text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 2 OJ L 168, 27.6.2002, p. 43. 3 See paragraph 2 of ECB Opinion

text: (text available on the ECB’s website http://www.ecb.int).

text: See paragraph 4 of

text: . 5 See paragraph 5 of

text: See also paragraph 13 of

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 4 August 2004 at the request of the Belgian Ministry of Finance on a draft law on financial collateral and various tax provisions in relation to in rem collateral arrangements and loans for financial instruments (CON/2004/27)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 4 August 2004 at the request of the Belgian Ministry of Finance on a draft law on financial collateral and various tax provisions in relation to in rem collateral arrangements and loans for financial instruments (

text: 1. On 22 June 2004 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Belgian Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft law on financial collateral and various tax provisions in relation to in rem collateral arrangements and loans for financial instruments (hereinafter the ‘draft law’).

text: 2. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on the second indent of Article 105(4) of the Treaty establishing the European Community and on the third, fifth and sixth indents of

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to (i) the Nationale Bank van België/Banque Nationale de Belgique (NBB/BNB); (ii) settlement institutions and systems; and (iii) the stability of financial institutions and markets. The ECB has no comments on the draft law’s tax provisions since these do not appear to have an impact on the ECB’s fields of competence.

text: 3. The ECB notes that the main purpose of the draft law is to implement Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 June 2002 on financial collateral arrangements (hereinafter the ‘Directive’) in Belgium. As already stated in the past the ECB has an interest in the harmonised implementation of the Directive and welcomes the fact that the draft law does not use any of the opt-out possibilities provided in the Directive. The ECB also notes that, while national authorities are not legally obliged to consult the ECB on draft national laws aimed exclusively at implementing EU directives, the draft law contains a substantial number of provisions that go beyond merely implementing the Directive thus justifying the ECB’s competence referred to in paragraph 2. Indeed, the draft law addresses matters directly relevant to the Eurosystem’s core fields of competence and it will have an impact both on the efficient and safe use of financial collateral arrangements in EU financial markets and on the Eurosystem’s collateralised operations.

text: 4. Furthermore, the ECB notes that, as regards both financial collateral and netting arrangements, the draft law’s scope is broader than that of the Directive. As regards financial collateral arrangements (see paragraph 11 as regards netting arrangements), the draft law applies, as a rule, to all financial collateral arrangements without restricting the categories of collateral takers or providers and, thus, also includes natural persons (

text: Article 4(1)

text: ). The only exception relates to title transfer collateral arrangements, other than repurchase transactions (see paragraph 10). The draft law also establishes uniform rules regarding, inter alia, (i) the proof of conclusion of financial collateral arrangements (

text: Article 6

text: ); (ii) the enforcement and use of any financial collateral in the form of a pledge, which under Belgian law corresponds to the ‘security financial collateral arrangement’ referred to in the Directive (Articles

text: and

text: ); and (iii) any title transfer financial collateral arrangement in the form of a repurchase transaction (

text: Article 13

text: ). The ECB emphasises that simple and reliable methods of collateralisation, which include efficient enforcement methods, are of fundamental interest to the Eurosystem, as they help, inter alia, to ensure the smooth functioning of the Eurosystem’s single monetary policy . The ECB also emphasises that establishing different regimes for the creation and use of the same kind of collateral, depending on the type of parties involved, implies evaluating the status of the parties to an arrangement and tends to disrupt the operation of collateralised transactions . Subject to the statements in paragraph 10, the ECB therefore welcomes the broad scope and uniform approach to financial collateral arrangements in the draft law. In this context the ECB notes that the fact that the draft law’s scope covers natural persons is without prejudice to consumer protection provisions (

text: Article 2

text: ). However, the ECB wonders whether, by harmonising the enforcement methods for pledges which specify the prior absence of any court involvement, the last subparagraph of

text: Article 119

text: nonies(2) of the Law of 4 December 1990 concerning financial operations and financial markets has not been affected. In particular, this provision mentions involving the president of the commercial court to enforce a pledge on debt instruments granted by a collective investment institution. The ECB therefore recommends abolishing such involvement if the pledged debt instruments are financial instruments or cash.

text: 5. The ECB notes that

text: Article 3(1)

text: , of the draft law defines ‘financial instruments’ by reference to

text: Article 2(1)

text: , of the Law of 2 August 2002 concerning the supervision of the financial sector and of financial services. The ECB welcomes the fact that this definition is broader than the one provided in the Directive. However, in line with the ECB’s suggestion to the Council when the Directive was proposed, which remains relevant and which the ECB maintains, the ECB suggests that it be considered whether the scope of the draft law could be extended to cover all types of assets that are eligible for Eurosystem credit operations, including, inter alia, credit claims in the form of bank loans .

text: 6. The ECB notes that the last subparagraph of Article 4(1) of the draft law provides legal certainty with regard to the fact that the general requirement under Belgian law that a pledgor does not remain in possession of the pledged asset is satisfied if financial instruments are credited on a special account, including an account opened in the name of the pledgor (‘hold-in-custody pledge’). The ECB considers that, particularly where such a hold-in-custody-pledge is used and in order to satisfy the dispossession requirement, the pledgor should not be able to dispose of the pledged financial instruments. The ECB understands that similar reasons of legal certainty underlie Article 5 of the draft law, which clarifies the validity and enforceability of financial collateral arrangements concluded by a representative of the beneficiaries of collateral acting in his own name but on behalf of these beneficiaries (‘security agent’). In the same vein, the ECB notes that

text: Article 20(2)

text: and Article 25(2) of the draft law clarify the protection of the pledgee if the pledgor is not the owner of dematerialised (book-entry) securities. Considering the overriding importance and benefits of legal certainty, especially in an area where the volume of transactions and the possible systemic implications of a lack of legal certainty are considerable, the ECB welcomes such clarifications.

text: 7. The ECB also welcomes the fact that the draft law’s provisions on (i) the proof of conclusion of financial collateral arrangements and of the provision of financial collateral (

text: Article 6

text: ), (ii) the ways of realising financial collateral provided under a security financial collateral arrangement (a pledge under Belgian law) and the absence of requirements for such realisation (Articles

text: and

text: ), and (iii) the right to use financial collateral under such arrangements (

text: Article 11

text: ), comply with the relevant provisions in the Directive. With regard to the reference in Article 6 of the draft law to demonstrating the proof of conclusion of arrangements by any legal means accepted in commercial matters, the ECB notes that this kind of proof will apply to all financial collateral arrangements, including arrangements that consist of a pledge on financial collateral that is governed by civil law. As regards Articles 8 and 9 of the draft law, the ECB notes that the uniform enforcement rules will also apply to commercial pledges on financial collateral, which is the reason that the draft law also abrogates existing Belgian legislation on the enforcement of such collateral, i.e. the third and fourth paragraphs of Article 4 of the Law of 5 May 1872. In view of the fact that this legislation also applies to the commissioners’ statutory lien and their financial backers, the ECB wonders whether this abrogation might not also affect the procedure for the enforcement of this lien where it relates to financial instruments or cash.

text: 8. The ECB welcomes the abolition in Article 7(1) of the draft law of the existing formal requirements under Belgian law for a civil pledge on financial collateral. The ECB notes that Belgian law does not currently contain formal requirements for the creation, validity and thirdparty enforceability of the following: 6 See paragraph 10 of ECB Opinion

text: (OJ C 196, 12.7.2001, p. 12). See also paragraph 6 of

text: . (i) commercial pledges on financial collateral generally, and (ii) pledges on special kinds of financial collateral specifically (i.e. dematerialised securities and financial instruments subject to Royal Decree No. 62 of 10 November 1967), apart from the general requirement of dispossession of the pledge, which is confirmed in the second subparagraph of Article 4(1) of the draft law and which is permitted under Article 3(2) of the Directive. Therefore, the ECB welcomes the fact that adopting of the draft law will ensure compliance with Article 3 of the Directive.

text: 9. The ECB notes that Article 10 of the draft law concerns the ranking between a pledge and two kinds of statutory liens on the same financial assets. These liens are (i) the lien of qualified intermediaries and of clearing and settlement institutions on financial collateral provided by their clients and participants, respectively; and (ii) the NBB/BNB’s lien on securities booked in their owners’ name with the NBB/BNB or with the NBB/BNB’s securities clearing system. The ECB considers that the ranking issue is most likely to arise when the statutory lien’s beneficiary acts as the agreed third-party depositor of financial assets in execution of a pledge on these assets. The draft law states that, unless parties have agreed otherwise and provided that the beneficiary of the statutory lien either has agreed to credit the pledged financial instruments or securities to a special account or, if cash is pledged, has recognised this pledge, priority should be given to the pledge. For the same reasons provided in paragraph 6, the ECB welcomes this clarification.

text: 10. The ECB notes that Article 12 of the draft law, which deals with title transfer of collateral arrangements, other than repurchase transactions, is intended to implement Article 6 of the Directive. The ECB also notes that, contrary to the situation for pledges, repurchase transactions, and netting arrangements,

text: Article 12

text: does not apply to arrangements between or with natural persons. While the ECB acknowledges that the Directive does not apply to natural persons, the ECB underlines the similar economic and financial nature of pledges and title transfer collateral arrangements (whether or not they are repurchase transactions), as well as the benefit of having the same simple and reliable legal regime for all types of financial collateral arrangements, irrespective of the nature of the parties involved (see paragraph 4). The ECB therefore recommends considering whether any concerns that underlie this outright exclusion might also be covered by the general reference to consumer protection in Article 2 of the draft law. Relying on this general reference would have the added benefit of enhancing the draft law’s uniformity, clarity and legal certainty.

text: 11. As regards netting arrangements, the ECB notes that Article 14 of the draft law, which recognises any netting arrangement and close-out provision to allow such netting, goes beyond the Directive as it is not restricted to (i) close-out netting provisions of which a financial collateral arrangement forms part; or (ii) specific categories of parties to the arrangement. The ECB welcomes this broad approach, since it considers it critical to have a high degree of legal certainty regarding the enforceability of close-out netting provisions in the event of counterparty default. By uniformly applying close-out netting provisions to all financial transactions legal certainty is ensured and the necessary level of legal protection for key financial instruments which play a vital role in financial markets is guaranteed. This will promote the certainty of transactions and the legitimate expectations of parties in an area where any doubt risks creating severe systemic damage and impairing market efficiency. Furthermore, the ECB understands

text: Article 7

text: (b) of the Directive as considering an assignment of rights to result in the same legal consequences for the enforceability of a close-out netting provision as, for instance, an attachment or an insolvency situation. In order to adequately reflect this meaning Article 14 of the draft law could be rephrased as follows: ‘Netting arrangements, as well as any resolution or early termination provisions and conditions that are established to allow novation or set-off, may, in the event of an assignment of the rights to which they apply, the opening of insolvency proceedings, an attachment, or any other concursus situation be enforced vis-à-vis the creditors (…).’ In order to cater for situations where such assignments occur Article 14 of the draft law could usefully include a reference to the time at which the debt and claim to be set off existed. Finally, the ECB notes that Article 14 of the draft law only deals with issues of the enforceability of netting arrangements in insolvency and similar situations. The ECB understands that Belgian law generally does not establish formal requirements that render netting arrangements effective and enforceable. The ECB nonetheless questions whether, in view of Article 7(2) of the Directive, the draft law should expressly state that, even if the netting arrangement does not contain an express provision to this effect, the arrangement will, when the netting event occurs, not require any formality, such as, for instance, a notice or default letter from the party who intends to rely on the event, unless the parties agree otherwise.

text: 12. The ECB further notes that Articles 15 and 16 of the draft law specifically deal with the validity, enforceability and legal consequences of financial collateral and netting arrangements, as well as with the protection of substitution and top-up collateral (‘margin call’) arrangements, in the event of insolvency or attachment proceedings. The ECB wonders whether the express reference in Article 15(1) of the draft law to Article 17(3) of the Bankruptcy Law is necessary in view of

text: Article 8(3)

text: (b)(ii) of the Directive. Such a reference might give the impression that other relevant provisions of the Bankruptcy Act, which do not concern the zero-hour rule, do not apply to Article 15 of the draft law. Article 17(3) of the Bankruptcy Law deals with the separate issue of prohibiting the granting of pledges for previously incurred debts during the suspect period prior to a bankruptcy. Moreover, Article 15(1) of the draft law – including the reference therein to Article 17(3) of the Bankruptcy Law – is applicable to substitution and top-up collateral (

text: Article 15(2)

text: ), which, however, seems to conflict with

text: Article 16(1)

text: and (2) of the draft law, which expressly exclude the application of Article 17(3) of the Bankruptcy Law to substitution and top-up collateral. The ECB therefore raises the question as to the appropriateness of a reference in

text: Article 15(1)

text: to Article 17(3) of the Bankruptcy Law.

text: 13. The ECB welcomes the fact that Article 17 of the draft law, which deals with various private international law issues, mirrors Article 9 of the Directive, apart from the justifiable addition of a reference in

text: Article 17

text: to the possible application of Article 8(2) of the Law of 28 April 1999. In line with what is stated in the draft law’s explanatory memorandum, the ECB notes that the draft law might be affected by the Hague Convention on the law applicable to certain rights in relation to securities held with an intermediary (hereinafter the ‘Convention’), the ratification of which is currently being considered by the Community and the Member States. Article 9 of the Directive, and consequently Article 17 of the draft law are not compatible with the Convention in so far as the Convention adopts a choice of law approach. The ECB wishes to stress that all parties involved in the legislative process should investigate closely the Convention’s potential impact on systemic stability and on the treatment of collateral transactions to avoid undermining the current level of protection . This might include, inter alia, limiting the choice of law applying to proprietary rights in respect of securities held on accounts with a systemically important system (in particular securities settlement systems evaluated and used by the Eurosystem) to the law governing that system, as well as other measures designed to safeguard systemic finality, certainty and transparency.

text: 14. The ECB notes that Article 18 of the draft law limits the regulation of Belgian dematerialised public debt securities to institutions that are located in Belgium and that are holding such securities on their accounts on behalf of third parties, instead of the current situation whereby this regulation also extends to Belgian dematerialised securities that are held outside Belgium. Furthermore, the licensing of certain of these institutions will pass from the Minister of Finance to the Belgian Banking, Finance and Insurance Commission (CBFA). The ECB notes that Article 22 of the draft law consequently puts the CBFA in charge of supervising compliance by these institutions with the rules governing the holding of dematerialised public debt securities and provides for the possibility of the CBFA imposing sanctions on, and taking other measures vis-à-vis these institutions in the event of failure to comply.

text: 15. The ECB also welcomes the fact that Article 19 of the draft law reinforces the NBB/BNB’s task as settlement entity in charge of holding public debt securities and of settling transactions in such securities. It notes that the institutions having such securities on their accounts will no longer be obliged to only and/or directly book these securities on their accounts with the NBB/BNB. Indeed, Article 19 of the draft law provides for a multi-tiered system of indirectly held dematerialised public debt securities. In this context, the ECB underlines the importance of the periodic reconciliation of the securities settlement systems’ own records with those of the entity in charge of the issuer’s accounts, in this case the NBB/BNB. In order to facilitate transfer between international securities settlement systems, the Article also empowers the King to regulate the custody of dematerialised securities denominated in foreign currency or in units of account; and the custody of securities.

text: 16. For financial stability reasons, the ECB welcomes the fact that

text: Articles 22

text: bis and 23bis of the draft law extend the scope of the CBFA’s consolidated prudential supervision to settlement institutions referred to in the Law of 2 August 2002 and to institutions carrying out the operational management of services provided by such settlement institutions. The ECB also welcomes the fact that

text: Article 26

text: bis of the draft law extends the supervisory regime of the CBFA for settlement institutions and the oversight of the NBB/BNB for settlement systems to institutions established in Belgium carrying out such operational management services. The ECB notes that these institutions will be designated by Royal Decree and that the intention is to designate institutions that provide substantial and critical operational and intellectual services to settlement institutions. The designated institutions will need a licence from the CBFA and conditions regarding their licensing and operation will also be laid down in a Royal Decree. The ECB also notes that this supervisory regime and oversight could extend to institutions established outside Belgium. The ECB welcomes in this respect the express requirement that such extension must comply with Belgium’s international obligations. The ECB trusts that it will be consulted on the abovementioned Royal Decrees since their subject matter falls within the ECB’s fields of competence.

