text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42). 2

text: Directive (EU) 2015/849

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, amending

text: Regulation (EU) No 648/2012

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council and

text: Commission Directive 2006/70/EC

text: (OJ L 141, 5.6.2015, p. 73). 3 See Opinion

text: Explanatory memorandum, p. 255.

text: Commission Recommendation of 22 March 2010 on the scope and effects of legal tender of euro banknotes and coins (OJ L 83, 30.3.2010, p. 70).

text: . 7

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 974/98 of 3 May 1998

text: on the introduction of the euro (OJ L 139, 11.5.1998, p. 1). 8 See for example Opinions

text: , CON2014/4 and

text: . All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 9 See for example paragraph 2.3. of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.3. of Opinion

text: and paragraphs 2.6 and 2.7 of Opinion

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 30 May 2017 on the limitation of cash payments (CON/2017/20)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 30 May 2017 on the limitation of cash payments (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 3 April 2017 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Belgian Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft law on the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing, and the limitation of cash payments (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the second and third indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft law contains provisions concerning means of payments and the Nationale Bank van België/Banque Nationale de Belgique (‘NBB’). In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1. The main purpose of the draft law is to implement into Belgian law

text: Directive (EU) 2015/849

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council . The Belgian legislator has taken this opportunity to consolidate in the draft law, and if necessary amend, provisions of relevance in this field, including the limitation of cash payments and the provisions defining the NBB’s powers in this field. 1.2. In particular, all rules on the limitation of cash payments, which are currently set out in the Law of 11 January 1993 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for money laundering and terrorist financing and the Law of 29 December 2010 laying down various measures, are now moved into the draft law. 1.3. Under these rules, which were last amended by the Law of 15 July 2013 containing urgent provisions on the fight against fraud , merchants may currently receive in cash up to 10 % and not more than EUR 3 000 of the sale price of goods or services, whether the sale takes place in one operation or in separate operations which appear linked. The same limitation of cash payments

text: applies to the sale and purchase by traders of precious metals (defined as gold, silver or platinum, with the exclusion of coins). Furthermore, to curb the increasing theft of copper wire, the abovementioned Law of 29 December 2010 specifically prohibits payment in cash for copper cables, whether recycled or used or presented as such, by natural or legal persons active in the recuperation and recycling of and trade in old or precious metals. Finally, natural and legal persons active in the recuperation, recycling and trade in old or precious metals are required, if they sell such metals to natural or legal persons, to identify and register the person who buys them if those purchases are paid for in cash in an amount over EUR 500. 1.4. The draft law expands the limitations on cash payments to all cash payments made by any person, without distinction as to the (contractual or extracontractual) nature of the obligations that give rise to such payments, the existence (or not) of consideration, the persons carrying out such payments or the capacity (merchant, trader or other) in which such persons act. According to the explanatory memorandum to the draft law, the purpose of this amendment is to capture various situations in which cash payments are sometimes substantial (exchange transactions with a supplement, specifically involving gold). 1.5. Exceptions are, however, made in respect of (1) real estate transactions, which involve notaries and real estate agents, to whom the draft law applies; (2) transactions between consumers, to whom the draft law does not apply, and who rarely conduct operations relating to high value goods and who may, in any case, not be subject to systematic monitoring; and (3) payment in cash or gifts effected by or with financial institutions, including credit institutions, the NBB, Bpost, payment institutions, issuers of electronic money, exchange offices, stock market companies and bureaux de change, as operations involving cash are inherent to their activities. 1.6. The draft law also redefines the thresholds for the limitation of cash payments which may now be made up to EUR 3 000. In particular, the draft law waives the criterion of 10 % of the price of goods or services. Furthermore, the cap of EUR 3 000 no longer relates to the amount to be paid, but to the amount effectively paid or given in cash. Thus, a payment or gift of EUR 5 000 may be effected and received in cash up to EUR 3 000, provided that the remaining balance is effected or received in another way. This relaxation of the rule is justified by the low threshold of EUR 3 000 and the complexity of the current rule, which is disadvantageous for any low-value advance payment effected in cash. 1.7. The draft law also reviews the limitations of cash payments applicable to the sale of gold by consumers to professionals. To remedy the lack of clarity as to the applicability of the limitation of cash payments to the purchase of gold ingots by professionals, the draft law substitutes the new concept of ‘precious substances’, which is broadly defined and refers to gold, platinum, silver and palladium, for the current concept of ‘precious metals’, which excludes investment gold, such as ingots and coins. Furthermore, except in the case of an open sale under the supervision of a bailiff, if a purchaser is not a consumer they may not pay in cash for old metals, copper cables or goods containing precious substances, unless they are present only in small quantities and only because of the physical properties they provide. According to the explanatory memorandum , this prohibition

text: is justified based on the increased risk of money laundering and the handling of stolen goods, especially by travelling criminal groups. The existing obligation to record such cash payments has not prevented the handling of such goods, and this requirement is regularly circumvented by traders overvaluing the quantity purchased from some consumers, and not recording the data of others who sell jewels with dubious origins. The draft law introduces, nevertheless, an exception to the prohibition for low cash payments of up to EUR 500, to allow occasional sales by a consumer of goods made out of gold, such as an old ring. The existing obligation regarding identification is retained in those instances. 1.8. The draft law also contains provisions intended to clarify the powers and tools of the NBB with regard to the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing. To this end, the draft law amends the Organic Law of the NBB to confer the task on the NBB, as part of its supervisory powers, of ensuring that financial institutions comply with legal and regulatory provisions including European law aimed at preventing the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing and the financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The draft law lists all of the supervisory powers, control measures and sanctions available to the NBB to discharge this task. The draft law furthermore authorises the NBB to exchange with other competent authorities of Union Member States or third countries information relevant to the discharge of this task under rules ensuring the respect of the confidentiality of such information. Finally, the draft law authorises the Treasury to demand information from the Central Point of Contact at the NBB for the purpose of the application of the financial penalties set out in Union Council regulations on financial sanctions set out in resolutions adopted by the United Nations Security Council.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1. Although the draft law amends the Organic Law to empower the NBB to ensure that financial institutions comply with legal requirements aimed at preventing the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering and terrorist financing and the financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the ECB understands that the NBB, as part of its current supervisory powers, already discharges this task and uses the powers, measures and tools set out in the draft law. Against this backdrop, the draft law does not confer any genuinely new task on the NBB. 2.2. This opinion does not address the issue of the draft law’s effective transposition of

text: Directive (EU) 2015/849

text: into Belgian law. The focus of this opinion is on the limitation of cash payments and the NBB’s tasks under the draft law.

text: 3. Limitation of cash payments

text: 3.1. The Commission’s Recommendation of 22 March 2010 on the scope and effect of legal tender of euro banknotes and coins (hereinafter “the Commission’ Recommendation”) states that the

text: acceptance of payments in cash should be the rule, but acknowledges that cash may be refused for reasons related to the ‘good faith principle’, without this constituting a breach of the legal tender status of cash. Neither the Commission Recommendation nor other Union law explicitly addresses whether, nor to what extent, itmay be permissible to introduce a more general limitation to the obligation to accept cash payments. Therefore, Union law must be interpreted in order to ascertain the conditions that a limitation on payments in euro banknotes and coins should fulfil, including the conditions that should be fulfilled to comply with the legal tender status of euro banknotes and coins when general limitations on the obligation to accept cash payments are introduced . 3.2. Without prejudice to the specific considerations in paragraphs 3.5 to 3.8, the draft law must comply with Union law. In this context,

text: recital 19

text: of

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 974/98

text: , which states that limitations on payments in banknotes and coins, established by Member States for public reasons, are not incompatible with the status of legal tender of euro banknotes and coins, provided that other lawful means for the settlement of monetary debts are available, should be taken into account . The ECB considers that other lawful means for the settlement of monetary debts, which ensure similar benefits to those of cash, are generally available in Belgium for all transactions that are subject to the limitation of cash under the draft law. 3.3. Limitations on payments in cash should, however, be effective and proportionate to the objectives pursued and should not go beyond what is necessary to achieve such objectives. Any negative impact of the proposed limitations should therefore be carefully weighed against the anticipated public benefits. When considering whether a limitation is proportionate, the adverse impact of the limitation in question should always be considered, as well as whether any alternative measures could be adopted that would fulfil the relevant objective and have less adverse impact 3.4. Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that the ability to pay in cash remains particularly important for certain groups in society that, for various legitimate reasons, prefer to use cash rather than other payment methods. Cash is generally also appreciated as a payment instrument because it is widely accepted, fast and facilitates control over the payer’s spending. Moreover, it is the only means of payment that allows citizens to instantly settle a transaction in central bank money and at face value, without the legal possibility to impose a fee for the use of this means of payment, Moreover, cash payments facilitate the inclusion of the entire population in the economy by allowing it to settle any kind of financial transaction in this way. 3.5. The ECB understands that the Belgian legislator proposes to take advantage of the implementation of

text: Directive (EU) 2015/849

text: to review the limitations on cash payments, which are relaxed in certain respects and bolstered in others. On the one hand, the draft law adapts the threshold for cash payments, which is to EUR 3 000 of the amount effectively paid, without being combined with the criterion of 10 % of the price of the goods or services. On the other hand, the limitation on cash

text: payments now applies to all kind of payments, without distinction as to the contractual or noncontractual nature of the payment, the existence (or not) of any consideration or the capacity in which natural or legal persons act. Transactions between consumers are, however, excluded from the scope of these limitations. Furthermore, the strict prohibition on cash payments which applies now to the purchase of copper cables by non-consumers is extended to purchases by nonconsumers of all types of old metals, copper cables or goods containing precious materials. The only exceptions are where an open sale takes place under the supervision of a bailiff, where the purchaser is not a consumer, and for low cash payments of up to EUR 500. 3.6. Although other lawful means for the settlement of monetary debts are available in Belgium and the draft law’s objectives of combating money laundering and the handling of stolen goods, especially by travelling criminal groups, qualify as public reasons outweighing any impact of the limitations on cash payments the ECB would, nevertheless, recommend a careful weighting of the measures proposed in the draft law that bolster the limitation on cash payments against the public benefits expected to be derived from them, especially as regards the strict prohibition on cash payment for goods containing precious metals. 3.7. The ECB welcomes that the threshold for cash payments is now defined without reference to the criterion of 10 % of the price of the goods or services. Not only does this amendment clarify the limitations on cash payments – which are currently poorly understood and implemented – but it also contributes to greater circulation of cash. As a matter of fact, the envisaged EUR 3 000 threshold – which is quite low considering that

text: Directive (EU) 2015/849

text: applies customer due diligence measures only to cash payments of EUR 10 000 or more – would now relate to the amount effectively paid, and no longer to the total purchase price of the goods or services. The ECB also welcomes that such limitations do not apply to transactions between consumers, as for such transactions there might be difficulties involved in replacing cash due, inter alia, to the insolvency risk of the counterparty, the lack of possibility of immediate settlement, and the absence of an infrastructure for cashless means of payment which ensure similar benefits to those of cash for private persons. 3.8. The ECB recommends, however, raising the threshold of EUR 500 for purchases by nonconsumers of all types of old metals, copper cables or goods containing precious materials, as this threshold is disproportionately low, despite the intention of combatting money laundering and the handling of stolen goods, especially by travelling criminal groups. In the case of vendors selling jewels with dubious origins traders are, in any case, not supposed to enter into such transactions, irrespective of their amount, as this would give rise to a breach of criminal law on account of concealment.

text: 4. The NBB’s tasks, powers and tools available for the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing

text: 4.1. The ECB welcomes that the draft law and the Organic Law separate the NBB’s powers and tools for the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing from those available to it as part of its

text: supervisory competences. This facilitates the exercise of supervisory powers within the framework of the Single Supervisory Mechanism. 4.2. The ECB notes that the Central Point of Contact at the NBB referred to in the draft law, from which the Treasury may request information for the purpose of the application of the financial penalties set out in Council regulations on financial sanctions set out in resolutions adopted by the United Nations Security Council, corresponds to the central register of bank accounts, regarding which the ECB issued Opinion

text: . The ECB understands that the Belgian legislator is currently drafting a law setting out the principles according to which the development and functioning costs of this register will be fully covered ex ante by its users (including the Minister for Finance, when the request emanates from the Treasury) and that a royal decree will further detail the accounting mechanisms to this end. The prohibition of monetary financing is therefore complied with and this issue does not call for further comments from the ECB.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 30 May 2017.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: Bundesgesetz, mit dem ein Bundesgesetz über die Errichtung eines Registers der wirtschaftlichen Eigentümer von Gesellschaften, anderen juristischen Personen und Trusts (Wirtschaftliche Eigentümer Registergesetz – WiEReG) erlassen wird und das Finanzmarkt-Geldwäschegesetz, das Finanzstrafgesetz, das Wirtschaftstreuhändergesetz, das Bilanzbuchhaltungsgesetz 2014, das Devisengesetz, das Zentrale Gegenparteien-Vollzugsgesetz, das Zentralverwahrer-Vollzugsgesetz, das Börsegesetz 1989, das Bankwesengesetz und die Bundesabgabenordnung geändert werden. The draft law is part of a larger legislative package mainly aimed at implementing Directives

text: (EU) 2015/849

text: and 2016/2258.

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).

text: See section 44b(1) of the Law of 1984 on the national bank.

text: See section 44b(3) and section 44c(1) of the Law of 1984 on the national bank.

text: See paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: See paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: and Recommendation of the European Systemic Risk Board of 4 April 2013 on intermediate objectives and instruments of macro-prudential policy (

text: ) (OJ C 170, 15.6.2013, p. 1).

text: See the Governing Council statement on macro-prudential policies of 15 December 2016 and paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: See paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

publisher: Europeiska centralbanken

sprak: en

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 7 June 2017 on macro-prudential measures to limit systemic risks (CON/2017/21)

serie: con

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 7 June 2017 on macro-prudential measures to limit systemic risks (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

type: rubrik

text: On 21 April 2017 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Austrian Ministry of Finance (MoF) for an opinion on a draft law regarding macro-prudential measures to limit systemic risks in real estate financing (hereinafter the ‘draft law’) . The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and on the third, fourth and sixth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft law relates to the Oesterreichische Nationalbank (OeNB), the collection of financial statistics and rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

type: stycke

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1. The purpose of the draft law is to create a legal basis for macro-prudential tools to counteract systemic risks arising from third-party financing of property in Austria. In this respect, the draft law enables the Austrian Financial Market Authority (FMA) to impose certain measures if increased systemic risks arising from real estate financing are identified. 1.2. The application of the macro-prudential measures by the FMA requires a recommendation from the Austrian Financial Market Stability Board (FMSB). Before taking the relevant measures, the FMA must establish the necessary evidence and conditions for systemic risks arising from third-party financing of property threatening financial market stability. For these purposes, the FMA has to obtain an expert opinion from the OeNB on the existence of the necessary evidence and conditions. The FMA also needs to obtain the MoF’s permission before issuing the relevant measures. Lastly, the FMA has to inform the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) about the

text: existence of the relevant systemic risks. 1.3. The FMA may take macro-prudential measures, by way of a regulation, setting limits for all or some credit institutions. For these purposes, the FMA may establish the following provisions:  upper limits for the ratio of the total credit obligations of a borrower resulting from third-party financing of property with respect to the relevant credit institution to the total market value of the property acting as security for the borrowing, less prior liens on the property (loan-tovalue ratio – LTV);  upper limits for the ratio of the total of a borrower’s repayment obligations to income in the case of natural persons, or to cashflow or another suitable financial indicator in the case of legal entities, within a particular period (debt-to-income ratio – DTI);  upper limits for the ratio of the total interest payments and repayments to service all of the borrower’s credit obligations falling due in a particular period to income in the case of natural persons, or to cashflow or another suitable financial indicator in the case of legal entities, within this period (debt service-to-income ratio – DSTI); in the case of interest-only loans, for calculation purposes a regular repayment is to be assumed, distributed equally over the term of the loan;  requirements on the maximum term of third-party financing of property (term restriction), subject to the proviso that the term restriction must be not less than ten years;  periods within which a specified proportion of the entire loan disbursed to the borrower must be repaid (i.e. a repayment requirement); and  provisions for the purposes of the national application of measures from other Member States and third countries that serve to limit systemic risks arising from third-party financing and are comparable to the national measures. 1.4. The FMA may restrict the material and geographical scope of the measures in particular to certain types of property use, the property location or the purposes of the property financing. The FMA may also: (a) determine different upper limits according to the type and amount of financing; (b) determine a proportion of new business relating to third-party financing of property by a credit institution that is excluded from the application of the measures (known as the new business exception); and (c) exclude third-party financing of property up to a specified maximum amount from the application of measures (known as the lower limit threshold). Furthermore, the FMA may determine specific calculation methods, in particular in respect of ratios, the new business exception and lower limit threshold, interest-only loans, foreign currency loans or loans with repayment vehicles. 1.5. A regulation issued by the FMA may apply for up to two years. Prior to the expiry of the measures, the FMA must evaluate them and, if the conditions for the application of the measures still exist, may extend the regulation by one year. 1.6. The draft law also amends the Law of 2004 on foreign exchange to provide that the relevant statistical reports submitted to the OeNB must be made in a standardised format and by electronic means only, subject to minimum requirements set by the OeNB. Under existing law, the OeNB does not have the power to require notifications relating to foreign currency statistics to be provided

text: in electronic form only. The processing of notifications in paper form is currently causing a considerable amount of additional effort which will be avoided by introducing this new requirement for electronic form.

text: 2. Observations

text: 2.1 The draft law entails a role for the OeNB to advise on the presence of the necessary evidence and conditions for systemic risks arising from third-party financing of property threatening financial market stability. The draft law provides for no additional tasks other than this advisory role in the field of macro-prudential oversight. Under the current legal framework, the OeNB already has a broad financial stability mandate to monitor all circumstances that may have an impact on safeguarding financial stability in Austria . This mandate includes reducing systemic and procyclical risk in Austria, in particular by analyzing the financial market facts relevant for maintaining financial stability and reducing systemic risk, identifying threats to financial stability, reporting observations and findings of a fundamental nature or of special significance to the FMSB and, on request, providing any factual clarifications and relevant documents that appear necessary, drafting opinions and proposing to the FMSB the adoption of recommendations and risk warnings to be submitted to the FMA. 2.2 The OeNB also assesses FMA’s implementation measures and presents its assessment to the FMSB. It is required to draw up and provide to the FMSB an annual financial stability report on the situation and the developments with regard to financial stability . In addition, the FMA may obtain expert opinions from the OeNB in relation to other macro-prudential measures provided for in the Law on banking, e.g. countercyclical capital buffers or systemic risk buffers. It follows that the provisions of the draft law that relate to the OeNB should be seen as falling within the same category of tasks as the other advisory tasks already discharged by the OeNB under its macroprudential and financial stability mandate. Therefore, for the purpose of assessment against the monetary financing prohibition, the ECB concludes that the draft law does not confer a new task upon the OeNB. 2.3 The ECB welcomes that recommendations made by the FMSB aiming at creating macro prudential tools that establish restrictions on the third-party financing of real estate will be implemented by amending the Law on banking . Imbalances in the residential immovable property sector that could result from overvaluation of residential property accompanied by excessive credit provision can have significant negative implications for financial stability and the real economy. Against this background, the core objectives of the draft law seem appropriate, namely to create instruments that enable the FMA to impose certain minimum standards upon lenders in connection with realestate financing, with a view to strengthening the resilience of the financial system and to counteracting the cyclical build-up of systemic risks, when deemed necessary. The objectives of the draft law are also in line with the principles set out in the ESRB’s Recommendation on

text: intermediate objectives and instruments of macro-prudential policy, in particular with regard to the objective to mitigate and prevent excessive credit growth and leverage . 2.4 From a financial stability perspective, the ECB welcomes the implementation of a legislative framework for borrower-based measures in all euro area countries . The measures contained in the draft law enabling the FMA to create macro-prudential tools to counteract potential risks to the stability of the national financial system seem appropriate to the extent that they aim at promoting responsible borrowing and lending, enforcing market discipline, reducing credit risk and increasing the transparency of credit institutions’ activities. The ECB understands that the draft law establishes a legal basis for imposing certain minimum standards upon lenders in connection with the granting of property loans. The different instruments envisaged by the draft law would allow the FMA to activate only one, all or a combination thereof of instruments depending on the circumstances threatening financial stability. This would enable the FMA to respond in a flexible and proportionate way to potential risks to financial stability. Nevertheless, a thorough quantitative impact assessment would be relevant to ascertain the effect and appropriateness of the draft law. Also, a regular review of the LTV, DTI and DSTI ratios would allot to take into account the implications of changes in macro-economic and financial conditions. The scope of exemptions from the draft law or from specific provisions thereof should be proportionate to the overall objective to curb excessive lending for the construction and purchase of property and prevent overindebtedness .

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 7 June 2017.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI

type: vagledning

utgivare: ecb


text: COM(2016) 723 final.

text: Se Diego Valiante, Harmonising Insolvency Laws in the Euro Area: rationale, stocktaking and challenges, Centre for European Policy Studies Special Report No 153, december 2016.

text: Se Internationella valutafonden (IMF), Orderly & Effective Insolvency Procedures: Key Issues, 1999, finns på IMF:s webbplats www.imf.org.

text: Finns på UNCITRAL:s webbplats www.uncitral.org.

text: Se Diego Valiante, Harmonising Insolvency Laws in the Euro Area, fotnot 2, s. 11–12, samt Gerard McCormack m.fl., Study on a new approach to business failure and insolvency, Comparative legal analysis of the Member States' relevant provisions and practices, Tender No JUST/2014/JCOO/PR/CIVI/0075, januari 2016, kapitel 5.2.

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 2014/59/EU av den 15 maj 2014

text: om inrättande av en ram för återhämtning och resolution av kreditinstitut och värdepappersföretag och om ändring av

text: rådets direktiv 82/891/EEG

text: och

text: och

text: samt Europaparlamentets och rådets förordningar

text: (EU) nr 1093/2010

text: och

text: (EU) nr 648/2012

text: (EUT L 173, 12.6.2014, s. 190).

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning (EU) nr 575/2013 av den 26 juni 2013

text: om tillsynskrav för kreditinstitut och värdepappersföretag och om ändring av förordning

text: (EU) nr 648/2012

text: (EUT L 176, 27.6.2013, s. 1).

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning (EU) nr 648/2012 av den 4 juli 2012

text: om OTC-derivat, centrala motparter och transaktionsregister (EUT L 201, 27.7.2012, s. 1).

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 98/26/EG av den 19 maj 1998

text: om slutgiltig avveckling i system för överföring av betalningar och värdepapper (EGT L 166, 11.6.1998, s. 45).

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 2002/47/EG av den 6 juni 2002

text: om ställande av finansiell säkerhet (EGT L 168, 27.6.2002, s. 43).

text: Se t.ex. definitionerna av avvecklingsförfarande, insolvensförfarande och resolutionsåtgärd i

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning (EU) 2015/848 av den 20 maj 2015

text: om insolvensförfaranden (EUT L 141, 5.6.2015, s. 19), direktiv

text: respektive

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 2001/24/EG av den 4 april 2001

text: om rekonstruktion och likvidation av kreditinstitut (EGT L 125, 5.5.2001, s. 15).

text: Spara sökresultat

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 2009/110/EG av den 16 september 2009

text: om rätten att starta och driva affärsverksamhet i institut för elektroniska pengar samt om tillsyn av sådan verksamhet, om ändring av direktiven

text: och

text: och om upphävande av direktiv

text: (EUT L 267, 10.10.2009, s. 7).

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv (EU) 2015/2366 av den 25 november 2015

text: om betaltjänster på den inre marknaden, om ändring av direktiven

text: och

text: samt förordning

text: (EU) nr 1093/2010

text: och om upphävande av direktiv

text: (EUT L 337, 23.12.2015, s. 35).

text: Se

text: artikel 7 i direktiv 2009/110/EG

text: och

text: artikel 10 i direktiv (EU) 2015/2366

text: Se

text: artikel 2.1 k

text: och

text: artikel 7 i direktiv 2002/47/EG

text: om hur regelverket hanterar erkännande av avtalsnettning.

text: Om gäldenären inte omfattas av någon av de kategorier som framgår av

text: artikel 1.2 a

text: – 1.2 d i direktiv

text: Se

text: artikel 1.3 i direktiv 2002/47/EG

text: avseende medlemsstaternas möjligheter att exkludera ställande av finansiell säkerhet för vissa motparter.

text: Se artiklarna

text: och

text: i förordning (EU) nr 575/2013.

sprak: sv

title: Europeiska centralbankens yttrande av den 7 juni 2017 om ett förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv om ramar för förebyggande omstrukturering, en andra chans och åtgärder för att göra förfaranden för omstrukturering, insolvens och skuldavskrivning effektivare och om ändring av direktiv 2012/30/EU (CON/2017/22)

text: Inledning och rättslig grund

text: Den 22 november 2016 antog Europeiska kommissionen ett förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv om ramar för förebyggande omstrukturering, en andra chans och åtgärder för att göra förfaranden för omstrukturering, insolvens och skuldavskrivning effektivare och om ändring av direktiv

text: (nedan kallad förslaget till direktiv). Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) anser att förslaget till direktiv faller inom dess behörighetsområde, men ECB har ej hörts om förslaget till direktiv. ECB utövar därför sin rätt enligt

text: artikel 127.4

text: andra meningen i fördraget om europeiska unionens funktionssätt att inom sitt behörighetsområde avge yttranden till behöriga institutioner inom unionen.

text: ECB:s behörighet att avge ett yttrande grundas på

text: artiklarna 127.4

text: andra meningen i fördraget eftersom förslaget till direktiv innehåller bestämmelser som faller inom ECB:s behörighetsområde, bl.a. Europeiska centralbankssystemets (ECBS) uppgift att medverka till att de behöriga myndigheterna smidigt kan genomföra sin politik när det gäller det finansiella systemets stabilitet enligt artikel 127.5 i fördraget samt de uppgifter som enligt artikel 127.6 i fördraget tilldelats ECB i samband med tillsynen över kreditinstitut. Dessutom påverkar förslaget till direktiv ECBS möjligheter att i enlighet med artikel 127.1 i fördraget stödja, utan att åsidosätta ECBS huvudmål att upprätthålla prisstabilitet, den allmänna ekonomiska politiken inom unionen. I enlighet med

text: artikel 17.5

text: första meningen i arbetsordningen för Europeiska centralbanken har detta yttrande antagits av ECB-rådet.

text: 1. Allmänna kommentarer

text: 1.1 ECB välkomnar att det huvudsakliga syfte med förslaget till direktiv är att minska de största hindren för den gränsöverskridande rörligheten för kapital som följer av skillnader i medlemsstaternas ramar för omstrukturering av företag. Förslaget till direktiv utgör ett viktigt steg på vägen mot att skapa en rättsligt bindande gemensam minimistandard i unionen, särskilt avseende förfaranden före likvidationsförfarandet för företag och omstrukturering av bolag.

text: 1.2 Trots att förslaget introducerar en rad mycket viktiga harmoniseringsåtgärder för befintliga regelverk för omstrukturering, tar det inte något helhetsgrepp för att harmonisera insolvenslagstiftningen i unionen som omfattar både omstrukturering och likvidation, och förslaget innehåller heller ingen harmonisering av det viktigaste aspekterna av insolvenslagstiftningen, t.ex. a) villkoren för att inleda insolvensförfaranden, bb) en gemensam definition av insolvens, c) förmånsrätten och d) talan om återvinning. ECB är fullt medveten om att det är mycket svårt ur både rättslig och praktisk synvinkel att ta ett sådant helhetsgrepp, pga. av de mycket omfattande ändringarna av både kommersiell, civilrättslig och bolagsrättslig lagstiftning som blir nödvändiga för att genomföra en sådant projekt, men anser ändå att mer ambitiösa åtgärder behövs för att lägga grunden till en mer omfattande harmonisering av medlemsstaternas insolvenslagstiftning för att säkerställa en mer omfattande harmonisering på lång sikt och bidra till en väl fungerande kapitalmarknadsunion.

text: 1.3 I de flesta rättssystem är de övergripande målen för insolvensförfaranden, inklusive omstruktureringar av företag, snarlika: a) en fördelning av risk mellan de olika deltagarna i en marknadsekonomi på ett förutsägbart, rättvist och transparent sätt, vilket inkluderar en balans mellan gäldenärens/borgenärens intressen, och b) ett skydda och maximera värde för alla berörda parter och hela ekonomin. Om man inte lyckas finna en balans mellan gäldenärens och borgenärens intressen i insolvensförfaranden kan detta få negativa och oavsiktliga följder. Väl utformade insolvensregler bör innefatta incitament för alla berörda parter och i rimlig omfattning beakta makro-finansiella aspekter. Förutsägbara insolvensförfaranden främjar även gränsöverskridande kapitalmarknadstransaktioner, medan oförutsägbara insolvensförfaranden, särskilt i gränsöverskridande sammanhang, utgör ett hinder på vägen mot ytterligare integrerade kapitalmarknader. När det gäller höga nivåer av nödlidande lån som för närvarande utgör ett problem för de europeiska bankernas balansräkningar, skulle förutsägbara och transparenta insolvensförfaranden kunna bidra till att det skapas marknader för nödlidande lån på unionsnivå, medan dessa marknader för närvarande bara är nationella marknader. Som ett minimum bör de övergripande målen för insolvensförfaranden i medlemsstaterna harmoniseras ytterligare, inklusive en gemensamt överenskommen balans mellan gäldenärers och borgenärers intressen.

text: 1.4 Företagen är beroende av avtal som kodifierar tilltron, minskar kostnader och osäkerhet samtidigt som de möjliggör nya projekt och utvecklingsmöjligheter. För att maximera värde för hela ekonomin bör ett effektivt regelverk för omstrukturering av icke-finansiella företag integreras i ett ekonomiskt och rättsligt sammanhang som gör det möjligt för företagen att omstrukturera sin verksamhet. Medan verksamheter som saknar framtidsutsikter snabbt bör likvideras för att maximera de återstående värdena och minska osäkerheten för borgenärerna och andra parter, bör verksamheter som kan överleva – vars tillgångar efter en omstrukturering har ett högre värde än i ett likvidationsscenario – kunna återgå till lönsam verksamhet för ägarna och återbetala borgenärerna samtidigt som man säkrar arbetstillfällen. I sådana fall bör ett företag räddas genom både informella och formella förfaranden. Vetskapen om att formella förfarande kan bli aktuella har tydliga implikationer för kostnaderna och incitamenten att nå en överenskommelse om en omstrukturering. Av detta följer att en mer effektiv lösning för omstrukturering som going concern kan öka gäldenärens värde och medföra en balans gentemot borgenärerna, särskilt sådana utan säkerhet. Rätten att påbörja en preventiv omstrukturering, att ta fram en omstruktureringsplan, möjligheten för borgenärerna att fatta beslut om planen med majoritetsbeslut och möjligheten att utse en förvaltare är element som kan bidra till att upprätthålla verksamhetens värde. Ett sådant tillvägagångssätt kan också stödja och främja finansiell stabilitet genom att skapa rätt incitament för gäldenärer och borgenärer. Gäldenärer med svårigheter uppmuntras att tidigt inleda en meningsfull dialog med borgenärerna, snarare än att räkna med anstånd, och verksamheter med goda framtidsutsikter kan ges möjligheter att genomföra en långsiktigt hållbar omstrukturering. Trots de begränsningar som uppskjutna verkställighetsåtgärder innebär för borgenärer att omedelbart göra sina rättigheter gällande, skulle borgenärer ändå dra nytta av minskade kostnader för att avveckla skulderna, tidigare och enklare tillgång till säkerheter, och därmed högre värde på säkerheterna, fördjupade marknader för nödlidande lån samt den signalverkan som ett sådant ramverk kan få för gäldenärers betalningsmoral.

text: 1.5 Utöver lagstiftningsåtgärder kan man även överväga en uppsättning anvisningar eller principer med bästa praxis för att den nationella insolvenslagstiftningen ska bli mer enhetlig på lång sikt. Om alla medlemsstater antar existerande erkända internationella standarder, t.ex. Förenta nationernas kommission för internationell handelsrätt (Uncitral) om gränsöverskridande insolvensfall, kan även detta leda till ökad harmonisering.

text: 1.6 Det finns också stora skillnader i den nationella lagstiftningen vad gäller definitionen av att inleda rekonstruktionsåtgärder. Förslaget innebär en unik möjlighet att anta en europeisk ordning som bygger på gemensamma grunder och en harmonisering av viktiga komponenter.

text: 1.7 Även om förslaget till direktiv inte omfattar förfaranden som rör gäldenärer som är kreditinstitut, värdepappersföretag och företag för kollektiva investeringar, centrala motparter och värdepapperscentraler, försäkringsföretag och återförsäkringsföretag samt andra finansinstitut och enheter som framgår av

text: artikel 1.1 i Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 2014/59/EU

text: , kan oväntade konsekvenser uppstå för dessa institutioner pga. de finansiella avtalens konsekvenser för deras kommersiella motparter (se t.ex. punkt 2.4 om verkställigheten av avtal om slutavräkning). Därutöver bör man noga överväga konsekvenserna och omfattningen av uppskjuten verkställighet, t.ex. huruvida uppskjuten verkställighet av enskilda verkställighetsåtgärder även omfattar tillgångar som gäldenären ställt som säkerhet för borgenärsfordringar, även utifrån frågan vilka konsekvenser detta kan få för de lagstadgade kapitalkraven, särskilt med beaktande av de kreditriskreducerande metoder som omnämns i

text: . I detta sammanhang är det viktigt att på ett nyanserat sätt granska de rättsliga relationerna mellan förslaget till direktiv och viktiga bestämmelser i unionens lagstiftning på finansområdet, bl.a. Europaparlamentets och rådets förordningar

text: (EU) nr 575/2013

text: , förordning

text: (EU) nr 648/2012

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 98/26/EG

text: samt direktiv

text: . Man bör särskilt granska eventuella oönskade konsekvenser.

text: 2. Specifika kommentarer

text: 2.1 En definition av insolvensförfaranden i unionslagstiftningen

text: Förslaget till direktiv bidrar till den existerande fragmenteringen avseende definitionen av relevanta förfaranden mellan olika unionsrättsakter, och innebär ett avsteg från förordning

text: (EU) 2015/848

text: , där alla insolvensförfaranden som omfattas framgår av bilagorna. Förslaget till direktiv bör sträva efter ökad harmonisering av denna definition, inte bidra till ökad konceptuell fragmentering.

text: 2.2 Sannolikhet för insolvens

text: Enligt förslaget till direktiv ska medlemsstaterna säkerställa att gäldenärer i ekonomiska svårigheter, om det råder sannolikhet för insolvens, har tillgång till en effektiv ram för förebyggande omstrukturering som ger dem möjlighet att omstrukturera sina skulder eller sin verksamhet, återupprätta sin livskraft och undvika insolvens. Detta koncept bör vidareutvecklas i förslaget till direktiv eftersom det är av avgörande betydelse för ramen för omstrukturering, och man bör inte helt överlåta detta åt medlemsstaterna. Man bör särskilt ge tydliga instruktioner till de nationella lagstiftarna om hur konceptet sannolikhet för insolvens ska tolkas. Istället för att inkludera sådana instruktioner i förslaget till direktiv skulle man även kunna använda sig av tekniska standarder för tillsyn som antas av kommissionen genom delegerade befogenheter.

text: 2.3 Behovet av en tydlig hierarki mellan förslaget till direktiv och andra unionsrättsakter som påverkar finansmarknadernas stabilitet och en bedömning av dess effekt för ytterligare unionslagstiftning

text: Enligt artikel 31 i förslaget till direktiv påverkar förslaget inte tillämpningen av direktiven

text: och

text: samt förordning

text: (EU) nr 648/2012

text: . Därutöver framgår det av skäl 43 att finansmarknadernas stabilitet i hög grad är beroende av avtal om finansiell säkerhet, särskilt när säkerhet tillhandahålls i samband med deltagande i utsedda system eller i centralbankstransaktioner och när marginalsäkerheter tillhandhålls till centrala motparter. Skäl 43 noterar dessutom att eftersom värdet på de finansiella instrument som ställs som säkerhet kan fluktuera mycket, är det viktigt att realisera deras värde snabbt innan det går ner.

text: För att ge medlemsstaterna en hög rättssäkerhet och tydliga anvisningar vore det fördelaktigt om man etablerade en tydlig hierarki mellan förslaget till direktiv och de andra angivna unionsrättsakterna, genom att uttryckligen i

text: artikel 31

text: ange att bestämmelserna i de rättsakterna ska ges företräde före förslaget till direktiv.

text: Därutöver bör man förtydliga i vilken utsträckning som enheter reglerade genom

text: och

text: , dvs. betalningsinstitut och institut för elektroniska pengar, får utnyttja ramarna för förebyggande omstrukturering enligt förslaget till direktiv. Dessa enheter ska skydda medel som de tar emot från innehavare av elektroniska pengar eller användare av betaltjänster genom att hålla isär dem från andra medel som institutet tar emot för annan affärsverksamhet. Detta har särskild betydelse vid insolvens. Varken betalningsinstitut och institut för elektroniska pengar är uttryckligen undantagna från förslaget till direktiv. Följaktligen bör de konsekvenser som uppskjuten verkställighet kan få för betalningsinstitut och institut för elektroniska pengar som omfattas av förslaget till direktiv granskas och förtydligas, eventuellt genom ett ytterligare skäl eller genom att lägga till punkter i förteckningen över undantag i artikel 31 i förslaget till direktiv.

text: 2.4 Verkställigheten av avtal om slutavräkning

text: Man bör förtydliga i vilken utsträckning förslaget till direktiv, inbegripet uppskjutna verkställighetsåtgärder, bör tillämpas utan att det påverkar verkställigheten av avtal om slutavräkning mellan å ena sidan kredit- och finansinstitut, och gäldenärsföretag å den andra. Förebyggande omstruktureringsförfaranden i den mening som avses i förslaget till direktiv skulle omfattas av definitionen av rekonstruktionsåtgärder i direktiv

text: enligt vilken medlemsstaterna ska säkerställa att en bestämmelse om slutavräkning inom ramen för ett finansiellt säkerhetsställande kan få verkan i enlighet med dess villkor utan hinder av inledda eller pågående rekonstruktionsförfaranden. Många nationella lagar accepteras en mer vittgående verkställbarhet av avtal om slutavräkning, som går utöver själva avtalet om finansiell säkerhet, utan hinder av att rekonstruktionsåtgärder inletts. Å andra sidan får medlemsstaterna från tillämpningsområdet för direktiv

text: undanta avtal om finansiell säkerhet om en av parterna är en vanlig företagsgäldenär. Detta skulle försvåra verkställigheten av avtal om slutavräkning med sådana vanliga gäldenärsföretag som motparter. Det kan även få praktiska konsekvenser för kreditinstitut och finansiella institut vad gäller deras möjligheter att uppfylla villkoren för att ett nettningsavtal ska accepteras som en godtagbar form av kreditriskreducerande åtgärder enligt förordning

text: (EU) nr 575/2013

text: . Innan en ram för förebyggande omstrukturering införs på unionsnivå måste dessa frågor diskuteras ingående.

text: I de fall där ECB rekommenderar att förslaget till direktiv ändras anges de specifika förslagen i ett separat tekniskt arbetsdokument som åtföljs av en förklaring. Det tekniska arbetsdokumentet finns på engelska på ECB:s webbplats.


text: Council Decision of 29 June 1998 on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).

text: See section entitled ‘Comments on the articles’ in the explanatory memorandum, pp. 10-12.

text: See Opinion

text: and paragraph 5.1 of Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: Explanatory memorandum, pp. 9 and 10.

text: Regulation (EU) No 909/2014

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on improving securities settlement in the European Union and on central securities depositories and amending Directives

text: and

text: and

text: Regulation (EU) No 236/2012

text: (OJ L 257, 28.8.2014, p. 1).

text: Explanatory memorandum, pp. 38-44.

text: Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on deposit guarantee schemes (OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 149).

text: Explanatory memorandum, pp. 29-38.

text: See paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 3.1 of Opinion

text: and paragraphs 3.1 and 3.2 of Opinion

text: See paragraph 3.1 of Opinion

text: . 12 See the Financial Stability Board’s (FSB’s) ‘Principles on Loss-absorbing and Recapitalisation Capacity of G-SIBs in Resolution: Total Loss-absorbing Capacity (TLAC) Term Sheet’, 9 November 2015, available on the FSB’s website at www.fsb.org. 13 See Opinion

text: . 14 See paragraphs 1.4 and 2.3.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 3.1.2 of Opinion

text: , and paragraph 3.7.1 of Opinion

text: . 15 Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending

text: Council Directive 82/891/EEC

text: , and Directives

text: and

text: , and Regulations

text: (EU) No 1093/2010

text: and

text: (EU) No 648/2012

text: , of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 190). 16 See paragraph 2.3.1 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 3.1.3 of Opinion

text: See Article 91 of the Italian Banking Law (Legislative Decree no. 385 of 1 September 1993); Article 207 of the Slovenian Law on the resolution and winding-up of banks (OJ No. 44/2016); and

text: Article 145

text: A of the Greek Banking Law (Law 4261/2014). 19 Guideline

text: (EU) 2015/510

text: of the ECB of 19 December 2014 on the implementation of the Eurosystem monetary policy framework (ECB/2014/60) (OJ L 91, 2.4.2015, p. 3). 20 See paragraph 2.5 of Opinion

text: and, in particular, paragraph 3.3 of Opinion

text: See Opinion

text: , especially paragraph 5.1.

text: See paragraphs 1.1, 1.3, 2.3 and 2.4 of Opinion

text: . 24 See paragraph 2.4 of Opinion

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 8 June 2017 on a new category of debt instruments, new macroprudential tool, the creation of a new category of settlement institution and the exclusion of set-off rights (CON/2017/23)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 8 June 2017 on a new category of debt instruments, new macroprudential tool, the creation of a new category of settlement institution and the exclusion of set-off rights (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 3 April 2017, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Governor of the Nationale Bank van België/Banque Nationale de Belgique (NBB), on behalf of the Minister of Finance, for an opinion on a draft law on various financial and tax provisions (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the third, fourth, fifth and sixth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , since the draft law concerns the NBB, the collection of balance of payments statistics, payment and settlement systems as well as rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The draft law amends various provisions contained in (a) the Law of 22 February 1998 establishing the Organic Statute of the Nationale Bank van België/Banque Nationale de Belgique (hereinafter the ‘NBB Organic Law’); (b) the Royal Decrees of 14 November 2008 and 22 April 2012 implementing the NBB Organic Law as regards the establishment of the guarantee fund for financial services; (c) the Law of 28 February 2002 organising the establishment of the balance of payments (hereinafter the ‘Law of 28 February 2002’); and (d) the Law of 25 April 2014 on the status and supervision of credit institutions and brokerage firms (hereinafter the ‘Banking Law’). 1.2 The draft law amends the NBB Organic Law in order to specify that the set-off that might result in the extinguishment of all or part of the claims pledged to the NBB or enforced by the NBB may not be asserted against the NBB or any other third-party purchasers of the said claims. According to the explanatory memorandum accompanying the draft law , under the current text of Article 7 of the NBB Organic Law a third party purchasing such a credit claim does not benefit from the exclusion of set-off rights. This implies that the debtor of pledged claims is able to assert a right of

text: set-off against a third-party purchaser of the claims in the same way that it can assert a right of setoff against its creditor. This situation lowers the sale value of the credit claims involved and could expose the NBB to potential losses, as it may incur liability towards the third-party purchaser. To neutralise this risk, the draft law proposes to expand the scope of the exclusion of set-off rights, which would therefore also benefit a third-party purchaser of the credit claim, in line with recent legislative amendments passed in France and Italy. However, the draft law does not extend the protection provided by this provision to the ECB and to other national central banks (NCBs) of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) . 1.3 The draft law also amends the NBB Organic Law to clarify that the NBB’s decisions relating to its task of contributing to the stability of the financial system may not be suspended or opposed by the Minister of Finance. 1.4 The draft law establishes a new category of institutions which may, in addition to the provision of custody, account maintenance and financial instrument settlement services, also carry out settlement-related non-banking services as well as certain specified activities. According to the explanatory memorandum , the low risk profile of these credit institutions, whose business model consists mainly of holding financial instruments on their customers’ behalf, calls for a prudential supervisory approach specific to their risk profile. These credit institutions will accordingly be treated similarly to settlement institutions as far as prudential supervisory rules are concerned, without becoming fully fledged settlement institutions governed by

text: Regulation (EU) No 909/2014

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council . 1.5 The draft law also empowers the NBB, when acting in its capacity as macroprudential supervisor, to impose on credit institutions and brokerage firms minimum funding requirements consisting of (a) Common Equity Tier 1 or additional Tier 1 or Tier 2 capital; (b) subordinated debt; (c) the debt instruments belonging to the new category of senior non-preferred debt (see paragraph 1.8 below); and (d) any liabilities that may be subject to bail-in. According to the explanatory memorandum , this provision aims at strengthening the arsenal of macroprudential tools available to the NBB, which will be empowered to impose additional requirements, either on a single institution (at individual or consolidated level) or a category of institutions, to hold additional amounts of own funds and debt eligible for bail-in. According to the explanatory memorandum, this will, in particular, empower the NBB to take appropriate action with respect to small credit institutions, in accordance with the principle of proportionality. 1.6 The draft law also amends the Royal Decrees of 14 November 2008 and 22 April 2012 relating to the guarantee fund for financial services. In line with Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council , the draft law introduces the concept of covered deposits, instead of

text: eligible deposits, and adapts the ratio of individual contributions payable by credit institutions and brokerage firms upwards, so as to maintain the same level of overall contribution to the fund. 1.7 The draft law also amends the Law of 28 February 2002 to empower the NBB to impose new penalty payments on reporting institutions that fail to provide the information necessary for the establishment of balance of payments statistics. Currently, if reporting institutions fail to meet their obligations under the Law of 28 February 2002, the NBB may take a series of measures in order to obtain the information necessary for the establishment of balance of payments statistics that reporting institutions fail to share voluntarily. These include, inter alia, consulting the relevant documents onsite, interviewing members of the reporting institution and drawing up a report on the failure to comply. In respect of the consultation of documents onsite, the NBB may, following authorisation by a judge, without the permission of the reporting agent, have access to the buildings where such documents are kept. According to the explanatory memorandum, the existing mechanisms have proved cumbersome and inadequate. This explains why the Belgian legislator seeks to impose penalty payments, which are administrative measures expected to be efficient and straightforward as they will accumulate as long as the reporting institution has not complied with its obligations. A Royal Decree will determine the procedural safeguards to be complied with by the NBB when imposing such penalty payments. 1.8 Finally, the draft law amends the Banking Law to introduce a new category of unsecured creditors which, in the order of priority of creditors with competing claims over the assets of a credit institution or investment firm that is the subject of liquidation proceedings, will rank below ordinary unsecured creditors but above creditors holding subordinated debt. In order to belong to this new category, the debt instruments held must (a) incorporate a monetary claim against the credit institution or investment firm, the principal and interest of which are not contingent on the occurrence of an event that is uncertain at the time of issue (while floating-rate debt instruments are not affected by this restriction); (b) have a maturity of not less than one year; (c) be subscribed and/or held by professional investors; and (d) be subject to rules governing their issuance to the effect that the claim will rank below other unsecured creditors in accordance with the abovedescribed new provision. According to the explanatory memorandum , the purpose of this amendment, which is inspired by recent similar amendments in France on which the ECB was consulted , is to facilitate the implementation of bail-in measures with respect to credit institutions, as the debt instruments falling within the ambit of this new category will be easily identifiable. Furthermore, loss-absorption by such debt instruments will mitigate possible contagion risks and adhere to the principle that no creditor should be worse off in resolution than in insolvency, as this particular ranking will also apply in the context of liquidation proceedings.

text: 2. Preliminary comment

text: This opinion does not address the issue of whether the draft law effectively implements Directive

text: in Belgian law. The focus of this opinion is on the various provisions of the draft law

text: relating to (a) the creation of a new category of senior non-preferred debt instruments in the insolvency hierarchy of credit institutions; (b) the introduction of new macroprudential tools; (c) the creation of a new category of settlement institution; (d) the exclusion of set-off rights with respect to credit claims pledged to the NBB; (e) the introduction of new penalty payments in the context of balance of payments statistics; and (f) the independence of the NBB’s decision-making bodies with regard to financial stability matters.

text: 3. A new category of senior debt instruments in the insolvency hierarchy of credit institutions

text: 3.1 A new category of senior debt instruments 3.1.1 The ECB welcomes the provisions in the draft law for the creation of a new asset class of ‘nonpreferred’ senior debt instruments, which are senior debt instruments with a lower rank than ordinary senior unsecured claims in liquidation proceedings . This lower rank is proposed to be achieved by establishing a statutory framework that recognises the contractual subordination arrangements contained in the rules governing the issue of such ‘non-preferred’ senior debt instruments by credit institutions and investment firms, where such debt instruments will rank before subordinated debt instruments but after other senior liabilities, including senior debt instruments and deposits, in liquidation proceedings. 3.1.2 Where the draft law requires that the principal and interest of such ‘non-preferred’ senior debt instruments are not contingent on the occurrence of an event that is uncertain at the time of issue, except as it relates to interest and can be calculated at any time according to a formula set out in the rules governing the issue of the debt instrument, some additional guidance to market participants in the form of an NBB regulation or a Royal Decree may be useful in order to enhance legal certainty. 3.2 Effect on the loss-absorbing capacity of an institution in resolution 3.2.1 Changing the statutory creditor hierarchy in bank insolvency proceedings is expected to enhance the loss-absorbing capacity of credit institutions in resolution, to the extent that they issue debt instruments belonging to this new category of ‘non-preferred’ senior debt instruments. The resolution authority may allocate losses in resolution to ‘non-preferred’ senior debt instruments prior to other senior liabilities, which will include operational liabilities such as corporate deposits and certain claims under derivative transactions. Imposing losses on ‘non-preferred’ senior debt instruments is regarded as carrying a lower contagion risk than that posed by operational liabilities, and will likely be more effective and appear more credible to market participants. The clear distinction in the insolvency ranking on a statutory basis created by the category of ‘non-preferred’ senior debt instruments will increase legal certainty regarding the ability of such debt instruments to absorb losses and, hence, help to minimise the risk of compensation claims under the principle that no creditor should be worse off in resolution than in insolvency. The presence of a layer of new ‘non-preferred’ senior debt instruments has the potential, depending on how substantial this layer is in a given institution, to foster effective resolution action and reduce the need for recourse to the

text: resolution fund. This is in turn expected to promote adequate pricing of risk for investors. The statutory recognition of contractual subordination is therefore expected to improve the resolvability of credit institutions under the Union resolution regime and enhance market discipline . 3.2.2 In addition, the establishment of a statutory basis for the issuance of ‘non-preferred’ senior debt instruments, which include contractual subordination arrangements, may facilitate the application of MREL and TLAC requirements concerning the loss-absorption and recapitalisation capacity of credit institutions and investment firms . As such, the draft law provides an additional means for credit institutions to comply with these requirements and improve their resolvability, without constraining their respective funding strategies. However, the draft law will not change the ranking of senior debt instruments that have already been issued, and requires newly issued debt instruments to contain an explicit contractual clause in order to be subordinated. 3.3 Reform initiatives currently underway at Union level The ECB notes that a proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on amending Directive

text: as regards the ranking of unsecured debt instruments in insolvency hierarchy is currently under discussion , and reiterates its position that a common framework at Union level on the hierarchy of creditors, including as regards the subordination of debt instruments and other similar financial instruments in bank resolution and/or insolvency proceedings, may help to advance the integration of the financial services markets within the Union and facilitate the tasks of the ECB with regard both to monetary policy and supervision within the Single Supervisory Mechanism. 3.4 General depositor preference 3.4.1 The ECB considers that additional reforms would be useful to enhance the resolvability of credit institutions and to promote further harmonisation in the hierarchy of creditor claims in bank insolvency. In particular, a general depositor preference rule, based on a tiered approach, would enhance resolvability by clarifying the hierarchy of creditor claims and facilitating the allocation of losses to unsecured bank debt instruments ahead of certain operational liabilities, while alleviating concerns regarding the principle that no creditor should be worse off in resolution than in insolvency . This would be complementary to the proposals set out in the draft law. It is worth noting that Member States are not precluded under Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council from establishing general depositor preference rules in national 16 17 law , and recently a number of Member States have done so .

text: 3.4.2 A general depositor preference, based on a tiered approach, could be achieved by introducing in national law another priority ranking for other deposits, such as large corporate deposits, deposits by credit institutions, collective investment undertakings, pension funds etc. Such deposits would rank below the higher priority ranking for deposits up to the EUR 100,000 coverage level, which are guaranteed by the deposit guarantee scheme, and the preference for certain eligible deposits held by natural persons or micro, small or medium-sized enterprises, but ahead of other senior liabilities . 3.5 Restriction to professional investors and resolvability The draft law stipulates that the new ‘non-preferred’ senior debt instruments may only be subscribed and/or held by professional investors, in accordance with the documentation rules governing the issuance of debt instruments. Given that the rationale for such a requirement is based on investor protection considerations and the desire to enhance resolvability, consideration should be given to addressing the issue in the context of the prospectus regime. The ECB notes that clear and easily understandable disclosure requirements and other safeguards that raise investors’ awareness as to the risks associated with such instruments would be an alternative to restricting the investor base to professional investors. In the same vein, consideration could be given to requiring a minimum denomination per unit of each instrument of at least EUR 100,000, which would increase the investment hurdle and thus also the awareness of investors, thereby limiting direct retail investment. An impact study could be useful in this context to inform the policy decision taken. A common framework at Union level and a coordinated approach among Union and Member State authorities should be pursued on these issues. This would avoid different approaches being taken across Member States, and thus fragmentation within the Union market for these instruments. Finally, the ECB notes that the abovementioned rationale also applies with respect to retail investment in subordinated debt instruments, which will normally be subject to bailin before the new ‘non-preferred’ senior class. 3.6 Effect on the eligibility of debt instruments as collateral for Eurosystem credit operations The ECB notes the potential implications of subordinating senior debt instruments to other debt instruments of the same issuer with respect to the eligibility of the former as collateral for Eurosystem credit operations. Guideline

text: (EU) 2015/510

text: of the European Central Bank (ECB/2014/60) sets out a single framework that applies in the Eurosystem to assets that may be submitted as eligible collateral for such operations. In order to be eligible as collateral, marketable assets must be debt instruments that fulfil the eligibility criteria laid down in Guideline

text: (EU) 2015/510

text: (ECB/2014/60). Pursuant to Article 64 of the Guideline, ‘eligible debt instruments shall not give rise to rights to the principal and/or the interest that are subordinated to the rights of holders of other debt instruments of the same issuer’ .

text: 4. New macroprudential tool

text: When applied to significant institutions, the proposed macroprudential tool to impose minimum funding requirements, including capital requirements, may interact with the ECB’s supervisory powers. In this context, due care should be given to avoid doublecounting of risks. Furthermore, this new tool risks increasing the complexity of the institutional framework, blurring the division of responsibilities for setting adequate levels of capital requirements and loss absorption and recapitalisation capacity for individual credit institutions. It also risks further complicating the interplay of different prudential requirements.

text: 5. A new category of credit institutions equivalent to settlement institutions

text: The ECB understands that the establishment of a new category of institutions, whose business activity consists chiefly in the holding of financial instruments on their customers’ behalf, is necessary as the current prudential framework applicable to institutions with such a business model does not address the specific risks stemming from such activity. The ECB therefore welcomes the extension of measures to mitigate such risks through the introduction of this new category of institutions, to which the NBB may apply supervisory tools akin to those applied to international and domestic central securities depositories.

text: 6. Exclusion of set-off rights with regard to credit claims pledged to the NBB

text: 6.1 In line with its previous opinions regarding similar legal changes introduced under French and Italian law, the ECB welcomes the extension of the prohibition of set-off to the debtor of a credit claim pledged to the NBB in relation to the third party acquirer of such credit claim. With this change, the Belgian legislator protects the NBB against any potential loss arising from the acceptance of credit claims, thereby strengthening the requirement laid down in the second indent of Article 18.1 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, pursuant to which lending by ESCB central banks must be based on adequate collateral. In addition, adequately addressing set-off risks also facilitates the continued eligibility of credit claims as eligible collateral in Eurosystem credit operations, and thereby contributes to the efficiency of the transmission of monetary policy to the real economy. 6.2 The ECB notes, however, that the prohibition of set-off by the debtor will only apply in its relationship towards a third party acquirer and the NBB, but not in respect of any other central bank of the ESCB. As a consequence thereof, another central bank of the ESCB, when acting as Correspondent Central Bank (“CCB”) in the context of Correspondent Central Banking Model (“CCBM”) under the laws of the Member State of that CCB on behalf of the home NCB (here NBB), as well as any other third party purchaser – would not be protected against set-off that may hence be applied by the debtor of such claim. The ECB understands that this approach currently does not give rise to legal risks in view of three elements. First, credit claims in Belgium are currently only

text: mobilised as collateral in Eurosystem operations with the NBB. Second, Article 6 of the Law of 3 August 2012 on various measures intended to facilitate the mobilisation of credit claims in the financial sector (hereinafter the ‘Law of 3 August 2012’) ensures that set-off may not be opposed after notification of recognition of the transfer of the credit claim. Third, Article 6 of the Law of 3 August 2012 ensures that set-off may not be opposed after the insolvency of the creditor of the transferred claims. Nevertheless, the Belgian legislator is encouraged to consider expanding the additional protection afforded to the NBB under the draft law to all other ESCB central banks, in order to support the growing use of credit claims at cross-border level in the future. In some Member States the relevant statutory provisions, similarly to the draft law, only exclude set-off rights for credit claims mobilised as collateral for operations with the NCB of that particular Member State. However, other Member States also have statutory provisions that provide protection not only for their own NCBs but also for the ECB and other ESCB NCBs . The latter solution is preferable, as it offers a higher degree of financial protection to ESCB NCBs and promotes financial integration by facilitating cross-border mobilisation of credit claims.

text: 7. Penalties imposed by the NBB in the context of the balance of payments

text: The ECB welcomes the draft law, insofar as it endows the NBB with the power to impose penalty payments on institutions that fail to comply with reporting requirements necessary in order to ensure the accuracy of balance of payments statistics.

text: 8. Decisions made by the NBB with regards to financial stability

text: The ECB welcomes the change introduced by the draft to Article 22 of the NBB Organic Law to the effect that the Minister of Finance may not suspend or oppose any decision made by the NBB with regard to financial stability, which the ECB had previously recommended .

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 8 June 2017.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).

text: Pursuant to Article 1 of the Court of Audit Act, the Court of Audit is the supreme audit institution for supervising State accounts, the State budget and all public spending in Slovenia. In relation to other State authorities, the Court of Audit is an autonomous and independent authority.

text: The draft law provides for the introduction of these rules by adding a new article to the Bank of Slovenia Act (Ur. l. RS No 72/06 – official consolidated text and 59/11).

text: Court of Auditors Act (Ur. l. RS No 11/01 and 109/12).

text: Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013

text: conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 5). 6 In particular, the draft law states that ‘the audit does not cover the application and interpretation of supervisory law and practices carried out by Banka Slovenije on the basis of the Bank of Slovenia Act or other provisions and within the framework of the single supervisory mechanism (SSM) on the basis of

text: Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013

text: . Notwithstanding the previous sentence the Court of Audit may audit the regularity and performance of those decisions of Banka Slovenije, which have led to the use of public funds.’ 7 Banking Act (Ur. l. RS No 25/15, 44/16 – ZRPPB and 77/16 – ZCKR). Article 14 of the Banking Act defines confidential information as any information obtained from banks or other persons in supervisory proceedings before Banka Slovenije or prepared by Banka Slovenije in the context of such proceedings.

text: Public Information Access Act (Ur. l. RS No 51/06 – official consolidated text, 117/06 – ZDavP-2, 23/14, 50/14, 19/15 – CC dec. and 102/15). 9 See Opinions

text: and

text: . All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu . 10 See the Government's proposal for an Act amending the Bank of Slovenia Act from 20 April 2017 (EVA 2016-1611- 0054). 11 See paragraphs 2.4 and 2.5 of Opinion

text: See paragraph 3.2.2 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 3.1.2 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 3.2 of Opinion

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 12 June 2017 on the auditing of Banka Slovenije’s business operations (CON/2017/24)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 12 June 2017 on the auditing of Banka Slovenije’s business operations (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 11 May 2017, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the President of the National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia for an opinion on a draft law amending the Bank of Slovenia Act and establishing rules for the auditing of Banka Slovenije’s operations by the national Court of Audit (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: as the draft law relates to Banka Slovenije. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 Banka Slovenije’s financial accounts must be audited pursuant to Article 27.1 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter the ‘Statute of the ESCB’). The purpose of the draft law is to establish rules for the auditing of Banka Slovenije’s operations by the national Court of Audit in a manner compatible with Banka Slovenije’s independence . 1.2 Under the draft law, the Court of Audit must audit the regularity and performance of Banka Slovenije’s business operations. Pursuant to Article 20(3) of the Court of Audit Act , the following terms have the following meanings: (a) a ‘regularity audit’ means obtaining relevant and sufficient data to enable an opinion to be expressed on the compliance of an operation with regulations and guidelines that any user of public funds is required to observe when conducting an operation; and

text: (b) a ‘performance audit’ means obtaining relevant and sufficient data to enable an opinion to be expressed on the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of a business operation. 1.3 The draft law expressly states that the Court of Audit must not audit: (a) any actions that constitute decisions on the implementation of monetary policy, in accordance with the rules established by the ECB’s decision-making bodies; and (b) the application and interpretation of supervisory law and practices carried out by Banka Slovenije on the basis of the Bank of Slovenia Act or other provisions within the framework of the single supervisory mechanism (SSM) . However, the draft law seems to limit this exclusion by stating that the Court of Audit may audit the regularity and performance of any Banka Slovenije decisions that have led to the use of public funds . The ECB understands that under the draft law the audit must not interfere with or encompass Banka Slovenije’s competences as part of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), the Eurosystem, the European System of Financial Supervision, the European Banking Authority, the European Systemic Risk Board, and the Single Resolution Mechanism. Nor must it entail a direct or indirect audit of the ECB, other members of the ESCB, or the Eurosystem. 1.4 The draft law provides that, notwithstanding the provisions of the Court of Audit Act, Banka Slovenije is not obliged to submit to the Court of Audit reports concerning the elimination of any irregularities and inexpediencies identified. The draft law further specifies that Banka Slovenije must explain any deviation from the recommendations proposed by the Court of Audit in its audit report. 1.5 The draft law provides that confidential information, within the meaning of Article 37 of the Statute of the ESCB, may be obtained by the Court of Audit in accordance with the rules governing the operations of the ESCB. It provides further that other confidential information, including statistical and supervisory data, whose exchange is regulated by Union rules, may be obtained by the Court of Audit in accordance with these rules. The draft law also stipulates that the auditors and officers of the Court of Audit and other persons who are in any legal relationship whatsoever with the Court of Audit must maintain the confidentiality of all information that they become aware of when auditing Banka Slovenije and which is regarded as confidential pursuant to the Banking Act .

text: 1.6 If information is requested from the Court of Audit pursuant to the Public Information Access Act , the Court of Audit may only disclose such information under the conditions governing the disclosure of information applicable to Banka Slovenije. 1.7 The draft law also introduces a new provision that was not present in its original versions, on which the ECB was consulted in 2016 , which establishes that an audit may include any actions of Banka Slovenije in the ten-year period prior to the entry into force of the draft law. The explanatory memorandum accompanying the draft law states that this provision will enable the Court of Audit to audit previous decisions of Banka Slovenije, including decisions taken in 2013 and 2014 regarding the recovery of banks .

text: 2. Observations

text: 2.1 The ECB notes that it has been consulted by the Slovenian authorities and issued opinions on previous versions of the draft law on two occasions. The ECB reiterates the views expressed in Opinions

text: and

text: and has the following additional comments to make in relation to the draft law. 2.2 The second indent of the proposed new paragraph 2 of

text: Article 52

text: .a of the Law on Banka Slovenije includes Banka Slovenije’s tasks within the SSM within the scope of the audit carried out by the Court of Audit, extending to any supervisory decisions of Banka Slovenije that have led to the use of public funds and to actions that have taken place during the last ten years. In this respect, the draft law is not in line with the independence requirement laid down in

text: Article 19 of Regulation (EU) 1024/2013

text: , which states that when acting within the SSM the national competent authorities must act independently and that the governments of the Member States and any other bodies must respect that independence. In line with this independence requirement, audits of Banka Slovenije’s supervisory activities should (a) not extend to the application and interpretation of supervisory law and practices in the context of the SSM, and (b) not interfere with and not include the tasks conferred on the ECB by

text: Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013

text: . 2.3 In addition, pursuant to Article 2 of the Law on Banka Slovenije, Banka Slovenije’s independence should be respected not only when it performs ESCB-related tasks, but also when it performs national tasks. 2.4 The draft law establishes a legal basis for auditing Banka Slovenije’s actions that have taken place during the last ten years, and as such may be seen as potentially having a retroactive character. As

text: previously noted by the ECB , introducing measures with retroactive effect could in principle undermine legal certainty and might not be in line with the principle of legitimate expectations. The prohibition against the retroactive effect of legal acts derived from the principle of legal certainty is also protected by EU legal principles. The principle of legal certainty is not absolute and would allow for limited and well defined exemptions where the purpose to be achieved so demands and the legitimate expectations of those concerned are duly respected. In this respect, the ECB questions whether a provision allowing for auditing Banka Slovenije’s actions that have taken place during the last ten years is compatible with the principle of legal certainty.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 12 June 2017

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: th The draft law amends the IMBISA’s interim ownership model, which was established by the 95 Additional Provision of Law 36/2014, on which the ECB has previously opined , and pursuant to which the Spanish Royal Mint is legally obliged to divest its ownership interest of up to 20 % in IMBISA by 31 December 2017. The effect of the amendment is that, instead of divesting its ownership interest by 31 December 2017, the Mint may now hold its ownership interest for as long as IMBISA carries out its euro banknote production on the Mint’s premises. The ECB understands that once IMBISA’s new facilities have been built and are operational, production on the Mint’s premises will cease and the ownership interest will be divested within the six-month period established by the draft law. However, extending the period for which the Mint may hold its stake does not affect the Banco de España’s decisive influence

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42). 2 See ECB Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu .

text: See Article 3 of IMBISA’s by-laws, which can be consulted at http://www.imbisa.es/transparencia/. 4 See Title III of IMBISA’s by-laws. 5 Guideline

text: (EU) 2015/280

text: of the European Central Bank of 13 November 2014 on the establishment of the Eurosystem Production and Procurement System (ECB/2014/44) (OJ L 47, 20.2.2015, p. 29).

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 16 June 2017 on the ownership of a special purpose entity for manufacturing euro banknotes (CON/2017/25)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 16 June 2017 on the ownership of a special purpose entity for manufacturing euro banknotes (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 18 May 2017 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Banco de España, on th behalf of the Spanish Sub-secretary for Finance and the Civil Service, on the 25 Final Provision of the draft law on the State budget for 2017 (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third indent of

text: , as the draft law relates to the Banco de España. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: The draft law provides that the Fábrica Nacional de Moneda y Timbre - Real casa de la Moneda (hereinafter the ‘Spanish Royal Mint’ or the ‘Mint’) may hold an ownership interest of up to 20 % in the special-purpose entity established in 2015 for the production of banknotes, Imprenta de Billetes, S.A. (hereinafter ‘IMBISA’), for as long as IMBISA carries out its euro banknote production on the Spanish Royal Mint’s premises. Once IMBISA’s activities on the Mint’s premises come to an end, the Mint is required to transfer its shares in IMBISA to the Banco de España within a period of six months.

text: 2. Consideration of IMBISA as an in-house printing works of the Banco de España

text: over IMBISA’s strategic objectives and significant decisions. Pursuant to IMBISA’s by-laws, the exclusive social purpose of the company is to produce and print euro banknotes at the Banco de España’s request, and the company is described as an instrument and technical service of the Banco de España . IMBISA’s governance arrangements also reflect the distribution of ownership, and do not grant power to the Mint to negatively impact the control exercised by the Banco de España . In particular, the Mint does not have any blocking minority or veto rights. On the basis of these facts, it appears that the Banco de España exercises sole control over the company, and that IMBISA may be considered to be an in-house printing work of the Banco de España pursuant to Article 1(2) of Guideline

text: (EU) 2015/280

text: (ECB/2014/44) of the European Central Bank .

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 16 June 2017.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI