title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 16 April 2012 on the Deposit Guarantee Fund and the bank resolution regime (CON/2012/30)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 16 April 2012 on the Deposit Guarantee Fund and the bank resolution regime (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 2 March 2012 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Danish Ministry of Business Affairs and Growth for an opinion on a law amending the Law on a guarantee fund for depositors and investors, the Law on financial business, the Law on securities trading, the Law on financial stability and the Law on tax assessment (amending the funding of the Guarantee Fund for depositors and investors, extending the compensation scheme, upholding banking licences as a resolution measure and the disclosure of confidential information by the Financial Supervisory Authority) (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the sixth indent of

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to the rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The draft law has the following objectives: First, it amends the method of financing of the Danish Guarantee Fund for depositors and investors (hereinafter ‘the DGS’). Second, it strengthens the possibility of winding up a banking institution in distress without the non-subordinated creditors incurring a loss, by amending the bank resolution powers and tools available to the Danish Financial Supervisory Authority (FSA) and the Financial Stability Company A/S, a State-owned bridge bank .

text: 1 The Law on a guarantee fund for depositors and investors, see Consolidated Law No 133 of 22 February 2011 with later amendments; Law on financial business, see Consolidated Law No 885 of 8 August 2011 with later amendments; Law on securities trading, see Consolidated Law No 883 of 9 August 2011; Law on financial stability, see Consolidated Law No 875 of 15 September 2009 with later amendments and the Law on tax assessment, Consolidated Law No 1017 of 28 October 2011 with later amendments.

text: 2 OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: 3 The draft law implements the political agreement of 25 August 2011 (the ‘Bank Package IV’), initially adopted by the Financial Committee of the Danish Parliament on 7 September 2011 as Document No 181. The current draft law is related to a previous draft law on the issuance of a loss guarantee in connection with an extended compensation scheme 1.2 With regard to the financing of the DGS, the draft law provides for ex-ante annual contributions to be paid to the Bank Department of the DGS by the member banking institutions. The draft law also requires the standing liquidity facility of the DGS’s Bank Department to be maintained at 0.75% of the covered net deposits, in order to address situations where the annual contribution by the member banking institutions does not cover payments liable to be made by the DGS . The standing liquidity facility may be used as collateral by the DGS to raise loans, including loans with a State guarantee. The draft law also extends the scope of the DGS’s Winding-up Department so that the Winding-up Department may cover the costs of a banking institution having to withdraw from a data-handling centre in connection with the merger or transfer of assets between the distressed bank and another bank . 1.3 With regard to amendments related to bank resolution powers and tools, the draft law proposes two changes: First, the draft law extends the existing compensation scheme in order to create sufficient incentives for sound banking institutions to take over all or parts of a banking institution in distress . The extended compensation scheme will involve the Financial Stability Company A/S which may provide compensation in connection with the winding-up or take-over of a distressed banking institution, in whole or in part, by a sound credit institution, i.e. the Model I and Model II resolution . Such compensation may amount to the level of losses, which the State would incur, based on the state guarantees issued to the distressed banking institution under resolution. Second, the draft law amends the rules by which the FSA can withdraw a banking licence from a banking institution which no longer fulfils the statutory solvency requirements by a set date. This is to ensure the continued functioning of a banking institution in distress where the FSA assesses that there are on-going serious negotiations with one or more potential acquirers. Furthermore, the draft law brings forward the time at which the FSA may disclose confidential information concerning the on which the ECB issued an Opinion on 9 November 2011; see Opinion

text: . All ECB Opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: 4 The draft law provides for a total annual contribution of 0.25% of the banks’ covered net deposits at 1 October of the preceding year. This rate may be changed under extraordinary circumstances in which the contribution may be increased. See §1 subsection 7 of the draft law and pages 14 to 16 of the Explanatory Memorandum to the draft law.

text: 5 See §1 subsection 7 of the draft law and page 15 of the Explanatory Memorandum.

text: 6 The Winding-Up Department was set up by Section 3 of Law No 721 of 25 June 2010 amending the Guarantee Fund for depositors and investors of 1 October 2010, and is financially and organisationally separate from the ordinary guarantee obligations of the DGS. The capital of the Winding-Up Department is provided entirely through mandatory contributions from the banking sector. See paragraph 1.5 of Opinion

text: .As a consequence of the extended scope in the draft law the Winding-Up Department will change its name to ‘the Winding-Up and Restructuring Department’.

text: 7 The existing compensation scheme allows the DGS, subject to certain conditions, to provide funds or a guarantee covering all depositors and non-subordinated creditors of a distressed banking institution in connection with the complete transfer of assets and liabilities of a distressed bank to another financially sound bank. The ECB issued Opinion

text: on this scheme on 24 May 2011.

text: 8 Under Model I a sound banking institution takes over an entire business of the banking institution in distress. Under Model II a sound banking institution purchases the sound part of the distressed banking institution from the Financial Stability Company A/S and funds obtained from this sale are included in the winding-up of the unsound part of the distressed banking institution; this is conditional upon the industry-funded Winding-Up Department of the DGS issuing a guarantee to the Financial Stability Company A/S, covering any losses incurred after the final winding-up of the distressed banking institution. Moreover, the use of Model I or Model II resolution procedures is subject to an assessment by the Financial Stability Company A/S that it does not put the State in a worse financial position than if the distressed banking institution was to be wound up under the special bank resolution regime (the Bank Package III). distressed banking institution to the interested private sector acquirers and to the public authorities . In this last respect, the FSA is given a broader authority to disclose confidential information to the Financial Stability Company A/S and the committees and groups, appointed by the Minister for Business Affairs and Growth, which are aimed at coordinating measures ensuring financial stability and addressing systemic risks. 1.4 The draft law also amends the Law on tax assessment to ensure that State compensation arising as a result of the application of Model I is not included in the calculation of taxable income, as is the case in the application of Model II .

text: 2. General observations

text: The draft law was submitted to the Danish Parliament on 1 February 2012; the ECB only received the request for an opinion on 2 March 2012. The ECB wishes to draw the consulting authority’s attention to the second sentence of

text: Article 4 of Decision 98/415/EC

text: which provides that the ECB must be consulted ‘at an appropriate stage’ in the legislative process. This implies that the consultation should take place at a stage in the legislative process which affords the ECB sufficient time to examine the draft legislative provisions, and to adopt its opinion in the required language versions in sufficient time to enable the relevant national authorities to consider the ECB’s opinion before the legislative provisions are adopted.

text: 3. Specific comments

text: 3.1 Ex-ante funding of the DGS The ECB welcomes the proposal for ex-ante funding arrangements to replace the current ex-post funding arrangements for the Danish DGS. This solution takes into consideration the proposed recast of the Directive on deposit-guarantee schemes (hereinafter, the ‘proposed Directive’) which anticipates a specified target level of ex-ante funding available to deposit-guarantee schemes, based on a percentage of deposits held. The ECB supports ex-ante funded depositguarantee schemes as a means to ensuring financial stability, where credit institutions participate in the deposit protection costs, and as an exclusive reliance on ex-post contributions may be a source of procyclicality. The ECB notes that the proposed Directive may also introduce risk-based elements into the calculation of the contributions payable into the deposit-guarantee scheme by the individual member credit institutions, which will better reflect the risk profiles of individual credit institutions thereby providing incentives to operate under less risky business models . Further, the

text: 9 The draft law proposes that the FSA may disclose confidential information at the point in time at which the FSA has received a mandate from the Ministry of Business Affairs and Growth to participate in the management of a banking institution in distress.

text: 10 See §5 of the draft law.

text: 11 See the proposal by the Commission for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Deposit Guarantee Schemes (COM(2010) 368), as commented on in Opinion

text: . See the latest Presidency Compromise proposal of 14 June 2011 and the Commission’s proposal and Presidency compromise proposal of 10 February 2012 on key issues with a view to negotiations with the European Parliament, both documents are available on the Council’s website at http://register.consilium.europa.eu.

text: 12 See the Commission’s staff working document ‘Summary of the impact assessment. Accompanying document to the proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Deposit Guarantee Schemes’, p. 5, available on the Commission’s website at www.ec.europa.eu. ECB supports the model of partial risk-based contributions, with provisions ensuring comparability of various asset classes . 3.2 Bank resolution powers and tools The ECB welcomes the enhancements made to the Danish bank resolution regime and how it facilitates private market-based solutions to deal with banking institutions in distress. The ECB understands that the enhanced resolution procedures to which the draft law relates will be conducted in accordance with Union State aid rules, inter alia, as regards the involvement of the DGS and the Financial Stability Company A/S in these procedures. More specifically, the ECB understands that the draft law establishing the extended compensation scheme has been notified to the Commission and that the Commission has approved the scheme in its Decision . Finally, the ECB understands that the enactment of a legal framework on bank recovery and resolution is somewhat complicated due to the absence of a stable legislative proposal at Union level. It invites the consulting authority to review the law in light of the future Union regulatory framework on bank recovery and resolution, in particular with regard to the resolution tools and the powers of resolution authorities, and of the proposed Directive. 3.3 The ECB understands that the possibility of not withdrawing a banking licence from an insolvent banking institution, where serious take-over negotiations are being conducted, is intended to ensure a smooth resolution procedure. However, this should not affect the immediate cessation of central bank credit to any banking institution that does not fulfil national solvency conditions and that could result in the provision of solvency support. Whereas the provision of financial support to illiquid but solvent banks constitutes an inherent central bank task, any public sector solvency support of credit or other financial institutions has to be carried out by the State and not the central bank. Continued provision of central bank credit to such a banking institution would contravene the monetary financing prohibition expressed in Article 123 of the Treaty . This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 16 April 2012. [signed] The President of the ECB Mario DRAGHI

text: 13 See paragraph 8 of Opinion

text: 14 See Commission Decision SA 33757 (2011/N) of 9.12.2011, available on the Commission’s website.

text: 15 See the ECB’s Convergence Report of May 2010, p. 25.


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: This term includes both physical persons and legal entities. 3 The Second Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece, March 2012, p. 117; http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2012/pdf/ocp94_en.pdf; also as an Annex V to Law 4046/2012. FEK A 28/14.2.2012.

text: Recommendation

text: of the European Systemic Risk Board of 22 December 2011 on the macro-prudential mandate of national authorities (OJ C 41, 14.2.2012, p. 1).

publisher: Europeiska centralbanken

sprak: en

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 16 April 2012 on the Statute of the Bank of Greece (CON/2012/31)

serie: con

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 16 April 2012 on the Statute of the Bank of Greece (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

type: rubrik

text: On 5 April 2012 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Bank of Greece for an opinion on draft legislative provisions introducing amendments to the Statute of the Bank of Greece (hereinafter the ‘draft provisions’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and on the third and sixth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft provisions relate to the Bank of Greece and to rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

type: stycke

text: 1. Purpose of the draft provisions

text: The draft provisions introduce a number of amendments to the Statute of the Bank of Greece, related to its operation, tasks and governance, participation in its share capital and the distribution of its profits. 1.1 As regards the operation, tasks and distribution of profits of the Bank of Greece, the proposed amendments: (a) extend the duration of the Bank of Greece from 2020 to 2050; (b) enable the Bank of Greece’s General Council to convene and take action with special composition in relation to urgent matters; (c) expressly entrust the Bank of Greece with macro-prudential authority; (d) specify for the financial years 2012-2020 the way in which the income of the Bank of Greece stemming from Greek government bonds forming part of its investment portfolio on 31 December 2011 will be transferred to the Greek State.

text: 1.2 As regards governance and participation in share capital, the proposed amendments: (a) prohibit persons supervised by the Bank of Greece from holding Bank of Greece shares and introduce a 2% cap on the voting rights that may be exercised by any private shareholder, with the exception of entities governed by public law, social security organisations and organisations providing services in the public interest and (b) provide that the Executive Committee, consisting of the Governor and the two Deputy Governors, will take decisions based on a quorum and majority of two members, one of which must be the Governor. The Executive Committee will be responsible for the prudential supervision of entities supervised by the Bank of Greece, and will exercise all powers related to this task by issuing acts or empowering other competent bodies of the Bank of Greece to exercise such powers. The Executive Committee’s work will be monitored by three non-executive General Council members.

text: 2. General observations

text: In general, the ECB welcomes the proposed amendments to the Statute of the Bank of Greece as they enhance the operation of the Bank of Greece and the exercise of its tasks. Moreover, the ECB understands that the proposed amendments are aimed at bringing the Statute of the Bank of Greece in line with some of the objectives set out in the Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies (hereinafter the ‘Memorandum’) , in accordance with the time frame provided for therein. In the light of the Bank of Greece’s responsibility for resolution, restructuring and supervision, the draft provisions provide for collegial decision-making at the executive level, i.e. the Governor and Deputy Governors, and establish on-going accountability through internal oversight by nonexecutives in the General Council. The draft provisions revise the structure and rights of the Bank of Greece’s shareholders to eliminate possible conflicts of interest in the Bank of Greece’s public policy role. In this respect, the draft provisions prohibit supervised institutions from shareholdings and set a cap on the number of votes that each or related private shareholders can exercise.

text: 3. Specific observations

text: 3.1 Distribution of profits 3.1.1 The transfer of the income of the Bank of Greece from Greek government bonds forming part of its investment portfolio on 31 December 2011 provided for in Article 71(3) of the draft provisions must comply with the monetary financing prohibition laid down in Article 123 of the Treaty, which prohibits overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facility with an NCB in favour of the public sector. Article 123 of the Treaty prohibits, in particular, the distribution of central bank profits that have not been fully realised, accounted for and audited and the distribution of income outside the statutory profit distribution rules. In order to comply with the monetary financing prohibition, the

text: Bank of Greece’s income from Greek government bonds may only be transferred to the State as part of the normal profit distribution and subject to the condition that the net profit of the year exceeds that income. The draft

text: Article 71(3)

text: may create the impression that the income stemming from Greek government bonds should be distributed separately and therefore should be amended accordingly. 3.1.2 In addition, the distribution of profits must also comply with the principle of financial independence. The transfer of the income of the Bank of Greece from Greek government bonds forming part of its investment portfolio on 31 December 2011 before the allocation of funds to the regular reserve fund could affect the Bank of Greece’s financial independence in periods during which the regular reserve fund is below its maximum statutory level.

text: Article 71(3)

text: should therefore clarify that in years where the size of the regular reserve fund is at its statutory limit, such income is to be distributed to the State budget as part of and up to the limit of the net profits of the Bank of Greece. In years where the size of the regular reserve fund is below its statutory limit, such income should be distributed to the State budget up to the remaining surplus after the regular reserve fund has been funded according to

text: Article 71(1)

text: . 3.2 Shareholder rights The ECB welcomes the proposed amendments that prohibit persons supervised by the Bank of Greece from participating in its share capital and that cap the voting rights that may be exercised by any private shareholder at general meetings of the Bank of Greece to votes attached to shares that do not exceed the percentage that corresponds to 2% of the Bank of Greece’s share capital. These amendments aim at preventing possible interference in the exercise by the Bank of Greece of its public tasks. 3.3 Governance arrangements The ECB notes that the proposed amendments enhance the Executive Committee’s role, making it a regular body of the Bank of Greece entrusted with the prudential supervision of entities supervised by the Bank of Greece. Although not explicitly mentioned in the proposed provisions, the ECB understands that the tasks related to the exercise of prudential supervision by the Executive Committee include, inter alia, the exercise of the resolution powers of the Bank of Greece. The ECB considers that the Executive Committee’s proposed composition and decisionmaking process allow for the establishment of a collegial decision-making process in the Bank of Greece in areas critical for the stability of financial institutions and markets, such as the resolution of supervised entities. The ECB notes that the work of the Executive Committee will be monitored by three non-executive members of the Governing Council; the ECB understands that the oversight conducted by the Governing Council will in no way impede the Executive Committee’s decision making powers.

text: 3.4 Exercise of the macro-prudential authority The draft provisions provide that the Bank of Greece exercises, inter alia, the macro-prudential authority in the context of prudential supervision. The ECB understands that these amendments are aimed at reflecting Recommendation

text: , which provides that Member States should designate a national authority entrusted with the conduct of macro-prudential policy. 3.5 Miscellaneous It would be advantageous to reflect the changes to the organisational structure of the Bank of Greece, with regard to the separation of prudential supervision from resolution, in the draft provisions.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 16 April 2012.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI

type: vagledning

utgivare: ecb


text: KOM(2011) 0860 slutlig.

text: KOM(2011) 0862 slutlig.

text: Meddelande från kommissionen Europa 2020 En strategi för smart och hållbar tillväxt för alla, KOM(2010) 2020 slutlig.

text: Europeiska rådets slutsatser av den 4 februari 2011, punkt 22.

text: Meddelande från kommissionen Inremarknadsakten Tolv åtgärder för att stimulera tillväxten och stärka förtroendet för inre marknaden Gemensamma insatser för att skapa ny tillväxt KOM(2011) 0206 slutlig, särskilt punkt 2.1.

text: ECB:s yttrande

text: av den 22 mars 2012 om i) ett förslag till direktiv om marknader för finansiella instrument och om upphävande av

text: , ii) ett förslag till förordning om marknaderna för finansiella instrument och ändring av förordning [EMIR] om OTC-derivat, centrala motparter och transaktionsregister, iii) ett förslag till direktiv om straffrättsliga sanktioner för insiderhandel och otillbörlig marknadspåverkan samt iv) ett förslag till förordning om insiderhandel och otillbörlig marknadspåverkan (marknadsmissbruk), punkt 8. Ännu ej offentliggjort i EUT. Den engelska versionen finns på ECB:s webbplats http://www.ecb.europa.eu

text: Artikel 4 i förslaget till förordning om Europeiska riskkapitalfonder och artikel 4 i förslaget till EuSEF-förordning.

text: Artiklarna 15 och 20.3 i förslaget till förordning om Europeiska riskkapitalfonder och artiklarna 16 och 21.3 i förslaget till EuSEF-förordning.

text: Artiklarna 7–12 i förslaget till förordning om Europeiska riskkapitalfonder och artiklarna 7–13 i förslaget till EuSEF-förordning.

text: Artiklarna 13–22 i förslaget till förordning om Europeiska riskkapitalfonder/artiklarna 14–23 i förslaget till EuSEF-förordning.

text: EUT L 174, 1.7.2011, s. 1. Commission staff working paper — Impact assessment accompanying the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on European Venture Capital Funds (kommissionens arbetsdokument – sammanfattning av konsekvensanalysen som åtföljer förslaget till Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning om europeiska riskkapitalfonder), SEC(2011) 1515, s. 37.

text: Artikel 3.2 b i direktiv 2011/61/EU

text: Skäl 17

text: i

text: direktiv 2011/61/EU

text: Skäl 13 i förslaget till förordning om Europeiska riskkapitalfonder och skäl 13 i förslaget till EuSEF-förordning.

text: Punkt 11 i ECB:s yttrande

text: av den 16 oktober 2009 om ett förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv om förvaltare av alternativa investeringsfonder och om ändring av direktiven

text: och 2009/…/EG (EUT C 272, 13.11.2009, s. 1).

text: Artikel 5.2 i förslaget till förordning om Europeiska riskkapitalfonder och artikel 5.2 i förslaget till EuSEF-förordning.

text: Ändringsförslagen avseende förslaget till förordning om Europeiska riskkapitalfonder ska tillämpas med nödvändiga ändringar på motsvarande bestämmelser i förslaget till EuSEF-förordning.

text: Text markerad med fet stil anger ECB:s förslag till ny text. Genomstruken text anger de strykningar som ECB föreslår.

text: Artikel

text: 1 b

text: och

text: 1 c

text: och

text: artikel 2.1 b

text: iii (EUT L 86, 24.3.2012, s. 24).

text: EUT L 145, 30.4.2004, s. 1. Artiklarna 2.1 i och 4.1.

text: KOM(2010) 0484 slutlig.

text: Artikel 1.1

text: KOM(2011) 0452 slutlig. Artiklarna

text: 250.1 d

text: och

text: Skäl 14 i förslaget till förordning om Europeiska riskkapitalfonder.

text: EUT L 302, 17.11.2009, s. 32. Artiklarna

text: och

text: Artikel 21

sprak: sv

title: Europeiska centralbankens yttrande av den 25 april 2012 om ett förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning om Europeiska riskkapitalfonder och om ett förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning om europeiska fonder för socialt företagande (CON/2012/32)

text: Inledning och rättslig grund

text: Den 20 januari 2012 mottog Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) en begäran från Europeiska unionens råd om ett yttrande över ett förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning om Europeiska riskkapitalfonder (nedan kallat förslaget till förordning om Europeiska riskkapitalfonder) och över ett förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning om europeiska fonder för socialt företagande (nedan kallat förslaget till EuSEF-förordning) (nedan tillsammans kallade de föreslagna förordningarna).

text: ECB:s behörighet att avge ett yttrande över de föreslagna förordningarna grundas på artiklarna

text: och

text: i fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt, eftersom de föreslagna förordningarna innehåller bestämmelser som har betydelse för de europeiska finansmarknadernas integration och som berör Europeiska centralbankssystemets (ECBS) medverkan till de behöriga myndigheternas smidiga genomförande av riktlinjerna för tillsynen över kreditinstitut och det finansiella systemets stabilitet såsom avses i artikel 127.5 i fördraget. I enlighet med artikel 17.5 första meningen i arbetsordningen för Europeiska centralbanken har detta yttrande antagits av ECB-rådet.

text: Allmänna kommentarer

text: 1. Förslaget till förordning om Europeiska riskkapitalfonder syftar till att åtgärda de europeiska små och medelstora företagens svårigheter att finna finansiering under uppstartsskedet. Eftersom en stor del av dessa företags finansiering kommer från mindre fonder vars förvaltade tillgångar i genomsnitt uppgår till 60 miljoner EUR, är förordningen tänkt att förbättra kapitalanskaffnings-förmågan i hela EU. Genom denna förordning inrättas särskilda europeiska riskkapitalfonder med gemensamma egenskaper inom ramen för ett enda regelverk. Detta skulle medföra säkerhet och öppenhet gentemot alla aktörer, inklusive investerare, tillsynsmyndigheter och företag som är godkända för investeringar. Införandet av ett pass för den inre marknaden, varigenom en fond registrerad i en medlemsstat skulle kunna saluföra andelar och aktier i andra medlemsstater, skulle minska den administrativa bördan och begränsa tillsynsmässiga hinder.

text: 2. Denna ram kompletteras av förslaget till EuSEF-förordning, som syftar till att stimulera finansieringen till sociala företag genom att det upprättas en ny kategori av europeiska fonder för socialt företagande (nedan kallade EuSEF). Detta skulle hjälpa investerare att identifiera och jämföra fonder som investerar i sociala företag samt utöka möjligheterna att saluföra deras fonder gentemot internationella investerare.

text: 3. I Europa 2020-strategin framhölls på nytt behovet av att vidta riktade regleringsåtgärder som ska förbättra de små och medelstora företagens tillgång till finansiering, särskilt genom att åtgärda de hinder som står i vägen för flödet av venture capital-finansiering med hjälp av särskilda investeringsfonder. Europeiska rådet ställde sig bakom denna strategi och krävde att kvarstående tillsynsmässiga hinder för gränsöverskridande venture capital-flöden skulle undanröjas. Till följd av detta tillkännagav kommissionen i april 2011 ett initiativ för att se till att riskkapitalfonder som är etablerade i en medlemsstat ska kunna anskaffa kapital i hela EU.

text: 4. Som ECB redan har konstaterat har det under senare tid varit svårare för många små och medelstora företag att få tillgång till finansiering än för större företag, särskilt under perioder av marknadspåfrestningar. ECB är förvissat om att de föreslagna nya systemen skulle bidra avsevärt till utvecklingen av en innovativ och hållbar ekonomi i och med att de gör det lättare för snabbt expanderande små och medelstora företag att få tillgång till finansiering och effektiviserar tillämpliga tillsynsmässiga krav. För att Europa 2020-strategin ska genomföras framgångsrikt enligt tidsplanen är det viktigt att åtgärda den splittrade finansieringen för innovativa och socialt inriktade små och medelstora företag och främja framväxten av en integrerad och öppen EU-omfattande finansmarknad som skulle stimulera till och underlätta gränsöverskridande investeringar inom dessa sektorer.

text: 5. Mot denna bakgrund välkomnar ECB de föreslagna förordningarna, som innebär att det införs enhetliga krav för fonder som bedriver verksamhet under en enda europeisk beteckning samt ett identiskt materiellt regelverk samtidigt som lämplig tillsyn säkerställs. I detta hänseende noterar ECB flera olika aspekter som skulle bidra till att ett lämpligt och balanserat regelverk uppnås: systemets frivilliga karaktär, det gränsöverskridande anmälningsförfarandet mellan de behöriga myndigheterna, reglerna för godkända förvaltares agerande och upplysningskraven samt bestämmelserna som syftar till att säkerställa en effektiv tillsyn av hur passet används.

text: Specifika kommentarer

text: 6. ECB stöder kommissionens mål om att säkerställa att de föreslagna förordningarna överensstämmer med det befintliga systemet för förvaltare av alternativa investeringsfonder enligt

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 2011/61/EU av den 8 juni 2011

text: om förvaltare av alternativa investeringsfonder samt om ändring av direktiv

text: och

text: och förordningarna

text: (EG) nr 1060/2009

text: och

text: (EU) nr 1095/2010

text: . I detta hänseende välkomnar ECB hänvisningen i de föreslagna förordningarna till tröskelvärdet i direktiv

text: , varigenom det införs ett tröskelvärde på 500 miljoner EUR för kapitalfonder som skulle avgränsa systemen för de europeiska riskkapitalfonderna och de europeiska fonderna för socialt företagande från det regelverk som inrättas genom direktiv

text: 7. ECB konstaterar att syftet med ovannämnda tröskelvärde är att skilja förvaltare av alternativa investeringsfonder vars verksamhet skulle kunna få betydande konsekvenser för den finansiella stabiliteten från andra där detta är föga sannolikt och att de förslagna systemen ska tillämpas på fonder som inte är systemviktiga.

text: 8. Som villkor för att de föreslagna förordningarna ska tillämpas ställs det också som krav att samtliga godkända riskkapitalfonder och fonder för socialt företagande ska vara utan finansiell hävstång, vilket ska säkerställa att de godkända fonderna inte bidrar till systemrisker och inriktas på att stödja godkända portföljföretag. Eftersom begreppet finansiell hävstång har stor betydelse för den affärsmodell som många förvaltare av alternativa investeringsfonder tillämpar, anser ECB att det är lämpligt att uttryckligen ange den eventuella finansiella hävstången när det gäller de föreslagna systemen för Europeiska riskkapitalfonder och fonder för socialt företagande.

text: I de fall där ECB rekommenderar att den föreslagna förordningen ska ändras anges de specifika förslagen i bilagan åtföljt av en förklaring.

text: BILAGA

text: Kommissionens förslag | ECB:s ändringsförslag

text: 2. Förvaltaren av en riskkapitalfond får inte utnyttja den godkända riskkapitalfonden för lån, utfärdande av skuldebrev, ställande av säkerhet eller på denna fond använda metoder som ökar fondens exponering, antingen genom lån av kontanter eller värdepapper, ingångna derivatpositioner eller på annat sätt. | 2. Förvaltaren av en riskkapitalfond får inte utnyttja den godkända riskkapitalfonden för lån, utfärdande av skuldebrev, ställande av säkerhet eller på denna fond använda metoder som ökar fondens exponering, antingen genom lån av kontanter eller värdepapper, ingångna derivatpositioner derivatkontrakt eller på annat sätt.

text: Förklaring Derivatpositioner kan också ingås i risksäkringssyfte, vilket då snarare skulle minska än öka riskexponeringen. ECB konstaterar visserligen att den föreslagna ordalydelsen har hämtats från motsvarande definition i

text: artikel 4.1 v i direktiv 2011/61/EU

text: , men föreslår ändå att begreppet derivatpositioner ersätts med derivatkontrakt, i överensstämmelse med ordalydelsen i annan befintlig eller föreslagen EU-finanslagstiftning, t.ex.

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning (EU) nr 236/2012 av den 14 mars 2012

text: om blankning och vissa aspekter av kreditswappar,

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 2004/39/EG av den 21 april 2004

text: om marknader för finansiella instrument och om ändring av

text: rådets direktiv 85/611/EEG

text: och

text: och

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 2000/12/EG

text: samt upphävande av

text: rådets direktiv 93/22/EEG

text: och förslagen till Europaparlamentets och rådets förordningar om OTC-derivat, centrala motparter och transaktionsregister respektive om tillsynskrav för kreditinstitut och värdepappersföretag.

text: eller som på begäran kan behandlas som professionella kunder enligt bilaga II.II till det direktivet, eller till andra investerare varvid | Förvaltare av riskkapitalfonder ska bara saluföra fondandelar och aktier i godkända riskkapitalfonder till investerare som betraktas som professionella kunder enligt bilaga II.I till direktiv

text: , såvida de inte har begärt att bli behandlade som icke-professionella kunder, eller som på begäran kan behandlas som professionella kunder enligt bilaga II.II till det direktivet, eller till andra investerare varvid samtliga följande villkor ska vara uppfyllda,

text: Förklaring I artikel 6 i förslaget till förordning om Europeiska riskkapitalfonder hänvisas det till professionella kunder enligt bilaga II.I till direktiv

text: . Det är oklart vilket system som skulle tillämpas på professionella kunder som på begäran behandlas som icke-professionella kunder enligt samma bestämmelse. Genom ändringsförslaget skulle begreppet professionella kunder i förslaget till förordning anpassas till definitionen i bilaga II till direktiv

text: i syfte att förhindra missförstånd. Enligt förordningen får Europeiska riskkapitalfonder också saluföras till andra investerare, som måste ha den kunskap, erfarenhet och kapacitet som fordras av dessa fonder. ECB anser visserligen att dessa kriterier ger det investerarskydd som krävs, men föreslår ändå att det ska säkerställas att samtliga kriterier är obligatoriska.

text: Ingen text |

text: Artikel 10

text: a Förvaringsinstitut 1. Förvaltare av riskkapitalfonder ska för varje europeisk riskkapitalfond de förvaltar se till att ett enda förvaringsinstitut utses i enlighet med denna artikel. 2. Förvaringsinstitutet ska vara ett institut enligt definitionen i

text: artikel 21 i direktiv 2011/61/EU

text: . 3. I syfte att garantera en konsekvent tillämpning av punkt 1 ska Esma utarbeta förslag till tekniska standarder för tillsyn för att ange villkoren för att utföra förvaringsinstitutsfunktionen för Europeiska riskkapitalfonder. Esma ska överlämna utkasten till tekniska standarder för tillsyn till kommissionen inom sex månader efter det att denna förordning har trätt i kraft. Till kommissionen delegeras befogenhet att anta de tekniska standarder för tillsyn som avses i första stycket i enlighet med artiklarna

text: i förordning (EU) nr 1095/2010.

text: Förklaring I syfte att stärka investerarskyddet föreslår ECB att det uttryckligen ska anges hur ett förvaringsinstitut utses, i enlighet med det ramverk som antogs i direktiv

text: om samordning av lagar och andra författningar som avser företag för kollektiva investeringar i överlåtbara värdepapper (fondföretag) och direktiv

text: . Det förenklade system som här föreslås syftar emellertid till att säkerställa att eventuella resulterande skyldigheter står i proportion till fondens karaktär och storlek.

text: 1. Behöriga myndigheter och Esma ska vid behov samarbeta med varandra för att fullgöra sina respektive uppdrag enligt denna förordning. | 1. Behöriga myndigheter och Esma ska vid behov samarbeta med varandra för att fullgöra sina respektive uppdrag enligt denna förordning och, om så är lämpligt, med Europeiska systemrisknämnden.

text: Förklaring För överensstämmelsen med

text: artikel 50 i direktiv 2011/61/EU

text: föreslår ECB att samarbetet mellan Esma och behöriga myndigheter även bör involvera ESRB, om så är lämpligt.

text: 2. Medlemsstaternas behöriga myndigheter eller Esma får inte hindras från att utbyta information i enlighet med denna förordning eller annan unionslagstiftning som är tillämplig på förvaltare av riskkapitalfonder samt godkända riskkapitalfonder. | 2. Medlemsstaternas behöriga myndigheter eller Esma får inte hindras från att, då så är nödvändigt, utbyta information i enlighet med denna förordning eller annan unionslagstiftning som är tillämplig på förvaltare av riskkapitalfonder samt godkända riskkapitalfonder under utförandet av sina uppgifter enligt denna förordning och utövandet av sina befogenheter enligt denna förordning eller nationell lagstiftning. Behöriga myndigheter ska lämna information till centralbankerna, inbegripet Europeiska centralbanken, och Europeiska systemrisknämnden, om denna information är relevant för fullgörandet av dessas uppdrag.

text: Förklaring På så sätt skulle det säkerställas att centralbankerna, inbegripet ECB och ESRB, på ett lämpligt sätt får information som är relevant för fullgörandet av deras uppdrag.


text: See paragraph 5 of Opinion

text: , reiterated in paragraph 2.3.2 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 8 May 2012 on limitations on cash payments (CON/2012/33)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 8 May 2012 on limitations on cash payments (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 26 April 2012 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Spanish Ministry of Finance and Public Administrations for an opinion on a proposal for a draft Law on the amendment and adjustment of tax and fiscal regulations to strengthen actions for preventing and fighting tax fraud (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the second indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions, as the draft law relates to means of payment. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The draft law implements a number of measures aimed at combating tax evasion. One such measure is a limitation on the amounts that can be paid in cash for transactions where at least one of the parties is acting in a professional or business capacity. 1.2 The limit is set at an amount of EUR 2 500, with a higher limit of EUR 15 000 if the payer is an individual who, (i) can demonstrate that he/she is not a tax resident in Spain, and (ii) does not act in a professional or business capacity. In addition, these limitations shall not be applied to payments and deposits made with credit institutions.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 The ECB notes that the draft law is in compliance with Union law , and in particular with

text: recital 19

text: of

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 974/98

text: , which states that ‘limitations on payments in notes and coins, established by Member States for public reasons, are not incompatible with the status of legal tender of euro banknotes and coins, provided that other lawful means for the settlement of

text: monetary debts are available’. The ECB acknowledges that: (i) such other lawful means for the settlement of monetary debts, other than cash, are available in Spain; and (ii) the draft law’s objective of combatting tax evasion qualifies as a public reason outweighing the impact of the limitations on cash payments. 2.2 However, limitations on payments in cash should be proportionate to the objectives pursued and should not go beyond what is necessary to achieve such objectives. Any impact of the proposed limitations should be carefully weighed against the public benefits expected to be derived from the proposed restrictions on payments in cash. The competent authorities should ensure that the effects of these measures do not go beyond what is necessary for achieving the objective of combating tax evasion.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 8 May 2012.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 2 See Opinion

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 10 May 2012 on the protection against counterfeiting and the quality of cash circulation (CON/2012/34)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 10 May 2012 on the protection against counterfeiting and the quality of cash circulation (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 30 March 2012, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the German Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft regulation on the delegation of power to the Deutsche Bundesbank to adopt regulations pursuant to Section 36a of the Law on the Deutsche Bundesbank (hereinafter the ‘draft regulation’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Article 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the first, second and third indents of

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft legislation concerns currency matters, means of payment and the Deutsche Bundesbank. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft regulation

text: 1.1 The draft regulation is based on Section 36a of the Law on the Deutsche Bundesbank, which became part of that Law in 2011 . This provision authorises the Ministry of Finance to issue more detailed provisions on submission duties, including the option to notify the Deutsche Bundesbank about transactions with banknote handling systems. It also provides the option of delegating the adoption of such provisions to the Deutsche Bundesbank’s Executive Board. The draft regulation aims to enable the Deutsche Bundesbank’s Executive Board to adopt implementing legislation on reporting duties on operators of banknote processing systems towards the Deutsche Bundesbank. The Deutsche Bundesbank will have to seek the agreement of the Ministry of Finance before such implementing legislation can be adopted. 1.2 The explanatory memorandum to the draft regulation provides that the delegation will be granted on the basis of the Deutsche Bundesbank’s expertise in this field. The implementing legislation to be enacted will contain detailed practical issues regarding on-site inspections of banknote

text: processing systems and details on the reporting duties of the operators of such systems. In addition, it will contain templates for reporting.

text: 2. General observations

text: The ECB welcomes the draft regulation under which the German Federal Government exercises its discretion to delegate its power to regulate the scope and manner of the reporting duties of banknote processing entities. The ECB expects to be consulted on any draft regulation by the Deutsche Bundesbank on the basis of this delegation. This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 10 May 2012. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 2 The ECB discussed this reform in Opinions

text: and

text: . 3

text: Article 1

text: , §1 of the draft royal decree. 4 See paragraph 1.5.4 and 3.3 of Opinion

text: . 5 The operating costs are broadly defined to include: personnel costs, administrative costs, depreciation of tangible and intangible assets and other costs that need to be attributed to the supervision of financial institutions (

text: Article 1

text: §2 of the draft royal decree).

text: The methods used and the total amount to be borne by each of the two sectors are certified each year by the NBB’s auditor; explanations are provided in the NBB’s annual financial statements (

text: Article 1

text: , §2 of the draft royal decree). 7

text: Article 2

text: , §1 to 5 (insurance sector) and

text: Articles 7

text: to 9 (banking sector) of the draft royal decree. 8

text: Article 2

text: , §2 2° (insurance sector) and

text: Article 7

text: 2° (banking sector) of the draft royal decree. Where several institutions belonging to one group are considered to be systemic, the additional contribution is paid by only one of them. See also

text: Article 13

text: , §3 with regard to clearing institutions, settlement institutions and assimilated entities. 9

text: Article 36

text: /3 of the Law of 22 February 1998. 10 i.e. it is either actually reimbursed or set-off against the contribution due by the institution for the following year. See

text: Article 3

text: (insurance sector) and 10 (banking sector) of the draft royal decree. 11

text: Article 4

text: (insurance sector) and 11 (banking sector) of the draft royal decree. 12

text: Article 5

text: (insurance sector) and 12 (banking sector) of the draft royal decree. See also

text: Article 13

text: , §5 with regard to clearing institutions, settlement institutions and assimilated entities. 13 Clearing institutions, settlement institutions, assimilated entities, payment institutions and mutual guarantee companies. 14

text: Article 13

text: to 15 of the draft royal decree. 15 Paragraph 3.3 of

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 10 May 2012 on supervision-related operating costs (CON/2012/35)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 10 May 2012 on supervision-related operating costs (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 23 March 2012, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Nationale Bank van België/Banque Nationale de Belgique (NBB), acting on behalf of the Belgian Ministry of Finance, for an opinion on a draft royal decree on the operating costs of the Nationale Bank van België/Banque Nationale de Belgique in relation to the supervision of financial institutions, implementing Article 12bis, § 4 of the Law of 22 February 1998 establishing the Organic Statute of the Nationale Bank van België/Banque Nationale de Belgique (hereinafter the ‘draft royal decree’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third indent of

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft royal decree contains provisions concerning the NBB. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft royal decree

text: 1.1 The draft royal decree is part of the reform of the Belgian financial supervisory structures towards a ‘twin-peaks’ type model under which the NBB is the sole authority responsible for the financial sectors’ micro- and macro-prudential stability . 1.2 The draft royal decree defines the arrangements under which the NBB’s operating costs in relation to the supervision of financial institutions are to be borne by such institutions , in accordance with

text: Article 12

text: bis, § 4 of the Law of 22 February 1998 . Each year, the NBB determines the share of its operating costs related to the supervision of the insurance and banking sectors, using a cost

text: calculation application . In order to pre-finance these costs, which can only be determined at yearend, the supervised institutions must pay a yearly contribution determined on the basis of 90% of the NBB’s actual operating cost for the previous year relating to the respective sector. Specific allocation criteria are then applied to this amount to calculate the individual contributions . A special contribution is charged to systemically relevant insurance companies and credit institutions to reflect the specific supervisory tasks entrusted to the NBB . The NBB informs the supervised institutions of the basic, and possibly specific, contribution that they must pay by 30 September each year. Where individual contributions collected from the banking and/or insurance sectors appear to exceed the NBB’s actual supervision-related operating costs relating to the respective sector, the surplus is repaid to the institutions concerned . Conversely, any shortfall between individual contributions collected and the NBB’s actual operating costs for the relevant sector is made up by requiring an additional contribution from the relevant supervised institutions . Finally, the NBB may charge affected insurance undertakings or credit institutions for exceptional costs incurred in the context of their supervision . 1.3 The NBB’s operating costs relating to the supervision of financial institutions from other sectors are covered by a lump sum. This contribution does not depend on the NBB’s actual operating costs and is calculated by the NBB in accordance with the criteria set out in the draft royal decree .

text: 2. General observation

text: The ECB welcomes the consultation submitted by the Belgian authorities . In view of the arrangements set out in the draft royal decree, the ECB understands that the exercise of the new tasks transferred to the NBB will be adequately financed by contributions from supervised institutions and will not result in any losses for the NBB. Therefore, the ECB considers that the draft royal decree meets the requirements for a national central bank to be financially independent.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 10 May 2012. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: See

text: recital 19

text: of

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 974/98 of 3 May 1998

text: on the introduction of the euro (OJ L 139, 11.5.1998, p. 1).

text: See paragraph 5 of Opinion

text: , reiterated in paragraph 2.3.2 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 10 May 2012 on restrictions of settlements in cash (CON/2012/36)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 10 May 2012 on restrictions of settlements in cash (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 18 April 2012 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Lithuanian Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft law amending the Law on Tax Administration (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the second indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to means of payment. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The draft law is intended to limit potential non-fulfilment of tax obligations by certain taxpayers and, more particularly, to reduce the risks of: (i) concealing income, (ii) attributing acquired assets to fictitious sources of income, and (iii) non-payment of taxes, which arise when settlements are made in cash. 1.2 The draft law grants the tax administrator the authority to restrict a taxpayer’s right to settle in cash where there is an established risk that a taxpayer, by settling in cash, may be concealing his income or avoiding tax in any other way. 1.2.1 In particular, the tax administrator may give an instruction to a specific taxpayer that for a limited period of time, up to one year, all his/her settlements with legal or natural persons engaged in commercial activities are to be made as non-cash settlements. 1.2.2 Such an instruction may be given if a taxpayer, or the manager of a taxpayer legal entity, has been found guilty of or has had an administrative penalty imposed on him/her for one of the following violations of law: (i) fraudulent or negligent keeping of accounts, (ii) legalisation of proceeds from crime and criminal assets, (iii) illegal employment, (iv) violating the procedure for paying a salary, (v) violating the rules on cash fund accounting, (vi) providing incorrect data on income, profits or

text: assets, and (vii) violating tax laws. The instruction may also be given if there is an established risk that a taxpayer, in making settlements in cash, may conceal income or avoid paying taxes in any other way.

text: 2. Specific observations

text: 2.1 The ECB notes that Union law only regulates restrictions on cash payments in euro . However, for consistency reasons, the ECB considers it appropriate to assess the draft law’s provisions against the relevant Eurosystem practices. 2.2 The ECB notes that the draft law is in compliance with Union law , and in particular with

text: recital 19

text: of

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 974/98

text: , which states that ‘limitations on payments in notes and coins, established by Member States for public reasons, are not incompatible with the status of legal tender of euro banknotes and coins, provided that other lawful means for the settlement of monetary debts are available’. The ECB acknowledges that: (i) such other lawful means for the settlement of monetary debts, other than cash, are available in Lithuania; and (ii) the draft law’s objective of combating tax evasion qualifies as a public reason outweighing the impact of the limitations on cash payments. 2.3 However, limitations on settlements in cash should be proportionate to the objectives pursued and should not go beyond what is necessary to achieve such objectives. Any impact of the proposed limitations should be carefully weighed against the public benefits expected to be derived from the proposed restrictions on settlements in cash. Also in view of the fact that the measures affect low value payments, the competent authorities should ensure that the effects of these measures do not go beyond what is necessary for achieving the objective of combating tax evasion.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 10 May 2012.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: The Law on tax assessment, see Consolidated law No 1017 of 28 October 2011 with later amendments, Law no 1333 of 19 December 2008 on the recovery of public debt with later amendments, Law No 403 of 8 May 2006 on an income register, Law on taxation according to source of income, see Consolidated law no 1403 of 7 December 2010 with later amendments, Law on the collection of tax and charges, see Consolidated law No. 1402 of 7 December 2010 with later amendments, Law on the registry of vehicles, see Consolidated law No 580 of 7 June 2011, Law on controlling taxes, see Consolidated law No 819 of 27 June 2011 with later amendments, the Law on value added tax, see Consolidated law No 287 of 28 March 2011 with later amendments and Law No 521 of 12 June 2009 amending the Law on taxation according to source of income.

text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: Approximately EUR 1 330.

text: The proposal gives rise to liability for the purchaser only if the provider fails to declare the payment for tax purposes or fails to report the VAT on the payment. See p. 12 of the Explanatory Memorandum.

text: The proposed threshold of DKK 10 000 mirrors the limit for the individual who chooses to pay cash when purchasing a service.

text: The proposal gives rise to liability for companies only if the provider fails to report the VAT on the purchase. See page 13 of the Explanatory Memorandum.

text: Article 205 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006

text: on the common system of value added tax, (OJ L 347, 11.12.2006, p. 1) sets out the legal basis for joint and several liability for the purchaser. Under page 25 of the Explanatory Memorandum, the joint and several liability is thus in accordance with the Directive.

text: See

text: recital 19

text: of

text: See paragraph 5 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: The legal tender status of Danish kroner is set out in Article 8 of the Law on Danmarks Nationalbank (Law No 116 of 7 April 1936 with later amendments).

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 10 May 2012 on limitations on cash payments (CON/2012/37)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 10 May 2012 on limitations on cash payments (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 17 April 2012 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Danish Ministry for Economic Affairs and the Interior on behalf of the Ministry of Taxation for an opinion on a Law amending the Law on tax assessment and various other laws (measures aimed at tax evasion) (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the second indent of

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The draft law implements a number of measures aimed at combating tax evasion. One of the measures is the tightening of the rules on cash payments in order to ensure greater traceability of payments. The draft law proposes the following two requirements on which the ECB is consulted. 1.2 The first requirement proposed is that any purchase of services or goods in connection with services above an amount of DKK 10 000 by an individual is to be made by electronic payment. The individual may be held jointly and severally liable with the provider of the services for any tax and/or VAT which the provider has evaded if the individual chooses to make a cash payment. The aim of the requirement to make electronic payments is to create a transaction trail of the payments

text: in order to identify the payer and the payee. The proposal also attempts to reduce the turnover of cash in order to reduce the black market for purchases of goods and services. The draft law also proposes that individuals who, in particular instances, are not able to pay electronically have the option to avoid liability for the failure of the provider to declare taxes and VAT. This option is conditional upon the individual notifying SKAT, the Danish tax authority, about the purchase made and the payment thereof via SKAT’s website. 1.3 The second requirement proposed is that any transaction between companies above an amount of DKK 10 000 shall be made electronically. If such payments are not made electronically, the companies will be denied any relevant tax deductions which they may be entitled to and they will 6 7 be held jointly and severally liable under the VAT rules . The direct joint and several liability in the area of VAT means that the tax authority, when recovering an outstanding tax and VAT balance, may seek to have the sum paid either by the purchaser or the provider in the order that the tax authority chooses. Whether the tax authority chooses to collect the sum due from the provider or the purchaser has no effect on the liability. The liability, in such cases, will follow the general rules governing joint and several liability. The introduction of joint and several liability in relation to VAT payments mentioned above aims to combat tax evasion and make it easier to detect transactions which have the evasion of VAT and other taxes as their purpose. Given that a transaction trail is created, it is anticipated that this will have a positive and crime-preventing effect on unreported employment, chain fraud and fictitious invoices used for the purposes of tax and VAT evasion. Furthermore, it is anticipated that unregistered firms will have trading difficulties, as purchasers will need to obtain documentation for incurred expenditure. 1.4 The two legislative requirements set out above under paragraphs 1.2 and 1.3 introduce joint and several liability for any individual purchasing services and for business-to-business transactions. Although this does not constitute a legal prohibition on cash payments, it will, in practice, limit the practical opportunity for a customer or a company to make cash payments above DKK 10 000.

text: 2. Specific observations

text: 2.1 The ECB notes that Union law only regulates restrictions on cash payments in euro . However, for consistency reasons, the ECB considers it appropriate to assess the draft law’s provisions against the relevant Eurosystem practices.

text: 2.2 The ECB notes that the draft law is in compliance with Union law , and in particular with

text: recital 19

text: of

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 974/98

text: , which states that ‘limitations on payments in notes and coins, established by Member States for public reasons, are not incompatible with the status of legal tender of euro banknotes and coins, provided that other lawful means for the settlement of monetary debts are available’. The ECB acknowledges that: (i) such other lawful means for the settlement of monetary debts, other than cash, are available in Denmark; and (ii) the draft law’s objective of combating tax evasion qualifies as a public reason outweighing the impact of the limitations on cash payments. 2.3 The ECB further notes that the draft law’s provisions on joint and several liability in relation to cash payments exceeding DKK 10 000 do not affect the legal tender status of Danish krone banknotes . 2.4 However, the effects of these provisions containing practical limitations on the possibility for a customer or an undertaking to make cash payments above DKK 10 000 should be proportionate to the general objective of combating tax evasion and should not go beyond what is necessary to achieve this objective. Any impact of the proposed provisions should be carefully weighed against the public benefits expected to be derived from them. Also in view of the fact that the measures may affect relatively low value payments, the competent authorities should ensure that the effects of these measures do not go beyond what is necessary for achieving the objective of combating tax evasion.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 10 May 2012.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: See Opinion

text: on this subject. All ECB Opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 3 International standards for payment, clearing and settlement systems, which are issued by the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) and the Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). 4 In the past, due to ‘specific legal and operational characteristics’, the entire clearing process was operated by the Banca d’Italia. Presidential Decree No. 248 of 13 December 2010 repealed the Royal Decree-Law No. 812 of 6 May 1926, ratified as Law 1262 of 25 June 1926, under which the management of clearing houses in Italy had been exclusively assigned to the Banca d’Italia. For this reason, the ECB understands that any specific legal and operational characteristics precluding the direct intervention of market operators in the field of retail payment have been removed.

text: 6 some cases reference is made to the ‘contractual framework’ and in others to the ‘rules’ governing the payment systems. For the sake of consistency, the ECB suggests that these references should be aligned. This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 21 May 2012. [signed]

text: See

text: Article 1

text: (e) of the draft regulation. 6 See

text: Articles 1

text: (a) and (g) of the draft regulation.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 21 May 2012 on the oversight of retail payment services and systems (CON/2012/38)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 21 May 2012 on the oversight of retail payment services and systems (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 12 March 2012, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Banca d’Italia for an opinion on a draft regulation concerning the oversight of retail payment services and systems (hereinafter the ‘draft regulation’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the second, third, fifth and sixth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft regulation relates to means of payments, the Banca d’Italia, payment and settlement systems, and rules applicable to financial institutions that materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft regulation

text: The draft regulation concerns the provision of retail payment services by payment service providers and retail payment systems operators whose registered address and/or centre of operations is in Italy. Under the draft regulation, payment service providers are requested to notify the Banca d’Italia of the name, location and oversight rules of payment systems used for the exchange of payment instructions, clearing and settlement of retail transactions when such systems do not fall within the scope of this draft regulation. Additional requirements are provided for payment systems located outside the euro area. With reference to retail payment system managers, the draft regulation provides specific requirements concerning governance, effectiveness of controls, outsourcing, business as well as legal and operational risks. It also covers access as well as connections with other retail payment systems and information requirements. Finally, the draft regulation also contains specific provisions on the retail payment systems operated by the Banca d’Italia. In this context, most of the requirements provided for retail payment system operators

text: also apply to the Banca d’Italia. In particular, the Banca d’Italia is requested to comply with the full cost recovery principle when providing retail payment services in competition with the market. The draft regulation replaces a regulation adopted by the Banca d’Italia in 2005 on low-importance payments .

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 The ECB understands that the need for a new regulation in the field of retail payment services and systems has been driven, in particular, by the latest developments in the Single Euro Payments Area project and the new CSSP-IOSCO principles for financial market infrastructures (the ‘PFMI principles’). In general, the ECB welcomes the draft regulation’s provisions which allow for freer competition in the whole sector of retail payments , as well as the measures directly concerning the Banca d’Italia which ensure a level playing field. The ECB also welcomes the reference in

text: Article 15

text: to the application of the principle of full cost recovery by the Banca d’Italia when directly providing low-value payment services in competition with the market. 2.2 In spite of the overall intention to ensure a level playing field, the ECB understands that the Banca d’Italia, as a retail payment system operator, would still enjoy several derogations from the rules which otherwise apply to other retail payment system operators under the draft regulation. In particular, the ECB notes that the Banca d’Italia is excluded from the scope of application of

text: Article 4

text: which relates to governance structure. The first sentence of such Article, however, concerns the application of the proportionality principle. While the PFMI principles require ‘appropriate and effective regulation, supervision, and oversight’ and these principles apply generally to systemically important payments systems, the principle of proportionality is nonetheless a general principle of Union law. For this reason, the Banca d’Italia should not be exempt from the application of the first sentence of Article 4 of the draft regulation. 2.3 The ECB notes that following the citations which set out the legal basis for the draft regulation, the recitals contain a list of factual elements which have been considered by the Banca d’Italia. For the sake of completeness, this list could also include other factual developments considered by the Banca d’Italia in the drafting of this regulation. Such developments include: (a) the ECB’s report ‘Business continuity oversight expectations for systematically important payment systems (SIPS)’ of June 2006, (b) the Eurosystem Oversight Policy Framework of July 2011, and (c) the PFMI of April 2012. The ECB also notes that in the definitions set out in Article 1 of the draft regulation, in

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI