text: OJ L 139, 11.5.1998, p. 1. Regulation as last amended by

text: Regulation (EC) No 1647/2006

text: (OJ L 309, 9.11.2006, p. 2).

text: OJ L 139, 11.5.1998, p. 6. Regulation as amended by

text: Regulation (EC) No 423/1999

text: (OJ L 52, 27.2.1999, p. 2).

text: See ECB Opinion

text: of 23 April 2002 at the request of the Finnish Ministry of Finance on a draft proposal concerning the issue of commemorative coins in Finland and ECB Opinion

text: of 28 April 2006 at the request of the Portuguese Ministry of Finance and Public Administration on a draft decree-law on the issue, minting, putting into circulation and marketing of coins. 8 See

text: Article 3

text: (a) of the

text: Commission Recommendation 2003/734/EC of 29 September 2003

text: on a common practice for changes to the design of national obverse sides of euro circulation coins (OJ L 264, 15.10.2003, p. 38).

text: Available on the European Commission’s website at www.europa.eu.int.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 21 February 2007 at the request of the Slovenian Ministry of Finance on a draft law on occasional coins (CON/2007/5)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 21 February 2007 at the request of the Slovenian Ministry of Finance on a draft law on occasional coins (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 11 January 2007 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Slovenian Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft law on occasional coins (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Article 105(4) of the Treaty establishing the European Community and the first and second indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to currency matters and means of payment. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The objective of the draft law is to align national legislative provisions concerning the issuance of commemorative and collector euro coins with relevant EU legislation, namely

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 974/98 of 3 May 1998

text: on the introduction of the euro ,

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 975/98 of 3 May 1998

text: on denominations and technical specifications of euro coins intended for circulation ,

text: on a common practice for changes to the design of national obverse sides of euro circulation coins and

text: Commission Recommendation 2005/491/EC of 3 June 2005

text: on common guidelines for the national sides of euro circulation coins . 1.2 The draft law introduces the distinction between collector and commemorative coins, whereby commemorative coins will be identical to normal 2-euro circulation coins in terms of dimension and physical and chemical characteristics, and collector coins will be made out of gold, silver or other metals as determined by the Slovenian government. Pursuant to the draft law,

text: commemorative coins will have the status of legal tender in the euro area Member States, while collector coins will have the status of legal tender only in Slovenia.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 The ECB welcomes the issue of collector and commemorative coins respecting the individual numismatic traditions and practices of the Member States . The draft law aims at establishing a regime that is compatible with the relevant EU legislation, and in particular with the requirement that issuing coins is subject to the ECB’s prior approval of the volume of the issue. Accordingly, the ECB has the exclusive right to approve the overall volume of coins, including collector and commemorative circulation coins. 2.2 The ECB would like to draw attention to Decision ECB/2006/19 of 24 November 2006 on the approval of the volume of coin issuance in 2007 laying down the approved volume of euro coins to be issued by the participating Member States in 2007. Article 1 of this Decision specifies the issuance of coins intended for circulation and issuance of collector coins (not intended for circulation). Therefore, the ECB’s approval for the volume of commemorative coins to be issued by Slovenia should be sought on an aggregate basis together with the yearly estimates of the volume of euro coins to be issued by Slovenia.

text: 3. Specific observations

text: Commemorative coins

text: 3.1 Article 4 of the draft law specifies the main characteristics of commemorative coins. In addition to the characteristics already set out in this Article, for reasons of legal clarity, the ECB advises rewording the second sentence of

text: Article 4(1)

text: to include the requirement that the national side should bear 12 stars surrounding the design and the year mark . 3.2 Moreover, the ECB recommends that

text: Article 4(4)

text: concerning prior consultation with the Member States regarding the appearance of the national side also specifies that the European Commission should be informed about an intended issue of commemorative coins at least 6 months before the coins are issued. 3.3

text: Article 4(5)

text: provides that ‘[c]ommemorative coins shall be sold at a price that may be higher than their nominal value. The price of commemorative coins shall be determined by Banka Slovenije, subject to the consent of the Ministry in charge of finance’. The ECB understands that this Article refers exclusively to the sale of commemorative coins by Banka Slovenije, while such coins will be

text: issued at face value. This means, in particular, that commemorative coins are issued at their face value, and any difference in price between the face value and the selling price does not have an impact on the volume (based on face value) of coins in circulation.

text: Collector coins

text: 3.4 Article 5 of the draft law contains provisions regarding collector coins. The ECB suggests that decisions regarding the nominal value of such coins to be adopted by the Slovenian Government ensure that collector coins to be issued fulfil the criteria adopted by the ECOFIN Council of 23 November 1998 and 5 November 2002 . The ECB would also like to point out that collector coins have different visual characteristics than normal circulation coins. In this respect, the ECB suggests amending

text: Article 5(4)

text: to clarify that the design on the obverse side of collector coins should, at a minimum, differ slightly from the national design for circulation coins and that collector coins should differ significantly from circulation coins with regard to at least two of the following characteristics: colour, diameter and weight. In addition, the ECB would like to point out that while collector coins will have the status of legal tender only in Slovenia, the issuing Member State, the national central banks of the Eurosystem should be able to impose certain conditions and fees for possible arrangements through which owners of euro collector coins issued in other euro area Member States can receive the face values of those coins.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 21 February 2007.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: See ECB Opinion

text: of 2 August 2001 on a draft Seventh Law amending the Deutsche Bundesbank Act. 3 See ECB Opinions

text: of 25 August 2006 at the request of the Banca d’Italia on the amended Statute of the Banca d’Italia,

text: of 11 May 2004 at the request of the Italian Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance on a draft law on the protection of savings,

text: of 22 June 2006 at the request of the French Senate on draft law on the Banque de France and

text: of 4 November 2004 at the request of the Hungarian Ministry of Finance on a draft law amending the Law on Magyar Nemzeti Bank. 4 See the above mentioned opinions.

publisher: Europeiska centralbanken

sprak: en

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 7 March 2007 at the request of the German Ministry of Finance on a draft Eighth Law amending the Law on the Deutsche Bundesbank (CON/2007/6)

serie: con

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 7 March 2007 at the request of the German Ministry of Finance on a draft Eighth Law amending the Law on the Deutsche Bundesbank (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

type: rubrik

text: On 5 February 2007 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the German Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft Eighth Law amending the Law on the Deutsche Bundesbank (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Article 105(4) of the Treaty establishing the European Community and the third indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to a national central bank. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

type: stycke

text: 1. Purpose of the draft

text: The draft law reduces the number of Executive Board members of the Deutsche Bundesbank (hereinafter the ‘Executive Board’) from eight to six members and is aimed at making the Bundesbank’s decisionmaking body more efficient. According to the Law on the Deutsche Bundesbank currently in force, the Executive Board is composed of eight members, namely the President, the Vice-President and six other members, whereby the President, Vice-President and two other members are nominated by the Federal Government and four other members are nominated by the Bundesrat (the Upper House of Parliament). By means of the draft law, the Executive Board will be reduced to six members, namely the President, the Vice-President and four other members, whereby the President, Vice President and one other member will be nominated by the Federal Government and three other members will be nominated by the Bundesrat. Furthermore, the draft law amends the provision concerning the nomination of the Executive Board members under §7(3) by inserting a new sentence whereby the Bundesrat may propose a nominee for Vice-President to the Federal Government. The draft law also provides for an amendment of the transitional provision under §45 by introducing a transitional regime effective until 30 April 2009, during

text: which the Executive Board may consist of seven members (the President, Vice-President and five other members).

text: 2. The ECB’s observations

text: 2.1 The ECB welcomes the proposed amendments. Establishing a more efficient decision-making structure within the Deutsche Bundesbank was also the express intention of the Seventh Law amending the Deutsche Bundesbank of 2002 , and the current draft law represents a further measure to achieve this aim. 2.2 As regards the transitional regime effective until 30 April 2009 under §45 of the draft law, the ECB notes, as in earlier opinions , that it should be compatible with Article 14.2 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and the European Central Bank. 2.3 In general, the principle of personal independence, as laid down in Article 14.2 of the Statute requires that the same rules for the security of tenure of office of Governor apply to other members of NCB decision making-bodies involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks. This applies in particular where a governor is first among equals between colleagues with equivalent voting rights. Thus, any NCB reorganisation measure affecting the tenure of office of the members of its decision-making bodies involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks should foresee that they continue to perform their duties until the end of their appointed term, in accordance with Article 14.2 of the Statute .

text: 2.4. The ECB notes that the end of the transitional regime coincides with the expiry of the terms of office of two current Executive Board members. This will allow the reduction of Executive Board members to six without termination of their term of office before its expiry. Since all members of the Executive Board will therefore be able to complete their term of office, the draft law does not affect the tenure of office of the Executive Board members, i.e. the principle of personal independence. In view of the above, the ECB has no comments on §45 of the draft law.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 7 March 2007.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET

type: vagledning

utgivare: ecb


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: Published in the Staatsblad (the Dutch Official Journal) No 475 of 31 October 2006. The date of entry into force of 1 January 2007 is laid down in Decision of 11 December 2006 published in the Staatsblad No 664 of 20 December 2006. See also ECB Opinion

text: of 25 April 2006 on the Dutch draft law concerning financial sector supervision.

text: Currently the Law contains 5 parts: the General Part, Market Access Financial Undertakings, Prudential Supervision Financial Undertakings, Market Conduct Supervision Financial Undertakings, and Market Conduct Supervision Financial Markets.

text: Available on the Bank for International Settlement’s website at www.bis.org.

text: See ECB Opinion

text: of 7 August 2003 at the request of the Banca d’Italia on a draft regulation on payment systems, payment infrastructures and payment instruments, p. 3.

text: On 30 November 2006 Equens was formed following the merger of Interpay and Transaktionsinstitut für Zahlungsverkehrsdienstleistungen AG.

text: IMF Country Report, No 04/310 of September 2004, p. 166, available on the IMF’s website at www.imf.org.

text: Bankwet 1998 (Bank Act 1998 ), Staatsblad 26 March 1998, p. 200.

text: Staatsblad 1977, No 333, as last amended by the Law of 25 June 1998, Staatsblad No 446.

text: Section 1.1(c) defines settlement services as the performance of ‘activities for the purpose of managing, safeguarding and administrating financial instruments and facilitating the processing of transactions in financial instruments by funds transfer’.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 15 March 2007 at the request of the Dutch Ministry of Finance on a draft law concerning systemic oversight of settlement institutions (CON/2007/7)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 15 March 2007 at the request of the Dutch Ministry of Finance on a draft law concerning systemic oversight of settlement institutions (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 5 February 2007 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Dutch Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft law concerning systemic oversight of clearing and settlement institutions (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Article 105(4) of the Treaty establishing the European Community and the third and fifth indents of

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) and payment and settlement systems. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: The draft law will amend the Law on financial sector supervision (hereinafter the ‘LFSS’) by adding a Part 6 concerning systemic oversight of clearing and settlement institutions . This is aimed at achieving an efficient system to supervise the safety and reliability of payments clearing and settlement services and securities clearing and settlement services, in order to safeguard financial infrastructure stability. Adequate supervision of clearing and settlement institutions’ compliance with the relevant rules will increase confidence in the financial sector by managing risks associated with the provision of clearing and settlement services and by establishing clear rules for market participants. To this end, the draft law provides the financial market supervisors, DNB and the Autoriteit Financiële Markten (AFM, Authority for the Financial Markets), with the legal instruments necessary for enforcing supervisory measures. In particular, the supervisors can require participants to comply with a certain line of conduct, appoint one or more persons as liquidator, impose incremental penalty payments and impose administrative penalties.

text: Furthermore, the supervisors may modify, withdraw fully or in part, or attach conditions to, an authorisation. The draft law adopts a functional approach by referring to clearing and settlement services instead of clearing and settlement systems.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 As a rule, systemic supervision aims at preventing financial problems encountered by one financial institution from spreading to other financial institutions and to the financial markets. The ECB understands that systemic oversight under the draft law is limited to clearing and settlement institutions and is aimed at ensuring the timely completion of clearing and settlement services, efficiency and the mitigation of legal, settlement, operational and financial risks. Moreover, the draft law is also intended to prevent one participant’s default from causing another participant to default, which may disrupt the financial infrastructure or, in the worst-case scenario trigger a systemic crisis. To this end, the draft law implements the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems and the International Organization of Securities Commissions’ (CPSS-IOSCO) recommendations for securities settlement systems and the CPSS Core Principles for Systemically Important Payment Systems . The ECB takes the view that the draft law should clarify that DNB continues to conduct oversight within the common Eurosystem oversight policy framework . 2.2 The clearing and settlement institutions that currently operate on the market are: (i) Equens , for payments clearing; (ii) LCH.Clearnet, as central counterparty for transactions in financial instruments; and (iii) Euroclear Netherlands/Necigef, for financial instruments settlement. The draft law does not apply to the Dutch real-time gross settlement payment system, TOP, since DNB is not a clearing and settlement institution, clearing institution or credit institution within the meaning of the draft law. 2.3 The ECB also notes that the draft law is a response by the Dutch authorities to the IMF Country Report assessment of the Netherlands which states that ‘[i]f the new Act makes it clear that e.g., an institution that operates as a central counterparty or a securities settlement system, are subject to direct supervision, and that the roles of DNB and AFM are clear, Recommendation 18 would be observed’ . 2.4 The ECB understands that payment products are not covered by the draft law and that DNB continues to conduct oversight of payment products, based on its task of promoting the smooth operation of the payment system laid down in Article 105(2) of the Treaty and

text: Article 3.1

text: and Article 22 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central

text: Bank, as well as the Eurosystem’s common oversight policy framework and

text: Article 3(1)

text: (e) and Article 4(2) of the Law on DNB . 2.5 The ECB also notes that under Section 6.21, the Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit (the Dutch Competition Authority) can impose measures, with regard to prices charged for clearing and settlement services, after receiving authorisation from the Minister for Finance, who must consult DNB and the AFM prior to granting such authorisation. These provisions are aimed at establishing objective, transparent and non-discriminatory prices. 2.6 The ECB welcomes the introduction of direct systemic supervision as it greatly improves transparency and accountability and provides the financial market supervisors with a clear basis for enforcing measures with regard to systemic, prudential and market conduct supervision.

text: 3. DNB’s oversight of payment systems

text: 3.1 In Opinion

text: , the ECB noted that certain parts of the LFSS did not distinguish between DNB’s Eurosystem- and non Eurosystem-related tasks. Under the LFSS, the AFM supervises the market conduct of financial institutions, including clearing and settlement institutions. The draft law provides that the AFM will supervise the market conduct of clearing and settlement systems, including payment systems not operated by DNB. Market conduct supervision is defined in Section 1.25 of the LFSS (previously Section 1.8 in the draft available at the time of the adoption of Opinion

text: ) as ‘promoting orderly and transparent financial market processes’. Given the similarity between the concepts of market conduct supervision and the Eurosystem’s statutory task of ‘promoting the smooth operation of payment systems’, which is performed through its oversight function, and also considering Article 25 of the Statute on the ECB’s financial stability role and the fact that payment systems are interlinked with securities clearing and settlement systems (SCSSs), this may give rise to a conflict between DNB’s responsibilities as an integral part of the Eurosystem, and AFM’s responsibilities as provided for in the draft law. 3.2 Since payment systems are interlinked with SCSSs, there is a strong argument in favour of the model followed by some Member States to have the national central bank perform the oversight of both payment systems and SCSSs. The draft law combines the integrated oversight model with respect to payment systems and SCSSs and divides the responsibilities and powers between the prudential and systemic supervisor, DNB and the supervisor for market conduct, the AFM. In that sense, the draft law formalises DNB’s role in the oversight of SCSSs as part of systemic and prudential supervision. 3.3 At Community level, the general legal basis for the oversight of payment systems is in Article 105(2) of the Treaty and

text: Article 3.1

text: and Article 22 of the Statute, with more detailed policies introduced by the Eurosystem’s common oversight policy as defined by the Governing Council. In the interest of clearly defining responsibilities, the ECB recommended in Opinion

text: that the oversight of payment systems, including market conduct, should be

text: explicitly assigned to DNB, which would be consistent with DNB’s participation in the Eurosystem. As this has not been taken into account in the draft law, the ECB reiterates this recommendation and strongly advises amending the draft law to make it clear that DNB enjoys full oversight over payment systems.

text: 4. Division of powers

text: 4.1 Under Section 2.3(c) of the draft law, if an authorised clearing and settlement institution no longer complies with the provisions laid down in Part 4.3.4(A), the AFM may advise DNB to withdraw the authorisation or to exercise its authority to appoint one or more persons as liquidator. The ECB notes that the draft law divides responsibilities between DNB and the AFM. As DNB will be the lead overseer, meaning that DNB is the entity authorising the overseen entities to provide clearing and settlement services, the draft law should also provide for an advisory function for DNB in relation to the AFM, to exercise its own powers in the event that the clearing and settlement institution no longer complies with Part 4.3.4(A). 4.2 Furthermore, Section 4.76a(2) provides that a participant may only be refused access by the clearing and settlement institution if such access would negatively affect the proper functioning of the settlement services offered by the clearing and settlement institution. This provision is laid down in Part 4, which covers the AFM’s responsibility over market conduct supervision. The ECB notes that DNB, as the prudential and systemic supervisor, should play a role in assessing whether the rules of the clearing and settlement institution contain criteria limiting access on grounds other than risk.

text: 5. Supervisory powers in the Securities Giro Law

text: The ECB notes that Article 2 of the Securities Giro Law provides for the appointment of the supervisor of the Central Institution, i.e. the Central Securities Depository, and specifies the supervisor’s powers. Given the definition of settlement services in Section 1.1 of the draft law , the ECB would suggest adding these supervisory provisions to the draft law and removing them from the Securities Giro Law.

text: 6. Influence on financial sector stability

text: Section 2.3a(2) provides that ‘the first subsection is not applicable to the provision of categories of clearing and settlement services to be established by order in council that do not or cannot have any significant influence on the stability of the financial sector’. The ECB notes that the criterion of insignificant influence is quite open-ended. Therefore, the ECB would encourage establishing objective and transparent criteria, after consulting DNB, and making them publicly available.

text: 7. Conflicts of interest

text: Section 6.3(1)(a) states that a clearing and settlement institution should avoid conflicts of interest, but the draft law does not further define the term. The explanatory memorandum defines ‘conflicts of interest’ as ‘evident violations of the relevant social standard seriously damaging confidence in the clearing and settlement institution or financial markets’, which is narrow in scope. The ECB considers that this definition is not sufficiently clear and recommends defining it more precisely. In particular, the term should refer to situations where there is an incompatibility between differing aims, such as between an agent and its principal. It also includes situations where the aims of different groups of persons within a clearing and settlement institution, such as the users, owners and public authorities, are not completely aligned.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 15 March 2007.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 2 Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-toconsumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending

text: Council Directive 84/450/EEC

text: , Directives

text: and

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council and

text: Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council (‘Unfair Commercial Practices Directive’) (OJ L 149, 11.6.2005, p. 22). 3 Pursuant to Article 44 of the Law No 6/1993 Coll. on Česká národní banka, as amended, these entities include banks, cooperative banks, electronic money institutions, capital market entities, insurance corporations and pension funds.

text: See ECB Opinions

text: of 13 September 2006 at the request of the Czech Ministry of Industry and Trade on an amendment to the Law on Česká národní banka and

text: of 25 July 2006 at the request of the Bank of Greece on a draft provision on the Bank of Greece’s powers in the field of consumer protection.

text: See the ECB’s Convergence Report of December 2006, p. 27.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 21 March 2007 at the request of the Czech Ministry of Industry and Trade on certain provisions of a draft law amending the Law on consumer protection relating to Česká národní banka (CON/2007/8)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 21 March 2007 at the request of the Czech Ministry of Industry and Trade on certain provisions of a draft law amending the Law on consumer protection relating to Česká národní banka (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 23 February 2007 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Czech Ministry of Industry and Trade for an opinion on certain provisions of the draft law amending Law No 634/1992 Coll. on consumer protection, Law No 40/1995 Coll. on the regulation of advertising and on the amendment of Law No 468/1991 Coll. on radio and television broadcasting, and Law No 513/1991 Coll., the Commercial Code (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Article 105(4) of the Treaty establishing the European Community and the third indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to a national central bank (NCB). In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: The purpose of the draft law is to transpose the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (hereinafter the ‘Directive’) into Czech law. Since the scope of the Directive includes financial services, the draft law assigns responsibility to Česká národní banka (ČNB) to supervise compliance by the entities which are subject to ČNB’s supervision with certain obligations set out in the draft law. Specifically, under the draft law, ČNB will supervise compliance with: (i) the prohibition of unfair commercial practices; (ii) the prohibition of discrimination against consumers; and (iii) obligations with regard to pricing information.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 The new consumer protection-related tasks entrusted to ČNB under the draft law are not listed among the functions of the NCBs specified in the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank. However, as already pointed out on previous occasions , without prejudice to the Governing Council’s powers under Article 14.4 of the Statute, the ECB does not consider that these new tasks would interfere with the objectives and tasks of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB). It should also be noted that pursuant to the last sentence of Article 14.4 of the Statute, these new tasks would have to be performed on the responsibility and liability of ČNB, and would not be regarded as being part of the ESCB’s functions. 2.2 The ECB understands that the underlying reason for allocating the above tasks to ČNB is linked to ČNB’s overall responsibility for supervision of the financial market. In this context, the ECB considers that the new tasks may complement ČNB’s existing supervisory powers and thus contribute to the soundness of the financial market and the preservation of confidence in the marketplace. However, it is important to ensure that both prudential supervision and consumer protection functions have adequate and equal emphasis and that appropriate organisational requirements are in place to ensure it.

text: 3. Specific observations

text: The ECB notes that ČNB will be required to commit additional resources, both human and financial, to carry out the new tasks referred to in the draft law. In this regard, the ECB would like to reiterate that ‘Member States may not put their NCBs in a position where they have insufficient financial resources to carry out their ESCB- or Eurosystem-related tasks, as applicable’ . Therefore, the Czech authorities will need to ensure that the performance of these additional tasks will not affect ČNB’s operational capacity to carry out ESCB-related tasks.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 21 March 2007.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: KOM(2007) 76 slutlig.

text: ECB:s behov av insamling av kvartalsstatistik över lediga platser inom 45 dagar efter utgången av det kvartal som uppgifterna avser beskrivs i publikationen Europeiska centralbankens statistikkrav inom området allmän ekonomisk statistik från augusti 2000 och upprepas i publikationen Översyn av kraven på allmän ekonomisk statistik från december 2004.

text: De europeiska ekonomiska huvudindikatorerna togs fram som resultat av handlingsplanen om statistikkrav för Ekonomiska och monetära unionen (EMU) (nedan kallad EMU-handlingsplanen), som på begäran av rådet (Ekofinrådet) utarbetats av kommissionen (Eurostat) i nära samarbete med ECB. EMU-handlingsplanen var ett svar på den monetära kommitténs rapport om informationskraven i EMU, som godkändes av Ekofinrådet den 18 januari 1999. Ekofinrådet mottog den senaste lägesrapporten om denna fråga i november 2006.

sprak: sv

title: Europeiska centralbankens yttrande av den 13 april 2007 om ett förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning om kvartalsstatistik över lediga platser i gemenskapen (CON/2007/9)

text: Inledning och rättslig grund

text: Den 12 april 2007 mottog Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) en begäran från Europeiska unionens råd om ett yttrande över ett förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning om kvartalsstatistik över lediga platser i gemenskapen (nedan kallad den föreslagna förordningen).

text: ECB:s behörighet att avge ett yttrande grundas på artikel 105.4 första strecksatsen i fördraget om upprättandet av Europeiska gemenskapen. I enlighet med artikel 17.5 första meningen i arbetsordningen för ECB har detta yttrande antagits av ECB-rådet.

text: 1. Allmänna kommentarer

text: 1.1. Syftet med den föreslagna förordningen är att skapa en rättslig grund för insamling, överföring och utvärdering av kvartalsuppgifter om lediga platser i gemenskapen. Uppgifterna om lediga platser, som ingår i förteckningen över europeiska ekonomiska huvudindikatorer, behövs för att bevaka kortfristiga förändringar av antalet lediga platser efter näringsgren.

text: 1.2. ECB välkomnar den föreslagna förordningen. Tillhandahållandet av jämförbar statistik över lediga platser ger tillgång till mer omfattande uppgifter för analys och bedömning av de risker som hotar prisstabiliteten i euroområdet, vilken har betydelse för Eurosystemets monetära politik. På liknande sätt kan uppgifter om lediga platser fungera som huvudindikatorer för vissa arbetsmarknadsvariabler, särskilt sysselsättning och arbetslöshet. De aggregerade uppgifter som för närvarande finns tillgängliga för euroområdet, baserade på uppgifter som de nationella statistikkontoren frivilligt översänder till Europeiska gemenskapernas kommission (Eurostat), speglar de avsevärda skillnader som finns i definitionen av de nationella serierna som används för beräkningen av serier för euroområdet.

text: 1.3. Med förbehåll för de tekniska kommentarerna i avsnitt 2 i detta yttrande anser ECB att den föreslagna förordningen utgör en bra kompromiss mellan användarnas krav och behovet av statistiska förenklingar som noga har utretts för att begränsa rapporteringsbördan. ECB stöder fullt ut genomförandet av den föreslagna förordningen och uppmanar kommissionen och medlemsstaterna att prioritera ett tidsenligt antagande av den tillämpningsförordning från kommissionen som krävs.

text: 2. Tekniska kommentarer

text: 2.1. ECB understryker att den föreslagna uppdelningen efter näringsgren enligt avdelningsnivå enligt Europeiska gemenskapens näringsgrensindelning (NACE), inklusive tjänstesektorn, är en viktig aspekt av den föreslagna förordningen på grund av tjänsternas ökade betydelse som procentuell andel av den totala ekonomin. Den föreslagna uppdelningen är dessutom betydelsefull för att förklara förändringar i det totala antalet lediga platser. En framgångsrik sammanställning och det påföljande tillhandahållandet av uppgifter som är resultatet av de föreslagna genomförbarhetsstudierna, samt även från genomförbarhetsstudierna om inkluderingen av enheter med mindre än tio anställda, ses som viktiga steg för att ytterligare förbättra kvaliteten på uppgifterna.

text: 2.2. Tillgång till en lämplig uppsättning retroaktiva uppgifter är av avgörande betydelse eftersom det är viktigt för analysarbetet att bedöma hur de lediga platserna förändras över tiden. ECB förstår dock den belastning som uppgiftslämnarna skulle utsättas för om de ålades att tillhandahålla en fullständig uppsättning retroaktiva uppgifter och godtar därför kravet på den begränsade uppgiftsöverföringen enligt artikel 6 i den föreslagna förordningen, samtidigt som skattningar över en längre tid uppmuntras där det är möjligt.

text: 2.3. Vad gäller frågan om förbättrad kvalitet på de uppgifter som behövs för tillförlitliga aggregat för euroområdet, är en hög grad av jämförbarhet mellan de nationella uppgifter som används för att beräkna aggregat för euroområdet en nyckelfråga för den övergripande kvalitetsbedömningen. Eftersom så är fallet skulle de kvalitetskriterier som skall definieras inom ramen för genomförandeåtgärderna enligt artikel 7 i den föreslagna förordningen lämpligen kunna inkludera regelbunden granskning av vilka konsekvenser icke-jämförbara aspekter i de nationella uppgifterna har.

text: Utfärdat i Frankfurt am Main den 13 april 2007.

text: Lucas D. Papademos

text: ECB:s vice ordförande


text: See also paragraph 5 of ECB Opinion

text: of 18 January 2002 at the request of the Danish Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs on a draft act amending the Act on money laundering.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 16 April 2007 on an amendment to the Law XV of 2003 on the prevention and combating of money laundering (CON/2007/10)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 16 April 2007 on an amendment to the Law XV of 2003 on the prevention and combating of money laundering (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 26 February 2007 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from Hungary’s Ministry of Finance (hereinafter the ‘Ministry’) for an opinion on a draft amendment to Law XV of 2003 on the prevention and restriction of money laundering (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Article 105(4) of the Treaty establishing the European Community and the third and fifth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the ECB by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to the national central bank and payment and settlement systems. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: According to the Ministry’s letter of 26 February 2007 (hereinafter the ‘letter’), the draft law intends to bring Hungarian legislation into line with

text: Regulation (EC) No 1781/2006

text: of the European Parliament and Council of 15 November 2006 on information on the payer accompanying transfers of funds (hereinafter the ‘Regulation’) .

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 First, the ECB would like to stress its commitment to contributing to the adoption, implementation and execution of measures preventing the use of the financial system for terrorist activities, as expressed in its public statement on 1 October 2001. 2.2 The ECB welcomes the enhanced clarity of the money laundering legislative framework that the draft law will introduce. In particular, this new sanctioning power will allow the relevant authority to respond within its legal framework to future challenges in the fight against money laundering.

text: 2.3 The eighth recital of the Regulation reflected the ECB’s recommendations in Opinion

text: , according to which any natural or legal person providing payment service providers solely with messaging or other support systems for transmitting funds or with clearing and settlement systems do not fall within the scope of the Regulation. This is also consistent with recital 34 of the Third Money Laundering Directive .The ECB notes that obligations are already imposed on credit institutions and financial institutions to combat money laundering. Hence, whenever the payment system operator ensures that only supervised credit institutions may participate, no further requirements should be imposed on the payment system itself . In light of this, the ECB submits that reporting obligations and, consequently, the imposition of sanctions, should apply only to payment and settlement system participants, and not to payment, clearing and settlement systems operators, including the Magyar Nemzeti Bank, because such operators fall outside the scope of the Regulation. Against this background, the Ministry is invited to bring its interpretation into line with the Regulation and the Third Money Laundering Directive. 2.4 The Ministry indicates in the letter its view that the draft law will also extend the supervisory powers of the State Supervisory Authority of Financial Organisations (hereinafter the ‘PSZÁF’) to the Magyar Nemzeti Bank as a financial services provider, although the draft law does not expressly provide this. In addition, Section 5 of the draft law introduces provisions regarding the PSZÁF’s sanctioning power, empowering the PSZÁF, inter alia, with the right to restructure internal rules of the subject in question, suspend the activity causing the breach, prohibit it to carry out money transfer activities, carry out on-site inspections and impose a fine. The ECB welcomes these proposed changes inasmuch as they are addressed to payment system participants as opposed to payment system operators, in line with applicable Community legislation.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 16 April 2007.

text: [signed]

text: The Vice-President of the ECB

text: Lucas PAPADEMOS


text: KOM(2006) 787 slutlig.

text: ECB stödjer också åsikten att det europeiska programmet för kritisk infrastruktur bör vara inriktat på att bemöta alla typer av risker även om terrorhot ges högsta prioritet och att enligt detta arbetssätt såväl hot som orsakas av människor, som hot av teknisk karaktär och naturkatastrofer alla omfattas av förfarandet för skyddet av den europeiska kritiska infrastrukturen.

text: Inom ramen för förberedelserna för en omfattande strategi som omfattar hela EU för att skydda kritisk infrastruktur gentemot terroristattacker, medför samtidigt inte erkännandet att Eurosystemet har sådan exklusiv behörighet att det frigörs helt från den Europeiska gemenskapen och att det undantas från alla gemenskapsbestämmelser (punkt 135 i

text: mål C-11/00

text: kommissionen mot Europeiska centralbanken [REG 2003, s. I-7147].

text: Till exempel fastställde Eurosystemet i juni 2006 principer och förfaranden för övervakningen av betalnings- och clearingsystem och infrastruktur, inklusive förebyggande åtgärder mot driftsproblem, såsom förväntningar på övervakningen av driftskontinuiteten i systemviktiga betalningssystem.

text: Artikel 4.2 och artikel 11 i det föreslagna direktivet.

text: Artikel 105.4 första strecksatsen i fördraget.

text: Text markerad med fet stil anger ECB:s förslag till ny text. Genomstruken text anger de strykningar som ECB föreslår.

title: Europeiska centralbankens yttrande av den 13 april 2007 om ett förslag till rådets direktiv om kartläggning och klassificering av europeisk kritisk infrastruktur och bedömning av behoven att stärka skyddet av denna (CON/2007/11)

text: Inledning och rättslig grund

text: Den 23 januari 2007 mottog Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) en begäran från Europeiska unionens råd om ett yttrande över ett förslag till rådets direktiv om kartläggning och klassificering av europeisk kritisk infrastruktur och bedömning av behoven att stärka skyddet av denna (nedan kallat förslaget till direktiv). Förslaget till direktiv fastställer ett förfarande för att kartlägga och klassificera europeisk kritisk infrastruktur, där en driftsstörning eller förstörelse på ett allvarligt sätt skulle drabba två eller flera medlemsstater eller en enda medlemsstat om den kritiska infrastrukturen befinner sig i en annan medlemsstat. ECB:s behörighet att avge ett yttrande grundas på artikel 105.4 första strecksatsen i fördraget om upprättandet av Europeiska gemenskapen. I enlighet med artikel 17.5 första meningen i arbetsordningen för Europeiska centralbanken har detta yttrande antagits av ECB-rådet.

text: 1. Allmänna kommentarer

text: 1.1 ECB stödjer fullt ut det föreslagna direktivets syfte att stärka samordningen av de åtgärder som planeras i olika berörda sektorer i Europeiska unionen för förebyggandet av, beredskapen för och insatserna gentemot hot, särskilt terroristattacker som omfattar kritisk infrastruktur och beroende mellan olika sektorer. ECB anser särskilt att det är viktigt att säkerställa att åtgärderna som vidtas i olika sektorer är förenliga och samordnade för att kunna svara på dessa hot på ett lämpligt sätt.

text: 1.2 Bestämmelserna i det föreslagna direktivet som ger medlemsstaterna visst ansvar för kartläggningen av den europeiska kritiska infrastrukturen, meddelandet av denna till kommissionen och fastställandet, uppdateringen, granskningen och särskilt den regelbundna översynen av säkerhetsplanerna för den europeiska kritiska infrastrukturen, liksom rapporteringen till kommissionen av sammanfattningen av riskerna för varje sektor, måste respektera nationella och EU-myndigheters rådande behörighet. Dessa innefattar centralbankernas exklusiva uppgifter, som måste kunna utföras på ett oberoende sätt i enlighet med fördraget, liksom de uppgifter som tillhör centralbankerna enligt tillämplig nationell lagstiftning. Det kommer särskilt att vara viktigt att säkerställa att de nationella bestämmelser som genomför det föreslagna direktivet blir helt förenliga med centralbankernas befogenheter avseende övervakning eller skyldigheterna avseende clearing- och avvecklingssystem för betalningar och värdepapper samt tillhörande system, clearingorganisationer och centrala motparter. I detta avseende är det underförstått att det ramverk som fastställs i det förslagna direktivet inte kommer att inverka på centralbankernas befogenheter och oberoende. Ett skäl som reflekterar detta borde införas i det föreslagna direktivet.

text: 1.3 Vidare skulle ECB vilja understryka att Eurosystemet och/eller nationella centralbanker redan har fastställt åtgärder som säkerställer avbrottsplanering i betalningssystemen i euroområdet och ECB anser att detta arbete borde erkännas för att undvika upprepning och för att säkerställa överensstämmelse i det arbete som utförs av flera myndigheter.

text: 2. Specifika kommentarer

text: 2.1 För det första, är den finansiella sektorn som identifieras i det föreslagna direktivet indelad i: 1) clearing- och avvecklingssystem för betalningar och värdepapper samt tillhörande system, och 2) reglerade marknader. ECB föreslår en vidare ordalydelse som omfattar handel, betalning, clearing- och avvecklingssystem samt tillhörande infrastruktur för finansiella instrument.

text: 2.2 För det andra erkänns i definitionen kritisk infrastruktur uttryckligen beroende mellan olika sektorer eftersom effektiviteten av genomförandeåtgärderna för en sektor allvarligt kan undermineras då beroendet mellan olika sektorer inte beaktas på ett korrekt sätt. Det noteras dock att denna definition inte uttryckligen refererar endast till anläggningar inom EU. Det är därför inte klart hur anläggningar som delvis befinner sig utanför EU, där en driftsstörning eller förstörelse skulle påverka europeisk kritisk infrastruktur skulle behandlas enligt det föreslagna direktivet. ECB skulle välkomna ett ytterligare klargörande i denna fråga.

text: 2.3 För det tredje är det allvarlighetstest som är relevant för kartläggningen av europeisk kritisk infrastruktur relativt bred och bör förbättras med klarare information för att säkerställa överensstämmelse av klassificeringen mellan länder och sektorer. Det skulle vara hjälpsamt att ytterligare klargöra detta koncept när generella och sektorsspecifika kriterier fastställs genom kommittéförfarandet i det föreslagna direktivet. Det noteras att det föreslagna direktivet förmodligen medför ytterligare administrativa krav som troligen medför relaterade kostnader för infrastrukturer och relevanta myndigheter. Beroende på fastställandet av sådana trösklar kan infrastrukturer som för närvarande inte övervakas fångas upp och bli föremål för ytterligare kostnader.

text: 2.4 För det fjärde, kan en separat gemenskapsakt behövas för att fastställa förfaranden för att kartlägga och klassificera europeisk kritisk infrastruktur som ägs eller drivs av gemenskapsinstitutioner, organ eller byråer. Medan kommissionen enligt det föreslagna direktivet kan föreslå en förteckning över kritisk infrastruktur som skall klassificeras som europeisk kritisk infrastruktur på grundval både av meddelanden som gjorts av medlemsstater och all annan [för kommissionen] tillgänglig information är det kanske inte praktiskt för europeisk kritisk infrastruktur som drivs av gemenskapsorgan och som har en paneuropeisk dimension att vara del av ett system som administreras av medlemsstaterna.

text: 2.5 För det femte krävs det enligt det föreslagna direktivet att förteckningen över kritisk infrastruktur som klassificeras som europeisk kritisk infrastruktur antas i enlighet med det kommittéförfarande som fastställs enligt det föreslagna direktivet. Förteckningen över all europeisk infrastruktur skulle behöva antas före upprättandet och starten för driften av säkerhetsplaner som innehåller relevanta säkerhetslösningar för skyddet av den förtecknade europeiska infrastrukturen, eftersom operatörerna har ett år på sig efter klassificeringen att upprätta en säkerhetsplan. I detta sammanhang är publicitet oönskad för clearing- och avvecklingssystem för betalningar och värdepapper samt tillhörande system. Eftersom syftet med direktivet innefattar förberedelser mot hot som påverkar de finansiella marknaderna skulle det vara osunt att offentliggöra förteckningen över kritisk infrastruktur som är av avgörande betydelse för väl fungerande finansiella marknader. Idag skulle inget land i världen offentliggöra en sådan förteckning på grundval av liknande överläggningar. ECB rekommenderar därför starkt att förteckningen över den europeiska kritiska infrastrukturen hålls hemlig.

text: 2.6 Slutligen, rekommenderar ECB starkt att ge lämpligt beaktande till existerande åtgärder för att definiera genomförandeåtgärder och att fokusera på de områden där inga specifika åtgärder ännu har identifierats. Mot denna bakgrund verkar det därför önskvärt att inte påbörja arbetet med att definiera eller genomföra åtgärder på områdena betalning och clearing, utan snarare att beakta det arbete som redan utförs av de behöriga myndigheterna. Å ena sidan måste ytterligare reglering och relaterade bördor motiveras med en lämplig konsekvensanalys. Å andra sidan är det viktigt att se till att standarder och förordningar på detta område förblir tillräckligt flexibla så att de lätt och fortlöpande kan anpassas till den förändrade miljön. ECB skulle föredra att inga specifika lagligt bindande åtgärder antas. Om kommissionen skulle bestämmas sig för att anta genomförandeåtgärder, måste ECB formellt höras i enlighet med fördraget om sådana åtgärder som relaterar till clearing- och avvecklingssystem för betalningar och värdepapper samt tillhörande system, och andra frågor som faller inom ECB:s behörighetsområde.

text: 3. Ändringsförslag

text: De ändringsförslag av direktivet som blir resultatet av rekommendationerna ovan framgår av bilagan.

text: BILAGA

text: Kommissionens förslag | ECB:s ändringsförslag

text: | Med avseende på den finansiella sektorn bör detta direktiv vara förenligt med de uppgifter och skyldigheter som ålagts det Europeiska centralbankssystemet (ECBS) enligt fördraget och stadgan för Europeiska centralbankssystemet och Europeiska centralbanken. I detta sammanhang måste den drift och övervakning av clearing- och avvecklingssystem för betalningar och värdepapper samt tillhörande system som utförs av centralbankerna i ECBS särskilt uppmärksammas, samt centralbankernas bidrag till det finansiella systemets stabilitet. För att undvika onödigt dubbelarbete bör medlemsstaterna förlita sig på det arbete och de regelbundna bedömningar som utförs av centralbankerna inom deras behörighetsområde.

text: Motivering – se punkt 1.2 i yttrandet

text: VII Finans Clearing- och avvecklingssystem för betalningar och värdepapper samt tillhörande system Reglerade marknader | VII Finans Handels-, clearing- och avvecklingssystem för betalningar och värdepapper samt tillhörande system för finansiella instrument. Reglerade marknader

text: Motivering – se punkt 2.1 i yttrandet


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 2 See ECB Opinion

text: of 23 October 2006 at the request of Latvijas Banka on a draft regulation for the use of Latvijas Banka’s monetary policy instruments and ECB Opinion

text: of 14 November 2006 at the request of Latvijas Banka on a draft regulation on Latvijas Banka’s securities settlement system.

text: The standards are available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.int.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 30 April 2007 at the request of Latvijas Banka on draft amendments to the Regulation on the use of Latvijas Banka’s monetary policy instruments and the Regulation on Latvijas Banka’s securities settlement system (CON/2007/12)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 30 April 2007 at the request of Latvijas Banka on draft amendments to the Regulation on the use of Latvijas Banka’s monetary policy instruments and the Regulation on Latvijas Banka’s securities settlement system (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 3 April 2007 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from Latvijas Banka for an opinion on draft amendments to the Regulation on the use of Latvijas Banka’s monetary policy instruments and draft amendments to the Regulation on Latvijas Banka’s securities settlement system (hereinafter collectively the ‘draft amendments’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Article 105(4) of the Treaty establishing the European Community and the third and fifth indents of Article 2(1), and

text: Article 2(2) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft amendments relate to a national central bank (NCB), payment and settlement systems and the instruments of monetary policy. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft regulation

text: The main objective of the draft amendments is to adjust the eligibility criteria for counterparties that participate in Latvijas Banka’s monetary policy operations. They aim to restrict access to such monetary policy operations to credit institutions that are subject to Latvijas Banka’s minimum reserve requirements. Furthermore, taking into account the fact that the primary operational objective of Latvijas Banka’s securities settlement system (hereinafter the ‘VNS’) is to ensure securities settlement for monetary policy operations, the draft amendments apply similar access criteria for participation in the VNS. The ECB has previously delivered opinions on the two Regulations that are now being amended .

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 Although non-participating Member States retain their powers in the field of monetary policy, it is nevertheless beneficial for them to gradually achieve consistency with Eurosystem standards so that credit institutions operating in their territories can become acquainted with the requirements that will apply once these Member States have adopted the euro. Such gradual harmonisation prior to the adoption of the euro will assist a smooth integration of the NCB into the Eurosystem. 2.2 ECB notes that, on adoption of the euro in Latvia, and provided that the VNS is selected to provide securities settlement of central bank credit operations, the VNS will be assessed against the Eurosystem standards for the use of EU securities settlement systems in ESCB credit operations . For that reason, this opinion is without prejudice to a future ECB assessment of the VNS against the abovementioned standards. 2.3 The ECB expects Latvijas Banka to ensure that the VNS complies with the Latvian Law on settlement finality in payment and security settlement systems.

text: 3. Specific observations

text: 3.1 The ECB notes that a reference to minimum reserves in the amendment to Article 1.1 of the Regulation on the use of Latvijas Banka’s monetary policy instruments would further align the Latvian definition of counterparties with the one applied by the Eurosystem. 3.2 Under Article 1.1 of the Regulation on Latvijas Banka’s securities settlement system the VNS’s primary, but not sole, operational objective is to ensure securities settlement of Latvijas Banka’s monetary and intraday credit operations. As long as the VNS legally remains open for other kinds of operations (e.g. trading of government debt), restricting participation in a securities settlement system by excluding EU/EEA credit institutions that do not have branches in Latvia would appear to represent a restriction on freedom to provide (and receive) services, which is prohibited by Article 49 of the Treaty. Therefore, the ECB would welcome a formulation that would also allow EU/EEA credit institutions which do not have branches in Latvia to participate in the VNS.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 30 April 2007. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: OJ L 310, 11.12.2000, p. 1. Guideline as last amended by Guideline ECB/2006/12 (OJ L 352, 13.12.2006, p. 1).

text: The second indent of Article 55(5) of the Bank of Greece’s Statute refers to systems for the netting, settlement and, in general, clearing of payments, as well as systems for the conclusion, netting, settlement and, in general, clearing of overthe-counter transactions regarding securities in physical or book-entry form and other financial instruments.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 8 May 2007 at the request of the Bank of Greece on amendments to its Statute (CON/2007/13)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 8 May 2007 at the request of the Bank of Greece on amendments to its Statute (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 29 March 2007 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Bank of Greece for an opinion on a set of draft amendments to its Statute (hereinafter the ‘draft amendments’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Article 105(4) of the Treaty establishing the European Community and the third and fifth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft amendments relate to the Bank of Greece and payment and settlement systems. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft amendments

text: As set out in the Explanatory Note accompanying the draft amendments, most of the proposed changes are intended to adapt the Bank of Greece’s Statute to recent developments in the Eurosystem’s collateral framework which specifies the assets acceptable as collateral for Eurosystem credit operations. In this regard, the draft amendments support the acceptance by the Bank of Greece of credit claims as collateral for monetary policy operations and the provision of intraday credit, in accordance with Guideline ECB/2000/7 of 31 August 2000 on monetary policy instruments and procedures of the Eurosystem , as incorporated into Greek law by the Act 61/6.12.2006 of the Monetary Policy Council of the Bank of Greece. In addition, the draft amendments are intended to improve the functioning of payment systems through increased protection of funds held in accounts in such systems, including the future Greek component of TARGET2, the new central bank payment system currently under establishment by the Eurosystem. Finally, the draft amendments are intended to enable the Bank of Greece, provided that there will be a further change to Greek law, to ensure control of the management of social security benefits

text: granted to its staff, with such control to be performed through a special purpose legal entity controlled by the Bank of Greece.

text: 2. General observations

text: Most of the draft amendments address the Bank of Greece’s execution of monetary policy operations and its provision of intra-day credit. Other draft amendments are intended to further secure the safety of payment systems and provide increased protection from systemic risk. The ECB generally welcomes these draft amendments, as they support the conduct of monetary policy in Greece in accordance with the recent changes to the Eurosystem collateral framework and further enhance the smooth operation of Greek payment systems thereby already anticipating the future TARGET2 legal framework.

text: 3. Specific changes introduced by the draft amendments

text: 3.1 The type of assets acceptable as collateral to the Bank of Greece will be extended to credit claims such as bank loans and other bank credits. The ECB understands that this is intended to reflect the recent changes to the Eurosystem collateral framework in which credit claims became eligible from 1 January 2007 for Eurosystem credit operations in all euro area countries in accordance with the latest amendment to Guideline ECB/2000/7 of 31 August 2000 on monetary policy instruments and procedures of the Eurosystem. 3.2 In addition, the Bank of Greece’s legal pledge securing its claims arising from monetary policy lending operations or transactions through the systems referred to in Article 55(5) of the Bank of Greece’s Statute will be extended to cover all assets deposited with the Bank of Greece . The ECB also notes that the Bank of Greece’s rights of pledge in relation to transactions through its component system of TARGET2 will be governed by the future TARGET2 legal framework. A pledge on a claim arising out of bank loans or other bank credits is permissible under Greek law. 3.3 The procedure for the realisation of eligible assets will become more flexible for the Bank of Greece. More specifically, the Bank of Greece will be granted discretion to proceed to the sale or cash collection of pledged securities or claims immediately as the claims of the Bank of Greece become due and without communicating a written notice to the debtor prior to initiating a sale or cash collection, in accordance with Community law, transposed into Greek law (

text: Article 4

text: L. 3301/2004). The ECB proposes including a reference to claims in addition to securities in the draft amendment of the second paragraph of

text: Article 57

text: A of the Statute of the Bank of Greece, where the following is stated: ‘or, if the securities are due and payable, cash them on its own behalf’.

text: 3.4 Under general Greek law, the attachment may not prejudice existing security interests or rights of set-off, so that transactions processed in payment systems or amounts already ear-marked for a transaction would be protected against attachment. To improve protection of those systems, also in the case of attachment, the draft amendments provide for an exemption from the attachment by third parties of accounts held in payment systems at the Bank of Greece. The ECB understands that the draft amendments thus constitute an exemption from the general provisions on set-off provided for in the Greek Civil Code, in particular AK 451 which prohibits any set-off of non-attachable claims, and do not prejudice the validity and enforceability of set-off rights of the Bank of Greece. Indeed, the draft amendments, which are limited to the specific situation of accounts held in payment systems or components thereof, do not impose a general prohibition against attachment and, under any circumstances, the claims dealt with under

text: Article 57

text: A of the Statute of the Bank of Greece are quite distinct from those enumerated as non-attachable in Article 982 of the Greek Code of Civil Procedure. Thus, particularly in view of the future requirements in this respect under the TARGET2 framework, the ECB welcomes this amendment. Furthermore, the ECB suggests extending the wording of the draft amendments to expressly cover also settlement systems operated by the Bank of Greece, since the same argumentation also applies to those systems. 3.5 Finally, the draft amendments would enable the Bank of Greece, following a further legislative provision to that effect, to establish or participate in legal entities specialised in the support or specific pursuit of objectives related to its staff’s social security, notwithstanding the prohibition against engaging in trade, having a direct interest in commercial, industrial or other enterprise and purchasing shares of other banks or corporations. Although the relationship between the Bank of Greece and any such specialised legal entities is not yet specified, the ECB understands that, if the Bank of Greece performed or controlled such functions, it would assume full responsibility and liability for them, without prejudice to the provisions of the Treaty and the Statute, particularly those concerning central banks’ financial independence and the prohibition against monetary financing.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 8 May 2007.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: See ECB Opinion

text: of 7 March 2007 at the request of the German Ministry of Finance on a draft Eighth Law amending the Law on the Deutsche Bundesbank, ECB Opinion

text: of 25 August 2006 at the request of the Banca d’Italia on the amended Statute of the Banca d’Italia, ECB Opinion

text: of 22 June 2006 at the request of the French Senate on draft law on the Banque de France, ECB Opinion

text: of 4 November 2004 at the request of the Hungarian Ministry of Finance on a draft law amending the Law on Magyar Nemzeti Bank and ECB Opinion

text: of 11 May 2004 at the request of the Italian Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance on a draft law on the protection of savings. 3 See the abovementioned opinions.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 24 May 2007 at the request of the Hungarian Ministry of Finance on a draft law amending the Law on the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (CON/2007/14)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 24 May 2007 at the request of the Hungarian Ministry of Finance on a draft law amending the Law on the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 27 April 2007 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Hungarian Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft law (hereinafter the ‘draft law’) amending Law LVIII of 2001 on the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (hereinafter the ‘MNB Law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Article 105(4) of the Treaty establishing the European Community and the third indent of

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to the Magyar Nemzeti Bank. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: The Ministry of Finance has indicated that the purpose of the draft law is to facilitate the efficient and economical functioning of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank by changing its governance structure. The draft law would abolish the Board of Directors and transfer most of its functions to the Magyar Nemzeti Bank’s Governor. In addition, the draft law would decrease the number of Monetary Council members. Currently, the Monetary Council consists of a minimum of nine and a maximum of 11 members. The draft law would reduce the number of members to a minimum of five and a maximum of seven members. The terms of office for the current members would remain unaffected. Finally, the draft law would also modify the scope of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank’s obligation to provide information to the Ministry of Finance.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 Credibility is the cornerstone of central banking. A credible monetary policy is a key condition for controlling inflationary expectations and promoting sustainable convergence towards price stability. An independent central bank in a stable institutional environment forms the basis for monetary policy’s credibility. The Treaty’s requirement for central bank independence reflects the generally held view that the primary objective of price stability is best served by a fully independent institution with a precisely defined mandate. It is therefore of utmost importance to design an institutional structure that separates monetary policy from the influence of short-term political interests. Over the years the convergence reports of the European Monetary Institute (EMI) and of the ECB have consistently confirmed the importance of central bank independence. The functional, institutional, personal and financial aspects of independence have also been further refined through ECB opinions. 2.2 One consideration in the context of central bank independence is the need for a central bank legal framework that provides a stable and long-term basis for the central bank’s functioning. With regard to the Hungarian central bank, the ECB notes that the Law on the Magyar Nemzeti Bank has been amended on several occasions in recent years, often substantially changing the central bank’s legal framework, and finds that the introduction of different legal concepts within such a relatively short time has adversely affected the Magyar Nemzeti Bank’s stability. In addition, the ECB notes that the draft law still does not address all the issues highlighted in the ECB’s Convergence Report from December 2006.

text: 3. Specific observations

text: Changes in the Magyar Nemzeti Bank’s governance structure

text: 3.1 According to the draft law, the Magyar Nemzeti Bank’s Board of Directors, which is in charge of the implementation of monetary policy and the running of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank, would be abolished. Its powers would be transferred to the Magyar Nemzeti Bank’s Governor, who would be entrusted to carry out these functions as an individual. The ECB understands that the objective for introducing this change is efficiency and has no objections to this institutional set-up as such.

text: Membership in the Monetary Council

text: 3.2 With regard to the draft law’s transitional measures on membership in the Magyar Nemzeti Bank’s Monetary Council, the ECB notes, as in its earlier opinions , that they should be compatible with Article 14.2 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and the ECB. 3.3 In general, the principle of personal independence, as laid down in Article 14.2 of the Statute requires that the same rules for the security of tenure of office of Governor apply to other members of NCB decision making-bodies involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks. This applies, in particular, where a governor is first among equals between colleagues with equivalent voting rights. Thus, any NCB reorganisation measure affecting the tenure of office of the members of its decision-making bodies involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks should ensure that they continue to perform their duties until the end of their appointed term, in accordance with Article 14.2 of the Statute . In this respect the draft law specifically provides that the term of office of the current members of the Monetary Council should remain unaffected by the foreseen amendments. In this context, the ECB notes that the effects of the expiration of the mandates for the current individual members of the Monetary Council, in the event that the euro is introduced during their mandates, should be clarified in a manner respecting the principle of personal independence. 3.4 In line with its previous opinions the ECB would also emphasise that not filling vacancies in the Monetary Council en bloc enhances the long-term independence of the decision-making body. Instead members’ appointments and expiry of their term of office should be at different times, allowing sufficient interim periods between subsequent appointments. This ensures that political cycles do not determine membership. Similarly,

text: Article 112(2)

text: (b) of the Treaty establishes the principle that members of the ECB’s Executive Board are ‘appointed from among persons of recognised standing and professional experience in monetary or banking matters’. This principle should also apply to Monetary Council members.

text: Information sharing with the Minister for Finance

text: 3.5 A new provision of the draft law would require the Magyar Nemzeti Bank’s Governor to inform the Minister for Finance of all important decisions regarding the Magyar Nemzeti Bank’s operations, together with the documents these decisions are based on. The proposed amendment would broaden the scope of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank’s obligation to provide information to the Government.

text: 3.6 Currently the Magyar Nemzeti Bank is obliged to provide the Government with information on monetary developments and other important issues relating to its basic tasks on an ad hoc basis, and on foreign exchange transactions and gold and foreign exchange reserves on a weekly basis. The scope of obligation currently in force appears adequate to satisfy the Government’s information needs. Any obligation imposed on the Magyar Nemzeti Bank to provide information to the Government must be within the limits of central bank independence. As a minimum, therefore, the draft law (i) should clarify that there is no obligation to consult or inform the Government ex ante, i.e. in advance of the decisions being taken; (ii) should not contain a requirement to submit to the Government the documents that the decisions are based on; and (iii) should ensure that the provision of information under the new Article 41 (3) of the Law on the Magyar Nemzeti Bank complies with the principles set out below. The ECB’s Convergence Reports in May and December 2006 described the prohibition on ex ante consultation relating to national central banks’ (NCBs) decisions as ‘An express statutory obligation for an NCB to consult third parties ex ante provides the latter with a formal mechanism to influence the final decision and is therefore incompatible with the Treaty and the Statute. However, dialogue between NCBs and third parties, even when based on statutory obligations to provide information and exchange views, is compatible with central bank independence provided that: – this does not result in interference with the independence of the members of the NCB’s decision-making bodies; – the special status of Governors in their capacity as members of the ECB’s General Council is fully respected; and – confidentiality requirements resulting from the Statute are observed.’

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 24 May 2007.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 2 OJ L 177, 30.6.2006, p. 1. 3 OJ L 177, 30.6.2006, p. 201.

text: See ECB Opinion

text: of 8 May 2007 at the request of the Bank of Greece on amendments to its Statute.

text: Available on the Bank for International Settlements’s website at www.bis.org. 6 See also paragraph 3.4 of ECB Opinion

text: of 25 July 2006 at the request of the Bank of Greece on a draft provision on the Bank of Greece’s powers in the field of consumer protection.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 15 June 2007 at the request of the Greek Ministry of Economy and Finance on certain provisions of a draft law on the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions, the sufficiency of own funds of credit institutions, undertakings providing investment services and other provisions (CON/2007/15)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 15 June 2007 at the request of the Greek Ministry of Economy and Finance on certain provisions of a draft law on the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions, the sufficiency of own funds of credit institutions, undertakings providing investment services and other provisions (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 25 April 2007 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Greek Ministry of Economy and Finance for an opinion on certain provisions of a draft law on the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions, the sufficiency of own funds of credit institutions, undertakings providing investment services and other provisions (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Article 105(4) of the Treaty establishing the European Community and the third, fifth and sixth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to a national central bank, payment and settlement systems and rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: The draft law implements Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions (recast) and Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 on the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions (recast) . The draft law complements the soon to be adopted amendments to the Bank of Greece’s Statute, with the aim of providing for acceptance of credit claims as eligible collateral, in line with the Eurosystem’s single list of eligible collateral for credit

text: operations (hereinafter the ‘single list’). The draft provisions on which the ECB was consulted concern: (i) supervision, in particular its costs and sanctions; (ii) the provision of collateral to the Bank of Greece in the context of the exercise of monetary policy, especially as a consequence of the introduction of the single list; and (iii) the liability regime.

text: 2. Costs of supervision

text: Article 86 of the draft law provides that the costs of auditing should be borne by the supervised credit and financial institutions. It empowers the Bank of Greece to determine the nature and extent of the costs, as well as criteria on the basis of which such costs may be differentiated by category of supervised institutions or audited activities. The ECB welcomes the fact that financial supervision will be financed by supervised institutions, since this would further enhance the Bank of Greece's financial soundness.

text: 3. Provision of collateral to the Bank of Greece

text: 3.1 The draft law makes clear that the Bank of Greece accepts credit claims as collateral in order to secure its claims arising out of monetary policy operations and the provision of intraday credit. Such credit claims will fulfil the Eurosystem’s eligibility criteria for collateral following the introduction of the single list. 3.2 In connection with the above, the draft law stipulates that announcement to a debtor of the establishment of collateral (including a pledge) provided by a credit institution in favour of the Bank of Greece or another central bank of the Eurosystem, in the context of monetary policy operations or the provision of intraday liquidity on its claims from a bank loan or a credit of any kind granted to the debtor, takes priority over any subsequent announcement or registration of collateral on the same, already collateralised claim. This is to ensure that collateral consisting of credit claims in favour of the Eurosystem that have not been registered in the public books pursuant to Law 2844/2000 still take priority over subsequent collateral on the same claims registered therein, if the debtor has been notified of the provision of collateral to the Eurosystem prior to such registration. Hence, with specific regard to collateral consisting of credit claims established in favour of the Eurosystem, priority is not determined on the basis of the time of registration in the public books, but a more flexible approach has been adopted, in line with the Eurosystem procedures. The ECB therefore welcomes these provisions of the draft law. 3.3 Regarding

text: Article 89

text: , which provides for additional collateral coverage within two working days for cases where the claims are not covered by the pledge, it is noted that such collateral coverage should be fulfilled at all times. The debtor should be obliged to supplement the additional collateral immediately so that at the end of the business day sufficient collateral coverage is restored. Therefore, it is suggested to amend the wording of this article.

text: 3.4 Regarding

text: Article 90

text: on the amendment of Law 2789/2000, the legislator is invited to clarify the wording of

text: Article 90(2)

text: , in order to extend to the ECB or another central bank of the Eurosystem the possibility of an off-the-stock-market sale of collateral.

text: 4. Publication of sanctions

text: Article 69(4) of the draft law provides for publication of the Bank of Greece’s decisions on the imposition of sanctions, in order to ensure transparency in the market. The ECB welcomes the reference to the stability of the financial markets in this paragraph: the Bank of Greece can only publish a decision on the imposition of sanctions if it considers that such publication is not related to the supervisory requirements set out in the draft law and is not likely to create a risk of serious disruption of the financial markets or disproportionate loss to interested parties. Such publication is accompanied by sufficient safeguards.

text: 5. Liability regime

text: The ECB also welcomes Article 69(5) of the draft law, which adequately reflects the Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision adopted by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision by requiring protection from personal and institutional liability for supervisory actions taken by bodies and staff of the Bank of Greece in good faith in the course of performing their supervisory duties .

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 15 June 2007.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: Chapter 204 of the Laws of Malta. 2 OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 3 OJ L 250, 2.10.2003, p. 10.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 15 June 2007 at the request of the Central Bank of Malta on draft amendments to Central Bank of Malta Directive No 1 on minimum reserve requirements (CON/2007/16)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 15 June 2007 at the request of the Central Bank of Malta on draft amendments to Central Bank of Malta Directive No 1 on minimum reserve requirements (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 28 May 2007 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Central Bank of Malta (CBM) for an opinion on draft amendments to CBM Directive No 1 on minimum reserve requirements (hereinafter the ‘draft amendments’), issued pursuant to the Central Bank of Malta Act . The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Article 105(4) of the Treaty establishing the European Community and

text: Article 2(2) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft amendments relate to an instrument of monetary policy of a Member State with a derogation. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft amendments

text: The draft amendments align the framework governing minimum reserve requirements in Malta with that of the Eurosystem. In particular, the draft amendments: (i) redefine the reserve base in Appendix I of Directive No 1 to align it with that of the Eurosystem definition in Regulation ECB/2003/9 of 12 September 2003 on the application of minimum reserves ; and (ii) change the computation method so that each maintenance period is calculated on the basis of the reserve base referring to the calendar month two months before the maintenance period begins. It is intended that the draft amendments will enter into force on 15 July 2007.

text: 2. General observations

text: The ECB welcomes the draft amendments as part of the preparations for the adoption of the euro in Malta. Within the framework of monetary policy, which remains a CBM competence until adoption of the

text: euro, the aim of the draft amendments is to make the Maltese minimum reserves system consistent with the Eurosystem standards that will apply after adoption of the euro. This step should help Maltese credit institutions become familiar with the Eurosystem’s requirements and ensure a smooth start to compliance with the Eurosystem’s reserve requirements in January 2008. To this end, the draft amendments adequately reflect the Eurosystem legal framework on minimum reserves, especially Regulation ECB/2003/9.

text: 3. Reserve ratio

text: Directive No 1 gives the CBM’s Governor the power to determine the reserve requirement ratio, after taking into consideration the advice of the Monetary Policy Advisory Council. In this respect the ECB notes that during the period before adoption of the euro, the CBM may decide which ratio it prefers, but once the euro is adopted, Article 4 of Regulation ECB/2003/9 will apply. This provides that a reserve ratio of 2,0 % applies to all liabilities included in the reserve base other than those for which a reserve ratio of 0 % is stipulated.

text: 4. Procedure for calculating, notifying and acknowledging minimum reserves

text: Directive No 1 continues to be silent on the procedure for calculating, notifying and acknowledging minimum reserves. The ECB understands that under the procedure which the CBM currently has in place, the CBM calculates – on the basis of the reserve base data submitted by credit institutions – the amounts of reserves required and notifies these to credit institutions before the start of the maintenance period. While credit institutions normally acknowledge the amounts by remaining silent, they are allowed to revise the reserve base data, even after the start of the maintenance period. In this respect the ECB notes that once Malta adopts the euro, Article 5(3) of Regulation ECB/2003/9 will apply. This provision sets out the principles to be followed by national central banks in establishing their procedures for notification and acknowledgement of institutions’ individual minimum reserves.

text: Article 5(3)

text: stipulates in particular that, once acknowledged, an institution’s minimum reserves for the relevant maintenance period cannot be revised.

text: 5. First maintenance period of 2008

text: If the Council of the European Union decides to abrogate the derogation in respect of Malta with effect from 1 January 2008, the ECB will in the coming months issue regulations on the transitional period applicable to institutions in Malta which would be subject to the ECB’s minimum reserve regime from 2008. It is envisaged that, for the purposes of the first maintenance period of 2008, these regulations will, inter alia, redefine the reserve base which must be reported by other euro area institutions subject to minimum reserve requirements, as they may be authorised to take into account, for the purpose of reporting the reserve base for the first transitional period, the liabilities owed to the abovementioned

text: Maltese institutions. These regulations will not affect the Maltese minimum reserve regime prior to 1 January 2008, but the CBM may already wish to take this factor into account as regards the first maintenance period of 2008. This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 15 June 2007. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET