identifier: AMC & GM to Part-ORO — Amendment 1

beslut: ED Decision 2013/009/R

publisher: Europeiska unionens byrå för luftfartssäkerhet

sprak: en

title: AMC & GM to Part-ORO — Amendment 1

serie: amc-gm

text: Annex to ED Decision 2013/009/R 16/04/2013

type: stycke

text: Annex to Decision 2013/009/R

text: Annex to Decision 2012/017/R of the Executive Director of the Agency of 24 October 2012, on ‘Acceptable means of compliance and guidance material to

text: Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 of 5 October 2012

text: laying down technical requirements and administrative procedures related to air operations pursuant to

text: Regulation (EC) No 216/2008

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council’, is amended as follows: The text of the amendment is arranged to show deleted text, new or amended text as shown below:

text: 1. deleted text is marked with strike through;

text: 2. new or amended text is highlighted in grey;

text: 3. an ellipsis (…) indicates that the remaining text is unchanged in front of or following the reflected amendment.

text: A new GM3 ORO.GEN.200(a)(3) is added as follows:

text: GM3 ORO.GEN.200(a)(3) Management system

text: RISK MANAGEMENT OF FLIGHT OPERATIONS WITH KNOWN OR FORECAST VOLCANIC ASH CONTAMINATION (a) Responsibilities The operator is responsible for the safety of its operations, including within an area with known or forecast volcanic ash contamination. The operator should complete this assessment of safety risks related to known or forecast volcanic ash contamination as part of its management system before initiating operations into airspace forecast to be or aerodromes/operating sites known to be contaminated with volcanic ash. This process is intended to ensure the operator takes account of the likely accuracy and quality of the information sources it uses in its management system and to demonstrate its own competence and capability to interpret data from different sources in order to achieve the necessary level of data integrity reliably and correctly resolve any conflicts among data sources that may arise. In order to decide whether or not to operate into airspace forecast to be or aerodromes/operating sites known to be contaminated with volcanic ash, the operator should make use of the safety risk assessment within its management system as required by ORO.GEN.200. The operator’s safety risk assessment should take into account all relevant data including data from the type certificate holders (TCHs) regarding the susceptibility of the aircraft they operate to volcanic cloud-related airworthiness effects, the nature and severity of these effects and the related pre-flight, in-flight and postflight precautions to be observed by the operator. The operator should ensure that personnel required to be familiar with the details of the safety risk assessments receives all relevant information (both pre-flight and in-flight) in order to be in a position to apply appropriate mitigation measures as specified by the safety risk assessments. (b) Procedures The operator should have documented procedures for the management of operations into airspace forecast to be or aerodromes/operating sites known to be contaminated with volcanic ash. These procedures should ensure that, at all times, flight operations remain within the accepted safety boundaries as established through the management system allowing for any variations in information sources, equipment, operational experience or organisation. Procedures should include those for flight crew, flight planners, dispatchers, operations, continuing airworthiness personnel such that they are in a position to evaluate correctly the risk of flights into airspace forecast to be contaminated by volcanic ash and to plan accordingly. Continuing airworthiness personnel should be provided with procedures allowing them to correctly assess the need for and to execute relevant continuing airworthiness interventions. The operator should retain sufficient qualified and competent staff to generate well supported operational risk management decisions and ensure that its staff are appropriately trained and current. It is recommended that the operator make the

text: necessary arrangements for its relevant staff to take up opportunities to be involved in volcanic ash exercises conducted in their areas of operation. (c) Volcanic activity information and operator’s potential response

text: Before and during operations, information valuable to the operator is generated by various volcano agencies worldwide. The operator’s risk assessment and mitigating actions need to take account of, and respond appropriately to, the information likely to be available during each phase of the eruptive sequence from pre-eruption through to end of eruptive activity. It is nevertheless noted that eruptions rarely follow a deterministic pattern of behaviour. A typical operator’s response may consist of the following: (1) Pre-eruption The operator should have in place a robust mechanism for ensuring that it is constantly vigilant for any alerts of pre-eruption volcanic activity relevant to its operations. The staff involved need to understand the threat to safe operations that such alerts represent. An operator whose routes traverse large, active volcanic areas for which immediate International Airways Volcano Watch (IAVW) alerts may not be available, should define its strategy for capturing information about increased volcanic activity before pre-eruption alerts are generated. For example, an operator may combine elevated activity information with information concerning the profile and history of the volcano to determine an operating policy, which could include re-routing or restrictions at night. This would be useful when dealing with the 60% of volcanoes which are unmonitored. Such an operator should also ensure that its crews are aware that they may be the first to observe an eruption and so need to be vigilant and ready to ensure that this information is made available for wider dissemination as quickly as possible. (2) Start of an eruption Given the likely uncertainty regarding the status of the eruption during the early stages of an event and regarding the associated volcanic cloud, the operator’s procedures should include a requirement for crews to initiate reroutes to avoid the affected airspace. The operator should ensure that flights are planned to remain clear of the affected areas and that consideration is given to available aerodromes/operating sites and fuel requirements. It is expected that the following initial actions will be taken by the operator: (i) determine if any aircraft in flight could be affected, alert the crew and provide advice on re-routing and available aerodromes/operating sites as required; (ii) alert management; (iii) for flight departures, brief flight crew and revise flight and fuel planning in accordance with the safety risk assessment; (iv) alert flight crew and operations staff to the need for increased monitoring of information (e.g. special air report (AIREP), volcanic activity report (VAR), significant weather information (SIGMET), NOTAMs and company messages); (v) initiate the gathering of all data relevant to determining the risk; and (vi) apply mitigations identified in the safety risk assessment.

text: (3) On-going eruption As the eruptive event develops, the operator can expect the responsible Volcanic Ash Advisory Centre (VAAC) to provide volcanic ash advisory messages (VAA/VAGs) defining, as accurately as possible, the vertical and horizontal extent of areas and layers of volcanic clouds. As a minimum, the operator should monitor, and take account of, this VAAC information as well as of relevant SIGMETs and NOTAMs. Other sources of information are likely to be available such as VAR/AIREPs, satellite imagery and a range of other information from State and commercial organisations. The operator should plan its operations in accordance with its safety risk assessment taking into account the information that it considers accurate and relevant from these additional sources. The operator should carefully consider and resolve differences or conflicts among the information sources, notably between published information and observations (pilot reports, airborne measurements, etc.).

text: Given the dynamic nature of the volcanic hazards, the operator should ensure that the situation is monitored closely and operations adjusted to suit changing conditions. The operator should be aware that, the affected or danger areas may be established and presented in a different way than the one currently used in Europe as described in EUR Doc 019-NAT Doc 006. The operator should require reports from its crews concerning any encounters with volcanic emissions. These reports should be passed immediately to the appropriate air traffic services (ATS) unit and to the operator’s competent authority. For the purpose of flight planning, the operator should treat the horizontal and vertical limits of the temporary danger area (TDA) or airspace forecast to be contaminated by volcanic ash as applicable, to be overflown as it would mountainous terrain, modified in accordance with its safety risk assessment. The operator should take account of the risk of cabin depressurisation or engine failure resulting in the inability to maintain level flight above a volcanic cloud, especially when conducting ETOPS operations. Additionally, minimum equipment list (MEL) provisions should be considered in consultation with the TCHs. Flying below a volcanic ash contaminated airspace should be considered on a case by case basis. It should only be planned to reach or leave an aerodrome/operating site close to the boundary of this airspace or where the ash contamination is very high and stable. The establishment of Minimum Sector Altitude (MSA) and the availability of aerodromes/operating sites should be considered.

text: (d) Safety risk assessment

text: When directed specifically at the issue of intended flight into airspace forecast to be or aerodromes/operating sites known to be contaminated with volcanic ash, the process should involve the following: (1) Identifying the hazards

text: The generic hazard, in the context of this document, is airspace forecast to be or aerodromes/operating sites known to be contaminated with volcanic ash, and whose characteristics are harmful to the airworthiness and operation of the aircraft.

text: This GM is referring to volcanic ash contamination since it is the most significant hazard for flight operations in the context of a volcanic eruption. Nevertheless it might not be the only hazard and therefore the operator should consider additional hazards which could have an adverse effect on aircraft structure or passengers safety such as gases. Within this generic hazard, the operator should develop its own list of specific hazards taking into account its specific aircraft, experience, knowledge and type of operation, and any other relevant data stemming from previous eruptions. (2) Considering the severity and consequences of the hazard occurring (i.e. the nature and actual level of damage expected to be inflicted on the particular aircraft from exposure to that volcanic ash cloud). (3) Evaluating the likelihood of encountering volcanic ash clouds with characteristics harmful to the safe operation of the aircraft. For each specific hazard within the generic hazard, the likelihood of adverse consequences should be assessed, either qualitatively or quantitatively. (4) Determining whether the consequent risk is acceptable and within the operator’s risk performance criteria. At this stage of the process, the safety risks should be classified as acceptable or unacceptable. The assessment of tolerability will be subjective, based on qualitative data and expert judgement, until specific quantitative data are available in respect of a range of parameters. (5) Taking action to reduce the safety risk to a level that is acceptable to the operator’s management. Appropriate mitigation for each unacceptable risk identified should then be considered in order to reduce the risk to a level acceptable to the operator’s management.

text: (e) Procedures to be considered when identifying possible mitigations actions When conducting a volcanic ash safety risk assessment, the operator should consider the following non-exhaustive list of procedures and processes as mitigation: (1) Type certificate holders Obtaining advice from the TCHs and other engineering sources concerning operations in potentially contaminated airspace and/or aerodromes/operating sites contaminated by volcanic ash. This advice should set out: (i) the features of the aircraft that are susceptible to airworthiness effects related to volcanic ash; (ii) the nature and severity of these effects; (iii) the effect of volcanic ash on operations to/from contaminated aerodromes/operating sites, including the effect on take-off and landing aircraft performance; (iv) the related pre-flight, in-flight and post-flight precautions to be observed by the operator including any necessary amendments to aircraft operating manuals, aircraft maintenance manuals, master minimum equipment list/dispatch deviation or equivalents; and (v) the recommended inspections associated with operations in volcanic ash potentially contaminated airspace and operations to/from volcanic ash

text: contaminated aerodromes/operating sites; this may take the form of instructions for continuing airworthiness or other advice. (2) Operator/contracted organisations’ personnel Definition of procedures for flight planning, operations, engineering and maintenance ensuring that: (i) personnel responsible for flight planning are in a position to evaluate correctly the risk of encountering volcanic ash contaminated airspace, or aerodromes/operating sites, and can plan accordingly; (ii) flight planning and operational procedures enable crews to avoid areas and aerodromes/operating sites with unacceptable volcanic ash contamination; (iii) flight crew are aware of the possible signs of entry into a volcanic ash cloud and execute the associated procedures; (iv) continuing airworthiness personnel are able to assess the need for and to execute any necessary maintenance or other required interventions; and (v) crews are provided with appropriate aircraft performance data when operating to/from aerodromes/operating sites contaminated with volcanic ash. (3) Provision of enhanced flight watch This should ensure: (i) close and continuous monitoring of VAA, VAR/AIREP, SIGMET, NOTAM, ASHTAM and other relevant information, and information from crews, concerning the volcanic ash cloud hazard; (ii) access to plots of the affected areas from SIGMETs, NOTAMs and relevant company information for crews and personnel responsible for the management and the supervision of the flight operations; and (iii) communication of the latest information to crews and personnel responsible for the management and the supervision of the flight operations in a timely fashion. (4) Flight planning Flexibility of the process to allow re-planning at short notice should conditions change. (5) Departure, destination and alternate aerodromes For the airspace to be traversed, or the aerodromes/operating sites in use, parameters to evaluate and take account of: (i) the probability of contamination; (ii) any additional aircraft performance requirements; (iii) required maintenance considerations; (iv) fuel requirements for re-routeing and extended holding. (6) Routing policy Parameters to evaluate and take account of: (i) the shortest period in and over the forecast contaminated area; (ii) the hazards associated with flying over the contaminated area; (iii) drift down and emergency descent considerations;

text: (iv) the policy for flying below the contaminated airspace and the associated hazards. (7) Diversion policy Parameters to evaluate and take account of: (i) maximum allowed distance from a suitable aerodrome/operating site; (ii) availability of aerodromes/operating sites outside the forecast contaminated area; (iii) diversion policy after an volcanic ash encounter. (8) Minimum equipment list (MEL) Additional provisions in the MEL for dispatching aircraft with unserviceabilities that might affect the following non-exhaustive list of systems: (i) air conditioning packs; (ii) engine bleeds; (iii) pressurisation system; (iv) electrical power distribution system; (v) air data system; (vi) standby instruments; (vii) navigation systems; (viii) de-icing systems; (ix) engine driven generators; (x) auxiliary power unit (APU); (xi) airborne collision avoidance system (ACAS); (xii) terrain awareness warning system (TAWS); (xiii) autoland systems; (xiv) provision of crew oxygen; (xv) supplemental oxygen for passengers. (9) Standard operating procedures Crew training to ensure they are familiar with normal and abnormal operating procedures and particularly any changes regarding but not limited to: (i) pre-flight planning; (ii) in-flight monitoring of volcanic ash cloud affected areas and avoidance procedures; (iii) diversion; (iv) communications with ATC; (v) in-flight monitoring of engine and systems potentially affected by volcanic ash cloud contamination; (vi) recognition and detection of volcanic ash clouds and reporting procedures; (vii) in-flight indications of a volcanic ash cloud encounter; (viii) procedures to be followed if a volcanic ash cloud is encountered; (ix) unreliable or erroneous airspeed;

text: (x) non-normal procedures for engines and systems potentially affected by volcanic ash cloud contamination; (xi) engine-out and engine relight; (xii) escape routes; and (xiii) operations to/from aerodromes/operating sites contaminated with volcanic ash. (10) Provision for aircraft technical log This should ensure: (i) systematic entry in the aircraft technical log related to any actual or suspected volcanic ash encounter whether in-flight or at an aerodrome/operating site ; and (ii) checking, prior to flight, of the completion of maintenance actions related to an entry in the aircraft technical log for a volcanic ash cloud encounter on a previous flight. (11) Incident reporting Crew requirements for: (i) reporting an airborne volcanic ash cloud encounter (VAR); (ii) post-flight volcanic ash cloud reporting (VAR); (iii) reporting non-encounters in airspace forecast to be contaminated; and (iv) filing a mandatory occurrence report in accordance with ORO.GEN.160. (12) Continuing airworthiness procedures Procedures when operating in or near areas of volcanic ash cloud contamination: (i) enhancement of vigilance during inspections and regular maintenance and appropriate adjustments to maintenance practices; (ii) definition of a follow-up procedure when a volcanic ash cloud encounter has been reported or suspected; (iii) thorough investigation for any sign of unusual or accelerated abrasions or corrosion or of volcanic ash accumulation; (iv) reporting to TCHs and the relevant authorities observations and experiences from operations in areas of volcanic ash cloud contamination; (v) completion of any additional maintenance recommended by the TCH or by the Competent Authority. (f) Reporting The operator should ensure that reports are immediately submitted to the nearest ATS unit using the VAR/AIREP procedures followed up by a more detailed VAR on landing together with, as applicable, a report as defined in

text: Regulation (EU) No 996/2010

text: and Directive

text: , and an aircraft technical log entry for: (1) any incident related to volcanic clouds; (2) any observation of volcanic ash activity; and (3) any time that volcanic ash is not encountered in an area where it was forecast to be. (g) References

text: Further guidance on volcanic ash safety risk assessment is given in ICAO Doc. 9974 (Flight safety and volcanic ash – Risk management of flight operations with known or forecast volcanic ash contamination).

text: A new GM4 ORO.GEN.200(a)(3) is added as follows:

text: GM4 ORO.GEN.200(a)(3) Management system

text: SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT – RISK REGISTER The results of the assessment of the potential adverse consequences or outcome of each hazard may be recorded by the operator in a risk register, an example of which is provided below.

type: vagledning

utgivare: easa


text: Annex to ED Decision 2014/003/R

text: For the date of entry into force of this Amendment, kindly refer to Decision 2014/003/R in the Official Publication of the Agency

identifier: AMC & GM to Part-ORO — Amendment 3

amnesord: Part-ORO - Organisation Requirements for Air Operations

beslut: ED Decision 2014/003/R

title: AMC & GM to Part-ORO — Amendment 3

text: European Aviation Safety Agency

type: rubrik

text: Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) and Guidance Material (GM) to Part-ORO (Subpart FTL)

text: Amendment 3 31 January 2014

text: The following new Guidance Material for Subpart FTL has been added to Part-ORO:

text: ACCLIMATISED (a) A crew member remains acclimatised to the local time of his/her reference time during 47 hours 59 minutes after reporting no matter how many time zones he/she has crossed. (b) The maximum daily FDP for acclimatised crew members is determined by using table 1 of ORO.FTL.205(b)(1) with the reference time of the point of departure. As soon as 48 hours have elapsed, the state of acclimatisation is derived from the time elapsed since reporting at reference time and the number of time zones crossed.

text: ACCLIMATISED ‘POINT OF DEPARTURE’ The point of departure refers to the reporting point for a flight duty period or positioning duty after a rest period.

text: ACCLIMATISED ‘TIME ELAPSED SINCE REPORTING AT REFERENCE TIME’ The time elapsed since reporting at reference time for operations applying CS FTL.1.235(b)(3)(ii) at home base refers to the time elapsed since reporting for the first time at home base for a rotation.

text: REFERENCE TIME (a) Reference time refers to reporting points in a 2-hour wide time zone band around the local time where a crew member is acclimatised. (b) Example: A crew member is acclimatised to the local time in Helsinki and reports for duty in London. The reference time is the local time in London.

text: ADEQUATE FURNITURE FOR ‘ACCOMMODATION’ Adequate furniture for crew member accommodation should include a seat that reclines at least 45° back angle to the vertical, has a seat width of at least 20 inches (50cm) and provides leg and foot support.

text: DETERMINATION OF DISRUPTIVE SCHEDULES If a crew member is acclimatised to the local time at his/her home base, the local time at the home base should be used to consider an FDP as ‘disruptive schedule’. This applies to operations within the 2-hour wide time zone surrounding the local time at the home base, if a crew member is acclimatised to the local time at his/her home base.

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text: ELEMENTS OF STANDBY FOR DUTY ORO.FTL.225(c) and (d) and CS FTL.1.225(b)(2) determine which elements of standby count as duty.

text: OPERATING CREW MEMBER A person on board an aircraft is either a crew member or a passenger. If a crew member is not a passenger on board an aircraft he/she should be considered as ‘carrying out duties’. The crew member remains an operating crew member during in-flight rest. Inflight rest counts in full as FDP, and for the purpose of ORO.FTL.210.

text: AMC1 ORO.FTL.110 Operator responsibilities

text: SCHEDULING (a) Scheduling has an important impact on a crew member’s ability to sleep and to maintain a proper level of alertness. When developing a workable roster, the operator should strike a fair balance between the commercial needs and the capacity of individual crew members to work effectively. Rosters should be developed in such a way that they distribute the amount of work evenly among those that are involved. (b) Schedules should allow for flights to be completed within the maximum permitted flight duty period and flight rosters should take into account the time needed for pre-flight duties, taxiing, the flight- and turnaround times. Other factors to be considered when planning duty periods should include: (1) the allocation of work patterns which avoid undesirable practices such as alternating day/night duties, alternating eastward-westward or westwardeastward time zone transitions, positioning of crew members so that a serious disruption of established sleep/work patterns occurs; (2) scheduling sufficient rest periods especially after long flights crossing many time zones; and (3) preparation of duty rosters sufficiently in advance with planning of recurrent extended recovery rest periods and notification of the crew members well in advance to plan adequate pre-duty rest.

text: AMC1 ORO.FTL.110(a) Operator responsibilities

text: PUBLICATION OF ROSTERS Rosters should be published 14 days in advance.

text: AMC1 ORO.FTL.110(j) Operator responsibilities

text: OPERATIONAL ROBUSTNESS OF ROSTERS The operator should establish and monitor performance indicators for operational robustness of rosters.

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text: GM1 ORO.FTL.110(j) Operator responsibilities

text: OPERATIONAL ROBUSTNESS OF ROSTERS Performance indicators for operational robustness of rosters should support the operator in the assessment of the stability of its rostering system. Performance indicators for operational robustness of rosters should at least measure how often a rostered crew pairing for a duty period is achieved within the planned duration of that duty period. Crew pairing means rostered positioning and flights for crew members in one duty period.

text: AMC1 ORO.FTL.120(b)(1) Fatigue risk management (FRM)

text: COMMERCIAL AIR TRANSPORT OPERATORS FRM POLICY (a) The operator’s FRM policy should identify all the elements of FRM. (b) The FRM policy should define to which operations FRM applies. (c) The FRM policy should: (1) reflect the shared responsibility of management, flight and cabin crew , and other involved personnel; (2) state the safety objectives of FRM; (3) be signed by the accountable manager; (1) be communicated, with visible endorsement, to all the relevant areas and levels of the organisation; (2) declare management commitment to effective safety reporting; (3) declare management commitment to the provision of adequate resources for FRM; (4) declare management commitment to continuous improvement of FRM; (5) require that clear lines of accountability for management, flight and cabin crew , and all other involved personnel are identified; and (6) require periodic reviews to ensure it remains relevant and appropriate.

text: AMC2 ORO.FTL.120(b)(2) Fatigue risk management (FRM)

text: COMMERCIAL AIR TRANSPORT OPERATORS FRM DOCUMENTATION The operator should develop and keep current FRM documentation that describes and records: (a) FRM policy and objectives; (b) FRM processes and procedures; (c) accountabilities, responsibilities and authorities for these processes and procedures; (d) mechanisms for on-going involvement of management, flight and cabin crew members, and all other involved personnel; (e) FRM training programmes, training requirements and attendance records;

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text: (f) scheduled and actual flight times, duty periods and rest periods with deviations and reasons for deviations; and (g) FRM outputs including findings from collected data, recommendations, and actions taken.

text: AMC1 ORO.FTL.120(b)(4) Fatigue risk management (FRM)

text: COMMERCIAL AIR TRANSPORT OPERATORS IDENTIFICATION OF HAZARDS The operator should develop and maintain three documented processes for fatigue hazard identification: (a) Predictive The predictive process should identify fatigue hazards by examining crew scheduling and taking into account factors known to affect sleep and fatigue and their effects on performance. Methods of examination may include, but are not limited to: (1) operator or industry operational experience and data collected on similar types of operations; (2) evidence-based scheduling practices; and (3) bio-mathematical models. (b) Proactive The proactive process should identify fatigue hazards within current flight operations. Methods of examination may include, but are not limited to: (1) self-reporting of fatigue risks; (2) crew fatigue surveys; (3) relevant flight and cabin crew performance data; (4) available safety databases and scientific studies; and (5) analysis of planned versus actual time worked. (c) Reactive The reactive process should identify the contribution of fatigue hazards to reports and events associated with potential negative safety consequences in order to determine how the impact of fatigue could have been minimized. At a minimum, the process may be triggered by any of the following: (1) fatigue reports; (1) confidential reports; (2) audit reports; (3) incidents; or (4) flight data monitoring (FDM) events.

text: AMC2 ORO.FTL.120(b)(4) Fatigue risk management (FRM)

text: COMMERCIAL AIR TRANSPORT OPERATORS RISK ASSESSMENT

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text: An operator should develop and implement risk assessment procedures that determine the probability and potential severity of fatigue-related events and identify when the associated risks require mitigation. The risk assessment procedures should review identified hazards and link them to: (a) operational processes; (b) their probability; (c) possible consequences; and (d) the effectiveness of existing safety barriers and controls.

text: AMC1 ORO.FTL.120(b)(5) Fatigue risk management (FRM)

text: COMMERCIAL AIR TRANSPORT OPERATORS RISK MITIGATION An operator should develop and implement risk mitigation procedures that: (a) select the appropriate mitigation strategies; (b) implement the mitigation strategies; and (c) monitor the strategies’ implementation and effectiveness.

text: AMC1 ORO.FTL.120(b)(8) Fatigue risk management (FRM)

text: COMMERCIAL AIR TRANSPORT OPERATORS FRM SAFETY ASSURANCE PROCESSES The operator should develop and maintain FRM safety assurance processes to: (a) provide for continuous FRM performance monitoring, analysis of trends, and measurement to validate the effectiveness of the fatigue safety risk controls. The sources of data may include, but are not limited to: (1) hazard reporting and investigations; (2) audits and surveys; and (3) reviews and fatigue studies; (b) provide a formal process for the management of change which should include, but is not limited to: (1) identification of changes in the operational environment that may affect FRM; (2) identification of changes within the organisation that may affect FRM; and (3) consideration of available tools which could be used to maintain or improve FRM performance prior to implementing changes; and (c) provide for the continuous improvement of FRM. This should include, but is not limited to: (1) the elimination and/or modification of risk controls have had unintended consequences or that are no longer needed due to changes in the operational or organisational environment; (2) routine evaluations of facilities, equipment, documentation and procedures; and

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text: (3) the determination of the need to introduce new processes and procedures to mitigate emerging fatigue-related risks.

text: AMC1 ORO.FTL.120(b)(9) Fatigue risk management (FRM)

text: COMMERCIAL AIR TRANSPORT OPERATORS FRM PROMOTION PROCESS FRM promotion processes should support the on-going development of FRM, the continuous improvement of its overall performance, and attainment of optimum safety levels. The following should be established and implemented by the operator as part of its FRM: (a) training programmes to ensure competency commensurate with the roles and responsibilities of management, flight and cabin crew , and all other involved personnel under the planned FRM; and (b) an effective FRM communication plan that: (1) explains FRM policies, procedures and responsibilities to all relevant stakeholders; and (2) describes communication channels used to gather and disseminate FRMrelated information.

text: GM1 ORO.FTL.205(a)(1) Flight Duty Period (FDP)

text: REPORTING TIMES The operator should specify reporting times taking into account the type of operation, the size and type of aircraft and the reporting airport conditions.

text: GM1 ORO.FTL.205(b)(1) Flight duty period (FDP)

text: REFERENCE TIME The start time of the FDP in the table refers to the ‘reference time’. That means, to the local time of the point of departure, if this point of departure is within a 2-hour wide time zone band around the local time where a crew member is acclimatised.

text: AMC1 ORO.FTL.205(f) Flight Duty Period (FDP)

text: UNFORESEEN CIRCUMSTANCES IN ACTUAL FLIGHT OPERATIONS — COMMANDER’S DISCRETION (a) As general guidance when developing a commander’s discretion policy, the operator should take into consideration the shared responsibility of management, flight and cabin crew in the case of unforeseen circumstances. The exercise of commander’s discretion should be considered exceptional and should be avoided at home base and/or company hubs where standby or reserve crew members should be available. Operators should asses on a regular basis the series of pairings where commander’s discretion has been exercised in order to be aware of possible inconsistencies in their rostering. (b) The operator’s policy on commander’s discretion should state the safety objectives, especially in the case of an extended FDP or reduced rest and should take due

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text: consideration of additional factors that might decrease a crew member’s alertness levels, such as: (1) WOCL encroachment; (2) weather conditions; (3) complexity of the operation and/or airport environment; (4) aeroplane malfunctions or specifications; (5) flight with training or supervisory duties; (6) increased number of sectors; (7) circadian disruption; and (8) individual conditions of affected crew members (time since awake, sleeprelated factor, workload, etc.).

text: GM1 ORO.FTL.205(f)(1)(i) Flight Duty Period (FDP)

text: COMMANDER’S DISCRETION The maximum basic daily FDP that results after applying ORO.FTL.205(b) should be used to calculate the limits of commander’s discretion, if commander’s discretion is applied to an FDP which has been extended under the provisions of ORO.FTL.205(d).

text: AMC1 ORO.FTL.210(c) Flight times and duty periods

text: POST-FLIGHT DUTIES The operator should specify post-flight duty times taking into account the type of operation, the size and type of aircraft and the airport conditions.

text: GM1 ORO.FTL.230(a) Reserve

text: ROSTERING OF RESERVE Including reserve in a roster , also referred to as 'rostering', implies that a reserve period that does not result in a duty period may not retrospectively be considered as part of a recurrent extended recovery rest period.

text: GM1 ORO.FTL.235(a)(2) Rest periods

text: MINIMUM REST PERIOD AT HOME BASE IF SUITABLE ACCOMMODATION IS PROVIDED An operator may apply the minimum rest period away from home base during a rotation which includes a rest period at a crew member’s home base. This applies only if the crew member does not rest at his/her residence, or temporary accommodation, because the operator provides suitable accommodation. This type of roster is known as "back-to-back operation".

text: AMC1 ORO.FTL.235(b) Rest periods

text: MINIMUM REST PERIOD AWAY FROM HOME BASE The time allowed for physiological needs should be 1 hour. Consequently, if the travelling time to the suitable accommodation is more than 30 minutes, the operator

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text: should increase the rest period by twice the amount of difference of travelling time above 30 minutes.

text: AMC1 ORO.FTL.240 Nutrition

text: MEAL OPPORTUNITY (a) The operations manual should specify the minimum duration of the meal opportunity, when a meal opportunity is provided, in particular when the FDP encompasses the regular meal windows (e.g. if the FDP starts at 11:00 hours and ends at 22:00 hours meal opportunities for two meals should be given). (b) It should define the time frames in which a regular meal should be consumed in order not to alter the human needs for nutrition without affecting the crew member’s body rhythms.

text: AMC1 ORO.FTL.250 Fatigue management training

text: TRAINING SYLLABUS FATIGUE MANAGEMENT TRAINING The training syllabus should contain the following: (a) applicable regulatory requirements for flight, duty and rest; (b) the basics of fatigue including sleep fundamentals and the effects of disturbing the circadian rhythms; (c) the causes of fatigue, including medical conditions that may lead to fatigue; (d) the effect of fatigue on performance; (e) fatigue countermeasures; (f) the influence of lifestyle, including nutrition, exercise, and family life, on fatigue; (g) familiarity with sleep disorders and their possible treatments; (h) where applicable, the effects of long range operations and heavy short range schedules on individuals; (i) the effect of operating through and within multiple time zones; and (j) the crew member responsibility for ensuring adequate rest and fitness for flight duty

text: 11 of 11


text: Footnote (1):  Aeroplane: FTD Level 2, or FFS, or aeroplane  Helicopter: FTD Level 2 and 3, or FFS, or helicopter Footnote (2):  Aeroplane: FFS Level C or D, or aeroplane  Helicopter: FSTD’S having dual qualification: FFS Level B and FTD Level 3, or FFS Level

text: C or D, or helicopter

text: Training Levels A and B require familiarisation training, levels C and D require differences training. Training Level E means that differences are such that type rating training is required.

identifier: AMC & GM to Part-ORO — Amendment 4

beslut: ED Decision 2014/009/R

title: AMC & GM to Part-ORO — Amendment 4

text: Annex to Decision 2014/009/R

text: Annex to Decision 2014/009/R of the Executive Director of the Agency of 31.01.2014 amending Acceptable Means of Compliance and Guidance Material to Part-ORO of

text: Regulation (EU) No 965/2012

text: . The text of the amendment is arranged to show deleted text, new or amended text as shown below:

text: 1. deleted text is marked with strike through;

text: 2. new or amended text is highlighted in grey;

text: 3. an ellipsis (…) indicates that the remaining text is unchanged in front of or following the reflected amendment.

text: Annex to ED Decision 2014/009/R

text: AMC1 ORO.FC.240 Operation on more than one type or variant

text: GENERAL

text: (a) Aeroplanes (1) When a flight crew member operates more than one aeroplane class, type or variant listed in

text: Regulation (EU) No 1178/2011

text: and associated procedures, as determined by the operational suitability data established in accordance with

text: Commission Regulation (EU) No 748/2012

text: for classsingle pilot and/or type-single pilot, but not within a single licence endorsement, the operator should ensure that the flight crew member does not operate more than: (i) three reciprocating engine aeroplane types or variants; (ii) three turbo-propeller aeroplane types or variants; (iii) one turbo-propeller aeroplane type or variant and one reciprocating engine aeroplane type or variant; or (iv) one turbo-propeller aeroplane type or variant and any aeroplane within a particular class. (2) When a flight crew member operates more than one aeroplane type or variant within one or more licence endorsement as defined by

text: Regulation (EU) No 1178/2011

text: and associated procedures determined by the operational suitability data established in accordance with

text: Commission Regulation (EU) No 748/2012

text: , the operator should ensure that: (i) the minimum flight crew complement specified in the operations manual is the same for each type or variant to be operated; (ii) the flight crew member does not operate more than two aeroplane types or variants for which a separate licence endorsement is required, unless credits related to the training, checking, and recent experience requirements are defined in data established in accordance with

text: Regulation (EC) No 1702/2003

text: Commission Regulation (EU) No 748/2012

text: for the relevant types or variants; and (iii) only aeroplanes within one licence endorsement are flown in any one flight duty period, unless the operator has established procedures to ensure adequate time for preparation. (3) When a flight crew member operates more than one aeroplane type or variant as listed in

text: Regulation (EU) No 1178/2011

text: Commission Regulation (EU) No 748/2012

text: for type-single pilot and type-multi pilot, but not within a single licence endorsement, the operator should comply with points (a)(2) and (4). (4) When a flight crew member operates more than one aeroplane type or variant listed in

text: Regulation (EU) No 1178/2011

text: Annex to ED Decision 2014/009/R

text: with

text: Commission Regulation (EU) No 748/2012

text: for type multi-pilot, but not within a single licence endorsement, or combinations of aeroplane types or variants listed in

text: Regulation (EU) No 1178/2011

text: and associated procedures as determined by the operational suitability data established in accordance with

text: Commission Regulation (EU) No 748/2012

text: for class single-pilot and type multi-pilot, the operator should comply with the following: (i) point (a)(2); (ii) before exercising the privileges of more than one licence endorsement: (A) flight crew members should have completed two consecutive operator proficiency checks and should have: - 500 hours in the relevant crew position in CAT operations with the same operator; or - for IFR and VFR night operations with performance class B aeroplanes, 100 hours or flight sectors in the relevant crew position in CAT operations with the same operator, if at least one licence endorsement is related to a class. A check flight should be completed before the pilot is released for duties as commander; (B) in the case of a pilot having experience with an operator and exercising the privileges of more than one licence endorsement, and then being promoted to command with the same operator on one of those types, the required minimum experience as commander is 6 months and 300 hours, and the pilot should have completed two consecutive operator proficiency checks before again being eligible to exercise more than one licence endorsement; (iii) before commencing training for and operation of another type or variant, flight crew members should have completed 3 months and 150 hours flying on the base aeroplane, which should include at least one proficiency check, unless credits related to the training, checking and recent experience requirements are defined in data established in accordance with

text: Regulation (EC) No 1702/2003

text: Commission Regulation (EU) No 748/2012

text: for the relevant types or variants; (iv) after completion of the initial line check on the new type, 50 hours flying or 20 sectors should be achieved solely on aeroplanes of the new type rating, unless credits related to the training, checking and recent experience requirements are defined in data established in accordance with

text: Regulation (EC) No 1702/2003

text: Commission Regulation (EU) No 748/2012

text: for the relevant types or variants; (v) recent experience requirements established in

text: Commission Regulation (EU) No 1178/2011

text: for each type operated; (vi) the period within which line flying experience is required on each type should be specified in the operations manual;

text: Annex to ED Decision 2014/009/R

text: (vii) when credits are defined in data established in accordance with

text: Regulation (EC) No 1702/2003

text: Commission Regulation (EU) No 748/2012

text: for the relevant type or variant, this should be reflected in the training required in ORO.FC.230 and: (A) ORO.FC.230 (b) requires two operator proficiency checks every year. When credits are defined in data established in accordance with

text: Regulation (EC) No 1702/2003

text: Commission Regulation (EU) No 748/2012

text: for operator proficiency checks to alternate between the types, each operator proficiency check should revalidate the operator proficiency check for the other type(s). The operator proficiency check may be combined with the proficiency checks for revalidation or renewal of the aeroplane type rating or the instrument rating in accordance with

text: Commission Regulation (EU) No 1178/2011

text: . (B) ORO.FC.230 (c) requires one line check every year. When credits are defined in data established in accordance for

text: Regulation (EC) No 1702/2003

text: with

text: Commission Regulation (EU) No 748/2012

text: for line checks to alternate between types or variants, each line check should revalidate the line check for the other type or variant. (C) Annual emergency and safety equipment training and checking should cover all requirements for each type. (b) Helicopters (1) If a flight crew member operates more than one type or variant, the following provisions should be met: (i) The recency requirements and the requirements for recurrent training and checking should be met and confirmed prior to CAT operations on any type, and the minimum number of flights on each type within a 3-month period specified in the operations manual. (ii) ORO.FC.230 requirements with regard to recurrent training. (iii) When credits related to the training, checking and recent experience requirements are defined in data established in accordance with

text: Regulation (EC) No 1702/2003

text: Commission Regulation (EU) No 748/2012

text: for the relevant types or variants, the requirements of ORO.FC.230 with regard to proficiency checks may be met by a 6 monthly check on any one type or variant operated. However, a proficiency check on each type or variant operated should be completed every 12 months. (iv) For helicopters with a maximum certified take-off mass (MCTOM) of more than 5 700 kg, or with a maximum operational passenger seating configuration (MOPSC) of more than 19: (A) the flight crew member should not fly more than two helicopter types, unless credits related to the training, checking and recent experience requirements are defined in data established in accordance with

text: Regulation (EC) No 1702/2003

text: Commission Regulation (EU) No 748/2012

text: for the relevant types or variants;

text: Annex to ED Decision 2014/009/R

text: (B) a minimum of 3 months and 150 hours experience on the type or variant should be achieved before the flight crew member should commence the conversion course onto the new type or variant, unless credits related to the training, checking and recent experience requirements are defined in data established in accordance with

text: Commission Regulation (EU) No 748/2012

text: for the relevant types or variants; (C) 28 days and/or 50 hours flying should then be achieved exclusively on the new type or variant, unless credits related to the training, checking and recent experience requirements are defined in data established in accordance with

text: Regulation (EC) No 1702/2003

text: Commission Regulation (EU) No 748/2012

text: for the relevant types or variants; and (D) a flight crew member should not be rostered to fly more than one type or significantly different variant of a type during a single duty period. (v) In the case of all other helicopters, the flight crew member should not operate more than three helicopter types or significantly different variants, unless credits related to the training, checking and recent experience requirements are defined in data established in accordance with

text: Regulation (EC) No 1702/2003

text: Commission Regulation (EU) No 748/2012

text: for the relevant types or variants. (c) Combination of helicopter and aeroplane (1) The flight crew member may fly one helicopter type or variant and one aeroplane type irrespective of their MCTOM or MOPSC. (2) If the helicopter type is covered by paragraph (b)(1)(iv) then (b)(1)(iv)(B), (C) and (D) should also apply in this case.

text: AMC2 ORO.FC.240 Operation on more than one type or variant

text: (a) Terminology The terms used in the context of the operation of more than one type or variant have the following meaning: (1) Base aircraft means an aircraft used as a reference to compare differences with another aircraft. (2) Variant means an aircraft or a group of aircraft within the same pilot type rating that has differences to the base aircraft requiring difference training or familiarisation training. (3) Credit means the recognition of training, checking or recent experience based on commonalities between aircraft. For substantiation of the credits ODR tables or other appropriate documentation for comparison of the relevant aircraft characteristics may be provided. (4) Operator difference requirements (ODRs) mean a formal description of differences between types or variants flown by a particular operator.

text: Annex to ED Decision 2014/009/R

text: (b) Philosophy The concept of operating more than one type or variant depends upon the experience, knowledge and ability of the operator and the flight crew concerned. The first consideration is whether or not aircraft types or variants are sufficiently similar to allow the safe operation of both. The second consideration is whether or not the types or variants are sufficiently similar for the training, checking and recent experience. Unless credits have been established by the operational suitability data in accordance with

text: Commission Regulation (EU) 1702/2003

text: , all training, checking and recent experience requirements should be completed independently for each type or variant. (c) Methodology – Use of Operator Difference Requirement (ODR) Tables (1) Before assigning flight crew members to operate more than one type or variant of aircraft, the operator should conduct a detailed evaluation of the differences or similarities of the aircraft concerned in order to establish appropriate procedures or operational restrictions. This evaluation should be based on the data established in accordance with

text: Commission Regulation (EU) No 1702/2003

text: for the relevant types or variants, and should be adapted to the operator’s specific aircraft configurations. This evaluation should take into account of the following: (i) the level of technology; (ii) operational procedures; and (iii) handling characteristics. The methodology described below should be used as a means of evaluating aeroplane differences and similarities to justify the operation of more than one type or variant, and when credit is sought. (2) ODR tables Before requiring flight crew members to operate more than one type or variant, operators should first nominate one aircraft as the base aircraft from which to show differences with the second aircraft type or variant, the ‘difference aircraft’, in terms of technology (systems), procedures, pilot handling and aircraft management. These differences, known as operator difference requirements (ODR), preferably presented in tabular format, constitute part of the justification for operating more than one type or variant and also the basis for the associated differences/familiarisation or reduced type rating training for the flight crew. (3) The ODR tables should be presented as follows:

text: GENERAL OPERATOR DIFFERENCES REQUIREMENTS TABLE

text: COMPLIANCE METHOD DIFFERENCE AIRCRAFT: CHKG/ BASE AIRCRAFT: TRAINING CURR

text: Annex to ED Decision 2014/009/R

text: Flt Proc FLT REC General Differences A B C D E char chg CHK EXP

text: Range CB GENERAL No Yes ETOPS Certified T

text: DIMENSIONS Configuration per AFM, Yes No CB FCOM T

text: SYSTEM OPERATOR DIFFERENCES REQUIREMENTS TABLE

text: COMPLIANCE METHOD

text: Flt Proc FLT REC System Differences A B C D E char chg CHK EXP

text: 21 – AIR CONTROLS AND HO CONDITIONIN INDICATORS: No Yes G - Panel layout

text: PACKS: - Switch type 21 - AIR CONDITIONIN - Automatically No Yes CBT controlled G - Reset switch for both packs

text: MANEUVER OPERATOR DIFFERENCES REQUIREMENTS TABLE

text: Flt Proc FLT REC Manoeuvre Differences A B C D E char chg CHK EXP

text: Exterior Minor differences NO NO HO Preflight

text: Annex to ED Decision 2014/009/R

text: Preflight Differences due to NO YES CBT FTD systems, ECL

text: FBW handling vs NO YES CBT FFS Conventional ; AFDS Normal TAKEOFF: takeoff - Autothrottle engagement FMA indications

text: (4) Compilation of ODR Tables (i) ODR 1: General The general characteristics of the candidate aircraft are compared with the base aircraft with regard to: (A) general dimensions and aircraft design (number and type of rotors, wing span or category); (B) flight deck general design; (C) cabin layout; (D) engines (number, type and position); (E) limitations (flight envelope). (ii) ODR 2: Systems Consideration is given to differences in design between the candidate aircraft and the base aircraft. For this comparison the Air Transport Association (ATA) 100 index is used. This index establishes a system and subsystem classification and then an analysis performed for each index item with respect to the main architectural, functional and operations elements, including controls and indications on the systems control panel. (iii) ODR 3: Manoeuvres Operational differences encompass normal, abnormal and emergency situations and include any change in aircraft handling and flight management. It is necessary to establish a list of operational items for consideration on which an analysis of differences can be made. The operational analysis should take the following into account: (A) flight deck dimensions (size, cut-off angle and pilot eye height); (B) differences in controls (design, shape, location and function); (C) additional or altered function (flight controls) in normal or abnormal conditions;

text: Annex to ED Decision 2014/009/R

text: (D) handling qualities (including inertia) in normal and in abnormal configurations; (E) aircraft performance in specific manoeuvres; (F) aircraft status following failure; (G) management (e.g. ECAM, EICAS, navaid selection, automatic checklists). (iv) Once the differences for ODR 1, ODR 2 and ODR 3 have been established, the consequences of differences evaluated in terms of flight characteristics (FLT CHAR) and change of procedures (PROC CHNG) should be entered into the appropriate columns. (v) Difference Levels - crew training, checking and currency (A) The final stage of an operator’s proposal to operate more than one type or variant is to establish crew training, checking and currency requirements. This may be established by applying the coded difference levels from Table 4 to the compliance method column of the ODR Tables. (B) Differences items identified in the ODR tables as impacting flight characteristics, or procedures, should be analysed in the corresponding ATA section of the ODR manoeuvres. Normal, abnormal and emergency situations should be addressed accordingly.

text: (d) Difference Levels (1) Difference levels — General Difference levels are used to identify the extent of difference between a base and a candidate aircraft with reference to the elements described in the ODR tables. These levels are proportionate to the differences between a base and a candidate aircraft. A range of five difference levels in order of increasing requirements, identified as A through E, are each specified for training, checking, and currency. Difference levels apply when a difference with the potential to affect flight safety exists between a base and a candidate aircraft. Differences may also affect the knowledge, skills, or abilities required from a pilot. If no differences exist, or if differences exist but do not affect flight safety, or if differences exist but do not affect knowledge, skills, or abilities, then difference levels are neither assigned nor applicable to pilot qualification. When difference levels apply, each level is based on a scale of differences related to design features, systems, or manoeuvres. In assessing the effects of differences, both flight characteristics and procedures are considered since flight characteristics address handling qualities and performance, while procedures include normal, non-normal and emergency items.

text: Annex to ED Decision 2014/009/R

text: Levels for training, checking, and currency are assigned independently, but are linked depending on the differences between a base and candidate aircraft. Training at level E usually identifies that the candidate aircraft is a different type to the base aircraft.

text: (2) Difference levels are summarised in the table below regarding training, checking, and currency.

text: DIFFERENCE TRAINING CHECKING CURRENCY LEVEL

text:  Self-instruction A Not applicable or Not applicable integrated with next proficiency check  Aided instruction B Task or system check Self-review  System devices C Partial proficiency check Designated system using qualified device

text: D Manoeuvre Training Partial proficiency check Designated 1 1 1 Devices or aircraft using qualified device manoeuvre(s) to accomplish specific manoeuvres

text: E FSTDs or aircraft Proficiency check using As per regulation, 2 2 FSTDs or aircraft using FSTDs or aircraft

text: (3) Difference level — Training The training differences levels specified represent the minimum requirements. Devices associated with a higher difference level may be used to satisfy a training differences requirement. (i) Level A training

text: Annex to ED Decision 2014/009/R

text: Level A differences training is applicable to aircraft with differences that can adequately be addressed through self-instruction. Level A training represents a knowledge requirement such that once appropriate information is provided, understanding and compliance can be assumed to be demonstrated. Training needs not covered by level A training may require level B training, or higher, depending on the outcome of the evaluations described in the aircraft evaluation process (CS FCD.420). (ii) Level B training Level B differences training is applicable to aircraft with system or procedure differences that can adequately be addressed through aided instruction. At level B aided instruction it is appropriate to ensure pilot understanding, emphasise issues, provide a standardised method of presentation of material, or to aid retention of material following training. (iii) Level C training Level C differences training can only be accomplished through the use of devices capable of systems training. Level C differences training is applicable to variants having ‘part task’ differences that affect skills or abilities as well as knowledge. Training objectives focus on mastering individual systems, procedures, or tasks, as opposed to performing highly integrated flight operations and manoeuvres in ‘real time’. Level C may also require self-instruction or aided instruction of a pilot, but cannot be adequately addressed by a knowledge requirement alone. Training devices are required to supplement instruction to ensure attainment or retention of pilot skills and abilities to accomplish the more complex tasks, usually related to operation of particular aircraft systems. The minimum acceptable training media for level C is interactive computer-based training, cockpit systems simulators, cockpit procedure trainers, part task trainers [such as Inertial Navigation System (INS), Flight Management System (FMS), or Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) trainers], or similar devices. (iv) Level D training Level D differences training can only be accomplished with devices capable of performing flight manoeuvres and addressing full task differences affecting knowledge, skills, or abilities. Devices capable of flight manoeuvres address full task performance in a dynamic ‘real time’ environment and enable integration of knowledge, skills and abilities in a simulated flight environment, involving combinations of operationally oriented tasks and realistic task loading for each relevant phase of flight. At level D, knowledge and skills to complete necessary normal, non-normal and emergency procedures are fully addressed for each variant.

text: Annex to ED Decision 2014/009/R

text: Level D differences training requires mastery of interrelated skills that cannot be adequately addressed by separate acquisition of a series of knowledge areas or skills that are interrelated. However, the differences are not so significant, that a full type rating training course is required. If demonstration of interrelationships between the systems was important, the use of a series of separate devices for systems training would not suffice. Training for level D differences requires a training device that has accurate, high fidelity integration of systems and controls and realistic instrument indications. Level D training may also require manoeuvre visual cues, motion cues, dynamics, control loading or specific environmental conditions. Weather phenomena such as low visibility operations or wind shear may or may not be incorporated. Where simplified or generic characteristics of an aircraft type are used in devices to satisfy level D difference training, significant negative training cannot occur as a result of the simplification. Appropriate devices as described in CS FCD.420(a), satisfying level D differences training range from those where relevant elements of aircraft flight manoeuvring, performance, and handling qualities are incorporated. The use of a Manoeuvre Training Device or aircraft is limited for the conduct of specific manoeuvres or handling differences, or for specific equipment or procedures. (v) Level E training Level E differences training is applicable to candidate aircraft having such a significant ‘full task’ differences that a full type rating training course or a type rating training course with credit for previous experience on similar aircraft types is required to meet the training objectives. The training requires a ‘high fidelity’ environment to attain or maintain knowledge, skills, or abilities that can only be satisfied by the use of FSTDs or the aircraft itself as mentioned in CS FCD.415(a). Level E training, if done in an aircraft, should be modified for safety reasons where manoeuvres can result in a high degree of risk. When level E differences training is assigned, suitable credit or constraints may be applied for knowledge, skills or abilities related to other pertinent aircraft types and specifies the relevant subjects, procedures or manoeuvres. (4) Difference level — Checking Differences checking addresses any pertinent pilot testing or checking. Initial and recurrent checking levels are the same unless otherwise specified. It may be possible to satisfactorily accomplish recurrent checking objectives in devices not meeting initial checking requirements. In such instances the applicant may propose for revalidation checks the use of certain devices not meeting the initial check requirements. (i) Level A checking

text: Annex to ED Decision 2014/009/R

text: Level A differences checking indicates that no check related to differences is required at the time of differences training. However, a pilot is responsible for knowledge of each variant flown. (ii) Level B checking Level B differences checking indicates that a ‘task’ or ‘systems’ check is required following initial and recurring training. (iii) Level C checking Level C differences checking requires a partial check using a suitable qualified device. A partial check is conducted relative to particular manoeuvres or systems. (iv) Level D checking Level D differences checking indicates that a partial proficiency check is required following both initial and recurrent training. In conducting the partial proficiency check, manoeuvres common to each variant may be credited and need not be repeated. The partial proficiency check covers the specified particular manoeuvres, systems, or devices. Level D checking is performed using scenarios representing a ‘real time’ flight environment and uses qualified devices permitted for level D training or higher. (v) Level E checking Level E differences checking requires that a full proficiency check be conducted in FSTDs or in an aircraft as mentioned in CS FCD.415(a), following both initial and recurrent training. If appropriate, alternating Level E checking between relevant aircraft is possible and credit may be defined for procedures or manoeuvres based on commonality. Assignment of level E checking requirements alone, or in conjunction with level E currency, does not necessarily result in assignment of a separate type rating. (5) Difference level — Currency Differences currency addresses any currency and re-currency levels. Initial and recurrent currency levels are the same unless otherwise specified. (i) Level A currency Level A currency is common to each aircraft and does not require separate tracking. Maintenance of currency in any aircraft suffices for any other variant within the same type rating. (ii) Level B currency Level B currency is ‘knowledge-related’ currency, typically achieved through self-review by individual pilots. (iii) Level C currency (A) Level C currency is applicable to one or more designated systems or procedures, and relates to both skill and knowledge

text: Annex to ED Decision 2014/009/R

text: requirements. When level C currency applies, any pertinent lower level currency is also to be addressed. (B) Re-establishing level C currency When currency is lost, it may be re-established by completing required items using a device equal to or higher than that specified for level C training and checking. (iv) Level D currency (A) Level D currency is related to designated manoeuvres and addresses knowledge and skills required for performing aircraft control tasks in real time with integrated use of associated systems and procedures. Level D currency may also address certain differences in flight characteristics including performance of any required manoeuvres and related normal, non-normal and emergency procedures. When level D is necessary, any pertinent lower level currency is also to be addressed. (B) Re-establishing level D currency When currency is lost, currency may be re-established by completing pertinent manoeuvres using a device equal to or higher than that specified for level D differences training and checking. (v) Level E currency (A) Level E currency requires that recent experience requirements of Part-FCL and operational requirements be complied with in each aircraft separately. Level E currency may also specify other system, procedure, or manoeuvre currency item(s) necessary for safe operations, and requires procedures or manoeuvres to be accomplished in FSTDs or in an aircraft as mentioned in CS FCD.415(a). Provisions are applied in a way which addresses the required system or manoeuvre experience. When level E is assigned between aircraft of common characteristics, credit may be permitted. Assignment of level E currency requirements does not automatically lead to a determination on same or separate type rating. Level E currency is tracked by a means that is acceptable to the competent authority. When CTLC is permitted, any credit or constraints applicable to using FSTDs, as mentioned in CS FCD.415(a), are also to be determined. (B) Re-establishing level E currency When currency is lost, currency may be re-established by completing pertinent manoeuvres using a device specified for level E differences training and checking. (6) Competency regarding non-normal and emergency procedures — Currency Competency for non-normal and emergency manoeuvres or procedures is generally addressed by checking requirements. Particular non-normal and emergency manoeuvres or procedures may not be considered mandatory for

text: Annex to ED Decision 2014/009/R checking or training. In this situation it may be necessary to periodically practice or demonstrate those manoeuvres or procedures specifying currency requirements for those manoeuvres or procedures.


text: Annex to ED Decision 2015/005/R

text: Decision 2014/017/R of the Executive Director of the Agency of 24 April 2014 adopting Acceptable Means of Compliance and Guidance Material to Part-ORO of

text: Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012

text: and repealing Decision 2012/017/R of the Executive Director of the Agency of 24 October 2012.

text: Annex to ED Decision 2015/005/R

text: Annex to ED Decision 2015/005/R

text: Annex to ED Decision 2015/005/R

text: Annex to ED Decision 2015/005/R

text: Annex to ED Decision 2015/005/R

text: Annex to ED Decision 2015/005/R

text: Annex to ED Decision 2015/005/R

text: Annex to ED Decision 2015/005/R

text: Annex to ED Decision 2015/005/R

text: Annex to ED Decision 2015/005/R

text: Annex to ED Decision 2015/005/R

identifier: AMC & GM to Part-ORO — Issue 2, Amendment 1

beslut: ED Decision 2015/005/R

title: AMC & GM to Part-ORO — Issue 2, Amendment 1

text: Annex to Decision 2015/005/R

text: ‘AMC and GM to Part-ORO — Issue 2, Amendment 1’

text: The Annex to Decision 2014/017/R is hereby amended as follows: The text of the amendment is arranged to show deleted, new or amended text as shown below:

text: 1. deleted text is marked with strike through;

text: 2. new or amended text is highlighted in grey; and

text: 3. an ellipsis (…) indicates that the remaining text is unchanged in front of or following the reflected amendment. A new AMC1 ORO.GEN.110(a) is inserted as follows:

text: AMC1 ORO.GEN.110(a) Operator responsibilities

text: SECURITY TRAINING PROGRAMME FOR CREW MEMBERS — CAT OPERATIONS Without prejudice to

text: Regulation (EC) No 300/2008

text: , the CAT operator should establish and maintain a security training programme for crew members, including theoretical and practical elements. This training should be provided at the time of operator conversion training and thereafter at intervals not exceeding three years. The content and duration of the training should be adapted to the security threats of the individual operator and should ensure that crew members act in the most appropriate manner to minimise the consequences of acts of unlawful interference. This programme should include the following elements: (a) determination of the seriousness of the occurrence; (b) crew communication and coordination; (c) appropriate self-defence responses; (d) use of non-lethal protective devices assigned to crew members whose use is authorised by the Member State; (e) understanding of behaviour of terrorists so as to facilitate the ability of crew members to cope with hijacker behaviour and passenger responses; (f) in case where cabin crew are required, live situational training exercises regarding various threat conditions; (g) flight crew compartment procedures to protect the aircraft; (h) aircraft search procedures, in accordance with

text: Regulation (EC) No 300/2008

text: , including identification of prohibited articles; and (i) guidance on the least risk bomb locations.

text: A new AMC2 ORO.GEN.110(a) is inserted as follows:

text: AMC2 ORO.GEN.110(a) Operator responsibilities

text: SECURITY TRAINING PROGRAMME FOR GROUND PERSONNEL — CAT OPERATIONS In accordance with

text: Regulation (EC) No 300/2008

text: , the CAT operator should establish and maintain a security training programme for ground personnel to acquaint appropriate employees with preventive measures and techniques in relation to passengers, baggage, cargo, mail, equipment, stores and supplies intended for carriage so that they contribute to the prevention of acts of sabotage or other forms of unlawful interference.

text: A new GM1 ORO.GEN.110(a) is inserted as follows:

text: GM1 ORO.GEN.110(a) Operator responsibilities

text: SECURITY TRAINING PROGRAMME FOR CREW MEMBERS ICAO Security Manual Doc 9811 (restricted access) contains guidance on the development of training programmes.

text: A new AMC2 ORO.GEN.110(e) is inserted as follows:

text: AMC2 ORO.GEN.110(e) Operator responsibilities

text: GROUND OPERATIONS WITH PASSENGERS ON BOARD IN THE ABSENCE OF FLIGHT CREW For ground operations, whenever passengers are embarking, on board or disembarking in the absence of flight crew members, the operator should: (a) establish procedures to alert the aerodrome services in the event of ground emergency or urgent need; and (b) ensure that at least one person on board the aircraft is qualified to apply these procedures and ensure proper coordination between the aircraft and the aerodrome services.

text: A new GM1 ORO.GEN.110(e) is inserted as follows:

text: GM2 ORO.GEN.110(e) Operator responsibilities

text: AERODROME SERVICES Aerodrome services refer to units available at an aerodrome that could be of assistance in responding to an urgent need or an emergency, such as rescue and firefighting services, medical and ambulance services, air traffic services, security services, police, aerodrome operations, air operators.

text: A new AMC1 ORO.GEN.110(f) is inserted as follows:

text: AMC1 ORO.GEN.110(f) Operator responsibilities

text: STERILE FLIGHT CREW COMPARTMENT (a) Sterile flight crew compartment procedures should ensure that: (1) flight crew activities are restricted to essential operational activities; and (2) cabin crew and technical crew communications to flight crew or entry into the flight crew compartment are restricted to safety or security matters. (b) The sterile flight crew compartment procedures should be applied: (1) during critical phases of flight; (2) during taxiing (aeroplanes); (3) below 10 000 feet above the aerodrome of departure after take-off and the aerodrome of destination before landing, except for cruise flight; and (4) during any other phases of flight as determined by the pilot-in-command or commander. (c) All crew members should be trained on sterile flight crew compartment procedures established by the operator, as appropriate to their duties.

text: A new GM1 ORO.GEN.110(f) is inserted as follows:

text: GM1 ORO.GEN.110(f) Operator responsibilities

text: STERILE FLIGHT CREW COMPARTMENT (a) Establishment of procedures The operator should establish procedures for flight, cabin, and technical crew that emphasise the objectives and importance of the sterile flight crew compartment. These procedures should also emphasise that, during periods of time when the sterile flight deck compartment procedures are applied, cabin crew and technical crew members should call the flight crew or enter the flight crew

text: compartment only in cases related to safety or security matters. In such cases, information should be timely and accurate. (b) Flight crew activities When sterile flight crew compartment procedures are applied, flight crew members are focused on their essential operational activities without being disturbed by non-safety related matters. Examples of activities that should not be performed are: (1) radio calls concerning passenger connections, fuel loads, catering, etc.; (2) non-critical paperwork; and (3) mass and balance corrections and performance calculations, unless required for safety reasons. (c) Communication to the flight crew Cabin crew and technical crew use their own discretion to determine whether the situation is related to safety or security matters and whether to call the flight crew. Situations requiring information to the flight crew may include: (1) any outbreak of fire inside the cabin or in an engine; (2) a burning smell in the cabin or presence of smoke inside or outside; (3) fuel or fluid leakage; (4) exit door unable to be armed or disarmed; (5) localised extreme cabin temperature changes; (6) evidence of airframe icing; (7) cabin/galley equipment or furniture malfunction/breakage posing a hazard to the occupants; (8) suspicious object; (9) disruptive passenger; (10) security threat; (11) abnormal vibration or noise; (12) medical emergency; (13) general drop-down of the oxygen masks in the cabin; and (14) any other condition deemed relevant by a cabin crew or technical crew member.

text: A new AMC1 ORO.AOC.100(a) is inserted as follows:

text: AMC1 ORO.AOC.100(a) Application for an air operator certificate

text: OPERATOR SECURITY PROGRAMME In accordance with

text: Regulation (EC) No 300/2008

text: , as part of granting the AOC, the CAT operator should provide the competent authority with the operator’s security programme, including security training. The security programme should be adapted to the type and area of operation, as well as to the aircraft operated.

text: A new AMC1 ORO.CC.200(e) is inserted as follows:

text: AMC1 ORO.CC.200(e) Senior cabin crew member

text: UNABLE TO OPERATE (a) Replacement of senior cabin crew member at a base of the operator A senior cabin crew member who did not report for or cannot commence the assigned flight or series of flights originating from a base of the operator should be replaced without undue delay. The flight should not depart unless another senior cabin crew member has been assigned. (b) Replacement of incapacitated or unavailable senior cabin crew member (1) A senior cabin crew member, who becomes incapacitated during a flight or series of flights, or unavailable at a stopover (layover) point, should be replaced without undue delay by another senior cabin crew member qualified on the concerned aircraft type/variant. If there is no other senior cabin crew member, the most appropriately qualified cabin crew member should be assigned to act as senior cabin crew member in order to reach a base of the operator. (2) If during the series of flights the aircraft transits via a base of the operator, the assigned cabin crew member acting as senior cabin crew member should be replaced by another senior cabin crew member.

text: A new AMC2 ORO.CC.200(e) is inserted as follows:

text: AMC2 ORO.CC.200(e) Senior cabin crew member

text: MOST APPROPRIATELY QUALIFIED CABIN CREW MEMBER Selection of the most appropriately qualified cabin crew member should take into account if the individual’s experience as operating cabin crew member is adequate for the conduct of duties required of a senior cabin crew member. The selected cabin crew member should have operational experience on the concerned aircraft type/variant.

text: A new GM1 ORO.CC.200(e) is inserted as follows:

text: GM1 ORO.CC.200(e) Senior cabin crew member

text: REPLACEMENT OF INCAPACITATED OR UNAVAILABLE SENIOR CABIN CREW MEMBER BY ANOTHER SENIOR CABIN CREW MEMBER To ensure that another senior cabin crew member is assigned without undue delay, the operator should take appropriate measures. These include, but are not limited to, the following: (a) to ensure that a flight or series of flights do not depart from an aerodrome where a senior cabin crew member is available or can be made available, the operator may: (1) appoint a senior cabin crew member originally assigned to another flight and who is available at the concerned base or stopover (layover) point if the reporting time for that flight provides sufficient time to find a replacement; or (2) assign a senior cabin crew member who is on standby to operate the flight or to position to the destination where the nominated senior cabin crew member has become incapacitated or unavailable to operate; (b) the operator should utilise another senior cabin crew member if she/he is among the operating crew on the same flight; (c) in case of unavailable senior cabin crew member, the operator should use the available time and resources to replace him/her at the stopover (layover) point with another senior cabin crew member; (d) the operator should consider including the identification of the most appropriately qualified cabin crew member in pre-flight briefings.

text: A new GM2 ORO.CC.200(e) is inserted as follows:

text: GM2 ORO.CC.200(e) Senior cabin crew member

text: FLIGHT OR SERIES OF FLIGHTS Flight or series of flights refers to a period that commences when a cabin crew member is required to report for duty, which includes a sector or a series of sectors, and finishes when the aircraft finally comes to rest and the engines are shut down, at the end of the last sector on which the cabin crew member acts as an operating crew member.

text: A new GM1 ORO.CC.205(b)(2) is inserted as follows:

text: GM1 ORO.CC.205(b)(2) Reduction of the number of cabin crew during ground operations and in unforeseen circumstances

text: UNFORESEEN CIRCUMSTANCES

text: Unforeseen circumstances in this context refer to incapacitation and unavailability of a senior cabin crew member or a cabin crew member as follows: (a) ‘Incapacitation’ means a sudden degradation of medical fitness that occurs during flight duty period either in-flight or during a flight transit of the same flight duty period away from operator’s base and that precludes the senior cabin crew member or cabin crew member from performing his/her duties. Incapacitation prior to dispatch of the aircraft from a base of the operator does not substantiate a reduction of the cabin crew complement below the minimum required. (b) ‘Unavailability’ means circumstances at a stopover (layover) destination that preclude the senior cabin crew member or cabin crew member from reporting for the flight duty period, such as traffic jams that prevent the senior cabin crew member or cabin crew member from presenting himself/herself at the crew pick-up point in time, difficulties with local authorities, health problems, death, etc. Unavailability does not refer to insufficient number or absence of cabin crew members on standby, or absence from work due to pregnancy, maternity/paternity leave, parental leave, medical leave, sick leave, or any other absence from work.

text: The following amendments are editorial changes to the existing text which are not related to the substantial amendments of this Decision:

text: AMC1 ORO.DEC.100 is amended as follows:

text: AMC1 ORO.DEC.100(d) Declaration

text: CHANGES The new declaration should be submitted before the change becomes effective indicating the date as of which the change would apply.

text: AMC3 ORO.MLR.100 is amended as follows:

text: AMC3 ORO.MLR.100 Operations manual — general

text: CONTENTS — COMMERCIAL AIR TRANSPORTCAT OPERATIONS (…) A GENERAL/BASIC (…) 8 OPERATING PROCEDURES (…) 8.3 Flight Procedures: (…)

text: 8.3.15 Cabin safety requirements. Procedures: (…) B AIRCRAFT OPERATING MATTERS – TYPE RELATED (…) 3 ABNORMAL AND/OR EMERGENCY PROCEDURES The abnormal and/or emergency procedures and duties assigned to the crew, the appropriate checklists, the system for their use and a statement covering the necessary coordination procedures between flight and cabin/other crew members. The following abnormal and/or emergency procedures and duties should include the following: (…) 4 PERFORMANCE 4.0 Performance data should be provided in a form that can be used without difficulty. 4.1 Performance data. Performance material that provides the necessary data for compliance with the performance requirements prescribed in Annex IV (Part-CAT). For aeroplanes, this performance data should be included to allow the determination of the following: (…) 4.1.1 Supplementary data covering flights in icing conditions. Any certified performance related to an allowable configuration, or configuration deviation, such as anti-skid inoperative. 4.1.2 If performance data, as required for the appropriate performance class, isare not available in the AFM, then other data should be included. The OM may contain crossreference to the data contained in the AFM where such data isare not likely to be used often or in an emergency. (…)

text: AMC1 ORO.MLR.105(h) is amended as follows:

text: AMC1 ORO.MLR.105(h) Minimum equipment list

text: OPERATIONAL AND MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES — APPLICABLE CHANGES (a) Changes to the operational and maintenance procedures referenced in the MMEL are considered applicable and require the amendment of the maintenance and operating procedures referenced in the MEL when the: (1) the modified procedure is applicable to the operator’s MEL; and (2) the purpose of this change is to improve compliance with the intent of the associated MMEL dispatch condition. (…)

text: AMC2 ORO.FC.240 is amended as follows:

text: AMC2 ORO.FC.240 Operation on more than one type or variant

text: GENERAL (…) (b) Philosophy The concept of operating more than one type or variant depends upon the experience, knowledge and ability of the operator and the flight crew concerned. The first consideration is whether or not aircraft types or variants are sufficiently similar to allow the safe operation of both. The second consideration is whether or not the types or variants are sufficiently similar for the training, checking and recent experience. Unless credits have been established by the operational suitability data in accordance with

text: Commission Regulation (EU) 1702/2003

text: No 748/2012, all training, checking and recent experience requirements should be completed independently for each type or variant. (c) Methodology – Use of Operator Difference Requirement (ODR) Tables (1) Before assigning flight crew members to operate more than one type or variant of aircraft, the operator should conduct a detailed evaluation of the differences or similarities of the aircraft concerned in order to establish appropriate procedures or operational restrictions. This evaluation should be based on the data established in accordance with

text: Commission Regulation (EU) No 1702/2003

text: 748/2012 for the relevant types or variants, and should be adapted to the operator’s specific aircraft configurations. This evaluation should take into account of the following: (…) (3) The ODR tables should be presented as follows: (…)

text: MANEUVER MANOEUVRE OPERATOR DIFFERENCES REQUIREMENTS TABLE

text: COMPLIANCE METHOD DIFFERENCE AIRCRAFT: CHKG/ BASE AIRCRAFT: TRAINING CURR

text: Flt Proc FLT REC Manoeuvre Differences A B C D E char chg CHK EXP

text: Exterior Minor differences NO NO HO

text: Preflight Preflight Differences due to systems, NO YES CBT FTD ECL FBW handling vs NO YES CBT FFS Conventional; AFDS TAKEOFF: Normal takeoff - Autothrottle engagement FMA indications (…)

text: AMC1 ORO.FC.A.245 is amended as follows:

text: AMC1 ORO.FC.A.245 Alternative training and qualification programme

text: COMPONENTS AND IMPLEMENTATION (a) Alternative training and qualification programme (ATQP) components The ATQP should comprise the following: (…) (2) A task analysis to determine the: (i) knowledge; (ii) required skills; (iii) associated skill-based training; and (iv) validated behavioural markers, where appropriate. For each aeroplane type/class to be included within the ATQP the operator should establish a systematic review that determines and defines the various tasks to be undertaken by the flight crew when operating that type/class. Data from other types/classes may also be used. The analysis should determine and describe the knowledge and skills required to complete the various tasks specific to the aeroplane type/class and/or type of operation. In addition, the analysis should identify the appropriate behavioural markers that should be exhibited. The task analysis should be suitably validated in accordance with (b)(3). The task analysis, in conjunction with the data gathering programme(s), permits the operator to establish a programme of targeted training together with the associated training objectives. (3) Curricula. The curriculum structure and content should be determined by task analysis, and should include proficiency objectives, including when and how these objectives should be met. (i) The training programme should have the following structure:

text: (A) Curriculum, specifying the following elements: (…) (AB) Daily lesson plan (…)

text: AMC1 ORO.FTL.120(b)(1) is amended as follows:

text: AMC1 ORO.FTL.120(b)(1) Fatigue risk management (FRM)

text: COMMERCIAL AIR TRANSPORTCAT OPERATORS FRM POLICY (a) The operator’s FRM policy should identify all the elements of FRM. (b) The FRM policy should define to which operations FRM applies. (c) The FRM policy should: (1) reflect the shared responsibility of management, flight and cabin crew, and other involved personnel; (2) state the safety objectives of FRM; (3) be signed by the accountable manager; (14) be communicated, with visible endorsement, to all the relevant areas and levels of the organisation; (25) declare management commitment to effective safety reporting; (36) declare management commitment to the provision of adequate resources for FRM; (47) declare management commitment to continuous improvement of FRM; (58) require that clear lines of accountability for management, flight and cabin crew, and all other involved personnel are identified; and (69) require periodic reviews to ensure it remains relevant and appropriate.

text: AMC1 ORO.FTL.120(b)(4) is amended as follows:

text: AMC1 ORO.FTL.120(b)(4) Fatigue risk management (FRM)

text: COMMERCIAL AIR TRANSPORTCAT OPERATORS IDENTIFICATION OF HAZARDS The operator should develop and maintain three documented processes for fatigue hazard identification: (…) (c) Reactive The reactive process should identify the contribution of fatigue hazards to reports and events associated with potential negative safety consequences in order to determine how the impact of

text: fatigue could have been minimizsed. At a minimum, the process may be triggered by any of the following: (1) fatigue reports; (12) confidential reports; (23) audit reports; (34) incidents; or (45) flight data monitoring (FDM) events.

text: AMC1 ORO.FTL.120(b)(8) is amended as follows:

text: AMC1 ORO.FTL.120(b)(86) Fatigue risk management (FRM)

text: COMMERCIAL AIR TRANSPORTCAT OPERATORS FRM SAFETY ASSURANCE PROCESSES (…)

text: AMC1 ORO.FTL.120(b)(9) is amended as follows:

text: AMC1 ORO.FTL.120(b)(97) Fatigue risk management (FRM)

text: COMMERCIAL AIR TRANSPORTCAT OPERATORS FRM PROMOTION PROCESS (…)

text: In order to ensure consistent use of terminology, the following terms are replaced in the entire Annex, except when mentioned for the first time:

text: — ‘air operator certificate’ replaced by ‘AOC’; — ‘commercial air transport’ replaced by ‘CAT’.


identifier: AMC & GM to Part-ORO — Issue 2, Amendment 10

beslut: ED Decision 2017/004/R

text: Annex II to ED Decision 2017/004/R

text: Annex II to ED Decision 2017/004/R

text: ‘AMC/GM to Part-ORO — Issue 2, Amendment 10’

text: The Annex to ED Decision 2014/017/R is amended as follows: The text of the amendment is arranged to show deleted, new or amended text as shown below: (a) deleted text is struck through; (b) new or amended text is highlighted in grey; and (c) an ellipsis ‘[…]’ indicates that the remaining text is unchanged.

text: Annex II to ED Decision 2017/004/R

text: 1. GM3 ORO.GEN.130(b) is amended as follows:

text: GM3 ORO.GEN.130(b) Changes related to an AOC holder

text: CHANGES REQUIRING PRIOR APPROVAL [...] (s) commercial air transport operations with single-engined turbine aeroplanes in instrument meteorological conditions or at night (CAT SET-IMC).

text: 2. AMC1 ORO.GEN.200(b) is amended as follows:

text: AMC1 ORO.GEN.200(b) Management system

text: SIZE, NATURE AND COMPLEXITY OF THE ACTIVITY [...] (b) Operators with up to 20 FTEs involved in the activity subject to

text: Regulation (EC) No 216/2008

text: and its Implementing Rules may also be considered complex based on an assessment of the following factors: (1) in terms of complexity, the extent and scope of contracted activities subject to the approval; (2) in terms of risk criteria, the extent of the followingwhether any of the following are present: (i) operations requiring the followinga specific approvals: performance-based navigation (PBN), low-visibility operation (LVO), extended range operations with two-engined aeroplanes (ETOPS), helicopter hoist operation (HHO), helicopter emergency medical service (HEMS), night -vision imaging system (NVIS) and dangerous goods (DG); (ii) high-risk commercial specialised operations requiring an authorisation; (iii) operations with different types of aircraft used; and (iv) operations in challenging the environment (offshore, mountainous area, etc.). [...]

text: 3. AMC3 ORO.MLR.100 is amended as follows:

text: AMC3 ORO.MLR.100 Operations manual — general

text: CONTENTS — CAT OPERATIONS [...] A GENERAL/BASIC 0 ADMINISTRATION AND CONTROL OF OPERATIONS MANUAL […] 8 OPERATING PROCEDURES 8.1 Flight preparation instructions. As applicable to the operation: 8.1.1 Minimum flight altitudes. A description of the method of determination and application of minimum altitudes including:

text: Annex II to ED Decision 2017/004/R

text: [...] 8.1.13 For commercial air transport operations with single-engined turbine aeroplanes in instrument meteorological conditions or at night (CAT SET-IMC) approved in accordance with Subpart L (SET-IMC) of Annex V (Part-SPA) to

text: Regulation (EU) No 965/2012

text: : (a) the procedure for route selection with respect to the availability of surfaces, which permits a safe forced landing; (b) the instructions for the assessment of landing sites (elevation, landing direction, and obstacles in the area); and (c) the instructions for the assessment of the weather conditions at those landing sites. [...] C ROUTE/ROLE/AREA AND AERODROME/OPERATING SITE INSTRUCTIONS AND INFORMATION [...] (2) Information related to landing sites available for operations approved in accordance with Subpart L (SET-IMC) of Annex V (Part-SPA) to

text: Regulation (EU) No 965/2012

text: , including: (a) a description of the landing site (position, surface, slope, elevation, etc.); (b) the preferred landing direction; and (c) obstacles in the area. [...]