text: COM(2013) 42 final.

text: EGT L 140, 14.6.2000, s. 1.

text: Genèvekonventionen har till dags dato ratificerats av alla medlemsstater utom Malta.

text: Nr 2623, s. 372 – Nationernas förbund, traktatsamling 1931.

text: Se artikel 3.1 a i direktivförslaget.

text: Text markerad med fet stil anger ECB:s förslag till ny text. Genomstruken text anger de strykningar som ECB föreslår.

title: Europeiska centralbankens yttrande av den 28 maj 2013 över ett förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv om straffrättsligt skydd av euron och andra valutor mot penningförfalskning och om ersättning av rådets rambeslut 2000/383/RIF (CON/2013/37)

text: Inledning och rättslig grund

text: Den 5 februari 2013 mottog Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) en begäran från Europeiska kommissionen om ett yttrande över ett förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv om straffrättsligt skydd av euron och andra valutor mot penningförfalskning och om ersättning av rådets rambeslut 2000/383/RIF (nedan kallat direktivförslaget). Den 20 februari och den 2 april 2013 mottog ECB en begäran från Europeiska unionens råd respektive Europaparlamentet om ett yttrande över samma direktivförslag.

text: ECB:s behörighet att avge ett yttrande grundas på artiklarna

text: och

text: i fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt enligt vilka ECB ska höras om varje förslag till unionsrättsakt inom dess behörighetsområde. Därutöver grundas ECB:s behörighet att avge ett yttrande på artikel 128.1 i fördraget samt på

text: artikel 16 i stadgan

text: för Europeiska centralbankssystemet och Europeiska centralbanken, eftersom direktivförslaget innehåller bestämmelser som berör vissa av Europeiska centralbankssystemets uppgifter. I enlighet med artikel 17.5 första meningen i arbetsordningen för Europeiska centralbanken har detta yttrande antagits av ECB-rådet.

text: 1. Direktivförslagets syfte och innehåll

text: Direktivförslaget ersätter rådets rambeslut 2000/383/RIF om förstärkning av skyddet mot förfalskning i samband med införandet av euron genom straffrättsliga och andra påföljder för sådana medlemsstater som deltar i antagandet. Man bibehåller de flesta av bestämmelserna i rådets rambeslut 2000/383/RIF med mindre ändringar och med beaktande av Lissabonfördraget. Därutöver kompletterar direktivförslaget rådets rambeslut 2000/383/RIF genom att införa ett minimi fängelsestraff om sex månader för framställning och spridning av falska pengar samt ett maximalt fängelsestraff på minst åtta år för spridning av falska pengar. Direktivförslaget inför även nya bestämmelser som förpliktigar medlemsstaterna a) att ge möjlighet att använda vissa utredningsverktyg och b) att de nationella analyscentrumen och nationella centrumen för myntanalys får analysera misstänkta penningförfalskningar av euron också under pågående rättsliga förfaranden för att kunna identifiera och spåra andra penningförfalskningar.

text: 2. Allmänna kommentarer

text: ECB välkomnar direktivförslaget vars syftet är att komplettera bestämmelserna och att underlätta medlemsstaternas tillämpning av den internationella konventionen för bekämpning av penningförfalskning som undertecknades i Genève den 20 april 1929, och dess protokoll (nedan kallad Genèvekonventionen). ECB välkomnar även det faktum att direktivförslaget beaktar ECB:s ståndpunkt att den straffrättsliga ramen bör skärpas genom en harmonisering av de straffrättsliga påföljderna, även genom att fastställa standarder för minimipåföljder. Samtidigt noterar ECB att direktivförslaget bibehåller de flesta av bestämmelserna i rådets rambeslut 2000/383/RIF vilket säkerställer rättsäkerheten efter övergången till den nya ordning som fastställs i direktivförslaget.

text: ECB tolkar det som att bestämmelsen om ömsesidigt erkännande av brottmålsdomar i syfte att identifiera upprepade överträdelser enligt artikel 9a i rådets rambeslut 2000/383/RIF inte påverkas när direktivförslaget antas avseende de medlemsstater som redan införlivat denna bestämmelse i sin lagstiftning. Vad gäller medlemsstater som ännu ej gjort detta tycks deras skyldighet att anta nationella regler om sådant ömsesidigt erkännande av brottmålsdomar enligt artikel 9a fortsätta att existera i enlighet med artikel 12 i direktivförslaget. För att förtydliga detta föreslår ECB att man inför innehållet i artikel 9a i rådets rambeslut 2000/383/RIF i direktivförslaget.

text: I enlighet med skälen 28, 29 och 30 i direktivförslaget noterar ECB att, medan Danmark inte deltar i antagandet av direktivförslaget, Förenade kungariket och Irland kan välja huruvida de vill delta i antagandet och tillämpningen av detta direktiv. ECB:s tolkning är att Danmark, Förenade kungariket och Irland, om de inte deltar i antagandet och tillämpningen av direktivförslaget, fortfarande omfattas av skyldigheterna avseende tidsfristen för införlivandet av rådets rambeslut 2000/383/RIF i enlighet med artikel 12 i direktivförslaget. Konsekvensen av detta blir att Danmark, Förenade kungariket och Irland inte kommer att omfattas av de nya reglerna enligt direktivförslaget. Därför vore det fördelaktigt att uppmana myndigheterna i Danmark, Förenade kungariket och Irland (om de två sistnämnda inte avser att delta i antagandet av direktivförslaget) att förbinda sig att tillämpa den minimala och maximala påföljdsnivån, säkerställa att det finns effektiva utredningsverktyg och att nationella analyscentrum och nationella centrum för myntanalys överför förfalskade sedlar och mynt i enlighet med artiklarna 5, 9 och 10 i direktivförslaget. I annat fall undermineras det gränsöverskridande samarbetet samtidigt som risken för forum shopping, såsom nämns i artikel 18 i direktivförslaget, ökar.

text: 3. Specifika kommentarer

text: 3.1 Det potentiella nominella värdet av förfalskade sedlar och mynt

text: Vad gäller hänvisningarna till det nominella värdet på förfalskade sedlar och mynt i skäl 19 och artikel 5 i direktivförslaget, noterar ECB att man, ur ett produktionsperspektiv, endast kan fastställa detta värde för färdigställda falska sedlar eller mynt.

text: ECB anser dock att konceptet med förfalskade sedlar och mynt inte bara avser färdigställda falska sedlar eller mynt utan även kan omfatta sådana förfalskningar som ännu inte är helt färdigproducerade. ECB påpekar att de brottsbekämpande myndigheterna, i samband med sitt arbete mot bedräglig tillverkning eller ändring av sedlar och mynt i euro eller andra valutor, även kan upptäcka förfalskningar som inte är färdig¬producerade. ECB noterar att polisen när den slår till mot förfalskare normalt försöker ingripa medan brottet pågår. Detta är en bedömningsfråga men i vissa fall kan det hända att polisen hittar få färdiga produkter men stora mängder halvfärdiga produkter. ECB noterar att sådana produkter saknar ett nominellt värde men istället har ett potentiellt nominellt värde som bör beaktas när man bestämmer den proportionerliga påföljden enligt artikel 5 i direktivförslaget. Därför bör skäl 19 och artikel 5 ändras och inkludera hänvisningar till de ännu ej färdigställda förfalskningarnas potentiella nominella värde. Det potentiella nominella värdet bör beaktas som ett ytterligare kriterium när man fastställer den proportionerliga påföljden för gärningar enligt artikel 3.1 a–c i direktivförslaget.

text: Därutöver kan det förekomma att de behöriga nationella myndigheterna upptäcker förfalskade sedlar och mynt i andra valutor än euro. I sådana fall bör de behöriga rättsliga myndigheterna vara behöriga att fastställa det nominella eller potentiella nominella värdet på förfalskningarna. Därför anser ECB att man bör företa ytterligare en ändring av skäl 19 och artikel 5 för att klargöra att den minimala och maximala påföljdsnivån bör beakta det nominella eller potentiella nominella värdet på de förfalskade sedlarna eller mynten i annan valuta än euro.

text: 3.2 Förfalskningsbrott och relationen till produktionsverktyg samt råmaterial till sedlar och mynt

text: ECB anser att den minimala och maximala påföljdsnivån bör gälla för alla typer av gärningar enligt artikel 3.1 i direktivförslaget. På så sätt skulle den avskräckande effekten öka avsevärt. Mot bakgrund av att de mest avancerade sedel- och myntförfalskningarna använder sig av komponenter från olika källor, t.ex. falska hologram från länder utanför EU, anser ECB att gärningar enligt direktivförslagets artikel 3.1 d, om de involverar särskilt allvarliga omständigheter, bör omfattas av straffbestämmelserna i direktivförslagets artikel 5.4.

text: 3.3 Skyldigheten att överlämna falska eurosedlar och euromynt för analys

text: ECB välkomnar att direktivförslaget föreskriver att de rättsliga myndigheterna måste ge de nationella analyscentrumen och de nationella centrumen för myntanalys möjlighet att undersöka misstänkta förfalskningar av eurosedlar och euromynt för analys, identifiering och spårning av andra förfalskningar. Om stickprov av misstänka förfalskade sedlar och mynt inte kan överföras på grund av att det är nödvändigt att behålla dem som bevis rekommenderar ECB att det nationella analyscentrumet eller det nationella centrumet för myntanalys erhåller dessa så snart det aktuella förfarandet har avslutats.

text: I de fall där ECB rekommenderar att direktivförslaget ska ändras anges de specifika förslagen i bilagan åtföljt av en förklaring.

text: BILAGA

text: Kommissionens förslag | ECB:s ändringsförslag

text: (19) Medlemsstaterna bör ha möjlighet att föreskriva ett kort fängelsestraff eller att avstå från fängelsestraff i de fall där det sammanlagda nominella värdet av de förfalskade sedlarna och mynten inte är betydande eller inga försvårande omständigheter föreligger. Detta värde bör understiga 5000 EUR, dvs. tio gånger värdet på eurosedlarnas högsta nominella sedelvärde, i de fall där man uppmanar till ett annat straff än fängelsestraff, och understiga 10000 EUR i de fall där man uppmanar till fängelsestraff för en period som understiger sex månader. | (19) Medlemsstaterna bör ha möjlighet att föreskriva ett kort fängelsestraff eller att avstå från fängelsestraff i de fall där det sammanlagda nominella eller potentiella nominella värdet av de förfalskade sedlarna och mynten inte är betydande eller inga försvårande omständigheter föreligger. Detta värde bör understiga 5000 EUR eller motsvarande belopp i valutan för de förfalskade sedlarna eller mynten, dvs. tio gånger värdet på eurosedlarnas högsta nominella sedelvärde, i de fall där man uppmanar till ett annat straff än fängelsestraff, och understiga 10000 EUR eller motsvarande belopp i valutan för de förfalskade sedlarna eller mynten i de fall där man uppmanar till fängelsestraff för en period som understiger sex månader.

text: Förklaring Skäl 19 bör ändras för att ge medlemsstaterna möjlighet att tillämpa en proportionerlig påföljd avseende ännu ej färdigställda förfalskningar av sedlar och mynt som kanske bara har ett potentiellt nominellt värde. Det potentiella nominella värdet bör beaktas som ett ytterligare kriterium när man fastställer den proportionerliga påföljden för gärningar enligt artikel 3.1 a–c i direktivförslaget. Därutöver kan det förekomma att de behöriga nationella myndigheterna upptäcker förfalskade sedlar och mynt i andra valutor än euro, och därför bör de behöriga nationella myndigheterna i medlemsstaten tillåtas fastställa det nominella eller potentiella nominella värdet på sådana förfalskningarna. Man bör därför företa ytterligare en ändring av skäl 19 så att den minimala och maximala påföljdsnivån beaktar det nominella eller potentiella nominella värdet på de förfalskade sedlarna eller mynten i annan valuta än euro.

text: Artikel 5 Påföljder (…) 2. För de straffbara gärningar som avses i artikel 3.1 a, b och c som omfattar sedlar och mynt till ett totalt nominellt värde som understiger 5000 EUR, och utan att det föreligger försvårande omständigheter, kan medlemsstaterna föreskriva ett annat straff än fängelsestraff. 3. De straffbara gärningar som avses i artikel 3.1 a, b och c som omfattar sedlar och mynt till ett totalt nominellt värde på minst 5000 EUR ska vara belagda med ett maximalt fängelsestraff på minst åtta år. 4. De straffbara gärningar som avses i artikel 3.1 a, b och c som omfattar sedlar och mynt till ett totalt nominellt värde på minst 10000 EUR eller som inbegriper allvarliga omständigheter ska vara belagda med a) ett minimalt fängelsestraff på minst sex månader b) ett maximalt fängelsestraff på minst åtta år. (Ingen text.) | Artikel 5 Påföljder […] 2. För de straffbara gärningar som avses i artikel 3.1 a, b och c som omfattar sedlar och mynt till ett totalt nominellt eller potentiellt nominellt värde som understiger 5000 EUR eller motsvarande belopp i valutan för de förfalskade sedlarna eller mynten, och utan att det föreligger försvårande omständigheter, kan medlemsstaterna föreskriva ett annat straff än fängelsestraff. 3. De straffbara gärningar som avses i artikel 3.1 a, b och c som omfattar sedlar och mynt till ett totalt nominellt eller potentiellt nominellt värde på minst 5000 EUR eller motsvarande belopp i valutan för de förfalskade sedlarna eller mynten ska vara belagda med ett maximalt fängelsestraff på minst åtta år. 4. De straffbara gärningar som avses i artikel 3.1 a, b och c som omfattar sedlar och mynt till ett totalt nominellt eller potentiellt nominellt värde på minst 10000 EUR eller motsvarande belopp i valutan för de förfalskade sedlarna eller mynten, eller som inbegriper allvarliga omständigheter ska vara belagda med a) ett minimalt fängelsestraff på minst sex månader b) ett maximalt fängelsestraff på minst åtta år. 5. Påföljderna enligt punkt 4 ska även tillämpas om de straffbara gärningar som avses i artikel 3.1 d inbegriper allvarliga omständigheter.

text: Förklaring Artikel 5.2–5.4 bör ändras så att det blir möjligt att tillämpa en proportionerlig påföljd avseende ännu ej färdigställda förfalskningar av sedlar och mynt som eventuellt bara har ett potentiellt nominellt värde. Det potentiella nominella värdet bör beaktas som ett ytterligare kriterium när man fastställer den proportionerliga påföljden för gärningar enligt artikel 3.1 a–c i direktivförslaget. Därutöver kan det förekomma att de behöriga nationella myndigheterna upptäcker förfalskade sedlar eller mynt i andra valutor än euro, och därför bör de behöriga nationella myndigheterna i medlemsstaten tillåtas fastställa det nominella eller potentiella nominella värdet på sådana förfalskningarna. Man bör därför företa ytterligare ändringar av artikel 5.2-5.4 så att den minimala och maximala påföljdsnivån beaktar det nominella eller potentiella nominella värdet på de förfalskade sedlarna eller mynten i annan valuta än euro. För att öka den avskräckande effekten föreslår ECB att brottsliga gärningar enligt direktivförslagets artikel 3.1 d, om de involverar särskilt allvarliga omständigheter, bör omfattas av straffbestämmelserna i direktivförslagets artikel 5.4 genom att en ny punkt 5 läggs till.

text: 2. Om de nödvändiga stickproven av de misstänka förfalskade sedlarna och mynten inte kan överföras på grund av att det är nödvändigt att behålla dem som bevisning i brottmål för att garantera en rättvis och effektiv rättegång och rätten till försvar för den misstänkta gärningsmannen, ska det nationella analyscentrumet och det nationella centrumet för myntanalys ges tillgång till dem så snart som möjligt. | 2. Om de nödvändiga stickproven av de misstänka förfalskade sedlarna och mynten inte kan överföras på grund av att det är nödvändigt att behålla dem som bevisning i brottmål för att garantera en rättvis och effektiv rättegång och rätten till försvar för den misstänkta gärningsmannen, ska det nationella analyscentrumet och det nationella centrumet för myntanalys ges tillgång till dem så snart som möjligt. Så snart förfarandet avslutats ska de rättsliga myndigheterna utan dröjsmål sända nödvändiga provexemplar av varje typ av misstänkta förfalskade sedlar till de nationella analyscentrumen och varje typ av misstänkta förfalskade mynt till det nationella centrumet för myntanalys.

text: Förklaring Om stickprov av misstänka förfalskade sedlar och mynt inte kan överföras på grund av att det är nödvändigt att behålla dem som bevis, rekommenderar ECB att det nationella analyscentrumet eller det nationella centrumet för myntanalys erhåller dessa så snart det aktuella förfarandet har avslutats.


text: Law No 3864/2010 on the establishment of the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund, FEK A 119/21.07.2010. 2 See

text: Article 1

text: subparagraph D.3 of Law 4152/2013 on urgent measures implementing laws 4046/2012, 4093/2012 and 4127/2013, FEK A 107/09.05.2013. 3 OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: Annex V to Law No 4046/2012 on the approval of the draft financing agreements between the European Financial Stability Fund, the Hellenic Republic and the Bank of Greece and of the draft Memorandum of Understanding between the Hellenic Republic, the European Commission and the Bank of Greece and other provisions of utmost importance for reducing the public debt and saving the national economy (FEK A 28/14.12.2012). 5 See, in particular, Opinions

text: and

text: . All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: The Second Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece - March 2012’, European Economy-Occasional Papers, 94, p. 3. 7 See, in particular, ECB opinion

text: , paragraph 1.2.1. See, also, Article 1 of Law 3864/2010. 8 See Article 4(9) of the HFSF Law.

