text: OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR AEROPLANES FIRST ISSUED WITH AN INDIVIDUAL CofA ON OR AFTER 1 JANUARY 2016 AND BEFORE 1 JANUARY 2023

identifier: AMC & GM to Part-NCC — Amendment 6

beslut: ED Decision 2016/012/R

title: AMC & GM to Part-NCC — Amendment 6

text: Annex II to ED Decision 2016/012/R ‘AMC and GM to Part-NCC — Amendment 6’

text: The Annex to Decision 2013/021/R is amended as follows: The text of the amendment is arranged to show deleted text, new or amended text as shown below: (a) deleted text is marked with strikethrough; (b) new or amended text is highlighted in grey; (c) an ellipsis (…) indicates that the remaining text is unchanged in front of or following the reflected amendment.

text: 1. Sub-paragraph (d) of GM2 NCC.GEN.145(b) is amended as follows: (…) For the understanding of the terms used in AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(b) AMC1 NCC.GEN.145(b): (…) (d) ‘continuous monitoring for proper operation’ means for a flight recorder system, a combination of system monitors and/or built-in test functions which operates continuously in order to detect the following: (1) loss of electrical power supply to the flight recorder system; (2) failure of the equipment performing acquisition and processing; (3) failure of the recording medium and/or drive mechanism; and (4) failure of the recorder to store the data in the recording medium as shown by checks of the recorded data including, as reasonably practicable for the storage medium concerned, correct correspondence with the input data. However, detections by the continuous monitoring for proper operation do not need to be automatically reported to the flight crew compartment.

text: 2. A new AMC to sub-paragraph (f)(1) of NCC.GEN.145 is introduced:

text: AMC1 NCC.GEN.145(f)(1) Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection and use

text: USE OF CVR RECORDINGS FOR MAINTAINING OR IMPROVING SAFETY (a) The procedure related to the handling of cockpit voice recorder (CVR) recordings should be written in a document which should be signed by all parties (aircraft operator, crew members, maintenance personnel if applicable). This procedure should, as a minimum, define:

text: (1) the method to obtain the consent of all crew members and maintenance personnel concerned; (2) an access and security policy that restricts access to CVR recordings and identified CVR transcripts to specifically authorised persons identified by their position; (3) a retention policy and accountability, including the measures to be taken to ensure the security of the CVR recordings and CVR transcripts and their protection from misuse. The retention policy should specify the period of time after which CVR recordings and identified CVR transcripts are destroyed; and (4) a description of the uses made of CVR recordings and of their transcripts. (b) Each time a CVR recording file is read out under the conditions defined by NCC.GEN.145(f)(1): (1) parts of the CVR recording file that contain information with a privacy content should be deleted to the extent possible, and it should not be permitted that the detail of information with a privacy content is transcribed; and (2) the operator should retain, and when requested, provide to the competent authority: (i) information on the use made (or the intended use) of the CVR recording; and (ii) evidence that the persons concerned consented to the use made (or the intended use) of the CVR recording file. (c) The person who fulfils the role of a safety manager should also be responsible for the protection and use of the CVR recordings and the CVR transcripts. (d) In case a third party is involved in the use of CVR recordings, contractual agreements with this third party should, when applicable, cover the aspects enumerated in (a) and (b).

text: 3. A new GM to sub-paragraph (f)(1) of NCC.GEN.145 is introduced:

text: GM1 NCC.GEN.145(f)(1) Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection and use

text: USE OF CVR RECORDINGS FOR MAINTAINING OR IMPROVING SAFETY (a) The CVR is primarily a tool for the investigation of accidents and serious incidents by investigating authorities. Misuse of CVR recordings is a breach of the right to privacy and it works against an effective safety culture inside the operator. (b) Therefore, the use of a CVR recording, when for purposes other than CVR serviceability or those laid down by

text: Regulation (EU) No 996/2010

text: , should be subject to the free prior consent of the persons concerned, and framed by a procedure that is endorsed by all parties and that protects the privacy of crew members and (if applicable) maintenance staff.

text: 4. A new AMC to sub-paragraph (f)(1a) of NCC.GEN.145 is introduced:

text: AMC1 NCC.GEN.145(f)(1a) Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection and use

text: CVR RECORDING INSPECTION FOR ENSURING SERVICEABILITY (a) When an inspection of the CVR recording is performed for ensuring audio quality and intelligibility of recorded communications: (1) the privacy of the CVR recording should be ensured (e.g. by locating the equipment in a separated area and/or using headsets); (2) access to the CVR replay equipment should be restricted to specifically authorised persons; (3) provision should be made for the secure storage of the CVR recording medium, the CVR recording files and copies thereof; (4) the CVR recording files and copies thereof should be destroyed not earlier than two months and not later than one year after completion of the CVR recording inspection, except that audio samples may be retained for enhancing the CVR recording inspection (e.g. for comparing audio quality); and (5) only the accountable manager of the operator, and when identified to comply with ORO.GEN.200, the person fulfilling the role of safety manager, should be entitled to request a copy of the CVR recording file. (b) The conditions enumerated in (a) should also be complied with if the inspection of the CVR recording is subcontracted to a third party. The contractual agreements with the third party should explicitly cover these aspects.

text: 5. The subtitle of AMC1 NCC.IDE.A.165 is amended as follows:

text: AMC1 NCC.IDE.A.165 Flight data recorder

text: 6. In Table 1 of AMC1 NCC.IDE.A.165 ,Parameter 27 is amended as follows: 27 Air–ground status . Air–ground status (and a sensor of each landing gear if installed)

text: 7. In Table 2 of AMC1 NCC.IDE.A.165, (a) Parameter 21 is amended as follows: 21 Vertical deviation — the approach aid in use should be recorded. For auto-land/category III operations, each system should be recorded:

text: 21a ILS/GPS/GLS glide path 21b MLS elevation 21c GNSS approach path Integrated approach navigation (IAN)/integrated area navigation

text: (IRNAV), vertical deviation

text: 8. Parameter No 32 is amended as follows:

text: (b) Parameter No 56 is amended as follows:

text: 56 Fuel quantity or fuel quantity in CG trim tank

text: (c) Parameters Nos 72, 73 and 74 are amended as follows:

text: 72 Trim control input position in the flight crew compartment, pitch Flight crew compartment trim control input position pitch — when mechanical means for control inputs are not available, cockpit displayed trim positions or trim command should be recorded. 73 Trim control input position in the flight crew compartment, roll Flight crew compartment trim control input position roll — when mechanical means for control inputs are not available, flight crew compartment displayed trim positions or trim command should be recorded. 74 Trim control input position in the flight crew compartment, yaw Flight crew compartment trim control input position yaw — when mechanical means for control inputs are not available, flight crew compartment displayed trim positions or trim command should be recorded.

text: 9. A new AMC to NCC.IDE.A.165 is introduced:

text: AMC2 NCC.IDE.A.165 Flight data recorder

text: OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR AEROPLANES FIRST ISSUED WITH AN INDIVIDUAL CofA ON OR AFTER 1 JANUARY 2023 (a) The operational performance requirements for flight data recorders (FDRs) should be those laid down in EUROCAE Document 112A (Minimum Operational Performance Specification for Crash Protected Airborne Recorder Systems) dated September 2013, or any later equivalent standard produced by EUROCAE. (b) The FDR should, with reference to a timescale, record: (1) the list of parameters in Table 1 below; (2) the additional parameters listed in Table 2 below, when the information data source for the parameter is used by aeroplane systems or is available on the instrument panel for use by the flight crew to operate the aeroplane; and (3) any dedicated parameters related to novel or unique design or operational characteristics of the aeroplane as determined by the Agency. (c) The parameters to be recorded should meet the performance specifications (range, sampling intervals, accuracy limits and resolution in read-out) as defined in the relevant tables of EUROCAE Document 112A, or any later equivalent standard produced by EUROCAE.

text: Table 1: FDR — All aeroplanes

text: No* Parameter

text: 1a Time; or 1b Relative time count 1c Global navigation satellite system (GNSS) time synchronisation 2 Pressure altitude (including altitude values displayed on each flight crew member’s primary flight display) 3 Indicated airspeed or calibrated airspeed (including values of indicated airspeed or calibrated airspeed displayed on each flight crew member’s primary flight display) 4 Heading (primary flight crew reference) — when true or magnetic heading can be selected, the primary heading reference, a discrete indicating selection should be recorded. 5 Normal acceleration 6 Pitch attitude — pitch attitude values displayed on each flight crew member’s primary flight display should be recorded, unless the aeroplane is type certified before 1 January 2023 and recording the values displayed at the captain position or the first officer position would require extensive modification. 7 Roll attitude — roll attitude values displayed on each flight crew member’s primary flight display should be recorded, unless the aeroplane is type certified before 1 January 2023 and recording the values displayed at the captain position or the first officer position would require extensive modification. 8 Manual radio transmission keying and CVR/FDR synchronisation reference 9 Engine thrust/power: 9a Parameters required to determine propulsive thrust/power on each engine, in both normal and reverse thrust 9b Flight crew compartment thrust/power lever position (for aeroplanes with non-mechanically linked engine controls in the flight crew compartment) 14 Total or outside air temperature 16 Longitudinal acceleration (body axis) 17 Lateral acceleration 18 Primary flight control surface and/or primary flight control pilot input (For aeroplanes with control systems in which the movement of a control surface will back drive the pilot’s control, ‘or’ applies. For aeroplanes with control systems in which the movement of a control surface will not back drive the pilot’s control, ‘and’ applies. For multiple or split surfaces, a suitable combination of inputs is acceptable in lieu of recording each surface separately. For aeroplanes that have a flight control break-away capability that allows either pilot to operate the controls independently, record both inputs):

text: 18a Pitch axis 18b Roll axis 18c

text: No* Parameter

text: Yaw axis 19 Pitch trim surface position 23 Marker beacon passage 24 Warnings — in addition to the master warning, each ‘red’ warning that cannot be determined from other parameters or from the CVR and each smoke warning from other compartments should be recorded. 25 Each navigation receiver frequency selection 27 Air–ground status. Air–ground status and a sensor of each landing gear if installed * The number in the left-hand column reflects the serial number depicted in EUROCAE 112A.

text: Table 2: FDR — Aeroplanes for which the data source for the parameter is either used by the aeroplane systems or is available on the instrument panel for use by the flight crew to operate the aeroplane

text: No* Parameter

text: 10 Flaps: 10a Trailing edge flap position 10b Flight crew compartment control selection 11 Slats: 11a Leading edge flap (slat) position 11b Flight crew compartment control selection 12 Thrust reverse status 13 Ground spoiler and speed brake: 13a Ground spoiler position 13b Ground spoiler selection 13c Speed brake position 13d Speed brake selection 15 Autopilot, autothrottle and automatic flight control system (AFCS): mode and engagement status (showing which systems are engaged and which primary modes are controlling the flight path and speed of the aircraft) 20 Radio altitude. For auto-land/category III operations, each radio altimeter should be recorded. 21 Vertical deviation — the approach aid in use should be recorded. For auto-land/category III operations, each system should be recorded:

text: No* Parameter

text: 21c Integrated approach navigation (IAN) /Integrated Area Navigation, vertical deviation 22 Horizontal deviation — the approach aid in use should be recorded. For autoland/category III operations, each system should be recorded:

text: 22a ILS/GPS/GLS localiser 22b MLS azimuth 22c GNSS approach path/IRNAV lateral deviation 26 Distance measuring equipment (DME) 1 and 2 distances: 26a Distance to runway threshold (GLS) 26b Distance to missed approach point (IRNAV/IAN) 28 Ground proximity warning system (GPWS)/terrain awareness warning system (TAWS)/ground collision avoidance system (GCAS) status — a suitable combination of discretes unless recorder capacity is limited in which case a single discrete for all modes is acceptable: 28a Selection of terrain display mode, including pop-up display status 28b Terrain alerts, including cautions and warnings and advisories 28c On/off switch position 29 Angle of attack 30 Low pressure warning (each system): 30a Hydraulic pressure 30b Pneumatic pressure 31 Ground speed 32 Landing gear: 32a Landing gear position 32b Gear selector position 33 Navigation data: 33a Drift angle 33b Wind speed 33c Wind direction 33d Latitude 33e Longitude 33f GNSS augmentation in use 34 Brakes: 34a Left and right brake pressure 34b Left and right brake pedal position 35 Additional engine parameters (if not already recorded in parameter 9 of Table 1, and if the

text: No* Parameter

text: aeroplane is equipped with a suitable data source): 35a Engine pressure ratio (EPR) 35b N1 35c Indicated vibration level 35d N2 35e Exhaust gas temperature (EGT) 35f Fuel flow 35g Fuel cut-off lever position 35h N3 35i Engine fuel metering valve position (or equivalent parameter from the system that directly controls the flow of fuel into the engine) — for aeroplanes type certified before 1 January 2023, to be recorded only if this does not require extensive modification. 36 Traffic alert and collision avoidance system (TCAS)/airborne collision avoidance system (ACAS) — a suitable combination of discretes should be recorded to determine the status of the system: 36a Combined control 36b Vertical control 36c Up advisory 36d Down advisory 36e Sensitivity level 37 Wind shear warning 38 Selected barometric setting — to be recorded for the aeroplane where the parameter is displayed electronically: 38a Pilot selected barometric setting 38b Co-pilot selected barometric setting 39 Selected altitude (all pilot selectable modes of operation) — to be recorded for the aeroplane where the parameter is displayed electronically 40 Selected speed (all pilot selectable modes of operation) — to be recorded for the aeroplane where the parameter is displayed electronically 41 Selected Mach (all pilot selectable modes of operation) — to be recorded for the aeroplane where the parameter is displayed electronically 42 Selected vertical speed (all pilot selectable modes of operation) — to be recorded for the aeroplane where the parameter is displayed electronically 43 Selected heading (all pilot selectable modes of operation) — to be recorded for the aeroplane where the parameter is displayed electronically 44 Selected flight path (all pilot selectable modes of operation) — to be recorded for the aeroplane where the parameter is displayed electronically:

text: No* Parameter

text: 44a Course/desired track (DSTRK) 44b Path angle 44c Coordinates of final approach path (IRNAV/IAN) 45 Selected decision height — to be recorded for the aeroplane where the parameter is displayed electronically 46 Electronic flight instrument system (EFIS) display format, showing the display system status: 46a Pilot 46b Co-pilot 47 Multi-function/engine/alerts display format, showing the display system status 48 Alternating current (AC) electrical bus status — each bus 49 Direct current (DC) electrical bus status — each bus 50 Engine bleed valve(s) position 51 Auxiliary power unit (APU) bleed valve(s) position 52 Computer failure — all critical flight and engine control systems 53 Engine thrust command 54 Engine thrust target 55 Computed centre of gravity (CG) 56 Fuel quantity in CG trim tank 57 Head-up display in use 58 Paravisual display on 59 Operational stall protection, stick shaker and pusher activation 60 Primary navigation system reference: 60a GNSS 60b Inertial navigational system (INS) 60c VHF omnidirectional radio range (VOR)/distance measuring equipment (DME) 60d MLS 60e Loran C 60f ILS 61 Ice detection 62 Engine warning — each engine vibration 63 Engine warning — each engine over temperature 64 Engine warning — each engine oil pressure low 65 Engine warning — each engine overspeed

text: No* Parameter

text: 66 Yaw trim surface position 67 Roll trim surface position 68 Yaw or sideslip angle 69 De-icing and/or anti-icing systems selection 70 Hydraulic pressure — each system 71 Loss of cabin pressure 72 Trim control input position in the flight crew compartment, pitch — when mechanical means for control inputs are not available, displayed trim position or trim command should be recorded. 73 Trim control input position in the flight crew compartment, roll — when mechanical means for control inputs are not available, displayed trim position or trim command should be recorded. 74 Trim control input position in the flight crew compartment, yaw — when mechanical means for control inputs are not available, displayed trim position or trim command should be recorded. 75 All flight control input forces (for fly-by-wire flight control systems, where control surface position is a function of the displacement of the control input device only, it is not necessary to record this parameter): 75a Control wheel input forces 75b Control column input forces 75c Rudder pedal input forces 76 Event marker 77 Date 78 Actual navigation performance (ANP) or estimate of position error (EPE) or estimate of position uncertainty (EPU) 79 Cabin pressure altitude — for aeroplanes type certified before 1 January 2023, to be recorded only if this does not require extensive modification. 80 Aeroplane computed weight — for aeroplanes type certified before 1 January 2023, to be recorded only if this does not require extensive modification. 81 Flight director command: 81a Left flight director pitch command — for aeroplanes type certified before 1 January 2023, to be recorded only if this does not require extensive modification. 81b Left flight director roll command — for aeroplanes type certified before 1 January 2023, to 81c be recorded only if this does not require extensive modification. 81d Right flight director pitch command — for aeroplanes type certified before 1 January 2023, to be recorded only if this does not require extensive modification. Right flight director roll command — for aeroplanes type certified before 1 January 2023, to be recorded only if this does not require extensive modification.

text: No* Parameter

text: 82 Vertical speed — for aeroplanes type certified before 1 January 2023, to be recorded only if this does not require extensive modification. * The number in the left-hand column reflects the serial number depicted in EUROCAE Document 112A.

text: 10. The subtitle of AMC1 NCC.IDE.H.165 is amended as follows:

text: AMC1 NCC.IDE.H.165 Flight data recorder

text: OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR HELICOPTERS HAVING AN MCTOM OF MORE THAN 3 175 KG AND FIRST ISSUED WITH AN INDIVIDUAL CofA ON OR AFTER 1 JANUARY 2016 AND BEFORE 1 JANUARY 2023

text: 11. In Table 1 of AMC1 NCC.IDE.H.165, Parameter No 10 is amended as follows: 10 Rotor: 10a Main rotor speed 10b Rotor brake (if installed)

text: 12. A new AMC to NCC.IDE.H.165 is introduced:

text: AMC2 NCC.IDE.H.165 Flight data recorder

text: OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR HELICOPTERS HAVING AN MCTOM OF MORE THAN 3 175 KG AND FIRST ISSUED WITH AN INDIVIDUAL CofA ON OR AFTER 1 JANUARY 2023 (a) The operational performance requirements for flight data recorders (FDRs) should be those laid down in EUROCAE Document 112A (Minimum Operational Performance Specification for Crash Protected Airborne Recorder Systems) dated September 2013, or any later equivalent standard produced by EUROCAE. (b) The FDR should, with reference to a timescale, record: (1) the list of parameters in Table 1 below; (2) the additional parameters listed in Table 2 below, when the information data source for the parameter is used by helicopter systems or is available on the instrument panel for use by the flight crew to operate the helicopter; and (3) any dedicated parameters related to novel or unique design or operational characteristics of the helicopter as determined by the Agency. (c) The parameters to be recorded should meet the performance specifications (range, sampling intervals, accuracy limits and resolution in read-out) as defined in the relevant tables of EUROCAE Document 112A, or any later equivalent standard produced by EUROCAE. Table 1: FDR — All helicopters

text: No* Parameter

text: 1 Time or relative time count

text: No* Parameter

text: 2 Pressure altitude 3 Indicated airspeed or calibrated airspeed 4 Heading 5 Normal acceleration 6 Pitch attitude 7 Roll attitude 8 Manual radio transmission keying CVR/FDR synchronisation reference 9 Power on each engine: 9a Free power turbine speed (NF) 9b Engine torque 9c Engine gas generator speed (NG) 9d Flight crew compartment power control position 9e Other parameters to enable engine power to be determined 10 Rotor: 10a Main rotor speed 10b Rotor brake (if installed) 11 Primary flight controls — pilot input or control output position if it is possible to derive either the control input or the control movement (one from the other) for all modes of operation and flight regimes. Otherwise, pilot input and control output position 11a Collective pitch 11b Longitudinal cyclic pitch 11c Lateral cyclic pitch 11d Tail rotor pedal 11e Controllable stabilator (if applicable) 11f Hydraulic selection 12 Hydraulics low pressure (each system should be recorded) 13 Outside air temperature 18 Yaw rate or yaw acceleration 20 Longitudinal acceleration (body axis) 21 Lateral acceleration 25 Marker beacon passage 26 Warnings — including master warning, gearbox low oil pressure and stability augmentation system failure, and other ‘red’ warnings where the warning condition cannot be determined from other parameters or from the cockpit voice recorder 27 Each navigation receiver frequency selection

text: No* Parameter

text: 37 Engine control modes * The number in the left-hand column reflects the serial numbers depicted in EUROCAE Document 112A. Table 2: Helicopters for which the data source for the parameter is either used by the helicopter systems or is available on the instrument panel for use by the flight crew to operate the helicopter

text: No* Parameter

text: 14 AFCS mode and engagement status (showing which systems are engaged and which primary modes are controlling the flight path) 15 Stability augmentation system engagement (each system should be recorded) 16 Main gear box oil pressure 17 Gear box oil temperature: 17a Main gear box oil temperature 17b Intermediate gear box oil temperature 17c Tail rotor gear box oil temperature 19 Indicated sling load force (if signals readily available) 22 Radio altitude 23 Vertical deviation — the approach aid in use should be recorded: 23a ILS glide path 23b MLS elevation 23c GNSS approach path 24 Horizontal deviation — the approach aid in use should be recorded: 24a ILS localiser 24b MLS azimuth 24c GNSS approach path 28 DME 1 & 2 distances 29 Navigation data: 29a Drift angle 29b Wind speed 29c Wind direction 29d Latitude 29e Longitude 29f Ground speed 30 Landing gear or gear selector position 31 Engine exhaust gas temperature (T4)

text: No* Parameter

text: 32 Turbine inlet temperature (TIT)/interstage turbine temperature (ITT) 33 Fuel contents 34 Altitude rate (vertical speed) — only necessary when available from cockpit instruments 35 Ice detection 36 Helicopter health and usage monitor system (HUMS): 36a Engine data 36b Chip detector 36c Track timing 36d Exceedance discretes 36e Broadband average engine vibration 38 Selected barometric setting — to be recorded for helicopters where the parameter is displayed electronically: 38a Pilot 38b Co-pilot 39 Selected altitude (all pilot selectable modes of operation) — to be recorded for the helicopters where the parameter is displayed electronically. 40 Selected speed (all pilot selectable modes of operation) — to be recorded for the helicopters where the parameter is displayed electronically. 41 Selected Mach (all pilot selectable modes of operation) — to be recorded for the helicopters where the parameter is displayed electronically. 42 Selected vertical speed (all pilot selectable modes of operation) — to be recorded for the helicopters where the parameter is displayed electronically. 43 Selected heading (all pilot selectable modes of operation) — to be recorded for the helicopters where the parameter is displayed electronically. 44 Selected flight path (all pilot selectable modes of operation) — to be recorded for the helicopters where the parameter is displayed electronically. 45 Selected decision height (all pilot selectable modes of operation) — to be recorded for the helicopters where the parameter is displayed electronically. 46 EFIS display format (showing the display system status): 46a Pilot 46b First officer 47 Multi-function/engine/alerts display format (showing the display system status) 48 Event marker 49 Status of ground proximity warning system (GPWS)/terrain awareness warning system (TAWS)/ground collision avoidance system (GCAS): 49a Selection of terrain display mode including pop-up display status — for helicopters type certified before 1 January 2023, to be recorded only if this does not require extensive

text: No* Parameter

text: 49b modification. Terrain alerts, both cautions and warnings, and advisories — for helicopters type certified 49c before 1 January 2023, to be recorded only if this does not require extensive modification On/off switch position — for helicopters type certified before 1 January 2023, to be recorded only if this does not require extensive modification 50 Traffic alert and collision avoidance system (TCAS)/airborne collision avoidance system (ACAS): 50a Combined control — for helicopters type certified before 1 January 2023, to be recorded only if this does not require extensive modification. 50b Vertical control — for helicopters type certified before 1 January 2023, to be recorded only if this does not require extensive modification. 50c Up advisory — for helicopters type certified before 1 January 2023, to be recorded only if this does not require extensive modification. 50d Down advisory — for helicopters type certified before 1 January 2023, to be recorded only if this does not require extensive modification. 50e Sensitivity level — for helicopters type certified before 1 January 2023, to be recorded only if this does not require extensive modification. 51 Primary flight controls — pilot input forces: 51a Collective pitch — for helicopters type certified before 1 January 2023, to be recorded only if this does not require extensive modification 51b Longitudinal cyclic pitch — for helicopters type certified before 1 January 2023, to be recorded only if this does not require extensive modification. 51c Lateral cyclic pitch — for helicopters type certified before 1 January 2023, to be recorded only if this does not require extensive modification. 51d Tail rotor pedal — for helicopters type certified before 1 January 2023, to be recorded only if this does not require extensive modification. 52 Computed centre of gravity — for helicopters type certified before 1 January 2023, to be recorded only if this does not require extensive modification. 53 Helicopter computed weight — for helicopters type certified before 1 January 2023, to be recorded only if this does not require extensive modification. * The number in the left-hand column reflects the serial numbers depicted in EUROCAE Document 112A.


identifier: AMC & GM to Part-NCC — Amendment 7

amnesord: Part-NCC - Non-commercial operations with complex-motor-powered aircraft

beslut: ED Decision 2016/022/R

publisher: Europeiska unionens byrå för luftfartssäkerhet

sprak: en

title: AMC & GM to Part-NCC — Amendment 7

serie: amc-gm

text: Annex VI to ED Decision 2016/022/R ‘AMC and GM to Annex VI (Part-NCC) — Amendment 7’

type: rubrik

text: The Annex to ED Decision 2013/021/R is amended as follows: The text of the amendment is arranged to show deleted text, new or amended text as shown below: (a) deleted text is marked with strikethrough; (b) new or amended text is highlighted in grey; (c) an ellipsis (…) indicates that the remaining text is unchanged in front of or following the reflected amendment.

type: stycke

text: 1. AMC1 NCC.OP.152 Destination alternate aerodromes — helicopter is deleted.

text: 2. AMC1 NCC.IDE.H.231 Additional requirements for helicopters conducting offshore operations in a hostile sea area is deleted.

text: 3. AMC1 NCC.IDE.H.235 All helicopters on flight over water — ditching is amended as follows: AMC1 NCC.IDE.H.235 All helicopters on flight over water — ditching The considerations of AMC1 NCC.IDE.H.231AMC1 SPA.HOFO.165(d) should apply in respect of emergency flotation equipment.

type: vagledning

utgivare: easa


identifier: AMC & GM to Part-NCC — Amendment 8

beslut: ED Decision 2017/002/R

title: AMC & GM to Part-NCC — Amendment 8

text: Annex II to Decision 2017/002/R

text: ‘AMC and GM to Part-NCC — Amendment 8’

text: The Annex to Decision 2013/021/R is hereby amended as follows: The text of the amendments is arranged to show deleted, new or amended text as shown below: — deleted text is marked with strike through; — new or amended text is highlighted in grey; and — an ellipsis (…) indicates that the remaining text is unchanged in front of or following the reflected amendment.

text: 1. AMC1 NCC.IDE.A.260 is amended as follows: AMC1 NCC.IDE.A.260 Electronic navigation data management ELECTRONIC NAVIGATION DATA PRODUCTS (a) When the operator of a complex motor-powered aeroplane uses a navigation database that supports an airborne navigation application as a primary means of navigation, the navigation database supplier should hold a Type 2 letter of acceptance (LoA), or equivalent, or be a Type 2 DAT provider certified in accordance with

text: Regulation (EU) 2017/373

text: , or equivalent. (b) If this airborne navigation application is needed for an operation requiring a specific approval in accordance with Annex V (Part-SPA), the operator’s procedures should be based upon the Type 2 LoA acceptance process.

text: 2. GM1 NCC.IDE.A.260 is amended as follows: GM1 NCC.IDE.A.260 Electronic navigation data management LETTERS OF ACCEPTANCE AND STANDARDS FOR ELECTRONIC NAVIGATION DATA PRODUCTS (a) A Type 2 LoA is issued by the Agency in accordance with the Agency’s Opinion No 01/2005 on The Acceptance of Navigation Database Suppliers (hereinafter referred to as the Agency’s Opinion No 01/2005). The definitions of navigation database, navigation database supplier, data application integrator, Type 1 LoA and Type 2 LoA can be found in the Agency’s Opinion No 01/2005. (b) Equivalent to a Type 2 LoA is the FAA Type 2 LoA, issued in accordance with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Advisory Circular AC 20-153 or AC 20-153A, and the Transport Canada Civil Aviation (TCCA) ‘Acknowledgement Letter of an Aeronautical Data Process’, which uses the same basis. (c) EUROCAE ED-76/Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) DO-200A Standards for Processing Aeronautical Data contains guidance relating to the processes which the supplier may follow. (d) A ‘Type 2 DAT provider’ is an organisation as defined in

text: Article 2(5)

text: (b) of

text: Regulation (EU) 2017/373

text: . (e) Equivalent to a certified ‘Type 2 DAT provider’ is defined in any Aviation Safety Agreement between the European Union and a third country, including any Technical Implementation Procedures, or any Working Arrangements between EASA and the competent authority of a third country.


identifier: AMC & GM to Part-NCC — Amendment 9

beslut: ED Decision 2017/003/R

title: AMC & GM to Part-NCC — Amendment 9

text: Annex II to Decision 2017/003/R

text: ‘AMC and GM to Part-NCC — Amendment 9’

text: The Annex to Decision 2013/021/R is hereby amended as follows: The text of the amendment is arranged to show deleted, new or amended text as shown below: — deleted text is marked with strike through; — new or amended text is highlighted in grey; and — an ellipsis (…) indicates that the remaining text is unchanged in front of or following the reflected amendment.

text: 1. AMC1 NCC.IDE.A.260 is amended as follows: AMC1 NCC.IDE.A.260 Electronic navigation data managementManagement of aeronautical databases ELECTRONIC NAVIGATION DATA PRODUCTSAERONAUTICAL DATABASES (a) When the operator of a complex motor-powered aeroplane uses a navigation database that supports an airborne navigation application as a primary means of navigation, the navigation database supplier should hold a Type 2 letter of acceptance (LoA), or equivalent, or be a Type 2 DAT provider certified in accordance with

text: Regulation (EU) 2017/373

text: or equivalent. (b) If this airborne navigation application is needed for an operation requiring a specific approval in accordance with Annex V (Part-SPA), the operator’s procedures should be based upon the Type 2 LoA acceptance process. When the operator of an aircraft uses an aeronautical database that supports an airborne navigation application as a primary means of navigation used to meet the airspace usage requirements, the database provider should be a Type 2 DAT provider certified in accordance with

text: Regulation (EU) 2017/373

text: or equivalent.

text: 2. GM1 NCC.IDE.A.260 is amended as follows: GM1 NCC.IDE.A.260 Electronic navigation data managementManagement of aeronautical databases LETTERS OF ACCEPTANCE AND STANDARDS FOR ELECTRONIC NAVIGATION DATA PRODUCTS AERONAUTICAL DATABASE APPLICATIONS (a) A Type 2 LoA is issued by the Agency in accordance with the Agency’s Opinion No 01/2005 on The Acceptance of Navigation Database Suppliers (hereinafter referred to as the Agency’s Opinion No 01/2005). The definitions of navigation database, navigation database supplier, data application integrator, Type 1 LoA and Type 2 LoA can be found in the Agency’s Opinion No 01/2005. (b) Equivalent to a Type 2 LoA is the FAA Type 2 LoA, issued in accordance with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Advisory Circular AC 20-153 or AC 20-153A, and the Transport Canada Civil Aviation (TCCA) ‘Acknowledgement Letter of an Aeronautical Data Process’, which uses the same basis. (c) EUROCAE ED-76/Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) DO-200A Standards for Processing Aeronautical Data contains guidance relating to the processes which the supplier may follow. Annex II to Decision 2017/003/R (d) A ‘Type 2 DAT provider’ is an organisation as defined in point 5 (b) of

text: Article 2

text: to

text: Regulation (EU) 2017/373

text: . (e) Equivalent to a certified ‘Type 2 DAT provider’ is defined in any Aviation Safety Agreement between the European Union and a third country, including any Technical Implementation Procedures, or any Working Arrangements between EASA and the competent authority of a third country. (a) Applications using aeronautical databases for which Type 2 DAT providers should be certified in accordance with

text: Regulation (EU) 2017/373

text: may be found in GM1 DAT.OR.100. (b) The certification of a Type 2 DAT provider in accordance with

text: Regulation (EU) 2017/373

text: 3. The new GM2 NCC.IDE.A.260 is introduced: GM2 NCC.IDE.A.260 Management of aeronautical databases TIMELY DISTRIBUTION The operator should distribute current and unaltered aeronautical databases to all aircraft requiring them in accordance with the validity period of the databases or in accordance with a procedure established in the operations manual if no validity period is defined.

text: 4. The new GM3 NCC.IDE.A.260 is introduced: GM3 NCC.IDE.A.260 Management of aeronautical databases STANDARDS FOR AERONAUTICAL DATABASES AND DAT PROVIDERS (a) A ‘Type 2 DAT provider’ is an organisation as defined in

text: Article 2(5)

text: (b) of

text: Regulation (EU) 2017/373

text: . (b) Equivalent to a certified ‘Type 2 DAT provider’ is defined in any Aviation Safety Agreement between the European Union and a third country, including any Technical Implementation Procedures, or any Working Arrangements between EASA and the competent authority of a third country.

text: 5. The new AMC1 NCC.IDE.H.260 is introduced: AMC1 NCC.IDE.H.260 Management of aeronautical databases AERONAUTICAL DATABASES When the operator of an aircraft uses an aeronautical database that supports an airborne navigation application as a primary means of navigation used to meet the airspace usage requirements, the database provider should be a Type 2 DAT provider certified in accordance with

text: Regulation (EU) 2017/373

text: or equivalent.

text: 6. The new GM1 NCC.IDE.H.260 is introduced: GM1 NCC.IDE.H.260 Management of aeronautical databases AERONAUTICAL DATABASE APPLICATIONS (a) Applications using aeronautical databases for which Type 2 DAT providers should be certified in accordance with

text: Regulation (EU) 2017/373

text: Regulation (EU) 2017/373

text: ensures data integrity and compatibility with the certified aircraft application/equipment. Annex II to Decision 2017/003/R

text: 7. The new GM2 NCC.IDE.H.260 is introduced: GM2 NCC.IDE.H.260 Management of aeronautical databases TIMELY DISTRIBUTION The operator should distribute current and unaltered aeronautical databases to all aircraft requiring them in accordance with the validity period of the databases or in accordance with a procedure established in the operations manual if no validity period is defined.

text: 8. The new GM3 NCC.IDE.H.260 is introduced: GM3 NCC.IDE.H.260 Management of aeronautical databases STANDARDS FOR AERONAUTICAL DATABASES AND DAT PROVIDERS (a) A ‘Type 2 DAT provider’ is an organisation as defined in

text: Article 2(5)

text: (b) of

text: Regulation (EU) 2017/373


identifier: AMC & GM to Part-NCC — Initial issue, Amendment 11

beslut: ED Decision 2019/008/R

text: Annex V to ED Decision 2019/008/R

text: Annex V to ED Decision 2019/008/R

text: ‘AMC/GM to Part-NCC – Amendment 11

text: The Annex to Decision 2013/021/R of 23 August 2013 is hereby amended as follows: The text of the amendment is arranged to show deleted, new or amended text as shown below:

text: 1. deleted text is is marked with strike through;

text: 2. new or amended text is highlighted in blue; and

text: 3. an ellipsis ‘(…)’ indicates that the remaining text is unchanged in front of or following the reflected amendment.

text: 1. AMC1 NCC.GEN.130 is amended as follows:

text: AMC1 NCC.GEN.130 Portable electronic devices (PEDs)

text: TECHNICAL PREREQUISITES FOR THE USE OF PEDS (…) (d) Demonstration of electromagnetic compatibility (1) EMI assessment at aircraft level The means to demonstrate that the radio frequency (RF) emissions (intentional or nonintentional) are tolerated by aircraft systems should be as follows: (i) Tto address front door coupling susceptibility for any kind of PEDs: (A) RTCA, ‘Guidance on allowing transmitting portable, electronic devices (T-PEDs) on aircraft’, DO-294C (or later revisions), Appendix 5C; or (A) EUROCAE, ‘Guidance for the use of Portable Electronic Devices (PEDs) on Board Aircraft’, ED-130A / RTCA DO-363 ‘Guidance for the Development of Portable Electronic Devices (PED) Tolerance for Civil Aircraft’, Section 5; or (B) RTCA, ‘Aircraft design and certification for portable electronic device (PED) tolerance’, DO-307 (including Change 1 or later revisions), Section 4; and (B) EUROCAE, ‘Aircraft Design and Certification for Portable Electronic Device (PED) Tolerance’, ED-239 / RTCA DO-307A, Section 4. The use of RTCA, ‘Guidance on Allowing Transmitting Portable, Electronic Devices (T-PEDs) on Aircraft’, DO-294C (or later revisions), Appendix 5C; or RTCA, ‘Aircraft Design and Certification for Portable Electronic Device (PED) Tolerance’, DO-307 (including Change 1 or later revisions), Section 4, may be acceptable. (ii) Tto address back door coupling susceptibility for T-PEDs: (A) EUROCAE, ‘Guidance for the use of Portable Electronic Devices (PEDs) on Board Aircraft’, ED-130A/RTCA DO-363, Section 6; or (or later revisions), Annex 6;

text: Annex V to ED Decision 2019/008/R

text: (B) RTCA DO-294C (or later revisions), Appendix 6D; or (B) EUROCAE, ‘Aircraft Design and Certification for Portable Electronic Device (PED) Tolerance’, ED-239 / RTCA DO-307A, Section 3. (C) RTCA DO-307 (including Change 1 or later revisions), Section 3. The use of EUROCAE, ‘Guidance for the use of Portable Electronic Devices (PEDs) on Board Aircraft’, ED-130, Annex 6; or RTCA DO-294C (or later revisions), Appendix 6D; or RTCA DO-307 (including Change 1 or later revisions), Section 3, may be acceptable. (2) Alternative EMI assessment of C-PEDs (i) For front door coupling: (A) C-PEDs should comply with the levels as defined by: (a) EUROCAE/RTCA, ‘Environmental Conditions and Test Procedures for Airborne Equipment’, ED-14D/DO-160D (or later revisions), Section 21, Category M, for operation in the passenger compartment and the flight crew compartment; and (b) EUROCAE ED-14ED/RTCA DO-160ED (or later revisions), Section 21, Category H, for operation in areas not accessible during the flight. (B) If the C-PEDs are electronic flight bags used in the flight crew compartment and if the DO-160 testing described in (A) identifies inadequate margins for interference or has not been performed, it is necessary to test the C-PED in each aircraft model in which it will be operated. The C-PED should be tested in operation on the aircraft to show that no interference occurs with the aircraft equipment. This testing should be performed in a real aircraft, and credit may be given to other similarly equipped aircraft (meaning in particular that they have the same avionics equipment) of the same make and model as the one tested., an alternative compliance method described in EASA, ‘General acceptable means of compliance for airworthiness of products, part and appliances’, AMC-20, AMC 20-25 (‘Airworthiness and operational considerations for electronic flight bags’), may be used. (ii) For To address back-door coupling susceptibility for C-PEDs with transmitting capabilities, the EMI assessment described in (1)(ii) should be performed. (…)

text: 2. A new AMC1 NCC.GEN.131(a) is added:

text: AMC1 NCC.GEN.131(a) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs)

text: HARDWARE In addition to AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.141(a), the following should be considered: (a) Display characteristics Consideration should be given to the long-term degradation of a display, as a result of abrasion and ageing. AMC 25-11 (paragraph 3.16a) may be used as guidance to assess luminance and legibility aspects.

text: Annex V to ED Decision 2019/008/R

text: Information displayed on the EFB should be legible to the typical user at the intended viewing distance(s) and under the full range of lighting conditions expected in a flight crew compartment, including direct sunlight. Users should be able to adjust the brightness of an EFB screen independently of the brightness of other displays in the flight crew compartment. In addition, when incorporating an automatic brightness adjustment, it should operate independently for each EFB in the flight crew compartment. Brightness adjustment using software means may be acceptable provided that this operation does not adversely affect the flight crew workload. Buttons and labels should have adequate illumination for night use. ‘Buttons and labels’ refers to hardware controls located on the display itself. All controls should be properly labelled for their intended function, except if no confusion is possible. The 90-degree viewing angle on either side of each flight crew member’s line of sight may be unacceptable for certain EFB applications if aspects of the display quality are degraded at large viewing angles (e.g. the display colours wash out or the displayed colour contrast is not discernible at the installation viewing angle). (b) Power source The design of a portable EFB system should consider the source of electrical power, the independence of the power sources for multiple EFBs, and the potential need for an independent battery source. A non-exhaustive list of factors to be considered includes: (1) the possibility to adopt operational procedures to ensure an adequate level of safety (for example, ensure a minimum level of charge before departure); (2) the possible redundancy of portable EFBs to reduce the risk of exhausted batteries; (3) the availability of backup battery packs to ensure an alternative source of power. Battery-powered EFBs that have aircraft power available for recharging the internal EFB batteries are considered to have a suitable backup power source. For EFBs that have an internal battery power source, and that are used as an alternative for paper documentation that is required by NCC.GEN.140, the operator should either have at least one EFB connected to an aircraft power bus or have established mitigation means and procedures to ensure that sufficient power with acceptable margins will be available during the whole flight. (c) Environmental testing Environmental testing, in particular testing for rapid decompression, should be performed when the EFB hosts applications that are required to be used during flight following a rapid decompression and/or when the EFB environmental operational range is potentially insufficient with respect to the foreseeable flight crew compartment operating conditions. The information from the rapid-decompression test of an EFB is used to establish the procedural requirements for the use of that EFB device in a pressurised aircraft. Rapid-decompression testing should follow the EUROCAE ED-14D/RTCA DO-160D (or later revisions) guidelines for rapiddecompression testing up to the maximum operating altitude of the aircraft at which the EFB is to be used.

text: Annex V to ED Decision 2019/008/R

text: (1) Pressurised aircraft: when a portable EFB has successfully completed rapid-decompression testing, then no mitigating procedures for depressurisation events need to be developed. When a portable EFB has failed the rapid-decompression testing while turned ON, but successfully completed it when turned OFF, then procedures should ensure that at least one EFB on board the aircraft remains OFF during the applicable flight phases or that it is configured so that no damage will be incurred should rapid decompression occur in flight at an altitude higher than 10 000 ft above mean sea level (AMSL). If an EFB system has not been tested or it has failed the rapid-decompression test, then alternate procedures or paper backup should be available. (2) Non-pressurised aircraft: rapid-decompression testing is not required for an EFB used in a non-pressurised aircraft. The EFB should be demonstrated to reliably operate up to the maximum operating altitude of the aircraft. If the EFB cannot be operated at the maximum operating altitude of the aircraft, procedures should be established to preclude operation of the EFB above the maximum demonstrated EFB operating altitude while still maintaining the availability of any required aeronautical information displayed on the EFB. The results of testing performed on a specific EFB model configuration (as identified by the EFB hardware manufacturer) may be applied to other aircraft installations and these generic environmental tests may not need to be duplicated. The operator should collect and retain: (1) evidence of these tests that have already been accomplished; or (2) suitable alternative procedures to deal with the total loss of the EFB system. Rapid decompression tests do not need to be repeated when the EFB model identification and the battery type do not change. The testing of operational EFBs should be avoided if possible to preclude the infliction of unknown damage to the unit during testing. Operators should account for the possible loss or erroneous functioning of the EFB in abnormal environmental conditions. The safe stowage and the use of the EFB under any foreseeable environmental conditions in the flight crew compartment, including turbulence, should be evaluated.

text: 3. A new AMC1 NCC.GEN.131(b) is added:

text: AMC1 NCC.GEN.131(b) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs)

text: SOFTWARE The same considerations as those in AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.141(b), AMC2 CAT.GEN.MPA.141(b) and AMC3 CAT.GEN.MPA.141(b) should apply in respect of EFB software.

text: 4. A new AMC1 NCC.GEN.131(b)(1) is added:

text: AMC1 NCC.GEN.131(b)(1) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs)

text: RISK ASSESSMENT (a) General

text: Annex V to ED Decision 2019/008/R

text: Prior to the use of any EFB system, the operator should perform a risk assessment for all type B EFB applications and for the related hardware as part of its hazard identification and risk management process. The operator may make use of a risk assessment established by the software developer. However, the operator should ensure that its specific operational environment is taken into account. The risk assessment should: (1) evaluate the risks associated with the use of an EFB; (2) identify potential losses of function or malfunction (with detected and undetected erroneous outputs) and the associated failure scenarios; (3) analyse the operational consequences of these failure scenarios; (4) establish mitigating measures; and (5) ensure that the EFB system (hardware and software) achieves at least the same level of accessibility, usability, and reliability as the means of presentation it replaces. In considering the accessibility, usability, and reliability of the EFB system, the operator should ensure that the failure of the complete EFB system as well as of individual applications, including corruption or loss of data, and erroneously displayed information, has been assessed and that the risks have been mitigated to an acceptable level. The operator should ensure that the risk assessments for type B EFB applications are maintained and kept up to date. When the EFB system is intended to be introduced alongside a paper-based system, only the failures that would not be mitigated by the use of the paper-based system need to be addressed. In all other cases, a complete risk assessment should be performed. (b) Assessing and mitigating the risks Some parameters of EFB applications may depend on entries that are made by flight crew/dispatchers, whereas others may be default parameters from within the system that are subject to an administration process (e.g. the runway line-up allowance in an aircraft performance application). In the first case, mitigation means would mainly concern training and flight crew procedure aspects, whereas in the second case, mitigation means would more likely focus on the EFB administration and data management aspects. The analysis should be specific to the operator concerned and should address at least the following points: (1) The minimisation of undetected erroneous outputs from applications and assessment of the worst credible scenario; (2) Erroneous outputs from the software application including: (i) a description of the corruption scenarios that were analysed; and (ii) a description of the mitigation means; (3) Upstream processes including:

text: Annex V to ED Decision 2019/008/R

text: (i) the reliability of root data used in applications (e.g. qualified input data, such as databases produced under ED-76/DO-200A, ‘Standards for Processing Aeronautical Data’); (ii) the software application validation and verification checks according to appropriate industry standards, if applicable; and (iii) the independence between application software components, e.g. robust partitioning between EFB applications and other airworthiness certified software applications; (4) A description of the mitigation means to be used following the detected failure of an application, or of a detected erroneous output; (5) The need for access to an alternate power supply in order to ensure the availability of software applications, especially if they are used as a source of required information. As part of the mitigation means, the operator should consider establishing a reliable alternative means to provide the information available on the EFB system. The mitigation means could be, for example, one of, or a combination of, the following: (1) the system design (including hardware and software); (2) a backup EFB device, possibly supplied from a different power source; (3) EFB applications being hosted on more than one platform; (4) a paper backup (e.g. quick reference handbook (QRH)); and (5) procedural means. Depending on the outcome of their risk assessment, the operator may also consider performing an operational evaluation test before allowing unrestricted use of its EFB devices and applications. EFB system design features such as those assuring data integrity and the accuracy of performance calculations (e.g. ‘reasonableness’ or ‘range’ checks) may be integrated in the risk assessment performed by the operator. (c) Changes The operator should update its EFB risk assessment based on the planned changes to its EFB system. However, modifications to the operator’s EFB system which: (1) do not bring any change to the calculation algorithms and/or to the interface of a type B EFB application; (2) introduce a new type A EFB application or modify an existing one (provided its software classification remains type A); (3) do not introduce any additional functionality to an existing type B EFB application; (4) update an existing database necessary to use an existing type B EFB application; or (5) do not require a change to the flight crew training or operational procedures, may be introduced by the operator without having to update its risk assessment. These changes should, nevertheless, be controlled and properly tested prior to use in flight. The modifications in the following non-exhaustive list are considered to meet these criteria:

text: Annex V to ED Decision 2019/008/R

text: (1) operating system updates; (2) chart or airport database updates; (3) updates to introduce fixes (patches); and (4) installation and modification of a type A EFB application.

text: 5. A new AMC1 NCC.GEN.131(b)(2) is added:

text: AMC1 NCC.GEN.131(b)(2) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs)

text: EFB ADMINISTRATION The operator should ensure: (a) that adequate support is provided to the EFB users for all the applications installed; (b) that potential security issues associated with the application installed have been checked; (c) that the hardware and software configuration is appropriately managed and that no unauthorised software is installed. The operator should ensure that miscellaneous software applications do not adversely impact on the operation of the EFB, and should include miscellaneous software applications in the scope of the EFB configuration management; (d) that only a valid version of the application software and current data packages are installed on the EFB system; and (e) the integrity of the data packages used by the applications installed.

text: 6. A new AMC2 NCC.GEN.131(b)(2) is added:

text: AMC2 NCC.GEN.131(b)(2) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs)

text: PROCEDURES The procedures for the administration or the use of the EFB device and the type B EFB application may be fully or partly integrated in the operations manual. (a) General If an EFB system generates information similar to that generated by existing certified systems, procedures should clearly identify which information source will be the primary, which source will be used for backup information, and under which conditions the backup source should be used. Procedures should define the actions to be taken by the flight crew members when information provided by an EFB system is not consistent with that from other flight crew compartment sources, or when one EFB system shows different information than the other. In the case of EFB applications providing information which might be affected by Notice(s) to Airmen NOTAMS (e.g. Airport moving map display (AMMD), performance calculation,…), the procedure for the use of these applications should include the handling of the relevant NOTAMS before their use. (b) Flight crew awareness of EFB software/database revisions

text: Annex V to ED Decision 2019/008/R

text: The operator should have a process in place to verify that the configuration of the EFB, including software application versions and, where applicable, database versions, are up to date. Flight crew members should have the ability to easily verify the validity of database versions used on the EFB. Nevertheless, flight crew members should not be required to confirm the revision dates for other databases that do not adversely affect flight operations, such as maintenance log forms or a list of airport codes. An example of a date-sensitive revision is that applied to an aeronautical chart database. Procedures should specify what actions should be taken if the software applications or databases loaded on the EFB system are outdated. (c) Workload mitigation and/or control The operator should ensure that additional workload created by using an EFB system is adequately mitigated and/or controlled. The operator should ensure that, while the aircraft is in flight or moving on the ground, flight crew members do not become preoccupied with the EFB system at the same time. Workload should be shared between flight crew members to ensure ease of use and continued monitoring of other flight crew functions and aircraft equipment. This should be strictly applied in flight and the operator should specify any times when the flight crew members may not use the specific EFB application. (d) Dispatch The operator should establish dispatch criteria for the EFB system. The operator should ensure that the availability of the EFB system is confirmed by preflight checks. Instructions to flight crew should clearly define the actions to be taken in the event of any EFB system deficiency. Mitigation may be in the form of maintenance and/or operational procedures for items such as: (1) replacement of batteries at defined intervals as required; (2) ensuring that there is a fully charged backup battery on board; (3) the flight crew checking the battery charging level before departure; and (4) the flight crew switching off the EFB in a timely manner when the aircraft power source is lost. In the event of a partial or complete failure of the EFB, specific dispatch procedures should be followed. These procedures should be included either in the minimum equipment list (MEL) or in the operations manual and should ensure an acceptable level of safety. Particular attention should be paid to establishing specific dispatch procedures allowing to obtain operational data (e.g. performance data) in the event of a failure of an EFB hosting application that provides such calculated data. When the integrity of data input and output is verified by cross-checking and gross-error checks, the same checking principle should be applied to alternative dispatch procedures to ensure equivalent protection. (e) Maintenance Procedures should be established for the routine maintenance of the EFB system and detailing how unserviceability and failures are to be dealt with to ensure that the integrity of the EFB system is preserved. Maintenance procedures should also include the secure handling of updated information

text: Annex V to ED Decision 2019/008/R

text: and how this information is validated and then promulgated in a timely manner and in a complete format to all users. As part of the EFB system’s maintenance, the operator should ensure that the EFB system batteries are periodically checked and replaced as required. Should a fault or failure of the system arise, it is essential that such failures are brought to the immediate attention of the flight crew and that the system is isolated until rectification action is taken. In addition to backup procedures, to deal with system failures, a reporting system should be in place so that the necessary action, either to a particular EFB system or to the whole system, is taken in order to prevent the use of erroneous information by flight crew members. (f) Security The EFB system (including any means used for updating it) should be secure from unauthorised intervention (e.g. by malicious software). The operator should ensure that the system is adequately protected at the software level and that the hardware is appropriately managed (e.g. the identification of the person to whom the hardware is released, protected storage when the hardware is not in use) throughout the operational lifetime of the EFB system. The operator should ensure that prior to each flight the EFB operational software works as specified and the EFB operational data is complete and accurate. Moreover, a system should be in place to ensure that the EFB does not accept a data load that contains corrupted contents. Adequate measures should be in place for the compilation and secure distribution of data to the aircraft. Procedures should be transparent, and easy to understand, to follow and to oversee: (1) If an EFB is based on consumer electronics (e.g. a laptop) which can be easily removed, manipulated, or replaced by a similar component, then special consideration should be given to the physical security of the hardware; (2) Portable EFB platforms should be subject to allocation tracking to specific aircraft or persons; (3) Where a system has input ports, and especially if widely known protocols are used through these ports or internet connections are offered, then special consideration should be given to the risks associated with these ports; (4) Where physical media are used to update the EFB system, and especially if widely known types of physical media are used, then the operator should use technologies and/or procedures to assure that unauthorised content cannot enter the EFB system through these media. The required level of EFB security depends on the criticality of the functions used (e.g. an EFB which only holds a list of fuel prices may require less security than an EFB used for performance calculations). Beyond the level of security required to assure that the EFB can properly perform its intended functions, the level of security ultimately required depends on the capabilities of the EFB. (g) Electronic signatures Some applicable requirements may require a signature when issuing or accepting a document (e.g. load sheet, technical logbook, notification to captain (NOTOC)). In order to be accepted as being equivalent to a handwritten signature, electronic signatures used in EFB applications need, as a minimum, to fulfil the same objectives and should assure the same degree of security as the handwritten or any other form of signature that they are intended to replace. AMC1 NCC.POL.110(c)

text: Annex V to ED Decision 2019/008/R

text: provides means to comply with the required handwritten signature or its equivalent for mass and balance documentation. On a general basis, in the case of required signatures, an operator should have in place procedures for electronic signatures that guarantee: (1) their uniqueness: a signature should identify a specific individual and be difficult to duplicate; (2) their significance: an individual using an electronic signature should take deliberate and recognisable action to affix their signature; (3) their scope: the scope of the information being affirmed with an electronic signature should be clear to the signatory and to the subsequent readers of the record, record entry, or document; (4) their security: the security of an individual’s handwritten signature is maintained by ensuring that it is difficult for another individual to duplicate or alter it; (5) their non-repudiation: an electronic signature should prevent a signatory from denying that they affixed a signature to a specific record, record entry, or document; the more difficult it is to duplicate a signature, the more likely it is that the signature was created by the signatory; and (6) their traceability: an electronic signature should provide positive traceability to the individual who signed a record, record entry, or any other document. An electronic signature should retain those qualities of a handwritten signature that guarantee its uniqueness. Systems using either a PIN or a password with limited validity (timewise) may be appropriate in providing positive traceability to the individual who affixed it. Advanced electronic signatures, qualified certificates and secured signature-creation devices needed to create them in the context of

text: Regulation (EU) No 910/2014

text: are typically not required for EFB operations.

text: 7. A new AMC3 NCC.GEN.131(b)(2) is added:

text: AMC3 NCC.GEN.131(b)(2) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs)

text: FLIGHT CREW TRAINING Flight crew members should be given specific training on the use of the EFB system before it is operationally used. Training should at least include the following: (a) an overview of the system architecture; (b) preflight checks of the system; (c) limitations of the system; (d) specific training on the use of each application and the conditions under which the EFB may and may not be used; (e) restrictions on the use of the system, including cases where the entire system or some parts of it are not available; (f) procedures for normal operations, including cross-checking of data entry and computed information; (g) procedures to handle abnormal situations, such as a late runway change or a diversion to an alternate aerodrome;

text: Annex V to ED Decision 2019/008/R

text: (h) procedures to handle emergency situations; (i) phases of the flight when the EFB system may and may not be used; (j) human factors considerations, including crew resource management (CRM), on the use of the EFB; (k) additional training for new applications or changes to the hardware configuration; (l) actions following the failure of component(s) of the EFB, including cases of battery smoke or fire; and (m) management of conflicting information.

text: 8. A new AMC4 NCC.GEN.131(b)(2) is added:

text: AMC4 NCC.GEN.131(b)(2) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs)

text: PERFORMANCE AND MASS AND BALANCE APPLICATIONS (a) General Performance and mass and balance applications should be based on existing published data found in the AFM or performance manual, and should account for the applicable CAT.POL performance requirements. The applications may use algorithms or data spreadsheets to determine results. They may have the capability to interpolate within the information contained in the published data for the particular aircraft but should not extrapolate beyond it. To protect against intentional and unintentional modifications, the integrity of the database files related to performance and mass and balance (the performance database, airport database, etc.) should be checked by the program before performing any calculations. This check can be run once at the start-up of the application. Each software version should be identified by a unique version number. The performance and mass and balance applications should record each computation performed (inputs and outputs) and the operator should ensure that this information is retained for at least 3 months. The operator should ensure that aircraft performance or mass and balance data provided by the application is correct compared with the data derived from the AFM (e.g. for take-off and landing performance data) or from other reference data sources (e.g. mass and balance manuals or databases, in-flight performance manuals or databases) under a representative cross-check of conditions (e.g. for take-off and landing performance applications: take-off and landing performance data on dry, wet and contaminated runways, with different wind conditions and aerodrome pressure altitudes, etc.). The operator should define any new roles that the flight crew and, if applicable, the flight dispatcher, may have in creating, reviewing, and using performance calculations supported by EFB systems. (b) Testing The verification of the compliance of a performance or mass and balance application should include software testing activities performed with the software version candidate for operational use. The testing can be performed either by the operator or a third party, as long as the testing process is documented and the responsibilities identified. The testing activities should include reliability testing and accuracy testing.

text: Annex V to ED Decision 2019/008/R

text: Reliability testing should show that the application in its operating environment (operating system (OS) and hardware included) is stable and deterministic, i.e. identical answers are generated each time the process is entered with identical parameters. Accuracy testing should demonstrate that the aircraft performance or mass and balance computations provided by the application are correct in comparison with data derived from the AFM or other reference data sources, under a representative cross section of conditions (e.g. for take-off and landing performance applications: runway state and slope, different wind conditions and pressure altitudes, various aircraft configurations including failures with a performance impact, etc.). The verification should include a sufficient number of comparison results from representative calculations throughout the entire operating envelope of the aircraft, considering corner points, routine and break points. Any difference compared to the reference data that is judged significant should be examined. When differences are due to more conservative calculations or reduced margins that were purposely built into the approved data, this approach should be clearly specified. Compliance with the applicable certification and operational rules needs to be assessed in any case. The testing method should be described. The testing may be automated when all the required data is available in an appropriate electronic format, but in addition to performing thorough monitoring of the correct functioning and design of the testing tools and procedures, operators are strongly suggested to perform additional manual verification. It could be based on a few scenarios for each chart or table of the reference data, including both operationally representative scenarios and ‘cornercase’ scenarios. The testing of a software revision should, in addition, include non-regression testing and testing of any fix or change. Furthermore, an operator should perform testing related to its customisation of the applications and to any element pertinent to its operation that was not covered at an earlier stage (e.g. airport database verification). (c) Procedures Specific care is needed regarding flight crew procedures concerning take-off and landing performance or mass and balance applications. Flight crew procedures should ensure that: (1) calculations are performed independently by each flight crew member before data outputs are accepted for use; (2) a formal cross-check is made before data outputs are accepted for use; such cross-checks should utilise the independent calculations described above, together with the output of the same data from other sources on the aircraft; (3) a gross-error check is performed before data outputs are accepted for use; such gross-error checks may use either a ‘rule of thumb’ or the output of the same data from other sources on the aircraft; and (4) in the event of a loss of functionality of an EFB through either the loss of a single application, or the failure of the device hosting the application, an equivalent level of safety can be maintained; consistency with the EFB risk assessment assumptions should be confirmed.

text: Annex V to ED Decision 2019/008/R

text: (d) Training The training should emphasise the importance of executing all take-off and landing performance or mass and balance calculations in accordance with the SOPs to assure fully independent calculations. Furthermore, due to the optimisation at different levels brought by performance applications, the flight crew members may be confronted with new procedures and different aircraft behaviour (e.g. the use of multiple flap settings for take-off). The training should be designed and provided accordingly. Where an application allows the computing of both dispatch results (from regulatory and factored calculations) and other results, the training should highlight the specificities of those results. Depending on the representativeness of the calculation, the flight crew should be trained on any operational margin that might be required. The training should also address the identification and the review of default values, if any, and assumptions about the aircraft status or environmental conditions made by the application. (e) Specific considerations for mass and balance applications In addition to the figures, a diagram displaying the mass and its associated centre of gravity (CG) should be provided. (f) Human-factors-specific considerations Input and output data (i.e. results) shall be clearly separated from each other. All the information necessary for a given calculation task should be presented together or be easily accessible. All input and output data should include correct and unambiguous terms (names), units of measurement (e.g. kg or lb), and when applicable, an index system and a CG-position declaration (e.g. Arm/%MAC). The units should match the ones from the other flight-crew-compartment sources for the same kinds of data. Airspeeds should be provided in a way that is directly useable in the flight crew compartment unless the unit clearly indicates otherwise (e.g. Knots Calibrated Air Speed (KCAS)). Any difference between the type of airspeed provided by the EFB application and the type provided by the AFM or flight crew operating manual (FCOM) performance charts should be mentioned in the flight crew guides and training material. If the landing performance application allows the computation of both dispatch (regulatory, factored) and other results (e.g. in-flight or unfactored), the flight crew members should be made aware of the computation mode used. (1) Inputs The application should allow users to clearly distinguish user entries from default values or entries imported from other aircraft systems. Performance applications should allow the flight crew to check whether a certain obstacle is included in the performance calculations and/or to include new or revised obstacle information in the performance calculations. (2) Outputs

text: Annex V to ED Decision 2019/008/R

text: All critical assumptions for performance calculations (e.g. the use of thrust reversers, full or reduced thrust/power rating) should be clearly displayed. The assumptions made about any calculation should be at least as clear to the flight crew members as similar information would be on a tabular chart. All output data should be available in numbers. The application should indicate when a set of entries results in an unachievable operation (for instance, a negative stopping margin) with a specific message or colour scheme. This should be done in accordance with the relevant provisions on messages and the use of colours. In order to allow a smooth workflow and to prevent data entry errors, the layout of the calculation outputs should be such that it is consistent with the data entry interface of the aircraft applications in which the calculation outputs are used (e.g. flight management systems). (3) Modifications The user should be able to easily modify performance calculations, especially when making lastminute changes. Calculation results and any outdated input fields should be deleted when: (i) modifications are entered; (ii) the EFB is shut down or the performance application is closed; and (iii) the EFB or the performance application have been in a standby or ‘background’ mode too long, i.e. such that it is likely that when it is used again, the inputs or outputs will be outdated.

text: 9. A new AMC5 NCC.GEN.131(b)(2) is added:

text: AMC5 NCC.GEN.131(b)(2) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs)

text: AIRPORT MOVING MAP DISPLAY (AMMD) APPLICATION WITH OWN-SHIP POSITION (a) General An AMMD application should not be used as the primary means of navigation for taxiing and should be only used in conjunction with other materials and procedures identified within the operating concept (see paragraph (e)). When an AMMD is in use, the primary means of navigation for taxiing remains the use of normal procedures and direct visual observation out of the flight-crew-compartment window. Thus, as recognised in ETSO-C165a, an AMMD application with a display of own-ship position is considered to have a minor safety effect for malfunctions that cause the incorrect depiction of aircraft position (own-ship), and the failure condition for the loss of function is classified as ‘no safety effect’. (b) Minimum requirements AMMD software that complies with European Technical Standard Order ETSO-C165a is considered to be acceptable. In addition, the system should provide the means to display the revision number of the software installed.

text: Annex V to ED Decision 2019/008/R

text: To achieve the total system accuracy requirements of ETSO-C165a, an airworthiness-approved sensor using the global positioning system (GPS) in combination with a medium-accuracy database compliant with EUROCAE ED-99C/RTCA DO-272C, ‘User Requirements for Aerodrome Mapping Information,’ (or later revisions) is considered one acceptable means. Alternatively, the use of non-certified commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) position sources may be acceptable in accordance with AMC6 NCC.GEN.131(b)(2). (c) Data provided by the AMMD software application developer The operator should ensure that the AMMD software application developer provides the appropriate data including: (1) installation instructions or equivalent as per ETSO-C165a Section 2.2 addressing: (i) the identification of each specific EFB system computing platform (including the hardware platform and the operating system version) with which this AMMD software application and database was demonstrated to be compatible; (ii) the installation procedures and limitations for each applicable platform (e.g. required memory resources, configuration of Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) antenna position); (iii) the interface description data including the requirements for external sensors providing data inputs; and (iv) means to verify that the AMMD has been installed correctly and is functioning properly. (2) Any AMMD limitations, and known installation, operational, functional, or performance issues of the AMMD. (d) AMMD software installation in the EFB The operator should review the documents and the data provided by the AMMD developer, and ensure that the installation requirements of the AMMD software in the specific EFB platform and aircraft are addressed. Operators are required to: perform any verification activities proposed by the AMMD software application developer, as well as identify and perform any additional integration activities that need to be completed; (e) Operational procedures Changes to operational procedures of the aircraft (e.g. flight crew procedures) should be documented in the operations manual or user’s guide as appropriate. In particular, the documentation should highlight that the AMMD is only designed to assist flight crew members in orienting themselves on the airport surface so as to improve the flight crew members’ positional awareness during taxiing and that it is not to be used as the basis for ground manoeuvring. (f) Training requirements The operator may use flight crew procedures to mitigate some hazards. These should include limitations on the use of the AMMD function or application. As the AMMD could be a compelling display and the procedural restrictions are a key component of the mitigation, training should be provided in support of an AMMD implementation.

text: Annex V to ED Decision 2019/008/R

text: All mitigation means that rely on flight crew procedures should be included in the flight crew training. Details of the AMMD training should be included in the operator’s overall EFB training.

text: 10. A new AMC6 NCC.GEN.131(b)(2) is added:

text: AMC6 NCC.GEN.131(b)(2) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs)

text: USE OF COMMERCIAL OFF-THE-SHELF (COTS) POSITION SOURCE COTS position sources may be used for AMMD EFB applications and for EFB applications displaying the ownship position in-flight when the following considerations are complied with: (a) Characterisation of the receiver: The position should originate from an airworthiness approved GNSS receiver, or from a COTS GNSS receiver fully characterised in terms of technical specifications and featuring an adequate number of channels (12 or more). The EFB application should, in addition to position and velocity data, receive a sufficient number of parameters related to the fix quality and integrity to allow compliance with the accuracy requirements (e.g. the number of satellites and constellation geometry parameters such as dilution of position (DOP), 2D/3D fix). (b) Installation aspects: COTS position sources are C-PEDs and their installation and use should follow the requirements of NCC.GEN.130. If the external COTS position source transmits wirelessly, cybersecurity aspects have to be considered. (c) Practical evaluation: As variables can be introduced by the placement of the antennas in the aircraft and the characteristics of the aircraft itself (e.g. heated and/or shielded windshield effects), the tests have to take place on the type of aircraft in which the EFB will be operated, with the antenna positioned at the location to be used in service. (1) COTS used as a position source for AMMD The test installation should record the data provided by the COTS position source to the AMMD application. The analysis should use the recorded parameters to demonstrate that the AMMD requirements are satisfactorily complied with in terms of the total system accuracy (taking into account database errors, latency effects, display errors, and uncompensated antenna offsets) within 50 metres (95 %). The availability should be sufficient to prevent distraction or increased workload due to frequent loss of position. When demonstrating compliance with the following requirements of DO-257A, the behaviour of the AMMD system should be evaluated in practice: (i) indication of degraded position accuracy within 1 second (Section 2.2.4 (22)); and

text: Annex V to ED Decision 2019/008/R

text: (ii) indication of a loss of positioning data within 5 seconds (Section 2.2.4 (23)); conditions to consider are both a loss of the GNSS satellite view (e.g. antenna failure) and a loss of communication between the receiver and the EFB. (2) COTS position source used for applications displaying own-ship position in-flight: Flight trials should demonstrate that the COTS GNSS availability is sufficient to prevent distraction or increased workload due to frequent loss of position.

text: 11. A new AMC7 NCC.GEN.131(b)(2) is added:

text: AMC7 NCC.GEN.131(b)(2) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs)

text: CHART APPLICATIONS The navigation charts that are depicted should contain the information necessary, in an appropriate form, to perform the operation safely. Consideration should be given to the size, resolution and position of the display to ensure legibility whilst retaining the ability to review all the information required to maintain adequate situational awareness. The identification of risks associated with the human–machine interface, as part of the operator’s risk assessment, is key to identifying acceptable mitigation means, e.g.: (a) to establish procedures for reducing the risk of making errors; (b) to control and mitigate the additional workload related to EFB use; (c) to ensure the consistency of colour-coding and symbology philosophies between EFB applications and their compatibility with other flight crew compartment applications; and (d) to consider aspects of crew resource management (CRM) when using an EFB system. In the case of chart application displaying own-ship position in flight, AMC9 NCC.GEN.131(b)(2) is applicable.

text: 12. A new AMC8 NCC.GEN.131(b)(2) is added:

text: AMC8 NCC.GEN.131(b)(2) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs)

text: IN-FLIGHT WEATHER APPLICATIONS (a) General An in-flight weather (IFW) application is an EFB function or application enabling the flight crew to access meteorological information. It is designed to increase situational awareness and to support the flight crew when making strategic decisions. An IFW function or application may be used to access both information required to be on board (e.g. World Area Forecast Centre (WAFC) data) and supplemental weather information. The use of IFW applications should be non-safety-critical and not necessary for the performance of the flight. In order for it to be non-safety-critical, IFW data should not be used to support tactical decisions and/or as a substitute for certified aircraft systems (e.g. weather radar). Any current information from the meteorological data required to be carried on board or from aircraft primary systems should always prevail over the information from an IFW application.

text: Annex V to ED Decision 2019/008/R

text: The displayed meteorological information may be forecasted and/or observed, and may be updated on the ground and/or in flight. It should be based on data from certified meteorological services providers or other reliable sources evaluated by the operator. The meteorological information provided to the flight crew should be as far as possible consistent with the information available to users of ground-based aviation meteorological information (e.g. operations control centre (OCC) staff, flight dispatchers, etc.) in order to establish common situational awareness and to facilitate collaborative decision-making. (b) Display Meteorological information should be presented to the flight crew in a format that is appropriate to the content of the information; coloured graphical depiction is encouraged whenever practicable. The IFW display should enable the flight crew to: (1) distinguish between observed and forecasted weather data; (2) identify the currency or age and validity time of the weather data; (3) access the interpretation of the weather data (e.g. the legend); (4) obtain positive and clear indications of any missing information or data and determine areas of uncertainty when making decisions to avoid hazardous weather; and (5) be aware of the data-link means status enabling necessary IFW data exchanges. Meteorological information in IFW applications may be displayed, for example, as an overlay over navigation charts, over geographical maps, or it may be a stand-alone weather depiction (e.g. radar plots, satellite images, etc.). If meteorological information is overlaid on navigation charts, special consideration should be given to HMI issues in order to avoid adverse effects on the basic chart functions. In case of display of own-ship position in flight, AMC9 NCC.GEN.131(b)(2) is applicable. The meteorological information may require reformatting to accommodate, for example, the display size or the depiction technology. However, any reformatting of the meteorological information should preserve both the geo-location and intensity of the meteorological conditions regardless of projection, scaling, or any other types of processing. (c) Training and procedures The operator should establish procedures for the use of an IFW application. The operator should provide adequate training to the flight crew members before using an IFW application. This training should address: (1) limitations of the use of an IFW application: (i) acceptable use (strategic planning only); (ii) information required to be on board; and (iii) latency of observed weather information and the hazards associated with utilisation of old information; (2) information on the display of weather data:

text: Annex V to ED Decision 2019/008/R

text: (i) type of displayed information (forecasted, observed); (ii) symbology (symbols, colours); and (iii) interpretation of meteorological information; (3) identification of failures and malfunctions (e.g. incomplete uplinks, data-link failures, missing info); (4) human factors issues: (i) avoiding fixation; and (ii) managing workload.

text: 13. A new AMC9 NCC.GEN.131(b)(2) is added:

text: AMC9 NCC.GEN.131(b)(2) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs)

text: APPLICATIONS DISPLAYING OWN-SHIP POSITION IN-FLIGHT (a) Limitations The display of own-ship position in flight as an overlay to other EFB applications should not be used as a primary source of information to fly or navigate the aircraft. Except on VFR flights over routes navigated by reference to visual landmark, the display of the own-ship symbol is allowed only in aircraft having a certified navigation display (moving map). In the specific case of IFW applications, the display of own-ship on such applications is restricted to aircraft equipped with a weather radar. (b) Position source and accuracy The display of own-ship position may be based on a certified GNSS or GNSS-based (e.g. GPS/IRS) position from certified aircraft equipment or on a portable COTS position source in accordance with AMC6 NCC.GEN.131(b)(2). The own-ship symbol should be removed and the flight crew notified if: (1) the estimated accuracy exceeds 50 meters; (2) the position data is reported as invalid by the GNSS receiver; or (3) the position data is not received for 5 seconds. (c) Charting data considerations If the map involves raster images that have been stitched together into a larger single map, it should be demonstrated that the stitching process does not introduce distortion or map errors that would not correlate properly with a GNSS-based own-ship symbol. (d) Human machine interface (HMI) (1) Interface The flight crew should be able to unambiguously differentiate the EFB function from avionics functions available in the cockpit, and in particular with the navigation display. A sufficiently legible text label “AIRCRAFT POSITION NOT TO BE USED FOR NAVIGATION” or equivalent should be continuously displayed by the application if the own-ship position depiction

text: Annex V to ED Decision 2019/008/R

text: is visible in the current display area over a terminal chart (i.e. SID, STAR, or instrument approach) or a depiction of a terminal procedure. (2) Display of own-ship symbol The own-ship symbol should be different from the ones used by certified aircraft systems intended for primary navigation. If directional data is available, the own-ship symbol may indicate directionality. If direction is not available, the own-ship symbol should not imply directionality. The colour coding should not be inconsistent with the manufacturer philosophy. (3) Data displayed The current map orientation should be clearly, continuously and unambiguously indicated (e.g., Track-up vs North-up). If the software supports more than one directional orientation for the own-ship symbol (e.g., Track-up vs North-up), the current own-ship symbol orientation should be indicated. The chart display in track-up mode should not create usability or readability issues. In particular, chart data should not be rotated in a manner that affects readability. The application zoom levels should be appropriate for the function and content being displayed and in the context of providing supplemental position awareness. The pilot should be able to obtain information about the operational status of the own-ship function (e.g. active, deactivated, degraded). During IFR, day-VFR without visual references or night VFR flight, the following parameters’ values should not be displayed: (i) Track/heading; (ii) Estimated time of arrival (ETA); (iii) Altitude; (iv) Geographical coordinates of the current location of the aircraft; and (v) Aircraft speed. (4) Controls If a panning and/or range selection function is available, the EFB application should provide a clear and simple method to return to an own-ship oriented display. A means to disable the display of the own-ship position should be provided to the flight crew. (e) Training and procedures The procedures and training should emphasise the fact that the display of own-ship position on charts or IFW EFB applications should not be used as a primary source of information to fly or navigate the aircraft or as a primary source of weather information. (1) Procedures:

text: Annex V to ED Decision 2019/008/R

text: The following considerations should be addressed in the procedures for the use of charts or IFW EFB application displaying the own-ship position in-flight by the flight crew: (i) Intended use of the display of own-ship position in-flight on charts or IFW EFB applications; (ii) Inclusion of the EFB into the regular scan of flight deck systems indications. In particular, systematic cross-check with avionics before being used, whatever the position source; and (iii) Actions to be taken in case of the identification of a discrepancy between the EFB and avionics. (2) Training: Crew members should be trained on the procedures for the use of the application, including the regular cross-check with avionics and the action in case of discrepancy.

text: 14. A new GM1 NCC.GEN.131(b)(2) is added:

text: GM1 NCC.GEN.131(b)(2) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs)

text: IN-FLIGHT WEATHER APPLICATIONS ‘Reliable sources’ of data used by in-flight weather (IFW) applications are the organisations evaluated by the operator as being able to provide an appropriate level of data assurance in terms of accuracy and integrity. It is recommended that the following aspects be considered during that evaluation: (a) The organisation should have a quality assurance system in place that covers the data source selection, acquisition/import, processing, validity period check, and the distribution phase; (b) Any meteorological product provided by the organisation that is within the scope of meteorological information included in the flight documentation as defined in MET.TR.215(e) (Annex V (Definitions of terms used in Annexes II to XIII) to Commission Implementing

text: Regulation (EU) 2016/1377

text: ) should originate only from authoritative sources or certified providers and should not be transformed or altered, except for the purpose of packaging the data in the correct format. The organisation’s process should provide assurance that the integrity of those products is preserved in the data for use by the IFW application.

text: 15. A new GM2 NCC.GEN.131(b)(2) is added:

text: GM2 NCC.GEN.131(b)(2) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs)

text: USE OF COMMERCIAL OFF-THE-SHELF (COTS) POSITION SOURCE – PRACTICAL EVALUATION The tests should consist of a statistically relevant sample of taxiing. It is recommended to include taxiing at airports that are representative of the more complex airports typically accessed by the operator. Taxiing segment samples should include data that is derived from runways and taxiways, and should include numerous turns, in particular of 90 degrees or more, and segments in straight lines at the maximum speed at which the own-ship symbol is displayed. Taxiing segment samples should include parts in areas of high buildings such as terminals. The analysis should include at least 25 inbound and/or outbound taxiing segments between the parking location and the runway. During the tests, any unusual events (such as observing the own-ship symbol in a location on the map that is notably offset compared to the actual position, the own-ship symbol changing to non-directional when the

text: Annex V to ED Decision 2019/008/R aircraft is moving, and times when the own-ship symbol disappears from the map display) should be noted. For the test, the pilot should be instructed to diligently taxi on the centre line.

text: 16. A new GM3 NCC.GEN.131(b)(2) is added:

text: GM3 NCC.GEN.131(b)(2) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs)

text: APPLICATIONS DISPLAYING OWN-SHIP POSITION IN FLIGHT The depiction of a circle around the EFB own-ship symbol may be used to differentiate it from the avionics one.