text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: OJ L 267, 10.10.2009, p. 7.

text: OJ L 329, 14.12.2010, p. 3.

text: This applies to Law No 492/2009 Coll. on payment services; Law No 747/2004 Coll. on supervision in the financial market; and Law No 129/2010 Coll. on consumer credits and other credits and loans for consumers.

text: See

text: Article 3

text: (k) of Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2007 on payment services in the internal market amending Directives

text: and

text: and repealing Directive

text: (OJ L 319, 5.12.2007, p.1).

text: See

text: Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 on European Union macro-prudential oversight of the financial system and establishing a European Systemic Risk Board (OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 1);

text: Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), amending Decision No

text: and repealing

text: Commission Decision 2009/78/EC

text: (OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 12);

text: Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority), amending Decision No

text: and repealing

text: Commission Decision 2009/79/EC

text: (OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 48);

text: Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority), amending Decision No

text: and repealing

text: Commission Decision 2009/77/EC

text: (OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 84). 7 See paragraph 2.4. of Opinion

text: , paragraph 3.2.3 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.2,(including footnotes 5 and 6) of Opinion

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 10 June 2011 on Národná banka Slovenska’s role as regards financial supervision and consumer credit (CON/2011/49)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 10 June 2011 on Národná banka Slovenska’s role as regards financial supervision and consumer credit (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 29 April 2011 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Slovak Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft law amending Law No 492/2009 Coll. on Payment Services and on amendments to certain laws, as amended by Law No …/2011 Coll., and amending certain laws (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third and fifth indents of

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to Národná banka Slovenska (hereinafter ‘NBS’) and payment and settlement systems. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The main purpose of the draft law is to transpose Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 on the taking up, pursuit and prudential supervision of the business of electronic money institutions amending Directives

text: and

text: and repealing Directive

text: , and Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 amending Directives

text: and

text: as regards capital requirements for the trading book and for re-securitisations, and the supervisory review of remuneration policies . 1.2 This opinion only addresses those draft law provisions that go beyond the mere transposition of 4 5 Directives

text: and

text: . These relate to: (a) limited providers’ notification

text: obligations towards NBS; (b) the NBS’s role in the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS); (c) the calculation of the annual contributions paid by supervised entities to NBS; (d) the obligation on creditors to report data on newly-provided consumer credits to NBS; (e) fine-tuning and eliminating ambiguity in procedures related to supervision.

text: 2. General observations

text: The ECB notes that it was not consulted on the draft of Law 129/2010 Coll., which was adopted on 9 March 2010 and which conferred certain tasks on NBS. Issues relevant to national central banks are expressly listed among the areas of the ECB’s competence. Therefore, the ECB reminds the Slovak authorities that they should honour their obligation under the Treaty to consult the ECB, in accordance with Decision

text: 3. Specific observations

text: 3.1 NBS’s role in the ESFS

text: Article 1(3)

text: (e) of Law No 747/2004 Coll. deals with NBS’s obligation to exchange information and cooperate at national and international level. The draft law amends this provision to expressly reflect NBS’s role in the ESFS. The tasks related to cooperation and exchange of information have already been conferred on national supervisory authorities by virtue of directly applicable Union 6 7 regulations . Therefore, they do not need to be transposed into the domestic law of Member States . The draft amendment to

text: Article 1(3)

text: (e) of Law 747/2004 Coll. alters the content of the abovementioned Union regulations by restricting the exchange of information to the scope necessary for the supervision of supervised entities by NBS, excluding other areas, such as macroprudential analysis. The ECB therefore suggests adapting the current scope of the exchange of information in

text: Article 1(3)

text: (e), so as to exclude its restrictive effect. Provided that the amendments referring to NBS’s participation in the ESFS and to NBS’s obligation to provide for the discharge of tasks arising from legally binding Union acts are adopted, the last sentence of Article 4(3) of Law No 747/2004 Coll. will no longer be necessary.

text: 3.2 Calculation of the annual contributions paid by supervised entities Under the draft amendment to Article 40(2) of Law No 747/2004 Coll., the calculation of annual contributions paid by supervised entities to NBS is amended so that the volume of assets will, for the purposes of the annual contribution calculation, not include assets used exclusively in the conduct of non-supervised commercial activities. Such non-supervised commercial activities may include commercial activities of a payment institution or limited issuance of electronic money by an electronic money institution. Under the draft law, the contributor is responsible for notifying NBS of the volume of assets to be used in calculating the contribution. The NBS may verify the amount and request additional information and documentation. In addition, the draft law abolishes the maximum amount of annual contributions for certain supervised entities that are legal entities or branches of foreign legal entities. Based on these amendments, NBS’s final revenue from such contributions will change. Therefore, it should be ensured that this does not undermine NBS’s financial independence. 3.3 Obligation for creditors to report data on newly-provided consumer credits to NBS The obligation for creditors to report data on newly-provided consumer credits to NBS was already included in Law No 129/2010 Coll. and the amendments introduced by the draft law on this issue only relate to personal data protection . Nevertheless, Law No 129/2010 Coll. could provide more clarity on the respective responsibilities of the Ministry of Finance, NBS and ‘the person designated by them’ with regard to the processing and disclosure of these data . Financing of a new task by a national central bank has to be in line with the principle of financial independence, under which it must have sufficient means to perform not only its European System of Central Banks tasks, but also its national tasks, e.g. financing its administration and own operations .

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 10 June 2011.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

publisher: Europeiska centralbanken

sprak: en

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 20 June 2011 on the capital and management structure of the Central Depository (CON/2011/50)

serie: con

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 20 June 2011 on the capital and management structure of the Central Depository (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

type: rubrik

text: On 26 May 2011 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Bulgarian Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft law amending the Law on the public offering of securities (hereinafter ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third and fifth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to Българска народна банка (Bulgarian National Bank) and payment and settlement systems. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

type: stycke

text: 1. Purpose and background of the draft law

text: The aim of the draft law is to establish conditions for the privatisation of the stakes held by the State and Българска народна банка (Bulgarian National Bank) in the Central Depository. Chapter 9 of the Law on the public offering of securities provides, inter alia,: (a) that the Ministry of Finance and Българска народна банка (Bulgarian National Bank) must hold a minimum of 34% of the Central Depository’s shares; (b) that the Central Depository’s Board of Directors must include at least one representative from Българска народна банка (Bulgarian National Bank) and from the Ministry of Finance; (c) that the Central Depository must not create profits nor distribute dividends; and (d) rules relating to the management of the Central Depository’s reserve and guarantee funds.

text: 2. General observations

text: The ECB notes that the draft law is necessary to advance the privatisation of the Central Depository and has no specific comments on the draft law provisions.

text: ECB-PUBLIC This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 20 June 2011. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET

type: vagledning

utgivare: ecb


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 2 Law No 136/2011 Coll. on the circulation of banknotes and coins and amending Law No 6/1993 Coll. on Česká národní banka. Under Article 35 of Law No 136/2011 Coll., CNB is authorised to issue a decree to implement specific provisions of the Law. 3 See Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: 5 of euro banknotes and (ii) the reproduction rules for euro banknotes currently do not apply to Česká národní banka. These requirements will apply to Česká národní banka once the Czech Republic adopts the euro and Česká národní banka becomes a fully integrated member of the Eurosystem. In this context, the ECB generally welcomes the efforts to make the Czech legal framework in this area compatible with that applicable in the euro area as this will facilitate the future participation of the Czech Republic in economic and monetary union. However, Opinion

text: remains largely valid also in the context of the present draft decree and should be considered alongside the specific observations set out below.

text: See Decision ECB/2010/14 of 16 September 2010 on the authenticity and fitness checking and recirculation of euro banknotes (OJ L 267, 9.10.2010, p. 1). 5 See Decision ECB/2003/4 of 20 March 2003 on the denominations, specifications, reproduction, exchange and withdrawal of euro banknotes (OJ L 78, 25.3.2003, p. 16). 6 See, in particular, paragraphs 2.2, 2.3 and 3.1 of Opinion

text: . 7 See Article 6(5) of the draft decree. 8 See Article 9(3) of Decision ECB/2010/14. 9 See

text: Article 16(1)

text: (d) of the draft decree.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 22 June 2011 on the circulation of banknotes and coins (CON/2011/51)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 22 June 2011 on the circulation of banknotes and coins (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 10 May 2011 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from Česká národní banka for an opinion on a draft decree on the implementation of certain provisions of the Law on the circulation of banknotes and coins (hereinafter the ‘draft decree’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the first, second and third indents of

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft decree relates to currency matters, means of payment and CNB. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft decree

text: The draft decree comprehensively implements relevant provisions of the recently adopted Law on the 2 3 circulation of banknotes and coins (hereinafter the ‘Law’), on which the ECB was consulted in 2009 . The draft decree lays down, in particular: (i) standards for processing national banknotes and coins; (ii) a description of the degree of wear and damage of national banknotes and coins unfit for further circulation; (iii) the procedure for seizing suspicious banknotes and coins; (iv) reproduction rules for national and foreign banknotes and coins; (v) reporting obligation vis-à-vis the national central bank; and (vi) types and content of professional training courses on identifying national and foreign banknotes and coins suspected of being counterfeit.

text: 2. General observations

text: The Czech Republic is a Member State with a derogation within the meaning of Article 139 of the Treaty and, therefore, the ECB requirements regarding (i) the authenticity and fitness checking and recirculation

text: 3. Specific observations

text: 3.1 Standards for processing the national currency The ECB notes that the standards for processing the national banknotes draw largely on Decision ECB/2010/14. As regards the procedures for the testing of currency processing equipment, the draft decree provides that each type of equipment will only be tested once and that the validity of a test will not be time limited. However, Česká národní banka may, where appropriate, retest all equipment that has already passed the test . This approach may bear the risk that currency processing equipment is not regularly and mandatorily re-tested to check that it is still capable of detecting the most recent counterfeits in circulation. The ECB notes that under Decision ECB/2010/14 the successful test results are valid for one year only, provided that the relevant equipment is capable of detecting all counterfeits known during this period . 3.2 Reproduction of banknotes According to the explanatory memorandum to the draft decree, the conditions under which banknote reproductions may be made are identical (with one exception allowing for the reproduction of visually distorted banknotes) to the conditions laid down in Decision ECB/2003/4. The ECB notes, however, that the draft decree allows tangible reproductions that have the original banknote size and the word ‘Specimen’ or other similar word printed diagonally across them . Decision ECB/2003/4 does not allow such reproductions of euro banknotes, as the risk that they may be mistaken by the general public for genuine euro banknotes is considered too high.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 22 June 2011. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 2 OJ L 302, 17.11.2009, p. 32.

text: Article 35(3)

text: and paragraph 21 of the transitional and final provisions of the draft law. 4

text: Article 195(3)

text: and (4) of the draft law. 5 Law on the BG-FSA, Darjaven vestnik, issue 8 of 28 January 2003, available at www.fsc.bg.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 22 June 2011 on exchange of information and cooperation obligations among national supervisory authorities (CON/2011/52)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 22 June 2011 on exchange of information and cooperation obligations among national supervisory authorities (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 25 May 2011 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Bulgarian Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft law on collective investment schemes and other undertakings for collective investments (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third and sixth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to Българска народна банка (Bulgarian National Bank) and rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: The aims of the draft law are to: (a) transpose into national legislation Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) (recast) ; (b) regulate the activities of certain non-UCITS funds including closed-end investment undertakings; (c) further develop the legal framework by, inter alia, imposing on Българска народна банка (Bulgarian National Bank) certain information obligations and fostering cooperation between Българска народна банка (Bulgarian National Bank) and the Financial Supervision Commission; (d) consolidate the regulatory framework for collective investment schemes and other undertakings for collective investments. In accordance with

text: Article 1(2) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: and taking into account the consultation request from the Ministry of Finance, this opinion only covers the provisions of the draft law that relate to Българска народна банка (Bulgarian National Bank).

text: 2. General observations

text: The ECB notes that the draft law imposes certain information obligations on Българска народна банка (Bulgarian National Bank) in relation to the Financial Supervision Commission as regards depository banks and banks . The draft law also provides for cooperation between Българска народна банка (Bulgarian National Bank) and the Financial Supervision Commission in the context of administrative enforcement measures . The ECB acknowledges that such arrangements are necessary in view of the supervisory framework in Bulgaria where Българска народна банка (Bulgarian National Bank) is in charge of banking supervision, and the Financial Supervision Commission is competent to supervise financial institutions and markets as laid down in Article 1(2) of the Law on the Financial Supervision Commission . The ECB supports information sharing and cooperation among supervisory authorities as it is necessary for efficient supervision. The measures introduced by the draft law will further promote efficient institutional arrangements for cooperation between Българска народна банка (Bulgarian National Bank) and the Financial Supervision Commission. In this context, the ECB welcomes the provisions of the draft law that relate to Българска народна банка (Bulgarian national bank).

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 22 June 2011.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 2 Law LVIII of 2001 on the MNB.

text: See the ECB’s Convergence Report 2010 p. 23, and paragraph 3.3 of Opinion

text: . See also Opinions

text: and

text: . All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 22 June 2011 on the Hungarian State Audit Office in relation to its audit of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (CON/2011/53)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 22 June 2011 on the Hungarian State Audit Office in relation to its audit of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 19 May 2011 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Hungarian Ministry of Public Administration and Justice for an opinion on a draft law on the State Audit Office (SAO) (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third indent of

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (MNB). In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: The purpose of the draft law is to replace Law XXXVIII of 1989 on the SAO. According to the explanatory memorandum, Law XXXVIII of 1989 on the SAO must principally be amended to recodify provisions of the previous framework and include new elements that became necessary in the light of developments over the past few years. The draft law retains the provision that the SAO audits the MNB’s financial management and all central bank activities carried out according to the Law on the MNB that do not constitute part of its primary tasks. Accordingly, the scope of SAO’s audit covers whether the MNB operates in accordance with its statutes, the decisions adopted by its General Meeting and any applicable legislation.

text: 2. The SAO’s powers and central bank independence

text: 2.1 The principle of central bank independence referred to in Article 130 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter the ‘Statute of the ESCB’) provides that the exercise of central bank powers and the performance of

text: tasks and duties under the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB are to be free from external instructions or government influence. In particular, when the SAO carries out a State audit of the MNB, the following central bank independence safeguards should apply: (a) the scope of the audit should be clearly defined in the legal framework; (b) the activities of MNB’s independent external auditors should not be prejudiced; (c) the audit should comply with the prohibition on giving instructions to the MNB and its decision-making bodies; (d) the audit should not interfere with the MNB’s ESCB-related tasks; (e) the audit should be performed on a non-political, independent and purely professional basis . 2.2 For reasons of certainty this provision should make it clear that the SAO’s audit does not extend to the MNB’s primary tasks, its main objective or any of its ESCB-related tasks. Therefore, the ECB welcomes the fact that Article 5(10) of the draft law already excludes the MNB’s primary tasks from the scope of the SAO’s audit.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: See paragraphs 1.2 and 1.6 of Opinion

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 28 June 2011 on cross-border transactions (CON/2011/54)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 28 June 2011 on cross-border transactions (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 16 May 2011, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Spanish State Secretary for Economic Affairs for an opinion on a draft royal decree amending Royal Decree 1816/1991 on crossborder financial transactions and on a draft ministerial order amending the order implementing Royal Decree 1816/1991 (hereinafter collectively referred to as the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third and fourth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to the Banco de España and to the collection, compilation and distribution of monetary, financial, banking, payment systems and balance of payment statistics. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: The draft law eliminates the obligation for payment service providers registered with the Banco de España to report information on cross-border transactions that they do not immediately and automatically have at their disposal. More specifically, payment service providers registered with the Banco de España will only be required to report to the competent authorities and the Banco de España information they can automatically collect without affecting the direct processing of payments, in respect of: (a) cross-border charges and payments within the scope of

text: Regulation (EC) No 924/2009

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 on cross-border payments in the Community and repealing

text: Regulation (EC) No 2560/2001

text: , ordered or received by a resident, and involving a payment service provider from another Member State; and (b) credits and debits to accounts of non-resident clients. The Banco de España will collect the remainder of the information on cross-border transactions necessary for administrative or statistical purposes from those involved in such transactions. The new reporting system for cross-border transactions will co-exist with the current one until the end of 2013. This transitional period is considered necessary for payment service providers to make adjustments so that the relevant

text: data may be obtained automatically and for those involved in cross-border transactions to adapt to survey and direct collection procedures.

text: 2. General observations

text: The ECB welcomes the draft law as a positive development, as it facilitates the implementation of the single euro payments area (SEPA) and it is also in line with the ECB’s position on cross-border payments in the Union . As stated in Opinion

text: , balance of payments reporting systems mainly based on payments data cannot be maintained as they are in respect of payments in euro within the Union. Reforming such systems may require substantially lowering reporting obligations for payment service providers, while at the same time increasing the reporting burden on other economic agents, which should be limited to the extent possible (e.g. by applying proper survey and sampling techniques). Statistical reporting requirements that have no impact on the direct processing of SEPA payments by payment service providers and can be fully automated by them should not be subject to exemption thresholds. In addition, the reform of balance of payments reporting systems should ensure that such statistics can continue to be compiled with the high reliability, frequency and timeliness required for ECB monetary policy-making in Guideline ECB/2004/15 of 16 July 2004 on the statistical reporting requirements of the European Central Bank in the field of balance of payments and international investment position statistics, and the international reserves template .

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 28 June 2011.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: Article 239(2) of the Code of obligations: ‘(2) If a debtor fails to perform its obligation or is late in performing it, the creditor shall also be entitled to demand reimbursement of damage incurred thereby.’

text: Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 amending Directives

text: and

text: in respect of the powers of the European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), the European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority) and the European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority) (OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 120).

