CASE OF M.P. AND OTHERS v. GREECE

THIRD SECTION

CASE OF M.P. AND OTHERS v. GREECE

(Application no. 2068/24)

Art 8 • Family life • Return of two children to father in United States ordered by Greek courts in international child abduction proceedings • National authorities required to examine whether or not to hear the child, directly or otherwise, with eventuality of reasoned decision in the negative • Domestic courts, being bound to act in the best interests of the child, should have considered whether to hear the children, irrespective of any express request by the applicants • Domestic authorities not having used all the means at their disposal to rule out any “grave risk” • Decision-making process under domestic law not having satisfied the procedural requirements inherent in Art 8 • Forced return in question not necessary in a democratic society

Prepared by the Registry, not binding on the Court.

9 September 2025

09/12/2025

This judgment has become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of M.P. and Others v. Greece,

The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:

Peeter Roosma , President , Ioannis Ktistakis, Lətif Hüseynov, Diana Kovatcheva, Mateja Đurović, Canòlic Mingorance Cairat, Vasilka Sancin , judges , and Olga Chernishova, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the application (no. 2068/24) against the Hellenic Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by three Greek and US nationals, Ms M.P. (“the first applicant”), Ms E.A.A. (“the second applicant”) and Mr I.R.A. (“the third applicant”), on 19 January 2024,

the decision to give notice to the Greek Government (“the Government”) of the complaint under Article 8 of the Convention and to declare the remainder of the application inadmissible,

the decision not to disclose the applicants’ identity,

the decision to give priority to the application (Rule 41 of the Rules of Court (“the Rules”)),

the parties’ observations,

the observations submitted by G.A., a Greek and US national and father of the second and third applicants, who had been invited by the President of the Chamber to intervene as a third party,

Having deliberated in private on 8 July 2025,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

1 The application concerns the return of two children to the United States of America as ordered by the Greek courts in the context of international child abduction proceedings. The mother (the first applicant) and the children (the second and third applicants) complained of a violation of Article 8 of the Convention, arguing in particular that the Greek courts had not effectively examined the alleged existence of a grave risk for the children in the event of their return.

2 The applicants, who are Greek and US nationals, were born in 1981, 2018 and 2016 respectively. The first applicant lives in Rhodes and the second and third applicants live in the United States. They were represented by Mr P. Stefanou and Mr A. Tsatsos, lawyers practising in Thessaloniki and Rhodes respectively.

3 The Government were represented by their Agent, N. Marioli, and their delegates, Ms Z. Chatzipavlou and Ms I. Krompa, Legal Assistants, State Legal Council.

4 The facts of the case, as established by the domestic courts, may be summarised as follows.

5 In 2014 the first applicant came into contact with G.A., a Greek and US national, on Facebook. In January 2015 she met G.A. in Rhodes during his holiday on the island.

6 In September 2015 the first applicant travelled to the United States.

7 In 2016 she was recruited by a private nursery in Houston, Texas. On 19 April 2016 she married G.A. in Houston, where the third applicant was born.

8 In 2017 the applicants and G.A. moved to Orlando, Florida, where the second applicant was born in 2018.

9 Between 2018 and 2020 there were episodes of conflict in the relations between the first applicant and G.A. (the parents).

10 In October 2020 the first applicant travelled to Rhodes (Greece) with the second and third applicants. The father, G.A., had consented, in a statement made before a notary, to the applicants’ stay in Greece until 4 February 2021, the date scheduled for their return to Florida. However, on 5 November 2020 the airline with which they were due to travel informed the applicants that, owing to the COVID-19 pandemic, their flight had been changed and that the return destination was now Miami. On 27 January 2021 the first applicant informed G.A. that she was postponing her return to Florida with the children until May 2021, citing the inconvenience of the proposed itinerary.

11 Subsequently, the first applicant, who was living with the second and third applicants at her parents’ home in Rhodes, enrolled them in school and affiliated them to her Greek social security scheme. In March 2021 she started working on the island as a psychologist.

12 On 5 August 2021 G.A. brought proceedings in the Greek courts seeking the return of the second and third applicants to the United States (see paragraph 19 below).

13 On 19 September 2022 the Seminole County Circuit Court (Eighteenth Judicial Circuit, Florida) dissolved the marriage between the first applicant and G.A., in accordance with the husband’s petition.

14 Between 9 August 2022 and 17 July 2023 the first applicant filed several criminal complaints against G.A. for breach of the obligation to pay maintenance ( παραβίαση υποχρέωσης διατροφής ) as recognised by decision no. 217/2022 of the Rhodes Court of First Instance.

15 . On 7 June 2023 the first applicant filed a criminal complaint against G.A. and his entourage alleging threats and domestic violence against the second and third applicants.

16 . On 31 January 2024 the Circuit Court issued an Order (case no. 2021-DR-2478) temporarily awarding sole custody and sole parental responsibility to G.A. On 12 July 2024 it made that award permanent and also ordered a psychological assessment of the first applicant.

17 . According to the applicants, G.A. had in the meantime moved to Rhodes after accepting a teaching post at the University of Patras (Greece). In support of their allegations, they produced to the Court a summary of an appointment notice dated 2 July 2024 issued by the rector of that university.

18 It appears from decision no. 326/2025 of the Rhodes Court of First Instance that in December 2024 the second and third applicants returned to the United States, where they live with their father, G.A. (see paragraph 44 below).

19 . On 5 August 2021 G.A. applied to the Rhodes Court of First Instance seeking the return of the second and third applicants to the United States. Before that court, sitting in a single-judge formation and deciding on interim measures, the first applicant, acting in her own name and on behalf of the second and third applicants, disputed the allegation of G.A., who was also acting in his own name and on behalf of the second and third applicants, that he had not consented to the children’s permanent settlement in Rhodes. She also contended that the second and third applicants had fully settled into their new environment in Rhodes and that G.A. had a demanding job in the US, where, according to her, he would have no support for the day-to-day care of the children, particularly during his working hours. Returning them to the US would therefore irremediably damage their mental health.

20 In judgment no. 216/2022 of 12 May 2022, the court accepted that G.A. had agreed only to the children’s temporary stay in Rhodes and that no final decision had been taken by G.A. and the first applicant as to whether they should settle permanently in Greece. Accordingly, the court held that the retention of the second and third applicants in Greece was unlawful within the meaning of Article 3 of the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the civil aspects of international child abduction (“the Hague Convention”).

21 . Nevertheless, the Greek court found that there was a grave risk that the second and third applicants would be exposed to psychological harm and placed in an intolerable situation, within the meaning of Article 13 (b) of the Hague Convention, if they returned to the United States, on the grounds that they were going to school and had settled into their new surroundings in Rhodes, where they had forged ties with their peers, and were receiving moral and financial support from the first applicant and her relatives, in addition to their affection and love. The court also considered that it would be impossible for the second and third applicants to settle in the United States, where they would be thousands of kilometres away from the first applicant, to whom they were attached and who, not being able to work or reside in that country because of the dissolution of her marriage to G.A., could not be with them there. It therefore concluded that any return of the children to that country would have negative effects on their psychosocial situation and their mental balance. Lastly, the court noted that G.A. worked all hours, that he did not have any help from family or friends, or social support for the day-to-day care of the second and third applicants, and that, if he entrusted the children to third parties during his working hours, this would have serious consequences for their mental health and would be perceived by them as abandonment ( απόρριψη ) and, consequently, as psychological abuse ( ψυχική κακοποίηση ) liable to cause them feelings of anxiety and insecurity.

22 . On 5 July 2022 G.A. appealed against judgment no. 216/2022 of the Rhodes Court of First Instance. Both G.A. and the first applicant acted in their own names and on behalf of the second and third applicants in the appeal proceedings. In their grounds of appeal, the applicants submitted that there was a “grave risk” within the meaning of Article 13 (b) of the Hague Convention, repeating the allegations they had made before the first-instance court.

23 . In judgment no. 325/2022 of 29 December 2022 the Dodecanese Court of Appeal, sitting in a single-judge formation, granted G.A.’s request, set aside the first-instance judgment concerning the existence of harm or an intolerable situation for the second and third applicants and ordered their return to the United States with their father (G.A.).

24 . The appellate court held that the integration of the second and third applicants into their new environment in Greece was not sufficient for their return to their State of habitual residence to constitute harm or an intolerable situation. In particular, the Court of Appeal held as follows:

“[i]t has not been established that: (a) their return would expose them to imminent harm, since it would not involve a return to a region affected by war, famine or epidemics, or to a parent who abuses alcohol or drugs; (b) there would be special circumstances consisting of domestic violence inflicted by G.A. on the first or second and third applicants, sexual abuse, verbal abuse, physical or emotional abandonment, or that G.A., to whom the second and third applicants are to return, would lead an immoral life. It should be noted that for the threshold of psychological or physical harm or an intolerable situation to be reached, any disturbance sustained by minor children must go beyond the unavoidable and ordinary disturbance caused by the return process, and not simply be linked to less favourable living conditions. In any event, it is certain that their psychological balance and daily life would be disrupted by returning to their place of habitual residence and being separated from their mother. However, this harm is due to their parents’ divorce ... and not to their return to their place of habitual residence, where they were born and remained until their arrival in Greece.”

25 On 4 January 2023 the first applicant, acting in her own name and on behalf of the second and third applicants, lodged an appeal on points of law. She relied on two grounds of appeal.

26 In her first ground she submitted that the Court of Appeal had accepted, in an ambiguous and contradictory manner, that the second and third applicants were habitually resident in Florida but had not ruled out the possibility that their habitual residence was now in Rhodes. She further considered that the Court of Appeal had adopted ambiguous reasoning concerning the question whether the retention of the second and third applicants was unlawful or whether it was based on an agreement between the first applicant and G.A. that they should settle in Rhodes.

27 In her second ground of appeal, she complained that the Court of Appeal had not applied Article 13 (b) of the Hague Convention, although it was, in her view, applicable in the instant case, and had thereby infringed that provision.

28 By decision no. 31/2023 of 16 February 2023, the Court of Cassation suspended the enforcement of the Court of Appeal’s judgment no. 325/2022 pending its own judgment on the applicants’ appeal on points of law.

29 . In judgment no. 1830/2023 of 12 December 2023 the Court of Cassation dismissed the appeal on points of law, upholding the Court of Appeal’s judgment. As regards the first ground of appeal, the Court of Cassation, citing the terms of the impugned judgment, found that the reasoning given concerning, firstly, the determination of the second and third applicants’ habitual residence prior to their travel to Rhodes, and secondly their unlawful retention, had been clear, sufficient and devoid of contradiction. As to the second ground of appeal, the Court of Cassation endorsed the Court of Appeal’s reasoning, holding that it had correctly interpreted the exception, which it had not applied in the instant case, under Article 13 (b) of the Hague Convention.

30 On 11 January 2024 G.A. initiated enforcement proceedings in respect of judgment no. 325/2022 of the Court of Appeal, serving the first applicant with the writ of execution ( απόγραφο ), dated 3 January 2024.

31 On 19 January 2024 the applicants submitted a request for interim measures under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court to suspend the second and third applicants’ return to the United States. On 22 January 2024 the President of the Chamber rejected that request.

32 On 16 April 2024 G.A. lodged a criminal complaint against the first applicant, alleging, inter alia , child abduction. On the same day the police handed the second and third applicants over to G.A.

33 . On 17 April 2024 the first applicant applied to the Rhodes Court of First Instance for a temporary resolution of the situation ( προσωρινή ρύθμιση της κατάστασης ), in the context of proceedings for provisional measures, seeking an order allowing the second and third applicants to stay with her in Rhodes (application no. 238/2024). The application was accompanied by a request for an interim order ( προσωρινή διαταγή ).

34 On 18 April 2024 the Rhodes Civil Court of First Instance, sitting in a single-judge formation, granted the request for an interim order and prohibited the second and third applicants from leaving Greek territory. On 19 April 2024 the same court ordered G.A. to bring the second and third applicants back to Rhodes for that reason.

35 On 20 April 2024 the second and third applicants were handed over to the first applicant.

36 On 22 April 2024 G.A. again served the writ of execution ( απόγραφο ) in respect of the Court of Appeal’s judgment no. 325/2022 on the first applicant, thereby initiating new enforcement proceedings.

37 . On 24 April 2024 the first applicant lodged an objection ( ανακοπή – application no. 267/2024) seeking to have the writs of execution (of 3 January 2024 and 22 April 2024) set aside. The objection in question was accompanied by a request for the stay of execution of judgment no. 325/2022 (application no. 264/2024).

38 . On 17 June 2024, by decision no. 268/2024 (provisional measures procedure on a request for a temporary resolution of the situation), the Rhodes Civil Court of First Instance dismissed the first applicant’s application no. 238/2024 (see paragraph 33 above).

39 On the same day, by decision no. 269/2024 (provisional measures proceedings on a request to have the writs of execution set aside), the Rhodes Civil Court of First Instance partly granted the first applicant’s application no. 264/2024, ordering the suspension of the enforcement proceedings concerning the Court of Appeal’s judgment no. 325/2022, proceedings which G.A. had brought on 22 April 2024 (see paragraph 37 above).

40 On 6 September 2024 G.A. initiated fresh enforcement proceedings in respect of judgment no. 325/2022 of the Court of Appeal, serving the first applicant with the corresponding writ of execution ( απόγραφο ).

41 The first applicant submitted that on 1 December 2024 the second and third applicants had been removed from her custody by the police and handed over to G.A.

42 . On 3 December 2024 the applicants lodged an application with the Rethymno Court of First Instance, in the context of provisional measure proceedings, for temporary custody of the second and third applicants to be awarded to the first applicant (application no. 552/2024). That application was accompanied by a request for an interim order ( προσωρινή διαταγή ) prohibiting G.A. from leaving Greece with the second and third applicants without the first applicant’s consent. On the same day the Rethymno Court of First Instance, sitting in a single-judge formation, dismissed the request for an interim order.

43 . On 5 December 2024 the applicants lodged an application with the Patras Court of First Instance for a temporary resolution of the situation ( προσωρινή ρύθμιση της κατάστασης ), in provisional measure proceedings, seeking an order prohibiting G.A. from leaving Greece with the second and third applicants (application no. 491/2024). The application was accompanied by a request for an interim order ( προσωρινή διαταγή ). On the same day, the Patras Court of First Instance, sitting in a single-judge formation, provisionally granted the request for an interim order pending the hearing of the case (6 December 2024). On 6 December 2024 the court dismissed the request.

44 . By decision no. 326/2025 of 2 June 2025, the Rhodes Court of First Instance dismissed the first applicant’s request for sole custody of the second and third applicants. The court first held that the judgment of 12 July 2024 (case no. 2021-DR-2478) of the Seminole County Circuit Court (see paragraph 16 above) did not produce legal effects in the Greek legal system, as it was not accompanied by the requisite authority to enforce the judgment in a foreign jurisdiction. It further found, inter alia , that despite the first applicant’s unquestionable love for and interest in her minor children and her determination and efforts to best meet their needs, she was not prepared to assume the responsibility of looking after them and did not seem to fully understand the demands of her role. It considered that the applicant had forced her minor children to change their place of residence multiple times (from the United States to Rhodes, from Rhodes to Karpathos and from Karpathos to Rethymno) within approximately seven months, during which time she had also attempted to deprive them not only of all family contact but also of their right to education. In the court’s view, this situation had created an extremely dangerous and harmful ( κακοποιητικό ) environment for the minor children, involving traumatic experiences and serious consequences which still persisted, both physically and psychologically, as they had been forced to live in a state of permanent flight in the knowledge that the police were looking for them. It further noted that the first applicant had not been systematically monitored by a mental health specialist so that she could understand the extent of the problems her behaviour had caused to the children, become more conscious of her parental role and to be able to exercise her parental functions properly in the future.

45 The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989 and the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction were respectively incorporated into Greek law by Law no. 2101/1992 and Law no. 2102/1992.

46 Furthermore, as regards the relevant provisions of Greek civil law, the Court refers to paragraph 21 of its judgment in Katsikeros v. Greece (no. 2303/19, 21 July 2022) and more specifically to Article 1511 § 4 of the Civil Code, as in force at the material time.

47 According to the domestic case-law concerning the reasons for refusing a request to hear a child, the court examining a request for return is not obliged to give specific reasons for its decision not to hear the child concerned in view of his or her age and level of maturity (see, for example, Court of Cassation, judgments nos. 1646/2023, 136/2022 and 283/1986).

48 . For the relevant provisions of international law, the Court refers to paragraphs 34 to 40 of its judgment in X v. Latvia ([GC], no. 27853/09, ECHR 2013).

49 Article 12 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child provides as follows:

“1. States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own views the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the child being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child.

2 For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided the opportunity to be heard in any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the child, either directly, or through a representative or an appropriate body, in a manner consistent with the procedural rules of national law.”

50 The Court also refers to General Comment No. 12 (2009) on the right of the child to be heard, adopted by the Committee on the Rights of the Child at its fifty-first session, from 25 May to 12 June 2009, and in particular paragraphs 15-16, 19, 25, 41-43 and 134 thereof.

51 In addition, it refers to General Comment No. 14 (2013) on the right of the child to have his or her best interests taken as a primary consideration (Article 3, paragraph 1) of 29 May 2013, and in particular paragraphs 43-45 and 53 thereof.

52 Furthermore, the European Convention on the Exercise of Children’s Rights of 25 January 1996 provides as follows:

Preamble

“...

Convinced that the rights and best interests of children should be promoted and to that end children should have the opportunity to exercise their rights, in particular in family proceedings affecting them;

Recognising that children should be provided with relevant information to enable such rights and best interests to be promoted and that due weight should be given to the views of children;

Recognising the importance of the parental role in protecting and promoting the rights and best interests of children and considering that, where necessary, States should also engage in such protection and promotion;

Considering, however, that in the event of conflict it is desirable for families to try to reach agreement before bringing the matter before a judicial authority, ...”

Article 3 – Right to be informed and to express his or her views in proceedings

“A child considered by internal law as having sufficient understanding, in the case of proceedings before a judicial authority affecting him or her, shall be granted, and shall be entitled to request, the following rights:

a to receive all relevant information;

b to be consulted and express his or her views;

...”

Article 6 – Decision-making process

“In proceedings affecting a child, the judicial authority, before taking a decision, shall:

a consider whether it has sufficient information at its disposal in order to take a decision in the best interests of the child and, where necessary, it shall obtain further information, in particular from the holders of parental responsibilities;

b in a case where the child is considered by internal law as having sufficient understanding:

– ensure that the child has received all relevant information;

– consult the child in person in appropriate cases, if necessary privately, itself or through other persons or bodies, in a manner appropriate to his or her understanding, unless this would be manifestly contrary to the best interests of the child;

– allow the child to express his or her views;

c give due weight to the views expressed by the child.”

53 Recommendation CM/Rec(2012)2 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on the participation of children and young people under the age of 18 (adopted on 28 March 2012 at the 1138th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies) reads, in so far as relevant:

“ Recommends that the governments of the member States:

1 ensure that all children and young people can exercise their right to be heard, to be taken seriously and to participate in decision making in all matters affecting them, their views being given due weight in accordance with their age and maturity; ...”

54 The Court also refers to Recommendation CM/Rec(2025)4 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on the protection of the rights and best interests of the child in parental separation proceedings (adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 28 May 2025 at the 1529th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies), and in particular paragraphs 19-31 thereof.

55 Lastly, it refers to the Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on child-friendly justice, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 17 November 2010, and in particular paragraphs 44-49 and 54 thereof.

56 Article 24 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union provides:

“1. Children shall have the right to such protection and care as is necessary for their well-being. They may express their views freely. Such views shall be taken into consideration on matters which concern them in accordance with their age and maturity.

2 In all actions relating to children, whether taken by public authorities or private institutions, the child’s best interests must be a primary consideration.

3 Every child shall have the right to maintain on a regular basis a personal relationship and direct contact with both his or her parents, unless that is contrary to his or her interests.”

57 The relevant provisions of Council Regulation (EC) No. 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility (“the Brussels II bis Regulation”) read as follows:

Article 11

“1. Where a person, institution or other body having rights of custody applies to the competent authorities in a Member State to deliver a judgment on the basis of the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (hereinafter ‘the 1980 Hague Convention’), in order to obtain the return of a child that has been wrongfully removed or retained in a Member State other than the Member State where the child was habitually resident immediately before the wrongful removal or retention, paragraphs 2 to 8 shall apply.

2 When applying Articles 12 and 13 of the 1980 Hague Convention, it shall be ensured that the child is given the opportunity to be heard during the proceedings unless this appears inappropriate having regard to his or her age or degree of maturity.”

58 . The relevant provisions of Council Regulation (EU) No. 2019/1111 of 25 June 2019 on jurisdiction, the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, and on international child abduction (“the Brussels II ter Regulation”) read as follows:

Article 21

Right of the child to express his or her views

“1. When exercising their jurisdiction under Section 2 of this Chapter, the courts of the Member States shall, in accordance with national law and procedure, provide the child who is capable of forming his or her own views with a genuine and effective opportunity to express his or her views, either directly, or through a representative or an appropriate body.

2 Where the court, in accordance with national law and procedure, gives a child an opportunity to express his or her views in accordance with this Article, the court shall give due weight to the views of the child in accordance with his or her age and maturity.”

Article 26

Right of the child to express his or her views in return proceedings

“Article 21 of this Regulation shall also apply in return proceedings under the 1980 Hague Convention.”

59 The applicants complained that the decisions of the Greek courts ordering the return of the second and third applicants to the United States and the failure to hear the children in the domestic proceedings had violated their rights under Article 8 of the Convention, which provides:

“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.

2 There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”

60 The present application was lodged by the first applicant, the biological mother of the second and third applicants, both in her own name and on behalf of the children. As the Government have not contested the first applicant’s locus standi to complain of a violation of Article 8 on behalf of the second and third applicants, the Court will examine this question of its own motion.

61 The present case concerns child return proceedings which were brought under the Hague Convention by the father (G.A.) of the second and third applicants following their alleged abduction by the first applicant. Prior to the impugned move, both parents had joint parental responsibility for the children.

62 The father of the second and third applicants, intervening as a third party, contested the first applicant’s locus standi to act on behalf of the second and third applicants, arguing that she had no custody or visitation rights in respect of them (see paragraph 16 above).

63 The Court reiterates at the outset that a restrictive or technical approach to the representation of children before it should be avoided (see Šneersone and Kampanella v. Italy , no. 14737/09, § 61, 12 July 2011). Moreover, in the event of a dispute between parents, it is the parent who has custody who is responsible for safeguarding the child’s interests. In such situations, the status of natural parent cannot be regarded as a sufficient basis for lodging an application on behalf of a child (see A.S. and M.S. v. Italy , no. 48618/22, § 113, 19 October 2023, and the references cited therein).

64 The Court observes that the first applicant opposes the return of the second and third applicants to the United States, relying, not entirely unjustifiably, on the risks associated with that measure, and also that she exercised parental responsibility in respect of them jointly with G.A. until 31 January 2024, the date on which G.A. was granted temporary sole custody and responsibility by a judicial decision (see paragraph 16 above). The Court therefore concludes that the first applicant is able to act in the best interests of the second and third applicants. Consequently, and in the absence of any indication to the contrary, she is entitled to lodge the present application also on their behalf (see, to similar effect, S.N. and M.B.N. v. Switzerland , no. 12937/20, §§ 63-66, 23 November 2021).

65 The Government submitted that the complaint was inadmissible for failure to exhaust domestic remedies as the applicants had not alleged a violation of Article 8 of the Convention before the domestic courts and, accordingly, had not given the domestic courts an opportunity to rule on that complaint.

66 In particular, the Government submitted that the applicants, in their appeal on points of law, had confined themselves, in the context of their submission that the Court of Appeal had failed to apply the exception provided for in Article 13 (b) of the Hague Convention, to arguments concerning the establishment of the facts and the allegedly insufficient reasoning. As to their submission concerning the interpretation and application of Articles 3 and 12 of the Hague Convention, the Government alleged that the applicants had merely questioned the adequacy of the reasoning in relation to the establishment of the second and third applicants’ habitual residence and to the first applicant’s retention of the children. The Government added that the applicants had, in their application form, submitted for the first time the complaint that the wishes of the second and third applicants had not been taken into account by means of a direct or indirect hearing.

67 The applicants contested the Government’s argument. In particular, in criticising the Court of Appeal, before the Court of Cassation, for having breached Article 13 (b) of the Hague Convention on account of its failure to apply that provision in the instant case, even though it was applicable in their view, they had relied in substance on Article 8 of the Convention.

68 . The Court reiterates that the purpose of the exhaustion rule is to afford a Contracting State the opportunity of addressing, and thereby preventing or putting right, the particular Convention violation alleged against it. It is true that under the Court’s case-law it is not always necessary for the Convention to be expressly invoked in domestic proceedings, provided that the complaint is raised “at least in substance”. This means that the applicant must raise legal arguments to the same or like effect on the basis of domestic law, in order to give the national courts the opportunity to redress the alleged breach. However, as the Court’s case-law bears out, to genuinely afford a Contracting State the opportunity of preventing or redressing the alleged violation requires taking into account not only the facts but also the applicant’s legal arguments for the purposes of determining whether the complaint submitted to the Court has indeed been raised beforehand, in substance, before the domestic authorities. That is because “it would be contrary to the subsidiary character of the Convention machinery if an applicant, ignoring a possible Convention argument, could rely on some other ground before the national authorities for challenging an impugned measure, but then lodge an application before the Court on the basis of the Convention argument” (see Humpert and Others v. Germany [GC], nos. 59433/18 and 3 others, § 151, 14 December 2023 ).

69 The Court notes that, as the applicants rightly argued before it, they relied at the domestic level on Article 13 (b) of the Hague Convention, which prohibits “the return of the child if the person, institution or other body which opposes its return establishes that – ... (b) there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation”.

70 The Court is of the view that, in the context of their complaints before the domestic courts, the applicants did complain, albeit implicitly, of a violation of their right to respect for their family life. In so doing they raised, at least in substance, a complaint under Article 8 of the Convention in the domestic courts, which proceeded to examine it. It follows that the applicants duly provided the national authorities the opportunity that is in principle intended to be afforded to Contracting States by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, namely the opportunity to put right the violations alleged against them (see, mutatis mutandis , Giannakopoulos v. Greece , no. 20503/20, § 41, 3 December 2024, and the references cited therein). The Government’s objection that Article 8 of the Convention was not relied upon must therefore be dismissed.

71 As to the Government’s preliminary objection that the applicants had raised for the first time in their application the complaint concerning the failure to take into account, by means of a direct or indirect hearing, the views of the second and third applicants, the Court considers that it raises issues that are closely linked to the merits of the complaint. It therefore decides to join this objection to the merits.

72 The Court notes that the application is neither manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article 35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible.

73 The applicants submitted that the return of the second and third applicants ordered by the Greek courts and the failure to hear them, directly or indirectly, amounted to an interference with their right to respect for their family life as protected by Article 8 § 1 of the Convention.

74 . The interference in question had been contrary to the best interests of the second and third applicants and had therefore been disproportionate. Reiterating most of the arguments they had made in the domestic courts (see paragraphs 19 and 22 above), and referring to the findings of the Rhodes Court of First Instance (see paragraph 21 above), they further submitted that the Dodecanese Court of Appeal and the Court of Cassation had failed to assess, in their respective decisions, the danger that the second and third applicants would face if returned to the United States. More specifically, the applicants complained that those courts had failed to take into account, inter alia , the risks to the children’s mental health and personal development which would arise, on the one hand, from a sudden and unexpected breakdown of their relationship with the first applicant – having regard also to the alleged inability of the first applicant to travel to the United States owing to her distance, her limited economic capacity and the fact, according to her, that she faced criminal charges there – and, more generally, the disruption of their family environment in Rhodes and, on the other, from the brutal and abrupt cessation of their educational and social activities. The applicants also submitted that the courts had not taken into account the allegedly limited ability of the second and third applicants to communicate in English, or the fact that in the United States G.A. worked all hours and had no support for the day-to-day care of the children. They further complained that the domestic courts had failed to take into consideration the criminal proceedings following the complaint filed by the first applicant against G.A. and his entourage for domestic violence and threats against the second and third applicants. The applicants further submitted that the domestic courts should, of their own motion, have compared the living conditions of the second and third applicants in Rhodes with the living conditions they could expect in the event of their return to the United States.

75 As to the domestic courts’ consideration of the views of the second and third applicants, the applicants submitted that the courts had rejected the requests – which they had submitted orally according to them – to hear the second and third applicants and to conduct a home study of their situation.

76 In addition, the applicants alleged that G.A. had left the United States permanently and settled in Greece (see paragraph 17 above), with the result that judgment no. 325/2022 of the Dodecanese Court of Appeal (see paragraph 23 above) and judgment no. 1830/2023 of the Court of Cassation (see paragraph 29 above) had become moot. Lastly, in their final set of observations, the applicants contested a number of points raised by the third party in his observations.

77 The Government acknowledged that the decisions of the Greek courts ordering the return of the second and third applicants to the United States amounted to an interference with the applicants’ right to respect for their family life, as protected by Article 8 of the Convention. Nevertheless, they considered that both the interpretation of the Hague Convention by the Dodecanese Court of Appeal and the Court of Cassation and its application in the present case had complied with the guarantees of that Convention provision while taking into account the best interests of the second and third applicants.

78 As regards the applicants’ arguments, the Government noted, first, that they had not disputed that the second and third applicants’ move to Rhodes with their mother had constituted an unlawful retention.

79 In response to the applicants’ complaint that the second and third applicants had not been heard by the domestic courts, the Government noted, first, that on the date of the hearing before the Court of Appeal (23 September 2022) the applicants had been four and six years old respectively and that they were therefore incapable of discernment. They therefore submitted that the Court of Appeal had not erred in not taking their views into account. The Government added that there was nothing in the case file to suggest that the applicants had requested that the second and third applicants be heard, directly or indirectly. In the absence of such a request, the domestic courts would not be required to give reasons for their decision on this point. Lastly, the Government submitted that the first applicant had not alleged that the second and third applicants had formally objected to their return. Moreover, in the Government’s view, no such objection could be seen from the case file.

80 They further submitted that the applicants’ allegation of a grave risk had been thoroughly examined by the domestic courts, based on the evidence adduced by the applicants, and had thus given rise to sufficiently reasoned decisions concerning the various factors at stake. In sum, the Government were of the view that the domestic courts had struck a fair balance between the competing interests – namely those of the children, those of both parents and those of public policy – while respecting the children’s best interests.

81 As to the applicants’ argument that judgment no. 325/2022 of the Dodecanese Court of Appeal (see paragraph 23 above) and judgment no. 1830/2023 of the Court of Cassation (see paragraph 29 above) had become moot, the Government submitted that the fact allegedly leading to this situation, namely G.A.’s move to Greece, had not been examined by the domestic courts because the applicants had not brought a case to that effect.

82 The father of the second and third applicants, intervening as a third party, submitted that the domestic courts’ decision to order the children’s return was compatible with Article 8 of the Convention, interpreted in the light of Article 13 (b) of the Hague Convention. He further referred to the findings of decision no. 326/2025 of the Rhodes Court of First Instance (see paragraph 44 above) and to three decisions of the domestic courts (see paragraphs 38, 42-43 above), arguing that all the first applicant’s requests for interim measures in order to obtain an order prohibiting the second and third applicants from leaving Greece had been thoroughly examined and rejected.

83 The general principles by which the Court is guided in examining an interference with the right to respect for family life within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention in the sphere of international child abduction are set out, in particular, in its Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland ([GC], no. 41615/07, §§ 131-140, ECHR 2010) and X v. Latvia (cited above, §§ 92-108) judgments.

84 The Court would particularly emphasise that in this sphere the Article 8 obligations of the member States must be interpreted in the light, inter alia , of the requirements imposed by the Hague Convention and by the Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989 (see, among other authorities, Neulinger and Shuruk , cited above, § 132).

85 The decisive issue is whether the fair balance that must exist between the competing interests at stake – those of the child, of the two parents, and of public order – has been struck, within the margin of appreciation afforded to States in such matters, taking into account, however, that the best interests of the child must be of primary consideration and that the objectives of prevention and immediate return correspond to a specific conception of “the best interests of the child” (see X v. Latvia , cited above, § 95).

86 In the context of that examination, the Court reiterates that it will not substitute its own assessment for that of the domestic courts. Nevertheless, it must satisfy itself that the decision-making process leading to the adoption of the impugned measures by the domestic courts was fair and allowed those concerned to present their case fully, and that the best interests of the child were defended (see, among other authorities, Neulinger and Shuruk , cited above, § 139, and X v. Latvia , cited above, § 102). In order to determine whether the decision-making process afforded those safeguards, the Court will consider whether the domestic courts conducted an appropriate examination of the practical implications of the child’s return (see B. v. Belgium , no. 4320/11, § 63, 10 July 2012).

87 Turning to the present case, the Court notes at the outset that the applicants submitted that judgment no. 325/2022 of the Dodecanese Court of Appeal had become moot as a result of G.A.’s move to Greece. It points out, in that regard, that since the parties confirmed that judgment no. 325/2022 had been enforced and G.A. had in the meantime gone to the United States with the second and third applicants, it will proceed with its examination.

88 The Court notes, firstly, that it is not in dispute between the parties that the return of the second and third applicants ordered by the domestic courts amounted to interference with the applicants’ right to respect for their family life, as protected by Article 8 of the Convention.

89 It further observes that the return decisions taken by the Greek authorities were based on the Hague Convention, which was incorporated into Greek law by Law no. 2102/1992 on the ratification of the Hague Convention and were aimed at protecting the rights and freedoms of the two children. The interference was therefore in accordance with the law and pursued a legitimate interest within the meaning of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention. It now remains to be determined whether such interference can be regarded as “necessary in a democratic society” for the fulfilment of the aim in question.

90 In the light of the above-mentioned general principles, the Court considers that the main question which arises is whether the decision-making process pursued the best interests of the second and third applicants and, in particular, whether it ensured that they would not face any “grave risk”, within the meaning of Article 13 (b) of the Hague Convention (see S.N. and M.B.N. v. Switzerland , cited above, § 104).

91 In the light of the criteria established in X v. Latvia (cited above), the Court must examine whether the domestic courts duly took the applicants’ arguable allegations into account and whether they justified their decisions in the light of the exceptions set out in the Hague Convention by providing sufficiently detailed reasoning – that is, by relying on the facts of the case –, while being mindful that those exceptions must be strictly interpreted (ibid., § 107).

92 The Court reiterates that the concept of “grave risk” cannot be read, in the light of Article 8 of the Convention, as including all of the inconveniences necessarily linked to the experience of return: the exception provided for in Article 13 (b) concerns only the situations which go beyond what a child might reasonably bear. Moreover, the harm referred to in Article 13 (b) of the Hague Convention cannot arise solely from separation from the parent who was responsible for the wrongful removal or retention. Such separation, however difficult for the child, would not automatically meet the “grave risk” test (see K.J. v. Poland , no. 30813/14, § 6, 1 March 2016). Lastly, regard must be had to the aim of the Hague Convention, which is to prevent the abducting parent from succeeding in obtaining legal recognition, by the passage of time, of a de facto situation that he or she unilaterally created. It is therefore a matter, once the conditions for the application of the Hague Convention have been met, of restoring as soon as possible the status quo ante in order to avoid the legal consolidation of de facto situations that were brought about wrongfully, and of leaving the issues of custody and parental authority to be determined by the courts that have jurisdiction in the place of the child’s habitual residence (see, among other authorities, Maumousseau and Washington v. France , no. 39388/05, §§ 69 and 73, 6 December 2007).

93 The Court would add that the wishes of a child who is capable of forming his or her own views will be a key factor to be taken into account in any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting him or her (see M.K. v. Greece , no. 51312/16, § 91, 1 February 2018). The right of a child to be heard and to participate in decision-making in family proceedings which primarily affect him or her is guaranteed by various international legal instruments (see paragraphs 48 et seq. above). Moreover, the second paragraph of Article 13 of the Hague Convention provides that the judicial or administrative authority may refuse to order the return of the child if it finds that the child objects to being returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of its views (see M.K. v. Greece , cited above, § 88).

94 Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court notes that, in the domestic courts, the applicants relied on several factors in order to show that the return of the second and third applicants to the United States would not be in their best interests.

95 It further observes that the domestic courts hearing the case were not unanimous as to the action to be taken. While the Rhodes Court of First Instance found that there was a “grave risk”, the Dodecanese Court of Appeal dismissed any such risk in a judgment that was subsequently upheld by the Court of Cassation. In particular, those courts considered that the alleged difficulties that the second and third applicants would encounter when resettling in their place of habitual residence (Florida, United States) stemmed essentially from the divorce of their parents and the subsequent determination of their habitual residence at the home of either one, and that those difficulties did not suffice to establish conditions in excess of what a child could reasonably bear on returning to his or her country of habitual residence. The courts also found that such resettlement difficulties did not amount to an “intolerable situation” as they were not linked to acts of physical or psychological abuse or violence (for details of the Court of Appeal’s strict interpretation of the concept of “grave risk”, see paragraph 24 above). Furthermore, the Court of Cassation emphasised that, in addition to stemming from an unlawful retention by the first applicant, the applicants’ allegations that the second and third applicants enjoyed more favourable living conditions in their new environment (Rhodes) and had fully settled there were related to the question of which parent had custody, thus falling within the jurisdiction of the court for the place of their habitual residence.

96 The Court notes, firstly, that the domestic courts took into account all the material submitted by the applicants, including affidavits and psychological assessments submitted by the first applicant in respect of the second and third applicants, and that they also heard witnesses. The Court notes, in this connection, that the applicants did not complain that the domestic courts had not taken into account certain evidence submitted by them.

97 As regards the applicants’ complaint that the second and third applicants were not heard, the Court observes, as a preliminary point, that at the date of the hearing before the Court of Appeal (23 September 2022) the applicants were approximately four and six years old respectively.

98 It further notes, first, that there is no evidence in the case file to show that the applicants made a request for the second and third applicants to be heard, directly or indirectly, or for a home study concerning them to be carried out, and, secondly, that, according to domestic case-law, the court hearing a request for return is not required to give specific reasons for a decision not to hear the child in view of his or her age and degree of maturity (Court of Cassation, judgments nos. 1646/2023, 136/2022 and 283/1986).

99 The Court cannot speculate as to whether the applicants made such a request orally – without being registered – in accordance with the relevant national rules or whether the domestic courts dismissed such a request on any grounds.

100 The Court, in the light of its case-law on the requirements of Article 8 of the Convention in the context of child abduction, observes that it has not, to date, clearly established a positive obligation of the domestic courts to examine of their own motion the appropriateness of hearing the children in proceedings concerning their rights. However, under the relevant international instruments (see paragraphs 48-58 above), in particular the recent Recommendation CM/Rec(2025)4 of the Committee of Ministers to member States (see paragraph 54 above), there is a consensus among States Parties as to the obligation to provide children with a real and effective opportunity to express his or her views, either directly or otherwise, and to assist the child in doing so through various child-friendly mechanisms and procedures.

101 In the light of the foregoing, the Court now considers that the time has come to hold that the national authorities are required to examine whether it is appropriate to hear the child, directly or otherwise, with the eventuality of rejecting such a hearing in a reasoned decision.

102. The Court notes, first, that the applicants submitted that it was essential to hear the second and third applicants in order to determine whether one of the exceptions to return provided for in Article 13 (b) of the Hague Convention was applicable. It further observes that the applicants’ return to the United States from Rhodes – where the first applicant and their maternal and paternal grandparents were living – was likely to bring about considerable changes in their lives. Consequently, the Court considers that, having regard to the specific circumstances of the present case, namely, on the one hand, the contradictory decisions given by the domestic courts concerning the return of the second and third applicants and, on the other, the radical change in their living conditions that such a return to the United States would have entailed, the domestic courts should have sought, by virtue of their obligation to act in the children’s best interests, to examine the appropriateness of hearing the children, irrespective of any express request made to that effect by the applicants. The Court notes that the present case was examined by three different courts over a period of approximately two and a half years and that at no time did the children have an opportunity to express their views, without any explanation being provided for that decision. The Court thus notes that the domestic courts assessed the situation without considering whether it was appropriate to seek the children’s opinion, which was nevertheless a key factor (see M.K. v. Greece , cited above, § 91). In particular, they did not examine of their own motion whether it was appropriate to hear the children, directly or otherwise, in particular by helping them to express their opinion through various child-friendly mechanisms and procedures, with the eventuality of rejecting such a hearing in a reasoned decision (see, mutatis mutandis , Voica v. Romania , no. 9256/19, § 70, 7 July 2020, and Zelikha Magomadova v. Russia , no. 58724/14, § 116, 8 October 2019).

103 Having regard to the foregoing, the Court concludes that the domestic courts did not use all the means at their disposal to rule out any “grave risk” within the meaning of Article 13 (b) of the Hague Convention.

104 In conclusion, the Court is of the view that the domestic courts were not in a position to determine, in an informed manner, whether there was a risk within the meaning of Article 13 (b) of the Hague Convention and that the decision-making process under domestic law therefore had not satisfied the procedural requirements inherent in Article 8 of the Convention. It follows, in the Court’s view, that the forcible return of the second and third applicants to the United States cannot be regarded as necessary in a democratic society.

105 The Court therefore concludes that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. Accordingly, the Court dismisses the Government’s preliminary objection based on the fact that the second and third applicants were not heard.

106 Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

107 The applicants each claimed 20,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage for the alleged violation of Article 8 of the Convention.

108 The Government asked the Court to dismiss the applicants’ claim. Given that the damage allegedly sustained by the applicants as a result of the return of the children to the United States had been caused by the first applicant’s divorce from her husband, G.A., and by the unlawful retention of the children by the first applicant, they considered that the sums claimed were unjustified and excessive.

109 Having regard to the circumstances of the case and ruling on an equitable basis, the Court considers it appropriate to award the applicants jointly the sum of EUR 7,500, plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage.

110 The first applicant claimed EUR 9,333.88 in respect of costs and expenses incurred in the proceedings before the domestic courts and before the Court.

111 The Government submitted that there was no causal link between the alleged violation of the Convention and the costs and expenses incurred by the applicants in the proceedings before the domestic courts. They considered that those costs and expenses would have been incurred in any event, on account of the ongoing dispute between the first applicant and G.A.

112 According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the first applicant the sum of EUR 4,200 for the costs and expenses incurred in the domestic proceedings and the proceedings before it, plus any tax that may be chargeable on that amount.

Done in French, and notified in writing on 9 September 2025, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

Olga Chernishova Peeter Roosma Deputy Registrar President

In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 74 § 2 of the Rules of Court, the separate opinion of Judges Roosma and Hüseynov is annexed to this judgment.

JOINT DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGES ROOSMA AND HÜSEYNOV

1 The majority’s finding of a violation of Article 8 of the Convention in the present case is based on the premise that the relevant international instruments give rise to a positive obligation, incumbent on domestic judicial authorities, to consider proprio motu the appropriateness of hearing children in proceedings affecting their rights and interests, and that the failure of the Greek courts to comply with that obligation resulted, in itself, in the said violation (see paragraphs 100-01 of the judgment). While agreeing, in principle, that such a general duty can be derived from Article 8 of the Convention, we nevertheless have certain reservations concerning the extent to which it applies to return proceedings under the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (“the Hague Convention”) [1] , given the specific object and purpose of that treaty, and the weight which should be attached to that duty in determining whether or not there has been a violation of the Convention.

2 Our disagreement with the majority’s finding turns on the manner in which our colleagues reached their conclusion. We respectfully consider that they failed (i) to provide a detailed assessment of the decisions of the higher courts and of how those courts substantiated the return order, having due regard to the principle of subsidiarity (see, among many other authorities, Gajtani v. Switzerland , no. 43730/07, § 112, 9 September 2014); and (ii) to explain how the aforementioned positive duty applies to return proceedings in general, and to the specific circumstances of the present case in particular, given the need for a harmonious application of the Convention and the Hague Convention (see X v. Latvia [GC], no. 27853/09, § 106, ECHR 2013).

3 It is important to note at the outset that the key question dealt with by the domestic courts was whether the children’s return to their State of habitual residence – thus ending their wrongful retention by the first applicant – would entail a grave risk of physical or psychological harm or otherwise place them in an intolerable situation, within the meaning of Article 13 (b) of the Hague Convention. While the majority referred to the children’s “wishes” (“ volonté ” – see paragraph 93 of the judgment), an aspect which is relevant under the second paragraph of Article 13 of the Hague Convention, their conclusion in the present case rested on the domestic courts’ failure to obtain, or consider obtaining, the children’s views specifically in relation to Article 13 (b) – that is, on the existence of a “grave risk” (see paragraphs 100-03 of the judgment).

4 In this regard, we would point out that, under the Hague Convention, it is for the party opposing a child’s return to establish the existence of a “grave risk” within the meaning of Article 13 (b). As the Explanatory Report on the Hague Convention sets out, this allocation of the burden of proof was intended to place the dispossessed parent on an equal footing with the abductor, who has chosen “what is for him the most convenient forum” [2] . The Guide to Good Practice under the Hague Convention confirms that the burden remains with the party resisting return, even where the domestic court examining the return application gathers information itself. In every case, the domestic court must be satisfied that the party opposing return has discharged that burden [3] . This approach is reflected in the Court’s case-law (see, among other authorities, X v. Latvia , cited above, §§ 106-07, and Thompson v. Russia , no. 36048/17, § 65, 30 March 2021), which requires domestic courts to consider arguable allegations of a “grave risk”.

5 As regards the present application, while the judgment expressly refers to this principle (see paragraphs 91-92 of the judgment), we respectfully consider that the burden of proof under Article 13 (b) was not properly applied. In our view, on the basis of the evidence before the Court, the first applicant failed to meet that burden.

6 We note that the first applicant’s allegations before the first-instance court under Article 13 (b) of the Hague Convention were, in substance, confined to the argument that the children were well settled in Rhodes and that G.A.’s demanding job and lack of childcare support in the United States would seriously harm the children’s mental health if they returned (see paragraph 19 of the judgment). We further note that, before the Dodecanese Court of Appeal, the first applicant simply reiterated those same allegations (see paragraph 22 of the judgment). Lastly, before the Court of Cassation, the first applicant argued that the Court of Appeal had erred in failing to apply Article 13 (b) (see paragraph 27 of the judgment). We cannot but note that the allegations of threats and domestic violence were raised only after the Court of Appeal had rendered its judgment, apparently in separate proceedings (see paragraph 15 of the judgment), and were not part of the proceedings under review in the present case.

7 Turning to the domestic courts, we note – as did the majority – that they examined all the evidence, including sworn statements, psychological reports and witness testimony, and that there was no claim that any material evidence was overlooked by the courts (see paragraph 96 of the judgment). On that basis, and with the exception of the first-instance court (whose decision was overturned), the courts concluded that the applicant had failed to show a “grave risk” within the meaning of Article 13 (b). In sum, the domestic courts examined the applicants’ evidence and arguments with sufficient thoroughness, but the submissions did not disclose an arguable allegation of a “grave risk” capable of justifying the children’s non-return.

8 We consider that the higher courts which ordered the children’s return were correct in their assessment and did so by reference to this Court’s principles (see X v. Latvia , cited above, §§ 106-07). They based their judgments on the relevant facts of the case and took due account of the parties’ arguments. They gave well-founded decisions, which they regarded as serving the best interests of the children. We disagree with the majority’s reliance on the divergence between the first-instance court and the higher courts (see paragraphs 21, 24, 29 and 102 of the judgment), as if such divergence indicated the complexity of the issue of the children’s return or the borderline nature of the case.

9 In our view, the first-instance court’s reasoning strayed beyond the framework of the Hague Convention, relying on considerations of custody, integration and parental capacity – factors which, in themselves, do not justify a finding of a “grave risk” under Article 13 (b).

10 X v. Latvia (cited above, § 106) very aptly speaks of the need for a “harmonious interpretation” of the European Convention and the Hague Convention – one that preserves the Hague Convention’s core purpose of securing the prompt return of children unless one of the exceptions is applicable, while at the same time ensuring that this Court interprets and applies the Convention guarantees in a manner that is practical and effective. A key element of this harmonious interpretation is the principle that the notion of “grave risk” must be construed strictly (see, among other authorities, Maumousseau and Washington v. France , no. 39388/05, § 73, 6 December 2007). In our view, the higher domestic courts faithfully applied that approach.

11 As regards the domestic courts’ failure to consider – of their own motion – the appropriateness of hearing the children and their failure to give reasons for it, our disagreement concerns the following points.

12 As noted above, we certainly agree that children should have the right to express their views and to be heard in proceedings that affect them. We also think that children must, in principle, be given an opportunity to be heard in return proceedings under the Hague Convention independently of whether a “children’s objection” exception under the second paragraph of Article 13 has been raised. This right is, however, subject to the conditions of the age and maturity of the child and the procedural rules of national law (see Article 12 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted on 20 November 1989, 1577 UNTS 3; see also N.Ts. and Others v. Georgia , no. 71776/12, § 72, 2 February 2016; Petrov and X. v. Russia , no. 23608/16, § 108, 23 October 2018; and, in the more general context of child custody, Katsikeros v. Greece , no. 2303/19, § 59, 21 July 2022) and should be interpreted in the light of the specific circumstances of each case.

13 The above-mentioned conditions are well defined in the Greek legal system. According to the Greek Court of Cassation’s case-law, as presented by the Government, a court is obliged to hear a child only if it considers that the child has the requisite maturity. No special reasoning is needed for the ruling on whether or not the child has such maturity, this being determined by a free assessment of the evidence.

14 Furthermore, we cannot overlook the fact that the applicants neither requested in writing that the children be heard nor raised any complaint about the absence of such a measure in their appeal to the Court of Cassation – striking omissions, given their assertion before this Court that it was “indispensable” to hear the children in order to determine whether the exception under Article 13 (b) applied (see paragraph 102 of the judgment).

15. Against this background, we cannot accept that the domestic courts should be reproached for not expressly giving reasons for omitting to seek the opinion of the four- and six-year-old applicants as to the existence of a “grave risk” in the event of their return. Such an omission cannot be equated with a failure to use all means available to exclude any “grave risk” within the meaning of Article 13 (b) of the Hague Convention (see paragraph 103 of the judgment), still less with a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. On the contrary, we find it difficult to see how, given the nature of the first applicant’s allegations under Article 13 (b), hearing such very young children could realistically have altered the assessment under that provision. Yet the majority have characterised the appropriateness of seeking their opinion as a “key factor” (see paragraph 102 of the judgment).

16 Lastly, a few words are warranted about the exhaustion of domestic remedies. We consider that the applicants’ complaint that the second and third applicants were not heard by the domestic courts (see paragraph 59 of the judgment) should have been declared inadmissible because of their failure to exhaust domestic remedies in that regard. Like the majority, we shall not speculate whether the applicants made an oral request before the domestic courts to that effect. What is undisputed is that they did not raise this issue in their appeals, notably in their appeal to the Court of Cassation. It should be pointed out in this connection that even in those jurisdictions where the domestic courts in civil proceedings are able, or even obliged, to examine a case of their own motion, applicants are not dispensed from raising before them a complaint which they may intend to subsequently make to the Court, it being understood that for the purposes of exhaustion of domestic remedies the Court must take into account not only the facts but also the legal arguments presented domestically (see Fu Quan, s.r.o. v. the Czech Republic [GC], no. 24827/14, § 171, 1 June 2023, with further references).

[1] The Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, HCCH Collection of Conventions (1951-2009).

[2] See Elisa Pérez-Vera, Explanatory Report on the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention, HCCH, 1982, paragraph 114.

[3] See the Guide to Good Practice under the Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Part VI – Article 13(1)(b), HCCH, 2020, p. 36, paragraph 51.