text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42). 2 See BNR’s Regulations No 2/2005 and 3/2005, which will be repealed once the draft regulation enters into force. 3

text: Regulation (EU) No 260/2012

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2012 establishing technical and business requirements for credit transfers and direct debits in euro and amending

text: Regulation (EC) No 924/2009

text: (OJ L 94, 30.3.2012, p. 22). 4 Law no. 231/2015 on setting out measures to implement

text: Regulation (EU) No 260/2012

text: Regulation (EC) No 924/2009

text: , published in Monitorul Oficial al României, Part I, No 758 of 10 October 2015. The law designates BNR as the competent authority for ensuring compliance with the SEPA Regulation in which respect BNR is entitled to issue regulations. 5 Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2007 on payment services in the internal market amending Directives

text: and

text: and repealing Directive

text: (OJ L 319, 5.12.2007, p. 1).

text: Published in Monitorul Oficial al României, Part I, No 685 of 12 October 2009. 7 See Article 3(1) of the draft regulation. 8 See Article 3(2) of the draft regulation. 9 See Article 3(3) of the draft regulation. 10 See Article 5(2) of the draft regulation. 11 See

text: Article 5(1)

text: and (3) of the draft regulation, respectively. A direct debit commitment is defined in Article 2(1) of the draft regulation as an agreement between the payee and the payee’s institution which relates, inter alia, to the consent given by the payee’s institution regarding the use of direct debit instructions by the payee. 12 See Article 4(2) of the draft regulation and

text: Article 74 of Directive 2007/64/EC

text: . 13 See Article 4(1) of the draft regulation. 14 See

text: Article 4(5)

text: to (8) of the draft regulation.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 16 March 2016 on mandatory requirements for credit transfers and direct debits (CON/2016/13)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 16 March 2016 on mandatory requirements for credit transfers and direct debits (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 3 February 2016 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from Banca Naţională a României (BNR) for an opinion on a draft regulation on credit transfer and direct debit transactions (hereinafter the ‘draft regulation’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the second and fifth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft regulation relates to means of payment and payment systems. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft regulation

text: 1.1 The purpose of the draft regulation is to recast and update the national legal framework governing payment orders used in credit transfer operations and direct debits executed through the automated clearing house , by establishing minimum mandatory requirements for credit transfers and direct debits processed in Romania. 1.2 The draft regulation covers certain technical requirements which are also addressed in

text: Regulation (EU) No 260/2012

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council (hereinafter, the ‘SEPA Regulation’), which has been implemented into Romanian law by Law No 231/2015 on setting out measures to implement the SEPA Regulation . In addition, the draft regulation relates to certain provisions of Directive

text: ‘Payment Services Directive’), which has been transposed into Romanian law by Government Emergency Ordinance No 113/2009 on payment services . 1.3 Under the draft regulation, a credit transfer instruction shall include the following mandatory data elements: (a) the identification as a credit transfer instruction; (b) the payer’s name and the unique identifier of its payment account; (c) the payee’s name and the unique identifier of its payment account; (d) the amount and currency of the credit transfer; (e) the elements allowing the verification of the authenticity of the credit transfer instruction, as determined by the payer’s institution according to a pre-agreed security procedure . In addition to the requirements outlined above, the payer and the payer’s institution may agree that the payer shall additionally provide, for example, the following elements: (a) the amount of the credit transfer spelled in letters; (b) the execution date for the credit transfer; and (c) details on the economic content of the transaction that determined the initiation of the credit transfer instruction . For State Treasury-related payments certain specific additional elements, such as fiscal identifiers, are to be required for credit transfers . 1.4 The mandatory data elements for a direct debit instruction are as follows: (a) the identification as a direct debit instruction; (b) the amount of the direct debit; (c) the name and/or BIC code of the payer’s institution; (d) the name and/or BIC code of the payee’s institution; (e) the holder’s name and the unique identifier of the payment account to be debited; (f) the holder’s name and the unique identifier of the payment account to be credited; (g) the elements allowing the authentication of the payee by the payee’s institution . In addition, mandatory data elements are prescribed for direct debit mandates and commitments . 1.5 Following the liability regime laid down in the Payment Services Directive, the draft regulation prescribes no liability for the payee’s institution where the credit transfer transaction was carried out in accordance with the payee’s unique identifiers . According to the draft regulation the payee’s institution shall only take into consideration as unique identifiers the payee’s unique identification code and/or the BIC code . Further rules are laid down in the draft regulation with regard to the State Treasury’s liability in relation to credit transfer instructions received by it as the payee’s institution .

text: 2. General observations

text: The draft regulation aims to standardise current practices with regard to credit transfers and direct debit operations in Romania, while at the same time simplifying the requirements laid down in the

text: currently applicable national legal framework. Harmonised rules and common standards are welcome as a means of generating benefits and increasing efficiency for the electronic payments market. Although Union law only regulates the technical and business requirements for eurodenominated credit transfers and direct debits, the ECB welcomes the alignment of national standards for payment transactions denominated in Romanian lei with established Union standards. To further support integration and harmonisation, an even higher degree of alignment with relevant EU legislation could be considered, for example by relying on existing definitions contained in Union law.

text: 3. Specific observations

text: 3.1 With a view to enhancing legal certainty, it would be desirable to specify the scope of the draft regulation in terms of whether it applies to: (a) payment transactions carried out between and within payment service providers; (b) transactions processed and settled through large-value payment systems; and (c) other means of payment. 3.2 The subject matter of the draft regulation would also benefit from further clarification to the effect that it covers only transactions denominated in Romanian lei, since the SEPA Regulation is to apply, as of 31 October 2016, to euro-denominated credit transfers and direct debit transactions also in Member States whose currency is not the euro.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).

text: The legal basis for the use of the euro in Saint Barthélemy is the monetary agreement between the European Union and the French Republic on keeping the euro in Saint-Barthélemy following the amendment of its status with regard to the European Union –

text: Council Decision 2011/433/EU of 12 July 2011

text: on the signing and conclusion of the Monetary Agreement between the European Union and the French Republic on keeping the euro in Saint Barthélemy following the amendment of its status with regard to the European Union (OJ L 89, 20.7.2011, p. 1).

text: The euro is used in Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon on the basis of

text: Council Decision 1999/95/EC of 31 December 1998

text: concerning the monetary arrangements in the French territorial communities of Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon and Mayotte (OJ L 30, 4.2.1999, p. 29). The ECB reiterates its position on the status of the use of the euro in Saint-Pierre-et- Miquelon, as communicated in Opinions

text: (OJ C 127, 7.5.1999, p. 5), and

text: . All ECB opinions are available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: See Article L-141-7 of the CMF.

text: See

text: Article 44

text: bis (I) of the draft law.

text: See Opinion CON/99/20.

text: See Opinion CON/99/20.

text: See Article L.141-7 of the CMF.

publisher: Europeiska centralbanken

sprak: en

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 16 March 2016 on the acquisition of the legal ownership of the Institut d’Émission des Départements d’Outre-Mer by the Banque de France (CON/2016/14)

serie: con

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 16 March 2016 on the acquisition of the legal ownership of the Institut d’Émission des Départements d’Outre-Mer by the Banque de France (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

type: rubrik

text: On 15 February 2016 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the French Ministry of Finance and Public Accounts for an opinion on a draft legislative provision (hereinafter the ‘draft law’) amending the statute of the Institut d’Émission des Départements d’Outre-Mer (IEDOM, Issuing Institution of the Overseas Departments). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the first and third indents of

text: , as the draft law relates to currency matters and to a national central bank (NCB). In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

type: stycke

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The IEDOM conducts monetary policy operations for the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) in the outermost regions of France (Martinique, Mayotte, Guadeloupe, French Guiana, La Réunion and Saint Martin) as well as in the French overseas countries and territories that use the 2 3 euro (Saint Barthélemy and Saint-Pierre-and-Miquelon ) (hereinafter referred to as the ‘geographical zone of activity’). 1.2 Under the current legal framework, the IEDOM is a national public law legal entity (établissement public national), the status of which is governed by the French Monetary and Financial Code (hereinafter the ‘CMF’). The entity is fully owned by the French State. However, for the implementation of ESCB tasks in its geographical zone of activity, the IEDOM is an agent of the Banque de France (BdF) acting in the name and on behalf of the BdF and under its direction.

text: According to Article L.711-9 of the CMF the IEDOM’s accounts are to be consolidated with those of the BdF. However given that the IEDOM is a public law legal entity exclusively owned by the French State, the assets and liabilities of the IEDOM are not consolidated with those of the BdF, but only ‘combined’ for presentation purposes in the BdF’s annual report. 1.3 Article L.711-2 of the CMF provides that the IEDOM acts for and on behalf, and under the authority, of the BdF when exercising the tasks laid down in Articles L.122-1 and L.141-1 to L.141-5-1 and L.141-6-1 of the CMF in its geographical zone of activity. When the BdF performs services requested by the State or carried out for third parties with the agreement of the State, these services must be remunerated in order to cover the BdF’s expenses . The ECB notes that the performance of such tasks by the IEDOM in its geographic zone of activity is remunerated under the same conditions as tasks performed by the BdF in metropolitan France (reference is made to Article L. 711-3 of the CMF, which remains as is). 1.4 The purpose of the draft law is to allow the BdF to acquire the ownership of the IEDOM, with a view to strengthening the latter’s independence vis-à-vis the French State. According to the draft law, the IEDOM would become a private law legal entity incorporated as a ‘société par actions simplifiée’ (SAS – simplified joint-stock company) and wholly-owned by the BdF. Pursuant to the draft law, this transformation of the IEDOM would not entail the creation of a new legal entity, nor constitute a dissolution (cessation d’activité) but rather would ensure the continuity of the IEDOM. From an accounting standpoint, the ECB understands that as a result of the transfer of ownership of the IEDOM to the BdF, the latter will recognise in its standalone accounts its shareholding in the IEDOM and the financial statements of the two entities will be fully consolidated. Pursuant to paragraph IV

text: Article 44

text: bis of the draft law, the BdF will indemnify the French State for the transfer of ownership of the IEDOM and its transformation into an SAS. 1.5 The governance structure of the IEDOM will also be substantially modified and simplified following its transformation into an SAS. The specificity of an SAS is that, subject to certain limited exceptions, the governance rules are not laid down by law. As an SAS, IEDOM’s governance rules will be laid down in its bylaws (see Article L.227-5 of the French Commercial Code) and may also be part of the Decree amending the regulatory part of the CMF. Neither the draft Decree nor the draft bylaws were communicated to the ECB in the context of the present consultation.

text: 2. Observations regarding the transfer of ownership of the IEDOM to the BdF

text: 2.1 As indicated in the ECB’s previous opinion on the statute and role of the IEDOM , the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter the ‘Statute of the ESCB’) does not provide for ESCB tasks being carried out by bodies other than the ECB and the ESCB NCBs. The ECB therefore welcomes the transfer of ownership of the IEDOM to the BdF and understands that the continued existence of the IEDOM, as a legal entity that is separate from

text: the BdF, is justified by the special situation of the Union’s outermost regions of France and of the French overseas countries and territories that use the euro. 2.2 The ECB understands that an agreement regarding the precise terms and conditions governing the transformation of IEDOM from a public law legal entity into an SAS is to be concluded between the French State and the BdF before the draft law enters into force. This agreement will, in particular, provide for an indemnity to be paid by the BdF to the French State. In this regard, the ECB emphasises that any provision of funds from an NCB to a Member State needs to comply with the limitations imposed by the Treaty, in particular with the prohibition on monetary financing laid down in

text: Article 123

text: TFEU. From the documents at its disposal the ECB is not in a position to assess the way in which the indemnification provided for in the draft law will be agreed upon. The ECB would therefore appreciate receiving a copy of the draft agreement between the French State and the BdF prior to its entry into effect and execution. 2.3 As a general matter, any indemnity to be paid by the BdF to the French State as a result of the transfer of ownership of the IEDOM should be based on a prudent and fair valuation as confirmed by an independent expert. 2.4 In addition, the ECB understands that the change in the status of the IEDOM that took place in 2000 following the transfer of national monetary policy powers to the ECB on 1 January 1999 did not entail any indemnification of the French State by the BdF, nor did it give rise to any claim to that effect. The ECB clearly stressed on that occasion that the result of any ESCB-related financial transactions should be recorded immediately and directly in the financial statements of the BdF. Against this background, the ECB emphasises that no indemnity should be paid by the BdF to the French State for any profits and losses (including undistributed dividends or reserves) related to ESCB tasks which were generated from 1 January 1999 onwards, including any which may be generated after the completion of the transfer of ownership of the IEDOM to the BdF. 2.5 As regards non-Eurosystem related assets and liabilities that will be transferred to what will become the BdF’s subsidiary as a result of the draft law, the ECB does not exclude such indemnification in principle, but stresses the importance of a prudent valuation on the basis of which such indemnification should be based. In that respect, the valuation should amount to the fair value of the assets and liabilities effectively transferred to the BdF (taking due account of all transferred liabilities, including in particular pension scheme-related liabilities). Given the complexity of such a valuation exercise, an independent expert should be tasked with its verification.

text: 3. Observations regarding the IEDOM’s new statute

text: 3.1 The draft law does not materially change the current framework as regards the IEDOM’s tasks and role (see paragraph 1.3 above) and no new tasks will be attributed to it as a result of the transfer of its ownership from the French State to the BdF. Furthermore, the tasks in the interest of the French State that the IEDOM will continue to perform in its geographical zone of activity will continue to be

text: remunerated by the French State. The IEDOM’s tasks of general interest are also identical in nature to those performed by the BdF in the BdF’s own geographical zone of activity . 3.2 Financial independence is a key aspect of the principle of central bank independence (

text: Article 130

text: TFEU) for the members of the ESCB. The ECB emphasises that any task undertaken by the IEDOM as the BdF’s wholly-owned subsidiary must be compatible with the BdF’s institutional and financial independence, to safeguard the proper performance of its tasks under the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB, as well as its national tasks. Thus, following the transfer of ownership of the IEDOM to the BdF, any tasks undertaken in the interests of the French State may be performed by the IEDOM on the condition that the IEDOM continues to receive appropriate remuneration for such tasks from the French State. 3.3 As regards the governance of the IEDOM, in accordance with its new statute, the ECB understands that choosing the SAS as the most appropriate form of corporate structure was justified by the flexible organisational and governance rules associated with the SAS structure. The ECB also understands that the choice of the SAS structure will allow the IEDOM to continue to act as the BdF’s agent while maintaining the IEDOM’s separate legal personality. However, the ECB notes that specific governance and organisational rules will be laid down in the bylaws of the SAS which are not part of the present consultation. Pursuant to Article L.711-12 of the CMF the arrangements regarding the organisation and the bylaws of the IEDOM are to be laid down by a Decree that will be adopted following the adoption of the draft law. In view of the fact that the IEDOM will become a wholly-owned subsidiary of the BdF it would appear that Article L.711-12 of the CMF will become redundant and could therefore be repealed. If, however, any Decree on the arrangements for the operation of IEDOM were to be adopted, the ECB would welcome being consulted on it. Furthermore, the ECB expects to be provided with any other corporate arrangements relating to the organisation and operation of the IEDOM as an SAS. 3.4 As regards the status of the IEDOM’s staff, the ECB notes that the proposed transformation will not have a direct impact on the legal regime applicable to anyone having an employment contract with the IEDOM. The ECB further observes that Article L.711-11 of the CMF, in accordance with which staff members seconded to the IEDOM by the Agence Française de Développement (AFD, the French Development Agency) remain subject to the provisions applicable to them as staff members of the AFD, is not amended by the draft law. The ECB underlines that, in line with

text: Article 130

text: TFEU, the legal regime applicable to the IEDOM must ensure its full independence vis-à-vis other offices, bodies or agencies of the French State. The ECB understands that any of the IEDOM’s staff that are on secondment from the AFD work entirely under the direction, control and supervision of the IEDOM during their secondment, both from an organisational and functional perspective, and that, in relation to their ESCB-related duties at the IEDOM, they are subject to

text: Article 37 of the Statute of the ESCB. This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 16 March 2016. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI

type: vagledning

utgivare: ecb


text: COM(2015) 583 final.

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 2003/71/EG av den 4 november 2003

text: om de prospekt som ska offentliggöras när värdepapper erbjuds till allmänheten eller tas upp till handel och om ändring av direktiv

text: (EUT L 345, 31.12.2003, s. 64).

text: Se artikel 1.2 b i förslaget till förordning.

text: Se artikel 1.2 c i förslaget till förordning.

text: Se skäl 7 i förslaget till förordning.

text: Se skäl 21 i förslaget till förordning.

text: Se punkt 2.4 sjätte stycket i yttrande

text: om ett förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning om rapportering och öppenhet om och insyn i transaktioner för värdepappersfinansiering. Alla ECB:s yttranden finns på ECB:s webbplats www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: Kommissionens förordning

text: (EG) nr 809/2004

text: av den 29 april 2004 om genomförande av

text: i fråga om informationen i prospekt, dessas format, införlivande genom hänvisning samt offentliggörande av prospekt och annonsering (EUT L 149, 30.4.2004, s. 1).

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning (EU) 2015/2365 av den 25 november 2015

text: om transparens i transaktioner för värdepappersfinansiering och om återanvändning samt om ändring av förordning

text: (EU) nr 648/2012

text: (EUT L 337, 23.12.2015, s. 1).

text: Se

text: artikel 7.7 a

text: första strecksatsen i förslaget till förordning.

text: Se punkt 4.1 i bilaga III, punkt 4.1 i bilaga V, punkt 4.1.1 i bilaga XII, punkt 4.2 i bilaga XIII i förordning

text: (EG) nr 809/2004

text: Se

text: artikel 4.10 b i förordning (EU) 2015/2365

text: Se EBA:s rekommendation On the use of the Legal Entity Identifier (LEI) (

text: ), finns på EBA:s webbplats www.eba.europa.eu, och Esmas informationsdokument med frågor och svar, Implementation of the Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories (EMIR) (

text: ), 4 februari 2016, s. 73, finns på Esmas webbplats www.esma.europa.eu.

text: Se FSB:s rapport A Global Legal Entity Identifier for Financial Markets, 8 juni 2012, finns på FSB:s webbplats www.financialstabilityboard.org.

text: Se artiklarna 13 och 42 i förslaget till förordning.

text: Se ändringsförslag 2, 3, 4 och 5 i bilagan till detta yttrande.

text: Se artikel 20.6 i förslaget till förordning.

text: Se ändringsförslag 6 i bilagan till detta yttrande.

text: Se ändringsförslag 1 i bilagan till detta yttrande.

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning (EU) nr 909/2014 av den 23 juli 2014

text: om förbättrad värdepappersavveckling i Europeiska unionen och om värdepapperscentraler samt ändring av direktiv

text: och

text: och förordning

text: (EU) nr 236/2012

text: (EUT L 257, 28.8.2014. s. 1).

sprak: sv

title: Europeiska centralbankens yttrande av den 17 mars 2016 om ett förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning om de prospekt som ska offentliggöras när värdepapper erbjuds till allmänheten eller tas upp till handel (CON/2016/15)

text: Inledning och rättslig grund

text: Den 8 mars 2016 mottog Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) en begäran från rådet om ett yttrande över ett förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning om de prospekt som ska offentliggöras när värdepapper erbjuds till allmänheten eller tas upp till handel (nedan kallat förslaget till förordning).

text: ECB:s behörighet att avge ett yttrande grundas på artiklarna

text: och

text: i fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt eftersom förslaget till förordning innehåller bestämmelser som berör Europeiska centralbankssystemets (ECBS) uppgifter när det gäller att genomföra penningpolitiken och medverka till att de behöriga myndigheterna smidigt kan genomföra sin politik när det gäller det finansiella systemets stabilitet, i enlighet med artikel 127.2 första strecksatsen och artikel 127.5 i fördraget. I enlighet med artikel 17.5 första meningen i arbetsordningen för Europeiska centralbanken har detta yttrande antagits av ECB-rådet.

text: 1. Allmänna kommentarer

text: Huvudsyftet med förslaget till förordning, som skulle upphäva

text: , är att förenkla de nuvarande reglerna för upprättande, godkännande och spridning av prospekt och därigenom minska kostnader och arbetsbördor för att ta fram dem. I förslaget till förordning anges närmare bestämt informationskrav som är särskilt anpassade till en emittents specifika behov och ska göra det lättare för företag, i synnerhet små och medelstora företag, att anskaffa kapital inom unionen. Syftet med förslaget till förordning är också att minska de avvikande och fragmenterade regler inom unionen som är en följd av att direktiv

text: har genomförts på olika sätt i vissa medlemsstater. På det hela taget välkomnar och stöder ECB målsättningarna med förslaget till förordning och ser det som ett positivt steg i riktning mot fullbordandet av kapitalmarknadsunionen (KMU).

text: 2. Specifika kommentarer

text: 2.1 Undantag för erbjudanden av icke-aktierelaterade värdepapper som har emitterats av ECB och nationella centralbanker i ECBS samt för kapitalandelar i nationella centralbanker i ECBS

text: ECB välkomnar att förslaget till förordning innehåller ett undantag för icke-aktierelaterade värdepapper som har emitterats av ECB och nationella centralbanker i ECBS. Detta undantag är avgörande för att säkerställa att Eurosystemets penningpolitiska transaktioner inte hindras. Det kan t.ex. röra sig om eventuella emissioner av skuldinstrument som genomförs av ECB och de nationella centralbankerna i ECBS. ECB välkomnar även undantaget för kapitalandelar i nationella centralbanker i ECBS, vilket är av direkt relevans för nationella centralbanker med aktier som innehas av privata investerare och/eller som är upptagna till handel på en reglerad marknad eller en annan handelsplats.

text: 2.2 Obligatoriska krav för användningen av ISIN-koden (International Securities Identification Number) och den globala LEI-koden (Legal Entity Identifier)

text: Syftet med förslaget till förordning är att garantera skydd för investerarna och en effektiv marknad, samtidigt som den inre kapitalmarknaden stärks. Den information som görs tillgänglig för investerarna bör därför vara tillräcklig och objektiv och presenteras i en uttömmande, koncis och lättbegriplig form. Denna information bör omfatta unika identifieringskoder för såväl värdepapper som emittent. Som tidigare har påpekats stöder ECB i hög grad användningen av internationellt överenskomna standarder, såsom ISIN-koden och den globala LEI-koden. Att använda internationella standarder som ISIN-koden och den globala LEI-koden är en förutsättning för att få till stånd en unik identifiering av emittenter, erbjudare och garanter samt av värdepapper som ska erbjudas allmänheten eller tas upp till handel på en reglerad finansmarknad.

text: För det första är ISIN-koden en unik ID-kod för värdepappersemissioner som är väletablerad och vanligt förekommande på finansmarknaderna. Att det behövs en unik ID-kod för värdepapper bekräftas i förslaget till förordning, i

text: kommissionens förordning (EG) nr 809/2004

text: samt i förordning

text: (EU) 2015/2365

text: . Enligt förslaget till förordning ska prospektsammanfattningen innehålla ett avsnitt med nyckelinformation om värdepapperen som ska omfatta identifieringskoder. I förordning

text: (EG) nr 809/2004

text: fastställs på liknande sätt att prospekt för skuldinstrument, aktier och derivat ska innehålla en beskrivning av typ och slag av värdepapper som erbjuds eller tas upp till handel, däribland ISIN-kod … eller motsvarande identitetskod för värdepapper. Men det anges inte närmare vilken motsvarande identitetskod för värdepapper som skulle kunna användas och det blir därför en tolkningsfråga om koder som inte används i särskilt stor omfattning skulle kunna utgöra ett alternativ. Denna vaghet leder till att informationen blir mindre användbar för investeraren och skapar hinder för kapitalmarknadsunionen. I förordning

text: (EU) 2015/2365

text: fastställs slutligen att när transaktioner för värdepappersfinansiering redovisas ska bland annat uppgifter om ISIN-kod anges för dessa värdepapper. Det stora flertalet av alla skuldinstrument som emitterats i euroområdet har en ISIN-kod, medan skuldinstrument utan ISIN-kod normalt koncentreras till specifika marknader och sektorer samt används för specifika ändamål. Tillgänglig information tyder på att värdepapper i vissa fall har emitterats utan ISIN-kod för att göra transaktionerna mindre spårbara, samtidigt som de fortfarande omfattas av rättsordningen för skuldinstrument. Det finns också en oro att värdepapper skulle kunna emitteras utan ISIN-kod för att man ska slippa lämna ut information till tillsynsmyndigheter och beslutsfattare. Av dessa skäl rekommenderar ECB att alla eventuella informationsluckor undanröjs för att säkerställa att det råder likvärdiga konkurrensvillkor för olika marknader och jurisdiktioner genom att göra det obligatoriskt att ange ISIN-koden i prospekten för de värdepapper som omfattas av förslaget till förordning.

text: För det andra stöder ECB att det globala LEI-systemet, som har godkänts av Europeiska bankmyndigheten (EBA) och Europeiska värdepappers- och marknadsmyndigheten (Esma), används i linje med rekommendationerna från Financial Stability Board (FSB). Den globala LEI-koden möjliggör en unik identifiering av värdepapperets emittenter, erbjudare och garanter och förser på så sätt investeraren med nyckelinformation. Det blir också allt vanligare att den globala LEI-koden används för att identifiera juridisk person samt juridisk form och ECB menar därför att det vore fördelaktigt att utvidga användningen genom att göra det obligatoriskt att ange den globala LEI-koden i prospekt eller registreringsdokument för de värdepapper som omfattas av förslaget till förordning.

text: ECB anser att skyldigheten att rapportera ISIN- och LEI-koderna ska slås fast både i förslaget till förordning och i kommissionens eventuella relaterade delegerade akter som genomför förslaget till förordning och som kommissionen måste anta för att specificera prospektens format. ECB anger förslag för denna punkt.

text: 2.3 Offentliggörande av prospekt i en lagringsmekanism online

text: Enligt förslaget till förordning får Esma till ansvar att på sin webbplats offentliggöra samtliga prospekt som inkommer från behöriga myndigheter. Esma ska säkerställa detta offentliggörande genom en centraliserad lagringsmekanism. Som ECB tolkar det ska denna lagringsmekanism ha en sökfunktion. ECB anser att lagringsmekanismen även ska presentera den information som finns i prospekten i maskinläsbar form med hjälp av metadata, åtminstone för vissa nyckelattribut. Det kan t.ex. gälla identifiering av värdepapper, emittenter, erbjudare och garanter, eftersom sådan information är avgörande för att säkerställa att (institutionella) investerare får tillgång till tillförlitliga uppgifter som kan användas och analyseras snabbt och effektivt. ECB anger förslag för denna punkt.

text: 2.4 Avskaffande av incitament för att emittera skuldinstrument med höga nominella värden

text: För att omfattas av gynnsam behandling enligt direktiv

text: har vissa emittenter nu infört avvecklingsregler med minimibelopp och/eller ett flertal belopp för vissa av sina emitterade värdepapper på värdepapperscentralsnivå. Det är emellertid fortfarande möjligt att genomföra avveckling som inte följer dessa regler på värdepapperscentralsnivå. Det kan t.ex. röra sig om centrala motparters nettning av handel med standardbelopp eller andra icke-handelsrelaterade aktiviteter, såsom behandling av bolagshändelser. Även om instruktionerna för sådan avveckling inte strider mot kraven i direktiv

text: , innebär detta att avvecklingen inte kan genomföras på sedvanligt sätt via de nationella finansmarknadsinfrastrukturernas tekniska plattformar. Normalt kringgår man detta genom att använda sig av ineffektiva och riskfyllda manuella lösningar (tekniska förfaranden som inte bygger på straight through processing (non-STP)) eller tekniska funktioner med ökad komplexitet.

text: Mot denna bakgrund välkomnar ECB att incitamenten för att emittera skuldinstrument med höga nominella värden, dvs. över 100000 euro, tas bort. ECB anser också att införandet av lägsta nominella värden och minimibelopp på avvecklingsnivå strider mot grundtanken i direktiv

text: . I det direktivet införs dessa restriktioner visserligen endast i fråga om marknadsintroduktion eller handel, men vissa emittenter i unionen inför sådana restriktioner även på värdepapperscentralsnivå. Detta belastar i ännu högre grad effektiviteten för finansmarknadsinfrastrukturerna och deras användare, dvs. värdepapperscentraler, centrala motparter och deras aktörer, som kan tvingas använda sig av tekniska förfaranden som inte bygger på straight through processing (non-STP) eller utveckla ytterligare komplexa funktioner för att hantera avvikande avveckling. Mot bakgrund av

text: och sjösättningen av Eurosystemets avvecklingsplattform TARGET2-Securities kommer de nuvarande bristerna som uppstått till följd av minimireglerna för avveckling att förstärkas på grund av den väntade ökningen av gränsöverskridande värdepappersavveckling.

text: 2.5 Tekniska synpunkter och förslag

text: I de fall där ECB rekommenderar att förslaget till förordning ändras anges de specifika förslagen i ett separat tekniskt arbetsdokument som åtföljs av en förklaring. Det tekniska arbetsdokumentet återfinns i bilagan till detta yttrande och finns på engelska på ECB:s webbplats.


text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).

text: See Article 7 and 21 of the draft law.

text: See Article 16 of the draft law, which sets out the relevant qualifying thresholds and the procedure for the CBC’s approval.

text: See

text: Articles 18

text: to 23 and 29 to 32 of the draft law.

text: See Article 12 of the draft law and

text: Article 31

text: (a) of the draft law.

text: See

text: Article 31

text: (b) of the draft law.

text: See

text: Article 31

text: (c) of the draft law.

text: See

text: Article 31

text: (d) of the draft law.

text: See

text: Article 31

text: (e) of the draft law.

text: See Article 8(7) of the draft law. 14 See paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: In accordance with

text: Article 6(2)

text: (d) of the Laws of 2002 to 2007 on the Central Bank of Cyprus, the CBC exercises supervision of banks. Banks are allowed to provide asset management services by virtue of item 11 in Annex IV to the Laws of 1997 to 2015 on the business of credit institutions.

text: Article 6(2)

text: (e) of the Laws of 2002 to 2007 on the Central Bank of Cyprus. 17 See the ECB’s 2014 Convergence Report, p. 25. 18 See, for example, paragraph 3.1.2 of Opinion

text: . 19 See Article 8(7) of the draft law. 20

text: Article 6(2)

text: (e) of the Laws of 2002 to 2014 on the Central Bank of Cyprus.

text: See Article 30 of the draft law. See also Principle 2 of the principles established by the Bank for International Settlements, setting out that the supervisor and its staff should be protected against lawsuits for actions taken and/or omissions made while discharging their duties in good faith.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 17 March 2016 on the establishment and operation of immovable property conveyancing organisations (CON/2016/16)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 17 March 2016 on the establishment and operation of immovable property conveyancing organisations (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 5 February 2016 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Cypriot Minister for Finance for an opinion on a draft law establishing and regulating how immovable property conveyancing organisations operate (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft law relates to the Central Bank of Cyprus (CBC). In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The purpose of the draft law is to create a new category of institution (‘escrow institutions’) whose aim is to safeguard the interests of immovable property buyers. The draft law requires any immovable property transfer to be carried out through an escrow institution that provides contract management and immovable property transfer services pursuant to the provisions of the draft law. As noted in the explanatory memorandum accompanying the draft law, escrow institutions will ensure that immovable property transfers will take place as soon as the buyer has fulfilled his contractual obligations. The draft law regulates the terms and conditions governing the licensing and operation of the escrow institutions providing these services. It also entrusts the CBC with authorising, regulating and supervising these institutions. 1.2 The draft law addresses the need in Cyprus for title deeds to be issued more quickly, an issue which is being addressed in the framework of the economic adjustment programme for Cyprus. 1.3 Under the draft law, only escrow institutions that are incorporated in Cyprus and licensed by the CBC may provide contract management and immovable property transfer services . In addition, the draft law sets out the types of activities that escrow institutions will carry out, as well as the obligations they must meet during the performance of their duties . Furthermore, the draft law

text: defines the CBC’s supervisory and regulatory powers with respect to escrow institutions, including the power to take enforcement measures and impose sanctions, and puts in place a comprehensive legal framework that regulates these institutions and the services they provide. 1.4 The draft law sets out the application procedure that an escrow institution must go through to obtain authorisation, including the documentation that the applicant institution must submit to the CBC. It also stipulates that the CBC will only grant an authorisation if specific conditions are met. In particular, the CBC must be satisfied that the escrow institution: (a) is in a position to fully comply with the draft law and the CBC directives adopted on the basis of the draft law; (b) has shareholders with the capacity to ensure the organisation’s sound and prudent management; (c) has members of its administrative body in good standing with sufficient knowledge, qualifications and experience to carry out their duties; and (d) has no close professional or personal links with any other entity or individual that, in the CBC‘s opinion, could prevent the CBC from carrying out effective supervision . There are also provisions requiring individuals to notify the CBC of any changes to their special holdings in escrow institutions , which will have to be approved by the CBC. In cases where an individual fails to follow the notification procedure set out in the draft law, the CBC Governor may impose administrative fines of up to one million euro. If the infringement continues, the Governor may impose administrative fines ranging from 200 to 100 000 euro for each day that the infringement continues . 1.5 The draft law also sets out: (a) the CBC’s supervisory powers over escrow institutions and other supervisory requirements relating to minimum capital requirements;, (b) the assessment of the company’s management body and key function holders; (c) the procedure for reporting to the CBC; (d) the CBC’s access to a company’s books and records; (e) the CBC’s confidentiality duties; and (f) the imposition of supervisory measures and sanctions by the CBC . 1.6 The draft law gives the CBC the power, pursuant to its own directives and guidelines, to: (a) set out procedures to grant, suspend and revoke authorisation for institutions ; (b) determine the criteria for measuring the fitness and probity of shareholders, directors and key function holders ; (c) regulate the internal organisation and governance of escrow institutions and the fees charged by the institutions for the services they provide pursuant to the draft law and the Law on immovable property contracts and conveyancing ; and (d) to determine the sum insured and the method for determining the sum insured under professional liability insurance as well as the amount of the guarantee against liability as a result of professional negligence .

text: 1.7 Finally, the draft law provides that the CBC has the power to require escrow institutions to pay all licensing and supervision costs in accordance with the CBC’s directives .

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 The ECB notes that the aim of the draft law is to provide legal certainty and confidence with regard to the transparency and safety of the sales process in the Cypriot real estate market. These measures will have an impact on the payment of arrears that affect bank balance sheets in Cyprus, which may be indirectly beneficial to preserving financial stability in Cyprus. 2.2 By giving the CBC specific regulatory and supervisory authority over escrow institutions, the draft law is primarily aimed at ensuring that these institutions carry out their activities properly that individuals and organisations that purchase real estate in Cyprus are adequately protected. 2.3 The ECB underlines that, as regards conferring new tasks on a central bank within the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), it is necessary to assess such a conferral against the prohibition of monetary financing under Article 123 of the Treaty . The ECB has developed the guidance set out in paragraphs 2.3.1 to 2.3.3 of this Opinion, in the form of general and specific considerations, on the basis of which it may determine whether a new task conferred on an ESCB national central bank (NCB) is to be considered a central banking task or a government task for the purposes of the monetary financing prohibition. The concrete assessment of whether the CBC’s task of supervising escrow institutions should be considered a central banking task or a government task is addressed in paragraph 3.1 of this opinion. 2.3.1 General considerations First, genuinely new tasks, or those tasks that do not form an integral part of the central banking tasks already assigned to an NCB in the past, must be systematically categorised as central banking or government tasks. In recognition of the Member States’ diverse legal frameworks, central banking traditions and national set-ups, the tasks currently discharged by an NCB as central banking tasks are not reviewed and re-categorised, but may be reassessed if they are subject to legislative amendments of substance. Second, the principle of financial independence requires that the Member States may not put their NCBs in a position where they have insufficient financial resources to carry out their ESCB- or Eurosystem-related tasks. Third, central banking tasks comprise in particular those tasks that are related to the ones listed in

text: Article 127(2)

text: , (5) and (6) of the Treaty. Fourth, new tasks conferred on an NCB that are atypical of NCBs’ tasks, or which are clearly discharged on behalf of and in the exclusive interest of the government or of other public entities, should be considered as government tasks.

text: 2.3.2 Specific considerations An important criterion for qualifying a new task as a government tasks is the impact of the task on an NCB’s institutional, financial and personal independence. In particular, the following should be taken into account. First, it should be assessed whether the performance of the new task will create inadequately addressed conflicts of interests with existing central banking tasks, without necessarily complementing the existing central banking tasks. If a conflict of interest arises between existing and new tasks, there should be sufficient mitigation measures in place to adequately address that conflict. Complementarity between the new task and existing central banking tasks should not, however, be interpreted broadly, as this could lead to the creation of an indefinite chain of ancillary tasks. The assessment of the complementarity of a new task should also take into account the financing of that task. Second, it should be assessed whether, without new financial resources, the performance of the new task places a disproportionate burden on the financial or organisational capacity of the NCB concerned, and may negatively impact its capacity to properly perform existing central banking tasks. Third, it should be assessed whether the performance of the new task is aligned with the institutional set-up of the NCB, in particular as regards central bank independence and accountability considerations. Fourth, it should be assessed whether the performance of the new task entails substantial financial risks. Fifth, it should be assessed whether the performance of the new task expose the members of the NCB’s decision-making bodies to political risks that: (a) are disproportionate; (b) could have an impact on their personal independence, including, in particular the guarantee of the term of office under Article 14.2 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank. 2.3.3 Any final assessment on the qualification of a task given to an NCB as either falling within the scope of central banking tasks or government tasks should be guided by the objective of ensuring that the prohibition of monetary financing within the Eurosystem and the ESCB is consistently applied, to the extent that it applies to its members.

text: 3. Specific observations

text: 3.1 Conferring the task of supervising escrow institutions on the CBC The draft law designates the CBC as the supervisory authority for escrow institutions. This broadens its current functions and activities, which include supervising the activities of authorised credit institutions, including asset management activities and other financial institutions, and

text: ensuring the stability of the financial system . In the light of the guidance set out in paragraphs 2.3.1 to 2.3.3, it must be assessed whether the CBC’s new task constitutes a breach of the prohibition of monetary financing. 3.1.1 Principle of financial independence The principle of financial independence requires NCBs to have sufficient means to carry out not only their ESCB-related tasks, but also their national tasks, from an operational and financial perspective . Further, when allocating specific non-ESCB-related tasks to the NCBs, additional staff and financial resources must also be allocated so that these tasks can be carried out in a manner that will not affect the NCBs’ operational capacity to perform their ESCB-related tasks . In this regard, the draft law provides that the CBC has the power to require that escrow institutions pay all the costs related to their licensing and supervision in accordance with the CBC directives , so as to safeguard the CBC’s financial independence. 3.1.2 Links to tasks listed in Article 127(5) of the Treaty Supervision over escrow institutions can be considered a task that is primarily designed to provide legal certainty and confidence with regard to the transparency and safety of the sales process in the Cypriot real estate market. Escrow institutions can further improve the payment of arrears of buyers and sellers of immovable properties, thus affecting the balance sheets of banks, which could indirectly assist in preserving financial stability in Cyprus. However , the ECB does not consider that the CBC’s tasks of supervising escrow institutions is related to the financial stability and prudential supervisory tasks referred to in Article 127 (5) of the Treaty, or that it complements the CBC’s supervision of financial institutions or the CBC’s task of ensuring the stability of the financial system . 3.1.3 Atypical tasks Currently, escrow institutions do not exist in other Member States; as such, the supervision of such institutions is not assigned to any other ESCB member. The ECB considers this new task to be completely atypical for an NCB. 3.1.4 Discharge of tasks on behalf of and in the exclusive interest of the government or of other public

text: entities

text: The CBC is designated as the sole supervisory authority of escrow institutions. Ensuring that these institutions carry out their functions properly and that immovable/real property buyers are adequately protected are public policy objectives which do not fall within the objectives of a central bank. As such, the draft law is considered as conferring on the CBC a task that is exercised in the exclusive interest of the government and of other public entities. The performance of this task by the CBC raises issues of central bank independence and accountability, in particular with regard to

text: the CBC assuming accountability in the governance of the sometimes contentious area of real estate transactions. 3.1.5 Extent to which the performance of the new task is aligned with the institutional set-up of the CBC The task conferred on the CBC by the draft law does not appear to fit into the institutional set-up of the CBC. The different nature of this new task, compared to those that are currently exercised by the CBC, means that it could not be readily assimilated into any of the CBC’s existing departments. 3.1.6 Extent to which the performance of tasks is proportionate to the CBC’s financial and operational

text: capacity and its ability to perform its ESCB-related tasks

text: As noted in paragraph 3.1.1, the draft law provides for the CBC’s costs for licensing and supervising escrow institutions to be covered by such institutions. However, conferring this task on the CBC raises questions concerning the CBC’s operational capacity. The CBC would need to ensure that it has the necessary staff with the appropriate skills that are considered essential for the supervision of these institutions. The CBC would also need to ensure that its capacity to perform its ESCB-related tasks and existing supervisory functions would not be affected by the assumption of these new tasks. 3.1.7 Extent to which the performance of tasks entails substantial financial risks The draft law contains provisions excluding or limiting the CBC’s liability, as well as the liability of any CBC director or officer, for any act or omission committed during the exercise of powers and responsibilities vested in the CBC – either as a result of the draft law or as a result of any regulations issued pursuant to the draft law – unless such an act or omission was not carried out in good faith or was the result of gross negligence . The CBC’s liability under the draft law is aligned with the liability concerning its supervision of credit institutions. 3.1.8 Conclusion The new task of supervising escrow institutions, and thereby protecting purchasers of immovable/real property, serves public policy objectives that fall outside the objectives of a central bank. This task is also atypical for an ESCB member and does not complement the CBC’s existing supervisory or financial stability functions. For these reasons, this task is not considered by the ECB to be a central banking task, and its conferral on the CBC thus raises issues of central bank independence and accountability, particularly since the task concerns the sometimes contentious nature of real estate transactions. It is acknowledged that requiring supervised escrow institutions to finance the new supervisory function will have a positive impact on the CBC’s financial capacity to assume the new task. In addition, it appears that no substantial financial risks are presented since the CBC’s liability under the draft law is aligned with its liability concerning its supervision of credit institutions. However, conferring the new task on the CBC raises questions regarding the CBC’s operational capacity to perform the task. The CBC would need to ensure that it has the necessary staff, with appropriate

text: skills, to supervise escrow institutions and ensure that its capacity to perform its ESCB-related tasks and existing supervisory functions would not be affected. In view of these considerations, the ECB wishes to express considerable concern about the proposed assignment of this task to the CBC. This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 17 March 2016. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).

text: Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2011 on Alternative Investment Fund Managers and amending Directives

text: and

text: and Regulations

text: (EC) No 1060/2009

text: and

text: (EU) No 1095/2010

text: (OJ L 174, 1.7.2011, p. 1).

text: No State body may buy junior or mezzanine notes. 4 Testo Unico della Finanza, Decreto Legislativo (24.02.1998, n. 58). 5 Regolamento sulla Gestione collettiva del risparmio (19.1.2015). 6 The exposure to a single client is subject to a limit of 10 per cent of the total assets of the fund. 7 More specifically, AIFs marketed to retail customers are subject to a leverage limit of 1.3 (calculated as the ratio between the total assets and the total net value of the fund) and can enter into derivative contracts exclusively for hedging purposes, whereas AIFs marketed to professional investors are subject to a leverage limit of 1.5.

text: See

text: Article 4

text: , second sentence, of

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42); Title IV, Section I of the Guide to consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions, which is available on the ECB’s website at: www.ecb.europa.eu. 9 See ECB Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are available on the ECB’s website at: www.ecb.europa.eu. 10 See ECB Opinion

text: . 11

text: Regulation (EU) No 575/2013

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending

text: Regulation (EU) No 648/2012

text: (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 1). 12 Commission Delegated

text: Regulation (EU) No 241/2014 of 7 January 2014

text: supplementing

text: Regulation (EU) No 575/2013

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards for Own Funds requirements for institutions (OJ L 74, 14.3.2014, p. 8).

text: Art. 1(4)(c) of the Decree-Law. 14 Art. 2(4) of the Decree-Law. 15

text: Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013

text: conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63). 16 Art. 4(1)(a) of

text: Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013

text: . 17 Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive

text: and repealing Directives

text: and

text: (OJ L 176 , 27.6.2013, p. 338). 18 Idem, see

text: Article 74

text: See European Banking Authority Guidelines ‘Limits on exposures to shadow banking entities which carry out banking activities outside a regulated framework under

text: Article 395(2) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013

text: ’ of 14 December 2015 (

text: ), p. 10. 20 Regolamento sulla Gestione collettiva del risparmio (19.1.2015).

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 24 March 2016 on the reform of cooperative banks, a guarantee scheme for securitisations of non-performing loans and the lending capacity of alternative investment funds (CON/2016/17)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 24 March 2016 on the reform of cooperative banks, a guarantee scheme for securitisations of non-performing loans and the lending capacity of alternative investment funds (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 2 March 2016, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Italian Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance for an opinion on Decree-Law No 18 of 14 February 2016 on urgent measures concerning the reform of banche di credito cooperativo (‘BCCs’, ‘Italian cooperative banks’), a guarantee scheme for securitisations of non-performing loans, tax arrangements relating to crisis procedures, and the collective management of assets (hereinafter the ‘Decree-Law’). The Decree-Law must be converted into a law within 60 days of publication, i.e. by 15 April 2016, failing which it is rendered invalid ab initio. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and the third and sixth indents of

text: , as the Decree-Law relates to the Banca d’Italia and to rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the Decree-Law

text: The Decree-Law contains three elements of interest to the ECB. First, it reforms the Italian BCCs. Second, it introduces a guarantee scheme for securitisations of non-performing loans. Third, the Decree-Law introduces new rules concerning the capacity of alternative investment funds governed by Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council and established in Italy (hereinafter ‘Italian AIFs’) or in another Member State (hereinafter ‘EU AIFs’) to engage in nonconsumer lending activities. 1.1 Reform of cooperative banks 1.1.1 The Decree-Law reforms BCCs with the aim of bringing about more transparent and efficient governance standards, and eliminating structural weaknesses in the system of BCCs. It provides

text: for the establishment of Cooperative Banking Groups (hereinafter ‘Groups’) each led by a parent company. 1.1.2 The Decree-Law requires each BCC to choose between joining a Group or, subject to certain conditions, being converted into a joint stock company. A BCC must join a Group in order to be authorised by the Banca d’Italia to carry out banking business in the form of a BCC. Alternatively, individual BCCs whose net assets exceed EUR 200 million may opt not to join a Group on condition that they become joint stock companies, with the authorisation of the Banca d’Italia, and pay an extraordinary tax of 20 % of their cash reserve. 1.1.3 Each Group must have a parent company, incorporated as a joint stock company, with the majority of its shares held by the BCCs in the group. A parent company must have net assets of at least EUR 1 billion, and be authorised by the Banca d’Italia to carry out banking activities. A parent company primarily directs and coordinates the BCCs in its Group in accordance with the relevant cohesion contract. 1.1.4 Cohesion contracts set out the powers of the parent company, in accordance with the principle of mutuality, including: (i) the power to identify and implement the strategic orientation and operational objectives of the Group adjusted to the risk level of the BCC in question; (ii) the power to approve or reject, in exceptional cases, the appointment of one or more BCCs’ board members up to the majority of its members; and (iii) the power to expel a BCC from the Group in the event of a serious breach of one or more of the terms of the cohesion contract, and other types of sanction proportionate to the seriousness of the breach in question. Cohesion contracts also provide for joint and several guarantees of the obligations assumed by the parent company and the BCCs, in accordance with the prudential regulations of the Groups and individual banks in the Group. 1.1.5 The Decree-Law also amends the rules regarding the capitalisation of individual BCCs as follows: (i) the maximum share capital in a BCC that can be held by a single shareholder is increased from EUR 50 000 to EUR 100 000; and (ii) the minimum number of shareholders of a BCC is increased from 200 to 500. 1.2 Guarantee scheme for securitisations of non-performing loans 1.2.1 The Decree-Law provides for the introduction of a State guarantee scheme to cover the senior tranches of securitisation transactions carried out by banks incorporated in Italy and backed by non-performing loans (NPLs). The guarantee scheme will be open to all Italian banks and the guarantee for the senior notes will be priced at market rates and be based on specified credit default swap contracts, in order to ensure compliance with State aid rules. The Minister for Economic Affairs and Finance is authorised to issue guarantees under the scheme for 18 months starting from the date the Decree-Law enters into force, i.e. 16 February 2016. This period may be extended for a further 18 months, subject to the prior approval of the European Commission. 1.2.2 The scheme is based on individual banks seeking to set up a securitisation structure under which NPLs will be transferred at a price no higher than their net book value, i.e. gross value minus provisions. The securitisation structure is financed by issuing senior, mezzanine (optional) and junior notes.

text: 1.2.3 The State guarantee is an unconditional, irrevocable and first-demand guarantee, covering contractual payments for interest and capital, but only for the benefit of senior noteholders. The guarantee will become effective only once the following conditions are fulfilled: (i) the bank appoints an independent NPL servicer to deal with securitisations; (ii) the securities receive a rating equal to or higher than investment grade from a rating agency included in the list of the external credit assessment institutions accepted by the Eurosystem; and (iii) the originating bank has sold to private investors a share of at least 50 % plus one of the junior tranches, and has sold a sufficiently large part of the junior and mezzanine tranches to achieve accounting derecognition of the NPLs sold . 1.3 Lending capacity of alternative investment funds 1.3.1 Since 2014 the Italian Consolidated Law on finance has provided for the possibility for Italian AIFs to engage in direct lending under certain conditions, specified in Banca d’Italia’s regulation : they 6 7 must have a closed ended structure and are subject to concentration and leverage limits ; the maturity of credits cannot exceed that of the fund. As for internal controls, asset managers are required to define, within the risk management system, a specific process of managing credit risk, with particular regard to: i) risk measurement; ii) risk diversification; iii) credit monitoring; iv) classification of risk positions; v) assessment and management of impaired loans. 1.3.2 The Decree-Law amends the Italian Consolidated Law on finance specifying that credit funds cannot lend to retail consumers and that AIFs’ lending activity is subject to rules on transparency. It also extends the possibility to grant loans to EU AIFs under the following conditions: (i) EU AIFs are authorized by the competent authority of the home Member State to grant loans in the home Member State; (ii) EU AIFs adopt a closed ended structure and their operating model, including the rules of participation, is comparable to that of Italian AIFs; (iii) the prudential regulation of the home Member State, including limits to leverage, are deemed equivalent to those applied to Italian AIFs. The assessment of equivalence is carried out by Banca d’Italia and can be based on the contractual provisions governing the AIFs. The home competent authority must ensure that the EU AIFs comply with such provisions. 1.3.3 Without prejudice to the foregoing, the Banca d’Italia is obliged to lay down detailed rules to be applied to EU AIFs engaging in direct lending in Italy. In any case, the Banca d’Italia has the power to veto EU AIFs engaging in direct lending in Italy. If no veto is imposed, EU AIFs operating in Italy will be also required to comply with Italian conduct of business rules governing transparency of contractual terms and client relationships.

text: 2. The appropriate time to consult the ECB

text: 2.1 The ECB must be consulted at an appropriate stage in the legislative process. Consultation should therefore take place at a time that enables the relevant national authority to take the ECB’s opinion into account before the provisions in question are adopted . 2.2 In the Italian legal system, a decree-law enters into force when it is adopted by the Government. It takes effect following publication in the Gazzetta Ufficiale and must be submitted on the same day to Parliament for conversion into law. If not converted within 60 days of publication, the decree-law is rendered invalid ab initio. Amendments may be introduced during the conversion process. In the light of the foregoing, the ECB should be consulted before the adoption of a decree-law . 2.3 In the present case, as the Decree-Law was adopted on 14 February 2016 and published on 15 February 2016, not only was the ECB not consulted before its adoption, but the submission of the consultation request was unnecessarily delayed. The request was received by the ECB on 2 March 2016, when the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance asked the ECB to consider the consultation as a matter of urgency in view of the short deadline for conversion. This situation is unfortunate and the ECB would like to emphasise to the Ministry the need for proper consultation.

text: 3. Observations

text: 3.1 Reform of cooperative banks 3.1.1 It is recalled that the ECB was consulted and issued an opinion on Decree-Law No 3/2015 on urgent measures for the banking system and investments, which introduced significant reforms of ‘popolari banks’ . The reform of cooperative banks is part of the same reform of the banking system. 3.1.2 Under the current prudential regulatory framework, both strong governance arrangements and a solid capital structure are crucial concerns for the banking supervisor. To this end, the consolidation of the cooperative banking sector into Groups where the parent company is a jointstock company would facilitate each Group’s ability to raise capital and enhance shareholders’ control over management. In addition, this could make it easier for capital instruments issued by the BCCs to fulfil the requirements of

text: Regulation (EU) No 575/2013

text: of the European Parliament 11 12 and of the Council , as supplemented by Commission Delegated

text: Regulation (EU) No 241/2014

text: , for capital instruments to qualify as Common Equity Tier 1 capital. Furthermore, the Group arrangements make it possible for the Common Equity Tier 1 of the BCCs in excess of minimum

text: requirements to be accounted for purposes of compliance with capital requirements at consolidated level. 3.1.3 The ECB expects that the Decree-Law will accelerate consolidation among Italian cooperative banks. This process should eventually result in the cooperative banking sector as a whole having an improved capacity to absorb negative shocks, as well as providing new opportunities for rationalisation of resources and diversification of investments. Given the importance of the Decree- Law in addressing the vulnerabilities of the Italian cooperative banking sector, the ECB generally supports the key elements of the proposed reform. 3.1.4 Nevertheless, the ECB wishes to raise the following points: 3.1.5 First, the establishment of a Group involves significant challenges for the parent company in terms of risk governance and control systems. In this regard, the ECB would like emphasise that, in order to be aligned with best practices at international level, the parent company’s powers to manage affiliated institutions and coordinate the Group should be broader than provided for in the Decree- Law. In particular, the parent company should be able to direct and coordinate the Group, including by giving direct instructions to the affiliated institutions under any circumstances to ensure compliance with applicable prudential rules and supervisory requirements as well as to ensure that the group entities’ operations and strategies are in line with the Group’s policies and objectives. The ECB understands that the powers of the parent company depending on the risk level of each BCC will be clearly specified in secondary regulation and in the “cohesion contracts” in a way to ensure that these powers are strong and effective, in compliance with CRD IV requirements and the best practices. This solution reflects the principle of autonomy of the BCCs which are cooperative companies devoted to a mutual activity according to their special statute. However, in order to safeguard the parent company’s effective control of the Group, the power to remove directors should not be limited to exceptional situations. 3.1.6 Second, the ECB welcomes the Decree-Law stipulating that the parent company will have control systems and the power to ensure compliance with prudential requirements, as it is of great importance that Groups have well-designed control functions, including risk management, compliance, internal audit and planning, reporting exclusively to the parent company. 3.1.7 Third, the ECB notes that the provision according to which BCCs can decide whether or not to join a Group may undermine the reform. In particular, as the date by which BCCs must have net assets of at least EUR 200 million is not stipulated in the Decree-Law, there is a risk of promoting mergers between BCCs with net assets below EUR 200 million. Not joining a Group should be an exceptional option which can only be exercised during a limited period of time and measured with reference to the required level of net assets for a BCC on a specific prior date (for example, net assets as at 31 December 2015). 3.1.8 Fourth, pursuant to the Decree-Law, the Banca d’Italia is the authority competent to verify whether the requirement to form a Group has been fulfilled. The Banca d’Italia is also competent to authorise a BCC’s membership of a Group, the rejection of a request for membership, the exclusion of a BCC from a Group, and the conversion of a BCC into a joint stock company. Where

text: the relevant authorisations are not granted, the BCC must commence liquidation proceedings . Further, in the event of non-compliance with the requirement to form a Group, the Banca d’Italia is competent to take the actions necessary to revoke the authorisations necessary to carry out banking activities . It is understood that these powers assigned to the Banca d’Italia are without prejudice to the powers assigned, within the scope and framework of

text: Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013

text: , to the ECB as the authority competent to withdraw authorisations of credit institutions and to ensure compliance with the requirement of Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council that credit institutions have in place robust governance arrangements . 3.1.9 Finally, two key aspects of the proposed legal framework for Groups concern the procedure for the functioning of the joint guarantee and the minimum organisational requirements for the parent company. Regarding the joint guarantee, there should be sufficient arrangements in place to ensure that committed support will be given when necessary. Regarding organisational requirements, it is critical that the Decree-Law requires adequate corporate governance measures to be in place in order to ensure that the parent company is able to meet its dual mandate as oversight body of the affiliated BCC and as executive body of the entire Group. The ECB notes that it is the intention of the Italian government to further develop these aspects in a ministerial Decree. The ECB would appreciate being consulted in advance of the final approval of this Decree. 3.2 The guarantee scheme for securitisations of NPLs 3.2.1 The ECB welcomes the guarantee scheme for securitisations of NPLs as it may lead to a reduction of funding costs for such securitisations, which would allow NPLs to be recognised with a higher value and thus incentivise the transfer of NPLs. From a financial stability point of view, the presence of significant volumes of NPLs on credit institutions’ balance sheets reduces their ability to fulfil their function as providers of credit to the real economy and hampers operational flexibility and overall profitability essential to a well-functioning banking sector. As such, the scheme may have a positive, albeit incremental, effect on financial stability to the extent that it would result in transfer of the risks of NPLs off credit institutions’ balance sheets. However, the scheme needs to be seen in conjunction with other measures required in order to address the issues posed by NPLs for credit institutions in a systemic manner. 3.2.2 The ECB notes that the procedure for enforcement of the guarantee, in particular the permitted timing of enforcement claims, set out in Article 11(1) of the Decree-Law should be clarified in order to align the first and second sentences of that paragraph. The first sentence reads as if the guarantee may only be enforced from the date of legal maturity of senior notes until nine months

text: thereafter. The second sentence, however, allows enforcement procedures to be commenced 30 days after a non-payment event, which could also occur prior to the final maturity of the senior notes, e.g. in relation to interest payments. It would therefore seem more logical that the guarantee may be enforced at the latest nine months after final maturity of the senior notes, but also prior to final maturity after a non-payment event. The ECB suggests that the wording in the first sentence should be amended accordingly to include the words ‘at the latest’. 3.2.3 The ECB further notes that Article 11(2) of the Decree-Law should be amended to clarify both the timing and quantum of payments which should be made by the guarantor under the guarantee. With regard to timing, the ECB understands that, within thirty days from the date of receipt of a documented request for enforcement of the State guarantee, the Minister for Economic Affairs and Finance must undertake payment, and not only upon the maturity of the senior notes. As currently drafted, the amount payable appears to cover only the full amount of principal of the senior notes which would be due at final maturity. This appears to contradict Article 8(2) of the Decree-Law, which indicates that the guarantee covers payments of principal and interest for the entire term of the senior notes, since future interest payments would not be covered. In addition, the ECB notes that the current drafting implies that, even if there were a non-payment event relating only to an interest payment occurring prior to the maturity of the senior notes, the guarantee payment would involve payment of the full amount of principal, prior to that principal becoming due on such final maturity date. 3.2.4 Finally, the ECB also welcomes the Decree-Law requiring the appointment of a qualified independent entity to monitor the compliance of the issued guarantee with stated conditions, the appointment of an independent servicer and the transfer of at least 50 % plus one of the junior notes, and in any case, an amount of mezzanine and junior notes permitting the derecognition of the underlying assets at consolidated level in accordance with Article 8(1) of the Decree-Law. 3.3 Lending capacity of alternative investment funds 3.3.1 In general, alternative investment funds (AIFs) which are entitled to grant loans carry out a typical banking activity outside the regulated banking system (i.e. without being subject to

text: Regulation (EU) No 575/2013

text: and Directive

text: or comparable prudential regulation). AIFs might therefore act as substitutes for bank lending and could generate credit intermediation risks (i.e. runs and/or liquidity risk) without having a banking (or comparable) licence. While regulated indirectly as a result of initial capital, own funds and internal controls requirements imposed on their asset managers under Directive

text: , AIFs are not subject to harmonised rules on concentration risks and credit assessments . 3.3.2 In light of these considerations, it should be ensured that the direct provision of loans by AIFs is subject to targeted measures efficiently mitigating the associated risks. The ECB thus welcomes that Italian legislation provides for rules applicable to lending activities of both EU AIFs and Italian

text: AIFs on managing credit risk with regard to risk measurement and diversification, leverage, fund structure as well as credit monitoring, classification of risk positions and assessment and management of impaired loans. This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 17 March 2016. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: Rådets beslut

text: av den 29 juni 1998 om nationella myndigheters samråd med Europeiska centralbanken rörande förslag till rättsregler (EGT L 189, 3.7.1998, s. 42).

text: Proposition 2015/16:89. I propositionen lämnas förslag om att införa en ny § 3b i kapitel 6 om amorteringskrav i lagen (2004:297) om bank- och finansieringsrörelse om bank- och finansieringsrörelse.

text: Innan en förvaltningsmyndighet beslutar föreskrifter som vid tillämpningen kan få sådana effekter på kostnader för staten, kommuner eller landsting som inte är oväsentliga, ska regeringens medgivande att besluta föreskrifterna inhämtas (förordning (2014:570) om regeringens medgivande till beslut om vissa föreskrifter).

title: Europeiska centralbankens yttrande av den 24 mars 2016 om amorteringskrav för bolån (CON/2016/18)

text: EUROPEISKA CENTRALBANKENS YTTRANDE av den 24 mars 2016 om amorteringskrav för bolån (

text: ) Inledning och rättslig grund

text: Den 5 februari 2016 mottog Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) en begäran från Finansinspektionen om ett yttrande över ett utkast till föreskrifter om amortering av bolån (nedan kallade förslaget). ECB:s behörighet att avge ett yttrande grundas på artiklarna

text: och

text: i fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt och artikel 2.1 sjätte strecksatsen i

text: rådets beslut 98/415/EG

text: , eftersom förslaget innehåller regler som gäller finansiella institut som har en påtaglig inverkan på de finansiella institutens och marknadernas stabilitet. I enlighet med

text: artikel 17.5

text: första meningen i arbetsordningen för Europeiska centralbanken har detta yttrande antagits av ECB-rådet.

text: 1. Syftet med förslaget

text: 1.1 Förslagets övergripande syfte är att begränsa hushållens skuldsättning. Bestämmelserna i förslaget gäller nya bolån avseende den inhemska fastighetsmarknaden i Sverige. Alla företag som står under Finansinspektionens tillsyn skulle omfattas av föreskrifterna. Föreskrifterna skulle alltså tillämpas på i princip alla företag som beviljar lån, dvs. banker, sparbanker, medlemsbanker och andra kreditinstitut. 1.2 Enligt Finansinspektionen tar en stigande andel nya bolånetagare i Sverige bolån som överstiger 50 procent av bostadens värde. Samtidigt är det vanligt med amorteringsfria lån som förlängs när de förfaller. Finansinspektionens uppgifter för 2014 visar att endast 60 procent av hushållen amorterade sina bolån. Dessutom har vissa hushåll överdrivet optimistiska förväntningar på bostadsprisutvecklingen och räntenivåer. Finansinspektionens data visar att hushållens skuldsättning är hög i relation till de disponibla inkomsterna. Detta utgör ett hot för den svenska ekonomin, eftersom högt skuldsatta hushåll är känsliga för störningar som t.ex. oväntade inkomstbortfall, bostadsprisfall eller högre räntor. Finansinspektionen anser att den största risken utgår från hushåll vars bolån överstiger 50 procent av bostadens värde. 1.3 Enligt förslaget ska alla nya bolån (avseende fastighet eller tomträtt för bostadsändamål för en eller två familjer och bostadsrätt eller ägarlägenhet) som beviljas fr.o.m. den 1 juni 2016 mot säkerhet i form av pant i bostad innehålla bestämmelser om amorteringskrav om bolånet överstiger 50 procent av egendomens marknadsvärde.

text: 1.4 Enligt förslaget ska amorteringskraven även gälla när man utökar befintliga lån. Amorteringsbeloppet beräknas då utifrån den samlade skuldsättningen (dvs. den nya belåningen adderas till tidigare lånebelopp). 1.5 Eftersom riskerna ökar med stigande skuldsättning, innehåller förslaget ett progressivt amorteringskrav enligt vilket nya bolån som överstiger 70 procent av bostadens marknadsvärde ska amorteras med minst 2 procent per år av det totala lånebeloppet, och med minst 1 procent per år av det totala lånebeloppet om ett nytt bolån överstiger 50 procent men är lägre än 70 procent av bostadens marknadsvärde. 1.6 För att undvika att de nya reglerna ökar procykliska effekter anger förslaget att marknadsvärdet för en bostad som huvudregel inte ska omvärderas oftare än vart femte år. Dock får en omvärdering göras oftare än vart femte år om det har skett avsevärda värdeförändringar som inte beror på den allmänna prisutvecklingen på bostadsmarknaden, t.ex. på grund av omfattande renoveringar, omeller tillbyggnad av bostaden. 1.7 Förslaget ger också långivare en möjlighet att inte tillämpa amorteringskravet på sådana lån som beviljas för köp av en nyproducerad bostad. En låntagare som förvärvar en nyproducerad bostad kan undantas från amorteringskravet. Därutöver ger förslaget möjlighet att bevilja temporära undantag i ett antal situationer som bl.a. omfattar arbetslöshet, sjukdom eller dödsfall inom familjen. Dessa undantag ska beakta särskilda omständigheter där en låntagare inte klarar av att amortera ett bolån. Det är långivaren som beslutar om dessa undantag och de beskrivs inte närmare i förslaget. 1.8 Vad gäller förslagets rättsliga grund förstår ECB att ett förslag till nya amorteringsregler för bolån återfinns i en proposition som överlämnats till riksdagen . Enligt förarbetena finns det skäl för regeringen att samordna en delegering av föreskriftsrätten avseende amorteringskrav till Finansinspektionen med ett krav på att inspektionen ska inhämta regeringens medgivande innan sådana föreskrifter träder i kraft.

text: 2. Allmänna kommentarer

text: 2.1 ECB förstår att bostadspriserna och hushållens skulder ökat kraftigt i Sverige sedan mitten av 1990-talet samtidigt som benägenheten att amortera bolån har minskat. Mot denna bakgrund välkomnar ECB de bakomliggande målen med förslaget, dvs. att begränsa hushållens skuldsättning och minska de risker för den finansiella stabiliteten som utgår från en hög skuldsättning. 2.2 ECB avstår från att kommentera de tänkbara institutionella konsekvenserna för Finansinspektionens operativa oavhängighet som makrotillsynsmyndighet som kan uppstå pga. av

text: kravet att Finansinspektionen ska inhämta regeringens medgivande innan föreskrifter om amortering träder i kraft. Detta yttrande kommer att offentliggöras på ECB:s webbplats. Utfärdat i Frankfurt am Main den 24 mars 2016. [Namnteckning] Mario DRAGHI

text: ECB:s ordförande