text: COM(2014) 508 final.

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning (EU) nr 1092/2010 av den 24 november 2010

text: om makrotillsyn av det finansiella systemet på EU-nivå och om inrättande av en europeisk systemrisknämnd (EUT L 331, 15.12.2010, s. 1).

text: Rådets förordning

text: (EU) nr 1096/2010

text: av den 17 november 2010 om tilldelning till Europeiska centralbanken av särskilda uppgifter angående Europeiska systemrisknämndens verksamhet (EUT L 331, 15.12.2010, s. 162).

text: Artikel 20 i förordning (EU) nr 1092/2010

text: Se kommissionens rapport, avsnitt 3.2.1.

text: Se

text: artikel 5.1 i förordning (EU) nr 1092/2010

text: Se kommissionens rapport, avsnitt 4.

text: Se den rådgivande tekniska kommitténs mandat som finns på ESRB:s webbplats.

text: Se arbetsdokument från kommissionen som medföljer rapporten till Europaparlamentet och rådet om Europeiska systemrisknämndens (ESRB) uppdrag och organisation, s. 16.

text: Främst genom att bättre synliggöra ESRB och underlätta det kontinuerliga beslutsfattandet inom ESRB.

text: Så som rekommenderats i punkt 1.2 i detta yttrande.

text: Se kommissionens rapport, avsnitt 3.2.3.

text: Se Europaparlamentets resolution av den 11 mars 2014 med rekommendationer till kommissionen om översynen av det europeiska systemet för finansiell tillsyn (EFSF) (2013/2166(INL)).

text: Se

text: artikel 16.2 i förordning (EU) nr 1092/2010

text: Beslut

text: av den 21 september 2011 om tillhandahållande och insamling av uppgifter för makrotillsynen av det finansiella systemet i unionen (EUT C 302, 13.10.2011, s. 3).

text: Ytterligare uppgifter om det arbete som utfördes för att förbereda, utveckla, genomföra och hantera den initiala uppsättningen av statistisk och tillsynsrelevant information som behövdes för att stödja ESRB presenteras av Israel J-M., Sandars P., Schubert A., och Fischer B. (2013), Statistics and Indicators for Financial Stability Analysis and Policy, Occasional Paper Series, nr 145, ECB, Frankfurt am Main, april 2013.

text: Se Financial Stability Board, Consultation Paper, Understanding Financial Linkages: A Common Data Template for Global Systemically Important Banks, 6 oktober 2011.

text: Uppgifter som insamlas inom ramen för

text: rådets förordning (EG) nr 2533/98 av den 23 november 1998

text: om Europeiska centralbankens insamling av statistiska uppgifter (EGT L 318, 27.11.1998, s. 8) omfattas av de skyddsåtgärder som anges i

text: artikel 8 i den förordningen

text: , och säkerställer det fysiska och logiska skyddet av insynsskyddade statistiska uppgifter.

text: Se punkt 2.1 i detta yttrande.

text: Se punkt 2.2 i detta yttrande.

text: Rådets förordning

text: (EU) nr 1024/2013

text: av den 15 oktober 2013 om tilldelning av särskilda uppgifter till Europeiska centralbanken i fråga om politiken för tillsyn över kreditinstitut (EUT L 287, 29.10.2013, s. 63).

text: Se

text: artikel 5 i förordning (EU) nr 1024/2013

text: Se Flagship Report on Macro-prudential Policy in the Banking Sector, finns på ESRB:s webbplats www.esrb.europa.eu

text: Se rekommendation

text: , rekommendation B4.

text: Se rekommendation

text: , rekommendation C34.

text: Förordning

text: (EU) nr 1024/2013

text: innehåller redan en hänvisning för hur samarbetet mellan SSM-länder och ESRB kan se ut avseende makrotillsynsfrågor eftersom den föreskriver att, utan att detta påverkar ESRB:s mandat, nationella behöriga myndigheter eller nationella utsedda myndigheter och ECB ska agera i fråga om varje samordningsförfarande som föreskrivs i sådana unionsakter efter att ha följt det förfarande som föreskrivs i förordning

text: (EU) nr 1024/2013

text: . Se skäl 24.

text: Se

text: artikel 16 i förordning (EG) nr 1092/2010

text: Se

text: artikel 17.1 i förordning (EU) nr 1092/2010

text: Detta föreslogs redan i punkt 2.1.1 a i Europeiska systemrisknämndens rekommendation av den 18 juni 2014 om riktlinjer för fastställandet av kontracykliska buffertvärden (EUT C 293, 2.9.2014, s. 1).

text: Se högnivågruppen för översynen av ESRB, bidrag till översynen av ESRB, mars 2013.

text: Se punkt 5.2 i detta yttrande.

sprak: sv

title: Europeiska centralbankens yttrande av den 4 februari 2015 om översynen av Europeiska systemrisknämndens uppdrag och organisation (CON/2015/4)

text: Inledning och rättslig grund

text: Den 8 augusti 2014 antog Europeiska kommissionen en rapport om Europeiska systemrisknämndens (ESRB) uppdrag och organisation (nedan kallad kommissionens rapport).

text: Europeiska centralbankens behörighet att avge ett yttrande om kommissionens rapport till Europaparlamentet och rådet grundas på

text: artikel 20 i Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning (EU) nr 1092/2010

text: och

text: artikel 8 i rådets förordning (EU) nr 1096/2010

text: . I enlighet med

text: artikel 17.5

text: första meningen i arbetsordningen för Europeiska centralbanken har detta yttrande antagits av ECB-rådet.

text: Allmänna kommentarer

text: Kommissionens rapport granskar ESRB:s uppdrag och organisation i enlighet med

text: artikel 20 i förordning (EU) nr 1092/2010

text: och

text: artikel 8 i förordning (EU) nr 1096/2010

text: . ECB stöder på det hela taget kommissionens slutsatser i rapporten.

text: ECB anser inte att det för närvarande behövs några större förändringar av den rättsliga ramen för ESRB. Den period som granskningen omfattar är relativt kort och ECB anser att ESRB sammantaget fungerat väl. Vissa tekniska justeringar av ESRB:s operativa ram skulle dock förbättra dess effektivitet och öka dess bidrag till att förhindra eller minska systemrisker för den finansiella stabiliteten till följd av skeenden inom det finansiella systemet. Dessa bör beaktas av Europaparlamentet, rådet och kommissionen när man bedömer behovet av konkreta lagstiftningsåtgärder. Mot denna bakgrund kommer ECB att avge ett yttrande i enlighet med de regler som framgår av fördragen när kommissionen lägger fram konkreta lagstiftningsåtgärder.

text: Specifika kommentarer

text: 1. ECB:s stöd till ESRB

text: 1.1 Koppling mellan ESRB:s makrotillsyn inom EU och ECB:s mandat avseende penningpolitik, finansiell stabilitet och banktillsyn

text: ESRB inrättades 2010 för att bedriva makrotillsyn inom unionen. I enlighet med

text: artikel 127.1 i fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt

text: , är ECB:s huvudmål att upprätthålla prisstabilitet, i enlighet med vilket ECB bestämmer och genomför penningpolitiken för euroområdet. Enligt artikel 127.5 i fördraget medverkar Europeiska centralbankssystemets (ECBS) till att smidigt genomföra politik som berör det finansiella systemets stabilitet. Denna politik definieras och genomförs utifrån en uppsättning makroekonomiska och makrofinansiella variabler och analyser.

text: Sedan starten har ESRB haft tillgång till makroekonomisk, ekonomisk och monetär expertis från alla nationella centralbanker i ECBS, särskilt inom områdena övervakning av den finansiella stabiliteten, makroekonomisk analys, analys av marknadsförhållanden och infrastruktur samt även insamling av statistiska uppgifter. Därutöver har ESRB dragit nytta av synergier i form av expertis, resurser och infrastruktur inom ramen för redan existerande ECBS-verksamheter.

text: Det stöd som ECB ger ESRB påverka inte ECB:s institutionella, funktionella och finansiella oberoende och ej heller utförandet av ECBS uppgifter enligt fördraget eller stadgan för Europeiska centralbankssystemet och Europeiska centralbanken. ECB har även fortsättningsvis goda möjligheter att ge stöd till ESRB i form av analyser, statistik och administration i linje med existerande arrangemang, särskilt enligt förordning

text: (EU) nr 1096/2010

text: . Vad gäller förslaget att öka ESRB:s oberoende som framförts av flera berörda parter i kommissionens remissrunda, anser ECB att man bör eftersträva en lämplig balans eftersom en alltför hög grad av oberoende inte är förenlig med ESRB:s fortsatta utnyttjande av ECB:s goda rykte och expertis.

text: 1.2 Ordföranden i ESRB:s styrelse

text: ECB stöder kommissionens förslag att ECB:s ordförande även fortsättningsvis ska vara ordförande i ESRB:s styrelse. Centralbankerna har en viktig roll för makrotillsynen pga. sitt ansvar för den finansiella stabiliteten, sin analytiska expertis och den information som de besitter om den reala ekonomin, finansmarknaderna och marknadsinfrastrukturen. ECB tillhandahåller stöd till ESRB i form av analyser, statistik, logistik och administration och säkerställer ett nära samarbete på teknisk mellan ESRB:s rådgivande tekniska kommitté (ATC) och ECB:s kommitté för finansiell stabilitet.

text: Det faktum att cheferna för alla ECBS-centralbanker deltar i ESRB:s styrelse, samt att ECB:s ordförande i enlighet med förordning

text: (EU) nr 1092/2010

text: är ordförande även i denna, understryker den betydelse som centralbankerna har för ESRB:s funktion. Det faktum att ECB:s ordförande även är ordförande i ESRB:s styrelse bör därför inte ändras.

text: Det är viktigt att komma ihåg att ECB:s ordförande måste utses på nytt som ordförande för ESRB:s styrelse före utgången av 2015, eftersom förordning

text: (EU) nr 1092/2010

text: uttryckligen begränsar mandattiden. Följaktligen bör ett lagförslag som anger hur ordföranden ska utses förberedas och antas under första halvåret 2015.

text: 2. ESRB:s organisation

text: 2.1 Granskning av sammansättningen av ESRB:s styrelse

text: Vad gäller kommissionens förslag att strömlinjeforma och minska ESRB:s styrelses storlek, anser ECB att det endast finns mycket begränsade möjligheter att minska antalet deltagare. ECB anser att alla beslutsfattare inom makrotillsyn bör delta i styrelsen. Mot bakgrund av den viktiga rollen för makrotillsynen bör styrelsen inkludera representanter för alla centralbanker inom ECBS samt de nationella makrotillsynsmyndigheterna (om dessa inte är en del av centralbanken), men inte nödvändigtvis med rösträtt. Därutöver vore det fördelaktigt om den gemensamma tillsynsmekanismen (SSM) företräddes i styrelsen (utan rösträtt), dvs. på samma sätt som de nationella tillsynsmyndigheterna för närvarande representeras.

text: 2.2 Granskning av sammansättningen på, och uppgifterna för, styrkommittén

text: ECB stöder kommissionens förslag att stärka styrkommitténs roll. Styrkommittén kunde t.ex. användas som en plattform för informationsutbyte avseende planerade makrotillsynsåtgärder innan dessa officiellt tillkännages av ESRB, för att på så sätt involvera alla berörda makrotillsynsmyndigheter. Dessa makrotillsynsmyndigheter skulle kunna bjudas in att delta i relevanta styrkommittéers möten. Detta skulle ge ECB möjligheten att diskutera tänkbar spridning och spridningseffekter, särskilt med medlemsstater utanför euroområdet, innan makrotillsynsåtgärder vidtas. Styrkommittén skulle också kunna agera mer proaktivt, framåtblickande när den sätter upp ärenden på styrelsens dagordning samt identifiera viktiga policyfrågor i form av ett arbetsprogram. Styrkommittén skulle kunna garantera transparens gentemot styrelsen när den utför dessa uppgifter. Målet att stärka styrkommitténs roll bör inte påverka styrelsens roll som ESRB:s beslutande organ. Slutligen anser ECB att det vore fördelaktigt om SSM är representerat i styrkommittén.

text: 2.3 Andra understrukturer (den rådgivande tekniska kommittén, ATC och den rådgivande vetenskapliga kommittén, ASC)

text: ESRB har inrättat olika understrukturer som stöd för dess analytiska arbete. ATC bidrar till ESRB:s arbete på olika områden. ASC ger ett mer innovativt, externt och vetenskapligt perspektiv på ESRB:s arbete. ECB anser inte att det behövs några större förändringar i sammansättningen eller strukturen på dessa kommittéer. Kommissionen har lämnat förslag på vissa förbättringar, t.ex. avseende ATC:s storlek, att synliggöra ASC:s arbete och en närmare koppling mellan ASC och ESRB:s allmänna agenda. ECB anser att en förändring i ATC:s storlek bör spegla ändringar i styrelsens sammansättning. ASC skulle kunna blir mer synligt genom att också arbeta med prioriterade frågor, enligt anvisningar från styrelsen och styrkommittén, förutsatt att ASC även fortsättningsvis har möjlighet att bedriva analysarbete på eget initiativ.

text: 2.4 En verkställande direktörs roll

text: Det framgår av kommissionens rapport att kommissionen överväger att skapa en ny heltidsanställd verkställande direktör som ansvarar för ESRB:s löpande verksamhet. Rent organisatoriskt skulle en sådan förändring vara fördelaktig, men det faktum att ESRB även fortsättningsvis kommer att behöva ECB:s stöd i form av analyser, statistik, administration och logistik talar för att ECB bör vara starkt representerad i ESRB:s beslutsfattande organ. Om man väljer att tillsätta en verkställande direktör bör detta balanseras genom att på permanent basis gör ECB:s ordförande till ordförande för styrelsen. ECB föreslår också att man ytterligare klargör vilken roll en verkställande direktör skulle ha, t.ex. i fråga om de uppgifter och det ansvar som ordföranden och chefen för ESRB:s sekretariat har, vad gäller ansvarsutkrävande och rapporteringsskyldighet samt även vad gäller den externa representationen av ESRB.

text: 3. ESRB:s verktygslåda

text: 3.1 Kommunikation (inkl. brev och offentliga uttalanden)

text: ECB anser att det krävs förtydliganden avseende förslaget att utvidga ESRB:s verktygslåda. Kommissionen föreslår att den aktuella verktygslådan, som inkluderar varningar och rekommendationer som de två viktigaste kommunikationsverktygen, ska utvidgas till att omfatta fler mjuka maktmedel. Exempelvis nämner kommissionens rapport att man skulle kunna offentliggöra skrivelser eller offentliga uttalanden som ett sätt att öka flexibiliteten i förvarningsfunktionen innan en formell varning eller rekommendationer utfärdas. ECB stöder ett sådant tillvägagångssätt som skulle göra det möjligt för ESRB att i ett tidigare skede peka på vissa risker utan att genast behöva utdela en formell varning.

text: 3.2 ESRB:s deltagande i unionens lagstiftningsprocess

text: ECB noterar att man i flera av de svar som inkommit inom ramen för kommissionens samråd, samt även i de andra rapporterna i samma fråga, föreslår att ESRB i en eller annan form bör involveras i unionens lagstiftningsprocess. Det är viktigt att komma ihåg att unionens lagstiftningsprocesser styrs av bestämmelserna i fördraget. Därutöver ger förordning

text: (EU) nr 1092/2010

text: redan ESRB möjlighet att rikta rekommendationer till kommissionen avseende relevant unionslagstiftning.

text: Självklart är ESRB:s kunskaper inom området finansiell stabilitet värdefulla när man diskuterar unionens politiska initiativ. ECB anser att ESRB i linje med en mer proaktiv kommunikationsstrategi enligt ovan kunde ge sitt bidrag till lagstiftningsprocessen t.ex. genom att peka ut områden för kommissionen där det i framtiden kan behövas lagstiftning. En annan möjlighet att involvera ESRB vore offentliga samråd på initiativ av kommissionen. ECB anser dock inte att det finns något behov av att skapa en formell roll för ESRB i unionens lagstiftningsprocess utöver vad som redan gäller enligt förordning

text: (EU) nr 1092/2010

text: 4. ESRB:s tillgång till uppgifter

text: 4.1 ECB:s tillhandahållande av statistikstöd till ESRB

text: Mot bakgrund av erfarenheterna under granskningsperioden bedömer ECB att det aktuella ramverket för att tillhandahålla statistikstöd till ESRB är ändamålsenligt och bekräftar att ESRB:s sekretariat och de europeiska tillsynsmyndigheterna har ett nära samarbete. Trots detta skulle förfarandena för utbyte av uppgifter kunna förbättras.

text: Som en del av ECB:s tillhandahållande av statistikstöd till ESRB har ECB hittills säkerställt att de initiala kraven på den regelbundna rapporteringen av aggregerade uppgifter som framgår av beslut

text: uppfylls utan förseningar och med hög uppgiftskvalitet. Beslut

text: antogs efter ett avgörande bidrag från en grupp bestående av ESRB:s sekretariat, ECB de europeiska tillsynsmyndigheterna för att tillgodose ESRB:s behov av statistik. Dessa uppgifter används för regelbunden rapportering av ESRB:s styrelse och den rådgivande tekniska kommittén, och särskilt för ESRB:s riskkontrolltavla som publicerats varje kvartal sedan september 2012.

text: 4.2 Allmänna förfaranden för tillgång till uppgifter

text: ECB är även positiv till att man förenklar förfarandena för tillgång till uppgifter i situationer där uppgifterna redan finns på europeisk nivå eller hos nationella myndigheter och endast innehåll, format och tillgångsrättigheter måste specificeras. Förfarandet bör fortfarande göra det möjligt för respektive institutioner eller organ (t.ex. de europeiska tillsynsmyndigheterna, nationella myndigheter eller ECBS) att kontrollera att eventuella begränsningar, t.ex. vad gäller spridningen av uppgifterna, efterlevs. ESRB-styrelsens existerande omröstningsförfaranden skulle dock fortfarande tillämpas i fall där uppgifter saknas och specifika undersökningar måste startas som ställer krav på uppgiftsinsamling från finansindustrin.

text: 4.3 ESRB:s tillgång till icke-aggregerade uppgifter

text: Sedan starten har ESRB:s behov av statistik i stor utsträckning tillgodosetts genom ad-hoc förfrågningar, både aggregerade och företagsspecifika. Förfarandena för att samla in, bearbeta och sprida sådana uppgifter är dock arbetsintensiva och tidskrävande vilket även får konsekvenser för hur snabbt det analytiska arbetet kan påbörjas. Eftersom aggregerade uppgifter och uppgifter på företagsnivå kompletterar varandra och är viktiga för makrotillsynen och policy-beslut, borde det aktuella restriktiva ramverket förändras. Särskilt

text: artikel 15 i förordning (EU) nr 1092/2010

text: begränsar ESRB:s möjligheter (via sekretariatet och ECB:s statistik- och analysfunktion) att snabbt och enkelt inhämta uppgifter på individuell företagsnivå i syfte att genomföra makroprudentiell analys. Svårhanterliga rutiner har skapats för att hantera dessa begränsningar. Dessa är delvis överdrivna, exempelvis hanterar ESRB:s sekretariat vissa företagsuppgifter som i många fall publiceras av noterade banker även i årsredovisningen i ett s.k. dark-room.

text: Mot bakgrund av detta stöder ECB en översyn av

text: med målet att tillhandahållandet av individuella uppgifter på företagsnivå bättre ska stämma överens med ESRB:s behov och vara mindre restriktiva – man bör skilja på känsliga uppgifter (t.ex. avseende sammanflätningar) och säkerställa en lämplig sekretess.

text: ECB föreslår att man gör en åtskillnad liknande den som gjorts av Financial Stability Board, mellan institut-till-aggregerade uppgifter, dvs. ett institut som rapporterar sin totala exponering som t.ex. balans- och resultaträkning, eller gentemot olika kategorier av motparter (t.ex. banker eller statliga enheter) grupperade efter risk faktorer, och institut-till-institut uppgifter, dvs. institut som rapporterar bilaterala exponeringar. Båda dessa fall kan omfatta känsliga uppgifter som måste bedömas för varje enskilt fall och vid behov sekretessbeläggas, kommer uppgiftskategorin institut-till-institut i många fall vara mer känsliga och bör därför omfattas av de aktuellt gällande mer restriktiva förfarandena. Kategorin institut-till-aggregerade uppgifter kan däremot omfattas av ett förenklat förfarande, samtidigt som man bibehåller möjligheten till en mer strikt behandling när detta är lämpligt pga. av uppgifternas känsliga karaktär. På områden där aggregerade uppgifter inte räcker till för analytiska ändamål pga. tail-faktorer och därtill hörande risker, är fördelningsåtgärder viktiga och kräver större detaljeringsnivå. Man bör komma ihåg att de flesta uppgifterna rapporteras flera veckor, ibland månader, efter referensperiodens utgång vilket gör att de blir allt mindre känsliga.

text: ESRB:s styrelse bör skapa rutiner för att dela sådana institut-till-aggregerade uppgifter samt uppgifter på företagsnivå inom den rättsliga ramen som styr detta informationsutbyte. ECB har lämpliga rutiner för att skydda sekretessbelagda uppgifter och kan bidra med sin omfattande erfarenhet på detta område.

text: 4.4 Rapporteringskrav avseende tillsynsarbetet

text: Slutligen vill ECB uppmana de europeiska tillsynsmyndigheterna att prioritera ESRB:s behov när de planerar nya eller ändrade rapporteringskrav avseende tillsynsarbetet så att uppgifterna bättre speglar makrotillsynens behov. ECB själv beaktar redan ESRB:s behov när den planerar ny eller förbättrad statistik genom sitt förfarande fördelar och kostnader som är jämförbart med kommissionens konsekvensbedömningar.

text: 5. Samverkan mellan ESRB och den gemensamma tillsynsmekanismen (SSM)

text: 5.1 Hur SSM är representerat i ESRB:s strukturer

text: När organisationsstyrningen för ESRB inrättades fanns bankunionen ännu inte på plats. För att beakta de förändringar som skett inom ramen för det europeiska systemet för finansiell tillsyn, inklusive inrättandet av SSM, borde förordning

text: (EU) nr 1092/2010

text: uttryckligen ange att SSM ska vara representerad i ESRB:s styrelse. SSM bör även vara representerad i styrkommittén. Slutligen bör SSM även vara representerad i den rådgivande tekniska kommittén.

text: 5.2 ESRB:s roll vid tillämpningen av makrotillsynsverktyg inom SSM

text: De bör noteras att

text: rådets förordning (EU) nr 1024/2013

text: uttryckligen ger ECB policy-uppgifter och behörighet inom makrotillsynen som kommer att utövas över merparten av ESRB-medlemmarna. För detta ändamål måste de nationella myndigheterna informera ECB om makrotillsynsåtgärder som de tänker tillämpa. ECB får dock vid behov tillämpa högre krav.

text: I mars 2014 publicerade ESRB rapporten Flagship report on macro-prudential policy in the banking sector. Av rapporten framgår att ESRB kommer att fungera som central punkt för att samla in och sprida information om makrotillsynspolitiska åtgärder inom unionen. ESRB har redan rekommenderat att premiepensionsmyndigheter bör samarbeta och utbyta information även över nationsgränserna, särskilt genom att informera ESRB om vilka åtgärder som vidtas för att åtgärda systemrisker på nationell nivå. Därutöver har ESRB rekommenderat att makrotillsynsmyndigheter, utan att detta påverkar de tillämpliga bestämmelserna i unionslagstiftningen, bör underrätta ESRB innan makrotillsynsinstrument tillämpas på nationell nivå om det förutspås bli betydande gränsöverskridande effekter på andra medlemsstater eller den inre marknaden.

text: Det är viktigt att ESRB:s makrotillsyn sker med beaktande av den roll och de funktioner som ECB har på området makrotillsyn. Dubbelarbete kan undvikas genom att man gör en tydlig åtskillnad mellan ESRB:s och ECB:s uppgifter och ansvarsområden. Mot denna bakgrund förväntas ESRB:s styrelse och ECB:s beslutsfattande organ att skapa tydliga regler om informationsutbyte och uppföljningen av ESRB:s rekommendationer.

text: 5.3 Adressaterna till ESRB:s rekommendationer

text: För närvarande kan ESRB:s rekommendationer i enlighet med förordning

text: (EU) nr 1092/2010

text: rikta sig till ett obegränsat antal adressater. ESRB har redan utfärdat rekommendationer till medlemsstater, nationella behöriga myndigheter, nationella utsedda myndigheter, Europeiska bankmyndigheten och kommissionen.

text: Samtidigt är förordning

text: (EU) nr 1092/2010

text: ganska restriktiv när det gäller adressaternas skyldighet att styrka sin uppföljning av ESRB:s rekommendationer enligt modellen reagera eller förklara. Endast vissa av ovannämnda adressater är skyldiga att rapportera sin uppföljning av ESRB:s rekommendationer. Sådana asymmetrier bör i största möjliga utsträckning undvikas.

text: Mot bakgrund av ovanstående bör man överväga huruvida den rättsliga ramen bör ge ESRB möjlighet att, inom ramen för dess mandat, utfärda rekommendationer till nationella makrotillsynsmyndigheterna samt även till ECB avseende dess uppgifter inom mikro- och makrotillsynen. Det faktum att ECB skulle kunna inkluderas som en potentiell adressat ska inte påverka huvudmålet för ECBS som är att upprätthålla prisstabilitet enlighet med artikel 127.1 i fördraget. För detta ändamål bör man säkerställa tydlig kommunikation och tydligt informationsutbyte i förväg mellan ESRB:s styrelse och ECB:s beslutsfattande organ, i enlighet med vad som föreslagits ovan.


text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).

text: Including

text: Regulation (EC) No 177/2008

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 February 2008 establishing a common framework for business registers for statistical purposes (OJ L 61, 5.3.2008, p. 6),

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 2533/98 of 23 November 1998

text: concerning the collection of statistical information by the European Central Bank (OJ L 318, 27.11.1998, p. 8) and

text: Regulation (EC) No 223/2009

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2009 on European statistics (OJ L 87, 31.3.2009, p. 164).

text: For example, Article 4(3) of the draft law. 7 See also paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2 of Opinion

text: , and Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: Article 20 of the draft law and Article 3 of the draft law amending the Code on administrative breaches of the law. 9 Article 7 of the draft law amending the Code on administrative breaches of the law (amendment to Article 259 of the Code on administrative breaches of the law).

text: Article 6(5)

text: (2) of the draft law, which should be brought in line with

text: Articles 9(2)

text: and (3) of the draft law. 17

text: Articles 13(2)

text: and (3) of the draft law. 18 Article 13(4) of the draft law. 19 Also see Opinion

text: , paragraph 4. 20 Recommendation ECB/2014/13 of the European Central Bank of 21 March 2014 for a Council Regulation amending

text: Regulation (EC) No 2533/98

text: concerning the collection of statistical information by the European Central Bank (OJ C 188, 20.6.2014, p. 1). 21 Article 14 of the draft law. 22 Annexes to the draft laws. 23

text: Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 2533/98

text: Article 2 of the draft law amending the Code on administrative breaches of the law. 25 Article 54 of the Law on Lietuvos bankas.

publisher: Europeiska centralbanken

sprak: en

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 6 February 2015 on a new legal framework for the production of official statistics in Lithuania (CON/2015/5)

serie: con

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 6 February 2015 on a new legal framework for the production of official statistics in Lithuania (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

type: rubrik

text: On 27 November 2014, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Lithuanian Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft law amending the Law on statistics (hereinafter the ‘draft law’) and a draft law amending the Code on administrative breaches of the law (hereinafter together the ‘draft laws’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third and fourth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft laws relate to Lietuvos bankas and the collection, compilation and distribution of monetary, financial, banking, payment systems and balance of payments statistics. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

type: stycke

text: 1. Purpose of the draft laws

text: 1.1 The aim of the draft laws is to improve the general functioning of official statistics production and ensure consistency with updated Union legislation in the field of statistics . The draft laws explicitly recognise the role of Lietuvos bankas in the area of official statistics and define its rights and obligations in this regard, including empowering it to impose sanctions for non-compliance with statistical reporting obligations. 1.2 The draft law defines the principles underlying the official statistics, the organisation of official statistics, the powers of and relationship between Lietuvos bankas and Lietuvos statistikos departamentas (the National Statistical Institute of Lithuania, hereinafter ‘Statistics Lithuania’), the rights and obligations of statistical data users, and the use and protection of statistical data, including confidential data.

text: 2. General observations

text: The ECB welcomes the draft laws, which aim to ensure consistency with the framework of European statistics and to improve the production of official statistics in Lithuania. The ECB welcomes in particular the provisions of the draft laws recognising two separate but complementary legal frameworks under which official statistics are developed, produced and disseminated, namely by Statistics Lithuania, operating within the partnership of the European Statistical System (ESS), and by Lietuvos bankas, as a member of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB).

text: 3. Statistical principles

text: 3.1 The statistical principles governing the production of European statistics by the ESCB under

text: Regulation (EC) No 2533/98

text: are similar but not identical to the statistical principles governing the production of European statistics by the ESS under

text: Regulation (EC) No 223/2009

text: . The ECB welcomes the recognition of two sets of principles in the draft law, one applying to Statistics 3 4 Lithuania and the other applying to Lietuvos bankas . 3.2 However, the ECB considers the condition ‘unless Union legislation provides otherwise’ superfluous since the complementary statistical regimes and the corresponding two sets of principles stem from Union legislation: Regulations

text: (EC) No 2533/98

text: and

text: (EC) No 223/2009

text: respectively. For legal certainty reasons, Article 3 of the draft law should make it explicit that the statistical principles contained in

text: Regulation (EC) No 223/2009

text: govern the production of official statistics by Statistics Lithuania and other bodies managing official statistics, while Lietuvos bankas, in its capacity as member of the ESCB, should apply the statistical principles contained in

text: Regulation (EC) No 2533/98

text: 4. Lietuvos bankas’ independence

text: 4.1 The ECB broadly welcomes the fact that the draft laws recognise and preserve the independence of Lietuvos bankas as a body concerned with and producing official statistics in its areas of competence. 4.2 However, the ECB recommends introducing certain drafting clarifications in the draft law to ensure Lietuvos bankas’ independence. More particularly, the draft law should make clear that the cooperation between Lietuvos bankas and Statistics Lithuania must be without prejudice to Lietuvos bankas’ independence and to its tasks within the statistical framework of the ESCB .

text: 4.3 Furthermore, as regards the administrative liability of officials, civil servants and the staff of official statistics bodies for non-compliance with the draft law, including as regards the treatment of 8 9 confidential data , the draft law amending the Code on administrative breaches of the law should be amended: it should ensure that, prior to submission to the court, administrative cases against Lietuvos bankas’ staff regarding unlawful use of statistical data and disclosure of confidential statistical data, if any, should be investigated by Lietuvos bankas, and not by Statistics Lithuania.

text: 5. Cooperation between Lietuvos bankas and Statistics Lithuania

text: 5.1 The ECB emphasises that ensuring effective cooperation between Lietuvos bankas and Statistics Lithuania is very important to minimise the reporting burden on respondents and to guarantee the coherence and consistency of all official statistics. It welcomes the general clause in the draft law referring to such cooperation in preparing and implementing the official statistics programme. The ECB recommends introducing drafting clarifications explicitly confirming the duty to cooperate in other provisions of the draft law, for example as regards the exchange of statistical data . The ECB recommends clarifying in Articles

text: and

text: that data produced by Lietuvos bankas may be used directly or indirectly by Statistics Lithuania and by other bodies managing official statistics for the production of European statistics and, equally, that statistics produced by Statistics Lithuania and the other bodies managing official statistics may be used directly or indirectly by Lietuvos bankas . 5.2 In the same vein, for legal certainty reasons the ECB recommends introducing drafting clarifications to spell out explicitly Lietuvos bankas’ performance of its statistical tasks within the statistical framework of the ESCB, and strengthen the overarching principle of the development, production and dissemination of the official statistics under two separate but complementary legal frameworks. In particular, the statistics that are necessary to undertake the tasks of the ESCB should be explicitly included in the definition of ‘European statistics’ . In addition to the definition of the ‘European statistical programme’, a corresponding definition of the ‘statistical work programme of the ESCB’ should be introduced. Lietuvos bankas’ place in the organisation of official statistics should be further clarified : although it is an official statistics body, Lietuvos bankas does not belong to the ESS and develops, produces and disseminates European statistics in its capacity as member of the ESCB. Finally, it should be clarified that Statistics Lithuania prepares the official Lithuanian statistics programme together with Lietuvos bankas , and that the report on the implementation of such statistics programme to be approved by the Lithuanian government should

text: not include information on the statistical activities of Lietuvos bankas as these are presented in the latter’s annual report.

text: 6. Sharing of confidential statistical data

text: 6.1 The draft law includes provisions regarding the sharing of statistical data and information with Eurostat, the ECB, and national central banks and national statistical institutes of Union Member States . It also allows the transmission of confidential statistical data to scientific research bodies . In order to ensure the efficient collection, compilation and dissemination of European statistics, the ECB recommends clarifying that Article 13 of the draft law allows the exchange of confidential statistical information data with Eurostat, all authorities belonging to the ESS and the ESCB . 6.2 The ECB also recommends, in line with its Recommendation ECB/2014/13 , explicitly allowing Lietuvos bankas to transfer confidential statistical information to Union and national authorities responsible for the supervision of financial institutions, markets and infrastructures and macroprudential oversight, in accordance with the procedure laid down in Union legislation, in particular

text: Regulation (EC) No 2533/98

text: . 6.3 As regards the treatment of confidential statistical information, the ECB recommends specifying in the draft law that Lietuvos bankas is bound by the provisions laid down in

text: Regulation (EC) No 2533/98

text: 7. Sanctioning powers

text: 7.1 The draft laws, which aim to ensure the proper application of

text: Regulation (EC) No 2533/98

text: , provide for the sanctioning powers of Lietuvos bankas and Statistics Lithuania in relation to third parties that fail to comply with their statistical obligations. However, the draft law does not mention the ECB’s powers to impose sanctions for non-compliance with the ECB’s statistical reporting requirements . The ECB recommends addressing this issue in the draft law.

text: 7.2 The ECB also recommends aligning the sanctioning powers of Lietuvos bankas laid down in the 24 25 draft laws and in the Law on Lietuvos bankas: according to the Law on Lietuvos bankas , it is for Lietuvos bankas to determine the size of sanctions and arrangements for their application to legal entities.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 6 February 2015.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI

type: vagledning

utgivare: ecb


text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 9 February 2015 on amendments to Eesti Pank’s Statute (CON/2015/6)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 9 February 2015 on amendments to Eesti Pank’s Statute (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 21 January 2015 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from Eesti Pank for an opinion on a draft decision of Eesti Pank’s Supervisory Board to recast Eesti Pank’s Statute (hereinafter the ‘draft decision’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft decision relates to a national central bank. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft decision

text: The existence of the Statute is a requirement under the Law on Eesti Pank. The Statute supplements the Law on Eesti Pank in areas that are not explicitly regulated by it and in particular sets out (a) principles for the division of tasks among and the functioning of Eesti Pank’s decision-making bodies, (b) principles for the functioning of Eesti Pank’s structural units, and (c) a number of internal administrative rules. The draft decision recasts Eesti Pank’s Statute without amending its substance.

text: 2. General observations

text: The ECB welcomes the draft decision, as it improves the clarity of Eesti Pank’s Statute.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 9 February 2015. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42). 2 Recommendation

text: of the European Systemic Risk Board of 4 April 2013 on intermediate objectives and instruments of macro-prudential policy (OJ C 170, 15.6.2013, p. 1). 3

text: Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 on European Union macro-prudential oversight of the financial system and establishing a European Systemic Risk Board (OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 1).

text: Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013

text: conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63). See also Recital (24) of that Regulation. 5 With regard to cooperation with other institutions, see Articles 21 and 23 of the draft resolution. See also Article 47 of the Law on Lietuvos bankas with respect to the Ministry of Finance. Žin., 1994, Nr. 99-1957; 2001, Nr. 28-890. See also point 2 of recommendation B of Recommendation

text: on the macro-prudential mandate of national authorities (OJ C 41, 14.2.2012, p. 1).

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 25 February 2015 on macro-prudential policy strategy (CON/2015/7)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 25 February 2015 on macro-prudential policy strategy (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 31 December 2014, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from Lietuvos bankas for an opinion on a draft macro-prudential policy strategy which will be adopted by resolution of the Board of Lietuvos bankas (hereinafter the ‘draft resolution’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and the third and sixth indents of

text: , as the draft resolution relates to a national central bank and rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft resolution

text: The aim of the draft resolution is to ensure the effective and transparent implementation of macroprudential policy. To this end, and in accordance with Recommendation

text: of the European Systemic Risk Board (hereinafter the ‘ESRB Recommendation’), the draft resolution sets out an overall framework defining the ultimate and intermediate macro-prudential policy objectives and lists a wide range of macro-prudential instruments that may be adopted. Furthermore, it outlines the general process and principles of decision-making, communications and cooperation with other authorities in the context of macro-prudential policy.

text: 2. Observations

text: 2.1. Follow-up assessment of ESRB recommendations is a task of the ESRB in accordance with

text: Article 17 of Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010

text: . In principle, it is not for the ECB to assess the national measures taken in response to an ESRB recommendation.

text: 2.2. Without prejudice to the above and to any actual follow up assessment to be carried out by the ESRB, the ECB welcomes the draft resolution. In particular, the ECB welcomes the provisions which envisage cooperation and/or coordination between Lietuvos bankas and the ECB when adopting decisions on macro-prudential policy, which is in accordance with Article 5 of Regulation 4 5

text: (EU) No 1024/2013

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council . The ECB suggests that the general provisions of the draft resolution refer to the fact that the draft resolution implements the ESRB Recommendation. This will help the public to identify the source for the draft resolution in addition to the legal basis provided by the Law on Lietuvos bankas. 2.3. The ECB welcomes the fact that the draft resolution provides a wide and non-exhaustive list of macro-prudential policy instruments which can be adopted, since additional macro-prudential policy instruments might be necessary in the future to prevent or mitigate new risks to financial stability. Therefore, the ECB also welcomes the fact that the draft resolution provides that it will be the responsibility of Lietuvos bankas to periodically assess the macro-prudential policy strategy at least once every three years, which leaves open the possibility of including other macro-prudential instruments, as provided for in recommendation D of the ESRB Recommendation.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 25 February 2015.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).

text: Zakon o Banki Slovenije (ZBS-1) (Ur. l. RS No 72/2006 – official consolidated text, 59/11).

text: Zakon o računskem sodišču (ZRacS-1) (Ur. l. RS No 11/01 and 109/12).

text: See amendments to Article 39 of the Law.

text: See amendments to Article 39 of the Law in connection with amendments to

text: Article 38

text: and Article 32 of the Law.

text: See amendments to Article 25 of the Law on Court of Audit. 7 See amendments to Article 33 of the Law.

text: See amendments to

text: Article 26

text: and Article 47 of the Law. 9 See amendments to Articles 35, 36 and 37 of the Law. 10 See amendments to Article 40 of the draft law. 11 In particular those described in points c) to f) above in paragraph 1 of this Opinion. The draft law now contains two different proposals in comparison to the previous legislative initiative and these two proposals relate to the grounds and procedure for the removal from office of members of Banka Slovenije’s Governing Board and to the audit of Banka Slovenije’s operations. 12 All ECB Opinions are available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: See, for example, the ECB’s Convergence Report 2014, p. 24. All ECB Convergence Reports are available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 14 See Opinion

text: . 15 See Opinion

text: and

text: . 16 Paragraph 2.4 of the Opinion

text: Council Decision 2012/444/EU of 24 July 2012

text: amending Decision

text: concerning the external auditors of the national central banks, as regards the external auditors of Banka Slovenije (OJ L 202, 28.7.2012, p. 21), approving the external auditors of Banka Slovenije for the period 2012-2014.

text: See, for example, the ECB’s Convergence Report 2013, p. 22. 19 Pursuant to Article 2 of the Law, the principle of central bank independence should be respected not only when Banka Slovenije performs ESCB-related tasks, but also when it performs national tasks.

text: See paragraph 5.1 and 5.2 of the Opinion

text: . 21 See, for example, p. 22 of the ECB’s Convergence Report 2013. 22 See, for example, p. 27 of the ECB’s Convergence Report 2013.

text: See Article 33(1) of the Law. 24

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 2533/98 of 23 November 1998

text: concerning the collection of statistical information by the European Central Bank (OJ L 318, 27.11.1998, p. 8). 25 Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive

text: and repealing Directives

text: and

text: (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 338). 26 Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (OJ L 281, 23.11.1995, p. 31).

text: ), Ireland, 19.12.2014, p. 2. 28 Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending

text: Council Directive 82/891/EEC

text: , and Directives

text: and

text: , and Regulations

text: (EU) No 1093/2010

text: and

text: (EU) No 648/2012

text: , of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 190). 29 See ECB Opinion on the disclosure of confidential information to a national parliamentary inquiry (

text: ), Ireland, 19.12.2014, p. 3.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 2 March 2015 on the independence of Banka Slovenije and of the members of its decision-making bodies (CON/2015/8)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 2 March 2015 on the independence of Banka Slovenije and of the members of its decision-making bodies (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 20 February 2015 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the President of the National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia for an opinion on a draft law amending the Law on Banka Slovenije (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft law relates to Banka Slovenije. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The draft law, which was submitted to the legislative procedure of the National Assembly by a group of its deputies, amends the legal framework of Banka Slovenije by amending the Law on 2 3 Banka Slovenije (hereinafter the ‘Law’) and the Law on the Court of Audit . The draft law: (a) introduces changes to the procedure for removing a member of Banka Slovenije’s Governing Board from office, in particular in cases of serious misconduct and incompatibility of functions ; (b) provides that Banka Slovenije be audited by the Court of Audit of the Republic of Slovenia ; (c) provides that, in addition to the representative of the committee of the National Assembly in charge of finance and monetary policy and the Minister for finance, additional representatives of the National Assembly’s committees may participate in meetings of Banka Slovenije’s Governing Board ; (d) increases Banka Slovenije’s reporting requirements to the National Assembly, in particular with regard to banks that received State aid;

text: (e) provides for an exemption whereby the duty to protect confidential information does not apply to information relating to banks receiving State aid, if such information is requested by the National Assembly, its working bodies or its Investigatory Committee ; (f) stipulates a larger voting majority for the appointment of a governor and other members of the Governing Board of Banka Slovenije by the National Assembly and limits the number of their reappointments to two ; (g) provides for the possibility that Banka Slovenije’s Governor may dismiss directors or deputy directors of its departments without providing any grounds .

text: 2. General observations

text: The ECB notes that early in 2014 it was consulted by the Slovenian authorities on draft legislation amending the Law on Banka Slovenije, which was also prepared by a group of deputies of the National Assembly and which proposed amendments to the Law on Banka Slovenije, some of which are identical to the amendments under the draft law . The ECB issued Opinion

text: on the previous legislative initiative and expressed some concerns. The previous legislative initiative was not endorsed in the deliberations in the Slovenian National Assembly, who took into consideration, inter alia, the concerns raised by the ECB in particular as regards the protection of central bank independence. The ECB reiterates the views expressed in Opinion

text: and has the following additional comments to make in relation to the draft law.

text: 3. Removal from office of a member of Banka Slovenije’s decision-making bodies

text: 3.1 Article 130 of the Treaty lays down the principle of personal independence, which is a key aspect of the principle of central bank independence for the members of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB). This principle is reflected in

text: Article 7

text: and Article 14.2 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter the ‘Statute of the ESCB’). In particular,

text: Article 14.2

text: provides, inter alia, that governors may only be relieved from office if they no longer fulfil the conditions required for the performance of their duties or if they have been guilty of serious misconduct, with the possibility of recourse to the Court of Justice of the European Union. The purpose of Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB is to prevent the authorities involved in the appointment of governors, particularly the government or parliament, from exercising their discretion to dismiss a governor. Since

text: Article 14.2

text: is directly applicable, national central bank

text: (NCB) statutes should either contain grounds for dismissal in line with

text: Article 14.2

text: , or should omit any mention of such grounds. Personal independence would be jeopardised if the same rules did not also apply to other members of the decision-making bodies of NCBs involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks. Various provisions of the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB require comparable security of tenure. Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB does not restrict the security of tenure of office to governors, while Article 130 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the ESCB Statute refer to ‘members of the decision-making bodies’ of NCBs rather than to governors specifically. This applies in particular where a governor is ‘first among equals’ with colleagues with equivalent voting rights or where such other members are involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks . 3.2

text: Article 39(1)

text: point 4, as proposed under the draft law, provides that a member of Banka Slovenije’s Governing Board may be removed from office if they have committed serious misconduct. The subsequent paragraphs of

text: Article 39

text: , as proposed under the draft law, set out a procedure for bringing this ground for dismissal, by reference to the evidence of a breach of law or constitution, and provide for the assessment of the initiative and any subsequent proposal to the National Assembly to dismiss a member of the Governing Board on the basis of a found breach of law or constitution. The ECB notes that not just any breach of law or of the constitution is inherently tantamount to or analogous with serious misconduct, and as such this provision broadens the scope of the Union law concept of ‘serious misconduct’ to such breaches. Accordingly, the national legislator should not specify what amounts to serious misconduct . Furthermore, the ECB has previously commented favourably on dismissal procedures where the finding of a breach of law had been the remit of the judicial system . However, the draft law entrusts a working body of the National Assembly, and not an independent judicial body, with the competence to establish breaches of law or of the constitution. Thus, the dismissal of a member of the Governing Board may be based on a discretionary assessment by a working body of the National Assembly whereas the purpose of Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB is to prevent competent authorities, typically the government or parliament, from exercising discretion on the grounds to dismiss a governor.

text: Article 39

text: , as proposed under the draft law, should be fully aligned with Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB, or omit any mention of grounds of dismissal, as

text: Article 14.2

text: is directly applicable. 3.3 The incompatibility of functions referred to in point 2 of Article 39(1) of the Law only addresses the situations defined in Article 38 of the Law. In this respect, the ECB reiterates the view expressed in its Convergence Report of May 2006 and in Opinion

text: that inserting a crossreference to

text: Article 38

text: in point 2 of

text: Article 39(1)

text: would be welcome for legal certainty reasons. In addition, it should be clarified that point 2 of Article 39(1) of the Law is a condition required for the

text: performance of duties and not a ground for dismissal in addition to the two grounds provided by Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB. 3.4 According to

text: Article 38(4)

text: , as proposed under the draft law, the existence of an incompatibility of functions of a member of the Governing Board is established by the National Assembly. As provided for in

text: Article 38(2)

text: point 5 of the Law ‘other work or activities that might affect their independence or could conflict with Banka Slovenije’s interests’ may constitute a function which is incompatible with the position of a member of the Governing Board. These provisions involve a discretionary assessment by the National Assembly on what impacts the independence or constitutes a conflict of interest of the members of the Governing Board. Given that incompatibilities may lead to the dismissal of members of the Governing Board and that their dismissal should not be discretionary in nature, the mentioned provisions raise concerns as regards the personal independence of the members of the board. Therefore, the ECB recommends that Banka Slovenije’s Governing Board retain its current powers to determine the existence of incompatibilities of the members of the Governing Board at least with regard to incompatibilities which may arise under

text: Article 38(2)

text: point 5 of the Law.

text: 4. Auditing of regularity of business operation of Banka Slovenije by the national Court of Audit

text: 4.1 The draft law amends Article 25 of the Law on Court of Audit, pursuant to which the operations of Banka Slovenije should be audited yearly by the Court of Audit of the Republic of Slovenia. 4.2 According to Article 1 of the Law on the Court of Audit, the Court is the supreme audit institution for the supervision of state accounts, the state budget and all public spending in Slovenia. In relation to other state authorities, the Court of Audit is an autonomous and independent authority. In relation to its auditing powers Article 20 of the Law on the Court of Audit states that the Court should audit the business operation of users of public funds, and more concretely (a) it may carry out regularity and performance audits; and (b) it may audit any act on past operations as well as any act on planned business operation, including acts prescribed by law or any special financial statement or report which the users of public funds is obliged to prepare at the request of the Court. 4.3 Article 27.1 of the Statute of the ESCB requires the accounts of the ECB and NCBs to be audited by independent external auditors recommended by the ECB’s Governing Council and approved by the Council of the European Union and this is duly reflected in Articles 52 and 65 of the Law. The established procedure as approved by the ECB’s Governing Council in the ʼGood Practices for the selection and mandate of external auditorsʻ, and as currently followed by Banka Slovenije is to appoint independent auditors or firms of auditors as external auditors with a specific audit multiyear mandate. 4.4 The ECB notes that whereas a state auditor may not be charged with the audit of the financial accounts of an NCB, it would be in principle possible to give competences to a state audit office or similar body charged with controlling the use of public finances, such as the Court of Audit, in

text: respect of NCB activities and use of public finances. However, such competence of the Court of Audit should be subject to a number of safeguards of central bank independence: (a) the scope of the control should be clearly defined by the legal framework; (b) the activities of the NCB’s independent external auditors should not be prejudiced; (c) in line with the principle of institutional independence, as enshrined in Article 130 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB, the audit should: (a) comply with the prohibition on giving instructions to an NCB and its decisionmaking bodies, (b) not interfere with the NCB’s ESCB-related tasks, and (c) be carried out on a non-political, independent and purely professional basis. 4.5 The ECB considers that the broad scope of the mandate that the proposed amendment gives to the Court of Audit in respect of Banka Slovenije is not compatible with Article 27 of the Statute of the ESCB and with the principle of independence. 4.6 In addition, and without prejudice to the above, the ECB notes an inconsistency in the Law resulting from the proposed deletion of point 1 of Article 32(1) of the Law. Point 1 of

text: Article 32(1)

text: provides that the Governing Board of Banka Slovenije shall be competent to propose the external auditor. Deleting the competence of the Governing Board to propose the external auditors from

text: Article 32(1)

text: is not consistent with its role established in

text: Article 52(2)

text: . According to Article 52(2) of the Law, the auditor is selected by the Governing Board on the basis of a preliminary call for bids and is then, in accordance with Article 52(1) and 65 of the Law proposed in line with the rules of Article 27.1 of the Statute of the ESCB. The ECB understands that this inconsistency may have been caused in light of the fact that the draft law is largely based on the text of the previous legislative initiative from 2014. The deletion of point 1 of

text: Article 32(1)

text: should be removed.

text: 5. Other amendments

text: 5.1 Previous legislative initiative of 2014 to change the Law on Banka Slovenije The ECB reiterates its views expressed in Opinion

text: where applicable to the draft law, and complements them, as follows. 5.2 Participation by representatives of third parties in Banka Slovenije’s Governing Board meetings The principle of central bank institutional independence, enshrined in Article 130 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB, renders the participation by representatives of third parties in an NCB’s decision-making body with a right to vote on matters concerning the performance by the NCB of ESCB-related tasks incompatible with the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB, even if such a vote is not decisive . Furthermore, the principle of central bank institutional independence also renders the participation of third party representatives, without a right to vote in the meetings of an NCB’s decision-making body entrusted with the performance of ESCB-related tasks, incompatible with the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB, if such participation interferes with the performance of ESCB-related tasks by that decision-making body or endangers compliance with the ESCB’s confidentiality regime.

text: 5.3 Reporting by Banka Slovenije to the National Assembly and confidentiality of information 5.3.1 The ECB notes that the proposed amendments to Article 26 of the Law on the reporting of Banka Slovenije to the National Assembly and the proposed amendment to Article 47 of the Law on the protection of confidential data should be assessed with regard to the relevant Union law. 5.3.2 First, the proposed new Article 26(3) of the Law provides that the report addressed to the National Assembly should contain a report on the work and on the performance of tasks of the members of the Governing Board of Banka Slovenije. However, the Governing Board is a collegial body accountable to the National Assembly as a whole. Depending on the level of detail of this report, this provision raises concerns regarding the institutional independence of Banka Slovenije and the personal independence of the members of the Governing Board. The Law should contain adequate safeguards in order to ensure that: (a) the reporting obligations do not result in an interference with the independence of the members of Governing Board as provided for in Article 130 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB; (b) the special status of governors in their capacity as members of the ECB’s decision-making bodies is fully respected; and (c) confidentiality requirements resulting from the Statute of the ESCB are observed . 5.3.3 Second, as pointed out by the ECB in its Convergence Reports , the obligation of professional secrecy for ECB and NCB staff under Article 37 of the Statute of the ESCB may give rise to similar provisions in NCBs’ statutes or in Member States’ legislation. The primacy of Union law and rules adopted thereunder also means that national laws on third party access to documents may not result in infringements of the ESCB’s confidentiality regime. Access to an NCB’s information and documents must be without prejudice to the ESCB’s confidentiality regime, to which the members of NCBs’ decision-making bodies and staff are subject. Where access to NCB’s information and documents is allowed under Union law, the NCBs should ensure that such bodies protect the confidentiality of information and documents disclosed at a level corresponding to that applied by the NCBs themselves. Therefore, any provision of information permitted by the proposed amendments to Article 26 of the Law on the reporting of Banka Slovenije to the National Assembly and the proposed amendment to Article 47 of the Law on protection of confidential data should comply with the relevant Union laws, including those governing the exchange of statistical and supervisory information, as well as the obligation of professional secrecy. Therefore, Article 26 of the Law should refer not only to national laws in this respect but also to Union law including Article 37 of the Statute of the ESCB. Furthermore, without prejudice to the ECB’s observations regarding the specific protection of statistical or supervisory information laid down in Union law and referred to in the next paragraphs, the ECB emphasises that confidential information may be exchanged only if necessary for the performance of the tasks of the body that receives the information. In this context, the ECB notes that a representative of the National Assembly’s Committee for finance and monetary policy may participate, subject to compliance with the conditions set out in paragraph 5.2 above regarding the participation by representatives of third parties in Banka Slovenije’s Governing Board meetings, in meetings of the Governing Board of

text: Banka Slovenije where they can become acquainted with any confidential information, including the details relating to granting State aid to credit institutions. 5.3.4 Third, with respect to the exchange of confidential statistical information, according to

text: Article 8(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2533/98

text: , the ESCB members shall take all the necessary regulatory, administrative, technical and organisational measures to ensure the physical and logical protection of confidential statistical information. The ECB recalls that confidential statistical information may only be used for the exercise of the tasks of the ESCB and, as regards NCBs, in the field of prudential supervision or for other statutory NCB tasks. 5.3.5 Fourth, with respect to supervisory information, Union law provides a framework for cooperation and collaboration with relevant authorities and other entities. These arrangements reflect the need to protect confidential information and also the need to allow cooperation. Any exchange of information may only be performed under those arrangements. Against this background, the ECB further notes that

text: Article 47(2)

text: as proposed under the draft law – suspending the duty to safeguard confidential information relating to banks and savings banks that received State aid or were subject to measures under the Law on measures for strengthening bank stability, if such information was requested by the National Assembly, a working body of the National Assembly, or the Investigation Committee of the National Assembly – raises concerns with regard to a number of provisions from Union law. In particular,

text: Article 47(2)

text: as proposed under the draft law is not compatible with

text: Article 59 of Directive 2013/36/EU

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council . Pursuant to

text: Article 59(2) of Directive 2013/36/EU

text: , Member States may authorise disclosures of certain information relating to the prudential supervision of institutions to parliamentary inquiry committees subject to specific conditions which apply when disclosing such information to parliamentary enquiry committees in the relevant Member State: (a) the parliamentary enquiry committee must have a ‘precise mandate’ under national law; (b) the information must be ‘strictly necessary’ for fulfilling that mandate; (c) persons with access to the information are subject to professional secrecy requirements under national law at least equivalent to those referred to in

text: Article 53(1) of Directive 2013/36/EU

text: ; (d) where the information originates in another Member State, that it is not disclosed without the express agreement of the competent authorities which have disclosed it and, solely for the purposes for which those authorities gave their agreement; and (e) to the extent that the disclosure of information relating to prudential supervision involves processing of personal data, any processing by the parliamentary enquiry committee must comply with national law transposing Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council . These conditions have to be respected and implemented when disclosing confidential information to an enquiry committee of

text: the National Assembly . The ECB notes that the provisions in Directive

text: on the exchange of information and professional secrecy do not provide a legal basis for the disclosure of confidential information to the National Assembly per se. Similar concerns may also be raised as regards

text: Article 26(4)

text: , as proposed under the draft law. Accordingly,

text: Article 26

text: should clearly state that the laws governing the protection of confidential information apply to any report that Banka Slovenije submits to the National Assembly. Second, under Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council the sharing of confidential information on resolution (actions, tools, plans etc.) with parliamentary enquiry committees is not wholly unrestricted.

text: Article 84(5) of Directive 2014/59/EU

text: provides that Member States may authorise the exchange of information with parliamentary enquiry committees in their Member State ‘under appropriate conditions’. Member States should take into account the general purpose behind professional secrecy in this context as expressed, for example, in

text: recital 86

text: of

text: Directive 2014/59/EU

text: which states that ‘… therefore [it is] necessary to ensure that there are appropriate mechanisms for maintaining the confidentiality of such information, such as the content and details of recovery and resolution plans and the result of any assessment carried out in that context’ .

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 2 March 2015.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42). 2 Consolidated text published in Dziennik Ustaw (Dz. U.) of 2013, item 908.

text: See in particular the ECB’s Convergence Report 2014, Section 6.6, pp. 250 to 254, and paragraph 2 of Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 4 See Opinion

text: See the ECB’s Convergence Report 2014, Section 6.6.2.2, p. 251, recommending amendments to Articles

text: and the second sentence of

text: Article 17

text: (2b) of the Law on NBP. 6 See

text: Article 1(5)

text: (b) of the draft law. 7 See

text: Article 1(6)

text: (a) of the draft law. 8 See Article 1(8) of the draft law and p. 5 of the explanatory memorandum. 9 See the ECB’s Convergence Report 2014, Section 6.6.2.2, p.251, and related ECB opinions referred to therein.

text: See the ECB’s Convergence Report 2014, Section 6.6.4, pp. 252 and 253. 11 Consolidated text published in Dz. U. of 2015, item 128. 12

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 1338/2001 of 28 June 2001

text: laying down measures necessary for the protection of the euro against counterfeiting (OJ L 181, 4.7.2001, p. 6). 13

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 1339/2001 of 28 June 2001

text: extending the effects of

text: Regulation (EC) No 1338/2001

text: laying down measures necessary for the protection of the euro against counterfeiting to those Member States which have not adopted the euro as their single currency (OJ L 181, 4.7.2001, p. 11).

text: See in particular the ECB’s Convergence Report 2014, Section 6.6, pp. 250 to 254. 15 See the ECB’s Convergence Report 2014, Section 6.6.2.1, pp. 251 and 252. 16 See the ECB’s Convergence Report 2014, Section 6.6.3, p. 252. 17 See the ECB’s Convergence Report 2014, Section 6.6.5.2, pp. 253 and 254.

text: See the ECB’s Convergence Report 2014, Section 6.6.5.3, p. 254. 19 In this respect, on 14 June 2012 the Governing Council approved a series of good practices for the selection and mandate of external auditors in accordance with Article 27.1 of the Statute of the ESCB. These were established in order to provide high level guidance for the selection and mandate of external auditors. Although not binding, it is intended that each Eurosystem central bank, when selecting its external auditors pursuant to Article 27.1 of the Statute of the ESCB, and when determining their mandate thereafter, applies these good practices and/or explains any divergence. 20 See the ECB’s Convergence Report 2014, Section 6.6.5.4, p. 254. 21 See the ECB’s Convergence Report 2014, Section 6.6.5.5, p. 254.

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 of 13 December 1993

text: specifying definitions for the application of the prohibitions referred to in Articles

text: and

text: b(1) of the Treaty (OJ L 332, 31.12.1993, p. 1). 23 See

text: Article 5

text: (1b) of the Law on NBP. 24 Similarly, see Opinion

text: . 25 Similarly, see Opinion

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 10 March 2015 on the legal framework for Narodowy Bank Polski (CON/2015/9)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 10 March 2015 on the legal framework for Narodowy Bank Polski (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 30 December 2014 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Polish Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft law amending the Law on Narodowy Bank Polski and the Law on higher education (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the first, second and third indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft law relates to currency matters, means of payment and national central banks. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The draft law amends the Law of 29 August 1997 on Narodowy Bank Polski (hereinafter the ‘Law on NBP’) with a view to revising and updating the legal framework for the central bank in Poland. 1.2 To this end, the draft law: (a) subject to a transitional period, reduces the number of members of the Monetary Policy Council (MPC), NBP’s independent rate-setting body, and introduces a rolling membership system with overlapping terms of office for MPC members appointed by the various appointing bodies, in order to enhance the stability of the MPC’s composition and the continuity of its decision-making process; (b) clarifies restrictions on the MPC members’ professional and public activities and introduces sanctions for non-compliance; (c) reorganises the portfolio of instruments available to NBP by categorising all existing and new NBP instruments as monetary policy instruments or financial stability instruments, as well as by expanding the category of financial stability instruments to include: (i) stability loans, which may be granted to banks as well as other entities subject to financial market supervision; (ii) intraday loans, which may be granted to entities that are subject to financial market supervision and participate in payment systems operated by NBP; and (iii) sales and

text: purchases of debt securities outside open market operations, as part of transactions with the deposit guarantee scheme and the central securities depository. (d) amends the provisions regarding the issue of currency, in particular by: (i) limiting the NBP President’s task of determining the maximum volume of issuance of banknotes and coins so that it applies only to collector banknotes and coins; (ii) consolidating in the Law on NBP and expanding the rules regarding authenticity and fitness checking, and the criteria for the replacement of banknotes and coins; and (iii) consolidating in the Law on NBP and expanding the rules regarding counterfeit banknotes and coins; (e) enables NBP to cooperate with international organisations, international financial institutions and international banking institutions even if it is not a member thereof, and to participate in projects implemented in the context of such cooperation; (f) clarifies that NBP may be a member of any international organisation, including organisations whose area of activity goes beyond banking and finance; (g) clarifies that the expenses relating to Poland’s membership in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that are covered by NBP’s own funds include in particular expenses relating to: (i) quotas assigned to Poland; and (ii) Poland’s participation in IMF financial initiatives addressed to its members; (h) streamlines the procedures for deputising for NBP’s President.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 Since 2004, in its Convergence Reports, the ECB has assessed the compatibility of Polish legislation with the requirements of primary Union law relating to NBP’s participation in the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and, prospectively, in the Eurosystem . The legal provisions identified in the ECB’s Convergence Reports as being incompatible with Union requirements are found both in the Polish Constitution and in ordinary legislation, in particular in the Law on NBP. 2.2 The ECB welcomes the draft law to the extent that it addresses a number of these incompatibilities. However, there are still various outstanding issues that the draft law does not remedy. The ECB therefore invites the Polish authorities to ensure compatibility with Union requirements at all levels of national legislation.

text: 3. Personal independence

text: 3.1 The ECB’s Convergence Report 2014 identified several provisions of the Law on NBP and other laws that are incompatible with the requirements under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union with respect to central bank personal independence. In particular, some of these provisions in the Law on NBP establish grounds for the dismissal of NBP’s President and other

text: members of NBP’s decision-making bodies involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks that go beyond the exclusive grounds for dismissal specified in Article 14.2 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter the ‘Statute of the ESCB’) . 3.2 In this respect, the draft law not only fails to remedy the above incompatibilities with the Union requirements but introduces an additional ground for dismissal of the MPC members, i.e. a breach of the restrictions imposed on their professional activities . These restrictions include a prohibition on holding any other positions or engaging in commercial or public activities other than academic work, teaching or writing or engaging, without the MPC’s consent, in any activities of international organisations . Such restrictions are welcomed since they represent safeguards against a conflict of interests, and such safeguards are an element of the personal independence of the members of NBP’s decision-making bodies. However, in order to ensure compliance with Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB, in conjunction with

text: Article 130

text: TFEU and Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB, the draft law should make clear that a breach of such restrictions does not constitute a ground for dismissal of MPC members in addition to the two grounds laid down in Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB. This could be achieved, for example, if compliance with the abovementioned restrictions was subsumed under the conditions required for the performance of the duties of the members of NBP’s decision-making bodies. 3.3 The sanction for non-compliance with the abovementioned restrictions is introduced with respect to the MPC members only, and not to the members of NBP’s Management Board . However, the ECB has on many occasions noted that personal independence would be jeopardised if the rules for the security of tenure and grounds for dismissal of governors of national central banks (NCBs) were not also to apply to other members of the NCBs’ decision-making bodies , which in this case covers the NBP Management Board and MPC members alike. In that respect, the ECB emphasises that the grounds for dismissal of both MPC members and NBP Management Board members should be fully in line with Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB. 3.4 At the same time, the ECB reiterates the remarks made in the ECB’s Convergence Report 2014 and Opinion

text: , which relate to the grounds for dismissal of members of NBP’s decisionmaking bodies.

text: 4. Monetary financing prohibition

text: 4.1 The ECB’s Convergence Report 2014 referred to the provisions of the Law on NBP that lay down NBP’s powers to grant refinancing credit to banks. In particular, reference was made to Article 42(3) of the Law on NBP, which allows NBP to grant refinancing credit for the purpose of implementing bank rehabilitation proceedings that are initiated in the event of a bank suffering a net

text: loss, of being threatened with such a loss, or of insolvency . The Convergence Report stated that safeguards aimed at ensuring timely repayment of such credit did not fully exclude an interpretation that would allow an extension of refinancing credit to a bank undergoing rehabilitation proceedings that then becomes insolvent. In this respect, the ECB recommended the introduction of explicit safeguards to avoid incompatibility with the monetary financing prohibition under Article 123 of the Treaty and recommended amending the Law on NBP by introducing more explicit safeguards in relation to all financial institutions receiving liquidity support. 4.2 Therefore, the ECB welcomes the provisions proposed in

text: Article 1(17)

text: (b) of the draft law, repealing Article 42(3) of the Law on NBP and thus abolishing the possibility of granting refinancing credit to a bank for the purpose of implementing a rehabilitation programme. This amendment brings the provisions related to refinancing credit into line with the monetary financing prohibition rules. 4.3 Nevertheless, the ECB would welcome two further clarifications in the draft law. First, it is noted that the draft law repeals Article 42(7) of the Law on NBP, which extends to refinancing credit the application of general conditions for extending credit contained in the Law of 29 August 1997 on banking , including in particular the requirement to provide adequate collateral. Therefore, the requirement to provide adequate collateral is missing from the proposed wording of Articles 42(1) and 43(1) of the Law on NBP, i.e. the provisions related to refinancing credit and loans extended to the Bank Guarantee Fund. The ECB would recommend that the requirement that these loans may only be granted against adequate collateral be reintroduced in these provisions. Secondly, as regards the intraday loan facility introduced by the proposed

text: Article 43

text: a of the Law on NBP, which may be granted to entities subject to financial market supervision which participate in the payment systems operated by NBP, the provision could specify that this instrument supports the smooth functioning of payment systems and not only financial stability. The ECB understands that such intraday credit is not restricted to situations that threaten financial stability.

text: 5. Issuance of money

text: 5.1 The proposed

text: Article 35

text: b(2)(1)(a) of the Law on NBP excludes euro banknotes and coins from the scope of applicability of the rules on authenticity checking. With regard to the authenticity checking of euro banknotes and coins,

text: Article 35

text: b(5) then refers to

text: Article 6 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1338/2001

text: . However,

text: Article 6 of Regulation (EC) No 1338/2001

text: is only applicable in Member States which have not adopted the euro as their single currency, due to the extension of the scope of applicability contained in

text: Article 1 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1339/2001

text: . Moreover,

text: Article 1 of Regulation (EC) 1339/2001

text: refers to a broader set of rules, so the reference made in the proposed

text: Article 35

text: b(5) of the Law on NBP appears to be too narrow in this regard. At the

text: same time,

text: encompasses references to other applicable rules, in particular concerning the method for carrying out authenticity checks. In this regard too, a reference to

text: Article 6 of Council Regulation (EC) 1338/2001

text: could be too narrow. 5.2 Therefore, the ECB advises amending the wording of the proposed

text: Article 35

text: b(5) of the Law on NBP to correctly reflect these references.

text: 6. Other incompatibilities with Union legislation

text: 6.1 The ECB’s Convergence Report 2014 identified several provisions in the Law on NBP that are incompatible with Treaty requirements regarding central bank independence and confidentiality . Although the draft law amends some of those provisions, it does not fully remedy all of the incompatibilities. This applies in particular to the following provisions. 6.2 Firstly, the ECB’s Convergence Report 2014 referred to various issues of institutional independence that need to be addressed inter alia by amending Article 11 of the Law on NBP . Although the draft law introduces some amendments to this Article, it does not remedy its incompatibility with Article 130 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB. Furthermore, the draft law amends Article 23 of the Law on NBP but it does not remove the obligation to forward draft monetary policy guidelines to the Council of Ministers and the Minister for Finance. These provisions need to be brought into line with the relevant requirements of the Treaty and of the Statute of the ESCB. 6.3 With respect to the rules on the confidentiality of information, although the draft law introduces amendments to Article 23 of the Law on NBP, it does not address the issue of the disclosure of certain data that is made possible by Article 23(7) of the Law on NBP. The ECB’s Convergence Report 2014 cites this as an issue that could potentially affect data protected under the ESCB’s confidentiality regime. The Convergence Report recommended amending the provision to fully comply with Article 37 of the Statute of the ESCB , and that recommendation is now reiterated.

text: 7. Legal integration of NBP into the Eurosystem

text: 7.1 The legal integration of NCBs into the Eurosystem requires that national legislation be amended to allow for the performance of Eurosystem-related tasks and compliance with the ECB’s decisions once the Member State concerned has adopted the euro. The ECB’s Convergence Report 2014 pointed to the necessity of several such amendments. Although some of the relevant provisions are being amended, the draft law has not taken this opportunity to remedy these incompatibilities. In addition to the provisions referred to in paragraphs 3, 4 and 6 of this Opinion, this refers in particular to the following. 7.2 Firstly, as regards NBP’s tasks , although the draft law amends provisions relating to the MPC and

text: monetary policy instruments, it does not address the fact that the provisions providing for NBP’s powers with regard to monetary policy do not recognise the ECB’s powers in this field. Similarly, the draft law amends Article 23 of the Law on NBP, which provides for NBP’s powers relating to the collection of statistics, but does not remedy the fact that the Law on NBP does not recognise the ECB’s powers in this field. Also, the provisions of the Law on NBP which provide for NBP’s exclusive powers to issue and withdraw banknotes and coins having the status of legal tender do not recognise the powers of the Council and the ECB in this field. 7.3 Secondly, as regards financial provisions , the draft law amends the rules on the appointment of independent external auditors, but does not recognise the powers of the Council and the ECB under Article 27.1 of the Statute of the ESCB . Also, the draft law does not address the need to ensure that the powers of the Supreme Audit Office (NIK) to control NBP’s activities are clearly defined and are without prejudice to the activities of NBP’s independent external auditors. 7.4 As regards exchange rate policy, although the draft law amends Article 17 of the Law on NBP, it does not recognise the powers of the Council and the ECB in this field . 7.5 Further, although the draft law amends the provisions of the Law on NBP related to the issuing of banknotes and coins having the status of legal tender, it does not recognise the powers of the Council and the ECB in this field. 7.6 Finally, although the draft law amends the provisions related to the NBP’s participation in international financial and banking institutions, it does not recognise the ECB’s powers in this field .

text: 8. Appropriate time to amend the Law on NBP

text: 8.1 The ECB draws the Polish authorities’ attention to the fact that, in order to comply with Article 131 of the Treaty requiring the compatibility of national legislation with the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB, the relevant Polish legislation had to be adjusted by the date of Polish accession to the Union, i.e. 1 May 2004. Hence, amendments addressing the outstanding issues identified in the ECB’s Convergence Report 2014 concerning central bank independence, confidentiality and the monetary financing prohibition need to be adopted and enter into force as soon as possible, irrespective of when Poland adopts the euro. 8.2 Although the amendments that are necessary to ensure the full integration of NBP into the Eurosystem should also be adopted as soon as possible, at the latest they must enter into force on the date when Poland adopts the euro.

text: 9. Expenses relating to Poland’s membership of the IMF

text: Monetary financing prohibition

text: 9.1 The tasks performed by an NCB must comply with the monetary financing prohibition under Article 123 of the Treaty and

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93

text: . Pursuant to Article 7 of that Regulation, the financing by NCBs of obligations falling upon the public sector vis-à-vis the IMF is not regarded as a credit facility within the meaning of Article 123 of the Treaty. Recital 14 of Regulation 3603/93 sets out the rationale for the exemption and confirms that it is appropriate to authorise the financing by NCBs of obligations falling on the public sector vis-à-vis the IMF, as this financing results in claims which have all the characteristics of reserve assets. In the light of the draft amendment to

text: Article 5

text: (1a) of the Law on NBP, it must be understood that NBP would be responsible for the financing of IMF-related obligations only in respect of financing which results in claims of NBP which have the characteristics of reserve assets , or in respect of financing which does not result in such claims but which is financed from funds that are due to Poland from, and transferred to it by, the IMF and the spending of which reduces NBP’s revenue and, consequently, the portion of its profit to be remitted to the State budget . Provided that this is the case, the ECB considers that the proposed provisions would fall within the scope of

text: Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 3603/93

text: and should therefore not be regarded as a form of monetary financing prohibited under the Treaty.

text: Central bank independence

text: 9.2 NBP is responsible for paying any increases in Poland’s IMF quota. It also exercises all rights connected with the IMF system of special drawing rights (SDRs) and is in charge of fulfilling all Polish financial obligations resulting from Poland’s membership of the IMF. In this context, and in line with the principle of central bank independence enshrined in Article 130 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB, NBP should take decisions regarding the management of the SDRs in a fully independent manner . The ECB recommends that this is clarified in the draft law.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 10 March 2015.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI