Murray v. the United Kingdom



AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application No. 22384/93

by Kevin MURRAY

against the United Kingdom

The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on

10 October 1994, the following members being present:

MM. C.A. NØRGAARD, President

S. TRECHSEL

A. WEITZEL

F. ERMACORA

E. BUSUTTIL

G. JÖRUNDSSON

A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

J.-C. SOYER

H.G. SCHERMERS

H. DANELIUS

Mrs. G.H. THUNE

MM. F. MARTINEZ

C.L. ROZAKIS

Mrs. J. LIDDY

MM. L. LOUCAIDES

J.-C. GEUS

M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

G.B. REFFI

M.A. NOWICKI

I. CABRAL BARRETO

B. CONFORTI

N. BRATZA

I. BÉKÉS

J. MUCHA

E. KONSTANTINOV

D. SVÁBY

G. RESS

Mr. H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission

Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

Having regard to the application introduced on 27 April 1993 by

K.S.M. against the United Kingdom and registered on 15 July 1993 under

file No. 22384/93;

Having regard to:

- reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of the

Commission;

- the observations submitted by the respondent Government on 2

March 1994

Having deliberated;

Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicant is a British citizen born in 1970 and presently

detained in the Maze Prison, Northern Ireland. He is represented by

Messrs. John Fahy & Company, a firm of solicitors practising in

Strabane, County Tyrone.

The facts as submitted by the parties, and which may be deduced

from documents lodged with the application, may be summarised as

follows.

On 13 March 1989, at 07.30, W.A., a part-time soldier in the

Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR), was injured after being shot four times

by two gunmen wearing balaclava helmets over their faces.

Shortly after that same day, the police went to the applicant's

house and asked him to account for his movements since the previous

evening. The applicant stated that he had spent the previous night at

a friend's house and that he had returned to his own house at 09.00

hours that day. When questioned about certain items of clothing, in

particular a pair of jeans which had mud on them, the applicant

explained that he had worn them when out hunting.

At 11.28 hours, the applicant was arrested under section 12 of

the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1984 in

connection with the shooting of W.A..

The applicant was taken to Castlereagh Police Office, where on

arrival he requested to see a solicitor. At 13.30 hours, a Detective

Superintendent authorised a delay in access to a solicitor for 48

hours, pursuant to section 15 of the Northern Ireland (Emergency

Provisions) Act 1987.

The applicant was cautioned, pursuant to Article 3 of the

Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1988, that a failure to

mention any fact that he later relied on in his defence in court might

be treated as supporting the case against him. He was also cautioned,

pursuant to Article 5 of the Order, in respect of adverse inferences

which might be drawn from any failure to account for items of clothing

in his possession on which were marks or substances attributable to

participation in the commission of an offence, and also in respect of

fibres found in his hair from a balaclava helmet allegedly used by one

of the gunmen. The applicant remained silent.

The applicant saw his solicitor on 15 March 1989 at 11.26 hours.

He was advised to remain silent.

On 18 March 1989, the applicant was charged with attempted murder

and possession of a firearm with intent to endanger life. He was

subsequently charged with the wounding of W.A. and possession of a

firearm for no lawful object.

On 23 March 1989, the applicant's application to be released on

bail was refused by the judge on the grounds of the serious nature of

the charges and the serious risk of the applicant not turning up for

trial.

Between 13 and 22 March 1989, 38 items were delivered by the

police for examination by the Northern Ireland Forensic Science

Laboratory ("NIFSL"). On 5 April and 14 June 1989, further exhibits

were delivered to the NIFSL.

The forensic report on cartridge residue was issued on 18 May

1989, the report on tyre mark comparisons on 31 October 1989, and the

report on fibre elements on 29 November 1989.

On 8 August 1989, the police file was received at the office of

the Director of Public Prosecutions.

The decision to prosecute was taken late November/early December

and the file was forwarded to the case preparation section for

committal proceedings to be arranged.

The direction to prosecute was signed but held back pending the

Attorney General's decision whether to consent to prosecution against

the applicant's co-accused, L., for the offence of allowing property

to be used for terrorism (ie. the Vauxhall car of L.' s father which

L. had borrowed on 13 March 1990 and which the police alleged to have

been the car used by the two gunmen).

The Attorney General gave consent for L.'s prosecution on 11

January 1990. On 24 January 1990, the direction to prosecute the

applicant and L. was sent to the Chief Constable.

The committal for trial was fixed for 21 February 1990 but was

adjourned when L., who was on bail, absconded. The committal papers had

to be edited for the applicant to be charged alone.

On 28 March 1990, the applicant was committed for trial. The bill

of indictment was received at the Crown Court office on 2 May 1990. He

was arraigned on 13 June 1990 and because of the serious nature of the

charges his case was scheduled for hearing before a High court judge.

The applicant's case was listed for hearing initially on 20

November 1990 but subject twice to short postponements when the trial

before overran.

The applicant was tried before a judge sitting without a jury

from 26 to 28 November 1990.

At his trial, the applicant on the advice of his legal advisers

did not give evidence.

The prosecution case was founded on circumstantial evidence of

a forensic nature linking the applicant with the Vauxhall car allegedly

used by the gunmen (a thumb print of the applicant on the interior rear

view mirror), and including residue of discharge from a firearm on a

pair of jeans owned by the applicant and fibres in his hair consistent

with those from a balaclava helmet allegedly used by one of the gunmen.

The applicant's father gave evidence that he and his son had been

shooting at rabbits several days before the shooting of the UDR

soldier. P. gave evidence that the night before the shooting the

applicant had sat and talked with him in the Vauxhall car which L. had

borrowed from his father. Another witness, I., stated that he had seen

the applicant driving the Vauxhall car that evening in the company of

L. It was also asserted in the applicant's defence that the fibres in

his hair could have come from similar material in his anorak rather

than the balaclava.

On 18 January 1991, the applicant was found guilty of the

offences of attempted murder of W.A. and possession of a firearm with

intent to endanger life. He was sentenced to a total of eighteen years'

imprisonment.

The trial judge in convicting the applicant relied upon Article

4 of the Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1988, pursuant to

which at the end of the prosecution case he had called upon the

applicant to give evidence in his own defence in default of which

adverse inferences could be drawn. He also drew inferences under

Article 3 of the Order from the applicant's silence during questioning

by the police, but declined to draw inferences under Article 5.

The trial judge stated in regard to Article 3 of the Order and

the applicant's failure to respond to questions by the police:

"By this silence, can it be said that he failed to mention

facts relied upon in his defence at the trial? I do not

forget that before he was cautioned under Article 3 at

Castlereagh he gave a general account of his movements to

Detective Constable Bell and explained the condition of his

jeans on the ground that he had been out "hunting" two days

before. What he omitted to do in reply to the caution under

Article 3 was to repeat these matters of his defence and to

fail to answer questions relative to their detail. He

omitted to mention at all and this to me is significant

that he had driven the Vauxhall car on the Saturday night

before the crime and that he had met up with <B., P. and

L.> in the early hours of the 13th. I consider that the

<applicant> "could reasonably have been expected" to have

mentioned these matters at Castlereagh. The "hunting" story

could have been investigated by the police. Its forensic

significance would have been considered by the firearms

expert. The potentially damning evidence of the

fingerprint, if left unexplained, found on the car mirror

was brought home to the accused at Castlereagh in clear

language as was the evidence linking the car to the scene

of the crime. The incriminating nature of fingerprint

evidence must be well-known to any member of the public. I

would have expected a suspect when faced with this, if he

had an innocent alternative to give, to have given it.

I do not, however, in all the circumstances draw the

strongest adverse inference that one may be entitled to

draw in other cases under Article 3. My reason is that he

did disclose in general terms some of the facts relied on

in his defence. But I do find that his failure to mention

the particular matters that he did, many of which were of

the greatest importance in his defence, reduces the

credibility of his defence and increases the weight of the

prosecution case..."

In relation to the applicant's silence in court and the

application of Article 4 of the Order, the trial judge commented:

"In the instant case it seems to be that what the prosecution has

proved in evidence calls for evidence from the accused in the

witness box. No reasons have been advanced for his refusal to

give evidence. Nor are any reasons apparent to the court for

withholding his account on oath. Indeed it seems to me remarkable

he has not given evidence. It is not the function of the court

to conjure up reasons for his silence. He has been told by the

court in plain language what the consequences of his failure may

be and he has no doubt been advised by his experienced counsel

to the same effect. It is only commonsense, in the circumstances,

to infer as proper inference that he is not prepared to assert

his innocence on oath because that is not the case. The inference

which I draw from his failure to give evidence under Article 4

is stronger and much more to his detriment than that drawn by me

under Article 3."

The applicant appealed against his conviction, alleging inter

alia that the judge had erred in applying Article 4 of the 1988 Order

in his case. The appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal in

Northern Ireland on 25 October 1991. Lord Chief Justice Hutton, giving

the judgment of the court, rejected the argument by the applicant's

counsel that the approach of the trial judge had the effect of

reversing the burden of proof. It found that the trial judge had

correctly drawn an inference from the applicant's failure to give

evidence:

"The right of the court under Article 4 to draw such

inferences as appear proper arises once the Crown has

established a prima facie case and does not require that

the Crown case constituted by the evidence should be `on

the brink' of proving guilt or should create a situation

which at common law would be regarded as a `confession and

avoidance' situation. But whether or not the court will

draw inferences will depend upon the circumstances of the

particular case and, if inferences are drawn, the strength

of those inferences will also depend upon the particular

circumstances of the case.

There may be cases where, despite the refusal of the

accused to give evidence when called upon by the court to

do so pursuant to Article 4, the court may think it

inappropriate to draw any inferences against him. Moreover,

before convicting the court, having regard to the evidence

adduced by the Crown and to the inferences (if any) which

it draws under Article 4, must always be satisfied that the

Crown has discharged the burden of proving that the accused

is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Article 4 does not

alter the fundamental principle that the burden rests on

the Crown to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The refusal of the accused to give evidence on his own

behalf does not in itself indicate guilt. Under Article 4

it would be improper for the court to draw the bare

inference that because the accused refused to give evidence

in his own defence he was therefore guilty. But where

commonsense permits it, it is proper in an appropriate case

for the court to draw the inference from the refusal of the

accused to give evidence that there is no reasonable

possibility of an innocent explanation to rebut the prima

facie case established by the evidence adduced by the

Crown, and for the drawing of this inference to lead on to

the conclusion, after all the evidence in the case has been

considered, that the accused is guilty...

We consider that in this case the trial judge was entitled

to draw the inference from the refusal of the appellant to

give evidence in his own defence that there was no

reasonable possibility of an innocent explanation which he

could put forward to rebut the inference which could be

drawn from the evidence adduced by the Crown, and that

accordingly the inference which the Crown submitted should

be drawn from that evidence, namely that the appellant was

one of the gunmen who used the Vauxhall car and who shot

and wounded <W.A.>... was correct and that therefore the

appellant was guilty...".

While the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge had erred

in drawing an inference under Article 3 of the Order from the failure

to offer an explanation for the fingerprint (ie. the fingerprint had

not been identified as that of the applicant until after his interviews

with the police), it found that this error did not invalidate his

general findings. It concluded that the convictions were not rendered

thereby unsafe or unsatisfactory.

The applicant was granted leave to appeal to the House of Lords.

In its judgment of 29 October 1992, the House of Lords rejected

the applicant's appeal, agreeing with the judgment of the Court of

Appeal.

Lord Slynn in the leading judgment stated:

"The accused cannot be compelled to give evidence but he

must risk the consequences if he does not do so. Those

consequences are not simply, as the appellant contends,

that specific inferences may be drawn from specific facts.

They include in a proper case the drawing of an inference

that the accused is guilty of the events with which he is

charged.

This does not mean that the court can conclude simply

because the accused does not give evidence that he is

guilty. In the first place the prosecutor must establish a

prima facie case - a case for him to answer. In the second

place in determining whether the accused is guilty the

judge or jury can draw only `such inferences from the

refusal as appear proper'. As Lord Diplock said in Haw Tua

Tau v. Public Prosecutor at p. 153B:

`What inferences are proper to be drawn from an

accused's refusal to give evidence depend upon

the circumstances of the particular case, and is

a question to be decided by applying ordinary

commonsense.'

There must thus be some basis derived from the

circumstances which justify the inference.

If there is no prima facie case shown by the prosecution

there is no case to answer. Equally if parts of the

prosecution had so little evidential value that they called

for no answer, a failure to deal with those specific

matters cannot justify an inference of guilt.

On the other hand if aspects of the evidence taken alone or

in combination with other facts clearly call for an

explanation which the accused ought to be in a position to

give, if an explanation exists, then a failure to give any

explanation may as a matter of commonsense allow the

drawing of an inference that there is no explanation and

that the accused is guilty...

In the present case if the only evidence relied on was that

relating to the fibres in the hair, on the clothing and in

the car, it might well not be enough to justify an

inference that the accused was guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt. The cartridge residue on the jeans, the thumb print

on the mirror and the mud on the trousers, the evidence

that he was not at home during the night clearly taken in

combination call for an explanation if there was one. The

judge was moreover entitled to have regard to the

cumulative effect of all the circumstantial evidence in

deciding whether a failure to give evidence justified an

inference of guilt.

In my opinion the evidence adduced by the prosecution

established a clear prima facie case and the trial judge

was entitled in all the circumstances of the case, and as

a matter of commonsense, to infer that there was no

innocent explanation to the prima facie case and that the

accused was guilty... Contrary to the <applicant's>

contention, he quite plainly did not proceed on the basis

that simply because the accused did not give evidence he

was therefore guilty...".

Relevant domestic law and practice

Provisions governing inferences which may be drawn from an

accused's silence

Article 3 of the Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1988

(hereafter referred to as the Order) provides as relevant:

"Circumstances in which inferences may be drawn from accused's

failure to mention particular facts when questioned, charged,

etc.

3 (1) Where, in any proceedings against a person for an

offence, evidence is given that the accused

(a) at any time before he was charged with the

offence, on being questioned by a constable

trying to discover whether or by whom the

offence has been committed, failed to mention

any fact relied on in his defence in those

proceedings; or

(b) on being charged with the offence or officially

informed that he might be prosecuted for it,

failed to mention any such fact,

being a fact which in the circumstances existing at the

time the accused could reasonably have been expected to

mention when so questioned, charged or informed, as the

case may be, paragraph (2) applies.

(2) Where this paragraph applies:

(a) the court, in determining whether to commit

the accused for trial or whether there is a case

to answer,

(b) a judge, in deciding whether to grant an

application made by the accused under Article 5

of the Criminal Justice (Serious Fraud)

(Northern Ireland) Order 1988 (application for

dismissal of charge where a case of fraud has

been transferred from a magistrates' court to

the Crown Court under Article 3 of that Order),

and

(c) the court or jury, in determining whether

the accused is guilty of the offence charged,

may

(i) draw such inferences from the failure

as appear proper;

(ii) on the basis of such inferences treat the

failure as, or as capable of amounting to,

corroboration of any evidence given against the

accused in relation to which the failure is

material.

(3) Subject to any directions by the court, evidence tending to

establish the failure may be given before or after evidence

tending to establish the fact which the accused is alleged to

have failed to mention."

Article 4 of the Order provides as relevant:

"Accused to be called upon to give evidence at trial

4 (1) At the trial of any person (other than a child) for an

offence paragraphs (2) to (7) apply unless

(a) the accused's guilt is not in issue, or

(b) it appears to the court that the physical or

mental condition of the accused makes it undesirable

for him to be called upon to give evidence;

but paragraph (2) does not apply if, before any evidence is

called for the defence, the accused or counsel or a solicitor

representing him informs the court that the accused will give

evidence.

(2) Before any evidence is called for the defence, the court

(a) shall tell the accused that he will be

called upon by the court to give evidence in his

own defence, and

(b) shall tell him in ordinary language what the

effect of this Article will be if

(i) when so called upon, he refuses

to be sworn;

(ii) having been sworn, without good

cause he refuses to answer any

question;

and thereupon the court shall call upon the accused to give

evidence.

(3) If the accused

(a) after being called upon by the court to give

evidence in pursuance of this Article, or after

he or counsel or a solicitor representing him

has informed the court that he will give

evidence, refuses to be sworn, or

(b) having been sworn, without good cause

refuses to answer any question, paragraph (4)

applies.

(4) The court or jury, in determining whether the accused is

guilty of the offence charged, may

(a) draw such inferences from the refusal as

appear proper;

(b) on the basis of such inferences, treat the

refusal as, or as capable of amounting to,

corroboration of any evidence given against the

accused in relation to which the refusal is

material."

Provisions governing access to a solicitor

Section 15 of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act

1987 provides as relevant:

"15. Right of access to legal advice

(1) A person who is detained under the terrorism provisions and

is being held in police custody shall be entitled, if he so

requests, to consult a solicitor privately...

(4) If a person makes such a request, he must be permitted to

consult a solicitor as soon as is practicable except to the

extent that any delay is permitted by this section...

(8) An officer may only authorise a delay in complying with a

request under subsection (1) where he has reasonable grounds for

believing that the exercise of the right conferred by that

subsection at the time when the detained person desires to

exercise it -

...

(d) will lead to interference with the gathering of

information about the commission, preparation or

instigation of acts of terrorism; or

(e) by alerting any person, will make it more difficult -

i. to prevent an act of terrorism, or

ii. to secure the apprehension, prosecution or

conviction of any person in connection with the

commission, preparation or instigation of an act of

terrorism."

The delay must be authorised by a police officer of at least the

rank of superintendent (sub-section (5)(a)), and the detained person

must be told the reason for the delay (subsection (7)). The maximum

delay is 48 hours.

COMPLAINTS

The applicant complains of the period of detention up to the date

of the original judgment, invoking Article 5 para. 3 of the Convention.

The applicant contends that the application of Article 4 of the

Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1988 violated his right to

a fair trial, as guaranteed by Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention, and

that it effectively removed the presumption of innocence, contrary to

Article 6 para. 2 of the Convention.

The applicant submits that the application of Article 3 of the

1988 Order also abrogated his right to remain silent and violated

Article 6 para. 3(b) of the Convention.

Further, the applicant contends that the refusal to allow him

access to a solicitor was in breach of Article 5 para. 3 of the

Convention.

Finally, he invokes Articles 13 and 14 of the Convention.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

The application was introduced on 27 April 1993 and registered

on 15 July 1993.

On 11 October 1993, the Commission decided to communicate the

application to the Government and to ask for written observations on

the admissibility and merits of the case.

The Government's observations were submitted on 2 March 1994,

after two extensions in the time-limit fixed for this purpose. The

applicant was invited to submit written observations in reply by 28

April 1994. None were produced.

THE LAW

1 The applicant has complained of the length of his detention on

remand. He invokes Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of the Convention,

which provides:

"Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions

of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly

before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise

judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable

time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by

guarantees to appear for trial."

The period to be considered under the above provision runs from

the applicant's arrest on 13 March 1989 to the date on which the first

instance court determined the charges against him, ie. in this case on

18 January 1991 - an overall period of 22 months and five days.

The Commission notes that the applicant was refused release on

bail on the ground of the serious risk that he would abscond. The

Commission recalls that the applicant's co-accused did in fact abscond

when released before trial and it finds that the authorities had

reasonable grounds to fear the applicant, facing more serious charges

than his co-accused, might do the same.

The case-law of the Convention organs indicates that where

relevant and sufficient grounds exist for detention pending trial, it

must be ascertained that the competent domestic authorities displayed

"special diligence" in the conduct of the proceedings (eg. Eur. Court

H.R., Tomasi judgment of 27 August 1992, Series A no. 241, p. 35,

para. 84).

As regards the conduct of the proceedings, the Commission recalls

that the case rested primarily on the forensic evidence which was

dispatched to a laboratory for analysis and report. While the bulk of

the material had been sent to the laboratory by 22 March 1989,

additional exhibits were delivered on 5 April and 14 June 1989, and the

reports of the NIFSL were issued on 18 May, 31 October and 29 November

1989.

The Commission does not find that the time spent on producing the

forensic reports, which necessarily required careful and thorough

preparation, was of such length as to disclose a lack of expedition.

The time which elapsed between committal and trial also, in the

Commission's view, does not disclose undue delay.

There was also a lapse of time between the committal of the

applicant for trial on 28 March 1990 and the beginning of his trial on

26 November 1990. However, part of this time was required for the

filing of the bill of indictment and the arraignment of the applicant

before the court. In any event, the Commission cannot find that the

delay which may have occurred at that stage was sufficiently important

to warrant a finding of a violation of Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of

the Convention.

Consequently, the Commission finds that the applicant's detention

on remand did not exceed a "reasonable time" within the meaning of

Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of the Convention.

It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as

manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

2 The applicant also complains that he was deprived of the right

to silence and the presumption of innocence in the criminal proceedings

brought against him as a result of the operation of the provisions of

the Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1988, which permitted

a judge, sitting without a jury, to draw inferences from his failure

to answer police questions and from his failure to give evidence in his

own defence during the trial. He further complains that he was deprived

of access to his solicitor in the first 48 hours of his detention. The

applicant invokes Article 6 paras. 1, 2 and 3 (b), Article 13 and

Article 14 (Art. 6-1, 6-2, 6-3-b, 13, 14) of the Convention. These

provide as relevant:

Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention:

"In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of

any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair

and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and

impartial tribunal established by law...".

Article 6 para. 2 (Art. 6-2) of the Convention:

"Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed

innocent until proved guilty according to law."

Article 6 para. 3 (b) (Art. 6-3-b) of the Convention:

"Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following

minimum rights:

...

b. to have adequate time and facilities for the

preparation of his defence;".

Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention:

"Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this

Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a

national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been

committed by persons acting in an official capacity."

Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention:

"The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this

Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground

such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other

opinion, national or social origin, association with a national

minority, property, birth or other status."

The Government submit, inter alia, that the provisions of the

1988 Order did not operate to deprive the applicant either of a fair

hearing, contrary to Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention,

or of the presumption of innocence contrary Article 6 para. 2

(Art. 6-2) . They refer to the safeguards provided in the Order: no

inference may be drawn unless the suspect/accused has been warned in

advance of the possible effect; before any inference is drawn, the

prosecution must have established a prima facie case against the

accused; the judge has a discretion whether to draw an inference and

is limited to drawing only such inferences as may be proper. The Order

merely allows the trier of fact to draw such inferences as common sense

dictates. In the present case, there was a formidable case against the

applicant which called for evidence from the applicant if there was an

innocent explanation for his conduct. The burden of proof remained

throughout on the prosecution.

As regards the denial of access by the applicant to his solicitor

for 48 hours, the Government contend that this delay did not

disadvantage the applicant in the conduct of his defence and therefore

discloses no violation of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention.

The Commission has taken cognizance of the submissions of the

parties. It notes similar issues regarding the right to silence and

presumption of innocence are at present under examination by the

European Court of Human Rights in the case of John Murray v. the United

Kingdom. It considers that, in the circumstances, it is not appropriate

at the present time to decide on the admissibility of this part of the

application.

For these reasons, the Commission by a majority

DECLARES INADMISSIBLE the applicant's complaint concerning the

length of his detention on remand;

ADJOURNS the examination of the remainder of the application.

Secretary to the Commission President of the Commission

(H.C. KRÜGER) (C.A. NØRGAARD)