BJÖRKGREN ; ED v. SWEDEN



AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application No. 12526/86

by Elsa BJÖRKGREN and Sture ED

against Sweden

The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private

on 7 January 1991, the following members being present:

MM. C.A. NØRGAARD, President

S. TRECHSEL

E. BUSUTTIL

G. JÖRUNDSSON

A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

A. WEITZEL

J.-C. SOYER

H. DANELIUS

Sir Basil HALL

Mr. F. MARTINEZ RUIZ

Mrs. J. LIDDY

MM. J.-C. GEUS

A.V. ALMEIDA RIBEIRO

M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

Mr. J. RAYMOND, Deputy Secretary to the Commission

Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the

Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

Having regard to the application introduced on 10 June 1986

by Elsa BJÖRKGREN and Sture ED against Sweden and registered

on 10 November 1986 under file No. 12526/86;

Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the

Rules of Procedure of the Commission;

Having regard to the observations submitted by the Government

on 31 March 1989, on 8 June 1989 and on 11 May 1990 and the observations

submitted by the applicants on 18 May 1989, on 13 March 1990 and on

5 July 1990;

Having deliberated;

Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be

summarised as follows.

The application was originally lodged by Elsa Björkgren and

Sture Ed, both Swedish citizens living in Johanneshov and Stockholm,

respectively. They were both retired. On 4 January 1990 the first

applicant died. Her husband and sole heir, Tage Björkgren, decided to

pursue the application. The applicants are represented by Jan Axelsson,

a lawyer practising in Stockholm.

The applicants, who were brother and sister, owned the

property Sicklaön 13:48 in the municipality of Nacka in the County of

Stockholm.

Soon after the applicants' father's acquisition of the

property, on which a dwelling-house and certain other buildings had

previously been constructed, Regulations for Non-Planned Areas

(utomplansbestämmelser) were introduced, requiring a permit for

construction on the property.

According to the applicants a prohibition on construction

(byggnadsförbud) was, in 1948, issued to prevent urban development

(tätbebyggelse) within an area not covered by a town plan or a building

plan. In the Government's view the applicants in this respect

probably refer to a prohibition on construction similar to the kind of

prohibition based on Section 56 of the 1959 Building Ordinance

(byggnadsstadgan), according to which the authorities were, in

principle, obliged not to grant permits for such new buildings or

major alterations of buildings as would have resulted in urban

development within an area not covered by a town plan or a building

plan.

In 1954 the applicants acquired the property as a gift from

their father.

On 25 August 1976 Mrs. Björkgren's request for a provisional

decision regarding an exemption from the prohibition on construction

was refused by the Building Committee (byggnadsnämnden; hereinafter

"the Committee") of the municipality of Nacka. Mrs. Björkgren wished

to erect a new house on the property with the intention of making it

the permanent home of the applicants.

On the same day the Committee, under penalty of a fine of

10.000 SEK, ordered the applicants to demolish those buildings on the

property which were considered to be beyond repair. These were

subsequently pulled down by the applicants, with the exception of the

dwelling-house.

Following a proposal for a town-plan for the area, the County

Administrative Board (länsstyrelsen; hereinafter "the Board") of the

County of Stockholm on 18 February 1977, on the municipality's

request, issued a prohibition on construction of all new buildings

until 18 February 1978, pursuant to Sections 15 and 35 of the Building

Act (byggnadslagen). Such a prohibition was valid for only one year,

but it could be prolonged for two years at a time.

A similar prohibition on construction was issued on 28 March

1978 This was valid until 18 March 1979.

On 27 March 1979 the Board again issued a similar prohibition

on construction. This was valid until 28 March 1981.

On 21 November 1979 the Committee's decision, insofar as it

concerned the request for an exemption from the prohibition on

construction, was upheld on appeal by the Board, which, however,

quashed the demolition order, since it was considered possible that

the dwelling-house could be restored and that it might be of

historical interest. On 23 February 1981 the Administrative Court of

Appeal (kammarrätten) of Stockholm rejected the Committee's appeal.

On 24 February 1981 the Board prolonged the prohibition on

construction until 28 March 1983. The applicants' appeal in this

respect was rejected by the Government on 29 April 1982.

On 21 October 1982 the Government rejected Mrs. Björkgren's

appeal regarding the provisional opinion.

On 7 June 1984 the Board issued a new prohibition on

construction pursuant to Sections 15 and 35 of the Building Act. This

was valid until 7 June 1985.

On 13 June 1984, the Committee, under penalty of a fine of

5.000 SEK, issued a new demolition order concerning the dwelling-

house, finding that the poor condition of the house excluded repair.

Mrs. Björkgren states that, on 15 December 1984, she lodged a

request for a building permit, but never obtained any answer. This has

not been confirmed by the Government.

On 7 March 1985 the applicants' appeal against the demolition

order of 13 June 1984 was rejected by the Board, which, however,

divided the penalty between the applicants.

On 31 May 1985 the Board prolonged the prohibition on

construction until 31 May 1987. This decision was upheld on appeal by

the Government on 17 October 1985.

On 9 March 1986 the Administrative Court of Appeal upheld the

decision by the Board of 7 March 1985.

On 9 June 1986 the applicants' request to the Supreme

Administrative Court (regeringsrätten) for a re-opening of the case

(resning) concerning the prolongation of the prohibition on

construction issued on 31 May 1985 was refused.

On 24 June 1986 Mrs. Björkgren, in a letter to the Minister of

Housing and Physical Planning (bostadsministern), requested that the

municipality of Nacka should buy the applicants' property.

On 23 July 1986 the Supreme Administrative Court refused leave

to appeal against the decision by the Administrative Court of Appeal

of 9 March 1986.

By letter of 10 October 1986 the Minister of Housing and

Physical Planning informed Mrs. Björkgren that the municipality of

Nacka had no legal obligation to buy or acquire the applicants'

property and that she should contact the municipality, if she objected

to the new town plan under preparation.

On 15 June 1987 a new town plan was adopted by the

municipality of Nacka, to the effect that a special prohibition on

construction entered into force in accordance with Sections 14 and 35

of the Building Act.

On 30 June 1987 the municipality applied for a permit from the

Board to expropriate the applicants' property, on which the

dwelling-house still remained.

On 1 July 1987 the new Plan and Building Act (plan- och

bygglagen) entered into force. As a result, the general and special

prohibitions on construction were cancelled.

On 19 October 1987 the Board granted the municipality of Nacka

a permit to expropriate the applicants' property on the grounds that

it was required for future urban development in accordance with

Chapter 2 Section 1 of the 1972 Expropriation Act (expropriations-

lagen). The applicants appealed to the Government, arguing that,

under the terms of Chapter 2 Section 12 of this Act, the purpose of

the expropriation could appropriately be attained by other means and

that the detriment to the applicants' interest occasioned by such

expropriation would outweigh any advantage gained.

On 22 January 1988 the new town plan, according to which

dwellings containing two stores were allowed to be erected on the

applicants' property, was confirmed by the Board.

In its decision of 28 April 1988 rejecting the applicants'

appeal regarding the expropriation permit, the Government stated that

on the basis of the preparatory works to the 1972 Expropriation Act no

decisive consideration could be given to the interests of a property

owner in the determination of the right of priority to land required

for urban development. Even though a property owner was equally

willing to develop a property in the intended way, the municipality

had to be given a permit to expropriate the property at issue.

On 17 October 1988 the municipality of Nacka requested the

Real Estate Court (fastighetsdomstolen) of Stockholm to decide on the

question of compensation to the applicants. The applicants were

offered 165.000 SEK by the municipality. In the municipality's view,

the dwelling-house had lost its historical value and was now in a

state which prevented repair.

On 20 November 1989 the applicants sold their property to a

tenant-owners' society with which the municipality had come to a

development agreement (exploateringsavtal). The expropriation

proceedings instituted before the Real Estate Court were therefore

discontinued and the case was struck from the Court's list.

The selling price has not been submitted by the applicants.