text: 17. The ECB confirms that it has no objection to the competent national authorities making this opinion publicly available at their discretion. This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website six months after the date of its adoption. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 4 August 2004. [ signed ] The President of the ECB Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: EGT L 189, 3.7.1998, s. 42.

text: Se punkt 2.3 i motiveringen till förslaget om kontantdistribution. 3 Se punkt 3.3 i motiveringen till förslaget om kontantdistribution. 4 Se också beslut ECB/2001/15 av den 6 december 2001 om utgivningen av eurosedlar, EGT L 337, 20.12.2001, s. 52.

text: Se artikel 5 i beslut ECB/2003/4 av den 20 mars 2003 om valörer, tekniska specifikationer, reproducering, inlösen och indragning avseende eurosedlar, EUT L 78, 25.3.2003, s. 16.

publisher: Europeiska centralbanken

sprak: sv

title: Europeiska centralbankens yttrande av den 31 augusti 2004 på begäran av Sveriges riksbank över två förslag till ändringar i lagen om Sveriges riksbank avseende vissa frågor om cirkulation av sedlar och mynt(CON/2004/28)

serie: con

text: EUROPEISKA CENTRALBANKENS YTTRANDE av den 31 augusti 2004 på begäran av Sveriges riksbank över två förslag till ändringar i lagen om Sveriges riksbank avseende vissa frågor om cirkulation av sedlar och mynt (

type: rubrik

text: 1. Den 25 juni 2004 mottog Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) en begäran från Sveriges riksbank om ett yttrande över två lagförslag från Sveriges riksbank till Sveriges riksdag om att anta två förslag till ändringar i lagen (1988:1385) om Sveriges riksbank (nedan kallade lagförslagen).

type: stycke

text: 2. ECB:s behörighet att avge ett yttrande grundar sig på artikel 2.1 andra och tredje strecksatserna i

text: rådets beslut 98/415/EG av den 29 juni 1998

text: om nationella myndigheters samråd med Europeiska centralbanken rörande förslag till rättsregler , eftersom lagförslagen gäller betalningsmedel och den svenska centralbanken. I enlighet med

text: artikel 17.5

text: första meningen i arbetsordningen för Europeiska centralbanken har detta yttrande antagits av ECB-rådet.

text: 3. Ett av de två lagförslagen syftar till att förtydliga riksbankens samarbetsformer med tredje part beträffande hantering och cirkulation av sedlar och mynt (nedan kallat lagförslaget om kontantdistribution). Genom det andra lagförslaget införs ett förbud avseende spridning av sedlar och mynt som har förändrats eller på annat sätt bearbetats (nedan kallat lagförslaget om förbud mot spridning av förändrade sedlar och mynt). Bakgrunden och motiven till lagförslagen förklaras i motiveringarna som utgör en del av lagförslagen.

text: 4. Sverige är en medlemsstat med undantag. ECB:s krav beträffande utgivning av eurosedlar av de nationella centralbankerna i de medlemsstater som har infört euron gäller därför inte för Sveriges riksbank innan Sverige har infört euron. De regler som gäller inom Eurosystemet för sedelutgivning kommer emellertid att gälla också för Sveriges riksbank så snart Sverige inför euron och riksbanken blir en helt integrerad del av Eurosystemet. ECB skulle därför vilja ta tillfället i akt att nämna att Eurosystemet håller på att utarbeta egna principer som rör det viktiga området utgivning av eurosedlar, vilket närmare redogörs för i punkt 7 nedan. Lagförslaget om kontantdistribution

text: 5. ECB noterar att lagförslaget om kontantdistribution föreslås inom ramen för en ny kontanthanteringsmodell som infördes av Sveriges riksbank i februari 2003 . Enligt denna nya modell levereras kontanterna av riksbanken till dess dotterbolag Svensk Kontantförsörjning AB (SKAB). SKAB fungerar som kontantgrossist, ägs helt av riksbanken och står under dess kontroll. ECB noterar att SKAB å ena sidan anförtrotts utlämnandet och mottagandet av kontanter för insättning och uttag på bankernas konton i riksbanken och å andra sidan äkthetskontroll och kvalitetssortering, liksom makulering av sedlar. Vidare är det SKAB:s uppgift att förvara logistiska och strategiska lager av sedlar. Sveriges riksbank svarar för att övervaka att makuleringen och kvalitetssorteringen sker på ett säkert och korrekt sätt. ECB noterar vidare att SKAB enligt den nya kontanthanteringsmodellen endast mottar sedlar och mynt när ett nettoöverskott av kontanter uppstår hos kontantdetaljisterna (t.ex. värdetransportörer och uppräkningscentraler). För att sedlar skall kunna återlämnas till SKAB måste de vara standardförpackade, kvalitetssorterade och äkthetskontrollerade. Av motiveringen förstår ECB att det uppstått överskottskapacitet vid SKAB:s kontor, samtidigt som det finns starka incitament hos de privata aktörerna att från deras depåer lämna in kontantöverskott till riksbanken för att undvika att betala onödiga räntekostnader. Detta leder i sin tur till att dessa aktörer transporterar kontantöverskotten betydande sträckor för att undvika en ränteförlust, även om dessa transporter i övrigt är obefogade. Detta medför betydande samhällsekonomiska kostnader och stora säkerhetsrisker.

text: 6. För att komma till rätta med ovannämnda problem, föreslås i lagförslaget om kontantdistribution en ändring i 5 kap. 3 § i riksbankslagen i syfte att effektivisera kontantcirkulationen. I 5 kap. 3 § i riksbankslagen föreskrivs att Sveriges riksbank skall svara för Sveriges försörjning med sedlar och mynt. I detta avseende beaktas i riksbankslagens förarbeten (SOU 1986:22, s. 108) att kontantförsörjning, innefattande både utgivning och distribution av sedlar och mynt är en av de klassiska uppgifterna för en centralbank, vilket skall föreskrivas i lag. I lagförslaget om kontantdistribution föreslås en ändring i 5 kap. 3 § i riksbankslagen genom införandet av ett klargörande att Sveriges riksbank får bedriva sin verksamhet avseende distribution av sedlar och mynt i samarbete med annan. Vidare ges riksbanken en möjlighet att utge ersättning eller erbjuda räntefri kredit till enheter som avskiljer och lagrar sedlar och mynt i enlighet med riksbankens anvisningar.

text: 7. ECB delar åsikten att utgivning av sedlar hör till en centralbanks huvuduppgifter och anser att utgivning av eurosedlar inom Eurosystemet är en offentlig uppgift som har ålagts ECB och de nationella centralbankerna i Eurosystemet enligt artikel 106.1 i fördraget om upprättandet av Europeiska gemenskapen och

text: artikel 16 i stadgan

text: för Europeiska centralbankssystemet och Europeiska centralbanken . ECB håller för närvarande på att se över vissa relevanta aspekter avseende reglerna för utgivning av eurosedlar beträffande i) att sätta eurosedlar i omlopp ii) att ta enskilda sedlar ur omlopp, och iii) att dra in en typ eller serie av sedlar ur omlopp , särskilt vad gäller samarbete med annan avseende denna verksamhet. I detta sammanhang ser ECB dessutom över behörigheten att besluta om sorteringsstandard, bestämmelser om utgivning och återlämning av sedlar och om valörer, tekniska specifikationer, reproducering, inlösen och indragning av sedlar, liksom behörigheten att vidta alla nödvändiga rättsliga åtgärder för att skydda eurosedlarnas ställning som betalningsmedel. Med tanke på Sveriges framtida införande av euron kan ECB, så snart överläggningarna inom Eurosystemet har avslutats, informera Sveriges riksbank om utgången, inklusive de kriterier som kan tänkas fastställas beträffande samarbete med annan avseende utgivning av eurosedlar. Lagförslaget om förbud mot spridning av förändrade sedlar och mynt

text: 8. Lagförslaget om förbud mot spridning av förändrade sedlar och mynt syftar på företeelsen reklammynt. Under våren 2004 har ett företag i reklambranschen spridit vanliga mynt utgivna av riksbanken på vilka företaget har fäst en plastfilmsetikett med ett reklambudskap. Mynten är därigenom bärare av dessa reklambudskap så fort som de åter sätts i omlopp. Av uppgifter i massmedia har framkommit att det i en enskild kampanj kan förekomma upp till 100.000 enkronor och det är inte känt i vilken omfattning plastfilmsetiketterna kan orsaka skador i uppräkningsmaskiner och andra myntautomater. Enligt det relevanta lagförslagets motivering är svensk lagstiftning otillräcklig på detta område och det föreslås därför i lagförslaget om förbud mot spridning av förändrade sedlar och mynt att ett förbud införs i riksbankslagen mot spridning av förändrade och bearbetade sedlar och mynt. Sveriges riksbank skall vara berättigad att utfärda mer detaljerade föreskrifter och ha möjligheten att sanktionera det föreslagna spridningsförbudet med vite för att upprätthålla detta nya förbud.

text: 9. ECB noterar att företeelsen reklammynt inte är okänd på andra håll och att lagstiftning på detta område förekommer i andra länder (t.ex. Frankrike, Belgien och Polen). ECB välkomnar lagförslaget om förbud mot spridning av förändrade sedlar och mynt, eftersom det utgör en rättslig åtgärd för att avskräcka från handlingar som kan påverka sedlars och mynts ställning. Vad beträffar eurosedlar, noterar ECB att i fall där nationella centralbanker vet eller har tillräckliga skäl att anta att eurosedlar har skadats avsiktligt skall Eurosystemets nationella centralbanker vägra lösa in dem och skall hålla kvar dem i enlighet med artikel 3.3 a i beslut ECB/2003/4 av den 20 mars 2003 om valörer, tekniska specifikationer, reproducering, inlösen och indragning avseende eurosedlar. ECB hävdar härvidlag att lagförslaget om förbud mot spridning av förändrade sedlar och mynt skulle få en effektivare tillämpning om en liknande bestämmelse införlivades i lagförslaget.

text: 10. ECB bekräftar att den inte har någon invändning mot att behöriga nationella myndigheter offentliggör detta yttrande om de så önskar. Detta yttrande kommer att offentliggöras på ECB:s webbplats sex månader efter datum för antagandet. Utfärdat i Frankfurt am Main den 31 augusti 2004. [Namnteckning] Jean-Claude TRICHET ECB:s ordförande

type: vagledning

utgivare: ecb


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

sprak: en

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 1 September 2004 at the request of the Central Bank of Malta on draft amendments to Central Bank of Malta Directive No 1 on minimum reserve requirements (CON/2004/29)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 1 September 2004 at the request of the Central Bank of Malta on draft amendments to Central Bank of Malta Directive No 1 on minimum reserve requirements (

text: 1. On 2 August 2004, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Central Bank of Malta (CBM) for an opinion on a draft amendment to CBM Directive No 1 on minimum reserve requirements (hereinafter the ‘draft legislative provisions’).

text: 2. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on

text: Article 2(2) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the ECB by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft legislative provisions relate to an instrument of monetary policy of a non-participating Member State, i.e. minimum reserve requirements. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the ECB, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 3. The draft legislative provisions would allow the CBM to exempt, on a non-discriminatory basis, the following credit institutions from maintaining minimum reserve requirements: (i) those which are subject to winding-up or reorganisation proceedings; and (ii) those upon which the imposition of minimum reserve requirements would not serve the CBM’s monetary policy objectives. In reaching a decision to grant an exemption to a credit institution on this latter basis, the CBM would be required to give due consideration to the extent to which that credit institution provides banking or ancillary services in the domestic market after taking into account, inter alia, that institution's provision of credit facilities, its involvement in the Maltese lira interbank market and its participation in the local payments system.

text: 4. The ECB notes that pursuant to Article 122(3) of the Treaty establishing the European Community, the basic tasks to be carried out through the ESCB to define and implement the monetary policy of the Community set out in Article 105(2) of the Treaty do not apply to Member States with a derogation, such as Malta. Thus, as also further set out in Article 43.2 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the ECB, the central banks of Member States with a derogation retain their powers in the field of monetary policy according to national law.

text: 5. For the Eurosystem, minimum reserves are an important tool for the implementation of monetary policy which primarily fulfils the functions of stabilisation of money market interest rates and the creation or enlargement of a structural liquidity shortage. A similar exemption to that set out in the draft legislative provisions also exists in the ECB’s framework, as set out in Article 2(2) of Regulation ECB/2003/9 of 12 September 2003 on the application of minimum reserves. However, the draft legislative provisions and the ECB’s framework differ significantly in this respect.

text: 6. Exemptions from the ECB’s minimum reserves regime for euro area credit institutions, except as regards reorganisation measures, are extremely rare. Under Article 2(2) of Regulation ECB/2003/9 the ECB may exempt, on a non-discriminatory basis, institutions for which the purpose of the ECB’s minimum reserves system would not be met by imposing reserve requirements upon them. In reaching a decision on any such exemption, the ECB is required to take into account one or more of the following three criteria: (i) whether the institution is pursuing special purpose functions; and (ii) whether the institution is not exercising active banking functions in competition with other credit institutions; and (iii) whether the institution has all its deposits earmarked for purposes relating to regional and/or international development assistance. These criteria are strictly applied. Currently there is only one euro area credit institution with an exemption.

text: 7. The ECB’s possibility to exempt therefore is much narrower than that provided for in the draft legislative provisions, because of the criterion that ‘the institution is not exercising active banking functions in competition with other credit institutions’. Under the ECB’s minimum reserves system, this criterion is of general application, and it is understood as referring to the provision of any banking service that is in competition with banking services provided by other credit institutions established in the European Union (and not only the euro area), irrespective of where such services are provided. Where any credit institution or relevant branch provides any banking service that is in any way in competition with other credit institutions, the ECB therefore considers that an exemption would not be appropriate.

text: 8. If Malta should, in due course, adopt the euro, the Eurosystem’s regime would not, as described above, provide a possibility for an exemption such as that set out in the draft legislative provisions. The ECB therefore recommends inserting an additional criterion in paragraph 10(b) of the draft legislative provisions, namely that the institution is not exercising active banking functions in competition with other credit institutions established in the EU.

text: 9. The ECB confirms that it has no objection to the competent national authorities making this opinion publicly available at their discretion. This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website six months after the date of its adoption. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 1 September 2004. [signed] The President of the ECB Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: The draft Decree is to be adopted pursuant to the Law on financial security No 2003-706 of 1 August 2003 that amended Articles L. 214-43, L. 214-44, L. 214-46 and L. 214-48 of the Monetary and Financial Code (hereinafter the ‘Code’). 2 OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 3 ECB Opinion

text: of 4 February 2004 at the request of the Ministry of Finance of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg on a draft law on securitisation.

text: The Commission chairs this group composed of industry representatives that was established in the framework of the post-Financial Services Action Plan debate.

text: ECB Opinion

text: of 18 December 2002 at the request of the French Minister of Economy, Finance and Industry on a draft law on financial security.

text: As regards negotiable debt securities issued under French law (titres de créance négociables -TCN), the ECB understands that the general rules of issuance will also apply to FCCs. 7 Decree No 89-623 of 6 September 1989; Decree adopted pursuant to Law No 88-1201 of 23 December 1988 relative aux organismes de placement collectif en valeurs mobilières et portant création des fonds communs de créances (Decree on undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities and creating securitisation funds). 8 See the AMF’s draft General Regulation of 30 July 2004.

text: OJ L 266, 9.10.1980, p. 1. 11 Paragraph 8 of Article L. 214-43 of the Code. 12 This UN Convention is not yet into force. 13 United Nations Convention on the Assignment of Receivables in International Trade, UN, New York, 2004, explanatory note, p. 28.

text: See, for instance, Articles 11, 13, 18 of the draft decree.

text: See in this respect the Information Report of the French Senate on the application of the Law of 1 August 2003 on financial security by Mr P. Marini of 27 July 2004.

text: Commission Regulation (EC) No 809/2004 of 29 April 2004

text: implementing Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards information contained in prospectuses as well as the format, incorporation by reference and publication of such prospectuses and dissemination of advertisements, OJ L 149, 30.4. 2004, p. 1.

text: For risk control purposes, they belong to liquidity category IV for tier one assets. Guideline ECB/2003/16 of 1 December 2003 amending Guideline ECB/2000/7 on monetary policy instruments and procedures of the Eurosystem, OJ L 69, 8.3.2004, p. 1.

text: Guideline ECB/2003/16, Chapter 6. Eligible assets, 6.2. Tier one assets. The Eurosystem accepts a wide range of assets to underlie its operations. A distinction is made, essentially for purposes internal to the Eurosystem, between two categories of eligible assets: ‘tier one’ and ‘tier two’ respectively. Tier one consists of marketable debt instruments fulfilling uniform euro area-wide eligibility criteria specified by the ECB. Tier two consists of additional assets, marketable and nonmarketable, which are of particular importance for national financial markets and banking systems and for which eligibility criteria are established by the national central banks, subject to ECB approval. In May 2004, however, the Governing Council of the ECB approved the gradual introduction of a single list in the collateral framework of the Eurosystem (see press release of 10 May 2004) to replace the current two-tier system of eligible collateral.

text: As a result of the on-going reform, FCCs will be composed at any time of a minimum number of two units representing the FCC’s assets.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 14 September 2004 at the request of the French Ministry of Economic Affairs, Finance and Industry on a draft decree concerning fonds communs de créances (securitisation funds) (CON/2004/30)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 14 September 2004 at the request of the French Ministry of Economic Affairs, Finance and Industry on a draft decree concerning fonds communs de créances (securitisation funds) (

text: 1. On 3 August 2004 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the French Ministry of Economic Affairs, Finance and Industry for an opinion on a draft decree (hereinafter the ‘draft decree’ ) concerning fonds communs de créances (FCC), which are French securitisation vehicles. The draft decree takes over and amends Decree No 89-158 on the same subject, and repeals it.

text: 2. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on the second indent of Article 105(4) of the Treaty establishing the European Community and the sixth indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft decree relates to rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion. Preliminary remarks

text: 3. In its recent opinion on a draft Luxembourg law, the ECB pointed out that securitisation is ‘an area where considerable progress in integrating European financial markets could still be made notably in terms of the convergence of market practices, instruments and legal rules. (…) Looking beyond the Financial Services Action Plan, the ECB sees merit in a strategy of increased harmonisation in the area of securitisation at EU level’. The Securities Expert Group supported this analysis in its final report of May 2004, stating that ‘one of Europe’s most innovative and rapidly growing financial market sectors is securitisation, which has developed as an alternative capital markets financing, funding, arbitrage and risk-shifting mechanism’. The Expert Group also considered that: ‘while several Member States have taken steps to create a more hospitable environment for securitisation, and many of these initiatives are similar in concept and purpose, (…) more coordination of some aspects of the legal framework applicable to these operations is necessary at EU level, thereby facilitating a more harmonised framework while simultaneously encouraging innovation in securitisation markets across Europe’. The ECB also shares this view. 4. The ECB notes that the Law on financial security of 1 August 2003 (hereinafter the ‘Law’) introduced substantial changes to the existing French legal framework on securitisation which dates back to 1988. The ECB notes in this respect that, although the French authorities consulted it on an early draft of the Law , they did not consult it on those amendments relating to securitisation transactions which Parliament only introduced late in the legislative process. Although the ECB is aware that it is now only being consulted on the draft decree, the provisions of the draft decree are in several respects so closely intertwined with those of the Law that any comments on the draft decree will also apply to related provisions of the Law. Reform of the French securitisation vehicles

text: 5. The ECB notes from the statement of reasons submitted with the draft decree that the French securitisation market has developed significantly over the past few years. Securitisation transactions have become more and more complex with the result that it has become necessary to adapt French law to changing market requirements. Under the new rules contained in the Law, as implemented by the draft decree, FCCs will be allowed inter alia to issue debt instruments; to use credit derivatives in synthetic securitisation transactions; to assign receivables during their life except in cases of liquidation; and to increase the security for some mechanisms, including accounts specifically dedicated to FCCs, in order to reduce costs and to increase the efficiency of these arrangements.

text: 6. The draft decree introduces, as a result of the Law, new rules for FCCs, in particular regarding the composition of FCCs’ liabilities. The ECB understands that under current rules, the units issued by FCCs represent co-ownership rights in assets that FCCs have acquired. These units are neither shares nor debt securities and therefore, due to their hybrid legal nature, might be considered unattractive to international investors. One of the main changes introduced by Article L. 214-43 of the Code, as amended by the Law, is that FCCs may now issue negotiable debt securities. The ECB welcomes the opportunity given to French securitisation vehicles to issue such instruments directly, as well as the flexibility under the draft decree as to the type of debt instrument (FCCs may now issue instruments such as notes, bonds or commercial paper – including Euro commercial paper) and as to the law governing the debt instrument (the debt instruments can be issued under French or any foreign law). The ECB understands that this new provision is intended to enlarge the investor base and to avoid setting up a two-tier structure for securitisation transactions involving the subscription of units by a repackaging special purpose vehicle. The statement of reasons notes that the draft decree does not affect the legal regime applying to any bonds that FCCs may issue to the extent that the general rules applying to bonds do not apply, since FCCs do not have legal personality. The ECB understands that a specific regime for bonds issued by FCCs would have to be governed by law and that the draft decree simply refers to the FCC regulations governing the conditions under which the FCC may issue debt instruments .

text: 7. Article 9 of Decree 89-158 provides that coverage of the debts acquired by the FCC against the risk of default by debtors may be obtained inter alia by issuing specific units bearing the risk of default of the acquired debts. Article 5(1) of the draft decree maintains this rule according to which only qualified investors are entitled to subscribe for or acquire such risk-bearing units in FCCs for the purpose of achieving their management objectives. The ECB notes however that the draft decree no longer expressly refers to the distinction between FCC units (parts ordinaires) and FCC subordinated units (parts spécifiques). The ECB questions whether the wording of Article 5(1) of the draft decree clarifies sufficiently that only qualified investors are entitled to subscribe for units having the same degree of subordination as parts spécifiques. Synthetic securitisation and credit derivatives

text: 8. Another innovation of the Law and the draft decree is the use of securitisation as a risk transfer technique by allowing FCCs to enter into credit derivatives transactions, as either buyers or sellers of credit protection. The ECB notes the introduction into French legislation of these new arrangements developed by the financial markets, following the recent Decrees of November 2003 implementing the UCITS Directive and defining in particular the rules applying in case of recourse to credit derivatives by UCITS. The draft decree determines the conditions under which an FCC, or the compartments of an FCC, may enter into derivatives contracts. To that end, Article 1 of the draft decree defines the FCC’s management objectives which consist of acquiring receivables or bearing the credit risk relating to one or more reference entities of any kind. The ECB notes from Article 19 of the draft decree that the FCC’s management company will have to comply with certain specific requirements where the FCC regulations provide for recourse to credit derivatives. In particular, these requirements will be further detailed in the Règlement Général de l’AMF (General Regulation of the French Financial Markets Authority (AMF) , hereinafter the ‘AMF’s General Regulation’) and taken into account when granting a licence to the management company. The ECB would suggest, in line with the practice for the other provisions of the draft decree, that the FCC regulations should determine the conditions under which the FCC may have recourse to credit derivatives and, in particular, bear a credit risk. Reducing commingling risk

text: 9. Article 22 of the draft decree further specifies the mechanism of the account specifically dedicated to an FCC to which sums recovered with respect to assigned receivables may be credited, as described in the third paragraph of Article L. 214-46 of the Code. The ECB understands from this mechanism that the account distinguishes the titulaire facial (apparent holder) and the actual beneficiary or creditor of any sum credited to such account. Any sums on such an account neither form part of the servicer’s assets nor can they be targeted by the servicer’s creditors, regardless of the fact that the servicer is the subject of insolvency proceedings. The ECB notes in this respect that Article 22 of the draft decree further specifies the respective obligations of the parties to a securitisation transaction where a specifically dedicated account is created, and in particular those of the credit institution holding such an account. The ECB understands that this new mechanism will reduce commingling risk and thereby improve investor protection.

text: 10. As regards the responsibilities of the depository ensuring the safe custody of an FCC’s assets, Article L. 214-48 II of the Code provides that it acts as the depositary of the cash (‘trésorerie’). This concept does not appear in the draft decree which refers instead to the concept of cash holdings (‘liquidités’) including deposits, debt securities, UCITS units and FCC units . Article 17(3) of the draft decree also provides that an FCC may only commit itself through repurchase transactions by paying within the liquidity limits it holds at the time of payment. Doubts could arise as to whether the ‘liquidity’ in

text: Article 17(3)

text: means the same as the cash holdings defined in Article 4 of the draft decree. The ECB therefore suggests using the same terminology consistently in the draft decree in the interests of clarity.

text: 11. According to Article L. 214-48 of the Code, as amended by the Law, FCCs must entrust their assets to the custody of a credit institution established in France. The ECB notes that this provision includes French branches of credit institutions established in the European Economic Area and welcomes this clarification. International assignments of receivables and applicable law

text: 12. Conflict of law issues which may affect the validity or enforceability of international assignments of receivables are an increasing concern in the context of international securitisation transactions. Under Article 12 of the Rome Convention

text: of 19 June 1980 on the law applicable to contractual obligations , the enforceability of a receivables assignment against a debtor is governed by the law of the assigned receivable. However, the Rome Convention does not provide any clear-cut solution with respect to the enforceability of an assignment of a receivable against other third parties. As a result, national legislators have recently taken steps to address this issue in their domestic legal frameworks. In this context, the relevant provision of French law applying to FCCs (but also to sociétés de crédit foncier and Dailly assignments) provides that an assignment of receivables ‘shall take effect between the parties and bind third parties on the date stated on the note on delivery (“acte de cession de créances”), regardless of the date of creation, maturity or payment of the receivables, without any further formality being required, and regardless of the law governing the assigned receivables and the law of the country of residence of the assigned debtors’ . At the international level, on 12 December 2001 the General Assembly of the United Nations meeting in New York adopted the Convention on the assignment of receivables in international trade (hereinafter the ‘UN Convention’) which may contribute to harmonising these conflicts of laws rules . The explanatory note to the UN Convention by the UNCITRAL Secretariat states that it is intended to remove the legal uncertainty surrounding a number of issues arising in the context of important receivables financing transactions, including inter alia assetbased lending and securitisation . In addition, under the UN Convention, the law where the assignor has its place of business governs the enforceability of a receivable’s assignment against third party creditors. As already mentioned in Opinion

text: , the ECB hopes that the solutions adopted and/or examined at international level will lead to an increased harmonisation of the rules applying in this area at EU level and reduce legal uncertainty and inefficiency in the context of cross-border commercial and financial transactions. Protection of investors

text: 13. As does Decree No 89-158, the draft decree often refers to the concept of ‘level of security offered to holders of units and debt instruments’. Furthermore, Article 24 of the draft decree imposes an obligation on the body recognised by the Minister of Economy (presumably a rating agency within the meaning of Article L. 544-4 of the Code) to ensure monitoring of the level of security offered by the units and debt securities issued by FCCs and that the conclusions of this monitoring are regularly made publicly available. The ECB considers that it could be useful to further clarify this concept of level of security offered to holders of units and debt instruments either in the draft decree itself or in the FCC regulations . The ECB also understands that some of these disclosure provisions date back to Decree No 89-158 and will be further detailed in the framework of the AMF’s General Regulation . The ECB suggests making this documentation as well as the FCC regulations publicly available at a central access point, for instance, on the FCC management company’s website. Furthermore, the draft decree needs to be compatible with the specific disclosure rules for the different types of instruments issued by FCCs (units, debt instruments, commercial paper, etc.), and also with the new general disclosure requirements applying to the issuance of asset-backed securities contained in the implementing rules of the Prospectus Directive . Statistics reporting 14. The regular and timely collection of accurate and reliable statistical data on securitisation vehicles and securitisation more generally across Europe is important for monetary policy purposes. Work is currently under way to improve euro area statistics on securitisation. In general, in carrying out its statistical tasks, the ECB identifies reporting agents using a combination of criteria based on EU law and national regulatory provisions, including supervisory agreements or tax provisions. In this context, the ECB notes that Article L. 214-45 of the Code imposes an obligation on FCCs to communicate to the Banque de France any information required for the preparation of monetary statistics. Article 25 of the draft decree specifies that the information referred to in Article L. 214– 45 of the Code will be communicated to the Banque de France by the FCC’s management company. The ECB welcomes these provisions assuming that the concept of monetary statistics is covered by the definition in the Decision No 02-01 of 22 May 2002 of the Governor of the Banque de France concerning the collection of statistical data by the Banque de France for monetary policy purposes, which comprises all types of data, also on a security-by-security basis, required by the Banque de France for the fulfilment of the statistical obligations imposed by the ECB. Use of asset-backed securities as collateral for Eurosystem credit operations

text: 15. Pursuant to Article 18.1 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, all Eurosystem credit operations (i.e. liquidity-providing operations) have to be based on adequate collateral. As mentioned in Opinion

text: , asset-backed securities may be accepted as collateral for Eurosystem monetary policy and intraday credit operations provided they fulfil the eligibility criteria laid down in the General Documentation on monetary policy instruments and procedures of the Eurosystem17. It should be noted however that the General Documentation provides that ‘debt instruments affording rights to the principal and/or the interest that are subordinated to the rights of holders of other debt instruments of the same issuer (or, within a structured issue, subordinated to other tranches of the same issue) are excluded from tier one’ . 16. Article 14 of the draft decree provides that the FCC regulations will stipulate the priority rules among the various categories of units, debt securities and loans regarding the amounts received by an FCC and that the units issued by an FCC will be repaid only after discharge of the FCC’s other creditors. The ECB understands from this provision that the holders of FCC units will bear in priority the risk of default by debtors. Most of these units issued by FCCs might therefore constitute ‘quasi-equity’ units, i.e. subordinated units traditionally subscribed for by the originator or a third party . This provision would not however preclude subordination mechanisms and ‘waterfall’ structures within the respective categories of units or debt instruments issued by an FCC. Therefore, based on the current wording of Article 14 of the draft decree, FCC units would no longer meet the criteria to be eligible for collateral purposes where an FCC, or the relevant compartment, issues debt instruments. Equally, debt instruments issued by an FCC may not be eligible as collateral if subordinated to other instruments related to the same FCC or compartment. 17. The ECB confirms that it has no objection to the competent national authorities making this opinion publicly available at their discretion. This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website six months after the date of its adoption. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 14 September 2004. [signed] The President of the ECB Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 2 Four expert commissions have been established under the Financial Market Integrated Supervision Implementation Plan adopted by the Slovak Government pursuant to Resolution No 775 of 21 August 2003. 3 No 460/1992 Coll. as last amended by Constitutional Act No 323/2004 Coll.

text: Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on insider dealing and market manipulation (market abuse) (OJ L 96, 12.4.2003, p. 16). 5 Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 on the prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading and amending Directive

text: (OJ L 345, 31.12.2003, p. 64). 6 Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on takeover bids (OJ L 142, 30.4.2004, p. 12). 7 Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on markets in financial instruments amending Council Directives

text: and

text: and Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing

text: Council Directive 93/22/EEC

text: (OJ L 145, 30.4.2004, p. 1).

text: See also paragraph 5 of ECB Opinion

text: of 11 May 2004 at the request of the Italian Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance on a draft law on the protection of savings. 9 Also the current wording of

text: Articles 2(2)

text: (d) and 36(1) of Act No 566/1992 Coll. on Národná banka Slovenska, as amended, refers to the safe operation of the banking system.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 22 September 2004 at the request of Národná banka Slovenska on a draft law on supervision of the financial market and on amendments to certain laws (CON/2004/31)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 22 September 2004 at the request of Národná banka Slovenska on a draft law on supervision of the financial market and on amendments to certain laws (

text: 1. On 5 August 2004, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from Národná banka Slovenska (NBS) for an opinion on a draft law on supervision of the financial market and on amendments to certain laws (hereinafter the ‘draft law’).

text: 2. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on the third and sixth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law contains provisions concerning the Slovak national central bank and rules applicable to financial institutions that materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 3. The main purpose of the draft law is to establish the legal framework for integrated supervision of the financial market by NBS. Under the draft law, the responsibility of the Slovak Financial Market Authority (FMA) for supervision of the non-banking financial market (capital markets, insurance business and pension schemes) will be transferred to NBS on 1 January 2006. Currently NBS is only responsible for the supervision of credit institutions. If the proposal goes ahead, the FMA will be dissolved on 1 January 2006.

text: 4. As explained in the reports of the expert commissions established by the Slovak Government to prepare the draft law , the existence of a relatively small financial market in the Slovak Republic led to the proposal to make a single authority responsible for financial market supervision. Various options were considered. The decisive reason for allocating this task to NBS was its independence, which is guaranteed by Article 56 of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic . Other essential reasons taken into consideration were: (i) NBS’s credibility; and (ii) the experience of its staff, acquired in carrying out its current tasks and more particularly through prudential supervision of credit institutions on the basis of Act No 483/2001 Coll. on banks.

text: 5. As previously stated, NBS is currently responsible for supervising credit institutions only. The draft law will therefore considerably broaden its existing supervisory powers. NBS will become the competent authority for supervision of the entire Slovak insurance sector including reinsurance companies and of the capitalisation pillar of compulsory pension insurance (i.e., old age pension savings). NBS will also assume all of the FMA’s current powers in the field of capital market supervision. It will therefore become the competent authority for supervision of investment firms, stock exchanges, central securities depositories, asset management companies and mutual funds. It will also be designated as the competent authority within the meaning of a number of recently adopted Community Directives which have not yet been transposed into Slovak law, in particular 4 5 6 the Market Abuse Directive , the Prospectus Directive , the Takeover Bids Directive and the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive . NBS’s regulatory powers will also be broadened. Its existing power to issue decrees and measures in the field of banking will be extended to the capital market and to the insurance and pensions sectors. After the reform, NBS will be able to adopt implementing regulations: (i) for the capital market and the insurance sector in cooperation with the Slovak Ministry of Finance; and (ii) for the pension savings sector in cooperation with the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and the Family.

text: 6. The ECB notes that the specific laws governing supervision of each financial market sector will be amended pursuant to the draft law. The provisions currently conferring supervisory and regulatory powers on the FMA will be amended in order to transfer these powers to NBS. Transitional provisions forming part of the amendments to these specific laws expressly indicate that the NBS will complete any administrative proceedings started by the FMA.

text: 7. The ECB notes that the draft law, when adopted, will establish a structure that is currently unique within the European Union by making a national central bank directly and fully responsible for supervision of a Member State’s entire financial market. The ECB understands that in Member States with a relatively small financial market, such as the Slovak Republic, there are good arguments for concentrating supervisory responsibilities in the hands of a single authority. The ECB welcomes the fact that NBS’s independence, credibility and experience have been considered as decisive reasons for the Slovak Government to propose appointing it for this task.

text: 8. Under Article 14.4 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, the national central banks may perform functions other than those specified in the Statute unless the Governing Council of the ECB finds, by a majority of two thirds of the votes cast, that these interfere with the objectives and tasks of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB). Such functions are performed on the responsibility and liability of the national central banks and are not regarded as being part of the functions of the ESCB.

text: 9. Without prejudice to the Governing Council’s powers to take action under Article 14.4 of the Statute, the ECB considers that the proposed extension of NBS’s supervisory tasks is compatible with its ESCB-related tasks. In particular, the ECB welcomes the fact that the task of performing prudential supervision of all financial intermediaries will be allocated to NBS. The proposed institutional framework for prudential supervision has the potential to cope with increasing crosssectoral interlinkages in the financial system. Indeed, the nature and scope of risk in the financial sector is widening due to closer links between credit institutions, insurance companies, investment firms and pension funds. The traditional borders between the banking, securities and insurance sectors of the financial market are becoming increasingly blurred, as demonstrated by the emergence of hybrid financial products, the increased use of risk transfer instruments and distribution agreements between the three sectors, and the growing role of financial conglomerates .

text: 10. The ECB takes note that the draft law is oriented towards recognising the essential role to be played by NBS in safeguarding the stability and credibility of the financial market, as well as in protecting clients. While the ECB’s overall assessment of this structure is positive, it favours recognising in the supervisory framework the clear distinction between the two goals of financial stability and investor protection. In particular, the draft law should clearly emphasise the importance of: (i) the safety and soundness of financial institutions; and (ii) the stability of the entire financial system. The micro-prudential approach in the draft law could be coupled with a macro-prudential dimension, which might result in more effective monitoring of systemic risk. There is a close relationship between prudential controls applied to individual intermediaries and the assessment of risks for the financial system as a whole. Therefore, the ECB would welcome it if the draft law explicitly recognised, as is the case in the statutes of other Member States’ national central banks, that NBS has the task of contributing to the stability of the financial system as a whole . Central banks’ focus on systemic stability means that they can better assess not only the likelihood and the potential impact of macro-shocks or disturbances in domestic and international capital markets, but also the operation of common factors affecting the stability of groups of intermediaries.

text: 11. The draft law provides for an organisational unit of NBS, established in accordance with NBS’s organisational rules and designated as the ‘financial market supervision unit’ (hereinafter the ‘supervision unit’) to carry out on and off-site supervision and, as a rule, also to act as the decisionmaking body in the first instance. The supervision unit will exercise its tasks under the managerial responsibility of the Vice-Governor of NBS, who will also adopt its decisions. § 2(10) of the draft law explicitly states that in supervising supervised entities, the supervision unit will act ‘separately, independently and impartially, in accordance with the draft law and specific laws’. NBS’s Bank Board (hereinafter the ‘Bank Board’) will rule on appeals against the supervision unit’s first instance decisions. The supervision unit will be bound by decisions of the Bank Board and in turn by court decisions taken on administrative review of such decisions.

text: 12. The ECB has examined the provisions of the draft law relating to the supervision unit particularly with a view to avoiding ambiguity with regard to allocation of responsibilities for supervision. The ECB understands that the draft law will not establish a body responsible for supervision functioning autonomously within the framework of NBS. Instead, the aim is to establish NBS itself as the competent authority directly and fully responsible for supervision of the entire Slovak financial market. This approach implies that the Bank Board is ultimately responsible for supervision. NBS’s internal governance structure should therefore appropriately reflect the fact that the exercise of supervisory tasks is under the ultimate control of the Bank Board. Ambiguity in this respect could impinge on NBS’s institutional and financial independence as well as its reputation.

text: 13. The ECB understands from the explanations provided by the supporting documents to the draft law and by NBS itself that the draft law together with Act No 566/1992 Coll. on Národná banka Slovenska ensure that the Bank Board will have the power to issue general guidelines on the exercise of supervisory tasks by the supervision unit as well as to any of NBS’s other business units. It also understands that the Bank Board will have access, where necessary, to all information concerning the financial situation of supervised entities and supervised transactions on the capital markets. In addition, the draft law explicitly provides that the Bank Board may issue warnings to the supervision unit if it fails to commence proceedings when it is under an obligation to do so, or fails to take a decision within the time limit prescribed by law. If the supervision unit still fails to take a decision in accordance with such a warning, the Bank Board may appoint another NBS organisational unit to take the decision concerned.

text: 14. The ECB considers that the proposed system of warnings coupled with the ability to transfer decision-making power from the supervision unit to another NBS organisational unit fails to recognise the prominent role that the Bank Board should play in some situations, particularly in crisis situations threatening the stability of the financial system. The proposed system could prove too cumbersome in such situations, where important decisions must sometimes be taken rapidly. The Bank Board must be in a position to manage such situations effectively and efficiently. The ECB therefore recommends clarifying in the draft law that the Bank Board will have full power to intervene, if necessary directly, in the decision-making process relating to NBS’s performance of its supervisory tasks.

text: 15. The ECB has also examined the possible impact of the proposed reform on NBS’s financial situation. In this respect, the ECB notes that NBS will no longer have to fully fund prudential supervision of the banking sector. After the reform, supervised credit institutions will be asked to contribute to supervision costs in accordance with the provisions of an NBS decree adopted in agreement with the Ministry of Finance. The ECB also notes that supervision of the insurance sector and of the capital market has until now been fully funded by market participants and that this financing system will be maintained after the reform. Finally, the ECB notes that the Slovak State is liable for all possible claims arising due to damage caused by activities performed by the FMA in the exercise of its supervsiory tasks .

text: 16. The ECB would appreciate being provided, for information purposes, with: (i) any proposed amendments to the draft law in relation to the issues addressed in this opinion; and (ii) a detailed description of the proposed organisational scheme and division of supervisory powers both within the supervision unit and within NBS as a whole from 1 January 2006.

text: 17. This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 22 September 2004. [signed] The President of the ECB Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: EUT L 244, 16.7.2004, s.47.

text: EUT C 88, 8.4.2004, s. 18.

title: CON/2004/32: Europeiska centralbankens yttrande av den 6 oktober 2004 på begäran av Europeiska unionens råd över Europeiska gemenskapernas kommissions rekommendation till rådets beslut om inledandet av förhandlingar om ett avtal om de monetära förbindelserna med Furstendömet Andorra (KOM(2004) 548 slutlig)

text: 1. Den 8 september 2004 begärde Europeiska unionens råd ett yttrande från Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) över Europeiska gemenskapernas kommissions rekommendation till rådets beslut om inledandet av förhandlingar om ett avtal om de monetära förbindelserna med Furstendömet Andorra (KOM(2004) 548 slutlig) (nedan kallad rekommendationen).

text: 2. ECB:s behörighet att avge ett yttrande över rekommendationen grundar sig på artikel 111.3 i Fördraget om upprättandet av Europeiska gemenskapen. I enlighet med artikel 17.5 första meningen i arbetsordningen för Europeiska centralbanken har detta yttrande antagits av ECB-rådet.

text: 3. I rekommendationen föreslås ett utkast till rådets beslut som fastställer att förhandlingarna kan inledas, eftersom de nödvändiga villkoren i

text: rådets beslut 2004/548/EG av den 11 maj 2004

text: för att inleda förhandlingar mellan gemenskapen och Furstendömet Andorra (nedan kallat Andorra) om ett monetärt avtal (nedan kallat avtalet) har uppfyllts.

text: 4. I sitt yttrande

text: av den 1 april 2004 över beslut

text: , ansåg ECB bl.a. att det skulle ligga i gemenskapens intresse att inleda förhandlingar om avtalet.

text: 5. Enligt rekommendationen har de nödvändiga villkoren i beslut

text: uppfyllts, eftersom gemenskapen och Andorra har paraferat avtalet om beskattning av inkomster från sparande och Andorra har åtagit sig att ratificera det före den 30 april 2005. På denna grund anser ECB att det inte finns några skäl som talar emot att anta rådets beslut att inleda förhandlingar med Andorra om avtalet.

text: 6. ECB konstaterar att förhandlingarna om avtalet kommer att skjutas upp om Andorra inte ratificerar avtalet om beskattning av inkomster från sparande före den 30 april 2005.

text: 7. I enlighet med

text: artikel 7 i beslut 2004/548/EG

text: kommer kommissionen att på gemenskapens vägnar föra förhandlingarna med Andorra. Spanien och Frankrike kommer att i full omfattning medverka vid förhandlingarna och ECB kommer att i full omfattning medverka vid de förhandlingar som ligger inom dess behörighetsområde.


title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 2 November 2004 at the request of Magyar Nemzeti Bank on a draft regulation on the scope of information to be supplied to the central bank’s information system and on the method and time limits for data supply (CON/2004/33)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 2 November 2004 at the request of Magyar Nemzeti Bank on a draft regulation on the scope of information to be supplied to the central bank’s information system and on the method and time limits for data supply (

text: 1. On 5 October 2004, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from Magyar Nemzeti Bank (MNB) for an opinion on a draft regulation on the scope, method and time limits for information to be supplied to the central bank’s information system (hereinafter the ‘draft regulation’).

text: 2. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on the fourth indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft regulation relates to the collection of statistical information. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 3. The draft regulation is intended to replace MNB Decree No 3/2003 (PK.16) on the information to be supplied to the central bank’s information system. The primary purpose is to extend to Hungarian branches of financial institutions and investment enterprises with headquarters outside Hungary the obligation to provide information to MNB. The proposed regulation relates to MNB’s information system, which collects the statistical information necessary for MNB to fulfil its tasks.

text: 4. Article 5.2 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank provides that the national central banks (NCBs) shall carry out, to the extent possible, the tasks described in

text: Article 5.1

text: , i.e. the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) tasks defined by the Treaty establishing the European Community and the Statute. Article 43.1 of the Statute implies that legal instruments adopted by the ECB for the fulfilment of its statistical reporting requirements do not confer any rights or impose any obligations on the non-participating Member States. At the same time, Article 47.2 of the Statute provides that the ECB’s General Council (of which MNB’s Governor is a member) must contribute to the collection of statistical information as referred to in Article 5 of the Statute.

text: 5. Article 10 of the Treaty requires that ‘Member States shall take all appropriate measures ... to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaty.’ More specifically,

text: Article 4 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2533/98

text: on the collection of statistical information by the European Central Bank requires all Member States to ‘organise themselves in the field of statistics … and fully cooperate with the ESCB in order to ensure the fulfilment of the obligations arising out of Article 5 of the Statute’.

text: Recital 17

text: of

text: Regulation (EC) No 2533/98

text: indicates that while it is recognised that the statistical information needed to fulfil the ECB’s statistical reporting requirements is not the same for the participating as for the non-participating Member States, Article 5 of the Statute applies to both participating and non-participating Member States; this fact, together with Article 10 of the Treaty, implies an obligation to design and implement at the national level all the measures that Member States consider appropriate in order to carry out the collection of the statistical information needed to fulfil the ECB’s statistical reporting requirements and the timely preparations in the field of statistics in order for them to become participating Member States.

text: 7. On the basis of the above, the ECB welcomes MNB’s initiative to adopt a regulation on the collection of statistical information. The ECB notes that the NCBs’ reporting provisions are an indispensable component of the national statistical collection systems. These national reporting provisions may differ to varying degrees between each Member State, depending on many national and external factors. As a result, the ECB’s comments on them are mainly of a general nature and intend to draw attention to aspects that may be made more explicit in the proposed draft regulation.

text: 8. The ECB welcomes the core objective of the amendments to be introduced by the draft regulation, which is to impose the obligation to provide information to MNB on Hungarian branches of financial institutions and investment enterprises with headquarters outside Hungary. This is essential in order to obtain the accurate statistical information necessary for the fulfilment of MNB’s tasks.

text: 9. The ECB concludes that the reporting scheme intended to be introduced by the draft regulation, as far as reporting agents residing in Hungary are concerned, appears to cover the ECB’s statistical reporting requirements for the abovementioned institutions located in the euro area. Furthermore, the draft regulation appears to be complete and consistent with these requirements.

text: 10. At the same time, it is the task primarily of the NCBs to assess whether any proposed detailed reporting instructions and collection methods at national level are the most efficient, effective and the least burdensome for the reporting agents concerned.

text: 11. This opinion does not prejudice any later assessment by the ECB of the Hungarian reporting scheme and the statistical information reported to it under the ECB’s statistical reporting requirements.

text: 12. The ECB confirms that it has no objection to the competent national authorities making this opinion publicly available at their discretion. This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website six months after the date of its adoption. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 2 November 2004. [signed] The President of the ECB Jean-Claude TRICHET