text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: All members are required to participate in person in meetings of the Committee, with the possibility to indicate an alternate in the event that participation in person is impossible. Any member may also invite other persons to participate in the meetings, in an advisory capacity (see Articles 3-4 of the draft law). The draft law will supersede as the legal basis for the establishment of the Committee the Memorandum of Understanding of 21 December 2007, in which the abovementioned parties agreed on the establishment of the Financial Stability Committee (see press releases of 27 December 2007 and 8 February 2008, as published on the NBP website, www.nbp.pl).

text: See Article 6 of the draft law. ‘Conclusions’ are not formal administrative decisions.

text: See Article 5 of the draft law. 7 See

text: Article 2(1)

text: (1) of the draft law. 8 See

text: Article 2(1)

text: (2) and Article 2(2) of the draft law. 9 See

text: Article 2(1)

text: (3) and

text: Article 2(3)

text: -(4) of the draft law. 10 Such agreements must describe the principles of cooperation, the extent of the exchange of information and the principles for the protection of such information. See Article 10 of the draft law. 11 See paragraphs 3.1.2 and 3.4 of ECB Opinion

text: of 9 March 2006 at the request of the Polish Minister of Finance on a draft law on the supervision of financial institutions; cf. paragraph 7 of ECB Opinion

text: of 25 May 2001 at the request of the Austrian Ministry of Finance on a draft Article of the Federal law establishing and organising the financial market supervisory authority [title shortened].

text: See paragraph 3.1 of the ECB Opinion

text: of 9 October 2007 at the request of the Polish Minister for Finance on a draft law amending the Law on the supervision of financial markets; cf. paragraph 11 of ECB Opinion

text: of 24 April 2002 at the request of the Belgian Ministry of Finance on a draft proposal for a law on prudential supervision of the financial sector and financial services. 13 See Article 8 of the draft law. 14 Law on Narodowy Bank Polski of 29 August 1997 (consolidated text: Dz.U. of 1 April 2005 No 1, item 2, as amended; hereinafter, the ‘Law on NBP’). 15 See point 6a inserted in Article 3(2) of the Law on NBP by Article 13(1) of the draft law. 16 See point 5a inserted in Article 17(4) of the Law on NBP by Article 13(2) of the draft law. 17 Details of such reporting obligations are to be further specified by NBP. See Article 23(3) of the Law on NBP, as amended by

text: Article 13(4)

text: (a) of the draft law. 18 See the current wording of Article 23(3) of the Law on NBP. 19 See the ECB’s Financial Stability Review, December 2004, p. 7. 20 See paragraph 2.2 of ECB Opinion

text: and paragraph 3.1 of ECB Opinion

text: ; see also paragraph 4.2 of Opinion

text: of 2 August 2006 at the request of Poland’s Sejm Marshall on a draft law amending the Law on Narodowy Bank Polski and paragraph 3.3 of ECB Opinion

text: of 23 July 2008 at the request of the Polish Minister for Finance on a draft law amending the Law on the Bank Guarantee Fund.

text: Such confidentiality obligations are protected by criminal sanctions. See Article 9(1) of the draft law. 22 See Articles 11-12 of the draft law. 23 Law on banking of 29 August 1997 (consolidated text: Dz.U. of 12 June 2002 No 72, item 665, as amended). 24 See paragraphs 8-9 added to Article 23 of the Law on NBP by

text: Article 13(4)

text: (d) of the draft law. 25 See

text: Article 17

text: a of the Law on supervision of financial market (Dz.U. of 4 September 2006 No 157, item 1119, as amended, hereinafter, the ‘Law on supervision of financial market’), as inserted by Article 14 of the draft law. 26 See paragraph 3.2 of ECB Opinion

text: . 27 In particular,

text: Articles 44

text: - 52 of Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions (recast) (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 177, 30.6.2006, p. 1 (hereinafter, the ‘Banking Directive’). Directive as last amended by Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 81, 20.3.2008, p. 38);

text: Article 13 of Council Regulation (EC) No 322/97 of 17 February 1997

text: on Community Statistics (OJ L 52, 22.2.1997, p. 1). Regulation as last amended by

text: Regulation (EC) No 1882/2003

text: of the European Parliament and the Council (OJ L 284, 31.10.2003, p. 1);

text: Article 8 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2533/98 of 23 November 1998

text: concerning the collection of statistical information by the European Central Bank (OJ L 318, 27.11.1998, p. 8); and Article 3 of Council Regulation (Euratom, EEC) No 1588/90 of 11 June 1990 on the transmission of data subject to statistical confidentiality to the Statistical Office of the European Communities (OJ L 151, 15.6.1990, p. 1). Regulation as last amended by

text: Regulation (EC) No 1882/2003

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 284, 31.10.2003, p. 1); Guideline ECB/1998/NP28 of 22 December 1998 concerning the common rules and minimum standards to protect the confidentiality of the individual statistical information collected by the European Central Bank assisted by the national central banks (OJ L 55, 24.2.2001, p. 72). 28 In particular, the ‘Memorandum of understanding on cooperation between the financial supervisory authorities, central banks and finance ministries of the European Union on cross-border financial stability’ of 1 June 2008, as published on the ECB website, www.ecb.europa.eu (the ‘June 2008 MoU’).

text: See paragraphs 5.1, 5.2 and 5.7 of the June 2008 MoU, together with Paragraph 1(5) of Annex 1 (Common Practical Guidelines) to the June 2008 MoU as well as Annex B (Content of the common database) to the Voluntary Specific Cooperation Agreement attached to the June 2008 MoU. 30 See amendments to Articles 49 and 130 of the Banking Directive, as proposed in the Commission’s consultation document ‘Public consultation on possible changes to the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD, consisting of Directives

text: and

text: ’ of 30 June 2008 (available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/regcapital/consultation_en.pdf). 31 I.e. the members of the FSC appointed by the President of the Republic, the Minister for Finance, the Minister responsible for the state pension system and the NBP President (see Article 7 of the draft law and Article 5(2) of the Law of 21 July 2006 on supervision of financial market). 32 See Article 23(7) of the Law on NBP, as amended by

text: Article 13(4)

text: (c) of the draft law.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 1 September 2008 at the request of the Polish Minister for Finance on a draft law on the Financial Stability Committee (CON/2008/39)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 1 September 2008 at the request of the Polish Minister for Finance on a draft law on the Financial Stability Committee (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 10 July 2008 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Polish Minister for Finance for an opinion on a draft law on the Financial Stability Committee (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Article 105(4) of the Treaty establishing the European Community and the third and sixth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to Narodowy Bank Polski (NBP) and to rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The draft law will establish the Financial Stability Committee (hereinafter the ‘Committee’) in the following composition: (i) the Minister for Finance (as Chairman); (ii) the NBP President; and (iii) the Chairman of the Financial Supervision Commission (FSC) . The Committee is to pursue the objective defined in the draft law as ‘fostering and protection of the stability of the national financial system through the exchange of information, opinions and assessments of the situation in the financial system in the country and abroad and the coordination of activities in this area’ . Acting unanimously, the Committee may adopt ‘positions’ and ‘conclusions’ . The Committee may also establish working groups, composed of staff from the Ministry of Finance, NBP and the FSC (hereinafter the ‘three represented institutions’) as well as invited external experts . The Committee

text: meetings are convened by the Minister for Finance, at least once every 6 months, and are prepared by Ministry of Finance staff . 1.2 Specifically, the Committee’s tasks will include: (i) Analytical activity, i.e. producing assessments of the situation in the national financial system and on international markets, and ensuring a proper flow of information between members of the Committee regarding major events and trends which could constitute a threat to the stability of the national financial system ; (ii) Development of crisis management procedures to be applied in the event of a threat to the stability of the national financial system. After adoption, the crisis management procedures are submitted by the Committee to the three represented institutions for implementation ; (iii) Crisis management coordination in situations where an immediate threat to the stability of the national financial system materialises. In such cases, the FSC Chairman submits to the Committee an opinion on the solvency of the threatened entities, the NBP President submits an opinion on the liquidity of the banking sector and the Minister for Finance submits an opinion on the possibility of support for the threatened entities from public funds. Furthermore, the NBP President and the FSC Chairman submit opinions on the systemic significance of the threatened entities ; and (iv) International cooperation, as the draft law provides that the members of the Committee may, for the purpose of strengthening international cooperation in support of financial stability, conclude agreements with institutions carrying out tasks in this area in the member states of the European Economic Area and in particular with the ECB, national central banks within the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), the relevant ministries and supervisory agencies .

text: 2. Central bank participation in the Financial Stability Committee

text: 2.1 Central bank independence In one of its previous opinions , the ECB advocated the creation of the Committee and NBP’s participation in it as one possible measure to ensure that NBP can continue to provide the necessary contribution to financial stability, following the implementation of the supervisory reform in Poland transferring the banking supervision responsibilities from NBP to a newly-created separate

text: authority (the current FSC). Therefore the ECB welcomes the establishment of the Committee, as it responds to the need to take coordinated action in financial crisis situations. However, in line with another of its previous opinions, the ECB recommends that: (i) the tasks attributed to the Committee must not compromise NBP’s independence with regard to its central bank tasks; and (ii) the legal framework of the Committee should be precisely formulated to ensure that the effectiveness of the coordination process is not affected by possible uncertainties regarding the role of the Committee and its participating bodies . The ECB recommends that such principles are followed, inter alia, in internal regulations of the Committee, to be adopted under the draft law . 2.2 Financial stability role of the central bank The ECB acknowledges that under the draft law, certain specific responsibilities in the field of financial stability will be assigned to NBP. In particular, the draft law amends the Law on Narodowy Bank Polski by including among NBP’s tasks the ‘task in support of the stability of the national financial system referred to in Article 1(4) of the [draft law]’, i.e. preparation of opinions addressed to the Committee on the systemic significance of the threatened entities . Additionally, it will become one of the tasks of NBP’s Management Board to produce analyses of the stability of the financial system . Moreover, NBP will be empowered to request credit institutions to provide information relevant to the assessment of the banking system’s financial stability , in addition to the current obligation of credit institutions to report on data relevant to the assessment of their financial condition and the banking sector risk . Such new powers are welcomed as they would facilitate NBP’s effective performance of its financial stability role. However, all the abovementioned amendments fall short of introducing an explicit financial stability function for NBP, encompassing the broad range of central bank contributions to financial stability . Therefore, the ECB reiterates its previous recommendation that the Law on NBP should be amended to specify that NBP has formal responsibility for contributing to financial stability by monitoring and assessing the financial system as a whole, as a separate function from hands-on supervision and financial regulation.

text: 3. Rules on exchange of information

text: 3.1 The draft law provides that all persons participating in Committee meetings, or in working groups established by the Committee, may exchange information necessary for the proper functioning of the Committee, while being obliged to keep such information confidential . The Committee may also publish public statements on its work, including as regards its ‘findings’. Committee members’ legal liability for information published in this way is excluded . Furthermore, the draft law provisions amending the Law on NBP define more precisely the exclusions from NBP’s confidentiality obligations, as contained, inter alia, in the Law on NBP and the Law on banking . In particular, NBP will be entitled to provide the Minister for Finance and the FSC with information obtained from individual credit institutions, as relevant to the work of the Committee . Reciprocally, the FSC Chairman will be entitled to provide information to NBP and the Minister for Finance . 3.2 The ECB welcomes the aim of ensuring effective exchange of information between members of the Committee with a view to allowing the Committee to be an efficient means of communication and coordination while respecting each institution’s responsibility. Furthermore, in line with its earlier opinion , the ECB notes that provisions relating to information-sharing within the Committee should be: (i) consistent with Community law regulating the exchange of supervisory and statistical information and professional secrecy , as well as with the Law on NBP; and (ii) capable of facilitating the operation of relevant EU Memoranda of Understanding to which the Polish authorities are signatories . The ECB considers in particular that, as part of the proposed amendments relating to exchange of information, appropriate procedures and amendments to the Law on the NBP should be considered ensuring that correctness and accuracy of information submitted by individual credit institutions could be verified by NBP. This would allow NBP to exercise its powers in the field of financial stability effectively and safeguard the high quality of

text: information exchanged within the Committee . In this respect the ECB also points to the published draft amendments to the Banking Directive, which may result in the introduction of an obligation for the supervisory authorities of the Member States to alert the relevant national central banks of arising crisis situations and to provide them with relevant information . 3.3 The ECB notes that the draft law stipulates explicitly that information exchanged within the Committee may be disclosed to members of the FSC who are not represented on the Committee . Should this provision be maintained in the draft law, equivalent access rights will need to be safeguarded for members of NBP’s governing bodies and staff who perform financial stability tasks but do not directly participate in the work of the Committee. 3.4 Finally, the ECB notes that separate amendments to the Law on NBP will allow NBP to disclose data collected from individual credit institutions, inter alia, to: (i) the ECB, in connection with NBP’s obligations stemming from its participation in the ESCB; (ii) foreign entities, in performance of Poland’s international obligations; (iii) the Minister for Finance, for the purposes of management of the public debt; and (iv) other entities, as specified in separate provisions . As stated in paragraph 3.2 of this opinion, the ECB would underline the fact that Community law provisions not only apply to NBP’s provision of information to the ECB but also to other listed instances of exchange of supervisory and statistical information. It could be advisable to define such other allowed instances of information disclosure by NBP more precisely in the draft law including a reference to compliance with Community law in this respect.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 1 September 2008.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: The first draft law consists of five amendments to specific laws falling within the field of competence of the Slovak Ministry of Defence.

text: The second draft law consists of six amendments to specific laws falling within the field of competence of the Slovak Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family.

text: The third draft law consists of 10 amendments to specific laws falling within the field of competence of the Slovak Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family, but only four of them are relevant to this consultation.

text: The fourth draft law consists of two amendments to specific laws falling within the field of competence of the Slovak Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family, but only one of them is relevant to this consultation. 5 The sixth draft law consists of two amendments to specific laws falling within the field of competence of the Slovak Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family, but only one of them is relevant to this consultation. 6 The seventh draft law consists of three amendments to specific laws falling within the field of competence of the Slovak Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family, but only two of them are relevant to this consultation. 7 For ease of reference, each draft law is divided into sections and subsequently into points and articles, if necessary, within each section.

text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 9 See ECB Opinion

text: of 19 December 2007 at the request of the Slovak Ministry of Finance on a draft law on the introduction of the euro in Slovakia and on amendments to certain laws; ECB Opinion

text: of 30 May 2008 at the request of Národná banka Slovenska on a draft decree laying down rules for the dual display of certain prices, payments and other amounts and on a draft decree laying down the number of decimal places of certain types of securities for the purpose of rounding by redenomination of their nominal value from the Slovak currency to the euro; ECB Opinion

text: of 12 June 2008 at the request of the Slovak Ministry of Finance on a draft decree laying down the scope of prices, payments and other amounts subject to dual display with regard to the field of gambling games and methods of their dual display; and ECB Opinion

text: of 1 July 2008 at the request of the Slovak Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family on a draft decree laying down further detailed rules on the dual display, conversion and rounding of certain prices, payments and other amounts in the labour law and social security sectors on the euro changeover. 10 Apart from requests received from the Slovak Ministry of Defence and the Slovak Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family, the ECB has also been consulted either officially or informally by the Slovak Ministry of Education (on eight draft laws), Národná banka Slovenska (on two draft decrees), the Slovak Ministry of Interior (on 38 draft laws), the Slovak Ministry of Transport, Post and Telecommunication (on six draft laws), the Slovak Ministry of Culture (on one draft law), the Slovak Ministry of Justice (on 24 draft laws), the Slovak Ministry of Health (on 14 draft laws and one draft decree), the Slovak Ministry of Finance (on 17 draft laws) and the Slovak Ministry of Environment (on 22 draft laws and one draft decree) in each case in relation to the same or very similar issues relating to the euro changeover.

text: See the Law No 566/1992 Coll. on Národná banka Slovenska. 12 The ECB notes that a comparable legal technique is already applied in the second draft law (see the second sentence of the provision proposed pursuant to Point 8 of Section I), in

text: Article 111(7)

text: in Section I of the third draft law and also in another provision of the first draft law (see the provision proposed pursuant to Point 20 of Section III). 13 OJ L 139, 11.5.1998, p. 1. 14 OJ L 162, 19.6.1997, p. 1. 15 The first and second sentences of Article 2(3) of the Slovak Euro-Law provide: ‘If calculation of conversion from the Slovak currency to euros in accordance with the conversion rate results in final financial amounts in euro which shall be actually paid or accounted (hereinafter ‘final amounts’), in particular final amounts accounted in statements of account or final amounts of price, payment or other value stated in invoices, other accounting documents or payment documents, such final amount in euro shall, after conversion in accordance with the conversion rate, be rounded to a number with two decimal places, i.e. to the nearest euro cent, pursuant to rules set out in a separate legal provision. The total calculated remainder of a final amount which is lower than one half of one euro cent, shall, pursuant to a separate legal provision, be rounded down to the nearest euro cent, and the total calculated remainder of a final amount which is higher than one half of one euro cent, shall, pursuant to a separate legal provision, be rounded up to the nearest euro cent, unless all parties to the respective legal relationship agree otherwise or a separate legal provision stipulates otherwise.’

text: The last sentence of Article 2(3) of the Slovak Euro-Law provides that ‘Final amounts representing revenues of the State budget or another type of general government budget shall preferentially be rounded down in favor of the persons obliged to make the respective payments, and final amounts representing expenditures of the state budget or another type of general government budget shall preferentially be rounded up in favor of the persons entitled for receipt of the respective payments, unless a separate legal provision stipulates otherwise.’ 17 A different approach to the methodology of rounding is derived from all of the following: (a) the relationship between rounded amounts and time units, i.e. either hours or months; (b) the levels of rounding applied until now, which start with rounding to tens of haliers in respect of hourly rate units, and end with rounding to hundreds of korunas in respect of monthly wages and lump sum reimbursements for certain groups of people; and (c) the source of funds, which is either the State budget or a municipal budget (general government budget), or expenses paid by an employer; this factor also has an impact on the direction of rounding of a particular amount. 18 It should be noted that rounding of certain monetary amounts in whole Slovak korunas up or down to 10 cent is recognised pursuant to the Law No 461/2003 Coll. on social insurance, which has already been adopted. 19 For rounding up or down to the nearest euro, see also the provision proposed pursuant to Point 1 of Section III of the second draft law,

text: Article 113(8)

text: in Section I of the third draft law and the provision proposed pursuant to Point 25 of Section III of the first draft law. 20 For rounding up or down to 50 cent see also the provisions proposed pursuant to Point 15 of Section I and Point 18 of Section I of the fourth draft law, and

text: Article 137(3)

text: in Section I of the third draft law. 21 For rounding up or down to the nearest cent see also the provisions proposed pursuant to Point 2 of Section IV and Point 4 of Section VI of the second draft law, Point 5 of Section I of the sixth draft law and Point 43 of Section I of the fifth draft law. 22 As stated in paragraph 25 of

text: Case C-359/05

text: Estager v Receveur principal de la recette des douanes de Brive [2007] ECR I-00581 ‘The principle of the continuity of legal instruments and the objective that the transition to the euro should be neutral apply to the “terms” or to the “wording” of the “legal instruments” within the meaning of Regulations No 1103/97 and No 974/98’. 23 It applies not only to legislative acts, but also to implementing measures or other legal instruments, e.g. collective agreements governing the issue of rounding of certain monetary amounts up or down to more than one cent. See for

text: example the provision proposed pursuant to Point 9 of Section I of the second draft law, which states that ‘Paid out wages shall be rounded up to the nearest euro cent unless the collective agreement or employer in an internal implementing regulation provide for more favourable arrangements for employees with regard to rounding of wages’. 24 The Court held in Estager that ‘

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 1103/97

text: … and

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 974/98

text: … must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which, on effecting the conversion into euros of an amount … raised it to an amount higher than that which would have resulted from application of the rules of conversion provided for in those regulations, unless such an increase meets the requirements of legal certainty and transparency guaranteed by those regulations, which presupposes that the legislative texts at issue make it possible to distinguish clearly the decision of the authorities of a Member State to increase that amount from the operation of conversion of that amount into euros.’ See also paragraphs 34, 35 and 37 of the judgment in Estager. 25 See paragraph 4 of ECB Opinion

publisher: Europeiska centralbanken

sprak: en

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 2 September 2008 at the request of the Slovak Ministry of Defence and of the Slovak Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family on draft laws laying down further detailed rules on the euro changeover falling within their field of competence (CON/2008/40)

serie: con

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 2 September 2008 at the request of the Slovak Ministry of Defence and of the Slovak Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family on draft laws laying down further detailed rules on the euro changeover falling within their field of competence (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

type: rubrik

text: On 28 July 2008 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Slovak Ministry of Defence for an opinion on a draft law amending certain laws in the field of defence in relation to the euro introduction (hereinafter the ‘first draft law’) and on 30 July 2008 the ECB received a request from the Slovak Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family on a draft law amending certain laws in the field of its competence in relation to the euro introduction (hereinafter the ‘second draft law’) , a draft law on civil service and on amendments to certain laws (hereinafter the ‘third draft law’) , a draft law amending the Law No 533/2003 Coll. on remuneration of certain employees performing work in the public interest and on amendments to certain laws (hereinafter the ‘fourth draft law’) , a draft law amending the Law No 283/2002 Coll. on reimbursement of travel expenses (hereinafter the ‘fifth draft law’), a draft law amending the Law No 599/2003 Coll. on assistance in material need and on amendments to certain laws, and amending the Law No 453/2003 Coll. on state administration bodies in the field of social affairs, family and employment services and on amendments to certain laws (hereinafter the ‘sixth draft law’) and a draft law on child care allowance and on amendments to certain laws (hereinafter the ‘seventh draft law’).

type: stycke

text: The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Article 105(4) of the Treaty establishing the European Community and the first and second indents of

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft laws relate to currency matters and means of payment. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft laws

text: The purpose of the draft laws is to facilitate the smooth euro changeover in Slovakia. All of them provide for technical details concerning the introduction of the euro and specific provisions relate to conversion and rounding of certain amounts and to foreign exchange rates. As specific legislative measures, all of the draft laws should be in accordance with the general legal framework established by the Law No 659/2007 Coll. on the introduction of the euro in Slovakia and on amendments to certain laws (hereinafter the ‘Slovak Euro-Law’).

text: 2. General observations

text: The Slovak authorities have already consulted the ECB on issues relating to the euro changeover. The ECB would therefore like to concentrate in this opinion on issues that were not addressed in its previous opinions and which are also significant for other Slovak authorities with regard to draft legislative provisions on the introduction of the euro falling within their competence and currently submitted to the legislative process in Slovakia . Among these issues, the following should be highlighted: (i) specific aspects of conversion and rounding of certain amounts in relation to the principle of neutrality; (ii) foreign exchange reference rates.

text: 3. Specific observations on the first draft law

text: Foreign exchange reference rates

text: 3.1 The general provisions establishing the system for setting and publishing foreign exchange rates are laid down in Article 17(2) of the Slovak Euro-Law and in new Articles

text: and

text: ab(6) of the Law on Národná banka Slovenska . This system applies from the date of introduction of the euro in Slovakia, after which: (i) the respective exchange rates between the euro and other currencies are set and published by the ECB; and (ii) other relevant exchange rates between the euro and other currencies are set and published by Národná banka Slovenska in the event the ECB does not set and publish the rates for such currencies, unless otherwise agreed by the parties to the respective legal relationship or provided for in a separate legal act. The provision proposed pursuant to Point 22 in Section III of the first draft law states that: ‘[…] if the prepayment was made in a currency other than euro, the exchange rate for such currency published by Národná banka Slovenska on the first day of the month in which the prepayment is deducted shall be used.’ This provision should be aligned with the abovementioned provisions of the Slovak Euro-Law in order to recognise the role of the ECB and the Council of the European Union in the field of exchange rate policy in accordance with Article 111 of the Treaty and Article 12.1 of the Statute.

text: Rounding rules and principle of neutrality

text: Article 7 of Council Regulation (EC) No 974/98 of 3 May 1998

text: on the introduction of the euro lays down the principle that ‘The substitution of the euro for the currency of each participating Member State shall not in itself have the effect of altering the denomination of legal instruments in existence on the date of substitution’ (hereinafter the ‘principle of neutrality’). Moreover, pursuant to

text: Article 5 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1103/97 of 17 June 1997

text: on certain provisions relating to the introduction of the euro , any monetary amount to be paid or accounted for must be rounded up or down to the nearest cent. This provision is reflected in the first and second sentences of Article 2(3) of the Slovak Euro-Law . The last sentence of Article 2(3) of the Slovak Euro-Law introduced the rule ‘in favour of citizens’, thereby allowing the national legislator to deviate from the general legal framework for the euro changeover by adopting a specific law in relation to the

text: rounding up or down of amounts to be paid or accounted for depending on whether such amounts

text: are income or expenditure of the State budget . Moreover, in line with existing rules and

text: practices for rounding of such amounts in Slovak legislation, the respective amounts were

text: rounded up or down to 50 haliers, to the nearest Slovak koruna, and to the nearest SKK 10, 100 or

text: 300, etc. As a consequence of the application of these rules and practices, the amounts to be paid or

text: accounted for as stated in all the draft laws , e.g. in the provisions proposed pursuant to Point 5 of

text: Section II of the first draft law , Point 5 of Section I of the second draft law, Point 14 of Section I

text: of the fourth draft law , Point 5 of Section I of the sixth draft law and Point 17 of Section III of

text: the first draft law, are rounded up or down to the nearest cent, to the nearest 10 or 50 cent, to the

text: nearest euro or to the nearest EUR 10. Furthermore, amounts are rounded inconsistently, even in

text: the case of the same type or category of amount.

text: The ECB would like to point out that the rounding of amounts to be paid or accounted for up or

text: down to more than one cent is not per se in accordance with Article 5 of Regulation

text: (EC) No 1103/97

text: and

text: Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 974/98

text: . Nevertheless, the principle of

text: neutrality must not prevent the national legislator from using its sovereign powers when

text: expressing monetary amounts such as fines, fees, minimum capital, taxes, allowances, salaries, etc.

text: in legislative provisions.

text: Accordingly, the national legislator remains free to legislate on the increase or decrease of any

text: monetary amounts while addressing euro changeover matters. In doing so, however, it is bound to

text: act in accordance with the principles of legal certainty and transparency, i.e. it must ensure that

text: economic agents are able to make a clear distinction between a decision of the Member State’s

text: authorities to increase or decrease any amount and the process of converting that amount into euro and rounding it . The national legislator is therefore obliged to act in accordance with the abovementioned principles when applying the provisions of the Slovak Euro-Law which permit certain amounts to be rounded up ‘in favour of citizens’. Finally, in the light of its Opinion

text: , the ECB would also like to emphasise that the same rounding method and a consistent approach should be used in draft legislative provisions for monetary amounts of a comparable type and/or category.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 2 September 2008.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET

type: vagledning

utgivare: ecb


text: In the context of this opinion, the question of the legal quality of the term ‘authorise’ (i.e. whether the OeNB has discretion in deciding whether and/or how many SDRs it would transfer or whether it could also decide not to transfer any SDRs) is not considered any further.

text: Article 101 of the Treaty prohibits overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facility with the ECB or the NCBs of Member States in favour of Community institutions or bodies, central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of Member States and the purchase directly from these public sector entities by the ECB or NCBs of debt instruments.

text: OJ L 332, 31.12.1993, p. 1. Recital 9 to

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93

text: provides that, notwithstanding the role assigned to the Commission pursuant to Article 169 of the Treaty, it is for the ECB, pursuant to

text: Article 109

text: f(9) (now

text: Article 117(9)

text: ) and

text: Article 180

text: (now

text: Article 237

text: ) of the Treaty, to ensure that NCBs honour the obligations laid down in the Treaty. 5 ECB Opinion

text: of 11 August 2005 at the request of the Austrian Federal Ministry of Finance concerning a draft Federal law on the payment of a contribution by Austria to the trust fund administered by the International Monetary Fund for low income developing countries affected by natural disasters.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 9 September 2008 at the request of the Austrian Federal Ministry of Finance on a draft Federal law providing for an Austrian contribution to the HIPC-Trust Fund for Liberia’s debt relief (CON/2008/41)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 9 September 2008 at the request of the Austrian Federal Ministry of Finance on a draft Federal law providing for an Austrian contribution to the HIPC-Trust Fund for Liberia’s debt relief (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 28 July 2008, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Austrian Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft Federal law providing for an Austrian contribution to the HIPC-Trust Fund for Liberia’s debt relief (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Article 105(4) of the Treaty establishing the European Community and the third indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law contains provisions concerning a national central bank (NCB). In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 Pursuant to Article 1 of the draft law, the Oesterreichische Nationalbank (OeNB) is authorised in the process of debt clearance for Liberia to transfer 4.8 million Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) as an Austrian contribution to the trust funds of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC). 1.2 The explanatory memorandum accompanying the draft law states that the IMF has lifted the suspension of Liberia’s membership, which had been imposed due to arrears of payments. As a precondition for lifting the suspension, and since the IMF was not in a position to advance the loan directly, IMF member countries agreed to provide a temporary IMF loan to Liberia to enable it to pay off its old IMF loans and thereby resume full IMF membership. By 11 March 2008, 102 IMF member countries had promised contributions totalling 547.2 million SDRs. It is understood that, from a procedural point of view, the next step will be actually to grant Liberia the debt relief provided that it satisfies certain conditions. 1 OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: 1.3 The ECB understands from the explanatory memorandum to the draft law that the OeNB, after the proportionate transfer of the relevant Special Contingent Account – 1 (SCA-1) funds and the proportionate transfer of outstanding charges, is authorised to retransfer these to the Liberia Administered Account established for Liberian debt clearance or the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF)-HIPC trust fund. The SCA-1 is a sub-account of the General Resources Account, which is remunerated by creditors and recipient countries in the context of the Burden Sharing Mechanism. The SCA-1 resources are repayable funds which can be repaid to the member countries following a resolution of the IMF (as has happened in this case), or following cancellation of all arrears due to the IMF. This is intended to ensure that in the event of a debtor country becoming unable to pay, the IMF is in a position to settle the claims of donor countries. The outstanding deferred charges were borne proportionally by creditor and debtor countries in the course of a burden sharing mechanism. After repayment of the debts and accrued charges, they are repaid automatically to the countries participating in this process. 1.4 From the explanatory memorandum the ECB also understands that, thereafter, a transfer to the Liberia administered account or the HIPC-Trust Fund takes place on the basis of the proposal made by the G-8 countries and accepted by the IMF relevant decision-making bodies, to the effect that all member countries which regularly appear in the financial transactions plan should participate in the debt clearance. The financial transactions plan is an integral part of IMF lending. The IMF makes its loans either directly in the form of SDRs or in foreign currency. In the second case, the quota position of the donor countries decreases and their claim against the IMF rises. 1.5 The explanatory memorandum states that Austria agreed to make a contribution of 4.8 million SDRs (EUR 5.025 million) to the financing package. It also states that the cancellation of Liberia’s IMF debts will reduce the OeNB’s income and that, as a result, lower funds will be transferred to the Ministry of Finance.

text: 2. Specific observations

text: 2.1 The ECB is of the view that an NCB’s involvement in financing the IMF’s PRGF and PRGF-HIPC Trusts reduces what is in principle government expenditure on development aid, and that the NCB effects this reduction by performing an immediate transfer of funds in lieu of the government. In the present case, the explanatory memorandum states that the participation envisaged by the draft law in respect of Liberia would increase the level of Austria’s multilateral official development assistance payments. In view of the involvement of the OeNB in this development assistance, the ECB notes that it is necessary to ascertain whether the draft law complies with the prohibition on monetary financing laid down in Article 101 of the Treaty and Council Regulation (EC)

text: No 3603/93 of 13 December 1993 specifying definitions for the application of the prohibitions referred to in Articles

text: and

text: b(1) of the Treaty . 2.2 The draft law covers a situation which is in substance similar to that covered by the Federal Law on the payment of a contribution by Austria to the trust fund administered by the International Monetary Fund for low income developing countries affected by natural disasters, on which the Ministry of Finance consulted the ECB in 2005. In its Opinion , the ECB took the view that the OeNB’s financing of the relevant IMF-administered initiative fell within the scope of the exemption provided for in

text: Article 7 of Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93

text: . This exemption relates to the financing by NCBs of obligations falling upon the public sector vis-à-vis the IMF, which are not to be regarded as credit facilities prohibited by Article 101 of the Treaty. Consequently, in this case the ECB considers that the OeNB’s financing of the Austrian contribution to the HIPC-Trust Fund for Liberia’s debt relief, as provided for in the draft law, falls within the scope of the same exemption and should not therefore be regarded as a form of monetary financing prohibited by the Treaty.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 9 September 2008.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: ECB Opinion

text: of 15 April 2008 at the request of the Luxembourg Minister for the Treasury and the Budget on a draft law improving the legislative framework for Luxembourg as a financial centre and on a draft law relating to social insurance contributions.

text: See paragraphs 4.1 to 4.5 of Opinion

text: . 4 OJ L 250, 2.10.2003, p. 10.

text: OJ L 318, 27.11.1998, p. 1.

text: See in particular paragraph 4 of Opinion

text: See paragraph 7 of ECB Opinion

text: of 25 May 2001 at the request of the Austrian Ministry of Finance on a draft Federal law establishing and organising the financial market supervisory authority [title shortened]; paragraph 2.2. of ECB Opinion

text: of 1 September 2008 at the request of the Polish Minister for Finance on a draft law on the Financial Stability Committee.

text: See paragraph 3.2 of Opinion

text: In particular,

text: Articles 44

text: to 52 of Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions (recast) (OJ L 177, 30.6.2006, p. 1);

text: Article 13 of Council Regulation (EC) No 322/97 of 17 February 1997

text: on Community Statistics (OJ L 52, 22.2.1997, p. 1);

text: Article 8 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2533/98 of 23 November 1998

text: concerning the collection of statistical information by the European Central Bank (OJ L 318, 27.11.1998, p. 8); and Article 3 of Council Regulation (Euratom, EEC) No 1588/90 of 11 June 1990 on the transmission of data subject to statistical confidentiality to the Statistical Office of the European Communities (OJ L 151, 15.6.1990, p. 1); Guideline ECB/1998/NP28 of 22 December 1998 concerning the common rules and minimum standards to protect the confidentiality of the individual statistical information collected by the European Central Bank assisted by the national central banks (OJ L 55, 24.2.2001, p. 72).

text: See paragraph 2 of the explanatory memorandum.

text: The text of the MoU is available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: See page 4 of the explanatory memorandum.

text: See proposed Article

text: See the ECB’s 1999 Annual Report, p. 99 and the ECB’s December 2006 Financial Stability Review, p. 17 available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: See the ECB’s May 2006 Convergence Report, p. 68; the December 2006 Convergence Report, p. 30; the May 2007 Convergence Report, p. 22 and the May 2008 Convergence Report, p. 24, which are available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: See paragraph 4 of the explanatory memorandum.

text: See p. 240 of the ECB’s May 2008 Convergence Report on Article 14 of the Law LVIII of 2001 on the Magyar Nemzeti Bank.

text: Alternatively a reference to the same level of independence as provided for in Article 108 of the Treaty could be considered.

text: See Article 26-1 of the BCL Law, as introduced by the Article V(6) of the draft law.

text: See paragraph 3 of the explanatory memorandum.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 10 September 2008 at the request of the Banque centrale du Luxembourg on amendments to the draft law improving the legislative framework for Luxembourg as a financial centre and amending the Law of 23 December 1998 on monetary status and on the Banque centrale du Luxembourg (CON/2008/42)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 10 September 2008 at the request of the Banque centrale du Luxembourg on amendments to the draft law improving the legislative framework for Luxembourg as a financial centre and amending the Law of 23 December 1998 on monetary status and on the Banque centrale du Luxembourg (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 24 July 2008 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Governor of the Banque Central du Luxembourg (BCL) for an opinion on amendments (hereinafter the ‘draft amendments’) proposed by the Government to the draft law (hereinafter the ‘draft law’) improving the legislative framework for Luxembourg as a financial centre and amending the provisions on covered bonds in the Law of 5 April 1993 on the financial sector, the Law of 15 June 2004 on the company investing in risk capital, the Law of 23 December 1998 creating a commission in charge of prudential supervision of the financial sector and the Law of 23 December 1998 on monetary status and on the Banque centrale du Luxembourg (hereinafter the ‘BCL Law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Article 105(4) of the Treaty establishing the European Community and the third and sixth indents of

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to the BCL and rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The ECB commented on the draft law in its Opinion

text: . The draft amendments take into account some of the ECB’s comments and introduce certain new elements aimed at reinforcing the framework for financial supervision and clarifying issues related to financial stability.

text: 1.2 The draft law introduces, inter alia, the following amendments to the BCL Law: (i) it clarifies the method to be used by the BCL to implement the minimum reserve requirements; (ii) to reinforce financial stability, the draft law: (a) sets out that the BCL will supervise the general liquidity situation on the markets as well as evaluate market operators for this purpose; (b) establishes that the BCL will cooperate at the national and international level with a view to ensuring financial stability; and (c) assigns to the BCL the power to grant, in exceptional circumstances, short-term liquidity assistance to its counterparts, also on the basis of a State guarantee provided to the BCL; (iii) it provides the legal basis for the BCL’s participation in public institutions, undertakings or public or private associations.

text: 2. General observations

text: A number of the draft amendments are proposed in response to recommendations made by the ECB in Opinion

text: , in particular those relating to minimum reserve requirements. However, a number of the ECB’s recommendations, in particular with respect to the BCL’s regulatory powers , have not yet been taken into account. Therefore, the ECB would like to reiterate the comments made in Opinion

text: and also presents a number of new issues raised by the draft amendments. This opinion concentrates on the aspects of the draft law concerning the BCL and its powers.

text: 3. Minimum reserve requirements

text: 3.1 Under the proposed amendments, Article 23 of the BCL Law will provide that ‘the Central Bank shall be the depository for amounts that credit institutions are obliged to maintain by monetary control measures based on Article 19 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank’ (hereinafter the ‘ESCB Statute’). 3.2 The ECB welcomes that the scope of application of this provision has been restricted ratione personae, i.e. to individual credit institutions, instead of to ‘professionals of the financial sector’ and ratione materiae with an exclusive reference to Article 19 of the ESCB Statute, as recommended in Opinion

text: . This national provision is without prejudice to the direct application of Article 19.1 of the ESCB Statute, Article 2 of Regulation ECB/2003/9 of 12 December 2003 on the application of minimum reserves and

text: Article 2 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2531/98 of 23 November 1998

text: concerning the application of minimum reserves by the European Central Bank .

text: 4. The BCL’s financial stability function

text: 4.1 The ECB notes that under the draft amendments, certain new provisions will be included in the BCL Law, under which the BCL will be assigned specific competences in the area of financial

text: stability, and in particular it will have the power to supervise liquidity management in the markets, engage in institutional cooperation and provide emergency liquidity assistance to the BCL’s counterparts. The assignment of such new competences is welcome, as it will facilitate the BCL’s effective performance of its financial stability role. In order to assist the BCL in fulfilling this new role, the ECB would like to make the following points. Adaptations of the BCL Law in order to strengthen the BCL’s financial stability role 4.2 It is important to stress the strong interdependencies between the BCL’s new and current competences. As highlighted in the explanatory memorandum, it is important to supervise liquidity given the BCL’s role in the provision of liquidity in both normal and crisis situations. In practice, to properly discharge its new competences, the BCL should be able to leverage its existing powers, both regulatory and statistical. However, the draft amendments falls short of acknowledging an explicit and formal financial stability task for the BCL, encompassing the broad range of central bank contributions to financial stability by monitoring, assessing and effectively supporting, by means of emergency liquidity assistance, the financial system in Luxembourg. Therefore, the ECB recommends that Article 2(5) of the BCL Law should be amended to expressly list all the BCL’s tasks, including the task of contributing to financial stability . This would allow the BCL to collect statistical information in the context of financial stability. In this latter respect, as the institutional structure of financial corporations is becoming increasingly complex, the scope of information and data extends to the financial corporations sector as a whole, which includes credit institutions, insurance companies and special purpose vehicles for securitisation activities. The ECB wishes nevertheless to stress, in line with its previous opinions , that information collection and sharing in the area of financial stability should be consistent with Community law regulating the exchange of supervisory and statistical information and professional secrecy , as well as with the BCL Law. In this regard, the ECB would like to remind the consulting authority of its recommendations in Opinion

text: that regulatory powers include the enforcement of ECB legal acts, particularly in the collection, compilation and reporting of statistical data.

text: Central bank supervision of liquidity management

text: 4.3 Under the draft amendments, the BCL will be responsible for ‘supervising the general liquidity situation on the markets as well as evaluating market operators for this purpose’. The draft amendments refer to a ‘coordination and cooperation procedure’ for performing this task, subject to agreements between the BCL and the Commission de surveillance du secteur financier (CSSF, Commission for the supervision of the financial sector) and the Commissariat aux assurances (Commision for insurance), which will be in accordance with the parties’ legal powers . In general, the ECB has consistently favoured the involvement of central banks in prudential supervision to support the Eurosystem’s task of contributing to the adequate monitoring of risks to financial stability in the euro area. This is of particular importance in a context in which the nature and scope of these risks are affected by the introduction of the euro and the enhanced integration of financial markets. In this respect, adequate access of central banks to prudential information and cooperation between financial supervisory authorities and central banks are essential. Furthermore, the recent market turmoil has confirmed the importance of liquidity supervision over financial institutions and, in particular, the central banks’ interest in banks’ liquidity risk management. 4.4 As emphasised by work in progress at EU level, central banks have to place a strong emphasis on the prevention of systemic liquidity crises, as in general, they rely on open market operations to implement their monetary policy decisions and to distribute liquidity to the financial system and thereby to the real economy. Banks’ liquidity risk management is an important issue for central banks because liquidity shocks at one bank can have knock-on effects and could disrupt the efficiency and stability of the money market in three ways. First, due to asymmetric information, a liquidity crisis at one bank can lead to increasing uncertainty in the wholesale and retail markets with respect to the liquidity situation of other banks, which in severe cases could lead to a drying-up of money market liquidity and/or to a bank run. In less severe cases, it could raise refinancing costs for other banks and increase uncertainty with respect to future cash-flows and market conditions, which would exacerbate liquidity management. Second, the large and increasing share of interbank exposures and money market instruments in banks’ funding can cause a knock-on effect, as liquidity problems at one bank directly translate into increasing liquidity pressure (e.g. due to reductions in cash-inflows and unexpected refinancing requirements) on its interbank counterparties. Third, asset fire sales can lead to a market meltdown under certain circumstances, which in turn decreases the counterbalancing capacity of all banks and consequently, their liquidity risk-bearing capacity. In the potential emergence of a liquidity crisis, central banks need to assess the scale of the liquidity problem and the potential systemic implications of liquidity stress. In order to make informed judgements, they need reliable, comparable and comprehensive information in a timely manner.

text: 4.5 Against this background, the ECB welcomes the attribution to the BCL of specific liquidity management competences. Moreover, the ECB notes that the draft law should clarify the powers assigned to the BCL in order to fulfil the new competences, such as the possibility to collect information from supervised entities and to perform on-site inspections. The ECB underlines that it will be very important that the cooperation procedure, which according to the BCL Law will have to be agreed by the BCL and national supervisory authorities, be carefully designed to allow the efficient performance by each authority of its own responsibilities, without unnecessarily increasing the administrative burden imposed on financial operators. 4.6 The ECB also recommends including a provision in the BCL Law setting out the principles according to which costs related to supervisory tasks will be covered, without prejudice to the principle of financial independence.

text: Clarification of the BCL’s institutional framework

text: 4.7 The proposed Article 2(5) of the BCL Law states that ‘in view of its tasks relating to monetary policy and to the promotion of the smooth functioning of payment systems, as well as contributing to the good management of policies implemented by authorities concerning prudential supervision of credit institutions and the financial system’s stability, while respecting its independence and the parties’ legal powers, the Bank shall cooperate with the Government and with prudential supervision authorities at national level, as well as with other central banks at the Community and international level to contribute to ensuring financial stability, in particular 11 12 within committees set up for this purpose’ . As set out in the explanatory memorandum , this provision is aimed at implementing the ‘Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation between the financial supervisory authorities, central banks and finance ministries of the European Union on cross-border financial stability’ of 1 June 2008 (hereinafter the ‘MoU’) . 4.8 As regards cooperation under the proposed Article 2(5) of the BCL Law, the ECB understands that the Government intentionally repeats the relevant Treaty provision in order to underline the importance of cooperation between all authorities involved at the national, Community and international level, in order to avoid a financial crisis endangering financial system stability . However, when considering this provision in the broader context of Article 2 of the BCL Law (‘tasks and legal status of the BCL’), there is an imbalance between proposed Article 2(5) of the BCL Law, which lists all of the BCL’s tasks (including its contribution to financial stability) and Article 2(2) of the BCL Law, which simply states that ‘the main task of the BCL shall be to participate in the execution of the tasks of the ESCB with a view to achieving its objectives’. In addition, restricting national, Community and international cooperation to financial stability issues is inaccurate, given that such cooperation is relevant to all ESCB tasks. For the sake of clarity, the BCL’s tasks, including contributing to financial stability as set out in this opinion,

text: should be listed in Article 2(2) of the BCL Law. As to proposed Article 2(5) of the BCL Law, for the sake of accuracy, a distinction should be drawn between domestic cooperation, which could focus on financial stability, in respect of the parties’s respective legal powers and independence and Community and international cooperation, which would encompass all of the BCL’s tasks, including contributing to financial stability.

text: Provision of emergency liquidity assistance

text: 4.9 The proposed Article 27-2 of the BCL Law provides that ‘The Central Bank may in exceptional circumstances grant short-term loans to its counterparties while respecting its independence and the provisions prohibiting monetary financing. It shall grant loans on the basis of adequate collateral which may consist of a State guarantee under the conditions previously agreed between the State and the Central Bank. The Central Bank’s privilege in Article

text: shall apply to ’15 these loans . 4.10 As regards the provision of emergency liquidity assistance, while it has no objection to support given by central banks in exceptional circumstances and on a case-by-case basis to temporarily illiquid credit institutions , it is the ECB’s view that ‘national legislation foreseeing the financing by NCBs of credit institutions other than in connection with central banking tasks (such as monetary policy, payment systems or temporary liquidity support operations), in particular to support insolvent credit and/or other financial institutions, is incompatible with the monetary financing prohibition’ . 4.11 In view of the above, the ECB strongly welcomes the draft law, which establishes the legal basis for the possible extension of emergency liquidity assistance by the BCL in the form of short-term loans extended to its counterparts, while at the same time providing for appropriate legal safeguards of central bank independence and compliance with the monetary financing prohibition under Article 101 of the Treaty . As regards this latter aspect, the ECB notes that the concrete formulation of certain elements of the draft provision needs to be clarified so that full compliance of the proposed Article 27-2 of the BCL Law with the monetary financing prohibition is achieved. First, instead of a general reference to the concept of monetary financing, the proposed provision should be drafted more precisely to refer explicitly to the prohibition on monetary financing as defined by Community law or directly to Article 101 of the Treaty . Second, the part of the proposed provision allowing for State guarantees to be used as collateral in connection with emergency liquidity assistance should be complemented by the requirement that the supported credit institution remains solvent. Third, the proposed provision should unequivocally

text: ensure the independence of the BCL in deciding on the extension of emergency liquidity assistance. To this end, when referring to the BCL’s independence, the proposed provision should stipulate that the same scope of independence is assigned to the BCL as regards the extension of emergency liquidity assistance as is available under Article 5(2) of the BCL Law with respect to the performance by the BCL of its ESCB-related tasks . The ECB considers, in particular, that ensuring the full independence of the BCL in deciding on the extension of emergency liquidity assistance will establish appropriate conditions for the possible acceptance by the BCL of a State guarantee in connection with such extended emergency liquidity assistance. In deciding whether a State guarantee may be accepted, the central bank should, in particular, assess whether the guarantee is economically adequate for emergency liquidity assistance purposes as well as legally valid and enforceable under national law.

text: 5. Central bank participation in public institutions, undertakings or public or private associations

text: 5.1 Under the proposed Article 26-1 of the BCL Law, ‘the Central Bank may take and dispose of participation in public institutions, undertakings or public or private associations . The explanatory memorandum states that this amendment provides the legal basis for the BCL’s participation in external organisations. The explanatory memorandum notes in this context that the BCL currently participates in the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), the Groupement d’intérêt économique pour la promotion et la gestion des systèmes de paiement au Luxembourg (SYPAL-Gie) and the Financial Technology Transfer Agency (ATTF) and may participate in future Eurosystem activities . 5.2 The ECB notes with interest the abovementioned provision as an element which could further facilitate the evolution of the financial market infrastructure in Luxembourg, its integration within the European environment and further market harmonisation.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 10 September 2008.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 2 Law on the incompatibility of holding public office with the pursuit of gainful activities, adopted on 10 February 2006, published in Uradni list Republike Slovenije (Official Gazette) No 20/2006. 3 Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slovenia, No U-I-57/06 of 29 March 2007, published in the Official Gazette No 33/2007.

text: Published in the Official Gazette Nos 58/02, 85/02 and 39/06. The relevant provisions of the Law on Banka Slovenije were aligned with Article 14.2 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter the ‘ESCB Statute’), following ECB Opinion

text: of 13 March 2006 at the request of the Slovenian Ministry of Finance on a draft law amending the Law on Banka Slovenije. 5 Memorandum of Understanding on a Code of Conduct for the members of the Governing Council (OJ C 123, 24.5.2002, p. 9), as amended by the Memorandum of Understanding amending the Memorandum of Understanding on a Code of Conduct for the members of the Governing Council (OJ C 10, 16.1.2007, p. 6).

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 17 September 2008 at the request of the Slovenian Ministry of Public Administration on a draft law on restrictions and prohibitions for public office holders (CON/2008/43)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 17 September 2008 at the request of the Slovenian Ministry of Public Administration on a draft law on restrictions and prohibitions for public office holders (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 14 July 2008 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Slovenian Ministry of Public Administration for an opinion on a draft law on restrictions and prohibitions for public office holders (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Article 105(4) of the Treaty establishing the European Community and the third indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to Banka Slovenije. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The draft law falls within the regulatory framework for the prevention of corruption in Slovenia and regulates: (i) restrictions on officials regarding the pursuit of gainful activities; (ii) restrictions on officials regarding the acceptance of gifts in connection with discharging their office; (iii) the conduct of business by companies and other entities with the public sector in cases where officials are connected with both parties; and (iv) the duty of officials to declare information on their wealth and the disclosure of such information. 1.2 The purpose of the draft law, as stated in its explanatory memorandum, is to bring the Law on the incompatibility of holding public office with the pursuit of gainful activities in line with the 2 3 Slovenian Constitution , following a decision by the Slovenian Constitutional Court . Accordingly, the draft law, which otherwise reflects the basic contents of the abovementioned Law, assigns the role of supervising compliance with a large part of its provisions to the Court of Audit, an independent state body, and limits the public disclosure of personal data. In addition, pursuant to

text: the draft law, the Court of Audit would be able to review the financial and other operations of officials and notify the competent authorities of its findings.

text: 2. General observations

text: The ECB welcomes this consultation by the Ministry of Public Administration. As the term ‘officials’, which is used for public office holders and is further defined for the purposes of the draft law, explicitly includes the Governor of Banka Slovenije and other high-ranking officials of Banka Slovenije (

text: Article 2(1)

text: ), the draft law should therefore be assessed from the perspective of compatibility with the principle of personal independence of the Governor and of other members of the Governing Board of Banka Slovenije.

text: 3. Applicability of the draft law to members of the Governing Board of Banka Slovenije

text: 3.1 Incompatibility of functions Under Article 1(2) of the draft law, the restrictions imposed regarding the acceptance of gifts and the pursuit of gainful activities do not apply to those categories of officials for whom these issues are regulated by other laws. The issue of gainful activities pursued by members of the Governing Board of Banka Slovenije, including an ultimate sanction (removal from office) in the case of incompatibility of functions, is regulated by the Law on Banka Slovenije (Articles

text: and

text: ). Therefore, the provisions of Article 8 of the draft law governing dismissal of officials who pursue gainful activities do not apply to members of the Governing Board of Banka Slovenije and compliance with the principle of personal independence as laid down in Article 14.2 of the ESCB Statute should not be jeopardised by the relevant provisions of the draft law. 3.2 Acceptance of gifts The provisions of the draft law restricting acceptance of gifts by public office holders are similar to the requirements laid down in the Code of Conduct for the members of the Governing Council (hereinafter the ‘Code of Conduct’), regarding which a declaration of compliance has also been signed by the Governor of Banka Slovenije. Although the restrictions in the draft law are to a certain extent stricter than the corresponding provision in Article 3.3 of the Code of Conduct (regarding maximum value, form of gift and applicability of the provisions to officials’ family members), they follow the same basic principles as stated in Article 2 of the Code of Conduct, while public disclosure of gifts received also serves the principle of transparency.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 17 September 2008. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: See Section 5 of the draft law. 11 See definition of the ‘draft legislative provisions’ under

text: Article 1(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: together with the sixth indent of Article 2(1) of this Council Decision.

text: See Article 1 of the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure, annexed to the Treaty.

text: See Section 2(3) of the draft law. 18 For example, ‘State guarantees … used as collateral in connection with emergency liquidity assistance’ are subject to ‘the requirement that the supported credit institution remains solvent.’ See paragraph 4.11 of ECB Opinion

text: of 10 September 2008 at the request of the Banque centrale du Luxembourg on amendments to the draft law improving the legislative framework for Luxembourg as a financial centre and amending the Law of 23 December 1998 on monetary status and on the Banque centrale du Luxembourg. 19 See Article 108 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the ESCB Statute.

text: See paragraph 8 of ECB Opinion

text: of 23 December 2005 at the request of the Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance on an amendment to the draft law on the protection of savings concerning the Banca d’Italia. 22 See paragraph 4 of ECB Opinion

text: of 18 June 2007 at the request of the Italian Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance on a draft law on the regulation and supervision of markets and the functioning of the competent independent authorities. 23 Section 7(1)(a) of the draft law. 24 Section 7(7) of the draft law. 25 See paragraph 3(3), last sentence of ECB Opinion

text: of 3 November 2006 at the request of the Italian Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance on a draft legislative decree exercising powers delegated under the Law on the protection of savings. 26 See paragraph 8, second sentence of ECB Opinion

text: of 23 December 2005 at the request of the Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance on an amendment to the draft law on the protection of savings concerning the Banca d’Italia. 27 See paragraph 3(3), second sentence of ECB Opinion

text: of 3 November 2006 at the request of the Italian Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance on a draft legislative decree exercising powers delegated under the Law on the protection of savings. 28 See paragraph 8, last sentence of ECB Opinion

text: As published on the ECB website, www.ecb.europa.eu.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 3 October 2008 at the request of the Irish Minister for Finance on a draft Credit Institutions (Financial Support) Bill 2008 (CON/2008/44)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 3 October 2008 at the request of the Irish Minister for Finance on a draft Credit Institutions (Financial Support) Bill 2008 (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 1 October 2008 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Irish Minister for Finance for an opinion on a draft Credit Institutions (Financial Support) Bill 2008 (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Article 105(4) of the Treaty establishing the European Community and the third and sixth indents of

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to a national central bank (the Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland (hereinafter the ‘Central Bank’)) and contains rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The draft law provides that, as from 30 September 2008, the Minister for Finance (hereinafter the ‘Minister’) may provide financial support in respect of the borrowings, liabilities and obligations of any credit institution or subsidiary (including to the Central Bank or any person) which the Minister may specify by order where the Minister is of the opinion, after consulting the Governor of the Central Bank and the Irish Financial Services Regulatory Authority (the ‘Financial Regulator’), that there is a serious threat to the stability of credit institutions in Ireland generally . Such financial support may be provided in any form and manner and determined by the Minister and on such commercial or other terms and conditions as the Minister thinks fit. The draft law contains provisions to the effect that all financial support provided should be, as far as possible, ultimately recouped . The draft law also contains provisions authorising the Minister to purchase shares in a credit institution or subsidiary to which financial support is provided . All money to be

text: paid out may be paid out of Government funds . Financial support would not be provided beyond 29 September 2010 . 1.2 The draft law also provides that a notification of a merger or acquisition that involves a credit institution or subsidiary is required to be given to the Minister, and not to the Irish Competition Authority, in the case where the Minister is of the opinion that the proposed merger or acquisition is necessary to maintain the stability of the financial system in Ireland . The Governor of the Central Bank and the Competition Authority will provide advice, information and assistance to the Minister regarding this matter . The Minister may approve a merger or acquisition even if he is of the opinion that the result of the merger or acquisition will substantially lessen competition in markets for goods or services in Ireland but that the merger or acquisition is necessary for financial stability reasons .

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 On 30 September 2008 the Irish Government announced that it has decided to put in place with immediate effect a guarantee arrangement to safeguard all deposits (retail, commercial, institutional and interbank), covered bonds, senior debt and dated subordinated debt (lower tier II), with six explicitly named Irish credit institutions and such specific subsidiaries as may be approved by the Government following consultation with the Central Bank and the Financial Regulator. According to the announcement, this guarantee arrangement will cover all existing aforementioned facilities with these institutions on 29 September 2008 and any new facilities issued thereafter, and will expire on 28 September 2010. 2.2 The draft law is scheduled to be adopted under an accelerated parliamentary procedure, with the ECB consultation requested on an urgent basis. Many of the provisions of the draft law are general in nature and will be implemented by means of secondary legislation to be adopted by the Minister . This implementing legislation would, in the ECB’s understanding, contain draft legislative provisions that would flesh out the details of the draft law . Consequently, the ECB expects to be consulted on any proposed implementing legislation to be adopted under the draft law that materially influences the stability of financial institutions and markets. 2.3 As a general matter, the ECB wishes to underline the importance it attaches to ensuring that the draft law and subsequent implementing legislation fully comply with the relevant provisions of Community law, in particular as regards competition (including in the area of cross-border bank mergers and acquisitions) and State aid rules, as well as EU financial services legislation and the

text: single market principles. In this regard the ECB wants to point out that the measures announced by the Irish Government raise concerns as their restriction to specifically named banks under the concept of safeguarding the Irish financial system appears to provide preferential treatment to these banks. The ECB understands that the Commission will assess and express its opinion on the compatibility of specific measures included in the draft law with Community law. The ECB expects that the Commission’s opinion will be appropriately taken into account and reflected in the Irish legislative and regulatory framework adopted under the draft law. 2.4 As a further general comment, the ECB notes that the Irish authorities have opted for an individual response to the current financial situation and not sought to consult their EU partners. In view of the similarities of the causes and consequences of the current financial distress across EU Member States and the potential interdependencies of policy responses, it would have been advisable to properly consult other EU authorities on the envisaged legislative plans. 2.5 A further point relates to the risks to the Government’s budgetary position arising from any financial support to Irish credit institutions. While the ECB appreciates that any guarantees provided by the Minister under the draft law would be contingent in nature, given that the financial exposure of the Irish State under such guarantees is potentially very large, the Irish Government could be obliged to make significant payments in case these guarantees are called over the next two years. At a point in time when the Irish budgetary position is deteriorating and may risk exceeding the 3 % of GDP reference value for public deficits, as specified under Community law , this is a cause for concern, even when the provision of financial support would, under the draft law, as far as possible ultimately have to be recouped from the credit institution or subsidiary in question.

text: 3. Central bank independence and the monetary financing prohibition

text: 3.1 The draft law provides that the Minister may use the financial support powers in the public interest, provided that, in the Minister’s assessment, made after consulting the Governor of the Central Bank and the Regulatory Authority, the statutory conditions for the exercise of such powers are met. In the exercise of the financial support powers, the Minister may further consult with the Governor of the Central Bank and the Regulatory Authority . Other provisions directly affecting the Governor and the Central Bank include, inter alia: (i) the possibility for the supported credit institution or subsidiary to receive financial support as regards its borrowings, liabilities and obligations vis-à-vis the Central Bank ; (ii) the possibility for the Minister to require the supported credit institution to comply with the requirements ‘imposed by the Central Bank or equivalent authority’ ; and (iii) the consultative role which the Governor and the Central Bank are to have in the exercise of the Minister’s powers in relation to mergers and acquisitions in the banking sector .

text: 3.2 The ECB notes that the draft law specifies that nothing in its provisions prevents the performance by the Central Bank or the Regulatory Authority of its functions in relation to any credit institution . The ECB recommends that this provision is made more precise by including three additional stipulations, specifying that nothing in the draft law shall prejudice the: (i) performance by the Governor of his powers and functions with respect to the stability of the State’s financial system under the Central Bank Act 1942; (ii) performance of any other functions and powers conferred on the Governor by the Treaty and the ESCB Statute; and (iii) compliance by the Central Bank with the prohibition of monetary financing under Article 101 of the Treaty . In addition to reinforcing the Governor’s financial stability role at a national level, these clarifications would help to specify that the advice of the Governor is sought with due respect paid to the responsibilities and tasks assigned to the Governor and the Central Bank within the ECB and the Eurosystem, including the independence required of the Governor and the Central Bank under the Treaty and the ESCB Statute . 3.3 The draft law contains a provision exempting charges created by a credit institution in favour of the Minister, any agent of the Minister or the Central Bank from company law requirements relating to the registration of charges with the Irish Companies Registration Office . In the Central Bank’s Eurosystem credit operations, the Central Bank mobilises much collateral, including mortgage and other loan portfolios of bank counterparties, by means of a floating charge technique. Careful consideration would therefore need to be given to the implications of this provision in connection with the collateralisation of the Central Bank’s Eurosystem credit operations. The Central Bank’s current practice of disclosing its floating charges, together with any negative pledges contained therein, through public registration with the Companies Registration Office ensures that parties dealing with the Central Bank’s bank counterparties have notice of any floating charge or negative pledge. This in turn ensures that in any winding-up or a receivership of such a company or counterparty the Central Bank would, subject to the claims of certain preferential creditors (if any), take priority over all other claims, including claims based on charges created subsequent to the creation of the floating charge. The ECB would like to stress that the financial interests of the Central Bank and the Eurosystem have to be preserved, and would therefore recommend that this provision be amended accordingly.

text: 4. Banking mergers and acquisitions and financial stability

text: 4.1 The ECB has already taken the view in previous opinions on draft national legislation that ‘it is

text: appropriate to maintain a clear distinction between procedures leading to antitrust and banking

text: supervision decisions’ and that draft national laws should reflect in these circumstances ‘the

text: principle of allocating powers to authorities in accordance with their respective objectives’ . In the

text: present case, the above dual competence of the Minister for these banking mergers and the mere

text: consultative or advisory role conferred on the Governor and the Financial Regulator as well as on

text: the Competition Authority , would conflict with these principles.

text: 4.2 Moreover, the ECB has pointed out in previous opinions the need to find a balance between ‘the

text: potentially conflicting objectives of market competition and financial stability by introducing

text: safeguards similar to those which apply under Community law’ . While acknowledging that ‘cases

text: might occur in which a banking merger would be necessary on stability grounds, although it raises

text: concerns for its effects on competition’ , the ECB stressed that these cases should remain

text: ‘exceptional’ and should ‘not unduly restrain competition’ . In such circumstances, the ECB

text: suggested for instance that the national competition authority may be entitled to authorise

text: concentrations on request of the [central bank] based on stability grounds . The ECB would

text: recommend that the prerogatives of the Minister under the draft law be applied in accordance with

text: the principle of proportionality and with appropriate safeguards.

text: 4.3 Finally, the ECB notes that measures which are adopted with the aim of safeguarding financial stability should involve cooperation with the relevant authorities of the Member States involved, in line with the applicable Community legislation and the arrangements in place, such as the Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation between the financial supervisory authorities, central banks and finance ministries of the European Union on cross-border financial stability . This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 3 October 2008. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: KOM(2008) 514 slutlig, volymerna I och II.

text: EUT L 373, 21.12.2004, s. 1.

text: EUT L 19, 21.1.2005, s. 73.

text: Text markerad med fet stil anger ECB:s förslag till ny text.

text: EUT L 19, 21.1.2005, s. 73.

sprak: sv

title: EUropeiska centralbankens yttrande av den 8 oktober 2008 om ett förslag till två rådsförordningar om medaljer och symboliska mynt som liknar euromynt (CON/2008/45)

text: Inledning och rättslig grund

text: Den 25 september 2008 mottog Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) en begäran från Europeiska unionens råd om ett yttrande över ett förslag till rådets förordning om ändring av förordning

text: (EG) nr 2182/2004

text: om medaljer och symboliska mynt som liknar euromynt (nedan kallad förordning I) och ett förslag till rådets förordning om ändring av förordning

text: (EG) nr 2183/2004

text: om utvidgning av tillämpningsområdet för förordning

text: (EG) nr 2182/2004

text: om medaljer och symboliska mynt som liknar euromynt till att gälla även icke-deltagande medlemsstater (nedan kallad förordning II) (nedan tillsammans kallade förordningarna).

text: ECB:s behörighet att avge ett yttrande över förslag I grundas på artikel 123.4 i fördraget om upprättandet av Europeiska gemenskapen och artikel 105.4 i fördraget för förslag II eftersom de rör valutafrågor. I enlighet med

text: artikel 17.5

text: första meningen i arbetsordningen för Europeiska centralbanken har detta yttrande antagits av ECB-rådet.

text: 1. Allmänna kommentarer

text: Genom att förtydliga vilka motiv på euromynt som gäller som lagligt betalningsmedel som inte bör mångfaldigas på medaljer och symboliska mynt som liknar euromynt, och genom att uppställa de kriterier på grundval av vilka kommissionen ska avge sitt yttrande om efterlevnaden av förordning

text: (EG) nr 2182/2004

text: , förstärker förslag I de bestämmelser i förordning

text: (EG) nr 2182/2004

text: som ska skydda mot bedrägerier och osäkerhetsmoment i samband med medaljer och symboliska mynt som av misstag skulle kunna uppfattas som euromynt. Samtidigt ökar även insynen i kommissionens beslutsprocess.

text: Eftersom euromynt kan vara i omlopp utanför de medlemsstater som har infört euron är det viktigt att ha ett visst skydd för euromynten i medlemsstater som ännu inte har infört euron t.ex. när det gäller förfalskning som kan få negativa konsekvenser för förtroendet för myntens ställning som lagligt betalningsmedel.

text: 2. Specifika kommentarer

text: 2.1 Snarlika motiv på ytan av medaljer eller symboliska mynt

text: Jämfört med

text: artikel 2 c i förordning (EG) nr 2182/2004

text: beskriver den nya artikeln 2.1 c i förordning I mer i detalj de motiv, eller delar av dessa, som förekommer på euromyntens yta och som inte får återges på medaljer och symboliska mynt. För att förbättra denna bestämmelses skyddskaraktär rekommenderar ECB att en uttrycklig hänvisning till eurosymbolen och orden euro och eurocent tas med i den nya artikeln 2.1 c i. ECB är medveten om att det sätt på vilken artikel 2.1 c i är utformad för närvarande inte utesluter dessa ord eller eurosymbolen, men anser att kommissionens förslag skulle bli ännu tydligare om orden uttryckligen nämndes, något som skulle öka bestämmelsens skyddskaraktär. Allmänheten kan missledas inte bara av att orden euro, eurocent eller eurosymbolen återges på medaljer eller symboliska mynt, något som är förbjudet enligt den nya artikeln 2.1 a, utan även av andra motiv som använder element som liknar denna symbol.

text: 2.2 Insynen i beslutsprocessen

text: Enligt motiveringen till förslag I har kommissionen haft ett nära samarbete med de experter på myntförfalskning som avses i artikel 4.1 i kommissionens beslut av den 29 oktober 2004 om inrättande av Europeiskt tekniskt och vetenskapligt centrum (CTSE) och om samordning av tekniska åtgärder för skydd av euromynt mot förfalskning vid bedömningen av hur bestämmelserna i förordning

text: (EG) nr 2182/2004

text: har efterlevts, och anser att detta samarbete bör fortsätta. Förslag I hänvisar dock bara till samråd med medlemsstaterna i skäl tre. ECB rekommenderar därför att en uttrycklig hänvisning till experterna på myntförfalskning inkluderas i den nya artikeln 2.2, detta mot bakgrund av att ett av huvudmotiven till förslag I är att öka insynen i beslutsprocessen.

text: 2.3 Särskilt tillstånd

text: Den nya artikeln 4 om särskilt tillstånd innehåller ingen bestämmelse om något förfarande för hur ekonomiska aktörer kan ansöka om ett undantag från skyddsåtgärderna enligt

text: artikel 2

text: . ECB anser att en lämplig bestämmelse om detta bör läggas till.

text: På samma sätt skulle insynen i beslutsprocessen kunna ökas ytterligare om förslag I explicit nämnde de villkor enligt vilka kommissionen får bevilja undantag. Formuleringen på vissa villkor i den nya artikeln 4 är vag – här stadgas att medaljer och symboliska mynt på vissa villkor får använda orden euro, eurocent eller eurosymbolen om det inte finns någon risk för förväxling. För ökad tydlighet och bättre rättssäkerhet skulle det vara fördelaktigt om den nya artikeln 4 innehöll en mer omfattande och/eller mer deskriptiv beskrivning av de allmänna kriterierna som kommissionen ska tillämpa när den beviljar undantag.

text: 2.4 Tillämpning av förslag I på Monaco, San Marino och Vatikanstaten

text: Monetära avtal existerar redan mellan i) Frankrike, på Europeiska gemenskapens vägnar, och Monaco samt ii) Italien, på Europeiska gemenskapens vägnar, och San Marino och Vatikanstaten. Enligt dessa avtal får Monaco, San Marino och Vatikanstaten ge ut euromynt som har ställning som lagligt betalningsmedel och har specifika konstnärliga kännetecken på myntets nationella sida. Eftersom dessa mynt optiskt skiljer sig från de euromynt som ges ut av de medlemsstater som infört euron, bör de mynt som ges ut av Monaco, San Marino och Vatikanstaten också omfattas av de skyddsåtgärder som framgår av förslag I. Följaktligen bör respektive monetära avtal och/eller de rättsliga bestämmelser som antagits med stöd av dessa mönetära avtal ändras så att innehållet i förslag I, när detta antagits, även kommer att gälla för Monaco, San Marino och Vatikanstaten.

text: 2.5 ECB och förordning II

text: Till skillnad från förslag I hänvisas det inte till ECB:s yttrande i ingressen till förordning II. Eftersom båda förordningarna faller inom ECB:s behörighetsområde, bör ingressen till förslag II ändras så att även den hänvisar till ECB:s yttrande.

text: 3. Ändringsförslag

text: De ändringsförslag av förordningarna som blir resultatet av rekommendationerna ovan framgår av bilagan.

text: BILAGA

text: Kommissionens förslag | ECB:s ändringsförslag

text: i) något motiv eller delar av detta, som förekommer på euromyntens yta, särskilt EU:s tolv stjärnor, den geografiska avbildningen och siffrorna, på samma sätt som de återges på euromynt,” | ”i) något motiv eller delar av detta, som förekommer på euromyntens yta, särskilt orden ’euro’, ’eurocent’, eurosymbolen, EU:s tolv stjärnor, den geografiska avbildningen och siffrorna, på samma sätt som de återges på euromynt,

text: Motivering – se punkt 2.1 i yttrandet

text: 2. Kommissionen ska vara behörig att avge ett yttrande om” | ”2. Kommissionen ska, efter samråd med de experter på myntförfalskning som avses i

text: artikel 4 i kommissionens beslut 2005/37/EG av den 29 oktober 2004

text: om inrättande av Europeiskt tekniskt och vetenskapligt centrum (CTSE) och om samordning av tekniska åtgärder för skydd av euromynt mot förfalskning, vara behörig att avge ett yttrande om

text: Motivering – se punkt 2.2 i yttrandet

text: med beaktande av kommissionens förslag, | ”med beaktande av kommissionens förslag,

text: med beaktande av Europaparlamentets yttrande, och | med beaktande av Europaparlamentets yttrande, med beaktande av Europeiska centralbankens yttrande, och

text: av följande skäl:” | av följande skäl:

text: Motivering – se punkt 2.5 i yttrandet