UUHINIEMI AND 14 OTHERS v. FINLAND



AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application No. 21343/93

by Mirja UUHINIEMI and 14 others

against Finland

The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on

10 October 1994, the following members being present:

MM. C.A. NØRGAARD, President

S. TRECHSEL

A. WEITZEL

F. ERMACORA

E. BUSUTTIL

G. JÖRUNDSSON

A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

J.-C. SOYER

H.G. SCHERMERS

H. DANELIUS

Mrs. G.H. THUNE

MM. F. MARTINEZ

C.L. ROZAKIS

Mrs. J. LIDDY

MM. L. LOUCAIDES

J.-C. GEUS

M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

G.B. REFFI

M.A. NOWICKI

I. CABRAL BARRETO

B. CONFORTI

N. BRATZA

I. BÉKÉS

J. MUCHA

E. KONSTANTINOV

D. SVÁBY

G. RESS

Mr. H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission

Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

Having regard to the application introduced on 9 December 1992

by Mirja UUHINIEMI and 14 others against Finland and registered on

5 February 1993 under file No. 21343/93;

Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

Having deliberated;

Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicants, all Finnish citizens, are set out in the Annex.

Before the Commission they are represented by Ms. Elina Lampi-

Fagerholm, a lawyer of the National Association of the Fishing Industry

("Kalatalouden keskusliitto").

The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, may be

summarised as follows.

Particular circumstances of the case

At an unofficial meeting on 30 May 1990 the Council of State

(valtioneuvosto, statsrådet) adopted the principles to be applied in

the further preparation of a shore conservation programme. A draft

version had been adopted by an ad hoc working group at the Ministry for

the Environment (ympäristöministeriö, miljöministeriet) appointed in

1988 The draft was based on information obtained through nature

inventories and the opinion submitted by an ad hoc Committee in 1985.

On 6 June 1990 the Ministry for the Environment published a draft

shore conservation programme and invited the municipalities concerned

to submit comments on it before 31 August 1990. It also requested the

municipalities to notify the property owners concerned of their right

to submit individual comments before the same date. 4.692 property

owners submitted such comments.

On 20 December 1990 the Council of State adopted "in principle"

(periaatepäätös, principbeslut) the shore conservation programme,

stating, inter alia:

"... [T]he programme includes 138 shore areas of

international or national value. The areas with sea nature

are 29 and cover about 1.500 kilometres of shore [about 4

per cent of the total seashore]. The areas with lakeside

nature are 109 and cover a total shore line of 7.300

kilometres [about 5 per cent of the total lakeside shore].

The areas included in the programme are nearly the same as

those indicated in the reference material of [the 1985

Committee]. ...

The ... programme will be implemented primarily through

voluntary conservation in accordance with the [1923] Nature

Conservation Act [luonnonsuojelulaki 71/23, lag 71/23 om

naturskydd; hereinafter "the 1923 Act"]. Measures will only

be taken on the property owner's initiative or in case of

construction or other activities damaging the conservation

values ...

The intention is to conserve the privately owned areas

primarily by establishing nature conservation areas in a

manner agreed to by the property owner and on [his] request

so that [he] receives full compensation for the

conservation in accordance with the principle of full

compensation. Alternatively, the area can be acquired by

the State, in which case full compensation will be paid for

it. ...

Measures for the conservation of an area or its acquisition

by the State in accordance with [the 1923 Act] will be

taken [either] on the property owner's initiative [or] if

a request for a permit for construction in such an area has

been lodged, if the forestry in the area deviates from the

... recommendations issued by the Central Forestry Boards

(keskusmetsälautakunnat, centralskogsnämnderna) with regard

to shore areas or if other measures damaging the

conservable values (luonnonarvot, naturvärdena) are being

taken.

...

... [R]estrictions on forestry [exceeding those indicated

in the above-mentioned recommendations] can be [applied]

only in areas with endangered and extremely rare animal and

plant species. ..."

In its judgment of 22 June 1992 following the applicants' appeal

the Supreme Administrative Court (korkein hallinto-oikeus, högsta

förvaltningsdomstolen) considered that the decision of the Council of

State of 20 December 1990 was appealable, stating, inter alia:

"... The decision contains, inter alia, internal

administrative orders addressed to the State authorities

... in general. ... In this respect the decision must

partly be considered ... as an official order against which

no appeal lies, ... and partly as a decision of a

preparatory character ... against which no appeal lies

either ... .

...

... The decision of principle contains the position of the

Council of State that [certain] areas are conservable.

Given that the decision also focuses on individualised

areas and thus also on their owners as well as on holders

of a right of usufruct, it is not in this respect only an

internal administrative measure nor such a statute or order

as would be addressed to a group of individuals in general.

The actual importance of the decision is increased by the

fact that it has been made by the Council of State sitting

in plenary session, which is also competent to determine

the conditions for expropriating real property and separate

rights pursuant to section 5, subsection 1 of the [1977]

Redemption Act [laki 603/77 kiinteän omaisuuden ja

erityisten oikeuksien lunastuksesta, lag 603/77 om inlösen

av fast egendom och särskilda rättigheter; hereinafter "the

1977 Act"]. At issue is, however, not the confirmation of

a plan referred to in subsection 2 which would entail a

right to proceed to the expropriation of a property without

a permit [to that end].

...

... Although the programme does not in itself prevent the

granting of a building permit, an activity prohibition

issued by a County Administrative Board (lääninhallitus,

länsstyrelse) prevents the implementation of a construction

project for which a permit has already been granted. ...

Whilst the adoption of the programme has not [as such]

entailed the entry into force of a prohibition on building

or construction, it has resulted in a de facto

expropriation threat which forces the property owner not to

make use of his property in a manner contrary to the

programme. At the same time it gives the County

Administrative Board the right to issue an activity

prohibition pursuant to section 18 of [the 1923 Act] in

order to secure the aim of the redemption.

Having regard to the above-mentioned repercussions on the

use of the areas, ... the decision has such a legal effect

as to be appealable ... by a party who considers that his

right has been violated."

The Supreme Administrative Court went on to hold that the

applicants had locus standi to lodge an appeal on account of the

location of their particular properties.

The Supreme Administrative Court further found that the Council

of State had been competent to adopt the conservation programme, having

regard to, inter alia, the general competence afforded to it by section

41 of the 1919 Constitution Act (Suomen Hallitusmuoto 94/19, Regerings-

form för Finland 94/19; hereinafter "the Constitution Act").

In regard to the general lawfulness of the decision of the

Council of State the Supreme Administrative Court stated, in general,

inter alia:

"... The programme is not such a national plan of higher

rank or other plan as would have a binding impact on

regional, general or other planning. The programme can

guide the planning as a document of reference on the basis

of which [the authorities] attempt, in pursuance of ... the

[1958] Building Act [rakennuslaki 370/58, byggnadslag

370/58; hereinafter "the 1958 Act"], to harmonise regional

and general planning with national planning within the

framework of State supervision. For these reasons ... the

decision of the Council of State is not unlawful as being

incompatible with the planning system set out in [the 1958

Act].

The effects ... on construction and forestry are not of

such immediate nature that they would follow in a legally

binding manner directly from the decision of the Council of

State. The immediate legal effects are caused only by

[subsequent] planning and building prohibitions for

planning purposes, by decisions made in accordance with

[the 1923 Act] on request by an individual property owner

or, if the property owner acts in a manner contrary to the

aims of the programme, by prohibitions and redemption

decisions issued in accordance with [the 1923 Act]. In all

these stages of the implementation of the programme the

parties are to be heard in accordance with legal

provisions, the decisions are to be made in a procedure ...

prescribed by law and the decisions are appealable. When

compulsory measures are resorted to pursuant to [the 1923

Act] the property owners and others who suffer damages

shall be entitled to full compensation for their losses.

Those seeking voluntary conservation may on request be

granted compensation for the restriction of their right of

usufruct to the land remaining in their possession. In

property exchanges and sales the compensation is based on

agreements. Building and activity prohibitions can only be

issued on the conditions prescribed in [the 1958 Act] and

they can only be limited in time. If an area ... is

reserved in a regional or general plan as a conservation

area and a building permit cannot therefore be issued, the

property owner is entitled to compensation for the refusal

of such a permit.

Having regard to the aim of the programme to protect

nationally valuable ... areas by resorting, in order to

further the aims of the conservation, to measures provided

for by current legislation which in an individual case

would also be at the authorities' disposal, ... the

programme does not impose such unreasonable limitations on

the property owners and holders of a right of usufruct as

to render the decision to adopt the programme unlawful in

general.

The decision may, however, be unreasonable or otherwise

unlawful with regard to an owner of an individual area or

a holder of a right of usufruct to such an area, if the

programme would contain, for instance, shore areas which

due to their ... character do not fulfil the conditions for

a conservable ... area or which are too large, having

regard to, in particular, the aim of the programme, namely

the conservation of nature on the shore. Although the

decision-making concerning these questions will take place

only during the implementation of the programme, it is not

justified to retain an area which ... clearly cannot be

conserved in the [programme] with its de facto restrictions

on the use [of the area]."

As to the lawfulness of the decision of the Council of State in

regard to the property Iso-Tilus 12:59 owned by applicants nos. 14 and

15 the Supreme Administrative Court carried out a detailed examination

of the conservable values on the property, but found that sufficient

reasons had been shown for reserving it as a conservable area.

In conclusion, the Supreme Administrative Court found that the

decision of the Council of State did not violate the applicants' rights

and rejected their appeals.

On 20 October 1990 the Parliamentary Ombudsman (eduskunnan

oikeusasiamies, riksdagens justitieombudsman) rendered his decision in

response to a complaint lodged by applicant no. 14. The Ombudsman

considered, inter alia,

- that the threat of expropriation following from the

adoption of a nature conservation programme as well as

possible building and activity prohibitions are likely to

result in the absence of other buyers than the State, this

negatively affecting the property owner's position in the

negotiations concerning the price of his property;

- that provided the property owner does not, by

endangering the conservation values, force the State to

take measures, the de facto expropriation threat will

remain in force indefinitely;

- that the decision of principle to adopt the shore

conservation programme contains the position of the Council

of State in regard to, inter alia, the areas which, if

necessary, can be acquired by the State;

- that the decision does not entail any right to

expropriate a property without a permit to that end issued

in pursuance of the 1977 Act;

- that the programme has not entailed the transfer of any

property or rights; but

- that it has resulted in a de facto expropriation threat

forcing the property owners and others concerned to abstain

from using their properties in a manner contrary to the

programme, thus creating de facto restrictions on their

right to use their properties;

- that domestic law contains no provisions on national

conservation programmes;

- that it could therefore be questioned whether in the

light of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention it

is sufficient that the decisions of principle concerning

nature conservation programmes have been made on the basis

of the general competence of the Council of State as

prescribed in section 41 of the Constitution Act;

- that the decision of the Council of State to adopt the

shore conservation programme cannot be considered as being

clearly contrary to section 6 of the Constitution Act or

Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention; but

- that, considering the de facto effects of the decision,

the shore conservation programme should justifiably have

been prescribed by law.

Relevant domestic law

1 The competence of the Council of State to adopt a conservation

programme

The Council of State shall ensure that the decisions of the

President of the Republic are being implemented, decide matters which

it has been empowered by law to decide as well as such government and

administrative matters which have neither been reserved in the

Constitution Act or in any other law or decree for decision by the

President nor delegated for decision by a minister in his capacity of

Head of a Ministry or to an authority of a lower rank (section 41,

subsection 1 of the Constitution Act).

2 The conditions for the establishment of conservation areas

Section 1 of the 1923 Act (as amended by Act no. 399/41) concerns

State-owned real property. Such property may be reserved as a general

conservation area for the purpose of protecting it from interferences

by man (subsection 1). A specific conservation area may also be

established in order to protect a place of great natural beauty or with

otherwise remarkable nature or in order to protect a particular animal

or plant species (subsection 2). A conservation order made in

accordance with the above-mentioned provisions shall not limit a right

of a private party which was acquired prior to the conservation

(section 8).

Section 9 of the 1923 Act (as amended by Act no. 672/91) concerns

private properties. On request by the property owner the County

Administrative Board may declare a property of significant importance

from the point of view of nature conservation as a specific

conservation area pursuant to section 1, subsection 2 (subsection 1).

3 Expropriation

Under the Constitution Act the right of Finnish citizens to their

possessions shall be secured by law (section 6, subsection 1).

Expropriation of property in the public interest against full

compensation shall be governed by law (subsection 3).

The State may expropriate real property in accordance with the

1977 Act for the purpose of creating a conservation area (section 18,

subsection 1 of the 1923 Act, as amended by Act no. 672/91).

A property may be expropriated if there is a general need

therefor. Expropriation shall, however, not be resorted to, if its aim

may also be achieved in another manner or if the inconvenience caused

to a private interest is more significant than the benefit to the

general interest (section 4, subsection 1 of the 1977 Act).

Expropriation permits are granted by the Council of State or, in

certain cases, by the competent County Administrative Board or another

administrative authority (section 5, subsection 1 of the 1977 Act). A

permit is not needed if another decision already entails a right to

proceed to expropriation (subsection 2, as amended by Act no. 1110/82).

A property owner is entitled to full compensation for the

economic losses caused by the expropriation. The sum shall be fixed on

the basis of the market price of the property (sections 29 and 30 of

the 1977 Act).

4 Restrictions on the use of real property

The County Administrative Board may, provisionally and for a

maximum period of two years, prohibit an area from being used in a

manner which could jeopardise the aim of an expropriation in accordance

with the 1923 and 1977 Acts. The prohibition is immediately enforceable

irrespective of appeal proceedings, unless the appeal body decides

otherwise. If no expropriation takes place a compensation shall be

fixed by the Board for any damage or inconvenience caused by the

prohibition (section 18, subsection 2 of the 1923 Act, as amended by

Act no. 672/91).

If an expropriation permit has been granted the property at issue

shall not be used in a manner which could jeopardise the aim of the

expropriation. This prohibition is in force until the expropriation

proceedings have terminated or until the moment when the expropriation

matter is struck off. In the last-mentioned case compensation for

losses or inconvenience caused by the prohibition shall be paid by the

State (section 18, subsection 3 of the 1923 Act, as amended by Act

no. 672/91). Under the 1959 Building Decree (rakennusasetus 266/59,

byggnads-förordning 266/59; hereinafter "the 1959 Decree") the

competent County Administrative Board shall be heard by the local

Building Board in respect of a request for a building permit pertaining

to a property located, inter alia, within an area included in a

conservation programme adopted by the Council of State. The County

Administrative Board's opinion shall be given within six months

(section 52, subsection 3, as amended by Decree no. 480/90 which

entered into force on 1 June 1990). Section 124, subsection 3 of the

1959 Decree (as amended by Decree no. 480/90) provides for similar

conditions in respect of a request for a building permit pertaining to

a property covered by a building plan (rakennuskaava, byggnadsplan).

Finally, section 137 (as amended by Decree no. 480/90) provides for a

similar procedure with regard to a request for a building permit within

an area not covered by a town plan (asemakaava, stadsplan), building

plan or shore plan (rantakaava, strandplan).

The Ministry for the Environment may, if it deems it necessary,

order a municipality to adopt or amend a certain plan within a fixed

period of time. The order entails a building prohibition and an

activity prohibition applicable to the area indicated in the order. If

necessary, the Ministry may proceed to having the municipality comply

with the order under threat of an administrative fine (uhkasakko, vite)

(section 143, subsection 1 of the 1958 Act, as amended by Act

no. 626/69, and subsection 7, as amended by Act no. 556/81).

COMPLAINTS

1 The applicants complain that they have no access to a court in

order to challenge, within a reasonable time, the alleged interference

with their property rights, nor do they have any other effective remedy

at their disposal. They submit that their appeal to the Supreme

Administrative Court was not examined on its merits insofar as it

related to the alleged unlawfulness of the conservation programme and

its related repercussions. They invoke Article 6 para. 1 of the

Convention.

2 The applicants further complain that their right peacefully to

enjoy their possessions has been violated in several respects as a

result of the adoption of the shore conservation programme. The

programme has allegedly no basis in domestic law, since its adoption

was not an executive measure falling within the general competence of

the Council of State. In any case, the Council of State had not been

specifically empowered by Parliament (eduskunta, riksdagen) to adopt

the programme. The programme is also claimed to be incompatible with

the planning monopoly afforded to the municipalities by law, since it

is alleged that subsequent planning would only amount to an enforcement

of the programme.

Moreover, already the publication of the draft shore conservation

programme had the immediate effect of restricting the applicants' use

of their properties for an indefinite period of time, thus causing them

financial losses, but without their receiving any compensation. The

restrictions were partly based on the allegedly unlawful amendments to

the 1959 Decree which entered into force on 1 June 1990. In particular,

the value of the applicants' properties as securities has decreased and

the properties are now impossible to sell except to the State which may

therefore "dictate" the conditions. In the above circumstances the

ownership of the applicants' properties has become so precarious that

the properties have been de facto expropriated by the State. The

applicants invoke Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.

3 The applicants furthermore complain that the expropriation threat

imposed on them amounts to an unlawful criminalisation of the use of

their properties. They point out that already the lodging of a request

for a building permit could entail the expropriation of their

properties. In this respect they invoke Article 7 of the Convention.

4 The applicants finally complain that they had no effective remedy

against the alleged violations of their Convention rights. They invoke

Article 13 of the Convention.

THE LAW

1 The applicants complain that they have no access to a court in

order to challenge, within a reasonable time, the interference with

their property rights, nor do they have any other effective remedy at

their disposal. They submit that their appeal to the Supreme

Administrative Court was not examined on its merits insofar as it

related to the alleged unlawfulness of the conservation programme and

its related repercussions. They invoke Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of

the Convention.

Insofar as it is relevant to the present case Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1) reads as follows:

"In the determination of his civil rights and obligations

..., everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing

within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial

tribunal established by law. ..."

The Commission must first ascertain whether Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1) is applicable in the instant case and, notably, whether

there was a dispute over a "civil right" which can be said, at least

on arguable grounds, to be recognised under domestic law. The dispute

must be genuine and serious and its outcome must be directly decisive

for the right in question (e.g. Eur. Court H.R., Oerlemans judgment of

27 November 1991, Series A no. 219, pp. 20-21, paras. 45-49).

In the present case the Commission considers that there existed

a dispute concerning the lawfulness of the shore conservation programme

and the allegedly related restrictions on the applicants' use of their

properties, the right of property clearly being a "civil right" within

the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) (e.g. Eur. Court H.R.,

Zander judgment of 25 November 1993, Series A no. 279-B, p. 40,

para. 27; cf. e.g. O. v. Austria, Comm. Report 14.5.93, para. 34,

pending before the European Court of Human Rights and to be published

in Series A).

The Commission finds that the conservation programme did not in

itself entail any de jure activity prohibition served on individualised

property owners and restricting the applicants' right to use their

properties without seeking prior authorisation (cf., a contrario, the

above-mentioned Oerlemans judgment, p. 10, para. 16; Eur. Court H.R.,

de Geouffre de la Pradelle judgment of 16 December 1992, Series A

no. 253-B, pp. 42-43, para. 33; Eur. Court H.R., Allan Jacobsson

judgment of 23 October 1989, Series A no. 163, pp. 19-20, paras.

68-71). Nor did the programme entail a refusal to authorise certain use

of the properties (cf., a contrario, Eur. Court H.R., Skärby judgment

of 8 June 1990, Series A no. 180-B, pp. 36-37, para. 28) or a

revocation of any permit already permitting certain use of the

properties (cf., a contrario, Fredin v. Sweden (no. 1), Comm. Report

6.11.89, paras. 90-91, Eur. Court H.R., Series A no. 192, p. 34, and

the above-mentioned de Geouffre de la Pradelle judgment, p. 43,

para. 34). Finally, the programme neither constituted the issuing of

an expropriation permit nor did it amount to an amendment of a plan

capable of otherwise extinguishing any of the applicants' property

rights (cf., a contrario, Eur. Court H.R., Sporrong and Lönnroth

judgment of 23 September 1982, Series A no. 52, pp. 29-30, para. 80,

and Eur. Court H.R., Mats Jacobsson judgment of 28 June 1990, Series A

no. 180-A, pp. 13-14, para. 33). It has not been shown that the use of

any of the applicants' properties has been restricted solely on the

basis of the conservation programme.

The Commission therefore concludes that in the particular

circumstances of the present case the dispute at issue was not directly

decisive for the applicants' "civil rights". Accordingly, Article 6

para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention is not applicable. This position

is not affected by the forestry recommendations appended to the

programme which, as their substance shows, are also of a non-binding

character.

It follows that this complaint must be rejected as being

incompatible ratione materiae with the Convention within the meaning

of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2).

2 The applicants further complain that the shore conservation

programme allegedly affecting their properties had no basis in domestic

law. It is further claimed that the programme has restricted the

applicants' use of their properties for an indefinite period of time,

but without their receiving any compensation for the financial losses

allegedly suffered by them. The applicants therefore assert that their

properties have been de facto expropriated by the State. They invoke

Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention which reads as

follows:

"Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful

enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of

his possessions except in the public interest and subject

to the conditions provided for by law and by the general

principles of international law.

The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way

impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it

deems necessary to control the use of property in

accordance with the general interest or to secure the

payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties."

The Commission recalls that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1

(P1-1) comprises three distinct rules. The first rule, set out in the

first sentence of the first paragraph, is of a general nature and

enunciates the principle of peaceful enjoyment of property. The second

rule, contained in the second sentence of the same paragraph, covers

deprivation of possessions and makes it subject to certain conditions.

The third rule, stated in the second paragraph, recognises that

Contracting States are entitled, amongst other things, to control the

use of property in accordance with the general interest. The three

rules are not "distinct" in the sense of being unconnected: the second

and third rules are concerned with particular instances of interference

with the right to peaceful enjoyment of property and should therefore

be construed in the light of the general principle enunciated in the

first rule (e.g., the above-mentioned Allan Jacobsson judgment, p. 16,

para. 53).

The Commission finds that the shore conservation programme did

not entail such serious consequences to the applicants' properties as

to amount to a de facto expropriation (cf., a contrario, Eur. Court

H.R., Papamichalopoulos judgment of 24 June 1993, Series A no. 260-B,

p. 70, paras. 45-46). The applicants have thus not been "deprived" of

their properties within the meaning of the second sentence of the first

paragraph of Article 1 (Art. 1-1).

Referring to its above conclusion with regard to the complaint

under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-2) of the Convention, the Commission

furthermore finds that the situation complained of does not constitute

a control of the use of the applicants' properties to be examined under

the second paragraph of Article 1 (Art. 1-2).

The Commission does not consider it necessary to determine

whether the situation complained of amounts to an interference with the

right guaranteed in the first sentence of the first paragraph of

Article 1 (Art. 1-1), as, even if it did, a fair balance has been

struck between the various public and private interests involved (cf.,

a contrario, the above-mentioned Sporrong and Lönnroth judgment, p. 24

et seq., para. 61 et seq.).

The Commission accepts that the aim of the shore conservation

programme was to protect valuable shore areas. This aim must be

considered as reflecting the demands of the general interest of the

community, the protection of the environment constituting an

increasingly important consideration in today's society (Eur. Court

H.R., Fredin judgment (no. 1) of 18 February 1991, Series A no. 192,

p. 16, para. 48). The decision to adopt the programme was, moreover,

made by the Council of State on the basis of its general competence

according to the Constitution Act. The Commission cannot find that

domestic law has thereby been breached.

In so far as the applicants' properties may have been adversely

affected as a result of their inclusion in the shore conservation

programme, the Commission notes that the applicants have not submitted

any evidence showing that the value of their properties has been so

substantially diminished on account of the outline objective as to

result in an unfair balancing of interests (cf., mutatis mutandis,

No. 9310/81, Dec. 16.7.86, D.R. 47 pp. 5-15, at p. 14). With reference

to the ever increasing importance attached to nature conservation the

Commission considers that some repercussions on landowners' property

rights cannot in themselves prevent the publication of a conservation

intention such as the conservation programme at issue in the present

case.

The Commission further observes that the inclusion of the

applicants' properties in the shore conservation programme resulted in

an obligation pursuant to sections 52, 124 and 137 of the 1959 Decree

on the part of the relevant municipal Building Boards to hear the

County Administrative Board in regard to proposed construction within

the area. It has not been shown, however, that this obligation has

caused any substantial adverse effects on any of the applicants'

properties.

The Commission concludes therefore that no such adverse effects

which could render the balancing of interests unfair have been shown

to exist as a result of the shore conservation programme. Accordingly,

there is no appearance of an improper balance between the protection

of the applicants' property rights and the demands of the general

interest and, consequently, no appearance of a violation of the

applicants' right to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions.

It follows that this complaint must be rejected as being

manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

3 The applicants furthermore complain that the expropriation threat

imposed on their properties amounts to an unlawful criminalisation of

their use of those properties. They invoke Article 7 (Art. 7) of the

Convention which reads as follows:

"1. No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on

account of any act or omission which did not constitute a

criminal offence under national or international law at the

time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be

imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the

criminal offence was committed.

2 This Article shall not prejudice the trial and

punishment of any person for any act or omission which, at

the time when it was committed, was criminal according to

the general principles of law recognised by civilised

nations."

The Commission considers that any use of the applicants'

properties contrary to the shore conservation programme cannot as such

be considered a "criminal offence" within the meaning of Article 7

(Art. 7). Accordingly, Article 7 (Art. 7) is not applicable.

It follows that this complaint must also be rejected as being

incompatible ratione materiae with the Convention within the meaning

of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2).

4 The applicants finally complain that they had no effective remedy

against the alleged violations of their Convention rights. They invoke

Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention which reads as follows:

"Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this

Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy

before a national authority notwithstanding that the

violation has been committed by persons acting in an

official capacity."

In view of its conclusions under nos. 1 and 3 above in regard to

the complaints under Articles 6 and 7 (Art. 6, 7) of the Convention the

Commission considers that the related aspect of the complaint under

Article 13 (Art. 13) must also be considered incompatible ratione

materiae with the provisions of the Convention.

In view of its conclusions under no. 2 above in regard to the

complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) the Commission

considers that the applicants have no "arguable claim" of a breach of

Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) which would warrant a remedy under

Article 13 (Art. 13) (see Eur. Court H.R., Powell and Rayner judgment

of 21 February 1990, Series A no. 172, p. 20, para. 46).

It follows that the complaint under Article 13 (Art. 13) must be

rejected under Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention, partly

as being incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the

Convention and partly as being manifestly ill-founded.

For these reasons, the Commission, by a majority,

DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

Secretary to the Commission President of the Commission

(H.C. KRÜGER) (C.A. NØRGAARD)

ANNEX

The applicants are:

1 Ms. Mirja Uuuhiniemi, a housewife born in 1920 and resident at

Kuhmoinen;

2 Mr. Kauko Konivuori, a farmer born in 1917 and resident at

Kuhmoinen;

3 Mr. Matti Helenius, a farmer born in 1947 and resident at

Puukkoinen;

4 Mr. Urho Lampinen, a farmer born in 1949 and resident at

Puukkoinen;

5 Ms. Maili Antila, a physician born in 1920 and resident in Turku;

6 Ms. Kaija-Leena Kosonen, a teacher in a day nursery for children,

born in 1926 and resident in Pori;

7 Mr. Allan Flinck, a farmer born in 1928 and resident at

Puukkoinen;

8 Mr. Ari Uuhiniemi, a farmer born in 1952 and resident at

Puukkoinen;

9 The estate of Mr. Olavi Savijärvi represented by Ms. Helvi

Savijärvi, a housewife born in 1923 and resident at Kuhmoinen;

10 Mr. Vesa Savijärvi, a farmer born in 1953 and resident at

Puukkoinen;

11 Mr. Veikko Koskinen, a farmer born in 1934 and resident at

Puukkoinen;

12 Mr. Risto Rannisto, a lumberjack born in 1944 and resident at

Länkipojha;

13 Ms. Rauha Janhonen, a housewife born in 1916 and resident at

Länkipohja;

14 Ms. Riitta Tilus, a city clerk born in 1949 and resident at

Himanka; and

15 Mr. Seppo Tilus, a farmer born in 1948 and resident at Himanka.