Miliūtė and Danauskienė v. Lithuania

SECOND SECTION

Application no. 27313/23 Rita MILIŪTĖ and Vilma DANAUSKIENE against Lithuania

The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on 9 June 2026 as a Chamber composed of:

Arnfinn Bårdsen , President , Jovan Ilievski, Péter Paczolay, Oddný Mjöll Arnardóttir, Gediminas Sagatys, Stéphane Pisani, Juha Lavapuro , judges , and Andrea Tamietti, Section Registrar,

Having regard to the above application lodged on 3 July 2023,

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicants,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

1 The case concerns a complaint by applicant journalists that no effective domestic remedy for a refusal by the authorities to provide them with information had been available to them. They relied on Articles 6 § 1, 10 and 13 of the Convention.

2 The applicants were born in 1968 and 1972 respectively and live in Vilnius. They were represented by Mr A. Šindeikis, a lawyer practising in Vilnius.

3 The Government were represented by their Agent, Mr R. Dzikovič.

4 . On 2 October 2018 the Ministry of Transport and Communications introduced a draft amendment to the Law on the Provision of Information to the Public ( Visuomenės informavimo įstatymas ). The amendment would bring into the Law a provision entitling journalists to receive information from public registers free of charge. It appears that there had been a practice of journalists being given such information free of charge but that in September 2018 the Centre of Registers discontinued it, on the grounds that it was not required by law.

5 . On 3 October 2018 the Lithuanian Government held a consultative meeting ( pasitarimas ; see paragraph 45 below) in which it discussed the draft amendment. Members of the government decided to return the draft to the Ministry for revision (see paragraph 7 below).

6 . The applicants are journalists. On 4 October 2018 they and several other journalists contacted the Office of the Government ( Vyriausybės kanceliarija ) by e-mail and asked it to provide them with a copy of an audio-recording of the consultative meeting. On the same day the second applicant received a reply from the Prime Minister’s public relations adviser saying that the audio-recording would not be provided. The applicants and the other journalists also received replies from the Office that consultative meetings were closed to the public and that the law did not require an audio-recording of them to be made; in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the Government ( Vyriausybės darbo reglamentas ), consultative meetings were recorded by the keeping of minutes (see paragraph 50 below), which journalists would be able to access as soon as they had been finalised and signed.

7 . The minutes of the consultative meeting (see paragraph 5 above) were finalised on 5 October 2018 and signed by the Prime Minister. They set out the draft amendment which had been discussed and the individuals who had spoken during the meeting. It was recorded in the minutes that the government would consider the matter after the Ministry of Transport and Communications had assessed the comments made during the consultative meeting and amended the draft accordingly.

8 . In further e-mail correspondence between the applicants or other journalists and the Office of the Government from 5 to 16 October 2018, the Office told the journalists that consultative meetings were audio-recorded only when employees of the Office considered it to be necessary for the purpose of finalising the minutes. When an audio-recording was made, it remained on the computer server used by the Office for two days and then it was deleted. The deletion was made automatically, without any separate decision being taken to that effect. The consultative meeting of 3 October 2018 had in fact been audio-recorded but the minutes had already been finalised (see paragraph 7 above) and the audio-recording had been deleted.

9 . It appears from the case material that the audio-recording was deleted on 5 October 2018 at 11 p.m.

10 . On 2 November 2018 the applicants, together with four other journalists and the Lithuanian Journalists’ Union, lodged a complaint against the Office of the Government with the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court. They submitted that the refusal to provide them with the audio-recording of the consultative meeting of 3 October 2018 (see paragraph 5 above) and the deletion of that audio-recording (see paragraphs 8 and 9 above) had been unlawful and had breached their right to receive and impart information as guaranteed by the Constitution and the Convention. They contended that they had a strong interest in learning what had been discussed during the meeting at issue because it had concerned journalists’ right to receive information from public registers free of charge, and the minutes of the meeting contained little useful information (see paragraph 7 above). They also emphasised the importance of ensuring the transparency of the work of the government. They therefore asked the court: (i) to find that the refusal to provide them with the audio-recording of the consultative meeting had been unlawful; (ii) to find that the deletion of that audio-recording had been unlawful; and (iii) to order the Office of the Government to restore the audio-recording and provide it to them.

11 . The Office of the Government disputed the complaint. It submitted that, in contrast to government sittings that had to be audio-recorded, the law did not require audio-recordings of consultative meetings of the government to be made, stored or managed (see paragraphs 46 and 50 below). Its actions had therefore been lawful. It also submitted that the practice of automatically deleting audio-recordings of consultative meetings had been in place since June 2018 and its aim was to avoid storing excessive personal data. There were no regulations governing the deletion or restoration of audio-recordings, and restoring the audio-recording at issue was not technically possible because back-up copies of deleted electronic files were only kept for one month and that time-limit had already expired.

12 . On 6 March 2019 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court dismissed the complaint. It observed that the Constitution and the case-law of the Constitutional Court recognised that the government had power to decide matters relating to State governance in government sittings by making resolutions, and it could not decide matters any other way. The Vilnius Regional Administrative Court emphasised that any discussions that took place in government consultative meetings were only preliminary and would not create any legal consequences for the complainants. The court further held that the minutes of the consultative meeting of 3 October 2018 (see paragraph 7 above) complied with the relevant legal requirements and that by providing the complainants with those minutes the Office of the Government had adequately ensured their right to receive and impart information. Given that only preliminary discussions took place during consultative meetings, the complainants’ request for the contents of all the comments made during that meeting was excessive.

