text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: See the ECB’s Convergence Report 2012, p. 237; European Commission Convergence Report 2012, p. 71.

text: Recital 7 of the ESM Treaty states ‘All euro area Member States will become ESM Members. As a consequence of joining the euro area, a Member State of the European Union should become an ESM Member with full rights and obligations, in line with those of the Contracting Parties’.

text: Saiemas Kārtības rullis, "LV", 96 (227), 18.08.1994. 8 See the ECB’s Convergence Report 2012, p. 25; see also Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 9 See the ECB’s Convergence Report 2012, p. 27; see also, in this regard, Opinion

text: , paragraph 4.2. 10 See the ECB’s Convergence Report 2010, pp. 21 and 22 and the ECB’s Convergence Report 2012, pp. 25 and 26.

text: See Opinion

text: , paragraph 2. 12 See the ECB’s Convergence Report 2012, p. 27; see also Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1. 14 See, for example, the ECB’s Convergence Report 2012, p. 24. 15 See Opinion

text: paragraph 2.1; see also Opinions

text: and

text: OJ L 267, 9.10.2010, p. 1. 18 See Opinion

text: . 19 See, in particular,

text: Article 6(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1338/2001 of 28 June 2001

text: laying down measures necessary for the protection of the euro against counterfeiting (OJ L 181, 4.7.2001, p. 6) and Decision ECB/2010/14.

text: See

text: recital 9

text: of

text: Council Regulation (EU) No 1096/2010 of 17 November 2010

text: conferring specific tasks upon the European Central Bank concerning the functioning of the European Systemic Risk Board (OJ L 331, 15.12.10, p.162) and

text: recital 6

text: of

text: Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 on European Union macro-prudential oversight of the financial system and establishing a European Systemic Risk Board (OJ L331, 15.12.10, p.1). 21 See Opinions

text: , paragraph 5, Opinion

text: , paragraph 3.1,

text: , paragraph 2.3, and

text: , paragraph 2.2. 22 The ECB notes that this reference to the contribution of the central banks to financial stability or the stability of the banking or financial system is provided for in various statutes of NCBs, including the following: Austria: Art. 44b(1) of the Federal Act on the Oesterreichische Nationalbank; Belgium: Art. 12 of the Law establishing the Organic Statute of the National Bank of Belgium; Bulgaria: Art. 2.6 of the Law on the Bulgarian National Bank; Cyprus: Article 6.2 of the Central Bank of Cyprus Laws of 2002 to 2007; Czech Republic: Art. 2(2) of the Act on the Czech National Bank; Estonia: §2(3) of the Eesti Pank Act; Finland: Section 3 of the Act on the Bank of Finland; Hungary: Art. 12 of the Law on the Magyar Nemzeti Bank; Ireland: Section 26(2)(a) of the Central Bank Reform Act 2010; Lithuania: Art. 8(4) of the Law on the Bank of Lithuania; Luxembourg: Art. 2.6 of the Organic law of the Banque centrale du Luxembourg; Malta: Art. 5 of the Central Bank of Malta Act; The Netherlands: Section 3(2) of the Bank Act 1998; Poland: Art. 3 of the Act on the National Bank of Poland; Romania: Art. 2 of the Law on the Statute of the Banca Naţională a României; Slovenia: Art. 4(3) of the Banka Slovenije Act; Slovakia: Art. 2(3) of the Act on the National Bank of Slovakia; United Kingdom: Section 2A of the Bank of England Act 1998.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 2 October 2012 on preparations and legal amendments required for the introduction of the euro (CON/2012/73)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 2 October 2012 on preparations and legal amendments required for the introduction of the euro (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 20 July 2012, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Latvian Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft law on the introduction of the euro (hereinafter the ‘draft law on the euro’), a draft law on amendments to the Law on Latvijas Banka (hereinafter the ‘draft law on Latvijas Banka) and a draft law on amendments to the Law on prevention of conflict of interests in activities of public officials (hereinafter the ‘draft law on PCI’) (hereinafter collectively referred to as the ‘draft laws’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the first, second and third indents of

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft laws relate to currency matters, means of payment and Latvijas Banka. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft laws

text: The purpose of the draft laws is to prepare for the introduction of the euro and to ensure the compatibility of Latvian legislation with the Treaty and the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter the ‘Statute of the ESCB’), as well as Latvia’s compliance with all adaptation requirements under Article 131 of the Treaty. 1.1 The draft law on the euro The purpose of the draft law on the euro is to ensure that the introduction of the euro in Latvia is done in an efficient and transparent manner. In particular, the draft law determines measures related to the cash changeover, the exchange of non-cash and electronic money and the dual display of prices of goods and services. It also provides for measures for the adaption of accounting practices and the adjustment of financial markets for the introduction of euro, as well as provisions concerning the amendment and enforcement of the law.

text: 1.2 The draft law on Latvijas Banka and the draft law on PCI The draft law on Latvijas Banka addresses a number of issues raised by the ECB and the European Commission in their Convergence Reports in relation to the Law on Latvijas Banka. In particular, amendments are made to the provisions concerning Latvijas Banka’s independence, prohibitions on monetary financing and privileged access and the legal integration of Latvijas Banka into the Eurosystem. The draft law on PCI addresses a personal independence issue previously identified by the ECB in relation to Article 31 of the Law on Latvijas Banka . It now clarifies that the Governor, the deputy Governor and members of the Council of Latvijas Banka are only permitted to hold other offices in accordance with laws or international agreements ratified by the Latvian Parliament, Cabinet regulations and order and only if the holding of other offices does not threaten the independence of Latvijas Banka.

text: 2. Observations on the draft law on the euro

text: 2.1 Article 3 of the draft law on the euro provides that the day on which the euro is introduced in Latvia shall be the day on which the Council abrogates the derogation. The ECB notes that this day may not happen to coincide with the day on which the abrogation enters into force. Therefore,

text: Article 3

text: should be amended to explicitly refer to the entry into force of the abrogation of the derogation. 2.2 In this context, the ECB also notes that Article 44 of the Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) (hereinafter the ‘ESM Treaty’) provides that the ESM Treaty shall be open for accession by other Member States of the EU upon their application for membership . These ‘other’ Member States are those which have not adopted the euro at the time of signature of the ESM Treaty. Article 44 of the ESM Treaty provides further that the Member State shall file with the ESM its application for membership after the adoption by the Council of the European Union of the decision to abrogate the Member State’s derogation from adopting the euro in accordance with Article 140(2) of the Treaty. Article 44 of the ESM Treaty also provides that, following the approval of the application for membership by the ESM’s Board of Governors, the new ESM Member shall accede upon deposit of the instruments for accession with the Depository.

text: 3. Observations on the draft law on Latvijas Banka and draft law on PCI

text: 3.1 The ECB welcomes the Latvian government’s efforts to achieve the required level of legal convergence and notes that the legal convergence of the amended Law on Latvijas Banka will be

text: also assessed in the ECB’s next Convergence Report. In the meantime, the ECB makes the following observations as regards the central bank independence and legal integration of Latvijas Banka into the Eurosystem. 3.2 Institutional independence The draft law on Latvijas Banka amends Article 43 of the Law on Latvijas Banka concerning the powers of the independent external auditors of Latvijas Banka in a manner compatible with the Treaty. In addition, the ECB notes that Article 43(1) of the Law on Latvijas Banka provides that the Parliament shall supervise Latvijas Banka. The ECB understands that ‘supervision’ in this context refers to the Parliament’s right to ask questions pursuant to the Law on the Rules of Procedure of the Parliament so as to enhance Latvijas Banka’s accountability for its decisions. This is compatible with the principle of institutional independence of Latvijas Banka. 3.3 Financial independence 3.3.1 The ECB welcomes the proposed increase of Latvijas Banka’s capital. The principle of financial independence requires a national central bank (NCB) to have sufficient means not only to perform its ESCB or Eurosystem-related tasks but also its national tasks e.g. financing its administration and own operations. Such financial independence is assessed from the perspective of whether any third party is able to exercise either direct or indirect influence not only over an NCB’s tasks but also over its ability to fulfil its mandate, both operationally in terms of manpower, and financially in terms of appropriate financial resources . In this respect, financial independence primarily implies that an NCB should always be sufficiently capitalised . In particular, the ECB is of the view that the higher the level of capital, reserves and provisions against financial risks is, the higher the safeguards against future losses are. For this reason, an NCB must be free to independently create financial provisions to safeguard the real value of its capital and assets. Furthermore, Member States may not hamper NCBs from building up their reserve capital to a level which is necessary for a member of the Eurosystem to fulfil its tasks . As mentioned in the ECB’s Convergence Reports 2010 and 2012 , any situation should be avoided whereby for a prolonged period of time an NCB’s net equity is below the level of its statutory capital or is even negative, including where losses beyond the level of capital and the reserves are carried over. Any such situation may negatively impact on the NCB’s ability to perform not only its ESCB or Eurosystemrelated tasks but also its national tasks. Moreover, such a situation may affect the credibility of the Eurosystem’s monetary policy. Therefore, the event of an NCB’s net equity becoming less than its statutory capital or even negative would require that the respective Member State provides the NCB with an appropriate amount of capital at least up to the level of the statutory capital within a

text: reasonable period of time so as to comply with the principle of financial independence. The financial independence of a central bank may also be strengthened by arrangements whereby the operational costs for the discharge of some of the latter’s tasks are borne by the entities concerned by such tasks . 3.3.2 The ECB understands that the competent Latvian authority has closely cooperated with Latvijas Banka in order to determine the level of authorised and paid-up capital to be effectively increased. Such cooperation not only serves to respect Latvijas Banka’s financial independence, but it also takes account of the fact that Latvijas Banka is best placed to assess its required level of reserve capital . 3.3.3 The ECB welcomes the new wording of Article 18 (1) of the Law on Latvijas Banka pursuant to which Latvijas Banka transfers parts of its profit to the State budget following the approval of the annual report by the Council of Latvijas Banka and only after covering losses accumulated in the previous years, if any. This reflects requirements arising from the financial independence principle . The ECB also welcomes new paragraph 2 that entitles Latvijas Banka to reduce the percentage share of the payment for the usage of state capital where it is needed to increase the reserve capital of Latvijas Banka in relation to the financial risks it is exposed to when executing its tasks. 3.4 Personal independence 3.4.1 The ECB welcomes the reference in Article 22(4) of the Law on Latvijas Banka to Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB as regards the grounds for dismissal of the Governor, the Deputy Governor or a member of the Council of Latvijas Banka. As specified in the ECB’s Convergence Reports , NCB statutes must ensure that Governors and other members of an NCB’s decision making bodies may not be dismissed for reasons other than those mentioned in

text: Article 14.2

text: . The purpose of this requirement is to prevent the authorities involved in the appointment of Governors, particularly the government or parliament, from exercising their discretion to dismiss a Governor. Under Article 22(4) of the Law on Latvijas Banka, as a precondition for the Latvian Parliament deciding to dismiss the Governor, Deputy Governor or a member of the Council of Latvijas Banka based on serious misconduct (being a ground for dismissal provided by

text: Article 14.2

text: ), a national court has to find the relevant official guilty of breaching the law. The ECB acknowledges that under

text: Article 22(4)

text: the court is entitled to rule only on a breach of law by the relevant official but it does not have the power to decide whether the breach of law amounts to serious misconduct. Still,

text: Article 22(4)

text: limits the scope of the Union law concept of ‘serious misconduct’ to breaches of the law, whereas the conditions for dismissal should not be specified by the national legislator .

text: Article 22(4)

text: should either be fully aligned with

text: Article 14.2

text: or should omit any mention of

text: grounds for dismissal, given that

text: Article 14.2

text: is directly applicable. Further, the ECB recommends that the procedures, including any court ruling, for the dismissal of the Governor, Deputy Governor or a member of the Council of Latvijas Banka be kept clearly distinct from the substantive provisions on the grounds for dismissal, i.e. in a separate legal provision, to ensure full consistency with the provisions of the Statute of the ESCB. 3.4.2 Personal independence also entails ensuring that no conflict of interest arises between the duties of members of NCB decision-making bodies involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks in relation to their respective NCBs (and of Governors in relation to the ECB) and any other functions which such members of decision-making bodies may have and which may jeopardise their personal independence. As a matter of principle, membership of a decision-making body involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks is incompatible with the exercise of other functions that might create a conflict of interest. In particular, members of such decision-making bodies may not hold an office or have an interest that may influence their activities, whether through office in the executive or legislative branches of the state or in regional or local administrations, or through involvement in a business organisation. Particular care should be taken to prevent potential conflicts of interest on the part of non-executive members of decision-making bodies . The clarification in the draft law on PCI addresses the ECB’s concerns in a way which adheres to the principle of institutional independence. However, national laws, international agreements, national regulations or orders that would permit the Governor and the other members of the Council of Latvijas Banka to combine their office with other offices pursuant to the draft law on PCI may raise concerns as regards their personal independence as referred to in Article 130 of the Treaty. The draft law on PCI should be further amended to clarify that holding other offices may be permitted if it does not pose a threat, not only to the independence of Latvijas Banka, but also to the personal independence of the Governor, Deputy Governor and of the other members of the Council of Latvijas Banka. 3.5 Legal integration into the Eurosystem Article 34(3) of the Law on Latvijas Banka does not recognise the ECB’s powers with respect to ‘the requirements for euro cash processing systems and the quality requirements for euro banknote processing, as well as the registration and reporting requirements for merchants engaged in cash processing and recycling’. In particular, the ECB considers it essential that any draft legislation implementing Decision ECB/2010/14 on the authenticity and fitness checking and recirculation of euro banknotes does not deviate from its common provisions, unless explicitly provided for in Decision ECB/2010/14 .Therefore, the Law on Latvijas Banka should provide that such activities are performed in compliance with Union law .

text: 3.6 Contribution to financial stability

text: In accordance with the Eurosystem’s role under Article 127(5) of the Treaty to contribute to the smooth conduct of policies pursued by competent authorities relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system, and taking into account institutional developments, such as the central banks’ support to the European Systemic Risk Board , the ECB is of the view, in line with its stance on this issue , that the task of contributing to the stability of the financial system should be explicitly referred to in the Law on Latvijas Banka .

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 2 October 2012.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: For example, draft heads 30 and 33. 3 This includes, but is not limited to, individuals, sole traders, partnerships, companies, branches, limited liability partnerships, trusts, charities and friendly societies (see the definition of ‘debtors’ under draft head 2 for the complete list).

text: See the ECB’s Convergence Report, May 2012, p. 25, and in particular Opinion

text: , paragraph 3.1, Opinion

text: , paragraph 3.2 and Opinion

text: , paragraph 3. All ECB opinions are available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 5 See, for example, Opinion

text: , paragraph 3, Opinion

text: , paragraph 3.3 or Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.3.

text: The State body concerned must submit to the Minister a justified request (draft head 13, paragraph 5). 7 OJ L 133, 22.5.2008, p. 66.

text: The draft Personal Insolvency Bill 2012 is currently being debated in the committee stage in the Irish parliament.. The ECB understands that the Insolvency Service will be responsible under the Personal Insolvency Act 2012 for the establishment and maintenance of these insolvency registers.

publisher: Europeiska centralbanken

sprak: en

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 5 October 2012 on new credit register measures in Ireland (CON/2012/74)

serie: con

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 5 October 2012 on new credit register measures in Ireland (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

type: rubrik

text: On 24 August 2012, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Irish Department of Finance for an opinion on a General Scheme of Credit Reporting Bill 2012. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third and sixth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the General Scheme relates to the Central Bank of Ireland (CBI) and contains rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

type: stycke

text: 1. Purpose of the General Scheme

text: The General Scheme is intended to form the basis of the Credit Reporting Bill 2012. The publication of the Credit Reporting Bill by the Irish Department of Finance by the end of September 2012 is a structural benchmark commitment of the Irish Government under the EU/IMF Programme for Ireland. The objective of the General Scheme is to establish a comprehensive and reliable registry of credit information to assist in achieving public policy objectives and improving financial stability by providing information for credit applications and on outstanding credits. The General Scheme provides for the establishment and operation of a statutory credit register database called the Central Credit Register (CCR). Credit Information Providers (CIPs) will be under an obligation to report to the CCR operator on a comprehensive range of credit information in respect of credit information subjects (CISs) for all credit applications and credit agreements in excess of a prescribed minimum threshold. Access to credit information held in the CCR will be limited to specific purposes and restricted to CIPs and individuals entered on a register of credit information users (CIUs) to be maintained by the CBI. The General Scheme contains extensive provisions in relation to the accuracy, protection and security of data on the CCR.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 The General Scheme will improve financial institutions’ credit risk management, as well as risk assessment for the financial sector as a whole. It will also be beneficial for the exercise of prudential supervision by the CBI, as well as for the CBI’s tasks of: (i) providing for the collection and study of data dealing with monetary and credit problems and publishing information about that data; (ii) collecting data to provide advice and assistance to the Central Statistics Office about the collection, compilation, analysis and interpretation of statistics relating to the balance of payments, national accounts and other financial statistics; (iii) contributing to the stability of the financial system overall. 2.2 The ECB notes that some draft heads have not been finalised. In addition, the ECB understands that the General Scheme remains subject to further review, including by the Irish Attorney General, meaning that the General Scheme may contain significant changes when its provisions are reflected in the Credit Reporting Bill. If this occurs, the ECB expects prompt consultation on the Credit Reporting Bill once it is published. 2.3 According to the General Scheme, the CBI is required to maintain a database of debtors containing information relating to their identity, payments and credit history, which is available to the CIUs. Further, the CBI is to collect and record credit information on CISs in the CCR. The definition of ‘debtor’ includes individuals and businesses with financial obligations to creditors under agreements within Ireland . A CIS is defined as a person or entity to which the credit information collected by a CIP relates. The ECB recommends consistent use of defined terms to ensure clarity and transparency. It would also be useful to further clarify whether the terms ‘debtor’ and ‘creditor’ include natural or legal persons with residency or registration outside Ireland respectively. In addition, the General Scheme contains an extensive list of the types of credit information that the CBI may collect and record for the CCR. It also sets out the types of identification information which the CBI is authorised to collect in respect of: (i) any CIS who is a natural person acting outside his or her business, trade or employment; (ii) any CIS who is not such a natural person. CIPs must report on the on-going performance status of credit agreements, any rescheduling of credit agreements, arrears accumulation, default events and all relevant credit events in accordance with regulations made under the General Scheme. The ECB assumes that the CCR is intended to capture information about the credit histories and borrowings of both commercial and individual debtors. The ECB recommends reviewing the definition of ‘default event’, the content of credit

text: information and the identification fields to ensure that all necessary information relating to all envisaged categories of debtor is in fact captured, to guarantee the functionality of the CCR.

text: 3. Central bank statutory powers and obligations

text: The ECB welcomes the provision of the General Scheme allowing the CBI to use the information stored in the CCR for the purpose of discharging its statutory powers and functions. The ECB welcomes that the General Scheme will allow the CBI to access this information for an indefinite period once the prescribed . periods for retention of the CCR data set out in the General Scheme expire. This will provide the CBI with indefinite access to data for the purposes of its mandate and statutory obligations, including those related to membership of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), the Eurosystem, macro- and micro- prudential supervision and consumer protection.

text: 4. Central bank independence

text: The CBI will establish, operate and own the CCR and its contents, with the possibility of outsourcing operations. It will also manage access to the CCR by authorised bodies. The General Scheme authorises the CBI to charge levies and fees to CIUs. The specific levels and methods of calculating these levies and fees may be prescribed by regulations to be made by the CBI with the consent of the Minister for Finance. The CBI may also, with the consent of the Minister, charge CIUs and CISs a fee for providing a record of all credit reports requested or issued on a particular CIS for a period of up to five years. It is not clear whether all CBI expenses in connection with the establishment, operation and maintenance of the CCR will be financed by the levies and fees. The ECB refers to the principle of financial independence under which a national central bank must have sufficient means not only to perform its ESCB-related tasks, but also its national tasks, e.g. financing its administration and own operations . As pointed out in previous ECB opinions , when allocating specific non-ESCB related tasks to the national central banks (NCBs), e.g. tasks in the area of financial supervision or consumer protection, additional human and financial resources must also be allocated for these tasks to be carried out in a manner that will not affect the NCBs’ operational capacity to perform their ESCB-related tasks.

text: 5. Access to the CCR and statistical reporting

text: 5.1 The General Scheme provides that the CBI will maintain a register of CIUs authorised to access credit information held on the CCR, namely the CBI, credit providers, CISs and their authorised representatives. The ECB notes that the register of CIUs may be amended to include:

text: (i) on direction by the Minister, any State body that requests from the CBI credit information on the CCR for the purpose of advancing the public good ; (ii) creditors from other Member States seeking information in accordance with Ireland’s obligations under

text: Article 9 of Directive 2008/48/EC

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 on credit agreements for consumers and repealing

text: Council Directive 87/102/EEC

text: ; (iii) with the consent of the Minister, any other State-owned credit register that meets sufficient data security standards, and where the CBI is satisfied that all data will be treated securely and that it will not be passed on to a third party without explicit agreement of the CBI. The ECB would welcome clarification in the General Scheme of who may access the credit information on the CCR. A reference to the tasks performed by the ESCB under Article 5 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank may be added. This also applies to accessing credit reports and credit scores that the CCR compiles. These reports and scores should be clearly stated as constituting credit information that may be accessed by CIUs. Further, draft head 13(8) on the CIU register provides that ‘the register of credit information may be amended to include creditors from other Member States seeking information.’ The ECB considers that creditors from other Member States should not be excluded from the outset, provided they meet the non-discriminatory access conditions, e.g. data protection rules. The ECB considers that these amendments would contribute to open, transparent and non- discriminatory access to the CCR. 5.2 According to draft head 10, paragraph 1, the CBI lists a minimum set of attributes to be collected and recorded in respect of each credit information subject, while paragraph 2 provides the flexibility for the CBI to expand this set for a specific credit provider for various purposes. The ECB would welcome if the General Scheme could also provide such flexibility for updating the overall CCR content, in particular when international or European standards require it, possibly via a regulation. 5.3 According to draft head 11(2), the CBI lists a number of attributes to be collected as regards the identification of entities, including the company and the VAT registration numbers. The ECB would recommend also including a reference to the necessity of identifying legal persons in compliance with international or European standards, facilitating cross-border access and use, provided that confidentiality is appropriately protected.

text: 6. Compatibility of registers

text: The CBI will have the power to collect and record credit information in respect of CISs, including registered insolvency information, namely, registered (i) Debt Relief Certificates; (ii) Debt Settlement

text: Arrangements; (iii) Personal Insolvency Arrangements registered in accordance with the Personal Insolvency Act 2012 . The ECB recommends requiring the Insolvency Service to provide the registered insolvency information to the CBI for inclusion on the CCR. In addition, this registered insolvency information, as well as any information from other registers to be included on the CCR, should be provided in a manner consistent with the format and scope of the CCR, to ensure a level of consistency and compatibility across these registers.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 5 October 2012.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI

type: vagledning

utgivare: ecb


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: See Title IV, Section I of the Guide to consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions, available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: Master Financial Assistance Facility Agreement between the EFSF, the Kingdom of Spain, the FROB and the Banco de España, available at http://www.eurozone.europa.eu/media/776296/2012-07-20-ffa-spain.pdf.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 9 October 2012 on European Financial Assistance (CON/2012/75)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 9 October 2012 on European Financial Assistance (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 17 July 2012, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Banco de España, on behalf of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Competitiveness for an opinion on Royal Decree-Law 21/2012 of 14 July 2012 on liquidity measures for the General Government and in the financial sector (hereinafter the ‘Royal Decree-Law’). The ECB was only consulted on the Fifth Additional Provision of the Royal Decree-Law which relates to the financial assistance for the recapitalisation of financial institutions in Spain by the European Financial Stability Facility (hereinafter the ‘financial assistance programme’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third and sixth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the Royal Decree-Law concerns the Banco de España and rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the Royal Decree-Law

text: The purpose of the Fifth Additional Provision is to clarify the competences of the different institutions involved in the implementation of the financial assistance programme, in order to ensure its successful launch. In particular, the Fifth Additional Provision provides for the following clarifications: 1.1 The information to be provided by the Banco de España to the European Commission, the ECB, the European Banking Authority (EBA), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and, where applicable, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) within the framework of the financial assistance programme shall be exempt from the secrecy obligation under Article 6 of Royal Decree-Legislation 1298/1986 insofar as disclosure of the relevant information is required for the performance of the functions of those institutions in connection with the financial assistance programme.

text: 1.2 The Fund for Orderly Bank Restructuring (FROB) is authorised to enter into any agreements or contracts as required in order to formalise the financial assistance and to make the financial assistance programme available to the State and the FROB. 1.3 In the context of recapitalisation, the FROB may advance, as a loan, in cash or in securities, the amount of aid requested by participating credit institutions. The advance payment is subject to certain circumstances which, in the Banco de España’s view, may ultimately impair the stability of the credit institution during the time frame required for the effective subscription and payment of the requested financial aid by the FROB. This advance payment will be offset as a credit claim against the credit institution on the date of subscription and disbursement of the instruments representing the equivalent amount of own resources. If, the subscription and disbursement do not ultimately take place, the credit institution will be obliged to immediately repay to the FROB all of the cash or securities granted under the loan. If the amount of the financial support granted is lower than the amount of the advance, the credit institution will immediately repay the corresponding excess amount. 1.4 The Deposit Guarantee Fund (DGF) may adopt measures to facilitate the implementation of the financial assistance programme. The DGF may also dispose of its assets for the constitution of guarantees requested in the context of such financial assistance. Such commitment and guarantees may be assumed by the credit institutions in the framework of the recapitalisation plans, as approved by the Banco de España.

text: 2. Duty to consult the ECB

text: The Spanish government approved the Royal Decree-Law on 13 July 2012 and it was published in the Boletín Oficial del Estado on 14 July 2012, entering into force on the following day. The urgent consultation request was received by the ECB on 17 July 2012, which effectively meant that the ECB was consulted on an adopted legislation and not on a draft law. The ECB would like to draw the Ministry’s attention to the proper procedure for its consultations .

text: 3. Information shared by the Banco de España

text: 3.1 The confidentiality regime under Article 6 of Royal Decree-Legislation 1298/1986 imposes a secrecy obligation regarding all data, documents and information in the Banco de España’s possession. However, in the performance of its supervisory role, this provision allows the Banco de España to share certain information with central banks and other similar monetary authorities when the information is relevant for the performance of their relevant statutory functions, for example, in the implementation of monetary policy and the corresponding provision of liquidity, the oversight of payment, netting and clearing systems and the stability of the financial system.

text: 3.2 The ECB understands that the supervisory information to be provided by the Banco de España to the ECB in the context of the financial assistance programme would be covered by the above mentioned

text: Article 6

text: , which permits the provision of supervisory information to central banks generally. Against this background, the ECB understands that, as far as concerns the information to be provided by the Banco de España to the ECB in particular, as distinct from the other institutions involved in the financial assistance programme, namely the Commission, the IMF, the EBA and the EFSF or the ESM, the new exemption regarding the Banco de España’s secrecy obligations has no material legal impact. The ECB therefore has no objection to the insertion, for the avoidance of any possible doubt, of this specific additional clause for the provision of supervisory information by the Banco de España to the ECB.

text: 4. Advance of the financial assistance as a loan by the FROB.

text: The ECB takes note of the possibility contained in the Fifth Additional Provision for the FROB to advance to any credit institution in the form of a loan, in cash or in securities, the amount of the financial aid requested by the participating credit institutions, and acknowledges that this tool will provide the FROB with additional flexibility to perform the duties conferred under the Financial Assistance Facility Agreement .

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 9 October 2012.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: See the ECB’s Convergence Report, May 2012, p. 28.

text: See also Article 15(3) of the Treaty according to which the ECB shall be subject to the public access regime of the Union only when exercising its administrative tasks.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 19 October 2012 on the freedom of information (CON/2012/76)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 19 October 2012 on the freedom of information (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 6 September 2012, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Irish Minister for Public Expenditure and Reform for an opinion on the General Scheme of the Freedom of Information Bill 2012. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third indent of

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the General Scheme relates to the Central Bank of Ireland (CBI). In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the General Scheme

text: 1.1 The General Scheme consolidates and restates the freedom of information legislation in Ireland. The General Scheme provides members of the public with the right to obtain access to information in the possession of public bodies, to have personal information relating to them in the possession of public bodies corrected where it is incomplete, incorrect or misleading, and to be given reasons for decisions taken by public bodies which affect them. 1.2 The General Scheme exempts certain records from the requirement to provide access to members of the public (hereinafter the ‘exempt records’). The exempt records that might be relevant from the perspective of the CBI include records relating to deliberations of public bodies, investigative functions of public bodies and negotiations by public bodies, international relations, confidential or commercially sensitive information, and the financial and economic interests of public bodies. Many of these records are only partially exempt as information can only be withheld if it can be shown that specific harm or injury would arise from disclosure. Many of the exempt records are also subject to an overall test of whether disclosure would be in the public interest.

text: 1.3 The General Scheme sets out details of the office of Information Commissioner. The Information Commissioner is to be independent in the performance of his or her functions. The Information Commissioner is to be appointed by the President of Ireland on the advice of the Irish Government following a resolution of the Irish Parliament recommending his or her appointment. Under the General Scheme, the powers of the Information Commissioner include the power to review decisions of public bodies in relation to freedom of information requests and, where necessary, to make binding decisions in relation thereto. The General Scheme provides that a requester who is refused access to records may appeal to the Office of the Information Commissioner, who may affirm, vary or annul the decision. 1.4 The General Scheme proposes that the Minister will, by way of an order (hereinafter the ‘Order’), declare that the CBI is a public body for the purposes of the Freedom of Information Act 2012 (hereinafter the ‘Act’), once it is enacted. This means that the Act will apply to the CBI. The Order is to provide that there will be no access to records which are subject to professional secrecy obligations under the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter the ‘ESCB Statute’) or EU Financial Services Directives. 1.5 The ECB understands that an amendment to section 33AK of the Central Bank Act 1942 may be required. Section 33AK currently prohibits the disclosure by the CBI of information that is subject to professional secrecy obligations under the Treaty, the ESCB Statute or the Supervisory Directives. However, section 33AK allows disclosure by the CBI of such information to certain bodies on the basis that those bodies comply with these professional secrecy obligations. It may be necessary to add the Information Commissioner as a body to whom this information can be disclosed.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 The ECB generally welcomes the General Scheme which is aimed at enhancing the legitimacy and accountability of the CBI by providing for access to certain records. 2.2 The ECB also welcomes that certain records are exempt. This aims to protect certain public and private interests. The categories of exempt records are intended to ensure balance between the right of access for the general public to CBI records and the need for the confidentiality of certain CBI records. 2.3 Once the General Scheme has been adapted into the Freedom of Information Bill 2012, the ECB looks forward to a consulted in the event it deviates substantially from the General Scheme.

text: 3. Professional secrecy obligations

text: 3.1 The obligation of professional secrecy for ECB and NCB staff under Article 37 of the ESCB Statute may give rise to similar provisions in the NCBs’ statutes or national legislation. The

text: primacy of EU law and rules adopted thereunder also means that national laws on access by third parties to documents may not lead to infringements of the European System of Central Bank’s confidentiality regime , and on the legal provisions on access to documents of the ECB. In this regard, the ECB refers to Decision ECB/2004/3 of 4 March 2004 on public access to European Central Bank documents and in particular to

text: Article 5

text: thereof which provides that ‘documents that are in the possession of an NCB and have been drawn up by the ECB as well as documents originating from the EMI or the Committee of Governors may be disclosed by the NCB only subject to prior consultation of the ECB concerning the scope of access, unless it is clear that the document shall or shall not be disclosed. Alternatively the NCB may refer the request to the ECB.’ The General Scheme should ensure consistency with the Treaties , the ESCB Statute and secondary EU legislation. 3.2 In this respect, the Order will be limited to access to records, subject to professional secrecy obligations under the ESCB Statute or EU Financial Services Directives. The ECB understands that this is an absolute exemption for which the restrictions referred to in 1.2 of this Opinion are not applicable. In this context, the ECB would welcome an opportunity to review the Order so as to determine whether it will sufficiently protect the professional secrecy obligations in the ESCB Statute. Article 37.2 of the ESCB Statute provides that persons having access to data covered by Union legislation imposing an obligation of secrecy shall be subject to this Union legislation. The Order should therefore be wide enough to cover all Union legislation imposing an obligation of secrecy. 3.3 The ECB expects that there will be no legal inconsistency or uncertainty as regards the relation between the Order and the amended section 33AK. The amended section 33AK and the Order must be without prejudice to the ESCB’s confidentiality regime. 3.4 The ECB understands that if a requester asks the Information Commissioner for a review of the CBI’s refusal of access to documents, the Information Commissioner is entitled to request documents from the CBI. In this regard, the ECB expects that this procedure is without prejudice to the ESCB’s confidentiality regime and the applicable public access legislation. The ECB notes that the CBI may appeal to the Irish High Court on a point of law only if the Information Commissioner decides that it is appropriate to grant access to CBI records. The ECB would welcome clarification in the Order that, given the protection that professional secrecy obligations are afforded in the ESCB Statute, the CBI will have an absolute right of appeal to a court or another body (and not just an appeal on a point of law) where the Information Commissioner determines that a refusal to grant access to records in reliance on the exemption for professional secrecy obligations is not justified. Access to the records should also be prohibited until the relevant court or body has ruled on the case.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 19 October 2012. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: EGT L 257, 27.10.1995, s. 1.

text: Se kommissionen (Eurostat) 2011 Annual Activity Report, s. 30, finns på kommissionens webbplats http://www.ec.europa.eu. Se även punkt 5 i yttrande

text: som finns på ECB:s webbplats http://www.ecb.europa.eu

text: Dom av den 10 juli 2003 i

text: mål C-11/00

text: , Europeiska gemenskapernas kommission mot Europeiska centralbanken, REG 2003, s. I-7147, särskilt punkterna 110 och 111. EU-domstolen förtydligade att skyldigheten att höra ECB huvudsakligen (har) till syfte att säkerställa att den som upprättar en sådan rättsakt avvaktar med att anta denna till dess det organ hörts som, genom de specifika uppgifter som det har på det aktuella området enligt gemenskapsrätten och med sin stora sakkunskap, särskilt kan bidra till det planerade lagstiftningsförfarandet.

text: Se

text: skäl 1

text: i

text: kommissionens förordning (EU) nr 1114/2010 av den 1 december 2010

text: om tillämpningsföreskrifter för

text: rådets förordning (EG) nr 2494/95

text: vad gäller minimistandarder för kvaliteten på vägningstalen för harmoniserade konsumentprisindex och om upphävande av

text: kommissionens förordning (EG) nr 2454/97

text: (EUT L 316, 2.12.2010, s. 4).

text: Se artikel 127.1 i fördraget

text: artikel 2

text: första meningen i stadgan för Europeiska centralbankssystemet och Europeiska centralbanken (nedan kallad ECBS-stadgan).

text: Se

text: artikel 127.2

text: första strecksatsen och

text: artikel 127.5

text: jämförd med artikel 139.2 c i fördraget samt

text: artikel 3.1

text: första strecksatsen och

text: artikel 3.3

text: jämförd med artikel 42.1 i ECBS-stadgan.

text: Se

text: skäl 3

text: i

text: rådets förordning (EG) nr 2494/95

text: Se

text: artikel 3 i förordning (EG) nr 2214/96 av den 20 oktober 1996

text: om harmoniserade konsumentprisindex: överföring och spridning av HIKP:s delindex (EGT L 296, 21.11.1996, s. 8) ändrad genom artikel 1.2 i förslaget till HICP-CT förordning och artikel 4.1 i förslaget till OOH-förordning.

text: EUT L 87, 31.3.2009, s. 164.

text: För närvarande i enlighet med artiklarna

text: eller

text: a, jämförda med

text: artikel 7

text: , i

text: rådets beslut 1999/468/EG av den 28 juni 1999

text: om de förfaranden som skall tillämpas vid utövandet av kommissionens genomförandebefogenheter (EGT L 184, 17.7.1999, s. 23). I det framtida ramverket enligt de ändringar som införs i förordning

text: (EG) nr 223/2009

text: enligt kommissionens förslag av den 17 april 2012 (COM(2012) 167 final) kommer kommissionen att agera enligt

text: artikel 5 i Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning (EU) nr 182/2011

text: om fastställande av allmänna regler och principer för medlemsstaternas kontroll av kommissionens utövande av sina genomförandebefogenheter (EUT L 55, 28.2.2011, s. 13).

text: Text markerad med fet stil anger ECB:s förslag till ny text. Genomstruken text anger de strykningar som ECB föreslår.

text: EUT C x, xx.xx.2012, s. xx

text: EUT C x, xx.xx.2012, s. xx

text: EGT L 229, 10.9.1996, s. 3.

text: EUT L 316, 2.12.2010, s. 4.

text: EGT L 229, 10.9.1996, s. 3.

text: EUT L 316, 2.12.2010, s. 4.

sprak: sv

title: Europeiska Centralbankens yttrande av den 19 oktober 2012 över ett förslag om ändring av kommissionens förordning (EG) nr 2214/96 om harmoniserade konsumentprisindex (HIKP): överföring och spridning av HIKP:s delindex, vad gäller införande av harmoniserade konsumentprisindex med konstant skattenivå, och ett förslag till kommissionens förordning med tillämpningsföreskrifter för rådets förordning (EG) nr 2494/95 om harmoniserade konsumentprisindex vad gäller fastställande av egnahemsprisindex (CON/2012/77)

text: Inledning och rättslig grund

text: Den 27 augusti 2012 mottog Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) en begäran från kommissionen om ett yttrande över a) ett förslag om ändring av

text: kommissionens förordning (EG) nr 2214/96

text: om harmoniserade konsumentprisindex (HIKP): överföring och spridning av HIKP:s delindex, vad gäller införande av harmoniserade konsumentprisindex med konstant skattenivå (nedan kallat förslaget till HICP-CT förordning) och b) ett förslag till kommissionens förordning med tillämpningsföreskrifter för

text: rådets förordning (EG) nr 2494/95

text: om harmoniserade konsumentprisindex vad gäller fastställande av egnahemsprisindex (nedan kallat förslaget till OOH-förordning) (nedan tillsammans kallade de föreslagna förordningarna).

text: ECB:s behörighet att avge ett yttrande grundar sig på artiklarna

text: och

text: i fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt och

text: artikel 5.3 i rådets förordning (EG) nr 2494/95 av den 23 oktober 1995

text: om harmoniserade konsumentprisindex. I enlighet med

text: artikel 17.5

text: första meningen i arbetsordningen för Europeiska centralbanken har detta yttrande antagits av ECB-rådet.

text: 1. Allmänna kommentarer

text: ECB stöder målen i de föreslagna förordningarna att a) genom förslaget till HICP-CT förordning skapa en regelbunden produktion av harmoniserade konsumentprisindex med konstant skattenivå och ta fram specifikationer för tillhörande uppgifter och metadata samt även gemensamma metoder samt b) genom förslaget till OOH-förordning sammanställa prisindex för bostäder och bostadskostnader för egnahem, inkl. framtagandet av tillhörande täckningsbeskrivning, metoder och krav på uppgifterna.

text: 2. ECB:s yttranden samt hur ECB involveras i det förberedande arbetet och vid genomförandet

text: 2.1 ECB understryker att den, i enlighet med artiklarna 127.4 och 282.5 i fördraget och enligt

text: , ska höras om alla genomförandeåtgärder som kommissionen föreslår avseende HIKP-ramverket. Skyldigheten att höra ECB är ett viktigt procedurkrav som man bör hänvisa till i alla rättsakter som utgör HIKP-ramverket. Den kommer också att gälla för alla genomförandeakter och delegerade akter som kommissionen antar enligt det reformerade rättsliga ramverket för HIKP som för närvarande tas fram.

text: 2.2 I

text: mål C-11/00

text: förtydligade domstolen att skyldigheten att höra ECB med hänvisning till dess uppgifter och sakkunskap. Harmoniserade konsumentprisindexen är viktiga som styrmedel för penningpolitiken och har därför stor betydelse för ECB och Europeiska centralbankssystemets (ECBS) huvudmål att upprätthålla prisstabilitet, samt även för Eurosystemets uppgifter att a) att utforma och genomföra euroområdets penningpolitik och b) bidra till det finansiella systemets stabilitet. Precis som i ingressen till

text: rådets förordning (EG) nr 2494/95

text: , där det stadgas att unionens monetära myndigheter behöver ha tillgång till konsumentprisindex av god kvalitet, bör sambandet mellan HIKP-ramverket och centralbankernas arbete uttryckligen nämnas i skälen till de föreslagna förordningarna. Dessutom bör man utnyttja den expertis avseende HIKP-ramverket som finns inom ECB, inte bara genom formella konsultationer med ECB rörande föreslag till rättsakter från kommissionen, utan även genom att involvera ECB i det förberedande arbetet och vid genomförandet, särskilt när det gäller framtagandet av relevanta metoder (se nedan). Som en del av ECB:s bidrag kan även input från experter från andra ECBS-medlemmar ingå.

text: 3. Utveckling av ramverk för HIKP-metoder och hur dessa integreras i rättsakter

text: 3.1 Enligt de föreslagna förordningarna ska kommissionen i nära samarbete med medlemsstaterna utarbeta riktlinjer för en metod för beräkning av de index och delindex som införs genom de föreslagna förordningarna. ECB stöder framtagandet av sådana metoder för ramverken men anser att ECB, tillsammans med medlemsstaterna, bör involveras när dessa tas fram. En sådan involvering av ECB, som även kan inkludera input från experter från andra ECBS-medlemmar, är en bra lösning som tar hänsyn till hur viktiga dessa index är för ECBS mål, och den expertis som ECB och andra ECBS-medlemmar har avseende HIKP-ramverket.

text: 3.2 Dessutom stadgar

text: artikel 12.2 i Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning (EG) nr 223/2009 av den 11 mars 2009

text: om europeisk statistik att när kvalitetskriterierna enligt denna förordning tillämpas på statistiska uppgifter som omfattas av sektorsspecifik lagstiftning ska kommissionen meddela närmare föreskrifter för de kvalitetsrapporter som avses i den sektorsspecifika lagstiftningen samt för rapporternas struktur och frekvens, i enlighet med det föreskrivande förfarande som avses i

text: artikel 27.2

text: . Mot denna bakgrund anser ECB att utarbetandet av riktlinjer för beräkningsmetoder för de index och delindex som införs genom de föreslagna förordningarna bör medföra att man tar in viktiga element och minimistandarder avseende kvaliteten för sådana metodologiska ramverk i unionens lagstiftning. För att värna rättslig transparens och rättssäkerhet kan manualer, riktlinjer och andra icke-rättsliga instrument komplettera, men inte ersätta, rättsligt bindande bestämmelser.

text: I de fall där ECB rekommenderar att de föreslagna förordningarna ändras anges de specifika förslagen i bilagan tillsammans med en förklaring.

text: BILAGA

text: Kommissionens förslag | ECB:s ändringsförslag

text: om harmoniserade konsumentprisindex ( ), särskilt

text: artikel 4 tredje stycket

text: och

text: artikel 5.3

text: , av följande skäl: […] (3) För analys av inflation och bedömning av konvergens i medlemsstaterna måste uppgifter samlas in om hur inflationen påverkas av skatteförändringar. Därför bör HIKP:s dessutom beräknas på grundval av priser vid konstant skattenivå istället för observerade priser i form av harmoniserade konsumentprisindex där skattenivån hålls konstant (konstantskatteindex). […] (6) Samråd har skett med Europeiska centralbanken i enlighet med

text: artikel 5.3 i förordning (EG) nr 2494/95

text: artikel 4 tredje stycket

text: och

text: artikel 5.3

text: , med beaktande av Europeiska centralbankens yttrande, och av följande skäl: […] (3) För analys av inflation, penning- och finanspolitik och bedömning av konvergens i medlemsstaterna måste uppgifter samlas in om hur inflationen påverkas av skatteförändringar. Därför bör HIKP:s dessutom beräknas på grundval av priser vid konstant skattenivå istället för observerade priser i form av harmoniserade konsumentprisindex där skattenivån hålls konstant (konstantskatteindex). […] (6) Samråd har skett med Europeiska centralbanken i enlighet med

text: Förklaring Skyldigheten att höra ECB är ett viktigt procedurkrav som man bör hänvisa till i ingressen till alla rättsakter som ingår i HIKP-ramverket. Därutöver bör man, precis som i ingressen till

text: rådets förordning (EG) nr 2494/95

text: , uttryckligen nämna sambandet mellan HIKP-ramverket och centralbankernas uppgifter i ett skäl till förslaget till HICP-CT förordning.

text: Artikel 3

text: ska ersättas med följande:

text: Artikel 3

text: Framtagande och överlämnande av delindex Medlemsstaterna ska varje månad beräkna och till kommissionen (Eurostat) överlämna alla delindex (bilaga I) som har en vikt som överstiger en promille av de totala utgifter som täcks av HIKP. Medlemsstaterna ska även, tillsammans med indexet för januari varje år, överlämna motsvarande uppgifter om viktningen till kommissionen (Eurostat). Dessutom ska medlemsstaterna varje månad beräkna och till kommissionen (Eurostat) överlämna samma delindex beräknade med konstant skattenivå (konstantskatteindex). Kommissionen (Eurostat) ska i nära samarbete med medlemsstaterna utarbeta riktlinjer för en metod för beräkning av konstantskatteindex och delindex. Kommissionen (Eurostat) ska vid behov uppdatera referensmetoden i enlighet med förfaranden som godkänts av kommittén för det europeiska statistiksystemet. | 2.

text: Artikel 3

text: ska ersättas med följande:

text: Artikel 3

text: Framtagande och överlämnande av delindex Medlemsstaterna ska varje månad beräkna och till kommissionen (Eurostat) överlämna alla delindex (bilaga I) som har en vikt som överstiger en promille av de totala utgifter som täcks av HIKP. Medlemsstaterna ska även, tillsammans med indexet för januari varje år, överlämna motsvarande uppgifter om viktningen till kommissionen (Eurostat). Dessutom ska medlemsstaterna varje månad beräkna och till kommissionen (Eurostat) överlämna samma delindex beräknade med konstant skattenivå (konstantskatteindex). Kommissionen (Eurostat) ska i nära samarbete med medlemsstaterna och Europeiska centralbanken utarbeta riktlinjer för en metod för beräkning av konstantskatteindex och delindex. Kommissionen (Eurostat) ska vid behov uppdatera referensmetoden i enlighet med förfaranden som godkänts av kommittén för det europeiska statistiksystemet.

text: Förklaring ECB bör involveras i det förberedande arbetet och vid genomförandet av förslaget till HICP-CT förordning, särskilt vid framtagandet av relevanta metoder. En sådan involvering av ECB, som även kan inkludera input från experter från andra ECBS-medlemmar, är ett nödvändigt steg utöver skyldigheten att samråda med ECB om alla rättsakter som utgör HIKP-ramverket. Skälen för detta är a) ECB:s expertis avseende HIKP-ramverket och b) den betydelse som HIKP-ramverket har för centralbankernas möjligheter att utföra sina arbetsuppgifter, särskilt avseende ECBS mål att upprätthålla prisstabilitet och Eurosystemets uppgifter att utforma och genomföra euroområdets penningpolitik och bidra till det finansiella systemets stabilitet.

text: Ingen text |

text: Artikel 1

text: a Övergångsbestämmelser Kommissionen (Eurostat), i samarbete med Europeiska centralbanken, ska inom två år efter den här förordningens ikraftträdande utarbeta en rapport som i) bedömer hur effektivt det metodologiska ramverket för beräkningen av konstantskatteindex och delindexenligt enligt den ändrade

text: artikel 3.2 i förordning (EG) nr 2214/96

text: är, och ii) rekommendera centrala element och minimikvalitetsstandarder för sådana metodologiska ramverk som ska fastställas i unionslagstiftning genom ändringar av det rättsliga ramverket kring HIKP.

text: Förklaring ECB anser att utarbetandet av metodologiska ramverk för riktlinjerna för beräkningsmetoder för de index och delindex som införs genom förslaget till HICP-CT förordning bör säkerställa att man inkluderar viktiga element och minimikvalitetsstandarder för sådana ramverk i unionens lagstiftning. För att värna rättslig transparens och rättssäkerhet kan manualer, riktlinjer och andra icke-rättsliga instrument komplettera, men inte ersätta, rättsligt bindande bestämmelser. ECB bör involveras i framtagandet av kommissionens förslag till lagstiftning av de skäl som anges i ändring 2 ovan. Som en del av ECB:s bidrag kan även input från experter från andra ECBS-medlemmar ingå.

text: om harmoniserade konsumentprisindex, särskilt

text: artikel 4 tredje stycket

text: och

text: artikel 5.3

text: , av följande skäl: […] (3) För sammanställning av index för egnahem måste husprisindex sammanställas. Husprisindex är också viktiga indikatorer i sig. […] (5) Samråd har skett med Europeiska centralbanken… . | med beaktande av fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt, med beaktande av

text: artikel 4 tredje stycket

text: och

text: artikel 5.3

text: , med beaktande av Europeiska centralbankens yttrande, och av följande skäl: […] (3) För sammanställning av index för egnahem måste husprisindex sammanställas. Husprisindex är också viktiga indikatorer i sig samt för penning- och finanspolitiken. […] (5) Samråd har skett med Europeiska centralbanken…

text: rådets förordning (EG) nr 2494/95

text: , uttryckligen nämna sambandet mellan HIKP-ramverket och centralbankernas uppgifter i ett skäl till förslaget till OOH-förordning.

text: 2. husprisindex ett index som mäter förändringarna av transaktionspriserna på bostäder som köps av hushållen. | 2. husprisindex ett index som mäter förändringarna av transaktionspriserna på bostäder som köps av hushållen, inklusive eventuell markkomponent.

text: Förklaring ECB anser att markpriser är en viktig komponent i ett husprisindex eftersom de spelar en viktig roll för den finansiella stabiliteten och ekonomisk analys, särskilt för att upptäcka eventuella prisbubblor. Därför bör man inkludera markpriser i OOH-förordningen istället för att nämna dem i metodmanualerna.

text: 1. Kommissionen (Eurostat) ska i nära samarbete med medlemsstaterna sammanställa en handbok med grundläggande metoder för de egnahemsprisindex och husprisindex som sammanställs enligt denna förordning (nedan kallad handbok). När så krävs ska kommissionen (Eurostat) uppdatera handboken i enlighet med rutiner som ESS-kommittén godkänner. | 1. Kommissionen (Eurostat) ska i nära samarbete med medlemsstaterna och Europeiska centralbanken sammanställa en handbok med grundläggande metoder för de egnahemsprisindex och husprisindex som sammanställs enligt denna förordning (nedan kallad handbok). När så krävs ska kommissionen (Eurostat) uppdatera handboken i enlighet med rutiner som ESS-kommittén godkänner.

text: Förklaring ECB bör involveras i det förberedande arbetet och vid genomförandet av förslaget till OOH-förordning, särskilt vid framtagandet av relevanta metoder. En sådan involvering av ECB, som även kan inkludera input från experter från andra ECBS-medlemmar, är ett nödvändigt steg utöver skyldigheten att samråda med ECB om alla rättsakter som utgör HIKP-ramverket. Skälen för detta är a) ECB:s expertis avseende HIKP-ramverket och b) den betydelse som HIKP-ramverket har för centralbankernas möjligheter att utföra sina arbetsuppgifter, särskilt avseende ECBS mål att upprätthålla prisstabilitet och Eurosystemets uppgifter att utforma och genomföra euroområdets penningpolitik och bidra till det finansiella systemets stabilitet.

text: 1. Ett år respektive tre år efter den här förordningens ikraftträdande ska medlemsstaterna till kommissionen (Eurostat) lämna rapporter om uppgifternas kvalitet med utgångspunkt i de krav som fastställts inom det europeiska statistiksystemet och i handboken. 2. Kommissionen (Eurostat) ska inom fem år efter den här förordningens ikraftträdande utarbeta en rapport om de index som fastställs i den här förordningen, särskilt om deras överensstämmelse med

text: kommissionens förordning (EG) nr 1749/96

text: och förordning

text: (EU) nr 1114/2010

text: . I rapporten ska det också behandlas huruvida det är lämpligt att inordna egnahemsprisindexet i det harmoniserade indexet över konsumentpriser. | 1. Ett år respektive tre år efter den här förordningens ikraftträdande ska medlemsstaterna till kommissionen (Eurostat) och Europeiska centralbanken lämna rapporter om uppgifternas kvalitet med utgångspunkt i de krav som fastställts inom det europeiska statistiksystemet och i handboken. 2. Kommissionen (Eurostat), i samarbete med Europeiska centralbanken, ska inom fem år efter den här förordningens ikraftträdande utarbeta en rapport som i) bedömer de index som fastställs i den här förordningen, särskilt om deras överensstämmelse med

text: och förordning

text: (EU) nr 1114/2010

text: , ii) I rapporten ska det också behandlas huruvida det är lämpligt att inordna egnahemsprisindexet i det harmoniserade indexet över konsumentpriser samt iii) rekommenderar centrala element och minimistandarder för det metodiska ramverket för egnahemsprisindex och husprisindex som bör fastställas i unionslagstiftning genom ändringar av ramverket kring HIKP.

text: Förklaring ECB anser att utarbetandet av metodologiska ramverk för riktlinjerna för beräkningsmetoder för de index och delindex som införs genom förslaget till OOH-förordning bör säkerställa att man inkluderar viktiga element och minimikvalitetsstandarder för sådana ramverk i unionens lagstiftning. För att värna rättslig transparens och rättssäkerhet kan manualer, riktlinjer och andra icke-rättsliga instrument komplettera, men inte ersätta, rättsligt bindande bestämmelser. ECB bör involveras i framtagandet av kommissionens förslag till lagstiftning av de skäl som anges i ändring 3 ovan. Som en del av ECB:s bidrag kan även input från experter från andra ECBS-medlemmar ingå.


text: Monitorul Oficial al României, Part One, No 142, 5.4.2000. 2 OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 23 October 2012 on open market operations and standing facilities (CON/2012/78)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 23 October 2012 on open market operations and standing facilities (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 2 October 2012, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from Banca Naţională a României (BNR) for an opinion on a draft regulation amending BNR Regulation No 1/2000 on open market operations performed by Banca Naţională a României and standing facilities granted to eligible participants (hereinafter the ‘draft regulation’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and

text: Article 2(2) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft regulation relates to instruments of monetary policy. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft regulation

text: The draft regulation repeals the restriction on the number of options in the bids submitted by eligible participants for variable-rate tenders organised by BNR for the purposes of open market operations, as such restriction may have a negative impact on the interbank Romanian leu money market liquidity in certain difficult market situations. This is in line with the commitments under the precautionary financial assistance programme with the International Monetary Fund, the European Union and the World Bank. The draft regulation also rearranges the wording of BNR Regulation No 1/2000 relating to the requirement that eligible participants in BNR’s open market operations must be subject to the minimum reserve regime, in accordance with BNR’s regulations, for greater clarity and terminological consistency.

text: 2. Specific observations

text: 2.1 The amended Article 34 of BNR Regulation No 1/2000 will no longer refer to ‘variable-rate tenders’ and, therefore, the concept of ‘bids’ under

text: Article 34

text: will encompass bids for both fixedrate and variable-rate tenders performed for the purposes of BNR’s open market operations. The

text: ECB understands that, under the amended Article 34 of BNR Regulation No 1/2000, options for different amounts in the fixed-rate tenders refer to the amounts with collateral from different International Security Identification Numbers for operations requiring eligible assets as collateral. The ECB further understands that BNR will also modify the operating procedures pursuant to Article 43 of BNR Regulation No 1/2000. 2.2 The ECB welcomes the clarification of the requirement that eligible participants in BNR’s open market operations must be subject to the minimum reserve regime.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website three weeks after the date of its adoption.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 23 October 2012.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 2 OJ L 306, 23.11.2011, p. 41.

text: Article 152(8) of the draft law. 4 According to this provision, the BNB shall act as a fiscal agent and depository of the State pursuant to contracts concluded and under market conditions and at market prices of services. In this capacity, the BNB is inter alia responsible for executing bank servicing of accounts and payments included in the single account system, in the name and for the account of the Ministry of Finance; collecting and submitting to the Ministry of Finance regular information about the accounts of public-financed enterprises with banks in Bulgaria; and acting as a government debts agent and a government guaranteed debts agent. In its capacity as a government debts agent, the BNB keeps government securities accounts, which shall be registered according to debt transferees. BNB may act as an authorised representative of the Council of Ministers for purposes and under conditions established thereby and by the Council of Ministers. 5 Article 154(12) of the draft law. 6 The precise scope of application of the monetary financing prohibition is further clarified by

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 of 13 December 1993

text: specifying definitions for the application of the prohibitions referred to in Articles

text: and

text: b(1) of the Treaty, (OJ L 332, 31.12.1993, p. 1). 7 ECB Convergence Report 2012, p. 29.

text: Article 154 (21) of the draft law. 9 Articles 104 and 142 of the draft law. 10 ECB Convergence Report 2012, p.31; see also Opinions

text: paragraph 3.3 and

text: paragraph 6.2.2.All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 11 See ECB Convergence Report 2012, pp. 21-28. 12 See Opinion

text: paragraph 6.1.

text: OJ L 198, 30.7.2010, p. 1. 14 OJ L 87, 31.3.2009, p. 164. 15 This includes the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union, which Bulgaria signed on 2 March 2012, as well as the six legislation changes to strengthen the Union economic governance framework (the so-called ‘six-pack’) which entered into force on 13 December 2011, including Directive

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 24 October 2012 on fiscal rules and on the servicing of bank accounts and payments of budget organisations (CON/2012/79)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 24 October 2012 on fiscal rules and on the servicing of bank accounts and payments of budget organisations (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 28 August 2012, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Bulgarian Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft law on public finance (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to Българска народна банка (Bulgarian National Bank or BNB). In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: The aims of the draft law are to: (a) improve the system for public finance management, including through the application of fiscal rules by the central and local authorities; (b) provide for the common organisation and structure of public finances as an integrated system for ensuring and financing public goods and services, the reallocation and transferring of incomes and the accumulation of resources by budget organisations; (c) consolidate national fiscal rules, inter alia, by introducing rules for the structural deficit, and for the deficit and consolidated debt of the general government sector; (d) transpose

text: Council Directive 2011/85/EU of 8 November 2011

text: on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States and create the conditions for the implementation of related regulations; and (e) provide for detailed rules on the servicing of bank accounts and payments of budget organisations by BNB and by banks, and for the interaction between BNB and the Ministry of Finance with regard to such servicing. The system for public finance management established by the draft law is combined with a system for the servicing of bank accounts and payments of budget organisations. The servicing of bank accounts of budget organisations and budget organisation payments is carried out by BNB and by banks, subject to the rules laid down in the draft law, and in accordance with the joint instructions of the Minister for

text: Finance and the Governor of BNB. Funds from the Union are paid into, kept and serviced in bank accounts at BNB. A limited number of exceptions to this rule are set out in the draft law. In order to ensure that public funds are secured, where accounts and payments of budget organisations are serviced by banks, the banks will guarantee the full amount of available cash funds in all accounts and deposits serviced by them in levs and exchangeable currency of the budget organisations. In this respect, BNB shall carry out services to enable the banks to guarantee the funds in favour of the Ministry of Finance. The types of guarantee are set out in the draft law. The Minister for Finance and the Governor of BNB can change the amount and the type of bank assets which serve as guarantee, as well as the terms and conditions of the guarantee referred to in the draft law . The accounts of the budget organisations with BNB are organised and serviced in a single system for collection, deposit, payment and accounting (hereinafter the ‘single account’). BNB services the single account and the other accounts and payments of budget organisations in accordance with the rules provided for in the draft law, and with the requirements of Article 43 of the Law on the Bulgarian National Bank (hereinafter the ‘Law on the BNB’) . BNB, on behalf and on the account of the Ministry of Finance, services the accounts of the budget organisations included in the single account. The Ministry of Finance pays BNB on a contractual basis for the servicing of the single account and for the services connected with information provision for the accounts of budget organisations .

text: 2. Prohibition on monetary financing

text: 2.1 It is important to safeguard compliance with the monetary financing prohibition pursuant to Article 123 of the Treaty. The prohibition is essentially designed to prevent national central banks (NCBs) from providing overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facility to the public sector . National legislation may not therefore require that an NCB finance the performance of functions of other public sector bodies . In this regard, the ECB notes that the draft law stipulates that payments in the single account system are carried out up to the amount of the total availability of the single account, within the framework of the relevant availability and limits referred to in

text: Article 154(1)

text: , (13), and (14) of the draft law. BNB does not bear liability for non-payments or delayed payments

text: due to an insufficiency of funds in the single account . The ECB understands that temporary interest-free loans from accounts which will be serviced by BNB do not involve any financing by the BNB as this would otherwise not be compliant with the monetary financing prohibition. 2.2 The ECB acknowledges that the draft law refers to services to be carried out by BNB as agent of the State. Article 21.2 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter the ‘Statute of the ESCB’) establishes that the ‘ECB and national banks may act as fiscal agents’ for ‘Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of Member States’. The ECB understands that the provision of services by BNB pursuant to the draft law is to be read in conjunction with Article 43 of the Law on the BNB, according to which BNB shall act as the fiscal agent and depositary of the State by virtue of contracts concluded at market conditions and prices. As noted in the ECB’s Convergence Report, national legislation that enables an NCB to hold government deposits and to service government accounts does not raise concerns about the compliance with the monetary financing prohibition as long as such provisions do not allow the extension of credit, including overnight overdrafts, and that deposits or current account balances are not remunerated above market rates .

text: 3. Central bank independence

text: The ECB expects that BNB’s involvement will be fully compatible with its institutional and financial independence to safeguard the proper performance of its tasks under the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB. The principle of central bank independence, inter alia, requires that Member States do not put their NCBs in a position where they have insufficient financial resources and inadequate net equity to carry out their tasks related to the European System of Central Banks or Eurosystem . The ECB acknowledges that the envisaged arrangements serve the system of servicing of the bank accounts and payments of budget organisations, and consequently of the system for public finance management. The ECB understands that instructions of the Minister for Finance relating to the services of BNB are limited to the role of the State and the budget organisations as clients and beneficiaries of accounts serviced by BNB. Furthermore, the ECB notes that BNB is able to charge appropriate fees for the provision of services under the draft law.

text: 4. Accountancy and statistics

text: With regard to accountancy, the ECB notes that

text: Article 165(1)

text: provides that the Ministry of Finance, upon agreement with the National Statistical Authority, may instruct enterprises which are not budget organizations and which fall within the general government sector to apply the relevant standards, instructions and accountancy plans. The list of these enterprises shall be published on the websites of both institutions. The ECB is of the opinion that complete and reliable public accounting practices for all subsectors of general government are a precondition for the production of high-quality statistics. In addition, Article 169 of the draft law specifies that the standards, instructions and accounting plan will provide the statistical information for preparation of the data on the general government sector and its subsectors in accordance with the requirements of the Union. To ensure high-quality statistics, the ECB considers that this provision could benefit from a reference to

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 679/2010 of 26 July 2010

text: amending

text: Regulation (EC) No 479/2009

text: as regards the quality of statistical data in the context of the excessive deficit procedure which strengthens the Commission’s powers to access a widened scope of information for the needs of data quality assessment, in full compliance with

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 223/2009

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2009 on European statistics establishing a legislative framework for the production of European statistics. The latter Regulation also lays down the principles governing the development, production and dissemination of European statistics as regards professional independence, impartiality, objectivity, reliability, statistical confidentiality and cost-effectiveness.

text: 5. Numerical fiscal rules

text: The draft law contains numerical fiscal rules associated with automatic correction mechanisms where expected budgetary outcomes deviate from targets. The ECB considers that numerical fiscal rules contribute to enhancing fiscal discipline as intended under the strengthened Union governance framework. To ensure full compliance with Union fiscal governance rules and possible future changes thereto, the draft act should refer to the relevant Union legislation .

text: 6. Fiscal transparency

text: The availability of timely and reliable fiscal data is crucial to the proper functioning of budgetary surveillance and the monitoring of budgetary developments. A key element in ensuring the quality of fiscal data is transparency, which must entail the regular public availability of such data. However, the draft law does not cover all the requirements under Directive

text: , such as the obligation to publish cash-based fiscal data (or the equivalent figure from public accounting if cash-based data are not

text: available) on a monthly basis for central government, state government and social security sub-sectors, and on a quarterly basis for the local government sub-sector. Moreover, for fiscal transparency reasons and to ensure compliance with the relevant Union legislation, the ECB suggests that the draft law also obliges the government to publish a detailed reconciliation table showing the methodology of transmission between cash-based data and data based on ESA 95 as required under Directive

text: 7. Government deposits and liquidity management

text: Article 154(22) of the draft law allows the Minister for Finance to manage the government liquidity, including the single account, without any prior coordination with BNB, except for general guidelines about the government liquidity management. The ECB notes that the management of the government liquidity may interfere with the smooth implementation of monetary policy by BNB. Indeed, placing the government liquidity either with BNB or with the Bulgarian banking system may trigger large liquidity effects for the economy which are equivalent to monetary policy operations. As a result, the lack of any prior coordination with the BNB regarding the management of the government liquidity may jeopardise the smooth fulfillment of the monetary policy mandate of the BNB, which is a deficiency that should be addressed in the draft law.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 24 October 2012.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 2 See the ECB’s Convergence Report 2012, p. 237 and the European Commission’s Convergence Report 2012, p. 71. 3 All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: In the request of 8 October 2012 from Latvijas Banka for an opinion on draft amendments to the Law on Latvijas Banka, Latvijas Banka informs the ECB that it has taken into account the ECB’s observation made in Opinion

text: . 5 Saiemas Kārtības rullis, "LV", 96 (227), 18.08.1994. 6 See Recommendation

text: of the European Systemic Risk Board of 22 December 2011 on the macro-prudential mandate of national authorities (OJ C 41, 14.2.2012, p. 1).

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 29 October 2012 on amendments to the Law on Latvijas Banka (CON/2012/80)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 29 October 2012 on amendments to the Law on Latvijas Banka (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 8 October 2012, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from Latvijas Banka for an opinion on draft amendments to the Law on Latvijas Banka (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to Latvijas Banka. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: The draft law addresses a number of issues raised by the ECB and the European Commission in their Convergence Reports in relation to the Law on Latvijas Banka. In this regard, amendments are made to the provisions concerning Latvijas Banka’s independence, prohibitions on monetary financing and privileged access, and the legal integration of Latvijas Banka into the Eurosystem. The draft law introduces additional amendments to the Law on Latvijas Banka compared to the previous draft legislation on which the ECB commented in Opinion

text: . In particular, the draft law aligns the grounds for dismissal of the Governor, the Deputy Governor and other members of the Council of Latvijas Banka under Article 22(4) of the Law on Latvijas Banka with grounds for dismissal set out in Article 14.2 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter the ‘Statute of the ESCB’). The draft law amends Article 41 of the Law on Latvijas Banka, by explicitly providing that Latvijas Banka shall, inter alia, contribute to the stability of the financial system. The draft law also amends Article 34(3) of the Law on Latvijas Banka, providing that the requirements for euro cash processing systems and the quality requirements for euro banknote processing must be performed in compliance with Union law.

text: 2. General observations

text: The ECB welcomes the fact that the Latvian authorities have taken into account the ECB’s earlier observations in Opinion

text: . The ECB also notes that the compatibility of Latvian legislation, including the Law on Latvijas Banka and the Law on prevention of conflict of interests in activities of public officials , with Article 130 and 131 of the Treaty will be assessed in the ECB’s next Convergence Report.

text: 3. Specific observations

text: 3.1 The ECB welcomes the amendments to Article 22 of the Law on Latvijas Banka that refer to Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB as regards the grounds for dismissal of the Governor, the Deputy Governor and other members of the Council of Latvijas Banka. 3.2 As regards institutional independence, the ECB reiterates its observations in paragraph 3.2 of Opinion

text: , specifically that it understands that the term ‘supervision’ in the context of Article 43(1) of the Law on Latvijas Banka refers to the Parliament’s right to ask questions pursuant to the Law on the Rules of Procedure of the Parliament so as to enhance Latvijas Banka’s accountability for its decisions. Based on this understanding, Article 43(1) of the Law on Latvijas Banka is compatible with the principle of central bank independence enshrined in Article 130 of the Treaty and mirrored in Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB. 3.3 The ECB welcomes the amendment to Article 34(3) of the Law on Latvijas Banka which takes into account the observation made by the ECB in paragraph 3.5 of Opinion CON 2012/73 on the legal integration of Latvijas Banka into the Eurosystem. 3.4 The ECB further welcomes the amendment to Article 41 of the Law on Latvijas Banka which provides for Latvijas Banka to contribute to the smooth conduct of policies pursued by the competent authorities relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system. This amendment takes into account the role of the Eurosystem under Article 127(5) of the Treaty, as recommended by the ECB in paragraph 3.6 of Opinion

text: . 3.5 Furthermore, the ECB is of the view that it would be beneficial, from a financial stability perspective, to establish an effective macro-prudential policy framework at a national level, where Latvijas Banka plays a key role .

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 29 October 2012. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: See the preparatory work of the draft law on public debt market and monetary policy instruments, Senate, 1001-1 (1990 – 1991), p. 6 and 21. 3 See for example

text: paragraph 2 and

text: paragraph 2.3. 4 See the annual accounts and reports for the financial year 2011, p. 63 (section 6) and p. 78, including footnote (1).

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 29 October 2012 on profit distribution between the Nationale Bank van België/Banque Nationale de Belgique and the Belgian State (CON/2012/81)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 29 October 2012 on profit distribution between the Nationale Bank van België/Banque Nationale de Belgique and the Belgian State (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 4 October 2012, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Nationale Bank van België/Banque Nationale de Belgique (NBB), acting on behalf of the Belgian Minister for Finance, for an opinion on a draft law repealing a profit distribution rule between the NBB and the Belgian State and amending the Law of 28 July 1948 on the reorganisation of the balance sheet of the NBB (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third indent of

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to the NBB. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purposes of the draft law

text: The draft law aims to delete, from 1 January 2012, the third paragraph of

text: Article 3

text: (b) of the Law on the reorganisation of the balance sheet of the NBB, which provides for a stand-alone obligation of the NBB to pay the Belgian State an annual amount of 986 million Belgian francs (EUR 24.4 million). The purpose of this obligation, introduced in 1991, was to neutralise the Belgian State’s additional annual expenditure resulting from the one-off conversion of the NBB’s consolidated claim on the Belgian State into freely markeatable securities bearing interest at market rates for a total of 34 billion Belgian francs. Pursuant to the distribution rules in force at the time, the Belgian State was to receive the net financial proceeds in excess of 3% of the difference between the average amount of the NBB’s interest-bearing assets and remunereated liabilities calculated on an annual basis. Taking into account an adjustment of 0.1% out of this 3% (due to the partial compensation for the maintenance of the banknotes in circulation), the application of the ‘3% rule’ to the 34 billion Belgian francs corresponding to the aggregate amount of freely markeatable securities bearing interest at market rates

text: booked in the NBB’s balance sheet resulted in an amount of EUR 24.4 million . Subsequently, Article 2 of the Law of 3 April 2009 amending the financial provisions of the Law of 22 February 1998 establishing the Organic Statute of the Nationale Bank of België/Banque Nationale de Belgique (hereinafter the ‘Organic Statute of the NBB’) repealed the ‘3% rule’.

text: Article 3

text: introduced a new profit distribution rule in Article 32 of the Organic Statute of the NBB according to which the NBB’s annual profits are allocated as follows: (a) from the excess of NBB annual profits after allocation to shareholders of a first dividend of 6% of the NBB’s capital, an amount proposed by the NBB’s Board of Directors and established by its Council of Regency is independently allocated to the reserve fund or to the available reserves; (b) from the remaining profits a second dividend established by the Council of Regency of a minimum of 50% of the net proceeds from assets forming the counterpart to the reserve fund and available reserves is allocated to shareholders; and (c) finally, the balance is allocated to the State. Articles 2 and 3 of that law entered into force on 1 January 2009. The ECB was consulted on this new profit distribution rule and adopted Opinion

text: 2. General observations

text: Any transfer of a national central bank’s resources to a Member State, either in the form of a profit distribution scheme or any equivalent form, needs to comply with the limitations imposed in this respect by the Treaty, in particular with the principle of central bank independence pursuant to Article 130 of the Treaty, and with the prohibition on monetary financing laid down in

text: Article 123(1)

text: 3. Specific observations

text: The draft law repeals the stand-alone obligation of the NBB to pay on a yearly basis to the Belgian State a fixed amount of EUR 24.4 million. The ECB understands that since the repeal of the ‘3% rule’ in 2009, the NBB has continued to pay this stand-alone amount, which was, however, computed in its annual accounts as an expense, thereby deducting from the total amount of distribution made to the State in accordance with Article 32 of the Organic Statute of the NBB the amount of EUR 24.4 million. As this obligation is formally incompatible with the (new) profit distribution rules contained in Article 32 of the Organic Statute of the NBB, repealing it removes the risk of inconsistent profit allocation. These profits will now be exclusively governed by the Organic Statute of the NBB. In addition, the ECB understands that the agreement between the NBB and the Ministry of Finance setting out the details of the application of

text: Article 3

text: (b) of the Law on the reorganisation of the balance sheet of the NBB is terminated. This would, in turn, strengthen the overall financial independence of the NBB, whose discretion will no more be restricted by requirements to take into account fixed annual payments to the Belgian State.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 29 October 2012. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI