text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).

text: The Director General, who is the chief executive officer of the FIN-FSA, is currently appointed for a period of five years by the Parliamentary Supervisory Council based on a proposal from the FIN-FSA’s Board. The Director General is not a member of the FIN-FSA’s Board. 3 See Section 10a of the draft law on the FIN-FSA. 4

text: Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013

text: conferring tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63).

text: See also

text: Article 13

text: b.1 of Decision ECB/2004/2 of the European Central Bank of 19 February 2004 adopting the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank (OJ L 80, 18.3.2004, p.33) and Article 4 of the Code of Conduct for the Members of the Supervisory Board of the European Central Bank (OJ C 93, 20.3.2015, p. 2).

text: See also

text: Article 23

text: a of Decision ECB/2004/2. 7 See Article 14.2 of the Code of Conduct for the Members of the Supervisory Board of the European Central Bank. 8 See

text: Article 23

text: a in conjunction with Article 23.3 of Decision ECB/2004/2.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 7 September 2016 on the role of the Financial Supervisory Authority’s representative on the European Central Bank’s Supervisory Board, and on supervision fees (CON/2016/43)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 7 September 2016 on the role of the Financial Supervisory Authority’s representative on the European Central Bank’s Supervisory Board, and on supervision fees (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 22 June 2016 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Finnish Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft Government Bill amending the Law on the Financial Supervisory Authority (hereinafter the ‘draft law on the FIN-FSA’) and the Law on the supervision fees of the Financial Supervisory Authority (hereinafter the ‘draft law on supervision fees’ and together with the draft law on the FIN-FSA, the ‘draft laws’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft laws relate to the tasks conferred on the ECB concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and Suomen Pankki. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The draft law on the FIN-FSA aims to adapt existing legislation to recent changes in the supervisory framework, in particular the division of supervisory tasks between the Finnish Financial Supervisory Authority (FIN-FSA) and the ECB under the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), and to specify the tasks and responsibilities within the FIN-FSA for SSM-related issues. 1.2 The draft law on the FIN-FSA proposes that the FIN-FSA’s maximum number of Board members be increased from five to six, three of whom will continue to be appointed based on proposals from Suomen Pankki, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, respectively. The Parliamentary Supervisory Council, which currently appoints the two remaining members of the Board, will in the future have the right to appoint three members of the Board. As noted in the motivations for the draft law, the amendment of the Law on the Financial Supervisory Authority is

text: necessary to ensure that the FIN-FSA’s Board has sufficient expertise to carry out all of its tasks, including macroprudential and insurance supervision. 1.3 The draft law on the FIN-FSA explicitly assigns to the FIN-FSA’s Board the task of appointing the FIN-FSA’s representative on the ECB Supervisory Board, and his or her alternate in the event of the representative’s absence. The motivations for the draft laws state that although the FIN-FSA’s Board has appointed the Director General of the FIN-FSA as the FIN-FSA’s representative on the ECB Supervisory Board, the Board could, in principle, appoint someone else as FIN-FSA’s representative. 1.4 Under the draft law on the FIN-FSA, the FIN-FSA’s representative on the ECB Supervisory Board is required to submit for the FIN-FSA Board’s consideration any matters to be considered by the ECB Supervisory Board concerning: (1) the financing of ECB banking supervision; (2) supervisory decisions or capitalisations relating to the business activities of significant credit institutions; (3) regulations and guidelines relating to the activities of significant credit institutions; (4) restrictions on the management activities of significant credit institutions; and (5) matters which in other ways have a significant bearing on the activity of the FIN-FSA and which are fundamental from a financial market perspective. The FIN-FSA’s representative may handle a matter that arises at an ECB Supervisory Board meeting without consulting the FIN-FSA’s Board, if this is necessary due to the urgent nature of the matter. In such cases, the FIN-FSA’s Board must be informed of the matter ex post. Furthermore, the representative must make the FIN-FSA’s Board aware of any information obtained that relates to the ECB Supervisory Board’s activities on matters and initiatives affecting the development of the financial market and financial legislation . According to the motivations for the draft laws, the reason for requiring the FIN-FSA’s representative on the ECB Supervisory Board to submit the abovementioned matters for the FIN- FSA Board’s consideration is not in order for the FIN-FSA’s Board to make a binding decision on ECB Supervisory Board matters, as the FIN-FSA’s Board is not authorised to decide on a matter on which the ECB’s Governing Council decides. The motivations for the draft laws state that this provision will apply to decisions which concern the FIN-FSA’s supervised entities and to decisions which could have a significant impact on the structure of European financial markets or financial stability. In this respect, the motivations for the draft laws clarify that at least those matters that affect credit institutions operating or based in Finland will be considered significant from the point of view of the FIN-FSA, and that it is necessary to limit the ECB Supervisory Board matters to be submitted for consideration by the FIN-FSA’s Board, in view of the large number of matters dealt with by the ECB Supervisory Board. The motivations for the draft laws acknowledge that according to

text: Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013

text: , the members of the ECB Supervisory Board must act independently, objectively

text: and in the interest of the Union as a whole. This means that decisions must be taken independently of external (political and industry) influences. The motivations for the draft laws also point out that the FIN-FSA’s Board is part of the FIN-FSA and not an external body and that the FIN-FSA is represented on the ECB Supervisory Board as an organisation. In addition, the motivations for the draft laws state that the requirement of independence laid down in

text: Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013

text: does not prevent the FIN-FSA’s Board from discussing a matter that is pending before the ECB Supervisory Board at one of the FIN-FSA Board’s meetings and, if necessary, taking a position on significant matters of principle. According to the motivations for the draft laws,

text: Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013

text: aims to ensure the operational independence and objectivity of the SSM and the ECB Supervisory Board as a whole, without interfering with the internal organisation of national supervisory authorities, such as the status of the person representing the national supervisory authority on the ECB Supervisory Board, in the decision-making system of the national supervisory authority.

text: Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013

text: does not include any provisions on the operational organisation or internal division of responsibilities of national supervisory authorities. Decisions on the organisation and internal responsibilities of national supervisory authorities are left to the sole discretion of each Member State. The motivations for the draft laws also argue that the role of the FIN-FSA’s representative on the ECB Supervisory Board differs from the role of Suomen Pankki’s Governor on the ECB’s Governing Council. On the basis of the Treaty, the Governor of Suomen Pankki is explicitly mentioned as being a member of the ECB’s Governing Council and exercises his or her voting rights on a personal basis. By contrast, the FIN-FSA is represented as an organisation on the ECB Supervisory Board, and the exercise of voting rights is not confined to a specific person under Union law. 1.5 The purpose of the draft Law on supervision fees is to take into account structural changes in the Finnish financial market and their impact, inter alia, on the financing of supervisory activities. The fees for branches of credit institutions established in the European economic area are amended by introducing higher fees for those branches that are categorised as significant (with a market share of 2-10 % of deposits) or very significant (with a market share of 10 % or more of deposits). In addition, fixed supervision fees are increased by 7 %, while the proportional fees are decreased by 5 % in order to achieve a more equitable distribution of the burden of paying the fees. These changes aim to maintain the current funding structure, with 95 % of the FIN-FSA’s operating costs being funded by supervision fees and the remaining 5 % by Suomen Pankki.

text: 2. Specific observations

text: 2.1 Appointment of FIN-FSA’s representative on the ECB Supervisory Board The ECB notes the clarification in the draft law on the FIN-FSA that the FIN-FSA’s Board will appoint the FIN-FSA’s representative to the ECB Supervisory Board, and his or her alternate in the event of the absence of the representative. In this respect, the ECB points out that

text: Article 26(1) of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013

text: provides that the ECB Supervisory Board must include one representative of the national competent authority (NCA) in each participating Member State, which

text: includes one representative of the FIN-FSA. However, the procedure and conditions for appointing the representative of the FIN-FSA to the ECB Supervisory Board remain a matter of national law. 2.2 Consideration by FIN-FSA’s Board of ECB Supervisory Board matters 2.2.1 The ECB notes that pursuant to Section 10a of the draft law on the FIN-FSA, the FIN-FSA’s representative on the ECB Supervisory Board must submit for the FIN-FSA Board’s consideration certain matters to be considered by the ECB Supervisory Board. Furthermore, the respective member of the ECB Supervisory Board may not deal with such matters without the FIN-FSA’s Board first having discussed them, unless the matters concerned are urgent. In this respect, the ECB highlights

text: Article 19 of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013

text: , which provides that the members of the ECB Supervisory Board must act independently and objectively in the interest of the Union as a whole and must neither seek nor take instructions from the institutions or bodies of the Union, from any government of a Member State or from any other public or private body. The governments of the Member States and any other bodies must respect that independence. In addition,

text: states that all members of the ECB Supervisory Board must act in the interest of the Union as a whole . 2.2.2 The ECB considers that the principle of independence under

text: prohibits, inter alia, any national body, including the FIN-FSA’s Board, from giving instructions to members of the ECB Supervisory Board. The draft laws are not clear on whether, after having considered any matter that the FIN-FSA’s representative on the ECB Supervisory Board submits for its consideration, the FIN-FSA’s Board might give instructions to the FIN-FSA’s representative on the ECB Supervisory Board. However, the ECB notes that the proposed provisions could be interpreted in such a way. In any case, a member of the ECB Supervisory Board would not be able to act independently if he or she had to bring, prior to any discussion at the ECB Supervisory Board, certain matters before a decision-making body of the NCA, if that decision-making body were allowed, or required, to take a position on those matters. Under such circumstances, the representative on the ECB Supervisory Board might be reluctant to deviate from the position of the decision-making body of the NCA by following his or her own assessment. Thus, national legislative provisions should not aim to enable the FIN-FSA’s Board to unduly influence the person appointed by it as a representative on the ECB Supervisory Board in a manner that would breach the ECB Supervisory Board representative’s independence in any way. 2.2.3 The ECB also notes that, based on the motivations for the draft laws, the reason for requiring the FIN-FSA’s representative on the ECB Supervisory Board to submit certain specified matters for the FIN-FSA Board’s consideration is not in order for the FIN-FSA’s Board to make a binding decision on ECB Supervisory Board matters, as the FIN-FSA’s Board is not authorised to decide on a matter on which the ECB’s Governing Council decides. However, as previously noted, this provision is designed to ensure that the FIN-FSA’s Board may exercise substantial influence over the FIN-FSA’s representative on the ECB Supervisory Board.

text: In this regard, the ECB emphasises that when the ECB is the competent authority for a supervisory decision, any national law provisions concerning the decision-making of the NCA may not influence the ECB’s decision-making. The ECB Supervisory Board is an internal body of the ECB. Although an NCA appoints a representative to the ECB Supervisory Board, that representative should not be subject to any national law provisions on the governance or decision-making of the NCA when it comes to his or her actions as a member of the ECB Supervisory Board to the extent that such provisions are incompatible with the status of the representative on the ECB Supervisory Board as defined by Union law.

text: Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013

text: does not assign the role of the NCA’s representative to a specific person, but allows the NCA to freely appoint its representative. This fact has no bearing on the conclusion that, once the representative has been appointed, he or she should not be subject to national law requirements which could hinder his or her independence and objectivity whilst acting in his or her capacity as a representative on the ECB Supervisory Board, which is an internal ECB body. 2.2.4 Because

text: Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013

text: specifically requires that the members of the ECB Supervisory Board act independently, the application of any national law provisions conflicting with that independence requirement should be considered to be inconsistent with Union law.

text: requires that the members of the ECB Supervisory Board ‘shall act independently’. It should be emphasised that this provision does not specify any exceptions to this independence requirement. The requirement applies to all members of the ECB Supervisory Board, including those appointed by the NCAs. By definition, a member of the ECB Supervisory Board could not ‘act independently’ if the member is unduly influenced by a decision-making body of the NCA, or is unable to take a position in ECB Supervisory Board meetings on an issue without the approval of a decision-making body of the NCA. This does not exclude the possibility for a member of the ECB Supervisory Board to seek, where appropriate, at his or her own initiative and discretion, the views of others when preparing for discussions in ECB Supervisory Board meetings. 2.2.5 It should also be noted that the planning and execution of the tasks conferred on the ECB under

text: Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013

text: must be fully undertaken by the ECB Supervisory Board, which prepares the draft decisions on supervisory issues to be sent to the ECB’s Governing Council for approval. In this respect, the ECB Supervisory Board is not intended to function as an inter-governmental body, but rather as an internal body of a Union institution, whose members are required to act objectively in the interest of the Union as a whole. In this context, it should be noted that the members of the FIN-FSA’s Board are not subject to a similar requirement to act objectively in the interest of the Union as a whole. In addition, the position of a member of the FIN-FSA’s Board is only a part-time position and the members of the FIN-FSA’s Board may have other fulltime positions, for example, in government offices. Any undue influence on the NCA’s representative on the ECB Supervisory Board by an internal body of the NCA would erode the requirement under

text: Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013

text: that the ECB Supervisory Board members must act independently and objectively in the interest of the Union as a whole, as this could mean that supervision would be driven by national rather than European interests.

text: 2.2.6 Furthermore, the ECB considers that the national law provisions requiring the NCA’s representative on the ECB Supervisory Board to submit matters for consideration by an internal body of the NCA would probably constitute an obstacle to the effective discharge of the ECB Supervisory Board’s responsibilities, thereby undermining the effective performance by the ECB of its supervisory tasks. The members of the ECB Supervisory Board must, where necessary, be able to take swift positions on the contents of the draft decisions prepared or adjust the procedures for processing matters without having to obtain verification or confirmation of the position of a decision-making body in the NCA. 2.2.7 In the light of the above, the ECB considers that the provisions of the draft law on the FIN-FSA imposing an obligation on the FIN-FSA’s representative on the ECB Supervisory Board to submit ECB Supervisory Board matters for the consideration of the FIN-FSA Board should be removed. 2.3 Provision of information regarding ECB Supervisory Board matters to FIN-FSA Board 2.3.1 The ECB notes that the motivations for the draft laws argue that the FIN-FSA’s Board cannot fulfil its legal, governance and other tasks unless it receives sufficient advance information on matters to be discussed at meetings of the ECB Supervisory Board. In this respect, the ECB understands that, based on existing legislation, the FIN-FSA’s Board decides, among other things, on the overall strategy of the FIN-FSA, sets specific operational objectives, directs and supervises compliance with the strategy and achievement of the objectives, and reports to the Parliamentary Supervisory Council on the achievement of the FIN-FSA’s objectives. The ECB understands that the FIN-FSA’s Board also decides on the principles to be observed by the FIN-FSA in international cooperation, is responsible for taking certain supervisory decisions, such as decisions on administrative sanctions, and considers certain decisions within the Director-General’s competence. The ECB understands that the FIN-FSA Board’s responsibilities related to the administration of the FIN-FSA include, among other things, considering the annual budget of the FIN-FSA and submitting it for confirmation by Suomen Pankki’s Board. 2.3.2

text: Article 27(1) of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013

text: makes the members of the Supervisory Board subject to the professional secrecy requirements set out in Article 37 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter the ‘Statute of the ESCB’) and in the relevant acts of Union law . Members of the ECB Supervisory Board and other participants in ECB Supervisory Board meetings are required to take all necessary measures to ensure that the professional secrecy obligations in Article 37 of the Statute of the ESCB are respected by persons having access to the members’ information . In addition, it should be noted that documents drawn up by the ECB Supervisory Board are ECB documents, and therefore they must be classified and handled in accordance with Decision ECB/2004/2 . In particular, the proceedings of the ECB Supervisory Board are confidential. Consequently, without prejudice to the duty of cooperation in good faith between the ECB and the NCAs and the obligation to exchange information provided by

text: Article 6(2) of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013

text: the SSM Regulation,

text: any sharing of information by members of the ECB Supervisory Board must strictly comply with professional secrecy obligations and the ECB’s confidentiality rules. Therefore, the sharing of information by a member of the ECB Supervisory Board when seeking the views of others as referred to by para 2.2.4 shall be subject to professional secrecy obligations of those other persons. However, in this respect, national law imposing an obligation on the ECB Supervisory Board members to share ECB documents with any person, including the NCAs, is incompatible with the ECB’s independence in deciding how to handle ECB documents, including documents of the ECB Supervisory Board. 2.3.3 In addition, the ECB considers that a requirement to provide information to the FIN-FSA’s Board before the ECB Supervisory Board considers a particular matter would interfere with the independence of FIN-FSA’s representative on the ECB Supervisory Board, making the representative susceptible to attempts to unduly influence him or her in connection with his or her duties as a member of the ECB Supervisory Board. 2.4 Supervision fees According to the draft law on supervision fees, the future funding of the FIN-FSA would be guaranteed in a situation where one or more significant credit institution operating as a subsidiary might be transformed into a branch. However, the motivations for the draft laws recognise that in such a situation, the FIN-FSA would have to levy supervision fees almost up to the maximum amount permitted by law. In this regard, the ECB would like to point out that, when considering FIN-FSA’s resources, the SSM’s need for NCA staff on joint supervisory teams and inspection teams and the more intense supervision expected for less significant institutions, should also be taken into account.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 7 September 2016.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: COM(2016) 461 final.

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning (EU) nr 345/2013 av den 17 april 2013

text: om europeiska riskkapitalfonder (EUT L 115, 25.4.2013, s. 1).

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning (EU) nr 346/2013 av den 17 april 2013

text: om europeiska fonder för socialt företagande (EUT L 115, 25.4.2013, s. 18).

text: Meddelande från kommissionen till Europaparlamentet, rådet, Europeiska centralbanken, Europeiska ekonomiska och sociala kommittén samt Regionkommittén: Handlingsplan för en kapitalmarknadsunion (COM(2015) 468 final).

text: Meddelande från kommissionen till Europaparlamentet, rådet, Europeiska centralbanken, Europeiska ekonomiska sociala kommittén, Regionkommittén och Europeiska investeringsbanken: En investeringsplan för Europa (COM(2014) 903 final).

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 2011/61/EU av den 8 juni 2011

text: om förvaltare av alternativa investeringsfonder samt om ändring av direktiv

text: och

text: och förordningarna

text: (EG) nr 1060/2009

text: och

text: (EU) nr 1095/2010

text: (EUT L 174, 1.7.2011, s. 1).

text: Se Building a Capital Markets Union – Eurosystem contribution to the European Commission’s Green Paper som finns på: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/150521_eurosystem_contribution_to_green_paper_-_building_a_cmuen.pdf

text: Se sjätte stycket i punkt 2.4 i yttrande

text: . Alla ECB:s yttranden finns på ECB:s webbplats www.ecb.europa.eu. Arbete pågår även med att ta fram andra internationella standarder, t.ex. för en unik produktkod och en unik transaktionskod, som kan användas på marknaderna som ytterligare unik id-koder.

text: Förvaltare av godkända riskkapitalfonder definieras i

text: artikel 3 c i förordning (EU) nr 345/2013

text: som en juridisk person vars ordinarie affärsverksamhet består i förvaltning av minst en godkänd riskkapitalfond. Förvaltare av godkända fonder för socialt företagande definieras på ett liknande sätt i

text: artikel 3 c i förordning (EU) nr 346/2013

text: Europeiska centralbankens förordning

text: (EU) nr 1073/2013

text: av den 18 oktober 2013 om statistik över tillgångar och skulder hos investeringsfonder (ECB/2013/38) (EUT L 297, 7.11.2013, s. 73).

text: Riktlinje ECB/2012/21 av den 26 september 2012 om regler för kvalitetssäkringen av uppgifter i den centraliserade värdepappersdatabasen (EUT L 307, 7.11.2012, s. 89).

text: Se punkterna 2.2 och 2.3 i yttrande

text: Se artikel 1.2 a i förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning om de prospekt som ska offentliggöras när värdepapper erbjuds till allmänheten eller tas upp till handel (COM(2015) 583 final).

text: Se punkterna 2.2 och 2.3 i yttrande

publisher: Europeiska centralbanken

sprak: sv

title: Europeiska centralbankens yttrande av den 12 september 2016 om ett förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning om ändring av förordning (EU) nr 345/2013 om europeiska riskkapitalfonder och förordning (EU) nr 346/2013 om europeiska fonder för socialt företagande (CON/2016/44)

serie: con

text: Inledning och rättslig grund

type: rubrik

text: Den 3 augusti 2016 mottog Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) en begäran från Europeiska unionens råd om ett yttrande över ett förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning om ändring av förordning

text: (EU) nr 345/2013

text: (EU) nr 346/2013

text: om europeiska fonder för socialt företagande (nedan kallat förslaget till förordning).

type: stycke

text: ECB:s behörighet att avge ett yttrande grundas på artiklarna

text: och

text: i fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt eftersom förslaget till förordning innehåller bestämmelser som berör Europeiska centralbankssystemets (ECBS) uppgifter när det gäller att genomföra penningpolitiken och medverka till att de behöriga myndigheterna smidigt kan genomföra sin politik när det gäller det finansiella systemets stabilitet, i enlighet med

text: artikel 127.2

text: första strecksatsen och artikel 127.5 i fördraget. I enlighet med

text: artikel 17.5

text: första meningen i arbetsordningen för Europeiska centralbanken har detta yttrande antagits av ECB-rådet.

text: 1. Allmänna kommentarer

text: ECB stöder målet med förslaget till förordning, som är ett centralt inslag i handlingsplanen för en kapitalmarknadsunion (KMU) och kompletterar de andra pelarna i investeringsplanen för Europa. Förslaget till förordning bör göra det lättare för investerare, fondförvaltare och portföljbolag som är kvalificerade för sådana investeringar att dra nytta av europeiska riskkapitalfonder (nedan kallade EuVECA) och europeiska fonder för socialt företagande (nedan kallade EuSEF) och på så sätt främja fullbordandet av kapitalmarknadsunionen och bidra till att diversifiera finansieringskällorna och frigöra kapital.

text: 2. Specifika kommentarer

text: 2.1 Registrering av EuVECA- och EuSEF-fonder och deras förvaltare

text: ECB konstaterar att förslaget till förordning fastställer de villkor som måste uppfyllas av förvaltare auktoriserade enligt

text: när de registrerar EuVECA- och EuSEF-fonder. Dessa bestämmelser inkluderar tillhandahållandet av information som identifierar fonderna, aktierna eller andelarna som ska marknadsföras samt de personer som förvaltar fonderna.

text: ECB har tidigare i samband med kapitalmarknadsunionen förklarat att standardiseringen av statistisk information, genom unika identifieringskoder för institut, produkter och transaktioner, måste prioriteras för att uppnå en fungerande och högkvalitativ datainfrastruktur. ECB stöder särskilt användningen av internationellt överenskomna standarder, t.ex. ISIN-koden (det internationella standardnumret för värdepapper) och den globala identifieringskoden för juridiska personer (LEI) som unika identifieringskoder för att uppfylla rapporteringskraven på värdepappersmarknaderna. Vad gäller EuVECA- och EuSEF-fonder anser ECB att den information som förvaltaren måste tillhandahålla när fonderna registreras bör omfatta det obligatoriska kravet att ange den globala identifieringskoden (LEI) för att identifiera fonderna och deras auktoriserade förvaltare. ISIN-koden bör också inkluderas för att identifiera andelarna, eller aktierna, i de fonder som ska marknadsföras. Detta skulle förbättra tillförlitligheten på sådan statistisk information och därmed göra det möjligt att bedriva en effektiv penningpolitik. EuVECA- och EuSEF-fonder är en del av den rapporterande populationen för statistik över investeringsfonders tillgångar och skulder enligt Europeiska centralbankens förordning

text: (EU) nr 1073/2013

text: (ECB/2013/38), och deras aktier eller andelar ingår i den centraliserade värdepappersdatabasen i enlighet med Europeiska centralbankens riktlinje ECB/2012/21. Dessa uppgifter används av ECB för att bestämma unionens penningpolitik, inklusive granskningen och analysen av icke-konventionella åtgärder.

text: ECB:s förslag om ett obligatoriskt krav att rapportera den globala identifieringskoden (LEI) och ISIN-koden bör gälla för alla finansmarknader, inte bara specifika marknadssegment. En sådan tillämpning säkerställer att alla berörda parter har tillgång till en minimiuppsättning av standardiserad information som omfattar de huvudsakliga egenskaperna för alla institut, produkter och transaktioner på finansmarknaderna.

text: ECB anser därför att andra ändringar av den lagstiftning som utgör grunden för kapitalmarknadsunionen i möjligaste mån också bör stadga om en obligatorisk rapportering av unika identifieringskoder. Detta skulle göra det möjligt att skapa automatiska databehandlingsrutiner som underlättar spridningen av standardiserad information till alla berörda parter på kapitalmarknaderna. ECB har tidigare förklarat att den anser att, när värdepapper erbjuds allmänheten eller tas upp till handel på en reglerad finansmarknad, vissa av nyckelattributen i prospekten bör vara maskinläsbara, och bör inkludera unika identifieringskoder avseende emittenter, erbjudare, garanter och själva värdepapperena. Enheter som emitteras av företag för kollektiva investeringar (ej slutna) untantogs uttryckligen från tillämpningsområdet för förslaget till förordning om prospekt och omfattas därför inte av ECB:s förslag om obligatorisk rapportering av unika identifieringskoder i det sammanhanget. För att delvis stänga denna lucka bör förslaget till förordning även inkludera en bestämmelse om obligatorisk rapportering av unika identifieringskoder, som en del av de föreslagna ändringarna avseende informationskraven för förvaltare när de registrerar sina EuVECA- och EuSEF-fonder.

text: 2.2 ESMA:s centrala databaser över förvaltare av EuVECA- och EuSEF-fonder

text: ECB konstaterar att förslaget till förordning uppställer kravet att Europeiska värdepappers- och marknadsmyndigheten (Esma) ska inrätta en central databas, tillgänglig för allmänheten, som a) identifierar alla förvaltare av godkända riskkapitalfonder som använder beteckningen EuVECA, de godkända fonder för vilka de använder denna samt de länder i vilka dessa fonder marknadsförs, och b) identifierar alla förvaltare av fonder för socialt företagande som använder beteckningen EuSEF, de godkända fonder för vilka de använder denna samt de länder i vilka dessa fonder marknadsförs.

text: I linje med vad som anförts ovan föreslår ECB att dessa databaser som Esma ska inrätta även inkluderar LEI-koden för varje fond och förvaltare samt ISIN-koden för fondens andelar eller aktier.

text: 3. Tekniska synpunkter och förslag

text: I de fall där ECB rekommenderar att förslaget till förordning ändras anges de specifika förslagen i ett separat tekniskt arbetsdokument som åtföljs av en förklaring.

text: Det tekniska arbetsdokumentet återfinns i bilagan till detta yttrande och finns på engelska på ECB:s webbplats.

type: vagledning

utgivare: ecb


text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).

text: The ECB has not been consulted on the assignment of the new task under the law on insurance.

text: See for example paragraph 3.1.2 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 3.1.1 of Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

sprak: en

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 19 September 2016 on the role of Národná banka Slovenska in reporting on insurance premium levy (CON/2016/45)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 19 September 2016 on the role of Národná banka Slovenska in reporting on insurance premium levy (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 16 August 2016 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Ministry of Finance of the Slovak Republic (hereinafter the ‘Ministry of Finance’) for an opinion on a draft law amending Law No 39/2015 on insurance and on amendments of certain laws (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft law relates to Národná banka Slovenska (NBS). In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 Under the current legal framework, insurance undertakings established in Slovakia and other Member States and branches of third-country insurance undertakings (hereinafter jointly referred to as ‘insurance undertakings’) are required to make annual partial premium transfers in the amount of 8% of the premiums received from compulsory motor vehicle liability insurance in respect of activities carried out in the Slovak Republic in the previous year. The transfers must be made to a separate account of the Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic (hereinafter the ‘Ministry of Interior’). The insurance undertakings must report the partial premium transfers to NBS, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Interior within three working days of the date of transfer. In addition, the insurance undertakings are required to provide NBS with data that supports the items used in the calculation of the base for the annual premium transfers. The funds collected from the premium transfers are allocated by the Ministry of Interior, after having consulted the Ministry of Finance, to cover certain pre-defined expenses, such as those of fire brigades and relevant units of the Ministry of Interior in relation to traffic and accidents. 1.2 The draft law extends the mandatory premium transfers to all classes of non-life insurance products and provides for the premium transfers to take place on a quarterly basis. Consequently, the insurance undertakings will have to report quarterly to the relevant Ministries and NBS and also provide to NBS on a quarterly basis the data that supports the items used in the calculation of the

text: base for the premium transfers. Under the draft law, the additional financial resources will be transferred to the Ministries of Health, Environment and Finance, which will use the funds for a set of pre-defined purposes, in particular for a renewal and modernisation of the healthcare infrastructure, implementation of flood management measures, and to cover unforeseen expenditures of the central government.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 The draft law imposes on the insurance undertakings a new substantial quarterly reporting requirement vis-à-vis NBS, which will considerably increase the amount of data to be reported to and processed by NBS. As a result, the draft law significantly expands the substance of the task currently performed by NBS. 2.2 The ECB underlines that, in the context of a proposed conferral of tasks on a European System of Central Banks (ESCB) member, it is necessary to assess such conferral against the prohibition of monetary financing under Article 123 of the Treaty. The ECB has developed the following guidance, in the form of general and specific considerations, on the basis of which the ECB may decide whether a new task conferred on an ESCB national central bank (NCB) is to be considered a central banking task or a government task for the purposes of the monetary financing prohibition. 2.2.1 General considerations First, the systematic categorisation of tasks assigned to NCBs as central banking or government tasks applies to genuinely new tasks that did not exist in the past or did not form an integral part of the central banking tasks already assigned to the NCB. In recognition of the different Member States’ legal frameworks, central banking traditions and national set-ups, the tasks currently discharged by an NCB as central banking tasks are not reviewed and re-categorised, but may be reassessed if they are subject to legislative amendments of substance. Second, the principle of financial independence requires that the Member States may not put their NCBs in a position where they have insufficient financial resources to carry out their ESCB- or Eurosystem-related tasks, as applicable. Third, central banking tasks comprise in particular those tasks that are related to the tasks listed in

text: Article 127(2)

text: , (5) and (6) of the Treaty. Fourth, new tasks conferred on an NCB which are atypical of NCBs’ tasks, or which are clearly discharged on behalf of and in the exclusive interest of the government or of other public entities, should be considered as government tasks. In that context, a distinction should be drawn between liquidity- and solvency-related tasks of NCBs. While, for purposes of the monetary financing prohibition, solvency support is a government task, liquidity-related tasks, the ultimate objective of which are to finance the economy, are central banking tasks. 2.2.2 Specific considerations An important criterion for classifying a new task as a government task is, therefore, the impact of the task on the institutional, financial and personal independence of the NCB. In particular, the following should be taken into account.

text: First, it should be assessed whether the performance of the new task creates inadequately addressed conflicts of interests with existing central banking tasks, and does not necessarily complement those existing central banking tasks. If a conflict of interest arises between existing and new tasks, there should be sufficient mitigation in place to adequately address that conflict. Complementarity between the new task and existing central banking tasks should not, however, be interpreted extensively, so as to lead to the creation of an indefinite chain of ancillary tasks. Complementarity should also be examined from the point of view of the financing of those tasks. Second, it should be assessed whether without new financial resources the performance of the new task is disproportionate to the financial or organisational capacity of the NCB concerned, and may negatively impact its capacity to properly perform existing central banking tasks. Third, it should be assessed whether the performance of the new task does not fit into the institutional set-up of the NCB in the light of central bank independence and accountability considerations. Fourth, it should be assessed whether the performance of the new task harbours substantial financial risks. Fifth, it should be assessed whether the performance of the new task exposes the members of the NCB’s decision-making bodies to political risks which are disproportionate and may also impact on their personal independence and, in particular, the guarantee of the term of office under Article 14.2 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank. 2.2.3 Any final assessment on the qualification of a task given to an NCB as either falling within the scope of a central banking task or a government task will be guided by the objective of ensuring the consistent application of the prohibition of monetary financing within the Eurosystem and the ESCB to the extent that it applies to its members.

text: 3. Specific observations

text: 3.1 Collection of additional insurance data for taxation purposes Under Law No 39/2015 on insurance and on amendments of certain laws (hereinafter the ’law on insurance’), NBS receives from insurance undertakings data that supports the items used in the calculation of the base for the annual premium transfers in respect of compulsory motor vehicle liability insurance . However, the draft law substantially extends the scope of the data to be reported to NBS by covering all non-life insurance products and increases the reporting frequency by requiring quarterly reporting. Although neither the law on insurance nor the draft law are clear on how and for which purposes the data is to be processed by NBS, the draft law significantly expands the substance of the task initially conferred on NBS, which should therefore be assessed against the prohibition of monetary financing. 3.2 Tasks not related to basic central banking tasks listed in

text: Article 127(2)

text: and (5) of the Treaty

text: The collection, maintenance and processing of the data that supports the items used in the calculation of the base for quarterly partial premium transfers is not linked to any of the central banking tasks listed in

text: Article 127(2)

text: and (5) of the Treaty. In addition, such new tasks are not complementary to the existing supervisory tasks of NBS. Although NBS is responsible for the supervision of insurance undertakings, the objectives of its supervisory tasks substantially differ from the objectives of the new tasks conferred on NBS under the draft law. While the main objective of the prudential supervision over insurance undertakings is the protection of policyholders and beneficiaries , the objective of the new tasks conferred on NBS under the draft law is linked to the financing of certain pre-defined expenses incurred in the performance of government tasks. In the ECB’s view, the fact that such expenses are related to losses or to the negative effects of losses, which would potentially be covered by non-life insurance products offered by the insurance undertakings, does not form a sufficient rationale to consider the new tasks conferred on NBS under the draft law as complementary to NBS’s supervisory tasks. 3.3 Discharge of tasks on behalf of and in the exclusive interest of the government The proceeds of the partial premium transfers are to be used by the relevant Ministries of the Slovak government for specific pre-defined purposes and contribute to the financing of government tasks, e.g. to finance expenses of fire brigades, renewal and modernisation of the healthcare infrastructure, implementation of flood management measures and to cover unforeseen expenditures of the central government. The collection, maintenance and processing of the data that supports the items used in the calculation of the base for the quarterly partial premium transfers are, therefore, also in the interest of the Slovak government. 3.4 Atypical tasks No ESCB NCB currently performs a task that would be comparable to the task introduced by the draft law. The task conferred on NBS by the draft law must be distinguished from the tasks performed by other ESCB NCBs related to the supervision of insurance undertakings, financial stability or collection of statistical data. In particular, some ESCB NCBs collect data from insurance undertakings in order to obtain sufficient information about their financial situation or to collect fees which ultimately finance the supervisory tasks of the relevant ESCB NCBs. Some ESCB NCBs are involved in the process of computing and imposing fees and contributions on financial institutions for the purpose of e.g. deposit guarantee funds, resolution funds, investor compensation funds or insurance compensation funds. Unlike the task conferred on NBS under the draft law, these tasks are either complementary to the ESCB NCBs’ supervisory mandates or related to financial stability. Therefore, it can be concluded that the new task under the draft law is an atypical central banking task. 3.5 Extent to which the performance of tasks poses substantial or disproportionate financial burden The principle of financial independence requires NCBs to have sufficient means to carry out not only their ESCB-related tasks, but also their national tasks from both an operational and financial point of view. Allocation of specific non-ESCB related tasks to NCBs, e.g. collection of data that

text: supports the items used in the calculation of the base for insurance premium transfers, also requires an allocation of additional human and financial resources for these tasks in order to ensure that they are carried out in a manner that will not affect the NCB’s operational capacity to perform its ESCB-related tasks . The draft law does not address in any way the additional expenses resulting from the conferral on NBS of the new task. The draft law is not clear on how NBS should treat and process the data received. Therefore, it is difficult to assess whether the performance of the new task is disproportionate to the financial or organisational capacity of NBS and whether it may negatively impact NBS’s capacity to properly perform its existing central banking tasks. 3.6 Extent to which the performance of tasks poses substantial financial or disproportionate political

text: risks

text: In the absence of any provision in the draft law which would exclude the liability of NBS for the exercise of the tasks under the draft law, NBS would ultimately be liable for damages in accordance with the Slovak state liability rules. Therefore, the new task conferred on NBS under the draft law would entail additional financial risks, which would have to be assumed by NBS in relation to tasks performed in the interest of the Slovak government. 3.7 Conclusion The ECB considers the new task conferred on NBS under the draft law to be a government task. Therefore the ECB expresses its general concern regarding the proposed conferral of such task on NBS. With a view to dispelling the monetary financing concerns associated with carrying out a government task, it should be ensured that NBS has sufficient resources to perform the new task without affecting its capacity to carry out its central banking tasks. To this end, it is necessary that NBS is fully reimbursed for any additional costs associated with performing the new task and, in the case of application of the Slovak state liability rules, the Slovak Republic has no indemnification rights.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 19 September 2016.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: Zakon o spremembah in dopolnitvah zakona o nematerializiranih vrednostnih papirjih. 2

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42). 3 Zakon o nematerializiranih vrednostnih papirjih (ZNVP-1) (Ur. l. RS No 75/15).

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 26 September 2016 on amendments to the Book Entry Securities Act (CON/2016/46)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 26 September 2016 on amendments to the Book Entry Securities Act (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 26 August 2016 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Slovenian Ministry of Finance for an opinion on amendments to the Book Entry Securities Act (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the fifth indent of

text: , as the draft law relates to payment and settlement systems. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft

text: 1.1 The main objective of the draft law is to establish rules facilitating auto-collateralisation within the Target2 Securities (T2S) platform by transferring book-entry securities to an account pledged in favour of Banka Slovenije. The draft law’s explanatory memorandum indicates that under the current Book Entry Securities Act , a pledge over book-entry securities can only be established on the basis of a unilateral order entered in the system by a member of a central securities depository (CSD). For successful auto-collateralisation, the pledgee must also be able to create a pledge. The draft law takes into account the fact that T2S cannot accommodate multiple liens over bookentry securities. 1.2 The draft law amends the current Book Entry Securities Act to provide for the creation and deletion of pledges over book-entry securities with and without the transfer of dematerialised securities between accounts. The creation and deletion of such pledges involving a transfer between the accounts of different holders can only be accomplished by a bilateral order. 1.3 When entering a transferring part of an order for the transfer of book-entry securities, their holder may give prior authorisation to the member of the CSD authorised to enter the receiving part of the order on behalf of the acquirer. Such prior authorisation may only be given for book-entry securities

text: on a specially marked account of the holder and is only valid for book-entry securities on this account. 1.4 The draft law further provides that if, in accordance with the holder’s request when entering their pledge over the book-entry securities, the member of the CSD authorised by the pledgor is replaced by a member authorised by the pledgee, the pledge is then created on the basis of a bilateral order. The holder may give prior authorisation for a member of the CSD to create the pledge. Such prior authorisation may only be given for book-entry securities on a specially marked account of the holder and is only valid for book-entry securities on this account. The draft law provides that a book-entry security may not be encumbered on multiple occasions, nor may a pledge be established over an already encumbered book-entry security.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 The ECB welcomes the amendments proposed by the draft law, which will further align the Slovenian legal framework with T2S requirements for successful auto-collateralisation and facilitate the smooth integration of the Slovenian CSD into T2S. 2.2 The ECB understands that in the context of T2S auto-collateralisation, Banka Slovenije is in a position to be simultaneously both a member of the CSD, authorised in advance to enter the transferring part of the order, and the acquirer (i.e., the entity which obtains a pledge over the security), authorised to enter the receiving part of the order. Consequently, T2S autocollateralisation transactions are executed in favour of Banka Slovenije automatically in line with T2S’s functionalities without any additional intervention by Banka Slovenije or other CSD members. The ECB further understands that by referring to the specially marked account of the holder, the draft law refers to the account pledged in favour of Banka Slovenije.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 26 September 2016.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42). 2 See Article 26 of the Law on Latvijas Banka. 3 See Article 24 of the Law on Latvijas Banka.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 28 September 2016 on amendments to the Law on Latvijas Banka reducing the number of members of the Council of Latvijas Banka (CON/2016/47)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 28 September 2016 on amendments to the Law on Latvijas Banka reducing the number of members of the Council of Latvijas Banka (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 8 September 2016 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from Latvijas Banka for an opinion on draft amendments to the Law on Latvijas Banka (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft law relates to Latvijas Banka. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The sole purpose of the draft law is to formally reduce the number of members of the Council of Latvijas Banka (hereinafter the ‘Council’) from eight to six. The Council is Latvijas Banka’s highest decision-making body. It makes decisions on behalf of Latvijas Banka, which are necessary to ensure the implementation of the tasks of Latvijas Banka, including the tasks of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) . The quorum for the meetings of the Council is more than half of its members, including the Governor and the Deputy Governor. Decisions of the Council are taken by a majority vote of the members present at the meeting. In the event of a tie, the chairperson of the meeting has the casting vote . The meetings of the Council are convened as required, but at least once a quarter. 1.2 The Council currently performs its tasks in the composition of six members because the terms of office of two members of the Council expired several months ago. Latvijas Banka is of the opinion that the current composition of the Council of six members in total, including the Governor and the Deputy Governor, will be adequate for successful performance of Latvijas Banka's functions, including ESCB-related tasks.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 The proposed amendments do not raise personal independence concerns regarding the tenure of office of the Council members due to the fact that the two posts proposed to be removed by the draft law are currently vacant. 2.2 The ECB relies on Latvijas Banka’s assessment that the reduction of the number of members of the Council will have no impact on Latvijas Banka’s ability to successfully perform all functions and tasks of Latvijas Banka, including ESCB-related tasks.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 28 September 2016.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: Business of Credit Institutions Law of 1997 to 2016 ( L. 66(I)/1997),(L. 74(I)/1999),(L.94(I)/2000),(L.119(I)/2003), (L.4(I)/2004),(L.151(I)/2004),(L.231(I)/2004),(L.235(I)/2004),(L.20(I)/2005),(L.80(I)/2005),(L.100(I)/2009),(L.123(I)/20 09),(L.27(I)/2011),(L.104(I)/2011),(L.107(I)/2012),(L.14(I)/2013),(L.87(I)/2013),(L.102(I)/2013),(L.141(I)/2013),(L.5(I)/ 2015),(L.26(I)/2015),(L.35(I)/2015),(L.71(I)/2015),(L.93(I)/2015),(L.109(I)/2015),(L.152(I)/2015),(L.168(I)/2015),(L.21( I)/2016).

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42). 3 Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive

text: and repealing Directives

text: and

text: (OJ L 176, 27.06.2013, p.338). 4 Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending

text: Council Directive 82/891/EEC

text: , and Directives

text: and

text: , and Regulations

text: (EU) No 1093/2010

text: and

text: (EU) No 648/2012

text: , of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 173, 12.06.2014, p.190).

text: Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 February 2014 on credit agreements for consumers relating to residential immovable property and amending Directives

text: and 2013/36EU and

text: Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010

text: (OJ L 60, 28.02.2014, p. 34). 6 Guidelines

text: of the European Banking Authority of 22 November 2012 on the assessment of the suitability of members of the management body and key function holders, available on the European Banking Authority’s website at www.eba.europa.eu. 7

text: Article 6

text: (1A) of the draft law. 8

text: Article 6

text: (1B) of the draft law. 9

text: Article 6

text: (1C) of the draft law. 10

text: Regulation (EU) No 575/2013

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending

text: Regulation (EU) No 648/2012

text: (OJ L 176, 27.06.2013, p.1).

text: Available on the CBC’s website at www.centralbank.gov.cy.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 11 October 2016 on the handling of real property or share capital acquired by a credit institution after a debt settlement process (CON/2016/48)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 11 October 2016 on the handling of real property or share capital acquired by a credit institution after a debt settlement process (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 9 August 2016 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Ministry of Finance of Cyprus for an opinion on a draft law amending the Laws on the business of credit institutions 1997 to 2016 (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third and sixth indents of

text: , as the draft law contains provisions relating to a national central bank, the ESCB’s task of contributing to the smooth conduct of policies pursued by competent authorities relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the financial market system pursuant to Article 127(5) of the Treaty, and the tasks conferred on the ECB pursuant to Article 127(6) of the Treaty concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1. The main purpose of the draft law is to harmonise Cypriot law with Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council , Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of 4 5 the Council , and Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council , as well as

text: to ensure that Cypriot law complies with Guidelines

text: of the European Banking Authority . 1.2 The draft law also introduces certain provisions that are specific to Cypriot law. In particular, the draft law expands the circumstances in which a credit institution may exercise a business activity where the credit institution, as a consequence of debt settlement proceedings, has acquired immovable property or share capital in another company. Under the draft law, a credit institution that acquires property following such proceedings may (a) carry out maintenance work on the property, (b) lease the property to third parties as long as the rent does not limit the possibilities of selling the property or (c) in cases where the credit institution has taken all the appropriate actions to sell the property but these were unsuccessful, may complete any semi-finished works or develop the property in order to make it marketable, in line with a viability study . The draft law further provides that, if a credit institution has acquired share capital in a company following debt settlement proceedings, the credit institution may appoint a receiver or a manager to wind up the company or a manager to run the company with a view to maintaining its value prior to foreclosure . Credit institutions that acquire another company’s share capital during debt settlement proceedings must dispose of this share capital within three years of the date of its acquisition. However, upon request by the credit institution, the Central Bank of Cyprus (CBC) may agree to extend the three-year deadline due to exceptional circumstances . 1.3 Additionally, the draft law imposes restrictions on granting credit facilities to the members of the management bodies of credit institutions and to persons holding more than 10% of the share capital of the credit institution. According to the draft law, these restrictions apply subject to Part Four of

text: Regulation (EU) No 575/2013

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council . 1.4 The draft law also provides that, in determining compliance with the restrictions on granting credit facilities to the members of the management bodies and to persons holding more than 10% of the share capital of the credit institution, the CBC may exempt any exposure having regard to the exceptionally low risk arising from the exposures concerned. The draft law deletes the existing provision in the Laws on the business of credit institutions 1997 to 2016, which states that such exemptions must not be in conflict with Union legislation currently in force in Cyprus. 1.5 The draft law prohibits legal entities from acting as members of the management board of a credit institution established in Cyprus. The draft law further specifies that no person may act as a member of the management board or a senior manager, nor may any person hold a key function or

text: participate in meetings of the management board of a credit institution established in Cyprus, without the CBC’s prior approval. The draft law exempts experts and senior managers of credit institutions from this approval procedure if they have been asked to give advice on specific issues under consideration by the management board. If, in the CBC’s opinion, a member of the management board, the chief executive officer, a senior manager or a key function holder of a credit institution established in Cyprus is not a fit and suitable person to continue to act in that position, the CBC may order that that person be removed from the position. The draft law specifies that the assessment procedure and the criteria determining the fitness and suitability of the above mentioned individuals are laid down in the CBC’s Directive on the Assessment of the Fitness and Probity of Members of the Management Board and managers of Authorised Credit Institutions of 2014 (hereinafter the ‘CBC Directive’) .

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 This opinion does not address whether Cypriot law has been effectively harmonised with Directive

text: , Directive

text: , and Directive

text: , for which the Commission is responsible, neither whether the draft law observes Guidelines

text: or whether the provisions of the draft law that specifically interact with directly applicable provisions of Union law are fully compliant with such directly applicable provisions. 2.2 The ECB notes that the draft law broadens the scope of the activities of credit institutions, as it expands the circumstances in which a credit institution may exercise a business activity where, as a consequence of debt settlement proceedings, it acquires immovable property or share capital of another company. The ECB appreciates that this proposal is necessary due to the high number of non-performing loans in Cyprus. Therefore, it is extremely likely that credit institutions will acquire a substantial number of immovable properties and shareholdings as a result of debt settlement arrangements, which will need to be dealt with. Allowing credit institutions to conduct business activities with immovable properties and shareholdings they acquire will facilitate the preservation of financial stability and the soundness of the Cypriot banking sector. However, having immovable property and shareholdings on the credit institutions’ balance sheets will result in the credit institutions’ solvency and profitability being more sensitive to fluctuations in the value of immovable property and share prices. The ECB recommends that credit institutions should take measures to ensure that they are adequately protected from such changes and that they employ individuals with the appropriate expertise to manage real estate portfolios, since this is not a part of their core business activity. 2.3 The ECB considers that the proposed restrictions on granting credit facilities to the members of the management bodies of credit institutions and to persons holding more than 10% of the share capital of the credit institution should positively contribute to more robust governance arrangements in the Cypriot banking sector.

text: 2.4 The ECB welcomes the provisions concerning the evaluation of, inter alia, key function holders, which aim to comply with Guidelines

text: . The key function holders may substantially influence the day-to-day management and risk profile of credit institutions, and thus play a crucial role in ensuring compliance with robust government arrangements. The ECB would like to recall that the ECB will conduct the suitability assessment of members of the management bodies of significant institutions, with the assistance of the CBC. In that regard the CBC Directive should be aligned with ECB administrative practices.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 11 October 2016.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: COM(2016) 450 final.

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv (EU) 2015/849 av den 20 maj 2015

text: om åtgärder för att förhindra att det finansiella systemet används för penningtvätt eller finansiering av terrorism, om ändring av

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning (EU) nr 648/2012

text: och om upphävande av

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 2005/60/EG

text: och rådets och

text: kommissionens direktiv 2006/70/EG

text: (EUT L 141, 5.6.2015, s. 73).

text: Se skäl 6 i förslaget till direktiv.

text: Se skäl 6 och artikel 1.1 i förslaget till direktiv.

text: Se artikel 1.16 i förslaget till direktiv.

text: Se ATF:s International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation: The FATF Recommendations (februari 2012). Se även FATF Report Virtual Currencies Key Definitions and Potential AML/CFT Risks (juni 2014) och FATF Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach – Virtual Currencies (juni 2015). Alla dokument finns på FATF:s webbplats www.fatf-gafi.org

text: Se sidan 13 i motiveringen till förslaget till direktiv och skälen 6 och 7 i förslaget till direktiv. Se även förslaget till betänkande från Europaparlamentets utskott för ekonomi- och valutafrågor om virtuella valutor (2016/2007 [INI]) av den 23 februari 2016.

text: Se artikel 1.2 c i förslaget till direktiv. Denna definition tycks vara baserad på punkt 19 i Europeiska bankmyndighetens (EBA) yttrande om virtuella valutor av den 4 juli 2014 (EBA/Op/2014/08) som finns på EBA:s webbplats www.eba.europa.eu

text: Se definitionen av pengar i

text: artikel 2 a i Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 2014/62/EU av den 15 maj 2014

text: om straffrättsligt skydd av euron och andra valutor mot penningförfalskning och om ersättande av rådets rambeslut 2000/383/RIF (EUT L 151, 21.5.2014, s. 1). Se även sidan 16 i Internationella valutafondens (IMF) publikation Virtual Currencies and Beyond: Initial Considerations (januari 2016), finns på IMF:s webbplats www.imf.org.

text: Se ingressen och

text: artikel 3.4 i fördraget om Europeiska unionen

text: artikel 119.2 i fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt

text: , samt

text: artikel 2 i rådets förordning (EG) nr 974/98 av den 3 maj 1998

text: om införande av euron (EGT L 139, 11.5.1998, s. 1).

text: Se t.ex. artiklarna 2–5 i den japanska lagen om betaltjänster där man definierar att virtuella valutor ej omfattar yen och utländska valutor, och avsnitt 103.8 i United States' National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws Draft Regulation of Virtual Currency Businesses Act av den 2 februari 2016, där man definierar att virtuella valutor ej omfattar pengar. För en mer ingående analys av regleringen av Bitcoin i 41 jurisdiktioner, se rapporten från The Law Library of Congress med titeln Regulation of Bitcoin in Selected Jurisdictions (januari 2014), se även uttalanden från det kanadensiska parlamentets senatskommitté för bank och handel av den 26 mars 2014, där det kanadensiska finansministeriet förklarar att virtuella pengar inte är den officiella valutan i Kanada, eftersom de inte är kanadensiska dollar.

text: Se s. 24 i ECB:s rapport Virtual Currency Schemes – a further analysis (februari 2015), finns på ECB:s webbplats www.ecb.europa.eu

text: Se s. 15 i rapporten från BIS Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures med titeln Digital currencies (november 2015), finns på www.bis.org

text: Exempelvis virtuella valutor som ethers, valutaenheten för ethereum block chain, som används på handelsplatser för inverstingar eller spekulation, men som inte alltid fungerar som betalningsmedel. Se även s. 4 FATF:s Guidance for a risk based approach - Virtual Currencies (juni 2015), finns på FATF:s webbplats www.fatf-gafi.org

text: Se sidan 7 i IMF:s publikation Virtual Currencies and Beyond: Initial Considerations (januari 2016), finns på IMF:s webbplats www.imf.org

text: Se artikel 1.12 i förslaget till direktiv.

text: Se s. 7 i motiveringen till förslaget till direktiv.

text: Se t.ex. punkt 2.1 i yttrande

text: , punkt 2 i yttrande

text: , punkterna 3.1 och 3.2 i yttrande

text: samt punkterna 3.1–3.8 i yttrande

text: . Alla ECB-yttranden finns på ECB:s webbplats www.ecb.europa.eu

title: Europeiska centralbankens yttrande av den 12 oktober 2016 om ett förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv om ändring av direktiv (EU) 2015/849 om åtgärder för att förhindra att det finansiella systemet används för penningtvätt eller finansiering av terrorism och om ändring av direktiv 2009/101/EG (CON/2016/49)

text: Inledning och rättslig grund

text: Den 19 augusti 2016 och den 23 september 2016 mottog Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) en begäran från rådet respektive Europaparlamentet om ett yttrande över ett förslag om ändring av

text: direktiv (EU) 2015/849

text: (nedan kallat förslaget till direktiv).

text: ECB:s behörighet att avge ett yttrande grundas på artiklarna

text: och

text: i fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt eftersom förslaget till direktiv faller inom ECB:s behörighetsområde. ECB:s behörighet att avge ett yttrande grundas på artikel

text: och

text: samt artikel 128.1 i fördraget, eftersom det förslaget till direktiv innehåller bestämmelser som berör vissa av Europeiska centralbankssystemets (ECBS) uppgifter, bl.a. att främja väl fungerande betalningssystem, att medverka till att de behöriga myndigheterna smidigt kan genomföra sin politik när det gäller det finansiella systemets stabilitet samt rätten att tillåta utgivning av eurosedlar inom unionen. I enlighet med

text: artikel 17.5

text: första meningen i arbetsordningen för Europeiska centralbanken har detta yttrande antagits av ECB-rådet.

text: 1. Observationer

text: 1.1 Reglering av växlingsplattformar för virtuella valutor och förvaringstjänster för virtuella plånböcker

text: 1.1.1 Genom förslaget till direktiv utökas förteckningen över ansvariga enheter som omfattas av

text: för att inkludera leverantörer som främst och professionellt erbjuder valutatjänster mellan virtuella valutor och fiatvalutor (som enligt förslaget till direktiv är valutor som förklarats vara lagliga betalningsmedel) samt leverantörer av förvaringstjänster för identifieringsuppgifter som krävs för åtkomst av virtuella valutor (nedan kallade förvaringstjänster för virtuella plånböcker). Enligt förslaget till direktiv ska medlemsstaterna också se till att leverantörer av valutatjänster mellan virtuella valutor och fiatvalutor, och förvaringstjänster för virtuella plånböcker har tillstånd eller är registrerade. ECB är mycket positiv till dessa bestämmelser, som är i linje med rekommendationerna från arbetsgruppen för finansiella åtgärder (FATF), eftersom terrorister och andra kriminella grupper för närvarande kan överföra pengar inom virtuella valutanät genom dolda överföringar eller genom att utnyttja en viss grad av anonymitet på dessa plattformar. Användningen av virtuella valutor utgör också en större risk än traditionella betalningsmedel i den bemärkelsen att överförbarheten av virtuella valutor är beroende av internet och bara begränsas av den kapacitet som en viss virtuell valutas underliggande nätverk av datorer och IT-infrastruktur har. I detta sammanhang påpekar ECB också att digitala valutor inte nödvändigtvis måste växlas till rättsligt etablerade valutor. De kan användas för att köpa varor och tjänster utan att växlas till ett rättsligt etablerade valutor eller utan att använda en förvaringstjänst för virtuella plånböcker. Sådana transaktioner skulle inte omfattas av någon av de kontrollåtgärder som framgår av förslaget och skulle kunna användas för att finansiera illegal verksamhet.

text: 1.1.2 ECB är medveten om att den tekniska utvecklingen bakom den distribuerade databastekniken (distributed ledger technology, DLT) som är grunden för alternativa betalningssätt, t.ex. virtuella valutor, potentiellt kan öka effektiviteten, spridningen och valet av betalnings- och överföringsmetoder. EU:s lagstiftande organ bör dock undvika att intrycket uppstår att man gynnar användningen av privata digitala valutor, eftersom sådana alternativa betalningssätt varken är rättsligt etablerade valutor och heller inte utgör lagliga betalningsmedel som getts ut centralbanker och andra offentliga myndigheter. ECB har flera synpunkter på de skillnader som finns mellan det som i förslaget kallas virtuella valutor och fiatvalutor – en sådan är de virtuella valutornas volatilitet, som normalt är högre än volatiliteten för valutor som getts ut av centralbanker eller vars utgivning godkänns av centralbanker, eftersom denna volatilitet inte alltid tycks ha ett samband med ekonomiska eller finansiella faktorer. Andra synpunkter är a) till skillnad från innehavare av rättsligt etablerade valutor saknar innehavare av virtuella valutaenheter oftast en garanti för att de i framtiden kommer att kunna byta ut dessa enheter mot varor och tjänster eller rättsligt etablerade valutor, och b) att om de ekonomiska aktörerna i framtiden i allt högre grad förlitar sig på virtuella valutor, skulle detta i princip kunna få negativa konselvenser för centralbankernas möjlighet att kontrollera penningmängden och teoretiskt kunna medföra risker för prisstabiliteten, även om detta just nu inte är någon risk. Även om det är lämpligt att EU:s lagstiftande organ, i överensstämmelse med FATF-rekommendationerna, reglerar virtuella valutor för att förhindra penningtvätt och finansiering av terrorism, bör de i detta sammanhang inte främja en ökad användning av virtuella valutor.

text: 1.1.3 Termen virtuella valutor definieras i förslaget till direktiv som en digital värderepresentation som varken emitterats av en centralbank eller en offentlig myndighet, som inte nödvändigtvis är kopplad till en fiatvaluta, och som godtas av fysiska och juridiska personer såsom betalningsmedel och som kan överföras, lagras och handlas elektroniskt. ECB har flera specifika kommentarer avseende den definitionen. Den första är att virtuella valutor inte kan anses vara valutor ur ett unionsperspektiv. I enlighet med fördragen och bestämmelserna i

text: rådets förordning (EG) nr 974/98

text: är euron den gemensamma valutan i den ekonomiska och monetära unionen som inrättats av Europeiska unionen, dvs. de medlemsstater som har antagit euron som sin valuta. Utifrån detta tillvägagångssätt som antingen har genomförts eller håller på att genomföras i andra jurisdiktioner som reglerar växlingsplattformar för virtuella valutor (bl.a. Kanada, Japan och Förenta staterna) rekommenderar ECB att definitionen av virtuella valutor bör vara mer specifik, så att den uttryckligen stadgar att virtuella valutor inte är rättsligt etablerade valutor eller pengar. Eftersom virtuella valutor inte är riktiga valutor, vore det mer naturligt att se dem som överföringssystem än som betalningsmedel. Definitionen av virtuella valutor såsom betalningsmedel i förslaget till direktiv beaktar inte det faktum att virtuella valutor i vissa fall kan användas för andra ändamål än som betalningsmedel. Banken för internationell betalningsutjämning (BIS) påpekar att den distribuerade databasteknik (distributed ledger technology, DLT) som ligger till grund för virtuella valutor kan användas på många andra områden än betalningar. I detta sammanhang har FATF påpekat att virtuella valutor kan användas för andra ändamål än betalningar, t.ex. produkter för att förvara värden för sparande eller för att investera i produkter som derivat, råvaror och värdepapper. Nyare digitala valutor, som är baserade på mer sofistikerad distribuerad databasteknik och s.k. block-chain teknik, kan användas inom många andra områden än betalningar, t.ex. kasinon på internet. Mot denna bakgrund föreslår ECB att förslaget till direktiv även nämner andra användningsområden för virtuella valutor i definitionen av denna term. ECB föreslår att man anpassar definitionen av termen virtuella valutor i förslaget till direktiv så att denna beaktar punkterna ovan.

text: 1.2 Centrala register över bank- och betalkonton

text: 1.2.1 Enligt förslaget till direktiv ska medlemsstaterna införa automatiska centraliserade mekanismer eller centrala elektroniska datasöksystem, som gör det möjligt att snabbt fastställa identiteten för fysiska eller juridiska personer som innehar eller kontrollerar betalkonton och bankkonton som innehas av ett kreditinstitut inom deras territorium. I motiveringen till förslaget till direktiv förtydligas i detta sammanhang att det står medlemsstaterna fritt att inrätta antingen ett centralt bankregister eller ett datasöksystem, beroende på vad som bäst passar i deras egna befintliga ramar. Medlemsstaterna får alltså utse sina nationella centralbanker till administratör av det centrala registret över bank- och betalkonton. Enligt förslaget till direktiv skulle ett sådant centralt register vara öppet för finansiella utredningsenheter och andra behöriga myndigheter.

text: 1.2.2 ECB har tidigare gett uttryck för åsikten att, vid bedömningen av huruvida förbudet mot monetär finansiering enligt fördraget åsidosatts, sådana uppgifter som Europeiska centralbankssystemet ger en nationell centralbank avseende inrättandet av ett centralt register över bankkonton inte ska bedömas som en centralbanksuppgift, och ej heller underlättar genomförande av sådana uppgifter. ECB anser att det är entydigt att inrättandet av ett centralt register över bankkonton enligt

text: artikel 30 i direktiv (EU) 2015/849

text: är en statlig uppgift eftersom syftet är att bekämpa penningtvätt och finansiering av terrorism. För att säkerställa ECBS-medlemmarnas finansiella oberoende och undvika frågetecken kring förbudet mot monetär finansiering i samband med att en statlig uppgift utförs, understryker ECB att den nationella lagstiftning som genomför förslaget till direktiv om att inrätta och bedriva ett centralt register över bankkonton även bör innehålla bestämmelser om hur kostnaderna härför ska återvinnas, med tydliga regler för att granska, allokera och fakturera alla kostnader som uppstår för de nationella centralbankerna när dessa bedriver och beviljar tillgång till det centrala registret.

text: 2. Tekniska synpunkter och förslag

text: I de fall där ECB rekommenderar att förslaget till direktiv ändras anges de specifika förslagen i ett separat tekniskt arbetsdokument som åtföljs av en förklaring. Det tekniska arbetsdokumentet finns på engelska på ECB:s webbplats.


text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).

text: For further information on lending in foreign currencies in the Union see the Annex to Recommendation

text: of the European Systemic Risk Board of 21 September 2011 on lending in foreign currencies (OJ C 342, 22.11.2011, p. 1). See paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu . 4 See the NBP’s Monetary and financial statistics report at http://www.nbp.pl. 5 See Opinions

text: and

text: . 6 Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 February 2014 on credit agreements for consumers relating to residential immovable property and amending Directives

text: and

text: and

text: Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010

text: (OJ L 60, 28.2.2014, p. 34). 7 See paragraph 3.2 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 3.2.1 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 3.1.1 of Opinion

text: . 8 See paragraph 3.2.2 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 3.1.2 of Opinion

text: See paragraphs 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 3.3.1 of Opinion

text: . 10 Available on the Polish Parliament’s website at http://orka.sejm.gov.pl. 11 See paragraph 3.4.1 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 3.3.3 of Opinion

text: . 12 See paragraph 3.4 of

text: , paragraph 3.3 of

text: , paragraph 3.3.4 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 3.3.6 of Opinion

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 13 October 2016 on a draft law to facilitate the reimbursement of certain spreads charged on foreign exchange-linked loans (CON/2016/50)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 13 October 2016 on a draft law to facilitate the reimbursement of certain spreads charged on foreign exchange-linked loans (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 15 September 2016 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Polish Parliament for an opinion on a draft law to facilitate the reimbursement of certain amounts due under loan and cash advancement agreements (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the sixth indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft law contains rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets, which relates to the ESCB’s contribution to the smooth conduct of policies pursued by the competent authorities relating to the stability of the financial system under Article 127(5) of the Treaty. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The purpose of the draft law is to facilitate the reimbursement to borrowers of foreign exchange spread amounts considered to be unfairly charged by banks in connection with certain secured loans denominated in, or indexed to, a foreign currency (hereinafter ‘foreign currency loans’). Borrowers who may benefit from the draft law include consumers as well as natural persons who are sole traders, provided that they did not invoke any depreciation charges with respect to the property acquired using the foreign currency loan and did not claim as tax-deductible expenses the interest and other charges arising from such loan. 1.2 The draft law applies to loan agreements entered into between 1 July 2000 and 26 August 2011, even if such loan agreements have terminated, provided that the loan agreement contained at least one of the following three features: (i) in the case of an indexed loan (i.e. a loan granted in Polish zloty (PLN), which in accordance with the loan agreement is equivalent to a specific foreign currency amount or is indexed to, or revalued in line with, a foreign currency), where, at the time the loan was granted, the

text: exchange rate used was lower than 99.5 % of the selling rate of Narodowy Bank Polski (NBP) for the foreign currency to which the loan is indexed, as published by NBP on the date on which the foreign currency amount was determined; (ii) in the case of a foreign currency denominated loan (i.e. a loan granted in a foreign currency that was disbursed in PLN), where, at the time the loan was granted, for the purpose of determining the loan amount or its tranches to be disbursed in PLN, the exchange rate used was lower than 99.5 % of NBP’s buying rate for the foreign currency in which the loan is denominated, as published by NBP on the date on which the conversion to PLN of the loan amount or its tranches occurred; or (iii) in the case of an indexed loan or foreign currency denominated loan, where for the purposes of converting PLN to the foreign currency in which the loan instalments, fees or charges are expressed, the exchange rate used was higher than 100.5 % of NBP’s selling rate for the foreign currency, as published by NBP on the due date for such loan instalments, fees or charges or, where payment was made after the due date, on the payment date. 1.3 A borrower has six months after the entry into force of the draft law to request the lender to notify the borrower in writing whether his or her loan agreement contains any of the abovementioned features. The lender is required to provide the notification within 30 days of receipt of the borrower’s request. If the loan agreement contains any of the abovementioned features, the lender’s notification must also specify: (i) an amount expressed in the relevant foreign currency which represents the difference between the value of the relevant loan principal, instalment, fee or charge as calculated based on the exchange rate actually used at the relevant time and the value of the same loan principal, instalment, fee or charge as calculated using the relevant NBP exchange rate decreased or increased by 0.5 %, as applicable, and (ii) interest on the amount referred to in point (i) calculated at 50 % of the statutory interest rate. The draft law provides formulae for the calculation of the amounts referred to in points (i) and (ii). 1.4 Within 14 days of a written request by the borrower (to be made within 12 months of the lender’s notification specified in paragraph 1.3), the lender must (i) reduce the principal of the foreign currency loan by the sum of the amounts referred to in paragraph 1.3, or (ii) where such sum exceeds the outstanding principal of the foreign currency loan or the loan principal has been repaid, pay such sum to the borrower. A borrower who disagrees with the content of the notification referred to in paragraph 1.3 may, within two months of receiving the notification, lodge a complaint with the lender. However, the lodging of a complaint does not affect the borrower’s right to the reduction of principal or payment of the surplus amount. 1.5 Irrespective of the amount of the foreign currency loan, the borrower is entitled to exercise the right to reduction or payment of the surplus amount only to a maximum loan principal amount of PLN 350 000. 1.6 If the lender fails to fulfil its obligations under the draft law, the borrower is entitled to compensation amounting to 0.01 % of the outstanding loan principal. In addition, the Polish Financial Supervision Authority may, as the body entrusted with the supervision of lenders’ compliance, impose on a

text: lender a penalty of up to 0.002 % of the value of the lender’s outstanding foreign currency loans for each day that the lender fails to comply with its obligations under the draft law. 1.7 The draft law is intended to enter into force within 30 days of its promulgation. The exercise by the borrower of rights under the draft law does not affect the borrower’s right to initiate or continue court proceedings with respect to claims related to the loan agreement.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 Prior to the global financial crisis, borrowing in foreign currencies by households and non-financial 2 3 corporations was popular in several Member States . As previously noted by the ECB , the lower interest rates applicable to foreign currency loans compared to loans in the domestic currency, as well as the expectation of domestic currency appreciation, increased the demand for such loans. The ECB understands that most of the foreign currency loans in Poland are housing loans denominated in Swiss francs and that foreign currency housing loans constituted approximately 43 % of all outstanding housing loans and 26 % of all outstanding loans to households in July 2016 . 2.2 The ECB has previously been consulted by the Polish Parliament and issued opinions on two draft legislative proposals, which were subsequently not adopted, dealing with the restructuring of foreign currency loans . The ECB notes that, unlike the previous two proposals, the draft law does not propose solutions involving the conversion of foreign currency loans into PLN loans.

text: 3. Specific observations

text: Retroactivity

text: 3.1 Although Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council does not apply to credit agreements existing before 21 March 2016, as previously noted by the ECB , the retroactive effect of the draft law does not seem to be in line with the general aim and principle of

text: Article 23(5) of Directive 2014/17/EU

text: . This provision allows Member States to further regulate foreign currency loans on condition that such regulation is not applied with retroactive effect. 3.2 In addition, as previously noted by the ECB , introducing measures with retroactive effect undermines legal certainty and is not in line with the principle of legitimate expectations. It is

text: however for the Polish authorities to assess whether the retroactive character of the draft law complies with Polish legal and constitutional principles.

text: Effects on the banking sector, financial stability and the Polish economy 3.3 The ECB reiterates its comments regarding risks associated with foreign currency loans made in previous opinions . Nevertheless, in the case of Poland, such risks do not, at present, appear to be of a systemic nature for the financial system and are not seen as representing a particular risk from a financial stability perspective. The ECB also notes that the draft law is mainly justified by considerations related to consumer protection. 3.4 The ECB notes that implementation of the draft law may entail significant financial costs for the banking sector. The explanatory memorandum estimates the implementation cost of the draft law for banks at between PLN 3.6 billion and 4.0 billion (i.e. approximately EUR 830-920 million). Nevertheless, considering the significant uncertainties relating to the estimation methodology, as well as additional operational costs, it is possible that the actual cost of implementing the draft law for banks will be higher than the legislators’ estimate. In this respect, the ECB notes that, in its opinion on the draft law , NBP estimates the cost of the draft law to be twice the cost indicated in the explanatory memorandum, suggesting it could amount to two thirds of the annual profits of the domestic banking sector in 2015. 3.5 As the ECB has noted previously , introducing measures with retroactive effect may also have some negative impact on the Polish economy if it leads to a deterioration in foreign investor sentiment due to a perceived increase in legal uncertainty and country risk. 3.6 Consequently, the ECB encourages the Polish authorities to carry out a thorough analysis to better quantify the financial stability implications of the draft law, in particular whether the envisaged retroactive measures could have negative effects on credit institutions taken individually, the banking sector as a whole and the overall economy in Poland. In particular, due consideration should be given to the capital adequacy of the affected institutions and cross-border effects on the consolidated profits of international banking groups. 3.7 With regard to any potential negative effects of the proposed measures, the ECB remains of the opinion that due consideration should also be given to fair burden sharing among all stakeholders, thus also avoiding moral hazard in the future . The ECB also expects that the solution proposed by the draft law should be balanced with regard to the impact on local and foreign owned banks. 3.8 Finally, the ECB notes that the scheme introduced by the draft law does not comprehensively eliminate risks relating to foreign currency loans.

text: Miscellaneous

text: 3.9 In line with the opinion expressed by NBP, the ECB also has some technical comments regarding the method indicated in the draft law for calculation of the amount of a spread refund. First, the value of the spread refund is denominated in a foreign currency and not in PLN, which may result in an increased benefit to borrowers. Second, the formula used for the computation of the spread refund in respect of indexed loans refers to the NBP selling rate while the NBP buying rate is used in the formula for foreign currency denominated loans. Use of these different NBP rates could result in borrowers with indexed loans receiving a much greater refund in PLN terms than borrowers with foreign currency denominated loans granted for the same amount.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 13 October 2016.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI