text: Ännu ej offentliggjord i EUT.

title: ECB-rådets yttrande av den 18 juli 2012 över en rekommendation från rådet om utnämning av en ledamot i Europeiska centralbankens direktion (CON/2012/56)

text: Inledning och rättslig grund

text: Den 16 juli 2012 mottog Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) en begäran från Europeiska rådets ordförande om ett yttrande över rådets rekommendation av den 10 juli 2012 om utnämning av en ledamot i Europeiska centralbankens direktion.

text: ECB-rådets behörighet att avge ett yttrande grundar sig på

text: artikel 283.2 i fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt

text: Allmänna kommentarer

text: 1. I rådets rekommendation, som överlämnats till Europeiska rådet och som Europaparlamentet och ECB-rådet nu ska yttra sig över, föreslås att Yves MERSCH utnämns till ledamot i Europeiska centralbankens direktion för en tid av åtta år.

text: 2. ECB-rådet anser att den förslagna kandidaten är en person som besitter den allmänt erkända auktoritet och yrkeserfarenhet inom den finansiella sektorn som krävs enligt artikel 283.2 i fördraget.

text: 3. ECB-rådet har ingen invändning mot rådets rekommendation att utnämna Yves MERSCH till ledamot i Europeiska centralbankens direktion.


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: See Title IV, Section I of the Guide to consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions, available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: See the third paragraph of Article 29 of the draft law.

text: See paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: and in the context of consultations by Slovenia paragraph 4.1.2 of Opinion

text: . All ECB Opinions are available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 5 See

text: Article 43(8)

text: , point 2 of the Law on banking.

publisher: Europeiska centralbanken

sprak: en

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 20 July 2012 on the Slovenia Sovereign Holding (CON/2012/57)

serie: con

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 20 July 2012 on the Slovenia Sovereign Holding (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

type: rubrik

text: On 13 July 2012, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Slovenian Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft law on the Slovenia Sovereign Holding (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the sixth indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

type: stycke

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The main purpose of the draft law is to establish the Slovenia Sovereign Holding (SSH) which will be charged with managing all investments of the Republic of Slovenia. Concentrating all State investments at one managing entity allows active management of the investments and a consistent corporate management system. Consequently, the value of the investments is expected to increase. The draft law: (a) simplifies the management structure; (b) defines more clearly the intention and criteria of State investment management; and (c) creates a single State asset reserve. 1.2 Article 29 of the draft law provides that the SSH or its subsidiary may acquire and manage assets transferred within restructuring programmes by the banks to the SSH or its subsidiary against consideration. In this context: (a) all ancillary rights, such as rights to privileged repayment, mortgage, pledge, rights arising from the contract with the guarantor, rights to interest, penalties, and other ancillary rights provided by law, pass to the SSH on the transfer of assets; (b) all bank assets acquired on the basis of an enforced ancillary right referred to in point (a) prior to the transfer of a bad claim are also transferred to the SSH on the transfer of assets; (c) the SSH may acquire investments as capital instruments, including hybrid convertible instruments, issued by banks and taken into account in calculation of the bank’s own funds in accordance with laws and

text: regulations and may recapitalise banks with monetary or non-monetary contributions. The consideration for the purchase of the banks’ assets may be either monetary or non-monetary in the form of financial instruments whose holder or, respectively, issuer is the SSH or its subsidiary. The SSH or its subsidiary may issue State-guaranteed bonds and take State-guaranteed loans to finance the purchase of the banks’ assets. Bonds issued by the SSH or its subsidiary for the purpose of financing the purchase of the banks’ assets may be paid in by transferring assets which are being purchased to the SSH or its subsidiary. The Government may adopt a regulation specifying the manner in which the assets are transferred to the SSH and the manner in which the activities referred to in this paragraph are performed.

text: 2. Duty to consult the ECB

text: 2.1 The Slovenian government endorsed the draft law on 12 July 2012 and submitted it to the Parliament for adoption in an extraordinary session of the Slovenian Parliament on 18 to 20 July 2012. The Ministry requested the ECB to deliver its opinion as soon as possible which effectively means that the ECB has been given an extremely short deadline of three to five working days. The ECB would like to draw the Ministry’s attention to the proper procedure for its consultations as set out below . 2.2 The second sentence of

text: Article 4 of Decision 98/415/EC

text: provides that the ECB must be consulted ‘at an appropriate stage’ in the legislative process. This implies that the consultation should take place at a point in the legislative process which affords the ECB sufficient time to examine the draft legislative provisions, and where necessary translate them, and to adopt its opinion in all required language versions, and which also enables the relevant national authorities to take the ECB’s opinion into consideration before the provisions are adopted. Where draft legislative provisions are prepared by an authority other than the adopting authority, it can be derived from

text: Article 4 of Decision 98/415/EC

text: that consultation on such provisions must take place at a time which enables the authority initiating the draft legislative provisions to consider whether they should be amended in order to accommodate the ECB’s opinion, i.e. before transmission of the provisions to the adopting authority. The timetable should also factor in a reasonable period for the ECB to examine the consultation dossier and deliver its opinion.

text: Article 4

text: does not preclude national authorities from taking steps in accordance with their legislative procedures that do not affect the substance of the draft legislative provisions. 2.3 It follows from the wording of

text: Article 3(4) of Decision 98/415/EC

text: that Member States are obliged to suspend the process for adoption of the draft legislative provision pending submission of the ECB’s opinion. This does not mean that the whole national legislative process, for example, preparatory work of parliamentary standing committees, discussion of other opinions submitted by national authorities, etc. should be suspended pending delivery of the ECB’s opinion. Rather it

text: means that the adopting authority has to have the opportunity to deliberate meaningfully the ECB’s opinion prior to taking its decision on the substance. If a time limit has been set for submission of the ECB opinion and this time limit has expired, the national authority concerned may restart the adoption process. But even in such a case, and as long as the legislation has not yet been adopted, the national authorities continue to be obliged to take the ECB’s opinion into consideration.

