ext/celex/62024TJ0479

JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Tenth Chamber)

15 April 2026 ( * )

( Arbitration clause – Research and technological development – Horizon 2020 Framework Programme for Research and Innovation (2014-2020) – Grant agreement – TICASS project – Final audit report – Costs relating to seconded staff members – Ineligible costs – Letter confirming the recovery of part of the sums paid under the grant agreement – Debit note – Reclassification of the action – Recovery of sums paid – Legitimate expectations – Counterclaim )

In Case T‑479/24,

Stowarzyszenie Edukacja, Nauka, Kultura, established in Szczecin (Poland), represented by R. Jakubowski, lawyer,

applicant,

v

European Research Executive Agency (REA), represented by S. Payan-Lagrou and V. Canetti, acting as Agents, and by M. Le Berre, lawyer,

defendant,

THE GENERAL COURT (Tenth Chamber),

composed of S.L. Kalėda, President, T. Perišin (Rapporteur) and S. Verschuur, Judges,

Registrar: V. Di Bucci,

having regard to the order of 25 November 2024, Edukacja, Nauka, Kultura v REA , T‑479/24 R, not published, EU:T:2024:861,

having regard to the written part of the procedure,

having regard to the fact that no request for a hearing was submitted by the parties within three weeks after service of notification of the close of the written part of the procedure, and having decided to rule on the action without an oral part of the procedure, pursuant to Article 106(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court,

gives the following

Judgment

1 By its action under Article 272 TFEU, the applicant, Stowarzyszenie Edukacja, Nauka, Kultura, seeks, first, annulment of debit note No 3242409862 of 16 July 2024 (‘the contested debit note’) for an amount of EUR 135 000 issued by the European Research Executive Agency (REA) on the basis of Grant Agreement No 734602, entitled ‘Technologies of Imaging in Communication, Art, and Social Sciences’ (‘the grant agreement’), second, annulment of the letter Ares (2024) 5169556 of 16 July 2024 (‘the contested letter’), by which the REA notified its decision relating to the recovery of that amount, and, third, a declaration that the costs declared ineligible by that agency in that amount are eligible costs.

2 REA’s counterclaim seeks payment by the applicant of the sum of EUR 135 000, as set out in the contested debit note, together with applicable costs and interests.

Background to the dispute and events subsequent to the bringing of the action

Background

3 The applicant is a non-profit association established under Polish law and active in the field of education, science and culture.

4 The REA is an executive agency established to manage EU action in the field of research. Pursuant to Article 4(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 58/2003 of 19 December 2002 laying down the statute for executive agencies to be entrusted with certain tasks in the management of Community programmes (OJ 2003 L 11, p. 1), it has legal personality, enjoys in each of the Member States the most extensive legal capacity and may, in particular, be a party to legal proceedings.

5 Between 14 July 2009 and 9 October 2015, A, B, C, D and E (‘the researchers’) joined the applicant as members.

6 On 19 December 2016, following the call for proposals ‘H2020-MSCA-RISE-2016’ for Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions under the Horizon 2020 Framework Programme for Research and Innovation (2014-2020), the applicant, as a beneficiary, entered into the grant agreement, which related to the implementation of the project ‘Technologies of Imaging in Communication, Art, and Social Sciences’ (‘the TICASS project’). The purpose of the TICASS project was to introduce visual culture into educational programmes in order to enable students to interpret visual communications in social spaces. Among the other beneficiaries of the grant agreement was the Polish University Abroad (‘PUNO’), established in London (United Kingdom).

7 On 2 January 2017, the researchers each signed an agreement with the applicant for the continuation of scientific and research cooperation by which they undertook to conclude a further separate agreement with the applicant in order to specify the limits of their temporary cooperation on the TICASS project.

8 On 1 April 2017, each of the researchers concluded a volunteering agreement with the applicant providing that their participation in the TICASS project activities would be unpaid and subject to the provisions of the Polish Civil Code and the Polish law on activities in the public interest and volunteering.

9 On 28 April 2017, F concluded an agreement with PUNO, which was extended, in the context of his participation as a researcher seconded to the TICASS project.

The grant agreement

10 In accordance with Article 3 of the grant agreement, the implementation of the project was to begin on 1 May 2017 for a duration of 48 months.

11 Under Articles 5.1 and 5.2 of the grant agreement, the maximum grant amount is EUR 630 000, which corresponds to the estimated eligible costs that are reimbursed at the rate of 100%.

12 Under Article 6.2 of the grant agreement, costs are eligible subject to compliance with the specific conditions relating to costs of seconded staff members and to institutional costs referred to in that provision and with the general conditions laid down in Article 6.1 of that agreement.

13 According to Article 6.2.A(b)(ii) of the grant agreement, the costs of seconded staff members are eligible if, at the date of secondment, they have been actively engaged in, or linked to, research and innovation activities for at least six months at the beneficiary or a partner organisation. The annotated model grant agreement drawn up by the European Commission (‘the annotated model grant agreement’) specifies, with regard to the type of relationship needed between a beneficiary and seconded staff members, that the beneficiary must have the necessary legal means in terms of controls and instructions to ensure the implementation of the activities in line with the obligations under the grant agreement.

14 Under Article 22.1.3 of the grant agreement, the REA or the Commission may carry out audits on the proper implementation of the project and compliance with the obligations under that agreement.

15 Article 22.5.1 of the grant agreement provides that findings made in the course of checks, reviews, audits or investigations may lead, inter alia, to the rejection of ineligible costs and the recovery of amounts unduly paid.

16 Under Article 42.1.1 of the grant agreement, the REA will reject any costs which are ineligible in the light of Article 6 of that agreement, entitled ‘Eligible and ineligible costs’, in particular following checks, reviews, audits or investigations.

17 According to Article 44.1.3 of the grant agreement, applicable to the recovery of amounts after payment of the balance, if, for a beneficiary, the revised final grant amount is lower than its share of the final grant amount, it must repay the difference to the REA.

A udit procedure

18 On 27 and 28 May 2021, the REA, through an audit firm, conducted an independent verification of PUNO’s financial statements for the period from 1 May 2017 to 30 April 2019. The findings of that audit did not give rise to any adjustment decisions.

19 From 22 to 24 March 2023, the REA, through another audit firm (‘the independent auditor’), conducted an independent verification of the applicant’s financial statements for the period from 1 May 2017 to 3 October 2021.

20 On 15 September 2023, the independent auditor sent the preliminary audit report to the applicant.

21 In the preliminary audit report, the independent auditor found, in paragraph 12.2, entitled ‘Findings’, in paragraph 1 thereof, headed ‘Ineligible costs’, that the applicant had not been able to provide supporting documentation that made it possible to verify that the seconded staff members, who were researchers, had, at the time of the secondment, been actively engaged in or linked to research and innovation activities for at least six months with the applicant or a partner organisation, in accordance with Article 6.2.A(b)(ii) of the grant agreement.

22 In addition, the independent auditor stated, in paragraph 12.2(1) of the preliminary audit report, that the applicant did not fulfil the condition laid down in Article 6.2.A(b)(ii) of the annotated model grant agreement as regards the type of relationship required between the beneficiary and the seconded staff members. In that regard, the independent auditor considered that the volunteering contracts submitted by the applicant did not confer on the latter the necessary legal means in terms of controls and instructions to ensure the implementation of the activities in line with the obligations under the grant agreement.

23 The findings of the independent auditor resulted, in point 1.1 of the preliminary audit report, entitled ‘Audit findings and adjustments’, in an adjustment in favour of the grant authority’s budget in the amount of EUR 60 000 for costs related to the recruitment of researchers as seconded staff and EUR 75 000 for institutional costs, in accordance with Articles 6.2.A and 6.2.B of the grant agreement and the annotated model grant agreement.

24 By letter of 16 October 2023, the applicant submitted its observations in response to the findings of the independent auditor in the preliminary audit report on the involvement of the researchers and on the nature of its relationship with them. In that regard, it stated that it had the necessary legal means in terms of control and instruction to ensure the activities of the TICASS project are carried out in line with the obligations under the grant agreement.

25 On 13 February 2024, the final audit report was communicated to the applicant; it confirmed the findings of the preliminary audit report regarding the ineligibility, first, of the costs relating to the recruitment of researchers as seconded staff members and, second, of the institutional costs, as is apparent from paragraph 23 above.

26 In Part 4 of the final audit report, entitled ‘Analysis of beneficiary’s comments’, the independent auditor noted, in response to the applicant’s observations, that the volunteering contracts did not specify minimum working time and that no record of the hours worked by the researchers had been provided. In that regard, the independent auditor took the view that the documents submitted by the applicant did not enable it to identify the periods and the number of hours and days worked on research activities by the persons concerned by the audit. In that respect, the independent auditor stated that it could not verify, in accordance with Article 6.2.A(b)(ii) of the grant agreement and the annotated model grant agreement, that the condition relating to the active engagement of seconded staff members in research and innovation activities six months before the start of the secondment at a level equivalent to full time had been fulfilled.

27 Furthermore, the independent auditor confirmed its findings, based on Article 6.2.A(b)(ii) of the annotated model grant agreement, that the volunteering contracts did not provide the applicant with the necessary legal means in terms of control and instruction to ensure the implementation of the activities in line with the obligations under the grant agreement.

R ecovery procedure

28 By pre-information letter of 25 April 2024, the REA sent the applicant a document entitled ‘Audit implementation calculation sheet’ and notified it of its intention to initiate a recovery procedure for the sum of EUR 135 000.

29 By letter of 24 May 2024, the applicant submitted its observations in response to the pre-information letter of 25 April 2024.

30 On 16 July 2024, the REA sent the applicant the contested letter and the contested debit note (‘the contested acts’) regarding the amount of EUR 135 000 to be recovered. The contested letter was accompanied by a list of arguments, from which it is apparent that the REA, at the end of the adversarial procedure, maintained its position expressed in the pre-information letter as regards the findings of the independent auditor and the recovery of the amount at issue.

