text: The proposed amendments affect the Law of 29 July 2005 on trading in financial instruments (Dz.U. 2005, No 183, Item 1538, as amended), the Law of 29 July 2005 on public offerings and the conditions for admitting financial instruments into the organised system of trading and on public companies (Dz.U. 2005, No 184, Item 1539, as amended) and the Law of 24 May 2004 on investment funds (Dz.U. 2004, No 146, Item 1546, as amended).

text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 3 Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on markets in financial instruments amending Council Directives

text: and

text: and Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing

text: Council Directive 93/22/EEC

text: (OJ L 145, 30.4.2004, p. 1). Directive as last amended by Directive

text: (OJ L 114, 27.4.2006, p. 60).

text: The proposed reformulation of the definition follows the wording developed by the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), as most recently referred to in ‘Payment and settlement systems in selected countries’, April 2003, p. 485; publication available on the Bank for International Settlements’ website at www.bis.org. Cf. European Central Bank, ‘Payment and securities settlement systems in the European Union’, June 2001, pp. 729 and 749; publication available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.int. 12 Cf. European Central Bank, ‘Business continuity oversight expectations for systematically important payment systems (SIPS)’, June 2006, p. 13; publication available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.int. 13

text: Article 68

text: a(11) of the Law on trading in financial instruments, as added by Article 1(35) of the draft law. 14 January 2004, p. 17. Report available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.int. 15 To that end,

text: Article 68

text: a(1)-(2) of the Law on trading in financial instruments (as amended by Article 1(35) of the draft law) should make reference to the relevant provisions of Article 48 of the Law on trading in financial instruments (as amended by Article 1(26) of the draft law).

text: See

text: Article 48(1)

text: (6) of the Law on trading in financial instruments (as amended by Article 1(26) of the draft law), in conjunction with Articles 133-146 of the Law on trading in financial instruments (as amended by

text: Article 1(86)

text: -(91) of the draft law). 17

text: Article 68

text: c(2) and (3) of the Law on trading in financial instruments, as added by Article 1(35) of the draft law. 18 Article 5(2) of the Law of 21 July 2006 on supervision of the financial market (Dz.U. 2006, No 157, Item 1119). 19 Articles 50(2) and 66(2) of the Law on trading in financial instruments, as amended by

text: Article 1(28)

text: and (32) of the draft law. 20

text: Articles 68

text: a(4) and 68c(1) of the Law on trading in financial instruments, as added by Article 1(35) of the draft law. 21 See paragraphs 4.1-4.3 of ECB Opinion

text: of 9 March 2006 at the request of the Polish Minister of Finance on a draft law on the supervision of financial institutions.

text: Cf. paragraph 3.2 of ECB Opinion

text: of 25 April 2006 on the Dutch draft law concerning financial sector supervision and ECB Opinion CON/99/19 of 20 January 2000 at the request of the Luxembourg Ministry for the Treasury and the Budget on a draft legislative proposal implementing Directive

text: on settlement finality in payment and securities settlement systems in the law of 5 April 1993, as amended, relating to the financial sector and completing the law of 23 December 1998 creating a commission in charge of the prudential supervision of the financial sector; cf. BIS Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, ‘Central Bank Oversight of Payment and Settlement Systems’, May 2005, p. 1; publication available on the BIS website at www.bis.org. 23

text: Article 45

text: e(1) of the Law on trading in financial instruments, as added by Article 1(24) of the draft law. 24 Article 15(2) of Law of 24 August 2001 on settlement finality in the payment and settlement systems and on the supervision of such systems (Dz.U. 2001, No 123, Item 1351, as amended), as amended by Article 3(3) of the draft law. The provisions implement Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 1998 on settlement finality in payment and securities settlement systems (OJ L 166, 11.6.1998, p. 45). 25 To be included in Article 16(2) of the Law on settlement finality, as amended by Article 3(4) of the draft law.

text: Article 1(70)

text: -(73) of the draft law, amending Articles 111-113 of the Law on trading in financial instruments. 27 See the explanatory memorandum to the draft law, p. 7. 28 Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions (recast) (OJ L 177, 30.6.2006, p. 1). 29 The following provisions of MiFID apply to credit institutions: (i) Article

text: and

text: ; (ii) Chapter II of Title II, excluding the second subparagraph of

text: Article 23(2)

text: ; (iii) Chapter III of Title II, excluding

text: Articles 31(2)

text: to 31(4) and 32(2) to 32(6), 32(8) and 32(9); (iv)

text: Articles 48

text: to 53, 57, 61 and 62; and (v)

text: Article 71(1)

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 16 November 2006 at the request of the Polish Minister for Finance on a draft law amending the Law on trading in financial instruments (CON/2006/53)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 16 November 2006 at the request of the Polish Minister for Finance on a draft law amending the Law on trading in financial instruments (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 29 September 2006 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Polish Minister for Finance for an opinion on a number of draft laws amending Polish laws in the area of capital markets regulation . The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Article 105(4) of the Treaty establishing the European Community and the third, fifth and sixth indents of

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft laws relate to Narodowy Bank Polski (NBP), payment and settlement systems and rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Scope of the consultation and purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The aim of the draft laws is to transpose a number of Community directives into the Polish legal system and to make certain other amendments that do not directly relate to implementation requirements. 1.2 This opinion is limited to one of the draft laws submitted for consultation, namely the draft law amending the Law on trading in financial instruments (hereinafter the ‘draft law’), which implements the Directive on markets in financial instruments (MiFID) and the Capital Adequacy

text: Directive . Furthermore, this opinion is limited to those provisions of the draft law that do not directly relate to the implementation of Community directives. Such provisions of the draft law primarily involve: (i) the introduction of a system for licensing and supervising the entities operating in the field of securities clearing and settlement ; and (ii) the streamlining of supervisory requirements for banks conducting brokerage activities .

text: 2. Provisions relating to securities clearing and settlement

text: 2.1 Currently, the sole securities clearing and settlement operators in Poland are: (i) the state-controlled National Depository for Securities (Krajowy Depozyt Papierów Wartościowych, KDPW) ; and (ii) NBP, for certain types of securities . The draft law proposes to introduce a system of licensing and supervision for other clearing and settlement operators in Poland. This proposal relates indirectly to the requirements laid down in

text: Article 34(2)

text: and Article 46 of MiFID, which effectively allow the Polish operators of regulated securities markets and participants in such markets to designate qualified entities established in other Member States as providers of clearing and settlement services. Under the current Polish regime, such designation could only relate to KDPW or clearing and settlement operators established in Member States other than Poland. As a result of the proposed amendments, it will be possible for new clearing and settlement operators to be established in Poland and be designated as providers of clearing and settlement services . KDPW will remain exclusively entitled to register the securities and to act as the central securities depository. 2.2 The ECB welcomes this proposal to broaden the category of entities entitled to offer clearing and settlement services in Poland and makes a number of comments below on the specific provisions of the draft law in this regard. 2.3 Definition of clearing and settlement services The ECB recommends adding certain new elements in the definitions of clearing and settlement services proposed by the draft law : (i) The definition of ‘clearing’ in the current version of the draft law includes the phrase ‘determining the value of monetary and non-monetary obligations resulting from the 4 Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 on the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions (recast) (OJ L 177, 30.6.2006, p. 201). 5

text: Article 1(22)

text: -(35) of the draft law. 6

text: Article 1(70)

text: -(73) of the draft law. 7 KDPW is owned in equal parts by the State Treasury, the Warsaw Stock Exchange and NBP. 8 NBP may register and settle transactions in securities (i) issued by itself or by the State Treasury; or (ii) incorporating derivative rights based on such securities (Article 49 of the Law on trading in financial instruments; cf.

text: Article 45

text: c of the Law on trading in financial instruments following the amendments introduced by Article 1(24) of the draft law). 9 Cf. the explanatory memorandum to the draft law, p. 2. 10

text: Article 45

text: b of the Law on trading in financial instruments, as added by Article 1(24) of the draft law.

text: transactions entered into [by the parties]’. The definition should be expanded to include essential elements such as transmitting, reconciling and, in some cases, confirming payment or securities transfer orders prior to settlement, possibly including the netting of orders and the establishment of final positions for settlement . (ii) The definition of ‘settlement’ in the current version of the draft law includes the phrase ‘debiting or crediting the [securities] deposit account or securities account … in connection with, respectively, disposal or acquisition of financial instruments, as well as debiting or crediting the bank account specified by the clearing participant, with the relevant values of liabilities determined as part of the clearing’. This definition should also reflect the purpose of securities settlement as the final step in a transaction or in the processing within a transfer system, the aim of which is to discharge participants from their obligations through the transfer of securities and/or funds . 2.4 Operation of securities clearing and settlement The draft law allows a single entity to provide both clearing and settlement services . Although the draft law does not specifically mention central counterparty (CCP) clearing services, in relation to any case where CCP clearing services and settlement services are provided by the same legal entity, which bears the credit risk, the ECB confirms the validity of remarks made in its report entitled ‘Assessment of accession countries’ securities settlement systems’ : ‘for the sake of financial stability, a [securities settlement system (SSS)] ought as far as possible to be designed as a service provider free of credit risk. The most effective way to ensure a credit risk-free environment is the establishment of distinct legal entities to manage the risk of securities clearing and securities settlement. The idea is to create a legal structure which prevents any spillover of risks from the entity providing CCP services to the entity providing SSS services. This may also take the form of a holding structure with the CCP and SSS as affiliates, provided that the SSS’s own capital remains unaffected if the CCP defaults’. 2.5 The draft law lists in detail KDPW’s tasks relating to ensuring the proper operation of the clearing and settlement process. The ECB recommends that such tasks should also apply to other system operators which may be established in Poland . Relevant clarification may also be needed to

text: ensure the proper functioning of the investor compensation scheme, as currently administered by KDPW in addition to its clearing and settlement tasks . 2.6 The amended provisions of the Law on trading in financial instruments should require that in order to mitigate operational risk the system operator should include rules on business continuity measures and secondary sites as a prerequisite for obtaining a licence. Such measures should in particular include: (i) contingency procedures to ensure the sustainability of critical functions, particularly in the event of disruption of the telecommunications network; (ii) arrangements for information dissemination in the event of a crisis; and (iii) other business continuity arrangements, including a second processing site with independent critical infrastructure components to those used at the primary site. Applicant operators should be expected to have a well-defined business continuity strategy in place, including plausible risk scenarios. At the same time, appropriate arrangements for business continuity training for the staff of system operators and system participants should be ensured. Business continuity processes and test results should be subject to periodic updates and security reviews by auditors. 2.7 Supervision and insolvency protection NBP’s supervisory role is currently exercised in relation to KDPW through: (i) the participation of an NBP representative in the authority supervising clearing and settlement systems (the Financial Supervision Commission) ; and (ii) NBP holding a substantial share in KDPW’s registered capital, allowing NBP to exercise control pursuant to the relevant corporate law provisions (such as representation on KDPW’s supervisory board). The draft law retains and even strengthens NBP’s position in relation to KDPW in this respect, inter alia by introducing a requirement to obtain the NBP President’s opinion in relation to proposed changes to KDPW’s rules and the rules of the settlement guarantee fund . 2.8 The ECB further notes that NBP’s supervisory role in relation to other clearing and settlement systems which may be established in Poland will obviously be limited to public supervisory powers (as opposed to rights stemming from the ownership of shares). The ECB therefore welcomes the NBP’s President’s power to issue an opinion: (i) before a licence for operating a system is granted; and (ii) before the system rules are adopted or amended . Such powers will not, however, be sufficient to maintain the level of supervisory powers currently exercised by NBP in relation to KDPW. Hence, the ECB reiterates the observation made in ECB Opinion

text: regarding

text: the need to ensure NBP’s responsibility for the oversight function in relation to securities clearing and settlement. An oversight function is inherent in the central banks’ task of promoting a sound market infrastructure, in order to safeguard the effectiveness of monetary policy and the overall stability of the financial system . Hence, the ECB recommends that NBP is expressly made responsible for the oversight of all securities clearing and settlement systems operating in Poland, including the systems’ rules, and given access to all information and data relevant to the performance of such oversight tasks. 2.9 The non-exhaustive list of insolvency-related measures that, under the terms of the draft law, do not affect the ability to pay or transfer securities should include an express reference to moratoria on payments imposed on supervised entities by the supervisory authority. The ECB further understands that such insolvency-related measures have no effect on either instruments or cash held as collateral in the accounts of the affected participant with the system, and this should be clarified in the draft law. 2.10 The ECB notes the amendments introduced by the draft law into the Law on settlement finality, which implements the Settlement Finality Directive in Poland . The amended provisions of the Law on settlement finality should expressly cover clearing systems as well as settlement systems. The main aim of expressly extending the settlement finality rules to clearing systems would be to protect the transfer orders and netting that take place in those systems. Further, the Law on settlement finality should make an express reference to the NBP President’s power to issue an opinion before licensing a new settlement system . It would be appropriate for this provision to exclude KDPW, for the sake of clarification, from the duty to apply for such a licence (as, taken literally, the proposed provision could be interpreted as requiring the suspension of KDPW’s activities until an appropriate licence is issued).

text: 3. Provisions relating to banks conducting brokerage activities

text: 3.1 The ECB notes that the draft law also aims to streamline the special supervisory regime relating to banks conducting brokerage activities. The proposed amendment will discontinue the two sets of separate supervisory requirements applied in relation to banking and brokerage activities of such

text: banks . This will imply, inter alia: (i) discontinuing the requirement to make initial capital for brokerage activities separate from initial capital for banking activities; (ii) discontinuing the requirement to prepare two sets of separate accounting records and financial statements; and (iii) limiting the capital adequacy requirements for banks conducting brokerage activities to requirements relating to the banking activity of such banks. The explanatory memorandum to the draft law justifies these measures as being consistent with supervisory practice, since banks conducting brokerage activities are subject to rigorous prudential supervision in relation to their banking activity . Hence, rather than increasing the safety of banks’ customers, the current duplicated supervisory functions have been deemed to create unnecessary impediments to banks’ conduct of brokerage activities. The explanatory memorandum further notes that the duplication of supervisory requirements in such cases is not required under Community law. 3.2 The ECB recognises that credit institutions authorised under the Banking Directive should not require another authorisation under MiFID to provide investment services or perform investment activities. When a credit institution decides to provide investment services or perform investment activities, the competent authorities should verify that it complies with the relevant provisions of MiFID before granting an authorisation. 3.3 However, although there is no requirement to obtain a separate authorisation, certain provisions of MiFID still apply to credit institutions when providing one or more investment services or performing investment activities . The streamlining of the capital market supervision of credit institutions conducting brokerage activities does not reduce the need to ensure the proper implementation and application of MiFID provisions relating to credit institutions.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 16 November 2006.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: It should be noted that formally the Rules of Procedure are not covered by

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: . 2 OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 3 Staatsblad 405 of 19 August 2004.

publisher: Europeiska centralbanken

sprak: en

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 7 December 2006 at the request of De Nederlandsche Bank on amendments to its Articles of Association and Rules of Procedure (CON/2006/54)

serie: con

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 7 December 2006 at the request of De Nederlandsche Bank on amendments to its Articles of Association and Rules of Procedure (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

type: rubrik

text: On 20 October 2006 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) for an opinion on amendments to its Articles of Association and Rules of Procedure (hereinafter the ‘draft amendments’) . The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Article 105(4) of the Treaty establishing the European Community and the third indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft amendments concern a national central bank (NCB). In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

type: stycke

text: 1. Purpose of the draft amendments

text: The draft amendments are largely a consequence of the introduction of the Dutch Corporate Governance Code (hereinafter the ‘Code’) by Royal Decree . Although the Code does not formally apply to DNB, DNB’s Governing Board wishes as far as possible to incorporate the basic principles and best practices laid down in the Code into DNB’s Articles of Association and to enhance its corporate governance. Moreover, the merger in 2004 between DNB and the Pensions and Insurance Supervisory Authority Foundation also triggered a number of amendments.

text: 2. Specific observations

text: 2.1 Independence of DNB and government approval of remuneration policies The ECB understands that under Article 10(1) of the amended Articles of Association, the remuneration policy for DNB’s Governing Board is adopted by the general meeting of shareholders, whilst under

text: Article 10(2)

text: it is the Minister for Finance who determines the salaries of the President and the Executive

text: Directors. In this context, the ECB would emphasise that DNB’s remuneration policy should continue to respect the principle of institutional independence.

text: 2.2 Grounds for dismissal for Supervisory Board members

text: Article 11(5) of the amended Articles of Association stipulates that Supervisory Board members may be suspended or dismissed if they no longer fulfil the requirements for carrying out their duties or seriously fail to perform them. However, Article 6(7) of the amended Articles of Association stipulates that these are the ‘only’ grounds for dismissal or suspension of the President and the Executive Directors. For reasons of clarity and legal certainty, the ECB would recommend inserting the word ‘only’ into

text: Article 11(5)

text: between the words ‘may’ and ‘be suspended’, thereby aligning it with

text: Article 6(7)

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 7 December 2006.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET

type: vagledning

utgivare: ecb


text: OJ L 181, 4.7.2001, p. 6. 3 OJ L 139, 11.5.1998, p. 1.

text: OJ L 373, 21.12.2004, p. 1, extended to the non-participating Member States by

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 2183/2004 of 6 December 2004

text: (OJ L 373, 21.12.2004, p. 7).

text: Case 34/73

text: Variola v Amministrazione italiana della Finanze [1973] ECR 981.

text: See

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 1103/97 of 17 June 1997

text: on certain provisions relating to the introduction of the euro (OJ L 162, 19.6.1997, p. 1),

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 974/98 of 3 May 1998

text: on the introduction of the euro (OJ L 139, 11.5.1998, p. 1) and

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 2866/98 of 31 December 1998

text: on the conversion rates between the euro and the currencies of the Member States adopting the euro (OJ L 359 31.12.1998, p. 1), all three of which were amended in 2000 for the introduction of the euro in Greece. See also the Community legislation on euro coins in 1998 and 1999, as well as

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 2169/2005 of 21 December 2005

text: amending

text: Regulation (EC) No 974/98

text: on the introduction of the euro (OJ L 346, 29.12.2005, p. 1).

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 6 December 2006 at the request of the Hungarian Ministry of Finance on a draft law amending Law LVIII of 2001 on Magyar Nemzeti Bank and Law XI of 1987 on legislation (CON/2006/55)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 6 December 2006 at the request of the Hungarian Ministry of Finance on a draft law amending Law LVIII of 2001 on Magyar Nemzeti Bank and Law XI of 1987 on legislation (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 20 October 2006 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Hungarian Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft law amending Law LVIII of 2001 on Magyar Nemzeti Bank (hereinafter the ‘MNB Law’) and Law XI of 1987 on legislation (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB has received two versions, ‘A’ and ‘B’, of the draft law attached to the consultation request. According to the Ministry of Finance, the Government has decided to submit only version ‘A’ of the draft law to the Parliament for adoption, once it has received the ECB’s opinion. As a result, the ECB has examined version ‘A’ of the draft law and this version of the draft law is the basis for the ECB’s opinion. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Article 105(4) of the Treaty establishing the European Community and the second and third indent of

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to means of payment and Magyar Nemzeti Bank (MNB). In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: The draft law aims to: (i) address some of the issues raised in the ECB’s 2004 Convergence Report concerning Hungary and its legislation on MNB; and (ii) amend the rules on banknotes, coins and imitations thereof, including certain new rights and obligations concerning the fight against counterfeiting; and

text: (iii) update certain other provisions related to changes in the Hungarian financial market’s arrangements.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 The ECB welcomes the draft law, as it will improve the compatibility of Hungary’s legislation with the Treaty and update the MNB Law in the light of certain changes in the Hungarian financial market. 2.2 According to the consultation request, the draft law ‘strives to take into consideration fully the recommendations concerning MNB’s institutional and personal independence in the Convergence Report of the European Commission and the European Central Bank in 2004’. The ECB would like to point out that although it is of crucial importance for Hungarian legislation to comply with the Treaty regarding a national central bank’s institutional and personal independence, the ECB’s 2004 Convergence Report highlighted several other issues that have not been addressed by the draft law, such as – with respect to the integration of the MNB into the Eurosystem – the failure to recognise the ECB’s powers in the field of monetary policy or the ECB’s exclusive right to authorise the issue of banknotes within the Community. The ECB also notes that the ECB 2006 Convergence Report is currently under preparation and would recommend that any future amendment to the MNB Law should take the ECB’s 2006 Convergence Report’s assessment into account. 2.3 In view of the fact that the MNB Law has been amended several times in the last few years, the ECB would also like to stress the importance of legal certainty. It is in this regard essential for fundamental legislation regulating the central bank to serve as clear and constant guidance, and overly frequent changes to the central bank legislation may compromise this function.

text: 3. Specific observations

text: 3.1 MNB’s independence 3.1.1 Currently MNB is obliged to obtain the Ministry of Justice’s opinion ex ante on MNB’s basic tasks. The ECB’s 2004 Convergence Report found that this obligation is incompatible with the Treaty’s principle of central bank independence.

text: Article 11(3)

text: and Article 15 of the draft law deletes such obligation, stating that ‘the opinion of the Minister of Justice does not need to be requested concerning the regulations issued by MNB’s Governor’. The ECB welcomes this change, as it further strengthens MNB’s institutional independence. 3.1.2 Concerning the personal independence of members of the Monetary Council and MNB officials, the ECB notes that Article 9(1) of the draft law deletes the reference to the intentional failure to submit a wealth declaration and the intentional disclosure of false data or information in the wealth declaration as a ground for dismissal in the case of the Governor and the Monetary Council members. In this regard, the ECB would like to emphasise that, although making the Governor, the

text: Deputy Governor and members of the Monetary Council, as well as members of the Supervisory Board subject to a requirement to submit a wealth declaration is in principle acceptable, the application of these provisions must take full account of Article 108 of the Treaty and 14.2 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank. Furthermore, with regard to the inability of a member of the Monetary Council to fulfil the conditions required for the performance of their duties as a ground for dismissal, the ECB is of the opinion that the distinction between reasons ‘beyond their control’ and ‘within their control’ in

text: Article 49(10)

text: (a) and (b) should be removed, since NCBs’ statutes should not specify the grounds for dismissal beyond those laid down in Article 14.2 of the Statute. 3.2 Banknotes, coins and imitations 3.2.1 The ECB understands that the draft law does not prejudice the application of

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 1338/2001 of 28 June 2001

text: laying down measures necessary for the protection of the euro against counterfeiting . 3.2.2 With respect to the legal integration of the MNB into the Eurosystem, the ECB recommends that Article 5 of the draft law, which aims to amend Article 31 of the MNB Law, should refer to Article 106 of the Treaty and Article 16 of the Statute. 3.2.3 The ECB also notes that the draft law seems to implement certain provisions of

text: on the introduction of the euro and

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 2182/2004 of 6 December 2004

text: concerning medals and tokens similar to euro coins , which are directly applicable Community law. The concept of direct applicability signifies that regulations and other directly applicable rules of Community law are taken to be part of the national legal systems automatically without the need for separate national legal measures and, according to the Court of Justice of the European Communities, Member States should not pass any measure which purports to transform a Community regulation or any other directly applicable Community rules into national law . 3.3 Other issues 3.3.1 The ECB notes that in spelling the name of the single currency as ‘euró’, the draft law does not comply with the spelling rules for the word ‘euro’. To make the euro’s singleness apparent, Community law requires a single spelling of the word ‘euro’ in the nominative singular case in all

text: Community and national legislative provisions. On the basis of these considerations, and in view of the Community’s exclusive competence to determine the name of the single currency, any deviations from this rule are incompatible with the Treaty and should be corrected. 3.3.2 With respect to the legal integration of the MNB into the Eurosystem, Articles 1 and 11 of the draft law which will amend Article 10(1) of the MNB Law and

text: Article 60(1)

text: (c) of the MNB Law respectively, fail to recognise the ECB’s powers under Article 19 of the Statute and therefore do not remove the incompatibility with Community law. To address such incompatibility, the ECB recommends that the above articles of the draft law refer to the ECB’s powers as specified in Article 19 of the Statute. 3.3.3 The ECB suggests that Article 15 of the draft law should refer to the duty to consult with the ECB in its fields of competence pursuant to Article 105(4) of the Treaty and Article 4 of the Statute.

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions expressly requires Member States to take the measures necessary to ensure compliance with this obligation.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 6 December 2006.

text: [signed]

text: The Vice-President of the ECB

text: Lucas PAPADEMOS


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: OJ L 145, 30.4.2004, p. 1.

text: For a similar legal provision see also ECB Opinion

text: of 3 August 2006 at the request of the Belgian Ministry of Finance on a draft law amending the Organic Statute of the National Bank van België/Banque Nationale de Belgique. 4 See Decisions taken by the Governing Council of the ECB (in addition to decisions setting interest rates) July 2005 and the related press release of 22 July 2005 entitled ‘Eurosystem collateral framework; Inclusion of non-marketable assets in the Single List’, available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.int.

text: For instance, Article L.153-1 inserted in the French Monetary and Financial Code by Act No 2005-842 of 26 July 2005;

text: Article 22

text: .a of Banka Slovenije’s Statute; seventh Additional Provision added to the Law 13/1994 on the autonomy of the Banco de España (Banco de España’s Statute) by Law 22/2005 of 18 November 2005.

text: Council Regulation 2533/98/EC of 23 November 1998

text: concerning the collection of statistical information by the ECB (OJ L 318, 27.11.1998, p. 8).

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 11 December 2006 at the request of the Luxembourg Ministry of Finance on a draft law on markets in financial instruments (CON/2006/56)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 11 December 2006 at the request of the Luxembourg Ministry of Finance on a draft law on markets in financial instruments (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 26 October 2006 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Luxembourg Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft law on markets in financial instruments (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB competence to deliver an opinion is based on Article 105(4) of the Treaty establishing the European Community and on the third, fourth and fifth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to a national central bank (NCB), to the collection, compilation and dissemination of monetary, financial, banking, payment systems and balance of payments statistics and to payment and settlement systems. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 While the main purpose of the draft law is to transpose Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on markets in financial instruments amending Council Directives

text: and

text: and Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing

text: Council Directive 93/22/EEC

text: , it also amends the Law of 23 December 1998 on the monetary status of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg (hereinafter the ‘BCL law’) in respect of (a) the use of claims as securities for loans granted by the Banque centrale du Luxembourg (BCL); and (b) the protection of the accounts held with the BCL in the context of common monetary or exchanges policies; and (c) the exchange of information required in the European System of Central Bank (ESCB) context with the Commission de surveillance du secteur financier (Commission for Supervision of the Financial Sector, hereinafter the ‘CSSF’), the Commissariat aux assurances (Insurance Commission)

text: and the Service central de la statistique et des études économiques (Central Service for Statistics and Economic Studies (STATEC)). 1.2 In accordance with the consultation request by the Ministry of Finance of Luxembourg, this opinion is limited to Article 172 of the draft law, which exclusively contains the changes to be made to the BCL Law, without relating to the transposition of Directive

text: 2. The use of claims as security for loans granted by the BCL

text: 2.1 Article 172 of the draft law introduces an Article

text: in the BCL Law which creates a specific sui generis method of perfection and enforceability for pledges of claims as security for loans granted by the BCL . The draft law creates a register where pledges of claims in favour of the BCL are recorded, which is kept, organised and made accessible to third parties according to rules to be laid down by the BCL. The sole entry in the register of a pledge on a claim in favour of the BCL renders the pledge effective against all third parties and ensures that the BCL’s rights in respect of such claim have priority over any other rights created in favour of third parties after such entry. If a third party receives a payment from the debtor of a claim previously pledged to the BCL through an entry in the registry this third party must transfer the amount to the BCL. In addition, no set-off may have the effect of undermining the security in favour of the BCL in respect of its claims. 2.2 The ECB welcomes this new provision as it will facilitate the use of credit claims as security for BCL loans, in line with the single list of eligible collateral for the Eurosystem’s credit operations, which will include credit claims from 1 January 2007 . The ECB understands that without this special regime, the creation of a pledge on a credit claim would be governed by Article 5(3) of the Law of 5 August 2005 on financial collateral arrangements, under which the creation of a pledge over a credit claim is only valid and effective against third parties on notification to or acceptance by the debtor of the pledged credit claim. Under the new regime, such notification to the debtor would no longer be required, since the sole entry in the register would ensure that the pledge is valid and effective against ‘third parties’, including the debtor. 2.3 The ECB understands from the new Article

text: and (4) that credit claims may be pledged by means of an entry into the register only in favour of the BCL and that Article 5(3) of the Law of 5 August 2005 remains applicable to pledging of credit claims to any other entity falling within the ambit of the latter law. While the draft law provides for the precedence of the BCL’s security interest over any subsequent security interest concerning the pledged claims, it does not specifically address

text: the potential conflict which may arise between the BCL’s security interest resulting from an entry into the register and a third party’s security interest resulting from the prior application of Article 5(3) of the Law of 5 August 2005. Unless the Luxembourg legislator intends to grant an absolute priority to the BCL, on entry in the registry of the pledge over credit claims, regardless of the date of such entry, which, for reasons of legal clarity should be expressly spelled out in the draft law, such conflict would be solved by application of the rule ‘prior tempore potior iure’. Consequently, the prior pledge created by application of the Law of 5 August 2005 would prevail over the BCL’s pledge. Therefore, the ECB would encourage the BCL to obtain assurance from the debtor or from the credit institution/pledgor that the claim subject to an entry into the BCL register has not been previously pledged in favour of a third party. 2.4 Concerning the draft law’s scope of application, the ECB understands that it is only applicable where the BCL uses such credit claims as security for the loans it grants itself. The ECB would recommend also encompassing situations where the BCL is acting as agent for other Eurosystem central banks for the cross-border collateralisation of credit claims in the framework of Eurosystem credit operations.

text: 3. The immunity from seizure for accounts held with the BCL in the context of common monetary or exchange policies

text: 3.1 Article 172 of the draft law provides for the insertion in the BCL Law of an Article

text: containing two paragraphs. 3.2 The first paragraph takes over the substance of the former Article 4(4) of the BCL Law and grants a lien to the BCL, the ECB and other NCBs forming an integral part of the ESCB over the assets held by the debtor ‘either with the central bank or with a system for the settlement of securities transactions or with another counterparty in Luxembourg’ and which guarantees ‘the claims deriving from operations in the context of common monetary or exchange policies’, such lien having ‘the same rank as the pledgee’s charge’. 3.3 The second paragraph, which is new, provides: ‘No account with the central bank intended to be used in the context of monetary or exchange policies may be subjected to any seizure, sequestration or blocking order’. As the euro is increasingly used as an international reserve currency and in line with recent changes made to the laws of other Member States , the ECB would recommend that this provision clarifies in an unambiguous manner the protection usually granted to foreign reserves held by the BCL by inserting the words “as well as of the management of foreign reserves assets held for foreign central banks or foreign States’ after ‘no account with the Central Bank intended to be used in the context of common monetary or exchange policies’.

text: 4. Exchange of information between BCL, the CSSF, STATEC and the Commissariat aux assurances

text: 4.1 Article 33 of the draft law currently provides that breaches by the BCL’s agents and auditors of their professional secrecy may be criminally sanctioned.

text: Article 33(2)

text: authorises nonetheless the communication of information between the BCL and the CSSF, such communication being however ‘without prejudice to the rules of professional secrecy applicable to the ESCB’.

text: Article 172

text: (d) of the draft law amends this provision in the two following respects. First, it no longer refers to the rules of professional secrecy applicable to the ESCB. Second, the BCL may now exchange information ‘to the extent necessary for the performance of its tasks’ not only with the CSSF, but also with the insurance commission and the STATEC ‘subject to reciprocity’. 4.2 The ECB generally welcomes the possibility for information to be exchanged between the BCL and the authorities supervising financial institutions and insurance undertakings, as well as other authorities compiling national statistics and contributing to European statistics. These authorities’ tasks are increasingly complementary and a proper exchange of information among them undoubtedly benefits all, not only by limiting the administrative burden but also by promoting an efficient performance of their respective tasks and in the interest of financial stability in general. For the sake of clarity, the ECB recommends that the draft law continues to refer to the rules of professional secrecy applicable to the ESCB. In the area of statistics, the confidentiality regime is ensured by

text: Council Regulation 2533/98/EC

text: 4.3 Finally, the ECB understands that reciprocity does not apply to individual data exchange between authorities in view of their differing tasks, but instead implies the existence of a general bilateral exchange of information.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 11 December 2006.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: Rådets direktiv

text: av den 20 december 1985 om samordning av lagar och andra författningar som avser företag för kollektiva investeringar i överlåtbara värdepapper (fondföretag), (EGT L 375, 31.12.1985, s. 3). Direktivet senast ändrat genom direktiv

text: (EUT L 79, 24.3.2005, s. 9), (nedan kallat fondföretagsdirektivet).

text: Kommissionens arbetsdokument ESC/43/2006.

text: ECB noterar att både Europeiska monetära institutet, ECB:s föregångare, och ECB konsulterades av rådet om fondföretagsdirektivet under 1995 respektive 1999. Se Europeiska monetära institutets yttrande

text: av den 27 juli 1995 om kommissionens förslag till ett direktiv avseende företag för kollektiva investeringar i överlåtbara värdepapper (fondföretag), ECB:s yttrande CON/98/54 av den 16 mars 1999 på anmodan av Europeiska unionens råd i enlighet med

text: artiklarna 109

text: l.2 och 109f.6 i Fördraget om upprättandet av Europeiska gemenskapen och artikel 5.3 i Europeiska monetära institutets stadga avseende två förslag från Europeiska kommissionen till direktiv av Europaparlamentet och rådet om ändring av direktiv

text: om samordning av lagar och andra författningar som avser företag för kollektiva investeringar i överlåtbara värdepapper (fondföretag), ref. 98/0242 KOM(1998) 451, slutlig och ref. 98/0243 KOM(1998) 449, slutlig, (EGT C 285, 7.10.1999, s. 9).

text: ECB stödjer därför STEP-initiativet (Short-Term European Paper), vilket är ett marknadsdrivet initiativ som främjas av Financial Markets Association (ACI) och Europeiska bankföreningen (EBF) och som syftar till att främja integration och utveckling av de europeiska marknaderna för kortfristiga värdepapper genom att konvergera marknadsstandarder. STEP:s marknadskonvention anger de kriterier och de krav som måste uppfyllas för att ett emissionsprogram skall vara STEP-kompatibelt och sålunda kunna STEP-märkas. Dessa kriterier avser information, dokumentationsformat, avveckling och tillhandahållande av uppgifter för framställning av STEP-statistik.

text: Se

text: artikel 53

text: a 1 i fondföretagsdirektivet.

text: Se bakgrundsdokumentet, s.1, tredje stycket.

text: D.v.s. de emittenter som täcks av artikel 5.3 i direktivförslaget.

text: Artikel 5.3 a i direktivförslaget.

text: Artikel 5.2 a i direktivförslaget.

text: Artikel 1.2 d i Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 2003/71/EG av den 4 november 2003

text: om de prospekt som skall offentliggöras när värdepapper erbjuds till allmänheten eller tas upp till handel och om ändring av direktiv

text: , (EUT L 345, 31.12.2003, s. 64).

text: Se arbetsdokument ESC/24/2006.

text: Artikel 5.2 c i direktivförslaget.

text: Artikel 2.1 a i direktiv 2003/71/EG

text: ECB kan t.ex. som en del av Eurosystemets öppna marknadstransaktioner utge skuldcertifikat med målet att justera Eurosystemets strukturella ställning gentemot den finansiella sektorn för att skapa eller förstärka ett likviditetsunderskott på marknaden. Dessa skuldcertifikat har en löptid på mindre än 12 månader. Villkoren för sådana skuldcertifikat fastställs av ECB (se Europeiska centralbanken, Genomförandet av penningpolitiken i euroområdet: Allmän dokumentation av Eurosystemets penningpolitiska instrument och förfaranden, september 2006, s. 17).

text: Se

text: artikel 105.2

text: första strecksatsen i fördraget om upprättande av Europeiska gemenskapen (fördraget) liksom artiklarna 18.2 och 20 i protokollet som bifogas fördraget om stadgan för Europeiska centralbankssystemet och Europeiska centralbanken.

text: Se punkt 7 femte strecksatsen i bilaga 1 till förordning ECB/2001/13 av den 22 november 2001 om konsoliderade balansräkningar för monetära finansinstitut, (EGT L 333, 17.12.2001, s. 1). Förordning senast ändrad genom förordning ECB/2004/21 (EUT L 371, 18.12.2004, s. 42)

text: CESR:s råd till Europeiska kommissionen om förtydligande av definitioner avseende godkända tillgångar för fondföretags investeringar (januari 2006) (CESR/06-005), s. 20, punkterna 63-64.

text: Text markerad med fet stil anger ECB:s förslag till ny text. Genomstruken text anger de strykningar som ECB föreslår.

sprak: sv

title: Europeiska centralbankens yttrande av den 12 december 2006 om ett utkast till kommissionens direktiv om genomförande av rådets direktiv 85/611/EEG om samordning av lagar och andra författningar som avser företag för kollektiva investeringar i överlåtbara värdepapper (fondföretag), när det gäller förtydligandet av vissa definitioner (CON/2006/57)

text: Inledning och rättslig grund

text: ECB avger på eget initiativ detta yttrande till kommissionen om ett utkast till kommissionens direktiv om genomförande av

text: rådets direktiv 85/611/EEG

text: om samordning av lagar och andra författningar som avser företag för kollektiva investeringar i överlåtbara värdepapper (fondföretag), när det gäller förtydligandet av vissa definitioner (nedan kallat direktivförslaget). Det huvudsakliga syftet med direktivförslaget, som är en genomförandeåtgärd baserad på

text: artikel 53

text: a i fondföretagsdirektivet, är att förtydliga betydelsen och tillämpningsområdet för vissa definitioner enligt fondföretagsdirektivet för att säkerställa att det tillämpas på ett enhetligt sätt i hela Europeiska unionen samt för att produktpasset skall fungera bättre.

text: ECB:s behörighet att avge ett yttrande över direktivförslaget grundas på artikel 105.4 i fördraget om upprättandet av Europeiska gemenskapen, eftersom direktivförslaget är länkat till genomförandet av euroområdets penningpolitik, särskilt med beaktande av de europeiska penningmarknadernas funktion. I detta avseende anser ECB att föreslagna nivå-2 rättsakter utgör förslag till gemenskapsrättsakt i enlighet med artikel 105.4 i fördraget. ECB förväntade sig därför att kommissionen skulle ha tagit initiativ att formellt höra ECB om direktivförslaget i enlighet med gällande bestämmelser i fördraget. Mot bakgrund av att ECB har flera kommentarer avseende direktivförslaget har ECB beslutat att på eget initiativ avge ett yttrande. I enlighet med

text: artikel 17.5

text: första meningen i arbetsordningen för Europeiska centralbanken har detta yttrande antagits av ECB-rådet.

text: 1. Allmänna kommentarer

text: 1.1 Ett effektivt och välintegrerat finansiellt system är viktigt för ett smidigt och effektivt genomförande av penningpolitiken i euroområdet. Även om detta gäller alla delar i det finansiella systemet, är det av störst betydelse för det marknadssegment som är viktigast för genomförandet av penningpolitiken, nämligen penningmarknaden. Den europeiska marknaden för kortfristiga värdepapper är det minst integrerade penningmarknadssegmentet i EU. Därför följer ECB med särskilt intresse regleringsförslag, liksom marknadsinitiativ som syftar till att stärka integrationen, utvecklingen och transparensen för marknader för kortfristiga värdepapper i Europa.

text: 1.2 Det är av största vikt för uppbyggnaden av den inre marknaden för finansiella tjänster att genomförandet och tolkningen av EU-rätten sker på ett enhetligt sätt. Mot denna bakgrund verkar valet av direktiv som rättsligt instrument för att uppnå detta enhetliga genomförande i detta fall motverka målet med genomförandeåtgärder i sammanhang med fondföretagsdirektivet, vilket är att klargöra definitionerna för att säkerställa en enhetlig tillämpning av detta direktiv inom hela gemenskapen, att främja en gemensam förståelse av huruvida vissa tillgångar är godkända för investeringar enligt fondföretagsdirektivet, att minska risken för olika tolkningar av fondföretagsdirektivet samt att förbättra rättssäkerheten och möjliggöra en mer sammanhängande tolkning av fondföretagsdirektivet. Ett förslag till genomförandeåtgärd i form av en förordning med detaljerade bestämmelser direkt tillämpliga på alla fondföretag skulle bättre kunna tackla den rådande ojämna tillämpningen av vissa allmänna principer i fondföretagsdirektivet (t.ex. avseende regler om godtagbarhet av penningmarknadsinstrument).

text: 2. Specifika kommentarer

text: 2.1 För det första, vad avser offentliggörande och informationskrav, inför direktivförslaget olika krav beroende på vilken rättslig natur emittenten har. För penningmarknadsinstrument emitterade av institutioner som är föremål för tillsyn kan till exempel informationen begränsas till antingen information om emissionen eller emissionsprogrammet eller om emittentens rättsliga och finansiella ställning före emissionen av penningmarknadsinstrumentet. Vad gäller icke-finansiella företag krävs information om både emissionen och emissionsprogrammet samt emittentens rättsliga och finansiella ställning. Kommissionen anger att det i denna skillnad tas i beaktande att t.ex. vissa bankcertifikat skulle ha svårt att uppfylla vissa kriterier enligt artikel 5.2 i direktivförslaget. Generellt sett anser ECB att det viktigt att lämplig och standardiserad information, liksom standardiserad statistik, är tillgänglig för marknadsaktörerna för att marknaderna skall fungera smidigt och effektivt. Det rekommenderas därför att samma ordalydelse antas för

text: artikel 5.3 a

text: och artikel 5.2 a i direktivförslaget.

text: 2.2 För det andra kan införandet av penningmarknadsinstrument som har emitterats av en medlemsstats lokala eller regionala myndighet (eller om medlemsstaten är en förbundsstat, en delstat som ingår i förbundsstaten) som inte har garanterats av en medlemsstat enligt

text: artikel 5.2

text: (övriga emittenter), snarare än under artikel 5.4 i direktivförslaget (dvs. jämte andra offentliga organ i medlemsstater) behöva övervägas ytterligare. Lokala, regionala och federala myndigheter i EU åtnjuter i allmänhet finansiellt stöd från sina respektive medlemsstater liksom särskild status enligt nationell insolvenslagstiftning. Vidare kan frågan huruvida skulder som lokala, regionala och federala myndigheter i EU har är formellt garanterade av deras medlemsstater, ge upphov till komplexa frågor i vissa fall, och utgör kanhända inte en lämplig bas för att skilja på instrument med eller utan garanti. Det borde övervägas att behandla regionala, lokala och (för fondföretagsdirektivet) federala myndigheter i medlemsstaterna på samma sätt både i nivå-1 fondföretagsdirektivet (

text: artikel 19.1 h

text: första strecksatsen) och i prospektdirektivet

text: . Liknande argument kan anföras för internationella offentliga organisationer. Kommissionen kunde sålunda överväga att ändra artikel 5.2 i direktivförslaget genom att stryka referensen till lokala, regionala eller federala myndigheter i medlemsstater, liksom internationella offentliga organisationer, för att uppnå en enhetlig behandling av alla sådana offentliga organ.

text: 2.3 För det tredje refereras i artikel 5.3 c i direktivförslaget till behovet av tillförlitlig statistik om emissionen eller emissionsprogrammet eller andra uppgifter som gör det möjligt att göra en lämplig bedömning av de kreditrisker som är förenade med en investering i sådana instrument. Det bör i detta sammanhang noteras att tillgängligheten av tillförlitlig statistik och av andra uppgifter som gör det möjligt att bedöma kreditrisker är två distinkta och önskvärda kännetecken för en marknad, vilka endast delvis överlappar varandra. Därför bör det ena inte behandlas som en motsvarighet till det andra. Dessutom är detta kriterium delvis överflödigt om det läses tillsammans med

text: artikel 5.1 b

text: , vilket redan föreskriver att för de finansiella instrument som avses i artikel 19.1 h i fondföretagsdirektivet skall information vara tillgänglig som möjliggör en lämplig bedömning av de kreditrisker som är förenade med investeringen. Därför bör referensen till eller andra uppgifter som gör det möjligt att göra en lämplig bedömning av de kreditrisker som är förenade med en investering i sådana instrument i artikel 5.3 c i direktivförslaget strykas.

text: 2.4 För det fjärde, ger referensen till kontroll av den information… av en för ändamålet kvalificerad tredje part i artikel 5.2 c i direktivförslaget upphov till vissa viktiga tolkningssvårigheter. I dess tidigare förklaringar angav kommissionen att handlare, revisorer, offentliga organ eller andra marknadsstrukturer kan vara godkända i den mån de inte är föremål för instruktioner från emittenten. Enligt kommissionen är syftet med detta kriterium att säkerställa att information om instrument som emitteras av företagsenheter – särskilt med tanke på att dessa enheter inte är föremål för tillsyn eller är reglerade – är tillförlitlig och föremål för kvalificerad granskning. Kommissionens förslag lämnar dock visst rum för flexibilitet beträffande frågan hur detta kan uppnås och påtvingar inte en specifik struktur. Det är inte klart vem som slutligen skall besluta om den tredje partens lämplighet. Dessutom föreskrivs enligt artikel 5.2 c i direktivförslaget att kontrollen av informationen avser både emissionen eller emissionsprogrammet och emittentens rättsliga och finansiella ställning. Beroende på den tredje partens beskaffenhet kommer den kontrollerande enheten dock inte nödvändigtvis att kontrollera dessa båda element. Till exempel kommer en revisor att kontrollera emittentens finansiella ställning, men inte programmet. Det är tveksamt om advokatfirmor och handlare skulle kunna anses kontrollera finansiell information. Ett offentligt organ skulle kunna kontrollera programmet, men inte nödvändigtvis en emittents finansiella ställning. Slutligen verkar införandet av kontrollmekanismer för ospecificerad information av en för ändamålet kvalificerad tredje part i direktivförslaget närma informationskraven för penningmarknadsinstrument till de krav som gäller för formella prospekt. I detta avseende bör det understrykas att prospektkraven på ett uttömmande sätt verkar täckas av prospektdirektivet, enligt vilket penningmarknadsinstrument undantas från definitionen av värdepapper.

text: 2.5 Uppenbarligen motsäger den handlingsfrihet som medlemsstaterna ges vid tillämpningen av detta kriterium målet med dessa genomförandeåtgärder, vilket är att ge mer rättssäkerhet och att säkerställa en enhetlig tillämpning. Såvida inte det är möjligt att klargöra betydelsen av denna bestämmelse, vilket verkar problematiskt mot bakgrund av de olika situationer som möjligen täcks in, föreslås därför att helt ta bort detta kriterium.

text: 2.6 För det femte, föreskrivs i artikel 5.4 i direktivförslaget att när det gäller samtliga penningmarknadsinstrument som täcks av

text: artikel 19.1 h

text: första strecksatsen i fondföretagsdirektivet (förutom de instrument som avses i punkt 2 i denna artikel) skall lämplig information bestå av information om emissionen eller emissionsprogrammet eller om emittentens rättsliga och finansiella ställning före emissionen av penningmarknadsinstrumentet. Vad beträffar emittenterna, täcker

text: artikel 19.1 h

text: första strecksatsen i fondföretagsdirektivet särskilt icke-medlemsstater, EU, Europeiska investeringsbanken, ECB samt centralbankerna i medlemsstaterna. Den föreslagna bestämmelsen skulle därför tillämpas på kollektiva investeringsföretags investering i vissa instrument som har emitterats av centralbanker och som används vid genomförandet av penningpolitiken. Med beaktande av att informationen om emittentens rättsliga och finansiella ställning inte skulle vara av direkt relevans för fondföretagsinvesterare vad avser centralbanker, samt också med beaktande av Eurosystemets befogenheter vad avser villkoren för emission av sådana instrument, föreslår ECB att artikel 5.4 i direktivförslaget ändras så att alla penningmarknadsinstrument som emitterats av ECB eller en centralbank i en medlemsstat undantas från den punkten.

text: 2.7 Slutligen definieras i artikel 3.2 i kommissionens direktivförslag penningmarknadsinstrument som instrument som normalt omsätts på penningmarknaden och som uppfyller ett av följande kriterier: i) De har en löptid vid emissionstillfället på högst 397 dagar, eller ii) De har en återstående löptid på högst 397 dagar, eller iii) De genomgår regelbundna avkastningsjusteringar i linje med penningmarknadsförhållanden åtminstone var 397:e dag, eller iv) Deras riskprofil motsvarar den som gäller för finansiella instrument som har en löptid på högst 397 dagar och som är föremål för en avkastningsjustering som avses i led iii. Kommissionen uppmärksammar att denna definition inte är samma som definitionen av penningmarknadsinstrument i förordning ECB/2001/13, som hänvisar till en återstående löptid på upp till ett år, eller är föremål för regelbundna räntejusteringar mot bakgrund av utvecklingen på penningmarknaden minst en gång om året. ECB är medveten om att den föreslagna 397-dagarsperioden är resultatet av CESR:s förslag att löptiden på 12 månader skall förlängas till 397 dagar för att inkludera risken för förseningar i avvecklingen som kan leda till en brytning om avvecklingen av instrumentet försenas. Det föreslås att man återgår till den lösning som kommissionen föreslagit i tidigare utkast av direktivförslaget, där man satte löptiden till ett år utan att det påverkar eventuellt ytterligare uppskov för avveckling som anges i emissionen eller emissionsprogrammet.

text: 3. Ändringsförslag

text: De ändringsförslag av direktivförslaget som är resultatet av rekommendationerna ovan framgår av bilagan.

text: Utfärdat i Frankfurt am Main den 12 december 2006.

text: ECB:s ordförande

text: Jean-Claude Trichet

text: BILAGA

text: Kommissionens förslag | ECB:s ändringsförslag

text: artikel 19.1 h

text: andra och fjärde strecksatserna i direktiv

text: , eller de penningmarknadsinstrument som har emitterats av en regional eller lokal myndighet i en medlemsstat eller av en internationell offentlig organisation men inte har garanterats av en medlemsstat eller, i fråga om förbundsstater som är medlemsstater, av en av de delstater som ingår i förbundsstaten, skall lämplig information som avses i punkt 1 b i denna artikel bestå av följande: a) Information om både emissionen eller emissionsprogrammet och emittentens rättsliga och finansiella ställning före emissionen av penningmarknadsinstrumentet. b) Regelbundna uppdateringar av den information som avses i a och närhelst en väsentlig händelse inträffar. c) Kontroll av den information som avses i led a genom en för ändamålet kvalificerad tredje part som inte tar emot instruktioner av emittenten. (d) Tillförlitlig statistik om emissionen eller emissionsprogrammet. | När det gäller penningmarknadsinstrument som täcks av

text: artikel 19.1 h

text: andra, tredje och fjärde strecksatserna i direktiv

text: , eller de penningmarknadsinstrument som har emitterats av en regional eller lokal myndighet i en medlemsstat eller av en internationell offentlig organisation men inte har garanterats av en medlemsstat eller, i fråga om förbundsstater som är medlemsstater, av en av de delstater som ingår i förbundsstaten, skall lämplig information som avses i punkt 1 b i denna artikel bestå av följande: a) Information om både emissionen eller emissionsprogrammet och emittentens rättsliga och finansiella ställning före emissionen av penningmarknadsinstrumentet. b) Regelbundna uppdateringar av den information som avses i a och närhelst en väsentlig händelse inträffar. c) Kontroll av den information som avses i led a genom en för ändamålet kvalificerad tredje part som inte tar emot instruktioner av emittenten. (cd) Tillförlitlig statistik om emissionen eller emissionsprogrammet.

text: Motivering – se punkterna 2.1-2.5 i yttrandet

text: artikel 19.1 h

text: tredje strecksatsen i direktiv

text: , skall lämplig information som avses i punkt 1 b i denna artikel bestå av följande: a) Information om emissionen eller emissionsprogrammet eller om emittentens rättsliga och finansiella ställning före emissionen av penningmarknadsinstrumentet. b) Regelbundna uppdateringar av den information som avses i a och närhelst en väsentlig händelse inträffar. c) Tillförlitlig statistik om emissionen eller emissionsprogrammet eller andra uppgifter som gör det möjligt att göra en lämplig bedömning av de kreditrisker som är förenade med en investering i sådana instrument. | När det gäller penningmarknadsinstrument som täcks av

text: artikel 19.1 h

text: tredje strecksatsen i direktiv

text: artikel 19.1 h

text: , första strecksatsen, i direktiv

text: förutom de instrument som avses i punkten 2 i denna artikel, skall lämplig information som avses i punkt 1 b i denna artikel bestå av information om emissionen eller emissionsprogrammet eller om den emittentens rättsliga och finansiella ställning före emissionen av penningmarknadsinstrumentet. | Vad gäller samtliga penningmarknadsinstrument som täcks av

text: artikel 19.1 h

text: , första strecksatsen, i direktiv

text: förutom de instrument som avses i punkt 2 i denna artikel och de som har emitterats av Europeiska centralbanken eller en medlemsstats centralbank, skall lämplig information som avses i punkt 1 b i denna artikel bestå av information om emissionen eller emissionsprogrammet eller om den emittentens rättsliga och finansiella ställning före emissionen av penningmarknadsinstrumentet.

text: Motivering – se punkt 2.6 i yttrandet

text: Hänvisningen i

text: artikel 1.9 i direktiv 85/611/EEG

text: till penningmarknadsinstrument som instrument som normalt omsätts på penningmarknaden skall förstås som en hänvisning till finansiella instrument som uppfyller ett av följande kriterier: i) De har en löptid vid emissionstillfället på högst 397 dagar. ii) De har en återstående löptid på högst 397 dagar. iii) De genomgår regelbundna avkastningsjusteringar i linje med penningmarknadsförhållanden åtminstone var 397:e dag. (iv) Deras riskprofil, inklusive kreditvärdighets- och ränterisker, motsvarar den som gäller för finansiella instrument som har en löptid som avses i leden i eller ii, eller som är föremål för en avkastningsjustering som avses i led iii. | Hänvisningen i

text: artikel 1.9 i direktiv 85/611/EEG

text: till penningmarknadsinstrument som instrument som normalt omsätts på penningmarknaden skall förstås som en hänvisning till finansiella instrument som, utan att det påverkar eventuellt ytterligare uppskov för avveckling som anges i emissionen eller emissionsprogrammet, uppfyller ett av följande kriterier: i) De har en löptid vid emissionstillfället på högst ett år 397 dagar. ii) De har en återstående löptid på högst ett år 397 dagar. iii) De genomgår regelbundna avkastningsjusteringar i linje med penningmarknadsförhållanden åtminstone en gång om åretvar 397:e dag. (iv) Deras riskprofil, inklusive kreditvärdighets- och ränterisker, motsvarar den som gäller för finansiella instrument som har en löptid som avses i leden i eller ii, eller som är föremål för en avkastningsjustering som avses i led iii.

text: Motivering – se punkt 2.7 i yttrandet


text: The ECB has already commented on the original amendments contained in the bill; see ECB Opinion

text: of 22 May 2006 at the request of the Central Bank of Malta concerning a draft law amending the Central Bank of Malta Act.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 15 December 2006 at the request of the Central Bank of Malta concerning amendments to the Central Bank of Malta Act (CON/2006/58)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 15 December 2006 at the request of the Central Bank of Malta concerning amendments to the Central Bank of Malta Act (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 21 November 2006 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Central Bank of Malta for an opinion on draft amendments to the Central Bank of Malta Act (hereinafter the ‘Act’), to be inserted in an existing bill amending the Act (hereinafter the ‘bill’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Article 105(4) of the Treaty establishing the European Community and the third and fourth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the amendments relate to the Central Bank of Malta (CBM) and the collection, compilation and distribution of statistics. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft amendments

text: The main purpose of the draft amendments is to bring the Act into line with the Treaty and the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, in particular with regard to the legal integration of the CBM into the Eurosystem. The draft amendments concern, inter alia, provisions relating to the CBM’s performance of its tasks, the management of foreign reserves, the collection of statistical information and administrative penalties.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 The ECB welcomes the draft amendments as they seek to address most of the issues raised in the ECB’s recently adopted December 2006 Convergence Report and aim to recognise the ECB’s powers in relation to foreign reserve management, financial instruments and statistical obligations.

text: 2.2 Article 2(2) of the bill provides that the Minister for Finance establishes, by notice in the Government Gazette, a date for the entry into force of the bill or different dates for different provisions. The Community has exclusive competence in matters relating to economic and monetary union, and national legislation should not in any way prejudice the EU Council’s decision regarding the abrogation of the relevant Member State’s derogation and the date on which this abrogation takes effect. Thus, for reasons of clarity and legal certainty, it would be advisable for the bill clearly to specify that the entry into force of certain provisions is related to the abolition of Malta’s derogation. 2.3 Concerning the references in the Act to the Statute, where applicable it would be advisable to complement them with references to the Treaty. 2.4 For ease of reference, when article numbers are quoted below these do not refer to the bill, but rather to the numbering in the Act if it is amended in accordance with the bill (hereinafter referred to as the ‘amended Act’).

text: 3. Specific observations

text: Part II ‘Establishment and Conduct of Affairs of Bank’

text: 3.1 The ECB observes that Article 4 of the amended Act should be adjusted to provide that the CBM has to support the general economic policies ‘in’ rather than ‘of’ the Community, in order to comply with Article 105(1) of the Treaty. 3.2 Article 7(1) of the amended Act assigns to the Board of Directors responsibility ‘for the policy and general administration of the affairs and business of the Bank, except in relation to the functions imposed and the exercise of powers conferred on the Bank by or under the Treaty or the Statute’. However, Article 8(6) of the amended Act states that ‘the Governor shall provide the Board with information about the exercise of powers conferred, upon the Governor or the Bank, by or under the Treaty or the Statute’. The relationship between these two provisions is unclear, in particular as regards the functions and powers of the Board of Directors, as well as the scope and implications of the Governor’s reporting duty concerning ESCB-related tasks, which tasks are under the Governor’s exclusive responsibility. Therefore, the ECB recommends further clarifying the respective powers of the Board of Directors and the Governor concerning ESCB-related tasks. 3.3 Article 11(1) of the amended Act provides for the disqualification, resignation and filling of vacancies of the Board of Directors; the latter includes the Governor and the Deputy Governor, pursuant to the definition of ‘director’ in Article 2 of the amended Act. The ECB observes that this extends the grounds on which the Governor can be dismissed from office from those provided for in Article 14(2) of the Statute (namely if the Governor no longer fulfils the conditions required for the performance of their duties or if they have been guilty of serious misconduct). For this reason, Article 11(1) of the amended Act should be aligned with the wording of Article 14(2) of the

text: Statute, as far as the Governor, Deputy Governor and other members of the Board of Directors involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks are concerned. 3.4 The ECB welcomes Article 17(2) of the amended Act, which expressly provides that the CBM will act in accordance with the ECB’s guidelines and instructions when managing and maintaining foreign reserve assets.

text: Part III ‘Financial Provisions’

text: 3.5 Article 20 of the amended Act concerning audit to a large extent reproduces the wording of Article 27 of the Statute. Given the primacy of Community law and for the sake of legal clarity, the ECB recommends replacing this with an explicit reference to Article 27 of the Statute. 3.6 Moreover, regarding Article 21 of the amended Act on the CBM’s financial reporting, it is recommended to include an explicit reference to Article 26(4) of the Statute in order to recognise the Eurosystem’s regime for the financial reporting of NCBs’ operations.

text: Part V ‘Relations with Government’

text: 3.7 Article 27(1) of the amended Act states that the CBM is not permitted to grant ‘overdrafts or any other type of credit facility to Community institutions or bodies or the government or to any public undertaking, public authority or government-owned corporation of any Member State’ or to ‘directly purchase their debt instruments’. However,

text: Article 27(1)

text: should fully mirror Article 101 of the Treaty, to avoid any confusion as to which entities are covered by the monetary financing prohibition. It is therefore recommended that Article 27(1) of the amended Act also includes ‘bodies governed by public law’, as provided for in Article 101 of the Treaty. 3.8 Article 29 of the amended Act provides that the CBM shall keep the Minister for Finance informed of the CBM’s policy. In its Convergence Reports, the ECB has noted that an express statutory obligation for an NCB to consult third parties ex ante provides the latter with a formal mechanism to influence the final decision and is therefore incompatible with the Treaty and the Statute. However, dialogue between NCBs and third parties, even when based on statutory obligations to provide information and exchange views, is compatible with central bank independence provided that: (a) this does not result in interference with the independence of the members of the NCB’s decision-making bodies; (b) the special status of Governors in their capacity as members of the ECB’s General Council is fully respected; and (c) confidentiality requirements resulting from the Statute are observed. The ECB recommends amending Article 29 of the amended Act in the light of the abovementioned requirements.

text: Part VII ‘Payment Systems’

text: 3.9 Concerning Article 34(5) of the amended Act, on payment systems and the CBM’s related power to issue directives, it is recommented explicitly to state that this CBM power is exercised in accordance with the Treaty, Article 22 of the Statute and any regulations issued under Article 22 of the Statute.

text: Part X ‘Currency’

text: 3.10 Although Articles 42 and 43 of the amended Act make it clear that, once the euro is introduced in Malta, euro banknotes and coins will be issued in compliance with the ESCB legal regime, the ECB also suggests inserting an explicit reference to Article 106 of the Treaty and Article 16 of the Statute. 3.11 Article 51 of the amended Act provides that the CBM ‘may, acting in accordance with the provisions of Decision ECB/2003/4 of 20 March 2003 on the denominations, specifications, reproduction, exchange and withdrawal of euro banknotes, authorise the reproduction of euro banknotes or euro coins’. The ECB recommends that any reference to euro coins in this Article be deleted, as Decision ECB/2003/4 only applies to euro banknotes. Furthermore, the ECB notes that rather than allowing an NCB to authorise a reproduction of a euro banknote, Article 2(4) of Decision ECB/2003/4 provides that an NCB may, in certain cases, provide confirmation that a reproduction of a euro banknote – even if it does not comply with the criteria under which certain reproductions are automatically deemed to be lawful, pursuant to Article 2(3) of Decision ECB/2003/4 – is deemed to be lawful in so far as it cannot be mistaken by the general public for a genuine euro banknote. Therefore it is suggested that Article 51 of the amended Act is adjusted accordingly.

text: Part XI ‘General’

text: 3.12 Concerning the publication of reference rates, covered in Article 61 of the amended Act, it is suggested to replace the phrase ‘key interest rates of the Eurosystem’ with ‘key interest rates of the ECB’.

text: 3.13 Finally, the ECB suggests deleting Schedule One to the Act, given that the contents of this Schedule are all already contained in Annex II to

text: Council Regulation (EC) 2182/2004 of 6 December 2004

text: concerning medals and tokens similar to euro coins , which is directly applicable. Consequently, Article 55 of the amended Act needs to be amended: it should contain a general reference to

text: Regulation (EC) 2182/2004

text: , and in accordance with

text: Article 6 of Regulation (EC) 2182/2004

text: it should only establish the sanctions applicable to infringements of the Regulation. Article 60 of the amended Act also needs to be adjusted accordingly.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 15 December 2006.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: ECB Opinion

text: of 13 January 2006 at the request of Eesti Pank on a draft decree establishing a procedure to calculate and comply with reserve requirements and draft decree amending Decree No 12 of 12 July 2002 on credit institutions’ prudential ratios.

text: The ECB understands that Appendix 4 to the draft decree will also be amended accordingly.

text: Article 7(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2531/98 of 23 November 1998

text: concerning the application of minimum reserves by the European Central Bank (OJ L 318, 27.11.1998, p. 1). Regulation as amended by

text: Regulation (EC) No 134/2002

text: (OJ L 26, 26.1.2002, p. 1).

text: See paragraph 10 of Opinion

text: OJ L 333, 17.12.2001, p. 1. Regulation as last amended by Regulation ECB/2004/21 (OJ L 371, 18.12.2004, p. 42).

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank 14 December 2006 at the request of Eesti Pank on a draft decree establishing a procedure to calculate and comply with reserve requirements (CON/2006/59)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 14 December 2006 at the request of Eesti Pank on a draft decree establishing a procedure to calculate and comply with reserve requirements (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 27 November 2006 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from Eesti Pank for an opinion on a draft decree establishing a procedure to calculate and comply with reserve requirements (hereinafter the ‘draft decree’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Article 105(4) of the Treaty establishing the European Community and

text: Article 2(2) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft decree relates to the instruments of monetary policy. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft decree

text: The purpose of the draft decree is to achieve greater convergence with the Basel II framework. The draft decree mainly amends the basis for calculating the reserve requirement by means of excluding the residential mortgage loan portfolio, hence returning to a purely liability-based reserve requirement calculation. In addition, a number of technical changes are introduced to the framework including an adjustment of the penalty rate, the abolition of the daily minimum level requirement on settlement accounts, and changes to the contractual relationship between Eesti Pank and credit institutions. It is envisaged that the draft decree will enter into force on 1 January 2007.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 The ECB has already analysed the Estonian minimum reserve system in Opinion

text: , where it emphasised the fact that differences between the Estonian and Eurosystem’s minimum reserve systems would need to be eliminated on adoption of the euro by Estonia. In this context, the

text: ECB welcomes the proposed exclusion of the residential mortgage loan portfolio from the basis for calculating the reserve requirement, which brings the Estonian minimum reserve system closer to that of the Eurosystem . 2.2 The ECB also welcomes the abolition of the daily minimum level requirement of 40 % on credit institutions’ settlement accounts with Eesti Pank, which further harmonises the Estonian minimum reserve system with that of the Eurosystem. 2.3 The ECB takes note of the change in the penalty rate which brings the Estonian penalty rate closer to the Eurosystem framework by making the rate dependent on a policy rate rather than applying a fixed rate (currently a 20 % annual rate is applied). Nevertheless, the ECB would like to draw Eesti Pank’s attention to the fact that Eesti Pank’s penalty rate is linked to the minimum bid rate of the Eurosystem’s main refinancing operations, whereas the Eurosystem applies a rate linked to the marginal lending rate. Under the Eurosystem framework a payment of up to 5 percentage points above the marginal lending rate can be applied to the amount of the reserve requirement which the relevant institution failed to provide. Depending on the severity of the infringement the Eurosystem may also impose higher penalties, such as a payment of up to twice the marginal lending rate or require the relevant institution to establish a non-interest-bearing deposit with the ECB or the national central banks of up to three times the amount of the reserve requirement which the relevant institution failed to provide. 2.4 Moreover, as already noted in Opinion

text: , Article 1 of Appendix 1 to the draft decree establishing a procedure to calculate and comply with reserve requirements does not list all EU Member States. Furthermore, under Article 2 of Appendix 1, a liquidity portfolio may contain only such debt securities that meet the criteria specified in the subsections of

text: Article 2

text: . In that context, the draft decree treats the debt issue in euro of the euro area Member States’ Governments differently from those of other EU Member States’ Governments in terms of the required minimum credit rating. 2.5 However, there are still significant differences between the Estonian minimum reserve system and that of the Eurosystem, which mainly derive from the different functions assigned to each of them. These differences from the legal framework under which the Eurosystem operates will have to be eliminated on adoption of the euro by Estonia. The legal framework underlying the Eurosystem’s minimum reserve system is laid down in: (i) Article 19 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank; (ii)

text: Regulation (EC) No 2531/98

text: ; (iii) Regulation ECB/2003/9 of 12 September 2003 on the application of minimum reserves ; and (iv) in relation to the definition and calculation of the reserve base, Regulation ECB/2001/13 of 22 November 2001

text: concerning the consolidated balance sheet of the monetary financial institutions sector . The purpose of these legal acts, which are directly applicable to and binding on euro area credit institutions, is to ensure that the terms and conditions for the Eurosystem’s minimum reserve system are uniform throughout the euro area. In the Eurosystem’s framework, reserve requirements primarily pursue the aims of stabilising money market interest rates, and creating or enlarging a structural liquidity shortage.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 14 December 2006.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET