text: KOM(2010) 289 slutlig.

text: EUT L 302, 17.11.2009, s. 1.

text: September 2008 (nedan kallat Eurosystemets bidrag 2008), finns på ECB:s webbplats http://www.ecb.europa.eu

text: EUT C 115, 20.5.2009, s. 1.

text: S. 4.

text: EUT L 177, 30.6.2006, s. 1.

text: Se artikel 1.4 i förslaget till förordning.

text: Se ändring av regel 17g-5 i del 240 i Securities Exchange Act 1934, SEC nr 34-61050 (23 november 2009), Federal Register vol. 74, nr 232, s. 63832 (4 december 2009) (nedan kallad ändrad SEC-regel 240.17g-5) som finns på SEC:s webbplats http://www.sec.gov Den ändrade SEC-regeln 240.17g-5 gäller sedan den 2 juni 2010 för amerikanska emittenter och kommer från och med den 2 december 2010 även att gälla för icke-amerikanska emittenter som utser ett kreditvärderingsinstitut baserat i USA, se SEC:s Order of 19 May 2010 granting temporary conditional exemption for nationally recognized statistical rating organizations from the requirements of rule 17g-5 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and request for comment (utgåva nr 34-62120) som finns på SEC:s webbplats.

text: Se en jämförelse mellan den aktuella ordalydelsen på den föreslagna förordningen och ordförandeskapets kompromissförslag av den 7 oktober 2010, 2010/160 (COD), s. 17.

text: Se ytterligare kommentarer i punkt 5.

text: Se ytterligare kommentarer i punkt 6.

text: Se förslaget till ny

text: artikel 8

text: a.2 i förordning

text: (EG) nr 1060/2009

text: Det aktuella förslaget jämfört med avsnitt (a)(3)(iii)(B)(1) i den ändrade SEC-regeln 240.17g-5.

text: Se de föreslagna nya artiklarna

text: och

text: a.1 i förordning

text: (EG) nr 1060/2009

text: och det föreslagna avsnittet I w) i bilaga III till förordning

text: (EG) nr 1060/2009

text: Se den föreslagna nya artikeln 11.3 i förordning

text: (EG) nr 1060/2009

text: och del II, avsnitt E i bilaga I till förordning

text: (EG) nr 1060/2009

text: Se förslaget till ny

text: artikel 11.2 i förordning (EG) nr 1060/2009

text: Se Eurosystemets bidrag 2008, s. 5 och avsnitt 6.3 (Eurosystemets ramverk för kreditbedömning) i bilaga I till riktlinje ECB/2000/7 av den 31 augusti 2000 om Eurosystemets penningpolitiska instrument och förfaranden, EGT L 310, 11.12.2000, s. 1.

text: Text markerad med fet stil anger ECB:s förslag till ny text. Genomstruken text anger de strykningar som ECB föreslår.

sprak: sv

title: Europeiska centralbankens yttrande av den 19 november 2010 om ett förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning om ändring av förordning (EG) nr 1060/2009 om kreditvärderingsinstitut (CON/2010/82)

text: Inledning och rättslig grund

text: Den 26 juli 2010 mottog Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) en begäran från Europeiska unionens råd om ett yttrande över ett förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning om ändring av förordning

text: (EG) nr 1060/2009

text: om kreditvärderingsinstitut (nedan kallat förslaget till förordning).

text: ECB:s behörighet att avge ett yttrande grundas på artiklarna

text: och

text: i fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt, eftersom förslaget till förordning innehåller bestämmelser som berör Europeiska centralbankssystemets (ECBS) medverkan till ett smidigt genomförande av politiken för det finansiella systemets stabilitet i enlighet med artikel 127.5 i fördraget. I enlighet med

text: artikel 17.5

text: första meningen i arbetsordningen för Europeiska centralbanken har detta yttrande antagits av ECB-rådet.

text: Allmänna kommentarer

text: 1. ECB välkomnar i princip de åtgärder som introduceras genom förslaget till förordning för att förstärka det regelverk som gäller för kreditvärderingsinstitut, främst att a) ge den europeiska värdepappers- och marknadsmyndigheten (ESMA) omfattande befogenheter vad gäller registrering och övervakning av kreditvärderingsinstitut, samt b) skapa mer öppenhet och konkurrens på marknaden för värdering av strukturerade finansiella instrument. ECB noterar att förordning

text: (EG) nr 1060/2009

text: innehåller många av de synpunkter som tidigare framförts i a) Eurosystemets bidrag till det offentliga samrådet om kommissionens förslag till direktiv/förordning om kreditvärderingsinstitut och b) ECB:s yttrande

text: av den 21 april 2009 om ett förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning om kreditvärderingsinstitut.

text: 2. Såsom framgår av Eurosystemets bidrag 2008 vore det bättre om endast en enhet ansvarar för tillsynen över kreditvärderingsinstituten eftersom man då enklare kan säkerställa konkurrens på lika villkor. I detta sammanhang välkomnar ECB att ESMA getts i uppdrag att handlägga ett antal uppgifter som rör registrering och övervakning av kreditvärderingsinstitut. ECB tolkar det som att det rättsliga ramverket även fortsättningsvis kommer att ge de nationella tillsynsmyndigheterna rätt att godkänna kreditvärderingsinstitut som externa ratinginstitut i enlighet med artiklarna

text: i Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 2006/48/EG av den 14 juni 2006 om rätten att starta och driva verksamhet i kreditinstitut (omarbetning).

text: 3. Med beaktande av kommentarerna nedan stöder ECB de arrangemang för ökad insyn som framgår av de föreslagna nya

text: artiklarna 8

text: a och 8b i förordning

text: (EG) nr 1060/2009

text: enligt vilka emittenter av strukturerade finansiella instrument även ska ge vissa andra kreditvärderingsinstitut tillgång till sådan information som getts det kreditvärderingsinstitut som emittenten anlitat. Genom att införa en sådan informationsplikt vill man främja kvalitet och öppenhet kring ratingprocessen för strukturerade finansiella instrument samt även bidra till ökad konkurrens mellan kreditvärderingsinstituten. I viss utsträckning liknar de nya reglerna också de regler som amerikanska Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) tillämpar sedan juni 2010. För att främja konkurrens på lika villkor vore det önskvärt att EU:s och USA:s regelverk konvergerar där detta är möjligt. ECB vill dock påpeka några aspekter som rör genomförandet av den nya informationsplikten. Enligt de föreslagna reglerna ska det kreditvärderingsinstitut som utsetts för att utföra en viss kreditvärdering vara utsatt för ökad konkurrens från andra kreditvärderingsinstitut som ej utsetts. Det kan bli enklare för kreditvärderingsinstitut som ej utsetts att utfärda ett kreditbetyg på eget initiativ, eftersom dessa andra kreditvärderingsinstitut kommer att få tillgång till information som emittenten ger det kreditvärderingsinstitut han utsett. Det kan dock finnas avsevärda hinder för kreditvärderingsinstitut som ej utsetts att komma in på marknaden t.ex. genom a) lagstadgade kriterier om tillgång till emittentens information, och b) informell kunskap som det kreditvärderingsinstitut som utsetts har tack vare tidigare affärsrelationer med emittenten. Erfarenheterna från reglerna om ökad öppenhet som SEC infört antyder att sådana regler inte alltid har något avgörande inflytande på kreditvärderingsinstitutens praxis vad gäller en ökning av antalet kreditbetyg som utfärdas på eget initiativ. Möjligheten att beställa olika kreditvärderingar kan även leda till att emittenter väljer det mest fördelaktig kreditbetyget, vilka innebär en risk för att kreditvärderingsinstituten konkurrerar om att utfärda det mest fördelaktiga kreditbetyget. Detta kan få negativa följder för kvaliteten på de kreditbetyg som utfärdas. Man måste även granska emittentens situation och beakta a) de svårigheter som kan uppstå genom skyldigheten att förse kreditvärderingsinstitut som ej utsetts med information, och b) hur missbruk av den information som kreditvärderingsinstitut som ej utsetts erhåller kan förebyggas. ECB har förstått att det under arbetet med att ta fram förslaget till förordning funnits ett brett stöd för de arrangemang för ökad insyn som framgår av de föreslagna nya

text: artiklarna 8

text: a och 8b. ECB föreslår därför endast smärre ändringar. Samtidigt rekommenderar ECB att ESMA noga bör granska utvecklingen inom ovannämnda områden när förordningen genomförs, så att lämpliga justeringsförslag kan lämnas till kommissionen på grundval av gjorda erfarenheter.

text: 4. ECB räknar även med att kommissionen, utifrån de erfarenheter som görs med de regler som införs genom förlaget till förordning, kommer att utföra ytterligare arbete om arrangemangen kring öppenhet i samband med utfärdande av kreditbetyg. För att uppnå önskad effekt bör reglerna om öppenhet dels ta hänsyn till emitteternas intressen när dessa överlämnar känslig information till kreditvärderingsinstitut, och dels de behov som centralbanker, tillsynsmyndigheter och andra aktörer har av att få mer information som möjliggör en oberoende bedömning av kreditvärderingsinstitutens arbete. Alla dessa aspekter är särskilt viktiga för värdepapperiseringsmarknaden. I detta hänseende avser Eurosystemet, som en del av sin bedömning av säkerheter, använda sådan information om individuella lån som möjliggör en fortlöpande bedömning av riskerna med värdepapperiserade instrument.

text: Specifika kommentarer

text: Ökad öppenhet kring kreditbedömningen

text: 5. Enligt förslaget till förordning ska varje kreditvärderingsinstitut som utses ge sina konkurrenter en förteckning över de strukturerade finansiella instrument som institutet bedömer, tillsammans med en länk till den webbplats där emittenten förvarar informationen som används för att göra kreditvärderingen. Kreditvärderingsinstitut som ej utsetts kan få tillgång till denna information om de a) vid tidpunkten för sin anhållan har infört de system och den organisationsstruktur som krävs för att säkerställa att informationen hålls konfidentiell, och b) efter att ha tagit del av informationen, utfärdar kreditbetyg en gång om året för minst 10 procent av de strukturerade finansiella instrument som de har begärt information om. ECB rekommenderar att man i den föreslagna förordningen tydligare bör definiera hur ESMA ska kontrollera att dessa kriterier efterlevs, vilken beräkningsmetod som ska användas för att verifiera att det andra kriteriet uppfylls samt i vilka fall ett icke-uppfyllande av det andra kriteriet kan medföra sanktioner.

text: 6. ECB gör även följande iakttagelser avseende aspekterna i punkt 3. Kreditvärderingsinstitut bör åläggas en skyldighet att var sjätte månad informera ESMA om antalet kreditbetyg som de utfärdat under en viss period, och dela upp dessa på a) kreditbetyg som begärts av den värderade enheten eller en anknuten tredje part, och b) kreditbetyg som utfärdats på eget initiativ, och instituten bör även ange den andel kreditbetyg som utfärdats på eget initiativ som var högre, lika höga eller lägre än de kreditbetyg som utfärdats av det kreditvärderingsinstitut som utsetts. Denna rapportering bör inkluderas i kreditvärderingsinstitutens regelbundna rapportering till ESMA. ESMA bör ges i uppdrag att övervaka genomförandet av de föreslagna nya

text: artiklarna 8

text: a och 8b för att a) kontrollera vilka konsekvenser dessa bestämmelser får för antalet utfärdade kreditbetyg och kvaliteten på dessa, b) upptäcka eventuella behov att ändra tillgångskriterierna för kreditvärderingsinstitut som ej utsetts så att det inte blir alltför svårt att ta sig in på marknaden, c) granska det merarbete emittenter åläggs, samt d) granska huruvida emittenter måste skyddas mot missbruk av den information som sådana kreditvärderingsinstitut som ej utsetts erhåller. En rapport från ESMA bör utgöra grunden för kommissionens översyn av de föreslagna nya

text: artiklarna 8

text: a och 8b under den angivna tiden efter det att de har trätt ikraft.

text: Information till ESMA och Eurosystemet

text: 7. ECB noterar att kreditvärderingsinstituten ska göra information om sina historiska resultat tillgänglig i det centrala arkiv som upprättas av ESMA. ECB rekommenderar att dessa uppgifter bör ges ett jämförbart format som överensstämmer med unionens statistiska regelverk. Jämförbara namnkonventioner och standarder bör i möjligaste mån användas när uppgifterna lagras (t.ex. genom att använda ISIN-koder).

text: 8. I Eurosystemets bidrag 2008 nämndes även att den nya regleringen av kreditvärderingsinstitut bör möjliggöra samarbete mellan tillsynsmyndigheter och Eurosystemet på en lämplig nivå. På grund av sin roll inom området finansiell stabilitet har Eurosystemet ett stort intresse av frågor som rör kreditvärdering. Det finns redan ett regelverk inom Eurosystemet för att övervaka kreditvärderingsinstitut i samband med penningpolitiska transaktioner. ECB uppskattar därför bestämmelserna kring utbyte av information som framgår av den föreslagna nya artikeln 27 i förordning

text: (EG) nr 1060/2009

text: . Trots detta rekommenderar ECB att denna bestämmelse uttryckligen bör ange att ECBS och ECB, samt även de angivna myndigheterna i medlemsstaterna, ska få tillgång till sådan information som är av betydelse för utövandet av deras lagstadgade uppgifter.

text: Ändringsförslag

text: I de fall där ECB rekommenderar att förslaget till förordning ändras anges de specifika förslagen i bilagan tillsammans med en förklaring.

text: BILAGA

text: Kommissionens förslag | ECB:s ändringsförslag

text: Ingen text. | med beaktande av Europeiska centralbankens yttrande,

text: Motivering Eftersom ECB måste höras om förslaget till förordning enligt artiklarna 127.4 och 282.5 i fördraget bör ett beaktandeled med detta innehåll införas i förslaget till förordning i linje med artikel 296 andra stycket i fördraget enligt vilket rättsakter bl.a. ska innehålla en hänvisning till de yttranden som föreskrivs i fördragen.

text: (5) Registrerade eller certifierade kreditvärderingsinstitut bör kunna få tillgång till en förteckning över strukturerade finansiella instrument som kreditvärderas av deras konkurrenter. Syftet med detta är att öka konkurrensen mellan kreditvärderingsinstitut, undvika eventuella intressekonflikter i samband med issuer-pays-modellen, som är särskilt besvärliga vid värderingen av strukturerade finansiella instrument, samt öka kreditbetygens överblickbarhet och kvalitet för strukturerade finansiella instrument. Informationen om dessa kreditbetyg bör lämnas av utfärdaren eller en anknuten tredje part, för utfärdande på eget initiativ av konkurrerande kreditbetyg på strukturerade finansiella instrument. Utfärdandet av sådana kreditbetyg på eget initiativ bör främja användningen av mer än ett kreditbetyg per strukturerat finansiellt instrument. Tillgång till webbplatserna bör bara beviljas, om ett kreditvärderingsinstitut kan se till att den begärda informationen hålls konfidentiell. | (5) Kreditvärdering av strukturerade finansiella instrument kan särskilt påverkas av Registrerade eller certifierade kreditvärderingsinstitut bör kunna få tillgång till en förteckning över strukturerade finansiella instrument som kreditvärderas av deras konkurrenter. Syftet med detta är att öka konkurrensen mellan kreditvärderingsinstitut, undvika eventuella intressekonflikter i samband med issuer-pays-modellen. För att åtgärda detta bör konkurrensen mellan kreditvärderingsinstitut förstärkas genom skapandet av incitament att använda flera olika kreditvärderingsinstitut för att på så sätt som är särskilt besvärliga vid värderingen av strukturerade finansiella instrument, samt öka kreditbetygens överblickbarhet och kvaliteten på kreditvärderingsförfarandet för strukturerade finansiella instrument. Registrerade eller certifierade kreditvärderingsinstitut bör därför kunna få tillgång till en förteckning över strukturerade finansiella instrument som kreditvärderas av deras konkurrenter. Informationen om dessa kreditbetyg bör lämnas av utfärdaren eller en anknuten tredje part, för utfärdande på eget initiativ av konkurrerande kreditbetyg på strukturerade finansiella instrument. Utfärdandet av sådana kreditbetyg på eget initiativ bör främja användningen av mer än ett kreditbetyg per strukturerat finansiellt instrument. Tillgång till webbplatserna bör bara beviljas, om ett kreditvärderingsinstitut kan se till att den begärda informationen hålls konfidentiell. ESMA bör ges i uppdrag att övervaka genomförandet av de åtgärder som ska öka överblickbarheten, och ta fram en rapport som beskriver deras praktiska konsekvenser för utfärdandet av kreditbetyg samt huruvida ändringar är nödvändiga. … (11a) För att möjliggöra en effektiv kontroll genom ESMA bör kreditvärderingsinstituten göra information om sina historiska resultat tillgänglig i ett centralt arkiv som inrättas av ESMA. Detta bör ske i ett format som överensstämmer med unionens statistiska regelverk och som underlättar direkta jämförelser mellan de olika kreditvärderingsinstitutens historiska uppgifter. För att säkerställa ett fungerande system med kreditbetyg som utfärdats på eget initiativ bör kreditvärderingsinstituten regelbundet ge ESMA specifik information som berör utfärdandet av sådana kreditbetyg. … (16a) Behöriga tillsynsmyndigheter, centralbanker i medlemsstaterna, Europeiska centralbankssystemet och Europeiska centralbanken, i deras egenskap av penningpolitiska myndigheter, Europeiska systemriskrådet samt, i tillämpliga fall, andra myndigheter i medlemsstaterna med ansvar för tillsyn över betalnings- och avvecklingssystemen, bör ges tillgång till sådan information som ESMA samlat in från kreditvärderingsinstitut som har betydelse för utövandet av deras uppgifter.

text: Motivering Se punkterna 5–8 i yttrandet. Dessa ändringar hör samman med ändringarna 3–7.

text: 4. Följande artiklar ska införas som

text: artiklarna 8

text: a och 8b:

text: Artikel 8

text: a Information om strukturerade finansiella instrument … 2. Om andra kreditvärderingsinstitut som är registrerade eller certifierade i enlighet med denna förordning begär tillgång till information enligt punkt 1, ska de utan dröjsmål beviljas sådan tillgång om de uppfyller följande villkor: a) De har system och en organisationsstruktur som tryggar att informationen hålls konfidentiell. b) De tillhandahåller årligen kreditbetyg för minst 10 % av de strukturerade finansiella instrument för vilka de begär tillgång till information enligt punkt 1. … | 4. Följande artiklar ska införas som

text: artiklarna 8

text: a, och 8b och 8c:

text: Artikel 8

text: a Information om strukturerade finansiella instrument … 2. Om andra kreditvärderingsinstitut som är registrerade eller certifierade i enlighet med denna förordning begär tillgång till information enligt punkt 1, ska de utan dröjsmål beviljas sådan tillgång om de har erhållit det tillstånd som avses i punkt 2 b. uppfyller följande villkor: a) De har system och en organisationsstruktur som tryggar att informationen hålls konfidentiell. b) De tillhandahåller årligen kreditbetyg för minst 10 % av de strukturerade finansiella instrument för vilka de begär tillgång till information enligt punkt 1. 2a. Ett kreditvärderingsinstitut som, i enlighet med punkt 2, tar del av den information som avses i punkt 1 för mer än 10 strukturerade finansiella instrument inom ett kalenderår ska inom samma kalenderår utfärda kreditbetyg avseende minst 10 procent av de strukturerade finansiella instrument för vilka det har tagit del av information. 2b. ESMA ska årligen kontrollera att de kreditvärderingsinstitut som registrerats eller certifierats i enlighet med denna förordning uppfyller följande villkor: a) De har system och en organisationsstruktur som tryggar att den information som avses i punkt 1 hålls konfidentiell. b) De har under föregående kalenderår uppfyllt det krav som framgår av punkt 2a. Om kontrollen utfaller positivt ska ESMA utfärda ett tillstånd som gäller i 12 månader och ger tillgång till informationen enligt punkt 1. …

text: Artikel 8

text: c Granskning 1. ESMA ska före den 1 april 2012 författa en rapport som beskriver hur tillämpningen av

text: artiklarna 8

text: a och 8b fungerat i praktiken. Rapporten ska särskilt granska a) vilka konsekvenser dessa artiklar fått för antalet utfärdade kreditbetyg, kvaliteten på dessa samt för kreditbetygen som utfärdas på eget initiativ, b) eventuella behov att ändra tillgångskriterierna enligt

text: artikel 8

text: a.2 med målsättningen att det inte ska bli alltför svårt att ta sig in på marknaden, c) det merarbete emittenter åläggs enligt

text: artikel 8

text: a.1 samt d) huruvida emittenter måste skyddas mot missbruk av den information som de överlämnar till sådana andra kreditvärderingsinstitut än det institut som de själva anlitat. 2. Med ledning av den rapport som avses i punkt 1 ska kommission vid behov föreslå ändringar av

text: artiklarna 8

text: a och 8b.

text: Motivering Se punkterna 5 och 6 i yttrandet.

text: 7. I

text: artikel 11

text: ska punkterna 2 och 3 ersättas med följande:2. I ett centralt arkiv som ska upprättas av värdepappers- och marknadsmyndigheten ska kreditvärderingsinstituten tillhandahålla information om sina historiska resultat, inbegripet hur ofta kreditbetygen ändrats och tidigare utfärdade kreditbetyg och ändringar av dessa. Kreditvärderingsinstituten ska lämna information till detta arkiv i en standardiserad form som föreskrivs av värdepappers- och marknadsmyndigheten. Värdepappers- och marknadsmyndigheten ska göra denna information tillgänglig för allmänheten och offentliggöra sammanfattande information om de huvudsakliga utvecklingstendenser som observerats på årlig basis. …. | 7. I

text: artikel 11

text: ska punkterna 2 och 3 ersättas med följande:2. I ett centralt arkiv som ska upprättas av värdepappers- och marknadsmyndigheten ska kreditvärderingsinstituten tillhandahålla information om sina historiska resultat, inbegripet hur ofta kreditbetygen ändrats och tidigare utfärdade kreditbetyg och ändringar av dessa. Kreditvärderingsinstituten ska lämna information till detta arkiv i en standardiserad form som föreskrivs av värdepappers- och marknadsmyndigheten och i ett format som överensstämmer med unionens statistiska regelverk som, genom användningen av jämförbara namnkonventioner och standarder, underlättar direkta jämförelser mellan de olika kreditvärderingsinstitutens historiska uppgifter. Värdepappers- och marknadsmyndigheten ska göra denna information tillgänglig för allmänheten och offentliggöra sammanfattande information om de huvudsakliga utvecklingstendenser som observerats på årlig basis. …

text: Motivering Se punkt 7 i detta yttrande.

text: 17. Artiklarna

text: och

text: ska ersättas med följande:…

text: Artikel 27

text: Utbyte av information … (2) Värdepappers- och marknadsmyndigheten får till de behöriga myndigheter som ansvarar för tillsynen av de företag som avses i

text: artikel 4.1

text: , till centralbankerna, Europeiska centralbankssystemet och Europeiska centralbanken, i deras egenskap av monetära myndigheter, europeiska systemrisknämnden och, där så är lämpligt, till andra offentliga myndigheter med ansvar för att övervaka betalnings- och avvecklingssystem överlämna konfidentiell information som ska användas för att de ska kunna fullgöra sina uppgifter. Dessa myndigheter eller organ ska inte heller hindras från att till värdepappers- och marknadsmyndigheten lämna uppgifter den kan behöva för att fullgöra sina uppgifter enligt denna förordning. | 17. Artiklarna

text: och

text: ska ersättas med följande:…

text: Artikel 27

text: Utbyte av information … (2) Värdepappers- och marknadsmyndigheten får ska till de behöriga myndigheter som ansvarar för tillsynen av de företag som avses i

text: artikel 4.1

text: , till centralbankerna i medlemsstaterna, Europeiska centralbankssystemet och Europeiska centralbanken, i deras egenskap av monetära myndigheter, europeiska systemrisknämnden och, där så är lämpligt, till andra offentliga myndigheter i medlemsstaterna med ansvar för att övervaka betalnings- och avvecklingssystem överlämna konfidentiell information som ska användas för att de ska kunna fullgöra sina uppgifter. Dessa myndigheter eller organ ska inte heller hindras från att till värdepappers- och marknadsmyndigheten lämna uppgifter den kan behöva för att fullgöra sina uppgifter enligt denna förordning.

text: Motivering Se punkt 8 i detta yttrande.

text: Ingen text. | 3. Avsnitt E del II punkt 1 ska ersättas med följande: 1. Var sjätte månad: a) uppgifter om historiska fallissemangsandelar inom deras betygskategorier, med särskiljande av emittenternas huvudsakliga geografiska områden och huruvida dessa andelar har ändrats över tiden, och b) uppgifter om antalet kreditbetyg som det har utfärdat under en viss rapporteringsperiod, uppdelat efter i) kreditbetyg som begärts av en värderad enhet eller en anknuten tredje part, och ii) kreditbetyg som utfärdats på eget initiativ, tillsammans med uppgifter om den andel av dessa kreditbetyg som var högre, lika höga eller lägre än de kreditbetyg som utfärdats av det kreditvärderingsinstitut som utsetts av den värderade enheten eller en anknuten tredje part. …

text: Motivering Se punkt 6 i detta yttrande.

text: (EG) nr 1060/2009

text: :BILAGA III SANKTIONER Överträdelser I. Överträdelser som gäller intressekonflikter, organisatoriska eller operativa krav … (w) Ett kreditvärderingsinstitut bryter mot

text: artikel 8

text: a.2 b, om det underlåter att utfärda kreditbetyg en gång om året för minst 10 % av de strukturerade finansiella instrument för vilka det har begärt tillgång till den information på webbplatsen som lämnas av emittenten eller en anknuten tredje part. … | Följande bilaga III ska läggas till förordning

text: (EG) nr 1060/2009

text: artikel 8

text: a.2a b, om det under ett kalenderår då det tagit del av information om fler än tio strukturerade finansiella instrument på en eller flera webbsidor som tillhandahålls i enlighet med

text: artikel 8

text: a.2 men underlåter att utfärda kreditbetyg en gång om året för minst 10 % av de strukturerade finansiella instrument för vilka det har tagit del av sådan begärt tillgång till den information på webbplatsen som lämnas av emittenten eller en anknuten tredje part. …

text: Motivering Se punkt 5 i detta yttrande.


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the European Central Bank on ‘An EU Framework for Crisis Management

text: in the Financial Sector’, COM(2010) 579 final of 20 October 2010; Commission Communication on an EU Framework for Cross-Border Crisis Management in the Banking Sector on 20 October 2009. 3 See the recent Council (ECOFIN) report to the European Council on the state of play on financial levies and taxes, and for guidance to the Member States in the conclusions of the ECOFIN meeting see ‘Immediate responses to financial turmoil’, Council Conclusions of 7 October 2008, both available on the Council’s website at www.consilium.europa.eu.

text: The text of the declaration of 12 October 2008 is available on the former French Presidency’s website at www.ue2008.fr.

text: Second

text: Council Directive 77/91/EC of 13 December 1976

text: on coordination of safeguards which, for the protection of the interests of members and others, are required by Member States of companies within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 58 of the Treaty, in respect of the formation of public limited liability companies and the maintenance and alteration of their capital, with a view to making such safeguards equivalent (OJ L 26, 31.1.1977, p. 1).

text: Opinion

text: , paragraph 10. All ECB opinions are available on the ECB's website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: See the Eurosystem’s reply of 8 February 2010 to the public consultation by the Commission launched in its Communication on an EU Framework for Cross-Border Crisis Management in the Banking Sector on 20 October 2009.

text: See in particular ‘Report and Recommendations of the Cross-border Bank Resolution Group’, March 2010, available at www.bis.org and ‘Practical Guide on Cross-Border Insolvency Cooperation’ adopted by UNCITRAL on 1 July 2009, available at www.uncitral.org; and the Communication of the Commission of 20 October 2010 on ‘An EU Framework for Crisis Management in the Financial Sector’, COM(2010) 579 final.

text: Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1.1; Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1.

text: Article 2

text: Section 48j(3) only provides that the selection of the remaining spin-off assets depends on how significant they are to an effective, cost-efficient defence of the systemic risk emanating from the credit institution. It is unclear if this sentence is at all applicable in the case of partial transfer, as Section 48k(2) only refers to the fourth to sixth sentences. This seems to be a drafting error as Section 48j(3) only has five sentences. Therefore the reference is understood to be to the third to fifth sentences; i.e. the main sentence dealing with selection of remaining spin-off assets for re-transfer.

text: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘Report and Recommendations of the Cross-border Bank Resolution Group’, March 2010, available at www.bis.org. Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 1998 on settlement finality in payment and securities settlement systems (OJ L 166 , 11.06.1998 p. 45), as amended by Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 (OJ L 146, 10.6.2009, p. 37). 13 Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 June 2002 on financial collateral arrangements, (OJ L168, 27.6.2002, p. 43).

text: Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 April 2001 on the reorganisation and winding up of credit institutions (OJ L 125, 5.5.2001, p 15). 15 See Opinion

text: . 16 Commission Communication on Bank Resolution Funds, COM (2010) 254 final, 26 May 2010.

publisher: Europeiska centralbanken

sprak: en

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 19 November 2010 on the restructuring of banks (CON/2010/83)

serie: con

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 19 November 2010 on the restructuring of banks (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

type: rubrik

text: On 4 October 2010, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the German Federal Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft law on the restructuring and organised winding up of banks, the creation of a restructuring fund for banks and the extension of the limitation periods for management and supervisory board members’ liability towards listed companies and banks (Law on restructuring) (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the third and sixth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to the Deutsche Bundesbank and contains rules applicable to banks which materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

type: stycke

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The general purpose of the draft law is to afford the competent authorities the powers and tools to resolve situations of distressed banks whose failure would pose a risk to the stability of the financial system. The draft law also aims to ensure that the consequential costs of dealing with the failure of such institutions are met by the private sector, i.e. the banking industry, and not by public funds, to the extent possible. 1.2 The draft law introduces new supervisory and resolution tools and procedures for the stabilisation, reorganisation, and, as a last resort, the orderly winding up of banks with a registered office in Germany which are in financial difficulties. For this purpose, the draft law introduces two main sets of measures. (i) It provides for a two-stage procedure for the stabilisation and reorganisation of banks. Both

text: stages of the procedure are introduced voluntarily at the credit institution’s initiative and serve to enable it to overcome the financial difficulties under its responsibility. When initiating this procedure, the credit institution will provide a plan for the stabilisation or reorganisation. Moreover, the relevant procedure and its underlying plans only become effective if the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) regards them as appropriate and if they are approved by the Higher Regional Court. In both stages of the procedure, an advisor is to be appointed by the Court. The role for this advisor is modelled on that of the special representative under the Law on banking and the provisional insolvency administrator. The stablilisation stage of the procedure is designed as an early intervention measure to correct financial difficulties. It does not involve any interference with shareholder or creditor rights. The reorganisation stage does interfere with such third party rights. It may only take place if the existence of the distressed bank is at risk and this constitutes a threat to the system, meaning that the measures taken must be covered by a manifest public interest. The reorganisation stage provides for rules on creditor voting and, if relevant, shareholders as regards the reorganisation plan under which they give or are deemed to give their consent to the plan. If the procedure described above is unlikely to succeed, the BaFin may immediately take the intervention measures set out under Article 2 of the draft law (amendment to the Law on banking). (ii) The draft law also significantly increases Bafin’s powers and tools to restructure and wind up banks by amending the current law on banks (Article 2 of the draft law, as mentioned above). This amendment contains, as a measure of last resort, BaFin’s power to order the transfer of assets from the failing bank to a new safe haven entity (‘bridge bank’) (new Section 48a of the Law on banking), if the distressed bank is at risk and this constitutes a threat to the system. A bridge bank is a bank which is independent from an organisational and financial perspective. The establishment of such a bank may be necessary if, at the relevant time, no credit institution is available to take over the relevant assets and liabilities. This is intended to ensure that stabilisation measures can subsequently focus on the new bank, whilst the non-systemically relevant parts of the old institution can be wound up under the ordinary insolvency procedure. The draft law also enables the BaFin to appoint a special representative, who may be given the power to act as the institution’s statutory organs. These new measures can be taken by the BaFin without prior agreement of creditors or shareholders. 1.3 In addition to these new procedures and tools, Article 3 of the draft law establishes a restructuring fund for banks (the ‘Fund’) and transfers new duties related to the management of this Fund to the Federal Authority for Financial Market Stabilisation (FMSA). The purpose of the Fund, a Federal special-purpose vehicle, is to finance future bank restructuring and winding-up measures. All

text: German banks will be obliged to contribute to the Fund. The amount of an individual institution’s contribution will be based on the systemic risk it poses, and this is determined according to the size of the bank and its cross-linkage within the financial market. In this regard, an institution’s liabilities must be taken into account and other relevant indicators may also be considered. The FMSA will be responsible for implementing restructuring measures and administering the Fund. 1.4 In addition to these key elements, the draft law extends the period of limitation for claims against Members of the Board of Management and the Supervisory Board who breach their managerial duties under the Law on stock corporations from 5 to 10 years. It also amends the Law on the Financial Market Stabilisation Fund and the Law on financial markets stabilisation acceleration so that the new procedures and tools mentioned above would, in the application of some transitional provisions, replace the stabilisation measures of the Fund.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 The ECB welcomes the draft law as it strengthens the tools and procedures available to the national authorities for effective early intervention, reorganisation and restructuring of distressed banks. The ECB notes that, in accordance with the Council conclusions of May 2010, the European Commission presented a communication which defined the milestones for a major overhaul of the Union’s regulatory framework. This overhaul is to be undertaken from 2011 onwards and aims to establish a holistic, coordinated and more harmonised framework for preventative action, early intervention and resolution management. In particular, the Commission announced legislative proposals aiming at further harmonisation of a wide set of early intervention and resolution tools. The ECB broadly supports such plans and notes that a common set of tools should be designed with the aim of allowing authorities to address problems with a distressed bank, without needing to resort to public support. In turn, such tools should also facilitate a private sector solution or, when appropriate, ensure the liqidation of the bank in a way which has minimal effects on financial stability. In this context, it is noted that the draft law significantly enhances the tools available to the national authorities, in particular by introducing a comprehensive framework for reorganisation which would enable the transfer of assets, or parts of thereof, of a systemically relevant bank to a private bank, or temporarily to a State ‘bridge bank’ or a debt to equity swap. 2.2 The ECB welcomes the acknowledgement of the German Government, as reflected in the explanatory notes to the draft law, of the need for coordinated action at Union level and the need for any national proposal to be integrated and aligned with the current preparatory work of the European Commission on a cross-border crisis management framework for the financial sector (EU crisis management framework) . Member States may need to adopt measures on crisis management

text: in the interests of urgency. However, prior to the adoption of the EU crisis management framework in the form of a Union legal instrument, and even before its implementation, Member States should take into account developments at Union level in the preparation of such a framework and should thus avoid any national legislation conflicting with it, in accordance with the general principle of sincere cooperation and loyalty pursuant to the Treaty on European Union. In this respect, the ECB also refers to guidance provided by the Council (ECOFIN) , as well as the Declaration issued by the Heads of State of the euro area . 2.3 It should also be ensured that the application of the draft law complies with

text: Article 107(3)

text: (b) TFEU, meaning that domestic support measures to banks in distress and their terms of application must comply with the principle of non-discrimination and competition law and the State aid rules of the Union.

text: 3. Procedure for the stabilisation and reorganisation of banks

text: 3.1 In Section 19(4) of

text: Article 1

text: , the draft law provides for the deemed consent of shareholders to the reorganisation plan, where the majority of the creditors have voted in favour and where the measures under the plan are proportionate and aim to prevent serious negative effects on other financial institutions arising from the failure of the bank concerned. This constitutes an interference with shareholder rights as guaranteed by Directive

text: , notably

text: Article 25(1)

text: on the increase of capital, for example in the case of a debt to equity swap. The explanatory notes to the draft law extensively address this legal issue. The ECB recognises the manifest conflict arising between shareholder rights and public interest issues in such a situation, and this may need to be addressed at national level as a matter of urgency. However, legal uncertainty could be exacerbated by provisions which clearly breach the Directive and merely rely on a possible future change in Union law in this regard. The existing conflict between the strong protection of shareholder rights and the legitimate protection of public interests needs to be addressed at Union level, respecting the principle of the primacy of Union law. 3.2 The stabilisation and reorganisation plans may only enter into force if they have been approved by the Higher Regional Court. Under this procedure, the Court is the final authority, after the BaFin’s prior involvement. As the ECB has stated in previous opinions, in many cases the banking supervisory authority will be best placed to assess whether a distressed bank is able to continue in

text: business and therefore will also be able to assess the appropriateness of such plans. Whilst this is reflected in the draft law, the requirement for the Court to approve the plans may mean that the restructuring is not always quick. 3.3 The provisions concerning the content of the reorganisation plan (Section 8(2) of

text: Article 1

text: ) provide for the building of voting groups among the creditors, whose composition depends not only on the creditors’ legal position but also their respective economic interests. The sub-division following the concept of ‘economic interest’ might create legal uncertainty unless the criteria for making these decisions, which may have direct consequences on creditor rights, are more clearly stipulated.

text: 4. Amendments to the Law on banking – Improved instruments for resolution of systemically relevant banks

text: 4.1 The draft law’s introduction of the option of a full or partial transfer of a distressed bank’s assets and liabilities to a bridge bank is welcomed. The Eurosystem highlighted the importance of such a resolution tool in ensuring the continuity of essential business operations of systemically important banks when replying to the Commission’s initial analysis of a future EU framework for crisis management and resolution . The availability of such resolution tools is also in line with the recommendations on the need for an enhanced convergence of national crisis management regimes adopted at both international and Union levels . In view of the increasing inter-dependencies between financial systems and the need to address the possible systemic impact of the failure of cross-border financial institutions, the domestic crisis management frameworks may need to be further aligned with future regulatory initiatives at Union level. These initiatives address, inter alia, existing problems in the coordination of resolution and insolvency proceedings concerning crossborder banks. 4.2 In line with its previous position, the ECB sees the need for the close involvement of central banks in prudential supervision . The ECB notes the involvement of the Deutsche Bundesbank, together with the BaFin, in assessing whether an existential risk to the credit institution and a systemic risk are present (Section 48b(3) of Article 2 of the draft law). The involvement of the Bundesbank is consistent with its role as a member of the European System of Central Banks in contributing to the stability of the financial system (

text: Article 127(5)

text: TFEU). 4.3 Pursuant to the provisions on transfer orders (Section 48a et seq. of

text: Article 2

text: ), the choice of assets and liabilities to be transferred from the distressed credit institution to another entity will depend

text: considerably on the BaFin’s discretion. There are no specific rules or other criteria in the draft law which provide the basis on which assets should be selected for transfer . Although it may be necessary to retain some flexibility to allow the BaFin to address different possible situations, some basic rules to be respected by the authorities in exercising this power would be useful as there could be considerable intrusion on the rights of creditors and on the principle of equal treatment (priority rights etc.). Whilst such basic rules would maintain a degree of flexibility, they would also limit the discretion in exercising this power with a view to promoting legal certainty on the market for bank debt.

text: 5. Suspension of close-out netting clauses

text: 5.1 Section 13 of

text: Article 1

text: fo the draft law provides that contractual relationships with a credit institution cannot be terminated until the business day following the date of an institution’s application to BaFin for the initiation of the reorganisation procedure. The ECB supports the rationale behind this temporary prohibition, as it may be essential to efficiently and safely transfer en bloc assets, such as derivative contracts with counterparties, to a bridge bank or another new entity to preserve the distressed bank’s business operations until it can be safely reorganised. Moreover, Section 48g(7) of Article 2 of the draft law contains an outright ban on counterparties terminating contracts with banks which are the subject of a spin-off of assets to another entity based on a BaFin transfer order. As stated in recommendation 9 of the Report and Recommendations of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s Cross-border Bank Resolution Group , ‘the ability of relevant [national] authorities to impose a brief delay on the exercise of early termination and netting rights would maximise the possibility of transfer to a sound financial institution, a bridge bank or another public entity provided that the period of time during which the authorities can delay immediate operation of contractual early termination rights pending a transfer is clearly defined and limited, after which full termination and close-out rights would be available for all financial contracts not transferred to a solvent transferee;’. 5.2 The ECB notes that any suspension of counterparties’ close-out netting rights conflicts with 12 13 14 Directives

text: and

text: Article 7(1)

text: (b) of Directive

text: requires Member States to ensure that in case of financial collateral a close-out netting provision can take effect in accordance with its terms notwithstanding the commencement or continuation of winding-up proceedings or reorganisation measures or any purported assignment, judicial or other attachment or other disposition of or in respect of such rights. Similarly, settlement finality is required by Directive

text: for netting within Union designated payment and securities settlement systems.

text: Article 25 of Directive 2001/24/EC

text: further provides that netting agreements shall be governed by the law of the contract which governs such agreements. The ECB notes that the master agreements on which close-out netting rights are based are often concluded by German banks under the laws of other jurisdictions, such as English or New York law. It is legally uncertain whether the proposed temporary stay would be consistent with the existing provisions of Union law. Also, it is unclear under Union law whether the proposed stay could be enforced against a German credit institution which has entered into a netting agreement governed by English or New York law or other non-German laws. In view of these legal uncertainties, any statutory powers to impose a temporary stay on such contracts should be coordinated closely at Union level.

text: 6. The restructuring fund and bank levy

text: 6.1 The ECB welcomes the establishment of the Fund as part of a broader range of initiatives aiming at strengthening financial stability. The Fund regime entails the further disengagement of the State in favour of restructuring primarily financed by the banking sector . This financing regime is in line with the G20 and the European Commission communications . 6.2 Nonetheless, the ECB considers that the Fund should provide financial support to mitigate the impact of an institution’s distress, i.e. in the context of a resolution, and should not be used for the purposes of a bail-out. The purpose of resolution funds is to mitigate the effects of a failure on different stakeholders by trying to maximise the value of remaining assets and facilitate, if possible, a quick return to their productive use. In some cases, this type of fund may help to continue the performance of core services by creating a bridge bank that will be sold afterwards. The costs incurred in these activities should be borne by the private sector, thus avoiding recourse to public funds to support distressed institutions. From this perspective, the ECB acknowledges the intention of the German authorities to establish a fund with a wider scope. 6.3 It cannot be excluded however that in a crisis situation, funding by the industry may be insufficient and that supplementary use of public funds may be necessary. In that case, the banking sector should be called upon to reimburse the State for the public funds it has provided. The principle of ex post recovery from the banking sector should promote additional market discipline and address moral hazard risk.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 19 November 2010. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET

type: vagledning

utgivare: ecb


text: As decided at a meeting of the Economic and Financial Affairs Council on 13 July 2010. 3 All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: OJ L 15, 20.1.2009, p. 14.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 26 November 2010 on the minimum reserves framework (CON/2010/84)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 26 November 2010 on the minimum reserves framework (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 25 October 2010, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from Eesti Pank for an opinion on the draft Governor decree on the procedure for calculating and complying with the reserve requirement (hereinafter the ‘draft decree’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and

text: Article 2(2) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft decree relates to monetary policy instruments. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft decree

text: The draft decree will fine-tune the minimum reserve framework in Estonia to the Eurosystem minimum reserve system in preparation for the introduction of the euro in Estonia on 1 January 2011 . The draft decree will create a single legal act on minimum reserves that will apply from 1 January 2011 and will repeal the earlier legal acts.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 Opinion

text: addressed similar provisions, noting that Estonia will be subject from 1 January 2011 to the ECB’s minimum reserves framework, consisting of: (i) Article 19 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank; (ii)

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 2531/98 of 23 November 1998

text: concerning the application of minimum reserves by the European Central Bank ; (iii) Regulation ECB/2003/9 of 12 September 2003 on the

text: application of minimum reserves ; and (iv) in relation to the definition and calculation of the reserve base, Regulation ECB/2008/32 of 19 December 2008 concerning the balance sheet of the monetary financial institutions sector (recast) .

text: Article 11

text: and Annex III to Regulation ECB/2008/32 require the use of the statistical information by credit institutions reported under this Regulation for minimum reserves purposes. Special rules set out in this Regulation prevail over Regulation ECB/2003/9 and concern small credit institutions, group reporting and reserve requirements in the case of mergers. 2.2 Decision ECB/2010/18 of 26 October 2010 on transitional provision for the application of minimum reserves by the European Central Bank following the introduction of the euro in Estonia ensures that the relevant institutions are integrated smoothly into the Eurosystem’s minimum reserve system without placing a disproportionate burden on them. While the regular reserve maintenance period runs from 8 December 2010 to 18 January 2011, this Decision provides for a transitional maintenance period from 1 to 18 January 2011 for the imposition of minimum reserve requirements on institutions located in Estonia. Furthermore, the Decision sets out specific rules governing the application of minimum reserve requirements during the transitional period and, in particular, describes the method for calculating the reserve base in relation to the transitional period for liabilities owed to institutions located in Estonia. 2.3 Taking into account Opinion ECB/2010/60, the draft Decree provides legal clarity and secures a smooth transition to the Eurosystem minimum reserves framework from 1 January 2011.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 26 November 2010.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Austria, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia. 2 OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2007 on payment services in the internal market amending Directives

text: and

text: and repealing Directive

text: (OJ L 319, 5.12.2007, p. 1). 4

text: Case C-118/07

text: Commission v Finland [2009] ECR 10889, paragraph 28

text: Article 3

text: (g)(vii) of Directive

text: contains this reference in the list concerning the negative scope of the Directive; paper-based postal money orders as defined by the Universal Postal Union are outside the scope of the Directive. 6

text: Article 2.27

text: and Article 6 of the Agreement. 7

text: Article 66 of Directive 2007/64/EC

text: . 8 Article 19.1 of the Agreement. 9

text: Article 58 of Directive 2007/64/EC

text: . 10 Article 20 of the Agreement. 11

text: Article 22.1

text: .1. of the Agreement. 12

text: Article 75 of Directive 2007/64/EC

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 30 November 2010 on the ratification or implementation of a Postal Payment Services Agreement (CON/2010/85)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 30 November 2010 on the ratification or implementation of a Postal Payment Services Agreement (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: Nineteen Member States agreed to sign the Postal Payment Services Agreement of 12 August 2008, as th drawn up by the 24 Universal Postal Congress (hereinafter the ‘Agreement’). Thus far, the European Central Bank (ECB) has not been consulted on any of the national draft legislative provisions ratifying or implementing the Agreement. Although some of the affected Member States have already ratified the Agreement, it still needs to be ratified by most of them. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the second indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the Agreement deals with cross-border payment instruments. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion. It is addressed to the competent national authorities of the 19 Member States that agreed to sign the Agreement (hereinafter the ‘relevant Member States’). The ECB anticipates that the draft legislative provisions ratifying the Agreement will be almost identical in the relevant Member States. For this reason, the ECB does not expect to be consulted on any draft legislative provisions that are addressed in this own-initiative opinion. The ECB reserves the right to make additional comments on specific national draft legislative provisions which go beyond the mere ratification of the Agreement, on which the ECB may be consulted separately.

text: 1. Purpose of the Agreement

text: 1.1 The Agreement obliges signatories to ensure, using best efforts, that at least one of the following four postal payment services is provided in their territories: money order in cash, outpayment money order, inpayment money order or postal transfer. The Agreement contains substantive rules which apply to paper-based postal money orders as well as to non paper-based postal payment orders, such as orders forwarded by electronic means or by any other technical means. These

text: substantive rules address issues such as electronic data-interchange, the processing of postal payment orders, inquiries and the liability regime. 1.2 The Agreement is accompanied by regulations, as revised by the Postal Operations Council in 2008 and 2009, which set out how the Agreement is to be implemented.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 The ECB notes that there is some overlap between the Agreement and Directive

text: on key legal points, such as the liability of postal payment services providers or the moment of irrevocability of a postal payment order. th 2.2 In this context, when signing the Acts adopted by the 24 Universal Postal Congress, including the Agreement, the relevant Member States made a Declaration stating that their countries will apply the Acts adopted by the Congress in accordance with their obligations pursuant to the Treaty establishing the European Community and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) of the World Trade Organization. The wording of this Declaration is in line with the wording of Article 4.3 of the Treaty on European Union which states, inter alia, that, ‘The Member States shall take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Union.’ and that ‘Member States shall … refrain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s objectives’. 2.3 The ECB is of the view that the relevant Member States that have signed the Declaration are reaffirming their obligation to apply any provisions of the Agreement in accordance with their obligations under the Treaties. This would include obligations stemming from secondary legislation, such as Directive

text: . Whilst the value of the Declaration is ultimately subject to review by the national courts, a Member State’s obligation to comply with the Treaties when entering into international obligations clearly derives from

text: Article 351

text: TFEU. The Court of Justice of the European Union confirmed this in a judgement of 2009, ‘However, the second paragraph of

text: Article 307

text: EC obliges the Member States to take all appropriate steps to eliminate incompatibilities with Community law which have been established in agreements concluded prior to their accession. Under that provision, the Member States are required, where appropriate, to assist each other to that end and, where appropriate, to adopt a common attitude.’ . Given that this obligation extends to international agreements concluded prior to a Member State’s accession to the Union, such an obligation would clearly extend to any international agreements, whether bilateral or multilateral, which were concluded following accession.

text: 3. Specific observations

text: Deletion of definition of ‘postal money orders' in the Agreement 3.1 In the context of the reference in Directive

text: to ‘postal money orders’ as defined by the Universal Postal Union, the ECB would like to point out that the 2008 version of the Agreement does not contain any definition of ‘postal money orders’, contrary to the previous version of the Agreement which was adopted in 2004 and which was in force at the time when Directive

text: was adopted. The ECB draws attention to the fact that in order to address this issue and ensure legal certainty, national implementing measures should define ‘postal money orders’ instead of merely referring to ‘postal money orders’ as defined by the Universal Postal Union. Incompatibilities between the Agreement and Directive

text: 3.2 In particular, the ECB would like to draw attention to the incompatibilities between the Agreement and Directive

text: that are set out below. 3.2.1 First, the definition of the moment of irrevocability of a payment order differs in the two legal instruments. The Agreement defines the moment of irrevocability of a payment order as the moment when the payee is paid or the payee’s account is credited whereas, in Directive

text: , a payment order is irrevocable, once it has been received by the payer’s payment services provider. 3.2.2 Second, under the Agreement , inquiries are to be entertained within a period of six months from the day after that on which the postal payment order was accepted. The deadline and its point of departure are different in Directive

text: which provides that notification of an unauthorised or incorrectly executed payment transaction must be made no later than 13 months after the debit date . 3.2.3 Finally, the scope and the duration of liability differ. Under the Agreement , the postal payment services provider is liable until the postal payment order has been duly paid or the payee’s account credited. An exception to the liability of the payment services provider is provided for in case of delay in the execution of the services . This exception does not exist in Directive

text: , which provides that the payee’s payment service provider shall be liable to the payee for the correct execution of the payment transaction .

text: 3.2.4 The ECB considers it important that each relevant Member State ensures that the ratification of the Agreement does not jeopardise the application of the relevant national rules implementing Directive

text: and takes appropriate measures in this respect, where necessary. This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 30 November 2010. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 2 Emergency Ordinance No 99 of 6 December 2006 on Credit Institutions and Capital Adequacy, Monitorul Oficial al României, Part One, No 1027 of 27 December 2006. 3 Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions (recast), OJ L 177, 30.6.2006, p. 1.

text: Article 5 (1)

text: (a) of the draft regulation. 5

text: Article 5 (1)

text: (b) of the draft regulation. 6

text: Article 5 (1)

text: (c) of the draft regulation. 7

text: Article 5 (1)

text: (d) of the draft regulation. 8 Article 7 of the draft regulation. 9 Article 9 of the draft regulation.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 3 December 2010 on the temporary holding of shares by credit institutions in the course of financial reconstructions or rescue operations of undertakings (CON/2010/86)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 3 December 2010 on the temporary holding of shares by credit institutions in the course of financial reconstructions or rescue operations of undertakings (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 5 November 2010, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from Banca Naţională a României (BNR) for an opinion on a draft Regulation on shares held temporarily during a financial reconstruction or rescue operation of an undertaking operating outside the financial sector (hereinafter the ‘draft regulation’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the sixth indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft regulation relates to rules applicable to the financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1 Purpose of the draft regulation

text: 1.1 The draft regulation sets out requirements for credit institutions’ prudent decision-making processes when they seek to temporarily acquire shares in (and possibly control of) a non-financial undertaking during a financial reconstruction or a rescue operation, by way of a debt-to-equity swap. 1.2 For this reason, the draft regulation provides further details on the exemption clause under Article 145 of the Government’s Emergency Ordinance No 99/2006 (GEO 99/2006) , which transposes

text: Article 121 of Directive 2006/48/EC

text: . This clause provides that shares held temporarily during a financial reconstruction or rescue operation shall not be counted as qualifying holdings. Therefore, the limitation applicable to qualifying holdings of credit institutions in non-financial

text: undertakings, as laid down in Articles 143 and 144 of GEO 99/2006, which transposes

text: Article 120 of Directive 2006/48/EC

text: , does not apply. 1.3 Article 5 of the draft regulation sets out the specific requirements to be met by a credit institution before acquiring shares in order for it to benefit from the exemption. In particular, the credit institution needs to provide a strategy and an overall policy . It must formulate and implement a concrete, viable and well-founded financial reconstruction or rescue plan for the undertaking concerned . It must also properly justify its view that the acquisition of shares is a measure of last 6 7 resort and it must have suitable risk management policies/procedures in place. 1.4 Furthermore, the credit institution needs to notify BNR’s Supervision Department of its intention to acquire the shares and to submit documentation demonstrating that it meets the requirements stipulated in Article 5 of the draft regulation. The Supervision Department shall then deliver an opinion as to whether these requirements have been met. 1.5 The ‘temporary’ holding of shares acquired under the exemption clause is limited to a period of 36 months, with the possibility of a one-off extension which may be granted by BNR’s Supervision Department. However, shares cannot be held for more than a total of 48 months .

text: 2. Specific observations

text: 2.1 The ECB welcomes the intention of the Romanian authorities to provide further details on the conditions under which credit institutions may acquire shares in non-financial undertakings and on the restrictions which apply in this context. This approach is in line with the spirit of the exemption clause in

text: Article 121 of Directive 2006/48/EC

text: , as implemented by Article 145 of GEO 99/2006. 2.2 The ECB notes that, for the purposes of clarity and legal certainty, some of the provisions in the draft regulation need to be further clarified. In particular, the consequences of a negative opinion of BNR’s Supervision Department on whether a credit institution meets the requirements to temporarily acquire shares in accordance with the exemption clause should be clearly stated. To this end, concrete provisions setting out the measures that BNR could take in such cases, including sanctions for non-compliance, would contribute to the enforcement of prudential supervision in this field.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 3 December 2010. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: OJ L 181, 4.7.2001, p. 6.

text: OJ L 267, 9.10.2010, p. 1.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 6 December 2010 on authenticity, fitness checking and recirculation of euro banknotes and on sanctions for the failure to protect euro banknotes and coins against counterfeiting (CON/2010/87)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 6 December 2010 on authenticity, fitness checking and recirculation of euro banknotes and on sanctions for the failure to protect euro banknotes and coins against counterfeiting (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 26 October 2010, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Bank of Greece (BoG) for an opinion on a draft BoG Monetary Policy Council act on the authenticity and fitness checking and recirculation of euro banknotes and on the imposition of sanctions for failure to withdraw from circulation counterfeit euro notes (hereinafter the ‘draft MPC act’) and on a draft BoG Governor’s act on the imposition of sanctions on credit institutions and bureaux de change that fail to withdraw from circulation counterfeit euro coins (hereinafter the ‘draft Governor’s act’; the draft MPC act and the draft Governor’s act are hereinafter jointly referred to as the ‘draft acts’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the first, second and third indents of

text: on the consultation of the ECB by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft acts concern currency matters, means of payment and the Bank of Greece. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the ECB, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft acts

text: 1.1 The draft acts will align national law with

text: Article 6 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1338/2001 of 28 June 2001

text: laying down measures necessary for the protection of the euro against counterfeiting . They establish a sanctions regime for failure to discharge the obligations under

text: Article 6(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1338/2001

text: . In addition, the draft MPC act complements Decision ECB/2010/14 of 16 September 2010 on the authenticity and fitness checking and recirculation of euro banknotes . National authorities are not formally obliged to consult the ECB on the implementation of the Member States’ obligation to take the necessary measures to ensure that

text: breaches of

text: Article 6(1) of Regulation (EC) 1338/2001

text: are subject to effective, proportionate and deterrent sanctions. However, the ECB considers it necessary to harmonise throughout the Union the national measures implementing the abovementioned obligation to the extent possible, subject to national peculiarities. Thus, the present opinion includes some observations on this point. 1.2 The draft MPC act amongst others: (i) aligns national law with

text: Article 6(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1338/2001

text: and Decision ECB/2010/14 by imposing on cash handlers, which are defined in Article 2 of the Decision ECB/2010/14 by reference to the institutions listed in

text: Article 6 of Regulation (EC) No 1338/2001

text: , the obligation to comply with the euro banknote authenticity and fitness checking and recirculation procedures defined by the ECB and to withdraw from circulation all euro banknotes received by them which they know or have sufficient reason to believe to be counterfeit; (ii) regulates certain issues that the Decision ECB/2010/14 leaves to the discretion of the national central banks (NCBs); (iii) provides that in the event of non-compliance with its provisions and with Decision ECB/2010/14 the BoG’s Governor or bodies authorised by the Governor will impose a fine ranging from EUR 10 000 to EUR 200 000, and in the event of repeated non-compliance, up to EUR 300 000, according to the findings of the inspections conducted by the competent authorities; (iv) provides that the BoG will prohibit the recirculation of euro banknotes that are affected by non-compliance by a cash handler with Decision ECB/2010/14 and with the draft MPC act where such non-compliance is detected during an on-site inspection, for as long as it has not been remedied. 1.3 The draft Governor’s act (i) imposes on credit institutions and bureaux de change the obligation to withdraw from circulation all euro coins received by them which they know or have sufficient reason to believe to be counterfeit and (ii) provides that a decision of the BoG Banking and Credit Committee will impose on non-compliance with the abovementioned obligation a fine in favour of the Greek State, in the same range provided under the draft MPC act. 1.4 The draft acts will enter into force on 1 January 2011.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 The draft acts will lay down measures on the authenticity and fitness checking and recirculation of euro banknotes and coins, in line with

text: and Decision ECB/2010/14. In this respect, the ECB welcomes the draft acts. 2.2 With regard to the draft MPC act, the ECB considers that the provisions regulating issues that the Decision ECB/2010/14 leaves to the discretion of the national central banks will contribute to the adequate implementation of this Decision in the Greek legal order. Regarding paragraph 1 of the draft MPC act, the ECB is of the opinion that it should specify more clearly that cash handlers not checking euro banknotes for authenticity and fitness will not be allowed to recirculate these banknotes and may only put in circulation euro banknotes that they have received either directly from an NCB or from another cash handler, such as a credit institution or a cash-in-transit

text: company, that has checked the euro banknotes for authenticity and fitness according to the procedures laid down in Decision ECB/2010/14. 2.3 The draft Governor’s act will apply the withdrawal obligation under

text: to euro coins, requiring only credit institutions and bureaux de change to comply with this obligation. Under Article 128 of the Treaty, the ECB has the exclusive right to authorise the issue of euro banknotes within the Union, whereas euro coins are issued by euro area Member States subject to the ECB’s approval of the volume. Consequently, the ECB’s regulatory competence concerns only euro banknotes. Thus, the ECB supports a clear and consistent separation between national rules for euro banknotes and coins. The ECB further understands that the reason for limiting the scope of the draft Governor’s act to credit institutions and bureaux de change relates to the fact that, in the field of euro coins, the BoG has competence only as regards the institutions it supervises, i.e. credit institutions and bureaux de change. Nevertheless, in respect of euro coins the ECB notes that a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning authentication of euro coins and handling of euro coins unfit for circulation was adopted on 29 November 2010 and will apply from 1 January 2012 to all institutions referred to in

text: 3. Specific observations

text: Sanctions regime 3.1 The ECB welcomes the establishment of a deterrent sanctions regime, composed of enforcement measures and financial sanctions, applicable to non-compliance by cash handlers with their obligations under Decision ECB/2010/14 and the draft MPC act, as such non-compliance may compromise the adequate protection of euro banknotes from counterfeiting in the Greek legal order. In addition to enforcement measures such as the prohibition imposed on a non-compliant cash handler from recirculating euro banknotes, the fact that the BoG may also apply financial sanctions in the context of the exercise of the regulatory powers provided by its Statute allows the effective and consistent application of administrative sanctions against non-compliant cash handlers, without prejudice to potential penal sanctions imposed by the competent authorities. 3.2 With regard to the types and range of sanctions provided by the draft MPC act, the ECB notes that particular importance should be attached to the proportionality between the obligation that the cash handler has not complied with and the sanction imposed on it. In particular, with regard to the second subparagraph of paragraph 6 of the draft MPC act, according to which the BoG will prohibit the recirculation of euro banknotes that are affected by non-compliance by a cash handler with Decision ECB/2010/14 and of the draft MPC act when such non-compliance is detected during an on-site inspection, the ECB stresses that, considering the variety of non-compliances that may be detected during an inspection, it may be disproportionate to prohibit the recirculation of euro banknotes in cases where the non-compliance is minor.

text: 3.3 The principle of proportionality is also relevant to the level of the financial sanction imposed on a non-compliant cash handler. The ECB considers positive that the level of the fines imposed for non-compliance with Decision ECB/2010/14 and the draft MPC act will depend on the findings of the inspections as referred to in paragraph 6 of the draft MPC act. 3.4 The ECB believes that the sanctioning regimes available in the Member States that have aligned their law with

text: Regulation (EC) No 1338/2001

text: in conjunction with Decision ECB/2010/14 could merit some harmonisation insofar as the ECB procedures laid down in the Decision are equally applicable to all cash handlers located in the euro area. In this respect, the ECB considers it important for national authorities to contribute to the establishment of a level playing field among cash handlers falling within the scope of

text: Regulation (EC) 1338/2001

text: , without prejudice to (i) the particularities of the cash cycle and the organisation of cash handlers at national level, and (ii) the consistency of the levels of financial sanctions available in their legal orders.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 6 December 2010.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 9 December 2010 on the increase of Banque de France’s capital and statutory reserve (CON/2010/88)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 9 December 2010 on the increase of Banque de France’s capital and statutory reserve (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 11 November 2010, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the French Ministry for Economic Affairs, Industry and Employment for an opinion on a draft decree on Banque de France budgetary and financial provisions (hereinafter the ‘draft decree’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to the Banque de France. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft decree

text: 1.1 The draft decree provides for an increase of Banque de France’s capital from around EUR 457 million to EUR 1 billion, and for an increase of the ceiling of the statutory reserve, which is equal to the amount of Banque de France’s capital , to double that amount, i.e. EUR 2 billion. 1.2 In addition, the draft decree specifies that the capital increase will be made by incorporating into the capital, (a) funds taken from the statutory reserve up to an amount equal to the current amount of Banque de France’s capital; and (b) funds taken from the unallocated reserve fund.

text: 1 OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: 2 Article R.144-10 of the French Monetary and Financial Code currently provides that the Banque de France’s capital shall be EUR 457 347 051.71.

text: 3 Article R.144-4, paragraph 2, of the French Monetary and Financial Code currently provides that a deduction of 5% of the net result for the financial year shall be allocated to a specific reserve that will no longer be funded when it reaches an amount equal to the Banque de France's capital. The ECB understands that the specific reserve referred to in this provision corresponds to the statutory reserve in the annual accounts of Banque de France as published in Banque de France’s annual report.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 The ECB welcomes the proposed increase of Banque de France’s capital and statutory reserve and understands that this decision has been made in close cooperation with Banque de France. The ECB considers it important from the perspective of central bank independence that such decisions are initiated and taken in close cooperation with the relevant national central bank (NCB) which is best placed to assess its required level of reserve capital . The principle of financial independence requires an NCB to have sufficient means not only to perform its ESCB or Eurosystem-related tasks but also its national tasks (e.g. financing its administration and own operations). Financial independence also implies that an NCB should always be sufficiently capitalised . In particular, the ECB is of the view that the higher the level of capital, reserves and provisions against financial risks is, the higher the safeguards against future losses are . As mentioned in the ECB’s Convergence Report 2010 , any situation should be avoided whereby for a prolonged period of time an NCB’s net equity is below the level of its statutory capital or is even negative, including where losses beyond the level of capital and the reserves are carried over. Any such situation may negatively impact on the NCB’s ability to perform not only its ESCB or Eurosystem-related tasks but also its national tasks. Moreover, such a situation may affect the credibility of the Eurosystem’s monetary policy. Therefore, the event of an NCB’s net equity becoming less than its statutory capital or even negative would require that the respective Member State provides the NCB with an appropriate amount of capital at least up to the level of the statutory capital within a reasonable period of time so as to comply with the principle of financial independence. 2.2 The ECB understands that the existing statutory reserve will be fully incorporated into the capital in order to finance its increase. As provided for by the draft decree , such reserve will in subsequent years be gradually built up again up to a higher amount, equal to double the new capital amount, i.e. EUR 2 billion. The ECB welcomes the increase of the ceiling of the statutory reserve. This should contribute to ensuring that the financial protection deemed necessary to safeguard the real value of an NCB’s capital and assets is strengthened before remaining profits may be distributed to the State budget, in accordance with the requirements resulting from the principle of financial independence . The ECB notes that the draft decree does not propose modifying the level of the deduction of the net result for the financial year to be allocated to the regulatory reserve, which is set to 5% of the net result. In order to safeguard the real value of its capital and assets, it is essential that Banque de France rebuilds its reserves in a period of time it considers appropriate and that Banque de France independently builds up any financial provisions deemed necessary.

text: 4 See the ECB’s Convergence Report 2010, p. 23.

text: 5 See the ECB’s Convergence Report 2010, p. 21.

text: 6 See also, in this regard, Opinion

text: , paragraph 4.2, available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: 7 See the ECB’s Convergence Report 2010, pp. 21-22.

text: 8 Pursuant to Article R.144-4, paragraph 2, of the French Monetary and Financial Code, as modified by the draft decree, a deduction of 5% of the net result for the financial year shall be allocated to a specific reserve that will no longer be funded when it reaches an amount equal to the double of Banque de France's capital.

text: 9 See the ECB’s Convergence Report 2010, p. 23. This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 9 December 2010. [signed] The President of the ECB Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 2 OJ L 267, 9.10.2010, p. 1.

text: Pursuant to the proposed amendment, negligible part shall mean a missing part that reduces length or also width of a euro banknote by not more than 10 mm, whilst the difference shall be always measured in relation to the nominal length or also nominal width of the euro banknote. 4 See Annex IIIa, point 7 in connection with Article 2(11) of Decision ECB/2010/14.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 9 December 2010 on certain new provisions on cash currency circulation (CON/2010/89)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 9 December 2010 on certain new provisions on cash currency circulation (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 23 November 2010, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from Národná banka Slovenska for an opinion on the draft decree amending Decree of Národná banka Slovenska No 607/2008 Coll. of 16 December 2008 on certain details regarding cash currency circulation and on amendments to certain decrees (hereinafter the ‘draft Decree’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the first, second and third indents of

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft Decree relates to currency matters, means of payment and Národná banka Slovenska. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft Decree

text: The main purpose of the draft Decree is to delete provisions of Decree No 607/2008 Coll. under which Národná banka Slovenska implemented the Framework for the detection of counterfeits and fitness sorting by the credit institutions and other professional cash handlers (hereinafter ‘the Framework’) against the background of Slovakia’s adoption of the euro. As of 1 January 2011, the Framework will be replaced by Decision ECB/2010/14 of 16 September 2010 on the authenticity and fitness checking and recirculation of euro banknotes . For this reason, it is no longer necessary to maintain those provisions of Decree No 607/2008 Coll. which implemented the Framework’s provisions on authenticity and fitness checking. In order to introduce a Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) standard, it is also proposed to delete the requirement to have lodgements of euro banknotes that are faced and oriented. Finally, the draft Decree aims at introducing a number of amendments to reflect the practical needs of cash currency circulation.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 The ECB notes that in Slovakia currently only Národná banka Slovenska exchanges incomplete mutilated and damaged euro banknotes. The draft Decree extends this obligation to commercial banks, provided that only a negligible part of the euro banknote is missing . In this respect, the ECB notes that any euro banknote with its length reduced by 6 mm or more or its width reduced by 5 mm or more is considered to be ‘unfit’ and therefore unsuitable for recirculation in accordance with Decision ECB/2010/14 . Types of banknote handling machines successfully tested by a national central bank which check euro banknotes for fitness must be able to detect and separate ‘unfit’ banknotes which are ‘unfit’ on the basis of the specifications mentioned above. The recirculation of ‘unfit’ banknotes, both via banknote handling machines and over the counter following checks for fitness by trained staff members, should therefore be prevented. 2.2 Article 4(2) of Decree No 607/2008 Coll. provides that incomplete banknotes are replaced by Národná banka Slovenska in accordance with the rules applicable in the euro area. However, if an amendment to

text: Article 4(1)

text: is adopted, commercial banks will also be obliged to exchange incomplete euro banknotes to a limited extent. For this reason, the ECB suggests amending

text: Article 4(2)

text: accordingly.

text: 3. Specific observations

text: 3.1 The new Article 3(6) of Decree No 607/2008 Coll. extends the applicability of provisions on the withholding procedure for counterfeit banknotes and coins to banknotes and coins that shall not be exchanged. The ECB understands that this provision may address cases where less than 50 % of a euro banknote is presented or where banknotes and coins are unidentifiable as a result of damage. There is, however, scope for a misunderstanding that, unlike banknotes and coins under new

text: Article 3(6)

text: , counterfeit euro banknotes and coins can actually be exchanged, although this clearly cannot be the case. The ECB therefore suggests that this new provision should rather refer to ‘other’ situations in which an exchange is not possible in order to clarify that withholding of counterfeit banknotes is an option. 3.2 The ECB also recommends that the references to ‘banks and cash handlers’ in Decree No 607/2008 Coll., as amended by the draft Decree, are replaced by a reference to ‘cash handlers’ within the meaning of Decision ECB/2010/14.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 9 December 2010. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: Chapter 2014 of the Laws of Malta

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 13 December 2010 on authenticity, fitness checking and recirculation of euro banknotes (CON/2010/90)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 13 December 2010 on authenticity, fitness checking and recirculation of euro banknotes (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 17 November 2010, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Central Bank of Malta (CBM) for an opinion on a draft CBM Directive No. 10 on the Authenticity and Fitness Checking and Recirculation of Euro Banknotes issued under the Central Bank of Malta Act (hereinafter the ‘draft Directive’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the first, second and third indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft Directive concerns currency matters, means of payment and the Central Bank of Malta. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft CBM Directive

text: 1.1 Under Article 5(3) of the Central Bank of Malta Act, read in conjunction with

text: Article 5(1)

text: (e), the CBM is empowered to issue directives to provide for the circulation of euro banknotes. The draft Directive will be a binding legal act, transposing Decision ECB/2010/14 of 16 September 2010 on the authenticity and fitness checking and recirculation of euro banknotes and will replace the CBM’s current Directive No. 10 on the Banknote Recycling Framework (BRF). 1.2 The draft Directive lays down measures on the authenticity, fitness checking and recirculation of euro banknotes and will enter into force on 1 January 2011.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 The common rules and procedures on authenticity, fitness checking and recirculation of euro banknotes laid down in the draft Directive impose obligations on cash handlers and seek to safeguard the integrity of euro banknotes as a means of payment. The ECB welcomes the draft Directive and is confident that its provisions will ensure the preservation of euro banknotes in circulation and will result in the maintenance of public confidence in euro banknotes. 2.2 Council Decision 98/415 does not contain provisions under which national authorities are required to consult the ECB on implementing measures. Subject to the specific observations in Section 3 below, the ECB notes that the draft Directive generally constitutes a faithful reproduction of the provisions of Decision ECB/2010/14 and introduces no new points. Also, as Decision ECB/2010/14 applies to cash handlers by virtue of

text: Article 6(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1338/2001 of 28 June 2001

text: laying down measures necessary for the protection of the euro against counterfeiting , which refers to ECB procedures for checking euro banknotes, there is no strict need to implement Decision ECB 2010/14 into Maltese law. It is also acknowledged that the draft Directive may contribute to making cash handlers in Malta comply with the rules and procedures laid down in the Decision ECB/2010/14.

text: 3. Specific observations

text: 3.1 Paragraph 37 of the draft Directive provides that the draft Directive will enter into force on 1 January 2011, with the reporting obligation laid down in paragraph 34 to take effect from 1 January 2012. The reporting obligations of credit institutions and professional cash handlers, defined as ‘intermediaries’ in the BRF, are, at present, dealt with in paragraph 16 of the BRF. The wording of paragraph 37 of the draft Directive should be reconsidered given that it may create some ambiguity as it could be inferred that categories of cash handlers currently within the scope of the BRF would, in future, not be obliged to report to the CBM until 1 January 2012. 3.2 The ECB also notes that paragraph 11 of the draft Directive entrusts responsibility for the testing of banknote handling machines to the CBM, thereby appearing to limit the scope of Article 3(3) of Decision ECB/2010/14. Therefore, paragraph 11 of the draft Directive should be amended accordingly. 3.3 Furthermore, paragraph 12 of the draft Directive provides that euro banknotes delivered directly to a cash handler by the CBM do not require authenticity and fitness checks prior to recirculation. The ECB also notes a discrepancy here with Article 3(4) of Decision ECB/2010/14 which provides that authenticity and fitness checks are not required in the case of euro banknotes that have been delivered directly to a cash handler by a national central bank. The draft provision seems to limit

text: the scope of the equivalent provisions of Decision ECB/2010/14 and the ECB is of the opinion that the relevant provisions of the draft CBM Directive should be amended accordingly. This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 13 December 2010. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET