text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: FEK Α 138/9.8.2010.

text: Currently the shortened time limits apply only to shareholders meetings deciding on the issuance of convertible bonds or other financial instruments and to the submission of documents to the supervisory authorities. 4 The draft law stipulates that this amendment to the fourth indent of

text: Article 7(2)

text: will be deemed to have entered into force upon submission of the draft law to the Parliament.

text: Law 3461/2006 (FEK A 106/30.5.2006) transposes into Greek law Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on takeover bids (OJ L 142, 30.4.2004, p. 12).

text: Annex V to Law No 4046/2012 on the approval of the draft financing agreements between the European Financial Stability Fund, the Hellenic Republic and the Bank of Greece and of the draft Memorandum of Understanding between the Hellenic Republic, the European Commission and the Bank of Greece and other provisions of utmost importance for reducing the public debt and saving the national economy (FEK A 28/14.12.2012), as amended.

text: See in particular Opinions

text: and

text: Opinion

text: , paragraph 6.1.

text: Directive

text: of the Εuropean Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the exercise of certain rights of shareholders in listed companies (OJ L 184, 14.7.2007, p. 17). On this point, account should be taken of the ongoing legislative initiative at Union level aimed at amending, inter alia, Directive

text: to provide for the shortening of minimum time limits for the convocation of a general meeting to decide on a capital increase subject to the fulfilment of certain conditions. See in particular proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directives

text: and

text: , Directives

text: and

text: and

text: Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010

text: (COM (2012) 280 final).

text: Namely, on decisions concerning an amendment of the company’s charter, a capital increase or decrease or core corporate events, such as the bank’s merger or the selling off of the bank’s assets, including subsidiaries; see

text: Article 7

text: a(1) of Law on HFSF.

text: A draft law amending the Law on HFSF, on which the ECB was consulted and issued its Opinion

text: , explicitly mentioned that the ECB representative in the HFSF participates without a voting right. However, the final text of the law following its adoption did not contain this explicit statement.

text: Opinion

text: , paragraph 8.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 12 March 2013 on the recapitalisation of credit institutions (CON/2013/17)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 12 March 2013 on the recapitalisation of credit institutions (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 4 March 2013, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Greek Ministry of Finance for an opinion on draft legislative provisions amending the law on the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund. On 6 March 2013, the ECB received a supplementary request on additional draft provisions amending the same law (hereinafter jointly referred to as the ‘draft provisions’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union and the sixth indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to rules applicable to financial institutions, insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft provisions

text: 1.1 Pursuant to the explanatory memorandum for the draft provisions, their purpose is: (a) to reinstate the pre-emption rights of existing shareholders, thereby facilitating private investor participation in a common equity capital increase of the banks under recapitalisation; (b) to broaden the scope for shortening initial and adjourned general meeting notice periods, to speed up the process of a bank’s recapitalisation; and (c) to eliminate counter motives for private investors to participate in the recapitalisation of Greek banks. The draft provisions amend Law No 3864/2010 establishing the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund (hereinafter the ‘Law on HFSF’). 1.2 In particular, the following changes are made: (a) the third indent of Article 7(1) of the Law on HFSF is amended to restore existing shareholders’ pre-emption rights, by abrogating the abolition of such rights under the law currently in force; (b) the fourth indent of Article 7(2) of the Law on

text: HFSF is supplemented to extend the shortened time limits currently in force to the convocation of general shareholders meetings deciding on any issue referring to the implementation of the Law on HFSF ; and (c) Article 7(5) of the Law on HFSF is amended to provide that HFSF shares will, unlike the regime currently in force, be taken into consideration when calculating the thresholds activating the exercise of a mandatory takeover bid under Article 7(1) of Law No 3461/2006 .

text: 2. General observations

text: The ECB welcomes the draft provisions, to the extent that they aim to complement the Greek legal framework for the recapitalisation of credit institutions, established in line with the financial sector objectives outlined by the Greek authorities in the Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, as applicable from time to time . In relation to the development of such a national legal framework, the ECB refers to its previous relevant opinions . Without prejudice to this general observation, the ECB has the following specific observations.

text: 3. Reinstatement of the shareholders’ pre-emption rights

text: The ECB attaches the utmost importance to the completion of the recapitalisation of credit institutions in Greece. In this respect, it supports the reinstatement of existing shareholders’ pre-emption rights, as it expects that this will enable the efficient and effective participation of private investors in the recapitalisation of Greek banks.

text: 4. Timely completion of corporate proceedings for the recapitalisation

text: 4.1 The ECB stresses the importance of completing the issuance of common stock in a timely manner, thereby ensuring the prompt finalisation of the recapitalisation process. Without prejudice to the observations below, the ECB notes the proposed amendment to Article 7(2) of the Law on HFSF, as a result of which the application of the shortened minimum time limits for calling the general shareholder meetings will be extended to any general meetings deciding on issues related to the implementation of the Law on HFSF related to the recapitalisation process.

text: 4.2 In previous opinions , the ECB underlined that any provision permitting the shortening of minimum time limits required by law for the convocation of general meetings of shareholders should be considered by the consulting authorities having regard to both the Greek corporate law framework and to the relevant Union legislation. In this respect, the ECB notes that any restriction on shareholders’ rights would require careful consideration in light of the protection of shareholders’ rights enshrined in Union legislation, in this case

text: Article 5

text: (Information prior to the general meeting) of Directive

text: on the exercise of certain rights of shareholders in listed companies .

text: 5. Application of takeover bid provisions in the recapitalisation process

text: 5.1 Following recapitalisation by the HFSF, viable Greek banks will, pursuant to the Law on HFSF, be managed by their private shareholders, provided that the latter have achieved a minimum equity participation representing 10% of the bank’s total share capital as a result of the recapitalisation. For as long as such minimum private sector participation is maintained, the HFSF can only exercise its voting rights in specific cases provided for in the Law on HFSF . 5.2 The ECB acknowledges the need to facilitate and encourage private participation in the process of recapitalising Greek banks. Furthermore, it understands that the shareholding structure of Greek banks may warrant the proposed amendment in Article 7(5) of the Law on HFSF disapplying the obligation for a mandatory takeover bid, at least at the stage of the initial common equity capital increase. However, the ECB notes that

text: Article 5(1) of Directive 2004/25/EC

text: requires the submission of a mandatory bid in such circumstances and does not currently allow Member States to dispense with this obligation on acquirers, be they State or private entities. Although the mandatory bid is designed primarily to protect the rights of minority shareholders, which is not the primary purpose of the draft provisions, the ECB considers it important that the Union regime for takeover bids is effectively applied to the recapitalised banks in the long term, taking into account, inter alia, the need to safeguard the interests of the HFSF both as a shareholder and investor and restore confidence in the smooth operation of the Greek capital market. The ECB would therefore invite the consulting authority to consider the proposed amendment in a more comprehensive context that will ensure an efficient application of the takeover bids provisions that duly takes into

text: account all relevant recapitalisation parameters, e.g. the exercise of warrants, as well as exit options for the HFSF in the context of future reprivatisation.

text: 6. ECB representation and HFSF governance structure

text: In the context and on the occasion of the proposed amendments to the Law on HFSF, the ECB would like to invite the consulting authority to also address aspects of the HFSF framework already highlighted in previous ECB opinions. In particular, Article 4(15) of the Law on HFSF should clarify that the ECB representative in the HFSF governing bodies participates without voting rights . Furthermore, the provision in Article 4(13) of the Law on HFSF entitling the ECB’s representative to request a convocation of a meeting of the General Council should be deleted, given that this goes beyond the mere observer status . Finally, the HFSF’s two-tier governance structure should be amended in line with the ECB’s recommendation that members of the Executive Board should at the same time be members of the General Council .

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 12 March 2013.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 2 International standards on combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism and proliferation, FATF Recommendations, February 2012.

text: See

text: and

text: . All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 8 See

text: Article 21

text: , paragraph 4 of the Law on money laundering.

publisher: Europeiska centralbanken

sprak: en

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 18 March 2013 on the limitation of cash payments (CON/2013/18)

serie: con

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 18 March 2013 on the limitation of cash payments (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

type: rubrik

text: On 21 February 2013, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Nationale Bank van België/Banque Nationale de Belgique (NBB), acting on behalf of the Belgian Ministry of Finance and the Belgian Ministry of Interior Affairs, for an opinion on a draft law providing for urgent measures to fight against fraud (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Article 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the second indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to means of payment. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

type: stycke

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 Further to the revision of the recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) in February 2012 , the draft law amends the criteria for identifying tax fraud, which triggers the application of the Law of 11 January 1993 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for money laundering and terrorist financing (hereinafter the ‘Law on money laundering’).

text: Article 5(3)

text: and Article 28 of the Law on money laundering currently refer to ‘serious and organised tax fraud, which sets in motion complex mechanisms or which uses processes with an international dimension’. Under the draft law, this is changed to ‘serious tax fraud, organised or not’. This change will also be reflected in the provisions of the Penal Code on confiscation and concealment. The explanatory memorandum states that this would make it possible to prosecute the laundering of the proceeds from serious tax fraud which is not organised, but nonetheless may be classified as serious given the amounts at stake.

text: 1.2 The draft law also clarifies the scope of the prohibition of cash payments under Article 21 of the Law on money laundering. Currently, a merchant may receive up to 10% and not more than EUR 5 000 of the sales price for goods or services in cash, whether the sale takes place in one operation or in the form of separate operations which appear linked. Article X+1 of the draft law provides that a trader in precious metals may pay up to 10% and not more than EUR 5 000 in cash when purchasing precious metals, whether the purchase takes place in one operation or in the form of separate operations which appear linked. From 1 January 2014, the amount which may be settled in cash shall be lowered to EUR 3 000. Precious metals are currently defined in Article 69(2) of the Law of 29 December 2010 laying down various measures with reference to gold, silver or platinum, with the exclusion of coins. 1.2.1 The breach of the abovementioned limitations of payments is sanctioned by a fine from EUR 250 to EUR 225 000, whose effective amount may not exceed 10% of the price unduly paid in cash. Both the debtor and the creditor are jointly liable for any fine . 1.2.2 The King will identify in a Royal Decree the list of merchants and service providers (including those involved in precious metal transactions) who must inform the Financial Information Processing Unit of any case of breach of the cash limitation . 1.3 In order to curb the increased theft of copper wire, the Law of 29 December 2010 laying down various measures will also be amended in order to prohibit using cash to purchase copper cables that are recycled, used or offered as such, by natural or legal persons active in the recuperation, recycling and trade in precious metals. Natural and legal persons active in the recuperation, recycling and trade in old metals or precious metals are required to identify and register the natural or legal person who buys the metals if those purchases are paid for in cash for an amount of more than EUR 500.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 As emphasised in ECB Opinions

text: and

text: in respect of previous versions of the Law on money laundering and

text: recital 19

text: of

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 974/98 of 3 May 1998

text: on the introduction of the euro , limitations on payments in notes and coins, established by Member States for public reasons, are not incompatible with the status of legal tender of euro banknotes and coins, provided that other lawful means for the settlement of monetary debts are available’. In addition, limitations on payments in cash should be proportionate to the objectives pursued and should not go beyond what is necessary to achieve such objectives. 2.2 The European Commission is currently reviewing Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on the prevention of the use of the financial

text: system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing , which was implemented in Belgium by the Law on money laundering. This review may potentially lead to the lowering of thresholds triggering a declaration in respect of the underlying transactions.

text: 3. Specific observations

text: 3.1 The ECB was not consulted on the Law of 29 March 2012 amending the Law on money laundering, which lowered the upper threshold for settlement of payments in cash from EUR 15 000 to EUR 5 000 (and EUR 3 000 from 1 January 2014). The legislative framework as amended by the draft law results in limitations on payments in cash which would be quite extensive. 3.2 The ECB understands, however, that: (a) lawful means for the settlement of monetary debts, other than cash, are available in Belgium; and (b) the draft law’s objectives of combating tax fraud and curbing of theft of copper qualify as public reasons outweighing the impact of the limitations on cash payments. 3.3 With a view to introducing some flexibility in the Law on money laundering, the ECB would recommend allowing payments in cash for compelling reasons or for reasons beyond the control of a customer . 3.4 The ECB would also recommend weighting the measures proposed in the draft law against the public benefits expected to be derived from them in order to ensure that the effects of those measures do not go beyond what is necessary for achieving the objective of combatting tax fraud and criminal activity in relation to precious metals. The ECB assumes that such weighting would be conducted by the King, when enacting the list of merchants and service providers who must pass to the Financial Information Processing Unit information on transactions carried out in breach of Article 21 of the Law on money laundering, following an opinion of the Financial Processing Unit and after consultation of the representatives of the sectors at stake .

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 18 March 2013.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI

type: vagledning

utgivare: ecb


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: All ECB’s opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: See Communication from the Commission — “The recapitalisation of financial institutions in the current financial crisis: limitation of aid to the minimum necessary and safeguards against undue distortions of competition”, point 11 (OJ C 10, 15.1.2009, p. 2). 5 See, in particular, Opinion

text: , paragraph 6.

text: See

text: Article 145

text: B(1) of the Legal Framework of Credit Institutions and Financial Companies (Decree-Law298/92 of 31 December 1992). 7 See Opinion

text: , paragraph 6.1.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 19 March 2013 on the recapitalisation of credit institutions (CON/2013/19)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 19 March 2013 on the recapitalisation of credit institutions (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 7 and 13 February 2013, the European Central Bank (ECB) received separate requests from the Portuguese Minister of State and for Finance and the President of the Portuguese Parliament, respectively, for an opinion on a draft law (hereinafter the ‘draft law’) amending Law No 63-A/2008 of 24 November 2008 establishing measures to strengthen the financial soundness of credit institutions (hereinafter the ‘Law on recapitalisation’). Given that the subject matter of both consultations is the same, the ECB has decided to consider both requests together and issue one opinion. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and on the third and sixth indents of

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to the Banco de Portugal and to rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The draft law introduces changes to the Law on recapitalisation, as amended and republished by Law No 4/2012 of 11 January 2012, on which the ECB adopted its Opinion

text: on 22 November 2011. The Law on recapitalisation was one of the actions considered necessary under the Economic Adjustment Programme for Portugal, with a view to restoring confidence in the banking sector and financial stability in the economy. It aims at reinforcing the resilience of the banking sector by establishing the conditions and procedures for providing temporary public support to viable credit institutions having their head office in Portugal. 1.2 The Portuguese Government undertook, under section 2.15 of the Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic Policy Conditionality, to propose amendments to the legal framework governing access to public capital in order to (a) allow the State, under strict circumstances and in

text: accordance with State Aid rules, to exercise control over a credit institution, and (b) impose mandatory recapitalisations with recourse to public funding. 1.3 In view thereof, the draft law aims mainly at: (i) lifting the prohibition under Article 2(2) of the Law on recapitalisation on the State acquiring control of a credit institution by exercising voting rights, and (ii) allowing mandatory recapitalisation of credit institutions by the State on a proposal from the Banco de Portugal. In addition, the draft law aims at: (iii) reducing the requirements for shareholders meetings convened specifically to decide on amendments to the articles of association necessary for a recapitalisation operation under the law, (iv) prohibiting the acquisition of State shares by new or existing shareholders during the investment period if there is a materially relevant breach of the recapitalisation plan, and (v) improving the procedures for credit institutions to access public funds and State guarantees.

text: 2. Mandatory recapitalisation

text: 2.1 Interaction of mandatory recapitalisation with the resolution framework The ECB welcomes that the amended law will empower the Banco de Portugal to propose the mandatory recapitalisation of viable credit institutions, if this is necessary to preserve financial stability. The ECB believes that the Banco de Portugal is best placed to assess and propose such recapitalisation, as it is required to have carried out a viability assessment and to have evaluated the overall circumstances justifying intervention with public funds in a given credit institution including, notably, the expected return to the State from the investment in line with Union State Aid rules and the terms and conditions of public disinvestment. Nonetheless, the ECB underlines that recapitalisation of distressed credit institutions with public funds should be a temporary measure and, as such, it may not resolve the difficulties of the benefiting credit institution in the longer term. In particular, it is important that such State intervention (a) should not be used to circumvent the application of the resolution framework and (b) ensures the least costly approach to resolving financial difficulties of distressed credit institutions, whilst safeguarding public funds as much as possible . The Banco de Portugal should, in the case of any credit institution which does not achieve the required capital ratios by its own efforts, assess whether the conditions for triggering the resolution framework, which explicitly states that shareholders and creditors should

text: first bear the losses , have been fulfilled. A mandatory recapitalisation by the State may be found to be a viable option pursuant to that assessment, in order to prevent the failure of the credit institution in question, so that its entry into resolution may not be required.

text: 2.2 Shareholder rights

text: The ECB welcomes the fact that the draft law allows for an effective intervention in a credit institution by the State, by means of the exercise of the proprietary right to vote its shares even if this means the State will acquire control of the institution. This will foster the State’s influence in the institution concerned with the aim of preserving financial stability and thus protecting the public interest . However, as far as mandatory recapitalisation under Article 16 of the draft law is concerned, any overriding of shareholder rights would require careful consideration in the light of shareholder rights protected under Union company law directives. In this respect, the ECB underlines that such overriding of shareholder rights might be considered, as a measure of last resort, if systemic and financial stability are at stake.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 19 March 2013.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 3 See Legislative Decree 1195/1942 (FEK A 70).

text: Article 7 of the draft provisions. 5 For deposited amounts in excess of EUR 100 notification by letter with acknowledgement of receipt takes place at least twice. See Article 8(1) of the draft provisions. According to the explanatory memorandum, the notification requirements seem to reflect Judgment No 66610/09 of the European Court of Human Rights. 6 Article 8(3) of the draft provisions. 8 See in particular European Convention on Human Rights.

text: See the ECB’s Convergence Report 2012, p. 25. See also Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 10 See

text: Article 5

text: A of the Statute of the Bank of Greece, available on the website of the Bank of Greece (www.bankofgreece.gr).

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 19 March 2013 on dormant deposit accounts with credit institutions (CON/2013/20)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 19 March 2013 on dormant deposit accounts with credit institutions (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 26 February 2013, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Greek Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a set of draft legislative provisions regarding the management of dormant deposit accounts by credit institutions in Greece (hereinafter the ‘draft provisions’). The draft provisions are part of a draft law on arrangements amending and improving pension-related, fiscal, administrative and other provisions of the Ministry of Finance. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft provisions concern the Bank of Greece. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft provisions

text: 1.1 According to the draft provisions, their main purpose is to allow money in dormant deposit accounts to transfer to the State once the rights of the depositors or their legal heirs have lapsed . To this end, the draft provisions reform the current legal framework governing such accounts . In particular, they establish an automated procedure requiring credit institutions operating in Greece to take specific action to deal with dormant deposit accounts held with them, including monitoring compliance with and implementation of the draft provisions. Furthermore, the draft provisions confer on the Bank of Greece specific supervisory tasks to ensure the adequate implementation of the scheme. 1.2 More specifically, for the purposes of the draft provisions, ‘dormant deposit account’ means an account on which no transaction by depositors has been recorded for a period of 20 years from the

text: day following the last transaction . The draft provisions require a credit institution to notify the beneficiary of a potentially dormant account several times before the expiry of the 20-year period that the balance on the dormant deposit account will be statute barred for the benefit of the Greek State twenty years from the day following the last transaction. 1.3 Following the expiry of the 20-year period, the credit institution concerned must transfer to the State the aggregate balance on any time-barred dormant deposit accounts, including any interest, by the end of April of each year and the credit institution must also notify the General Accounting Office (GAO) and the concerned beneficiaries or heirs of the transfer, as provided for in the draft provisions . 1.4 The draft provisions confer on the Bank of Greece supervision of proper compliance by credit institutions with their obligations and impose the necessary sanctions for breaches. In addition, within the first two months of every year the Bank of Greece is required to submit to the GAO a list of all credit institutions operating in Greece. Finally, the Minister for Finance may ask the Bank of Greece to carry out ad hoc inspections, whenever necessary, to confirm correct application of the draft provisions .

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 According to the explanatory memorandum, the draft provisions are expected to clarify that the money on dormant deposit accounts after the 20-year lapse of the rights of beneficiaries and their heirs may be used to fund State protection of vulnerable social groups. In this respect, the ECB broadly welcomes the draft provisions and notes the importance of ensuring that a fair balance is struck between general interest considerations underlying the statute-barring and the protection of beneficiaries’ property rights, as enshrined in national and international legislation . Furthermore, the ECB notes that, in the explanatory memorandum, the Greek legislator has taken into account the relevant national legislation and well established case law on statute-barring, as well as relevant arrangements in other Member States, noting however that currently there is no harmonised European Union legislation dealing especially with time barring for dormant deposit accounts. In this context, the ECB notes that it is essential to ensure equal treatment of depositors, regardless of whether they are resident in Greece or abroad. 2.2 Moreover, the ECB notes that the Bank of Greece is assigned supervisory tasks related to the application of the draft provisions, as set out in paragraph 1.4 above. The ECB has consistently expressed its concern that, when allocating additional tasks to national central banks, it must be

text: ensured that they have sufficient human and financial resources, both in terms of quantity and quality, for all of their tasks, and in particular that their capacity to fulfil their European System of Central Banks or Eurosystem-related tasks is not affected . 2.3 Finally, in particular as regards the power of the Minister of Finance to ask the Bank of Greece to carry out ad hoc inspections in accordance with Article 9(5) of the draft provisions, the ECB notes that this is not in line with the prohibition on the Bank of Greece from taking instructions from the Government . If the intention of the Greek legislator is to hold the Bank of Greece accountable for its new tasks, it should set up an appropriate accountability framework, such as additional reporting.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 2 Zakon o ukrepih Republike Slovenije za krepitev stabilnosti bank (Uradni list Republike Slovenije No 105/2012). 3 Pursuant to Article 2 of the draft regulation in connection to Article 2 of the Law on bank stability, ‘bank’ here refers to a bank or a savings bank, as defined in the Law on Banking, with its head office in Slovenia. 4 Dedicated companies are companies that take over the risks of banks. They may be established by the banks or by the banks together with the BAMC, as joint-stock companies, pursuant to Articles 2 and 21 of the Law on bank stability. 5 Zakon o bančništvu (Uradni list Republike Slovenije, No 99/2010, official consolidated text, 9/2011 – ZPlaSS-B, 35/2011, 59/2011, 85/2011, 48/2012 and 105/2012). 6 See Article 3 of the draft regulation.

text: See Article 4 of the draft regulation. 8 See

text: Article 6

text: in connection to Article 2(2) of the draft regulation. 9 See Articles 8 and 9 of the draft regulation. See also Article 20(6) of the Law on bank stability. 10 According to

text: Article 2(2)

text: (4) of the draft regulation, the ‘non-payer’ is a legal entity with its head office in Slovenia and the characteristics of a debtor whose financial assets or assumed liabilities are classified in Group D or E in accordance with the Decision on estimating the credit risk losses of banks and savings banks. 11 See Articles 13 and 14 of the draft regulation. 12 See Article 16 of the draft regulation. 13 See Articles

text: and

text: in conjunction with Article 23 of the draft regulation. 14 See Article 30 of the draft regulation.

text: See Articles 25 and 26 of the draft regulation. 16 See

text: Articles 30

text: to 34 of the draft regulation. 17 See Chapter 2 of the draft regulation. 18 All ECB Opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 19 See Article 127(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: . See also the Guide to consultation of the European central bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions.

text: See

text: Article 4(1)

text: (2) of the draft regulation. 21 See Articles 3 and 30 of the draft regulation. 22 OJ L 331, 14.12.2011, p. 1. 23 While the compensation for the assets transferred to the BAMC will be primarily provided in the form of BAMC Stateguaranteed bonds, according to Article 22(2) of the draft regulation the BAMC may also take a State-guaranteed loan from the transferring bank or ensure other sources of financing for the takeover of risk items.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 22 March 2013 on the measures for strengthening bank stability (CON/2013/21)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 22 March 2013 on the measures for strengthening bank stability (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 7 March 2013, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Slovenian Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft regulation on the implementation of measures to strengthen bank stability (hereinafter the ‘draft regulation’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third and sixth indents of

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft regulation relates to Banka Slovenije and to rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft regulation

text: 1.1 Criteria and conditions for the application of measures aimed at strengthening bank stability 1.1.1 The draft regulation implements the Law on Slovenia’s measures to strengthen bank stability (hereinafter the ‘Law on bank stability’). It lays down criteria and conditions for: (a) the transfer of 3 4 a bank’s assets to the Bank Asset Management Company (BAMC) or to dedicated companies ; (b) the issuance of State guarantees for liabilities of the BAMC and of the dedicated companies; (c) the increase of a bank’s share capital and of other capital instruments of banks which are taken 5, 6 into account in calculating a bank’s capital pursuant to the Law on banking .

text: 1.1.2 The measures may apply to a bank where the Government establishes that the bank does not have, or will not have within the following 12 months, sufficient capital to meet capital adequacy requirements and, as a result, the stability of the financial system is threatened . 1.1.3 In order to be eligible for the measures, a bank must be able to show in its business strategy that it: (a) will be able to conduct long-term sustainable and successful operations and have stable and adequate capital; (b) will implement measures for the suitable participation of its own assets and the assets of holders of the bank’s capital instruments taken into account in calculating the bank’s capital to attain these goals; (c) will implement measures to prevent or mitigate any possible distortion of competition . On the basis of the Government’s decision and after having received a positive opinion for State aid from the European Commission, the BAMC and the bank will conclude an agreement on implementing the approved measures in accordance with the business strategy . 1.2 Purchase or takeover of bank assets or rights for consideration Pursuant to the draft regulation, the BAMC may acquire bank assets by transfer of all rights under certain risk items of the bank to the BAMC for consideration. The BAMC may take over risk items of a bank only if it also participates in increasing the bank’s share capital or acquires other capital instruments of the bank. The following risk items may be transferred to the BAMC: (a) bank claims exceeding EUR 500 000 on the day of the valuation against non-payers classified in group D or E which are in default for more than 90 days or otherwise unlikely to be repaid in full; (b) a bank’s capital investments in shares or holdings in the share capital of companies with their head offices in Slovenia, which the bank acquired when realising its collateral rights over such capital investments or when increasing debtor share capital through non-cash contributions, the subject of which were the claims of the bank against the debtor; (c) real property, which the bank acquired when realising its collateral rights; (d) off-balance sheet items of the bank, if their acquisition will increase the BAMC’s management efficiency or confidence in the bank . The draft regulation requires that a bank’s risk items be valued on the basis of the real long-term economic value of assets . As a rule, the payment for transfers of assets will be provided to banks in the form of BAMC bonds guaranteed by the State and will be equal to the value of the assets, reduced by refinancing costs of the BAMC . According to the draft regulation, the bank’s assets may also be transferred to a dedicated company .

text: 1.3 Issuance of State guarantees for liabilities of the BAMC and dedicated companies State guarantees may be issued for BAMC liabilities meeting the ECB’s eligibility criteria for collateral in monetary policy operations . State guarantees may be issued also for liabilities of a dedicated company . 1.4 Increase of bank share capital and other capital instruments A bank’s share capital may be increased with cash contributions for new ordinary shares of the bank or other capital instruments that are taken into account when calculating a bank’s capital. .

text: 2. Duty to consult the ECB

text: The ECB was consulted on the draft provisions of the Law on bank stability, which the draft regulation now implements, and adopted Opinion

text: . Some of the amendments to the draft provisions of the Law on bank stability, following adoption of that ECB Opinion, were substantial. The national authorities did not consult the ECB on those amendments. Furthermore, the draft regulation subject to this consultation was adopted four business days after the ECB received the request for an opinion. The ECB would like to draw the Ministry’s attention to the proper procedure for its consultations. The national authorities must consult the ECB on substantive new provisions introduced in draft legislative acts after the adoption of an ECB opinion on such draft legislative act. The ECB must also be consulted at an appropriate stage of the legislative procedure affording the ECB sufficient time to prepare its opinion and enabling the relevant national authorities to take the ECB’s opinion into consideration before the draft provisions are adopted .

text: 3. General observations

text: The ECB welcomes the efforts of the Slovenian authorities to address its banking sector’s difficulties. The implementation of the measures envisaged under the draft regulation would however be most effective in promoting financial intermediation if they were embedded in a comprehensive financial sector strategy aimed at creating a more resilient and profitable banking system. In this context, an independent system-wide asset quality review and a fresh stress test using appropriately severe assumptions should be conducted, also with a view to ensuring that the fiscal envelope remains realistic and the selection of tools is appropriate.

text: 4. Role of Banka Slovenije

text: In Opinion

text: , the ECB noted that Banka Slovenije should be more actively involved in the BAMC, in particular in any procedure identifying the banks that would be eligible to draw on the measures. Against this background, it should not be the Government or the Committee, but rather Banka Slovenije assessing and deciding whether the stability of the financial system is threatened . Banka Slovenije should also be given a role in the valuation of assets to be transferred to the BAMC or any dedicated company .

text: Article 16(2)

text: provides that the long-term real economic value of assets is assessed by the bank and the assessment confirmed by an authorised independent auditor. While the ECB welcomes the involvement of an independent auditor, Banka Slovenije should be given a prominent, if not leading, role in determining the long-term real economic value, with the valuation to be confirmed by such auditor.

text: 5. Eligibility of bonds, credit claims and other financial instruments as collateral in Eurosystem credit operations

text: As payment for the transferred assets, the participating banks will receive bonds issued by the BAMC or dedicated companies and guaranteed by the State. Potentially the banks could also have credit claims against the BAMC and dedicated companies arising from loans granted to them for the purposes of asset transfer payment. It follows from Articles 25 and 26 of the draft regulation that these instruments and credit claims will be structured to meet the conditions set out in Guideline ECB/2011/14 of 20 September 2011 on monetary policy instruments and procedures of the Eurosystem . In this context the ECB emphasises that it is the prerogative of the Eurosystem to decide, on the basis of any information it may consider relevant within the legal framework laid down in and according to Article 18.1 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, whether such instruments and credit claims fulfil the criteria of its collateral framework. In addition, the consideration provided for the transferred banks assets by the BAMC or a dedicated company must comply with the Union state aid framework.

text: 6. Dividend payments and use of excess cash holdings by the BAMC

text: The draft regulation should provide for the necessary legal arrangements to ensure, in a transparent manner, the timely redemption of State-guaranteed BAMC bonds, other financial instruments and credit claims of transferring banks . This may be accomplished by additional provisions which limit dividend payments by the BAMC and by ensuring that cash held by the BAMC is, as a priority, applied to the timely or early repayment of the State-guaranteed bonds or other potentially issued financial instruments

text: or credit claims of the transferring banks . In addition, if the BAMC’s liabilities towards banks arising from bonds, credit claims or other potential financial instruments are transferred to another entity after the expiry of the BAMC’s term in 2017, as follows from the Law on bank stability , the cash protocol arrangements should apply to such entity as well. The same requirements should also apply to dedicated companies.

text: 7. Asset valuation and management

text: The valuation of assets to be transferred should correspond to their real economic value. The definition of ‘real long-term economic value’ used in Article 16(3) of the draft regulation should be thus brought in line with the Communication from the Commission on the Treatment of Impaired Assets in the Community Banking Sector. The valuation to be performed by Banka Slovenije or the BAMC should be confirmed by an internationally renowned audit firm that has not had any business dealings with the participating bank for more than three years. The BAMC will likely receive a large set of heterogeneous assets, such as diverse credit claims, equity participations and real estate property. Therefore, a comprehensive and transparent asset management and divestiture strategy should be developed to promote efficient BAMC operations and minimise costs borne by the public. To this effect the ECB expects that the BAMC will additionally abide by internationally recognised best practice as regards corporate governance.

text: 8. Other issues

text: Article 5(3)

text: (16) of the draft regulation provides that the bank must include as part of its business strategy a plan of measures to enhance the scope of loans, primarily of loans to small and medium-sized companies, and measures to implement the sustainable business model. The ECB notes that the eligibility of banks for the measures envisaged should not be contingent on a commitment to increase lending to small and medium-sized companies, since extension of credit should always rely on a sound assessment of borrowers’ creditworthiness. Given the fixed financial envelope of the BAMC and the need to restore the soundness of participating banks, assets that represent the greatest burden for such banks should be transferred to the BAMC first. The corresponding wording in

text: Article 15(2)

text: should be brought into line with Article 21(2) of the draft regulation.

text: 9. Dedicated companies

text: The ECB notes that the draft regulation allows the banks to also apply to transfer risky assets to a dedicated company as an alternative to the BAMC. It does not however stipulate any further specific 24 See also Opinion

text: , paragraph 9. 25 Article 36(3) of the Law on bank stability provides that the assets, rights and obligations of the BAMC will be transferred to the Slovenian Compensation Company (or its legal successor, i.e. Slovenia Sovereign Holding), whereas the legal succession of the BAMC will be specified by the Government in an executive act on preliminary reporting to the Parliament.

text: conditions that dedicated companies have to meet to be able to take over bank assets, apart from those mentioned in Article 32 of the draft regulation. It would be advisable to include in the draft regulation minimum conditions on key matters, such as corporate governance standards and conflict of interest rules, which would have to be part of the bye-laws of dedicated companies.

text: 10. Monitoring the BAMC and dedicated companies

text: For asset management companies established in other euro area countries to which bank assets have been transferred, the ECB has welcomed arrangements where an independent body, not involved in the activities of the company, monitors the operations of the company and has access to relevant information. The ECB notes that no such mechanism is envisaged for the BAMC and dedicated companies that may be established. The ECB suggests that such arrangements may nevertheless prove useful, to enhance the acceptance of the scheme and its work, and therefore could still be considered by the authorities in the implementing regulations or any other relevant legal act.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 22 March 2013.

text: [signed]

text: The Vice-President of the ECB

text: Vítor CONSTÂNCIO


text: See Opinion

text: See Opinion

text: See Opinion

text: Available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 8 Available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: Financial Stability Board reports on the LEI: http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/list/fsb_publications/tid_156/index.htm

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 25 March 2013 on balance of payments reporting (CON/2013/22)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 25 March 2013 on balance of payments reporting (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 20 February 2013, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Oesterreichische Nationalbank (OeNB) for an opinion on a draft regulation of the OeNB governing balance of payments reporting (hereinafter the ‘draft regulation’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Article 127(4) and Article 282 (5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union as well as the third and fourth indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft regulation relates to the OeNB and the collection of balance of payments statistics. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft regulation

text: 1.1 Since the beginning of 2006, two OeNB balance of payments reporting regulations have been in effect: ZABIL 1/2005 , as amended by ZABIL 1/2009, governed the collection of statistical data required for compiling current accounts, in particular data on cross-border services. Due to international standards as well as European Union and ECB requirements, the necessary adaptations to this regulation were implemented by the adoption of the balance of payments regulation (ZABIL 1/2012), which entered into force on 1 January 2013 . 1.2 The second reporting regulation, ZABIL 1/2004, as amended by ZABIL 2/2009 , governs the collection of statistical data for financial accounts, in particular data on a security-by-security basis, direct investments, cross-border loans and deposits of non-banks. The draft regulation shall replace ZABIL 1/2004, as amended. The replacement of this regulation is necessary due to new international standards, namely the sixth edition of the International Monetary Fund’s Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual, and new Union legal requirements based thereon. The Union legal requirements include in particular Guideline ECB/2011/23 of

text: 9 December 2011 on the statistical reporting requirements of the European Central Bank in the field of external statistics and

text: Commission Regulation (EU) No 555/2012 of 22 June 2012

text: amending

text: Regulation (EC) No 184/2005

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council on Community statistics concerning balance of payments, international trade in services and foreign direct investment, as regards the update of data requirements and definitions . The draft regulation also implements Article 6 of the Exchange Control Act 2004, under which the OeNB is responsible for compiling the Austrian balance of payments, international investment position statistics, direct investment statistics and all statistics regarding cross-border transactions and positions in the context of the abovementioned statistics, based on Union regulations.

text: 2. General observation

text: In accordance with Article 14.3 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and the European Central Bank (hereinafter the ‘Statute of the ESCB’), national central banks must act in accordance with the guidelines of the ECB. The ECB generally welcomes the draft regulation, which will ensure consistency with the reporting requirements under Guideline ECB/2011/23 following the basic principles of the ECB Statistics Quality Framework . The main purpose of euro area balance of payments and international investment position statistics is to support the ECB’s monetary policy and other Eurosystem tasks. Moreover, as stated in the Eurosystem’s mission statement , accountability, transparency and good governance are important values supporting the integrity of the statistical functions defined by Article 5 of the Statute of the ESCB.

text: 3. Specific observations

text: 3.1 Electronic reporting

text: The ECB welcomes the OeNB’s emphasis on the greater use of electronic reporting as the main channel for data transmission, as this could assist in the provision of more timely and accurate reporting.

text: 3.2 Reporting thresholds

text: The ECB accepts that, for the purpose of reducing the collection burden on reporting agents, an increase in the reporting thresholds, as specified below, is envisaged. (a) For data on end-month stocks of cross-border loans, trade credit and deposits and for all investment categories, the threshold is raised to EUR 10 million (formerly EUR 3 million and EUR 5 million, respectively).

text: (b) For data on direct investment transactions, the threshold is raised to EUR 500 000 (formerly EUR 100 000) per transaction; additionally, the reporting deadline is brought forward by five days. (c) For data on quarterly stocks of claims and liabilities under cross-border financial derivatives, the threshold is raised to EUR 5 million (formerly EUR 1 million). Furthermore, the ECB understands that intermediary measures, such as estimates and recourse to secondary sources, may become necessary to fill the gaps arising from the increased thresholds. Nevertheless this would still result in freeing up resources which can be used to improve the quality of data reported by statistically significant reporting agents.

text: 3.3 Direct investment transactions

text: For data on direct investment transactions, the ECB welcomes the introduction of additional data collection categories and changes to the reporting period, as set out below: (a) The inclusion of two new indicators, namely to differentiate between ‘purchase of shares’ and ‘sales of shares’ could enable improved data analysis, particularly for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) purposes. (b) The mandatory disclosure of the tax ID or commercial register number will facilitate faster and unambiguous identification of foreign (i.e. non-resident) direct investment enterprises/direct investors, which are located in the EEA and Switzerland. This is particularly important from the perspective of the joint ECB/Eurostat project on the FDI Network, which aims to harmonise and improve statistics on FDI. Moreover, the ECB invites the OeNB to closely monitor the developments in the Global Legal Entity Identifier (LEI) Initiative . th (c) The change of the report submission deadline to five days earlier, i.e. the 15 calendar day of the month following the reporting period, could ensure more timely availability of data for the OeNB’s and ECB’s monthly data analysis production rounds.

text: 3.4 Portfolio investment transactions

text: With respect to data on portfolio investment transactions, the ECB welcomes the introduction of new data collection categories, as outlined below: (a) Extension of the existing reports on securities by custodians in the context of breakdowns of customer accounts by report category, i.e. by adding (i) the country of residence of the account holder, (ii) changes in the definitions of the reporting categories, and (iii) a new category of non-resident public entities. In addition, the following will be collected: (i) new mandatory items for stating the market value, (ii) a value field for short positions, and (iii) a field for the nominal currency of banks’ and customers’ stocks. However, the reporting of data on securities prices will be discontinued.

text: (b) New annual account holder reports by custodian banks will be included in the reporting framework. The collection of additional information, as above, could support compliance with the updated European System of Accounts (ESA 2010) as well as with any potential future requirements for extended institutional sector breakdowns in the balance of payments reporting framework. Furthermore, the additional variables could enable better facilities for data analysis and quality checking.

text: 3.5 Other investment transactions

text: With respect to data on other investment transactions, the ECB welcomes the introduction of a separate category for participations of less than 10 % in other enterprises, which could assist in the compilation of the new ‘Other Equity’ item in the other investments account.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 25 March 2013.

text: [signed]

text: The Vice-President of the ECB

text: Vítor CONSTÂNCIO


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 2 Article I (3), (6), (7), (8) and (61) of the draft law. 3 Article 67(1) of Law No 483/2001 on banks. Pursuant to

text: Article 2(1)

text: , a bank is defined as a legal entity with its registered office in the territory of the Slovak Republic, founded as a joint-stock company, which (a) accepts deposits, and (b) provides loans; and which holds a banking licence to perform activities noted in paragraph 1. 4 See the specific part of the explanatory memorandum to the draft law, explanations to Article I (3), (6), (7) and (8). 5 Article I (11) of the draft law. 6 Article I (16) of the draft law.

text: Title IV, Chapter II, Articles 49-55 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 8 See

text: Article 23

text: in conjunction with Annex I to Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions (recast) (OJ L 177, 30.6.2006, p. 1).

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 2 April 2013 on special mortgage transactions (CON/2013/23)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 2 April 2013 on special mortgage transactions (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 1 March 2013, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Slovak Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft law amending Law No 483/2001 on banks (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the sixth indent of

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: The purpose of the draft law is, inter alia, to curtail foreign banks’ entitlement to carry out special mortgage transactions covered by the banking licence through their branches in Slovakia . Special mortgage transactions comprise: (a) the provision of mortgage loans and the related issuance of mortgage bonds; or (b) the provision of municipal loans and the related issuance of municipal loans . The proposed amendment aims at protecting consumers and other clients, since Národná banka Slovenska has limited supervisory powers over branches of foreign banks as compared to banks. In the event that the draft law were adopted, only banks could carry out special mortgage transactions in Slovakia. However, branches of foreign banks would continue to be entitled to provide common mortgage loans . The draft law also contains a transitional provision covering situations where a bank which has performed special mortgage transactions ceases to exist and its legal successor is a foreign bank . Furthermore, the draft law also provides that a bank has a duty to notify its clients of its intention to terminate its activity .

text: 2. Freedom of establishment

text: The consulting authority should ensure that the draft law does not restrict the freedom of establishment of Union credit institutions in Slovakia as exercised through the setting up of branches and, in particular, the conduct of activities subject to the principle of mutual recognition .

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 2 April 2013.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: Legal Notice 177 of 2004.

text: Also known as the SICAV Regulations. Legal Notice 241 of 2006.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 5 April 2013 on financial collateral arrangements (CON/2013/24)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 5 April 2013 on financial collateral arrangements (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 13 February 2013, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Ministry of Finance, the Economy and Investment of Malta for an opinion on draft regulations amending the Financial Collateral Arrangements Regulations of 2004 (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the second and sixth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the ECB by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law concerns means of payment and rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the ECB, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The Financial Collateral Arrangements Regulations (hereinafter the ‘Regulations’), issued pursuant to Article 7 of the Set-off and Netting on Insolvency Act , transposed Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 June 2002 on financial collateral arrangements as well as Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 insofar as it amends Directive

text: as regards linked systems and credit claims. 1.2 The draft law amends the definitions of ‘credit claims’, ‘instrument’, ‘non-natural person’ and ‘recognised jurisdiction’ in Section 2(1) of the Regulations. It also inserts a new provision in Section 2(2), providing for an interpretation of ‘control’ where financial collateral is held by a third party. In addition, the draft law extends the list in the Regulations of who may constitute a

text: collateral taker and a collateral provider to include ‘a corporation or other legal person established by statute’, ‘non-natural persons’ and ‘securitisation vehicles’. 1.3 Furthermore, the draft law amends the existing notification requirements where credit claims are provided as collateral as well as the provisions on the enforcement of financial collateral arrangements. Finally, it clarifies that in certain situations the Regulations shall prevail over the Companies Act (Investment Companies with Variable Share Capital) Regulations of 2006 .

text: 2. General observations

text: Subject to the specific observations on the points mentioned below, the ECB welcomes the amendments to the Regulations and notes that they generally constitute implementation or clarification measures.

text: 3. Credit claims

text: 3.1 The ECB notes the proposed extension of the definition of ‘credit claim’ in Section 2(1) of the draft law, to include ‘pecuniary claims due to a non-natural person, provided that the debtor of the claims granted as collateral is also a non-natural person’. This amendment goes beyond the definition of credit claim set out in Directive

text: , i.e. ‘pecuniary claims arising out of an agreement whereby a credit institution, as defined in

text: Article 4(1) of Directive 2006/48/EC

text: , including the institutions listed in Article 2 of that Directive, grants credit in the form of a loan’. 3.2 The ECB has no objection to this extension of the definition of credit claims, currently restricted in the Regulations to those claims where the creditor of a claim is a bank or credit institution. The ECB understands that the proposed extension of the definition of credit claims is intended to include within the ambit of the Regulations further categories of credit claims which may be provided as collateral. The ECB notes that credit claims due to or owed by individuals are not included in the proposed amendment. In this context, the ECB notes that the definition of ‘nonnatural person’ in the draft law as ‘any legal person, unincorporated firm or body of persons or partnership not being an individual’ was included as a consequential amendment of the proposed amendment to the definition of ‘credit claims’.

text: 4. Definition of instrument

text: The ECB understands that the current definition of ‘instrument’ in the Regulations could generate doubts about whether Article 2 of the Investment Services Act includes financial instruments for which the Regulations are intended to cater. In this regard, it notes the revision of the definition of ‘instrument’ in

text: 5. Recognised jurisdiction

text: The ECB notes that the amended definition of ‘recognised jurisdiction’ in Section 2(1) of the draft law is a definition already used in Maltese law and welcomes the further clarification of this concept through its proposed inclusion.

text: 6. Control

text: 6.1 The new provision in Section 2(2) of the draft law provides that a collateral taker shall also be deemed to have control over financial collateral when ‘this is held by a third party, non-natural person, who acts on the instructions of the collateral taker or of a person acting on his behalf, whether throughout the duration of the financial collateral arrangement or upon the occurrence of an event of default under the financial collateral arrangement’. The ECB understands that this provision is being introduced to provide clarity in cases where financial collateral is held by a custodian on behalf of the collateral taker. 6.2 The ECB acknowledges that the concept of control set forth in Directive

text: seeks to maintain a balance between market efficiency and transactional security, but notes that any clarification of the term ‘control’ must be aligned with Directive

text: . The ECB understands that the new provision in Section 2(2) of the draft law is added for reasons of legal certainty, to further clarify the validity and enforceability of financial collateral arrangements concluded in the circumstances referred to.

text: 7. Collateral taker and collateral provider

text: As regards the proposed amendments to Section 4(1) of the Regulations on the list of collateral takers and collateral providers, specifically paragraphs (a), (k), (m) and (n), the ECB has no objection to the inclusion of ‘a corporation or other legal person established by statute’ in paragraph (a), the inclusion of ‘securitisation vehicles’ in paragraph (k), and that of ‘non-natural persons’ in paragraphs (m) and (n).

text: 8. Enforcement of financial collateral arrangements

text: The ECB notes the inclusion of the new paragraph (c) in Section 6 of the draft law, which refers to the enforcement of financial collateral arrangements and provides that ‘in relation to instruments consisting of securities of a SICAV, the financial collateral may also be realised in the manner and in accordance with the value as contemplated in Regulation 14(6)(iii) of the Companies Act (Investment Companies with Variable Share Capital) Regulations’. The ECB notes that the Companies Act (Investment

text: Companies with Variable Share Capital) Regulations already provide for the scenario where the collateral taker may realise any financial collateral provided in relation to instruments consisting of the securities of a SICAV. In this context, the process of realisation of financial collateral is clarified by including a reference to the relevant provision in these Regulations. This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 5 April 2013. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: Boletín Oficial del Estado No 168 of 14 July 2012.

text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: OJ L 135, 31.5.1994, p. 5. See the European Commission’s proposal COM(2010) 368 final, which recasts Directive

text: See paragraph 8.2 of ECB Opinion

text: of 29 November 2012 on a proposal for a directive establishing a framework for recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms. All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: See COM(2010) 368 final.

text: Available on the Commission’s website at www.ec.europa.eu.

text: MoU, Paragraph 17 states that ‘Steps will be taken to minimise the cost to taxpayers of bank restructuring’. Paragraph 18 states that ‘These amendments should also include provisions allowing that holders of hybrid capital instruments and subordinated debt fully participate in the SLEs’. Finally, paragraph 19 states the following: ‘For non-viable banks, SLEs will also need to be used to the full extent to minimise the cost for the taxpayer’.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 10 April 2013 on the Deposit Guarantee Fund (CON/2013/25)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 10 April 2013 on the Deposit Guarantee Fund (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 20 March 2013, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Spanish Secretary of State for Economic Affairs and Business Support for an opinion on a draft Royal Decree-Law amending Royal Decree-Law 21/2012 of 13 July 2012 on liquidity measures for the general government and the financial sector (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the sixth indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 Role of the Deposit Guarantee Fund The draft law specifies the measures that the Deposit Guarantee Fund (DGF), in addition to its core role of protecting insured deposits, may take to facilitate the implementation of the Union financial assistance programme to recapitalise Spanish credit institutions. Pursuant to the draft law, the DGF may: (a) provide guarantees in the context of the financial assistance programme; (b) subscribe or purchase shares not listed on an official market and issued by nationalised credit institutions and credit institutions subject to restructuring or resolution processes in the context of the subordinated liability exercises and actions to manage subordinated debt and hybrid capital instruments; (c) subscribe shares or subordinated debt issued by the Spanish impaired assets scheme, i.e. the Asset Management Company for Assets Resulting from Bank Restructuring (the SAREB).

text: 1.2 Maximum cost to the DGF The cost of such measures must be less than the cost the DGF would have incurred if, at the beginning of the relevant restructuring or resolution process, it would have paid the amounts covered by it. 1.3 Extraordinary contribution to the DGF In order to bolster the assets of the DGF, the draft law provides that the annual contribution to be made by member institutions based on their deposits at 31 December 2012 be subject to an extraordinary, one-off increase of an additional 0.3 %, which will be paid in two instalments: two fifths of the total increase will be paid within 20 business days of 31 December 2013, while the remaining three fifths will be paid within a maximum period of seven years starting from 2014 and subject to a payment schedule to be adopted by the DGF’s Steering Committee. Notwithstanding such payment schedule, the amount corresponding to the second instalment will be recorded as the DGF’s assets on the date of payment of the first instalment. 1.4 Exemptions Regarding the first instalment, the DGF’s Steering Committee may, by a favourable vote of two thirds of its members, decide: (a) to exempt member institutions which are nationalised or subject to a restructuring or resolution process from paying all of the first instalment; (b) to grant an exemption of up to 50 % of that instalment to member institutions with a calculation base not exceeding EUR 5 billion; (c) to grant an exemption of up to 30 % of the amounts invested by 31 December 2013 by member institutions in the subscription or purchase of shares or subordinated debt instruments issued by the SAREB. For each member institution, the total of the deductions provided for in points (b) and (c) may not exceed 90 % of the amount that the institution should have paid in accordance with the deposits held at 31 December 2012.

text: 2. Compatibility with Union legislation

text: 2.1 The draft law specifies the financial support measures the DGF may take in addition to its core role of protecting insured deposits in line with Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994 on deposit-guarantee schemes . As previously pointed out, the ECB supports rules which provide that the available financial means of deposit guarantee schemes may be used to finance resolution, as this allows for synergies between such schemes and resolution financing, but considers it of the utmost importance that this does not compromise in any way the core function of deposit guarantee schemes in protecting insured deposits . Furthermore, in seeking to achieve any of its statutory objectives, the DGF should choose the least costly measure. The

text: ECB welcomes the rule requiring that costs of the DGF’s involvement in restructuring should be lower than the costs of potential pay-outs of deposit guarantees and expects that this rule will be implemented in a transparent manner, allowing for verification of the compliance with this rule in practice. 2.2 To fulfil its core role of protecting insured deposits in the event of bank insolvency, the DGF needs to be able to rely on a highly liquid asset structure. The ECB views the envisaged purchase of equity shares in non-listed banks as conflicting with that prudential principle and would therefore caution against amending the investment rules applying to the DGF that allow such purchases. As the draft law is an amendment of the Fifth Additional Provision of RDL 21/2012, which specifically deals with the measures to be adopted in the context of the European financial assistance programme, the ECB understands that the envisaged purchases would take place in relation to the DGF’s temporary involvement in the resolution of ailing banks. Moreover, the ECB points to the on-going review of Directive

text: , which may introduce rules concerning deposit-guarantee scheme investment policies. This may result in the need to amend in the future Royal Decree-Law 21/2012, in particular with regard to the categories of securities in which the DGF is allowed to invest. 2.3 The arrangements introduced by the draft law may need to be assessed from the perspective of State aid rules.

text: 3. Compatibility with financial-sector policy conditionality framework

text: 3.1 The DGF’s powers under the draft law need to respect the requirement under the Memorandum of Understanding on Financial-Sector Policy Conditionality (hereinafter the ‘MoU’) of minimising the taxpayer’s burden. In this respect, the ECB understands that State resources will not be used to finance the DGF’s new capabilities (see paragraph 1.3 above). The measures to be taken need to carefully weigh the benefits (i.e. the potential positive contribution to the value of the Fund for Orderly Bank Restructuring’s shareholding in banks, as well as the mitigation of the potential risk of litigation by certain categories of creditors or shareholders of non-listed banks) against the costs, in particular the reduced tax revenue for the State resulting from lower financial results of the banks owing to the extraordinary contributions to the DGF. In addition, it should be assessed whether the DGF’s limited funds would be best used for the benefit of retail investors or instead for other financial stability purposes, such as replenishing the DGF and thereby reinforcing market confidence in its ability to carry out its core role. Finally, due consideration needs to be given to the alternative that banks could rebuild their capital buffers instead of contributing funds to the DGS.

text: 3.2 Furthermore, the principles of burden sharing as agreed in the MoU need to be respected . It is essential that the price paid by the DGF for the equity shares to be acquired from retail investors in the context of the subordinated liability exercises be fair. In the absence of a quoted price, the price needs to be the inferred market price, i.e. using the economic valuation of the banks only as a starting point, so that investors in listed banks would not be disadvantaged. In this respect, the ECB notes that the final version of the law expressly requires that (i) the purchase price be no higher than the market value of the shares; (ii) it should comply with Union rules on State aid; and (iii) the DGF is requested to commission an independent expert report to determine such market value.

text: 4. Extraordinary contribution and exemptions

text: As regards banks that have directly invested in the SAREB, the business plan underlying the SAREB envisages a reasonable return to investors, therefore there is no need to exempt banks that decided on business grounds to invest in the SAREB from the extraordinary contributions to the DGS.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 10 April 2013.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directives

text: and

text: , Directives

text: and

text: and

text: Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010

text: , COM (2012) 280 final.

text: See Articles

text: and

text: (regarding recovery plans) and Articles

text: and

text: (resolution plans) of the draft Bank Intervention and Restructuring Act.

text: OJ L 177, 30.6.2006, p. 1.

text: OJ L 177, 30.6.2006, p. 201.

text: Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions, October 2011, Financial Stability Board, points 10.1 and 11.4(ii) http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_111104cc.pdf.

text: See ECB

text: , paragraph 3.2.

text: See Amendment 6 in the Annex to ECB

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 11 April 2013 on crisis planning and early intervention for credit institutions (CON/2013/26)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 11 April 2013 on crisis planning and early intervention for credit institutions (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 22 February 2013, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Austrian Ministry of Finance (MoF) for an opinion on a draft Banking Intervention and Restructuring Act, amendments to the Federal Banking Act and the Financial Market Authority Act (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third and sixth indents of

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to the Oesterreichische Nationalbank (OeNB) and contains rules applicable to banks which materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The general purpose of the draft law is to establish a preventive crisis planning and early intervention regime for credit institutions (CIs). The draft law requires CIs to prepare recovery and resolution plans. It also introduces certain early intervention measures that may be taken by the Financial Market Authority (FMA) as regards CIs in breach of certain triggers (see point 1.3 below for details). In this way, the draft law aims to prevent CIs becoming distressed, thereby reducing the likelihood of public funds needing to be used to bail out CIs. The draft law is based on the European Commission’s proposal for a directive on the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms dated 6 June 2012 (the BRRD) . However, the draft law does not encompass resolution mechanisms as proposed in the BRRD. 1.2 In order to prepare for crisis scenarios, CIs shall establish recovery and resolution plans and submit them to the FMA. Recovery plans must describe the measures to be taken by each CI in the event

text: of a significant deterioration in its financial situation. In their resolution plans, CIs shall demonstrate a coordinated approach to the potential resolution or reorganisation of the CI. Recovery and resolution plans are to be updated annually or in the event of a significant change in the underlying conditions. The FMA shall analyse both the recovery and resolution plans, and may require amendments if deemed necessary. In this context, the FMA shall also seek the expert opinion of the OeNB as to whether the legal requirements for recovery and resolution plans defined in the draft law are met. If a CI is part of a group entity, the parent institution shall prepare recovery and resolution plans for the entire group, including recovery plans for each of its significant subsidiary institutions and resolution plans for all subsidiary institutions. Referring to the principle of proportionality, the draft law provides for exemptions to the requirement to establish recovery and resolution plans. At the request of a CI, the FMA may exempt that CI from individual requirements or reduce the level of detail required, depending on the nature of activities of the institution in question, its size or its interconnectedness with other financial market participants. Furthermore, the FMA may exempt a CI from preparing recovery and resolution plans altogether if, in the event of that CI’s insolvency, there are no concerns that this would have any material adverse impact on the financial markets, on other CIs or on funding conditions . 1.3 The draft law also strengthens the FMA’s powers and tools for taking early intervention measures. If a CI fails to comply with capital or liquidity requirements under Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions or Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 on the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions or is at risk of violating these requirements, the FMA shall take one or more of the early intervention measures set out in the draft law. A risk of violation of the above requirements exists where there is a substantial deterioration in a CI’s assets, earnings, liquidity or refinancing situation and where, in light of the negative development in question, it may be justifiably assumed that the CI is at risk of failing to fulfil its obligations. In any event, it shall be assumed that a risk of such violation is present if the CI’s equity is less than the threshold of 8 % plus 1.25 % common equity. In order to determine whether there is a need for early intervention, the FMA may order the OeNB to carry out on-site audits and request the OeNB’s expert opinion on this matter. Notwithstanding other existing tools, the FMA may direct the following early intervention measures in accordance with the draft law: (a) the implementation of one or more recovery measures contained in the recovery plan, (b) the prompt preparation of a recovery plan if the FMA has previously granted an exemption with regard to the preparation or update of a recovery plan,

text: (c) the carrying out of specific improvements in or the intensifying of risk management, (d) the convening of a general meeting of the shareholders, in particular for taking capital measures, (e) the addition of certain items to the agenda of the general meeting or proposing that certain resolutions be added, (f) the preparation of a negotiation plan which envisages the voluntary restructuring of the CI’s liabilities with its creditors, or (g) an on-site audit by the OeNB with the aim of assessing a CI’s assets and liabilities.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 The ECB welcomes the draft law as it strengthens the tools and procedures available to the national authorities for effective preventive measures and early intervention in CIs. 2.2 The ECB welcomes the recognition by the Austrian MoF, as reflected in the explanatory notes to the draft law, that there should be a harmonised approach to providing effective preventive measures, early intervention in and resolution of banks at Union level. 2.3 The ECB notes that the draft law includes aspects of the recovery and resolution planning provided for in the BRRD. In this context, the ECB understands that the legislator will review the law once the BRRD is adopted, in order to ensure full consistency with developments at Union level. The ECB also refers to the Recommendations of the European Banking Authority on the development of recovery plans (

text: ) dated 23 January 2013. Member States should avoid enacting national legislation that conflicts with developments at Union level, in accordance with the general principle of sincere cooperation and loyalty pursuant to the Treaty. 2.4 The ECB notes that the draft law does not contain resolution tools as provided for in Title IV of the BRRD. In this respect, it will be essential for an effective resolution regime that the authority is provided with the necessary tools. 2.5 The ECB notes that the threshold for assuming that a breach of capital requirements is likely, which forms the basis for taking early intervention measures, is not clear in the Austrian draft law (8 % plus 1.25 % common equity) and asks for clarification of the intended measure.

text: 3. Principle of proportionality

text: 3.1 In

text: Article 1(5)

text: and (12), the draft law provides for a complete exemption from a CI’s obligations to establish and update recovery and resolution plans. The FMA may exempt CIs from these requirements if that CI’s insolvency can be presumed not to have any material adverse impact on the financial markets, on other CIs or on funding conditions. As mentioned in the explanatory memorandum accompanying the draft law, the ECB recognises that these provisions will be in line with

text: Article 4(1)

text: (a) of the BRRD. However, Article 4 of the BRRD does not provide for the possibility to exclude CIs altogether, but provides only for simplified obligations for certain CIs. Nevertheless, the ECB acknowledges the ongoing discussions at the Council and the European Parliament on the subject of enabling Member States to waive the requirement to maintain and

text: update recovery and resolution plans in certain cases, for example in the case of resolution plans if the institution is not part of a group or has no branches in other Member States. Regarding the provision in the draft law which allows for exempting smaller CIs from resolution planning, the ECB is of the view that it is possible to extend the requirement of resolution planning to all CIs, while simplifying the planning requirements for smaller CIs. However, the ECB understands that the consulting authority intends to address a possible concern relating to proportionality and does not wish to overburden small CIs. In this respect, the ECB recommends that any exemptions pursuant to

text: Article 1(5)

text: and (12) of the draft law are granted only under very strict conditions in accordance with the proportionality principle of the BRRD. 3.2 In connection with the principle of proportionality, and without prejudice to the above comments, the ECB also notes that the definitions used in Articles 5(2) and 12(2) of the draft law, under which the FMA may exempt a CI from establishing or updating a recovery or resolution plan, are rather vague. In the interests of legal certainty, the ECB recommends defining clear and specific criteria, e.g. size, business models and interconnectedness, which would enable the FMA to exempt a CI from establishing or updating recovery and resolution plans.

text: 4. Establishment and assessment of resolution plans

text: 4.1 In

text: Article 1(11)

text: , the draft law requires CIs to prepare a resolution plan and submit it to the FMA. The ECB notes that this approach differs from the one currently being discussed at Union level in the context of the BRRD, under which the resolution authorities, in consultation with the competent authorities, are responsible for drawing up the resolution plans. Under the BRRD, the resolution authority would, while drawing up the resolution plan, be responsible for assessing the resolvability of the CI or group, and would have the power to address impediments to its resolvability. The ECB notes that this approach is in line with the Financial Stability Board (FSB) Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes, which also require the resolution planning and resolvability assessment to be conducted by the resolution authority itself . Resolution planning and resolvability assessment are essential to ensuring the effectiveness of resolution. They are therefore key tasks of the resolution authority, which will safeguard the quality of the planning and the assessment, as well as the institutional readiness to take resolution action if needed. The draft law could be further aligned with the FSB Key Attributes (as reflected in the BRRD). In any case, the ECB deems it of paramount importance to ensure the same high quality of the respective resolution plan. 4.2 The ECB notes that the parts of the draft law dealing with early intervention do not grant the FMA all the powers provided for in this area by the BRRD, as set out in

text: Article 23

text: et seq. thereof. These provisions should be aligned with the BRRD once the BRRD is adopted. The ECB notes that, in

text: the absence of a resolution mechanism, an assessment of resolvability of a CI or group will be carried out on the basis that normal insolvency procedures will apply in the event of its winding up. This constitutes a more rigorous benchmark than an assessment of resolvability in which the use of resolution tools may be assumed.

text: 5. Access to central bank liquidity in the context of recovery and resolution planning

text: The ECB notes that

text: Article 1(6)

text: (6) of the draft law provides that recovery plans shall not assume any access to or receipt of extraordinary public financial support, but that they shall include an analysis of how and when an institution may apply for the use of central bank facilities in stressed conditions, and what may be used as collateral. The ECB wishes to underline that this provision should not in any way affect the competence of central banks to decide independently and at their full discretion on the provision of central bank liquidity to solvent credit institutions, both through standard monetary policy operations as well as emergency liquidity assistance, within the limits imposed by the monetary financing prohibition under the Treaty . Similarly, the ECB also notes that, pursuant to

text: Article 1(14)

text: (1)(9) of the draft law, the resolution plan must contain an explanation from the institution as to how the resolution options should be financed without assuming any extraordinary public support. The ECB recommends clarifying the point that resolution options may not assume the granting of emergency liquidity assistance by the central bank .

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 11 April 2013.

text: [signed]

text: The Vice-President of the ECB

text: Vítor CONSTÂNCIO