publisher: Europeiska centralbanken

sprak: en

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 29 May 2013 on the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund (CON/2013/38)

serie: con

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 29 May 2013 on the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

type: rubrik

text: On 24 April 2013, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Greek Ministry of Finance for an opinion on certain draft legislative provisions amending the Law on the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund (hereinafter the ‘HFSF Law’) . The draft provisions were submitted to the Hellenic Parliament on 26 April 2013 and adopted on 28 April 2013 . The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft provisions relate to the representation of the ECB in the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund’s (HFSF) governing bodies and to the strengthening of the HFSF’s governance structure in view of its crucial role in the process of the recapitalisation and restructuring of the Greek banking sector. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

type: stycke

text: 1. Purpose of the draft provisions

text: 1.1 The draft provisions aim at implementing the commitments undertaken by the Greek government in the context of the second review of the second economic adjustment programme for Greece to (a) strengthen the HFSF’s governance structure; (b) rationalise the division of tasks between the HFSF’s General Council and Executive Board; and (c) strengthen the HFSF’s independence. 1.2 The draft provisions, inter alia, alter the composition of the HFSF’s General Council by increasing its members from five to seven; amend the rules relating to the competences of the HFSF’s General Council and Executive Board; and enhance the tasks of the HFSF’s Managing Director. Furthermore, the draft provisions amend the rules relating to the convocation of the meetings and

text: the validity of the decisions of the HFSF’s General Council and Executive Board, and to the quorum required for the meetings of the HFSF's General Council. 1.3 Finally, the draft provisions amend the rules relating to the representation of the ECB and the European Commission in the HFSF, by clarifying that the ECB and Commission representatives may: (a) participate as observers in the committee selecting members of the HFSF’s General Council and Executive Board; and (b) attend the meetings of the HFSF’s General Council and Executive Board as observers without voting rights.

text: 2. Appropriate time to consult the ECB

text: According to

text: Article 4 of Decision 98/415/EC

text: , the ECB must be consulted ‘at an appropriate stage’ in the legislative process in order to afford the ECB sufficient time to adopt its opinion. In certain cases, the consulting authority may invoke reasons of extreme urgency and request that the ECB might adopt its opinion within a shorter time frame. In the present case, the consulting authority did not provide the ECB with a specific time frame within which to adopt its opinion. Furthermore, the draft provisions were adopted by the Greek Parliament within days of requesting the ECB’s opinion. The ECB stresses that even cases of particular urgency do not relieve national authorities of their duty to consult the ECB at an appropriate stage in the legislative process and to allow sufficient time to take into account its views in accordance with Decision

text: 3. General observations

text: The ECB welcomes the draft provisions, to the extent that they aim to amend the HFSF framework in line with the financial sector objectives outlined by the Greek authorities in the Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, as applicable from time to time . In relation to the evolution of the abovementioned legal framework, the ECB refers the consulting authority to its previous, relevant opinions . Without prejudice to this general observation, the ECB has the following specific observations.

text: 4. HFSF’s governance structure

text: 4.1 The ECB understands that the proposed amendments to the HFSF’s governance structure aim at clarifying the competences and responsibilities of the HFSF’s governing bodies and optimising the

text: HFSF’s operation in order to support it in its efforts for an ambitious and swift operational restructuring of all banks in which it has a significant stake. 4.2 The ECB emphasises that the enhancement of the HFSF’s governance structure has been pursued since the agreement on the second economic adjustment programme for Greece in March 2012, on account of the very substantial amount of official financing that is being channelled to Greek banks through the HFSF . Moreover, the ECB notes that the Greek authorities have already, since the time of the agreement on the first economic adjustment programme for Greece in 2010, undertaken to ensure that the HFSF will be governed by private law, that it will enjoy administrative and financial independence, and that it will operate purely in accordance with private economic activity standards . 4.3 The ECB considers that any amendment to the HFSF’s governance structure should take into consideration all the commitments undertaken by the Greek government under the economic adjustment programme for Greece and aim at enabling the HFSF to pursue effectively its critical mandate, which is to maintain the stability of the Greek banking system and to minimise costs for the taxpayer. Against this background, the ECB considers that, although the draft provisions improve to some extent the HFSF’s operation, they do not contribute substantially to enhancing the independent and effective fulfilment of the HFSF’s mandate. In particular, the ECB welcomes the fact that the independence of the HFSF’s General Council is enhanced by means of the addition of two independent members. At the same time, the ECB is of the view that the competences and responsibilities of the HFSF’s governing bodies should be clarified further in order to facilitate more effective practical decision-making. More specifically, the ECB understands that, although the HFSF’s General Council has the status of a supervisory body, it exercises significant decisionmaking powers upon proposal from the Executive Board . The HFSF framework should ensure that the two governing bodies of the HFSF bear adequate responsibility for the HFSF’s decisions, that they cooperate efficiently, that the boundaries of their respective competences are clear, and that these boundaries are also reflected in the internal rules of procedure of the HFSF.

text: 5. Representation of the ECB in the HFSF

text: 5.1 The ECB welcomes the draft provisions relating to the ECB’s representation in the HFSF, as these are broadly in line with the ECB representative’s mandate within the HFSF, which has always been limited to that of an observer, without decision-making authority .

text: 5.2 The ECB nevertheless wishes to reiterate its position that the provision in Article 4(13) of the HFSF Law entitling the ECB’s representative to request the convocation of a meeting of the General Council should be deleted, given that this goes beyond mere observer status of the ECB representative . This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 29 May 2013. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI

type: vagledning

utgivare: ecb


text: Currently, in Romania, macro-prudential policy at national level is not explicitly regulated in national legislation. Oversight of the national financial system is performed by BNR (for the credit institutions sector) and the Financial Supervisory Authority (for the capital market, insurance and private pensions sector). The legislation governing the activity of the two national supervisory authorities provides for their respective task of maintaining the financial stability of the respective sectors. No single authority is entrusted with the exclusive competence of safeguarding the overall stability of the financial system.

text: 9 systemically important institutions , setting a systemic risk buffer or taking specific measures to address macro-prudential concerns . The latter tasks may also be attributed to the competent authority. The ECB understands that the draft emergency ordinance may have to be reviewed upon entry into force of the proposed directive and proposed regulation to determine whether the Committee is a designated authority and to reflect the tasks laid down thereof for designated authorities. 3.2 The ECB welcomes the express provisions of the draft emergency ordinance stating BNR’s independence with regard to macro-prudential policy decisions and the institutional independence of the Committee , in line with Article 130 of the Treaty, 3.3 This opinion does not prejudice the conclusions of the follow-up assessment of the above mentioned recommendation, which the ESRB will issue in accordance with

text: Article 17 of Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 on European Union macro-prudential oversight of the financial system and establishing a European Systemic Risk Board .

text: Article 124

text: a of the proposed directive. 9

text: Article 124

text: d of the proposed directive. 10

text: Article 443

text: a of the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms (2011/0202 (COD) available at: 11 See footnote 10. 13 Pursuant to Article 2(2) of the draft emergency ordinance, the Committee and the General Board members may not seek or take instructions from public authorities or institutions or any public or private bodies.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 3 June 2013 on the macro-prudential oversight of the national financial system (CON/2013/39)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 3 June 2013 on the macro-prudential oversight of the national financial system (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 3 May 2013, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from Banca Naţională a României (BNR) for an opinion on a draft emergency ordinance on the macro-prudential oversight of the national financial system (hereinafter the ‘draft emergency ordinance’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third and sixth indents of

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft emergency ordinance relates to Banca Naţională a României and rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft emergency ordinance

text: The draft emergency ordinance establishes the National Committee for Macro-prudential Oversight (hereinafter the ‘Committee’) mandated to coordinate macro-prudential oversight of the national financial system by defining macro-prudential policy and determining the appropriate instruments for its implementation . The Committee’s primary objective is to contribute to the safeguarding of financial stability by strengthening the resilience of the financial system and decreasing the build-up of systemic risks, thereby ensuring a sustainable contribution of the financial sector to economic growth. The Committee is also entrusted with: (a) coordinating financial crisis management; (b) supervising implementation of European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) recommendations and measures taken at national level as a follow-up to ESRB warnings; (c) collaborating and exchanging information with the micro-prudential supervisory authorities, relevant authorities in the other Member States and the ESRB.

text: The Committee is an entity without legal personality designed as a structure for inter-institutional cooperation . It consists of representatives from BNR, the Financial Supervisory Authority (FSA) and the Ministry of Public Finances. It has the following governing bodies: the General Board, a technical committee on systemic risk, a technical committee on financial crisis management and a Secretariat provided by BNR. BNR’s Governor is the president of the Committee, as well as the chairperson of the General Board, which will include two more representatives of BNR’s executive management, the FSA’s chairperson and the Minister for Public Finance. The chairperson of the Bank Deposit Guarantee Fund also attends the meetings, but has no voting right. Where a potential risk to financial stability is identified based on the assessments conducted, the Committee may issue recommendations and warnings to national micro-prudential supervisory authorities for a policy response. It may also issue recommendations to the Government for legislative initiatives aimed at safeguarding financial stability. The President of the Committee submits the Committee’s annual report to Parliament by 30 June of the following year.

text: 2. General observations

text: The consulting authority asked for an ECB opinion on an urgent basis . The ECB draws the consulting authority’s attention to the second sentence of

text: Article 4 of Decision 98/415/EC

text: pursuant to which the ECB must be consulted ‘at an appropriate stage’ in the legislative process. This implies that the consultation should take place at a point in the legislative process that affords the ECB sufficient time to carefully examine the draft legislative provisions and to adopt its opinion in the required language versions and which also enables the relevant national authorities to take the ECB’s opinion into consideration before the draft legislative provisions are adopted.

text: 3. Specific observations

text: 3.1 The Committee’s tasks include identifying systemically-relevant financial institutions and any other tasks related to macro-prudential oversight, as specified in Union legal acts . Under the proposed directive on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms (hereinafter the ‘proposed directive’), Member States are to designate a public authority that is responsible for setting the countercyclical buffer rate for that Member State . Such a designated authority may also be attributed the task of identifying 3 Article 1 of the draft emergency ordinance. 4 Due to the deadline of 1 July 2013 for the implementation of Recommendation

text: of the European Systemic Risk Board on the macro-prudential mandate of national authorities (OJ C 41, 14.2.2012, p. 1). 5 Article 3(1) of the draft emergency ordinance. 6 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council on the supplementary supervision of credit institutions, insurance undertakings and investment firms in a financial conglomerate (2011/0203 (COD) available at: 7 Article 126(1) of the proposed directive.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 3 June 2013.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: Law CXX of 2001. 7 Law XXIII of 2003. 8 Law CXXXVIII of 2007. 9 Law CLXII of 2009. 10 Law CLVIII of 2010. 11 Law CXCIV of 2011. 12 Law CCVIII of 2011.

text: Article 106

text: , which was not the subject of the consultation request, also purports to amend the Law on the MNB. Articles 2, 3, 12, 49 and 73 of the draft law also concern the role of MNB. 14 I.e.

text: Articles 99

text: to 105 of the draft law. 15 The new Law on the MNB came into effect on 1 January 2012. 16 See, for example,

text: and

text: . All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 17 See

text: and

text: , as well as section 6.5 of the ECB’s May 2012 Convergence Report, and Section 6.6 of the May 2010 Convergence Report. 18

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 3 June 2013 on the new supervisory tasks of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (CON/2013/40)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 3 June 2013 on the new supervisory tasks of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 16 May 2013, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Hungarian Ministry for the National Economy (hereinafter the ‘consulting authority’) for an opinion on a draft law amending several financial-law related legal acts (hereinafter ‘the draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and the third and fifth indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law concerns rules applicable to the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (MNB) and to payment and settlement systems. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The consultation request states that the Law on the MNB needs to be amended in order to harmonise Hungarian law with

text: Regulation (EU) No 648/2012

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories (hereinafter ‘EMIR’), as well as with

text: Regulation (EU) No 260/2012

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2012 establishing technical and business requirements for credit 3 4 transfers and direct debits in euro (hereinafter ‘SEPA’) . To this end, the draft law amends several Hungarian laws; furthermore, it also contains provisions concerning other aspects going beyond the harmonisation of national legislation, as described in the following. 1.2 The draft law contains amendments of the Law on credit institutions and financial enterprises , which aim, inter alia, to regulate the market for, and the issuing, redemption, and supervision of activities and enterprises involved in issuing negotiable vouchers not constituting legal tender

text: (hereinafter ‘negotiable vouchers’), and it also contains rules on the role of the MNB as the competent authority for registering and supervising entities issuing negotiable vouchers. 1.3 The draft law purports to amend several laws governing specific segments of the financial markets, including inter alia the Law on capital markets , the Law on settlement finality in payment and securities settlement systems , the Law on investment firms and commodity exchange service 8 9 providers and the rules of their activities , the Law on consumer credit , the Law on the Financial 10 11 Supervisory Authority , the Law on the financial stability of Hungary , and the Law on the MNB . 1.4 The draft law purports to amend the following aspects of the Law on the MNB: (i) the scope of central bank audit of the issuers of negotiable vouchers; (ii) the sanctions that may be imposed by the MNB where it establishes a breach of applicable rules during a central bank audit; (iii) the deadlines for certain administrative procedures carried out by the MNB; and (iv) the scope of the legislative powers of the Governor of the MNB.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 Appropriate time to consult the ECB The request for an urgent opinion was justified by the consulting authority by the fact that the Hungarian Parliament intended to adopt the draft law in the course of May. According to

text: Article 4 of Decision 98/415/EC

text: the ECB must be consulted at an appropriate stage in the legislative process. This implies that the consultation should take place at a point in the legislative process that allows the ECB sufficient time to examine the draft legislative provisions and adopt its opinion, and the national authorities to take into account the ECB’s views in accordance with Decision

text: . Therefore, the ECB would appreciate the consulting authority honouring its obligation to consult the ECB in good time in future. 2.2 Scope of the consultation

text: Article 2(1) of Decision 98/415/EC

text: provides that national authorities shall consult the ECB on any draft legislative provision within its field of competence pursuant to the Treaty.

text: Article 2(1) of Decision 98/415/EC

text: contains a non-exhaustive list of matters which fall within the ECB’s field of competence, and on which the ECB must be consulted by national authorities.

text: While the draft law contains 111 articles, the consulting authority requested the ECB’s opinion only in respect of

text: Articles 99

text: to 105 of the draft law . The consulting authority is invited to carefully consider whether any of the other provisions of the draft law are subject to the requirement to consult the ECB. Given the urgent nature of the consultation request, the ECB has considered only the provisions on which its opinion was requested .

text: 3. Specific observations

text: 3.1 Changes to the legal framework of the MNB The draft law again purports to amend the recently adopted Law on the MNB . The frequency of amendments to the Law on the MNB has been criticised in previous ECB Opinions , as it does not provide the solid legal framework necessary for the central bank’s functioning. The ECB again emphasises its preference for addressing the outstanding issues concerning the strengthening of the MNB’s independence as part of the present parliamentary procedure on amendments to the Law on the MNB, in order to avoid the need for further amendments at a later stage. 3.2 Harmonisation of national legislation and additional provisions 3.2.1 In accordance with Decision

text: , this opinion is limited to those provisions of the draft law which relate to the MNB and which go beyond harmonisation of national law with EMIR and SEPA. 3.2.2 While the EBC welcomes in general the fact that, under the draft law, the MNB is appointed as the competent authority responsible for ensuring compliance with SEPA, it notes that Article 10 of SEPA provides that each Member State was to designate its competent authority by 1 February 2013. 3.2.3 The ECB welcomes the fact that the Hungarian market for negotiable vouchers is to be regulated, and understands that: (a) negotiable vouchers do not fall within the scope of Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2007 on payment services in the internal market ; and (b) regulation of this area will clearly define the central bank’s role by providing for that the MNB is responsible for registering and supervising entities involved in issuing negotiable vouchers, thereby ensuring consumer protection in this area.

text: 3.2.4 As regards the amendment of the legislative powers of the Governor of the MNB, the ECB would like to point out, in line with the point made in paragraph 2.2, that draft national legislation prepared for adoption by the Governor of the MNB falls within the competence of the ECB and is therefore subject to the consultation requirement, in accordance with the provisions of Decision

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 3 June 2013.

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: Law 138(I)/2002 as amended and currently in force.

text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: It follows from Article 119 of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus that the Governor and Deputy Governor are independent State officials, with clearly circumscribed powers and tasks. The same provision also provides that the Governor shall be in charge of the management of the CBC and shall exercise all powers and perform all functions and duties within the scope of the CBC’s competences.

text: For instance,

text: Article 17

text: , as amended, requires the Board’s approval for decisions laying down and applying the CBC’s policy.

text: See, paragraph 3.4 of ECB Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: See, for example, paragraph 3.5 of ECB Opinion

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 5 June 2013 on changes to the governance of the Central Bank of Cyprus (CON/2013/41)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 5 June 2013 on changes to the governance of the Central Bank of Cyprus (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 18 April 2013, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the President of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Cyprus (hereinafter ‘the consulting authority’) for an opinion on a proposed amendment to the Central Bank of Cyprus Laws of 2002 to 2007 . On 16 May 2013, the ECB received a revised version and, on 31 May 2013, a further revised version of the proposed amendment (hereinafter the ‘draft law’), and it is this last version which forms the basis for this opinion. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (hereinafter the ‘Treaty’) and the third indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to the Central Bank of Cyprus (CBC). In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: The draft law provides for the following: 1.1 The composition of the CBC’s Board of Directors (hereinafter the ‘Board’) is modified by providing for seven directors instead of five, in addition to the Governor and the Deputy Governor. Two of the directors will be executive directors, while the remaining five will be non-executive directors. 1.2 Remuneration and other terms of tenure of the executive directors and the remuneration of the nonexecutive directors are to be set by the Council of Ministers at the time of the directors’ appointment. 1.3 The number of annual mandatory meetings of the Board is increased from six to twelve. 1.4 The quorum for meetings of the Board is increased from four to five members.

text: 1.5 Decisions relating to the CBC’s policy, including licensing of banking institutions and amendments to existing banking licences, are to be adopted by the Governor with the approval of the Board. 1.6 The Board will assign specific duties to the executive directors who, in turn, will assist the Governor in the management, supervision and control of the CBC’s operations. Executive directors will be employed on a full-time basis. 1.7 The composition of the CBC’s Personnel Committee is augmented by the inclusion of the two executive directors, and the quorum for meetings of the Personnel Committee is increased from three to four members. 1.8 An Audit Committee comprised of three members of the Board, appointed by the Board and who will have no executive powers, is to be established and its functions will be to audit compliance with the corporate governance code, supervise the carrying out of internal administrative audits and report to the Board. The Audit Committee may also use the services of an internal auditor.

text: 2. ECB observations on the draft law

text: 2.1 The ECB notes the consulting authority’s aim to facilitate the smooth functioning of the CBC’s decision-making bodies. It nevertheless makes the following observations to the consulting authority, for its consideration. 2.2 As a general remark, unless the executive directors and board members of a national central bank (NCB) are subject to the same legal requirements, and enjoy the same independence safeguards as the Governor of the NCB concerned, any provision assigning ESCB-related tasks of the Governor to an executive director, or requiring the approval of that NCB’s Board for decisions of the Governor, raises concerns about the Governor’s ability to independently carry out the ESCBrelated tasks assigned to the Governor. This would not be compatible with Article 130 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter the ‘Statute of the ESCB’). The Governor should not be influenced by an executive director or the members of the Board in the performance of ESCB-related tasks which, under national law, are assigned exclusively to the Governor. 2.3 The ECB considers that the draft law is unclear with regard to the nature of the executive directors’ powers and the division of competences between the Board and the Governor. In the case of Cyprus, the ECB understands that the competences of the CBC’s Governor stem both from primary Union law – in particular the Statute of the ESCB – and from the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus . Although the draft law purports to vest two members of the Board with executive powers, in addition to the Governor, it does not specify the corporate governance arrangements applicable to the CBC once the draft law has entered into force. In the ECB’s view, the draft law should

text: provide clarity in terms of: (a) the precise scope of the powers and tasks to be assigned to the executive directors, (b) the limits of the competence of the executive directors when assisting the Governor, in particular as regards whether the executive directors will have decision-making powers , and (c) the position of the proposed executive directors in the CBC’s organisational structure, for instance, whether or not CBC staff members will report directly to the executive directors. In particular, the independence of the Governor of the CBC should be reinforced by ensuring that the assistance provided by the executive directors to the Governor should be conducted under the supervision of the Governor. Without clarity in these respects, the ECB is concerned that the CBC’s decision-making processes will be undermined. 2.4 Clarification of the division of competences between the Board and the Governor is also necessary in order to ensure that the draft law does not interfere with central bank independence requirements. The ECB notes that, under Sections 15 and 17 of the Central Bank of Cyprus Law, (a) the Board has no competence in relation to matters which fall within the fields of competence of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB); and (b) the Board, when exercising its duties and tasks, should take due account of the Governor’s role as a member of the Governing Council and the General Council of the ECB. Sections 17 and 17A as amended or introduced by the draft law provide that the proposed amendments are without prejudice to the powers of the ESCB and the ECB, and to the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB. Notwithstanding this, the ECB invites the consulting authority to clarify the interplay between the powers newly granted to two of the members of the Board and the proposed governance structure’s compliance with the requirements of central bank independence. 2.5 The ECB would like to point to the fact that there are currently a number of vacancies on the Board. Against this background, it is unclear why the number of Board members is being increased, taking into account: (a) the appointment of executive directors; and (b) the requirement for the approval of the Board as regards decision-making in implementing the CBC’s policy. Central bank independence needs a stable legal framework for the central bank’s functioning. Frequent changes to the legal framework may adversely affect the organisational and governance stability of an NCB and could therefore affect its institutional independence. 2.6 The ECB also has concerns about measures which might affect the personal independence of the Board members. To protect the CBC’s autonomy in staff matters, which is part of the principle of central bank independence under Article 130 of the Treaty, the Cypriot authorities have an obligation to ensure that any amendment to the legislative provisions on the remuneration of the CBC’s Board members is decided in cooperation with the CBC, taking due account of the CBC’s views . Furthermore, in order to comply with the Treaty requirements for the personal independence of the members of an NCB’s decision-making bodies who are involved in the

text: performance of ESCB-related tasks, any adjustments to salaries should not affect the terms under which the members concerned were appointed . 2.7 In light of the above concerns, the ECB urges the consulting authority to take appropriate steps in order to preserve the independence of the CBC and the members of its decision-making bodies involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks. This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 5 June 2013. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: Article 6 of the draft law (new

text: Article 45

text: /1 of the Law of 22 March 1993). 4 Explanatory memorandum, comment on

text: Article 6

text: . 5 Article 8 of the draft law (new

text: Article 45

text: /2 of the Law of 22 March 1993). 6 Article 14 of the draft law (new

text: Article 57

text: /1 of the Law of 22 March 1993, referring to

text: Article 57

text: §1). 7 Critical functions are defined as any activities, services and operations the interruption of which is likely to disrupt the economy or the financial system (Article 3 of the draft law, new

text: Article 3

text: §1 26° of the Law of 22 March 1993). 8 Article 11 of the draft law (new

text: Article 55

text: /1 of the Law of 22 March 1993).

text: Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions, October 2011, Financial Stability Board. Available on the FSB’s website at www.financialstabilityboard.org. 14 See also Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.3.

text: Articles 6 and 11 of the draft law (new

text: Articles 45

text: /1 and 55/1 of the Law of 22 March 1993). 17 Article 6 of the draft law (new

text: Article 45

text: /1 §5 of the Law of 22 March 1993). 19 Explanatory memorandum, comment on

text: Article 6

text: . See also Article 5(7) of the BRRD.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 10 June 2013 on recovery and resolution plans (CON/2013/42)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 10 June 2013 on recovery and resolution plans (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 31 May 2013, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Nationale Bank van België/Banque Nationale de Belgique (NBB), acting on behalf of the Belgian Ministry of Finance, for an opinion on a draft law amending the Law of 22 March 1993 on the legal status and supervision of credit institutions and the Law of 22 February 1998 establishing the Organic Statute of the Nationale Bank van België/Banque Nationale de Belgique (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB was requested to deliver an opinion as a matter of extreme urgency to allow for this element of the Belgian crisis management framework to be adopted before the Belgian Parliament’s summer recess. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third and sixth indents of

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to the NBB and contains rules applicable to credit institutions which materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The draft law aims to strenghten the ability of Belgian credit institutions and public authorities to prevent future financial crises, or to prevent such crises from intensifying, and to react promptly in the event of a crisis, by introducing into Belgian law a framework governing the establishment and the assessment of recovery and resolution plans for credit institutions. Pending the designation of a resolution authority in Belgium, the draft law temporarily grants the NBB, in its capacity as supervisory authority, certain powers concerning recovery and resolution plans . 1.2 Under the draft law, all Belgian credit institutions must establish and keep up to date a recovery

text: plan detailing the measures susceptible of being taken by the institution or its shareholders to correct a significant deterioration in its financial position, without having any significant adverse effects on the Belgian or the international financial system . These measures may take various forms, and can include increasing the credit institution’s own funds or reducing its risk profile by selling off branches, lines of business or subsidiaries, but they may not allow for any form of exceptional financial support from public authorities or the central banks. To ensure that this prohibition is fully effective, the concept of ‘public authorities’ is to be understood in the widest sense and covers, for example, the deposit guarantee scheme, the resolution fund, and the State in its capacity as shareholder of a credit institution . The credit institutions must test their recovery plans by comparing them with various crisis scenarios, ranging from a crisis that is specific to an institution to a one that is systemic. Recovery plans are to be submitted to the NBB, which will assess their compliance with the standards set out in the draft law, taking into account the fact that other institutions might also implement a recovery plan in the same period . The NBB will require an institution to revise its recovery plan within three months if it is found to have shortcomings or if there are obstacles to its implementation. If the shortcomings are not remedied within the deadline provided, the institution will be required to take any measures that the NBB deems necessary to remedy the situation, such as facilitate a reduction of the risk profile of the credit institution concerned, or modify its governance structure. Finally, if a credit institution is found to be in breach of regulatory requirements, if the manner in which it is managed or its financial situation adversely affect the proper fulfilment of its commitments or do not offer sufficient guarantees in terms of its solvability, liquidity or profitability, and where the credit institution concerned has no measures in place to remedy the situation as required by the NBB, the NBB has the power to request the credit institution to implement all or part of its recovery plan . 1.3 The NBB must establish, and keep up to date, resolution plans in respect of all Belgian credit institutions, which are to outline the measures to be taken in the event of a credit institution’s failure in order, in particular, to safeguard the continuing operation of its critical functions , to avoid adversely affecting financial stability, and to protect the assets of the depositors covered by the deposit guarantee scheme . Simplified resolution plans may be drawn up depending on (i) the potential impact of an institution’s failure on financial stability, or (ii) the existence of a plan at group level. The measures outlined in the resolution plan may not take any account of the possibility of exceptional financial support by public authorities or the central banks. The NBB will be responsible for assessing the resolvability of credit institutions. If the NBB finds that there are obstacles to resolvability, and if it considers the remedial actions proposed by a credit institution

text: unsatisfactory, it will have the authority to impose certain measures on the institution in question, requiring it, for example, to enter into contracts for services, to limit risk exposure, to assign certain assets or to change its legal or operational structure. Where the institution concerned fails to comply with the NBB’s request, it will be considered to be in breach of regulatory requirements such that the NBB will have the power to require it to implement its recovery plan . Until the European Commission’s proposal for a Directive on the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms dated 6 June 2012 (hereinafter the ‘BRRD’) is fully transposed, the resolution plans will not be submitted to the Ministry of Finance as this would conflict with the professional secrecy obligations which the NBB is bound by in its capacity as supervisory authority pursuant to Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions .

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 The ECB welcomes the draft law as it strengthens the tools and procedures available to the national authorities for planning the recovery and resolution of credit institutions. The approach taken is in line with the Financial Stability Board’s (FSB) Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions and the BRRD, whereby recovery and resolution plans are a key element of preparation for possible crisis scenarios and for taking swift and effective remedial action. 2.2 The ECB notes that the Belgian authorities have decided, in advance of the adoption of the BRRD, to transpose the provisions which they consider to be close to finalisation and which do not require institutional reform. The ECB understands that the responsibilities entrusted to the NBB by the draft law do not take into account the designation of a resolution authority in Belgium, which will be done at a later stage once the BRRD is adopted. Any resolution powers vested in the NBB would need to be functionally separate from its current supervisory tasks, in order to ensure independence and avoid conflicts of interest . In the event that the NBB is not ultimately designated as the resolution authority, it is important that the designated resolution authority engages in an adequate exchange of information with the NBB in its capacity as central bank as well as supervisory authority . In addition, the ECB understands that, once the BRRD is adopted, the framework established under the draft law will be reviewed in order to ensure full consistency 9 Article 14 of the draft law (new

text: Article 57

text: Article 57

text: §1). See point 1.2 above. 10 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directives

text: and

text: , Directives

text: and

text: and

text: Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010

text: , COM (2012) 280 final. The ECB commented on this proposal in its Opinion

text: with developments at Union level.

text: 3. Credit institutions subject to the establishment of recovery and resolution plans

text: 3.1 The ECB welcomes the broad scope of application of the draft law, which will cover all Belgian credit institutions, including their branches and subsidiaries both in Belgium and abroad, in terms of the requirement for recovery and resolution plans . This will allow all credit institutions to benefit from a clear plan for remedial action in the event of emerging difficulties, and will provide clarity regarding their resolvability. The existence of such plans for all credit institutions also addresses potential concerns as regards ensuring a level playing field. The ECB notes that, to balance the extent of the scope of application against the necessary proportionality, the NBB will have the power to grant exemptions from the requirement to establish a recovery plan, based on the impact that the failure of an institution would have on financial stability or because the institution is part of a group for which the competent authorities have already communicated a recovery plan to the NBB . It is important to conduct a rigorous assessment as to why no potential threat to the system is considered likely in the event of the failure of an institution, demonstrating fully in the case in question why recovery planning is considered unnecessary . 3.2 The ECB notes that the NBB’s power to lay down the minimum content of recovery plans in a regulation will allow developing international and European standards, in particular Recommendation of the European Banking Authority on the development of recovery plans (

text: ) dated 23 January 2013, to be taken into account .

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 10 June 2013.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 3 Amendment No 1 (proposed new Article 3(3) of the draft law). 4 The amendments and the draft law apply to all institutions falling within the scope of: (a)

text: Article 6 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1338/2001 of 28 June 2001

text: laying down measures necessary for the protection of the euro against counterfeiting (OJ L 181, 4.7.2001, p. 6); (b) Decision ECB/2010/14 of 16 September 2010 on the authenticity and fitness of checking and recirculation of euro banknotes (OJ L 267, 9.10.2010, p. 1); and (c) Regulation (EU)

text: No 1210/2010 of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 December 2010 concerning authentication of euro coins and handling of euro coins unfit for circulation (OJ L 339, 22.12.2010, p. 1). 5 Amendment No 2 (proposed new

text: Article 4

text: bis of the draft law). 7 Amendment No 2 (proposed new

text: Article 4

text: bis of the draft law). 8 Amendments Nos 3, 4 and 5, introducing a reference to the proposed new

text: Article 4

text: bis in Articles 5, 8 and 9 of the draft law. The consulting authority clarified that a similar reference will also be introduced in Article 6 of the draft law. 9 See Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: See paragraph 5 of the Commission Recommendation of 22 March 2010 on the scope and effects of legal tender of euro banknotes and coins (OJ L 83, 30.3.2010, p. 70), and

text: Article 10 of Regulation (EU) No 1214/2011

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the professional cross-border transport of euro cash by road between euro area Member States (OJ L 316, 29.11.2011, p. 1). 11 See Opinion

text: and paragraph 5 of the above-mentioned Commission Recommendation. 12 OJ L 139, 11.5.1998, p. 1.

text: See for instance Opinion

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 12 June 2013 on the treatment of euro banknotes neutralised by anti-theft devices (CON/2013/43)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 12 June 2013 on the treatment of euro banknotes neutralised by anti-theft devices (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 24 May 2013, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Nationale Bank van België/Banque Nationale de Belgique (NBB), acting on behalf of the Belgian Ministry for Home Affairs, for an opinion on five amendments (hereinafter the ‘amendments’) to a draft law on protection against counterfeiting and the preservation of the quality of cash in circulation (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the first, second and third indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , since the draft amendments concern currency matters, means of payment and the NBB. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the amendments

text: The amendments aim to enhance public security by reducing the possibility for thieves to recycle or obtain reimbursement for genuine euro banknotes that have been neutralised following the activation of an anti-theft device . To this end, the amendments introduce the concept of ‘presumably neutralised banknotes’, i.e. euro banknotes for which there are sufficient reasons to believe that they have been neutralised by certain types of ink stains resulting from the activation of an anti-theft device , and apply to such euro banknotes a treatment which is similar to that applied to counterfeits. First, certain institutions (hereinafter ‘professional cash handlers’ ) will be required to withdraw from circulation all presumably neutralised banknotes that come into their possession, and to hand them over to

text: the NBB without undue delay . In addition, when presumably neutralised banknotes are found in a banknote handling machine or are discovered by a professional cash handler during a transaction, the professional cash handlers will be required to ensure that they are neither reimbursed nor credited to the account of the person presenting them and that the depositor or the account owner is identified. These obligations will apply in the case of over-the-counter transactions and also upon presentation of presumably neutralised banknotes to banknote handling machines . The presumably neutralised banknotes handed over to the NBB will only be reimbursed in accordance with Decision ECB/2013/10 of 19 April 2013 on the denominations, specifications, reproduction, exchange and withdrawal of euro banknotes . The monitoring measures that the NBB can take, and the administrative fines and corrective measures it can impose on professional cash handlers with respect to their obligations regarding counterfeits, will also apply with respect to presumably neutralised banknotes .

text: 2. Appropriate time to consult the ECB

text: The amendments concern the draft law, on which the Belgian Ministry of Finance consulted the ECB in the past . The draft law has recently been tabled before the Belgian Parliament and the amendments were introduced by members of Parliament on 22 May 2013. The ECB was requested to deliver an opinion on the amendments as a matter of extreme urgency, if possible within two weeks, because of the imminent vote in the Parliament. According to

text: Article 4 of Decision 98/415/EC

text: , the ECB must be consulted at an appropriate stage in the legislative process. This implies that the consultation should take place at a point in the legislative process that allows the ECB sufficient time to examine the draft legislative provisions and to adopt its opinion, and the national authorities the possibility to take into account the ECB’s views. The ECB stresses that even cases of particular and duly justified urgency do not relieve national authorities of their duty to consult at an appropriate stage in the legislative process and to allow sufficient time for its views to be taken into account in accordance with Decision

text: 3. General observation

text: The ECB understands that the amendments aim at enhancing public security by reducing the risk of criminals being able to put into circulation neutralised euro banknotes, i.e. euro banknotes which have

text: certain specific types of ink stains resulting from the activation of an anti-theft device. To this end, they introduce in the draft law an

text: Article 4

text: bis, the second paragraph of which prohibits cash handlers from reimbursing neutralised euro banknotes or crediting an account with such euro banknotes, both in the context of cash payment transactions and deposits with banknote handling machines.

text: 4. Transactions settlement in neutralised euro banknotes

text: 4.1 The ECB takes into account that stakeholders (banks, retailers, cash in transit companies, the general public) are actively encouraged to remove neutralised euro banknotes from circulation and return them to the national central banks as it is very likely that such euro banknotes are the proceeds of a theft . 4.2 Nevertheless, the ECB notes that neutralised euro banknotes retain their legal tender status and that this has been acknowledged by the European Commission . In this respect, the requirements and prohibitions introduced in the draft law by the amendments would affect the legal tender status of presumably neutralised banknotes. In addition, they would effectively introduce limitations on cash payments in relation to the settlement of cash transactions where such euro banknotes are used in good faith to this end. 4.3

text: Recital 19

text: of

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 974/98 of 3 May 1998

text: on the introduction of the euro states that limitations on payments in notes and coins, established by Member States for public reasons, are not incompatible with the status of legal tender of euro banknotes and coins, provided that other lawful means for the settlement of monetary debts are available. The ECB acknowledges that: (a) such other lawful means for the settlement of monetary debts, other than neutralised euro banknotes, are available in Belgium; and (b) the draft law’s objective of enhancing public security by reducing the risk of criminals’ being able to put into circulation neutralised euro banknotes in relation to a crime qualifies as a public reason outweighing the impact of the limitations on cash payments. 4.4 However, limitations on cash payments should be proportionate to the general objective of reducing the risk of criminals being able to put into circulation neutralised euro banknotes and should not go beyond what is necessary to achieve this objective. Any limitations as a result of the amendments should be carefully weighed against the public benefits expected to be derived from them.

text: 5. Detection by customer-operated machines of presumably neutralised banknotes

text: The ECB welcomes the amendments, which further develop the existing ECB rules on the treatment of neutralised euro banknotes by customer-operated machines in the context of criminal activity. In this respect, the ECB considers it necessary that these amendments are complemented by technical rules setting out details and criteria defining how euro banknotes neutralised by anti-theft devices will be treated in a manner similar to the regime for suspect counterfeit euro banknotes under Decision ECB/2010/14. In particular, such technical rules should establish details, in line with the existing ECB rules in this respect, about the minimum stained area, the contrast, and the specific spectral signature of the stains, for euro banknotes to be considered as presumably neutralised banknotes, and the success rate expected from the customer-operated machines regarding the correct identification and separation of such presumably neutralised banknotes.

text: 6. A new NBB task

text: The NBB is entrusted with the task of monitoring professional cash handlers’ compliance with the new obligations. The ECB has consistently expressed its concern that, when allocating additional tasks to national central banks, it must be ensured that they have sufficient human and financial resources, both in terms of quantity and quality, for all their tasks, and in particular that their capacity to perform their European System of Central Banks or Eurosystem-related tasks is not affected .

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 12 June 2013.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: Law 84(I)/2011. 2 OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: See Opinions

text: , paragraph 3.2 and

text: , paragraph 2.1. All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 4 See Opinion

text: , paragraph 3.1. 5 See conclusions of the European Council of 17 June 2010, p. 6, paragraph 16.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 19 June 2013 on a special tax on credit institutions (CON/2013/44)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 19 June 2013 on a special tax on credit institutions (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 14 May 2013, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the President of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Cyprus for an opinion on a proposed amendment to the Law on the imposition of a special tax on credit institutions (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the sixth indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: The draft law aims to create an incentive for credit institutions to lower the interest rates offered on certain deposits. The amendments to Section 4 of the Law on the imposition of a special tax on credit institutions provide for the following: 1.1 An increase in the total special levy on deposits from 0.15% to an aggregate of 0.75%, by providing for an additional special levy of 0.6% on deposits held in euro by credit institutions in Cyprus. 1.2 The additional special levy will be payable only in relation to new deposits made or renewed after 1 July 2013, provided such deposits earn annual interest which exceeds the rate of interest of the marginal lending facility as determined by the ECB, increased by a margin of 1.5%. 1.3 The additional special levy will be payable by the credit institutions to the Inland Revenue of the Republic of Cyprus within 30 days after the end of each quarter starting from 31 October 2013. Within the same time period, each credit institution should submit a declaration with respect to all deposits made or renewed with interest which exceeds the maximum interest as specified above.

text: 2. General comments

text: 2.1 As the ECB has stated in earlier opinions , taxes on financial institutions should be considered in relation to the dual objective of ensuring a more equitable distribution of the costs arising from their potential failure between taxpayers and the financial sector and of addressing the risks that they pose. 2.2 The ECB notes that the purpose of the draft law differs from that of the law being amended, which was initially enacted for the purpose of: (a) contributing to the Government’s short-term budgetary targets; and (b) financing the Independent Financial Stability Fund within the bank resolution framework as part of a fiscal buffer for banking sector risks. Since the draft law creates an incentive for credit institutions to lower the interest rates offered on deposits, the ECB recommends a comprehensive impact assessment of the proposed measure, to ensure that the public benefit from its imposition will outweigh any potential negative implications for banks, their customers and the economy, particularly in view of the circumstances specific to Cyprus following the resolution measures employed recently in the country’s banking sector. 4 5 2.3 As the ECB has previously pointed out , in line with the European Council’s conclusions , Member States should introduce systems of levies and taxes on financial institutions to ensure fairburden sharing and to set incentives to contain systemic risks.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 19 June 2013.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 26 June 2013 on Lietuvos bankas’ macro-prudential mandate (CON/2013/45)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 26 June 2013 on Lietuvos bankas’ macro-prudential mandate (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 29 May 2013 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Lithuanian Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft law amending the Law on Lietuvos bankas (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third and sixth indents of

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to Lietuvos bankas and rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The main aim of the draft law is to implement Recommendation

text: of the European Systemic Risk Board of 22 December 2011 on the macro-prudential mandate of national authorities . 1.2 More specifically, the draft law designates Lietuvos bankas as the authority responsible for establishing, publishing and implementing macro-prudential policy, and it assigns to Lietuvos bankas a number of tasks and grants it certain powers in order to achieve its objectives in this regard. The draft law also establishes a mechanism for cooperation at national and cross-border level, and gives Lietuvos bankas the power to obtain relevant information. 1.3 The draft law also contains provisions which are not related to the implementation of Recommendation

text: , i.e.: (a) an amendment to Article 27(3) of the Law on Lietuvos bankas under which loans provided by Lietuvos bankas to credit institutions may be secured by entering into an agreement with the credit institution to transfer the title to financial collateral; and (b) an amendment to Article 55 of the Law on Lietuvos bankas extending the nature and frequency of the publication of statistical information.

text: 2 OJ C 41, 14.2.2012, p. 1. 1.4 The ECB was not consulted on the draft law amending the Law on Lietuvos bankas that will enter into force on the introduction of the euro in Lithuania . If its provisions are similar to those of the draft law, the ECB’s observations concerning the draft law as expressed in this opinion will apply by analogy to that law also. The ECB should be consulted on the draft law amending the Law on Lietuvos bankas that will enter into force on the introduction of the euro in Lithuania in the event its provisions are substantially different from the provisions of the draft law.

text: 2. Lietuvos bankas’ macro-prudential mandate

text: 2.1 The ECB supports the design of effective macro-prudential policy frameworks within Member States, in line with the guiding principles set out in Recommendation

text: . Moreover, the ECB considers that the ECB and national central banks should play a leading role in macroprudential oversight, given their expertise and existing responsibilities in the area of financial stability . 2.2 At the same time, performance by Lietuvos bankas of macro-prudential tasks should not affect: (a) Lietuvos bankas’ functional and financial independence; or (b) the performance by the European System of Central Banks of its tasks under the Treaty and the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter the Statute of the ESCB) . 2.3 The ECB understands that current provisions of the Law on Lietuvos bankas ensuring Lietuvos bankas’ independence in implementing all its objectives and performing all its tasks and activities , – and not merely those in relation to maintaining price stability, also cover the establishment and implementation of macro-prudential policy. 2.4 In addition, the ECB understands that the draft law not only assigns a new task of Lietuvos bankas to perform macro-prudential oversight, but also establishes a new objective for Lietuvos bankas, namely to contribute to the stability of the financial system through its macro-prudential policy. In line with Article 127(1) of the Treaty and Article 2 of the Statute of the ESCB, this objective should be subordinated to the primary objective of price stability. The draft law should be adapted to reflect this. 2.5 Moreover, in line with Article 127(1) of the Treaty and Article 2 of the Statute of the ESCB, the secondary objectives of Lietuvos bankas should be subordinated to both the primary and the secondary objectives of the ESCB. This is required for the full legal integration of Lietuvos bankas

text: 3 Draft amendments to the Law amending Articles

text: , titles of fourth and fifth sections, repealing Articles

text: and supplementing the Annex to the Law on Lietuvos bankas. Valstybės žinios, 29-04-2006, No 48–1699. Pursuant to Article 33 of this Law, it will come into force on the date on which the Council of the European Union abrogates the derogation of Lithuania in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 122(2) of the Treaty establishing the European Community.

text: 4 See paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: 5 See paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: . into the Eurosystem, and therefore a legislative provision to this effect will need to enter into force on the date on which Lithuania adopts the euro . 2.6 The provisions of the draft law regarding compensation for the damage caused by unlawful acts of Lietuvos bankas and its staff aim to implement Recommendation D4 of Recommendation

text: . They repeat similar existing provisions of the Law on Lietuvos bankas regarding compensation for damage caused by unlawful acts related to the performance of financial market supervision . However, these provisions of the draft law do not expressly address Recommendation D4, which calls for legal protection of Lietuvos bankas and its staff when acting in good faith. In this respect, such legal protection should be provided for in the draft law or, if it is already contained in other laws , the ECB recommends that the draft law includes a reference to such other laws. 2.7 Pursuant to the draft law, Lietuvos bankas is: (a) given the power to obtain information necessary for the implementation of macro-prudential policy ; (b) obliged to ensure the confidentiality of such information ; (c) mandated to cooperate and exchange information with the ESRB, macroprudential authorities and financial supervisory authorities of other Member States, third countries and Union institutions . The draft law precludes Lietuvos bankas from releasing such confidential information to anyone or otherwise making it available, except as specified by law . The ECB understands that Lietuvos bankas’ obligation to cooperate and exchange information at national and cross-border level is one of such cases specified by law. 2.8 This opinion is without prejudice to the conclusions of the follow-up assessment of the abovementioned recommendation, which the ESRB will prepare in accordance with

text: Article 17 of Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 on European Union macro-prudential oversight of the financial system and establishing a European Systemic Risk Board .

text: 7 See ECB’s Convergence Report of June 2013, p. 42.

text: 8 New Article 47 of the Law on Lietuvos bankas, contained in the draft law.

text: 9 Recommendation D4 recommends that Member States ensure legal protection for macro-prudential authorities and their staff when they act in good faith.

text: 10 Article 45 of the Law on Lietuvos bankas.

text: 11 For example, laws regulating civil liability matters in general, such as the Civil Code. 1

text: 12 Recommendation C2 of Recommendation

text: , and its implementation by new

text: Article 47 (4)

text: (2) of the Law on Lietuvos bankas, contained in the draft law. 2

text: 13 Recommendation C2 of Recommendation

text: , and its implementation by new Article 47 of the Law on Lietuvos bankas, contained in the draft law. 4

text: 14 Recommendation B4 of Recommendation

text: , and its implementation by new Article 47 of the Law on Lietuvos bankas, contained in the draft law. 2

text: 15 New Article 47 of the Law on Lietuvos bankas, contained in the draft law. 4

text: 3. Collateral for loans by Lietuvos bankas to credit institutions

text: 3.1 Article 27 of the Law on Lietuvos bankas currently permits Lietuvos bankas to provide loans denominated in litai to credit institutions established in Lithuania, which have accounts with Lietuvos bankas. Such loans are to be granted against the following types of collateral, which is to be provided by the credit institution concerned: (a) Government or Lietuvos bankas’ debt securities; (b) foreign currency or precious metals; (c) promissory notes and other debt liabilities and immovable property which comply with conditions laid down by Lietuvos bankas. In addition, loans can also be secured by means of a State guarantee or the surety or guarantee of a credit institution. 3.2 The draft law provides that, in addition to the abovementioned types of collateral, loans denominated in litai granted by Lietuvos bankas to credit institutions may also be collateralised by entering into an agreement with a credit institution to transfer the title to financial collateral. 3.3 The ECB notes that, although Member States that have not adopted the euro retain competence in the field of monetary policy, it is nevertheless beneficial for them to achieve consistency with Eurosystem standards so that credit institutions in those Member States can become familiar with the Eurosystem eligibility criteria for marketable and non-marketable assets that will apply to them once the euro is introduced. The ECB understands that Article 27 of the Law on Lietuvos bankas will be repealed on the date on which the Council of the European Union abrogates the derogation of Lithuania in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 140 of the Treaty, i.e. on the introduction of the euro in Lithuania.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 26 June 2013.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI

text: 18 Law amending Articles


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: See, for example, the ECB’s Convergence Report 2013, p. 30, and paragraph 6 of Opinion

text: . All ECB documents are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 3 See the ECB’s Convergence Report 2013, p. 33 and the reference to ECB opinions made there.

text: See section 6D of the Central Bank of Ireland Act 1942, as inserted by section 7 of the Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland Act 2003 and as amended.

text: See also Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.6 of Opinion

text: ECB Convergence Report June 2013, p. 27.

text: See also paragraph 3.2.10 of Opinion

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 28 June 2013 on pay and pension reforms (CON/2013/46)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 28 June 2013 on pay and pension reforms (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 27 May 2013, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Irish Minister for Public Expenditure and Reform (hereinafter ‘the Minister’) for an opinion on the Financial Emergency Measures in the Public Interest Bill 2013 (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to the Central Bank of Ireland (CBI). In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The draft law amends the Financial Emergency Measures in the Public Interest Act 2009 (hereinafter the ‘2009 Act’), which was introduced as part of the Government’s programme of measures to urgently address the serious position of the public finances, and which provided for deductions to be made from the remuneration of public servants. The draft law provides for a further reduction in the remuneration of all public servants earning EUR 65 000 per annum or more. A public servant is defined in the 2009 Act as a person who is employed by, or who holds any office or other position in, a public service body. The CBI is explicitly defined as coming within the meaning of ‘public service body’. It follows, therefore, that the 2009 Act and the draft law apply to both employees and office holders of the CBI. 1.2 The draft law also amends the Financial Emergency Measures in the Public Interest Act 2010 (hereinafter the ‘2010 Act’), the purpose of which was to reduce public service pension costs. It introduced the Public Service Pension Reduction (PSPR), under which a progressively structured levy-type is imposed on Irish public service pensions greater than EUR 12 000 per annum. Public service pensions are defined as including pensions payable to or in respect of a public servant or former public servant under a public service pension scheme. Public servants are defined as

text: persons who are employed by, or who hold any office or other position in a public service body, including the CBI, and includes an office holder. Both current and former employees and office holders of the CBI come within the scope of application of the 2010 Act. The Financial Emergency Measures in the Public Interest (Amendment) Act 2011 (hereinafter the ‘2011 Act’) amended the 2010 Act by introducing a provision pursuant to which the 2010 Act is to apply in respect of employees and office holders of the CBI only with its consent, given in writing to the Minister for Finance by the Governor, and with the consent of the Minister for Finance. The draft law provides for an increased reduction in respect of the PSPR for all public service pensions in excess of EUR 32 500. 1.3 The draft law provides that, for a period of three years from 1 July 2013, increments will not be awarded and pay scales will be suspended in respect of public servants. This particular provision also applies to any pay scale that is applicable after 1 July 2013 in consequence of an appointment or a promotion to a position, but with the substitution for any reference to 1 July 2013 of a reference to the date of the appointment or promotion in question. Groups or grades of public servants may be excluded from the effect of this provision, or have its effects modified, in the event that a collective agreement, which has been registered with the Labour Relations Commission, is reached. 1.4 Currently, the CBI enjoys statutory autonomy in determining its staff policy, including remuneration, with the CBI’s officers and employees subject to individual employment contracts and to collective bargaining agreements entered into between the CBI and staff representative groups. The measures provided for in the draft law, as is the case with the 2009 Act and the 2010 Act, represent a departure from that regime in so far as the reductions proposed are to be imposed unilaterally.

text: 2. Non-compliance with the consultation obligation

text: 2.1 The ECB received the consultation request on 27 May 2013. The Irish Parliament adopted the draft law on 6 June, and it came into force on the same date. The consultation request does not specify a time by which the Irish authorities wished to receive the ECB’s opinion, nor does it mention that it is urgent. The consultation request refers to the fact that the draft law was being considered by the Irish Parliament at the time of the request. However, it fails to mention when the Irish Parliament was scheduled to vote on the draft law. 2.2

text: Article 4 of Decision 98/415/EC

text: provides that the ECB must be consulted ‘at an appropriate stage’ in the legislative process. It follows from this that the consultation should take place at a point in the legislative process that affords the ECB sufficient time to examine the draft legislative provisions in question and adopt its opinion. Following from the wording of

text: Article 3(4) of Decision 98/415/EC

text: , Member States are obliged to suspend the process for adoption of the draft legislative provisions pending receipt of the ECB’s opinion in order to allow the relevant national authorities to meaningfully deliberate the ECB’s opinion prior to adoption of the provisions in

text: question. In this respect, the ECB stresses that the fact that the enactment of a particular draft law is urgent does not relieve national authorities of their obligation to consult the ECB and to allow sufficient time for its views to be taken into account in accordance with Decision

text: . The Irish Government should have postponed the final vote on the draft law until such time as would have allowed for a proper consultation with the ECB, as well as due consideration of the ECB’s Opinion. The ECB would appreciate it if the consulting authority would honour its obligation to consult the ECB in due time in the future.

text: 3. General observations

text: The ECB welcomes the general aims of the draft law in the context of the ongoing efforts to stabilise public finances.

text: 4. Central bank independence

text: 4.1 As the draft law applies to and directly affects the CBI’s decision-making bodies and its employees, it should be examined from the perspective of central bank independence, in particular institutional and financial independence, as well as that of the personal independence of the members of the CBI’s decision-making bodies. 4.2 The principle of central bank independence as enshrined in Article 130 of the Treaty prohibits third parties, including the governments of the Member States, from issuing instructions to the national central banks (NCBs). In addition, the principle of central bank independence means that third parties may not influence, directly or indirectly, an NCB in the performance of its tasks or as regards its ability to fulfil its mandate both operationally in terms of manpower, and in terms of appropriate financial resources .

text: Financial independence

text: 4.3 Member States may not interfere with an NCB’s ability to employ and retain the qualified staff necessary for the NCB to perform independently the tasks conferred on it by the Treaty and the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank. To protect autonomy in staff matters, the ECB has consistently recommended in previous opinions and in its convergence reports that any amendment to legislation on remuneration for members of an NCB’s decision-making bodies and its employees should be decided in close and effective cooperation with the NCB, taking due account of its views, to ensure the ongoing ability of the NCB to independently carry out its tasks. Autonomy in staff matters extends to issues relating to staff pensions .

text: 4.4 Given that the CBI’s employees are employed under the conditions (including conditions as to remuneration and allowances) set by the Central Bank Commission , in order to protect the CBI’s autonomy in staff matters, legislative provisions affecting the remuneration of members of the CBI’s decision-making bodies and employees should be drafted in close and effective cooperation with the CBI . The ECB understands that a first step has been made in terms of such cooperation since the CBI’s Governor has been consulted on the draft law. 4.5 As regards the pension-related deductions applicable to the CBI’s officers and employees, the ECB notes that Section 1A of the 2010 Act, as inserted by the 2011 Act, requires the Minister to obtain the written consent of the CBI’s Governor in respect of reductions to pensions of former CBI employees and office holders. Personal independence of members of the CBI’s decision-making bodies 4.6 Furthermore, Member States may not seek to influence the members of an NCB’s decision-making bodies by amending national legislation affecting their remuneration which legislation, as a matter of principle, should apply only in respect of future appointments . The draft law applies not only to the CBI’s decision-making bodies but also more generally to all public servants in Ireland who come within its scope and, as such, does not seek directly or indirectly to influence the CBI’s decision-making bodies in the performance of their tasks. The provisions will therefore be considered compatible with the principle of personal independence, as long as the abovementioned requirements in respect of the principle of financial independence are taken into account .

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 28 June 2013.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI