text: Law on credit institutions (Закон за кредитните институции, обн. ДВ, бр. 59 от 21.07.2006 г.).

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/1998/415/oj). 3 Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions, amending Directive

text: and repealing Directives

text: and

text: (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 338, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2013/36/oj). 4

text: Directive (EU) 2024/1619

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2024 amending Directive

text: as regards supervisory powers, sanctions, third-country branches, and environmental, social and governance risks (OJ L, 2024/1619, 19.6.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1619/oj).

text: See proposed new

text: Article 6

text: a of the Law on credit institutions. 6 See proposed amendment to Article 12(5) of the Law on BNB, which would enter into force and repeal and replace the previous Law on BNB as of 1 January 2026. 7 See proposed new transitional provision in the Law on BNB, which would enter into force and repeal and replace the previous Law on BNB as of 1 January 2026. 8 Under Article 15(3) of the Law on BNB. 9 See proposed amendment to Article 15(4) of the Law on BNB, which would enter into force and repeal and replace the previous Law on BNB as of 1 January 2026. 10 See proposed new

text: Article 6

text: b of the Law on credit institutions. 11 See proposed new

text: Article 6

text: c of the Law on credit institutions.

text: See proposed new

text: Article 6

text: d of the Law on credit institutions. 13 Regarding the doctrine of the ECB as to the independence and its ramifications, see the ECB’s Convergence Report 2025, Section 2.2. Available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 14 See paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on EUR-Lex. 15 Code of Conduct for high-level ECB officials (OJ C 478, 16.12.2022, p. 3). 16 Guideline (EU) [2021/2253] of the European Central Bank of 2 November 2021 laying down the principles of the Eurosystem Ethics Framework (ECB/2021/49) (OJ L 454, 17.12.2021, p. 7, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/guideline/2021/2253/oj). 17 See paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: . 18 See Article 14.3 of the Statute of the ESCB.

text: See paragraph 2.1.4 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: . 20

text: Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013

text: conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2013/1024/oj). 21 See paragraph 2.1.1 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.4 of Opinion

text: . 22 Guideline

text: (EU) 2021/2256

text: of the European Central Bank of 2 November 2021 laying down the principles of the Ethics Framework for the Single Supervisory Mechanism (ECB/2021/50) (OJ L 454, 17.12.2021, p. 21, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/guideline/2021/2256/oj). 23 See Article 6(1) of the SSM Regulation. 24 See paragraph 2.5 of Opinion

text: . 25 See

text: Article 4

text: a of Directive

text: as inserted by the CRD6. See also paragraph 2.6 of Opinion

text: . 26 See judgment of the Court of Justice of 29 April 2004, Commission v Council,

text: , ECLI:EU:C:2004:253, paragraphs 57 and 58; and judgment of the Court of Justice of 10 January 2006, Commission v Parliament and Council,

text: , ECLI:EU:C:2006:4, paragraphs 43 to 60.

text: See paragraph 2.6.2 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1.3 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.6 of Opinion

text: . 28 See

text: Article 4

text: a(2), fourth subparagraph, of Directive

text: , as inserted by the CRD6. This acknowledgement refers directly to the dismissal requirements included in

text: Article 4

text: a(2), second subparagraph, of Directive

text: , as inserted by the CRD6. 29 See paragraph 2.1.4 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.7 of Opinion

text: . 30 See Аrticle 13(4) of the Law on BNB, which enters into force and repeals and replaces the previous Law on BNB as of 1 January 2026 (Закон за Българската народна банка, обн. ДВ, бр. 13 от 13.02.2024 г.). 31 Article 130 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB, which address the independence of central banks in the ESCB, refer to ‘members of the decision-making bodies’ of NCBs, rather than to Governors specifically. 32 See the ECB’s Convergence Report 2025, Section 2.2.3, p. 26.

text: Law on BNB, which enters into force and repeals and replaces the previous Law on BNB as of 1 January 2026. 34 See

text: Article 4

text: a(2), second subparagraph, of Directive

text: , as inserted by the CRD6. 35 See

text: Article 15(1)

text: and (2) of the Law on BNB, which enters into force and repeals and replaces the previous Law on BNB as of 1 January 2026. On the issue of reproduction of relevant provisions of Union law directly applicable in the legal order of the Member State, see the ECB’s Convergence Report 2025, Section 2.2, pp. 18-19. 36 See Articles 12 and 15 of the Law on BNB, which enters into force and repeals and replaces the previous Law on BNB as of 1 January 2026. 37 See

text: Article 4

text: a(2), second subparagraph, second and third sentences, of Directive

text: , as inserted by the CRD6. 38 Article 130 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB refer to ‘members of the decision-making bodies’ of NCBs, rather than to Governors specifically. 39 See the ECB’s Convergence Report 2025, Section 2.2.3, p. 26. 40 See proposed new

text: Article 6

text: c(1) of the Law on credit institutions.

text: See

text: Article 17.3

text: , point (b), of the Single Code; see also paragraph 3.2.2 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 3.3 of Opinion

text: . 42 See Articles 17.1 and 17.2 of the Single Code. 43 See proposed new

text: Article 6

text: c(4) of the Law on credit institutions. 44 See paragraph 3.4 of Opinion

text: . 45 See Article 11 of Guideline (EU) [2021/2253] (ECB/2021/49) of the European Central Bank. 46 See Article 11 of Guideline

text: (EU) 2021/2256

text: (ECB/2021/50) of the European Central Bank. 47 See Article 16 of the Single Code. 48 See proposed new

text: Article 6

text: b of the Law on credit institutions. 49 As defined in Article 2(8) of Guideline (EU) [2021/2253] (ECB/2021/49); Article 2(7) of Guideline (EU) [2021/2256] (ECB/2021/50).

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 2 September 2025 on the independence of the members of the Governing Council of Българска народна банка (Bulgarian National Bank) (CON/2025/27)

text: EN ,

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 2 September 2025 on the independence of the members of the Governing Council of Българска народна банка (Bulgarian National Bank) (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 4 August 2025 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from Българска народна банка (Bulgarian National Bank (BNB)), acting on behalf of the Bulgarian Ministry for Finance, for an opinion on a draft law amending the Law on credit institutions and other laws (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 2(1), third indent, of

