identifier: AMC & GM to Part-ORO — Issue 2, Amendment 17

beslut: ED Decision 2021/002/R

title: AMC & GM to Part-ORO — Issue 2, Amendment 17

text: AMC and GM to Part-ORO of Annex III to ED Decision 2021/002/R

text: Regulation (EU) No 965/2012

text: ‘AMC and GM to Part-ORO — Issue 2, Amendment 17’

text: The Annex to ED Decision 2014/017/R is amended as follows: The text of the amendment is arranged to show deleted text, new or amended text as shown below: (a) deleted text is struck through; (b) new or amended text is highlighted in blue; (c) an ellipsis (…) indicates that the remaining text is unchanged.

text: AMC and GM to Part-ORO of

text: Regulation (EU) No 965/2012

text: Issue 2, Amendment 17

text: GM1 ORO.GEN.130(b) Changes related to an AOC holder

text: CHANGES REQUIRING PRIOR APPROVAL The following list GM is a non-exhaustive checklist of items that require prior approval from the competent authority as specified in the applicable Implementing Rules: (a) alternative means of compliance; (b) procedures regarding items to be notified to the competent authority; (…)

text: AMC1 ORO.FC.115 Crew resource management (CRM) training

text: CRM TRAINING — MULTI-PILOT OPERATIONS (a) General (1) Training environment CRM training should be conducted in the non-operational environment (classroom and computer-based) and in the operational environment (flight simulation training device (FSTD) including other training solutions described in CS-FSTD when available and aircraft). Tools such as group discussions, team task analysis, team task simulation and feedback should be used. (2) Classroom training Whenever possible, classroom training should be conducted in a group session away from the pressures of the usual working environment, so that the opportunity is provided for flight crew members to interact and communicate in an environment conducive to learning. (3) Computer-based training (CBT) Computer-based training should not be conducted as a stand-alone training method, but may be conducted as a complementary training method. Complementary training method in the context of EBT: advanced CBT following the aviation blended learning environment, such as virtual reality, chatbots, interactive scenario trainers, etc. may serve as the principal method to deliver training in the nonoperational environment. In such case, the classroom training may be the complementary method. (…)

text: AMC1 ORO.FC.146(c) Personnel providing training, checking and assessment

text: EBT INSTRUCTOR — INITIAL STANDARDISATION PROGRAMME (a) Before delivering the operator’s EBT programme, the instructor should complete an EBT

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text: instructor initial standardisation programme composed of: (1) EBT instructor training; and (2) EBT assessment of competence. EBT INSTRUCTOR TRAINING (b) The EBT instructor training course should be delivered by at least one pilot who is or has been an EBT instructor, and who has demonstrated proficiency to train the elements specified in point (c) below. (c) The EBT instructor training course should comprise theoretical and practical training. At the completion of EBT instructor training, the instructor should: (1) have knowledge of EBT, including the following underlying principles: (i) competency-based training; (ii) learning from positive performance; (iii) building resilience; and (iv) data-driven training; (2) demonstrate knowledge of the structure of an EBT module; (3) demonstrate knowledge of the method of training delivery for each phase of an EBT module; (4) demonstrate knowledge of the principles of adult learning and how they relate to EBT; (5) conduct objective observations based on a competency framework, and document evidence of observed performance; (6) relate specific performance observations of competencies; (7) analyse trainee performance to determine competency-based training needs and recognise strengths; (8) evaluate performance using a competency-based grading system; (9) apply appropriate teaching styles during simulator training to accommodate trainee learning needs; (10) facilitate trainee learning, focusing on specific competency-based training needs; and (11) conduct a debrief using facilitation techniques. (d) An instructor may be given credits for parts of point (c) if the instructor has demonstrated competencies in those topics. EBT ASSESSMENT OF COMPETENCE (e) Prior to conducting assessment and training within an EBT programme, the EBT instructor should complete an EBT assessment of competence where the EBT instructor delivers: (1) an evaluation phase (EVAL) and a manoeuvres training phase (MT); or (2) a scenario-based training phase (SBT).

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text: (f) The assessment of competence has a validity period of 3 years counted from the end of the month the assessment of competence was conducted. (g) The EBT assessment of competence should be conducted by a person nominated by the operator, who: (1) is qualified in accordance with Annex I (Part-FCL) to

text: Regulation (EU) No 1178/2011

text: to conduct an assessment of competence; and (2) has completed the EBT instructor standardisation. (h) The EBT assessment of competence may be combined with the assessment of competence required in Annex I (Part-FCL) to

text: Regulation (EU) No 1178/2011

text: AMC2 ORO.FC.146(c) Personnel providing training, checking and assessment

text: EBT INSTRUCTOR — RECURRENT STANDARDISATION PROGRAMME The EBT instructor should: (a) conduct six EVAL or SBT phases of an EBT module (or a combination of both) every 36 months. One of the EVAL or SBT should take place in the period of 12 months immediately preceding the expiry date. The 36-month period should be counted from the end of the month the module was taken. If this has not been fulfilled, the EBT instructor should complete an EBT assessment of competence. When the module is undertaken within the last 12 months of the validity period, the new period should be counted from the original expiry date; (b) receive annual recurrent standardisation. The recurrent standardisation should include: (1) refresher EBT training; and (2) concordance training; and (c) complete an assessment of competence every 3 years. When the assessment of competence is conducted within the 12 months preceding the expiry date, the next assessment of competence should be completed within 36 calendar months of the original expiry date of the previous assessment of competence.

text: GM1 ORO.FC.146(c) Personnel providing training, checking and assessment

text: EBT INSTRUCTOR — INITIAL STANDARDISATION (a) The intent of the practical training is to ensure that EBT instructors have exposure to assessment of performance and root cause identification within an EBT programme. (b) EBT instructors receive practical assistance and guidance during standardisation in order to apply the learning from EBT instructor training. In particular, the focus should be on assessment of performance and the determination of root cause for remediation, plus facilitated debriefing based on root cause as a learning objective.

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text: (c) The pilot delivering the training may be supported by a subject matter expert (or experts). The personnel providing the EBT training is selected by the operator to assess the instructor capability in delivering EBT and provide effective feedback in order that instructor practice meets the expectations of the operator. (d) Practical EBT training includes the learning objective ‘Evaluate performance using a competency-based grading system’. This may be done with videos and other multimedia. It means that EBT instructors are exposed to: (1) different levels of pilot performance. This enables EBT instructors to distinguish between pilots performing lower than the minimum acceptable level of performance (e.g. grade 1) and those whose performance is at an acceptable level in all competencies (e.g. grade 2). This EBT training may also include other performance examples (e.g. 3, 4 and 5); and (2) different scenarios (e.g. complex to less complex) so that the instructor has exposure to assessments of competency in varying EBT scenarios. (e) The EBT instructor training course may be a minimum of 14 hours (EBT instructor training alone) and the recommended length is between 21 to 24 hours (EBT instructor training plus assessment of competence).

text: GM2 ORO.FC.146(c) Personnel providing training, checking and assessment

text: EBT INSTRUCTOR — RECURRENT STANDARDISATION (a) Refresher EBT training The intent of this training is to provide the framework for existing instructors to develop their competence to conduct EBT. Further guidance can be found in the EASA EBT manual. (b) Concordance training This training is one of the elements to ensure concordance within the EBT instructor community. Those EBT instructors who do not demonstrate concordance may require further training. The operator’s instructor standardisation and concordance assurance programme provides insight in the areas that an instructor (or instructor population) requires concordance training. As such, concordance training varies in content and scale depending on the need for concordance improvement. Instructor concordance training may include candidates grading the same controlled content (e.g. a video or paper case) followed by: (1) a subsequent comparison of intra-group variance; and (2) alignment of root-cause analyses between instructors.

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text: GM3 ORO.FC.146(c) Personnel providing training, checking and assessment

text: EBT INSTRUCTOR COMPETENCY FRAMEWORK Pilot competencies Description: See pilot competency framework Instructor See pilot competency framework observable behaviour (iOB) For ground instructors, some competencies may not apply. For the instructor assessment of competence, these competencies may not be observed. A review of the records of the instructor may be sufficient. Management of the learning environment Description: Ensures that the instruction, assessment and evaluation are conducted in a suitable and safe environment iOB 2.1 Applies TEM in the context of instruction/evaluation iOB 2.2 Briefs on safety procedures for situations that are likely to develop during instruction/evaluation iOB 2.3 Intervenes appropriately, at the correct time and level (e.g. progresses from verbal assistance to taking over control) iOB 2.4 Resumes instruction/evaluation as practicable after any intervention iOB 2.5 Plans and prepares training media, equipment and resources iOB 2.6 Briefs on training devices or aircraft limitations that may influence training, when applicable iOB 2.7 Creates and manages conditions (e.g. airspace, ATC, weather, time, etc.) to be suitable for the training objectives iOB 2.8 Adapts to changes in the environment whilst minimising training disruptions iOB 2.9 Manages time, training media and equipment to ensure that training objectives are met Instruction Description: Conducts training to develop the trainee’s competencies

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text: iOB 3.1 References approved sources (operations, technical and training manuals, standards and regulations) iOB 3.2 States clearly the objectives and clarifies roles for the training iOB 3.3 Follows the approved training programme Applies instructional methods as appropriate (e.g. explanation, demonstration, learning by iOB 3.4 discovery, facilitation, in-seat instruction) iOB 3.5 Sustains operational relevance and realism iOB 3.6 Adapts the amount of instructor inputs to ensure that the training objectives are met iOB 3.7 Adapts to situations that might disrupt a planned sequence of events iOB 3.8 Continuously assesses the trainee’s competencies (e.g. by including the root cause(s) of the deficiency(-ies) observed according to the competency framework) iOB 3.9 Encourages the trainee to self-assess iOB 3.10 Allows the trainee to self-correct in a timely manner iOB 3.11 Applies trainee-centred feedback techniques (e.g. facilitation, etc.) iOB 3.12 Provides positive reinforcement Interaction with the trainees Description: Supports the trainees’ learning and development and demonstrates exemplary behaviour (role model) iOB 4.1 Shows respect for the trainee (e.g. for culture, language and experience) Shows patience and empathy (e.g. by actively listening, reading non-verbal messages and iOB 4.2 encouraging dialogue) iOB 4.3 Manages trainees’ barriers to learning iOB 4.4 Encourages engagement and mutual support between the trainees iOB 4.5 Coaches the trainees iOB 4.6 Supports the goal and training policies of the operator/ATO and authority iOB 4.7 Shows integrity (e.g. honesty and professional principles) iOB 4.8 Demonstrates acceptable personal conduct, acceptable social practices, content expertise, a model for professional and interpersonal behaviour iOB 4.9 Actively seeks and accepts feedback to improve own performance

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text: Assessment and evaluation Description: Assesses the competencies of the trainee and contributes to continuous training system improvement iOB 5.1 Complies with operator/ATO and authority requirements iOB 5.2 Ensures that the trainee understands the assessment process iOB 5.3 Applies the competency standards and conditions iOB 5.4 Assesses trainee’s competency (-ies) iOB 5.5 Performs grading iOB 5.6 Provides recommendations based on the outcome of the assessment iOB 5.7 Makes decisions based on the outcome of assessments iOB 5.8 Provides clear feedback to the trainee iOB 5.9 Reports strengths and weaknesses of the training system (e.g. training environment, curriculum, assessment/evaluation) including feedback from trainees iOB 5.10 Suggests improvements for the training system iOB 5.11 Produces reports using appropriate forms and media The recommended competency assessment grading system methodology for instructor competencies should be the same as the one used for pilots. This is the Venn model. More information can be found in ORO.FC.231 point (d)(1) and the related AMC and GM, as well as in the EASA EBT manual.

text: GM1 ORO.FC.230(a);(b);(f) Recurrent training and checking

text: MIXED EVIDENCE-BASED RECURRENT TRAINING AND CHECKING OF FLIGHT CREW CONDUCTED IN FLIGHT SIMULATION TRAINING DEVICES (FSTDs) ICAO has developed Doc 9995 ‘Manual of Evidence-based Training’, followed by the EASA EBT manual, which is intended to provide guidance to the competent civil aviation authorities, operators and approved training organisations in on the recurrent assessment and training of pilots by establishing a new methodology for the development and conduct of a recurrent assessment and training and assessment programme, titled evidence-based training (EBT). ‘Evidence-based Training(EBT)’ means training and assessment based on operational data that is characterised by developing and assessing the overall capability of a trainee across a range of core competencies rather than by measuring the performance during individual events or manoeuvres. ICAO Doc 9995 and the EASA EBT manual are is the reference documents for operators seeking to implement mixed EBT. The purpose of this guidance material (GM) is to enable the implementation of

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text: mixed EBT according to the principles established in ICAO Doc 9995 and the EASA EBT manual taking into account in the context of the European regulatory framework. In the current regulatory framework, it is possible to achieve a mixed EBT implementation of EBT. Implementation of a mixed EBT programme means that some portion of the recurrent assessment and training is dedicated to the application of EBT. This includes the Llicence Pproficiency Ccheck (LPC) and the Ooperator Pproficiency Ccheck (OPC). As it is possible to combine LPC and OPC in ORO.FC, this GM is applicable to both checks. Therefore, the EBT training programme described in this GM refers to the recurrent training and checking of flight crew, including LPCs and OPCs. The EBT training programme takes into account the differences between aircraft of different generations and the effect of these differences on training. The operator should acquire a thorough knowledge of ICAO Doc 9995 or the EASA EBT manual before implementing this GM. For applicability, see ICAO Doc 9995 Chapter 3 or the EASA tables of applicable aeroplane/helicopter types by generation. Mixed EBT programme Within the current regulatory framework tThe operator may undertake a mixed implementation of the mixed EBT programme according to this GM. The ICAO table of assessment and training topics is defined in ICAO Doc 9995 Chapter 4.3.1 and in Appendices 2 to 7; the EASA EBT programme is defined in AMC2 to AMC7 to ORO.FC.232. The baseline mixed EBT programme provides operators with the flexibility to adapt programmes according to their specific operator risks. Elements of the enhanced EBT programme may be implemented according to the definition and process described in ICAO Doc 9995 Chapter 5. The operator should contact the competent authority in order for them to assess the application of the process described in ICAO Doc 9995 or the EBT manual including, where applicable, the results from data analyses to support the enhanced EBT programme. Personnel providing training and checking in EBT (Refers to AMC1 ORO.FC.230(d)) ICAO Doc 9995 Chapter 6, or EASA AMC1 and AMC2 to ORO.FC.146(c), which is additional to EU regulations, contain(s) the guidance for the assessment and training and assessment of personnel involved in the conduct of EBT. Equivalency of malfunctions/Malfunction clustering (Refers to ICAO Doc 9995 Paragraph 3.8.3) According to the concept of EASA and ICAO Doc 9995 Chapter 3.8.3, major failures reduce the capability of the aircraft or the ability of the crew to cope with operating conditions to the extent that there would be a significant reduction in functional capabilities, significant increase in crew workload or in conditions impairing crew efficiency. Clusters of major failures of aircraft systems are determined by reference to malfunction characteristics and the underlying elements of crew performance required to manage them. Malfunction clustering Equivalency of malfunctions may be used to guide the operator towards the implementation of an a mixed EBT programme according to AMC1 ORO.FC.230(a)(4)(i)(A) and ORO.FC.145(d).

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text: Conduct of Llicence and Ooperator Pproficiency Cchecks The EASA EBT programme described in ORO.FC.231 and the ICAO EBT programme described in ICAO Doc 9995 contains modules with three phases: the EVAL evaluation phase, the MT manoeuvres training phase, and the SBT scenario-based training phase. In order to comply with the existing regulatory framework, in the mixed EBT programme the LPC and OPC requirements are fulfilled by a combination of the EVAL evaluation phase and the manoeuvres validation phase, which replaces the MT manoeuvres training phase described in the EASA EBT programme or ICAO Doc 9995. The manoeuvres validation phase is defined in Section 2 3 below. This is a form of mixed EBT implementation, which is described as follows: 1. Evaluation phase: This includes check scenarios referred to in Part-FCL Appendix 9 within an accepted approved mixed EBT programme. In order to facilitate the provision of simple and realistic scenarios in accordance with ICAO Doc 9995 Chapters 3.8 and 7.4, the EVAL evaluation phase is not intended to be a comprehensive assessment of all Part-FCL Appendix 9 items; nevertheless, the list below includes the items that should be included in the EVAL evaluation phase only. Part-FCL or Description Part-ORO reference A H The examiner may choose between different skill test or proficiency check scenarios containing simulated relevant operations developed and E E approved by the competent authority. Full-flight simulators and other R L training devices, when available, shall be used, as established in this Part. O I P C Part-FCL Appendix 9 L O Paragraph 6 A P N T E E S R S A The test or check should be accomplished under instrument flight rules Part-FCL Appendix 9 (IFRs), if instrument rating (IR) is included, and as far as possible be E Paragraph 16 of accomplished in a simulated commercial air transport environment. An R section B essential element to be checked is the ability to plan and conduct the flight from routine briefing material.

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text: O Use of checklist prior to starting engines, starting procedures, radio and Part-FCL Appendix 9 navigation equipment check, selection and setting of navigation and P Item 1.4 communication frequencies. L Part-FCL Appendix 9 A Before take-off checks. Item 1.6 N E Adherence to departure and arrival routes and ATC instructions. Part-FCL Appendix 9 S The starred item (*) shall be flown solely by reference to instruments. If Item 3.8.1* this condition is not met during the skill test or proficiency check, the type rating will be restricted to VFR only. H In case of proficiency check for an IR, the applicant shall pass section 5 of the proficiency check. Failure in more than three items will require the E Part-FCL Appendix 9 applicant to take the entire section 5 again. An applicant failing not more Paragraph 2 of L than three items shall take the failed items again. Failure in any item of section C I the re-check or failure in any other items of section 5 already passed will require the applicant to take the entire check again. C O Part-FCL Appendix 9 Starting procedures, radio and navigation equipment check, selection and Item 1.3. setting of navigation and communication frequencies P T Part-FCL Appendix 9 Taxiing/air taxiing in compliance with air traffic control instructions or E with instructions of an instructor Item 1.4 R Part-FCL Appendix 9 S Pre-take-off procedures and checks Item 1.5 Adherence to departure and arrival routes and ATC instructions Part-FCL Appendix 9 The starred item (*) shall be flown solely by reference to instruments. If Item 5.2* this condition is not met during the skill test or proficiency check, the type rating will be restricted to VFR only. 2. Manoeuvres validation phase: The purpose of the manoeuvres validation phase is to check the handling skills necessary to fly critical flight manoeuvres so that they are maintained to a defined level of proficiency. This replaces the MT manoeuvres training phase described in ICAO Doc 9995 Chapter 7.5 and ORO.FC.231(a)(2)(iv)(B)(a). Manoeuvres in this context are not part of the lineorientated flight scenario; they are a sequence of deliberate actions to achieve a prescribed flight path or to perform a prescribed event to a prescribed outcome. All remaining items listed in Part-FCL Appendix 9, and not included in the EVAL evaluation phase, should be included here. The manoeuvres listed in Doc 9995 or the EASA table of assessment and training topics for the MT that do not form part of the Part-FCL Appendix 9 mandatory items may be trained after the

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text: manoeuvres validation phase. 3. Scenario-based training phase: The purpose of the SBT scenario-based training phase is to further develop pilot core competencies in a learning environment. This does not form part of any LPC or OPC requirement. It should be noted that if the operator is following an alternative means of compliance to ORO.FC.230 (b) Operator Pproficiency Ccheck, the equivalence of using EBT evaluation and manoeuvres validation phases may no longer exist. Conduct of CRM assessment The operator is advised to use the EBT grading system (AMC1 ORO.FC.231(d)(1)) and the EBT competencies (AMC1 ORO.FC.231(b)) for the non-technical skills assessment. Additional guidance on mixed EBT implementation is available in the EASA checklist ‘Oversight guidance for transition to Mixed EBT Implementation’.

text: AMC1 ORO.FC.231(a) Evidence-based training

text: EBT PROGRAMME SUITABILITY An operator’s EBT programme is one in which: (a) training is focused on development of competencies, rather than repetition of tasks; (b) the development of the programme is based on data-driven EBT training topics with a link to the operator’s competency framework; (c) training needs are addressed through training based on underlying competencies; (d) the programme includes: (1) an evaluation phase to identify training needs based on competencies and collect population-based data; to identify the training needs means, the root cause of the deficiency observed should be identified rather than the symptoms of the deficiency; (2) a manoeuvres training phase (skill retention): to train skill-based manoeuvres (body memory actions). These manoeuvres should place a significant demand on a proficient pilot; and (3) a scenario-based training phase to focus on identified training needs based on competencies rather than repetition of tasks; (e) the programme includes the conduct of objective observations based on a competency framework, and documents evidence of the behaviour observed; (f) there is a customisation of syllabi: (1) The operator should describe in the operations manual the procedure to customise syllabi. It should include how to: (i) select the example scenario elements within a training topic that should be included in the EBT programme; and

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text: (ii) contextualise the example scenario elements based on the operator’s operational data (e.g. input from SMS, FDM programme, etc.) and training data. (2) This customisation should be based on evidence both internal and external to the operator; (g) performance is evaluated using a competency-based grading system; (h) instructors grade competencies based on observable behaviours (OBs); (i) instructors grade the pilot using a defined methodology — observe, record, classify and assess/evaluate (ORCA) is recommended; (j) instructors have completed the EBT instructor standardisation; (k) instructors have sufficient concordance based on defined criteria (instructor concordance assurance programme); (l) the analysis of the pilot's performance is used to determine competency-based training needs; (m) there is a range of teaching styles during simulator training to accommodate trainee learning needs; and (n) facilitation techniques in debriefing are incorporated.

text: AMC2 ORO.FC.231(a) Evidence-based training

text: UPSET PREVENTION AND RECOVERY TRAINING (UPRT) FOR COMPLEX MOTOR-POWERED AEROPLANES WITH A MAXIMUM OPERATIONAL PASSENGER SEATING CONFIGURATION (MOPSC) OF MORE THAN 19 Operators approved for EBT should follow the provisions for upset prevention and recovery training (UPRT) contained in AMC1 ORO.FC.220&230 ‘Operator conversion training and checking & recurrent training and checking’. These provisions should be included in the tables of assessment and training topics detailed in ORO.FC.232.

text: AMC3 ORO.FC.231(a) Evidence-based training

text: PERSONNEL CONDUCTING ASSESSMENT AND PROVIDING TRAINING (a) Ground and refresher training should be provided by suitably qualified personnel. (b) For non-EBT assessment and training: flight training should be provided by a flight instructor (FI), type rating instructor (TRI) or class rating instructor (CRI) or, in the case of the FSTD content, a synthetic flight instructor (SFI). The FI, TRI, CRI or SFI should satisfy the operator's standardisation, experience and knowledge requirements. (c) Emergency and safety equipment training should be provided by suitably qualified personnel. (d) CRM training should be provided by an EBT instructor or, for the classroom CRM training, a CRM trainer.

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text: (e) Additional personnel requirements are described in ORO.FC.146 and ORO.FC.231 and in the associated AMC and GM.

text: GM1 ORO.FC.231(a) Evidence-based training

text: RECURRENT CREW RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (CRM) Operators implementing EBT in accordance with ORO.FC.231 may demonstrate compliance with ORO.FC.115 by showing how the recurrent CRM requirements are integrated within the operator’s EBT programme. An example of how this may be done is provided in the safety promotion material of EASA (e.g. ‘EASA EBT manual´).

text: GM2 ORO.FC.231(a) Evidence-based training

text: EBT PROGRAMME — TRANSITION FROM MIXED EBT The operator may agree with the competent authority the transition measures from mixed EBT to EBT baseline, which may include amongst others that the 3-year programme may include one or more modules in mixed EBT and one or more modules in EBT baseline, provided that all assessment and training topics in ORO.FC.232 are completed in the 3-year programme.

text: GM3 ORO.FC.231(a) Evidence-based training

text: CUSTOMISATION OF THE EBT PROGRAMME (SYLLABI) (a) Syllabi can be customised at three different steps: (1) The first step would be a syllabus for the whole pilots’ population (customisation only at type rating level and/or aircraft generation level). At this step, the operator customises the example scenario elements based on relevant operational data (safety management system, state safety plan, OSD, occurrences, manufacturer data, etc.), and the training topics within the module are the same (same syllabus). At this level, it may be necessary to have a different example scenario element for the different crews within the same module to ensure that pilots are exposed to surprise and unexpected events and thus avoid pilots knowing all the details of the simulator session beforehand. (2) The second step would be a different syllabus or part of it for the different populations of pilots. For example, some parts of the syllabus are different for the first officers and the captain, or the syllabus is different for the B747 pilots or for the Airbus pilots, etc. At this step, the module or part of the module is different for each population; this may include a different example scenario element for each population (or a different training topic; however, the customisation at training topic level is more difficult to control). (3) The third step would be syllabi tailored to the individual pilot (pilot customisation — individual syllabus). This step is linked to the procedures established for the tailored training and the additional training of the pilots following the VENN model.

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text: (b) The procedure to describe the customisation of syllabi must be described in the OM. Customisation is based on evidence that can be gathered on three different levels, two from the inner loop, one from the outer loop. (1) Inner loop (i) Individual evidence based on training data (e.g. grading metrics, training reports, questionnaires, etc.), analysed either for an individual pilot or a group of pilots (for example, all first officers, all B747 pilots, all pilots flying an Airbus model, etc.). (ii) Operator-specific evidence gathered through the safety management process in accordance with ORO.GEN.200. (2) Outer loop Evidence gathered from external sources such as authorities (e.g. state safety plan, etc.), OEMs (e.g. OEBs, OSD, safety documentation such as getting to grip, etc.), etc.

text: GM4 ORO.FC.231(a) Evidence-based training

text: EBT PROGRAMME Further guidance on the EBT programme can be found in the EASA EBT manual.

text: AMC1 ORO.FC.231(a)(1) Evidence-based training

text: EXPERIENCE IN MIXED EBT TO SUBSTITUTE ORO.FC.230 (a) The operator should have a minimum experience of 3 years of a mixed EBT programme. Note: More information on a mixed EBT programme is provided in GM1 ORO.FC.230(a);(b);(f) and in GM2 ORO.FC.A.245. (b) The operator should demonstrate 2 years of an instructor concordance assurance programme. (c) The operator should demonstrate 1 year of a valid equivalency of malfunctions. (d) The operator should demonstrate 1 year of integration of the training data in the customisation of the EBT programme and SMS data for the contextualisation of the example scenario elements. (e) The operator should demonstrate that there is a verification of the grading system and feedback is provided to the training system performance and to the instructor standardisation concordance assurance. SUBSTITUTION OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF ORO.FC.230 (f) One complete EBT module substitutes one operator proficiency check (OPC). (g) The line evaluation of competence substitutes the line check.

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text: AMC1 ORO.FC.231(a)(2) Evidence-based training

text: EBT PROGRAMME AND ASSSESMENT AND TRAINING TOPICS — RESILIENCE (a) Compliance with the table of assessment and training topics ensures that crews are presented with an array of realistic changing events that allow for resilience development purposes. (b) The EBT programme should be designed observing the following principles for resilience development: (1) Resilience, surprise, and unexpected events The EBT programme should be designed in such a way that in every cycle the simulator session (or part of it) allows variations so that the pilots are not familiar with the scenarios presented in the simulator session. Variations should be the focus of EBT programme design, and should not be left to the discretion of individual instructors, in order to preserve programme integrity and fairness. (2) Resilience and decision-making (dilemma) The EBT programme should be designed in such a way that in every cycle the crews are exposed to a scenario where more than one possible and less than ideal solutions exist, with some unfavourable conditions attached to each solution.

text: AMC2 ORO.FC.231(a)(2) Evidence-based training

text: VALIDITY OF THE EBT MODULE (a) The validity period should be counted from the end of the month when the module was completed. When the module is undertaken within the last 3 months of the validity period, the new validity period should be counted from the original expiry date. (b) In the context of ORO.FC.130 point (a), the pilot should have a valid module.

text: GM1 ORO.FC.231(a)(2) Evidence-based training

text: EBT PROGRAMME AND ASSSESMENT AND TRAINING TOPICS — RESILIENCE (a) For resilience development, crews should be exposed to an array of realistic changing scenarios. The strategies developed by the crews whilst coping with different causes of action will create opportunities for resilience development. (b) Resilience and surprise The operator may create a comprehensive list of scenarios to ensure that each crew is trained in different scenarios avoiding the same scenarios for all crews. This relates to training topic ‘surprise’ and to the customisation of the EBT programme. (c) Resilience and unexpected events Exposing crews to rare, fortuitous, events may prepare crews to deal with other unexpected events. For instance, the table of assessment and training topics offers infrequent example

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text: scenario elements such as flying over ‘no fly zone’, etc. The operator may also take infrequent examples from occurrence reporting, or SMS, or manufacturer reports, etc. This relates to decision-making (PSD) — see OB 6.9 ‘Demonstrates resilience when encountering an unexpected event’. (d) Dilemma The operator may create scenarios suitable for training of threat assessment, threat management processes and option generation, leading to an optimum decision-making process. At programme design, as in real life, one ‘correct answer’ should be avoided; instead, the EBT programme should offer the crews a number of less than ideal courses of actions; some with unfavourable conditions attached. This relates to decision-making (PSD) and to the contextualisation of the example scenario element.

text: GM2 ORO.FC.231(a)(2) Evidence-based training

text: EBT PROGRAMME —TRAINING PHASE — IN-SEAT INSTRUCTION (ISI) (a) Effective monitoring and error detection are increasingly important when operating highly reliable automated aircraft. (b) In-seat instruction may be used as a valuable tool to maintain and develop the training objectives of some of the training topics, such as skills of monitoring, cross-checking, error management, and recognition of mismanaged aircraft state.

text: GM3 ORO.FC.231(a)(2) Evidence-based training

text: EBT PROGRAMME —ORDER OF THE PHASES The order of the phases is intended as follows: (2) First the EVAL; and (3) Second, and in a timely manner after the EVAL, the training phases. The training phases are the MT and the SBT and may be delivered in any order. Further guidance can be found in the EASA EBT manual.

text: AMC1 ORO.FC.231(a)(3) Evidence-based training

text: EBT PROGRAMME — ENROLMENT (a) Enrolment is when a flight crew member commences the first EBT module. (b) A flight crew member is considered to leave the operator’s EBT programme (de-enrolled) when the operator is no longer responsible for the administrative action for the flight crew’s licence revalidation under an EBT programme. (c) The operator should inform the flight crew members who fail to demonstrate an acceptable level of competence and leave the operator’s EBT programme (de-enrolled) that they should not exercise the privileges of that type rating.

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text: GM1 ORO.FC.231(a)(3) Evidence-based training

text: MODULE SEPARATION BY A PERIOD OF NOT LESS THAN 3 MONTHS (a) The separation begins when the first module finished (end of the training phase) and the second module begins (EVAL). (b) When the operator decides to do more than two modules during the validity period of the type rating (approximately 1 year), the operator may count the 3 months of separation between the first and the third module if it so wishes. (c) The separation of 3 months applies even between modules in different validity periods.

text: AMC1 ORO.FC.231(a)(4) Evidence-based training

text: INSTRUCTOR CONCORDANCE ASSURANCE PROGRAMME (ICAP) (a) The ICAP should be able to identify areas of weak concordance to drive improvement in the quality and validity of the grading system. (b) The ICAP should be adapted to the size and complexity of the instructors’ group and the complexity of the operator’s EBT programme. (c) Complex operators should include an ICAP-specific data analysis, demonstrating: (1) instructor-group assessment homogeneity (agreement); (2) instructor assessment accuracy (alignment). (d) The operator should verify the concordance of the instructors: (1) once every cycle; (2) for a sufficient number of competency-grade combinations. (e) The operator should establish procedures to address those instructors who do not meet the standards required. (f) The operator should maintain a list with the EBT instructors qualified to deliver the EBT programme.

text: GM1 ORO.FC.231(a)(4) Evidence-based training

text: INSTRUCTOR CONCORDANCE ASSURANCE PROGRAMME (ICAP) (a) Instructor concordance is a tool for continuous improvement of the EBT programme as data reliability results in a more accurate and effective training. (b) The operator may have a more frequent, or even a continuous, assessment of concordance as it provides more opportunities to improve. (c) Concordance standards are normally set by the operator; however, the competent authority may recommend criteria, as licences’ revalidation is performed under EBT.

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text: (d) Individual instructor concordance may be verified: (1) through uniform standardisation material where at least three different levels of performance are included and for all the competencies at a frequency of 72 months; (2) by reference to the analysis of the data produced by the instructor every 12 months; normalisation may be necessary as there is no homogeneity of all EBT modules and the pilots that the instructor assessed; and (e) Instructor-group assessment homogeneity (agreement) may be inferred from instructors who have observed the same content. (f) Instructor assessment accuracy (alignment) may be inferred from comparing instructor assessments with an ‘assessment standard’ consisting of correctly identified competency(-ies) and correctly identified grade levels. Neither the competency(-ies) nor the grade level(s) may be communicated in advance to the instructors. The assessment standards may be set by consensus of a standards group, in order to guard against individual biases. (g) When the operator uses a small group of instructors (e.g. 10), the data-driven concordance assurance programme may be directly integrated into the annual refresher training, removing the need for the above guidance. (h) Operators with a complex group of instructors (e.g. a big rotation of instructors, subcontracted instructors, big number of instructors, many different fleets, etc.) may need to implement a more extensive concordance assessment system.

text: AMC1 ORO.FC.231(a)(5) Evidence-based training

text: CONTINGENCY PROCEDURES FOR UNFORESEEN CIRCUMSTANCES THAT MAY AFFECT THE DELIVERY OF THE MODULE (a) The operator should detail in the EBT programme the contingency procedures in the event of unforeseen circumstances that may affect the delivery of the module (e.g. long-term sick pilot). (b) In case of unforeseen interruption of a module at any point, the missing parts of the module should be rescheduled. (1) The pilot may continue line flying until the expiry of the validity period unless the performance observed was below the minimum acceptable level. (2) If the interruption results in an instructor change, the operator should ensure that the instructor completing the module is provided with the details of the performance of the pilots. (c) In case the pilot misses modules and does not meet the requirements of recent experience (FCL.060): (1) when the pilot misses one module out of the two modules required, the EVAL of the missing module should be rescheduled before the pilot can resume line operations. The MT and SBT phases of the missing module should be completed 30 days after the EVAL or before the expiry date, whichever occurs first;

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text: (2) when the pilot misses one module in the preceding 12 months but the pilot’s rating is expired by less than 3 months, the missing module should be rescheduled before the pilot can resume line operations; (3) when the pilot misses one module in the preceding 12 months but the pilot’s rating is expired by longer than 3 months but shorter than 1 year, the missing module should be rescheduled. The evaluation should be delivered by an EBT instructor (or instructors) with examiner privileges before the pilot can resume line operations; (4) when the pilot misses two modules and the pilot’s rating is valid: (i) one module should be rescheduled before the pilot can resume line operations using an EBT instructor (or instructors) with examiner privileges; and (ii) training topics B and C of the other module should be rescheduled before the expiry date. In such case, the 3-month separation requirement between modules may not apply; (5) when the pilot misses two modules and the pilot’s rating is expired by less than 1 year: (i) one module should be rescheduled using an EBT instructor (or instructors) with examiner privileges; and (ii) training topics B and C of the other module should be rescheduled before the pilot can resume line operations. In such case, the period of 3-month separation between modules may not apply; and (6) if the amount of time elapsed since the expiry of the rating is more than 1 year, the pilot is de-enrolled. AMC1 FCL.625(c) ‘IR — Validity, revalidation and renewal’ and AMC1 FCL.740(b)‘Validity and renewal of class and type ratings’ apply. (d) In the case of other situations not covered by points (b) or (c), point (a) applies.

text: GM1 ORO.FC.231(a)(5) Evidence-based training

text: CONTINGENCY PROCEDURES — RATINGS RENEWAL (a) The renewal of ratings (e.g. type rating or instrument rating) in EBT follows the Annex I (Part- FCL) to the Aircrew Regulation provisions (IRs and AMC) and is complemented with the provisions covered in AMC1 ORO.FC.231(a)(5). The ATO or the operator will determine the amount of training following Part-FCL; however, as EBT combines assessment and training, the following guidance is applicable: (1) Expiry shorter than 3 months may not require additional training in Part-FCL. In EBT, the missing module is rescheduled with an EBT instructor. Following that, the EBT manager for the type rating may renew the licence without extra training, as the EBT programme is now completed (at least two modules in the last 12 months). (2) In Part-FCL, when the expiry is longer than 3 months but shorter than 1 year, there need to be two training sessions. In EBT, there are two cases:

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text: (i) One module is missing: the pilot must complete the missing module (two simulator sessions) before resuming line operations. Following that, the EBT manager for the type rating may renew the licence in accordance with Appendix 10 as the EBT programme is now completed (two modules in the last 12 months). (ii) Two modules are missing: the pilot must complete one module (two simulator sessions) and training topics B and C of the other missing module (an extra simulator session) with a total of three simulator sessions. Training data is gathered in a short time period; therefore, an EBT instructor with examiner privilege is involved to ensure the proficiency of the pilot. (b) In case of an expiry longer than 1 year, the requirements of Part-FCL will be followed and the proficiency checks will be performed in accordance with Appendix 9 as the EBT system may not have sufficient training data for the pilot. (1) Expiry longer than 1 year but shorter than 3 years: a minimum of three training sessions in which the most important malfunctions in the available system are covered plus a proficiency check in accordance with Appendix 9 to renew the licence. (2) Expiry longer than 3 years: the pilot should undergo the training for the initial issue of the type rating. (3) Expiry longer than 7 years: the pilot should undergo the training for the initial issue of the instrument rating.

text: AMC1 ORO.FC.231(b) Evidence-based training

text: RECOMMENDED EBT COMPETENCIES (EASA COMPETENCY FRAMEWORK) (a) The operator should include in its EBT programme at least the following competencies: Application of knowledge (KNO) Description: Demonstrates knowledge and understanding of relevant information, operating instructions, aircraft systems and the operating environment OB 0.1 Demonstrates practical and applicable knowledge of limitations and systems and their interaction OB 0.2 Demonstrates the required knowledge of published operating instructions OB 0.3 Demonstrates knowledge of the physical environment, the air traffic environment and the operational infrastructure (including air traffic routings, weather, airports) OB 0.4 Demonstrates appropriate knowledge of applicable legislation. OB 0.5 Knows where to source required information OB 0.6 Demonstrates a positive interest in acquiring knowledge OB 0.7 Is able to apply knowledge effectively

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text: Application of procedures and compliance with regulations (PRO) Description: Identifies and applies appropriate procedures in accordance with published operating instructions and applicable regulations OB 1.1 Identifies where to find procedures and regulations OB 1.2 Applies relevant operating instructions, procedures and techniques in a timely manner OB 1.3 Follows SOPs unless a higher degree of safety dictates an appropriate deviation OB 1.4 Operates aircraft systems and associated equipment correctly OB 1.5 Monitors aircraft systems status OB 1.6 Complies with applicable regulations OB 1.7 Applies relevant procedural knowledge Communication (COM) Description: Communicates through appropriate means in the operational environment, in both normal and non-normal situations OB 2.1 Determines that the recipient is ready and able to receive information OB 2.2 Selects appropriately what, when, how and with whom to communicate OB 2.3 Conveys messages clearly, accurately and concisely OB 2.4 Confirms that the recipient demonstrates understanding of important information OB 2.5 Listens actively and demonstrates understanding when receiving information OB 2.6 Asks relevant and effective questions OB 2.7 Uses appropriate escalation in communication to resolve identified deviations OB 2.8 Uses and interprets non-verbal communication in a manner appropriate to the organisational and social culture OB 2.9 Adheres to standard radiotelephone phraseology and procedures OB 2.10 Accurately reads, interprets, constructs and responds to datalink messages in English

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text: Aeroplane flight path management — automation (FPA) Description: Controls the flight path through automation OB 3.1 Uses appropriate flight management, guidance systems and automation, as installed and applicable to the conditions OB 3.2 Monitors and detects deviations from the intended flight path and takes appropriate action OB 3.3 Manages the flight path to achieve optimum operational performance OB 3.4 Maintains the intended flight path during flight using automation whilst managing other tasks and distractions OB 3.5 Selects appropriate level and mode of automation in a timely manner considering phase of flight and workload OB 3.6 Effectively monitors automation, including engagement and automatic mode transitions Aeroplane flight path management — manual control (FPM) Description: Controls the flight path through manual control OB 4.1 Controls the aircraft manually with accuracy and smoothness as appropriate to the situation OB 4.2 Monitors and detects deviations from the intended flight path and takes appropriate action OB 4.3 Manually controls the aeroplane using the relationship between aeroplane attitude, speed and thrust, and navigation signals or visual information OB 4.4 Manages the flight path to achieve optimum operational performance OB 4.5 Maintains the intended flight path during manual flight whilst managing other tasks and distractions OB 4.6 Uses appropriate flight management and guidance systems, as installed and applicable to the conditions OB 4.7 Effectively monitors flight guidance systems including engagement and automatic mode transitions Leadership & teamwork (LTW) Description: Influences others to contribute to a shared purpose. Collaborates to accomplish the goals of the team OB 5.1 Encourages team participation and open communication OB 5.2 Demonstrates initiative and provides direction when required

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text: OB 5.3 Engages others in planning OB 5.4 Considers inputs from others OB 5.5 Gives and receives feedback constructively OB 5.6 Addresses and resolves conflicts and disagreements in a constructive manner OB 5.7 Exercises decisive leadership when required OB 5.8 Accepts responsibility for decisions and actions OB 5.9 Carries out instructions when directed OB 5.10 Applies effective intervention strategies to resolve identified deviations OB 5.11 Manages cultural and language challenges, as applicable Problem-solving — decision-making (PSD) Description: Identifies precursors, mitigates problems, and makes decisions OB 6.1 Identifies, assesses and manages threats and errors in a timely manner OB 6.2 Seeks accurate and adequate information from appropriate sources OB 6.3 Identifies and verifies what and why things have gone wrong, if appropriate OB 6.4 Perseveres in working through problems whilst prioritising safety OB 6.5 Identifies and considers appropriate options OB 6.6 Applies appropriate and timely decision-making techniques OB 6.7 Monitors, reviews and adapts decisions as required OB 6.8 Adapts when faced with situations where no guidance or procedure exists OB 6.9 Demonstrates resilience when encountering an unexpected event Situation awareness and management of information (SAW) Description: Perceives, comprehends and manages information and anticipates its effect on the operation OB 7.1 Monitors and assesses the state of the aeroplane and its systems OB 7.2 Monitors and assesses the aeroplane’s energy state, and its anticipated flight path OB 7.3 Monitors and assesses the general environment as it may affect the operation

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text: OB 7.4 Validates the accuracy of information and checks for gross errors OB 7.5 Maintains awareness of the people involved in or affected by the operation and their capacity to perform as expected OB 7.6 Develops effective contingency plans based upon potential risks associated with threats and errors OB 7.7 Responds to indications of reduced situation awareness Workload management (WLM) Description: Maintains available workload capacity by prioritising and distributing tasks using appropriate resources OB 8.1 Exercises self-control in all situations OB 8.2 Plans, prioritises and schedules appropriate tasks effectively OB 8.3 Manages time efficiently when carrying out tasks OB 8.4 Offers and gives assistance OB 8.5 Delegates tasks OB 8.6 Seeks and accepts assistance, when appropriate OB 8.7 Monitors, reviews and cross-checks actions conscientiously OB 8.8 Verifies that tasks are completed to the expected outcome OB 8.9 Manages and recovers from interruptions, distractions, variations and failures effectively while performing tasks

text: AMC2 ORO.FC.231(b) Evidence-based training

text: ADAPTED COMPETENCY MODEL (a) An operator seeking to develop an adapted competency model under ORO.GEN.120 should: (1) identify positive behaviours and use language that avoids ambiguity; and (2) demonstrate equivalence to the recommended EBT competencies in AMC1 ORO.FC.231(b). (b) In order to demonstrate equivalence, the operator should map the competencies and observable behaviours to the recommended EBT competencies. (c) When the operator is translating AMC1 ORO.FC.231(b) into its common language, the application of ORO.GEN.120 may not be necessary. The translation may not be literal.

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text: GM1 ORO.FC.231(b) Evidence-based training

text: ADAPTED COMPETENCY MODEL/POSITIVE OBSERVABLE BEHAVIOUR (a) OBs should describe behaviours that contribute to positive pilot performance. (b) The indicators should clearly describe how a competency is expected to be demonstrated by a crew member in the context of the operational environment. (c) If the operator makes small adjustments in the wording used to describe the OBs of the EASA competency framework in order to improve the understanding of the pilots while maintaining the same meaning, it may be considered as EASA competency framework and not as an adapted competency model.

text: AMC1 ORO.FC.231(c) Evidence-based training

text: TRAINING SYSTEM PERFORMANCE — FEEDBACK PROCESS (a) Feedback process is the continuous process of collecting and analysing assessment and training data from an EBT programme. (b) The feedback process should use defined metrics to collect data in order to: (1) identify trends and ensure corrective action where necessary; (2) identify collective training needs; (3) review, adjust and continuously improve the training programme; (4) further develop the training system; and (5) standardise the instructors (when the standardisation and concordance assurance programme is integrated into the training system performance). (c) The following defined metrics should be collected as a minimum: (1) level 0 grading metrics (competent metrics): data metrics providing the information whether the pilot(s) is (are) competent or not; (2) level 1 grading metrics (competency metrics): quantifiable data from the grading system — numeric grade of the competencies (e.g. 1 to 5); (3) level 2 grading metrics (observable behaviour metrics): the instructors record predetermined OBs during the session; (4) level 3 grading metrics (other metrics): the instructors may record other predetermined data (e.g. specific tasks, actions, questions, etc.). (d) Alternatively, where a system for the measurement of training system performance already exists, the operator may use it and, if necessary, adapt it to meet the demands of EBT.

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text: AMC2 ORO.FC.231(c) Evidence-based training

text: FEEDBACK PROCESS — DATA PROTECTION – GRADING SYSTEM (a) The objective of protecting the EBT data is to avoid inappropriate use of it in order to ensure the continued availability of such data, to maintain and improve pilot competencies. (b) The data access and security policy should restrict information access to authorised persons. (c) The data access and security policy should include the measures to ensure the security of the data (e.g. information security standard). (d) The data access and security policy (including the procedure to prevent disclosure of crew identity) should be agreed by all parties involved (airline management and flight crew member representatives nominated either by the union or the flight crew themselves). (e) The data access and security policy should be in line with the organisation safety policy in order to not make available or to not make use of the EBT data to attribute blame or liability. (f) The operator may integrate the security policy within other management systems already in place (e.g. information security management).

text: GM1 ORO.FC.231(c) Evidence-based training

text: TRAINING SYSTEM PERFORMANCE — FEEDBACK PROCESS — METRICS (a) Training metrics within the feedback process are a valuable source of data. Typical metrics may include but are not limited to: (1) differences in success rates between training topics; (2) the trainees’ feedback (e.g. surveys), which provides a different perspective as to the quality and effectiveness of the training; (3) instructor concordance assurance: this system is important to measure the effectiveness of the instructor calibration process. It is important to remind that the purpose of this system is not to spy on instructors or to pressure individuals to change their grading; (4) level 0 grading metrics (competent metrics): Metrics examples: distribution of pilots not competent after the SBT, distribution of pilots not competent in the EVAL and competent after the SBT; (5) level 1 grading metrics (competency metrics): Metrics examples: (i) distribution of level of performance within the range of competencies; (ii) differences in grades between aircraft types; (6) level 2 grading metrics (observable behaviour metrics): e.g. in specific example scenario elements. Metrics example: differences in displaying OBs between ranks of pilots; (7) level 3 grading metrics (other metrics such as data based on tasks): for instance, did the pilot calculate the landing distance? Or, did the pilots make a call-out in a specific manoeuvre? This level is usually linked to data collection of the SMS or EBT feedback loop

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text: (e.g. was the call-out of the TCAS manoeuvre correct? ‘TCAS I have control’). Metrics example: distribution of errors for various training scenarios and aircraft types. (8) during the simulator session, the operator may consider the level of grading metrics that the instructor needs to collect, taking into consideration the workload of the instructor. (b) Training metrics are an invaluable component in supporting an EBT programme, but they must be placed in the context of operational data because only the latter can justify the importance of specific training. For this purpose, data from the line evaluation of competence is important to measure the effectiveness of the EBT programme in operations. It may include data from the process for the monitoring of line operations. (c) Complex operators may, in the context of their safety management system, establish a safety action group dedicated to training: ‘training safety action group’. This may be a best practice to meet the implementing rule.

text: GM2 ORO.FC.231(c) Evidence-based training

text: FEEDBACK PROCESS — DATA PROTECTION – GRADING SYSTEM (a) The data access and security policy may, as a minimum, define: (1) a policy for access to information only to specifically authorised persons identified by their position in order to perform their duties. The required authorised person(s) does (do) not need to be the EBT manager; it could be the EBT programme manager or a third party mutually acceptable to unions or staff and management. The third party may also be in charge of ensuring the correct application of the data access and security policy (e.g. the third party is the one activating the system to allow access to the authorised persons); (2) the identified data retention policy and accountability; (3) the measures to ensure that the security of the data includes the information security standard (e.g. information security management systems standard e.g. ISO 2700x-ISO 27001, NIST SP 800-53, etc.); (4) the method to obtain de-identified crew feedback on those occasions that require specific follow-up; and (b) When there is a need for data protection, it is preferable to de-identify the data rather than anonymise it.

text: AMC1 ORO.FC.231(d)(1) Evidence-based training

text: GRADING SYSTEM (a) The grading system should provide quantifiable data for the measurement of the training system performance. (b) The grading scale should be 1 to 5, where:

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text: (1) Grade 1 — NOT COMPETENT — determines that the minimum acceptable level of performance was not achieved for the conduct of line operations. An outcome of ADDITIONAL TRAINING REQUIRED and level 2 grading metrics should be recorded. (2) Grade 2 to 5 determine an outcome of COMPETENT for the conduct of line operations. (3) Grade 2 (below the average) determines that the minimum acceptable level was achieved for the conduct of line operations. Additionally, level 2 grading metrics should be recorded. Minimum performance indicates a need for training (e.g. tailored or additional) to elevate performance. It includes: (i) a competency graded continuously with 2 in multiple modules, or (ii) the majority of competencies graded with 2 in a module. (4) Grade 3 is the average. (5) Grade 4 determines that the pilot is above the average. (6) Grade 5 (exemplary) determines that the pilot is above the average and the outcome is enhanced safety, effectiveness and efficiency. (c) The operator should develop further grading guidance to the above points to help the instructors determine the grade of the pilots they assess.

text: AMC2 ORO.FC.231(d)(1) Evidence-based training

text: GRADING SYSTEM — ALTERNATIVE SYSTEM (a) An operator seeking to develop an alternative grading system under ORO.GEN.120 should: (1) provide quantifiable data for the measurement of the training system performance; and (2) demonstrate equivalence to the recommended grading system in AMC1 ORO.FC.231(d)(1). (b) The grading scale for each competency should: (1) determine the grade at which the performance is considered: (i) NOT COMPETENT for the conduct of line operations. An outcome of ADDITIONAL TRAINING REQUIRED and level 2 grading metrics should be recorded; and (ii) COMPETENT for the conduct of line operations; and (2) determine for the pilot whose performance is considered competent for the conduct of line operations: (i) if the pilot needs more training (e.g. tailored or additional training) to elevate their performance to the operator specified norm; (ii) if the pilot is at the operator specified norm; (iii) if the pilot is above the average (it can be one or more grades e.g. above the average and exemplary).

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text: (c) The operator should develop further guidance to the above points to help the instructors determine the grade of the pilots they assess.

text: AMC3 ORO.FC.231(d)(1) Evidence-based training

text: RECOMMENDED CONDUCT OF THE GRADING — ORCA (a) Grading the performance of flight crew members during an EBT module should include the following steps: (1) Observe performance (behaviours) during the simulator session. (2) Record details of effective and ineffective performance (behaviours) observed during the simulator session (‘record’ in this context refers to instructors taking notes). (3) Classify observations against the OBs and allocate the OBs to each competency (or competencies), using amongst others the facilitation technique. (4) Assess and evaluate (grade): assess the performance by determining the root cause(s) according to the competency framework. Low performance would normally indicate the area of performance to be remediated in subsequent phases or modules. Evaluate (grade) the performance by determining a grade for each competency using a methodology defined by the operator. (b) As a minimum, the instructor should grade all the observed competencies at: (1) the end of the EVAL (de-briefing) by providing at least level 1 grading metrics; (2) the end of the MT (de-briefing) by providing at least level 0 grading metrics; and (3) at the end of the EBT module (de-briefing) by providing at least level 0 grading metrics (level 1 grading metrics are recommended).

text: AMC4 ORO.FC.231(d)(1) Evidence-based training

text: RECOMMENDED GRADING SYSTEM METHODOLOGY — VENN MODEL (a) To grade a competency, the instructor should assess the associated OBs of each competency against the following dimensions by determining: (1) what was the outcome of the threat management, error management and undesired aircraft state management relating specifically to the competency being assessed; (2) how well the flight crew member demonstrated the OB(s) when they were required. This includes: (i) how many OBs the flight crew member demonstrated over the EBT phase (e.g. EVAL, MT, SBT) when they were required; and (ii) how often the flight crew member demonstrated the OB(s) when they were required;

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text: Abbreviated word picture VENN model TEM Observable behaviours Grading OUTCOME (1) HOW WELL (2) = HOW MANY (i)+ HOW OFTEN (ii) 1 unsafe situation ineffectively few, hardly any rarely 2 not an unsafe situation minimally acceptable some occasionally 3 safe situation adequately many regularly 4 safe situation effectively most regularly 5 enhanced safety, effectiveness and efficiency in an exemplary manner all, almost all always (b) Grades should be determined during each EBT module as follows: (1) EVAL — overall performance of the phase at level 1 grading metrics. (2) MT — overall performance of the phase at level 0 grading metrics. When the phase is graded ‘not competent’, it requires level 2 grading metrics. Note: Only a limited number of competencies may be observed and graded in this phase (e.g. PRO, FPA, FPM); the others are ‘to be left in blank’. (3) SBT — overall performance of the phase at level 1 grading metrics. Unless just culture and the necessary non-jeopardy environment during training may be compromised. In that case, level 0 grading metrics. Note: In-seat instruction (ISI) should not be included in any assessment. (c) Where any competency is graded below the minimum acceptable level of performance (grade 1 on a 5-point scale), an outcome of additional FSTD training is required. (1) Additional level 2 grading metrics must be recorded. (2) The flight crew member should not be released to unsupervised line operations until each competency is demonstrated at or above the minimum acceptable level of performance. (d) Where all competencies are determined at or above the minimum acceptable level of performance (grade 2 on a 5-point scale), the outcome should be COMPETENT. Consistent grading below the average (2 on a 5-point scale) may indicate a need for training to elevate the performance to the average (grade 3 on a 5-point scale). As a minimum, the following conditions apply: (1) Any competency graded with 2 requires level 2 grading metrics. (2) Any competency graded with 2 in any simulator session of the 1st module followed by a grade 2 in the same competency in the EVAL of the 2nd module requires individual tailored training in the SBT of the 2nd module. (First example: 1st Module SBT graded with 2, 2nd Module EVAL graded with 2 in the same competency, thus the 2nd SBT should be an individual tailored training on that competency. Second example: 1s module EVAL nd nd graded 2, 2 module EVAL graded 2 on the same competency, thus the 2 module SBT should be individual tailored training on that competency). (3) Any competency graded with 2 in three consecutive modules requires individual tailored training. If at the end of the tailored training (3rd SBT) the competency continues being graded with 2, additional FSTD training is required within the next 3 months. For instance, following the example above, the SBT in the 2nd Module was an individual tailored training. In the 3rd Module during the EVAL the same competency is graded with 2 and

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text: individual tailored training is applied. The SBT is graded with 2 again. The pilot may continue line operations but should receive additional FSTD training within the next 3 months. (4) The operator should not release a flight crew member to unsupervised line operations when more than four competencies (the majority of the competencies — five competencies or above) are graded with 2 in any single simulator session of the module. (5) Any EVAL graded with 2 in more than three competencies requires individual tailored training in the SBT. If at the end of the module more than three competencies continue being graded with 2, the pilot may continue line operations but should receive additional FSTD training within the next 3 months. (e) ‘Individual tailored training’ refers to a simulator session tailored to the pilot’s individual training needs, which may require a different programme or syllabus. Normally, it may be done during the SBT and normally there is not an increase of FSTD volume (no extra simulator session). It may require an increased volume of training such as CBT, additional briefings, etc. Any individual tailored training may be substituted by additional FSTD training before the start of the next module. (f) ‘Additional FSTD training’ refers to the fact that in addition to the requirements of tailored training, there is an increase of FSTD volume (extra simulator session). It normally happens after individual tailored training.

text: GM1 ORO.FC.231(d)(1) Evidence-based training

text: RECOMMENDED CONDUCT OF THE GRADING — ORCA (a) At the end of the EVAL, after the facilitated de-briefing, the instructor may, as a minimum, record level 1 grading metrics. (b) The instructor may conduct the simulator session of the EVAL following the principles of a summative assessment and the facilitated de-briefing following the principles of a formative assessment. The MT and SBT simulator sessions may be conducted as a formative assessment. (c) At the end of each training phase, it is recommended to record level 1 grading metrics unless just culture and the necessary non-jeopardy environment during training may be compromised. In that case, the following alternative may be recommended: level 0 grading metrics for all competencies may be recorded (exceptionally ‘not observed’ or ‘left in blank’ may be recorded) and de-identified level 1 grading metrics may be recorded for the data collection and analysis purposes.

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text: GM2 ORO.FC.231(d)(1) Evidence-based training

text: RECOMMENDED GRADING SYSTEM METHODOLOGY — VENN MODEL (a) Grades may be determined during each EBT module as follows: (1) For each assigned grade: (i) the observed performance should be identified with one or more OBs; and (ii) the OB(s) should simply link the observed performance to the competency; they are not to be used as a checklist. (2) At the completion of the EVAL, the grade should be assigned for each competency, based on the overall assessment of the performance during the EVAL. (3) The underlying philosophy of the individual tailored training and additional FSTD training is the identification of the pilot’s individual training needs during the EVAL or EVALs. However, there may be cases in which such an identification may be complemented using other phases or combination of phases along the EBT programme. Nevertheless, when this happens consistently to a large number of pilots, it may indicate a problem of instructor standardisation. (4) At the completion of the MT, only a limited number of competencies can be graded. The others are to be left in blank. Note: The grade of a competency as ‘not observed’ is a relevant set of data to be used in the EBT programme (e.g. may be used for instructor concordance assurance programme, programme design, etc.), while ‘competency left in blank’ is stating the obvious, which is that MT is a skill retention phase and therefore it focuses on only some of the competencies which may provide NO opportunity to observe all the competencies. (5) At the completion of the module, grades should be assigned for each competency, based on the overall assessment of training during the SBT. (6) In exceptional occasions, the instructor may have been unable to assess one or two competencies in the EVAL or SBT. A ‘not observed’ may be graded. The training system performance and concordance assurance system may use these metrics to improve instructors’ standardisation and the EBT programme design. When the operator grades the MT alone (instead of grading the MT and EVAL together), a ‘not observed’ grading may be frequent. It also occurs when the instructor grades each one of the manoeuvres. (b) The word pictures are standardised according to the VENN model but may be simplified once instructors become familiar with the system.

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text: Issue 2, Amendment 17 Word picture VENN model Application of procedures (PRO) The pilot applied procedures in an exemplary manner, by always demonstrating almost all of the 5 observable behaviours to a high standard when required, which enhanced safety, effectiveness and efficiency The pilot applied procedures effectively, by regularly demonstrating most of the observable behaviours 4 when required, which resulted in a safe operation The pilot applied procedures adequately, by regularly demonstrating many of the observable 3 behaviours when required, which resulted in a safe operation The pilot applied procedures at the minimum acceptable level, by only occasionally demonstrating some 2 of the observable behaviours when required, but which did not result in an unsafe situation The pilot applied procedures incorrectly, by rarely demonstrating any of the observable behaviours 1 when required, which resulted in an unsafe situation Communication (COM) The pilot communicated in an exemplary manner, by always demonstrating almost all of the observable 5 behaviours to a high standard when required, which enhanced safety, effectiveness and efficiency The pilot communicated effectively, by regularly demonstrating most of the observable behaviours 4 when required, which resulted in a safe operation The pilot communicated adequately, by regularly demonstrating many of the observable behaviours 3 when required, which resulted in a safe operation The pilot communicated at the minimum acceptable level, by only occasionally demonstrating some of 2 the observable behaviours when required, but which did not result in an unsafe situation The pilot communicated ineffectively, by rarely demonstrating any of the observable behaviours when 1 required, which resulted in an unsafe situation Flight path management — automation (FPA) The pilot managed the automation in an exemplary manner, by always demonstrating almost all of the 5 observable behaviours to a high standard when required, which enhanced safety, effectiveness and efficiency The pilot managed the automation effectively, by regularly demonstrating most of the observable 4 behaviours when required, which resulted in a safe operation The pilot managed the automation adequately, by regularly demonstrating many of the observable 3 behaviours when required, which resulted in a safe operation The pilot managed the automation at the minimum acceptable level, by only occasionally demonstrating 2 some of the observable behaviours when required, but which did not result in an unsafe situation The pilot managed the automation ineffectively, by rarely demonstrating any of the observable 1 behaviours when required, which resulted in an unsafe situation Annex III to ED Decision 2021/002/R Page 34 of 119 AMC and GM to Part-ORO of

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text: Issue 2, Amendment 17 Flight path management — manual control (FPM) The pilot controlled the aircraft in an exemplary manner, by always demonstrating almost all of the 5 observable behaviours to a high standard when required, which enhanced safety, effectiveness and efficiency The pilot controlled the aircraft effectively, by regularly demonstrating most of the observable 4 behaviours when required, which resulted in a safe operation The pilot controlled the aircraft adequately, by regularly demonstrating many of the observable 3 behaviours when required, which resulted in a safe operation The pilot controlled the aircraft at the minimum acceptable level, by only occasionally demonstrating 2 some of the observable behaviours when required, but which did not result in an unsafe situation The pilot controlled the aircraft ineffectively, by rarely demonstrating any of the observable behaviours 1 when required, which resulted in an unsafe situation Application of knowledge (KNO) The pilot showed exemplary knowledge, by always demonstrating almost all of the observable 5 behaviours to a high standard when required, which enhanced safety, effectiveness and efficiency The pilot showed adequate knowledge, by regularly demonstrating most of the observable behaviours 4 when required, which resulted in a safe operation The pilot showed adequate knowledge, by regularly demonstrating many of the observable behaviours 3 when required, which resulted in a safe operation The pilot showed knowledge at the minimum acceptable level, by only occasionally demonstrating some 2 of the observable behaviours when required, but which did not result in an unsafe situation The pilot showed inadequate knowledge, by rarely demonstrating any of the observable behaviours 1 when required, which resulted in an unsafe situation Leadership & teamwork (LTW) The pilot led and worked as a team member in an exemplary manner, by always demonstrating almost 5 all of the observable behaviours to a high standard when required, which enhanced safety, effectiveness and efficiency The pilot led and worked as a team member effectively, by regularly demonstrating most of the 4 observable behaviours when required, which resulted in a safe operation The pilot led and worked as a team member adequately, by regularly demonstrating many of the 3 observable behaviours when required, which resulted in a safe operation The pilot led and worked as a team member at the minimum acceptable level, by only occasionally 2 demonstrating some of the observable behaviours when required, but which did not result in an unsafe situation The pilot led or worked as a team member ineffectively, by rarely demonstrating any of the observable 1 behaviours when required, which resulted in an unsafe situation Annex III to ED Decision 2021/002/R Page 35 of 119 AMC and GM to Part-ORO of

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text: Issue 2, Amendment 17 Problem-solving & decision-making (PSD) The pilot solved problems and made decisions in an exemplary manner, by always demonstrating almost 5 all of the observable behaviours to a high standard when required, which enhanced safety, effectiveness and efficiency The pilot solved problems and made decisions effectively, by regularly demonstrating most of the 4 observable behaviours when required, which resulted in a safe operation The pilot solved problems and made decisions adequately, by regularly demonstrating many of the 3 observable behaviours when required, which resulted in a safe operation The pilot solved problems and made decisions at the minimum acceptable level, by only occasionally 2 demonstrating some of the observable behaviours when required, but which did not result in an unsafe situation The pilot solved problems or made decisions ineffectively, by rarely demonstrating any of the 1 observable behaviours when required, which resulted in an unsafe situation Situation awareness (SAW) The pilot’s situation awareness was exemplary, by always demonstrating almost all of the observable 5 behaviours to a high standard when required, which enhanced safety, effectiveness and efficiency The pilot’s situation awareness was good, by regularly demonstrating most of the observable 4 behaviours when required, which resulted in a safe operation The pilot’s situation awareness was adequate, by regularly demonstrating many of the observable 3 behaviours when required, which resulted in a safe operation The pilot’s situation awareness was at the minimum acceptable level, by only occasionally 2 demonstrating some of the observable behaviours when required, but which did not result in an unsafe situation The pilot’s situation awareness was inadequate, by rarely demonstrating any of the observable 1 behaviours when required, which resulted in an unsafe situation Workload management (WLM) The pilot managed the workload in an exemplary manner, by always demonstrating almost all of the 5 observable behaviours to a high standard when required, which enhanced safety, effectiveness and efficiency The pilot managed the workload effectively, by regularly demonstrating most of the observable 4 behaviours when required, which resulted in a safe operation The pilot managed the workload adequately, by regularly demonstrating many of the observable 3 behaviours when required, which resulted in a safe operation The pilot managed the workload at the minimum acceptable level, by only occasionally demonstrating 2 some of the observable behaviours when required, but which did not result in an unsafe situation The pilot managed the workload ineffectively, by rarely demonstrating any of the observable behaviours 1 when required, which resulted in an unsafe situation Annex III to ED Decision 2021/002/R Page 36 of 119 AMC and GM to Part-ORO of

text: Regulation (EU) No 965/2012

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text: AMC1 ORO.FC.231(d)(2) Evidence-based training

text: VERIFICATION OF THE ACCURACY OF THE GRADING SYSTEM (a) The purpose is to provide data to assess the accuracy of the grading system. (b) The items defined below are based on Part-FCL Appendix 9. They should be included in the EVAL and MT of the applicable module. The minimum items to be included are: rejected take-off, failure of critical engine between V1 & V2, adherence to departure and arrival, 3D approaches down to a decision height (DH) not less than 60 m (200 ft), engine-out approach & go-around, 2D approach down to the MDH/A, engine-out approach & go-around, engine-out landing. (c) Instructors should record if the exercises are flown to proficiency using Appendix 9 references (define criteria). Note: Individual pilots’ grading and assessment remains according to the EBT grading system and Appendix 10. (d) This verification should be performed once every 3 years.