31 By letter of 30 September 2024, the Commission sent a letter of formal notice to the applicant regarding payment of the sum of EUR 135 000, together with the sum of EUR 1 318.56 by way of late-payment interest.

Forms of order sought

32 The applicant claims that the Court should:

– annul the contested acts;

– declare that the excluded costs are eligible costs under the grant agreement and that the REA is not entitled to recover the sum of EUR 135 000;

– order the REA to pay the costs.

33 The REA contends that the Court should:

– dismiss the action as unfounded;

– uphold its counterclaim and order the applicant to pay the sum of EUR 135 000 together with applicable costs and interests;

– order the applicant to pay the costs.

Law

Preliminary observations

The legal basis for the action

34 As a preliminary point, it should be noted that it is for the applicant to choose the legal basis of its action (see judgments of 15 March 2005, Spain v Eurojust , C‑160/03, EU:C:2005:168, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited, and of 20 May 2019, Fundación Tecnalia Research & Innovation v REA , T‑104/18, not published, EU:T:2019:345, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited).

35 However, as is apparent from the applicant’s pleadings, the applicant explicitly based its action on Articles 263 and 272 TFEU, without specifying the consequences of that choice in relation to the first and second heads of claim in so far as they seek, first, annulment of the contested acts and, second, in essence, a declaration that the claim made by the REA under the grant agreement does not exist.

36 In that regard, Article 57.2 of the grant agreement provides as follows:

‘If a dispute concerning the interpretation, application or validity of the Agreement cannot be settled amicably, the General Court – or, on appeal, the Court of Justice of the European Union – has sole jurisdiction. Such actions must be brought under Article 272 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU). If a dispute concerns administrative or financial penalties, offsetting or an enforceable decision under Article 299 TFEU (see Articles 44, 45 and 46), the beneficiaries must bring action before the General Court – or, on appeal, the Court of Justice of the European Union – under Article 263 TFEU. Actions against enforceable decisions must be brought against the Commission (not against the Agency).’

37 In that respect, it should be recalled that Article 272 TFEU is a specific provision allowing the courts of the European Union to be seised under an arbitration clause agreed by the parties for contracts governed by either public or private law, and without restriction as regards the nature of the action to be brought before the Courts of the European Union (see judgment of 25 June 2020, SC v Eulex Kosovo , C‑730/18 P, EU:C:2020:505, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).

38 In addition, it is clear from settled case-law that an action for annulment based on Article 263 TFEU must be available in the case of all measures adopted by the institutions, whatever their nature or form, which are intended to have legal effects capable of affecting the interests of the applicant by bringing about a distinct change in his or her legal position (see judgment of 25 June 2020, SC v Eulex Kosovo , C‑730/18 P, EU:C:2020:505, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).

39 Nevertheless, where there is a contract between the applicant and one of the EU institutions, an action may be brought before the EU judicature on the basis of Article 263 TFEU only where the contested measure aims to produce binding legal effects falling outside of the contractual relationship between the parties and which involve the exercise of the prerogatives of a public authority conferred on the contracting institution acting in its capacity as an administrative authority (see judgment of 16 July 2020, ADR Center v Commission , C‑584/17 P, EU:C:2020:576, paragraph 65 and the case-law cited).

40 The Court has also specified that a debit note or a formal notice, the purpose of which is to recover a debt on the basis of the grant agreement concerned, and which includes an indication of a due date and also the payment terms of the debt that they establish, cannot be equated to an enforcement order as such, even if it refers to enforcement pursuant to Article 299 TFEU as a possible option among others open to the Commission where a party fails to perform an obligation by the delivery date laid down (judgment of 16 July 2020, ADR Center v Commission , C‑584/17 P, EU:C:2020:576, paragraph 66).

41 It follows that such a debit note or formal notice does not produce legal effects stemming from the exercise of prerogatives of public authority, but must, rather, be regarded as inseparable from the contractual relationship between the applicant and the EU institution, body, office or agency concerned.

42 It is in the light of the case-law cited in paragraphs 37 to 41 above that it is necessary, therefore, to examine whether the applicant’s claims submitted in the context of the first and second heads of claim come within the scope of proceedings for annulment under Article 263 TFEU or whether, on the contrary, they are contractual in nature.

43 In the present case, in the first place, it should be noted that the second head of claim seeks a declaration that the contractual debt claimed by means of the contested acts does not exist and to enable the applicant to retain in full the financial assistance granted to it for performance of its obligations under the grant agreement. In those circumstances, the second head of claim must be regarded as being based on Article 272 TFEU and as coming within the scope of a contractual dispute.

44 In the second place, as regards the first head of claim, by which the applicant seeks the annulment of the contested acts, the following must be noted.

45 First, as regards the contested letter, the Court notes that the REA informed the applicant that, on the basis of Article 22 of the grant agreement and for the reasons referred to in the list of arguments attached to that letter, it maintained its position expressed in the pre-information letter of 25 April 2024. That letter also contained the ‘Audit implementation calculation sheet’ which referred to an amount of EUR 135 000 to be recovered. On the basis of those results, the REA stated in the contested letter that, since the revised final amount of the applicant’s grant was less than the final grant amount at the time of payment of the balance, it intended to recover the difference, that is to say EUR 135 000, by means of the contested debit note.

46 In view of the above, the content of the contested letter leads to the conclusion that the REA did not act, in the present case, by using its prerogatives as a public authority, but by implementing the rights and obligations stemming from the grant agreement. Indeed, it is clear from that letter that the applicant is being given formal notice to perform a contractual obligation under the grant agreement in question and that, consequently, that act is not among the measures which may be annulled by the EU courts under the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU.

47 Second, as regards the contested debit note, which fixes the amount to be recovered on the basis of the grant agreement and the payment period relating thereto, it is apparent from paragraphs 39 to 41 above that an action brought against such a debit note cannot validly be brought before the EU judicature on the basis of Article 263 TFEU, since that note forms part of a purely contractual framework, from which it is inseparable, and does not produce binding legal effects going beyond those flowing from the grant agreement and involving the exercise of the prerogatives of a public authority conferred on the REA in its capacity as an administrative authority.

48 In those circumstances, it must be concluded that the first head of claim, by seeking the annulment of the contested acts referred to therein, comes within a purely contractual framework since it constitutes, although it precedes it, an extension of the second head of claim, which seeks, in essence, a declaration that the contractual debt claimed by means of those acts on the basis of the grant agreement does not exist, and to enable the applicant to retain in full the financial assistance granted to it for performance of its obligations under that agreement.

49 Accordingly, notwithstanding the use of terminology characteristic of actions brought on the basis of Article 263 TFEU, the first head of claim does not seek the annulment of acts within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, but must be regarded as being based on Article 272 TFEU, as coming within the scope of a contractual dispute and as being indissociable from the second head of claim (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 December 2022, Green Power Technologies v Key Digital Technologies Joint Undertaking , T‑533/20, not published, EU:T:2022:805, paragraphs 35 to 37, 39 and 40).

50 In the light of all the foregoing considerations, it must be concluded that the present action must be interpreted as having been brought exclusively on the basis of Article 272 TFEU.

The jurisdiction of the General Court

51 The General Court has jurisdiction to rule on the present action in accordance with Article 272 TFEU and the arbitration clause in Article 57.2 of the grant agreement, which confers jurisdiction on the General Court to rule on any dispute concerning the interpretation, application or validity of that agreement.

52 The General Court also has jurisdiction, on the same basis, to give judgment on the REA’s counterclaim. Indeed, in accordance with the case-law, the jurisdiction of the General Court, on the date when the action is brought, to hear and determine an action brought on the basis of an arbitration clause necessarily implies jurisdiction to deal with a counterclaim made by an institution in the context of the same action which derives from the contractual relationship or the situation on which the main application is based or has a direct link with the obligations deriving therefrom (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 July 2014, Isotis v Commission , T‑59/11, EU:T:2014:679, paragraph 265 and the case-law cited). As with the applicant’s action, the REA’s counterclaim seeking reimbursement of all the sums unduly paid to the applicant under the grant agreement plus late-payment interest arises from the contractual relationship established between the parties by that same agreement.

The applicable law

53 It must be observed that, when seised under an arbitration clause pursuant to Article 272 TFEU, the Court must resolve the dispute on the basis of the substantive law applicable to the contract (judgment of 4 February 2016, Isotis v Commission , T‑562/13, not published, EU:T:2016:63, paragraph 51; see also judgment of 20 May 2019, Fundación Tecnalia Research & Innovation v REA , T‑104/18, not published, EU:T:2019:345, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited), namely, in the present case, principally, in the light of the provisions of the grant agreement, the provisions of EU acts relating to the Horizon 2020 Framework Programme, those of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and repealing Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 (OJ 2012 L 298, p. 1), in the version applicable to the facts of the case, and the other rules arising from EU law, and, in the alternative, in the light of Belgian law, in accordance with Article 57.1 of the grant agreement.

54 In addition, the procedural rules governing the financial audit are laid down by Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation No 966/2012 (OJ 2018 L 193, p. 1), Article 282 of which provides for its entry into force and application with effect from 2 August 2018.

55 Lastly, it should be noted that when EU institutions, bodies, offices or agencies perform a contract, they remain subject to their obligations under the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the general principles of EU law (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 July 2020, ADR Center v Commission , C‑584/17 P, EU:C:2020:576, paragraph 86). Thus, if the parties decide, in their contract, to confer on the EU judicature, by means of an arbitration clause, jurisdiction over disputes relating to that contract, that judicature will have jurisdiction, independently of the applicable law stipulated in that contract, to examine any infringement of that charter or of the general principles of EU law (judgment of 16 July 2020, Inclusion Alliance for Europe v Commission , C‑378/16 P, EU:C:2020:575, paragraph 81).

The main action

56 In support of its action, the applicant raises four pleas in law, alleging, first and second, in essence, misinterpretation and misapplication of Article 6.2.A(b)(ii) of the annotated model grant agreement, third, misapplication of Article 6.2 of the grant agreement and, fourth, breach of the principles of equal treatment and protection of legitimate expectations.

57 In that respect, it must be recalled that, according to a fundamental principle governing EU financial aid, the European Union can subsidise only expenses which have actually been incurred. It follows from that principle that it is not sufficient for the beneficiary of the aid to show that a project has been carried out for the allocation of a specific grant to be justified. The beneficiary of the aid must, in addition, produce evidence that it has incurred the expenses declared in accordance with the conditions laid down for the award of the grant or financial aid concerned, with only those expenses which are properly justified being capable of being regarded as eligible. Its obligation to satisfy the prescribed financial commitments is an essential commitment and, accordingly, determines the allocation of the EU grant (see judgment of 21 December 2021, Datax v REA , T‑381/20, not published, EU:T:2021:932, paragraph 52 and the case-law cited). With regard to staff costs in particular, according to the case-law, those costs can be reimbursed to the party declaring the costs to the EU institution, body, office or agency concerned for the award of an EU financial contribution only if that party has demonstrated, inter alia, that they were actually incurred as well as their link to the grant agreement in question (see judgment of 21 December 2021, Datax v REA , T‑381/20, not published, EU:T:2021:932, paragraph 56 and the case-law cited).

58 It is only if the party that has declared the costs adduces such evidence by relying on working time records and other relevant information that it is for the EU institution, body, office or agency concerned to demonstrate that the expenditure at issue must be excluded, justifying its rejection, in particular, on the grounds that the time records are not correct or credible (see judgment of 21 December 2021, Datax v REA , T‑381/20, not published, EU:T:2021:932, paragraph 57 and the case-law cited).

59 Consequently, where an audit report contains specific indications capable of giving rise to doubt as to whether the working time declared satisfies the eligibility conditions, it is for the beneficiary of the grant to prove that those conditions have, on the contrary, been complied with. An audit report must, in that regard, be analysed as evidence justifying the ineligibility of expenditure if it is based on concrete evidence (see judgment of 22 January 2019, EKETA v Commission , T‑198/17, not published, EU:T:2019:27, paragraph 50 and the case-law cited). The presence of concrete evidence of a risk that the conditions for the eligibility of expenditure are not satisfied is sufficient for the burden of proof to remain on the beneficiary (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 October 2020, EKETA v Commission , C‑273/19 P, not published, EU:C:2020:852, paragraphs 74 to 77).

60 It is in the light of those observations that the Court must examine the applicant’s various pleas in law.

61 In that respect, the Court considers it appropriate to examine the third plea, then the first and second pleas together and, lastly, the fourth plea.

The third plea in law, alleging misapplication of Article 6.2 of the grant agreement

62 By its third plea in law, the applicant submits, in essence, that Article 6.2 of the grant agreement cannot constitute a legal basis for finding that the costs declared in respect of the TICASS project are ineligible. According to the applicant, Article 6.3 of the grant agreement, which defines the concept of ‘ineligible costs’, makes no mention of Article 6.2 of that agreement.

63 The REA disputes the applicant’s claims.

64 Article 6.2 of the grant agreement, entitled ‘Specific conditions for costs to be eligible’, provides that ‘costs are eligible, if they comply with the general conditions … and the specific conditions set out below for each of the following two budget categories’. Those two categories concern costs relating to seconded staff members (Article 6.2.A) and institutional costs (Article 6.2.B).

65 By the words ‘general conditions’, Article 6.2 refers to Article 6.1 of the grant agreement, entitled ‘General conditions for costs to be eligible’.

66 Lastly, Article 6.3 of the grant agreement states, under subparagraph (a), that ‘ineligible costs’ are costs that do not comply with the general eligibility conditions set out in Article 6.1 of that agreement.

67 In the present case, as is apparent from the final audit report and from the list of arguments enclosed with the contested letter, the REA considered that the costs declared by the applicant in respect of seconded staff members were ineligible, inter alia, on the basis of Article 6.2.A(b)(ii) of the grant agreement, the content of which is set out in paragraph 13 above.

68 Although, as the applicant observes, Article 6.3 of the grant agreement does not expressly refer to Article 6.2, it is apparent from paragraphs 64 and 65 above that the costs declared under that provision must necessarily comply, in addition to the specific conditions for the eligibility of costs referred to therein, with the general conditions laid down in Article 6.1 of the grant agreement.

69 It follows that the eligibility of costs coming under Article 6.2 of the grant agreement entails verification that they comply, first, with the general conditions laid down in Article 6.1 of that agreement and, second, with the specific conditions for the eligibility of costs relating to seconded staff members (Article 6.2.A) and institutional costs (Article 6.2.B) of that agreement.

70 In that regard, the fact that Article 6.3 of the grant agreement does not expressly refer to non-compliance with the conditions set out in Article 6.2.A and 6.2.B of that agreement does not affect the application of the eligibility conditions referred to in those provisions and cannot lead to the conclusion that the costs the eligibility of which is disputed in the present case are eligible.

71 Indeed, it is apparent from the general scheme of the grant agreement and from the principles referred to in paragraph 57 above that the beneficiary of the aid is required to produce evidence that it has incurred the costs declared in accordance with the conditions laid down for the award of the grant or financial assistance concerned, with only those costs which are properly justified being capable of being regarded as eligible.

72 Those principles are reflected in particular in Articles 17 and 18 of the grant agreement. According to Article 17.1, the beneficiaries must provide any information requested in order to verify the eligibility of all the costs declared. Article 18.1 provides that the beneficiaries must keep the supporting documentation necessary to prove the eligibility of the costs. It therefore follows from the provisions of the grant agreement that the REA had to be in a position to determine with certainty whether all of the costs declared by the applicant were genuine, necessary and had actually been incurred in respect of the implementation of the project during the course thereof.

73 In that regard, as is apparent from paragraph 26 above, the independent auditor took the view in the final audit report, inter alia, that the documents submitted by the applicant did not enable it to identify the periods and number of hours and days devoted to the research activities by the persons concerned by the audit. In that respect, the independent auditor stated that it could not verify, in accordance with Article 6.2.A(b)(ii) of the grant agreement, that the condition relating to the active involvement of seconded staff members in research and innovation activities six months before the start of the secondment at a level equivalent to full time had been fulfilled.

74 In those circumstances, the REA was fully entitled to rely, inter alia, on Article 6.2.A(b)(ii) of the grant agreement in order to find that the costs declared by the applicant as regards the seconded staff members were ineligible.

75 Accordingly, the third plea in law must be rejected as unfounded.

The first and second pleas in law, alleging, in essence, misinterpretation and misapplication of Article 6.2.A(b)(ii) of the annotated model grant agreement

76 By its first and second pleas in law, the applicant claims that the REA misinterpreted and misapplied Article 6.2.A(b)(ii) of the annotated model grant agreement.

77 The applicant submits that the REA excluded the possibility of using volunteering contracts for the engagement of seconded staff, whereas the grant agreement and its annotated model did not prohibit their use. In its view, the REA did not examine the content of the legal relationships between the applicant and the researchers in the light, in particular, of Polish law on associations, activities in the public interest and volunteering.

78 In that respect, the applicant submits that the REA did not indicate which provisions of the membership declarations, agreements for the continuation of scientific and research cooperation and volunteering contracts were in breach of the requirements of the grant agreement. In that regard, the nature of the researchers’ membership relationship with the applicant and the agreements signed gave the applicant the necessary legal means in terms of controls and instructions to ensure the implementation of the activities covered by the grant agreement, in accordance with Article 6.2.A(b)(ii) of the annotated model of that agreement.

79 The REA disputes the applicant’s claims.

80 It should be borne in mind that the EU judicature may reject a plea or complaint as ineffective where it finds that it is not capable, in the event that it is well founded, of calling into question the findings of an audit report relating to the ineligibility of costs declared under a grant agreement (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgments of 21 September 2000, EFMA v Council , C‑46/98 P, EU:C:2000:474, paragraph 38, and of 19 November 2009, Michail v Commission , T‑50/08 P, EU:T:2009:457, paragraph 59).

81 In the present case, it should be noted that the REA relied, in the list of arguments enclosed with the contested letter, on the findings of the final audit report in order to justify the ineligibility of the costs relating to seconded staff members and, more specifically, on the failure to comply with the conditions set out in Article 6.2.A(b)(ii) of the grant agreement and the annotated model grant agreement.

82 In that regard, it is apparent, in essence, from point 1.1, entitled ‘Audit findings and adjustments’ and point 12.2, entitled ‘Findings’ as well as from Part 4, entitled ‘Analysis of beneficiary’s comments’, of the final audit report, on which the REA relies, that the decision to recover the amount at issue is based on two separate grounds.

83 Under the first ground, the independent auditor took the view that the applicant had not been able to provide supporting documentation to verify that the seconded staff members (the researchers) had been actively engaged in or linked to research and innovation activities for at least six months within its organisation or within a partner organisation, in accordance with Article 6.2.A(b)(ii) of the grant agreement (see paragraphs 13 and 26 above).

84 Under the second ground, the independent auditor considered that the applicant did not meet the condition laid down in Article 6.2.A(b)(ii) of the annotated model grant agreement (see paragraphs 13 and 27 above) as regards the type of relationship required between itself and the researchers. More specifically, the independent auditor considered that the volunteering contracts did not confer on the applicant the necessary legal means in terms of controls and instructions to ensure the implementation of the activities in line with the obligations under the grant agreement.

85 However, although the applicant did in fact dispute the findings of the independent auditor relating to the first ground, described in paragraph 83 above, during the pre-litigation stage, and submitted observations in that regard, the fact remains that it did not raise any argument in its application calling into question the findings of the final audit report relating to that same ground, which were reproduced, inter alia, by the REA in the list of arguments enclosed with the contested letter.

86 Conversely, it should be noted that the arguments put forward by the applicant in support of the first and second pleas focus on challenging the second ground, in so far as they seek, in essence, to demonstrate that the applicant did have, in the circumstances, the necessary legal means in terms of control and instruction to ensure the implementation of the activities covered by the grant agreement, in accordance with Article 6.2.A(b)(ii) of the annotated model of that agreement.

87 Even if the arguments challenging the merits of the second ground, described in paragraph 84 above, were upheld, that would have no bearing on the validity and persistence of the first ground, which, together with the second ground, forms the basis of the REA’s decision to recover the amount at issue which gave rise to the contested acts.

88 It follows from the foregoing that the first and second pleas in law must be rejected as ineffective.

The fourth plea in law, alleging breach of the principles of equal treatment and protection of legitimate expectations

89 The fourth plea in law is divided, in essence, into two parts, the first alleging breach of the principle of equal treatment and the second alleging breach of the principle of protection of legitimate expectations.

90 The REA disputes the applicant’s claims.

– The first part, alleging a breach of the principle of equal treatment

91 By the first part of the fourth plea, the applicant submits in particular that the REA infringed the principle of equal treatment in that non-uniform criteria were applied in the context of the audits carried out by the REA in order to assess the implementation of the TICASS project, which led to inconsistencies in the assessment of the costs declared by the applicant as compared to those declared by PUNO. More specifically, the applicant claims that the auditors did not raise any objections with regard to the legal relationship between PUNO and its seconded staff members, whereas those relationships were of a voluntary nature.

92 It should be borne in mind that the principle of equal treatment is infringed where comparable situations are treated differently or different situations are treated in the same way, unless such difference in treatment is objectively justified. It follows that, where the beneficiaries of a grant or financial aid are in comparable situations, the European Union, or the institution representing it, cannot treat them differently when they exercise their contractual rights, a fortiori when the essential conditions for the award of the grant or financial aid concerned are at issue (see judgment of 8 September 2015, Amitié v Commission , T‑234/12, not published, EU:T:2015:601, paragraph 156 and the case-law cited).

93 In the present case, it should be noted that the applicant focuses its arguments, in essence, first, on the findings of the independent auditor concerning the second ground, relating to the interpretation of Article 6.2.A(b)(ii) of the annotated model grant agreement regarding the nature of the legal relationship between the beneficiaries and the seconded staff members and, second, on the fact that the audits commissioned by the REA in order to assess the implementation of the TICASS project by itself and PUNO were carried out by two different entities which did not apply uniform criteria.

94 In that regard, although the applicant comments on the findings of the independent auditor in relation to the second ground, described in paragraph 84 above, giving rise to the REA’s decision to recover the amount at issue, it must be noted that the applicant has not adduced any evidence in the application that explains how those findings infringe the principle of equal treatment as regards the assessment made by the independent auditor in relation to the first ground, described in paragraph 83 above and which also forms the basis of that decision.

95 In those circumstances, even if the applicant, first, was in a situation comparable to that of PUNO as a beneficiary and a party to the same grant agreement and, second, had been subject to different treatment that was not objectively justified when assessing the costs relating to seconded staff members with regard to the second ground (see paragraph 84 above), the applicant has not adduced any evidence to challenge the findings of the independent auditor as regards the first ground (see paragraph 83 above). In that regard, the applicant does not in any way explain how, in the light of the evidence presented in the final audit report, those findings constitute a breach of the principle of equal treatment.

96 Accordingly, as is apparent from paragraph 80 above, even if the first part of the present plea were well founded, it is not capable of calling into question the findings of the independent auditor set out in the final audit report concerning the ineligibility of the costs relating to seconded staff members that were declared by the applicant under the grant agreement.

97 In those circumstances, the first part of the fourth plea in law must be rejected as ineffective in so far as it alleges a breach of the principle of equal treatment.

98 Furthermore, as regards the complaint alleging infringement of the principle of transparency, put forward under the same part of the fourth plea in paragraph 106 of the application, it should be noted that the applicant has not put forward any specific arguments as to the relevance of that principle, with the result that it does not comply with the requirements of clarity and precision laid down in Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court.

99 It follows from the foregoing that the first part of the fourth plea in law must be rejected as in part ineffective and in part inadmissible.

– The second part, alleging breach of the principle of protection of legitimate expectations

100 In support of the second part of the fourth plea, the applicant is of the view, in essence, that the REA acted in breach of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations in that it gave it assurances as to the eligibility of the costs relating to seconded staff members which it subsequently found to be ineligible. In that regard, it submits that it drew on the experience of other beneficiaries of the TICASS project in the context of the implementation of activities linked to that project and, in particular, that of PUNO, whose costs relating to seconded staff members were considered eligible.

101 The REA disputes the applicant’s claims.

102 In order to claim entitlement to the protection of legitimate expectations three conditions must be satisfied. First, precise, unconditional and consistent assurances originating from authorised and reliable sources must have been given to the person concerned by the EU authorities. Second, those assurances must be such as to give rise to a legitimate expectation on the part of the person to whom they are addressed. Third, the assurances given must comply with the applicable rules (see judgment of 25 September 2018, GABO:mi v Commission , T‑10/16, not published, EU:T:2018:600, paragraph 122 and the case-law cited).

103 In the present case, it is sufficient to note that the first of those conditions is not satisfied. The applicant’s line of argument focuses in essence on the fact, first, that it drew on the experience of other beneficiaries of the TICASS project in the context of the implementation of the activities linked to that project and, second, as regards PUNO, that the audit commissioned did not identify any irregularity even though that university carried out its activities under the grant agreement to which the applicant was also a party.

104 In those circumstances, the applicant has not demonstrated that the REA gave it precise, unconditional and consistent assurances as to the eligibility of the costs at issue. Consequently, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 102 above, the applicant cannot rely on the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations.

105 It follows from the foregoing that the second part of the fourth plea must be rejected as unfounded, as must, consequently, the fourth plea in law in its entirety.

The measure of inquiry requested by the applicant

106 Without formally invoking Article 91(b) of the Rules of Procedure, the applicant asks the Court, in essence, to adopt a measure of inquiry inviting the REA to submit all the relevant documentation relating to the agreements concluded between PUNO, on the one hand, and G and H, on the other. In that regard, the applicant claims that those agreements were voluntary in nature like those concluded between PUNO and F on 28 April 2017 and 22 January 2018.

107 In that connection, it must be recalled that the Court is the sole judge of any need to supplement the information available to it in respect of the cases before it (see judgment of 26 January 2017, Mamoli Robinetteria v Commission , C‑619/13 P, EU:C:2017:50, paragraph 117 and the case-law cited; judgment of 12 November 2020, Fleig v EEAS , C‑446/19 P, not published, EU:C:2020:918, paragraph 53).

108 In the present case, it should be noted that the applicant submits in paragraph 35 of the application that the agreements concluded between PUNO, on the one hand, and G and H, on the other, are similar to those concluded between PUNO and F. The Court notes that the applicant sent a copy of the agreements concluded between PUNO and F and their annexes with the application. In those circumstances, the adoption of a measure of inquiry seeking to obtain a copy of all the relevant documentation relating to the agreements concluded between PUNO, on the one hand, and G and H, on the other, serves no useful purpose for the resolution of the dispute.

109 In view of the foregoing, it must be concluded that the information in the file is sufficient to enable the Court to give judgement, the latter having been able to rule on the basis of the forms of order sought, the pleas in law and arguments put forward during the proceedings and in the light of the documents lodged by the parties, without it being necessary to order the production of the requested documents.

110 Therefore, the request for the adoption of a measure of inquiry is rejected.

111 It follows from all of the foregoing that the action must be dismissed.

The REA’s counterclaim

112 By its counterclaim, the REA asks the Court to order the applicant, first, to pay the sum of EUR 135 000 as referred to in the contested debit note and, second, to pay ‘applicable costs and interests’.

113 The applicant did not submit any observations on the counterclaim.

114 In the present case, in the first place, as regards the REA’s claim for recovery of the sum of EUR 135 000 corresponding to the amount of the costs found to be ineligible on the basis of the final audit report, it must be held that, in so far as none of the pleas raised by the applicant has been upheld, that claim is well founded.

115 The applicant must therefore be ordered to pay the REA the sum of EUR 135 000 due under the grant agreement, in accordance with the form of order sought by the REA.

116 In the second place, as regards the REA’s request for payment by the applicant of ‘applicable costs and interests’, it is appropriate to refer, in the absence of any clarification in that regard in the defence, to Article 44.1.3 of the grant agreement. Under that article, if payment is not made by the date specified in the debit note, the amount to be recovered is to be increased by late-payment interest at the rate set out in Article 21.11.1 of that agreement from the day following the date for payment stated in the debit note up to and including the date on which the REA receives full payment of the amount.

117 Under Article 21.11.1 of the grant agreement, the interest rate applicable is to be calculated on the basis of the rate applied by the European Central Bank (ECB) to its main refinancing operations, as published in the C series of the Official Journal of the European Union, in force on the first day of the month in which the payment deadline expires, plus 3.5 percentage points.

118 In this case, the rate applied by the ECB to its main refinancing operations, as published in the C series of the Official Journal of the European Union , in force on 1 August 2024, the first day of the month in which the payment deadline – set at 30 August 2024 in the contested debit note – expired, was 4.25%, to which an increase of 3.5 percentage points should be applied, as stated in paragraph 117 above.

119 In view of the above, the interest rate applicable in the present circumstances is 7.75%.

120 In the light of the foregoing considerations, the counterclaim must be upheld and the applicant must be ordered to pay the REA the sum of EUR 135 000, together with late-payment interest at a rate of 7.75% from 31 August 2024 until full payment of that amount.

Costs

121 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

122 Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the form of order sought by the REA, including those relating to the proceedings for interim relief.

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (Tenth Chamber)

hereby:

1. Dismisses the action;

2. Upholds the counterclaim brought by the European Research Executive Agency (REA);

3. Orders Stowarzyszenie Edukacja, Nauka, Kultura to pay the REA the sum of EUR 135 000, plus late-payment interest at the rate of 7.75% for the period from 31 August 2024 until full payment;

4. Orders Stowarzyszenie Edukacja, Nauka, Kultura to pay the costs, including those relating to the proceedings for interim relief.

Kalėda | Perišin | Verschuur

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 15 April 2026.

V. Di Bucci | S. Papasavvas

Registrar | President

* Language of the case: English.