lagen.nu
no. 21576/93

F.D. v. NORWAY

Inadmissible

Domstol
European Court of Human Rights
Avgörandedatum
1993-09-10
ECLI
ECLI:CE:ECHR:1993:0910DEC002157693
Artiklar
3, 13, 5, 5-1-f
Källa
hudoc.echr.coe.int

Berörda konventionsartiklar



AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application No. 21576/93

by F.D.

against Norway

The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on

10 September 1993, the following members being present:

MM. C.A. NØRGAARD, President

S. TRECHSEL

A. WEITZEL

F. ERMACORA

E. BUSUTTIL

G. JÖRUNDSSON

A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

J.-C. SOYER

H.G. SCHERMERS

H. DANELIUS

Mrs. G.H. THUNE

Mr. F. MARTINEZ

Mrs. J. LIDDY

MM. J.-C. GEUS

M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

B. MARXER

M.A. NOWICKI

I. CABRAL BARRETO

B. CONFORTI

N. BRATZA

Mr. H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission

Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

Having regard to the application introduced on 4 February 1993

by F.D. against Norway and registered on 23 March 1993 under file No.

21576/93;

Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent

Government on 14 May 1993 and the observations in reply submitted by

the applicant on 30 June 1993;

Having deliberated;

Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be

summarised as follows.

The applicant is a so-called Kosovo Albanian, born in 1972. He

is a Muslim. At present he is living in an asylum centre in Norway.

Before the Commission he is represented by Mr. Eric Rundhovde, a lawyer

practising in Bergen.

A. The particular facts of the case

The applicant came to Norway for the first time on 1 May 1989 and

applied for asylum. His request was rejected by the Ministry of Justice

on 21 March 1990 and he was returned to Zagreb on 20 April 1990.

Thereafter he stayed at home with his parents, brothers and sisters in

a village called Ghloxan in Kosovo.

On 6 May 1991 he was called to serve in the Federal Yugoslav army

and, in order to avoid this, he went to Switzerland on 29 June 1991

where he worked in a restaurant. He stayed there until 29 October 1991

when he returned to Kosovo and stayed at Pristina, Kosovo. He submits

that he stayed there illegally and that the authorities were looking

for him since he had deserted from the army. On 21 January 1992 he left

for Norway by car. He submits that a friend drove him to Norway for

2000 DM.

In Norway the applicant applied for asylum or a residence permit

on humanitarian grounds, referring to the situation in Yugoslavia and

to the fact that he had not complied with the draft order. He was

interrogated by the Norwegian police on 6 February 1992. He submitted,

inter alia, that he did not want to return to Yugoslavia as long as

there is a war going on there, but he would return and fight the Serbs

if war broke out between the Serbs and the Albanians in Kosovo.

During the asylum/residence permit proceedings the applicant was

represented by counsel under a legal aid grant.

On 21 July 1992 the Directorate for Aliens (Utlendings-

direktoratet) rejected the application. In its decision the Directorate

stated:

(translation)

"the Directorate considers that it cannot be established that

[the applicant] has been subjected to actions by the authorities

which may be characterised as persecution within the meaning of

the Aliens Act (Utlendingsloven) or the Refugee Convention.

It appears from his previous application (for asylum in Norway)

that [the applicant] was convicted in absentia and sentenced to

six months' imprisonment for participation in demonstrations.

However, there is no information in the new application which

could lead to the conclusion that the authorities tried to

enforce the judgment despite the fact that [the applicant]

remained in his country after the alleged judgment was

pronounced.

It has been noticed that [the applicant] claims to have been

arrested twice. However, no explanation as to why he was

arrested, or when, has been submitted.

[The applicant] has not been a member of a political party or

organisation either and it is not found to be established that

[the applicant] has been politically active in such a way that

there is reason to fear persecution.

As a reason for leaving the country [the applicant] also submits

that, on 6 May 1991, he was called to do military service as from

19 June 1991. A copy of the order is enclosed.

[The applicant] did not, however, comply with the order but

travelled to Switzerland and started working there. [He] returned

to Yugoslavia/Kosovo in October 1991 and stayed there until he

left for Norway. It is considered to be extraordinary that [the

applicant] returned to his country and actually stayed there for

about three months if he had received a draft order with which

he did not intend to comply.

There is also reason to point out that fear of or an aversion to

doing military service in general does not entitle to asylum or

a residence permit in Norway.

Having considered the case as a whole it is not likely that there

would be an imminent risk of persecution upon leaving the country

within the meaning of the Aliens Act and the Refugee Convention.

Nor is there reason to give [the applicant] a residence or a work

permit in Norway in accordance with Section 8, subsection 2, of

the Aliens Act.

Section 15, subsection 1, of the Aliens Act does not prevent a

return to the country of origin."

The applicant appealed against this decision to the Ministry of

Justice. During these proceedings he was represented by his present

representative under a grant of legal aid.

In its decision of 29 September 1992, rejecting the appeal, the

Ministry stated inter alia:

(translation)

"[the applicant] submits in his application of 25 January 1992

that he has received a draft order. However, it is clear that

this is not a mobilisation order but an order for ordinary first

time military service. The Ministry refers in this respect to the

fact that non-appearance for ordinary first time military service

does not constitute a basis for granting asylum in Norway.

After considering the case as a whole the Ministry does not find

that such strong humanitarian considerations or particular

connections with Norway exist that [the applicant] should receive

a residence permit in accordance with Section 8, subsection 2,

of the Aliens Act. The Ministry considers it obvious that a

possible reaction from the authorities due to the fact that [the

applicant] has evaded military service is not of such character

as would necessitate the granting of a residence permit in

accordance with Section 8, subsection 2. The so-called 'immediate

danger of war' situation was not at hand when [the applicant] was

allegedly called to do his first time military service.

Furthermore, the Federal (Yugoslav) Army is not a party in the

present war in former Yugoslavia. It should also be pointed out

that [the applicant] remained in Kosovo approximately three

months after he was called to the army. Furthermore, it is

recalled that the Ministry is constantly informed of the

situation in Kosovo and that it is not considered to be such that

a residence permit on humanitarian grounds could be granted.

...

The decision should be enforced in accordance with Sections 40

and 41 of the Aliens Act. In this connection the Ministry points

out that the present situation in Yugoslavia requires that a

deportation will only take place in consultation with the

Ministry."

The applicant submits that deportation would mean that he will

be taken by air to Skopje in Macedonia, and then by bus to the Kosovo

border, where he will receive certain travel money and otherwise be

left there. He also submits that the border between Macedonia and

Kosovo is closed and that he could not therefore return to Kosovo

without being arrested by the Serbian dominated authorities in Kosovo.

On 7 October 1992 the applicant instituted proceedings in the

City Court (byrett) of Oslo claiming that the decision to refuse him

asylum or a residence permit and to deport him was illegal. He also

applied for legal aid as his previous legal aid grant only covered the

proceedings before the administrative authorities ending with the

decision of the Ministry of Justice. He furthermore requested that the

court proceedings be given suspensive effect. The latter request was

subsequently withdrawn as he was informed that he would not be deported

while the case was pending.

On 14 October 1992 the applicant's request for legal aid was

refused by the County Governor (Fylkesmannen). This decision was upheld

by the Ministry of Justice on 27 January 1993.

The case was heard in the City Court on 11 February 1993. The

applicant was present, but not represented. The respondent State was

represented by its Solicitor General (Regjeringsadvokaten).

In its judgment of 17 February 1993, finding in favour of the

respondent State, the Court stated inter alia:

"The Court must first consider whether [the applicant] has

a right to asylum in accordance with Section 17 of the

Aliens Act. Thereafter the question of a residence permit

in accordance with Section 8, subsection 2, of the Aliens

Act arises and finally the question whether Section 15 of

the Act is applicable.

The requirements under Section 17 of the Act are that the

alien should be considered a refugee. A refugee within the

meaning of this Act is someone who falls under Section 1A

of the Refugee Convention, i.e. a person who rightly fears

persecution due to race, religion, nationality, membership

of a particular social group or due to his political

conviction.

Non-appearance for first time military service cannot in

itself constitute the basis for granting asylum. Such a an

act is normally punished in most countries ... .

However, if someone risks a disproportionately severe

sentence therefor, due to his nationality or political

opinion ... he may nevertheless be considered to be a

refugee.

[The applicant] should have appeared for ordinary first

time military service in 1991, before the war started. The

Court must therefore consider it established that as a

starting point he does not risk being convicted under the

more severe sanctions applicable in case of wartime

desertion. It has been submitted that only a few judgments

have been pronounced, concerning refusal by Kosovo

Albanians to do military service. Of these pronounced the

sentence imposed lies between 6 and 13 months. Furthermore

it has been submitted that more than 100,000 - 200,000

persons have refused to appear for military service in

Serbia most recently, both Kosovo Albanians and others. The

Court finds no reason to doubt this information. This means

that the Serbian authorities' possibilities of pursuing

such offences are minimal. [The applicant] has also stayed

in Kosovo for three months after he should have joined the

military without this leading to reactions, something which

supports this opinion.

On the other hand it may be questioned whether the

situation in Kosovo is so tense and unclear that it is

difficult to say anything about how the authorities would

react towards military objectors in the future. The Court

refers to the fact that the situation in Kosovo from

several sides is characterised by being explosive even

without concrete reasons to fear that the war in Yugoslavia

will spread to Kosovo in the near future. The situation for

the Kosovo Albanians is difficult. They are harassed by the

Serbs and the Court has no reason to doubt that there is a

serious fear of open conflict/war. It has been submitted

that frequent searches and identity controls take place, as

well as brief detentions. The Serbs fear among other things

that the Kosovo Albanians would take up arms. This general

harassment and fear of conflict is not normally considered

to constitute a basis for asylum.

A risk of imprisonment due to a refusal to do military

service in such circumstances, in particular in the light

of the atrocities which this war has shown, makes it easy

to understand that [the applicant] seriously fears

persecution due to his refusal to do military service.

The Court has nevertheless reached the conclusion that this

fear cannot be decisive in respect of the question whether

[the applicant] should be considered a refugee. The Court

considers that, in accordance with the definition of a

refugee, it is a requirement that this fear must relate to

a more concrete development and base itself on information

concerning the treatment of military objectors in the

country.

The question must also be raised whether it is possible

that [the applicant] will be particularly severely punished

if arrested because he has participated in demonstrations

against the authorities earlier. He has maintained during

the hearing that he has been convicted and sentenced to six

months' imprisonment in absentia in 1989 therefor, and that

the police have looked for him at his parents' home in

order to arrest him for political activity.

The Court does not find it unlikely that [the applicant]

has participated in some of the many political

demonstrations in Kosovo in the 80's. A proposal for a

constitutional amendment limiting the self-government was

followed by demonstrations and strikes in January/February

1989 However, the Court finds it unlikely that [the

applicant] thereby caught the attention of the authorities

due to his political opinion. ... It is clear that [the

applicant] since then stayed in Kosovo approximately one

year and two months without the authorities succeeding in

finding him. [He] alleges that this was due to the fact

that he did not stay with his parents but stayed in Kosovo

illegally. The Court finds, however, that this supports the

view that the authorities did not make an effort in order

to find him and there is no reason to fear that he will be

subjected to a particularly severe punishment due to

political activity.

As regards the risk that [the applicant], if forced to do

military service, will have to participate in acts of war

which take place in former Yugoslavia and which the UN has

condemned ... the Court refers to the fact that troops from

the Federal Yugoslav Army do not participate in the acts of

war which take place. Therefore [the applicant] does not

risk having to participate in these acts of war which the

UN has condemned. Furthermore, the Serbs do not want to

train the Kosovo Albanians in handling weapons.

One may of course ask whether the situation in Yugoslavia

is so turbulent that it is difficult to say anything about

the risk of being engaged in such acts of war in the

future. However, the Court has reached the conclusion that

it must be considered to be a fact that the Federal

Yugoslav Army, including troops from Kosovo and Monte-

negro, does not for the time being participate in the acts

of war which take place, regardless of the fact that the

situation in Yugoslavia has been turbulent now for some

time.

[The applicant] has also submitted that he has a right to

a residence permit in accordance with Section 8, subsection

2, of the Aliens Act. This provision provides that when

strong humanitarian considerations so require, or when the

alien has special connections with the country, a work or

residence permit may be given despite the fact that the

requirements are not fulfilled.

The administrative authorities have a margin of

appreciation here, i.e. the Court cannot review the use

thereof. This follows from the fact that the word 'may' has

been used. Only errors in applying the margin of

appreciation may be reviewed.

The Court finds that no such errors have been committed in

applying the margin of appreciation. Nothing indicates that

the Ministry of Justice has based itself on incorrect

facts, that irrelevant considerations have been applied or

that there has been an unjustifiable differential

treatment. The conclusion is therefore that the Court must

find in favour of the State on this point.

An alien may be protected against persecution under Section

15 of the Aliens Act regardless of the fact that he cannot

be considered a refugee if inter alia, for similar reasons

as set out in the definition of a refugee, he is in

imminent danger of losing his life or of being subjected to

inhuman treatment if returned. It is here the alien's

situation at the time of his return which is decisive.

As regards the Kosovo Albanians who have been returned,

between 50 - 100 because of minor criminal offences, the

State has maintained that they have not been subjected to

any particular treatment upon return in so far as the State

has been informed. It is alleged that the Ministry of

Justice inter alia receives information from LDK (a legal

political party dominated by Kosovo Albanians) and that it

would have been informed if something had happened. The

deportation had taken place by air to Macedonia and

subsequently by bus or private car to Kosovo. Many asylum

seekers also returned voluntarily and visited Kosovo. The

Court has no reason to believe that this information is not

correct. Nothing has been submitted, in particular as

regards whether Kosovo Albanian miliary objectors have been

returned, for example how many, but the Court finds that

there are no reasonable grounds for suspecting that they

will be subjected to a particular persecution because they

have left their country. In this connection it must be kept

in mind that the risk of being convicted for refusal to do

military service does not in itself suffice to bring

Section 15 into play. In this respect the question also

arises whether the tense situation in Kosovo, the

insecurity in regard to how the situation will develop

compared with the risk of being detained for refusal to do

military service in such a situation, implies that Section

15 applies.

However, the Court has reached the conclusion that the risk

of losing his life or of [the applicant] being subjected to

inhuman treatment if he is deported, is not of the

imminence which is required in order to be protected under

this provision.

According to the submissions, the Ministry of Justice will

not in any circumstances decide to deport (the applicant)

before the European Commission of Human Rights has decided

in the case. The situation may then have changed and the

authorities must in view of all the circumstances

prevailing at the moment of deportation decide whether [the

applicant], due to similar reasons as those set out in the

definition of a refugee, is in imminent danger of losing

his life or of being subjected to inhuman treatment, cf.

Section 15 of the Aliens Act."

The applicant appealed against this judgment to the Eidsivating

High Court (Lagmannsrett) where the case is at present pending. The

appeal has no suspensive effect.

B. Domestic law and practice

Asylum

The right to refuse asylum in Norway is regulated by the Aliens

Act of 24 June 1988. According to Section 4 of the Act, it shall be

applied in accordance with international rules by which Norway is bound

when these are intended to safeguard the position of foreign nationals.

Norwegian practice concerning refugees and the question of "non-

refoulement" should therefore be applied in accordance with the 1951

Convention relating to the status of refugees, and the European

Convention on Human Rights.

Section 16 of the Aliens Act concerning the determination of

refugee status refers directly to the definition in Article 1 A of the

1951 Convention, from which it follows that a refugee is a person who

stays outside his country of origin, and who may fear persecution from

the authorities in his country of origin, due to e.g. political or

religious activity, or ethnic or national origin.

According to Section 17, subsection 1, of the Aliens Act, a

foreign national considered a refugee has, with some exceptions, the

right to asylum in Norway.

According to Article 15 of the Aliens Act, no foreign national

should be sent to any area where he or she may fear persecution of such

a kind as may justify recognition as a refugee, or where the foreigner

will not feel confident about being sent to such an area. A

corresponding protection applies to foreign nationals, who for reasons

similar to those given in the definition of a refugee, are in

considerable danger of losing their lives or being made to suffer

inhuman treatment. This section applies to foreign nationals in

general.

Residence permit

According to Section 8 of the Aliens Act a residence permit can

be issued on humanitarian grounds if asylum is denied. Whether or not

such a residence permit should be granted depends on an individual

assessment in each case. Section 8 does not give a foreign national

an automatic right to a residence permit, but it follows from the

Aliens Act that a residence permit will be granted on humanitarian

grounds if a foreign national may be subjected to a considerable danger

of losing his life or if he risks suffering inhuman treatment due to

reasons similar to those applicable to refugees.

Available remedies

According to Sections 15 and 21 of the Aliens Act, the

Directorate for Aliens will in the first instance decide whether an

asylum seeker can be considered a refugee. If asylum is denied, the

Directorate shall on its own account assess whether the asylum seeker

should be granted a residence permit on humanitarian grounds. Under

Chapter VI of the Public Administration Act (Forvaltningsloven) of

10 February 1967 the asylum seeker can appeal to the Ministry of

Justice if asylum or both asylum and the request for a residence permit

are denied.

Following the administrative proceedings an asylum seeker has the

possibility of instituting proceedings in the ordinary courts of law

against the State concerning the refusals to grant him asylum or a

residence permit. These proceedings have no suspensive effect unless

the court so decides and they follow the usual civil law procedure.

Such procedure comprises three court levels: the City Court, the High

Court and, with leave, the Supreme Court (Høyesterett).

Free legal aid

According to Section 42, subsection 3, of the Aliens Act, and

Section 13, subsection 1, of the Act of 13 June 1980 relating to Legal

Aid, aliens are entitled to free legal aid in connection with the

administrative processing of applications for asylum, without being

subject to a means test. This represents preferential treatment in

comparison with Norwegian citizens. In accordance with Section 42,

subsection 4, of the Aliens Act, the authorities have the right to

demand a refund if the alien can afford it.

In accordance with the Immigration Regulations, Sections 131 -

133, the police shall provide information on the applicant's right to

legal aid, and the authorities' right to demand a refund. Legal

guidance shall be given in a language understood by the alien. The

police shall furthermore assist the alien in contacting a lawyer, if

so requested.

The right to free legal aid applies to both the processing of the

case in the first instance, and to possible appeals to the superior

administrative authorities. The authorities meet lawyers' fees for up

to five hours' work at 495.- NOK per hour in connection with the

processing at first instance, and one hour for the processing of

appeals.

In the event of the alien wanting to have his case examined by

the courts of law, the standard regulations governing free legal aid

take effect. The regulations relating to free legal aid are identical

for aliens and Norwegian citizens. The regulations governing free

legal aid are contained in Chapter IV of the Legal Aid Act. Should the

applicant meet the economic conditions and if the County Governor deems

it reasonable, free legal aid may be awarded. An overall assessment

shall be made, and there shall be particular emphasis on the nature of

the case, the implications of the case for the plaintiff, and the

likelihood of the application being successful. According to Section

28 of the Legal Aid Act, the County Governor's decision may be appealed

to the Ministry of Justice.

In the event of free legal aid being granted before a particular

court, the alien must make a fresh application if he wishes to appeal

the case to a higher court.

If free legal aid has been awarded, it also covers the

administrative fee charged by the court before which the case is being

heard.

COMPLAINTS

The applicant complains of a violation of Articles 3 and 13 of

the Convention.

As regards Article 3, he refers to the general situation in

former Yugoslavia and to the fact that he has refused to join the

Federal Yugoslav Army. He maintains that he risks up to ten years'

imprisonment and being forced to do military service, helping the

Serbs. He also maintains that there is no guarantee that the courts in

Kosovo could guarantee him a fair trial or that prison conditions would

comply with Article 3 of the Convention. He submits that the general

situation in Kosovo is very turbulent and the information from there

is controlled by the Serbs. He considers that it would be contrary to

Article 3 of the Convention to deport him to Kosovo in the present

circumstances.

As regards Article 13, the applicant complains that the refusal

to grant him legal aid deprived him of an effective remedy before a

national authority in order to bring his case before the ordinary

courts of law.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

The application was introduced on 4 February 1993 and registered

on 23 March 1993.

On 10 February 1993 the Commission decided to apply Rule 36 of

its Rules of Procedure, having found that it was desirable not to

deport the applicant to former Yugoslavia until it had had an

opportunity to examine the case further.

On 8 April 1993 the Commission decided to prolong its indication

under Rule 36 of its Rules of Procedure and to bring the application

to the notice of the respondent Government, inviting them to submit

written observations on the admissibility and merits of the case.

The Government's observations were submitted on 14 May 1993 and

the applicant's observations in reply were submitted on 30 June 1993.

On 9 July 1993 the Commission decided to prolong its indication

under Rule 36 of its Rules of Procedure.

THE LAW

1 The applicant complains that, if returned to Kosovo, he risks

being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 (Art. 3) of the

Convention which reads as follows:

"No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or

degrading treatment or punishment."

In support of his contention the applicant refers to the general

situation in former Yugoslavia and the particular situation of the

Kosovo Albanians. Furthermore, he refers to his own political views and

to the fact that he has refused to comply with the draft order to the

Federal Yugoslav Army. He maintains that he risks up to ten years'

imprisonment for draft evasion. In addition the applicant maintains

that there is no guarantee that the courts in Kosovo would comply with

the fair trial requirements or that prison conditions would be in

accordance with Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention. He submits that

the situation in Kosovo is very turbulent and fully under Serbian

control. If returned, he would accordingly face imprisonment or, while

doing his military service, be completely in the hands of the Serbian

authorities.

The Government maintain that, although the Serbian authorities

are harassing a large number of ethnic Albanians, there is nothing

which indicates that the applicant would be particularly exposed to

such harassment. His political activities have been minimal and he has

not been subjected to ill-treatment while in Kosovo.

As regards the draft order the Government submit, in particular,

that being drafted into military service, with possible prosecution for

default, does not in itself violate Article 3 (Art. 3) of the

Convention. Conscientious objectors who have been punished in Serbia

recently have received sentences ranging from six to eighteen months'

imprisonment and there have been no objections to the way in which

these cases have been handled by the Serbian authorities.

The Government conclude that it is highly unlikely that the

applicant would be met with any kind of reaction if returned to Kosovo.

At any rate, any reaction on the part of the Serbian authorities would

not, in the opinion of the Government, exceed the minimum level of

severity required by Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention.

The Commission recalls that Contracting States have the right to

control the entry, residence and expulsion of aliens. The right to

political asylum is not protected in either the Convention or its

Protocols (Eur. Court H.R., Vilvarajah and Others judgment of

30 October 1991, Series A no. 215, p. 34, para. 102). However,

expulsion by a Contracting State of an asylum seeker may give rise to

an issue under Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention and hence engage

the responsibility of that State under the Convention, where

substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person

concerned would face a real risk of being subjected to torture or to

inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the country to which

he is to be expelled (ibid., para. 103). A mere possibility of ill-

treatment is not in itself sufficient (ibid., p. 37, para. 111).

The examination of the present case involves, on the one hand,

the applicant's personal situation and, on the other, the general

situation in Kosovo. For this purpose the parties have provided

relevant material which includes information from the United Nations

High Commissioner for Refugees and Amnesty International as well as

information concerning the applicant's particular situation. Having

regard thereto the Commission finds that the general situation in

Kosovo at present is not of a kind that an expulsion to that area of

former Yugoslavia would as such amount to a violation of the Convention

or its Protocols. In order to raise an issue under the provision

invoked there should accordingly be some substantiation as to the

existence of a specific risk of treatment contrary to Article 3

(Art. 3) of the Convention.

In the present case such particular circumstances might be that

the applicant is a draft evader. However, the Commission shares the

Government's doubts as to whether the applicant will, in the

circumstances, receive any punishment at all. Furthermore, the

Commission does not find that the possible sanction for draft evasion

is so severe as to raise an issue under Article 3 (Art. 3) of the

Convention (cf. No. 11017/84, Dec. 13.3.86, D.R. 46 p. 176 and No.

12364/86, Dec. 17.10.86, D.R. 50 p. 280).

Accordingly, the Commission concludes, on the evidence before it

concerning the applicant's background and the general situation in

Kosovo, that it has not been established that there are substantial

grounds for believing that the applicant would be exposed to a real

risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 (Art. 3) of

the Convention if returned to Kosovo.

It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as

being manifestly ill-founded, within the meaning of Article 27 para.

2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

2 The applicant also complains of a violation of Article 13

(Art. 13) of the Convention due to the fact that he was not granted

legal aid in order to bring his case before the ordinary courts of

law.

The Commission recalls that according to the provisions of the

Norwegian Aliens Act, an alien may apply for asylum or a residence

permit to the Directorate for Aliens. The Directorate's decisions may

be appealed against to the Ministry of Justice. The alien is entitled

to free legal aid in connection with these proceedings, without being

subject to a means test.

Subsequently, the alien may institute proceedings in the ordinary

courts of law and may be granted legal aid for that purpose provided

he fulfils certain general requirements for obtaining such aid.

The Commission considers that a system as described above does

not disclose any appearance of a violation of Article 13 (Art. 13) of

the Convention. It follows that this part of the application is also

manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Commission, by a majority

DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

Secretary to the Commission President of the Commission

(H.C. KRÜGER) (C.A. NØRGAARD)