title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 22 January 2026 on limitations to cash payments (CON/2026/3)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 22 January 2026 on limitations to cash payments (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 17 November 2025 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Dutch Minister for Finance for an opinion on a draft law on the exceptions to the mandatory acceptance of cash (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 2(1), second indent, of

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft law relates to means of payment. In accordance with

text: Article 17.5

text: , first sentence, of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The draft law supplements Article IIA of the Law amending the Law on the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing and Book 6 of the Civil Code in connection with the prohibition of cash payments for goods worth EUR 3 000 or more and the right of consumers to make smaller cash payments (anti-money laundering action plan) (hereinafter the ‘AML Law’). Under the AML Law, a creditor must accept the debtor’s obligation to pay a sum of money in cash, of which the amount must be lower than EUR 3 000. This applies where the debtor is a natural person who is acting for purposes outside their business, trade or profession, and where the creditor is not a natural person acting for purposes outside their business, trade or profession. 1.2 Article IIA of the AML Law sets out the text of Article 113 of Book 6 of the Civil Code. Article 113(2) of Book 6 of the Civil Code provides for the possibility of deviating from the obligation to accept cash payments by means of an administrative order where this is necessary due to the specific nature of the activities or for security reasons. The draft law gives substance to this provision. According to the explanatory memorandum accompanying the draft law (hereinafter the ‘explanatory memorandum’), the guiding principle behind the latter is to achieve a balance between the importance of an inclusive and robust payment system and the importance of an efficient and secure payment system.

text: 1 Besluit van houdende uitzonderingen op de verplichte acceptatie van contant geld (Besluit uitzonderingen acceptatie contant geld), available on the Overheid’s website at www.overheid.nl.

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/1998/415/oj).

text: 3 Wet van 11 juni 2025, houdende wijziging van de Wet ter voorkoming van witwassen en financieren van terrorisme en Boek 6 van het Burgerlijk Wetboek in verband met het verbod op contante betalingen voor goederen vanaf 3.000 euro en het recht van consumenten op kleinere contante betalingen (Wet plan van aanpak witwassen), Staatsblad 2025, 262. 1.3 The draft law lists six exceptions to the mandatory acceptance of cash payments based on the specific nature of the activities . 1.4 First, the mandatory acceptance of cash payments will not apply to an underlying contract where the obligation to pay a sum of money arose without the simultaneous physical presence of the creditor, including a person acting on his or her behalf, and the debtor . According to the explanatory memorandum, this exception primarily contributes to public order and security. 1.5 Second, for reasons of practicality, the requirement to accept cash payments will not apply to distance contracts, such as those concluded online, by mail order or by telephone . 1.6 Third, the requirement to accept cash will not apply to periodic payments . As stated in the explanatory memorandum, the reason behind this exception is that the administrative burden on the creditor to record and link every cash payment to the supply of goods or services associated with it was considered disproportionate. 1.7 Fourth, the draft law provides an exception to the obligation to accept cash payments when these are made outside the creditor’s commercial premises . According to the explanatory memorandum, this exception is legitimate due to broader security concerns. 1.8 Fifth, the draft law provides an exception to the obligation to accept cash payments when these are made on board means of transport . According to the explanatory memorandum, this exception is justified on grounds of broader security concerns. 1.9 Sixth, the draft law provides an exception to the obligation to accept cash payments made between 22:00 and 06:00 . According to the explanatory memorandum, this exception is justified due to broader security concerns. 1.10 Furthermore, the draft law stipulates that a creditor may temporarily refuse cash payments entirely or cap the cash payment at an amount lower than EUR 3 000 if there is an essential security reason to justify doing so . According to the explanatory memorandum, a refusal of cash for an essential security reason should in principle not be permanent since even a persistently elevated security risk can be mitigated over time. 1.11 The draft law further provides that enterprises with fewer than four people working in them may permanently refuse to accept cash if there is an essential security reason to justify doing so . According to the explanatory memorandum, the reason behind this exception is that small enterprises cannot be expected to permanently mitigate an increased security risk, considering that this would not be proportionate with the limited resources at their disposal.

text: 4 Article 1 of the draft law.

text: Article 1

text: , point (a), of the draft law.

text: Article 1

text: , point (b), of the draft law.

text: Article 1

text: , point (c), of the draft law.

text: Article 1

text: , point (d), of the draft law.

text: Article 1

text: , point (e), of the draft law.

text: Article 1

text: , point (f), of the draft law.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 The ECB was consulted on a draft amendment to a legislative proposal regarding the AML Law, pursuant to which the draft law is to be adopted, and has adopted an opinion thereon . 2.2 Although electronic payment instruments are increasingly used for retail payments in a number of Member States, cash continues to play an important role in society and is still widely used throughout the entire population. Euro cash has legal tender status and should be generally accepted as a means of payment. As the ECB has noted previously, cash is secure, widely accepted, fast and facilitates control over the payer’s spending. Moreover, it is currently the only payment instrument that allows citizens to settle a transaction instantly and directly between two parties in central bank money, while ensuring privacy . 2.3 The ability to pay in cash remains particularly important for those who, for various legitimate reasons, prefer to use physical money for payments rather than other payment instruments, or do not have access to the banking system and electronic means of payment. These groups include not only elderly people but also people with disabilities, immigrants, socially vulnerable people, minors and others with limited or no access to digital payment services . Furthermore, cash may play an important role in the event of a disturbance in the payment system and it is robust against cybercrime and power outages as it guarantees person-to-person payment transactions in such situations. Cash also has an important function as a store of value. The availability and accessibility of cash and its fallback function in case of disruptions to electronic payment systems contribute to trust in the financial system, which is important for the smooth functioning of monetary policy . 2.4 The ECB has the exclusive right to authorise the issue of euro banknotes within the Union, and the euro banknotes issued by the ECB and the national central banks of the euro area are the only

text: 13 See Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on EUR-Lex.

text: 14 See, for example, paragraph 2.4 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 9.2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 7.2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1 of

text: , paragraph 2.1 of

text: , paragraph 2.5 of

text: , paragraph 2.2 of

text: , and paragraph 2.2 of

text: 15 See, for example, paragraph 2.4 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 9.2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 7.2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 1.7 of Opinion

text: of the European Central Bank of 13 October 2023 on a proposal for a regulation on the legal tender of euro banknotes and coins (OJ C, C/2023/1355, 1.12.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/1355/oj), paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.4 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.5 of Opinion

text: , and paragraph 2.2 of

text: 16 See, for example, paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 9.2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.4 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.5 of Opinion

text: , and paragraph 2.2 of

text: 17 See, for example, paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.4 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.5 of Opinion

text: , and paragraph 2.2 of

text: 18 See, for example, paragraph 2.2 of Opinions

text: and

text: , paragraph 2.5 of Opinion

text: , and paragraph 2.2 of

text: . banknotes with legal tender status within the euro area . The legal tender status of euro coins is provided for in secondary Union law . 2.5 The concept of ‘legal tender’ as a means of payment denominated in a currency unit has been considered by the Court of Justice of the European Union. In particular, the Court of Justice clarified that the concept of ‘legal tender’ signifies that this specific means of payment cannot generally be refused in settlement of a debt, denominated in the same currency unit at its full-face value, with the effect of discharging the debt. In clarifying the concept of ‘legal tender’ under Union law, the Court of Justice took into consideration

text: Commission Recommendation 2010/191/EU

text: , which provides useful guidance for the interpretation of the relevant provisions of Union law. Point 1 of Recommendation 2010/191 states that, where a payment obligation exists, the legal tender of euro banknotes and coins should imply: (a) mandatory acceptance of those banknotes and coins; (b) their acceptance at full face value; and (c) their power to discharge from payment obligations. According to the Court of Justice, this shows that the concept of ‘legal tender’ encompasses, inter alia, an obligation in principle to accept banknotes and coins denominated in euro for payment purposes . 2.6 However, the Court of Justice further clarified that the status of legal tender calls only for acceptance in principle of banknotes and coins denominated in euro as a means of payment, not for absolute acceptance. The Union’s exclusive competence in matters of monetary policy is without prejudice to the competence of the Member States whose currency is the euro to regulate the procedures for settling pecuniary obligations, provided, in particular, that the legislation does not affect the principle that, as a general rule, it must be possible to discharge a payment obligation in cash. Thus, that exclusive competence does not prevent a Member State from adopting a measure falling within one of the Member State’s competences. For instance, a Member State may, based on its competence to organise its public administration, oblige the public administration to accept cash payments from citizens. Neither does it prevent a Member State, in the exercise of its own powers, from introducing, on legitimate public interest grounds, a derogation from that obligation for statutorily imposed payments, subject to compliance with certain conditions. In particular, the obligation to accept euro banknotes and coins may, in principle, be restricted by the Member States for reasons of public interest and subject to the principle of proportionality. This means that any such restrictions must be proportionate to the public interest objective pursued. When limiting the possibility, recognised by Union law, of generally discharging a payment obligation in banknotes and coins denominated in euro, Member States must ensure that all measures comply with the principle of proportionality, which requires in particular that they are appropriate for achieving the legitimate objectives pursued by the legislation at issue and do not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives .

text: Article 128(1)

text: , first and third sentences, of the Treaty and

text: Article 16

text: , first paragraph, first and third sentences, of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank.

text: Article 11 of Council Regulation (EC) No 974/98 of 3 May 1998

text: on the introduction of the euro (OJ L 139, 11.5.1998, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/1998/974/oj).

text: Commission Recommendation 2010/191/EU of 22 March 2010

text: on the scope and effects of legal tender of euro banknotes and coins (OJ L 83, 30.3.2010, p. 70, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reco/2010/191/oj).

text: 22 See judgment of the Court of Justice of 26 January 2021, Hessischer Rundfunk,

text: and

text: , EU:C:2021:63, paragraphs 46 to 49.

text: 23 See judgment of the Court of Justice of 26 January 2021, Hessischer Rundfunk,

text: and

text: , cited above, paragraphs 55 to 56 and 67 to 70. 2.7 The Court of Justice has established that restrictions of the legal tender status of euro banknotes in particular require that the legislation (a) does not have the object or effect of establishing legal rules governing the status of legal tender of euro banknotes; (b) does not lead, in law or in fact, to abolition of those banknotes, in particular by calling into question the possibility, as a general rule, of discharging a payment obligation in cash; (c) has been adopted for reasons of public interest; (d) only entails a limitation on cash payments that is appropriate for attaining the public interest objective pursued; and (e) only entails a limitation on cash payments that does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve the public interest objective . 2.8 Regarding the proportionality of a restriction of the legal tender status of euro banknotes, the Court requires not only that the measure is appropriate for attaining the public interest objective pursued, but also that it must not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve that objective. The ECB has undertaken additional reflection in its opinions with respect to whether limitations may be considered proportionate . In particular, the ECB has noted that the broader and more general a limitation is, the stricter the interpretation of the proportionality requirement should be. When considering whether a limitation is proportionate, the adverse impact of the limitation in question and whether alternative measures capable of fulfilling the relevant objective with a less adverse impact should always be considered . 2.9 The Court of Justice has clarified that the concept of ‘legal tender’ is a concept of Union law that must be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the Union . It has also established that Article 133 of the Treaty empowers the Union legislature alone to specify the legal rules governing the status of legal tender accorded to banknotes and coins denominated in euro, insofar as that is necessary for the use of the euro as the single currency. Furthermore, the Union legislature’s exclusive competence precludes any competence on the part of the Member States in the matter, unless they have been empowered by the Union to do so or for the implementation of Union acts . In this respect, the ECB notes that, on 28 June 2023, the Commission published a proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the legal tender of euro banknotes and coins (hereinafter the ‘proposed regulation on the legal tender of euro cash’), which will establish rules on the legal tender of euro banknotes and coins in binding Union secondary law The explanatory memorandum accompanying the proposed regulation on the legal tender of euro cash states that discussions within the Euro Legal Tender Expert Group (ELTEG) confirmed the existence of legal uncertainty regarding the legal tender of euro cash and differing application of its

text: 24 See judgment of the Court of Justice of 26 January 2021, Hessischer Rundfunk,

text: and

text: , cited above, paragraph 78.

text: 25 See paragraph 4 of Opinion

text: of the European Central Bank of 16 February 2022 on a proposal for a directive and a regulation on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing (OJ C 210, 25.5.2022, p. 15).

text: 26 See paragraph 2.7 of Opinion

text: 27 See judgment of the Court of Justice of 26 January 2021, Hessischer Rundfunk,

text: and

text: , cited above, paragraph 45.

text: 28 See judgment of the Court of Justice of 26 January 2021, Hessischer Rundfunk,

text: and

text: , cited above, paragraphs 50 to 52.

text: 29 COM(2023) 364 final. principles in the euro area . These differences would justify establishing rules on the legal tender of euro cash in a regulation adopted under Article 133 of the Treaty.

text: 3. Specific observations

text: 3.1 The explanatory memorandum states that the guiding principle behind its drafting was to strike a good balance between the importance of an inclusive and resilient payment system and that of an efficient and secure one. In Opinion

text: , the ECB considered that since the legal tender status of euro banknotes and coins is already provided for in primary and secondary Union law, respectively , the draft amendment to the legislative proposal regarding the AML Law would not create an ex novo obligation to accept cash. Therefore, the ECB considers that by referring to the balance between the obligation to accept cash payments (inclusivity) and the efficiency and security arguments, the explanatory memorandum disregards the fact that primary Union law already establishes an obligation, as a general rule, to accept euro banknotes and coins in discharge of a payment obligation. In other words, this approach to the proportionality assessment does not align with that approach established by the Court of Justice, which consists of assessing the proportionality of a cash restriction by reference to an existing general obligation to accept cash in Union law. 3.2 The ECB is fully committed to ensuring that euro cash remains accepted in payments throughout the euro area, in line with the Eurosystem’s cash strategy . For this reason, the ECB welcomed the draft amendment to the legislative proposal regarding the AML Law, which clarified and strengthened the obligation to accept cash as a means of payment in business-to-consumer transactions in the Netherlands . However, the ECB notes that the overall effects of the draft amendments to the legislative proposal regarding the AML Law, namely the reinforcement of the obligation to accept cash for payments up to EUR 3 000, would be severely diminished by the draft law, under which the combination of several exceptions may lead, in law or in fact, to the abolition of the use of euro banknotes and coins in several sectors and situations (payments in the public space, payments in unattended commercial premises, payments on board public means of transport, payments during night hours, periodic payments, payments in enterprises refusing cash due to an essential security reason, and payments in enterprises with fewer than four people working in them refusing cash due to essential security reasons), in particular by calling into question the possibility, as a general rule, of discharging a payment obligation in cash. This casts doubt on the compliance of the measures proposed in the draft law with the criteria set out by the Court of Justice to guarantee the status of legal tender of euro cash. As a consequence, these measures may severely undermine the mandatory acceptance of euro cash in the Netherlands. The number and scope of the exceptions

text: 30 See section 3, page 4 of the explanatory memorandum accompanying the proposed regulation on the legal tender of euro cash and Principle 6 of the final report of ELTEG of 6 July 2022, available on the European Commission’s website at www.ec.europa.eu. See also Opinion

text: 31 See paragraph 3.1 of Opinion

text: Article 128(1)

text: , third sentence, of the Treaty and

text: on the introduction of euro (OJ L 139, 11.5.1998, p.1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/1998/974/oj).

text: 33 Available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. See also paragraph 1.7 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.6 of Opinion

text: 34 Paragraph 2.6 of Opinion

text: . create a high risk of undermining public trust in euro cash as legal tender and could render situations in which euro cash is currently accepted increasingly rare. 3.3 In this context, the ECB notes that the proposed regulation on the legal tender of euro includes an obligation on Member States to ensure cash acceptance in their territories. 3.4 Exceptions to the obligation to accept cash payments that relate to the specific nature of activities 3.4.1 According to the explanatory memorandum, the public interest justification applicable to a number of the exceptions to the obligation to accept cash is security . However, this public interest objective is described only in broad terms and without specifying how these exceptions will contribute to improving security in the Netherlands. The wide scope of the security justification used to support the measures included in the draft law suggests a direct link between cash acceptance and security risks, yet no supporting evidence is cited for the existence of such a causal link. 3.4.2 In relation to the exception that would apply where the debtor or creditor are not both present at the moment when the payment obligation is created , the explanatory memorandum only states in general terms that unattended sales outlets are vulnerable to robbery, burglary and vandalism. It makes no reference to the various types of security measures that may be implemented for unattended sales outlets, including self-checkout terminals equipped with robust vaults and advanced protective mechanisms designed to withstand vandalism, deter robbery attempts, and safeguard stored cash against unauthorised access and theft. Moreover, such unattended commercial premises may also be vulnerable to fraudulent activities involving card payments, where criminals may install devices to steal customers’ sensitive payment card data. 3.4.3 In relation to the exception that would apply to contracts concluded outside sales premises , the explanatory memorandum refers to the security concerns associated with cash payments in public spaces and the security of local residents, without reference to specific areas in the Netherlands or to any specific studies or other statistical evidence on the level of criminality involving the theft of cash in the Netherlands. The explanatory memorandum also argues that in the case of contracts made outside sales premises, it would be undesirable for sellers or service providers to be obliged to accept only cash. However, the obligation to accept cash does not imply that sellers would not be able to accept electronic payments in addition to cash payments. 3.4.4 The exception that would apply to payments made on board means of transport is justified in the explanatory memorandum only by reference to ensuring security on public transport, with no further explanation. Public transportation services are essential services that are used by a wide range of individuals, including some who may not have access to electronic means of payment. Denying the possibility to pay in cash could disproportionately affect vulnerable groups, such as the elderly or individuals without bank accounts, thereby undermining financial inclusivity. Furthermore, it should be noted that tickets for public transportation services are not only sold directly on buses, trams, or trains, but are also made available at stations, ticket counters, or through vending machines in many cases. In such contexts, there is no compelling justification for entirely excluding the possibility of

text: 35 See

text: Article 1

text: , points (a), (d), (e) and (f), of the draft law.

text: Article 1

text: , point (a), of the draft law.

text: Article 1

text: , point (d), of the draft law.

text: Article 1

text: , point (e), of the draft law. cash payments, especially since vending machines continue widely to be equipped with secure mechanisms to accept and process cash transactions. A blanket restriction on cash payments in public transportation does not appear proportionate, as it disregards the diverse methods of ticket distribution and the importance of ensuring that all passengers, regardless of their access to electronic payment tools and with due regard to their payment preferences, can use public transportation seamlessly. The ECB therefore urges the Dutch legislator to reconsider this exception to preserve the inclusive and non-discriminatory nature of payment systems in the public transportation sector. 3.4.5 Similarly, the explanatory memorandum refers to security risks associated with holding cash on premises after 22:00 and to security risks being greater in the evening hours, but does not elaborate. It justifies the exception that would apply to payments made between 22:00 and 06:00 by reference to the existence of a general prohibition under Dutch law on opening an enterprise or selling to the public on weekdays between 22:00 and 06:00 . However, this general prohibition is itself subject to numerous exceptions in respect of, for example, pharmacies, hospitals, nursing/care homes, road restaurants, stations, airports, petrol stations, professional shipping and newspapers, and can be regulated differently by way of a municipal license for hotels, bars, restaurants and cafés. The scope of the exception to accept cash between 22:00 and 06:00 in the draft law thus appears to be broader than it might seem at first sight, which raises doubts about the proportionality of the restriction to the public interest objective pursued. The explanatory memorandum fails to account fully for the fact that many essential services continue to operate during these hours, including pharmacies, petrol stations, restaurants, hotels, cinemas, and other establishments that often serve individuals who rely on cash payments. A number of social groups, such as shift workers, tourists, individuals without access to electronic payment methods, or those who prefer to use cash for budgeting purposes, may find themselves excluded from accessing necessary goods and services if cash is not accepted during these hours. The exception to the obligation to accept cash for payments made in the evening hours between 22:00 and 06:00 does not coincide with the definition of legal tender enshrined by the Court of Justice since it effectively denies legal tender status to euro cash for one third of the time. The ECB therefore urges the Dutch legislator to reconsider this exception . 3.4.6 Furthermore, the explanatory memorandum does not specify any other alternative, less restrictive measures to increase security around unattended sales outlets, public spaces, on public means of transport or in the night hours. 3.4.7 In addition, the broad nature of Article 1 of the draft law , which covers all kinds of unattended sales outlets, including those which located inside buildings, such as shopping centres or car parks equipped with security installations, calls into question whether its scope is proportionate to the public interest objective of security.

text: 39 Shop Opening Hours Act (Winkeltijdenwet, Stb. 2021, 376). Shop Opening Hours Act Exemptions Decree (Vrijstellingenbesluit Winkeltijdenwet, Stb. 2015, 267).

text: 40 See also De Nederlandsche Bank, Response of 31 December 2025 to consultation on exceptions to cash acceptance (hereinafter the ‘Response of 31 December 2025 to consultation on exceptions to cash acceptance’), available on the Overheid’s website at www.overheid.nl.

text: 41 Article 1 of the draft law. 3.4.8 The explanatory memorandum justifies the exception that would apply in relation to periodic payments , by citing the administrative burden that accepting cash would place on creditors who are subject to the Civil Code. The Court of Justice has acknowledged that an unreasonable financial burden justify an exception to accepting cash payments by a public authority , provided that such an exception is proportionate to the objective pursued. However, the interest identified in the explanatory memorandum to the draft law is the administrative burden for creditors who are subject to the Civil Code i.e. private parties, and not the public administration. In any case, the explanatory memorandum does not address whether the burden allegedly relieved by the measure outweighs its potential disadvantages, such as the financial exclusion of certain social groups in case alternative means of payment are not available to them. It should be considered whether other lawful alternative means of payment are readily accessible to everyone liable to make periodic payments. 3.5 Additional exceptions provided for in the draft law 3.5.1 As noted above, the draft law provides for two additional exceptions where cash may be refused. First, a creditor may temporarily refuse to accept of cash because of an essential security interest . Second, small enterprises with fewer than four people working in them are given the possibility to permanently refuse to accept of cash if there is an essential security reason . Such criteria are practically impossible to verify, both for consumers and for competent national authorities assessing the legality of cash refusals. Regarding the reference to a creditor who can ‘temporarily refuse the acceptance of cash’, the explanatory memorandum lacks legal certainty since no limit is placed on such temporary refusal. Furthermore, the concept of an ‘essential security interest’ is not sufficiently defined in the draft law or the accompanying explanatory memorandum. Without clear, objective, and narrowly tailored criteria to determine what constitutes an ‘essential security interest,’ there is a high risk of inconsistent application or overly broad interpretations that may unduly restrict the acceptance of cash payments. This lack of precision creates legal uncertainty for both creditors and debtors, undermining the predictability and uniformity of the legal framework governing cash acceptance. Moreover, the possibility of permanently refusing cash for small enterprises with fewer than four people working in them, even if justified by an essential security reason, is particularly problematic. Small enterprises often serve local communities and vulnerable groups, such as the elderly, low-income individuals, or those without access to electronic payment methods, who rely on cash as their primary means of payment. Allowing such enterprises to refuse cash payments entirely could disproportionately exclude these groups from accessing essential goods and services, thereby undermining the inclusivity of the payment system. Furthermore, the permanent nature of the exception for small enterprises raises serious concerns about its proportionality. Security risks associated with cash handling can be effectively mitigated through alternative measures, such as secure storage facilities, time-delayed safes, enhanced surveillance, or cash collection services. These measures are widely used and can address security concerns without permanently excluding cash as a means of payment. A blanket exception allowing the permanent refusal of cash, even for

text: Article 1

text: , point (c), of the draft law.

text: 43 See judgment of the Court of Justice of 26 January 2021, Hessischer Rundfunk,

text: and

text: , cited above, paragraphs 76 and77. small enterprises, does not adequately balance the security interests of creditors with the obligations stemming from the legal tender status of euro cash . 3.5.2 Regarding the appropriateness of these measures to the public objective pursued, the explanatory memorandum does not provide evidence that the exceptions set out in Article 1 of the draft law are likely to achieve the aim of decreasing or otherwise mitigating security risks. 3.5.3 Moreover, the Dutch legislator has not indicated whether alternative measures that would fulfil the relevant objective and have a less adverse impact on the right to pay in cash could have been adopted. Since the public interest objective is related to increasing physical security in Dutch society, it is unclear whether an exception to the obligation to accept cash payments adequately addresses that public interest objective. The exception to the obligation to pay in cash does not appear to address the cause of potential heightened security risks in specific areas nor how to reduce such risks. 3.5.4 Furthermore, the explanatory memorandum does not address the social impact and risk of financial exclusion that would result from the introduction of these exceptions, in particular with regard to the application of the permanent exception for enterprises with fewer than four people working in them. 3.5.5 These measures would make it significantly more difficult to settle legitimate transactions using cash as a means of payment, which could endanger the concept of legal tender enshrined in the Treaty . Notably, the possibility for the restriction to be applied by an undertaking on a permanent basis is disproportionate in relation to the public interest pursued. In this regard, according to available public official statistics , more than 80 % of enterprises engaged in retail business in the Netherlands only have one or two people working in them. This indicates that a large majority of these enterprises could use this exception for security reasons, effectively undermining the legal tender status of cash and creating the risk that the acceptability of cash becomes the exception. Based on these calculations, the draft law would, in practice, lead to the abolition of cash in more than half of the sales outlets in the Netherlands, should all concerned creditors invoke an essential security reason to justify the non-acceptance of cash . 3.5.6 Regarding the proportionality of the exceptions, the explanatory memorandum refers to the existence of an ‘essential security interest’, which would be assessed by a competent organ or an emergency regulation proclaimed by the mayor at municipality level. The explanatory memorandum also states that the assessment may be based on the creditor having been a victim of an assault. However, the draft law itself does not lay down these criteria, which may lead creditors, including enterprises with fewer than four people working in them, to apply the exceptions based on essential security risks in a discretionary manner. 3.5.7 Granting such a discretionary leeway to enterprises would create uncertainty for consumers as to whether retailers will accept cash or not. This uncertainty is exacerbated by the fact that consumers

text: 46 See the Response of 31 December 2025 to consultation on exceptions to cash acceptance.

text: 47 See paragraph 3.1 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.9 of Opinion

text: 49 See the relevant dataset available on the website of the Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek at www.cbs.nl.

text: 50 See the Response of 31 December 2025 to consultation on exceptions to cash acceptance. do not have information on the number of people working in an enterprise. The draft law explanatory memorandum does not address this uncertainty for consumers. 3.5.8 Moreover, the explanatory memorandum clarifies that no public supervision or enforcement of the obligation to accept cash is envisaged. The draft law inappropriately shifts the obligation to ensure the mandatory acceptance of euro cash onto consumers and leaves the Dutch civil courts with the responsibility to enforce the obligation to accept cash in those cases where the creditor does not comply with the exceptions laid down in the draft law. It is therefore doubtful whether the draft law effectively achieves the objective of creating a higher level of consumer protection . In this context, the ECB notes that a lack of public supervision over the application of the exceptions provided for in the draft law could undermine cash acceptance, as envisaged in the proposed regulation on the legal tender of euro cash .

text: 4. Concluding remarks

text: The ECB is profoundly concerned that the draft law, in its current form, risks undermining the legal tender status of euro cash in the Netherlands, which is enshrined in Union law. The extensive scope of exceptions, combined with a lack of supporting evidence to demonstrate a robust public interest justification, as well as adequate proportionality assessments threatens to erode public trust in cash as a universally accessible means of payment. Moreover, the lack of public oversight or enforcement could lead to a discretionary and arbitrary application of these exceptions, with the risk of disproportionately affecting, inter alia, vulnerable groups and increasing the risk of financial exclusion. The ECB strongly urges the Dutch legislator to reconsider the breadth of the exceptions under the draft law and ensure the proportionality of the measures proposed, safeguarding full compliance with Union law and the Court of Justice’s established criteria. It invites the legislator to amend the draft law to protect the mandatory acceptance of euro cash, preserve financial inclusivity, and uphold the legal tender status of euro cash, which is vital for the integrity and cohesion of the single currency area .

text: This opinion will be published on EUR-Lex.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 22 January 2026.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Christine LAGARDE

text: 51 See the Response of 31 December 2025 to consultation on exceptions to cash acceptance.

text: 52 COM(2023) 364 final.

text: 53 See the Response of 31 December 2025 to consultation on exceptions to cash acceptance.


text: A kötelező tartalékráta mértékéről szóló 52/2023. (XI. 20.) MNB rendelet, Magyar Közlöny 2023/164 (XI. 20.). 2

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/1998/415/oj). 3

text: Article 1

text: (b) of MNB decree 52/2023. (XI. 20.) on the required reserve ratio. The liabilities concerned are all liabilities included in a credit institution’s reserve base, except: (1) deposits and loans taken, the original maturity of which exceeds two years according to the MNB decree on data provision in force; (2) debt securities, provided that the maturity of the securities at the time of the issuance exceeds two years; and (3) repos.

text: 4, 2.1 As previously noted by the ECB Member States whose currency is not the euro retain their powers in the field of monetary policy according to national law . On the introduction of the euro, Hungary’s monetary policy would be the single monetary policy for the euro and would need at that time to be consistent with the Eurosystem’s operational framework. The ECB’s minimum reserve framework currently includes reserve base components similar to those applicable in Hungary. A 1 % reserve ratio applies to short-term deposits and debt securities with an original maturity of up to and including two years, except where those liabilities are to other institutions subject to minimum reserve 6. requirements In addition, reserves complying with minimum reserve requirements are not 7. remunerated Credit institutions should therefore be familiar with the requirements that will apply to them once the single monetary policy is implemented in Hungary.

text: See, for example, paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.6 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on EUR-Lex. 5 Article 282(4) of the Treaty and Article 42.2 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank. 6 See

text: Article 6(1) of Regulation (EU) 2021/378

text: of the European Central Bank of 22 January 2021 on the application of minimum reserve requirements (ECB/2021/1) (OJ L 73, 3.3.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/378/oj). These requirements are subject to amendment or repeal by the ECB. 7 See

text: Article 9(1) of Regulation (EU) 2021/378

text: (ECB/2021/1). These requirements are subject to amendment or repeal by the ECB.

publisher: Europeiska centralbanken

sprak: en

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 27 January 2026 on the required reserve ratio of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (CON/2026/4)

serie: con

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 27 January 2026 on the required reserve ratio of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

type: rubrik

text: On 15 January 2026 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (MNB) for an opinion on a draft MNB decree amending the MNB decree on the required reserve ratio (hereinafter the ‘draft MNB decree’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the 2, Functioning of the European Union and

text: Article 2(2) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: as the draft decree relates to instruments of monetary policy of a Member State that has not adopted the euro. In accordance with

text: Article 17.5

text: , first sentence, of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

type: stycke

text: 1. Purpose of the draft MNB decree

text: 1.1 Currently, the required reserve ratio decided by the MNB is a uniform 8 % for certain liabilities . The draft MNB decree aims to decrease the required reserve ratio from the current 8 % to 6 %. 1.2 According to the explanatory memorandum accompanying the draft MNB decree, this planned amendment has two purposes. First, the average interbank liquidity is expected to decrease as central bank programmes introduced during the COVID-19 pandemic mature, and the reduction of the required reserve ratio aims to contribute to counterbalancing this effect. Second, the MNB aims to support the continued effectiveness of reserve requirements in steering short-term interest rates to ensure effective monetary policy transmission. As also noted in the explanatory memorandum accompanying the draft MNB decree, under the proposed change, the required reserve ratio would converge toward the minimum reserve requirements established by the ECB.

text: 2. General observations

text: This opinion will be published on EUR-Lex following its adoption and in any case no later than six months following its adoption.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 27 January 2026.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Christine LAGARDE

type: vagledning

utgivare: ecb


text: Lag (2014:966) om kapitalbuffertar.

text: Rådets beslut

text: av den 29 juni 1998 om nationella myndigheters samråd med Europeiska centralbanken rörande förslag till rättsregler (EGT L 189, 3.7.1998, s. 42, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/1998/415/oj).

text: Finansinspektionens föreskrifter om amortering av krediter mot säkerhet i bostad (FFFS 2016:16), Finansinspektionens allmänna råd om begränsning av krediter mot säkerhet i form av pant i bostad (FFFS 2016:33) och Finansinspektionens allmänna råd om undantag från amorteringskrav på grund av särskilda skäl (FFFS 2020:3).

text: 4, 5 och 6 §§ i lagförslaget.

text: 7 § i lagförslaget. 10 Se avsnitt 5.3.2 i remissen.

text: 11 § i lagförslaget. 12 9 § i lagförslaget. 13 Se avsnitt 10.1 i remissen. 14 Se avsnitt 5.3.4 i remissen och 10 § i lagförslaget. 15 Se avsnitt 10.1 i remissen. 16 Se avsnitt 5.3.5 i remissen och 13 § i lagförslaget. 17 Se avsnitt 10.1 i remissen. 18 Se avsnitt 5.5 i remissen och 14 § i lagförslaget. 19 7 kap. 1 § i den ändrade lagen om kapitalbuffertar. 20 7 kap. 3, 4 och 5 §§ i den ändrade lagen om kapitalbuffertar. 21 7 kap. 8 § i den ändrade lagen om kapitalbuffertar. 22 7 kap. 7a § i den ändrade lagen om kapitalbuffertar. 23 11 kap. 1 § i den ändrade lagen om kapitalbuffertar.

text: Se avsnitt 6.4 i remissen. 25 Europeiska systemrisknämndens rekommendation

text: av den 22 december 2011 om de nationella myndigheternas mandat för makrotillsyn (EUT C 41, 14.2.2012, s. 1). 26 Se avsnitt 7.3 i remissen. 27 Se avsnitt 6.2 i remissen. 29 Se t.ex. punkt 2.1 i yttrande

text: , punkt 2.1 i yttrande

text: och punkt 3.1.3 i yttrande

text: . Alla ECB:s yttranden publiceras i EUR-Lex. 30 Se t.ex. punkt 3.1.3 i yttrande

text: . 31 Se

text: skäl 24

text: i

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning (EU) nr 1092/2010 av den 24 november 2010

text: om makrotillsyn av det finansiella systemet på EU-nivå och om inrättande av en europeisk systemrisknämnd (EUT L 331, 15.12.2010, s. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2010/1092/oj).

text: Se avsnitt 1 rekommendation E i rekommendation

text: . Se även punkterna 3.1.3 och 3.1.4 i yttrande

text: och punkterna 2.1 och 2.2 i yttrande

text: Se avsnitt 1 rekommendation C i rekommendation

text: . Se även punkt 2.2 i yttrande

text: . 34 Se yttrande punkt 2.3 i yttrande

text: , punkt 2.3 i yttrande

text: och punkt 2.3 i yttrande

text: . 35 Europeiska systemriksnämndens rekommendation

text: av den 27 juni 2019 om sårbarheter på medellång sikt inom sektorn bostadsfastigheter i Sverige (EUT C 366, 30.10.2019, s. 35). 36 Vulnerabilities in the residential real estate sectors of EEA countries, ESRB, februari 2022, har publicerats på ESRB:s webbplats www.esrb.europa.eu. 37 Follow-up report on vulnerabilities in the residential real estate sectors of the EEA countries, ESRB, februari 2024, har publicerats på ESRB:s webbplats www.esrb.europa.eu.

text: 39 för låginkomsthushåll. I det specifika fallet Sverige har både Riksbanken och Finansinspektionen nyligen kommit med bedömningar av den finansiella stabiliteten där de har framhållit att hushållens skuldsättning förblir hög i ett internationellt perspektiv. Detta trots att såväl bostadspriser som hushållens skuldsättning nu ökar i dämpad takt. Båda myndigheterna har uttryckt oro för att de föreslagna lättnaderna i regelverket för bostadskrediter riskerar att leda till att skuldsättning och bostadspriser återigen börjar öka på ett sätt som inte är hållbart på lång sikt. 3.2.4 I sitt uttalande från juli 2025 framhöll ECB-rådet hur viktigt det är att bevara banksystemets motståndskraft, särskilt med tanke på den kraftigt ökande globala geopolitiska osäkerheten. Även om detta uttalande gällde euroländer råder likartade förutsättningar för Sverige. I samma uttalande uppmanade ECB-rådet de nationella makrotillsynsmyndigheterna att upprätthålla banksystemets nuvarande motståndskraft, både vad gäller att bibehålla kapitalbuffertkraven och åtgärderna inom fastighetssektorn. Framför allt vad gäller åtgärderna inom fastighetssektorn upprepade ECB-rådet att de befintliga låntagarbaserade åtgärderna bör bibehållas för att upprätthålla sunda och hållbara utlåningskrav eftersom de utgör strukturella säkerhetsmekanismer. 3.2.5 Som ECB-rådet också konstaterade i sitt uttalande från juli 2025 behöver makrotillsynen därför vara fortsatt flexibel och anpassningsbar till föränderliga förhållanden, också med tanke på den höga osäkerhetsnivån. ECB uppmanar beslutsfattarna i Sverige att fortsätta att noga följa hur de finansiella stabilitetsriskerna utvecklas inom bostadssektorn och vara redo att anpassa de låntagarbaserade åtgärderna, eftersom ytterligare negativa chocker kan kräva snabba förändringar av den penningpolitiska inriktningen.

text: Se Riksbanken, Finansiell stabilitet, 2025:2. 39 Se Finansinspektionen, Stabiliteten i det finansiella systemet, 2025:2. 40 Se ECB, ECB-rådets uttalande om makrotillsyn, 7 juli 2025, finns på ECB:s webbplats www.ecb.europa.eu.

sprak: sv

title: Europeiska centralbankens yttrande av den 6 februari 2026 om Riksbankens roll inom makrotillsynen och om vissa makrotillsynsåtgärder (CON/2026/5)

text: EUROPEISKA CENTRALBANKENS YTTRANDE av den 6 februari 2026 om Riksbankens roll inom makrotillsynen och om vissa makrotillsynsåtgärder (

text: ) Inledning och rättslig grund

text: Den 16 januari 2026 mottog Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) en begäran från Finansdepartementet om ett yttrande över en lagrådsremiss av den 18 december 2025 om utvecklingen av makrotillsynsområdet (nedan kallad remissen) som innehåller ett förslag till lag om begränsning av bostadskrediter (nedan kallat lagförslaget) och förslag till ändringar av lagen om kapitalbuffertar (nedan kallat de föreslagna ändringarna och tillsammans med lagförslaget den föreslagna lagstiftningen). ECB:s behörighet att avge ett yttrande grundas på artiklarna

text: och

text: i fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt och artikel 2.1 tredje och sjätte strecksatserna i

text: rådets beslut 98/415/EG

text: , eftersom den föreslagna lagstiftningen avser Riksbanken och regler som gäller finansiella institut i den mån de har en påtaglig inverkan på de finansiella institutens och marknadernas stabilitet. I enlighet med

text: artikel 17.5

text: första meningen i arbetsordningen för Europeiska centralbanken har detta yttrande antagits av ECB-rådet.

text: 1. Syftet med den föreslagna lagstiftningen

text: 1.1 Det övergripande syftet med lagförslaget är att bidra till en sund amorteringskultur i Sverige, minskade trösklar på bostadsmarknaden och bättre förutsättningar för olika grupper att äga sin bostad utan att det görs avkall på den finansiella stabiliteten. Syftet med de föreslagna ändringarna är även att stärka Riksbankens roll på makrotillsynsområdet. 1.2 De nuvarande bestämmelserna om begränsning av bostadskrediter fastställs i vissa föreskrifter och allmänna råd som meddelas av Finansinspektionen (den svenska tillsynsmyndigheten för den finansiella sektorn) . Enligt remissen kommer dessa bestämmelser nu i stället att regleras i lag, med vissa ändringar som behandlas nedan i detta yttrande. Regeringen anser att frågor som på ett så fundamentalt sätt påverkar institutens kreditgivning och hushållens ekonomi, som utgångspunkt, bör regleras genom lag eftersom detta stärker den demokratiska legitimiteten . I remissen konstateras vidare att en sådan reglering kräver en viss flexibilitet för att åtgärder som har till syfte att motverka risker för den finansiella stabiliteten inte fördröjs. Enligt regeringens mening bör det, i den

text: utsträckning som lagstiftningen behöver kompletteras med föreskrifter på lägre nivå än lag, ske genom att regeringen ges bemyndigande att meddela föreskrifter på området. 1.3 Lagförslaget omfattar följande bestämmelser i fråga om belåningsgrad och amorteringskrav : a) när en bostadskredit för ett nytt bostadsköp lämnas måste kreditgivaren begränsa krediten så att belåningsgraden är högst 90 procent, b) när en bostadskredit utökas måste kreditgivaren begränsa krediten så att belåningsgraden är högst 80 procent, och c) regeringen får meddela föreskrifter om att tillfälligt begränsa belåningsgraden ytterligare. Vid lämnande av bostadskredit enligt nuvarande bestämmelser måste kreditgivaren begränsa krediten så att belåningsgraden är högst 85 procent, oavsett om krediten lämnas eller utökas. I remissen konstateras att det nuvarande bolånetaket inte utgör ett hinder för höga skulder, eftersom låntagaren kan finansiera bostadsköpet på annat sätt, t.ex. med eget sparande eller krediter utan säkerhet. Bolånetaket kan bidra till att hushåll lånar mindre och köper billigare bostäder. För hushåll som inte redan äger en bostad skulle det nya bolånetaket innebära en lägre tröskel för inträde på bostadsmarknaden. För hushåll som har stark återbetalningsförmåga via goda inkomster men lägre förmögenhet innebär bolånetaket att kreditutrymmet begränsas om man inte är beredd, eller har möjlighet, att komplettera bostadskrediten med en blancokredit. Blancokrediterna innebär i regel högre räntebetalningar och amorteringstakt, vilket påverkar denna grupps känslighet för t.ex. ett inkomstbortfall . Vad gäller tillfälliga ytterligare begränsningar av belåningsgraden kan sådana skärpningar genomföras om det t.ex. är en alltför hög kredittillväxt som riskerar den finansiella stabiliteten. Dessa begränsningar har tillfällig karaktär och behovet av skärpningar bör omprövas fortlöpande, i vart fall var tolfte månad . 1.4 Enligt lagförslaget ska det befintliga amorteringskravet kvarstå, dvs. om belåningsgraden överstiger 50 men inte 70 procent, måste bostadskrediten årligen amorteras med ett belopp som motsvarar minst 1 procent av det totala kreditbeloppet när det låg som högst efter den senaste värderingen (nedan kallat det högsta kreditbeloppet), och om belåningsgraden överstiger 70 procent, måste bostadskrediten årligen amorteras med ett belopp som motsvarar minst 2 procent av det högsta kreditbeloppet . 1.5 Enligt lagförslaget avlägsnas det gällande amorteringskravet, dvs. kravet på att bostadskrediten måste amorteras med ytterligare 1 procent av det högsta kreditbeloppet om kredittagarens samlade bostadskrediter överstiger 4,5 gånger bruttoårsinkomsten. Regeringen anser att detta amorteringskrav riskerar att hindra och försena hushåll som annars skulle ha råd och inkomster att ta sig in på den ägda bostadsmarknaden. Att kravet delvis har bidragit till en minskad skuldsättning måste ställas mot att det utestänger vissa grupper från att kunna äga sitt boende . 1.6 I lagförslaget behålls det befintliga systemet, dvs. när en bostadskredit lämnas för en bostad som är nyproducerad, får kreditgivaren under högst fem år från det att bostaden tillträddes medge att krediten inte amorteras enligt lagförslaget, om kredittagaren är den som först förvärvat bostaden.

text: Detta gäller även om bostadskrediten ersätter krediter som använts för att finansiera produktionen av bostaden och som lämnas till samma kredittagare . 1.7 I lagförslaget fastställs att om belåningsgraden inte överstiger 50 procent måste kreditgivaren verka för att bostadskrediten amorteras i syfte att upprätthålla en sund amorteringskultur . Detta behöver emellertid inte få genomslag i en kreditgivares samtliga bostadskreditavtal. Det ställs inget krav på faktisk amortering eller lägsta amorteringstakt, utan det är upp till kreditgivaren att i samråd med kredittagaren besluta om amortering baserat på låntagarens omständigheter . 1.8 I lagförslaget anges att om det under bostadskreditens löptid uppstår särskilda skäl, får kreditgivaren medge att kredittagaren under en begränsad period inte amorterar enligt det befintliga amorteringskrav som beskrivs i punkt 1.4 . Särskilda skäl kan t.ex. omfatta en nära anhörigs bortgång, arbetslöshet, sjukdom, skilsmässa eller föräldraledighet . 1.9 Enligt lagförslaget får regeringen meddela föreskrifter om tillfälliga undantag från amorteringskrav vid extraordinära situationer som sannolikt kan medföra en synnerligen djup lågkonjunktur . Ett exempel är den situation som observerades under covid-19-pandemin. Till grund för behovet av tillfälliga undantag kan ligga t.ex. ekonomiska prognoser . 1.10 Enligt lagförslaget måste kreditgivaren vid beräkningen av belåningsgraden använda det marknadsvärde som gällde när bostaden förvärvades. Vid beräkningen av belåningsgraden får kreditgivaren också använda det marknadsvärde som fastställs vid en senare värdering. En sådan omvärdering får tidigast göras fem år efter det att bostaden förvärvades eller efter den senaste omvärderingen som ledde till en ändring av amorteringsbeloppet eller låneutrymmet. Om bostadens marknadsvärde avsevärt förändras av en annan anledning än den allmänna prisutvecklingen på bostäder, får dock en omvärdering göras tidigare . 1.11 Enligt de föreslagna ändringarna blir Riksbanken – i stället för Finansinspektionen – ansvarig myndighet för att beräkna buffertriktvärdet och fastställa kontracykliska buffertvärden. Riksbanken får fastställa buffertvärden som överstiger 2,5 procent samt identifiera och fastställa kontracykliska buffertvärden för väsentliga tredjeländer . Enligt de föreslagna ändringarna blir Riksbanken även ansvarig för att rapportera beslut om kontracykliska buffertvärden till Europeiska systemrisknämnden (ESRB) . Riksbanken måste ge Finansinspektionen tillfälle att yttra sig innan banken fattar sådana 22 23 beslut , vilka får överklagas till allmän förvaltningsdomstol . Enligt remissen bör dessutom

text: Finansinspektionen ge Riksbanken tillfälle att yttra sig innan Finansinspektionen fattar beslut om andra kapitalbaserade makrotillsynsåtgärder än kontracykliska buffertvärden . 1.12 I Sveriges ramverk för makrotillsyn är det i nuläget Finansinspektionen som har tilldelats den ledande rollen inom makrotillsyn och Finansinspektionen som har utsetts till makrotillsynsorgan. Enligt den promemoria som åtföljer lagförslaget (nedan kallad promemorian) får den nya ansvarsfördelningen mellan Finansinspektionen och Riksbanken anses medföra att Finansinspektionen inte längre innehar den ledande rollen i fråga om makrotillsyn i Sverige. I promemorian anges även att vid ett sådant förhållande finns inte längre förutsättningar att upprätthålla det nuvarande avsteget från huvudregeln att den nationella centralbanken har rösträtt i ESRB. Mot denna bakgrund dras i promemorian slutsatsen att rösträtten i ESRB bör övergå från Finansinspektionen till Riksbanken och att det av detta följer att Riksbanken även får anses vara utsedd myndighet i enlighet med 25, 26 Europeiska systemrisknämndens rekommendation

text: . 1.13 I remissen konstateras sammanfattningsvis att regeringen, mot bakgrund av de stabilitetsuppdrag och de olika specialistkompetenser som finns hos både Finansinspektionen och Riksbanken, gör bedömningen att det finns anledning att se över ansvarsfördelningen för de kapitalbaserade makrotillsynsåtgärderna mellan de två myndigheterna, dels i syfte att stärka Riksbankens roll beträffande den nationella tillämpningen av de kapitalbaserade makrotillsynsåtgärderna, med syfte att även tilldelas ett krisförebyggande verktyg, dels när det gäller att stärka myndigheternas ömsesidiga ansvar avseende den finansiella stabiliteten i allmänhet och makrotillsynen i synnerhet . Regeringen anser även att det är angeläget att tilldela Riksbanken ansvar för det kontracykliska buffertvärdet. Regeringen gör bedömningen att Riksbanken är särskilt ändamålsenlig för detta, inte minst med tanke på att dess uppdrag redan förutsätter en bred ansats när det gäller att analysera samhällsekonomin, inbegripet det finansiella systemet och utvecklingen på kreditmarknaderna .

text: 2. Riksbankens roll inom makrotillsynen

text: 2.1 I sina tidigare yttranden om makrotillsyn har ECB uttryckt sitt stöd för att det utformas effektiva regelverk för makrotillsyn inom medlemsstaterna, i linje med de vägledande principerna i rekommendation

text: . Det bör understrykas att ESRB rekommenderar att nationella centralbanker bör ha en ledande roll i makrotillsynen tack vare sin sakkunskap och sitt befintliga ansvar för den finansiella stabiliteten . ECB noterar att denna princip även framhålls i

text: 2.2 Mot denna bakgrund välkomnar ECB att Riksbanken får en stärkt roll inom makrotillsynsområdet, framför allt att Riksbanken får ansvar för att fastställa kontracykliska buffertvärden. 2.3 Samtidigt är ECB uppmärksam på det faktum att alla övriga kapitalbaserade åtgärder utöver den kontracykliska kapitalbufferten ligger kvar hos Finansinspektionen. Detta omfattar t.ex. systemriskbufferten, såväl den allmänna som den sektorbaserade systembufferten, som kan användas för cykliska risker som annars inte skulle omfattas av den kontracykliska kapitalbufferten. Denna ansvarsfördelning för de kapitalbaserade instrumenten kan införa komplexitet och ge upphov till oönskade överlappningar och/eller ohanterade risker till följd av samspelet mellan instrumenten. I detta sammanhang understryker ECB vikten av att det finns mekanismer för samarbete, samordning och informationsutbyte mellan de båda myndigheterna för att säkerställa att makrotillsynen genomförs på ett effektivt sätt. Detta är även viktigt för att i möjligaste mån säkerställa att det finns en helhetssyn på de övergripande kapitalkraven för banker i Sverige. I det hänseendet välkomnar ECB att Riksbanken enligt lagförslaget ska ge Finansinspektionen tillfälle att yttra sig i beslut om den kontracykliska kapitalbufferten och att Finansinspektionen enligt remissen bör ge Riksbanken tillfälle att yttra sig i beslut om andra kapitalbaserade åtgärder. 2.4 ECB välkomnar att Riksbanken får en stärkt roll inom ESRB, både vad gäller att erhålla rösträtter i ESRB och att anses vara utsedd myndighet enligt rekommendation

text: . Fördelningen av kapitalbaserade instrument innebär att Riksbanken tilldelas ansvaret för att fastställa kontracykliska buffertvärden, medan ansvaret för övriga kapitalbaserade makrotillsynsverktyg ligger kvar hos Finansinspektionen. Samtidigt kommer de låntagarbaserade åtgärder som är riktade direkt mot hushållen nu att regleras i lag. ECB konstaterar därför att dessa förändringar i själva verket kan leda till osäkerhet om vilken myndighet som har huvudansvaret för makrotillsynen i Sverige.

text: 3. Ändringar i ramverket för låntagarbaserade åtgärder i Sverige

text: 3.1 Reglering av låntagarbaserade åtgärder i lag 3.1.1 Enligt lagförslaget ska det rådande regelverket för låntagarbaserade åtgärder i Sverige ändras. I nuläget är det Finansinspektionen som initierar åtgärderna, antingen genom att införa en ny åtgärd eller genom att justera en befintlig åtgärd. På grundval av Finansinspektionens analys och bedömning av systemriskerna på marknaden för bostadsfastigheter och av lämpligt instrument för att hantera de identifierade riskerna utarbetar inspektionen ett förslag till antingen en föreskrift eller ett allmänt råd. Innan Finansinspektionen meddelar det lämpliga instrumentet måste den inhämta regeringens medgivande så att åtgärderna förankras i demokratisk ordning. Som nämndes i punkt 2.4 kommer de låntagarbaserade åtgärder som är riktade direkt mot hushållen nu att regleras i lag. Denna ändring av det rådande regelverket riskerar att strida mot rekommendationen i rekommendation

text: , närmare bestämt att makrotillsynsorganet, i sin strävan att uppfylla sitt mål, ska vara åtminstone operativt oberoende, särskilt från politiska organ . I rekommendation

text: rekommenderas vidare att medlemsstaterna bör säkerställa att makroorganet har

text: kontroll över lämpliga instrument för att uppnå sina mål, och där så krävs bör tydliga och snabba förfaranden upprättas för att tilldela makrotillsynsorganet instrument . 3.1.2 ECB avstår från att lämna ytterligare synpunkter om tänkbara institutionella konsekvenser av att låntagarbaserade åtgärder som riktar sig till hushåll regleras i lag och inte genom en föreskrift meddelad av Finansinspektionen. ECB understryker dock att den svenska regeringen bör säkerställa att den kan agera flexibelt och proportionerligt när den fastställer och kalibrerar låntagarbaserade åtgärder för hushåll. I detta sammanhang understryker ECB vikten av att det finns en omfattande uppsättning låntagarbaserade åtgärder, inbegripet inkomstbaserade åtgärder. Sådana åtgärder är avgörande för att man ska kunna hantera potentiella risker för finansiell stabilitet på ett effektivt och ändamålsenligt sätt. 3.2 Förändringar i kalibreringen av låntagarbaserade åtgärder 3.2.1 Som konstaterats i punkt 1.3 ska enligt lagförslaget lättnader införas för vissa av de nuvarande låntagarbaserade åtgärderna i Sverige. Bland annat skulle bolånetaket för nya bostadsköp höjas från 85 procent till 90 procent, medan taket för utökade bolån skulle sänkas till 80 procent. Samtidigt skulle amorteringskravet som är kopplat till låntagarnas inkomst tas bort, dvs. kravet på att bostadskrediter som överstiger 4,5 gånger bruttoinkomsten måste amorteras med ytterligare 1 procent per år. 3.2.2 I Europeiska systemrisknämndens rekommendation

text: identifierades ett antal sårbarheter på medellång sikt inom bostadssektorn i Sverige. I sin bedömning som offentliggjordes 36 37 i februari 2022 och i den uppföljning som offentliggjordes i februari 2024 ansåg ESRB att sårbarheterna fortfarande var höga på den svenska bostadsmarknaden. Några av de främsta sårbarheterna var hushållens höga skuldsättning, övervärderade bostäder, mycket stora bostadsprisökningar, mycket stor ökning av bolån, en stor andel amorteringsfria bolån i den befintliga stocken av bolån samt en hög grad av sammanlänkning i det nordiska banksystemet. Även om både bostadspriserna och hushållens skuldsättning som andel av BNP har sjunkit sedan 2022, bedömde ESRB att sårbarheterna förblir på en hög nivå eftersom hushållens skuldsättning fortfarande är bland de högsta i unionen. Mot denna bakgrund bedömde ESRB att den nuvarande policymixen i Sverige är lämplig och delvis tillräcklig. Myndigheterna rekommenderades att fortsätta övervaka sårbarheterna och framför allt att överväga att införa åtgärder som skulle begränsa alltför skuldsatta hushålls låntagande (t.ex. ett skuldkvotstak). 3.2.3 Utifrån ett finansiellt stabilitetsperspektiv skulle mer tillåtande låntagarbaserade åtgärder kunna leda till ökad efterfrågan på större bostadskrediter, vilket skulle kunna bidra till högre bostadspriser. Detta skulle i sin tur kunna bidra till ökade skuldsättningsnivåer bland hushållen och göra boendet dyrare

text: Detta yttrande kommer att offentliggöras i EUR-Lex.

text: Utfärdat i Frankfurt am Main den 6 februari 2026.

text: [Namnteckning]

text: Christine LAGARDE

text: ECB:s ordförande


text: EUT C, C/2026/707, 28.1.2026, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2026/707/oj.

title: ECB-rådets yttrande av den 25 februari 2026 om rådets rekommendation om utseende av vice ordförande för Europeiska centralbanken (CON/2026/6)

text: Inledning och rättslig grund

text: Den 30 januari 2026 mottog Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) en begäran från Europeiska rådets ordförande om ett yttrande över rådets rekommendation av den 26 januari 2026 om utseende av vice ordförande för Europeiska centralbanken.

text: ECB-rådets behörighet att avge ett yttrande grundar sig på

text: artikel 283.2 i fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt

text: Allmänna kommentarer

text: 1. I rådets rekommendation, som överlämnats till Europeiska rådet och som Europaparlamentet och ECB-rådet nu ska yttra sig om, rekommenderas att Boris VUJČIĆ utses till vice ordförande för ECB för en mandattid på åtta år från och med den 1 juni 2026.

text: 2. ECB-rådet anser att den förslagna kandidaten är en person som besitter den allmänt erkända auktoritet och yrkeserfarenhet inom den finansiella sektorn som krävs enligt artikel 283.2 i fördraget.

text: 3. ECB-rådet har ingen invändning mot rådets rekommendation att utnämna Boris VUJČIĆ till vice ordförande för ECB.

text: Utfärdat i Frankfurt am Main den 25 februari 2026.

text: Christine Lagarde

text: ECB:s ordförande

text: Europeiska unionens officiella tidning

text: III Förberedande akter

text: EUROPEISKA CENTRALBANKEN

text: Europeiska centralbanken


text: See the Moneyval publication Fifth Round Mutual Evaluation Report, Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures, Bulgaria, May 2022; First enhanced follow-up report and technical compliance re-rating, Antimoney laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures, Bulgaria, May 2024, available at www.coe.int/en/web/moneyval. See also the FATF Recommendations, available on FATF’s website at www.fatfgafi.org.

text: Directive (EU) 2024/1640

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2024 on the mechanisms to be put in place by Member States for the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, amending

text: Directive (EU) 2019/1937

text: , and amending and repealing

text: Directive (EU) 2015/849

text: (OJ L, 2024/1640, 19.6.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1640/oj).

text: See Articles 36 and 103 of the Law on credit institutions.

text: Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013

text: conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2013/1024/oj).

text: See Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions, amending Directive

text: and repealing Directives

text: and

text: (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 338, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2013/36/oj).

text: See

text: Article 4(1)

text: , point (a), of

text: Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013

text: . 10

text: Regulation (EU) No 468/2014

text: of the European Central Bank of 16 April 2014 establishing the framework for cooperation within the Single Supervisory Mechanism between the European Central Bank and national competent authorities and with national designated authorities (SSM Framework Regulation) (ECB/2014/17) (OJ L 141, 14.5.2014, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/468/oj). 11 See

text: Article 36(1)

text: , point (2), in conjunction with

text: Article 108(1)

text: , point (8), of the Law on credit institutions. 12 See Article 2(1) of the Law on credit institutions. 13 See

text: Article 2(2)

text: and (7) of the Law on credit institutions. 14 See

text: Article 13(2)

text: , point (3), of the Law on credit institutions. 15 See Article 36 of the Law on credit institutions. 16 See

text: Article 103(2)

text: , point (25), and Article 103(10) of the Law on credit institutions.

text: See paragraph 3.3.2 of Opinion

text: of the European Central Bank of 16 February 2022 on a proposal for a directive and a regulation on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing (OJ C 210, 25.5.2022, p. 15). All ECB opinions are published on EUR-Lex. 18 See paragraph 3.3.2 of Opinion

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 26 February 2026 on prudential supervisory powers in relation to anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing (CON/2026/7)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 26 February 2026 on prudential supervisory powers in relation to anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 4 June 2025 the National Assembly of the Republic of Bulgaria adopted a law amending the Law on the measures against the financing of terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the Law on the measures against money laundering (hereinafter the ‘adopted law’). The ECB has decided to deliver an own initiative opinion on the adopted law. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, as the adopted law relates to the ECB’s tasks concerning the prudential supervision of credit institutions under Article 127(6) of the Treaty. In accordance with Article 17.5, first sentence, of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the adopted law

text: 1.1 The adopted law amends, inter alia, the Law on the measures against the financing of terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the Law on the measures against money laundering. Both of these laws impose specific obligations for obliged entities, which include credit institutions in Bulgaria . 1.2 The adopted law introduces two parallel provisions, which govern the possible consequences of breaches of these two laws committed by obliged entities . Pursuant to these two provisions, in cases of repeated, severe or systematic breaches of the two laws, the authority competent to withdraw the authorisation or licence of an obliged entity, acting on a proposal by the Chairperson of the State Agency for National Security or by the Minister of the Interior, or on its own initiative, may restrict, suspend or withdraw the licence of the obliged entity.

text: 2. General observation

text: 2.1 The ECB understands that the abovementioned provisions of the adopted law aim to reflect the findings by Moneyval with respect to the powers of relevant authorities to address breaches of antimoney laundering and counter terrorist financing rules, and to achieve full technical compliance with

text: Recommendation 27 of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) . 2.2 In addition, the ECB understands that the adopted law may have, to some extent, attempted to anticipate the transposition of

text: Directive (EU) 2024/1640

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council into Bulgarian law. In this regard, the ECB refrains from expressing any opinion on whether and to what extent the adopted law correctly transposes the provisions of this directive. 2.3 The ECB understands that where the adopted law refers to supervisory powers vis-à-vis obliged entities, such as in Article 125 of the Law on the measures against money laundering and Article 18 of the Law on the measures against the financing of terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the adopted law uses general terms as it aims to capture a broad range of obliged entities whose authorisations are governed by various sectoral laws and regulations. As the terminology used in the adopted law may thus not correspond exactly to each of the sectoral laws, the adopted law envisages that the supervisory powers referred to therein must be exercised under the terms and according to the procedure established by the Administrative Procedure Code and the relevant law. Based on this, the ECB understands that the adopted law will be applied and interpreted in accordance with existing sectoral legislation, including legislation governing the prudential supervision of credit institutions and establishing or conferring specific supervisory powers, such as 5 6 for example the Law on credit institutions , as well as

text: Council Regulation (EU) 1024/2013

text: . The following specific observations aim to set out the ECB’s understanding of several formulations within the adopted law which concern the ECB’s tasks concerning the prudential supervision of credit institutions within the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) under

text: Regulation (EU) 1024/2013

text: 3. Specific observations

text: 3.1 The powers of the banking supervisor 3.1.1 The adopted law refers to the powers of the authorities which are competent for the authorisation and withdrawal of authorisation of obliged entities to restrict, suspend or withdraw the licences of those obliged entities. Granting authorisations to credit institutions within the Union is regulated primarily under Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council and, for credit institutions established in the Member States participating in the SSM, the ECB has been entrusted

text: with the exclusive competence to grant and withdraw authorisations . It follows that the adopted law envisages that the banking supervisor responsible for granting and withdrawing authorisations would adopt the relevant supervisory measures. Conversely, the ECB understands that the adopted law does not seek to empower the Chairperson of the State Agency for National Security or the Minister of the Interior to adopt the relevant supervisory measures. 3.1.2 The ECB understands that the adopted law establishes a new, additional procedure for initiating the withdrawal of authorisations in the event of relevant breaches of anti-money laundering (AML) and countering the financing of terrorism (CFT) (AML/CFT) requirements by credit institutions, whereby the Chairperson of the State Agency for National Security or the Minister of the Interior makes a proposal directly to the ECB. The ECB understands that in practice this procedure may also involve the State Agency for National Security or the Ministry of the Interior informally liaising with BNB, given BNB’s mandates in relation to both the prudential and the AML/CFT supervision of credit institutions. This new procedure for proposing the withdrawal of authorisations in the event of relevant breaches of AML/CFT requirements by credit institutions is established in addition to the existing procedure governed by the Law on credit institutions and

text: Regulation (EU) No 468/2014

text: of the European Central Bank (ECB/2014/17) , whereby BNB, acting upon findings of breaches of AML/CFT requirements may itself submit proposals for the withdrawal of licences to the ECB, without any involvement of the State Agency for National Security or the Ministry of the Interior . 3.2 The power to restrict licences 3.2.1 The adopted law does not clarify the precise scope of the power to restrict licences. In this regard, the Law on credit institutions provides that, in addition to core activities which are always part of the 12 13 licence , a credit institution may also carry out other activities if they are covered by its licence . The Law on credit institutions therefore provides for the possibility for credit institutions to carry out a number of optional activities, subject to a dedicated authorisation by the competent authority . The Law on credit institutions further empowers the competent authority to permanently withdraw a credit institution’s licence, either for all activities, including core activities , or only for some of the optional activities . 3.2.2 It follows that the Law on credit institutions recognises the possibility that a credit institution may maintain its licence, even in the event that its authorisation to perform some of the optional activities included under that licence is withdrawn. The ECB understands that the power to restrict licences under the adopted law refers to this exact situation, where the licence to operate as a credit institution is maintained, but the authorisation for some optional activities is revoked completely and

text: permanently. This power is inherent in the overall power to withdraw the authorisation of a credit institution, albeit that it applies only in relation to specific optional activities for which authorisation had been granted. 3.2.3 It follows that, irrespective of the terminology used in the adopted law, the power to restrict licences is to be interpreted as being the power to withdraw the authorisation to carry out certain optional activities, while maintaining the licence to operate as a credit institution. For the sake of legal certainty, it is suggested that the adopted law is amended to explicitly reflect this interpretation. 3.2.4 The ECB reiterates that, in order to reflect that in some situations the exclusive power to withdraw authorisations of obliged entities is exercised by authorities other than AML/CFT supervisors and to avoid the duplication of supervisory powers in other situations, it should be clarified that where the powers to withdraw authorisation, or to take another action with respect to the authorisation of an obliged entity, rests with another authority, the AML/CFT supervisors only have the possibility to propose withdrawals or other actions with respect to authorisations, such as restrictions of licences under the adopted law, to the authority that is competent for taking such actions . The ECB recommends that the adopted law is clarified to reflect the specificities stemming from procedures and allocation of competences under

text: Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013

text: . 3.3 The power to suspend licences The adopted law does not clarify the precise scope of the power to suspend an obliged entity’s licence. While

text: Article 56(2)

text: , point (f), of

text: Directive (EU) 2024/1640

text: provides the possibility to suspend an obliged entity’s licence, in the ECB’s understanding such a power would not apply in respect of credit institutions, in view, inter alia, of their specific characteristics under Union legislation concerning the banking sector. As the ECB has previously remarked, Directive

text: does not recognise the possibility to suspend authorisation of credit institutions . The adopted law should therefore be amended to clarify that the power to suspend licences does not apply in respect of obliged entities which are credit institutions.

text: This opinion will be published on EUR-Lex.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 26 February 2026

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Christine LAGARDE