text: 3. Consultation on the implementing regulations

text: The ECB takes note of the Slovenian authorities’ endeavours to help banks in difficulties by transferring their bad claims to the SSH. The ECB understands that Article 29 of the draft law is only the basic provision enabling such transfer whereas the detailed rules on the asset transfer and the SSH’s activities in this respect will be set out in an implementing regulation to be adopted by the Government . Such implementing rules are of great interest to the Eurosystem, for example as regards the possible role of Banka Slovenije, the price at which assets are transferred to the SSH and the SSH’s investment strategy. Taking due account of the ECB’s fields of competence, the ECB invites the Slovenian authorities to duly consult it on any such implementing regulations.

text: 4. Role of Banka Slovenije

text: Banka Slovenije as the banking supervisor should be involved in any procedure identifying the banks transferring their bad claims to the SSH as well as identifying and defining the value of the assets to be transferred to the SSH. The ECB would therefore suggest explicitly providing for an appropriate role of Banka Slovenije, either in the draft law or in any other relevant legal act.

text: 5. Value at which banks’ assets are transferred to the SHH or its subsidiary

text: In accordance with Article 29 of the draft law the SSH or its subsidiary may acquire banks’ assets as part of restructuring programmes. Although the draft law does not provide any details about their valuation, the ECB emphasises the importance of assets being transferred at their real economic value. Bad claims should usually be purchased at market value. Using public resources to purchase assets at relatively high prices from a bank under resolution may be a hidden subsidy and bail out private shareholders or creditors and may conceal the real cost of recapitalisation. It may also provide incentive to banks to sell to the SSH a greater portion of their assets than justified.

text: 6. Transfer of interest accrued on bank assets transferred to the SSH

text: In accordance with the second indent of the first paragraph of Article 29 of the draft law, all bank’s assets acquired on the basis of an enforced ancillary right prior to the transfer of a bad claim are also transferred to the SSH together with the transfer of assets. This implies that, in addition to the bad claim itself, also all interest accrued prior to the transfer of the bad claim to the SSH, including the interest accrued in the

text: course of the regular repayment of the bank claim, should be transferred to the SSH. Such provision would thus apply in arrears and could also refer to assets that have perhaps already been disposed of. It would also not be in line with the intention of the asset transfer under the draft law to reduce the burden on banks with bad claims. Taking the above into account, the ECB would recommend revisiting this provision.

text: 7. Bank recapitalisation by the SSH

text: In accordance with the third indent of the first paragraph of Article 29 of the draft law, the SSH may recapitalise banks with cash or non-cash contributions. As consistently expressed in its opinions , the ECB generally prefers issuances of shares against a cash contribution for financial stability reasons. It should also be noted that recapitalisation against non-cash contributions may in this case be carried out only if the bank share capital increase is based on an additional measure of Banka Slovenije .

text: 8. SSH bonds

text: In accordance with the second paragraph of Article 29 of the draft law, the SSH or its subsidiary may issue State-guaranteed bonds to finance the purchase of the banks’ assets. Bonds issued by the SSH or its subsidiary for the purpose of financing the purchase of the banks’ assets can be paid in by transferring assets being purchased to the SSH or its subsidiary. Such investment in banks of the State-owned SSH’s bonds is not desirable from the financial stability perspective as it reinforces the link between the State and the banking sector.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 20 July 2012.

text: [signed]

text: The Vice-President of the ECB

text: Vítor CONSTÂNCIO

type: vagledning

utgivare: ecb


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: To this end the draft law amends (a) the Law of 14 December 1994 on the Bank Guarantee Fund, consolidated text published in Dziennik Ustaw (Dz. U.) of 2009 No 84, item 711 (hereinafter the ‘Law on BFG’); and (b) the Law of 12 February 2010 on the recapitalisation of certain financial institutions, Dz. U. of 2010 No 40, item 226 (hereinafter ‘the Law on recapitalisation’). 3 According to

text: Article 4(2)

text: (1) and (1a) in connection with Articles 19 and 20 of the Law on BFG, the existing assistance fund is used by the BFG to provide the entities covered by the obligatory deposit guarantee scheme with returnable financial assistance (in the case of an insolvency threat or for the acquisition of banks’ shares), and for acquiring claims of banks threatened with insolvency. See also paragraphs 32(2) and 34 of the BFG’s Statute as introduced by the Regulation of the Minister for Finance of 14 September 2009 on establishing the Statute of the Bank Guarantee Fund (Dz. U. of 2009 No 164, item 1308).

text: Under the Law on recapitalisation, a recapitalisation guarantee may be granted to a distressed financial institution by the Minister for Finance, resulting in the State Treasury acquiring shares, bonds or other debt instruments issued by the recapitalised financial institution in cases where such instruments are not acquired by market entities. See in this respect Opinion

text: (all ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu). According to new

text: Article 6

text: (2a) of the Law on recapitalisation, inserted by Article 4 of the draft law, the Minister for Finance, having taken a decision to grant a recapitalisation guarantee, may request the BFG to provide financing or co-financing of the guarantee from the stabilisation fund. 5 See Article 16(3) of the Law on BFG, as amended by

text: Article 1(5)

text: (c) of the draft law. 6 See

text: Article 38

text: (4a) of the Law on BFG, inserted by Article 1(9) of the draft law. 7 See

text: Article 17

text: a of the Law of 21 July 2006 on financial market supervision, Dz. U. of 2008 No 209, item 1317, inserted by Article 2 of the draft law 8 Established by the Law of 7 November 2008 on the Financial Stability Committee, Dz. U. of 2006 No 157, item 1119. The Financial Stability Committee is a body currently comprising: the Minister for Finance (as Chairman), the President of NBP and the Chairman of the Financial Supervision Authority. It is responsible for the fostering and protection of the stability of the national financial system through the exchange of information and coordination of activities in this area. See also Opinion

text: . 9 See Article 4(1) of the Law on the Financial Stability Committee, as amended by Article 3(2) of the draft law. 10 See p. 11 of the draft law and its explanatory memorandum. 11 See the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directives

text: and

text: , Directives

text: and

text: and

text: Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010

text: (COM(2012) 280 final) (hereinafter the ‘proposed bank resolution directive’).

text: OJ L 135, 31.5.1994, p. 5. 13 See

text: Article 10(1) of Directive 94/19/EC

text: . 14 See

text: recital 23

text: of

text: Directive 94/19/EC

text: specifying that the financing capacity of deposit guarantee schemes must be in proportion to their liabilities; see also paragraph 2.5 of Opinion

text: . 15 See the European System of Central Banks contribution to the Commission’s public consultation on the technical details of a possible EU framework for bank recovery and resolution, May 2011, p. 18; see also Article 99(1) of the proposed bank resolution directive. 16 See new

text: Article 20

text: e(1) of the Law on BFG, inserted by Article 1(8) of the draft law. 17 See

text: Articles 7(2)

text: (5a)(b) and 20c(1) of the Law on BFG, as amended by

text: Articles 1(3)

text: (a) and 1(8) of the draft law, and Article 5(4) of the draft law. 18 See paragraph 3.6 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.4 of Opinion

text: . 19

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 of 13 December 1993

text: specifying definitions for the application of the prohibitions referred to in Articles

text: and

text: b(1) of the Treaty (OJ L 332, 31.12.1993, p. 1).

text: See, for example, the ECB’s Convergence Report of May 2012, p. 30. 21 See paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: . 22 See Article 43 of the Law on Narodowy Bank Polski of 29 August 1997 (consolidated text: Dz.U. of 1 April 2005 No 1, item 2) together with

text: Article 16

text: a(5) of the Law on BFG. See also paragraph 2 of Opinion

text: . 23 Cf. paragraph 2.6 of Opinion

text: . 24 Cf.

text: Article 1(1)

text: (ii)(b) of

text: Regulation (EC) No 3603/93

text: . 25 See paragraph 3.2 of Opinion

text: . 26 See new Article 4(4) of the Law on BFG, added by

text: Article 1(2)

text: (b) of the draft law.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 23 July 2012 on a stabilisation fund for banks (CON/2012/58)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 23 July 2012 on a stabilisation fund for banks (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 19 June 2012, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Polish Minister for Finance for an opinion on a draft law amending the Law on the Bank Guarantee Fund and certain other laws (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third and sixth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to the Narodowy Bank Polski (NBP) and to rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The draft law aims at enhancing the Polish framework for crisis management in the financial sector by establishing an industry-funded stabilisation fund for credit institutions, formed as a sub-fund under the management of the Bank Guarantee Fund (‘BFG’), the operator of the Polish deposit guarantee scheme . An existing BFG sub-fund, which is dedicated to providing assistance to the banks covered by the deposit guarantee scheme, will continue to exist in parallel to the newlycreated fund .

text: 1.2 The proposed sources of financing of the stabilisation fund include: (a) a pre-defined proportion of

text: the mandatory annual contributions of institutions covered by the obligatory deposit guarantee

text: scheme; and (b) a one-off payment to be made by those institutions in the year of the draft law’s

text: entry into force. The funds in the stabilisation fund will primarily be used to finance or co-finance

text: recapitalisation guarantees granted in accordance with the Law on recapitalisation and will be

text: subject mutatis mutandis to the application of the relevant procedures and modalities laid down in

text: that Law . Moreover, the draft law expands the list of eligible securities in which available BFG

text: funds (not limited to those in the stabilisation fund) may be invested to include securities issued or

text: guaranteed by governments or central banks of, inter alia, Union Member States .

text: 1.3 In addition, the draft law amends information-sharing arrangements by: (a) enabling the NBP to

text: effectively obtain from the BFG any information necessary for it to fulfil its financial stability

text: mandate and introducing reciprocity ; and (b) enabling the sharing of relevant information between

text: the Polish Financial Supervision Authority and the BFG . Finally, the draft law expands the

text: membership of the Financial Stability Committee to include the President of the BFG .

text: 2. General observations

text: Assistance measures that may be offered by the BFG through the stabilisation fund are presently

text: defined in the Law on recapitalisation as measures aiming to address solvency problems at a failing

text: bank. The ECB understands that the Polish authorities contemplate further expansion of the role of

text: the BFG which may in the future perform functions of a resolution authority designated under a

text: harmonised Union framework . The ECB supports this intention to implement a fully-fledged

text: bank resolution regime, in which the designated authority uses resolution tools harmonised under

text: Union law, offering legally sound means of resolving non-viable institutions. The implementation

text: of such a harmonised framework would achieve the objective of ensuring financial stability while preserving a level playing field, limiting distortions to competition, and addressing stakeholder rights. At the present stage, the ECB invites the Polish authorities to adopt a flexible approach in this respect, capable to adapting to the evolving Union framework.

text: 3. Specific observations

text: 3.1 Financing of the BFG’s function related to deposit guarantees Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994 on deposit-guarantee schemes requires that deposit guarantee schemes should be in a position to pay duly verified claims by depositors in the periods specified by this Directive .This implies that the deposit guarantee schemes should have adequate financial means at their disposal to realise this objective . A deposit guarantee scheme’s deposit guarantee role and its assistance role should be well separated. Therefore, the financial resources available for paying guaranteed deposits should be ring-fenced and, if necessary, only used to cover the part of the assistance cost that indirectly ensures the depositors’ protection . This is crucial to ensure that the objective of the deposit guarantee scheme is fully respected. In this context, the ECB welcomes the fact that the recapitalisation guarantees will be granted by the BFG at its discretion , solely on the basis of the funds explicitly allocated to the stabilisation fund in accordance with its financing regime . 3.2 Financing of the BFG’s function related to bank resolution In accordance with its previous opinions , the ECB invites the Polish authorities to consider introducing rules for replenishing the funds in the stabilisation fund where part or all of such funds are used to finance recapitalisation measures. 3.3 Compliance with the monetary financing prohibition At the same time, the ECB reiterates its position concerning the limited conditions under which central bank credit may be provided to deposit guarantee schemes without breaching the monetary financing prohibition contained in Article 123 of the Treaty in connection with Council Regulation 19 20

text: (EC) No 3603/93

text: . As pointed out in the ECB’s convergence reports and several opinions

text: directed to the Polish authorities, the NBP may only extend credit to the BFG where such credit is provided for a short term, addresses urgent situations, with systemic stability aspects being at stake, and with decisions remaining at NBP’s discretion . Presently the Polish law complies with those conditions as it provides for a possible extension by the NBP, under its discretion, of short-term credit to the BFG related to the financing of its deposit guarantee function, if a threat to financial 22 23 stability arises and in view of its urgent needs . In line with its previously stated position , the ECB considers that provision of central bank credit to the national deposit guarantee fund for purposes not related to pay-outs of guaranteed deposits, but related to its recapitalisation functions, would constitute central bank financing of a public sector function in breach of the monetary financing prohibition .The ECB understands that the draft law complies with the monetary financing prohibition, as the financing of assistance measures conducted through the stabilisation fund (i.e. the recapitalisation functions) is not linked to the mechanism for the activation of guaranteed deposits described in

text: Article 16

text: a of the Law on BFG. Therefore, the ECB understands that such assistance measures will not be financed by way of central bank credit extended to the BFG. 3.4 Information sharing arrangements In view of its previous recommendations , the ECB welcomes the proposed amendment of

text: Article 38

text: (4a) of the Law on BFG as this will give the NBP access to prudential information possessed, inter alia, by the BFG, which will allow the NBP to properly perform its financial stability role. 3.5 The ECB understands that the inclusion of the BFG President in the composition of the Financial Stability Committee aims to reflect the new financial stability tasks, which are explicitly assigned to the BFG under the draft law and which the BFG will perform vis-à-vis the banks covered by the obligatory deposit guarantee scheme. The ECB welcomes this development as it reflects the rising role of the BFG in the financial safety net of the Polish financial system and ensures the involvement in the Financial Stability Committee’s work of all relevant bodies, thereby facilitating effective exchange of information and coordination of financial stability activities.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 23 July 2012.

text: [signed]

text: The Vice-President of the ECB

text: Vítor CONSTÂNCIO


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: Article 127(1)

text: , first sentence of the Treaty and

text: Article 2

text: , first sentence of the Statute of the ESCB. Section 2(1) of Law CCVIII of 2011 on the Magyar Nemzeti Bank. 3 The concept of financial independence should be assessed from the perspective of whether any third party is able to exercise direct or indirect influence over the NCB’s ability to fulfil its mandate, both operationally in terms of manpower and financially in terms of appropriate financial resources. See ECB Convergence Report May 2012, p. 25. The NCB should in all circumstances have at its disposal the necessary resources to conduct monetary policy. Hence, it is of utmost importance to allow the central bank to make a sufficient provision of reserves during years of profits in order to face possible future losses without weakening its financial means to implement its monetary policy. See also paragraph 2.4.1 of ECB Opinion

text: . 4 See also Section 1(2) of Law CCVIII of 2011 on the Magyar Nemzeti Bank.

text: Since the summer of 2001, monetary policy in Hungary has been conducted within an inflation-targeting framework, under which the MNB aims to meet a publicly announced inflation target using various monetary policy instruments. The main instrument of monetary policy is the central bank base rate, which affects future inflationary developments via various channels of monetary transmission. Within this framework, the MNB conducts open market operations with twoweek MNB bills (debt issuances) that carry the base rate, and accepts deposits by commercial banks at interest rates linked to the base rate, with a corresponding impact on banking sector liquidity and the wider spectrum of interest rates. 6 The prohibition on monetary financing under Article 123 of the Treaty aims at preventing central banks from providing overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facility to the public sector, which includes any financing of the public sector’s obligations vis-à-vis third parties. See ECB Convergence Report May 2012, p. 28.

text: See paragraph 3.2 of ECB Opinion

text: . In 2010, a special tax, envisioned as a temporary measure, was imposed on financial institutions. The tax was applied at differentiated tax rates on banks’ balance sheet totals at 2009 (constant base). 8 COM(2011) 594 final of 28 September 2011. 9 See

text: Article 1(4)

text: (d) and recital 6 of the proposed FTT Directive.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 24 July 2012 on the financial transaction tax (CON/2012/59)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 24 July 2012 on the financial transaction tax (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 3 July 2012, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Hungarian Ministry for the National Economy for an opinion on a new draft law introducing a financial transaction tax (hereinafter the ‘FTT Law’). On 5 July 2012 the ECB received a request from the Ministry for an opinion on a new amending proposal to the FTT Law. On 9 July 2012 the Parliament adopted the FTT Law with the changes introduced by the new amending proposal. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third indent of Article 2(1) and

text: Article 2 (2) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the FTT Law relates to the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (MNB) and its monetary policy instruments. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the FTT Law

text: The FTT will become payable in connection with: (a) the specified types of payment obligations whereby at the value date of the relevant transfer order the payment service provider with a head office or branch in Hungary is obliged to pay the tax calculated as a percentage of the amount debited on the payer’s payment account or of the money transfer. The applicable tax rate is 0.1%, subject to a cap of HUF 6 000 per payment; and (b) the issuance of MNB bills with a maturity of up to two weeks, or the placement of overnight deposits with the MNB, whereby at the issuance or the value date, the MNB is obliged to pay the tax calculated as a percentage of the face value of the security discounted with the daily central bank base interest or of the amount of the overnight deposit. The applicable tax rate is 0.01% for the overnight deposits and 0.1% for the MNB bills, without a cap.

text: 2. Breach of the consultation obligation

text: The ECB received the initial request by the Ministry for an urgent consultation on the FTT Law on 3 July 2012. A revised version of the law, introducing further changes to the MNB-related provisions, was received by the ECB on 5 July 2012. The Parliament adopted the FTT Law less than two business days later on 9 July 2012. According to

text: Article 4 of Decision 98/415/EC

text: , the ECB must be consulted ‘at an appropriate stage’ in the legislative process. This implies that the consultation should take place at a point in the legislative process which affords the ECB sufficient time to examine the draft legislative provisions and adopt its opinion, and also enables the relevant national authorities to take the ECB’s opinion into consideration before the provisions are adopted. In this respect, the ECB once again stresses its position that even cases of particular urgency do not relieve national authorities from their duty to consult the ECB and to allow sufficient time to take into account its views in accordance with Decision

text: . The Hungarian Government should have postponed the final vote on the draft law until such time that would have allowed for a proper consultation with the ECB, as well as due consideration of the ECB Opinion. Furthermore, the ECB would appreciate the Ministry honouring its obligation to consult the ECB in due time in the future.

text: 3. Effects of the FTT on the MNB

text: The MNB is a public institution whose primary objective, in line with the Treaty, the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter the ‘Statute of the ESCB’) and the Law on the MNB, is to maintain price stability . The main task carried out by the MNB for maintaining price stability is to define and implement monetary policy. In performance of such tasks by the MNB, the Hungarian authorities should respect the principle of central bank independence. The principle of central bank independence referred to in Article 130 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB requires inter alia that: (i) an NCB’s functional independence is ensured by having the necessary means and instruments for achieving price stability independently of any other authority, (ii) an NCB’s institutional independence is respected and the NCB is not influenced by third parties in the performance of its tasks, and (iii) an NCB enjoys financial independence . However, the new FTT Law impairs MNB’s functional and institutional independence .

text: First, it disrupts the monetary policy transmission mechanism by affecting the attractiveness of overnight deposits and MNB bills to the MNB and commercial banks, depending on the final burden-sharing of the tax. In this respect, while generally a central bank is expected to exercise financial prudence, its measures need to be driven by its monetary policy role and not by profit/cost assessments. Thus, in line with its mandate, the MNB may not simply transfer the burden of the FTT to its counterparties by, for instance, lowering its deposit interest rate. The MNB is not a commercial entity and such decision has to be determined by price stability concerns such as a need to increase liquidity in the market. In addition, the FTT can indirectly affect monetary policy implementation through its likely detrimental impact on financial market liquidity that could impede price discovery. This will complicate the achievement of the MNB’s monetary policy objectives. Second, the FTT affects the ability of the MNB to select freely the monetary policy tools that best serve the primary objective of price stability, as it introduces cost considerations that are unrelated to the original design of such tools. Thus monetary policy instruments best suited for transmitting the MNB policy decisions to the wider economy in the absence of the FTT could be severely disabled by subjecting them to the FTT. In addition, the imposition of the FTT on the MNB’s operations, which is not justified for the reasons specified above, may interfere with the MNB’s financial independence. The MNB would need to pay the FTT from its own resources leading to de facto limiting the financial resources available to the MNB to carry out its ESCB-related tasks. The imposition of a tax on the MNB’s monetary policy operations, which is not compatible with the MNB’s functional and institutional independence and thus not justified for the reasons specified above, could also be seen as creating means to finance the public sector from central bank money. Therefore, the MNB’s payment of the FTT to the State is not compatible with the monetary financing prohibition laid down in Article 123(1) of the Treaty .

text: 4. The general impact of an unharmonised introduction of the FTT

text: The ECB has drawn attention to the potential negative side-effects of the Hungarian Government’s previous policy of temporarily raising the financial sector’s tax burden on the financial sector’s capital

text: accumulation ability and credit availability . The FTT Law’s introduction of a permanent FTT, particularly in a manner which is not harmonised with other Member States, may produce distortions in financial markets and the real economy through: (i) increasing the cost of capital as the tax burden is likely to be shared with users of financial services, (ii) reducing financial market liquidity and access to finance, by increasing the costs of transactions, and (iii) producing incentives for tax evasion and/or avoidance that may, inter alia, divert economic and financial activity to other Member States. The ECB draws the attention of the Hungarian authorities to the advanced legislative process for harmonisation of the FTT at Union level through the proposal for a Council directive on a common system of financial transaction tax and amending Directive

text: (hereinafter the ‘proposed FTT Directive’) . While the legislative process is still on-going, the ECB considers that such harmonisation, in particular the exclusion of transactions with the ESCB central banks from the FTT base, is important to avoid a ‘negative impact on the refinancing possibilities of financial institutions or on monetary policies in general’ and to mitigate economic distortions.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 24 July 2012.

text: [signed]

text: The Vice-President of the ECB

text: Vítor CONSTÂNCIO


text: Boletín Oficial del Estado, 14.7.2012, p. 50519. 2 Boletín Oficial del Estado, 30.4.2012, p. 46432. 3 OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 4 See Communication from the Commission on the application, from 1 January 2012, of State aid rules to support measures in favour of banks in the context of the financial crisis (OJ C 356, 6.12.2011, p. 7).

text: Opinion

text: , paragraph 3.2, Opinion

text: , paragraph 3.3.2, Opinion

text: , paragraph 3.9 and Opinion

text: , paragraph 3.1.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 26 July 2012 on State guarantees (CON/2012/60)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 26 July 2012 on State guarantees (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 6 July 2012 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Governor of the Banco de España, on behalf of the Spanish Deputy Minister for Economic Affairs and Competitiveness, for an opinion on the royal decree-law 21/2012, of 13 July, on liquidity measures in the public administration and in the financial sector ; its first final provision amended Article 52(2)(b) and (c) of Law 2/2012 of 29 June 2012 on the State General Budget for 2012, on State guarantees (hereinafter the ‘draft RDL’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and on the third and sixth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft provisions relate to the Banco de España and to rules applicable to financial institutions that materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft RDL

text: The draft RDL lays down the conditions for the State guarantees, the eligibility of institutions, the applicable fees and the requesting and granting procedures. It applies to credit institutions with a registered office in Spain which the Banco de España considers solvent but to have temporary liquidity problems. The eligible issues are new issues of bonds and obligations. The securities may be issued until 15 December 2012. The draft RDL does not mention the type of securities, maturity, interest rate or minimum amount of issue. On granting the guarantee, a fee of 0.5% of the guaranteed amount may be charged. In addition, a fee applies to every guaranteed issue of securities. This fee will be calculated in following European Commission criteria . The maximum amount of the State guarantees is EUR 55 000 million.

text: 2. General observations

text: The consultation request was submitted on 5 July 2012, and the consulting authority requested the ECB to consider the consultation as a matter of urgency, without however setting a time limit. On 13 July 2012, the draft RDL was adopted and published in the Boletín Oficial del Estado. In this context, the ECB reminds the Spanish authorities that, according to

text: Article 4 of Decision 98/415/EC

text: , the ECB must be consulted at an appropriate stage enabling the authority initiating the draft legislative provision to take into consideration the ECB’s opinion before taking its decision on the substance.

text: 3. Pricing

text: The ECB welcomes that

text: Article 52

text: bis(4) of the draft RDL specifies that guarantee fees applied to financial institutions benefiting from the State guarantees will be in line with the above-mentioned criteria adopted by the Commission. The ECB reiterates its view that coordination of the duration of national financial support schemes across the Union is of crucial importance to ensure a level playing field. In addition, the ECB notes the need for national support measures to be temporary in nature.

text: 4. Relationship with the single monetary policy

text: According to

text: Article 52

text: bis(1) of the draft RDL, only bank bonds (‘obligaciones’ and ‘bonos’) may be guaranteed. The ECB understands that interbank deposits will not be guaranteed. This is in line with the ECB’s previous opinions , whereby the extension of State guarantees to interbank deposits should be avoided, as it could entail a substantial distortion in the various national segments of the euro area money market by potentially increasing short-term debt issuance activity across Member States and therefore impairing the implementation of the single monetary policy.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 26 July 2012.

text: [signed]

text: The Vice-President of the ECB

text: Vítor CONSTÂNCIO


text: Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica Italiana, No 156, of 6.7.2012, p. 1, Supplemento Ordinario. No. 141 .

text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: Istituto per la vigilanza sulle assicurazioni private e di interesse collettivo, Institution for the supervision of private and public interest insurance. 4 Commissione di vigilanza sui fondi pensione, Commission for the supervision of pension funds. 5 With regard to the competences and tasks, see Article 4 of Law No 576 of 12 August 1982 and Article 5 of Legislative Decree No 209 of 7 September 2005.

text: Articles 335

text: to 337 of the latter contain provisions on the fees due to the ISVAP. In particular, according to

text: Article 335(2)

text: insurance and reinsurance companies are subject to a fee based on the premia collected by such companies; the fee cannot exceed 0,2% of the premia. Insurance and reinsurance intermediaries are subject to a fee whose maximum amount depends on the specific category in question. Insurance assessors are subject to

text: a fee whose maximum amount is 100 euro. The amount of the aforementioned fees is currently determined on a yearly basis by means of a decree of the Ministry of Economy and Finance on a proposal of the ISVAP. 6 With reference to the competences transferred from the COVIP to the IVARP see Legislative Decree No 252 of 5 December 2005. As for the provisions concerning the fees on pension funds, see Article 13(3) of Law No 335 of 8 August 1995, according to which the COVIP can be funded by means of a fee not exceeding 0,05% of the yearly contributions inflows of pension funds. The competences which are transferred to the Ministry of Labour and the Welfare State are those set out in Article 14 of Decree Law No 98 of 6 July 2011, converted with amendments into Law No 111 of 15 July 2011. 7 The CONSAP (Concessionaria servizi assicurativi pubblici, Concessionaire for public insurance services). will be responsible for keeping a registry of insurance assessors. The Ministry of Economic Development will make provision for assigning a quota of the aforementioned fees to the CONSAP by means of decree, after having consulted the IVARP. 8 The Directorate has authority to adopt measures of external significance regarding the exercise of the public functions entrusted by law to the Banca d’Italia or to the Governor in pursuit of the Banca d’Italia’s institutional aims, other than decisions falling under the authority of the ESCB. Within the scope of its authority, the Directorate may grant mandates to managers of the Bank, establishing how they are to be performed, for the adoption of measures that do not require discretionary assessments but merely involve the acknowledgement of facts, circumstances and qualifications. According to Article 17 of the Statute of the Banca d’Italia, the Director General and the three Deputy Directors General are appointed by another decision-making body of the Banca d’Italia, the Board of Directors, on a proposal of the Governor. The appointment, reappointment and removal from office of the Director General and the Deputy Directors General must be approved by a decree of the President of the Republic acting on a proposal from the President of the Council of Ministers in agreement with the Minister for the Economy and Finance after consulting the Council of Ministers.

text: See Article 4 of Law No 576 of 12 August 1982, as amended by

text: Article 351(1)

text: , of Legislative Decree No 209 of 7 September 2005, and

text: Article 18(4)

text: , last sentence, of Legislative Decree No 252 of 5 December 2005. 10 An exception being the regulatory powers on the integrity and experience requirements for the members of the governing bodies and managers of insurances and supplementary pension schemes, which remain with the Ministry of Labour and the Welfare State. 11 All ECB opinions are available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: See Title IV, Section I of the Guide to consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions, available on the ECB’s website. See also paragraphs 2.2 and 2.3 of Opinion

text: . 13 On earlier attempts to confirm the attribution of responsibility for prudential supervision to the Banca d’Italia and to extend the scope of such supervision to all financial intermediaries, see in particular Opinions

text: , paragraph 2.2, and

text: , paragraph 5. See also Opinions

text: , paragraph 2.2,

text: , paragraph 2.1,

text: , paragraph 2.2,

text: , paragraph 2,

text: , paragraph 2.2,

text: , paragraph 2,

text: , paragraph 2.2,

text: , paragraph 2.3,

text: , paragraph 5,

text: , paragraph 4,

text: , paragraph 9 and

text: , parapaphs 6 to 8. 14 Primarily, the standards and guidelines of the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), in particular ICP2, available on the IAIS’s website at www.iaisiweb.org.

text: See the ECB’s Convergence Report of May 2012, p. 22.

text: See also paragraph 3.5 of Opinion

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 30 July 2012 on the reform of supervision of insurance and retirement provision (CON/2012/61)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 30 July 2012 on the reform of supervision of insurance and retirement provision (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 5 July 2012, the Italian Government adopted Decree Law No 95 on public spending review (hereinafter the ‘Decree Law’), which entered into force on 6 July 2012. On 18 July 2012, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Ministry of Economic Development for an opinion on Article 13 of the Decree Law. Article 13 concerns the establishment of a new institution for the supervision of the insurance and retirement provision sectors (Istituto per la vigilanza sulle assicurazioni e sul risparmio previdenziale, IVARP). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third and sixth indents of

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the Decree Law relates to the Banca d’Italia and the rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the Decree Law

text: 1.1 Under Article 13 of the Decree Law, the IVARP will be established as a public law institution with 3 4 legal personality. The IVARP will replace the ISVAP and the COVIP , and take over their competences, tasks and administrative and financial resources. With regard to the insurance sector, the IVARP will have the same competences and tasks as the ISVAP, and will be entitled to receive the fees charged to insurance companies, insurance intermediaries and insurance assessors under the relevant legislation . With regards to the retirement provision sector, the COVIP’s competence

text: concerning the supervision of pension funds is transferred to the IVARP, as well as the entitlement to receive the fees which pension funds pay to the COVIP under the relevant legislation . Some other competences will be transferred to the Ministry of Labour and the Welfare State and to the CONSAP . Where competence is transferred to the Ministry of Labour and the Welfare State, the latter and the IVARP may enter into special agreements for the exercise by the IVARP of powers of verification and control, including via inspections. 1.2 The Governance of the IVARP will consist of a President, a Council and the Directorate of the Banca d’Italia, which pursuant to Article 21 of the Statute of the Banca d’Italia consists of the Governor, the Director General and three Deputy Directors General , enlarged by the addition of the two IVARP Councillors, solely for the purposes of the performance of the institutional functions assigned to the IVARP in insurance and pension matters. The Council, which will be responsible for the overall administration of the IVARP, will consist of the President and two Councillors, chosen among persons of unquestioned integrity, independence and professional expertise in insurance or pension matters. The Director General of the Banca d’Italia will be the President of the IVARP, who will in this capacity be the legal representative of the IVARP and chair the Council. The two Councillors will be appointed for a term of office of six years, renewable once, within 120 days from the entry into force of the Decree Law, by decree of the President of the Republic upon a resolution adopted by the Council of Ministers at the initiative of the President of the Council of Ministers, acting on a proposal from the Governor of the Banca d’Italia, and in agreement with the Minister for Economic Development and the Minister for Labour and the Welfare State. The enlarged Directorate will be responsible for setting guidelines and for the strategic direction of the IVARP and will have the power to take all measures of external importance relating to the performance of the IVARP’s institutional functions of insurance and pension supervision. It will also be responsible for the approval of the IVARP’s annual report and the adoption of regulatory measures.

text: 1.3 The Statute of the IVARP will be adopted by the Directorate of the Banca d’Italia within 120 days from the entry into force of the Decree Law, and approved by decree of the President of the Republic acting on a proposal from the President of the Council of Ministers, in agreement with the Ministry of Economic Development and the Ministry of Labour and the Welfare State, subject to a prior resolution of the Council of Ministers. Amendments to the Statute of the IVARP, adopted by the enlarged Directorate, will have to be approved by the same procedure. Criteria for possible secondment of employees from the Banca d’Italia to the IVARP or from the IVARP to the Banca d’Italia will be laid down in the Statute of the IVARP, and the IVARP will have access to the technical infrastructure of the Banca d’Italia. Within 120 days from the takeover of the functions of the ISVAP and the COVIP, the IVARP Council will draft a regulation on the legal, economic and pension treatment of IVARP staff, and a reorganisation plan aimed at optimizing resources and reducing operating expenses. A regulation to be issued by the Government within two years of the entry into force of the Decree Law will make provision for the establishment of a private institution responsible for keeping a single register of insurance and reinsurance intermediaries and supervision thereof. This institution will be subject to supervision by the IVARP. 1.4 Several measures are contained in the Decree Law to ensure an adequate level of independence of the newly-established IVARP. In the first place, the IVARP’s accounts will be audited by external auditors in the manner established for the Banca d’Italia by Article 27 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter the ‘Statute of the ESCB’), without prejudice to the controls already performed by the State Audit Office on the ISVAP and the COVIP, pursuant to the legislation in force . Secondly, several provisions concerning both the influence of the competent ministries on the organisation of the ISVAP and the COVIP, and the regulatory powers of such ministries with reference to the sectors supervised by the ISVAP and the COVIP, are repealed, whereas such regulatory powers are transferred to the IVARP .

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 The ECB understands that in the Italian legal system the adoption of a Decree Law is part of a twophase urgent legislative procedure. In the first phase the Government adopts a Decree Law which immediately enters into force and takes effect, for a limited period of 60 days, upon publication in the Official Journal. In the second phase, the Government submits the Decree Law to the Parliament, on the same day as its adoption, for conversion into law within the 60-day period. The ECB already noted in paragraph 2 of its Opinion

text: that decree laws are legal acts that enter into force on adoption by the Government, and that therefore consultation should take place

text: before adoption. Consulting the ECB after the submission of a decree law to Parliament is not sufficient to comply with the consultation obligation and the ECB would like to draw the Ministry’s attention to the proper procedure for its consultations . 2.2 With reference to this Decree Law, the ECB understands that the Banca d’Italia is only concerned by

text: Article 13

text: and is not affected by any other provision contained therein. The ECB notes that Article 13 of the Decree Law will only take effect at a later stage, upon implementation of this Article, in particular when the Statute of the IVARP is adopted. This time lag should enable the relevant national authorities to take the ECB’s opinion into consideration before the Article takes effect both during the process of conversion into law, and when drafting and adopting the implementing measures, including the Statute of the IVARP.

text: 3. Contribution to the prudential supervision and the stability of the financial system

text: 3.1 Article 127(5) of the Treaty provides that the ESCB has to contribute to the smooth conduct of policies pursued by the competent authorities relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system. In this context, the ECB has constantly stressed the importance of having central banks closely involved in prudential supervision . With respect to the insurance sector in particular, experience has shown that insurance companies are important for systemic financial stability because of their size and their interconnectedness with the financial sector. In view of the systemic relevance of the insurance sector for financial stability, it is subject to macro-prudential oversight by the European Systemic Risk Board. Against this background, the ECB welcomes the Decree Law, which ensures that the Banca d’Italia will be closely involved in the IVARP both through its decision-making bodies and operationally. 3.2 The ECB notes that it is of utmost importance to ensure that the IVARP will have full and effective supervisory independence, in compliance with international principles . In this context, the ECB welcomes the safeguards included in the Decree Law as regards the personal independence of the two Councillors, as well as the operational independence of the IVARP and the members of its governing bodies (

text: Article 13(4)

text: and (13)). In this context, it is also of importance that, when sharing supervisory data with the Ministries of Economic Development and of Labour and Social Policies, this is limited to aggregated data. Moreover, the ECB welcomes that any conferral on the IVARP of powers of verification and control over entities subject to the oversight of the Ministry

text: of Labour and Social Policies is subject to special agreements signed by the IVARP and the Ministry.

text: 4. Central bank independence and monetary financing

text: 4.1 Member States must ensure that the national central banks have sufficient financial resources to carry out their ESCB-related tasks. In this respect, the ECB understands that the functions to be performed by the members of the Directorate of the Banca d’Italia in the IVARP will be conducted in a manner that is fully compatible with the functional, institutional and financial independence of the Banca d’Italia and with the personal independence of the members of its Directorate, including the Governor and the Director General, which is designed to safeguard the proper performance of their tasks under the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB . In this respect, the ECB notes that the envisaged formal separation between the Banca d’Italia and the IVARP, in particular with regard to the IVARP’s distinct legal personality, staff, and financial autonomy, would avoid any liability of the Banca d’Italia for the activities or decisions of the IVARP or for obligations entered into by the predecessor authorities. In addition, the ECB notes that the IVARP will be financed via contributions of the supervised institutions and understands that it will not receive financial or human resources, with the exception of the secondments referred to in Article 13(25) of the Decree Law from the Banca d’Italia. 4.2 With regard to the separation of the governance bodies of the Banca d’Italia and the IVARP the ECB recommends clarifying in the converting law that the Directorate of the Banca d’Italia in its enlarged composition responsible for the IVARP is a body formally distinct from the Directorate of the Banca d’Italia, that the Banca d’Italia will not take any liability for IVARP’s decisions, and that the Directorate of the Banca d’Italia remains the only body exclusively entrusted with supervision of the banking sector, as provided for in the legislation currently in force. The same clarification should be made concerning the function of the IVARP’s President and that of the Banca d’Italia’s Director General. 4.3 The ECB also notes that the contribution of the Banca d’Italia to the IVARP through its Directorate members should not affect the Banca d’Italia’s ability to carry out its ESCB-related tasks from an operational and financial point of view. The ECB expects that care will be taken to ensure that the provision of staff of the Banca d’Italia to the IVARP and the use by the IVARP of the technical infrastructures of the Banca d’Italia, which should serve to enhance the Banca d’Italia’s contribution to the IVARP’s supervisory and stability-related policies, does not affect the Banca d’Italia’s ability to carry out its ESCB-related tasks from an operational and financial point of view. 4.4 As regards autonomy in staff matters of the Banca d’Italia, which is an aspect of central bank financial independence, the ECB understands that the initial text of the Statute of the IVARP which will, inter alia, govern secondments between the Banca d’Italia and the IVARP, will be adopted by the Directorate of the Banca d’Italia, whereas future amendments will be decided on in the enlarged

text: Directorate of the Banca d’Italia. However, the Statute of a separate authority such as the IVARP cannot provide for the conditions under which Banca d’Italia staff are seconded to that authority unless those conditions are compliant with the relevant rules of the Banca d’Italia applicable to Banca d’Italia staff, including the approval of secondments by the Banca d’Italia as an employer. Therefore, the ECB recommends providing for the necessary explicit clarifications in this sense in the converting law. 4.5 The Decree Law also provides for the possibility for the IVARP to use the technical infrastructure of the Banca d’Italia for the performance of its functions, as well as for possible secondment of employees from the Banca d’Italia to the IVARP. In this respect, the ECB notes that the financing by the Banca d’Italia of such resources to be used by the IVARP does not appear to present monetary financing concerns, given that this would in particular facilitate the performance by the Banca d’Italia of its ESCB-related task under Article 127(5) of the Treaty to contribute to the smooth conduct of policies pursued by the IVARP relating to the stability of the financial system. In this respect, it is crucial that the Banca d’Italia is in a position to make a meaningful contribution to the conduct of stability-related policies by the IVARP. The ECB considers that the role envisaged for the Banca d’Italia under the Decree Law, as well as possible staff secondment from the Banca d’Italia to the IVARP, should serve to enhance the Banca d’Italia’s contribution to the IVARP’s stability-related policies .

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 30 July 2012.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI