Luncan v. Romania

FOURTH SECTION

Application no. 22660/20 Silviu-Radu LUNCAN against Romania

The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 30 June 2026 as a Chamber composed of:

Lado Chanturia , President , Faris Vehabović, Anja Seibert-Fohr, Ana Maria Guerra Martins, Sebastian Răduleţu, András Jakab, Corinna Wissels , judges , and Simeon Petrovski, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to the above application lodged on 9 June 2020,

Having regard to the decision to give notice to the Romanian Government (“the Government”) of the complaints concerning Article 3 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) and to declare inadmissible the remainder of the application,

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,

Having regard to the decision to uphold the Government’s objection to the examination of the application by a Committee;

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

1 The applicant, Mr Silviu-Radu Luncan, is a Romanian national who was born in 1958 and lives in Bucharest.

2 The Government were represented by their Agent, Ms O.F. Ezer, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The CIRCUMSTANCES of the case

3 The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties and not in dispute, may be summarised as follows.

4 . On 22 August 2016, at around 12.30 p.m., the applicant was swimming in the Black Sea at the Mangalia beach resort (Stațiunea Mangalia). One person had drowned there at around that time and a search was ongoing for a second person reported missing in the water. There were three lifeguards on duty, employed by a private company (Callatis Club Nautic) contracted to provide rescue services to the Mangalia local council.

5 . The three lifeguards swam towards the applicant and ordered him to come out. He refused, informing them that he would do so once he had finished his swim. He was thereupon forcibly removed by the lifeguards, with the assistance of four tourists.

6 . Once ashore, police officers (D.M.E. and T.R.) from the Mangalia Local Police twisted the applicant’s arms behind his back and handcuffed him.

7 The applicant was escorted along the sea front, barefoot and in his swimming gear, to the police car for transfer to the Mangalia national police station. The applicant was not fined.

8 The parties contest the following facts (see paragraphs 9-12 and 13 ‑ 15 below).

9 . The applicant alleged that the lifeguards had physically and verbally abused him while restraining and dragging him out of the sea. He claimed that the four tourists (see paragraph 5 above) had also hit him.

10 . His refusal to leave the sea had been neither unlawful nor “unruly”. Furthermore, he had not been at risk of drowning, as contended by the Government (see paragraph 15 below), as he was a professional swimmer who swam in the sea for around two hours daily during the summer.

11 Prior to being handcuffed, the police officer (D.M.E.) had neither asked him any questions nor requested that he identify himself, and had not allowed him to collect his belongings.

12 . Contrary to the Government’s assertion, no red flag had been hoisted on the beach at the time to indicate that swimming was prohibited owing to the high risk of drowning (see paragraphs 14-15 below).

13 . On the day in question, lifeguards and police officers had asked tourists at the Mangalia beach resort to leave the sea in order to facilitate the search and rescue operation for a person reported missing in the water.

14 . A red flag had been hoisted on the beach that day (see paragraph 12 above).

15 . The applicant had been handcuffed owing to his uncooperative behaviour, specifically his “unruly conduct”, namely refusing to exit the sea when lawfully instructed to do so, despite being exposed to the risk of drowning. He had subsequently been taken to the national police station for identification purposes.

16 . The incident was recorded by an unidentified third party. The video, which is neither continuous nor time-stamped, reveals the following.

17 . A considerable number of tourists are present on the beach. The applicant is seen in the sea engaging in a discussion first with two, and then three, lifeguards. The lifeguards make several attempts to take hold of his arms, which he evades by stepping back. The lifeguards and the applicant are seen gesticulating at each other.

18 . The police officers D.M.E. and T.R. (see paragraph 6 above) are present on the beach. D.M.E. watches the interaction between the lifeguards and the applicant from the shore.

19 Four tourists enter the sea. The applicant is initially seen held by two of them, one on each side. At one point he appears to attempt to break free from the hold of one of the tourists. Shortly afterwards, he is shown with his hands behind his back, being restrained by the same tourists and escorted towards the shore. The other tourists and the lifeguards follow closely behind him.

20 . As they approach the shore, one of the lifeguards makes a gesture resembling a handcuffing motion, presumably directed at the police officers on the beach (see paragraph 18 above).

21 . A crowd is seen observing from the beach. Several individuals clap and cheer and various bystanders berate the applicant for his behaviour.

22 . Once ashore, the applicant is surrounded by D.M.E. and T.R., the three lifeguards and several tourists. There is considerable commotion around him. He remains restrained with his hands behind his back.

23 . Although filmed from an obstructed angle, the video shows the applicant being handcuffed with his arms behind his back by T.R., while D.M.E. assists in holding him. At least two tourists and one lifeguard are seen assisting in restraining the applicant.

24 The applicant is heard asking permission to collect his belongings, to which D.M.E. responds, “Now you are going to the [police] car, you had until now to [inaudible]”.

25 The applicant is shown being escorted to the police car by D.M.E. and T.R., barefoot and in his swimming gear, handcuffed with his arms behind his back. Several tourists are seen nearby.

26 Throughout the events captured in the footage, the applicant does not appear to offer any resistance. His demeanour and responses are calm, and he is not violent or unruly. The video does not reveal any acts of violence towards the applicant on the part of the police officers, the tourists or the lifeguards.

27 . According to the summary report prepared by the local police and dated 22 August 2016, between 11.30 a.m. and 4.00 p.m. the national police, the gendarmerie and the ambulance service, including a helicopter, were deployed at the Mangalia beach resort. The police officers assisted in cordoning off the area for the rescue operation involving a person who was later declared dead by drowning. The lifeguards contacted the local police to request assistance with an individual who had refused to leave the sea. They indicated that two persons had drowned. Upon arrival, D.M.E. and T.R. found that the individual had already been removed from the sea by the lifeguards and several tourists. D.M.E. and T.R. handcuffed him and transferred him to the national police and the gendarmerie officers. Police Officer M. confirmed that the individual who had refused to exit the sea was the applicant.

28 . On 16 November 2016 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint for battery and misconduct in public office against the three lifeguards and D.M.E., and for unlawful deprivation of liberty against the latter. He submitted the video of the incident (see paragraph 16 above) and contended, in particular, that the lifeguards had struck him on his back with their fists and knees, had immobilised him and had dragged him towards the shore while continuing to hit him. When they had approached the shore, four tourists had joined in, taken over restraining him and continued to hit him. As regards D.M.E., the applicant alleged that she had used physical force against him without legal justification by twisting his left arm behind his back and applying the handcuffs. He further submitted that the bystanders on the beach had been given the impression that he was a dangerous criminal, which had seriously undermined his dignity.

29 . On 23 November 2016 the prosecutor opened an investigation in rem (that is, without a designated suspect).

30 . On 13 January 2017 D.M.E. was heard. She stated that when she and her colleague T.R. had arrived at the beach one individual was receiving medical assistance and a rescue operation was ongoing for a second person believed to be missing in the water. Together with the lifeguards they had evacuated all tourists from the sea, except for the applicant, who had refused to comply. The applicant had insulted everyone present. Once the applicant had been brought ashore, she, T.R., and several tourists had managed to handcuff him and calm him down. As the applicant had refused to identify himself, Police Officer M. had taken him to the national police station for that purpose.

31 . On an unspecified date Officer M. gave a statement saying that, at D.M.E.’s request, he had escorted the applicant to the national police station, where the applicant had agreed to identify himself following lengthy discussions.

32 . On 12 September 2017 the applicant was heard. He claimed, among other things, that the lifeguards had ordered him to leave the sea without giving any reasons and had insulted and threatened him.

33 . On 10 October 2017 the three lifeguards were heard (see paragraph 4 above). They stated that, on the day in question, they had rescued a swimmer who had gotten into difficulties and had also been searching for a second missing person (a child). As the applicant had refused to leave the sea, they and four tourists had forced him to do so and handed him over to the police officers.

34 . On 19 September 2017 and 10 June 2019 the Callatis Club Nautic informed the prosecutor that a red flag had been displayed on the beach from 8.00 a.m. on 22 August 2016, indicating that swimming and bathing were prohibited. It also provided information concerning the lifeguards’ duties.

35 . On 10 October 2017 the prosecutor discontinued, under Article 16 § (1) (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the investigation into the alleged offences (see paragraph 28 above), finding that the lifeguards’ and D.M.E.’s acts had not amounted to a criminal offence. That decision was upheld by a more senior prosecutor ( procuroul ierarhic superior ) on 18 October 2017.

36 . On 27 June 2018, pursuant to a challenge by the applicant, the Mangalia District Court (“the District Court”) concluded that the prosecutor’s findings of fact were not supported by the evidence and ordered that the investigation be resumed.

37 . On 8 January 2019 the applicant was heard again. He stated that he had been hit by the lifeguards while in the sea, that his hand had been violently twisted by D.M.E. behind his back and that she had tightened the handcuffs, causing unbearable pain in both wrists.

38 . Between January and February 2019 the authorities took additional investigative steps, including verifying the duties and legal powers of D.M.E. and the lifeguards involved.

39 . In May and June 2019 the authorities reviewed the video and contacted two television channels to obtain additional footage. No further relevant witnesses or evidence were identified.

40 . On 13 August 2019, having taken note of the additional investigative steps (see paragraphs 37-39 above), the prosecutor discontinued the investigation on the same legal grounds and for largely the same reasons as before (see paragraph 35 above).

41 . That decision was upheld by a more senior prosecutor on 12 February 2020. That prosecutor found that neither the video nor the other evidence indicated that the lifeguards had assaulted the applicant or that his removal from the sea by them had amounted to violence within the meaning of the offence of misconduct in public office.

42 . As for the applicant’s handcuffing, the senior prosecutor found that it had been lawful and justified by his recalcitrant and aggressive behaviour, including verbal aggression, when refusing to leave the sea. Only minimal force had been used and the duration of handcuffing had been reasonable and necessary to eliminate certain risks. He further found that handcuffing was mandatory for individuals resisting police officers ( măsurilor polițienești ) and whose resistance could not be overcome by other means, and was also warranted when escorting aggressive individuals to a police station for the taking of legal measures. As the applicant had been taken to the police station for that purpose and the time spent there for checks had been reasonable, he had not been unlawfully deprived of his liberty.

43 . On 12 March 2020 the District Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint and upheld the discontinuation (see paragraph 40 above), noting that the authorities had taken further investigative steps (see paragraphs 37 ‑ 39 above) and that they could not reasonably have obtained further evidence. It also remarked that the applicant had neither submitted additional evidence nor obtained medical evidence attesting to any signs of violence.

44 . Having reviewed the video (see paragraph 16 above), the District Court observed that the applicant’s immobilisation by the lifeguards had been carried out purely to remove him from a dangerous situation and to prevent a potential further tragedy. It noted that the footage showed that the applicant had displayed a recalcitrant attitude and had refused to leave the sea when told, which had led the lifeguards to escort him out with the help of tourists. Contrary to the applicant’s claims, the District Court concluded that the footage did not show any evidence of physical or verbal violence by the lifeguards against him.

45 . As for the applicant’s handcuffing, the District Court found that it had been lawful, that the police officer D.M.E. had not been violent with the applicant and that her actions had not caused him suffering, as evidenced by the video, which showed him smiling at the time. It further held that the applicant had been handcuffed for a reasonable duration for the purpose of escorting him to the police station to determine whether the “conditions for fining him were met”.

46 . The District Court further remarked that pursuant to Article 24 of Law no. 155 concerning the local police (see paragraph 48 below), officers could use handcuffs on persons who engaged in behaviour that endangered the physical integrity, health or property of other persons. It found that the applicant’s recalcitrant behaviour and his refusal to leave the sea, as seen in the video, fell within that category, particularly given that a red flag signalling that bathing and swimming were prohibited had been hoisted on the beach and that another person had already drowned there that day. The District Court concluded that the applicant’s refusal to exit the sea had endangered both his own life and that of the lifeguards.

47 Law no. 155 (see paragraph 46 above) regulates the use of force, including means of restraint, by the local police.

48 . Article 24 of that Law, in so far as relevant, provides the following:

Chapter VI

Use of police equipment and weapons

Article 24

“(1) In order to discourage, prevent and neutralise aggressive actions by persons who disturb public order and peace, when it is impossible to do so by other means, local police officers may use non-lethal weapons intended for self-defence, ..., handcuffs, ..., as well as other means of immobilisation which do not endanger life or cause serious bodily injury.

(2) The means provided for in paragraph (1) may be used against persons who:

...

(3) The means provided for in paragraph (1) against aggressive individuals shall be carried out gradually, after prior warning regarding the use of such means and allowing the time necessary for the cessation of the actions and compliance with the lawful requests of local police officers ...

(4) The use of the means provided for in paragraph (1) must not exceed what is actually necessary for preventing or neutralising the aggressive actions.”

49 Government Ordinance no. 1136/2007 approved the methodological norms on the organisation of public sea-rescue services, lifeguards and beach first ‑ aid stations.

50 Under Articles 3(1) and 5(d), local authorities with tourist ‑ designated beaches on the Black Sea coast are obliged to set up sea-rescue services and first ‑ aid stations and to mark, by means of flags, the areas designated or prohibited for bathing and nautical activities. Under Article 20, a red and yellow flag together with a red flag signifies that the weather conditions do not permit access to the sea.

51 Article 6 sets out the responsibilities of beach users, which including complying with warning signs and not entering the sea when bathing and swimming are prohibited. Under Article 23, failure to act in accordance with those responsibilities constitutes a minor offence punishable by a fine ranging from 500 Romanian lei (RON – approximately 100 euros (EUR)) to RON 1,000 (approximately EUR 200).

52 . The applicant complained about the ill-treatment he had allegedly suffered at the hands of the lifeguards and the police officer D.M.E. on 22 August 2016. He contended that D.M.E. had used force when handcuffing him and that being handcuffed in full view of hundreds of beachgoers had caused him physical and psychological suffering, fear, anxiety and a feeling of inferiority. He further complained about the lack of an effective investigation into those events. He alleged a breach of Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:

“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”

53 . The Court notes that the applicant’s allegations of ill ‑ treatment concern two distinct aspects, namely the alleged ill-treatment by the lifeguards while he was in the sea, and his handcuffing on the beach (see paragraph 52 above). As regards the latter, the Court will not consider the applicant’s complaint about the subsequent dissemination of the footage in the media, as it falls outside the scope of the communicated case. The Court will address each allegation in turn (see paragraphs 64-78 below).

54 . The Government submitted that the minimum level of severity under Article 3 of the Convention had not been reached. The applicant had failed to submit any medical evidence of physical injury, nor did he appear to have suffered any psychological harm as a result of the alleged ill-treatment.

55 . The Government further contended that the lifeguards had been searching at the material time for a tourist who had reportedly drowned, making it necessary for all those present to comply with the lifeguards’ instructions. The applicant’s removal had therefore been motivated by the lifeguards’ professional duty to ensure safety, while the subsequent police intervention had been necessary to maintain public order and enable the lifeguards to continue their work.

56 . The applicant argued that the actions of the lifeguards and police officers, including his forcible removal from the sea and subsequent handcuffing, had reached the minimum level of severity required to fall within the scope of Article 3 of the Convention. He emphasised that he had been publicly restrained by a total of nine individuals, namely three lifeguards, two police officers and four tourists, despite offering no resistance. He reiterated that the lifeguards had used physical violence against him and submitted that the video supported that allegation. As to the absence of medical evidence attesting to his injuries, he explained that he had been bedridden for three days after the incident and that the nearest forensic clinic was around 45 km from his home.

57 . As for his handcuffing, he submitted that it had not been in connection with lawful arrest or detention. He reiterated that the treatment had caused him fear, anguish and a sense of inferiority, especially given its public nature and the wide dissemination of the incident in the media. He submitted that the circumstances were comparable to those in Archip v. Romania (no. 49608/08, 27 September 2011).

58 Ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3 of the Convention. The assessment of this minimum is relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see Nicolae Virgiliu Tănase v. Romania [GC], no. 41720/13, §§ 121 and 123, 25 June 2019 ). Further factors include the purpose for which the ill-treatment was inflicted, together with the intention or motivation behind it, although the absence of an intention to humiliate or debase the victim cannot conclusively rule out a finding of a violation of Article 3. Regard must also be had to the context in which the ill-treatment was inflicted, such as an atmosphere of heightened tension and emotions (see Bouyid v. Belgium [GC], no. 23380/09, § 86, ECHR 2015).

59 Ill-treatment that attains such a minimum level of severity usually involves actual bodily injury or intense physical or mental suffering. However, even in the absence of these aspects, where treatment humiliates or debases an individual, showing a lack of respect for or diminishing his or her human dignity, or arouses feelings of fear, anguish or inferiority capable of breaking an individual’s moral and physical resistance, it may be characterised as degrading and also fall within the prohibition set forth in Article 3. It should also be pointed out that it may well suffice that the victim is humiliated in his or her own eyes, even if not in the eyes of others (ibid., § 87 with further references).

60 As concerns handcuffing, the Court has stated on previous occasions that such a measure does not normally give rise to an issue under Article 3 of the Convention where it has been imposed in connection with lawful arrest or detention and does not entail the use of force, or public exposure, exceeding what is reasonably considered necessary in the circumstances (see, among others, Pranjić-M-Lukić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina , no. 4938/16, § 72, 2 June 2020; Archip , cited above, § 52; and Raninen v. Finland , 16 December 1997, § 56, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-VIII). In this regard, it is of importance, for instance, whether there is reason to believe that the person concerned would resist arrest or try to abscond or cause injury or damage or suppress evidence (see Svinarenko and Slyadnev v. Russia [GC], nos. 32541/08 and 43441/08, § 117, ECHR 2014 (extracts)).

61 Moreover, in order to fall within the scope of Article 3, the handcuffing, like any other form of treatment, must attain a minimum level of severity. The assessment in that regard will depend on the circumstances of the case in their entirety (see Radkov and Sabev v. Bulgaria , nos. 18938/07 and 36069/09, § 31, 27 May 2014, and Kummer v. the Czech Republic , no. 32133/11, § 64, 25 July 2013).

62 The Court attaches particular importance to the circumstances of each case when examining whether the use of handcuffs was necessary (see Pranjić ‑ M ‑ Lukić , cited above, § 72 with further references). In doing so, the Court has had regard to several factors, assessed cumulatively, among which are the public nature of the measure, including the extent and duration of the applicant’s exposure, and the duration of handcuffing (see H.M. and Others v. Hungary , no. 38967/17, § 26, 2 June 2022; Akkad v. Turkey , no. 1557/19, §§ 114 ‑ 15, 21 June 2022; Archip , cited above, § 54; and contrast Zamfirachi v. Romania , no. 70719/10, § 50, 17 June 2014, and Kazakova v. Bulgaria , no. 55061/00, § 53, 22 June 2006); whether the measure caused psychological harm (see Erdoğan Yağız v. Turkey , no. 27473/02, § 45, 6 March 2007, and contrast Raninen , cited above, § 58); whether the applicant was vulnerable (on account of a mental illness see Pranjić-M-Lukić , cited above, § 80; on health grounds see Archip , cited above, § 57, and Ilievska v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia , no. 20136/11, § 61, 7 May 2015 ); the material conditions relating to the handcuffi ng (see Skorupa v. Poland, no. 44153/15, §§ 265-71, 16 June 2022); and circumstances relating to the aggressiveness or dangerousness of the individual concerned (see Comoraşu v. Romania , no. 16270/12, § 46, 31 May 2016 ; Kuzmenko v. Russia , no. 18541/04, § 45, 21 December 2010; and Wieser v. Austria , no. 2293/03, § 37, 22 February 2007).

63 Finally, in respect of a person who is deprived of his or her liberty, or, more generally, is confronted with law-enforcement officers, any recourse to physical force which has not been made strictly necessary by his or her own conduct diminishes human dignity and is, in principle, an infringement of the right set forth in Article 3 (see Bouyid , cited above, § 88).

64 . The Court considers it essential to emphasise at the very outset that, as submitted by the Government and not disputed by the applicant, the relevant events occurred in a context of heightened tension, during an ongoing search of the waters near the beach following the drowning of one person and the reported disappearance of another (see paragraph 4 above). The presence of the ambulance service, a medical helicopter, the gendarmerie and the police at the scene (see paragraph 27 above) reflects the seriousness of the emergency the authorities were facing when the events unfolded, which was an operation giving rise to unexpected developments to which the authorities were called upon to react (see, mutatis mutandis , Staszewska v. Poland , no. 10049/04, § 56, 3 November 2009). The Court further notes that, notwithstanding the applicant’s denial (see paragraph 12 above), it has no reason to call into question the domestic authorities’ finding that a red flag prohibiting bathing and swimming was displayed on the beach that day (see paragraphs 14, 34 and 46 above). It is against that backdrop that the applicant’s conduct and the authorities’ response must be assessed.

65 . In his initial complaint before the domestic courts, the applicant complained that the three lifeguards had forcibly removed him from the sea, had punched and kicked him multiple times, had immobilised his hands behind his back and had dragged him onto the beach (see paragraph 28 above). The applicant made allegations to the same effect before the Court (see paragraphs 9 and 52 above). In his observations on the merits, the applicant alleged that he had been restrained by nine individuals, despite offering no resistance (see paragraph 56 above).

66 The Court observes that the three lifeguards who allegedly ill ‑ treated the applicant were employed by a private company providing services to the local council (see paragraph 4 above). It does not deem it necessary to determine whether the lifeguards acted as State agents, and, consequently, whether the respondent State bears direct responsibility for their alleged actions (see Beganović v. Croatia , no. 46423/06, § 69, 25 June 2009), since, for the reasons set out below, the applicant’s complaint is in any event manifestly ill-founded.

67 The Court reiterates its established case-law that, where allegations are made under Article 3 of the Convention, it must, in its assessment of the evidence, apply a particularly thorough scrutiny (see, among others, Şerban Marinescu v. Romania , no. 68842/13, § 62, 15 December 2015). Where domestic proceedings have taken place, it is not the Court’s task to substitute its own assessment of the facts for that of the domestic courts and, as a general rule, it is for those courts to assess the evidence before them. Even though in cases involving Article 3 the Court is prepared to be more critical of the conclusions of the domestic courts, in normal circumstances it requires cogent elements to lead it to depart from the findings of fact reached by those courts (see D.H. and Others v. North Macedonia , no. 44033/17, § 34, 18 July 2023 , with further references).

68 Turning to the present case, the Court notes that the domestic authorities gathered and examined evidence concerning the applicant’s complaint, including the video submitted by him (see paragraphs 30 ‑ 34 and 37 ‑ 39 above), and, on the basis of the whole body of evidence, concluded that the applicant had not suffered the alleged ill-treatment (see paragraphs 41 and 43 ‑ 46 above). Furthermore, the District Court concluded that the domestic authorities could not reasonably have obtained further evidence and that the applicant himself had failed to adduce further evidence to support his allegations (see paragraph 43 above).

69 As regards the evidence before the domestic authorities, the applicant consistently maintained that the video (see paragraph 16 above) demonstrated him being ill-treated by the lifeguards (see paragraphs 28 and 56 above). The Court notes, however, that the video, whose authenticity is not disputed, was viewed by the domestic authorities and that they all independently concluded that there was no evidence that the applicant had been ill-treated by the lifeguards (see paragraphs 39-41 and 44 above).

70 . Having considered the findings of the domestic authorities, the applicant’s submissions and the material before it, the Court sees no reason to call into question those findings. At this juncture, the Court points to the District Court’s findings that the applicant had failed to substantiate his allegations with appropriate medical evidence (see paragraph 43 above) and the arguments advanced by the applicant justifying his failure to obtain such evidence (see paragraph 57 above). Having regard to its settled principle that allegations of ill-treatment must be supported by appropriate evidence ( see Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772/95, § 121, ECHR 2000-IV), the Court is not convinced by the justifications advanced by the applicant for that failure (contrast Balogh v. Hungary , no. 47940/99, § 49, 20 July 2004).

71 . In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that there is no evidence that the applicant was subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention.

72 . It is common ground between the parties that, once ashore, the applicant was handcuffed and escorted to a police car for transfer to the national police station (see paragraph 5 above).

73 The Court notes that both the more senior prosecutor and the District Court examined the circumstances of the applicant’s handcuffing and concluded that the measure had been lawful and justified by the applicant’s conduct and for the purpose of determining whether the conditions for fining him were met (see paragraphs 42 and 45 above).

74 . The Court further observes that the essence of the applicant’s complaint lies in the alleged public humiliation he suffered as a result of being handcuffed in full view of hundreds of tourists, (see paragraph 56 above, and, mutatis mutandis , Archip , cited above, § 54 in fine ), and that the domestic authorities did not specifically address that dimension of his complaint. The Court will therefore examine whether the applicant’s public exposure during his handcuffing exceeded what could reasonably be considered necessary in the circumstances (see, among others, Erdoğan Yağız , cited above, § 42).

75 It is accepted by the parties that the events in question occurred in August, at the height of the tourist season, and that there were a considerable number of tourists on the beach (see paragraphs 17 and 21 above). Beyond the ordinary crowds of beachgoers during peak holiday period, the beach was, moreover, the scene of a highly visible emergency operation, which had itself attracted significant public attention (see paragraph 64 above). Against that backdrop, the applicant’s refusal to leave the sea, which is not disputed (see paragraph 5 above), drew further attention to the unfolding operation and, to a certain extent, to his own person. By the time he was brought ashore, a considerable number of bystanders had gathered. The video shows them clapping and cheering, and criticism of the applicant can be heard (see paragraph 21 above). That said, the material before the Court indicates that that was a spontaneous public reaction to the events as they were unfolding, and that the ensuing handcuffing took place against a background not of the authorities’ making and largely outside their control.

76 The Court accepts that those circumstances might have caused the applicant a degree of unease and embarrassment (compare H.M. and Others v. Hungary , cited above, § 26, and Erdoğan Yağız , cited above, §§ 44 ‑ 45). There is, however, no indication that the handcuffing and the walk to the police car exposed the applicant to public view for longer than was reasonably necessary to effect those measures, nor has the applicant argued otherwise (for the duration of exposure, compare Raninen , cited above, §§ 57-58, and contrast Archip , cited above, § 52). Furthermore, the applicant has not argued that the handcuffing was carried out with an intention to debase or humiliate him, and, on the evidence before it, the Court cannot discern any such motivation (compare Raninen , cited above, § 58, and contrast Erdoğan Yağız , cited above, §§ 46-47).

77 Lastly, the applicant also alleged, albeit as a secondary complaint, that he had been subjected to a degree of force when the handcuffs were applied (see paragraphs 28 and 52 above) and that they had caused unbearable pain in both wrists (see paragraph 37 above). The District Court found, on the basis of the video, that no violence had been used when the handcuffs were applied (see paragraph 45 above). Furthermore, as noted above, the applicant failed to adduce any medical evidence to substantiate his allegations of physical injury (see paragraph 43 above), and the Court thus finds no basis on which to depart from the District Court’s findings in that regard (see paragraph 70 above and Kummer , cited above, §§ 68 and 70 with further references).

78 . Having regard to the circumstances of the case – the absence of any indication that the exposure lasted beyond what was reasonably necessary, the absence of any evidence of injury, and the fact that the applicant had already, for reasons not of the authorities’ making, become the focus of public attention before the handcuffing took place – the Court finds that the applicant’s handcuffing did not attain the minimum level of severity required to fall within the scope of Article 3 of the Convention.

79 In the light of the Court’s findings above (see paragraphs 71 and 78 above), it follows that the applicant’s complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Articles 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

80 The Court reiterates that where a person raises an arguable claim or makes a credible assertion that he or she has suffered treatment contrary to Article 3 at the hands of State agents, that provision, read in conjunction with the general duty under Article 1 of the Convention to “secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in ... [the] Convention”, requires by implication that there should be an effective official investigation (see, among others, Nicolae Virgiliu Tănase , cited above, § 115 ; Labita , cited above, § 131; and Sládková v. the Czech Republic , no. 15741/15, § 66, 10 November 2022).

81 Having regard to its conclusion under the substantive limb of Article 3 of the Convention, the Court does not consider it necessary to examine the parties’ arguments concerning the investigation into the impugned events. In these circumstances, the authorities of the respondent State were not under a positive obligation to conduct an effective investigation into the applicant’s allegations (see, among others, Öcalan v. Turkey (dec.), no. 12261/10, §§ 34 ‑ 35, 27 September 2018 with further references and, mutatis mutandis , Ghişoiu v. Romania (dec.), no. 40228/20, §§63-64, 20 December 2022).

82 Accordingly, this part of the applicant’s complaint is also manifestly ill ‑ founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,

Declares the application inadmissible.

Done in English and notified in writing on 27 August 2026.

Simeon Petrovski Lado Chanturia Deputy Registrar President