text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: Belgian Official Gazette, 28.9.2010, p. 59140. The validity of the empowering clause in Article 26 of the Law of 2 July 2010 that is the legal basis for the draft royal decree was extended to 31 March 2011 (Law of 6 January 2011 amending the Law of 2 July 2010). The ECB commented on an early draft of the Law of 2 July 2010 in Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: New

text: Article 12

text: bis §1 of the Law of 22 February 1998 establishing the NBB’s organic statute (hereinafter the ‘Law on the NBB’), Article 187 of the draft royal decree, and new

text: Articles 39

text: to 61 of the Law on the NBB (Article 195 of the draft royal decree). The financial institutions that are subject to the NBB’s prudential supervision as listed in new Article 40 of the Law on the NBB are the following: (i) credit institutions, including electronic money institutions, (ii) stockbrokerage firms, (iii) insurance companies, reinsurance companies, surety companies, (iv) clearing institutions, securities settlement institutions and assimilated institutions, and (v) payment institutions..

text: New

text: Article 41

text: §2 of the Law on the NBB. The concept of ‘systemically relevant institutions’ will not be generally defined in or under the draft royal decree (Explanatory Memorandum, pp. 48 and 49).

text: Article 12 of the Law on the NBB.

text: New

text: Article 45

text: §1 3° of the Law of 2 August 2002 on the supervision of the financial sector and on financial services (Article 217 of the draft royal decree). The FSMA’s supervisory responsibilities with regard to institutions subject to the NBB’s prudential supervision only apply: (i) with regard to certain of these institutions; and (ii) with respect to a list of rules of conduct set out in the draft royal decree. This list may be completed by the King, acting upon advice from the BFIC and the NBB (new

text: Article 45

text: §2). The draft royal decree also introduces rules of conduct with regard to settlement institutions (new Article 23 of the Law of 2 August 2002, Article 205 of the draft royal decree).

text: Notably portfolio management and investment advice companies, or intermediaries in insurance, banking and investment services (new

text: Article 45

text: §1 2° of the Law of 2 August 2002).

text: The establishment of the preparatory committee was provided for in

text: Article 26

text: §2 of the Law of 2 July 2010.

text: Explanatory Memorandum, p. 11.

text: See e.g. new

text: Article 41

text: §6 of the Law on the NBB (Article 195 of the draft royal decree) and new Article 59 of the Law of 22 March 1993 on the status and supervision of credit institutions (Article 131 of the draft royal decree).

text: For instance, when authorising a credit institution, the NBB will have to consult the future FSMA on a number of issues that relate to the latter’s competence (e.g. new

text: Article 9

text: bis of the Law of 22 March 1993, Article 111 of the draft royal decree). The future FSMA’s opinion will not be binding on the NBB, but it will have to provide reasons if it departs from it. Explanatory Memorandum, p. 31.

text: Articles 36, 125 and 176 of the draft royal decree with regard to, respectively, the supervision of insurance companies, credit institutions and investment firms.

text: In this respect, it is noted that the rules on professional secrecy will be split into a general provision applicable to all NBB tasks (new Article 35 of the Law on the NBB, Article 194 of the draft royal decree) and a set of provisions specifically covering the NBB’s prudential supervisory tasks (new

text: Articles 51

text: to 53 of the Law on the NBB). The NBB will also be subject to the same limitation of liability (

text: Article 12

text: bis §3 of the Law on the NBB, Article 187 of the draft royal decree, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 43).

text: New Articles 17 and 46 of the Law on the NBB (Articles 188 and 195 of the draft royal decree), Explanatory Memorandum, p. 8. The Sanctions Committee is composed of six members, of which four are judges, appointed by the King who can only be dismissed if they no longer fulfil the conditions for their appointment or in case of serious misconduct. In addition to the conflicts of interests rules applicable to the members of the other NBB organs under Article 25 of the Law on the NBB, the members of the Sanctions Committee will be subject to their own regime of conflicts of interests (e.g. three years before their appointment, they cannot have been members of the NBB’s Board of Directors or members of the NBB or CSRSFI’s staff, new

text: Article 46

text: §4 of the Law on the NBB). The Committee is further required to establish its own ethics regime (new

text: Article 46

text: §8 of the Law on the NBB).

text: This also covers the staff providing the related legal, administrative and IT support (Article 336 of the draft royal decree). The ECB understands that the Preparatory Committee agreed on the number of persons to be transferred in accordance with this allocation principle, taking into account the need to ensure continuity in supervision and in the functioning of the two authorities and also identified the individuals concerned (Explanatory Memorandum, p. 5).

text: Article 337 of the draft royal decree, Explanatory Memorandum, pp. 9 and 69. They will be subject to the incompatibilities regime in Articles 25 and 26 of the Law on the NBB and will be assimilated to NBB Board Members for the purpose of the monitoring of the NBB’s Code of Deontology, but will not be subject to the other provisions of the Law on the NBB applicable to NBB Board Members.

text: Article 335

text: , second subparagraph, of the royal decree. Explanatory Memorandum, p. 67.

text: New

text: Article 12

text: bis, § 4 of the Law on the NBB (Article 187 of the draft royal decree).

text: Pending the adoption of a Royal Decree on the financing of the NBB’s prudential supervisory tasks under the new

text: Article 12

text: bis, § 4 of the Law on the NBB, it is the Royal Decree of 22 May 2005 on the financing of the operating costs of the BFIC that will, provisionally, apply to calculate the supervised institutions’ contributions (

text: Article 343

text: §1 of the draft royal decree). For 2011, the year of the transfer of tasks, the NBB will request the contributions as calculated by the BFIC under the Royal Decree of 22 May 2005. These are to be considered as an advance payment against the final amount due to the NBB for that year under the future Royal Decree on the financing of the NBB’s prudential supervisory tasks (

text: Article 343

text: §3 of the draft royal decree).

text: The possibility of having these prudential supervisory tasks exercised by a separate legal entity triggered certain concerns expressed in previous Opinion

text: Opinion

text: This Memorandum must cover all instances where the authorities’ respective consultation or information is provided for by law or where they need to adopt a concerted action to ensure the uniform application of the law (Articles 36, 125 and 176 of the draft royal decree).

text: In accordance with a Royal Decree to be adopted by the King under new

text: Article 12

text: bis, § 4 of the Law on the NBB.

text: See the ECB’s Convergence Report, May 2010, p. 21, and notably Opinion

text: , paragraph 3.1.5.

text: Explanatory memorandum, p. 43.

text: Opinion

text: , paragraph 3.2.3.

text: OJ L 332, 31.12.1993, p. 1.

text: ECB’s Convergence Report, May 2008, pp. 23 and 24; see Opinion

text: , paragraph 12, and Opinion

text: , paragraph 9. 29 Opinion

text: , paragraphs 3.2.3 and 3.2.4. 30 New

text: Article 12

text: bis, § 4 of the Law on the NBB (Article 187 of the draft royal decree) and

text: Article 343

text: §1 of the draft royal decree, see also footnote 19. 31 Article 335 of the draft royal decree.

text: See Article 29(2) of the NBB’s Articles of Association. 33 In addition, the oversight activities of some NCBs of Member States whose currency is the euro are carried out on the basis of national laws and regulations, which complement and, in some cases, repeat the Eurosystem’s competence. The oversight competence of NCBs of the Member States whose currency is not the euro is laid down in national laws and regulations. 34 See also ‘Eurosystem Oversight Policy Framework’, 20 February 2009, published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 35 Article 8 of the Law on the NBB and

text: Article 23

text: §3 of the Law of 2 August 2002. 36 New Article 33 of the Law of 2 August 2002 (Article 212 of the draft royal decree), referring notably to Article 8 of the Law on the NBB regarding oversight. 37 Opinion

text: , see also paragraph 2.2 of this Opinion.

text: i.e. credit institutions, stock broking firms or insurance companies (see new

text: Article 36

text: bis §1 and §2 of the Law of 2 August 2002, Article 215 of the draft royal decree). 39 New

text: Article 36

text: bis §2, 1° and 2°, of the Law of 2 August 2002. Explanatory Memorandum, pp. 38 and 57. 40 New

text: Article 36

text: bis §2, 3°, of the Law of 2 August 2002. 41 New

text: Article 36

text: bis §3, second and third subparagraphs, of the Law of 2 August 2002. The NBB’s decision to oppose the envisaged measures must provide the reasons on which it is based. Explanatory Memorandum, p. 14 and 23. 42 One member of the arbitration panel is appointed by the NBB, another by the future FSMA and these two members choose a third member (new

text: Article 36

text: bis § 4 of the Law of 2 August 2002).

text: New

text: Article 36

text: bis § 3, fourth subparagraph, of the Law of 2 August 2002. The measures can also be taken by the future FSMA if the NBB, despite its assessment that the measures could compromise financial stability, decides not to engage the arbitration procedure. 44 New

text: Article 36

text: bis §4, ninth subparagraph, of the Law of 2 August 2002 45 New

text: Article 52

text: § 1, 1° and 2°, of the Law on the NBB (Article 195 of the draft royal decree).

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 28 January 2011 on the implementation of the principles for the development of financial supervisory structures in Belgium (CON/2011/5)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 28 January 2011 on the implementation of the principles for the development of financial supervisory structures in Belgium (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 23 December 2010, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Belgian Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft royal decree implementing the development of financial supervisory structures (hereinafter the ‘draft royal decree’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and the third, fifth and sixth indents of

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft royal decree relates to the Nationale Bank van België/Banque Nationale de Belgique (NBB), payment and settlement systems, and rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In addition, the Eurosystem shall contribute to the smooth conduct of policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system under Article 127(5) of the Treaty. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft royal decree

text: 1.1 The draft royal decree is aimed at implementing the Law of 2 July 2010 amending the Law of 2 August 2002 on the supervision of the financial sector and financial services, as well as the Law of 22 February 1998 establishing the Organic Statute of the Nationale Bank van België/Banque Nationale de Belgique and containing various other provisions (hereinafter the ‘Law of 2 July 2010’). The Law of 2 July 2010 lays down the principles for the development of the Belgian financial supervisory structures towards a ‘twin-peaks’-type model under which the NBB will become the sole authority responsible for the financial sector’s micro- and macro-prudential stability.

text: 1.2 In order to implement the planned supervisory model, the draft royal decree will, on the one hand,

text: extend the NBB’s responsibilities to the prudential supervision of financial institutions , including

text: the specific supervisory tasks relating to system-relevant financial institutions . These new micro-

text: prudential supervisory tasks will be in addition to the NBB’s existing task of contributing to the

text: stability of the financial system . On the other hand, the responsibilities of the current Banking,

text: Finance and Insurance Commission (BFIC) will cover the surveillance of all aspects related to

text: financial markets, including the adherence to the rules of conduct , and the supervision of certain

text: entities that are not subject to the NBB’s prudential supervision . The BFIC’s name will be changed

text: to the Financial Services and Market Authority (FSMA) to reflect its new mandate. The ECB

text: understands that a preparatory committee composed of NBB and BFIC representatives provided

text: their assistance in the context of drawing-up the arrangements put in place by the draft royal

text: decree .

text: 1.3 The NBB’s prudential supervision will coexist with the tasks entrusted to the future FSMA. The

text: ECB understands that in specifying the respective competences of the two supervisory authorities

text: in the existing framework, the Belgian legislator has aimed to avoid both any duplication of tasks as

text: well as the risk of conflicting decisions . To this end, the draft royal decree provides for various

text: information and mutual consultation requirements. In this respect, the conclusion of a

text: Memorandum of Understanding aims to ensure smooth cooperation between the NBB and the

text: future FSMA .

text: 1.4 The general framework governing the exercise of the NBB’s new supervisory tasks is largely modelled on that which applied to the BFIC and to the ‘Committee for systemic risks and systemrelevant financial institutions’ (CSRSFI), with regard to the supervision over system-relevant institutions. 1.5 Finally, the draft royal decree addresses certain issues arising as a consequence of the transfer of new tasks to the NBB, such as issues relating to its governance structure and the human and financial resources necessary to carry out these tasks. 1.5.1 First, the royal decree establishes some limited changes affecting the NBB’s organs and governance structure. These changes include, notably, the establishment of a Sanctions Committee as a new NBB body that will decide on the imposition of administrative penalties and fines applicable to the institutions subject to the NBB’s prudential supervision . 1.5.2 Second, the staff members whose main responsibility is the execution of prudential tasks within the current BFIC will automatically be transferred to the NBB when the transfer of micro-prudential tasks to the NBB becomes effective . In addition, the two members of the BFIC’s Management Committee in charge of the BFIC departments responsible for the transferred prudential tasks will be assigned to the NBB for the remainder of their current terms of office; these two members will have the status of special representatives . 1.5.3 Third, the transfer of prudential tasks to the NBB will also cover the rights and obligations related to such tasks stemming from the BFIC’s previous activities. The actual financial burden arising from any such obligations in the form of liabilities is however not supposed to be borne by the NBB, as the NBB will be authorised to charge such financial obligations to the supervised institutions to the extent that they would not be sufficiently covered by the provisions and reserves transferred from the BFIC to the NBB .

text: 1.5.4 Fourth, the exercise of the prudential tasks transferred to the NBB will be financed by way of a contribution charged by the NBB to the institutions it supervises , i.e. in accordance with a similar system as the one currently applied to finance the BFIC’s supervisory tasks . To this end, the NBB’s operational costs will be duly and separately identified in its books, which will be monitored by the NBB’s audit committee. The NBB’s external auditor shall audit the calculation method and the total amount of these costs.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 The ECB notes that the draft royal decree implements the Belgian supervisory reform outlined in the Law of 2 July 2010, so that all comments and recommendations made in ECB Opinion

text: apply equally in this case. However, the ECB notes that the exercise of the prudential supervisory tasks will be fully integrated into the NBB, without the creation of a distinct legal entity . 2.2 Cooperation between the NBB and the future FSMA in the exercise of their respective tasks should not impinge upon the NBB’s independent execution of tasks within the framework of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) . This general principle should be given due consideration, in particular, when drafting the Memorandum of Understanding to be concluded between the NBB and the future FSMA pursuant to the draft royal decree .

text: 3. Specific observations

text: Central bank independence and the monetary financing prohibition 3.1 As regards the financing of the prudential supervisory tasks transferred to the NBB , the ECB refers to the principle of financial independence under which a national central bank (NCB) must have sufficient means not only to perform its ESCB-related tasks, but also its own national tasks . The tasks transferred to the NBB should not affect its ability to carry out its ESCB-related tasks from an operational and financial point of view. The ECB understands that, to this end, the draft royal decree provides that the exercise of the prudential supervisory tasks transferred to the NBB

text: will be financed by way of a contribution that the NBB will be authorised to charge to the supervised institutions . The ECB also notes that in the context of the work by the preparatory committee, the NBB was able to assess the additional financial and human resources that would be made available in the context of the transfer, including the conditions of employment of the transferred staff, as well as the costs related to the transfer. The ECB welcomes the provisions of the draft royal decree concerning the financing of the new NBB tasks, subject to the safeguards detailed in the following paragraphs. 3.2 Provisions under which an NCB becomes the legal successor to any liabilities of a distinct supervisory authority may raise issues of financial independence and compliance with the prohibition of monetary financing laid down in Article 123(1) of the Treaty , read in conjunction with

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 of 13 December 1993

text: specifying definitions for the application of the prohibitions referred to in Articles

text: and

text: b(1) of the Treaty . In this respect, the ECB understands that the assignment to the NBB of the BFIC’s tasks and powers is accompanied by measures that insulate the NBB from financial obligations resulting from any BFIC activities from the period before the transfer of tasks . The ECB understands that such financial obligations would include, for example, any pending or future legal proceedings from the period before the transfer of tasks to the NBB or any financial obligations deriving from employment relations that any new NBB staff member may have had with the BFIC . 3.3 The principle of financial independence requires that the new tasks transferred to the NBB are adequately financed by contributions from supervised institutions and that their exercise will not result in any loss for the NBB. The ECB understands that the concrete terms for financing the NBB’s prudential supervisory tasks beyond the year 2011 will be laid down in a Royal decree that is still to be adopted . This separate legislation should be the subject of a separate consultation based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty. 3.4 Legal certainty would be enhanced if the draft royal decree would expressly provide that the 31 transfer to the NBB of liabilities arising from the BFIC’s previous activities is accompanied by a concomitant transfer of assets, including the corresponding provisions and reserves which were at the BFIC’s disposal for the performance of its tasks are transferred to the NBB. 3.5 Concerning the BFIC staff transferred to the NBB, the ECB stresses that from the perspective of central bank independence, the NBB should be free to retain the necessary personnel resources, in terms of quantity and quality, to carry out all its tasks and that it should also have control over its

text: entire staff . An express provision clarifying this aspect in the draft royal decree would be welcome. Coexistence of the NBB’s oversight competence with the FSMA’s supervisory powers 3.6 Under the fourth indent of Article 127(2) of the Treaty and the fourth indent of

text: Article 3.1

text: and Article 22 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter the ‘Statute of the ESCB’), in conjunction with the derogations provided for under Article 139 of the Treaty and 42.1 of the Statute of the ESCB, one of the basic tasks to be carried out through the ESCB is the promotion of the smooth operation of payment systems. In this respect, the ECB and the NCBs of the Member States whose currency is the euro may provide facilities, and the ECB may make regulations, to ensure efficient and sound clearing and payment systems within the Union and with other countries. The Eurosystem’s oversight competence over 33 payment, clearing and settlement systems derives from these provisions . The oversight competence is also inherent to the ESCB’s task of contributing to the stability of the financial system under Article 127(5) of the Treaty, as mirrored in Article 3.3 of the Statute of the ESCB. Moreover, the implementation of monetary policy in the euro area under the first indent of Article 127(2) of the Treaty, as mirrored in the first indent of Article 3.1 of the Statute of the ESCB, depends on the existence of reliable and effective market systems and infrastructures. The promotion of the smooth operation of payment, clearing and settlement infrastructures is, therefore, a basic task of the Eurosystem . Moreover, the NBB has traditionally exercised broad oversight powers over settlement systems based on its national legal framework . 3.7 The ECB welcomes the fact that the draft royal decree provides that the supervision by the future FSMA shall not prejudice the exercise by the NBB of the powers it currently has . This is particularly important for the tasks that the NBB has to execute pursuant to the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB. In this respect, the ECB notes that cooperation between the NBB and the future FSMA in the exercise of their respective tasks should not impinge upon the NBB’s independent execution of tasks executed within the framework of the ESCB, and notably its oversight tasks . 3.8 However, in view of the above context, the draft royal decree should be further elaborated to ensure that it adequately reflects the NBB’s oversight competence over infrastructures, as laid down in the Treaty, the Statute of the ESCB and national legal acts. It must be ensured in the draft royal decree

text: that the powers of the future FSMA are complemented and balanced by the adequate involvement of the NBB which oversees payment, clearing and settlement systems. Such an amendment of the draft royal decree would avoid the risk of duplication of work undertaken by the future FSMA from a supervisory perspective and by the NBB from an oversight perspective. It would also be more efficient for market infrastructures. For these reasons, the ECB considers that the respective roles of the future FSMA and the NBB should be explicitly reflected and specifically described in the draft royal decree to address these considerations. Divergence between FSMA and NBB with regard to the adoption of individual measures against

text: financial institutions

text: 3.9 Under the draft royal decree, the future FSMA will be empowered, as part of its task to supervise compliance with the rules of conduct, to take measures against certain individual financial institutions that are subject to the NBB’s prudential supervision . Where such financial institution seriously breaches the rules of conduct, the future FSMA will inform the NBB of the alleged breach and may under specific conditions take the following measures against this institution: (i) prohibiting or suspending (in whole or in part) the activities of the institution concerned; or (ii) ordering the replacement of its management . Where such breaches are systematic, this includes the power to request the NBB to revoke the licence of such financial institution . In this context, the ECB understands that two main scenarios should be distinguished: (a) Where the future FSMA requests the NBB to revoke a license, the NBB may only refuse if the withdrawal is likely to compromise the stability of the financial system. The NBB must issue a reasoned decision, which the future FSMA may challenge before the Ministry of Finance. Under such circumstance, the Ministry of Finance will render a final decision on the issue. (b) Where the future FSMA measures do not concern the revocation of a financial institution’s license, these will be notified to the NBB. The NBB may oppose such measures only where they would compromise financial stability or where they would result in the suspension or termination of a financial institution’s activity as a whole . If the future FSMA and the NBB disagree, an arbitration panel composed of three members appointed by the NBB and the FSMA (not belonging to their staff or decision-making bodies) , decides on whether the

text: measures affect financial stability . This decision is binding and it is not subject to recourse . The ECB would welcome clarification in the draft royal decree of the allocation of statutory responsibilities conferred, on the one hand, to the future FSMA and, on the other hand, to the NBB as the authority responsible for the prudential supervision of financial institutions and as the central bank contributing to the stability of the financial system. Concerning the measures addressed in point (b), instead of resorting to an arbitration panel, the draft royal decree could provide the NBB with a right to veto the future FSMA’s proposed measures for reasons of financial stability. Another possibility would be to provide the NBB with the right to issue a non-binding opinion, which is submitted to the future FSMA. After having considered the NBB’s opinion, if the future FSMA decides to maintain its decision to adopt the proposed measures, it must adopt a reasoned opinion explaining the reasons for such decision despite the NBB’s opinion in relation to the potential impact of the measures on the stability of the financial system. Exchange of information 3.10 The draft royal decree also provides that the NBB and the future FSMA may exchange information in so far as this information is necessary for the accomplishment of their respective tasks. Such transmission needs to be accompanied by appropriate protection measures to safeguard the confidentiality of the information. In line with this, the ECB understands that the draft royal decree allows for confidential data to be communicated to the ECB, not only in its capacity as a monetary authority but also for the performance of the ESCB tasks outlined in Article 127 of the Treaty . Access to prudential information and cooperation with financial supervisory authorities is essential for macro-prudential monitoring which, in turn, is indispensable for the smooth conduct of monetary policy and helpful in reducing the reporting burden imposed on institutions. The recent financial crisis has shown that from a financial stability perspective, the ECB needs to be involved in the event of any financial market crisis and in that context, the availability of relevant information and the ability to interpret it are crucial.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 28 January 2011.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: KOM(2010) 433 slutlig.

text: Dessa består för närvarande av

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 2002/87/EG av den 16 december 2002

text: om extra tillsyn över kreditinstitut, försäkringsföretag och värdepappersföretag i ett finansiellt konglomerat (EUT L 35, 11.2.2003, s. 1) och Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv nr

text: av den 27 oktober 1998 om extra tillsyn över försäkringsföretag som ingår i en försäkringsgrupp (EGT L 330, 5.12.1998, s. 1).

text: Se ändringarna av

text: artikel 1

text: , artiklarna

text: och

text: och av bilagorna I och II till direktiv

text: som införts genom

text: artikel 1

text: och bilaga I i direktivförslaget; se ändringarna av artiklarna

text: och

text: i Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 2006/48/EG av den 14 juni 2006 om rätten att starta och driva verksamhet i kreditinstitut (omarbetning) (EUT L 177, 30.6.2006, s. 1), som införts genom artikel 3 i direktivförslaget.

text: Se ändringsförslag 3 i bilagan till detta yttrande.

text: Se artiklarna

text: och

text: 3.2 tredje stycket

text: i direktiv 2002/87/EG, som införts genom artikel 2.1 och 2.2 i direktivförslaget.

text: Se ändringsförslag 1 i bilagan till detta yttrande.

text: Se ändringsförslag 2 i bilagan till detta yttrande.

text: Se artiklarna

text: och

text: i direktiv 2002/87/EG, som införts genom artikel 2.2 och 2.4–7 i direktivförslaget.

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 2010/78/EU av den 24 november 2010

text: om ändring av direktiven

text: och

text: , vad gäller befogenheterna för Europeiska tillsynsmyndigheten (Europeiska bankmyndigheten), Europeiska tillsynsmyndigheten (Europeiska försäkrings- och tjänstepensionsmyndigheten) och Europeiska tillsynsmyndigheten (Europeiska värdepappers- och marknadsmyndigheten) (EUT L 331, 15.12.2010, s. 120).

text: Se

text: artikel 9 i direktiv 2002/87/EG

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 2009/65/EG av den 13 juli 2009

text: om samordning av lagar och andra författningar som avser företag för kollektiva investeringar i överlåtbara värdepapper (fondföretag) (EUT L 302, 17.11.2009, s. 32). Tillsyn över kapitalförvaltningsbolag omnämns i artiklarna 21.1 och 102.4 a i fondföretagsdirektivet. Där läggs fokus på att säkerställa överensstämmelse med i) de regler som enligt

text: artikel 12

text: ska uppställas för kapitalförvaltningsbolagen och ii) ytterligare regler enligt artiklarna

text: och

text: avseende tillhandahållande av kapitalförvaltningstjänster genom filialer samt tillhandahållande av gränsöverskridande tjänster.

text: Direktiv

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 2009/138/EG av den 25 november 2009

text: om upptagande och utövande av försäkrings- och återförsäkringsverksamhet (Solvens II) (omarbetning) (EUT L 335, 17.12.2009, s. 1).

text: Se ändringsförslag 4 och 6 i bilagan till detta yttrande.

text: Se

text: artikel 21

text: a.2 i direktiv

text: , som införts genom

text: artikel 2.15 i direktiv 2010/78/EU

text: Se

text: artikel 6.2 i direktiv 2002/87/EG

text: Se

text: artikel 74.2 andra stycket i direktiv 2006/48/EG

text: , som införts genom

text: artikel 1.14 i Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 2009/111/EG av den 16 september 2009

text: om ändring av direktiven

text: och

text: vad gäller banker anslutna till centrala kreditinstitut, vissa frågor som gäller kapitalbasen, stora exponeringar, tillsynsrutiner och krishantering (EUT L 302, 17.11.2009, s. 97).

text: Text markerad med fet stil anger ECB:s förslag till ny text. Genomstruken text anger de strykningar som ECB föreslår.

publisher: Europeiska centralbanken

sprak: sv

title: Europeiska Centralbankens Yttrande av den 28 januari 2011 om ett förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv om ändring av direktiven 98/78/EG, 2002/87/EG och 2006/48/EG i fråga om extra tillsyn över finansiella enheter i ett finansiellt konglomerat (CON/2011/6)

serie: con

text: Inledning och rättslig grund

type: rubrik

text: Den 30 september 2010 mottog Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) en begäran från Europeiska unionens råd om ett yttrande över ett förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv om ändring av direktiven

text: och

text: i fråga om extra tillsyn över finansiella enheter i ett finansiellt konglomerat (nedan kallat direktivförslaget).

type: stycke

text: ECB:s behörighet att avge ett yttrande grundas på artiklarna

text: och

text: i fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt, eftersom direktivförslaget innehåller bestämmelser som berör Europeiska centralbankssystemets (ECBS) medverkan till ett smidigt genomförande av politiken för det finansiella systemets stabilitet i enlighet med artikel 127.5 i fördraget. I enlighet med

text: artikel 17.5

text: första meningen i arbetsordningen för Europeiska centralbanken har detta yttrande antagits av ECB-rådet.

text: Allmän kommentar

text: 1. ECB välkomnar direktivförslagets främsta mål – att säkra en lämplig omfattning på den extra tillsynen av finansiella konglomerat – genom att reglera sådana aspekter som varken omfattas av unionens regler om extra tillsyn eller av sektorsdirektiven avseende bank- och försäkringstjänster.

text: Specifika kommentarer

text: Behandling av blandade finansiella holdingföretag

text: 2. ECB välkomnar hänvisningen till begreppet blandat finansiellt holdingföretag i sektorsdirektivens bestämmelser som anger omfattningen på den konsoliderade tillsynen över banker och försäkringsgrupper. Härigenom kommer det att bli möjligt att utöva sektors- och gruppvis konsoliderad tillsyn, utöver extra tillsyn, över ett finansiellt holdingföretag eller ett försäkringsholdingföretag som p.g.a. utökad verksamhet inom andra finansiella områden blir ett blandat finansiellt holdingföretag. ECB anser att den insyn man kan erhålla om utvecklingen inom olika sektorer genom tillsyn på konsoliderad nivå/gruppnivå på ett värdefullt sätt kan kompletteras av en bättre förståelse för sektorsvisa risker som kan erhållas genom extra tillsyn. Samtidigt bör man ta fram en effektiv tillsynspraxis som dels gör det möjligt att beakta alla risker i tillsynsarbetet och dels att man undviker dubbel tillsyn men säkerställer konkurrens på lika villkor. ECB rekommenderar att de europeiska tillsynsmyndigheterna genom den gemensamma kommittén ges befogenhet att anta allmänna riktlinjer i detta hänseende.

text: Behandling av kapitalförvaltningsbolag

text: 3. ECB välkomnar att även kapitalförvaltningsbolag uttryckligen kommer att omfattas när man genomför tröskelvärdestester för att identifiera finansiella konglomerat. ECB rekommenderar att kapitalförvaltningsbolag läggs till den sektor med vilken de har ett nära samband, något som kan specificeras närmare i riktlinjerna för tillsynsarbetet. Denna lösning är bättre ur riskbedömningsperspektiv än att företagen läggs till den minsta finansiella sektorn enligt formuleringen i direktivförslaget. ECB rekommenderar också, till följd av att kapitalförvaltningsbolag uttryckligen kommer att omfattas av reglerna om extra tillsyn, att även Europeiska värdepappers- och marknadsmyndigheten, tillsammans med de europeiska tillsynsmyndigheterna, involveras i framtagandet av riktlinjer som främjar utvecklingen av jämförbar praxis för extra tillsyn. I detta hänseende bör ordalydelsen vara snarlik som den i direktiv

text: , d.v.s. den berörda europeiska tillsynsmyndigheten, genom den gemensamma kommittén. Genom att involvera alla behöriga europeiska tillsynsmyndigheter säkerställer man att risken för spridning, koncentration och komplexa förhållanden samt intressekonflikter kan hanteras på ett effektivt sätt mellan olika sektorer och alla reglerade enheter som ingår i ett finansiellt konglomerat. Vad gäller extra tillsyn av rutiner för intern kontroll och riskhantering bör det på samma sätt framgå av direktiv

text: Uppställning

text: 4. ECB rekommenderar att man, med utgångspunkt från de tekniska genomförandestandarderna som tagits fram av den berörda europeiska tillsynsmyndigheten, i samarbete med gemensamma kommittén, använder harmoniserade format, frekvenser och rapporteringsdatum vid rapporteringen av kapitalkrav som beräknas för de relevanta enheterna i ett finansiellt konglomerat. Denna harmonisering bör följa den förlaga som tillämpas inom banksektorn och är baserad på en ändring av bankdirektivet som gjordes år 2009. ECB förstår det som att arbetet med att harmonisera rapporteringsformaten även fortsättningsvis kommer att bedrivas, bl.a. i samband med att reglerna enligt Basel III införlivas i EU-rätten. På grund av sin roll inom området finansiell stabilitet har Eurosystemet ett stort intresse av dessa frågor och kommer tillsammans med kommissionen att noga följa utvecklingen inom området.

text: I de fall där ECB rekommenderar att direktivförslaget ändras anges de specifika förslagen i bilagan tillsammans med en förklaring.

text: BILAGA

text: Kommissionens förslag | ECB:s ändringsförslag

text: artikel 30

text: läggs till den sektor som de hör till inom gruppen. Om de inte enbart hör till en sektor inom gruppen, ska de läggas till den minsta finansiella sektorn. | a) Följande ska läggas till som tredje stycke i punkt 2: Kapitalförvaltningsbolag i den mening som avses i

text: artikel 30

text: läggs till den sektor som de hör till inom gruppen. Om de inte enbart hör till en sektor inom gruppen, ska de läggas till den minsta finansiella sektorn med vilken de har närmast samband.

text: Motivering Den aktuella lösningen att kapitalförvaltningsbolag klassificeras i den minsta sektorn i det finansiella konglomeratet är inte tillräckligt riskbaserad. Man bör istället använda kriteriet nära samband, något som kan specificeras närmare i gemensamma riktlinjer från den europeiska tillsynsmyndigheten som antas enligt

text: artikel 3.8 i direktiv 2002/87/EG

text: (se ändring 2).

text: f) Följande ska läggas till som punkt 8: 8. Europeiska bankmyndigheten och Europeiska försäkrings- och tjänstepensionsmyndigheten ska utfärda allmänna riktlinjer för att se till att tillsynsmetoderna stämmer överens med tillämpningen av punkterna 2, 3, 3a, 4 och 5 i den här artikeln. | f) Följande ska läggas till som punkt 8: 8. Europeiska bankmyndigheten och Europeiska försäkrings- och tjänstepensionsmyndigheten Behöriga europeiska tillsynsmyndigheter ska genom den gemensamma kommittén utfärda allmänna riktlinjer för att se till att tillsynsmetoderna stämmer överens med tillämpningen av punkterna 2, 3, 3a, 4 och 5 i den här artikeln.

text: Motivering Eftersom även kapitalförvaltningsbolag uttryckligen kommer att beaktas när man genomför tröskelvärdestester för att identifiera finansiella konglomerat bör även Europeiska värdepappers- och marknadsmyndigheten, tillsammans med de europeiska tillsynsmyndigheterna, involveras i framtagandet av dessa riktlinjer för att på så sätt främja utvecklingen av jämförbar praxis för extra tillsyn av finansiella konglomerat. Genom att involvera alla behöriga europeiska tillsynsmyndigheter säkerställer man att risken för spridning, koncentration och komplexa förhållanden samt intressekonflikter kan hanteras på ett effektivt sätt mellan olika sektorer och alla reglerade enheter som ingår i ett finansiellt konglomerat. Ordalydelsen som används här (den berörda europeiska tillsynsmyndigheten, genom den gemensamma kommittén) är snarlik den som framgår av direktiv

text: . Denna ändring hör samman med ändring 5.

text: Ingen text. | 2 a) I

text: artikel 5

text: ska följande punkt läggas till som punkt 6:6. Den berörda europeiska tillsynsmyndigheten ska, genom den gemensamma kommittén, utfärda gemensamma riktlinjer för att utveckla tillsynspraxis för extra tillsyn över finansiella holdingföretag för att komplettera den grupptillsynen enligt direktiv

text: , eller den konsoliderade tillsynen enligt direktiv

text: , och för att göra det möjligt att beakta alla relevanta risker i tillsynsarbetet samtidigt som man undviker dubbel tillsyn och säkerställer konkurrens på lika villkor.

text: Motivering Effektiv tillsynspraxis bör utvecklas för att göra det möjligt att samtidigt utöva sektors- och gruppvis konsoliderad tillsyn samt extra tillsyn över ett blandat finansiellt holdingföretag. Den berörda europeiska tillsynsmyndigheten bör, genom den gemensamma kommittén, ges befogenhet att anta allmänna riktlinjer i detta hänseende.

text: Ingen text. | 2 b) I

text: artikel 6.2

text: ska följande punkt läggas till som punkt 6:Från och med den [1 januari 2013] ska medlemsstaterna kräva att samma format, frekvenser och rapporteringsdatum används vid rapportering av de beräkningar som avses i denna artikel, i enlighet med de tekniska standarder som uppställs i linje med

text: artikel 21

text: a.1 d.

text: Motivering På liknande sätt som i bankdirektivet bör harmoniserade format, frekvenser och rapporteringsdatum användas vid rapporteringen av kapitalkrav som beräknats enligt direktiv

text: . Denna ändring hör samman med ändring 6.

text: 4) I

text: artikel 7

text: ska följande punkt läggas till som punkt 5.5. Europeiska bankmyndigheten och Europeiska försäkrings- och tjänstepensionsmyndigheten ska utfärda allmänna riktlinjer för att se till att tillsynsmetoderna är anpassade till tillämpningen av den extra tillsyn över riskkoncentrationen i enlighet med punkterna 1–4. De ska utfärda särskilda riktlinjer om tillämpningen av punkterna 1–4 till ägarintressen i det finansiella konglomeratet i de fall där nationell bolagsrätt hindrar att

text: artikel 14.2

text: tillämpas. 5) I

text: artikel 8

text: ska följande punkt läggas till som punkt 5.5. Europeiska bankmyndigheten och Europeiska försäkrings- och tjänstepensionsmyndigheten ska utfärda allmänna riktlinjer för att se till att tillsynsmetoderna är anpassade till tillämpningen av den extra tillsynen över transaktioner inom det finansiella konglomeratet, i enlighet med punkterna 1–4. De ska utfärda särskilda riktlinjer om tillämpningen av punkterna 1–4 till ägarintressen i det finansiella konglomeratet i de fall där nationell bolagsrätt hindrar att

text: artikel 14.2

text: tillämpas. 6) I

text: artikel 9

text: ska följande punkt läggas till som punkt 6.6. Behöriga myndigheter ska anpassa tillämpningen av den extra tillsynen över rutiner för intern kontroll och metoderna för riskhantering enligt vad som anges i denna artikel till den översyn av tillsynsprocessen som anges i

text: artikel 124 i direktiv 2006/48/EG

text: och

text: artikel 36 i direktiv 2009/138/EG

text: . Europeiska bankmyndigheten och Europeiska försäkrings- och tjänstepensionsmyndigheten ska utfärda riktlinjer för att anpassa metoderna för den extra tillsynen över rutiner för intern kontroll och metoder för riskhantering enligt vad som anges i den här artikeln, samt om anpassning till den översyn av tillsynsprocessen som anges i

text: artikel 124 i direktiv 2006/48/EG

text: och

text: artikel 36 i direktiv 2009/138/EG

text: artikel 14.2

text: tillämpas. 7) I

text: artikel 11

text: ska följande läggas till som punkt 4 och punkt 5:[…] 5. Europeiska bankmyndigheten och Europeiska försäkrings- och tjänstepensionsmyndigheten ska utfärda riktlinjer för att skapa en konsekvent tillsynssamordning i enlighet med

text: artikel 131

text: a i direktiv

text: och

text: artikel 248.4 i direktiv 2009/138/EG

text: . […] 10) Följande

text: artikel 21

text: b ska läggas till:

text: Artikel 21

text: b Allmänna riktlinjer Europeiska bankmyndigheten och Europeiska försäkrings- och tjänstepensionsmyndigheten ska utfärda allmänna riktlinjer som avses i artiklarna 3.3, 7.5, 8.5, 9.6 och 11.5 i enlighet med det förfarande som anges i artikel 42 i förordning (EU) nr …/… om inrättande av en europeisk bankmyndighet och artikel 42 i förordning (EU) nr …/… om inrättande av en europeisk försäkrings- och tjänstepensionsmyndighet, efter samordning med de europeiska tillsynsmyndigheternas gemensamma kommitté. | 4) I

text: artikel 7

text: ska följande punkt läggas till som punkt 5.5. Europeiska bankmyndigheten och Europeiska försäkrings- och tjänstepensionsmyndigheten Behöriga europeiska tillsynsmyndigheter ska genom den gemensamma kommittén utfärda allmänna riktlinjer för att se till att tillsynsmetoderna är anpassade till tillämpningen av den extra tillsyn över riskkoncentrationen i enlighet med punkterna 1–4. De ska utfärda särskilda riktlinjer om tillämpningen av punkterna 1–4 till ägarintressen i det finansiella konglomeratet i de fall där nationell bolagsrätt hindrar att

text: artikel 14.2

text: tillämpas. 5) I

text: artikel 8

text: ska följande punkt läggas till som punkt 5.5. Europeiska bankmyndigheten och Europeiska försäkrings- och tjänstepensionsmyndigheten Behöriga europeiska tillsynsmyndigheter ska genom den gemensamma kommittén utfärda allmänna riktlinjer för att se till att tillsynsmetoderna är anpassade till tillämpningen av den extra tillsynen över transaktioner inom det finansiella konglomeratet, i enlighet med punkterna 1–4. De ska utfärda särskilda riktlinjer om tillämpningen av punkterna 1–4 till ägarintressen i det finansiella konglomeratet i de fall där nationell bolagsrätt hindrar att

text: artikel 14.2

text: tillämpas. 6) I

text: artikel 9

text: artikel 124 i direktiv 2006/48/EG

text: och

text: artikel 36 i direktiv 2009/138/EG

text: och till den granskning som behöriga myndigheter utför av att de regler som uppställs i

text: artikel 12 i direktiv 2009/65/EG

text: tillämpas. Europeiska bankmyndigheten och Europeiska försäkrings- och tjänstepensionsmyndigheten Behöriga europeiska tillsynsmyndigheter ska genom den gemensamma kommittén utfärda riktlinjer för att anpassa metoderna för den extra tillsynen över rutiner för intern kontroll och metoder för riskhantering enligt vad som anges i den här artikeln, samt om anpassning till den översyn av tillsynsprocessen som anges i

text: artikel 124 i direktiv 2006/48/EG

text: och

text: artikel 36 i direktiv 2009/138/EG

text: artikel 12 i direktiv 2009/65/EG

text: tillämpas. De ska utarbeta särskilda riktlinjer om tillämpningen av den här artikeln till ägarintressen i det finansiella konglomeratet i de fall där nationell bolagsrätt hindrar att

text: artikel 14.2

text: tillämpas. 7) I

text: artikel 11

text: ska följande läggas till som punkt 4 och punkt 5:[…] 5. Europeiska bankmyndigheten och Europeiska försäkrings- och tjänstepensionsmyndigheten Behöriga europeiska tillsynsmyndigheter ska genom den gemensamma kommittén utfärda riktlinjer för att skapa en konsekvent tillsynssamordning i enlighet med

text: artikel 131

text: a i direktiv

text: och

text: artikel 248.4 i direktiv 2009/138/EG

text: . […] 10) Följande

text: artikel 21

text: b ska läggas till:

text: Artikel 21

text: b Allmänna riktlinjer Europeiska bankmyndigheten och Europeiska försäkrings- och tjänstepensionsmyndigheten Behöriga europeiska tillsynsmyndigheter ska genom den gemensamma kommittén utfärda allmänna riktlinjer som avses i artiklarna 3.38, 7.5, 8.5, 9.6 och 11.5 i enlighet med det förfarande som anges i artikel 4256 i förordning (EU) nr …/…

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning (EU) nr 1093/2010 av den 24 november 2010

text: om inrättande av en europeisk tillsynsmyndighet (Europeiska bankmyndigheten), om ändring av beslut nr

text: och om upphävande av

text: kommissionens beslut 2009/78/EG

text: , i artikel 4256 i förordning (EU) nr …/…

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning (EU) nr 1094/2010 av den 24 november 2010

text: om inrättande av en europeisk tillsynsmyndighet (Europeiska försäkrings- och tjänstepensionsmyndigheten), om ändring av beslut nr

text: och om upphävande av

text: kommissionens beslut 2009/79/EG

text: och i

text: artikel 56 i Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning (EU) nr 1095/2010 av den 24 november 2010

text: om inrättande av en europeisk tillsynsmyndighet (Europeiska värdepappers- och marknadsmyndigheten), om ändring av beslut nr

text: och om upphävande av

text: kommissionens beslut 2009/77/EG

text: Motivering Se förklaringen under ändring 2,som denna ändring hör samman med. Vad gäller extra tillsyn av rutiner för intern kontroll och riskhantering bör det av den föreslagna ändringen av

text: artikel 9.6 i direktiv 2002/87/EG

text: framgå att den extra tillsynen ska vara förenlig med de kontroller som behöriga myndigheter utövar inom ramen för UCITS-direktivet. Redan nu krävs det att extra tillsyn är förenlig med tillsynspraxis enligt bestämmelserna i bankdirektivet och Solvens II-direktivet.

text: Ingen text. | 9a Följande punkt d ska läggas till det första stycket i

text: artikel 21

text: Artikel 6.2

text: för att säkerställa identiska format (med tillhörande instruktioner), frekvenser och rapporteringsdatum.

text: Motivering Se förklaringen under ändring 4, som denna ändring hör samman med.

type: vagledning

utgivare: ecb


text: See Opinions

text: and

text: . All opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 3 The national central banks of non-participating Member States may only connect to TARGET2 if they conclude an agreement with the Eurosystem central banks, see Article 4 of Guideline ECB/2007/2.

text: OJ L 237, 8.9.2007, p. 1.

text: Paragraph 4 of Annex III of Guideline ECB/2007/2 provides: ‘Intraday credit shall be based on eligible collateral and granted by means of collateralised intraday overdrafts and/or intraday repurchase transactions in compliance with the additional minimum common features (including the events of default therein listed, as well as their respective consequences) that the Governing Council specifies with respect to Eurosystem monetary policy operations. Eligible collateral shall consist of the same assets and instruments as eligible assets for Eurosystem monetary policy operations, and shall be subject to the same valuation and risk control rules as those laid down in Annex I to Guideline ECB/2000/7’.

text: Including type of asset, acceptable markets, currency of denomination, settlement procedures, type of/place of establishment of the issuer/guarantor, place of issue. 8 Paragraph 19 of the draft regulations. 9 Paragraph 6.8 of the draft regulations. 10 Paragraph 11.4 of the draft regulations.

sprak: en

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 1 February 2011 on amendments to the national monetary policy operations framework with a view to further harmonising it with the Eurosystem (CON/2011/7)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 1 February 2011 on amendments to the national monetary policy operations framework with a view to further harmonising it with the Eurosystem (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 10 December 2010 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from Lietuvos bankas for an opinion on the recast of the Regulations on selection, valuation and publishing of eligible assets used as underlying assets in credit operations of Lietuvos bankas (hereinafter the ‘draft regulations’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and

text: Article 2(2) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft regulations relate to instruments of monetary policy in a Member State whose currency is not the euro. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft regulations

text: The main objective of the draft regulations is to further harmonise the monetary policy operations framework of Lietuvos bankas with that of the Eurosystem by: (a) separating the eligibility criteria applicable to the assets used for collateralisation of intraday credit in euro and of all other credit operations of Lietuvos bankas, (b) specifying credit standards for eligible assets, (c) referring in its monetary policy framework to the Eurosystem monetary policy framework.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 Although Member States whose currency is not the euro retain their powers in the field of monetary policy, it is beneficial for them to gradually achieve consistency with the operational framework for the implementation of the ECB’s monetary policy so that credit institutions operating in their territories can become acquainted with the requirements that will apply once these Member States have adopted the euro. Such gradual harmonisation prior to the adoption of the euro will contribute to the smooth integration of the national central bank into the Eurosystem.

text: 2.2 The ECB has previously commented on other Lithuanian regulations on monetary policy instruments, in particular the Lithuanian minimum reserves regime . In its opinions, the ECB emphasised the need to further align the Lithuanian minimum reserves regime with Eurosystem standards, including the fact that the Lithuanian credit unions will also be subject to the Eurosystem’s minimum reserves requirements when Lithuania adopts the euro. The ECB observes that all comments previously made on the Lithuanian minimum reserves regime are still valid. 2.3 The ECB welcomes the provisions of the draft regulations that will contribute to the alignment of the monetary policy operations framework of Lietuvos bankas with that of the Eurosystem.

text: 3. Specific observations

text: 3.1 Implications of the draft regulations for the selection of assets eligible for collateralisation of intraday credit operations in TARGET2 by Lietuvos bankas as a connected central bank 3.1.1 Lietuvos bankas concluded an agreement with the Eurosystem central banks on connection to the Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross settlement Express Transfer system (TARGET2) . This agreement specifies, inter alia, that the connected central banks will comply with Guideline ECB/2007/2 of 26 April 2007 on a Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross settlement Express Transfer system (TARGET2) , subject to any mutually agreed appropriate qualifications and modifications. 3.1.2 Lietuvos bankas, as a connected central bank, may provide intraday credit in TARGET2 to its participants under certain conditions. Such intraday credit must be collateralised by eligible assets which meet the same quality standards and are subject to the same valuation and risk control rules as those prescribed for eligible collateral for Eurosystem monetary policy operations . Therefore, in providing intraday credit in TARGET2 and selecting the eligible collateral in this context, Lietuvos bankas is bound by the Eurosystem monetary policy framework as set out in Guideline ECB/2000/7 of 31 August 2000 on monetary policy instruments and procedures of the Eurosystem (hereinafter the ‘General Documentation’). 3.2 Further specification of the rules applicable to intraday credit in euro The draft regulations apply to all credit operations of Lietuvos bankas, including intraday credit in euro. Since Lietuvos bankas is bound by the General Documentation only as regards the collateralisation of intraday credit in euro in TARGET2, the ECB welcomes the specification in the

text: draft regulations of (a) the relevant eligibility criteria to be applied to the assets used for collateralisation of intraday credit in euro in TARGET2, and (b) the relevant eligibility criteria to be applied to the assets used for collateralisation of other credit operations of Lietuvos bankas. However, the ECB recommends further specification also for other rules, in particular as regards credit standards including rules for credit assessment and guarantees, and risk control measures including the relevant valuation haircuts. 3.3 Additional currency valuation haircut As regards the additional 2% valuation haircut applicable to the valuation of securities denominated in litai which are used to collateralise Lietuvos bankas’s intraday credit in euro , the ECB agrees with this additional haircut. Close cooperation with the ECB on an annual basis will ensure also in the future that the currency risk is appropriately addressed and takes into account changing circumstances in the markets and other possible factors. 3.4 References to the Eurosystem monetary policy framework Some provisions of the draft regulations replicate provisions from the General Documentation without any additional qualification. Other provisions from the General Documentation are qualified to reflect particularities of the Lithuanian market. Such qualifications include, inter alia, acceptance of securities registered exclusively with the Lithuanian central securities depository and of guarantees which are regulated exclusively under Lithuanian law . There are also several direct references to the General Documentation. The ECB recommends: (a) using references to the General Documentation where the aim of the specific provision is to replicate the General Documentation’s provisions without any additional qualification, and (b) replicating the General Documentation’s provisions in the national rules where they are further qualified. In any case, it must be ensured that (a) there is clarity as to which rules of the General Documentation apply and where there is divergence from such rules, and (b) the national rules applicable to the collateralisation of the Lietuvos bankas’s intraday credit in euro in TARGET2 meet the minimum requirements established by the General Documentation. This means that any divergence from the rules of the General Documentation is only permissible if it contains more restrictive eligibility criteria.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 1 February 2011. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: KOM(2011) 23 slutlig.

text: Text markerad med fet stil anger ECB:s förslag till ny text. Genomstruken text anger de strykningar som ECB föreslår.

text: EUT C 28, 4.2.2010, s. 13.

text: EGT L 181, 4.7.2001, s. 6.

text: Att sätt mynt i omlopp är en operationell och praktisk verksamhet som kan utföras av ett ombud.

text: Utgivning av mynt är myndighetsutövning som omfattar både att sätta mynt i omlopp och att ta upp motsvarande belopp i den utgivande myndighetens balansräkning.

title: Europeiska centralbankens yttrande av den 11 februari 2011 om en rekommendation till rådets beslut om ordning för omförhandlingen av det monetära avtalet med Monaco (CON/2011/8)

text: Inledning och rättslig grund

text: Den 9 februari 2011 mottog Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) en begäran från Europeiska unionens råd om ett yttrande över en rekommendation till rådets beslut om ordning för omförhandlingen av det monetära avtalet med Monaco (nedan kallat utkastet till beslut).

text: ECB:s behörighet att avge ett yttrande grundar sig på

text: artikel 219.3 i fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt

text: . I enlighet med artikel 17.5 första meningen i arbetsordningen för Europeiska centralbanken har detta yttrande antagits av ECB-rådet.

text: Allmänna kommentarer

text: ECB välkomnar utkastet till beslut som, mer än tio år efter eurons införande, har som mål att ändra det monetära avtalet med Monaco för att uppnå ett mera konsekvent förhållningssätt i förbindelserna mellan unionen och tredje länder.

text: ECB välkomnar särskilt den nya metoden för att fastställa taket för utgivning av euromynt i Monaco samt att avtalet fastställer att minimiandelen euromynt i Monaco som ska sättas i omlopp till nominellt värde ska uppgå till 80 procent.

text: ECB noterar dock att terminologin som används i utkastet till beslut – och följaktligen även i det monetära avtalet – bör justeras till följd av den lagstiftningstekniska utvecklingen.

text: I de fall där ECB rekommenderar att utkastet till beslut ska ändras anges de specifika förslagen i bilagan åtföljt av en förklaring.

text: BILAGA

text: Kommissionens förslag | ECB:s ändringsförslag

text: a) Avtalet ska ingås mellan unionen, företrädd av Frankrike och Europeiska kommissionen, och Monaco. | a) Avtalet ska ingås mellan unionen, företrädd av Frankrike och Europeiska kommissionen i nära samråd med ECB, och Monaco.

text: Motivering Eftersom ett av målen för omförhandlingen av avtalet med Monaco är att öka konsekvensen i förhållande till andra monetära avtal, rekommenderar ECB att man använder vissa formuleringar som använts i det monetära avtalet med Vatikanstaten (signerat den 17 december 2009) för att beskriva ECB:s roll. Den föreslagna ordalydelsen stämmer också överens med artikel 9 i rådets förordning (EG) nr Rådets förordning

text: (EG) nr 1338/2001

text: av den 28 juni 2001 om fastställande av nödvändiga åtgärder för skydd av euron mot förfalskning enligt vilken kommissionen ska samarbeta med tredje land och internationella organisationer, i nära samråd med Europeiska centralbanken.

text: b) Metoden för att fastställa taket för utgivning av euromynt i Monaco ska ses över. Det nya taket ska beräknas med hjälp av en metod som kombinerar en fast del, med syftet att undvika myntsamlares överdrivna spekulation i Monacomynt genom att tillfredsställa efterfrågan på denna marknad, och en rörlig del, beräknad som den genomsnittliga myntutgivningen per capita i Frankrike år n–1 multiplicerad med antalet invånare i Monaco. Utan att det påverkar utgivningen av samlarmynt, ska avtalet fastställa att minimiandelen euromynt i Monaco som ska utges till ett nominellt värde ska uppgå till 80 %. | b) Metoden för att fastställa taket för utgivning av monegaskiska euromynt i Monaco ska ses över. Det nya taket ska beräknas med hjälp av en metod som kombinerar en fast del, med syftet att undvika myntsamlares överdrivna spekulation i monegaskiska Monacomynt genom att tillfredsställa efterfrågan på denna marknad, och en rörlig del, beräknad som den genomsnittliga myntutgivningen per capita i Frankrike år n–1 multiplicerad med antalet invånare i Monaco. Utan att det påverkar utgivningen av samlarmynt, ska avtalet fastställa att minimiandelen monegaskiska euromynt i Monaco som ska utges sättas i omlopp till ett nominellt värde ska uppgå till 80 % av de euromynt som ges ut varje år.

text: Motivering ECB anser att det är viktigt att rätt terminologi används i både mandatet och det monetära avtalet. I detta fall bör slutsatserna från en rapport som tagits fram av en arbetsgrupp bestående av representanter för euroområdets finansministerier och nationella centralbanker (Euro legal tender working group) beaktas, vilket innebär att man bör skilja mellan begreppen att sätta i omlopp och ge ut euromynt.


text: Published on the Parliament’s website at www.sejm.gov.pl, parliamentary print no 3598.

text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: Dziennik Ustaw (Dz. U.) of 1997, No 78, item 483 (hereinafter the ‘Constitution’).

text: See the explanatory memorandum to the draft law, p. 4.

text: and

text: and

text: Article 227 (1)

text: , (5) and (6) of the Constitution by

text: Article 1(2)

text: , (3) and (7) of the draft law, together with Article 2 of the draft law. 7 See the amendments introduced in Articles

text: and

text: (1) of the Constitution by

text: Article 1(5)

text: and (6) of the draft law. 9 See Article 3 of the draft law. 10 Consolidated text published in Dz. U. of 2005, No 1, item 2 (hereinafter the ‘Law on NBP’). 11 See the ECB’s Convergence Report, May 2010, Section 2.2.2.2, p.17.

text: Second and third sentence of Article 227(1) of the Constitution. 13 See Article 3(1) of the Law on NBP. 14 See the second sentence of Article 227(1) of the Constitution introduced by Article 1(7) of the draft law. 15 See the ECB’s Convergence Report 2010 pp. 22 and 253, the ECB’s Convergence Report, May 2006, pp. 66 and 74, and paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: . See also Opinions

text: and

text: . 16 See the ECB’s Convergence Report 2010, Section 6.7.2.1, pp. 252 and 253.

text: See third sentence of Article 227(1) of the Constitution introduced by Article 1(7) of the draft law. 18 See Article 227(2) of the Constitution, as amended by Article 1(7) of the draft law, together with amendments to Articles 103(1) and 144(3) of the Constitution introduced by

text: Article 1(2)

text: and (3) of the draft law. 19 See in particular the following judgements of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal: judgment K 25/99 of 28 June 2000, (Orzecznictwo Trybunału Konstytucyjnego (OTK) ZU No 5/2000, item 141); judgement K 26/03 of 24 November 2003 (OTK ZU No 9/A/2003, item 95); judgement U 4/06 of 22 September 2006 (OTK ZU No 8/A/2006, item 109); and judgement Kp 4/08 of 16 July 2009 (OTK ZU No 7/A/2009, item 112). 20 Compare, for example, solutions adopted in this respect by the Republic of Slovakia:

text: Article 56(1)

text: (1) of the Constitution of Republic of Slovakia (general rule of central bank independence) and Article 7(7) of Law on Národná banka Slovenska (prohibition for members of the central bank governing bodies to receive external instructions). 21 See Section 6.7.2.1 of the ECB’s Convergence Report 2010. 22 See the ECB’s Convergence Report, May 2010, Section 6.7.2.1, p. 252.

text: See the second sentence of Article 203 of the Constitution. 24 See the ECB’s Convergence Report 2010, p. 22, and paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: . 25 The Law on the State Tribunal of 26 March 1982; consolidated text published in Dz. U. of 2002, No 101, item 925. 26 See Article 9(5) of the Law on NBP, together with the second sentence of

text: Article 11(1)

text: and

text: Article 1(1)

text: (3) of the Law on the State Tribunal. 27 See

text: Article 25(3)

text: together with

text: Article 3

text: and

text: Article 1(1)

text: (3) of the Law on the State Tribunal. 29 See the ECB’s Convergence Report 2010, Section 6.7.2.2 recommending amendments to Articles

text: and second sentence of

text: Article 17

text: (2b) of the Law on NBP.

text: See the second sentence of Article 227(1) of the Constitution introduced by Article 1(7) of the draft law. 32 See the amendments introduced in

text: Article 227(2)

text: , (5) and (6) of the Constitution by Article 1(7) of the draft law. 33 See the amendments introduced in Articles 103(1), 144(3) and 227(1) of the Constitution by

text: Article 1(2)

text: , (3) and (7) of the draft law, together with Article 2 of the draft law. 34 See the ECB’s Convergence Report 2010, Section 6.7.5, p. 255.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 14 February 2011 on amendments to the Polish Constitution concerning adoption of the euro (CON/2011/9)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 14 February 2011 on amendments to the Polish Constitution concerning adoption of the euro (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 10 December 2010, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Marshal of the Polish Parliament for an opinion on a draft law amending the Constitution of the Republic of Poland (hereinafter the ‘draft law’) . The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the third indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to Narodowy Bank Polski (NBP). In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The draft law amends the Constitution in order to address obligations stemming from Poland’s membership in the European Union. In particular, the draft law: (a) introduces a new Chapter Xa that consolidates provisions relating specifically to Poland’s membership in the Union; and (b) amends several existing provisions of the Constitution relating to NBP, by introducing ‘changes necessary for the full performance of Poland’s obligations in respect of its participation in economic and monetary union, allowing for the future introduction of … the euro in Poland’ (hereinafter the ‘NBP amendments’). 1.2 The NBP amendments will: (a) redefine NBP’s institutional status and objectives by introducing references to NBP’s membership in the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), to price stability as NBP’s primary objective and to NBP’s independence from other State bodies ; (b) repeal the provisions granting NBP the exclusive authority to issue money and to formulate and implement monetary policy; (c) abolish the Monetary Policy Council (MPC) as one of NBP’s

text: decision-making bodies ; (d) modify the scope of the Supreme Audit Office’s (SAO) audit of NBP ; and (e) remove the reference to the NBP President from the list of State officials that are accountable before the State Tribunal . 1.3 The draft law provides that all NBP amendments enter into force upon Poland’s adoption of the euro .

text: 2. General comments

text: 2.1 Since 2004, in its Convergence Reports, the ECB has been assessing the compatibility of Polish legislation, including the Constitution, with the requirements of primary Union law related to NBP’s participation in the ESCB and, prospectively, in the Eurosystem. In particular, this assessment focuses on: (a) whether national law is compatible with Union law on central bank independence and confidentiality; (b) whether national law is compatible with the Union law prohibition on monetary financing and privileged access; and (c) the NBP’s legal integration into the Eurosystem. This Opinion follows the structure of the relevant assessments in the ECB’s Convergence Reports. 2.2 The legal provisions identified in the ECB’s Convergence Reports as being incompatible with Union requirements are found in the Constitution and in ordinary legislation, and in particular, in the Law on Narodowy Bank Polski of 29 August 1997 . This Opinion focuses on the constitutional provisions amended by the draft law and also makes necessary references to directly related provisions of ordinary legislation. The ECB invites the Polish authorities to ensure compatibility with Union requirements at all levels of national legislation within the timeframe provided for under Union law. Union law does not prescribe the manner in which national legislation should be adapted to achieve compatibility with the relevant requirements under the TFEU and the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter the ‘Statute of the ESCB’). This may be achieved by referring to the TFEU and the Statute of the ESCB, by incorporating provisions thereof and referring to their source, by deleting any incompatibility, or by using a combination of these methods . Depending on the national legislator’s decision, and in line with the hierarchical structure of national legislation, such changes may be introduced in constitutional provisions, ordinary legislation, or both.

text: 3. Central bank independence

text: Functional independence

text: 3.1 The principle of functional independence of a national central bank (NCB) requires that an NCB’s primary objective is stated clearly and that it is fully in line with the primary objective of price stability pursuant to

text: Article 127(1)

text: TFEU. Currently, the Constitution specifies that NBP ‘shall have the exclusive right to issue money as well as to formulate and implement monetary policy’ and ‘shall be responsible for the value of the Polish currency’ . Furthermore, the Law on NBP states that ‘The primary objective of the activity of NBP shall be to maintain price stability, while supporting the economic policies of the Government, insofar as this does not constrain the pursuit of the primary objective of NBP’ . 3.2 The draft law introduces a constitutional provision specifying that NBP ‘shall ensure the stability of prices and shall perform the tasks and exercise the competences specified in the Treaties that form the basis of the European Union and in ordinary legislation ’. The ECB welcomes the inclusion of an explicit reference to ‘price stability’ in the Constitution, as this strengthens NBP’s independence and ensures consistency between the Constitution and the Law on NBP. From the perspective of an NCB’s functional independence, which is not linked to the Member State’s adoption of the euro, the ECB would welcome the entry into force of the provision explicitly referring to ‘price stability’ as soon as possible, and prior to Poland adopting the euro.

text: Institutional independence

text: 3.3 The principle of institutional independence referred to in

text: Article 130

text: TFEU and Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB refers to the exercise of central bank powers and the performance of relevant tasks and duties which is free from external instructions or government influence. In particular, in relation to the powers of a State audit office exercised vis-à-vis an NCB, the following central bank independence safeguards should apply to State audits : (a) the scope of the audit should be clearly defined in the legal framework; (b) the activities of an NCB’s independent external auditors should not be prejudiced; (c) the audit should comply with the prohibition on giving instructions to the NCBs and their decision-making bodies; (d) the audit should not interfere with the NCB’s ESCBrelated tasks; and (e) the audit should be performed on a non-political, independent and purely professional basis. The ECB’s Convergence Report 2010 identifies a few incompatibilities in the Polish legislation in the area of institutional independence, which include: (a) Article 203(1) of the Constitution on the scope of the SAO’s powers to audit NBP; and (b) the lack of an express prohibition for NBP and members of its decision-making bodies to seek or take outside instructions and the lack of an express prohibition on the Government to seek to influence members of NBP’s

text: decision-making bodies in situations where this may have an impact on NBP’s fulfilment of its ESCB-related tasks. 3.4 The draft law introduces two changes to the Constitution related to NBP’s institutional independence. First, it introduces an express general principle according to which ‘In performing its activities, Narodowy Bank Polski is independent of other State bodies’ . Second, it modifies the SAO’s powers vis-à-vis NBP by limiting such powers to ‘audit[ing] the activities of Narodowy Bank Polski regarding their legality, economic prudence, efficiency and diligence, to the extent such activities are not related to the performance of tasks and the exercise of competences specified in the Treaties that form the basis of the European Union’ . 3.5 The general principle of central bank independence has already been extensively defined in the Constitutional Tribunal’s decisions , which refer to both the TFEU and the Statute of the ESCB, as well as to the specific aspects of central bank independence. The ECB understands, therefore, that in line with those decisions the rule expressed in the proposed third sentence of Article 227(1) of the Constitution will be interpreted with reference to all established aspects of central bank independence, i.e. functional, institutional, personal and financial. Moreover, the ECB understands that this rule refers to all NBP activities, i.e. its ESCB-related tasks and its other tasks. At the same time, the ECB expects that this rule will be elaborated on in the Law on NBP and other relevant legislation . In this respect, the ECB reiterates its remarks relating to NBP’s institutional independence in the ECB’s Convergence Report 2010 . 3.6 As regards the SAO, the proposed wording of Article 227(2) of the Constitution excludes ESCBrelated tasks and competences performed by NBP from the scope of an SAO audit. The ECB considers the joint effect of both this exclusion and the express introduction into the Constitution of the general principle of central bank independence an important enhancement of legal certainty in the area of NBP’s institutional independence. This is subject to the following specific observations: (a) in order to achieve full compliance with the principle of institutional independence, the prohibition on giving and taking instructions referred to in

text: Article 130

text: TFEU and Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB needs to be expressly referred to in Polish legislation so that it specifically applies to, inter alia, the SAO ; (b) the scope of the SAO’s audit of NBP should, for reasons of legal certainty, be further defined to safeguard NBP’s institutional independence. In particular, relevant legislation should ensure that when auditing NBP, the application by the SAO of the

text: ‘efficacy criterion’ does not extend to an evaluation of NBP’s activities related to its primary objective of price stability .

text: Personal independence

text: 3.7 The principle of personal independence covers security of tenure and safeguards against arbitrary dismissal of members of the NCB’s decision-making bodies. The ECB’s Convergence Report 2010 identified several provisions of the Law on NBP and of the Law on the State Tribunal that are incompatible with TFEU requirements in this respect. In particular, these laws establish grounds for the dismissal of NBP’s President and other members of NBP’s decision-making bodies involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks which are in addition to the exclusive grounds for dismissal specified in Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB. One such additional ground for dismissal refers specifically to the NBP President who may be suspended as a result of an indictment by the Parliament before the State Tribunal , and may ultimately be removed from office by a decision of this Tribunal . 3.8 The draft law removes the reference to NBP’s President from the constitutional provision listing State officials that are accountable before the State Tribunal . The ECB welcomes this constitutional amendment as it eliminates the respective incompatibly with Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB, and understands that it will be followed by relevant legislative amendments. At the same time, the ECB reiterates the remarks made in the ECB’s Convergence Report 2010 which relate to the grounds for dismissal of members of NBP’s decision-making bodies .

text: 4. Legal integration of NBP into the Eurosystem

text: 4.1 Legal integration of NCBs into the Eurosystem requires that national legislation be adapted to allow for the performance of Eurosystem-related tasks and compliance with the ECB’s decisions once the Member State concerned has adopted the euro. The ECB’s Convergence Report 2010 identifies several legislative provisions that are incompatible with TFEU requirements, in particular: (a) the provisions of the Constitution and of the Law on NBP which provide for NBP’s powers with regard to monetary policy and certain other fields, which do not recognise the ECB’s powers in those fields; and (b) the provision of the Law on NBP which defines NBP’s secondary objective in a manner that does not reflect the secondary objective of supporting the general economic policies in the Union, in accordance with

text: Article 127(1)

text: TFEU.

text: 4.2 The draft law: (a) reformulates the description of NBP’s institutional status by introducing a reference to NBP’s membership in the ESCB ; (b) defines NBP’s objectives by providing that NBP ‘shall ensure the stability of prices and shall perform the tasks and exercise the competences specified in the Treaties which form the basis of the European Union and in ordinary legislation’ ; (c) removes NBP’s exclusive powers to issue money and to formulate and implement monetary policy ; and (d) abolishes the MPC, an NBP decision-making body responsible for the formulation and implementation of monetary policy . The ECB welcomes these amendments, with the reservation that, for reasons of legal certainty, the Constitution should also refer in a sufficiently precise manner to the secondary objective of the ESCB specified in

text: Article 127(1)

text: TFEU and Article 2 of the Statute of the ESCB. Those provisions provide that, without prejudice to the primary objective of price stability, an NCB must support the general economic policies of the Union with a view to contributing to the achievement of Union objectives as laid down in Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union. The ECB understands that the above-mentioned constitutional amendments will be followed by the necessary amendments in the Law on NBP, which are indicated in the ECB’s Convergence Report 2010 .

text: 5. Entry into force of the NBP amendments

text: The draft law provides that all NBP amendments are to enter into force at a later time than the remaining amendments introduced in the Constitution by the draft law, i.e. only when Poland adopts the euro. The ECB draws the Polish authorities’ attention to the fact that, to comply with

text: Article 131

text: TFEU requiring compatibility of Polish legislation with the TFEU and the Statute of the ESCB, relevant Polish legislation had to be adjusted by the date of Polish accession to the Union, i.e. 1 May 2004. Hence, amendments addressing the outstanding issues identified in the ECB’s Convergence Report 2010 concerning central bank independence, confidentiality and compliance with the monetary financing prohibition need to be adopted and enter into force as soon as possible, irrespective of when Poland adopts the euro. In relation to the constitutional amendments introduced by the draft law, this applies to the amendments discussed in paragraphs 3.3 to 3.8 of this Opinion. Adjustments necessary to ensure full integration of NBP into the Eurosystem, while they should also be adopted as soon as possible, must enter into force on the date Poland adopts the euro. This relates to the constitutional amendments discussed in paragraph 4 of this Opinion. Specifically, as regards the introduction in the Constitution of an express reference to price stability discussed in paragraphs 3.1 to 3.2 of this Opinion, the ECB would welcome its entering into force before the date Poland adopts the euro, since it strengthens NBP’s functional

text: independence. The ECB recommends that Article 3 of the draft law be amended in accordance with the above comments. This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 14 February 2011. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: Decree Law No 225 of 29 December 2010, Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica Italiana, Serie generale No 303, 29.12.2010, p. 1. 3 The Decree-Law was adopted by the Italian Government on 29 December 2010 and entered into force on the same day. Under the Italian Constitution, the Decree-Law needs to be converted into a law by the Italian Parliament within 60 days from adoption by the Government. 4 As also provided in Article 2(13) of the Decree-Law, the initiatives were decided at the G20 Summit of the Heads of State and Government held in London on 2 April 2009, later reaffirmed at the G20 Summit held in Seoul in November 2010, and supported by the European Council. See also the Presidency Conclusions of the European Council held in Brussels on 18 and 19 June 2009.

text: The IMF’s Executive Board adopted a ‘Proposed decision to modify the New Arrangements to Borrow’ on 12 April 2010. It is available on the IMF’s website at www.imf.org. 6 Italy’s agreed share of this contribution was SDR 13 578 million. 7 Until now Italy has participated in the NAB with a credit line provided by the Banca d’Italia currently amounting to SDR 1 753 billion (equivalent to about EUR 2 billion).. 8 According to the explanatory memorandum, the Italian contribution will be charged to the Banca d’Italia and will not affect the Italian State budget. 9 The process of consents and adherences to the proposed expansion of the NAB has not yet been completed. 10 Where additional financial resources are needed, the Banca d’Italia may contribute up to a cumulative total of EUR 13,53 billion. See

text: Article 2(13)

text: (b) of the Decree-Law. 11 The bilateral loan will be offset against Italy’s extended provision of credit arrangements under the NAB of EUR 13,53 billion. 12 On 23 July 2009, the IMF’s Executive Board approved wide ranging modifications to upgrade its concessional financial facilities for low-income countries. The decision adopted by the IMF’s Executive Board establishes the PRGT, replacing and expanding the former Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility-Exogenous Shocks Facility. The PRGT includes new financially improved credit lines, such as the ECF, that are considered to be more adapted to low-income countries’ needs. 13 According to the explanatory memorandum, this amount represents remaining contributions that have already been provided but which will be considered as new resources.

text: The 14th recital of

text: Regulation (EC) No 3603/93

text: reads as follows: ‘Whereas the financing by the central banks of obligations falling upon the public sector vis-à-vis the International Monetary Fund or resulting from the implementation of the mediumterm financial assistance facility set up within the Community results in foreign claims which have all the characteristics of reserve assets; whereas it is, therefore, appropriate to authorise them’. 16 All Opinions are available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: This Opinion considered that an NCB’s involvement in financing such an IMF initiative reduces what is in principle government expenditure on development aid, and that the NCB effects this reduction by immediately transferring funds in lieu of the Government.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 14 February 2011 on Italy’s participation in International Monetary Fund programmes in response to the financial crisis (CON/2011/10)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 14 February 2011 on Italy’s participation in International Monetary Fund programmes in response to the financial crisis (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 20 January 2011, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Italian Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance for an opinion on a decree-law on the extension of deadlines and on urgent

text: measures in the field of taxation and in support of enterprises and families , concerning also Italy’s

text: participation in International Monetary Fund (IMF) programmes in response to the financial crisis (hereinafter the ‘Decree-Law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the Decree-Law relates to the Banca d’Italia. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the Decree-Law

text: Article 2(13)

text: to (16) of the Decree-Law regulates the relations between Italy and the IMF with regard to the implementation of the commitments made by the Italian State to the IMF in response to the financial crisis . 1.2 The Decree-Law refers to the expansion of the IMF’s New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB). The increase in the NAB, as approved by the IMF’s Executive Board on 12 April 2010 , includes credit

text: lines from new NAB participant countries and additional credit lines from existing NAB participants, such as Italy. Under the expanded and more flexible NAB, credit of up to SDR 367,5 billion (equivalent to about EUR 429,6 billion) will be available. Member States have agreed to contribute EUR 125 billion to the expanded NAB . According to the Decree-Law, Italy’s contribution will 7 8 amount to EUR 13,58 billion , to be funded from the Banca d’Italia’s resources . 1.3 In view of the uncertain economic situation , a number of IMF member countries have agreed to make bilateral agreements with the IMF in the interim. The Decree-Law implements such an agreement to provide an interim bilateral loan, authorising the Banca d’Italia to grant the IMF a loan of up to EUR 8,11 billion on Italy’s behalf. The IMF’s Executive Board approved a draft borrowing agreement with the Banca d’Italia on 27 October 2009 that became effective on entry into force of the Decree-Law. The bilateral agreement with the IMF addressed in the Decree-Law may be terminated once the new NAB agreement has entered into force . 1.4 The Decree-Law also refers to Italy’s participation in the Extended Credit Facility (ECF) of the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT) . The Decree-Law authorises the Banca d’Italia to provide loans at market rates of up to SDR 800 million, whereas the Italian Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance will provide a SDR 22,1 million subsidy . 1.5 The State budget will guarantee the reimbursement of the capital and interest and will cover any exchange rate risk on the loans provided by the Banca d’Italia under the Decree-Law.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 It is necessary to assess whether the decree law complies with the prohibition of monetary financing under Article 123(1) of the Treaty, which prohibits overdraft facilities or any other type of credit

text: facility with national central banks (NCBs) in favour of central governments. This prohibition is subject to certain exceptions contained in Article 123(2) of the Treaty and in

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 of 13 December 1993

text: specifying definitions for the application of the prohibitions referred to in Articles

text: and

text: b(1) of the Treaty . In particular,

text: Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 3603/93

text: provides that the financing by NCBs of obligations falling upon the public sector vis-à-vis the IMF is not regarded as a credit facility within the meaning of Article 123 of the Treaty . It is also necessary to ensure that the possible euro liquidity injections resulting from the Banca d’Italia’s funding of Italy’s participation in the NAB, from the disbursements by the Banca d’Italia under the bilateral loan agreement between the Banca d’Italia and the IMF and from the loans granted by the Banca d’Italia under the ECF of the PRGT, do not interfere with the implementation of the single monetary policy. Under paragraph 23 of the IMF’s Proposed Decision to Modify the New Arrangements to Borrow, there is a presumption that the IMF will notify the respective central bank at least five business days prior to drawing. Likewise, under paragraph 2(a) of the Borrowing Agreement between the Banca d’Italia and the IMF, the IMF will give the Banca d’Italia at least five business days’ notice of its intention to draw. Also with regard to the loans under the ECF of the PRGT, the Banca d’Italia should be given sufficient notice of a loan. This will allow for possible euro liquidity injections under these facilities to be taken into account when implementing single monetary policy

text: Increase of the credit limits under the expanded IMF’s NAB

text: 2.2 Opinion

text: considered a draft law authorising the Oesterreichische Nationalbank (hereinafter the ‘OeNB’) to grant, in Austria’s name, a loan to the IMF, and Opinion

text: considered a draft law authorising the OeNB to increase on Austria’s behalf the credit limits for the NAB with the IMF. In both Opinions, the ECB concluded that the operations covered were not a credit facility within the meaning of

text: Article 123(1)

text: , but fell within the exception in

text: Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 3603/93

text: . Similarly, the Banca d’Italia’s authorisation, under the Decree-Law, to increase the credit limits for the NAB should be considered as falling within the scope of

text: Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No. 3603/93

text: Bilateral loan with the IMF

text: 2.3 The Banca d’Italia’s authorisation under the Decree-Law to grant a bilateral loan to the IMF should also be considered as falling within the scope of

text: Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 3603/93

text: , and should therefore not be regarded as a form of monetary financing prohibited by the Treaty. Opinion

text: considered a draft law authorising Banka Slovenije to provide payments to the IMF on the basis of a bilateral agreement between Slovenia and the IMF, while Opinion

text: considered a draft law authorising the OeNB to provide payments to the IMF on the basis of a bilateral agreement between the OeNB and the IMF. In both cases, the ECB came to the same conclusion.

text: Contribution to the IMF’s ECF of the PRGT

text: 2.4 Opinion

text: considered more closely an NCB’s involvement in financing the IMF’s facility for low-income countries. Similarly, Opinion

text: considered a draft law on the OeNB’s involvement in financing the IMF’s PRGF and PRGF-HIPC Trusts for Liberia’s debt relief, and Opinion

text: considered a draft law on the OeNB’s authorisation to pay, in Austria’s name, a contribution to the trust fund administered by the IMF for low income developing countries affected by natural disasters. In all the abovementioned Opinions, the ECB took the view that an NCB’s financing of an IMF-administered initiative fell within the exemption in

text: Article 7 of Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93

text: . Also in view of the above, the provision by the Banca d’Italia of loans under the ECF of the PRGT should be considered as falling within the exemption in

text: Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 3603/93

text: and therefore should not be regarded as a form of monetary financing prohibited by the Treaty.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 14 February 2011.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: Ännu ej offentliggjort i EUT.

title: ECB-rådets yttrande av den 7 december 2011 över en rekommendation från rådet om utnämning av en ledamot i Europeiska centralbankens direktion (CON/2011/100)

text: Inledning och rättslig grund

text: Den 1 december 2011 mottog Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) en begäran från Europeiska rådets ordförande om ett yttrande över rådets rekommendation av den 30 november 2011 om utnämning av en ledamot i Europeiska centralbankens direktion.

text: ECB-rådets behörighet att avge ett yttrande grundar sig på

text: artikel 283.2 i fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt

text: Allmänna kommentarer

text: 1. I rådets rekommendation, som överlämnats till Europeiska rådet och som Europaparlamentet och ECB-rådet nu ska yttra sig över, föreslås att Benoît COEURÉ utnämns till ledamot i Europeiska centralbankens direktion för en tid av åtta år.

text: 2. ECB-rådet anser att den förslagna kandidaten är en person som besitter den allmänt erkända auktoritet och yrkeserfarenhet inom den finansiella sektorn som krävs enligt artikel 283.2 i fördraget.

text: 3. ECB-rådet har ingen invändning mot rådets rekommendation att utnämna Benoît COEURÉ till ledamot i Europeiska centralbankens direktion.