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 30 June 2011 on the harmonisation of legislation related to TARGET2-Securities and Banka Slovenije’s sanctioning powers relating to investment services (CON/2011/55)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 30 June 2011 on the harmonisation of legislation related to TARGET2-Securities and Banka Slovenije’s sanctioning powers relating to investment services (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 27 May 2011, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Slovenian Ministry of Finance for an opinion on the draft law amending the Law on the market in financial instruments and the draft law amending the Law on book-entry securities (hereinafter jointly referred to as the ‘draft laws’). On 21 June 2011, the Ministry notified the ECB that a new Article 7 had been added to the draft law amending the Law on the market in financial instruments. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third and fifth indents of

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft laws relate to Banka Slovenije and payment and settlement systems. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft laws

text: 1.1 The main objective of the draft laws is to harmonise legislation governing the operation of integrated securities settlement systems in order to facilitate the integration of the Slovenian central securities depository, Centralna klirinško depotna družba d.d., Ljubljana, with TARGET2- Securities (T2S). To this end, the draft laws introduce the following changes: (a) The draft law amending the Law on the market in financial instruments removes all references concerning the application of administrative procedures to the central securities depository (CSD). As stated in the explanatory memorandum to the draft law, the amendments are: (i) made in order to clarify that the CSD does not exercise public authority; and (ii) necessary to allow the CSD to transfer its task of effecting entries of book-entry securities in the central register to T2S;

text: (b) According to Article 34 of the Law on book-entry securities, the CSD is strictly liable to issuers and holders of rights entered into the central register for any damage caused by the CSD’s failure to execute an order, execute it correctly, or meet any of its other obligations under the Law. However, the CSD will not be strictly liable where it can prove that the cause was (i) an event beyond the scope of its business and its consequences could not be anticipated, avoided or averted; or (ii) an action on the part of an issuer, holder, CSD member or third party that could not be anticipated and its consequences could not be avoided or averted. Pursuant to the draft law, strict liability will be replaced by fault-based liability of the CSD vis-à-vis its service users in accordance with the law governing obligations ; (c) The draft law amending the Law on book-entry securities also introduces a matching phase in the securities transfer between different accounts whereby, prior to carrying out a transfer, the CSD must establish that transfer orders from the transferor and the recipient match . 1.2 The draft law amending the Law on the market in financial instruments (hereinafter the ‘Law’) is also intended to transpose Directive

text: into Slovenian law. In accordance with

text: Article 1(2) of Decision 98/415/EC

text: , the ECB does not provide its opinion on draft legislative provisions the exclusive purpose of which is the transposition of Union directives in the law of Member States. 1.3 The draft law amending the Law has been amended to add a new

text: Article 7

text: , which amends Article 33 of the Law. If this amendment were made, Banka Slovenije would no longer have powers to sanction a breach of the Law relating to the provision of investment services by banks in Slovenia. Instead, those powers would be transferred to the Slovenian Securities Market Agency (hereinafter the ‘Agency’), which is competent, in cooperation with Banka Slovenije to supervise all of the following in respect of investment services: (a) Slovenian banks; (b) Member State banks and special financial institutions as defined by the Law; (c) third country banks.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 The ECB welcomes the amendments proposed by the draft laws mentioned in paragraph 1.1, which should facilitate the smooth integration of the Slovenian CSD with T2S. 2.2 As regards the proposed transfer of Banka Slovenije’s sanctioning powers to the Agency, pursuant to Article 7 of the draft law amending the Law, the ECB notes that breaches of the Law relating to the provision of investment services might affect the prudent and safe operations of supervised entities in general which are subject to prudential supervision by Banka Slovenije. Also, taking into

text: account that, according to the Law, supervision in the area concerned is carried out by the Agency in cooperation with Banka Slovenije, this warrants Banka Slovenije remaining involved in the sanctioning process. Against this background, the ECB expects that any decision on the transfer of sanctioning powers should be taken in consultation with Banka Slovenije. This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 30 June 2011. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: KOM(2011) 360 slutlig.

text: Offentliggörs samtidigt som detta yttrande.

text: Ännu ej offentliggjord.

text: Text markerad med fet stil anger ECB:s förslag till ny text. Genomstruken text anger de strykningar som ECB föreslår.

text: Ännu ej offentliggjord.

sprak: sv

title: Europeiska centralbankens yttrande av den 4 juli 2011 om ett förslag till rådets beslut om undertecknande och ingående av ett monetärt avtal mellan Europeiska unionen och Republiken Frankrike om bibehållandet av euron på Saint-Barthélemy efter förändringen av dess status i förhållande till Europeiska unionen (CON/2011/56)

text: Inledning och rättslig grund

text: Den 29 juni 2011 mottog Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) en begäran från Europeiska unionens råd om ett yttrande över ett förslag till rådets beslut om undertecknande och ingående av ett monetärt avtal mellan Europeiska unionen och Republiken Frankrike om bibehållandet av euron på Saint-Barthélemy efter förändringen av dess status i förhållande till Europeiska unionen (nedan kallat förslaget till beslut) och om ordalydelsen i det monetära avtal som är bifogat förslaget till beslut.

text: ECB:s behörighet att avge ett yttrande grundas på artiklarna

text: och

text: i fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt eftersom förslaget till beslut avser ett monetärt avtal som faller under artikel 219.3 i fördraget. I enlighet med artikel 17.5 första meningen i arbetsordningen för Europeiska centralbanken har detta yttrande antagits av ECB-rådet.

text: Allmänna kommentarer

text: ECB välkomnar förslaget till beslut eftersom den text som bifogats till det monetära avtalet beaktar de synpunkter och ändringsförslag som ECB lämnat i sitt yttrande

text: av den 11 mars 2011 över en rekommendation till rådets beslut om en ordning för förhandlingen om ett monetärt avtal med Republiken Frankrike, som företrädare för det franska autonoma utomeuropeiska förvaltningsområdet Saint-Barthélemy samt även de ståndpunkter som ECB intagit under förhandlingarna.

text: Trots detta har ECB specifika ändringsförslag avseende förslaget till beslut som ska säkerställa att man uppnår konsekvens mellan rådets beslut om ordning för förhandlingen av det monetära avtalet med Republiken Frankrike i egenskap av representant för Saint-Barthélemy och förslaget till beslut.

text: BILAGA

text: Kommissionens förslag | ECB:s ändringsförslag

text: Ingen text | med beaktande av Europeiska centralbankens yttrande,

text: Motivering Den föreslagna ändringen är nödvändig för att beakta det faktum att unionens rättsakt antas i enlighet med artiklarna 127.4 och 282.5 i fördraget som stadgar att ECB ska höras om varje förslag till unionsrättsakt inom Europeiska centralbankens behörighetsområde.

text: (3) Den 13 april 2011 bemyndigade rådet, i samråd med Europeiska centralbanken och med bankens godkännande inom dess kompetensområden, kommissionen att inleda förhandlingar med Republiken Frankrike, som företräder det franska utomeuropeiska förvaltningsområdet Saint-Barthélemy, om ingåendet av ett monetärt avtal. Avtalet paraferades den 30 maj 2011. | (3) Den 13 april 2011 bemyndigade rådet, i samråd med Europeiska centralbanken och med bankens godkännande inom dess kompetensområden, kommissionen att inleda förhandlingar med Republiken Frankrike, som företräder det franska utomeuropeiska förvaltnings-området Saint-Barthélemy, om ingåendet av ett monetärt avtal och ge ECB möjlighet att fullt ut medverka vid förhandlingarna samt söka dess samtycke i frågor inom ECB:s behörighets-område. Avtalet paraferades den 30 maj 2011.

text: Motivering Den föreslagna ändringen är nödvändig för att förslaget till beslut helt ska överensstämma med skäl 6 och artikel 1 i rådets beslut om ordning för förhandlingen av det monetära avtalet med Republiken Frankrike i egenskap av representant för Saint-Barthélemy.


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: As published in Dziennik Ustaw (Dz. U.) of 2002 No 72, Item 665.

text: As published in Dz. U of 2009 No 84, Item 711.

text: Credit institutions registered in Poland are legally referred to as ‘domestic banks’. The term ‘credit institution’ under Polish law only relates to European Economic Area (EEA) credit institutions from outside Poland. Non-EEA credit institutions are referred to under Polish law as ‘foreign banks’ (

text: Article 2

text: Article 4(3)

text: Article 4(1)

text: (1) and

text: Article 4(1)

text: (17) to (20) of the Law on banking).

text: All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 10 See

text: Article 124

text: c of the Law on banking added by the Law amending the Law on banking of 18 October 2006 (Dz. U. of 2006 No 190, Item 1401). 11 Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions (recast) (OJ L 177, 30.6.2006, p. 1). 12 See Articles 30 and 37 of the Law on banking. 13 See

text: Article 48

text: s(2) of the Law on banking as amended by the draft law. 14 See the explanatory memorandum to the draft law, p. 9. The relevant changes had been introduced in the amending law of 18 October 2006 after the adoption of Opinion

text: See

text: Article 6 of Directive 2006/48/EC

text: . 16 See in particular Judgment of 13 December 2005 in

text: Case C-411/03

text: Sevic (ECR 2005, p. I-10805), Judgment of 13 May 2003 in

text: Case C-463/00

text: Commission v Spain (ECR 2003, p. I-4581), Judgment of 13 September 2007 in

text: Case C-260/04

text: Commission v Italy (ECR 2007, p. I-7083), Judgment of 22 March 2007 in

text: Case C-383/05

text: Raffaele Talotta v Belgium ECR 2007, p. I-2555), Judgment of 11 December 2007 in

text: Case C-438/05

text: International Transport Workers’ Federation and another v Viking Line and another (ECR 2007, p. I-10779). 17 See Judgment of 13 December 2005 in

text: Case C-411/03

text: Sevic (ECR 2005, p. I-10805, paragraph 18). 18 See Judgment of 11 December 2007 in

text: Case C-438/05

text: International Transport Workers’ Federation and another v Viking Line and another (ECR 2007, p. I-10779, paragraph 75). 19 See Judgment of 11 November 2010 in

text: Case C-543/08

text: Commission v Portugal (not yet reported), paragraphs 6 and 91 to 92 (the case considered restrictions to freedom to provide services and freedom of establishment, see paragraph 98 to 99). 20 See Judgment of 12 March 1996 in

text: Case C-441/93

text: Panagis Pafitis and others v Trapeza Kentrikis Ellados (ECR 1996, I- 01347, paragraphs 12 and 46 to 52). 21 See paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 5 July 2011 on the conversion of foreign credit institutions’ branches into subsidiaries (CON/2011/57)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 5 July 2011 on the conversion of foreign credit institutions’ branches into subsidiaries (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 31 May 2011, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Polish Minister for Finance for an opinion on a draft law amending the Law on banking and certain other laws (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the sixth indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The draft law amends, inter alia, the Law on banking of 29 August 1997 and the Law on the bank guarantee fund of 14 December 1994 . 1.2 The main purpose of the draft law is to enable the transformation of a Polish branch of a credit institution established in another Member State and conducting its business in Poland under the single passport into a subsidiary of the same credit institution. Such a subsidiary would be established in Poland and operate as a domestic bank in the form of a joint-stock company and would therefore be subject to supervision by the Komisja Nadzoru Finansowego (KNF, Financial Supervision Commission). Furthermore, deposits received by the subsidiary from the public would

text: be covered by the Bankowy Fundusz Gwarancyjny (BFG, Deposit Guarantee Scheme), which, according to the explanatory memorandum to the draft law, ‘may be beneficial from the point of view of customers, and particularly of depositors who entrusted their money to the branch in question’ . 1.3 The draft law sets out the procedure to be followed when conducting the transformation, which comprises the following steps : (a) application by the foreign credit institution concerned for an authorisation to establish, on the basis of an existing branch, a domestic bank in the form of a jointstock company; (b) audit by the KNF of the branch to be transformed, verifying its current financial condition; (c) grant by the KNF of authorisation to establish a domestic bank on the basis of the branch ; (d) contribution in kind by the foreign credit institution of the business of the branch to the newly established domestic bank, in exchange for the bank’s shares; (e) registration of the new domestic bank in, and deletion of the transformed branch from, the register of entrepreneurs. 1.4 The following main consequences occur on registration of a new domestic bank in the register of entrepreneurs: (a) the new bank assumes all the foreign credit institution’s rights and obligations stemming from the operation of the transformed branch (universal succession) ; (b) the KNF assumes responsibility for supervision of the operations of the new domestic bank; (c) deposits accumulated via operations of the transformed branch, and transferred to the new domestic bank, become covered by the Polish deposit-guarantee scheme.

text: 2. General observations

text: The appropriate time to consult the ECB

text: The draft law was adopted by the lower chamber of the Polish Parliament on 10 June 2011. This was shortly after the ECB had been consulted, resulting in the draft law being adopted not only before the expiry of the time limit for the submission of an ECB opinion set by the legislator in its consultation request, but also before it could take the ECB’s views into account. The ECB reiterates that even in cases of extreme urgency national authorities are not relieved from the duty to consult the ECB and to allow sufficient time to take its views into account laid down in Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty. The second sentence of

text: Article 4 of Decision 98/415/EC

text: provides that the ECB must be consulted ‘at an appropriate stage’ in the legislative process. This 5 See the explanatory memorandum to the draft law, p. 3. 6 See

text: Articles 48

text: p to 48u of the Law on banking as amended by the draft law; see also the explanatory memorandum to the draft law, p. 7 to 11. 7 In accordance with

text: Article 48

text: p(2) of the Law on banking as amended by the draft law, standard provisions governing the establishment of banks in the form of joint-stock companies apply to the establishment of banks on the basis of an existing branch, including in particular the following:

text: Article 30

text: a, which requires that authorisation for the establishment of a bank is granted by the KNF;

text: Article 30

text: , which specifies the criteria applied in the assessment of an application for the establishment of a bank;

text: Article 37

text: , which specifies the grounds for the rejection of such applications. 8 See

text: Article 48

text: u(2) of the Law on banking, as amended by the draft law. As a result of the universal succession, the newly-established bank assumes, by operation of law, all relevant rights and obligations, including all liabilities, claims and related rights, as well as all authorisations, licences and exemptions, unless this is opposed by the relevant issuing authorities.

text: implies that the consultation should take place at a point in the legislative process that affords the ECB sufficient time to examine the draft legislative provisions and to adopt its opinion in all required language versions, and also enables the relevant national authorities to take the ECB’s opinion into account before the provisions are adopted.

text: Article 3(4) of Decision 98/415/EC

text: obliges Member States to suspend the process of adoption of draft legislative provisions pending receipt of the ECB’s opinion. On this occasion, the duty to consult the ECB at an appropriate stage in the legislative process has not been respected by the Polish authorities.

text: 3. Specific observations

text: 3.1 The restructuring mechanism proposed by the draft law will allow banking groups that have a presence in Poland to transform their branches into subsidiary companies. The ECB understands that such a mechanism will be triggered only upon request from a credit institution and will not impede Union credit institutions from exercising their right of establishment in Poland through the setting up and operation of either branches or subsidiaries. Opinion

text: addressed similar draft legislation enabling the division of banks . In this opinion, the ECB emphasised that, while there is no specific Union legislation on the supervisory aspects of such restructuring operations, Directive

text: provides for specific requirements regarding supervisory approvals of banking activities, which must be continuously applied. 3.2 In assessing applications for the establishment of a new bank on the basis of an existing branch, the KNF will apply standard prudential assessment criteria . The draft law adds an additional criterion for rejecting applications, according to which a transformation should not be ‘significantly detrimental to the national economy or to important interests of the State’ . The explanatory memorandum to the draft law justifies adding this criterion in the draft law based on the fact that an identical criterion had been established as a ground for the rejection of a supervisory approval for the division of an existing bank . The ECB notes that this broad additional criterion may be seen as a general public interest clause, in so far as it does not explicitly refer to any specific prudential consideration for the rejection of supervisory approval for the establishment of a bank. The ECB understands that the Polish authorities may have intended to introduce this criterion to address threats to financial stability or, more specifically, to the smooth functioning of the national depositguarantee scheme. The introduction of such additional criterion in the Law on banking has to respect the limits set out by Union law.

text: 3.3 In particular, when considering the further specification of that additional criterion, the Polish authorities should carefully take Directive

text: into account. Directive

text: provides that requirements laid down by Member States in respect of obtaining authorisation to carry on business as a credit institution should respect the minimum harmonised rules set out in

text: Articles 7

text: to 12 of that Directive, and in particular the rule prohibiting assessment of applications for the establishment of a credit institution in terms of the ‘economic needs of the market. Furthermore, the Polish authorities should take into account the judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union regarding the right of establishment specified in Article 49 of the Treaty . The Court has stated, inter alia, that ‘the right of establishment covers all measures which permit or even merely facilitate access to another Member State and the pursuit of an economic activity in that State’ and that restrictions on the freedom of establishment, allowed under Article 52(1) of the Treaty, may only be introduced pursuant to a legitimate aim which is compatible with the Treaty, justified by the overriding principles of public interest and achieved through measures proportionate to this aim . In this last respect, the Court has taken the view that restrictions referring generally to ‘national interest’ fail the proportionality test . The Court has also rejected the possibility that Union secondary law provisions safeguarding freedom of establishment may be set aside by special rules related to the financial sector introduced in the national law in order to, inter alia, ensure the proper operation of the national economy . 3.4 In view of the above, the ECB invites the Polish authorities to further specify the supervisory assessment criteria introduced by the draft law in connection with the transformations of foreign branches into subsidiaries, with the view to ensuring compliance with Union law. 3.5 The ECB emphasises the need to ensure that a branch continues to meet its obligations relating to the calculation and holding of minimum reserves following its transformation into a subsidiary. It also reiterates the remarks made in the context of the proposal enabling the division of banks, particularly with regard to ensuring compliance of the Polish minimum reserve framework with Eurosystem requirements .

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 5 July 2011. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: KOM(2011) 142 slutlig.

text: Se skäl 4 i direktivförslaget.

text: ECB:s översyn av den finansiella stabiliteten, juni 2010, s. 167.

text: Se ECB:s yttrande

text: av den 4 augusti 2010 om ändringar i olika lagar för att minska de finansiella obalanserna, punkt 3.1.1. Alla ECB:s yttranden finns på ECB:s webbplats http://www.ecb.europa.eu

text: Se fotnot 3.

text: ECB:s yttrande

text: av den 4 augusti 2010 om ändringar i olika lagar för att minska de finansiella obalanserna, punkt 3.1.2.

text: T.ex. vilken formel som används för att beräkna valutaspreadar och frekvensen av räntejusteringar eller exempel som visar hur förändringar av den tillämpliga valutakursen kan påverka avbetalningsbeloppet (se bilaga II i direktivförslaget, det standardiserade EU-faktabladet, särskilt del B punkt 2.2 och punkt 2.5).

text: Artikel 9.1 f i direktivförslaget.

text: I direktivförslaget omfattar detta begrepp såväl kreditinstitut som andra tillhandahållare av bostadslåneavtal än kreditinstitut.

text: Artikel 16.2 i direktivförslaget.

text: Se samförståndsavtalet om informationsutbyte mellan nationella centrala kreditregister för överföring till rapporterande institut (nedan kallat samförståndsavtalet), april 2010, s. 1–18.

text: Se ECB:s yttrande

text: av den 31 maj 2001 på det spanska ekonomiministeriets begäran om ett lagförslag som medför ändringar i flera lagar rörande den spanska finansmarknaden.

text: EUT L 133, 22.5.2008, s. 66.

text: Se rapporten från expertgruppen om kredithistorik, generaldirektoratet för inre marknaden och tjänster, maj 2009, finns på kommissionens webbplats: http://ec.europa.eu

text: Se t.ex. Världsbankens rapport om kreditrapportering från mars 2011 som finns på Världsbankens webbsajt, http://siteresources.worldbank.org (s. 8, 25 och 53–59), eller sakkunnigrapporten från rådet för finansiell stabilitet, Thematic Review on Mortgage Underwriting and Origination Practices, 17 mars 2011, finns på webbplatsen för rådet för finansiell stabilitet, http://www.financialstabilityboard.org

text: Artikel 14 i direktiv 2008/48/EG

text: KOM(2008) 614 slutlig. Resultatet av Europaparlamentets första behandling finns på rådets webbplats på http://register.consilium.europa.eu

text: Kommissionen föreslår att översynen av det framtida direktivet ska omfatta en undersökning av behovet av att införa rättigheter och skyldigheter för tiden efter utgången av kreditavtalens kontraktstid (se artikel 31 f i direktivförslaget).

text: Text markerad med fet stil anger ECB:s förslag till ny text. Genomstruken text anger de strykningar som ECB föreslår.

title: Europeiska centralbankens yttrande av den 5 juli 2011 om ett förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv om bostadslåneavtal (CON/2011/58)

text: Inledning och rättslig grund

text: Den 18 april 2011 mottog Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) en begäran från Europeiska unionens råd om ett yttrande över ett förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv om bostadslåneavtal (nedan kallat direktivförslaget).

text: ECB:s behörighet att avge ett yttrande grundas på artiklarna

text: och

text: i fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt, eftersom direktivförslaget innehåller bestämmelser som berör Europeiska centralbankssystemets (ECBS) medverkan till ett smidigt genomförande av politiken för det finansiella systemets stabilitet enligt artikel 127.5 i fördraget. I enlighet med artikel 17.5 första meningen i arbetsordningen för Europeiska centralbanken har detta yttrande antagits av ECB-rådet.

text: 1. Allmänna kommentarer

text: ECB välkomnar direktivförslaget, som syftar till att underlätta utvecklingen av en väl fungerande inre marknad med ett starkt konsumentskydd när det gäller bostadslåneavtal. Ur finansiell stabilitetssynpunkt stöder ECB de åtgärder som ska säkerställa låntagande och utlåning på ett ansvarsfullt sätt samt återupprätta konsumenternas förtroende. ECB stöder också förslagen om det regelverk samt i tillämpliga fall den tillsynsram som ska gälla för icke-kreditinstitut som tillhandahåller de kreditavtal som omfattas av direktivförslaget samt för kreditförmedlare.

text: 2. Utlåning i utländsk valuta

text: 2.1 En av de frågor som Europeiska kommissionen uppmärksammat i samband med oansvarig utlåning på EU:s hypotekslånemarknader gäller de lån denominerade i utländsk valuta som konsumenter har tagit för att utnyttja en erbjuden ränta men utan att ha tillräckliga insikter i valutariskerna.

text: 2.2 I sin översyn av den finansiella stabiliteten påpekade ECB under 2010 att den senaste finanskrisen har visat vilka systemrisker som kan uppstå i samband med den utbredda utlåningen i utländsk valuta i vissa medlemsstater och underströk att denna fråga behöver övervakas och behandlas för att förhindra en ytterligare ökning av lånestocken i utländsk valuta. ECB konstaterade att en hög nivå av lån i utländsk valuta till låntagare utan säkerheter kan innebära en stor sårbarhet i vissa medlemsstater, eftersom sådan utlåning innebär att banksystemets direkta valutaexponering omvandlas till en kreditrisk och utsätter ekonomin för betydande makrofinansiella risker. En hög grad av skuldsättning i utländsk valuta kan också begränsa manöverutrymmet för penningpolitiken och dess effektivitet. Mot bakgrund av dessa negativa sidoeffekter av utlåning i utländsk valuta påpekade ECB att det är viktigt att beslutsfattarna vidtar åtgärder för att förhindra att den får alltför stor omfattning i banksystemet.

text: 2.3 Mot denna bakgrund framhöll ECB att det kan vara viktigt att anta policyåtgärder för reglering och tillsyn i syfte att minska riskerna med utlåning i utländsk valuta. Som överordnad princip uppmanas beslutsfattare eftertryckligen att skapa övergripande verksamhetsförutsättningar för ekonomiska aktörer som uppmuntrar långivare och låntagare att fatta försiktiga och välinformerade beslut så att utlåningen i utländsk valuta begränsas. I detta ingår att satsa på en sund, stabilitetsinriktad makroekonomisk politik och politiska åtgärder för att förbättra förståelsen av finansiell information samt lämplig finansiell reglering och tillsyn. I direktivförslaget anges det här vilken information som ska lämnas till konsumenter när ett lån ska ges i en annan valuta än låntagarens nationella valuta. ECB anser att den information som tillhandahålls även ska omfatta en förklaring av de potentiella riskerna för konsumenten om krediten är denominerad i utländsk valuta.

text: 3. Tillgång till databaser och offentliga kreditregister

text: 3.1 Enligt direktivförslaget ska varje medlemsstat säkerställa att alla kreditgivare kan få icke-diskriminerande tillgång till databaser som i den medlemsstaten används för att bedöma konsumenters kreditvärdighet och övervaka konsumenters fullgörande av kreditvillkoren under kreditavtalets löptid. Enligt direktivförslaget ska också kommissionen få mandat att fastställa enhetliga registreringskriterier och villkor för databehandling som ska tillämpas på databaserna, inklusive de begränsningar för uppgiftsregistrering som ska tillämpas på sådana databaser och etablerade definitioner av nyckelbegrepp som används i dem.

text: 3.2 Med undantag för en ändring som är av teknisk karaktär (se ändringsförslag 1) har ECB följande synpunkter när det gäller det mandat som kommissionen tilldelas.

text: 3.2.1 För det första är de databaser som avses i direktivförslaget databaser som förvaltas av privata kreditupplysningsinstitut eller kreditupplysningsfirmor och offentliga kreditregister och som används i respektive medlemsstat för att bedöma konsumenters kreditvärdighet och övervaka konsumenters fullgörande av kreditvillkoren under kreditavtalets löptid. Centrala kreditregister förs av de nationella centralbankerna i ett antal medlemsstater och vissa av dem tillgodoser dessa ändamål. ECB, som fungerar som en katalysator inom detta område, stöder gränsöverskridande samarbete, informationsutbyte och harmonisering av definitioner och begrepp mellan centrala kreditregister. Den återkommande turbulensen inom bank- och finanssektorn har visat hur viktigt det är med centrala kreditregister för att hjälpa kreditinstituten att övervaka och hantera kreditrisken på ett effektivt sätt genom att ge dem tillgång till information om låntagarnas skulder. Centrala kreditregister är fördelaktiga för utövandet av tillsyn, centralbankens uppgift att bidra till det finansiella systemets stabilitet samt för statistiska ändamål. Att utveckla gränsöverskridande synergieffekter mellan centrala kreditregister bör också bidra till att säkerställa att kreditgivarna har adekvat tillgång till centrala kreditregister.

text: 3.2.2 För det andra stöder ECB förslaget att ge kommissionen mandat att fastställa enhetliga kreditregistreringskriterier och villkor för databehandling som ska tillämpas på databaserna i syfte att främja en harmonisering av reglerna inom detta område. För att säkerställa att utgående data är harmoniserade och tillgängliga för gränsöverskridande utbyte skulle det i fråga om databehandlingsvillkoren och kreditregistreringskriterierna krävas en grundläggande uppsättning attribut, gemensamma identifikatorer samt en gemensam definition av underliggande begrepp och datainnehåll. Konfidentialitet och dataskydd samt aspekter kring driftskompatibilitet mellan nationella databaser är andra frågor som bör övervägas. ECB tolkar det också som att de enhetliga kreditregistreringskriterierna är att betrakta som minimistandarder, som gör det möjligt för privata kreditupplysningsinstitut eller kreditupplysningsfirmor och offentliga kreditregister att vid behov samla in ytterligare information om dessa krediter utifrån sina ändamål och affärsmodeller.

text: 3.2.3 För det tredje rekommenderar ECB ett nära samarbete med Europeiska bankmyndigheten, ECB och de centralbanker inom ECBS som förvaltar ovannämnda databaser, med hänsyn till deras olika kompetens och sakkunskap inom detta område. För konsekvensens och fullständighetens skull rekommenderar ECB också att kommissionen ges motsvarande mandat i fråga om de databaser som avses i

text: artikel 9 i Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 2008/48/EG av den 23 april 2008

text: om konsumentkreditavtal och om upphävande av

text: rådets direktiv 87/102/EEG

text: i fråga om kreditavtal för konsumenter. Om lagstiftaren beslutar att inte ge kommissionen något mandat, skulle ECB rekommendera att man bygger vidare på det arbete som redan har utförts genom att undersöka möjligheterna till ytterligare harmonisering av regler och praxis på unionsnivå, där hänsyn också tas till rekommendationerna från internationella fora, t.ex. när det gäller en effektiv tillsyn av kreditrapporteringssystem.

text: 4. Ytterligare kommentarer av teknisk natur

text: Till skillnad från direktiv

text: eller förslaget till Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv om konsumenträttigheter tas frågan om en harmoniserad ångerrätt för konsumenter i unionen inte upp i direktivförslaget. Med tanke på betydelsen av konsumenternas finansiella åtaganden i samband med bostadslåneavtal samt för att bidra till finansiell stabilitet, ansvarsfullt låntagande och ansvarsfull utlåning rekommenderar ECB att det redan under det pågående lagstiftningsförfarandet undersöks om det är nödvändigt att införa bestämmelser om ångerrätt i direktivförslaget.

text: I de fall där ECB rekommenderar att direktivförslaget ska ändras anges de specifika förslagen i bilagan åtföljt av en förklaring.

text: Utfärdat i Frankfurt am Main den 5 juli 2011.

text: Jean-Claude Trichet

text: ECB:s ordförande

text: BILAGA

text: Kommissionens förslag | ECB:s ändringsförslag

text: 1. Varje medlemsstat ska säkerställa att alla kreditgivare kan få icke-diskriminerande tillgång till databaser som i den medlemsstaten används för att bedöma konsumenters kreditvärdighet och övervaka konsumenters fullgörande av kreditvillkoren under kreditavtalets löptid. Sådana databaser kan förvaltas av privata kreditupplysningsinstitut eller kreditupplysningsfirmor och offentliga kreditregister. 2. Kommissionen får mandat att i enlighet med

text: artikel 26

text: , och på de villkor som anges i artiklarna

text: och

text: , fastställa enhetliga kreditregistreringskriterier och villkor för databehandling som ska tillämpas på databaserna enligt punkt 1 i denna artikel. I sådana delegerade akter ska särskilt anges vilka begränsningar för uppgiftsregistrering som ska tillämpas på sådana databaser och etablerade definitioner av nyckelbegrepp som används i dem. | 1. Varje medlemsstat ska säkerställa att alla kreditgivare från andra medlemsstater kan få icke-diskriminerande tillgång till databaser som i den medlemsstaten används för att bedöma konsumenters kreditvärdighet och övervaka konsumenters fullgörande av kreditvillkoren under kreditavtalets löptid. Sådana databaser kan förvaltas av privata kreditupplysningsinstitut eller kreditupplysningsfirmor och offentliga kreditregister som förs av centralbanker eller andra offentliga myndigheter. 2. Kommissionen får mandat att i enlighet med

text: artikel 26

text: och

text: , i samråd med Europeiska bankmyndigheten, ECB och de centralbanker inom Europeiska centralbankssystemet som för databaserna enligt punkt 1 i denna artikel, fastställa enhetliga kreditregistreringskriterier och villkor för databehandling som ska tillämpas på databaserna enligt punkt 1 i denna artikel. I sådana delegerade akter ska särskilt anges vilka begränsningar för uppgiftsregistrering som ska tillämpas på sådana databaser och etablerade definitioner av nyckelbegrepp som används i dem.

text: Motivering I enlighet med direktiv

text: föreslår ECB att direktivförslaget ska innehålla en hänvisning till kreditgivare från andra medlemsstater. Syftet med ändringsförslagen i

text: artikel 16.2

text: är vidare att klargöra att: a) ett antal offentliga kreditregister förvaltas av centralbanker och andra offentliga myndigheter och b) kommissionen skulle dra nytta av sakkunskapen hos Europeiska bankmyndigheten, ECB och berörda nationella centralbanker inom ECBS i samband med att utkast till delegerade akter utarbetas inom detta område.

text: f) Uppgift om i vilken valuta/valutor som krediterna tillhandahålls, inklusive en förklaring av konsekvenserna för konsumenten om krediten är denominerad i utländsk valuta. | f) Uppgift om i vilken valuta/valutor som krediterna tillhandahålls, inklusive en förklaring av konsekvenserna och de potentiella riskerna för konsumenten om krediten är denominerad i utländsk valuta.

text: Motivering Den allmänna informationen om kreditavtalen bör även omfatta information om de potentiella riskerna om lånet är denominerat i utländsk valuta, t.ex. vilka återverkningar förändringar av den tillämpliga växelkursen kan få.

text: c) Om denne agerar som anknuten kreditförmedlare, ska denne presentera sig som sådan och på konsumentens begäran uppge för vilken/vilka kreditgivare vederbörande agerar. | c) Om denne agerar som anknuten kreditförmedlare, ska denne presentera sig som sådan och på konsumentens begäran uppge för vilken/vilka kreditgivare vederbörande agerar.

text: Motivering Av öppenhetsskäl bör denna information tillhandahållas konsumenten under alla omständigheter.

text: 1. Medlemsstaterna ska se till att kreditgivaren, på papper eller på något annat varaktigt medium, informerar konsumenten om varje ändring av krediträntan och det innan den träder i kraft. Informationen ska innehålla återbetalningsbeloppen efter att den nya krediträntan har trätt i kraft och, om betalningarnas antal och frekvens ändras, uppgift om detta. | 1. Medlemsstaterna ska se till att kreditgivaren, på papper eller på något annat varaktigt medium, informerar konsumenten om varje ändring av krediträntan i regel minst en månad och det innan den träder i kraft. Informationen ska innehålla återbetalningsbeloppen efter att den nya krediträntan har trätt i kraft och, om betalningarnas antal och frekvens ändras, uppgift om detta.

text: Motivering Det är viktigt att konsumenten informeras om ändringar i låneräntan tillräckligt långt i förväg.

text: […] Kreditgivaren ska också tillfoga följande: 1) I tillämpliga fall tillämpade räntetak eller lägsta ränta. 2) Ett exempel på hur avbetalningsbeloppet kan variera om räntan stiger eller sjunker med 1 procentenhet eller mer, om detta är mer realistiskt med tanke på normala ränteförändringar. 3) Avbetalningsbeloppet vid det värsta tänkbara scenariot, om det finns ett räntetak. | […] Kreditgivaren ska också tillfoga följande: 1) I tillämpliga fall tillämpade räntetak eller lägsta ränta. 2) Ett exempel på hur avbetalningsbeloppet kan variera om räntan stiger eller sjunker med 21 procentenhet procentenheter eller mer, om detta är mer realistiskt med tanke på normala ränteförändringar. 3) Avbetalningsbeloppet vid det värsta tänkbara scenariot, om det finns ett räntetak.

text: Motivering Ett bostadslåneavtal kan ha en löptid på flera decennier. Det är därför högst sannolikt att räntorna kommer att öka med mer än 1 procentenhet under denna period. Om kreditavtalet ingås under en period med låga räntor är det nästan säkert att en sådan ökning kommer att ske. Låntagarna bör få tillräckligt med information för att ha möjlighet att förstå konsekvenserna av en framtida räntehöjning. En ändring på 1 procentenhet är i sig mycket måttlig sett till hur den ändrade räntan påverkar amorteringarna. Mot denna bakgrund skulle en höjning på 2 procentenheter ge en bättre bild av hur amorteringarna påverkas av räntehöjningar.


text: Decree No 2/2009 (I. 23.) of the Governor of the MNB on the processing and distribution of banknotes, and on technical tasks relating to the protection of banknotes against counterfeiting and Decree No 3/2009. (I. 23.) of the Governor of the MNB on the processing and distribution of coins, and on technical tasks relating to the protection of coins against counterfeiting.

text: Available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 20 July 2011 on cash recycling and the protection of national and foreign legal tender against counterfeiting (CON/2011/59)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 20 July 2011 on cash recycling and the protection of national and foreign legal tender against counterfeiting (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 3 June 2011, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (MNB) for an opinion on two MNB Governor draft decrees: (i) on the processing and distribution of banknotes and on technical tasks relating to the protection of banknotes against counterfeiting (the ‘draft banknote decree’), and (ii) on the processing and distribution of coins, and on technical tasks relating to the protection of coins against counterfeiting (the ‘draft coin decree’; the draft banknote decree and the draft coin decree are hereinafter jointly referred to as the ‘draft decrees’) . The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the first and second indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft decrees relate to currency matters and means of payment. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft decrees

text: According to the explanatory memorandum, the draft decrees are justified by the increasing risk of counterfeit forint banknotes, the MNB’s practical experience with the application of the decrees currently in force , the need for a legal framework to assess and manage the operational risks of cash distribution, and the obligation to harmonise national legislation with the Union regulations on the protection of euro banknotes and euro coins against counterfeiting. To that end, the draft decrees, inter alia, provide: - from 1 January 2012, only the banknote handling machines tested by the MNB meeting the relevant requirements may be operated,

text: - from 1 January 2012, the annual ratio of checked forint banknotes conducted by cash processing providers with banknote handling machines successfully tested by the MNB will increase from 80% to 90%, - banknotes rejected by staff-operated banknote handling machines, which may sometimes provide a lower level of security, that prove to be genuine during the subsequent manual authenticity check may not be re-circulated, but will be delivered as unfit banknotes to the MNB, - from 1 January 2013, branches of credit institutions and the postal service may only recirculate forint banknotes received as supplies if the authenticity and fitness check of the annual ratio of the received forint banknotes is carried out with a banknote handling machine successfully tested by the MNB, the ratio of the checked forint banknotes by a successfully tested banknote handling machine has increased year by year until it reaches 90% in 2017 and only forint banknotes deposited in the specific branch and re-circulated over the counter may be checked manually, - the credit institutions and the postal service shall accept small amounts of unfit forint banknotes and coins for denomination exchange in return for a limited fee.

text: 2. General comments

text: 2.1 As already stated in ECB Opinion

text: , since Hungary is a Member State with a derogation pursuant to Article 139 of the Treaty, the ECB’s requirements regarding the recirculation of euro banknotes in Member States that have adopted the euro do not apply to the MNB. These requirements will apply to the MNB once Hungary adopts the euro and the MNB becomes a fully integrated member of the Eurosystem. However, in this respect, the ECB welcomes the MNB’s alignment of Decree No 2/2009 with Decision ECB/2010/14 of 16 September 2010 on the authenticity and fitness checking and recirculation of euro banknotes . 2.2 Under Article 128 of the Treaty, the ECB has the exclusive right to authorise the issue of banknotes within the Union, whereas coins are issued by euro area Member States subject to the ECB’s approval of their volume. Consequently, the ECB’s regulatory competence concerns only banknotes.

text: 3. Specific observations

text: Pursuant to Article 21(1) of the draft banknote decree, credit institutions and the postal service may charge a fee for the exchange of fit or unfit forint banknotes to different denominations of fit forint banknotes or coins. As regards the euro currency, the ECB considers that the replacement of euro banknotes, whether fit or unfit for circulation, should, as a general rule, be free from any handling fees.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 20 July 2011. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 2 Under the draft law, an ‘institution’ refers to credit institutions and insurance companies. 3 Defined in the new

text: Article 3

text: :159a(g), in conjunction with the new

text: Article 3

text: :159b, of the Law on financial supervision. 4 The new Section 3.5.4A of the Law on financial supervision. Pursuant to the new

text: Article 3

text: :159f of the Law on financial supervision, the State cannot be the purchaser. 5 The new

text: Article 3

text: The new

text: Article 6

text: :8 and 6:9 of the Law on financial supervision. 7 Article II of the draft law. 8 Article III of the draft law. 9 Article IV of the draft law. 10 Article V of the draft law. 11 See paragraph 2.1.1 of Opinion CON/2009/ 54. All ECB Opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 12 The ECB’s Convergence Report May 2010, p. 22.

text: See paragraph 3.1.4 of Opinion

text: . 14 See the Commission’s consultation document ‘Technical details of a possible EU framework for bank recovery and resolution’, p. 52, available at http://ec.europa.eu (hereinafter the ‘Commission’s consultation on crisis resolution’). A ‘bridge bank’ is an institution or other legal person that is wholly owned by one or more public authority. 15 New

text: Article 3

text: :159g(1) of the Law on financial supervision. 16 New

text: Article 3

text: :159l of the Law on financial supervision. 17 The new

text: Article 3

text: :159g(2) of the Law on financial supervision.

text: See ECB Annual Report 2010, p. 120. See also the ECB’s convergence report, May 2010, p. 25. 19 An introduction of partial ex ante funding arrangements for the deposit guarantee schemes is also considered crucial from a financial stability perspective, as already stated in Opinion

text: . 20 New

text: Articles 3

text: :159p to 3:159r of the Law on financial supervision. 21 See also the ESCB’s contribution to the Commission’s consultation document ‘Technical details of a possible EU framework for bank recovery and resolution’, p. 3, available at http://ec.europa.eu (hereinafter the ‘ESCB’s response to Commission’s consultation’). 22 New

text: Article 3

text: :159t of the Law on financial supervision provides for the possibility for shareholders, holding more than 10% of the shares, to be heard by the district court ex ante, before the court approves the transfer plan and pronounces that the transfer agreements may proceed. The shareholders may challenge DNB’s assessment that the trigger conditions

text: justifying the intervention are met and the adequateness of the price for the shares. Furthermore, new

text: Article 3

text: :159u of the Law on financial supervision provides for the possibility for those shareholders the district court did not hear ex ante, to oppose the court decision approving the transfer plan ex post. 23 Report and recommendations of the Cross-border Bank Resolution Group, March 2010, available on the Bank for International Settlement’s website at www.bis.org. 24 See the Commission’s consultation on crisis resolution, p. 64. 25 See the ESCB’s response to the Commission’s consultation, p.12. 26 As defined in the new

text: Article 3

text: :267e of the Law on financial supervision. 27 OJ L 168, 27.6.2002, p. 43. 28 OJ L 125, 5.5.2001, p. 15. 29 OJ L 166, 11.6.1998, p. 45.

text: See comments on the new

text: Article 3

text: :267f of the Law on financial supervision. 31 See comments on

text: Article 3

text: :267f. of the Law on financial supervision. 32 See the new

text: Article 6

text: :2(7) of the Law on financial supervision.

text: See also paragraphs 3.2.1 and 3.2.6 of Opinion CON 2009/24 and paragraph 3.3 of Opinion

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 20 July 2011 on crisis intervention measures for financial institutions in difficulty (CON/2011/60)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 20 July 2011 on crisis intervention measures for financial institutions in difficulty (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 19 April 2011, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Dutch Minister for Finance for an opinion on the draft law on crisis intervention measures (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third and sixth indents of

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) and to rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The draft law introduces, inter alia, a number of amendments to the Law on financial supervision. In particular, it grants new powers to DNB and the Minister for Finance to intervene in situations 2 3 where an institution faces financial difficulty or where there is a serious and immediate risk to the stability of the financial system caused by an institution in difficulty. 1.2 Pursuant to the draft law, DNB may prepare a plan for the partial or total transfer of the shares, and/or assets and liabilities, including deposits, of an institution in difficulty to a private purchaser . The plan becomes effective upon the district court’s approval. Transfers and related measures do not trigger the rights of the contracting parties of a credit institution to exercise early termination, set off and netting . 1.3 Furthermore, the draft law grants the Minister for Finance the power to take ‘special measures related to the stability of the financial system’. Accordingly, the Minister may expropriate the assets of an institution in difficulty for the purpose of stabilising the financial system. The draft law

text: provides for a right of indemnification for such action, based on the actual value of the assets or securities seized. The value will be determined by estimating the market price at the time of the expropriation, less the amount of any financial support . 1.4 In addition to the amendments to the Law on financial supervision, the draft law amends the Law 7 8 9 on bankruptcy , the Civil Code , the Law on general administration and the Law on securities bank giro transactions .

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 In line with its previous opinions, the ECB emphasises that, when adopting measures to deal with a financial crisis, Member States should act in a coordinated manner to avoid significant differences in national implementation, which could have a counterproductive effect and cause distortions in global financial markets. Moreover, it is crucial to ensure consistency with the Eurosystem’s operational framework and liquidity management . Against this background, any national measure should ensure a sufficiently level playing field within the euro area, which is of key importance to maintaining the integrity of the euro area financial system. 2.2 The ECB supports the plans put forward by the European Commission to develop a crisis management and resolution framework for Union financial institutions. The Union clearly needs better tools with well-designed triggers to tackle problems faced by financial institutions more effectively. National regimes should be as harmonised as possible and there should be better coordination between Member States in crisis situations. In particular, the ECB shares the view that the overriding policy objective of the new Union regime should be to allow any institution to fail in a way that safeguards the stability of the Union financial system as a whole and minimises public costs and economic disruptions.

text: 3. The role of DNB and measures taken

text: 3.1 The ECB understands that the tasks allocated to DNB under the draft law do not interfere with the performance of any of DNB’s Eurosystem-related tasks provided for by the Treaty and do not prejudice the financial means necessary for carrying out DNB’s Eurosystem-related tasks . 3.2 Any involvement of DNB and its Governor in the application of measures to strengthen financial stability must be compatible with the Treaty and consequently with DNB’s institutional and financial independence, as well as with the Governor’s personal independence to safeguard the

text: proper performance of their tasks under the Treaty and the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank . 3.3 The draft law defines ‘transitional institution’ as an institution whose role is to purchase, on a temporary basis, deposit agreements, assets or liabilities (other than pursuant to deposit agreements), and shares of an institution in difficulty. The draft law does not specify who is responsible for setting up a transitional institution or the procedure to be used. Moreover, it is unclear under which circumstances a transitional institution would play a role. Under the draft law, the new

text: Article 3

text: :159f(2) of the Law on financial supervision provides that ‘Rules can be established by general administrative regulation with respect to the transfer to a transitional institution’, but does not offer an explanation regarding the transitional institution itself. The ECB would welcome clarification with respect to these open issues, as without clear specifications, the transitional institutions cannot serve as effective tools and their function and design cannot be coordinated among the Member States. It should also be made clear how the transitional institutions relate to the ‘bridge bank tool’ discussed at Union level .

text: 4. Prohibition of monetary financing and financing of resolution measures

text: 4.1 It is important to safeguard compliance with the monetary financing prohibition under Article 123 of the Treaty. This prohibition of monetary financing is designed to prevent central banks from providing overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facility to the public sector, which includes any financing of the public sector’s obligations vis-à-vis third parties. The draft law provides for the possibility for DNB to furnish an amount for the transfer of deposit agreements and allows DNB to subsequently recover such amount from credit institutions . The ECB notes that the amount that DNB may provide for the transfer of deposit agreements under the draft law may not exceed the total amount of the guaranteed deposits held by an institution in difficulty . It should be explicitly spelled out that a transfer of a deposit agreement may only be financed by funds from the deposit guarantee scheme. From this perspective, the ECB notes that the draft law does not change in substance the regime currently in force, envisaging that the Dutch deposit guarantee scheme is financed by advance payments from DNB, with a collection of contributions from credit institutions at a later point in time. 4.2 Advance payments by DNB in the context of the operation of the Dutch deposit guarantee scheme are generally considered incompatible with the monetary financing prohibition and legislation is required to make the deposit guarantee scheme compliant with the monetary financing

text: prohibition . The ECB understands that a law is being prepared that will provide for ex ante funding as regards the deposit guarantee scheme. Until such legislation is in place, advance payments by DNB and the resulting claims for DNB in relation to the transfer of deposit agreements, even though financed ex post by contributions from credit institutions, would in principle not be compatible with the prohibition of monetary financing. 4.3 Also from a financial stability perspective, the ECB calls for the relevant authorities to set up an ex ante funding scheme for institutions in the deposit guarantee scheme , which would have, inter alia, the advantage of greater reliability and availability. It would avoid the risk of being an additional strain on the banking sector in times of crisis. An ex ante funding scheme should also include the possibility to call upon the private sector for additional financial support, as it cannot be excluded that in a crisis situation, pre-collected funds from the industry may be insufficient and that supplementary use of public funds may be necessary. This principle of ex post recovery from the private sector should promote additional market discipline and address the risk of moral hazard.

text: 5. Shareholder rights

text: 5.1 Under the draft law, the transfer plan prepared by DNB may provide for the transfer of deposit agreements, assets and liabilities, and shares from the institution in difficulty to a private sector purchaser. 5.2 The draft law sets out the procedure for the transfer of shares from an institution in difficulty to a private sector purchaser, according to which consent or cooperation on the part of the shareholders is not required. The new

text: Article 3

text: :159q(c) of the Law on financial supervision requires that a transfer plan include the price the purchaser is willing to pay and the reason that price is considered reasonable for the shares. 5.3 In order to strike the right balance between the need for prompt and effective action by the authorities on the one hand and the preservation of shareholders’ property rights on the other, safeguards need to be put in place to render such a procedure compatible with the right to property, as guaranteed in Article 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union . In this respect, the ECB notes that the draft law and in particular the new

text: Article 3

text: :159u of the Law on financial supervision, provides for such safeguards. Given the importance of timely and effective crisis management, inclusion of an ex ante hearing of large shareholders is undesirable and the new

text: Article 3

text: :159t of the Law on financial supervision should be amended accordingly .

text: 6. Close-out netting and set off rights

text: 6.1 The new

text: Article 3

text: :267f of the Law on financial supervision provides that measures taken in the context of a transfer are not considered trigger events for early termination, set off or netting rights. In this respect, as stated in recommendation 9 of the Report and Recommendations of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s Cross-border Bank Resolution Group (CBRG) , ‘the ability of relevant [national] authorities to impose a brief delay on the exercise of early termination and netting rights would maximise the possibility of transfer to a sound company, a bridge bank or another public entity provided that: the period of time during which the authorities can delay immediate operation of contractual early termination rights pending a transfer is clearly defined and limited, after which full termination and close-out rights would be available for all financial contracts not transferred to a solvent transferee’. 6.2 The ECB notes that a solution aligned with the CBRG recommendations has been contemplated as part of the proposed Union framework on crisis resolution . The response of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) to the Commission’s consultation, states that it ‘supports the proposal to give the resolution authority the legal power to temporarily delay the exercise by any party of closeout netting rights under a netting agreement with the institution in difficulty to complete a transfer of certain financial markets contracts to another sound company, a bridge bank or other public entity’ . Until this recommendation is incorporated into Union law, due regard needs to be paid to ensuring compliance with resolution measures introduced into the national legislation of the Member States with the relevant elements of the existing Union legal framework, as specified below. 6.3 Against this background, the ECB notes that the rejection of counterparties’ close-out netting or other rights following a ‘measure’ should not jeopardise rights protected under financial collateral arrangements, as defined in

text: Article 2(1)

text: (a) of Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 June 2002 on financial collateral arrangements as well as further rules specified in Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 April 2001 on the reorganisation and winding up of credit institutions and Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 1998 on settlement finality in payment and securities settlement systems .

text: Article 7(1)

text: (b) of Directive

text: requires Member States to ensure that for a financial collateral arrangement, a close-out netting provision can take effect in accordance with its terms notwithstanding the commencement or continuation of winding-up proceedings, reorganisation measures or any other type of judicial proceeding, attachment, assignment or other disposition concerning such rights. Until draft amendments to Union law related to the preparation of a Union crisis management framework are adopted, the above rules should continue to be fully implemented in national legislation. As specified in the explanatory memorandum to the draft law , the ECB understands that the exclusion of ‘financial collateral arrangements’ from the operation of new

text: Article 3

text: :267f of the Law on financial supervision, as introduced in paragraph 4(b) of this Article, is intended to achieve this result. 6.3.2

text: Article 25 of Directive 2001/24/EC

text: provides that netting agreements are governed by the law of the contract which governs such agreements. Following the new

text: Article 3

text: :267d of the Law on financial supervision this section ‘applies to agreements … regardless of the law that governs the agreement’. The ECB notes that the master agreements on which close-out netting rights are based are often concluded by Dutch credit institutions under the laws of other jurisdictions such as England or New York. It is unclear under Union law whether the proposed stay could be enforced against a Dutch credit institution that has entered into a netting agreement governed by English, New York or other third country’s laws. In view of these legal uncertainties, any statutory powers to impose a temporary stay on such contracts or a rejection of counterparties’ close-out netting rights should be coordinated closely at Union level. 6.3.3

text: Article 9 of Directive 1998/26/EC

text: protects rights to collateral security to which the central banks and participants in the systems are entitled within the scope of this Directive. As specified in the explanatory memorandum to the draft law , the ECB understands that the new

text: Article 3

text: :267f (4)(a) of the Law on financial supervision is intended to maintain this protection in that it will exclude from the operation of

text: Article 3

text: :267f ‘a right to which a central bank or, in connection with participation in a system as referred to in

text: Article 212

text: a, part b, of the Bankruptcy Act, another institution that participates in the system is entitled pursuant to a legal relationship as referred in the first paragraph of [

text: Article 3

text: 7. Measures to ensure the stability of the financial system, including the right of expropriation

text: 7.1 A new Part 6 of the Law on financial supervision establishes a special expropriation regime to ensure stability of the financial system, which specifies that the Dutch Expropriation Act will not be applicable . The ECB notes that the new

text: Article 6

text: :1(1) of the Law on financial supervision gives the Minister for Finance the power to ‘take immediate measures’ without specifying which kind of measures are covered by this power. In this respect, the draft law should specify if those ‘immediate

text: measures’ cover other measures besides expropriation and, if this is the case, it should clearly define the scope of these other measures. 7.2 The power of the Minister to expropriate assets of an institution in difficulty is laid down in the new

text: Article 6

text: :2 of the Law on financial supervision. The ECB highlights that expropriation is a severe measure with far-reaching effects on market participants. For this reason, expropriation by the State in relation to institutions in difficulty should remain a tool for use in clearly defined and exceptional circumstances. The new

text: Article 6

text: :2(1) specifies that the expropriation can take place if the Minister ‘is of the opinion that the stability of that system is coming into serious and immediate risk by the situation of an institution domiciled in the Netherlands’. It should be made clear that such expropriation is a last resort measure and can only take place if there is no other less intrusive, equally effective measure available. 7.3 It is very important that indemnification for an expropriation provides for a transparent valuation of the assets, which adequately reflects market conditions. The new

text: Articles 6

text: :8 and 6:9 of the Law on financial supervision provide that the value will be determined by estimating the market price at the time of the expropriation, less the amount of any financial support. The ECB welcomes that the new

text: Article 6

text: :9(2) provides for a discount of any public financial support previously received by an institution. Moreover, the ECB understands that expropriation under the draft law will ultimately not amount to a bailout or state aid. 7.4 Any State’s role taken with respect to an institution should be clearly limited in time . It is therefore important to have an adequate exit strategy in place. The new

text: Article 6

text: :1(3) of the Law on financial supervision, which provides that the Minister ‘will determine the period of those measures’ and that he ‘can extend this period by a separate decision’, is not clear enough in order to limit the time of expropriation and to define a clear exit strategy. In this respect, the draft law should contain clearer and more detailed provisions.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 20 July 2011.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET