text: COM(2016) 853 final.

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 2014/59/EU av den 15 maj 2014

text: om inrättande av en ram för återhämtning och resolution av kreditinstitut och värdepappersföretag och om ändring av

text: rådets direktiv 82/891/EEG

text: och

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 2001/24/EG

text: och

text: samt Europaparlamentets och rådets förordningar

text: (EU) nr 1093/2010

text: och

text: (EU) nr 648/2012

text: (EUT L 173, 12.6.2014, s. 190).

text: ECB har konsulterats av rådet om den bredare uppsättningen lagförslag som har lagts fram av kommissionen, och ECB:s yttrande om dessa förslag kan innehålla ytterligare synpunkter som är av relevans för detta yttrande, särskilt vad gäller förslagen till instrument för kvalificerade skulder.

text: Se Financial Stability Boards (FSB) Principles on Loss-absorbing and Recapitalisation Capacity of G-SIBs in Resolution: Total Loss-absorbing Capacity (TLAC) Term Sheet, den 9 november 2015, finns på FSB:s webbplats www.fsb.org.

text: Se t.ex. yttrandena

text: och

text: . Alla ECB-yttranden finns på ECB:s webbplats www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: Se punkt 3.1.2 i yttrande

text: och punkt 3.7.1 i yttrande

text: Observera att icke-prioriterade skuldinstrument med förmånsrätt även skulle kunna emitteras av ett dotterbolag i form av ett internt minimikrav för kapitalbas och nedskrivningsbara skulder enligt en strategi med en enda ingångspunkt. Sådana instrument bör även finnas tillgängliga för att absorbera förluster före en resolution, i de fall då dotterbolaget inte försätts i resolution i egenskap av emitterande institut.

text: För en diskussion om nationella insolvensramar som föreskriver lagstadgad efterställning av skuldinstrument med förmånsrätt utan säkerhet, se yttrandena

text: och

text: I detta sammanhang betyder efterställt enligt lag att ett skuldinstrument utan säkerhet är efterställt på grund av lagstadgade regler som emittenten omfattas av, inte på grund av de avtalsmässiga villkoren för skuldinstrumentet, vilket betecknas som efterställt enligt avtal.

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning (EU) nr 575/2013 av den 26 juni 2013

text: om tillsynskrav för kreditinstitut och värdepappersföretag och om ändring av förordning

text: (EU) nr 648/2012

text: (EUT L 176, 27.6.2013, s. 1).

text: Se punkt 3.1.2 i yttrande

text: och punkt 3.7.1 i yttrande

text: . Se även utskriften av frågestunden efter ECB-ordförandens inledningsanförande till ECB:s presskonferens av den 4 april 2013, finns på ECB:s webbplats, www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: Se International Association of Deposit Insurers Core Principles for Effective Deposit Insurance Systems, november 2014, s. 8. I Förenta staternas lagstiftning har det t.ex. funnits generella regler om insättarföreträde sedan 1993, där lagstiftningen vid likvideringen av ett försäkrat inlåningsinstitut ger företräde till institutets inhemska inlåning jämfört med institutets andra allmänna skulder eller efterställda skulder. Se avsnitt 1821 d.11.A och 1813.l.5.A i avdelning 12, kapitel 16 i den amerikanska lagen.

text: Se punkt 3.1.3 i yttrande

text: Se artikel 91 i den italienska banklagen (lagstiftningsdekret nr 385 av den 1 september 1993), artikel 207 i den slovenska lagen om resolution och likvidation av banker (Officiella tidningen nr 44/2016) och

text: artikel 145

text: A i den grekiska banklagen (lag 4261/2014).

text: Se punkt 3.1.2 i yttrande

text: och punkt 3.7.1 i yttrande

text: Se punkt 3.7.3 i yttrande

text: Det bör noteras att insättningsgarantisystem har samma prioritet när det ersätter rättigheterna och skyldigheterna för garanterade insättare.

text: Samma prioritet beviljas även insättningar som kunde ha omfattats av insättningsgarantisystemet om de inte gjorts genom filialer till unionens kreditinstitut som är belägna i en jurisdiktion som inte hör till en EU-medlemsstat eller Europeiska ekonomiska samarbetsområdet.

text: Vissa mindre kreditinstitut kan vara beroende av stora insättningar (t.ex. insättningar över 100000 euro från andra än fysiska personer, mikroföretag eller små och medelstora företag) med en återstående löptid av minst ett år för att uppfylla minimikravet för kapitalbas och kvalificerade skulder, förutsatt att något efterställningskrav inte påtvingas av resolutionsmyndigheten. ECB noterar att kommissionen föreslår att

text: artikel 45.4 f i direktiv 2014/59/EU

text: ska ändras och att det ska införas en ny

text: artikel 45

text: b i direktiv

text: (som avser de nya

text: artiklarna 72

text: a och 72b i förordning

text: (EU) nr 575/2013

text: ) och att dessa föreslagna ändringar inte förväntas förhindra att man är beroende av stora insättningar från företag med en återstående löptid av minst ett år för att uppfylla minimikravet för kapitalbas och kvalificerade skulder på samma sätt som enligt de aktuellt gällande reglerna.

text: Se

text: artikel 48.1 i direktiv 2014/59/EU

text: Europeiska centralbankens riktlinje

text: (EU) 2015/510

text: av den 19 december 2014 om genomförandet av Eurosystemets penningpolitiska ramverk (ECB/2014/60) (EUT L 91, 2.4.2015, s. 3).

text: Se särskilt punkt 3.3 i yttrande

sprak: sv

title: Europeiska centralbankens yttrande av den 8 mars 2017 om ett förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv om ändring av direktiv 2014/59/EU vad gäller rangordningen av skuldinstrument utan säkerhet i en insolvenshierarki (CON/2017/6)

text: Inledning och rättslig grund

text: Den 3 januari 2017 respektive den 17 februari 2017 mottog Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) en begäran från Europeiska unionens råd respektive Europaparlamentet om ett yttrande över ett förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv om ändring av direktiv

text: vad gäller rangordningen av skuldinstrument utan säkerhet i en insolvenshierarki (nedan kallat direktivförslaget).

text: ECB:s behörighet att avge ett yttrande grundas på artiklarna

text: och

text: i fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt eftersom direktivförslaget innehåller vissa bestämmelser som berör Europeiska centralbankssystemets (ECBS) grundläggande uppgift att genomföra unionens penningpolitik enligt

text: artikel 127.2

text: första strecksatsen i fördraget, ECBS medverkan till ett smidigt genomförande av politiken när det gäller det finansiella systemets stabilitet i enlighet med artikel 127.5 i fördraget samt de uppgifter som tilldelas ECB enligt artikel 127.6 i fördraget vad gäller politik för tillsyn av kreditinstitut. I enlighet med

text: artikel 17.5

text: första meningen i arbetsordningen för Europeiska centralbanken har detta yttrande antagits av ECB-rådet.

text: 1. Allmänna kommentarer

text: 1.1 ECB välkomnar direktivförslaget, som innehåller ändringar av

text: vad gäller rangordningen av skuldinstrument som har emitterats av kreditinstitut och vissa andra institut i unionen. Detta direktiv ingår i en bred uppsättning lagförslag som syftar till att ändra unionens regelverk för finansiella tjänster. Ändringarna av

text: artikel 108 i direktiv 2014/59/EU

text: syftar till att förbättra genomförandet av det skuldnedskrivningsverktyg som föreskrivs i direktiv

text: samt att underlätta tillämpningen av minimikravet på kapitalbas och kvalificerade skulder (MREL) och det kommande kravet på total förlustabsorberande kapacitet (TLAC) vad gäller kreditinstituts och värdepappersföretags förlustabsorberingsförmåga och rekapitaliseringskapacitet. Dessa ändringar innebär att kreditinstitut och vissa andra institut får ytterligare en möjlighet att uppfylla de kommande TLAC- och MREL-kraven och ökar deras möjlighet att försättas i resolution, utan någon begränsning av deras respektive finansieringsstrategier. Denna reform bör antas så snart som möjligt för att bistå kreditinstituten med deras förberedelser för att uppfylla de nya kraven, särskilt i de fall då instituten har ett underskott vad gäller uppbyggnaden av nödvändiga nivåer av förlustabsorberande skulder (om det föreligger efterställningskrav), och med tanke på potentiella begränsningar i marknadernas kapacitet att snabbt absorbera stora volymer nyemissioner.

text: 1.2 ECB delar helt kommissionens bedömning att harmoniserade regler på den inre marknaden för behandlingen av vissa fordringsägare i banker i insolvens och resolution behövs för att minska skiljaktigheterna i de nationella reglerna vad gäller bankers förlustabsorberingskapacitet och rekapitaliseringskapacitet, som skulle kunna snedvrida konkurrensen på den inre marknaden. ECB konstaterar att harmoniseringen inom detta område är särskilt viktig för att värna den finansiella stabiliteten, för att främja en effektiv och ändamålsenlig resolutionsåtgärd, inbegripet genomförandet av skuldnedskrivningsverktyget enligt direktiv

text: i ett gränsöverskridande sammanhang, samt för att minska osäkerheten för emittenter och investerare.

text: 1.3 ECB upprepar sin ståndpunkt att en gemensam EU-ram om borgenärshierarkin, även vad gäller efterställning av skuldinstrument och andra liknande finansiella instrument i bankresolutions- och/eller insolvensförfaranden, kan bidra till att utveckla integreringen av marknaderna för finansiella tjänster inom unionen samt underlätta ECB:s uppgifter i fråga om såväl penningpolitiken som tillsynen inom den gemensamma tillsynsmekanismen.

text: 1.4 ECB anser att direktivförslaget endast medför en partiell harmonisering och att det vore värdefullt med ytterligare reformer för att främja ytterligare harmonisering i hierarkin av borgenärsfordringar vid bankinsolvens. Framför allt bör det i unionslagstiftningen fastställas en generell regel om insättarföreträde som baseras på ett stegvis förfarande. Detta skulle förbättra möjligheten att försätta institut i resolution eftersom det klargör borgenärshierarkin och underlättar fördelningen av förluster mellan bankernas skuldinstrument utan säkerhet före vissa operativa skulder, och samtidigt minska oron i fråga om principen inte sämre villkor för borgenär än vid normala insolvensförfaranden.

text: 2. Specifika kommentarer

text: 2.1 Ny klass av icke-prioriterade skuldinstrument med förmånsrätt

text: ECB välkomnar direktivförslagets förslag om att införa en ny klass av icke-prioriterade skuldinstrument med förmånsrätt med lägre rangordning än ordinarie skuldinstrument med förmånsrätt utan säkerhet i händelse av insolvens. Denna lägre rangordning upprättas genom lagstadgade regler som erkänner efterställning enligt avtal i de tillämpliga avtalsvillkoren för emission av sådana icke-prioriterade skuldinstrument med förmånsrätt.

text: 2.1.1 Vad gäller kravet att den nya klassen av icke-prioriterade skuldinstrument med förmånsrätt ska ha en ursprunglig löptid på ett år, anser ECB att kreditinstitut och vissa andra institut bör tillåtas emittera icke-prioriterade skuldinstrument med förmånsrätt som har ursprungliga löptider på antingen över eller under ett år. Även om icke-prioriterade skuldinstrument med förmånsrätt som har en ursprunglig eller återstående löptid på under ett år inte skulle kvalificeras för att uppfylla MREL- eller TLAC-kraven, skulle dessa instrument fortfarande kunna skrivas ned och därigenom minska institutets förmåga att absorbera förluster. ECB konstaterar att i de fall då icke-prioriterade skuldinstrument med förmånsrätt emitteras med ursprungliga löptider på över ett år, skulle detta definitivt utöka den genomsnittliga löptiden för denna klass och därigenom bidra till ökade möjligheter till resolution av institut.

text: 2.1.2 Vad gäller kravet att den nya klassen av icke-prioriterade skuldinstrument med förmånsrätt inte får ha några derivatinslag kan det vara befogat att överväga om det i det här skedet skulle vara ändamålsenligt att klargöra vad ett derivatinslag faktiskt utgör. Detta skulle eventuellt kunna ske i form av tekniska standarder för tillsyn.

text: 2.1.3 Som ECB ser det skulle den föreslagna ramen för ett lagstadgat erkännande av efterställning enligt avtal i enlighet med villkoren för icke-prioriterade skuldinstrument med förmånsrätt som ny klass inte hindra medlemsstaterna från att behålla en lagstadgad efterställningsordning. Enligt direktivförslaget ska icke-prioriterade skuldinstrument med förmånsrätt ha lägre rangordning än ordinarie fordringar utan säkerhet som härrör från skuldinstrument med den högsta prioritetsrangordningen bland skuldinstrument i nationell lagstiftning som reglerar normala insolvensförfaranden. Denna strategi kan dock vara besvärlig att genomföra i de medlemsstater där det redan finns stöd i nationell lag för en efterställning av skuldinstrument med förmånsrätt utan säkerhet och där sådana instrument i nuläget rangordnas lägst bland skulder med förmånsrätt. För sådana jurisdiktioner vore det lämpligt att i direktivförslaget förtydliga att icke-prioriterade skuldinstrument med förmånsrätt rangordnas i nivå med (pari passu) de skuldinstrument med förmånsrätt utan säkerhet som redan är efterställda enligt lag. Det är kanske inte nödvändigt att göra någon ytterligare differentiering i hierarkin av borgenärsfordringar med icke-prioriterade skuldinstrument med förmånsrätt som har olika (lägre) rangordning. I de medlemsstater där lagstadgad efterställning redan har införts skulle kreditinstituten kunna använda sig av den befintliga stocken av skuldinstrument med förmånsrätt för att absorbera förluster, utan något omedelbart behov att emittera nya icke-prioriterade skuldinstrument med förmånsrätt. För att främja harmonisering när det gäller hur skuldinstrument med förmånsrätt utan säkerhet ska efterställas i hierarkin av borgenärsfordringar samt för att främja en inre marknad för sådana skuldinstrument kunde direktivförslaget lämpligen innehålla en bestämmelse där det anges att när löptiden går ut för befintliga skuldinstrument som är efterställda enligt lag, ska nyemissioner av skuldinstrument med företrädesrätt som är avsedda att efterställas, om så är lämpligt (t.ex. att det inte förekommer några derivatinslag), följa den ordning som upprättats för icke-prioriterade skuldinstrument med förmånsrätt.

text: 2.1.4 Vad gäller efterställningskraven i

text: och direktiv

text: bör det klargöras att skuldinstrument med företrädesrätt som är efterställda enligt lag alternativt strukturellt efterställda alltjämt skulle vara kvalificerade, enligt tillämpliga kriterier för instrument för kvalificerade skulder, utöver den nya klassen av icke-prioriterade skuldinstrument med företrädesrätt.

text: 2.2 Övergångsordning

text: ECB understryker behovet av tydlighet när det gäller den planerade övergångsordningen för de skuldinstrument med förmånsrätt utan säkerhet som är utestående när det nya systemet träder i kraft, inbegripet om det krävs undantagsklausuler för gamla regler (se punkt 2.1.3). En sådan tydlighet är nödvändig för att säkerställa rättssäkerhet för investerare och emittenter under övergångsperioden. ECB förstår att den befintliga nationella lagstiftningen kommer att fortsätta vara tillämplig på skuldinstrument som var utestående före det föreslagna direktivets tillämpningsdatum. ECB anser också att det kan uppstå osäkerhet vad gäller tillämplig rättsordning för nyemissioner under övergångsperioden mellan det föreslagna direktivets tillämpningsdatum och det datum då det nya systemet införs i den nationella insolvenslagstiftningen. Framför allt bör direktivförslagets planerade sista tillämpningsdag för den nationella lagstiftningen ses över eftersom denna dag ligger långt före direktivförslagets planerade tillämpningsdag. Det måste tas i beaktande att det kan ta ytterligare tid innan ändringar får verkan i den nationella insolvenslagstiftningen sedan direktivförslaget har genomförts.

text: 2.3 Generell regel om insättarföreträde

text: 2.3.1 ECB anser att det vore fördelaktigt att införa en generell regel om insättarföreträde som baseras på ett stegvis förfarande i unionen. Detta skulle komplettera de förslag som läggs fram i direktivförslaget. Med en generell regel om insättarföreträde skulle normalt sett samtliga insättares fordringar rangordnas högre än fordringar från vanliga oprioriterade borgenärer utan säkerhet, men i ett system med insättarföreträde och ett stegvist förfarande skulle försäkrade (eller garanterade) insättningar rangordnas högre än kvalificerade insättningar, men oförsäkrade insättningar fortfarande rangordnas högre än andra skulder med förmånsrätt. Det ska noteras att det enligt direktiv

text: inte finns något hinder för medlemsstaterna att införa generella regler om insättarföreträde i den nationella lagstiftningen, vilket också ett antal medlemsstater har gjort under senare tid.

text: 2.3.2 ECB noterar att en prioritetsordning för all inlåning skulle medföra en förbättrad funktion av skuldnedskrivningsverktyget vid rekonstruktioner eftersom rekonstruktionsmyndigheten då kan i skuldnedskrivningen kan inkludera prioriterade osäkrade bankskulder före inlåning, samtidigt som man minimerar risken för krav som grundar sig i principen om lika behandling av samtliga borgenärer. En skuldnedskrivning av sådana osäkrade bankskulder anses medföra lägre systemspridningsrisker än vad operativa skulder som inlåning gör. Generella regler om insättarföreträde skulle sannolikt medföra att skuldnedskrivningen av prioriterade osäkrade bankskulder blev mer effektiva och trovärdiga, och på så sätt främja effektiva rekonstruktionsåtgärder och lägre belastningar för rekonstruktionsfonden.

text: 2.3.3 Förutom ökade möjligheter till resolution skulle generella regler om insättarföreträde, baserade på ett stegvist förfarande, i unionen främja ytterligare harmonisering i hierarkin av borgenärsfordringar vid bankinsolvens.

text: 2.3.4 Enligt de aktuella reglerna som framgår av direktiv

text: ska medlemsstaterna i sin nationella insolvenslagstiftning inom gruppen fordringar utan säkerhet säkerställa att högre prioritet ges till insättningar upp till garantinivån 100000 Euro (garanterade insättningar) som omfattas av insättningsgarantisystemet. En andra prioritetsordning finns för kvalificerade insättningar över 100000 euro som tillhör fysiska personer eller mikroföretag samt små och medelstora företag. Enligt nationell lagstiftning rangordnas insättningar från storföretag ofta i nivå med andra oprioriterade fordringar. Även andra fordringar förenade med förmånsrätt, t.ex. skatter eller löner, rangordnas utifrån tillämplig nationell lagstiftning. Generella regler om insättarföreträde som baseras på ett stegvist förfarande kan skapas genom att en tredje prioritetsordning införs i

text: artikel 108 i direktiv 2014/59/EU

text: för andra insättningar, t.ex. insättningar från storföretag, kreditinstitut, företag för kollektiva investeringar, pensionsfonder etc., som skulle rangordnas lägre än garanterade insättningar och vissa prioriterade kvalificerade insättningar, men högre än andra efterställda skulder.

text: 2.4 Behandlingen av supplementärkapitalinstrument

text: Trots de förbättringar som direktivförslaget förväntas medföra kan den pågående fragmenteringen av de nationella insolvensreglerna innebära utmaningar även i framtiden. Detta gäller särskilt behandlingen av supplementärkapitalinstrument och andra efterställda skulder vid insolvens och resolution. Vissa nationella insolvensregler rangordnar supplementärkapitalinstrument och andra efterställda skulder vid insolvens på olika nivå, medan supplementärkapitalinstrument i andra jurisdiktioner rangordnas på samma nivå som andra typer av efterställda skulder. Detta kan försvåra utövandet av t.ex. skuldnedskrivnings- och konverteringsbefogenheter som resolutionsmyndigheter som utsetts enligt direktiv

text: har, eftersom supplementärkapitalinstrument ska skrivas ned före andra efterställda skulder utom i fall då detta utgör tillskott av primärt eller supplementärt kapital. Man bör eftersträva ytterligare harmonisering på detta område, t.ex. genom krav på att de nationella insolvensreglerna måste samordnas så att supplementärkapitalinstrument behandlas annorlunda och rangordnas lägre än andra typer av efterställda skulder. Ett annat område som bör utredas ytterligare är hur gruppinterna skulder ska rangordnas i hierarkin av borgenärsfordringar vid bankinsolvens.

text: 2.5 Konsekvenser för godtagbarheten av skuldinstrument som säkerhet för Eurosystemets kredittransaktioner

text: ECB noterar de möjliga konsekvenserna av att man rangordnar skuldinstrument med företrädesrätt lägre än andra skuldinstrument som samma emittent ger ut vad gäller godtagbarheten av de förstnämnda som säkerhet vid Eurosystemets kreditoperationer. I Europeiska centralbankens riktlinje

text: (EU) 2015/510

text: (ECB/2014/60) fastställs ett gemensamt ramverk som ska tillämpas i Eurosystemet för tillgångar som kan lämnas som godtagbara säkerheter för sådana operationer. För att vara godtagbara som säkerhet måste omsättbara tillgångar vara skuldinstrument som uppfyller godtagbarhetskriterierna som framgår av riktlinje

text: (EU) 2015/510

text: (ECB/2014/60). I artikel 64 i riktlinjen fastställs följande: Godtagbara skuldinstrument får ej medföra någon rätt till kapital och/eller ränta som är efterställd andra skuldinstrument som emittenten gett ut..

text: 2.6 Tekniska synpunkter och förslag

text: I de fall där ECB rekommenderar att direktivförslaget ska ändras anges de specifika förslagen i ett separat tekniskt arbetsdokument som åtföljs av en förklaring. Det tekniska arbetsdokumentet finns på engelska på ECB:s webbplats.


text: Article 27

text: A of Law No 4172/2013 (FEK A 167/23.7.2013) was inserted by Law No 4302/2014 (FEK A 225/8.10.2014) and was further amended by Law No 4303/2014 (FEK A 231/17.10.2014) and Law No 4340/2015 (FEK A 134/1.11.2015).

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).

text: See also Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu

text: Regulation (EU) No 575/2013

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending

text: Regulation (EU) No 648/2012

text: (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 1).

text: See ‘Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems’, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, December 2010, revised version June 2011.

text: Article 48

text: CRR. DTAs that rely on future profitability and arise from debit differences are subject to a threshold exemption whereby only amounts above a particular threshold are to be deducted. Amounts below the threshold shall be risk weighted.

text: November 2016 version.

publisher: Europeiska centralbanken

sprak: en

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 15 March 2017 on certain amendments to the deferred tax assets legal framework in Greece (CON/2017/7)

serie: con

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 15 March 2017 on certain amendments to the deferred tax assets legal framework in Greece (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

type: rubrik

text: On 8 March 2017, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Greek Ministry of Finance for an opinion on certain draft amendments to Articles 27 and 27A of Law No 4172/2013 on deferred tax assets (DTAs) arising from debit differences (hereinafter the ‘draft amending provisions’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion on the draft amending provisions is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and on the sixth indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft amending provisions relate to rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion .

type: stycke

text: 1. Background and purpose of the draft amending provisions

text: Article 36(1)

text: (c) and

text: Article 38 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013

text: of the European Parliament and of 4 5 the Council (hereinafter the ‘CRR’), which implements Basel III standards , provide that DTAs relying on the future profitability of a credit institution are to be deducted from its Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) items, subject to threshold exemptions and transitional provisions . Conversely, Article 39(2) of the CRR lays down the requirements under which DTAs not relying on future profitability and arising from temporary differences shall not be deducted from CET1 items but to which a risk weight of 100 % is applied.

text: 1.2 Article 27 of Law No 4172/2013 provides that losses generated by the business of an eligible institution (including a credit institution) may be carried over and set off (amortised) against its profits over a period of five consecutive years.

text: Article 27

text: A makes certain types of DTAs eligible for conversion into tax credits and, assuming that all the conditions of

text: Article 39(2)

text: are met, not subject to deduction from CET1 capital of the respective institutions.

text: Article 27

text: A limits the scope of DTAs which must not be deducted from CET1 items to those accounted for as at 30 June 2015. 1.3 The draft amending provisions seek to attain two distinct aims. First, the draft amending provisions seek to provide a legal basis for eligible institutions to apply Article 39(2) of the CRR to DTAs related to non-performing loans (NPLs), linked to the temporary difference created owing to a different recognition in the applicable tax and accounting provisions when the NPL is written off, forgiven or sold to another institution. The relevant temporary differences resulting in DTAs shall be amortised over a 20-year period. In particular, the draft amending provisions seek to ensure that, in the event of NPL write-offs, loan forgiveness or sales, the stock of DTAs that must not be deducted from CET1 items can be gradually reduced through the prescribed amortisation over 20 years. Second, the draft amending provisions seek to ensure that the maximum amount of DTAs not to be deducted from CET1 (DTAs/CET1) is gradually lowered. At present, the maximum amount of DTAs/CET1 is the amount of the income tax payable by a credit institution, which is to be calculated by multiplying the applicable tax rate by the eligible temporary differences accounted for as at 30 June 2015. By introducing a cap on the tax rate (the one applicable for the 2015 tax year) the amount of DTAs/CET1 cannot increase. Additionally, the draft amending provisions provide rules to reduce annually the relevant temporary differences, by deducting any subsequent additional tax provisions linked to the relevant NPLs and also deducting, as explained above, the amortised DTA/CET1 related to NPLs that are written off, forgiven or sold. Accordingly, the draft amending provisions seek to avoid additional State aid being granted and to ensure the gradual reduction of DTAs that are not to be deducted from CET1. 1.4 The amendments to Article 27 of Law No 4172/2013 are to take effect retroactively (as of 1 January 2016), while the amendments to

text: Article 27

text: A thereof are to capture DTAs impacted in the 2016 tax year. In this regard, the consultation request letter states that the adoption of the draft amending provisions is relevant to the publication of the annual financial statements of credit institutions in Greece for the 2016 tax year (currently scheduled for the second half of March 2017).

text: 2. Observations on the draft amending provisions

text: 2.1 The ECB expects that the draft amending provisions will not affect the current legal basis for DTAs, meaning that if the DTAs covered by the draft amending provisions previously fulfilled all the requirements of Article 39(2) of the CRR, the new amendment to the tax law should not lead to a different treatment. This being said, if in any circumstances a lack of profitability is observed, the ECB expects that these DTAs are replaced with a direct claim on the Greek Government. 2.2 The ECB understands that the draft amending provisions aim to adjust the accounting and regulatory framework applicable to credit institutions in Greece so as to better enable these

text: institutions to resolve the high stock of NPLs accumulated by credit institutions in Greece in line with the non-performing exposure (NPE)/NPL targets agreed by Greek banks in 2016. The draft amending provisions aim to reduce existing tax disincentives regarding the loan loss provisioning and write-off policies of credit institutions in Greece, as required under the draft Supplemental Memorandum of Understanding between the Hellenic Republic and the European Commission . 2.3 The ECB notes that the draft amending provisions allow credit institutions in Greece to implement the agreed NPL resolution targets, while avoiding large reductions of their own funds, which would endanger financial stability. Without the draft amending provisions, which address tax impediments to the implementation of the NPL resolution targets, there is a risk that the capital adequacy of credit institutions would be jeopardised by the timely implementation of those targets, hence the desirability and necessity of their adoption.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 15 March 2017.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI

type: vagledning

utgivare: ecb


title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 21 March 2017 on limiting the obligation to receive cash payments (CON/2017/8)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 21 March 2017 on limiting the obligation to receive cash payments (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 10 February 2017, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Danish Financial Supervisory Authority for an opinion on a draft law on payments (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the second indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates, inter alia, to means of payment. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Description of the proposed limitation

text: 1.1 The main purpose of the draft law is to implement into Danish law

text: Directive (EU) 2015/2366

text: of the 2 European Parliament and of the Council . However, in addition to this, the draft law also proposes certain other amendments to current Danish legislation, including one that is of relevance to this opinion since it establishes a new limitation to the current Danish legislation that obliges payees to accept cash payments . 4 5 1.2 The legal tender status of Danish krone banknotes and coins is generally interpreted under Danish law to mean that Danish krone banknotes and coins are legal tender unless otherwise agreed, or unless other statutory provisions apply . Under the currently applicable Act on Payment Services and Electronic Money , a payee is obliged to accept cash payment if the payee accepts payment by other payment instruments, such as payment cards. The obligation to accept cash payment in these circumstances is mandatory and prevails over a payee’s contractual freedom to make an agreement conditional on payment being made by a payment instrument rather than by

text: 1 OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: Directive (EU) 2015/2366

text: of European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on payment services in the internal market, amending Directives

text: and

text: and

text: Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010

text: , and repealing Directive

text: (OJ L 337, 23.12.2015, p. 35).

text: 3 See Section 81 of the draft law.

text: 6 See pages 29 and 33 of the Danish Payments Council, Report on the Role of Cash in Society, August 2016 and the explanatory notes to Section 81(3) of the draft law.

text: 7 See Section 56 of Consolidation Act no. 613 of 24 April 2015, as amended. cash. A payee is therefore not currently able to avoid the obligation to accept cash by placing a clearly visible sign stating that cash is not accepted, as that would be a breach of the obligation to accept cash in these circumstances. This obligation to accept cash under the Act on Payment Services and Electronic Money is not based on the legal tender status of Danish krone banknotes and coins, which is regulated by the Danmarks Nationalbank Act and the Coinage Act, but is considered a separate statutory obligation for payees covered by the Act on Payment Services and Electronic Money. 1.3 The statutory obligation to accept cash payment, which is currently set out in the Act on Payment Services and Electronic Money, is repeated in the draft law. However, the draft law introduces a new exemption from the obligation to accept cash payment by providing that this obligation does not apply from 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. Therefore, during these hours, payees who accept payment by payment instruments will have the contractual freedom to choose whether they want to accept cash payments or not. 1.4 As is also currently the case, the obligation to accept cash payment pursuant to the draft law does not apply to remote sales, in unstaffed self-service environments or where cash payment is prohibited pursuant to the Act on Measures to Prevent Money Laundering of Proceeds and Financing of Terrorism . The draft law also authorises the Minister for Industry, Business and Financial Affairs to adopt further rules setting out specific payees or types of payees who will not be covered by the exemption applicable between the hours of 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. According to the explanatory notes to the draft law , the aim of authorising the Minister to adopt such further rules is to ensure that payees that perform duties that are vital to the society, e.g. emergency treatment services and twenty-four hour pharmacies, must continue to have to accept cash payment at all times. 1.5 The explanatory notes to the draft law state that the proposal is intended to strike a balance between trying to deter robberies, for which the risk is considered higher after dark, and trying to ensure that a broad right to pay by cash will remain in place. Although it is not stated as an objective of the limitation to the obligation to receive cash payments, the explanatory notes to the draft law state that it is expected that businesses' cash handling costs will be reduced because of the limitation .

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 The ECB notes that Denmark has an exemption from participating in the third stage of economic and monetary union . Against this specific institutional backdrop, the ECB has prepared an assessment of the draft law’s provisions against relevant practices in the euro area, in particular the legal requirements for the euro and the legal tender status of euro banknotes.

text: 8 Consolidation Act no. 1022 of 13 August 2013, as amended.

text: 9 See the explanatory notes to Section 81 of the draft law.

text: 10 See the explanatory notes to Section 81 of the draft law.

text: 11 See Protocol (No 16) to the Treaty on certain provisions relating to Denmark. 2.2 Under the Treaty, the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) is required to act, inter alia, in accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free competition, favouring an efficient allocation of resources . The ESCB has the basic task of promoting the smooth operation of payment systems , and the ECB has the exclusive right to authorise the issue of euro banknotes within the Union . The euro banknotes issued by the ECB and the national central banks of the euro area are the only banknotes with legal tender status within the Union . 2.3 The scope and effects of the legal tender status of euro banknotes and coins has not yet been defined in Union law. Therefore, the legislators of the euro area Member States remain competent to implement the scope and effects of legal tender in their national laws. According to the Commission Recommendation of 22 March 2010 on the scope and effects of legal tender of euro banknotes and coins (hereinafter the ‘Commission Recommendation’), the concept of legal tender of the euro should rely on three main elements. First, there should be a mandatory acceptance of banknotes and coins unless the parties have agreed on other means of payment. The acceptance of euro banknotes and coins as a means of payment in retail transactions should be the rule. A refusal to accept cash should be possible only if it is based on reasons related to the ‘good faith principle’. Second, banknotes and coins should be accepted at full face value. Third, banknotes and coins should have the power to discharge debts. 2.4 Although electronic payment instruments are increasingly used as the preferred form for retail payments in a number of Member States, including Denmark, the ECB notes that cash continues to play an important role in society. While in 1991 cash payments accounted for some 60% of the value of all retail turnover in Denmark, the figure in 2015 was around 20% . The ability to pay in cash remains particularly important for certain groups in society that, for various legitimate reasons, prefer to use cash rather than other payment instruments. These groups include the disabled, senior citizens, socially vulnerable citizens and minors . Cash is generally also appreciated as a payment instrument because it is widely accepted, fast and facilitates control over the payer’s spending. Moreover, it is the only payment instrument that allows citizens to settle a transaction in central bank money instantly. 2.5 The Commission Recommendation states that the acceptance of payments in cash should be the rule, but acknowledges that cash may be refused for reasons related to the good faith principle, without this being a breach of the legal tender status of cash. Neither Union law nor the Commission Recommendation explicitly addresses if and to what extent it may be permissible to introduce a more general limitation to the obligation to accept euro cash payments. Therefore,

text: 12 See Article 127(1) of the Treaty and Article 2 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter the ‘Statute of the ESCB’).

text: 16 OJ L 83, 30.3.2010, p 70.

text: 17 See also Danmarks Nationalbank’s Opinion on the draft law, available at www.nationalbanken.dk and page 5 of the Danish Payments Council’s Report on the Role of Cash in Society, August 2016. The Danish population also has the highest use of payment cards among the populations of the European Union according to the 2015 statistics on noncash payments. See European Central Bank, Press Release: Payment Statistics for 2015 (26 September 2016), Annex (Relative importance of the main payment instruments in the EU (2015)).

text: 18 See pages 37-41 of the Danish Payments Council’s Report on the Role of Cash in Society, August 2016. Union law has to be interpreted in order to establish the conditions that a limitation on payments in euro notes and coins must fulfil, including which conditions should be fulfilled to comply with the legal tender status of euro banknotes and coins when introducing general limitations to the obligation to accept cash payments. In particular, with respect to limiting cash payments,

text: recital 19

text: of

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 974/98

text: should be taken into consideration. This recital states that limitations on payments in notes and coins, established by Member States for public reasons, are not incompatible with the status of legal tender of euro banknotes and coins, provided that other lawful means for the settlement of monetary debts are available. 2.6 Limitations on cash payments should also be effective and proportionate to the objectives pursued and should not go beyond what is necessary to achieve such objectives . This requires, inter alia, that, for the settlement of monetary debts other lawful means of payment are available. These other lawful means of payment should be readily accessible to all citizens in the respective Member State. Any negative impact of the proposed limitations should be carefully weighed against the anticipated public benefits. 2.7 With respect to the requirement for limitations to be proportionate, the ECB notes that the broader and more general a limitation is, the stricter should be the interpretation of the requirement for the limitation to be proportionate to the objective pursued. When considering whether a limitation is proportionate, the adverse impact of the limitation in question should always be considered and it should also be considered whether alternative measures could be adopted that would fulfil the relevant objective with a less adverse impact. 2.8 Finally, it is of relevance to note that Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council has made it easier for Union citizens to obtain payment accounts and related electronic payment services as an alternative to cash .

text: 3. Specific observations

text: 3.1 The ECB welcomes the fact that the draft law maintains the right for citizens to pay in cash in most circumstances, thereby preserving the role of cash as a generally accepted means of payment. 3.2 The ECB understands that the Danish authorities have carefully considered and weighed, on the one hand, the anticipated benefits of the proposed limitation and, on the other hand, the potential adverse impact of the proposed limitation. In considering whether the conditions for introducing the limitation are fulfilled, the ECB notes that other lawful means for the settlement of monetary debts are generally available in Denmark and that the limitation's objective of combating crime may qualify as a public reason that justifies such a limitation, provided the anticipated benefits of the limitation outweigh its potentially adverse impact. With regard to the condition that the limitation should be effective and proportionate, the ECB notes that it is not specifically described in the

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 974/98 of 3 May 1998

text: on the introduction of the euro (OJ L 139, 11.5.1998, p. 1).

text: 20 See Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: 21 Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on the comparability of fees related to payment accounts, payment account switching and access to payment accounts with basic features (OJ L 257, 28.8.2014, p. 214).

text: 22 Directive

text: has been implemented in Denmark by Act no. 375 of 27 April 2016. explanatory notes to the draft law to what extent alternative, and equally or more effective measures could be adopted that would also fulfil the objective of the draft law . Against this background, it is difficult for the ECB to assess whether or not the limitation could be considered proportionate to the objective pursued. 3.3 The ECB notes that it should be ensured that, to the extent that a payee accepts cash, no surcharges are imposed on cash payments. This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 21 March 2017. [signed] The President of the ECB Mario DRAGHI

text: 23 The ECB is aware that three different models for a limitation of the obligation to receive cash payments were considered in the Danish Payments Council’s Report on the Role of Cash in Society of August 2016. However, the explanatory notes to the draft law do not mention any other models nor do they explain why the model set out in the draft law was chosen.


title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 24 March 2017 on foreign exchange-linked loans (CON/2017/9)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 24 March 2017 on foreign exchange-linked loans (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 8 February 2017 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Polish Parliament for an opinion on a draft law amending the Civil Code to resolve issues relating to foreign exchange-linked loans (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the sixth indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft law relates to rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 Under the Polish Civil Code, provisions of a contract entered into with a consumer that have not been individually agreed are not binding if they set down the consumer’s rights and obligations in a way which is contrary to good practice and are clearly against their interests (prohibited contractual clauses) . This does not apply to provisions laying down the main obligations of the parties, including price or remuneration, as long as they are clearly worded. The Civil Code further provides that, in the event of doubt, certain specified clauses are deemed to be prohibited. The purpose of the draft law is to amend the Civil Code by supplementing this list of prohibited contractual clauses with clauses which (1) denominate in foreign currency a loan which is then disbursed in Polish zloty (PLN) and (2) index to, or revalue in line with, a foreign currency a loan which is denominated and disbursed in PLN. 1.2 The amendment proposed by the draft law is also to apply retroactively. However, according to the explanatory memorandum, the draft law has no effect on the content of the legal relationships between banks and borrowers as the new clauses proposed to be included in the abovementioned list were never valid. Furthermore, the draft law merely aims to accelerate resolution of the court proceedings between banks and borrowers relating to foreign exchange-linked loans.

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).

text: 2 See Article 3851 of the Polish Civil Code.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 Prior to the global financial crisis, borrowing in foreign currencies by households and non-financial 3 4 corporations was popular in several Member States . As previously noted by the ECB , the lower interest rates applicable to foreign currency loans compared to loans in the domestic currency, as well as the expectation of domestic currency appreciation, increased the demand for such loans. The ECB understands that most of the foreign currency loans in Poland are housing loans denominated in Swiss francs and that foreign currency housing loans constituted approximately 40 % of all outstanding housing loans and 24 % of all outstanding loans to households in January 2017 . 2.2 The ECB has previously been consulted by the Polish Parliament and issued opinions on three draft legislative proposals, which were subsequently not adopted, dealing with the restructuring of foreign currency loans . 2.3 The ECB notes that the draft law has both prospective and retroactive elements, which raise different issues. The ECB will therefore address these prospective and retroactive elements separately.

text: 3. Prospective elements of the draft law

text: 3.1 The ECB has pointed out on several occasions the risks associated with foreign currency loans , and referred to the analysis of such risks by the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and the ESRB recommendations for addressing them in Recommendation

text: . The ECB also notes that the Polish Financial Supervision Authority took account of the ESRB recommendations and issued Recommendation S pursuant to which banks are recommended to ensure that future mortgage loans to retail borrowers are granted in the currency of the borrower’s income. 3.2 Against this background, to contain foreign currency lending and, as suggested by the ECB in the past , policymakers are strongly encouraged to create an overall environment for economic agents which encourages prudent and well-informed decision-making. This involves the pursuit of sound and stability-oriented macroeconomic policies and policies to strengthen financial literacy and appropriate financial regulation and supervision. If this proves insufficient, additional policies to prevent an excessive build-up of foreign currency debt could be considered.

text: 3 For further information on lending in foreign currencies in the Union, see the Annex to the Recommendation of the European Systemic Risk Board of 21 September 2011 on lending in foreign currencies (

text: ) (OJ C 342, 22.11.2011, p. 1).

text: 4 See for example, paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: 5 See the Narodowy Bank Polski report on monetary and financial statistics, available at www.nbp.pl.

text: 6 Opinions

text: and

text: 7 See the ECB Financial Stability Review of June 2010 and, for example, Opinion

text: 8 Recommendation of the European Systemic Risk Board of 21 September 2011 on lending in foreign currencies (

text: ) (OJ C 342, 22.11.2011, p.1).

text: 9 Recommendation S on good practices with regard to management of credit exposures that finance property and are mortgage secured, last revised in June 2013. Available on the website of the Polish Financial Supervision Authority at www.knf.gov.pl.

text: 10 See paragraph 3.1.2 of Opinion

text: . 3.3 Therefore, as also noted before , the ECB in principle welcomes measures promoting responsible lending by banks, enforcing market discipline and increasing the transparency of bank’s activities to provide a higher level of consumer protection, especially in the area of loans relating to residential property. Such specific measures which have been welcomed or suggested by the ECB in the past include limitations on the acceptable loan-to-value and debt-to-income ratios where the credit and income currencies are different, a requirement for the potential risks to be explained to the borrower where the credit is denominated in a foreign currency and incentives to banks to offer domestic currency loans to customers, for the same purposes as foreign currency loans . More generally and also as previously noted by the ECB, there is a need to ensure that strict and prudent regulatory measures are in place for lending to unhedged domestic borrowers in a foreign currency. In addition, banks should always hold sufficient capital to reflect the specific risks associated with foreign currency lending, in particular as regards the transformation of exchange rate risk into credit risk . 3.4 Finally, as noted by the ECB in previous opinions , if the draft law has a cross-border effect in the sense that it would effectively prevent borrowing in foreign currency, it may raise issues of compliance with Article 63 of the Treaty on free movement of capital and payments . The ECB has also noted in this respect that the free movement of capital and payments is without prejudice to, inter alia, ‘measures which are justified on grounds of public policy or public security’, as laid down in

text: Article 65(1)

text: (b) of the Treaty. However, as in the case of exceptions based on the principle of general good, the exemption in

text: Article 65(1)

text: (b) of the Treaty is narrowly interpreted by the Court of Justice of the European Union, with the implication that any such measure would, for example, need to meet the proportionality test. Under this test, restrictions are justified only if no less restrictive measure would suffice to reach the desired end. The ECB notes that the assessment of whether the measures affecting financial institutions under the draft law are in breach of the free movement of capital and payments, the freedom of establishment or other Union rules is entrusted to the Union institutions ensuring the application and observance of the Treaties.

text: 4. Retroactive elements of the draft law

text: Legal aspects of retroactivity

text: 4.1 As previously noted by the ECB , introducing measures with retroactive effect undermines legal certainty and is not in line with the principle of legitimate expectations. 4.2 In addition, although Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council does

text: 11 See paragraph 3.1 of Opinion

text: 12 See, for example, paragraph 3.2.2 of Opinion

text: 13 See paragraph 3.1.3 of Opinion

text: 14 See, for example, paragraph 3.2 of

text: 15 See Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Friedrich Stefan and Republik Österreich,

text: , ECLI:EU:C:2001:9.

text: 16 See, for example, paragraph 3.2 of Opinion

text: 17 Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 February 2014 on credit agreements for consumers relating to residential immovable property and amending Directives

text: and

text: and

text: Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010

text: (OJ L 60, 28.2.2014, p. 34). not apply to credit agreements existing before 21 March 2016, as previously noted by the ECB , the retroactive effect of the draft law does not seem to be in line with the general aim and principle of

text: Article 23(5) of Directive 2014/17/EU

text: . This provision allows Member States to further regulate foreign currency loans on condition that such regulation is not applied with retroactive effect. In that sense the provision reflects one of the key general principles of Union law, namely the principle of 19 20 legal certainty which also embraces the principle that the retroactivity of laws must be limited . 4.3 It is for the Polish authorities to assess whether the retroactive character of the draft law complies with Polish legal and constitutional principles. Effects on the banking sector, financial stability and the Polish economy 4.4 As noted in previous ECB opinions , in the case of Poland, risks associated with foreign currency loans do not, at present, appear to be of a systemic nature for the financial system and are not seen as representing a particular risk from a financial stability perspective. The ECB notes that this was also acknowledged in the recent Resolution of the Polish Financial Stability Committee on the recommendation on the restructuring of the FX housing loans portfolio . 4.5 The ECB notes that implementation of the draft law may entail significant financial costs for the banking sector. Whilst the explanatory memorandum does not provide any estimates, the ECB notes that, in its opinion on the draft law , Narodowy Bank Polski assesses that the potential cost of the entry into force of the draft law would exceed the estimated costs associated with the entry into force of the proposal presented by the President of Poland on 15 January 2016 and of another proposal on foreign currency loans on which the ECB was consulted and issued an opinion . 4.6 As the ECB has noted previously , introducing measures with retroactive effect may also have some negative impact on the Polish economy if it leads to deterioration in foreign investor sentiment due to a perceived increase in legal uncertainty and country risk. 4.7 Consequently, the ECB encourages the Polish authorities to carry out a thorough analysis to better quantify the financial stability implications of the draft law, in particular whether the envisaged retroactive measures could have negative effects on banks taken individually, the banking sector as a whole and the overall economy in Poland. In particular, due consideration should be given to the capital adequacy of the affected institutions and cross-border effects on the consolidated profits of international banking groups.

text: 18 See, for example, paragraph 3.1 of Opinion

text: 19 See, for example, the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Gottfried Heinrich,

text: Case C-345/06

text: , ECLI:EU:C:2009:140.

text: 20 See, for example, the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Ditta Angelo Tomadini Snc v Amministrazione delle finanze dello Stato,

text: Case 84/78

text: , ECLI:EU:C:1979:129.

text: 21 See, for example, Opinion

text: 22 See Resolution No 14/2017 of the Financial Stability Committee of 13 January 2017 on the recommendation on the restructuring of the FX housing loans portfolio, available at www.nbp.pl.

text: 23 Available on the Polish Parliament’s website at http://orka.sejm.gov.pl.

text: 24 Opinion

text: 25 See paragraph 3.4.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 3.3.3 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 3.5 of Opinion

text: . 4.8 With regard to any potential negative effects of the proposed measures, the ECB remains of the opinion that due consideration should also be given to fair burden sharing among all stakeholders, thus also avoiding moral hazard in the future. The ECB also expects that the draft law should be balanced with regard to the impact on local and foreign-owned banks. This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 24 March 2017. [signed] The President of the ECB Mario DRAGHI


title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 6 April 2017 on the identification of critical infrastructures for the purpose of information technology security (CON/2017/10)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 6 April 2017 on the identification of critical infrastructures for the purpose of information technology security (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 27 February 2017 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the German Ministry of the Interior for an opinion on a first amendment to a German draft regulation of the German regulation to identify critical infrastructures under the Law on the Federal Office for Information Security (hereinafter the ‘draft regulation’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the fifth indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft regulation relates to payment and settlement systems. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft regulation

text: 1.1 The purpose of the draft regulation is to identify critical infrastructures and their operators that are subject to the Law on information technology security (hereinafter the ‘Law on IT security’), which stipulates the obligations of such operators to take appropriate organisational and technical precautionary measures to protect infrastructure-related information technology (IT) systems and to report severe IT incidents to the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik). The BSI is empowered to carry out inspections and require the implementation of measures to safeguard compliance with the Law on IT security. Under the Law on IT security, the operators of critical infrastructures are also entitled to privileged advice and information provided by the BSI. 1.2 By providing specifications of infrastructures which have a key function in relation to various areas of society, the draft regulation aims to remove uncertainties as to which entities operate a given critical infrastructure. 1.3 Regarding the finance and insurance sector, the draft regulation covers the following: (a) the supply of cash in respect of authorisation of withdrawals, entering into payment transactions, charging customer accounts and cash logistics; (b) card-based payment transactions linked to cards within

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).

text: 2 Act on the strengthening of the safety of information technology systems of 17 July 2015. the meaning of

text: Regulation (EU) No 2015/751

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council in respect of the authorisation of and entering into payment transactions, as well as charging customer accounts and crediting the payment recipient’s account; (c) conventional payment transactions carried out by means of transfer and direct debit within the meaning of

text: Regulation (EU) No 260/2012

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council in respect of acceptance of a transfer or direct debit, entering into payment transactions and charging and crediting customers’ accounts; (d) the settlement and processing of securities and derivatives transactions including posting securities and funds; and (e) the utilisation of insurance services. 1.4 Both the Law on IT security and the draft regulation implement

text: Directive (EU) 2016/1148

text: of the 5 6 Parliament and of the Council , on which the ECB has issued an opinion . The draft regulation implements Article 5(1) of and Annex II to

text: Directive (EU) 2016/1148

text: , which together specify the scope of application of the Directive. 1.5 Beyond what is required by

text: Directive (EU) 2016/1148

text: , the explanatory memorandum to the draft regulation explicitly lists TARGET2, SWIFT, EURO1, STEP1 and STEP2-T as examples of infrastructures subject to the Law on IT security. In particular, these systems are classified as ‘systems to connect to an interbank payment system’ which are allocated to the categories of ‘infrastructures for the supply of cash’ and ‘conventional payment transactions’ under part 1(1) of Annex 6 to the draft regulation. 1.6 The Law on IT security exempts from its scope operators of critical infrastructures that are subject to legal provisions which are either comparable to or go beyond the requirements of the Law on IT security .

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 As previously noted , the ECB supports the aim of

text: Directive (EU) 2016/1148

text: to ensure a high common level of network and information security (NIS) across the Union and to achieve a consistency of approach in this field across business sectors and Member States. It is important to ensure that the internal market is a safe place to do business and that all Member States have a certain minimum level of preparedness for cyber-security incidents. 2.2 While the draft regulation seeks to enhance the overall resilience of critical infrastructures by identifying infrastructures that have key functions for society in different areas, it should be ensured that the provisions of the draft regulation do not encroach on the Eurosystem’s competences. This could be done by explicitly exempting from its scope of application payment and securities settlement systems overseen and/or operated by the ECB and the Eurosystem in general, including the Deutsche Bundesbank, as these are subject to comparable or more stringent

text: Regulation (EU) No 2015/751

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2015 on interchange fees for card-based payment transactions (OJ L 123, 19.05.2015, p. 1).

text: Regulation (EU) No 260/2012

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2012 establishing technical and business requirements for credit transfers and direct debits in euro (OJ L 94, 30.03.2012, p. 22).

text: Directive (EU) 2016/1148

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 concerning measures for a high common level of security of network and information systems across the Union (OJ L 194, 19.7.2016, p. 1).

text: 6 See Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: 7 Sections 8c(2) no. 5 and 8c(3) no. 5 of the Law on IT security.

text: 8 See paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: . requirements. Essentially, it must be ensured that implementation of the requirements of

text: Directive (EU) 2016/1148

text: does not conflict with

text: Regulation (EU) No 795/2014

text: of the European Central Bank (ECB/2014/28) and the Eurosystem’s oversight policy framework. An extension of the scope of the Law on IT security to infrastructures operated and/or overseen by the ECB and the Eurosystem in general, including the Deutsche Bundesbank, would raise severe concerns regarding the principle of primacy of Union law as well as regarding the principle of central bank independence pursuant to Article 130 of the Treaty. 2.3 Notwithstanding the above, the ECB stands ready to cooperate with the BSI to ensure that best practices with regard to NIS are established and followed. 2.4 Finally, to qualify the infrastructures operated and overseen by the ECB and the Eurosystem, including the Deutsche Bundesbank, as subject to the Law on IT security, seems to lack a sufficient legal basis under the draft regulation itself. First, contrary to the intended application of the Law on IT security to Eurosystem-operated infrastructures, there are doubts as to whether the definition of critical infrastructures provided for in Section 2(10) of the Law on IT security captures these infrastructures. While this provision generally refers to the ‘financial and insurance sector’, the explanatory memorandum to the parliamentary draft of the Law on IT security sets out a comprehensive list of sub-sectors relevant to this area, which should form a basis for secondary legislation applicable to banking, financial service providers, stock exchanges and insurance companies. Central banks are not part of this list. Following the principle established by the Court of Justice of the European Union that provisions of national law must be interpreted in conformity with the directive that they implement , it is noteworthy that Annex II to

text: Directive (EU) 2016/1148

text: does not list central banks as operators of essential services. Central banks are also not to be qualified as credit institutions, referred to in the definition of ‘banking’, as credit institutions are defined by reference to

text: Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council .

text: Regulation (EU) No 575/2013

text: lays down uniform rules concerning general prudential requirements with which credit institutions and investment firms subject to Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council must comply. Central banks are excluded from the scope of Directive

text: and are thus not supervised institutions falling within the scope of

text: Regulation (EU) No 575/2013

text: . Therefore, neither the ECB nor the Deutsche Bundesbank falls within the scope of the banking sector, in accordance with point (3) of Annex II to

text: Directive (EU) 2016/1148

text: . 2.5 The ECB and the Bundesbank do not fall within the scope of the ‘financial market infrastructures’ referred to in point (4) of Annex II to

text: Directive (EU) 2016/1148

text: since they do not operate trading venues within the meaning of

text: Article 4(24) of Directive 2014/65/EU

text: of the European Parliament and

text: 9 Regulation of the European Central Bank

text: (EU) No 795/2014

text: of 3 July 2014 on oversight requirements for systemically important payment systems (ECB/2014/28) (OJ L 217, 23.7.2014, p. 16).

text: 10 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA.,

text: , ECLI:EU:C:1978:49; Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA.,

text: , ECLI:EU:C:1990:395.

text: Regulation (EU) No 575/2013

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending

text: Regulation (EU) No 648/2012

text: (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 1).

text: 12 Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive

text: and repealing Directives

text: and

text: (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 338). of the Council , being excluded from the scope of this Directive under

text: Article 2(1)

text: (h) thereof. The members of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) also do not qualify as central counterparties within the meaning of

text: Article 2(1) of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012

text: since ESCB members are excluded from the scope of this Regulation under

text: Article 1(4)

text: (a) thereof.

text: 3. Impact of the draft regulation on payment systems overseen by the ECB and the Eurosystem

text: 3.1 The ECB takes particular note of the fact that the explanatory memorandum to the draft regulation explicitly lists TARGET2, EURO1 and STEP2-T as examples of infrastructures subject to the Law on IT security . These payment systems have been identified, pursuant to Decision ECB/2014/35 16 17 of the European Central Bank and Decision ECB/2014/36 of the European Central Bank respectively, as systemically important payment systems (SIPS) and are overseen by the ECB as competent authority under

text: Regulation (EU) No 795/2014

text: (ECB/2014/28). Among the listed SIPS, TARGET2 plays a distinct role, as it is owned and operated by the Eurosystem, and subject to strict regulation and oversight. 3.2 The draft regulation incorrectly classifies TARGET2, EURO1 and STEP2-T as examples of ‘systems to connect to an interbank payment system’. In fact, they are payment systems which should be classified as systems for carrying out conventional payment transactions. With regard to conventional payment transactions, due to the draft regulation’s reference in Section 7(4) to

text: Regulation (EU) No 260/2012

text: of the Parliament and the Council , which contains provisions on retail payment systems, all payments are exempted from the scope of conventional payment transactions which are carried out on a large-value payment system like TARGET2 and EURO1. 3.3 According to the fourth indent of Article 127(2) of the Treaty, promotion of the smooth operation of payment systems is one of the core tasks of the ESCB. Furthermore, pursuant to Article 22 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter the ‘Statute of the ESCB’), the ECB and the national central banks may provide facilities, and the ECB may make regulations, to ensure efficient and sound clearing and payment systems within the Union. Thus, the ECB and the Eurosystem as a whole have a particular interest in an enhanced level of NIS in respect of payment systems, as it fosters confidence in the euro and the smooth functioning of the economy in the Union.

text: 13 Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial instruments and amending Directive

text: and Directive

text: (OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 349).

text: Regulation (EU) No 648/2012

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories (OJ L 201, 27.7.2012, p. 1).

text: 15 STEP1, which is also identified by the draft regulation as a critical infrastructure, is primarily a payment service for commercial transactions and has been designed to process single cross-border payments in euro. STEP1 benefits from the technical and legal infrastructure of EURO1; participants in the STEP1 service can make full use of the EURO1 platform and are directly connected to all EURO1 and STEP1 participants.

text: 16 Decision ECB/2014/35 of the European Central Bank of 13 August 2014 on the identification of TARGET2 as a systemically important payment system pursuant to

text: Regulation (EU) No 795/2014

text: on oversight requirements for systemically important payment systems (OJ L 245, 20.8.2014, p. 5).

text: 17 Decision ECB/2014/36 of the European Central Bank of 13 August 2014 on the identification of EURO1 and STEP2- T as systemically important payment systems pursuant to

text: Regulation (EU) No 795/2014

text: on oversight requirements for systemically important payment systems.

text: Regulation (EU) No 260/2012

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2012 establishing technical and business requirements for credit transfers and direct debits in euro and amending Regulation (EC) No 924/200 (OJ L 94 of 30.3.2012, p. 22). 3.4 Within the euro area, SIPS are subject to the requirements of

text: Regulation (EU) No 795/2014

text: (ECB/2014/28). This Regulation implements the Principles for financial market infrastructures published by the Committee on Payment and Market Infrastructures (CPMI) and the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) (CPMI-IOSCO) (hereinafter ‘the CPMI-IOSCO Principles’) in a legally binding manner and covers both large-value and retail payment systems of systemic importance, operated either by a Eurosystem central bank or a private entity. Thus, SIPS are subject to regular assessment against the requirements of

text: Regulation (EU) No 795/2014

text: (ECB/2014/28) related to operational risk, which allows the designated competent authority to verify that the systems are in compliance. In cases of non-compliance, the competent authority has the power to impose sanctions or corrective measures to ensure compliance. 3.5 In line with the ECB’s recommendation ,

text: recital 14

text: of

text: Directive (EU) 2016/1148

text: states that the Directive does not affect the Eurosystem’s oversight of payment and settlement systems. While Article 3 of the Directive clarifies that the Directive lays down minimum harmonisation measures, such that Member States may adopt or maintain provisions with a view to achieving a higher level of security of network and information systems, it also states that this is without prejudice to Member States’ obligations under Union law. In this respect, it is important to emphasise that there are already applicable effective provisions in place on the security of SIPS within the Union legal framework on oversight of payment systems. More specifically,

text: Regulation (EU) No 795/2014

text: (ECB/2014/28) imposes a number of legal requirements on SIPS, which also address operational risk, including the obligation to (a) establish comprehensive physical and information security policies that adequately identify, assess and manage all potential vulnerabilities and threats, and (b) to ensure that critical information technology systems can resume operations within specified timeframes where an event poses a significant risk of disrupting the SIPS’ operations. Finally,

text: recital 13

text: of

text: Directive (EU) 2016/1148

text: acknowledges that the operational risk requirements in respect of financial market infrastructures (such as SIPS) under Union legal acts often exceed the requirements provided for under the Directive and should thus be considered as lex specialis, and therefore prevail over national measures implementing

text: Directive (EU) 2016/1148

text: . 3.6 There are plans to enhance the existing Union legal framework on oversight of payment systems. In particular,

text: Regulation (EU) No 795/2014

text: (ECB/2014/28) is currently subject to a general review of its application, and public consultation in respect of a revised draft of

text: Regulation (EU) No 795/2014

text: (ECB/2014/28) was carried out in December 2016 . The proposed regulation amending

text: Regulation (EU) No 795/2014

text: (ECB/2014/28) seeks to further strengthen operational risk and NIS requirements, taking into account, inter alia, the CPMI-IOSCO Guidance on cyber resilience for financial market infrastructures . It introduces a number of new requirements addressing operational and cyber risks, such as imposing an obligation on SIPS operators to take the following steps: (a) review, audit and test systems, operational policies, procedures and controls periodically and after significant changes; (b) establish an effective cyber resilience framework with appropriate

text: 19 Available on the Bank for International Settlement’s (BIS) website at www.bis.org.

text: 20 See paragraph 3.1 of Opinion

text: 21 See

text: Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 795/2014

text: 22 Published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: 23 Available on the BIS’ website at http://www.bis.org. governance measures in place; (c) identify their critical operations and supporting assets, and have appropriate measures in place to protect them from, detect, respond to and recover from cyberattacks; (d) regularly test the established measures; and (e) have a sound level of situational awareness of cyber threats, including through a process of continuous learning . The proposed new arrangements will therefore also qualify as Union sector-specific legislation of at least equivalent effect within the meaning of

text: Article 1(7) of Directive (EU) 2016/1148

text: , and should thus prevail over national measures implementing the Directive. As a result, the abovementioned SIPS should be excluded from the scope of application of the draft regulation. 3.7 In line with the requirements set out in

text: Directive (EU) 2016/1148

text: Regulation (EU) No 795/2014

text: (ECB/2014/28) already provides competent authorities with the power to obtain information concerning, inter alia, major and minor incidents, the nature and type of the incidents, their seriousness and their duration . Additionally, the proposed regulation amending

text: Regulation (EU) No 795/2014

text: (ECB/2014/28) further enhances competent authorities’ powers to conduct onsite inspections and request independent reviews of and investigations into the functioning of the systems . 3.8 Similarly to SIPS that are governed by

text: Regulation (EU) No 795/2014

text: (ECB/2014/28), the other two categories of non-SIPS, namely prominently important retail payment systems (PIRPS) and other retail payment systems (ORPS), are subject to comparable oversight standards. According to the Eurosystem Revised Oversight Framework for retail payment systems , both PIRPS and ORPS are subject to the CPMI-IOSCO Principles, in particular Principle 17 on operational risk . 3.9 While the objective of the draft regulation is to implement

text: Article 5(1) of Directive (EU) 2016/1148

text: by identifying the operators of essential services with an establishment within the territory of Germany, it is questionable whether the identified payment systems can be considered as having ‘effective and real exercise of activity through stable arrangements’ within Germany . While it is acknowledged that the critical infrastructures identified are subject to German law, the governing law should not be considered as a determining factor in assessing their critical nature with regard to German territory, as in many cases the physical infrastructure is to a relevant extent located outside the jurisdiction of Germany .

text: 4. Impact of the draft regulation on TARGET2-Securities

text: 4.1 In light of the abstract criteria set out in the draft regulation referred to in paragraph 1.3, the ECB understands that TARGET2-Securities (T2S) may also fall within the scope of the draft regulation.

text: 26 See

text: Article 21 of Regulation (EU) No 795/2014

text: 28 Published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: 29 This includes Key Considerations 1, 3 and 5 from Principle 17.

text: 30 See

text: recital 21

text: of

text: Directive (EU) 2016/1148

text: 31 With regard to TARGET2, this is only true for the TARGET2-ECB and TARGET2-Deutsche Bundesbank components. It should also be noted that EURO1 and STEP2-T are operated by a legal entity incorporated in France. 4.2 T2S is a service set up by the Eurosystem to support securities settlement in central bank money, to be provided to central securities depositories (CSDs) as part of the Eurosystem’s tasks in accordance with Articles 17, 18 and 22 of the Statute of the ESCB. T2S is based on a single technical platform integrated with central bank real time gross settlement systems . It is systemically important, as it provides critical core settlement services to CSDs. 4.3 In line with the Governing Council decision in its Eurosystem Oversight Policy Framework of July 2011, T2S falls under the Eurosystem oversight competences under Articles 127(2) of the Treaty and

text: Article 3(1)

text: and Article 22 of the Statute of the ESCB . These competences are exercised in accordance with the CPMI-IOSCO Principles. The Eurosystem oversight function over T2S is similarly recognised in the T2S Framework Agreement, which is the core T2S contractual document that sets out the rules governing the provision of T2S services by the Eurosystem to CSDs . In addition, in conducting the oversight of T2S, the Eurosystem cooperates with national authorities responsible for the oversight and supervision of CSDs connected to T2S on the basis of a memorandum of understanding between the ECB and those authorities. To consider T2S as falling under the scope of the draft regulation would interfere with the Eurosystem competences stemming from the Treaty, and the draft regulation should be amended in order to clearly exclude T2S from its scope.

text: 5. Impact of the draft regulation on payment instruments overseen by the Eurosystem

text: 5.1 Card-based transactions and conventional payment transactions should not fall under the scope of the draft regulation as this would interfere with the Eurosystem’s existing supervisory and oversight competences. 5.2 While infrastructures related to card-based transactions and conventional payment transactions, e.g. credit transfers and direct debits may fall within the scope of the draft regulation, it should be noted that the Eurosystem Oversight Policy Framework identifies payment instruments, such as cards, credit transfers, direct debit and e-money, as an ‘integral part of payment systems’, and thus includes these within the scope of its central bank oversight. For payment instruments, the role of primary overseer (for the Eurosystem) is assigned by reference to the national anchor of the payment scheme and the legal incorporation of its governance authority. For credit transfer and direct debit schemes within the Single Euro Payments Area, as well as some of the international card payment schemes, the ECB has the primary oversight role. 5.3 While payment service providers (PSPs) that provide payment services via payment instruments are supervised by competent authorities, the underlying critical financial market infrastructures are overseen by the Eurosystem. With regard to ensuring a high level of NIS, PSPs are subject to

text: Directive (EU) 2015/2366

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council , which is applicable as of January 2018. The Directive sets out stringent guidelines on major incident reporting under

text: 33 See Section 4.4 of the Eurosystem oversight policy framework, revised version (July 2016), available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: 34 See

text: Article 18

text: thereof.

text: Directive (EU) 2015/2366

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on payment services in the internal market, amending Directives

text: and

text: and

text: Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010

text: , and repealing Directive

text: (OJ L 337, 23.12.2015, p. 35).

text: Article 96

text: , on security measures for operational and security risk under

text: Article 95

text: , and on regulatory technical standards on strong customer authentication and secure communication under

text: Article 98

text: . These guidelines were drafted by the European Banking Authority in cooperation with the ECB.

text: 6. Impact of the draft regulation on critical service providers

text: 6.1 Contrary to the explanatory memorandum to the draft regulation, which explicitly lists the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) as an infrastructure subject to the Law on IT security, the draft regulation should exclude SWIFT from its scope. It supplies secure messaging services in a vast number of countries, and is a limited liability cooperative company established in Belgium whose infrastructure hubs are not located within the territory of Germany. Nationale Bank van België / Banque Nationale de Belgique acts as the lead overseer of SWIFT, and conducts, on the basis of a cooperative oversight arrangement, oversight in respect of SWIFT in cooperation with the other G10 central banks, including the ECB and the Deutsche Bundesbank. 6.2 The G10 overseers recognise that the main focus of oversight is SWIFT’s operational risk, as this is considered to be the primary risk category through which SWIFT could pose a systemic risk to the financial system in the Union. In this regard, the SWIFT Cooperative Oversight Group has developed a specific set of principles and high level expectations that apply to SWIFT, such as risk identification and management, information security, reliability and resilience, technology planning and communication with users. The G10 overseers subject SWIFT to an intense form of oversight, and expect that SWIFT specifically adheres to the CPMI-IOSCO Guidance on cyber resilience and other international standards on IT Security, which exceed the requirements set out in

text: Directive (EU) 2016/1148

text: 7. Impact of the draft regulation on other types of financial market infrastructures

text: 7.1 While central clearing counterparties (CCPs) and CSDs may fall within the scope of the draft regulation, it is noteworthy that such financial market infrastructures are already strictly regulated and supervised by different authorities under

text: Regulation (EU) No 648/2012

text: and

text: Regulation (EU) No 909/2014

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council , which set out requirements pertaining to operational risk. Furthermore, both types of financial market infrastructures should take note of the CPMI-IOSCO Cyber Guidance, which is applicable to all financial market infrastructures. 7.2 In addition to the supervisory competences entrusted to national competent authorities under

text: Regulation (EU) No 648/2012

text: and

text: Regulation (EU) No 909/2014

text: , it should be noted that national authorities, in particular the members of the ESCB, may be entrusted with oversight competences in relation to those financial market infrastructures. In this regard,

text: recital 11

text: of

text: Regulation (EU) No 648/2012

text: clarifies that one of the basic tasks to be carried out through the ESCB is to promote the smooth operation of payment systems. In this respect, the members of the ESCB execute oversight by ensuring efficient and sound clearing and payment systems, including CCPs. Further,

text: Regulation (EU) No 648/2012

text: is without prejudice to the responsibilities of the ECB and the NCBs

text: Regulation (EU) No 909/2014

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on improving securities settlement in the European Union and on central securities depositories and amending Directives

text: and

text: and

text: Regulation (EU) No 236/2012

text: (OJ L 257, 28.8.2014, p. 1). to ensure efficient and sound clearing and payment systems within the Union and with other countries. 7.3 In the same vein, as regards CSDs,

text: recital 8

text: of

text: Regulation (EU) No 909/2014

text: states that the Regulation should be without prejudice to the responsibilities of the ECB and the NCBs to ensure efficient and sound clearing and payment systems within the Union and other countries and that the Regulation should not prevent the members of the ESCB from accessing information relevant for the performance of their duties, including the oversight of CSDs and other financial market infrastructures. 7.4 Therefore, the ECB considers that the potential coverage of CCPs and CSDs within the scope of the draft regulation could interfere with the existing supervisory and oversight competences. Thus, the draft regulation should be amended in order to (a) clarify that the BSI’s responsibilities under the draft regulation are without prejudice to and are aligned with the tasks of the competent authorities, including the members of the ESCB responsible for the supervision and oversight of the CCPs and CSDs, and (b) avoid the application to those financial market infrastructures of any requirements stemming from the draft regulation that could overlap with the lex specialis requirements applicable to CCPs and CSDs under their respective supervisory and oversight frameworks. This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 6 April 2017. [signed] The President of the ECB Mario DRAGHI