text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: OJ L 96, 12.4.2003, p. 16.

text: European Commission Communication, 21 May 2003.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 11 May 2004 at the request of the Italian Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance on a draft law on the protection of savings (CON/2004/16)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 11 May 2004 at the request of the Italian Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance on a draft law on the protection of savings (

text: 1. On 30 March 2004 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Italian Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance for an opinion on a draft law on the protection of savings (hereinafter the ‘draft law’).

text: 2. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on the third and sixth indents of

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law contains (i) provisions concerning a national central bank as well as; (ii) rules applicable to financial institutions which could materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 3. The draft law was adopted by the Italian Government on 3 March 2004 and subsequently submitted to the Parliament. It is currently being discussed by the competent committees of the Chamber of Deputies, which prepared a new draft on 5 May 2004. The present opinion is based on this most recent text, which has been informally sent to the ECB by the consulting authority. The ECB appreciates that the preparation of the draft law is a dynamic process where amendments may be introduced at any time. It stands ready to comment on any such amendments to the extent possible. This is particularly important where amendments fundamentally change draft legislation in areas in which the ECB has a specific interest.

text: 4. The draft law has two main aims: The first aim is to strengthen the safeguards for the integrity of financial markets and institutions. In this context, it revises corporate governance mechanisms regarding listed companies such as those relating to independent directors (

text: Article 1

text: ), statutory auditing (

text: Article 2

text: ), liability of company’s administrators (

text: Article 3

text: ), and transparency of cross-border complex corporate structures (

text: Article 5

text: ). It also introduces provisions dealing with conflicts of interest with regard to companies that have recourse to capital markets, financial intermediaries and collective investment vehicles (

text: Articles 6

text: to 8). In addition, it includes provisions dealing with the protection of investors, notably with regard to the sale to retail investors of financial instruments initially placed with institutional investors (

text: Article 9

text: ), transparency of contractual conditions (

text: Article 10

text: ), and criteria for the placement of financial products with retail investors (

text: Article 11

text: ). Furthermore, the draft law contains provisions concerning the implementation of the ‘Market Abuse Directive’ (Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on insider dealing and market manipulation (market abuse) ) and provides more stringent rules with regard to auditing companies. The second aim is to reform the institutional framework in Italy for the regulation and supervision of financial markets and intermediaries. In particular, it envisages the allocation of regulatory and supervisory tasks according to their objectives, thus refining and extending to all financial sectors a model already partially adopted in the Italian framework. The central bank will be responsible for the safeguard of financial stability and the prudential regulation and supervision of credit institutions, insurance companies, investment firms and other financial intermediaries. A newly established authority – the Authority for the Financial Markets (Autorità per i mercati finanziari, AMeF) – will be responsible for conduct of business regulation and supervision. This includes consumer protection issues, market confidence, the transparency and fair business practices of financial intermediaries, and more generally financial markets’ transparency and corporate disclosure practices. As a result of this approach, the current Italian supervisory authorities will be reduced in number and reorganised. The insurance supervisory authority (Istituto per la vigilanza sulle assicurazioni private e di interesse collettivo) and the pension funds regulator (Commissione di vigilanza sui fondi pensione) will be dissolved and their tasks transferred to the Banca d’Italia and the AMeF. The AMeF will take over the competencies and responsibilities of the current financial markets regulator (Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa), as well as those related to the transparency of banking activities currently belonging to the Banca d’Italia. The tasks of the Italian Foreign Exchange Office (Ufficio Italiano dei Cambi, UIC) concerning anti-money laundering policies will be attributed to a new Agency for Financial Investigation (Agenzia per l’investigazione finanziaria, AIF), whilst those concerning the management of the Italian official foreign reserves, collection of data for the preparation of statistics on the balance of payments and the fight against usury, will be transferred to the Banca d’Italia. The draft law also foresees that responsibility for competition policy in the banking sector will be transferred from the Banca d’Italia to the Italian competition authority (Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, AGCM). The Banca d’Italia will be consulted with regard to measures concerning the financial institutions under its responsibility. In addition, mergers and acquisition giving rise to a dominant position may also be authorised if the Banca d’Italia deems them necessary for the stability of the institution concerned (

text: Article 59

text: 5. The ECB welcomes the reinforcement of specific safeguards for the integrity of financial markets. This is in line with the concerns which have emerged at the international and European Union (EU) levels as a result of recent corporate failures in the U.S. and in Europe. In particular, the draft law addresses current shortcomings with respect to corporate governance, financial disclosure, the monitoring role of financial and reputational intermediaries, and the control of offshore structures. The ECB considers that the arrangements envisaged in the draft law are likely to help to build a better system of checks and balances on corporate behaviour against the background of recent cases. Recent corporate failures have shown how internal and external control mechanisms may be ineffective where complex multinational groups span a number of countries and operate through offshore centres. Given the increasing integration and interlinkages of EU financial markets, the ECB considers that legislative responses should be coordinated at the EU level, as purely nationally-based safeguards for market integrity might be more easily circumvented. The European Commission has already taken various initiatives. It recently proposed an Action Plan on Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union . The Action Plan suggests enhancing disclosure of corporate governance structures and practices, strengthening shareholders’ rights and introducing several requirements concerning the organisation of company boards. A greater role for independent non-executive and supervisory directors is envisaged, and minimum standards for their nomination and remuneration and for audit committees are set out. Other measures have also been adopted to increase investors’ confidence in European capital markets, such as the new proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on statutory audit of annual accounts and consolidated accounts and amending Council Directives

text: and

text: . The Market Abuse Directive is also to be mentioned. The ECB notes that the draft law takes into account these various initiatives developing at the EU level. Moreover, the draft law introduces some innovative tools aimed at tackling the failures in internal and external controls regarding the behaviour of managers and controlling shareholders and at limiting the potential for conflicts of interest. It would seem appropriate that also in these areas enhanced coordination is sought at the EU level. The ECB also welcomes the fact that the proposed institutional framework is oriented towards recognising the essential role of the central bank in promoting the safety and soundness of financial institutions and the stability of the financial system as a whole. It understands that, after a thorough debate, a wide consensus has emerged to confirm the attribution of responsibility for prudential supervision to the Banca d’Italia and to extend the scope of such supervision to all financial intermediaries. The ECB sees a number of advantages in this choice. First, the chosen approach recognises that the nature and scope of systemic risk is widening due to the closer links between credit institutions, insurance companies, investment firms and pension funds. The traditional borders between the banking, insurance and securities segments of the financial system are increasingly blurred, as demonstrated by the emergence of hybrid financial products, the increased use of risk transfer instruments and distribution agreements between the three sectors, and the growing role of financial conglomerates. These developments suggest that the integration of microand macro-prudential supervisory tools might provide a more effective monitoring of systemic risk, thus contributing to financial stability. Second, the approach acknowledges the growing importance of financial groups that combine different types of financial services. This calls for some degree of coordination between the supervisory policies and regulation in all sectors of financial activity in order to address the specific prudential concerns with regard to such groups and ensure an overall level playing field between competing intermediaries. Entrusting one authority with responsibilities for prudential supervision over the whole range of financial intermediaries is considered an appropriate method of addressing the challenges of financial conglomeration. Third, the attribution of extensive supervisory responsibilities of both a micro and macro-prudential nature to the central bank is appropriate in view of the changes triggered by the introduction of the euro and the synergies that are achieved between the exercise of central banking and supervisory functions, notably with regard to the assessment of risks for the financial system as a whole. At the same time, it should be noted that financial stability and investor protection are complementary objectives and must be pursued consistently by the authorities to which they are entrusted.

text: 6. Within the above framework, it is essential to ensure that the reform and its actual implementation respect provisions of the Treaty establishing the European Community concerning central bank independence and that due attention is paid to ensuring the operational independence of supervisory authorities.

text: Central bank independence

text: 7. The ECB notes that Article 24 of the draft law provides that the Governor shall have a nonrenewable eight-year term of office and that he may be dismissed only in accordance with Article 14.2 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter the ‘ESCB Statute’). The proposed article is in compliance with Treaty requirements.

text: 8. The ECB also notes that the draft law is silent concerning the future status of the existing Governor of the Banca d’Italia. In this context it would like to point out that in order to protect the personal independence of the governors of the national central banks, any reorganisation of such a bank affecting the term of office of its governor should foresee that the existing Governor can continue to perform his duties until the end of the term of office he has been appointed for. The ECB understands that the case of the Governor of the Banca d’Italia is exceptional in that he has been appointed for an indefinite term of office without any compulsory retirement age. For this case the draft law should provide for a transitional regime which is compatible with Article 14.2 of the ESCB Statute. The present formulation of

text: Article 74(5)

text: amounts to an ex lege revocation of the appointment of the incumbent governor, without observing the abovementioned provision of the Statute. As regards the appointment procedure, an additional guarantee of independence lies in the power of appointment by the Board of Directors of the Bank, and not merely in the power of nomination. The appointment is then approved at the political level.

text: 9. The ECB notes that according to Article 72(9) of the draft law the assets and real estate of the Banca d’Italia that are instrumental for the exercise of the tasks transferred to the AMeF may be acquired by the State Property Agency in order to be assigned or leased to the AmeF. The ECB welcomes the fact that such a transfer has to be made in accordance with an agreement between the parties concerned and that, according to

text: Article 72(10)

text: , will be applied with due attention to the obligations arising from the Banca d’Italia’s membership of the ESCB. Moreover, the ECB notes that the UIC is an instrumental entity of the Banca d’Italia.

text: Article 71

text: assigns to the new AIF assets currently belonging to the UIC, and thus to the Banca d’Italia. In order to comply with Article 108 of the Treaty it is also necessary that this transfer only take place with the agreement of the Banca d’Italia.

text: Operational independence of supervisory authorities

text: 10. Operational independence of supervisory bodies vis-à-vis the political authorities is an essential and internationally recognised standard for supervision of financial markets. In this respect, the ECB notes that a previous version of the draft law provided for extensive powers of oversight of supervisory activities to be held by the Interdepartmental Committee for Credit and Savings (Comitato interministeriale per il credito e il risparmio, CICR), which could give rise to some concerns regarding the appropriate safeguard of the operational independence of supervisory authorities. The ECB welcomes the fact that the latest version of the draft law, on which this opinion is based, no longer provides for such a role for the CICR, but rather reverts to the framework currently in place.

text: 11. In accordance with

text: Article 18

text: , the supervisory authorities and the AGCM, while respecting each other’s independence, will be under the obligation to exercise their competencies in a coordinated manner, namely through a coordination committee, so that the risk of overlaps and duplications of responsibilities over the financial industry is mitigated to the extent possible. The ECB fully recognises the need for coordination and welcomes the fact that this provision is consistent with the responsibility and independence of each authority in the exercise of its supervisory functions.

text: 12. Finally, the ECB notes that a number of provisions in the draft law specifically refer to the transparency and accountability of the Banca d’Italia and the AMeF as regards their supervisory activities. In particular, in accordance with

text: Article 17

text: , the authorities shall deliver a yearly report on the results of their supervisory activity to the Presidents of the Parliamentary Chambers and to a newly instituted Parliamentary Commission for the protection of savings and the financial markets (Commissione per la tutela del risparmio e i mercati finanziari), together with any opinion or recommendation on regulatory intervention. Such reports, opinions and recommendations are also transmitted to the Government which, in turn, may adopt any initiative falling under its competence. The ECB considers such provisions consistent with the transparency and accountability requirements, that are the natural complement of the operational independence of supervisory authorities.

text: Further aspects relating to the institutional framework for financial supervision and regulation

text: 13. The ECB also notes that Article 41(2) of the draft law attributes to the AMeF the right to ask the Banca d’Italia to propose to the Treasury Minister the initiation of a special administration procedure or compulsory administrative liquidation concerning a bank (Articles 70 and 80 of the Banking Law), and to adopt supervisory measures, such as provisional management (

text: Article 76

text: ) and special measures (Articles

text: and

text: ). It is understood that this provision could apply in extreme cases, in which the violation of conduct of business and transparency regulations suggests the exit from the market of an otherwise solvent entity. Close ex ante coordination of the AMeF with the Banca d’Italia, which is generally warranted, is particularly required with regard to such measures, as the Banca d’Italia is entrusted not only with the responsibility of preserving the solvency and liquidity of the bank concerned but also with safeguarding the stability of the financial system as a whole. If such coordination was lacking, the activation of such a measure by the AMeF could trigger a serious instability. The ECB welcomes the proposed procedure, which ensures adequate coordination between the AMeF and the Banca d’Italia.

text: 14. Finally, in transferring the responsibilities for the enforcement of competition policy in the banking sector from the Banca d’Italia to the AGCM the draft law introduces procedures aimed at ensuring a smooth interplay between the measures taken by the two authorities. While coordination is highly needed to avoid an overly complex framework for supervised entities, it would seem appropriate to maintain a clear distinction between procedures that are pursuing distinct public interests, taking due account of the importance that the Italian legal system assigns to the stability of financial intermediaries and of the financial system as a whole. In particular, the requirement to notify also to the AGCM the mergers and acquisitions as foreseen by the regulatory framework for banking supervision and to incorporate the assessment for supervisory and competition purposes into a single act by the AGCM might raise delicate issues. The procedure foreseen in the Directive

text: aims at ascertaining the compatibility of the acquisition of qualifying holdings in a credit institution with the sound and prudent management and may require access to information that are not directly relevant for competition policy purposes. It would seem appropriate that national measures implementing these Community provisions and defining the criteria for the fulfilment of the related responsibilities should refer only to the authority entrusted with prudential supervisory tasks. Some separation between the two procedures seems warranted also for practical reasons, as the thresholds for communication and the notion on control are not entirely overlapping in Community legislation. Such procedural separation may be compatible with establishing ex ante, as the draft law foresees, criteria to be used regarding the clearance of mergers and acquisitions by both authorities. The ECB would welcome such ex ante criteria as a tool to enhance the transparency and objectivity of such clearance decisions by either of the two authorities concerned.

text: 15. This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 11 May 2004. [signed] The President of the ECB Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: EGT L 189, 3.7.1998, s. 42.

publisher: Europeiska centralbanken

sprak: sv

title: Europeiska centralbankens yttrande av den 17 maj 2004 på begäran av Sveriges riksbank över två lagförslag om vissa äldre sedlar och mynt som upphör att vara lagliga betalningsmedel (CON/2004/17)

serie: con

text: EUROPEISKA CENTRALBANKENS YTTRANDE av den 17 maj 2004 på begäran av Sveriges riksbank över två lagförslag om vissa äldre sedlar och mynt som upphör att vara lagliga betalningsmedel (

type: rubrik

text: 1. Den 5 april 2004 mottog Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) en begäran från Sveriges riksbank om ett yttrande över ett förslag från Sveriges riksbank till Sveriges riksdag om att anta två lagförslag enligt vilka vissa äldre sedlar och mynt upphör att vara lagliga betalningsmedel (nedan kallade "lagförslagen").

type: stycke

text: 2. ECB:s behörighet att avge ett yttrande grundas på artikel 2.1 andra och tredje strecksatserna i

text: rådets beslut 98/415/EG av den 29 juni 1998

text: om nationella myndigheters samråd med Europeiska centralbanken rörande förslag till rättsregler , eftersom lagförslagen innehåller bestämmelser om betalningsmedel och den svenska nationella centralbanken. I enlighet med

text: artikel 17.5

text: första meningen i arbetsordningen för Europeiska centralbanken har detta yttrande antagits av ECB-rådet.

text: 3. I motiveringen till lagförslagen föreslår Sveriges riksbank att vissa äldre sedlar och mynt skall upphöra att vara lagliga betalningsmedel den 31 december 2005. Enligt 9 kap. 14 § regeringsformen har Sveriges riksbank ensamrätt att ge ut sedlar och mynt. Av 5 kap. 1 § lagen (1988:1385) om Sveriges riksbank framgår att sedlar och mynt som ges ut av Sveriges riksbank är lagliga betalningsmedel. Allmänna regler om penning- och betalningsväsendet, såsom beslut om att vissa svenska sedlar och mynt skall upphöra att vara lagliga betalningsmedel skall däremot meddelas genom lag som antagits av Sveriges riksdag.

text: 4. Med beaktande av detta har Sveriges riksbank lagt fram två lagförslag för antagande av Sveriges riksdag; dels förslag till lag om vissa äldre sedlars upphörande som lagliga betalningsmedel (nedan kallat "lagförslaget om äldre sedlar") och dels förslag till lag om äldre femtioöresmynts upphörande som lagligt betalningsmedel (nedan kallat "lagförslaget om det äldre femtioöresmyntet"). Enligt lagförslaget om äldre sedlar skall äldre versioner av svenska sedlar med valörerna 20, 100 respektive 500 SEK upphöra att vara lagliga betalningsmedel den 31 december 2005. Enligt lagförslaget om det äldre femtioöresmyntet, skall det äldre silverfärgade femtioöresmyntet också upphöra att vara lagligt betalningsmedel den 31 december 2005. Det föreslås att lagförslagen skall träda i kraft den 1 januari 2005, dvs. ett år innan de berörda sedlarna och mynten upphör att vara lagliga betalningsmedel.

text: 5. I motiveringen till lagförslagen anges bland annat grunderna till att de berörda sedlarna och mynten kan upphöra att vara lagliga betalningsmedel med relativt kort varsel. Det huvudsakliga skälet för detta är Sveriges riksbanks generösa praxis att lösa in äldre sedlar och mynt under en lång tid efter det att de upphört att gälla som lagliga betalningsmedel.

text: 6. ECB har beaktat tidsaspekten och anser precis som Sveriges riksbank att den föreslagna tidsperioden mellan det datum då lagförslagen skall träda i kraft och det datum då de berörda sedlarna och mynten upphör att vara lagliga betalningsmedel bör vara tillräcklig. ECB har inga andra kommentarer om lagförslagen.

text: 7. ECB bekräftar att den inte har någon invändning mot att behöriga nationella myndigheter offentliggör detta yttrande om de så önskar. Detta yttrande kommer att offentliggöras på ECB:s webbplats sex månader efter datum för antagandet. Utfärdat i Frankfurt am Main den 17 maj 2004. [Namnteckning] Jean-Claude TRICHET ECB:s ordförande

type: vagledning

utgivare: ecb


text: See, in the same vein, the considerations made in paragraph 5 of ECB Opinion

text: of 16 March 2004. 6 See

text: recital 15

text: of

text: Directive 2001/24/EC

sprak: en

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 18 May 2004 at the request of the Portuguese Ministry of Finance on a draft decree-law on the reorganisation and winding up of credit institutions (CON/2004/18)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 18 May 2004 at the request of the Portuguese Ministry of Finance on a draft decree-law on the reorganisation and winding up of credit institutions (

text: 1. On 16 April 2004 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Portuguese Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft decree-law on the reorganisation and winding up of credit institutions (the ‘draft decree-law’).

text: 2. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on the fifth and sixth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the legislative proposal contains provisions on payment and settlement systems and financial institutions that would materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 3. The draft decree-law will transpose into domestic law Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 April 2001 on the reorganisation and winding up of credit institutions . In addition, Chapters I and II contain a full review of the legal requirements applying to the process of winding up credit institutions with their head offices in Portugal, as defined by a legal act from 1940. Chapter IV also provides for professional secrecy under winding-up proceedings. As draft national legal acts exclusively transposing directives fall outside the scope of

text: , the current opinion is restricted to these latter provisions of the draft decree-law.

text: 4. Whereas Decree-Law No 298/92 of 31 December 1992, approving the general legal framework for credit institutions and financial companies (the ‘Decree-Law No 298/92’), currently governs the reorganisation of credit institutions with their head offices in Portugal, Decree-Law No 30 689 of 27 August 1940 continues to regulate winding up. The ECB notes that the Portuguese legislator’s initiative reviews the existing regime for winding up credit institutions with their head offices in Portugal so that the legal framework can be brought closer to Community legal principles and standards on this matter.

text: Article 4

text: restricts the scope of application of Chapter II of the draft decree-law to the following: - the winding up of credit institutions having their head offices in Portugal, and - with the necessary adaptations, to financial companies having their head offices in Portugal, and - the winding up of branches located in Portugal of credit institutions having their head offices in countries which are not Member States, and of branches located in Portugal of financial institutions. The ECB assumes that the term ‘financial institutions’ in the draft decree-law is the legal term used by Decree-Law No 298/92 and Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 March 2000 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit 3 4 institutions , as amended by Directive

text: , which laid down the definition of those entities and specified which branches are subject to supervision by the Banco de Portugal. Therefore, the ECB understands that the scope of Chapter II, when read together with Article 1(1) of the draft decree-law, also includes those branches of ‘financial institutions’ when those branches are located in Portugal. The ECB notes from

text: Article 4(2)

text: that special legislation will continue to cover the winding up of the caixas de crédito agrícola mútuo (mutual agricultural credit banks).

text: 6. According to Article 5(1) of the draft decree-law, credit institutions with their head offices in Portugal may only be wound up by either: (i) withdrawing the authorisation to pursue the business of banking; or (ii) shareholders’ decision.

text: Article 5(3)

text: provides that decisions to withdraw authorisation shall indicate the date and time of the act, it being considered, in the event of omission, that the act occurred at 12.00 this being deemed, for all legal purposes, the moment when the winding up proceedings are opened. The ECB notes that the date and time of adoption of the act withdrawing the authorisation will thus constitute, for legal purposes, the moment when the winding-up proceedings are opened. Hence, the ECB understands that the date on which the Banco de Portugal applies to the competent court for a credit institution to be wound up is not deemed to be the moment when the winding-up proceedings are opened. The ECB also notes that the Banco de Portugal will give to the decision withdrawing authorisation the publicity it deems convenient pursuant to Article 23(3) of Decree-Law No 298/92, to ensure third parties are adequately informed. The ECB notes that this rule ensures legal certainty. The ECB considers however that this rule could be improved by clarifying that the omission should only concern the time but not the date, as otherwise it would not be possible to identify to which day the time rule established in

text: Article 5(3)

text: refers.

text: 7. Articles 6 and 7 of the draft decree-law provide for winding up by shareholders’ decision.

text: Article 6(1)

text: provides that voluntary winding up is governed by

text: Article 35

text: -A of Decree-Law No 298/92. This ensures that any plan to voluntarily wind up a credit institution is notified to Banco de Portugal at least 90 days in advance of the date of its implementation. The ECB understands that voluntary winding up of a credit institution entails its extra-judicial winding up within the terms and conditions set by Article 7 of the draft decree-law. Notwithstanding this, the ECB welcomes the power granted by Article 6(2) of the draft decree-law to the Banco de Portugal to request the judicial winding up of a credit institution, as foreseen in

text: Article 8

text: , even when woundup by shareholders’ decision. The ECB considers that such a discretionary power will allow the Banco de Portugal to strengthen creditor protection, where it deems necessary, in particular by allowing a request for the judicial application of interim measures.

text: Articles 8

text: to 15 of the draft decree-law regulate judicial winding up where the authorisation of a credit institution is withdrawn, with the abovementioned exception in

text: Article 6(2)

text: . The ECB understands that these judicial winding up proceedings will be carried out within the framework of the Portuguese Insolvency and Company Reorganisation Code subject to the specific rules laid down in the draft decree-law. In respecting the Member States’ procedural autonomy, the ECB recommends granting national supervisory authorities and national central banks, if not granted supervisory powers over credit institutions, ample intervention rights in winding-up proceedings. This reinforces the financial stability framework by allowing judicial authorities to consider the assessment and concerns of national supervisory authorities and national central banks, as the case may be . This is also in line with the spirit of Directive

text: , which highlights the important role played by the competent authorities of the home Member State before winding-up proceedings may continue during the process of winding-up so that these proceedings can be properly carried out . In this regard, the ECB welcomes the extensive set of rights granted to the Banco de Portugal in the context of the judicial winding-up proceedings by the draft decree-law. In particular, the ECB notes that

text: Article 8(3)

text: grants the Banco de Portugal exclusive standing to request the winding up of a credit institution before the appropriate court. The ECB notes further that, pursuant to

text: Article 10(1)

text: and (2) respectively, the judge appoints the liquidator or the liquidating commission, as the case may be, on proposal by the Banco de Portugal. The latter may propose the dismissal or substitution of the liquidator or of the members of the liquidating commission, as the case may be, or the substitution of a liquidator by a liquidating commission, or the latter by the former. The ECB notes also that the credit institution may only be continued pending winding-up, under the terms and conditions in

text: Article 12(1)

text: , with the Banco de Portugal’s approval under

text: Article 12(2)

text: . Finally, the ECB supports the ample intervention rights of the Banco de Portugal in the judicial winding-up proceedings established in

text: Article 14

text: . In particular, it supports the possibility of examining the credit institution’s accounts and requesting the liquidator or liquidating authority, as the case may be, to provide all information and documents deemed necessary by the Banco de Portugal.

text: 9. The ECB welcomes the wide scope of

text: Article 40

text: in Chapter IV of the draft decree-law, as all persons intervening in winding-up proceedings are subject to professional secrecy under

text: Articles 78

text: to 84 of Decree-Law No 298/92.

text: 10. The ECB confirms that it has no objection to the competent national authorities making this opinion publicly available at their discretion. This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website six months after the date of its adoption. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 18 May 2004. The President of the ECB Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: Europeiska centralbankens statistikkrav inom området allmän ekonomisk statistik, Europeiska centralbanken, augusti 2000. Se även Europeiska monetära institutets yttrande över ett förslag till rådets förordning om konjunkturstatistik (CON/97/19).

title: Europeiska centralbankens yttrande av den 24 maj 2004 på begäran av Europeiska unionens råd över ett förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning om ändring av rådets förordning (EG) nr 1165/98 om konjunkturstatistik (KOM(2003) 823 slutlig) (CON/2004/19)

text: 1. Den 30 april 2004 mottog Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) en begäran från Europeiska unionens råd om ett yttrande över ett förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning om ändring av

text: rådets förordning (EG) nr 1165/98

text: om konjunkturstatistik (nedan kallat förslaget till förordning).

text: 2. ECB:s behörighet att avge ett yttrande grundas på

text: artikel 105.4

text: första strecksatsen i Fördraget om upprättandet av Europeiska gemenskapen. I enlighet med

text: artikel 17.5

text: första meningen i arbetsordningen för Europeiska centralbanken har detta yttrande antagits av ECB-rådet.

text: 3. Syftet med den förslagna förordningen är att förbättra Europeiska unionens (EU) konjunkturstatistik avseende företagen. En av huvudpunkterna i förslaget till förordning är framtagandet av ett importprisindex avseende industriprodukter och ett producentprisindex avseende tjänster. Enligt förslaget skall också vissa viktiga ekonomiska indikatorer sammanställas oftare och överföras inom kortare tidsfrister.

text: A. Allmänna synpunkter

text: 4. ECB har definierat den konjunkturstatistik som den behöver för att genomföra penningpolitiken. Förslaget till förordning har uppkommit inom ramen för handlingsplanen för statistikkrav avseende Ekonomiska och monetära unionen (EMU) (nedan kallad handlingsplanen), som på begäran av rådet (Ekofinrådet) utarbetats av Europeiska kommissionen (Eurostat) i nära samarbete med ECB. Av handlingsplanen framgår att det är viktigt att förbättra den statistik som omfattats av förordning

text: (EG) nr 1165/98

text: . Förslaget till förordning är också viktigt med beaktande av de europeiska ekonomiska huvudindikatorerna som antogs av Ekofin-rådet den 18 februari 2003 och som omfattar åtta indikatorer som finns med i förslaget till förordning. ECB välkomnar det gentlemen's agreement som för närvarande finns mellan de nationella statistikinstituten och Eurostat och som syftar till att säkerställa att de europeiska ekonomiska huvudindikatorerna i förslaget till förordning kan offentliggöras i enlighet med tidsfristerna för de europeiska ekonomiska huvudindikatorerna, oavsett när förslaget till förordning antas.

text: 5. ECB stöder fullt ut förslaget till förordning som innehåller indikatorer som är ytterst betydelsefulla för att bedöma företagskonjunkturen och för att genomföra penningpolitiken. Förslaget innebär också ett stort steg framåt på vägen mot framtagandet av viktig månatlig och kvartalsvis statistik över omsättning och producentpriser avseende tjänster. Förslaget till förordning återspeglar de förslag som gemensamt lades fram av Kommittén för det statistiska programmet och Kommittén för valuta-, finans- och betalningsbalansstatistik i februari 2003.

text: 6. ECB välkomnar särskilt att många av indikatorerna skall rapporteras oftare och att tidsfristen för översändningen blir kortare. För ECB:s bedömning av det ekonomiska läget är i tid aggregerade indikatorer viktigare än detaljerade uppdelningar.

text: 7. ECB stöder också att det i förslaget till förordning föreslås att en uppdelning av nya order och priser skall ske efter ursprung, d.v.s. om de har sitt ursprung inom eller utanför euroområdet. ECB behöver denna uppdelning för att kunna skilja mellan hur ekonomin utvecklas inom euroområdet jämfört med hur den utvecklas utanför euroområdet. ECB samtycker till att denna uppdelning endast behöver göras av de medlemsstater som har infört euron. Det är dock viktigt att de medlemsstater som i framtiden inför euron vid den tidpunkten också kommer att kunna tillhandahålla tillräckligt omfattande historiska tidsserier.

text: 8. ECB välkomnar den möjlighet i förslaget till förordning som innebär att vissa av indikatorerna för euroområdet får sammanställas genom s.k. europeiska stickprovsundersökningar. Eftersom resurserna är begränsade och det finns ett behov att prioritera, bidrar detta till att förbättra statistiken avseende euroområdet samtidigt som det kan bidra till att minska resursbehovet på nationell nivå. Av samma skäl stöder ECB det faktum att översändningskraven genom förslaget till förordning minskar för de mindre EU-länderna, så att dessa kan koncentrera sig på att sammanställa de viktigaste aggregaten.

text: 9. Ytterligare arbete krävs för att förbättra jämförbarheten av den nuvarande statistiken som omfattas av förordning

text: (EG) nr 1165/98

text: . Trots de stora framsteg som har gjorts sedan 1998, finns det fortfarande vissa faktorer som verkar hämmande på kvaliteten på aggregaten för euroområdet och på jämförbarheten av nationella uppgifter (såsom t.ex. olika praxis i länderna avseende arbetsdags- och säsongsjusteringar och för revideringar).

text: B. Särskilda kommentarer

text: 10. ECB är positiv till den nya variabeln importpriser (bilaga, del A) som skall sammanställas fr.o.m. 2005 och den planerade tidsfristen för översändningen av denna. Denna variabel kommer att ge värdefull ytterligare information för analysen av priserna i euroområdet. ECB behöver denna variabel för att kunna fastställa priserna för euroområdets samlade import av industriprodukter från länderna utanför euroområdet.

text: 11. Enligt förslaget till förordning skall uppgifter om sysselsättning, arbetade timmar samt bruttolöner tas fram kvartalsvis och översändas inom tre månader (två månader när det gäller sysselsättningsuppgifterna). För ECB:s behov är kvartalsvisa uppgifter i kombination med långa tidsfrister för översändning otillräckliga. För de viktigaste aggregaten för euroområdet bör dessa uppgifter finnas tillgängliga månadsvis med en tidsfrist för översändning på högst en månad.

text: 12. När det gäller statistik över produktionen i byggsektorn noterar ECB med tillfredsställelse att tidsfristen för översändande av uppgifter kortats ned samtidigt som uppgifterna nu skall insamlas månadsvis istället för kvartalsvis (bilaga, del B).

text: 13. ECB välkomnar den planerade genomförbarhetsstudien om framtagandet en variabel för producentpriser för byggnadsverksamhet. En sådan variabel skulle komplettera den nuvarande variabeln för byggkostnader – som är ett index för priser på insatsvaror – eftersom producentprisindexet är bättre lämpat för prisanalyser.

text: 14 ECB välkomnar de stora förbättringar som planeras för statistiken avseende tjänster, särskilt införandet av ett producentprisindex. Detta index kommer att bli en viktig beståndsdel av prisanalysen för euroområdet och kommer att bidra till en förbättring av kvaliteten på tillväxtprognoserna i nationalräkenskaperna. Eftersom tidsfristen för offentliggörande av producentprisindexet enligt de europeiska ekonomiska huvudindikatorerna är senast två månader efter rapporteringskvartalets utgång, föreslår ECB att tidsfristen för översändande enligt förslaget till förordning (tre månader) anpassas till tidsfristen för offentliggörande enligt de europeiska ekonomiska huvudindikatorerna, vilken är mer lämplig. Därutöver kommer enligt förslaget till förordning ett datum att fastställas, fram till vilket förteckningen över de tjänster som omfattas av statistiken över producentpriser får ändras (bilaga, del D). Eftersom helt ny statistik håller på att utvecklas kan denna begränsning bli kontraproduktiv. Täckningen av statistik över producentpriser för tjänster bör vid behov kunna ändras, så att förändrade informationsbehov kan tillgodoses. ECB föreslår därför att tidsfristen stryks.

text: 15. ECB välkomnar att tidsfristen för översändning av uppgifter om variabeln för omsättning av tjänster föreslås kortas ned från tre månader till två månader. ECB stöder även den planerade genomförbarhetsstudien som gäller sammanställning av variabler för omsättning av tjänster på månadsbasis.

text: Utfärdat i Frankfurt am Main den 24 maj 2004.

text: Jean-Claude Trichet

text: ECB:s ordförande


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 2 Article L. 112-2 of the Monetary and Financial Code (hereinafter the ‘Code’). 3 Article L. 112-3 of the Code. 4 EMI Opinion CON/97/24 of 16 December 1997 at the request of the German Ministry of Justice, under

text: Article 109

text: f(6) of the Treaty establishing the European Community (The ‘Treaty’) and Article 5.3 of the Statute of the European Monetary Institute (EMI), on a draft act (the ‘draft law’) for the introduction of the euro.

text: Décret no 2001-966 du 24 octobre 2001 portant modalités d’indexation de certains instruments financiers sur le niveau général des prix, Journal Officiel de la République Française, no 248, 25 octobre 2001 (Decree No 2001-966 of 24 October 2001 setting out the terms and conditions for the indexation of certain financial instruments to the general level of prices, Official Journal of the French Republic, No 248, 25 October 2001).

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 3 June 2004 at the request of the French Ministry of Economic Affairs, Finance and Industry on a draft legislative provision authorising inflation-indexed loans from credit institutions (CON/2004/20)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 3 June 2004 at the request of the French Ministry of Economic Affairs, Finance and Industry on a draft legislative provision authorising inflation-indexed loans from credit institutions (

text: 1. On 1 April 2004 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the French Ministry of Economic Affairs, Finance and Industry for an opinion on a draft legislative provision authorising inflation-indexed loans from credit institutions (hereinafter the ‘draft provision’).

text: 2. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on the first and sixth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft provision relates to currency matters and rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 3. Under current French law, statutory or contractual provisions are prohibited from containing clauses providing for indexations based, inter alia, on the general level of prices or of salaries . However, by way of exception from this general provision, debt instruments and financial futures may be indexed to the general level of prices . The ECB notes that the French authorities wish to extend this exception to loans granted by credit institutions or by the Caisse des dépôts et consignations (CDC) by amending Article L. 112-3 of the Code. The ECB understands that the draft provision affects consumer loans (including home loans), corporate loans and inter-bank loans.

text: 4. The European Monetary Institute (EMI) has previously examined the issue of indexation clauses in its Opinion CON/97/24 . The EMI noted that ‘according to

text: Article 9

text: , §1, a provision of the [German] Currency Act shall be deleted which lays down a requirement for the prior authorisation of index clauses by the competent authority. (…) The monetary law of the Community currently under consideration does not contemplate any prohibition or Community control of index clauses. Therefore, the EMI agrees with the conclusion of the Explanatory Memorandum that, with regard to the monetary policy function, national provisions on index clauses are no longer necessary. However, Member States may, for other policy requirements, establish or maintain indexation provisions relating to the competence of the national legislator, e.g. in the field of contractual law, such as the provision (…) for residential rent contracts’. The EMI’s statement is still valid today and the ECB therefore considers that Member States may, in principle, authorise indexation clauses, as long as they comply with Community law.

text: 5. According to the French authorities, the draft provision is necessary to ensure coherence with the regime for inflation-indexed securities. The ECB takes note of the objective pursued by the French Government of extending the freedom of contract, in order to allow economic agents to hedge against the inflation risk, and to enlarge the range of available financial products. However, the ECB would stress that a widespread use of indexation clauses would give rise to considerable concern. In particular, widespread indexation in wage and price setting may generate excessive rigidity in the relative price system and would risk fuelling inflation spirals. Although the demand for indexation clauses, in the current environment of low inflation, appears relatively limited, it cannot be fully excluded that households when faced with an increased debt-service burden, as a result of inflation rising faster than wages, would request that their wages be more closely indexed to prices. Similarly, certain firms might be tempted to pass any nominal increase in their debtburden on to the prices they charge to consumers. If the economy were hit by a persistent inflationary shock, in case of widespread indexation, it would be very difficult to reduce the use of indexation clauses once inflation rates have passed a certain threshold.

text: 6. The implementation in France of the 2003 reform introducing the automatic indexing of regulated savings rates to inflation will require banks to marginally adjust the management of their assets and liabilities in order to minimise inflation risk. The ECB understands that the proposed change would be particularly important for the CDC which channels deposits on regulated savings accounts and uses these funds, inter alia, to finance public housing and to grant loans to public housing bodies. However, since these specific loans are themselves indexed to regulated savings rates, the option of directly indexing them to inflation is likely to be of limited use. The French authorities consider that authorising the indexation of bank loans to inflation poses no specific risks to the stability of the financial system, in particular because its impact would remain limited. The ECB has no comments on this aspect.

text: 7. A decree of 24 October 2001 , which will also apply to the draft provision, further specifies the terms and conditions for the indexation of certain financial instruments to the general level of prices. The Decree provides that the harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP), excluding tobacco, for the euro area as published monthly by Eurostat may be used to implement the indexation. However, as is the case for French inflation-indexed Government bonds, other general price indices, such as the French consumer price index, may in principle also be used. The ECB considers that indexation to a national price level or rate of inflation, rather than to a euro area index, may risk increasing the heterogeneity of financial systems across the euro area and in general of the different euro area economies. Indexation to a euro area index would therefore be clearly preferable from a monetary policy viewpoint. The ECB also supports, for reasons of transparency and comparability, the use of the HICP for the euro area.

text: 8. The ECB confirms that it has no objection to the competent national authorities making this opinion publicly available at their discretion. This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website six months after the date of its adoption. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 3 June 2004. [ signed ] The President of the ECB Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: The law on which the ECB was consulted concerned the formal merger of the two bodies into one authority. The scope of its non-ESCB related tasks remained to be formally defined in the draft Financial Supervision Act. The draft merger act is currently being discussed in Parliament.

text: Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 March 2000 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions, OJ L 126, 26.5.2000, p. 1. 4 Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 September 2000 on the taking up, pursuit of and prudential supervision of the business of electronic money institutions, OJ L 275, 27.10.2003, p. 39 5 Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on markets in financial instruments amending Council Directives

text: and

text: and Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing

text: Council Directive 93/22/EEC

text: , OJ L 145, 30.4.2004, p. 1.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 7 June 2004 at the request of the Ministry of Finance of the Netherlands on a draft Financial Sector Supervision Act (CON/2004/21)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 7 June 2004 at the request of the Ministry of Finance of the Netherlands on a draft Financial Sector Supervision Act (

text: 1. On 6 May 2004 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Ministry of Finance of the Netherlands for an opinion on the Voorstel Wet op het financieel toezicht (draft Financial Sector Supervision Act – hereinafter the ‘draft act’).

text: 2. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on the third, fifth and sixth indents of

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft act concerns national central banks (NCBs), payment and settlement systems and rules applicable to financial institutions in so far as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 3. Previously De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) was in charge of supervising credit institutions and investment firms, while the Pensions and Insurance Supervisory Authority Foundation (PVK) was in charge of supervising insurance companies and pension funds and the Authority for Financial Markets (AFM, previously STE) was in charge of supervising securities firms and markets. Under the new functional model introduced by the draft act, DNB and the PVK after being merged under the name DNB will be responsible for prudential supervision of the entire financial sector. The AFM will be responsible for conduct of business supervision and will focus on ensuring orderly and transparent financial market processes, clear relationships between market entities and that consumers are treated with due care. The reforms proposed in the Parliamentary report are being implemented in two phases. The first phase involved adapting certain regulations and concluding covenants between the two supervisors to redistribute their respective supervisory responsibilities. This phase was completed in September 2002. In the second phase other laws will be amended to take account of this new situation. The first legal act to be proposed in this phase is the proposed law on provisions concerning the merger of DNB and the PVK, on which the ECB was consulted in October 2003 (

text: ) . The ECB refers to this opinion with regard to the statements made on DNB’s role in prudential supervision and protecting the quality of supervision while reducing administrative costs. In the current opinion the ECB addresses only issues raised by the section of the draft act on which it is consulted. The draft act is divided into five sections. Section one sets out general provisions; section two covers prudential supervision; section three deals with market conduct supervision; section four concerns infrastructure supervision; and section five contains final and transitional provisions. Section two assigns responsibility for prudential supervision to DNB whereas responsibility for market conduct supervision is assigned to AFM under section three. Under section four infrastructure supervision is a shared competence of both DNB and the AFM. The current consultation of the ECB relates only to section one.

text: 4. The ECB welcomes the fact that, having thoroughly considered the different approaches adopted in other Member States and elsewhere, the Dutch authorities have adopted a functional division of labour with regard to supervising the financial sector. In particular, the draft act envisages allocating regulatory and supervisory tasks on the basis of the functional approach as follows: DNB will be responsible for safeguarding financial stability and for the prudential regulation and supervision of the entire financial sector, while the AFM will be responsible for conduct of business supervision as described above. This allocation of tasks demonstrates a very good understanding of current financial system developments and addresses the supervision of this changing market effectively, fully acknowledging DNB’s essential role in promoting the safety and soundness of financial institutions and the stability of the financial system as a whole. The ECB welcomes the proposed institutional framework, in particular in so far as it pursues a functional model that organises the instruments and responsibilities of financial regulation and supervision around the two primary public objectives in this area, namely that: (i) DNB is mandated with a clear financial stability objective and entrusted with extensive supervisory responsibilities over individual financial institutions; and (ii) the AFM is entrusted with the main task of market conduct supervision. The new structure acknowledges the growing importance of financial groups that provide different types of financial services. In order to address the specific prudential concerns related to such groups and ensure an overall level playing field among competing intermediaries, an effective coordination between the supervisory policies and regulation in all sectors of financial activity is also required. From the ECB’s perspective, this approach recognises the distinct character of the two goals of financial stability and investor protection, taking into account that the nature and scope of systemic risk is widening due to the closer links between credit institutions, insurance companies, investment firms and pension funds. At the same time, it should be noted that financial stability and investor protection are complementary objectives and must be pursued consistently by the authorities to which they are entrusted, with both authorities acting in close cooperation.

text: 5. The ECB notes as a matter of general concern that the Minister of Finance’s influence over the supervisory authorities is increased. The ECB welcomes the fact that supervisors are to be held accountable for their actions, as this will enhance their efforts to maintain the highest possible standards of supervision. The ECB understands that the role of the Minister will continue to be based on the principle of ‘supervision at a distance’. This principle guarantees relative autonomy to the supervisors, implying that the Minister of Finance will only carry out an investigation into the Act’s adequacy or the way in which the supervisor implements or has implemented it where his ‘at a distance’ responsibility requires it. The Minister of Finance monitors the exercise of the supervision and must be able to form a correct assessment of the manner in which the supervisor implements or has implemented the law. However, it should be acknowledged that such accountability cannot apply to DNB’s ESCB-related functions. While it is recognised that the draft act in no way intends to affect these tasks, nevertheless, the ECB would welcome an explicit statement regarding the scope of this important principle. Furthermore, a similar qualification could usefully be introduced in

text: Article 1(2)

text: (1) of the draft act.

text: 6. A number of important general definitions will be provided in

text: Article 1(1)

text: (a) of section one. The list of definitions is currently incomplete. The ECB notes that the explanatory memorandum states that only where definitions under the draft act need to differ from definitions provided in other legal acts will they be defined in the draft act. The ECB underlines that that all terms and definitions, e.g. electronic money, branch office, qualified holding and credit institution, should be in line with those already existing in EU Regulations or Directives such as, inter alia, the 3 4 Consolidated Banking Directive , the E-money Directive and the Directive on Markets in Financial Instruments .

text: 7. Article 1(2) of section one details the budgetary framework for the supervisory bodies under the draft act. The draft act requires both supervisory bodies to submit their budgets, where these concern the supervisory tasks undertaken in accordance with sections two to four, to the Minister of Finance for approval. It should be noted that the 1998 European Monetary Institute (EMI) Convergence Report states that where third parties, in particular the Government, are in a position, directly or indirectly, to exercise influence on the determination of an NCB’s budget, the relevant statutory provisions should contain a safeguard clause that this does not impede the proper performance of the NCB’s ESCB-related tasks. The ECB considers it essential that approval from the Minister is restricted to the budget for prudential supervision tasks and would recommend including wording that specifically excludes approval of the budget for ESCB-related tasks of DNB. Under

text: Article 1(2)

text: (l) the Minister of Finance has the authority to request any information required to assess the feasibility of general policy intentions and draft legal provisions, where these relate to the supervision to be carried out by the supervisor in accordance with the draft act. The ECB notes that a similar provision exists in current financial supervisory legislation. The ECB understands that this provision does not apply to DNB’s ESCB-related tasks. Indeed, Article 18(2) of the Bank Act 1998 already lays down DNB’s obligation to provide information to the Minister of Finance when so requested. However, here the obligation is qualified by the need to take into account the relevant provisions of the Treaty and the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank.

text: Article 1(2)

text: (h) of section one requires any proposed amendment to the Statutes of the supervisory authorities be submitted to the Minister of Finance for prior consent. The current wording of this provision is incompatible with Article 108 of the Treaty in so far as it concerns DNB. Under Article 108 of the Treaty, when exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties conferred upon it by the Treaty and the ESCB/ECB Statute, neither an NCB nor any members of its decision-making bodies will seek or take instructions from, inter alia, any government of a Member State or from any other body. The ECB recognises that the Government will be involved in any proposed amendment to DNB’s Statute in its capacity as sole shareholder in DNB. However, this Article should not extend to amendments to provisions of DNB’s Statute that concern DNB’s ESCB-related tasks or both its ESCB-related and non-ESCB-related tasks.

text: 9. The ECB understands that the provisions on international cooperation and confidentiality will provide that DNB may cooperate with other third country supervisors and pass on information on the basis of reciprocity, if all other conditions are met. The ECB understands that these provisions will be interpreted in accordance with the relevant provision of DNB’s Statute and the Bank Act 1998, which ensure compliance with DNB’s obligations under the Treaty and the ESCB/ECB Statute. The ECB notes that the draft

text: article 1(5)

text: (1)(f) would allow DNB and the AFM to exchange confidential information with the ECB, a foreign central bank or other foreign institution, to the extent that this is conducive to fulfilling the ECB’s, a foreign central bank’s or other foreign institution’s ‘monetary task’. The drafting of the latter part of this Article appears to be insufficiently comprehensive. This term ‘monetary task’ could be narrowly interpreted as excluding the ECB’s and EU NCBs’ tasks in the field of ‘the smooth operation of payment systems’ and contributions ‘to the smooth conduct of policies pursued by the competent authorities relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system’. To ensure an optimal exchange of information in this area the ECB would recommend redrafting

text: Article 1(5)

text: (1)(f) so that it includes an explicit reference to all ‘ESCB-related tasks’.

text: 10. The ECB notes that due to the individual drafting schedules for the five sections of the draft act, it is not possible at this stage to provide a comprehensive opinion on the full scope of the restructuring of the supervisory framework. The ECB looks forward to being able to supplement this opinion when it is consulted on the other sections.

text: 11. The ECB confirms that it has no objection to the competent national authorities making this opinion publicly available at their discretion. This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website six months after the date of its adoption. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 7 June 2004. [signed] The President of the ECB Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: Published on the Commission’s website at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/finances/mobil/clearing/ index.htm. 3 ‘Clearing and Settlement in the European Union – The Way Forward’ COM/2004/0312/final, 28 April 2004, published on the Commission’s website at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/finances/ mobil/clearing/index.htm.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 15 June 2004 at the request of the French Ministry of Economic A (CON/2004/21)ffairs, Finance and Industry on certain provisions of a draft order reforming transferable securities issued by joint-stock companies (CON/2004/22)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 15 June 2004 at the request of the French Ministry of Economic Affairs, Finance and Industry on certain provisions of a draft order reforming transferable securities issued by joint-stock companies (

text: 1. On 1 April 2004 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the French Ministry of Economic Affairs, Finance and Industry for an opinion on certain provisions of a draft order (ordonnance) reforming transferable securities issued by joint-stock companies (hereinafter the ‘provisions of the draft order’).

text: 2. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on the fifth and sixth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the provisions of the draft order relate to payment and settlement systems and rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 3. As a whole the draft order aims to simplify and modernise the regime applicable to transferable securities (valeurs mobilières) issued by joint-stock companies. The ECB notes that this reform is principally intended to facilitate the issuance of transferable securities while maintaining legal certainty as regards the applicable regime. The ECB understands that the final Order will amend the relevant provisions of the French Commercial Code. However, this consultation only concerns the two provisions of the draft order clarifying Articles L.431-2 and L.431-3 of the Monetary and Financial Code (hereinafter the ‘Code’). These two Articles of the Code concern rules on the transfer of ownership of financial instruments.

text: 4. The ECB understands that the French Financial Markets Authority (the ‘AMF’) will complement these amendments to the Code by adopting detailed implementing measures in its General Regulation (Règlement Général) (hereinafter the ‘AMF’s General Regulation’). In this respect, the ECB notes that the French authorities intend to consult the ECB on the relevant provisions of the AMF’s General Regulation prior to their adoption. It should, therefore, be stressed that the ECB may review its position as stated in this opinion at a later date once it has comprehensively assessed the implementing measures contained in the AMF’s General Regulation, taken in conjunction with the relevant provisions of the Code (as amended).

text: 5. Article L.431-2 of the Code provides for different rules depending on whether financial instruments are transferred on or outside a regulated market. Under the current regime, in the case of a transaction on a regulated market, the transfer of ownership of financial instruments results from their being credited to the buyer’s account on the date and under the conditions laid down by marketplace rules. For operations outside a regulated market, the Code provides that transfer of ownership results in the irrevocable settlement of the transaction as laid down by the rules governing the functioning of the settlement system. Under the proposed new regime, the transfer of ownership of financial instruments (whether listed or unlisted) would result from their being credited to the buyer’s account, with the date and the conditions being laid down by the AMF’s General Regulation. The ECB understands that the provisions of the draft order would simplify this dual regime and replace it with a single regime. Furthermore, the ECB notes that the concept of ‘regulated market’/‘outside a regulated market’ would disappear from Article L.431-2 of the Code.

text: 6. The ECB welcomes the French authorities’ aim of simplifying the existing transfer of ownership regimes for financial instruments and trusts that the provisions of the draft order will further the continuing integration of clearing and settlement arrangements in the European Union (EU). In the ECB’s view, the effectiveness of transfers and the finality of transfers as a result of book-entry debits and credits made within systems are crucial to reduce uncertainty and systemic risk. The ECB assumes that future implementation measures to be included in the AMF’s General Regulation, will take full account of these matters, in particular to ensure the finality and irrevocability of transfers of ownership in financial instruments within a system. As mentioned in paragraph 5, Article L.431-2 of the Code makes it clear that the transfer of ownership of financial instruments is effected when the buyer’s account is credited; however, the date and the conditions of the transfer will be defined in the AMF’s General Regulation. In this respect it would be advisable to ensure specifically that the rules relating to the point in time when securities are credited on an account and the value date for such transfer should not give rise to legal uncertainty that could undermine the smooth operation of securities settlement systems, raising potential systemic concerns.

text: 7. By way of exception from the general rule regarding transfer of ownership, Article L.431-2 of the Code provides that the AMF’s General Regulation may, under certain conditions, lay down specific conditions for the transfer of ownership of financial instruments. The ECB understands this provision as meaning that when irrevocable settlement occurs on a real-time basis within a settlement system for financial instruments, a specific regime for the transfer of ownership may be laid down in the AMF’s General Regulation. The ECB notes in this respect that this specific regime, as mentioned above, will be subject to ECB consultation and should further clarify the scope of the exception provided for in the fourth paragraph of Article L.431-2 of the Code. The ECB also notes that the ownership rights of intermediaries where a purchaser of financial instruments has not paid the transaction price are not affected by the proposed amendments of the Code.

text: 8. The ECB understands that the provisions of the draft order concern the following financial instruments: shares, debt instruments, UCITS units and any equivalent financial instruments issued under foreign laws, when they are admitted to the operations of a central securities depository or delivered within a settlement system for financial instruments. In addition, the first paragraph of Article L.431-2 of the Code refers to the settlement systems for financial instruments ‘mentioned in Article L.330-1’ of the Code. For the sake of clarity, the ECB would propose replacing the words ‘mentioned in Article L.330-1’ with the words ‘as defined in Article L.330-1’. The ECB understands in this respect that the definition provided for in Article L.330-1 of the Code covers both systems operating under French law and systems operating under the law of a Member State of the European Economic Area.

text: 9. More generally, the ECB would like to emphasise that it is fundamental to the functioning and creation of a safe, efficient and integrated EU clearing and settlement infrastructure to have clear rules regarding transfer of ownership in the context of securities clearing and settlement systems, applicable to financial instruments held with central securities depositories. The ECB is of the view that this objective, as highlighted in the Second Report on EU Clearing and Settlement Arrangements published by the Giovannini Group in April 2003 , and, more recently, in the Commission’s Communication to the Council and the European Parliament regarding clearing and settlement in the EU , should be considered when elaborating any new domestic legislation in this area.

text: 10. The ECB confirms that it has no objection to the competent national authorities making this opinion publicly available at their discretion. This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website six months after the date of its adoption. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 15 June 2004. [signed] The President of the ECB Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: nd 1 Entwurf einer Zweiundsechzigsten Verordnung zur Änderung der Außenwirtschaftsverordnung (A draft 62 regulation amending the Foreign Trade and Payments Regulation). 2 OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 18 June 2004 at the request of the German Federal Ministry of Economics and Labour on a draft regulation amending the Foreign Trade and Payments Regulation (CON/2004/23)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 18 June 2004 at the request of the German Federal Ministry of Economics and Labour on a draft regulation amending the Foreign Trade and Payments Regulation (

text: 1. On 1 June 2004, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the German Ministry of Economics and Labour for an opinion on a draft regulation amending the German Foreign Trade and Payments Regulation (hereinafter the ‘draft regulation’).

text: 2. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on the fourth indent of

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft regulation relates to the collection, compilation and distribution of monetary, financial, banking, payment systems and balance of payments statistics. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 3. The draft regulation amends the Foreign Trade and Payments Regulation, which deals with reporting requirements in relation to cross-border transactions between residents and non-residents. The ECB understands that the proposed amendments result, inter alia, from the following: – changes to the Deutsche Bundesbank’s organisational structure, – the need to comply with internationally used terms and definitions and the data requirements of the ECB, the European Commission and the OECD, – the introduction of a new reporting form for transactions in securities and financial derivatives, and – the need to ease reporting via central reporting points in companies and the use of electronic reporting procedures.

text: 4. The ECB welcomes the initiative in adjusting the sector classification of reporting agents. The application of the harmonised classification of ‘Monetary Financial Institutes’ (MFIs) to German reporting requirements will improve the consistency of information used for euro area aggregates.

text: 5. The ECB also welcomes the use in German legislation of International Securities Identification Numbers (ISIN). The use of these internationally accepted identification numbers will enable the German authorities to implement an efficient statistical reporting system in the area of balance of payments and the international investment position based on the collection of information on individual securities. The use of internationally accepted securities identification numbers will be required for compiling statistics on euro area balance of payments and the international investment position on a security-by-security basis.

text: 6. Additionally, the ECB particularly welcomes the adaptation of reporting requirements in the area of direct investment statistics to permit the use of the valuation principles required for compiling euro area international investment position statistics.

text: 7. The ECB confirms that it has no objection to the competent national authorities making this opinion publicly available at their discretion. This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website six months after the date of its adoption. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 18 June 2004. [signed] The President of the ECB Jean-Claude TRICHET


title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 8 July 2004 at the request of the Oesterreichische Nationalbank on a draft regulation on the collection of statistics concerning imports and exports of services (CON/2004/24)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 8 July 2004 at the request of the Oesterreichische Nationalbank on a draft regulation on the collection of statistics concerning imports and exports of services (

text: 1. On 9 June 2004, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Oesterreichische Nationalbank (OeNB) for an opinion on a draft regulation of the OeNB on the collection of statistics concerning imports and exports of services (Verordnung der Oesterreichischen Nationalbank betreffend statistische Erhebungen über die Importe und Exporte von Dienstleistungen) (hereinafter the ‘draft regulation’).

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: 3. The draft regulation will form part of the new reporting system in Austria in the area of balance of payments and international investment position statistics (hereinafter ‘cross-border statistics’) and reflects a general change from indirect reporting by the banking sector of cross-border payments to a system that relies predominantly on direct reporting by resident legal entities that conduct crossborder transactions. The reporting requirements cover the services that reporting agents provide to or receive from non-residents. The ECB notes that notwithstanding the proposed changes, the Austrian reporting system will have the following features: (a) The geographical classification of transactions with non-residents is in accordance with the geographical breakdown requested by the ECB and will thus allow the OeNB to continue to contribute data to euro area cross-border statistics. (b) The reporting population of resident legal entities is defined by means of thresholds relating to number of employees or turnover, allowing a sample-based estimation of the services provided to or received from non-residents. The definition of reporting population is sufficiently wide to cover all legal entities resident in Austria from which statistical data need to be collected to enable precise euro area cross-border statistics to continue to be compiled. (c) The scope of services covered will continue to allow different types of transactions to be recorded comprehensively in an adequately structured form. This will continue to enable Austria to contribute precise data to euro area statistics on cross-border services and compensation of employees.

text: 4. The ECB welcomes the initiative of adjusting the reporting system in Austria, which, whilst reducing the reporting burden falling on the banking sector and financial intermediaries, should ensure the quality of the data contributed to euro area cross-border statistics.

text: 5. The ECB notes that the draft regulation allows the OeNB to entrust data collection in the area of balance of payments to third parties. The ECB does not object in principle to the OeNB outsourcing specific data collection activities, provided certain legal requirements are met. In particular, the OeNB must retain full responsibility for all such activities, including the transmission of all relevant data to the ECB. The OeNB must also be able to check whether reporting agents are complying with its own and thereby with the ECB’s statistical reporting requirements. As far as reporting requirements vis-à-vis the ECB are concerned, any cooperation between the OeNB and other competent authorities in Austria is subject to the requirements laid down in Guideline ECB/2003/7 of 2 May 2003 on the statistical reporting requirements of the European Central Bank in the field of balance of payments and international investment position statistics and the international reserves template . The ECB invites the OeNB to consult the ECB on any agreement that the OeNB concludes in this context regarding the outsourcing of data collection activities.

text: 6. The ECB confirms that it has no objection to the competent national authorities making this opinion publicly available at their discretion. This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website six months after the date of its adoption. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 8 July 2004. [signed] The President of the ECB Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: OJ L 193, 18.7.1983, p. 1. Directive as last amended by Directive

text: (OJ L 178, 17.7.2003, p. 16). 3 OJ L 141, 11.6.1993, p. 1. Directive as last amended by Directive

text: (OJ L 145, 30.4.2004, p. 1).

text: OJ L 126, 26.5.2000, p. 5. Directive as last amended by Directive

text: (OJ L 145, 30.4.2004, p. 1).

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 30 July 2004 at the request of the Estonian Ministry of Finance on a draft law amending the Credit Institutions Act and the Commercial Code and a draft law on e-money institutions (CON/2004/25)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 30 July 2004 at the request of the Estonian Ministry of Finance on a draft law amending the Credit Institutions Act and the Commercial Code and a draft law on e-money institutions (

text: 1. On 18 June 2004 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Estonian Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft law amending the Credit Institutions Act and the Commercial Code and a draft law on e-money institutions (hereinafter the ‘draft laws’).

text: 2. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on the second, fifth and sixth indents of

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft laws contain provisions concerning means of payment, payment and settlement systems and rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 3. The ECB notes that the draft law amending the Credit Institutions Act and the Commercial Code will transpose the following Community directives into Estonian law: the Seventh

text: Council Directive 83/349/EEC of 13 June 1983

text: based on the

text: Article 54(3)

text: (g) of the Treaty on consolidated accounts , as far as credit institutions are concerned;

text: Council Directive 93/6/EEC of 15 March 1993

text: on the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions ; Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 March 2000 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions ; and Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 April 2001 on the reorganisation and winding up of credit institutions . Further, the draft law on e-money institutions will transpose the following Community directives into Estonian law: Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 September 2000 amending Directive

text: relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions and Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 September 2000 on the taking up, pursuit of and prudential supervision of the business of electronic money institutions . 4. Pursuant to

text: Article 1(2) of Decision 98/415/EC

text: , Member States do not have to consult the ECB on the transposition of Community directives into national law. On this occasion therefore, the Estonian Ministry of Finance was not legally obliged to consult the ECB formally regarding the draft laws. While the ECB notes that the competent authority for verifying the transposition of Community directives into national law is the Commission, the ECB nevertheless welcomes the opportunity to deliver its opinion on the draft laws in as far they fall under one or more of its fields of competence.

text: 5. The ECB supports the transposition of the Community directives listed above into Estonian law, as this will enhance the existing supervisory framework in Estonia. However, the ECB would like to draw attention to the following specific issue in relation to the draft law on e-money institutions. Directive

text: defines e-money institutions as ‘credit institutions’. In Estonia, credit institutions are, as a rule, regulated by Eesti Pank which issues decrees and adopts regulations, while it is the Estonian Minister of Finance who regulates the rest of the financial sector. Articles 37(8), 39(4), 44(5) and 45(2) of the draft law on e-money institutions, which provide for the Minister of Finance to adopt regulations in relation to e-money institutions, are therefore not coherent with this principle. The existence of separate regulatory authorities creates a risk of applying different regulations on the same subject to credit institutions, which could undermine financial stability and payment systems in Estonia.

text: 6. The ECB would furthermore like to draw attention to the fact that central banks’ traditional focus on systemic risk, together with their knowledge of money and securities markets and market infrastructures and their function in the oversight of payment and settlement systems, place them in a unique position to identify threats to the stability of the financial system. In this context, given that e-money is a means of payment and that ensuring financial stability is one of the tasks Eesti Pank has to perform under Article 2(4) of the Eesti Pank Act, and taking into account that Article 65 of the Government of the Republic Act does not provide for the Ministry of Finance to have the power to adopt regulations in relation to credit institutions, the power to adopt regulations in relation to e-money institutions should now be entrusted to Eesti Pank alone.

text: 7. The ECB confirms that it has no objection to the competent national authorities making this opinion publicly available at their discretion. This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 30 July 2004. [ signed ] The President of the ECB Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: [To be published in the Official Journal of the European Union.]

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 30 July 2004 at the request of the Oesterreichische Nationalbank on a draft regulation of the Oesterreichische Nationalbank governing balance of payments reporting with the exception of services and transfers (CON/2004/26)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 30 July 2004 at the request of the Oesterreichische Nationalbank on a draft regulation of the Oesterreichische Nationalbank governing balance of payments reporting with the exception of services and transfers (

text: 1. On 9 June 2004, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Oesterreichische Nationalbank (OeNB) for an opinion on a draft regulation of the OeNB governing balance of payments reporting with the exception of services and transfers (Meldeverordnung ZABIL 1/2004 der Oesterreichischen Nationalbank) (hereinafter the ‘draft regulation’).

text: 2. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on the fourth indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft regulation relates to the collection, compilation and distribution of monetary, financial, banking, payment systems and balance of payments statistics. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 3. The reporting requirements defined in the draft regulation cover transactions that reporting agents undertake and positions that they hold vis-à-vis non-residents, related income as well as transfers of assets between residents and non-residents entered in the capital account. The draft regulation will form part of the new reporting system in Austria in the area of balance of payments and international investment position statistics (hereinafter ‘cross-border statistics’), and reflects a general change to a system that relies predominantly on direct reporting by resident legal entities that conduct cross-border transactions. Nevertheless, indirect reporting by custodians also forms an integral part of the new system.

text: 4. The ECB welcomes the initiative of adjusting the reporting system in Austria, which, whilst reducing the reporting burden falling on the banking sector and financial intermediaries, should ensure the quality of the data contributed to euro area cross-border statistics.

text: 5. Moreover, the ECB welcomes the fact that the OeNB collects and compiles cross-border statistics in a manner compliant with the responsibilities of national central banks as set out in Guideline ECB/2004/15 of 16 July 2004 on the statistical reporting requirements of the European Central Bank in the field of balance of payments and international investment position statistics and the international reserves template , and in particular

text: Article 4.2

text: thereof.

text: 6. The ECB also welcomes the provision in Austrian legislation for the use of International Securities Identification Numbers (ISIN). The use of such internationally accepted securities identification numbers will be required for compiling statistics on euro area balance of payments and the international investment position on a security-by-security basis. In this context, the ECB specifically acknowledges the assignment of a standard ‘internal’ identifier where no ISIN code is available.

text: 7. The ECB confirms that it has no objection to the competent national authorities making this opinion publicly available at their discretion. This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website six months after the date of its adoption. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 30 July 2004. [signed] The President of the ECB Jean-Claude TRICHET