However, in their view they received a marginally better price for

their property than could be expected to be awarded by a court, but it

was considerably lower than a free market price. The applicants were

also granted, for the same price as offered to the public, the right

to acquire a flat in the dwelling-house erected by the tenant-owners'

society.

COMPLAINTS

1 The applicants complain that they could not obtain a court

determination of the lawfulness under Swedish law of the prohibitions

on construction, seen as a whole, or of the decision to issue an

expropriation permit in respect of their property. They allege a

violation of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.

2 The applicants furthermore complain that the prohibitions on

construction, seen as a whole, caused severe deterioration of their

property and deprived them of its practical use; that the prohibitions

on construction, seen as a whole, in combination with the demolition

order of 13 June 1984 interfered with their right to the peaceful

enjoyment of their possessions; and that the decision to issue the

expropriation permit deprived them of their property. They allege

violations of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.

3 The applicants finally complain that they did not have an

effective remedy before a national authority for the above violations

of their rights under the Convention. They allege a violation of

Article 13 of the Convention.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

The application was introduced on 10 June 1986 and registered

on 10 November 1986.

On 12 December 1988 the Commission decided that notice of the

application should be given to the respondent Government and that the

parties should be invited to submit written observations on the

admissibility and merits of the application.

After an extension of the time-limit, the Government's

observations were submitted on 31 March 1989. The applicants'

observations in reply were submitted on 18 May 1989.

Further observations were submitted by the Government on

8 June 1989. The applicants submitted further observations on

13 March 1990. After an extension of the time-limit the Government

submitted further observations in reply on 11 May 1990. Further

observations by the applicants were submitted on 5 July 1990.

The Commission decided to grant legal aid to the applicants on

14 April 1989.

THE LAW

1 Mr. Tage Björkgren, the husband and sole heir of Mrs.

Björkgren, has expressed the wish to pursue the application introduced

by Mrs. Björkgren who died on 4 January 1990. He argues that as he is

the sole heir of Mrs. Björkgren, he has acquired the initial and

legitimate interest in having a violation established by the

Commission, especially since all complaints have a bearing on his late

wife's property.

The Government submit that the estate cannot arguably claim

to be a victim entitled to lodge an application under Article 25

(Art. 25) of the Convention. In the Government's opinion a transfer

of the victim notion can be accepted only if a person can be said to

have been affected by the original alleged violation in a way similar

to that in which the original victim was affected.

Under Article 25 para. 1 (Art. 25-1) of the Convention the

Commission "may receive petitions... from any person... claiming to be

a victim of a violation ... of the rights set forth in (the)

Convention".

The Commission recalls its case-law (No. 10474/87,

Dec. 6.5.86, D.R. 47 p. 116 with further references) according to

which the applicant's death does not in itself dispose of his or her

complaint. In principle, it falls to the Convention organ before which

the case is pending to decide whether the application should be

further examined or whether it should be struck off the list of cases.

In the examination of this question, special consideration must be

given to the intentions exposed by the applicant's legal successor as

well as to the nature of the complaint. However, the heir of a

deceased applicant cannot claim a general right to have the

examination of an application introduced by a deceased person

continued by the Commission (Kofler v. Italy, Comm. Report 9.10.82,

D.R. 30 p. 9 para. 16).

The present complaints relate to the applicants' property,

including the first applicant's estate. As regards the latter, the

Commission finds that the claim is transferable and that Mr. Björkgren,

as the sole heir, has a sufficient legal interest in the outcome of

the proceedings before the Convention organs. It concludes that the

husband of Mrs. Björkgren may take over and continue the proceedings

instituted by Mrs. Björkgren before the Commission.

2 The applicants complain that they could not obtain a court

determination of the lawfulness under Swedish law of the prohibitions

on construction, seen as a whole, or of the decision to issue an

expropriation permit. They allege a violation of Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1) of the Convention.

Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention reads, insofar

as it is relevant, as follows:

"In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ...,

everyone is entitled to a ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal..."

The Government submit that the proceedings of which the

applicants complain must be examined separately.

The applicants contend that the various decisions prohibiting

construction on the property, including the refusal of an exemption

from this prohibition, created a continuing situation starting with

the first prohibition on construction and terminating with the

expropriation proceedings. Thus, the Commission should deal with this

whole series of events.

The Commission considers that in the light of the nature of

the applicants' complaints under Article 6 (Art. 6) the proceedings

concerned must be examined separately.

(a) Insofar as the applicants' complaint under Article 6 of the

Convention refers to the prohibitions on construction issued on

18 February 1977, on 28 March 1978, on 27 March 1979 and on

7 June 1984 as well as to the prolongation on 24 February 1981 of the

prohibition on construction, the Commission considers that it is not

required to decide whether or not the facts alleged by the applicants

disclose any appearance of a violation of the Convention, as Article

26 of the Convention provides that the Commission "may only deal with

the matter ... within a period of six months from the date on which

the final decision was taken".

In the present case the decisions of the Board, which were the

final decisions regarding the issuing of new prohibitions on

construction, were given on 18 February 1977, on 28 March 1978,

on 27 March 1979 and on 7 June 1984. The decision of the Government,

which was the final decision regarding the prolongation of the

prohibition on construction, was given on 29 April 1982. However, the

application was submitted to the Commission on 10 June 1986, that is,

more than six months after the dates of the above decisions.

Furthermore, an examination of the complaint in this respect under

Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention does not disclose the existence

of any special circumstances which might have interrupted or suspended

the running of that period.

It follows that the complaint in this respect under Article 6

(Art. 6) of the Convention has been introduced out of time and must be

rejected under Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of the Convention.

(b) Insofar as the applicants' complaint under Article 6 (Art. 6)

of the Convention refers to the prolongation on 31 May 1985 of the

prohibition on construction, the Commission refers to the above six

months time-limit laid down in Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention.

The Commission furthermore recalls that according to its established

case-law the "final decision" within the meaning of Article 26

(Art. 26) refers solely to the final decision involved in the

exhaustion of all domestic remedies according to the generally

recognised rules of international law. In particular, only a remedy

which is "effective and sufficient" can be considered for this purpose

(see e.g. No. 654/59, Dec. 3.6.60, Yearbook 4 pp. 276, 282; No.

9266/81, Dec. 28.1.83, D.R. 30 pp. 155, 187).

The Commission finds that, in the present case, the

applicant's request for a re-opening of the case concerning the

prolongation on 31 May 1985 of the prohibition on construction was not

an effective remedy under the generally recognised rules of

international law. Consequently, the decision regarding this request

cannot be taken into consideration in determining the date of the

final decision for the purpose of applying the six months time-limit

laid down in Article 26 (Art. 26).

The final decision regarding the prolongation of the

prohibition on construction issued on 7 June 1984 is accordingly the

decision of the Government which was given on 17 October 1985, whereas

the present application was submitted to the Commission on 10 June

1986, that is, more than six months after the date of this decision.

Furthermore, an examination of the complaint in this respect under

Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention does not disclose the existence

of any special circumstances which might have interrupted or suspended

the running of that period.

It follows that also the complaint in this respect under

Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention has been introduced out of time

and must be rejected under Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of the

Convention.

(c) Insofar as the applicants' complaint under Article 6 (Art. 6)

of the Convention refers to the proceedings concerning the

expropriation permit ending with the Government's decision of 28 April

1988, the Commission considers that the issues to be decided are

whether the decision to issue an expropriation permit was decisive for

the applicants' "civil rights and obligations" and, if so, whether a

genuine dispute of a serious nature arose between the applicants and

the authorities in relation to this decision. In the affirmative, it

would have to be determined whether the applicants had at their

disposal a procedure satisfying the conditions of Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1) of the Convention with regard to that dispute.

The Government waive objections against the admissibility of

the complaint in this respect under Article 6 (Art. 6) and admit that

it was not at the time possible under Swedish law to have the decision

of 28 April 1988 reviewed by a court.

The Commission finds that the complaint in this respect under

Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention is not manifestly ill-founded

within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention. As no other ground for declaring it inadmissible has been

established, the complaint is admissible.

3 The applicants complain that the decision to issue the

expropriation permit, the prohibitions on construction, seen as a

whole, and the prohibitions on construction, seen as a whole, in

combination with the demolition order of 13 June 1984 violated

Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention.

Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) reads:

"Every natural or legal person is entitled to the

peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be

deprived of his possessions except in the public interest

and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the

general principles of international law.

The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way

impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems

necessary to control the use of property in accordance with

the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or

other contributions or penalties."

The Government submit that each measure complained of must be

examined separately. Insofar as the applicants' complaint under

Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) concerns the prohibitions on

construction based on the decisions of 18 February 1977, 28 March

1978, 27 March 1979 and 7 June 1984, the complaint is inadmissible,

since the applicants did not exhaust domestic remedies. Insofar as

the complaint concerns the prohibitions on construction based on the

decisions of 24 February 1981 and 31 May 1985 and the prohibitions on

construction in combination with the demolition order of 13 June 1984,

the applicants did not introduce their complaint within six months

from the dates of the final domestic decisions. The complaint in this

respect is therefore also inadmissible.

The applicants contend that the various decisions prohibiting

construction on the property, including the refusal of an exemption

from this prohibition, created a continuing situation starting with

the first prohibition on construction and ending with the

expropriation proceedings. Thus, the Commission should deal with this

series of events as a whole.

The Commission recalls that the Court in the Sporrong and

Lönnroth case (Eur. Court H.R., judgment of 23 September 1982, Series

A No. 52, p. 23, para. 60) considered that the expropriation permits

and the prohibitions on construction at issue should in principle be

examined together, as they had the single objective of facilitating

development in accordance with successive plans prepared for that

purpose. Moreover, the present applicants' complaint about the

demolition order is linked to the prohibitions on construction. The

Commission therefore finds that the measures of which the applicants

complain under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention

must be seen as a whole and be examined together.

Insofar as the applicants' complaint under Article 1 of

Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) concerns the expropriation permit, the

Government submit that the interference was justified in view of the

aim pursued and as being effected in the general interest; that, at

the time when the applicants lodged their complaints, the question of

compensation for the expropriation was still pending before the

Stockholm Real Estate Court, which, when considering the question of

compensation, could also review the expropriation permit under certain

circumstances; that the applicants can therefore not be considered to

have exhausted domestic remedies; and that in, any case, consideration

should be given to the agreement reached regarding compensation.

Insofar as the applicants' complaint under Article 1 of

Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) refers to the prohibitions on construction and

to the prohibitions on construction in combination with the demolition

order, the Government submit that the complaint is manifestly

ill-founded; that the decisions were justified under the second

paragraph of the provision since they were made in the general

interest in order to control the use of the applicants' property; that

the prohibitions on construction only prevented the applicants from

erecting new buildings or from building substantial additions to the

existing one; and that the applicants never requested an exemption

from these prohibitions. The Government invoke the wide margin of

appreciation enjoyed by the State when deciding matters falling under

this provision.

The applicants contend that the decision to issue the

expropriation permit was an unlawful deprivation of their possessions

which did not serve the public interest or the purpose of the

interference. The situation of which they complain is similar to the

Sporrong and Lönnroth case (loc. cit.) in the sense that their right

of ownership was rendered precarious by the expropriation permit.

Thus, the case should be examined under the second sentence of Article

1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) and, therefore, be distinguished from the Allan

Jacobsson case in which the interference was examined under the second

paragraph of this provision, inter alia, on the ground that no

expropriation permit was issued (Eur. Court H.R., judgment of 25

October 1989, Series A No. 163, p. 16, para. 54).

The applicants contend that the prohibitions on construction,

seen as a whole, constituted an unjustified interference, as they had

to bear an individual and excessive burden, not having the possibility

of claiming compensation for the prohibitions; that they objected to

the prohibitions in several applications and appeals; and that they

once asked for a preliminary opinion regarding an exemption from a

prohibition.

Insofar as their complaint refers to the prohibitions on

construction, seen as a whole, in combination with the demolition

order, the applicants contend that the bad state of the building was

caused by the prohibitions on construction, which prevented repair.

The Commission considers that the complaint under Article 1 of

Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) raises the issue whether the cumulative effect

of, on the one hand, the decisions to prohibit construction, seen as a

whole, and, on the other hand, the expropriation permit may be said to

be justified under this provision, or, alternatively, whether the

prohibitions on construction, seen as a whole, were justified under

the second paragraph of Article 1 (Art. 1-2).

The Commission does not, for the reasons stated below, find it

necessary to determine whether the complaint should be examined under

the first or the second sentence of Article 1 (Art. 1). It notes that

the applicants acquired their property only after a prohibition on

construction had already come into effect. The Court has found that a

property owner cannot reasonably have been unaware of the state of the

law as to the restrictions on the use of his property already imposed

on the property when this was acquired by him (above-mentioned Allan

Jacobsson judgment, loc.cit., p. 18, paras. 59-61).

Furthermore, the Commission observes that the decisions to

prohibit construction issued under Sections 15 and 35 of the Building

Act were only valid for one year, with the possibility of a

prolongation for a period of two years at a time. The need to

maintain them was thus examined at regular intervals. Moreover, the

proceedings following a request for a provisional or final decision

regarding an exemption from a prohibition on construction provided a

possibility for weighing the public interest against that of the

individual (above-mentioned Allan Jacobsson judgment, loc.cit.,

pp. 18-19, para. 62). Finally, contrary to the Sporrong and Lönnroth

case where the expropriation permits were in force for twenty-three and

eight years, respectively, the expropriation permit was, in the

present case, in force for only two years before the development

agreement was reached and the expropriation proceedings were

discontinued.

In view of the above considerations an examination of this

complaint as it has been submitted does not disclose any appearance of

a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).

It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded

within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

4 The applicants finally complain that they had no effective

remedy before a national authority for the above violation of their

rights under the Convention. They allege a violation of Article 13

(Art. 13) of the Convention, which reads:

"Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in

this Convention are violated shall have an effective

remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that

the violation has been committed by persons acting in an

official capacity."

The Government submit that no separate issue arises under this

provision.

The Commission finds that the issue under Article 13 (Art. 13)

of the Convention, insofar as it concerns the absence of a court

determination with regard to the expropriation permit, is closely

linked to the corresponding issue under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the

Convention which the Commission has found above to be admissible. This

complaint under Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention is therefore

also admissible.

Insofar as the applicants' complaint under Article 13 (Art. 13)

of the Convention concerns the absence of a court determination with

regard to the decisions to prohibit construction, the Commission has

found above that the corresponding complaint under Article 6 (Art. 6)

of the Convention must be rejected as introduced out of time.

Consequently, the complaint in this respect under Article 13 (Art. 13)

of the Convention must be rejected on the same grounds.

Insofar as the applicants' complaint under Article 13 (Art. 13)

of the

Convention concerns the alleged violation of Article 1 of Protocol

No. 1 (P1-1), the Commission has found above that the complaint under Article

1 (Art. 1) is manifestly ill-founded. The Commission finds, for similar

reasons, that the applicants' claim of a violation of Article 1 of

Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) cannot be regarded as "arguable" for the purpose of

Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Powell and Rayner

judgment of 21 February 1990, Series A No. 172, para. 33).

Accordingly, Article 13 of the Convention does not in this respect

entitle the applicants to a remedy in domestic law. Consequently,

this complaint under Article 13 (Art. 13) is also manifestly ill-founded within

the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Commission, by a majority,

DECLARES ADMISSIBLE, without prejudging the merits of the

case, the applicants' complaints under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1)

and Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention concerning the

absence of a court determination of the lawfulness of the

expropriation permit;

DECLARES INADMISSIBLE the remainder of the application.

Deputy Secretary to the Commission President of the Commission

(J. RAYMOND) (C.A. NØRGAARD)