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft laws relate to BNB and the specific tasks conferred upon the ECB concerning the prudential supervision of credit institutions pursuant to Article 127(6) of the Treaty. In accordance with

text: Article 17.5

text: , first sentence, of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The main purpose of the draft law is to transpose into Bulgarian law the amendments to Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council introduced by

text: Directive (EU) 2024/1619

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council (hereinafter the ‘CRD6’). In particular, several provisions of the draft law seek to transpose

text: Article 4

text: a of Directive

text: , which relates to the supervisory independence of competent authorities and the prevention of conflicts of interest in relation to the officials and employees of such authorities. 1.2 The draft law provides that in exercising the supervisory powers of BNB, the members of the Governing Council of BNB, other than the Governor, and BNB employees act independently and objectively and are not allowed to request or accept instructions from any banks or from any Union

text: authorities, the Council of Ministers, governments of other Member States, or from other authorities and institutions . 1.3 The draft law provides that the Deputy Governor or any other member of the Governing Council of BNB cannot be elected or appointed, as the case may be, as a member of the Governing Council if, during the term of office for which they would have been elected or appointed, the performance of their duties as a member of the Governing Council would exceed 14 years, taking into account all previous terms of office . This rule applies to members of the Governing Council, with the exception of the Governor, elected or appointed after 11 January 2026, and, when calculating the term, terms of offices prior to 11 January 2026 are not counted . 1.4 The draft law provides that in the event of early discharge of a member of the Governing Council of BNB , the decision of the Governing Council is published on BNB’s website, unless a written objection to such publication is submitted by the member of the Governing Council concerned . 1.5 The draft law provides that members of the Governing Council of BNB and BNB employees are not allowed to trade in financial instruments issued by or referred to banks licensed in the territory of the Republic of Bulgaria and the direct or indirect parent companies, subsidiaries, or affiliates of such banks, subject to several exceptions . 1.6 The draft law provides that members of the Governing Council of BNB and BNB employees whose functions are directly related to the purposes of supervision or decision-making are subject to coolingoff periods – referred to in the draft law as ‘suspension periods’ – upon the termination of their employment with BNB . In particular, they must not enter into employment contracts, consultancy contracts, or management or control contracts, or accept any type of contractual arrangement for the provision of professional services for a specified period of time with: (1) banks with which the employees or the members of the Governing Council have been directly involved for supervisory or decision-making purposes, including in the direct or indirect parent companies, subsidiaries, or affiliates of those banks, with subjects that provide services to such banks, unless the employees or members of the Governing Council are not allowed to participate in the provision of those services during the suspension period; and (2) subjects carrying out lobbying and advocacy activities directed at BNB on issues for which the employees or members of the Governing Council were responsible during their employment or term of office. The relevant BNB employees are determined by decision of the Governing Council of BNB. The duration of the suspension period with respect to entities under (1) is 12 months for members of the Governing Council and at least three months for BNB employees directly involved in the supervision of banks, with the specific suspension periods to be determined by the Governing Council of BNB. The duration of the suspension period with respect to entities under

text: (2) is three months. During the suspension period, the persons subject to the suspension do not have access to information considered official, banking, professional, commercial, or other legally protected secrets or information relating to the relevant entities. The persons subject to the suspension are entitled to compensation under the terms, in the manner, and in the amount determined by the Governing Council of BNB. 1.7 The draft law provides that members of the Governing Council of BNB and the relevant BNB employees must file a declaration of interests in which they declare information on their holdings of property, equity instruments, bonds, mutual funds, investment funds, mixed funds, hedge funds, and exchange-traded funds that may give rise to suspicions of a conflict of interest .

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 Article 130 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter the ‘Statute of the ESCB’) address the independence of central banks in the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) , stipulating that when exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties conferred upon them by the Treaties and the Statute of the ESCB, neither the ECB, nor a national central bank (NCB), nor any member of their decisionmaking bodies, are to seek or take instructions from Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, from any government of a Member State or from any other body. This independence was thus entrusted to the ECB and BNB, as an NCB, by primary law . 2.2 Based on considerations of central bank independence, and in order to ensure the independence of NCBs such as BNB when exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties conferred upon them by the Treaties and the Statute of the ESCB, the ECB has established an ethics framework. This includes the ECB’s Code of Conduct for high-level ECB officials (hereinafter the ‘Single Code’), which applies, among others, to the members of the Governing Council of the ECB when exercising their functions as members of a high-level ECB body, and Guideline (EU) [2021/2253] of the European Central Bank (ECB/2021/49) , which is addressed to the NCBs of the Eurosystem and establishes ethics requirements applicable to the members of the decision-making bodies and staff of the NCBs . The NCBs, as an integral part of the ESCB, must act in accordance with the guidelines of the ECB . 2.3 Hence, national legislation transposing the CRD6 into Bulgarian law is without prejudice to the ethics framework which the ECB has established in order to ensure the independence of the ECB and the NCBs when exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties conferred upon them by the

text: Treaties and the Statute of the ESCB, as both frameworks have their own scope and legal basis . For the avoidance of doubt, the national legislator may wish to clarify this within the text of the draft law. 2.4 Furthermore, the draft law is intended to apply as of 2026, following Bulgaria’s adoption of the euro on 1 January 2026. Therefore, it should be mentioned that

text: Article 19 of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013

text: (hereinafter the ‘SSM Regulation’) stipulates that when carrying out the tasks conferred on it by the SSM Regulation, the ECB and the national competent authorities acting within the SSM must act independently. Article 31(3) of the SSM Regulation furthermore requires the ECB, in cooperation with the national competent authorities, to: (a) establish and maintain comprehensive and formal procedures including ethics procedures and proportionate periods to assess in advance and prevent possible conflicts of interest resulting from subsequent employment within two years of members of the Supervisory Board; and (b) provide for appropriate disclosures. Those procedures are without prejudice to the application of stricter national rules . The legal basis for these provisions of the SSM Regulation is Article 127(6) of the Treaty. 2.5 In view of this independence and these requirements of the SSM Regulation, the ECB has established an ethics framework to ensure the independence of national competent authorities, such as BNB, when assisting the ECB in carrying out the tasks conferred on it by the SSM Regulation. This ethics framework includes the Single Code, which applies, among others, to the members of the Supervisory Board of the ECB when exercising their functions as members of a high-level ECB body, and Guideline

text: (EU) 2021/2256

text: of the European Central Bank (ECB/2021/50) , which is addressed to the national competent authorities of the SSM and establishes ethics requirements applicable to the members of their bodies and the members of staff of the national competent authorities. In view of the responsibility of the ECB for the effective and consistent functioning of the SSM , the national competent authorities must comply with Guideline

text: (EU) 2021/2256

text: (ECB/2021/50) . 2.6 In contrast to the ethics framework, which is ultimately based on Article 127(6) of the Treaty, the CRD6, including its provision on the supervisory independence of competent authorities , is based on Article 53(1) of the Treaty. A legal act based on this provision cannot alter the rights and obligations of the ECB and the national competent authorities when carrying out the tasks conferred on them by the SSM Regulation based on Article 127(6) of the Treaty. It follows from settled case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union that the different legal bases, namely

text: Article 53(1)

text: and Article 127(6) of the Treaty, cannot be combined as the legal basis for a legal act, in view of the different

text: procedures involved. In particular, the measures adopted under Article 53(1) of the Treaty are adopted by the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee (and, if relevant, the ECB in accordance with Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty). By contrast, the regulations adopted under Article 127(6) of the Treaty are adopted by the Council alone, in a special legislative procedure in which the Council acts unanimously, after consulting the European Parliament and the ECB . 2.7 Hence, the amendments made by the CRD6 are without prejudice to the ethics framework which the ECB has established to ensure the independence of the national competent authorities in the context of the SSM, as both frameworks have their own scope and legal basis. The Union legislator acknowledged this through the CRD6’s amendments to Directive

text: , which provide that

text: Article 4

text: a(2) of Directive

text: is without prejudice to the rights and obligations of the national competent authorities pursuant to the SSM established by the SSM Regulation . For the avoidance of doubt, the national legislator may wish to clarify this within the text of the draft law. From an ECB perspective, the provisions from the CRD6 may nevertheless serve as guidance for establishing safeguards for the independence of the ECB and the national competent authorities when carrying out the tasks conferred on them by the SSM Regulation .

text: 3. Specific observations

text: 3.1 The draft law proposes to limit the maximum term of office of members of the Governing Council of BNB, other than the Governor, to 14 years, whereas currently they may be appointed to unlimited consecutive six-year terms . In this context, the ECB highlights that in accordance with Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB, statutes of NCBs must provide for a minimum term of office of five years for a Governor. This does not preclude longer terms of office. Applying the rules regarding the term of office of Governors to other members of the decision-making bodies of NCBs involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks also safeguards the personal independence of those persons . The application of the same rules regarding the term of office to both Governors and members of decision-making bodies is particularly pertinent where a Governor is ‘first among equals’ alongside other members who have equivalent voting rights, or where other members are involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks , as is the case in BNB. 3.2 As noted in paragraph 1.3, according to the draft law, the Deputy Governor or any other member of the Governing Council of BNB, other than the Governor, cannot be elected or appointed, as the case may be, as a member of the Governing Council if, during the term of office for which they would have been elected or appointed, the performance of their duties as a member of the Governing Council

text: would exceed 14 years, taking into account all previous terms of office. Since this provision is about the election and appointment process, it does not interfere with the security of tenure of an elected and appointed candidate. Against this background, the ECB considers that the relevant provisions of the Law on BNB are consistent with the requirements of Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB. 3.3 The CRD6 provides that Member States must ensure that members of a competent authority’s governance body can be dismissed if they no longer meet the criteria of appointment or have been convicted of a serious criminal offence . Under the Law on BNB, the Governor, the Deputy Governors and the other members of the Governing Council can only be dismissed prior to the expiration of their term of office if they no longer fulfil the conditions required for the performance of their duties or if they have been found guilty of serious misconduct within the meaning of

text: Article 14.2

text: , of the Statute of the ESCB . Against this background, the ECB understands that the current provisions of the Law on BNB regulating the appointment and dismissal of members of the Governing Council of BNB are consistent with the principles of the CRD6 and that, therefore, it is not necessary for the draft law to include any provisions in this respect. Furthermore, the ECB understands that the draft law only supplements the Law on BNB by adding new provisions concerning the public disclosure of grounds for dismissal that transpose the amendments to that effect made by the CRD6 to Directive

text: . 3.4 In this context, the ECB highlights that, pursuant to

text: Article 14.2

text: , second paragraph, first sentence, of the Statute of the ESCB, ‘a Governor may be relieved from office only if he no longer fulfils the conditions required for the performance of his duties or if he has been guilty of serious misconduct’. Applying the same rules regarding the grounds for relieving Governors from office to other members of the decision-making bodies of NCBs involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks also safeguards the personal independence of those persons . The application of the same rules regarding dismissal to both Governors and members of decision-making bodies is particularly pertinent where a Governor is ‘first among equals’ with other members who have equivalent voting rights, or where other members are involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks , as is the case in BNB. The ECB considers that the relevant provisions of the Law on BNB are consistent with the requirements of Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB. 3.5 The maximum 12-month suspension period applicable to the members of the Governing Council of BNB under the draft law is less restrictive than the requirements of the Single Code. The ECB highlights that the draft law should be without prejudice to the Single Code, as it may be amended

text: from time to time, and must not prevent the possibility of imposing and extending a cooling-off period of a maximum of two years when such an extended period is applied based on the Single Code . 3.6 In addition, the Single Code sets limits on the establishment of post-employment relationships, not only directly with significant or less significant credit institutions, but also with ‘other financial institutions’ or ‘any entity engaged in lobbying in relation to the ECB, or consultancy and/or advocacy for the ECB or for any [supervised] institution’ . In this regard, the draft law covers these three categories . In any event, the ECB notes further that the draft law must be interpreted without prejudice to the Single Code, as it may be amended from time to time . 3.7 The prohibition on the trading by members of the Governing Council of BNB and BNB employees of 45 46 certain financial instruments is less restrictive than the requirements of the Eurosystem and SSM Ethics Frameworks which the ECB has established and the requirements of the Single Code insofar as it limits the prohibition to financial instruments issued by, or referring to, banks licensed exclusively in the territory of the Republic of Bulgaria and the direct or indirect parent companies, subsidiaries, or 48 49 affiliates of such banks , and does not extend to other regulated entities . The ECB highlights that the draft law should be without prejudice to the Eurosystem and SSM Ethics Frameworks which the ECB has established and to the Single Code, as it may be amended from time to time, and must not prevent the possibility of extending such prohibition to financial instruments issued by regulated entities to members of the Governing Council of BNB and BNB employees.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Christine LAGARDE


text: Kredītiestāžu likums, Latvijas Vēstnesis, 163, 24.10.1995.

text: Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions, amending Directive

text: and repealing Directives

text: and

text: (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 338, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2013/36/oj).

text: Krājaizdevu sabiedrību likums, Latvijas Vēstnesis, 60, 18.04.2001. 4 See Article 1 of the draft law. 5 See

text: Article 4(1)

text: , point (a), of

text: Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013

text: conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2013/1024/oj). 6 See paragraph 1.9 of Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on EUR-Lex. 7 See paragraphs 3(1) and 12(1) and paragraph 38 of the Estonian Law on credit institutions (Krediidiasutuste seadus, RT I 1999, 23, 349). 8 See paragraph 39(1) of the Estonian Law on credit institutions. 9 See paragraph 43 of the Estonian Law on commercial associations (Tulundusühistuseadus, RT I 2002, 3, 6).

text: See paragraphs 1.9 and 3.1 of Opinion

text: . 11 Lietuvos Respublikos bankų įstatymas Nr. IX-2085, 2004 03 30. 12 See Article 2(10) of the Lithuanian Law on banks. 13 Under Article 4(5) of the Lithuanian Law on banks, a specialised bank shall have the right to provide only the following financial services, unless such right is restricted in accordance with the procedure laid down by that Law or other laws: 1) receipt of deposits and other repayable funds; 2) lending (including mortgage loans); 3) financial lease (leasing); 4) payment services; 5) issuing and administering travellers’ cheques, bankers’ drafts and other means of payment, insofar as this activity is not covered by the services indicated in point 4 of paragraph 5 of this Article; 6) provision of financial assurances and financial guarantees; 7) financial mediation (activities of an agent); 8) administering of money; 9) credit rating services; 10) lease of safes; 11) currency exchange (in cash); and 12) issuance of electronic money. Under Article 4(3) of the Lithuanian Law on banks, in addition to the provision of financial services, a bank may pursue only such other activities as those in the absence of which financial services cannot be provided, which assist in the provision of the financial services or are otherwise directly related to the provision of the financial services. 14 Estonia (draft law), Ireland, Spain, Croatia, Cyprus, Lithuania, Netherlands, Portugal and Slovenia. 15 Estonia: a draft law is currently in the legislative process. The ECB was consulted on it and adopted Opinion

text: in response; Spain: see Article 3 of Royal Decree 84/1993, on the Regulation implementing Law 13/1989 on credit cooperatives; Croatia: see Article 19 of the Law on credit institutions; Portugal: see Article 95(1) of the Legal Framework of Credit Institutions and Financial Companies, approved by Decree-Law No 298/92 of 31 December 1992, and Ordinance No 94/95, which sets the minimum share capital requirements for credit institutions and financial companies.. 16 Lithuania: see Article 40(2) of the Law on banks; Netherlands: see

text: Article 48(1)

text: , point (b), of the Decree on Prudential Rules for Financial Undertakings and Article 2(13) of the Law on financial supervision. 17 Ireland: see Section 9E(3) of the Central Bank Act 1971 (No 24); Cyprus: see Section 4(2), point (d), of the Law on the business of credit institutions (66(I)/1997); Slovenia: see

text: Article 118(4)

text: and

text: Articles 347

text: to 349 of the Law on banking.

text: See paragraph 2.9 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 3.3 of Opinion

text: . 21 See paragraph 3.2 of Opinion

text: . 22

text: Regulation (EU) No 575/2013

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and amending

text: Regulation (EU) No 648/2012

text: (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2013/575/oj . 23 Available on the EBA’s website at www.eba.europa.eu.

publisher: Europeiska centralbanken

sprak: en

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 17 September 2025 on the establishment of special credit institutions with a lower initial capital threshold of EUR 1 million (CON/2025/28)

serie: con

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 17 September 2025 on the establishment of special credit institutions with a lower initial capital threshold of EUR 1 million (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

type: rubrik

text: On 10 July 2025 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Latvian Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft law amending the Law on credit institutions to introduce a new regulatory framework for special credit institutions with an initial capital that may not be less than EUR 1 million (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Article 25(1) of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, which provides, inter alia, that the ECB may be consulted by the competent authorities of the Member States on the implementation of Union legislation relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions. In particular, the draft law contains provisions affecting the ECB’s tasks concerning the prudential supervision of credit institutions pursuant to Article 127(6) of the Treaty. In accordance with Article 17.5, first sentence, of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

type: stycke

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 As noted in the explanatory memorandum accompanying the draft law, the main objective of the draft law is to improve the regulation of the Law on credit institutions by defining a special credit institution and setting out its eligibility criteria, thereby facilitating the development of the financial market and its competitiveness in the credit institution sector as a whole, as well as the availability of financial services across the territory of Latvia. In order to facilitate the entry of new market participants and ensure the harmonisation of laws across the Baltic States, the explanatory memorandum accompanying the draft law notes the necessity of exercising all the options provided for in

text: Article 12(4) of Directive 2013/36/EU

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council (hereinafter the ‘CRD’) by setting the framework for the activities of a special credit institution and providing for a lower initial capital threshold of EUR 1 million. 1.2 Latvian law does not currently provide for any exemption from the minimum initial capital requirement of EUR 5 million established for credit institutions under the CRD. The draft law provides for a possibility to establish a special credit institution with a lower initial capital threshold of EUR 1 million.

text: 1.3 In order to benefit from the exemption from the EUR 5 million initial capital requirement a credit institution would need to comply with the following non-cumulative criteria: (a) have a limited range of customers established according to the territorial principle, the employment principle, or the principle of community of interests within the meaning of the Law on credit unions ; (b) provide financial services exclusively in digital form; or (c) have a business model that envisages the provision of innovative services, which are new or significantly improved financial services in Latvia . No secondary legislation is envisaged in the draft law to further define these criteria. 1.4 The draft law does not limit the range of financial services that the above categories of credit institutions, which would benefit from the exemption from the EUR 5 million initial capital requirement, would be entitled to provide. Accordingly, they would be entitled to provide the same services as credit institutions subject to the full EUR 5 million initial capital requirement. 1.5 The explanatory memorandum accompanying the draft law notes that, taking into account that a special credit institution will be allowed to enjoy the freedom to provide services and the freedom of establishment in the Union, it will be subject to all the same prudential and other requirements for a credit institution as are currently established for a credit institution with an initial capital of no less than EUR 5 million.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 The ECB notes that, within the framework of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), which is composed of the ECB and the national competent authorities, including Latvijas Banka, the ECB is, in accordance with all relevant Union law (and Latvian legislation transposing Union directives), exclusively competent to carry out, for prudential supervisory purposes, the tasks of authorising credit institutions and withdrawing authorisations of credit institutions . 2.2 Regarding the draft law’s objective of ensuring the harmonisation of laws across the Baltic States, the ECB was consulted by the Estonian Ministry of Finance in 2023 and adopted an opinion on a draft law that proposed to reduce the minimum initial capital requirement applicable to association banks from the current EUR 5 million to EUR 1 million in line with Article 12(4) of the CRD . The ECB understands that association banks are a particular category of credit institution that can exist only in the specific legal form of a commercial association and must be established by at least 50 persons , and, irrespective of the amount of capital contributed by any member to its share or initial capital, each member of the association bank has one vote at its general meeting . Notwithstanding these features, the ECB understands that the draft Estonian law does not limit the range of services that an association bank may provide, and that association banks may provide the same range of

text: services as credit institutions established as public limited companies (aktsiaselts) . However, the

text: ECB understands that the draft law has not been adopted by the Estonian legislator.

text: 2.3 The ECB was not consulted by the Lithuanian authorities on the Lithuanian Law on banks , which

text: established a regime for ‘specialised banks’ under Lithuanian law with a minimum initial capital

text: banks are defined as credit institutions established in the Republic of Lithuania authorised to

text: engage, and which engage, in receiving deposits and other repayable funds from non-professional

text: market participants and in lending thereto, and which assume the risk and liability related thereto,

text: and have the right to provide such other financial services that are specified in the Law on banks .

text: 2.4 Other SSM jurisdictions have exercised the option under the CRD to establish a regime for the

text: authorisation of particular categories of credit institutions with an initial capital of less than EUR 5

text: CRD into their national laws have followed a heterogeneous approach. Some of those Member

text: States have introduced geographic limitations , some have limited the services that can be provided

text: by such credit institutions , and some have simply transposed the provisions of the CRD without

text: any further specifications . In terms of implementation of the exception, the ECB has not granted

text: authorisations to credit institutions with initial capital lower than EUR 5 million, except under the

text: Lithuanian specialised banks regime.

text: 2.5. Against this backdrop, it seems difficult to conclude that the draft law would achieve its goal of

text: ensuring the harmonisation of laws across the Baltic States. The draft law would not align with the

text: current Estonian regime, where there is no legal framework for special credit institutions.

text: Furthermore, the draft Estonian law on which the ECB was consulted in 2023 envisaged a narrower

text: category of special credit institution than that envisaged by the draft law. Rather, the draft law

text: appears to be designed to harmonise the Latvian regime with the Lithuanian regime, albeit subject to different detailed terms and conditions.

text: 3. Specific observations

text: 3.1 Particular categories of special credit institutions under the draft law and scope of services provided 3.1.1 Under the CRD, Member States may grant authorisation to particular categories of credit institutions with an initial capital of less than EUR 5 million, subject, inter alia, to the conditions that the initial capital is no less than EUR 1 million and that the Member States concerned must notify the Commission and the European Banking Authority (EBA) of their reasons for exercising that option . As noted in the recitals of the CRD, in order to secure a sustainable and diverse Union banking culture which primarily serves the interest of the citizens of the Union, small-scale banking activities, such as those of credit unions and cooperative banks, should be encouraged . Accordingly, the ECB understands that the purpose of the exception for the authorisation of particular categories of credit institutions under the CRD is to accommodate certain types of credit institutions that do not have the same risk profile or business scale as larger credit institutions, such as local savings banks, cooperative banks, or credit unions. By doing so, the Union legislator sought to encourage a diverse banking sector, supporting smaller community-based or specialised institutions that play important roles in local economies and financial inclusion. Therefore, the exercise of the option conferred on Member States under the CRD is, in principle, only justified in respect of institutions that have a local scope of activity with a limited risk profile. 3.1.2 The draft law provides for a EUR 1 million initial capital requirement for three categories of credit institutions. The ECB understands the first category to include, inter alia, credit unions, which, after the entry into force of the draft law, would have the option to convert into credit institutions with an initial capital requirement of minimum EUR 1 million. However, this category ultimately seems to target applicants that have established a territorial, employment or common interest focus in their statutes. While this appears to be a distinctive definition, it opens the field to a future broad spectrum of commercial banking activities that could be pursued by a special credit institution after obtaining authorisation to commence the activity of a credit institution. Similarly, the second category – credit institutions that provide financial services exclusively in digital form – appears to be a very broad and not particularly distinctive category of credit institution. The same applies to the third category – credit institutions that have a business model that envisages the provision of innovative services which are new or significantly improved financial services in Latvia. This also appears to be a very broad and not particularly distinctive category of credit institution. While the CRD does not provide any further guidance regarding the particular categories which under the national law may be entitled to benefit from reduced initial capital requirements, the CRD does confine the exemption to particular categories. The ECB invites the legislator to consider whether the criteria for qualifying as a credit institution falling within the three categories of credit institutions are sufficiently clear, unique and distinctive, and to reinforce the proposed criteria to foster such clarity, and also ensure an accurate

text: application of the envisaged provisions to institutions that have a local scope of activity with a limited risk profile. 3.1.3 Furthermore, in the event that the Latvian legislator pursues the lower initial capital requirement, the ECB suggests that it should consider specifying the range and type of services that credit institutions with a lower initial capital may provide in order to provide sufficient clarity to possible applicants and to better manage risks in the banking sector . As outlined above, this should focus on low-risk local banking activities. 3.2 Initial capital level of special credit institutions 3.2.1 The ECB cautions that the combination of a high number of potential new entrants to a market of rather limited size and relatively low capital levels could lead to increased risks if market players prove to be less risk averse or engage in more aggressive behaviour in order to obtain market shares. Therefore, the ECB encourages the Latvian legislator to thoroughly consider whether lowering the initial capital requirement for special credit institutions to EUR 1 million is a good legislative choice in terms of policy for the banking market . This becomes even more relevant when the objective of the draft law is to improve regulation and facilitate the development of the financial market and its competitiveness in the credit institution sector. 3.2.2 Furthermore, a credit institution must comply with the own funds requirements as set by the relevant applicable Union and national law, including

text: Regulation (EU) No 575/2013

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council . The amount of own funds required on authorisation is determined on the basis of an entity's business plan and the risks that it intends to undertake according to the methodology described in Chapter 8 of the EBA Guidelines of 11 November 2021 on a common assessment methodology for granting authorisation as a credit institution under

text: Article 8(5) of Directive 2013/36/EU

text: ) . 3.3 Licensing process and conditions for special credit institutions 3.3.1 If the lower initial capital requirement is implemented, the ECB considers that supervisors would need to consider sufficient assurances to ensure that the abovementioned risks do not materialise, in particular by applying a thorough scrutiny in the assessment of authorisation applications jointly with the ECB. This could be achieved through a careful and comprehensive challenge of proposed business plans, including enhanced business plan stress testing. Furthermore, institutions authorised under such a regime may materially depart from the business model they applied for, for example through a shift towards riskier activities, or by failing to deliver on the digital and innovative ambitions proposed in their applications, or may have difficulties in achieving scale efficiency. Consequently, the ECB also invites the Latvian legislator to consider amending the draft law to

text: require applicants to prepare and submit an exit plan as a prerequisite for the granting of authorisation. 3.3.2 To sum up, the ECB invites the Latvian legislator to thoroughly consider whether lowering the initial capital requirement for special credit institutions to EUR 1 million is a good choice in terms of policy for the banking market. Should the Latvian legislator decide to proceed, the ECB would suggest that the draft law be amended in two respects in order to ensure that the exceptional national treatment it provides for credit institutions avoids undue banking risks building up. First, as concerns the categories of special credit institutions under the draft law, the ECB suggests ensuring that these are targeted categories with limited risk and business profiles, so that they qualify as a sufficiently precisely defined and distinctive category of particular credit institution within the meaning of the CRD and thus warranting the exceptional national capital treatment. These should be institutions that have a local scope of activity with a limited risk profile. In addition, the range and type of activities falling under that definition should be specified. Second, the Latvian legislator is invited to consider requiring a mandatory, credible exit plan with clear triggers as a prerequisite for the granting of an authorisation as a special credit institution.

text: This opinion will be published on EUR-Lex.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 17 September 2025.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Christine LAGARDE

type: vagledning

utgivare: ecb


text: Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions, amending Directive

text: and repealing Directives

text: and

text: (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 338, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2013/36/oj).

text: Directive (EU) 2024/1619

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2024 amending Directive

text: as regards supervisory powers, sanctions, third-country branches, and environmental, social and governance risks (OJ L, 2024/1619, 19.6.2024, http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1619/oj). 3 Bankenrichtlinienumsetzungs- und Bürokratieentlastungsgesetz (BRUBEG). 4

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/1998/415/oj).

text: Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013

text: conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2013/1024/oj). 6 Code of Conduct for high-level ECB officials (OJ C 478, 16.12.2022, p. 3). 7 Guideline

text: (EU) 2021/2256

text: of the European Central Bank of 2 November 2021 laying down the principles of the Ethics Framework for the Single Supervisory Mechanism (ECB/2021/50) (OJ L 454, 17.12.2021, p. 21, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/guideline/2021/2256/oj). 8 See Article 6(1) of the SSM Regulation. 9 See

text: Article 1

text: , point (4), of the CRD6, which inserts

text: Article 4

text: a in Directive

text: See judgment of 29 April 2004, Commission v Council,

text: , ECLI:EU:C:2004:253, paragraphs 57 and 58; and judgment of 10 January 2006, Commission v Parliament and Council,

text: , ECLI:EU:C:2006:4, paragraphs 43 to 60. 11 See also paragraph 2.6.2 of Opinion of the European Central Bank of 21 June 2024 on a proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards certain reporting requirements in the fields of financial services and investment support (

text: ) (OJ C, C/2024/5048, 16.8.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/5048/oj). 12 See

text: Article 4

text: a(2), fourth subparagraph, of Directive

text: , as inserted by the CRD6. This acknowledgement refers directly to the dismissal requirements included in

text: Article 4(2)

text: , second subparagraph, of the CRD6. 13 See

text: Article 4

text: a(2), second subparagraph, of Directive

text: , as inserted by the CRD6. 14 See Section 9(2) of the Law on the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority, Finanzdienstleistungsaufsichtsgesetz as published in the announcement of 22 April 2002, Bundesgesetzblatt I, p. 1782, as amended.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 18 September 2025 on the independence of the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (CON/2025/29)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 18 September 2025 on the independence of the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 20 August 2025, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the German Federal Ministry of Finance for an opinion on draft legislative proposals concerning the transposition of amendments to Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council introduced by

text: Directive (EU) 2024/1619

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council (hereinafter the ‘CRD6’), including in particular a draft law amending the Law on the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: as the draft law relates to the specific tasks conferred upon the ECB concerning the prudential supervision of credit institutions pursuant to Article 127(6) of the Treaty. In accordance with

text: Article 17.5

text: , first sentence, of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The main purpose of the draft law is to transpose into German law the amendments to Directive

text: introduced by the CRD6. In particular, the provisions of the draft law seek to transpose

text: Article 4

text: a of Directive

text: , which relates to the supervisory independence of competent authorities and the prevention of conflicts of interest of the officials and employees of such authorities. 1.2 The draft law provides that the Executive Board members of the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (hereinafter ‘BaFin’, Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht) have a renewable term of office of five years and cannot be longer in office than 14 years. In case of dismissal, the grounds for dismissal must be published, unless the Executive Board member concerned objects. 1.3 The draft law empowers the Federal Ministry of Finance to determine by means of an ordinance, to the extent that is appropriate, complementary ethics rules applicable to Executive Board members of BaFin relating, first, to private transactions regarding financial instrument and crypto-assets, and,

text: second, to cooling-off periods, including rules related to the prohibition of and compensation for activities within 24 months after their term of office as Executive Board members. 1.4 The draft law provides that, as far as civil servants, employees, workers, and trainees of BaFin are concerned, the Federal Ministry of Finance is empowered to determine, by means of an ordinance, the cooling-off period, with the possibility for a distinction to be made on the basis of the type of employing entity involved. Furthermore, as far as all kinds of staff are concerned the Federal Ministry of Finance is empowered to oblige them to provide, when taking up the employment and annually, a declaration of interest on specific financial assets which could give rise to concerns of conflicts of interest.

text: 2. General observations 2.1

text: Article 19 of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013

text: (hereinafter the ‘SSM Regulation’) stipulates that when carrying out the tasks conferred on it by the SSM Regulation, the ECB and the national competent authorities acting within the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) must act independently. Article 31(3) of the SSM Regulation furthermore requires the ECB, in cooperation with the national competent authorities, to: (a) establish and maintain comprehensive and formal procedures including ethics procedures and proportionate periods to assess in advance and prevent possible conflicts of interest resulting from subsequent employment within two years of members of the Supervisory Board; and (b) provide for appropriate disclosures. Those procedures are without prejudice to the application of stricter national rules. The legal basis for these provisions is Article 127(6) of the Treaty. 2.2 In view of this independence and these requirements of the SSM Regulation, the ECB has established an ethics framework to ensure the independence of national competent authorities, such as the BaFin, when assisting the ECB in carrying out the tasks conferred on it by the SSM Regulation. This ethics framework includes the ECB’s Code of Conduct for high-level ECB officials , which applies, among others, to the members of the Supervisory Board of the ECB when exercising their functions as members of a high-level ECB body, and Guideline

text: (EU) 2021/2256

text: of the European Central Bank , which is addressed to the national competent authorities of the SSM and establishes ethics requirements applicable to the members of their bodies and the members of staff of the national competent authorities. In view of the responsibility of the ECB for the effective and consistent functioning of the SSM , the national competent authorities must comply with Guideline

text: (EU) 2021/2256

text: . 2.3 In contrast to the ethics framework ultimately based on Article 127(6) of the Treaty, the CRD6, including its provision on the supervisory independence of competent authorities , is based on Article

text: 53(1) of the Treaty. A legal act based on this provision cannot alter the rights and obligations of the ECB and the national competent authorities when carrying out the tasks conferred on them by the SSM Regulation based on Article 127(6) of the Treaty. It follows from settled case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union that the different legal bases, namely Articles 53(1) and 127(6) of the Treaty, cannot be combined as the legal basis for a legal act, in view of the different procedures involved. In particular, the measures adopted under Article 53(1) of the Treaty are adopted by the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee (and, if relevant, the ECB in accordance with Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty). By contrast, the regulations adopted under Article 127(6) of the Treaty are adopted by the Council alone, in a special legislative procedure in which the Council acts unanimously, after consulting the European Parliament and the ECB . 2.4 Hence, the amendments made by the CRD6 are without prejudice to the ethics framework which the ECB has established to ensure the independence of the national competent authorities in the context of the SSM, as both frameworks have their own scope and legal basis. The Union legislator acknowledged this through the CRD6’s amendments to Directive

text: , which provide that

text: Article 4

text: a(2) of Directive

text: is without prejudice to the rights and obligations of the national competent authorities pursuant to the SSM established by the SSM Regulation . To avoid any doubt, the national legislator may wish to clarify this within the text of the draft law. From an ECB perspective, the provisions from the CRD6 may nevertheless serve as guidance for establishing safeguards for the independence of the ECB and the national competent authorities when carrying out the tasks conferred on them by the SSM Regulation.

text: 3. Specific observations

text: 3.1 The CRD6 provides that Member States must ensure that members of a competent authority’s governance body can be dismissed if they no longer meet the criteria of appointment or have been convicted of a serious criminal offence . Under the Law on the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority, the member of the Executive Board of BaFin can be dismissed – upon resolution of the Federal Government – for good cause . The ECB understands that this provision – which is to be interpreted in conformity with the requirements of

text: Article 4

text: a(2), second subparagraph, of the CRD6 – enables , in consistency with CRD6, the dismissal of members of the Executive Board of BaFin if they no longer meet the criteria of appointment or have been convicted of a serious criminal offence.

text: 3.2 Furthermore, the ECB understands that the draft law only supplements the Law on the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority by adding new provisions concerning the term of office of the Executive Board members (being no longer than 14 years) and concerning the public disclosure of grounds for dismissal that transpose the amendments to that effect made by

text: Article 4

text: a(2), second subparagraph, of the CRD6. 3.3 The ECB expects to be consulted on the draft national legislation on the empowerment of the Federal Ministry of Finance to determine, as outlined in paragraph 1.3, rules applicable to Executive Board members and all kinds of staff of BaFin relating to cooling-off periods and private transactions once this is available.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 18 September 2025.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Christine LAGARDE


text: Council Decision of 29 June 1998 on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/1998/415/oj).

text: Section 2, point (a), of the draft law defines ‘seller’ as a natural or legal person authorised to conduct business or perform other self-employed activities, and who receives revenue for the sale of goods or the provision of services, regardless of where they have their permanent residence or registered office.

text: See the submission report and general part of the explanatory memorandum. 5 Section 2(19) of Law No. 492/2009 Coll. on payment services and amending certain laws (Zákon č. 492/2009 Z. z. zo

text: novembra 2009 o platobných službách a o zmene a doplnení niektorých zákonov).

text: Section 15(3) of the draft law. 7 Sections 3(2) and 15(1) of the draft law. 8 Section 4 and Section 15(1) of the draft law. 9 Section 15(1) of the draft law. 10 Sections 16, point (v), and 17(1), point (h), of the draft law. 11 Sections 16, point (v), and 17(2), point (a), of the draft law. 12 See paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: ; paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: . 13 See Opinion

text: of the European Central Bank of 1 February 2023 on a proposal for a regulation amending Regulations

text: (EU) No 260/2012

text: and

text: (EU) 2021/1230

text: as regards instant credit transfers in euro (OJ C 106, 22.3.2023, p. 2); see also the ECB, ‘The Eurosystem’s retail payments strategy – priorities for 2024 and beyond’, available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 14 This intention appears in the analysis of the impact on the business environment prepared by the Slovakian Ministry of Finance.

text: See paragraph 2.4 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 9.2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 7.2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on EUR-Lex.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 26 September 2025 on the mandatory acceptance of cashless payments by sellers (CON/2025/30)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK Of 26 September 2025 on the mandatory acceptance of cashless payments by sellers (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 21 August 2025 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Minister for Finance of the Slovak Republic for an opinion on a draft law on the registration of sales (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 2(1), second indent, of

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft law relates to means of payment. In accordance with

text: Article 17.5

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The draft law recodifies the legislation on online and virtual cash registers and proposes a new type of cash register known as a software online cash register (hereinafter, together, ‘e-cash register’ (eKasa)), which must be used by sellers to register revenue when selling goods or providing services. The overall purpose of the draft law is to reflect new trends in the registration of sales revenues, and to support the fight against tax evasion . 1.2 The draft law introduces, inter alia, an obligation for sellers to enable buyers to make cashless payments for goods and services for any sale exceeding EUR 1 in value as of 1 March 2026 . This obligation is considered to be fulfilled when the seller accepts as cashless payment the use of a ‘payment instrument’, which is defined as any personalised device and/or set of procedures agreed between the payment service user and the payment service provider, and used in order to initiate a payment order, including but not limited to a payment card, internet banking or any other electronic banking payment application . 1.3 The draft law provides that when a cashless payment is made using a payment instrument that allows scanning of a payment order in the form of a QR code, the Financial Directorate of the Slovak Republic (hereinafter the ‘Financial Directorate’) will provide the technical means necessary to enable the e-cash register to obtain confirmation of such cashless payment. If, when making such a

text: cashless payment, confirmation of its execution is not provided, the e-cash register will print a document confirming this fact. The draft law requires the Financial Directorate to determine and publish on its website the technical details of the technical means that will enable the e-cash register to obtain confirmation of the cashless payment and the particulars of the non-confirmation of a payment. The technical means for cashless payments may also be provided by third parties independently from the Financial Directorate . 1.4 Sellers are exempted from the obligation to enable buyers to make a cashless payment if: (a) they are exempted from the mandatory use of an e-cash register ; (b) they have permission to postpone sending data to the e-cash register ; or (c) at the time of payment for the sale of goods or the provision of a service there is (i) no internet connection available at the point of sale, or (ii) a failure of the technical means provided by the Financial Directorate or by a third party to confirm the processing of a cashless payment . 1.5 The draft law envisages that a second breach of a seller’s obligation to enable buyers to make cashless payments will be subject to a fine ranging from EUR 500 to 15 000 . Any further breach would be subject to a fine ranging from EUR 1 000 to 30 000 .

text: 2. Observations

text: 2.1 The ECB views further innovation and development in the field of electronic payment instruments and their further spread in society positively and recalls the Eurosystem’s support for the full deployment of instant payments . Therefore, the ECB welcomes the draft law in terms of its goal to contribute to the development of instant payments in Slovakia. At the same time, given the lack of technical details on the concrete implementation of the draft law, the ECB is unable to opine on the feasibility of the intended solution for instant payments. The ECB recommends that the specific details of the technical solution for cashless payments that is to be facilitated by the e-cash register, including any need for the establishment of accounts with payment providers and related fee structures, is made known to the sellers well in advance of the entry into force of the draft law, obliging them to accept cashless payments. 2.2 The ECB understands that the intention of the Slovakian Ministry of Finance is to oblige sellers to accept at least one means of cashless payment, and that the choice of acceptable means of cashless payment will lie solely with the seller . However, the text of the draft law is unclear in this respect and may also lend itself to the interpretation that the buyer is entitled to use any payment instrument

text: of its choice. Such an interpretation would, however, be tantamount to the introduction of a requirement for the mandatory acceptance of all payment instruments and could, in the case of noninstant payments, involuntarily expose sellers to credit and settlement risks. Therefore, the ECB recommends that the draft law should be amended to expressly clarify that sellers discharge their obligation to enable buyers to make cashless payments by accepting at least one means of cashless payment of each individual seller’s choice. 2.3 The ECB understands that the draft law introduces an obligation for sellers to enable buyers to make cashless payments, but does not limit the ability of buyers to continue paying for goods and services in cash. In this regard, the ECB stresses that sellers are generally obliged to accept cash as a means of payment for goods and services, as euro banknotes and coins have legal tender status, and their continuing acceptance plays an important role in society .

text: This opinion will be published on EUR-Lex.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 26 September 2025.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Christine LAGARDE


text: 19, 20 Systemic Risk Board . Specifically, the Finnish definition allows for the inclusion of assets other than real estate as eligible collateral. Furthermore, the ECB observes that, based on available information regarding similar borrower-based measures implemented in other Member States, a relaxation of the limits for the LTV ratio and maximum loans’ maturity would position Finland among the countries with the higher limits regarding this type of macroprudential measure. Finally, with regard to the proposal to entrust the government with the power to amend certain macroprudential measures related to loans granted to housing companies via decree depending on the economic cycle, the ECB recalls its recent statement calling on national macroprudential authorities to maintain the resilience of the banking sector. In this respect, the ECB has highlighted the importance of maintaining existing borrower-based measures to preserve sound lending standards via their role as structural backstops, where this is feasible in national legislation . 2.4 Finally, the ECB also notes that other factors, such as the renovation costs associated with ensuring that older dwellings comply with the relevant energy efficiency regulations, may increase the depreciation in the value of such properties. These considerations could also be relevant when macroprudential authorities evaluate the appropriateness of relaxing borrower-based measures.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 6 October 2025 on national macroprudential measures related to mortgage lending (CON/2025/31)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 6 October 2025 on national macroprudential measures related to mortgage lending (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 27 August 2025 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Finnish Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft law amending the law on credit institutions and certain related laws (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 2(1), sixth indent, of

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft law relates to rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with

text: Article 17.5

text: , first sentence, of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The main purpose of the draft law is to amend provisions on certain macroprudential measures, namely borrower-based measures related to mortgage lending, in order to promote saving and investing, support housing trade and construction, make it easier to change housing, and make the regulation of financing for housing more flexible. 1.2 Currently loan-to-value (LTV) requirements applicable to mortgage loans granted by credit institutions and certain other creditors providing consumer loans limit the maximum amount of a mortgage loan relative to the available collateral to 90 % (or 95 % in the case of first-time buyers) of the fair value of the collateral. The draft law gives Finanssivalvonta (FIN-FSA, Financial Supervisory Authority), as the national macroprudential authority, the power to increase the LTV limit to 95 % . The increase of the LTV ratio would be possible for the purpose of limiting an exceptional downturn of the housing market but only if it is not assessed to result in a significant increase in the risks related to financial stability. 1.3 In addition, the draft law increases the maximum loan period applicable to residential mortgages from 30 to 35 years. In each calendar quarter 10 % of the total amount of a lender’s loans would be allowed to exceed the maximum limit .

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/1998/415/oj ).

text: 3 Draft Chapter 7a, Section 14a of the Law on consumer protection (38/1978). 1.4 Currently the maximum amount of a loan granted to a housing company for the construction of new residential properties is limited to 60 % of the debt-free sales price of the shares of the housing company offered for sale. The draft law would remove this limit from the law and replace it with a mechanism whereby the limit would be set between 60 to 70 % in a government decree . 1.5 Similarly, the current maximum 12-month limit for the amortisation-free period or a period of lower than regular amortisation of a housing company loan would be removed from the law and replaced with a mechanism whereby the limit would be set between 12 to 24 months in a government decree . 1.6 Finally, the 30-year maximum loan period for loans to housing companies laid down in the law would be replaced with a mechanism whereby the limit would be set between 30 to 35 years in a government decree. In each calendar quarter 10 % of the total amount of a lender’s loans would be allowed to exceed the maximum limit . 1.7 According to the explanatory memorandum accompanying the draft law, adopting the measures related to housing company loans by means of a government decree allows the limits to be adjusted more flexibly in accordance with the economic cycle compared to setting the limits in legislation .

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 In its previous opinions on macroprudential oversight the ECB expressed support for the design of effective macroprudential policy frameworks within Member States, in line with the guiding principles set out in Recommendation

text: of the European Systemic Risk Board . It should be highlighted that

text: Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council indicates that national central banks should have a leading role in macroprudential oversight because of their expertise and their existing responsibilities in the area of financial stability. This principle is also upheld by the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) . In addition, Recommendation

text: recommends that, in the pursuit of its objective, the macroprudential authority is, as a minimum, operationally independent, in particular from political bodies . The ECB notes that under Finnish law the power to adopt macroprudential measures is currently assigned to the FIN-FSA Board. The Board is composed of a minimum of five and a maximum of six members, three of whom are appointed on the basis of proposals by Suomen Pankki, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry

text: 4 Draft Chapter 15, Section 11a(1) of the Law on credit institutions (610/2014) and draft Section 15(1) of the Law on the registration of certain creditors and credit intermediaries (186/2023).

text: 5 Draft Chapter 15, Section 11a(2) of the Law on credit institutions (610/2014) and draft Section 15(2) of the Law on the registration of certain creditors and credit intermediaries (186/2023).

text: 6 Draft Chapter 15, Section 11a(3) of the Law on credit institutions (610/2014) and draft Section 15(3) of the Law on the registration of certain creditors and credit intermediaries (186/2023).

text: 7 Chapter 8, page 29 of the draft government bill on the law amending the law on credit institutions and certain related laws.

text: 8 See, for example, paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: 9 Recommendation

text: of the European Systemic Risk Board of 22 December 2011 on the macro-prudential mandate of national authorities (OJ C 41, 14.2.2012, p. 1). See also paragraph 4.2 of Opinion

text: Recital 24

text: of

text: Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010

text: on European Union macro-prudential oversight of the financial system and establishing a European Systemic Board (OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2010/1092/oj).

text: 11 See recital 7 and Section 1, Recommendation B, of Recommendation

text: . See also paragraph 2.7 of

text: 12 See Section 1, Recommendation E, of Recommendation

text: . of Social Affairs and Health, respectively. The Board members must be conversant with the activities of the financial markets. Decisions are taken by simple majority and the Chair of the Board has a casting vote in decisions on the adoption of macroprudential measures. 2.2 Based on the draft law, the new macroprudential measures related to loans granted to housing companies would be adopted by a decree issued by the government instead of by decisions taken by the FIN-FSA Board. According to the explanatory memorandum accompanying the draft law the measures need to be adopted by a decree because the limits on the loans granted to housing companies are far-reaching by their social nature and important in principle . The ECB notes that adopting the macroprudential measures related to housing company loans through a government decree risks conflict with the recommendation set out in Recommendation

text: that, in the pursuit of its objective, the macroprudential authority is as a minimum operationally independent, in particular from political bodies . Furthermore, Recommendation

text: recommends Member States to ensure that the macroprudential authority has control over appropriate instruments for achieving its objectives. Where necessary, clear and expeditious procedures should be established for assigning instruments to the macroprudential authority . However, the ECB refrains from making any further observations regarding the possible institutional implications for the FIN- FSA, as the national macroprudential authority, arising out of the requirement that the new macroprudential measures related to loans granted to housing companies would be adopted by a decree issued by the government instead of by decisions taken by the FIN-FSA Board . Furthermore, it is for the Finnish authorities to consider the constitutional feasibility of granting the FIN-FSA Board the power to adopt these measures, rather than adopting them through a government decree. 2.3 The ECB observes that, from a financial stability perspective, an extension of the maximum maturity for both mortgages and housing company loans, as well as the possibility to increase the LTV limit in respect to all homebuyers, could lead to an increase in the demand for larger loans. This, in turn, could contribute to increased levels of indebtedness among households and housing companies. In the specific case of Finland, this warrants close monitoring as household indebtedness remains elevated both from a historical perspective and compared with other Member States, as highlighted by Suomen Pankki in its recent financial stability assessment . With regard to any potential change to the LTV limit, the ECB has already noted in a previous opinion that the definition of collateral in Finland differs from the approach recommended in Recommendation

text: of the European

text: 13 Draft Chapter 15, Section 11a of the Law on credit institutions (610/2014) and draft Section 15 of the Law on the registration of certain creditors and credit intermediaries (186/2023).

text: 14 Chapter 8, page 29 of the draft government bill on the law amending the law on credit institutions and certain related laws.

text: 15 See Section 1, Recommendation E, of Recommendation

text: . See also paragraphs 3.1.3 and 3.1.4 of

text: 16 See Section 1, Recommendation C, of Recommendation

text: 17 See also paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.3 of

text: 18 See Suomen Pankki, ‘Global upheaval – Financial stability at risk from power politics’, 19 June 2025, available on Suomen Pankki’s website at www.bofbulletin.fi . This opinion will be published on EUR-Lex. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 6 October 2025. [signed] The President of the ECB Christine LAGARDE

text: 19 Recommendation

text: of the European Systemic Risk Board of 27 June 2019 on medium-term vulnerabilities in the residential real estate sector in Finland (OJ C 366, 30.10.2019, p. 29).

text: 20 See paragraph 3.2 of Opinion

text: 21 See ECB, Governing Council statement on macroprudential policies, 7 July 2025, available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu .