text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).

text: Directive (EU) 2022/2555

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, amending

text: Regulation (EU) No 910/2014

text: and

text: Directive (EU) 2018/1972

text: , and repealing

text: Directive (EU) 2016/1148

text: (NIS 2 Directive) (OJ L 333, 27.12.2022, p. 80).

text: Informācijas tehnoloģiju drošības likums, Latvijas Vēstnesis, 2010, 178. Nr.

text: Directive (EU) 2016/1148

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 concerning measures for a high common level of security of network and information systems across the Union (OJ L 194, 19.7.2016, p. 1). 5 Nacionālās drošības likums, Latvijas Vēstnesis, 473/476, 29.12.2000.

text: See Section 24 of the draft law. 8 See Section 26 of the draft law. 9 See Section 28 of the draft law.

text: See Section 43 of the draft law. 17 See

text: Article 6(35) of Directive (EU) 2022/2555

text: . 18 See paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: of the European Central Bank of 25 July 2014 on a proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning measures to ensure a high common level of network and information security across the Union (OJ C 352, 7.10.2014, p. 4), paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on EUR-Lex. 19 See Opinion

text: of the European Central Bank of 11 April 2022 on the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, repealing

text: Directive (EU) 2016/1148

text: (OJ C 233, 16.6.2022, p. 22), General observations. 20 See paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: See judgment of the Court of Justice of 10 July 2003, Commission v ECB,

text: , EU:C:2003:395, paragraphs 134 to 136. 22 See Sections 7, 8 and 12 of the draft law. 23 See Section 2 of the draft law. 24 Decision ECB/2014/35 of the European Central Bank of 13 August 2014 on the identification of TARGET2 as a systemically important payment system pursuant to

text: Regulation (EU) No 795/2014

text: on oversight requirements for systemically important payment systems (OJ L 245, 20.8.2014, p. 5); Decision ECB/2014/36 of the European Central Bank of 13 August 2014 on the identification of EURO1 AND STEP2-T as systemically important payment systems pursuant to

text: Regulation (EU) No 795/2014

text: on oversight requirements for systemically important payment systems, available on EUR-Lex. 25 Regulation of the European Central Bank

text: (EU) No 795/2014

text: of 3 July 2014 on oversight requirements for systemically important payment systems (ECB/2014/28) (OJ L 217, 23.7.2014, p. 16). 26 See

text: Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 795/2014

text: (ECB/2014/28). 27 See paragraph 3.4 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 3.1.2 of Opinion

text: Guideline

text: (EU) 2022/912

text: of the European Central Bank of 24 February 2022 on a new-generation Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross Settlement Express Transfer system (TARGET) and repealing Guideline ECB/2012/27(ECB/2022/8) (OJ L 163, 17.6.2022, p. 84). 29 See Section 13(3)1) of the draft law. 30

text: Regulation (EU) 2022/2554

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on digital operational resilience for the financial sector and amending Regulations

text: (EC) No 1060/2009

text: (EU) No 648/2012

text: (EU) No 600/2014

text: (EU) No 909/2014

text: and

text: (EU) 2016/1011

text: (OJ L 333, 27.12.2022, p. 1). 31 See paragraph 6.3 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.4 of Opinion

sprak: en

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 13 May 2024 on cybersecurity (CON/2024/14)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 13 May 2024 on cybersecurity (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 12 April 2024 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Latvia for an opinion on a draft law on national cybersecurity (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third and fifth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft law relates to Latvijas Banka and to payment and settlement systems. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The main purpose of the draft law is to improve cybersecurity in Latvia and to implement

text: Directive (EU) 2022/2555

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council . The draft law replaces the Law on IT security currently in force, which implemented

text: Directive (EU) 2016/1148

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council . The draft law strengthens and enhances the existing measures and procedures to bolster the security of network and information systems of essential and important entities, as set out in

text: Directive (EU) 2022/2555

text: , and national critical information and communication technology (ICT) infrastructures defined in accordance with the Law on national security . 1.2 More specifically, the draft law has three aims . First, it aims to improve ICT security, including by laying down the requirements for the provision and receipt of essential and important services, and also for the operation of information and communication technologies. Second, the draft law aims to determine the procedures for ensuring cybersecurity, providing for the division of responsibility among the relevant national authorities, the competence of Nacionālais kiberdrošības centrs (NKC, the National Cybersecurity Centre), the framework of cooperation, and the tasks for the promotion of

text: cybersecurity. Third, the draft law aims to promote the implementation of cybersecurity measures in such a way as to be able to foresee, prevent and overcome cyber threats in a timely manner and to eliminate their consequences, ensuring the continuity of the confidentiality, integrity and availability of services to the extent possible. 1.3 The draft law applies to Latvijas Banka in its entirety. The consultation letter sent to the ECB by the Latvian Minister of Finance explains that for the past two years, Latvian public institutions have experienced a dramatic increase in malicious cyber activities. In 2022, Latvia was the target of 16 % of all cyberattacks against Member States, while the Baltic states collectively were targeted by 32 % of all cyberattacks. Therefore, the consulting authority believes that the cybersecurity of all Latvian public institutions, including Latvijas Banka, should be strengthened, and that excluding Latvijas Banka from the scope of the draft law would pose a major risk to Latvian national security and to the security of the Eurosystem as a whole. 1.4 The draft law provides that the Cabinet of Ministers determines (1) minimum cybersecurity requirements ; (2) the minimum contents of a plan for the management of cyber risks and the continuity of operations, as well as procedures for supervision and control of the execution of the 8 9 10 plan ; (3) the requirements for the cybersecurity of data centres ; (4) cyber hygiene requirements ; and (5) restrictions on activities in the event of a cyber incident . 1.5 Although under the draft law a new institution (the NKC) is established, Latvijas Banka’s cybersecurity compliance will continue to be supervised by Satversmes Aizsardzības birojs (SAB, the Constitution Protection Bureau), which is a state security service. The main tasks of SAB include intelligence, counterintelligence and the protection of state (official) secrets. Such supervision of the cybersecurity of Latvijas Banka will entail checking its conformity with the cybersecurity requirements determined by the Cabinet of Ministers, on-site checks and remote monitoring of information and 12 13 technologies, data and document checks , annual self-assessment reports and a cybersecurity conformity audit . 1.6 If a cyber incident significantly threatens the security of information systems or electronic communications networks and cannot be prevented by other means, SAB may resort to restricting activities, such as, for example, restricting access to the internet protocol (IP) address involved in the cyber incident; restricting access to the mobile platform application involved in the cyber incident; or making changes to the domain name system records . In the event of non-compliance by Latvijas Banka, SAB would be entitled to issue a warning to Latvijas Banka or to direct Latvijas Banka to: (1) take certain actions to remedy the non-compliance, setting a reasonable timeframe for remedying the non-compliance and reporting on progress in remedying the non-compliance; (2) immediately

text: cease and desist from any further conduct in violation of the provisions of the draft law; (3) inform the recipients of services or publish information on the cyber threat, its nature and extent, as well as the actions necessary to prevent or mitigate it; (4) inform the recipients of services or publish information on the detected infringements of Latvijas Banka . In the event that Latvijas Banka fails to comply with the abovementioned obligations, SAB is entitled to instruct Latvijas Banka to suspend the operation of its information system, resource or e-service until the detected non-compliance is eliminated.

text: 2. General observations

text: Directive (EU) 2022/2555

text: is a minimum-harmonisation directive. Article 5 of that Directive provides that it does not preclude Member States from adopting or maintaining provisions ensuring a higher level of cybersecurity, provided that such provisions are consistent with Member States’ obligations laid down in Union law. The draft law goes beyond

text: Directive (EU) 2022/2555

text: , which excludes central banks (along with parliaments and the judiciary) from the definition of a ‘public administration entity’ .This would have the consequence that the Latvian component of Eurosystem-owned and operated financial market infrastructures, such as TARGET, would not benefit from the exclusion of central banks from the application of

text: Directive (EU) 2022/2555

text: . 2.2 The ECB refers to its previous stance taken in the context of national measures implementing

text: Directive (EU) 2016/1148

text: , whereby the ECB supported the aim of

text: Directive (EU) 2016/1148

text: of ensuring a high common level of network and information security across the Union and of achieving a consistency of approach in this field across business sectors and Member States . The ECB strongly supports the objectives of

text: Directive (EU) 2022/2555

text: to increase the level of cyber resilience across all relevant sectors, reduce inconsistencies across the internal market and improve the level of situational awareness and the collective capability to prepare and respond by ensuring efficient cooperation in the Union . As already noted by the ECB, it is important to ensure that the internal market is a safe place to do business and that all Member States have a certain minimum level of preparedness for cybersecurity incidents .

text: Directive (EU) 2022/2555

text: produces benefits from synergies and economies of scale. In particular, dedicated national cyber security authorities have the potential to become repositories of considerable resources and expertise which the Eurosystem may draw upon. Concurrently, it should be ensured that the provisions of the national legislation transposing

text: Directive (EU) 2022/2555

text: are interpreted and applied consistently with the Eurosystem’s competences, and respect the principle of central bank independence enshrined in Article 130 of the Treaty. Indeed, Latvijas Banka’s independent exercise of its tasks and responsibilities within the

text: Eurosystem, for instance to implement monetary policy and for the smooth operation of payment and settlement systems, should not be affected. Central bank independence does not have the consequence of separating the Union’s central banks entirely from the Union and exempting them from every rule of Union law . This also applies to national legislative measures capable of applying to national central banks (NCBs). Furthermore, the exercise of SAB powers is subject to various specific rules and guarantees, whilst the purpose for which they may be used is clearly delineated. In that respect, certain provisions of the draft law provide for specifically listed powers of SAB to be exercised with a view to achieving the objectives set out in the draft law . Therefore, national measures implementing

text: Directive (EU) 2022/2555

text: that extend to NCBs, such as the draft law, are not per se precluded from applying to Eurosystem central banks.

text: 3. Impact of the draft law on TARGET and on payment systems overseen by the ECB and the Eurosystem

text: 3.1 In accordance with the fourth indent of Article 127(2) of the Treaty, promotion of the smooth operation of payment systems is one of the core tasks of the European System of Central Banks. Furthermore, pursuant to Article 22 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter the ‘Statute of the ESCB’),,the ECB and the NCBs may provide facilities, and the ECB may make regulations, to ensure efficient and sound clearing and payment systems within the Union and with other countries. Thus, the ECB and the Eurosystem as a whole have a particular interest in an enhanced level of network information security in respect of payment systems, as it fosters confidence in the euro and the smooth functioning of the economy in the euro area and beyond. 3.2 Systemically important payment systems (SIPS) such as, for example, EURO1, STEP2-T and TARGET are identified pursuant to ECB Decisions and are thus overseen by the ECB as the competent authority under

text: Regulation (EU) No 795/2014

text: of the European Central Bank 25 26 (ECB/2014/28) . SIPS are subject to regular assessment related to operational risk , which allows the competent Eurosystem central bank, as the competent authority, to verify that the systems are in compliance. In cases of non-compliance, the competent Eurosystem central bank has the power to impose sanctions or corrective measures to ensure compliance . 3.3

text: Regulation (EU) No 795/2014

text: (ECB/2014/28) inter alia contains provisions aimed at ensuring cyber resilience for financial market infrastructures. It provides that a SIPS operator is required to establish

text: an effective cyber resilience framework with appropriate governance measures in place to manage cyber risk. The SIPS operator must identify its critical operations and supporting assets, and have appropriate measures in place to protect them from, detect, respond to and recover from cyberattacks. These measures are to be regularly tested. The SIPS operator is required to ensure that it has a sound level of situational awareness of cyber threats. The SIPS operator is required to ensure that there is a process of continuous learning and evolution to enable it to adapt its cyber resilience framework to the dynamic nature of cyber risks, in a timely manner, whenever needed. 3.4 The ECB understands that the draft law should be without prejudice to the oversight of SIPS given that such oversight is performed on the basis of ECB regulations issued on the basis of

text: Article 3.1

text: Article 22

text: and the first indent of Article 34.1 of the Statute of the ESCB. 3.5 Among the listed SIPS, TARGET plays a distinct role, as it is the large value payment system for the euro, which is owned and operated by the Eurosystem and which serves as the channel for the implementation of the euro area’s monetary policy. TARGET has its own legal personality and is subject to harmonised legal conditions defined in Guideline

text: (EU) 2022/912

text: of the European Central Bank (ECB/2022/8) . The Latvian component of TARGET, TARGET-Latvija, for which Latvijas Banka acts as the operator, would appear to fall within the scope of the draft law, as the draft law applies to Latvijas Banka and no exemption with regard to infrastructures or payment systems operated by Latvijas Banka is provided. 3.6 Against this background, the ECB would welcome the establishment of cooperation arrangements between SAB and Latvijas Banka going beyond what is currently envisaged in the draft law , which pertains only to matters related to the cybersecurity of the financial entities referred to in

text: Article 2 of Regulation (EU) 2022/2554

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council . The ECB suggests that, in the context of such cooperation, effective information-sharing and consultation mechanisms are put in place in order to prevent situations which could undermine the ability of Latvijas Banka to perform its ESCB tasks independently. In particular, Latvijas Banka would need to be informed about actual and potential cyber incidents, as well as planned or adopted measures which may affect the TARGET-Latvija component in a timely and efficient manner in order to enable Latvijas Banka to fulfil its obligations under the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB. Such arrangements would also ensure that SAB and Latvijas Banka exchange information and consult on actual and potential cyber incidents or threats in the financial sector’s systems, and in particular infrastructures operated by the Eurosystem, and on planned and adopted measures, in an effective and timely manner without the need to resort to the unilateral enforcement measures envisaged under the draft law. 3.7 In addition, the ECB stands ready to cooperate with SAB, with a view to ensuring that best practices with regard to

text: Directive (EU) 2022/2555

text: are established and followed . The ECB also suggests that the respective cooperation and information-sharing arrangements are established between SAB and

text: the ECB, through Latvijas Banka, to ensure that the overall functioning of TARGET is not undermined. This opinion will be published on EUR-Lex.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 13 May 2024. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Christine LAGARDE


text: Regulamentul Băncii Naționale a României nr. 1/2000 privind operaţiunile de piaţă monetară efectuate de Banca Naţională a României şi facilităţile permanente acordate de aceasta participanţilor eligibili, Monitorul Oficial al României, Partea I, nr. 84/ 01.02.2008.

text: Regulamentul Băncii Naționale a României nr. 4/2021 privind raportarea de date şi informaţii statistice la Banca Naţională a României, Monitorul Oficial al României, Partea I, nr. 1163/08.12.2021.

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).

text: Regulamentul Băncii Naționale a României nr. 6/2002 privind regimul rezervelor minime obligatorii, Monitorul Oficial al României, Partea I, nr. 566/01.08.2002.

text: See Opinions

text: and

text: , which point to differences between the BNR minimum reserves regime and the Eurosystem’s minimum reserves framework, including more restrictive features of the former, such as the level of required reserves or sanctions applicable in the event of breaches of minimum reserves requirements. All ECB opinions are published on EUR-Lex.

text: See, in particular, Article 19 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and the European Central Bank;

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 2531/98 of 23 November 1998

text: concerning the application of minimum reserves by the European Central Bank (OJ L 318, 27.11.1998, p. 1);

text: Regulation (EU) No 2021/378

text: of the European Central Bank of 22 January 2021 on the application of minimum reserves (ECB/2021/1) (OJ L 73, 3.3.2021, p. 1);

text: Regulation (EU) No 2021/379

text: of the European Central Bank of 22 January 2021 on the balance sheet items of credit institutions and of the monetary financial institutions sector (ECB/2021/2) (OJ L 73, 3.3.2021, p. 16); Decision

text: (EU) 2021/1815

text: of the European Central Bank of 7 October 2021 on the methodology applied for the calculation of sanctions for noncompliance with the requirement to hold minimum reserves and related minimum reserve requirements (ECB/2021/45) (OJ L 367, 15.10.2021, p. 4).

text: See, for example, paragraphs 10 to 14 of Opinion

text: ; paragraph 3.1 of Opinion

text: ; paragraphs 10 to 17 of Opinion

text: ; and paragraphs 2.1 to 2.5 of Opinion

text: See

text: Article 1

text: , point (a)(ii), of

text: Regulation (EU) No 2021/378

text: 8 % for minimum reserves denominated in national currency and 5 % for minimum reserves denominated in foreign currency, according to information provided on the BNR’s website at www.bnr.ro. 10 See paragraph 3.2 of Opinion

text: . 11 See in particular Decision

text: (EU) 2021/1815

text: Article 7 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2531/98

text: and

text: Article 2 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2532/98 of 23 November 1998

text: concerning the powers of the European Central Bank to impose sanctions (OJ L 318, 27.11.1998, p. 4). 12 See paragraph 3.3.4 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 3.1 of Opinion

text: See Article 7 of the draft regulation on the minimum reserves regime. 14 See paragraph 3.1 of Opinion

text: . 15 This approach is grounded in Legea nr. 312/2004 privind Statutul Băncii Naţionale a României, Monitorul Oficial al României, Partea I, nr. 582/30.06.2004 (hereinafter the ‘BNR Statute’), Article 8(2) of which provides that ‘Minimum required reserves for foreign exchange resources shall be set up in foreign exchange alone’.

text: This approach is grounded in the BNR Statute, Article 8(3) of which provides that ‘The interest paid by Banca Naţională a României for minimum required reserves shall equal at least the average interest rate applied by credit institutions on demand deposits’.

publisher: Europeiska centralbanken

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 14 May 2024 on amendments to the minimum reserves regime (CON/2024/15)

serie: con

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 14 May 2024 on amendments to the minimum reserves regime (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

type: rubrik

text: On 2 April 2024 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from Banca Națională a României (BNR) for an opinion on three draft regulations of BNR: (1) a draft regulation on the minimum reserves regime, (2) a draft regulation amending Regulation No 1/2000 on open market operations performed by Banca Națională a României and standing facilities granted to eligible participants (hereinafter the ‘draft regulation amending Regulation No 1/2000’) and (3) a draft regulation amending Regulation No 4/2021 on the reporting of data and statistical information to Banca Națională a României (hereinafter the ‘draft regulation amending Regulation No 4/2021’) (together hereinafter the ‘draft regulations’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third indent of Article 2(1) and

text: Article 2(2) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft regulations relate to BNR and the instruments of monetary policy in a Member State whose currency is not the euro. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

type: stycke

text: 1. Purpose of the draft regulations

text: 1.1 The draft regulations update the legislative framework governing the minimum reserves regime established by BNR with the aim of achieving a significant increase in the degree of harmonisation of this legislative framework with the Eurosystem framework in order to enhance the robustness, clarity and transparency of the legislative framework regarding this monetary policy instrument and to allow for a smooth transition of the Romanian banking system to the Eurosystem framework once Romania adopts the euro.

text: 1.2 By means of the draft regulations, BNR aims to continue the process of easing the restrictions that characterise the minimum reserves regime established by BNR , while at the same time harmonising it with the Eurosystem’s standards. In particular, the explanatory memorandum to the draft regulations points out that the draft regulation on the minimum reserves regime brings significant changes to elements previously not harmonised with the Eurosystem minimum reserves framework, in particular: (1) the reserve base (definition and source of data for its calculation); (2) the definition of minimum reserves ratios and the reserve bases to which they apply; (3) the observance period of the minimum reserves; (4) the contents and the means of reporting the minimum reserves; (5) the terms for exemption of credit institutions from minimum reserve requirements; and (6) the sanctions applied for non-compliance with minimum reserve requirements. The explanatory memorandum also highlights that a few elements remain unharmonised: (1) the holding of minimum reserves in both domestic currency and euro; (2) the maintenance period; and (3) the remuneration of minimum reserves. This is considered justified in view of the particularities of the national legal framework governing BNR and credit institutions, as well as by practical considerations. 1.3 The draft regulation amending Regulation No 4/2021 introduces related requirements regarding the reporting of statistical information and data related to minimum reserves. 1.4 The draft regulation amending Regulation No 1/2000 updates the categories of credit institutions and the eligibility criteria regarding access to open market and standing facilities offered by BNR. Eligibility criteria include the requirements of (1) being subject to BNR’s minimum reserve requirements; (2) being subject to at least one form of prudential supervision; (3) having a sound financial situation (to be assessed taking into account prudential information); and (4) fulfilling all operational requirements and having the technical capacities necessary to execute the respective operation.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 The ECB welcomes BNR’s initiative to update the legal framework governing the minimum reserves regime. As a Member State with a derogation, i. e., whose currency is not the euro, Romania retains the powers in the field of monetary policy as provided for under national law until such time as the relevant derogation is abrogated by the Council of the EU and the euro is introduced in Romania. This notwithstanding, a timely alignment of the minimum reserve system ahead of Romania’s adoption of the euro contributes to ensuring a smooth changeover and an effective transmission of monetary policy when such adoption takes place. In addition, it is beneficial to achieve consistency

text: with the Eurosystem’s minimum reserves framework so that credit institutions become acquainted with the reserve requirements that will apply to them following the adoption of the euro. In this respect, it is noted that BNR presents the draft regulations as the most important and comprehensive stage of the process aiming to bring BNR’s minimum reserves regime in line with the Eurosystem framework, with limited revisions remaining to achieve full consistency. 2.2 The draft regulation on the minimum reserves regime is intended to repeal and replace the existing BNR regulation on the minimum reserves regime, and appears to be based on the structure of

text: Regulation (EU) No 2021/378

text: (ECB/2021/1), while the chapter on sanctions appears to be based on the provisions of Decision

text: (EU) 2021/1815

text: 3. Specific observations on harmonised elements

text: Following the structure of the Eurosystem framework on minimum reserve requirements, the draft regulations aim to harmonise important elements of the Romanian minimum reserves regime with the Eurosystem framework. Certain aspects are not yet completely aligned. Specific observations on some of the proposed changes are set out below. 3.1 Credit institutions subject to minimum reserves The draft regulation on the minimum reserves regime applies to credit institutions that are Romanian legal persons, which are either credit institutions authorised by BNR, or are development banks, as well as branches located in Romania of credit institutions from other Member States or from third countries. The ECB understands that development banks are a type of credit institution newly and specifically regulated under Romanian law and that this is why they have been explicitly added to the scope of application of the minimum reserves regime. It is also clear from certain specific provisions on the minimum reserve holdings that credit cooperatives are also subject to minimum reserve requirements. This clarity as to the scope of application of the minimum reserves regime is welcome. It is noted that the Eurosystem opted for a functional interpretation of the concept of credit institution for the purpose of applying minimum reserves, which has also included credit unions or credit cooperatives . This interpretation is also reflected in the explicit inclusion in the scope of application of

text: Regulation (EU) No 2021/378

text: (ECB/2021/1) of credit institutions ‘exempt from such authorisation pursuant to

text: Article 2(5) of Directive 2013/36/EU

text: ’ . 3.2 The reserve base While some key elements of the reserve base under the existing BNR minimum reserves framework were already similar to the corresponding elements of the Eurosystem framework (e.g. differentiation

text: between relevant liabilities with maturity under and over two years respectively), the draft regulations define the types of liabilities used for the calculation of the reserve base with greater precision and with greater similarity to the approach taken under the Eurosystem framework, and make reference to the statistical information reported by credit institutions concerning those liabilities. 3.3 The minimum reserves ratios and the reserve base The draft regulations maintain the approach taken under the existing BNR minimum reserves framework, setting out a reserve ratio of zero applicable to the relevant liabilities with maturities over two years and a different ratio applicable to the relevant liabilities with maturities under two years. This is similar to the Eurosystem framework. However, the second ratio, which determines the minimum reserves through its application to the liabilities included in the reserve base and is set at 1 % under the Eurosystem framework, is to be established by a BNR circular, allowing BNR to change it at short notice (at least 10 days prior to the start of the maintenance period when the changed ratio would enter into force). This ratio is higher than the Eurosystem one and is differentiated between the reserve base denominated in domestic currency and the reserve base denominated in euro . Thus, further alignment of the reserve ratio will be necessary in this respect as and when Romania adopts the euro. In this context, a timely alignment of the BNR minimum reserve system with the Eurosystem framework would contribute to ensuring a smooth changeover with a view to preserving the effectiveness of the transmission of monetary policy. 3.4 Exemptions from minimum reserves Whereas the current regime provides for BNR’s Board to apply an exceptional minimum reserves regime in certain circumstances, which are not fully clear , the ECB notes that the draft regulation on the minimum reserves regime contains a provision that is aligned to a great extent with

text: Article 4 of Regulation (EU) No 2021/378

text: (ECB/2021/1), which sets out the circumstances under which automatic or discretionary exemptions from minimum reserve requirements apply. 3.5 Sanctions for non-compliance with minimum reserve requirements The existing sanctioning regime is replaced by the draft regulations to reflect the Eurosystem’s approach of applying only financial penalties with respect to the failure to hold the required level of minimum reserves. The proposed sanctions are similar to those laid down under Decision

text: (EU) 2021/1815

text: (ECB/2021/45), applying a margin of 2.5 percentage points to the average interest rate on BNR’s lending facility taken over the maintenance period during which the breach occurred, with the resulting penalty interest rate being applied to the daily average amount of minimum reserves that the credit institution failed to hold for that maintenance period; in the event of a repetitive breach, a penalty of 5 percentage points is added. The proposed approach addresses comments made by the ECB in earlier opinions that, under the Romanian minimum reserves regime, the sanctions in cases of non-compliance are considerably more severe than those provided for under the

text: Eurosystem’s minimum reserves framework. Notably, in the event of a credit institution’s failure to hold the required level of minimum reserves on more than two occasions within a 12-month period, the existing rules allow BNR to apply sanctions ranging from warnings and fines to the partial or total suspension of the concerned credit institution’s authorisation for a period of up to 90 days, and even to the withdrawal of authorisation. The same applies in the event of misreporting or repeated failure to report data for the calculation of the reserve base or of the minimum reserves remuneration rate. However, as regards other breaches related to the minimum reserves, BNR maintains a particular approach, different from the approach taken by the Eurosystem, whereby the draft regulation on the minimum reserves regime imposes a penalty for the non-reporting of data that consists of increasing the minimum reserves during the applicable maintenance period by 10 % compared to the previous maintenance period . Other breaches, such as misreporting, are not expressly referred to in the draft regulation on the minimum reserves regime and thus appear to remain under BNR’s general sanctioning power, which includes the abovementioned types of severe sanctions. In view of the broad range and severity of sanctions applicable for breaches not related to the holding of the required level of minimum reserves in those cases, the ECB invites the consulting authority to consider whether those sanctions are proportional and suitable for the purposes of minimum reserves requirements .

text: 4. Specific observations on non-harmonised elements

text: Certain elements of the minimum reserves regime have been left unharmonised and will need to be aligned with the Eurosystem framework as and when Romania adopts the euro. 4.1 The holding of minimum reserves in both domestic currency and euro Romanian credit institutions are required to hold minimum reserves in both the national currency and euro for their reserve base denominated in foreign currency, whereas holding minimum reserves in US dollars has been excluded under the draft regulations. Different reserve ratios that may be set in respect of holdings in the two different currencies would reflect different monetary policy objectives that may be pursued by BNR through this instrument. The Eurosystem framework only provides for the holding of minimum reserves in euro. 4.2 The maintenance period The draft regulations maintain the existing system of defining the maintenance period by reference th rd to fixed calendar days (from the 24 day of a month to the 23 day of the following month). The Eurosystem establishes the calendar of maintenance periods by reference to the setting of certain monetary policy rates, which implies that maintenance periods are not related to fixed calendar days and that their duration is variable. Romanian credit institutions will need to adapt to the new system as and when Romania adopts the euro. This also implies different timelines for the calculation, notification and reporting of minimum reserves.

text: 4.3 The remuneration of minimum reserves BNR’s approach on the remuneration of minimum reserves is maintained under the draft regulation on the minimum reserves regime. The remuneration is set by reference to the average interest rate on demand deposits applied by credit institutions, which is thus a market rate. This is different from the Eurosystem, which in the past remunerated minimum reserves by reference to certain monetary policy rates and currently applies remuneration at zero percent. The ECB understands that, currently, in practice, the difference between the BNR and the Eurosystem approach is limited, as the BNR remuneration is also close to zero percent.

text: This opinion will be published on EUR-Lex.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 14 May 2024.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Christine LAGARDE

type: vagledning

utgivare: ecb


text: COM(2024) 134 final.

text: EUT C 369, 17.12.2011, s. 1.

text: EUT C 121, 26.4.2012, s. 5. Detta monetära avtal ersatte det tidigare monetära avtalet mellan Republiken Italien, på Europeiska gemenskapens vägnar, och Republiken San Marino (EGT C 209, 27.7.2001, s. 1).

text: Se kommissionens pressmeddelande av den 12 december 2023, The Commission welcomes the end of the negotiations for an Association Agreement with Andorra and San Marino, finns på kommissionens webbplats www.ec.europa.eu. ECB har inte sett texten till associeringsavtalet, såsom denna överenskommits på förhandlarnivå, trots att associeringsavtalet är grunden till de föreslagna ändringarna av de monetära avtalen.

text: Se artikel 11 i de monetära avtalen.

text: Se artikel 1 första stycket punkt a i förslaget till beslut.

text: Enligt vad som avses i artikel 1 första stycket punkt a i förslaget till beslut.

text: Se artikel 1 första stycket punkt c i förslaget till beslut.

text: Se artikel 1 första stycket punkt d i förslaget till beslut.

text: Se artikel 1 första stycket punkt e i förslaget till beslut.

text: Se artikel 2 i förslaget till beslut.

text: Se

text: artikel 7 i rådets beslut 1999/97/EG av den 31 december 1998

text: om gemenskapens ståndpunkt beträffande ett avtal om de monetära förbindelserna med Republiken San Marino (EGT L 30, 4.2.1999, s. 33),

text: artikel 7 i rådets beslut 2004/548/EG av den 11 maj 2004

text: om den ståndpunkt gemenskapen skall inta vad gäller ett avtal om de monetära förbindelserna med Furstendömet Andorra (EUT L 244, 16.7.2004, s. 47) samt

text: artikel 3 i rådets beslut 2009/904/EG av den 26 november 2009

text: om Europeiska gemenskapens ståndpunkt vid omförhandlingen av det monetära avtalet med Republiken San Marino (EUT L 322, 9.12.2009, s. 12).

sprak: sv

title: Europeiska centralbankens yttrande av den 15 maj 2024 om en rekommendation till rådets beslut om ändring av det monetära avtalet med furstendömet Andorra och av det monetära avtalet med republiken San Marino (CON/2024/16)

text: Inledning och rättslig grund

text: Den 16 april 2024 mottog Europeiska central-banken (ECB) en begäran från Europeiska unionens råd om ett yttrande över en rekommendation till rådets beslut om ändring av det monetära avtalet med Furstendömet Andorra och av det monetära avtalet med Republiken San Marino (nedan kallat förslaget till beslut).

text: ECB:s befogenhet att avge ett yttrande grundas på

text: artikel 219.3 i fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt

text: som stadgar att om unionen behöver föra förhandlingar om avtal angående monetära frågor eller växelkursfrågor med en eller flera tredjestater eller internationella organisationer ska rådet, på rekommendation av kommissionen och efter att ha hört Europeiska centralbanken besluta om en ordning för förhandlingarna och för hur sådana avtal ska ingås. I enlighet med artikel 17.5 första meningen i arbetsordningen för Europeiska centralbanken har detta yttrande antagits av ECB-rådet.

text: 1. Allmänna kommentarer

text: 1.1 2011 ingicks ett monetärt avtal mellan unionen och Furstendömet Andorra, följt av ett monetärt avtal mellan unionen och Republiken San Marino 2012 (nedan kallade de monetära avtalen). I december 2023 avslutade kommissionen förhandlingarna om ett associeringsavtal med Andorra och San Marino (nedan kallat associeringsavtalet).

text: 1.2 ECB välkomnar syftena med förslaget till beslut, nämligen att undvika dubbelarbete i Andorra och San Marino inom ramen för de monetära avtalen och i associeringsavtalet. Det föreligger en delvis överlappning när det gäller vilka EU-rättsakter som måste genomföras av Andorra och San Marino enligt de monetära avtalen och i associeringsavtalet. Om denna överlappning inte åtgärdas skulle det förekomma dubbelarbete, eftersom genomförandet av de överlappande unionsrättsakterna skulle övervakas parallellt inom ramen för de monetära avtalen och associeringsavtalet.

text: 1.3 Samtidigt noterar ECB att införandet av de ändringar av de monetära avtalen som framgår av föreslaget till beslutet kommer att ha betydande konsekvenser för ramverket kring de monetära avtalen. Genom de monetära avtalen inrättas en gemensam kommitté som spelar en avgörande roll vid bedömningen av genomförandet av de unionsrättsakter som anges i bilagorna till de monetära avtalen. När det gäller det monetära avtalet mellan unionen och Andorra består den gemensamma kommittén av företrädare för Andorra, kommissionen, Spanien, Frankrike och ECB. Den gemensamma kommittén för det monetära avtalet mellan unionen och San Marino består av företrädare för San Marino, kommissionen, Italien och ECB. Det är ECB:s tolkning att sammansättningen av den underkommitté som kommer att bedöma genomförandet av de unionsrättsakter som anges i den relevanta bilagan till associeringsavtalet men som markerats som relevanta för tillämpningen av de monetära avtalen kommer att skilja sig markant från sammansättningen av de gemensamma kommittéerna för de monetära avtalen. Det är inte tänkt att ECB ska vara officiell ledamot i underkommittén. På grund av de föreslagna ändringarnas betydelse anser ECB att den bör delta fullt ut i förhandlingarna inom sitt behörighetsområde, i linje med tidigare praxis.

text: 2. Specifika kommentarer

text: 2.1 I motiveringen till förslaget till beslut anges att de unionsrättsakter om bank- och finanslagstiftning och om bekämpning av penningtvätt och finansiering av terrorism som anges i den relevanta bilagan till associeringsavtalet och relevanta för euron kommer att tydligt markeras som sådana, så att detta även görs för de monetära avtalen när genomförandet bedöms inom ramen för associeringsavtalet. Det förklaras att kommissionen planerar att erbjuda sina motparter på Europeiska centralbanken att ansluta sig till kommissionens delegation till den underkommitté för finansiella tjänster som inrättats enligt associeringsavtalet när den diskuterar genomförandet av de unionsakter som också är relevanta för tillämpningen av de monetära avtalen. ECB välkomnar att kommissionen planerar att bjuda in ECB till underkommitténs möten när föremålet för diskussionerna är relevant för tillämpningen av de monetära avtalen. Av förslaget till beslut framgår det inte hur ett sådant deltagande skulle formaliseras och vilken ställning ECB skulle ha vid dessa möten. ECB tolkar det som att ECB skulle bjudas in till relevanta möten i underkommittén som observatör.

text: 2.2 Enligt förslaget till beslut ska en bestämmelse införas i de monetära avtalen enligt vilken alla nya rättsakter inom den underkategori av unionsrättsakter om bank- och finanslagstiftning som är av betydelse för euron, och alla nya unionsrättsakter om bekämpning av penningtvätt eller finansiering av terrorism, blir en del av den relevanta bilagan till associeringsavtalet så snart dessa unionsrättsakter blir tillämpliga enligt associeringsavtalet. I motiveringen till förslaget till beslut anges att olika delar av protokollet om finansiella tjänster i associeringsavtalet kan träda i kraft successivt i de associerade staterna. Fram till dess att de unionsrättsakter som ingår i ett visst segment blir tillämpliga enligt associeringsavtalet kommer unionens relevanta regelverk att fortsätta att införlivas och beaktas i bilagorna till de monetära avtalen.

text: 2.3 ECB vill påpeka att det kan ta lång tid mellan antagandet av associeringsavtalet och det datum då de delar av protokollet om finansiella tjänster som införlivar unionsrättsakter om bank- och finansrätt och om bekämpning av penningtvätt och finansiering av terrorism träder i kraft i de associerade staterna. För högre rättssäkerhet bör det därför uttryckligen anges i den relevanta bestämmelsen i de monetära avtalen att om en unionsrättsakt inom det relevanta regelverket antas eller ändras innan den blir tillämplig enligt associeringsavtalet, kommer den att läggas till i bilagorna till de monetära avtalen och överföras till den relevanta bilagan till associeringsavtalet så snart den blir tillämplig enligt associeringsavtalet. I förslaget till beslut klargörs inte heller exakt vid vilken tidpunkt man kommer att anse att de unionsrättsakter som rör ett visst segment av protokollet om finansiella tjänster blir tillämpliga enligt associeringsavtalet. Det är nödvändigt att klargöra denna aspekt för att säkerställa rättssäkerhet avseende tidsfristerna för överföringen av ansvar från ramverket enligt de monetära avtalen till ramverket enligt associeringsavtalet.

text: 2.4 I förslaget till beslut anges att man bör införa en bestämmelse i det monetära avtalet enligt vilken unionsrättsakter inom bank- och finanslagstiftning som är nödvändiga för euron, samt unionsrättsakter om bekämpning av penningtvätt eller finansiering av terrorism som förtecknas i associeringsavtalet men som är av betydelse för eurons problemfria användning och skydd ska vara tydligt markerade. Detta skulle göra det möjligt att bedöma hur de två associerade staterna genomför dessa akter inom ramen för associeringsavtalet med sikte på de monetära avtalen. ECB välkomnar att man inför en sådan bestämmelse, eftersom den är den centrala bestämmelsen i förslaget till beslut för att undvika överlappning mellan de monetära avtalen och associeringsavtalet. Samtidigt vill ECB påpeka bristen på tydlighet när det gäller genomförandet av denna åtgärd. Det är fortfarande oklart om en bestämmelse av samma innebörd också ska införas i associeringsavtalet och vem som skulle besluta om märkningen av unionsrättsakter som relevanta för tillämpningen av de monetära avtalen. ECB är beredd att delta i detta arbete. Beslut om märkningen skulle t.ex. kunna fattas vid mötena med den underkommitté för finansiella tjänster som inrättats enligt associeringsavtalet. För att öka rättssäkerheten föreslår ECB dessutom att man markerar de relevanta unionsrättsakterna som relevanta för tillämpningen av det monetära avtalet, i stället för av betydelse för euron, nödvändiga för euron eller av betydelse för eurons problemfria användning.

text: 2.5 ECB föreslår dessutom att man i samma bestämmelse fastställer att man, efter möten om statusen för genomförandet av de unionsrättsakter som förtecknas i den relevanta bilagan till associeringsavtalet och hat markerats som relevanta för tillämpningen av de monetära avtalen, kommer att dela ett översiktsdokument för genomförandet med den berörda gemensamma kommittén för de monetära avtalen. Utan detta finns det en risk för att markeringen av vissa unionsrättsakter som relevanta för tillämpningen av de monetära avtalen samt stadgandet att bedömningen av genomförandet av dessa rättsakter inom ramen för associeringsavtalet kommer att göras samtidigt med avseende på de monetära avtalen kommer att sakna praktisk betydelse. De gemensamma kommittéerna för de monetära avtalen måste vederbörligen informeras om statusen när det gäller genomförandet av de relevanta unionsrättsakterna för att kunna avgöra huruvida detta har någon inverkan på tillämpningen av de monetära avtalen. ECB är medveten om att en bestämmelse av samma slag ska införas i associeringsavtalet.

text: 2.6 Utkastet till beslut stadgar att en bestämmelse ska införas i de monetära avtalen enligt vilken den underkategori av unionsrättsakter inom bank- och finanslagstiftning som är av betydelse för euron och alla nya unionsrättsakter om bekämpning av penningtvätt eller finansiering av terrorism som har blivit en del av associeringsavtalet, automatiskt ska införlivas i bilagorna till de monetära avtalen om hela eller delar av associeringsavtalet tillfälligt upphävs eller sägs upp. För fullständighetens skull föreslår ECB att man förtydligar att denna process också skulle åtföljas av en bedömning av genomförandet av de relevanta unionsrättsakterna, som skulle genomföras inom ramen för de monetära avtalen.

text: 2.7 ECB välkomnar att förslaget till beslut inför en bestämmelse i de monetära avtalen som säkerställer att unionsrättsakter av penningrättslig karaktär även framöver enbart ska regleras genom de monetära avtalen. Såsom framgår av motiveringen till förslaget till beslut omfattar rättsakter av penningrättslig karaktär rättsliga åtgärder på områdena sedlar och mynt, bedrägerier och förfalskningar, rapportering av statistik till ECB samt rättsakter som antagits enligt artikel 133 i fördraget. Detta omfattar således bl.a. alla de rättsakter som antagits av ECB och som förtecknas i bilagorna till de monetära avtalen.

text: 2.8 I förslaget till beslut stadgas även att kommissionen ensam bemyndigas att förhandla om, ingå och underteckna ändringen av de monetära avtalen med Andorra och San Marino. ECB konstaterar att detta avviker från den praxis som hittills följts, enligt vilken ECB har varit fullt delaktig i förhandlingarna om de monetära avtalen inom sitt behörighetsområde. Dessutom är den ändring av de monetära avtal som ska förhandlas fram med Andorra och San Marino i enlighet med förslaget till beslut inte av mindre och teknisk karaktär. Såsom nämns i punkt 1.3 i detta yttrande har den föreslagna ändringen betydande konsekvenser för de monetära avtalens ramverk, särskilt för den roll som de gemensamma kommittéer som inrättas genom de monetära avtalen har. Därför bör man i förslaget till beslut stadga att ECB kommer att delta fullt ut i förhandlingarna inom sitt behörighetsområde, i linje med tidigare praxis. I de fall där ECB rekommenderar att förslaget till beslut ska ändras anges de specifika förslagen i ett separat tekniskt arbetsdokument som åtföljs av en förklaring. Det tekniska arbetsdokumentet finns på engelska i EUR-Lex.

text: Utfärdat i Frankfurt am Main den 15 maj 2024.

text: Christine Lagarde

text: ECB:s ordförande

text: Europeiska unionens officiella tidning

text: III Förberedande akter

text: EUROPEISKA CENTRALBANKEN

text: Europeiska centralbanken


text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).

text: Regulation (EU) 2023/1114

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2023 on markets in cryptoassets, and amending Regulations

text: (EU) No 1093/2010

text: and

text: (EU) No 1095/2010

text: and Directives

text: and

text: (EU) 2019/1937

text: (OJ L 150, 9.6.2023, p. 40).

text: Available on FATF’s website at www.fatf-gafi.org.

text: See Articles 8,10 and 12 of the Statute of the ESCB.

text: Guideline

text: (EU) 2022/912

text: of the European Central Bank of 24 February 2022 on a new-generation Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross Settlement Express Transfer system (TARGET) and repealing Guideline ECB/2012/27 (ECB/2022/8) (OJ L 163, 17.6.2022, p. 84).

text: See Annex I, Part I,

text: Article 4

text: , of Guideline

text: (EU) 2022/912

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 27 May 2024 on crypto-asset service providers’ accounts at a central bank (CON/2024/17)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 27 May 2024 on crypto-asset service providers’ accounts at a central bank (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 12 April 2024 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Latvia for an opinion on a draft law on crypto-asset services (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 2(1), third, fifth and sixth indents of Council Decision 1,

text: as the draft law relates to Latvijas Banka, payment and settlement systems and rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The aim of the draft law is to establish a legal framework for the operation of the crypto-assets market in Latvia by regulating persons and firms involved in the issuance, public offering and admission to trading of crypto-assets or providing post-issuance crypto-asset services. The draft law follows up on the provisions of

text: Regulation (EU) 2023/1114

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council and also seeks to ensure compliance with the requirements of Recommendation No 15 of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). 1.2 The subjects to be covered by the draft law would include new crypto-asset market participants planning to commence their activities from 30 June 2024 or 30 December 2024, as well as existing financial market participants that have already obtained a licence or authorisation issued by Latvijas Banka to provide certain types of financial services. Crypto-asset service providers that have already started their activities before 30 December 2024, and whose activities are currently supervised by the State Revenue Service, would also be subject to the requirements of the draft law if they receive an authorisation issued by Latvijas Banka to provide crypto-asset services.

text: 1.3 The draft law designates Latvijas Banka as the competent supervisory authority in Latvia . In this capacity, Latvijas Banka would issue authorisations to the subjects of the draft law and would be entitled to impose appropriate supervisory and administrative measures, as well as sanctions, in accordance with national law, for infringements of the requirements laid down in

text: Regulation (EU) No 2023/1114

text: . 1.4 The draft law provides that, in order to comply with

text: Article 70(3) of Regulation (EU) No 2023/1114

text: , a crypto-asset service provider has the right to open an account with Latvijas Banka for the purposes of safeguarding clients’ funds, by concluding an account service agreement with Latvijas Banka, and thus confers a new task on Latvijas Banka. The explanatory memorandum and the consultation letter explicitly state that the provisions of the account service agreement will be developed in accordance with the Eurosystem’s common policy on the servicing of such accounts at the national central bank (NCB). The consulting authority has specifically requested the ECB to opine on the right of crypto-asset service providers to open accounts with Latvijas Banka.

text: 2. Observations on the right of crypto-asset service providers to open accounts with Latvijas Banka

text: 2.1 As noted above, according to the draft law crypto-asset service providers will have the right to open an account with Latvijas Banka in order to comply with

text: . The ECB does not support the provision of the draft law establishing a right for cryptoasset service providers to hold accounts with Latvijas Banka.

text: Regulation (EU) No 2023/1114

text: merely provides that crypto-asset service providers must, by the end of the business day following the day on which clients’ funds other than e-money tokens were received, place those funds with a credit institution or a central bank.

text: Recital 82

text: of

text: Regulation (EU) No 2023/1114

text: clarifies that such funds may be deposited with central banks but only where an account with the central bank is available. Hence

text: , read in conjunction with recital 82, neither creates a right of crypto-asset service providers to open accounts with central banks, nor creates any corresponding obligation on the part of central banks to open such accounts for cryptoasset service providers. 2.2 The ECB also draws the Latvian legislator’s attention to Article 17 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter the ‘Statute of the ESCB’), which is part of Chapter IV thereof, on the ‘Monetary Functions and Operations of the ESCB’.

text: Article 17

text: states that the ECB and the NCBs may (rather than shall) open accounts for market participants in order to conduct their operations. Within the Eurosystem, decisions pertaining to the conduct of monetary operations are to be taken by the Governing Council and are binding on all Eurosystem central banks, including Latvijas Banka. It follows that the decision to open accounts for market participants needed for the purposes of conducting monetary policy rests with each of the ESCB central banks, which may only provide such accounts in the context of the conduct of

text: their monetary operations, subject to the overall authority of the Governing Council with respect to the monetary operations of Eurosystem central banks, including Latvijas Banka. 2.3 As regards accounts in TARGET, the large value payment systems for the euro, which is owned and operated by the Eurosystem and which serves, inter alia, as the channel for the implementation of the euro area’s monetary policy, these are only available to entities that fulfil the eligibility criteria determined by the Governing Council in a public legal act binding on all Eurosystem central banks, including Latvijas Banka . It follows from the relevant eligibility criteria that access to TARGET is possible as of right for certain predefined entities, upon their request, and is subject to the exercise of central bank discretion for certain other entities . At the present juncture, crypto-asset service providers are not eligible to hold accounts in TARGET, as they do not belong to either of the above two categories. 2.4 The situation regarding the opening of accounts for purposes other than monetary policy operations and outside TARGET has so far been less homogenous across the Eurosystem. The ECB accordingly takes the opportunity presented by this opinion to signal that the Eurosystem is currently working on the specific matter of access to central bank operated payment systems and safeguarding accounts for non-bank payment service providers, with a view to providing a harmonised approach of the Eurosystem on the subject. In the coming months, the Eurosystem expects to announce this harmonised approach, which will also specify the discretion for accessing Eurosystem central bank accounts. The ECB therefore invites the Latvian authorities to remove the provision related to the opening of an account at Latvijas Banka from the draft law entirely, in order to ensure that Latvian legislation does not pre-empt or foreshadow a matter pertaining to the Eurosystem’s competences.

text: This opinion will be published on EUR-Lex.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 27 May 2024.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Christine LAGARDE


text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42). 2 Regulation of Lobbying Act 2015. 3 Section 6(2) of the 2015 Act. 4 Section 6(3) of the 2015 Act. 5 Section 3 of the draft Regulations. 6 Section 5 of the 2015 Act

text: Section 12 of the 2015 Act 8 Sections 5(4) and 5(5)(c) of the 2015 Act 9 Sections 22 and 22A of the 2015 Act 10 Programme for Government: Our Shared Future, 2020, p. 121, available on the Irish Government’s website at https://www.gov.ie/en/.

text: See judgment of the Court of Justice of 10 July 2003, Commission v ECB,

text: , ECLI:EU:C:2003:395, paragraphs 134 to 136. See also paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on EUR-Lex. 12 See Code of Conduct for high-level ECB officials (OJ C 478, 16.12.2022, p. 3). 13 See paragraph 2.4 of Opinion

text: and, generally, the Single Code. 14 See paragraph 2.4 of Opinion

text: . 15 Article 17 of the Single Code. 16 Article 17 of the Single Code. 17 As required under section 22(1) of the 2015 Act. 18 See Article 2 of the Single Code.

text: See Articles 4 and 5 of Guideline (EU) [2021/2253] of the European Central Bank of 2 November 2021 laying down the principles of the Eurosystem Ethics Framework (ECB/2021/49) (OJ L 454, 17.12.2021, p. 7); and Articles 4 and 5 of Guideline

text: (EU) 2021/2256

text: of the European Central Bank of 2 November 2021 laying down the principles of the Ethics Framework for the Single Supervisory Mechanism (ECB/2021/50) (OJ L 454, 17.12.2021, p. 21). 20 See Article 6 of Guideline (EU) [2021/2253] (ECB/2021/49) and Article 6 of Guideline

text: (EU) 2021/2256

text: (ECB/2021/50) 21 See paragraph 2.5 of Opinion

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 31 may 2024 on the extension of the register of lobbying (CON/2024/18)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 31 May 2024 on the extension of the Register of Lobbying (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 2 May 2024 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Irish Minister for Public Expenditure, National Development Plan Delivery and Reform (hereinafter the ‘Minister’) for an opinion on the Regulation of Lobbying Act 2015 (Designated Public Officials) Regulations 2024 (hereinafter the ‘draft regulations’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the third indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft regulations relate to the Central Bank of Ireland (CBI). In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft regulations

text: 1.1. The purpose of the draft regulations is to expand the scope of the Regulation of Lobbying Act 2015 (hereinafter the ‘2015 Act’) to include certain members of the CBI as designated public officials (DPOs). In this respect, under the 2015 Act, the Minister may prescribe descriptions of public servants by reference to their roles, levels of remuneration, grades or similar factors who are then designated as DPOs under the 2015 Act. In determining whether or not to prescribe any description of public servants the Minister must have regard to the public interest and any recommendations made under the 2015 Act . 1.2. Under the draft regulations, persons holding the following roles in the CBI are prescribed as DPOs: the Governor, Deputy Governor, Chief Operations Officer, Director, Chief People Officer, Chief Information Officer, Registrar of Credit Unions, and the Chief of Staff/Advisor to the Governor . 1.3. Under the 2015 Act, where a person subject to the 2015 Act makes, manages, or directs the making of any relevant communication to a DPO in the circumstances outlined in the 2015 Act (hereinafter

text: a ‘lobbyist’), the lobbyist is required to report that interaction to the Standards in Public Office Commission (hereinafter the ‘Commission’) , which maintains a Register of Lobbying. As noted by the Minister in the consultation request, the objective of introducing the Register of Lobbying was to make information available to the public on the identity and intentions of those communicating with DPOs. 1.4. As communications by or on behalf of Union institutions are excepted communications under the 2015 Act, such communications do not have to be registered . 1.5. The 2015 Act does not impose any obligations on DPOs with regard to the registration and reporting of lobbying. DPOs are, however, subject to certain restrictions on post-term employment as a lobbyist and may, from 1 June 2024, be sanctioned for breaching these restrictions . 1.6. The designation of certain members of the CBI as DPOs in accordance with the 2015 Act formed part of the Irish Government’s Programme for Government. In its Programme for Government, the Government committed to expanding the scope of the Register of Lobbying so that the lobbying of senior officials in bodies like the CBI, which have significant policymaking or development functions, would be reported on the same basis as the lobbying of DPOs of central and local government . The draft regulations also seek to bring similarly senior members of other public bodies within the scope of the 2015 Act.

text: 2. Observations

text: 2.1 This opinion addresses the designation by the Minister in the draft regulations of certain members of the CBI as DPOs in accordance with the 2015 Act. In particular, the members of the CBI designated in the draft regulations include members of the ECB’s Governing Council, General Council, and Supervisory Board, who take part in the ECB’s decision-making process, as well as alternate members of these bodies and certain CBI staff members. 2.2

text: Article 130

text: TFEU requires that, when exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties conferred upon them by the TFEU, the Treaty on the European Union and the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, neither the ECB nor a national central bank (NCB) nor any member of their decision-making bodies shall seek or take instructions from Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, from any government of a Member State or from any other body. The aim of

text: Article 130

text: TFEU is to shield central banks from political pressure and to enable them to effectively pursue the objectives attributed to their tasks through the independent exercise of the specific powers conferred on them for that purpose. However, the recognition that central banks have such independence does not have the consequence of exempting them from

text: every rule of law and to shield them from any kind of legislation . Moreover, the ECB has itself put in place measures with a purpose similar to those of the 2015 Act. 2.3 First, in view of

text: Article 130

text: TFEU and to avoid conflicts of interest, the ECB has a Code of Conduct for high-level ECB Officials (hereinafter the ‘Single Code’) . The Single Code requires members and alternates of the ECB’s decision-making bodies (hereinafter ‘high-level ECB officials’) to sign upon their appointment, a declaration of adherence to the Single Code. The Single Code provides good governance safeguards for relations with interest groups and also includes guiding principles regarding communication with external parties. High-level ECB officials commit to safeguarding confidential information in accordance with their obligations and to avoid any appearance that potentially market-sensitive information may not be available to the widest possible public audience at the same time. To enhance transparency and accountability, members of high-level ECB bodies must, as a general rule, include information on their meetings with external parties in their published meeting calendars to the extent that such information relates to their role as high-level ECB officials . While these measures aim to ensure independence and avoid conflicts of interest, they do not exclude regular contact and interaction with external stakeholders who can provide relevant input and information that helps to understand the dynamics of the economy, the financial markets and the banking sector, and the broader societal context . 2.4 Second, high-level ECB officials are also subject to post-employment notification obligations and are required to make a request to the ECB’s Ethics Committee to issue an opinion on the applicable cooling-off periods prior to the taking up of a specific prospective gainful occupational activity . The Single Code also states that high-level ECB officials may only engage in a gainful occupational activity with any entity engaged in lobbying in relation to the ECB after the expiry of the relevant time period following the end of their term of office or from the date of cessation of their function as a member of a high-level ECB body . In this regard, an application for consent made to the Commission by a DPO where applicable under the 2015 Act would be in addition to the concurrent obligation of the high-level ECB official to consult the ECB’s Ethics Committee. Recommendations of the ECB’s Ethics Committee pertain only to a DPO’s former role as a high-level ECB official and are also in addition to further ethical rules applicable to high-level ECB officials under national law . 2.5 Finally, the ECB, NCBs and national competent authorities (NCAs) participating in the Single Supervisory Mechanism are required to take the necessary measures to ensure that their members of staff and members of their bodies act independently and maintain neutrality when meeting with

text: external parties, in particular with representatives from the financial services industry . The ECB, NCBs and NCAs are also required to have a mechanism in place to assess and avoid possible conflicts of interest arising from post-employment occupational activities undertaken by their members of staff and the members of their bodies, including appropriate notification requirements and cooling-off periods . 2.6 In view of the above considerations, the ECB considers that the draft regulations, including the postterm employment restrictions, would not impair the independent performance of the CBI’s ESCBrelated tasks .

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 31 May 2024.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Christine LAGARDE


text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42). 2 4 See the proposed new Section 74. of the Law on credit institutions.

text: 4 See the proposed new Section 74. of the Law on credit institutions. 4 COM(2020) 592 final. See in particular, Pillar 1, Chapter III, paragraph 7, of the Communication. 5 Available on the Council’s website at consilium.europa.eu. 6 Available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: See the new paragraph 13 of Section 198 of the Law on credit institutions. 8

text: Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013

text: conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63) (hereinafter the ‘SSM Regulation’). 9 See, for example, paragraphs 2.4 and 2.7 of Opinion

text: , paragraphs 2.1 and 2.2 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 4.7 of Opinion

text: of the European Central Bank of 16 February 2022 on a proposal for a directive and a regulation on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing (OJ C 210, 25.5.2022, p. 15), paragraph 1.7 of Opinion

text: of the European Central Bank of 13 October 2023 on a proposal for a regulation on the legal tender of euro banknotes and coins (OJ C, C/2023/1355, 1.12.2023) and paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: . The ECB has stated its neutrality regarding different means of payment, which means that it does not favour one instrument over another. See paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on EUR-Lex. 10 See paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: . 11 See Opinions

text: and

text: See, paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: . 13 See paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: . 14 See paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 3.3 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: . 15 See paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 1.2 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: . See also Principle 6 of ELTEG III in the Final report of the Euro Legal Tender Expert Group (ELTEG) of 6 July 2022, available on the Commission’s website at www.ec.europa.eu. 16 See paragraph 2.4 of Opinion

text: . 17 COM(2023) 364 final.

text: See paragraphs 2.3 and 2.4 of Opinion

text: . 19 See paragraph 1.2 of Opinion

text: . 20 See recital 28 of the SSM Regulation. 21 See paragraph 3.2 of Opinion

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 31 May 2024 on requiring credit institutions to provide a minimum cash infrastructure (CON/2024/19)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 31 May 2024 on requiring credit institutions to provide a minimum cash infrastructure (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 25 April 2024 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Latvia for an opinion on amendments to the Law on credit institutions (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 2(1), first, second and third indents, of

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft law relates to currency matters, means of payment and Latvijas Banka. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The overall purpose of the draft law is to ensure access to cash to the population throughout the territory of Latvia by setting minimum requirements for the provision of cash withdrawal services. 1.2 The requirement to ensure minimum access to cash withdrawal services is to apply to the major credit institutions, which have a significant role in providing access to cash in Latvia. These credit institutions are defined on the basis of the following elements: (1) the credit institution provides payment account-related services to consumers resident in the Union; (2) payment accounts opened with the credit institution on 31 December of the previous year constitute at least 5 % of the total number of payment accounts opened in Latvia; and (3) the holdings of domestic household deposits in the credit institution on 31 December of the previous year constitute at least 5 % of total domestic household deposits in Latvia . The requirement applies to credit institutions and branches of credit institutions registered in Latvia. It does not apply to credit institutions registered in other Member States which have started to provide financial services in Latvia without opening a branch. According to the explanatory memorandum accompanying the draft law these requirements apply to the four largest credit institutions in Latvia: AS Swedbank, AS SEB banka, AS Citadele banka and the Latvian branch of Luminor Bank AS.

text: 1.3 Access to cash withdrawal services is to be ensured by imposing requirements with regard to the geographical coverage, number and minimum up-time of automatic teller machines (ATMs), as well as setting a minimum threshold for free-of-charge cash withdrawals from ATMs. The draft law does not specify any requirements regarding in-person cash services at credit institutions. The draft law lays down the requirements for major credit institutions with regard to providing cash withdrawal services, while the decisions concerning the numerical values and permitted deviations are delegated to Latvijas Banka. When setting the numerical values for these requirements, Latvijas Banka must ensure that they are proportionate, including that they are appropriate to achieve their legitimate objective regarding access to cash, among other things, by setting the permitted deviations and conditions for their application. The draft law requires Latvijas Banka to consult with the Latvian Association of Local and Regional Governments and the Ministry of Economics before setting such requirements . 1.4 The explanatory memorandum accompanying the draft law notes that the draft law has been developed in order to ensure that, despite the growing proportion of non-cash payments, Latvia’s population continues to enjoy access to cash and freedom of payment choice. In this regard the explanatory memorandum refers to: (1) the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on a Retail Payments Strategy for the EU , which states that access to cash should be preserved and that one means whereby Member States might achieve that could be to provide for minimum coverage of ATMs, or equivalent means of access; (2) the acknowledgement contained in Council conclusions on the Commission Communication on a ‘Retail Payments Strategy for the European Union’ that cash continues to play an essential role in retail payments, including for those who are financially or digitally excluded and, in certain cases, as a safeguard in the case of malfunctions in payment systems and infrastructures, and that both cash and digital payments should be broadly available and accepted, in response to user needs and preferences; and (3) the Eurosystem Cash Strategy , which states that the Eurosystem has a fundamental responsibility to ensure the smooth supply of cash and facilitate the use of cash in payments as well as to safeguard the future of cash. 1.5 The explanatory memorandum accompanying the draft law identifies a number of risks that would become progressively higher if access to cash payment services continues to decline for Latvia's population: (1) the risk that the role of euro banknotes and coins as legal tender and the only means of payment that allows direct in-person payments, with immediate and final settlement of payment requirements, will be jeopardised; (2) the risk that in the event of extreme circumstances – such as major malfunctions, limitations or even disruptions in payment systems due to cyber-attacks, natural disasters or power outages – the capacity of the infrastructure available to credit institutions to provide access to cash payment services will be insufficient to satisfy the demand for cash; (3) the risk that population groups that do not know how to use or are unable to make full use of digital

text: technologies, or prefer cash to non-cash payments for other legitimate reasons, will be at a higher risk of social exclusion; and (4) the risk that the population’s opportunities to quickly exchange noncash money (claims on credit institutions) for risk-free central bank money with legal tender status (euro banknotes and coins) will be undermined, thereby creating a risk that people might lose confidence in the general stability of the monetary system. 1.6 In addition, the draft law empowers Latvijas Banka to enforce the draft law by imposing administrative sanctions . These sanctions include issuing a warning or imposing a fine up to EUR 50 000 on major credit institutions if they fail to ensure the accessibility of ATMs in terms of the requirements regarding distance, number or uptime of ATMs, or if they do not provide their customers (natural persons to whom they have issued a payment card) free-of-charge cash withdrawal services within the specified minimum requirements. 1.7 Finally, the explanatory memorandum accompanying the draft law states that the draft law does not concern the prudential supervision of credit institutions. It is thus without prejudice to the tasks conferred on the ECB in

text: Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013

text: 2. Observations

text: 2.1 The ECB understands that electronic payment instruments are increasingly used as the preferred method of payment in Latvia, while the use of cash is declining. Despite the digitalisation of the Union economy and the increasing use of electronic means of payment, cash continues to play an important role in society . As rightly pointed out in the explanatory memorandum accompanying the draft law, cash is a well-established and secure means of payment providing for immediate settlement of debts and direct control over the payer’s spending. It is currently the only payment instrument that allows citizens to settle a transaction in central bank money which is also settled instantly, while, importantly, ensuring privacy . Cash payments facilitate the inclusion of the entire population in the economy by allowing it to settle any kind of financial transaction in this way, thus ensuring freedom of choice as to the method of payment for all citizens . The ECB concurs with the view expressed in the explanatory memorandum that cash could play an important role in the event of a disturbance in the payment systems, even though cash machines and other service points may also be affected as these are dependent on interaction with the account holding institutions. The ECB fully agrees that the ability to pay in cash remains particularly important for certain groups in society that, for various

text: legitimate reasons, prefer to use cash rather than other means of payment, or who do not have access to bank services and electronic means of payments. These groups include disabled citizens, immigrants, socially vulnerable citizens, elderly people, minors and others with limited or no access to digital payment services . 2.2 Notwithstanding that the ECB holds a positive view of further innovation and development in the field of electronic payment instruments, the ECB also welcomes the core objectives of the draft law to facilitate the continued use of cash in Latvian society by ensuring an adequate level of access to cash services throughout Latvia, including remote rural areas. The availability and accessibility of cash and its fallback function in case of disruptions contribute to trust in the financial system, which is important for the smooth functioning of monetary policy . 2.3 The ECB considers it important that all Member States take appropriate measures to ensure that credit institutions and branches operating within their territories provide adequate access to cash services, in order to facilitate the continued use of cash . Sufficient and effective access to cash is necessary to preserve the effectiveness of the legal tender status of cash. If citizens do not have easy access to cash, they will not be able to use it as a means of payment . 2.4 In addition, the ECB wishes to note that a minimum level of in-person cash withdrawal services may be needed at credit institutions, especially for those groups in society that do not have access to electronic means of payment, and to be prepared for situations where ATMs are not available. Moreover, customers should have sufficient and effective access to cash deposit services at credit institutions. This would support the acceptance of cash by payees (e.g. merchants and public sector entities) by ensuring that they can conveniently convert euro cash into commercial bank money and manage their liquidity efficiently, for instance to pay their suppliers and employees. 2.5 The ECB welcomes the administrative sanctions, including warnings and financial fines, that may be imposed on credit institutions under the draft law, which should facilitate the enforcement of their requirements under the draft law . 2.6 On 28 June 2023 the Commission published a proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the legal tender of euro banknotes and coins , which includes an obligation for Member States to ensure sufficient and effective access to cash throughout their territory. The draft law seems aligned with the Commission proposal in this respect. The imposition in the draft law of new requirements on credit institutions will contribute to ensuring that cash remains widely available and accessible in Latvia. 2.7 The ECB understands that it will be consulted on the future regulation of Latvijas Banka to establish the specific numerical values regarding the ATM network in terms of the total number of ATMs

text: provided by credit institutions; the geographical distance between ATMs; the operating hours of ATMs; and the requirements related to the monthly minimum threshold of free-of-charge withdrawals of cash and the total number of free-of-charge withdrawals. Consistent with its previous stance , the ECB would caution against low thresholds for free-of-charge withdrawals of cash from ATMs to the extent that these could make the use of euro banknotes more expensive than electronic means of payment, and would therefore recommend that the threshold is set at a level that does not discourage the use of cash. The ECB underlines its view that access to cash is necessary to preserve the effectiveness of its legal tender status. If citizens do not have access to cash, they will not be able to use it as a means of payment and store of value . 2.8 Regarding the requirement contained in the draft law to consult with the Latvian Association of Local and Regional Governments and the Ministry of Economics before Latvijas Banka sets the minimum requirements, including the numerical values, in its regulation, the ECB understands that any views expressed in such consultation would not be binding on Latvijas Banka. In this respect, the explanatory memorandum accompanying the draft law states that this approach is designed to respect the principle of central bank independence enshrined in Article 130 of the Treaty. 2.9 Finally, in line with what is stated in the explanatory memorandum accompanying the draft law, the ECB understands that the new requirements do not relate to the prudential supervision of credit institutions. Based on Article 127(6) of the Treaty, the SSM Regulation confers tasks on the ECB concerning the prudential supervision of credit institutions. In this respect, the SSM Regulation clarifies that supervisory tasks not conferred on the ECB should remain with the national authorities . Therefore, the ECB understands that the draft law cannot include any role for the ECB in its prudential supervisory function .

text: This opinion will be published on EUR-Lex.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 31 May 2024.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Christine LAGARDE


text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42). 2 Lietuvos Respublikos įstatymas dėl Lietuvos Respublikos narystės Tarptautiniame valiutos fonde, TAR, 2017-12-19, Nr. 20432.

text: Lietuvos Respublikos Lietuvos banko įstatymas, Valstybės žinios, 1994-12-23, Nr. 99-1957. 4

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 of 13 December 1993

text: specifying definitions for the application of the prohibitions referred to in Articles

text: and

text: b (1) of the Treaty (OJ L 332, 31.12.1993, p. 1). 5 See Opinion

text: , which concerns the last increase of Austria’s quota in the IMF. See also Opinions

text: and

text: . All ECB Opinions are published on EUR-Lex.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 12 June 2024 on the increase of Lithuania’s quota in the International Monetary Fund (CON/2024/20)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 12 June 2024 on the increase of Lithuania’s quota in the International Monetary Fund (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 29 May 2024 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Lithuanian Ministry of Finance for an opinion on the draft law on the increase of Lithuania’s quota in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 2(1), third indent, of

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft law relates to Lietuvos bankas. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The purpose of the draft law is to increase Lithuania’s quota in the IMF. On 15 December 2023, the IMF Board of Governors finalised the Sixteenth General Review of Quotas and agreed to a 50 % increase in quotas while maintaining the existing relative quota shares. The quotas are expected to increase by 238.6 billion Special Drawing Rights (SDR) to SDR 715.7 billion. The Board of Governors’ resolution also states that the IMF’s lending capacity should be maintained and its dependence on borrowed funds reduced. This is to be achieved by reducing the New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB) and phasing out bilateral borrowing agreements. The IMF member countries have until 15 November 2024 to agree to a corresponding increase in their quotas. This increase comes into force only when (1) IMF member countries that together hold no less than 85 % of the previous quota funds have agreed to the increase and (2) the participants under the NAB agree to a reduction in the NAB. 1.2 The draft law incorporates the IMF quota increase into Lithuanian law. In particular, the draft law provides that the Lithuanian Parliament approves the increase of Lithuania’s quota in the IMF from SDR 441.6 million to SDR 662.4 million. The draft law requires Lietuvos bankas to fulfil Lithuania’s financial obligations related to the increase of Lithuania’s quota in the IMF by SDR 220.8 million, by using the financial assets of Lietuvos bankas. The ECB understands that, in accordance with the Law on the membership of Lithuania in the IMF , Lietuvos bankas has been since 2018 a fiscal

text: agency of the IMF that executes the IMF’s quota-related financial operations on behalf of Lithuania, and holds the rights and obligations relating to the performance of the functions of a fiscal agency of the IMF. In addition, the SDRs allocated to Lithuania by the IMF are part of the official foreign reserves of Lietuvos bankas, which are managed, used and disposed of in accordance with the procedure established by the Law on Lietuvos bankas .

text: 2. Monetary financing prohibition

text: Article 123(1) of the Treaty prohibits the national central banks (NCBs) from granting overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facility to public authorities and bodies of the Member States.

text: Article 1 of Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93

text: defines ‘any other type of credit facility’, inter alia, as ‘any financing of the public sector’s obligations vis-à-vis third parties’. However,

text: Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 3603/93

text: provides that the financing by NCBs of obligations falling upon the public sector vis-à-vis the IMF is not regarded as a credit facility within the meaning of Article 123(1) of the Treaty. The fourteenth recital of

text: Regulation (EC) No 3603/93

text: sets out the rationale behind this exemption, stating that it is appropriate to authorise the financing by the NCBs of obligations falling upon the public sector vis-à-vis the IMF because such financing results in ‘claims which have all the characteristics of reserve assets’. Therefore, the exemption set out in

text: Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 3603/93

text: should be interpreted in line with that rationale. As the financing by Lietuvos bankas of the proposed increase in Lithuania’s IMF quota would result in claims which have all the characteristics of reserve assets, the draft law complies with the monetary financing prohibition .

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 12 June 2024.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Christine LAGARDE