13 . The Vilnius Regional Administrative Court further held that the Law on the Right to Receive Information from State and Municipal Institutions and Entities ( Teisės gauti informaciją iš valstybės ir savivaldybių institucijų ir įstaigų įstatymas ) did not apply to documents which the institution or entity was not legally obliged to store and manage (see paragraph 38 below). The court agreed with the Office of the Government that, at the material time, it had not been required by law to make and store audio-recordings of consultative meetings (see paragraph 11 above). There had therefore been no legal grounds for the Office to grant the complainants’ request and provide them with an audio-recording. The court held that the complainants’ right to receive information from the government was adequately recognised by the fact that government sittings were broadcast publicly and audio-recordings of them were publicly available (see paragraph 46 below).

14 . The complainants lodged an appeal against the decision of the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court. They submitted that the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Government ( Vyriausybės kanceliarijos darbo reglamentas ), which had been approved by the Chancellor of the Government, provided for the making and storing of audio-recordings of consultative meetings. The court had therefore erred when it found that the Office had not been required by law to make audio-recordings of the meetings (see paragraph 13 above). The complainants contended that the lack of such an obligation in legislation constituted a legislative omission and that the court ought to have remedied that omission through case-law. Furthermore, they disputed the court’s finding that the discussion which had taken place during the consultative meeting had not created any legal consequences for them (see paragraph 12 above). In any event, the right to receive information was not limited to information which created legal consequences for the person seeking it. Lastly, they disputed the court’s finding that the minutes of the consultative meeting had adequately ensured their right to receive and impart information.

15 The Office of the Government submitted a reply to the appeal in which it raised essentially the same arguments as in its previous reply (see paragraph 11 above).

16 . On 8 June 2020 the Supreme Administrative Court decided to reassess the evidence and invited the parties to submit new evidence of how the deleted audio-recording could be restored. The Office of the Government provided official letters from two public authorities operating in the fields of information technologies and telecommunications, both of which stated that restoring the audio-recording from 2018 was not technically possible. Following an application filed by the complainants, the court ordered the Office to provide further information regarding the media where the audio-recording at issue had been stored, detailed procedures on backing up electronic files, file system permission settings, replication servers used by the Office and international certification of its information system. The Office provided that information to the court.

17 . On 23 July 2020 the Supreme Administrative Court quashed the decision of the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court. Firstly, it held that it was immaterial whether or not the Office’s refusal to provide the complainants with the requested information had created legal consequences for them. It emphasised the importance of the role of journalists in a democratic society, which had been recognised in the case-law of the Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human Rights. It also observed that holding consultative meetings was one of the ways of organising the work of government. The complainants had therefore had the right in their professional capacity as journalists to ask the Office for information about the consultative meeting at issue. The court observed that when the complainants had asked for the audio-recording it had not yet been deleted (see paragraphs 6 and 9 above), which meant that the Office would have been able to provide it to them.

18 It further found that the Office had not argued in the proceedings that there was any justification for the refusal to provide the audio-recording to the complainants. The information available about the matters discussed in that meeting and the individuals present there gave no reason to believe that providing the audio-recording to journalists might have led to threats to national security or might have disclosed information of a private nature. The court also found that the minutes of the consultative meeting (see paragraph 7 above) were not sufficiently informative and that the complainants’ wish to obtain information about the remarks made during the consultative meeting was not excessive (see, in contrast, the reasoning of the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court in paragraph 12 above).

19 . The Supreme Administrative Court agreed with the lower court that at the material time the Office had not been required by law to make audio-recordings of government consultative meetings (see paragraph 13 above): the requirement to do so was only in an internal document – the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Government (see the complainants’ submissions summarised in paragraph 14 above). However, it had been established that the Office had in fact made an audio-recording of the consultative meeting at issue. The Supreme Administrative Court emphasised that, when determining whether the Office had been required to provide the audio-recording to the complainants, the key element was not the form of the document requested but the contents of the information they had asked for. The Law on the Right to Receive Information from State and Municipal Institutions and Entities, which transposed the relevant EU law into domestic law, gave everyone the right to receive from public authorities any information which those authorities stored and managed in the course of their public duties (see paragraph 38 below).

20 . The Office of the Government had made an audio-recording of the consultative meeting of 3 October 2018 in the fulfilment of its public duties and had had that recording at the time when the complainants had asked for it. It had refused to provide it to them and had not shown that the refusal was justified for any legal reason. The Supreme Administrative Court concluded that the refusal to provide the audio-recording to the complainants had violated their right to receive and impart information. It had therefore been ill-founded and unlawful ( nepagrįstas ir neteisėtas ).

21 . However, having examined the information provided by the Office (see paragraph 16 above), the court found that it would not be technically possible to restore the deleted audio-recording. The breach of the complainants’ rights therefore had to be remedied in a different manner provided by law – by acknowledging that the refusal to provide them with the audio-recording had violated their right to receive and impart information.

22 . In August 2020 the applicants lodged an application with the Vilnius District Court to commence administrative-offence proceedings under Article 547 § 1 of the Code of Administrative Offences for the refusal to provide information to the media or the obstruction of journalists in the performance of their professional duties (see paragraph 37 below). They submitted that the Supreme Administrative Court had found that the refusal of the Office of the Government to provide them and other journalists with the audio-recording of the consultative meeting had been unlawful and had violated their right to receive and impart information (see paragraph 20 above). Given that it was not possible to restore the deleted audio-recording (see paragraph 21 above), the applicants contended that whoever had taken the decision to refuse to provide it to them was liable under the Code of Administrative Offences. In their view, that decision could have been taken by the Prime Minister or the Chancellor of the Government, or the Prime Minister’s public relations adviser – they asked the court to identify and punish the person or persons responsible. They further submitted that the administrative offence had been committed intentionally, with the aim of hiding from the public the arguments presented during the consultative meeting with regard to the journalists’ right of access to information, and that it had therefore been an abuse of public office. Whoever was liable should therefore be given the maximum penalty provided by law (see paragraph 37 below). The applicants also claimed 1,000 euros (EUR) each in respect of non-pecuniary damage.

23 . On 10 May 2021 the Vilnius District Court commenced administrative-offence proceedings under Article 547 § 1 of the Code of Administrative Offences (see paragraph 37 below) against the individuals who, at the relevant time, had held the offices of Prime Minister, Chancellor of the Government and the Prime Minister’s public relations adviser.

24 . At the hearing before the court, the defendants stated that they had not given orders to anyone to deny access to the audio-recording or to delete it and that it had been deleted automatically, in accordance with the procedural rules which had been in force at that time. The court also heard several witnesses who had worked at the Office of the Government at the material time. They testified that the Office’s responses to journalists’ questions had been coordinated among several different departments of the Office, but none of the witnesses could indicate whether any specific person or persons had issued an order not to provide the audio-recording to journalists.

25 . On 30 November 2021 the Vilnius District Court discontinued the administrative-offence proceedings in respect of all three defendants. The court held firstly that administrative liability under Article 547 § 1 of the Code of Administrative Offences could arise only in respect of the head of an institution or entity which had refused to provide journalists with information (see paragraph 37 below). In the case at hand, that institution had been the Office of the Government and its head was the Chancellor of the Government. The Prime Minister and the Prime Minister’s public relations adviser had therefore not been the proper defendants. The court further held that there was no evidence that the Chancellor himself had refused to provide information to the applicants or that he had given any orders to that effect to any employees of the Office. Moreover, it had not been shown that the refusal had been entirely devoid of reasons or that it had obstructed the applicants in the performance of their professional duties. The administrative proceedings against the Chancellor therefore had to be discontinued on the grounds that the alleged administrative offence had not been committed. Lastly, the Vilnius District Court noted that, according to witness statements, the decision not to provide the audio-recording to journalists had been taken within the Office collectively and not by a single person (see paragraph 24 above), but Article 547 § 1 of the Code of Administrative Offences did not provide for collective liability.

26 . The applicants appealed against the decision of the Vilnius District Court. They claimed, in particular, that the Chancellor had acknowledged that he had been aware of the requests made by journalists to access the audio-recording. Moreover, some of the journalists’ e-mails (see paragraph 6 above) had been addressed to the Chancellor, among other recipients, and the situation had been widely reported in the media. Had the Chancellor made the decision to provide the audio-recording to journalists, that would have been done and the disputed administrative offence would not have been committed. The applicants asserted that it was immaterial for the purpose of Article 547 § 1 of the Code of Administrative Offences that the Chancellor had not personally refused to provide them with information – he had an obligation to organise the work of the Office of the Government in such a way as to avoid violating that provision. If Article 547 § 1 was applied only in those cases where the head of the institution had personally refused to provide information to journalists, administrative liability could be easily avoided by the head either delegating decisions to his or her subordinates or taking no action whatsoever, and the provision in question would become ineffective. The applicants also pointed out that, on the one hand, a violation of their rights had been found by the Supreme Administrative Court (see paragraph 20 above), but, on the other hand, according to the Vilnius District Court, nobody was responsible for it. They contended that interpreting the law in this manner created conditions allowing the heads of public institutions to abuse their office.

27 . On 7 January 2022 the Vilnius Regional Court dismissed the applicants’ appeal. It held that the replies which the Office of the Government had sent to the applicants and the other journalists had included reasons why the requested audio-recording could not be provided (see paragraphs 6 and 8 above). The Supreme Administrative Court’s finding that the refusal to provide the applicants with the audio-recording had been ill-founded and unlawful (see paragraph 20 above) did not necessarily mean that there had been wilful obstruction ( sąmoningai trukdoma ) of the journalists’ ability to fulfil their professional duties or an unreasoned ( nemotyvuotas ) refusal to provide information within the meaning of Article 547 § 1 of the Code of Administrative Offences. The Vilnius Regional Court further stated that Article 547 § 1 provided for administrative liability in cases where no reasons at all were given for a refusal to provide information to journalists or where the reason given was clearly ill-founded ( akivaizdžiai nepagrįsta ). After considering the decisions taken by the administrative courts, the Vilnius Regional Court was not persuaded that the heads of the relevant institution or other individuals who had been in charge had had an intention to obstruct the journalists in the performance of their professional duties or that they had refused to provide information to the journalists without giving reasons for the refusal. Furthermore, the violation of the applicants’ rights had been remedied by an acknowledgment of that violation (see paragraphs 21 above).

28 . The Vilnius Regional Court accepted that the Chancellor of the Government had probably known about the journalists’ requests for the audio-recording (see the applicants’ arguments in this respect, summarised in paragraph 26 above). However, the fact that the Chancellor had not himself replied to the applicants did not mean that they had not received reasoned replies to their requests. The fact that the applicants had been able to challenge the Office’s replies before the administrative courts further demonstrated that those replies had been appropriate. The Vilnius Regional Court also endorsed the lower court’s conclusions to the effect that Article 547 § 1 of the Code of Administrative Offences only made the head of the institution liable and that the Prime Minister was not a proper defendant. It furthermore agreed with the lower court that the decision not to provide the audio-recording to journalists had been taken within the Office collectively (see paragraph 25 above). The administrative offence provided in Article 547 § 1 of the Code of Administrative Offences had therefore not been committed.

29 . The applicants applied to the Supreme Court for the reopening of the administrative-offence proceedings on the grounds that the courts had committed a material breach of the law. They made essentially the same arguments as those which they had raised in their previous appeal (see paragraph 26 above). In addition, they contended that the Vilnius Regional Court had limited the scope of Article 547 § 1 of the Code of Administrative Offences to offences committed intentionally (see paragraph 27 above) and that it had failed to consider that such offences could also be committed negligently.

30 . The Supreme Court reopened the administrative proceedings. However, on 24 October 2022 it upheld the decisions of the lower courts. It emphasised that an individual could be subject to administrative liability only if his or her actions or omissions included all the objective and subjective elements of the administrative offence at issue: if at least one of those elements was absent, that meant that an administrative offence had not been committed. For administrative liability under Article 547 § 1 of the Code of Administrative Offences to arise, there had to have been a refusal to provide information to journalists without providing the reason for the refusal, or journalists had to have been obstructed in the performance of their professional duties. What was important for the purposes of that provision was not just the fact that there had been a refusal to provide information but also the content of that refusal. The administrative offence at issue could be committed both actively (for example, by refusing to provide information without giving any reasons or giving only formalistic reasons ( nurodant formalias priežastis )) and by omission (for example, by ignoring a request for information and not responding to it). In the case at hand, the Office of the Government had given its reasons for refusing to provide the applicants with the audio-recording requested (see paragraph 6 above) and the Office’s replies could not be considered unreasoned. It had therefore not been shown that the Chancellor of the Government, either personally or through the Office, had refused to provide the applicants with information without giving reasons and had thereby obstructed them in fulfilling their professional duties. The Supreme Court also noted that, contrary to the applicants’ submissions, the lower courts had confirmed that under Article 547 § 1 of the Code of Administrative Offences the head of an institution could be held liable for a refusal to provide information not only when he or she had given that refusal personally but also when that had been done by employees of the institution in question.

31 . The Supreme Court further held that the Supreme Administrative Court’s finding that the refusal to provide the applicants with the information from the audio-recording had violated their right to receive and impart information (see paragraph 20 above) was not to be considered res judicata in the administrative-offence proceedings ( nurodytoje byloje šį pripažintą faktą laikyti prejudiciniu nagrinėjamai administracinio nusižengimo bylai nėra pagrindo ). The proceedings in the administrative courts had concerned the question of whether the Office’s refusal to provide the requested information had been lawful and well-founded, but those proceedings had not addressed the alleged administrative offence or the individuals who might have committed it. Although the Supreme Administrative Court had acknowledged that the Office’s refusal to provide the applicants with the information in the audio-recording had been ill-founded and unlawful, that did not necessarily mean that there had been a wilful and unreasoned refusal ( sąmoningai nemotyvuotai atsisakoma ) to provide information or that journalists had been obstructed in the performance of their professional duties within the meaning of Article 547 § 1 of the Code of Administrative Offences. Lastly, the Supreme Court observed that the lower courts had not held that the administrative offence at issue could only be committed intentionally, contrary to the claims of the applicants (see paragraph 29 above).

32 . In January 2023 the applicants lodged a complaint with the Constitutional Court. They asked the Constitutional Court to find that Article 547 § 1 of the Code of Administrative Offences, “to the extent that it provided for administrative liability only in those cases where no reason for refusing to provide information was given, that is, without linking the refusal to provide information with a lawful basis for refusing”, was incompatible with the Constitution. They cited, inter alia , Article 25 of the Constitution, which provided for the right to receive and impart information (see paragraph 36 below), and also the constitutional principles of the rule of law and the protection of legitimate expectations.

33 . On 12 April 2023 the Constitutional Court declined to examine the applicants’ complaint. It observed that in the decision of 24 October 2022 the Supreme Court had held that what was important for the question of administrative liability under Article 547 § 1 of the Code of Administrative Offences was not just the fact of a refusal to provide information but also the content of that refusal and that a refusal to provide information to journalists could be committed both actively (for example, by refusing to provide information without giving any reasons or giving only formalistic reasons) and by omission (for example, by ignoring a request for information and not responding to it; see paragraph 30 above). This meant that Article 547 § 1 should not be interpreted literally and understood as providing for administrative liability only in those cases where no reasons whatsoever for refusing to provide information to journalists had been given. Contrary to the applicants’ submissions, liability also arose where the reasons for the refusal were formalistic, unlawful or ill-founded ( nurodo formalias, neteisėtas ar niekuo nepagrįstas priežastis ). Article 547 § 1 therefore did say what the applicants said it did not. The Constitutional Court concluded that the applicants’ complaint did not disclose any issue for it to review ( prašyme nėra tyrimo dalyko ) and therefore, in line with that court’s case-law, fell outside its jurisdiction ( prašymas yra nežinybingas Konstituciniam Teismui ).

34 . On 10 October 2018 the government approved a revised draft amendment to the Law on the Provision of Information to the Public which entitled journalists to receive information from public registers free of charge (see paragraph 4 above). The Seimas enacted the amendment on 15 April 2021 and it entered into force on 1 July 2021 (see paragraph 42 below).

35 . On 31 October 2018 the government initiated the procedure for amending the Law on the Government so as to introduce, inter alia , a requirement for the audio-recording of the government’s consultative meetings and live broadcasting of consultative meetings and sittings on the internet. The amendment was enacted by the Seimas on 13 December 2018 and the provision on the audio-recording of consultative meetings entered into force on 1 January 2019 (see paragraph 47 below). The Rules of Procedure of the Government were also amended accordingly on 22 May 2019. The amendment entered into force on 30 May 2019 (see paragraph 51 below).

36 . The relevant provisions of the Constitution read (official translation):

Article 25

“...

No one must be hindered from seeking, receiving, or imparting information and ideas.

The freedom to express convictions, as well as to receive and impart information, may not be limited otherwise than by law when this is necessary to protect human health, honour or dignity, private life, or morals, or to defend the constitutional order.

...”

Article 95

“The Government of the Republic of Lithuania shall decide the affairs of state governance at its sittings by adopting resolutions by a majority vote of all the members of the Government. ...”

Article 105

“The Constitutional Court shall consider and adopt decisions on whether the laws of the Republic of Lithuania or other acts adopted by the Seimas are in conflict with the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania.

The Constitutional Court shall also consider whether the following are in conflict with the Constitution and laws:

1) the acts of the President of the Republic;

2) the acts of the Government of the Republic.

...”

Article 106

(as amended on 21 March 2019, in force from 1 September 2019)

“...

Every person shall have the right to apply to the Constitutional Court concerning the acts specified in the first and second paragraphs of Article 105 if a decision adopted on the basis of these acts has violated the constitutional rights or freedoms of the person and the person has exhausted all legal remedies. The procedure for implementing this right shall be established by the Law on the Constitutional Court.

...”

37 . Article 547 § 1 of the Code of Administrative Offences reads:

“1. A refusal by heads of State or municipal institutions or entities to provide information to representatives of the media, except for information which is not public under the laws of the Republic of Lithuania, without giving reasons for the refusal, [or] the obstruction of journalists in the performance of their professional duties is punishable by a fine, which shall be imposed on the heads of State or municipal institutions or entities, of between 20 and 140 euros.”

38 . At the material time, the public had a right to receive information from public authorities under the Law on the Right to Receive Information from State and Municipal Institutions and Entities. The Law required public authorities to provide individuals and legal entities, on request, with information which the authority was storing and managing in the course of its public functions, save where there was an exception provided by law (Articles 2 § 1, 3 § 1 and 4 § 1). Under Article 2 § 2 (1), the Law did not apply to documents which the institution or entity at issue was not required by law to store and manage, except for information about the salaries of its employees.

39 Article 6 § 1 of the Law on the Provision of Information to the Public provides, inter alia , that everyone has the right to obtain unclassified information about their activities and official documents or copies of them from State and municipal institutions and entities. Article 6 § 3 requires State and municipal institutions and entities to provide that information in accordance with the procedure provided in regulations.

40 Article 6 § 6 states that information should be provided free of charge. State and municipal institutions and entities may only charge for services related to searching for the information requested and the copying of documents, but any such charge must not exceed the actual costs of the services.

41 Prior to 1 July 2021, the Law on the Provision of Information to the Public did not give journalists any right to receive information from public registers free of charge.

42 . Following an amendment which was enacted on 15 April 2021 and entered into force on 1 July 2021, Article 6 § 8 provides, inter alia , that journalists have the right to receive, free of charge, information and data from registers and public information systems, provided that the media outlet on behalf of which the journalist is requesting the information has not committed certain offences specified in the Law within the previous year.

43 . Article 36 of the Law on the Government provides that the functioning of the government will be governed by the Rules of Procedure of the Government, which must be approved by the government.

44 Article 37 § 1 provides that the government decides on matters of State governance in sittings ( posėdžiai ) by adopting resolutions ( nutarimai ) by a majority vote of all members of the government.

45 . Article 37 § 4 provides, inter alia , that the most important issues may, before sittings, be discussed in consultative meetings of the government or in government committees.

46 . At the material time, Article 42 provided, inter alia , that government sittings should be recorded by keeping minutes and by making an audio-recording. The Rules of Procedure of the Government set out what data had to be recorded in the minutes. It required the audio-recordings of the sittings to be stored in accordance with the procedure set out in the Law on Documents and Archives.

47 . Amendments to Article 42 were enacted on 13 December 2018 and entered into force on 20 December 2018 in respect of Article 42 § 1 and on 1 January 2019 in respect of Article 42 § 2. Following those amendments, Article 42 § 1 provides, inter alia , that sittings and consultative meetings of the government will be broadcast live on the internet, except for matters which concern classified information or personal data. Article 42 § 2 provides, inter alia , that sittings and consultative meetings must be recorded by keeping minutes and by making an audio-recording. The Rules of Procedure of the Government state what data must be recorded in the minutes. The audio-recordings must be stored in accordance with the procedure set out in the Law on Documents and Archives and relevant EU law.

48 Article 44 § 1 provides that the Office of the Government is a public entity established by the government which assists the government and the Prime Minister in carrying out their functions. It is headed by the Chancellor of the Government.

49 The Rules of Procedure of the Government were approved by the government pursuant to Article 36 of the Law on the Government (see paragraph 43 above).

50 . At the material time, paragraph 62 provided, inter alia , that consultative meetings of the government would be recorded by the keeping of minutes. The minutes had to be finalised by the Office of the Government and had to state who attended the meeting, the issues discussed, who had spoken and what decisions were taken. The minutes had to be prepared for the Prime Minister’s signature no later than two working days after the meeting and they had to be made public no later than the day after signature.

51 . Following an amendment which was enacted on 22 May 2019 and which entered into force on 30 May 2019, in addition to a regulation which is essentially the same as that described in paragraph 50 above, paragraph 62 provides that consultative meetings of the government are also audio-recorded, except as stated in the Law on the Government and other laws. The audio-recordings must be stored by the Office of the Government in accordance with the procedure set out in the Law on Documents and Archives and relevant EU law.

52 The applicants complained under Articles 6 § 1, 10 and 13 of the Convention that although the refusal to provide them with information had been unlawful and ill-founded, nobody had been held liable for it.

53 The applicants complained that the domestic authorities had failed to adequately remedy the violation of their right to receive and impart information because nobody had been held accountable for the refusal to provide them with information. They relied on Articles 6 § 1, 10 and 13 of the Convention.

The Court is the master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case (see Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], nos. 37685/10 and 22768/12, §§ 114 and 126, 20 March 2018). In the present case, it considers that the applicants’ complaint falls under Article 13 of the Convention read in conjunction with Article 10. Those provisions read as follows:

Article 10

“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.

2 The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.”

Article 13

“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”

54 . The Government submitted that the applicants had failed to comply with the four-month time-limit laid down in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention because a complaint to the Constitutional Court was not an effective remedy in the circumstances of the case. As set out in Article 105 of the Constitution (see paragraph 36 above), the Lithuanian Constitutional Court reviews whether certain legislation over which it has jurisdiction is compatible with the Constitution or the laws enacted by the Seimas, but it does not adjudicate individual legal disputes or the application of contested legislation in a given case. Furthermore, the Constitutional Court will decline to hear complaints which do not meet the admissibility criteria laid down in the Constitution and/or the Law on the Constitutional Court. In particular, it does not hear cases which are not within its jurisdiction, such as those where a rule which the complainant claims did not exist was in fact properly created, either under the legislation being disputed or elsewhere (the Government referred to the Constitutional Court’s decisions of 25 March 2020 in case no. KT53 ‑ A ‑ S48/2020; of 28 January 2021 in case no. KT15-A-S15/2021; of 12 January 2022 in case no. KT6-A-S6/2022; and of 9 March 2022 in case no. KT29-A-S28/2022).

55 In the applicants’ case, the Constitutional Court referred to the decision taken by the Supreme Court on 24 October 2022 (see paragraphs 30, 31 and 33 above) and found that the rule which the applicants claimed did not exist (that is, they claimed that Article 547 § 1 of the Code of Administrative Offences did not provide for administrative liability in cases where refusal to provide information to journalists was accompanied by reasons that were unlawful or ill-founded) did in fact exist. As a result, in line with its case-law, the Constitutional Court found that the applicants’ complaint did not disclose any issue for it to consider and was therefore not within its jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Government contended that the “final” decision in the present case for the purposes of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention had been the decision of the Supreme Court of 24 October 2022, but the application had been lodged with the Court only on 3 July 2023, that is more than four months later.

56 The applicants submitted that the text of Article 547 § 1 of the Code of Administrative Offences did not require the reasons for a refusal to provide information to journalists to be lawful (see paragraph 37 above). The Supreme Court’s decision of 24 October 2022 could not be read as confirming such a requirement either – the Supreme Court had ruled that an administrative offence had not been committed despite the earlier finding by the Supreme Administrative Court that the refusal to provide information to journalists had been unlawful (see paragraph 31 above). According to the applicants, the Constitutional Court provided a different interpretation of Article 547 § 1 from that given by the Supreme Court – namely, the Constitutional Court held that any unlawful reasons for refusing to provide information to journalists could be grounds for administrative liability (see paragraph 33 above). The two different interpretations of that legislative provision by the domestic courts enabled public officials to avoid administrative liability.

57 The applicants submitted that the Constitutional Court had declined to hear their complaint without sufficient grounds. They contended that they had had a valid expectation that the Constitutional Court would find that there was an omission in Article 547 § 1 of the Code of Administrative Offences which made it contrary to the Constitution. That should have enabled them to have the proceedings before the Supreme Court reopened and their rights could have been remedied at the domestic level. Accordingly, they contended that a complaint to the Constitutional Court was a remedy which needed to be exhausted in the circumstances of the present case.

58 As a rule, the four-month period runs from the date of the final decision in the process of exhaustion of domestic remedies (see Blokhin v. Russia [GC], no. 47152/06, § 106, ECHR 2016). However, this provision allows only remedies which are normal and effective to be taken into account, as an applicant cannot extend the strict time-limit imposed under the Convention by seeking to make inappropriate or misconceived applications to bodies or institutions which have no power or competence to offer effective redress for the complaint in issue under the Convention (see Lopes de Sousa Fernandes v. Portugal [GC], no. 56080/13, § 132, 19 December 2017, and the cases cited therein). The pursuit of remedies which do not satisfy the requirements of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention will not be considered by the Court for the purposes of establishing the date of the “final decision” or calculating the starting-point for the running of the four-month rule (see Jeronovičs v. Latvia [GC], no. 44898/10, § 75, 5 July 2016, and the cases cited therein). Whether an individual application to the Constitutional Court is a remedy which needs to be exhausted under Article 35 § 1 will depend largely on the particular features of the respondent State’s legal system and the scope of its Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction (see Uzun v. Turkey (dec.), no. 10755/13, §§ 42-71, 30 April 2013, and the cases cited therein).

59 Having regard to the scope of the Lithuanian Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction (see paragraph 54 above), the Court must determine whether a challenge to the constitutionality of Article 547 § 1 of the Code of Administrative Offences could have led to an effective remedy in the circumstances of the present case. In their constitutional complaint the applicants contended that that provision was incompatible with the Constitution because it provided for administrative liability only in those cases where the reason for refusing to provide information to journalists was not given, that is without linking the refusal to provide information with the lawfulness of such a refusal (see the applicants’ arguments summarised in paragraph 32 above). In this connection, the Court observes that Article 547 § 1 does not expressly include a requirement for reasons for a refusal to provide information to be lawful (see paragraph 37 above). It further takes note of the interpretation and application of that provision by the Supreme Court in the applicants’ case, where that court found that the administrative offence in issue had not been committed because the refusal had been accompanied by reasons, even though the Supreme Administrative Court had previously found that refusal to be ill-founded and unlawful (see paragraphs 20 and 31 above). Given the circumstances, the Court accepts that it was not unreasonable for the applicants to believe that the failure to hold anyone personally accountable for the refusal to provide them with information resulted from the content of the legislative provision itself, and thus to question its compatibility with the Constitution. Furthermore, the Government did not explicitly allege that in their constitutional complaint the applicants had failed to properly raise or substantiate their arguments that Article 547 § 1 was not compatible with the Constitution, or that they had otherwise used that avenue improperly (compare and contrast Traina v. Portugal (dec.), no. 59431/11, §§ 19 and 24-30, 21 March 2017, and, in the context of the exhaustion of domestic remedies, Harvey v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 80237/13, §§ 63-64, 21 November 2017; S.R. v. Norway (dec.), no. 43927/17, §§ 31-35, 21 April 2020; and Magyar Kétfarkú Kutya Párt v. Hungary [GC], no. 201/17, §§ 53-57, 20 January 2020).

60 In the light of the foregoing, the Court considers that, in the circumstances of the present case, it cannot be held against the applicants that they availed themselves of a remedy from the Constitutional Court (see, mutatis mutandis , Kušić v. Croatia (dec.), no. 71667/17, §§ 86-87, 10 December 2019). It follows that the final domestic decision is the decision of the Constitutional Court of 12 April 2023 declining to examine the applicants’ constitutional complaint (see paragraph 33 above). As that decision was given less than four months before the date of introduction of the present application (3 July 2023), the Government’s objection concerning the lack of compliance with the four-month time-limit must be dismissed.

61 The parties did not dispute that Article 13 of the Convention was applicable in the present case. However, the issue of applicability ratione materiae is a matter that goes to the Court’s jurisdiction and that it is obliged to examine of its own motion (see Grosam v. the Czech Republic [GC], no. 19750/13, § 107, 1 June 2023, and the cases cited therein).

62 The Supreme Administrative Court found that the applicants had had the right in their professional capacity as journalists to seek information about the government’s consultative meeting; that the Office of the Government had not given any justification, such as national security or privacy concerns, for the refusal to provide them with the audio-recording of that meeting; and that, consequently, the refusal to provide the applicants with the audio ‑ recording had violated their right to receive and impart information (see paragraphs 17-20 above). In view of the findings of the domestic court, the Court is satisfied that the applicants can claim to have an “arguable complaint” under Article 10 of the Convention and that, as a result, Article 13 of the Convention is applicable in the present case (see, mutatis mutandis and under Article 3 of the Convention, Barbotin v. France , no. 25338/16, § 32, 19 November 2020, and the cases cited therein).

63 . The Government submitted that the applicants could no longer claim to be “victims” of a violation of Article 10 of the Convention because the Supreme Administrative Court had expressly acknowledged the violation of their right to receive and impart information (see paragraphs 17-21 above) and the applicants had had the possibility of claiming damages from the Office of the Government, the institution which had violated their rights, either in the same administrative court proceedings or by instituting separate civil proceedings. The applicants disputed that submission.

64 The Court considers that it is not necessary to address the Government’s objection concerning the applicants’ victim status because the application is in any event inadmissible, for the reasons presented below.

65 . The Government submitted that, in the circumstances of the present case, Article 13 of the Convention read in conjunction with Article 10 did not require specific individuals to be held liable for the refusal to provide the applicants with the information at issue. The Court has previously established that the notion of an effective remedy does not include the need to resort to criminal proceedings to vindicate the applicant’s freedom of expression (the Government referred, mutatis mutandis , to Peev v. Bulgaria , no. 64209/01, § 71, 26 July 2007). The Government pointed out that the case-law of both the Lithuanian courts and the Court considers administrative offences in the Lithuanian legal system to be “criminal” for the purposes of the Convention.

66 . The Government further submitted that the applicants had had the possibility of claiming damages from the State for the violation of their rights, either in the same administrative court proceedings or by instituting separate civil proceedings. They could have also complained to the Administrative Disputes’ Commission ( Administracinių ginčų komisija ), and if it had established a violation of their rights, they could then have made a claim for damages in the administrative court. The Government cited a number of domestic court decisions relating to those remedies. They also pointed out that in several cases concerning violations of Article 10 of the Convention the Court had held that the finding of a violation constituted sufficient just satisfaction (the Government referred, mutatis mutandis , to Yuriy Chumak v. Ukraine , no. 23897/10, §§ 53-56, 18 March 2021, and Rovshan Hajiyev v. Azerbaijan , nos. 19925/12 and 47532/13, §§ 71-73, 9 December 2021). A monetary award was therefore not necessarily required.

67 The Government therefore contended that the domestic law provided effective remedies for the violation of the applicants’ right to receive and impart information.

68 . The applicants submitted that the acknowledgment by the Supreme Administrative Court that the refusal to provide them with the audio ‑ recording of the government’s consultative meeting of 3 October 2018 had been unlawful and ill-founded and that it had violated their right to receive and impart information (see paragraph 20 above) had not been sufficient to remedy that violation. In the applicants’ view, the audio ‑ recording could not have been deleted without someone taking a decision to that effect and the courts therefore ought to have identified the person or persons who had taken that decision and held them accountable. However, while in one set of proceedings the courts had found the refusal to provide information to be unlawful (see paragraph 20 above), in another set of proceedings they had declined to hold anyone accountable for it (see paragraphs 30 and 31 above).

69 . The applicants contended that, in the circumstances of the case, Article 13 of the Convention read in conjunction with Article 10 required specific individuals to be held accountable for the refusal to provide them with information. The right of journalists to receive information was important in a democratic society and it was a matter of public interest. Politicians who obstructed journalists in the fulfilment of their professional duties therefore had to be held personally accountable. The applicants stated that they were “not interested” in claiming compensation from the Office of the Government (see the Government’s submissions in paragraph 66 above) because it would enable the individuals who were responsible for the violation at issue – the politicians who had used civil servants to “deliberately sabotage” journalists’ access to the audio-recording – to avoid personal accountability.

70 . The general principles relating to press freedom have been summarised in Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland ([GC], no. 931/13, §§ 124-28, 27 June 2017, and the cases cited therein) and, as concerns the right of access to information, in Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary ([GC], no. 18030/11, §§ 149-80, 8 November 2016).

71 The general principles relating to the right to an effective remedy have been summarised in Mugemangango v. Belgium ([GC], no. 310/15, §§ 130 ‑ 31, 10 July 2020, and the cases cited therein).

72 In line with the above principles, the Court will examine whether the applicants had at their disposal a domestic remedy that was capable of dealing with the substance of their complaint (that is, that the refusal by the Office of the Government to provide them with the audio-recording of the government’s consultative meeting had violated their right to receive and impart information) and granting them appropriate relief.

73 The Court turns firstly to the proceedings brought by the applicants against the Office of the Government in the administrative courts (see paragraphs 10-21 above). Although the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court dismissed their complaint (see paragraphs 12 and 13 above), the Supreme Administrative Court quashed that decision. It acknowledged that the applicants had had the right to seek the information in issue, that the Office had had that information in its possession at the relevant time, and that its refusal to provide it to the applicants had not been based on any legal grounds. For those reasons, the Supreme Administrative Court concluded that the refusal to provide the applicants with the audio-recording had been ill ‑ founded and unlawful (see paragraphs 17-20 above). The applicants had asked the court to order the Office to restore the audio-recording which had by then already been deleted, but the Supreme Administrative Court, having assessed the evidence, found that it was not technically possible to do so. Consequently, it held that the violation of the applicants’ right must be remedied in a different manner provided by law – by acknowledging that the refusal to provide them with the audio-recording had violated their right to receive and impart information (see paragraph 21 above). The Court is therefore satisfied that the Supreme Administrative Court dealt with the substance of the applicants’ complaint concerning the violation of their right to receive and impart information.

74 The applicants did not raise any complaints regarding the scope of the review carried out by the Supreme Administrative Court or the reasons on which its decision was based. Furthermore, they did not question its finding that it was not technically possible to restore the audio-recording. Nor did they complain about a lack of financial compensation – they had not asked for compensation in the administrative court proceedings (see paragraph 10 above) and in their submissions before the Court they stated that they were “not interested” in obtaining compensation from the Office of the Government (see paragraph 69 above). Instead, their complaint was that, in the circumstances of their case, where the audio-recording had been deleted and could not be restored, Article 13 of the Convention read in conjunction with Article 10 required the individual or individuals responsible for the refusal to provide the audio-recording to the journalists and for its deletion to be held personally accountable (see paragraphs 68 and 69 above). The applicants sought to have such personal accountability established in the administrative-offence proceedings that they had brought against several public officials (see paragraphs 22-31 above). In this connection, the Court observes that, as noted by the Government, administrative-offence proceedings under Lithuanian law were considered “criminal” within the meaning of the Convention (see paragraph 65 above).

75 The Court, in the context of assessment concerning the exhaustion of domestic remedies, has not in principle excluded the possibility that a pecuniary sanction imposed under domestic law on a relevant public official could constitute an effective remedy for a violation of the rights guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention (see Guseva v. Bulgaria , no. 6987/07, §§ 44 ‑ 45, 17 February 2015, which concerned the refusal of a mayor to comply with several court decisions ordering him to grant the applicant access to certain information and where the Government argued that the applicant could have sought an imposition of a pecuniary sanction on the mayor). It reiterates, however, that neither Article 13 nor any other provision of the Convention guarantees an applicant a right to secure the prosecution and conviction of a third party or a right to “private revenge” (see Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], no. 48939/99, § 147, ECHR 2004-XII; see also Peev v. Bulgaria , no. 64209/01, § 71, 26 July 2007, where the Court did not find that the notion of an effective remedy went as far as calling for the criminal prosecution of the persons who had carried out the search of the applicant’s office in violation of Article 10 of the Convention).

76 In the present case, the Court has regard to the following circumstances. When the applicants asked for the audio-recording in issue, the Law on the Government and the Rules of Procedure of the Government did not expressly provide for the making and storing of audio-recordings of government’s consultative meetings (see paragraphs 46 and 50 above), although as submitted by the applicants and not disputed by the Government, there appeared to be such a requirement in subordinate legislation – the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Government (see the applicants’ submissions in the domestic proceedings summarised in paragraph 14 above and the Supreme Administrative Court’s decision summarised in paragraph 19 above). It appears from the case material that the deletion of audio-recordings from the server within two days was carried out automatically, without a separate decision being made (see paragraphs 8 and 11 above). Furthermore, in the administrative-offence proceedings, the courts established that the refusal to provide the applicants with the audio-recording in issue had resulted from collective actions of the Office and not from a decision taken by any individual defendant (see paragraphs 25 and 28 above). In the Court’s view, the fact that the refusal to provide the audio-recording to the journalists and its subsequent deletion resulted from a lack of domestic regulation and from the practices within the Office of the Government is further corroborated by the fact that, less than a month after the refusal, the government brought in legislative amendments which, inter alia , required the audio-recording of the government’s consultative meetings and the live broadcasting of consultative meetings and sittings on the internet; those amendments entered into force in January and May 2019 (see paragraph 35 above).

77 The Court emphasises the vital role of the media in facilitating and fostering the public’s right to receive and impart information and ideas that it has repeatedly recognised. Furthermore, it is well established that the gathering of information is an essential preparatory step in journalism and an inherent, protected part of press freedom (see, among many other authorities, Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy , cited above, §§ 126 and 128, and the cases cited therein). However, given the circumstances referred to in the preceding paragraphs, it finds that in the present case the applicants had at their disposal a domestic remedy that was capable of dealing with the substance of their complaint (that is, that the refusal by the Office of the Government to provide them with the audio-recording of the government’s consultative meeting had violated their right to receive and impart information) and granting them appropriate relief, and that Article 13 of the Convention read in conjunction with Article 10 did not require public officials to be held personally accountable under the Code of Administrative Offences.

78 It follows that the present application is manifestly ill‑founded and must be declared inadmissible in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,

Declares the application inadmissible.

Done in English and notified in writing on 2 July 2026.

Andrea Tamietti Arnfinn Bårdsen Registrar President