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text: VERIFICATION OF THE ACCURACY OF THE GRADING SYSTEM Items that may be included in a verification of the accuracy of the grading system:

text: r fo n se o Description (includes type of Desired outcome Guidance material (GM) Assessment a ti h a topic, being threat, error or iv (includes performance criteria OR training outcome) Example scenario elements and training t p h ct focus) a topic ig M O

text: Fl W LM O N PRO C FPA FPM LTW PSD SA W K

text: Use of checklist prior to starting Use of checklist engines, starting procedures, prior to starting GND radio and navigation equipment This element is not required Intentionally left in blank Intentionally left in blank engines (1.4 check, selection and setting of AP9) navigation and communication frequencies Before take-off GND This element is not required Intentionally left in blank Intentionally left in blank checks (1.6 AP9)

text: PRO - demonstrate adequate knowledge of the technique and procedure for accomplishing a rejected take-off after power-plant/system(s) failure/warnings, including related safety factors; Rejected take- - take into account, prior to beginning the take-off, operational factors which could affect the manoeuvre, such as off at a take-off warning inhibit systems or other aeroplane characteristics, runway length, surface conditions, wind, Engine failure after the obstructions that could affect take-off performance and could adversely affect safety; From initiation of take-off to reasonable TO application of take-off thrust and - perform all required pre-take-off checks as required by the appropriate checklist items. complete stop (or as applicable to x x speed before FPM before reaching V1 procedure) reaching V1 (2.6 - align the aeroplane on the runway centreline; AP9) - reduce the power smoothly and promptly, if appropriate to the aeroplane, when power-plant failure is recognised. Maintain the aeroplane under control close to the runway centreline; -use spoilers, prop reverse, thrust reverse, wheel brakes, and other drag/braking devices, as appropriate, maintaining positive control in such a manner as to bring the aeroplane to a safe stop. Accomplish the appropriate power-plant failure or other procedures and/or checklists as set forth in the POH or AFM or SOPs.

text: 3.8.1* Adherence to departure and CLB This element is not required Intentionally left in blank arrival routes and APP ATC instructions

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text: FPM The manoeuvre is considered to - establish a bank of approximately 5°, if required, or as recommended by the manufacturer, to maintain be complete at a point when the coordinated flight, and properly trim for that condition; maintain the operating engine within acceptable operating aircraft is stabilised at normal limits; engine-out climb speed with the - establish the best engine inoperative airspeed as appropriate to the aircraft and condition of flight; x x correct pitch and lateral control, - establish and maintain the recommended flight attitude and configuration for the best performance for all Take-off with manoeuvring necessary for the phase of flight; in trim condition and, as Failure of the critical engine from engine failure - maintain desired altitude within given limits, when a constant altitude is specified and is within the capability of applicable, autopilot V1 and before reaching V2 in the between V1 and V2 TO the aeroplane; engagement. lowest CAT I visibility conditions - maintain the desired airspeed and heading within given limits. (2.5.2 AP9) PRO The manoeuvre is considered to - recognise an engine failure or the need to shut down an engine as simulated by the examiner; be complete at a point when the - complete engine failure vital action checks from memory; aircraft is stabilised in a clean x x - follow the prescribed aeroplane checklist, and verify the procedures for securing the inoperative engine; - demonstrate proper engine restart or shutdown procedures (whatever appropriate) in accordance with approved configuration with engine-out procedure/checklist or the manufacturer’s recommended procedures and pertinent checklist items; and monitor all procedures completed. functions of the operating engine and make necessary adjustments.

text: Manually, with one engine PRO simulated inoperative; engine - select and comply with the ILS or LPV instrument approach procedure to be performed; failure has to be simulated - prior to final approach course, maintain declared or assigned altitudes within given limits without descending during final approach before below applicable minimum altitudes and maintain headings within given limits; passing 1 000 ft above - select, tune, identify and confirm the operational status of ground and aircraft navigation equipment to be used aerodrome level until for the approach procedure. touchdown or through the COM complete missed approach - establish two-way communications with ATC using the proper communications phraseology and techniques, procedure. either personally, or, if appropriate, direct co-pilot/safety pilot to do so, as required for the phase of flight or or approach segment; - comply in a timely manner with all clearances, instructions, and procedures issued by ATC and advise accordingly if unable to comply. 3.8.3* 3D FPA/FPM operations to - establish the appropriate aircraft configuration and airspeed/V-speed considering turbulence, wind shear or other DH/A of 200 ft meteorological and operating conditions; (60 m) or to higher APP - complete the aircraft checklist items appropriate to the phase of flight or approach segment, including engine out Intentionally left in blank Intentionally left in blank minima if required approach and landing checklist, as appropriate; Manually, with one engine - apply necessary adjustment to the published DH and visibility criteria for the aeroplane approach category when by the approach simulated inoperative; engine required, such as NOTAMs, inoperative aeroplane and ground navigation equipment, inoperative visual aids procedure failure has to be simulated associated with the landing environment; during final approach after - on final approach course, allow no more than ½ scale deflection of the localiser and/or glideslope indications; passing the outer marker (OM) - maintain declared approach airspeeds within given limits; within a distance of not more - maintain a stabilised descent to the DH to permit completion of the visual portion of the approach and landing than 4 NM until touchdown or with minimal manoeuvring; and through the complete missed - initiate the missed approach procedure, upon reaching the DH, when the required visual references for the approach procedure. intended runway are not obtained. 3D linear vertical deviations (e.g. RNP APCH (LNAV/VNAV) using BaroVNAV): not more than – 75 ft below the vertical profile at any time, and not more than + 75 ft above the vertical profile at or below 1 000 ft above aerodrome level. 3D (LNAV/VNAV) ‘linear’ lateral deviations: cross-track error/deviation should normally be limited to ± ½ the RNP value associated with the procedure. Brief deviations from this standard up to a maximum of 1 time the RNP value are allowable.

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text: PRO - select and comply with the PBN, VOR/ LOC/ LOC BC or NDB instrument approach procedure to be performed; - complete the aircraft checklist items appropriate to the phase of flight or approach segment, including engine out approach and landing checklist, as appropriate; - prior to final approach course, maintain declared altitudes in given limits without descending below applicable minimum altitudes, and maintain headings as given; - select, tune, identify, confirm and monitor the operational status of ground and aircraft navigation equipment to be used for the approach procedure. COM - establish two-way communications with ATC using the proper communications phraseology and techniques, either personally, or, if appropriate, direct co-pilot/safety pilot to do so, as required for the phase of flight or approach segment; - comply in a timely manner with all clearances, instructions, and procedures issued by ATC and advise accordingly if unable to comply. 2D operations Non-precision approach down FPA/FPM down to the - apply necessary adjustment to the published minimum descent altitude (MDA) and visibility criteria for the to the MDH/A MDH/A Intentionally left in blank Intentionally left in blank APP aeroplane approach category when required, such as NOTAMs, inoperative aeroplane and ground navigation equipment, inoperative visual aids associated with the landing environment; (3.8.4 AP9) - on the intermediate and final segments of the final approach course: a. maintain PBN, VOR/ LOC/ LOC BC tracking within ½ scale deflection of the course deviation indicator or within 5 degrees of the desired track in the case of an NDB approach; b. fly the approach in a stabilised manner without descending below the applicable minimum altitudes depicted on the approach chart (+as required/–0 feet); 2D (LNAV) ‘linear’ lateral deviations: cross-track error/deviation should normally be limited to ± ½ the RNP value associated with the procedure. Brief deviations from this standard up to a maximum of 1 time the RNP value are allowable. c. descend to and accurately maintain the MDA and track to the missed approach point (MAPt) or to the recommended minimum visibility that would permit completion of the visual portion of the approach with a normal rate of descent and minimal manoeuvring; d. maintain declared approach airspeeds (+10/-5 knots); e. initiate the missed approach procedure, if the required visual references for the intended runway are not obtained at the MAPt; f. execute a normal landing from a straight-in or circling approach as required.

text: This manoeuvre should be flown from intercept to centreline until acceleration after go-around. The manoeuvre is considered to be Manual go-around with the Engine-out complete at a point when the critical engine simulated approach & go- aircraft is stabilised at normal x x APP inoperative after an instrument Demonstrate manual aircraft control skills with smoothness and accuracy as appropriate to the situation; around engine-out climb speed with the approach on reaching DH, MDH Detect deviations through instrument scanning; (4.4* AP9) correct pitch and lateral control, or MAPt Maintain spare mental capacity during manual aircraft control; in trim condition and, as Maintain the aircraft within the flight envelope; applicable, autopilot engagement Apply knowledge of the relationship between aircraft attitude, speed and thrust. (describe generally critical part of manoeuvre) Initiation in a stabilised engine- Engine-out Landing with the critical engine out configuration from not less x x LDG landing (5.5 AP9) inoperative than 3 NM final approach, until completion of roll-out

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text: GM2 ORO.FC.231(d)(2) Evidence-based training

text: VERIFICATION OF THE ACCURACY OF THE GRADING SYSTEM — FEEDBACK PROCESS The verification of the accuracy of the grading system provides valuable data for the training system performance and concordance assurance. Therefore, the verification is necessary from a systemic point of view and the intention is not to measure individual pilot against Appendix 9 criteria. Concordance agreement between instructors may be high; however, the whole community of instructors may be grading too low or too high (accuracy). The statistical result of the verification against Appendix 9 criteria can provide the operator with a criterion-referenced system to adjust the accuracy of the grading system. The verification does not require an examiner; EBT instructors may provide the necessary data. Example 1: For the last 36 months, the operator has a rate of 3 % of pilots scoring 1 (assuming the data is statistically relevant). In this example, the rate of 3 % of the pilots scoring 1 is maintained across all the technical competencies. When the operator performs a verification, the rate of failure would have been only 0,5 %. This may indicate that instructors are rating too low in EBT and therefore some of the pilots scoring 1 should have been graded with a score higher than 1. This may be economically negative for the operator. On the other hand, it could be that the operator has decided to implement higher standards. Example 2: The operator has an EBT programme with a negligible rate of pilots scoring 1 and a 1 % of pilots scoring 2 in two consecutive recurrent modules. The verification of the technical competencies against Appendix 9 criteria provides a rate of 5 % failure. The EBT manager should further investigate the reason behind this mismatch between EBT and Appendix 9 in the technical competencies. There may be factors influencing this mismatch (e.g. statistical issues, the events in the EBT modules are too benign compared to the events in Appendix 9), which may lead to a corrective action (e.g. redesign of the EBT modules). If the difficulty of the EBT scenarios is equivalent to Appendix 9 and the concordance is high between instructors, then the discrepancy in outcomes might be because the community of instructors are grading too high in the technical competencies (they are grading with 2 when they should have graded 1). Further instructor standardisation will be needed to address this. The implementation of mixed EBT following GM1 ORO.FC.230(a);(b);(f) provides a good opportunity to fine-tune and verify the accuracy of the grading system because an Appendix 9 licence proficiency check is carried out every year. The authority may not allow full EBT unless the accuracy of the grading system is demonstrated. Further guidance can be found in the EASA EBT manual.

text: AMC1 ORO.FC.231(e) Evidence-based training

text: VOLUME AND FSTD QUALIFICATION LEVEL (a) The EBT programme has been developed to include a notional exemplar of 48 FSTD hours over a 3-year programme for each flight crew member.

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text: (b) Subject to ORO.GEN.120, the operator may reduce the number of FSTD hours provided that an equivalent level of safety is achieved. The programme should not be less than 36 FSTD hours. (c) Each EBT module should be conducted in an FSTD with a qualification level adequate to complete proficiency checks; therefore, it should be conducted in a full-flight simulator (FFS) level C or D.

text: AMC1 ORO.FC.231(f) Evidence-based training

text: EQUIVALENCY OF MALFUNCTIONS — PROCESS (a) The equivalency of malfunctions process should be undertaken by subject matter experts (SMEs) who hold or have held a type rating on the aeroplane type. (b) Steps of the equivalency of malfunctions Step 1: Look at (review) all aircraft system malfunctions provided by the OEM. For example, FCOM for Airbus, or AFM for other manufacturers, does not normally provide an exhaustive list of malfunctions. Step 2: Determine and retain in a list only malfunctions that place a significant demand on a proficient crew, in isolation from an environmental or operational context. Step 3: For each retained malfunction, determine the applicable characteristic or characteristics. Step 4: Develop the EBT FSTD programme to incorporate malfunctions at the frequency specified in the table of assessment and training topics. (c) Malfunctions included in the equivalency of malfunctions but not included in the EBT FSTD programme require review and appropriate procedural knowledge training, conducted in a less qualified but suitable alternative environment (classroom, flight procedure training device, advance computer-based training, aviation blended learning environment (ABLE), etc.). Further guidance can be found in the EASA EBT manual. (d) The operator should establish procedures to determine what malfunctions should be included in the FSTD. This may include a different malfunction difficulty between the EVAL and the SBT.

text: AMC1 ORO.FC.231(f)(3) Evidence-based training

text: CREW EXPOSURE TO AT LEAST ONE MALFUNCTION FOR EACH CHARACTERISTIC (a) Unless specified in the OSD, each crew member should be exposed to the characteristics of degraded control and loss of instrumentation in the role of pilot flying. (b) Notwithstanding point (a), for aircraft types with a limited number of malfunctions in the characteristic of degraded control or loss of instrumentation, the operator may use an alternative means of compliance in accordance with ORO.GEN.120.

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text: GM1 ORO.FC.231(f) Evidence-based training

text: EQUIVALENCY OF MALFUNCTIONS — SIGNIFICANT DEMAND ON A PROFICIENT CREW (a) The criteria to determine that a malfunction places a significant demand on a proficient crew are the following: (1) The procedure includes one or more action items and not only a set of information for crew awareness. (2) The flight crew’s cognitive load (resources required by the mental processes of perception, memory, judgement, and reasoning) significantly increases during or after the application of the associated abnormal or emergency procedure. The cognitive load is considered to be significantly increased when it is well above the cognitive load induced by the application of the normal standard operating procedures. (3) The flight crew’s workload significantly increases during or after the application of the associated abnormal or emergency procedure. The workload is considered to be significantly increased when it is well above the workload induced by the application of the normal standard operating procedures. (4) The aircraft handling perceived by the pilot when flying in abnormal conditions is different compared to the aircraft handling in normal conditions; e.g. the symmetry of the flight is affected. (b) The criteria to determine that a malfunction places a significant demand on a proficient crew allow the identification of: (1) the pilot competencies that are specifically challenged during the management of the related procedure, and (2) the characteristic of the aircraft system malfunction procedure. Note: The identification of the pilot competencies allows a consistent assessment to determine the proficiency of the crew member. Criteria Definition Challenged Example of procedure characteristics in (a) Competency (1) The procedure includes one or more ▪ PRO ▪ multiple paths within the action items and not only a set of ▪ KNO procedure (e.g. decision trees) information for crew awareness. ▪ multiple inoperative or degraded systems (2) The flight crew’s cognitive load ▪ SAW ▪ multiple paths within the (resources required by the mental ▪ PSD procedure (e.g. decision trees) processes of perception, memory, ▪ multiple inoperative or degraded judgement, and reasoning) systems significantly increases, during, or after, ▪ a high potential for undetected the application of the errors (e.g. removal of flight abnormal/emergency procedure. The protections) cognitive load is considered to be significantly increased when it is well above the cognitive load induced by

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text: the application of the normal standard operating procedures. (3) The flight crew’s workload ▪ time criticality; significantly increases, during, or after, ▪ multiple paths within the ▪ WLM the application of the procedure (e.g. decision trees); abnormal/emergency procedure. The ▪ multiple inoperative or degraded workload is considered to be systems; significantly increased when it is well ▪ a high potential for undetected above the workload induced by the errors (e.g. removal of flight application of the normal standard protections); and operating procedures. ▪ a significant increase in workload (e.g. removal of automation). (4) The aircraft handling perceived by the ▪ FPM ▪ multiple inoperative or degraded pilot when flying in abnormal ▪ FPA systems conditions is different compared to ▪ a high potential for undetected the aircraft handling in normal errors (e.g. removal of flight conditions; e.g. the symmetry of the protections) flight is affected. (c) When a malfunction is placing a significant demand on a proficient crew, it means it has one or more of the malfunction characteristics (see more in GM2.ORO.FC.231(f)).

text: GM2 ORO.FC.231(f) Evidence-based training

text: EQUIVALENCY OF MALFUNCTIONS — MALFUNCTION CHARACTERISTICS The following may be considered suitable definitions for each of the characteristics: (a) ‘Immediacy’: System malfunctions that require immediate and urgent crew intervention or decision (e.g. malfunctions with memory items, loss of pressurisation at high altitude, brake failure during landing). (b) ‘Complexity’: System malfunctions that require recovery procedures with multiple options to analyse and/or multiple decision paths to apply (e.g. multiple hydraulic system failures, smoke and fumes procedures). (c) ‘Degradation of aircraft control’: System malfunctions that result in significant degradation of flight controls in combination with abnormal handling characteristics, such as modification of the normal pitch attitude during approach and landing or reconfiguration of the flight control laws or modes (e.g. jammed stabiliser, flaps/slats inoperative) (d) ‘Loss of instrumentation’: System malfunctions that require monitoring and management of the flight path using degraded or alternative displays such as temporary or permanent loss of any flight-path-related parameter displayed on the primary flight display (PFD), head-up display (HUD) or navigation display (ND), including loss of any setting capability of one of these indications. It includes primary instrumentation to monitor and manage primary aircraft systems (e.g. FLAPS indication, loss of fuel indications, etc.). (e) ‘Management of consequences’: System malfunctions that affect significantly the flight crew standard task sharing and/or the workload management and/or the decision-making process

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text: during an extensive period after the management of the malfunction itself (e.g. fuel leak or fuel not usable, altitude/speed limitations, malfunctions with ‘deferred’ items in later flight phases). Note: Equivalency of malfunctions may be undertaken in consultation with the aircraft OEM. The objective of the OEM consultation is to review the operator analysis regarding the OEM operational certification (e.g. OSD) documents and the general OEM operation and training policy.

text: GM3 ORO.FC.231(f) Evidence-based training

text: EQUIVALENCY OF MALFUNCTIONS — ISOLATION FROM AN ENVIRONMENTAL OR OPERATIONAL CONTEXT When considering significant demand on a proficient crew, SMEs may consider that there are no significant environmental and operational threats. For example, the aircraft is close to a suitable aerodrome with environmental conditions permitting all published approaches to be made, with no pre-existing malfunctions and sufficient fuel for several hours (e.g. A320 or B737 overhead Ibiza - Spain, at FL350 with visible moisture at 30 000 ft, at the aerodrome wind calm, CAVOK, ISA).

text: GM4 ORO.FC.231(f) Evidence-based training

text: EQUIVALENCY OF MALFUNCTIONS PROCESS — DELPHI (a) The operator reviews/looks at aircraft system malfunctions provided in the official documentation of the OEM — for example, FCOM for Airbus, or AFM for other manufacturers. (b) Before launching the equivalency of malfunctions survey and when the aircraft system malfunctions list is very long, the operator may slightly shorten the list by removing the malfunctions that surely will not place a significant demand of a proficient crew (see GM on SIGNIFICANT DEMAND ON A PROFICIENT CREW). (c) A group of EBT instructors statistically relevant will be selected to perform the equivalency of malfunctions survey. 50 % of the instructors’ community will be used as a reference. In small instructors’ communities, it may be necessary to refer to 100 %. In operators with large instructors’ communities, the number of instructors statistically relevant may be less than 50 %. (d) The group of instructors selected in point (c) will rate each of the malfunctions listed in points (a) and (b) (1) Each instructor will rate each one of the 5 characteristics in each malfunction listed in point (b). (2) The rate will be 0 when the malfunction does not have the characteristic (the characteristic does not appear in the malfunction). (3) The rate will be 1 to 5 when the characteristic appears in the malfunction. Rating 1 when the characteristic is not relevant for the malfunction and rate 5 when the characteristic is very relevant. (4) The instructors will rate individually (e.g. home, classroom, etc.) to avoid exchange of opinions with other instructors. (e) An average rate of the whole instructors’ community as a result of point (d) will be calculated for each characteristic of each malfunction.

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text: (f) A second round of survey will be performed with the same instructors and the same list. This time the operator will provide the average calculated in point (e) and ask them if in light of the average they would like to change their rating. Group discussion may substitute or complement the second survey. (g) When an instructor changes their rating, the old rate will be discarded. (h) A new average will be calculated for each characteristic of each malfunction at the end of the second survey. The final average will be rounded to the closest integer number. (i) The operator may select an average rate of the characteristics (e.g. rate 2 or 3) at which or above which the characteristic is considered to be present in the malfunction, thus it places a significant demand on a proficient crew. (j) The operator may use the rates of the characteristics to determine the difficulty of the malfunction. As SBT is a developing phase, the operator may select a higher difficulty of the malfunctions selected in this phase. Further guidance can be found in the EASA EBT manual. (k) The operator may refer to an aircraft OEM malfunction analysis to support all the steps of the session. (l) A simpler version of the process may be acceptable provided that: (1) the aircraft manufacturer provides equivalency of malfunction documentation; (2) there is a minimum of three EBT instructors who have a deep knowledge of aircraft systems; and (3) the instructors referred to in (2) above are properly standardised. The standardisation is based on the EBT programme design knowledge and in particular the concept, definitions and process of the equivalency of malfunctions. The simplified process may or may not use a survey and use either a two-point scale (0 and 1), three-point scale (1, 2 and 3) or five-point scale (1 to 5).

text: AMC1 ORO.FC.231(g) Evidence-based training

text: APPROACHES THAT PLACE AN ADDITIONAL DEMAND ON A PROFICIENT CREW (a) In order to identify approaches that place an additional demand on a proficient crew, an operator should: (1) review its operational network; (2) select approaches with one or more of the following characteristics: (i) unusual design; (ii) low frequency of exposure; and (iii) degraded approach guidance; (3) select at least one approach of each type and method and include them in the EBT programme at the frequency given in the table of assessment and training topics; and (4) ensure the approaches selected in (3) cover all the characteristics at the frequency given in the table of assessment and training topics.

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text: Note: The approaches listed within Section 2 of the table of assessment and training topics should be selected in this process. (b) Any approach that is required to be flown in the PF role specifically should be classified as ‘skills retention’ and may be trained in the MT.

text: AMC2 ORO.FC.231(g) Evidence-based training

text: EQUIVALENCY OF APPROACHES RELEVANT TO OPERATIONS — SPECIFIC APPROVAL The operator may extend the interval for recurrent training and checking of approaches that require specific approval as defined in the AMC to Part-SPA (e.g. SPA.LVO) to the frequency given in the EBT programme.

text: GM1 ORO.FC.231(g) Evidence-based training

text: EQUIVALENCY OF APPROACHES RELEVANT TO OPERATIONS — APPROACH CHARACTERISTICS The following may be considered suitable examples for each of the approach characteristics: (a) Design (1) Unusual approach design feature — for example, offset final approach track or steep approach, etc. (2) Unusual runway design feature — for example, non-standard lighting or marking (b) Frequency (1) Infrequently visited airfields — for example, alternate airfields (2) Infrequently flown approaches at commonly visited airfields — for example, circling approach, CAT 2, SA CATI (c) Degraded guidance (1) Degraded internal guidance or aircraft equipment — for example, head-up display (HUD) failure (2) Degraded external guidance or ground equipment — for example, GPS signal failure

text: GM2 ORO.FC.231(g) Evidence-based training

text: SELECTED APPROACHES AT THE FREQUENCY GIVEN IN THE EBT PROGRAMME The table of assessment and training topics for each generation provides the type of approach, flight method and frequency for the crew.

text: AMC1 ORO.FC.231(h) Evidence-based training

text: LINE EVALUATION OF COMPETENCE (a) The purpose of the line evaluation of competence is to verify the capability of the flight crew member(s) to undertake line operations, including preflight and post-flight activities as specified in the operations manual. Therefore, the line evaluation of competence should be performed in the aircraft. The route should be representative of typical sectors undertaken in normal

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text: operations. The commander, or any pilot who may be required to relieve the commander, should also demonstrate their competency in the role. (b) Each flight crew member should be assessed according to the competency framework and grading system approved for their operator’s EBT programme. (c) Flight crew members should be assessed in duties as pilot flying and pilot monitoring; they should be evaluated in each role. Therefore, they should be checked on one flight sector as pilot flying and on another flight sector as pilot monitoring. (d) The operator should maintain a list and inform the competent authority about the line evaluators suitably qualified to undertake line evaluations of competence. (e) The person that conducts the line evaluation of competence should occupy an observer’s seat. For aeroplanes, in the case of long-haul operations where additional operating flight crew members are carried, the person that conducts the line evaluation of competence may fulfil the function of a cruise relief pilot and should not occupy either pilot’s seat during take-off, departure, initial cruise, descent, approach and landing. (f) The validity period should be counted from the end of the month when the line evaluation of competence was undertaken. When the line evaluation of competence is undertaken within the last 3 months of the validity period, the new validity period should be counted from the original expiry date.

text: AMC2 ORO.FC.231(h) Evidence-based training

text: LINE EVALUATION OF COMPETENCE — LINE EVALUATOR (a) The line evaluator should have a valid line evaluation of competence. (b) The line evaluator should receive an acceptable training based on the EBT instructor training. The EBT assessment of competence is not required.

text: AMC1 ORO.FC.231(h)(3) Evidence-based training

text: LINE EVALUATION OF COMPETENCE — EXTENSION OF THE VALIDITY In order to extend the validity of the line evaluation of competence to: (a) 2 years, in every cycle, one EVAL for each pilot should be conducted by an EBT instructor (EBT instructors) who has (have) a valid line evaluation of competence in the same operator; (b) 3 years, in addition to point (a) above, the operator should have a feedback process for the monitoring of line operations which: (1) identifies threats in the airline’s operating environment; (2) identifies threats within the airline’s operations; (3) assesses the degree of transference of training to the line operations; (4) checks the quality and usability of procedures; (5) identifies design problems in the human-machine interface; (6) understands pilots’ shortcuts and workarounds; and

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text: (7) assesses safety margins.

text: GM1 ORO.FC.231(h) Evidence-based training

text: LINE EVALUATION OF COMPETENCE (a) Line evaluation of competence, route and aerodrome knowledge, and recent experience requirements are intended to verify the capability of the flight crew member(s) to operate safely, effectively and efficiently under line operating conditions, including preflight and postflight activities as specified in the operations manual. Other EBT assessments, legacy checks and emergency and safety equipment training are primarily intended to prepare flight crew members for abnormal/emergency procedures. (b) The line evaluation of competence is considered a particularly important factor in the development, maintenance and refinement of high operating standards, and can provide the operator with a valuable indication of the usefulness of its training policy and methods.

text: GM1 ORO.FC.231(h)(4) Evidence-based training

text: LINE EVALUATOR (a) AMC1.ORO.FC.146(c) ‘EBT instructor training’ provides some learning objectives which may be used to qualify the commander nominated by the operator to perform line evaluation of competence. The training may be a minimum of 7 hours, where 1 hour may be done outside the classroom. The use of advance training environments such as advance computer-based training or ABLE may reduce further the need of classroom training. The assessment of competence may not be required. Further guidance can be found in the EASA EBT manual. (b) The line evaluator training may be included in the EBT instructor standardisation and concordance programme. This option is however limited due to the limited number of line evaluations of competence that are required (every 2 or 3 years), the difficulties in observing the whole range of performance of competencies and the lack of control of the environment during a line evaluation of competence. Therefore, the operator may need to use EBT instructors to maintain an acceptable level of standardisation.

text: AMC1 ORO.FC.231(i) Evidence-based training

text: PERFORMANCE-BASED CONTINUOUS TECHNICAL GROUND TRAINING (a) Technical ground training programme (1) The objective of the technical ground training programme is to ensure that pilots have adequate: (i) knowledge of: (A) the aircraft systems; and (B) the operational procedures and requirements; and (ii) awareness of:

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text: (A) the most significant accidents or incidents that could affect their operations following the ‘threat and error management model’ or an alternative risk model agreed with the authority; and (B) the occurrences in the airline or occurrences from other airlines that may be relevant for their operations, accident/incident and occurrence review. (2) The technical ground training should: (i) be conducted as part of a 3-year programme; (ii) allow a customisation of syllabi. The operator should describe in the operations manual the procedure to determine the customisation of syllabi. This customisation should be based on evidence both internal and external to the operator. (iii) as a minimum, allow the pilot to receive technical ground training every 12 months. The validity period should be counted from the end of the month. When this training is conducted within the last 3 months of the validity period, the new validity period should be counted from the original expiry date. (3) The technical ground training syllabi should be delivered using different methods and tools. (i) The selection of the method and tool results from a combination of the learning objectives and the target group receiving the training (WHAT needs to be trained and WHO needs to be trained). (ii) The selection of the appropriate method and tool should be driven by the desired outcome in terms of adequate knowledge. (iii) The delivery of the technical ground training syllabi should include the methods or tools to verify if the pilot has acquired the objective of the technical ground training programme. This may be achieved by means a questionnaire, assessment of application of the competency ‘knowledge’ (KNO) or other suitable methods. (4) The measurement and evaluation of the training system performance through the feedback process should include the performance of the technical ground training. (b) Emergency and safety equipment training (1) Training on the location and use of all emergency and safety equipment should be conducted in an aircraft or a suitable alternative training device. (2) Every year the emergency and safety equipment training programme should include the following: (i) actual donning of a life jacket, where fitted; (ii) actual donning of protective breathing equipment, where fitted; (iii) actual handling of fire extinguishers of the type used; (iv) instruction on the location and use of all emergency and safety equipment carried on the aircraft;

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text: (v) instruction on the location and use of all types of exits; and (vi) security procedures. (3) Every 3 years the programme of training should include the following: (i) actual operation of all types of exits; (ii) demonstration of the method used to operate a slide, where fitted; (iii) actual firefighting using equipment representative of that carried on the aircraft on an actual or simulated fire except that, with Halon extinguishers, an alternative extinguisher may be used; (iv) the effects of smoke in an enclosed area and actual use of all relevant equipment in a simulated smoke-filled environment; (v) actual handling of pyrotechnics, real or simulated, where applicable; (vi) demonstration in the use of the life rafts, where fitted; and (vii) particularly in the case where no cabin crew is required, first aid appropriate to the aircraft type, the kind of operation and the crew complement. (4) The successful resolution of aircraft emergencies requires interaction between flight crew and cabin/technical crew and emphasis should be placed on the importance of effective coordination and two-way communication between all crew members in various emergency situations. (5) Emergency and safety equipment training should include joint practice in aircraft evacuations so that all who are involved are aware of the duties other crew members should perform. When such practice is not possible, combined flight crew and cabin/technical crew training should include joint discussion of emergency scenarios. (6) Emergency and safety equipment training should, as far as practicable, take place in conjunction with cabin/technical crew undergoing similar training with emphasis on coordinated procedures and two-way communication between the flight crew compartment and the cabin. (7) The emergency and safety equipment training should include a pilot’s assessment of the training received; as a minimum, by means of a questionnaire, or computer-based exercises, or other suitable methods. (8) When the emergency and safety equipment training is conducted within 3 calendar months prior to the expiry of the 12-calendar-month period, the next emergency and safety equipment training should be completed within 12 calendar months of the original expiry date of the previous training. (c) Emergency and safety equipment training — extension of period of training (1) The emergency and safety equipment training programme should establish and maintain at least an equivalent level of proficiency achieved by complying with the provisions of (b). The level of flight crew proficiency in the use of emergency and safety equipment should be demonstrated prior to being granted approval to extend the period of training by the competent authority.

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text: (2) The operator applying for an approval to extend the period of emergency and safety equipment training should provide the competent authority with an implementation plan, including a description of the level of flight crew proficiency to be achieved in the use of emergency and safety equipment. The implementation plan should comprise the following: (i) A safety case which should: (A) demonstrate that the required or equivalent level of proficiency in the use of emergency and safety equipment is maintained; (B) incorporate the programme of implementation, to include controls and validity checks; (C) minimise risk during all phases of the programme’s implementation and operation; and (D) include oversight, including review and audits. (ii) The measurement and evaluation of the training system performance through the feedback process should include the performance of the emergency and safety equipment training. The feedback should be used as a tool to validate that the emergency and safety equipment training is correctly implemented; this enables substantiation of the emergency and safety equipment training and ensures that objectives have been met. (iii) Documentation that details the scope and requirements of the programme, including the following: (A) the operator’s training needs and established operational and training objectives; (B) a description of the process for designing and obtaining approval for the operator’s emergency and safety equipment training programmes. This should include quantified operational and training objectives identified by the operator’s internal monitoring programmes. External sources may also be used; and (C) a description of how the programme will develop a support and feedback process to form a self-correcting training system. (3) When the emergency and safety equipment training is conducted within 6 calendar months prior to the expiry of the 24-calendar-month period, the next emergency and safety equipment training should be completed within 24 calendar months of the original expiry date of the previous training.

text: GM1 ORO.FC.231(i) Evidence-based training

text: PERFORMANCE-BASED CONTINUOUS GROUND TRAINING — INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (a) Operator evidence (inner loop) (1) Pilot data (individual or group);

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text: (2) Population-based data according to the training metrics determined in the training system performance; (3) Evidence identified or recognised through the safety management process covered in ORO.GEN.200. (b) External evidence from the authority and manufacturers (external loop) (1) Revision of existing rules and regulations, updated versions of the EBT data report, state safety plan; (2) Training needs derived from updated OSD (if appropriate for ground training), etc. (c) The evidence drives the selection of the methods and tools.

text: GM2 ORO.FC.231(i) Evidence-based training

text: PERFORMANCE-BASED CONTINUOUS GROUND TRAINING — METHODS AND TOOLS This is a non-exhaustive list of methods and tools to deliver ground training: — classroom, presentations, — web-based training, — self-learning instructions, — advance CBT such as virtual reality, chatbots, interactive scenario trainers.

text: AMC1 ORO.FC.232 EBT programme assessment and training topics

text: ASSESSMENT AND TRAINING TOPICS Each table of assessment and training topics is specific to the aeroplane generation specified in the title. The component elements in the column headings of the matrix are as follows: (a) Assessment and training topic. A topic or grouping of topics derived from threats, errors or findings from data analysis, to be considered for assessment and mitigation by training. (b) Frequency. The priority of the topic to be considered in an EBT programme, according to the evidence derived from a large-scale analysis of operational data, is linked to a recommended frequency. There are three levels of frequency: (1) A — assessment and training topic to be included with defined scenario elements during every EBT module; (2) B — assessment and training topic to be included with defined scenario elements during every cycle; (3) C — assessment and training topic to be included with defined scenario elements at least once in the 3-year period of the EBT programme. (c) Flight phase for activation. The flight phase for the realisation of the critical threat or error in the assessment and training scenario. (d) Description (includes type of topic, being threat, error or focus). A description of the training topic.

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text: (e) Desired outcome (includes performance criteria or training outcome). Simple evaluative statements on the desired outcome. (f) Example scenario elements (guidance material). The example scenario elements address the training topic and detail the threat and/or error that the crew are exposed to. (g) Competency map. Competencies marked are those considered critical in managing the scenario.

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text: AMC2 ORO.FC.232 EBT programme assessment and training topics

text: GENERATION 4 (JET) — TABLE OF ASSESSMENT AND TRAINING TOPICS

text: Desired outcome se cy a n Assessment and Description (includes type of topic, h o Guidance material (GM) en (includes performance criteria OR ti training topic u being threat, error or focus) t p a Example scenario elements training outcome) h iv eq ig ct Fr Fl a M W LM O

text: O N PRO C FPA FPM LTW PSD SA W K

text: Generation 4 Jet — Recurrent assessment and training matrix Competency map

text: Section 1 — Skill retention. Manoeuvres training phase (MT)

text: Engine failure after the application of

text: Rejected take-off B take-off thrust and before reaching V1 TO From initiation of take-off to complete stop (or as applicable to the procedure) x x

text: (CAT I or above)

text: Failure of the critical engine (if The manoeuvre is complete at a point when the aircraft is stabilised at normal engine-out Failure of the critical applicable) from V1 and before reaching climb speed with the correct pitch and lateral control, in trim condition and, as applicable, engine between V1 B TO x x V2 in the lowest CAT I visibility or in LVO autopilot engagement. Only one failure of the critical engine between V1 and V2 a year and V2 meteorological (MET) conditions. may be done in LVO conditions.

text: Failure of one engine from V1 and The manoeuvre is complete at a point when the aircraft is stabilised in a clean

text: before reaching V2 in the lowest CAT I configuration with engine-out procedures completed. Only one failure of the critical x x

text: visibility or in LVO MET conditions. engine between V1 and V2 a year may be done in LVO conditions. Failure of one engine B TO on take-off Failure of one engine above V2 (any Demonstrate manual aircraft control The manoeuvre is complete at a point when the aircraft is stabilised in a clean segment of the TO) in the lowest CAT I x x x skills with smoothness and accuracy as configuration with engine-out procedures completed. visibility or in LVO MET conditions. appropriate to the situation.

text: Detect deviations through instrument Initiation of emergency descent from The manoeuvre is complete once the aircraft is stabilised in emergency descent Emergency descent C scanning. CRZ x x x normal cruise altitude configuration (and profile). Maintain spare mental capacity during MT manual aircraft control. Engine-out approach With the critical engine (if applicable) Initiation in a stabilised engine-out configuration from not less than 3 NM final approach, B Maintain the aircraft within the flight LDG x x & landing failed, normal landing until completion of roll-out envelope.

text: Apply knowledge of the relationship With the critical engine (if applicable) between aircraft attitude, speed and This manoeuvre should be flown from intercept to centreline until acceleration after gofailed, manually flown normal precision Engine-out approach thrust. around. The manoeuvre is complete at a point when the aircraft is stabilised at normal B approach to DA, followed by a manual APP x x & go-around engine-out climb speed with the correct pitch and lateral control, in trim condition and, as go-around — the whole manoeuvre to applicable, autopilot engagement (describe generally the critical part of the manoeuvre). be flown without visual reference

text: High energy, initiation during the approach at 150 to 300 m (500 to 1 000 ft) below the x x x missed approach level-off altitude Go-around, all engines operative Go-around A APP Initiation of a go-around from DA followed by visual circuit and landing x x x

text: During flare/rejected landing x x x

text: Pilot qualification to

text: operate in either B As per ORO.FC.235 APP Complete the manoeuvres mandated in ORO.FC.235. Intentionally left in blank.

text: pilot’s seat

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text: Issue 2, Amendment 17 se a n Desired outcome h o Assessment and cy Description (includes type of topic, being ti Guidance material (GM) (includes performance criteria OR t p a Example scenario elements training topic en threat, error or focus) h u training outcome) iv ig ct M O eq Fl a W LM

text: O N Fr PRO C FPA FPM LTW PSD SA W K

text: Section 2 — Equivalency of approaches relevant to operations. Evaluation phase, manoeuvres training phase or scenario-based training phase (EVAL, MT or SBT)

text: See equivalency of approaches Approach type A or relevant to operations that place an B Approach type A or B flight method 3D APP See equivalency of approaches relevant to operations x x x x X B additional demand on a proficient crew

text: MT See equivalency of approaches Approach type A B Approach type A flight method 2D relevant to operations that place an APP See equivalency of approaches relevant to operations x x x x X additional demand on a proficient crew

text: See equivalency of approaches relevant to operations that place an Approach type A B Approach type A flight method 3D or 2D APP See equivalency of approaches relevant to operations x x x x X additional demand on a proficient r SBT crew

text: L o See equivalency of approaches EVA relevant to operations that place an Approach type B B Approach type B flight method 3D APP See equivalency of approaches relevant to operations x x x x X additional demand on a proficient crew

text: Section 3 – Equivalency of approaches under specific approvals and take-off under specific approvals. Evaluation phase, manoeuvres training phase or scenario-based training phase (EVAL, MT or SBT)

text: See equivalency of approaches MT SPA approach(es) B Approach requiring specific approval relevant to operations — specific APP Approaches flown from FAF to landing or go-around x x x approval

text: See equivalency of approaches r SBT SPA approach(es) B Approach requiring specific approval relevant to operations — specific APP Approaches flown from FAF to landing or go-around x x x L o approval EVA

text: Engine failure after the application of take-off thrust and before reaching V1 (in low-visibility MET conditions, Demonstrate manual aircraft control preferably in the lowest approved visibility) skills with smoothness and accuracy as Low-visibility RTO is not required under Part SPA but appropriate to the situation. r SBT instead in Appendix 9 Section 6. Detect deviations through instrument RTO — can be combined with the assessment and training topic ‘surprise’ in T o SPA rejected take- B scanning. TO EVAL or SBT X X M off (RTO) L, Note: AMC1 SPA.LVO.120 point (f) does not require a Maintain spare mental capacity during low-visibility RTO. manual aircraft control. EVA Maintain the aircraft within the flight RTO is required only in the initial LVO course (point envelope. (g)(1)(iii) of AMC1 SPA.LVO.120).

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text: Notwithstanding AMC1 SPA.LVO120 point (f)(1) Apply knowledge of the relationship between aircraft attitude, speed and r SBT AMC1 SPA.LVO.120 requires SPA manoeuvres in the thrust. The manoeuvre is complete at a point when the aircraft is stabilised at normal T o frequency of the OPC, as OPC is substituted in the EBT LVTO B TO climb speed with the correct pitch and lateral control, in trim condition and, as x x M programme. Thus, the frequency in EBT is determined in L, applicable, autopilot engagement. every cycle (B). EVA Low-visibility take-off, preferably in the lowest approved visibility.

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text: Issue 2, Amendment 17 se n Assessment cy a o Desired outcome en h ti Description (includes type of topic, Guidance material (GM) and training u a (includes performance criteria t p iv eq h being threat, error or focus) Example scenario elements topic ig ct OR training outcome) Fr a

text: Fl M W LM O O N PRO C FPA FPM LTW PSD SA W K

text: Section 4 — Training topics with frequency (A) in alphabetical order. Evaluation phase or scenario-based training phase (EVAL or SBT) GND Predictive wind shear warning before take-off, as applicable x x x ALL Adverse-weather scenario, e.g. thunderstorm activity, precipitation, icing x x x x TO Wind shear encounter during take-off, not predictive x x x X TO Predictive wind shear warning during take-off x x x x TO Crosswinds with or without strong gusts on take-off x x CRZ Turbulence that increases to severe turbulence x x x x CRZ Wind shear encounter scenario during cruise x x x x x APP Anticipate adverse weather. Reactive wind shear warning during approach or go-around x x x x APP Thunderstorm, heavy rain, turbulence, ice Prepare for suspected adverse Predictive wind shear warning during approach or go-around x x x x APP build-up to include de-icing issues, as well weather. Thunderstorm encounter during approach or on missed approach x x x r SBT Adverse APP as high-temperature conditions. Recognise adverse weather. Increasing tailwind on final approach (not reported) x x x x A L o weather APP The proper use of anti-ice and de-icing Take appropriate action. Approach and landing in demanding weather conditions, e.g. turbulence, up and x x x EVA systems should be included generally in Apply the appropriate procedure downdrafts, gusts and crosswinds including shifting wind directions APP appropriate scenarios. correctly. Non-precision approach in cold-temperature conditions, requiring altitude x x x Assure aircraft control. compensation for temperature, as applicable to the type APP Crosswinds with or without strong gusts on approach, final approach and landing x x x LDG (within and beyond limits) In approach, unexpected braking action ‘good to medium’ reported by the preceding x x x x APP aircraft APP Moderate to severe icing conditions during approach effecting aircraft performance x x x x APP Reduced visibility even after acquiring the necessary visual reference during approach, x x x due to rain or fog CLB Know how and when to use the ACAS warning, recovery and subsequent engagement of automation x x CRZ flight management system(s), DES guidance and automation. APP Demonstrate correct methods for ALL engagement and disengagement of FMS tactical programming issues, e.g. step climb, runway changes, late clearances, x x X The purpose of this topic is to encourage the auto flight system(s). destination re-programming, executing diversion CLB and develop effective flight path Demonstrate appropriate use of Recoveries from terrain avoidance warning systems (TAWS), management of energy x x x CRZ management through proficient and flight guidance, auto thrust and state to restore automated flight DES appropriate use of the flight management other automation systems. APP system(s), guidance and automation, Maintain mode awareness of the CLB including transitions between modes, auto flight system(s), including Amendments to ATC cleared levels during altitude capture modes to force mode x x x CRZ monitoring, mode awareness, vigilance engagement and automatic awareness and intervention r SBT Automation A DES and flexibility needed to change from one transitions. L o management APP mode to another. The means of mitigating Revert to different modes when EVA TO errors are included in this topic. The appropriate. Late ATC clearance to an altitude below acceleration altitude x x x TO errors are described as mishandled auto Detect deviations from the desired Engine-out special terrain procedures x x x APP flight systems, inappropriate mode aircraft state (flight path, speed, CRZ selection, mishandled flight management attitude, thrust, etc.) and take Forcing autopilot disconnect followed by re-engagement, recovery from low- or high- x x x x system(s) and inappropriate autopilot appropriate action. speed events in cruise CLB usage. Anticipate mishandled auto flight Engine failure during or after initial climb using automation x x CRZ system. Engine failure in cruise to onset of descent using automation x x CRZ Recognise mishandled auto flight Emergency descent x x X DES system. Managing high-energy descent capturing descent path from above (correlation with x x x X APP Take appropriate action if unstable approach training) APP necessary. No ATC clearance received prior to commencement of approach or final descent x x x

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text: APP Restore correct auto flight state. Reactive wind shear and recovery from the consequent high-energy state x x x

text: APP Identify and manage Automation fail to capture the approach altitude in descent (e.g. last altitude before the x x x x

text: consequences. FAP). Ideally, the failure occurs when the workload is high (e.g. configuration of the

text: aircraft for final approach).

text: APP Non-precision or infrequently flown approaches using the maximum available level of x x X

text: automation

text: APP Gear malfunction during an approach planned with autoland (including autobrake). x x x x

text: Competency FPA may or may not be included depending on the impact of such

text: malfunction on the automation.

text: APP ATC clearances to waypoints beyond the programmed descent point for a coded final x x x X

text: descent point during an approach utilising a final descent that is commanded by the

text: flight management system

text: APP Exposure to an event or sequence GPS failure prior to commencement of approach associated with position drift and a x x x X

text: of events to allow the pilot to build terrain alert

text: DES awareness of human factors in Cabin crew report of water noise below the forward galley indicating a possible toilet x x x

text: aviation and the human limitations. pipe leak, with consequent avionics failures

text: This includes the development of CRZ Smoke removal but combined with a diversion until landing is completed. x x x x x X the following competencies:

text: GND Communication: Apron fuel spilling x x x

text: Demonstrate: CRZ Important water leak in an aircraft galley x x x x — effective use of language;

text: ALL — responsiveness to feedback; A relevant number of cabin crew are wounded or incapacitated. Additionally, the

text: and cabin crew wounded or incapacitated are the most competent (e.g. senior cabin crew x x x This encapsulates the general CRM — capability to state the plans member). principles and objectives. It includes ALL and resolve ambiguities. Unruly passenger(s) x x communication; leadership and GND Leadership and teamwork: teamwork; problem-solving and decision- Passenger oxygen: passenger service unit open and mask falling down x x x Use appropriate authority to ALL making; situation awareness and ensure focus on the task. Support Passenger with medical problems — medical emergency x x Competencies management of information; and CRZ others in completing tasks. r SBT —non- workload management. Credible threat reported to the crew. Stowaway or fugitive on board. x x x x A Problem-solving and decision- L o technical GND No METAR or TAFOR is available for destination due to industrial action at the making: x x x x (CRM) Emphasis should be placed on the destination airport. EVA Detect deviations from the desired CRZ development of leadership, shown by EBT Credible bomb threat reported to crew x x x x state, evaluate problems, identify data sources to be a highly effective CLB the risk, consider alternatives and Credible bomb threat or pressurisation problem, but no quick landing possible (due to x x x x competency in mitigating risk and DES select the best course of action. weather, terrain or other reasons) improving safety through pilot Continuously review progress and APP performance. Diversion with low remaining fuel or increased fuel flow due to system malfunction x x x x adjust plans.

text: APP Situation awareness and ACAS warning immediately following a go-around, with a descent manoeuvre required x x x x X

text: management of information:

text: Have an awareness of the aircraft

text: state in its environment; project

text: and anticipate changes.

text: Workload management:

text: Prioritise, delegate and receive

text: assistance to maximise focus on

text: the task. Continuously monitor the

text: flight progress.

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text: Compliance failure. Consequences of not Recognise that a compliance failure The following are examples of potential compliance failures and are not intended to be

text: complying with operating instructions (e.g. has occurred. developed as scenarios as part of an EBT module:

text: SOPs). Make a verbal announcement.

text: This is not intended to list example Take appropriate action if 1. Requesting flap beyond limit speed

text: scenario elements, but instructors should necessary.

text: r SBT ensure that observed non-compliances are Restore safe flight path if necessary. 2. Flaps or slats in the wrong position for phase of flight or approach Compliance A ALL Intentionally blank L o taken as learning opportunities Manage consequences.

text: throughout the programme. In all modules 3. Omitting an action as part of a procedure EVA of the programme, the FSTD should as far

text: as possible be treated like an aircraft, and 4. Failing to initiate or complete a checklist

text: non-compliances should not be accepted

text: simply for expediency. 5. Using the wrong checklist for the situation

text: APP Any threat or error that can result in Adverse-weather scenario leading to a reactive wind shear warning during approach x x x x

text: circumstances that require a decision to perform a go-around, in addition to the Adverse-weather scenario leading to a predictive wind shear warning during approach x x x x APP execution of the go-around. Go-around or go-around

text: scenarios should be fully developed to Adverse-weather scenario, e.g. thunderstorm activity, heavy precipitation or icing x x x x APP encourage effective leadership and forcing decision at or close to DA/MDA

text: teamwork, in addition to problem-solving DA with visual reference in heavy precipitation with doubt about the runway surface x x x x APP and decision-making, plus execution using braking capability

text: APP manual aircraft control or the flight Adverse-wind scenario resulting in increasing tailwind below DA (not reported) x x x r SBT Go-around A management system(s) and automation as L o management Adverse-wind scenario including strong gusts and/or crosswind out of limits below DA x x x APP applicable. Design should include the EVA (not reported) element of surprise, and scenario-based Adverse-wind scenario including strong gusts and/or crosswind out of limits below 15 m x x x APP go-arounds should not be predictable and (50 ft) (not reported) anticipated. This topic is completely Lost or difficult communications resulting in no approach clearance prior to x x x APP distinct from the go-around manoeuvre commencement of approach or final descent listed in the MT section that is intended Birds: large flocks of birds below DA once visual reference has been established x x x APP only to practise psychomotor skills and a

text: simple application of the procedures. APP System malfunction, landing gear malfunction during the approach

text: CLB Flight with unreliable airspeed, which may or may not be recoverable x x x X

text: CRZ

text: DES Demonstrate manual aircraft

text: APP control skills with smoothness and

text: CLB accuracy as appropriate to the Alternate flight control modes according to malfunction characteristics x x x X

text: CRZ situation.

text: DES Detect deviations through

text: Manual APP instrument scanning. r SBT Controls the flight path through manual aircraft A CLB Maintain spare mental capacity ACAS RA requires the pilot to descend or ATC calls for immediate descent x x x L o control control CRZ during manual aircraft control. EVA DES Maintain the aircraft within the

text: APP normal flight envelope.

text: Apply knowledge of the TAWS warning when deviating from planned descent routing, requiring immediate x x x DES relationship between aircraft response

text: attitude, speed and thrust. Scenario immediately after take-off which requires an immediate and overweight x x x x TO landing

text: TO Adverse wind, crosswinds with or without strong gusts on take-off x x

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text: Adverse weather, wind shear, wind shear encounter during take-off, with or without x x x TO reactive warnings

text: TO Engine failure during initial climb, typically 30-60 m (100-200 ft) (autopilot off) x x x x

text: Wind shear encounter scenario during cruise, significant and rapid change in wind speed x x x x x CRZ or down/updrafts, without wind shear warning

text: Adverse weather, wind shear, wind shear encounter with or without warning during x x x x APP approach

text: Adverse weather, deterioration in visibility or cloud base, or adverse wind, requiring a x x x x x x x APP go-around from visual circling approach, during the visual segment

text: APP Interception of the glide slope from above (correlation with unstable approach training) x x x

text: APP Adverse wind, crosswinds with or without strong gusts on approach, final approach and x x x

text: LDG landing (within and beyond limits)

text: Adverse weather, adverse wind, approach and landing in demanding weather x x x APP conditions, e.g. turbulence, up and downdrafts, gusts and crosswinds including shifting LDG r SBT wind directions

text: APP Circling approach manually flown at night in minimum in-flight visibility to ensure L o X X X X LDG ground reference, minimum environmental lighting and no glide slope guidance lights

text: EVA APP Runway incursion during approach, which can be triggered by ATC at various altitudes x x x

text: LDG or by visual contact during the landing phase

text: LDG Adverse wind, visibility, type-specific, special consideration for long-bodied aircraft, x x x x

text: landing in minimum visibility for visual reference, with crosswind

text: LDG System malfunction, auto flight failure at DA during a low-visibility approach requiring x x x x

text: a go-around flown manually

text: APP Approach planned with autoland, followed by a failure below 1 000 ft requiring a x x x x

text: LDG manual go-around and an immediate landing due to fuel shortage

text: TO In-seat instruction: x x x x

text: Insufficient engine failure recovery, forcing the pilot monitoring to take over the flight

text: controls

text: APP In-seat instruction: x x x x

text: LDG Unstable approach on short final or long landing, forcing the pilot monitoring to take

text: over the flight controls

text: ALL The scenarios should be realistic and Deviations from the flight path, in pitch attitude, speed, altitude, bank angle x x Recognise mismanaged aircraft relevant, and should be used for the In-seat instruction: x x state. purpose of demonstration and Simple automation errors (e.g. incorrect mode selection, attempted engagement Observe the pilot’s behaviour: how ALL reinforcement of effective monitoring. without the necessary conditions, entering wrong altitude or speed, failure to execute the pilot is mitigating errors, the desired mode) culminating in a need for direct intervention from the pilot performing cross-checking, Monitoring, Modules in the FSTD should be treated like monitoring, and where necessary taking control. monitoring performance and cross- those in an aircraft so that trainees have In-seat instruction: x x x x dealing with a mismanaged aircraft checking, APP the opportunity to develop the Unstable approach or speed/path/vertical rate not congruent with the required state r SBT state, in order to ensure that error A competency with the practice of the right for the given flight condition L o observed deviations, errors and management, techniques and attitudes related to these x x x EVA mistakes are taken as learning mismanaged topics through pilot performance, and that opportunities throughout the aircraft state instructors have the opportunity to assess In-seat instruction: programme. and train these topics in a realistic Demonstration exercise — recovery from bounced landing, adverse wind, strong gusts LDG Monitor flight path excursions. environment. As shown by the EBT data during landing phase, resulting in a bounce and necessitating recovery action from the Detect errors and threats through report, these topics are of key importance pilot monitoring proper cross-checking to improve safety in operations. performance.

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text: In addition, the operator may also use Make appropriate interventions these topics to develop scripted role- either verbally or by taking control playing scenarios in the form of ISI. These if applicable. scenarios cater for the need to monitor Take appropriate action if flight path excursions from the instructor necessary. pilot (PF), detect errors and make Restore the desired aircraft state. appropriate interventions, either verbally Identify and manage or by taking control as applicable. consequences. Demonstration scenarios may also be used. Demonstrated role-play should contain realistic and not gross errors, leading at times to a mismanaged aircraft state, which can also be combined with upset management training.

text: DES ATC or terrain-related environment creating a high-energy descent with the need to x x x APP capture the optimum profile to complete the approach in a stabilised configuration Reinforce stabilised approach philosophy DES ATC or terrain-related environment creating a high-energy descent leading to unstable x x x and adherence to defined parameters. APP conditions and requiring a go-around Unstable Encourage go-arounds when crews are A Approach and landing in demanding weather conditions, e.g. turbulence, up and x x x approach APP outside these parameters. Develop and downdrafts, gusts and crosswinds including shifting wind directions sustain competencies related to the APP Increasing tailwind on final approach (not reported) x x x x management of high-energy situations. APP Crosswinds with or without strong gusts on approach, final approach and landing x x x LDG (within and beyond limits)

text: Section 5 — UPRT training topic with frequency (B). Evaluation phase, manoeuvres training phase or scenario-based training phase (EVAL, MT or SBT)

text: Compliance with AMC1 or AMC2 to See Table 1 of AMC1 ORO.FC.220&230: Elements and respective components of upset Intentionally blank N/A ORO.FC.220&230 prevention training.

text: Include upset prevention elements in Demonstration of the defined normal flight envelope and any associated changes in X x x Table 1 for the recurrent training flight instruments, flight director systems, and protection systems. This should take CRZ programme in at least every cycle, such the form of an instructor-led exercise to show the crew the points beyond which an that all the elements are covered over a upset condition could exist. Early recognition and prevention of TO period not exceeding 3 years. The Severe wind shear or wake turbulence during take-off or approach x x x x upset conditions. r SBT APP elements are numbered with letters from

text: T o Upset prevention CRZ A to I in Table 1 of AMC1 As applicable and relevant to the aircraft type, demonstration at a suitable intermediate X x x B When the differences between LHS M training ORO.FC.220&230. Each element is made level, with turbulence as appropriate; practise steep turns and note the relationship L, and RHS are not significant in the up of several numbered components. between bank angle, pitch and stalling speed. handling of the aircraft, UPRT may EVA CRZ According to the principles of EBT, At the maximum cruise flight level for the current aircraft weight, turbulence to trigger X x x x be conducted in either seat. covering one component should satisfy overspeed conditions (if FSTD capability exists, consider use of the vertical wind the requirement to cover the whole component to add realism). CRZ element of recognising and preventing At the maximum cruise flight level for the current aircraft weight, turbulence and X x x X the development of upset conditions. significant temperature rise to trigger low-speed conditions (if FSTD capability exists,

text: consider use of the vertical wind component to add realism). CRZ High-altitude TCAS RA (where the RA is required to be flown in manual flight) x x x x

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text: Issue 2, Amendment 17 cy se n a o Description (includes type of h ti Desired outcome Assessment and en a Guidance material (GM) u t p topic, being threat, error or (includes performance criteria training topic h iv Example scenario elements eq ct focus) OR training outcome) Fr ig a M W O

text: Fl O LM N PRO C FPA FPM LTW PSD SA W K

text: Section 6 — Training topics with frequency (B) in alphabetical order. Evaluation phase or scenario-based training phase (EVAL or SBT)

text: TO Take-off with different crosswind/tailwind/gust conditions x x

text: TO Take-off with unreported tailwind x x

text: TO Crosswinds with or without strong gusts on take-off x x

text: APP Wind exceeding limits on final approach (not reported) x x x x

text: APP Wind exceeding limits on final approach (reported) in manual aircraft control x x x x Recognise adverse-wind APP Increasing tailwind on final approach (not reported) x x x x conditions. Adverse wind/crosswind. This Approach and landing in demanding weather conditions, e.g. turbulence, up and x x x r SBT APP Observe limitations. Adverse wind B includes tailwind but not ATC mis- downdrafts, gusts and crosswind including shifting wind directions L o Apply the appropriate procedures. APP reporting of the actual wind. Adverse-wind scenario resulting in increasing tailwind below DA (not reported) x x x EVA Maintain directional control and safe flight path. Adverse-wind scenario including strong gusts and/or crosswind out of limits below DA x x x APP (not reported)

text: Adverse-wind scenario including strong gusts and/or crosswind out of limits below x x x APP 15 m (50 ft) (not reported)

text: APP Crosswind with or without strong gusts on approach, final approach and landing x x x

text: LDG (within and beyond limits)

text: Any internal failure(s) apparent or not (i) System malfunctions that require immediate and urgent crew intervention or Intentionally blank

text: apparent to the crew decision, e.g. fire, smoke, loss of pressurisation at high altitude, failures during take-

text: off, brake failure during landing.

text: Any item cleared by the MEL but (ii) System malfunctions that require complex procedures, e.g. multiple hydraulic

text: having an impact upon flight system failures, smoke and fumes procedures, major electrical system failure.

text: operations — for instance, thrust (iii) System malfunctions that result in significant degradation of flight controls in

text: reverser locked. combination with abnormal handling characteristics, e.g. jammed flight controls, ALL certain degradation of FBW control, jammed horizontal stabiliser; flaps and/or slats

text: Malfunctions to be considered should locked; other malfunctions that result in degraded flight controls.

text: have one or more of the following (iv) System failures that require monitoring and management of the flight path using

text: characteristics: Recognise system malfunction. degraded or alternative displays, unreliable primary flight path information, unreliable

text: — Immediacy Take appropriate action including airspeed, e.g. flight with unreliable airspeed

text: — Complexity correct stop/go decision. (v) System failures that require extensive management of their consequences

text: — Degradation of aircraft control Apply the appropriate procedure (independent of operation or environment), e.g. fuel leak.

text: TO — Loss of primary instrumentation correctly. MEL items with crew operating procedures applicable during take-off x X

text: Aircraft system — Management of consequences Maintain aircraft control. Response to an additional factor that is affected by an MEL item (e.g. system failure, x x x X TO malfunctions, The operator should vary Manage consequences. runway state) r SBT including B GND malfunctions for each characteristic Malfunction during preflight preparation and prior to departure x x x L o operations under CLB over the EBT cycle. Apply crew operating procedures Malfunction after departure x x x X EVA MEL Unless specified otherwise in the where necessary. Malfunctions that require immediate attention (e.g. bleed fault during engine start, x x x ALL operational suitability data, at least Respond appropriately to hydraulic failure during taxi) CLB one malfunction with each additional system abnormalities x x x X characteristic should be included in associated with MEL dispatch. Fuel leak (management of consequences) CRZ every cycle. Combining characteristics TO Malfunction on take-off high speed below V1 x x x should not reduce the number of TO Malfunction on take-off high speed above V1 x x malfunctions below seven in each During taxi to the runway, a spurious brake temperature announcement. The crew had GND cycle. For each crew member, the X X X the correct brake temperature moments before the failure. characteristics of degraded control TO Tyre failure during take-off x x x and loss of instrumentation should be TO in the role of pilot flying and the Malfunction on initial climb x x

text: APP others may be in the role of pilot Malfunction on approach x x x

text: APP flying or pilot monitoring. Malfunction on go-around x x x

text: LDG Malfunction during landing x x x x x

text: For full details, see the malfunction

text: equivalency methodology.

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text: Issue 2, Amendment 17 se n cy a o h ti Description (includes type of Desired outcome Assessment and en a Guidance material (GM) u t p topic, being threat, error (includes performance criteria training topic h iv Example scenario elements eq ct or focus) OR training outcome) Fr ig a M W O

text: Fl O LM N PRO C FPA FPM LTW PSD SA W K

text: See ‘compliance’ topic above. There are no defined scenarios, but the instructor This is not considered as a standshould focus on learning opportunities when system management non-compliances alone topic. It is linked with the manifest themselves during other scenarios. Underpinning knowledge of systems and Intentionally blank X topic ‘compliance’. Aircraft system Normal system operation according their interactions should be developed and challenged, and not merely the application B Where a system is not managed management to defined instructions of normal procedures. according to normal or defined CRZ X x x x procedures, this is determined as a Minimum fuel, caused by extended delays, weather, etc. where the crew would need APP non-compliance. to manage a minimum fuel situation. LDG

text: APP Recognise actual conditions. Approach in poor visibility x x x x

text: Observe aircraft and/or procedural Approach in poor visibility with deteriorations necessitating a decision to perform a x x x APP Approach, limitations. go-around Any situation where visibility visibility close to B Apply the appropriate procedures x x x becomes a threat minimum if applicable. LDG Landing in poor visibility Maintain directional control and

text: safe flight path.

text: Pilots should have opportunities to

text: practise landings in demanding r SBT situations at the defined frequency. L o Data indicates that landing problems

text: EVA have their roots in a variety of factors, Landing in demanding This topic should be combined with the adverse-weather topic, aircraft system including inappropriate decision- Landing B LDG environmental conditions, with malfunctions topic or any topic that can provide exposure to a landing in demanding Intentionally blank making, in addition to manual aircraft malfunctions as appropriate conditions. control skills if difficult environmental

text: conditions exist. The purpose of this

text: item is to ensure that pilots are

text: exposed to this during the

text: programme.

text: GND x X Recognise hazardous runway Planned anticipated hazardous conditions with dispatch information provided to TO condition. facilitate planning and execution of appropriate procedures LDG Contamination or surface quality of Observe limitations. Runway or GND x x x B the runway, taxiway, or tarmac Take appropriate action. Unanticipated hazardous conditions, e.g. unexpected heavy rain resulting in flooded taxiway condition TO including foreign objects Apply the appropriate procedures runway surface LDG correctly. TO Take-off on runway with reduced cleared width due to snow x x x x Assure aircraft control. TO Stop/go decision in hazardous conditions x x x

text: The data analysed during the X X X

text: development of the EBT concept

text: indicated substantial difficulties

text: encountered by crews when faced Exposure to an unexpected event r SBT with a threat or error, which was a or sequence of events at the Surprise B TO surprise or an unexpected event. The Rejected take- off L o defined frequency in order to build element of surprise should be EVA resilience. distinguished from what is sometimes

text: referred to as the ‘startle factor’ —

text: the latter being a physiological

text: reaction. Wherever possible,

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text: consideration should be given

text: towards variations in the types of

text: scenario, times of occurrences and

text: types of occurrence, so that pilots do

text: not become overly familiar with r SBT ALL repetitions of the same scenarios. Intentionally blank L o Intentionally blank Variations should be the focus of EBT EVA programme design, and not left to

text: the discretion of individual

text: instructors, in order to preserve

text: programme integrity and fairness.

text: ALL ATC clearance giving insufficient terrain clearance x x x X Anticipate terrain threats. Demonstration of terrain avoidance warning systems (TAWS) (this scenario element ALL Prepare for terrain threats. x x x may be done in an ISI.) Recognise unsafe terrain clearance. TO Take appropriate action. Engine failure where performance is marginal leading to TAWS warning x x x CLB Terrain B Alert, warning, or conflict Apply the appropriate procedures DES correctly. ATC provides a wrong QNH x x APP Maintain aircraft control. ‘Virtual mountain’ refers to the surprise element of an unexpected warning. Care Restore safe flight path. DES should be exercised in creating a level of realism, so this can best be achieved by an X x x Manage consequences. r SBT unusual and unexpected change of route during the descent.

text: L o This is not considered a topic for

text: EVA specific attention on its own, but

text: more as a reminder to programme

text: developers to ensure that pilots are Manage available resources Workload, exposed to immersive training efficiently to prioritise and perform distraction, B ALL Intentionally blank Intentionally blank scenarios which expose them to tasks in a timely manner under all pressure, stress manageable high workload and circumstances

text: distractions during the course of the

text: EBT programme, at the defined

text: frequency.

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text: Fl O LM N PRO C FPA FPM LTW PSD SA W K

text: Section 7 — UPRT Upset recovery training topic with frequency (C). Manoeuvres training phase or scenario-based training phase (MT or SBT)

text: Compliance with AMC1 or AMC2 to The example scenario elements may be done in ISI, as non-ISI or a combination of ORO.FC.220&230 Recognise upset condition. both. If done in ISI: The instructor should position the aircraft within but close to the edge of Include the recovery exercises in Make timely and appropriate the validated training envelope before handing control to the trainee to demonstrate N/A Table 2 of AMC1 ORO.FC.220&230 for intervention. the restoration of normal flight. Careful consideration should be given to flying within Intentionally blank

text: the recurrent training programme, Take appropriate action. the validated training envelope. such that all the exercises are covered Assure timely and appropriate Table2 of AMC1 ORO.FC.220&230: Exercises for upset recovery training over a period not exceeding 3 years. intervention. (AMC1 A. Recovery from developed upsets According to the principles of EBT, ORO.FC.220&230 Table 2 Recovery from stall events in the following configurations: covering one component should component 1) satisfy the requirement to cover the — take-off configuration, whole element of recovery from Assure aircraft control. CLB developed upsets. The same Maintain or restore a safe flight — clean configuration low altitude, x x x x DES 2. r SBT Upset recovery C principles apply to the exercises of path. o components 2, 3 and 4 where one — clean configuration near maximum operating altitude, and MT exercise may satisfy the requirement Assess consequential issues. — landing configuration during the approach phase. to cover the whole component. Manage outcomes. CRZ 3. Recovery from nose high at various bank angles x x x x An aeroplane upset is defined as an CRZ x x x x undesired aeroplane state in flight Consolidate the summary of 4. Recovery from nose low at various bank angles CRZ characterised by unintentional aeroplane recovery techniques.

text: divergences from parameters (AMC1 ORO.FC.220&230 Table 2 Demonstration at a normal cruising altitude. Set conditions and disable aircraft x x x APP normally experienced during line component 5) systems as necessary to enable trainee to perform stall recovery according to OEM operations or training. An aeroplane instructions.

text: upset may involve pitch and/or bank Note: The operator should assess if Demonstration at an intermediate altitude during early stages of the approach. Set x x x CLB angle divergences as well as the exercises should be practised conditions and disable aircraft systems as necessary to enable trainee to perform stall DES inappropriate airspeeds for the for the either seat qualification. recovery according to OEM instructions.

text: conditions. Recovery from a wake turbulence position with high-bank angle x x x x

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text: Issue 2, Amendment 17 cy se n a o Description (includes type of h ti Desired outcome Assessment and en a Guidance material (GM) u t p topic, being threat, error (includes performance criteria training topic h iv Example scenario elements eq ct or focus) OR training outcome) M O Fr ig a W LM Fl O N

text: PRO C FPA FPM LTW PSD SA W K

text: Section 8 — Training topics with frequency (C) in alphabetical order. Evaluation phase or scenario-based training phase (EVAL or SBT)

text: ATC role-play: the instructor provides scripted instructions, as a distraction to the x x x ALL ATC error. Omission, crew ALL Respond to communications Controller error, provided by the instructor according to a defined scripted scenario x x x x miscommunication, garbled, poor appropriately. ALL quality transmission. All these act as Frequency congestion, with multiple aircraft using the same frequency x Recognise, clarify and resolve any APP distractions to be managed by the Destination temporarily closed x x x x r SBT ambiguities. ATC C CRZ crew. The scenarios should be Rescue and firefighting services (RFFS) level reduction at destination x x x L o Refuse or question unsafe combined, where possible, with Runway change before the interception of the localiser or similar navigation aid in x x x x EVA APP instructions. others of the same or higher azimuth Use standard phraseology GND weighting, the principal reason being x x x whenever possible. Stray dogs at the opposite threshold runway TO to create distractions.

text: ALL Poor quality transmissions x

text: TO Any engine failure or malfunction, Engine failure or engine malfunction on take-off low speed x x x x

text: TO which causes loss or degradation of Engine failure or engine malfunction on take-off high speed below V1 x x x x Recognise engine failure. TO thrust that affects performance. This Engine failure or engine malfunction on take-off above V1 x x x x Take appropriate action. TO is distinct from the engine-out Engine failure or engine malfunction on initial climb x x x r SBT Apply the appropriate procedure Engine failure C APP manoeuvres described in the MT Engine malfunction x x x L o correctly. CRZ section above, which are intended Engine failure in cruise (with autopilot) x x x EVA Maintain aircraft control. only to practise psychomotor skills Multiple engine failure in CRZ (volcanic ash, recoverable). Competency FPM may or x x x x CRZ Manage consequences. and reinforce procedures to manage may not be included depending on the impact on the automation.

text: LDG engine failures. Engine failure or engine malfunction on landing x

text: GND Fire in cargo or cabin/cockpit at gate x x x x

text: GND Fire during taxi x x x x X

text: GND Fire with no cockpit indication x x x x X

text: TO Take-off low speed x x x x X

text: TO Fire or smoke on take-off high speed below V1 x x x x Recognise fire, smoke or fumes TO Fire or smoke on take-off high speed above V1 x x x Take appropriate action. TO This includes engine, electric, Fire or smoke on initial climb x x x r SBT Fire and smoke Apply the appropriate procedure C CRZ pneumatic, cargo fire, smoke or Cargo compartment fire or avionics compartment fire x x x L o management correctly. APP fumes. Engine fire in approach (extinguishable) x x EVA Maintain aircraft control. APP Manage consequences. Engine fire in approach (non-extinguishable) x x x

text: CLB

text: CRZ Lithium battery fire in the cockpit or cabin compartment x x x x x

text: DES

text: APP Flight deck or cabin fire x x x X

text: GND Any of the example scenario elements above ending in an evacuation x x x x

text: GND Recognise loss of communications. Loss of communications during ground manoeuvring x x

text: TO Lost or difficult communications due Take appropriate action. Loss of communications after take-off x x X

text: to either pilot mis-selection or a Execute the appropriate procedure x x x x X Loss of C failure external to the aircraft. This as applicable. communications APP could be for a few seconds or a total Use alternative ways to Loss of communications during approach phase, including go-around

text: loss. communicate.

text: Manage consequences.

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text: Issue 2, Amendment 17 se cy a n Description (includes type of Desired outcome Assessment and h o Guidance material (GM) en ti topic, being threat, error (includes performance criteria training topic u t p a Example scenario elements h iv or focus) OR training outcome)

text: eq ig M W LM O

text: ct O N

text: Fr Fl a PRO C FPA FPM LTW PSD SA W K

text: This can be a demonstrated error, in that the crew may be instructed to deliberately x x x

text: insert incorrect data — for example, to take off from an intersection with full-length

text: ALL performance information. The crew will be asked to intervene when acceleration is

text: Anticipate the potential for errors sensed to be lower than normal, and this may be part of the operator procedures,

text: in load/fuel/performance data. especially when operating mixed fleets with considerable variations in MTOM.

text: A calculation error by one or more Recognise inconsistencies. Wind report with take-off clearance not consistent with prior performance calculation. x x x x Managing TO pilots, or someone involved with the Manage/avoid distractions. ATC, cabin crew or other people are pushing crew to take off quickly. r SBT loading, fuel, C process, or the process itself, e.g. Make changes to Environmental change during taxi (e.g. heavy rain) not consistent with prior take-off x x L o performance GND incorrect information on the load paperwork/aircraft system(s) to performance calculation EVA errors sheet eliminate error. Fuel ground staff on industrial action. Only limited amount of fuel available, which is x x x x GND Identify and manage below the calculated fuel for the flight.

text: consequences. Advise crew that there is a change of the load sheet figures during taxi to the runway. x x GND The crew may have limited time due to a calculated take-off time (CTOT) — ATC Slot.

text: Braking action reported ‘medium’. The information is transmitted just before take-off. x x x GND The flight is subject to a CTOT — ATC slot.

text: x x x x External failure or a combination of external failures degrading aircraft navigation GND performance on ground

text: TO x x x x

text: CLB External failure or a combination of external failures degrading aircraft navigation

text: APP performance in flight Recognise a NAV degradation. LDG Take appropriate action. External NAV failure. Standard initial departure change during taxi. The flight may be subject to a CTOT — GND Execute the appropriate procedure x x x Navigation C Loss of GPS satellite, ANP exceeding ATC slot. as applicable. APP RNP, loss of external NAV source(s) Loss of runway lighting below decision height x x x Use alternative NAV guidance. No fly zone: when the crew changes control frequency, the new ATCO informs the crew Manage consequences. that they are flying over an unannounced ‘no fly zone’ that is not included in the

text: NOTAMs. (To trigger such an event, the context may be as follows: an unexpected

text: CRZ military conflict in the territory the aircraft is flying over or the crew is forced to re-route x x x

text: in flight and the new route flies over a city that has an important event such the Olympic

text: games, a G20/G7 submit, or the route is flying near a space rocket launch close to the

text: r SBT time of the launch, like the Guiana Space Centre, Cape Cañaveral, etc.).

text: L o Operations- or C ALL Intentionally blank Intentionally blank Intentionally blank Intentionally blank type-specific EVA The operator should comply with

text: Operations of the national qualification APP See equivalency of approaches special airport C requirements published in the Intentionally blank Intentionally blank LDG relevant to operations. approval aeronautical information

text: publication (AIP).

text: Recognise incapacitation.

text: TO Take appropriate action including During take-off x x x x X

text: correct stop/go decision. Pilot Consequences for the non- C Apply the appropriate procedure incapacitation incapacitated pilot correctly. APP During approach x x x X Maintain aircraft control.

text: Manage consequences.

text: Anticipate potential loss of CLB Traffic conflict. ACAS RA or TA, or separation. Traffic C CRZ visual observation of conflict, which ACAS warning that requires crew intervention x x x x Recognise loss of separation. DES requires evasive manoeuvring Take appropriate action.

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text: Apply the appropriate procedure correctly. Maintain aircraft control. Manage consequences. TO Anticipate potential for wind shear. Predictive wind shear warning during take-off x x TO Avoid known wind shear or Wind shear encounter during take-off x x x TO prepare for suspected wind shear. Wind shear encounter after rotation x x TO Recognise wind shear encounter. Predictive wind shear after rotation x x APP Take appropriate action. Predictive wind shear during approach x x x With or without warnings including APP Apply the appropriate procedure Wind shear encounter during go-around x x x x predictive. A wind shear scenario is Wind shear correctly. C ideally combined with an adverserecovery Assure aircraft control. weather scenario containing other Recognise out of wind shear elements. condition. APP Maintain or restore a safe flight Wind shear encounter during approach x x x path. Assess consequential issues and manage outcomes.

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text: AMC3 ORO.FC.232 EBT programme assessment and training topics

text: GENERATION 3 (JET) — TABLE OF ASSESSMENT AND TRAINING TOPICS

text: se cy Desired outcome a n Assessment and Description (includes type of topic, h o Guidance material (GM) en ti u (includes performance criteria OR t p a training topic being threat, error or focus) h iv Example scenario elements eq training outcome) ig ct Fr Fl a M W LM O

text: O N PRO C FPA FPM LTW PSD SA W K

text: Generation 3 Jet — Recurrent assessment and training matrix Competency map

text: Engine failure after the application of

text: (CAT I or above)

text: Failure of the critical engine from V1 The manoeuvre is complete at a point when the aircraft is stabilised at normal engine-out Failure of the critical and before reaching V2 in the lowest climb speed with the correct pitch and lateral control, in trim condition and, as applicable, engine between V1 A TO x x CAT I visibility or in LVO meteorological autopilot engagement. Only one failure of the critical engine between V1 and V2 a year and V2 (MET) conditions. may be done in LVO conditions.

text: During flare/rejected landing x x x

text: Pilot qualification to

text: pilot’s seat

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text: Issue 2, Amendment 17 se a n Desired outcome h o Assessment and cy Description (includes type of topic, being ti Guidance material (GM) M W O (includes performance criteria OR t p a O LM N training topic en threat, error or focus) h Example scenario elements PRO C FPA FPM LTW PSD SA W K u training outcome) iv ig ct eq Fl a Fr Generation 3 Jet — Recurrent assessment and training matrix Competency map

text: See equivalency of approaches Approach type A or B Approach type A or B flight method 3D relevant to operations that place an APP See equivalency of approaches relevant to operations X X X X X B additional demand on a proficient crew

text: MT See equivalency of approaches Approach type A B Approach type A flight method 2D APP See equivalency of approaches relevant to operations relevant to operations that place an X X X X X

text: additional demand on a proficient crew

text: See equivalency of approaches

text: Approach type A B Approach type A flight method 3D or 2D relevant to operations that place an APP See equivalency of approaches relevant to operations X X X X X

text: r SBT additional demand on a proficient crew

text: L o See equivalency of approaches APP EVA Approach type B B Approach type B flight method 3D relevant to operations that place an See equivalency of approaches relevant to operations X X X X X

text: additional demand on a proficient crew

text: See equivalency of approaches

text: SPA approach(es) B Approach requiring specific approval relevant to operations — specific APP Approaches flown from FAF to landing or go-around x x x

text: MT approval

text: See equivalency of approaches r SBT SPA approach(es) B Approach requiring specific approval relevant to operations — specific APP Approaches flown from FAF to landing or go-around x x x L o approval

text: EVA

text: Engine failure after the application of take-off thrust and

text: before reaching V1 (in low-visibility MET conditions,

text: preferably in the lowest approved visibility) Demonstrate manual aircraft control Low-visibility RTO is not required under Part SPA but skills with smoothness and accuracy as RTO — can be combined with the assessment and training topic ‘surprise’ in SPA Rejected take- instead in Appendix 9 Section 6. B appropriate to the situation. TO EVAL or SBT X X r SBT off (RTO) Detect deviations through instrument T o Note: AMC1 SPA.LVO.120 point (f) does not require a scanning. M low-visibility RTO. L, Maintain spare mental capacity during RTO is required only in the initial LVO course (point manual aircraft control. EVA (g)(1)(iii) of AMC1 SPA.LVO.120). Maintain the aircraft within the flight

text: envelope. Notwithstanding AMC1 SPA.LVO120 point (f)(1) Apply knowledge of the relationship r SBT The manoeuvre is complete at a point when the aircraft is stabilised at normal between aircraft attitude, speed and T o AMC1 SPA.LVO.120 requires SPA manoeuvres in the LVTO B thrust. TO climb speed with the correct pitch and lateral control, in trim condition and, as x x M frequency of the OPC, as OPC is substituted in the EBT L, applicable, autopilot engagement. programme. Thus, the frequency in EBT is determined in

text: EVA every cycle (B).

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text: Low visibility take-off, preferably in the lowest approved visibility

text: cy se n a o Description (includes type of Desired outcome Assessment and en h ti Guidance material (GM) u a topic, being threat, error (includes performance criteria t p iv training topic eq h Example scenario elements ig ct or focus) OR training outcome) Fr a

text: Section 4 — Training topics with frequency (A) in alphabetical order. Evaluation phase or scenario-based training phase (EVAL or SBT). GND Predictive wind shear warning before take-off, as applicable x x x ALL Adverse-weather scenario, e.g. thunderstorm activity, precipitation, icing x x x x TO Wind shear encounter during take-off, not predictive x x x X TO Predictive wind shear warning during take-off x x x x TO Crosswinds with or without strong gusts on take-off x x CRZ Turbulence that increases to severe turbulence x x x x CRZ Wind shear encounter scenario during cruise x x x x x APP Anticipate adverse weather. Reactive wind shear warning during approach or go-around x x x x Thunderstorm, heavy rain, APP Prepare for suspected adverse Predictive wind shear warning during approach or go-around x x x x turbulence, ice build-up to include de- APP weather. Thunderstorm encounter during approach or on missed approach x x x icing issues, as well as highr SBT APP Recognise adverse weather. Increasing tailwind on final approach (not reported) x x x x Adverse weather A temperature conditions. L o APP Take appropriate action. Approach and landing in demanding weather conditions, e.g. turbulence, up and x x x The proper use of anti-ice and de- EVA Apply the appropriate procedure downdrafts, gusts and crosswinds including shifting wind directions icing systems should be included APP correctly. Non-precision approach in cold-temperature conditions, requiring altitude x x x generally in appropriate scenarios. Assure aircraft control. compensation for temperature, as applicable to the type APP Crosswinds with or without strong gusts on approach, final approach and landing x x x LDG (within and beyond limits) In approach, unexpected braking action ‘good to medium’ reported by the preceding x x x x APP aircraft APP Moderate to severe icing conditions during approach effecting aircraft performance x x x x APP Reduced visibility even after acquiring the necessary visual reference during approach, x x x due to rain or fog CLB Know how and when to use the ACAS warning, recovery and subsequent engagement of automation x x CRZ The purpose of this topic is to flight management system(s), DES encourage and develop effective guidance and automation. APP flight path management through Demonstrate correct methods for ALL proficient and appropriate use of the engagement and disengagement of FMS tactical programming issues, e.g. step climb, runway changes, late clearances, x x X flight management system(s), the auto flight system(s). destination re-programming, executing diversion CLB guidance and automation, including Demonstrate appropriate use of Recoveries from TAWS, management of energy state to restore automated flight x x x CRZ transitions between modes, flight guidance, auto thrust and DES monitoring, mode awareness, other automation systems. r SBT Automation A APP vigilance and flexibility needed to Maintain mode awareness of the L o management CLB change from one mode to another. auto flight system(s), including Amendments to ATC cleared levels during altitude capture modes to force mode x x x EVA CRZ The means of mitigating errors are engagement and automatic awareness and intervention DES included in this topic. The errors are transitions. APP described as mishandled auto flight Revert to different modes when TO systems, inappropriate mode appropriate. Late ATC clearance to an altitude below acceleration altitude x x x TO selection, mishandled flight Detect deviations from the desired Engine-out special terrain procedures x x x APP management system(s) and aircraft state (flight path, speed, CRZ inappropriate autopilot usage. attitude, thrust, etc.) and take Forcing autopilot disconnect followed by re-engagement, recovery from low- or high- x x x x appropriate action. speed events in cruise

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text: Issue 2, Amendment 17 se n cy a o Description (includes type of Desired outcome Assessment and en h ti Guidance material (GM) u a topic, being threat, error (includes performance criteria t p iv training topic eq h Example scenario elements ig ct or focus) OR training outcome) Fr a

text: CLB Engine failure during or after initial climb using automation x x

text: CRZ Anticipate mishandled auto flight Engine failure in cruise to onset of descent using automation x x

text: CRZ system. Emergency descent x x X

text: DES Recognise mishandled auto flight Managing high-energy descent capturing descent path from above (correlation with x x x X

text: APP system. unstable approach training)

text: APP Take appropriate action if No ATC clearance received prior to commencement of approach or final descent x x x

text: APP necessary. Reactive wind shear and recovery from the consequent high-energy state x x x

text: APP Restore correct auto flight state. Automation fail to capture the approach altitude in descent (e.g. last altitude before the x x x x

text: Identify and manage FAP). Ideally, the failure occurs when the workload is high (e.g. configuration of the

text: consequences. aircraft for final approach).

text: automation

text: malfunction on the automation.

text: flight management system.

text: Demonstrate: CRZ Important water leak in an aircraft galley x x x x — effective use of language; This encapsulates the general CRM ALL — responsiveness to feedback; A relevant number of cabin crew are wounded or incapacitated. Additionally, the principles and objectives. It includes r SBT and cabin crew wounded or incapacitated are the most competent (e.g. senior cabin crew x x x communication; leadership and L o — capability to state the plans member). teamwork; problem-solving and EVA ALL and resolve ambiguities. Unruly passenger(s) x x decision-making; situation awareness GND Leadership and teamwork: and management of information; and Passenger oxygen: passenger service unit open and mask falling down x x x Competencies — Use appropriate authority to ALL workload management. non-technical A ensure focus on the task. Support Passenger with medical problems — medical emergency x x

text: (CRM) CRZ others in completing tasks. Emphasis should be placed on the Credible threat reported to the crew. Stowaway or fugitive on board. x x x x Problem-solving and decision- GND development of leadership, shown by No METAR or TAFOR is available for destination due to industrial action at the making: x x x x EBT data sources to be a highly destination airport. Detect deviations from the desired CRZ effective competency in mitigating Credible bomb threat reported to crew x x x x state, evaluate problems, identify risk and improving safety through the risk, consider alternatives and pilot performance. CLB select the best course of action. Credible bomb threat or pressurisation problem, but no quick landing possible (due to x x x x

text: DES Continuously review progress and weather, terrain or other reasons)

text: APP adjust plans. Diversion with low remaining fuel or increased fuel flow due to system malfunction x x x x

text: Situation awareness and r SBT management of information: L o APP ACAS warning immediately following a go-around, with a descent manoeuvre required x x x x X Have an awareness of the aircraft

text: EVA state in its environment; project

text: and anticipate changes.

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text: Workload management: Prioritise, delegate and receive assistance to maximise focus on the task. Continuously monitor the flight progress. Compliance failure. Consequences of Recognise that a compliance failure The following are examples of potential compliance failures and are not intended to be not complying with operating has occurred. developed as scenarios as part of an EBT mod: instructions (e.g. SOPs). Make a verbal announcement. This is not intended to list example Take appropriate action if 5. 1. Requesting flap beyond limit speed scenario elements, but instructors necessary. should ensure that observed non- Restore safe flight path if necessary. 2. Flaps or slats in the wrong position for phase of flight or approach r SBT compliances are taken as learning Manage consequences. Compliance A ALL Intentionally blank L o opportunities throughout the 3. Omitting an action as part of a procedure programme. In all modules of the EVA programme, the FSTD should as far as 4. Failing to initiate or complete a checklist possible be treated like an aircraft, and non-compliances should not be 5. Using the wrong checklist for the situation accepted simply for expediency.

text: APP Any threat or error that can result in Adverse-weather scenario leading to a reactive wind shear warning during approach x x x x circumstances that require a decision to perform a go-around, in addition to Adverse-weather scenario leading to a predictive wind shear warning during approach x x x x APP the execution of the go-around. Go- or go-around around scenarios should be fully Adverse-weather scenario, e.g. thunderstorm activity, heavy precipitation or icing x x x x APP developed to encourage effective forcing decision at or close to DA/MDA leadership and teamwork, in addition DA with visual reference in heavy precipitation with doubt about the runway surface x x x x APP to problem-solving and decision- braking capability APP making, plus execution using manual Adverse-wind scenario resulting in increasing tailwind below DA (not reported) x x x aircraft control or the flight r SBT Go-around Adverse-wind scenario including strong gusts and/or crosswind out of limits below DA x x x A APP management system(s) and L o management (not reported) automation as applicable. Design Adverse-wind scenario including strong gusts and/or crosswind out of limits below 15 m x x x EVA APP should include the element of (50 ft) (not reported) surprise, and scenario-based go- Lost or difficult communications resulting in no approach clearance prior to x x x APP arounds should not be predictable and commencement of approach or final descent anticipated. This topic is completely Birds: large flocks of birds below DA once visual reference has been established x x x APP distinct from the go-around manoeuvre listed in the MT section that is intended only to practise System malfunction, landing gear malfunction during the approach APP psychomotor skills and a simple application of the procedures. CLB Demonstrate manual aircraft Flight with unreliable airspeed, which may or may not be recoverable x x x X CRZ control skills with smoothness and DES accuracy as appropriate to the r SBT Manual aircraft APP Controls the flight path through situation. A L o control CLB manual control Detect deviations through Alternate flight control modes according to malfunction characteristics x x x X EVA CRZ instrument scanning. DES Maintain spare mental capacity APP during manual aircraft control.

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text: CLB Maintain the aircraft within the ACAS RA requires the pilot to descend or ATC calls for immediate descent x x x CRZ normal flight envelope. DES Apply knowledge of the APP relationship between aircraft attitude, speed and thrust. TAWS warning when deviating from planned descent routing, requiring immediate x x x DES response Scenario immediately after take-off which requires an immediate and overweight x x x x TO landing TO Adverse wind, crosswinds with or without strong gusts on take-off x x Adverse weather, wind shear, wind shear encounter during take-off, with or without x x x TO reactive warnings TO Engine failure during initial climb, typically 30-60 m (100-200 ft) (autopilot off) x x x x Wind shear encounter scenario during cruise, significant and rapid change in wind speed x x x x x CRZ or down/updrafts, without wind shear warning Adverse weather, wind shear, wind shear encounter with or without warning during x x x x APP approach Adverse weather, deterioration in visibility or cloud base, or adverse wind, requiring a x x x x x x x APP go-around from visual circling approach, during the visual segment APP Interception of the glide slope from above (correlation with unstable approach training) x x x APP Adverse wind, crosswinds with or without strong gusts on approach, final approach and x x x LDG landing (within and beyond limits) Adverse weather, adverse wind, approach and landing in demanding weather x x x APP conditions, e.g. turbulence, up and downdrafts, gusts and crosswinds including shifting r SBT LDG wind directions L o APP Circling approach manually flown at night in minimum in-flight visibility to ensure X X X X EVA LDG ground reference, minimum environmental lighting and no glide slope guidance lights APP Runway incursion during approach, which can be triggered by ATC at various altitudes x x x LDG or by visual contact during the landing phase LDG Adverse wind, visibility, type-specific, special consideration for long-bodied aircraft, x x x x landing in minimum visibility for visual reference, with crosswind LDG System malfunction, auto flight failure at DA during a low-visibility approach requiring x x x x a go-around flown manually APP Approach planned autoland, followed by a failure below 1 000 ft requiring a manual go- x x x x LDG around and an immediate landing due to fuel shortage

text: TO In-seat instruction: x x x x Insufficient engine failure recovery, forcing the pilot monitoring to take over the flight controls APP In-seat instruction: x x x x LDG Unstable approach on short final or long landing, forcing the pilot monitoring to take over the flight controls

text: Monitoring, ALL The scenarios should be realistic and Recognise mismanaged aircraft Deviations from the flight path, in pitch attitude, speed, altitude, bank angle x x cross-checking, relevant, and should be used for the state. In-seat instruction: x x r SBT error purpose of demonstration and Observe the pilot’s behaviour: how Simple automation errors (e.g. incorrect mode selection, attempted engagement A L o management, ALL reinforcement of effective monitoring. the pilot is mitigating errors, without the necessary conditions, entering wrong altitude or speed, failure to execute EVA mismanaged performing cross-checking, the desired mode) culminating in a need for direct intervention from the pilot aircraft state monitoring performance and monitoring, and where necessary taking control.

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text: Modules in the FSTD should be treated dealing with a mismanaged aircraft In-seat instruction: x x x x APP like those in an aircraft so that trainees state, in order to ensure that Unstable approach or speed/path/vertical rate not congruent with the required state have the opportunity to develop the observed deviations, errors and for the given flight condition competency with the practice of the mistakes are taken as learning x x x right techniques and attitudes related opportunities throughout the to these topics through pilot programme. performance, and that instructors Monitor flight path excursions. have the opportunity to assess and Detect errors and threats through train these topics in a realistic proper cross-checking environment. As shown by the EBT performance. data report, these topics are of key Make appropriate interventions importance to improve safety in either verbally or by taking control operations. if applicable. Take appropriate action if In addition, the operator may also use necessary. In-seat instruction: these topics to develop scripted role- Restore the desired aircraft state. Demonstration exercise — recovery from bounced landing, adverse wind, strong gusts LDG playing scenarios in the form of ISI. Identify and manage during landing phase, resulting in a bounce and necessitating recovery action from the These scenarios cater for the need to consequences. pilot monitoring monitor flight path excursions from the instructor pilot (PF), detect errors and make appropriate interventions, either verbally or by taking control as applicable. Demonstration scenarios may also be used. Demonstrated roleplay should contain realistic and not gross errors, leading at times to a mismanaged aircraft state, which can also be combined with upset management training. DES ATC or terrain-related environment creating a high-energy descent with the need to x x x Reinforce stabilised approach APP capture the optimum profile to complete the approach in a stabilised configuration philosophy and adherence to defined DES ATC or terrain-related environment creating a high-energy descent leading to unstable x x x parameters. Encourage go-arounds APP conditions and requiring a go-around Unstable when crews are outside these A Approach and landing in demanding weather conditions, e.g. turbulence, up and x x x approach APP parameters. Develop and sustain downdrafts, gusts and crosswinds including shifting wind directions competencies related to the APP Increasing tailwind on final approach (not reported) x x x x management of high-energy APP situations. Crosswinds with or without strong gusts on approach, final approach and landing x x x LDG (within and beyond limits)

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text: Issue 2, Amendment 17 cy se n a o Description (includes type of h ti Desired outcome Assessment and en a Guidance material (GM) u t p topic, being threat, error (includes performance criteria training topic h iv Example scenario elements eq ct or focus) OR training outcome) Fr ig a M W O

text: Fl O LM N PRO C FPA FPM LTW PSD SA W K

text: See Table 1 of AMC1 ORO.FC.220&230: Elements and respective components of upset N/A Compliance with AMC1 or AMC2 to Intentionally blank prevention training. ORO.FC.220&230 Demonstration of the defined normal flight envelope and any associated changes in x x x

text: Include upset prevention elements in flight instruments, flight director systems, and protection systems. This should take

text: CRZ Table 1 for the recurrent training the form of an instructor-led exercise to show the crew the points beyond which an programme in at least every cycle, upset condition could exist.

text: such that all the elements are TO Early recognition and prevention of Severe wind shear or wake turbulence during take-off or approach x x x x covered over a period not exceeding APP upset conditions. r SBT 3 years. The elements are numbered CRZ As applicable and relevant to the aircraft type, demonstration at a suitable intermediate x x x T o Upset prevention with letters from A to I in Table 1 of B When the differences between LHS level, with turbulence as appropriate; practise steep turns and note the relationship M training AMC1 ORO.FC.220&230. Each L, and RHS are not significant in the between bank angle, pitch and stalling speed element is made up of several CRZ handling of the aircraft, UPRT may At the maximum cruise flight level for the current aircraft weight, turbulence to trigger x x x x EVA numbered components. be conducted in either seat. overspeed conditions (if FSTD capability exists, consider use of the vertical wind According to the principles of EBT, component to add realism) covering one component should CRZ At the maximum cruise flight level for the current aircraft weight, turbulence and x x x X satisfy the requirement to cover the significant temperature rise to trigger low-speed conditions (if FSTD capability exists, whole element of recognising and consider use of the vertical wind component to add realism) preventing the development of upset CRZ conditions. High-altitude loss of reliable airspeed x x x x x

text: CRZ High-altitude TCAS RA (where the RA is required to be flown in manual flight) x x x x

text: LDG (within and beyond limits)

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text: Any internal failure(s) apparent or not (i) System malfunctions that require immediate and urgent crew intervention or

text: off, brake failure during landing.

text: reverser locked. combination with abnormal handling characteristics, e.g. jammed flight controls, ALL Intentionally blank certain degradation of FBW control, jammed horizontal stabiliser; flaps and/or slats

text: characteristics: degraded or alternative displays, unreliable primary flight path information, unreliable Recognise system malfunction. — Immediacy airspeed, e.g. flight with unreliable airspeed Take appropriate action including — Complexity (v) System failures that require extensive management of their consequences correct stop/go decision. — Degradation of aircraft control (independent of operation or environment), e.g. fuel leak. Apply the appropriate procedure TO — Loss of primary instrumentation MEL items with crew operating procedures applicable during take-off x X correctly. — Management of consequences Response to an additional factor that is affected by an MEL item (e.g. system failure, x x x X Aircraft system TO Maintain aircraft control. The operator should vary runway state) r SBT malfunctions, Manage consequences. GND malfunctions for each characteristic Malfunction during preflight preparation and prior to departure x x x L o including B CLB over the EBT cycle. Malfunction after departure x x x X operations under Apply crew operating procedures Unless specified otherwise in the Malfunctions that require immediate attention (e.g. bleed fault during engine start, x x x EVA MEL ALL where necessary. operational suitability data, at least hydraulic failure during taxi) Respond appropriately to CLB one malfunction with each x x x X additional system abnormalities Fuel leak (management of consequences) CRZ characteristic should be included in associated with MEL dispatch. every cycle. Combining characteristics TO Malfunction on take-off high speed below V1 x x x should not reduce the number of TO Malfunction on take-off high speed above V1 x x malfunctions below seven for each During taxi to the runway, a spurious brake temperature announcement. The crew had GND cycle. For each crew member, the X X X the correct brake temperature moments before the failure. characteristics of degraded control TO Tyre failure during take-off x x x and loss of instrumentation should be TO in the role of pilot flying and the Malfunction on initial climb x x

text: For full details, see the malfunction

text: equivalency methodology.

text: See ‘compliance’ topic above. There are no defined scenarios, but the instructor This is not considered as a standshould focus on learning opportunities when system management non-compliances alone topic. It is linked with the N/A manifest themselves during other scenarios. Underpinning knowledge of systems and Intentionally blank X topic ‘compliance’. Aircraft system Normal system operation according their interactions should be developed and challenged, and not merely the application B Where a system is not managed management to defined instructions of normal procedures. according to normal or defined CRZ x x x x procedures, this is determined as a Minimum fuel, caused by extended delays, weather, etc. where the crew would need APP non-compliance. to manage a minimum fuel situation. LDG

text: Observe aircraft and/or procedural Approach in poor visibility with deteriorations necessitating a decision to perform a x x x r SBT APP Approach, limitations. go-around Any situation where visibility L o visibility close to B Apply the appropriate procedures x x x becomes a threat EVA minimum if applicable. LDG Landing in poor visibility Maintain directional control and

text: safe flight path.

text: Pilots should have opportunities to

text: practise landings in demanding

text: situations at the defined frequency. Landing in demanding This topic should be combined with the adverse-weather topic, aircraft system

text: Landing B LDG Data indicates that landing problems environmental conditions, with malfunctions topic or any topic that can provide exposure to a landing in demanding Intentionally blank

text: have their roots in a variety of malfunctions as appropriate conditions.

text: factors, including inappropriate

text: decision-making, in addition to

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text: manual aircraft control skills if difficult environmental conditions exist. The purpose of this item is to ensure that pilots are exposed to this during the programme.

text: cy se n a o Description (includes type of h ti Desired outcome Assessment and en a Guidance material (GM) u t p topic, being threat, error (includes performance criteria training topic h iv Example scenario elements eq ct or focus) OR training outcome) Fr ig a M W O

text: Fl O LM N PRO C FPA FPM LTW PSD SA W K

text: The data analysed during the development of the EBT concept indicated substantial difficulties encountered by crews when faced with a threat or error, which was a surprise or an unexpected event. The Rejected take-off X X X element of surprise should be distinguished from what is sometimes referred to as the ‘startle factor’ — the latter being a physiological Exposure to an unexpected event r SBT reaction. Wherever possible, or sequence of events at the Surprise B ALL L o consideration should be given defined frequency in order to build towards variations in the types of resilience. EVA scenario, times of occurrences and types of occurrence, so that pilots do not become overly familiar with repetitions of the same scenarios. Variations should be the focus of EBT Intentionally blank Intentionally blank

text: programme design, and not left to the discretion of individual instructors, in order to preserve programme integrity and fairness. TO Anticipate potential for wind shear. Predictive wind shear warning during take-off x x Avoid known wind shear or TO Wind shear encounter during take-off x x x prepare for suspected wind shear. TO Wind shear encounter after rotation x x Recognise wind shear encounter. TO Predictive wind shear after rotation x x Take appropriate action. APP With or without warnings including Predictive wind shear during approach x x x Apply the appropriate procedure APP predictive. A wind shear scenario is Wind shear encounter during go-around x x x x r SBT Wind shear correctly. B ideally combined with an adverse- L o recovery Assure aircraft control. weather scenario containing other EVA Recognise out of wind shear elements. condition. APP Maintain or restore a safe flight Wind shear encounter during approach x x x path. Assess consequential issues and manage outcomes.

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text: This is not considered a topic for

text: specific attention on its own, but

text: more as a reminder to programme

text: developers to ensure that pilots are Manage available resources Workload, r SBT exposed to immersive training efficiently to prioritise and perform distraction, B ALL Intentionally blank Intentionally blank L o scenarios which expose them to tasks in a timely manner under all pressure, stress EVA manageable high workload and circumstances

text: distractions during the course of the

text: EBT programme, at the defined

text: frequency.

text: Fl O LM N PRO C FPA FPM LTW PSD SA W K

text: Compliance with AMC1 or AMC2 to The example scenario elements may be done in ISI, as non-ISI or a combination of

text: ORO.FC.220&230 Recognise upset condition. both.

text: If done in ISI: The instructor should position the aircraft within but close to the edge of

text: Include the recovery exercises in Make timely and appropriate the validated training envelope before handing control to the trainee to demonstrate N/A the restoration of normal flight. Careful consideration should be given to flying within Intentionally blank Table 2 of AMC1 ORO.FC.220&230 for intervention.

text: the recurrent training programme, Take appropriate action. the validated training envelope.

text: such that all the exercises are covered Assure timely and appropriate Table2 of AMC1 ORO.FC.220&230: Exercises for upset recovery training

text: over a period not exceeding 3 years. intervention. (AMC1 A. Recovery from developed upsets

text: According to the principles of EBT, ORO.FC.220&230 Table 2 Recovery from stall events in the following configurations:

text: covering one component should component 1)

text: satisfy the requirement to cover the — take-off configuration,

text: CLB whole element of recovery from Assure aircraft control. developed upsets. The same Maintain or restore a safe flight 2. — clean configuration low altitude, x x x x DES r SBT Upset recovery C principles apply to the exercises of path. o — clean configuration near maximum operating altitude, and components 2, 3 and 4 where one MT exercise may satisfy the requirement Assess consequential issues. — landing configuration during the approach phase.

text: to cover the whole component. Manage outcomes. CRZ 3. Recovery from nose high at various bank angles x x x x An aeroplane upset is defined as an CRZ x x x x undesired aeroplane state in flight Consolidate the summary of 4. Recovery from nose low at various bank angles CRZ characterised by unintentional aeroplane recovery techniques. Demonstration at a normal cruising altitude. Set conditions and disable aircraft x x x divergences from parameters (AMC1 ORO.FC.220&230 Table 2 APP systems as necessary to enable trainee to perform stall recovery according to OEM normally experienced during line component 5) instructions. operations or training. An aeroplane upset may involve pitch and/or bank Note: The operator should assess if Demonstration at an intermediate altitude during early stages of the approach. Set x x x

text: CLB angle divergences as well as the exercises should be practised conditions and disable aircraft systems as necessary to enable trainee to perform stall

text: DES inappropriate airspeeds for the for the either seat qualification. recovery according to OEM instructions.

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text: ATC role-play: the instructor provides scripted instructions, as a distraction to the x x x ALL ATC error. Omission, crew ALL Respond to communications Controller error, provided by the instructor according to a defined scripted scenario x x x x miscommunication, garbled, poor ALL appropriately. Frequency congestion, with multiple aircraft using the same frequency x quality transmission. All these act as Recognise, clarify and resolve any APP distractions to be managed by the Destination temporarily closed x x x x r SBT ambiguities. L o ATC C CRZ crew. The scenarios should be Rescue and firefighting services (RFFS) level reduction at destination x x x Refuse or question unsafe combined, where possible, with Runway change before the interception of the localiser or similar navigation aid in x x x x EVA APP instructions. others of the same or higher azimuth Use standard phraseology GND/ weighting, the principal reason being x x x whenever possible. Stray dogs at the opposite threshold runway TO to create distractions.

text: ALL Poor quality transmissions x

text: TO which causes loss or degradation of Engine failure or engine malfunction on take-off high speed below V1 x x x x TO Recognise engine failure. Engine failure or engine malfunction on take-off above V1 x x x x thrust that affects performance. This Take appropriate action. TO is distinct from the engine-out Engine failure or engine malfunction on initial climb x x x r SBT Apply the appropriate procedure L o Engine failure C APP manoeuvres described in the MT Engine malfunction x x x correctly. CRZ section above, which are intended Engine failure in cruise (with autopilot) x x x EVA Maintain aircraft control. only to practise psychomotor skills Multiple engine failure in CRZ (volcanic ash, recoverable). Competency FPM may or x x x x CRZ Manage consequences. and reinforce procedures to manage may not be included depending on the impact on the automation.

text: GND Fire during taxi x x x x X

text: TO Take-off low speed x x x x X

text: TO Fire or smoke on take-off high speed below V1 x x x x Recognise fire, smoke or fumes. TO Fire or smoke on take-off high speed above V1 x x x Take appropriate action. TO This includes engine, electric, Fire or smoke on Initial climb x x x r SBT Fire and smoke Apply the appropriate procedure C CRZ pneumatic, cargo fire, smoke or Cargo compartment fire or avionics compartment fire. x x x L o management correctly. APP fumes. Engine fire in approach (extinguishable) x x EVA Maintain aircraft control. APP Manage consequences. Engine fire in approach (non-extinguishable) x x x

text: CLB

text: DES

text: APP Flight deck or cabin fire x x x X

text: to either pilot mis-selection or a Execute the appropriate procedure x x x x X Loss of r SBT C failure external to the aircraft. This as applicable. communications L o APP could be for a few seconds or a total Use alternative ways to Loss of communications during approach phase, including go-around

text: loss. communicate. EVA Manage consequences.

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text: A calculation error by one or more Recognise inconsistencies. Wind report with take-off clearance not consistent with prior performance x x x x Managing TO pilots, or someone involved with the Manage/avoid distractions. calculation. ATC, cabin crew or other people are pushing crew to take off quickly. r SBT loading, fuel, C process, or the process itself, e.g. Make changes to Environmental change during taxi (e.g. heavy rain) not consistent with prior take-off x x L o performance GND incorrect information on the load paperwork/aircraft system(s) to performance calculation errors EVA sheet eliminate error. Fuel ground staff on industrial action. Only limited amount of fuel available, which is x x x x GND Identify and manage below the calculated fuel for the flight

text: consequences. Advise crew that there is a change of the load sheet figures during taxi to the runway. x x GND The crew may have limited time due to a calculated take-off time (CTOT) — ATC slot.

text: TO x x x x

text: APP performance in flight Recognise a NAV degradation. LDG Take appropriate action. External NAV failure. Standard initial departure change during taxi. The flight may be subject to a CTOT — GND Execute the appropriate procedure x x x Navigation C Loss of GPS satellite, ANP exceeding ATC slot. as applicable. APP RNP, loss of external NAV source(s) Loss of runway lighting below decision height x x x Use alternative NAV guidance. r SBT No fly zone: when the crew changes control frequency, the new ATCO informs the crew Manage consequences. L o that they are flying over an unannounced ‘no fly zone’ that is not included in the

text: EVA NOTAMs. (To trigger such an event, the context may be as follows: an unexpected

text: CRZ military conflict in the territory the aircraft is flying over or the crew is forced to re- x x x

text: route in flight and the new route flies over a city that has an important event such the

text: Olympic games, a G20/G7 submit, or the route is flying near a space rocket launch close

text: to the time of the launch, like the Guiana Space Centre, Cape Cañaveral, etc.).

text: Operations- or C ALL Intentionally blank Intentionally blank Intentionally blank Intentionally blank type-specific

text: Operations of The operator should comply with APP See equivalency of approaches special airport C the national qualification Intentionally blank Intentionally blank LDG relevant to operations. approval requirements published in the AIP.

text: Recognise incapacitation.

text: correct stop/go decision. r SBT Pilot Consequences for the non- C Apply the appropriate procedure L o incapacitation incapacitated pilot correctly. APP During approach x x x X EVA Maintain aircraft control.

text: Manage consequences.

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text: GND x X Recognise hazardous runway Planned anticipated hazardous conditions with dispatch information provided to TO condition. facilitate planning and execution of appropriate procedures LDG Contamination or surface quality of Observe limitations. Runway or GND x x x C the runway, taxiway, or tarmac Take appropriate action. Unanticipated hazardous conditions, e.g. unexpected heavy rain resulting in flooded taxiway condition TO including foreign objects Apply the appropriate procedures runway surface LDG correctly. TO Take-off on runway with reduced cleared width due to snow x x x x Assure aircraft control. TO Stop/go decision in hazardous conditions x x x

text: ALL ATC clearance giving insufficient terrain clearance x x x X Anticipate terrain threats. Demonstration of terrain avoidance warning systems (TAWS) (this scenario element ALL Prepare for terrain threats. x x x may be done in an ISI.) Recognise unsafe terrain clearance. TO Take appropriate action. Engine failure where performance is marginal leading to TAWS warning x x x CLB Terrain C Alert, warning, or conflict Apply the appropriate procedures DES correctly. ATC provides a wrong QNH x x APP Maintain aircraft control. Restore safe flight path. ‘Virtual mountain’ refers to the surprise element of an unexpected warning. Care

text: DES Manage consequences. should be exercised in creating a level of realism, so this can best be achieved by an x x x

text: unusual and unexpected change of route during the descent. r SBT

text: L o

text: EVA Anticipate potential loss of

text: separation.

text: Recognise loss of separation. CLB Traffic conflict. ACAS RA or TA, or Take appropriate action. Traffic C CRZ visual observation of conflict, which ACAS warning that requires crew intervention x x x x Apply the appropriate procedure DES requires evasive manoeuvring correctly.

text: Maintain aircraft control.

text: Manage consequences.

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text: AMC4 ORO.FC.232 EBT programme assessment and training topics

text: GENERATION 3 (TURBOPROP) — TABLE OF ASSESSMENT AND TRAINING TOPICS

text: O N PRO C FPA FPM LTW PSD SA W K

text: Generation 3 Turboprop — Recurrent assessment and training matrix Competency map

text: Engine failure after the application of

text: Rejected take-off A take-off thrust and before reaching V1 TO From initiation of take-off to complete stop (or as applicable to the procedure) x x

text: (may be in LVOs or CAT I or above)

text: Detect deviations through instrument Initiation of emergency descent from The manoeuvre is complete once the aircraft is stabilised in emergency descent Emergency descent C scanning. CRZ x x x normal cruise altitude configuration (and profile). Maintain spare mental capacity during MT manual aircraft control. Engine-out approach With the critical engine (if applicable) Initiation in a stabilised engine-out configuration from not less than 3 NM final approach, A Maintain the aircraft within the flight LDG x x & landing failed, normal landing until completion of roll-out envelope.

text: Apply knowledge of the relationship With the critical engine (if applicable) between aircraft attitude, speed and This manoeuvre should be flown from intercept to centreline until acceleration after gofailed, manually flown normal precision Engine-out approach thrust. around. The manoeuvre is complete at a point when the aircraft is stabilised at normal A approach to DA, followed by a manual APP x x & go-around engine-out climb speed with the correct pitch and lateral control, in trim condition and, as go-around — the whole manoeuvre to applicable, autopilot engagement (describe generally the critical part of the manoeuvre). be flown without visual reference

text: During flare/rejected landing x x x

text: Pilot qualification to

text: pilot’s seat

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text: Issue 2, Amendment 17 se a n Desired outcome h o Assessment and cy Description (includes type of topic, being ti Guidance material (GM) M W O (includes performance criteria OR t p a O LM N training topic en threat, error or focus) h Example scenario elements PRO C FPA FPM LTW PSD SA W K u training outcome) iv ig ct eq Fl a Fr Generation 3 Turboprop — Recurrent assessment and training matrix Competency map

text: additional demand on a proficient crew

text: See equivalency of approaches

text: additional demand on a proficient crew

text: Section 3 — Equivalency of approaches under specific approvals and Take-off under specific approvals. Evaluation phase, manoeuvres training phase or scenario-based training phase (EVAL, MT or SBT)

text: See equivalency of approaches

text: MT approval

text: EVA

text: preferably in the lowest approved visibility) Demonstrate manual aircraft control Low-visibility RTO is not required under Part SPA but skills with smoothness and accuracy as RTO — can be combined with the assessment and training topic ‘surprise’ in SPA rejected take- instead in Appendix 9 Section 6. B appropriate to the situation. TO EVAL or SBT X X r SBT off (RTO) Detect deviations through instrument T o Note: AMC1 SPA.LVO.120 point (f) does not require a scanning. M low-visibility RTO. Maintain spare mental capacity during L, RTO is required only in the initial LVO course (point manual aircraft control. EVA (g)(1)(iii) of AMC1 SPA.LVO.120). Maintain the aircraft within the flight

text: envelope. Notwithstanding AMC1 SPA.LVO120 point (f)(1) Apply knowledge of the relationship

text: r SBT between aircraft attitude, speed and The manoeuvre is complete at a point when the aircraft is stabilised at normal AMC1 SPA.LVO.120 requires SPA manoeuvres in the T o LVTO B thrust. TO climb speed with the correct pitch and lateral control, in trim condition and, as x x frequency of the OPC, as OPC is substituted in the EBT M applicable, autopilot engagement. L, programme. Thus, the frequency in EBT is determined in A every cycle (B). V

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text: Low-visibility take-off, preferably in the lowest approved

text: visibility

text: se a n Description (includes type of Desired outcome Assessment and h o Guidance material (GM) cy p ti t a topic, being threat, error (includes performance criteria training topic en h iv Example scenario elements u or focus) OR training outcome) ig ct M O eq Fl a W LM

text: O N Fr PRO C FPA FPM LTW PSD SA W K

text: Section 4 — Training topics with frequency (A) in alphabetical order. Evaluation phase or scenario-based training phase (EVAL or SBT)

text: GND Predictive wind shear warning before take-off, as applicable x x x

text: ALL Adverse-weather scenario, e.g. thunderstorm activity, precipitation, icing x x x x

text: TO Wind shear encounter during take-off, not predictive x x x X

text: TO Predictive wind shear warning during take-off x x x x

text: CRZ Turbulence that increases to severe turbulence x x x x

text: CRZ Wind shear encounter scenario during cruise x x x x x

text: APP Anticipate adverse weather. Reactive wind shear warning during approach or go-around x x x x Thunderstorm, heavy rain, APP Prepare for suspected adverse Predictive wind shear warning during approach or go-around x x x x turbulence, ice build-up to include de- APP weather. Thunderstorm encounter during approach or on missed approach x x x icing issues, as well as highr SBT APP Recognise adverse weather. Increasing tailwind on final approach (not reported) x x x x Adverse weather A temperature conditions. L o APP Take appropriate action. Approach and landing in demanding weather conditions, e.g. turbulence, up and x x x The proper use of anti-ice and de- Apply the appropriate procedure downdrafts, gusts and crosswinds including shifting wind directions EVA icing systems should be included APP correctly. Non-precision approach in cold-temperature conditions, requiring altitude x x x generally in appropriate scenarios. Assure aircraft control. compensation for temperature, as applicable to the type

text: APP Crosswinds with or without strong gusts on approach, final approach and landing x x x

text: LDG (within and beyond limits)

text: In approach, unexpected braking action ‘good to medium’ reported by the preceding x x x x APP aircraft

text: APP Moderate to severe icing conditions during approach effecting aircraft performance x x x x

text: APP Reduced visibility even after acquiring the necessary visual reference during approach, x x x

text: due to rain or fog

text: CLB The purpose of this topic is to ACAS warning, recovery and subsequent engagement of automation x x Know how and when to use the CRZ encourage and develop effective flight management system(s), DES flight path management through guidance and automation. APP proficient and appropriate use of the Demonstrate correct methods for ALL flight management system(s), FMS tactical programming issues, e.g. step climb, runway changes, late clearances, x x X engagement and disengagement of guidance and automation, including destination re-programming, executing diversion the auto flight system(s). r SBT Automation CLB transitions between modes, Recoveries from TAWS, management of energy state to restore automated flight x x x A Demonstrate appropriate use of L o management CRZ monitoring, mode awareness, flight guidance, auto thrust and EVA DES vigilance and flexibility needed to other automation systems. APP change from one mode to another. Maintain mode awareness of the CLB The means of mitigating errors are Amendments to ATC cleared levels during altitude capture modes to force mode x x x auto flight system(s), including CRZ included in this topic. The errors are awareness and intervention engagement and automatic DES described as mishandled auto flight transitions. APP systems, inappropriate mode

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text: Issue 2, Amendment 17 e as n Description (includes type of Desired outcome Assessment and h o Guidance material (GM) cy p ti t a topic, being threat, error (includes performance criteria training topic en h iv Example scenario elements u or focus) OR training outcome) ig ct M O eq Fl a W LM

text: O N Fr PRO C FPA FPM LTW PSD SA W K

text: TO selection, mishandled flight Revert to different modes when Late ATC clearance to an altitude below acceleration altitude x x x

text: TO management system(s) and appropriate. Engine-out special terrain procedures x x x

text: APP inappropriate autopilot usage. Detect deviations from the desired

text: CRZ aircraft state (flight path, speed, Forcing autopilot disconnect followed by re-engagement, recovery from low- or high- x x x x

text: attitude, thrust, etc.) and take speed events in cruise

text: CLB appropriate action. Engine failure during or after initial climb using automation x x

text: CRZ system. Emergency descent x x X

text: APP system. unstable approach training)

text: Take appropriate action if APP No ATC clearance received prior to commencement of approach or final descent x x x necessary. APP Reactive wind shear and recovery from the consequent high-energy state x x x Restore correct auto flight state. APP Automation fail to capture the approach altitude in descent (e.g. last altitude before the x x x x Identify and manage FAP). Ideally, the failure occurs when the workload is high (e.g. configuration of the consequences. aircraft for final approach).

text: automation

text: APP Gear malfunction during an approach planned with autoland (including autobrake). x x x

text: malfunction on the automation.

text: flight management system

text: CRZ This includes the development of Smoke removal but combined with a diversion until landing is completed. x x x x x X

text: the following competencies: GND This encapsulates the general CRM Communication: Apron fuel spilling x x x principles and objectives. It includes CRZ Demonstrate: communication; leadership and Important water leak in an aircraft galley x x x x — effective use of language; ALL teamwork; problem-solving and A relevant number of cabin crew are wounded or incapacitated. Additionally, the — responsiveness to feedback; decision-making; situation awareness cabin crew wounded or incapacitated are the most competent (e.g. senior cabin crew x x x and and management of information; and member). Competencies — — capability to state the plans r SBT ALL workload management. Unruly passenger(s) x x non-technical A and resolve ambiguities. L o (CRM) GND Leadership and teamwork: Passenger oxygen: passenger service unit open and mask falling down x x x EVA Emphasis should be placed on the Use appropriate authority to ALL development of leadership, shown by Passenger with medical problems — medical emergency x x ensure focus on the task. Support EBT data sources to be a highly CRZ others in completing tasks. Credible threat reported to the crew. Stowaway or fugitive on board. x x x x effective competency in mitigating Problem-solving and decision- GND risk and improving safety through No METAR or TAFOR is available for destination due to industrial action at the making: x x x x pilot performance. destination airport Detect deviations from the desired CRZ Credible bomb threat reported to crew x x x x state, evaluate problems, identify

text: the risk, consider alternatives and CLB select the best course of action. Credible bomb threat or pressurisation problem, but no quick landing possible (due to x x x x

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text: APP Situation awareness and ACAS warning immediately following a go-around, with a descent manoeuvre required x x x x X management of information: Have an awareness of the aircraft state in its environment; project and anticipate changes. Workload management: Prioritise, delegate and receive r SBT assistance to maximise focus on L o the task. Continuously monitor the flight progress. EVA

text: Compliance failure. Consequences of Recognise that a compliance failure The following are examples of potential compliance failures and are not intended to be Intentionally blank not complying with operating has occurred. developed as scenarios as part of an EBT module: instructions (e.g. SOPs). Make a verbal announcement. This is not intended to list example Take appropriate action if 1. Requesting flap beyond limit speed scenario elements, but instructors necessary. should ensure that observed non- Restore safe flight path if necessary. 2. Flaps or slats in the wrong position for phase of flight or approach r SBT compliances are taken as learning Manage consequences. Compliance A ALL L o opportunities throughout the 3. Omitting an action as part of a procedure programme. In all modules of the EVA programme, the FSTD should as far as 4. Failing to initiate or complete a checklist possible be treated like an aircraft, and non-compliances should not be 5. Using the wrong checklist for the situation accepted simply for expediency.

text: APP Any threat or error that can result in Adverse-weather scenario leading to a reactive wind shear warning during approach x x x x circumstances that require a decision to perform a go-around, in addition to Adverse-weather scenario leading to a predictive wind shear warning during approach x x x x APP the execution of the go-around. Go- or go-around around scenarios should be fully Adverse-weather scenario, e.g. thunderstorm activity, heavy precipitation or icing x x x x APP developed to encourage effective forcing decision at or close to DA/MDA leadership and teamwork, in addition DA with visual reference in heavy precipitation with doubt about the runway surface x x x x APP to problem-solving and decision- braking capability APP making, plus execution using manual Adverse-wind scenario resulting in increasing tailwind below DA (not reported) x x x aircraft control or the flight Adverse-wind scenario including strong gusts and/or crosswind out of limits below DA x x x APP management system(s) and (not reported) r SBT Go-around automation as applicable. Design A Adverse-wind scenario including strong gusts and/or crosswind out of limits below 15 m x x x L o management APP should include the element of (50 ft) (not reported) surprise, and scenario-based go- EVA Lost or difficult communications resulting in no approach clearance prior to x x x APP arounds should not be predictable and commencement of approach or final descent anticipated. This topic is completely Birds: large flocks of birds below DA once visual reference has been established x x x APP distinct from the go-around manoeuvre listed in the MT section that is intended only to practise System malfunction, landing gear malfunction during the approach psychomotor skills and a simple application of the procedures. APP

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text: CLB Flight with unreliable airspeed, which may or may not be recoverable x x x X CRZ DES APP CLB Alternate flight control modes according to malfunction characteristics x x x X CRZ DES APP CLB ACAS RA requires the pilot to descend or ATC calls for immediate descent x x x CRZ DES APP TAWS warning when deviating from planned descent routing, requiring immediate x x x DES response Scenario immediately after take-off which requires an immediate and overweight x x x x TO landing TO Adverse wind, crosswinds with or without strong gusts on take-off x x Adverse weather, wind shear, wind shear encounter during take-off, with or without x x x TO Demonstrate manual aircraft reactive warnings TO control skills with smoothness and Engine failure during initial climb, typically 30-60 m (100-200 ft) (autopilot off) x x x x accuracy as appropriate to the Wind shear encounter scenario during cruise, significant and rapid change in wind speed x x x x x CRZ situation. or down/updrafts, without wind shear warning Detect deviations through Adverse weather, wind shear, wind shear encounter with or without warning during x x x x APP instrument scanning. approach r SBT Manual aircraft Controls the flight path through A Maintain spare mental capacity Adverse weather, deterioration in visibility or cloud base, or adverse wind, requiring a x x x x x x x L o control APP manual control during manual aircraft control. go-around from visual circling approach, during the visual segment EVA APP Maintain the aircraft within the Interception of the glide slope from above (correlation with unstable approach training) x x x APP normal flight envelope. Adverse wind, crosswinds with or without strong gusts on approach, final approach and x x x LDG Apply knowledge of the landing (within and beyond limits) relationship between aircraft Adverse weather, adverse wind, approach and landing in demanding weather x x x APP attitude, speed and thrust. conditions, e.g. turbulence, up and downdrafts, gusts and crosswinds including shifting LDG wind directions APP Circling approach manually flown at night in minimum in-flight visibility to ensure X X X X LDG ground reference, minimum environmental lighting and no glide slope guidance lights APP Runway incursion during approach, which can be triggered by ATC at various altitudes x x x LDG or by visual contact during the landing phase LDG Adverse wind, visibility, type-specific, special consideration for long-bodied aircraft, x x x x landing in minimum visibility for visual reference, with crosswind LDG System malfunction, auto flight failure at DA during a low-visibility approach requiring x x x x a go-around flown manually APP Approach planned with autoland, followed by a failure below 1 000 ft requiring a x x x x LDG manual go-around and an immediate landing due to fuel shortage TO In-seat instruction: x x x x Insufficient engine failure recovery, forcing the pilot monitoring to take over the flight controls APP In-seat instruction: x x x x LDG Unstable approach on short final or long landing, forcing the pilot monitoring to take over the flight controls

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text: ALL The scenarios should be realistic and Deviations from the flight path, in pitch attitude, speed, altitude, bank angle x x relevant, and should be used for the In-seat instruction: x x purpose of demonstration and Simple automation errors (e.g. incorrect mode selection, attempted engagement ALL reinforcement of effective monitoring. without the necessary conditions, entering wrong altitude or speed, failure to execute the desired mode) culminating in a need for direct intervention from the pilot Modules in the FSTD should be treated Recognise mismanaged aircraft monitoring, and where necessary taking control. like those in an aircraft so that trainees state. In-seat instruction: x x x x APP have the opportunity to develop the Observe the pilot’s behaviour: how Unstable approach or speed/path/vertical rate not congruent with the required state competency with the practice of the the pilot is mitigating errors, for the given flight condition right techniques and attitudes related performing cross-checking, x x x to these topics through pilot monitoring performance and performance, and that instructors dealing with a mismanaged aircraft have the opportunity to assess and state, in order to ensure that train these topics in a realistic observed deviations, errors and Monitoring, environment. As shown by the EBT mistakes are taken as learning cross-checking, data report, these topics are of key opportunities throughout the error importance to improve safety in programme. A management, operations. Monitor flight path excursions. mismanaged Detect errors and threats through aircraft state In addition, the operator may also use proper cross-checking In-seat instruction: these topics to develop scripted role- performance. r SBT Demonstration exercise — recovery from bounced landing, adverse wind, strong gusts LDG playing scenarios in the form of ISI. Make appropriate interventions L o during landing phase, resulting in a bounce and necessitating recovery action from the These scenarios cater for the need to either verbally or by taking control pilot monitoring EVA monitor flight path excursions from if applicable. the instructor pilot (PF), detect errors Take appropriate action if and make appropriate interventions, necessary. either verbally or by taking control as Restore the desired aircraft state. applicable. Demonstration scenarios Identify and manage may also be used. Demonstrated role- consequences. play should contain realistic and not gross errors, leading at times to a mismanaged aircraft state, which can also be combined with upset management training. DES ATC or terrain-related environment creating a high-energy descent with the need to x x x APP Reinforce stabilised approach capture the optimum profile to complete the approach in a stabilised configuration philosophy and adherence to defined DES ATC or terrain-related environment creating a high-energy descent leading to unstable x x x parameters. Encourage go-arounds APP conditions and requiring a go-around Unstable when crews are outside these A Approach and landing in demanding weather conditions, e.g. turbulence, up and x x x approach APP parameters. Develop and sustain downdrafts, gusts and crosswinds including shifting wind directions competencies related to the APP Increasing tailwind on final approach (not reported) x x x x management of high-energy APP Crosswinds with or without strong gusts on approach, final approach and landing x x x situations. LDG (within and beyond limits)

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text: Compliance with AMC1 or AMC2 to See Table 1 of AMC1 ORO.FC.220&230: Elements and respective components of Intentionally blank N/A ORO.FC.220&230 upset prevention training.

text: Include upset prevention elements in Demonstration of the defined normal flight envelope and any associated changes in x x x

text: Table 1 for the recurrent training flight instruments, flight director systems, and protection systems. This should take CRZ programme in at least every cycle, the form of an instructor-led exercise to show the crew the points beyond which an

text: such that all the elements are upset condition could exist.

text: TO covered over a period not exceeding Severe wind shear or wake turbulence during take-off or approach x x x x Early recognition and prevention of APP 3 years. The elements are numbered upset conditions. r SBT CRZ with letters from A to I in Table 1 of As applicable and relevant to the aircraft type, demonstration at a suitable x x x

text: T o Upset prevention AMC1 ORO.FC.220&230. Each intermediate level, with turbulence as appropriate; practise steep turns and note the B When the differences between LHS M training element is made up of several relationship between bank angle, pitch and stalling speed L, and RHS are not significant in the CRZ numbered components. At the maximum cruise flight level for the current aircraft weight, turbulence to trigger x x x x handling of the aircraft, UPRT may EVA According to the principles of EBT, overspeed conditions (if FSTD capability exists, consider use of the vertical wind be conducted in either seat. covering one component should component to add realism)

text: CRZ satisfy the requirement to cover the At the maximum cruise flight level for the current aircraft weight, turbulence and x x x X

text: whole element of recognising and significant temperature rise to trigger low-speed conditions (if FSTD capability exists,

text: preventing the development of upset consider use of the vertical wind component to add realism)

text: CRZ conditions. High-altitude loss of reliable airspeed x x x x x

text: off, brake failure during landing.

text: reverser locked. combination with abnormal handling characteristics, e.g. jammed flight controls, ALL Recognise system malfunction. certain degradation of FBW control, jammed horizontal stabiliser; flaps and/or slats Take appropriate action including locked; other malfunctions that result in degraded flight controls. Malfunctions to be considered should correct stop/go decision. (iv) System failures that require monitoring and management of the flight path using have one or more of the following Apply the appropriate procedure degraded or alternative displays, unreliable primary flight path information, characteristics: correctly. unreliable airspeed, e.g. flight with unreliable airspeed — Immediacy Aircraft system Maintain aircraft control. (v) System failures that require extensive management of their consequences — Complexity malfunctions, Manage consequences. (independent of operation or environment), e.g. fuel leak. r SBT — Degradation of aircraft control including B TO MEL items with crew operating procedures applicable during take-off x X L o — Loss of primary instrumentation operations under Apply crew operating procedures Response to an additional factor that is affected by an MEL item (e.g. system failure, x x x X TO — Management of consequences EVA MEL where necessary. The operator should vary runway state) Respond appropriately to GND malfunctions for each characteristic Malfunction during preflight preparation and prior to departure x x x additional system abnormalities CLB over the EBT cycle. Malfunction after departure x x x X associated with MEL dispatch. Malfunctions that require immediate attention (e.g. bleed fault during engine start, x x x ALL Unless specified otherwise in the hydraulic failure during taxi)

text: CLB operational suitability data, at least x x x X Fuel leak (management of consequences) CRZ one malfunction with each

text: TO characteristic should be included in Malfunction on take-off high speed below V1 x x x

text: TO every cycle. Combining characteristics Malfunction on take-off high speed above V1 x x

text: should not reduce the number of During taxi to the runway, a spurious brake temperature announcement. The crew had GND malfunctions below seven for each X X X the correct brake temperature moments before the failure. TO cycle. For each crew member, the Tyre failure during take-off x x x

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text: TO characteristics of degraded control Malfunction on initial climb x x APP and loss of instrumentation should be Malfunction on approach x x x APP in the role of pilot flying and the Malfunction on go-around x x x LDG others may be in the role of pilot Malfunction during landing x x x x x flying or pilot monitoring.

text: For full details, see the malfunction equivalency methodology. See ‘compliance’ topic above. There are no defined scenarios, but the instructor This is not considered as a standshould focus on learning opportunities when system management non-compliances alone topic. It is linked with the manifest themselves during other scenarios. Underpinning knowledge of systems and Intentionally blank X topic ‘compliance’. Aircraft system Normal system operation according their interactions should be developed and challenged, and not merely the B Where a system is not managed management to defined instructions application of normal procedures. according to normal or defined CRZ x x x x procedures, this is determined as a Minimum fuel, caused by extended delays, weather, etc. where the crew would need APP non-compliance. to manage a minimum fuel situation LDG APP Recognise actual conditions. Approach in poor visibility x x x x Observe aircraft and/or procedural Approach in poor visibility with deteriorations necessitating a decision to perform a x x x APP Approach, limitations. go-around Any situation where visibility visibility close to B Apply the appropriate procedures x x x becomes a threat r SBT minimum if applicable. LDG Landing in poor visibility Maintain directional control and L o safe flight path. EVA Pilots should have opportunities to practise landings in demanding situations at the defined frequency. Data indicates that landing problems have their roots in a variety of Landing in demanding This topic should be combined with the adverse-weather topic, aircraft system factors, including inappropriate Landing B LDG environmental conditions, with malfunctions topic or any topic that can provide exposure to a landing in demanding Intentionally blank decision-making, in addition to malfunctions as appropriate conditions. manual aircraft control skills if difficult environmental conditions exist. The purpose of this item is to ensure that pilots are exposed to this during the programme. The data analysed during the development of the EBT concept indicated substantial difficulties encountered by crews when faced with a threat or error, which was a Rejected take-off X X X surprise or an unexpected event. The element of surprise should be distinguished from what is sometimes referred to as the ‘startle factor’ — the latter being a physiological Exposure to an unexpected event r SBT reaction. Wherever possible, or sequence of events at the Surprise B ALL L o consideration should be given defined frequency in order to build towards variations in the types of resilience. EVA scenario, times of occurrences and types of occurrence, so that pilots do not become overly familiar with Intentionally blank Intentionally blank repetitions of the same scenarios. Variations should be the focus of EBT programme design, and not left to the discretion of individual instructors, in order to preserve programme integrity and fairness.

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text: Issue 2, Amendment 17 se n cy a o h ti Description (includes type of Desired outcome Assessment and en a Guidance material (GM) u t p topic, being threat, error (includes performance criteria training topic h iv Example scenario elements eq ct or focus) OR training outcome) Fr ig a M W LM O Fl O N

text: PRO C FPA FPM LTW PSD SA W K

text: ALL ATC clearance giving insufficient terrain clearance x x x Anticipate terrain threats. Prepare for terrain threats. Demonstration of terrain avoidance warning systems (TAWS) (this scenario element ALL x x x Recognise unsafe terrain clearance. may be done in an ISI.)

text: TO Take appropriate action. r SBT Engine failure where performance is marginal leading to TAWS warning x x x Terrain B CLB Alert, warning, or conflict Apply the appropriate procedures L o DES correctly. ATC provides a wrong QNH x x EVA APP Maintain aircraft control.

text: Restore safe flight path. ‘Virtual mountain’ refers to the surprise element of an unexpected warning. Care should

text: DES Manage consequences. be exercised in creating a level of realism, so this can best be achieved by an unusual x x x

text: and unexpected change of route during the descent.

text: TO Anticipate potential for wind shear. Predictive wind shear warning during take-off x x

text: Avoid known wind shear or TO Wind shear encounter during take-off x x x prepare for suspected wind shear. TO Wind shear encounter after rotation x x Recognise wind shear encounter. TO Predictive wind shear after rotation x x Take appropriate action. APP With or without warnings including Predictive wind shear during approach x x x Apply the appropriate procedure APP predictive. A wind shear scenario is Wind shear encounter during go-around x x x x Wind shear correctly. B ideally combined with an adverserecovery Assure aircraft control. weather scenario containing other Recognise out of wind shear elements. condition.

text: APP Maintain or restore a safe flight Wind shear encounter during approach x x x

text: r SBT path.

text: L o Assess consequential issues and

text: EVA manage outcomes.

text: This is not considered a topic for Intentionally blank Intentionally blank

text: specific attention on its own, but

text: more as a reminder to programme

text: developers to ensure that pilots are Manage available resources Workload, exposed to immersive training efficiently to prioritise and perform distraction, B ALL scenarios which expose them to tasks in a timely manner under all pressure, stress manageable high workload and circumstances.

text: distractions during the course of the

text: EBT programme, at the defined

text: frequency.

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text: Compliance with AMC1 or AMC2 to The example scenario elements may be done in ISI, as non-ISI or a combination of ORO.FC.220&230 Recognise upset condition. both. If done in ISI: The instructor should position the aircraft within but close to the edge Include the recovery exercises in Make timely and appropriate of the validated training envelope before handing control to the trainee to N/A demonstrate the restoration of normal flight. Careful consideration should be given to Intentionally blank Table 2 of AMC1 ORO.FC.220&230 for intervention. the recurrent training programme, Take appropriate action. flying within the validated training envelope.

text: such that all the exercises are Assure timely and appropriate Table2 of AMC1 ORO.FC.220&230: Exercises for upset recovery training

text: covered over a period not exceeding intervention. (AMC1 A. Recovery from developed upsets 3 years. According to the principles of ORO.FC.220&230 Table 2 Recovery from stall events in the following configurations: EBT, covering one component should component 1) satisfy the requirement to cover the — take-off configuration,

text: CLB whole element of recovery from Assure aircraft control. 2. — clean configuration low altitude, x x x x DES developed upsets. The same Maintain or restore a safe flight r SBT Upset recovery C principles apply to the exercises of path. o — clean configuration near maximum operating altitude, and components 2, 3 and 4 where one MT exercise may satisfy the requirement Assess consequential issues. — landing configuration during the approach phase. to cover the whole component. Manage outcomes. x x x x CRZ 3. Recovery from nose high at various bank angles An aeroplane upset is defined as an CRZ undesired aeroplane state in flight Consolidate the summary of x x x x

text: 4. Recovery from nose low at various bank angles CRZ characterised by unintentional aeroplane recovery techniques. divergences from parameters (AMC1 ORO.FC.220&230 Table 2 Demonstration at a normal cruising altitude. Set conditions and disable aircraft x x x APP normally experienced during line component 5) systems as necessary to enable trainee to perform stall recovery according to OEM operations or training. An aeroplane instructions.

text: TO Take-off with different crosswind/tailwind/gust conditions x x TO Take-off with unreported tailwind x x

text: APP Wind exceeding limits on final approach (reported) in manual aircraft control x x x x Recognise adverse-wind APP Increasing tailwind on final approach (not reported) x x x x conditions. Adverse wind/crosswind. This Approach and landing in demanding weather conditions, e.g. turbulence, up and x x x r SBT APP Observe limitations. Adverse wind C includes tailwind but not ATC mis- downdrafts, gusts and crosswind including shifting wind directions L o Apply the appropriate procedures. APP reporting of the actual wind. Adverse-wind scenario resulting in increasing tailwind below DA (not reported) x x x EVA Maintain directional control and safe flight path. Adverse-wind scenario including strong gusts and/or crosswind out of limits below DA x x x APP (not reported) Adverse-wind scenario including strong gusts and/or crosswind out of limits below x x x APP 15 m (50 ft) (not reported)

text: APP Crosswind with or without strong gusts on approach, final approach and landing x x x LDG (within and beyond limits)

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text: ATC role-play: the instructor provides scripted instructions, as a distraction to the x x x ALL ATC error. Omission, crew Respond to communications ALL miscommunication, garbled, poor Controller error, provided by the instructor according to a defined scripted scenario x x x x appropriately. ALL quality transmission. All these act as Frequency congestion, with multiple aircraft using the same frequency x Recognise, clarify and resolve any APP distractions to be managed by the Destination temporarily closed x x x x r SBT ambiguities. ATC C CRZ crew. The scenarios should be Rescue and firefighting services (RFFS) level reduction at destination x x x L o Refuse or question unsafe combined, where possible, with Runway change before the interception of the localiser or similar navigation aid in x x x x APP instructions. EVA others of the same or higher azimuth Use standard phraseology GND weighting, the principal reason being x x x whenever possible. Stray dogs at the opposite threshold runway TO to create distractions.

text: ALL Poor quality transmissions x

text: TO which causes loss or degradation of Engine failure or engine malfunction on take-off high speed below V1 x x x x Recognise engine failure. TO thrust that affects performance. This Engine failure or engine malfunction on take-off above V1 x x x x Take appropriate action. r SBT TO is distinct from the engine-out Engine failure or engine malfunction on initial climb x x x Apply the appropriate procedure Engine failure C APP manoeuvres described in the MT Engine malfunction x x x L o correctly. CRZ section above, which are intended Engine failure in cruise (with autopilot) x x x EVA Maintain aircraft control. only to practise psychomotor skills x Manage consequences. LDG and reinforce procedures to manage Engine failure or engine malfunction on landing

text: engine failures.

text: GND Fire during taxi x x x x X

text: TO Take-off low speed x x x x X

text: TO Fire or smoke on take-off high speed below V1 x x x x Recognise fire, smoke or fumes. TO Fire or smoke on take-off high speed above V1 x x x Take appropriate action. TO This includes engine, electric, Fire or smoke on initial climb x x x r SBT Fire and smoke Apply the appropriate procedure C CRZ pneumatic, cargo fire, smoke or Cargo fire x x x L o management correctly. APP fumes. Engine fire in approach (extinguishable) x x EVA Maintain aircraft control. APP Manage consequences. Engine fire in approach (non-extinguishable) x x x

text: CLB

text: DES

text: APP Flight deck or cabin fire x x x X

text: C GND Recognise loss of communications. Loss of communications during ground manoeuvring x x

text: APP to either pilot mis-selection or a Execute the appropriate procedure Loss of communications during approach phase, including go-around x x x x X Loss of r SBT failure external to the aircraft. This as applicable. communications L o could be for a few seconds or a total Use alternative ways to

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text: Anticipate the potential for errors insert incorrect data — for example, to take off from an intersection with full-length

text: ALL in load/fuel/performance data. performance information. The crew will be asked to intervene when acceleration is

text: A calculation error by one or more Recognise inconsistencies. sensed to be lower than normal, and this may be part of the operator procedures, Managing pilots, or someone involved with the Manage/avoid distractions. especially when operating mixed fleets with considerable variations in MTOM. r SBT loading, fuel, C process, or the process itself, e.g. Make changes to Fuel ground staff on industrial action. Only limited amount of fuel available, which is x x x x L o performance GND incorrect information on the load paperwork/aircraft system(s) to below the calculated fuel for the flight. EVA errors sheet eliminate error. Advise crew that there is a change of the load sheet figures during taxi to the runway. x x GND Identify and manage The crew may have limited time due to a calculated take-off time (CTOT) — ATC slot.

text: consequences. Braking action reported ‘medium’. The information is transmitted just before take- x x x GND off. The flight is subject to a (CTOT) — ATC slot.

text: TO x x x x

text: APP performance in flight Recognise a NAV degradation. LDG Take appropriate action. External NAV failure. Standard initial departure change during taxi. The flight may be subject to a CTOT — GND Execute the appropriate procedure x x x Navigation C Loss of GPS satellite, ANP exceeding ATC slot. as applicable. APP RNP, loss of external NAV source(s) Loss of runway lighting below decision height x x x Use alternative NAV guidance. Manage consequences. No fly zone: when the crew changes control frequency, the new ATCO informs the crew r SBT that they are flying over an unannounced ‘no fly zone’ that is not included in the

text: L o NOTAMs. (To trigger such an event, the context may be as follows: an unexpected

text: EVA CRZ military conflict in the territory the aircraft is flying over or the crew is forced to re- x x x

text: The operator should comply with

text: Operations of the national qualification APP See equivalency of approaches special airport C requirements published in the Intentionally blank Intentionally blank LDG relevant to operations. approval Aeronautical Information

text: Publication.

text: Recognise incapacitation.

text: Manage consequences. r SBT GND x X L o Recognise hazardous runway Planned anticipated hazardous conditions with dispatch information provided to TO condition. facilitate planning and execution of appropriate procedures EVA LDG Contamination or surface quality of Observe limitations. Runway or GND x x x C the runway, taxiway, or tarmac Take appropriate action. Unanticipated hazardous conditions, e.g. unexpected heavy rain resulting in flooded taxiway condition TO including foreign objects Apply the appropriate procedures runway surface LDG correctly. TO Take-off on runway with reduced cleared width due to snow x x x x Assure aircraft control. TO Stop/go decision in hazardous conditions x x x

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text: Anticipate potential loss of

text: separation.

text: Recognise loss of separation. CLB Traffic conflict. ACAS RA or TA, or r SBT Take appropriate action. Traffic C CRZ visual observation of conflict, which ACAS warning that requires crew intervention x x x x L o Apply the appropriate procedure DES requires evasive manoeuvring EVA correctly.

text: Maintain aircraft control.

text: Manage consequences.

text: END GEN3 TURBOPROP

text: AMC5 ORO.FC.232 EBT programme assessment and training topics

text: GENERATION 2 (JET) — EBT PROGRAMME — TABLE OF ASSESSMENT AND TRAINING TOPICS

text: Given the very small number of turbo-jet aeroplanes of the second generation in current use in commercial air transport operations, the operator should apply for an alternative means of compliance to develop a table of assessment and training topics to apply EBT. Annex III to ED Decision 2021/002/R Page 97 of 119 AMC and GM to Part-ORO of

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text: AMC6 ORO.FC.232 EBT programme assessment and training topics

text: GENERATION 2 (TURBOPROP) — TABLE OF ASSESSMENT AND TRAINING TOPICS

text: cy se n Desired outcome a o Assessment and en Description (includes type of topic, h ti Guidance material (GM) u (includes performance criteria OR a t p iv training topic eq being threat, error or focus) h Example scenario elements training outcome) ig ct Fr a M W O

text: Fl O LM N PRO C FPA FPM LTW PSD SA W K

text: Generation 2 Turboprop — Recurrent assessment and training matrix Competency map

text: Engine failure after the application of

text: (may be in LVO or CAT I or above)

text: visibility or in LVO MET conditions. engine between V1 and V2 a year may be done in LVO conditions. Failure of one engine B TO on take-off Failure of one engine above V2 (any Demonstrate manual aircraft control The manoeuvre is complete at a point when the aircraft is stabilised in a clean segment of the TO) in the lowest CAT I x x x skills with smoothness and accuracy as configuration with engine-out procedures completed visibility or in LVO MET conditions. appropriate to the situation.

text: During flare/rejected landing x x x

text: Pilot qualification to

text: pilot’s seat

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text: Issue 2, Amendment 17 cy se n a o Desired outcome h ti Assessment and en Description (includes type of topic, being a Guidance material (GM) M W O u (includes performance criteria OR t p O LM N training topic threat, error or focus) h iv Example scenario elements PRO C FPA FPM LTW PSD SA W K eq training outcome) ct Fr ig a Fl Generation 2 Turboprop — Recurrent assessment and training matrix Competency map

text: additional demand on a proficient crew

text: See equivalency of approaches

text: additional demand on a proficient crew

text: See equivalency of approaches

text: MT approval

text: See equivalency of approaches

text: r SBT SPA approach(es) B Approach requiring specific approval relevant to operations — specific APP Approaches flown from FAF to landing or go-around x x x

text: L o approval

text: EVA

text: preferably in the lowest approved visibility) Demonstrate manual aircraft control Low-visibility RTO is not required under Part SPA but skills with smoothness and accuracy as RTO — can be combined with the assessment and training topic ‘surprise’ in SPA rejected Take- instead in Appendix 9 Section 6. B appropriate to the situation. TO EVAL or SBT X X r SBT off (RTO) Detect deviations through instrument T o Note: AMC1 SPA.LVO.120 point (f) does not require a scanning. M low-visibility RTO. L, Maintain spare mental capacity during RTO is required only in the initial LVO course (point manual aircraft control. EVA (g)(1)(iii) of AMC1 SPA.LVO.120). Maintain the aircraft within the flight

text: Notwithstanding AMC1 SPA.LVO120 point (f)(1) envelope.

text: Apply knowledge of the relationship r SBT between aircraft attitude, speed and The manoeuvre may is complete at a point when the aircraft is stabilised at AMC1 SPA.LVO.120 requires SPA manoeuvres in the T o LVTO B thrust. TO normal climb speed with the correct pitch and lateral control, in trim condition x x frequency of the OPC, as OPC is substituted in the EBT M and, as applicable, autopilot engagement. L, programme. Thus, the frequency in EBT is determined in A every cycle (B). V

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text: visibility

text: se a n Description (includes type of Desired outcome Assessment and h o Guidance material (GM) cy ti t p a topic, being threat, error (includes performance criteria training topic en h iv Example scenario elements u or focus) OR training outcome) ig ct eq Fl a M W LM O

text: O N Fr PRO C FPA FPM LTW PSD SA W K

text: APP Anticipate adverse weather. Reactive wind shear warning during approach or go-around x x x x Thunderstorm, heavy rain, APP Prepare for suspected adverse Predictive wind shear warning during approach or go-around x x x x turbulence, ice build-up to include de- APP weather. Thunderstorm encounter during approach or on missed approach x x x icing issues, as well as highr SBT APP Recognise adverse weather. Increasing tailwind on final approach (not reported) x x x x Adverse weather A temperature conditions. L o APP Take appropriate action. Approach and landing in demanding weather conditions, e.g. turbulence, up and x x x The proper use of anti-ice and de- EVA Apply the appropriate procedure downdrafts, gusts and crosswinds including shifting wind directions icing systems should be included APP correctly. Non-precision approach in cold-temperature conditions, requiring altitude x x x generally in appropriate scenarios. Assure aircraft control. compensation for temperature, as applicable to the type

text: LDG (within and beyond limits)

text: due to rain or fog

text: See ‘compliance’ topic above. There are no defined scenarios, but the instructor should This is not considered as a standfocus on learning opportunities when system management non-compliances manifest alone topic. It is linked with the N/A themselves during other scenarios. Underpinning knowledge of systems and their Intentionally blank X topic ‘compliance’. r SBT Aircraft system Normal system operation according interactions should be developed and challenged, and not merely the application of A Where a system is not managed L o management to defined instructions normal procedures. according to normal or defined EVA CRZ procedures, this is determined as a Minimum fuel, caused by extended delays, weather, etc. where the crew would need APP x x x x non-compliance. to manage a minimum fuel situation. LDG

text: CLB The purpose of this topic is to ACAS warning, recovery and subsequent engagement of automation x x

text: CRZ encourage and develop effective Know how and when to use the

text: DES flight path management through flight management system(s),

text: r SBT Automation APP proficient and appropriate use of the guidance and automation. A L o management ALL flight management system(s), Demonstrate correct methods for FMS tactical programming issues, e.g. step climb, runway changes, late clearances, x x X

text: EVA guidance and automation, including engagement and disengagement of destination re-programming, executing diversion

text: CLB transitions between modes, the auto flight system(s). Recoveries from TAWS, management of energy state to restore automated flight x x x

text: CRZ monitoring, mode awareness,

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text: Issue 2, Amendment 17 se a n Description (includes type of Desired outcome Assessment and h o Guidance material (GM) cy ti t p a topic, being threat, error (includes performance criteria training topic en h iv Example scenario elements u or focus) OR training outcome) ig ct M O eq Fl a W LM

text: O N Fr PRO C FPA FPM LTW PSD SA W K

text: DES vigilance and flexibility needed to Demonstrate appropriate use of

text: APP change from one mode to another. flight guidance, auto thrust and

text: CLB The means of mitigating errors are other automation systems. Amendments to ATC cleared levels during altitude capture modes to force mode x x x

text: CRZ included in this topic. The errors are Maintain mode awareness of the awareness and intervention

text: DES described as mishandled auto flight auto flight system(s), including

text: APP systems, inappropriate mode engagement and automatic

text: TO selection, mishandled flight transitions. Late ATC clearance to an altitude below acceleration altitude x x x

text: TO management system(s) and Revert to different modes when Engine-out special terrain procedures x x x

text: APP inappropriate autopilot usage. appropriate.

text: CRZ Detect deviations from the desired Forcing autopilot disconnect followed by re-engagement, recovery from low- or high- x x x x

text: aircraft state (flight path, speed, speed events in cruise

text: CLB attitude, thrust, etc.) and take Engine failure during or after initial climb using automation x x

text: CRZ appropriate action. Engine failure in cruise to onset of descent using automation x x

text: Anticipate mishandled auto flight CRZ Emergency descent x x X system. DES Managing high-energy descent capturing descent path from above (correlation with x x x X Recognise mishandled auto flight APP unstable approach training) system. APP No ATC clearance received prior to commencement of approach or final descent x x x Take appropriate action if APP Reactive wind shear and recovery from the consequent high-energy state x x x necessary. APP Restore correct auto flight state. Automation fail to capture the approach altitude in descent (e.g. last altitude before the x x x x

text: automation

text: malfunction on the automation.

text: flight management system

text: DES awareness of human factors in Cabin crew report of water noise below the forward galley indicating a possible toilet x x x This encapsulates the general CRM pipe leak, with consequent avionics failures aviation and the human limitations. principles and objectives. It includes CRZ This includes the development of Smoke removal but combined with a diversion until landing is completed. x x x x x X communication; leadership and the following competencies: GND teamwork; problem-solving and Apron fuel spilling x x x Communication: decision-making; situation awareness CRZ Demonstrate: and management of information; and Important water leak in an aircraft galley x x x x Competencies — — effective use of language; r SBT ALL workload management. A relevant number of cabin crew are wounded or incapacitated. Additionally, the non-technical A — responsiveness to feedback; L o cabin crew wounded or incapacitated are the most competent (e.g. senior cabin crew x x x (CRM) and EVA Emphasis should be placed on the member). — capability to state the plans ALL development of leadership, shown by Unruly passenger(s) x x and resolve ambiguities. GND EBT data sources to be a highly Leadership and teamwork: Passenger oxygen: passenger service unit open and mask falling down x x x effective competency in mitigating ALL Use appropriate authority to risk and improving safety through Passenger with medical problems — medical emergency x x ensure focus on the task. Support CRZ pilot performance. others in completing tasks. Credible threat reported to the crew. Stowaway or fugitive on board. x x x x

text: Problem-solving and decision- GND No METAR or TAFOR is available for destination due to industrial action at the making: x x x x destination airport

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text: CRZ Detect deviations from the desired Credible bomb threat reported to crew x x x x state, evaluate problems, identify CLB the risk, consider alternatives and Credible bomb threat or pressurisation problem, but no quick landing possible (due to x x x x DES select the best course of action. weather, terrain or other reasons) Continuously review progress and APP Diversion with low remaining fuel or increased fuel flow due to system malfunction x x x x adjust plans. Situation awareness and APP ACAS warning immediately following a go-around, with a descent manoeuvre required x x x x X management of information: Have an awareness of the aircraft state in its environment; project and anticipate changes. Workload management: Prioritise, delegate and receive assistance to maximise focus on the task. Continuously monitor the flight progress. Compliance failure. Consequences of Recognise that a compliance failure The following are examples of potential compliance failures and are not intended to be Intentionally blank not complying with operating has occurred. developed as scenarios as part of an EBT module: instructions (e.g. SOPs). Make a verbal announcement. This is not intended to list example Take appropriate action if 1. Requesting flap beyond limit speed scenario elements, but instructors necessary. should ensure that observed non- Restore safe flight path if necessary. 2. Flaps or slats in the wrong position for phase of flight or approach r SBT Compliance A ALL compliances are taken as learning Manage consequences. L o opportunities throughout the 3. Omitting an action as part of a procedure EVA programme. In all modules of the programme, the FSTD should as far as 4. Failing to initiate or complete a checklist possible be treated like an aircraft, and non-compliances should not be 5. Using the wrong checklist for the situation accepted simply for expediency. APP Any threat or error that can result in Adverse-weather scenario leading to a reactive wind shear warning during approach x x x x circumstances that require a decision to perform a go-around, in addition to Adverse-weather scenario leading to a predictive wind shear warning during approach x x x x APP the execution of the go-around. Go- or go-around around scenarios should be fully Adverse-weather scenario, e.g. thunderstorm activity, heavy precipitation or icing x x x x APP developed to encourage effective forcing decision at or close to DA/MDA leadership and teamwork, in addition DA with visual reference in heavy precipitation with doubt about the runway surface x x x x APP to problem-solving and decision- braking capability APP making, plus execution using manual Adverse-wind scenario resulting in increasing tailwind below DA (not reported) x x x aircraft control or the flight r SBT Go-around Adverse-wind scenario including strong gusts and/or crosswind out of limits below DA x x x A APP management system(s) and L o management (not reported) automation as applicable. Design Adverse-wind scenario including strong gusts and/or crosswind out of limits below 15 m x x x EVA APP should include the element of (50 ft) (not reported) surprise, and scenario-based go- Lost or difficult communications resulting in no approach clearance prior to x x x APP arounds should not be predictable and commencement of approach or final descent anticipated. This topic is completely Birds: large flocks of birds below DA once visual reference has been established x x x APP distinct from the go-around manoeuvre listed in the MT section that is intended only to practise System malfunction, landing gear malfunction during the approach APP psychomotor skills and a simple application of the procedures.

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text: Issue 2, Amendment 17 se a n Description (includes type of Desired outcome Assessment and h o Guidance material (GM) cy ti t p a topic, being threat, error (includes performance criteria training topic en h iv Example scenario elements u or focus) OR training outcome) ig ct eq Fl a M W LM O

text: O N Fr PRO C FPA FPM LTW PSD SA W K

text: CLB Flight with unreliable airspeed, which may or may not be recoverable x x x X CRZ DES APP CLB Alternate flight control modes according to malfunction characteristics x x x X CRZ DES APP CLB ACAS RA requires the pilot to descend or ATC calls for immediate descent x x x CRZ DES APP TAWS warning when deviating from planned descent routing, requiring immediate x x x DES response Scenario immediately after take-off which requires an immediate and overweight x x x x TO Demonstrate manual aircraft landing TO control skills with smoothness and Adverse wind, crosswinds with or without strong gusts on take-off x x accuracy as appropriate to the Adverse weather, wind shear, wind shear encounter during take-off, with or without x x x TO situation. reactive warnings TO Detect deviations through Engine failure during initial climb, typically 30-60 m (100-200 ft) (autopilot off) x x x x instrument scanning. Wind shear encounter scenario during cruise, significant and rapid change in wind speed x x x x x r SBT Manual aircraft CRZ Controls the flight path through A Maintain spare mental capacity or down/updrafts, without wind shear warning L o control manual control during manual aircraft control. Adverse weather, wind shear, wind shear encounter with or without warning during x x x x APP EVA Maintain the aircraft within the approach normal flight envelope. Adverse weather, deterioration in visibility or cloud base, or adverse wind, requiring a x x x x x x x APP Apply knowledge of the go-around from visual circling approach, during the visual segment APP relationship between aircraft Interception of the glide slope from above (correlation with unstable approach training) x x x APP attitude, speed and thrust. Adverse wind, crosswinds with or without strong gusts on approach, final approach and x x x LDG landing (within and beyond limits) Adverse weather, adverse wind, approach and landing in demanding weather x x x APP conditions, e.g. turbulence, up and downdrafts, gusts and crosswinds including shifting LDG wind directions APP Circling approach manually flown at night in minimum in-flight visibility to ensure X X X X LDG ground reference, minimum environmental lighting and no glide slope guidance lights APP Runway incursion during approach, which can be triggered by ATC at various altitudes x x x LDG or by visual contact during the landing phase LDG Adverse wind, visibility, type-specific, special consideration for long-bodied aircraft, x x x x landing in minimum visibility for visual reference, with crosswind LDG System malfunction, auto flight failure at DA during a low-visibility approach requiring x x x x a go-around flown manually APP Approach planned with autoland, followed by a failure below 1 000 ft requiring a x x x x LDG manual go-around and an immediate landing due to fuel shortage TO In-seat instruction: x x x x

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text: Insufficient engine failure recovery, forcing the pilot monitoring to take over the flight controls APP In-seat instruction: x x x x LDG Unstable approach on short final or long landing, forcing the pilot monitoring to take over the flight controls

text: ALL The scenarios should be realistic and Deviations from the flight path, in pitch attitude, speed, altitude, bank angle x x relevant, and should be used for the In-seat instruction: x x purpose of demonstration and Simple automation errors (e.g. incorrect mode selection, attempted engagement ALL reinforcement of effective monitoring. without the necessary conditions, entering wrong altitude or speed, failure to execute the desired mode) culminating in a need for direct intervention from the pilot Modules in the FSTD should be treated Recognise mismanaged aircraft monitoring, and where necessary taking control. like those in an aircraft so that trainees state. In-seat instruction: x x x x APP have the opportunity to develop the Observe the pilot’s behaviour: how Unstable approach or speed/path/vertical rate not congruent with the required state competency with the practice of the the pilot is mitigating errors, for the given flight condition right techniques and attitudes related performing cross-checking, x x x to these topics through pilot monitoring performance and performance, and that instructors dealing with a mismanaged aircraft have the opportunity to assess and state, in order to ensure that train these topics in a realistic observed deviations, errors and Monitoring, environment. As shown by the EBT mistakes are taken as learning cross-checking, data report, these topics are of key opportunities throughout the error importance to improve safety in programme. A management, operations. Monitor flight path excursions. mismanaged Detect errors and threats through aircraft state In addition, the operator may also use proper cross-checking these topics to develop scripted role- performance. In-seat instruction: r SBT Demonstration exercise — recovery from bounced landing, adverse wind, strong gusts LDG playing scenarios in the form of ISI. Make appropriate interventions L o These scenarios cater for the need to either verbally or by taking control during landing phase, resulting in a bounce and necessitating recovery action from the monitor flight path excursions from if applicable. pilot monitoring EVA the instructor pilot (PF), detect errors Take appropriate action if and make appropriate interventions, necessary. either verbally or by taking control as Restore the desired aircraft state. applicable. Demonstration scenarios Identify and manage may also be used. Demonstrated role- consequences. play should contain realistic and not gross errors, leading at times to a mismanaged aircraft state, which can also be combined with upset management training. DES ATC or terrain-related environment creating a high-energy descent with the need to x x x APP Reinforce stabilised approach capture the optimum profile to complete the approach in a stabilised configuration philosophy and adherence to defined DES ATC or terrain-related environment creating a high-energy descent leading to unstable x x x parameters. Encourage go-arounds APP conditions and requiring a go-around Unstable when crews are outside these A Approach and landing in demanding weather conditions, e.g. turbulence, up and x x x approach APP parameters. Develop and sustain downdrafts, gusts and crosswinds including shifting wind directions competencies related to the APP Increasing tailwind on final approach (not reported) x x x x management of high-energy APP Crosswinds with or without strong gusts on approach, final approach and landing x x x situations. LDG (within and beyond limits)

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text: TO covered over a period not exceeding Severe wind shear or wake turbulence during take-off or approach x x x x Early recognition and prevention of APP 3 years. The elements are numbered upset conditions. r SBT CRZ with letters from A to I in Table 1 of As applicable and relevant to the aircraft type, demonstration at a suitable intermediate x x x

text: T o Upset prevention AMC1 ORO.FC.220&230. Each level, with turbulence as appropriate; practise steep turns and note the relationship B When the differences between LHS M training element is made up of several between bank angle, pitch and stalling speed L, and RHS are not significant in the CRZ numbered components. At the maximum cruise flight level for the current aircraft weight, turbulence to trigger x x x x handling of the aircraft, UPRT may EVA According to the principles of EBT, overspeed conditions (if FSTD capability exists, consider use of the vertical wind be conducted in either seat. covering one component should component to add realism)

text: conditions. CRZ High-altitude loss of reliable airspeed x x x x x

text: For full details, see the malfunction (i) System malfunctions that require immediate and urgent crew intervention or Intentionally blank

text: equivalency methodology. decision, e.g. fire, smoke, loss of pressurisation at high altitude, failures during take-

text: off, brake failure during landing.

text: Any internal failure(s) apparent or not (ii) System malfunctions that require complex procedures, e.g. multiple hydraulic

text: apparent to the crew system failures, smoke and fumes procedures, major electrical system failure.

text: (iii) System malfunctions that result in significant degradation of flight controls in Recognise system malfunction. combination with abnormal handling characteristics, e.g. jammed flight controls, ALL Any item cleared by the MEL but Take appropriate action including certain degradation of FBW control, jammed horizontal stabiliser; flaps and/or slats having an impact upon flight correct stop/go decision. locked; other malfunctions that result in degraded flight controls. operations — for instance, thrust Apply the appropriate procedure (iv) System failures that require monitoring and management of the flight path using reverser locked. correctly. degraded or alternative displays, unreliable primary flight path information, unreliable Aircraft system r SBT Maintain aircraft control. airspeed, e.g. flight with unreliable airspeed malfunctions, Malfunctions to be considered should T o Manage consequences. (v) System failures that require extensive management of their consequences including B have one or more of the following M Apply crew operating procedures (independent of operation or environment), e.g. fuel leak. L, operations under characteristics: TO where necessary. MEL items with crew operating procedures applicable during take-off x X MEL — Immediacy EVA Respond appropriately to — Complexity Response to an additional factor that is affected by an MEL item (e.g. system failure, x x x X TO additional system abnormalities — Degradation of aircraft control runway state) associated with MEL dispatch. GND — Loss of primary instrumentation Malfunction during preflight preparation and prior to departure x x x

text: CLB — Management of consequences Malfunction after departure x x x X

text: The operator should vary Malfunctions that require immediate attention (e.g. bleed fault during engine start, x x x ALL malfunctions for each characteristic hydraulic failure during taxi)

text: CLB over the EBT cycle. x x x X Fuel leak (management of consequences) CRZ

text: TO Unless specified otherwise in the Malfunction on take-off high speed below V1 x x x

text: TO operational suitability data, at least Malfunction on take-off high speed above V1 x x

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text: one malfunction with each During taxi to the runway, a spurious brake temperature announcement. The crew had GND X X X characteristic should be included in the correct brake temperature moments before the failure. TO every cycle. Combining characteristics Tyre failure during take-off x x x TO should not reduce the number of Malfunction on initial climb x x APP malfunctions below seven for each Malfunction on approach x x x APP cycle. For each crew member, the Malfunction on go-around x x x LDG characteristics of degraded control Malfunction during landing x x x x x and loss of instrumentation should be in the role of pilot flying and the others may be in the role of pilot flying or pilot monitoring.

text: For full details, see the malfunction equivalency methodology. TO Any engine failure or malfunction, Engine failure or engine malfunction on take-off low speed x x x x TO which causes loss or degradation of Engine failure or engine malfunction on take-off high speed below V1 x x x x Recognise engine failure. TO thrust that affects performance. This Engine failure or engine malfunction on take-off above V1 x x x x Take appropriate action. TO is distinct from the engine-out Engine failure or engine malfunction on initial climb x x x Apply the appropriate procedure Engine failure B APP manoeuvres described in the MT Engine malfunction x x x correctly. CRZ section above, which are intended Engine failure in cruise (with autopilot) x x x Maintain aircraft control. only to practise psychomotor skills Manage consequences. x LDG and reinforce procedures to manage Engine failure or engine malfunction on landing engine failures. r SBT Pilots should have opportunities to practise landings in demanding L o situations at the defined frequency. EVA Data indicates that landing problems have their roots in a variety of Landing in demanding This topic should be combined with the adverse-weather topic, aircraft system factors, including inappropriate Landing B LDG environmental conditions, with malfunctions topic or any topic that can provide exposure to a landing in demanding Intentionally blank decision-making, in addition to malfunctions as appropriate conditions. manual aircraft control skills if difficult environmental conditions exist. The purpose of this item is to ensure that pilots are exposed to this during the programme. The data analysed during the X X X development of the EBT concept Rejected take-off indicated substantial difficulties encountered by crews when faced with a threat or error, which was a surprise or an unexpected event. The element of surprise should be distinguished from what is sometimes referred to as the ‘startle factor’ — the latter being a physiological Exposure to an unexpected event r SBT reaction. Wherever possible, or sequence of events at the Surprise B ALL L o consideration should be given defined frequency in order to build EVA towards variations in the types of resilience. Intentionally blank Intentionally blank scenario, times of occurrences and types of occurrence, so that pilots do not become overly familiar with repetitions of the same scenarios. Variations should be the focus of EBT programme design, and not left to the discretion of individual instructors, in order to preserve programme integrity and fairness.

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text: ALL ATC clearance giving insufficient terrain clearance x x x Anticipate terrain threats. Demonstration of terrain avoidance warning systems (TAWS) (this scenario element ALL Prepare for terrain threats. x x x may be done in an ISI.) Recognise unsafe terrain clearance. TO Take appropriate action. r SBT Engine failure where performance is marginal leading to TAWS warning x x x Terrain B CLB Alert, warning, or conflict Apply the appropriate procedures L o DES correctly. ATC provides a wrong QNH x x EVA APP Maintain aircraft control.

text: Restore safe flight path. ‘Virtual mountain’ refers to the surprise element of an unexpected warning. Care should DES Manage consequences. be exercised in creating a level of realism, so this can best be achieved by an unusual x x x and unexpected change of route during the descent. This is not considered a topic for Intentionally blank Intentionally blank specific attention on its own, but more as a reminder to programme developers to ensure that pilots are Manage available resources Workload, r SBT exposed to immersive training efficiently to prioritise and perform distraction, B ALL L o scenarios which expose them to tasks in a timely manner under all pressure, stress manageable high workload and circumstances EVA distractions during the course of the EBT programme, at the defined frequency.

text: Fl O LM N PRO C FPA FPM LTW PSD SA W K

text: Section 7 — UPRT Upset recovery training topic with frequency (C). Evaluation phase, manoeuvres training phase or scenario-based training phase (EVAL, MT or SBT)

text: Compliance with AMC1 or AMC2 to The example scenario elements may be done in ISI, as non-ISI or a combination of ORO.FC.220&230 Recognise upset condition. both. If done in ISI: The instructor should position the aircraft within but close to the edge of Include the recovery exercises in Make timely and appropriate the validated training envelope before handing control to the trainee to demonstrate N/A the restoration of normal flight. Careful consideration should be given to flying within Intentionally blank Table 2 of AMC1 ORO.FC.220&230 for intervention. the recurrent training programme, Take appropriate action. the validated training envelope.

text: such that all the exercises are Assure timely and appropriate Table2 of AMC1 ORO.FC.220&230: Exercises for upset recovery training covered over a period not exceeding intervention. (AMC1 A. Recovery from developed upsets 3 years. According to the principles of ORO.FC.220&230 Table 2 Recovery from stall events in the following configurations: EBT, covering one component should component 1) satisfy the requirement to cover the — take-off configuration, CLB whole element of recovery from Assure aircraft control. developed upsets. The same Maintain or restore a safe flight 2. — clean configuration low altitude, x x x x DES r SBT Upset recovery C principles apply to the exercises of path. o — clean configuration near maximum operating altitude, and components 2, 3 and 4 where one MT exercise may satisfy the requirement Assess consequential issues. — landing configuration during the approach phase. to cover the whole component. Manage outcomes. CRZ 3. Recovery from nose high at various bank angles x x x x An aeroplane upset is defined as an CRZ x x x x undesired aeroplane state in flight Consolidate the summary of 4. Recovery from nose low at various bank angles CRZ characterised by unintentional aeroplane recovery techniques. divergences from parameters (AMC1 ORO.FC.220&230 Table 2 Demonstration at a normal cruising altitude. Set conditions and disable aircraft x x x APP normally experienced during line component 5) systems as necessary to enable trainee to perform stall recovery according to OEM operations or training. An aeroplane instructions. upset may involve pitch and/or bank Note: The operator should assess if Demonstration at an intermediate altitude during early stages of the approach. Set x x x CLB angle divergences as well as the exercises should be practised conditions and disable aircraft systems as necessary to enable trainee to perform stall DES inappropriate airspeeds for the for the either seat qualification. recovery according to OEM instructions.

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text: Fl O LM N PRO C FPA FPM LTW PSD SA W K

text: APP Wind exceeding limits on final approach (reported) in manual aircraft control x x x x Recognise adverse-wind APP Increasing tailwind on final approach (not reported) x x x x conditions. Adverse wind/crosswind. This Approach and landing in demanding weather conditions, e.g. turbulence, up and x x x APP Observe limitations. Adverse wind C includes tailwind but not ATC mis- downdrafts, gusts and crosswind including shifting wind directions Apply the appropriate procedures. APP reporting of the actual wind. Adverse-wind scenario resulting in increasing tailwind below DA (not reported) x x x Maintain directional control and safe flight path. Adverse-wind scenario including strong gusts and/or crosswind out of limits below DA x x x r SBT APP (not reported) L o Adverse-wind scenario including strong gusts and/or crosswind out of limits below x x x APP EVA 15 m (50 ft) (not reported)

text: LDG (within and beyond limits)

text: Observe aircraft and/or procedural Approach in poor visibility with deteriorations necessitating a decision to perform a x x x APP Approach, limitations. go-around Any situation where visibility visibility close to C Apply the appropriate procedures x x x becomes a threat minimum if applicable. LDG Landing in poor visibility Maintain directional control and

text: safe flight path.

text: ALL ATC role-play: the instructor provides scripted instructions, as a distraction to the crew x x x ALL ATC error. Omission, Controller error, provided by the instructor according to a defined scripted scenario x x x x Respond to communications ALL miscommunication, garbled, poor Frequency congestion, with multiple aircraft using the same frequency x appropriately. quality transmission. All these act as APP Recognise, clarify and resolve any Destination temporarily closed x x x x r SBT distractions to be managed by the CRZ ambiguities. Rescue and firefighting services (RFFS) level reduction at destination x x x L o ATC C crew. The scenarios should be Refuse or question unsafe Runway change before the interception of the localiser or similar navigation aid in x x x x APP combined, where possible, with EVA instructions. azimuth others of the same or higher GND/ Use standard phraseology x x x weighting, the principal reason being Stray dogs at the opposite threshold runway TO whenever possible. to create distractions. ALL Poor quality transmissions x

text: GND Fire during taxi x x x x X

text: TO Take-off low speed x x x x X

text: TO Fire or smoke on take-off high speed below V1 x x x x Recognise fire, smoke or fumes TO Fire or smoke on take-off high speed above V1 x x x Take appropriate action. TO This includes engine, electric, Fire or smoke on Initial climb x x x r SBT Fire and smoke Apply the appropriate procedure C CRZ pneumatic, cargo fire, smoke or Cargo fire x x x L o management correctly. APP fumes. Engine fire in approach (extinguishable) x x Maintain aircraft control. EVA APP Engine fire in approach (non-extinguishable) x x x Manage consequences. CLB

text: DES

text: APP Flight deck or cabin fire x x x X

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text: consequences. Braking action reported ‘medium’. The information is transmitted just before take- x x x GND off. The flight is subject to a calculated take-off time (CTOT) — ATC slot.

text: External failure or a combination of external failures degrading aircraft navigation x x x x GND performance on ground

text: TO x x x x

text: APP performance in flight

text: LDG Recognise a NAV degradation.

text: Take appropriate action. Standard initial departure change during taxi. The flight may be subject to a CTOT — GND External NAV failure. x x x Execute the appropriate procedure ATC slot. Navigation C Loss of GPS satellite, ANP exceeding APP as applicable. Loss of runway lighting below decision height x x x RNP, loss of external NAV source(s) Use alternative NAV guidance. No fly zone: when the crew changes control frequency, the new ATCO informs the crew

text: Manage consequences. that they are flying over an unannounced ‘no fly zone’ that is not included in the r SBT L o NOTAMs. (To trigger such an event, the context may be as follows: an unexpected

text: CRZ military conflict in the territory the aircraft is flying over or the crew is forced to re- x x x EVA route in flight and the new route flies over a city that has an important event such the

text: The operator should comply with

text: publication (AIP).

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text: Recognise incapacitation.

text: Manage consequences.

text: GND x X Recognise hazardous runway Planned anticipated hazardous conditions with dispatch information provided to TO condition. facilitate planning and execution of appropriate procedures LDG Contamination or surface quality of Observe limitations. r SBT Runway or GND x x x C the runway, taxiway, or tarmac Take appropriate action. Unanticipated hazardous conditions, e.g. unexpected heavy rain resulting in flooded L o taxiway condition TO including foreign objects Apply the appropriate procedures runway surface LDG EVA correctly. TO Take-off on runway with reduced cleared width due to snow x x x x Assure aircraft control. TO Stop/go decision in hazardous conditions x x x

text: Anticipate potential loss of

text: separation.

text: Maintain aircraft control.

text: Manage consequences.

text: Anticipate potential for wind

text: shear.

text: Avoid known wind shear or r SBT TO prepare for suspected wind shear. Predictive wind shear warning during take-off x x L o Recognise wind shear encounter.

text: EVA With or without warnings including Take appropriate action.

text: predictive. A wind shear scenario is Apply the appropriate procedure Wind shear C ideally combined with an adverse- correctly. recovery TO Wind shear encounter during take-off x x x weather scenario containing other Assure aircraft control. TO Wind shear encounter after rotation x x elements. Recognise out of wind shear TO Predictive wind shear after rotation x x condition. APP Maintain or restore a safe flight Predictive wind shear during approach x x x

text: APP path. Wind shear encounter during go-around x x x x

text: Assess consequential issues and APP Wind shear encounter during approach x x x manage outcomes.

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text: AMC7 ORO.FC232 EBT programme assessment and training topics

text: GENERATION 1 (JET) — EBT PROGRAMME — TABLE OF ASSESSMENT AND TRAINING TOPICS

text: Given the very small number of turbo-jet aeroplanes of the first generation in current use in commercial air transport operations and the lack of appropriate FSTDs for recurrent training, it has not been deemed possible to provide a table of assessment and training topics for those aeroplanes and therefore it is not possible to apply EBT. Annex III to ED Decision 2021/002/R Page 111 of 119 AMC and GM to Part-ORO of

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text: AMC8 ORO.FC.232 EBT programme assessment and training topics

text: SCENARIO ELEMENTS AND COMPETENCY MAPPING (a) The operator may develop scenario elements and a competency map that are more relevant to its operation. (b) When developing scenario elements, the operator should ensure that there can be no negative training when asking pilots to induce their own errors. (c) Competencies mapped are those considered critical in managing the scenario. They are determined according to the following principles: (1) those competencies considered most critical to the successful management of the defined threat or error; or (2) those competencies most likely to be linked to the root cause of poor performance in the case of unsuccessful management of a defined threat or error. (d) The competency map may indicate scenarios or combinations of scenarios for development of particular competencies. (e) The competency map indicates the most critical competencies suggested by design, but the instructor should always assess all observed competencies.

text: GM1 ORO.FC.232 EBT programme assessment and training topics

text: TABLE OF ASSESSMENT AND TRAINING TOPICS (a) The assessment and training topics usually have several example scenario elements. At least one example scenario element is selected (e.g. Gen 4 topic ‘Go-around’ in MT has three example scenario elements — the operator may choose one at each module (frequency A)). (b) Flight phase for activation: Abbreviation Flight phase Description GND (1) Flight planning, Ground phases up to when the crew increases thrust for taking-off preflight, engine start & taxi-out Taxi-in, engine From the speed that permits the aircraft to be manoeuvred by means of shutdown, post- taxiing for arriving at a parking area until the crew completes post-flight flight & flight and flight closing duties. closing TO (2) Take-off This phase begins when the crew increases the thrust for taking-off. It ends after the speed and configuration are established at a defined manoeuvring altitude or to continue the climb for cruise. CLB (3) Climb This phase begins when the crew establishes the aircraft at a defined speed and configuration enabling the aircraft to increase altitude for the purpose of cruise. It ends with the aircraft established at a predetermined constant

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text: Abbreviation Flight phase Description initial cruise altitude at a defined speed. CRZ (4) Cruise The cruise phase begins when the crew establishes the aircraft at a defined speed and predetermined constant initial cruise altitude and proceeds in the direction of a destination. It ends with the beginning of descent for an approach. DES (5) Descent This phase begins when the crew departs the cruise altitude for an approach at a particular destination. It ends when the crew initiates changes in aircraft configuration and/or speed to facilitate a landing on a particular runway. APP (6) Approach This phase begins when the crew initiates changes in aircraft configuration and/or speeds enabling the aircraft to manoeuvre for landing on a particular runway. It ends when the aircraft is in the landing configuration and the crew is dedicated to land on a specific runway. It also includes goaround where the crew aborts the descent to the planned landing runway during the approach phase. Go-around ends after speed and configuration are established at a defined manoeuvring altitude or to continue the climb for cruise. LDG (7) Landing This phase begins when the aircraft is in the landing configuration and the crew is dedicated to touchdown on a specific runway. It ends when the speed permits the aircraft to be manoeuvred by means of taxiing for arrival at a parking area. ALL (8) All Any or all phases of flight

text: GM2 ORO.FC.232 EBT programme assessment and training topics

text: COMPETENCY MAP PROCESS Note 1. The competency map process may be done in teams of instructors. Then the results are compared and reconciled by a small group of subject matter experts (SMEs). Note 2. It is always easy to map SAW or KNO as the underlying competency, but there are almost invariably other competencies, especially when there is ineffective management, so the intent should be to balance the mapping of SAW or KNO and map the other predominant competencies within the scenario.

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text: AMC1 ORO.FC.232(b)(1) EBT programme assessment and training topics

text: EBT DATA REPORT (a) The data report is a large-scale comprehensive study of operational data. It identifies the areas of pilot training for improvement, providing the prioritisation of germane and relevant training topics to guide in the construction of suitable EBT programmes. The data report uses other studies, a variety of data sources and/or varied methodology to mitigate the inherent bias associated with individual types of data sources. (b) The data report should: (1) be endorsed or developed by the competent authority, EASA or ICAO; (2) be reviewed by a team of experts in pilot training, representing airline operators, pilot associations, regulators, and original equipment manufacturers (OEM); (3) use data or information (training data, operational data and safety data) from the following sources: (i) accident investigation bodies; (ii) competent authorities; (iii) OEM — aircraft; (iv) EASA safety information; (v) operators; and (vi) studies or reports (aviation or scientific); (4) analyse the data with the following objectives: (i) to substantiate the need for change in the assessment and training programmes for commercial transport pilots; (ii) to provide evidence from data analyses to support the derivation of training topics, prioritised according to aircraft generation; (iii) to challenge and/or corroborate the other sources of data (e.g. Training Criticality Survey and Training Guidance) with operational data; (iv) to provide feedback regarding the effectiveness of changes implemented through the adoption of competency-based training methodologies; and (v) to validate or ascertain practices, findings or conclusions made previously by the industry; (5) include the studies and define the use of such studies in the data report following the criteria below: (i) The study is relevant from a training perspective (e.g. if incorporating a training change mitigates the risk found in the study). (ii) There is evidence that it will assist with the identification of competencies to be

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text: developed in training in order to mitigate risks encountered in the evolving operational environment. (iii) The findings of the study will be corroborative or challenging across the spectrum of the analysis made in the data report. (iv) The study allows the analysis and comparison of the data or findings in the data report and it is coming from industry-respected research or studies; (6) include an evidence table for the purpose of: (i) integrating the evidence of the analyses in points (4) and (5); (ii) identifying meaningful patterns; (iii) enabling the grouping of evidence to support the key findings; and (iv) facilitating the prioritisation of results; and (7) include a prioritisation of the training topics for the purpose of translating data into useful events and scenarios to assess and develop pilot performance (assessment and training topics). The prioritisation shall: (i) systematically rank threats, errors and competencies along with the factors leading to accidents and serious incidents from multiple data sources to formulate a table of assessment and training topics; (ii) be performed for each of the generations of aircraft. This allows highlighting the differences and commonalities between generations; and (iii) ensure sufficient flexibility in the process to allow enhancement of the training programmes according to the type of operation, culture and type of aircraft.

text: AMC1 ORO.FC.232(b)(3) EBT programme assessment and training topics

text: AIRCRAFT TYPES BY GENERATIONS The operator should only develop an EBT programme for aircraft types for which there is a table of assessment and training topics. Generation 4 From 1988. A318/A319/A320/A321 (including — Jet) EFIS cockpit — FMS equipped neo), A330, A340-200/300, A340- FADEC 500/600, B777, A380, B787, Fly-by-wire control systems A350, Bombardier C Series Advanced flight envelope protection (A220), Embraer Integrated auto flight control system — navigation E170/E175/E190/E195 performance, and terrain avoidance systems Generation fatal accident average rate: 0,1/million flights Generation 3 A310/A300-600, B737- From 1969 — Jet 300/400/500, B737-600/700/800 EFIS cockpit — FMS equipped (NG), B737 MAX, B757, B767, FADEC B747-400, B747-8, B717, BAE

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text: Integrated auto flight control system — navigation 146, MD11, MD80, MD90, F70, performance, and terrain avoidance systems F100, Bombardier CRJ Series, Basic flight envelope protection — stick shaker/pusher Embraer ERJ 135/145 Generation fatal accident average rate: 0,2/million flights Generation 3 From 1992 ATR 42-600, ATR 72-600, — Turboprop EFIS cockpit — FMS equipped Bombardier Dash 8-400, BAE ATP, EEC/ECU or higher engine control Saab 2000 Integrated auto flight control system — navigation performance and terrain avoidance systems Basic flight envelope protection — stick shaker/pusher Generation 2 From 1964. A300 (except A300-600), BAC111, — Jet Integrated auto-flight system. B727, B737-100/200, B747- EEC/ECU or higher engine control 100/200/300, DC9, DC10, F28, Analogue/CRT instrument display L1011 Basic flight envelope protection — stick shaker/pusher Generation fatal accident average rate: 0,7/million flights Generation 2 ATR 42, ATR 72 (all series except - From 1964 — Turboprop 600), BAE J-41, Fokker F27/50, Analogue/CRT instrument display Bombardier Dash 7 and Dash 8- EEC/ECU 100/200/300 Series, Convair 580- Basic flight envelope protection — stick shaker/pusher 600 Series, Shorts 330 and 360, Integrated auto flight control system Saab 340, Embraer 120 Generation 1 From 1952 DC8, B707 — Jet First commercial jets. Manual engine control Analogue instrument display Not integrated auto flight control system Basic flight envelope protection — stick shaker/pusher, attitude warning Generation fatal accident average rate: 3.0/million flights

text: AMC1 ORO.FC.240 Operation on more than one type or variant

text: GENERAL (a) Aeroplanes (1) When a flight crew member operates more than one aeroplane class, type or variant, as determined by the operational suitability data established in accordance with

text: Commission Regulation (EU) No 748/2012

text: for class-single pilot or type-single pilot, but not within a single licence endorsement, the operator should ensure that the flight crew member does not operate more than: (i) three reciprocating engine aeroplane types or variants; (ii) three turbo-propeller aeroplane types or variants; (iii) one turbo-propeller aeroplane type or variant and one reciprocating engine aeroplane type or variant; or

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text: (iv) one turbo-propeller aeroplane type or variant and any aeroplane within a particular class. (2) When a flight crew member operates more than one aeroplane type or variant within one or more licence endorsement, as determined by the operational suitability data established in accordance with

text: Commission Regulation (EU) No 748/2012

text: , the operator should ensure that: (i) the minimum flight crew complement specified in the operations manual is the same for each type or variant to be operated; (ii) the flight crew member does not operate more than two aeroplane types or variants for which a separate licence endorsement is required, unless credits related to the training, checking, and recent experience requirements are defined in the operational suitability data established in accordance with

text: Commission Regulation (EU) No 748/2012

text: for the relevant types or variants; and (iii) only aeroplanes within one licence endorsement are flown in any one flight duty period, unless the operator has established procedures to ensure adequate time for preparation. (3) When a flight crew member operates more than one aeroplane type or variant as determined by the operational suitability data established in accordance with

text: Commission Regulation (EU) No 748/2012

text: for type-single pilot and type-multi pilot, but not within a single licence endorsement, the operator should comply with points (a)(2) and (4). (4) When a flight crew member operates more than one aeroplane type or variant as determined by the operational suitability data established in accordance with

text: Commission Regulation (EU) No 748/2012

text: for type multi-pilot, but not within a single licence endorsement, or combinations of aeroplane types or variants as determined by the operational suitability data established in accordance with

text: Commission Regulation (EU) No 748/2012

text: for class single-pilot and type multi-pilot, the operator should comply with the following: (i) point (a)(2); (ii) before exercising the privileges of more than one licence endorsement: (A) flight crew members should have completed two consecutive operator proficiency checks OPCs and should have: — 500 hours in the relevant crew position in CAT operations with the same operator; or — for IFR and VFR night operations with performance class B aeroplanes, 100 hours or flight sectors in the relevant crew position in CAT operations with the same operator, if at least one licence endorsement is related to a class. A check flight should be completed before the pilot is released for duties as commander;

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text: (B) in the case of a pilot having experience with an operator and exercising the privileges of more than one licence endorsement, and then being promoted to command with the same operator on one of those types, the required minimum experience as commander is 6 months and 300 hours, and the pilot should have completed two consecutive operator proficiency checks OPCs before again being eligible to exercise more than one licence endorsement; (iii) before commencing training for and operation of another type or variant, flight crew members should have completed 3 months and 150 hours flying on the base aeroplane, which should include at least one proficiency check, unless credits related to the training, checking and recent experience requirements are defined in the operational suitability data established in accordance with

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text: for the relevant types or variants; (iv) after completion of the initial line check on the new type, 50 hours flying or 20 sectors should be achieved solely on aeroplanes of the new type rating, unless credits related to the training, checking and recent experience requirements are defined in the operational suitability data established in accordance with

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text: for the relevant types or variants; (v) recent experience requirements established in

text: Commission Regulation (EU) No 1178/2011

text: for each type operated; (vi) the period within which line flying experience is required on each type should be specified in the operations manual; (vii) when credits are defined in the operational suitability data established in accordance with

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text: for the relevant type or variant, this should be reflected in the training required in ORO.FC.230 and: (A) ORO.FC.230 (b) requires two operator proficiency checks OPCs every year. When credits are defined in the operational suitability data established in accordance with

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text: for operator proficiency checks OPCs to alternate between the types, each operator proficiency check OPC should revalidate the operator proficiency check OPC for the other type(s). The operator proficiency check OPC may be combined with the proficiency checks for revalidation or renewal of the aeroplane type rating or the instrument rating in accordance with

text: Commission Regulation (EU) No 1178/2011

text: . For EBT programmes, ORO.FC.231(a)(3) requires the pilot to complete a minimum of two modules of the EBT programme, separated by a period of more than 3 months, within a 12-month period. In addition, the pilot is required to be trained according to assessment and training topics distributed across a 3-year period at the defined frequency relevant to the type or variant of aircraft. When credits are defined in the operational suitability data established in accordance with

text: Commission Regulation (EU) No 748/2012

text: , EBT modules should alternate between types. The EBT modules may be combined for revalidation or renewal of the

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text: aeroplane type rating or the instrument rating in accordance with

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text: . When operating more than one type of different generations, the operator has to fulfil both generation table of assessment and training topics as per ORO.FC.232. (B) ORO.FC.230 (c) requires one line check every year. When credits are defined in the operational suitability data established in accordance with

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text: for line checks to alternate between types or variants, each line check should revalidate the line check for the other type or variant. For EBT programmes, ORO.FC.231(h) requires one line evaluation of competence every year. When credits are defined in the operational suitability data established in accordance with

text: Commission Regulation (EU) No 748/2012

text: for line evaluation of competence to alternate between types or variants, each line evaluation of competence should revalidate the line evaluation of competence for the other type or variant. In such case, the operator should meet the requirements to extend the validity of the line evaluation of competence to 2 years. Extension to 3 years should not be allowed. (C) Annual emergency and safety equipment training and checking should cover all requirements for each type. (b) Helicopters […]

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