Guzun v. the Republic of Moldova

FIFTH SECTION

Application no. 18059/16 Tudor GUZUN against the Republic of Moldova

The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting on 25 June 2026 as a Committee composed of:

María Elósegui , President , Diana Sârcu, Sébastien Biancheri , judges , and Martina Keller, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the application (no. 18059/16) against the Republic of Moldova lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 28 March 2016 by a Moldovan national, Mr Tudor Guzun (“the applicant”), who was born in 1986, lives in Porumbeni and was represented by Mr V. Zama, a lawyer practising in Chișinău;

the decision to give notice of the complaints concerning Article 6 §§ 1 and 2 of the Convention (incitement to commit an offence, equality of arms and presumption of innocence) to the Moldovan Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent at the relevant time, Mr O. Rotari, and to declare the remainder of the application inadmissible;

the parties’ observations;

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE

1 The case manly concerns the alleged incitement of the applicant to commit an offence which he otherwise would not have committed.

2 At the material time, the applicant was a criminal investigation officer within the Rîșcani Police Commissariat in Chișinău.

3 . On 3 August 2012 a certain T. lodged a complaint with the Centre for Fighting Economic Crime and Corruption (CFECC), submitting, inter alia , that on 25 July 2012 the applicant had invited her to his office and requested that she appear as a witness in the criminal proceedings against her daughter. In the course of the discussion the applicant told her that, in exchange for 250 euros (EUR), he could exert his influence over the prosecutor to have the criminal proceedings against her daughter discontinued and to prevent any new criminal proceedings against either her or her daughter from being instituted.

4 On the same day, in response to T.’s complaint, a criminal investigation into suspected bribe ‑ taking was initiated.

5 On 6 August 2012 the Buiucani District Court authorised the use of special investigative measures (that is, the interception and recording of communications between T. and the applicant, along with the surveillance of the handover of funds). The investigating judge also authorised an on ‑ site examination, a body search of the applicant and a search of his workplace.

6 On 7 August 2012 T., equipped with special devices for audio and video recording, met with the applicant at a café.

7 In the course of the meeting, T. handed over EUR 100 to the applicant. Reluctant at first, he expressed his fear of criminal liability and of the possibility of being reported to the authorities. However, despite initially refusing the money, the applicant took it and assured T. that he would take care of the matter.

8 On 10 August 2012, while inside the applicant’s vehicle, T. handed over the remainder of the requested money – that is, EUR 150.

9 Shortly thereafter, the applicant was apprehended by CFECC officers.

10 On 24 August 2012 a further criminal investigation into the suspected offence of peddling influence was initiated in respect of the applicant.

11 On 28 August 2012 the two cases were joined in a single investigation.

12 On 18 September 2012 the applicant was charged with bribe ‑ taking through extortion and peddling influence.

13 On 23 March 2015 the Buiucani District Court acquitted the applicant of bribe ‑ taking through extortion, concluding that the element of extortion had not been proved, but found him guilty of peddling influence and sentenced him to a fine of 40,000 Moldovan lei (MDL – approximately EUR 2,000 at the time of the events). The court dismissed the applicant’s allegations of incitement to commit an offence. It referred to, inter alia , T.’s initial complaint to the police and subsequent statements given by her, the results of the investigative measures (including the video recordings), police officers’ reports, and other relevant documents.

14 The applicant appealed against that judgment. He pointed to multiple alleged procedural shortcomings concerning the special investigative measures and challenged the lawfulness of the evidence obtained as a result of them. He also claimed that he had been incited by T. and the police to commit an offence.

15 On 21 May 2015 the Chișinău Court of Appeal upheld the applicant’s appeal in part, quashing the first ‑ instance court’s decision in so far as it concerned the punishment. The applicant’s fine was reduced to MDL 20,000. The court examined the applicant’s argument that he had been the victim of entrapment and dismissed it as unfounded.

16 The applicant appealed on points of law, essentially repeating the arguments that he had made before the appellate court.

17 On 1 December 2015 the Supreme Court of Justice upheld the lower court’s judgment.

18 The applicant mainly complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that he had been incited by T., acting under the guidance of the authorities, to commit an offence which he would not have otherwise committed, and that the courts had relied on evidence obtained as a result of entrapment to convict him. He also claimed that the proceedings had been unfair since the prosecutor and the court had rejected several applications submitted by him and had therefore breached the principle of equality of arms.

The applicant also complained of a breach of his right to be presumed innocent under Article 6 § 2 of the Convention since, after he had been apprehended by the police, the head of the CFECC Criminal Investigation Directorate had given an interview, stating that the applicant had accepted a bribe.

THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT

19 The general principles concerning entrapment have been summarised in Matanović v. Croatia (no. 2742/12, §§ 122-35, 4 April 2017), and Akbay and Others v. Germany (nos. 40495/15 and 2 others, §§ 109-24, 15 October 2020). When faced with a plea of police incitement, or entrapment, the Court will attempt to establish whether there has been such incitement or entrapment (substantive test of incitement). If there has been such incitement or entrapment, the subsequent use of evidence obtained thereby in the criminal proceedings against the person concerned raises an issue under Article 6 § 1 (see Matanović , cited above, § 145, and Akbay and Others , cited above, § 111).

20 In determining whether there was entrapment in the present case, that is, whether the authorities exerted such an influence on the applicant as to incite the commission of an offence that would otherwise not have been committed, the Court will first examine (i) whether there were objective suspicions that the applicant was involved in criminal activity or was predisposed to commit a criminal offence (see Akbay and Others , cited above, §§ 114-15); (ii) the procedure for authorising and carrying out the special investigative measures against the applicant, notably whether there was judicial supervision of those measures; and (iii) whether the authorities or any persons acting on their behalf had “joined” an ongoing criminal activity or had exerted any undue pressure on the applicant so as to incite the commission of the offence.

21 The Court notes that prior to the complaint by T., the applicant had never been suspected of participation in any criminal activity. The investigating authorities became involved in the present case only after T. complained that she had been forced to pay a bribe to the applicant. The authorities reacted to that complaint by gathering evidence of the alleged bribery. It follows that the authorities did not start recording the applicant’s acts on the basis of an objective suspicion that he was already involved in illegal activity, but instead in reaction to specific accusations concerning the applicant’s refusal to carry out his duties and his alleged request for a bribe.

22 It is also important to note that, before making use of special investigation techniques, the investigating authorities obtained the relevant court authorisation. There was a clear procedure in domestic law for authorising such techniques, involving judicial supervision (compare also Akbay and Others , cited above, § 118), which was followed in the present case.

23 Lastly, the Court must examine whether the authorities or any persons acting on their behalf had “joined” an ongoing criminal activity of the applicant or whether the applicant was subjected to undue pressure to commit the offence (compare Akbay and Others , cited above, § 116). The Court takes note, in that regard, of the applicant’s reliance on several elements proving, in his opinion, his entrapment.

24 In particular, he argued that T. was the one who had insisted that they meet. While the Court cannot conclude who had initiated the meeting, the recordings in its possession show that it was the applicant who opened the conversation regarding the criminal proceedings under his management.

25 The applicant further argued that he had never asked for any money and that it was T. who had insisted on handing over some of the money during their meeting, and the remainder upon the applicant’s return from leave.

The recordings of the meetings between T. and the applicant clearly show that the matter had been discussed previously. The applicant initially appeared reluctant to accept any money from T. and the video showed him explaining that his reluctance stemmed from his fear of criminal liability and the possibility of being reported to the authorities. However, despite initially refusing the money, the applicant asserted that he would take care of the matter. This implies that, notwithstanding T.’s offer of a bribe, the applicant promised to exert his influence over the prosecutor. On 10 August 2012, while inside the applicant’s vehicle, T. handed over the remainder of the money. There is no indication that T. exerted any pressure on the applicant to take the money.

26 The applicant further argued that it would have been pointless for him to extort any money once the criminal case had been referred to the prosecutor as he (the applicant) would no longer have the authority to issue any decisions in that connection. The domestic courts acquitted the applicant of bribe ‑ taking through extortion, but found him guilty of peddling influence. The recorded discussions provide clear evidence that the applicant assured T. that he would solve the matter, but that he needed to discuss everything with the prosecutor.

27 The Court concludes that the authorities had “joined” an ongoing criminal activity of the applicant and did not subject him to undue pressure to commit the offence. The applicant was not therefore entrapped by the authorities or any persons acting on their behalf. Accordingly, the subsequent use in the criminal proceedings against the applicant of the evidence obtained by the undercover measure does not raise an issue under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

28 It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

29 The applicant also raised other complaints under Article 6 §§ 1 and 2 of the Convention, about alleged violations of the principle of equality of arms and of the presumption of innocence.

30 The Court has examined these complaints and considers that, in the light of all the material in its possession and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, these complaints either do not meet the admissibility criteria set out in Articles 34 and 35 of the Convention or do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Convention or the Protocols thereto.

31 It follows that this part of the application must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,

Declares the application inadmissible.

Done in English and notified in writing on 16 July 2026.

Martina Keller María Elósegui Deputy Registrar President