Judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) 15 July 2026

JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Third Chamber)

15 July 2026 ( * )

( Action for annulment – Restrictive measures against Belarus – Prohibition on the purchase, import or transfer of potash products from Belarus – Prevention of the transit of potash from Belarus via the territory of Lithuania – Application seeking assessment of the legality of a provision that does not provide for restrictive measures against natural or legal persons within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 275 TFEU – Application for a direction to be issued – Partial lack of jurisdiction – Breach of procedural requirements – Time limit for bringing proceedings – Partial inadmissibility – Action for failure to act – No call to act – Inadmissibility )

In Case T‑261/24,

Birių Krovinių Terminalas UAB, established in Klaipėda (Lithuania), represented by V. Nikitinas and A. Staševskaja, lawyers,

applicant,

v

Council of the European Union, represented by B. Driessen and L. Berger, acting as Agents,

defendant,

supported by

Republic of Lithuania, represented by K. Dieninis, S. Grigonis, V. Vasiliauskienė and V. Kazlauskaitė-Švenčionienė, acting as Agents,

intervener,

THE GENERAL COURT (Third Chamber),

composed of K. Kowalik-Bańczyk, President, I. Reine and R. da Silva Passos (Rapporteur), Judges,

Registrar: V. Di Bucci,

having regard to the written part of the procedure,

having regard to the order of 19 May 2025, Birių Krovinių Terminalas v Council (T‑261/24, not published, EU:T:2025:540), dismissing the action in so far as it was directed against the European Commission, in part as inadmissible and in part as having been brought before a court lacking jurisdiction to hear and determine it,

having regard to the fact that no request for a hearing was submitted by the parties within three weeks after service of notification of the close of the written part of the procedure, and having decided to rule on the action without an oral part of the procedure, pursuant to Article 106(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court,

gives the following

Judgment

1 By its action, the applicant, Birių Krovinių Terminalas UAB, in essence, (i) under Article 263 TFEU, seeks annulment of Council Regulation (EC) No 765/2006 of 18 May 2006 concerning restrictive measures against President Lukashenko and certain officials of Belarus (OJ 2006 L 134, p. 1), as amended and supplemented, and of Council Decision 2012/642/CFSP of 15 October 2012 concerning restrictive measures against Belarus (OJ 2012 L 285, p. 1), as amended and supplemented, in so far as they concern the prohibition on the transfer of potassium chloride (potash) fertilisers from Belarus; and (ii) under Article 265 TFEU, asks the Court to declare that the Council of the European Union unlawfully refrained from taking, at the applicant’s request, any steps to remedy a number of infringements of international agreements and of EU law.

Background to the dispute

2 The applicant is a Lithuanian company specialising, inter alia, in the transshipment of potash products in the port of Klaipėda (Lithuania). Its business mainly involves the transit by rail of potash fertilisers from Belarus through the territory of Lithuania to third countries.

3 The present case arises in the context of the restrictive measures adopted by the European Union since 2004 in view of the situation in Belarus as regards democracy, the rule of law and human rights and the involvement of that State in actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.

4 In the light, in particular, of the persistent failure to respect human rights, democracy and the rule of law and the systematic repression of civil society and democratic opposition in Belarus, on 18 May 2006 the Council adopted, under Articles 75 and 215 TFEU, Regulation No 765/2006 imposing individual restrictive measures on President Lukashenko and certain officials of the Republic of Belarus. In addition, on 15 October 2012, it adopted, under Article 29 TEU, Decision 2012/642 supplementing that package of measures by, in particular, sectoral restrictive measures with a view to prohibiting the sale, supply, transfer or export to the Republic of Belarus of arms and related material.

5 In response to the Russian Federation’s illegal annexation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol in March 2014, on 17 March 2014 the Council adopted, inter alia, under Article 215 TFEU, Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 78, p. 6). Furthermore, on 31 July 2014 it adopted, on the same basis, Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 229, p. 1).

6 In parallel, in May 2014 the European Commission drew up and submitted to the Member States and to the Council’s Working Party of Foreign Relations Counsellors (RELEX) a document entitled ‘Guidance of May 2014’ (‘the May 2014 document’), by which it sought to clarify the term ‘transfer’ when used in relation to ‘transport’.

7 On 24 June 2021, the Council, by Decision (CFSP) 2021/1031 amending Decision 2012/642 (OJ 2021 L 224 I, p. 15) and by Regulation (EU) 2021/1030 amending Regulation No 765/2006 (OJ 2021 L 224 I, p. 1), inserted Article 2g and Article 1i in the latter decision and the latter regulation respectively, laying down a prohibition on the purchase, import or transfer of potash products from Belarus.

8 On 22 June 2022, the Commission adopted a document entitled ‘Consolidated FAQs on the implementation of Council Regulation No 833/2014 and Council Regulation No 269/2014’ (‘the contested FAQs’), which included, in particular, specific details on the interpretation of the term ‘transfer’ for the purpose of implementing the restrictive measures provided for in Regulations No 269/2014, No 833/2014 and, by analogy, No 765/2006.

9 On 24 February 2023, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2023/421 amending Decision 2012/642 (OJ 2023 L 61, p. 41). By that decision, the Council, first, extended the applicability of Decision 2012/642 until 28 February 2024 and, second, amended the list of persons, entities and bodies subject to restrictive measures in Annex I to that decision.

10 On 24 May 2023, the applicant brought an action seeking annulment of Article 2g(1) and (1a) of Decision 2012/642, and of Article 1i of and Annex VIII to Regulation No 765/2006, both as amended by Decision 2023/421.

11 On 12 September 2023 and 30 October 2023, the applicant sent two letters to the Commission calling on it to take the view, first, that the prohibition laid down in Article 1i of Regulation No 765/2006 did not apply to the transit of potash fertilisers through Lithuania, as a result, it claimed, of the infringement of several international agreements, and, second, that the Republic of Lithuania was in breach of its obligations under EU law.

12 Furthermore, on 29 January 2024, by a letter sent to the President of the European Council, the applicant asked, as its main request, that Regulation No 765/2006 be supplemented by provisions defining the term ‘transfer’ and establishing a derogation from the restrictive measure at issue. In the alternative, it requested the adoption of an explanatory measure.

13 By order of 6 December 2023, Birių Krovinių Terminalas v Council (T‑287/23, not published, EU:T:2023:793), the Court dismissed the applicant’s action referred to in paragraph 10 above as inadmissible.

14 By letters of 8 and 15 February 2024, the Commission replied to the applicant’s requests, stating, inter alia, that the sectoral prohibition at issue included the prohibition on the transit of Belarusian potash products and transport services in relation to such products and that that was not contrary to EU law.

15 By letter of 26 February 2024, the European Council replied to the applicant that responsibility for the implementation and interpretation of the restrictive measures lay with the competent national authorities of the Member States and the Commission and that, consequently, specific questions in that regard should be addressed to them.

16 On 26 February 2024, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2024/769 amending Decision 2012/642 (OJ L, 2024/769). By that decision, the Council, first, extended the applicability of Decision 2012/642 until 28 February 2025 and, second, amended the list of persons, entities and bodies subject to restrictive measures in Annex I to that decision.

17 On the same date, the Council adopted Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/768 implementing Article 8a of Regulation No 765/2006 (OJ L, 2024/768). By that regulation, it amended Annex I to Regulation No 765/2006 containing the list of persons, entities and bodies subject to restrictive measures.

Forms of order sought

18 The applicant claims, in essence, that the Court should:

– annul the contested FAQs and the May 2014 document as regards the interpretation and definition of the term ‘transfer’;

– declare that the Commission misused its powers by allowing and subsequently not withdrawing the interpretation of the term ‘transfer’ set out in those FAQs and that document;

– annul Regulation No 765/2006, as amended and supplemented, and Decision 2012/642, as amended and supplemented, in so far as they are incompatible with the provisions of international agreements and of EU law concerning restrictions on the transit of potash fertilisers from Belarus to third countries through the applicant’s port terminal;

– declare that the Council unlawfully refrained from taking, at the applicant’s request, any steps to remedy a number of infringements of international agreements and of other provisions of EU law;

– order the Council to adopt provisions pursuant to which the restrictive measures provided for in Regulation No 765/2006 and Decision 2012/642 do not apply to the transport by rail of potash products from Belarus through the territory of the European Union, between the Belarusian and Lithuanian borders and the applicant’s port terminal, or to other operations relating to transit to third countries, or to order the Council and the Commission to publish official guidelines or clarification in that regard;

– order the Council to pay the costs.

19 The Council, supported by the Republic of Lithuania, claims, in essence, that the Court should:

– dismiss the action as inadmissible or, in the alternative, as unfounded;

– order the applicant to pay the costs.

Law

The applicant’s first and second heads of claim

20 By its first head of claim, the applicant requests the Court to annul in part the contested FAQs and the May 2014 document.

21 By its second head of claim, the applicant requests the Court to declare that the Commission misused its powers by unlawfully adopting, under its power of legislative initiative, and subsequently not withdrawing, the interpretation of the term ‘transfer’ set out in the contested FAQs and the May 2014 document, in breach of Article 17(1) and Article 31(1) TEU.

22 The Council, supported by the Republic of Lithuania, submits that those heads of claim are inadmissible, which the applicant disputes. In the alternative, the applicant raises a plea of illegality under Article 277 TFEU in respect of the contested FAQs and the May 2014 document.

23 In the first place, it should be borne in mind at the outset that an action for annulment must be brought against the EU institution, body, office or agency that adopted the act in question (see order of 19 May 2025, Birių Krovinių Terminalas v Council, T‑261/24, not published, EU:T:2025:540, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited).

24 Accordingly, since the institution that adopted the contested FAQs and the May 2014 document is not the Council but the Commission, the Council cannot be designated as a defendant in relation to the first and second heads of claim.

25 In the second place, a plea, such as that in the present case, that an act of general application does not apply under Article 277 TFEU does not constitute an independent right of action and recourse may be had to it only as an incidental plea (order of 19 November 2018, Iccrea Banca v Commission and SRB , T‑494/17, EU:T:2018:804, paragraph 21).

26 Furthermore, it cannot be ascertained from the applicant’s arguments which acts should be annulled under Article 263 TFEU on account of the alleged unlawfulness of the contested FAQs and the May 2014 document. Nor does the applicant explain, therefore, to what extent those documents form the legal basis for the acts which it seeks to have annulled. Accordingly, it must be held that the applicant’s arguments do not meet the requirements of sufficient clarity and precision laid down in Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court.

27 In those circumstances, the present heads of claim must be rejected as inadmissible.

The applicant’s third head of claim

28 By the present head of claim, the applicant requests the Court, in essence, to annul in part Decision 2012/642 and Regulation No 765/2006, both as supplemented and amended, to the extent that they are incompatible with the provisions of international agreements and EU law regarding the restriction of the transit of potash fertilisers from Belarus to third countries through the BKT terminal (port of Klaipėda);

29 The Council, supported by the Republic of Lithuania, claims that, in the light of Article 275 TFEU, the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear and determine the application for annulment of Decision 2012/642. Next, it submits that the present head of claim is inadmissible under Article 76(d) and (e) of the Rules of Procedure, given that Regulation No 765/2006 has been amended on numerous occasions and that, in that context, the applicant has still not identified which provision of that regulation it seeks to have annulled. Last, the Council claims, in essence, that the third head of claim was submitted outside the time limit for bringing proceedings laid down in Article 263 TFEU.

30 The applicant refutes those arguments and notes that what is sought in the present head of claim seeks specifically to challenge the restriction on the transit of potash products from Belarus to third countries through its port terminal and that that prohibition is laid down in Article 1i of Regulation No 765/2006 and Article 2g of Decision 2012/642, as is explicitly evident from the application. It also submits that the claim in question is not out of time, since the action was brought within the time limit that ran from the date of publication of Decision 2024/769 and Implementing Regulation No 2024/768 in the Official Journal of the European Union .

31 In the first place, concerning the scope of the present head of claim, it is true that the applicant confines itself to seeking annulment of Regulation No 765/2006 and of Decision 2012/642, both as amended and supplemented, and does not specify which provisions within that regulation and of that decision it wishes to be annulled.

32 However, it is clear from the wording itself of the present head of claim that the applicant is seeking annulment of Regulation No 765/2006 and of Decision 2012/642 in so far as they establish the sectoral prohibition on transferring Belarusian potash products. That prohibition appears in Article 1i of that regulation and in Article 2g of that decision, which are both expressly cited in the application.

33 Furthermore, by way of its overview of the facts, the application refers to the Implementing Regulation 2024/768 and the Decision 2024/769 adopted by the Council on 26 February 2024.

34 It is therefore clear from the application that the applicant intended to refer to Article 1i of Regulation No 765/2006 and Article 2g of Decision 2012/642 as amended and supplemented by the Council, most recently, on 26 February 2024.

35 In the second place, as regards Decision 2012/642, that decision was adopted under Article 29 TEU, which is a provision relating to the ‘common foreign and security policy’ within the meaning of Article 275 TFEU. Moreover, the prohibition measures laid down by that decision are of a general nature, their scope being determined by reference to objective criteria and not by reference to identified natural or legal persons. Consequently, Article 2g of that decision is not a decision providing for ‘restrictive measures against natural or legal persons’ within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 275 TFEU. Accordingly, it must be concluded that, under the first paragraph of Article 275 TFEU, the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear and determine an action seeking to assess the legality of Article 2g of that decision.

36 In the third place, as regards Regulation No 765/2006, it should be borne in mind that, under the sixth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, an action for annulment must be brought within two months of the publication of the contested measure, or of its notification to the plaintiff, or, in the absence thereof, of the day on which it came to the knowledge of the latter, as the case may be.

37 Article 59 of the Rules of Procedure provides that where the time limit allowed for initiating proceedings against a measure adopted by an institution runs from the publication of that measure in the Official Journal, that time limit shall be calculated, for the purposes of Article 58(1)(a), from the end of the fourteenth day after such publication. In accordance with Article 60 of those rules, that time limit is, in addition, to be extended on account of distance by a single period of 10 days.

38 According to settled case-law, the time limit prescribed for bringing proceedings is a matter of public policy since it was established in order to ensure that legal positions are clear and certain and to avoid any discrimination or arbitrary treatment in the administration of justice, and the Courts of the European Union must ascertain of their own motion whether that time limit has been observed (see order of 24 June 2024, Druzyagin v Commission , T‑186/24, not published, EU:T:2024:427, paragraph 15 and the case-law cited).

39 In the present case, it should be noted, first, that Article 1i of Regulation No 765/2006, annulment of which the applicant is seeking in the present action, was inserted by Regulation 2021/1030 and was applicable without any time limit.

40 Second, the only amendment made to Regulation No 765/2006 on 26 February 2024 was that made by Implementing Regulation 2024/768. That amendment concerns only Annex I to Regulation No 765/2006, which consists of the list of persons, entities and bodies subject to the measures freezing funds and economic resources. As the applicant stated expressly in its written pleadings, it is not challenging the individual measures imposed on specific entities.

41 It follows that Article 1i of Regulation No 765/2006 was neither amended nor supplemented by the Council on 26 February 2024 and has subsequently remained unchanged. In that respect, it should be noted, first, that the time limit for bringing proceedings against Regulation 2021/1030 and, therefore, against that provision, had expired several years before the present proceedings were brought and, second, that the adoption of Implementing Regulation 2024/768 did not have the effect that a new time limit in which to bring proceedings to dispute the legality of that provision began to run for the applicant. Consequently, the applicant’s claims directed against the provision in question are out of time and, therefore, inadmissible.

42 In those circumstances, the present head of claim must be rejected, in part as having been brought before a court lacking jurisdiction to hear and determine it and in part as inadmissible.

The applicant’s fourth head of claim

43 By the present head of claim, the applicant criticises the Council for failing to act following its call to do so of 29 January 2024.

44 The Council, supported by the Republic of Lithuania, submits that the applicant’s call to act received a response on 26 February 2024. It then claims that the present head of claim is inadmissible because it was lodged more than two months and ten days after that response. It also observes that the request was in fact addressed to the President of the European Council rather than to the Council itself. The Republic of Lithuania claims that that circumstance is significant, because the applicant did not directly call upon the Council to act, contrary to Article 265 TFEU. It concludes as a result that, in those circumstances, an action pursuant to that provision could only be brought against the European Council, since the applicant submitted a call to act to that institution but not to the Council.

45 In the alternative, the Council claims that the present head of claim is unfounded. It states, in particular, in essence, that the applicant’s call to act concerns the implementation of the sectoral measure at issue and, as such, falls within the Commission’s competence rather than its own. Moreover, it submits that it cannot adopt the provisions requested by the applicant without a Commission proposal. It refutes that it is obliged to take a position on the interpretation of EU legislation. Last, it claims that the applicant could have challenged Regulation 2021/1030 but failed to do so and therefore can no longer challenge it in the present action.

46 The applicant disputes the arguments of the Council and of the Republic of Lithuania. It submits, first, that the present head of claim is admissible, because the Council confined itself to responding to the applicant by general statements, and that the Council’s letter of 26 February 2024 cannot therefore be regarded as a definition of the Council’s position within the meaning of Article 265 TFEU. It acknowledges that its call to act was formally addressed to the President of the European Council but submits that it was also sent to the official email address of the Council and that its examination fell within the competence of the Council. The applicant submits that both the Council and the Republic of Lithuania have accepted that the letter in question expressed the Council’s position on that call to act. Even assuming that it did not, the Council would in that case have failed to define its position on that call to act, and the applicant’s action for failure to act would also have been brought within the time limit.

47 Second, the applicant submits, in essence, that the principles of legal certainty, of transparency and of the legality of criminal offences and penalties required the Council to define the term ‘transfer’ clearly. It also claims that the Council has a duty to take all necessary measures to ensure fulfilment of the Treaty obligations and the consistency of the European Union’s policies and actions and to guarantee compliance with the principles of legality, subsidiarity, proportionality and providing reasons for acts. The applicant refers to an unlawfully broad definition of the term ‘transfer’, which has not been remedied by the Council. In that regard it relies on existing international agreements and the principles of legality, uniform application of EU rules and equal treatment.

48 It must be borne in mind that, pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 265 TFEU, an action for failure to act is admissible only if the institution in question has first been called upon to act. Giving the institution formal notice is an essential procedural requirement the effects of which are, first, to cause the two-month period within which the institution is required to define its position to begin to run and, secondly, to delimit any action that might be brought should the institution fail to define its position (order of 24 June 2016, Onix Asigurări v EIOPA , T‑590/15, EU:T:2016:374, paragraph 32).

49 In the present case, as the applicant acknowledges, its call to act was addressed to the President of the European Council. Accordingly, first, the applicant produced a postal receipt dated 29 January 2024, which shows the European Council as the only addressee. Second, it is clear from the letterhead of that call to act, the form of address and the wording of the applicant’s requests that the applicant was appealing expressly to the President of the European Council. Moreover, the Council does not appear even as being copied into that call to act.

50 Although the applicant states that its call to act was, in fact, sent to the Council’s official email address and therefore was indeed communicated to it, the applicant does not however support that statement with any evidence.

51 Furthermore, the letter from the European Council of 26 February 2024 was sent electronically to the applicant, by the cabinet of the President of the European Council. That letter was also signed by the head of cabinet of the President of the European Council.

52 In those circumstances, and even though the Council was competent to examine the applicant’s requests, it cannot be found to have been called upon to act by the applicant. Nor can it be found that the Council answered the applicant, even indirectly, in the letter from the European Council of 26 February 2024.

53 Accordingly, in the light of the case-law cited in paragraph 48 above, it should be found that the requirements laid down in Article 265 TFEU are not satisfied and that, consequently, the fourth head of claim is inadmissible.

54 In any event, even assuming that the applicant had sent the call to act to the Council, pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 265 TFEU, it should be borne in mind that, in order to rule on the substance of a claim of failure to act, it is necessary for the Court to determine whether, at the time of the call to act, the institution in question was under a duty to act in the manner requested by the applicant in that request (see, to that effect, order of 17 July 2020, Wagenknecht v European Council , T‑715/19, EU:T:2020:340, paragraph 34).

55 In that regard, first, it should be borne in mind that the Council has a broad discretion in areas, such as the area of restrictive measures, which involve the making by that institution of political, economic and social choices, and in which it is called upon to undertake complex assessments (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 March 2017, Rosneft , C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraph 113 and the case-law cited).

56 Second it should be noted that, under Article 215 TFEU, the Council acts on a joint proposal from the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Commission. In the present case, in the absence of any such joint proposal to amend Regulation No 765/2006, the Council could not act on its own initiative.

57 Third, contrary to the applicant’s claim, neither Article 4(3) TEU nor Article 19(1) of the annex to Council Decision 2009/937/EU of 1 December 2009 adopting the Council’s Rules of Procedure (OJ 2009 L 325, p. 35) required the Council to adopt an explanatory measure or to amend an existing regulation, such as Regulation No 765/2006.

58 Fourth, the explanatory measures taken by the Commission in relation to the concept of ‘transfer’ in Regulation No 833/2014 or by means of the guidelines comprising document 15579/03 were likewise not such as to give rise to an obligation on the Council to adopt an explanatory measure or to supplement Regulation No 765/2006 in relation to the restrictive measure in question. Suffice it to note, first, that the restrictive measures laid down by Regulation No 833/2014 apply to the Russian Federation and are separate from the restrictive measures applied in respect of the Republic of Belarus. Second, the guidelines comprising document 15579/03 merely state that it may be necessary to address the definition of the term ‘transit’. In any event, those guidelines are only general recommendations and have no binding legal effect (see, to that effect, judgment of 1 June 2022, Prigozhin v Council , T‑723/20, not published, EU:T:2022:317, paragraph 78).

59 In those circumstances, the Council had no obligation to act, with the effect that the present head of claim is, in any event, unfounded.

60 It follows from the foregoing that the present head of claim must be rejected.

The applicant’s fifth head of claim

61 By the present head of claim, the applicant asks the Court to order the Council to adopt certain provisions.

62 The Council submits that the applicant’s request under the present head of claim is inadmissible. The applicant has not responded to those arguments.

63 In the present case, it should be noted, as the Council has observed, that the present head of claim appears to be seeking an injunction.

64 It is settled case-law that the Court has no jurisdiction to issue directions to the EU institutions or to the Member States (see order of 19 May 2025, Birių Krovinių Terminalas v Council, T‑261/24, not published, EU:T:2025:540, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited).

65 Consequently, the present head of claim must be rejected on the ground that the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear and determine it.

66 It follows from the foregoing that the action must be dismissed, in part as having been brought before a court that lacks jurisdiction to hear and determine it, in part as inadmissible and in part as in any event unfounded.

Costs

67 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

68 Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the Council, in accordance with the form of order sought by the latter.

69 In accordance with Article 138(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the Republic of Lithuania must bear its own costs.

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (Third Chamber)

hereby:

1. Dismisses the action;

2. Orders Birių Krovinių Terminalas UAB to bear, in addition to its own costs, those incurred by the Council of the European Union;

3. Orders the Republic of Lithuania to bear its own costs.

Kowalik-Bańczyk | Reine | da Silva Passos

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 15 July 2026.

V. Di Bucci | | S. Papasavvas

Registrar | | President

* Language of the case: English.