Sweden’s ninth national report under the Convention on Nuclear Safety

Sweden’s Ninth National Report under the Convention on Nuclear Safety

Sweden’s implementation of the obligations of the Convention

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ISBN 978-91-525-0452-9 (tryck) ISBN 978-91-525-0453-6 (pdf) ISSN 0284-6012

Sweden’s Ninth National Report under the Convention on Nuclear Safety Sweden’s implementation of the obligations of the Convention

Foreword 6 Foreword

Foreword

Sweden’s ninth national report has been issued in compli- tion about the Swedish nuclear power programme.

ance with the provisions of Article 5 of the Convention Chapter 2 includes a summary of the report and addi-

on Nuclear Safety (CNS). Sweden signed the Convention tional comprehensive information. It also includes a

on 20 September 1994. The Convention was ratified one summary of high lights and issues raised in relation to

year later, on 11 September 1995, and entered into force Sweden during the seventh review meeting, held during

on 24 October 1996. the period 24 March–4 April 2017. Additionally, this

chapter provides an overview of the issues Sweden was The first national report on Swedish implementation of requested to account for in its eighth national report. the obligations under the Convention was issued in August Chapter 3 provides facts and information, Article by 1998. Subsequent national reports were issued in August Article, to substantiate compliance with the obligations of of the years 2001, 2004, 2007, 2010, 2013, 2016 and 2019. the Convention. The reporting on Articles 6, 14, 18, 19 All these reports are available from the CNS website as and the summary contain specific paragraphs regarding well as from the website of the Swedish Radiation Safety implementation of Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety Authority (www.ssm.se). The reports were the subject of (VDNS) principles, in consideration of a special letter and discussion at review meetings held in 1999, 2002, 2005, advice issued by the president of the eighth review 2008, 2011, 2014 and 2017. meeting. Altogether, this information provides evidence

The 8th review conference, originally planned to be held demonstrating compliance with the obligations of the

in March 2020, was postponed as a consequence of the Convention on Nuclear Safety.

Covid-19 pandemic and eventually merged with the 9th The seventh review meeting of the contracting parties to conference, planned for March 2023. The present report the Convention on Nuclear Safety resulted in a number of is an update of the 8th CNS report issued in 2019, and it topics to be considered while preparing national reports reflects developments since the 7th report issued in 2016. for the eighth review meeting. The topics are to be

The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority has been assigned reflected upon and the results presented in the report.

by the Government of Sweden to coordinate preparation The general conclusions regarding Sweden’s compliance of this national report. The report was produced by a with the obligations of the Convention are provided in the working group comprising representatives of the regula- Summary and in Chapter 3, Article 5. tory body, i.e. the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority,

together with representatives of the licensed operators The present national report covers the period March

of nuclear power plants in Sweden. 2016–February 2022.

The present report is structured in accordance with The report is designed for good screen readability. This

Convention guidelines and other recommendations. increases its accessibility, while also reducing the need to

To provide the reader with a frame of reference and an make a printout. This is beneficial from an environmental

introduction, Chapter 1 includes basic facts and informa- aspect.

Foreword 7

Executive Summary

The national reports for the review meetings are developed the Government Offices, regulatory authorities, the industry,

in response to Article 5 of the Convention, which call for a and non-governmental organisations were involved in the

self-assessment of each Contracting Party with regard to investigation. In early April 2019, a report was delivered to

compliance with the obligations of the Convention. On the Swedish Government in which a proposal is made to

the part of Sweden, this self-assessment has demonstrated have the Act on Nuclear Activities (1984:3) repealed and

compliance with all the obligations of the Convention, as replaced by a new act with a new structure.

shown in Chapter 3 of this national report. A overhaul of SSM’s regulations promulgated in the SSM

The Swedish nuclear power reactors were designed in the Code of Statutes, SSMFS, began in late 2013. The first of

1970th and 1980th and have since the original design and the new regulations are finalised and entered into force in

constructions been periodically modernised and reassessed June 2018. By 1 March 2022, key regulations governing

to ensure compliance with the current design basis and to nuclear power reactors entered into force.

further improve safety as well as to prepare for long term A full scope IAEA IRRS mission to Sweden was operation. In 2015, decisions were taken by the plant performed in February 2012. The Government subseowners to phase out the four oldest operating nuclear quently requested a follow-up IRRS mission, which was power reactors during the period 2017–2020. Two of these performed in April 2016. The outcome of the follow-up reactors were shut down permanently during the period mission was that two out of 22 recommendations given to 2017 – april 2019, and the remaining two during the Sweden in 2012 remained open, signifying that work current reporting period. The plant owners decisions were remained to be done. A general conclusion of the IRRS based on the overall business and energy market situation team was that they were satisfied with the approach of and other circumstances over the past few years. Sweden to address the findings and work on closing the

There are currently six nuclear power reactors in operation remaining recommendations. The next IRRS mission

in Sweden. The four permanently shut down reactors will scheduled for Sweden is in the fall of 2022.

not be included in this reporting. No major events implying serious consequences for safety

From the perspective of political developments, the at Swedish NPPs have occurred during the review period.

Government prepared an invitation following the 2014 However, a few events have occurred which have impor-

election to parties across the Parliament to participate in a tance in relation to fuel cladding or containment integrity.

special energy commission to agree on long-term energy For example, reactor containment liner leakage and an

policy. The multiparty Energy Commission, whose internal leakage between drywell and wetwells have been

members in June 2016 announced an overall agreement on detected and identified during a regular integrated contain-

Swedish energy policy, published its final report on 9 ment air tests during annual outages.

January 2017. The agreement included the aim of 100 % Important measures identified by the EU stress test renewable electricity production by 2040 which does, National Action Plan (NAcP) include measures for however, not preclude the operation of nuclear reactors meeting new requirements for robust and functionally after 2040. The agreement also confirmed the existing independent core cooling. The purpose of these measures legislation allowing new nuclear power reactors to be built is to increase the reliability of core cooling in a NPP by at existing reactor sites to replace existing and closed introducing a new and alternate independent function. reactors, and that there is no end date for nuclear energy in Thus, SSM decided in 2014 that any nuclear power Sweden. Furthemore, a special tax on electrical power reactor in operation at 2020 must have functionally produced in nuclear reactors was eliminated. independent core cooling system (ICCS) capabilities in

An investigation into a revision of Swedish nuclear legisla- place. At the time of the eights report, temporary safety

tion has been performed following the Government’s measures to increaseing the independence of existing

authorisation in June 2017. An appointed investigator core cooling systems were in place at all plants. By the

assisted by an expert committee with representatives from end of 2020, permanent independent core cooling

8 Executive Summary

systems were installed at all reactors in continued concerning the ability to receive aid and support from

operation in Sweden. external organisations. Changes have also been made to the

structure of the regulations and some requirements were Following decisions taken by the plant owners to permamoved to new over-arching general safety regulations in nently shut down four reactors, licensees in Sweden were SSMFS 2018:1. A number of new monitoring stations have facing new challanges in the area of human resources as been installed around the nuclear power plants in Sweden. well as the overall safety strategies. Decommissioning is The new stations will provide information on dose rates at now ongoing, in different stages, at three sites. Various 90 locations around the Swedish nuclear power plants. The approaches are applied by the licensees to preserve, licensees have also devoted efforts to the area of severe develop and strengthen the safety culture, and to ensure accident management guidelines (SAMG) and improvethat safety, including measures for radiation protection, is ments to existing procedures, and new procedures for properly maintained. extraordinary situations at Swedish NPPs are in place,

The closure of the four oldest reactors, less maintenance including procedures and guides on managing accidents

and fewer large projects involving reactor systems, and affecting more than one unit at a site.

concerted efforts to improve radiation protection condi- At the seventh review meeting, Contracting Parties decided tions in the work environment resulted in substantially that the fulfilment of the principles and practical implelower average collective dose per year and reactor. The mentation of the VDNS should be specifically considered work to lower individual radiation doses has also been while preparing national reports for the eighth review successful. During the reporting period only very few meeting. For this reason, practical measures regarding NPP staff received radiation doses exceeding 10 mSv. implementation of principles of the Declaration are briefly Special projects have inter alia focused on education and discussed in Chapter 2, and are presented in detail in training and measures to adhere the new dose limit for Chapter 3, Articles 6, 14, 18 and 19 of this report. the lens of the eye.

In the area of emergency preparedness, the regulations

contain new rules for logistics centres and provisions

Executive Summary 9

1. Introduction

1.1. National policy The Swedish electric power market has been deregulated since 1996. Trading of electricity is managed on the Nordic 1.1.1. Current role of nuclear power in Swedish marketplace, Nord Pool, which offers trading, clearing, electricity production settlement and associated services in both day-ahead and Total electricity production decreased during 2020. Net intraday markets across nine European countries. The production amounted to 160.9 TWh, a decrease of 2.9 national high voltage grid is managed by a state authority, percent compared to 2019. Svenska Kraftnät. Regional and local grids are operated as regulated monopolies by various grid companies. Electric power generated in Sweden surpassed domestic consumption. This meant Sweden had a net surplus of

1.1.2. Political developments regarding use nuclear

25.0 TWh on its international electricity exchanges. Sweden

Energy

has had a surplus of electricity since 2014 on an annual After the 2014 election, the Government invited parties basis. across the political aisles in Parliament to participate in a In 2020, windpower production increased by 38.7 percent special energy commission to agree on long-term energy to 27.5 TWh. Hydro-power, including pumping, increased policy. The multiparty Energy Commission announced an by 10.7 percent to 71.9 TWh. Conventional thermal power overall agreement on Swedish energy policy in June 2016, decreased by 16.9 percent to 13.1 TWh. Nuclear power and published its final report on 9 January 2017 (SOU decreased by 26.5 percent to 47.3 TWh. Solar power 2017:2 in the Government Official Reports series). The contributed with 1.0 TWh, an increase of 56.1 percent main points relating to nuclear energy in the report were: compared with 2019. – The target by 2040 is 100 per cent renewable electricity The net electricity generation from the various production production. This is a target, not a deadline for banning resources was in 2020 distributed as presented in the nuclear power, nor does it mean closing of nuclear figure 1. power plants through political decisions. – New nuclear power reactors may be built at existing Total generation net 160,5 TWh reactor sites to replace existing and closed reactors. The Solar power total number of Swedish nuclear power reactors at any

0.6%

time is limited to 10. Nuclear power reactors may

Conv. thermal power Windpower

8.2% 17.1%

operate beyond 2040; consequently, there is no end date for nuclear energy in Sweden. Central government support for nuclear power, in the form of direct or indirect subsidies, cannot however be assumed. – The tax on installed reactor capacity was decided to be entirely removed over a period of two years. The Government has thereafter abolished the tax on nuclear Hydro-power reactor capacity with the intent of introducing a

44.7%

compensatory increase in the tax on electricity, though with an exemption for electricity-intensive industry.

The report also stated that Nuclear operators should have Nuclear power full liability for a radiological accidents and that the insurance Source: Swedish Energy Agency 29.4% and Statistics Sweden coverage should triple, from about 4 billion SEK to about 12 billion SEK (1,2 billion Euro), in accordance with the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Figure 1. Power generation 2020 by type of power, percent.

10 Introduction

Energy. In December 2021, Sweden ratified the 2004 July 2012. At that time the applicant, Vattenfall, considered

Protocols to amend the Paris Convention on Third Party replacing the two oldest units at Ringhals by one or two

Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy and the Brussels new units. However, in late 2014, Vattenfall informed SSM

Supplementary Convention. This was later implemented in that all ongoing work relating to plans for new builds of

the national legal framework through the Act on Liability and nuclear reactors had been put on hold.

Compensation for Radiological Accidents (2010:950), that During the autumn of 2015, at extraordinary shareholders’ entered into force on 1 January 2022. meetings of RAB and OKG, decisions in principal were

In december 2019 several political parties that initially taken to phase out the reactors Ringhals units 1 and 2 and

supported the above mentioned agreement on Swedish Oskarshamn units 1 and 2. The decisions were taken based

energy policy announced that they would withdraw their on to the overall business and energy market situation,

support and seek support for a new agreement on Swedish existing taxes, and SSM’s requirements for operation

energy policy. beyond 2020. The owners of RAB decided at the time that

operation of Ringhals unit 2 would end in 2019 and that In June 2017, the government appointed an inquiry chair to operation of Ringhals unit 1 would end in 2020. As a review theAct on Nuclear Activities. The aim of the inquiry consequence, all major investments in these two units were was to carry out a review of the nuclear safety law to ensure cancelled, though all necessary measures for maintaining that the legal framework will provide an effective and sound safety were implemented until the reactors were taken out base ensuring high level of nuclear safety to protect workers of operation. Subsequently, a new and important mission and the general public against the dangers arising from for the concerned utilities OKG and RAB, has been to ionizing radiations from nuclear installations. The report has ensure safe and effective decommissioning of the permabeen delivered to the government and is, at the time of nently shut down units. reporting, being handled by the Government Offices.

The nuclear safety strategy in Sweden is to apply In recent years, major changes have also been made to the continuous improvements based on regular and systematic regulations on financing of the residual products of re-assessments, aiming at ensuring compliance with nuclear power. The main purpose of the changes is to modern requirements and current design basis. The create more clarity in the legislation and improve the strategy also includes identification of further safety financial security of the state. improvements by taking into account ageing issues,

operational experience, most recent research and develop- 1.2. National nuclear power programme ment, and developments in international standards.

The Swedish licensee have implemented safety measures

1.2.1. Development of the nuclear power

through relevant modifications and, in some cases, by means

programme in Sweden

of comprehensive modernization projects. For example, In Sweden, the first steps towards a national nuclear after the accident in Three Mile Island in 1979, severe programme were taken in 1947, when AB Atomenergi was accident management systems (including Filtered Containestablished to realise a development programme decided ment Venting System, FCVS) were introduced at the by Parliament. As a result, the first research reactor, located Swedish NPPs. Also, extensive modernization programmes at the Royal Institute of Technology (KTH) in Stockholm, were introduced in 2005 and completed in 2015 for all went critical in 1954. This was followed by the first Swedish NPPs in order to meet new requirements issued by proto type nuclear power plant (PHWR), Ågesta NPP, the regulator in 2004. In summary, the safety measures located in a rock cavern near a suburb of Stockholm, and implemented as a result of the new regulations in 2004 research reactors built at the Studsvik research centre. The mainly included improvements in separation and diversifica- Ågesta NPP was in operation between 1964 and 1974, and tion, as well as enhancing the capability to control condiwas mainly used for district heating. The first commercial tions that might arise during design basis accidents. Actions nuclear power plant, Oskarshamn unit 1, was commishave also been taken to considerably strengthen the sioned in 1972. Between 1974 and 1985 another eleven capabilities to operate the plants and monitor the status of nuclear power reactor units were taken in to operation, the barriers by introducing new and or upgraded instrumenat the sites in Barsebäck, Oskarshamn, Ringhals and tation and control equipment. Forsmark. The twelve commercial reactors built in Sweden

comprise nine BWRs (ASEA-Atom design) and three Furthermore, safety improvements have also been identi-

PWRs (Westinghouse design). As a result of political fied through international reviews such as the now

decisions, the BWR units Barsebäck 1 and 2 were shut completed EU stress test National Action Plan (NacP).

down permanently in 1999 and 2005, respectively. In 2004, Through a decision by SSM in 2014 the licensees were Studsvik Nuclear AB decided to shut down the two required to implement an independent core cooling system remaining research reactors at the Studsvik site. The (ICCS) at reactors intended to be operated beyond 2020. Studsvik research reactors were closed in June 2005 and The principal design solutions for the ICCS functions are the decommissioning will be completed in 2019. presented in section 18.2.1.6. and installations of the An application for a licence to construct, own and operate systems are at the time of this report completed. The new

a nuclear facility consisting of one or two nuclear power systems were taken into operation during the second

reactors with adjacent facilities was presented to SSM in half of 2020.

Introduction 11

Table 1: Main data for nuclear power installations in Sweden.

Licensed thermal Electrical gross Commercial

Power reactor Type Operator Construction start

power level (MW) output (MW) operation

Ågesta 105 12 PHWR AB Atomenergi Vattenfall 1957 1964–1974 11 Barsebäck 1 1800 615 BWR Barsebäck 1970 1975–1999 Barsebäck 2 1800 615 BWR Kraft AB 1972 1977–2005 Forsmark 1 2928 984 BWR Forsmarks 1971 1980 Forsmark 2 3253 1120 BWR Kraftgrupp AB 1975 1981 Forsmark 3 3300 1167 BWR 1978 1985 Oskarshamn 1 1375 492 BWR OKG Aktiebolag 1966 1972–2017 Oskarshamn 2 1800 661 BWR 1969 1975–2015 Oskarshamn 3 3900 1450 BWR 1980 1985 Ringhals 1 2540 910 BWR Ringhals AB 1968 1976–2020 Ringhals 2 2660 966 PWR 1969 1975–2020 Ringhals 3 3144 1117 PWR 1972 1981 Ringhals 4 3300 1171 PWR 1973 1983

1 Maintained by Vattenfall AB and AB SVAFO. All fuel and heavy water as well as parts of the primary system (some of the steam generators) have been removed from the installation.

1.2.2. Nuclear power installations in Sweden 1.2.3. Ownership and staffing

Ownership of Swedish nuclear power plants is character- As of February 2022, Sweden has six nuclear power ized by a large extent cross-ownership, as shown in figure reactors with an operational licence, as specified in Table 1 3. The key players in the nuclear power sector in Sweden above. Seven nuclear power reactors have been permaare mainly large power companies such as Vattenfall AB, nently shut down, namely Ågesta, Barsebäck unit 1, Sydkraft Nuclear Power AB, and Fortum Generation AB. Barsebäck unit 2, Oskarshamn unit 1, Oskarshamn unit 2, Ringhals unit 1, and Ringhals unit 2. The respective workforces at the different sites vary in number of employees depending on the plant situation in All Swedish BWRs including Ågesta PHWR were designed terms of the operational status for the units. The number by domestic vendor ASEA-Atom (later merged into ABB of employees is declining at the Oskarshamn and Ringhals Atom, further Westinghouse Electric Sweden AB), and all sites. This was also previously the case at Barsebäck NPP. Swedish PWRs were designed by Westinghouse Electric Workforces present at Swedish nuclear power plants in Company (USA). The maximum power level of the 2021, together with trends compared with the years since operated reactors has been uprated between 6 % and 38 % 2015, are presented in Table 4 of section 11.2.2. from the original licensed power levels (see section 6.3). An overview of the current situation and the main data for 1.2.4. Support organisations of owner and licensees nuclear power installations in Sweden are shown in Table 1. Swedish nuclear power plant operators jointly own the Figure 2 shows the geographical locations of Swedish following support organisations: nuclear facilities, all of which are situated in the southern – KSU AB (Nuclear Safety and Training): provides half of Sweden. operational training, including simulator training, on a Considering the ageing of the Swedish nuclear reactor contractual basis to all Swedish nuclear power plants. fleet, work on implementation and development of KSU also analyses international operational experience comprehensive ageing management programmes at the and provides the results to the Swedish operators. nuclear power plants has been ongoing since specific – SQC (Swedish Qualification Centre): a company for requirements regarding ageing management and long term independent qualification of NDT systems operation were originally introduced in the national (Non-Destructive Testing) to be used by NDT regulations in 2005. In recent years, activities regarding companies at Swedish nuclear power plants. ageing management have been intensified, and the – Norderf (formerly ERFATOM): formed by Swedish preparations for long term operation for reactors facing and Finnish NPP operators, KSU and SKB with the aim the end of their original design lifetime in the near future, to proactively monitor predetermined trends and typically 40 years, have been intensified. deviating results, and carry out experience feedback

12 Introduction

Nuclear Facilities in Sweden

Boiling Water Reactor (ASEA-Atom)

Pressurized Water Reactor (Westinghouse) Forsmark 1 Forsmark 2 Other facilities Forsmark 3

Permanently Shut down SFR Final repository for radioactive operational waste

Westinghouse Stockholm Electric Sweden AB Ågesta Fuel fabrication facility Vattenfall AB Ågesta PHWR Ranstad Mineral AB Studsvik Nuclear AB, Uranium recovery facility AB Svafo, Radiologically cleared Cyclife Sweden AB Facilities for fuel and materials testing, waste management and storage Gothenburg Ringhals 1 Ringhals 2 Ringhals 3 Ringhals 4

Oskarshamn 1 Oskarshamn 2 Oskarshamn 3 Barsebäck 1 CLAB Barsebäck 2 Central interim storage Malmö facility for spent fuel

Figure 2. Locations of nuclear facilities in Sweden.

analysis of events in Swedish and Finnish NPPs, as well waste - primarily from government research activities. as of international operational experience. Currently Svafo is tasked to decommission nuclear – SKB (Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management facilities from previous research and development Company): a company that deals with spent nuclear fuel activities in Studsvik, among other places, and to and radioactive waste. SKB owns and operates the temporarily store decommissioned waste and waste central interim storage facility for spent nuclear fuel from the research period until final disposal can be (Clab) at Oskarshamn and the final repository for carried out. Its operations are financed by the Nuclear short-lived radioactive waste (SFR) at Forsmark. SKB is Waste Fund to which owners of the four nuclear utilities also responsible for R&D work in connection with the pay fees. technical concept and location of the final repository for spent fuel, including the Äspö Hard Rock 1.2.5. Other commercial services in the nuclear Laboratory and canister laboratory at Oskarshamn. SKB industry has applied for the construction and operation of a final The supply of services in the nuclear field has become repository for spent nuclear fuel, which the concentrated to a few companies. The main Swedish Government decided to approve on 27 January 2022. vendor, previously ASEA-Atom/ABB Atom, is now part – Svafo is a non-profit company, originaly established to of Westinghouse Corporation, which is owned by Brookbe responsible for coordinating and managing legacy field Buisness Partners L.P. under the name Westinghouse

Introduction 13

Uniper SE

100%

Sydkraft AB

100%

Sydkraft Utility/ MKB AB Group Vattenfall AB Nuclear Power Fortum Owner of Utilites AB

22,2% 45,5% *) 70,4% 66% 9,9% *) 54,5% 100% 29,6%

Licence Barsebäck Kraft Forsmark Holder/ Ringhals AB OKG AB AB Kraftgrupp AB Operator

100% 100% 100% 100%

Nuclear Barsebäck NPP Ringhals NPP Oskarshamn NPP 1 Forsmark NPP Power 2 BWR 2 PWR BWR 3 BWR Plants Shut down 1 BWR 2 BWR Shut down Shut down

1 PWR *) including ownership through Shut down Mellansvensk Kraftgrupp AB (MKB)

Figure 3. Utility and ownership structure 2021.

Electric Sweden AB. Other active vendors on the Swedish on 60 years of reactor operation, with the exceptions of

market are Framatome, Westinghouse, GE Hitachi Nuclear Ringhals units 1 and 2 which were expected to be operated

Energy, GE, Siemens, and Alstom. for 50 years and the actual years for the permanently shut

down reactor units. Total annual production of LILW at the Studsvik AB is a contractor for materials testing and nuclear facilities is usually around 1.000–1.500 m . 3 nuclear fuel investigations. Studsvik AB operates a hot-cell

laboratory for fuel investigations. The company also The national waste programme includes the waste

provides decommissioning and waste treatment services. treatment facilities at Studsvik, the Final Repository for

Short-lived Radioactive Waste at the Forsmark site (SFR), According to the amended EU Nuclear safety directive and shallow land burials at the nuclear power plant sites in Swedish law, a licence holder is required to make the Forsmark, Oskarshamn and Ringhals and at Studsvik, the necessary checks for the quality and competence of a Central Interim Storage Facility for Spent Nuclear Fuel at contractor and to take full responsibility for the work Oskarshamn (Clab), the transportation system, and the use performed by such contractors. of clearance. Material may be cleared for unrestricted use,

for example recycling, or for treatment as conventional

1.2.6. Nuclear waste

non-radioactive waste. Three additional major waste Operational radioactive waste is generated by nuclear management facilities are foreseen to be designed, sited, reactors and fuel cycle facilities, such as Studsvik AB’s constructed and licensed in the future: A plant for encapfacilities at Studsvik and Westinghouse Electric Sweden sulation of spent nuclear fuel, a disposal facility for spent AB’s fuel fabrication plant located in Västerås. Radioactive fuel, a disposal facility for long-lived low and intermediate waste also originates from medical and research institulevel waste. SKB in addition plans foran extension of the tions, industry and consumer products. The radioactive SFR facility to accommodate also waste. Additional land waste produced during infancy of the Swedish civil nuclear burials may also be constructed. industry’s development, is safely stored at the Studsvik site

or has already been disposed of in the Final Repository for Transport of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste is done

Short-lived Radiactive Waste. largely by sea, since all Swedish nuclear power reactors and

most nuclear facilities are situated along coastlines. The In total, the Swedish nuclear power programme is expected transport system has been in operation since 1982 and to generate approximately 20.000 m (12.600 tonnes) of 3 consists of a transport ship, transport casks and containers, spent fuel, 155.000 m of short-lived low and intermediate 3 and terminal vehicles for loading and unloading. In 2013, the level waste (LILW) from operations and decommissioning, new transport ship M/S Sigrid was taken into operation, a and 15.000 m of long-lived LILW. The assumption is based 3

14 Introduction

custom built vessel for transports of spent fuel and radio- development of methods and processes to a number of active waste from nuclear power plants to Clab and SFR. Swedish universities as well as relevant reaserch intsitutes. SSM have also recurrently received Government assign- 1.2.7. Nuclear education, research and ment to investigate staffing and competence needs over the development long term among all stakeholders in the Swedish nuclear

In Sweden, higher education in nuclear technology is sector. The last assignment was reported to the Governmainly concentrated to the Royal Institute of Technology ment in 2018. in Stockholm (KTH), Chalmers University of Technology A large research programme on development of leadin Gothenburg (Chalmers), and Uppsala University (UU). cooled SMR technology has been launched in 2021. The To ensures the availability of qualified staff and necessary first step in this programme was the establishment of the competences in the future, all actors in the nuclear industry SUNRISE centre, hosted by KTH Royal Institute of in Sweden are working systematically with competency Technology and joining Uppsala University and Luleå management and competence retention. In cooperation University of Technology, as well as a large number of with the industry, SSM has developed a ten year plan for industrial and societal partners, including SSM in an competence retention, focusing on five strategic areas: advisory role. The major industrial partners in SUNRISE national coordination; international research collaboration; are Westinghouse, Leadcold and Sandvik, while most research policy for viable research environments; education companies in the nuclear and nuclear materials sector in for society’s competence needs; and the attractiveness of Sweden are in the advisory committee of the centre. the Radiation Safety Sector. SUNRISE aims to design and prepare for licensing of a

lead-cooled research and demonstration reactor, and The three Swedish nuclear power plant licensees, the includes work on materials development, fuel develop- Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) and Westingment, process development, code development and safety house Electric Sweden AB jointly support these three studies. The second step in the larger research programme universities through the Swedish Centre of Nuclear is the Solstice project, which is funded by the Swedish Technology (SKC), an organisation for sponsoring and Energy Agency, and in which Uniper, Leadcold, their joint coordination that has been in existence since 1992. SKC venture company SMR AB and KTH Royal Institute of supports undergraduate education, graduate schools as well Technology are designing, building and working with an as research. The present SKC contract ends in 2023, electrically heated advanced test facility which in many negotiations regarding terms and conditions for the next aspects is a mock-up of the proposed research and operating period will be initiated by the end of 2022. In demonstration reactor, as well as of the Leadcold 2020, SSM resumed its cooperation with SKC as well as its commercial concept SEALER-55. SKB board membership.

The industry and University partners have also formed a When SKC was set up in 1992, there was a decision centre of excellence, called ANITA, for research on SMR pending on closure of nuclear power plants, and student technologies, with focus on light water SMR technology. enrolment in nuclear studies was very low. At that time, the The participants are Vattenfall, Fortum, Uniper, and the industry and the regulatory authority faced similar chalnuclear power specialists Westinghouse and Studsvik, lenges in competence development in general and staff together with Uppsala University, Chalmers and the KTH renewal in particular. Thirty years later, similar challenges Royal Institute of Technology. The centre was proposed in will face Sweden in terms of maintaining sufficient response to the call from the Swedish Energy Agency for competence for safely operating 6 remaining reactors. centres of excellence for a sustainable energy system The Unlike 1992, enrolement in nuclear studies is currently centre’s research is focused on how SMRs can support relatively high. transitioning the Swedish energy system into a sustainable There is currently only one Master programme on Nuclear system and to resolve technical and regulatory matters in Engineering in Sweden and this is the TNEEM order to realise SMRs in the most effective way. The centre programme which was established in 2007 at KTH Royal started in January 2022 and has received a SEK 25 million Institute of Technology. It is at the same time a regular research grant from the Swedish Energy Agency, repre- Master programme and an international educational senting one-third of the total funding for the centre. collaboration. Students enrolled in courses given in the programme can be either enrolled in the TNEEM Vattenfall programme, or join the programme through the European Vattenfall has provided joint funding for a new bachelor’s Master in Nuclear Engineering (EMINE), or though degree programme on nuclear power at UU which started several double degree bilateral agreements that have been in 2019. Moreover, long-term cooperation is established established with e.g. Politechnico di Milano, INP between the nuclear industry and UU for training staff in Grenoble, Tsinghua University and KAIST. From all these nuclear technology and radiation protection within enrollement paths, the programme graduates around 25 NANSS (Nordic Academy for Nuclear Safety and students per year. Security). This effort has also resulted in improved

education and closer exchange between students and the In addition to efforts within the SKC to maintain and industry, because places not used by industry are filled by secure necessary competence, SSM also provides financial university students. support for basic and applied research as well as the

Introduction 15

Moreover, Vattenfall has been a major partner in KIC Nuclear Safety Regulators Group), an expert advisory InnoEnergy (Knowledge & Innovation Community) group for the European Commission. ENSREG is during the development of the master’s programme composed of senior officials from national nuclear safety, EMINE (European Master in Nuclear Energy), where radioactive waste safety or radiation protection regulatory students attend one year in Barcelona or at KTH, and one authorities and senior civil servants with competence in year in France. Around 20 students graduate annually from these fields from all 27 Member States of the European the EMINE programme. Discussions are in progress with Union together with representatives of the European Chalmers on launching a similar programme. Commission.

Following the severe accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi

1.2.8. National industry cooperation

NPP in March 2011, the European Council requested that A joint industry initiative was taken in 2013 by forming a comprehensive safety and risk assessments should be coordination group, KSKG (Kärnkraftssäkerhetskoordiperformed for all EU nuclear power plants. The so called neringsgrupp), to coordinate critical nuclear safety and EU stress tests were performed at national level, and security issues (primarily following the Fukushima Dai-ichi supplemented by a European peer review. On behalf of accident), EU stress tests on nuclear safety, EU topical peer the Swedish government, and with input from the Swedish reviews and work on other upcoming regulatory requirelicensees, SSM developed and published a national ments. The goal of this liaison group is to develop and assessment report. Furthemore, SSM contributed to this strengthen safety and security in an effective way. KSKG process as a member of ENSREG’s stress test peer review delivers position papers on high priority and strategic board and as a team leader for one of the three topical issues. The members of KSKG are these licence holders: areas included in the peer review. Forsmarks Kraftgrupp AB (FKA), RAB, OKG, SKB and the owners of the nuclear facilities, i.e. Vattenfall, Sydkraft In 2017 the first EU topical peer review under the NP and Fortum. amended EU Nuclear Safety Directive, took place. Ageing management was the topic for this peer review process. On behalf of the Swedish government and with input 1.3. Swedish participation in international from the Swedish licensees, SSM developed and published activities to enhance nuclear safety and a national assessment report and participated actively in the

radiation protection peer review process.

1.3.1. The regulatory body SSM contributes to the work performed within interna- Through SSM, Sweden is involved in about 150 interna- tional conventions in the areas of nuclear safety and tional working groups. The majority of these groups deal radiation protection, such as the Convention on Nuclear with nuclear safety, and radiation protection issues. The Safety and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent cooperation mainly takes place within the frameworks of Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste the IAEA, OECD/NEA, UNSCEAR and EU, and also in Management, the Convention on Early Notification of a connection with the international conventions ratified by Nuclear Accident, the Convention on Assistance in the Sweden and in non-governmental organisations such as Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, the Western European Nuclear Regulators Association the Espoo Convention, the Convention for the Protection (WENRA), Heads of European Radiation Control of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic Authorities (HERCA), International Nuclear Regulators (OSPAR) and the Helsinki Commission (HELCOM) Association (INRA) and the International Commission on conventions for reduction of releases of radioactive Radiological Protection (ICRP). substances from nuclear facilities.

In addition to multilateral collaboration, SSM currently has SSM participate actively in the development of the IAEA bilateral agreements with thirteen regulatory bodies in safety standards, through the membership of the Commisvarious countries. These agreements concern the exchange sion on Safety Standards (CSS) as well as the membership of information and cooperation within agreed areas (e.g. of the Safety Standards Committees.

nuclear safety, emergency preparedness, occupational In addition to regulatory matters, SSM is engaged in a exposure, environmental radiological protection, and number of international research projects, mostly within radioactive waste management). These countries are the framework of cooperation projects carried out by the Australia, Belarus , Canada, France, Finland, Germany, Nordic countries, the EU research programme, OECD/ Japan, South Korea, Lithuania, Russia, Ukraine, the United NEA, and the IAEA. Sweden is also active in networks for Kingdom, and the United States. In addition, Sweden has promoting research and cooperation in radiobiology, special agreements with the Nordic countries (Denmark, radioecology and biological dosimetry. Furthermore, SSM Finland, Iceland and Norway) regarding emergency staff have been involved in many international expert preparedness and information exchange. missions, for example as experts in the IAEA peer review SSM provided technical expertise to the Swedish govern- service teams of the IRRS, OSART and SALTO.

ment during the development of the new and amended SSM is active within the framework of OECD/NEA EU directives in the areas of nuclear safety and radiation through participation in committees and working groups as protection. SSM participates in ENSREG (European well as in several Joint Research Projects.

16 Introduction

ICRP har started a review of its general recommendations Ageing Management. They supported the development on radiological protection in Publication 103, and SSM will and updates of National Report and National Action take an active part in this work. Plans, through these peer review processes. SSM plays an active role in WENRA and its working Swedish nuclear licensees participate in European Nuclear groups. SSM has contributed to the review and develop- Installations Safety Standards Initiative, ENISS. ENISS has ment of the updated WENRA Safety Reference Levels for representation from 19 European nuclear power Existing Reactors, and participated in WENRA’s ongoing companies and licensees from 16 countries. The primary benchmarking projects, which makes a systematic compar- objective of ENISS was to create a forum for the ison of national reactor safety requirements and their European nuclear operators to prepare common positions implementation against jointly agreed reference levels. for WENRA consultation processes. For example, ENISS participated actively in the consultation process for the 1.3.2. International development and cooperation WENRA study, “Safety Objectives for New Power programmes Reactors”, and the review of the 2014 update of the Through SSM, Sweden is involved in a number of WENRA Safety Reference Levels, as well as the Guidance development and cooperation programmes with countries Documents related to that update, i.e., WENRA Guidance in Central and Eastern Europe. The aim is to enhance Documents on Design Extension Conditions (Issue F) and safety at nuclear power plants in the region and improve Natural Hazards (Issue T). Another task of ENISS is to radiation protection of people and the environment. SSM review new or revised IAEA Requirements and Guidelines, also works towards increasing awareness about nuclear TECDOCs and the Safety Glossary. From this aspect, non-proliferation and strengthening control regimes in the ENISS has adopted a coordinating role in the European region. The cooperation projects are mainly run together industry’s contacts with the IAEA. This means that with Russia and Ukraine, though certain projects are also European nuclear utilities can join the IAEA revision run together with Georgia, Moldova and Belarus. In 2020 process at an earlier stage than was previously the case. SSM received a government assignment to analyse In February 2019, Vattenfall nuclear sector received full possibilities for a cooperation programme with Armenia, membership of the Electric Power Research Institute, but due to the Covid pandemic, the bilateral cooperation EPRI. This organisation offers support, often based on has been delayed. The situation after the Russian invasion best practices, in many important nuclear areas. EPRI of Ukraine in 24 February 2022 will have a major impact conducts research on materials management, fuel and on cooperation in the region. chemistry, plant performance and strategic initiatives to The programmes are based on Government decisions, with support safe, reliable, cost-effective and environmentally financing provided by the Ministry of the Environment, friendly use of nuclear power. This is done by means of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and Sweden’s Interna- global collaboration conducted together with nuclear tional Development Cooperation Agency. The total budget power plant operators, regulatory authorities, and other is approximately 35 million Swedish krona per year. research organizations. The membership gives Vattenfall the potential to maintain existing and develop new 1.3.3. Utilities competences as well as the possibility to follow the latest Utilities in Sweden are active in international cooperation development in important areas of interests. for the purpose of enhancing nuclear safety by sharing experience, contributing to work on international regulation and guidelines, and by participating in safety assessments and peer reviews. At the present time, this is primarily accomplished through memberships in WANO,in owner’s group associations of major European and US vendors, through EPRI and by participation in the Foratom initiative European Nuclear Installations Safety Standards, the European Utilities Requirements project as well as through cooperation with IAEA and and OECD/ NEA and participation in IAEA activities. Both Vattenfall and Sydkraft Nuclear Power have direct membership in WANO. Swedish utilities are also engaged in international projects and research organisations. The examples are, the Nordic Safety Research Project (NKS), ongoing since 1977, and programmes and projects within the framework of EU and OECD/NEA. Swedish nuclear licensees participated in the 2011 EU stress test and in the 2017 EU Topical Peer Review on

Introduction 17

2. Summary of the development since last national report

2.1. Highlights and issues in the companywide awareness of the necessities and requirements related to operating the plants beyond its original discussion about Sweden at the design life. Furthermore, Sweden participated in the first seventh review meeting held in 2017 EU Topical Peer Review process on managing the ageing Observations and aspects which were highlighted and of nuclear installations. documented by the rapporteur during the discussions of Through supervision, SSM has found deviations in some the CNS Review Meeting regarding the seventh Swedish of the plants aging management processes, and has national report, led to the following challenges presented requested improvements and relevant measures to be in country report. A short summary on progress done implemented by the licensees. Follow-up reviews and since seventh review meeting is also presented below. inspection have been conducted to control that the Challenge SE-2014-05: Ensuring safe long-term measures taken by the licensees have the intended effect. operation of Swedish NPPs requires additional safety Results from these inspections are described in Sweden’s improvements and licensee applying an effective ageing EU Topical Peer Review on ageing management. management (remained open). More details are available and described in section 14.3.5.

In the latest years, the preparations for long term operation Challenge SE-2017-01: Implementing an approach, (LTO i.e. more than 40 years of operation) has been consistent with the government assignment, to sustain and intensified. SSM requires an integrated programme for develop capability in both the regulatory body and licensee management of degradation due to ageing. Long term (including sustaining support such as R&D and suppliers) operation (LTO) is not formally defined in Swedish given the plan to shut down some NPPs and the need to legislation or associated regulations, instead the term develop additional capability in technical and radiological “continued operation” has been suggested. The require- aspects of the decommissioning area.

ment on establishment of an ageing management As presented in section 11.4., in September 2018 SSM programme is applicable to all reactors in operation, submitted a government assignment on the national regardless of age. SSM recognizes the fact that the reactors long-term competence supply in the field of radiation were originally designed for an operating time of 40 years, safety to the government. The report to the Government with LTO used as a term to designate operation in excess shows that there are challenges and shortcomings in the of 40 years. Since the last CNS report, SSM has defined a supply of skills in the radiation safety area in Sweden. It position regarding LTO which states that that the main includes several suggestions covering the areas of process for supervision in regards of LTO will be within knowledge management, funding provided to the critical the framework of the PSR reviews. core of research environments, and identification of The licensees have developed overall ageing management education programmes critical importance to society in the programmes (AMP), by compiling information from field of nuclear safety and radiation protection.

already existing programmes, such as maintenance, In addition, recommendations were given to employers and component qualification, in service inspection and to the industry within the field to attract students so that chemistry programmes. These programmes compile a lot they enrol in nuclear safety and radiation protection of experience gained from the operation of the plants as programmes, and to manage research funding to guarantee well as external ageing related experience. that the relevant research environments will be sustained.

To have international experience and aspects included in Since September 2018, some progress has been made and the overall ageing management programmes, all licensees the industry have carried out recruitment campaigns to have made use of the IAEA SALTO or pre-SALTO attract young employees. Additionally, SSM is reforming its reviews, which were important steps in both the technical work to strengthen the national strategic perspective on details of managing ageing issues, as well as a in creating a long-term knowledge management.

18 Summary of the development since last national report

Challenge SE-2017-02: Maintaining and overseeing safety ments to the Act on Nuclear Activities entered into force

culture during the transition from operation to decommis- on 1 August 2017. At the same time, several regulations of

sioning. the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority were amended to

transpose other provisions of the directive. Following the decisions on permanent shutdown of four

reactors, the licensees concerned are facing new tasks to As presented in section 7.2.2 of the report, a major review

take measures and set up strategies in order to ensure that of SSM’s Code of Statues, SSMFS, is under progress. In

safety is maintained throughout the decommissioning May 2018, the first part of the new Code of Statutes,

process. In this respect preservation of safety culture is an concerning nuclear activities, was decided. This part

important aspect, which needs to remain in focus of both (SSMFS 2018:1) includes regulations on basic rules for all

the licensees and the regulatory body, and numerous licensed activities involving ionising radiation. The

activities were started and are currently ongoing. regulations also transpose provisions of Council Directive

2013/59/Euratom, which have not been included in the In order to maintain continuity in the work with, and new Radiation Protection Act. The regulation SSMFS implementation of safety culture throughout the decom- 2018:1 came into force on 1 June 2018 and regulations on missioning process, the licensees developed action plans or nuclear power reactors in operation entered into force 1 special projects. These plans and projects address safety-re- March 2022. lated activities that the management prioritises in order to

maintain, develop and strengthen the safety culture, and to In preparing SSM’s new Code of Statutes, consideration is

ensure that safety and radiation protection standards are also given to all relevant IAEA standards as well as to the

maintained throughout the decommissioning process. WENRA Safety Reference Levels.

Various approaches have been used by the licensees 2.2. Significant changes to the National concerned, including new safety promoting work methods,

experiences exchanges (benchmarks) with other organisa- Nuclear Programme

tions, and projects for preparing for decommissioning.

2.2.1. Licensee

Safety culture workshops and surveys were also performed During the review period two nuclear reactors units at in order to identify and discuss safety culture challenges Ringhals site were permanently shut down. The owners of related to transition to decommissioning. RAB decided in 2015 that operation of Ringhals unit 2

SSM focus areas has been the licensees’ competence would end in 2019 and of Ringhals unit 1 in 2020. In

provision and staffing, considering the challenges the consequence, all major investments for these units were

licensees have in retaining personnel and hiring new staff cancelled, but all necessary measures to maintain safety

now and in the near future. SSM has formed a cross-organ- were taken until they are decommissioned. Ringhals units

isational team to carry out the strengthened supervision, 3 and 4 will remain in operation, with a planned lifespan of

and to ensure that the licensees are continuously followed. 60 years, i.e., into the 2040’s.

One further area that has come into focus is the issue of

2.2.2. Regulatory programme

the relationship between national culture and nuclear safety Pursuant to Government’s authorisation in June 2017, the culture. A Country-specific Safety Culture Forum (CSSCF) Ministry of the Environment and Energy appointed an was developed jointly by the Nuclear Energy Agency inquiry chair to conduct a review of the national nuclear (NEA) and the World Association of Nuclear Operators legislation. Additionally an appointed expert committee (WANO) to provide countries with a forum for dialogue with representatives from the Government offices, and reflection on how national attributes can influence regulatory authorities, the industry and non-governmental nuclear safety culture. SSM was involved in the developorganisations was established to assist the inquiry chair. In ment of this forum and hosted the very first CSSCF in April 2019 the inquiry chair delivered a report (SOU January 2018. Representatives from both the regulator and 2019:16) to the Swedish Government where it is proposed the industry participated in the workshop on national that the current Act on Nuclear Activities will be repealed safety culture. and replaced by a new act with a new structure.

Section 12.2.1 and 12.4.1 contains more details and Most of the substance of the present provisions is description of the activities performed. transferred to the new act, but sometimes with revised

Challenge SE-2017-03: Completion of the remaining language. Some provisions are suggested to be modified

work to update the set of regulations, including considera- and others deleted. A few completely new provisions are

tion of the requirements from EU Directives and also suggested to be added.

WENRA reference levels. A summary of the most important proposals from the

On 15 June 2017, the Swedish Parliament (Riksdagen) inquiry is presented in section 7.1.2.

decided on amendments to the Act on Nuclear Activities

to transpose several important provisions of the Council 2.2.3. Regulatory body

Directive (2014/87/Euratom) amending Directive SSM is currently revising its Code of Statutes related to

2009/71/Euratom establishing a Community framework nuclear activities and radiation protection. Experience has

for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations. The amend- demonstrated the need to clarify and broaden the regula-

Summary of the development since last national report 19

tions in order to create more predictability for the licensees Furthermore, several IAEA SALTO review missions were and to improve the regulatory support. performed in Sweden during the current and previous reporting periods. In December 2017, IAEA performed a The major review of Codes and Statutes, SSMFS, began in pre-SALTO peer review at Oskarshamn NPP for OKG late 2013. In the early stages of the work, a decision in unit 3. In November 2016 and in June 2019 IAEA principle was taken stating that the aspects of radiation performed pre-SALTO reviews at the Forsmark NPP and protection, nuclear safety and security to a greater extent a full scope SALTO peer review mission at Forsmark NPP than previously should be regulated in an integrated in October 2021. In March 2018, an IAEA SALTO peer manner. The new structure that was decided signifies review mission was performed at Ringhals NPP for unit 3, regulation of radiation safety (i.e. radiation protection, and a follow-up mission in September 2020. nuclear safety and security) at nuclear facilities for different phases of a facility’s lifetime and for different main types OKG performed an expert mission(limited SALTO) in of substantive issues (see section 7.2.2). Considering the December 2019 and will perform a pre SALTO mission in relatively large change to structure and content as well as to September 2022. OKG is also planning for both a SALTO the regulatory approach, SSM decided to apply a multi-step and follow up mission in the coming years. process during the development process. Thus, the first The sections 9.2.3.1 and 9.2.3.2 contain more details and parts of the new Code of Statutes entered into force in in description of the activities performed. June 2018, and regulations on nuclear power reactors in operation entered into force 1 March 2022. 2.4. Implementation of Vienna An additional challenge for the regulator was the Government’s decision in August 2017 to relocate SSM’s head- Declaration on Nuclear Safety

quarters from Stockholm to Katrineholm by the end of Since the previous national report a number of safety 2018. Starting from October 2018, SSM has located parts related activities in line with the VDNS principles have of its operations in the new offices. In addition, SSM also been ongoing. The most relevant activities are as follows: opened a branch office in Gothenburg. – The licensees were required to implement an SSM was reorganised during 2021 to increase transparency independent core cooling system (ICCS) at reactors and separation of licencing, supervision and regulation. intended to be operated beyond 2020. The principal design solutions for the ICCS functions are presented in section 18.2.1.6. and installations of the systems are 2.3. IAEA IRRS mission and other IAEA at the time of this reportcompleted. The new systems peer-reviews were taken into operation during the second half of A full-scope IAEA IRRS mission to Sweden was 2020. performed February 2012 and the resulting recommenda- – During this review period, the focus from both the tions have been addressed, on behalf of the Swedish regulatory body and the licensees on the assurance of Government, by SSM in an action plan. A follow-up long-term safety functions and safety barriers through mission took place in April 2016. the introduction of extensive work related to ageing The general conclusion from the 2016 IRRS follow-up issues, has been maintained since the last report. The team was that they were satisfied with the approach of licensees have subsequently updated ageing Sweden to address the findings of the 2012 IRRS mission management programmes to address the impact of and to improve on the regulatory system for nuclear safety. degradations and other ageing related processes on However, two of 22 recommendations originally given by specific safety related components and systems. These the IRRS team were judged still to be open. The two activities also relate to the preparation of LTO at the recommendations refer to: units that will be facing end of their design lifetime, to assure safe continued operation. For this purpose, – Provisions to maintain competence for nuclear safety ageing issues are given considerably increased attention and radiation protection on a national level, and in relation to PSR reporting and review, including – The systematic evaluation of operational experience reporting on matters related to long-term plant safety from non-nuclear facilities and radiation protection status and proof of continued safe operation until the events and activities, including dissemination of all time for the next PSR (see section 14.1.1). significant experience. – Operational procedures and improved guides to handle The work with these recommendations are still ongoing. accidents affecting more than one reactor unit at a site Also, the 2016 IRRS follow-up mission resulted in four have been developed and are in place at all sites. The additional suggestions for Sweden (for more information updates also included improved severe accident see section 8.12). management procedures in line with international standards for such procedures. The work was finished at The Government has officially requested IAEA to carry the end of 2020 in the Swedish NPPs. out the next IRRS mission in Sweden, which is scheduled for 2022.

20 Summary of the development since last national report

2.5. Future activities until the next In order to keep focus on the area of ageing management and LTO, several IAEA SALTO missions has been National Report performed and are scheduled to be performed at Swedish In the upcoming period until preparation of the next NPPs. national report there are a number of activities already Ringhals performed a follow up SALTO mission for ongoing and planned that will be of vital importance for Ringhals 3, also valid for Ringhals 4, in September 2020 further work to ensure that safety and radiation protection and are not planning any further reviews. are properly maintained.

The Act on Nuclear Activities have been updated Forsmark has done a full scope SALTO mission in regarding the responsibility for the final repository for October 2021 for Forsmark 1 and 2 and are planning for a spent fuel and put in force by January 1, 2022. SALTO mission in 2023.

OKG performed an expert mission(limited SALTO) in A major review of SSM’s Code of Statutes, SSMFS, has December 2019 and will perform a pre SALTO mission in been completed (see section 7.2.2). September 2022. OKG are also planning for both a The challenges related to transition from operation to SALTO and follow up mission in the coming years. decommissioning will continue to be in focus for all organisations involved and particularly in the area of Preparation for the next IRRS mission to Sweden, human resources. The changed work load in total with scheduled for 2022, will be a vital part of SSM’s activities lower number of employees and with operation and during the period, requiring extensive efforts and resources decommissioning in parallel, is a challenge for years to prior to the mission.

come for both the licensees and the regulatory body.

Summary of the development since last national report 21

Part I General Provisions 22 22 Part I General Provisions

3. Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

Article 4. Implementing measures

The legislative, regulatory and other measures to fulfil the Each Contracting Party shall take, within the framework of obligations of the Convention in Sweden are accounted its national law, the legislative, regulatory and administrafor in this report. tive measures and other steps necessary for implementing its obligations under this Convention.

Article 5. Reporting

obligations of the Convention’s Articles. Articles 6-8 are Each Contracting Party shall submit for review, prior to structured to enable reporting in a clear and reviewable each meeting referred to in Article 20, a report on the manner. Articles 9-19 have a similar basic structure, where measures it has taken to implement each of the obligainformation is provided about the regulatory requirements tions of this Convention. relating to the corresponding Article and measures taken by the licence holders to comply with the regulatory The present report constitutes the ninth Swedish report requirements. These accounts also include information issued in compliance with Article 5 of the Convention. about the licensees’ own safety initiatives as well as about

regulatory control. In the reporting for Articles 6-19, the present report describes and accounts for Sweden’s compliance with the

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 23

Article 6. Existing nuclear installations

6.1. Significant events since the Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that the safety of nuclear installations existing at the previous national report

time the Convention enters into force for that Contracting During the current review period, no events occurred Party is reviewed as soon as possible. When necessary in indicating a serious degradation of safety and radiation the context of this Convention, the Contracting Party shall protection at Swedish nuclear power plants. An overview ensure that all reasonable practicable improvements are of the most relevant events occurring during the period made as a matter of urgency to upgrade the safety of the 2016–2021 is provided below. nuclear installation. If such upgrading cannot be achieved, plans should be implemented to shut down the nuclear

Ringhals NPP Leakage through the reactor

installation as soon as practically possible. The timing of the

containment liner (R3)

shut-down may take into account the whole energy context and possible alternatives as well as the social, environ- The containment of Ringhals unit 3 is a concrete structure mental and economic impact. with a gastight steel liner covered with concrete on both sides. Hence the condition of the steel liner cannot effortlessly be inspected. Under this article, Sweden provides information about significant events that have occurred at the nuclear power During a containment air test (CAT) in 2016 an inspection plants during the past six years, as well as conclusions was performed in the auxiliary building to look for leakage drawn from these events. Furthermore, information is from the concrete structure of the containment. This provided about performed and planned measures for inspection revealed a leakage through the containment but safety upgrades and power uprates of the reactors. Basic the origin of this leakage could not be determined. Since information about the design of the reactors, safety the CAT showed that the containment leakage was within upgrading already decided, and measures already imple- the specified limits unit 3 was started up. mented, is provided in section 18.2. and Appendix 1. An effort to analyse, assess and to perform corrective actions in order to ensure the integrity of the containment Summary of developments since was initiated after outage 2016. During outages 2017 and 2018 the steel liner in a few selected areas was inspected at the last report by removing the concrete from the inside of the contain- During the current review period, the following development wall. These inspections was carried out with no ments are of relevance with regard to the obligations of anomalies found. During outage 2020 the steel liner in an Article 6: area around the purge air system penetration was – Permanent safety enhancements measures has been inspected. In this area a corroded part of the liner was undertaken with the installation of an independent core detected. The corrosion had caused a hole in the liner of cooling function, designed to fulfill the cooling of the approximately 50 mm diameter. The steel liner was then reactor core in case of extreme events, such as a repaired and the concrete was restored. After the reparacomplete loss of electrical power (for 72 hours) or a tion of the liner a CAT was performed and any leakage to loss of the normal acess to the ultimate heat sink under the auxiliary building could no longer be detected. extreme (beyond design basis external events) which The cause of the corrosion was a piece of wood located at were previously not covered by the safety analyses. the outside of the steel liner. This piece of wood had been – The licensees have finalised implementation of major accidentally forgotten in connection with the concrete power uprating as the remaining part of the uprate casting during the construction of the containment. The programme for nuclear power capacity in Sweden and area in question is judged to have been difficult to visually all the reactors concerned have resumed commercial inspect why the piece of wood could have been missed operations. despite the inspection programs carried out during the

24 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

casting. During outage 2021 additional inspections of the Reactor Hall ceiling. These worked and the alarm was funcsteel liner was performed at similar penetration areas with tioning as expected, (3) Portable air monitoring. These did no anomalies found. The forgotten piece of wood is not alarm because it was too far away from the filter (4) therefore considered to be an isolated case and no further Radiation protection technician with radiation protection inspection are to be performed. instruments. The instrument malfunctioned and showed an incorrect measurement value.

Shielding fuel assembly damaged during handling

The two alarms that worked require staff to respond to the

in fuel pit (R3)

alarm. The work was safely interrupted as soon as possible During transport of a shielding fuel assembly (SFA) in when the alarms were triggered. spent fuel pit during yearly outage 2021 at Ringhals unit 3, the top plate separated from the rest of the fuel assembly Procedural deficiencies: Telescope detector had not been as welds holding the sockets between top plate and fuel functionally checked with respect to the high dose probe, assembly separated. The fuel assembly placed itself on top despite the fact that all other radiation protection instruof the fuel rack and tipped to the side, leaning against the ments are functionally tested before use. This was due to spent fuel pit wall and a spent fuel pit cooling pipe. The lack of high-dose material available for the functional fuel building was evacuated and radiation protection control of the high dose probe. personnel measured the activity in the building, finding Shortcomings in safety culture: It is clear from interviews that the incident had not caused the release of any with staff involved that the working environment has been radioactivity. stressed and error prevention methods have not been The incident did not result in the release of any radio- applied. activity and the integrity of the fuel rods remained intact. Forsmark have implemented corrective actions based on a Neither the spent fuel pit cooling or integrity of the spent Human, Technology, Organisation investigation. fuel pit itself were affected by the fuel rod placing itself against them and remain operable. Root cause analysis 6.2. Safety improvements of nuclear showed that the welds in SFA fuel assemblies were too weak as a result of a design flaw, eventually leading to a power reactors break. The yearly outage was halted until the fuel assembly Comprehensive overviews of plant modifications was moved to a secure position and analyses were complete, performed in the past and implemented during the current resulting in a total unplanned outage extension of 49 days. reporting period are presented in Appendix 1.

Forsmark NPP

The nuclear safety strategy in Sweden is to apply contin- At Forsmark NPP unit 2 on November 29, 2019 after pool uous improvements based on regular and systematic cleaning, the filter in the pool remediation equipment was re-assessments, aiming at ensuring compliance with to be replaced. A total of five people, two reactor hall modern requirements and current design basis. The mechanics, two radiation protection technicians and one strategy also includes identification of further safety cleaning staff participated. Everyone has approved improvements by taking into account ageing issues, radiation protection training and a PJB was conducted operational experience, most recent research and developbefore the work was started. The area was clearly closed ment and developments in international standards. off and two radiation protection technicians were present The Swedish licensee implemented safety measures through throughout the work so that no unauthorized persons relevant modifications and, in some cases, by means of could be in the area. All personnel had electronic dosicomprehensive modernization projects. For example, after meters with preset alarm levels. the accident in Three Mile Island in 1979, severe accident When lifting the filter, the electronic dosimeter began to management systems (including Filtered Containment alarm for the individual who handled the filter, the activity Venting System, FCVS) were introduced at the Swedish alarm in the ceiling of the reactor building began to alarm NPPs. Also, extensive modernization programmes were shortly afterwards. The electronic dosimeter of one of the introduced in 2005 and completed in 2015 for all Swedish radiation protection technicians also began to alarm. These NPPs in order to meet new requirements issued by the alarms safely interrupted the work. regulator in 2004. In summary, the safety measures imple-

The event resulted in a maximum individual dose of 1.7 mented as a result of the new regulations in 2004 mainly mSv, this should be compared to the annual dose limit of included improvements in separation and diversification, as 20 mSv and Forsmark’s planning value of 10 mSv per year. well as enhancing the capability to control conditions that After the event, the individual’s accumulated annual dose is might arise during design basis accidents. Actions have also lower than Forsmark’s planning value. been taken to considerably strengthen the capabilities to operate the plants and monitor the status of the barriers by When considering the number of independent safety introducing new and or upgraded instrumentation and barriers, it is necessary to consider the number of alarms control equipment. and how the staff reacted to the alarms separately. In this case, there were four independent safety barriers; (1) Furthermore, safety improvements have also been identi- Personal electronic dosimeters with preset alarm levels. fied through international reviews such as the EU stress These worked as expected, (2) Installed gamma alarm in test National Action Plan (NacP).

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 25

Following the EU stress test, Sweden developed a National – Extreme external events (including terrorism) beyond Action Plan (NAcP), with the intention to manage all plant the ordinary design base weaknesses identified by the EU stress tests as well as by In addition to the independent core cooling system main other forums such as the second extraordinary meeting function, the system also improves the capability to cool under the Convention on Nuclear Safety. In general, the the spent fuel pool by establishing a feed and boil-off Swedish NAcP required investigations to be performed with cooling function if the ordinary means of cooling the the aim to identify necessary technical and administrative spent fuel pool is lost. Measures have also being taken to measures, how they should be implemented as well as improve the physical separation between the existing appropriate time schedules for the implementation of these redundant spent fuel cooling pumps and seismic reinforcemeasures. All actions resulting from these investigations were ment of the storage racks for the spent fuel elements. successfully completed according to schedule, including the Independent Core Cooling System (ICCS) installations.

Oskarshamn NPP

At Oskarshamn unit 3 a permanent independent core

6.2.1. Independent core cooling system

cooling function, mainly located inside the existing reactor The ICCS is a major safety enhancing technical measure building, has been installed. The function consists of a that was required to be in place by the end of 2020 at all one-train system that provides core cooling water via a new Swedish NPPs in operation. The ICCS provides core penetration through the containment wall, with new cooling that is completely independent from previously isolation valves, and that connects to the existing piping existing core cooling systems in terms of power supply and inside the containment. The capacity is around 120 kg/s in water source. The introduction of the ICCS strengthens order to restore normal water level in the RPV after an reactor capabilities to prevent core damage during a number ADS. The ADS function is enhanced with new logic and of extreme events that were previously not covered by the independent battery power to the blow-down valves. safety analyses. The ICCS is designed to protect the plants during events leading to loss of normal core cooling All electrical equipment that is needed for the ICC functions. Such events for example include failure of all AC function and the reactor protection system is protected voltage, as well as common cause failures in emergency core against all electrical disturbances (including unknown) via cooling functions, which might occur simultaneously due to motor-generator sets that are installed to feed the bus-bars extreme external impact. Examples of design solutions for with power, including the battery packs. The battery packs ICCS functions are given in section 18.2.1.6. have a capacity of 24 hours, after that a dedicated diesel

generator can be started to feed the bus-bars (the DG is

Forsmark NPP

also protected by motor-generator sets). A new ICCS (Independent Core Cooling System) was put The primary water source for the ICC is the central into operation at each one of the three Forsmark reactors handling pool at the reactor service floor. The pools in 2020. The new system is a consequence of the stress (central handling pool, storage pool of the internal parts tests following the Fukushima accident and the SSM and the spent fuel pool) can get make-up water from the requirements for an ICCS, designed to withstand extreme fire extinguishing tanks. This make-up water is provided by external hazards. The power supply is galvanically a two train system. separated from the plant’s regular electrical power system via a motor-generator set. Forsmark units 1 and 2 share the The fire extinguishing tanks can in turn be fed with a same ICCS building and water source. There are, however, two-train system from a fresh-water pond on-site that separate pumps, pipes and valves so that the ICCS function normally holds 120 000 m3. is independent between the units. The ICC-pump is a direct diesel-motor driven pump with Safety improvements have been conducted on Forsmark throttling capablílity, on order to keep normal water level unit 1, 2 and 3 in order to increase the resilience to external in the RPV once it is restored after the ADS. grid disturbances. The improvements includes introduction The two fire extinguishing pumps are also direct dieselof the ICCS, exchange to more resilient components and motor driven. installation of component protection.

If the ICC-pump should be (or become) unavailable, the

Ringhals NPP

fire extinguishing piping is directly connected (with Ringhals has installed an independent core cooling system shut-off valves) to the pressure side of the ICC-pump and (ICCS), contained in a separate hardened building, for can, in that way, feed the RPV with cooling water. Ringhals units 3 and 4 in 2020. The purpose of the ICCS is to provide alternative core cooling if the ordinary safety The pumps providing water from the fresh water pond are systems are unavailable in the event of design extension electrical and have a dedicated diesel generator located conditions (DEC). close to the pumps.

The design events for the independent core cooling The fire extinguishing pumps and piping can also be used system are: for feed-and-bleed of the spent fuel pool. The capacity is enough for both the ICC needs and the cooling of the – Extended Loss of AC Power, ELAP (for 72 hours spent fuel. The bleed-water is brought to the plants outlet

– Loss of Ultimate Heat Sink, LUHS (for 72 hours channel via its own piping.

26 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

All equipment and installations described above have the requiring special attention for the purpose of ensuring that following design events: there is no impact on plant safety. – Extended Loss of AC Power, ELAP (for 72 hours) In its regulatory review of a power uprate application, SSM checks that the licensee is in compliance with all applicable – Extreme (unknown) electrical disturbances safety requirements. In this sense, an application for a – Loss of Ultimate Heat Sink, LUHS (for 72 hours) power uprate comprises an opportunity to revise and verify – Extreme external events beyond the ordinary design the entire safety case. The licensing process in Sweden is bases. described in section 7.3. 6.2.2. Regulatory control Since the previous report, the ongoing power uprate SSM has continuously performed reviews and follow up on processes have developed as follows: the licensee actions concerning the Swedish NAcP. All – Forsmark unit 2 resumed commersial operation at the measures in the NAcP have been completed in accordance new power level in 2020 following completion of with the original given time schedule, meaning that all startup testing in 2012 and with a steady state operation identified measures were fully implemented by the end of at the new maximum power level since 2013. 2020. Of the various actions, the installation of Inde- – Oskarshamn unit 3 got permission for routine operation pendent Core Cooling Systems at all reactors in operation at the new power level in 2019. after 31 December 2020 is the most extensive single measure taken. More details on the progress of the Swedish NAcP are given in Appendix 2. 6.4. Implementation of Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety 6.3. Status of the nuclear power reactors The nuclear safety strategy in Sweden is to apply contin-

Operating licences, which are issued by the Government, uous improvements based on regular and systematic stipulate the highest allowed thermal power level. To re-assessments, aiming at ensuring compliance with modern further increase the power level, the licensee must apply to requirements and current design basis. The strategy also the Government for a new licence in accordance with the includes identification of further safety improvements by Act on Nuclear Activities. taking into account ageing issues, operational experience, most recent research and development and developments in The power uprate programmes in Sweden included major international standards, including the principles defined in power uprates of seven reactors, and a minor power uprate the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety. of one reactor. Several Swedish reactors were uprated in the 1980s, with additional power uprates having been Since the introduction of nuclear power in Sweden implemented over the past twelve years. The levels of extensive safety modifications and modernizations these power uprates are illustrated by figure 4 below. programs at all operation NPP have been introduced. Measure to improve safety include among others, the introduction of severe accident management systems

power uprates in the 1980s power uprates between 2007–2019

30 (including Filtered Containment Venting System, FCVS) in respons to the accident in Three Mile Island in 1979, as well as the most recent completion of the ICCS (see

25

section 6.2).

20

15

Power uprates [%] 10

5

0

Forsmark 1 Forsmark 2 Forsmark 3 Oskarshamn 3 Ringhals 3 Ringhals 4

Figure 4. Power uprate levels of Swedish reactors in operation.

Depending on the magnitude of the power uprate, a power increase can affect the facility in a number of different ways and to a varying degree. Therefore, conditions and parameters that might affect safety must be identified and analysed in order to show that the safety requirements are met. A number of components and systems in the nuclear power plant must be verified as having a capacity corresponding to the higher power level. Consequently, planning as well as reviewing a power uprate are key aspects

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 27

Part II Legislation and regulation 28 Part II Legislation and regulation

Article 7. Legislative and regulatory framework

This part (SSMFS 2018:1) includes regulations on basic 1. Each Contracting Party shall establish and maintain rules for all licensed activities involving ionising legislative and regulatory framework to govern the safety radiation. The regulations also transpose provisions of of nuclear installations. Council Directive 2013/59/Euratom, which have not 2. The legislative and regulatory framework shall provide for: been included in the new Radiation Protection Act. The (i) the establishment of applicable national safety regulation SSMFS 2018:1 came into force on 1 June requirements and regulations; 2018. Key regulations applying to nuclear power (ii) a system of licensing with regard to nuclear installations reactors were issued at the end of 2021 and entered into and the prohibition of the operation of a nuclear installa- force on 1 March 2022.

tion without a licence; – On 1 April 2019, an inquiry chair appointed by the (iii) a system of regulatory inspection and assessement of Government presented a proposal regarding a new Act nuclear installations to ascertain compliance with on Nuclear Activities. This proposal has been submitted applicable regulations and the terms of licences; for a consultation procedure involving authorities, municipalities, licensees and other stakeholders. (iv) the enforcement of applicable regulations and the terms of licences, including suspension, modification or revocation. 7.1. Hierachy of Swedish legislation

and the regulatory framework Summary of developments since the

previous report

During the review period, the following developments are

Parliament Acts

of relevance with regard to the obligations of Article 7:

Legally

– On 15 June 2017, the Swedish Parliament (Riksdag) binding

Government Ordinances

decided on amendments to the Act on Nuclear Activities to transpose several important provisions of the Council Directive (2014/87/Euratom) amending SSM Regulations Directive 2009/71/Euratom establishing a Community framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations.

General advices

The amendments to the Act on Nuclear Activities Not entered into force on 1 August 2017. At the same time,

legally

binding

several regulations of the Swedish Radiation Safety

Guidance

Authority were amended to transpose other provisions of the directive. Figure 5. Hierarchy of Swedish legislation and the regulatory – A new Radiation Protection Act (2018:396) was decided framework. by the Swedish Parliament (Riksdag) on 26 April 2018 and entered into force on 1 June 2018. The new In the Swedish system the parliament decides on acts, the Radiation Protection Act transposes several key government on ordinaces and SSM on more detailed provisions of Council Directive 2013/59/Euratom regulations and guides, see figure 5. Acts, ordinances and laying down basic safety standards for protection against SSM’s regulations are legally binding. General advice is not the dangers arising from exposure to ionising radiation. legally binding per se, but cannot be ignored by the – A major overhaul of SSM’s Code of Statutes, SSMFS, is licensee without risking actions being taken by the regulaunder progress. On 24 May 2018, the first part of the tory body. The general advice belonging to a regulation can new Code, concerning nuclear activities, was decided. be seen as a strong recommendation. Measures should be

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 29

taken according to the general advice or, alternatively, 7.1.2. The Act and Ordinance on Nuclear Activities methods that are deemed as justified, and equivalent from The Act on Nuclear Activities is the basic law regulating a safety point of view, should be implemented. Guidance is nuclear safety. It contains basic provisions concerning safety provided for comprehension of the implications of the in connection with nuclear activities, and applies to the regulations, with explanations and examples of application. operation of nuclear power plants and other nuclear facilities, Guidance is not binding. as well as handling of nuclear material and nuclear waste.

The Act does not contain provisions concerning radiation

7.1.1. Basic nuclear safety and radiation protection

protection and general provisions on environmental

legislation

protection. These areas are regulated by a separate act and The following five enactments constitute the basic nuclear a separate code: the Radiation Protection Act (see section safety and radiation protection legislation in Sweden: 7.1.3) and the Environmental Code (see section 7.1.4). As – The Act on Nuclear Activities (1984:3), far as nuclear activities are concerned, the Radiation

– The Radiation Protection Act (2018:396), Protection Act, the Environmental Code and the Act on – The Environmental Code, Nuclear Activities should be applied in parallel and in close association with each other. – The Act on the Financing of Residual Products from Nuclear Activities (2006:647), and In the Act on Nuclear Activities, nuclear activities are

– The Act on Liability and Compensation for Radiological defined as: Accidents (2010:950). – The construction, possession and operation of a nuclear All acts and the code all supplemented by a number of installation

ordinances and other secondary legislation which contain – Acquisition, possession, transfer, handling, processing, more detailed provisions for particular aspects of the regime. transport or other dealings with nuclear substances and

nuclear waste Operation of a nuclear facility may only be conducted in – Import of nuclear substances and nuclear waste accordance with a licence issued under the Act on Nuclear Activities, as well as with a licence issued under the – Export of nuclear waste.

Environmental Code. The Act on Nuclear Activities The Act on Nuclear Activities contains: mainly concerns issues of safety and security, while the Environmental Code regulates general aspects of the – Basic requirements for nuclear safety, including nuclear environment and the possible impacts of “environmentally security and measures to be taken to prevent unlawful hazardous activities”. Nuclear activities are defined as dealings with nuclear material or nuclear waste. belonging here. – Licensing obligation, licensing requirements, mandate to

The objective of the Radiation Protection Act is to protect decide on licence conditions and conditions for people, animals and the environment from harmful effects revocation of licences.

of radiation. The Act applies to radiation protection in – Provisions on subsidiary responsibility of the state for general and, in this context, provides provisions regarding nuclear activities and ultimate responsibility of the state workers’ protection, radioactive waste management, and for nuclear waste.

the protection of the general public and the environment. – General obligations of the licensees, including requirements for measures to maintain and improve The Act on the Financing of Residual Products from safety, to perform periodic safety reviews (PSR), to Nuclear Activities contains provisions concerning the decommission and dismantle facilities, and to safely future costs of spent fuel disposal, decommissioning of handle and dispose of nuclear waste. reactors, and research in the field of nuclear waste. – Provisions on supervision and mandates of the Financial means for these purposes must be available regulatory authority. when needed. – Provisions on public transparency. The Act on Liability and Compensation for Radiological – Provisions on responsibilities and sanctions. Accidents implements Sweden’s obligations as a party to the 1960 Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the On 15 June 2017, the Swedish Parliament decided on Field of Nuclear Energy, and the 1963 Brussels Conven- amendments to the Act on Nuclear Activities to transpose tion Supplementary to the Paris Convention. several important provisions of the Council Directive

(2014/87/Euratom) amending Directive 2009/71/ Other relevant acts are the Act on Control of Export of Euratom establishing a Community framework for the Dual-Use Products and Technical Assistance (2000:1064) nuclear safety of nuclear installations. The amendments to and the Act on Inspections According to International the Act on Nuclear Activities entered into force on 1 Agreements on Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons August 2017. These included the Article 8a, paragraphs (a) (2000:140). Emergency preparedness matters are regulated and (b) of the directive, which correspond to safety by the Civil Protection Act (2003:778) and Ordinance objectives according to the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear (2003:789). Safety. These new provisions in the Act on Nuclear Activities concern not only existing Swedish nuclear power reactors, but also any new reactors that might be built.

30 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

The Ordinance on Nuclear Activities (1984:14) contains in the act. Moreover, the inquiry proposes introduction of

detailed provisions on matters including definitions, provisions clarifying that the long-term responsibility for a

applications for licences, reviews, evaluations and inspec- geological repository for spent nuclear fuel or radioactive

tions. The Ordinance also specifies that the regulatory waste, once it has been sealed, shall rest with the state

authority is authorised to impose licence conditions and to (ultimate responsibility of the state).

issue general regulations concerning measures to maintain

the safety of nuclear activities. Permanently closed nuclear power reactors:

The inquiry proposes introduction of an obligation Pursuant to the Government’s authorisation granted in requiring the licence holder to notify the authorities when a June 2017, the head of the Ministry of the Environment decision has been made to permanently shut down a and Energy appointed an inquiry chair to conduct a review nuclear power reactor. A formal notification should also be of national nuclear legislation. The Government also made when all nuclear fuel (nuclear material under appointed an expert committee with representatives from safeguards) has been removed from the permanently shut the Government offices, regulatory authorities, the industry down nuclear power reactor. and non-governmental organisations, to assist the inquiry

chair. On 1 April 2019, the inquiry chair delivered a report

Nuclear waste:

(SOU 2019:16) to the Swedish Government. In this report, The inquiry proposes harmonisation of the concept of it is proposed that the present Act on Nuclear Activities nuclear waste with the definition of radioactive waste should be repealed and replaced by a new act having a new contained in the Radiation Protection Act. Thus, nuclear structure. waste becomes a subset of what is defined as radioactive

Most of the substance of the present provisions is trans- waste. Furthermore, the inquiry proposes a change to the

ferred to the proposed new act, though occasionally using provisions regarding special permits for the disposal of

revised wording. Some provisions have been modified and foreign nuclear waste in Sweden and for the final disposal

others removed. A small number of entirely new provisions of Swedish nuclear waste abroad. In general, “special

have also been added to the proposed legislation. reasons” for these permits should be the requirement, and

not “exceptional reasons”, as is the case today. However, A summary of key proposals made by the inquiry is this does not entail any practical change in the basis for the presented below. assessment or the grounds for granting such permits, since

that which has been termed “exceptional reasons” rather

The responsibilities of licence holders

constitutes “special reasons”.

and operators are clarified:

The inquiry proposes clarification of the operator’s

Research and development responsibility

long-term responsibility, including the financial responsibility

for waste management:

for the decommission of closed facilities and the manage- The inquiry proposes amending the current requirement ment and disposal of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste, of the Act on Nuclear Activities to imply that a licence and the licence holder’s responsibility for the safety of holder of a nuclear power reactor is responsible for setting nuclear facilities and activities, i.e. that a nuclear facility is up a comprehensive research and development programme designed, sited, constructed, commissioned, operated and as needed for the safe management and disposal of spent decommissioned in a safe way, as well as the responsibility nuclear fuel and radioactive waste, including building for safe management of nuclear material or radioactive waste necessary waste management facilities and repositories. resting with the licence holder. The proposal also clarifies Furthermore, the inquiry proposes that the programme that delegation of licensee responsibility is not allowed. should only cover parts of the planned system for waste

disposal for which a licence has not been granted. This

A formal stepwise licensing process is introduced:

means that the obligations only covers the parts of the The inquiry proposes that a stepwise process for the waste system for which a solution is yet to be realised. licensing of nuclear operations or facilities are to be Dismantling of closed nuclear facilities should be encomintroduced in the new act. Up until now, the stepwise passed only to the extent that this relates to existing or licensing process has had its legal basis in the licence planned repositories. conditions stipulated by the licensing authority (the

Government). The licence conditions usually state that the

Decommissioning and dismantling of nuclear facilities:

licensee is not allowed to begin construction, commence The inquiry proposes amending the Environmental test operation, or commercially operate the nuclear facility Assessment Ordinance (2013:251) to imply that a renewed or begin decommissioning activities until the regulatory licensing process, including an environmental impact authority has given its approval. assessment, for decommissioning of a nuclear power

reactor would apply as of the time when dismantling and

Subsidiary responsibility and ultimate

demolition activities commence. The assessment should

responsibility of the state:

focus on the environmental effects that the new activities, The inquiry proposes that the state’s subsidiary responsii.e. dismantling and demolition, entail. Activities performed bility for nuclear activities, which ensues from international under the existing licence, e.g. management of operational commitments and which has been confirmed by the wastes and spent nuclear fuel, do not need to be subject to Swedish parliament and government, should be laid down new review and approval.

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 31

The inquiry proposes that a facility that has been released The Ordinance on Radiation Protection (2018:506) in accordance with the requirements of the Radiation contains detailed information on dose limits for ionising Protection Act ceases to be classified as nuclear facility. radiation activities. The Ordinance also contains detailed provisions pursuant to authorisation under the Radiation The proposal regarding a new Act on Nuclear Activities Protection Act. It stipulates that the regulatory authority with the appurtenant ordinance has been submitted for assigned by the Government may issue regulations consultation with government agencies, municipal authoriregarding further provisions concerning general obligaties, licensees and other stakeholders. tions, radioactive waste and prohibitions against activities The proposals regarding subsidiary responsibility and with certain materials, etc. The Ordinance also stipulates ultimate responsibility of the state were implemented in that certain provisions in the Act do not apply to very the autumn of 2020. The rest of the proposals are still low-level radioactive materials and technical equipment handled in the Government Offices. emitting only low-level radiation (exemption). The

regulatory authority may also issue regulations concerning 7.1.3. The Radiation Protection Act and Ordinance the release of very low-level radioactive material.

Requirements for radiation protection are set out in the Radiation Protection Act and Radiation Protection 7.1.4. The Environmental Code Ordinance. The purpose of the legislation is to protect The objective of the Environmental Code is to promote people, animals and the environment against harmful sustainable development and thereby ensure a healthy effects of radiation. environment for current and future generations.

The Act applies to all activities involving radiation. These The Code includes general provisions on environmental are defined as including all activities involving radioactive protection. The Code is applicable to nuclear activities and substances or technical devices capable of generating activities involving radiation and must be applied in radiation. Consequently, the Act applies to radiation from parallel with the Act on Nuclear Activities and the nuclear activities and to harmful radiation, ionising as well Radiation Protection Act. The Code is supplemented by a as non-ionising, from any other source (medical, industrial, number of ordinances. These are laid down by the research, consumer product and NORM). As far as nuclear Swedish Government. installations are concerned, this Act and the Act on In the Code, environmentally hazardous activities are Nuclear Activities are applied in parallel. defined as: A new Radiation Protection Act (2018:396) was decided by – the discharge of wastewater, solid matter or gas from the Swedish Parliament on 26 April 2018, entering into land, buildings or structures onto land or into water force on 1 June 2018. The new Radiation Protection Act areas or groundwater, transposes several key provisions of Council Directive 2013/59/Euratom laying down basic safety standards for – any use of land, buildings or structures that entails a risk protection against the dangers arising from exposure to detrimental to human health or the environment due to ionising radiation. discharges or emissions other than those referred to above, or to pollution of land, air, water areas or The Radiation Protection Act contains: groundwater, or

– Basic provisions on protection against ionising – ny use of land, buildings or structures that may be radiation, including issues of justification, optimisation, detrimental to the surroundings due to noise, vibration, dose limits, waste, releases and environmental light, ionising or non-ionising radiation or similar protection. impact.

– Obligations for licensees, regulating areas such as The Environmental Code contains general rules of precautionary measures, knowledge management, and consideration. These are several important principles that financial, administrative and human resources. must be complied with by a licensee, e.g: – Prohibition on employing anyone below 18 years of age. – The knowledge principle means that the implementer – Provisions on medical examinations, notification of must possess the knowledge that is necessary regarding pregnancy and breastfeeding. the nature and scope of the activity to protect human – Provisions on providing information concerning tasks health and the environment against damage or in radiological emergency situations and voluntary work detriment. for their implementation, in addition to surveillance and – The precautionary and BAT (Best Available Technique) protective devices. principles mean that the implementer shall put into – Provisions relating to radioactive waste management, and practice protective measures, comply with restrictions, measures for clearance of building structures and areas. and take any other precautions that are necessary in – Licensing obligation, licensing requirements, mandate to order to prevent, hinder or combat damage or detriment decide on license conditions and conditions for to human health or the environment as a result of the revocation of licenses. activity. For the same reason, the best possible – Provisions on supervision and mandates of the technology shall be used in connection with regulatory authority. professional activities. – Provisions on responsibilities and sanctions.

32 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

– The most suitable site principle means that as regards means that, with some exceptions, they have the right to

activities for which land or water areas are used, a tell, for example, the media about matters that would

suitable site shall be selected while taking into account otherwise be secret without punishment and without the

the goals of the Environmental Code. Sites for activities employer discovering who provided the information.

must always be chosen in such a way as to make it

possible to achieve their purpose with a minimum of 7.2. National safety and radiation damage or detriment to human health and the environment. protection regulations

– The after-treatment liability principle means that

7.2.1. SSM’s nuclear safety and radiation

everyone who has pursued an activity that causes

protection regulations

damage or is detrimental to the environment shall be With reference to its legal mandate SSM issues legally responsible for restoring it to the extent deemed binding safety and radiation protection regulations for reasonable. An individual who is liable for afternuclear facilities in its Code of Statutes, SSMFS. General treatment shall carry out or pay for any after-treatment advice provides interpretation of the regulations, in addition measures necessary. to guidance on understanding the meaning of the regula-

The general rules of consideration function as a preventive tions, including explanations and examples of application.

tool and follow the principle that the economic risks of See also figure 5 in the introduction to section 7.1.

environmental impact should be borne by the polluter and SSM’s regulations also implement binding EU legislation not by the environment. and international obligations. In preparing SSM’s regula-

According to the Environmental Code, a permit is required tions, consideration is given to IAEA safety standards,

for environmentally hazardous activities. The Government WENRA Safety Reference Levels (RL) and other WENRA

has in the Environmental Assessment Ordinance (2013:251) reports as well as other relevant international recommenda-

stipulated that facilities for the treatment, storage or tions. SSM’s regulations are issued in accordance with an

disposal of spent fuel, nuclear waste or radioactive waste established management procedure which stipulates

need a permit. A permit is also needed for the decommis- technical and legal reviews of draft versions. In accordance

sioning of nuclear reactors. The Land and Environmental with governmental rules, consultation with government

Court is the court of first instance for the hearing of cases authorities, licensees, various interested parties is required

concerning such activities. In addition, the Government before new regulations are issued.

must consider the permissibility of nuclear activities, e.g. the SSM’s Code of Statutes (SSMFS) currently (February 2022) disposal of spent fuel and radioactive waste. The system for contains 15 parts regarding nuclear safety, nuclear security licensing is further described in section 7.3. and radiation protection.

7.1.5. The principle of Public access

7.2.2. Major revision of the Code of Statutes, SSMFS

(Open government)

SSM is currently revising its Code of Statutes relating to To guarantee transparency, the principles of public access to nuclear activities and radiation protection. Experience has official documents are enshrined in one of the fundamental demonstrated the need to clarify and broaden the regulalaws, Chapters 2 and 3 of the Freedom of the Press Act. tions in order to create more predictability for the licensees

“To encourage the free exchange of opinion and availa- and to improve the regulatory support. Another reason for

bility of comprehensive information, every Swedish citizen this revision is the IRRS mission report to Sweden in

shall be entitled to have free access to official documents.” spring 2012, which concluded that Swedish regulations for

(Chapter 2, Article 1, Freedom of the Press Act) nuclear facilities have, historically, emerged as the need for

regulation arose. The report also notes that the IAEA’s The principle of public access entitles the general public to safety standards were used as the basis for the Swedish access official documents submitted to or drawn up by the nuclear safety rules, or referenced therein, but not in a authorities. Anyone may avail him/herself of this possisystematic way. Therefore, the report recommended that bility whenever they wish. Documents that are received or SSM review the existing regulatory framework and make it sent out by the Government Offices and other governclearer, more consistent and comprehensive. Moreover, the ment agencies, e.g. letters, decisions and inquiries, usually Swedish Government has, through appropriation direcconstitute official documents. As a general rule, all tions, ordered SSM in 2012 and 2013 to review the incoming documents should be registered by the receiving regulations concerning nuclear power reactors, to ensure authority. Notes and draft decisions are not normally that appropriate requirements were in place for potential classified as official documents. new nuclear power plants, taking into account the experi-

If a member of the public wants to know what documents ences of events and accidents that have occurred and new

are held by a government agency or wants to get hold of international safety standards.

them, this person should contact the agency in question. Against this background, a major and thorough review of

The principle of public access also means that officials and the Codesof Statutes, SSMFS, began in late 2013. In the

others working for central government, municipalities and early stage of the work, a decision in principle was taken

county councils have freedom of communication. This stating that the aspects of radiation protection, nuclear

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 33

Traditional way of regulating in Sweden

Non-proliferation

Nuclear safety Radiation protection Nuclear security

control

Design and construction X X X X

Analysis and assessment X X X X

Operation X X X X regulation New integrated Decommissioning X X X X

Figure 6. Different approaches to regulation of various aspects.

safety and security, to a greater extent than previously, Considering the relatively large change to the structure and should be regulated in an integrated manner and in the content as well as to the regulatory approach that these contexts where these aspects are concerned, and not in new regulations were expected to introduce in relation to separate regulations. See also figure 6. The objectives are to today’s situation, it was obvious that extensive interaction establish an improved and more transparent and consistent with concerned parties would be needed before new set of requirements, give a more logical structure, and to regulations could be issued. SSM therefore decided to improve the preconditions for more integrated regulatory apply a multi-step process during the development process. supervision. In order to achieve this aim, it was decided to Hence, all the proposed regulations and associated general define a collective term that encompasses “nuclear safety”, advice produced as part of this project have to go through including “security” (in accordance with the Act on several steps of review and consultation: Nuclear Activities) and “radiation protection”. The term 1. An initial internal consultation procedure within SSM; “radiation safety” (strålsäkerhet in Swedish) was therefore 2. A preliminary consultation procedure with relevant defined accordingly. licensees; The new structure that was decided signifies regulation of 3. A second internal consultation procedure within SSM in radiation safety at nuclear facilities for different phases of a parallell with a second preliminary consultation facility’s lifetime and for different main types of substanprocedure with relevant licensees. At this stage SSM also tive issues. Moreover, this regulation is to encompass three requests input to the impact assessments, from levels, namely: concerned licensees; and

1. The first level represents requirements that are 4. A formal external consultation procedure with relevant applicable to all licensed activities involving ionising licensees, in addition to a number of Swedish public radiation; authorities and other organisations, including NGOs. In 2. The second level is facility/activity-specific addition, the proposals will be published as draft requirements; and documents on SSM’s website to enable interested parties in the public to submit their comments. This last 3. The third level consists of requirements applying to consultation procedure will also have an attached report specific aspects of radiation safety. on the impact of the new regulations on the facilities This structure is also illustrated schematically in figure 7 and activities in question. below.

The first parts of the new Code of Statutes were finalised, issued and entered into force in June 2018. Key regulations

The

Acts parliament applying to nuclear power reactors were issued at the end of 2021 and will enter into force on 1 March 2022. The

Ordinances The

government remaining parts of the new Code of Statutes are expected to be completed and enter into force in 2024.

Regulations with

1 basic provisions for all

Level

activities involving ionising

radiation that are licensed

Facility/activity specific 7.3. System of licensing

regulations

Level 2 Design, safety assessment and

operation of NPP and other nuclear SSM Licensing of nuclear activities is governed by several acts

Increasing levels of detail facilities

having different purposes. This also involves a number Regulation of specific aspects of radiation safety of authorities. A general permissibility consideration has

Pressurized components

to be made as to whether or not to grant permission for

Level 3 Reactor containment, other building structures

Lifting equipment

Information security an activity. Furthermore, a nuclear activity must be

Management of nuclear waste

approved in accordance with aspects of nuclear safety and radiation protection to ensure the protection of Figure 7. Schematic illustration of the structure of radiation safety human health and the environment. Lastly, licensing regulations.

34 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

Applicant

Prepares and submits a licence application in accordance with the Environmental Code and the

Act on Nuclear Activities.

Land and Environmental Court Swedish Radiation Safety Authority

Processes the matter in accordance Processes matter under the Act on Nuclear

with the Environmental Code, holds Activities; statement of its views.

main hearing. Examination under the Coordination Code; issues statement of its views.

Swedish Government

Grants approval Issues licence

under the Swedish under the act on Municipal authority Environmental Nuclear Activities;

The municipal council approves Code. decides on licence

or rejetcts the activity. conditions.

Environmental court Swedish Radiation Safety Authority

Holds new main hearing. Issues Decides on any additional conditions under

licence and conditions under the the Act on Nuclear Activities and Radiation

Environmental Code. Protection Act; also, examination in

accordance with the Government’s licence

conditions.

Figure 8. Schematic illustration of the licensing process for a new nuclear facility.

conditions are issued under the various acts by the and private projects on the environment. An EIA is to be

authorities responsible. submitted together with an application for permission to

conduct environmentally hazardous activities. An EIA

New nuclear facilities and major modifications of existing must also be submitted in connection with the future

facilities that are subject to authorisation must be consid- decommissioning of nuclear facilities.

ered under both the Act on Nuclear Activities and the If an activity is likely to have a significant environmental Environmental Code. As stipulated by the procedure for impact in another country, the authority responsible, as applications, a licence application must be submitted to the designated by the Government, must inform the authority Swedish Radiation Safety Authority, which processes the responsible in the possibly affected country about the matter under the Act on Nuclear Activities, and to the planned activity. This requirement is intended to give the Land and the Environment Court, which processes the country concerned and the citizens who are affected the case under the Environmental Code. Applications are to be opportunity to take part in a consultation procedure accompanied by an Environmental Impact Assessment concerning the application and the environmental impact under Chapter 6 of the Environmental Code. Figure 8 assessment. Another requirement is providing this kind of below is a schematic illustration of the licensing process information when so requested by another country that is for construction of a new nuclear facility. The figure likely to be exposed to a significant environmental impact. depicts how related review and licensing tasks are assigned.

7.3.2. Permissibility, licensing approval and

7.3.1. Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)

step-wise review process

and consultation with other countries

According to the Environmental Code, as a step of the During the licensing process, an important instrument is licensing process, the Government is to consider the the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). Swedish permissibility of certain activities, such as represented by EIA legislation is in accordance with Directive2011/92/ facilities for nuclear activities under the Act on Nuclear EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 Activities. An environmental impact statement must be December 2011, amended by Directive 2014/52/EU of submitted for the permissibility assessment. The Land and the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April Environment Court reviews an application for permissi- 2014, on the assessment of the effects of certain public

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 35

bility, which is thereafter forwarded to the Government for It should be noted that for all nuclear power reactors in final consideration. The Government may decide on the operation in Sweden, the operating licence are granted with permissibility only if the municipal council concerned an indefinite term. This means that the operation of a agrees that the planned activities may be sited in the nuclear power reactor is allowed as long as the licensee municipality (municipal veto). meets the requirements set by the applicable laws, government ordinances, regulation of the nuclear regulatory If the Government grants permissibility as per the authority, and conditions imposed to the initial licence. Environmental Code, licensing approval needs to be issued for the nuclear activity according to the Act on Nuclear

7.3.3. Legal provisions to prevent the operation

Activities, and for the environmentally hazardous activity

of a nuclear installation without a valid licence

according to the Environmental Code. The Government All activities involving nuclear installations require a ultimately grants a possible licence in accordance with the licence. As mentioned in the introduction to section 7.3, Act on Nuclear Activities. licensing of nuclear activities is governed by several acts The application is reviewed by the regulatory authority having different purposes, and involves a number of assigned by the Government (i.e. SSM) and forwarded government authorities. A general permissibility considerathereafter for a Government decision. A licence under the tion has to be made as to whether or not to grant permis- Radiation Protection Act is not required for activities sion for an activity. Furthermore, a nuclear activity must be encompassed by the Act on Nuclear Activities. Following a approved in accordance with aspects of nuclear safety and Government permissibility decision, the Land and radiation protection to ensure the protection of human Environment Court grants a possible licence and issues health and the environment. conditions imposed on environmentally hazardous A licence to conduct nuclear activities may be revoked by activities under the Environmental Code. The Land and the authority issuing the permit in cases where: Environment Court’s judgement when granting permission for an activity may include provisions concerning super- – Conditions or regulations have not been complied with vision, inspections and checks, the safety and technical in some essential respect; design of the activity, and conditions that are necessary to – The licensee has not fulfilled its obligations concerning prevent or limit any harmful or other detrimental impact. research and development work on waste management and decommissioning, and there are very specific It should be noted that the preparation and review of an reasons from the viewpoint of safety to revoke the application, as well as the issuing of a licence and condilicence; or tions, take place in open court hearings at the Land and Environment Court. At these hearings, all interested – There are any other very specific reasons for revocation, parties may attend and comment, including the relevant from the viewpoint of safety.

authorities. The applicant must verbally describe all This means that revocation of a licence may be decided in relevant aspects of its case. Questions may be submitted cases of severe misconduct by the operator, or otherwise during the proceedings. for exceptional safety reasons. If the licence to operate a In a case where SSM approves the application and nuclear power plant is revoked, the licence holder remains proposes that the Government grant the licence under the responsible for waste management and decommissioning. Act on Nuclear Activities, SSM must in these matters also According to Section 18 of the Act on Nuclear Activities, propose that the Government take a decision on licence the regulatory authority (SSM) may decide on the measures conditions enabling a continued step-wise review process that are needed, including prohibitions in individual cases, until such date that the planned facility may begin regular for compliance with the Act, or regulations issued or operation. conditions granted under the Act. As regards nuclear facilities, depending on the type of Furthermore, according to Section 25 of the Act on matter, one or more of the following licence conditions are Nuclear Activities, anyone without permission who to be proposed: intentionally or negligently is engaged in nuclear activities – The facility may not commence construction prior to shall be imposed a fine or imprisonment not exceeding two approval by SSM. years.

– The facility may not commence test operation (commissioning) prior to approval by SSM. 7.4. EU legislation – The facility may not commence regular operation prior to approval by SSM. 7.4.1. The European Nuclear Safety Directive On 25 June 2009, Council Directive 2009/71/Euratom Based on these licence conditions, a step-wise review was adopted establishing a Community framework for the process then follows, where SSM decides at each stage if nuclear safety of nuclear installations in the Member States. the licensee is allowed to proceed to the next step. As On 8 July 2014, an amended Nuclear Safety Directive was mentioned in section 7.1.2, this process involving step-wise adopted by the Council, the Council Directive 2014/87/ reviews is now proposed to be regulated by the Act on Euratom of 8 July 2014. Nuclear Activities.

36 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

The amended directive introduces nuclear safety objectives patients against the dangers arising from ionising radiation comparable to the nuclear safety objectives included in the (EU BSS). The new directive also strengthens requirements Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety, which aims to limit for emergency preparedness and response. the consequences of a potential nuclear accident while also The aim of the EU BSS basic safety standards is to ensure: addressing the safety of the entire lifecycle of nuclear installations (siting, design, construction, commissioning, – Protection of workers exposed to ionising radiation, operation and decommissioning of nuclear power plants), such as workers in the nuclear industry and other including on-site emergency preparedness and response. industrial applications, medical staff, and those working

in places with indoor radon or in activities involving The amended directive further strengthens the role and the naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM) independence in regulatory decision-making of the – Protection of members of the public, for example from national regulatory authorities, and enhances transparency radon in buildings in nuclear safety matters. Also, the provisions on the information to be provided to the general public are now – Protection of medical patients, for example by avoiding more specific. As the consequences of a nuclear accident accidents in radio-diagnosis and radiotherapy

may cross national borders, close cooperation, coordina- – More stringent regulation of emergency preparedness tion and information exchange between regulatory and response, incorporating lessons learnt from the authorities of member states in the vicinity of a nuclear Fukushima accident.

installation are encouraged by the amended directive. The The directive incorporates recommendations from the amended directive also introduced a new concept for International Commission on Radiological Protection exchange of experiences through its provisions on topical (ICRP) published in 2007, and harmonises the EU regime peer reviews. Starting in 2017, these are to be performed with the requirements of the Basic Safety Standards of the on the nuclear installations at least every sixth year. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

7.4.1.1. Implementation of the amended nuclear safety

directive in the national regulatory framework 7.4.2.1. Implementation of basic safety standards for

protection against the dangers arising from exposure

On 15 June 2017, the Swedish Parliament decided on

to ionising radiation

amendments to the Act on Nuclear Activities to transpose The main transposition in Sweden of Directive 2013/59/ several important provisions of the Council Directive Euratom has been implemented in the form of additions (2014/87/Euratom) amending Directive 2009/71/ to the amended Radiation Protection Act (2018:396) and Euratom establishing a Community framework for the its appurtenant ordinance (2018:506), together with SSM’s nuclear safety of nuclear installations. The amendments to regulations (SSMFS 2018:1) on basic rules for all licensed the Act on Nuclear Activities entered into force on 1 activities involving ionising radiation, which all entered into August 2017. This included the Article 8a, paragraphs (a) force on 1 June 2018. In addition, five other acts as well as and (b) of the directive, which correspond to safety several ordinances and authority regulations have been objectives as per the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety. amended to fully transpose provisions of the Directive These new provisions in the Act on Nuclear Activities 2013/59/Euratom in Sweden. These amendments also apply both to existing Swedish nuclear power reactors and entered into force on 1 June 2018. to any new reactors that might be built.

The changes to the Act also clarified licensee responsibility as well as the requirements for continuous analysis and 7.5. Enforcement of applicable

assessment of safety at facilities. regulations and terms of licences

Changes to existing SSM regulations have also been made 7.5.1. Powers for legal actions and enforcement for transposition of the safety provisions of the Directive measures available to the regulatory body 2014/87/Euratom that are not regulated by the amended SSM has a strong mandate as a regulatory body. According Act on Nuclear Activities or which, through previous to the Act on Nuclear Activities, SSM may, during the term readings, were not encompassed sufficiently by the of validity of a licence, decide that certain conditions are regulations. These amendments were decided on 15 June necessary to ensure safety. SSM may also decide that 2017 and concerned SSM’s regulations (SSMFS 2008:1) on additional measures are necessary, and issue orders and safety in nuclear facilities, and the regulations (SSMFS prohibitions to the licensee to ensure that the Act, or 2014:2) on preparedness at nuclear facilities. The amended regulations or conditions issued under the Act, are regulations entered into force on 1 August 2017. observed.

A licence may be revoked for activities that do not fulfil

7.4.2. European basic safety standards for

the obligations set out in the legislation. If there is an

protection against the dangers arising from

ongoing licensed activity that does not comply with

exposure to ionising radiation

regulations or the terms of the licence, the supervisory On 5 December 2013, Council Directive 2013/59/ authorities may issue any injunctions and prohibitions Euratom was adopted, establishing a set of basic safety required in the specific case to ensure compliance. standards to protect workers, members of the public and

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 37

Injunctions or prohibitions issued under the acts may carry In various cases, decisions issued by the Land and Envicontingent fines. If a person fails to carry out a measure ronment Court or by government authorities may be incumbent upon him or her under the acts, ordinances, or appealed not only by the party concerned, but also by regulations or conditions issued pursuant to the acts, or environmental organisations and non-governmental under SSM’s injunction, SSM may arrange for the measure organisations (which have existed for at least three years to be taken at this person’s own expense. and have a minimum of 100 members). The Act on Nuclear Activities also contains provisions A decision by the Government on permissibility under the regulating areas such as safeguards and sanctions. Anyone Environmental Code (see section 7.1.4) and a licence who conducts nuclear activities without possessing a granted under the Act on Nuclear Activities (see section licence, or disregards conditions or regulations, shall be 7.1.2) cannot be appealed. Under certain conditions, the sentenced to pay a fine, or to imprisonment for a maximum Supreme Administrative Court might examine whether a of two years. Such cases are submitted to a prosecutor and decision by the Government is in contravention of any rule it is not SSM who decides on a sanction or penalty. If the of law. This does not imply an examination of the case in offence is intentional and aggravated, the individual shall be substance, but rather to ascertain whether the decision have sentenced to imprisonment for a minimum of six months been taken according to the correct procedures. or a maximum of four years. Liability shall not be adjudged To ensure that necessary information in relation to the if responsibility for the offence may be assigned under the nuclear safety of nuclear installations and its regulation is Penal Code or the Act on Penalties for Smuggling made available to workers and the general public, all (2000:1225), or if the offence is trivial. reports issued by SSM are publicly available and the SSM SSM has a similar mandate as per the Radiation Protection website is used to provide information on current events Act to decide whether additional measures are necessary, and Authority decisions in accordance with the SSM and to issue orders and prohibitions to the licensee to communication policy. In addition, the licensees provides ensure compliance with the Act, or with regulations or information to their employees through working meetings, conditions issued under the Act. intranets and internal information meetings, and to the public through their websites and public media. In specific According to the provisions of both the Act on Nuclear cases, licensees may also host public information meetings. Activities and Radiation Protection Act, the police authority shall, if necessary, provide the assistance needed Furthermore, according to the Act on Nuclear Activities, a for SSM’s supervision. licensee is liable to provide local safety boards, as appointed by the Government, with insight into the safety and SSM has access to a variety of measures that can be used radiation protection work at the facility. The insight shall to remedy a non-compliance situation. SSM’s management enable the board to obtain information about the safety and system provides guidance on how different measures radiation protection work that has been conducted or is should be used (see further description in 8.8). being planned at the facility and to compile material in order to inform the general public about this work. 7.6. Regulatory supervision 7.8. The WENRA Reactor SSM’s regulatory activities relating to inspection and assessment are reported under “Article 8, Regulatory Harmonisation Project Body”. An overview of SSM’s supervision with regard to the safety of nuclear installations and supervisory As a member of WENRA, SSM participates in the programme is contained in section 8.10. development of the WENRA safety reference levels for existing nuclear power reactors (SRLs). The SRLs reports were issued in 2006 and updated in January 2008, 7.7. Openness and transparency September 2014 and March 2020 (issued February 2021). In line with the Aarhus Convention, Sweden’s legal The 2020 SRLs include new issues such as internal hazards framework contains provisions regulating access to and external hazards. WENRA reports are available on the information, public participation in decision making, and WENRA website (www.wenra.org). access to justice. The 2020 SRLs are based on latest available knowledge and The Swedish Constitution also contains provisions experience and takes into account the lessons learned from regulating public access to official records as described in the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power section 7.1.5. Plant, including the insight from the EU stress tests, the reviews of the IAEA safety requirements as well as the Under EIA provisions, the public is also guaranteed opporconclusions from the 2nd Extraordinary Meeting of the tunities to gain access to information and to submit their Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety. opinions on planned activities and facilities for which Prior to finalisation of updated versions, WENRA makes permission is sought. These provisions require consultathe reference levels available for stakeholder consultation. tion (in addition to that conducted between municipalities and authorities) with the public concerned and with WENRA members are currently working on a pilot study environmental organisations. regarding member countries’ implementation of SRLat

38 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

their nuclear power plants. Technical specifications for the These provisions of the Directive have been transposed coming ENSREG Topical Peer Reviiew regarding Fire into the Swedish Act on Nuclear Activities, which means Safety, as well as the preparation for the 2024 SRLs that the first and second principles in the Vienna Declararevision programme. Furthermore, during this review tion on Nuclear Safety are considered in the act. These period WENRA has published a number of reports, new provisions in the Act on Nuclear Activities concern guidance, position papers and recommendations, including both existing nuclear power reactors and new nuclear guidance documents on different initiating events power reactors. connected to issue TU (Externa Hazards) , reports Section 7.2.2 describes how Sweden implements the third regarding applicability of the Safety Objectives to SMRs principle of the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety in and Practical Elimination Applied to New NPP Designs, the form of SSM’s ongoing comprehensive review of its which provide a common understanding of the approach Code of Statutes, and which shall ensure that IAEA Safety to demonstrate the avoidance of early releases and large Standards are more systematically referenced and used as a releases by using the notion of practical elimination. basis for the regulations governing safety, security and In preparing SSM’s new Code of Statutes, consideration radiation protection at nuclear facilities. has been given to the WENRA Safety Reference Levels as well as other WENRA reports.

7.9. Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety

Article 8a, paragraphs (a) and (b) of Directive 2009/71/ Euratom, are corresponding to the first and second principles under the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety.

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 39

Article 8. Regulatory Body

In connection with the decision to relocate parts of the 1. Each Contracting Party shall establish or designate a Authority to Katrineholm, the Government also decided regulatory body entrusted with the implementation of the that the Authority’s tasks concerning the Nuclear Waste legislative and regulatory framework referred to in Article Fund and control function in nuclear waste financing 7, and provided with adequate authority, competence and would be transferred to the National Debt Office by 1 financial and human resources to fulfil its assigned responsibilities. December 2018 at the latest. The transfer of these tasks

was completed by 1 September 2018. Nevertheless, SSM 2. Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps has the task of providing assistance on the information to ensure an effective separation between the functions and analyses within its area of responsibility which are of the regulatory body and those of any other body or needed by the Debt Office for performance of its tasks. organisation concerned with the promotion or utilization

of nuclear energy. SSM launched a new organisational structure in June 2021

derived from SSM’s roles and responsibilities, i.e. policies,

regulation and harmonization, licensing, inspection and Summary of developments since enforcement, emergency preparedness and knowledge the last report management. The organisational structure effectively

During the current review period, the following develop- separates the authority´s regulatory decision-making with

ments are of relevance with regard to the obligations of respect to policies and regulations, inspection and enforce-

Article 8: ment and its licensing and authorisation work in three

separate departments. – SSM has been reorganised and its headquarters partly relocated. SSM works to promote protection of people and the

environment from harmful effects of radiation, now and in – Development of the integrated management system has the future. The mission and tasks of SSM are defined in an resulted in a new overarching process map. ordinance with instructions for the Authority and in the – Development of the supervisory programme for annual government appropriation directions, which nuclear power plants. contains detailed objectives and reporting obligations. – New regulations for nuclear reactors have been Other authorities that have a supervisory mandate relating developed. to nuclear power plants are the Swedish Civil Contingen-

cies Agency, the Swedish Work Environment Authority, 8.1. The regulatory body the Nuclear Waste Fund, and the National Electrical

and its mandate Safety Board.

SSM is a central administrative authority, independent in its

8.1.1. General information about the Swedish

decisionmaking (see section 8.2), that reports to the

Radiation Safety Authority

Ministry of the Environment. The Government decided on 31 August 2017 to relocate

SSM’s headquarters to the city of Katrineholm by 30 The director general of the Swedish Radiation Safety

November 2018. Katrineholm is situated about 120 Authority is appointed by the Government, normally for

kilometres southwest of Stockholm. In addition, SSM has a term of six years. The director general has the sole

opened a small branch office in Gothenburg. responsibility and reports directly to the Government.

However, the Authority has an advisory council whose In February 2019, SSM had approximately 50 employees members are appointed by the Government. The council with positions at the Katrineholm office. In the long term, members are usually members of parliament, agency SSM’s ambition is to increase its staffing to approximately officials or independent experts. The functions of the 70 employees. council are to advise the director general and to ensure

40 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

8.3. Missions, tasks and fundamental public transparency (insight) in the Authority’s activities, but it has no decision-making powers. values

The level of requirements imposed on SSM and other SSM’s missions and tasks are defined in the Ordinance Swedish authorities for openness and provision of (2008:452) with instructions for the Swedish Radiation information services to the public, politicians and media is Safety Authority and in annual appropriation directions. In very high. Swedish official documents are public unless a the latter, the Government issues directives for authorities, decision is made to classify them according to the Public which include the use of appropriations. Access to Information and Secrecy Act (2009:400). Secrecy The Ordinance states that SSM is the administrative may be warranted in the interests of national security, authority for protection of people and the environment international relations, commercial relations, or individuals’ against harmful effects of ionising and non-ionising right to privacy. No one needs to explain why they wish to radiation, for issues on nuclear safety including physical review a public document, or to reveal her/his identity to protection in nuclear technology activities, as well as in have access to a document. other activities involving radiation, and for issues regarding As all other Swedish authorities, SSM issues an annual non-proliferation. report and financial statement, which are submitted to the SSM is to work actively and preventively to promote high Government. They summarize major results, effects, levels of nuclear safety and radiation protection in society revenues and costs. The Government carries out follow-up and, through its activities, take actions to: work and evaluates an agency’s operations based on the annual report. 1. Prevent radiological accidents and ensure safe operations and safe waste management at the nuclear SSM publishes reports to inform interested parties and facilities; stakeholders. The SSM website is used to provide information on current events and Authority decisions. R&D 2. Minimise risks and optimise the effects of radiation in reports and central regulatory assessments are published as medical applications; part of the SSM report series. All reports issued by SSM 3. Minimise radiation risks in the use of products and are publicly available; most of them are available for services, or which arise as a by-product in the use of downloading from the SSM website. products and services; As an emergency authority, SSM coordinates the national 4. Minimise the risks linked to exposure to naturally system for emergency preparedness and radiation protecoccurring radiation; and tion. SSM maintains 24-hour emergency preparedness for the purpose of rapid response to the consequences of 5. Contribute to an enhanced level of nuclear safety and accidents and events involving radiation in Sweden or radiation protection internationally.

abroad. SSM also has functions in place for press contacts SSM shall ensure that regulations and work routines are and IT support outside office hours. cost effective and straightforward for citizens and enter-

prises to apply and understand.

8.2. Independence of the SSM shall furthermore:

regulatory body 1. Take measures to fulfil Swedish obligations according to

The de jure and de facto independence from political conventions, EU ordinances/directives, and other pressure and promotional interests is well provided for binding agreements;

in Sweden. 2. Supervise that nuclear material and equipment are used

as declared and in manner that agrees with the According to the Swedish constitution, administrative international commitments; authorities are independent in its regulatory decisionmaking within the legislation and statutes laid down by 3. Carry out international cooperation with national and the Government. An individual minister is not allowed to multinational organisations; interfere in a specific case handled by an administrative 4. Monitor and contribute to the progress of international authority. The Cabinet as a whole is responsible for all standards and recommendations; governmental decisions. Although in practice, a large number of routine matters are decided upon by individual 5. Coordinate activities needed to prevent, identify and detect ministers, and only formally confirmed by the Govern- nuclear or radiological emergencies, as well as organise and ment, the principle of collective responsibility is reflected lead the national organisation for expert advice to in all forms of governmental work. authorities involved in, or leading, rescue operations;

6. Contribute to national competence development within The laws governing SSM concentrate solely on nuclear the Authority’s field of activities; safety and radiation protection (also security, physical protection, and non-proliferation, but these tasks of SSM 7. Provide data for radiation protection assessments and are outside of the scope addressed in this convention). SSM maintain the competence to predict and manage reports to the Ministry of the Environment, which is not evolving issues; and involved in the promotion or utilization of nuclear energy. 8. Ensure public insight into all the Authority’s activities.

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 41

The annual appropriation directions focus more on objective and impartial. ‘Competence’ means employees short-term issues and funding of authorities’ activities. having the requisite professional skills, education, training and experience. SSM’s work can be divided into supervision of safety and radiation protection work relating to non-ionising and Integrity means maintaining the Authority’s independence ionising radiation. As far as concerns ionising radiation, the and not allowing us to be unduly influenced when it comes main regulatory areas are: use of nuclear technology and to our own decisions, standpoints, advice and recommenpower production, the medical sector with therapy and dations. Integrity involves taking charge, both while diagnostics, the use of radiation sources and x-ray exercising authority and on an employee level. equipment in industry, public use of sources and devices in Openness means that the work of the Authority is commodities, use of detectors and scanning equipment for transparent to the outside world and that we clearly and security reasons, and exposure to ionising radiation from proactively provide information about our work, standnaturally occurring radioactive material (NORM). points, advice, recommendations and decisions. Openness SSM also runs the the National Metrology Laboratory for also involves our willingness to be attentive to and consider ionising radiation and maintains the national secondary external views. standards for the dosimetric quantities of kerma, absorbed The key values are an active component of all the Authoridose and dose equivalent. Furthermore, SSM operates a ty’s activities. They are for instance used to underpin the national dose register and issues national individual dose decision making of the Authority. passports. SSM has no resident inspectors for supervision of nuclear 8.4. Safety Culture facilities. However, there is an appointed inspector responsible for the coordination between the licensee and One important aspect of the development of the regularegulator, who monitors the licensee’s overall activities and tory body is to scrutinize its own safety culture and its the Authority’s activities towards the licensee. The task wider role in the national safety infrastructure. A regulatory rotates between the inspectors in relation to the respective body must have public safety as the primary focus, and in plant, at an interval of four years. Inspections are carried order to achieve, this it is essential for the regulatory body out by teams where the inspection team is composed of to have a healthy safety culture. SSM has for several years different competencies relevant to the area of inspection. In worked on its own safety culture. This work has encomgeneral, the inspector in charge of coordination between passed involvement in international activities to enhance the licensee and SSM participates in the inspections. the safety culture as well as internal activities. SSM has, in terms of the safety of nuclear facilities, SSM participated e.g. in the OECD-NEA senior task permanent advisory committees on reactor safety, radioac- group, which developed the booklet ‘The Safety Culture of tive waste and spent nuclear fuel, and research and an Effective Nuclear Regulatory Body’ (NEA No. 7247, development. SSM also has advisory committees in other OECD 2016) and has, as a direct result of this work, incorfields such as UV, and electromagnetic fields. porated the five principles from these efforts into the management system of the regulator. The five principles in 8.3.1. Fundamental values the integrated management system of SSM are: SSM embraces the fundamental values held by Swedish – Safety and security aspects are clear elements of the public administration based on the platform of democracy Authority’s leadership and human rights, while continually striving to follow the – All SSM employees have a personal responsibility for rule of law, maintain efficiency and effectiveness, and have patterns of behaviour that influence safety and security a citizen’s perspective. The fundamental values of the Authority comprise its vision, mission statement and key – A culture that promotes safety and security facilitates values. These fundamental values also shape the Authori- cooperation and open dialogue ty’s safety culture. – The Authority has a holistic approach to aspects of safety and security

SSM’s vision:

– Continual improvements, learning and self-assessments A society safe from harmful effects of radiation. on all levels of the organisation. Mission statement of SSM: SSM has also conducted several internal seminars, some SSM works proactively and preventively to protect people with invited speakers, on different themes related to the and the environment from harmful effects of radiation, safety culture of the regulator, such as leadership, the roles now and in the future. We have a systematic and structured of the regulatory body, the content of the OECD-NEA approach to continual improvements to our processes in booklet “The Safety Culture of an Effective Nuclear order to develop our operations, render them more Regulatory Body”, and information safety and information efficient and achieve our objectives. classification.

Key values: Furthermore, SSM procured an external evaluation of the Credibility, Integrity and Openness safety culture, conducted by Lund University. The evaluation involved interviews, focus groups and a questionnaire, and Credibility means pursuing our work on the basis of facts. resulted in a valuable baseline evaluation of the status of the Credibility is achieved when employees are competent,

42 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

safety culture. SSM is still working on some of the findings 8.5.2. Recruitment from the evaluation in its continuous effort to support and In total, the authority had 49 recruitment cases in 2021, promote the safety culture of the regulatory body. which is a marginal decrease compared to 2020 when the authority had 50 recruitment cases. When hiring new employees they have an obligatory digital security training. 2021 there has been a small decrease in male applicants and a small increase in female applicants to the authority. This is probably due to the fact that the authority has had 8.5. Human and financial resources more recruitment cases within support competence where many applications have been received and where the

8.5.1. Staffing

proportion of applications from women is higher. SSM has (31 Dec. 2021) a workforce totalling 297 employees. A recruitment strategy with prioritized activities has been The authority had an average of 297 employees in 2021. developed to increase the authority’s ability to attract and This is a decrease of 8 employees compared with the recruit the right skills in the coming years. Lack of previous year. Staff turnover was 12 percent in 2021, competent applicants is a problem that the authority shares which is an increase compared with the previous year when with the state in general. turnover was 10 percent. A total of 35 people have

8.5.3. Staff turnover

terminated their employment, of which 13 are women and Staff turnover was 12% in 2021. 22 are men. Of these, 12 people have retired. Compared with many other authorities, the staff of SSM 8.5.4. Knowledge management has a rather high educational level. This is a result of the SSM systematically analyses prospective skills needed by many specialist areas covered by the Authority, and to the Authority in the short and long term in order to some extent the fact that there are no Technical Support perform its current and future tasks. Working strategically Organisations in Sweden to support the regulatory body with staffing and competence, and thereby developing the with specialist knowledge. organisation and its work is a crucial prerequisite for SSM’s capability to achieve its goals and effectively conduct its Comparing internationally, the number of regulatory staff activities. in Sweden is small for the size of the nuclear programme. When comparing the sizes of staff between different The purpose of the model is to provide an overview of countries, it is however important not only to count the the methods and other assumptions that SSM applies in staff members per reactor, but also to consider the types order to optimally meet its needs for staffing and compeof legal obligations imposed on the licensees and the tence (see figure 9). different supervisory practices.

Attract Recruit Develop Retain Departures

Attract Recruit Develop employees Retain Skills transfer means appropriate the right so that they have knowledge termination after having candidates candidate with appropriate competence in-house adequately transferred with the right appropriate and skills for the the departing qualifications skills assignment employee’s competence

Figure 9. Knowledge management process.

The overall objective of the model is to create the precon- – In order to retain our employees, we have several ditions for performing effective knowledge management in programmes in the areas of supervision and leadership. order to develop the operations of SSM. Employee departures are subject to a tailored skills transfer programme for the purpose of retaining SSM’s model includes the following steps: knowledge in-house at SSM. – To attract the right candidates with appropriate

8.5.5. Employee value proposition

qualifications, we use our employee value proposition An important prerequisite for the Authority’s staffing and and market it, for example at job fairs. competence is that the Authority succeeds in attracting and – In order to recruit the right candidates, we apply recruiting staff who have the education, experience and competence-based recruitment, and ensure that the skills needed, together with the qualities that make the employees that we recruit are committed to SSM’s employees contribute optimally to the organisation. What induction programme that also includes a mentor for the Authority offers as an employer and workplace should the first six months. be attractive to those who we wish to recruit.

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 43

8.5.6. Skills transfer programme and secure a consistent management of the Authority´s SSM has developed a skills transfer concept (KÖK) in regulatory functions. order to manage transfer of skills possessed by only one or SSM has worked on developing the Authority’s employer a few employees. It is important to have a structured and branding in order to attract candidates and retain in-house systematic approach to maintaining competence and skills knowledge at three locations. Consequently, the Authority in the organisation. The programme should also be seen as has developed more flexible terms of employment a professional development opportunity for both mentors including teleworking, together with the opportunity to use and mentees. The mentorship pairs are identified in travel time as working hours. connection with professional development interviews. SSM has continued working on a structured programme Internal training program for transfer of competence. A leadership Competence At the end of 2019, the admission process to the manageprogramme has been run to enable backup functions ment supply program was carried out in the form of an among the Authority’s employees possessing critical application, nomination, interviews, tests and selection of competence, as well as to carry out professional develop- 10 participants. The program started in February 2020 with ment. The KÖK programme defines different roles: A all participants being assigned a mentor, which is an mentee sees to it that objectives and goals are met. A important support throughout the program. All planned mentor transfers his or her skills and helps the mentee training has subsequently been carried out according to achieve the defined objectives and goals. A supervisor plan, such as physical meetings, with certain adjustments performs follow-ups and sees to it that the competency required during the current pandemic in accordance with transfer takes place. the Swedish Public Health Agency’s recommendations and SSM’s guidance. In parallel with the training, the partici- 8.5.7. Competence and employee policy pants work with their respective group tasks, which are: A basic competence profile and performance expectations Leading at a distance, Leadership of the Future and From for all staff at SSM, including managers, are given in the one in the group to being a manager. Employee policy. The policy has a clear starting point in the public administration values and has a clear link to the 8.5.9. Financial resources Authority´s model for training of leaders, “Developing The regulatory activities of SSM are financed by the State Leadership. budget. These costs are largely recovered from licensees in the form of fees that cover the cost of regulatory activities 8.5.8. Introduction programme and related research. The amounts of the fees are proposed annually by SSM, but decided by the Govern-

8.5.8.1.

ment. The budgets for 2019, 2020 and 2021, including the A new induction programme for employees has been funding of the separately financed international cooperadeveloped with the aim of providing basic knowledge tion and development work, are shown in Table 2. about the Authority and the Authority’s role and mandates. Additional resources are in the form of fees for processing The induction programme is mandatory for new of special applications and licensing work, which are employees, and covers the Authority’s role, occupational directly payable to the Authority. health and safety work, in addition to SSM’s core operations. The aim is to foster a deeper understanding of the Authority’s activities and to give new employees an 8.6. Integrated management system important network. SSM has an integrated and process-based management system. The management system describes how activities

8.5.8.2. Safety training

are controlled, implemented, followed up and improved. Training efforts are conducted continuously to increase The management system can be viewed as a structure of safety awareness among employees. An introduction to the processes that together create an overall picture of the safety work is provided and given to all new employees. activities. The management system supports a systematic The majority of SSM’s employees in safety-classified and effective approach and good administration. positions have undergone a basic safety education programme over the past years. The management system has been designed to ensure that radiation safety requirements are fulfilled in coordination 8.5.8.3. Leadership training with other operational requirements. The management In recent years, ongoing development efforts have been system has also been designed to support and promote a undertaken on the part of the entire senior management culture whereby issues with an impact on radiation safety team. The content of this work was based on the skills are given the attention and priority that their importance profiles of identified managers at SSM. requires.

The Authority has continued to develop managerial skills The various processes of the management system form and carried out basic training programmes for new the basis for how the authority’s activities are to be supervisors, and continuing education in developmental conducted in order to fulfil its objectives. Process-oriented leadership. A specific internal training program for future management is based on the management process, the leaders has been set up in order to foster good leadership main processes and the supporting processes.

44 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

Table 2. Budget of SSM in million SEK.

Budget item 2019 2020 2021 Source of funding

Nuclear safety, emergency preparedness, supervision, crisis 397.0 395.7 409.9 Mainly fees management, nuclear non-proliferation (including administration) Supervision of nuclear facilities (proportion of above) 152.0 157.6 155.5 Fees Crisis management (proportion of above) 26.0 26.0 30.5 Fees Nuclear non-proliferation (proportion of above) 14.0 14.0 12.0 Fees

Scientific research and development work (proportion of above) 76.0 76.0 77.0 Mainly fees Final disposal of radioactive waste 60.0 60.0 60.0 Fees Licensing of new facilities 21.5 21.5 19.1 Fees Historical wastes, etc. 3.0 3.0 3.0 Tax funded

International cooperation and development 31.5 26.0 28.0 Tax funded

Total (million SEK) 513.0 506.2 520.0

Strategic management Project Process Management areas and operational control management management

Management process

International Emergency preparedness and emergency response cooperation and development A society safe from Licensing Communi cating Rule making Super vision the harmeful reviews and influencing effects of Securing radiation knowledge Laboratory operations, and skills environmental monotoring, measurements and calibrations

Supporting processes

Managing matters, records and archiving

Communi- Staffing and Accounting Legal affairs Purchasing IT cation competence and finance

Figure 10. SSM’s overarching process map.

The management process is based on the authority’s system accounts for internal and external requirements; the overall remit to be proactive in good radiation safety in latter including ISO standards, statutes and legal provisions. society and is divided into a strategic element with the The objective of internal audits is to check compliance strategic vision and an operational element with planning with external and internal requirements, to investigate how and follow-up of the activities. An internal management the ‘shared values’ are integrated in the day-to-day work, and control system is integrated with the authority’s and to check whether the management system is effective financial planning and management of objectives and and fit for purpose. SSM’s internal auditors are appointed results within the scope of the management process. by the director general. Audit teams are formed based on Figure 10 illustrates SSM’s present overarching process map. experience, competence and audit objectives.

External audits are carried out every year. Audits on the 8.7. Internal and external audits annual report, finances and effectiveness are conducted by

the Swedish National Audit Office. The requirements of SSM ensures that annual internal and external audits of the ISO 9001, ISO 14001, OHSAS 18001 and other relevant Authority’s activities are carried out. The SSM management

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 45

requirements are audited by contracted external auditors accredited by the government authority SWEDAC. In 2018, SSM was re-certified in accordance with ISO 9001 General part and ISO 14001. These certificates are valid until 5 December 2021. The certificate in OHSAS 18001 is valid Baseline until 26 October 2019. The plan is to be certified in ISO Plant specific part 45001 in September/Ocotber 2019. From the last external audit of SSM, conducted in September 2018, no deviations were identified, however, some proposals were made for improvement of the management system. These proposals Neded base Specific needs for each year will mainly be considered in 2019 as part of efforts to improve the management of objectives, and by means of improved potential to manage our processes. Supervisory programme

Figure 11. Structure of the Supervision program. 8.8. Regulatory supervision

Regulatory inspections and safety assessments are carried out by SSM as authorized by the Ordinance on Nuclear 8.8.2.1. Baseline supervision Activities and Radiation Protection Ordinance, and as The requirements building up the baseline supervision plan instructed by the Government. are divided into six fundamental aspects (see figure 12):

– Management and control

8.8.1. SSM’s supervisory practices

– Safety analysis SSM has during 2021 reorganised the authority to increase – Design transparency and separation of licencing, supervision and regulation. The supervision of licensees with different – Plant status scope and nature of operation have therefore increased in – Operation coherency. – Environmental impact Since 2015, development projects have been performed with the aim of improving and simplifying the Authority’s supervision and thereby increase the quality and efficiency of SSM’s supervision. The supervisory process is divided into the following eight sub-processes:

– Compliance inspections – Surveillance inspections – Reviews – Managing events Plant Operation status – Managing reports Safety analysis – Integrated safety assessments – Periodic safety review, PSR.

These processes are used in the supervisory programme as Management and control described below.

8.8.2. Supervisory programme

A new supervisory programme was tested in 2017, and formally introduced in 2018. The programme is designed to provide a better overview and introduce a more clear Design Environmental risk-information and it entails considerable changes to the impact planning, implementation, and follow-ups of supervision. The supervisory programme is structured into two basic parts, baseline supervision and demand-based supervision (see figure 11). Figure 12. Functional supervisory aspects. SSM has during 2021 continued to develop its supervisory processes and methods, which are also part of SSM’s overall management system.

46 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

The baseline supervision plan covers a period of 10 years and on the subject matter of the inspection. An exit meeting is describes the supervision groups that are carried out each year held where preliminary results are communicated to the for nuclear power plants in operation. Over the 10-year licensee. The inspection report documents the purpose and period, the baseline supervision programme is supposed to objectives of the inspection, observations, compliance and cover every requirement in the regulations at least once. deviations from requirements, and an assessment of the significance of any deviations. The report is accompanied The supervision groups are carried out every three, five or with a decision on further regulatory actions or terminaseven years, based on the risk importance of the group. tion of the supervision. There are a total of 36 supervision groups, including, e.g.: In addition to compliance inspections, SSM carries out – Safety analysis (3 years) surveillance inspections to gather information on safety – Operations (3 years) problems and overall activities at the plants. Normally – Management systems (5 years) these surveillance inspections include three or four annual – Safety review (5 years) meetings with each reactor operations management, two – Experience feedback (5 years) annual meetings with the safety department, one inspection – Security (5 years) at each power plant, and yearly meetings to review safety and internal audit programmes. Some inspections are made – ALARA programme (5 years) in connection with events, to follow up organisational change, and relating to other current issues, such as

8.8.2.2. Identification of supervision needs

findings from earlier inspections. In many cases, these As an important complement to the baseline supervision, inspections focus on non-technical issues, such as safety the demand-based supervision is defined yearly. It can management and safety culture. therefore differ from year to year, depending on: Preparation and documentation of surveillance inspections – Results from integrated safety assessments are simplified in comparison with compliance inspections, – Results from inspections carried out or events that have but the results are systematically documented and reported occurred at SSM management meetings. Each surveillance inspec- – Identified areas where supervision is deemed necessary tion typically takes 1–2 days on site for 1–2 inspectors. from, e.g., events or concerns Often, a specialist on the subject matter for the visit – Major ongoing changes, technical or organisational accompanies the inspector. Table 3 below provides an – Other identified needs overview of the performed activities. SSM can also perform so-called intensified supervision. 8.8.3. Nuclear safety and radiation The use is decided by the director general and is applied protection inspections when the Authority is dissatisfied with the safety perfor- The compliance inspections are carried out by teams mance of a licensee. Intensified supervision can also be composed of the site inspector(s) and one or more experts applied to other special safety reasons, e.g. during test

Table 3. Number of supervision activities at NPPs 2016–2021.

Year Regulatory Activity Forsmark Oskarshamn Ringhals Total

Compliance inspections 3 8 5 16 2021 Surveillance inspections 38 15 22 75 Reviews 16 11 19 46 Compliance inspections 9 8 11 28 2020 Surveillance inspections 25 22 31 78 Reviews 25 16 16 57 Compliance inspections 3 3 6 12 2019 Surveillance inspections 34 52 33 119 Reviews 21 19 21 61 2018 Compliance inspections 5 4 4 13 Surveillance inspections 45 34 44 123 Reviews 25 22 31 78 2017 Compliance inspections 4 5 6 15 Surveillance inspections 44 30 53 127 Reviews 15 25 22 62 2016 Compliance inspections 6 5 2 13 Surveillance inspections 37 53 50 140 Reviews 32 13 43 88

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 47

operations after a large plant modification. The intensified report should be comprehensible to interested parties

supervision regime means that more inspections are done lacking expert knowledge in the assessed areas. In order to

and particular progress reporting is required. Intensified perform the integrated safety assessments more effectively

supervision has been applied in several cases. and to improve the quality of the assessment, SSM has

developed a database with the aim of covering all identified Under SSM regulations, inspection of the licensee deficiencies and issues from performed supervisory programmes, activities and results of surveillance, and activities. The database was taken into operation in 2012. in-service inspection of mechanical components, are

performed by an accredited control body (“third-party 8.9. Enforcement measures control”). If the requirements are fulfilled, a compliance

certificate is issued by the control organisation It is the task of the regulatory body to enforce the (see Section 14). constitutional rules, judgments, conditions and other

decisions governing the activities of a licensee. SSM has

8.8.4. Periodic Safety Reviews

the task of providing advice and information to create the Periodic safety reviews (PSR) were introduced in Sweden conditions for regulatory purposes to be met, and taking in the early 1980’s as a result of the TMI nuclear accident. the necessary steps to remedy a situation if necessary. The requirements regarding the reviews have developed Under the Act on Nuclear Activities, the Radiation over the years and are now quite similar to those recom- Protection Act and the Environmental Code, the regulamended in the IAEA Safety Standards. tory body has extensive legal powers to enforce the

The licensees perform a PSR in a systematic way, with an regulations and its decisions.

interval not exceeding ten years. The purpose of the PSR is The regulatory body has access to a variety of measures to have the licence holder re-assess, verify and continuously that can be used to remedy a non-compliance situation. improve the safety of its nuclear installations. In addition, Here, an overarching principle is to avoid taking a measure the PSR addresses any issues that might limit the planned that is more restrictive than necessary in the case. Also, the operating period of the facility, and shows how they will be SSM management system provides guidance on how managed. All reasonably practicable improvements shall be different measures should be taken for compliance with taken by the licensee. this principle. Whoever becomes the subject of a regula-

SSM reviews the licensee’s PSR regarding confidence in the tory decision always has the option to appeal the decision.

level of radiation safety at present, and the licence holder’s Normally the regulatory body uses a scale of administraability to maintain and increase it in the future. SSM’s tive sanctions in cases where the licensees deviate from the review is partly based on regulatory supervision, while regulations. The different steps are: including an assessment of the licensee’s ability to operate

the facility until the next PSR. – Issuing a remark on issues to be corrected by the

licensee Recently performed periodic safety reviews are on the – Ordering an action plan to be developed and actions to part of Oskarshamn 3 (2017–2018), Forsmark 1 and 2 be taken within a certain time period (2018–2019), and Ringhals 3 and 4 (2019–2020). These reviews take into account new regulations and require- – Ordering specified actions to be taken within a certain

ments laid down in the EU’s revised Nuclear Safety time period and the results submitted for review and

Directive (2014/87/Euratom) (see section 7). approval. This can be applied in combination with a fine.

– Ordering suspension of operations until deficiencies are

8.8.5. SSM’s integrated safety assessments corrected and the measures taken are reviewed and

SSM’s integrated safety assessments comprise annual approved by the Authority

nuclear safety and radiation protection assessments of each – Revoking a licence.

major facility under SSM’s supervision. Based on all In combination with the above sanctions, the regulatory compliance inspections, surveillance inspections, reviews, body can take the following actions: authority decisions and other relevant information,

evaluations and a general appraisal are made of the nuclear – Adjustment of the supervision (connected to intensified

safety, radiation protection and non-proliferation control supervision)

status of the facility in relation to relevant requirements. – Temporary care (Radiation Protection Act) The basic material should also cover earlier information – Sealment (Radiation Protection Act) and conclusions in order to identify trends that could – Correction at the licensee’s expense otherwise be difficult to detect in a short-term perspective. – Refer suspected cases of criminal violations to a public The reports are approved by the head of SSM’s superviprosecutor sion division and presented at top-level management meetings with the licensees. – Impose additional licensing conditions.

An aspect of importance when drafting the report is the traceability from the basis of data, via the analysis, to the 8.10. Regulatory research

final conclusions and the assessment. It should be clearly Based on the provisions concerning research, as laid down

described how SSM evaluated the relevant issues, and the in the Ordinance (2008:452) with instructions for the

48 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

Swedish Radiation Safety Authority, the overall objective for Swedish organisations that participate in EU projects. of the research funded by SSM is to: SSM plans to continue providing this support in the future.

– Maintain and develop national competence of importance As examples, the following international projects can be for radiation protection and nuclear safety, and mentioned:

– Ensure that SSM has the knowledge and tools needed to – NKS (Nordic Nuclear Safety Research): Nuclear safety carry out effective regulatory and supervisory activities. research is performed within NKS in two programme SSM supports basic and applied research, and also areas: reactor safety, and emergency preparedness and development of methods and processes. However, for response; also, within bilateral agreements with Finland.

development work, the intention is to have the developed – SCIP (Studsvik Cladding Integrity Project) and SMILE method or process preferably used by the Authority in (Studsvik Material Integrity Life Extension) The support of the Authority’s work. projects Sare OECD/NEA international Joint Projects

conducted in Sweden. SSM:s total annual research funding budget is about 95 – ESARDA (European Safeguards Research and MSEK. Of this amount, around 70 MSEK is earmarked Development Association): ESARDA is an important for research relating to nuclear safety. joint project focusing on the area of safeguards.

8.10.1. National research – Fukushima-related projects in cooperation with other Research is a prerequisite for SSM to be able to conduct its OECD/NEA countries in, for example, TCOFF-2 and regulatory activities and to achieve its overall objectives. FACE.

Research to support supervision in the nuclear field focuses Moreover, SSM cooperates with other government on strategic areas such as safety assessment, safety analysis, agencies internationally, e.g. the NRC (US), IRSN (France), reactor technology, material and fuel properties, severe STUK (Finland) and ENSI (Switzerland). In particular, accidents, non-proliferation, human factors, and emergency close cooperation with the NRC is prioritised in order to preparedness. Ageing of reactor components is an have access to models and computer programs developed important area of focus, since Swedish reactors have entered for three-dimensional coupled thermal-hydraulics simulaor will soon enter into long term operation (> 40 years). tions, neutron kinetic calculations, as well as severe In the area of radiation protection, key aspects are for accident analyses. example research about source terms, production and spread of activated corrosion products, new detection and 8.10.3. Long-term national competence

measurement methods, and waste treatment. More SSM has established from previous investigations of the generally, research on radioecology, radiation biology and prerequisites for maintaining national competence that there radiation dosimetry is also ofimportance. is a need to strengthen the national framework for knowledge management in areas relating to radiation safety, both In order to contribute to national competence and research for the purpose of meeting today’s needed competence, and capacity, SSM also supports research in the area of severe for anticipating needs arising in the years to come. One of accidents. This is partly directed at Chalmers University of the root causes of this vulnerability in the knowledge Technology and the Royal Institute of Technology, in management system nationally is the present underfunding addition to providing support for a national project, APRI, of several areas of research that are critical to society. which is being run jointly with Swedish industry and academia. The purpose of these projects is to contribute to SSM has taken the initiative to develop a proposal for a strategic national engagements in OECD/NEA and EU national strategic direction aimed at addressing the national projects. Similar funding is directed at Uppsala University competence needs in the field of radiation safety over the and the Royal Institute of Technology in the area of next ten years. The proposal is based on conclusions from nuclear non-proliferation. Support is also provided for a SSM’s previous government assignments within national long-term activity in the area of cross-section measure- competence. It is is also prompted by a recommendation in ments and analysis of nuclear data at Uppsala University. the area of “Competence for Safety” that emerged from the IRRS mission in 2012 and IRRS follow-up mission in 8.10.2. International research collaborations. 2016. The proposal is broadly anchored with national

The major part of SSM:s research funding goes to stakeholders with responsibility or interest in the field of universities and consulting companies in Sweden. However, radiation safety (universities, industry, other authorities, as an important complement to this, SSM also participates etc.). The proposal contains a vision “A secure national actively in many international research projects. Over many competence supply in the field of radiation safety enables years, a general trend has been observed in Europe of the socially useful use of radiation and contributes to increasing international cooperation in the area of nuclear protecting people and the environment from undesirable safety research. effects now and in the future” with proposals for a total of

21 priority actions in five strategic focus areas; national Internationally, SSM collaborates in research projects coordination, research policies for viable research environconducted mainly by the EU and OECD/NEA. Ever since ments, international research collaboration, education for Sweden joined the EU, the importance of participating in the needs of society, and attractiveness of the radiation joint European work has increased. Not only does SSM safety area to relevant target groups (students, reserachers have its own active role, the Authority also provides funding and other professionals).

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 49

8.11. Communication SSM’s communication policy states that all employees are responsible for communicating in accordance with our SSM’s ordinance states that SSM shall, by means of mission and fundamental values. It also states that all communication and transparency, contribute towards employees have the right to inform the media (freedom of public insight into all operations encompassed by the speech). This means that all employees have the statutory Authority’s mandate. The aim of this work shall be to: right to anonymously inform the mass media about our 1. Promote health and prevent ill health, operations..

2. Prevent acute radiation injuries and reduce the risk of

8.11.2.1. Overall communication strategy

delayed injuries due to radiation, and SSM’s communication policy is accompanied by an overall 3. Provide advice and information about radiation, its communication strategy, listing its key target groups as properties and areas of application, and about radiation follows: protection. – Employees 8.11.1. Governance policy and communication – The public Our governance policy states that the Authority’s role – Licensees includes working proactively and preventively in many arenas – to develop, improve and promote radiation The strategy emphasises that communication is a strategic protection and nuclear safety, and to ensure compliance. tool for achieving the vision of a radiation-safe society, and The governance policy states further that we shall influence contributing to the fulfilment of SSM’s mission. It also patterns of behaviour for improvement of radiation safety emphasises that in order for the Authority to influence the within our mandates and make use of appropriate tools for behaviour of the target groups, they need to know and influencing behaviours, and that our work should be trust us. Consistent and targeted communication work is a perceived as beneficial to interested part. Communication basis for ensuring knowledge and confidence. and consultation are strategic tools used by the Authority The communication strategy sets out how SSM’s vision for influencing behaviours and adding value on the part of and governance goals can be achieved from: the interested parties. – Strategies for guidance of communication work, and 8.11.2. Communication policy – Criteria for navigating selection of communication SSM’s communication policy is an overall governance activities. document that sets out how our mission and fundamental values should characterise our communication with The strategy has both an internal and an external perspecinterested parties. The policy specifies the responsibility of tive and applies to all employees. The strategy does not employees and managers for internal and external commu- claim to cover all communication work of the Authority. nication. It also states that SSM, as per our ordinance, shall, SSM’s communication strategy is accompanied by guidethrough information and transparency, contribute to lines for communication, and in some cases by separate providing the public with insight into all activities covered strategies, e.g. SSM’s reputation crisis communication by our mandates. The policy also emphasises our fundastrategy. mental values – credibility, integrity and openness – in communication: 8.12. Follow-up of the 2012 IRRS

Credibility

review mission – Our messages are based on the laws and regulations A full-scope IAEA IRRS mission to Sweden was governing our operations. performed February 2012, with the resulting recommen- – We clearly convey that our recommendations and dations having been addressed by SSM in an action plan. decisions are based on objectivity and facts. Following arrangements made with the IAEA, a Integrity follow-up mission took place in April 2016. Two out of the subsequent 22 recommendations given by the IRRS – We communicate based on our mission: achieving a team in 2012 were considered by Sweden in 2016 to radiation-safe society. We do not allow ourselves to be remain open since more work was needed to close these influenced by irrelevant interests. recommendations. – We clearly separate between our mission and actions from those of others. The general conclusion of the 2016 IRRS follow-up team was that they were satisfied with the approach of Sweden

Openness

to address the findings of the 2012 IRRS mission, and to – We communicate proactively and comprehensively and improve the regulatory system for nuclear safety. Eleven have accessible information about our mission, matters recommendations out of the 22 identified in 2012 were and mandates. closed, and a further nine were closed on “progress and

– We are also open about issues that might have a negative confidence”. Two recommendations remained open in impact on us. 2016. Twelve suggestions out of the 17 identified during – We are attentive to the needs of interested parties, and the 2012 IRRS mission were closed and the remaining five seek new ways of communicating with them. were closed on “progress and confidence”.

50 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

The two recommendations that remain open refer to 1) SSM also received two new “good practices” referring to a) provisions to maintain competence for nuclear safety and the development of criteria for assessing risks in connecradiation protection on a national level, and 2) the system- tion with the use of radiation sources, and b) SSM’s atic evaluation of operational experience from non-nuclear approach to establishing consistent and comprehensive facilities and radiation protection events and activities, regulations, while taking into account international including dissemination of all significant experience. The standards and good practices. work on these areas continues. The Swedish Government has officially requested that the As a further result of the 2016 IRRS follow-up, an IAEA carry out the next IRRS mission in Sweden. This additional four suggestions were received. These are listed full-scope IRRS mission is scheduled to take place at SSM below. in November 2022 with a preparatory meeting to be held in April. The IRRS mission is held back-to-back with an SSM should: ARTEMIS-mission planned for April 2023. – Complete a comprehensive resource and competence SSM has developed a proposal for a national strategic assessment, based on a strategic review that focus with respect to the still open 2012-recommendation incorporates the Swedish nuclear industry’s perspective on provisions to maintain competence for nuclear safety – Consider making key management system process and radiation protection on a national level. The proposal documentation available to the applicants, licensees and contains a total of 21 priority initiatives to satisfy the other interested parties national competence needs in the field of radiation safety – Consider reviewing its roles, responsibilities, and during the coming ten-year period. The basis for the expectations of its departments to ensure clarity and to proposal were two analytical investigations on the proviconsider methods to ensure effective cross- sions on long term supply of competence and clarification organisational boundary communication that enables of research needs within radiation safety, respectively. The effective implementation of its management system proposal has been broadly anchored through referrals to components national stakeholders in the field of radiation safety – The Swedish Government should consider expanding (universities, industry, authorities and others). These the scope of the national emergency response plan for stakeholders have been part of a collaboration platform management of nuclear accidents to take into that has been used for several years in the agency’s strategic consideration arrangements for responding to work with national competence supply. The proposal was radiological emergencies, based on threat/hazard submitted to the Government in March 2022. assessment.

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 51

Article 9. Responsibility of the licence holders

measures to maintain safety, but also measures to improve Each Contracting Party shall ensure that prime responsisafety where this is justified. bility for the safety of a nuclear installation rests with the holder of the relevant licence and shall take the appro- Furthermore, according to the Act, SSM shall ensure that priate steps to ensure that each such licence holder meets regulations and procedures applied are cost effective and its responsibility. useful for individuals as well as companies. The regulations and procedures must be formulated in a way implying that the regulatory body does not take over the prime responsi- Summary of developments since bility for safety and radiation protection.

the previous national report Also, supervision by SSM shall ensure that the licensees During the current review period, the following developmaintain good control over the safety of the plants and ments are of relevance with regard to the obligations of that safety work is conducted with a satisfactory level of Article 9: quality.

– WANO peer review and development work are SSM’s regulations on safety in nuclear facilities (SSMFS continuing at all plants. 2008:1 specify the responsibility of the licensee through a – IAEA SALTO reviews have been conducted for the number of fundamental requirements for safety manage- Forsmark NPP, Ringhals NPP and Oskarshamn NPP as ment, design and construction, safety analysis and review, a part of activities related to safe continued operation operations, nuclear materials and waste management and of the units. documentation including archiving. In addition, it is clearly stated by these regulations (Chapter 2, Section 9, item 8) that safety shall be monitored and followed up by the 9.1. Regulatory requirements licensee on a routine basis, with deviations identified and The Act on Nuclear Activities (1984:3) is clear about the rectified so that safety is maintained and developed further prime responsibility for safety: in accordance with set objectives and strategies. The

Section 10 in the Act on Nuclear Activities states that the meaning of this provision is that continuous preventive holder of a licence for nuclear activities shall ensure that all safety work is a legal requirement, which includes safety measures are taken which are needed for: reassessments, analysis of events in one’s own facility and other installations, and analysis of relevant new safety – Maintaining safety, taking into account the nature of the standards, practices and research results. All reasonable activities and conditions under which they are measures that are useful for safety shall be taken as a result conducted, of this proactive and continuous safety work, and they – The safe management and disposal of nuclear waste must be documented in a safety programme that is to be arising in the activities or therein arising nuclear material updated annually. which is not reused, and SSM’s regulations spell out three basic control principles, – The safe decommissioning and dismantling of facilities which clearly separate the roles of a licensee and the in which nuclear activities are no longer carried out. regulator: It is also stated that the holder of a licence for nuclear – Approval by SSM (in specified matters) after primary activities shall, in connection with near-accidents, threats or and independent safety review by the licensee. other similar circumstance, report without delay to the – Notification of SSM (in specified matters) after primary regulatory body such information that is of consequence and independent safety review by the licensee. for the assessment of safety. – Internal audits by the licensees according to their own In the bill and the legislative history for the Act on Nuclear management systems. Activities, it is stated that the licensee shall not only take

52 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

For nuclear facilities, the SAR, OLCs, plan for emergency – Take an active and leading role in research and response and and plan for physical protection must be development. formally approved by SSM before construction or commis- – Strive for the continuous improvement of safety. sioning are initiated. Plant and organisational modifications Implementation of the safety policies is described further and changes in the safety documentation are to be notified in section 10.2.1. to SSM. If warranted, SSM may impose additional conditions and requirements.

9.2.2. Continuous improvements at the plants

The principles applied to improvements at nuclear power

9.1.1. Development of new regulations

plants are discussed in section 6.2. It is made clear by these SSM has developed new regulations for nuclear safety, descriptions that the utilities make substantial own which enter into force 1 March 2022, i.e., after the current initiatives to assess and improve the reactors. reporting period. These are SSMFS 2021:4, SSMFS 2021:5 and SSMFS 2021:6.

9.2.3. International peer reviews

The biggest change relating to the responsibility of the International reviews are performed on the initiative of the licensees in the new regulations is the transfer of responsi- licensees. Several Swedish nuclear power plant staff bility for development and maintenance of site-specific members also participate each year in WANO as well as environmental monitoring programmes (Chapter 4, Section OSART review missions abroad. Participating as an expert 11 of SSMFS 2021:6), from SSM to the licensee. However, is considered to be of great value to the individuals as well the initial porgramme of the licensee still has to be as to their plant organisations. approved by SSM.

9.2.3.1. WANO peer review

According to Chapter 7, Section 4 of SSMFS 2021:5, planned modifications in the SAR, OLCs, programme for Oskarshamn NPP limiting radioactive discharges, environmental monitoring In autumn 2017, a WANO follow-up of the peer review programme, plan for physical protection and plan for conducted in 2015 took place at the Oskarshamn NPP. A emergency response shall be notified to SSM for review, total of 13 areas for improvement (AFI) were followed up. before being implemented. WANO review was performed in April 2019 including a Conduct of Crew Performance Observations, CPO, for 9.2. Compliance of the licence holders control room training at the simulator, and a CPO for work in connection with a “safety train outage” in 2019. A number of measures being taken give evidence that the A corporate peer review was also performed in the Swedish licensees are taking the prime responsibility for summer 2019. safety. The following subsections give examples of such measures where the activities are more or less ongoing. In December 2021 a WANO follow-up of the peer review conducted in 2015 took place at the Oskarshamn NPP. A 9.2.1. Safety policies total of 8 areas for improvement (AFI) were followed up. The industry has adopted nuclear safety policies. These An action plan for dealing with the AFI has been estabsafety policies are the highest level documents expressing lished by the senior management team. The action plan has key corporate values, and are valid for all parts of each been merged with OKG’s strategic plan. Thus, it is fully company. The policies express a fundamental perspective integrated in the development strategy of the company. on matters of safety and establish levels of ambition and This allows the actions to be tracked for their progress and priorities, such as the following: evaluated in terms of their effect as part of the standard procedures of management review and performance – Always put safety first. management. – Take own safety initiatives. In August/Septemeber 2023 is the next WANO Peer – Maintain an open dialogue with the regulators and with review planned to be conducted. other companies on safety issues. – Regard regulations as the minimum standard, meeting Forsmark NPP this with conservative margins. A WANO Peer Review was performed in Forsmark in October 2019. The purpose of the Review was to determine

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 53

strengths and areas in which improvements could be made. – 2022: second pre-SALTO The Review resulted in some areas for improvement (AFI). – 2024: full scope SALTO These identified areas was addressed, following an action – 2025: follow-up SALTO plan agreed between Forsmark and WANO. The aim is to ensure long-term and safe operation of WANO performed a follow-up at the Forsmark NPP in OKG unit 3 and meet the new requirements from the November 2021. The follow-up resulted in 3 areas for Swedish Radiation Safety Authority, SSM. improvement (AFI). The areas are within the following: Operational risk management, Configuration management Forsmark NPP (improve instructions) and Configuration management The Forsmark NPP’s units 1 and 2 passed 40 years of (coherent changes). Work with these issues are ongoing. operation and subsequently enter LTO in 2020 and 2021, The next WANO Peer Review is planned for 2024. respectively. Forsmark initiated a IAEA SALTO peer review program in November 2016 and performed av In addition, Forsmark has requested and performed several pre-SALTO in June 2019. The Review laid the foundation member support missions (MSM), within the areas for further development efforts. A pre-SALTO follow up equipment failure, lifting and rigging, independent oversight, was performed in October 2021. The follow up resulted in risk assessment, scram reduction and design authority. Other 4 issues resolved, 14 satisfactory progress and 1 insufficient areas supported by WANO are significant operating progress. A full scope SALTO mission is planned for 2023. experience reports (SOER), where several recommendations have been implemented over the past years. Ringhals NPP

In March 2018, an IAEA SALTO review mission was

Ringhals NPP

performed for unit 3 of the Ringhals NPP. The SALTO In May 2019 WANO performed a follow up on the “Areas review mission resulted in 9 recommendations, 8 suggesfor Improvements” (AFI) identified during the 2017 tions, 13 encouragements, 19 good performances and 3 WANO Peer Review. Based on the results from the follow good practices. In September 2020, a mission to reviewed up mission Ringhals updated the action plan. Enhanced Ringhals’ response to recommendations and suggestions interaction with WANO representative was carried out made during the initial mission was performed. The 2019 and 2020 with quarterly visits by the WANO follow-up mission team found a good progress in the field representatives. Ringhals formed a specific forum for of ageing management and preparedness for safe monitoring progress regarding work related to AFI:s and long-term operation. The plant had made significant meetings were chaired by the station director. improvements in the area of ageing management and had Ringhals were scheduled for a peer review in April 2021, shown continued commitment to preparing for safe LTO. which was postponed due to the pandemic. A new date Some activities were still in implementation and some were was set to December 2021 and the Peer Review was carried fully completed. The plant had progressed in solving most out November 24th – December 10th. The result indicated of the issues identified during the SALTO mission in 2018. that progress had been made. In addition, as part of the Some issues required further work by the plant, and the 2021 Peer Review, WANO conducted a Crew Performance resolution degree was determined as following: Observation in October 2021 and an Outage Observations – 1 issue was assessed as insufficient progress to date; at unit 4 outage in the summer of 2021. – 11 issues were assessed as satisfactory progress to date; WANO assessed Ringhals work with recommendations – 5 issues were assessed as issue resolved. part of the significant operating experience reports (SOER) during the 2021 Peer Review. 92% of the recom- Furthermore, the follow-up mission team found several mendations were assessed as satisfactory implemented good practices and good performances, including:

(SAT), compared to 76% after the 2017 Peer Review. – The LTO project is implemented using primarily the During the period Ringhals has requested several member plant’s own staff; support missions (MSM), within areas including operation, – The plant has successfully developed and implemented engineering, emergency preparedness and coaching. a comprehensive risk informed inservice inspection methodology for piping;

9.2.3.2. IAEA SALTO peer review

– The plant has used a novel approach to identify Oskarshamn NPP corrosion in concrete structures exposed to marine In December 2017, OKG conducted an IAEA pre-SALTO environment

peer review for OKG unit 3. The mission resulted in three good performances and 19 issues. The LTO project at 9.3. Regulatory control OKG has been dealing with issues arising from the SSM’s regulatory activities involves promotion and pre-SALTO mission, together with other actions needed verification of compliance. That means performing a for safe long-term operation of unit 3. number of inspections as a part of supervisory practices Planning for future IAEA peer reviews is preliminary (see section 8.8). scheduled as follows:

54 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

The aim is to produce evidence on how the licensees apply modifications to the SAR itself and the OLC. The principles of prime responsibility for safety in practice and statement of the independent safety review made by the in their daily work. In cases where inspections resulted in licensee must be attached to the notification. enforcement actions these are followed up in order to If SSM is not satisfied with a notification, the licensee has control that the deviations have been given sufficient to complement it, or SSM can impose further requirements attention. or conditions on the proposed solution before it may be Reporting requirements are also an important aspect of the implemented. If more investigation time is needed, SSM SSM’s assurance that licensees continue meet their can stop the implementation until the case has been responsibilities. According to regulations, licensees have to investigated further. Futher information on this process notify SSM of all plant and organisational modifications can be found under section 10.5.3. affecting conditions reported in the SAR, as well as

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 55

Part III

General Safety Considerations 56 Part III General Safety Considerations

Part III

General Safety Considerations Article 10. Priority to safety

perspective. Also, Chapter 3, Section 2 of SSMFS 2018:1, Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to states that responsibilities, levels of authority and cooperaensure that all organisations engaged in activities directly tion shall be defined for staff having tasks of importance related to nuclear installations shall establish policies that for safety. give due priority to nuclear safety. Chapter 3, Section 4 of SSMFS 2018:1, further requires that for all licensed activities involving ionising radiation, a Summary of developments since management system shall be implemented and kept up to

the previous report date so that requirements on safety and security are met in

Significant developments during the current review period all relevant activities. Also, Chapter 3, Section 5 of SSMFS related to Article 10 are the following: 2018:1, requires that the management system uses established goals, strategies, plans and objectives for the – As a consequence of the owners decision to shutdown organization, to achieve this. Chapter 3, Section 6 of of Oskarshamn units 1 and 2, SSM conducted increased SSMFS 2018:1, requires that the leadership and managesupervision of the safety status and licensees activities ment shall promote the safety and security culture required in order to closely monitor the situation. OKG have in for the safe operation. recent years adjusted to the scope and nature of Chapter 3, Section 14 of SSMFS 2018:1, states requiresimultaneous operation and decommissioning. ments to systematically esure that all persons working in – During 2021-2022, Ringhals NPP has been subject to the licensed activities involving ionising radiation (own and increased supervision in order to monitor/follow the hired staff) shall be given the working conditions needed to licencees adjustment to decommissioning. safely carry out work. Chapter 3, Section 14 of SSMFS 2018:1 futher requires that both facility design and tools 10.1. Regulatory requirements used during work, and physical environment shall be adapted to facilitate safe working conditions. Policies that provide due priority to safety are recognised as normal safety policies and safety strategies. Safety manage- According to Chapter 3, Section 16 of SSMFS 2018:1, ment provisions and tools for managing a nuclear power experiences important to safety in licensed activities plant apply in such a way that safety is prioritised and a involving ionising radiation, from own operation or other good safety culture is estabilished and maintained. A good similar operation, shall be collected, assessed and used to safety culture that gives safety issues the attention imrprove safety. As a part of this, Chapter 3, Section 17 of warranted by their significance is also a prerequisite for SSMFS 2018:1 states that, persons working with the robust implementation of a management system. activities shall be encouraged to report events and conditions that could imply a safety risk. Section 3 of the Act on Nuclear Activities states that the requirements on safety shall be fulfilled at all nuclear Requirements laid down in Chapter 2, Section 1 of SSMFS activities. 2008:1 state that radiological accidents shall be prevented through a verified and robust design on the part of each Chapter 2, Section 2 of SSMFS 2018:1, requires that a nuclear facility. Such a design shall include multiple barriers. facility-specific implementation of a “defence in depth” This is further elaborated in the general advice for the shall be used to achieve safety and security for all licensed regulation, where the items below should be prioritised in activities involving ionising radiation. order to develop and maintain effective implementation of a Chapter 3, Section 1 of SSMFS 2018:1, requires that the defence in depth in five levels, based on IAEA-INSAG-10. operating organization of all licensed activities involving In Chapter 2, Section 9 of SSMFS 2008:1, these requireionizing radiation, is stuctured to ensure that safety and ments are given for safety management having the aim of security can be maintained in both a short- and a long-term giving the right priority to safety:

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 57

– Documented safety objectives and safety strategies must Chatpter 2 of SSMFS 2021:6 also includes reuirements that be in place for ensuring that safety is maintained and clarify the importance of safety assessment in decisionenhenched. making, in work preperation and in the implementation of – Activities shall be planned in such a way that necessary modifications to the nuclear power plant. time and resources are allocated for safety measures and safety reviews. 10.2. Compliance of the licence holders – Safety decisions shall be preceded by sufficient safety investigation and review; for instance, an independent 10.2.1. Safety policies safety committee should be used to review issues of The safety policies (see section 9.2) issued by Vattenfall principal importance for safety. and Uniper, express the most important corporate values – Safety shall be assessed and followed up on a routine regarding nuclear safety. They have been interpreted and basis, with deviations identified and corrective measures further developed in the management systems for each taken so that safety is maintained and developed nuclear power plant. The safety policies are reviewed according to the established safety objectives and periodically and the policies of the plant managements are strategies. reviewed by external and internal safety audits.

Chapter 2, Section 10 of SSMFS 2008:1, requires that the 10.2.2. Safety management provisions licensees have an up-to-date safety programme. It is stated, All licensees have safety committees in order to review that after commissioning, the safety of a facility shall be major and principal safety issues and to follow up and regularly analysed and assessed in a systematic manner. assess the safety situation at the plants. Furthermore, for Reasonably practicable technical and organisational many years local safety review committees have been estabmeasures for safety improvements that are identified as a lished at plant level to advice on principal safety issues. result of this analysis and assessment shall be included in All licensees have quite similar structure in place for safety an established safety programme. This programme shall be management and review where the responsibilities and evaluated and updated annually to identify priorities and levels of authority of the different levels of management time schedules for measures to be taken. are clearly defined. At Vattenfall there are two parallel The regular analysis and assessment should take into management structures, one for safety and one for consideration technical and organisational experience from operational responsibility. The roles often coincide. At the plant’s own activities as well as from other similar OKG there is one management structure applied for plants, results of relevant R&D-projects and development operational structure. Safety management are included in of safety standards. Organisational experience includes for the reponsibility of all managers at OKG. instance; results of Man, Technology and Organisation The basic principles are the following: (MTO) analysis, evaluation of organisational changes, evaluation of work conditions, and self-assessments of the – Safety management level 1 is responsible for the overall working climate and safety culture. safety review process, and for specific safety issues forwarded to the manager from lower levels (2 and 3).

10.1.1. Development of new regulations

Level 1 responsibility includes issuing policies, the safety SSM has developed new regulations for nuclear safety, management system and company directives for nuclear which enter into force 1 March 2022, i.e., after the current safety, as well as sanctioning deviations. Safety reporting period. The requirements from SSMFS 2008:1 management level 1 is often represented by the plant mentioned under 10.1 will be found mainly in Chapter 2 of manager. the new regulations SSMFS 2021:6. A difference from – Safety management level 2 is responsible for long-term SSMFS 2008:1 is that Chapter 2, Section 1 of SSMFS safety issues, manuals and procedures. Level 2 is also 2021:6, more clearly requires that the management system responsible for the unit-related safety reviews. of a nuclear power plant uses defined goals and guidelines, Additionally, Level 2 has to ensure that the unit Safety that can be used for evaluation, to promote the mainte- Analysis Report (SAR) is up to date and reflects sound nance and improvemen of safety (and security). safety practices. Level 2 performs follow-ups on In addition to the old requirements Chapter 2, Section 3 of deviations, trends and operating experience. Deviations SSMFS 2021:6, requires the licensee of a nuclear power plant from regulations, company norms and policies should to have an organizational function for independent review of be reported to safety management level 1. Level 2 also decisions important to safety or security, independent safety has the role of sanctioning procedures relating to the assessment, monitoring of safety performance, and that extent of work on safety-related equipment, and continuously works to improve all nuclear safety activities. To ensuring that documentation fulfils the requirements. this, Chapter 2, Section 21 of SSMFS 2021:6, requires the – Safety management level 3 is responsible for safe licensee to continuously and systematically monitor and operation within the limits of procedures and technical evaluate the safety performance of the nuclear power plant specifications. Level 3 is also responsible for all work using several performance indicators. Chapter 2, Section 20 permits regarding safety-related equipment. Safetyof SSMFS 2021:6, now clearly requires the licensees to have related deviations should be reported to safety an implemented operating experience programme. management level 2.

58 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

Independent safety reviews are carried out by the safety Forsmark NPP and quality departments. The management structure The level of safety in plant operations is monitored in outlines: several ways, including the use of performance indicators. The indicators are classified into four areas: Safety and – Reporting criteria and requirements. Environment, Production and Plant, Competence and – Criteria for regular and periodical (daily and weekly) Staffing, and Efficiency and Cooperation. The indicators operational meetings including criteria for shift change- measure factors such as fuel integrity, Safety Incident for over. employee, radiation exposure, unviability of safety systems,

– Issues to be handled within the company’s safety review and outage deviation. There are 16 indicators on company committee. level. These are further broken down on department level.

– Requirements regarding plant modifications (technical The indicators are periodically reviewed (monthly or and organisational). quarterly) by the management teams. Any deviation from expected performance is analysed and actions for improve- All licensees have safety programmes in place as required ments are decided on by the plant manager. by SSM’s regulation SSMFS 2008:1. The programmes are part of the management system documentation. They Oskarshamn NPP contain priorities and schedules for technical, organisa- The level of safety in plant operations is monitored in tional and administrative measures to be implemented as a several ways, including the use of performance indicators. result of safety analyses, audits, safety culture surveys and The performance indicators are linked to the company’s other evaluations conducted at the plant. strategic goals.

The indicators are periodically reviewed (monthly or 10.3. Measures at the nuclear quarterly) by the management team. Any deviation from

power plants expected performance is analysed and actions for improvement are decided. Selected indicators, their results, and

Ringhals NPP

corrective actions to improve performance are presented The level of safety in plant operations is monitored in to the board on a quarterly basis. All results are also several ways, including the use of performance indicators. presented on the intranet under the heading “Goals and The indicators are classified into four groups: Maintain and Safety Indicators”. Develop the Plant, Maintain and Develop the Competence, Structured work on KPIs forms the basis for continuous Develop Structures and Behaviours, and Reinforce Trust in development of the management structure. Currently, the the Ringhals NPP Internally and Externally. The quality concept of “Operational Excellence” is being rolled out indicators measure factors such as unplanned automatic throughout the organisation. Visual management, in which scrams, fuel integrity, safety systems performance, safety KPIs are published on “visual boards” as a basis for culture, and work-related injuries. The indicators are decisions, follow-ups and planning, is a vital part of periodically reviewed (monthly or quarterly) by the Operational Excellence. management team. Any deviation from expected performance is analysed and actions for improvement are decided 10.4. Use of WANO on by the plant manager.

A description is provided below on safety management Performance Indicators

development at Ringhals over the past three years. Safety All licensees utilise the complete WANO programme of management has been adjusted in accordance with the Performance Indicators including the WANO Indicator Ringhals CEO’s allocation of tasks across the organisation Index. This is a weighted index consisting of ten specific by introducing operation and construction management. indicators. The calculation of the Indicator Index was Safety issues with a direct impact on the plant safe developed by INPO and is used for evaluation and setting operation are dealt with by the operation management, and goals for NPPs. safety issues without a direct impact on the plant are dealt WANO Index is a method to be able to quarterly create an with by the operation and construction management overview over performance indicators. The Index have Safety evaluation has been divided into four safety rating values from 0 to 100 and calculates as weighted values. levels according to complexity and impact on the indi- Higher result is a better performance. vidual, construction, or the environment. The following 10 indicators are included in the Index, – Safety management level 4 is represented by the skift listed from highest (weighted) to lowest: manager or the shift engineer who is responsible for the • Unit Capability Factor UCF (0,15): safety within the limits of procedures and technical specifications. Level 4 should continuously evaluate • Forced Lost Rate FLR (0,15)

ready and mandate to order changes to the facility’s • Unplanned Automatic Scram UA7 (0,10) operation within assigned management responsibility. • Safety System SP1 (327), 2 (322), 5 (650) (0,10) Fuel Level 4 is also responsible for all work permits on safety Reliability Indicator FRI (0,10): relates equipment. Safety related deviations should be • Collective Radiation Exposure CRE (0,10) reported to the safety management level 3.

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 59

Formal reporting Reporting/information Oversight scope NPPs

Line Management Independent oversight Committees/Councils function

Vattenfall Group Level

Vattenfall AB Board of Directors Vattenfall CINSO – Corporate Vattenfall Nuclear Safety Council Independent Nuclear (NSC) Safety Oversight Vattenfall CEO

Business Area Level Nuclear Safety Board (NSB)

CNO Safety Coordination Group (SRG)

NPP Company & Unit Level

EHSQ Department NPP Company Boards

NPP MD/Oversight Level 1 On-site Safety Review Committees (SRC) Oversight Level 2

Oversight Level 3

Control Room

Figure 13. Schematic illustration of Vattenfall’s Corporate Independent Nuclear Safety Oversight.

• Chemistry Performance Indicator CPI (0,05) The members of the NSC are appointed by the CEO, and the CEO is Chair of NSC. The NSC consists of external • Industrial Safety Accident Rate ISA (0,05) experts possessing extensive experience from the nuclear field. The CNO and head of CINSO participate in the

10.4.1. Vattenfall’s Corporate Independent

Nuclear Safety Oversight NSC meetings.

Independent Oversight at Vattenfall Corporate Level

10.4.1.1. Whistle-blowing function

The CEO of Vattenfall conduct independent oversight of CINSO has a “whistle-blowing” function i.e. anyone within nuclear safety and performance through two functions the Vattenfall organisation may contact CINSO regarding independent of the line organisation: the Corporate concerns on nuclear related safety issues. Independent Nuclear Safety Oversight (CINSO) function, The CINSO whistleblowing function has a broad scope and the Nuclear Safety Council (NSC). (See figure 13). regarding safe nuclear operations. Any serious concerns In addition to the NPP independent safety organisations, related to nuclear and radiation safety could be reported to Vattenfall has established an independent nuclear safety CINSO, whether they be issues on technical matters, oversight function on high corporate level, namely the competence, safety management, safety culture etc., in Corporate Independent Nuclear Safety Oversight cases of non-compliance by the line organisation. (CINSO) group reporting directly to the CEO of Vattenfall. CINSO has the task of providing advice to the CEO 10.4.2. Corporate independent oversight (CINSO) at of Vattenfall on the basis of an independent and diversi- Sydkraft Nuclear Power Sweden AB (SNP) fied perspective. The independent oversight work should In Sweden, the licence holder has the full responsibility for be strategic, enabling the CEO to be well-informed in nuclear safety according to the Act on Nuclear Activities matters that may have consequences on nuclear safety and and national regulations. This means that the licence performance. By reporting its findings, the CINSO holders of the operating nuclear companies have the full function is also to provide added value to the Chief responsibility for taking measures to comply with the Nuclear Officer (CNO) and the licence holders. The legislation. Additionally, all nuclear activities within Uniper CNO reports directly to the CEO. shall comply with the Uniper Nuclear Safety Policy, which also constitutes an important point of reference for the The NSC advises the CEO on matters of nuclear safety corporate independent nuclear oversight performed. and performance from an external perspective.

60 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

CINSO is independent of the line organisation, and rule violations benefit from special protection according to reports directly to the CEO at SNP. The purpose of the principles of the Code of Conduct. In other words, a CINSO is to create an additional layer in the defence in whistleblower need not fear any retaliation resulting from depth by advising SNP´s CEO and top management on his or her report. safety and performance in SNP´s nuclear business. Investigations and evaluations relating to compliance Processes and performance should be systematically incidents are coordinated by the chief compliance officer assessed with identified gaps reported to the line organisaat Uniper. tion for decision making and actions.

The basis for the process of CINSO is to challenge safety 10.4.2.2. Legislation board at OKG performance over and above legal requirements and the Uniper, as the owner, exercises control over OKG. Uniper level of standards and guidelines from international organi- governs OKG through recommendations and business sations. The activities should be planned adequately in strategies.

order to ensure that all relevant aspects of SNP´s nucle- OKG, as a licensee, assesses whether, and the extent to ar-related business are covered, thus providing the means which, these recommendations and strategies comply with to work systematically and be proactive. This is done as the regulatory requirements. This assessment, which is part of a continual review plan that is reviewed annually to conducted by the legislation board, identifies gaps between also cover current areas of interest. Uniper’s recommendations and strategies in relation to the Assessments are made with the aim to achieve best safety regulations and the impact on OKG from the perspectives performance from a corporate point of view, thus adding of current legislation and safety requirements.

value by reviewing quality and safety against safety criteria and best practice. Nuclear safety assessments are 10.4.3. Safety culture programmes performed in order to identify areas for improvements and Maintaining a strong safety culture when operating and to give a second opinion for the line organisation’s safety decommissioning nuclear power plants is considered a vital oversight. aspect by the Swedish utilities. Safety culture is emphasised in the policies of the different plants and in their strategic Depending on the severity of identified gaps, reporting is planning. Management at all levels, including the managing to be performed immediately or according to a reporting directors, is involved in activities to enhance the safety schedule. Recommendations made by CINSO are followed culture and to stress the responsibility of all personnel to by relevant indicators until completion. work actively in maintaining and developing the safety The main recipient of outcomes from CINSO is the CEO culture standard, for further information see section 12.2.1.

of SNP. Regular reporting also takes place to SNP’s board

10.4.4. Safety Management at OKG

of directors and to the managing directors of the plants. In order to strengthen the conditions for, and under- A number of different evaluations of the function of standing of, a safe and efficient business, OKG has over CINSO have been conducted. The effectiveness of the the past three years maintained focus on safety manageindependent oversight process is self-assessed annually. ment, operational excellence and safety culture. The aim Uniper also has a Nuclear Safety Council which serves as has been to increase the competence of the employees and the highest independent function. Uniper Nuclear Safety to create an understanding of how their own tasks have an Council, UNSC, consists of senior nuclear experts and impact on radiation safety and the importance of provides recommendations to the CNO based on a performing them correctly. Among other things, these combination of observing the organisation and the plants efforts have taken place in the form of dialogue seminars and by studying assessment and performance reports. Most for all employees and certain hired staff.

members of the UNSC are external senior experts who

10.4.5. Safety culture during a period

give an additional, external view on safety aspects.

of preparation for decommissioning

10.4.2.1. Whistleblowing function Oskarshamn NPP

Employees at Uniper are to report any potential violations of Since the last report the work with safety culture within the the Code of Conduct and other violations of law or internal framework of decommissioning has been streamlined with company policies. All employees have the oppor tunity to the safety culture strategy and activities being generally securely submit reports on any violation, also anony mously adopted at the OKG NPP. The same values, expectations if desired, via the Uniper “whistleblower hotline”. and actions are applied to decommissioning as well as operations. Reports on potential violations within the company may be directed to any member of the Uniper Compliance Team Ownership for safety culture has been firmly established in and to supervisors serving as internal ombudsmen. This the management of the decommissioning and is an integral opportunity is equally available to all third parties (e.g. part to maintaining safety at the sites. customers and suppliers) who have a business relationship Some activities have been performed to accommodate the with Uniper. shift from radiological safety to a more conventional Each report received will be treated with the utmost industrial safety perspective. This has been a gradual confidentiality. Also, all employees who report potential progress as the plant has transitioned from activities that

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 61

are radiological in nature, such as removal of fuel from the maintained. The strategy of the project is to decrease or reactors, tracing and removing radioactive materials and mitigate the consequences of the three risks mentioned cleaning out radioactive environments to more conven- above. This is carried out in cooperation between the tional jobs such as dismantling, cutting and logistical project’s human factors and safety culture specialist, handling of parts and debris. together with the line organisation’s representative, who has the formal responsibility. With the transition from primary hazards from radiological to industrial a tighter cooperation has been established Methods for identifying signals from the organisation have with the work environment to ensure a safety culture been developed. These are monitored continually and perspective. This has been activities such as joint meetings, corrective actions are identified, when applicable. For key safety culture perspective in work environment inspections, actions, the effect of corrective actions is monitored. joint perspective and attendance of Pre Job Briefs among Applicable activities include: other activities. – A method was developed in 2015 for regularly Changes in organizational structure within the decommis- evaluating whether signals on degraded safety sioning project has required a renewed focus on psycho-so- performance due to a shutdown decision can be cial wellbeing and its effect on safety culture. Surveys have identified within the organisation, or whether signals been performed to gauge the feeling and attitude of can be identified relating to the company’s capability to workers and managers in a transitional situation. Coupled successfully manage the transition; this method has been with management dialogue a re-established focus has been applied every three months since its inception. on prioritizing management in the field, conventional – An interview programme involving 10 managers was coaching and safety coaching on select jobs has been introduced in 2017. This programme is carried out prioritized areas. quarterly to convey an up-to-date picture of Continuous sharing between the different decommis- organisational status regarding the change process, sioning sites has been performed enhance safety culture. motivation, competence, challenges, etc. on the part of Since the same activities and work is being performed at different departments and groups. An analysis of multiple sites care has been taken to utilize the experience aggregated results is also performed on a yearly basis. and learning in each activity to enhance performance when – Comments and conclusions from the Swedish Radiation it’s being performed at other sites. Safety Authority’s supervisory activities are compiled yearly, and relevant corrective actions are evaluated. The pandemic has had an influence on how safety culture – A supplementary follow-up of signals indicating a high is handled but is not specific to decommissioning. See workload was carried out in 2017, with a follow-up on chapter 12.2.1.2. motivation to be performed in 2019.

Ringhals NPP unit 1 and 2

Actions

The decision to decommission Ringhals units 1 and 2 was Several actions have been taken in relation to safety culture made in April 2015. In May 2015, a dedicated project, in the stage of transition to decommissioning: called STURE, was assigned to prepare for the decommissioning. The purpose of the project is to prepare for – A safety culture workshop was held in 2016 in order to decommissioning, mainly regarding technical and organisa- identify and discuss safety culture challenges related to tional aspects, and thereby support the line organisation the transition to decommissioning. In addition to the focusing on safe and reliable operation. risks identified from literature and experience exchange, the workshop resulted in five focus areas (groupthink, One part of the STURE project is a sub-project on human normalisation, clear standards, motivation, lack of resources and safety culture. The purpose of this project is holistic perspective). to identify and secure overall company actions needed within the areas of human resources, competence and – After the safety culture workshop, communication took safety culture. place in 2016 and 2017 covering the five focus areas. The topic was on encouraging managers and employees The safety environment of a plant requires regular and to reflect upon their current and future work situation. sufficient attention so that a healthy nuclear safety culture – Two workshops with employees regarding the future at can be maintained. The transitional period between a Ringhals were held in 2017. Their purpose was to focus decision and a shutdown poses a challenge to the safety on new opportunities in the future. culture. From literature studies and experience exchange, – A “transition to decommissioning” perspective is three risks have emerged as essential to address: applied to other safety culture evaluation activities, such – Loss of motivation, as the company’s overall safety culture evaluations, – Loss of knowledge and experience, and which were performed in 2016 and 2018. – Decreased quality in work processes, with degraded – A workshop was carried out in 2018 on the topic of technical safety as a consequence. organisational and social work environment. – Another strong emphasis is placed on high-priority

Goals, strategies and measurements

topical issues in the area of communication The goal is to prevent safety culture degradation due to the (see section 11.2.2.2). shutdown decision, i.e. a healthy safety culture should be

62 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

10.5. Regulatory control prioritisation of forthcoming supervisory activities relating

to key safety issues. Inspection results, international work, SSM performs a number of regulatory activities in order to research and other inputs may indicate that SSM needs to verify that the licensees give adequate priority to safety. devote regulatory resources to specific facilities and safety Some examples are provided below. issues.

The supervision described in section 8.8 is targeted to Moreover, the general safety regulations (SSMFS 2008:1) assess how safety is prioritised. Examples include inspecallow SSM to apply a flexible approach to reviewing plant tions of licensee safety programmes, management of modifications, safety cases and technical specifications. The organisational changes, management of safety reviews, and licensees are required to notify SSM of such modifications, management and assessment of incidents (conservative as well as to notify SSM of all plant and organisational decision making). modifications affecting conditions reported in the SAR, in

SSM applies a special methodology for rapid response addition to as modifications to the SAR itself, and to the

surveilliance inspections following significant events. Also, OLCs. The statement from the independent safety review

the decision-making process on the part of the licensees conducted by the licensee must be attached to the notifica-

regarding the operational status of the reactor following an tions. SSM also checks that the independent review report

event or identified deficiencies has received increased attached to the notification is of sufficient quality. Notifi-

attention in recent years. cations dealing with new or complex technology are usually

reviewed further by SSM, and assisted by external experts Another tool used for evaluating whether the licensees are if necessary. Large plant modifications must be notified in assigning adequate priority to safety is a yearly integrated the form of a preliminary safety analysis report in order to safety assessment (see section 8.8.5), which provides an systematically clarify all the interactions with the existing updated and comprehensive regulatory assessment of safety case. Following the commissioning and the first facility safety. entry into routine operation, necessary findings are to be

Furthermore, SSM monitors the work of licensees on incorporated in the SAR, and the SAR shall be finalised so

safety culture issues. This is mainly conducted through its that it describes and represents the nuclear power plant’s

regular inspections. The role of SSM in this context is to as-built status.

ensure that the licensees have proactive safety management SSM has an established a procedure with specified criteria in place. SSM expects the licensees to create and maintain a to assess the notifications and to decide whether a notificastrong safety culture. It is essential that the licensees react tion is sufficiently important from a safety point of view to in a timely manner to indications of deficiencies in their warrant detailed review (see section 14.3.5). A standing safety culture. If such deficiencies are not corrected, the group of experts (ABG) has been established by SSM in ability of the operating organisation to handle difficult order to conduct a first assessment of all notifications. situations and maintain safety will deteriorate. This group makes a proposal regarding each notification at

the management meeting of the nuclear power plant safety

10.5.1. Regular top management meetings

department. The proposals are categorised as follows:

with the licensees

At least once a year, the director general and department – No further action directors of SSM meet with the management group of – To be postponed until the notification meets the each nuclear power plant to discuss current issues and expected quality safety priorities. Annual meetings are also held with the – The notification should be further reviewed regarding corporate executives of the utilities. specified aspects (in this case the licensee is allowed to

introduce the modification during the SSM review)

10.5.2. Special or increased supervision

– The proposed modification shall not be allowed to be Ringhals NPP and the licencees adjustment to decommisintroduced until SSM has finalised it´s review. sioning has been subject to increased supervision during

2021–2022. The process of pre-reviewing of notifications is an

efficient and effective procedure that meets the expecta- OKG have adjusted to the scope and nature of simultations of SSM. It is also made clear that SSM has the neous operation and decommissioning since a period of necessary regulatory control over the modifications special supervison which was established in 2012 and without having to review everything in great detail or to ended in 2016. grant permission. This has enabled SSM to allocate

10.5.3. Actions taken by SSM to prioritise safety resources to more important safety tasks. The criteria in

One of the basic concepts of SSM’s supervisory use puts 20–25% of all notifications into the recommenda-

programme is to dedicate its supervisory resources to key tion category “review to be performed”.

safety issues. The annual activity planning process has, as This system allows SSM to concentrate its review resources its starting point, current regulatory challenges, which are on safety issues of key significance, while also retaining full documented, as well as input from SSM’s integrated safety insight intothe measures taken by the licensees. assessments and other regulatory processes. The supervi-

sory database in use is an important tool for integrated

safety assessments, but it is also used to facilitate SSM’s

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 63

Article 11. Financial and human resources

– New working methods for transferring employees have 1. Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps been developed, as a consequence of the need for more to ensure that adequate financial resources are available employees in the area of decomissioning and the to support the safety of each nuclear installation opposite for reactors in operation. throughout its life.

2. Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps 11.1. Regulatory requirements to ensure that sufficient numbers of qualified staff with appropriate education, training and retraining are In order to obtain a licence in Sweden, large adequate available for all safety-related activities in or for each financial resources must be committed in order to manage nuclear installation, throughout its life. the far-reaching safety obligations required by the Act on

Nuclear Activities and SSM’s regulations. Each prospective

Summary of developments since licensee must be assessed in this respect.

the previous report In addition to this basic requirement, power plant licensees

must pay a fee on each produced kWh to a state-controlled Oskarshamn units 1 and 2 are permanently shut down fund, the Nuclear Waste Fund, as per the Act on Financing and Ringhals units 1 and 2 were closed in 2020 and 2019, of Management of Residual Products from Nuclear respectively. This has reduced the number of employees Activities (2006:647). This is to ensure that financing is needed, and this number will be reduced further. At the available for the future decommissioning, management and same time, this will increase the need for employees within disposal of spent fuel and nuclear waste, including the the area of decommissioning. The licensees have handled research needed for these activities. The fees are calculated the situation by conducting a proactive transitional activity. on the assumption that each reactor will generate electricity The licensees have reduced redundancies in their operafor 50 years, though always with a minimum remaining tional organisations and the number of individual agreeoperating time of six years. If there is insufficient assets in ments for leaving the companies has been smaller than the Fund to pay for the costs, the licensees will nevertheinitially expected. This approach has ensured sufficient less still be liable. For a reactor site with no reactor in competence in the organisations and a distribution based operation, the remaining costs for a permanently shut on the needs. down reactor shall be paid to the fund within three years. Since last reporting period, the following developments have In addition, the power plant licensees shall provide two

taken place with regard to the obligations of Article 11: separate financial guarantees as security in order to account

for possible early shutdowns and for costs in connection – Significant financial funds have been invested in with unforeseen events. The Government´s decision in Swedish nuclear power plants during the last few years. December 2017 on fees and financial guarantees for the – A revision of the Financing act was promulgated in period 2018–2020 2 for the first time took into account the 2017, clarifying the principles for how the nuclear waste utilities decisions for the early permanent shut down of fee is calculated and how assets in the Nuclear Waste reactors in Oskarshamn and Ringhals, resulting in fewer Fund are to be managed in order to reduce the state´s production units paying for the future liabilities. financial risk. Based on the revised act, nuclear waste

fees and finacial guarantees for Nuclear power plants Licensees are also required to pay regulatory and research

have been decided by the Government for the period fees invoiced by the regulatory body. These fees are laid

2018–2020. down in ordinances and payable to the Government, see

– General transfer of competence is still of high priority also section 8.5.9.

at all Swedish nuclear power plants.

2 The nuclear waste fees for 2018-2020 are 0.033 SEK/kWh for Forsmark Kraftgrupp AB, 0.064 for OKG AB and 0.052 for Ringhals AB. Required financial guarantees amount to an average of 14 billion SEK per licensee.

64 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

As mentioned under 10.1, Section 3 of the Act on Nuclear According to Chapter 4 Section 2 (and annex 2) of SSMFS

Activities requires that the safety requirements shall be 2008:1, the principles for training and examination of

fulfilled at all nuclear activities. Section 13 2 of the same competence for all personal of importance to safety shall

Act, further requires that licensees shall have the required be documented in the SAR.

operating organization, financial, administrative and personnel resources to achieve this. 11.1.1. Development of new regulations

SSM has developed new regulations for nuclear safety, In the area of human resources, Chapter 3, Sections 10 and which enter into force 1 March 2022, i.e., after the current 11 of SSMFS 2018:1 clearly stipulate requirements for reporting period. For nuclear power plants, the regulations staffing, competence and training of personnel at all SSMFS 2008:1, SSMFS 2008:32, SSMFS 2008:26 and licensed activities involving ionising radiation. The licensee SSMFS 2014:2 are superseded by the new regulations has to ensure that the staff has the competence and SSMFS 2021:4, SSMFS 2021:5 and SSMFA 2021:6, from 1 suitability needed for all tasks of importance for safety or march 2022. The new requirements on competence and security. This must be documented. Long-term planning is training are manily found in Chapter 3 of SSMFS 2021:6. required in order to ensure a sufficient and available While previous requirements of SSMFS 2008:32 focused workforce having adequate competence and suitability for on specific roles and positions in the organisation, the new the safety-related tasks. A systematic approach should be requirements instead uses a broader perspective of tasks to used for the definition of competence requirements, and be performed, using a graded approach to the safety for planning and evaluation of all safety-related training. significance of the tasks performed by individual Annual competence assessments shall be performed. To personnel. The new requirements also more clearly the extent applicable, these general requirements also apply requires a systematic planning of competences and human to using contractors. Another requirement for safety-reresources, criteria for competence requirements, training, lated tasks is to ensure a careful balance between using authorization and re-authorisation of personnel, by the in-house personnel and contractors. The competence licensee. Chapter 3 of SSMFS 2021:6 also include new and necessary for ordering, managing and evaluating contracted clarified requirements regarding quality of education and work should always exist within the organisation of a training of personnel. nuclear installation.

In addition to the general requirements in SSMFS 2018:1, 11.2. Compliance by licence holders Sections 6 and 7 of SSMFS 2008:26 contain requirements

on training principles and practices for radiation protec-

11.2.1. Financial resources

tion, valid for both own personnel and contractors, in two The majority owners of the Swedish nuclear power plants levels depending on tasks assigned to the individual worker. are Vattenfall and Sydkraft NP, with ownership shares as The first level of this training (minimum requirement) shown in figure 3 of section 1.2.3. The Swedish state is the must be repeated every third year. Section 8 of SSMFS sole owner of Vattenfall, while the owner of Sydkraft NP 2008:26 also states that the training performed should be is the German energy company, Uniper SE. documented. Vattenfall and Uniper are two large electrical power Specific regulations govern operational staff at nuclear producers in Sweden and elsewhere in Europe. Besides the power plants and research reactors (SSMFS 2008:32 nuclear power plants, they also have substantial assets in Regulation on the competence of operation personnel at hydropower, thermal power and wind power. Both groups nuclear reactor facilities). These regulations also encompass are financially stable and have good financial records. operations managers and plant managers to the extent the latter are involved in the operational decision making. To date, all safety investments in the nuclear power plants

Operational staff must be formally authorised by the are decided by the bord of the reactor companies and have

licensee for the specific position. The authorisation is valid been financed by loans from the owner. A high safety level,

for three years under certain conditions. demonstrated by a good safety record, is considered an

essential component of the total business concept and as Chapter 10, Sections 1–3 of SSMFS 2014:2 also specifies legal and commercial grounds for the licensees. Costs for more detailed requirements on competrence and training safety improvements are considered an integrated part of regarding emergency preparedness and emergency the operating costs. response at nuclear facilities.

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 65

Table 4. Number of employees working for the licensees.

Nuclear Power Plant 2021 2020 2019 2018 2017 2016 2015

Oskarshamn* 561 555 575 629 672 865 957

Forsmark 1145 1152 1154 1166 1168 1166 1154

Ringhals** 1017 1194 1277 1375 1420 1498 1627

* Note: Decision to decommission in 2015. Decommissioning initiated for two units in 2017. ** Note: Decision to decommission in 2015. Decommissioning initiated for two units in 2019 and 2020, respectively.

11.2.2. Staffing 11.2.2.1. Transferring of competence at

The number of employees working for the licensees has the Oskarshamn NPP been changing somewhat over the past few years, see Table Since last reporting period, no major changes have been 4. Consultants and contractors are not included in these made regarding the procedure for transferring competence figures. The number of contractors used during a unit at OKG.

refuelling outage, normally lasting between two to five The short term objective is still to: weeks, is, as before, between 500 and 1,000. The decision in 2015 by the plant owners to decommission four reactors – In every group, create a plan for the upcoming need for at Oskarshamn and Ringhals, and the subsequent initiation transferring of competence; and

of decommissioning activities at the respective sites, have – From this plan, create individual plans for those who are led to stepwise decreases of staffing numbers at the plants, expected to leave the company within the next few years. while at Forsmark, the number of employees has been The longer-term perspective is still to: relatively stable. – Create an environment in day-to-day operations that A challenging factor regarding the continued use of stimulates transfer of competence. consultants is that several of them having experience from – During the autumn of 2015, the company board took a the start of the nuclear programme have changed positions definitive decision to begin the decommissioning of and or are no longer available. units 1 and 2, starting immediately at unit 2 and after the The staffing and competence planning at the plants has summer of 2017 at unit 1. Consequently, many of the been reinforced over the past few years. The need for procedures regarding competence and staffing have high-level competence in specific areas has been identified been further developed in order for OKG to meet the and competence profiles have been defined. By comparing challenges of keeping two units in decommissioning these profiles with the available expertise, the need for and one unit in long-term operation. OKG must be development and training of employees and for recruit- successful in maintaining strategic competencies and ment has been assessed. obtaining new competencies simultaneously.

The need to “rejuvenate” the nuclear power plant organisa- OKG has thus performed a staffing and competence tions is obvious when considering the average age of the analysis for the remaining business timeframe for the period plants. At OKG, the average employee working today is 2015-2050. The aim of this analysis has been to assess the about 49 years old. In addition to these figures, about 15 need for various competencies and estimate staffing levels employees per year face retirement from OKG over the during the entire expected life span of the company. The forthcoming years. Of OKG’s 565 present employees, the experience and the result from the transition within the ratio male-female is about 80/20. The situation is compacompany is that new working methods are developed as a rable to the situation at FKA and RAB. result of a reduced total workload, with fewer employees All licensees work actively to transfer knowledge from and simultaneous production and decommissioning, with soon to retire, experienced staff to the next generation. an increasing workload in the area of decommissioning. The planning builds on mapping of strategic competence This means that analyses based on previous assessments needs and individual plans to replace key personnel. Other gradually become out of date and therefore there is a approaches include trainee programmes and the involve- recurring need for reconsideration parts of previous ment of young engineers together with highly experienced analyzes. In accordance with OKG’s routines, a review of staff in modernization and development projects as well as the staffing analyzes is carried out annually. For example, in in international R&D projects. Current planning at the the framework of the development of the work with different sites is described below. demolition and demolition, OKG reviews the staffing analyzes over time.OKG has completed the planned The decision to permanently shut down the four oldest transition as regards the number of employees in two steps units in Sweden has made the competence and staffing – the first step in autumn 2017 and the second step in plans even more important. Activities regarding compeautumn 2019. A total of 150 employees left OKG as a tence planning have therefore been intensified and the result of termination or individual agreements during these plans are more detailed. The goal is to secure competence years. During the same period of time approximately 220 prior to the closure and to support a good transition employees changed positions or organisation affiliation. process.

66 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

A change of this kind requires careful preparation, and external recruitments have been minimized during the

great importance is attached to managing identified risks so transition period.

that safety and serviceability are not compromised during Since the announcement of closure 2015, a total of 480 the transition work. Risk analyses have been conducted employees have left the company. Of these, a total of 150 continuously at different levels and having different time employees left OKG as a result of downsizing 2017 och perspectives. Skills requirements that arise in the business 2019. During the period från 2015 until 2021 about 330 are handled in a company transitional meeting, where employees departed for natural reasons, such as retirement decisions on further management are made. The or other jobs outside OKG Staff turnover was during the magnitude and nature of the needs that arise paint an years 2016 and 2017 higher than normal, and the reason ongoing picture of the state of competence in the for this was likely the uncertainty sensed by many people company, and indicate whether there is a need for more during the transition of the company and the currently extensive measures in any specific area. very favourable local labour market. From 2018, staff

On a more detailed level, mapping of key competencies turnover returned to normal.

has been carried out at the company. This basis has given During the summer and autumn of 2016, OKG and the OKG a comprehensive picture of key positions and owners produced a staffing analysis, and in parallel, work individuals within the company, which in itself has began on developing new competence requirements for provided the prerequisites to be able to plan strategies and OKG’s operations. In 2017 step one in the planned conduct long-term development planning for the whole transition as regards the number of employees was organisation in a more robust manner. Examples of completed. In this step all employees were assessed against activities that have been run to address the problem of the new requirements for the position they had at the time. staffing and competence of staff within OKG and in the The competence assessment and the previously completed industry are strengthening of the brand, expanding mapping of formal competence were important tools for contacts with the education system, and deepening future staffing of the new OKG.OKG then conducted collaboration with regional businesses and various types of negotiations with the trade union organisations, where the industry. This includes BWR Future, an investigation in staffing level was established and the proper procedure was which Nordic licensees and suppliers jointly map available decided. The main principle was that the number of years competencies in the area of boiling water reactor techof employment and sufficient competence were the nology. OKG also needs to maintain an environment primary selection criteria. The company produced a basis where employees are encouraged to move between for staffing at the individual level, which also became the different positions, thus developing their competence and subject of negotiation before a message could be leaving new positions open for others. submitted to all co-workers. In 2019 step two in the

The supply of additional, changed and existing compe- planned transition as regards the number of employees

tence areas requires a structured and goal-oriented work was completed in similar ways as step one.

with competence assurance. It also requires an effectiv use In connection with the redundancies, recurring checks of of the tools that are available, such as plans for compefitness for duty were carried out in the business, and tence development, competence transfer and succession throughout the process, transparent and factual informaplanning. This applies to both the competence needed for tion was provided to employees. All departments at OKG the decommissioning of unit O1 and O2 and the compealso carried out recurrent psychosocial surveys in order to tence needed for the long-term operation of unit O3. be able to catch signals early on if the general conditions

Transition work at the Oskarshamn NPP changed. The questionnaires also provided the basis for

internal discussions and adapted support measures. When The overall strategy for the transition work has always been all employees were informed, the managers could also start to have the work and its approach create an image of the planning for transfer of competence, handing over company that all employees are proud to be part of, and to assignments, and receiving new employees. In support of have those who are let go have the desire to start working this work, checklists were developed. for the company again if the possibility arises.

The decision to end operation of units 1 and 2 made Prior to adapting the staffing, the department head

redun dancies necessary. However, thanks to the company’s presented a departmental implementation plan for the

proactivity immediately after the announcement to shut transition in order to create an overall picture of the

down units 1 and 2, measures were taken to minimize the change and document the measures that would be

future redundancy, and the figures for redundancies and implemented to manage the changeover. The plan was a

individual agreements were smaller than was initially living document throughout the transition. It was of great

expected. importance to be prepared to be able to quickly manage

the changes that the process entails. Other important A transitional meeting was created, the purpose of which measures are the management’s accessibility for conversawas to have all the competence needs that arise in the tions and support in everyday life and in dialogue stations, company dealt with there for further decision making. supplemented by the CEO and HR manager’s round of This is to ensure that sufficient competence exists and visits to all departments to meet employees in a direct that it is distributed where it is best needed. As a result, dialogue. Altogether, these measures have been crucial to

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 67

the success of the implementation, progress and result to select one, or several, mentees, and to assess the need alike. for support from human resources (HR) to implement all the skill changes. To be able to ensure the competence of control room staff – Training: The purpose of this training is to give the at unit 1 and unit 2, which was one of the largest risks stakeholders a shared understanding of the following identified, a number of measures were taken. From the areas: what skills transfer is, what each role entails, the first moment after the owners’ notice regading decision on areas included in the transfer of skills, and the support closure, continuous meetings were held where both the or assistance that is available. CEO and the HR manager, together with the plant managers, met with employees in joint dialogue. In – Competence Shift Plan created: To create a skills addition to this, specific agreements were concluded for transfer plan that describes in detail how the work will the benefit of the operators. be performed in terms of objectives and activities. Identify forms of monitoring and for starting skills One conclusion from the year of transformation was that exchange. it is important to continuously evaluate risk analyses and – Competence Exchange Activities implemented: To associated measures. Some changes in the business have implement the planned activities for achievement of the taken place faster than planned, while others have been set of competence transfer goals. slower. For this reason, it has been crucial for the manage- – Monitoring and evaluation conducted: Follow up to ment to continually monitor signals from the organisation. ensure that the objectives of competence shift are At the end of 2020, the company management evaluated achieved and to consider experience for further process the transformation with both internal and external development. competencies. The decision for permanent shut down of Ringhals 1 and In 2020, an annual process began for long-term compe- 2 was taken in April 2015. In May 2015, a dedicated project tence management with the purpose to meet and deal with was assigned to prepare for the decommissioning. The the challenges and oppurtunities that follow from simultapurpose of the project is to prepare for decommissioning, neously operating one single unit in production and two mainly regarding technical and organisational aspects, units for decommissioning. As a result of the annual thereby supporting the line organisation focusing on safe process, joint work has been established within Uniper and reliable operation. A sub-project concerns Human Nuclear Sweden in the areas such as competence Resources (HR) and safety culture. assurance, attractive employers and supplier market.

Goals, strategies and evaluations

11.2.2.2. Competence assurance at the Ringhals NPP A long term goal for the HR transition was developed to In the next few years, it is estimated that 30 employees are secure the right competence and staffing as of that time expected to retire from Ringhals each year. Strategies for and forward to minimize potential redundancies. This is transferring key competencies are based on an annual essential in the ambition to decrease risks regarding loss of competence and staffing plan covering future needs and the motivation, loss of knowledge and experience, as well as balance between Ringhals employees and contractors or degradation in work processes. consultants. The need for competence transfer is an annual The following goals for the HR transition have been process. The “competence transfer” means an intentional developed: learning programme having a clear goal in a situation where a person (mentor) with important knowledge will retire, – Create a clear picture of the future and a well-defined resign, or where Ringhals from a vulnerability perspective change process up until 2022. needs to change a specific skill. The mentor then transfers – Secure and adapt competence and staffing continuously. the competence to one or more persons (mentees) so that – Managers will have abilities and feel secure in handling the knowledge is retained at Ringhals. the change process. The competence and staffing plan is based on an annual – Everyone will receive information and have inventory regarding the strategic competencies that opportunities for dialogue and support. Ringhals needs for fulfilment of short and long term – Everyone will have an individual professional company goals. development plan, both short term and long term.

A specific method for competence transfer was developed – We will cooperate internally and externally to identify and has been in place since 2009. The method involves the good solutions from company and employee following steps: perspectives.

To support the goals, the following strategies were – Inventory: To annually create a comprehensive list of all identified: possible candidates for skills transfer.

– Selecting: To determine which persons’ competencies – Continuously strive to perform actions that lead towards should be transferred. current and future needs regarding organisation,

– Competence Inventory: To create an understanding of strategies, ways of working, competence needs and the the skills that each mentor is expected to transfer. Also, number of employees.

68 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

– Strong focus on listening and flexibility. Adapt the plan – Estimating and mapping the needs of employees from to upcoming needs. 2020 and onwards.

– Minimise the risk of redundancies in the form of – Investigating and mapping the employer’s ambitions in natural personnel turnover or transitions to other units relation to the company’s future needs. of Vattenfall, i.e. decommissioning, or externally. The – Preparation to reduce shifts (from seven to six) in the company cannot promise more than it can keep. event of large staff turnover.

– Collect experiences and good practices from – Regular meetings with employees for information and decommissioning and HR transitions. involvement.

– Communicate and visualise future possibilities with a – Training and transferring operators from units 1 and 2 focus on units 3 and 4. to units 3 and 4 to increase flexibility and motivation.

Evaluation of performance indicators, i.e. leadership index, – Contractors help to bridge gaps.

engagement index and personnel turnover, was established. – Analysis of minimum staff during defueling ready in Methods were developed for identification of other signals 2019. from the organisation. Indicators and signals were Actions have also been taken by other parts of the monitored on a monthly basis and acted on by senior organisation. Within engineering and maintenance, minor management. Trends were monitored over these years. If organisational changes are continually made to reduce the needed, corrective actions were taken. As far as concerns number of employees. One major challenge is restricted key actions, the effect of corrective actions was monitored. recruitment when employees depart – preparing for unit 2 Actions on an overall organsational level operation – while retaining key skills and expertise. The Several actions have been taken on various management actions were taken to increase flexibility within and levels in the organisation. between departments as well as achieve effective use of consultants and contractors. The most important actions are:

Communication

– In 2015, individual dialogues were initiated between Close collaboration was maintained between the project managers and employees to deal with feelings relating to and communications. A communication strategy and plan the decision. Since then, individual dialogues are one of have been developed. the most important communication tools during the change process. Communication has mainly focused on opportunities:

– Incentives for control room operators were – Decommissioning – development and possibilities. implemented in 2015 and revised in 2016. A bonus – Opportunities for personal development – focus on scheme was implemented in 2017 for the control room internal recruitment. operators of units 1 and 2. – A long time between the decision and shutdown from a – Training in change management was provided for human perspective – time to plan and address questions managers, union representatives and HR staff in 2015 and challenges. and 2016. – Two reactors will close, two will stay in production. – Principles for management of the HR transition were The company will still be a major employer. negotiated in 2016. New meeting fora for addressing – Decommissioning opportunities for employees forming questions concerning competence and staffing were a new business area. implemented on departmental level and company level in 2016. Communication has mainly involved weekly updates via a

– A simplified internal recruitment process was newsletter on the intranet with a personal tone of voice. implemented in 2017. The risk of losing one’s job is a personal matter and should – Individual dialogues regarding individual wishes for the be addressed with this in mind. Multiple channels have future were conducted in 2017 and 2018, in addition to been used: meetings, open fora, opportunities to pose a gap analysis comparing future needs with employees’ questions anonymously to the management, and editorials wishes. in the staff magazine and on the intranet.

– An incentive programme called “65 plus” was

11.2.2.3. Competence assurance at the Forsmark NPP

introduced in 2019 to encourage elderly employees to The goal for transferring competence is set in the business remain in the workforce instead of retiring. plan. To create a positive attitude, the human resource Actions on departmental level department and the respective managers have to be engaged Operations, and especially the control room operators of and take responsibility for carrying out the action plans. units 1 and 2, have been an area of special concern due to The process of transferring competence (knowledge, skills the risk of losing competence and motivation. Several and attitude) consists of several steps: actions have been taken on departmental level, for example: – Whose competence is important to transfer? The identified need of transferring necessary long-term – A risk forum addressing risks and needs during competence is documented in the annual strategic action 2015–2016.

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 69

plans, following a dialogue conducted between the extended check is also performed with regard to fitness for respective managers and HR staff. duty. This extended check is required for issuance of the – What kind of competence? The chosen individuals authorisation, which is valid for three years. The systematic work in groups developing the existing task analysis, approach is being extended to encompass maintenance focusing on the specific competencies of each person. staff and other groups with tasks of importance for safety.

In view of explicit and tacit knowledge by means of, for The line managers of the operating organisations are example, interviews and observations, new information responsible for the training of their staff and for is gathered on performance of the tasks. providing the necessary resources. KSU (the Swedish – To whom shall the competence be transferred? The Nuclear Training and Safety Centre) has been contracted results of renewed and in-depth competence task by the licensees to carry out most of the operator analysis are used to complement available working training and annual re-training. The training and compemethods for the competence transfer and tence follow-up systems are audited by the licensees on a documentation, e.g. instructions, material for training, regular basis to ensure that they fulfil specifications and work rotation, supervision and guidance, pre-job requirements. Procedures for plant and safety documenbriefing, and daily practices. Depending on the level of tation modifications ensure that such modifications are knowledge and experience of recipients or mentees introduced into the training programmes. The annual suitable methods are identified. The measures must be training inventories ensure that domestic and relevant discussed in the development dialogues and international operational experience is incorporated into documented in the personal development plans. the training programmes.

– How to transfer competence and by whom? Several KSU has significant resources for training and production methods can be used depending on the recipients or of training material. The total number of training days per mentees and supervisors. In the case of employees who year during the review period varies in the range of will serve as supervisors, the measures are to be 4.000–5.000 days. KSU also has an extensive instructor discussed in the development dialogues and training programme for its own staff with several qualificadocumented in the personal action plans. tion levels.

11.2.2.4. Training of nuclear power plant staff Since 2000, all operator training has been moved from the All licensees have a systematic approach in place for KSU central facility in Studsvik to the local centres situated training of operators. Training programmes are developed near the power plants. Full-scale simulators for all operating based on task analysis and definitions of required compe- reactors are now located at these local training centres. tence. A systematic method is also used to define the annual The degree of training has decreased in the past few years re-training that is required. The training programmes due to the completion of the extensive modernisation include theoretical courses, on-site training with experiprogrammes. The number of training days is estimated to enced colleagues and full scope simulator training, as well as be reduced yet further over the forthcoming five years due training performed in a workplace environment. to the decommissioning of four units at Swedish NPPs. Control room personnel are subject to an internal The need for future training in decommissioning activities promotion schedule in which the operators begin working is expected to slightly increase, though this estimation as field operators. The qualification time to become a remains uncertain. reactor operator is about five years, and to become a shift supervisor, a minimum of seven years. 11.3. Regulatory control The mandatory training programmes typically include basic Through its supervision, SSM has concluded that the courses in nuclear technology and safety, plant knowledge licensee compliance with SSM’s requirements for compeincluding systems, processes and dynamics, operational tence assurance is satisfactory. The required systematic limits and conditions (Tech-Spec), radiation protection, approach is in place to ensure long term staffing and plant organisation and work routines. Operational competence, including health checks, as well as systems for personnel are given extended courses on systems, ensuring the competence of consultants and contractors. processes and dynamics, transients and accident scenarios, operational procedures, emergency operating procedures, However, SSM has previously observed delays and quality and Tech-Spec. problems in the modernisation and power uprate

programmes at the nuclear power plants. It is paramount The control room operators receive about 10 days of that these kinds of problems do not negatively affect the annual re-training, partly on a simulator, divided into two safety of the plants. SSM is therefore continuing to focus periods: one that focuses on normal operation startup and attention on the licensees’ systems for ensuring quality of shutdown procedures, and one period on transients and services purchased, e.g. assuring supplier and consultant accidents. All simulator sessions are evaluated systematically. competence. In addition, the licensees’ reliance on Competence assessments against specified criteria are contractors and consultants might decrease in the forthperformed each year by operations management. This is coming years, due to the permanent shutdown of four to check the required competence for the specific position units. It is difficult to predict whether this will affect the and to define further training needs. Every third year, an long-term availability of contractors with the right

70 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

competence. On the other hand, the shutdowns might lead The report submitted to the Government includes the to an increase of contractors with other competencies, and following suggestions: is therefore something that will be considered by SSM in – A comprehensive national strategy with coordinated the future. efforts is needed for achieving a higher level of effectiveness in the knowledge management system. 11.4. National availability of – Increase the funding provided to the critical core of qualified experts in nuclear safety research environments needed to maintain the and radiation protection knowledge management system. – Formalise the interaction between stakeholders in the As described in Section 1.2.7, all actors in the nuclear system for central government research funding to industry in Sweden are working systematically with guarantee that the relevant research environments as competency management and competence retention. described above will be sustained. SSM and the industry are also working systematically to – Ensure that education programmes critical to society in monitor the availability of qualified experts. In September the field of nuclear safety and radiation protection can 2018, SSM submitted a government assignment on the be run, and that the content of courses relating to the national long-term competence supply in the field of field is given defined objectives as necessary and radiation safety to the government. The final report subjected to quality assurance. describes how a healthy competence supply consists of university education that attracts students to study in the In addition, one recommendation was given to employers field, research that provides university programmes with within the field: competence and meets society’s need for expertise, and – Several stakeholders should run campaigns and issue employers who attract and employ the skilled labour. communication for attracting students so that they enrol The report shows that there are shortcomings in the in nuclear safety and radiation protection education supply of skills in the radiation safety area in Sweden, programmes and choose occupations in the field. mainly due to the following: Since September 2018, some progress has been made. The – Students are not being attracted to the field as industry has with good results carried out campaigns to decommissioning is taking place. attract employees, one university nuclear programme that – Financial pressure has made the nuclear industry reduce was previously closed down due to few student applicaits research budgets. tions has reopened, and SSM is reforming its work to – Nuclear programmes at the universities suffer from a strengthen the national strategic perspective on long-term lack of students and declining research budgets. knowledge management. – Certain competencies needed mainly in emergencies are in low demand by employers for their day-to-day operations, thus making it difficult for research projects of this kind to find matching sources of funding. – There are no incentives for central government sources of research funding to liaise on concerted investment for sustaining dynamic research environments relating to radiation safety.

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 71

Article 12. Human Factors

– Management system, including safety culture, Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to – Safety objectives and strategies, ensure that the capabilities and limitations of human performance are taken into account throughout the life of – Responsibilities and levels of authority,

a nuclear installation. – Competence assurance, fitness for duty,

– Occupational environment,

– Planning of nuclear activities, Summary of developments – Design adapted to human capabilities and limitations, since the previous report – Operational experience feedback, and – New general requirements have been implemented 2018 – Event investigation. including further development of many of the Chapter 3, Section 1 of SSMFS 2008:1 states general requirements related to human and organisational factors. requirement on that the design of a nuclear facility shall – Hosting of the first Country-Specific Safety Culture enable maintenance, surveillance and in-service inspection Forum. of structures, systems and components important to safety. – New requirements for nuclear power plants in operation The same section also general requires that the design as have been developed and enter into force in March 2022, far as resonably possible, shall facilitate radiation proteci.e. outside of the current reporting period. The require- tion (and physical protection). Chapter 3, Section 3 of ments will cover Human and organisational factors. SSMFS 2008:1 also states that the design of a nuclear

facility shall be adapted to the ability of operating personnel to monitor and operate the facility during both Introduction operational states and accident conditions. Also this The area of human factors has developed over many years adaption shall be assessed. and is now to many people known as “human and According to Chapter 4 Section 2 (and annex 2) of organisational factors” in order to further highlight the SSMFS 2008:1, the principles for design of control rooms breadth of the areas covered. This is also reflected in the and other operating positions where the human/machine development of SSM’s Code of Statutes. interface is important to safety, shall be documented in the SAR. 12.1. Regulatory requirements In addition, the regulation SSMFS 2008:17 contains more In June 2018, new general requirements were implemented specific requirements on: in the form of regulation SSMFS 2018:1. This regulation governs a wide range of requirements related to human – Design to allow operators sufficient time to understand and organisational factors, replacing several requirements situations and take safe actions, contained in SSMFS 2008:1. What differs the new general – Design of the central control room and the secondary requirements from earlier requirements in this area is a control room/control post, more detailed regulatory framework with additional – Evaluation of control room design as well as requirements and clearer guidelines that are provided. verification and validation of new solutions, and

The regulation SSMFS 2018:1, in conjunction with certain – Design requirements for detection and control of core requirements contained in SSMFS 2008:1, impose instability.

extensive requirements relating to human factors on the SSM requires that the licensees have adequate staff with following: competence concerning human factors in order to conduct

independent safety reviews (see section 14.1.3) of relevant – Safety monitoring and follow-ups, issues. There is no explicit requirement to have staff with – The operating organisation and its design, behavioural science competence in the line organisation of

72 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

the operators; however, SSM recommends this in order to – Safety culture programmes, and

integrate the human-technology-organisation (MTO) – Specific development and analysis projects.

perspective early on as part of plant modifications, experience feedback, investigation of events, assessments Swedish licensees use a set of specific methods for analysis

of safety culture, etc. of human factors events and trends. The analyses are

based on both the Human Performance Enhancement

12.1.1. Development of new regulations System (HPES) model and behavioural science expertise.

SSM has developed new regulations which enter into force Lately, recent developments in the field of event analysis

1 march 2022, i.e., after the current reporting period. New have been utilised, such as Functional Resonance Analysis

requirements in SSMFS 2021:4 will supersede the require- Methodology (FRAM).

ments related to human factors of SSMFS 2008:1 and All licensees take into account the human factors perspec- SSMFS 2008:17, for nuclear power plants. Chapter 4, tive in plant modifications, Human System Interface (HSI). Sections 18–20 of SSMFS 2021:4 present general require- To ensure that the work performance of operators and ments on incorporating human factors engineering other personnel is not negatively affected, HSI is applied principles in design of a nuclear power plant, with specific by means of several analyses and by dealing with known requirements on control rooms and other operating issues in the existing configuration. The modifications are positions in Chapter 7, Sections 21–24. In general, the new ultimately subject to a verification and validation process in requirements are more clear in describing the aim of order to ensure safe operation. Generally, the human minimizing risks for human errors, and that procedures factors engineering process is very similar to the US NRC’s and human tasks shall be included in the design, together Human Factors Engineering Program Review Model, with structures, systems and components. The new NUREG 0711. regulations SSMFS 2021:4 also include a separate chapter, Chapter 3, for requirements on the process of design, All licensees have formal procedures for assessment and

construction and commissioning. The requirements in this review of organisational changes. These procedures ensure

chapter also enhance the importance of a comprehensive that relevant safety aspects are considered when such

view of safety during this process including the human/ changes are notified to SSM and reviewed in the same

machine interface and the importance to validate i.e. manner as technical changes.

operating and other procedures during design and R&D projects in MTO have been conducted over the commissioning. years on:

– Design assessment of control rooms, 12.2. Compliance of the licence holders – Operability verification, Maintaining a strong safety culture in the operation of – Assessment of plant changes, nuclear power plants is considered vital by the Swedish – Non-destructive testing from a human factors utilities, and this is emphasised in the policies of the perspective, different plants and in their strategic plans. Management at – Development of methods for human reliability all levels, including the managing director’s, is involved in assessments, activities to enhance the safety culture and to stress the – Event analysis, responsibility of all personnel to work actively in maintaining and developing the safety culture standard. – Good practices in control rooms,

– Evaluation of control room function during outages, Furthermore, the concept of the interaction between – Team training of control room operators, MTO has become an established component in the nuclear – Safety culture surveys, safety work of all Swedish nuclear power plants, supported by policies, responsibilities and organisational structures. – Safety diagnosis of the plant organisation,

Currently, all the licensees have MTO specialists with a – Assessment of organisational modifications,

behavioural science background or similar industrial field – Resilience engineering in maintenance outages,

experience in their independent safety review functions – Human performance tools in maintenance, and

(see section 14.2.5). All licensees have specialist teams – Learning from successes in maintenance (i.e. Safety II). whose work focuses on human and organisational issues.

The responsibility of these teams is to gather competence Research in the area of HSI, i.e. on best practices in main

(both technical and behavioural) and to work with MTO control rooms and research on operators’ need for

issues, experience feedback, safety culture, management computer-based tools, is being conducted at the

development and organisational issues. Typically, MTO Norwegian Institute for Energy Technology (IFE) in

competence is used within the licensee organisations for collaboration with utilities in Sweden and Finland.

the following activities: Research on Resilience Engineering (RE), Human Perfor-

mance (HuP) and learning from successes in maintenance – Review of plant modifications, especially control room is performed jointly by IFE, the VTT Technical Research design issues, Centre in Finland and Ringhals NPP in Sweden, and is – Review of organisational modifications, sponsored by Nordic Nuclear Safety Research (NKS).

– Event analysis,

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 73

A network for Human Performance and Safety Culture management and staff, worker to worker and organization (HUSC) involving the NPP licensees in Finland and to organization. Due to the separation that the pandemic Sweden as well as SKB, KSU and Westinghouse. The required these interactions have been disrupted. OKG has network was established in 2006. The aim of the network during this time had focus on Safety messages, messages is to exchange information and develop expert knowledge. focused on different safety related topics with expectation This initiative is still ongoing. that the message is presented by the managed and discussed in the group as well as online workshops and 12.2.1. Ongoing activities tighter and clearer dialogues between managers on how to

Oskarshamn NPP handle the new risks that the pandemic brought.

Ever since OKG’s long term programme for improving A human performance simulator was developed at OKG safety culture (referred to as the “Action plan for safety in 2018. The aim of the simulator is to have employees culture at OKG”) was implemented in 2004, OKG has practice in different areas such as human performance worked with these aspects in a systematic way. Periodical tools, foreign material exclusion and personal protective investigations, such as a safety culture survey and a equipment use. Also, during 2018 the package regarding meta-analysis, have been carried out regularly. Other pre-job briefing (PJB), post-job debriefing (PJD) at OKG activities involving all staff, such as workshops discussing was updated and restructured to better support the users. different topics regarding safety culture, have been popular The procedures were updated with new checklists and events that brought about good discussions. different levels of PJB and PJD, the existing requirements OKG has, apart from a continuous work with safety were clarified, and new requirements were set regarding culture as a strategic tool to enhance safety, emphasized the documentation.

practical application of safety culture and its tools. In 2017 and 2018, OKG carried out cross-group seminars A review of existing Human Performance Tools with for all managers, employees, long term contractors and optimizations and changes to facilitate ease-of-use has partners. The focus of the seminar was on discussing the been performed. Coupled with this OKG has constructed interconnections between safety culture, safety managea work- and behavior simulator with the express goal to ment, and operational excellence.

create a learning experience for managers and workers that At OKG, weekly safety messages have been distributed show how expectations and requirements fit into a for discussion by the entire organisation. This format was real-world setting. The simulator takes multiple theoretical implemented in 2014 and has been ongoing since then. In areas (such as safety culture, human performance, work 2015, the maintenance, production, engineering, and safety, FME and waste management), ties them together shared services departments contributed with two safety and show how they apply at a simulated plant work place. messages each. In 2017, this format expanded to now also The simulator is created to allow management of all levels include the safety department and managing director. All to educated and discuss the different areas of the simulator employees work together with the safety culture departwith their personnel as well as clarify their expectations on ment to formulate messages for discussion by the how to maintain safety at the plant. organisation.

The simulator has been utilized during normal operations Forsmark and Ringhals NPPs but a special focus has been applied ahead of outages At the Forsmark and Ringhals NPPs, the role of coordiwhere the majority of internal and external personnel nating safety culture development and activities is since with work connected to the outage has been educated. It 2018 delegated to the safety and compliance departments. has been very well received by both management and Expertise and best practices are shared between the two workers alike. plants. Development of nuclear safety culture is part of

the normal procedures incorporated in the management Furthermore, safety culture and work environment has system, and encouraged by the reactor safety programme. become more tightly integrated with joint strategic The programme is revised annually and approved by the planning to enhance the synergy between two interconchief executive officer. nected fields.

A comprehensive evaluation of safety culture is performed OKG has also integrated a national culture perspective in at each site every four years. The evaluation follows a safety culture. Analysis and workshops with regards to Vattenfall corporate instruction for assessing safety culture, how an overarching national culture effects behaviors and and consists of both quantitative and qualitative methods. actions has been performed on both a plant and One of the inputs is the outcome of the safety culture corporate level. survey, which follows WANO’s ten traits for a strong safety This has further led to focus on how management and culture. The safety culture survey is administered every two workers work with accountability to ensure and evaluate years. Other sources of input for the comprehensive safety at the plant. evaluation of safety culture include a summary of feedback

from group discussions following the safety culture survey, The pandemic has created challenges with regards to how evaluation of event analyses, evaluation of licensee the site should work with safety culture. Much of the work operational events, interviews, evaluation of trends in is normally done in the personal interactions between

74 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

indicators, and comments from IAEA OSART missions, Strengthened supervision due WANO reviews and SSM reviews and inspections. to shutdown decisions

Safety culture questionnaires are used as a tool for develop- From 2015, SSM performed strengthened supervision of ment of the safety culture, together with other activities. A the Ringhals and Oskarshamn NPPs, after the decisions shared initiative has been taken by the licensees to improve were taken on the shutdown of Ringhals units 1 and 2 and the questionnaire. Oskarshamn units 1 and 2. The strengthened supervisions have now been completed, and SSM continue to follow the At the Ringhals NPP, a human performance improvement licennsees ongoing work with decommissioning in several project was carried out during the period 2015-2019. The supervisiory activities, e.g assessement of event reports, purpose of the project is to increase the focus on continrapid-, and surveillance supervision. The plants under uous improvements to human performance in order to decommissioning are also integrated in SSM´s supervision achieve safe and well-performed results throughout the programme. company. All managers and staff receive an extensive training programme that includes areas such as usage of human performance tools, managers coaching in the field, 12.4. National culture

feedback training, self-assessments, how to utilize staff competence in human performance development with 12.4.1. Workshop on national culture traits group dialogues, and fallibility models. The focus on One area that came into focus after the Fukushima Daiichi human performance improvement and general competence accident was the challenging issue of the relationship for safe and good job performance were increased between national culture and nuclear safety culture. All throughout the organisation. Managers and supervisors cultures have certain characteristics or traits that reinforce now have the tools for continuation of everyday improve- nuclear safety culture, and all cultures have characteristics ments to human performance. that might not provide this reinforcement. A Country-Specific Safety Culture Forum (CSSCF) was developed jointly by the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) and the World 12.3. Regulatory control Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) to provide

The unit of Coordination and Human and Organisational countries with a forum for dialogue and reflection on how Factors at SSM is, since june 2021, located within the unit the national attributes of a given country can influence of Supervision. The section consists of five professionals, nuclear safety culture. SSM was involved in the developwith a behavioural science background. The MTO ment of this forum, and hosted the very first CSSCF in specialists conduct inspections, safety reviews and other January 2018 3 . supervisory activities. The unit is also responsible for The purpose of the forum is to enable licence holders and coordinating the supervision, e.g SSM´s supervision the regulatory body in a specific country to explore which prgrammes and the integratet safety assessement factors and characteristics of the national culture can performed annualy. influence safety culture. The design of the forum is meant Current tasks for the unit include inspections and reviews to facilitate an open and explorative dialogue on possible of management systems, organisations and organisational essentials for maintaining a healthy safety culture. In change, safety culture and management of safety, opera- addition, the dialog should also explore suggested actions tional decision making and time for consultation, compe- for mitigating potentially negative aspects and identifying tence, training and staffing including fitness for duty, best practices. working conditions for safety, MTO perspective of plant The explorative dialogue that took place during the forum, modernisations and modifications, in accordance with the in conjunction with material from interviews and focus supervision programme. In many cases, the MTO specialgroup sessions ahead of the forum, resulted in six themes, ists lead the inspections in which they are involved. or characteristics, which can be recognised as rather typical Swedish cultural traits, or national attributes in Sweden.

12.3.1. Current regulatory research

(See figure 14 on next page.) The unit of Coordination and Human and Organisational Factors has procured projects on e.g. dealing with chal- To some extent, these national attributes can all reinforce lenges faced by organisations under economic pressure and nuclear safety culture, or might have a negative impact on human capability for dealing with unforeseen events. SSM nuclear safety culture if they are not taken into account. also provides funding for postgraduate studies and an The first-of-its-kind forum conducted in Sweden was associate professorship in Man-Technology-Organisation considered a success, building on a foundation for at Lund University. For many years now, the Authority has continued reflection and work relating to national cultural provided support to the Halden Reactor Project in traits and their impact on the safety culture of licence Norway. holders, the regulatory body, and the Swedish safety infrastructure as a whole.

3 Country-Specific Safety Culture Forum Sweden, NEA report no. 7420, 2018.

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 75

4 A drive towards “Samskap”

shared understanding Being in unity To ensure successful and a will to implementation, take take a collective the time to explain and accountability check understanding. for well being Otherwise a risk for and harmony. preferential right of interpretation.

“Allskap”

Complacency/National pride

Everyone should have the “There is no point in seeking same rights and all things advice from others because we should be fair. No one should think we are the best.” stand out from the crowd!

Freedom Security and trust

Lead your staff by Tendency to feel secure defining goals. and to trust that the Do not micro- system works correctly. manage our staff. “Trust your staff, don’t ask questions about progress or you will seem bossy!”

Figure 14. National attributes recognised during the CSSCF forum. 4

4 This figure depicts only certain aspects of national attributes in Sweden. These were among the themes that emerged during the CSSCF forum, discussed by participants representing the nuclear infrastructure in Sweden.

76 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

Article 13. Quality Assurance

as well as requirements on quality assurance and update Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to due to experience feedback. ensure that quality assurance programmes are established and implemented with a view to providing confidence that It is furthermore required by Chapter 3, Sections 7 and 8

specified requirements for all activities important to of SSMFS 2018:1 to have the application of the manage-

nuclear safety are satisfied throughout the life of a nuclear ment system, and its efficiency and effectiveness, audited

installation. systematically and periodically. An established audit

programme shall be in place. It is furthermore required by

Chapter 2, Section 8 of SSMFS 2008:1 that the internal Summary of developments since audit function should have a sufficiently strong and the previous report independent position in the organisation and should report

– New general requirements have been implemented. to the highest management of the plant. The audits should

have continuity and auditors should have good knowledge – Change in legal conditions for supervision concerning about activities being audited. Audit intervals should take suppliers. into account the safety significance of the different

activities and special needs that can arise. Normally, all 13.1. Regulatory requirements audit areas should as a minimum be audited every four

years. The auditing activity itself and the management In June 2018, new general requirements were implemented function of the plant should also be periodically audited. in the form of regulation SSMFS 2018:1. Among many

areas, this regulation covers quality assurance, thus Furthermore, Chapter 2, Section 8 a of SSMFS 2008:1

replacing similar requirements that were contained in requires that it should be made clear by the management

SSMFS 2008:1. What differs the new general requirements system how contractors and vendors are to be audited, and

from earlier requirements in this area is a more detailed how to keep the results of these audits up to date.

regulatory framework, including additional requirements The legal conditions for supervision of suppliers have and clearer guidelines that are provided. SSMFS 2018:1 been changed through changes made in the Act on Nuclear requires nuclear activities with regard to related design, Activities (1984:3). This gives the regulatory body the construction, commissioning, operation and decommispossibility to monitor how the safety requirements are sioning to be managed, controlled, assessed and developed followed concerning activities conducted by suppliers or by means of a management system so designed that their subsuppliers and contractors or their subcontractors requirements for safety will be met. The management or other parties delivering services to the licensees. system, including the necessary routines and procedures,

must be kept up to date and be documented. This view on

13.1.1. Development of new regulations

the integration of quality and safety with other business SSM has developed new regulations for nuclear safety, concerns into a total integrated management system is in which enter into force 1 March 2022, i.e., after the current line with the IAEA Safety Requirements on Leadership reporting period. For nuclear power plants, the regulations and Management for Safety, GSR Part 2. SSMFS 2008:1 will be superseded by the regulation in

The management system should cover all nuclear activities SSMFS 2021:4, SSMFS 2021:5 and SSMFS 2021:6.

at a nuclear facility. Chapter 5, Section 2 of SSMFS 2008:1 Changes in the regulations include that Chapter 2, Section specifies more detailed requirements on establishment of 4 of SSMFS 2021:6 specifies that the scope, design and appropriate operating procedures and guidelines, applicable layout of all procedures, shall be adapted to their for situations correspronding to normal operation, important to safety (or security) and to the conditions in anticipated operational occurences, design basis accidents which they are expected to be used. Further detailed and design extension conditions. Also requirements on requirements on operating procedures are found in priciples for these procedures and guidelines are included,

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 77

Chapter 5, Sections 6–13 of SSMFS 2021:6. The new 13.2.1.2. Ringhals NPP

regulations also more clearly and in more detail, specifies RAB’s management system is an integrated, modernised

requirements on applicability, principles and quality and user-friendly management system. This means that

assurance of the operating procedures, compared to the RAB has an overall structure which includes clear steering,

older requirements in SSMFS 2008:1. New requirements evaluation and development of processes to fulfil goals

are included regarding temporary operating procedures and strategies. RAB also has a process for handling of

(Chapter 5, Sections 12), and deviations from operating requirements which involves corrective actions and

procedures (Chapter 5, Sections 13). Chapter 5, Sections 15 verifications. The ambition of RAB is to fulfil external

and 16 of SSMFS 2021:6 specify detailed requirements on requirements for management systems, derived from

procedures for core management and handling of fuel nuclear as well as conventional industry models.

assamblies.

13.2.1.3. Oskarshamn NPP

The new regulations SSMFS 2021:6 also more clearly No structural or principal changes regarding management express scope, actions and expectations for specific and governance have been made to the operating system. required programmes, that must be implemented to However, development has taken place within the coordinate administrative and technical actions for the framework of existing principles for management and purpose of monitoring, maintaining and improving safety control. and and security. Decisions made include the development of a new The new requirements of Chapter 2, Section 3 of SSMFS process-oriented management system. This work is in 2021:6, specifies that the licensee shall have an independant progress. An introduction is ongoing, focusing on methods part of the organization, supported by the top managefor process mapping in the organisation. ment, with the function of independent review and supervision of that all requirements on safety and security Procedures for requirement management and requirement

are met for design and operation of the power plant. This handling have been mapped, and associated routines have,

part of the organization shall also be in contact with SSM. in connection with this, been simplified and adapted to the

processes. Spring of 2017 was characterized by continued Other important additions in the new regulations, relating implementation in the management system of the requireto quality assurance, are also Chapter 3 of SSMFS 2021:4, ments contained in the new ISO standard for the environcontaining specific requirements on management and ment, 14001:2015. quality assurance of design and construction work, and

Chapter 2, Section 8 of SSMFS 2021:6 together with

13.2.2. Audit programmes

Chapter 7 of SSMFS 2021:5, containing new requrements At licensee corporate level, audit programmes support to on safety (and security) demonstration for quality assurance ensure and confirm that requirements from the owners are during implementation of modifications at the nuclear adhered to, as well as that the right level of governance is power plant. in place, at both corporate and nuclear power plant level.

The licensees have processes in place for performing audits 13.2. Compliance of the licence holders and running audit programmes. These processes are used

to monitor how well the quality system is implemented at

13.2.1. Current development of management

different levels and applied to the organisation, as well as

systems

the efficiency of the system to ensure quality and safety. All the licensees have integrated management systems in Such quality audits are performed on a regular basis so that place and work continuously to improve their systems. all areas are covered over a three years period. At FKA and Since the previous national report was issued, the licensees RAB, audit teams consist of individuals who are experihave continuously management system to have a stronger enced in audits, in addition to an audit team leader. The focus on integrated processes and information modelling. audit programmes being run fulfil the requirements for

independent assessment stipulated by IAEA Safety Guide

13.2.1.1. Forsmark NPP

GS-G-3.1. Continuous improvement of the management system is a

priority, including a high level of involvement and commit-

Forsmark and Ringhals NPPs

ment from the management team. FKA and RAB also utilise different methods for self-as-

FKA has clarified the responsibility for the line organisa- sessment. The management system at both plants requires

tion’s structure and process governance, line organisation performance of self-assessments at different levels in the

responsibility for implementation of external requirements, organisation. Both methods for performing self-assess-

and reducing the number of functions for internal ments are based on IAEA Safety Guide GS-G-3.1.

requirements.

Oskarshamn NPP

FKA is in compliance with IAEA GSR Part 2, Leadership During this review period, several development activities

and Management for Safety. A management system review have been carried out by the internal audit organisation of

was commenced to identify potential gaps when the new OKG in order to create more added value for the organisa-

issue of GS-R part 2 (new version of GS-R-3) was tion. Staffing of internal audit teams has changed so that

published.

78 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

the auditors are now part of the safety and quality depart- management systems, organisations, and organisational ment. Previously, auditors from the entire organisation change management. The purpose of the baseline were used. Audit teams are led, and the audits evaluated, by inspections regarding the management system is to lead auditors who work on the section’s internal audit monitor the current status and progress of the licensees’ within the safety and quality department. This change was principles for, and their systematic work on, their respecmade to ensure that auditing resources are available to tive systems. This is to ensure that their management meet the needs of the audit programme. systems direct, control, evaluate and develop the organisation’s activities. Another purpose is also to determine A new audit training programme covering the audit whether the management system is suitable, up-to-date, process and related methodology has been developed. accessible and effective enough. Auditors have taken part in this programme. The audit process itself has been strengthened by means of human As far as concerns the baseline inspections in relation to an performance tools for reinforcement of safety and quality. organisation, the purpose is to determine the current status Another development activity has been initiated to bolster of the licensees’ organisations and their systematic work on evaluation of identified audit findings by supporting the ensuring that they have an organisation with an appropriate managers to a greater extent. Here, the objective is to design for maintaining nuclear and radiation safety now and ensure that findings are manage systematically to prevent in the long term, as well as to judge the suitability of the their reoccurrence. organisation. The inspections also include looking into licensee management of organisational changes.

13.2.3. Audits of suppliers

Furthermore, SSM conducts continuous supervision of the Audits of suppliers are carried out jointly and in cooperainternal audit process. The results of internal audits are tion between the Swedish licensees. Swedish licensees have covered in most inspections and reviews of specifically a joint working group for shared development of procedefined technical areas, and sometimes the subject of dures and methods for supplier audits. The working group inspections focusing specifically on audit programmes. meets two or three times per year. A shared procedure is used for executing a supplier audit, which is maintained and developed as a collaborative effort between the Swedish licensees.

13.3. Regulatory control

As per the new supervisory programme, SSM conducts baseline inspections in all areas. The MTO section has recently conducted baseline inspections of the licensees’

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 79

Article 14. Assessment and Verification of safety

all licensed activities involving ionising radiation. This also Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to applies to the requirement on keeping the assessment up to ensure that: date. The legally binding requirements and the corre- (i) Comprehensive and systematic safety assessments are sponding general advice are summarized below. carried out before the construction and commissioning of a nuclear installation and throughout its life. Such 14.1.1.1. Safety analysis report assessments shall be well documented, subsequently A comprehensive deterministic safety analysis shall be updated in the light of operating experience and signifiperformed before a facility is constructed and before it is cant new safety information, and reviewed under the taken into operation. In addition to the deterministic authority of the regulatory body. analysis, the facility shall be analysed using probabilistic (ii) Verification by analysis, surveillance, testing and methods in order to provide a more complete picture of inspection is carried out to ensure that the physical state an overall safety level. and the operation of a nuclear installation continue to be in accordance with its design, applicable national safety A preliminary safety analysis report is required to be requirements, and operational limits and conditions. prepared and approved before a facility may be constructed and, for an existing facility, before major refurbishing or rebuilding work or major modifications are carried out. The Summary of developments since the safety analysis report (SAR) must be renewed before

previous report commissioning, and completed before the facility may be

taken into commercial operation. The SAR shall contain During the current review period, the following developinformation as specified in the regulations and be subject to ments have taken place with regard to the obligations of safety reviews before submission to the regulator. All stages Article 14: of the SAR shall be reviewed and approved by SSM. – Sweden has intensified and developed its management Thereafter, the safety analysis report is to be kept up to date. of ageing issues and long term operation, as well as The SAR shall reflect the plant as built, analysed and supervision in this area. verified, and show how current safety requirements are – The development process for new regulations for met. All safety systems as well as all other plant structures, assessment, as was mentioned in the previous report, systems and components of importance for the defence in has been extended. The regulations will come into force depth shall be described in the SAR. New safety standards on 1 March 2022 which is after the current reporting and practices, which have been assessed by the licensee and period. found applicable, shall be documented and incorporated into the SAR as soon as the corresponding modifications 14.1. Regulatory requirements or other plant measures have been taken.

14.1.1. Requirements for Comprehensive and 14.1.1.2. Safety programme

Systematic Safety Assessment The licensee must have a safety programme in place. After The requirement for a safety programme is defined in a facility has been taken into operation, the safety of the Chapter 2 of the regulations concerning safety in nuclear facility shall be regularly analysed and assessed in a facilities (SSMFS 2008:1). Requirements on safety assess- systematic manner. Such analysis and assessment shall ment, safety reviews and reporting are mainly defined in cover applicable rules for design, construction and Chapter 4 of SSMFS 2008:1. Since the previous report, the operation as well as assumptions and methods applied. requirement on identifying events, event sequences and Reasonably practicable safety improvement measures, conditions that are of importance to safety and associated technical as well as organisational, resulting from such assessment has been superceeded by Chapter 2, Section 1 analyses or assessments, are to be documented in the safety in the new regulations (SSMFS 2018:1) on basic rules for programme and implemented in a timely manner. The

80 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

safety programme shall be reviewed and updated on an operation following maintenance or other interventions. annual basis. Programmes for testing of active components should reflect consequences of a fault and the probability of this

14.1.1.3. Periodic Safety Reviews

occurring. The functional testing has to be carried out with The PSR shall aim at ensuring compliance with the current the frequency and scope providing confidence that the design basis and identify further safety improvements by equipment will fulfil its required function, as credited in the taking into account developments in science and techsafety analysis. The functional tests shall reflect the nology. Reasonably practicable safety improvements must circumstances that are expected when the function is be implemented in order to maintain the level of safety required. If this is not possible, an analysis shall show that and to ensure that older facilities can achieve a comparable the safety function is verified sufficiently despite limitations level of safety as new nuclear facilities. Thus, the PSR of the testing. process is an important instrument for ensuring safe long-term operation of nuclear facilities in Sweden, see Detailed requirements for mechanical components are section 14.3.5 defined in the regulations concerning mechanical components in certain nuclear facilities (SSMFS 2008:13). These 14.1.1.4. Long term operation regulations contain requirements for the use of mechanical SSM determines the specific point in time for submission equipment, limits and conditions, damage control, accrediof periodic safety reviews for each facility, which according tation of control organisations and laboratories, in-service to the Act on Nuclear Activities (see section 7.1.2) must be inspection and control , repair, replacement and modificaperformed at least once every ten years. In the general tion of structures and components, as well as on compliadvice for the regulations, it is clarified that the periodic ance control and annual reporting to SSM.

review of the facility’s safety, including radiation protec- Regulation SSMFS 2008:13 requires certain inspections and tion, should provide a basis for determining, at an estabinspection intervals for specified components, such as the lished point in time, whether the facility can continue its reactor pressure vessel and its nozzles, etc. In addition to operation until the next periodic safety reviews with the such compulsory inspections, the nuclear power plants are level of safety assumed in the licence for the nuclear required to allocate the mechanical components in the facility. Since the previous report, SSM has also decided to plants to a number of inspection groups. The inspection adopt a standpoint accepting status of continued operation groups determine the extent of the in-service inspections. (LTO) in connection with the PSR reviews. The inspection programme, resulting from the use of the The general advice also specifies that the periodic safety principles, shall be reviewed by the accredited inspection review should cover 17 safety review areas. It is also body to certify that the programme complies with the clarified that if the facility does not fulfil relevant, new regulations and additional SSM decision rulings. Three safety standards, measures should be implemented if this is inspection groups, A, B and C, are used. Group A includes considered to be reasonable and suitable with respect to components with the highest relative risk, and C those with the benefit to safety, taking into account the existing design the lowest. The relative risks can be assessed using assumptions of the facility. qualitative or quantitative methods as described above. In inspection groups A and B, the non-destructive inspection 14.1.2. Requirements for verification by systems used shall be qualified by an NDT qualification surveillance, testing and inspection body to detect, characterize and size any existing defects to

Sweden has since the beginning of its nuclear programme the required standard. Apart from the division into had specific requirements for surveillance, testing and inspection groups, mechanical components must be in-service inspection to ensure that the operation and the divided into five quality classes. The principles for this shall material condition of the reactors comply with design also be approved by SSM. The division into quality classes requirements and operational limits and conditions. shall take into account the safety significance of the

integrity of the respective mechanical component for Chapter 5, Section 3 of SSMFS 2008:1, includes requiresafety in all plant states up to, and including, design basis ments on continuous surveillance, maintenance and testing accidents. The quality classes determine the design of structures, systems and components important to safety requirements and quality assurance measures needed for to ensure that they meet the safety requirements. repairs, replacements and plant modifications. Programmes are required for maintenance, surveillance, inspection and testing. The programmes must be carried An accredited inspection body is required to review the out using methods validated for their purposes. Measure- inspection programmes in detail, and issues certificates of ment and test devices shall be calibrated in line with compliance with the SSM regulation. In addition, a instructions. Programmes shall be documented and kept qualification body, approved by SSM, qualifies the non-deup to date with regard to new experiences and develop- structive testing systems used and certifies their suitability ments in science and technology. In order to ensure that for the component and applicability in question. The maintenance, as well as continuous inspections and inspection companies (laboratories) conducting the controls, are carried out in line with safety requirements, inspections must be accredited for the tasks and methods the licensee must have documented procedures. they use with regard to quality systems, technical proce-

dures and competence by the Swedish Board for Accredi- Functional testing to verify operability has to be performed tation and Conformity Assessment (SWEDAC). SWEDAC before structures, systems and components are taken into

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 81

makes annual inspections and follow-ups of the accredited that all decisions significant for safety or security, are inspection bodies. SSM, as the competent authority for adequately and comprehensively prepared and informed in nuclear matters, supports SWEDAC in this supervision of order to prioritize safety. Further, Chapter 2, Section 6 of the inspection bodies. SSMFS 2021:6 requires that all works to be performed at a nuclear power plant have to be prepared and controlled by 14.1.3. Requirements for safety reviews a administrative system, to verify that the work does not Chapter 4, Section 3 of SSMFS 2008:1 specifies require- entail unacceptable risks and that OLCs are not exceeded. ments for licensees’ safety reviews. The objective is to Chapter 5, Sections 1 and 2 of SSMFS 2021:6 also requires ensure that all relevant aspects of a safety issue have been a continuously verification of that the power plant at all taken into account and that all relevant requirements times are ready for operation and that operations are concerning the design, function, organisation and activities within the OLCs. of a facility are met. The review shall be carried out Chapter 2, Section 5 of SSMFS 2021:6 specifies general systematically and be documented. requirements for implementation of programmes for i.a. The safety review is to be performed in two steps. The surveillance and in-service inspections. Chapter 6, Section first step, the primary review, shall be carried out within 2 of SSMFS 2021:6 specifies the aim (to verify equipment the parts of the licensee’s organisation that are in charge availability) and scope of these programmes (structures, of the specific issues. The primary review should typically systems and components important to safety), while address motives for implementing a measure, in addition Chapter 6, Section 3 further specifies the basis for surveilto presumptions and delimitations, verification and lance through functional testing. Also Chapter 6, Section 4 validation of analysis methods, and the accuracy of the of SSMFS 2021:6 requires that faults or deficiencies found results. The second step, the independent review, shall be during i.e. preventive maintenance shall be correted as carried out by a safety review function, established for this promptly as possible. purpose and having an independent position in relation to the organisation responsible for the specific issues. The 14.1.3.2. Safety reviews independent review should not duplicate the primary In the new regulations, requirements relating to safety review, but rather apply a different perspective and focus review during operation of a nuclear power plant are on how a matter has been handled, whether all relevant divided into several levels of review. While Chapter 2, aspects have been considered, and whether all relevant Section 5 of SSMFS 2021:6 requires that continuous safety requirements have been met. Both of the review experience feedback and review shall be included each steps should ascertain whether the measures maintain or implemented programme in order to keep them up to date, improve the level of safety. Chapter 2, Section 21 of SSMFS 2021:6 states requirements on continuous systematic monitoring and review Areas which, as per regulation SSMFS 2008:1 and the safety (and security), for the plant operation as a whole, regulations contained in SSMFS 2014:2 concerning using measurable performance indicators. A comprehenemergency preparedness in nuclear facilities, are subject to sive annual follow-up and assessment of this work is also the licensee’s own safety review, include the following: required, which shall be reported to SSM. – Technical or organisational modifications to a facility From Chapter 2, Sections 5 and 20 of SSMFS 2021:6, a which might affect the conditions specified in the safety licensee is also required to have an implemented operating analysis report, experience programme (see also 19.7.3). This programme – Principal modifications in the safety analysis report, forms an important tool in the safety reviews mentioned – Modifications in an emergency response plan, above. – Modifications in the OLC, Chapter 5 of SSMFS 2021:5 presents detailed requirements – Modifications in procedures concerning the control of on the PSR required by Section 10 a of the Act on Nuclear readiness for operation as well as procedures and Activities (1984:3). The chapter and the associated Annex 3 guidelines intended for abnormal operation and specifies aim, approach and scope of such a review. accidents, – Investigations carried out as regards deficiencies in barriers and in defence in depth, and the measures taken 14.2. Compliance of licence holders as a result of the deficiency, and The Act on Nuclear Activities (1984:3) stipulates that a – Plans for necessary measures for ensuring safe licensee shall continuously and systematically evaluate and, confinement of non-conforming waste (nuclear waste as far as possible and reasonable, improve the safety of its arising which, in terms of quantity and type, deviates activities and its facilities with regard to: from specification in the safety analysis report). – The conditions under which the activities are conducted, – How equipment and facilities are affected by operations

14.1.3.1. Development of new regulations

and ageing, SSM has developed new regulations which enter into force – Experiences from the activities and similar activities, and 1 March 2022, i.e., after the current reporting period. During operation of a nuclear power plant, Chapter 2, – Developments in science and technology. Section 2 of the new regulations SSMFS 2021:6 requires

82 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

14.2.1. Safety analysis reports 14.2.1.2. Probabilistic safety assessments

Earlier major development of the Swedish safety analysis All nuclear power reactors have complete level 1 and level reports (SAR) is described in previous national reports. 2 PSA studies including all operating modes and viritually all relevant internal and external hazards for the sites. Safety requirements included in the SAR are regularly assessed for their applicability, and the licensees have The PSA models are expected to be updated every year if specific procedures in place regarding evaluation of new or there have been plant modifications during the past year revised codes and standards. These procedures include: that have an impact on the PSA result. Full updates of the PSA studies are expected every three years. In principle, – Maintenance, the licensees are progressing towards application of a – Component qualification, “Living PSA” approach. PSA results are also used routinely – In-service inspection/ISI, and by the licensees to support decisions concerning significant – Surveillance testing. modification of the designs, modification of operations, documentation and assessment of events. As an example, the licensees have specific norm commit- As mentioned in previous national reports, the numerical tees that hold periodical meetings to evaluate new codes PSA figures are not regarded as a definitive and exact value and standards. of the actual risk level. There are no requirements related 14.2.1.1. Deterministic safety assessments to numerical PSA results, although the licensees have The safety analyses of Swedish plants presented in the internally developed such safety objectives. The studies are original SAR were from the beginning essentially struc- required to be sufficiently detailed, comprehensive and tured according to US rules. The events analysed were realistic to enable identification of weaknesses in designs, divided into different classes depending on the expected and must be used for assessment of plant modifications, frequency and significance (severity). The highest class modifications of technical specifications and procedures, contains the design basis accident (DBA), typically a large as well as the risk significance of events. loss of coolant accident such as a double-ended guillotine PSA is used to evaluate plant modifications. It was used as break of the largest pipe cooling the reactor. a tool to plan measures for compliance with the regulations The methods and methodologies in the safety analyses SSMFS 2008:17. Generally, these modifications covered: were essentially based on 10 CFR 50.46 Appendix K. measures to protect against CCF, actions to improve fire Design criteria to be fulfilled included limited fuel cladding protection, improvement of operator support, and damage and no zirconium-water reaction (i.e. maximum improvements to maintenance and testing. Since the cladding temperature of 1204 ˚C). Although the DBA did previous report, PSA has been used to evaluate safety not include core melt at that time, it was postulated that a improvements for transitional measures pending installalarge proportion of the fission products would be released tion of the new independent core cooling system (ICCS) into the containment. It was subsequently shown that the and of the new ICCS itself. containment leak tightness was sufficient for limiting Extensive development of the methods and tools for PSA radioactive releases to the environment. has been performed over the years. As a result, up-to-date The introduction of the severe accident mitigation require- software and considerable expertise is at hand both within ments in 1986 implied introduction of a new class of the Swedish utilities, the regulator, and consultancies/ accidents, including severe fuel damage (core melt), and the contractors. One item of particular importance is the safety analyses were extended to show that the acceptance reliability databases accumulated from operational expericriteria for these cases (see section 18.1) were met. ence. These databases are available in the reliability data handbooks “The Reliability Data of Components in The regulation SSMFS 2008:17 issued in 2005 resulted in a Nordic NPPs” (the T Book), and “Reliability Data for need to update and extend certain analyses and tasks. Piping Components in Nordic Nuclear Power Plants” (the These were included in the reactor-specific modernisation R Book). The T Book provides specific reliability data of plans (see section 6.2) and completed by December 2015. high quality for a large number of components since 1977. The reviews and updates mainly consisted of a few The R Book provides high quality data for piping compoexternal events and several beyond design basis events. nents, and is utilised to distribute pipe break frequencies Major updates of the deterministic safety analyses have and to categorise pipe breaks in different categories. Data also been made for reactors that have had power uprates, relating to Common Cause Failure (CCF) data is compiled see section 6.3. Since the previous report, deterministic in the CCF reliability book (the C Book). Extensive safety analyses for Forsmark 2 have been renewed for their compilation of CCF data is also performed within the applications for routine operation following power uprates. OECD/NEA ICDE project. These sets of dependency data are transferred into the domestic PSA models when The deterministic safety analyses for Oskarshamn 3 was delivered from the OECD/NEA project. None of the renewed and accepted by the regulator and Oskarshamn 3 books are readily available, but the T Book can be have permission for routine operation after the power uprate. purchased 5 . Access to the R Book and the C Book is possible via the Nordic PSA Group (NPSAG) 6 .

5 Contact TUD@vattenfall.com 6 See www.npsag.org

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 83

NPSAG was founded in December 2000 by the nuclear The goals have subsequently been broken down into utilities in Finland and Sweden. SSM, the Finnish regulator relevant activities for each department and unit. An (STUK) and the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Manage- example of an activity linked to the first area mentioned is ment Company (SKB) participate as associated members. a cross-group seminar on the topics of safety management, The associated members may take part in the funding of safety culture and operational excellence. Nearly all the projects run within the NPSAG. NPSAG is a forum managers, employees and a selection of partners particifor discussing issues relating to PSAs of nuclear power pated in this seminar, which was held on several occasions plants, with a focus on research and development needs. in 2018. The group monitors and discusses current issues relating to PSAs both nationally and internationally, as well as PSA 14.2.3. Safety programmes activities conducted at participating utilities. The group All licensees have safety programmes in place, as required initiates, finances and co-ordinates research and develop- by SSM regulation SSMFS 2008:1. The programmes are ment activities and discusses how new knowledge shall be part of the management system’s documentation, and are a used. The licensees strive to implement results from the result of safety analyses, audits, safety culture surveys and NPSAG projects in their PSAs. other evaluations performed at the plant. The programmes contain priorities and time schedules for future technical, 14.2.2. Periodic safety reviews organisational and administrative measures. The licensees are required to submit a PSR of each reactor unit at least every ten years. The review must verify that the 14.2.4. Verification by surveillance, plant complies with the current safety requirements and testing and inspection has the prerequisites for safe operation until the next PSR, A number of different verification programmes are taking into account advances in science and technology. implemented in order to ensure that the physical state and The analyses, assessments and proposed measures shall be the operation of the nuclear installation continue to be in reported to SSM. accordance with its design basis, safety requirements, and its operational limits and conditions. The programmes are The licensee must inform SSM when the planning starts. broken down into these groups: surveillance, in-service The licensee meets with SSM to discuss the proposed inspection, preventive maintenance , and safety reviews. scope, contents and methodology of the PSR. Typically, the review is organised in project form involving 15-20 14.2.4.1. Surveillance staff members from the licensee. One goal is to include a The operational limits and conditions (OLC) are developed few young engineers in every project in order to transfer to ensure that plants are operated in accordance with knowledge. The total work effort encompasses around design assumptions. This document is discussed in more 8–10 man-years per PSR. detail in connection with Article 19 . The OLC document Ageing management is an important topic in the PSRs. also clarifies the types and frequency of functional testing When performing the PSR, long-term operation must be for verification that components and systems are ready for addressed specifically, and it must be demonstrated operation. These tests are carried out in accordance with (through sufficient analyses) that the plant is able to documented procedures, and all test results are reviewed operate safely beyond the designed lifetime, typically 40 and documented. years, referred to as long term operation (LTO). The PSR Special attention has been given to verification of the for Ringhals 3 was submitted in April 2019 and the operability of safety systems when going from shutdown regulatory review was completed in June 2020. to a power operating mode. This verification is ensured The Act on Nuclear Activities (1984:3) stipulates that a today by using a large number of parameters, computerised licensee must continuously and systematically evaluate tools and new procedures. Operability is discussed further and, as far as reasonably practicable, improve the level of in section 19.2 and 19.3. safety in its activities and facilities. Therefore, the PSR is

14.2.4.2. In-service inspection

not expected to identify any major needs for enhancement Swedish licensees use a shared document that serves as an of nuclear safety, but give an opportunity to make an industry standard. This document is divided into general, overall assessment of the safety and performance of the technical, quality control, and in-service inspection plant and organisation as a part of the efforts on requirements, and has facilitated the development of continued improvements. plant-specific documents in these areas. As an example, for Oskarshamn NPP unit 3, the last PSR Organisations required for qualification of Non-Destrucwas reported in 2017. The review led to findings (strengths tive Testing (NDT) systems and techniques, as well as for and weaknesses) and improvements within the organisacarrying out and evaluating such inspections, have been tion. An aggregated analysis and overall assessment established in accordance with regulatory requirements. identified four strategic development areas, for example SQC (Swedish Qualification Centre) serves as an inde- “Take advantage of personnel as enablers and barriers ” pendent body for qualification of NDT systems to be and “Further development of the organisation’s ability in used by NDT companies that operate at Swedish nuclear operational excellence”. These strategic areas have become power plants. part of OKG’s strategic planning and safety programme.

84 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

The regulations require all safety-related components to be There are review committees on operating unit level, as

assigned to specific inspection groups related to their safety well as on power plant level (see section 10.2.9). These

significance. The assignment to inspection groups is consist of individuals representing different disciplines in

documented together with relevant information order to achieve a broad view of the subjects discussed.

concerning the inspection in question. The assignment is The members are appointed based on their personal

reviewed and approved by the plant organisation. The qualifications and knowledge. In some committees and

overall objectives of the total inspection programme and councils, one or more external members also take part.

the fulfilment of the requirements of the regulations are Committees working on operating unit level deal with daily also reviewed by a specifically accredited inspection body. operational matters of safety, such as event and scram The information concerning inspection group assignments reports, operational experience from other plants, and and inspection areas is maintained by the plant organisasafety issues linked to OLC and plant modifications. tion in a database, and forms the basis for the creation of Committees working on power plant level focus on issues the inspection programmes to be performed at given of principle, such as a safety policy and strategy, the plants’ inspection times. adherence to the Authority’s regulations, and general

The inspection group assignment is reviewed annually, and reviews of safety and quality activities.

updated if deemed necessary, depending on plant modifications, damage or indications found in Swedish or other 14.2.6. Ageing management and LTO

nuclear power plants, or new and relevant research (Long Term Operation)

findings. Implementation and development of ageing management

at the nuclear power plants have been ongoing efforts over Extensive replacement of piping, found to be sensitive to more than a decade starting when requirements were specific damage mechanisms, has been carried out in the introduced in the national regulation SKIFS 2004:1 in power plants. Many of these replacements were carried out 2005. Preparations for long term operation (LTO), i.e. to mitigate potential future damage as knowledge was operation beyond the designed lifetime (typically 40 years), gained on damage mechanisms. In other cases, replacehave been performed following review reports published ments were carried out when the damage occurred. by SSM in 2012 and guidance from the IAEA. The

Swedish nuclear reactor fleet has experience as regards

14.2.5. Safety reviews

LTO, e.g. from the units Oskarshamn 1 and 2, and In order to verify that the operation of a nuclear power Ringhals 1 and 2. Presently four reactors in Sweden are in plant is in accordance with the applicable national safety LTO, see table 5. Note that operation beyond the original requirements and standards, different types of safety designed lifetime for a Swedish reactor does not result in a reviews are performed regularly at the plants. The regula- Licence Renwal. The license to operate is not limited in tion on nuclear safety, SSMFS 2008:1, requires a dual safety time. Instead we have present a Periodic Safety Report, review for all safety-related issues at the plant, e.g. opera- PSR, every 10 years where the possibility for safe operation tional events, changes in OLCs, plant modifications, etc. over the next ten years is evaluated. First, a primary review is carried out by the operations

department that is primarily responsible for reactor safety. Table 5. Swedish reactors to enter LTO.

If needed, resources from other departments are utilized.

Reactor Commencing LTO

A second review that is autonomous is then performed by Forsmark 1 2020

an independent department or function within the Forsmark 2 2021 licensee’s organisation. This independent department or Forsmark 3 2025 function is not allowed to be involved in the preparation or

Oskarshamn 3 2025 execution of the issues under review. Typically, the

independent review function consists of 10–15 experi- Ringhals 3 2020

enced engineers with competence profiles to cover all Ringhals 4 2022

forthcoming matters. In some cases, consultants are For more information about Long term operation and the utilised to back up the function. alternate term “continued operation”, see section 14.3.5.2. The objective of the secondary review is to assess whether Key elements for assessing ageing are based on the nine the primary review included the relevant types of analyses attributes contained in the IAEA’s safety standards, and investigations, and whether they are of sufficient “Ageing Management and Development of a Programme quality, rather than repeating the primary review. Certain for Long Term Operation of Nuclear Power Plants” issues, according to the regulations, require application or (SSG-48), which are similar to the ten elements described notification to the regulator. Both the primary and the in the Generic Aging Lessons Learned (GALL) Report independent reviews are carried out according to written (NUREG-1801). In order to check consistency, Swedish instructions developed specifically for the purpose. licensees have used IAEA’s generic lessons learned report 7 A third type of review is performed by the safety review (SRS 82) and NUREG-1801, as described in the EU-TPR

committees and councils at different organisational levels. ageing assessment 8 .

7 Ageing Management for Nuclear Power Plants: International Generic Ageing Lessons Learned (IGALL), IAEA Safety Reports Series No. 82 8 2017:36, Topical Peer Review 2017. Ageing Management, Swedish National Assessment Report.

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 85

To enable an international assessment of the overall ageing SSM. The existing program is based on IAEA NS-G-2.12, management programmes, all licensees have made use of Ageing Management for Nuclear Power Plants. These new the IAEA SALTO or pre-SALTO review service, see regulations uses IAEA SSG-48 as a guide for the work. section 9.2.3.2. The SALTO peer reviews are important The result of the work within the project will be an steps as part of the technical details of managing ageing updated program for Aging Management together with issues, as well as creating a company-wide awareness of the new scooping, article groups and Aging Management necessities and requirements of operating the plants past Reviews, AMRs. The project also handled all relevant their originally intended lifespan. TLAAs during 2021.

Ringhals NPP Forsmark NPP

The Ringhals nuclear power plant has worked on imple- The Forsmark NPP has developed overall ageing managementing and developing methods for ageing management ment programmes by compiling information from at the plant. The Ringhals power plant also adopted the pre-existing programmes, such as maintenance, IAEA methodology (SRS-57) for justifying LTO at an early component/environmental qualification, in-service stage. Initially, this work was done as part of an extension inspection obsolescence and chemistry programmes (i.e., of the PSR for the oldest reactors, Ringhals 1 and 2, but Plant Programmes). By using these programmes, a great this also covered units 3 and 4. The work within the LTO deal of experience, gained from the operation of the plants project covered a review of the existing ageing manage- as well as external ageing-related experience, has been ment as well as identification, reviews and updates of implemented. The overall ageing management programme TLAAs for the remaining time of planned operation: 60 has therefore naturally become an interdisciplinary years for units 3 and 4 and 50 years for units 1 and 2. The programme linking the ageing perspective in a range of IAEA was invited by Ringhals for a peer review of the programmes, while also keeping them in tune with safety project and discussion of other preconditions for LTO requirements and reliability over time. In order to verify through the SALTO mission services. The project ended in the scope of systems, structures and components, and to 2017 and underwent an IAEA SALTO in 2018. IAEA has review the ageing management for operating the plants been asked to return for a follow-up in 2020. The LTO beyond the originally intended lifespan, Forsmark is being programme at Ringhals is given as an example in figure 15. reviewed by IAEA in av series of SALTO-reviews and with independent peer reviews by staff from other sites.

Oskarshamn NPP

The review has included an update of the licensing basis At OKG a project has been formed to develop the documentation regarding analyses that use time-based excisting Aging Management Program to meet new assumptions. requirements from the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority,

2018-03 2018-06 2018-09 2019-04 2020 Q1 2020-06 2020-12 2022-06 2022-12 PSR R34 SALTO SSM SSM SALTO LTO- LTO LTO TLAA sub - ~ Follow- Notice ~ Notice R3 project R3 R4 mission up R3 R4

Conduct ageing management

Production ageing management documents (AMD) 2109-03-01

Assesment AMD

Punch list (LTO Q&C) 2109-04-01

SALTO SALTO Followup 2020 Q1 R3 2019-10-18 R1, LTO:2016 R2, LTO:2015 Facts and issues SALTO AIP 2019-12-01 R3, LTO:2021 R4, LTO:2023 TLAA Analysis Areas: RAB NU effort Production PSR R34, report 7 LTO-project SALTO Production PSR R34, Main report PSR R34 TLAA

Dept NU LTO project SALTO TLAA PSR Figure 15. Plan for LTO activities at Ringhals NPP, unit 3 and 4.

86 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

14.2.6.1. Organisation of the ageing management work The Engineering Department is responsible for coordi- Each site has organised its ageing management work in nating the ageing management. different ways. These different approaches are described In order to manage the above requirements, a coordinating below. group has been established within OKG. The coordination Ringhals NPP group is responsible for overall ageing management and Handling of ageing-related degradation and damage as handles subjects such as:

described in the ageing management programme requires – Events and deviations that may have resulted in forced access to support and information from closely related ageing and thereby degradation of function and programmes and activity areas. performance. The ageing management programme functions on an – New knowledge of the status of the facilities based on interdisciplinary level through existing programmes and is the outcome of testing activities. to be the link that fulfils the ageing perspective in all – New knowledge of material and ageing effects. programmes. The related programmes are: New knowledge of the supplier market and access to – Maintenance replacement components. – Equipment qualification

Forsmark NPP

– In-service inspection/ISI The responsibility for coordinating overall ageing manage- – Surveillance and monitoring ment is assigned to the engineering department. Since – Chemistry ageing management is a common concern, with collective – Operations responsibilities, it involves staff in many plant departments. – Radiation protection Forsmark has implemented collaboration groups in the – Obsolescence. areas of civil engineering, ventilation, electrical, I&C and mechanical equipment with the purpose of developing The maintenance department is responsible for dealing interdepartmental coordination in ageing management. with and developing the ageing management at Ringhals. A team coordinates and supervises the ageing management Part of the engineering department’s configuration programme. The team’s responsibilities are to: management activities is the responsibility to develop and maintain systematic ageing management analyses for – Document the overall ageing management process systems, structures and components that are important for – Ensure that the programme for ageing management is safety. This includes identification and documentation of complete relevant degradation mechanisms and ageing effects for – Coordinate activities related to ageing management relevant SSCs. – Evaluate and optimize the efficiency of the programme The maintenance department is responsible for conducting – Exchange experiences with external organisations a continuous review of the maintenance programmes and – Ensure that experience and results from R&D relating In-Service Inspection, including ageing management-reto ageing management are forwarded to the parties lated activities. The maintenance department is also concerned responsible for management of obsolescence and the – Ensure that information and training within the area are establishment of a programmatic approach. available and conveyed to the right persons The operations department is responsible for surveillance – Report to the management. testing, routine trending of results from testing and status monitoring/reporting of vital activities as part of detecting

Oskarshamn NPP

effects of ageing. Handling of ageing-related degradation and damage as described in the ageing management programme requires The human resources department is responsible for access to support and information from closely related training of staff in detecting aging-related degradation and programmes and activity areas. competence management.

The ageing management programme functions on an interdisciplinary level through existing programmes and is 14.3. Regulatory control

to be the link that fulfils the ageing perspective in all SSM continuously reviews and inspects work performed by programmes. The related programmes are: the licensees. Section 14.3 describes some general – Maintenance approaches regarding regulatory control in this area, and – Component qualification gives examples of recent supervision. – In-service inspection/ISI – Surveillance testing 14.3.1. Safety analysis reports – Chemistry Generally, SSM reviews safety analysis reports due to – Operations applications for power uprates or notifications (see – Radiation protection section 10.5.3) relating to (for example) plant modifica- – Obsolescence. tions or new analysis methods. SSM may also initiate SAR

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 87

reviews at any time, regardless of incoming updates. SSM analyses from the Ringhals NPP, which are currently

may also impose new assessments to prove requirement under review.

fulfilment, for example due to increased knowledge

Mitigation of unidentified degrading power supplies

through research projects, international collaboration, Another topic that has been an area of focus in recent and/or own investigations. years is mitigation of unidentified degrading power SSM’s reviews have the aim of verifying that a SAR reflects supplies. After the undetected phase inbalance at Forsmark the facility as it is built, analysed and verified, as well as that 3 in 2013, SSM issued an injunction to conduct plant it demonstrates how current requirements on design, assessments to identify possible mitigation measures to function, organisation and activities are met. limit the consequences of degraded power supplies. This

Since the previous report, SSM has reviewed a number of was followed by an injunction in 2017 to justify plant

SAR updates, including updates due to measures taken behaviour and configuration based on the insight that it

following the stress tests, power uprates (Ringhals 4, may be subjected to unidentified degrading power supplies.

Oskarshamn 3 and Forsmark 2), and the modernization The licensees generally concluded that preventive and

programmes to comply with SSM’s regulations concerning protective measures are suitable measures in an existing

the design and construction of nuclear power reactors, plant, as well as enhanced electro-mechanical separation

contained in SSMFS 2008:17. measures in the independent core cooling function to be

implemented before 2021.

14.3.1.1. Deterministic Safety Assessment

Robustness of structures and components

In the following cases, SSM reviews the Deterministic

in the lower drywell of the containment

Safety Analyses (DSA): Another example where SSM has required new assess-

– As part of power uprate reviews, ments to prove requirement compliance is an injunction in

– When a licensee notifies the Authority (see section 10.3) 2018 to have the licensees of Forsmark 1-3 and Oskar-

of new analyses due to e.g. shamn 3 analyse the robustness of structures and compo-

– New fuel types, nents in the lower drywell of the containment against

impulse loads that might occur in a case of steam explo- – Plant changes, sions during a severe accident. The injunction was based – New or modified analyses, on an investigation taking into account both national and – As a response to injunctions issued by SSM for new international research results. analyses to prove requirement fulfilment, for instance when new safety issues have been raised that are not During 2021 SSM reviewed the licensees of Forsmark 1–3

covered by the current SAR. and Oskarshamn 3 analyzes. SSM assesed that both

licensees have not been able to show that the locks in the Some examples are presented below of SSM’s review reactor containment have a sufficient margin against the

activities performed during the current CNS review period. loads from a steam explosion in connection with a severe

accident. SSM has injucted the licensees to develop action

Ringhals 1 routine operation review

plans on how to ensure that the locks have a load capacity Since the previous report, SSM has reviewed and approved of 30 kPa against steam explosions. The action plans must the application for routine operation at Ringhals 1, after be reported to SSM no later than June 2022. the modernisation to meet the requirements in the

regulations concerning the design and construction of

14.3.1.2. Probabilistic Safety Assessments

nuclear power reactors, SSMFS 2008:17. As of 2014, the licensees submit a yearly report to SSM

that includes information regarding the Probabilistic Safety

Manual measures credited in the safety analyses

Analysis (PSA) status as well as relevant information One example of a new area of focus since the previous regarding plant changes, method changes, R&D, and report is the issue of time for performing manual operational experience of importance for the plant-specific measures that are credited in the safety analyses. Section 4 PSAs. SSM’s PSA supervision also includes reviews of of the regulations concerning the design and construction updated PSAs, living PSA reporting, treatment of fire and of nuclear power reactors, SSMFS 2008:17, stipulates that other hazards in the PSA, topical meetings with licensees, manual measures in connection with necessary activation and surveillance inspections. Another important part of and operational change of reactor safety functions may SSM’s PSA supervision is to observe the processes used by only be applied if the personnel are given sufficient time the licensees, for instance to ensure that PSAs are used in – time for consideration – in order to safely take the all relevant applications. measures. Since the previous report, SSM has placed an

increasing focus on assessing the time needed for taking In the area of PSA, SSM performs surveillance inspections

manual actions in deterministic safety analyses. SSM has at all sites every second year. The PSAs for Forsmark 2 and

imposed a requirement on the licensees to identify and Ringhals 4 have been reviewed within the applications for

report all necessary manual actions and to validate that the routine operation following the power uprates.

time for these is sufficient, for example by using a full

scale simulator of the plant. This work is ongoing and has 14.3.2. Periodic safety reviews

thus far resulted in notifications of several updated SSM requires that licensees present a plan for conducting

88 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

the PSR in order to reach a consensus concerning the SSM’s review of PSR for Ringhals 3 and 4 was completed overall arrangements including the scope of the PSR, the in June 2020, in which some shortcomings were identified methods used in the analyses, etc. SSM maintains a dialogue and that Ringhals needed to address. However, all these and hosts meetings with the licensee during the entire PSR were judged to be of little importance to safety and were process. When a PSR is submitted to SSM, SSM conducts managed and completed by the end of 2020. comprehensive reviews and assessments of the submitted reports and their references. In its reviews, SSM compares 14.3.2.3. Oskarshamn 3 PSR the statements made by the licensees with findings from the SSM has decided that the licensee of Oskarshamn 3 (see regulatory supervision. SSM’s process for PSR review is in also 14.2.2) should present a plan for rectification of the line with IAEA safety guide SSG-25, Periodic Safety Review weaknesses identified by SSM. (The licensee’s own for Nuclear Power Plants (2013), and the Nuclear Safety amendments were not included since most of them were Directive amendment. The regulatory assessments of the already to have been implemented according to plan.) SSM PSRs are submitted to the Government. also decided that OKG should present the results of its Time Limiting Ageing Analysis (TLAA) review in 2021, During the last six years, SSM has concluded reviews of since the reactor will pass 40 years of operation before the eight PSRs from nuclear power plants in operation, i.e. next PSR. Forsmark 1-3, Ringhals 1- 4, and Oskarshamn 3. In all of these reviews, SSM concluded that the safety improve-

14.3.3. Safety programmes

ments suggested by the licensees had the potential to Since the previous report, SSM has not conducted any provide an appropriate basis for continued operations. direct supervision of the safety programmes, however, a SSM also identified additional areas of improvement to safety programme is one of the seventeen areas in the ensure safe future operation of these reactors. periodic safety review. In this respect, the safety programmes for Forsmark 3, Ringhals 1 and Oskarshamn

14.3.2.1. Forsmark 1–3 PSR

3 have been reviewed. In the case of Forsmark 3, SSM decided that the licensee should implement its action plan to improve the identified

14.3.4. Inspection and testing of plant structures,

weaknesses in a timely manner. SSM also decided that the

systems and components

licensee should present a plan for rectifying the weaknesses

14.3.4.1. The Swedish third-party control system

identified by SSM. Five months after the review was As mentioned in section 14.1.2. the Swedish system finished, SSM performed a follow-up on how the licensee regarding inspection and testing of mechanical devices is proceeded with the improvements. The supervision based on the regulator, SSM, having set up a framework showed that most of the highest ranked improvements had (the regulations) encompassing principles, methods and been taken care of. modes for inspections and testing. An accredited inspec- In the review of PSR for Forsmark 1 and 2, SSM identified tion body and qualification body are involved in the some shortcommings in the area Safety analyses and safety process. These bodies undergo annual inspections report. SSM required a reassessment and which Forsmark conducted by SWEDAC for evaluation of the accredited has subsequently submitted. SSMs review of this is onging. inspection bodies. SSM, as the competent authority for

nuclear matters, supports SWEDAC in this supervision of

14.3.2.2. Ringhals 1–4 PSRs

the inspection bodies. The reviews of the PSRs for Ringhals 1 and 2 were specific , since the decisions to cease operation of the plants were As far as concerns the only qualification body in Sweden taken at the beginning of the SSM reviews. Due to the new (SQC), its approval was renewed in 2016, though subject to circumstances, the licensee had to update its action plans terms and conditions. These were followed up at an for safety improvements. The greatest change was that inspection performed in 2018, along with previous inspec- Ringhals 1 cancelled its plans to modernise the control tion findings. The conclusion was that the licensee complied room. In the case of Ringhals 2, the major change was that for the most part with the regulatory requirements.

the plan for a new analysis package for the deterministic

14.3.4.2. Inspection and surveillance of plant structures

safety analyses was cancelled. In the cases of both Ringhals

and components

1 and 2, SSM decided that the licensee should complete the implementation of its updated action plans to rectify the Corrosion of the containment steel liner in Ringhals 3 identified weaknesses and report on its progress every six A hole through the steel liner in Ringhals 3 containment months until all improvements regarding requirement (2020).

compliance were implemented. To date, 43 out of the 44 In the past, there have been several instances of detected improvements have been implemented. SSM also decided flaws in nuclear containments in Swedish reactors. The last that the licensee should implement improvements relating flaw occurrence was detected in Ringhals 3 containment in to weaknesses identified by SSM. As far as concerns 2020. Ringhals 2, SSM also concluded that the licensee should present an updated evaluation regarding the need for The Ringhals 3 (PWR) reacor was constructed during modernization of the deterministic analyses. This re-evalu- 1970s and began its operation in 1981. It has a reinforced ation was reviewed by SSM and the conclusion was made concrete containment with a wall thickness of 1–1.5 m. that the necessary steps had been taken. There is also a steel liner with a thickness of 5 to 8 mm,

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 89

embedded in concrete. The containment is supposed to Corrosion in the bottom part of the containment liner

withstand high pressure and keep its integrity in order to The seventh national report described an ageing problem

prevent the leakage of radioactive materials into the involving corrosion in the bottom part of the containment

environment. The designers of Ringhals 3 containment liner in Ringhals 2 (see section 6.1.3 of Sweden’s seventh

had chosen a design with an embedded steel liner in order national report), which was identified during a regular

to protect the liner and to achieve leak tightness. The integrated containment air test in 2014. At that time, the

weakness of this design is a difficulty to inspect the liner work had not been finished, and a continued degradation

visually or by other means. search led to uncovering of a total area of 380 m2 of liner.

Areas with instances of corrosion damage deeper than 3 The integrity of the containment in Ringtails 3 (as well as mm were then repaired (the liner is 5-6 mm thick). The the other containments) is routinely tested by means of work on uncovering the liner was terminated when the containment air tests (CAT). The CAT-test in 2016 licensee found a correlation between the magnitude of the indicated a diffuse leakage through the reactor containment damage and the root cause of the corrosion. Based on this, wall, although the results were within the accepted limits. the licensee assessed that the parts of the liner that During the following years 2017 and 2018, the personnel in remained covered would not have instances of damage Ringhals removed concrete samples in suspicious areas in deeper than 3 mm. order to inspect the steel liner. However, they did not

succeed to localize the leak source at that time. In 2015, the licensee submitted an application for permis-

sion to restart the reactor with the remaining instances of Finally, in 2020 the personnel removed another concrete damage. The regulatory assessment was difficult, since the sample and found a hole through the liner. The hole was licensee had recovered the liner before the permission was immediately (2020-04-30) reported by Ringhals to SSM and sought . In early 2016, the plant remained shut down, with classified as “category 1”, which means that a special ongoing investigations, analyses and discussions. In investigation and permission from SSM is needed before a October 2016, SSM decided that the licensee could restart re-start of the reactor. the reactor, but for a limited period, i.e. until the end of

A following investigation established that the hole had a 2019. SSM’s integrated assessment was that the licensee

diameter of 5 cm and fully penetrated through the steel had shown that the safety margins against breach of the

liner. Furthermore, there were corrosion damages of integrity were sufficient for this limited period. Due to

various depth in the region proximal to the hole. Nearby, uncertainties, the authorisation to restart the reactor was

there wood pieces were found, of which the largest piece subject to certain conditions regarding further analyses,

had a size of 140x350x45 mm. controls and examinations.

The investigators concluded that the wood pieces were Environmental qualification

used during construction of the containment in 1974 in During 2015, SSM started to examine the status of the areas with complex geometry (such as pipes penetraenvironmental qualification at all licensees. SSM found tions). The wood pieces should have been removed but some components and equipment at the Forsmark NPP were forgotten due to human errors. With time, they and at OKG where the validity of environmental qualificacreated a corrosive environment that resulted in the steel tion had expired due to ageing. In the following years, the liner to be damaged. licensees have investigated, qualified and exchanged

The investigators believed that the hole had already evolved equipment, primary in the containment, during the period

through the liner in 2016, but thick concrete walls helped to to maintain and restore the status of the equipment.

achieve acceptable leak tightness during the CAT-test.

Surveillance programmes

However, it is reasonable to believe that the higher pressure Since the previous report, SSM has reviewed the surveilduring accidental conditions could have led to a lack of lance programmes for the reactor pressure vessels of integrity due to the presence of corrosion damage. Ringhals 1-4, Forsmark 1-3 and Oskarshamn 3.

After repair, a new CAT test was carried out at full design

pressure with accepted results and SSM gave a permission 14.3.4.3. Functional tests

(2020-07-07) to re-start the reactor, based on a condition to Since the previous report, SSM has performed supervision

proceed with the investigation next year. During the next at the Ringhals, Oskarshamn, and Forsmark NPPs within

year outage of the reactor (2021), Ringhals personnel the area of functional tests as part of the baseline super-

removed several samples of concrete and investigated the vision programme, see section 8.7.1.

condition of steel liner and reinforcement. No damage or other wood pieces close to the steel liner or reinforcement 14.3.5. Ageing management and long term

were found, which led to a conclusion that the previously operation

detected corrosion hole was caused by singular human error. 14.3.5.1. Ageing management programmes

As stated in section 14.1.2, SSMFS 2008:1 requires an The detected hole, as well as other instances of damage, integrated programme for management of degradation due indicate a need of better methods in order to inspect and to ageing. The programme needs to include all structures, ensure the integrity of nuclear containments. Furthermore, systems and components that are of importance for safety. given the origin of this mistake, there is a need of better This includes mechanical, electrical and I&C components. quality checks during the construction works.

90 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

Concrete structures also need to be covered by the ageing EU-TPR report . In this respect, a key aspect for the 9

management programmes. licensees for justifying continued operation is to show that

the identified TLLAs meet the criteria established. The In the past ten years, SSM has intensified its reviews and TLLAs should consider the entire remaining period of inspections of the NPP programmes for ageing managetime for which the continued operation is planned. If the ment, considering the ages of Swedish NPPs. SSM had licensee has not provided SSM with the time limiting found deviations in some of the plants’ ageing manageageing analyses in time for the PSR review, SSM will ment, and has consequently requested improvements. require this by issuing a decision to provide SSM with these

Follow-up reviews and inspections were performed to verify analyses well in advance prior to 40 years of operation.

that measures implemented by the licensees are effective. This was done for Oskarshamn 3, see section 14.3.2,

The results of these inspections are described in 2019 in “Periodic safety reviews”.

Sweden’s EU Topical Peer Review on ageing management, which is presented in Section A of this report. The inspec- 14.3.6. Safety reviews

tions showed that all licensees in different degrees had SSM supervises the licensees’ safety reviews most

implemented the requirements stated in Chapter 5, Section 3 frequently when reviewing notifications. However,

of the Swedish regulation SSMFS 2008:1. inspections are also performed from time to time.

SSM noted that the licensee had identified a need for further improvements and these were compiled into an 14.4. Implementation of VDNS

action plan that was submitted in ENSREG 1st Topical This section, in reference to Article 14 of CNS, describes Peer Review Swedish National Action Plan.. how Sweden implements relevant measures and performs

The National Action Plan was reviewed by SSM in 2021 to safety analyses in enhancement of the fulfilment of

see how the work was progressing with the actions principles of the VDNS.

planned. The results were submitted in Follow up of During this reporting period, the focus of the regulatory ENSREG 1st Topical Peer Review Swedish National body and licensees alike was on ensuring safety functions Action Plan for Swedish Nuclear Facilities. Status of and safety barriers through the introduction of extensive progress of implementation of Ageing Management work on ageing issues. This was followed by setting up Programmes to other risk significant nuclear installations updated ageing management programmes by the licensees was incorporated by SSM into the TPR process in January to guarantee the elimination of impact from degradation 2021. The Swedish Central Interim Storage Facility for and other processes on specific safety-related components Spent Nuclear Fuel (Clab) submitted their self-assessment and systems. The programmes were subject to several accordingly and also submitted an action plan in accord- IAEA SALTO review missions and the results were ance with the TPR process. incorporated.

SSM´s review of the progress of the action plan concluded An important instrument for implementing the second that all licensee now have an overall Ageing Management principle of the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety is Programme that fulfils SSM requirements and international the periodic safety review (PSR) process. Furthermore, an expectations. SSM also concluded that all licencee are emphasis was placed on the importance of preparation and working according to plan and all actions are to be assessing safety on the part of all reactors that will be completed in 2024. facing their end of design lifetime in order to ensure safe

SSM is awaiting the outcome of these improvements. continued operation (“LTO”). For this purpose, an

extended PSR has been used specifically in the area of

14.3.5.2. Long term operation ageing to require analyses and reporting on matters related

Long term operation (LTO) is not defined in Swedish to plant safety status, and to prove continued safe

legislation, nor in associated regulations, see section 7; operation until the next PSR.

instead, the term “continued operation” has been Sections 14.2.1 through 14.2.6 present the licensees’ suggested. The requirement on having an ageing manageimplementation of the regulatory requirements. Relevant ment programme is applicable to all reactors in operation, regulatory activities are reported in sections 14.3.1 through regardless of age. 14.3.5.

Nevertheless, SSM recognises the fact that the reactors

were originally constructed and analysed for 40 years of

operation. Since the previous report, SSM has decided to

adopt a standpoint accepting continued operation (LTO) in

connection with the PSR reviews, as described in the

9 2017:36, Topical Peer Review 2017. Ageing Management, Swedish National Assessment Report.

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 91

Article 15. Radiation Protection

15.1. Regulatory requirements Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that in all operational states the radiation exposure A new Radiation Protection Act (2018:396) was decided by to the workers and the public caused by a nuclear the Swedish Parliament (Riksdag) on 26 April 2018 and installation shall be kept as low as reasonably achievable entered into force on 1 June 2018. This is supplemented by and that no individual shall be exposed to radiation doses the Ordinance on Radiation Protection (2018:506), and by which exceed prescribed national dose limits. national radiation protection regulations specified in SSM’s

Code of Statutes, SSMFS. A more detailed specification of SSMFS is provided in section 7.2. Summary of developments since

the previous report 15.1.1. Occupational radiation protection

During the current and previous review periods, the Presently, Swedish occupational radiation protection following developments are of relevance with regard to the requirements governing nuclear facilities are in accordance obligations of Article 15: with the binding requirements of the new Radiation Protection Act. The new Radiation Protection Act – A new Radiation Protection Act (2018:396) was decided transposes several key provisions of Council Directive by the Swedish Parliament (Riksdag) on 26 April 2018 2013/59/Euratom laying down basic safety standards for and entered into force on 1 June 2018. This was protection against the dangers arising from exposure to supplemented by the Ordinance on Radiation ionising radiation. Protection (2018:506). The new Act and Ordinance SSM’s regulations SSMFS 2018:1 and SSMFS 2008:26 transposes several key provisions of Council Directive contain extensive requirements relating to occupational 2013/59/Euratom laying down basic safety standards radiation protection in connection with activities involving for protection against the dangers arising from exposure ionizing radiation as well as workers at all nuclear facilities. to ionising radiation. Chapter 4 of SSMFS 2018:1 contains general requirements – On 24 May 2018, new regulations on basic rules for all on facility design, workplace radiation monitoring, radiation licensed activities involving ionising radiation were protection competences, categorization of workers, decided (SSMFS 2018:1). These regulations came into occupational dose monitoring and assessment, as well as force on 1 June 2018. They transpose additional health surveillance of workers. The regulations SSMFS provisions of Council Directive 2013/59/Euratom that 2008:26 contain additional more detailed requirements in were not included in the new Radiation Protection Act. these areas. Note that SSMFS 2008:26 are replaced from 1 – A new lower dose limit for equivalent dose to the lens of March 2022 by new regulations.The requirements are based the eye is stated in the Ordinance on Radiation on the fundamental principles of radiation protection as Protection. Requirements on the application of this are defined by the International Commission on Radiological specified in SSMFS 2018:1. These include the situations Protection (ICRP): justification, optimisation of protection where measurements need to be conducted. A joint and application of dose limits. project has been carried out together with all Swedish nuclear facilities in connection with this lower dose limit. Regulations regarding an appointed radiation protection Shared methods and guidelines have been developed. manager, the actual radiation protection expert available – Radiation protection education and training have been onsite (not deemed a manager in the line organisation), are continuously reviewed and strengthened. specified in SSMFS 2008:24. These requirements have been supplemented by additional requirements on an – Efforts to reduce releases of radioactive substances to organisational function for radiation protection expertise air and water have been effective. The activity amounts, in SSMFS 2018:1. as well as the corresponding calculated doses to the public, have decreased or remained at the same order of The new, lower dose limit for equivalent dose to the lens magnitude. of the eye is stated in the Ordinance on Radiation Protec-

92 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

tion. Requirements on the application of this are specified Environmental monitoring in the areas surrounding in SSMFS 2018:1. These include situations where measure- nuclear facilities is currently performed according to ments need to be conducted. monitoring programmes determined by SSM. This arrangement will be changed in the future to imply that 15.1.2. Protection of the general public licence holders will be charged with developing and and the environment maintaining site-specific environmental monitoring Chapter 5 of SSMFS 2018:1 contains general requirements programmes at the site. The programmes are to be kept on the protection of members of the public and the regularly updated and subject to approval by SSM. environment from exposure to ionizing radiation, and The programmes specify the type and sampling frequency, SSMFS 2008:23 include more detailed requirements on the sample treatment, radionuclides to consider, reporting etc. protection of members of the public and the environment, Sampling is performed at and outside the sites. Samples are as well as requirements on monitoring programmes. analysed by staff of the nuclear facilities, or by external The requirements comprise a dose constraint on effective laboratories that have adequate quality assurance systems. dose to the public from discharges of radioactive To verify compliance, SSM performs inspections and substances to the environment, and required monitoring evaluates laboratory performance. The laboratories take of releases of radioactive substances to water and air. All part in proficiency tests and bilateral inter-laboratory unmonitored leakages must be investigated and an upper comparisons on random sub-samples to check compliance boundary has to be set for possible unmonitored leakages with measurements performed by SSM or by another to air and water from each facility. independent laboratory.

Compliance with the dose constraint is demonstrated by Nuclear reactor licensees report annually to SSM on calculating the dose to representative individuals. A new adopted or planned measures to limit or reduce releases of and more site specific methodology for calculating the radioactive substances, with the aim of achieving specified dose was approved by SSM in 2019. The methodology is target values. If established reference values are exceeded, used for calculating the dose to representative persons in the planned measures to achieve the reference values shall three different age groups from one year’s releases be reported. integrated over a 100-year period, with the calculated dose According to the requirements, releases of radioactive consisting of the sum of the effective dose from external substances to the environment as well as results from exposure and the committed effective dose from internal environmental monitoring shall be reported twice per year exposure. The new methodology includes adoption of the to SSM. In practice however these releases and results have ICRP’s recommendations for the “representative person” only been reported once a year, since all licensees have (instead of critical group).. been permitted dispensation from this requirement. Events The discharge limit is achieved by restricting the radiation that lead to a substantial increase in releases of radioactive dose to the public. Sweden has no statutory nuclide-spe- substances from a nuclear facility must be reported to SSM cific discharge limits. The dose limit for members of the as soon as possible, together with a description of the public is 1 mSv per year. Hence, in order to protect the actions taken to reduce the releases. public, the dose constraint is 0,1 mSv per year and site for Clearance of materials, rooms, buildings and land in discharges of radioactive substances to the environment practices involving the use of ionising radiation is regulated (authorised releases). in SSMFS 2018:3, which stipulates detailed requirements Releases though the main stacks of nuclear power reactors for clearance procedures. shall be controlled by means of continuous nuclide-specific measurements of volatile radioactive substances, such 15.1.3. Development of new regulations as noble gases, continuous collection of samples of iodine SSM has developed new regulations for nuclear safety, which and particle-bound radioactive substances, as well as enter into force 1 March 2022, i.e., after the current reporting measurements of carbon-14 and tritium. period. For nuclear power plants, the regulations SSMFS 2008:23, SSMFS 2008:24 and SSMFS 2008:26 are super- Discharges of radionuclides to water shall be controlled ceeded by SSMFS 2021:4, SSMFS 2021:5 and SSMFS 2021:6. through measurements of representative samples from each release pathway. The analyses shall cover nuclide- In the new regulations, the general requirements on specific measurements of gamma and alpha-emitting prere quisites for protection of workers and members of radioactive substances as well as, where relevant, the public from exposure to ionizing radiation found in strontium-90 and tritium. Chapter 4 and 5 of SSMFS 2018:1, have been complemented with more specific requirements in SSMFS 2021:4, Limitation of releases shall be based on optimisation of specifying requirements on design of the nuclear power radiation protection and by applying the Best Available plant, to enable radiation exposure to workers and Technology (BAT) in order to limit and further reduce the members of the public to be kept as low as reasonably releases of radionuclides. achievable. The function and efficiency of measurement equipment The requirements on activities for radiation protection of and release limiting systems shall be checked periodically workers as well as the public during operation are mainly and whenever there are any indications of malfunctions.

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 93

found in Chapter 4 of SSMFS 2021:6. In addition to management of the plant, and particularly in connection previous requirements this chapter also include require- with overall health and safety activities. ments on the use of a dose reduction programme (ALARA programme) for occupational exposure, use of 15.2.1.1. Ringhals NPP dose constraints, use of radiation zones, and requirments The decisions to phase out units 1 and 2 at the Ringhals on workplace and individual monitoring. The previous NPP affected the organisational structure in radiation requirements on appointed radiation protection managers, protection. Measures have been taken to ensure adequate have been removed from the new regulations for nuclear competence and resources during the future decommispower plants, as the requimenents on a organizational sioning process. A reorganisation took place in 2919 within function for radiation protection expertise, as stated in the RP department to meet new criteria.

SSMFS 2018:1 are assessed to be sufficient.

15.2.1.2. Forsmark NPP

Chapter 4 of SSMFS 2021:6 also include more detailed and Forsmark has a cohesive group for operational radiation newrequirements on environmental monitoring and protection for all three units. The group has competence assessment of radiological impact on the environment, and succession plan, with a clear career path, that gives compared to previous regulations in SSMFS 2008:23. For additional development opportunities within the profession. example, the responsibility for development and maintenance of site-specific environmental monitoring 15.2.1.3. Oskarshamn NPP programmes is transferred from SSM to the licensee. The The decision to phase out the two oldest reactors at the programmes shall however still be subject to approval by Oskarshamn NPP affected the organizational structure. A SSM. Another change is that the frequency for reporting new organization was created with two main directions: of discharge and environmental data to SSM is reduced production and decommissioning, whereby a new departfrom two times a year to once a year. ment was created to handle decommissioning.

Requirements on reporting deficiencies in radiation There are two separate radiation protection organizations protection of workers, events that lead to a substantial at Oskarshamn NPP, one for radiation protection within increase in releases of radioactive substances or occurences the decommissioning project of the two oldest reactors, of unexpected concentrations of radioactive substances in according to previous decisions on decommissioning of the environment to SSM, have been clarified in Chapter 9, these, and one radiation protection organization for the together with Annex 3 of SSMFS 2021:6. remaining reactor in operation and radiation protection at

other operating facilities.

15.2. Compliance of licence holders The two radiation protection organizations work with their

respective activities; decommissioning and production, but Previous national reports include descriptions of measures tries to align its work and therefore has a common taken by the licensees to comply with the new radiation evaluation forum for status regarding radiation protection protection regulations. The following sections describe the and for a common evaluation of radiation protection current situation at Swedish nuclear facilities. The sections events, as the same rules for categorization and classificaselected provide relevant examples of the ongoing work. tion of events exist, regardless of business orientation.

15.2.1. Organisation of radiation protection

Both at the decommissioning department and the produc-

at the nuclear power plants

tion department, a focus has been placed on creating Radiation protection (RP) resources are centralised at radiation protection organizations with a higher degree of Swedish nuclear power plants, though normally a few own staff than previously. individuals are assigned to specific units. Plant operators frequently hire external RP personnel, particularly during Difficulties exist with regard to hiring radiation protection outages. The percentage of hired RP personnel during resources from contractor companies in sufficient numbers outages can be as high as 70–80 %. During normal and with sufficient competence and experience.

operation, the percentage of hired RP personnel is

15.2.2. Internal procedures for radiation protection

approximately 30-40 % at Forsmark, 20 % at Ringhals and Work is continuing to harmonise procedures at and 25 % at Oskarshamn. between sites. This includes behaviour-related instructions, Radiation protection responsibilities reflect the organisasuch as procedures and rules for radiation protection, tional structure. The RP sections are responsible for usage of prescribed personal protective equipment in performing assessments and providing other radiation radiation and contamination controlled areas, and controls protection services. The responsibility to comply with of the frequencies of contamination alarms and houseinstructions rests with management in the line organisakeeping in general. Some examples of focus areas are tion. Planning and discharging of resources are carried out clearance of materials, measurements of equivalent dose to within the overall processes for production, refurbishment, the lens of the eye, enhancing practical training of exposed outages, project work, etc., except for special services (e.g. workers in the controlled areas, enhancing the process of dosimeter service, whole-body counting, RP instruments, making dose prognoses, as well as categorisation of some monitoring and surveillance, etc.). The senior radiation protection-related events and incidents. management plans RP work in conjunction with the overall

94 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

15.2.3. Radiation protection education and training Ringhals NPP

A mandatory education programme on radiation Ringhals has installed personal identification at all exit protection techniques for own personnel working in the monitors located at units 3 and 4. The purpose was to controlled area and for external foremen and supervisors improve handling of PCE (Personal Contamination are being updated in cooperation between the Swedish Events) in order to more effectively gain control over NPPs. radioactive contamination in controlled area and protect the individuals involved. Due to the new national regulations in the field of radiation protection, site-specific instructions and proce- Ringhals previously reported on ongoing work to improve dures are in the process of being adjusted accordingly. procedures for clearance measurements. There are Examples of significant changes include new dose limits currently three clearance stations equipped with HpGe and new procedures for measuring equivalent dose to the detectors. An average of around 300 nuclide-specific lens of the eye. measurements are performed each year, and very few of them exceed the clearance limits. This indicates that the

Forsmark NPP and Ringhals NPP

clearance process works well in all stages regarding sorting, Competence Councils have been established between packing, smear tests, etc. Forsmark and Ringhals in order to deal with common educational issues within the radiation protection area. An Oskarshamn NPP training programme for radiation protection personnel in At Oskarshamn, there is a continued high focus on the area of clearance has been developed together with the preventing the spread of radioactive contamination, by other nuclear power plants in Sweden. Targeted radiation following up and mapping contamination incidents in the protection training is held within the plant renewal projects event of alarms in the personal monitoring and through where the need exists. the care of the radiation protection organizations, and by carrying out remediation for preventive purposes. If an At Forsmark NPP an ALARA training and education individual sets off an alarm when exiting, this information programme for staff involved in the plant modification is also communicated to the manager responsible. and renewal process has been developed and a pilot training course has been held after each step. The training A special focus is placed on the number of contamination and education programme is intended for personnel alarms during monitoring related to the number of involved in planning and construction of plant modifica- passages and established target values for number of tions and the project managers. Feedback and experience alarms which are adapted to the nature and scope of the from this have been taken into account. The programme activities. has been revised and is now offered on a broader front.

15.2.5. Measurements of radionuclides

Oskarshamn NPP in reactor systems

A simulator for practical training, set up in an authentic Online dose rate measurements at several locations are environment, is used by in-house staff and contractor carried out in order to continuously monitor changes in workers at Oskarshamn, and it offers opportunities to dose rates. During outages, supplementary measurement carry out practical training in an authentic environment, campaigns are performed as input for determining with focus on personal radiation protection. additional protective measures during the outage, but also to cover long-term trends in specific measurement 15.2.4. Activities to prevent spread programmes.

of contamination

Activities have been enforced further at all sites. The Ringhals NPP activities cover individual follow-ups of alarms set off at At the Ringhals NPP, surface activity measurements (SAM) exit gates in connection with identity registration when have been conducted at all plants since 1990. Measureconducting a measurement, changes in procedures, ments are performed using collimated gamma spectrosenhanced checks closer to workplaces, as well as enhanced copy equipment. It has been established that most nuclides information, education and training efforts. contributing to dose rate have decreased over the years due to operational and chemical controls. In 2018, a new

Forsmark NPP

shutdown program was tested on Ringhals unit 2 without At Forsmark, work has been carried out to take into using RCPs during the cleanup. The purpose of this test account international guidelines on detection and control was to reduce recontamination and activity spread to of alpha activity. This includes, among other things, systems during the cleanup, and thus reduce dose rates mapping of alpha activity levels inside the facilities. Mobile during the maintenance period. During the shutdown, dose filters are now used to filter the air from radioactive rates were monitored in a number of positions, and a aerosols as close to the source as possible. Furthermore, nuclide-specific online measurement was performed using card readersin personal monitors are used for easier the SAM equipment. Online nuclide-specific measureidentification of contaminated personnel. A web-based ments of system surfaces and reactor water are installed interface simplifies the follow-ups of personal contaminaonly at the BWR unit Ringhals 1. The online instrumentation registered by the personal monitors. tion is used to track the surface activity buildup in the

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 95

reactor system with the aim of evaluating the effect of lent doses to extremities, and for different levels of dose system decontamination campaigns, as well as smaller rate and dose prognosis. The measure has significantly changes in chemistry and operation. The measurements decreased the number of high individual doses. show that the degree of recontamination of the reactor The recommendations from the joint ALARA Benchmark system surfaces is now roughly 80% of the status prior to are being successively implemented. A new model for the campaign carried out in 2014. management of dose prognosis, which was implemented Forsmark NPP throughout the organisation, will be evaluated in order to enhance the precision of the prognosis. All the Forsmark units have nuclide-specific gamma measurement systems installed online monitoring of The main focus of the activity is to spread the responsigaseous fission products in the condenser’s off-gases. This bility for and dedication to ALARA among the departmonitoring is used for early detection of fuel failures and ments outside the RP department. Also, the management to identify a leaking fuel bundle in the core. of ALARA plans has been strengthened. The ALARA During the annual outage of each Forsmark unit, plans, one from each department, have to be reviewed by nuclide-specific gamma measurements are performed on the ALARA committee before approval. For projects with pipes and heat exchangers at selected locations. The dose prognosis greater than 0.08 man Sv, a specific measurements show the amount of radioactivity that is ALARA plan must always be established. present as internal contamination, and which nuclides that At Ringhals units 2, 3 and 4, fuel decontamination has contribute to the dose rate at the measurement location. been performed annualy.

15.2.6. Dose reduction and ALARA programmes An alternative shutdown procedure involving RCP All NPPs continue to make improvements to their radiation operation during hydrogen peroxide cleanup was tested at protection activities by using the principle of optimisation Ringhals 2 shutdown for refuelling in 2018. The eventual of protection in a long-term perspective, as well as in effects on source terms and dose rates will be analysed in day-to-day work. During the previous review period, the order to evaluate future implementation in Ringhals’ PWRs. focus had already come to concentrate more on reducing

Forsmark NPP

high individual exposures as a complement to focusing on In line with the ALARA-program, Forsmark has for collective doses. This work is continuing. Dose statistics for exempel developed requirements for cobolt content in fuel a ten-year period are presented in section 15.3.1. components and in order to reduce emission of radioactive The alpha value is used when applicable. In case there is a nobel gases made a system function investigation of the possibility to achieve a greater overall benefit, the monetary off gas delay system. sum may be increased. An assessment is made on a case by The alpha value of 10 million SEK/man Sv is still valid at case basis. the Forsmark NPP.

Ringhals NPP

The use of the EPD system has progressed using further The alpha value, used at the Ringhals NPP in the optimisareduced/fine-tuned dose alarm limits for work in spaces tion process, has since 2015 been 10.8 million SEK per with low dose rates. A list of spaces, systems and jobs with saved man-sievert (man Sv). The former alpha value, since a high risk of overexposure has been developed and used 2008, was 10 million SEK/man Sv. This alpha value is still when planning RP measures. valid at the Forsmark NPP. When working with the Foreign Material Exclusion (FME), System decontamination, conducted at Ringhals unit 1 which involves prioritising where the focus should be starting in 2014, remains beneficial in 2019 as regards low placed, classification lists were developed for different recontamination of the involved systems. Each year, this systems to facilitate maintenance work at all three facilities. saves several tens of man mSv collective dose. Already in the preparation stage, these classification lists The ALARA committee is undergoing a review regarding make it possible to plan the appropriate type of measures the procedures workflow. The main focus for the before, during and after the work. For complex works, committee remains to conduct supervision over continua- templates are available so that the responsible work group, tion of long-term radiation protection development. The together with the FME staff, can in advance produce committee also evaluates ALARA plans and objectives for structured FME plans that describe in detail how the works individual and collective doses, and follows up radiation are to be carried out in order to minimise the risk of adding protection activities. The committee members are made up foreign objects. Checklists and certificates help employees of managers who have personnel working in the controlled to carry out all key tasks. As a final safety measure, FME area or who can affect the design and/or conditions in the staff makes final checks using their own specially trained controlled area, together with radiation protection experts. staff to ensure purity after work has been completed.

A number of dose constraints have been implemented, Oskarshamn NPP and will be revised as an optimisation tool to reduce high When deciding on measures to limit exposures Oskarindividual doses. Dose constraints are established for shamn uses an alpha value, which is calculated annually individual doses: not only effective dose, but also equiva- according to the consumer price index, and which follows

96 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

a decision in the company’s ALARA committee from 2016. Efforts to avoid fuel failures are ongoing and include The alpha value in 2021 was 11.8 million SEK per saved education and training, as well as introducing new techman Sv and for 2022 has been calculated up to 12.1 million niques to stop foreign debris from entering reactor SEK per saved man Sv. An assessment can also be made systems. on a case by case basis.

Forsmark NPP

The main focus of the ALARA Committee at Oskarshamn Forsmark works actively to reduce emission to air. The is to monitor the long-term development of radiation work with reducing fuel failures and identify leakage have protection. The committee evaluates the strategies for given a positive trend and the emissions have decreased. individual and collective doses and monitors radiation Forsmark NPP has under a number of years had problems protection in connection with activities, projects and with fuel failures. Extensive work has been made to solve measures, with a main focus on overall and facility-specific the problem. Forsmark has received external help with the ALARA plans. The members of the committee are development of general routines and controls . At managers who have staff working in the controlled area, or Forsmark 3 during the shutdown 2021, an extensive work who can influence the design and conditions in the was conducted with cleansing the reactor tank bottom controlled area, together with radiation protection experts. from foreign debris. In 2021 all three units in Forsmark A number of planning values for dose and dose rate have were free of fuel failures. been implemented as an optimization tool to reduce high Discharges of waste water has been kept at very low levels individual and collective doses. Dose limits have been for recent years. established for individual doses on a daily, monthly and annual basis, and for dose rates. The measure has signifi-

Ringhals NPP

cantly reduced the number of high individual doses. The Since 2014, Ringhals units 1-4 have been free from any fuel recommendations from the common ALARA benchmark damage. For this reason, they have been able to maintain are gradually implemented on an annual basis. low activity release rates to the environment. All the units Each department head has the full and undivided responsi- now have very low levels of tramp fissile material on the bility for doses received in their respective operations and core (below detection limit on unit 3 and 4); in the case of is also responsible for, through their radiation protection Ringhals 1, it was considered as an all-time low before the organization, producing dose predictions and then the final shutdown in the end of 2020. During 2020, unit 3 responsibility for determining these and for following up implemented up flow conversion (modification of reactor outcomes related to prognosis. The main focus of the vessel lower internals to avoid baffle jetting), thereby ALARA operations is that responsible and executing limiting the risk of fuel damage even further. The total organizations, operating in the facilities, should feel the amount of airborne releases decreased during the previous responsibility and commitment of ALARA and the dose period due to the shutdown of unit 1 and 2. However, the outcome of their respective staff. reduction rate for the operating units 3 and 4 has levelled off. Installations at Ringhals units 3 and 4 for delaying and An extensive project with the FME, Foreign Material reducing releases of radioactive gases have been working as Exclusion, has been carried out in order to prevent foreign intended for most of the period. substances or objects from ending up in the reactor systems. OKG works proactively to keep process systems Dishargers to water have been decreasing over the past 10 free of foreign objects. The work with FME promotes years, owing mainly to the operation of the evaporator at nuclear safety, protects the integrity of the fuel, contributes the liquid waste processing facility at unit 1. However, to reduced radiation dose, through reduced contamination, some challenges still remain. Ongoing initiatives include contributes to the health of the components and the the reduction of antimony source terms and improvement reliability of the equipment, reduces unplanned stops and of antimony cleaning at unit 3 and 4, and the modernizareduces remedial maintenance. An established and tion of the Ringhals NPP liquid waste processing facility; well-functioning FME program is a cost-effective way of serving all the units. reducing the risk of fuel damage, caused by wear and tear, Since 2012 (Ringhals unit 4) and 2015 (Ringhals unit 2 and and thus constitutes an important ALARA measure. 3), a programme for ultrasonic cleaning of fuel elements has been implemented. The removal of both activated and

15.2.7. Programmes to reduce the release of

not yet activated deposits limits the general source term of

radioactive substances

the plant including the reactor water, which is also Plans and action programmes remain in effect for the expected to affect the effluents. purpose of reducing releases of radioactive substances from nuclear power plants to the environment. Some At the Ringhals NPP, the annual dose to the “representaexamples of measures implemented are given here. tive person” is mainly due to C-14. Releases of other radionuclides contribute less than 10 % of the total dose. All sites have programmes for separation and minimisation Releases to water accounts for approximately 1% of the of different types of waste water. This has altogether total dose calculated to the representative person. A new resulted in reduced volumes of waste water as well as method for calculating doses from normal releases of reduced activity discharges. radionuclides to the public (PREDO) was implemented

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 97

2019, affecting both the absolute dose (being increased) different parts of the OKG organization, and with a strong and the relative contributors. focus on raising OKG’s level of occupational safety by means of improved security ahead of schedule, rules and Ringhals NPP ALARA-plan has been further developed identified risks related to operations, stopping tasks that during the period and now includes a goal for Minimizaseem to pose risks, and rectifying and reporting risks and tion of radioactive releases as far as reasonably achievable. events. The purpose have been to reinforce the overall safety Oskarshamn NPP culture and this work will continue during future outages.

The decision to decommission the two oldest units at WANO’s compilation of registered collective doses at the Oskarshamn’s nuclear power plant has reduced the releases world’s boiling water reactors and with a rolling three-year from the site. For the two facilities that are being under average showed that Oskarshamn’s O3 reactor, at the turn decommissioning, plans have been specially developed for of the year 2017, had the lowest value of all compared monitoring and limiting releases during the decommisreactors. The internal conclusion was that the reactor had a sioning and with special focus on the various work positive trend over a long period of time in terms of the packages that occur during the decommissioning. facility’s radiological status and purity and that the success For the remaining reactor still in operation, the focus is to was the result of even better cooperation between all continuously follow up releases to air and water, where parties involved, mainly within the maintenance and higher emissions to air have been found than budgeted for radiation protection organizations.

and which could be attributed to fuel damage. During the 2020 outage, however, it was found that when opening systems, high dose rates were obtained and that

15.2.8. Other events and activities during

there were high levels of contamination in the systems.

the review period

Improving the precision of the dose prognosis is a An investigation is underway into these phenomena and continius work at all three units. linked to used fuel types, contaminants in spreading material, and the moisture content of the steam and A joint project has been carried out by the Swedish nuclear execution organizations on the operational and technical facilities due to the lower dose limit for equivalent dose to side have the task, together with and with the help of data the lens of the eye. Common work methods and guidelines from the company’s source term group, to investigate the have been developed. From earlier studies, it has been root cause of problems when opening systems and found that the whole body dose, Hp(10), and dose to the especially ahead of the upcoming longer outage, when the lens of the eye, Hp(3), are comparable for most work organization again need to open up systems. situations that occur in a nuclear power plant. A number of specific jobs have been identified in which the lens of Based on the results through the root cause analysis, the eye might receive a higher dose than measured by the measures will then be implemented in ALARA terms and whole body dosimeter. New rutines are beeing imple- the goal for Oskarshamn is that the O3 reactor will be one mented at all units. of the five best reactors in terms of WANO’s rolling three-year average for collective dose in 2027.

Ringhals NPP

As a result of less maintenance and fewer large projects involving reactor systems along with stable or decreasing 15.3. Impact and results of radiation

source terms, the power plant has faced a notably lower protection measures

CRE (collective radiation exposure). Along with lower

15.3.1. Occupational exposure

individual doses and a fewer number of man hours, this Activities to improve the radiological environment and to challenges the system of dose prognosis. decrease exposure of workers at the reactors are described Decommissioning activities are in progress for Ringhals in section 15.2. unit 1 and 2 with, for example, RKL (radiological mapping) Figure 16 shows occupational collective radiation doses at as ongoing procedures. Swedish NPPs in operation during the period 2012-2021. Forsmark NPP As observed, the annual total collective dose has decreased The plans for long time operation on the part of all three the last decade and there are several reasons for this. The reactors have resulted in an increased need for mainte- main source of occupational exposure is external radiation nance of contaminated systems and components, which in from Co-60 on the surface layers in primary reactor turn creates a need for efficient ALARA planning and systems. A continuous effort for many years to reduce implementation of ALARA measures. production and distribution of Co-60 have resulted in a decreaser of radiation levels in the work environment. Identification and encapsulation of damaged fuel rods and Another explanation for the decrease in exposure is the removal to the intermediate fuel storage are ongoing. This decision to permanently shut down some of oldest reactor is to minimize leakage of activity to the storage basins. units. At Oskarshamn NPP, unit 2 was permanently shut Oskarshamn NPP down in December 2016 unit 1 in 2017. At Ringhals NPP In conjunction with the outages “safety team” have been unit 2 was shut down in 2020 and unit 1 in 2021. Phasing represented in the reactor facility, by using personnel from out reactor operation lead initially to less workload inside

98 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

controlled areas and therefore less occupational exposure. monitoring program was introduced in 2019 when the new The increase in collective dose in 2014 and 2015 illustrated dose limit came into force. by figure 16 is due to major modernisation work carried out at Ringhals and Oskarshamn. 15.3.2. Doses to the public and releases to the

environment

The dose limit for members of the public is 1 millisievert

Occupational collective effective dose for NPPs in operation

14

per year (effective dose) as set out in the Radiation

12

Protection Ordinance (2018:506). In order to sufficiently 10 protect the public, SSM has issued a site-specific dose constraint for releases of radioactive substances from

8

nuclear installations to the environment. The dose manSv 6 constraint of 0,1 mSv per year is independent of the number of release points at the site. The methodology

4

used for estimating dose to the public is described in 2 section 15.1.2. There are no regulatory limitations for releases of specific radionuclides. Figure 18 displays

0

2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 effective dose to the public resulting from releases of Forsmark Oskarshamn Ringhals All NPP radionuclides during the period 2010–2020 at Swedish Figure 16. Collective radiation doses at Swedish NPPs in operation nuclear power plant sites. during the period 2012–2021.

Estimated dose to representative person

Internal exposure of workers at the NPPs in operation

1,4E-03

continue to be rare. A total of five workers have registered an internal dose in the last 10 years, with the highest

1,2E-03

committed effective dose being 0.6 mSv. The low number 1,0E-03 of intakes of radionuclides reflects low contamination 8,0E-04

mSv

levels and effective work procedures.

6,0E-04

Effective doses to workers depend on the type of work. 4,0E-04 This can be seen in figure 17, where annual average

2,0E-04

effective doses for some specific work categories are shown for the time period 2012–2021.

0,0E+00

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

Forsmark Ringhals Oskarshamn

Average annual effective dose

5,0

4,5 Figure 18. Estimated radiation dose to representative person from release of radionuclides from Swedish NPPs.

4,0

3,5

The efforts to reduce releases of radioactive substances, by

3,0

administrative and technical means, have been effective,

2,5

mSv and the released activity amounts, as well as the corre-

2,0

sponding calculated doses to the representative person,

1,5

have decreased or remained at the same level in recent

1,0

years. The increase in dose observed in 2019 and 2020 is

0,5

due to the change of methodology used for dose estima-

0,0

2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 tions and does not implicate an increase in the actual Mechanical work Insulation work Operators discharges from the nuclear power plants. The increase in In-service inspection Health Physics All workers dose is also small compared to the stipulated dose constraint at 0,1 mSv a year. Figure 17. Average individual doses to selected work categories at Swedish NPPs. Releases to water and air from Swedish reactors are for the most part at the same level as releases from other reactors A selection of statistics on occupational doses at Swedish of the same type and size in other countries. Further NPPs during the same time period is shown in table 7. As actions to reduce gaseous and liquid effluents are planned. can be seen, there is a significant decrease in the number The concepts of reference values and target values are of individuals exceeding 10 millisievert per year, which is used on the part of nuclear power reactors as a measure as considered to be an effect of the operator’s specific focus part of applying Best Available Technique (BAT) for on reducing doses to the most exposed workers, e.g. by the reducing releases of radionuclides. These values are use of dose constraints. In addition, no worker has defined by the licensees and are valuable for achieving the received an annual effective dose exceeding 20 mSv in the long-term objective of reducing releases and effluents of last 10 years, and the average annual effective dose has radioactive substances. been kept below 2 mSv with a slightly decreasing level. Data is also shown from monitoring of eye exposure. This

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 99

Table 7. Occupational dose statistics for Swedish NPPs.

Number of Number of Highest annual Number of

Total collective Average Highest annual

persons with persons with dose to lens persons with

Year effective dose effective dose effective dose

effective dose effective dose of eye dose to lens of

(manSv) (mSv) (mSv)

> 10 mSv ≥ 0,1 mSv (mSv) eye > 10 mSv

10

2012 6.3 1.5 17.5 23 4251

2013 6.6 1.5 16.9 20 4416

2014 8.7 1.6 15.2 13 5229

2015 7.9 1.5 14.2 34 5091

2016 4.4 1.3 16.4 5 3510

2017 3 1.1 10.6 2 2705

2018 2.6 1 9.7 0 2470

2019 2.8 1.1 13.6 8 2511 15.1 13

2020 4.1 1.4 12.4 6 2851 13.6 12

2021 2.8 1.1 10.2 1 2459 10.2 1

15.4. Regulatory control In addition to the baseline supervision plan, inspections are carried out on an on-going basis to monitor activities at the The baseline supervision plan in radiation protection is NPPs related to radiation protection. Normally, these divided into five supervision groups (see 8.8.2.1): Work in include meetings workers and representatives of the the facility, Optimisation of protection (ALARA radiation protection management as well as inspection of programme), Protection of workers, Releases of radioacwork activities during outages. tive substances and Environmental monitoring. SSM’s regulatory control also includes review of various Between 2018-2021 the following groups were inspected: documents submitted by the licensees, eg. annual reports – Work in the facility, including operational radiation on radiation protection and releases of radioactive protection, issuance of radiation work permits and substances. radiation protection activities at operation and Examples of findings from supervision completed in maintence departments recent years are: – ALARA programme, including operational and long term handling of the programme at the company – a need to include radiation protection to a greater extent management level in operational planning

– Releases of radioactive substances, including how – challenges associated with maintaining competence in releases are kept as low as reasonably achievable, that all radiation protection

releases are monitored and reporting to SSM of – to further develop internal review processes of the increased releases or physical changes to the releases effects of programmes and of measures to prevent reccurrence of incidents In 2022, focus is on the supervision group Protection of – a need to demonstrate that diffuse releases are workers and will include external and internal dosimetry, accounted for internal transports of radioactive material, and other work – a need to analyse the exposure of biota due to activities specific to radiation protection. radioactive releases Supervision of the fifth group, Environmental monitoring, is planned for 2024.

10 Monitoring of dose to lens of the eye started in 2019.

100 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

Article 16. Emergency Preparedness

– The structure of the regulation has been changed. Some 1. Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps requirements that were previously found in SSMFS to ensure that there are on-site and off-site emergency 2014:2 (on-site emergency preparedness and response) plans that are routinely tested for nuclear installations and are now instead found in SSMFS 2018:1 (basic rules for cover the activities to be carried out in the event of an all licensed activities involving ionising radiation). emergency. For any new nuclear installations, such plans shall be prepared and tested before it commences – New monitoring stations have been installed around the operation above a low power level agreed by the nuclear power plants in Sweden. The new stations will regulatory body. provide information on dose rates at 90 locations 2. Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps around the Swedish nuclear power plants. The last to ensure that, insofar as they are likely to be affected by stations went online in late 2018 and are currently a radiological emergency, its own population and the undergoing an evaluation process.

competent authorities of the states in the vicinity of the – Two ordinances, 2015:1052 and 2015:1053, entered into nuclear installation are provided with appropriate force on 1 April 2016. These ordinances replace the information for emergency planning and response. former Emergency Preparedness and Heightened Alert 3. Contracting Parties which do not have a nuclear Ordinance (2006:942) that is now split into two parts installation on their territory, insofar as they are likely to without any major revisions of the content having be affected in the event of a radiological emergency at a being made. nuclear installation in the vicinity, shall take the appro- – The Government has decided on the new emergency priate steps for the preparation and testing of emergency planning zones and distances and changes to the plans for their territory that cover the activities to be Ordinance. The amendments to the Civil Protection carried out in the event of such an emergency. Ordinance entered into force 1 July 2020 and will be implemented on 1 July 2022 at the latest. Summary of developments since – A new mobile radiation monitoring system for more

the previous national report efficient fallout mapping has been introduced because of the extended planning distance (EPD) around – During the current review period, the following Swedish NPPs which will be increased from 50 km to developments are of relevance with regard to the 100 km in July 2022 obligations of Article 16: – SSM has developed new regulations, which enter into – A new Radiation Protection Act (2018:396) which force 1 March 2022, i.e., after the current reporting entered into force on 1 June 2018. It is applicable to period. All requirements for emergency preparedness workers and the public during an emergency. and response for NPPs in operation are integrated into – A new Radiation Protection Ordinance (2018:506) the three regulations. Because of the new regulations which entered into force on 1 June 2018. It sets the SSM regulation SSMFS 2014:2 concerning reference levels to be applied in the case of a emergency preparedness at nuclear facilities have been radiological emergency and includes requirements for revised and does not include requirements for NPPs in optimisation. operation anymore.

– Updated regulations, SSMFS 2014:2 (revised through SSMFS 2018:26), concerning on-site emergency preparedness and response, entered into force on 1 June 16.1. Regulatory requirements

2018. The regulation contains new rules for logistics – Requirements for emergency activities and plans for the centres and provisions concerning the ability to receive nuclear facilities are included in several legally binding aid and support from external organisations. Also, some documents: concepts have been renamed.

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 101

– SSM’s regulations (SSMFS 2014:2) concerning Through the Ordinance on Nuclear Activities (1984:14) emergency preparedness at nuclear facilities (on-site and the Radiation Protection Ordinance (1988:293), the emergency preparedness and response), Government has assigned SSM the mandate to issue – SSM’s regulations (SSMFS 2018:1, Chapter 2) specific regulations for licensees in the fields of nuclear concerning basic rules for licensed activities involving safety and radiation protection. ionising radiation, Chapter 2, Section 4 of SSMFS 2018:1 states that all – Civil Protection Act (2003:778) regarding protection activities involving sources that can cause a radiological against accidents with serious potential consequences emergency shall be placed (by SSM) in one of the for human health and the environment (on-site and emergency preparedness categories 1, 2, 3 or 4. These off-site emergency preparedness and response), categories are later used (see below) to apply a graded – Civil Protection Ordinance (2003:789) regarding approach of requirements for emergency preparedness and protection against accidents with serious potential response. Chapter 2, Section 5 of SSMFS 2018:1 further consequences for human health and the environment requires that the organization shall have an prepared (on-site and off-site emergency preparedness and emergency preparedness and response organization response), corresponding to their assigned category. The organization – Ordinance with instructions for the Swedish Radiation and the actions to be taken in case of emergency shall be Safety Authority (2008:452) (off-site emergency documented in an emergency response plan along with preparedness and response), instructions for the on-site emergency response organisa- – Ordinance on Emergency Preparedness and tion, including the chain of command, relevant facilities, Surveillance Responsible Authorities’ Measures at resources and coordination of emergency response Heightened Alert (2015:1052) (off-site emergency activities (both on-site and off-site). Emergency preparedpreparedness and response), ness and response shall be tested through exercises and experiences shall be used for improvement. – Ordinance on Total Defence and Heightened Alert (2015:1053) (off-site emergency preparedness and The regulations SSMFS 2014:2 uses the concept of response), and emergency preparedness categories (1, 2, 3 and 4) based on – Health Care Act (2017:30) (off-site emergency the IAEA’s emergency preparedness categories. The preparedness and response). regulation introduces the application of a graded approach depending on the radiological hazard at the nuclear facility. The following new regulations will enter into force on 1 SSM’s regulation SSMFS 2014:2 requires the licensee to take March 2022: prompt actions in the event of an emergency in order to: – SSM’s regulations (SSMFS 2021:4) concerning – Classify the event according to predefined alarm criteria, construction of nuclear power reactors – Alert the facility’s emergency response organisation, – SSM’s regulations (SSMFS 2021:5) concerning – Assess the risk and magnitude of possible radioactive assessment and statement of radiation and nuclear releases and time-related aspects, safety for nuclear power reactors – Return the facility to a safe and stable state, and – SSM’s regulations (SSMFS 2021:6) concerning operation – Notify SSM. of nuclear power reactors – Accordingly, SSM’s regulations (SSMFS 2014:2) The regulations SSMFS 2014:2 require nuclear power plant concerning emergency preparedness at nuclear facilities (NPP) licensees to have in place an emergency response (on-site emergency preparedness and response) have organisation capable of dealing with simultaneous emerbeen revised to only include requirements for nuclear gencies at all reactor units at their site over a minimum facilities in emergency category 2 and 3, and are no period of one week. Another requirement in SSMFS longer valid for NPPs in operation. 2014:2, states that the licensees of facilities categorised as belonging to emergency preparedness category 1 must be 16.1.1. Requirements for on-site activities capable of setting up a logistics centre in a location As far as concerns on-site emergency preparedness and distanced from the site. This logistics centre should have response, the Civil Protection Act (2003:778) and capabilities for serving as the forward control point for Ordinance (2003:789) stipulate general requirements transports of personnel and equipment to and from the applying to facilities that conduct dangerous activities. The facility during an emergency, including facilities and Act requires preventive measures and emergency prepared- equipment for dosimetry and decontamination. ness to be arranged by the owner or operator of a facility Similar to the previous regulations, SSMFS 2014:2 also that conducts dangerous activities. addresses alarm criteria and alerting, emergency facilities, The Act on Nuclear Activities (1984:3) contains general evacuation plans, training and exercises, and other aspects provisions on emergency response in the event of an of emergency preparedness (e.g. iodine prophylaxis, accident at a nuclear facility. The Act requires the licensee personal protective equipment, monitoring, ventilation to have an organisation with sufficient financial, adminis- filters and meteorological data). trative and human resources to carry out protective All requirements in SSMFS 2014:2 concerning NPP measures in connection with an accident at the facility. licensees have been integrated, and to some extent revised

102 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

or extended, in the new SSM regulations SSMFS 2021:4 Ordinance (2006:942) that is now split into two parts

concerning construction of nuclear power reactors, SSMFS without any major revisions of the content having being

2021:5 concerning assessment and statement of radiation made. The aim of ordinance 2015:1052, Emergency

and nuclear safety for nuclear power reactors, and SSMFS Preparedness and Surveillance Responsible Authorities’

2021:6 concerning operation of nuclear power reactors. Measures at Heightened Alert, is to ensure that govern-

ment authorities at national and regional level work to Accordingly, SSM’s regulations (SSMFS 2014:2) concerning reduce vulnerabilities in society and develop a good emergency preparedness at nuclear facilities (on-site capacity for handling their tasks during emergencies, crises emergency preparedness and response) have been revised and cases of heightened alert. The ordinance requires of to only include requirements for nuclear facilities in each government authority affected by a crisis, for example emergency category 2 and 3, and are no longer valid for a nuclear or radiological emergency, that it carry out NPPs in operation. The new regulations enter into force necessary measures for managing the consequences of on 1 March 2022. such event. In crisis situations, these authorities are to

cooperate and provide mutual assistance. Ordinance

16.1.2. Requirements for off-site activities

2015:1053 on Total Defence and Heightened Alert The overarching objective of the Civil Protection Act contains provisions on civil defence during periods of (2003:778) is civil protection for all of Sweden with heightened alert. consideration given to local conditions – for life, health,

property and the environment, against all types of

16.1.3. Development of new regulations

incidents, accidents, emergencies, crises and disasters. The SSM has developed new regulations for nuclear safety, act defines the responsibilities for individuals, local which enter into force 1 March 2022, i.e., after the current authorities and central government in cases of serious reporting period. For nuclear power plants, the regulations accidents, including radiological accidents. The act contains SSMFS 2014:2 are superseded by requirements in SSMFS provisions on how community rescue services shall be 2021:4, SSMFS 2021:5 and SSMFS 2021:6. organised and operated, and also stipulates that a rescue

commander with a specified competence, and far-reaching Compared to previous requirements, the new regulations

authority, is to be engaged in all rescue operations. SSMFS 2021:4, more clearly state that the design of a

nuclear power plant shall take into consideration the needs The Civil Protection Ordinance (2003:789) states that for effective emergency preparedness and response, mainly County Administrative Boards are responsible for rescue through the specification emergency response as an operations in cases where the public needs protection from important function, and by the use of specified emergency a radioactive release from a nuclear installation, or in cases scenarios (including long-lasting situations and simultawhere such a release seems imminent. The ordinance neous emergencies at several nuclear facilities at the same contains general provisions concerning emergency site), to be considered in the design of both the facility and planning as well as more specific requirements on its equipment, and of the human tasks needed. reporting obligations, information to the public, responsi-

bility of the County Administrative Board for planning and Chapter 5, Section 5 of SSMFS 2021:5 presents more

implementing public protective measures, content of the detailed requirements on the contents of the site

off-site emergency plan, competence requirements for emergency response plan, required by SSMFS 2018:1,

rescue commanders, inner emergency planning zones and which includes i.e. description of and references to

outer emergency planning zones around major nuclear procedures, facilities, mobile equipment, technical assis-

facilities. The County Administrative Board is required to tance to operational staff, and coordination with off-site

draw up an off-site nuclear emergency response plan. The organisations. Requirements on emergency response

Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) is responsible organization, response time, criteria for alarm for different

at a national level for coordination and supervision of emergency classes, and protective equipment are found in

preparedness for an off-site rescue service response to Chapter 8 of SSMFS:6. Chapter 8, Section 10 of SSMFS

radioactive releases. 2021:6 also contain new requirements, to clarify the

initiation of transfer of process data to SSM during The ordinance with instructions for the Swedish Radiation emergencies, as requirement by Section 10 of the Act on Safety Authority (2008:452) contains provisions imposed Nuclear Activities (1984:3). The latter part has before 1 on SSM that apply in the case of a nuclear or radiological March 2022, partly been regulated through plant specific emergency. SSM’s role in the Swedish emergency managedecisions. ment system is mainly to give advice and recommendations

on radiation protection to the public and authorities in charge, maintain a national expert response organisation 16.2. National structure

for monitoring, and provide information on the technical The Swedish emergency management system is based on state of nuclear installations in the case of a nuclear three principles: emergency.

– The principle of responsibility – meaning that the entity Two ordinances, 2015:1052 and 2015:1053, entered into that is responsible for an activity under normal force on 1 April 2016. These ordinances replace the conditions also should have this responsibility in the former Emergency Preparedness and Heightened Alert case of an emergency.

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 103

– The principle of parity – meaning that to the extent The Government is responsible for crisis management at

possible, operations should be organised in the same national level. The Government’s mandate is primarily

way during emergencies as under normal conditions. strategic issues. Responsibility for management and

– The principle of proximity – meaning that emergencies coordination of operational work rests with the relevant

should be dealt with where they occur and at the most authorities. The Government has the overall responsibility

local level possible in society (the affected municipality to ensure that an effective crisis management system is in

or county). place and that crisis communication is credible. The

Government is also responsible for maintaining certain Furthermore, the Swedish emergency management system contacts with international organisations. The Government

distinguishes between authorities having jurisdiction in a Offices assist the Government in crisis management work.

specific region (municipality, county or country) and Within the Government Offices, the responsibility

authorities having mandates in specific areas of expertise, principle is to be applied during times of crisis. This

for instance SSM in the fields of radiation protection and principle implies that the ministry with mandates under

nuclear safety. The system is based on collaboration normal conditions also has these responsibilities in the

between authorities in order to enable agreement on how event of a crisis.

to direct handling and coordination of available resources. A senior official for crisis management has a post at the The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) has the Ministry of Justice. In the event of a crisis, the senior task of supporting coordination between the public sector official has the task of ensuring that crisis management and various stakeholders. MSB has developed recommenwork begins promptly. The senior official is also respondations for the shared foundations of collaboration and sible for coordination and assistance for crisis management management, which will contribute to an improved work conducted at the Government Offices. The senior capability to cope with emergency situations in Sweden. official is in turn assisted by the Secretariat for Crisis The aim is to provide guidance to authorities on joint Management. The Secretariat monitors threat and risk methods and approaches for enabling shared direction and developments around the clock, both domestically and coordination. The recommendations developed by MSB internationally, and is the central focal point in the Governhave resulted in a review of SSM’s emergency response ment Offices. The Government’s strategic direction for the organisation to enable SSM’s role in the emergency Government Offices is prepared by a group for strategic response system to efficiently provide advice and recomcoordination (GSS) that consists of the state secretaries of mendations to other authorities. all the ministries involved in managing a serious incident. A national contingency plan is in place for dealing with GSS is convened by the Ministry of Justice’s state secretary,

nuclear accidents. This national plan describes basic or by the state secretary that he or she appoints.

conditions, such as applicable legislation and the authorities SSM is tasked with coordinating the emergency preparedinvolved in dealing with an incident, in addition to these ness measures necessary for preventing, identifying and authorities’ mandates. The plan also describes national detecting nuclear and radiological events that might cause coordination and liaison between competent authorities. damage to human health or the environment. SSM is the The document outlines the resources available at national appointed National Competent Authority (NCA) in level and how they are requested and coordinated. Interna- Sweden. In the event of a radiological or nuclear tional assistance is also described in the plan. In addition to emergency, SSM provides recommendations and expert the contingency plan, a national action plan is in place for advice to other authorities, including those responsible for improvements to emergency preparedness work. deciding on protective actions for the public. The recom- The County Administrative Boards are responsible for mendations and expert advice include, but are not limited

emergency preparedness and response in the event of an to, protective actions, radiation protection assessments,

accident at a nuclear facility. The Board appoints a rescue dispersion prognoses, radiation monitoring and conditions

commander who decides on issuing a warning and at an NPP. SSM also maintains and leads a national expert

communicating to the population affected, and who response organisation for radiation monitoring and expert

determines which actions to take to protect the public. The support. Furthermore, SSM is tasked with keeping the

responsibility for directing rescue services also rests with Government informed about the situation, current and

the County Administrative Board in the affected county or possible developments, forecasts, available resources, and

counties, unless the Government decides otherwise. measures taken and planned following a request from the

Surrounding each NPP, inner emergency zones are Secretariat for Crisis Management at the Ministry of

established. Here, predistributed potassium iodide tablets Justice, or from MSB. SSM is required to provide necessary

are available for iodine thyroid blocking, and predistributed information for assessment of a situation.

information describes urgent protective actions in the Authorities that have key roles during a radiological or event of a nuclear emergency. Residents inside the inner nuclear emergency include the National Food Agency, emergency planning zone are provided with special radio which is responsible for taking decisions on maximum receivers. These are used for warning residents in the event permitted levels of radioactive materials in foodstuffs, and of an emergency at the NPP. The County Administrative the Board of Agriculture, which is responsible for taking Board is also responsible for managing decontamination decisions on maximum permitted levels in feed. Other activities following a nuclear emergency involving fallout. authorities that have a mandate during crises and that

104 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

cooperate with SSM, or receive advice and recommenda- radio communication system for connection of national tions from SSM, include the County Administrative emergency services and other stakeholders in the fields of Boards, MSB, Board of Health and Welfare, Swedish civil protection, public safety and security, emergency Customs, Swedish Meteorological and Hydrological medical services and healthcare during emergency situa- Institute (SMHI), Police Authority, and Swedish Coast tions. The Rakel system is used by municipalities, counties, Guard. SMHI assists SSM by providing weather forecasts, national agencies, licensees and commercial entities. MSB weather data and certain dispersion calculations in the also assists the Swedish Government Offices by providing event of a radiological or nuclear emergency. documentation and information in the event of serious crises or disasters, and by providing methods for crisis MSB, the National Food Agency, Board of Agriculture, communication and coordination of official information Swedish Defence Research Agency and SSM collaborate to the public. closely within the national expert council on remediation (NESA). The purpose of NESA is to collect and share Sweden’s structure for emergency preparedness and information on different aspects of remediation among response for nuclear emergencies is shown in figure 19. the participating organisations, other central authorities In the event of a nuclear emergency abroad, any affected and the County Administrative Boards. The work of the County Administrative Boards still have a responsibility to council includes revision of national guidelines on provide information and take potential protective actions remediation and food production in the event of fallout in their region as per the principle of proximity. SSM’s role of radioactive substances in Sweden. as an advisory authority is maintained in the event of a As mentioned earlier, MSB has a responsibility in prepar- nuclear emergency abroad. edness work to assist in coordinating preparedness measures taken by local, regional and national authorities. 16.2.1. Alerts MSB also provides competent authorities with communica- In the event of a radiological emergency at a Swedish tion networks during extraordinary events. MSB has the nuclear power plant (belonging to emergency preparedness overall responsibility for Rakel, the Swedish national digital category 1), the licensee is responsible for immediately

Swedish Radiation National expert Safety Authority response organisation

Swedish Civil Licensee Contingencies Agency

Government

County Administrative Regional Actors Board

Other Authorities Municipalities

Figure 19. The Swedish national structure for emergency preparedness and response for nuclear emergencies.

County Administrative Public alert Regional stakeholders Alert in emergency Board planning zone

Swedish Radiation International org. Radio Sweden Safety Authority Neighbouring countries

Licensee

Swedish Civil SOS Alarm Contigencies Agency

Other stakeholders Other authorities in respective sector

Figure 20. Current sequence for communicating an Government Respective ministry emergency event at a Swedish nuclear power plant.

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 105

contacting the national alarm centre (SOS Alarm Sverige ties and stakeholders, to perform a review of emergency

AB). In its turn, SOS Alarm will alert the authorities and planning zones and emergency planning distances applying

organisations responsible for emergency management. See to activities involving ionising radiation. On 1 November

figure 20. 2017, SSM proposed new emergency planning zones and

distances to surround the relevant nuclear facilities in In the event of an emergency at a nuclear facility classified Sweden. The review included sensitivity analyses for the as belonging to emergency preparedness category 2, the purpose of looking into the feasibility of the proposed alert sequence is similar, with some differences in terms of emergency planning zones and distances, including events the role of SOS Alarm. with simultaneous releases from several reactors at a site.

In the event of a radiological or nuclear emergency abroad The Government commissioned MSB on 22 February (with a possible request for assistance), the alert goes to 2018 to propose necessary changes to the Civil Protection SMHI, which is the national point of contact (National Ordinance in order to implement the proposal from SSM. Warning Point, NWP). Upon an alert SMHI will, through On 1 September 2018, MSB finalised the proposal for the SOS Alarm, contact the officer on duty at SSM. The necessary changes to the Civil Protection Ordinance. On officer on duty at SSM then contacts the Government 30 October 2018, the Government released both the ministry offices and the central and regional authorities proposal for new emergency planning zones and distances having roles and responsibilities in the initial phase of a from SSM as well as the proposed changes to the Civil nuclear accident or incident. Protection Ordinance for public consultation. The deadline

for submitting comments was set at 1 March 2019. On 19

16.2.2. Emergency preparedness strategy

May 2020 the Government decided on the new emergency The new Radiation Protection Act and new appurtenant planning zones and distances and changes to the ordinance came into force on 1 June 2018 as part of the Ordinance. The amendments to the Civil Protection implementation of Council Directive 2013/59/Euratom. Ordinance entered into force 1 July 2020 and will be imple- The new legislation has strengthened the requirements in mented on 1 July 2022 at the latest. the field of emergency preparedness and response. Among

other things, the Government has, in the radiation protec- SSM produced in 2020 a report stating SSM’s assessment

tion ordinance, set reference levels for the public in of which contingency planning is justified for extra

emergency exposure situations. Optimised protection distribution and intake of iodine tablets in connection with

strategies for different postulated events have been a Swedish nuclear accident. The report provides support

developed by SSM for nuclear facilities in emergency to, among others, the county administrative boards in their

preparedness categories 1 and 2 (cf. SSM Report 2017:27e) contingency planning.

in consultation with MSB, relevant County Administrative A national strategy for radiation measurements in the event Boards, and other involved authorities and stakeholders. of a nuclear or radiological accident is being developed by The protection strategies are based on identified hazards SSM, MSB and the County Administrative Boards together and potential consequences at each nuclear facility, with the nuclear power plants. The project focuses including generic criteria for public protective actions primarily on a possible accident at a Swedish nuclear power derived from the reference levels, as well as operational plant. After this, the project will broaden its scope to cover criteria and default triggers. other nuclear and radiological emergencies.

To support an optimised protection strategy, SSM has On the basis of the Nordic Flag Book and in collaboration developed decision support diagrams that provide guidance with the National Food Agency, Board of Agriculture, for making decisions on public protective actions in the County Administrative Boards, MSB, National Board of event of a nuclear emergency at the Swedish NPPs, which Health and Welfare, and the Police Authority, SSM is in the take the inherent uncertainties of such events into account. process of developing national guidelines on protective The decision support diagrams are based on emergency measures during a nuclear or radiological event at facilities class and recurring evaluation of the situation, and lead to and activities belonging to emergency preparedness a recommended course of action given the present categories 3 and 4. The guidelines will supplement the knowledge of the situation. The decision support diagrams review of Swedish emergency planning zones and were developed in close collaboration between radiological distances (SSM Report 2017:27e) which took into considexperts, the authorities responsible for nuclear emergency eration facilities belonging to emergency preparedness response planning, and the final decision makers. Methodcategories 1 and 2. The guidelines will use the concepts of ologies developed by SSM from a review of the Swedish reference levels, dose criteria and operational intervention emergency planning zones and distances were used in the levels in an emergency exposure situation, in line with development. Development of this decision support has recommendations contained in ICRP 103 and IAEA GSR continued for the purpose of securing its performance in Part 7. The project will be completed by the end of 2019. connection with the forthcoming new emergency prepar-

edness zones and planning distances. A development project (ETAPP), together with Swedish

NPPs regarding electronic transmission of nuclear power On 22 October 2015, the Government of Sweden plant parameters, was launched in 2012. A first memocommissioned SSM, in consultation with MSB, relevant randum of understanding was signed by the director County Administrative Boards and other involved authorigeneral of SSM and the managing directors of the NPPs in

106 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

the autumn of 2012. This encompassed three phases of 16.2.3. Radiation monitoring development and a specification of requirements regarding Sweden has a gamma monitoring network that presently these first three phases. In 2015, phase one and phase two has 28 permanent stations spread throughout the country. were completed, including a transmission solution and a The stations are designed to provide warnings and rapid shared standard for visualisation of the parameters. In information about radiation levels. Each gamma station 2017, all three development phases were completed and an continually records the dose rate and can be monitored agreement on operation of the transmission and the online. If the integrated dose or dose rate exceeds a visualisation tool was signed by the same parties, while pre-defined alarm level, notifications are automatically awaiting new requirements from SSM. That same year, a transmitted to RadGIS where, depending on the alarm, second memorandum of understanding was signed further actions will be taken by the officer on duty at SSM. regarding education, training and exercises, i.e. phase four. The alarm level is set to detect deviations from prevailing In 2022, the fourth phase will be completed, and the online conditions. In addition to the national gamma monitoring visualisation tool, together with transmission of process network, new stations are currently being installed around parameters, are in use. From 1 March 2022 there will be the nuclear power plants in Sweden. The new monitoring requirements implemented regarding this electronic stations will provide information on the dose rate at 90 transmission of nuclear power plant parameters with the locations around the NPPs. While the national gamma new regulation SSMFS 2021:4 concerning construction of monitoring network is primarily used as an early informanuclear power reactors. For the transmission solution there tion system, the new stations will, when online in late 2019, are facility specific agreements in place. provide fast, reliable and automatic information on dose rates to be used in decision making on early public In 2021, SSM has investigated and reported the radiologprotective actions in the case of an accident at a Swedish ical acceptance criteria regarding exposure of the public to nuclear power plant. Figure 21 shows the monitoring ionizing radiation that the authority thinks should apply to stations set up around the Forsmark NPP. new nuclear power reactors when with the use of deterministic methods evaluating events and conditions in the In addition, a new radiation monitoring system for fallout event classes expected, unexpected, unlikely and special mapping in Sweden has been developed and introduced. events and conditions. Radiological acceptance criteria The system will be based on mobile gamma spectrometry indicate a highest acceptable level of radiological conse- and be used for detailed mapping of dose rates around quences for the public when evaluating events and Swedish nuclear power plants in the case of a nuclear conditions in different event classes and shall be applied to accident. It is mainly a carborne monitoring system new nuclear power reactors. Anyone applying for a license intended to be used along predefined routes. The new for a new nuclear facility must, as part of the basis for system has been distributed to the County Administrative SSM’s opinion to the Government, show that the radiolog- Boards. Training is currently conducted and the system is ical acceptance criteria for the public specified by SSM are ready to be used. The system replaced a former system, not exceeded. This creates better conditions for new which involved measurement of dose rates using handheld reactors to be designed in such a way that the risk of instruments in discrete positions. exposure to the public in radiological emergencies is low.

Figure 21. New monitoring stations around the Forsmark nuclear power plant (the inset shows a monitoring station).

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 107

Radiation monitoring organisation

Rescue leader

Strategic monitoring Crisis centre command

Advice from SSM

Tactical monitoring Operations and command coordination centre

Monitoring leader Monitoring leader Monitoring leader SSM Coast guard Fire brigade

Coast guard Fire brigade National (International monitoring teams monitoring teams monitoring teams monitoring teams)

Figure 22. The Swedish radiation monitoring organisation which is set up in preparation for a possible nuclear emergency.

SSM has developed new GIS software for reporting, The national expert response organisation comprises storing, extracting and visualising radiation monitoring data government authorities, organisations and laboratories that and environmental samples collected during an emergency. have expertise in radiological assessment and radiation The new software, RadGIS 2.0, replaces RadGIS 1.0, monitoring. This organisation, coordinated by SSM, has as which was developed in the 1990s. RadGIS 2.0 will be used its main purpose to perform radiation measurements. by all Swedish organisations that perform radiation Figure 23 lists the contracted authorities, organisations and monitoring and sampling during a nuclear emergency. This laboratories that have capabilities encompassing laboratory software, launched on 15 April 2019, will be implemented analysis and field monitoring, mobile and airborne in the response plans drawn up by organisations belonging monitoring, weather forecasting and plume dispersion to the national structure for emergency preparedness and prognoses. In addition to the tasks belonging to the response. national expert response organisation, individuals engaged in this response organisation may also have a role in Sweden also has six permanent air sampling stations providing expert advice during the response. operated by the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) and a Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) 16.3. Compliance of licence holders station located in Stockholm. These stations continuously sample the air in order to collect any airborne radioactive The licensees at all sites are working on measures to fulfil materials. Their air filters are regularly collected and the new requirements of SSMFS 2014:2, which concern transported to a laboratory for measurement and evaluaon-site emergency preparedness and response at nuclear tion. The detection system is sufficiently sensitive to installations. This regulation entered into force on 1 July measure activity levels in the order of tens of µBq/m3 and 2018. Measures have been completed regarding requireis consequently also used for environmental monitoring. ments for the ability to establish an off-site logistics centre As the County Administrative Boards are responsible for for heavy equipment, and decontamination, monitoring protecting the public during and after a nuclear emergency, and follow-ups of radiation doses, in addition to other the Boards’ emergency response planning also encom- aspects.. The licensees also carry out measures that were passes monitoring. Monitoring of dose rates and collection identified and reported during and after the European of air samples for the purpose of public protective actions stress tests and were included in the NAcP. are performed by local rescue services from municipalities More specific information regarding the work performed is within each county at predefined locations or routes. provided below. During a nuclear emergency, the relevant County Administrative Board coordinates response and monitoring

16.3.1. Activities at each site

activities with the national expert response organisation

Forsmark NPP

and government authorities in accordance with the At the Forsmark NPP, documentation has been developed organisational chart shown in figure 22. to manage abnormal events. This documentation consists

108 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

In order to follow up the strengthened focus on Severe Accident Management (SAM) an inspection by SSM was carried out during February 2020. The inspection showed improvements and acceptable level of drills and education regarding frequency and evaluation, but further activities are expected regarding validation of the Severe Accident Expert Response Organisation Management Guidelines (SAMG) package for Ringhals 3 • Swedish Defence Research and Ringhals 4. A plan has been drawn up for the work on Agency, FOI (Umeå) the ordered measures. Umeå • Geological Survey of Sweden, In 2020, the new system for independence core emergency SGU (Uppsala) cooling (OBH) was included in the models which resulted • Cyclife Sweden AB (Nyköping) in a significant reduction in both heart rate and the • Linköping University (Linköping) frequency of unacceptable emissions. • Göteborg University (Göteborg) In order to clarify management conditions and communi- • Lund University (Malmö region) Uppsala cation channels within emergency response organisation • Swedish Meteorological and Stockholm (RIHAB), a new management philosophy been developed Hydrological Institute, SMHI Nyköping and implemented during 2020. When RIHAB is estab- Linköping Norrköping (Norrköping) lished, ordinary management structure deleted and the Site Göteborg • SSM (Stockholm region) Emergency Director (OL) has unrestricted powers to decide on measures within the plant. On the affected units, it is Unit Manager (BL) who decides on operational Figure 23. National expert response organisation for nuclear and actions. The principle of subsidiarity must permeate the Malmö radiological emergencies. management philosophy - it means that the room for maneuver must be as large as possible for the person performing the assignment / is closest to the event. The of early support strategies for the operational management staff methodology is crucial for event management and a for coping with; slowly developing incidents, extreme condition for being able to conduct qualified management weather conditions, emergency situations such as loss of in an efficient manner. the ultimate heatsink, station blackout (loss of all external and internal power), and long-term loss of alternate power. In 2021, the emergency unit and the fire protection unit The strategies may or may not lead to a declared merged, which has further simplified cooperation between emergency level. these areas.

Since mid-2017, a project is ongoing at Forsmark to update The exercise activities have been developed through its procedures for severe accidents. Forsmark have built a collaboration between the areas of emergency response completely new severe accident management guideline organisation, fire and rescue, physical protection and the based on IAEA Safety Standards ”Severe Accident maintenance department during 2021. Management Programmes for Nuclear Power Plants Safety

OKG NPP

Guide NS-G-2.15”. This SAMG will give us support for Post-Fukushima improvement work in the field of good decision making in a severe accident. The SAMG emergency preparedness has been implemented. One contains strategies for Forsmark 1, 2 and 3 for how to deal example is represented by OKG’s off-site operational with the reactor, the containment, the reactorbuilding and support centre. The latest command management techalso for the spent fuel pools. The SAMG manage both nology, such as sound and video equipment etcetera, has ordinary operation and outage. The work was finished at been installed in the off-site operational support centre. the end of 2020. The off-site operational support centre’s technology is A fully mobile logistics centre has been established. The identical to that of the pre-existing on-site operational purposes of the centre include receiving equipment, support centre. The off-site operational support centre is personnel and supply protective equipment, dosimetry located in the town of Oskarshamn, about 30 kilometres services (EPD), screening for external and internal from the nuclear power plant. The Engineer on Duty contamination, cleaning personnel, cars, trucks and (EoD) will, following an assessment of the situation, select equipment, rotation of on-site personnel, and receiving from which of the operational support centres to operate. heavy equipment prior to transport to the NPP. An The two operational support centres give the opportunity exercise was conducted in 2019 that tested the functionality for shared management and relocation, if necessary. of the mobile logistic centre. The result of the exercise Another example of a post-Fukushima improvement is a conclude a well-functioning centre. mutual agreement that has been concluded by Swedish Ringhals NPP nuclear power plants regarding protective equipment. The project aiming to provide Swedish Radiation Safety Furthermore, the mutual agreement concluded previously Authority (SSM) with process data has been developed and on pooling resources during an event will provide addiis still ongoing together with SSM. tional reinforcement of an affected plant.

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 109

OKG places great emphasis on good performance from the 16.3.2.1. Forsmark NPP response organisation during stressful conditions. Conse- At the Forsmark NPP, training, retraining and exercises are quently, all personnel belonging to the emergency response carried out according to predetermined plans for staff organisation, are trained and retrained annually in command involved in emergency preparedness and response work. and control methodology. This arrangement works well, as The exercises have needed to adapt to the circumstances was confirmed during various exercises carried out with the of the pandemic. emergency response organisation. OKG has ten members In addition to the annual functional exercises, the FKA of staff from the emergency preparedness organisation, NPP conducts unannounced call-out drills a number of who are available around the clock. times each year. The purpose of the drills is to evaluate the In 2018, OKG conducted an internal audit, in 2016 and performance of the emergency response organization. 2021, SSM conducted compliance inspections, and in 2017, All nuclear power plants in Sweden take turns every two WANO conducted a follow-up of the peer review that years to exercise with authorities up to government level. took place in 2015 in the area of emergency preparedness. Forsmark NPP last national level exercise was 2019, ”Sea Great emphasis was placed on rectifying the development Eagle”. areas of the emergency preparedness and response organisations, an aspect that was identified from OKG’s During certain periods, with a high spread of COVID internal audit as well as from SSM’s inspection. The infections, weekly controls of the emergency response development areas identified are currently being managed staff have been conducted. These controls have shown in the existing development plan for the emergency that the ability to handle emergency situations is mainpreparedness and response arrangements. tained.

As another outcome set against the background of the

16.3.2.2. Ringhals NPP

nuclear accident in Fukushima in 2011, the requirements Drills are planned annually with a 3-year perspective, with for emergency equipment were made more stringent at the coming year in detail. Key improvement actions Swedish nuclear power plants. Among other things, it is up coming out of these exercises are presented in the to the licensees of nuclear power plants to have capability evaluation reports for each exercise. The prioritised actions to establish a logistics centre during an emergency. The for improvement are date set and followed up in the logistics centre is to serve as a hub for transporting corrective action database (AvÄrs). personnel and equipment to and from the site in the event of a serious accident. This requirement came into force on Evaluators observe the exercise, note the actions taken by 1 July 2018. For this reason, OKG has established a RIHAB and identifies deviations and areas for improvelogistics centre at a former airport, having an organisation ment. Moreover, the evaluator and value which actions set up to provide assistance at this centre. should be prioritised and they present concrete, feasible proposals that could lead to the development of the Since the last report, there has been strengthened focus on business. Evaluators are usually senior role holders of the severe accident management. Several new instructions have role they evaluate but can also be personnel from The been introduced and exercised by the shift crews and Swedish Nuclear Training and Safety Centre (KSU). Technical Support Centre (TSC) in the simulator. Existing routines(EOPs and SAMGs) have been updated, verified Future role holders who are under education observe the and validated. SAMG routines have been trained and exercises as a part of the training of becoming a role exercised by the shift crews and TSC. holder. During functional exercises a senior experienced role holder mentor the newer role holders. A number of Another improvement is that process data from OKG is on-site functional exercises are conducted annually delivered electronically in real time to SSM. The applicaaccording to plan. tion(ETAPP) used for displaying process data has also been used to develop and record simulated emergency scenarios Unannounced call-out drills are conducted annually. The for training and exercises. This has been developed as a purpose of the call-out is to evaluate the response capabilijoint project between the nuclear power plants in Sweden, ties of the emergency organisation. Due to the pandemic, and will be used in future exercises to improve the skills of the number of call-out drills was fewer during 2020-2021. the emergency response organisations. Existing restrictions have prevented us from being able to gather too many in RIHAB.

16.3.2. Exercises

The ordered leave routine for Ringhals has been trained A number of on-site functional exercises are conducted once a year. The Ordered Leave routine states that annually at all nuclear sites. Specific plans are in place for personnel on site shall leave site as soon as possible by these exercises. Exercised functions for example include their own means. accident management, communication within the emergency response organisation, environmental moni- Training on handling serious accidents according to toring and sampling, assessment of core damage and SAMG has been carried out annually during refresher source terms, and assessment of total environmental training for operating personnel. The pandemic has led to consequences of a scenario. Local follow-up exercises parts of training being carried out digitally. It has given us from the major national exercise (named KKÖ17, see new experiences that we take with us in further training section 16.5) have also been carried out. and exercises.

110 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

In November 2021, the largest total exercise ever was In 2017, staffing and reorganisation at the OKG NPP were

conducted. The exercise lasted for 12 hours and the inspected. Due to the decision to close two out of the

practicing elements were KC, Technical Support Centre three reactors at the site, the focus of this inspection

(TSC), Ringhals Evacuation Centre (REC), fire protection, encompassed staffing, competence and the subsequent

physical protection, radiation protection and maintenance reorganisation of remaining personnel. Another inspection

personnel. A full muster exercise was also included. SSM conducted at the Ringhals NPP in 2017 focused on direct

and The County Administrative Board participated in the communication between the Ringhals NPP and SSM

exercise. during a radiological emergency situation. The Ringhals

NPP has subsequently changed its emergency response 16.3.2.3. Oskarshamn NPP organisation and introduced a new function that roughly

At OKG, training in emergency response is based on an translates to team leader.

exercise and training plan. Each function within the In 2018 and 2019, SSM’s supervisory focus is on the emergency preparedness organisation continuously requirements imposed on licensees to implement a logistics conducts internal exercises in order to strengthen its centre (new requirements regarding a logistics centre, as capacity. The plan is continuously monitored, and reported stipulated by SSMFS 2014:2, for facilities belonging to on at the last meeting of OKG’s emergency preparedness emergency preparedness category 1). All three operating council. Training activities are adapted to the content, NPP sites have been inspected, with all of them having structure and time aspects emerging from needs and been found to be compliant with the new requirements experiences. This is in addition to adaptation to other regarding a logistics centre. parties’ exercises, or events that are considered valuable for

the emergency response organisation. An adaptation is SSM’s focus in 2020 and 2021 has been the operating

carried out by selecting a scenario, as well as by means of NPP’s ability to man the crisis organization and potential

quick and flexible planning. loss of staff, and their actions taken to prevent the spread

of the Covid virus in light of the pandemic. Furthermore, OKG has conducted exercises involving the Swedish the buildings, equipment and tools for emergency response armed forces and police. In late 2017, a major regional have been subject to regulatory activities. exercise was performed as planned. Its main focus was

evacuation. OKG’s goal was to put the functions of the Regulatory control has shown that on-site emergency

logistics center into practice. Future exercise activities will preparedness at Swedish nuclear facilities categorised as

be adapted to this scenario. In 2018, a number of exercises belonging to an emergency preparedness category (see

were carried out with the purpose of training staff and Table 8) has been strengthened in recent years, and that the

verifying the function of the logistics centre. All functions main elements of SSMFS 2014:2 have been effectively

have additional exercises planned. In April 2019, a simula- implemented.

tion exercise was carried out involving the entire From 1 March 2022 the new regulations including EPR emergency response organisation, including certain requirements for NPPs in operation will enter into force. governmental organisations, with the theme of cybersecu- SSM regulatory activities on emergency preparedness and rity. In 2017 and 2018, 450 people belonging to the response will in the coming years be concentrated to the response teams were trained in EPO (emergency preparedlicensees’ implementation of these requirements. ness organisation) and RP (radiation protection) during

severe accident conditions. Table 8. The Swedish nuclear facilities that are categorised in an

emergency preparedness category. During the period, exercises were also held on six

occasions at the logistics centre. This was for training of Emergency

Facility Preparedness

personnel who will staff the logistics centre, as well as to Category

provide practice to the personnel involved in the crisis Forsmark NPP 1 management organisation. Oskarshamn NPP 1

Ringhals NPP 1 16.4. Regulatory control Central interim storage facility for spent fuel (Clab) 2

In recent years, regulatory control of on-site emergency Westinghouse fuel fabrication facility 2

preparedness and response has focused on implementation SWAFO waste management and storage 3 of the new requirements contained in regulation SSMFS Barsebäck (permanently shut down NPP) 3 2014:2.

Chalmers University of Technology (research) 3 In 2015 and 2016, compliance inspections were carried out Cyclife waste management facility 3 regarding new requirements at the nuclear facilities, Studsvik fuel and material testing and waste termination of transitional rules, and further implementa- 3 management facilities tion of SSMFS 2014:2.

In 2016, emergency preparedness at the Oskarshamn NPP During the period, the Chalmers University of Technology

was inspected. Only a minor remark was noted regarding and Cyclife waste management facility were both classified

dosimetry during a radiological emergency. as belonging to emergency preparedness category 3.

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 111

16.5. National exercises shared direction and coordination regarding decisions on

protective actions were tested with very good results, A number of emergency response exercises of varying according to the evaluation report. In 2017, the exercise scope are conducted annually in Sweden. These exercises IPilot was carried out, with its main focus on IT intrusion. vary in complexity from limited scope to full-scale exercises. This was simulated in a computer environment, primarily Periodical tests of the alerting systems between the power involving participants from the nuclear power plants. The plants and the authorities are performed each year. exercise was a good opportunity for operators to increase

Every other year, a full-scale exercise is held at one of the their knowledge in the area. Once again in 2018, two

three nuclear power sites to check the planning and capa- exercises were carried out involving only the County

bility of the on-site and off-site organisations. Full-scale Administrative Board and NPPs, where the IAEA’s IEC

exercises are designed to enable evaluations of regional level also participated with assessment and prognosis capabilities,

command and national inter-agency cooperation. Often, including reactor assessment tool reports, with good results.

full-scale exercises are also used to test international In 2019 the County Administrative Board of Uppsala communications, for instance USIE and ECURIE . The 11 12 arranged the Sea Eagle exercise. It was the largest nuclear respective County Administrative Board where the plant is exercise ever organised in Sweden and included endurance, located has the responsibility for planning these exercises, command and control, evacuation, overarching and shared often with the assistance of MSB, a government agency, situation awareness and prioritization of important which is also responsible for the evaluation and follow-up activities, information and communication, the ability to analyses. SSM participates in planning and evaluation. measure and indicate ionizing radiation, and receiving Usually, 15 to 30 organisations participate in these exercises, international support. including SSM and the Government.

The exercise comprised of four different parts: In recent years, a number of annual, limited extent

exercises have been held, which primarily include an NPP 1. An alarm exercise to test the alarm chain involving many

site, a County Administrative Board, and SSM. These authorities and organisations.

exercises require relatively little planning, though they 2. A main nuclear exercise that lasted for 36 hours. 77 provide a good opportunity for training, as well as testing different Swedish authorities and organisations from 6 of shared development concepts. The aim is to conduct different counties and international actors practiced in a one of these exercises with each NPP site on an annual NPP accident scenario involving disrupted conditions basis. These limited exercises also bring about better (known as a ‘grey zone’ scenario). This part of the continuity in the collaboration between the NPPs, SSM, exercise tested the national, regional and local abilities to and the County Administrative Boards. act and coordinate rescue services during disrupted

In addition, SSM conducts a number of more limited conditions over a longer period of time which required

functional exercises every year. Exercised functions for extra resources and everyone who participated in the

instance include assessment of core damage and source exercise worked in shifts.

terms, prognosis and assessment of environmental 3. A radiation monitoring exercise, including two days of consequences and doses to the public as part of a scenario, radiation monitoring in the field including international and arrangements for national and international notificaassistance. This part involved the ability to map, by tion and communication. Yearly timetables are in place for indication and measurement, which areas have been these exercises. affected by the fallout of radioactive substances and

The expert response organisation is exercised annually in how high the levels of ionizing radiation are in these

field monitoring exercises and by participating in labora- areas. Radiation measurement participants were not only

tory intercomparison measurements. SSM has a central role from Sweden. Measurement resources in the form of

in organising these exercises. SSM also uses the exercises to expert teams from Finland, Denmark, Norway and

train its own field assessment teams. The contracted Iceland participated in order to train receiving

organisations within the expert response organisation international support and how to collaborate with

maintain their own equipment and arrange for internal international actors.

education and small-scale exercises. 4. A table top exercise where the long term effects of the

Sweden has a long tradition of participating in international accident were discussed. In addition to the county’s

emergency response exercises. This allows for testing of municipalities, the police and the region, nine national

aspects relating to bilateral and international agreements on authorities, such as the National Food Administration and

early notification and information exchange. Sweden regularly the Swedish Board of Agriculture, and several

participates in the IAEA Convention Exercises (ConvEx), the representatives from the business community (who are also

OECD/NEA International Nuclear Emergency Exercises an important part of maintaining a functioning society in

(INEX), and the European ECURIE exercises. crisis situations) participated in this part of the exercise.

Due to the Covid-19 pandemic exercises have been In 2017, the KKÖ17 full-scale exercise was organised by cancelled or minimised and adjusted in order not to spread the County Administrative Board in Kalmar. Also in this the virus. SSM has conducted digital training and digital exercise, the joint methods and approaches for creating

11 USIE is IAEA’s Unified System for Information Exchange in Incidents and Emergencies. 12 ECURIE is the interface to the EU early notification and information exchange system for radiological emergencies.

112 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

exercises to uphold the capability of the crisis organisation The five Nordic countries of Denmark, Finland, Iceland,

when most of the employees have been working from Norway and Sweden have compiled a Nordic manual

home. In December 2020 there was an incident at an NPP (NORMAN) for cooperation between their respective

in a neighbour country which SSM managed in a virtual regulators in response to and preparedness for nuclear and

crisis management format. Challenges which have surfaced radiological emergencies and incidents. The manual

in digital exercises are the difficulty in staying informed and describes practical arrangements regarding communication

sharing information in an efficient way within the crisis and information exchange to fulfil the stated obligations in

organisation when limited to communication at a distance. bilateral agreements between the Nordic countries. These

arrangements also apply to a response to events or threats

of malicious use of radioactive material and threats or 16.6. International arrangements malevolent acts concerning nuclear facilities. Other aspects Sweden has ratified the International Convention on Early include small-scale events, such as the spreading of

Notification and the Convention on Assistance in the Case rumours and minor incidents, having consequences limited

of a Nuclear Accident. Moreover, Sweden has bilateral to public concern and interest by the media, or a need for

agreements with Denmark, Norway, Finland, Germany, exchange of technical information between nuclear and

Ukraine and Russia regarding early notification and radiation safety regulatory bodies. The arrangements

exchange of information in the event of an incident or defined in this document include all phases of events,

accident at a nuclear power plant in Sweden or abroad. An including intermediate and recovery phases.

agreement at regulatory body level has also been signed NORMAN also takes into consideration the current with Lithuania. international development concerning response to and In 2015, the Nordic radiation and nuclear safety authorities preparedness for nuclear and radiological incidents and

published a revised joint manual for cooperation between emergencies, as well as other key international aspects.

the authorities in response to, and preparedness for, nuclear Communication exercises are performed five times per

and radiological emergencies and incidents. The manual year, in compliance with NORMAN. These exercises

describes practical arrangements regarding communication include procedures for alerts and communication by means

and information exchange to fulfil the stated obligations in of videoconference systems.

bilateral agreements between the Nordic countries. These

arrangements also cover response to events and threats of 16.6.2. Assistance

malicious use of radioactive material, as well as threats or Sweden has registered national field and laboratory

malevolent acts concerning nuclear facilities. resources with the international response and assistance

network (RANET), managed by the IAEA under the In 2013, the Nordic radiation and nuclear safety authorities Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear published the document “Protective measures in early and Accident (INFCIRC/336). In 2018, Swedish national intermediate phases of a nuclear or radiological emergency assistance capacities were updated to reflect the current – Nordic guidelines and recommendations” (Nordic Flag situation. For example, atmospheric dispersion modelling Book). The document gives comprehensive recommendawas added due to extensive experience gained in this area in tions on the Nordic countries’ shared approach to implerecent years. Sweden contributed to the development of the mentation of the 2007 ICRP system of radiological RANET system by participating in a radiation monitoring protection during an emergency exposure situation. The workshop held in the Fukushima prefecture in 2018, hosted Nordic Flag Book is now under revision in order to by the IAEA at its Capacity Building Centre in Japan. encompass changes on different levels such as EU BSS

(2013), GSR Part 7 (2015), GSG-11 (2018), new national

16.6.3. Nuclear accidents abroad

legislations (-2018) and the Swedish review of emergency As demonstrated by the impact on Sweden due to the planning zones and distances (2017). Chernobyl accident in 1986, Sweden can be affected by

radiological consequences from a nuclear accident that takes

16.6.1. Measures taken to inform

place abroad. Although the foreseeable consequences, such

neighbouring states

as the impact on agriculture, animal breeding, forestry, SSM has been appointed a Competent Authority in hunting, recreation, household outdoor activities (fishing, accordance with the IAEA Convention on Early Notificapicking mushrooms, hunting game, vegetable gardening, tion in the Case of a Nuclear Accident (INFCIRC/335) etc.) and on the environment can be substantial due to the and EU Council Decision (87/600/Euratom) on early uptake and concentration of radioactive substances in notification. SMHI is the designated NWP, implying plants, animals, and human food chains, sheltering or availability around the clock. SSM and SMHI use the relocation of people due to fallout is unlikely. ECURIE information system for information exchange

within the European Union, and the USIE system for In the event of a nuclear accident abroad, the County

notification and information exchange between the IAEA Administrative Boards affected still have the responsibility

member states. Sweden participates regularly in ConvEx to provide information and take potential protective

and ECURIE exercises and routinely includes arrange- actions in their respective regions. SSM’s role as an

ments for early notification in national exercises. advisory authority is maintained in the event of a nuclear

accident abroad.

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 113

Part IV Safety of Installations 114 Part IV Safety of Installations

Article 17. Siting

meet all safety (and security) requirements. There are no Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to distinctions between internal or external events and ensure that appropriate procedures are established and conditions in this requirement, so site specific characterisimplemented: tics including i.e. natural phenomena or human induced (i) for evaluating all relevant site-related factors likely to situations and activities that might affect safety (or security) affect the safety of a nuclear installation for its projected must be considered. lifetime; Resilience to failures and other internal and external events, (ii) for evaluating the likely safety impact of a proposed nuclear installation on individuals, society and the including natural phenomena and human induced situa-

environment; tions and activities, are regulated by Section 14 of SSMFS

2008:17. According to these requirements, a nuclear reactor (iii) for re-evaluating as necessary all relevant factors shall withstand natural phenomena and other events that referred to in sub-paragraphs (i) and (ii) so as to ensure the continued safety acceptability of the nuclear installation; might arise outside or inside the facility and which can lead

to a radiological accident. Natural phenomena and event (iv) for consulting Contracting Parties in the vicinity of a sequences that do not allow for sufficient time for taking proposed nuclear installation, insofar as they are likely to of protective measures when they occur shall be assigned be affected by that installation and, upon request to event class. For each type of natural phenomenon that providing the necessary information to such Contracting Parties in order to enable them to evaluate and make their can lead to a radiological accident, an established action

own assessment of the likely safety impact on their own plan shall be available for the situations in which the

territory of the nuclear installation. dimensioning values run the risk of being exceeded. In the

general advice for Section 14 of SSMFS 2008:17, examples

are listed of natural phenomena that should be taken into Summary of developments since account, such as extreme winds, extreme precipitation,

the previous report extreme ice formation, extreme temperatures, extreme sea

waves, extreme seaweed/algae growth or other biological During the current review period, the following developconditions that can affect the cooling water intake, as well ments are of relevance with regard to the obligations of as extreme water levels and earthquakes. Article 17:

Safety classification is regulated by Section 21 of SSMFS – SSM is currently revising its regulations on nuclear 2008:17. According to these requirements, structures, activities, including requirements related to external systems and components of a nuclear power reactor shall hazards and siting. be divided into different safety classes. The detailed quality – The licensees have revisited the site impact analyses of and functional requirements resulting from this safety their designs, with actions taken and planned with the classification are defined and controlled by specifying aim of improving robustness and safety. The actions sub-classes, including mechanical quality class, electrical include an update of the dimensioning values relating to function class, as well as classification with respect to external hazards and implementation of any needed seismic and environmental tolerance. measures at the NPPs. In relation to the safety impact of a nuclear installation on

individuals, society and the environment, and in relation to 17.1. Regulatory requirements having revisited the impact and bases for drawing conclu-

Chapter 2, Section 1 of SSMFS 2018:1 requires that events sions from the evaluations, it is stated in the introduction

and conditions important to safety (or security) shall be to the SSM regulation that limitation of emissions of

identified and assessed by the licensee, before any activity radioactive substances from a nuclear facility is to be based

or operation begins. The assessment of these events and on optimization of radiation protection and using the best

conditions shall form the basis for the measures needed to available technology.

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 115

The major project for updating SSM regulations, as assessment have been made since then. The experiences

described in section 7.2.2, includes amending the regula- from the Fukushima Daiichi accident, the EU stress test

tion governing siting aspects. The background and and the development of the Swedish national action plan

experiences used in the update project also include, apart (NAcP) have constituted the main background for

from international standards and experiences, the national developing and improving the assessment during the

action plan (NAcP) developed by Sweden as a consequence period as of the reporting comprising the seventh national

of the EU stress tests (see Appendix 2), and the SSM report under the Convention.

decision on installation of an Independent Core Cooling The safety analysis of the nuclear installations is based on System (ICCS), described in section 18.1. identifying a number of initiating events undergoing

analysis using deterministic methods and, if appropriate,

17.1.1. Development of new regulations

probabilistic methods. The basis for the original design SSM has developed new regulations which enter into force comprised safety features for ensuring the robustness of 1 March 2022, i.e., after the current reporting period. The the facility during external events with a probability of current regulations SSMFS 2008:17 are superceeded by > 10{ } per year. Today, events with a probability of -4 requirements in SSMFS 2021:4, SSMFS 2021:5 and SSMFS > 10{ } per year are being analysed, and the analyses -5 2021:6. performed as a result of the NAcP and the analyses as part

With basis in Chapter 2, Section 1 of SSMFS 2018:1, the of the design of the ICCS include external events with a

new regulations give more detailed requirements on site probability of > 10{ } per year. -6

specific characteristics that must be considered in design The licensees have, for all facilities at their sites, identified and construction of a nuclear power plant. Chapter 4 of external events that may lead to a radiological accident. SSMFS 2021:4 more clearly specifies the events and The basic principle is that initiating events are divided into conditions important to safety that shall be considered in categories based on the estimated frequency of occurrence. design and construction of a nuclear power plant. Events A distinction is made between events that are not considand conditions to be considered are specified in Annex 1 ered for further evaluations (screening) and events that are of SSMFS 2018:1, which includes site specific: considered, with the latter being classified into categories

• Geological conditions based on frequency. The events that are not considered for

• Geotechnical conditions further evaluations are those that are either considered

extremely unlikely to occur (<10{ } per year) with a high -6 • Geophysical conditions level of confidence, or that are deemed physically impos- • Hydrological conditions sible to occur, such as sandstorms. • Meteorological conditions

• Biological conditions The events being considered are assessed in terms of:

• External fires or explosions – Probability of occurrence with respect to the conditions • Solar storm or meteorite at the site,

• Aircraft accident – Whether the event sequences are covered by other

• Transport accident events, and

• Possible interactions between the nuclear power plant – Whether there is a need for further analysis or other

and other facilities or activities measures.

Identification of these events and conditions shall be kept The deterministic analyses are used to verify that there are up to date. Also a comprehensive review of these are no initiating events that can jeopardize the safety of the expected in conjunction with the PSR (see 14.1.4). The surroundings and the environment. This is accomplished Annex 2 of SSMFS 2021:4 also state design criteria for the by verifying that fuel damage is avoided, verifying that the fulfillment on the main safety (and security) functions of a reactor coolant pressure boundary is not overpressurised, nuclear power plant that have to be met. verifying that the containment is not overpressurized, and

Chapter 3, Section 6 of SSMFS 2021:5 includes clarified demonstrating that the plant can be brought to safe state

requirements on analysis of expected radiological conse- after any initiating event.

quences for workers and members of the public during Calculations are performed to verify that the plant structures operation of the nuclear power plant. Acceptence criteria can withstand certain loads. Calculations are also used to for these analysis are presented in Annex 1 of SSMFS estimate the fatigue loads of the structures. Estimations and 2021:5. assumptions regarding material properties such as radia-

tion-induced embrittlement are verified through inspection

17.2. Compliance of licence holder programmes including monitoring of irradiation and

non-destructive testing. Safety margin assessments consid-

17.2.1. Evaluation of site-related factors ering all external hazards have been performed. Weaknesses

As part of the licensing process of the plant, an assess- and potential improvements have been identified.

ment was made to evaluate site-related factors affecting the In addition to the deterministic safety analyses, a probabilsafety of the nuclear installation. Based on experience istic safety assessment (PSA) is performed in terms of feedback, certain supplements and improvements to the

116 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

external events (excluding a seismic PSA ) on the part of 17.2.1.4. Investigation of extreme weather conditions 13 each reactor unit. The purpose of the PSA is to evaluate An investigation has been performed of plant characteris-

plant resilience against various events. The probability of tics in extreme weather conditions. In particular, the

core damage and the probability of releases to the environ- investigation assessed plant robustness against combined

ment are evaluated in the PSA study. extreme weather conditions, such as ice storms and

simultaneous heavy snow load on structures. A systematic Assessments performed in relation to siting are reported analysis of other possible combinations of naturally below. Physical measures as a consequence of the assessoccurring hazards has also been performed. ments are reported in sections 6.2.1 and 18.2.1. Informa-

tion on actions taken in the area of on-site emergency Some possible improvements have been identified (e.g.

preparedness is presented in section 16. improving the resistance of certain buildings against

tornado-induced missiles and heavy snow load). Further

17.2.1.1. Seismic plant analyses analyses have resulted in the identification of additional

Evaluations of structures, systems and components against measures that have been taken to protect the plant against

ground motions exceeding the values specified for the negative impacts of extreme weather. One example is

design basis accidents have been performed. These reinforcement of the service building’s resilience against

evaluations place special emphasis on safety margin external events at Ringhals. The work on addressing this

assessments. shortcoming is under way, with the measures planned to be

in place by 2020. For more information, see the transition Following the EU stress test, the EU Member States solution described in section 6.2.1. agreed that a return frequency of 10{ } per year (with a -5

minimum peak ground acceleration of 0.1 g) should be The Ringhals plant’s ability to withstand an ice storm has

used as a basis for plant reviews/backfitting. been evaluated, giving an acceptable outcome. A renewed

estimation of temperature extremes for return periods up To ensure compliance with this, Swedish licensees have to 100.000 years at Ringhals has also been performed. The performed the following actions: emergency diesel generators have been reinforced to

– Further studies regarding the structural integrity of the withstand low outdoor temperatures in the form of

reactor containments, scrubber buildings and fuel installed manual waste gate valves.

storage pools, and

– A pipe has been evaluated further, located between the 17.2.1.5. Investigation of the frequency

of extreme water levels

reactor containment and the MVSS, that allows for An investigation of the frequency of extreme water levels controlled pressure relief of the containment. The has been performed. function of the pipe is essential for fulfilling the

requirements regarding a release of radioactive nuclides This analysis considered the combined effects of waves

affecting society and the environment in the event of a and high seawater levels (including potential dynamic

core meltdown. effects of such events). Historically, extreme seawater

levels in Scandinavia are mainly caused by very high wind Ringhals has performed a robustness check on a 10{ } per -6 speeds. Thus, it is important to expand the analyses to take year earthquake and for the severe accident mitigation into account these combined effects. systems, in addition to the estimated ability to withstand

the 10{ } per year probability earthquake. -7

17.2.1.6. Flooding margin assessments

An analysis of incrementally increased flood levels beyond

17.2.1.2. Investigations regarding secondary

the design basis and identification of potential improve-

effects of an earthquake

ments have been performed. This analysis assessed and Investigations have been performed on possible secondary verified the capability of the plant to mitigate internal and effects of an earthquake. Fire analyses at Swedish NPPs external flooding events. The analysis also included an are generally performed according to the SAR, however, an evaluation of potential distribution of water volumes analysis of fire starting as a result of an earthquake had inside the plants following external flooding. previously not been carried out at any Swedish NPPs.

Detailed analysis of earthquake-induced flooding, such as Forsmark NPP and Ringhals NPP

an analysis taking into account leakage from broken water FKA has performed analyses of extreme external flooding storage tanks and cracks in cooling water channels, has showing that the plants can withstand the 10{ } per year -6 been performed. flooding. RAB has analysed extreme flooding levels, based

on statistics, including the consequences of waves. Due to

17.2.1.3. Seismic monitoring

the results of the analyses, the conclusion has been drawn Seismic monitoring systems are installed at all Swedish that flood levels having a frequency of > 10{ } per year -5 sites. The utilities have updated the procedures and training cannot flood the ground level, thus ruling out the risk of programme for seismic monitoring, and implemented posing a real threat to reactor safety. The ICCS is neverthethem. less designed for a 0.5 m water over ground level.

13 No seismic PSAs have been performed for Swedish NPPs. However, the Swedish seismic ground response spectra were developed by using probabilistic methods. The plants that were not originally seismically designed have afterwards been verified to the Swedish DBE (10–5/year).

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 117

17.2.1.7. Evaluation of the protected volume approach power plant that contain dangerous materials. Oil spills

Studies have been performed to identify critical areas and from ships operating on the Baltic Sea are taken into

rooms inside the plants following a flooding event. In account in the external event analysis. Possible forest fires

particular, this study considered the need for further near the Forsmark nuclear power plant are also considered.

improvement of the volumetric protection of buildings

Ringhals NPP

containing safety-related equipment located in rooms at or below ground level. Hydrogen gas explosions/deflagration taking place at the

hydrogen gas plant (HGP) or at the turbine building of

17.2.1.8. Investigation of improved early Ringhals unit 1 constitute the largest risk. Smaller explo-

warning notification sions might be caused by hydrogen gas containers, though

At all sites, the need for improved early warning systems the actual impact is judged as negligible. The distance from

for deteriorating weather conditions has been investigated, the reactors of Ringhals units 1 and 2 to units 3 and 4 is

as well as the provision of appropriate procedures to be too large to bring about an event affecting the latter two

followed by operators when warnings are issued. units, if initiated at Ringhals’ reactors at units 1 or 2.

In these analyses, distance-dependent effects such as

17.2.1.9. Development of standards to address

pressure, impulse density and heat impact are studied. The

qualified plant walk-downs

analysis regarding existing buildings was performed in the The licensees have developed standards to address autumn of 2008. Fire constitutes a secondary fault/effect qualified plant walk-downs with regard to earthquakes, initiated by the explosion/deflagration, and is analysed and flooding, on-site fires and extreme weather conditions. evaluated in connection with unit-specific analysis of The aim is to enable more systematic identification of explosion/deflagration. It is the summed effect of non-conformities and their correction (e.g. appropriate explosion and fire which constitutes the dimensioning case. storage of equipment, particularly for temporary and The present analysis of the HGP only accounts for the mobile equipment and tools used to mitigate beyond explosion/deflagration aspect. A hydrogen deflagration at design basis external events). The potential creation of the HGP has the potential to result in lost external power. debris that might affect essential safety systems of the The study “Loss of external power” covers this case. If plant has been recognized and evaluated. The walk-downs gas releases are detected, existing surveillance automatically also included mapping of potential on-site fire initiators. closes the air supply. A judgement is made depending on

17.2.1.10. Practices to collect data for the distance to the source.

characterizing the site

The Ringhals NPP has its own harbour, which is dimen- Meteorological and hydrological data are acquired from sioned for bulky transports so that reactor vessels, steam SMHI, the Swedish Meteorological and Hydrological generators and other heavy components can be received. Institute. Since 1966, SMHI has performed oceanographic The harbour is mainly used by the marine vessel M/S investigations at sea outside the relevant sites. SMHI has Sigrid, which is specially designed to transport spent also performed local meteorological surveys and studied nuclear fuel and low and intermediate level wastes. fog conditions in the areas.

There are two fairways close by along the coast. The Snow and wind loads are stated by Swedish building largest, the “T route” is mostly used by large ships, passing regulations. Normal wind load (>10{ } per year) is stated -2 20 kilometres (10 nautical miles) west of the Ringhals site. by Eurocode (EN 1991-4) using the national values from All transports of chemicals take place along this fairway. regulations issued by the National Board of Housing, The “Öresund route” lies closer to the coast and is used by Building and Planning, which specify reference winds from cargo ships and tankers, especially vessels that are northvarious parts of the country. Estimation of a wind having bound. The risk of external influence from these vessels a probability in the range 10{ } to 10{ } per year is based -3 -6 may be posed in the form of potential releases from these on values measured by SMHI over the course of 24 years. ships, either by means of an accident or in the form of

Information is also gathered through observation of ocean illicit dumping. Chemicals transported along the west coast

levels and precipitation data. Information regarding of Sweden include hydrocarbons, acids, hydroxides and

bedrock is available through drilling protocols and photos other aggressive chemicals. Transports of hydrocarbons,

taken during and before construction of the NPPs. Local i.e. crude oil, represent up to half of all transports made

meteorological investigations are performed on site using through Kattegat. Transports of acids, hydroxides and

an observation mast, where temperature, wind speed and other aggressive chemicals only constitute a small fraction

wind direction are recorded. The temperature of the of those made through Kattegat. Releases having a

cooling water intake is measured. Equipment is also potential to harm or endanger the safe and stable operation

available for measurement of ground acceleration and of the nuclear power plant may possibly occur along the

the response of civilian structures. larger “T route” fairway. An impact to the seawater used

for cooling might be caused due to the marine transports

17.2.1.11. Nearby installations containing materials that

that take place along and outside the coast.

might jeopardize the safety of the nuclear installation

Main public roads, railroads and fairways with transports

Forsmark NPP

of large quantities of goods are located at a distance of at The Forsmark nuclear power plant is located in a relatively least three kilometres. This means that a potential isolated area. There are no other installations near the

118 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

explosion would be at such a distance making an influence Other forms of identified disturbances consist of light, from a fire irrelevant. An explosion or transport accident noise, smells, water use, releases to water and air, effects occurring just outside the plant site might potentially lead from electromagnetic fields, and the use of chemical to a loss of external power. The study “Loss of external products. Chemical products such as hypochlorite are used power” covers this case. Since the distance is sufficiently to reduce settlement of mussels and barnacles in the water far, chemical releases do not merit consideration of urgent tunnels for cooling waters. It is possible for unforeseen, actions; however, actions will be taken in connection with non-ionising related accidents such as explosions, fires and this kind of event. pipe breaks on raw water lines in the area to occur.

Oskarshamn NPP Several studies were carried out regarding the effects of releasing cooling water and its impact on fish and the Similar to the Forsmark NPP, the site of the Oskarshamn small-scale fishing industry. All fishing is forbidden in an NPP is located in a relatively isolated area. The site is established and marked area around the mouths of the situated on the coastline of the Baltic Sea, on Simpevarp discharge tunnels. From the harbours of Bua and Videberg Peninsula, part of Oskarshamn Municipality, located 8 km on the Värö peninsula, both trawling and coastal fishing northeast of the village of Figeholm and 20 km northeast take place. The releases from the power plants have no of the town of Oskarshamn. discernible effect on fishing, according to the consistent Hydrogen gas explosions at the hydrogen gas plant or at views of the inspector of fisheries at the County Administhe turbine building are considered to pose a risk. The trative Board of Halland, the chairpersons of the local analysis of existing buildings was performed in 2007. The fishing associations of Bua and Videberg, and the coastal safety distance is maintained between the nuclear power laboratory of the Swedish Agency for Marine and Water plant and hydrogen gas plant with respect to a possible Management in Gothenburg. blast, heat radiation and tremors in connection with a hydrogen explosion. The safety distance between the Report no. 3463 from the Environmental Protection nuclear power plant and hydrogen gas plant is not main- Agency, from 1988, describes the results of test fishing tained with respect to objects expelled by a blast (missiles). during the period 1975–85 regarding easily discernible A missile might potentially reach the nuclear power plant, sicknesses and defects. The test comprised 29,000 cod, though the buildings are dimensioned to withstand 13,000 flounder and 7,000 eels. For some of the material, tornadoes, and thus generated missiles. the fish were more laboriously examined. The occurring frequency of sicknesses and parasites was largely repre- There are no other installations near the power plant sentative for the regions of Bohuslän and Halland. No containing dangerous materials. Oil spills from ships effects due to the Ringhals NPP could be detected; operating on the Baltic Sea are considered in the external furthermore, no effects were observed on plankton and event analysis. Potential forest fires occurring near the algal growth, since the area around the Värö peninsula Oskarshamn NPP are also considered. does not deviate from the rest of the coast of Halland.

17.2.2. Impact of the installation on individuals, Oskarshamn NPP

society and the environment BAT implies introduction of the most effective measure to

Forsmark NPP limit the release of radioactive substances and their The environmental control programme in place at and harmful effects on human health and the environment, and around the power plant has the objective of verifying that no which does not entail unreasonable costs. One should also unknown sources for releases of radionuclides to water and consider that the radiation doses to workers may increase air exist, or that any unpermitted accumulation of radioactive when emissions into the environment are reduced. The substances is occurring in the vicinity of the power plant. regulation SSMFS 2008:23 also specifies that the annual effective dose from air and water discharges from all plants

Ringhals NPP

in the same geographical area to individuals in the critical With the help of aerial photography of smoke releases group is not allowed to exceed 0.1 mSv. The “critical during different meteorological circumstances (wind, group” refers to persons who are estimated to receive the temperature, precipitation, snow cover, etc.), weather data largest dose from the plant. from the meteorological mast and values of the diffusion During the stress tests and as part of the NAcP (EU stress parameters, a so-called “dispersion catalogue” for the test National Action Plan), a review of the Design Basis Ringhals NPP was established. Using this catalogue, the main External Events (DBEE) was conducted. The Swedish characteristics of the dispersion can easily be identified. requirements (SSMFS 2008:17) concerning the magnitude No special study of the hydrological dispersion conditions of the DBEE stipulate that it must correspond to the has been conducted. The dispersion may, however, be probability of occurrence of 10-5 per year. As far as described based on hydrological observations, e.g. how the concerns earthquakes, a robustness check was made surface water is affected by the water flowing from the regarding an even more improbable event, 10-6 per year, Baltic Sea, and how often it is exchanged (less than once and for the severe accident mitigation systems, the every thirty days), the bottom water being contained capability to withstand a 10-7per year probability earthbetween one to four months per year, and the outflow of quake was also estimated. An earthquake specific to water from rivers, streams and point releases by industries Sweden is defined in the regulator’s report, SKI 92:3. As and sewage installations. far as concerns high water levels, the Swedish Meteorolog-

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 119

ical and Hydrological Institute’s (SMHI) data was reviewed. added to the event list. It is nevertheless possible to have The Finnish meteorological institute conducted a second new potential initiating events identified. All new events evaluation of the probability of extremely high water levels are categorized in accordance with the occurrence and waves in the Baltic sea, confirming SMHI’s data. The frequency and their safety impact on the facility, as was plants’ capability to withstand an ice storm was also carried out earlier during the original event identification. evaluated, giving an acceptable outcome. Identification of new initiating events is performed partly through the systematic work on probabilistic safety 17.2.2.1. Implementation of criteria in the licensing process assessments, which are periodically conducted, partly by A general description regarding the licensing process is means of the internal and external systems for feedback presented in section 7.3 and the environmental impact exchange and reporting. assessment is further described in section 7.3.1. Protection Actions related to the NAcP are further described in of the environment is further described in section 15.1.2. Appendix 2. All licensees have conducted evaluations and reassessments in accordance with the NAcP. The conclu-

17.2.3. Re-evaluation of site-related factors

sion has been made that ongoing work relating to extreme The most common reason for initiating a change in the natural phenomena will provide prerequisites for managedesign basis is experience feedback from both internal and ment of extreme events, which will result in improving the external sources. With the methods used to collect and plants’ defence in depth. evaluate information from an own facility and facilities of the same type, and through the systems for international 17.3. Regulatory control feedback and reporting, the safety design basis is kept up-to-date and relevant. Experience feedback from both Generally speaking, site re-evaluations are conducted as internal and external sources is further described in part of periodic safety reviews, see section 14.3.2. A review section 19.7.3. of the NAcP’s implementation has been performed. This In an attempt to keep the design basis up-to-date and was reported to SSM at the end of 2015. SSM has also complete, records are kept about new events that need to ensured that all measures identified in the NAcP have been be addressed in the safety assessment. In this additional appropriately considered for each reactor. work, the initiating events are studied that have already Most measures in the NAcP have been followed by a phase been identified due to their estimated event frequency. If it two, which includes implementation of reasonably can be shown that an event is more probable than previpracticable/achievable technical and administrative safety ously assessed, it is moved to another category of events improvements. The main improvement is the installation that matches the assumed frequency. of Independent Core Cooling systems, which adds another Since the systematics of the original event identification safety barrier for many of the external events dealt with in involved identifying the worst case events that might occur the NAcP, see section 18.2.1.6. within each event category, only a few events have been

120 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

Article 18. Design and Construction

identified anomalies that can affect the defence in depth or Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to barriers of the facility according to a predefined classificaensure that: tion scheme. Chapter 3, Section 1 of SSMFS 2008:1 (i) the design and construction of a nuclear installation outlines the basic requirements for defence in depth as provides for several reliable levels and methods of follows. protection (defence in depth) against the release of radioactive materials, with a view to preventing the “Defence in depth shall be achieved by: occurrence of accidents and to mitigating their radiological – ensuring that the design, construction, operation, consequences should they occur; monitoring and maintenance of a facility are such that (ii) the technologies incorporated in the design and? abnormal operation and accidents are prevented, construction of a nuclear installation are proven by – ensuring that multiple devices are available and prepared experience or qualified by testing or analysis; measures are in place to protect the integrity of the (iii) the design of a nuclear installation allows for reliable, barriers and, if the integrity should be breached, to stable and easily manageable operation, with specific mitigate the ensuing consequences, and consideration of human factors and the man-machine – ensuring that any release of radioactive substances to interface. the environment, which may nevertheless occur as a result of abnormal operation and accidents, is Summary of developments since the prevented, or, if this is not possible, controlled and mitigated through devices and prepared measures.” previous report

– Re-assessments of the robustness of the electrical More specific requirements on design and construction are power supply are ongoing at all operating reactors in given in Chapter 3 of SSMFS 2008:1. These can be reaction to national and international events indicating a summarized in the following points from Section 1. need for a more rigorous approach to electrical system “A nuclear facility shall be designed and constructed so design. that it: – The first requirement in the decision on introducing an – is able to withstand component and system failures, independent core cooling system was to considerably improve independence of existing emergency core – is dependable and has operational stability, cooling systems by the end of 2017; this has been – is able to withstand events or conditions which can achieved for all reactors in operation at that time. affect the safety function of the barriers or defence in – The design work for the independent core cooling depth, as well as system has been finalised, and the construction work is – enables maintainance, inspection and testing of completed for all reactors that are in operation after structures, systems and components important to safety 31/12 2020. (or security), – as far as reasonable facilitates radiation protection and security, and 18.1. Regulatory requirements – as far as reasonable facilitates protection and safety The SSM regulation, Chapter 2 of SSMFS 2018:1, and during future decommissioning.” Chapter 2 of SSMFS 2008:1, outline licensees’ obligations with regard to barriers and defence in depth. This includes More specific requirements regarding design principles for requirements on the utilisation of multiple barriers and defence in depth in nuclear power reactors are defined in requires a facility-specific approach for implementing the the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority’s Regulations and defence in depth concept for nuclear facilities. It also General Advice concerning the Design and Construction obliges licensees to analyse and report to the Authority any of Nuclear Power Reactors (SSMFS 2008:17). These

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 121

regulations include requirements on simplicity and extreme events that were previously not covered by the

durability, redundancy and diversification as well as physical safety analyses. The extreme events are defined by the

and functional separation in the design of the safety extended loss of all AC voltage, as well as the by common

functions, requirements regarding automatic control or cause failures in emergency core cooling functions. The

passive functions, and requirements to ensure that failures two events should be combined with extreme external

in safety classified equipment lead to acceptable levels of influence that may arise.

safety. SSMFS 2008:17 also includes design requirements concerning resilience to failures and internal and external 18.1.1. Development of new regulations

events, environmental tolerance and environmental impact, SSM has developed new regulations for nuclear safety,

control rooms, safety classification, event classification as which enter into force 1 March 2022, i.e., after the current

well as the reactor core. reporting period. The regulations SSMFS 2008:1 are

superceeded by requirements in SSMFS 2021:4, SSMFS In addition to the regulations SSMFS 2008:18, SSMFS 2021:5 and SSMFS 2021:6. 2008:1 and SSMFS 2008:17, there are also regulations

concerning pressure vessels, mechanical equipment, In SSMFS 2021:4, Chapter 2, Sections 2 and 3 require tha

competence and training for operators, security, and application of a site-specific defence in depth in five

radiation protection. defined levels, in design as well as in operation of a nuclear

power plant. The regulations SSMFS 2008:1 stipulate that guidelines

shall be developed to manage beyond design basis events. Chapter 4, Section 12 of SSMFS 2021:4 requires that the

Regulations regarding the design and construction of design and construction of a nuclear power plant, enables

nuclear reactors to cope with beyond design basis events the main safety functions to be fulfilled with as high level

(including severe accidents with core melt) are found in of dependability as reasonably achievable. To fulfill this

SSMFS 2008:17. Requirements on release mitigation in the general requirement during operation, the design must

event of severe accidents are given in a governmental consider the both reliability of plant equipment and

decision from February 1986. For a discussion about the prerequisites for human tasks, and factors affecting these

applicable requirements for an emergency situation, see such as maintainability, testability, maintenance support

section 16.1. performance, human factors and the man-machine

interface. Chapter 4 of SSMFS 2021:4 also include Requirements on proven and verified technology are found separate, more detailed requirements on reliability of in Chapter 2 of the Environmental Act (1998:808) and structures, systems and components important to safety further detailed by the provisions of Chapter 3, Section 2 (or security), resistance to loads and environmental of SSMFS 2008:1. This requires testing of design princiconditions, fail-safe design, maintainability and prerequiples and design solutions under realistic conditions, or if sites for human tasks. this is not reasonably achievable, to have them undergo the

necessary testing or evaluation with regard to safety.. In order to achieve sufficient reliability for structures,

systems and components important to safety (or security), The regulation SSMFS 2008:1 requires functionally based Chapter 4, Section 13 of SSMFS 2021:4 requires that the safety classification. In the case of nuclear power reactors, principles of simplicity, redundancy, diversity, and physical this is further detailed by the regulations SSMFS 2008:17, and functional separation are used as needed. Chapter 4, which states that structures, systems, components and Section 13 of SSMFS 2021:4 also indicates a strive for the devices of the nuclear power reactor shall be divided into use of proven design and construction. If this is not safety classes. According to the general advice for SSMFS practical achievable, a separate process of verification and 2008:17, safety classification may be carried out as per the validation of sufficient reliability is required. An important principles contained in the US standards ANSI/ANS 51.1 addition to the new regulations is also Chapter 3 of SSMFS for PWR and 52.1 for BWR. Classification may also follow 2021:4, containing specific requirements on management IEC standards where applicable; the I&C systems of and quality assurance of design and construction work. modernised plants in particular use applicable aspects of

IEC61226. Sufficient maintenance support performance is achieved

through the requirements on competences in chapter 3 of Provisions concerning quality classification of mechanical SSMFS 2021:6, and on several implemented programmes components in certain nuclear facilities are stipulated in the with the aim to maintain and confirm equipment availaregulation SSMFS 2008:13. bility in Chapter 2, Section 5 and Chapter 6 of SSMFS

In December 2014, SSM issued an injunction with 2021:6 (i.e. maintenance, surveillance, in-service inspection,

requirements for an independent core cooling system. The ageing management).

injunction requires safety measures considerably improving

the independence of existing emergency core cooling to be 18.2. Compliance of licence holders implemented by the end of 2017, and the system for

independent core cooling to be installed and in operation 18.2.1. Implementation of defence in depth

by 31 December 2020. The purpose of the measures is to All Swedish facilities basically follow the INSAG-10

increase the reliability of the core cooling and strengthen approach to defence in depth, which is referred to in

the capabilities to prevent core damage during a number of SSMFS 2008:17, and in practice also take into considera-

122 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

tion the WENRA approach of Design Extension Condi- – Battery capacity extended to 8 hours. tions. Swedish nuclear power plants were designed at a – Mobile and fixed equipment and connection points for time when the focus was on three levels of defence in recharging of batteries. depth, but have followed the advancements to more – Upgraded reactor cooling pump seals (PWR) reducing specifically address beyond design basis accidents and reactor coolant system leakage during beyond design design extension conditions. conditions.

The earliest reactor designs in Sweden incorporated a lower – Spent fuel pool level measurement, and independent degree of redundancy and separation, but enhanced injection. diversification of safety functions through the use of – Independent Core Cooling designed to cope with loss isolation condensers and steam-driven pumps. Later designs of ultimate heat sink and extended loss of AC power, as are characterized by significantly increased redundancy and described below. separation, but with a lower degree of diversification of Measures to increase the level of safety and strengthening safety functions. Backfitting and modernisations have led to the defence in depth at all the Swedish NPPs have been major improvements to the older designs, especially implemented gradually, taking account of new knowledge concerning increased redundancy and separation, and have and experience. New knowledge and experience have implemented increased diversification and protection emerged from lessons learned in connection with incidents against common-cause failures, see Appendix 1. and accidents, and from research, safety analyses and new The risk for single failures are taken into consideration in reactor designs. International accidents/incidents such as the the design . The same applies to common-cause failures, TMI nuclear accident in 1979, as well as domestic incidents although it is always possible to postulate even more such as the ‘strainer event’ in Barsebäck unit 2 in 1992 and challenging failures to identify critical areas for improve- the electric power system event at Forsmark unit 1 in 2006, ments. It is an ongoing process to identify reasonably have had a major influence on these measures. Furthermore, achievable safety enhancements through deterministic and the new Swedish regulations on the design and construction probabilistic methods, complemented by engineering of nuclear power reactors issued in 2005 have resulted in judgements and operational experience. extensive backfitting and modernisation programmes for all

Safety functions should be able to withstand a single failure Swedish NPPs. Also, insights gained from the EU stress in active components during all events within the design tests after the accident in Fukushima Daiichi have led to the basis envelope. Reasonable diversification in order to identification of further areas of improvement, all of which withstand common-cause failures should be applied to the have been addressed by the end of 2020.

design of the safety functions for events up to and In summary, since the time when the original reactor including unanticipated events (except LOCAs). designs were taken into operation, extensive measures have Safety systems are generally designed to be fail-safe, which been taken to improve:

means that the loss of active functions leads to a favour- – physical and functional separation with in and between able state of the plant. The level of active functions safety functions required varies for different designs of different genera- – diversification of safety functions tions. However, for all reactor designs, the severe accident – severe accident management measures mitigation systems have passive actuation parts which – protection against local dynamic effects from pipe would mitigate the consequences of a sequence where breaks and other internal hazards there is a risk of containment overpressurisation. – protection against external events Separation of systems, both physically and functionally, is an – control room capabilities important area in which a number of backfitting measures – environmental qualification and surveillance. have been implemented over many years as reported previously, see Appendix 1. In many cases, the need for

18.2.1.1. Seismic

improved separation was identified through PSA. Swedish Sweden uses a design envelope, when defining the realistic reactors have been retrofitted to comply with regulatory seismic events on the Scandinavian peninsula. This is done requirement on functional diversification. The functions of with a safety margin. Reactors built earlier were not reactivity control, overpressure protection, cooling and originally designed to withstand a design basis earthquake, residual heat removal, and the containment function, shall all but earthquake requirements have been taken into account have diversified backup capabilities, see Appendix 1. as part of maintenance and modernisation measures. The objective of implemented or planned design measures Reasonably practicable approaches to strengthen the or changes (plant modifications, backfitting) is to prevent reactors’ capabilities to withstand earthquakes have been beyond design basis accidents and to mitigate their taken to ensure that no undue risk is foreseen with regard radiological consequences, should they occur. Some to seismic criteria being excluded from the initial design examples are: basis. Also, when installing new equipment and implementing measures, seismic events are required to be taken – Structural integrity assessed for containment and into account. For the ICCS that was installed in 2020, containment filtered venting systems for beyond design seismic events with the frequency exceeding 1E-6 per seismic events. annum have been considered for the design.

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 123

Release to atmosphere

CONTAINMENT OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION CONTAINMENT FILTERED VENTING

Rupture disk

Rupture disk

Pressure

release

to the

atmosphere Manually operated valves

UPPER

Auxilliary feedwater DRYWELL Moisture separator

Scrubber

pool

WETWELL Pressure relief line

from containment

LOWER DRYWELL Venturis and venturi

distribution system

Independent core Lower drywell

cooling system flooding from

wetwell

Water injection to the

reactor Containment

Containment penetration

shielding in lower drywell

Water pumped in by mobile pump unit

Water reservoir

Illustrated by Bosse Alenius

Figure 24. Schematic view of the independent core cooling system and severe accident mitigation features installed in Swedish BWRs. The ICCS schematic is specific for the Forsmark plant.

18.2.1.2. Flooding and tsunami site were not included in the design basis of existing

The general risk of flooding was reassessed after the nuclear facilities. Safety systems as well as severe accident

Fukushima Daiichi accident. The analyses and, in some management systems at Swedish nuclear power plants are,

cases, corresponding administrative and physical improve- however, dedicated to one unit only. Shared auxiliary

ments, show that the NPPs can handle extreme water systems principally encompass the off-site grid, station

levels with the exceedance frequency of 10-5 per year. For blackout generators, and inlet and outlet channels to the

the ICCS that was installed in 2020, extreme water levels ultimate heat sink. Evaluations and measures for coping

with the exeedance frequency of 1E-6 per annum has been with multi-unit accidents are part of the NAcP, where the

considered for the design. requirement for independent core cooling specifically

addresses the loss of ultimate heat sink and extended loss The tsunami risk in Sweden is low given the geographical of AC power at all reactors on the site, see sections 18.1. location of the country. After the Fukushima Daiichi

accident, the tsunami risk was reassessed and no additional

18.2.1.5. Severe accident mitigation measures

measures to particularly mitigate a tsunami were identified. The government decree of February 1986, following the

Three Mile Island accident in the United States in 1979,

18.2.1.3. Other external hazards

substantially strengthened the nuclear reactors’ capabili- The facilities’ characteristics in relation to extreme weather ties to manage design extension conditions. This governconditions have been reassessed after the Fukushima ment decree required all licensees to take appropriate Daiichi accident. In general, the evaluations indicate that actions to ensure that all nuclear power reactors are the facilities are robust; however, for some areas, measures capable of withstanding a core melt accident without any have been taken to strengthen the protection against casualties or ground contamination of significance to the extreme weather conditions. The ICCS has made the population. In the decree, it was stated that these requirefacilities even more robust. ments can be considered met if a release is limited to a

maximum of 0.1% of the reactor core content of

18.2.1.4. Simultaneous accidents at multiple units

caesium-134 and caesium-137 in a reactor core of 1800 Simultaneous accidents at multiple reactors on the same

124 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

Ordinary containment spray system

Containment spray

Release to atmosphere

Independent pump

and connection for

containment spray

Manually operated valves

Steam generator

Auxiliary water

source – fire water

or as a last resort

sea water Rupture disk Moisture separator

Reactor

pressure

vessel

Scrubber

pool

Pressure relief line

from containment

Venturis and venturi

distribution system

Independent core

cooling system

Illustrated by Bosse Alenius

Figure 25. Schematic view of the independent core cooling system and severe accident mitigation features installed in Swedish PWRs.

MW thermal power (corresponding to approximately 100 the BWRs and PWRs is presented in figure 24 and figure TBq Cs-137), provided that other nuclides of significance 25, respectively. are limited to the same extent as caesium. This resulted in The major component is the scrubber system comprising a an extensive backfitting for all Swedish nuclear power large number of small venturi scrubbers submerged in a reactors including: pool of water. The water contains chemicals for adequate – Filtered containment venting through an inert MVSS retention of iodine. with a decontamination factor of at least 500, The design of the venturi is based upon the suppliers’ – Unfiltered pressure relief in BWRs in the case of a large broad experience in this area, gained when designing LOCA and degraded pressure suppression function to venturi for cleaning of polluted gases from various protect the containment from early overpressurization, industrial plants. The MVSS can be activated automatically, – Flooding of lower drywell from wetwell (most BWR:s) via a rupture disk, or manually. There are two separate – Passive autocatalytic recombiner (PAR), venting lines from the containment for these two modes – Independent containment spray, of activation. The venting line with the rupture disk is – All mitigating systems designed to withstand an always open so that no operator actions are needed to vent earthquake, and this way. The design principle of the system is the same for

– A comprehensive set of SAM procedures and BWRs and PWRs. The system is kept inert to avoid a guidelines. hydrogen explosion.

All of the reactors in operation have chosen the Multi The Swedish strategy for dealing with a core melt in BWRs Venturi Scrubber System (MVSS) concept to fulfil the is to allow the core debris to fall into a large volume of requirements for filtered venting. A venturi scrubber is a water in the lower regions of the containment. This is a gas cleaning device that lets the contaminated gas pass as quite uncommon approach and only a few reactors in the bubbles through the cleaning liquid.A conceptual illustra- world apply this strategy. Since the strategy is somewhat tion of the overall severe accident mitigation concept for unique, the international research related to the special

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 125

phenomena, mainly steam explosion, associated with this condition is that the FRISK system must be fully available

strategy was fairly limited, even if a wide range of interna- for severe accident management if an event escalates into a

tional research has been conducted on phenomena that are severe accident scenario involving core damage. If needed,

also applicable to Swedish plants. An extensive national there is an additional possibility to utilize mobile

research programme was set up in the 1980s to highlight all equipment to supply more water, and thereby use the ICCS

important aspects needing to be addressed. The for a longer period of time than 72 hours.

programme (APRI, Accident Phenomena of Risk Impor- Forsmark has also the implementation of a new function tance) is still run in cooperation between the Authority and for independent water supply to the spent fuel pools, using licensees. The programme is conducted in consecutive the principle of “feed-and-boil”. The water is allowed to three-year periods, with evaluation of the progress and boil while water is added at least at the same pace that the results over the previous three years. The current boiling occurs. The technical solution consists of new programme is the 10th. In order to address specific pipes, mobile pumps and level measurement. uncertainties relating to the Swedish severe accident

mitigation strategy, major efforts are conducted by the

Ringhals NPP

Royal Institute of Technology and Chalmers University of An independent core cooling system ICCS was installed in Technology within the APRI programme. The severe Ringhals units 3 and 4 in 2020. The purpose of the ICCS is accident research is now targeted at confirming that the to provide alternative core cooling if the ordinary safety uncertainties linked to the chosen solution are acceptable. systems are unavailable in the event of design extension APRI also monitors international research in the area of conditions (DEC). severe accidents.

The design events for the independent core cooling Results from the APRI programme indicate, e.g., that a system are: major interaction between concrete and core melt (MCCS)

will most likely be avoided. Also, some issues still need to – Extended Loss of AC Power, ELAP (for 72 hours)

be further explored, including steam explosions, which – Loss of Ultimate Heat Sink, LUHS (for 72 hours).

might occur when the core melt interacts with water and a huge heat transfer occurs. In addition to loss of AC power, it is postulated that DC

power is lost and that the existing steam-driven auxiliary

18.2.1.6. Installation of independent core cooling systems feedwater pump fails. The ELAP/LUHS events are

Independent core cooling systems (ICCS) are in place at all assumed to coincide with, or be the consequence of, severe

reactors in operation, as described in section 6.2.1. external events (beyond the ordinary design base),

including various electrical disturbances. All features,

Forsmark NPP

including supportive functions, are housed in a separate A new ICCS was put into operation at the Forsmark plant building designed to withstand severe external events, one in 2020. The new system is a consequence of the stress for each unit. Inside the building, there are two large water tests following the Fukushima accident and the SSM tanks that provide the different functions with water for requirements for an independent core cooling system, independent core cooling, see figure ny referens. The water designed to withstand extreme external hazards. provided to the reactor coolant system is borated and

The ICCS mainly consists of the following components: demineralized, and the water for the steam generators and

spent fuel pit is demineralized and deareated. – Building structure The main features of the Independent Core Cooling – Water source system are as follows: – Pump

– Valves – Providing feedwater to the steam generators (normal

– Connection pipes operation)

– Providing boron and make-up to a closed reactor The power supply is galvanically separated from the plant’s coolant system (normal operation) regular electrical power system via a motor-generator set. – Providing borated make-up for feed-and-bleed for an Forsmark units 1 and 2 share the same ICCS building and open reactor coolant system (shutdown mode) water source. There are, however, separate pumps, pipes – Providing make-up for feed-and-boil of the spent and valves so that the ICCS function is independent fuel pit. between the units. The water source is sufficient for at least

24 hours of operation for both units, or 72 hours for one The ICCS building has a separate electrical power supply unit. In case of operation for both units, additional water system that is galvanically, functionally, and physically sources are available to make operation for 72 hours separated from the regular electrical power system. The possible. The pump capacity is sufficient to supply water to galvanic separation is achieved by a motor-generator set the RPV at full pressure. between the incoming power supply and ICCS power

Decay heat will be removed from the containment after system. The electromagnetic design of the building

about 8 hours of ICCS operation by transporting steam to structure and shielding of cables ensure that no electrical

the multi venturi scrubber (FRISK). One important design disturbances (conductive or radiative) can affect the ICCS.

126 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

In addition to the independent core cooling system main – The cable separation shall, considering limitations posed

function, the system also improves the capability to cool by the existing buildings, to the largest extent possible

the spent fuel pool by establishing a feed and boil-off fulfil the requirements stated in IEEE 384 –1992.

cooling function. – The fire protection shall, considering limitations posed

the existing buildings, to the largest extent possible fulfil

Oskarshamn NPP

requirements applicable to new nuclear power plants. The ICCS function comprises a new one-train low pressure – Installations of cabinets and equipment which support make-up system with a direct diesel-driven pump and safety-related system functions shall have seismic supporting electrical and water source make-up systems. capabilities according to “Swedish earthquake spectra” The primary water source for the ICCS is the central with a probability of exceedance of 10–5 per year. handling pool at the reactor service floor. The available – The structure shall have a level of functional separation amount of water is sufficient for continuation of core that allows I&C system failures without loss of major cooling for 40 hours. After 40 hours, make-up water for plant system functionality, and allows maintenance and the central service pool is taken from the fire water tanks, modification work to be performed at a plant and on which will last for another 32 hours. I&C system/function level without affecting any other As part of the design and installation of the ICCS at major systems/functions .

OKG, measures are being taken to establish feed-and-bleed – The structure shall have a sufficient degree of for the spent fuel pools (SPF). The measures comprise functional diversity for avoidance of software Common feeding of the SFP with water from the fire water tanks. If Cause Failures (CCF) that might affect functional safety additional make-up water for both the ICCS and the SFP is or reliability. needed, it can be pumped by diesel-driven pumps from a – The structure shall not introduce any additional freshwater pond on the site that holds approximately functional dependencies between plant systems/ 120,000 m3. The bleeding is done through new piping functions. leading to the normal cooling water outlet channel. The

measures introduced will keep the SFP temperature below A plant safety demonstration method was developed and

80° C. iterated with the regulator. The objective of the method

was to demonstrate that plant safety was improved or at The ICCS has its own diesel generator set that can least remained unchanged prior to the implementation in a recharge the dedicated batteries for the ICCS and energize defined number of areas. The method was applied to the the battery-backed busbars after the initial 8 hours in order main steps of the project, with a final demonstration of to retain RPS functionality. Residual heat is released safety during start-up and operation. Additional analyses through the multi-venturi scrubber system. of the concept were performed based upon experiences Implementation of the final design solution is completed, from the “Forsmark event” that occurred in 2006, and

includning the extension of the battery capacity. resulted in implementation of additional possibilities for

DC power supply by DC, and some additional UPSs. For

18.2.2. Incorporation of proven technologies

more information, see Sweden’s seventh national report The application of particular standards for fulfilment of under the Convention on Nuclear Safety. legal and regulatory requirements is a licensee responsi-

bility. The original design of the Swedish NPPs relied to a 18.2.3. Design for reliable, stable and

large extent on US standards, and these US standards still manageable operation

have a strong influence. As applicable, European standards The design solutions must be adapted to the ability of the

have been assessed by the licensees, and where appropriate, personnel to manage the facility in a safe manner, as well as

incorporated into the design. One way for the licensees to to manage abnormal events, incidents and accidents. In

perform the work is to use the co-operation of a shared some areas, specific Swedish requirements on considera-

group, mainly for managing technical requirements for tion of grace time have been added, e.g. the “30-minute

plant design found to be applicable. Further information rule”. This rule requires that all measures needed to be

on verification by surveillance, testing and inspection is taken within 30 minutes after an initiating event involving

provided in sections 14.1.2 and 14.2.4. the risk of a radioactive release must be automated. The

rule is implemented in the BWRs, and with some excep- A good example of incorporation of proven technologies, tions in the PWRs. including the assessment needed to ensure that the

technology is proven, is the major upgrade to the digital SSM has requested that the licensees, starting with the

instrumentation and control system (I&C), completed in PWR operators, to conduct an analysis as to whether the

Ringhals unit 2 as part of the TWICE project. The project grace times are suitable for different incidents. Human

involved installation of a completely new and modern factors have long been recognised as an important

control room. consideration in design matters, and are addressed in

Section 5 of SSMFS 2008:1. Both the licensees and the Some of the requirements applied to the TWICE project Authority have dedicated functions in place in their were: respective organisations to specifically ensure that due – Functional classification is to follow the intentions consideration is given to human factors.

stated in IEC 1226, first edition.

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 127

Sweden also participates in international organisations, standing group of experts (see section 10.5.3) makes the such as the Halden Project in Norway, which conducts first assessment of all notifications; it consists of experts research of importance for the areas of fuel, materials and representing all relevant disciplines, including human human factors. factors experts. Information on regulatory review and control activities in relation to operation and human factors is provided in sections 12 and 19. 18.3. Regulatory control

The regulatory approach in Sweden is to retrofit facilities to meet modern requirements, and all facilities are expected 18.4. Implemetation Vienna Declaration as far as reasonably achievable to meet modern standards. on Nuclear Safety Major safety upgrades have been completed at Swedish This section, in reference to Article 18, describes how facilities over the last 15 years to achieve this target, see Sweden implements relevant improvements concerning Appendix 1. SSM conducts and will continue to carry out principles of the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety supervision of licensee implementation of safety improve- regarding the design of power plants. ments and measures taken to ensure compliance with As reported in the previous national reports, all Swedish current standards and regulations. reactors have installed filtered venting systems according to SSM’s overall assessment is that the measures taken to the Multi Venturi Scrubber concept to fulfil the requirecomply with modern requirements contained in SSMFS ments for filtered venting in the case of a severe accident 2008:17 have significantly improved the level of safety at mitigation. Simultaneous accidents at multiple unit sites all nuclear power reactors in Sweden. The main capability were not included in the design basis of existing nuclear that has been improved is control over conditions that facilities. Safety systems as well as severe accident managemight possibly arise in the event of design basis accidents. ment systems at Swedish nuclear power plants are, The operation of the nuclear power reactors and licensee however, dedicated to one unit only. monitoring of the barriers’ surveillance have also been In 2014, SSM decided that the licensees are required to substantially improved by implementing new or upgraded implement an independent core cooling system at reactors control equipment. intended to be operated after December 31 2020. Design All measures in the NAcP have been completed in solutions for the ICCS function were developed for all accordance with the original given time schedule, meaning affected reactors and were operative by the end of 2020, as that all identified measures were fully implemented by the presented in section 18.2.1.6. end of 2020, following the Independent Core Cooling Implementation of particular design measures to maintain System (ICCS) installations. the integrity of the physical containment and to basically Detailed information regarding the Swedish NAcP can be avoid a severe accident with potential long-term off-site found in section 6.2 and Appendix 2. contamination are examples of VDNS principles’ According to the regulation, any safety significant events or fulfilment. plant modifications must be reported to the Authority. A

128 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

Article 19. Operation

– The total number of licensee event reports (category 2 Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to LERs) has decreased from 210 to 150 per year over the ensure that: past three years, due to fewer reactors in operation.

(i) The initial authorization to operate a nuclear installation – Since mid-2017, efforts are ongoing to produce specific is based upon an appropriate safety analysis and a procedures for extraordinary situations at Swedish commissioning programme demonstrating that the NPPs. These will give better support to the organisation installation, as constructed, is consistent with design and in the case of similar events. A part of the work is safety requirements; improvement and adaptation to international guidelines (ii) Operational limits and conditions derived from the in the area of SAMG. safety analysis, tests and operational experience are defined and revised as necessary for identifying safe

boundaries for operation; 19.1. Development of new regulations

(iii) Operation, maintenance, inspection and testing of a SSM has developed new regulations which enter into force nuclear installation are conducted in accordance with 1 March 2022, i.e., after the current reporting period. The approved procedures; main changes in the future regulations, are described in the (iv) Procedures are established for responding to respective subsections below. anticipated operational occurrences and to accidents;

(v) Necessary engineering and technical support in all safety-related fields is available throughout the lifetime of 19.2. Initial authorization

a nuclear installation;

19.2.1. Regulatory requirements

(vi) Incidents significant to safety are reported in a timely Chapter 2, Section 1 of SSMFS 2018:1 requires that events manner by the holder of the relevant licence to the and conditions important to safety (or security) shall be regulatory body; identified and assessed by the licensee, before any activity (vii) Programmes to collect and analyse operating or operation begins. The assessment of these events and experience are established, the results obtained and the conditions shall form the basis for the measures needed to conclusions drawn are acted upon and that existing meet all safety (and security) requirements. mechanisms are used to share important experience with

international bodies and with other operating organisa- As mentioned in section 14.1, a comprehensive determintions and regulatory bodies; istic and probabilistic safety analysis is required by SSMFS

(viii) the generation of radioactive waste resulting from the 2008:1, Chapter 4, Sections 1 and 2, prior to constructing

operation of a nuclear installation is kept to the minimum and commissioning a plant. These analyses shall subse-

practicable for the process concerned, both in activity and quently be kept up to date. To show how the plant is built, in volume, and any necessary treatment and storage of analysed, verified, and the safety requirements are met, a

spent fuel and waste directly related to the operation and Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) shall be on the same site as that of the nuclear installation take supplemented to provide a pre-operational Safety Analysis into consideration conditioning and disposal. Report, which justifies the finalised detailed design of the

plant and demonstrates its safety. The final report (SAR)

incorporates any necessary revisions to the pre-operational Summary of developments since

Safety Analysis Report following the commissioning and the previous report licensing process for the first entry into routine operation During the current review period, the following develop- of the as-built nuclear power plant.

ments are of relevance with regard to the obligations of

Article 19:

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 129

19.2.2. Development of new regulations related to (for example) plant modifications or analysis

New regulations, entering into force 1 March 2022, are as updates. Reviews by SSM have the aim of verifying that the

follows. The regulations SSMFS 2008:1 are superceeded by SAR reflects the facility as it is built, analysed and verified,

requirements in SSMFS 2021:4, SSMFS 2021:5 and SSMFS as well as its demonstrating how current requirements for

2021:6. design, function, organisation and activities are met.

Chapter 4 of SSMFS 2021:4 more clearly specifies the events and conditions important to safety that shall be 19.3. Operational limits and conditions

considered in design and construction of a nuclear power

19.3.1. Regulatory requirements

plant, and also specifies the main safety/security functions As stated by the regulation SSMFS 2008:1, Chapter 5, that have to be fulfilled and criteria for their fulfillment. In Section 1, documented and up-to-date Operational Limits the new regulation, requirements on deterministic and and Conditions (OLCs), known in Sweden as STF, are probabilistic safety analysis in Chapters 3 and 4 of SSMFS required containing the necessary limits and conditions, as 2021:5, are given in more detail than was the case of further specified in a separate annex to the regulations. SSMFS 2008:1. Also, the relationship between these

analysis, SAR and the safety assessment as a whole, are The OLC shall, together with the operational procedures,

more clearly described. Requirements on PSAR are now ensure that the conditions postulated in the safety analysis

included in Chapter 7 of SSMFS 2021:5, as a part of the report are maintained during operation of the facility

safety demonstration, required for modifications (or new (Chapter 5, Section 1 of SSMFS 2008:1). The OLC is

built) significant to safety (or security). subjected to a twofold safety review by the licensee and

submitted to SSM for approval. SSM is to be notified by Chapter 3 of SSMFS 2021:4 now include new requirements the licensee about any changes that must also be subjected on management of design and construction work, including to a safety review. requirements on plans for commissioning, demonstrating

that the installation, as constructed, is consistent with

19.3.2. Development of new regulations

design and safety (and security) requirements. New regulations, entering into force 1 March 2022, are as

follows. Chapter 5, Sections 3 and 4 of SSMFS 2021:5

19.2.3. Compliance by licensees and actions taken

requires a set of OLCs to be specified (STF), based on No nuclear units have been commissioned in Sweden since limits and conditions for safe operation as proven by safety 1985, when Forsmark 3 and Oskarshamn 3 went into analysis or experience. Chapter 4, Section 11 of SSMFS commercial operation. No additional units are currently 2021:4 also requires that limits and conditions for normal undergoing planning or construction. operation are identified for all areas, spaces, structures,

As described in section 14.2, all Swedish units in operation systems and components contributing in the fulfillment of

have been analysed and have followed commissioning the main safety functions. While some of these limits and

programmes in order to demonstrate their compliance with conditions for normal operation shall be included in the

design and safety requirements, as specified in legislation, OLCs, other limits and conditions for normal operation

regulations and standards that were in effect at the time of may be important for maintenance, inspection and testing,

startup. The objective was to develop a PSAR before as defined references or required functions.

commencing design, construction and erection of the unit,

and later an FSAR; and through extensive operational 19.3.3. Compliance by licensees and actions taken

testing, to verify both the function of the different The operational limits and conditions for a reactor units

individual systems and their shared performance. Permis- stated in Annex 3 to SSMFS 2008:1 are included in an

sion to start up the units was given in steps by the regula- operational document named “STF” in Sweden (Säkerhet-

tory authority, following completion of the different opera- stekniska driftförutsättningar). This document is consid-

tional tests, and reporting of results from the startup ered as one of the cornerstones in the governance and

stages. Permission for commercial operation was granted regulation of the operations of Swedish plants. As required

when the operational tests had been completed satisfacto- by SSM, all control room operators and operations

rily and reported, and the FSAR and technical specifica- managers, as well as engineers on duty at the plants, are

tions had been accepted. given training and annual retraining on the intent and

content of this document. Each STF is unit-specific and is The main changes and modifications in the SAR were in its basic version approved by SSM. For the oldest BWRs, related to plant modifications due to power uprates. Also, STFs were produced in close cooperation between nuclear plant modifications and related analyses are to be reflected utilities. Consequently, the structure of the STF documents in SAR updates. The state of the art safety requirements is similar for all BWRs in the country. For PWRs, the STFs are regularly assessed for their implementation in the follow the Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG) current SARs, and the licensees have specific procedures in approach. The scope and content of Swedish STF place for evaluation of new or revised codes and standards documents are similar to the OLCs used in other European to be reflected in a regular update. countries.

19.2.4. Regulatory control The original STF for each unit is derived from the safety

SSM reviews safety analysis reports as a result of updates analyses contained in the SAR, where the behaviour of the

made due to applications for power uprates, or notifications unit, when different transients and abnormal events

130 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

occurred, is described. However, several revisions have accidents. These guidelines should be developed to the

been made in all STFs since the first versions were issued. extent possible and reasonable with regard to the need for

Corrections and updates take place when new and better protection of the public and the environment. The

knowledge is available, either from research and testing, or guidelines should be well coordinated with emergency

from operational experience or plant modifications. procedures. Required instructions also cover events and

Suggestions for changes to the STF are subjected to a conditions affecting several facilities at the same site.

twofold safety review and notified to SSM. Today, STFs are The procedures for operability verification, as well as integrated in plant management systems in order to ensure procedures and guidelines used in plant modes other than adequate use and updates of the document. normal operation shall be subjected to a twofold safety

Parts of STFs developed after commissioning the plants review by the licensee. A full scale simulator should be

comprise specific chapters concerning conditions during used if possible and to a suitable extent for verification of

refuelling outages and the background to the document operational procedures. Procedures for maintenance that

(STF BASIS). The STF documents are now part of the are important for safety are also included in the require-

SAR documentation upon which STFs are based. SSM has ment. Programmes for ageing management, maintenance,

imposed further requirements for the scope of STFs, for surveillece and in-service inspection are to be documented

instance their also covering non-safety system equipment and up to date, and methods used shall be validated for

of importance for defence in depth, such as fire protection their purpose. The regulations of SSMFS 2008:13 state

systems and certain electrical systems. For these, require- that inspection and testing of mechanical components

ments for operability have been included to a varying shall be carried out in accordance with qualified methods

extent in STFs. and verified procedures.

The STF of the Westinghouse PWRs at Ringhals has been

19.4.2. Development of new regulations

updated as part of a particular project using the MERITS New regulations, entering into force 1 March 2022, are as concept (Methodically Engineered Restructured and follows. The current regulations SSMFS 2008:1 will be Improved Technical Specifications) documented in superceeded by requirements in SSMFS 2021:4, SSMFS NUREG-1431 rev. 1, and following experience gained by 2021:5 and SSMFS 2021:6. the Westinghouse Owners Group, documented in

NUREG-1431 rev. 2. While Chapter 3, Sections 4 and 5 of SSMFS 2018:1

requires that all activities important to safety (or security) Before equipment with importance for defence in depth is follow written procedures, new requirements in Chapter accepted for continuous operation following maintenance, 2, Section 4 of SSMFS 2021:6 specifies that all procein-service inspection or after a plant modification, the dures at a nuclear power plant shall be adapted to the equipment must pass an operability test to verify that the tasks to be performed and to the conditions in which the equipment fulfils specified operational requirements. tasks are expected to be fulfilled. Chapter 5 of SSMFS Integral tests for verification of complete system function 2021:6 specifies more detailed requirements on principles are used as far as possible. If they are not feasible, overlapfor, and quality assurance of operational procedures and ping tests are conducted. After this, an initial integral test is guidelines to be used during normal operation, under performed. anticipated operational occurrences or during accidents.

Also Chapter 3 of SSMFS 2021:4 requires that associated

19.3.4. Regulatory control

procedures, as far as resonably achievable, are verified and SSM is regularly notified by a licensee when changes are validated during commissioning of a new power plant or made in the STF (OLC), or when temporary exemptions of new equipment. are needed. These notifications on changes in STFs and

exemptions from STFs are reviewed as described in section Chapter 2, Section 5 and Chapter 6, Section 2 of SSMFS

14.3. In total, SSM receives 10 to 20 notifications from the 2021:6 requires a systematic coordination of plans and

licensees each year. procedures in the implementation of progammes for

maintenance, surveillance and in-service inspection. Since

Chapter 6 of SSMFS 2021:6 inlude all requirements related 19.4. Procedures for operation, to maintaining plant dependability, the chapter also maintenance, inspection and testing specifies requirements on programmes for chemistry,

verification of equipment qualification and aeging manage-

19.4.1. Regulatory requirements

ment, housekeeping and foreign material management. Suitable, verified and documented procedures according to

Chapter 5, Section 2 of SSMFS 2018:1 shall be established

19.4.3. Compliance by licensees

by the licensee and are required for all plant states, All activities that directly affect the operation of the plants including accidents. Chapter 5, Section 2 of SSMFS 2008:1 are governed by procedures of different kinds. Normal requires that symptom-based procedures shall be in place operation, abnormal operation, emergency operation and for a nuclear power reactor in order to re-establish or functional tests are included in this category. Maintenance compensate for lost safety functions and to avoid core activities according to an approved maintenance damage. Also, management guidelines are required to programme are also to a great extent accomplished control and mitigate consequences of beyond design basis according to procedures that are not always as detailed as

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 131

operating procedures, where activities are described step by symptom-based emergency operating procedures for all

step, in sequences. units (Övergripande störningsinstruktioner, ÖSI). ÖSI are

used by the shift supervisors and represent a link to the Periodic maintenance consists of activities performed on a safety panel display system (SPDS) in place using different routine basis, and may include any combination of layouts at all Swedish units as part of the accident manageexternal/internal inspection, alignment or calibration, ment system. The emergency management procedures are overhaul, and component or equipment replacement. Any also the link to the emergency planning and its criteria for deficiencies found by predictive or periodic maintenance activating an alarm. The structure of procedures is are addressed by corrective or planned maintenance. illustrated by figure 26.

Planned maintenance includes activities performed prior to

equipment failure, and is typically carried out during

outages, or on spare or redundant equipment that is

available during plant operation. The safety regulation

SSMFS 2008:17 allows preventive maintenance to be

performed during operation, if specific conditions are met. Procedures Used by the plant management

for

This is specified in the OLCs and lies within the conditions extraordinary

situations

analysed and described in the Safety Analysis Report

(SAR). Symptom based

emergency operating Used by the shift supervisor

Modification activities are also carried out as part of procedures

maintenance and the Plant Life Management (PLiM)

Unit specific event based

programme, which deals with the design life of compo- emergency operating procedures

nents, to fulfil their function throughout the plant’s Used by the

expected lifetime. Such activities are part of the long-term

control room

Unit specific operating procedures operators

plans and strategies included in the safety programmes.

Optimization is also carried out in order to achieve an System specific procedures for normal

appropriate balance between maintenance and equipment

and disturbed operation

modification.

Figure 26. Overview of the main procedures applied during Signing of steps’ fulfillment, carried out in the procedures, emergency situations. is mandatory in most cases in order to confirm their

completion and to facilitate verification. Temporary Other documents are available that reference to the main operation procedures (TOP) and special conditions are procedures. The level of detail and number of procedures controlled in the form of operation notices with limited decrease in pace with the increasing height of the pyramid. validity. These notices are reviewed and issued by the

operations department according to a special procedure. At the top of the pyramid, procedures for extraordinary

situations include procedures for the engineer on duty, the Operations personnel are deeply involved in production operative emergency response plan, and technical and revision of operating procedures. Normally, the handbooks for dealing with beyond design basis accidents, different process systems are allocated among shift teams, including severe accidents as well as cases when more than and one part of team ownership is the task of developing, one unit per site is affected. reviewing and revising related operating procedures.

The Swedish PWRs follow EOPs and SAMG (Severe Development of procedures follows specified directives, Accident Management Guidelines) from the Westinghouse which include reviewing the documents, normally by more Owners Group, whereas the BWRs have own specifically than one person other than the author, before their developed instructions and guidelines from the 1980s for approval by the operations manager or someone else with accident management. At that time, these procedures (both the corresponding level of authority. The same applies PWR and BWR) covered dealing with situations including when revising procedures. Revision of procedures is to be loss of all AC power and depressurization by means of the carried out continuously, particularly in the case of system for filtered ventilation of the containment. maintenance procedures, when new experience is obtained.

Due to experience from the Fukushima event, an ongoing Procedures used for abnormal operation and emergency project is being carried out since mid-2017 to create should undergo specific safety review. The same review procedures for extraordinary situations at Swedish NPPs. applies when it comes to procedures for checking opera- The purpose of the work is to develop procedures to bility according to technical specifications. As far as better facilitate the organisation during similar events. The possible, or when needed, full-scale simulators of the units goal of this update is to improve the procedures and adapt are used when verifying a new or revised operating them to international guidelines in the area of SAMG. procedure. Completion of the project is planned for late 2020.

Emergency procedures have been developed in order to Moreover, this work will enhance procedures and guides

deal with anticipated operational occurrences and accident for dealing with accidents affecting more than one unit at a

conditions. Emergency procedures are supplemented by site (when each facility will be staffed to manage its own

132 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

situation and the plant’s emergency and command centre is to an applicable extent. Requirements for using contractors staffed and has the ultimate responsibility for making as opposed to own personnel should be carefully considfundamental decisions that have an impact on more than ered in order to have a capability to develop and sustain the individual facility). adequate in-house expertise, as stated in Chapter 3, Section 11 of SSMFS 2018:1. The requirements also state that 19.4.4. Regulatory control necessary expertise should always be available in-house for Procedures are usually reviewed during supervision. When requesting, managing and evaluating work important for conducting an event investigation, SSM requests that safety that is carried out by contractors. procedures be submitted relating to the event in question. In these cases, SSM performs scrutiny in order to ascertain 19.5.2. Development of new regulations whether the procedure gives the prerequisite for the New regulations, entering into force 1 March 2022, are as personnel to properly accomplish their tasks. follows. In addition to the current requirements on resources and competences in SSMFS 2018:1, Chapter 3 Ordinarily, operational, emergency and maintenance of SSMFS 2021:6 requires a systematic identification of procedures are not reviewed by SSM when they have been competences needed for safety (or security) related published or updated. However, SSM’s review of the activities at a nuclear power plant, several years ahead. It is procedures that was carried out in 2016 highlighted the also required that this include a documented plan of how need for a reassessment of the instructions and guidelines to achieve this, both in short- and long-term perspectives. for severe accident management at the BWRs. In July 2017, SSM issued orders to the licensees to evaluate and reassess Chapter 8, Section 2 of SSMFS 2021:6 also specificly their procedures for BWRs, with reference to recommen- requires that engineering and technical support is available dations from the IAEA and WENRA. SSM requested within the emergence response organization. broadening of the scope of prepared strategies for managing severe accidents, in addition to a specific 19.5.3. Compliance by licensees and actions taken reassessment of the interface between the preventive and The nuclear power plants have personnel whose role is to mitigatory domains. SSM had also identified a need for specifically account for the responsibilities of the licensees. improvement of the documented support for deci- All the licensees have these competencies available in their sion-making, and for extended verification and validation organisation. This means that even if some external of the procedures. The licensees were also asked to support still must be used, the plants have in-house evaluate their training programmes for both BWRs and expertise and the capability to evaluate the results of PWRs, and to report to SSM each year until 2020 about the analyses, calculations, etc. that have been performed. outcome of their evaluations and reassessments. The former engineering group (VPC) within Vattenfall The licensees work at Forsmark and Oskarshamn NPPs functioned previously as consultants. The group has been has resulted in the implementation of new SAMG:s incorporated as a line organisation function for some time inspired by IAEA Safety Guide NS-G-2.15 and Specific now, and in 2019 it was reorganised in order to incorporate Safety Guide SSG-54. These SAMGs are currently under the Fuel business unit. This unit, which is responsible for review. In addition, SSM issued new orders in March 2021 Vattenfall’s nuclear fuel supplies, is now named Fuel to Ringhals NPP to update the SAMGs for their PWRs Engineering & Projects (FE&P). unit 3 and 4. The licensee has submitted a plan to follow In 2018, the concept of Competence Centres (CC) was the current work of PWROGs development of a new introduced at Vattenfall. CCs comprise the joint resource generic SAMG and subsequent plant specific customizamanagement for FE&P, Ringhals, Forsmark, decommistion and implementation of the new guidelines. sioning and SKB. The purpose of the CC model is to ensure access to strategically important competence within 19.5. Engineering and technical support agreed competence areas, which is a long-term need.

19.5.1. Regulatory requirements 19.5.4. Regulatory control

Chapter 3, Sections 4 and 5 of SSMFS 2018:1 requires that With the exception of the independent safety review all activities important to safety (or security) follow written functions and involvement in the national competence procedures. Chapter 3, Sections 11 and 12 of the Radiation situation, as reported in section 11, SSM has thus far not Protection Act (2018:396), and Section 13 of the Act on specifically reviewed the engineering and technical support Nuclear Activities together, require that anyone conducting available at the nuclear power plants. In connection with nuclear activities involving ionizing radiation or shall have other inspections and reviews, the specialist staffing the economic, administrative and personnel resources situation has occasionally been commented upon. neccisary to fulfill the requirements set by these acts. Chapter 3, Section 10 of SSMFS 2018:1 also more in detail 19.6. Reporting of incidents to SSM specifies requirements that adequate personnel are available having the necessary competence and suitability required

19.6.1. Regulatory requirements

for tasks that are important for safety, while also ensuring The requirements of SSMFS 2008:1, “The Swedish that these aspects are documented. A long-term staffing Radiation Safety Authority’s Regulations concerning Safety plan is required. The requirement also covers contractors in Nuclear Facilities”, include a chapter containing

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 133

provisions on reporting and an appendix specifying these 1 event, SSM must approve the measures taken before the

requirements in relation to various types of events (SSMFS licensee is allowed to restart the plant. Category 3 events

2008:1, Chapter 7, Sections 1 and 2 and Appendix 4, are not subject to specific reporting to SSM. It is sufficient

respectively). The following is a brief summary: to make a compilation of these events in the annual report.

The regulations also include an important general clause – Reporting within one hour: alarm events, scram with stipulating that the plant is to be brought to a safe state complications, and events and conditions belonging to without delay if the plant has a disturbance in its operacategory 1 (see below) tions, or in cases where it is difficult to determine the – Reporting within 16 hours: INES events of Level 2 or significance of an identified deficiency. higher Section 10 of SSMFS 2008:23 requires that abnormally – Reporting within 7 days: a comprehensive investigation large concentrations of radioactive substances found in the report on alarm events or events and conditions surrounding environment of a nuclear facility shall be belonging to category 1 reported to SSM. Section 28 of the same regulations, also – Reporting within 30 days: a comprehensive investigation require that incidents leading to increased discharges of report on events and conditions belonging to category radioactive substances from nuclear facilities, shall be 2, INES events of Level 1, and scram reports. reported to SSM. Sections 36 and 37 of SSMFS 2008:26

Additional requirements include daily reporting of include requirements on reporting internal contamination

operational state, power level and occurrence of any and exceeded dose limits for workers at the facility.

abnormal events or disturbances, such as scrams, and

19.6.2. Development of new regulations

requirements for a comprehensive annual report summa- New regulations, entering into force 1 March 2022, are as rizing all experiences that are important for plant safety. follows. Requirements on reporting to SSM in the regula- Specifications are provided on the content of the different tions SSMFS 2008:1, SSMFS 2008:23 and SSMFS 2008:26 reports and further interpretation of the reporting will be superceeded by requirements SSMFS 2021:6. requirements given in the general advice.

In the new regulations SSMFS 2021:6, requirements on One of the fundamental paragraphs contained in SSMFS identification, categorization and management of incidents 2008:1 regulates actions to be taken by licensees in cases of in Chapter 2, Sections 16–19 are similar to the previous deficiencies in barriers or in the defence in depth. These requirements in SSMFS 2008:1, still using the categories 1, actions include the first assessment and classification, 2 and 3. However, all previous requirements on reporting adjustment of the operational state, implementation of incidents to SSM from SSMFS 2008:1, SSMFS 2008:23 and necessary measures, performance of safety reviews, and SSMFS 2008:26 have now been merged into a single reporting to SSM. A graded approach is allowed here. Section, Chapter 9, Section 1, with Annex 3 describing Appendix 1 of the SSMFS 2008:1 regulation specifies different reporting procedures for different types of events and conditions that require different responses incidents. Also, requirements on reporting incidents related depending on the category of event they belong to. The to radiation protection, discharges of radioactive three categories below are defined in this appendix: substances and abnormal radioactive substances in the

Category 1 surrounding environment have been clarified.

A severe deficiency observed in one or more barriers or in the defence in depth system, or a well-founded suspicion 19.6.3. Compliance by licensees and actions taken:

that safety is severely threatened. (In these cases, the facility incident reporting

must be brought to a safe state without delay.) Incidents of safety significance, including unintended

reactor shutdowns, are reported in accordance with the Category 2 non-routine reporting requirements in the STFs. There are

A deficiency observed in one barrier or in the defence in two types of licensee event report (LER). The more severe

depth system that is less severe than that which is referred one, called category 1, requires plant personnel to notify

to in category 1, or a well-founded suspicion that safety is SSM within one hour. An extensive report is to be

threatened. (In these cases, the facility is allowed to submitted within seven days from the point in time of the

continue operation under certain limitations and controls.) event, and the full analysis of the event and appropriate

measures to prevent recurrence must be approved by SSM

Category 3

before restarting the reactor. Only a very limited number A temporary deficiency in the defence in depth system that of events of this category have occurred at Swedish plants arises when an event or situation is rectified and which, over the years. These events are also typically of a without measures, could lead to a more severe condition. magnitude warranting prompt reporting (Level 2 or higher) Such deficiencies are pre-analysed in the OLCs. (In these according to the INES scale. During the period 2016–18, cases, the facility is allowed to continue operation under three reported events were rated as Level 1 on the INES certain limitations during implementation of the corrective scale. The rest of the reported events were rated as 0 or measures.) below the scale.

In all three cases, corrective measures are to be subjected The other type of LER, called category 2, is used for less to a twofold safety review by the licensee. The results of severe events. This type of event is mentioned in the daily these reviews must be submitted to SSM. After a category

134 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

report that is submitted to the regulatory body; this is rence of events with a negative impact on safety (or

followed up by a final report within 30 days. security). Chapter 3, Section 18 of SSMFS 2018:1 requires

the fostering of a reporting culture, so that errors and Events that have resulted in reactor shutdown are analysed abnormal conditions are identified and recorded. The by the operations department and reviewed independently results of the investigations related to incidents shall, under by the safety department and, at some sites, by the safety Chapter 5, Section 4 of SSMFS 2008:1, be disseminated committee before restarting the unit. The reports are within the organisation and have the purpose of contribreviewed at different levels within the operating organisauting to the development of safety work at the facility. tion and approved by the operations or production Moreover, the results of investigations must also be manager before submittal. These reports are distributed reported to SSM (see above). SSM ensures that significant within the organisation, to the regulatory body, and to events are reported to international organisations as other Swedish NPPs. This description is also valid for appropriate (IAEA IRS) and other regulatory bodies, as handling of LER category 2. well as to other suitable organisations.

The front page of the standardised report form describes

the event in general: identification number, title, reference 19.7.2. Development of new regulations

to the relevant STF paragraph, date of discovery and New regulations, entering into force 1 March 2022, are as

length of time for corrective actions, conditions at the time follows. Requirements on systematic feedback of operating

of occurrence, system consequences, a contact person at experience in the current regulations SSMFS 2008:1 will be

the plant, and activities affected by the event. On the superceeded by requirements in SSMFS 2021:6.

reverse side of the document, the event is described under In the new regulations, Chapter 2, Section 5 and 20 of the following headings: SSMFS 2021:6, now requires an implemented operating

– Sequence of events and operational consequence(s) experience programme, to compile experiences significant to

safety or security, follow scientific and technological – Safety significance development, assess and prioritize experiences and to – Direct and root causes mediate these to relevant personnel and parties, such as i.e. – Planned/decided measures international bodies, other operating organisations and SSM. – Lessons learned from the event

– Other information 19.7.3. Compliance by licensees and actions taken

The objective of the operating experience analysis and If the description of the event is extensive, additional feedback programme is to learn from experience, from pages are added to the form. one’s own plant and from others, and to prevent recur-

Reports are also required in accordance with the STF if the rences of events, particularly events that might affect plant

permitted levels of activity release from the plant are safety. The operating experience process consists of a wide

exceeded, or in the event of unusually high radiation variety of activities within the plant organisation as well as

exposure to individuals at the plant. externally. Some activities are described briefly below.

Around half of operating experience feedback is from

19.6.4. Regulatory control and actions taken

plant personnel and around half of overall analysis efforts Over the past three years, the number of licensee event focus on events in one’s own reactors. Event reports reports (category 2 LERs) has been approximately 20 per constitute essential input for this analysis task, together year and operating reactor and the total number has been with specific operating experience reports written about between 120 and 140 LERs each year. Licensee reporting events. The reports include events that do not meet the provides in most cases the necessary information, together event criteria for LERs, in addition to minor events and with SSM verifications on-site, for making needed regulanear-misses. tory decisions.

SSM imposes strict requirements for systematic investiga- For more serious incidents, SSM has a procedure in place tions and analyses of events. The event sequence must be for conducting on-site rapid investigations in the form of fully clarified, including circumstances that might have surveilance inspection (see 8.8). This procedure has been prevented or stopped the sequence, causes and root causes used in a few cases over the past few years. are to be identified, and the consequences clarified and the

measures defined to prevent recurrence. MTO analysis is 19.7. Operating experience used when root causes and in-depth analysis are deemed

relevant. MTO analysis is an established methodology (see

19.7.1. Regulatory requirements

section 12.2) executed by a team of trained investigators While Chapter 3, Section 16 of SSMFS 2018:1, requires available at all plants. that experiences from own activities or from similar Analyses of reactor shutdowns and other event reports activities shall be collected and assessed to improve safety from Swedish NPPs, as well as from Finnish BWRs in (and security), Chapter 3, Sections 18 and 19 of SSMFS addition to other information from abroad, are performed 2018:1 also require that events of importance to safety (or by Norderf, which provides Nordic NPPs with external security) shall be evaluated in a systematic manner, operational experience from the nuclear industry resulting in a plan for actions needed to prevent reoccur-

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 135

worldwide. Norderf consists of representatives from TVO considered valuable, although it is a more demanding task

(Finland), Swedish nuclear power companies, SKB to separate operating experience relevant to a specific

(Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company), plant design.

as well as KSU (nuclear safety and training). Analysis work

Operating experience at KSU

is performed by representatives of the above organisations OEF is included in KSU’s training programmes for plant and the results are reported to the plants every other week, personnel. A special section at KSU is responsible for supplemented by topical and annual reports. Event reports screening and selecting OEF suitable for the training are classified. Severe events also imply recommendations programmes. OEF information is forwarded to training (REK) directed towards Swedish and Finnish operators. departments in the form of OEF modules sorted by The procedure for operating experience feedback (OEF, training category. International OE information suitable termed “ERF” in Swedish) describes the requirements, for training purposes is selected from WANO, IAEA and organisation and working principles for experience NRC reports. Trainers can also consult with OE engineers feedback in the Nordic system. A shared organisation for additional operating experience suitable for training of reviews experience feedback from the areas of reactor operations personnel. safety, environmental protection and occupational safety.

Other experience feedback initiated by Norderf, or any Ringhals NPP

other internal organisation, is also reviewed and entered The internal operating experience feedback function at

into a shared database. Ringhals follows the principles of the industrial practice

commonly referred to as the Corrective Action The working principles of the Nordic system include Programme (CAP). The external operating experience screening by different organisations: feedback function (OPEX) is managed in a similar

– KSU is responsible for collecting and assessing events systemic process.

abroad for the Norderf process. These sources are

Corrective Action Programme (CAP)

mainly WANO, IAEA, OECD-NEA, USNRC, EU CAP has the purpose of identifying deviations, near- Clearing House etc., and the information is collected, misses and lessons learned in daily operations, implereviewed, screened and sorted out as well as categorised menting corrective actions, and performing follow-ups. In by KSU. The events are graded on a scale of four addition, CAP provides input for the internal experience – Norderf assesses all events, including scram reports, feedback loop. from Nordic BWR and PWR reactors, including final

repository and its settlement. International events are Each department manager is responsible for encouraging

assessed by Norderf and categorised into one of the reporting of deviations (e.g. observations and near-misses)

below: from expected conditions (status, quality, etc.) and ensuring

– Category A: Significant importance for reactor safety that the process of screening, analyses, corrective action

and follow-ups is effective. – Category B: Moderate importance for reactor safety

– Category C: Minor importance for reactor safety CAP is carried out at the distributed sub-locations of

– Category N: Not applicable to Nordic plants Operations, Maintenance and Health & Physics, and they

– The task of OEF is to collect, evaluate, document and all provide input for the internal OPEX by addressing

follow up experience from the Nordic system. relevant observations to the central OPEX group.

– The OEF database is used for registration and

Internal OPEX

management of issues and the measures taken. Each department is responsible for managing OPEX – All Norderf Category A, B and C events, WANO within their sub-organisation, including screening and Significant Operating Experience Reports (SOERs) and corrective actions. Screening and addressing are managing Norderf recommendations are managed in the by the central OPEX group. The result is brought respective plant’s OEF system. upstream to the central OPEX group meeting. This group

is staffed by appointed representatives from the OPEX All Swedish event reports are registered in the Norderf group and two or three from the line organisation. event database. The database is intended for use by

operators who have direct access and can use it for specific Industrial experience, an analytical approach and credibility

purposes. in the organisation are considered valuable qualities for this

role. Input for the central OPEX group consists of Plants report events to the WANO Event Reporting screened observations that might be of interest to share Program. Event reports are selected in accordance with and act upon across the organisation, along with OPEX WANO criteria and sent for worldwide distribution. As information from Norderf. mentioned above, Swedish utilities also participate in

various owners’ groups. Some plants also carry out External OPEX

cooperation directly with other plants (i.e. Forsmark with The production unit’s safety board (SPS) meets three or the Finnish plant, TVO and the German plant, Gundremfour times per year and constitutes the decision-making mingen; the Oskarshamn NPP cooperates with other body for external experience feedback. The SPS appoints Uniper SE plants). Participation in owners’ groups is members to the external OPEX group based upon

136 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

If the trend of codes show a rising trend, a new

External Internal

analyze is expected and corrective action are taken

Effect evaluation INPUT DATA/CODING

CAP

Follow-up Analyze Information No corrective action

Trend

Measure taken Recommendation

Corrective

Action

Work orders Plant amendment Education Documentation Routine/Method

Figure 27. Vattenfall’s CAP.

technical skills and organisational position. The overall organisation meets every other week to evaluate incoming objective is to enhance reactor safety by making use of external reports. The WANO SOER coordinator assists in external events/lessons learned. and follows up ongoing work with recommendations and actions for the SOER. Selected technical issues with a possible impact on nuclear safety are investigated within the organisation and then MTO investigation group evaluated by a multidisciplinary technical group composed The group’s main task is to provide and assist the entire of 10 persons. The group meets eleven times per year. The organisation with adequate knowledge for performing SPS decides upon recommendations and whether or not root cause analysis for events affecting the interplay actions are to be taken. between MTO.

Forsmark NPP Oskarshamn NPP

The OEF function at Forsmark is organised in the All departments and sections at the Oskarshamn plant are Engineering Department. The OEF function is composed responsible for applying experience feedback in daily work of two groups: Internal/External Operating Experience within their own operations. This means that departments and MTO Investigation. and sections at OKG:

Internal and External OE – Identify and share experiences The main task of the Internal OE is to manage all OEF in – Identify root causes to prevent recurrence a systematic and structured way. This includes implementa- – Allow experience feedback to be a natural part of daily tion of a process for CAP (see figure 27). In order to assist self-assessments and development and improvement in handling and processing of OE reports, all main work departments at FKA have OE coordinators who are – Report on experiences and conduct trend analyses. responsible for ensuring that matters are dealt with as specified by the CAP process. The OEF department has Departments and sections at OKG also obtain experience four OE coordinators: one for the maintenance unit and feedback from the quality department and from OKG’s project, which is the planning and outage management ERF (operational experience feedback) group, which unit, one coordinator for plant operations units 1, 2 and 3, consists of key members from various parts of the one coordinator for the engineering unit, and one coordi- organisation. Production managers deal with deviations nator for the safety, quality and environment unit. and events with regard to reactor safety at daily operational review meetings. These are held every weekday. Specific The main task for external OE is to enhance reactor safety key issues are dealt with at operations assessment meetings, by making use of experience from external events and where the production managers require a broad illustration lessons learned. A group made up of members designated and cause analysis of the issues being dealt with. based upon their technical skills and position in the

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 137

CAP-process workflow

Decision/ Handeling/ Screening Follow up Completion Report CR Complete CR priority on completion of CR actions of CR report actions of actions Condition CAP- Production CAP- Observer CR-owner CR-owner CR-owner coordinator meeting coordinator

Analysis

Resource for Figure 28. CAP process at OKG. analyse

Depending on the nature and complexity of the event, if necessary. If there are any regulatory concerns, the issue MTO analyses on different levels are conducted in order to is brought up at the management meeting of the supervias far as possible have capability to focus resources and sion division and further measures to be taken by SSM are evaluation time on events that require special scrutiny. decided. The event analysis group can also issue informa- External issues are assessed with regard to any possibility tion notices in order to raise concerns in a broader sense. that a similar event might occur at OKG. It is vital in this Once per year, a seminar is held at which licensees and the assessment to avoid exclusion of any issues based on regulator discuss lessons learned from recent reports and dissimilarities found, and instead to seek identification of the quality of the reports and root cause analysis. associated similarities and details. Since the 1970s, all LERs and reactor shutdown reports Corrective action programme (CAP) from Swedish nuclear power reactors have been registered OKG works with a CAP for management of events, in a database at the regulator (“ASKEN”). All events are nonconformities and suggested improvements, see figure 28. indexed and searchable and can easily be trended across These are referred to collectively as ‘observations’. The main many parameters. The events are also evaluated against IRS objective of observations is not only to identify appropriate reporting guidelines and, if necessary, suggested for measures for reducing the risk of recurrence, but also to reporting to the IAEA/NEA international reporting eliminate the risk of more serious events taking place. system (WBIRS).

All employees at OKG undergo training on reporting of observations. Managers and other key personnel undergo 19.9. Radioactive waste

training on actively managing observations, performing

19.9.1. Regulatory requirements

analyses, and executing proposed actions. Experiences Chapter 5, Section 9 of SSMFS 2018:1 requires a docufrom the plant are shared through the CAP process by the mented plan for radioactive waste management. Section 10 managers responsible in accordance with the management in the same chapter also requires that management of system. It is expected that all nonconformities and radioactive waste is adapted to the characteristics of the improvement proposals are dealt with in the process, waste and that radioactive waste with different characteriswhich visualizes the drive for continuous improvements tics are separated from each other. Chapter 5 of SSMFS and defines setting of priorities. 2018:1 also include further general requirements on documentation of radioactive waste and annual reports to 19.8. Regulatory control SSM, describing i.e. amount, contents, placement of and

responsibilities related to the radioactive waste. A procedure called “ASK” in Swedish, which deals with analysis of disturbances on electricity-generating nuclear As of 1 November 2012, requirements are in effect power plants, is in place and used by SSM. The procedure regarding handling, processing and storage of radioactive describes the management and evaluation of shortcomings waste. These requirements are stipulated by regulation reported by the licensees. This activity is divided into two SSMFS 2008:1. The regulations of SSM include requireparts: a national part which deals with reporting from the ments for the following: respective power plant, as regulated by SSMFS 2008:1, and an international part which is reporting activity through the – Measures for safe on-site handling, storage or disposal IAEA reporting system, IRS. of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel shall be described in the safety analysis report of the facility. The All reports from licensees are screened each week by a measures for on-site handling shall consider the SSM team of four to five persons from the organisation. requirements implied by continued handling, transport These persons have different expert knowledge and make a and disposal of the radioactive material. first assessment as to whether these reports need further – Legally binding requirements to minimize radioactive regulatory attention. Licensees are asked for clarifications waste to a reasonable extent.

138 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

– When designing and operating a facility concerning 19.9.3. Compliance by licensees

space for storage, the need to inspect the stored

19.9.3.1. Spent fuel

radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel must be met as Spent fuel is stored in fuel pools at Swedish nuclear power well as the need for extra space for moving radioactive plants, usually for an average of two years while awaiting materials. transport. In the cases of the Forsmark and Ringhals – Plans for the management, including disposal, of all NPPs, transports are carried out by the m/s Sigrid, which radioactive material present at the facility, which is likely ships the spent fuel in special transport casks to Clab. Clab to arise at the facility or is brought to the facility in some is a central interim storage facility located near the Oskarway. The plans shall for example take into account shamn nuclear power plant. At the Oskarshamn site, amounts of different categories of the radioactive handling and operation of the casks are performed using material, estimated nuclide-specific content, and sorting, purpose-built vehicles. All transportation of the spent fuel treatment and interim storage of the radioactive is a routine operation. material. The plans are to be included in the safety

analysis report before the facility is taken into operation. 19.9.3.2. General objectives of waste management

– Only packages approved by SSM may be transported to The general objectives of waste management at the

a geological repository (such as the SFR facility) for locations of the nuclear power plants are:

disposal. Such approval presupposes the waste packages – Minimizing the amount of waste, complying with conditions stated in the safety analysis report of the repository. – Ensuring that all nuclear waste is handled and

conditioned for disposal according to existing regulatory – An up-to-date inventory of on-site radioactive waste. requirements, and The inventory of nuclear materials including spent nuclear fuel is regulated by SSMFS 2008:3. – Accomplishing safe and cost-efficient waste

management with the least possible impact on human – Waste acceptance criteria must be derived based on the health and the environment. properties of the radioactive material that can be

received for storage, disposal or some other Waste minimization is in certain cases substituted by management. These criteria must, to the extent that is optimization of waste generation, in which consideration is feasible and possible, be formulated while taking into given to radiation doses and costs. Minimization of the account safety and radiation protection throughout all amount of waste is, for example, achieved by reducing the stages of the ongoing management. The waste amounts and kinds of materials brought into radiologically acceptance criteria are to form part of the safety controlled areas, and separating waste at source. Radioac- Procedures must also be in place for management of tive wastes generated at Swedish nuclear power plants radioactive material that does not meet the waste belong to different categories; consequently, they are acceptance criteria in that it is returned to the consignor, treated, stored and disposed of in various ways as or by taking measures to rectify identified deviations. described briefly below. For shallow land burial facilities, waste acceptance criteria

are stated in the licence conditions. 19.9.3.3. Intermediate-level waste

This type of waste is dominated by filters and spent ion

19.9.2. Development of new regulations

exchange resins, which are commonly solidified with New regulations, entering into force 1 March 2022, are as cement or bitumen in steel drums, or in moulds of follows. Several reuirements of SSMFS 2008:1, related to reinforced concrete or carbon steel. The cement or radioactive waste, will be superceeded by the new and bitumen immobilizes waste, while moulds contain different clarified requirements of SSMFS 2021:7. materials and in case of use concrete moulds also provide

Chapter 4, Section 5 of SSMFS 2021:4 requires that the the for radiation shielding. Some intermediate-level resins with

fulfillment of the main safety functions for a nuclear relatively low activity content are packaged in concrete

power plant, as far as reasonably achievable, shall strive to tanks and dehydrated without solidification.

minimize exposure of workers, members of the public and Metal scrap and other kinds of solid wastes above a certain the environment to ionizing radiation. This includes both level of activity also belong to this category. They are actions to minimize discharges and radioactive waste. Also, packaged in concrete or steel moulds, compacted if Chaper 5, Section 1 of SSMFS 2021:4 requires that possible and grouted with concrete. balanced choices shall be made in the design and construc-

tion of a nuclear power plant, so that amounts of radioac- 19.9.3.4. Low and very low-level waste

tive waste will be minimized to the extent practicable. After segregation with respect to activity content and

Similar considerations are also required in the preparation combustibility, low-level waste is compacted into bales or

of work at the power plant, as stated by Chapter 2, Section packaged in drums or cases, which are placed in standard

6 of SSMFS 2021:6. Chapter 5, Section 15 of SSMFS freight containers. Some waste with very low activity level

2021:6 also requires that core management ensures is disposed of in shallow land burial sites at the nuclear

operation, so that used nuclear fuel have appropriate power plants. To minimize infiltration, the waste is covered

characteristics to be managed according to the plan for with bentonite liners and/or compacted clays. The sealing

radioactive waste. layers are protected by an approximately 1 metre thick layer

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 139

19.10. Vienna Declaration on Nuclear of moraine. Some combustible low-level waste is shipped to Studsvik, where it is incinerated in a special facility. The Safety ash is collected in steel drums, which in turn are grouted This section, in reference to Article 19, accounts for with concrete in overpacks of steel. Sweden’s implementation of relevant improvements 19.9.3.5. Registration, storage and disposal of waste concerning principles of the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Registration and documentation are required for all waste Safety regarding safe operation of nuclear power plants.

management at the sites. Examples of data concerning the Swedish PWRs use EOPs and SAMG (Severe Accident waste that is documented and registered in a database Management Guidelines) from the Westinghouse Owners include: Group, whereas the BWRs are subject to their own developed instructions and guidelines for accident manage- – Identity ment. These procedures (both PWR and BWR) originally – Type of package covered management of situations including loss of all AC – Date of production power and dealt with depressurization through the system – Category of waste for filtered ventilation of the containment, etc. – Weight New procedures for extraordinary situations at Swedish – Activity content, nuclide composition and dose rate at NPPs are in place at all sites. Due to the experience from the surface or at a distance of 1 m the Fukushima event, the work will also enhance proce- – Position during intermediate storage. dures and guides are now applicable for accidents affecting Production and storage of radioactive waste at the plants more than one unit at a site. They are also improved to are reported annually to SSM and SKB. adapt to international guidelines in the area of SAMG.

Intermediate and low-level waste at the nuclear power plants is stored temporarily in rock caverns or storage buildings while awaiting transport to the SFR repository. SFR is located near the Forsmark nuclear power plant. The use of waste packages of different types and their application for storage of various radioactive waste must have approval of SSM.

19.9.4. Regulatory control and actions taken

Inspection of on-site management of radioactive waste is carried out by SSM’s inspectors. SSM also inspects radiation protection aspects of waste handling. A major effort undertaken by specialists at SSM is to review and approve the types of waste packages produced at the nuclear power plants, prior to their use for disposal in SFR.

140 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

Abbreviations

ALARA As Low As Reasonably Achievable (a principle applied in radiation protection) ANS American Nuclear Society ANSI American National Standard Institute BAT Best Available Technique BSS The Basic Safety Standards Directive of the Euratom BWR Boiling Water Reactor CAP Corrective Action Programme CAT Containment Air Test CCF Common Cause Failure Clab Central Interim Storage Facility for Spent Nuclear Fuel CNS Convention on Nuclear Safety DBA Design Basis Accident BDBA Beyond Design Basis Accident EDG Emergency Diesel Generator ENISS European Nuclear Installations Safety Standards ENSREG European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group EPRI Electric Power Research Institute EU European Union EUR European Utility Requirements FKA Forsmarks Kraftgrupp AB (licence holder of Forsmark NPP) FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency ICCS Independent Core Cooling System I&C Instrumentation and Control IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers INES International Nuclear Event Scale IRS IAEA International Reporting System for Operating Experience INPO Institute of Nuclear Power Operations IRRS IAEA Integrated Regulatory Review Service KPI Key Performance Indicator KSKG Kärnkraftssäkerhetskoordineringsgrupp (Nuclear Safety Coordination Group of the Swedish licensees) KSU Kärnkraftsäkerhet och Utbildning AB (the Swedish Nuclear Training and Safety Centre) LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident LTO Long Term Operation KTH Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan (Royal Institute of Technology) LER Licensee Event Report LILW Low and Intermediate Level Waste MSB Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap (Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency) MTO Interaction between Man, Technology and Organisation

Abbreviations 141

MVSS Multi Venturi Scrubber System NAcP EU stress test National Action Plan NORM Naturally occurring radioactive material NDT Non Destructive Testing NKS Nordic Nuclear Safety Research Norderf Swedish-Finnish Group for Operating Experience Feedback NPP Nuclear Power Plant (including all nuclear power units at one site) NPSAG Nordic PSA Group NUREG Nuclear Regulatory Guide (issued by the USNRC) OE Operational Experience OECD/NEA Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/ Nuclear Energy Agency OKG OKG Aktiebolag (licence holder of Oskarshamn NPP) OLC Operational Limits and Conditions OSART Operational Safety Review Team (a review service of the IAEA) PSA Probabilistic Safety Analysis (or Assessment) PSAR Preliminary Safety Analysis Report PSR Periodic Safety Review PWR Pressurized Water Reactor PHWR Pressurized Heavy Water Reactor R&D Research and Development RAB Ringhals AB (licence holder of Ringhals NPP) RPS Reactor Protection System SALTO Safe Long Term Operation (a review service of the IAEA) SAMG Severe Accident Management Guideline SAR Safety Analysis Report SFR Final repository for short-lived radioactive waste SKB Svensk Kärnbränslehantering AB (the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company) SKC Svenskt kärntekniskt centrum (Swedish Centre of Nuclear Technology) SOER Significant Operating Experience Report SQC Swedish Qualification Centre (NDT qualification SSM Strålsäkerhetsmyndigheten (Swedish Radiation Safety Authority) SSMFS Strålsäkerhetsmyndighetens författningssamling (the SSM Code of Statutes) STF Säkerhetstekniska driftförutsättningar (Technical Specifications, Operational Limits and Conditions) SVAFO Swedish company engaged in management of radioactive waste SWEDAC Swedish Board for Accreditation and Conformity Assessment TMI Three Mile Island NPP USNRC US Nuclear Regulatory Commission VDNS Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety Finnish Technical Research Centre VTT Finnish Technical Research Centre WANO World Association of Nuclear Operators WENRA Western European Nuclear Regulators’ Association

142 Abbreviations

Appendix 1

Major past and currently implemented

modifications at Swedish NPPs

1. Measures implemented during

the reporting period 2019–2021

1.1. Oskarshamn NPP – New permanent diesel generator set to the emergency Command Centre location 1.1.1. Oskarshamn unit 1 and unit 2 – An external break-point about 50 km from the site, where

– No significant measures are implemented since decision we in a safe way can exchange staff to and from the site in have been taken to permanently shut down unit 1 and 2 case of a severe accident. The break-point has monitors (Today not in operation). and showers as well as a storehouse and, of course,

personnel that supports the teams and runs the place.

1.1.2. Oskarshamn unit 3

– Exchange of electrical motors to a new design in most – Enhanced and simplified connection of the on-site of the process systems, no spare parts to the original existing gas-turbine plant to the busbars on unit 3. In motors are available anymore. order to get a robust and powerful (40 MW) diversified – Exchange of fire extinguishing piping due to corrosion. power source. – Installation of protection against discrepancies beween – The amount of availavable water for make-up to the the terminals in the three-phase connections to the primary system and creating a feed-and-bleed possibility external grid. for the spent fuel pools is increased to 120 000 m by 3 – Inspection and repair measures in the sea water cooling installation of new pumps and valves to bypass to channels operational water treatment facility. The latter is also a part of the final solution of the ICCS function. – Installation of additional logic to run-back of the main feedwater pumps in case of an ATWS event, in order to – A shut-off valve in the storm water well in the yard in protect the cladding from high temperatures. order to prevent back-flow from the baltic sea in case of water levels exceeding the 10-7/year probability. – Installation of additional logic regarding the pressure control valves in the safety relief valve system, in order – Reinforced capability to cool the condensation pool to better preserve the Reactor Pressure Vessels water with two out of the four available trains of the inventory. condensation pool cooling system and the corresponding diesel generator engines. – Installation of new relay protections in the operational 10 kV busbars in order to protect the electrical motors

Measures implemented during the reporting period 2019–2021 143

connected to the busbars from asymmetric errors Ringhals unit 3and unit 4 (phase errors). – Independent core cooling function (2020)

– Replacement of all 10 kV breakers. – RCP passive thermal shutdown seal (As a post

– Measures in accordance with Severe Accident Fukushima action the reactor coolant pumps of Unit 3 Management Program and 4 were equipped with low leakage seals.) – Increased battery capacity from 2 to 8 hours to better (2018–2020)

meet ELAP scenario – Independent make-up for feed-and-boil of the spent – Installation of new systems for Independent Core fuel pit including rugged WR-level measurement (part Cooling of the independent core cooling function) (2020)

– Replacement of one out of four Emergency Diesels – Separation measures for the spent fuel pool cooling Generators. This follows a plan for replacement of all system (2020)

EDGs. – Seismic reinforcemnt of Spent fuel storage racks (2020)

– Reinforcement of the Diesel Generator building to cope with earthquake and severe weather (2020) 1.2. Forsmark NPP – Seismic reinforcement of Diesel Generator room

Forsmark unit 1 and 2 cooling equipment, 6kV switchgear and 6kV/500V transformers (2020) – Replacement of reactivity measuring channels in the mail chimney and in the reactor hall. – Installation of automatic air waste gate valves for the – Replacement of excitation equipment. Diesel Generators to improve the tolerance for low outside temperatures (2019–2020) – Replacement of power transformers. – Emergency Diesel Generators modernization, power – Installation of Surge protection device. increase and major overhaul of diesel generators – Replacement of containment electrical penetration (2016–2020) assemblies. – Environmental qualification uppgrades (2016–2020) – Replacement of cables in the containment. – Installation of protection features against Open Phase – Installation of ICCS conditions and Sustained Degraded Voltage conditions – Installation of independent water supply to the spent in the Electric Power Systems (2018–2019) fuel pool. – Replacement of non safety related 6kV switchgear – Replacement of anchor plates. (2020–2022) – Improvment of fire protection in mail transformer – Replacement of electrical pump motors of the booths – Fire extinguisher grille. Charging, Containment Spray and Residual Heat Removal pumps (only unit 3) (2018–2020)

Forsmark unit 3

– Replacement of electrical pump motors of the Auxiliary – Replacement of reactivity measuring channels in the Feedwater pumps (2020–2021) mail chimney and in the reactor hall. – Upgrade of the Core Exit Thermocoples (2020–2021) – Installation of ICCS. – Replacement of Instrument Air compressors (2019–2020) – Installation of Surge protection device. – Replacement of cables inside containment (2020–2021) – Replacement of anchor plates. – Installation of ultrasonic flowmeter to reduce the – Installation of independent water supply to the spent uncertainty of the measured feedwater flow (2019–2020) fuel pool. – Replacement of filters in the salt water system – Replacement of rectifiers. (2019–2020) – Improvment of fire protection in mail transformer booths – Fire extinguisher grille.

1.3. Ringhals NPP

Ringhals unit 1–4

– Improvements of the Emergency preparedness to comply with new regulations SSMFS 2014:2 (including new logistics centre outside the site, sysstem to oversee the evacuation of the site ) (2016-2018)

Ringhals unit 1 and unit 2

– Installation of protection features against Open Phase Conditions in the Electric Power Systems (2017)

– Installation of temperature controlled ventialtion dampers to avoid steam intrusion to electrical rooms (only unit 2) (2016)

144 Measures implemented during the reporting period 2019–2021

2. Modifications implemented 1995–2018

2.1. Oskarshamn NPP The following modifications were performed after the finalisation of the PULS project until 2013.

Oskarshamn unit 3

Major safety modifications have been implemented at – Changed turbine bearings

Oskarshamn unit 3. The PULS (Power Uprate with Licensed – Increased manoeuvrability and instrumentation of the Safety) project included a power uprate, modifications to reactor protection functions in the emergency control comply with SSMFS 2008:17 as well as replacement of room critical components in order to achieve a 60-year operating – Replacement of 400kV switchgear life. The power uprate of Oskarshamn unit 3 to 3900 MWth – Replaced internal parts of the reactor pressure vessel and 1450 MWe gross is now complete (the plant is still in (shroud head, steam separators and steam dryers). test operations). This corresponds to 129% of the original – Fire hazards analysis (2010–13) design (3020 MWth). The uprated plant is planned for – Update of the environmental qualification inside the operation until 2045 (60-year lifetime). The main part of the containment, including measures if necessary (2014) work was performed during the 2009 outage.

A great number of modifications were made in order to improve safety. For example, nuclide-specific on-line 2.2. Forsmark NPP

measurement was installed in the turbine offgas system The first comprehensive modernization programme for with the purpose of achieving early detection of fuel the Forsmark NPP, Program 2000, started in 1995, and was failures. Experience from the events at Forsmark unit 1 on completed in 2000. Another strategy and modernization 25 July 2006 resulted in the redesign of the auto switching plan was then adopted, Program P40+, that contained automatics for the diesel bus bars at voltages of less than modernization items, of which 70% are aimed at main- 85%. taining technical status, 20% for safety upgrades and 10%

for dose reduction and environmental improvements. Some other examples of the modifications implemented during PULS are listed below: The following major measures have been completed:

– Replacement of internal parts in the RPV – removal of the core spray nozzles in the reactor

– Replacement of main steam isolation valves pressure vessel after analyses showing that all safety

– Installation of new aggregate and station transformers requirements are met with injection only. The – Installation of a new generator advantages are: less non-destructive testing will be required in the future, releasing resources for other – Replacement of high-pressure turbine and all safety work; avoiding the risk for costly repairs; and low-pressure turbines lower doses to the personnel – Installation of two new scram modules in system for – replacement of equipment in the main circulation hydraulic SCRAM pumps to reduce transients on the fuel at loss of – Replacement of all main circulation pumps external power – Replacement of all main cool water-pumps – prevention of oxy-hydrogen in steam systems – Installation of new logic chains in the reactor protection – diversified reactor vessel level measurement computer system – new equipment for physical protection – Installation of new diversified cooling chains. – improved fire safety and security systems – Component diversity in the RPV level measurement – strengthening of auxiliary buildings to withstand created by using different brands of level transmitters external hazards. (differential pressure) in two different measurement – exchange of moderator tank lid ranges.

Modifications implemented 1995–2018 145

– exchange of moisture separator Forsmark unit 2 – exchange of steam separator – Independent water supply to the spent fuel pool – a new diversified reactor shutdown system – Upgrade of alarm signal system (non-safety system) – robustness measure to prevent pipe-break – Installation of protection device regarding degraded – measures on new I&C in the Emergency Control Room voltage conditions at the EDG busbars – earthquake measures – Replacement of Step-up and Auxiliary Transformers – diversification of sensors and actuation of RPS – Improvement of the RPS regarding trip conditions – ventilation measures in electrical building to segregate – Partial scram upgraded. Modification comprises design fire compartments as well as conditions for the activation of partial scram. – new hook-on devices for the containment for external – Replacement of the power range monitor system. The mobile decay heat cooling units. new system contains protection against power oscillations Forsmark unit 1 and unit 2 – Modernization of instrumentation for activity – core grids and other reactor internals have been measurement in the off-gas system. These modifications replaced in units (unit 1 and 2) comprise detectors as well as electronics. – replacement of 6 kV switchboards (units 1 and 2). – Measures to handle slow decreasing voltage in the outside grid. Relay protection modification to Forsmark unit 1 disconnect the external grid if the voltage decreases to – Independent water supply to the spent fuel pool less than 85% for 10 second. – Forward pumping of high pressure drainage – Improved fire protection of safety functions by additional spray nozzles in culverts containing power – Upgrade of alarm signal system (non-safety system) and I&C cables – Change of production platform for control systems – New RPV-internals. Moderator vessel head, steam and (non-safety system) moisture separators installed. – Installation of protection device regarding degraded – Diversified reactivity control implemented. Automavoltage conditions at the EDG busbars tization of the initiation of the boron injection system – Improvement of the RPS regarding trip conditions – New main steam inboard isolation valves installed – Modernization of instrumentation for activity – Reconstruction of the sequence for control rod screw measurement in the off-gas system. These modifications activation in order to fulfil requirements on diversity comprise detectors as well as electronics. – New high voltage switchgear for connection of unit 2 – Measures to deal with slowly decreasing voltage in the to the 400kV grid external grid. Relay protection modification to – New high pressure turbines disconnect the external grid if the voltage decreases to – replacement of electrical control boards in the main less than 85 % for 10 second. control room (unit 2) – Improved capacity and physical separation of cooling – modification of the reactor pressure vessel head chains to the condensation pool. These cooling chains sprinkler are now divided in four sub divisions. – modernization of the power measurement system – Partial scram upgraded. Modification comprises design – modification of the cooling chain for increased capacity as well as conditions for the activation of partial scram. and separation of power supply connections – Installation of cyclone filters in the feed water system – new low pressure turbines. inside the containment. The purpose of these filters is to collect debris that could cause fuel damage. Forsmark unit 3 – Independent water supply to the spent fuel pool – Redesign of the sequence for control rod screw activation in order to fulfil requirements on diversity. – Installation of protection device regarding degraded voltage conditions at the EDG busbars – Replacement of the power range monitoring system. The new system contains protection against power – Replacement of containment electrical penetration oscillations. assemblies – Replacement of wide range neutron monitor – Improved fire protection of safety functions by additional spray nozzles in culverts containing power – Measures to handle slow decreasing voltage in outside and i&c cables. grid. Relay protection modification to disconnect the outside grid if the voltage decreases to less than 85% – New high voltage switchgear for connection of unit 1 for 10 second. to the 400kv grid. – Diversified source for emergency feed water to the RPV – Alteration of the reactor’s auxiliary cooling circuits, – Partial scram upgraded. Modification comprises design separation of power supplies and increase in capacity as well as conditions for the activation of partial scram – New low pressure turbines. – New nuclide-specific on-line measurement equipment in the stack

146 Modifications implemented 1995–2018

– Separation of operational and safety functions in the Ringhals units 3 and 4

power system with battery back-up – Extended battery capacity on Class 1E electrical systems

– A new diversified reactor shutdown system (at least 8 hours)

– Separation of safety classified electrical equipment from – Mobile diesel generators (primarily to charge batteries)

non safety with separate connection points to the electric power

– Measures to diversify the residual heat removal systems

– Security measures – Installation of protection features against Open Phase

– Robustness measure against pipe-break conditions and Sustained Degraded Voltage conditions

the Electric Power Systems – new automatic stop of reactor building ventilation in – Environmental qualification uppgrades case of loss of heating system for the building – Replacement of safe ends and spool pieces on – new low pressure turbines (2004) pressurizer (only unit 3) – Analysis of the requirement on two different parameters – Installation of filters in the salt water system piping to identify the need of initiation of the reactor upstream the emergency diesels protection system, including necessary plant modifications (2013) – Installation of manual waste gate valves to improve the

tolerance for low outside temperatures

– Automatic disconnection of the pressurizer backup 2.3. Ringhals NPP heater upon active SI-signal to decrease the Emergency

The renewal programme for the Ringhals plant was Diesel Generator load

initiated in 1997, and the following major measures have – Emergency Diesel Generators modernization, power

been completed. increase and major overhaul of diesel generators

– Analysis of verify Long Term Operation of the plant

Ringhals units 1–4

– Time Limited Ageing Analyses of important structures, – Improvements of the Emergency preparedness to systems and components comply with new regulations SSMFS 2014:2 (including – Introduction of a risk monitoring tool new logistics centre outside the site, sysstem to oversee – Requalification of the containment sump strainers the evacuation of the site ) (including reducing the amount och fibre isolation in the – Improvements in fire protection systems containment) to resolve GSI-191 – Fire system modernizations – modernization of the safety injection pumps including – Upgrading and modernizing Ringhals NPP’s Command vibration monitoring Centre – upgrading with redundant cooling of the charging – Strategy for long-term cooling of a severely damaged pumps at shut-down core, including necessary plant modifications – modernization of vibration measurement/monitoring – Update of the environmental qualification outside the of the reactor coolant pumps containment, including necessary plant modifications – introduction of cavitation alarms on the residual heat

Ringhals unit 1 and unit 2 removal pumps

– reactor pressure vessel heads replaced – Installation of protection features against Open Phase – pressurizer relief valves replaced/modified Conditions in the Electric Power Systems – new emergency core cooling strainers fitted in the – Installation of temperature controlled ventialtion bottom of the containments dampers to avoid steam intrusion to electrical rooms – diesel back up power supply to the spent fuel pool (only unit 2) cooling systems installed

Ringhals unit 1 and unit 4 – passive autocatalytic re-combiners installed in the

containment – Analysis of earthquake, including necessary plant – upgraded capacity in the heat exchangers for the spent modifications fuel pool cooling systems

Ringhals unit 2 and unit 4 – power operated relief valves of the pressurizer qualified

– Interconnection of RH and SP systems to withstand water blowing

– improved fire protection in the relay and cable spreading

Ringhals units 2–4 rooms

– improvements of the safety valves of the pressurizer – environmental qualification of components in the

– modernization of the radiation monitoring system turbine and auxillary building

– measures to cope with containment sump blockage – Diversified Protection System

during design basis accidents – redundant check valves

– improved battery capacity during station black-out – PORV qualification for containing liquid

– securing of piping for the pressurizer – steam line break protection

Modifications implemented 1995–2018 147

– NICE – Modernization of turbine and generators’ I&C Ringhals unit 2 – replacement of Kerotest valves – completions for the Twice-project, replacement I & C – replacement of control room roof equipment including the main control room – modernization emergency control room – a fourth level measurement channel installed in the – measures to meet the seismic requirements of the steam generators facility. – modernization of 110 V DC systems with new – Analysis of the emergency control post, including switchboards necessary plant modifications – replacement of toroid plates – Analysis of local loads, including necessary plant – pressurizer relief valves replaced/modified modifications – replacements and improvement in the electrical supply – Analysis of natural phenomena, including necessary systems for improved separation and safety plant modifications – Passive autocatalytic recombiners installed in the – Measures regarding dependency of miniature circuit containment breakers – Implementation of the TWICE-project. I&C equipment – Emergency Diesel Generators modernization, power replaced with new technology. Modifications include increase and major overhaul of diesel generators new main control room (MCR), all I&C and cables connected to MCR together with sensors and measuring Ringhals unit 1 apparatus in the plant. – separation of electric power supply of core cooling – Separation of RPS systems – Diverse actuation system – introduction of alarm for core instability – New severe accident monitoring systems – exchange of control rod indication and manoeuvring – a new main fire water ring installed for the site of units system 1 and 2. – verification and improvement of piping supports – Measures to make the auxiliary feed-water system – the SPRINT project (replacement of primary system independent, including a new water supply piping) – Physical separation within the ventilation system in the – part two of fire protection modernization programme auxiliary systems building completed. – Analysis of the physical separation within the power – diversified source for feed water to the core spray system in the auxiliary systems building and the system installed. containment, including necessary plant modifications – modernization project RPS/SP2 completed. The main – Separation within component cooling system purpose of these modifications is to increase the level – Supports for several containment isolation valves of separation in order to strengthen protection against – Fire hazards analysis, including necessary plant fire and to mitigate common cause failures, i.e. to modifications improve diversity in safety functions. Major – Incore and Flux measurement modifications consist of modernization of the reactor protection system and improvement of the residual heat Ringhals unit 3 removal systems. – Modernization of turbine – measures on RPS (isolation logic train blockage during – The GREAT power uprate project completed, thermal tests enhanced) power increased to 3144 MW. – robustness measures on electrical systems (from Forsmark event of 25 July 2006) Ringhals unit 4 – a new diversified reactor shutdown system – Steam generator and pressurizer replacement. – security measures – Post-Accident measure system – a new main fire water ring installed for the site of units 1 and 2. – Separation of operation and safety systems within the switchgear – Change to two phase flow relief valves – Measures to vent incondensable gases from the reactor vessel – Improvement of the back panels in the control room

148 Modifications implemented 1995–2018

Appendix 2

Progress of National Action Plan

Foreword

The Swedish NAcP was first issued in December 2012 and by 31 December 2017. These measures were completed for was reviewed and revised in December 2014, December all NPPs in accordance with the decisions, with solutions 2017 and March 2020. This Appendix describes the final that primarily focused on actions that provided, with update of the Swedish NAcP including the status of all limited modification and without fulfilling robustness actions in the plan. requirements, a substantial increase of the safety level. Following the severe accidents which started in the In general, the Swedish NAcP required investigations to be Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant, the European performed with the aim to identify necessary technical and Council of 24/25 March 2011 requested stress tests to be administrative measures, how they should be implemented performed on all European nuclear power plants. The as well as appropriate time schedules for the implementa- Swedish national action plan is part of these stress tests tion of these measures. All actions resulting from these and was developed with the aim to manage all plant investigations were fully implemented by the end of 2020. weaknesses identified by the EU stress tests as well as by SSM has continuously performed reviews and follow-up other forums such as the second extraordinary meeting on the licensee actions concerning the Swedish NAcP. Due under the Convention on Nuclear Safety. to the high degree of complexity, the majority of the All measures in the NAcP have been completed in accord- necessary technical and administrative measures identified ance with the original given time schedule, meaning that all by the investigations included in the Swedish NAcP were identified measures were fully implemented by the end of implemented after 2015. 2020, following the Independent Core Cooling System Finally, it is worth stressing as another important success (ICCS) installations. The ICCS is a major safety enhancing factor the comprehensive safety modernisation carried out technical measure that was required to be in place by the at Swedish NPPs between 2006 and 2014 as a result of the end of 2020 at all Swedish NPPs that continued operation updated design regulation SSMFS 2008:17. The main areas after 2020. The ICCS provides core cooling that is for the safety modernization was to reinforce independcompletely independent from previously existing CC ence, to increase diversification, to increase separation, and systems in terms of power supply and water source. It is measures performed to fulfil the requirement to withstand also significantly more robust and built to handle extended extreme external events. This created a good basis for loss of power supply and ultimate heat sink. meeting many of the requirements linked to the experience The installation of the ICCS is the most extensive single after the nuclear accident in Fukushima. Hence, the measure in the Swedish NAcP. As it necessarily required a completion of the then still ongoing safety modernization relatively long time for design and implementation, SSM programme was a top priority in parallel with the complealso decided on transitional measures to be implemented tion of the stress test activities.

Modifications implemented 1995–2018 149

1. Implementation of technical and

administrative measures

In the following sections the progress on the measures building with its own water source adjacent to the reactor included in the Swedish NAcP are described. Further building of Forsmark 1. The power supply is galvanically technical and administrative measures identified and separated from the plant’s normal electrical power system considered as needed by the completed investigations are via a motor-generator set. The water source is sufficient for also described. 24 hours of operation for Forsmark 1 and 2 or for 72 hours for one of the units. In case of operation for both units, additional water sources are available to make 1.1. Implementation of the operation for 72 hours possible. The pump capacity is Independent Core Cooling sufficient to supply water to the RPV at full pressure. The most important measure in the Swedish NAcP is the Forsmark 3 has its own new building designed according to implementation of the Independent Core Cooling system the same principles. Decay heat will be removed from the (ICCS). Other important technical measures are the containment after about 8 hours of ICCS operation, by implementation of more robust cooling of spent fuel transporting steam to the multi-venturi scrubber. pools and more robust supply of emergency power. The If needed, there is an additional possibility to utilize mobile ICCS was not an explicit part of the first version of the equipment to supply more water, and thereby use the ICCS Swedish NAcP , but was foreseen as a consequence of the for a longer period than 72 hours. results of the analyses, studies and investigations requested in the Swedish NAcP 2013. The ICCS will provide Ringhals NPP alternative core cooling if the normal safety systems are ICCSs have been installed for Ringhals 3 and 4. All unavailable in a situation with design extension conditions. features of the ICCS, including supportive functions, are In December 2014 SSM issued an injunction requiring the housed in a separate building, one for each unit. The main installation of the ICCS, as a condition for operation after features of the Independent Core Cooling system are as 2020. This condition applies to six reactors, since four of follows: the Swedish reactors have been permanently shut down in – Providing feedwater to the steam generators (normal the period between 2014 and 2020. operation) The main basic design requirements for ICCS are the – Providing boron and make-up water to the closed ability to handle: reactor coolant system (normal operation) – Extended Loss of AC Power, ELAP (for 72 hours) – Providing borated make-up for feed-and-bleed for an – Loss of Ultimate Heat Sink, LUHS (for 72 hours). open reactor coolant system (shutdown mode)

The ELAP and LUHS events are assumed to coincide with, The ICCS building has a separate electrical power supply or be the consequence of, severe external events (beyond system, galvanically, functionally and physically separated the ordinary design base), including various electrical from the normal electrical power system. The galvanic disturbances. These events should have an exceedance separation is achieved by a motor-generator set. The frequency of 10-6 per annum, and the ICCS should operate electromagnetic design of the building structure and without the need for manual action the first 8 hours. The shielding of cables ensure that no electrical disturbances system have been in operation since late 2020 at all reactors, (conductive or radiative) can affect the ICCS. in accordance with the injunction from 2014.

Oskarshamn NPP

Forsmark NPP ICCS has been installed for Oskarshamn 3. The ICCS ICCSs have been installed for Forsmark 1, 2 and 3. For function comprises a new low pressure make-up system Forsmark 1 and 2, the ICCS has been placed in a new with a diesel-driven pump, also giving electrical support.

150 Implementation of technical and administrative measures

The primary water source is the central fuel handling pool exceedance frequency of 10-6 per annum shall be considat the reactor service floor. The available amount of water ered for the design. is sufficient for continuation of core cooling for 40 hours. T1.LA.6 – Flooding margin assessments After 40 hours, make-up water for the central service pool is taken from the fire water tanks, which will last for Completed for all NPPs. Analyses of incrementally another 32 hours. The ICCS has its own diesel generator increased flooding levels beyond the design basis and set that can recharge the dedicated batteries for the ICCS identification of potential improvements have been and energize the battery-backed busbars after the initial 8 performed. These analyses included capability to mitigate hours. Residual heat is released through the multi-venturi internal and external flooding events. Weaknesses have scrubber system. been addressed and physical measures have been taken at some plants. For the ICCS installed 2020, flooding margins with the exceedance frequency of 10-6 per annum is 1.2. Natural hazards considered for the design.

1.2.1. Actions performed by the licensees

T1.LA.7 – Evaluation of the protected volume approach In this section, the status for each measure related to natural hazards performed by the Swedish licensees (LA) Completed for all NPPs. Based on performed stress tests, is given. Further technical and administrative measures measures have been taken at some plants. needed are also described. T1.LA.8 – Investigation of an improved early warning T1.LA.1 – Seismic plant analyses notification Completed for all NPPs. Further studies regarding the Completed for all NPPs. The licensees have introduced structural integrity of the reactor containments, scrubber instructions for the control room staff to check the buildings and fuel storage pools have been performed. The weather forecast with the Swedish Metrological and analyses showed that those structures can withstand an Hydrological Institute (SMHI) once per shift. The instrucearthquake significantly stronger than the “Swedish tions include a check regarding possible effects of extreme E-5-earthquake”. For the ICCS installed by 2020 earth- weather conditions at the NPPs and the consideration of quakes with the exceedance frequency of 10-6 per annum suitable mitigating measures. shall be considered for the design. T1.LA.9 – Investigation of external hazard margins T1.LA.2 – Investigation regarding secondary effects of an Completed for all NPPs. The analyses and in some cases earthquake the corresponding administrative and physical improve- Completed for all NPPs. A more detailed analysis of ments show that the NPPs can handle external hazard with earthquake induced flooding has been included in the the exceedance frequency of 10-5 per annum. For the analyses regarding secondary effects. In addition, seismic ICCS installed by 2020 extreme external hazards with the induced fires have been analysed. Minor weaknesses have exceedance frequency of 10-6 per annum shall be considbeen addressed. ered for the design. T1.LA.3 – Review of seismic monitoring T1.LA.10 – Develop standards to address qualified plant walk-downs Completed for all NPPs. Seismic monitoring systems are installed at all Swedish sites. The licensees have reviewed Completed for all NPPs. Extensive efforts have been the procedures and training program for seismic moni- undertaken to manage resistance to earthquakes and other toring and implemented the revised procedures and external events. As part of this, a walk-down methodology programs. has been defined and documented, and walk-downs have been performed. The licensees use the deterministic T1.LA.4 – Investigation of extreme weather conditions method represented by SMA (Seismic Margin Assessment), Completed for all NPPs. The analyses, and in some cases based on guidelines in the EPRI NP-6041 SL corresponding administrative and physical improvements, shows that the NPPs can handle extreme weather with the 1.2.2. Actions to be performed by the regulators exceedance frequency of 10-5 per annum. For the ICCS The following section describes the status for each installed by 2020 extreme weather with the exceedance measure related to natural hazards performed by the frequency of 10-6 per annum shall be considered for the Swedish regulatory body (RA). design. T1.RA.1 – Research project regarding the influence of T1.LA.5 – Investigation of the frequency of extreme water paleoseismological data levels Completed. Results presented in SSM technical report Completed for all NPPs. The analyses and in some cases 2017:35. corresponding administrative and physical improvements T1.RA.2 – Estimation of extreme weather conditions shows that the NPPs can handle extreme water levels with A study to better estimate extreme weather conditions has the exceedance frequency of 10-5 per annum. For the been performed as a research project by the licensees The ICCS installed by 2020 extreme water levels with the

Implementation of technical and administrative measures 151

resulting extreme weather conditions have been used as T2.LA.7 – Reassess the instrumentation and monitoring design conditions for the construction of the ICCS. Completed for all NPPs. For dose monitoring, see T3. LA.4. For core cooling and residual heat removal, see T3. 1.3. Design issues LA2. For spent fuel pools see, T2.LA.8, and T3.LA.3.

T2.LA.8 – Reassess the integrity of the spent fuel pools

1.3.1. Actions to be performed by the licensees

The following section describes the status for each Completed for all NPPs. The integrity and robustness of measure related to Design issues performed by the Swedish the spent fuel pools during prolonged extreme situations licensees (LA). Further technical and administrative have been further evaluated and reassessed. The assessmeasures needed are also described. ments have defined technical and administrative measures

to be addressed, e.g. regarding strengthening of the T2.LA.1 – Implementation of the demonstrations of instrumentation and of the water supply to the fuel pools. design basis in SAR

T2.LA.9 – Evaluate the need for mobile equipment Completed for all NPPs. Included in the Safety Analysis Reports for all Swedish NPPs Completed for all NPPs. New mobile equipment has been

identified as necessary for all plants for prolonged extreme T2.LA.2 – Define design basis for alternate cooling and situations. The needed mobile equipment is in place. As alternate residual heat removal part of the ICCS decision, SSM decided on transitional Completed for all NPPs. The ICCS decision states that measures to be implemented before 31 December 2017. Loss of Ultimate Heat Sink (LUHS) 72 hours is a design The transitional measures were completed for all NPPs in basis. The licensees have also performed strengthening of accordance with the decisions. existing alternate cooling and alternate residual heat T2.LA.10 – Reassess and update equipment inspection removal. In some cases, the strengthening will be a part of programs the ICCS solutions.

Completed for all NPPs. Plans have been developed to T2.LA.3 – Primary and alternative AC power supplies and ensure that the procedures for inspection and maintenance AC power distribution systems are incorporated in ordinary activities, both for equipment Completed for all NPPs. The ICCS decision states that that existed before the Fukushima accident and equipment Extended Loss of AC Power (ELAP) for 72 hours is a acquired as a result of the stress tests. design basis. All licensees have already performed strength- T2.LA.11 – Reassess and update training programs ening of the electrical power supply. In some cases, the strengthening will be a part of the ICCS solutions. Completed for all NPPs. Training programs were reas-

sessed when new equipment and new administrative T2.LA.4 – Reassess DC power supplies and DC power measures were in place. distribution system Completed for all NPPs. The licensees have analysed the actual battery capacity available with T2.LA.12 – Evaluate the need for consumables existing loads. The analyses shows that there are consider- Completed for all NPPs. The licensees have evaluated and able margins of the batteries at some of the plants. For the assessed the technical and administrative measures needed remaining plants, measures have been taken to expand the to ensure adequate accessibility during all potential battery capacity in existing battery systems. Alternatively an situations. application of load shedding or a combination thereof have been installed. The conclusions drawn were that the review carried out by

all facilities for fuel supplies and consumables do fulfil the T2.LA.5 – Reassess the integrity of the primary system requirement. Completed for all NPPs. For the PWRs the integrity of the T2.LA.13 – Evaluate the need for resources primary system has been further evaluated and reassessed for prolonged extreme situations resulting from natural Completed for all NPPs. This issue is handled within the phenomena and other events. This included reassessment framework of actions in response to the requirements of of the primary pumps seals, which have been replaced. the new emergency regulations, SSMFS 2014: 2

T2.LA.6 – Reassess the operability and habitability of the T2.LA.14 – Evaluate the accessibility of important areas Main and Emergency Control Rooms as well as emergency Completed for all NPPs. The licensees have conducted a control centre review of existing emergency operating procedures with Completed for all NPPs. Operability and habitability of bearing on accessibility of important areas. This has both the main and the emergency control rooms as well as resulted in an updating of the instructions in the of the emergency control centre have been further Emergency Operating Procedures. evaluated. Some weak points have been identified and T2.LA.15 – Investigate the effects of simultaneous events addressed. For example, the inner roofs in the control affecting all reactors at the site rooms have been strengthened to withstand strong earthquakes. Completed for all NPPs. The licensees have conducted a

review of existing operating procedures with focus on

152 Implementation of technical and administrative measures

weather and other events that can simultaneously affect all The licensees have in a common project developed a reactors at the site. This has resulted in an update of the ”Position Paper” that defines requirements that are instructions in SAR and Operating Procedures. adopted and used in the design process. T2.LA.16 – Reassess the use of severe accident mitigation T3.LA.3 – Investigate instrumentation of spent fuel pool systems Completed for all NPPs. This has been addressed by This is a part of the solutions for ICCS for the BWRs, introducing necessary instrumentation to monitor temperwhich uses the severe accident mitigation systems as an ature and water level in the fuel pools in connection with ultimate heat sink. Analyses or/and technical improve- the introduction of an alternative function for cooling the ments showing that this does not affect the system’s fuel in the fuel storage pools. See Action T3.LA.1. primary function as a severe accident mitigation system T3.LA.4 – Investigate the need for measuring radiation have been performed. levels T2.LA.17 – Reassess the procedures and operational Completed for all NPPs. Recommendations on more dose training rate monitors in the reactor building to support accident Completed for all NPPs. Procedures and operational management have been addressed at all utilities. New training are reassessed when new equipment and new monitors have been installed at the NPPs. administrative measures are in place. T3.LA.5 – Develop a plan to handle more than one T2.LA.18 - Evaluate the need for external support affected unit Completed for all NPPs. The licensees have implemented Completed for all NPPs. As a direct measure after the and evaluated external recourses that will be needed in Stress tests, the licensees have developed training scenarios prolonged extreme situations. and emergency exercises in which more than one reactor at each site is involved. T2.LA.19 – Reassess the risk of criticality and/or re-criticality T3.LA.6 – Improve the strategies for managing recriticality Completed for all NPPs. For the Ringhals PWRs re-criticality must be considered in the long-term scenario. Completed for all NPPs. The licensees have conducted a Measures have been identified and addressed and were review of existing emergency operating procedures with considered in the ICCS project. Boron is included in the bearing on re-criticality. This has resulted in updating of ICCS water and new pump seals have been installed. the instructions in the Emergency Operating Procedures. The overall probability for re-criticality that endangers the T3.LA.7 – Develop the strategies for managing loss of containment integrity is judged very low for the BWRs containment integrity Completed for all NPPs. based on research performed within the long term Swedish The licensees have investigated possible strategies on the program APRI (Accident Phenomena of Risk Imporloss of containment function and approaches to assess the tance). containment damage extent. The outcome of the investigations have been incorporated in the Emergency

1.3.2. Actions to be performed by the regulators

Operating Instructions. No specific actions to be performed by the Swedish regulatory body (RA) have been identified. T3.LA.8 – Evaluate accident management programmes Completed for all NPPs. A review of the instructions have 1.4. Severe accident management been carried out for all utilities. Some changes have been and recovery (On-site) implemented based on the findings. As the emergency preparedness organisation develops, further mobile 1.4.1. Actions to be performed by the licensees equipment are introduced and analyses carried out. The The following section describes the final status of each emergency procedures are continuously developed. measure related to severe accident management performed T3.LA.9 – Consider an extended scope of training and by the Swedish licensees (LA). Further technical and drills administrative measures needed are also described. Completed for all NPPs. As a direct measure after the T3.LA.1 – Consider improvements of the capability to Stress tests, the licensees developed training scenarios and cool the spent fuel pool emergency exercises in which more than one plant at each The licensees have in a common project developed a site is involved. ”Position Paper” that defines requirements that are T3.LA.10 – Investigate the need for a new call-in system adopted and improvements are introduced as a part of the installation of the ICCS. Completed for all NPPs. The licensees have in some cases decided to introduce enhanced call-in-systems. T3.LA.2 – Define the design basis for an independent core cooling system T3.LA.11 – Analyse the management of hydrogen

Implementation of technical and administrative measures 153

Completed for all NPPs. An investigation regarding the 1.4.2. Actions to be performed by the regulators handling of hydrogen (oxyhydrogen) after a severe No specific actions to be performed by the Swedish accident is handled in a joint licensee project. Some regulatory body (RA) was identified. potential shortcomings in the handling of hydrogen gas after a severe accident have been identified and have been corrected by installing increased venting in identified 1.5. National organisations

potentially vulnerable locations.

1.5.1. Actions to be performed by the operators or

T3.LA.12 – Investigate the need for means to manage large other national organisations volumes of contaminated water The following section describes the status for each measure related to the specified national organisation. Completed for all NPPs. Plans on how to manage large T4.NA.1 – Processing the result from the evaluations of volumes are in place. the country-wide exercise focusing on a nuclear power T3.LA.13 – Reassess personal safety issues plant accident – SAMÖ/KKÖ

Completed for all NPPs. This issue is handled within the The result has been processed. framework of actions in response to the requirements of T4.NA.2 – Processing the result from the evaluations of the new emergency regulations, SSMFS 2014: 2. the performances of the national organisations throughout T3.LA.14 – Secure the accessibility of the emergency the first month of the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi control centre NPP.

Completed for all NPPs. This issue is handled within the Findings related to responsibilities were handled within the framework of actions in response to the requirements of framework of the Action Plan “The Swedish preparedness the new emergency regulations, SSMFS 2014: 2. for radiological and nuclear accidents” (2015). Internal development projects have been initiated at the involved T3.LA.15 – Set up action plans for support to local authorities to increase the ability to manage a nuclear operators event. During 2016-2017 a working model following Completed for all NPPs. This issue is handled within the guidelines for effective coordination (SOL) published by framework of actions in response to the requirements of the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) has been the new emergency regulations, SSMFS 2014: 2. implemented, exercised and evaluated with good results.

During this period, three different exercises were T3.LA.16 – Reassess the use of containment filtered conducted involving the County Administrative Boards venting system in the long-term that have the primary responsibility for protecting the Completed for all NPPs. Investigations and assessments of public during a NPP accident. the ability to manage a severe accident have been T4.NA.3 – Evaluation of the Swedish Defense Research performed by the licensees with different suggested Agency‘s (FOI) role during a radiological or nuclear solutions. Implementation of the ICCS, which takes into emergency account the filtered venting system for residual heat removal, also resulted in more detailed analyses. The role of the FOI has been evaluated as part of the evaluations mentioned above in T4.NA.2. The responsibili- T3.LA.17 – Investigate long-term handling of the containties of FOI during a radiological or nuclear emergency ment chemistry include field and laboratory measurements and analysis (for Completed for all NPPs. Investigations and assessments of example within the framework of the national expert the ability to manage a severe accident have been performed response organisation led by SSM). FOI also gives advice by the licensees. The conclusion of the study is that none of to the Government of Sweden and supports SSM with the studied phenomena are expected to provide substantial assessment and prognosis in radiological or nuclear degradation of the containment and increase the emissions. emergencies. Uncertainties remain for some plants regarding the risks of T4.NA.4 – A country-wide exercise focusing on a nuclear corrosion and degradation of polymeric materials. Current power plant accident – Havsörn research in these areas is followed. The exercise included 33 organisations and was carried out T3.LA.18 – Evaluate the need for common resources in December 2013. The scenario included an event on the available at the site NPP Forsmark, in the County of Uppsala, that escalated to Completed for all NPPs. The licensees have evaluated the a discharge. The exercise included field measurements.

existing shared resources on the site with different T4.NA.5 – The evaluation of the exercise finished with a suggested solutions. final report from the evaluation team – Havsörn

T3.LA.19 – Investigate the performance of the common The County Board of Uppsala has produced the final system for filtered containment venting report evaluating the exercise.

Not applicable since Oskarshamn 1 and 2 are permanently T4.NA.6 – Processing the result from the evaluations of shut down. No other plants have common containment the country-wide exercise focusing on a nuclear power venting. plant accident – Havsörn

154 Implementation of technical and administrative measures

Most findings are handled within the framework of the 1.6.2. Actions to be performed by the regulators Action Plan “The Swedish preparedness for radiological The following section describes the status for each and nuclear accidents” (2015). Various development measure related to Emergency preparedness and response projects have been initiated to increase the ability to and post-accident management performed by the Swedish manage a nuclear event. For example, a table top (Assar) regulatory body (RA). was conducted in December 2014 as a follow-up to increase the ability to handle a nuclear accident. 1.6.3. Actions identified in Sweden at a national level T5.RA.1 - Up-dating and formalization of pre-defined criteria on countermeasures and the implementation of 1.6. Emergency preparedness measurable operational intervention levels and routines for and response and post-accident application of intervention levels management (Off-site) On 22 October 2015, the Government of Sweden 1.6.1. Actions to be performed by the licensees commissioned the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority The following section describes the status for each (SSM) to, in consultation with the Swedish Civil Continmeasure related to Emergency preparedness and response gencies Agency (MSB), relevant county administrative and post-accident management performed by the Swedish boards and other competent authorities and stakeholders, licensees (LA). Further technical and administrative perform a review of emergency planning zones and measures needed are also described. emergency planning distances applying to activities involving ionising radiation. The review, presented to the T5.LA.1 – Clarify the responsibility for decontamination Government of Sweden on 1 November 2017, encomstations outside the site for personnel during shift passes overall objectives for the emergency planning, the turnovers and how equipment is to be replaced types of emergency planning zones and emergency Handled within the update of the emergency plan. planning distances that should be established, reference levels that should serve as the basis for emergency T5.LA.2 – Investigate the course of action during a planning, and dose criteria and intervention levels for long-term need for personnel different protective actions. The review considers events at, Handled within the update of the emergency plan. and emergency planning zones surrounding, the nuclear power plants, a fuel fabrication plant and the central T5.LA.3 – An investigation is suggested to ascertain advaninterim storage facility for spent nuclear fuel in Sweden. In tages and disadvantages in replacing the present substitute 2020, the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) Command Centre with a suitable office outside the site published a report on the planning basis for activities and Handled within the update of the emergency plan. acts in emergency preparedness category 4 (SSM 2020:15). The report covers pre-defined criteria on countermeasures T5.LA.4 – It shall be investigated whether some of the and the implementation of measurable operational functions included in the emergency preparedness organisaintervention levels and routines for application of intertion staffing are sufficient, to sustain shifts around the clock vention levels for nuclear or radiological emergencies. The An investigation has been conducted and the number of report will be published in English during 2021. The persons to maintain permanent staffing around the clock reports complements earlier reports for facilities in in case of emergency has been established for the roles in emergency preparedness category I, II and III. the emergency response organisation. The results have T5.RA.2 – SSM and the nuclear facilities are currently been incorporated in the emergency plan. working towards establishing a system for electronic T5.LA.5 – Presently calling in personnel depends on a transmission of plant data from the Swedish nuclear power functioning GSM/Telenet. An improvement in this area plants to SSM’s Emergency Response Centre. shall be investigated The system is installed. T5.RA.3 - Implementation of the Handled within the update of the emergency plan in 2014. revised Swedish regulation SSMFS 2008:15,

T5.LA.6 – Identify alternative evacuation routes. SSM’s Regulations concerning Emergency Preparedness at Certain Nuclear Alternative collection sites shall be decided upon and incorporated in the licensee’s emergency plans These sites Facilities. The regulation has been implemented. shall be communicated with the emergency planning at the T5.RA.4 – The Nordic Flag Book county administration board. Handled within the framework of actions in response to the requirements of the new In the last quarter of 2013 the “Nordic Flagbook”, emergency preparedness regulations, SSMFS 2014: 2. “Protective Measures in Early and Intermediate Phases of a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency, Nordic Guidelines T5.LA.7 – The Command Centre shall be connected to its and Recommendations”, was completed and approved by own auxiliary power supply that is independent of the the Director Generals of the Nordic Radiation Safety regular power supply at the plant site. Authorities. The “Nordic Flagbook” has been translated Auxiliary power is now in place for all the Command into Swedish during 2014. Centres.

Implementation of technical and administrative measures 155

1.7. International cooperation T6.RA.3 – IRRS recommendation to SSM to establish and implement guidance for dissemination of all significant 1.7.1. Actions to be performed by the licensees operating experience and lessons learned to all relevant The following section describes the status for each authorized parties. This is an ongoing process. measure related to International cooperation performed by T6.RA.4 – Actively participate in information exchange the Swedish licensees (LA). Further technical and adminisafter the Fukushima accident – International organisations trative measures needed are also described. Ongoing. Sweden participates in relevant meetings and T6.LA.1 – Expanding the scope of WANO Peer Reviews information exchange. Ongoing. T6.RA.5 – IRRS-recommendation: Better ensure compli- T6.LA.2 – Expanding the frequency of WANO Peer ance with relevant IAEA Standards Reviews Ongoing. Completed, the internal guidelines are updated and have T6.LA.3 – Developing a world-wide integrated event been checked against IAEA guides and standards. This has response strategy Ongoing. also been an important part of project to update the regulations related to operating NPP:s, which entered into 1.7.2. Actions to be performed by the regulators force on 1 March 2022. The following section describes the status for each T6.RA.6 – More strategic coordination and follow-up of measures related to International cooperation performed the work in the different IAEA Safety Standards Commitby the Swedish regulatory body (RA). tees Ongoing. T6.RA.1 – Accede to the 2004 Protocol to amend the Paris T6.RA.7 – Fulfilment of WENRA reference levels (RLs) and Brussels Conventions on Third Party Liability in the field of nuclear energy Ongoing. New regulations enter into force in 1 March 2022.

T6.RA.2 – Assessment and improvement of international crisis communication and information dissemination. The Swedish emergency preparedness guidelines have been updated.

156 Implementation of technical and administrative measures

Departementsserien 2022

Kronologisk förteckning

1. Viktigt meddelande till allmänheten – en översyn av 11. Arlanda flygplats – en plan för framtiden. I. VMA-systemet. Ju. 12. Vistelseförbud för barn. S. 2. Bättre konsekvensutredning i svensk statsförvaltning. Fi. 13. Utökat informationsutbyte. Fi. 3. Garantitillägg i bostadstillägget. S. 14. Ett hållbart mediestöd för hela landet. Ku. 4. Ökade möjligheter till användning av välfärdsteknik 15. Regler om privata sjukvårdsförsäkringar inom den inom äldreomsorgen. S. offentligt finansierade hälso- och sjukvården. S. 5. En effektivare upphandlingstillsyn. Fi. 16. Ledarhundar. S. 6. Straff för deltagande i en terroristorganisation. Ju. 17. Inordnande av Statens medieråd i Myndigheten för 7. Ett försämrat säkerhetspolitiskt läge – konsekvenser för press, radio och tv. Ku. Sverige. UD. 18. Straffansvar för pyskiskt våld. Ju. 8. Deterioration of the security environment – 19. Sweden’s Ninth National Report under the Convention implications for Sweden. UD. on Nuclear Safety. Sweden’s Implementation of the 9. Ett utvidgat utreseförbud för barn. S. Obligations of the Convention. M.

10. Ett flexiblare karensvillkor i arbetslöshets försäkringen. A.

Departementsserien 2022 157

Departementsserien 2022

Systematisk förteckning

Arbetsmarknadsdepartementet Miljödepartementet

Ett flexiblare karensvillkor i arbetslöshetsförsäkringen. [10] Sweden’s Ninth National Report under the Convention on Nuclear Safety. Sweden’s Implementation of the Finansdepartementet Obligations of the Convention. [19] Bättre konsekvensutredning i svensk statsförvaltning. [2]

Socialdepartementet

En effektivare upphandlingstillsyn. [5] Garantitillägg i bostadstillägget. [3] Utökat informationsutbyte. [13] Ökade möjligheter till användning av välfärdsteknik inom äldreomsorgen. [4]

Infrastrukturdepartementet

Arlanda flygplats – en plan för framtiden. [11] Ett utvidgat utreseförbud för barn. [9]

Vistelseförbud för barn. [12]

Justitiedepartementet

Viktigt meddelande till allmänheten – en översyn av Regler om privata sjukvårds försäkringar inom den VMA-systemet. [1] offentligt finansierade hälso och sjukvården. [15] Straff för deltagande i en terroristorganisation. [6] Ledarhundar. [16] Straffansvar för psykiskt våld. [18]

Utrikesdepartementet

Ett försämrat säkerhetspolitiskt läge – konsekvenser för

Kulturdepartementet

Sverige. [7] Ett hållbart mediestöd för hela landet. [14] Deterioration of the security environment – implications Inordnande av Statens medieråd i Myndigheten för press, for Sweden. [8] radio och tv. [17]

158 Departementsserien 2022

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 159

160 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

Sweden’s Ninth National Report under the Convention on Nuclear Safety