text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 2 Ordinance No 8/2001 of NBP’s President of 27 June 2001 on the method and procedure for counting, sorting, packaging and labelling packaging units of banknotes and coins, and in conducting activities related to the supply of banknotes and coins to banks (Dz.Urz. NBP of 17 July 2001 No 10, Item 22, as amended). The statutory basis for the adoption of the draft ordinance is contained in Article 68(2) of the Law of 29 August 1997 on banking (consolidated text: Dz.U. of 13 May 2002 No 72, Item 665, as amended; hereinafter: ‘Law on banking’). 3 See the first paragraph of the explanatory memorandum accompanying the draft ordinance, and the second paragraph of the letter from NBP’s President of 18 July 2007 requesting the ECB’s opinion.

text: Paragraph 2(3) and paragraphs 6 to 9 of the draft ordinance. 5 Paragraphs 10 to 16 of the draft ordinance. 6 Paragraph 29(3) of the draft ordinance. 7 Ordinance No 1/2003 of NBP’s President of 15 January 2003 laying down the detailed rules of exchange of currency items that due to their use or damage have ceased to be legal tender on the territory of the Republic of Poland (Dz.Urz. NBP of 17 January 2003 No 1, Item 1, as amended). The statutory basis for the adoption of this ordinance is contained in Article 34(2) of the Law on Narodowy Bank Polski of 29 August 1997 (consolidated text: Dz.U. of 1 April 2005 No 1, Item 2, as amended; hereinafter, the ‘NBP Statute’). 8 Ordinance of NBP’s President of 31 August 1989 on the seizure of counterfeit currency (M.P. of 27 September 1989 No 32, Item 255, as amended). The statutory basis for the adoption of this ordinance is currently contained in Article 35(3) of the NBP Statute. Cf. resolution No 19/2004 of the NBP Management Board of 22 April 2004 amending the resolution on the introduction of the Organisational By-laws of Narodowy Bank Polski (as regards creation of the National Analysis Centre, the Coin National Analysis Centre and the National Counterfeit Centre within NBP’s Head Office. The penal sanctions for currency counterfeiting are contained in the Chapter XXXVII of the Penal Code of 6 June 1997 (Dz.U. of 2 August 1997 No 88, Item 553, as amended).

text: OJ L 181, 4.7.2001, p. 11. The provisions of

text: Regulation (EC) No 1339/2001

text: are currently reflected in the Polish law provisions specified in footnote 8 above. 10 Currently the draft ordinance separates banknote and coin rules only to a certain extent. As an example, in Section II (‘Polish currency’) of the draft ordinance separate chapters cover packaging and labelling in relation to banknotes (Chapters 2-3) and in relation to coins (Chapters 4-5), while the provisions relating to counting and sorting, as well as to cash lodging and cash discrepancies cover, for the most part, both banknotes and coins (see Chapter 1 and 6 to 7). 11 Paragraphs 2, 6 to 9 and 35 to 39 of the draft ordinance. The draft ordinance provides in the case of detecting a banknote in relation to which there is sufficient reason to believe that it is counterfeit that the relevant organisational unit of a commercial bank is obliged to act in accordance with the principles set in the draft ordinance and in separate provisions, i.e. the Ordinance on the seizure of counterfeit currency (see footnote 8 above). 12 See Article 121(1) of the Treaty. 13 Document available on the ECB’s website. The equivalent rules for euro coins are contained in the Commission’s Recommendation of 27 May 2005 concerning authentication of euro coins and handling of euro coins unfit for circulation (C(2005)1540 final).

text: See points 2.1.2. and 2.1.3. of the Banknote Recycling Framework. 15 Paragraph 6(1) to (2) of the draft ordinance. 16 Paragraph 7 of the draft ordinance. 18 See Annex to the Banknote Recycling Framework ‘Minimum standards for fitness sorting of euro banknotes by credit institutions and other professional cash handlers’, available on request from the ECB. 19 See Ordinance No 1/2003 referred to in footnote 7 above.

text: The term ‘credit institutions’ under Polish law only relates to EU credit institutions from outside Poland. Polish credit institutions are legally referred to as ‘banks’ (this definition does not cover the Polish variety of credit unions, operating on the basis of the Law of 14 December 1995 on cooperative savings and loan associations (Dz.U. of 4 January 1996 No 1, Item 2, as amended)). Non-EU banks are referred to as ‘foreign banks’ (

text: Article 2

text: and

text: Article 4(1)

text: (17) to (20) of the Law on banking). 21 Paragraph 1(2) of the draft ordinance. 22 See Article 68(2) of the Law on banking in conjunction with Article 92 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 1997 (Dz.U. of 16 July 1997 No 78, Item 483, as amended); cf. judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 28 June 2000 in Case K25/99 (Dz.U. of 7 July 2000 No 53, Item 648). 23 Including, among others, specialised cash handling service providers, bureaux de change, retailers, etc. Operations in the area of banknotes counting, sorting and packaging may be outsourced by banks to other entities, subject to supervisory clearance under

text: Article 6

text: a(1)(2) in conjunction with

text: Article 6

text: d of the Law on banking; cf. point II of the NBP’s explanatory note NB-BPN-I-022-70/04 of 3 August 2004 on the application of certain provisions related to outsourcing.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 25 September 2007 at the request of the President of Narodowy Bank Polski on a draft ordinance on the method and procedure for counting, sorting, packaging and labelling packaging units of banknotes and coins, and in conducting activities related to the supply of banknotes and coins to banks (CON/2007/28)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 25 September 2007 at the request of the President of Narodowy Bank Polski on a draft ordinance on the method and procedure for counting, sorting, packaging and labelling packaging units of banknotes and coins, and in conducting activities related to the supply of banknotes and coins to banks (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 24 July 2007 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the President of Narodowy Bank Polski (NBP) for an opinion on a draft ordinance of the NBP’s President on the method and procedure for counting, sorting, packaging and labelling packaging units of banknotes and coins, and in conducting activities related to the supply of banknotes and coins to banks (hereinafter the ‘draft ordinance’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Article 105(4) of the Treaty establishing the European Community and the first, second and third indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft ordinance relates to currency matters, means of payment and to the NBP. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft ordinance

text: The draft ordinance is intended to replace the current NBP rules concerning commercial banks’ obligations with respect to counting, sorting and packaging of banknotes and coins . Particularly in view of the need to adjust the existing legal requirements to the increased automation of cash handling procedures , the draft ordinance introduces the following key modifications: (i) streamlining regulatory

text: obligations as regards the manual counting and sorting of banknotes ; (ii) modifying relevant technical standards, such as those related to packaging banknotes in packets (100 pieces), half-bundles (500 pieces) and bundles (1000 pieces) ; and (iii) facilitating a decrease in stocks of banknotes held by commercial banks, inter alia by allowing packaged banknotes of certain denominations to be lodged with NBP’s regional branches in half-bundles .

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 While Poland is a Member State with a derogation and the ECB requirements regarding the organisation of national cash cycles in Member States that have adopted the euro currently do not apply to NBP, these requirements will become applicable to NBP once Poland adopts the euro and NBP becomes a fully integrated part of the Eurosystem. As a general comment, the ECB notes that the NBP’s provisions on the handling of banknotes differ to some extent from Eurosystem practices and that these provisions will have to be aligned with the Eurosystem standards before Poland adopts the euro. The ECB understands that the main intention of the draft ordinance is to adapt the NBP’s legislation to the growing automisation of the cash handling operations. The ECB assumes that the draft ordinance may be an adequate legislative instrument to achieve this specific purpose. However, the ECB would have welcomed at the same time a more consistent approach to achieve a high level of harmonisation with the Eurosystem standards. The ECB also considers that the explanatory memorandum to the draft NBP ordinance could include an appropriate reference to the necessary further evolution of NBP’s regulatory framework in view of the future adoption of euro. 2.2 The ECB furthermore notes that the draft ordinance forms part of a wider body of the regulatory framework containing also NBP’s legislative instruments covering: (i) rules on withdrawal from circulation of worn or damaged banknotes and coins ; and (ii) rules on seizure of suspected counterfeits . Legal certainty and clarity could be enhanced by consolidating all such Polish cash handling rules, in a single administrative instrument. The ECB notes that this is currently difficult to achieve due to the existence of separate statutory bases for the regulation of the various elements of NBP’s cash handling regulation. While greater legal coherence may currently be achieved by way of introducing clear cross-references between the various existing provisions, a uniform cash

text: handling regulation should be introduced in view of the future adoption of euro, on the basis of a single statutory delegation. Moreover, as regards the euro banknotes and coins such framework needs to comply with the directly applicable provisions of

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 1339/2001 of 28 June 2001

text: extending the effects of

text: Regulation (EC) No 1338/2001

text: laying down measures necessary for the protection of the euro against counterfeiting to those Member States which have not adopted the euro as their single currency (this ECB opinion does not assess such compliance) . 2.3 Under Article 106 of the EC Treaty, the ECB has the exclusive right to authorise the issue of banknotes within the Community, whereas the coins are issued by the Member States subject to approval by the ECB of the volume of the issue. Consequently, as a general principle, the Eurosystem’s regulatory competence concerns only banknotes. Hence, in view of the accession of national central banks (NCBs) to the Eurosystem, the ECB supports a clear and consistent separation between national rules relating to banknotes and rules relating to coins. Also the draft ordinance, and more generally the NBP’s overall cash handling framework, would benefit from introducing such consistent internal separation between rules concerning banknotes and coins, respectively . This would in time facilitate the legal convergence of the Polish legislative framework, necessary to become a full participant in economic and monetary union.

text: 3. Alignment with the Eurosystem’s Banknote Recycling Framework

text: 3.1 The draft ordinance regulates, among others, the detection of counterfeits and fitness sorting of banknotes ensuring that worn or defective banknotes that are unfit for circulation, and banknotes where there is sufficient reason to believe that they are counterfeit, are duly withdrawn from circulation . In the view of Poland’s future adoption of euro and the related general obligation to align Polish law with the law of the Eurosystem , the ECB would welcome already establishing in the draft ordinance a legal framework at the national level that is consistent with the ECB’s ‘Framework for the detection of counterfeits and fitness sorting by credit institutions and other professional cash handlers’ (hereinafter the ‘Banknote Recycling Framework’ or the ‘Framework’) . 3.2 The Banknote Recycling Framework aims to implement a common policy for the recycling of banknotes by credit institutions and other professional cash handlers, so as to contribute to

text: maintaining the quality and authenticity of euro banknotes in circulation. As issuing authorities, the ECB and the NCBs of the Member States that have adopted the euro consider it to be of utmost importance for euro banknotes in circulation to be in good physical condition so that the general public, as well as professional cash handlers, can check their authenticity in a reliable and proper manner and separate authentic banknotes from counterfeits or suspected counterfeits. 3.3 Under the Banknote Recycling Framework , credit institutions and other professional cash handlers may re-issue euro banknotes to customers only if these banknotes are duly checked for authenticity and fitness. As a general rule, the authenticity and fitness checks of the banknotes to be recycled can be performed either by banknote handling machines successfully tested by NCBs, or by trained staff members. However, the banknotes may only be returned to circulation via automated teller machines (ATM) or other customer-operated devices if they have been checked for both authenticity and fitness by banknote handling machines successfully tested by an NCB. Banknotes which have been checked for authenticity by trained staff members of a cash handler without the use of successfully tested banknote handling equipment, e.g. manually, may not be returned to circulation via ATMs or other customer-operated devices, but may only be re-issued over the counter after being checked for fitness. 3.4 Under the draft ordinance the definition of ‘counting of banknotes’ includes verification of their authenticity, and ‘sorting of banknotes’ consists in separating banknotes fit for circulation from those unfit for circulation due to wear or tear damage . Both counting and sorting of banknotes can be effected manually or with the use of sorting machines . The draft ordinance does not, however, include any provisions corresponding to the Framework’s requirements that would provide that only the banknotes checked by banknote handling machines for both authenticity and fitness may be returned to circulation via ATMs or other customer-operated devices. 3.5 Moreover, the ECB notes that the draft ordinance contains a definition of ‘banknotes unfit for circulation’, which covers, among others, banknotes which are tattered, torn partially or entirely, backed with an adhesive, excessively soiled, stained or damaged in any other way . The above description does not correspond with the Eurosystem’s minimum standards for manual and automated fitness sorting of euro banknotes by credit institutions and other professional cash handlers that are contained in the Annex to the Banknote Recycling Framework . Further, the ECB notes that the draft ordinance’s criteria for qualifying banknotes as unfit for circulation are without prejudice to the separate NBP’s provisions relating to the exchange of worn or damaged banknotes . In view of preparations for the future adoption of the euro by Poland, the ECB invites

text: the NBP to already consider the overall alignment of such NBP’s standards for fitness sorting with the Banknote Recycling Framework and its Annex. 3.6 The ECB notes that the draft ordinance applies only to domestic banks, branches of European 20 21 Union credit institutions and branches of foreign (i.e. non-EU) banks as well as to NBP itself , whereas the Banknote Recycling Framework applies to all professional cash handlers, i.e. both credit institutions and other professional cash handlers. The ECB understands that under Polish law the NBP has no powers to regulate non-bank entities , such as non-bank cash handlers. Taking into account the potentially increasing role of non-bank cash handlers in the Polish cash cycle, the ECB therefore recommends taking appropriate steps to ensure uniform application of Eurosystem standards contained in the Banknote Recycling Framework to all relevant categories of cash handling entities. Hence, in addition to fully aligning with the Framework of the NBP’s own legislative instruments directed to banks, which would be an important first step, other appropriate legislative or contractual instruments may need to be introduced for the remaining categories of cash handlers.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 25 September 2007.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: See ECB Opinion

text: of 13 September 2006 at the request of the Czech Ministry of Industry and Trade on an amendment to the Law on Česká národní banka, ECB Opinion

text: of 25 July 2006 at the request of the Bank of Greece on a draft provision on the Bank of Greece’s powers in the field of consumer protection, and ECB Opinion

text: of 21 March 2007 at the request of the Czech Ministry of Industry and Trade on certain provisions of a draft law amending the Law on consumer protection relating to Česká národní banka.

text: See ECB Opinion

text: , ECB Opinion

text: and ECB Opinion

text: See e.g. the ECB’s Convergence Report 2004, p. 28, and similarly in the ECB’s Convergence Report December 2006, p. 27.

publisher: Europeiska centralbanken

sprak: en

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 5 October 2007 at the request of the Portuguese Ministry of Finance and Public Administration on a draft decreelaw amending the legal framework of credit institutions and financial companies (CON/2007/29)

serie: con

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 5 October 2007 at the request of the Portuguese Ministry of Finance and Public Administration on a draft decree-law amending the legal framework of credit institutions and financial companies (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

type: rubrik

text: On 6 August 2007 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Portuguese Ministry of Finance and Public Administration for an opinion on a draft decree-law amending the legal framework of credit institutions and financial companies (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Article 105(4) of the Treaty establishing the European Community and the third indent of

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to the Banco de Portugal. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

type: stycke

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The draft law is intended to enhance the consumer protection regime for transactions in financial products and services offered by entities supervised by the Banco de Portugal. More specifically, it will empower the Banco de Portugal to lay down rules on: (i) the conduct of credit institutions in their dealings with customers, namely by issuing instructions concerning codes of conduct to be adopted by the credit institutions and/or industry associations and by establishing guidelines for this purpose; and (ii) the transparency of transactions in financial products and services. The draft law will also give the Banco de Portugal powers to impose sanctions in case of breach of such rules. 1.2 Furthermore, the draft law will empower the Banco de Portugal to lay down minimum information requirements which credit institutions will have to comply with when advertising their products and services to the public. The Banco de Portugal will be empowered to lay down mandatory rules

text: on the content of contracts between credit institutions and their customers and to impose penalties for breach, by credit institutions, with the rules on advertising issued by it. 1.3 Finally, the draft law will provide for an additional derogation from the current regime for data protection and professional secrecy which applies to supervisory authorities, in order to allow judges in criminal or insolvency proceedings to have access to confidential information held by the Banco de Portugal about credit liabilities and cheque users (payers).

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 As regards the granting of new consumer protection powers to the Banco de Portugal, the ECB notes that the new tasks described in paragraph 1.1 and 1.2 above are not listed among the functions of national central banks (NCBs) as specified in the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (the ESCB Statute). However, as pointed out on previous occasions , and without prejudice to the Governing Council’s powers under Article 14.4 of the ESCB Statute, the ECB does not consider that the abovementioned tasks would interfere with the objectives and tasks of the European System of Central Banks. 2.2 Nonetheless, pursuant to the last sentence of Article 14.4 of the ESCB Statute, these new tasks would have to be performed on the responsibility and liability of the Banco de Portugal, and would not be regarded as being part of the ESCB’s functions. 2.3 The ECB understands that the underlying reason for allocating the above tasks to the Banco de Portugal is linked to its overall responsibility for supervision of the financial market. In this context, the ECB considers that the new tasks may complement the Banco de Portugal’s existing supervisory powers and thus contribute to the soundness of the financial market and the preservation of confidence in the marketplace. 2.4 The ECB welcomes the allocation of new powers to the Banco de Portugal with the aim of ensuring the transparency of transactions for financial services and products offered by entities subject to its supervision, as this could improve the clarity and efficiency of the national regulatory framework while ensuring adequate consumer protection and a level playing field. The imposition of specific transparency requirements for financial transactions, accompanied by effective monitoring of compliance with those requirements, should allow consumers to compare more easily the different products and services on offer and could therefore enhance competition.

text: 2.5 As previously stated by the ECB with regard to granting similar powers to other NCBs , it is important to ensure that both prudential supervision and investor/consumer protection have adequate and equal emphasis and that appropriate resources are available to ensure the performance of such functions.

text: 3. Specific observations

text: 3.1 It is noted that, without prejudice to the rules applicable to complaints made to credit institutions, the customers of these institutions may submit complaints directly to the Banco de Portugal if there is breach of legislative or regulatory provisions governing their activities, as long as the complaint is not related to a dispute of a purely contractual nature between the customer and the credit institution. Disputes between credit institutions and their customers stemming from unregulated commercial practices, and complaints on any matter which has already been brought before a court of law or an arbitration tribunal will fall outside the scope of the Banco de Portugal’s intervention. 3.2 However, the ECB suggests that the negative competence clause in

text: Article 77

text: -A(4) may not be sufficient to avoid a potentially large volume of complaints, even though it specifically aims to tackle this risk. These new tasks and procedures broadly described under

text: Article 77

text: -A of the draft law are likely to require the Banco de Portugal to commit considerable resources, both human and financial. The ECB has consistently held the view that ‘Member States may not put their NCBs in the position of not having sufficient financial resources to carry out their ESCB or Eurosystem related tasks, as applicable’ . 3.3 The ECB therefore expects that, when granting these additional powers to the Banco de Portugal, care will be taken to ensure that the Banco de Portugal’s operational capacity to carry out Eurosystem-related tasks will not be affected.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 5 October 2007.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET

type: vagledning

utgivare: ecb


sprak: sv

title: Europeiska centralbankens yttrande av den 5 oktober 2007 över ett förslag till förordning om ändring av kommissionens förordning (EG) nr 1749/96 om genomförandet av rådets förordning (EG) nr 2494/95 om harmoniserade konsumentprisindex gällande initiala åtgärder för implementering (CON/2007/30)

text: Inledning och rättslig grund

text: Den 5 september 2007 mottog Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) en begäran från Europeiska kommissionen om ett yttrande över ett förslag till kommissionens förordning om ändring av förordning

text: (EG) nr 1749/96

text: av den 9 september 1996 om genomförandet av

text: rådets förordning (EG) nr 2494/95

text: om harmoniserade konsumentprisindex gällande initiala åtgärder för implementering (nedan kallat förslaget till förordning).

text: ECB:s behörighet att avge ett yttrande grundas på

text: artikel 105.4

text: första strecksatsen i fördraget om upprättandet av Europeiska gemenskapen. I enlighet med

text: artikel 17.5

text: första meningen i arbetsordningen för Europeiska centralbanken har detta yttrande antagits av ECB-rådet.

text: 1. Allmänna kommentarer

text: 1.1 ECB välkomnar förslaget till förordning eftersom det förtydligar och stärker de principer som ligger till grund för det harmoniserade indexet för konsumentpriser (HIKP) samt förfarandena för urval, ersättningar och kvalitetsjusteringar och på så sätt främjar jämförbarhet och exakthet. Genom att introducera konceptet konsumtionssegment efter ändamål som de riktmärken som prisindexet skall följa förtydligar förslaget den konceptuella grunden för HIKP. Genom att tillhandahålla ett ramverk och gemensam terminologi för urval, ersättning av produkter och kvalitetsjusteringar kan förslaget även underlätta en ytterligare harmonisering inom dessa områden.

text: 1.2 Utvecklingen av produktspecifika standarder för metoder för kvalitetsjustering kommer att medföra viktiga förbättringar. ECB stöder det tillvägagångssätt som valts i förslaget till förordning för att skapa standarder för kvalitetsjusteringar för varje enskilt fall, och för att klassificera alternativa metoder för kvalitetsjusteringar efter deras lämplighet. Sådana standarder kan dock fortfarande medge utrymme för olika praxis mellan nationella HIKP så att en fullständig harmonisering av metoderna för kvalitetsjustering bör vara det långsiktiga målet. Eftersom det är av avgörande betydelse att överenskomna och effektiva standarder genomförs, rekommenderar ECB starkt att genomförandet av förslaget till förordning åtföljs av regelbunden rapportering om vilka framsteg medlemsstaterna gör med genomförandet och att Europeiska kommissionen noga granskar att medlemsstaterna fullgör sina skyldigheter. Granskningen bör ha som mål att uppmana medlemsstaterna att effektivt tillämpa A-metoder för kvalitetsjusteringar eftersom detta är det bästa sättet att förbättra HIKP:s exakthet och jämförbarhet mellan medlemsstaterna. Om det skulle visa sig att dessa metoder inte är tillräckliga för att uppnå den nödvändiga graden av jämförbarhet välkomnar ECB antagandet av sådana åtgärder som framgår av artikel 1.3 i förslaget till förordning så att produktspecifika standarder för kvalitetsjustering blir rättsligt bindande.

text: 1.3 ECB välkomnar också de specifika bestämmelser i förslaget till förordning som rör kvalitetsjustering och de tillhörande metoderna för att uppdatera urvalet. Med tanke på att de nationella metoderna för att uppdatera HIKP-urval för närvarande skiljer sig åt, kan det dock vara svårt att uppnå fullständig jämförbarhet mellan olika HIKP när det gäller representativitet och kvalitetsjustering. ECB uppmanar därför Europeiska kommissionen att fortsätta arbetet med att upprätta standarder för en jämförbar uppdatering av urval för HIKP.


text: Dz.U. of 4 September 2006 No 157, Item 1119, as amended (hereinafter the ‘Law on the supervision of financial markets’).

text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: The composition of the Banking Supervision Commission before 19 September 2006 was as follows: (i) NBP’s President, as Chairman; (ii) the Minister for Finance or his representative, as Vice-Chairman; (iii) another representative appointed by the Minister for Finance; (iv) the representative of the President of the Republic; (v) the Chairman of the Bank Guarantee Fund; (vi) the Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission or deputy thereof; and (vii) the General Inspector for Banking Supervision (Article 26(1) of the Law on Narodowy Bank Polski of 29 August 1997 (consolidated text: Dz.U. of 1 April 2005 No 1, Item 2, as amended; hereinafter the ‘NBP Statute’)) .

text: The current composition of the FSC is as follows: (i) the FSC Chairman, appointed by the President of the Council of Ministers for a five year term in office; (ii) two FSC Vice-Chairmen, appointed and dismissed by the President of the Council of Ministers on the motion of the FSC Chairman; (iii) the minister responsible for financial institutions or his representative; (iv) the minister responsible for social security (participating, among other things, in the regulation of pension funds) or his representative; (v) NBP’s President or the delegated Vice-President; and (vi) the representative of the President of the Republic (

text: Article 5

text: and

text: Articles 7

text: to 9 of the Law on the supervision of financial markets). 6 The FSC was established on 19 September 2006 and on this date took over non-banking supervision responsibilities (supervision of capital markets and insurance firms/pension funds:

text: Article 67(1)

text: together with Article 65(1) of the Law on the supervision of financial markets). 7

text: Articles 66

text: and Article 67(2) of the Law on the supervision of financial markets. 8

text: Article 74(4)

text: together with Article 75(2) of the Law on the supervision of financial markets. 9 Article 77(2) of the Law on the supervision of financial markets. The Law provides that NBP’s President (or delegated Vice-President) will continue to participate in the Banking Supervision Commission as an ordinary member. 10 The proposed amendments affect the Law on the supervision of financial markets as well as, among others, the NBP Statute and the Law on banking of 29 August 1997 (consolidated text: Dz.U. of 12 June 2002 No 72, Item 665, as amended, hereinafter the ‘Law on banking’). 11 Article 1(6) of the draft law, amending Article 67(2) of the Law on the supervision of financial markets. 12 Entry into force is 14 days after the draft law is published (

text: Article 17

text: ). 13

text: Article 14(1)

text: together with Article 1(12) of the draft law, which repeals Article 77(2) of the Law on the supervision of financial markets. 14 Article 1(5) of the draft law, amending Article 66(2) of the Law on the supervision of financial markets. 15

text: Article 1(1)

text: and (2) of the draft law, amending Articles 5(1) and 9(1) of the Law on the supervision of financial markets (the change does not have any foreseen end date). The candidates for the positions of FSC Vice-Chairmen have to comply with the same statutory criteria as the candidate for the position of the FSC Chairman. The FSC Chairman will be consulted on candidates for the FSC Vice-Chairmen presented by the Minister for Finance and NBP’s President.

text: Article 4(2)

text: (b) of the draft law, adding

text: Article 131(8)

text: to (11) to the Law on banking. The Financial Stability Committee will include the following members: (i) NBP’s President; (ii) the General Inspector for Banking Supervision; (iii) one further representative appointed by NBP’s President; (iv) the minister responsible for financial institutions or his representative; (v) the FSC Chairman; (vi) the Chairman of the Management Board of the Bank Guarantee Fund; and (vii) the representative of the President of the Republic. 17 ECB Opinion

text: of 9 March 2006 at the request of the Polish Minister of Finance on a draft Law on the supervision of financial institutions (an early version of the Law on the supervision of financial markets). The ECB specifically recommended: (i) that NBP appoint members to the supervisory authority’s decision-making body; (ii) establishing express duties of cooperation and information-sharing between NBP and the supervisory authority; and (iii) that NBP participate in major supervisory decisions or in selected types of supervisory operations (see paragraphs 2.3, 2.4, 3.2, 3.3 and 3.5 of Opinion

text: ). The ECB had the opportunity to repeat its comments on the reform in ECB Opinion

text: of 2 August 2006 at the request of Poland’s Sejm Marshall on a draft law amending the Law on Narodowy Bank Polski. 18 See paragraph 3.1.1 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 4.1 of Opinion

text: . 19 See paragraph 2.1.4 of Opinion

text: ; see also European Central Bank, ‘Financial Sectors in the EU Accession Countries’, 19 August 2002, p. 172 and ‘Banking structures in the new EU Member States’, 31 January 2005, p. 38. Both publications are available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.int. 20 See, e.g. paragraph 6 of ECB Opinion

text: of 24 October 2003 at the request of the Ministry of Finance of the Netherlands on a draft law on provisions concerning the merger of De Nederlandsche Bank and the Pensions and Insurance Supervisory Authority Foundation; paragraph 4 of ECB Opinion

text: of 25 May 2001 at the request of the Austrian Ministry of Finance on a draft article of the Federal law establishing and organising the financial market supervisory authority (title shortened); and paragraph 2.1.2 of Opinion

text: See, e.g. paragraph 5 of ECB Opinion

text: of 11 May 2004 at the request of the Italian Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance on a draft law on the protection of savings and paragraph 2.1.3 of Opinion

text: . 22 Section 2 of the explanatory memorandum to the draft law. The ‘Capital Requirements Directives’ are Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions (recast) (OJ L 177, 30.6.2006, p. 1). Directive as last amended by Directive

text: (OJ L 247, 21.9.2007, p.1) and Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 on the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions (recast) (OJ L 177, 30.6.2006, p. 201). The Capital Requirements Directives have been implemented in Poland by the Law of 26 January 2007 amending the Law on banking (Dz.U. of 9 March 2007 No 42, Item 272) and by resolutions of the Banking Supervision Commission (Nos 1 to 6/2007 of 13 March 2007). 23 Section 3 of the explanatory memorandum to the draft law. 24 The ECB pointed out risks related to interrupting long-term supervisory work stemming from the CRD reform and emphasised the importance of preserving continuity in supervisory expertise possessed by the staff of NBP’s General Inspectorate for Banking Supervision (see paragraphs 6.1 and 6.3 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: ). 25 See paragraph 7 of ECB Opinion

text: of 22 September 2004 at the request of Národná banka Slovenska on a draft law on the supervision of the financial market and on amendments to certain laws. 26 NBP’s supervisory staff of the General Inspectorate for Banking Supervision will be transferred to the FSC’s office as of 1 January 2013 and their employment contracts will expire after a six-month period, unless they receive and accept new employment conditions (

text: Article 1(9)

text: and (10) of the draft law, amending Articles 74(4) and 75(2) of the Law on the supervision of financial markets).

text: See paragraph 3 of Opinion

text: . 28 OJ L 166, 11.6.1998, p. 45. The Directive was transposed by the Law of 24 August 2001 on settlement finality in the payment and settlement systems and on the supervision of such systems (Dz.U. of 25 October 2001 No 123, Item 1351, as amended, hereinafter, the ‘Law on settlement finality’). 29 Article 1(15) of the draft law amends Article 82(2) of the Law on the supervision of financial markets by deleting the reference to the Law on settlement finality from the list of legislative provisions to be amended on the date the Banking Supervision Commission is dissolved. Consequently, the day on which the draft law enters into force will be the day the changes to the Law on settlement finality enter into force. 30 See the fifth indent of the

text: Article 2 of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42), requiring consultation with the ECB on draft legislative provisions concerning ‘payment and settlement systems’.

text: Article 1(2) of Decision 98/415/EC

text: specifies that the term ‘draft legislative provisions’ does not include ‘draft provisions the exclusive purpose of which is the transposition of Community directives into national law’. In May 2007, a legislative draft was submitted to the Polish Parliament which substantially amended provisions of the Law on settlement finality, including the definition of a ‘system’ and the scope of the President of NBP’s powers in the area of the supervision of payment and settlement infrastructure (see Article 13 of the draft law on amendments to the law on trading in financial instruments and to certain other laws, as submitted by the Council of Ministers to Sejm (Parliament) on 23 May 2007 (Sejm print No 1789)). The legislative process related to this legislative draft is currently at a standstill. 31

text: Article 4(2)

text: (b) of the draft law, adding

text: Article 131(8)

text: to (11) to the Law on banking. See also paragraph 3.4 of Opinion

text: See paragraph 11 of ECB Opinion

text: of 24 April 2002 at the request of the Belgian Ministry of Finance on a draft proposal for a law on prudential supervision of the financial sector and financial services. 33 See paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 4.2 of Opinion

text: . 34 In particular, the Banking Supervision Commission is a party to the agreement establishing the Committee although its representation in the Committee is not clearly set out (the participation of NBP’s President in the Committee is not expressly linked to his chairmanship of the Banking Supervision Commission) (paragraphs (8) and (9) added to Article 131 of the Law on banking by

text: Article 4(2)

text: (b) of the draft law). 35 Article 131(8) of the Law on banking, as added by

text: Article 4(2)

text: (b) of the draft law limits the Financial Stability Committee tasks to co-ordination and information-sharing. However,

text: Article 131(10)

text: (1) of the Law on banking, as added by the

text: Article 4(2)

text: (b) of the draft law makes it possible for the Financial Stability Committee to ‘adopt arrangements’ in relation to the statutory tasks of the parties establishing the Committee. Furthermore, the explanatory memorandum to the draft law seems to give the Committee an active role in ‘managing’ financial crises. 36 See Article 1(3) of the draft law adding

text: Article 17(5)

text: to the Law on the supervision of financial markets (data disclosure by the FSC); Article 3 of the draft law, amending Article 38(10) of the Law of 14 December 1994 on the Bank Guarantee Fund (consolidated text: Dz.U. of 19 April 2007 No 70, Item 474) (data disclosure by the Bank Guarantee Fund); and Article 5(2) of the draft law, adding

text: Article 23(8)

text: and (9) to the NBP Statute (data disclosure by NBP). 37 See, in particular,

text: Articles 44

text: to 52 of Directive

text: Article 13 of Council Regulation (EC) No 322/97 of 17 February 1997

text: on Community Statistics (OJ L 52, 22.2.1997, p. 1). Regulation as last amended by

text: Regulation (EC) No 1882/2003

text: of the European Parliament and the Council (OJ L 284, 31.10.2003, p. 1);

text: Article 8(1)

text: to (3) of

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 2533/98 of 23 November 1998

text: concerning the collection of statistical information by the European Central Bank (OJ L 318, 27.11.1998, p. 8); and Article 3 of Council Regulation (Euratom, EEC) No 1588/90 of 11 June 1990 on the transmission of data subject to statistical confidentiality to the Statistical Office of the European Communities (OJ L 151, 15.6.1990, p. 1). Regulation as last amended by

text: Regulation (EC) No 1882/2003

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 284, 31.10.2003, p. 1). 38 See

text: Article 23(6)

text: and (7) of the NBP Statute.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 9 October 2007 at the request of the Polish Minister for Finance on a draft law amending the Law on the supervision of financial markets (CON/2007/31)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 9 October 2007 at the request of the Polish Minister for Finance on a draft law amending the Law on the supervision of financial markets (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 16 August 2007 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Polish Minister for Finance for an opinion on a draft law amending the Law of 21 July 2006 on the supervision of financial markets . On 23 August 2007, the ECB received a revised version of a draft law amending the Law on the supervision of financial markets (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Article 105(4) of the Treaty establishing the European Community and the third and sixth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to Narodowy Bank Polski (NBP) and to rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The draft law modifies certain elements of the supervisory reform, which was initiated in September 2006 and originally scheduled to be implemented by 1 January 2008. Prior to the introduction of the reform, financial supervision was carried out by sectoral supervisors, including, for the banking sector, the Banking Supervision Commission chaired by NBP’s President and assisted by the General Inspectorate for Banking Supervision (a specialised supervisory unit within

text: NBP) . The reform introduced a single consolidated supervisory authority, the Financial Supervision

text: Commission (FSC) , which is gradually taking over supervisory responsibility for all segments of the

text: financial markets . One result of this process is that the Banking Supervision Commission is

text: scheduled to be dissolved on 31 December 2007, following which its powers will be allocated to the

text: FSC . At the same time, the supervisory staff of the General Inspectorate for Banking Supervision

text: will be transferred to the FSC’s office . During the transitory period from 19 September 2006 to

text: 31 December 2007 the FSC Chairman replaces NBP’s President as the Banking Supervision

text: Commission Chairman .

text: 1.2 The draft law modifies the supervisory framework as follows :

text: (a) the transfer of banking supervision responsibility from the Banking Supervision Commission

text: to the FSC will be delayed until 1 January 2013 . During the transitory period from the

text: effective date of the draft law until 31 December 2012: (i) NBP’s President will take over as

text: Chairman of the Banking Supervision Commission ; and (ii) the General Inspectorate for

text: Banking Supervision will remain within NBP and will assist the Banking Supervision

text: Commission in its work ;

text: (b) as of the effective date of the draft law, the FSC will include three FSC Vice-Chairmen who

text: will be appointed and dismissed by the President of the Council of Ministers on the motion of

text: the Minister for Finance, NBP’s President and the FSC Chairman, respectively (currently the

text: two FSC Vice-Chairmen are appointed and dismissed on the motion of the FSC Chairman) ;

text: and

text: (c) NBP will become responsible for establishing a Financial Stability Committee, which will act

text: on the basis of an agreement between NBP, the Banking Supervision Commission, the FSC,

text: the Bank Guarantee Fund and the Minister for Finance, with the view to ensuring the

text: exchange of information and coordination between the parties to the agreement as regards

text: implementation of their respective statutory tasks .

text: 2. Central bank contribution to prudential supervision

text: 2.1 Organisation of the supervisory framework

text: The ECB commented on the original reform proposals in 2006 . In its opinions, the ECB stressed its

text: positive assessment of the model of prudential supervision existing in Poland prior to

text: September 2006, in which banking supervision was carried out by the Banking Supervision

text: Commission, chaired by NBP’s President and assisted by the General Inspectorate for Banking

text: Supervision. The ECB considered this model particularly well-suited to facilitate NBP’s contribution

text: to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and to the stability of the financial system, as

text: Poland . This is in particular relevant for financial markets such as the Polish one, where banking is

text: a dominant sector and where banks remain key agents of financial intermediation . The ECB

text: emphasised the central banks’ pivotal role in the financial system on many occasions, stressing that

text: their close involvement in prudential supervision is necessary to allow central banks to adequately

text: monitor financial stability risks . Therefore, the ECB welcomes the draft law provisions that

text: strengthen NBP’s involvement in financial market supervision by reassigning the chairmanship of

text: the Banking Supervision Commission to NBP’s President. Moreover, by maintaining NBP’s

text: President as a member of the FSC and giving him the power to designate one of the FSC Vice-

text: Chairmen, the draft law’s provisions will enhance coordination between NBP and the FSC,

text: facilitating consistent macro-prudential monitoring of the increasingly integrated financial markets .

text: 2.2 Ensuring a stable, long-term supervisory environment

text: The explanatory memorandum states that the additional delay (until 1 January 2013) in transferring

text: banking supervision responsibility from the Banking Supervision Commission to the FSC is

text: necessary in order to, among other things: (i) ensure the smooth continuation of the follow-up

text: supervisory work related to the transposition of the Capital Requirements Directives (CRD) ; and

text: (ii) mitigate operational risks arising in connection with the supervisory reform process, in particular

text: as regards maintaining the expertise of NBP’s supervisory staff . The consulting authority’s remarks

text: mirror the ECB’s concerns which were expressed in its earlier opinions . It is important to

text: emphasise that the supervisory reform process should ensure the uninterrupted continuation of

text: NBP’s involvement in prudential supervision as well as sustainability of the supervisory expertise

text: developed by NBP staff. As already noted by the ECB in the specific context of Member States

text: preparing for the introduction of the euro, the independence, credibility and experience that national

text: central banks can contribute to the conduct of prudential policies should be recognised as an

text: important institutional asset .

text: 2.3 In this context, the provisions of the draft law concerning the transfer of the Banking Supervision

text: Commission’s powers to the FSC on 1 January 2013 and the coincident assignment of NBP’s

text: supervisory staff to FSC’s office may not provide the necessary incentives for NBP and its

text: supervisory staff to continue developing the supervisory function. Therefore, the temporary

text: arrangements provided for by the draft law, while mitigating the above mentioned short- and

text: medium-term risks, may not ensure the creation of a stable, long-term supervisory environment. An

text: essential precondition for an efficient and effective supervisory framework is its capacity to build a

text: long-term relationship of mutual trust between supervisors and market participants providing the latter with confidence in the expertise and competence of the supervisory authority. Hence, any reform of the institutional supervisory setting should aim at comprehensive long-term arrangements that are conducive to a stable economic climate. 2.4 This opinion is based on the most recent version of the draft law, which the ECB understands may not be the final legislative proposal concerning the supervisory reform. In case new legislative drafts are proposed which constitute ‘draft legislative provisions’ within the meaning of Decision

text: , the ECB should be consulted and stands ready to provide its comments. This is particularly important where newly proposed drafts fundamentally change legislation in areas in which the ECB has a specific interest . 2.5 Supervision and oversight over payment and settlement infrastructure The draft law corrects the provisions of the law transposing Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 1998 on settlement finality in payment and securities settlement systems that refer to a defunct sectoral supervisor as the body supervising securities settlement systems. The draft law corrects these references by inserting the name of the FSC in the relevant provisions, while not further affecting any substantive rules . The ECB welcomes the correction and notes that it would need to be further consulted on any substantive legislative proposals in this area falling within its scope of competence; this applies in particular to provisions on the supervision and oversight of market infrastructure .

text: 3. Establishment of the Financial Stability Committee

text: 3.1 The ECB welcomes the draft law provisions under which NBP will establish a Financial Stability Committee . The explanatory memorandum to the draft law explains that this is necessary in the context of building the institutional framework for the prevention, forecasting and management of

text: financial crises. The ECB supports this statutory intent; however, the ECB recommends that the legal

text: framework of the Financial Stability Committee be more precisely formulated to ensure that the

text: effectiveness of the coordination process is not affected by possible uncertainties regarding the role

text: of the Committee and its participating bodies . In particular, it should be clarified that the tasks

text: attributed to this Committee must not compromise NBP’s independence with regard to its central

text: bank tasks. In addition, the NBP Statute should expressly recognise NBP’s responsibility for

text: contributing to financial stability by monitoring and assessing the financial system as a whole, which

text: is a separate function from financial supervision and regulation .

text: 3.2 Moreover, the composition of the Committee should reflect the contribution of each of its members

text: in respect of their specific supervisory powers; the existing discrepancy between the list of parties

text: adopting the agreement establishing the Financial Stability Committee and the list of Committee

text: members should be resolved . At the same time, the Financial Stability Committee tasks should be

text: more clearly specified . Finally, the current provisions relating to information-sharing within the

text: Committee should be complemented with appropriate information disclosure standards consistent

text: with Community law provisions regulating the exchange of supervisory and statistical information

text: and the NBP Statute . Such provisions should also be capable of facilitating the operation of

text: relevant EU Memoranda of Understanding that the Polish authorities are signatories to.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 9 October 2007. [signed]

text: The Vice-President of the ECB

text: Lucas D. PAPADEMOS


text: Article 2 of the revised draft law amending Appendix I to the Law on remuneration of the Federal civil service. 4 See, e.g. paragraph 3 of ECB Opinion

text: of 23 December 2005 at the request of the Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance on an amendment to the draft law on the protection of savings concerning the Banca d’Italia.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 15 October 2007 at the request of the German Ministry of Finance on a draft law modernising the supervisory structure of the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (CON/2007/32)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 15 October 2007 at the request of the German Ministry of Finance on a draft law modernising the supervisory structure of the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 9 July 2007, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Federal Ministry of Finance for an opinion on the draft law modernising the supervisory structure of the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). On 27 September 2007, the Federal Ministry of Finance sent to the ECB a revised text of the draft law (hereinafter the ‘revised draft law’) with an urgent request for an opinion. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Article 105(4) of the Treaty establishing the European Community and the sixth indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the revised draft law

text: The revised draft law has a limited scope compared to the draft law and is mainly addressing the governance and management structure of the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin, Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht). In particular, the revised draft law introduces the principle of collegiality for the Directorate’s decision-making by replacing the existing presidential structure . Henceforth, the Directorate will consist of a president and four executive directors. The Directorate’s responsibilities will include decision-making with regard to the BaFin’s rules of procedure, adoption of its statute, the budget, as well as decisions where there are differences of opinion between Directorate members and the adoption of administrative regulations. Moreover, each executive director

text: will be responsible for one of the following four business areas: fundamental issues and internal administration, banking supervision, insurance supervision and securities supervision. According to Article 1(2) of the revised draft law, the Directorate will unanimously adopt the organisation’s statute laying down the Directorate’s responsibilities and functions. It will adopt its decisions by simple majority of the submitted votes, even in case of disagreement. The Directorate will also establish rules of procedure for the BaFin. Pursuant to Article 1(3) of the revised draft law, the Directorate has to inform the administrative council of its management. These changes to the BaFin’s governance and management structure make it necessary to also amend the Law on remuneration of the Federal civil service. The increased responsibility of the BaFin’s Board of Directors will result in the future salary classification of executive directors in class B 8 .

text: 2. General observations

text: The ECB welcomes the introduction of collegial decision-making for the Directorate’s decision-making in the area of prudential supervision and, in view of the limited scope of the revised draft law, has no further observations.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 15 October 2007.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 5 November 2007 at the request of the Austrian Ministry of Finance on a draft law amending the Law on banking, the Law on savings banks, the Law on the Financial Market Supervisory Authority and the Law on the Oesterreichische Nationalbank (CON/2007/33)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 5 November 2007 at the request of the Austrian Ministry of Finance on a draft law amending the Law on banking, the Law on savings banks, the Law on the Financial Market Supervisory Authority and the Law on the Oesterreichische Nationalbank (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 8 October 2007, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Austrian Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft law amending the Law on banking, the Law on savings banks, the Law on the Financial Market Supervisory Authority and the Law on the Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Bundesgesetz zur Reform der Finanzmarktaufsicht – hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Article 105(4) of the Treaty establishing the European Community and the third, fourth and sixth indents of

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law contains provisions concerning the Oesterreichische Nationalbank (OeNB), the collection, compilation and distribution of banking statistics and rules applicable to financial institutions which materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The draft law is intended to further improve the supervisory system set up in 2001 and to strengthen the position of Austria as a financial centre through financial market supervision that is as effective and efficient as possible. Whilst the statement of reasons explains that the supervisory instruments of the Financial Market Authority (FMA) have been extended since the establishment of the FMA, the consulting authority stresses the need for a stronger network of individual bank and credit institution group supervision and macroeconomic analysis by the OeNB .

text: 1 OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: 2 See page 1 of the statement of reasons. 1.2 The draft law is intended to optimise financial market supervision of banking and to clarify the allocation of tasks between the FMA and the OeNB. In so doing, the OeNB's technical competence and experience in banking supervision, particularly regarding on-site inspections and analyses are intended to be used to a greater extent, which also makes it possible for both institutions to use their resources more efficiently . 1.3 The draft law will transfer the responsibility for all on-site bank inspections to the OeNB. These inspections will take place on the basis of an inspection plan agreed between the two institutions, as well as on a request from the FMA. In addition, the OeNB may carry out on-site inspections in cases of macroeconomic necessity without a request from the FMA . However, the FMA remains the competent authority for banking supervision. 1.4 The draft law also expressly regulates, for the first time, the OeNB’s responsibilities for banking analysis and a jointly fed and used FMA/OeNB database to ensure the availability of a comprehensive, complete and uniform level of information at any time . 1.5 Furthermore, the proposal provides for express legislative recognition of the OeNB’s formal responsibility for contributing to financial stability by monitoring and assessing the financial system in Austria as a whole, and for reporting to the FMA and the Ministry of Finance thereon . 1.6 Finally, the draft law is intended to enhance corporate governance requirements for credit institutions, including qualitative requirements for the supervisory boards of credit institutions , and provides for the establishment of an auditing committee to control and inspect accounting, the annual accounts and auditing among others things .

text: 2. Financial stability and the prudential role of a central bank

text: 2.1 General observations 2.1.1 Article 105(5) of the Treaty assigns to the European System of Central Banks the task of contributing to the smooth conduct of policies pursued by the competent authorities relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system. 2.1.2 In line with this Article, the ECB has consistently stated the following when consulted on draft national legislation reforming the institutional framework for prudential supervision in Member States: (i) central banks have traditionally been closely involved in the prudential supervision of credit institutions due to their pivotal role in the financial system, in particular regarding the

text: 3 See page 1 of the statement of reasons.

text: 4 Draft amendments to Article 70 of the Law on banking.

text: 5 Draft amendments to Article 79 of the Law on banking.

text: 6 New

text: Article 44

text: b of the Law on the OeNB.

text: 7 New

text: Article 28

text: a of the Law on banking.

text: 8 Draft amendment to

text: Article 63

text: a of the Law on banking. implementation of monetary policy and ensuring the proper functioning of payment systems ; and (ii) the maintenance of a close involvement of national central banks (NCBs) in prudential supervision is an important condition for allowing the Eurosystem to contribute adequately – also through the availability of relevant statistics on financial institutions - to monitoring the risks to financial stability in the euro area , in accordance with Article 105(5) of the Treaty, and to safeguarding a smooth coordination between the central banking functions exercised at the Eurosystem’s level and the supervisory functions carried out at national level . 2.2 Legislative recognition of the central bank’s financial stability role 2.2.1 In keeping with the position taken by the ECB in previous opinions on draft national legislation proposing supervisory reforms, including the ECB opinion on the 2001 reform of the Austrian financial supervision framework , the ECB considers that central banks are in general in the best position to take on responsibility for financial stability, given their insight into money and financial market developments and their involvement in payment systems and monetary policy operations. This applies both to the normal conduct of business and in crisis situations . The central banks’ remit on systemic stability means that they concentrate on the potential impact of macroeconomic shocks or disturbances and other factors influencing the stability of financial system as a whole . Therefore, the ECB welcomes the express legislative recognition of the OeNB’s formal responsibility for contributing to financial stability by monitoring and assessing the financial system in Austria and reporting to the FMA and the Ministry of Finance, as a separate function from hands-on supervision and financial regulation, as provided for in the new

text: Article 44

text: b(1) of the Law on the OeNB. In this respect, the adequate access of central banks to information and data on prudential and financial stability, and cooperation between financial supervisory authorities and central banks, are essential for the accomplishment of their respective missions and conducive to reducing the prudential and statistical reporting burden imposed on institutions. 2.3 Operational involvement of the OeNB in prudential supervision 2.3.1 The ECB welcomes the fact that the proposed amendments to Articles

text: and

text: a of the Law on banking are intended to give the OeNB the sole responsibility for conducting on-site inspections of the banking sector as part of the ongoing banking supervision in Austria, while at present the FMA is obliged to mandate the OeNB only concerning credit and market risk. According to the draft law

text: 9 See, e.g. paragraph 6 of ECB Opinion

text: of 24 October 2003 at the request of the Ministry of Finance of the Netherlands on a draft law on provisions concerning the merger of De Nederlandsche Bank and the Pensions and Insurance Supervisory Authority Foundation.

text: 10 See, e.g. paragraph 4 of ECB Opinion

text: of 25 May 2001 at the request of the Austrian Ministry of Finance on a draft law establishing and organising the financial market supervisory authority [title shortened].

text: 11 See, e.g. paragraph 5 of ECB Opinion

text: of 8 November 2001 at the request of the German Ministry of Finance on a draft law establishing an integrated financial services supervision.

text: 12 See, e.g. paragraph 7 of ECB Opinion

text: 13 See, e.g. paragraph 7 of ECB Opinion

text: 14 See, e.g. paragraph 10 of ECB Opinion

text: of 22 September 2004 at the request of Národná banka Slovenska on a draft law on supervision of the financial market and on amendments to certain laws. the scope of the OeNB’s on-site examination powers will cover all relevant risks, including in particular operational risks . These new tasks also encompass the verification of credit institutions’ compliance with money laundering obligations and following up on-site inspections of credit institutions. This will allow the OeNB to better contribute to supervisory activities and lead to a more efficient use of resources with positive consequences for the efficacy of the Austrian supervisory system. Moreover, the ECB welcomes the proposed amendments to Articles

text: d and 77a of the Law on banking, which further strengthen cooperation between the FMA and the OeNB in relation to banking supervision . 2.3.2 Pursuant to the new paragraph 4b of Article 79 of the Law on banking in connection with Articles 18 and 19 of the Law on the Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FMABG), the direct costs incurred by the OeNB for on-site inspections and microeconomic analyses of banks will ultimately be borne – up to a cap, the exact level of which has not been indicated in the draft law received by the ECB – by the supervised entities (while the charges are collected by the FMA). The OeNB, and ultimately the Government via the OeNB’s results, would have to bear out of its own budget any OeNB costs which exceed the cap or are not directly related to the OeNB’s banking supervisory tasks. In the statement of reasons, it is explained that this cap is necessary to prevent the supervised entities having to bear an unreasonable share of the costs incurred by the FMA and the OeNB in the execution of their banking supervisory tasks. In this respect, the ECB notes that the OeNB has specific nomination rights in relation to the appointment of members of the FMA’s Executive Board and Supervisory Board (Articles 5 and 8 of the FMABG), providing the OeNB with influence over the organisation and management of the FMA. Nevertheless, if there is a wish to expose the OeNB to part of the costs for on-site inspections conducted for reasons other than financial stability (in particular, if the cap is set at a level not reflecting the costs incurred for those inspections), it must be ensured that the OeNB has sufficient financial resources to carry out its Eurosystem tasks under Article 105(5) of the Treaty. Finally, the ECB notes that, according to the draft

text: Article 26

text: (b) of the FMABG, the costs of banking supervisory tasks borne by the OeNB for 2008 will be refunded in 2010. 2.3.3 First, the ECB notes that, in principle, the OeNB may conduct on-site inspections only at the request of the FMA. In general, on-site inspections are to be conducted in line with an annual inspection plan to be agreed between the FMA and the OeNB (new paragraph 1b of Article 70 of the Law on banking). The ECB understands that the two institutions will draw up a plan that takes into account priorities and resources available, without prejudice to the fulfilment of their supervisory mandates, and that the FMA would deviate from that plan and request additional onsite inspections from the OeNB only to the extent necessary. 2.3.4 Second, the ECB welcomes the proposed introduction of paragraph 1c into Article 70 of the Law on banking pursuant to which the OeNB may conduct on-site inspections of credit institutions on

text: 15 See paragraph 10 of ECB Opinion

text: 16 See paragraph 8 of ECB Opinion

text: . its own initiative if it considers them necessary for macroeconomic reasons. However, according to the wording of the draft law, the OeNB would only be able to carry out on-site inspections without a request from the FMA ‘if the inspections in the inspection programme under paragraph 1b or other FMA inspection requests are not affected’. In view of the OeNB’s overall responsibility for contributing to the stability of the financial system in Austria, the ECB considers it crucial that the OeNB should be able to give priority to conducting on-site inspections for financial stability reasons, irrespective of other ongoing or planned inspections that may be requested by the FMA. Therefore the proposed new paragraph 1c of Article 70 of the Law on banking should be amended accordingly. 2.3.5 Third, the ECB notes that, for the extension of the initial scope of an inspection as deemed necessary by the OeNB, the procedure provided for by Article 70 of the Law on banking requires a request to be made to the FMA. In this respect, the ECB recommends that the OeNB should be able to extend inspections without requesting the authorisation of the FMA, where this is justified on financial stability grounds. Such an extension might also be critical for the successful completion of an on-site inspection. 2.4 Information-sharing between the OeNB and the FMA 2.4.1 As emphasised in previous ECB opinions , central bank access to prudential information and cooperation between financial supervisory authorities and central banks are essential for the conduct of macro-prudential monitoring, the oversight of payment systems and the safeguarding of other market infrastructures, which are in turn essential for the smooth conduct of monetary policy. In particular, from a financial stability perspective, a central bank would inevitably need to be involved in the event of any crisis in financial markets. In that context, the ready availability of relevant information and the ability to interpret it are crucial. The Consolidated Banking Directive provides that, subject to confidentiality and professional secrecy requirements, information may be shared between supervisory authorities and central banks and vice versa, for the purposes of the exercise of their respective tasks . Therefore the legislation of virtually all Member States that have adopted supervisory models based on an independent financial supervisory authority include provisions authorising the exchange of information between central banks and supervisory authorities .

text: 17 See, e.g. paragraph 9 of ECB Opinion

text: . 18

text: Article 49 of Directive 2006/48/EC

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions (recast) (OJ L 177, 30.6.2006, p. 1). 19 See, e.g. Belgium: Article 56 of the Statute of the Nationale Bank van België/Banque Nationale de Belgique; Article 35 of the Law of 22 February 1998 establishing the Organic Statute of the Nationale Bank van België/Banque Nationale de Belgique; Article 74 of the Law of 2 August 2002 on the supervision of the financial sector and on financial services; Denmark: Article 354(5) of the Law on financial services; Article 22 of the Law on deposit guarantees and investors; Article 20 of the Law on Danmarks Nationalbank; Estonia: Section 2(5) of the Law on Eesti Pank; Sections 48(2), 54(2) of the Law on the Financial Supervision Authority; Ireland: Sections 33C(1)(c) and 33C(8) of the Central Bank Act 1942; Latvia: Article 6 of the Law on Latvijas Banka; Article 10 of the Law on the Financial and Capital Market Commission; Luxembourg: Article 33(2) of the Law of 23 December 1998 concerning monetary status and the Banque centrale du Luxembourg;

text: Article 16

text: , third paragraph of the Law of 23 December 1998 on the establishment of a commission for the supervision of the financial sector; Hungary: Article 44 of Law No LVIII of 2001 on the Magyar 2.4.2 Against this background, the ECB welcomes the proposed introduction of paragraph 4a into Article 79 of the Law on banking and the new

text: Article 44

text: b of the Law on the OeNB. Pursuant to paragraph 4a, the FMA has to enter all relevant information on credit institutions which it collects in the course of its banking supervisory work in a central database operated by, and fully accessible to, the OeNB. The OeNB will be able to use these data for the preparation of analyses in relation to specific credit institutions and macroeconomic analyses and for its financial stability responsibilities, as the statement of reasons expressly recognises. However, the ECB does not see any valid reason for limiting the information the FMA has to feed into the database to information relevant to on-site inspections and the analytical tasks of the OeNB, as the statement of reasons suggests. Such a limitation would increase the risk of impediments to an efficient flow of information between the FMA and the OeNB, which the statement of reasons indicates is a key objective of the reform of the financial market supervision. Instead, all information on the banking sector within the FMA’s control should be shared with the OeNB on an ongoing basis via that database. 2.4.3 Pursuant to the new

text: Article 44

text: b of the Law on the OeNB, the FMA has to provide all information on entities in the financial sector and pension funds to the OeNB at the latter’s request, provided that the information is relevant to financial stability in Austria. Given that the traditional borders between the banking, securities and insurance sectors of the financial market are becoming increasingly blurred, and given the risks that this development entails, the ECB welcomes the extension of the OeNB’s right to information. However, the automatic insertion of all relevant information into the database by the FMA, possibly by linking any FMA databases containing relevant information with the new shared database (without prejudice to applicable data protection law), and thus without the need for a specific request by the OeNB, might reduce the risk of gaps in the information flow and avoid unnecessary administrative procedures between the FMA and the OeNB.

text: 3. Specific issues

text: 3.1 Strengthening the corporate governance of credit institutions The ECB welcomes the enhanced corporate governance requirements for the appointment of the chair to the supervisory boards of credit institutions. In particular, the ECB welcomes: (i) the cooling-off period of two years if a person has previously served as a member of the management board – ‘Geschäftsleiter’ – before that person may be appointed as chair; (ii) the stricter ‘fit and proper’ requirements – (new

text: Article 28

text: a of the Law on banking); (iii) the strengthening of credit institutions’ internal audit function (amended Article 42(3) of the Law on banking); and (iv) the mandatory installation of an audit committee for credit institutions of particular relevance to the

text: Nemzeti Bank; Malta: Section 38A of the Central Bank of Malta Act; Section 18 of the Malta Financial Services Act; Austria:

text: Articles 79

text: to 80 of the Law on banking; Finland: Section 26 of the Law on Suomen Pankki, No 214/1998.

text: financial market (new paragraph 4 of

text: Article 63

text: a of the Law on banking). This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 5 November 2007. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: Dz.Urz. NBP of 23 April 2004 No 3, Item 4, as amended. 2 OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 3 Credit institutions registered in Poland are legally referred to as ‘banks’ (this definition does not cover the Polish version of credit unions, operating pursuant to the Law of 14 December 1995 on cooperative savings and loan associations (Dz.U. of 4 January 1996 No 1, Item 2, as amended)). The term ‘credit institutions’ under Polish law only relates to European Economic Area (EEA) credit institutions from outside Poland. Non-EEA credit institutions are referred to under Polish law as ‘foreign banks’ (

text: Article 2

text: Article 4(1)

text: Article 4(3)

text: and

text: Articles 4(17)

text: to (20) of the Law on banking of 29 August 1997 (consolidated text: Dz.U. of 12 June 2002 No 72, Item 665, as amended, hereinafter, the ‘Law on banking’)).

text: Article 124

text: c of the Law on banking, as added by the Article 1(3) of the amending law of 18 October 2006 (Dz.U. of 19 October 2006 No 190, Item 1401), together with

text: Article 529(1)

text: (4) of the Commercial Companies Code of 15 September 2000 (Dz.U. of 8 November 2000, No 94, Item 1037, as amended). The ECB commented on the early version of the above referred amendments to the Law on banking in ECB Opinion

text: of 20 June 2006 at the request of the Polish Minister of Finance on a draft law amending the Law on banking. 5

text: Article 124

text: c(2) of the Law on banking. Supervisory approval for a proposed division may be denied under certain circumstances. 6 Paragraph 9(3a) and (3b) of Resolution 15/2004, as added by the paragraph 1 of the draft resolution. 7 See

text: Article 13(3)

text: and (4) of Regulation ECB/2003/9 of 12 September 2003 on the application of minimum reserves (OJ L 250, 2.10.2003, p. 10) together with Article 19 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank. The ECB’s concept of ‘division’ as regards a credit institution differs from the one that applies under the draft resolution in that the ECB rules assume that all assets and liabilities of a divided credit institution are acquired by the recipient entities, i.e. the divided credit institution ceases to exist after the division (Article 1 of Regulation ECB/2003/9). 8 See also paragraph 5 of ECB Opinion

text: of 31 May 2005 at the request of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank on a draft regulation on the calculation, method of allocation and placement of minimum reserves.

text: Funds held by the credit institution in its reserve account at the central bank. 10 Paragraph 4(1) of Resolution 15/2004 together with the

text: Article 39

text: a of the Law on Narodowy Bank Polski of 29 August 1997 (consolidated text: Dz.U. of 1 April 2005 No 1, Item 2, as amended). 11 See

text: Article 13(3)

text: , last sentence and

text: Article 13(4)

text: , last sentence of Regulation ECB/2003/9. 12 See paragraphs 9(1) to (3) of Resolution 15/2004. See also

text: Article 13(1)

text: and (2) of the Regulation ECB/2003/9.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 13 November 2007 at the request of the President of Narodowy Bank Polski on a draft resolution amending Resolution 15/2004 of the Management Board of Narodowy Bank Polski of 13 April 2004 on the rules and procedures for calculating and holding minimum reserves by banks (CON/2007/34)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 13 November 2007 at the request of the President of Narodowy Bank Polski on a draft resolution amending Resolution 15/2004 of the Management Board of Narodowy Bank Polski of 13 April 2004 on the rules and procedures for calculating and holding minimum reserves by banks (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 28 September 2007 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the President of Narodowy Bank Polski (NBP) for an opinion on a draft resolution amending Resolution 15/2004 of the Management Board of Narodowy Bank Polski of 13 April 2004 on the rules and procedures for calculating and holding minimum reserves by banks (hereinafter the ‘draft resolution’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Article 105(4) of the Treaty establishing the European Community and

text: Article 2(2) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft resolution relates to an instrument of monetary policy of a non-participating Member State. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft resolution

text: 1.1 The draft resolution complements NBP’s current minimum reserves regime by providing for the treatment of minimum reserves held by a bank undergoing division (hereinafter the ‘divided bank’) . The need for these rules stems from recent changes made to the Polish banking regime, which makes it possible for banks established in Poland in the form of a joint stock company to be divided. Under the applicable procedure, part of the divided bank’s assets and liabilities are

text: transferred to another existing or newly established entity or entities, i.e. the divided bank continues to operate after the division, retaining part of its original assets . The recipient entities can be any EEA credit institution that obtains necessary supervisory approval . 1.2 The draft resolution provides the following rules for calculating minimum reserves in relation to a divided bank and the banks receiving the assets and liabilities of the divided bank (hereinafter the ‘recipient banks’): (i) In the reserve maintenance period in which the division takes effect, the divided bank’s minimum reserve obligations are allocated to the banks participating in the division (the recipient bank(s) and the divided bank), in proportion to the part of the original reserve base of the divided bank that is allocated to each of them; if a recipient bank already exists, such newly allocated minimum reserves obligations increase the amount of its own minimum reserve requirements for that period. (ii) In the following maintenance periods, each bank participating in the division continues to bear its (additional) minimum reserve obligations in proportion to the part of the reserve base allocated to it as a result of the division, until such time as such bank submits complete reporting data regarding its total updated reserve base figures .

text: 2. The ECB’s comments

text: 2.1 The draft resolution provisions are similar to the ECB’s own minimum reserve rules that apply when a credit institution is subject to division . The ECB welcomes this approach as it takes into account the need for the gradual adaptation of the Polish legislative framework in view of the future adoption of euro . However, the following elements of the draft resolution should be further clarified: (i) paragraph 9(3a) should specify that the maintenance period referred to in that provision is the maintenance period in which the division takes effect, rather than generally referring to the maintenance period in which a bank is ‘subject to division’ (which could be interpreted

text: as potentially spanning over several maintenance periods in which activities preceding the legally defined date of division take place). In this context, the draft resolution may refer to the maintenance period in which the legally defined ‘date of division’ occurs (as specified in Article 530(2) of the Commercial Companies Code); (ii) the draft resolution should specify the way in which current account holdings held by a divided bank from the start of the maintenance period in which the division takes effect until the day the division takes effect are to be allocated between the banks participating in the division; (iii) the draft resolution should expressly state the manner in which the banks participating in a division apply the general lump sum allowance provisions of NBP’s minimum reserves regime (a fixed amount which an institution deducts in the calculation of its reserve requirement) in the maintenance period in which the division takes effect and the maintenance period immediately following the maintenance period in which the division takes effect . Such express regulation of the required treatment of the lump sum allowance in the case of the division of a credit institution is contained in the ECB’s minimum reserve regime, which may be used as a model in this regard . 2.2 The ECB limits its comments in this opinion to NBP’s minimum reserve regime as it relates to the division of banks. It notes, however, that parallel minimum reserve provisions relating to bank acquisitions and mergers should be harmonised with the draft resolution provisions . This is particularly relevant to corporate restructurings involving interlinked merger and division operations affecting the same group of banks. In such situations, the applicable rules should ensure consistent treatment of the affected banks’ minimum reserve holdings throughout the restructuring process.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 13 November 2007. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: KOM(2007) 625.

text: Text markerad med fet stil anger ECB:s förslag till ny text. Genomstruken text anger de strykningar som ECB föreslår.

text: EGT L 318, 27.11.1998, s. 8.

title: Europeiska centralbankens yttrande av den 14 november 2007 på begäran av Europeiska unionens råd över ett förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning om europeisk statistik (CON/2007/35)

text: Inledning och rättslig grund

text: Den 8 november 2007 mottog Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) en begäran från Europeiska unionens råd om ett yttrande över ett förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning om europeisk statistik (nedan kallat förslaget till förordning).

text: ECB:s behörighet att avge ett yttrande grundas på artikel 105.4 första strecksatsen i fördraget om upprättandet av Europeiska gemenskapen. I enlighet med artikel 17.5 första meningen i arbetsordningen för ECB har detta yttrande antagits av ECB-rådet.

text: 1. Allmänna kommentarer

text: 1.1 ECB välkomnar förslaget till förordning eftersom det erkänner existensen av två parallella, kompletterande system för framställning av europeisk statistik och samtidigt bekräftar ECBS oberoende ställning vid fullgörandet av uppgifter inom statistikområdet (skäl 7 och 8). ECB välkomnar också hänvisningen i skäl 9 till den viktiga rådgivande roll som kommittén för valuta-, finans- och betalningsbalansstatistik (CMFB) har.

text: 1.2 ECB noterar också med tillfredsställelse att förslaget till förordning understryker behovet av ett nära samarbete mellan ESS och ECBS vid utveckling, framställning och spridning av sådan europeisk statistik som tas fram av de båda systemen (artikel 8). I detta sammanhang noterar ECB att kravet på ett nära samarbete mellan ESS och ECBS, enligt vad som anges i skäl 6 i förslaget till förordning, faller inom ramen för den primärrätt som är tillämplig på ECBS enligt fördraget. Enligt artikel 5 i ECBS-stadgan ska ECB, för att utföra ECBS uppgifter, med de nationella centralbankernas stöd samla in de statistiska uppgifter som behövs, antingen från de behöriga nationella myndigheterna eller direkt från de ekonomiska aktörerna, och för detta ändamål samarbeta med gemenskapsinstitutioner och gemenskapsorgan samt med behöriga myndigheter i medlemsstaterna.

text: 1.3 Därutöver välkomnar ECB att artikel 20.3 i förslaget till förordning behandlar frågan om utbyte av konfidentiella uppgifter, för statistiska ändamål, mellan ESS och ECBS. Det är allmänt vedertaget att ett förbättrat utbyte av konfidentiella uppgifter mellan ESS och ECBS blir allt nödvändigare för att säkerställa kvaliteten och konsistensen på europeisk statistik samtidigt som belastningen för uppgiftslämnarna ska bli minsta möjliga. Detta kan ske genom att samma uppgifter bara efterfrågas en gång, och att dessa sedan distribueras mellan berörda statistikmyndigheter med bibehållen uppgiftskonfidentialitet. ECB anser dock, till skillnad från vad som anges i artikel 20.3, att ett sådant informationsutbyte inte ska göras beroende av antagandet av ny, sektorvis lagstiftning som uttryckligen godkänner sådant utbyte av konfidentiell statistikinformation. För att säkerställa ett fungerande effektivt utbyte av nödvändig konfidentiell statistikinformation bör de rättsliga reglerna ange att en sådan överföring får ske om den är nödvändig för att effektivt utveckla, framställa eller sprida europeisk statistik, enligt förebilden i artikel 20.1 i förslaget till förordning som reglerar utbytet av konfidentiell statistikinformation inom ESS.

text: 1.4 ECB understryker att det, för att belastningen för uppgiftslämnarna ska minska, är viktigt att man erhåller fullständig rättslig tillgång till alla nödvändiga uppgifter som existerar. Denna aspekt berörs också i artikel 23 (Tillgång till administrativa källor) i förslaget till förordning. ECB föreslår dock att den rättsliga ramen bör innehålla regler för rutiner och tillvägagångssätt för att uppnå en faktisk tillgång till uppgifter, snarare än begränsningar och villkor eftersom detta implicerar en omotiverad begränsning av sådan tillgång.

text: 1.5 Enligt artikel 253 i fördraget ska förordningar som antas av Europaparlamentet och rådet gemensamt hänvisa till de yttranden som ska inhämtas enligt fördraget. ECB föreslår därför att man i beaktandemeningen till den förslagna förordningen hänvisar till det här yttrandet.

text: 2. Ändringsförslag

text: De ändringsförslag av förordningen som blir resultatet av ECB:s synpunkter framgår av bilagan.

text: BILAGA

text: ÄNDRINGSFÖRSLAG

text: Kommissionens förslag | ECB:s ändringsförslag

text: Artikel 20 – Överföring av konfidentiella uppgifter | Artikel 20 – Överföring av konfidentiella uppgifter

text: 1. Konfidentiella uppgifter får överföras mellan nationella myndigheter och mellan de nationella myndigheterna och kommissionen (Eurostat) om överföringen är nödvändig för att utveckla, framställa och sprida europeisk statistik. All övrig överföring måste uttryckligen godkännas av den nationella myndighet som samlat in uppgifterna. | 1. Konfidentiella uppgifter får överföras mellan nationella myndigheter och mellan de nationella myndigheterna och kommissionen (Eurostat) om överföringen är nödvändig för att utveckla, framställa och sprida europeisk statistik. All övrig överföring måste uttryckligen godkännas av den nationella myndighet som samlat in uppgifterna.

text: 2. Nationella bestämmelser om statistiksekretess får inte åberopas för att hindra överföring av konfidentiella uppgifter om överföringen föreskrivs i en gemenskapsrättsakt. | 3.2. Utbyte av konfidentiella uppgifter för statistiska ändamål får ske mellan Överföring av konfidentiella uppgifter från en ESS-statistikmyndighet till och enECBS-centralbank får ske om så anses förutsatt att överföringen ärnödvändigt för att effektivt utveckla, framställa och sprida europeisk statistik eller ECBS-statistik som avses i artikel 285 i fördraget och

text: artikel 5 i stadgan

text: för ECBS och ECB och om så uttryckligen föreskrivs i gemenskapsrätten.

text: 3. Utbyte av konfidentiella uppgifter för statistiska ändamål får ske mellan ESS och ECBS om så anses nödvändigt för att utveckla, framställa och sprida europeisk statistik eller ECBS-statistik och om så uttryckligen föreskrivs i gemenskapsrätten. | 2.3. Nationella bestämmelser om statistiksekretess får inte åberopas för att hindra överföring av konfidentiella uppgifter enligt punkterna 1 och 2 om överföringen föreskrivs i en gemenskapsrättsakt.

text: 4. Skyddsåtgärderna i denna förordning ska gälla alla konfidentiella uppgifter som överförs inom ESS samt mellan ESS och ECBS. | 4. Om konfidentiella uppgifter överförs av en ECBS-centralbank till en ESS-statistik-myndighet i enlighet med

text: rådets förordning (EG) nr 2533/98 av den 23 november 1998

text: om Europeiska centralbankens insamling av statistiska uppgifter ska dessa uppgifter uteslutande användas för att utveckla, framställa eller sprida europeisk statistik som avses i artikel 285 i fördraget och

text: artikel 5 i stadgan

text: för ECBS och ECB. 5. Utan att det påverkar tillämpningen av punkt 2 måste all annan överföring av konfidentiella uppgifter utanför ESS uttryckligen godkännas av den nationella myndighet som samlat in uppgifterna. 6. Skyddsåtgärderna i denna förordning ska gälla alla konfidentiella uppgifter som överförs inom ESS samt mellan ESS-statistik-myndigheter och ECBS-centralbanker.

text: Motivering – se punkt 1.3 i yttrandet

text: Artikel 23

text: – Tillgång till administrativa källor För att göra arbetet mindre betungande för uppgiftslämnarna ska de nationella myndigheterna och kommissionen (Eurostat) ha tillgång till administrativa uppgiftskällor, var och en inom sina offentliga förvaltningars respektive verksamhetsområden, i den utsträckning som dessa uppgifter behövs för att utveckla, framställa och sprida europeisk statistik. Varje medlemsstat och kommissionen ska inom sina respektive behörighetsområden vid behov fastställa vilka rutiner samt begränsningar och villkor som ska gälla för den faktiska tillgången till uppgifterna. |

text: Artikel 23

text: – Tillgång till administrativa källor För att göra arbetet mindre betungande för uppgiftslämnarna ska de nationella myndigheterna och kommissionen (Eurostat) ha tillgång till administrativa uppgiftskällor, var och en inom sina offentliga förvaltningars respektive verksamhetsområden, i den utsträckning som dessa uppgifter behövs för att utveckla, framställa och sprida europeisk statistik. Varje medlemsstat och kommissionen ska inom sina respektive behörighetsområden vid behov fastställa vilka rutiner samt begränsningar och villkor tillvägagångssätt som ska gälla för den faktiska tillgången till uppgifterna.

text: Motivering – se punkt 1.4 i yttrandet

text: med beaktande av kommissionens förslag, efter samråd med Europeiska datatillsynsmannen, | med beaktande av kommissionens förslag, med beaktande av Europeiska centralbankens yttrande, efter samråd med Europeiska datatillsynsmannen,

text: Motivering – se punkt 1.5 i yttrandet