text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: The provisions relating to the authorisation are the following:

text: Article 5

text: amending Article 72(3) of the Law,

text: Article 6

text: inserting a new

text: Article 72

text: .a in the Law,

text: Article 37

text: amending Article 396(2) of the Law and

text: Article 38

text: in the transitional and final provisions chapter of the draft law.

text: Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 amending Directives

text: and

text: as regards capital requirements for the trading book and for re-securitisations, and the supervisory review of remuneration policies (OJ L 329, 14.12.2010, p. 3).

text: Directive

text: and

text: in respect of the powers of the European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), the European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority) and the European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority) (OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 120).

text: See e.g. the ECB’s Convergence Report May 2010, p. 21, available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: In the context of consultations by Slovenian authorities, see e.g. paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 3.5 of Opinion

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 9 September 2011 on authorisation to act on the supervisory boards of banks (CON/2011/70)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 9 September 2011 on authorisation to act on the supervisory boards of banks (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 22 August 2011, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Slovenian Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft law amending the Law on banking (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third and sixth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to Banka Slovenije and contains rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The Ministry requested the ECB’s opinion on the provisions of the draft law introducing in the Law on banking (hereinafter the ‘Law’) the need to obtain authorisation to act as member of a bank’s supervisory board (hereinafter the ‘authorisation’) . Banka Slovenije grants the authorisation if the candidate has been duly appointed by the bank’s general assembly and meets the conditions under the Law, namely: (i) appropriate professional qualifications and the characteristics and experience necessary to supervise the management of the bank’s operations (i.e. at least five years of experience in managing or supervising the operations of a company of comparable size and activities), and (ii) not having been convicted, by a final judgment, of certain criminal offences. If the candidate does not meet the conditions mentioned above or the available information shows that the bank’s operations could be jeopardised, pursuant to risk management rules, due to activities and operations carried out by the candidate or due to past actions, Banka Slovenije rejects the

text: application. The authorisation is bound to the supervisory board member’s function at a particular bank and ceases to be valid following expiry of the term of office to which it relates. The supervisory board member must inform Banka Slovenije within five business days that their term of office has expired and Banka Slovenije issues a decision declaring that the authorisation ceased to be valid on that basis. According to the transitional provisions of the draft law, members of a bank’s supervisory board carrying out their function on the basis of decisions valid before the entry into force of the draft law must obtain authorisation within 24 months from the entry into force of the draft law. 1.2 Most of the draft law provisions are intended to transpose Directive

text: and Directive

text: into Slovenian law. In accordance with

text: Article 1(2) of Decision 98/415/EC

text: , the ECB does not provide its opinion on draft legislative provisions the exclusive purpose of which is the transposition of Union directives into the law of Member States. 1.3 Finally, the draft law makes mainly editorial changes to the provisions of the Law governing the Slovenian deposit guarantee scheme.

text: 2. The competence of Banka Slovenije

text: 2.1 The ECB welcomes the provisions of the draft law introducing an authorisation to act as member of a bank’s supervisory board. It could contribute to efficient supervision of banks’ operational management. Within its role as Slovenian banking supervisor, Banka Slovenije is well placed to grant the authorisation, as it already does in the case of the authorisation to act as member of a bank’s management board. 2.2 The ECB expects that any legislative provisions giving new competences to Banka Slovenije are agreed by Banka Slovenije.

text: 3. Central bank independence

text: 3.1 As granting the authorisation would be a new task entrusted to Banka Slovenije, it would have to commit additional human and financial resources to carry out this task. In this context, the ECB has emphasised that ‘Member States may not put their [national central banks] in a position where they have insufficient financial resources to carry out their ESCB or Eurosystem related tasks, as applicable’ . The ECB has consistently expressed its concern that, when allocating additional tasks

text: to national central banks, it must be ensured that they have sufficient human and financial resources, both in terms of quantity and quality, for all of their tasks, and in particular that their capacity to fulfil their ESCB or Eurosystem-related tasks is not affected . 3.2 Such considerations are of particular importance from the perspective of the initial additional work stemming from the requirement for members already appointed to banks’ supervisory boards to obtain authorisation within 24 months from entry into force of the draft law. Consequently, Banka Slovenije would have to process these applications at the same time as applications by members appointed to banks’ supervisory boards following entry into force of the draft law.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 2 These public debt securities are mainly governed by: (a) the Law of 2 January 1991 on the market for public debt securities and on monetary policy instruments; and (b) the Royal Decree of 14 June 1994 laying down the rules for maintaining accounts for dematerialised securities denominated in foreign currency or units of account. 3 Currently, these intermediaries are the following NBB-SSS participants: (a) the NBB; (b) Clearstream Banking and Euroclear France; (c) Euroclear Bank; and (d) the participant who is either the issuer, or the paying agent designated in the issuing agreement (

text: Article 1

text: §2 of the Royal Decree of 14 June 1994). 4 See Article 4 of the Law of 2 January 1991 which designates the NBB as the settlement institution entrusted with holding dematerialised Belgian public debt securities and the settlement of transactions therein.

text: The two following categories of NBB-SSS participants will be added: (a) securities settlement institutions, as defined in Article 2 of the Law of 2 August 2002 on the supervision of the financial sector and on financial services; and (b) paying agents responsible for the servicing of an on-going issue of securities with NBB-SSS (new

text: Article 1

text: §2 of the Royal Decree of 14 June 1994, amended by Article 1 of the draft royal decree). 6 Fourth recital to the draft royal decree. 7 New

text: Article 1

text: §3 of the Royal Decree of 14 June 1994, amended by Article

text: ° of the draft royal decree. 8 New Article

text: ° of the Royal Decree of 14 June 1994, amended by Article 2 of the draft royal decree. 9 The requirement in the Law of 2 January 1991, that authorised intermediaries maintain dematerialised public debt securities only and/or directly on accounts held with the NBB’s settlement system or with a participant in that system (i.e. the principle of ‘direct and single access’) was repealed by Article 19 of the Law of 15 December 2004 relating to financial collateral and various tax provisions in relation to in rem collateral arrangements and loans relating to financial instruments. This allowed for the establishment of a multi-tiered system of indirectly held dematerialised public debt securities (see Opinion

text: , paragraph 15). 10 See section 2.8.2 of the June 2011 Issue List for Task Force on smooth cross-CSD settlement, available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 11 See the ESCB-CESR Recommendations for securities settlement systems and recommendations for central counterparties in the European Union (2009), available on the ECB website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

publisher: Europeiska centralbanken

sprak: en

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 15 September 2011 on the categories of intermediaries authorised to maintain accounts for dematerialised securities denominated in foreign currency or units of account (CON/2011/71)

serie: con

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 15 September 2011 on the categories of intermediaries authorised to maintain accounts for dematerialised securities denominated in foreign currency or units of account (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

type: rubrik

text: On 15 August 2011, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Belgian Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft royal decree amending the Royal Decree of 14 June 1994 laying down the rules for maintaining accounts for dematerialised securities denominated in foreign currency or units of account (hereinafter the ‘draft royal decree’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Article 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the fifth indent of

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft legislation concerns settlement systems. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

type: stycke

text: 1. Purpose of the draft royal decree

text: 1.1 The draft royal decree aims to improve the marketability of dematerialised Belgian public debt securities denominated in foreign currency or units of account by increasing the number of intermediaries authorised to maintain accounts for such securities . These securities are held in the securities settlement system administered by the Nationale Bank van België/Banque Nationale de Belgique (NBB), the NBB-SSS . The two new categories of intermediaries that will be authorised

text: to maintain accounts for these securities were selected for their ability to process cash flows in foreign currency or in units of account . 1.2 In addition, the concept of ‘foreign currencies’ defining the scope of the Royal Decree of 14 June 1994 will cover the ‘foreign currencies for which the ECB publishes daily foreign exchange reference rates’ , instead of referring to the monetary units of the members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. These daily foreign exchange reference rates will also be used for calculating the euro value of the securities . Finally, the draft royal decree will reflect in the Royal Decree of 14 June 1994, the abolition of the principle of ‘direct and single access’ to the NBB-SSS that entered into force in 2006 already .

text: 2. General observations

text: The ECB welcomes the draft royal decree as it will allow for a much wider range of financial institutions participating in NBB-SSS to maintain accounts for dematerialised Belgian public debt securities denominated in foreign currency or units of account. In June 2011, a TARGET2-Securities (T2S) taskforce had indeed already indicated that the restricted categories of NBB-SSS participants authorised to maintain accounts for such securities were obstacles to smooth cross-CSD settlement in T2S . In addition, this development is in line with the recommendation issued by the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) concerning access (recommendation 14) , which states that rules and requirements restricting access to securities settlement systems should be aimed solely at controlling risk.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 15 September 2011. [signed]

text: The Vice-President of the ECB

text: Vítor CONSTÂNCIO

type: vagledning

utgivare: ecb


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: Such extension will not apply to the fulfilment of the credit institution’s obligations under proposed

text: Article 63

text: A(2), such as transactions in financial instruments carried out on the money or capital markets.

text: FEK Vol Α 27/16.2.2009.

text: ‘Branch’ means a separate operational unit within the HDGIF availing of a segregated account for the purposes of resolution financing as specified in proposed

text: Article 13

text: A of the Law on the HDGIF.

text: FEK Vol Α 178/1.8.2007.

text: See the Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece – Fourth Review available at: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2011/op82_en.htm. In particular, paragraph 12 of the Memorandum of Financial and Economic Policies in the Annex iterates the need, in the context of ongoing initiatives at the EU level, to strengthen the resolution framework for problem banks and to allow timely and effective intervention and resolution consistent with EU Treaty rules and international sound practices. In this context, a broad set of tools is to be prepared to ensure that a resolution regime for financial institutions is put into place to safeguard financial stability and ensure effective depositor protection.

text: See also DG Internal Market and Services Working document on ‘Technical details of a possible EU framework for bank recovery and resolution’, January 2011, available on the European Commission’s website at www.ec.europa.eu.

text: See proposed

text: Article 63

text: E in the draft law.

text: FEK Vol A 119/21.7.2010.

text: See proposed

text: Article 63

text: E(5) in the draft law.

text: See proposed

text: Article 63

text: E(4) in the draft law.

text: See proposed

text: Article 13

text: A in the draft law.

text: See proposed

text: Article 13

text: A(3) in the draft law.

text: See proposed

text: Article 63

text: (D) and (E) in the draft law.

text: See proposed

text: Article 13

text: A(3) and (4) in the draft law.

text: See proposed

text: Article 63

text: D(4) in the draft law.

text: See proposed

text: Article 63

text: B in the draft law.

text: OJ L 125, 5.5.2001, p. 125.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 19 September 2011 on amendments to the Greek resolution regime for credit institutions (CON/2011/72)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 19 September 2011 on amendments to the Greek resolution regime for credit institutions (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 5 September 2011, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Greek Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft law entitled ‘Enhanced supervisory and resolution measures for credit institutions, regulation of financial issues, ratification of the European Financial Stability Facility Framework Agreement and amendments thereto and other provisions’ (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). On 16 September 2011, the Ministry submitted another request in relation to a set of draft legislative provisions amending the legal framework governing the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund (HFSF) (hereinafter the ‘draft provisions on the HFSF’), which also form part of the draft law. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union and the third and sixth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the ECB by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to the Bank of Greece (BoG) and to rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the ECB, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose and contents of the draft law

text: The purpose of the draft law is to enhance the framework for the supervision and control of credit institutions and to introduce resolution powers to protect financial stability and public confidence in the Greek financial system. For this purpose, the draft law will: (i) reinforce the BoG’s supervisory powers in addressing an actual or potential breach by credit institutions of the draft law following adoption and relevant BoG decisions; (ii) extend the role and powers of the Commissioner appointed to manage troubled credit institutions; (iii) empower the BoG to take specific resolution measures vis-à-vis credit institutions; and (iv) establish a resolution branch within the Hellenic Deposit and Investment Guarantee Fund (HDIGF) to finance the resolution measures in the draft law.

text: 1.1 Prudential supervisory measures: the BoG requires any credit institution actually or potentially failing to comply with the draft law and/or the BoG’s relevant decisions to take the necessary actions or corrective measures at an early stage to address any possible defects or weaknesses. 1.2 Appointment of a commissioner: the BoG may appoint a commissioner to a credit institution for a renewable term of up to 12 months. The Commissioner will assess the credit institution’s situation and take the necessary action for its recovery, preparing it for any of the resolution measures under the draft law or putting it into special liquidation. The Commissioner will be subject to the BoG’s oversight and report to it. 1.3 Extension of the time limit for the fulfilment of obligations: following the appointment of a commissioner, the BoG may extend by up to 20 days the period for the fulfilment of part or all of the credit institution’s obligations, if the credit institution’s liquidity is significantly reduced and it is likely that its own funds are inadequate . 1.4 Resolution measures and their activation: the BoG may trigger certain resolution measures to ensure financial stability and strengthen public confidence in the Greek financial system. In particular, it may: (a) instruct the Commissioner to decide on a capital increase within a specified time limit, disapplying any pre-emptive rights of the existing shareholders; (b) oblige a credit institution to transfer certain assets and liabilities to a transitional credit institution (TCI) to another credit institution or entity, against consideration and within a specified time limit; (c) recommend that the Minister for Finance establish on grounds of public interest a TCI to which all or part of the assets and liabilities of the credit institution will be transferred. The credit institution’s licence will be revoked and the credit institution will be placed under special liquidation. The intrinsic value of its shares will be set to negative. Any rights emanating from the shares will cease to apply. The HFSF will pay the TCI’s share capital in full. The TCI will be subject to State control, regardless of the mandatory participation of other entities in its share capital or its funding in other ways. 1.5 Special liquidation of credit institutions: where a credit institution’s licence is withdrawn, the BoG will appoint a special liquidator to manage the credit institution. Following the communication to the credit institution of the BoG’s decision placing it under special liquidation, the credit institution may not accept deposits, and the BoG may also restrict other operations. 1.6 Establishment of a resolution branch within the HDIGF to finance the resolution measures: the draft law amends Law No 3746/2000 (hereinafter the ‘Law on the HDIGF’), extending its scope to the provision of financial assistance to credit institutions for the purposes of resolution measures. In addition to the existing Depositors’ Coverage Branch and the Investors’ Coverage Branch, a new

text: separate resolution branch will be created within the HDIGF and financed by contributions paid by credit institutions. 1.7 The draft provisions on the HFSF empower the HFSF to provide capital support to a TCI established under proposed

text: Article 63

text: E in the draft law. They also specify and extend the competence and procedure for the HFSF to recruit its staff independently, including salaried lawyers. Further, they amend the provisions activating the HFSF by stating that capital support may only be provided to a credit institution, including any TCI, if: (a) there is well founded risk of it not being able to continue to meet minimum capital requirements under Article 27 of Law No 3601/2007 (hereinafter the ‘Law on banking’), and (b) the institution’s efforts to increase its capital, even at a price significantly below the average market price, have failed. The draft provisions on the HFSF also specify that TCIs which have been recapitalised by the HFSF have to submit a business plan guaranteeing that they are viable, and that the HFSF must approve the business plan. Other important provisions state that the HFSF receives common shares in consideration for any capital increase in the credit institution that it funds, and that the HFSF appoints at least one member of the board of the credit institution.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 The draft law is a structural benchmark under the EU/IMF support programme for Greece . It is intended to enhance the authorities’ powers of intervention in and resolution of ailing credit institutions. The introduction of amendments to the legal framework governing the HFSF, inter alia, to strengthen its role in bank resolution, is another of the structural benchmarks. 2.2 The ECB also notes that one of the guiding principles for implementation of the resolution framework should be to resolve ailing institutions without severe systemic disruption and to avoid taxpayer exposure to loss. 2.3 The ECB welcomes the provisions specifying the conditions and objectives to be met before the BoG activates any of the resolution measures and the BoG’s enhanced role as the resolution authority for credit institutions. The ECB also understands that, under the draft law, the BoG will have exclusive responsibility for supervision and resolution and that, when taking any of the resolution measures under the draft law, the Commissioner will act as the BoG’s agent.

text: 2.4 The ECB considers that the draft provisions on the HFSF are broadly consistent with and reinforce the effectiveness of the resolution measures under the draft law. However, there are several areas where specific further amendments will be required.

text: 3. Recovery and resolution plans

text: The draft law rightly acknowledges the importance of the preparation of recovery and resolution plans as a preventive supervisory measure. The ECB underlines that the preparation, submission and approval of recovery plans should be an ordinary supervisory measure to be complied with by all credit institutions irrespective of a crisis . The draft law should expressly distinguish recovery from the resolution plans. Each institution will draw up and maintain recovery plans, whereas the supervisory authority will draw up resolution plans on the basis of information provided by the credit institution .

text: 4. Commissioner

text: The BoG will appoint a commissioner from among persons of recognised standing and professional experience in banking matters to perform certain statutory duties on a full-time basis, subject to confidentiality requirements . To avoid conflicts of interest, the ECB considers it essential for the Commissioner to also be independent from the credit institution to which it is appointed. The ECB also notes that the Commissioner is deemed to act as a ‘quasi-corporate’ body when participating in or exercising management of the credit institution, and as a public official when exercising BoG supervisory activities . For the sake of legal certainty, the ECB considers that the draft law should ensure there is no ambiguity in the Commissioner’s status, role and powers under Greek law, and, in this regard, the consulting authority should consider deleting the reference to the dual role of the Commissioner.

text: 5. Recapitalisation in resolution

text: 5.1 Proposed

text: Article 63

text: C in the draft law should be based on the principle that the credit institution’s shareholders and not the taxpayer bear the costs of resolution. The ECB notes that this principle should apply to all resolution measures. On the draft law’s exclusion of the pre-emption rights of existing shareholders in any new share issue by the credit institution in resolution, the ECB notes that proposed

text: Article 63

text: G in the draft law caters for the compensation of shareholders in institutions affected by resolution measures.

text: 5.2 In the same vein, to prevent banks’ moral hazard and minimise the public sector’s burden from a bank resolution, the ECB invites the consulting authority to consider the interaction between proposed

text: Article 63

text: C of the Law on banking and the draft provisions on the HFSF. In particular, the ECB recommends only allowing the possibility for an ailing credit institution to apply to the HFSF by decision of the BoG. Therefore, the application of the last paragraph of Article 7 of the draft law on the HFSF should expressly be excluded.

text: 6. Transitional credit institution

text: 6.1 The ECB welcomes the proposal to establish a TCI as a resolution tool , with the aim of preserving the continuity of financial services, ensuring financial stability and protecting depositors. The ECB understands that the ‘assets’ to be transferred to the TCI also extend to liabilities including deposits, which represent an important part of the systemic function of credit institutions. Moreover, the ECB understands that the reference to the TCI being controlled by the Greek State is to be construed as an indication that the TCI is State-owned. The ECB underlines that the proposed

text: Article 63

text: E(3), according to which the share capital of the TCI is entirely to be provided by the HFSF, and in Article 1 of Law No 3864/2010 (hereinafter the ‘Law on the HFSF’), providing that the HFSF is a private legal entity not forming part of the public sector, may not fulfil the requirement that the TCIs should be State-owned. The ECB takes the view that the HFSF should finance the capital injection into the TCI, while the shares corresponding to this capital increase should only be subscribed by the State. This is notably because the voting and other rights attaching to these shares should belong to the Greek State and be exercised in the public interest, and not belong to the HFSF, being a private law entity. 6.2 Accordingly, the ECB considers that the proposed

text: Article 63

text: E(3) should specify that the State should exercise control over the TCI as the TCI’s sole shareholder. The ECB also understands that the HFSF’s contribution of the entire capital to the TCI should be exclusively based on the Minister’s decision, following a recommendation by the BoG. 6.3 In the light of the above, the ECB also notes that the TCI’s governance should be clarified. The members of the Board of Directors of the TCI appointed by the Minister for Finance must convene within 20 days a general shareholders meeting to elect of the new Board of Directors . Given that the HFSF contributes the whole share capital of the TCI , the ECB understands that the TCI’s new Board of Directors will be appointed by and represent the HFSF, i.e. a private law entity legally independent from the public sector. This would contrast with the requirement for the TCI to be State-owned.

text: 6.4 Along the same lines, to ensure the resolution’s efficiency, the ECB notes that the draft law needs to clarify the BoG’s relationship as the resolution authority, and/or the Minister, with the HFSF as regards the TCI.

text: 7. Resolution branch

text: 7.1 The ECB welcomes the establishment of a separate resolution branch of the HDGIF to fund resolution measures, in particular the transfer of assets and liabilities to a third party or to the TCI. The ECB welcomes the segregation of the Resolution Branch from the Deposit Coverage Fund and the Investor Coverage Fund managed by the HDGIF. The ECB notes, however, that to fully satisfy the segregation requirement, the provision should also expressly prohibit cross-compensation among each of the funds managed by the HDGIF. 7.2 The ECB welcomes the banking sector’s responsibility for funding the HDGIF’s Resolution Branch through special levies, distinct from the contributions to the Deposit Coverage Fund . To finance this Resolution Branch, the ECB suggests that the choice of liabilities, net of equity (not to discourage the accumulation of internal buffers against unforeseen idiosyncratic shocks) and other insured sources of funding, such as insured deposits to avoid double imposition of levies in the presence of the deposit coverage part of the HDGIF, appears to be an appropriate basis. The ECB notes, however, that during the early stages of the Resolution Branch, its funds will consist of public financing by the Greek State, the HFSF or other entities of private or public law guaranteed by the State . 7.3 In the same context, the ECB notes that where the Resolution Branch is activated for the purposes of the resolution measures , its claims will be satisfied in absolute priority over any other claims in the event of special liquidation of an ailing credit institution . The ECB understands that the priority right statutorily established in favour of the Resolution Branch would only be warranted during the early stages of its existence, when its funding is to still be provided by the State or a State-controlled entity. Once the Resolution Branch has built up its own funds through contributions by the participating credit institutions, no such priority right would be warranted. 7.4 Finally, a provision on the recovery by the Resolution Branch of any funds it has granted for resolution purposes could be added to the draft law. 7.5 The draft law could also clarify the authority to determine any funding gaps on transferring the assets and liabilities of the credit institution. Consistently with the rationale of the draft law, such authority should be vested in the BoG as the resolution authority. The BoG will take into account,

text: but should not be bound by, the auditors’ reports provided for in the draft law as part of the statutory valuation process .

text: 8. Compensation

text: Proposed

text: Article 63

text: G lays down a ‘no worse-off’ principle for the compensation of stakeholders in institutions affected by resolution measures. The draft law should additionally clarify that compensation will be based on an independent valuation, which may result in no compensation being payable, and that any potential or actual financial assistance from the State or support from the central bank should be disregarded when assessing the credit institution’s financial situation. It should also clarify that compensation claims are to be directed against the Hellenic Republic, rather than the BoG or the TCI.

text: 9. Other observations on bank resolution

text: 9.1 The ECB notes that the protection of creditors and investors should not qualify as an objective for activating the resolution measures. Moreover, the ECB invites the consulting authority to clarify the interaction between paragraph 2 of proposed

text: Article 63

text: B, setting out the grounds for activating resolution measures, and paragraph 3, setting out the considerations that the BoG is to take into account for the same purpose. 9.2 The ECB draws the consulting authority’s attention to a possible inconsistency between the draft law and the Greek transposition of Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 April 2001 on the reorganisation and winding up of credit institutions as regards the qualification of the appointment of the Commissioner as a reorganisation measure. 9.3 Proposed

text: Article 62(2)

text: (g) provides that the BoG may authorise ‘certain transactions that may jeopardise the solvency of credit institutions’. The ECB understands that the power in question is to be exercised within the bounds of reason and subject to time restrictions.

text: 10. Observations on the draft provisions on the HFSF

text: 10.1 In order to prevent potentially high losses for the HFSF as a result of its participation in the provision of capital support for recapitalised credit institutions, the draft provisions should make it clear that the price at which the HFSF recapitalises credit institutions will be substantially below the market price, and specify further how the issue price of the new shares is to be determined. The ECB also notes that the title of Article 7 of the Law on the HFSF should also be reworded to match its contents, referring to ‘common’ shares instead of ‘preference’ shares. Furthermore, the law should specify clearly how the share price will be determined.

text: 10.2 In order to provide legal certainty, a sentence should be added to Article 3(4) of the Law on the HFSF, clarifying that the general prohibition on ‘other investments’ does not include the opening of an interest-bearing account with a private credit institution to settle the HFSF’s day-to-day operating costs. Such activities comprise in particular paying out salaries, purchasing office supplies and other operating costs. The money held in this account should be limited to the amount necessary to meet such operating costs and should be earmarked for this purpose. 10.3 With regard to the proposed

text: Article 7(3)

text: in the draft provisions on the HFSF, which relates to the determination of the fair value, the ECB recommends that the average value of the two assessments, by the two independent auditing firms, should diverge by more than 10%, and not by 25%, in order for the value to be finally defined by a third independent auditing firm appointed by decision of the Minister for Finance, following the recommendation of the BoG. The proposal to introduce a trigger of 25% divergence is not supported by any factual evidence. 10.4 In the proposed

text: Article 7(3)

text: (i) in the draft provisions on the HFSF the ECB recommends that actual or potential support by the Greek State is ‘subtracted’ when calculating the fair value. Furthermore, the calculation in this respect shall ‘in addition’ take into account as a ceiling ‘before the above subtractions’, the average price of the credit institution’s shares. The same criteria and subtractions should be followed by the independent auditing firms for the fair-value assessment. Furthermore, the words ‘outside Eurosystem operations’ should be replaced by the words ‘or by any Eurosystem operations’. 10.5 In the light of the extension of the scope of the HFSF’s activities, the ECB invites the consulting authority to consider enhancing the governance structure and effectiveness of the Fund by, inter alia, increasing the number of members of the board of directors.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 19 September 2011.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: Regulation ECB/2008/32 of 19 December 2008 concerning the balance sheet of the monetary financial institutions sector (recast) (OJ L 15, 20.1.2009, p. 14). Regulation ECB/2001/18 of 20 December 2001 concerning statistics on interest rates applied by monetary financial institutions to deposits and loans vis-à-vis households and non-financial corporations (OJ L 10, 12.1.2002, p. 24). Regulation ECB/2007/8 of 27 July 2007 concerning statistics on the assets and liabilities of investment funds (OJ L 211, 11.8.2007, p. 8).

text: Regulation (EC) No 184/2005

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 January 2005 on Community statistics concerning balance of payments, international trade in services and foreign direct investment (OJ L 35, 8.2.2005, p. 23).

text: Article 5(1) of Regulation (EC) No 924/2009

text: /EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 on cross-border payments in the Community and repealing

text: Regulation (EC) No 2560/2001

text: (OJ L 266, 9.10.2009, p. 11). 3

text: Regulation (EC) No 223/2009

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2009 on European statistics and repealing Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1101/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the transmission of data subject to statistical confidentiality to the Statistical Office of the European Communities,

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 322/97

text: on Community Statistics, and

text: Council Decision 89/382/EEC

text: , Euratom establishing a Committee on the Statistical Programmes of the European Communities (OJ L 87, 31.3.2009, p. 164). 4

text: Regulation (EC) No 2533/98 of 23 November 1998

text: concerning the collection of statistical information by the European Central Bank (OJ L 318, 27.11.1998, p. 8).

text: The reference is mainly to Regulation ECB/2003/9 of 12 September 2003 on the application of minimum reserves (OJ L 250, 2.10.2003, p. 10), which also provides the basis for sub-paragraph 3.3.2 of this Opinion. 6 This is derived from the marginal lending facility rate, incremented by 250 basis points.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 21 September 2011 on statistics and interbank money and government securities markets managed by Banca Naţională a României, and the foreign exchange and minimum reserves regime (CON/2011/73)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 21 September 2011 on statistics and interbank money and government securities markets managed by Banca Naţională a României, and the foreign exchange and minimum reserves regime (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 31 May 2011, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from Banca Naţională a României (BNR) for an opinion on its draft regulation on statistics, its draft regulation on interbank money and government securities markets managed by BNR and the foreign exchange and minimum reserves regime, and its draft regulation on payments. This opinion concerns the draft regulation on statistics (hereinafter the ‘first draft regulation’) and the draft regulation on interbank money and government securities markets managed by BNR, and the foreign exchange and minimum reserves regime (hereinafter the ‘second draft regulation’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the third, fourth and sixth indents of Article 2(1), and

text: Article 2(2) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft regulations relate to BNR; the collection, compilation and distribution of monetary, financial, banking, payment systems and balance of payments statistics; and rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft regulations

text: BNR’s two draft regulations are the result of a systematisation and standardisation process through which the BNR will consolidate regulations currently in force that it has adopted in the performance of its statutory tasks. The objectives of this process are to ensure legal clarity, consistency, access and understanding.

text: 1.1 The first draft regulation The draft regulation on statistical data and information reporting to BNR provides the framework for the collection, processing, analysis and dissemination of statistical data in its areas of competence. It covers reporting of data and information (i) on monetary and financial statistics, balance of payments and Romania’s medium and long-term private external debt, (ii) for the oversight of money/foreign exchange market transactions, and (iii) for payments oversight. It defines the reporting mechanisms under the relevant Union regulations . 1.2 The second draft regulation This draft regulation covers BNR’s monetary policy and exchange rate policy, the foreign exchange and minimum reserves regimes, as well as transactions with government securities and certificates of deposit.

text: 2. General observations

text: The ECB welcomes BNR’s efforts to increase legal certainty, as well as the transparency and clarity of its requirements for market participants. Moreover, such a project should take into account the need for precision and consistency throughout the draft regulations and with the national and Union legal frameworks. Although Romania has not yet adopted the euro, the draft provisions should already take into consideration and be broadly consistent with the Union legislative framework that will apply in Romania once it has adopted the euro.

text: 3. Specific observations

text: The first draft regulation

text: 3.1 The regime for the production of European statistics is set out in Regulations (EC) Nos 223/2009 and 2533/98 . A national regime’s specific arrangements should optimise the quality and availability of official statistics, also in the context of the NCB’s participation in the European

text: System of Central Banks (ESCB) in general and its duty to collaborate with the ECB on statistical matters in particular, while preserving its independence as a central bank participating in the ESCB.

text: The second draft regulation

text: 3.2 Member States that have not adopted the euro retain their monetary policy powers. It is nevertheless beneficial for them to achieve consistency with Eurosystem standards so that their credit institutions can familiarise themselves with the requirements that will apply once the euro has been introduced. With these considerations in mind, the ECB welcomes Title IV of this draft regulation, outlining the architecture and operation of the minimum reserves regime for Romanian credit institutions. The regime strongly resembles the Eurosystem’s minimum reserves framework . The main parameters are calculated in a similar manner, including the computation of the reserve base and the resulting minimum reserves requirements and its averaging mechanism. These similarities are expected to make the future transition of Romanian credit institutions to the Eurosystem’s minimum reserves framework smoother and more straightforward. 3.3 The ECB has, nevertheless, identified a number of differences between the minimum reserves regime for Romanian credit institutions and the Eurosystem’s minimum reserves framework. 3.3.1 First, the reserve base for Romanian cooperative credit institutions appears to differ from that applicable to other credit institutions. The Eurosystem’s minimum reserves framework treats all credit institutions equally, irrespective of their nomenclature. While legitimate economic considerations relevant to the market share of cooperative credit institutions in Romania may warrant a differentiated treatment for the purposes of the imposition and collection of minimum reserves, such differentiated treatment will be unsustainable once Romania has adopted the euro. 3.3.2 Second, BNR will communicate the remuneration rate on minimum reserves to credit institutions only on an ad hoc basis. Under the Eurosystem’s minimum reserves framework, the relevant rate is derived from the main financing operation rates. In the interests of transparency, the consulting authority should consider communicating, ex ante, the basis on which the remuneration rate is to be defined. Similar considerations apply to BNR’s discretion as regards the penalty rate, compared to the fixed penalty rate under the Eurosystem’s minimum reserves framework . 3.3.3 Third, under the Romanian minimum reserves regime, the credit institutions’ minimum reserves calculations may be revised both during the reserve maintenance period and subsequently. The Eurosystem’s minimum reserves framework considers the credit institutions’ minimum reserves calculations to be frozen at the start of the relevant reserve maintenance period. A national law arrangement more closely resembling the Eurosystem’s minimum reserves framework would provide more legal certainty.

text: 3.3.4 Finally, there are also differences in sanctions when data for the calculation of a credit institution’s minimum reserves requirements are reported late, as well as for repetitive breaches. In both cases the sanctions under the minimum reserves regime for Romanian credit institutions are considerably more severe compared to the corresponding sanctions under the Eurosystem’s minimum reserves framework.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 21 September 2011.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: COM(2011) 142 final. 3 All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: In the Financial Stability Review of June 2011, the ECB highlighted that ‘About a third of outstanding commercial property mortgages in the euro area are due to mature between 2011 and 2013 … Many of these mortgages … were often granted with high loan-to-value ratios (often 75-85%)’.

text: See paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: Paragraph 3.1.1 of Opinion

text: ESRB press conference of 22 June 2011.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 20 September 2011 on lending to natural persons (CON/2011/74)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 20 September 2011 on lending to natural persons (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 5 September 2011, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from Banca Naţională a României (BNR) for an opinion on a draft regulation on lending to natural persons (hereinafter the ‘draft regulation’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and the sixth indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft regulation relates to rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft regulation

text: 1.1 The main purpose of the draft regulation is to update lending requirements applying to credit institutions that provide loans to natural persons, with a view to financial stability. The draft regulation covers loans for real estate investments and consumer credit. It is part of the prudential measures limiting risks related to the indebtedness of natural persons. It is intended to reduce systemic risk within the banking sector, as well as to protect consumers against excessive financial liability. Accordingly, the draft regulation aims to contribute to the overall stability of the financial system. 1.2 The requirements for lending to natural persons provided for in the draft regulation include: (a) rules to assess a borrower’s ability to meet its financial obligations; (b) maximum acceptable loan-to-value ratios for real estate; (c) minimum guarantee-to-loan ratios for consumer credit denominated or indexed in a foreign currency; (d) maximum credit maturity for consumer credit; and (e) rules relating to the lending process and conditions, including information to be provided to borrowers (such as booklets with warnings on the possibility and consequences of an increase of the credit cost if exchange rate risk materialises) and clear information in the credit agreement or

text: reimbursement schedule on the possibility of an increase of the amounts to be repaid should exchange rate risk or interest rate risk materialise. The definitions of loans for real estate investment purposes and consumer credits are also provided, so that the amended framework will cover all credit provided to natural persons.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 BNR has informed the ECB that Romania intends to establish by 31 October 2011 measures to balance the currency structure of loans granted to natural persons in the context of the financial assistance programmes concluded with the International Monetary Fund and the European Commission. In view thereof, the consulting authority invokes reasons of extreme urgency and asks the ECB to deliver its opinion by 20 September 2011. The ECB would like to draw the consulting authority’s attention to the fact that according to the second sentence of

text: Article 4 of Decision 98/415/EC

text: , the ECB must be consulted ‘at an appropriate stage’ in the legislative process. This implies that the consultation should take place at a point in the legislative process that affords the ECB sufficient time to examine the draft legislative provisions and to adopt its opinion in the required language versions and which also enables the relevant national authority to take the ECB’s opinion into consideration before these provisions are adopted. 2.2 The ECB welcomes the draft regulation, which is aimed at promoting responsible lending by credit institutions, enforcing market discipline, and increasing the transparency of credit institutions’ activities to provide a higher level of consumer protection, especially in the area of credit for real estate investment. From a financial stability perspective, the ECB supports the measures that are aimed at ensuring responsible borrowing and lending, and restoring consumer confidence. 2.3 The ECB understands that BNR follows the current legislative initiatives at Union level related to the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on credit agreements 2 3 relating to residential property . In this context, the ECB refers to its Opinion

text: . The ECB understands the relevant national legislation will, if necessary, be aligned with the future Directive.

text: 3. Specific observations

text: 3.1 Criteria for assessing consumers’ creditworthiness The ECB welcomes the introduction of quantitative limits insofar as such measures should contribute to strengthening credit institutions’ lending practices, while also ensuring consistency in assessing consumers’ creditworthiness. As regards the quantitative limits referred to above, the

text: ECB recommends subjecting them to a thorough impact assessment study of their appropriateness , regularly reviewing them to take into account the implications of changes in macroeconomic and financial conditions and complementing them, if necessary, with other measures (for instance, the provision of maximum debt-to-income ratios). 3.2 Foreign currency lending 3.2.1 High levels of foreign currency loans to unhedged borrowers may create latent financial vulnerabilities in certain Member States . Such lending converts direct exchange rate exposure in the banking system into credit risk and exposes the economy to significant macro-financial risks. Given the potentially negative side effects associated with foreign currency lending, the ECB emphasises the importance for policymakers taking appropriate measures to avoid an excessive accumulation within the banking system . Generally, there is a need to ensure that strict and prudent regulatory and administrative measures are in place for lending to unhedged domestic borrowers in a foreign currency. In addition, banks should always hold sufficient capital to reflect the specific risks associated with foreign currency lending, in particular as regards the transformation of exchange rate risk into credit risk. 3.2.2 The ECB welcomes the stricter limitations on the acceptable loan-to-value ratios where the credit and income currencies are different, which would take into consideration potential foreign exchange risk. In addition, the regulatory framework could be amended to provide incentives to credit institutions to offer domestic currency loans to customers, for the same purposes as foreign currency loans. 3.2.3 More generally, the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), in considering options to reinforce the resilience of the Union financial system, has identified as one of the challenges the potential problems arising from foreign currency borrowing by households and small and medium-sized enterprises within the Union . The outcome of the work undertaken by the ESRB in this regard will need to be adequately taken into account by the relevant national authorities.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 20 September 2011. [signed]

text: The Vice-President of the ECB

text: Vítor CONSTÂNCIO


text: Under Law No 6/1993 Coll. on Česká národní banka (hereinafter the ‘CNB Law’), CNB may require banks, foreign bank branches and credit unions to hold minimum reserves. The CNB Law also provides the basic conditions for minimum reserves and authorises CNB to adopt a provision in this respect. 3 Technical details will be specified separately in CNB’s Official Information published in respect of the draft provision (see, for example,

text: Article 2(4)

text: and

text: Article 5(1)

text: and (4) of the draft provision).

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 30 September 2011 on minimum reserves (CON/2011/75)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 30 September 2011 on minimum reserves (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 16 August 2011 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from Česká národní banka (CNB) for an opinion on a draft provision of the Czech National Bank stipulating the terms and conditions for creating minimum reserves (hereinafter the ‘draft provision’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and

text: Article 2(2) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft provision relates to instruments of monetary policy of a Member State that has not adopted the euro. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft provision

text: The draft provision will replace CNB provision No 2 of 23 September 2003, stipulating the terms and conditions for creating minimum reserves. Among other changes to the CNB provision, the draft provision extends to credit unions the obligation to hold minimum reserves , which currently applies only to banks and foreign bank branches, following the CNB Bank Board’s decision of 12 May 2011. The draft provision covers, among other things, the reserve base, reserve ratio, compliance with the reserve requirement, remuneration, a sanction for non-compliance with the reserve requirement and the holding of minimum reserves in the event of the winding-up, conversion, transfer of the business or division of a bank or credit union. The text has been simplified and refined in line with changes to related legislation.

text: 2. General observations

text: Although Member States that have not adopted the euro retain their powers in the field of monetary policy, including in connection with their minimum reserves frameworks, it is nevertheless beneficial to achieve consistency with the Eurosystem minimum reserves framework so that their credit institutions

text: become acquainted with the reserve requirements that will apply to them following the adoption of the euro in the Member State where they are established. The legal framework for the Eurosystem’s minimum reserve system consists of: (i) Article 19 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank; (ii)

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 2531/98 of 23 November 1998

text: concerning the application of minimum reserves by the European Central Bank ; (iii) Regulation ECB/2003/9 of 12 September 2003 on the application of minimum reserves ; and (iv) in relation to the definition and calculation of the reserve base, Regulation ECB/2008/32 of 19 December 2008 concerning the balance sheet of the monetary financial institutions sector .

text: Article 11

text: and Annex III to Regulation ECB/2008/32 require the use of statistical information by credit institutions reported under this Regulation for minimum reserves purposes.

text: 3. Specific observations

text: 3.1 Under the draft provision, the credit institutions’ minimum reserves calculations may be revised during the reserve maintenance period, in particular in case of corrections made to erroneous reporting of liabilities in the statistical statements. In this context, the ECB would like to point out that the Eurosystem’s minimum reserves framework considers the credit institutions’ minimum reserves calculations to be ‘frozen’ at the start of the relevant reserve maintenance period. 3.2 Finally, the ECB understands that the statistical reporting requirements used to calculate the reserve base of banks and foreign bank branches are aligned with Regulation ECB/2008/32, and that the CNB is preparing an amendment to the statistical reporting requirements for credit unions for the purpose of calculating credit unions’ minimum reserves.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 30 September 2011.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 4 October 2011 on reform of the deposit guarantee scheme (CON/2011/76)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 4 October 2011 on reform of the deposit guarantee scheme (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 1 August 2011, the Dutch Ministry of Finance published a draft general administrative regulation (hereinafter ‘the draft regulation’) for public consultation, which intends to transform the Dutch deposit guarantee scheme into an ex-ante funded scheme with risk-based contributions. This public consultation was open for response until 11 September 2011. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third and sixth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft regulation relates to De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) and to rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. The ECB should be consulted on this draft regulation, particularly because ECB Opinion

text: on the Law which the draft regulation will implement advised changes in the Dutch deposit guarantee scheme to ensure compliance with Treaty provisions on the prohibition on monetary financing. Since the ECB was informed that the Dutch Ministry of Finance does not intend consulting the ECB on this matter, the ECB has decided to submit this own-initiative opinion. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft legislation

text: The draft regulation amends the Decree on special prudential measures, investor compensation and deposit guarantees pursuant to the Law on financial supervision and to the Decree on prudential rules pursuant to this Law . Such amendments concern the financing of the Dutch Deposit Guarantee Scheme (Dutch DGS) which is presently operated by DNB. If a credit institution is no longer able to meet its obligations vis-à-vis depositors, the Dutch DGS is activated and the costs are apportioned among other participating credit institutions. The Dutch DGS is funded on an ex-post basis by contributions from the

text: 1 OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: 2 All ECB opinions are available at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: 3 Staatsblad 2006, 507 and 519. member credit institutions and DNB advances amounts needed for its operation. The main aim of the draft regulation is to transform the financing of the Dutch DGS from ex-post to ex-ante. Hence, the draft regulation establishes the Foundation for the Deposit Guarantee Fund (hereinafter the ‘Foundation’) which will be financed though contributions imposed on member credit institutions and will reimburse 5 6 DNB for the Dutch DGS’ operating costs and for advance payouts in respect of guaranteed deposits . The draft regulation regulates such various contributions to be made by member credit institutions of the 7 8 Dutch DGS, including one-off contributions , basic regular contributions and ex-post contributions if the Dutch DGS has insufficient funds available .

text: 2. General observation

text: The ECB should be consulted on future substantial amendments to the draft regulation. No further consultation will be required if the amendments in essence aim to accommodate the concerns expressed by the ECB in this opinion. Moreover, given the current legislative initiative at Union level for the recast of Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994 on depositguarantee schemes (hereinafter ‘draft recast DGS Directive’) , the ECB understands that the relevant national legislation will, as necessary, be aligned with this future Directive .

text: 3. Specific observations 3.1 Prohibition on monetary financing and operation of the Dutch DGS

text: 3.1.1 The ECB supports the establishment of ex-ante funded deposit guarantee schemes, given their relevance to financial stability, insofar as an exclusive reliance on DGS members’ ex-post contributions may be a source of procyclicality , and credit institutions will participate in deposit protection costs. The ECB points out in this context that the recast DGS Directive will, inter alia, harmonise a target level of ex-ante financing, fixed at a certain percentage level of covered deposits. Against this background, the ECB welcomes the Dutch Ministry of Finance’s replacement of the current ex-post funding arrangements for the Dutch DGS with ex-ante funding arrangements. However, at the same time it is important for the national provisions on funding of the deposit guarantee schemes to comply with the monetary financing prohibition under Article 123 of the

text: 4 See Sections 23f-23m of the draft regulation.

text: 5 See Section 23o of the draft regulation.

text: 6 See Section 23n of the draft regulation.

text: 7 See Section 23f of the draft regulation.

text: 8 See Section 23g-h of the draft regulation.

text: 9 See Section 23r of the draft regulation.

text: 10 OJ L 135, 31.5.1994, p. 5.

text: 11 See proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Deposit Guarantee Schemes [recast] – Council Presidency compromise proposal of 14 June 2011, available on the Council’s website at http://register.consilium.europa.eu.

text: 12 See Commission’s staff working document ‘Summary of the impact assessment. Accompanying document to the proposal for a DIRECTIVE …/…/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on Deposit Guarantee Schemes [recast]’, p. 5, available on the Commission’s website at www.ec.europa.eu. Treaty. This provision prohibits central banks from providing overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facility to the public sector, including any financing of the public sector’s obligations vis- 13 14 à-vis third parties . Hence, ECB Opinion

text: advised the Dutch authorities that advance payments by DNB in the context of the operation of the Dutch DGS are incompatible with the monetary financing prohibition and that consequently relevant Dutch legislation needs to be amended. 3.1.2 Section 22 of the draft regulation provides that DNB will make arrangements for the establishment of the Foundation and that the Foundation will reimburse DNB its costs in connection with the operation of the Dutch DGS. Further, Section 23n of the draft regulation provides that if DNB has paid out amounts related to the operation of the DGS, the Foundation will reimburse DNB as soon as possible for the total of those amounts up to an amount equal to the funds present in the Dutch DGS. Finally, Section 23o of the draft regulation provides that the Foundation reimburses the costs DNB has borne in connection with the DGS. The ECB understands that these provisions imply that DNB will finance, until it is reimbursed by the Foundation: (a) the Dutch DGS’ tasks, such as payouts of the guaranteed deposits, and (b) the costs of operating the Dutch DGS. Further, the ECB understands that the limit ‘up to an amount equal to the funds present in the deposit guarantee fund’ in Section 23n may lead to a situation where DNB has made payments in the context of the operation of the Dutch DGS which will need first to be reimbursed through ex-post contributions from the member credit institutions of the Dutch DGS and can only be reimbursed to DNB subject to the availability of such contributions. The draft legislation does not provide for any backstop financing if ex-post contributions from member credit institutions are unavailable or insufficient . 3.1.3 The above described forms of advance financing of the deposit guarantee scheme by the central bank are incompatible with the monetary financing prohibition. The only compatible forms of central bank financing of deposit guarantee schemes are: (a) intraday credit in line with the general rules on provision of such credit by the central bank, and (b) short-term emergency liquidity financing under strict conditions established in the ECB’s Convergence Reports, i.e. if such funding is short term, addresses urgent situations, systemic stability aspects are at stake and 16 17 decisions are at the NCB’s discretion . These conditions need to be listed in national law in the cases where emergency liquidity financing of the DGS is foreseen by the national legal system. 3.1.4 Consequently, the ECB proposes the following amendments: (a) clarifying in Section 22 that the Foundation is financed by the dedicated contributions from the member credit institutions of the Dutch DGS and by other listed funding sources, which will not include advance financing by DNB;

text: 13 See

text: Article 1

text: (b)(ii) of

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 of 13 December 1993

text: specifying definitions for the application of the prohibitions referred to in Articles

text: and

text: (b)(1) of the Treaty (OJ L 332, 31.12.1993, p. 1).

text: 14 See paragraph 4.2 of ECB Opinion

text: ; see also ECB Annual Report 2010, p. 120 and paragraphs 2.2 to 2.3 of ECB Opinion

text: 15 See also paragraphs 3.1.4(d) and 3.2.2 of this opinion.

text: 16 See ECB’s Convergence Report, May 2010, p. 25.

text: 17 See paragraphs 2.2 to 2.8 of ECB Opinion

text: . (b) specifying in Section 23n that the Foundation transfers the necessary amounts to DNB before DNB makes payments related to the performance of the Dutch DGS’ tasks. Alternatively, it should provide expressly that any advance payments by DNB are only intraday. If in addition short-term emergency liquidity financing of Dutch DGS operations by DNB is foreseen, conditions for such financing referred to in paragraph 3.1.3 of this opinion should be expressly listed in the Dutch law; (c) specifying in Section 23o that sufficient funds will be made available to DNB for fulfilling its mandatory task of operating the Dutch DGS, in order to protect DNB’s financial independence; (d) specifying funding sources available to the Foundation if ex-post contributions by the member credit institutions are insufficient to cover the needs of the Dutch DGS.

text: 3.2 Financing of the Dutch DGS by its member credit institutions

text: 3.2.1 One-off contribution Section 23f of the draft regulation provides that an entity which becomes a credit institution following entry into force of the Decree will pay a one-off amount to the Foundation. The ECB understands from the explanatory memorandum that existing credit institutions will pay the same contribution under Section III to provide the Foundation with starting capital, both contributions to be laid down by ministerial regulation. The ECB requests further clarification of the determination and size of these contributions, and reassurance that this does not conflict with the principle of a level playing field. The ECB points in this context to the draft recast DGS Directive which aims, inter alia, at harmonising the level of contributions paid to the national deposit guarantee schemes with a view to achieving a level playing field . 3.2.2. Ex-post contributions by member credit institutions and backstop financing Section 23r of the draft regulation provides for ex-post contributions by member credit institutions of the Dutch DGS if the Foundation does not have sufficient funds to reimburse DNB for incurred costs and advance payments in connection with the DGS. As stated in an earlier ECB opinion , an ex-ante funding scheme should also include the possibility to call on the private sector for additional financial support, as pre-collected funds from the industry may be insufficient in a crisis situation. This principle of ex-post financing from the private sector should promote additional market discipline and address the risk of moral hazard. At the same time, the ECB notes that additional temporary financing going beyond the ex-post contributions by the member credit institutions may be needed in a severe crisis requiring, e.g. activation of deposit guarantees for a major credit institution. The draft regulation does not provide for financing to bridge this financial

text: 18 See explanatory memorandum, p. 38.

text: 19 See recital 6 of the draft recast DGS Directive.

text: 20 See ECB Opinion

text: . gap. As already indicated in paragraph 3.1.4(d) above, the ECB invites the Dutch Ministry of Finance to expressly regulate this issue.

text: 3.3. DNB’s financial independence

text: The ECB refers to the principle of financial independence under which an NCB must have sufficient means not only to perform its ESCB-related tasks, but also its national tasks, e.g. financing its administration and own operations . Previous ECB opinions pointed out that allocation to the NCBs of specific non-ESCB related tasks (e.g. tasks in the area of financial supervision or consumer protection) needs to be accompanied by the allocation of adequate human and financial resources allowing for such tasks to be carried out in a manner which will not affect the NCBs’ operational capacity to carry out their ESCB-related tasks . In particular, the ECB has advocated a prudent approach in this respect when reimbursement arrangements are proposed in the national legislation as a mode of financing the non-ESCB related tasks . The ECB considers that the draft regulation raises concerns in this respect to the extent that, as developed above, advance financing by the DNB of the Dutch DGS operations is foreseen by the draft regulation other than as intraday or short-term emergency liquidity financing, and in particular in the circumstances where DNB would not be fully reimbursed for such advance financing.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 4 October 2011.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET

text: 21 See the ECB’s Convergence Report, May 2010, p. 21.

text: 22 See for instance paragraph 3 of ECB Opinion

text: 23 See for instance paragraph 4.2(c) of ECB Opinion


text: Ännu ej offentliggjord i EUT.

sprak: sv

title: ECB-rådets yttrande av den 6 oktober 2011 över en rekommendation från rådet om utnämning av en ledamot i Europeiska centralbankens direktion (CON/2011/77)

text: Inledning och rättslig grund

text: Den 4 oktober 2011 mottog Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) en begäran från Europeiska rådets ordförande om ett yttrande över ett förslag till rådets rekommendation av den 4 oktober 2011 om utnämning av en ledamot i Europeiska centralbankens direktion.

text: ECB-rådets behörighet att avge ett yttrande grundar sig på

text: artikel 283.2 i fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt

text: Allmänna kommentarer

text: 1. I rådets rekommendation, som överlämnats till Europeiska rådet och som Europaparlamentet och ECB-rådet nu ska yttra sig över, föreslås att Jörg Asmussen utnämns till direktionsledamot i Europeiska centralbanken för en tid av åtta år.

text: 2. ECB-rådet anser att den förslagna kandidaten är en person som besitter den allmänt erkända auktoritet och yrkeserfarenhet inom den finansiella sektorn som krävs enligt artikel 283.2 i fördraget.

text: 3. ECB-rådet har ingen invändning mot rådets rekommendation att utnämna Jörg Asmussen till direktions-ledamot i Europeiska centralbanken.


text: See paragraph 1.1 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.4 of Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 5 For instance, it could be useful to define ‘euro banknote depot’ to ensure clarity in granting the remote credit institution branch status under Article 7(2) of the draft regulation.

text: See e.g. the ECB’s Convergence Report May 2010, p. 21, available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 7 In the context of consultations by Slovenian authorities, see e.g. paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 3.5 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 3.1 of Opinion

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 7 October 2011 on sanctions related to the protection of the euro against counterfeiting (CON/2011/78)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 7 October 2011 on sanctions related to the protection of the euro against counterfeiting (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 8 September 2011 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Slovenian Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft regulation on the implementation of

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 1338/2001 of 28 June 2001

text: laying down measures necessary for the protection of the euro against counterfeiting, amended by

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2009 of 18 December 2008

text: amending

text: Regulation (EC) No 1338/2001

text: laying down measures necessary for the protection of the euro against counterfeiting (hereinafter the ‘draft regulation’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the first, second and third indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to currency matters, means of payment and Banka Slovenije. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft regulation

text: Pursuant to

text: amending

text: Regulation (EC) No 1338/2001

text: laying down measures necessary for the protection of the euro against counterfeiting , the draft regulation: (a) sets out the offences in breach of the first and second subparagraphs of

text: Article 6(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1338/2001

text: in conjunction with Decision ECB/2010/14 of the European Central Bank of 16 September 2010 on the authenticity and fitness checking and recirculation of euro banknotes ; and (b) provides that Banka Slovenije is the competent authority to supervise compliance with

text: Regulation (EC) No 1338/2001

text: and to take decisions on offences under the draft regulation. The draft regulation will enter into force on 31 December 2011.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 Even though national authorities are not required to consult the ECB on measures taken to ensure that breaches of

text: are subject to effective, proportionate and deterrent sanctions, it is nonetheless beneficial to address this issue in order to encourage a harmonised approach across the Union to the extent possible, subject to national peculiarities . 2.2 The ECB broadly welcomes the draft regulation which should provide for an effective system of deterrent sanctions in relation to the protection of the euro against counterfeiting and thus contribute to maintaining public confidence in euro banknotes in circulation.

text: 3. Consistency with Union legislation

text: Articles 3

text: to 9 of the draft regulation describe cash handler obligations, the breach of which constitutes a serious or minor offence sanctioned by a fine under Articles 11 or 12 of the draft regulation. The ECB considers it essential for the draft regulation to only deviate from Decision ECB/2010/14 where the Decision has expressly allowed such deviations. To ensure consistency, the ECB recommends including direct references in the draft regulation to the relevant provisions of Decision ECB/2010/14, including its technical annexes. Alternatively, a full reproduction of the relevant provisions of Decision ECB/2010/14 without any alterations or additions is also acceptable. 3.2 Decision ECB/2010/14 applies to cash handlers by virtue of

text: , which refers to procedures defined by the ECB for checking euro banknotes. In this context, the ECB understands that the terms used in the draft regulation have the same meaning as in Decision ECB/2010/14. If necessary to ensure legal certainty, additional new terms should be defined .

text: 4. Sanctions regime

text: In accordance with Articles 11 and 12 of the draft regulation, a fine of EUR 75 000 will be imposed on cash handlers committing a serious breach of their obligations under the draft regulation and a fine of EUR 3 000 will be imposed on the responsible person of such cash handlers. For a minor breach, cash handlers will be fined EUR 30 000 and their respective responsible persons EUR 1 000. To ensure that specific circumstances are taken into account and that sanctions are proportionate, the ECB recommends that the Ministry consider whether the proposed system of fixed fines could be replaced by a system that sets a maximum ceiling or provides for a range of fines for each particular breach.

text: 5. Tasks of Banka Slovenije under the draft regulation

text: In accordance with Article 2 of the draft regulation, Banka Slovenije acts as the competent authority to supervise compliance with

text: Regulation (EC) No 1338/2001

text: and to take decisions regarding offences under the draft regulation. Banka Slovenije would have to commit additional human and financial resources to carry out these new tasks. In this context, the ECB has emphasised that ‘Member States may not put their [national central banks] in a position where they have insufficient financial resources to carry out their [European System of Central Banks] or Eurosystem related tasks, as applicable’ . The ECB has consistently expressed its concern that, when allocating additional tasks to national central banks, it must be ensured that they have sufficient human and financial resources, both in terms of quantity and quality, for all of their tasks, and in particular that their capacity to fulfil their European System of Central Banks or Eurosystem-related tasks is not affected .

text: 6. Name of the single currency

text: The title and Article 1 of the draft regulation refer to the full title of

text: Regulation (EC) No 1338/2001

text: and thereby uses the incorrect spelling of the name of the single currency (‘evro’ instead of ‘euro’). The ECB would like to draw the Ministry’s attention to the corrigendum to the Slovenian language version of

text: Regulation (EC) No 1338/2001

text: replacing all instances of incorrect spelling of the name of the single currency with the correct spelling and thus making it compatible with Union law in this respect. The ECB expects that the abovementioned spelling mistakes in the draft regulation will be corrected.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 7 October 2011.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 2 This provision was originally adopted as

text: Article 117

text: bis of the Law of 2 August 2002 on the supervision of the financial sector and on financial services, whose substance was transferred to the Law of 22 February 1998 NBB in the context of the recent reform of the Belgian supervisory architecture. The ECB issued the following two opinions on this reform:

text: and

text: . ECB Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1 commented on an early draft of the empowering clause. All ECB opinions are available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: See in particular

text: Article 36

text: /24, §1, 2° of the Law of 22 February 1998. 4 Belgium has consulted the ECB on seven other draft legislative provisions adopted in this context: (i) Opinion

text: ; (ii) Opinion

text: ; (iii) Opinion

text: ; (iv) Opinion

text: ; (v) Opinion

text: ; (vi)

text: and (vii)

text: . 5 See the references to the safeguard of the stability of the Belgian financial system in recital 3 of the draft royal decree. 6 Article 1 of the draft royal decree. 7 Article 2 of the draft royal decree. In addition to the principal, the guarantee also covers interests and ancillary costs, which are not subject to the EUR 54 450 000 000 ceiling. 8 Article 2 of the draft royal decree. The categories of ‘professional counterparts’ that are eligible for the guarantee are to be identified by the Minister for Finance in a further contract or regulation. 9 Article 3 of the draft royal decree. The eligible beneficiaries will need to provide a precise justification of the amounts concerned and declare that these amounts are payable and unpaid. 10 Article 4 of the draft royal decree. 11 Article

text: ° of the draft royal decree. 12 Article

text: ° and Article

text: ° of the draft royal decree. 13 Article

text: ° of the draft royal decree. 14 The following will also need to be specified in the agreements : (i) whether the guarantee is assignable (Article

text: ° of the draft royal decree); (ii) the arrangements ensuring subrogation and compensation of the Belgian State in the event of a call on the guarantees, and any possible related security (Article

text: ° of the draft royal decree); (iii) the arrangements for informing the State of the development of the guaranteed loans (Article

text: ° of the draft royal decree; (iv) the pay out deadlines (Article

text: ° of the draft royal decree), as well as (v) any other provision deemed useful by the Minister for Finance (Article

text: ° of the draft royal decree).

text: See notably the Communication from the Commission on the application, from 1 January 2011, of State aid rules to support measures in favour of banks in the context of the financial crisis, (OJ C 329, 7.12.2010, p. 7); the DG Competition Staff Working Document - The application of State aid rules to government guarantee schemes covering bank debt to be issued after 30 June 2011, published on the Commission’s website at www.ec.europa.eu; the Communication from the Commission – The application of State aid rules to measures taken in relation to financial institutions in the context of the current global financial crisis (OJ C 270, 25.10.2008, p. 8); the Eurosystem’s Guiding principles for bank asset support schemes, 25 February 2009; and Commission Communication of 25 February 2009 on the treatment of impaired assets in the Community banking sector (OJ C 72, 26.3.2009, p. 1). See furthermore in this context the Recommendations of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank on government guarantees for bank debt, 20 October 2008. 16

text: , paragraph 3.1,

text: , paragraph 3.3,

text: , paragraph 3.9. 17

text: , paragraph 3.5. 18

text: , paragraph 3.1,

text: , paragraph 3.2,

text: , paragraph 3.5 . 19

text: , paragraph 3.1,

text: , paragraph 3.9,

text: , paragraph 3.2,

text: , paragraph 3.3.2. 20

text: , paragraph 3.1,

text: , paragraph 3.9,

text: , paragraph 3.3.2 and

text: , paragraph 3.7.

text: , paragraph 3.1,

text: , paragraph 3.3.2,

text: , paragraph 3.9. 22 DG Competition Staff Working Document - The application of State aid rules to government guarantee schemes covering bank debt to be issued after 30 June 2011, published on the Commission’s website at www.ec.europa.eu. 23

text: , paragraph 3.2,

text: , paragraph 3.1,

text: , paragraph 2.5.2.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 13 October 2011 on a State guarantee covering certain loans granted to Dexia SA and Dexia Crédit Local SA (CON/2011/79)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 13 October 2011 on a State guarantee covering certain loans granted to Dexia SA and Dexia Crédit Local SA (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 12 October 2011, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Nationale Bank van België/Banque Nationale de Belgique (NBB), acting on behalf of the Belgian Ministry of Finance, for an opinion on a draft royal decree granting a State guarantee covering certain loans granted to Dexia SA and Dexia Crédit Local SA (hereinafter the ‘draft royal decree’). The ECB was requested to deliver an opinion under extremely urgent circumstances. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Article 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the sixth indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , since the draft royal decree relates to rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft royal decree

text: Article 36

text: /24 §1 of the Law of 22 February 1998 establishing the Organic Statute of the Nationale Bank van België/Banque Nationale de Belgique empowers the King, on advice from the NBB, to adopt certain measures, including notably the establishment of a system to grant a State guarantee covering liabilities entered into by certain supervised institutions or covering certain claims held by

text: these institutions in the event of a sudden crisis in the financial markets or a serious threat of a

text: systemic crisis and, if the measures are taken, to limit the scale or effects thereof .

text: The draft royal decree is based on this empowering provision and is motivated by the need, given

text: the current turbulence in the international financial markets, to take certain measures to safeguard

text: the stability of and confidence in the Belgian financial system. These measures consist in the setting

text: up of a guarantee scheme covering particular loans of certain entities of the Dexia group in the

text: context of the group’s restructuring .

text: 1.2 Under the draft royal decree, the Belgian State will guarantee loans granted to Dexia SA and/or

text: Dexia Crédit Local SA by other credit institutions or professional counterparts , up to a maximum

text: principal amount of EUR 54 450 000 000 . The guarantee will only apply for loans issued until

text: 31 December 2021 at the latest and having a maturity of maximum 10 years . The guarantee will be

text: payable at first demand and its remuneration is to be determined by the Minister for Finance .

text: The entry into force of the State guarantee will be conditional on the Minister for Finance entering

text: into one or several agreement specifying certain aspects of the arrangement, notably: (i) the

text: identification of the guaranteed loans ; (ii) Dexia SA and Dexia Crédit Local SA’s undertaking to

text: pay the remuneration agreed for the guarantee and to implement any measure aimed at restoring

text: their solvability deemed useful by the Minister for Finance ; (iii) the duration of the guarantee and

text: events causing the guarantee to expire .

text: 2. General observations

text: It is important to ensure that the draft royal decree and any subsequent implementing measures fully

text: comply with the relevant provisions of Union law, including competition and State aid rules. In this

text: respect, it is essential that Member States comply with the guidance given by the European Commission in its communications on the application of State aid rules to support measures in favour of banks and government guarantee schemes covering bank debt , including with regard to the temporary nature of the acceptability of such aid measures and the necessity for credit institutions receiving State support to submit a restructuring plan.

text: 3. Interaction of the draft royal decree with the monetary policy of the euro area

text: The draft royal decree does not define the type of liabilities falling within the meaning of ‘loans’ under Article 1 of the draft royal decree since they will be defined in the agreement(s) referred to in Article 5 of the draft royal Decree. In this respect, the ECB makes the following observations. First, it reminds the consulting authority that government guarantees for bank debt should, when practically implemented: (i) address the funding problems of liquidity-constrained solvent banks by improving the functioning of the market for bank debt of longer-term maturity; (ii) preserve the level playing field among financial institutions and avoid market distortions; and (iii) ensure consistency in the management of Eurosystem liquidity. In this vein, government guarantees on short-term bank debt with a maturity of three to 12 months may be provided to revitalise the short-term bank debt market . In this regard, the ECB reiterates that granting government guarantees for bank debt with a maturity of less than three months should be avoided to the extent possible . Second, it is also stressed that it is of the utmost importance that support operations conducted by national authorities do not in any way affect the conduct and the implementation of monetary policy in the euro area . In this context, the ECB reiterates its view that the extension of the State guarantee to cover interbank deposits should be avoided , as this could entail substantial distortion in the various national segments of the euro area money market by potentially increasing short-term debt issuance activity across Member States and therefore impairing the implementation of the single monetary policy, which is an exclusive competence of the Eurosystem under Article 127(2) of the Treaty . It could also affect the

text: transmission of monetary policy decisions and make it difficult to maintain the necessary level playing field in the euro area between the financial institutions benefiting from the State guarantee and those not benefiting.

text: 4. Temporary nature of the scheme

text: Also in line with the guidance given by the Commission on 30 June 2011 , the ECB notes the need for national support measures to be temporary in nature . It is understood that the support scheme covers a time period of up to 20 years, as the loans covered by the guarantee may be issued until 31 December 2021 at the latest and may be for a maximum duration of 10 years, and thus could be considered of a longer-term rather than temporary nature.

text: 5. Pricing of the guarantee

text: As for Article 4 of the draft royal decree, the ECB underlines that, for the Minister of Finance to determine the remuneration due to the State for the guarantee, the pricing formula recommended by the Governing Council on 20 October 2008 should be taken into consideration. This was also supported by the Commission in its guidance related to the application of State aid rules to government guarantees of 2011.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 13 October 2011.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 2 Articles XII, XVII, XXVIII, XXXIV and XL of the draft law. 3 Article I, points 22 and 10 of the draft law. 4 Article I, point 22 of the draft law - proposed

text: Article 23

text: Article I, point 14 of the draft law - proposed amendment to

text: Article 21(5)

text: . 6 Article I, points 13, 19 and point 22 of the draft law - proposed

text: Article 23(2)

text: (h). 7 Article I, points 23 to 30 of the draft law. 8 Article I, point 34 of the draft law.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 14 October 2011 on the financial statements register (CON/2011/80)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 14 October 2011 on the financial statements register (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 14 September 2011 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Slovak Ministry of Finance for an opinion on the draft law amending Law No 431/2002 Coll. on accounting, and on amendments to some laws (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to Národná banka Slovenska. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: The draft law establishes a register for financial statements managed by the Ministry of Finance. In substance, the centralised registration of financial statements will free entities from the obligation to submit such statements to various other authorities. Some of these entities supervised by Národná banka Slovenska (NBS) are currently obliged to submit their financial statements to NBS. As a consequence of the proposed amendments , they will register their financial statements centrally, instead of submitting them to NBS. The register will be divided into public and non-public sections. The public section will include financial statements of banks, branches of foreign banks, management companies, branches of management companies, insurance companies, branches of foreign insurance companies, reinsurance companies, branches of foreign reinsurance companies, retirement pension savings management companies, supplementary pension asset management companies and the stock exchange (hereinafter ‘financial institutions’). The documents in the public section of the register will be available to the public through the website free of charge .

text: At present, financial institutions are obliged to publish their financial statements on their websites. Under the draft law, financial institutions may opt to announce on their websites only that such statements have been registered . The draft law provides that financial institutions will also prepare and register reports on selected data 6 7 8 from financial statements and amends the rules on valuation methods and the sanctions regime .

text: 2. General observations

text: The ECB understands that although NBS will no longer receive financial statements from the entities directly, the financial statements will be registered within unchanged deadlines and accessible to NBS. Provided that the draft laws triggers only this procedural change and the required information remains available to NBS as a financial market supervisor, the ECB has no observations.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 14 October 2011.

text: [signed]

text: The Vice-President of the ECB

text: Vítor CONSTÂNCIO