text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: See ECB Opinions

text: and

text: . All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 23 February 2010 on the introduction of a seven-day deposit facility (CON/2010/18)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 23 February 2010 on the introduction of a seven-day deposit facility (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 8 February 2010 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from Latvijas Banka for an opinion on draft amendments to the Regulation on the use of Latvijas Banka’s monetary policy instruments (hereinafter the ‘draft legislation’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and

text: Article 2(2) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft legislation relates to instruments of monetary policy in a Member State that has not adopted the euro. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft legislation

text: The main objective of the draft legislation is to amend the Regulation on the use of Latvijas Banka’s monetary policy instruments (hereinafter the ‘Regulation’), introducing a standing seven-day deposit facility.

text: 2. Observations

text: 2.1 The consulting authority has informed the ECB that the draft legislation is to be adopted by 11 March 2010. In view thereof, the consulting authority would seem to invoke the exemption provided for in

text: Article 3(2) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , which allows for a reduction of the minimum time limit for submission of the ECB’s opinion of one month in case of extreme urgency, and asks the ECB to deliver its opinion by 24 February 2010. The ECB, however, wishes to draw the consulting authority’s attention to the fact that the second sentence of

text: Article 4 of Decision 98/415/EC

text: states that the ECB must be consulted ‘at an appropriate stage’ in the legislative process. This implies that the consultation should take place at a point in the legislative

text: process that affords the ECB sufficient time to examine the draft legislative provisions and to adopt its opinion in the required language versions and which also enables the relevant national authorities to take the ECB’s opinion into consideration before the legislative provisions are adopted. 2.2 Although Member States that have not adopted the euro retain their powers in the field of monetary policy, it is nevertheless beneficial for them to gradually achieve consistency with the operational framework for the implementation of the ECB’s monetary policy so that credit institutions operating in their territories can become acquainted with the requirements that will apply once these Member States have adopted the euro. Such gradual harmonisation prior to the adoption of the euro will contribute to the smooth integration of the national central bank into the Eurosystem. In this context, the ECB draws Latvijas Banka’s attention to the fact that a seven-day deposit facility does not exist in the operational framework for the implementation of the ECB’s monetary policy, which comprises an overnight deposit facility. Thus, such a seven-day deposit facility will need to be phased out at the latest when Latvia adopts the euro. The ECB understands that such phasing out could be performed expeditiously. 2.3 The ECB previously commented on the Regulation and other regulations in the field of monetary policy instruments . In its opinions, the ECB emphasises the need to further align the Latvian minimum reserves regime with Eurosystem standards and makes the point that Latvian credit unions should also be subject to reserve requirements when Latvia adopts the euro. The ECB notes that all comments previously made on the Latvian minimum reserves regime still remain valid. 2.4 The ECB understands from the Explanatory Note to the draft legislation that the introduction of the seven-day deposit facility is aimed at facilitating liquidity management in view of the continuous rise in the liquidity surplus related to the new policy of the Latvian Treasury to exchange their funds for lats exclusively off-market at Latvijas Banka. The ECB underlines the importance of conducting these off-market transactions at prevailing market conditions so that they do not lead to any preferential treatment of the Latvian Treasury and are fully in line with Article 124 of the Treaty.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 23 February 2010. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


publisher: Europeiska centralbanken

sprak: sv

title: ECB-rådets yttrande av den 4 mars 2010 om en rekommendation från rådet rörande utnämningen av vice ordförande i Europeiska centralbanken (CON/2010/19)

serie: con

text: Inledning och rättslig grund

type: rubrik

text: Den 24 februari 2010 mottog Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) en begäran från Europeiska rådets ordförande om ett yttrande över ett förslag till rådets rekommendation rörande utnämningen av vice ordförande i Europeiska centralbanken.

type: stycke

text: ECB-rådets behörighet att avge ett yttrande grundar sig på

text: artikel 283.2 i fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt

text: Allmänna kommentarer

text: 1. I rådets rekommendation, som överlämnats till Europeiska rådet och som Europaparlamentet och ECB-rådet nu ska yttra sig om, föreslås att Vítor CONSTÂNCIO utnämns till vice ordförande i ECB för en tid av åtta år från och med den 1 juni 2010.

text: 2. ECB-rådet anser att den förslagna kandidaten är en person som besitter den allmänt erkända auktoritet och yrkeserfarenhet inom den finansiella sektorn som krävs enligt artikel 283.2 i fördraget.

text: 3. ECB-rådet har ingen invändning mot rådets rekommendation att utnämna Vítor CONSTÂNCIO till vice ordförande i ECB.

type: vagledning

utgivare: ecb


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: See the ECB’s Convergence Report of December 2006, p. 213, and that of May 2008 p. 235.

sprak: en

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 5 March 2010 on amendments to the Law on and Statute of Eesti Pank (CON/2010/20)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 5 March 2010 on amendments to the Law on and Statute of Eesti Pank (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 10 February 2010 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from Eesti Pank for an opinion on a draft decision of Eesti Pank’s Supervisory Board to amend Eesti Pank’s Statute and on 18 February 2010 a request for an opinion on a draft law amending the Law on Eesti Pank (hereinafter the ‘draft provisions’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the third indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft provisions relate to the national central bank. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft provisions

text: The draft provisions replace references to the Treaty establishing the European Community with references to the TFEU and include additional references to the TFEU and Union legal acts in articles on the competence and meetings of the Supervisory Board. The draft provisions also set Eesti Pank’s capital in euro. The provision on a standing Monetary Policy Committee in Eesti Pank’s Statute is repealed, as is the provision on the monetary financing prohibition in the Law on Eesti Pank. The draft provisions will enter into force on the date of abrogation of Estonia’s derogation pursuant to

text: Article 140(2)

text: TFEU, except some minor consistency corrections concerning the Statute which will enter into force upon the adoption of the Supervisory Board’s decision.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 The draft provisions are in line with the ECB recommendations for improving the clarity of legislative provisions made in previous convergence reports . This opinion is without prejudice to the assessment of Estonian legislation in the upcoming convergence report. 2.2 The ECB notes that the draft provisions repeal Article 16 of the Law on Eesti Pank transposing the monetary financing prohibition contained in

text: Article 123

text: TFEU.

text: Article 16

text: lays down that Eesti Pank is prohibited from granting loans to the public sector. However,

text: Article 16

text: is not fully in line with

text: Article 123

text: TFEU for two reasons. First, it does not extend the prohibition on monetary financing to direct purchases by Eesti Pank of debt instruments from public sector entities. Second, it does not exempt publicly-owned credit institutions from the prohibition in the context of supply of reserves by national central banks. Provisions containing such imperfections should either be amended or repealed, especially as

text: Article 123

text: TFEU is directly applicable and there is, therefore, generally, no reason to transpose it into national legislation. The ECB therefore welcomes the draft provisions in this respect. 2.3 The ECB also notes that after the repeal of the articles on the Monetary Policy Committee by the draft provisions and other changes, the scope of Eesti Pank’s Statute is now largely limited to repeating the provisions of the Law on Eesti Pank.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 5 March 2010.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 2 Law on the Dematerialised Securities System, the capital market, tax issues and other matters, FEK A53/31.3.2009. 3 Law on the enhancement of liquidity of the economy in response to the impact of the international financial crisis, FEK A 250/9.12.2008. 4 Law on measures to enhance the capital market, FEK A 173.

text: According to the current text, such preference shares must be repurchased by the bank at the issue price after five years or, optionally, earlier and in any case after 1 July 2009, following approval by the Bank of Greece. 6 Under

text: Article 1(3)

text: , the preference shares carry the right to a fixed rate of return of 10% upon the contributed capital. 7 Opinion of the European Central Bank of 27 November 2008 at the request of the Greek Ministry of Economy and Finance on a draft law on enhancing liquidity of the economy to address the impact of the international financial crisis and on a draft decision on its implementation. All ECB opinions are available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 8 See the press release of the 2894th Ecofin Council meeting (13784/08), available on the Council’s website at www.consilium.europa.eu. 9 The Declaration is available on the former French Presidency’s website at www.ue2008.fr.

text: The recommendations were adopted in 2008 and are available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 8 March 2010 on amendments to the legal framework on the enhancement of liquidity of the economy in response to the impact of the international financial crisis (CON/2010/21)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 8 March 2010 on amendments to the legal framework on the enhancement of liquidity of the economy in response to the impact of the international financial crisis (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 8 February 2010 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Greek Ministry of Finance for an opinion on two sets of draft legislative provisions in relation to the Law on the enhancement of liquidity of the economy in response to the impact of the international financial crisis (hereinafter the ‘draft provisions’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third and sixth indents of

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft provisions relate to a national central bank and to rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft provisions

text: 1.1 The purpose of the first set of draft provisions is to extend to the fiscal year 2009 the restriction imposed by Article 28 of Law 3756/2009 in relation to dividend distribution by banks participating in the liquidity enhancement scheme (hereinafter the ‘scheme’) under Article 1 of Law 3723/2008 . More specifically, under Article 1(3) of Law 3723/2008, the distribution of dividends to shareholders during the period of participation in the scheme may not exceed 35%, which is the minimum percentage provided for in Article 3(1) of Law 148/1967 . Article 28 of Law 3756/2009 further stipulates that the distribution of dividends under Article 1(3) of Law 3723/2008 for the fiscal year 2008 is to be restricted to shares only; this restriction is now being extended to dividend distribution for the fiscal year 2009.

text: 1.2 The second set of draft provisions aims at introducing arrangements in relation to the repurchase of preference shares acquired by the Greek State under the same Article 1 of Law 3723/2008, in order for the banks participating in the scheme to exit, when the market and financial circumstances so allow, the recapitalisation part of the scheme. In particular, according to the second set of draft provisions, which replaces

text: Article 1(1)

text: second subparagraph of Law 3723/2008 , the preference shares are to be repurchased by the bank at the issue price, five years after their acquisition or earlier, following approval by the Bank of Greece. After the expiry of the five-year period, if the General Assembly of the bank has not decided to repurchase the shares, a cumulative increase in the price of 2% per year will be imposed in addition to the annual fixed rate of return that is due to the Greek State under Article 1(3) of Law 3723/2008 , by a decision of the Minister of Finance, following a recommendation of the Bank of Greece.

text: 2. General observations

text: In its Opinion

text: the ECB expressed its views on the arrangements introduced by Law 3723/2008 to address the impact of the international financial crisis. The ECB’s observations made on that occasion also apply, where relevant, to the changes proposed by the draft provisions. The ECB notes that both sets of draft provisions are broadly in line with the conclusions adopted at the Ecofin Council meeting of 7 October 2008, which highlighted common principles to guide the action of Member States , and with the ‘Declaration on a concerted European action plan of the euro area countries’ issued on 12 October 2008 by the Heads of State of the euro area , confirming their commitment to act together in a decisive and comprehensive way to restore confidence in and the proper functioning of the financial system, with the aim of restoring appropriate and efficient financing conditions for the economy.

text: 3. Specific observations

text: The ECB understands, as stated above, that the first set of draft provisions extends the restriction imposed by Article 28 of Law 3756/2009 to dividend distribution for the fiscal year 2009. Moreover, it understands that the second set of draft provisions removes the current obligation for banks participating in the scheme to repurchase the preference shares within five years of their acquisition. At the same time, the second set of draft provisions introduces an incentive for banks to exit the recapitalisation scheme after the expiry of the five-year period by imposing the cumulative

text: increase described above. In this regard the ECB notes that the second set of draft provisions is in line with the recommendations of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank on the pricing of recapitalisations according to which terms should be set for the redemption of the instruments used for recapitalisations, either on the basis of a period of time or evolution of market conditions, so as to retain the temporary nature of the State’s involvement and discourage financial institutions from maintaining such involvement for an extensive period of time .

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 8 March 2010.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: A special drawing right (SDR) is an international reserve asset, created by the IMF in 1969 to supplement its member countries’ official reserves. Its value is based on a basket of four key international currencies, and SDRs can be exchanged for freely usable currencies.

text: All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 12 March 2010 on Austria’s contribution to the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust of the IMF (CON/2010/22)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 12 March 2010 on Austria’s contribution to the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust of the IMF (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 9 February 2010, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Austrian Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft Federal law on Austria’s participation in financing International Monetary Fund loans to the poorest developing countries (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the third indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to the Oesterreichische Nationalbank (OeNB). In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 On 23 July 2009, the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved wideranging modifications to upgrade its concessional financial facilities for low-income countries. The decision adopted by the IMF’s Executive Board establishes a Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT), replacing and expanding the former Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility-Exogenous Shocks Facility. The PRGT includes new financially improved credit lines that are considered to be more adapted to low-income countries’ needs. According to the explanatory memorandum to the draft law, a total of SDR 400 million as additional bilateral contributions is needed. Given the Austrian share of the total quota of donor countries, the Austrian contribution to the IMF’s subsidy accounts is SDR 3.9 million (approximately EUR 4.4 million). 1.2 The draft law authorises the OeNB to contribute, on behalf of Austria, SDR 3.9 million, in the reform of IMF loans to the poorest developing countries (i.e. low-income countries). The OeNB will provide funds that will help replenish the IMF’s subsidy accounts. From a legal and economic point of view, the OeNB’s contribution is regarded as a donation. Thus, the OeNB has no repayment claims vis-à-vis the IMF or third parties. The explanatory memorandum to the draft law

text: states that the contribution to the IMF’s subsidy accounts will reduce the OeNB’s revenue and consequently, the OeNB’s transfer of profit to the Ministry of Finance will be reduced correspondingly.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 A national central bank’s (NCB’s) involvement in financing the IMF’s initiative is in principle government expenditure on development aid. The NCB effects this by making a direct transfer of funds to the IMF in lieu of to the government. In the present case, the explanatory memorandum to the draft law states that the contribution provided for by the draft law in respect of the poorest developing countries would increase the level of Austria’s development aid. 2.2 In view of the OeNB’s involvement in this development assistance, it is necessary to assess whether the draft law complies with the prohibition of monetary financing under

text: Articles 123

text: TFEU whereby overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facility with the NCBs in favour of central governments are prohibited. This prohibition is subject to certain exemptions contained in

text: Article 123(2)

text: TFEU and in

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 of 13 December 1993

text: specifying definitions for the application of the prohibitions referred to in Articles

text: and

text: b(1) of the Treaty [now Articles

text: and

text: TFEU] . In particular,

text: Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 3603/93

text: provides that the financing by NCBs of obligations falling upon the public sector vis-àvis the IMF is not regarded as a credit facility within the meaning of

text: Article 123

text: TFEU. The draft law is similar to that addressed in Opinion

text: , where the ECB considered that the OeNB’s financing of an Austrian contribution to the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries initiative fell within the exemption of

text: Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 3603/93

text: . Similarly, the OeNB’s PRGT financing under the draft law should also be considered as falling under the exemption of

text: Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 3603/93

text: and therefore should not be regarded as a form of monetary financing prohibited by the TFEU.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 12 March 2010.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: COM(2009) 576 slutlig.

text: ECB:s yttrande

text: av den 26 oktober 2009 över ett förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning om makroprudentiell tillsyn över det finansiella systemet på gemenskapsnivå och om inrättande av ett Europeiskt systemriskråd samt ett förslag till rådets beslut om att ge Europeiska centralbanken särskilda uppgifter för Europeiska systemriskrådets verksamhet (EUT C 270, 11.11.2009, s. 1). Alla ECB:s yttranden finns på ECB:s webbplats http://www.ecb.europa.eu

text: ECB:s yttrande

text: av den 8 januari 2010 över tre förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets förslag till förordningar om inrättande av en europeisk bankmyndighet, en europeisk försäkrings- och tjänstepensionsmyndighet och en europeisk värdepappers- och marknadsmyndighet (EUT C 13, 20.1.2010, s. 1).

text: Den 23 september 2009 antog Europeiska kommissionens ett lagstiftningspaket bestående av följande: 1) ett förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning om makroprudentiell tillsyn över det finansiella systemet på gemenskapsnivå och om inrättande av ett Europeiskt systemriskråd [COM(2009) 499 slutlig] (nedan kallat förslaget till ESRB-förordning), 2) ett förslag till rådets beslut om att ge Europeiska centralbanken särskilda uppgifter för Europeiska systemriskrådets verksamhet [COM(2009) 500 slutlig], 3) ett förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning om inrättande av en europeisk bankmyndighet (COM(2009) 501 slutlig) (nedan kallat förslaget till EBA-förordning), 4) ett förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning om inrättande av en europeisk försäkrings och tjänstepensionsmyndighet [COM(2009) 502 slutlig, samt 5)] ett förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning om inrättande av en europeisk värdepappers- och marknadsmyndighet [COM(2009) 503 slutlig]. Efter ikraftträdandet av fördraget den 1 december 2009 är artikel 127.6 i fördraget (f.d. artikel 105.6 i fördraget om upprättandet av Europeiska gemenskapen ) ny rättslig grund för förslaget till ESRB-beslutet, vilket innebär att förslaget till ESRB-beslut nu kommer att omvandlas till ett förslag till förordning.

text: Se artikel 7 i förslagen till ESA-förordningar.

text: Se artikel 7.2 i förslagen till ESA-förordningar.

text: Skäl 9 i direktivförslaget.

text: Se t.ex. skäl 14 i förslaget till EBA-förordning.

text: Mål C-11/00

text: , Europeiska gemenskapernas kommission mot Europeiska centralbanken, REG 2003, s. I-7147, särskilt punkterna 110 och 111.

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 2003/71/EG av den 4 november 2003

text: om de prospekt som ska offentliggöras när värdepapper erbjuds till allmänheten eller tas upp till handel och om ändring av direktiv

text: (EUT L 345, 31.12.2003, s. 64).

text: Enligt direktivförslaget ska ESMA på sin webbplats offentliggöra förteckningen över godkända prospekt och, i tillämpliga fall, även länkar till prospekt som offentliggjorts på webbplatsen för den behöriga myndigheten i hemmedlemsstaten, på emittentens webbplats eller på webbplatsen för den reglerade marknaden (artikel 5.3 i direktivförslaget genom vilken en ny

text: artikel 14.4 a

text: införs i direktiv

text: ). Den allmänna riktlinje som överenskommits i rådet för andra ändringar av direktiv

text: innebär att prospekt ska publiceras i elektronisk form (se artikel 1.13 b i den allmänna riktlinjen till kommissionens förslag om Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv om ändring av direktiv

text: och direktiv

text: [2009/0132 (COD), 17451/09]. Enligt

text: artikel 14.2 andra stycket i direktiv 2003/71/EG

text: är det för närvarande medlemsstaterna själva som bestämmer huruvida en emittent måste offentliggöra ett prospekt i elektronisk form.

text: ECB:s yttrande

text: av den 11 januari 2010 över ett förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv om ändring av direktiv

text: och

text: , punkt 1.2.

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 2006/48/EG av den 14 juni 2006

text: om rätten att starta och driva verksamhet i kreditinstitut (omarbetning) (EUT L 177, 30.6.2006, s. 1).

text: Vad gäller direktiv

text: , se artiklarna 9.10, 9.11, 9.12, 9.25 och 9.27 i direktivförslaget.

text: Se t.ex. artikel 9.12 i direktivförslaget om ändring av

text: artikel 49 i direktiv 2006/48/EG

text: Såsom avses i

text: artikel 129

text: artikel 130.1

text: och

text: artikel 131 a i direktiv 2006/48/EG

text: Artikel 131 a

text: 1a) i direktiv

text: Enligt kapitel 1, avsnitt 2 i direktiv

text: Artikel 131 a

text: 1 tredje stycket i direktiv

text: Inklusive de kollegier som inrättats enligt

text: artikel 42

text: a.3 i direktiv

text: Att ge ESRB tillgång till information som finns tillgänglig inom kollegierna skulle vara i linje med synpunkterna i rapporten från de Larosières högnivågrupp om den finansiella tillsynen i EU från 25 februari 2009, punkterna 180 och 186, s. 45 och s. 47, kommissionens meddelande om den finansiella tillsynen i Europa [COM(2009) 252 slutlig, s. 15] samt Ekofinrådets slutsatser av den 9 juni 2009, s. 13 som stöder ESRB:s tillgång till denna information.

text: Direktivförslaget antogs innan fördraget trädde i kraft. Fördragscitat i kommissionens ändringsförslag kommer att behöva anpassas.

text: Text markerad med fet stil anger ECB:s förslag till ny text. Genomstruken text anger de strykningar som ECB föreslår.

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 98/26/EG av den 19 maj 1998

text: om slutgiltig avveckling i system för överföring av betalningar och värdepapper (EGT L 166, 11.6.1998, s. 45).

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 2002/87/EG av den 16 december 2002

text: om extra tillsyn över kreditinstitut, försäkringsföretag och värdepappersföretag i ett finansiellt konglomerat och om ändring av

text: rådets direktiv 73/239/EEG

text: och

text: samt

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 98/78/EG

text: och

text: (EGT L 35, 11.2.2003, s. 1).

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 2003/41/EG av den 3 juni 2003

text: om verksamhet i och tillsyn över tjänstepensionsinstitut (EUT L 235, 23.9.2003, s. 10).

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 2004/39/EG av den 21 april 2004

text: om marknader för finansiella instrument och om ändring av

text: rådets direktiv 85/611/EEG

text: och

text: och

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 2000/12/EG

text: samt upphävande av

text: rådets direktiv 93/22/EEG

text: (EUT L 145, 30.4.2004, s. 1).

title: Europeiska centralbankens yttrande av den 18 mars 2010 över ett förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv om ändring av direktiv 1998/26/EG, 2002/87/EG, 2003/6/EG, 2003/41/EG, 2003/71/EG, 2004/39/EG, 2004/109/EG, 2005/60/EG, 2006/48/EG, 2006/49/EG och 2009/65/EG med avseende på befogenheterna för Europeiska bankmyndigheten, Europeiska försäkrings- och tjänstepensionsmyndigheten och Europeiska värdepappers- och marknadsmyndigheten (CON/2010/23)

text: Inledning och rättslig grund

text: Den 25 november 2009 mottog Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) en begäran från Europeiska unionens råd om ett yttrande över ett förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv om ändring av direktiv

text: och

text: med avseende på befogenheterna för Europeiska bankmyndigheten, Europeiska försäkrings- och tjänstepensionsmyndigheten och Europeiska värdepappers- och marknadsmyndigheten (nedan kallat direktivförslaget).

text: ECB:s behörighet att avge ett yttrande grundas på artiklarna

text: och

text: i fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt eftersom direktivförslaget innehåller bestämmelser som berör Europeiska centralbankssystemets (ECBS) medverkan till ett smidigt genomförande av riktlinjerna för tillsynen över kreditinstitut och det finansiella systemets stabilitet i enlighet med artikel 127.5 i fördraget.

text: Kommentarerna i detta yttrande måste läsas tillsammans med ECB:s yttranden

text: och

text: som antagits inom ramen för den pågående reformen av den europeiska finansiella tillsynsverksamheten.

text: I enlighet med

text: artikel 17.5

text: första meningen i arbetsordningen för Europeiska centralbanken har detta yttrande antagits av ECB-rådet.

text: 1. Allmänna kommentarer

text: ECB stöder direktivförslagets mål, som innebär att ändringar företas i elva finansmarknadsdirektiv som är nödvändiga för att de europeiska tillsynsmyndigheterna och Europeiskt systemriskrådet (ESRB) ska fungera på ett smidigt sätt.

text: Kommentarerna och ändringsförslagen i detta yttrande rör främst de aspekter som är av direkt betydelse för ECB/ECBS och ESRB samt deras samarbete med de europeiska tillsynsmyndigheterna och behöriga nationella myndigheter. För att dessa ska kunna utföra sina respektive uppgifter är det särskilt viktigt att man undanröjer alla rättsliga hinder för informationsutbyte mellan ECB/ECBS, ESRB, de tre europeiska tillsynsmyndigheterna samt de nationella tillsynsmyndigheterna.

text: 1.3 Antagandet av tekniska standarder

text: De föreslagna förordningarna genom vilka de europeiska tillsynsmyndigheterna inrättas (nedan kallade förslagen till ESA-förordningar) föreskriver ett enhetligt förfarande för att anta tekniska standarder. Utkast till tekniska standarder ska tas fram av varje europeisk tillsynsmyndighet i form av förordningar eller beslut och därefter godkännas av kommissionen. Direktivförslaget innehåller flera förslag på ändringar av gällande sektorlagstiftning och anger de områden inom vilka tekniska standarder bör tas fram. Såsom framgår av ECB:s yttrande

text: stöder ECB fullt ut införandet av en enda europeisk regelbok som gäller för alla finansinstitut på den inre marknaden och därmed behovet av ett effektivt instrument som fastställer bindande harmoniserade tekniska standarder för finansiella tjänster.

text: Vad gäller kommissionens genomförandebefogenheter så skiljer fördraget på delegerade akter (artikel 290 i fördraget) och genomförandeakter (artikel 291 i fördraget) Förordningar och beslut som kommissionen antar för att införa tekniska standarder kommer att falla inom en av dessa två kategorier. Inom ramen för EU:s lagstiftning på området finansiella tjänster bör de institutioner som deltar i lagstiftningsprocessen komma överens om en lämplig metod för att införliva de rättsakter där kommissionen godkänner sådana förslag till tekniska standarder i det vidare regelverket inom vilket delegerade befogenheter och genomförandebefogenheter används enligt fördraget.

text: I den mån som ett förslag till tekniska standarder är ett utkast till unionsakt enligt

text: artikel 127.4

text: första strecksatsen och artikel 282.5 i fördraget, samt faller inom ECB:s behörighetsområde, bör ECB höras om alla sådana förslag till delegerad akt eller genomförandeakt genom vilka ett förslag till tekniska standarder godkänns. I OLAF-domen har domstolen förtydligat att skyldigheten att höra ECB om förslag till unionsrättsakter huvudsakligen [har] till syfte att säkerställa att den som upprättar en sådan rättsakt avvaktar med att anta denna till dess det organ hörts som, genom de specifika uppgifter som det har på det aktuella området enligt gemenskapsrätten och med sin stora sakkunskap, särskilt kan bidra till det planerade lagstiftningsförfarandet. Mot bakgrund av att tekniska standarder i framtiden kommer att fylla en mycket viktig funktion för unionens finansrättsliga lagstiftning vill ECB utöva sin rådgivande roll i enlighet med ovannämnda principer.

text: 2. Specifika kommentarer

text: 2.1 Direktiv

text: Genom att den Europeiska värdepappers- och marknadsmyndigheten (ESMA) offentliggör alla prospekt i elektronisk form och dessa finns tillgängliga antingen på ESMA:s hemsida eller genom en länk till den relevanta webbplatsen ökar tydligheten. I detta hänseende är ECB mycket positiv till målsättningen att förbättra tillgängligheten till, och öka jämförbarheten mellan, vissa uppgifter i prospekten, främst genom att skapa en standard för referensuppgifter om värdepapper och emittenter i syfte att göra dessa uppgifter tillgängliga för beslutsfattare, lagstiftare och finansiella marknader genom en internationell offentlig infrastruktur. Eftersom prospekt innehåller nyckelinformation som kan vara viktig för att analysera systemrisker, för företagens riskhantering samt för sammanställningen av värdepappersstatistik bör sådan information vara lättillgänglig. ECB är beredd att samarbeta med ESMA inom detta område genom att bidra till utformningen och skapandet av ett elektroniskt arkiv samt tillhörande rutiner.

text: 2.2 Direktiv

text: Flera av direktivförslagets ändringar av sektoriella direktiv syftar till att förbättra informationsflödet mellan berörda myndigheter på nationell nivå och EU-nivå. ECB välkomnar de föreslagna ändringarna, främst de som införs för att beakta inrättandet av ESRB. Därutöver föreslår ECB två ändringar.

text: Direktivförslaget förtydligar att behöriga myndigheter får utbyta information med Europeiska bankmyndigheten (EBA). ECB rekommenderar att man ändrar en bestämmelse i direktiv

text: för att undanröja eventuella rättsliga hinder mot ett informationsutbyte mellan EBA och ESRB. Genom en sådan ändring skulle man förtydliga att EBA, i enlighet med direktiv

text: och relevanta bestämmelser i förslaget till EBA-förordning, får översända all information som erhållits från nationella myndigheter till ESRB som behövs för att ESRB:s uppgifter ska kunna utföras, utan att det påverkar tillämpningen av andra tillämpliga europeiska regler, särskilt artikel 15.4 i förslaget till ESRB-förordning.

text: Direktiv

text: ger tillsynskollegier rätten att utföra vissa uppgifter (vilket bl.a. omfattar reglerna för informationsutbyte, och i detta sammanhang bör de tillämpliga sekretessreglerna inte förhindra att behöriga myndigheter utbyter information inom tillsynskollegierna. Mot bakgrund av att den information som är tillgänglig inom tillsynskollegierna kan vara mycket viktig, rekommenderar ECB att man uttryckligen anger att de europeiska tillsynsmyndigheterna får utbyta sekretessbelagd information som rör tillsynskollegiernas verksamhet med ESRB, om denna information är relevant för utförandet av dess uppgifter och överlämnas efter en motiverad förfrågan från ESRB. Detta förtydligande bör tas in antingen i artikel 12 i förslagen till ESA-förordningar om tillsynskollegier eller i bestämmelserna om informationsutbyte i sektordirektiven som reglerar tillsynskollegier.

text: 3. Ändringsförslag

text: I de fall där ECB rekommenderar att direktivförslaget ändras anges de specifika förslagen i bilagan tillsammans med en förklaring.

text: BILAGA

text: Kommissionens förslag | ECB:s ändringsförslag

text: (15) Med den nya tillsynsstruktur som införs genom ESFS kommer det att krävas att de nationella tillsynsmyndigheterna samarbetar nära med de europeiska tillsynsmyndigheterna. Ändringar i den tillämpliga lagstiftningen ska säkerställa att det inte finns några rättsliga hinder för de skyldigheter om informationsutbyte som har införts i kommissionens förslag till förordningar om inrättandet av de europeiska tillsynsmyndigheterna. | (15) Med Den nya tillsynsstruktur som införs genom inrättandet av ESFS och ESRB kommer det att krävas att de nationella tillsynsmyndigheterna och de europeiska tillsynsmyndigheterna samarbetar nära med varandra och ESRBde europeiska tillsynsmyndigheterna. Ändringar i den tillämpliga lagstiftningen ska säkerställa att det inte finns några rättsliga hinder för de skyldigheter om informationsutbyte som har införts i kommissionens förslag till förordningar om inrättandet av de europeiska tillsynsmyndigheterna och ESRB.

text: Förklaring: Sektoriell lagstiftning behöver ändras för att beakta inrättandet av de europeiska tillsynsmyndigheterna och ESRB. I skäl 5 i direktivförslaget skulle man också kunna hänvisa till de två förslag som kommissionen antagit rörande ESRB som en del av lagstiftningspaketet om europeisk finansiell tillsynsverksamhet.

text: 3. Den medlemsstat som avses i punkt 2 ska omedelbart underrätta övriga medlemsstater och Europeiska värdepappers- och marknadsmyndigheten, inrättad genom Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning …/…, om detta och förmedla all information som är avgörande till denna myndighet för att den ska kunna fullgöra sina uppgifter. | 3. Den medlemsstat som avses i punkt 2 ska omedelbart underrätta övriga medlemsstater, kommissionen, Europeiska centralbanken, centralbankerna i medlemsstaterna och Europeiska värdepappers- och marknadsmyndigheten, inrättad genom Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning …/…, om beslut som fattats i enlighet med punkt 1. detta och förmedla all information som är avgörande till denna myndighet för att den ska kunna fullgöra sina uppgifter. Så snart kommissionen erhållit sådan information ska den omedelbart informerad alla designerade system och systemoperatörer om beslut som fattats i enlighet med punkt 1.

text: Förklaring: Den föreslagna ändringen av

text: artikel 6.3 i direktiv 98/26/EG

text: är en högst avsevärd förbättring vad gäller konsekvenserna av att ett insolvensförfarande inleds vad gäller överföringsuppdrags oåterkallelighet och slutgiltighet. Dessa konsekvenser är dock viktiga för alla som utöver tillsyn över betalnings-, clearing- och avvecklingssystem samt annan kritisk infrastruktur. Därför bör förteckningen över mottagare som ska meddelas om sådana förfaranden utökas, så att den inte bara omfattar kommissionen och ESMA utan även de nationella centralbankerna och ECB, tillsammans ECBS, eftersom dessa är behöriga inom området tillsyn över betalnings-, clearing- och avvecklingssystem. Därutöver är det viktigt att kommissionen omedelbart vidarebefordrar meddelanden om att ett insolvensförfarande har inletts till sådana berörda enheter som omfattas av direktiv

text: , för att på så sätt säkerställa att inga överföringsuppdrag verkställs av sådana enheter där dessa är eller borde ha varit medvetna om att ett insolvensförfarande inletts. Slutligen bör hänvisningen i direktivförslaget till medlemsstaternas skyldighet att tillhandahålla all nödvändig information till ESMA strykas, eftersom kommissionen föreslås sköta informationsspridningen. Dessutom kan medlemsstaterna endast tillhandahålla information om de beslut som avses i artikel 6 i direktiv 98/26/EC och inte all information nödvändig för ESMA:s uppgifter. Dessutom görs en mindre redaktionell ändring av

text: artikel 6.3

text: första meningen för att förtydliga den exakta omfattningen av informationsskyldigheten.

text: Medlemsstaterna ska ange vilka system, och vilka respektive systemoperatörer, som kommer att innefattas i detta direktivs räckvidd och anmäla dem till Europeiska värdepappers- och marknadsmyndigheten och underrätta den om vilka myndigheter de har utsett enligt

text: artikel 6.2

text: . Europeiska värdepappers- och marknadsmyndigheten ska offentliggöra dessa uppgifter på sin webbplats. | Medlemsstaterna ska ange vilka system, och vilka respektive systemoperatörer, som kommer att innefattas i detta direktivs räckvidd och anmäla dem till Europeiska värdepappers- och marknadsmyndigheten kommissionen och underrätta den om vilka myndigheter de har utsett enligt

text: artikel 6.2

text: . Kommissionen Europeiska värdepappers- och marknadsmyndigheten ska offentliggöra dessa uppgifter på sin webbplats.

text: Förklaring: Kommissionen har upprättat en förteckning över system som informeras efter antagandet av direktiv 98/26/EC och denna praxis är väl inarbetad. Med beaktande av ECBS grundläggande uppgift att främja väl fungerande betalningssystem och ECB:s/ den nationella centralbankernas tillsyn över betalnings-, clearing- och avvecklingssystem anser ECB att kommissionen även fortsättningsvis bör utföra denna uppgift.

text: När det är nödvändigt för utförandet av deras respektive uppgifter, kan de behöriga myndigheterna också utbyta uppgifter om reglerade enheter i ett finansiellt konglomerat med följande myndigheter i enlighet med bestämmelserna i särreglerna: centralbanker, Europeiska centralbankssystemet och Europeiska centralbanken. (Ingen ändring i direktivförslaget) | När det är nödvändigt för utförandet av deras respektive uppgifter, kan de behöriga myndigheterna också utbyta uppgifter om reglerade enheter i ett finansiellt konglomerat med följande myndigheter centralbanker, (inkl. ECB och de nationella centralbanker i Europeiska centralbankssystemet), europeiska tillsynsmyndigheter samt Europeiskt systemriskrådet i enlighet med bestämmelserna i särreglerna: centralbanker, Europeiska centralbankssystemet och Europeiska centralbanken.

text: Förklaring: Hinder mot informationsutbyte mellan behöriga myndigheter och centralbankerna, ESA och ESRB inom ramen för direktiv

text: bör undanröjas.

text: Ingen text. |

text: Artikel 20

text: a Sekretess och samarbete mellan myndigheter 1. Sekretess ska gälla för alla personer som arbetar eller har arbetat för en behörig myndighet. Information som omfattas av sekretess får överlämnas till andra personer eller myndigheter endast när detta föreskrivs i lag. 2. Medlemsstaternas behöriga myndigheter ska samarbeta med varandra när så krävs för att de ska kunna utföra sina uppgifter och utöva sina befogenheter. De behöriga myndigheterna ska bistå behöriga myndigheter i övriga medlemsstater. 3. Punkt 1 ska inte hindra de behöriga myndigheterna från att utbyta konfidentiell information eller från att överföra konfidentiell information till Europeiska försäkrings och tjänstepensionsmyndighet (EIOPA) eller Europeiskt systemriskrådet (ESRB). Den information som utväxlas mellan behöriga myndigheter och EIOPA eller ESRB ska omfattas av sekretesskyldigheten.

text: Förklaring: Bestämmelsen om sekretess och samarbete mellan behöriga myndigheter återfinns normalt i direktiven som berör finanssektorn och bör även inkluderas i direktiv

text: . Utbyte av konfidentiell information mellan behöriga myndigheter och EIOPA och ESRB kan bli nödvändig för att utföra respektive uppgifter och rättsliga hinder mot ett sådant informationsutbyte bör undanröjas.

text: 5. Den här artikeln samt artiklarna

text: och

text: ska inte hindra en behörig myndighet att till Europeiska värdepappers- och marknadsmyndigheten, Europeiska systemrisknämnden, inrättat genom Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning …/…, centralbankerna, Europeiska centralbankssystemet och Europeiska centralbanken i deras egenskap av monetära myndigheter och, där så är lämpligt, till andra offentliga myndigheter med ansvar för att övervaka betalnings- och avvecklingssystem överlämna konfidentiell information som ska användas för att de ska kunna fullgöra sina uppgifter; dessa myndigheter eller organ ska inte heller hindras från att meddela de behöriga myndigheterna de uppgifter dessa eventuellt behöver för att utföra sina uppgifter enligt detta direktiv. | 5. Den här artikeln samt artiklarna

text: och

text: ska inte hindra en behörig myndighet att till Europeiska värdepappers- och marknadsmyndigheten, Europeiska systemrisknämnden, inrättat genom Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning …/…, och till centralbankerna, inklusive de nationella centralbankerna i Europeiska centralbankssystemet och Europeiska centralbanken i deras egenskap av monetära myndigheter och, där så är lämpligt, till andra offentliga myndigheter med ansvar för att övervaka betalnings- och avvecklingssystem överlämna konfidentiell information som om denna information ska användas för att de ska kunna fullgöra sina uppgifter inklusive bedrivandet av monetär politik och tillhandahållande av likviditet i anslutning till detta, tillsyn av betalnings-, clearing- och avvecklingssystem och säkerställande av det finansiella systemets stabilitet; dessa myndigheter eller organ ska inte heller hindras från att meddela de behöriga myndigheterna de uppgifter dessa eventuellt behöver för att utföra sina uppgifter enligt detta direktiv.

text: Förklaring: Den föreslagna ändringen ska säkerställa att formuleringen överensstämmer med motsvarande bestämmelser i andra sektoriella direktiv, särskilt direktiv

text: 2. Vad som sägs i punkt 1 ska inte hindra medlemsstaternas behöriga myndigheter från att utbyta eller förmedla information till Europeiska bankmyndigheten i enlighet med såväl detta direktiv som andra direktiv som gäller för kreditinstitut. För sådan information ska tystnadsplikt gälla enligt punkt 1. | 2. Vad som sägs i punkt 1 ska inte hindra medlemsstaternas behöriga myndigheter från att utbyta eller förmedla information till Europeiska bankmyndigheten i enlighet med såväl detta direktiv, som andra direktiv som gäller för kreditinstitut samt artiklarna [12], 20 och 21 i förordning …/… [EBA]. För sådan information ska tystnadsplikt gälla enligt punkt 1.

text: Förklaring:

text: Artikel 44.2 i direktiv 2006/48/EG

text: i dess lydelse enligt direktivförslaget förtydligar redan att de behöriga myndigheterna får utbyta information med EBA. Detta förtydligande motsvarar den föreslagna ändringen av

text: artikel 49 i direktiv 2006/48/EG

text: enligt vilken en behörig myndighet får lämna ut information till ESRB, särskilt i sådana fall som avses i

text: artikel 130.1 i direktiv 2006/48/EG

text: . Den föreslagna ändringen innebär att man i

text: artikel 44.2 i direktiv 2006/48/EG

text: lägger till en uttrycklig hänvisning till artiklarna 20 och 21 i förslaget till EBA-förordning. Artikel 20 i förordning …/… [EBA] avser EBA:s insamling av information från behöriga myndigheter. Enligt artikel 21 i samma förordning ska EBA samarbeta med ESRB och ge ESRB regelbunden och aktuell information utförandet av dess uppgifter, se artikel 15 i förordning …/… [ESRB]. Om den ändrade artikeln 44.2 i direktiv

text: läses tillsammans med dessa två artiklar i förslaget till EBA-förordning och förslaget till ESRB-förordning blir det tydligt att EBA är behörig att översända all information som erhållits från behöriga myndigheter till ESRB som behövs för att ESRB:s uppgifter ska kunna utföras. Om artikel 12 i förordning …/… [EBA] avseende tillsynskollegier skulle ändras såsom förslås i punkt 2.2.3 i detta yttrande, bör denna artikel även uttryckligen nämnas i

text: artikel 44.2 i direktiv 2006/48/EG

text: för att klargöra att EBA får informera ESRB om information som erhållits från tillsynskollegierna.


text: OJ L 269, 14.10.2009, p. 1. This applies, e.g., in the field of macro-prudential statistics and the structural developments in the financial markets. 3 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Community macro prudential oversight of the financial system and establishing a European Systemic Risk Board (COM(2009) 499 final).

text: §3(3) of the Law on Statistics Denmark (Consolidated Act No 599 of 22 June 2000) delegates the collection of statistics in the financial field, together with the right to impose sanctions for non-compliance, as follows: ‘In agreement with Danmarks Nationalbank, the Board may delegate to Danmarks Nationalbank the collection, compilation and distribution of statistics within the field of finance. The Board can likewise instruct financial undertakings to submit to Danmarks Nationalbank, at its request, the information referred to in § 8(1) No 3’. 5

text: Regulation (EC) No 223/2009

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2009 on European statistics and repealing Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1101/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the transmission of data subject to statistical confidentiality to the Statistical Office of the European Communities,

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 322/97

text: on Community Statistics, and

text: Council Decision 89/382/EEC

text: , Euratom establishing a Committee on the Statistical Programmes of the European Communities (OJ L 87, 31.3.2009, p. 164).

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 19 March 2010 on an amendment to the Law on Danmarks Nationalbank regarding authority to collect information for the compilation of statistics (CON/2010/24)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 19 March 2010 on an amendment to the Law on Danmarks Nationalbank regarding authority to collect information for the compilation of statistics (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 2 March 2010 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Danish Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs for an opinion on a proposal for a law to amend the Law on Danmarks Nationalbank (authorisation for the collection of data for use in compiling statistics) (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third and fourth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to Danmarks Nationalbank and to the collection, compilation and distribution of monetary, financial, banking, payment systems and balance of payments statistics. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The purpose of the draft law is to give direct authority to Danmarks Nationalbank to collect, compile and publish statistical information within its fields of competence, and to use such information as necessary for the fulfilment of its tasks, including for non-statistical purposes. 1.2 The draft law enables Denmark to comply with the extended statistical requirements for national central banks (NCBs) pursuant to

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 951/2009 of 9 October 2009

text: amending

text: Regulation (EC) No 2533/98

text: concerning the collection of statistical information by the European Central Bank and the regulation on the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) when it is adopted , as well as meeting the national needs of Danmarks Nationalbank. At present Danmarks

text: Nationalbank carries out statistical tasks under powers delegated by Statistics Denmark pursuant to §3(3) of the Law on Statistics Denmark . 1.3 Furthermore, the draft law authorises Danmarks Nationalbank to distribute confidential statistical information to the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and to the ESRB to the extent and in such detail (including information enabling an individual financial institution to be identified) as is necessary for these institutions to perform their tasks. 1.4 In addition, the scope of reporting agents from which Danmarks Nationalbank will be allowed to collect information is extended to encompass all legal and natural persons operating in the financial field, including issuers and holders of securities, those engaged in trans-border activities, as well as clearing and settlement institutions.

text: 2. General observations

text: The ECB welcomes the draft law, which provides direct authority for the independent statistical function of Danmarks Nationalbank. The ECB notes that there are two complementary regimes for the production of European statistics, one set out in

text: Regulation (EC) No 223/2009

text: and the other in

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 2533/98 of 23 November 1998

text: concerning the collection of statistical information by the European Central Bank . Whatever the national regime, the specific arrangements should aim to optimise the quality and availability of official statistics, also in the context of the NCB’s participation in the ESCB in general and its duty to collaborate with the ECB on statistical matters in particular, while preserving its independence as a central bank participating in the ESCB.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 19 March 2010. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: Published in Darjaven vestnik No 94, 31.10.2008 (in force as of 1.1.2009). 4 OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 5 See the ECB’s Convergence Report, May 2008, pp. 229-231. 6 COM(2008) 248 final, available on the Commission’s website at www.ec.europa.eu. 7 All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: See the ECB’s Convergence Report, May 2008, p. 26: ‘To comply with Article [131] of the Treaty, national legislation had to be adjusted to ensure its compatibility by the date of establishment of the ESCB (as regards Sweden) and by 1 May 2004 or 1 January 2007 (as regards the Member States which joined the EU on these dates). Nevertheless, statutory requirements relating to the full legal integration of an NCB into the Eurosystem need only enter into force at the moment that full integration becomes effective, i.e. the date on which the Member State with a derogation adopts the euro’.

text: In particular, this draft law provision states: ‘The competent authority under

text: Article 12

text: may only remove a member of the Governing Council from office if they no longer fulfil the conditions required for the performance of their duties or if they have been found guilty of serious misconduct’. 10 See the ECB’s Convergence Report, May 2008, p. 20: ‘National legislation should also provide for a right of review by the national courts of a decision to dismiss any other member of the decision-making bodies of the NCB involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks. This right can either be a matter of general law or can take the form of a specific provision. Even though it may be said that this right is available under the general law, for legal certainty reasons it could be advisable to provide specifically for such a right of review’. 11 The current Article 14(3) of the Law on BNB will become Article 14(4) of the Law on BNB, should the draft law be adopted.

text: See the ECB’s Convergence Report, May 2008, p. 230. 14 See the ECB’s Convergence Report, May 2008, p. 230.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 25 March 2010 on independence, confidentiality and the prohibition of monetary financing (CON/2010/25)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 25 March 2010 on independence, confidentiality and the prohibition of monetary financing (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 25 February 2010 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Bulgarian Minister of Finance for an opinion on a draft law amending the Law on Българска народна банка (Bulgarian National Bank) (hereinafter the ‘Law on BNB’), the Law on the prevention and disclosure of conflicts of 2 3 interest (hereinafter the ‘Law on conflicts of interest’) and the Administrative Procedure Code (hereinafter the ‘Code’) (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third indent of

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to Българска народна банка (Bulgarian National Bank) (BNB). In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: The main purpose of the draft law is to address the observations made in the ECB’s Convergence Report 5 6 of May 2008 on legal convergence, the European Commission’s Convergence Report of 2008 and Opinions

text: and

text: . In particular, the draft law: (a) aligns the Law on BNB with the institutional and personal independence requirements in Article 130 of the Treaty, and

text: Article 7

text: and Article 14.2 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter the ‘Statute of the ESCB’), with the

text: confidentiality requirement in Article 37 of the Statute of the ESCB and with the prohibition of monetary financing in Article 123 of the Treaty; (b) updates the references in the Law on BNB to reflect the wording of the Treaty; (c) brings the Law on conflicts of interest into line with the requirements for dismissal of members of BNB’s decision-making bodies, as set out in Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 The ECB welcomes the Bulgarian authorities’ efforts to achieve the required level of legal convergence by following the recommendations in the ECB’s Convergence Report of May 2008. Bulgaria is a Member State with a derogation as referred to in Article 139 of the Treaty and must therefore comply with Article 131 of the Treaty . In the Convergence Report of May 2008, the ECB identified incompatibilities and inconsistencies between Bulgarian legislation, on the one hand, and the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB, on the other hand. The draft law relates to these incompatibilities and inconsistencies in the areas of central bank independence, confidentiality and the prohibition of monetary financing. 2.2 The draft law does not address the other identified incompatibilities relating to monetary policy, the collection of statistics, official foreign reserve management, payment systems, the issue of banknotes and coins, the appointment of independent auditors, financial reporting, exchange rate policy and international cooperation. In this respect, the Law on BNB requires further adaptation to ensure BNB’s full integration into the Eurosystem.

text: 3. Specific observations

text: 3.1 Institutional independence The proposed amendment to Article 44 of the Law on BNB brings this provision into line with Article 130 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB regarding the principle of institutional independence.

text: 3.2 Personal independence Grounds for dismissal of Governing Council members The proposed amendment to Article 14(1) of the Law on BNB on the grounds for dismissal of a Governing Council member fully aligns this Article with Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB. The ECB also welcomes proposed Article 3(2) of the Law on conflict of interests, since it removes the grounds for dismissal of BNB’s Governing Council members that are inconsistent with the grounds for removal set out in Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB. Minimum term of office for Governing Council members The proposed amendment to Article 14(2) of the Law on BNB removes the incompatibility with the Statute of the ESCB regarding the minimum term of office for the members of BNB’s Governing Council and is in line with Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB. Right of judicial review Proposed Article 14(3) of the Law on BNB grants jurisdiction to the Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) over decisions to dismiss any Governing Council member, including BNB’s Governor. The ECB welcomes this proposed amendment to the extent that it relates to the Governing Council members other than the Governor . Furthermore, the ECB fully supports the draft law’s amendments to the Code, which ensure the SAC’s jurisdiction to decide on dismissal issues related to those BNB Governing Council members. Concerning the Governor, the jurisdiction of the SAC under proposed Article 14(3) of the Law on BNB should be without prejudice to the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union under Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB . In this context, the ECB notes that Article 14(3) of the Law on BNB, which will become

text: Article 14(4)

text: under the draft law, confirms the competence of the Court of Justice of the European Union with regard to dismissal issues related to the Governor. In addition, Article 14(3) of the Law on BNB constitutes an exception from the proposed Article 14(3) of the draft law, exempting the Governor from the scope of the latter. Therefore, proposed Article 14(3) of the draft law should clarify this point. 3.3 Confidentiality The draft law amends Articles 4(2), 13(1) and 23(2) of the Law on BNB and introduces the requirement of non-disclosure for information that constitutes professional secrets for BNB, its staff

text: and the members of its Governing Council, which is in line with Article 37 of the Statute of the ESCB. However, the proposed amendment to Article 4(2) of the Law on BNB does not remove the exception, in the cases provided for by the Law on the protection of classified information , from the obligation not to disclose banking, professional or commercial secret information. As stated in the Convergence Report of May 2008 , and in view of the proposed amendments to Articles 4(2), 13(1) and 23(2) of the Law on BNB, the ECB assumes that the exception in

text: Article 4(2)

text: in conjunction with Articles 13(1) and 23(2) of the Law on BNB is without prejudice to the confidentiality obligations vis-à-vis the European System of Central Banks and the ECB. The ECB recommends clarifying this explicitly in this provision. 3.4 Monetary financing The ECB welcomes the proposed amendment to Article 45(1) of the Law on BNB to remove the inconsistency with Article 123(1) of the Treaty regarding the range of public sector entities covered by the prohibition of monetary financing. While the range of public sector entities is identical with the list of such entities enumerated in Article 123 of the Treaty, the ECB suggests slightly redrafting the proposed

text: Article 45(1)

text: to ensure that it accurately reflects the prohibition of monetary financing to cover both (a) lending ‘to’ the range of public sector entities, and (b) purchases of debt instruments ‘from’ the range of public sector entities. The prohibition of monetary financing prohibits the direct purchase of public sector debt, but such purchases in the secondary market are allowed, in principle, as long as such secondary market purchases are not used to circumvent the objective of Article 123 of the Treaty. For this reason the word ‘direct’ should be inserted in the amendment to Article 45(1) of the Law on BNB. Finally, acknowledging the particularities arising from the currency-board regime, i.e. the prohibition on BNB extending credit to credit institutions other than in the context of emergency liquidity operations, the ECB reiterates the need to bring Article 45(2) of the Law on BNB into line with Article 123(2) of the Treaty. Such alignment would certainly be mandatory on the introduction of the euro in Bulgaria.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 25 March 2010. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 2 Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 3 Law on State Capital Investment in Deposit Banks, 1171/2009 and Government Decree on State Capital Investment in Deposit Banks, 1749/2009. The scheme was approved by the European Commission on 11 September 2009, C(2009)6931.

text: The Declaration is available on the French Presidency’s website at www.ue2008.fr. 6 See, in particular, paragraph 3.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.5.2 of Opinion

text: , and paragraph 3.2 of Opinion

text: . 7 See, in particular, paragraph 3.2 of ECB Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.2 of

text: , paragraph 3.3 of

text: , paragraph 3.2 of

text: , and paragraph 3.6 of

text: Recommendations of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank on the pricing of recapitalisations, issued on 20 November 2008 and available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 10

text: . 11 See

text: . The original draft proposal provided that the principal amount of the loan would be gradually raised in the event of non-repayment, but the law that was passed and is currently in force does not contain this penalty.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 26 March 2010 on a draft law on State capital investment in deposit banks (CON/2010/26)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 26 March 2010 on a draft law on State capital investment in deposit banks (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 9 March 2010 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Finnish Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft proposal for a law on state capital investment in deposit banks (hereinafter the ‘draft law’), including as an annex a draft decree on State capital investment in deposit banks (hereinafter the ‘draft decree’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the sixth indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Background and purpose of the draft law

text: On 24 November 2008, the ECB gave its opinion on a draft Government proposal for a law on state capital investment in deposit banks (hereinafter the ‘original draft proposal’) and a draft decree annexed to it. However, the ECB notes that the law which was eventually enacted and which is currently in force differs in some respects from the original draft proposal which had been the subject of Opinion

text: . The scheme which was established under the law came into force on 1 January 2010 and will operate until 30 April 2010 . The main purpose of the scheme is to enable the provision of capital support to sound and solvent deposit banks, to ensure the proper financing of the economy. The draft law aims at extending the operation of the scheme until the end of 2010, without making any further amendments to it. Under the scheme, the State may provide capital support to sound and solvent deposit banks by subscribing an unsecured capital loan which will form part of the original own funds of the bank referred to in Section 45 of the Law on Credit Institutions (Tier 1 capital). Eligible institutions

text: are all Finnish deposit banks authorised by the Financial Supervisory Authority (FSA), including central bodies of co-operative banks, subsidiaries of foreign credit institutions and deposit banks’ holding companies incorporated in Finland. Capital loans may be subscribed up to a maximum of EUR 4 billion in total, and up to 25 % of each supported bank’s minimum own funds. The capital loan principal of a capital loan is only repayable to the State after three years from the date of its issue, provided that certain solvency requirements are met and that the FSA gives its consent for the repayment. The Government has no right to demand the repayment of the capital loan. The interest rate on the capital loan is based on the reference rate determined on the basis of the rate applicable to five year Government bonds plus six percentage points. If the issuer does not pay the full interest for a calendar year, the Government is entitled to appoint two additional members to the issuer’s board of directors. The scheme contains certain restrictions applicable to the issuer of a capital loan, for example with regard to profit distribution, business restructuring, marketing and remuneration of the management.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 In its Opinion

text: the ECB emphasised, inter alia, the importance of complying with the Declaration on a concerted European action plan of the euro area countries of 12 October 2008 and referred to the criteria set out in the Commission Communication entitled ‘The application of State aid rules to measures taken in relation to financial institutions in the context of the current global financial crisis’ . 2.2 The ECB would like to reiterate that any initiatives put in place by the competent national authorities to restore confidence in the financial markets should be coordinated and should aim to implement common principles in a spirit of close cooperation with other Member States and the Union institutions since significant differences in national implementation could create distortions in global banking markets. In this regard, the ECB emphasises that it is necessary to coordinate the duration of national financial support schemes across the Union in order to ensure a level playing field . In addition, the ECB again underlines the need for national support measures to be temporary in nature . The temporary nature of the State’s intervention should be ensured by providing financial institutions with incentives to redeem such instruments as early as possible after a certain period of time.

text: 2.3 The ECB points out that the draft law should be in line with the guidance provided in the abovementioned documents, as well as with the Commission Communication on ‘The recapitalisation of financial institutions in the current financial crisis: limitation of aid to the minimum necessary and safeguards against undue distortions of competition’ and the recommendations of the ECB’s Governing Council on the pricing of recapitalisations .

text: 3. Temporary nature of the scheme

text: 3.1 The ECB understands that the draft law aims to extend the scheme for a period of eight months, so that capital loans could be subscribed until 31 December 2010. The ECB notes that in line with the abovementioned Commission Communication on the recapitalisation of financial institutions a regular review of the scheme is to be conducted. The continued operation of the scheme in line with the State aid rules is dependent on the scheme being notified to and approved by the Commission. Such approval is usually provided for six months. Thus, if the Commission so decides, it may be necessary to resubmit the scheme for approval for the remaining two months. 3.2 The draft law, as with the existing scheme, requires from the issuer commitments related to management remuneration, profit distribution, acquisition of own shares and business restructuring until the capital loan has been repaid in full. The ECB notes, however, that the draft law, and hence also the existing scheme, differ from the original draft proposal on which the ECB gave its opinion in 2008 , in that the minimum term for the repayment of the capital loan is three years rather than five and no specific penalties apply if the capital loan principal is not repaid after this period of time . Therefore, there are fewer incentives than in the original draft proposal for financial institutions to redeem the State capital investment, making it more difficult to ensure the temporary nature of the State’s intervention.

text: 4. The appropriate time to consult the ECB

text: The ECB notes that in cases of particular urgency that do not allow for a normal consultation period, the consulting authority may indicate urgency in the consultation request and ask for a shorter time limit for the ECB’s opinion to be adopted. This does not prejudice the national authorities’ duty under Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty to consult the ECB on national draft legislative provisions falling within its fields of competence in due course of the national legislative process. Given that the consulting authority has not specified reasons for the extreme urgency, except that the current scheme expires on 30 April 2010, the ECB considers that the

text: minimum consultation period of one month provided for in

text: Article 3(1) of Decision 98/415/EC

text: applies. This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 26 March 2010. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: On a similar issue, see e.g. paragraph 3.3 of ECB Opinion

text: of 27 July 2009 on public access to information on officials' wealth. All ECB opinions are available on the ECB website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: ECB Opinion

text: of 17 September 2008 at the request of the Slovenian Ministry of Public Administration on a draft law on restrictions and prohibitions for public office holders.

text: Memorandum of Understanding on a Code of Conduct for the members of the Governing Council (OJ C 123, 24.5.2002, p. 9), as amended by the Memorandum of Understanding amending the Memorandum of Understanding on a Code of Conduct for the members of the Governing Council (OJ C 10, 16.1.2007, p. 6).

text: As regards the relevant Union legislation, see e.g. footnote 27 of ECB Opinion

text: of 1 September 2008 at the request of the Polish Minister for Finance on a draft law on the Financial Stability Committee.

text: Pursuant to Article 47(2) of the Law on Banka Slovenije, ‘Banka Slovenije may send confidential data under the conditions set out by a law and the Statute of the ESCB’. Pursuant to paragraph 3 of the same Article, ‘Banka Slovenije shall prescribe the criteria for defining confidential data and the procedures for handling confidential data concerning the performance of Banka Slovenije’s tasks pursuant to this Law or any other law or concerning the activities of Banka Slovenije in the European System of Central Banks.’

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 29 March 2010 on a new legal framework concerning integrity and prevention of corruption as regards its application to Banka Slovenije and its decision-making bodies (CON/2010/27)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 29 March 2010 on a new legal framework concerning integrity and prevention of corruption as regards its application to Banka Slovenije and its decision-making bodies (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 9 March 2010 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia for an opinion on a draft law on integrity and prevention of corruption (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third indent of

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to Banka Slovenije. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The draft law is designed as a comprehensive legal framework concerning prevention of corruption in Slovenia. While taking on board a large number of current legal provisions in this area, the draft law introduces several new provisions which go beyond the narrow definition of measures for the prevention of corruption. Its aim is namely to provide the necessary conditions for employees and officials to perform their duties in an honest, professional and transparent manner, and to promote honest and transparent behaviour of public servants and good practices of any person involved in decision-making processes. 1.2 The draft law applies to the public sector, except where certain issues are regulated by other laws, and to the private sector where this is explicitly provided for. It foresees the continuation of the work of the Commission for the prevention of corruption (hereinafter the ‘Commission’), an independent State body with the central role in the combating and prevention of corruption, and entrusted with other tasks. The Commission is given important tasks and competences, in particular regarding (i) monitoring compliance with the draft law by its addressees; (ii) requesting information from legal entities; (iii) issuing other requests; (iv) giving information and making

text: proposals to other competent authorities and organisations; and (v) imposing fines for breaches of the draft law’s provisions. 1.3 A large part of the draft law is addressed to ‘officials’. This term, as defined in the draft law, includes persons holding public office such as the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, members of the National Assembly, ministers, judges and, explicitly, high-ranking officials of Banka Slovenije, ‘unless their rights and obligations are otherwise regulated by the law governing Banka Slovenije or other regulations binding upon Banka Slovenije’ . 1.4 The main provisions applying to officials are the following: a) Rules on incompatibility of functions prohibit officials, with certain exceptions, from holding other offices or carrying out other activities with the intention of earning income or acquiring other benefits. An official assuming an office must terminate any such other offices or activities within a defined period. If this does not happen, the Commission issues a warning to the official and sets a deadline for compliance. If the Commission establishes that the official has not ceased to hold the office or perform the activities concerned, it communicates its findings to the body responsible for initiating proceedings to terminate the official’s office. The Commission may also impose a fine on the official concerned. b) Acceptance of gifts in connection with officials’ discharge of office is restricted to gifts not exceeding a defined low value and completely prohibited if a gift does or could influence the official’s objective and unbiased discharge of office. All gifts received must be entered in a list maintained by the body or organisation where an official holds office, and copies of such lists must be sent annually to the Commission which will then publish information on the gifts on its website. The Commission also assesses if rules on acceptance of gifts are being followed and, upon discovery of a breach, imposes a fine and informs other competent authorities where appropriate. c) Restrictions on business are aimed at restricting entities where an official holds office from conducting business with other, especially commercial, entities with which the official has managerial or ownership connections. Such restrictions apply during the official’s term of office and, to some extent, within one or two years after leaving office. d) Conflicts of interest, both actual and potential, should be avoided by all public officers as defined in the Slovenian Criminal Code . The ECB understands that the definition of public officers includes officials as well as certain other categories of persons. If an actual or potential conflict of interest arises, the public officer in question must immediately cease his work in the relevant area and inform his superior or, if there is no superior, the Commission thereof. If it is established that a conflict of interest exists or could exist, the public officer is removed from the relevant area of work, unless other laws provide for specific procedures for the removal of a public officer. The Commission may also institute a procedure for

text: identifying conflicts of interest in the official activities of public officers and, if suspicion is confirmed, communicate its findings to the officer’s employer or the relevant competent body and request feedback on the measures taken. e) Supervision of wealth of professional officials and certain other categories of persons, including persons responsible for public procurement, is performed by the Commission. Under the draft law, these persons are obliged to periodically provide the Commission with information on their personal wealth, e.g. income, real estate, securities and cash holdings. If a person fails to provide the relevant information, the Commission has the power to impose a fine and also to decide that the person’s salary is gradually reduced every month by one tenth, to the level of the minimum salary, until he provides the requested information. Furthermore, if the Commission establishes that there is a disproportionate increase in a person’s wealth relative to his income from the activities allowed by law, or that the information provided differs substantially from the data contained in tax records, the person is required to provide an explanation. If the explanation is not to the Commission’s satisfaction, it communicates its findings to the authority where the person works or holds office or the authority responsible for electing or appointing the person, and this authority initiates proceedings for removal from office or other appropriate proceedings.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 The draft law defines ‘public sector’ as having the same meaning as in the Law on public servants . The ECB understands that the definition of public sector in Article 1(2) of that Law does not include Banka Slovenije and, therefore, the relevant provisions of the draft law do not apply thereto. As a consequence, this opinion concentrates on issues which have been identified, through other definitions and provisions, as applicable to Banka Slovenije. 2.2 In general, various definitions of entities and persons covered by the draft law may cause uncertainty regarding the applicability of its provisions in individual cases. 2.3 Article 51 of the draft law requires the National Assembly to adopt a resolution for the prevention of corruption. In the implementation of this resolution and of plans for its implementation, the Commission collaborates with a wide range of entities, including organisations from the public and private sectors. The Commission will monitor the implementation of the resolution on the basis of an action plan, in collaboration with executive agencies indicated in that action plan. The ECB understands that such activities will not interfere with the independent functioning, organisation and decision-making of Banka Slovenije.

text: 3. Requirements applicable to members of Banka Slovenije’s Governing Board as ‘officials’ 3.1 General As mentioned in paragraph 1.3, pursuant to Article 4(5) of the draft law the Governor and other members of Banka Slovenije’s Governing Board are subject to the draft law’s provisions with respect to officials ‘unless their rights and obligations are otherwise regulated by the law governing Banka Slovenije or other regulations binding upon Banka Slovenije’. To the extent that this definition ensures that the draft law does not jeopardise compliance with the provisions on central bank independence included in the Treaty and in the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter the ‘Statute of the ESCB’) (in particular, Article 130 of the Treaty and Articles 7 and 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB), the ECB welcomes it , as it takes into account the special position of the national central bank and its decision-making bodies as regulated by other legislation. For reasons of legal certainty and clarity, however, a provision could be included in the draft law explicitly identifying which provisions apply to the Governor and other members of Banka Slovenije’s Governing Board. 3.2 Incompatibility of functions, conflicts of interest The comment in paragraph 3.1 on the need for compliance with the relevant articles of the Treaty and of the Statute of the ESCB applies especially to the draft law’s provisions on incompatibility of functions and conflicts of interest. The ECB understands that the quoted definition from

text: Article 4(5)

text: ensures that the draft law’s provisions on incompatibility of functions and on grounds and procedures for relief from office of officials and removal from an area of work of public officers do not apply to the members of Banka Slovenije’s Governing Board, since these issues are explicitly regulated by Articles

text: and

text: a of the Law on Banka Slovenije. 3.3 Acceptance of gifts The main provisions of the draft law concerning acceptance of gifts by officials correspond to the relevant provisions of the draft law on restrictions and prohibitions for public office holders on which the ECB issued its opinion

text: . As noted in paragraph 3.2 of that opinion, these provisions are similar to the requirements laid down in the ECB’s Code of Conduct for the members of the Governing Council (hereinafter the ‘Code of Conduct’). Although the restrictions in the draft law are to a certain extent stricter than the corresponding provisions in Article 3.3 of the Code of Conduct (as regards maximum value, form of gift and applicability of the provisions to officials’ family members), they follow the same basic principles as stated in Article 2 of the Code of Conduct. The public disclosure of gifts received also serves the principle of transparency.

text: 3.4 Supervision of wealth The main provisions of the draft law concerning supervision of wealth, to the extent that they apply to officials, correspond to the relevant provisions of the draft law on public access to information on officials’ wealth on which the ECB issued its opinion

text: . The main difference, apart from the fact that pursuant to the new draft law the competent authority is the Commission and not the Court of Audit, is the absence in the new draft law of a fine in the amount of the value of any undeclared wealth or of wealth from unexplained sources. Instead, the Commission may forward the case to the State Prosecutors’ office or to other competent authorities. The ECB understands that the possibility of reducing the salaries of members of Banka Slovenije’s Governing Board will apply as a general sanction, equivalent to a fine, under the Slovenian legal system and will not interfere with the legal relationship between the central bank and its independent decision-making officials. Under this assumption, the sanction of salary reduction would not jeopardise the personal independence of Banka Slovenije officials as provided for in Article 130 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB, despite the fact that the sanction is linked to the salary of the Governor and the members of Banka Slovenije’s Governing Board, provided that the ECB’s understanding as follows is correct. The sanction of salary reduction is understood to be used to speed up the provision of information requested by the Commission and it applies, in addition to certain other persons, to all professional officials in Slovenia, including the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister and members of the National Assembly. Moreover, the sanction will be imposed by the Commission, which is an independent body, and the conditions for the decision on the salary reduction (i.e. the grounds, amount and duration) as well as the legal remedy against such a decision are clearly provided for in the draft law. Pursuant to Article 45(2) of the draft law, the Commission communicates findings on unjustified increases of wealth, or on lack of explanation regarding such increases, to the body competent for electing or appointing the relevant official. In this context, the importance of the appropriate reading of the term ‘officials’, as explained in paragraph 3.1, is reiterated. On the basis of the above assumptions and understanding, the ECB is of the opinion that the provisions of the draft law on supervision of wealth and the related sanctions are not incompatible with the principle of personal independence.

text: 4. Banka Slovenije’s duty to present information and documents

text: Pursuant to Article 16(1) of the draft law, all legal persons governed by public or private law (therefore including Banka Slovenije) are obliged to give the Commission, at its reasoned request and regardless of other laws, all information and documents necessary for the fulfilment of its tasks. Although such a request must include the legal basis, reasons for and purpose of such a request, this obligation is very broad, in particular with respect to Banka Slovenije. Namely, the relevant information necessary for the fulfilment of the Commission’s tasks might not only include information on the performance of tasks by Banka Slovenije, its employees and decision-making bodies themselves, but also confidential information

text: obtained by Banka Slovenije from other entities in the performance of supervisory and statistical tasks. The ECB would recommend an amendment to the draft law to ensure that any exchange of information between Banka Slovenije and the Commission is consistent with Union law regulating the exchange of 8 9 supervisory and statistical information and professional secrecy , as well as with Article 47 of the Law on Banka Slovenije.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 29 March 2010.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET