text: Supplementary document to ED Decision 2013/021/R

text: Regulation (EC) No 216/2008

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 February 2008 on common rules in the field of civil aviation and establishing a European Aviation Safety Agency, and repealing

text: Council Directive 91/670/EEC

text: Regulation (EC) No 1592/2002

text: and Directive

text: (OJ L 79, 19.3.2008, p. 1). Regulation as last amended by

text: Regulation (EC) No 1108/2009

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 (OJ L 309, 24.11.2009, p. 51).

text: http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/33/CAP%20789.pdf. http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/33/CAPAP2003_04.PDF.

text: Supplementary document to ED Decision 2013/021/R 11. Description of the occurrence, including details of injury, damage, etc. (if necessary continue on the reverse of this form):

text: OJ L 295, 12.11.2010, p. 35.

text: *: The reported RVR/VIS value representative of the initial part of the take-off run can be replaced by pilot assessment. **: The pilot is able to continuously identify the take-off surface and maintain directional control.

text: Note: HIALS: high intensity approach lighting system; MIALS: medium intensity approach lighting system; ALS: approach lighting system.

text: *: The MDH refers to the initial calculation of MDH. When selecting the associated RVR, there is no need to take account of a rounding up to the nearest 10 ft, which may be done for operational purposes, e.g. conversion to MDA. **: The tables are only applicable to conventional approaches with a nominal descent slope of not greater than 4°. Greater descent slopes will usually require that visual glide slope guidance (e.g. precision path approach indicator (PAPI)) is also visible at the MDH. ***: FALS comprise FATO/runway markings, 720 m or more of high intensity/medium intensity (HI/MI) approach lights, FATO/runway edge lights, threshold lights and FATO/runway end lights. Lights to be on. IALS comprise FATO/runway markings, 420 – 719 m of HI/MI approach lights, FATO/runway edge lights, threshold lights and FATO/runway end lights. Lights to be on. BALS comprise FATO/runway markings, < 420 m of HI/MI approach lights, any length of low intensity (LI) approach lights, FATO/runway edge lights, threshold lights and FATO/runway end lights. Lights to be on. NALs comprise FATO/runway markings, FATO/runway edge lights, threshold lights, FATO/runway end lights or no lights at all.

text: *: The DH refers to the initial calculation of DH. When selecting the associated RVR, there is no need to take account of a rounding up to the nearest 10 ft, which may be done for operational purposes, e.g. conversion to DA. **: The table is applicable to conventional approaches with a glide slope up to and including 4°. ***: FALS comprise FATO/runway markings, 720 m or more of HI/MI approach lights, FATO/runway edge lights, threshold lights and FATO/runway end lights. Lights to be on. IALS comprise FATO/runway markings, 420 – 719 m of HI/MI approach lights, FATO/runway edge lights, threshold lights and FATO/runway end lights. Lights to be on. BALS comprise FATO/runway markings, < 420 m of HI/MI approach lights, any length of LI approach lights, FATO/runway edge lights, threshold lights and FATO/runway end lights. Lights to be on. NALS comprise FATO/runway markings, FATO/runway edge lights, threshold lights, FATO/runway end lights or no lights at all.

text: Supplementary document to ED Decision 2013/021/R (2) At 200 ft above runway threshold elevation, at least one of the visual references specified under (a) should be distinctly visible and identifiable to the pilot without reliance on the EVS.

text: For a scale/cell load An accuracy of

text: below 2 000 kg ± 1 % from 2 000 kg to 20 000 kg ± 20 kg above 20 000 kg ± 0.1 %

text: Commission Regulation (EU) No 748/2012 of 3 August 2012

text: laying down implementing rules for the airworthiness and environmental certification of aircraft and related products, parts and appliances, as well as for the certification of design and production organisations (OJ L 224, 21.8.2012, p. 1).

text: 1a Time; or 1b Relative time count 1c Global navigation satellite system (GNSS) time synchronisation 2 Pressure altitude 3 Indicated airspeed; or calibrated airspeed 4 Heading (primary flight crew reference) - when true or magnetic heading can be selected, the primary heading reference, a discrete indicating selection, should be recorded 5 Normal acceleration 6 Pitch attitude 7 Roll attitude 8 Manual radio transmission keying and CVR/FDR synchronisation reference. 9 Engine thrust/power: 9a Parameters required to determine propulsive thrust/power on each engine 9b Flight crew compartment thrust/power lever position (for aeroplanes with nonmechanically linked flight crew compartment — engine controls) 14 Total or outside air temperature 16 Longitudinal acceleration (body axis) 17 Lateral acceleration 18 Primary flight control surface and primary flight control pilot input (for multiple or split surfaces, a suitable combination of inputs is acceptable instead of recording each surface separately. For aeroplanes that have a flight control break-away capability that allows either pilot to operate the controls independently, record both inputs): 18a Pitch axis 18b Roll axis 18c Yaw axis 19 Pitch trim surface position 23 Marker beacon passage

text: Warnings — in addition to the master warning each ‘red’ warning (including smoke warnings from other compartments) should be recorded when the warning condition cannot be determined from other parameters or from the CVR 25 Each navigation receiver frequency selection 27 Air-ground status (and a sensor of each landing gear if installed) 75 All flight control input forces (for fly-by-wire flight control systems, where control surface position is a function of the displacement of the control input device only, it is not necessary to record this parameter): 75a Control wheel 75b Control column 75c Rudder pedal * The number in the left hand column reflects the serial number depicted in EUROCAE ED-112.

text: Flaps 10a Trailing edge flap position 10b Flight crew compartment control selection 11 Slats 11a Leading edge flap (slat) position 11b Flight crew compartment control selection 12 Thrust reverse status 13 Ground spoiler and speed brake: 13a Ground spoiler position 13b Ground spoiler selection 13c Speed brake position 13d Speed brake selection 15 Autopilot, autothrottle, automatic flight control system (AFCS) mode and engagement status

text: Radio altitude. For auto-land/Category III operations, each radio altimeter should be recorded. 21 Vertical deviation — (the approach aid in use should be recorded. For autoland/CAT III operations, each system should be recorded.): ILS/GPS/GLS glide path 21a MLS elevation 21b GNSS approach path/integrated area navigation (IRNAV) vertical deviation 21c 22 Horizontal deviation — (the approach aid in use should be recorded. For autoland/CAT III operations, each system should be recorded. It is acceptable to arrange them so that at least one is recorded every second): 22a ILS/GPS/GLS localiser 22b MLS azimuth 22c GNSS approach path/IRNAV lateral deviation 26 Distance measuring equipment (DME) 1 and 2 distances: 26a Distance to runway threshold (GLS) Distance to missed approach - 26b Point (IRNAV/IAN) 28 Ground proximity warning system (GPWS)/TAWS/ground collision avoidance system (GCAS) status: 28a Selection of terrain display mode, including pop-up display status 28b Terrain alerts, including cautions and warnings and advisories 28c On/off switch position 29 Angle of attack 30 Low pressure warning (each system): 30a Hydraulic pressure 30b Pneumatic pressure 31 Ground speed 32 Landing gear: 32a Landing gear 32b Gear selector position 33 Navigation data:

text: 33a Drift angle 33b Wind speed 33c Wind direction 33d Latitude 33e Longitude 33f GNSS augmentation in use 34 Brakes: 34a Left and right brake pressure 34b Left and right brake pedal position 35 Additional engine parameters (if not already recorded in parameter 9 of Table 1 of AMC1 NCC.IDE.A.165 and if the aeroplane is equipped with a suitable data source):

text: 35a Engine pressure ratio (EPR) 35b N1 35c Indicated vibration level 35d N2 35e Exhaust gas temperature (EGT) 35f Fuel flow 35g Fuel cut-off lever position 35h N3 36 Traffic alert and collision avoidance system (TCAS)/ACAS — a suitable combination of discretes should be recorded to determine the status of the system:

text: 36a Combined control 36b Vertical control 36c Up advisory 36d Down advisory 36e Sensitivity level 37 Wind shear warning 38 Selected barometric setting: 38a Pilot

text: 38b Co-pilot 39 Selected altitude (all pilot selectable modes of operation) — to be recorded for the aeroplane where the parameter is displayed electronically 40 Selected speed (all pilot selectable modes of operation) — to be recorded for the aeroplane where the parameter is displayed electronically 41 Selected Mach (all pilot selectable modes of operation) — to be recorded for the aeroplane where the parameter is displayed electronically 42 Selected vertical speed (all pilot selectable modes of operation) — to be recorded for the aeroplane where the parameter is displayed electronically 43 Selected heading (all pilot selectable modes of operation) — to be recorded for the aeroplane where the parameter is displayed electronically Selected flight path (All pilot selectable modes of operation) - to be recorded for 44 the aeroplane where the parameter is displayed electronically:

text: 44a Course/desired track (DSTRK) 44b Path angle 44c Coordinates of final approach path (IRNAV/IAN) Selected decision height - to be recorded for the aeroplane where the parameter 45 is displayed electronically 46 Electronic flight instrument system (EFIS) display format: 46a Pilot 46b Co-pilot 47 Multi-function/engine/alerts display format 48 AC electrical bus status — each bus 49 DC electrical bus status — each bus 50 Engine bleed valve position 51 Auxiliary power unit (APU) bleed valve position 52 Computer failure (all critical flight and engine control systems) 53 Engine thrust command 54 Engine thrust target

text: Computed centre of gravity (CG) 56 Fuel quantity or fuel quantity in CG trim tank 57 Head-up display in use 58 Para visual display on 59 Operational stall protection, stick shaker and pusher activation 60 Primary navigation system reference: 60a GNSS 60b Inertial navigational system (INS) 60c VHF omnidirectional radio range (VOR)/DME 60d MLS 60e Loran C 60f ILS 61 Ice detection 62 Engine warning — each engine vibration 63 Engine warning — each engine over temperature 64 Engine warning — each engine oil pressure low 65 Engine warning — each engine over speed 66 Yaw trim surface position 67 Roll trim surface position 68 Yaw or sideslip angle 69 De-icing and/or anti-icing systems selection 70 Hydraulic pressure — each system 71 Loss of cabin pressure 72 Flight crew compartment trim control input position pitch — when mechanical means for control inputs are not available, cockpit display trim positions or trim command should be recorded 73 Flight crew compartment trim control input position roll — when mechanical means for control inputs are not available, cockpit display trim positions or trim

text: command should be recorded 74 Flight crew compartment trim control input position yaw — when mechanical means for control inputs are not available, cockpit display trim positions or trim command should be recorded 76 Event marker 77 Date 78 Actual navigation performance (ANP) or estimate of position error (EPE) or estimate of position uncertainty (EPU) * The number in the left hand column reflects the serial number depicted in EUROCAE ED-112.

text: Data link initiation This includes any application used to log on to, C or initiate, a data link service. In future air navigation system (FANS)-1/A and air traffic navigation (ATN), these are ATS facilities notification (AFN) and context management (CM), respectively.

text: Controller/pilot This includes any application used to exchange C communication requests, clearances, instructions and reports between the flight crew and controllers on the ground. In FANS-1/A and ATN, this includes the controller pilot data link communications (CPDLC) application. It also includes applications used for the exchange of oceanic clearances (OCL) and departure clearances (DCL), as well as data link delivery of taxi clearances.

text: Addressed This includes any surveillance application in C, F2 surveillance which the ground sets up contracts for delivery of surveillance data. In FANS-1/A and ATN, this includes the automatic dependent surveillance-contract (ADS-C) application.

text: Flight information This includes any application used for delivery of C flight information data to specific aeroplanes. This includes for example digital automatic terminal information service (D ATIS), data link operational terminal information service (D OTIS), digital weather information services (data link-meteorological aerodrome or aeronautical report (D-METAR) or terminal weather information for pilots (TWIP)), data link flight information service (D-FIS), and Notice to Airmen (electronic NOTAM) delivery.

text: * 5 Broadcast This includes elementary and enhanced M , surveillance surveillance systems, as well as automatic F2 dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) output data.

text: * 6 Aeronautical This includes any application transmitting or M operational control receiving data used for AOC purposes (in (AOC) data accordance with the ICAO definition of AOC). Such systems may also process aeronautical administrative communication (AAC) messages, but there is no requirement to record AAC messages

text: * 7 Graphics This includes any application receiving graphical M data to be used for operational purposes (i.e. F1 excluding applications that are receiving such things as updates to manuals).

text: CM CM is an ATN service

text: AFN AFN is a FANS 1/A service

text: CPDLC All implemented up and downlink messages to be recorded

text: ADS-C ADS-C reports All contract requests and reports recorded

text: Position reports Only used within FANS 1/A. Mainly used in oceanic and remote areas.

text: ADS-B Surveillance Information that enables correlation with data any associated records stored separately from the aeroplane.

text: D-FIS D-FIS is an ATN service. All implemented up and downlink messages to be recorded

text: TWIP TWIP Terminal weather information for pilots messages

text: D-ATIS ATIS messages Refer to EUROCAE ED-89A, dated December 2003: Data Link Application System Document (DLASD) for the ‘ATIS’ data link service

text: OCL OCL messages Refer to EUROCAE ED-106A, dated March 2004: Data Link Application System Document (DLASD) for ‘Oceanic Clearance’ (OCL) data link service

text: DCL DCL messages Refer to EUROCAE ED-85A, dated December 2005: Data Link Application System Document (DLASD) for ‘Departure Clearance’ data link service

text: Graphics Weather maps Graphics exchanged in the framework of & other procedures within the operational control, graphics as specified in Part-ORO. Information that enables correlation with any associated records stored separately from the aeroplane.

text: AOC Aeronautical Messages exchanged in the framework of operational procedures within the operational control, control as specified in Part-ORO. messages Information that enables correlation with any associated records stored separately from the aeroplane. Definition in EUROCAE ED-112, dated March 2003.

text: Surveillance Downlinked As defined in ICAO Annex 10 Volume IV aircraft (Surveillance systems and ACAS). parameters (DAP)

text: Time or relative time count 2 Pressure altitude 3 Indicated airspeed

text: Heading 5 Normal acceleration 6 Pitch attitude 7 Roll attitude 8 Manual radio transmission keying CVR/FDR synchronisation reference 9 Power on each engine: 9a Free power turbine speed (NF) 9b Engine torque 9c Engine gas generator speed (NG) 9d Flight crew compartment power control position 9e Other parameters to enable engine power to be determined 10a Main rotor speed 10b Rotor brake (if installed) 11 Primary flight controls — Pilot input and/or control output position (if applicable): 11a Collective pitch 11b Longitudinal cyclic pitch 11c Lateral cyclic pitch 11d Tail rotor pedal 11e Controllable stabilator (if applicable) 11f Hydraulic selection 12 Hydraulics low pressure (each system should be recorded.) 13 Outside air temperature 18 Yaw rate or yaw acceleration 20 Longitudinal acceleration (body axis) 21 Lateral acceleration 25 Marker beacon passage 26 Warnings — a discrete should be recorded for the master warning, gearbox low oil pressure and stability augmentation system as failure. Other ‘red’ warnings should be recorded where the warning condition cannot be

text: determined from other parameters or from the cockpit voice recorder. 27 Each navigation receiver frequency selection 37 Engine control modes *

text: AFCS mode and engagement status 15 Stability augmentation system engagement (each system should be recorded) 16 Main gear box oil pressure 17 Gear box oil temperature: 17a Main gear box oil temperature 17b Intermediate gear box oil temperature 17c Tail rotor gear box oil temperature 19 Indicated sling load force (if signals readily available) 22 Radio altitude 23 Vertical deviation — the approach aid in use should be recorded: 23a ILS glide path 23b MLS elevation 23c GNSS approach path 24 Horizontal deviation — the approach aid in use should be recorded: 24a ILS localiser 24b MLS azimuth 24c GNSS approach path 28 DME 1 & 2 distances 29 Navigation data:

text: 29a Drift angle 29b Wind speed 29c Wind direction 29d Latitude 29e Longitude 29f Ground speed 30 Landing gear or gear selector position 31 Engine exhaust gas temperature (T4) 32 Turbine inlet temperature (TIT/ITT) 33 Fuel contents 34 Altitude rate (vertical speed) — only necessary when available from cockpit instruments 35 Ice detection 36 Helicopter health and usage monitor system (HUMS): Engine data 36a Chip detector 36b Track timing 36c Exceedance discretes 36d Broadband average engine vibration 36e 38 Selected barometric setting — to be recorded for helicopters where the parameter is displayed electronically: 38a Pilot 38b Co-pilot 39 Selected altitude (all pilot selectable modes of operation) — to be recorded for the helicopters where the parameter is displayed electronically 40 Selected speed (all pilot selectable modes of operation) — to be recorded for the helicopters where the parameter is displayed electronically 41 Not used (selected Mach) 42 Selected vertical speed (all pilot selectable modes of operation) — to be recorded for the helicopters where the parameter is displayed electronically

text: Selected heading (all pilot selectable modes of operation) — to be recorded for the helicopters where the parameter is displayed electronically 44 Selected flight path (all pilot selectable modes of operation) — to be recorded for the helicopters where the parameter is displayed electronically 45 Selected decision height (all pilot selectable modes of operation) — to be recorded for the helicopters where the parameter is displayed electronically 46 EFIS display format 47 Multi-function/engine/alerts display format 48 Event marker * The number in the left hand column reflects the serial number depicted in EUROCAE ED-112.

text: Flight information This includes any application used for delivery of C flight information data to specific helicopters. This includes for example digital automatic terminal information service (D-ATIS), data link operational terminal information service (D- OTIS), digital weather information services (D- METAR or TWIP), data link-flight information service (D-FIS) and Notice to Airmen (electronic NOTAM) delivery.

text: Broadcast This includes elementary and enhanced M*, surveillance surveillance systems, as well as automatic F2 dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) output data.

text: * 6 AOC data This includes any application transmitting or M receiving data used for AOC purposes (in accordance with the ICAO definition of AOC). Such systems may also process AAC messages, but there is no requirement to record AAC messages

text: CM CM is an ATN service

text: AFN AFN is a FANS 1/A service

text: ADS-B Surveillance Information that enables correlation with any data associated records stored separately from the helicopter.

text: D ATIS ATIS messages Refer to EUROCAE ED-89A, dated December 2003: Data Link Application System Document (DLASD) for the ‘ATIS’ data link service

text: DCL DCL messages Refer to EUROCAE ED-85A, dated March 2003: Data Link Application System Document (DLASD) for ‘Departure Clearance’ data link service 11 Graphics Weather maps Graphics exchanged in the framework of & other procedures within the operational control, as graphics specified in Part-ORO. Information that enables correlation with any associated records stored separately from the helicopter. 12 AOC Aeronautical Messages exchanged in the framework of operational procedures within the operational control, as control specified in Part-ORO. messages Information that enables correlation with any associated records stored separately from the helicopter. Definition in EUROCAE ED-112, dated March 2003. 13 Surveillance Downlinked As defined in ICAO Annex 10 Volume IV Aircraft (Surveillance systems and ACAS). Parameters (DAP)

text: Clothing assembly Beaufort wind Times within which the most vulnerable individuals

text: force are likely to drown

text: (water temp 5 °C) (water temp 13 °C)

text: Working clothes 0 – 2 Within ¾ hour Within 1 ¼ hours (no immersion suit) 3 – 4 Within ½ hour Within ½ hour

text: and above Significantly less than ½ Significantly less than ½ hour hour

text: Immersion suit worn over 0 – 2 May well exceed 3 hours May well exceed 3 hours working clothes (with leakage inside suit) 3 – 4 Within 2 ¾ hours May well exceed 3 hours

text: and above Significantly less than 2 ¾ May well exceed 3 hours hours. May well exceed 1 hour

identifier: AMC & GM to Part NCC

beslut: ED Decision 2013/021/R

nummer: part-ncc

title: AMC & GM to Part NCC

text: European Aviation Safety Agency

text: Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) and Guidance Material (GM) to Part-NCC

text: Initial issue 23 August 2013

text: For the date of entry into force of this amendment, refer to Decision 2013/021/R in the Official Publication of the Agency.

text: Part-NCC — AMC/GM

text: Subpart A — General requirements

text: GM1 NCC.GEN.105(e)(2) Crew responsibilities

text: GENERAL In accordance with 7.g. of Annex IV to

text: Regulation (EC) No 216/2008

text: (essential requirements for air operations), a crew member must not perform duties on board an aircraft when under the influence of psychoactive substances or alcohol or when unfit due to injury, fatigue, medication, sickness or other similar causes. This should be understood as including the following: (a) effects of deep water diving and blood donation, and allowing for a certain time period between these activities and returning to flying; and (b) without prejudice to more restrictive national regulations, the consumption of alcohol while on duty or less than 8 hours prior to the commencement of duties, and commencing a flight duty period with a blood alcohol level in excess of 0.2 per thousand.

text: AMC1 NCC.GEN.105(g) Crew responsibilities

text: OCCURRENCE REPORTING Whenever a crew member makes use of the applicable reporting systems, a copy of the report should be communicated to the pilot-in-command.

text: GM1 NCC.GEN.106 Pilot-in-command responsibilities and authority

text: GENERAL In accordance with 1.c. of Annex IV to

text: Regulation (EC) No 216/2008

text: (Essential Requirements for air operations), the pilot-in-command is responsible for the operation and safety of the aircraft and for the safety of all crew members, passengers and cargo on board. This would normally be from the time that he/she assumes responsibility for the aircraft and passengers prior to a flight until the passengers are deplaned and escorted out of the operational area of the aerodrome or operating site and he/she relinquishes responsibility for the aircraft at the end of a flight or series of flights. The pilot-in-command’s responsibilities and authority should be understood as including at least the following: (a) the safety of all crew members, passengers and cargo on board, as soon as he/she arrives on board, until he/she leaves the aircraft at the end of the flight; and

text: (b) the operation and safety of the aircraft: (1) for aeroplanes, from the moment it is first ready to move for the purpose of taxiing prior to take-off, until the moment it comes to rest at the end of the flight and the engine(s) used as primary propulsion unit(s) is/are shut down; or (2) for helicopters, from the moment the engine(s) are started until the helicopter comes to rest at the end of the flight with the engine(s) shut down and the rotor blades stopped.

text: GM1 NCC.GEN.106(b) Pilot-in-command responsibilities and authority

text: AUTHORITY TO REFUSE CARRIAGE OR DISEMBARK This may include: (a) passengers who have special needs that cannot be provided on the aircraft; or (b) persons that appear to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs.

text: AMC1 NCC.GEN.106(c) Pilot-in-command responsibilities and authority

text: REPORTING OF HAZARDOUS FLIGHT CONDITIONS (a) These reports should include any detail which may be pertinent to the safety of other aircraft. (b) Such reports should be made whenever any of the following conditions are encountered or observed: (1) severe turbulence; (2) severe icing; (3) severe mountain wave; (4) thunderstorms, with or without hail, that are obscured, embedded, widespread or in squall lines; (5) heavy dust storm or heavy sandstorm; (6) volcanic ash cloud; and (7) unusual and/or increasing volcanic activity or a volcanic eruption. (c) When other meteorological conditions not listed above, e.g. wind shear, are encountered that, in the opinion of the pilot-in-command, may affect the safety or the efficiency of other aircraft operations, the pilot-in-command should advise the appropriate air traffic services (ATS) unit as soon as practicable.

text: AMC1 NCC.GEN.106(d) Pilot-in-command responsibilities and authority

text: MITIGATING MEASURES — FATIGUE The use of additional crew members and/or controlled rest during flight as described in GM1 NCC.GEN.106(d) may be considered as appropriate fatigue mitigating measures.

text: GM1 NCC.GEN.106(d) Pilot-in-command responsibilities and authority

text: MITIGATING MEASURES — FATIGUE — CONTROLLED REST IN THE FLIGHT CREW COMPARTEMENT (a) This Guidance Material (GM) addresses controlled rest taken by the minimum certified flight crew. It is not related to planned in-flight rest by members of an augmented crew. (b) Although flight crew members should stay alert at all times during flight, unexpected fatigue can occur as a result of sleep disturbance and circadian disruption. To cater for this unexpected fatigue, and to regain a high level of alertness, a controlled rest procedure in the flight crew compartment, organised by the pilot-in-command, may be used, if workload permits. ‘Controlled rest’ means a period of time ‘off task’ that may include actual sleep. The use of controlled rest has been shown to significantly increase the levels of alertness during the later phases of flight, particularly after the top of descent, and is considered to be good use of crew resource management (CRM) principles. Controlled rest should be used in conjunction with other on board fatigue management countermeasures such as physical exercise, bright flight crew compartment illumination at appropriate times, balanced eating and drinking and intellectual activity. (c) Controlled rest taken in this way should not be considered to be part of a rest period for the purposes of calculating flight time limitations, nor used to justify any duty period extension. Controlled rest may be used to manage both sudden unexpected fatigue and fatigue that is expected to become more severe during higher workload periods later in the flight. Controlled rest is not related to fatigue management, which is planned before flight. (d) Controlled rest periods should be agreed according to individual needs and the accepted principles of CRM; where the involvement of the cabin crew is required, consideration should be given to their workload. (e) When applying controlled rest procedures, the pilot-in-command should ensure that: (1) the other flight crew member(s) is(are) adequately briefed to carry out the duties of the resting flight crew member; (2) one flight crew member is fully able to exercise control of the aircraft at all times; and (3) any system intervention that would normally require a cross-check according to multi-crew principles is avoided until the resting flight crew member resumes his/her duties. (f) Controlled rest procedures should satisfy the following criteria: (1) only one flight crew member at a time should take rest at his/her station; the harness should be used and the seat positioned to minimise unintentional interference with the controls; (2) the rest period should be no longer than 45 minutes (in order to limit any actual sleep to approximately 30 minutes) so as to limit deep sleep and associated long recovery time (sleep inertia);

text: (3) after this 45-minute period, there should be a recovery period of 20 minutes during which sole control of the aircraft should not be entrusted to the flight crew member taking controlled rest; (4) in the case of two-crew operations, means should be established to ensure that the non-resting flight crew member remains alert. This may include: (i) appropriate alarm systems; (ii) on board systems to monitor flight crew activity; and (iii) where cabin crew are on board the aircraft, frequent cabin crew checks. In this case, the pilot-in-command should inform the cabin crew member of the intention of the flight crew member to take controlled rest, and of the time of the end of that rest; frequent contact should be established between the non-resting flight crew member and the cabin crew by communication means, and the cabin crew should check that the resting flight crew member is alert at the end of the period; (5) there should be a minimum of 20 minutes between two sequential controlled rest periods in order to overcome the effects of sleep inertia and allow for adequate briefing; (6) if necessary, a flight crew member may take more than one rest period, if time permits, on longer sectors, subject to the restrictions above; and (7) controlled rest periods should terminate at least 30 minutes before the top of descent.

text: AMC1 NCC.GEN.106 (e) Pilot-in-command responsibilities and authority

text: VIOLATION REPORTING If required by the State in which the incident occurs, the pilot-in-command should submit a report on any such violation to the appropriate authority of such State; in that event, the pilot-in-command should also submit a copy of it to the competent authority. Such reports should be submitted as soon as possible and normally within 10 days.

text: GM1 NCC.GEN.120(b)(4) Taxiing of aeroplanes

text: SKILLS AND KNOWLEDGE The person designated by the operator to taxi an aeroplane should possess the following skills and knowledge: (a) Positioning of the aeroplane to ensure safety when starting engine; (b) Getting ATIS reports and taxi clearance, where applicable; (c) Interpretation of airfield markings/lights/signals/indicators; (d) Interpretation of marshalling signals, where applicable; (e) Identification of suitable parking area; (f) Maintaining lookout and right-of-way rules and complying with ATC or marshalling instructions when applicable;

text: (g) Avoidance of adverse effect of propeller slipstream or jet wash on other aeroplanes, aerodrome facilities and personnel; (h) Inspection of taxi path when surface conditions are obscured; (i) Communication with others when controlling an aeroplane on the ground; (j) Interpretation of operational instructions; (k) Reporting of any problem that may occur while taxiing an aeroplane; and (l) Adapting the taxi speed in accordance with prevailing aerodrome, traffic, surface and weather conditions.

text: GM1 NCC.GEN.125 Rotor engagement

text: INTENT OF THE RULE (a) The following two situations where it is allowed to turn the rotor under power should be distinguished: (1) for the purpose of flight, as described in the Implementing Rule; (2) for maintenance purposes. (b) Rotor engagement for the purpose of flight: it should be noted that the pilot should not leave the control when the rotors are turning. For example, the pilot is not allowed to get out of the aircraft in order to welcome passengers and adjust their seat belts with the rotors turning. (c) Rotor engagement for the purpose of maintenance: the Implementing Rule, however, should not prevent ground runs being conducted by qualified personnel other than pilots for maintenance purposes. The following conditions should be applied: (1) The operator should ensure that the qualification of personnel, other than pilots, who are authorised to conduct maintenance runs, is described in the appropriate manual. (2) Ground runs should not include taxiing the helicopter. (3) There should be no passengers on board. (4) Maintenance runs should not include collective increase or autopilot engagement (risk of ground resonance).

text: AMC1 NCC.GEN.130 Portable electronic devices

text: GENERAL (a) Scope This AMC provides means to prevent that portable electronic devices (PEDs) on board aircraft adversely affect the performance of the aircraft’s systems and equipment. This AMC addresses operation of PEDs in the different aircraft zones – passenger compartment, flight compartment, and cargo compartments. Furthermore, it addresses the specific case of PEDs qualified and under

text: configuration control by the operator - controlled PEDs (C-PEDs) - for which the operator gives some credit. (b) Restrictions on the use of PEDs in the passenger compartment If an operator permits passengers to use PEDs on board its aircraft, procedures should be in place to control their use. The operator should ensure that all crew members and ground personnel are trained to enforce the restrictions on this equipment in line with these procedures. These procedures should ensure the following: (1) As the general principle all PEDs (including transmitting PEDs (T-PEDs)) are switched off at the start of the flight when the passengers have boarded and all doors have been closed, until a passenger door has been opened at the end of the flight. (2) The following exceptions from the general principle may be granted under the responsibility of the operator: (i) Medical equipment necessary to support physiological functions does not need to be switched off. (ii) The use of PEDs, excluding T-PEDs, may be permitted during noncritical phases of flight, excluding taxiing. (iii) T-PEDs may be used during non-critical phases of flight, excluding taxiing, if the aircraft is equipped with a system or otherwise certified allowing the operation of such technology during flight. The restrictions coming from the corresponding aircraft certification as documented in the aircraft flight manual (AFM), or equivalent document(s), stay in force. (iv) The use of C-PEDs during critical phases of flight, however, may only be permitted if the operator has accounted for this situation in its assessment. (v) The pilot-in-command may permit the use of any kind of PED when the aircraft is stationary during prolonged departure delays, provided that sufficient time is available to check the passenger compartment before the flight proceeds. Similarly, after landing, the pilot-incommand may authorise the use of any kind of PED in the event of a prolonged delay for a parking/gate position (even though doors are closed and the engines are running). (3) Announcements should be made during boarding of the aircraft to inform passengers of the restrictions applicable to PEDs (in particular to T-PEDs) before fastening their seat belts. (4) Where in-seat electrical power supplies are available for passenger use, the following should apply: (i) information cards giving safety instructions are provided to the passengers;

text: (ii) PEDs should be disconnected from any in-seat electrical power supply, switched off and stowed during taxiing, take-off, approach, landing, and during abnormal or emergency conditions; and (iii) crew members should be aware of the proper means to switch off inseat power supplies used for PEDs. (5) During boarding and any phase of flight: (i) appropriate coordination between crew members is defined to deal with interference or other safety problems associated with PEDs; (ii) passenger use of equipment during the flight is monitored; (iii) suspect equipment is switched off; and (iv) particular attention is given to passenger misuse of equipment that could include a built-in transmitting function. (6) Thermal runaways of batteries, in particular lithium batteries, and potential resulting fire can be handled properly. (7) Appropriate coordination between crew members should be defined to deal with interference or other safety problems associated with PEDs. (8) The pilot-in-command may, for any reason and during any phase of flight, require deactivation and stowage of PEDs. (9) Occurrences of suspected or confirmed interference that have potential safety implications should be reported to the competent authority. Where possible, to assist follow-up and technical investigation, reports should describe the offending device, identify the brand name and model number, its location in the aircraft at the time of the occurrence, interference symptoms and the results of actions taken by the crew. The cooperation of the device owner should be sought by obtaining contact details. (10) Special requests to operate a PED or T-PED during any phase of the flight for specific reasons (e.g. for security measures) should be handled properly. (c) Restrictions on the use of PEDs in the flight compartment Due to the higher risk of interference and potential for distracting crew from their duties, PEDs should not be used in the flight compartment. However, the operator may allow the use of PEDs, e.g. to assist the flight crew in their duties, if procedures are in place to ensure the following: (1) The conditions for the use of PEDs in-flight are specified in the operations manual, otherwise they should be switched off and stowed during all phases of flight. (2) The PEDs do not pose a loose-item risk or other hazard. (3) During critical phases of flight only those C-PEDs are operated, for which the operator has demonstrated that the radio frequency (RF) interference levels are below those considered acceptable for the specific aircraft environment. Guidance for such test is provided in (e) below.

text: (4) During pre-flight procedures, e.g. when loading route information into navigation systems or when monitoring fuel loading, no T-PED should be operated. In all other cases, flight crew and other persons on board the aircraft involved in dispatching the aircraft should observe the same restrictions as applicable to passengers. (5) These restrictions should not preclude use of a T-PED (specifically a mobile phone) by the flight crew to deal with an emergency. However, reliance should not be predicated on a T-PED for this purpose. (d) PEDs not accessible during the flight PEDs should be switched off, when not accessible for deactivation during flight. This should apply especially to PEDs contained in baggage or transported as part of the cargo. The operator may allow deviation for PEDs for which tests have demonstrated their safe operation. Other precautions, such as transporting in shielded, metal boxes, may also be used to mitigate associated risks. In case an automated function is used to deactivate a T-PED, the unit should be qualified for safe operation on board the aircraft. (e) Test methods The means to demonstrate that the RF radiations (intentional or non-intentional) are tolerated by aircraft systems should be as follows: (1) The radio frequency (RF) emissions of PEDs should meet the levels as defined by EUROCAE ED-14E/RTCA DO 160E Section 21 Category M for operation in the passenger compartment and EUROCAE ED-14E/RTCA DO 160E Section 21 Category H for operation in the cargo bay. Later revisions of those documents may be used for testing. The assessment of intentional transmissions of T- PEDs is excluded from those test standards and needs to be addressed separately. (2) When the operator intends to allow the operation of T-PEDs, its assessment should follow the principles set out in EUROCAE ED-130.

text: GM1 NCC.GEN.130 Portable electronic devices

text: DEFINITIONS

text: (a) Definition and categories of PEDs PEDs are any kind of electronic device, typically but not limited to consumer electronics, brought on board the aircraft by crew members, passengers, or as part of the cargo and that are not included in the approved aircraft configuration. All equipment that is able to consume electrical energy falls under this definition. The electrical energy can be provided from internal sources as batteries (chargeable or non-rechargeable) or the devices may also be connected to specific aircraft power sources. PEDs fall into three categories: (1) Non-intentional transmitters can non-intentionally radiate RF transmissions. This category includes, but is not limited to, computing equipment, cameras, radio receivers, audio and video reproducers, electronic games and toys. In

text: addition, portable, non-transmitting devices provided to assist crew members in their duties are included in this category. The category is identified as PED. (2) Intentional transmitters can radiate RF transmissions on specific frequencies as part of their intended function. In addition, they may radiate nonintentional transmissions like any PED. The term ‘transmitting PED’ (T-PED) is used to identify the transmitting capability of the PED. Intentional transmitters are transmitting devices such as RF-based remote control equipment, which may include some toys, two-way radios (sometimes referred to as private mobile radio), mobile phones of any type, satellite phones, computer with mobile phone data connection, wireless fidelity (WIFI) or Bluetooth capability. After deactivation of the transmitting capability, e.g. by activating the socalled ‘flight mode’ or ‘flight safety mode’, the T-PED remains a PED having non-intentional emissions. (3) A controlled PED (C-PED) is subject to administrative control by the operator. This will include, inter alia, tracking the location of the devices to specific aircraft or persons and ensuring that no unauthorised changes are made to the hardware, software or databases. A controlled PED will also be subject to procedures to ensure that it is maintained to the latest amendment state. C- PEDs can be assigned to the category of non-intentional transmitters (PEDs) or intentional transmitters (T-PEDs). (b) Definition of the switched-off status Many PEDs are not completely disconnected from the internal power source when switched off. The switching function may leave some remaining functionality e.g. data storage, timer, clock, etc. These devices can be considered switched off when in the deactivated status. The same applies for devices having no transmit capability and operated by coin cells without further deactivation capability, e.g. wrist watches.

text: GM2 NCC.GEN.130 Portable electronic devices

text: GENERAL (a) PEDs can pose a risk of interference with electronically operated aircraft systems. Those systems could range from the electronic engine control, instruments, navigation or communication equipment, autopilots to any other type of avionic equipment on the aircraft. The interference can result in on-board systems malfunctioning or providing misleading information and communication disturbance. This can also lead to an increased workload for the flight crew work. (b) Interference may be caused by transmitters being part of the PED’s functionality or by unintentional transmissions from the PED. Due to the likely proximity of the PED to any electronically operated aircraft system and the generally limited shielding found in small aircraft, the risk of interference is to be considered higher than for larger aircraft with metal airframes. (c) During certification of the aircraft, when qualifying the aircraft functions consideration may only have been made of short-term exposure to a high radiating field, with an acceptable mitigating measure being a return to normal function after removal of the threat. This certification assumption may not be true when operating the transmitting PED on board the aircraft.

text: (d) It has been found that compliance with the electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) Directive

text: and related European standards, as indicated by the CE marking, is not sufficient to exclude the existence of interference. A well-known interference is the demodulation of the transmitted signal from GSM (global system for mobile communications) mobile phones leading to audio disturbances in other systems. Similar interferences are difficult to predict during the PED design and protecting the aircraft’s electronic systems against the full range of potential interferences is practically impossible. Therefore, not operating PEDs on-board aircraft is the safest option, especially as effects may not be identified immediately but under the most inconvenient circumstances.

text: GM3 NCC.GEN.130 Portable electronic devices

text: FIRE CAUSED BY PEDs A detailed discussion of fire caused by PEDs can be found in CAA UK CAP 789 edition 2, chapter 31, section 6 Fires in the cabin caused by PEDs and CAA PAPER 2003/4, Dealing With In-Flight Lithium Battery Fires in Portable Electronic Devices, M.J. Lain, D.A. Teagle, J. Cullen, V. Dass .

text: AMC1 NCC.GEN.135 Information on emergency and survival equipment carried

text: CONTENT OF INFORMATION The information, compiled in a list, should include, as applicable: (a) the number, colour and type of life-rafts and pyrotechnics; (b) details of emergency medical supplies and water supplies; and (c) the type and frequencies of the emergency portable radio equipment.

text: AMC1 NCC.GEN.140(a)(3) Documents, manuals and information to be carried

text: CERTIFICATE OF AIRWORTHINESS The certificate of airworthiness should be a normal certificate of airworthiness, a restricted certificate of airworthiness or a permit to fly issued in accordance with the applicable airworthiness requirements.

text: AMC1 NCC.GEN.140(a)(11) Documents, manuals and information to be carried

text: CURRENT AND SUITABLE AERONAUTICAL CHARTS (a) The aeronautical charts carried should contain data appropriate to the applicable air traffic regulations, rules of the air, flight altitudes, area/route and nature of the

text: operation. Due consideration should be given to carriage of textual and graphic representations of: (1) aeronautical data including, as appropriate for the nature of the operation: (i) airspace structure; (ii) significant points, navigation aids (navaids) and air traffic services (ATS) routes; (iii) navigation and communication frequencies; (iv) prohibited, restricted and danger areas; and (v) sites of other relevant activities that may hazard the flight; and (2) topographical data, including terrain and obstacle data. (b) A combination of different charts and textual data may be used to provide adequate and current data. (c) The aeronautical data should be appropriate for the current aeronautical information regulation and control (AIRAC) cycle. (d) The topographical data should be reasonably recent, having regard to the nature of the planned operation.

text: AMC1 NCC.GEN.140(a)(12) Documents, manuals and information to be carried

text: PROCEDURES AND VISUAL SIGNALS FOR USE BY INTERCEPTING AND INTERCEPTED AIRCRAFT The procedures and the visual signals information for use by intercepting and intercepted aircraft should reflect those contained in the International Civil Aviation Organisation’s (ICAO) Annex 2. This may be part of the operations manual.

text: AMC1 NCC.GEN.140 Documents, manuals and information to be carried

text: GENERAL The documents, manuals and information may be available in a form other than on printed paper. An electronic storage medium is acceptable if accessibility, usability and reliability can be assured.

text: GM1 NCC.GEN.140(a)(1) Documents, manuals and information to be carried

text: AFM OR EQUIVALENT DOCUMENT ‘Aircraft flight manual (AFM), or equivalent document’ means the flight manual for the aircraft or other documents containing information required for the operation of the aircraft within the terms of its certificate of airworthiness, unless these data are available in the parts of the operations manual carried on board.

text: GM1 NCC.GEN.140(a)(9) Documents, manuals and information to be carried

text: JOURNEY LOG OR EQUIVALENT ‘Journey log or equivalent’ means in this context that the required information may be recorded in documentation other than a log book, such as the operational flight plan or the aircraft technical log.

text: GM1 NCC.GEN.140(a)(13) Documents, manuals and information to be carried

text: SEARCH AND RESCUE INFORMATION This information is usually found in the State’s aeronautical information publication.

text: GM1 NCC.GEN.140(a)(19) Documents, manuals and information to be carried

text: DOCUMENTS THAT MAY BE PERTINENT TO THE FLIGHT Any other documents that may be pertinent to the flight or required by the States concerned with the flight may include, for example, forms to comply with reporting requirements. STATES CONCERNED WITH THE FLIGHT The States concerned are those of origin, transit, overflight and destination of the flight.

text: GM1 NCC.GEN.145(a) Preservation, production and use of flight recorder recordings

text: REMOVAL OF RECORDERS AFTER A REPORTABLE OCCURENCE The need for removal of the recorders from the aircraft is determined by the investigating authority with due regard to the seriousness of an occurrence and the circumstances, including the impact on the operation.

text: AMC1 NCC.GEN.145(b) Preservation, production and use of flight recorder recordings

text: OPERATIONAL CHECKS Whenever a recorder is required to be carried, the operator should: (a) perform an annual inspection of flight data recorder (FDR) recording and cockpit voice recorder (CVR) recording, unless one or more of the following applies: (1) Where two solid-state FDRs both fitted with internal built-in-test equipment sufficient to monitor reception and recording of data share the same acquisition unit, a comprehensive recording inspection need only be performed for one FDR. For the second FDR, checking its internal built-in-test equipment is sufficient. The inspection should be performed alternately such that each FDR is inspected once every other year. (2) Where the following conditions are met, the FDR recording inspection is not needed:

text: (i) the aircraft flight data are collected in the frame of a flight data monitoring (FDM) programme; (ii) the data acquisition of mandatory flight parameters is the same for the FDR and for the recorder used for the FDM programme; (iii) the integrity of all mandatory flight parameters is verified by the FDM programme; and (iv) the FDR is solid-state and is fitted with internal built-in-test equipment sufficient to monitor reception and recording of data. (3) Where two solid-state CVRs are fitted both with internal built-in-test equipment sufficient to monitor reception and recording of data, a comprehensive recording inspection need only to be performed for one CVR. For the second CVR, checking its internal built-in-test equipment is sufficient. The inspection should be performed alternately such that each CVR is inspected once every other year. (b) perform every 5 years an inspection of the data link recording. (c) check every 5 years, or in accordance with the recommendations of the sensor manufacturer, that the parameters dedicated to the FDR and not monitored by other means are being recorded within the calibration tolerances and that there is no discrepancy in the engineering conversion routines for these parameters.

text: GM1 NCC.GEN.145(b) Preservation, production and use of flight recorder recordings

text: INSPECTION OF THE FLIGHT RECORDERS RECORDING (a) The inspection of the FDR recording usually consists of the following: (1) Making a copy of the complete recording file. (2) Examining a whole flight in engineering units to evaluate the validity of all mandatory parameters - this could reveal defects or noise in the measuring and processing chains and indicate necessary maintenance actions. The following should be considered: (i) when applicable, each parameter should be expressed in engineering units and checked for different values of its operational range - for this purpose, some parameters may need to be inspected at different flight phases; and (ii) if the parameter is delivered by a digital data bus and the same data are utilised for the operation of the aircraft, then a reasonableness check may be sufficient; otherwise a correlation check may need to be performed; (A) a reasonableness check is understood in this context as a subjective, qualitative evaluation, requiring technical judgement, of the recordings from a complete flight; and (B) a correlation check is understood in this context as the process of comparing data recorded by the flight data recorder against the corresponding data derived from flight instruments, indicators or

text: the expected values obtained during specified portion(s) of a flight profile or during ground checks that are conducted for that purpose. (3) Retaining the most recent copy of the complete recording file and the corresponding recording inspection report. (b) The inspection of the CVR recording usually consists of: (1) checking that the CVR operates correctly for the nominal duration of the recording; (2) examining, where practicable and subject to prior approval by the flight crew, a sample of in-flight recording of the CVR for evidence that the signal is acceptable on each channel; and (3) preparing and retaining an inspection report. (c) The inspection of the DLR recording usually consists of: (1) Checking the consistency of the data link recording with other recordings for example, during a designated flight, the flight crew speaks out a few data link messages sent and received. After the flight, the data link recording and the CVR recording are compared for consistency. (2) Retaining the most recent copy of the complete recording and the corresponding inspection report.

text: AMC1 NCC.GEN.150(e) Transport of dangerous goods

text: DANGEROUS GOODS ACCIDENT AND INCIDENT REPORTING (a) Any type of dangerous goods accident or incident, or the finding of: (1) undeclared or misdeclared dangerous goods in cargo; (2) forbidden dangerous goods in mail; or (3) forbidden dangerous goods in passenger or crew baggage, or on the person of a passenger or a crew member should be reported. For this purpose, the Technical Instructions consider that reporting of undeclared and misdeclared dangerous goods found in cargo also applies to items of operators’ stores that are classified as dangerous goods. (b) The first report should be dispatched within 72 hours of the event. It may be sent by any means, including e-mail, telephone or fax. This report should include the details that are known at that time, under the headings identified in (c). If necessary, a subsequent report should be made as soon as possible giving all the details that were not known at the time the first report was sent. If a report has been made verbally, written confirmation should be sent as soon as possible. (c) The first and any subsequent report should be as precise as possible and contain the following data, where relevant: (1) date of the incident or accident or the finding of undeclared or misdeclared dangerous goods; (2) location and date of flight;

text: (3) description of the goods and the reference number of the air waybill, pouch, baggage tag, ticket, etc.; (4) proper shipping name (including the technical name, if appropriate) and United Nations (UN)/identification (ID) number, when known; (5) class or division and any subsidiary risk; (6) type of packaging, and the packaging specification marking on it; (7) quantity; (8) name and address of the passenger, etc.; (9) any other relevant details; (10) suspected cause of the incident or accident; (11) action taken; (12) any other reporting action taken; and (13) name, title, address and telephone number of the person making the report. (d) Copies of relevant documents and any photographs taken should be attached to the report. (e) A dangerous goods accident or incident may also constitute an aircraft accident, serious incident or incident. The criteria for reporting both types of occurrence should be met. (f) The following dangerous goods reporting form should be used, but other forms, including electronic transfer of data, may be used provided that at least the minimum information of this AMC is supplied:

text: DANGEROUS GOODS OCCURRENCE REPORT DGOR No:

text: 1. Operator: 2. Date of Occurrence: 3. Local time of occurrence:

text: 4. Flight date:

text: 5. Departure aerodrome: 6. Destination aerodrome:

text: 7. Aircraft type: 8. Aircraft registration:

text: 9. Location of occurrence: 10. Origin of the goods:

text: 12. Proper shipping name (including the technical name): 13. UN/ID No (when known): 14.Class/Division 15. Subsidiary 16. Packing group: 17. Category (when known): risk(s): (Class 7 only): 18. Type of 19.Packaging 20. No of packages: 21. Quantity packaging: specification (or transport marking: index, if applicable): 22. Name and address of passenger, etc.: 23. Other relevant information (including suspected cause, any action taken): 24. Name and title of person making report: 25. Telephone No: 26. Company: 27. Reporters ref: 28. Address: 29. Signature: 30. Date:

text: Description of the occurrence (continuation)

text: Notes for completion of the form: 1. A dangerous goods accident is as defined in Annex I. For this purpose serious injury is as defined in

text: Regulation (EU) No 996/2010

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council .

text: 2. The initial report should be dispatched unless exceptional circumstances prevent this. This occurrence report form, duly completed, should be sent as soon as possible, even if all the information is not available.

text: 3. Copies of all relevant documents and any photographs should be attached to this report.

text: 4. Any further information, or any information not included in the initial report, should be sent as soon as possible to the authorities identified in NCC.GEN.150(e).

text: 5. Providing it is safe to do so, all dangerous goods, packagings, documents, etc. relating to the occurrence should be retained until after the initial report has been sent to the authorities identified in NCC.GEN.150(e), and they have indicated whether or not these should continue to be retained.

text: GM1 NCC.GEN.150 Transport of dangerous goods

text: GENERAL (a) The requirement to transport dangerous goods by air in accordance with the Technical Instructions is irrespective of whether:

text: (1) the flight is wholly or partly within or wholly outside the territory of a State; or (2) an approval to carry dangerous goods in accordance with Annex V (Part- SPA), Subpart G is held. (b) The Technical Instructions provide that in certain circumstances dangerous goods, which are normally forbidden on an aircraft, may be carried. These circumstances include cases of extreme urgency or when other forms of transport are inappropriate or when full compliance with the prescribed requirements is contrary to the public interest. In these circumstances all the States concerned may grant exemptions from the provisions of the Technical Instructions provided that an overall level of safety that is at least equivalent to that provided by the Technical Instructions is achieved. Although exemptions are most likely to be granted for the carriage of dangerous goods that are not permitted in normal circumstances, they may also be granted in other circumstances, such as when the packaging to be used is not provided for by the appropriate packing method or the quantity in the packaging is greater than that permitted. The Technical Instructions also make provision for some dangerous goods to be carried when an approval has been granted only by the State of Origin and the competent authority. (c) When an exemption is required, the States concerned are those of origin, transit, overflight and destination of the consignment and that of the operator. For the State of overflight, if none of the criteria for granting an exemption are relevant, an exemption may be granted based solely on whether it is believed that an equivalent level of safety in air transport has been achieved. (d) The Technical Instructions provide that exemptions and approvals are granted by the ‘appropriate national authority’, which is intended to be the authority responsible for the particular aspect against which the exemption or approval is being sought. The operator should ensure that all relevant conditions on an exemption or approval are met. (e) The exemption or approval referred to in (b) to (d) is in addition to the approval required by Annex V (Part SPA), Subpart G.

text: Subpart B — Operational procedures

text: AMC1 NCC.OP.100 Use of aerodromes and operating sites

text: USE OF OPERATING SITES (a) The pilot-in-command should have available from a pre-survey or other publication, for each operating site to be used, diagrams or ground and aerial photographs, depiction (pictorial) and description of: (1) the overall dimensions of the operating site; (2) location and height of relevant obstacles to approach and take-off profiles and in the manoeuvring area; (3) approach and take-off flight paths; (4) surface condition (blowing dust/snow/sand); (5) provision of control of third parties on the ground (if applicable); (6) lighting, if applicable; (7) procedure for activating the operating site in accordance with national regulations, if applicable; (8) other useful information, for example details of the appropriate ATS agency and frequency; and (9) site suitability with reference to available aircraft performance. (b) Where the operator specifically permits operation from sites that are not presurveyed, the pilot-in-command should make, from the air, a judgement on the suitability of a site. At least (a)(1) to (a)(6) inclusive and (a)(9) should be considered.

text: GM1 NCC.OP.100 Use of aerodromes and operating sites

text: PUBLICATIONS ‘Other publication’ mentioned in AMC1 NCC.OP.100 refers to publication means, such as: (a) civil as well as military aeronautical information publication; (b) visual flight rules (VFR) guides; (c) commercially available aeronautical publications; and (d) non-commercially available publications.

text: AMC1 NCC.OP.110 Aerodrome operating minima — general

text: COMMERCIALLY AVAILABLE INFORMATION An acceptable method of specifying aerodrome operating minima is through the use of commercially available information.

text: AMC2 NCC.OP.110 Aerodrome operating minima — general

text: GENERAL (a) The aerodrome operating minima should not be lower than the values given in NCC.OP.111 or AMC3 NCC.OP.110 (c). (b) Whenever practical approaches should be flown as stabilised approaches (SAps). Different procedures may be used for a particular approach to a particular runway. (c) Whenever practical, non-precision approaches should be flown using the continuous descent final approach (CDFA) technique. Different procedures may be used for a particular approach to a particular runway. (d) For approaches not flown using the CDFA technique: when calculating the minima in accordance with NCC.OP.111, the applicable minimum runway visual range (RVR) should be increased by 200 m for Category A and B aeroplanes and by 400 m for Category C and D aeroplanes, provided the resulting RVR/converted meteorological visibility (CMV) value does not exceed 5 000 m. SAp or CDFA should be used as soon as facilities are improved to allow these techniques.

text: AMC3 NCC.OP.110 Aerodrome operating minima — general

text: TAKE-OFF OPERATIONS (a) General: (1) Take-off minima should be expressed as visibility (VIS) or RVR limits, taking into account all relevant factors for each aerodrome planned to be used and aircraft characteristics. Where there is a specific need to see and avoid obstacles on departure and/or for a forced landing, additional conditions, e.g. ceiling, should be specified. (2) The pilot-in-command should not commence take-off unless the weather conditions at the aerodrome of departure are equal to or better than applicable minima for landing at that aerodrome, unless a weatherpermissible take-off alternate aerodrome is available. (3) When the reported meteorological visibility is below that required for take-off and RVR is not reported, a take-off should only be commenced if the pilot-incommand can determine that the visibility along the take-off runway/area is equal to or better than the required minimum. (4) When no reported meteorological visibility or RVR is available, a take-off should only be commenced if the pilot-in-command can determine that the RVR/VIS along the take-off runway/area is equal to or better than the required minimum. (b) Visual reference: (1) The take-off minima should be selected to ensure sufficient guidance to control the aircraft in the event of both a rejected take-off in adverse circumstances and a continued take-off after failure of the critical engine. (2) For night operations, ground lights should be available to illuminate the runway/final approach and take-off area (FATO) and any obstacles.

text: (c) Required RVR/visibility: (1) Aeroplanes: (i) For aeroplanes, the take-off minima specified by the operator should be expressed as RVR/VIS values not lower than those specified in Table 1.A. (ii) When reported RVR or meteorological visibility is not available, the pilot-in-command should not commence take-off unless he/she can determine that the actual conditions satisfy the applicable take-off minima. (2) Helicopters: (i) For helicopters having a mass where it is possible to reject the take-off and land on the FATO in case of the critical engine failure being recognised at or before the take-off decision point (TDP), the operator should specify an RVR/VIS as take-off minima in accordance with Table 1.H. (ii) For all other cases, the pilot-in-command should operate to take-off minima of 800 m RVR/VIS and remain clear of cloud during the take-off manoeuvre until reaching the performance capabilities of (c)(2)(i). (iii) Table 5 for converting reported meteorological visibility to RVR should not be used for calculating take-off minima.

text: Table 1.A: Take-off — aeroplanes (without low visibility take-off (LVTO) approval) RVR/VIS

text: Facilities RVR/VIS (m)*

text: Day only: Nil** 500

text: Day: at least runway edge lights or runway 400 centreline markings Night: at least runway edge lights or runway centreline lights and runway end lights

text: Table 1.H: Take-off — helicopters (without LVTO approval) RVR/Visibility

text: Onshore aerodromes with instrument flight RVR/VIS (m) rules (IFR) departure procedures

text: No light and no markings (day only) 400 or the rejected takeoff distance, whichever is the greater No markings (night) 800 Runway edge/FATO light and centreline marking 400 Runway edge/FATO light, centreline marking 400 and relevant RVR information

text: Offshore helideck *

text: Two-pilot operations 400 Single-pilot operations 500 *: The take-off flight path to be free of obstacles.

text: AMC4 NCC.OP.110 Aerodrome operating minima — general

text: CRITERIA FOR ESTABLISHING RVR/CMV (a) In order to qualify for the lowest allowable values of RVR/CMV specified in Table 4.A, the instrument approach should meet at least the following facility requirements and associated conditions: (1) Instrument approaches with designated vertical profile up to and including 4.5° for Category A and B aeroplanes, or 3.77° for Category C and D aeroplanes, where the facilities are: (i) instrument landing system (ILS)/microwave landing system (MLS)/GBAS landing system (GLS)/precision approach radar (PAR); or (ii) approach procedure with vertical guidance (APV); and where the final approach track is offset by not more than 15° for Category A and B aeroplanes or by not more than 5° for Category C and D aeroplanes. (2) Instrument approach operations flown using the CDFA technique with a nominal vertical profile, up to and including 4.5° for Category A and B aeroplanes, or 3.77° for Category C and D aeroplanes, where the facilities are non-directional beacon (NDB), NDB/distance measuring equipment (DME), VHF omnidirectional radio range (VOR), VOR/DME, localiser (LOC), LOC/DME, VHF direction finder (VDF), surveillance radar approach (SRA) or global

text: navigation satellite system (GNSS)/lateral navigation (LNAV), with a final approach segment of at least 3 NM, which also fulfil the following criteria: (i) the final approach track is offset by not more than 15° for Category A and B aeroplanes or by not more than 5° for Category C and D aeroplanes; (ii) the final approach fix (FAF) or another appropriate fix where descent is initiated is available, or distance to threshold (THR) is available by flight management system (FMS)/area navigation (NDB/DME) or DME; and (iii) the missed approach point (MAPt) is determined by timing, the distance from FAF to THR is ≤ 8 NM. (3) Instrument approaches where the facilities are NDB, NDB/DME, VOR, VOR/DME, LOC, LOC/DME, VDF, SRA or GNSS/LNAV, not fulfilling the criteria in (a)(2), or with an minimum descent height (MDH) ≥ 1 200 ft. (b) The missed approach operation, after an approach operation has been flown using the CDFA technique, should be executed when reaching the decision height/altitude (DH/A) or the MAPt, whichever occurs first. The lateral part of the missed approach procedure should be flown via the MAPt unless otherwise stated on the approach chart.

text: DETERMINATION OF RVR/CMV/VIS MINIMA FOR NPA, APV, CAT I - AEROPLANES (a) The minimum RVR/CMV/VIS should be the highest of the values specified in Table 3 and Table 4.A but not greater than the maximum values specified in Table 4.A, where applicable. (b) The values in Table 3 should be derived from the formula below: required RVR/VIS (m) = [(DH/MDH (ft) x 0.3048) / tanα] – length of approach lights (m); where α is the calculation angle, being a default value of 3.00° increasing in steps of 0.10° for each line in Table 3 up to 3.77° and then remaining constant. (c) If the approach is flown with a level flight segment at or above MDA/H, 200 m should be added for Category A and B aeroplanes and 400 m for Category C and D aeroplanes to the minimum RVR/CMV/VIS value resulting from the application of Table 3 and Table 4.A. (d) An RVR of less than 750 m as indicated in Table 3 may be used: (1) for CAT I operations to runways with full approach lighting system (FALS), runway touchdown zone lights (RTZL) and runway centreline lights (RCLL); (2) for CAT I operations to runways without RTZL and RCLL when using an approved head-up guidance landing system (HUDLS), or equivalent approved system, or when conducting a coupled approach or flight-director-flown approach to a DH. The ILS should not be published as a restricted facility; and

text: (3) for APV operations to runways with FALS, RTZL and RCLL when using an approved head-up display (HUD). (e) Lower values than those specified in Table 3 may be used for HUDLS and auto-land operations if approved in accordance with Annex V (Part SPA), Subpart E. (f) The visual aids should comprise standard runway day markings and approach and runway lights as specified in Table 2. The competent authority may approve that RVR values relevant to a basic approach lighting system (BALS) are used on runways where the approach lights are restricted in length below 210 m due to terrain or water, but where at least one cross-bar is available. (g) For night operations or for any operation where credit for runway and approach lights is required, the lights should be on and serviceable, except as provided for in Table 6. (h) For single-pilot operations, the minimum RVR/VIS should be calculated in accordance with the following additional criteria: (1) an RVR of less than 800 m as indicated in Table 3 may be used for CAT I approaches provided any of the following is used at least down to the applicable DH: (i) a suitable autopilot, coupled to an ILS, MLS or GLS that is not published as restricted; or (ii) an approved HUDLS, including, where appropriate, enhanced vision system (EVS), or equivalent approved system; (2) where RTZL and/or RCLL are not available, the minimum RVR/CMV should not be less than 600 m; and (3) an RVR of less than 800 m as indicated in Table 3 may be used for APV operations to runways with FALS, RTZL and RCLL when using an approved HUDLS, or equivalent approved system, or when conducting a coupled approach to a DH equal to or greater than 250 ft.

text: Table 2: Approach lighting systems

text: Class of lighting Length, configuration and intensity of approach facility lights

text: FALS CAT I lighting system (HIALS ≥ 720 m) distance coded centreline, Barrette centreline

text: IALS Simple approach lighting system (HIALS 420 – 719 m) single source, Barrette

text: BALS Any other approach lighting system (HIALS, MIALS or ALS 210 – 419 m)

text: NALS Any other approach lighting system (HIALS, MIALS or ALS < 210 m) or no approach lights

text: Table 3: RVR/CMV vs. DH/MDH

text: DH or MDH Class of lighting facility

text: FALS IALS BALS NALS

text: See (d), (e), (h) above for RVR < 750/800 m

text: ft RVR/CMV (m)

text: 200 - 210 550 750 1 000 1 200 211 - 220 550 800 1 000 1 200 221 - 230 550 800 1 000 1 200 231 - 240 550 800 1 000 1 200 241 - 250 550 800 1 000 1 300 251 - 260 600 800 1 100 1 300 261 - 280 600 900 1 100 1 300 281 - 300 650 900 1 200 1 400 301 - 320 700 1 000 1 200 1 400 321 - 340 800 1 100 1 300 1 500 341 - 360 900 1 200 1 400 1 600 361 - 380 1 000 1 300 1 500 1 700 381 - 400 1 100 1 400 1 600 1 800 401 - 420 1 200 1 500 1 700 1 900 421 - 440 1 300 1 600 1 800 2 000 441 - 460 1 400 1 700 1 900 2 100 461 - 480 1 500 1 800 2 000 2 200 481 500 1 500 1 800 2 100 2 300 501 - 520 1 600 1 900 2 100 2 400 521 - 540 1 700 2 000 2 200 2 400 541 - 560 1 800 2 100 2 300 2 500

text: DH or MDH Class of lighting facility

text: FALS IALS BALS NALS

text: ft RVR/CMV (m)

text: 561 - 580 1 900 2 200 2 400 2 600 581 - 600 2 000 2 300 2 500 2 700 601 - 620 2 100 2 400 2 600 2 800 621 - 640 2 200 2 500 2 700 2 900 641 - 660 2 300 2 600 2 800 3 000 661 - 680 2 400 2 700 2 900 3 100 681 - 700 2 500 2 800 3 000 3 200 701 - 720 2 600 2 900 3 100 3 300 721 - 740 2 700 3 000 3 200 3 400 741 - 760 2 700 3 000 3 300 3 500 761 - 800 2 900 3 200 3 400 3 600 801 - 850 3 100 3 400 3 600 3 800 851 - 900 3 300 3 600 3 800 4 000 901 - 950 3 600 3 900 4 100 4 300 951 - 1 000 3 800 4 100 4 300 4 500 1 001 - 1 100 4 100 4 400 4 600 4 900 1 101 - 1 200 4 600 4 900 5 000 5 000 1 201 and above 5 000 5 000 5 000 5 000

text: Table 4.A: CAT I, APV, NPA - aeroplanes Minimum and maximum applicable RVR/CMV (lower and upper cut-off limits)

text: Facility/conditions RVR/CMV Aeroplane category (m) A B C D

text: ILS, MLS, GLS, PAR, Min According to Table 3 GNSS/SBAS, GNSS/VNAV

text: Max 1 500 1 500 2 400 2 400

text: NDB, NDB/DME, VOR, Min 750 750 750 750 VOR/DME, LOC, LOC/DME, VDF, SRA, Max 1 500 1 500 2 400 2 400 GNSS/LNAV with a procedure that fulfils the criteria in AMC4 NCC.OP.110 (a)(2).

text: For NDB, NDB/DME, VOR, Min 1 000 1 000 1 200 1 200 VOR/DME, LOC, LOC/DME, VDF, SRA, Max According to Table 3 if flown using the GNSS/LNAV: CDFA technique, otherwise an add-on of 200/400 m applies to the values in — not fulfilling the Table 3 but not to result in a value criteria in AMC4 exceeding 5 000 m. NCC.OP.110 (a)(2)., or — with a DH or MDH ≥ 1 200 ft

text: AMC6 NCC.OP.110 Aerodrome operating minima — general

text: DETERMINATION OF RVR/CMV/VIS MINIMA FOR NPA, CAT I — HELICOPTERS (a) For non-precision approach (NPA) operations the minima specified in Table 4.1.H should apply: (1) where the missed approach point is within ½ NM of the landing threshold, the approach minima specified for FALS may be used regardless of the length of approach lights available. However, FATO/runway edge lights, threshold lights, end lights and FATO/runway markings are still required; (2) for night operations, ground lights should be available to illuminate the FATO/runway and any obstacles; and (3) for single-pilot operations, the minimum RVR is 800 m or the minima in Table 4.2.H, whichever is higher. (b) For CAT I operations, the minima specified in Table 4.2.H should apply:

text: (1) for night operations, ground light should be available to illuminate the FATO/runway and any obstacles;

text: (2) for single-pilot operations, the minimum RVR/VIS should be calculated in accordance with the following additional criteria:

text: (i) an RVR of less than 800 m should not be used except when using a suitable autopilot coupled to an ILS, MLS or GLS, in which case normal minima apply; and

text: (ii) the DH applied should not be less than 1.25 times the minimum use height for the autopilot.

text: Table 4.1.H : Onshore NPA minima

text: MDH (ft) * Facilities vs. RVR/CMV (m) **, ***

text: FALS IALS BALS NALS

text: 250 – 299 600 800 1 000 1 000

text: 300 – 449 800 1 000 1 000 1 000

text: 450 and above 1 000 1 000 1 000 1 000

text: Table 4.2.H: Onshore CAT I minima

text: DH (ft) * Facilities vs. RVR/CMV (m) **, ***

text: FALS IALS BALS NALS

text: 200 500 600 700 1 000

text: 201 – 250 550 650 750 1 000

text: 251 – 300 600 700 800 1 000

text: 301 and above 750 800 900 1 000

text: AMC7 NCC.OP.110 Aerodrome operating minima — general

text: VISUAL APPROACH OPERATIONS

text: For a visual approach operation the RVR should not be less than 800 m.

text: AMC8 NCC.OP.110 Aerodrome operating minima — general

text: CONVERSION OF REPORTED METEOROLOGICAL VISIBILITY TO RVR/CMV

text: (a) A conversion from meteorological visibility to RVR/CMV should not be used:

text: (1) when reported RVR is available;

text: (2) for calculating take-off minima; and

text: (3) for other RVR minima less than 800 m.

text: (b) If the RVR is reported as being above the maximum value assessed by the aerodrome operator, e.g. ‘RVR more than 1 500 m’, it should not be considered as a reported value for (a)(1). (c) When converting meteorological visibility to RVR in circumstances other than those in (a), the conversion factors specified in Table 5 should be used.

text: Table 5 : Conversion of reported meteorological visibility to RVR/CMV

text: RVR/CMV = reported meteorological visibility x Light elements in operation

text: Day Night

text: HI approach and runway lights 1.5 2.0 Any type of light installation other 1.0 1.5 than above No lights 1.0 not applicable

text: AMC9 NCC.OP.110 Aerodrome operating minima — general

text: EFFECT ON LANDING MINIMA OF TEMPORARILY FAILED OR DOWNGRADED GROUND EQUIPMENT (a) General These instructions are intended for both pre-flight and in-flight use. It is, however, not expected that the pilot-in-command would consult such instructions after passing 1 000 ft above the aerodrome. If failures of ground aids are announced at such a late stage, the approach could be continued at the pilot-in-command’s discretion. If failures are announced before such a late stage in the approach, their effect on the approach should be considered as described in Table 6 and, if considered necessary, the approach should be abandoned. (b) Conditions applicable to Table 6: (1) multiple failures of runway/FATO lights other than indicated in Table 6 should not be acceptable; (2) deficiencies of approach and runway/FATO lights are treated separately; and (3) failures other than ILS, MLS affect RVR only and not DH.

text: Table 6 : Failed or downgraded equipment — effect on landing minima

text: Failed or Effect on landing minima downgraded equipment CAT I APV, NPA

text: ILS/MLS standby No effect

text: transmitter

text: APV — not applicable

text: NPA with FAF: no effect unless used No effect if as FAF replaced by Outer marker height check at If the FAF cannot be identified (e.g. 1 000 ft no method available for timing of descent), non-precision operations cannot be conducted

text: Middle marker No effect No effect unless used as MAPt

text: RVR Assessment No effect Systems

text: Approach lights Minima as for NALS

text: Approach lights except Minima as for BALS the last 210 m

text: Approach lights except Minima as for IALS the last 420 m

text: Standby power for No effect approach lights

text: Edge lights, threshold Day — no effect lights and runway end Night — not allowed lights

text: No effect if flight director (F/D), HUDLS Centreline lights or auto-land; No effect

text: otherwise RVR 750 m

text: Centreline lights spacing increased to No effect 30 m

text: No effect if F/D, HUDLS or Touchdown zone lights auto-land; No effect otherwise RVR 750 m Taxiway lighting No effect system

text: GM1 NCC.OP.110 Aerodrome operating minima — general

text: AIRCRAFT CATEGORIES (a) Aircraft categories should be based on the indicated airspeed at threshold (VAT), which is equal to the stalling speed (VSO) multiplied by 1.3 or where published 1-g (gravity) stall speed (VS1g) multiplied by 1.23 in the landing configuration at the maximum certified landing mass. If both VSO and VS1g are available, the higher resulting VAT should be used. (b) The aircraft categories specified in the following table should be used.

text: Table 1: Aircraft categories corresponding to VAT values

text: Aircraft VAT category

text: A Less than 91 kt B from 91 to 120 kt C from 121 to 140 kt D from 141 to 165 kt E from 166 to 210 kt

text: GM2 NCC.OP.110 Aerodrome operating minima — general

text: CONTINUOUS DESCENT FINAL APPROACH (CDFA) — AEROPLANES (a) Introduction (1) Controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) is a major hazard in aviation. Most CFIT accidents occur in the final approach segment of non-precision approaches; the use of stabilised-approach criteria on a continuous descent with a constant, predetermined vertical path is seen as a major improvement in

text: safety during the conduct of such approaches. Operators should ensure that the following techniques are adopted as widely as possible, for all approaches. (2) The elimination of level flight segments at MDA close to the ground during approaches, and the avoidance of major changes in attitude and power/thrust close to the runway that can destabilise approaches, are seen as ways to reduce operational risks significantly. (3) The term CDFA has been selected to cover a flight technique for any type of NPA operation. (4) The advantages of CDFA are as follows: (i) the technique enhances safe approach operations by the utilisation of standard operating practices; (ii) the technique is similar to that used when flying an ILS approach, including when executing the missed approach and the associated missed approach procedure manoeuvre; (iii) the aeroplane attitude may enable better acquisition of visual cues; (iv) the technique may reduce pilot workload; (v) the approach profile is fuel-efficient; (vi) the approach profile affords reduced noise levels; (vii) the technique affords procedural integration with APV operations; and (viii) when used and the approach is flown in a stabilised manner, CDFA is the safest approach technique for all NPA operations. (b) CDFA (1) Continuous descent final approach is defined in Annex I to the Regulation on Air Operations. (2) An approach is only suitable for application of a CDFA technique when it is flown along a nominal vertical profile; a nominal vertical profile is not forming part of the approach procedure design, but can be flown as a continuous descent. The nominal vertical profile information may be published or displayed on the approach chart to the pilot by depicting the nominal slope or range/distance vs. height. Approaches with a nominal vertical profile are considered to be: (i) NDB, NDB/DME (non-directional beacon/distance measuring equipment); (ii) VOR (VHF omnidirectional radio range), VOR/DME; (iii) LOC (localiser), LOC/DME; (iv) VDF (VHF direction finder), SRA (surveillance radar approach); or (v) GNSS/LNAV (global navigation satellite system/lateral navigation); (3) Stabilised approach (SAp) is defined in Annex I to the Regulation on Air Operations.

text: (i) The control of the descent path is not the only consideration when using the CDFA technique. Control of the aeroplane’s configuration and energy is also vital to the safe conduct of an approach. (ii) The control of the flight path, described above as one of the requirements for conducting an SAp, should not be confused with the path requirements for using the CDFA technique. The predetermined path requirements for conducting an SAp are established by the operator and published in the operations manual part B. (iii) The predetermined approach slope requirements for applying the CDFA technique are established by the following: (A) the published ‘nominal’ slope information when the approach has a nominal vertical profile; and (B) the designated final approach segment minimum of 3 NM, and maximum, when using timing techniques, of 8 NM. (iv) An SAp will never have any level segment of flight at DA/H or MDA/H, as applicable. This enhances safety by mandating a prompt missed approach procedure manoeuvre at DA/H or MDA/H. (v) An approach using the CDFA technique will always be flown as an SAp, since this is a requirement for applying CDFA. However, an SAp does not have to be flown using the CDFA technique, for example a visual approach.

text: GM3 NCC.OP.110 Aerodrome operating minima — general

text: TAKE-OFF MINIMA — HELICOPTERS To ensure sufficient control of the helicopter in IMC, the speed, before entering in IMC, should be above the minimum authorised speed in IMC, Vmini. This is a limitation in the AFM. Therefore, the lowest speed before entering in IMC is the highest of Vtoss (take-off safety speed) and Vmini. As example, Vtoss is 45 kt and Vmini 60 kt. In that case, the take–off minima have to include the distance to accelerate to 60 kt. The take-off distance should be increased accordingly.

text: AMC1 NCC.OP.111 Aerodrome operating minima — NPA, APV, CAT I operations

text: NPA FLOWN WITH THE CDFA TECHNIQUE The DA/DH used should take into account any add-on to the published minima as identified by the operator’s management system and specified in the operations manual (aerodrome operating minima).

text: GM1 NCC.OP.112 Aerodrome operating minima — circling operations with aeroplanes

text: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION (a) The purpose of this Guidance Material is to provide operators with supplemental information regarding the application of aerodrome operating minima in relation to circling approaches. (b) Conduct of flight — general: (1) the MDH and obstacle clearance height (OCH) included in the procedure are referenced to aerodrome elevation; (2) the MDA is referenced to mean sea level; (3) for these procedures, the applicable visibility is the meteorological visibility; and (4) operators should provide tabular guidance of the relationship between height above threshold and the in-flight visibility required to obtain and sustain visual contact during the circling manoeuvre. (c) Instrument approach followed by visual manoeuvring (circling) without prescribed tracks: (1) When the aeroplane is on the initial instrument approach, before visual reference is stabilised, but not below MDA/H — the aeroplane should follow the corresponding instrument approach procedure until the appropriate instrument MAPt is reached. (2) At the beginning of the level flight phase at or above the MDA/H, the instrument approach track determined by the radio navigation aids, RNAV, RNP, ILS, MLS or GLS should be maintained until the pilot: (i) estimates that, in all probability, visual contact with the runway of intended landing or the runway environment will be maintained during the entire circling procedure; (ii) estimates that the aeroplane is within the circling area before commencing circling; and (iii) is able to determine the aeroplane’s position in relation to the runway of intended landing with the aid of the appropriate external references. (3) When reaching the published instrument MAPt and the conditions stipulated in (c)(2) are unable to be established by the pilot, a missed approach should be carried out in accordance with that instrument approach procedure. (4) After the aeroplane has left the track of the initial instrument approach, the flight phase outbound from the runway should be limited to an appropriate distance, which is required to align the aeroplane onto the final approach. Such manoeuvres should be conducted to enable the aeroplane: (i) to attain a controlled and stable descent path to the intended landing runway; and

text: (ii) to remain within the circling area and in a such way that visual contact with the runway of intended landing or runway environment is maintained at all times. (5) Flight manoeuvres should be carried out at an altitude/height that is not less than the circling MDA/H. (6) Descent below MDA/H should not be initiated until the threshold of the runway to be used has been appropriately identified. The aeroplane should be in a position to continue with a normal rate of descent and land within the touchdown zone. (d) Instrument approach followed by a visual manoeuvring (circling) with prescribed track. (1) The aeroplane should remain on the initial instrument approach procedure until one of the following is reached: (i) the prescribed divergence point to commence circling on the prescribed track; or (ii) the MAPt. (2) The aeroplane should be established on the instrument approach track determined by the radio navigation aids, RNAV, RNP, ILS, MLS or GLS in level flight at or above the MDA/H at or by the circling manoeuvre divergence point. (3) If the divergence point is reached before the required visual reference is acquired, a missed approach should be initiated not later than the MAPt and completed in accordance with the initial instrument approach procedure. (4) When commencing the prescribed circling manoeuvre at the published divergence point, the subsequent manoeuvres should be conducted to comply with the published routing and published heights/altitudes. (5) Unless otherwise specified, once the aeroplane is established on the prescribed track(s), the published visual reference does not need to be maintained unless: (i) required by the State of the aerodrome; or (ii) the circling MAPt (if published) is reached. (6) If the prescribed circling manoeuvre has a published MAPt and the required visual reference has not been obtained by that point, a missed approach should be executed in accordance with (e)(2) and (e)(3). (7) Subsequent further descent below MDA/H should only commence when the required visual reference has been obtained. (8) Unless otherwise specified in the procedure, final descent should not be commenced from MDA/H until the threshold of the intended landing runway has been identified and the aeroplane is in a position to continue with a normal rate of descent to land within the touchdown zone. (e) Missed approach (1) Missed approach during the instrument procedure prior to circling:

text: (i) if the missed approach procedure is required to be flown when the aeroplane is positioned on the instrument approach track defined by radio navigation aids; RNAV, RNP, ILS, MLS or GLS, and before commencing the circling manoeuvre, the published missed approach for the instrument approach should be followed; or (ii) if the instrument approach procedure is carried out with the aid of an ILS, MLS or a stabilised approach (SAp), the MAPt associated with an ILS or MLS procedure without glide path (GP-out procedure) or the SAp, where applicable, should be used. (2) If a prescribed missed approach is published for the circling manoeuvre, this overrides the manoeuvres prescribed below. (3) If visual reference is lost while circling to land after the aeroplane has departed from the initial instrument approach track, the missed approach specified for that particular instrument approach should be followed. It is expected that the pilot will make an initial climbing turn toward the intended landing runway to a position overhead of the aerodrome where the pilot will establish the aeroplane in a climb on the instrument missed approach segment. (4) The aeroplane should not leave the visual manoeuvring (circling) area, which is obstacle protected, unless: (i) established on the appropriate missed approach procedure; or (ii) at minimum sector altitude (MSA). (5) All turns should be made in the same direction and the aeroplane should remain within the circling protected area while climbing either: (i) to the altitude assigned to any published circling missed approach manoeuvre if applicable; (ii) to the altitude assigned to the missed approach of the initial instrument approach; (iii) to the MSA; (iv) to the minimum holding altitude (MHA) applicable for transition to a holding facility or fix, or continue to climb to an MSA; or (v) as directed by ATS. When the missed approach procedure is commenced on the ‘downwind’ leg of the circling manoeuvre, an ‘S’ turn may be undertaken to align the aeroplane on the initial instrument approach missed approach path, provided the aeroplane remains within the protected circling area. The pilot-in-command should be responsible for ensuring adequate terrain clearance during the above-stipulated manoeuvres, particularly during the execution of a missed approach initiated by ATS. (6) Because the circling manoeuvre may be accomplished in more than one direction, different patterns will be required to establish the aeroplane on the prescribed missed approach course depending on its position at the time visual reference is lost. In particular, all turns are to be in the prescribed

text: direction if this is restricted, e.g. to the west/east (left or right hand) to remain within the protected circling area. (7) If a missed approach procedure is published for a particular runway onto which the aeroplane is conducting a circling approach and the aeroplane has commenced a manoeuvre to align with the runway, the missed approach for this direction may be accomplished. The ATS unit should be informed of the intention to fly the published missed approach procedure for that particular runway. (8) The pilot-in-command should advise ATS when any missed approach procedure has been commenced, the height/altitude the aeroplane is climbing to and the position the aeroplane is proceeding towards and/or heading the aeroplane is established on.

text: AMC1 NCC.OP.120 Noise abatement procedures

text: NADP DESIGN (a) For each aeroplane type two departure procedures should be defined, in accordance with ICAO Doc. 8168 (Procedures for Air Navigation Services, ‘PANS- OPS’), Volume I: (1) noise abatement departure procedure one (NADP 1), designed to meet the close-in noise abatement objective; and (2) noise abatement departure procedure two (NADP 2), designed to meet the distant noise abatement objective. (b) For each type of NADP (1 and 2), a single climb profile should be specified for use at all aerodromes, which is associated with a single sequence of actions. The NADP 1 and NADP 2 profiles may be identical.

text: GM1 NCC.OP.120 Noise abatement procedures

text: TERMINOLOGY (a) ‘Climb profile’ means in this context the vertical path of the NADP as it results from the pilot’s actions (engine power reduction, acceleration, slats/flaps retraction). (b) ‘Sequence of actions’ means the order in which these pilot’s actions are done and their timing. GENERAL (c) The rule addresses only the vertical profile of the departure procedure. Lateral track has to comply with the standard instrument departure (SID). EXAMPLE (d) For a given aeroplane type, when establishing the distant NADP, the operator should choose either to reduce power first and then accelerate, or to accelerate first and then wait until slats/flaps are retracted before reducing power. The two methods constitute two different sequences of actions.

text: (e) For an aeroplane type, each of the two departure climb profiles may be defined by one sequence of actions (one for close-in, one for distant) and two above aerodrome level (AAL) altitudes/heights. These are: (1) the altitude of the first pilot’s action (generally power reduction with or without acceleration). This altitude should not be less than 800 ft AAL; or (2) the altitude of the end of the noise abatement procedure. This altitude should usually not be more than 3 000 ft AAL. These two altitudes may be runway specific when the aeroplane flight management system (FMS) has the relevant function that permits the crew to change thrust reduction and/or acceleration altitude/height. If the aeroplane is not FMS equipped or the FMS is not fitted with the relevant function, two fixed heights should be defined and used for each of the two NADPs.

text: AMC1 NCC.OP.125 Minimum obstacle clearance altitudes — IFR flights

text: GENERAL Commercially available information specifying minimum obstacle clearance altitudes may be used.

text: AMC1 NCC.OP.140 Passenger briefing

text: TRAINING PROGRAMME (a) The operator may replace the briefing/demonstration with a passenger training programme covering all safety and emergency procedures for a given type of aircraft. (b) Only passengers who have been trained according to this programme and have flown on the aircraft type within the last 90 days may be carried on board without receiving a briefing/demonstration.

text: GM1 NCC.OP.145(b) Flight preparation

text: OPERATIONAL FLIGHT PLAN (a) Dependent on the length and complexity of the planned flight, an operational flight plan may be completed based on considerations of aircraft performance, other operating limitations and relevant expected conditions on the route to be followed and at the aerodromes/operating sites concerned. (b) The operational flight plan used and the entries made during flight may contain the following items: (1) aircraft registration; (2) aircraft type and variant; (3) date of flight; (4) flight identification; (5) names of flight crew members;

text: (6) duty assignment of flight crew members; (7) place of departure; (8) time of departure (actual off-block time, take-off time); (9) place of arrival (planned and actual); (10) time of arrival (actual landing and on-block time); (11) type of operation (VFR, ferry flight, etc.); (12) route and route segments with checkpoints/waypoints, distances, time and tracks; (13) planned cruising speed and flying times between check-points/waypoints (estimated and actual times overhead); (14) safe altitudes and minimum levels; (15) planned altitudes and flight levels; (16) fuel calculations (records of in-flight fuel checks); (17) fuel on board when starting engines; (18) alternate(s) for destination and, where applicable, take-off and en-route; (19) initial ATS flight plan clearance and subsequent reclearance; (20) in-flight replanning calculations; and (21) relevant meteorological information.

text: AMC1 NCC.OP.152 Destination alternate aerodromes — helicopters

text: OFFSHORE ALTERNATE AERODROMES (a) Weather-permissible offshore alternate aerodromes may be selected and specified subject to the following: (1) the offshore alternate aerodrome should only be used after passing a point of no return (PNR). Prior to a PNR, onshore alternate aerodromes should be used; (2) mechanical reliability of critical control systems and critical components should be considered and taken into account when determining the suitability of the alternate aerodrome; (3) one-engine-inoperative (OEI) performance capability should be attainable prior to arrival at the alternate; (4) to the extent possible, deck availability should be guaranteed; and (5) weather information should be reliable and accurate. (b) Offshore alternate aerodromes should not be used when it is possible to carry enough fuel to have an onshore alternate aerodrome. Offshore alternate aerodromes should not be used in a hostile environment. (c) The landing technique specified in the AFM following control system failure may preclude the nomination of certain helidecks as alternate aerodromes.

text: AMC1 NCC.OP.155 Refuelling with passengers embarking, on board or disembarking

text: OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES — GENERAL (a) If passengers are on board when refuelling with: (1) other than aviation gasoline (AVGAS); or (2) wide-cut type fuel; or (3) a mixture of these types of fuel, ground servicing activities and work inside the aeroplane, such as catering and cleaning, should be conducted in such a manner that they do not create a hazard and allow emergency evacuation to take place through those aisles and exits intended for emergency evacuation. (b) The deployment of integral aircraft stairs or the opening of emergency exits as a prerequisite to refuelling is not necessarily required. OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES — AEROPLANES (c) Operational procedures should specify that at least the following precautions are taken: (1) one qualified person should remain at a specified location during fuelling operations with passengers on board. This qualified person should be capable of handling emergency procedures concerning fire protection and firefighting, handling communications and initiating and directing an evacuation; (2) two-way communication should be established and should remain available by the aeroplane’s inter-communication system or other suitable means between the ground crew supervising the refuelling and the qualified personnel on board the aeroplane; the involved personnel should remain within easy reach of the system of communication; (3) crew members, personnel and passengers should be warned that refuelling will take place; (4) ‘fasten seat belts’ signs should be off; (5) ‘no smoking’ signs should be on, together with interior lighting to enable emergency exits to be identified; (6) passengers should be instructed to unfasten their seat belts and refrain from smoking; (7) the minimum required number of cabin crew should be on board and be prepared for an immediate emergency evacuation; (8) if the presence of fuel vapour is detected inside the aeroplane, or any other hazard arises during refuelling, fuelling should be stopped immediately; (9) the ground area beneath the exits intended for emergency evacuation and slide deployment areas, if applicable, should be kept clear at doors where stairs are not in position for use in the event of evacuation; and (10) provision should be made for a safe and rapid evacuation.

text: OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES — HELICOPTERS (d) Operational procedures should specify that at least the following precautions are taken: (1) door(s) on the refuelling side of the helicopter remain closed; (2) door(s) on the non-refuelling side of the helicopter remain open, weather permitting; (3) fire fighting facilities of the appropriate scale be positioned so as to be immediately available in the event of a fire; (4) sufficient personnel should be immediately available to move passengers clear of the helicopter in the event of a fire; (5) sufficient qualified personnel be on board and be prepared for an immediate emergency evacuation; (6) if the presence of fuel vapour is detected inside the helicopter, or any other hazard arises during refuelling, fuelling should be stopped immediately; (7) the ground area beneath the exits intended for emergency evacuation be kept clear; and (8) provision should be made for a safe and rapid evacuation.

text: GM1 NCC.OP.155 Refuelling with passengers embarking, on board or disembarking

text: AIRCRAFT REFUELLING PROVISIONS AND GUIDANCE ON SAFE REFUELLING PRACTICES Provisions concerning aircraft refuelling are contained in Volume I (Aerodrome Design and Operations) of ICAO Annex 14 (Aerodromes), and guidance on safe refuelling practices is contained in Parts 1 and 8 of the ICAO Airport Services Manual (Doc 9137).

text: AMC1 NCC.OP.165 Carriage of passengers

text: SEATS THAT PERMIT DIRECT ACCESS TO EMERGENCY EXITS Passengers who occupy seats that permit direct access to emergency exits should appear to be reasonably fit, strong and able to assist the rapid evacuation of the aircraft in an emergency after an appropriate briefing by the crew.

text: GM1 NCC.OP.165 Carriage of passengers

text: MEANING OF DIRECT ACCESS ‘Direct access’ means a seat from which a passenger can proceed directly to the exit without entering an aisle or passing around an obstruction.

text: AMC1 NCC.OP.180 Meteorological conditions

text: EVALUATION OF METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS Pilots should carefully evaluate the available meteorological information relevant to the proposed flight, such as applicable surface observations, winds and temperatures aloft, terminal and area forecasts, air meteorological information reports (AIRMETs), significant meteorological information (SIGMET) and pilot reports. The ultimate decision whether, when, and where to make the flight rests with the pilot-in-command. Pilots should continue to re-evaluate changing weather conditions.

text: GM1 NCC.OP.180 Meteorological conditions

text: CONTINUATION OF A FLIGHT In the case of in-flight re-planning, continuation of a flight refers to the point from which a revised flight plan applies.

text: GM1 NCC.OP.185 Ice and other contaminants — ground procedures

text: TERMINOLOGY Terms used in the context of de-icing/anti-icing have the meaning defined in the following subparagraphs. (a) ‘Anti-icing fluid’ includes, but is not limited to, the following: (1) Type I fluid if heated to min 60 °C at the nozzle; (2) mixture of water and Type I fluid if heated to min 60 °C at the nozzle; (3) Type II fluid; (4) mixture of water and Type II fluid; (5) Type III fluid; (6) mixture of water and Type III fluid; (7) Type IV fluid; (8) mixture of water and Type IV fluid. On uncontaminated aircraft surfaces Type II, III and IV anti-icing fluids are normally applied unheated. (b) ‘Clear ice’: a coating of ice, generally clear and smooth, but with some air pockets. It forms on exposed objects, the temperatures of which are at, below or slightly above the freezing temperature, by the freezing of super-cooled drizzle, droplets or raindrops. (c) ‘Conditions conducive to aircraft icing on the ground’ (e.g. freezing fog, freezing precipitation, frost, rain or high humidity (on cold soaked wings), snow or mixed rain and snow). (d) ‘Contamination’, in this context, is understood as being all forms of frozen or semifrozen moisture, such as frost, snow, slush or ice.

text: (e) ‘Contamination check’: a check of aircraft for contamination to establish the need for de-icing. (f) ‘De-icing fluid’: such fluid includes, but is not limited to, the following: (1) heated water; (2) Type I fluid; (3) mixture of water and Type I fluid; (4) Type II fluid; (5) mixture of water and Type II fluid; (6) Type III fluid; (7) mixture of water and Type III fluid; (8) Type IV fluid; (9) mixture of water and Type IV fluid. De-icing fluid is normally applied heated to ensure maximum efficiency. (g) ‘De-icing/anti-icing’: this is the combination of de-icing and anti-icing performed in either one or two steps. (h) ‘Ground ice detection system (GIDS)’: system used during aircraft ground operations to inform the personnel involved in the operation and/or the flight crew about the presence of frost, ice, snow or slush on the aircraft surfaces. (i) ‘Lowest operational use temperature (LOUT)’: the lowest temperature at which a fluid has been tested and certified as acceptable in accordance with the appropriate aerodynamic acceptance test whilst still maintaining a freezing point buffer of not less than: (1) 10 °C for a Type I de-icing/anti-icing fluid; or (2) 7 °C for Type II, III or IV de-icing/anti-icing fluids. (j) ‘Post-treatment check’: an external check of the aircraft after de-icing and/or antiicing treatment accomplished from suitably elevated observation points (e.g. from the de-icing/anti-icing equipment itself or other elevated equipment) to ensure that the aircraft is free from any frost, ice, snow or slush. (k) ‘Pre-take-off check’: an assessment normally performed by the flight crew, to validate the applied hold-over time (HoT). (l) ‘Pre-take-off contamination check’: a check of the treated surfaces for contamination, performed when the HoT has been exceeded or if any doubt exists regarding the continued effectiveness of the applied anti-icing treatment. It is normally accomplished externally, just before commencement of the take-off run. ANTI-ICING CODES (m) The following are examples of anti-icing codes: (1) ‘Type I’ at (start time) — to be used if anti-icing treatment has been performed with a Type I fluid;

text: (2) ‘Type II/100’ at (start time) — to be used if anti-icing treatment has been performed with undiluted Type II fluid; (3) ‘Type II/75’ at (start time) — to be used if anti-icing treatment has been performed with a mixture of 75 % Type II fluid and 25 % water; and (4) ‘Type IV/50’ at (start time) — to be used if anti-icing treatment has been performed with a mixture of 50 % Type IV fluid and 50 % water. (n) When a two-step de-icing/anti-icing operation has been carried out, the anti-icing code should be determined by the second step fluid. Fluid brand names may be included, if desired.

text: GM2 NCC.OP.185 Ice and other contaminants — ground procedures

text: DE-ICING/ANTI-ICING — PROCEDURES (a) De-icing and/or anti-icing procedures should take into account manufacturer’s recommendations, including those that are type-specific, and should cover: (1) contamination checks, including detection of clear ice and under-wing frost; limits on the thickness/area of contamination published in the AFM or other manufacturers’ documentation should be followed; (2) procedures to be followed if de-icing and/or anti-icing procedures are interrupted or unsuccessful; (3) post-treatment checks; (4) pre-take-off checks; (5) pre-take-off contamination checks; (6) the recording of any incidents relating to de-icing and/or anti-icing; and (7) the responsibilities of all personnel involved in de-icing and/or anti-icing. (b) The operator’s procedures should ensure the following: (1) When aircraft surfaces are contaminated by ice, frost, slush or snow, they are de-iced prior to take-off, according to the prevailing conditions. Removal of contaminants may be performed with mechanical tools, fluids (including hot water), infrared heat or forced air, taking account of aircraft type-specific provisions. (2) Account is taken of the wing skin temperature versus outside air temperature (OAT), as this may affect: (i) the need to carry out aircraft de-icing and/or anti-icing; and/or (ii) the performance of the de-icing/anti-icing fluids. (3) When freezing precipitation occurs or there is a risk of freezing precipitation occurring that would contaminate the surfaces at the time of take-off, aircraft surfaces should be anti-iced. If both de-icing and anti-icing are required, the procedure may be performed in a one or two-step process, depending upon weather conditions, available equipment, available fluids and the desired hold-over time (HoT). One-step de-icing/anti-icing means that de-icing and anti-icing are carried out at the same time, using a mixture of de-icing/anti-

text: icing fluid and water. Two-step de-icing/anti-icing means that de-icing and anti-icing are carried out in two separate steps. The aircraft is first de-iced using heated water only or a heated mixture of de-icing/anti-icing fluid and water. After completion of the de-icing operation a layer of a mixture of deicing/anti-icing fluid and water, or of de-icing/anti-icing fluid only, is sprayed over the aircraft surfaces. The second step will be applied before the firststep fluid freezes, typically within three minutes and, if necessary, area by area. (4) When an aircraft is anti-iced and a longer HoT is needed/desired, the use of a less diluted Type II or Type IV fluid should be considered. (5) All restrictions relative to OAT and fluid application (including, but not necessarily limited to, temperature and pressure) published by the fluid manufacturer and/or aircraft manufacturer, are followed and procedures, limitations and recommendations to prevent the formation of fluid residues are followed. (6) During conditions conducive to aircraft icing on the ground or after de-icing and/or anti-icing, an aircraft is not dispatched for departure unless it has been given a contamination check or a post-treatment check by a trained and qualified person. This check should cover all treated surfaces of the aircraft and be performed from points offering sufficient accessibility to these parts. To ensure that there is no clear ice on suspect areas, it may be necessary to make a physical check (e.g. tactile). (7) The required entry is made in the technical log. (8) The pilot-in-command continually monitors the environmental situation after the performed treatment. Prior to take-off he/she performs a pre-take-off check, which is an assessment of whether the applied HoT is still appropriate. This pre-take-off check includes, but is not limited to, factors such as precipitation, wind and OAT. (9) If any doubt exists as to whether a deposit may adversely affect the aircraft’s performance and/or controllability characteristics, the pilot-in-command should arrange for a pre-take-off contamination check to be performed in order to verify that the aircraft’s surfaces are free of contamination. Special methods and/or equipment may be necessary to perform this check, especially at night time or in extremely adverse weather conditions. If this check cannot be performed just before take-off, re-treatment should be applied. (10) When retreatment is necessary, any residue of the previous treatment should be removed and a completely new de-icing/anti-icing treatment should be applied. (11) When a ground ice detection system (GIDS) is used to perform an aircraft surfaces check prior to and/or after a treatment, the use of GIDS by suitably trained personnel should be part of the procedure. (c) Special operational considerations

text: (1) When using thickened de-icing/anti-icing fluids, the operator should consider a two-step de-icing/anti-icing procedure, the first step preferably with hot water and/or un-thickened fluids. (2) The use of de-icing/anti-icing fluids should be in accordance with the aircraft manufacturer’s documentation. This is particularly important for thickened fluids to assure sufficient flow-off during take-off. (3) The operator should comply with any type-specific operational requirement(s), such as an aircraft mass decrease and/or a take-off speed increase associated with a fluid application. (4) The operator should take into account any flight handling procedures (stick force, rotation speed and rate, take-off speed, aircraft attitude, etc.) laid down by the aircraft manufacturer when associated with a fluid application. (5) The limitations or handling procedures resulting from (c)(3) and/or (c)(4) should be part of the flight crew pre-take-off briefing. (d) Communications (1) Before aircraft treatment. When the aircraft is to be treated with the flight crew on board, the flight and personnel involved in the operation should confirm the fluid to be used, the extent of treatment required and any aircraft type-specific procedure(s) to be used. Any other information needed to apply the HoT tables should be exchanged. (2) Anti-icing code. The operator’s procedures should include an anti-icing code, which indicates the treatment the aircraft has received. This code provides the flight crew with the minimum details necessary to estimate an HoT and confirms that the aircraft is free of contamination. (3) After treatment. Before reconfiguring or moving the aircraft, the flight crew should receive a confirmation from the personnel involved in the operation that all de-icing and/or anti-icing operations are complete and that all personnel and equipment are clear of the aircraft. (e) Hold-over protection The operator should publish in the operations manual, when required, the HoTs in the form of a table or a diagram, to account for the various types of ground icing conditions and the different types and concentrations of fluids used. However, the times of protection shown in these tables are to be used as guidelines only and are normally used in conjunction with the pre-take-off check. (f) Training The operator’s initial and recurrent de-icing and/or anti-icing training programmes (including communication training) for flight crew and those of its personnel involved in the operation who are involved in de-icing and/or anti-icing should include additional training if any of the following is introduced: (1) a new method, procedure and/or technique; (2) a new type of fluid and/or equipment; or (3) a new type of aircraft.

text: (g) Contracting When the operator contracts training on de-icing/anti-icing, the operator should ensure that the contractor complies with the operator’s training/qualification procedures, together with any specific procedures in respect of: (1) de-icing and/or anti-icing methods and procedures; (2) fluids to be used, including precautions for storage and preparation for use; (3) specific aircraft requirements (e.g. no-spray areas, propeller/engine de-icing, auxiliary power unit (APU) operation etc.); and (4) checking and communications procedures. (h) Special maintenance considerations (1) General The operator should take proper account of the possible side effects of fluid use. Such effects may include, but are not necessarily limited to, dried and/or re-hydrated residues, corrosion and the removal of lubricants. (2) Special considerations regarding residues of dried fluids The operator should establish procedures to prevent or detect and remove residues of dried fluid. If necessary, the operator should establish appropriate inspection intervals based on the recommendations of the airframe manufacturers and/or the operator’s own experience: (i) Dried fluid residues Dried fluid residues could occur when surfaces have been treated and the aircraft has not subsequently been flown and has not been subject to precipitation. The fluid may then have dried on the surfaces. (ii) Re-hydrated fluid residues Repetitive application of thickened de-icing/anti-icing fluids may lead to the subsequent formation/build-up of a dried residue in aerodynamically quiet areas, such as cavities and gaps. This residue may re-hydrate if exposed to high humidity conditions, precipitation, washing, etc., and increase to many times its original size/volume. This residue will freeze if exposed to conditions at or below 0 °C. This may cause moving parts, such as elevators, ailerons, and flap actuating mechanisms to stiffen or jam in-flight. Re-hydrated residues may also form on exterior surfaces, which can reduce lift, increase drag and stall speed. Re-hydrated residues may also collect inside control surface structures and cause clogging of drain holes or imbalances to flight controls. Residues may also collect in hidden areas, such as around flight control hinges, pulleys, grommets, on cables and in gaps. (iii) Operators are strongly recommended to obtain information about the fluid dry-out and re-hydration characteristics from the fluid manufacturers and to select products with optimised characteristics. (iv) Additional information should be obtained from fluid manufacturers for handling, storage, application and testing of their products.

text: GM3 NCC.OP.185 Ice and other contaminants — ground procedures

text: DE-ICING/ANTI-ICING — BACKGROUND INFORMATION Further guidance material on this issue is given in the ICAO Manual of Aircraft Ground De-icing/Anti-icing Operations (Doc 9640) (hereinafter referred to as the ICAO Manual of Aircraft Ground De-icing/Anti-icing Operations). (a) General (1) Any deposit of frost, ice, snow or slush on the external surfaces of an aircraft may drastically affect its flying qualities because of reduced aerodynamic lift, increased drag, modified stability and control characteristics. Furthermore, freezing deposits may cause moving parts, such as elevators, ailerons, flap actuating mechanism, etc., to jam and create a potentially hazardous condition. Propeller/engine/APU/systems performance may deteriorate due to the presence of frozen contaminants on blades, intakes and components. Also, engine operation may be seriously affected by the ingestion of snow or ice, thereby causing engine stall or compressor damage. In addition, ice/frost may form on certain external surfaces (e.g. wing upper and lower surfaces, etc.) due to the effects of cold fuel/structures, even in ambient temperatures well above 0 °C. (2) Procedures established by the operator for de-icing and/or anti-icing are intended to ensure that the aircraft is clear of contamination so that degradation of aerodynamic characteristics or mechanical interference will not occur and, following anti-icing, to maintain the airframe in that condition during the appropriate HoT. (3) Under certain meteorological conditions, de-icing and/or anti-icing procedures may be ineffective in providing sufficient protection for continued operations. Examples of these conditions are freezing rain, ice pellets and hail, heavy snow, high wind velocity, fast dropping OAT or any time when freezing precipitation with high water content is present. No HoT guidelines exist for these conditions. (4) Material for establishing operational procedures can be found, for example, in: (i) ICAO Annex 3, Meteorological Service for International Air Navigation; (ii) ICAO Manual of Aircraft Ground De-icing/Anti-icing Operations; (iii) International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 11075 Aircraft — De-icing/anti-icing fluids — ISO type I; (iv) ISO 11076 Aircraft — De-icing/anti-icing methods with fluids; (v) ISO 11077 Aerospace — Self-propelled de-icing/anti-icing vehicles — Functional requirements; (vi) ISO 11078 Aircraft — De-icing/anti-icing fluids — ISO types II, III and IV; (vii) Association of European Airlines (AEA) ‘Recommendations for deicing/anti-icing of aircraft on the ground’;

text: (viii) AEA ‘Training recommendations and background information for deicing/anti-icing of aircraft on the ground’; (ix) EUROCAE ED-104A Minimum Operational Performance Specification for Ground Ice Detection Systems; (x) Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) AS5681 Minimum Operational Performance Specification for Remote On-Ground Ice Detection Systems; (xi) SAE ARP4737 Aircraft — De-icing/anti-icing methods; (xii) SAE AMS1424 De-icing/anti-Icing Fluid, Aircraft, SAE Type I; (xiii) SAE AMS1428 Fluid, Aircraft De-icing/anti-icing, Non-Newtonian, (Pseudoplastic), SAE Types II, III, and IV; (xiv) SAE ARP1971 Aircraft De-icing Vehicle — Self-Propelled, Large and Small Capacity; (xv) SAE ARP5149 Training Programme Guidelines for De-icing/anti-icing of Aircraft on Ground; and (xvi) SAE ARP5646 Quality Program Guidelines for De-icing/anti-icing of Aircraft on the Ground. (b) Fluids (1) Type I fluid: Due to its properties, Type I fluid forms a thin, liquid-wetting film on surfaces to which it is applied which, under certain weather conditions, gives a very limited HoT. With this type of fluid, increasing the concentration of fluid in the fluid/water mix does not provide any extension in HoT. (2) Type II and Type IV fluids contain thickeners that enable the fluid to form a thicker liquid-wetting film on surfaces to which it is applied. Generally, this fluid provides a longer HoT than Type I fluids in similar conditions. With this type of fluid, the HoT can be extended by increasing the ratio of fluid in the fluid/water mix. (3) Type III fluid is a thickened fluid especially intended for use on aircraft with low rotation speeds. (4) Fluids used for de-icing and/or anti-icing should be acceptable to the operator and the aircraft manufacturer. These fluids normally conform to specifications such as SAE AMS1424, SAE AMS1428 or equivalent. Use of non-conforming fluids is not recommended due to their characteristics being unknown. The anti-icing and aerodynamic properties of thickened fluids may be seriously degraded by, for example, inappropriate storage, treatment, application, application equipment and age. (c) Hold-over protection (1) Hold-over protection is achieved by a layer of anti-icing fluid remaining on and protecting aircraft surfaces for a period of time. With a one-step deicing/anti-icing procedure, the HoT begins at the commencement of deicing/anti-icing. With a two-step procedure, the HoT begins at the

text: commencement of the second (anti-icing) step. The hold-over protection runs out: (i) at the commencement of the take-off roll (due to aerodynamic shedding of fluid); or (ii) when frozen deposits start to form or accumulate on treated aircraft surfaces, thereby indicating the loss of effectiveness of the fluid. (2) The duration of hold-over protection may vary depending on the influence of factors other than those specified in the HoT tables. Guidance should be provided by the operator to take account of such factors, which may include: (i) atmospheric conditions, e.g. exact type and rate of precipitation, wind direction and velocity, relative humidity and solar radiation; and (ii) the aircraft and its surroundings, such as aircraft component inclination angle, contour and surface roughness, surface temperature, operation in close proximity to other aircraft (jet or propeller blast) and ground equipment and structures. (3) HoTs are not meant to imply that flight is safe in the prevailing conditions if the specified HoT has not been exceeded. Certain meteorological conditions, such as freezing drizzle or freezing rain, may be beyond the certification envelope of the aircraft. (4) References to usable HoT tables may be found in the AEA ‘Recommendations for de-icing/anti-icing of aircraft on the ground’.

text: AMC1 NCC.OP.190 Ice and other contaminants — flight procedures

text: FLIGHT IN EXPECTED OR ACTUAL ICING CONDITIONS (a) The procedures to be established by the operator should take account of the design, the equipment, the configuration of the aircraft and the necessary training. For these reasons, different aircraft types operated by the same company may require the development of different procedures. In every case, the relevant limitations are those that are defined in the AFM and other documents produced by the manufacturer. (b) The operator should ensure that the procedures take account of the following: (1) the equipment and instruments that should be serviceable for flight in icing conditions; (2) the limitations on flight in icing conditions for each phase of flight. These limitations may be imposed by the aircraft’s de-icing or anti-icing equipment or the necessary performance corrections that have to be made; (3) the criteria the flight crew should use to assess the effect of icing on the performance and/or controllability of the aircraft; (4) the means by which the flight crew detects, by visual cues or the use of the aircraft’s ice detection system, that the flight is entering icing conditions; and

text: (5) the action to be taken by the flight crew in a deteriorating situation (which may develop rapidly) resulting in an adverse effect on the performance and/or controllability of the aircraft, due to: (i) the failure of the aircraft’s anti-icing or de-icing equipment to control a build-up of ice; and/or (ii) ice build-up on unprotected areas. (c) Training for dispatch and flight in expected or actual icing conditions. The content of the operations manual should reflect the training, both conversion and recurrent, that flight crew, cabin crew and all other relevant operational personnel require in order to comply with the procedures for dispatch and flight in icing conditions: (1) For the flight crew, the training should include: (i) instruction on how to recognise, from weather reports or forecasts that are available before flight commences or during flight, the risks of encountering icing conditions along the planned route and on how to modify, as necessary, the departure and in-flight routes or profiles; (ii) instruction on the operational and performance limitations or margins; (iii) the use of in-flight ice detection, anti-icing and de-icing systems in both normal and abnormal operation; and (iv) instruction on the differing intensities and forms of ice accretion and the consequent action which should be taken. (2) For the cabin crew, the training should include: (i) awareness of the conditions likely to produce surface contamination; and (ii) the need to inform the flight crew of significant ice accretion.

text: GM1 NCC.OP.215 Ground proximity detection

text: GUIDANCE MATERIAL FOR TERRAIN AWARENESS WARNING SYSTEM (TAWS) FLIGHT CREW TRAINING PROGRAMMES (a) Introduction (1) This GM contains performance-based training objectives for TAWS flight crew training. (2) The training objectives cover five areas: theory of operation; pre-flight operations; general in-flight operations; response to TAWS cautions; response to TAWS warnings. (3) The term ‘TAWS’ in this GM means a ground proximity warning system (GPWS) enhanced by a forward-looking terrain avoidance function. Alerts include both cautions and warnings. (4) The content of this GM is intended to assist operators who are producing training programmes. The information it contains has not been tailored to any specific aircraft or TAWS equipment, but highlights features that are typically available where such systems are installed. It is the responsibility of the

text: individual operator to determine the applicability of the content of this Guidance Material to each aircraft and TAWS equipment installed and their operation. Operators should refer to the AFM and/or aircraft/flight crew operating manual (A/FCOM), or similar documents, for information applicable to specific configurations. If there should be any conflict between the content of this Guidance Material and that published in the other documents described above, then the information contained in the AFM or A/FCOM will take precedence. (b) Scope (1) The scope of this GM is designed to identify training objectives in the areas of: academic training; manoeuvre training; initial evaluation; recurrent qualification. Under each of these four areas, the training material has been separated into those items that are considered essential training items and those that are considered to be desirable. In each area, objectives and acceptable performance criteria are defined. (2) No attempt is made to define how the training programme should be implemented. Instead, objectives are established to define the knowledge that a pilot operating a TAWS is expected to possess and the performance expected from a pilot who has completed TAWS training. However, the guidelines do indicate those areas in which the pilot receiving the training should demonstrate his/her understanding, or performance, using a real time interactive training device, i.e. a flight simulator. Where appropriate, notes are included within the performance criteria that amplify or clarify the material addressed by the training objective. (c) Performance-based training objectives (1) TAWS academic training (i) This training is typically conducted in a classroom environment. The knowledge demonstrations specified in this section may be completed through the successful completion of written tests or by providing correct responses to non-real-time computer-based training (CBT) questions. (ii) Theory of operation. The pilot should demonstrate an understanding of TAWS operation and the criteria used for issuing cautions and warnings. This training should address system operation. Objective: to demonstrate knowledge of how a TAWS functions. Criteria: the pilot should demonstrate an understanding of the following functions: (A) Surveillance (a) The GPWS computer processes data supplied from an air data computer, a radio altimeter, an instrument landing system (ILS)/microwave landing system (MLS)/multi-mode (MM) receiver, a roll attitude sensor, and actual position of the surfaces and of the landing gear. (b) The forward-looking terrain avoidance function utilises an accurate source of known aircraft position, such as that which may be provided by a flight management system

text: (FMS) or global positioning system (GPS), or an electronic terrain database. The source and scope of the terrain, obstacle and airport data, and features such as the terrain clearance floor, the runway picker, and geometric altitude (where provided), should all be described. (c) Displays required to deliver TAWS outputs include a loudspeaker for voice announcements, visual alerts (typically amber and red lights) and a terrain awareness display (that may be combined with other displays). In addition, means should be provided for indicating the status of the TAWS and any partial or total failures that may occur. (B) Terrain avoidance. Outputs from the TAWS computer provide visual and audio synthetic voice cautions and warnings to alert the flight crew about potential conflicts with terrain and obstacles. (C) Alert thresholds. Objective: to demonstrate knowledge of the criteria for issuing cautions and warnings. Criteria: the pilot should be able to demonstrate an understanding of the methodology used by a TAWS to issue cautions and alerts and the general criteria for the issuance of these alerts, including: (a) basic GPWS alerting modes specified in the ICAO standard: Mode 1: excessive sink rate; Mode 2: excessive terrain closure rate; Mode 3: descent after take-off or missed approach; Mode 4: unsafe proximity to terrain; and Mode 5: descent below ILS glide slope (caution only); (b) an additional, optional alert mode: Mode 6: radio altitude call-out (information only); and (c) TAWS cautions and warnings that alert the flight crew to obstacles and terrain ahead of the aircraft in line with or adjacent to its projected flight path (forward-looking terrain avoidance (FLTA) and premature descent alert (PDA) functions). (D) TAWS limitations. Objective: to verify that the pilot is aware of the limitations of TAWS. Criteria: the pilot should demonstrate knowledge and an understanding of TAWS limitations identified by the manufacturer for the equipment model installed, such as: (a) navigation should not be predicated on the use of the terrain display; (b) unless geometric altitude data is provided, use of predictive TAWS functions is prohibited when altimeter subscale settings display ‘QFE’ (atmospheric pressure at aerodrome elevation/runway threshold);

text: (c) nuisance alerts can be issued if the aerodrome of intended landing is not included in the TAWS airport database; (d) in cold weather operations, corrective procedures should be implemented by the pilot unless the TAWS has in-built compensation, such as geometric altitude data; (e) loss of input data to the TAWS computer could result in partial or total loss of functionality. Where means exist to inform the flight crew that functionality has been degraded, this should be known and the consequences understood; (f) radio signals not associated with the intended flight profile (e.g. ILS glide path transmissions from an adjacent runway) may cause false alerts; (g) inaccurate or low accuracy aircraft position data could lead to false or non-annunciation of terrain or obstacles ahead of the aircraft; and (h) minimum equipment list (MEL) restrictions should be applied in the event of the TAWS becoming partially or completely unserviceable. (It should be noted that basic GPWS has no forward-looking capability.) (E) TAWS inhibits. Objective: to verify that the pilot is aware of the conditions under which certain functions of a TAWS are inhibited. Criteria: the pilot should demonstrate knowledge and an understanding of the various TAWS inhibits, including the following means of: (a) silencing voice alerts; (b) inhibiting ILS glide path signals (as may be required when executing an ILS back beam approach); (c) inhibiting flap position sensors (as may be required when executing an approach with the flaps not in a normal position for landing); (d) inhibiting the FLTA and PDA functions; and (e) selecting or deselecting the display of terrain information, together with appropriate annunciation of the status of each selection. (2) Operating procedures. The pilot should demonstrate the knowledge required to operate TAWS avionics and to interpret the information presented by a TAWS. This training should address the following topics: (i) Use of controls. Objective: to verify that the pilot can properly operate all TAWS controls and inhibits. Criteria: the pilot should demonstrate the proper use of controls, including the following means by which: (A) before flight, any equipment self-test functions can be initiated; (B) TAWS information can be selected for display; and

text: (C) all TAWS inhibits can be operated and what the consequent annunciations mean with regard to loss of functionality. (ii) Display interpretation. Objective: to verify that the pilot understands the meaning of all information that can be annunciated or displayed by a TAWS. Criteria: the pilot should demonstrate the ability to properly interpret information annunciated or displayed by a TAWS, including the following: (A) knowledge of all visual and aural indications that may be seen or heard; (B) response required on receipt of a caution; (C) response required on receipt of a warning; and (D) response required on receipt of a notification that partial or total failure of the TAWS has occurred (including annunciation that the present aircraft position is of low accuracy). (iii) Use of basic GPWS or use of the FLTA function only. Objective: to verify that the pilot understands what functionality will remain following loss of the GPWS or of the FLTA function. Criteria: the pilot should demonstrate knowledge of how to recognise the following: (A) un-commanded loss of the GPWS function, or how to isolate this function and how to recognise the level of the remaining controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) protection (essentially, this is the FLTA function); and (B) un-commanded loss of the FLTA function, or how to isolate this function and how to recognise the level of the remaining CFIT protection (essentially, this is the basic GPWS). (iv) Crew coordination. Objective: to verify that the pilot adequately briefs other flight crew members on how TAWS alerts will be handled. Criteria: the pilot should demonstrate that the pre-flight briefing addresses procedures that will be used in preparation for responding to TAWS cautions and warnings, including the following: (A) the action to be taken, and by whom, in the event that a TAWS caution and/or warning is issued; and (B) how multi-function displays will be used to depict TAWS information at take-off, in the cruise and for the descent, approach, landing (and any missed approach). This will be in accordance with procedures specified by the operator, who will recognise that it may be more desirable that other data is displayed at certain phases of flight and that the terrain display has an automatic ‘pop-up’ mode in the event that an alert is issued. (v) Reporting rules. Objective: to verify that the pilot is aware of the rules for reporting alerts to the controller and other authorities. Criteria: the pilot should demonstrate knowledge of the following:

text: (A) when, following recovery from a TAWS alert or caution, a transmission of information should be made to the appropriate ATC unit; and (B) the type of written report that is required, how it is to be compiled and whether any cross-reference should be made in the aircraft technical log and/or voyage report (in accordance with procedures specified by the operator), following a flight in which the aircraft flight path has been modified in response to a TAWS alert, or if any part of the equipment appears not to have functioned correctly. (vi) Alert thresholds. Objective: to demonstrate knowledge of the criteria for issuing cautions and warnings. Criteria: the pilot should be able to demonstrate an understanding of the methodology used by a TAWS to issue cautions and warnings and the general criteria for the issuance of these alerts, including awareness of the following: (A) modes associated with basic GPWS, including the input data associated with each; and (B) visual and aural annunciations that can be issued by TAWS and how to identify which are cautions and which are warnings. (3) TAWS manoeuvre training. The pilot should demonstrate the knowledge required to respond correctly to TAWS cautions and warnings. This training should address the following topics: (i) Response to cautions: (A) Objective: to verify that the pilot properly interprets and responds to cautions. Criteria: the pilot should demonstrate an understanding of the need, without delay: (a) to initiate action required to correct the condition that has caused the TAWS to issue the caution and to be prepared to respond to a warning, if this should follow; and (b) if a warning does not follow the caution, to notify the controller of the new position, heading and/or altitude/flight level of the aircraft, and what the pilot-in-command intends to do next. (B) The correct response to a caution might require the pilot to: (a) reduce a rate of descent and/or to initiate a climb; (b) regain an ILS glide path from below, or to inhibit a glide path signal if an ILS is not being flown; (c) select more flap, or to inhibit a flap sensor if the landing is being conducted with the intent that the normal flap setting will not be used; (d) select gear down; and/or (e) initiate a turn away from the terrain or obstacle ahead and towards an area free of such obstructions if a forward-

text: looking terrain display indicates that this would be a good solution and the entire manoeuvre can be carried out in clear visual conditions. (ii) Response to warnings. Objective: to verify that the pilot properly interprets and responds to warnings. Criteria: the pilot should demonstrate an understanding of the following: (A) The need, without delay, to initiate a climb in the manner specified by the operator. (B) The need, without delay, to maintain the climb until visual verification can be made that the aircraft will clear the terrain or obstacle ahead or until above the appropriate sector safe altitude (if certain about the location of the aircraft with respect to terrain) even if the TAWS warning stops. If, subsequently, the aircraft climbs up through the sector safe altitude, but the visibility does not allow the flight crew to confirm that the terrain hazard has ended, checks should be made to verify the location of the aircraft and to confirm that the altimeter subscale settings are correct. (C) When workload permits, that the flight crew should notify the air traffic controller of the new position and altitude/flight level and what the pilot-in-command intends to do next. (D) That the manner in which the climb is made should reflect the type of aircraft and the method specified by the aircraft manufacturer (which should be reflected in the operations manual) for performing the escape manoeuvre. Essential aspects will include the need for an increase in pitch attitude, selection of maximum thrust, confirmation that external sources of drag (e.g. spoilers/speed brakes) are retracted and respect of the stick shaker or other indication of eroded stall margin. (E) That TAWS warnings should never be ignored. However, the pilot’s response may be limited to that which is appropriate for a caution, only if: (a) the aircraft is being operated by day in clear, visual conditions; and (b) it is immediately clear to the pilot that the aircraft is in no danger in respect of its configuration, proximity to terrain or current flight path. (4) TAWS initial evaluation: (i) The flight crew member’s understanding of the academic training items should be assessed by means of a written test. (ii) The flight crew member’s understanding of the manoeuvre training items should be assessed in a flight simulation training device (FSTD) equipped with TAWS visual and aural displays and inhibit selectors similar in appearance and operation to those in the aircraft that the pilot will fly. The results should be assessed by a flight simulation training

text: instructor, synthetic flight examiner, type rating instructor or type rating examiner. (iii) The range of scenarios should be designed to give confidence that proper and timely responses to TAWS cautions and warnings will result in the aircraft avoiding a CFIT accident. To achieve this objective, the pilot should demonstrate taking the correct action to prevent a caution developing into a warning and, separately, the escape manoeuvre needed in response to a warning. These demonstrations should take place when the external visibility is zero, though there is much to be learnt if, initially, the training is given in ‘mountainous’ or ‘hilly’ terrain with clear visibility. This training should comprise a sequence of scenarios, rather than be included in line orientated flight training (LOFT). (iv) A record should be made, after the pilot has demonstrated competence, of the scenarios that were practised. (5) TAWS recurrent training: (i) TAWS recurrent training ensures that pilots maintain the appropriate TAWS knowledge and skills. In particular, it reminds pilots of the need to act promptly in response to cautions and warnings and of the unusual attitude associated with flying the escape manoeuvre. (ii) An essential item of recurrent training is the discussion of any significant issues and operational concerns that have been identified by the operator. Recurrent training should also address changes to TAWS logic, parameters or procedures and to any unique TAWS characteristics of which pilots should be aware. (6) Reporting procedures: (i) Verbal reports. Verbal reports should be made promptly to the appropriate ATC unit: (A) whenever any manoeuvre has caused the aircraft to deviate from an air traffic clearance; (B) when, following a manoeuvre that has caused the aircraft to deviate from an air traffic clearance, the aircraft has returned to a flight path that complies with the clearance; and/or (C) when an air traffic control unit issues instructions that, if followed, would cause the pilot to manoeuvre the aircraft towards terrain or obstacle or it would appear from the display that a potential CFIT occurrence is likely to result. (ii) Written reports. Written reports should be submitted in accordance with the operator's occurrence reporting scheme and they also should be recorded in the aircraft technical log: (A) whenever the aircraft flight path has been modified in response to a TAWS alert (false, nuisance or genuine); (B) whenever a TAWS alert has been issued and is believed to have been false; and/or

text: (C) if it is believed that a TAWS alert should have been issued, but was not. (iii) Within this GM, and with regard to reports: (A) the term 'false' means that the TAWS issued an alert that could not possibly be justified by the position of the aircraft in respect to terrain and it is probable that a fault or failure in the system (equipment and/or input data) was the cause; (B) the term 'nuisance' means that the TAWS issued an alert that was appropriate, but was not needed because the flight crew could determine by independent means that the flight path was, at that time, safe; (C) the term 'genuine' means that the TAWS issued an alert that was both appropriate and necessary; (D) the report terms described in (c)(6)(iii) are only meant to be assessed after the occurrence is over, to facilitate subsequent analysis, the adequacy of the equipment and the programmes it contains. The intention is not for the flight crew to attempt to classify an alert into any of these three categories when visual and/or aural cautions or warnings are annunciated.

text: GM1 NCC.OP.220 Airborne collision avoidance system (ACAS)

text: GENERAL (a) The ACAS operational procedures and training programmes established by the operator should take into account this Guidance Material. It incorporates advice contained in: (1) ICAO Annex 10, Volume IV; (2) ICAO PANS-OPS, Volume 1; (3) ICAO PANS-ATM; and (4) ICAO guidance material ‘ACAS Performance-Based Training Objectives’ (published under Attachment E of State Letter AN 7/1.3.7.2-97/77). (b) Additional guidance material on ACAS may be referred to, including information available from such sources as EUROCONTROL. ACAS FLIGHT CREW TRAINING (c) During the implementation of ACAS, several operational issues were identified that had been attributed to deficiencies in flight crew training programmes. As a result, the issue of flight crew training has been discussed within the ICAO, which has developed guidelines for operators to use when designing training programmes. (d) This Guidance Material contains performance-based training objectives for ACAS II flight crew training. Information contained here related to traffic advisories (TAs) is also applicable to ACAS I and ACAS II users. The training objectives cover five areas: theory of operation; pre-flight operations; general in-flight operations; response to TAs; and response to resolution advisories (RAs).

text: (e) The information provided is valid for version 7 and 7.1 (ACAS II). Where differences arise, these are identified. (f) The performance-based training objectives are further divided into the areas of: academic training; manoeuvre training; initial evaluation and recurrent qualification. Under each of these four areas, the training material has been separated into those items which are considered essential training items and those which are considered desirable. In each area, objectives and acceptable performance criteria are defined. (g) ACAS academic training (1) This training is typically conducted in a classroom environment. The knowledge demonstrations specified in this section may be completed through the successful completion of written tests or through providing correct responses to non-real-time computer-based training (CBT) questions. (2) Essential items (i) Theory of operation. The flight crew member should demonstrate an understanding of ACAS II operation and the criteria used for issuing TAs and RAs. This training should address the following topics: (A) System operation Objective: to demonstrate knowledge of how ACAS functions. Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate an understanding of the following functions: (a) Surveillance (1) ACAS interrogates other transponder-equipped aircraft within a nominal range of 14 NM. (2) ACAS surveillance range can be reduced in geographic areas with a large number of ground interrogators and/or ACAS II-equipped aircraft. (3) If the operator's ACAS implementation provides for the use of the Mode S extended squitter, the normal surveillance range may be increased beyond the nominal 14 NM. However, this information is not used for collision avoidance purposes. (b) Collision avoidance (1) TAs can be issued against any transponder-equipped aircraft that responds to the ICAO Mode C interrogations, even if the aircraft does not have altitude reporting capability. (2) RAs can be issued only against aircraft that are reporting altitude and in the vertical plane only. (3) RAs issued against an ACAS-equipped intruder are co-ordinated to ensure complementary RAs are issued.

text: (4) Failure to respond to an RA deprives own aircraft of the collision protection provided by own ACAS. (5) Additionally, in ACAS-ACAS encounters, failure to respond to an RA also restricts the choices available to the other aircraft's ACAS and thus renders the other aircraft's ACAS less effective than if own aircraft were not ACAS equipped. (B) Advisory thresholds Objective: to demonstrate knowledge of the criteria for issuing TAs and RAs. Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate an understanding of the methodology used by ACAS to issue TAs and RAs and the general criteria for the issuance of these advisories, including the following: (a) ACAS advisories are based on time to closest point of approach (CPA) rather than distance. The time should be short and vertical separation should be small, or projected to be small, before an advisory can be issued. The separation standards provided by ATS are different from the miss distances against which ACAS issues alerts. (b) Thresholds for issuing a TA or an RA vary with altitude. The thresholds are larger at higher altitudes. (c) A TA occurs from 15 to 48 seconds and an RA from 15 to 35 seconds before the projected CPA. (d) RAs are chosen to provide the desired vertical miss distance at CPA. As a result, RAs can instruct a climb or descent through the intruder aircraft's altitude. (C) ACAS limitations Objective: to verify that the flight crew member is aware of the limitations of ACAS. Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate knowledge and understanding of ACAS limitations, including the following: (a) ACAS will neither track nor display non-transponderequipped aircraft, nor aircraft not responding to ACAS Mode C interrogations. (b) ACAS will automatically fail if the input from the aircraft’s barometric altimeter, radio altimeter or transponder is lost. (1) In some installations, the loss of information from other on board systems such as an inertial reference system (IRS) or attitude heading reference system (AHRS) may result in an ACAS failure. Individual operators should ensure that their flight crews are

text: aware of the types of failure which will result in an ACAS failure. (2) ACAS may react in an improper manner when false altitude information is provided to own ACAS or transmitted by another aircraft. Individual operators should ensure that their flight crew are aware of the types of unsafe conditions which can arise. Flight crew members should ensure that when they are advised, if their own aircraft is transmitting false altitude reports, an alternative altitude reporting source is selected, or altitude reporting is switched off. (c) Some aeroplanes within 380 ft above ground level (AGL) (nominal value) are deemed to be ‘on ground’ and will not be displayed. If ACAS is able to determine an aircraft below this altitude is airborne, it will be displayed. (d) ACAS may not display all proximate transponder-equipped aircraft in areas of high density traffic. (e) The bearing displayed by ACAS is not sufficiently accurate to support the initiation of horizontal manoeuvres based solely on the traffic display. (f) ACAS will neither track nor display intruders with a vertical speed in excess of 10 000 ft/min. In addition, the design implementation may result in some short-term errors in the tracked vertical speed of an intruder during periods of high vertical acceleration by the intruder. (g) Ground proximity warning systems/ground collision avoidance systems (GPWSs/GCASs) warnings and wind shear warnings take precedence over ACAS advisories. When either a GPWS/GCAS or wind shear warning is active, ACAS aural annunciations will be inhibited and ACAS will automatically switch to the 'TA only' mode of operation. (D) ACAS inhibits Objective: to verify that the flight crew member is aware of the conditions under which certain functions of ACAS are inhibited. Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate knowledge and understanding of the various ACAS inhibits, including the following: (a) ‘Increase Descent’ RAs are inhibited below 1 450 ft AGL. (b) ‘Descend’ RAs are inhibited below 1 100 ft AGL. (c) All RAs are inhibited below 1 000 ft AGL. (d) All TA aural annunciations are inhibited below 500 ft AGL. (e) Altitude and configuration under which ‘Climb’ and ‘Increase Climb’ RAs are inhibited. ACAS can still issue

text: ‘Climb’ and ‘Increase Climb’ RAs when operating at the aeroplane's certified ceiling. (In some aircraft types, ‘Climb’ or ‘Increase Climb’ RAs are never inhibited.) (ii) Operating procedures The flight crew member should demonstrate the knowledge required to operate the ACAS avionics and interpret the information presented by ACAS. This training should address the following: (A) Use of controls Objective: to verify that the pilot can properly operate all ACAS and display controls. Criteria: demonstrate the proper use of controls, including the following: (a) Aircraft configuration required to initiate a self-test. (b) Steps required to initiate a self-test. (c) Recognising when the self-test was successful and when it was unsuccessful. When the self-test is unsuccessful, recognising the reason for the failure and, if possible, correcting the problem. (d) Recommended usage of range selection. Low ranges are used in the terminal area and the higher display ranges are used in the en-route environment and in the transition between the terminal and en-route environment. (e) Recognising that the configuration of the display does not affect the ACAS surveillance volume. (f) Selection of lower ranges when an advisory is issued, to increase display resolution. (g) Proper configuration to display the appropriate ACAS information without eliminating the display of other needed information. (h) If available, recommended usage of the above/below mode selector. The above mode should be used during climb and the below mode should be used during descent. (i) If available, proper selection of the display of absolute or relative altitude and the limitations of using this display if a barometric correction is not provided to ACAS. (B) Display interpretation Objective: to verify that the flight crew member understands the meaning of all information that can be displayed by ACAS. The wide variety of display implementations require the tailoring of some criteria. When the training programme is developed, these criteria should be expanded to cover details for the operator's specific display implementation.

text: Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate the ability to properly interpret information displayed by ACAS, including the following: (a) Other traffic, i.e. traffic within the selected display range that is not proximate traffic, or causing a TA or RA to be issued. (b) Proximate traffic, i.e. traffic that is within 6 NM and ± 1 200 ft. (c) Non-altitude reporting traffic. (d) No bearing TAs and RAs. (e) Off-scale TAs and RAs: the selected range should be changed to ensure that all available information on the intruder is displayed. (f) TAs: the minimum available display range that allows the traffic to be displayed should be selected, to provide the maximum display resolution. (g) RAs (traffic display): the minimum available display range of the traffic display that allows the traffic to be displayed should be selected, to provide the maximum display resolution. (h) RAs (RA display): flight crew members should demonstrate knowledge of the meaning of the red and green areas or the meaning of pitch or flight path angle cues displayed on the RA display. Flight crew members should also demonstrate an understanding of the RA display limitations, i.e. if a vertical speed tape is used and the range of the tape is less than 2 500 ft/min, an increase rate RA cannot be properly displayed. (i) If appropriate, awareness that navigation displays oriented on ‘Track-Up’ may require a flight crew member to make a mental adjustment for drift angle when assessing the bearing of proximate traffic. (C) Use of the TA only mode Objective: to verify that a flight crew member understands the appropriate times to select the TA only mode of operation and the limitations associated with using this mode. Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate the following: (a) Knowledge of the operator's guidance for the use of TA only. (b) Reasons for using this mode. If TA only is not selected when an airport is conducting simultaneous operations from parallel runways separated by less than 1 200 ft,

text: and to some intersecting runways, RAs can be expected. If, for any reason, TA only is not selected and an RA is received in these situations, the response should comply with the operator's approved procedures. (c) All TA aural annunciations are inhibited below 500 ft AGL. As a result, TAs issued below 500 ft AGL may not be noticed unless the TA display is included in the routine instrument scan. (D) Crew coordination Objective: to verify that the flight crew member understands how ACAS advisories will be handled. Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate knowledge of the crew procedures that should be used when responding to TAs and RAs, including the following: (a) task sharing between the pilot flying and the pilot monitoring; (b) expected call-outs; and (c) communications with ATC. (E) Phraseology rules Objective: to verify that the flight crew member is aware of the rules for reporting RAs to the controller. Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate the following: (a) the use of the phraseology contained in ICAO PANS-OPS; (b) an understanding of the procedures contained in ICAO PANS-ATM and ICAO Annex 2; and (c) the understanding that verbal reports should be made promptly to the appropriate ATC unit: (1) whenever any manoeuvre has caused the aeroplane to deviate from an air traffic clearance; (2) when, subsequent to a manoeuvre that has caused the aeroplane to deviate from an air traffic clearance, the aeroplane has returned to a flight path that complies with the clearance; and/or (3) when air traffic issue instructions that, if followed, would cause the crew to manoeuvre the aircraft contrary to an RA with which they are complying. (F) Reporting rules Objective: to verify that the flight crew member is aware of the rules for reporting RAs to the operator.

text: Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate knowledge of where information can be obtained regarding the need for making written reports to various States when an RA is issued. Various States have different reporting rules and the material available to the flight crew member should be tailored to the operator’s operating environment. This responsibility is satisfied by the flight crew member reporting to the operator according to the applicable reporting rules. (3) Non-essential items: advisory thresholds Objective: to demonstrate knowledge of the criteria for issuing TAs and RAs. Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate an understanding of the methodology used by ACAS to issue TAs and RAs and the general criteria for the issuance of these advisories, including the following: (i) The minimum and maximum altitudes below/above which TAs will not be issued. (ii) When the vertical separation at CPA is projected to be less than the ACAS-desired separation, a corrective RA that requires a change to the existing vertical speed will be issued. This separation varies from 300 ft at low altitude to a maximum of 700 ft at high altitude. (iii) When the vertical separation at CPA is projected to be just outside the ACAS-desired separation, a preventive RA that does not require a change to the existing vertical speed will be issued. This separation varies from 600 to 800 ft. (iv) RA fixed range thresholds vary between 0.2 and 1.1 NM. (h) ACAS manoeuvre training (1) Demonstration of the flight crew member’s ability to use ACAS displayed information to properly respond to TAs and RAs should be carried out in a full flight simulator equipped with an ACAS display and controls similar in appearance and operation to those in the aircraft. If a full flight simulator is utilised, crew resource management (CRM) should be practised during this training. (2) Alternatively, the required demonstrations can be carried out by means of an interactive CBT with an ACAS display and controls similar in appearance and operation to those in the aircraft. This interactive CBT should depict scenarios in which real-time responses should be made. The flight crew member should be informed whether or not the responses made were correct. If the response was incorrect or inappropriate, the CBT should show what the correct response should be. (3) The scenarios included in the manoeuvre training should include: corrective RAs; initial preventive RAs; maintain rate RAs; altitude crossing RAs; increase rate RAs; RA reversals; weakening RAs; and multi-aircraft encounters. The consequences of failure to respond correctly should be demonstrated by reference to actual incidents such as those publicised in EUROCONTROL ACAS II Bulletins (available on the EUROCONTROL website).

text: (i) TA responses Objective: to verify that the pilot properly interprets and responds to TAs. Criteria: the pilot should demonstrate the following: (A) Proper division of responsibilities between the pilot flying and the pilot monitoring. The pilot flying should fly the aircraft using any type-specific procedures and be prepared to respond to any RA that might follow. For aircraft without an RA pitch display, the pilot flying should consider the likely magnitude of an appropriate pitch change. The pilot monitoring should provide updates on the traffic location shown on the ACAS display, using this information to help visually acquire the intruder. (B) Proper interpretation of the displayed information. Flight crew members should confirm that the aircraft they have visually acquired is that which has caused the TA to be issued. Use should be made of all information shown on the display, note being taken of the bearing and range of the intruder (amber circle), whether it is above or below (data tag), and its vertical speed direction (trend arrow). (C) Other available information should be used to assist in visual acquisition, including ATC ‘party-line’ information, traffic flow in use, etc. (D) Because of the limitations described, the pilot flying should not manoeuvre the aircraft based solely on the information shown on the ACAS display. No attempt should be made to adjust the current flight path in anticipation of what an RA would advise, except that if own aircraft is approaching its cleared level at a high vertical rate with a TA present, vertical rate should be reduced to less than 1 500 ft/min. (E) When visual acquisition is attained, and as long as no RA is received, normal right of way rules should be used to maintain or attain safe separation. No unnecessary manoeuvres should be initiated. The limitations of making manoeuvres based solely on visual acquisition, especially at high altitude or at night, or without a definite horizon should be demonstrated as being understood. (ii) RA responses Objective: to verify that the pilot properly interprets and responds to RAs. Criteria: the pilot should demonstrate the following: (A) Proper response to the RA, even if it is in conflict with an ATC instruction and even if the pilot believes that there is no threat present. (B) Proper task sharing between the pilot flying and the pilot monitoring. The pilot flying should respond to a corrective RA with

text: appropriate control inputs. The pilot monitoring should monitor the response to the RA and should provide updates on the traffic location by checking the traffic display. Proper CRM should be used. (C) Proper interpretation of the displayed information. The pilot should recognise the intruder causing the RA to be issued (red square on display). The pilot should respond appropriately. (D) For corrective RAs, the response should be initiated in the proper direction within 5 seconds of the RA being displayed. The change in vertical speed should be accomplished with an acceleration of approximately ¼ g (gravitational acceleration of 9.81 m/sec²). (E) Recognition of the initially displayed RA being modified. Response to the modified RA should be properly accomplished, as follows: (a) For increase rate RAs, the vertical speed change should be started within 2½ seconds of the RA being displayed. The change in vertical speed should be accomplished with an acceleration of approximately ⅓ g. (b) For RA reversals, the vertical speed reversal should be started within 2½ seconds of the RA being displayed. The change in vertical speed should be accomplished with an acceleration of approximately ⅓ g. (c) For RA weakenings, the vertical speed should be modified to initiate a return towards the original clearance. (d) An acceleration of approximately ¼ g will be achieved if the change in pitch attitude corresponding to a change in vertical speed of 1 500 ft/min is accomplished in approximately 5 seconds, and of ⅓ g if the change is accomplished in approximately 3 seconds. The change in pitch attitude required to establish a rate of climb or descent of 1 500 ft/min from level flight will be approximately 6 when the true airspeed (TAS) is 150 kt, 4 at 250 kt, and 2 at 500 kt. (These angles are derived from the formula: 1 000 divided by TAS.). (F) Recognition of altitude crossing encounters and the proper response to these RAs. (G) For preventive RAs, the vertical speed needle or pitch attitude indication should remain outside the red area on the RA display. (H) For maintain rate RAs, the vertical speed should not be reduced. Pilots should recognise that a maintain rate RA may result in crossing through the intruder's altitude. (I) When the RA weakens, or when the green 'fly to' indicator changes position, the pilot should initiate a return towards the original clearance, and when ‘clear of conflict’ is annunciated, the pilot should complete the return to the original clearance.

text: (J) The controller should be informed of the RA as soon as time and workload permit, using the standard phraseology. (K) When possible, an ATC clearance should be complied with while responding to an RA. For example, if the aircraft can level at the assigned altitude while responding to RA (an ‘adjust vertical speed’ RA (version 7) or ‘level off’ (version 7.1)), it should be done; the horizontal (turn) element of an ATC instruction should be followed. (L) Knowledge of the ACAS multi-aircraft logic and its limitations, and that ACAS can optimise separations from two aircraft by climbing or descending towards one of them. For example, ACAS only considers intruders that it considers to be a threat when selecting an RA. As such, it is possible for ACAS to issue an RA against one intruder that results in a manoeuvre towards another intruder that is not classified as a threat. If the second intruder becomes a threat, the RA will be modified to provide separation from that intruder. (i) ACAS initial evaluation (1) The flight crew member’s understanding of the academic training items should be assessed by means of a written test or interactive CBT that records correct and incorrect responses to phrased questions. (2) The flight crew member’s understanding of the manoeuvre training items should be assessed in a full flight simulator equipped with an ACAS display and controls similar in appearance and operation to those in the aircraft the flight crew member will fly, and the results assessed by a qualified instructor, inspector, or check airman. The range of scenarios should include: corrective RAs; initial preventive RAs; maintain rate RAs; altitude crossing RAs; increase rate RAs; RA reversals; weakening RAs; and multi-threat encounters. The scenarios should also include demonstrations of the consequences of not responding to RAs, slow or late responses, and manoeuvring opposite to the direction called for by the displayed RA. (3) Alternatively, exposure to these scenarios can be conducted by means of an interactive CBT with an ACAS display and controls similar in appearance and operation to those in the aircraft the pilot will fly. This interactive CBT should depict scenarios in which real-time responses should be made and a record made of whether or not each response was correct. (j) ACAS recurrent training (1) ACAS recurrent training ensures that flight crew members maintain the appropriate ACAS knowledge and skills. ACAS recurrent training should be integrated into and/or conducted in conjunction with other established recurrent training programmes. An essential item of recurrent training is the discussion of any significant issues and operational concerns that have been identified by the operator. Recurrent training should also address changes to ACAS logic, parameters or procedures and to any unique ACAS characteristics which flight crew members should be made aware of.

text: (2) It is recommended that operator's recurrent training programmes using full flight simulators include encounters with conflicting traffic when these simulators are equipped with ACAS. The full range of likely scenarios may be spread over a 2 year period. If a full flight simulator, as described above, is not available, use should be made of an interactive CBT that is capable of presenting scenarios to which pilot responses should be made in real-time.

text: AMC1 NCC.OP.225 Approach and landing conditions

text: LANDING DISTANCE/FATO SUITABILITY The in-flight determination of the landing distance/FATO suitability should be based on the latest available meteorological report.

text: AMC1 NCC.OP.230 Commencement and continuation of approach

text: VISUAL REFERENCES FOR INSTRUMENT APPROACH OPERATIONS (a) NPA, APV and CAT I operations At DH or MDH, at least one of the visual references specified below should be distinctly visible and identifiable to the pilot: (1) elements of the approach lighting system; (2) the threshold; (3) the threshold markings; (4) the threshold lights; (5) the threshold identification lights; (6) the visual glide slope indicator; (7) the touchdown zone or touchdown zone markings; (8) the touchdown zone lights; (9) FATO/runway edge lights; or (10) other visual references specified in the operations manual. (b) Lower than standard category I (LTS CAT I) operations At DH, the visual references specified below should be distinctly visible and identifiable to the pilot: (1) a segment of at least three consecutive lights, being the centreline of the approach lights, or touchdown zone lights, or runway centreline lights, or runway edge lights, or a combination of these; and (2) this visual reference should include a lateral element of the ground pattern, such as an approach light crossbar or the landing threshold or a barrette of the touchdown zone light unless the operation is conducted utilising an approved HUDLS usable to at least 150 ft. (c) CAT II or OTS CAT II operations

text: At DH, the visual references specified below should be distinctly visible and identifiable to the pilot: (1) a segment of at least three consecutive lights, being the centreline of the approach lights, or touchdown zone lights, or runway centreline lights, or runway edge lights, or a combination of these; and (2) this visual reference should include a lateral element of the ground pattern, such as an approach light crossbar or the landing threshold or a barrette of the touchdown zone light unless the operation is conducted utilising an approved HUDLS to touchdown. (d) CAT III operations (1) For CAT IIIA operations and for CAT IIIB operations conducted either with fail-passive flight control systems or with the use of an approved HUDLS: at DH, a segment of at least three consecutive lights, being the centreline of the approach lights, or touchdown zone lights, or runway centreline lights, or runway edge lights, or a combination of these is attained and can be maintained by the pilot. (2) For CAT IIIB operations conducted either with fail-operational flight control systems or with a fail-operational hybrid landing system using a DH: at DH, at least one centreline light is attained and can be maintained by the pilot. (3) For CAT IIIB operations with no DH there is no requirement for visual reference with the runway prior to touchdown. (e) Approach operations utilising EVS – CAT I operations (1) At DH or MDH, the following visual references should be displayed and identifiable to the pilot on the EVS: (i) elements of the approach light; or (ii) the runway threshold, identified by at least one of the following: (A) the beginning of the runway landing surface, (B) the threshold lights, the threshold identification lights; or (C) the touchdown zone, identified by at least one of the following: the runway touchdown zone landing surface, the touchdown zone lights, the touchdown zone markings or the runway lights. (2) At 100 ft above runway threshold elevation at least one of the visual references specified below should be distinctly visible and identifiable to the pilot without reliance on the EVS: (i) the lights or markings of the threshold; or (ii) the lights or markings of the touchdown zone. (f) Approach operations utilising EVS – APV and NPA operations flown with the CDFA technique (1) At DH/MDH, visual references should be displayed and identifiable to the pilot on the EVS image as specified under (a).

text: Subpart C — Aircraft performance and operating limitations

text: AMC1 NCC.POL.105(a) Mass and balance, loading

text: CENTRE OF GRAVITY LIMITS — OPERATIONAL CG ENVELOPE AND IN-FLIGHT CG In the Certificate Limitations section of the AFM, forward and aft CG limits are specified. These limits ensure that the certification stability and control criteria are met throughout the whole flight and allow the proper trim setting for take-off. The operator should ensure that these limits are respected by: (a) Defining and applying operational margins to the certified CG envelope in order to compensate for the following deviations and errors: (1) Deviations of actual CG at empty or operating mass from published values due, for example, to weighing errors, unaccounted modifications and/or equipment variations. (2) Deviations in fuel distribution in tanks from the applicable schedule. (3) Deviations in the distribution of baggage and cargo in the various compartments as compared with the assumed load distribution as well as inaccuracies in the actual mass of baggage and cargo. (4) Deviations in actual passenger seating from the seating distribution assumed when preparing the mass and balance documentation. Large CG errors may occur when ‘free seating’, i.e. freedom of passengers to select any seat when entering the aircraft, is permitted. Although in most cases reasonably even longitudinal passenger seating can be expected, there is a risk of an extreme forward or aft seat selection causing very large and unacceptable CG errors, assuming that the balance calculation is done on the basis of an assumed even distribution. The largest errors may occur at a load factor of approximately 50 % if all passengers are seated in either the forward or aft half of the cabin. Statistical analysis indicates that the risk of such extreme seating adversely affecting the CG is greatest on small aircraft. (5) Deviations of the actual CG of cargo and passenger load within individual cargo compartments or cabin sections from the normally assumed mid position. (6) Deviations of the CG caused by gear and flap positions and by application of the prescribed fuel usage procedure, unless already covered by the certified limits. (7) Deviations caused by in-flight movement of cabin crew, galley equipment and passengers. (b) Defining and applying operational procedures in order to: (1) ensure an even distribution of passengers in the cabin; (2) take into account any significant CG travel during flight caused by passenger/crew movement; and (3) take into account any significant CG travel during flight caused by fuel consumption/transfer.

text: AMC1 NCC.POL.105(b) Mass and balance, loading

text: WEIGHING OF AN AIRCRAFT (a) New aircraft that have been weighed at the factory may be placed into operation without reweighing if the mass and balance records have been adjusted for alterations or modifications to the aircraft. Aircraft transferred from one EU operator to another EU operator do not have to be weighed prior to use by the receiving operator, unless the mass and balance cannot be accurately established by calculation. (b) The mass and centre of gravity (CG) position of an aircraft should be revised whenever the cumulative changes to the dry operating mass exceed ±0.5 % of the maximum landing mass or for aeroplanes the cumulative change in CG position exceeds 0.5 % of the mean aerodynamic chord. This should be done either by weighing the aircraft or by calculation. (c) When weighing an aircraft, normal precautions should be taken, which are consistent with good practices such as: (1) checking for completeness of the aircraft and equipment; (2) determining that fluids are properly accounted for; (3) ensuring that the aircraft is clean; and (4) ensuring that weighing is accomplished in an enclosed building. (d) Any equipment used for weighing should be properly calibrated, zeroed and used in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions. Each scale should be calibrated either by the manufacturer, by a civil department of weights and measures or by an appropriately authorised organisation within 2 years or within a time period defined by the manufacturer of the weighing equipment, whichever is less. The equipment should enable the mass of the aircraft to be established accurately. One single accuracy criterion for weighing equipment cannot be given. However, the weighing accuracy is considered satisfactory if the accuracy criteria in Table 1 are met by the individual scales/cells of the weighing equipment used:

text: Table 1: Accuracy criteria for weighing equipment

text: AMC1 NCC.POL.105(c) Mass and balance, loading

text: DRY OPERATING MASS (a) The dry operating mass should include:

text: (1) crew and crew baggage; (2) catering and removable passenger service equipment; and (3) tank water and lavatory chemicals. (b) The operator should correct the dry operating mass to account for any additional crew baggage. The position of this additional baggage should be accounted for when establishing the centre of gravity of the aircraft. (c) The operator should establish a procedure in the operations manual to determine when to select actual or standard masses for crew members. (d) When determining the actual mass by weighing, crew members’ personal belongings and hand baggage should be included. Such weighing should be conducted immediately prior to boarding the aircraft.

text: AMC1 NCC.POL.105(d) Mass and balance, loading

text: MASS VALUES FOR PASSENGERS AND BAGGAGE (a) The predetermined mass for hand baggage and clothing should be established by the operator on the basis of studies relevant to its particular operation. In any case, it should not be less than: (1) 4 kg for clothing; and (2) 6 kg for hand baggage. The passengers’ stated mass and the mass of passengers’ clothing and hand baggage should be checked prior to boarding and adjusted, if necessary. The operator should establish a procedure in the operations manual when to select actual or standard masses and the procedure to be followed when using verbal statements. (b) When determining the actual mass by weighing, passengers’ personal belongings and hand baggage should be included. Such weighing should be conducted immediately prior to boarding the aircraft. (c) When determining the mass of passengers by using standard mass values, provided in Tables 1 and 2 of NCC.POL.105(e), infants occupying separate passenger seats should be considered as children for the purpose of this AMC. When the total number of passenger seats available on an aircraft is 20 or more, the standard masses for males and females in Table 1 of NCC.POL.105(e) should be used. As an alternative, in cases where the total number of passenger seats available is 30 or more, the ‘All Adult’ mass values in Table 1 of NCC.POL.105(e) may be used. On aeroplane flights with 19 passenger seats or less and all helicopter flights where no hand baggage is carried in the cabin or where hand baggage is accounted for separately, 6 kg may be deducted from male and female masses in Table 2 of NCC.POL.105(e). Articles such as an overcoat, an umbrella, a small handbag or purse, reading material or a small camera are not considered as hand baggage. For helicopter operations in which a survival suit is provided to passengers, 3 kg should be added to the passenger mass value.

text: (d) Mass values for baggage. The mass of checked baggage should be checked prior to loading and increased, if necessary. (e) On any flight identified as carrying a significant number of passengers whose masses, including hand baggage, are expected to significantly deviate from the standard passenger mass, the operator should determine the actual mass of such passengers by weighing or by adding an adequate mass increment. (f) If standard mass values for checked baggage are used and a significant number of passengers’ checked baggage is expected to significantly deviate from the standard baggage mass, the operator should determine the actual mass of such baggage by weighing or by adding an adequate mass increment.

text: GM1 NCC.POL.105(d) Mass and balance, loading

text: ADJUSTMENT OF STANDARD MASSES When standard mass values are used, item (e) of AMC1 NCC.POL.105(d) states that the operator should identify and adjust the passenger and checked baggage masses in cases where significant numbers of passengers or quantities of baggage are suspected of significantly deviating from the standard values. Therefore, the operations manual should contain instructions to ensure that: (a) check-in, operations and loading personnel as well as cabin and flight crew report or take appropriate action when a flight is identified as carrying a significant number of passengers whose masses, including hand baggage, are expected to significantly deviate from the standard passenger mass, and/or groups of passengers carrying exceptionally heavy baggage; and (b) on small aircraft, where the risks of overload and/or CG errors are the greatest, pilots pay special attention to the load and its distribution and make proper adjustments.

text: GM1 NCC.POL.105(e) Mass and balance, loading

text: TYPE OF FLIGHTS (a) For the purpose of Table 3 of NCC.POL.105(e): (1) domestic flight means a flight with origin and destination within the borders of one State. (2) flights within the European region means flights, other than domestic flights, whose origin and destination are within the area specified in item (b). (3) Intercontinental flight means flights beyond the European region with origin and destination in different continents. (b) Flights within the European region are flights conducted within the following area: – N7200 E04500 – N4000 E04500 – N3500 E03700

text: – N3000 E03700 – N3000 W00600 – N2700 W00900 – N2700 W03000 – N6700 W03000 – N7200 W01000 – N7200 E04500 as depicted in Figure 1: European region.

text: Figure 1: European region

text: GM1 NCC.POL.105(g) Mass and balance, loading

text: FUEL DENSITY (a) If the actual fuel density is not known, the operator may use standard fuel density values for determining the mass of the fuel load. Such standard values should be based on current fuel density measurements for the airports or areas concerned.

text: (b) Typical fuel density values are: (1) Gasoline (reciprocating engine fuel) – 0.71 (2) JET A1 (Jet fuel JP 1) – 0.79 (3) JET B (Jet fuel JP 4) – 0.76 (4) Oil – 0.88

text: AMC1 NCC.POL.110(a) Mass and balance data and documentation

text: CONTENTS The mass and balance documentation should include advice to the pilot-in-command whenever a non-standard method has been used for determining the mass of the load.

text: AMC2 NCC.POL.110(b) Mass and balance data and documentation

text: INTEGRITY The operator should verify the integrity of mass and balance data and documentation generated by a computerised mass and balance system, at intervals not exceeding 6 months. The operator should establish a system to check that amendments of its input data are incorporated properly in the system and that the system is operating correctly on a continuous basis.

text: AMC1 NCC.POL.110(c) Mass and balance data and documentation

text: SIGNATURE OR EQUIVALENT Where a signature by hand is impracticable or it is desirable to arrange the equivalent verification by electronic means, the following conditions should be applied in order to make an electronic signature the equivalent of a conventional hand-written signature: (a) electronic ‘signing’ by entering a personal identification number (PIN) code with appropriate security, etc.; (b) entering the PIN code generates a print-out of the individual’s name and professional capacity on the relevant document(s) in such a way that it is evident, to anyone having a need for that information, who has signed the document; (c) the computer system logs information to indicate when and where each PIN code has been entered; (d) the use of the PIN code is, from a legal and responsibility point of view, considered to be fully equivalent to signature by hand; (e) the requirements for record keeping remain unchanged; and (f) all personnel concerned are made aware of the conditions associated with electronic signature and this is documented.

text: AMC2 NCC.POL.110(c) Mass and balance data and documentation

text: MASS AND BALANCE DOCUMENTATION SENT VIA DATA LINK Whenever the mass and balance documentation is sent to the aircraft via data link, a copy of the final mass and balance documentation as accepted by the pilot-in-command should be available on the ground.

text: GM1 NCC.POL.110(b) Mass and balance data and documentation

text: ON-BOARD INTEGRATED MASS AND BALANCE COMPUTER SYSTEM An on-board integrated mass and balance computer system may be an aircraft installed system capable of receiving input data either from other aircraft systems or from a mass and balance system on the ground, in order to generate mass and balance data as an output.

text: GM2 NCC.POL.110(b) Mass and balance data and documentation

text: STAND-ALONE COMPUTERISED MASS AND BALANCE SYSTEM A stand-alone computerised mass and balance system may be a computer, either as part of an electronic flight bag (EFB) system or solely dedicated to mass and balance purposes, requiring input from the user, in order to generate mass and balance data as an output.

text: AMC1 NCC.POL.125 Take-off — aeroplanes

text: TAKE-OFF MASS The following should be considered for determining the maximum take-off mass: (a) the pressure altitude at the aerodrome; (b) the ambient temperature at the aerodrome; (c) the runway surface condition and the type of runway surface; (d) the runway slope in the direction of take-off; (e) not more than 50 % of the reported head-wind component or not less than 150 % of the reported tailwind component; and (f) the loss, if any, of runway length due to alignment of the aeroplane prior to takeoff.

text: AMC2 NCC.POL.125 Take-off — aeroplanes

text: CONTAMINATED RUNWAY PERFORMANCE DATA Wet and contaminated runway performance data, if made available by the manufacturer, should be taken into account. If such data is not made available, the operator should account for wet and contaminated runway conditions by using the best information available.

text: AMC3 NCC.POL.125 Take-off — aeroplanes

text: ADEQUATE MARGIN The adequate margin should be defined in the operations manual.

text: GM1 NCC.POL.125 Take-off — aeroplanes

text: RUNWAY SURFACE CONDITION Operation on runways contaminated with water, slush, snow or ice implies uncertainties with regard to runway friction and contaminant drag and therefore to the achievable performance and control of the aeroplane during take-off or landing, since the actual conditions may not completely match the assumptions on which the performance information is based. In the case of a contaminated runway, the first option for the pilotin-command is to wait until the runway is cleared. If this is impracticable, he/she may consider a take-off or landing, provided that he/she has applied the applicable performance adjustments, and any further safety measures he/she considers justified under the prevailing conditions. The excess runway length available including the criticality of the overrun area should also be considered.

text: GM2 NCC.POL.125 Take-off — aeroplanes

text: ADEQUATE MARGIN ‘An adequate margin’ is illustrated by the appropriate examples included in Attachment C to ICAO Annex 6, Part I.

text: AMC1 NCC.POL.135 Landing — aeroplanes

text: GENERAL The following should be considered to ensure that an aeroplane is able to land and stop, or a seaplane to come to a satisfactorily low speed, within the landing distance available: (a) the pressure altitude at the aerodrome; (b) the runway surface condition and the type of runway surface; (C) the runway slope in the direction of landing; (d) not more than 50 % of the reported head-wind component or not less than 150 % of the reported tailwind component; and (e) use of the most favourable runway, in still air; (f) use of the runway most likely to be assigned considering the probable wind speed and direction and the ground handling characteristics of the aeroplane, and considering other conditions such as landing aids and terrain.

text: AMC2 NCC.POL.135 Landing — aeroplanes

text: ALLOWANCES The allowances should be stated in the operations manual.

text: Subpart D — Instrument Data Equipment

text: Section 1 — Aeroplanes

text: GM1 NCC.IDE.A.100(a) Instruments and equipment — general

text: APPLICABLE AIRWORTHINESS REQUIREMENTS The applicable airworthiness requirements for approval of instruments and equipment required by this Part are the following: (a)

text: Regulation (EC) 748/2012

text: for: (1) aeroplanes registered in the EU; and (2) aeroplanes registered outside the EU but manufactured or designed by an EU organisation. (b) Airworthiness requirements of the state of registry for aeroplanes registered, designed and manufactured outside the EU.

text: GM1 NCC.IDE.A.100(b)&(c) Instruments and equipment — general

text: INSTRUMENTS AND EQUIPMENT THAT DO NOT NEED TO BE APPROVED (a) The provision of this paragraph does not exempt the item of equipment from complying with the applicable airworthiness requirements if the instrument or equipment is installed in the aeroplane. In this case, the installation should be approved as required in the applicable airworthiness requirements and should comply with the applicable airworthiness codes. (b) The functionality of non-installed instruments and equipment required by this Part that do not need an equipment approval should be checked against recognised industry standards appropriate for the intended purpose. The operator is responsible for ensuring the maintenance of these instruments and equipment. (c) The failure of additional non-installed instruments or equipment not required by this Part or by the applicable airworthiness requirements or any applicable airspace requirements should not adversely affect the airworthiness and/or the safe operation of the aircraft. Examples are the following: (1) instruments supplying additional flight information (e.g. stand-alone global positioning system (GPS)); (2) mission dedicated equipment (e.g. radios); and (3) non-installed passenger entertainment equipment.

text: GM1 NCC.IDE.A.100(d) Instruments and equipment — general

text: POSITIONING OF INSTRUMENTS This requirement implies that whenever a single instrument is required in an aeroplane operated in a multi-crew environment, the instrument needs to be visible from each flight crew station.

text: GM1 NCC.IDE.A.110 Spare electrical fuses

text: FUSES A spare electrical fuse means a replaceable fuse in the flight crew compartment, not an automatic circuit breaker or circuit breakers in the electric compartments.

text: AMC1 NCC.IDE.A.120&NCC.IDE.A.125 Operations under VFR & operations under IFR — flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment

text: INTEGRATED INSTRUMENTS (a) Individual equipment requirements may be met by combinations of instruments, by integrated flight systems or by a combination of parameters on electronic displays. The information so available to each required pilot should not be less than that required in the applicable operational requirements, and the equivalent safety of the installation should be approved during type certification of the aeroplane for the intended type of operation. (b) The means of measuring and indicating turn and slip, aeroplane attitude and stabilised aeroplane heading may be met by combinations of instruments or by integrated flight director systems, provided that the safeguards against total failure, inherent in the three separate instruments, are retained.

text: AMC2 NCC.IDE.A.120 Operations under VFR — flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment

text: LOCAL FLIGHTS For flights that do not exceed 60 minutes’ duration, that take off and land at the same aerodrome and that remain within 50 NM of that aerodrome, an equivalent means of complying with NCC.IDE.A.120 (a)(5) & (b)(1)(i) may be: (a) a turn and slip indicator; (b) a turn coordinator; or (c) both an attitude indicator and a slip indicator.

text: AMC1 NCC.IDE.A.120(a)(1)&NCC.IDE.A.125(a)(1) Operations under VFR & operations under IFR — flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment

text: MEANS OF MEASURING AND DISPLAYING MAGNETIC HEADING The means of measuring and displaying magnetic heading should be a magnetic compass or equivalent.

text: AMC1 NCC.IDE.A.120(a)(2)&NCC.IDE.A.125(a)(2) Operations under VFR & operations under IFR — flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment

text: MEANS OF MEASURING AND DISPLAYING THE TIME An acceptable means of compliance is a clock displaying hours, minutes and seconds, with a sweep-second pointer or digital presentation.

text: AMC1 NCC.IDE.A.120(a)(3)&NCC.IDE.A.125(a)(3) Operations under VFR & operations under IFR — flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment

text: CALIBRATION OF THE MEANS FOR MEASURING AND DISPLAYING PRESSURE ALTITUDE The instrument measuring and displaying pressure altitude should be of a sensitive type calibrated in feet (ft), with a sub-scale setting, calibrated in hectopascals/millibars, adjustable for any barometric pressure likely to be set during flight.

text: AMC2 NCC.IDE.A.125(a)(3) Operations under IFR — flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment

text: ALTIMETERS — IFR OR NIGHT OPERATIONS Except for unpressurised aeroplanes operating below 10 000 ft, the altimeters of aeroplanes operating under IFR or at night should have counter drum-pointer or equivalent presentation.

text: AMC1 NCC.IDE.A.120(a)(4)&NCC.IDE.A.125(a)(4) Operations under VFR & operations under IFR — flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment

text: CALIBRATION OF THE INSTRUMENT INDICATING AIRSPEED The instrument indicating airspeed should be calibrated in knots (kt).

text: AMC1 NCC.IDE.A.120(c)&NCC.IDE.A.125(c) Operations under VFR & operations under IFR — flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment

text: MULTI-PILOT OPERATIONS - DUPLICATE INSTRUMENTS Duplicate instruments include separate displays for each pilot and separate selectors or other associated equipment where appropriate.

text: AMC1 NCC.IDE.A.125(a)(9) Operations under IFR — flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment

text: MEANS OF DISPLAYING OUTSIDE AIR TEMPERATURE (a) The means of displaying outside air temperature should be calibrated in degrees Celsius. (b) The means of displaying outside air temperature may be an air temperature indicator that provides indications that are convertible to outside air temperature.

text: AMC1 NCC.IDE.A.125(d) Operations under IFR — flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment

text: MEANS OF PREVENTING MALFUNCTION DUE TO CONDENSATION OR ICING The means of preventing malfunction due to either condensation or icing of the airspeed indicating system should be a heated pitot tube or equivalent.

text: AMC1 NCC.IDE.A.125(f) Operations under IFR — flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment

text: CHART HOLDER An acceptable means of compliance with the chart holder requirement is to display a pre-composed chart on an electronic flight bag (EFB).

text: AMC1 NCC.IDE.A.135 Terrain awareness warning system (TAWS)

text: EXCESSIVE DOWNWARDS GLIDESLOPE DEVIATION WARNING FOR CLASS A TAWS The requirement for a Class A TAWS to provide a warning to the flight crew for excessive downwards glideslope deviation should apply to all final approach glideslopes with angular vertical navigation (VNAV) guidance, whether provided by the instrument landing system (ILS), microwave landing system (MLS), satellite-based augmentation system approach procedure with vertical guidance (SBAS APV (localiser performance with vertical guidance approach LPV)), ground-based augmentation system (GBAS (GPS landing system, GLS)) or any other systems providing similar guidance. The same requirement should not apply to systems providing vertical guidance based on barometric VNAV.

text: GM1 NCC.IDE.A.135 Terrain awareness warning system (TAWS)

text: ACCEPTABLE STANDARD FOR TAWS An acceptable standard for Class A and Class B TAWS may be the applicable European technical standards order (ETSO) issued by the Agency or equivalent.

text: AMC1 NCC.IDE.A.145 Airborne weather detecting equipment

text: GENERAL The airborne weather detecting equipment should be an airborne weather radar, except for propeller-driven pressurised aeroplanes with an MCTOM not more than 5 700 kg and an MOPSC of not more than nine, for which other equipment capable of detecting thunderstorms and other potentially hazardous weather conditions, regarded as detectable with airborne weather radar equipment, are also acceptable.

text: AMC1 NCC.IDE.A.155 Flight crew interphone system

text: TYPE OF FLIGHT CREW INTERPHONE The flight crew interphone system should not be of a handheld type.

text: AMC1 NCC.IDE.A.160 Cockpit voice recorder

text: GENERAL The operational performance requirements for cockpit voice recorders (CVRs) should be those laid down in the European Organisation for Civil Aviation Equipment (EUROCAE) Document ED-112 (Minimum Operational Performance Specification for Crash Protected Airborne Recorder Systems), dated March 2003, including amendments n°1 and 2, or any later equivalent standard produced by EUROCAE.

text: AMC1 NCC.IDE.A.165 Flight data recorder

text: OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS (a) The operational performance requirements for flight data recorders (FDRs) should be those laid down in EUROCAE Document ED-112 (Minimum Operational Performance Specification for Crash Protected Airborne Recorder Systems) dated March 2003, including amendments n°1 and n°2, or any later equivalent standard produced by EUROCAE. (b) The flight data recorder should record, with reference to a timescale, the list of parameters in Table 1 and Table 2, as applicable. (c) The parameters to be recorded should meet the performance specifications (designated ranges, sampling intervals, accuracy limits and minimum resolution in read-out) as defined in the relevant tables of EUROCAE Document ED-112, dated March 2003, including amendments n°1 and 2, or any later equivalent standard produced by EUROCAE.

text: Table 1: All Aeroplanes

text: No Parameter

text: No Parameter

text: Table 2: Aeroplanes for which the data source for the parameter is either used by aeroplane systems or is available on the instrument panel for use by the flight crew to operate the aeroplane

text: No Parameter

text: No Parameter

text: No Parameter

text: No Parameter

text: No Parameter

text: No Parameter

text: AMC1 NCC.IDE.A.170 Data link recording

text: GENERAL (a) As a means of compliance with NCC.IDE.A.170 (a) the recorder on which the data link messages are recorded may be: (1) the CVR; (2) the FDR; (3) a combination recorder when NCC.IDE.A.175 is applicable; or (4) a dedicated flight recorder. In that case, the operational performance requirements for this recorder should be those laid down in EUROCAE Document ED-112 (Minimum Operational Performance Specification for Crash Protected Airborne Recorder Systems), dated March 2003, including amendments No 1 and 2, or any later equivalent standard produced by EUROCAE. (b) As a means of compliance with NCC.IDE.A.170 (a)(2) the operator should enable correlation by providing information that allows an accident investigator to understand what data was provided to the aircraft and, when the provider identification is contained in the message, by which provider. (c) The timing information associated with the data link communications messages required to be recorded by NCC.IDE.A.170 (a)(3) should be capable of being determined from the airborne-based recordings. This timing information should include at least the following: (1) the time each message was generated; (2) the time any message was available to be displayed by the flight crew; (3) the time each message was actually displayed or recalled from a queue; and (4) the time of each status change.

text: (d) The message priority should be recorded when it is defined by the protocol of the data link communication message being recorded. (e) The expression ‘taking into account the system’s architecture’, in NCC.IDE.A.170 (a)(3), means that the recording of the specified information may be omitted if the existing source systems involved would require a major upgrade. The following should be considered: (1) the extent of the modification required; (2) the down-time period; and (3) equipment software development. (f) Data link communications messages that support the applications in Table 1 below should be recorded. (g) Further details on the recording requirements can be found in the recording requirement matrix in Appendix D.2 of EUROCAE Document ED-93 (Minimum Aviation System Performance Specification for CNS/ATM Recorder Systems), dated November 1998.

text: Table 1: Data link recording

text: Item Application Type Application Description Required No. Recording Content

text: GM1 NCC.IDE.A.170 Data link recording

text: GENERAL

text: (a) The letters and expressions in Table 1 of AMC1 NCC.IDE.A.170 have the following meaning:

text: (1) C: complete contents recorded.

text: (2) M: information that enables correlation with any associated records stored separately from the aeroplane.

text: (3) *: applications that are to be recorded only as far as is practicable, given the architecture of the system.

text: (4) F1: graphics applications may be considered as AOC messages when they are part of a data link communications application service run on an individual basis by the operator itself in the framework of the operational control.

text: (5) F2: where parametric data sent by the aeroplane, such as Mode S, is reported within the message, it should be recorded unless data from the same source is recorded on the FDR.

text: (b) The definitions of the applications type in Table 1 of AMC1 NCC.IDE.A.170 are described in Table 1 below.

text: Table 1: Definitions of the applications type

text: Item Application Messages Comments No. Type

text: AAC aeronautical administrative communications

text: ADS-B automatic dependent surveillance - broadcast

text: ADS-C automatic dependent surveillance – contract

text: AFN aircraft flight notification

text: AOC aeronautical operational control

text: ATIS automatic terminal information service

text: ATSC air traffic service communication

text: CAP controller access parameters

text: CPDLC controller pilot data link communications

text: CM configuration/context management

text: D-ATIS digital ATIS

text: D-FIS data link flight information service D-METAR data link meteorological airport report DCL departure clearance FANS Future Air Navigation System FLIPCY flight plan consistency OCL oceanic clearance SAP system access parameters TWIP terminal weather information for pilots

text: AMC1 NCC.IDE.A.175 Flight data and cockpit voice combination recorder

text: GENERAL When two flight data and cockpit voice combination recorders are installed, one should be located near the flight crew compartment in order to minimise the risk of data loss due to a failure of the wiring that gathers data to the recorder. The other should be located at the rear section of the aeroplane in order to minimise the risk of data loss due to recorder damage in the case of a crash.

text: GM1 NCC.IDE.A.175 Flight data and cockpit voice combination recorder

text: GENERAL (a) A flight data and cockpit voice combination recorder is a flight recorder that records: (1) all voice communications and the aural environment required by NCC.IDE.A.160; and (2) all parameters required by NCC.IDE.A.165, with the same specifications required by NCC.IDE.A.160 and NCC.IDE.A.165. (b) In addition, a flight data and cockpit voice combination recorder may record data link communication messages and related information required by NCC.IDE.A.170.

text: AMC1 NCC.IDE.A.180 Seats, seat safety belts, restraint systems and child restraint devices

text: CHILD RESTRAINT DEVICES (CRDS) (a) A CRD is considered to be acceptable if: (1) it is a ‘supplementary loop’ belt manufactured with the same techniques and the same materials as the approved safety belts; or (2) it complies with (b). (b) Provided the CRD can be installed properly on the respective aircraft seat, the following CRDs are considered acceptable:

text: (1) CRDs approved for use in aircraft by a competent authority on the basis of a technical standard and marked accordingly. (2) CRDs approved for use in motor vehicles according to the UN standard ECE R 44, -03 or later series of amendments. (3) CRDs approved for use in motor vehicles and aircraft according to Canadian CMVSS 213/213.1. (4) CRDs approved for use in motor vehicles and aircraft according to US FMVSS No 213 and manufactured to these standards on or after February 26, 1985. US approved CRDs manufactured after this date should bear the following labels in red letters: (i) ‘THIS CHILD RESTRAINT SYSTEM CONFORMS TO ALL APPLICABLE FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARDS’; and (ii) ‘THIS RESTRAINT IS CERTIFIED FOR USE IN MOTOR VEHICLES AND AIRCRAFT’; (5) CRDs qualified for use in aircraft according to the German ‘Qualification Procedure for Child Restraint Systems for Use in Aircraft’ (TÜV Doc. TÜV/958- 01/2001); and (6) Devices approved for use in cars, manufactured and tested to standards equivalent to those listed above. The device should be marked with an associated qualification sign, which shows the name of the qualification organisation and a specific identification number, related to the associated qualification project. The qualifying organisation should be a competent and independent organisation that is acceptable to the competent authority. (c) Location (1) Forward facing CRDs may be installed on both forward and rearward facing passenger seats but only when fitted in the same direction as the passenger seat on which they are positioned. Rearward facing CRDs should only be installed on forward facing passenger seats. A CRD may not be installed within the radius of action of an airbag, unless it is obvious that the airbag is de-activated or it can be demonstrated that there is no negative impact from the airbag. (2) An infant in a CRD should be located as near to a floor level exit as feasible. (3) An infant in a CRD should not hinder evacuation for any passenger. (4) An infant in a CRD should neither be located in the row (where rows are existing) leading to an emergency exit nor located in a row immediately forward or aft of an emergency exit. A window passenger seat is the preferred location. An aisle passenger seat or a cross aisle passenger seat that forms part of the evacuation route to exits is not recommended. Other locations may be acceptable provided the access of neighbour passengers to the nearest aisle is not obstructed by the CRD. (5) In general, only one CRD per row segment is recommended. More than one CRD per row segment is allowed if the infants are from the same family or travelling group provided the infants are accompanied by a responsible adult sitting next to them.

text: (6) A row segment is the fraction of a row separated by two aisles or by one aisle and the aeroplane fuselage. (d) Installation (1) CRDs should only be installed on a suitable aircraft seat with the type of connecting device they are approved or qualified for. E.g., CRDs to be connected by a three point harness only (most rearward facing baby CRDs currently available) should not be attached to an aeroplane seat with a lap belt only; a CRD designed to be attached to a vehicle seat by means of rigid bar lower anchorages (ISO-FIX or US equivalent) only, should only be used on aeroplane seats that are equipped with such connecting devices and should not be attached by the aeroplane seat lap belt. The method of connecting should be the one shown in the manufacturer’s instructions provided with each CRD. (2) All safety and installation instructions should be followed carefully by the responsible adult accompanying the infant. Crew members should prohibit the use of any inadequately installed CRD or not qualified seat. (3) If a forward facing CRD with a rigid backrest is to be fastened by a lap belt, the restraint device should be fastened when the backrest of the passenger seat on which it rests is in a reclined position. Thereafter, the backrest is to be positioned upright. This procedure ensures better tightening of the CRD on the aircraft seat if the aircraft seat is reclinable. (4) The buckle of the adult safety belt should be easily accessible for both opening and closing, and should be in line with the seat belt halves (not canted) after tightening. (5) Forward facing restraint devices with an integral harness must not be installed such that the adult safety belt is secured over the infant. (e) Operation (1) Each CRD should remain secured to a passenger seat during all phases of flight, unless it is properly stowed when not in use. (2) Where a CRD is adjustable in recline, it should be in an upright position for all occasions when passenger restraint devices are required.

text: AMC2 NCC.IDE.A.180 Seats, seat safety belts, restraint systems and child restraint devices

text: UPPER TORSO RESTRAINT SYSTEM An upper torso restraint system having three straps is deemed to be compliant with the requirement for restraint systems with two shoulder straps. SAFETY BELT A safety belt with diagonal shoulder strap (three anchorage points) is deemed to be compliant with the requirement for safety belts (two anchorage points).

text: AMC3 NCC.IDE.A.180 Seats, seat safety belts, restraint systems and child restraint devices

text: SEATS FOR MINIMUM REQUIRED CABIN CREW (a) Seats for the minimum required cabin crew members should be located near required floor level emergency exits, except if the emergency evacuation of passengers would be enhanced by seating cabin crew members elsewhere. In this case, other locations are acceptable. (b) Such seats should be forward or rearward facing within 15 of the longitudinal axis of the aeroplane.

text: AMC1 NCC.IDE.A.190 First-aid kit

text: CONTENT OF FIRST-AID KITS (a) First-aid kits should be equipped with appropriate and sufficient medications and instrumentation. However, these kits should be amended by the operator according to the characteristics of the operation (scope of operation, flight duration, number and demographics of passengers, etc.). (b) The following should be included in the FAKs: (1) Equipment: (i) bandages (assorted sizes); (ii) burns dressings (unspecified); (iii) wound dressings (large and small); (iv) adhesive dressings (assorted sizes); (v) adhesive tape; (vi) adhesive wound closures; (vii) safety pins; (viii) safety scissors; (ix) antiseptic wound cleaner; (x) disposable resuscitation aid; (xi) disposable gloves; (xii) tweezers: splinter; and (xiii) thermometers (non-mercury). (2) Medications: (i) simple analgesic (may include liquid form); (ii) antiemetic; (iii) nasal decongestant; (iv) gastrointestinal antacid, in the case of aeroplanes carrying more than nine passengers;

text: (v) anti-diarrhoeal medication, in the case of aeroplanes carrying more than nine passengers; and (vi) antihistamine. (3) Other: (i) a list of contents in at least two languages (English and one other). This should include information on the effects and side effects of medications carried; (ii) first-aid handbook, current edition; (iii) medical incident report form; and (iv) biohazard disposal bags. (4) An eye irrigator, although not required to be carried in the FAK, should, where possible, be available for use on the ground.

text: AMC2 NCC.IDE.A.190 First-aid kit

text: MAINTENANCE OF FIRST-AID KITS To be kept up to date first-aid kits should be: (a) inspected periodically to confirm, to the extent possible, that contents are maintained in the condition necessary for their intended use; (b) replenished at regular intervals, in accordance with instructions contained on their labels, or as circumstances warrant; and (c) replenished after use in-flight at the first opportunity where replacement items are available.

text: AMC1 NCC.IDE.A.195 Supplemental oxygen — pressurised aeroplanes

text: DETERMINATION OF OXYGEN (a) In the determination of the amount of oxygen required for the routes to be flown, it is assumed that the aeroplane will descend in accordance with the emergency procedures specified in the operations manual, without exceeding its operating limitations, to a flight altitude that will allow the flight to be completed safely (i.e. flight altitudes ensuring adequate terrain clearance, navigational accuracy, hazardous weather avoidance, etc.). (b) The amount of oxygen should be determined on the basis of cabin pressure altitude and flight duration, and on the assumption that a cabin pressurisation failure will occur at the pressure altitude or point of flight that is most critical from the standpoint of oxygen need. (c) Following a cabin pressurisation failure, the cabin pressure altitude should be considered to be the same as the aeroplane pressure altitude, unless it can be demonstrated to the competent authority that no probable failure of the cabin or pressurisation system will result in a cabin pressure altitude equal to the aeroplane pressure altitude. Under these circumstances, the demonstrated maximum cabin pressure altitude may be used as a basis for determination of oxygen supply.

text: GM1 NCC.IDE.A.195(c)(2) Supplemental oxygen – pressurised aeroplanes

text: QUICK DONNING MASKS A quick donning mask is a type of mask that: (a) can be placed on the face from its ready position, properly secured, sealed and supplying oxygen upon demand, with one hand and within 5 seconds and will thereafter remain in position, both hands being free; (b) can be donned without disturbing eye glasses and without delaying the flight crew member from proceeding with assigned emergency duties; (c) once donned, does not prevent immediate communication between the flight crew members and other crew members over the aircraft intercommunication system; and (d) does not inhibit radio communications.

text: AMC1 NCC.IDE.A.200 Supplemental oxygen — non-pressurised aeroplanes

text: DETERMINATION OF OXYGEN (a) On routes where the oxygen is necessary to be carried for 10 % of the passengers for the flight time between 10 000 ft and 13 000 ft, the oxygen may be provided by: (1) a plug-in or drop-out oxygen system with sufficient outlets and dispensing units uniformly distributed throughout the cabin so as to provide oxygen to each passenger at his/her own discretion when seated on his/her assigned seat; or (2) portable bottles, when a cabin crew member is required for the flight. (b) The amount of supplemental oxygen for sustenance for a particular operation should be determined on the basis of flight altitudes and flight duration, consistent with the operating procedures, including emergency procedures, established for each operation and the routes to be flown, as specified in the operations manual.

text: AMC1 NCC.IDE.A.205 Hand fire extinguishers

text: NUMBER, LOCATION AND TYPE (a) The number and location of hand fire extinguishers should be such as to provide adequate availability for use, account being taken of the number and size of the passenger compartments, the need to minimise the hazard of toxic gas concentrations and the location of toilets, galleys, etc. These considerations may result in the number of fire extinguishers being greater than the minimum required. (b) There should be at least one hand fire extinguisher installed in the flight crew compartment and this should be suitable for fighting both flammable fluid and electrical equipment fires. Additional hand fire extinguishers may be required for the protection of other compartments accessible to the crew in flight. Dry chemical fire extinguishers should not be used in the flight crew compartment, or in any

text: compartment not separated by a partition from the flight crew compartment, because of the adverse effect on vision during discharge and, if conductive, interference with electrical contacts by the chemical residues. (c) Where only one hand fire extinguisher is required in the passenger compartments, it should be located near the cabin crew member’s station, where provided. (d) Where two or more hand fire extinguishers are required in the passenger compartments and their location is not otherwise dictated by consideration of (a), an extinguisher should be located near each end of the cabin with the remainder distributed throughout the cabin as evenly as is practicable. (e) Unless an extinguisher is clearly visible, its location should be indicated by a placard or sign. Appropriate symbols may also be used to supplement such a placard or sign.

text: AMC1 NCC.IDE.A.210 Marking of break-in points

text: MARKINGS – COLOUR AND CORNERS (a) The colour of the markings should be red or yellow and, if necessary, should be outlined in white to contrast with the background. (b) If the corner markings are more than 2 m apart, intermediate lines 9 cm x 3 cm should be inserted so that there is no more than 2 m between adjacent markings.

text: AMC1 NCC.IDE.A.215 Emergency locator transmitter (ELT)

text: ELT BATTERIES Batteries used in the ELTs should be replaced (or recharged, if the battery is rechargeable) when the equipment has been in use for more than 1 cumulative hour, and also when 50 % of their useful life (or for rechargeable, 50 % of their useful life of charge), as established by the equipment manufacturer, has expired. The new expiry date for the replacement (or recharged) battery should be legibly marked on the outside of the equipment. The battery useful life (or useful life of charge) requirements of this paragraph do not apply to batteries (such as water-activated batteries) that are essentially unaffected during probable storage intervals.

text: AMC2 NCC.IDE.A.215 Emergency locator transmitter (ELT)

text: TYPES OF ELT AND GENERAL TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS (a) The ELT required by this provision should be one of the following: (1) Automatic fixed (ELT(AF)). An automatically activated ELT that is permanently attached to an aircraft and is designed to aid search and rescue (SAR) teams in locating the crash site. (2) Automatic portable (ELT(AP)). An automatically activated ELT that is rigidly attached to an aircraft before a crash, but is readily removable from the aircraft after a crash. It functions as an ELT during the crash sequence. If the ELT does not employ an integral antenna, the aircraft-mounted antenna may be disconnected and an auxiliary antenna (stored on the ELT case) attached

text: to the ELT. The ELT can be tethered to a survivor or a life-raft. This type of ELT is intended to aid SAR teams in locating the crash site or survivor(s). (3) Automatic deployable (ELT(AD)). An ELT that is rigidly attached to the aircraft before the crash and that is automatically ejected, deployed and activated by an impact, and, in some cases, also by hydrostatic sensors. Manual deployment is also provided. This type of ELT should float in water and is intended to aid SAR teams in locating the crash site. (4) Survival ELT (ELT(S)). An ELT that is removable from an aircraft, stowed so as to facilitate its ready use in an emergency and manually activated by a survivor. An ELT(S) may be activated manually or automatically (e.g. by water activation). It should be designed either to be tethered to a life-raft or a survivor. (b) To minimise the possibility of damage in the event of crash impact, the automatic ELT should be rigidly fixed to the aircraft structure, as far aft as is practicable, with its antenna and connections arranged so as to maximise the probability of the signal being transmitted after a crash. (c) Any ELT carried should operate in accordance with the relevant provisions of ICAO Annex 10, Volume III and should be registered with the national agency responsible for initiating search and rescue or other nominated agency.

text: AMC1 NCC.IDE.A.220 Flight over water

text: ACCESSIBILITY OF LIFE-JACKETS The life-jacket should be accessible from the seat or berth of the person for whose use it is provided, with a safety belt or restraint system fastened. ELECTRIC ILLUMINATION OF LIFE-JACKETS The means of electric illumination should be a survivor locator light as defined in the applicable ETSO issued by the Agency or equivalent. RISK ASSESSMENT (a) When conducting the risk assessment, the pilot-in-command should base his/her decision, as far as is practicable, on the Implementing Rules and AMCs applicable to the operation of the aeroplane. (b) The pilot-in-command should, for determining the risk, take the following operating environment and conditions into account: (1) sea state; (2) sea and air temperatures; (3) the distance from land suitable for making an emergency landing; and (4) the availability of search and rescue facilities.

text: AMC2 NCC.IDE.A.220 Flight over water

text: LIFE–RAFTS AND EQUIPMENT FOR MAKING DISTRESS SIGNALS (a) The following should be readily available with each life-raft:

text: (1) means for maintaining buoyancy; (2) a sea anchor; (3) life-lines and means of attaching one life-raft to another; (4) paddles for life-rafts with a capacity of six or less; (5) means of protecting the occupants from the elements; (6) a water-resistant torch; (7) signalling equipment to make the pyrotechnic distress signals described in ICAO Annex 2, Rules of the Air; (8) 100 g of glucose tablets for each four, or fraction of four, persons that the life-raft is designed to carry: (9) at least 2 litres of drinkable water provided in durable containers or means of making sea water drinkable or a combination of both; and (10) first-aid equipment. (b) As far as practicable, items listed in (a) should be contained in a pack.

text: GM1 NCC.IDE.A.220 Flight over water

text: SEAT CUSHIONS Seat cushions are not considered to be flotation devices.

text: AMC1 NCC.IDE.A.230(a)(2) Survival equipment

text: SURVIVAL ELT An ELT(AP) may be used to replace one required ELT(S) provided that it meets the ELT(S) requirements. A water-activated ELT(S) is not an ELT(AP).

text: AMC1 NCC.IDE.A.230(a)(3) Survival equipment

text: ADDITIONAL SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT (a) The following additional survival equipment should be carried when required: (1) 500 ml of water for each four, or fraction of four, persons on board; (2) one knife; (3) first-aid equipment; and (4) one set of air/ground codes. (b) In addition, when polar conditions are expected, the following should be carried: (1) a means of melting snow; (2) one snow shovel and one ice saw; (3) sleeping bags for use by 1/3 of all persons on board and space blankets for the remainder or space blankets for all passengers on board; and

text: (4) one arctic/polar suit for each crew member carried. (c) If any item of equipment contained in the above list is already carried on board the aircraft in accordance with another requirement, there is no need for this to be duplicated.

text: AMC1 NCC.IDE.A.230(b)(2) Survival equipment

text: APPLICABLE AIRWORTHINESS STANDARD The applicable airworthiness standard should be CS-25 or equivalent.

text: GM1 NCC.IDE.A.230 Survival equipment

text: SIGNALLING EQUIPMENT The signalling equipment for making distress signals is described in ICAO Annex 2, Rules of the Air.

text: GM2 NCC.IDE.A.230 Survival equipment

text: AREAS IN WHICH SEARCH AND RESCUE WOULD BE ESPECIALLY DIFFICULT The expression ‘areas in which search and rescue would be especially difficult’ should be interpreted, in this context, as meaning: (a) areas so designated by the competent authority responsible for managing search and rescue; or (b) areas that are largely uninhabited and where: (1) the authority referred to in (a) has not published any information to confirm whether search and rescue would be or would not be especially difficult; and (2) the authority referred to in (a) does not, as a matter of policy, designate areas as being especially difficult for search and rescue.

text: AMC1 NCC.IDE.A.240 Headset

text: GENERAL (a) A headset consists of a communication device that includes two earphones to receive and a microphone to transmit audio signals to the aeroplane’s communication system. To comply with the minimum performance requirements, the earphones and microphone should match the communication system’s characteristics and the flight crew compartment environment. The headset should be adequately adjustable in order to fit the flight crew’s head. Headset boom microphones should be of the noise cancelling type. (b) If the intention is to utilise noise cancelling earphones, the operator should ensure that the earphones do not attenuate any aural warnings or sounds necessary for alerting the flight crew on matters related to the safe operation of the aeroplane.

text: GM1 NCC.IDE.A.240 Headset

text: GENERAL The term ‘headset’ includes any aviation helmet incorporating headphones and microphone worn by a flight crew member.

text: GM1 NCC.IDE.A.245 Radio communication equipment

text: APPLICABLE AIRSPACE REQUIREMENTS For aeroplanes being operated under European air traffic control, the applicable airspace requirements include the Single European Sky legislation.

text: AMC1 NCC.IDE.A.255 Transponder

text: SSR TRANSPONDER (a) The secondary surveillance radar (SSR) transponders of aeroplanes being operated under European air traffic control should comply with any applicable Single European Sky legislation. (b) If the Single European Sky legislation is not applicable, the SSR transponders should operate in accordance with the relevant provisions of Volume IV of ICAO Annex 10.

text: AMC1 NCC.IDE.A.260 Electronic navigation data management

text: ELECTRONIC NAVIGATION DATA PRODUCTS (a) When the operator of a complex motor-powered aeroplane uses a navigation database that supports an airborne navigation application as a primary means of navigation, the navigation database supplier should hold a Type 2 letter of acceptance (LoA), or equivalent. (b) If this airborne navigation application is needed for an operation requiring a specific approval in accordance with Annex V (Part-SPA), the operator’s procedures should be based upon the Type 2 LoA acceptance process.

text: GM1 NCC.IDE.A.260 Electronic navigation data management

text: LETTERS OF ACCEPTANCE AND STANDARDS FOR ELECTRONIC NAVIGATION DATA PRODUCTS (a) A Type 2 LoA is issued by the Agency in accordance with the Agency’s Opinion No 01/2005 on The Acceptance of Navigation Database Suppliers (hereinafter referred to as the Agency’s Opinion No 01/2005). The definitions of navigation database, navigation database supplier, data application integrator, Type 1 LoA and Type 2 LoA can be found in the Agency’s Opinion No 01/2005. (b) Equivalent to a Type 2 LoA is the FAA Type 2 LoA, issued in accordance with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Advisory Circular AC 20-153 or AC 20-153A,

text: and the Transport Canada Civil Aviation (TCCA) ‘Acknowledgement Letter of an Aeronautical Data Process’, which uses the same basis. (c) EUROCAE ED-76/Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) DO-200A Standards for Processing Aeronautical Data contains guidance relating to the processes which the supplier may follow.

text: Section 2 — Helicopters

text: GM1 NCC.IDE.H.100(a) Instruments and equipment — general

text: Regulation (EC) 748/2012

text: for: (1) helicopters registered in the EU; and (2) helicopters registered outside the EU but manufactured or designed by an EU organisation. (b) Airworthiness requirements of the state of registry for helicopters registered, designed and manufactured outside the EU.

text: GM1 NCC.IDE.H.100(b)&(c) Instruments and equipment — general

text: INSTRUMENTS AND EQUIPMENT THAT DO NOT NEED TO BE APPROVED (a) The provision of this paragraph does not exempt the item of equipment from complying with the applicable airworthiness requirements if the instrument or equipment is installed in the helicopter. In this case, the installation should be approved as required in the applicable airworthiness requirements and should comply with the applicable airworthiness codes. (b) The functionality of non-installed instruments and equipment required by this Part that do not need an equipment approval should be checked against recognised industry standards appropriate for the intended purpose. The operator is responsible for ensuring the maintenance of these instruments and equipment. (c) The failure of additional non-installed instruments or equipment not required by this Part or by the applicable airworthiness requirements or any applicable airspace requirements should not adversely affect the airworthiness and/or the safe operation of the aircraft. Examples are the following: (1) instruments supplying additional flight information (e.g. stand-alone global positioning system (GPS)); (2) some aerial work equipment (e.g. some mission dedicated radios, wire cutters); and (3) non-installed passenger entertainment equipment.

text: GM1 NCC.IDE.H.100(d) Instruments and equipment — general

text: POSITIONING OF INSTRUMENTS This requirement implies that whenever a single instrument is required in a helicopter operated in a multi-crew environment, the instrument needs to be visible from each flight crew station.

text: AMC1 NCC.IDE.H.115 Operating lights

text: LANDING LIGHT The landing light should be trainable, at least in the vertical plane.

text: AMC1 NCC.IDE.H.120&NCC.IDE.H.125 Operations under VFR & operations under IFR — flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment

text: INTEGRATED INSTRUMENTS (a) Individual equipment requirements may be met by combinations of instruments or by integrated flight systems or by a combination of parameters on electronic displays. The information so available to each required pilot should not be less than that required in the applicable operational requirements, and the equivalent safety of the installation should be approved during type certification of the helicopter for the intended type of operation. (b) The means of measuring and indicating slip, helicopter attitude and stabilised helicopter heading may be met by combinations of instruments or by integrated flight director systems, provided that the safeguards against total failure, inherent in the three separate instruments, are retained.

text: AMC1 NCC.IDE.H.120(a)(1)&NCC.IDE.H.125(a)(1) Operations under VFR & operations under IFR — flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment

text: AMC1 NCC.IDE.H.120(a)(2)&NCC.IDE.H.125(a)(2) Operations under VFR & operations under IFR — flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment

text: MEANS FOR MEASURING AND DISPLAYING THE TIME An acceptable means of compliance is be a clock displaying hours, minutes and seconds, with a sweep-second pointer or digital presentation.

text: AMC1 NCC.IDE.H.120(a)(3)&NCC.IDE.H.125(a)(3) Operations under VFR & operations under IFR — flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment

text: AMC1 NCC.IDE.H.120(a)(4)&NCC.IDE.H.125(a)(4) Operations under VFR & operations under IFR — flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment

text: AMC1 NCC.IDE.H.120(b)(1)(iii)&NCC.IDE.H.125(a)(8) Operations under VFR & operations under IFR — flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment

text: STABILISED HEADING Stabilised heading should be achieved for VFR flights by a gyroscopic heading indicator, whereas for IFR flights this should be achieved through a magnetic gyroscopic heading indicator.

text: AMC1 NCC.IDE.H.125(a)(9) Operations under IFR — flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment

text: OUTSIDE AIR TEMPERATURE (a) The means of displaying outside air temperature should be calibrated in degrees Celsius. (b) The means of displaying outside air temperature may be an air temperature indicator that provides indications that are convertible to outside air temperature.

text: AMC1 NCC.IDE.H.120(c)&NCC.IDE.H.125(c) Operations under VFR & operations under IFR — flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment

text: MULTI-PILOT OPERATIONS — DUPLICATE INSTRUMENTS Duplicate instruments include separate displays for each pilot and separate selectors or other associated equipment where appropriate.

text: AMC1 NCC.IDE.H.125(d) Operations under VFR & operations under IFR — flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment

text: AMC1 NCC.IDE.H.125(f) Operations under IFR — flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment

text: AMC1 NCC.IDE.H.145 Airborne weather detecting equipment

text: GENERAL The airborne weather detecting equipment should be an airborne weather radar.

text: AMC1 NCC.IDE.H.155 Flight crew interphone system

text: AMC1 NCC.IDE.H.160 Cockpit voice recorder

text: GENERAL The operational performance requirements for CVRs should be those laid down in EUROCAE Document ED-112 (Minimum Operational Performance Specification for Crash Protected Airborne Recorder Systems), dated March 2003, including amendments n°1 and 2, or any later equivalent standard produced by EUROCAE.

text: AMC1 NCC.IDE.H.165 Flight data recorder

text: OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS (a) The operational performance requirements for flight data recorders (FDRs) should be those laid down in EUROCAE Document ED-112 (Minimum Operational Performance Specification for Crash Protected Airborne Recorder Systems) dated March 2003, including amendments n°1 and n°2, or any later equivalent standard produced by EUROCAE. (b) The FDR should record, with reference to a timescale, the list of parameters in Table 1 and Table 2, as applicable. (c) The parameters recorded by the FDR should meet, as far as practicable, the performance specifications (designated ranges, sampling intervals, accuracy limits and minimum resolution in read-out) defined in EUROCAE ED-112, including amendments n°1 and n°2, or any later equivalent standard produced by EUROCAE. (d) FDR systems for which some recorded parameters do not meet the performance specifications of EUROCAE Document ED-112 may be acceptable to the Agency.

text: Table 1: FDR parameters — All helicopters

text: No Parameter

text: No Parameter

text: No Parameter

text: The number in the left hand column reflects the serial number depicted in EUROCAE ED-112.

text: Table 2: FDR parameters — Helicopters for which the data source for the parameter is either used by helicopter systems or is available on the instrument panel for use by the flight crew to operate the helicopter.

text: No Parameter

text: No Parameter

text: No Parameter

text: AMC1 NCC.IDE.H.170 Data link recording

text: GENERAL (a) As a means of compliance with NCC.IDE.H.170, the recorder on which the data link messages are recorded should be: (1) the CVR; (2) the FDR; (3) a combination recorder when NCC.IDE.H.175 is applicable; or (4) a dedicated flight recorder. In such a case, the operational performance requirements for this recorder should be those laid down in EUROCAE Document ED-112 (Minimum Operational Performance Specification for Crash Protected Airborne Recorder Systems), dated March 2003, including amendments n°1 and n°2, or any later equivalent standard produced by EUROCAE. (b) As a means of compliance with NCC.IDE.H.170 (a)(2), the operator should enable correlation by providing information that allows an accident investigator to understand what data was provided to the aircraft and, when the provider identification is contained in the message, by which provider. (c) The timing information associated with the data link communications messages required to be recorded by NCC.IDE.H.170(a)(3) should be capable of being determined from the airborne-based recordings. This timing information should include at least the following: (1) the time each message was generated; (2) the time any message was available to be displayed by the flight crew; (3) the time each message was actually displayed or recalled from a queue; and

text: (4) the time of each status change. (d) The message priority should be recorded when it is defined by the protocol of the data link communication message being recorded. (e) The expression ‘taking into account the system’s architecture’, in NCC.IDE.H.170 (a)(3), means that the recording of the specified information may be omitted if the existing source systems involved would require a major upgrade. The following should be considered: (1) the extent of the modification required; (2) the down-time period; and (3) equipment software development. (f) Data link communications messages that support the applications in Table 1 should be recorded. (g) Further details on the recording requirements can be found in the recording requirement matrix in Appendix D.2 of EUROCAE Document ED-93 (Minimum Aviation System Performance Specification for CNS/ATM Recorder Systems), dated November 1998.

text: Table 1: Data link recording

text: Item Application Type Application Description Required No Recording Content

text: GM1 NCC.IDE.H.170 Data link recording

text: GENERAL

text: (a) The letters and expressions in Table 1 of AMC1 NCC.IDE.H.170 have the following meaning:

text: (1) C: complete contents recorded.

text: (2) M: information that enables correlation with any associated records stored separately from the helicopter.

text: (5) F2: where parametric data sent by the helicopter, such as Mode S, is reported within the message, it should be recorded unless data from the same source is recorded on the FDR.

text: (b) The definitions of the applications type in Table 1 of AMC1 NCC.IDE.H.170 are described in Table 1 below.

text: Item Application Messages Comments No Type

text: AFN aircraft flight notification

text: AOC aeronautical operational control

text: ATSC air traffic service communication

text: CAP controller access parameters

text: CM configuration/context management

text: D-ATIS digital ATIS

text: D-FIS data link flight information service

text: D-METAR data link meteorological airport report

text: DCL departure clearance

text: FANS Future Air Navigation System

text: FLIPCY flight plan consistency OCL oceanic clearance SAP system access parameters TWIP terminal weather information for pilots

text: GM1 NCC.IDE.H.175 Flight data and cockpit voice combination recorder

text: COMBINATION RECORDERS (a) A flight data and cockpit voice combination recorder is a flight recorder that records: (1) all voice communications and the aural environment required by NCC.IDE.H.160; and (2) all parameters required by NCC.IDE.H.165, with the same specifications required by NCC.IDE.H.160 and NCC.IDE.H.165. (b) In addition, a flight data and cockpit voice combination recorder may record data link communication messages and related information required by the NCC.IDE.H.170.

text: AMC1 NCC.IDE.H.180 Seats, seat safety belts, restraint systems and child restraint devices

text: CHILD RESTRAINT DEVICES (CRDS) (a) A CRD is considered to be acceptable if: (1) it is a supplementary loop belt manufactured with the same techniques and the same materials of the approved safety belts; or (2) it complies with (b). (b) Provided the CRD can be installed properly on the respective helicopter seat, the following CRDs are considered acceptable: (1) CRDs approved for use in aircraft by a competent authority on the basis of a technical standard and marked accordingly. (2) CRDs approved for use in motor vehicles according to the UN standard ECE R 44, -03 or later series of amendments. (3) CRDs approved for use in motor vehicles and aircraft according to Canadian CMVSS 213/213.1. (4) CRDs approved for use in motor vehicles and aircraft according to US FMVSS No 213 and manufactured to these standards on or after February 26, 1985. US approved CRDs manufactured after this date should bear the following labels in red letters: (i) ‘THIS CHILD RESTRAINT SYSTEM CONFORMS TO ALL APPLICABLE FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARDS’; and

text: (ii) ‘THIS RESTRAINT IS CERTIFIED FOR USE IN MOTOR VEHICLES AND AIRCRAFT’; (5) CRDs qualified for use in aircraft according to the German ‘Qualification Procedure for Child Restraint Systems for Use in Aircraft’ (TÜV Doc.: TÜV/958-01/2001); and (6) Devices approved for use in cars, manufactured and tested to standards equivalent to those listed above. The device should be marked with an associated qualification sign, which shows the name of the qualification organisation and a specific identification number, related to the associated qualification project. The qualifying organisation should be a competent and independent organisation that is acceptable to the competent authority. (c) Location (1) Forward facing CRDs may be installed on both forward and rearward facing passenger seats but only when fitted in the same direction as the passenger seat on which they are positioned. Rearward facing CRDs should only be installed on forward facing passenger seats. A CRD may not be installed within the radius of action of an airbag, unless it is obvious that the airbag is de-activated or it can be demonstrated that there is no negative impact from the airbag. (2) An infant in a CRD should be located as near to a floor level exit as feasible. (3) An infant in a CRD should not hinder evacuation for any passenger. (4) An infant in a CRD should neither be located in the row (where rows are existing) leading to an emergency exit nor located in a row immediately forward or aft of an emergency exit. A window passenger seat is the preferred location. An aisle passenger seat or a cross aisle passenger seat that forms part of the evacuation route to exits is not recommended. Other locations may be acceptable provided the access of neighbour passengers to the nearest aisle is not obstructed by the CRD. (5) In general, only one CRD per row segment is recommended. More than one CRD per row segment is allowed if the infants are from the same family or travelling group provided the infants are accompanied by a responsible adult sitting next to them. (6) A row segment is the fraction of a row separated by two aisles or by one aisle and the helicopter fuselage. (d) Installation (1) CRDs should only be installed on a suitable helicopter seat with the type of connecting device they are approved or qualified for. E.g., CRDs to be connected by a three point harness only (most rearward facing baby CRDs currently available) should not be attached to a helicopter seat with a lap belt only; a CRD designed to be attached to a vehicle seat by means of rigid bar lower anchorages (ISO-FIX or US equivalent) only, should only be used on helicopter seats that are equipped with such connecting devices and should not be attached by the helicopter seat lap belt. The method of connecting should be the one shown in the manufacturer’s instructions provided with each CRD.

text: (2) All safety and installation instructions should be followed carefully by the responsible person accompanying the infant. Cabin crew should prohibit the use of any inadequately installed CRD or not qualified seat. (3) If a forward facing CRD with a rigid backrest is to be fastened by a lap belt, the restraint device should be fastened when the backrest of the passenger seat on which it rests is in a reclined position. Thereafter, the backrest is to be positioned upright. This procedure ensures better tightening of the CRD on the aircraft seat if the aircraft seat is reclinable. (4) The buckle of the adult safety belt should be easily accessible for both opening and closing, and should be in line with the seat belt halves (not canted) after tightening. (5) Forward facing restraint devices with an integral harness should not be installed such that the adult safety belt is secured over the infant. (e) Operation (1) Each CRD should remain secured to a passenger seat during all phases of flight, unless it is properly stowed when not in use. (2) Where a CRD is adjustable in recline, it should be in an upright position for all occasions when passenger restraint devices are required.

text: AMC2 NCC.IDE.H.180 Seats, seat safety belts, restraint systems and child restraint devices

text: UPPER TORSO RESTRAINT SYSTEM An upper torso restraint system having three straps is deemed to be compliant with the requirement for restraint systems with two shoulder straps. SAFETY BELT A safety belt with a diagonal shoulder strap (three anchorage points) is deemed to be compliant with the requirement for safety belts (two anchorage points).

text: AMC3 NCC.IDE.H.180 Seats, seat safety belts, restraint systems and child restraint devices

text: SEATS FOR MINIMUM REQUIRED CABIN CREW (a) Seats for the minimum required cabin crew members should be located near required floor level emergency exits, except if the emergency evacuation of passengers would be enhanced by seating the cabin crew members elsewhere. In this case other locations are acceptable. This criterion should also apply if the number of required cabin crew members exceeds the number of floor level emergency exits. (b) Seats for cabin crew member(s) should be forward or rearward facing within 15° of the longitudinal axis of the helicopter.

text: AMC1 NCC.IDE.H.190 First-aid kit

text: CONTENT OF FIRST-AID KIT (a) First-aid kits should be equipped with appropriate and sufficient medications and instrumentation. However, these kits should be amended by the operator according to the characteristics of the operation (scope of operation, flight duration, number and demographics of passengers, etc.). (b) The following should be included in the FAKs: (1) Equipment: (i) bandages (assorted sizes); (ii) burns dressings (unspecified); (iii) wound dressings (large and small); (iv) adhesive dressings (assorted sizes); (v) adhesive tape; (vi) adhesive wound closures; (vii) safety pins; (viii) safety scissors; (ix) antiseptic wound cleaner; (x) disposable resuscitation aid; (xi) disposable gloves; (xii) tweezers: splinter; and (xiii) thermometers (non-mercury). (2) Medications: (i) simple analgesic (may include liquid form); (ii) antiemetic; (iii) nasal decongestant; (iv) gastrointestinal antacid, in the case of helicopters carrying more than nine passengers; (v) anti-diarrhoeal medication in the case of helicopters carrying more than nine passengers; and (vi) antihistamine. (3) Other: (i) a list of contents in at least two languages (English and one other). This should include information on the effects and side effects of medications carried; (ii) first-aid handbook; (iii) medical incident report form; and

text: (iv) biohazard disposal bags. (4) An eye irrigator, although not required to be carried in the FAK, should, where possible, be available for use on the ground.

text: AMC2 NCC.IDE.H.190 First-aid kit

text: MAINTENANCE OF FIRST-AID KITS To be kept up to date, first-aid kits should be: (a) inspected periodically to confirm, to the extent possible, that contents are maintained in the condition necessary for their intended use; (b) replenished at regular intervals, in accordance with instructions contained on their labels, or as circumstances warrant; and (c) replenished after use in-flight at the first opportunity where replacement items are available.

text: AMC1 NCC.IDE.H.200 Supplemental oxygen — non-pressurised helicopters

text: DETERMINATION OF OXYGEN The amount of supplemental oxygen required for a particular operation should be determined on the basis of flight altitudes and flight duration, consistent with the operating procedures, including emergency procedures, established for each operation and the routes to be flown as specified in the operations manual.

text: AMC1 NCC.IDE.H.205 Hand fire extinguishers

text: NUMBER, LOCATION AND TYPE (a) The number and location of hand fire extinguishers should be such as to provide adequate availability for use, account being taken of the number and size of the passenger compartments, the need to minimise the hazard of toxic gas concentrations and the location of toilets, galleys, etc. These considerations may result in the number of fire extinguishers being greater than the minimum required. (b) There should be at least one hand fire extinguisher installed in the flight crew compartment and this should be suitable for fighting both flammable fluid and electrical equipment fires. Additional hand fire extinguishers may be required for the protection of other compartments accessible to the crew in flight. Dry chemical fire extinguishers should not be used in the flight crew compartment, or in any compartment not separated by a partition from the flight crew compartment, because of the adverse effect on vision during discharge and, if conductive, interference with electrical contacts by the chemical residues. (c) Where only one hand fire extinguisher is required in the passenger compartments, it should be located near the cabin crew member’s station, where provided. (d) Where two or more hand fire extinguishers are required in the passenger compartments and their location is not otherwise dictated by consideration of (a),

text: an extinguisher should be located near each end of the cabin with the remainder distributed throughout the cabin as evenly as is practicable. (e) Unless an extinguisher is clearly visible, its location should be indicated by a placard or sign. Appropriate symbols may also be used to supplement such a placard or sign.

text: AMC1 NCC.IDE.H.210 Marking of break-in points

text: AMC1 NCC.IDE.H.215 Emergency locator transmitter (ELT)

text: ELT BATTERIES Batteries used in the ELTs should be replaced (or recharged, if the battery is rechargeable) when the equipment has been in use for more than 1 cumulative hour, and also when 50% of their useful life (or for rechargeable, 50% of their useful life of charge), as established by the equipment manufacturer, has expired. The new expiry date for the replacement (or recharged) battery should be legibly marked on the outside of the equipment. The battery useful life (or useful life of charge) requirements of this paragraph do not apply to batteries (such as water-activated batteries) that are essentially unaffected during probable storage intervals.

text: AMC2 NCC.IDE.H.215 Emergency locator transmitter (ELT)

text: TYPES OF ELT AND GENERAL TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS (a) The ELT required by this provision should be one of the following: (1) Automatic fixed (ELT(AF)). An automatically activated ELT that is permanently attached to an aircraft and is designed to aid SAR teams in locating the crash site. (2) Automatic portable (ELT(AP)). An automatically activated ELT that is rigidly attached to an aircraft before a crash, but is readily removable from the aircraft after a crash. It functions as an ELT during the crash sequence. If the ELT does not employ an integral antenna, the aircraft-mounted antenna may be disconnected and an auxiliary antenna (stored on the ELT case) attached to the ELT. The ELT can be tethered to a survivor or a life-raft. This type of ELT is intended to aid SAR teams in locating the crash site or survivor(s). (3) Automatic deployable (ELT(AD)). An ELT that is rigidly attached to the aircraft before the crash and that is automatically ejected, deployed and activated by an impact, and, in some cases, also by hydrostatic sensors. Manual deployment is also provided. This type of ELT should float in water and is intended to aid SAR teams in locating the crash site.

text: (4) Survival ELT (ELT(S)). An ELT that is removable from an aircraft, stowed so as to facilitate its ready use in an emergency, and manually activated by a survivor. An ELT(S) may be activated manually or automatically (e.g. by water activation). It should be designed either to be tethered to a life-raft or a survivor. (b) To minimise the possibility of damage in the event of crash impact, the automatic ELT should be rigidly fixed to the aircraft structure, as far aft as is practicable, with its antenna and connections arranged so as to maximise the probability of the signal being transmitted after a crash. (c) Any ELT carried should operate in accordance with the relevant provisions of ICAO Annex 10, Volume III and should be registered with the national agency responsible for initiating search and rescue or other nominated agency.

text: AMC1 NCC.IDE.H.225(a) Life-jackets

text: ACCESSIBILITY The life-jacket should be accessible from the seat or berth of the person for whose use it is provided, with a safety belt or restraint system fastened.

text: AMC1 NCC.IDE.H.225(b) Life-jackets

text: ELECTRIC ILLUMINATION The means of electric illumination should be a survivor locator light as defined in the applicable ETSO issued by the Agency or equivalent.

text: GM1 NCC.IDE.H.225 Life-jackets

text: GM1 NCC.IDE.H.226 Crew survival suits

text: ESTIMATING SURVIVAL TIME (a) Introduction (1) A person accidentally immersed in cold seas (typically offshore Northern Europe) will have a better chance of survival if he/she is wearing an effective survival suit in addition to a life-jacket. By wearing the survival suit, he/she can slow down the rate which his/her body temperature falls and, consequently, protect himself/herself from the greater risk of drowning brought about by incapacitation due to hypothermia. (2) The complete survival suit system — suit, life-jacket and clothes worn under the suit — should be able to keep the wearer alive long enough for the rescue services to find and recover him/her. In practice the limit is about 3 hours. If a group of persons in the water cannot be rescued within this time, they are likely to have become so scattered and separated that location will be

text: extremely difficult, especially in the rough water typical of Northern European sea areas. If it is expected that in water protection could be required for periods greater than 3 hours, improvements should, rather, be sought in the search and rescue procedures than in the immersion suit protection. (b) Survival times (1) The aim should be to ensure that a person in the water can survive long enough to be rescued, i.e. the survival time should be greater than the likely rescue time. The factors affecting both times are shown in Figure 1. The figure emphasises that survival time is influenced by many factors, physical and human. Some of the factors are relevant to survival in cold water and some are relevant in water at any temperature.

text: Figure 1: The survival equation

text: (2) Broad estimates of likely survival times for the thin individual offshore are given in Table 1 below. As survival time is significantly affected by the prevailing weather conditions at the time of immersion, the Beaufort wind scale has been used as an indicator of these surface conditions.

text: Table 1: Timescale within which the most vulnerable individuals are likely to succumb to the prevailing conditions.

text: (3) Consideration should also be given to escaping from the helicopter itself should it submerge or invert in the water. In this case, escape time is limited to the length of time the occupants can hold their breath. The breath holding time can be greatly reduced by the effect of cold shock. Cold shock is caused by the sudden drop in skin temperature on immersion, and is characterised by a gasp reflex and uncontrolled breathing. The urge to breath rapidly becomes overwhelming and, if still submerged, the individual will inhale water resulting in drowning. Delaying the onset of cold shock by wearing an immersion suit will extend the available escape time from a submerged helicopter. (4) The effects of water leakage and hydrostatic compression on the insulation quality of clothing are well recognised. In a nominally dry system the insulation is provided by still air trapped within the clothing fibres and between the layers of suit and clothes. It has been observed that many systems lose some of their insulating capacity either because the clothes under the 'waterproof' survival suit get wet to some extent or because of hydrostatic compression of the whole assembly. As a result of water leakage and compression, survival times will be shortened. The wearing of warm clothing under the suit is recommended. (5) Whatever type of survival suit and other clothing is provided, it should not be forgotten that significant heat loss can occur from the head.

text: AMC1 NCC.IDE.H.227 Life-rafts, survival ELTs and survival equipment on extended overwater flights

text: LIFE-RAFTS AND EQUIPMENT FOR MAKING DISTRESS SIGNALS (a) Each required life-raft should conform to the following specifications: (1) be of an approved design and stowed so as to facilitate their ready use in an emergency; (2) be radar conspicuous to standard airborne radar equipment; (3) when carrying more than one life-raft on board, at least 50 % of the rafts should be able to be deployed by the crew while seated at their normal station, where necessary by remote control; and (4) life-rafts that are not deployable by remote control or by the crew should be of such weight as to permit handling by one person. 40 kg should be considered a maximum weight. (b) Each required life-raft should contain at least the following: (1) one approved survivor locator light; (2) one approved visual signalling device; (3) one canopy (for use as a sail, sunshade or rain catcher) or other means to protect occupants from the elements; (4) one radar reflector; (5) one 20 m retaining line designed to hold the life-raft near the helicopter but to release it if the helicopter becomes totally submerged; (6) one sea anchor; and (7) one survival kit, appropriately equipped for the route to be flown, which should contain at least the following: (i) one life-raft repair kit; (ii) one bailing bucket; (iii) one signalling mirror; (iv) one police whistle; (v) one buoyant raft knife; (vi) one supplementary means of inflation; (vii) sea sickness tablets; (viii) one first-aid kit; (ix) one portable means of illumination; (x) 500 ml of pure water and one sea water desalting kit; and (xi) one comprehensive illustrated survival booklet in an appropriate language.

text: AMC1 NCC.IDE.H.230 Survival equipment

text: ADDITIONAL SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT (a) The following additional survival equipment should be carried when required: (1) 500 ml of water for each four, or fraction of four, persons on board; (2) one knife; (3) first-aid equipment; and (4) one set of air/ground codes. (b) In addition, when polar conditions are expected, the following should be carried: (1) a means of melting snow; (2) one snow shovel and one ice saw; (3) sleeping bags for use by 1/3 of all persons on board and space blankets for the remainder or space blankets for all passengers on board; and (4) one arctic/polar suit for each crew member carried. (c) If any item of equipment contained in the above list is already carried on board the aircraft in accordance with another requirement, there is no need for this to be duplicated.

text: AMC2 NCC.IDE.H.230 Survival equipment

text: GM1 NCC.IDE.H.230 Survival equipment

text: GM2 NCC.IDE.H.230 Survival equipment

text: AREAS IN WHICH SEARCH AND RESCUE WOULD BE ESPECIALLY DIFFICULT The expression ‘areas in which search and rescue would be especially difficult’ should be interpreted, in this context, as meaning: (a) areas so designated by the competent authority responsible for managing search and rescue; or (b) areas that are largely uninhabited and where: (1) the authority referred to in (a) has not published any information to confirm whether search and rescue would be or would not be especially difficult; and

text: (2) the authority referred to in (a) does not, as a matter of policy, designate areas as being especially difficult for search and rescue.

text: AMC1 NCC.IDE.H.231 Additional requirements for helicopters conducting offshore operations in a hostile sea area

text: INSTALLATION OF THE LIFE-RAFT (a) Projections on the exterior surface of the helicopter that are located in a zone delineated by boundaries that are 1.22 m (4 ft) above and 0.61 m (2 ft) below the established static water line could cause damage to a deployed life-raft. Examples of projections which need to be considered are aerials, overboard vents, unprotected split-pin tails, guttering and any projection sharper than a three dimensional right angled corner. (b) While the boundaries specified in (a) are intended as a guide, the total area that should be considered should also take into account the likely behaviour of the liferaft after deployment in all sea states up to the maximum in which the helicopter is capable of remaining upright. (c) Wherever a modification or alteration is made to a helicopter within the boundaries specified, the need to prevent the modification or alteration from causing damage to a deployed life-raft should be taken into account in the design. (d) Particular care should also be taken during routine maintenance to ensure that additional hazards are not introduced by, for example, leaving inspection panels with sharp corners proud of the surrounding fuselage surface, or allowing door sills to deteriorate to a point where sharp edges become a hazard.

text: AMC1 NCC.IDE.H.235 All helicopters on flight over water - ditching

text: The same considerations of AMC1 NCC.IDE.H.231 should apply in respect of emergency flotation equipment.

text: GM1 NCC.IDE.H.232 Helicopters certificated for operating on water — Miscellaneous equipment

text: INTERNATIONAL REGULATIONS FOR PREVENTING COLLISIONS AT SEA International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea are those that were published by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) in 1972.

text: AMC1 NCC.IDE.H.240 Headset

text: GENERAL (a) A headset consists of a communication device that includes two earphones to receive and a microphone to transmit audio signals to the helicopter’s communication system. To comply with the minimum performance requirements, the earphones and microphone should match the communication system’s characteristics and the flight crew compartment environment. The headset should

text: be adequately adjustable in order to fit the flight crew’s head. Headset boom microphones should be of the noise cancelling type. (b) If the intention is to utilise noise cancelling earphones, the operator should ensure that the earphones do not attenuate any aural warnings or sounds necessary for alerting the flight crew on matters related to the safe operation of the helicopter.

text: GM1 NCC.IDE.H.240 Headset

text: GM1 NCC.IDE.H.245 Radio communication equipment

text: APPLICABLE AIRSPACE REQUIREMENTS For helicopters being operated under European air traffic control, the applicable airspace requirements include the Single European Sky legislation.

text: AMC1 NCC.IDE.H.255 Transponder

text: SSR TRANSPONDER (a) The secondary surveillance radar (SSR) transponders of helicopters being operated under European air traffic control should comply with any applicable Single European Sky legislation. (b) If the Single European Sky legislation is not applicable, the SSR transponders should operate in accordance with the relevant provisions of Volume IV of ICAO Annex 10.