text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42). 2

text: Regulation (EU) 2016/679

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive

text: (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ L 119 4.5.2016, p. 1). 3 The draft law defines ‘creditors’ as the legal persons to which data subjects owe credit that falls within the scope of the draft law but other than: entities listed as public sector agencies in article 51 of Law 1892/1990 (Government Gazette issue Α 101/1990, p. 101); local and regional municipal authorities and their enterprises/corporations; and utility undertakings to the extent that the Greek State holds, directly or indirectly, part of the share capital.

text: The draft law contains a non-exhaustive/indicative list of creditors, that includes: i) credit institutions within the meaning of

text: Article 3(1)

text: (1) of Law 4261/2014 and

text: Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013

text: established in Greece; ii) branches in Greece of credit institutions established abroad; iii) credit institutions established in the EEA which trade in Greece pursuant to Article 39 of Law 4261/2014; iv) corporate credit providers within the meaning of Article 153(4) of Law 4261/2014; v) factoring companies within the meaning of Article 4(2) of Law 1905/1990 (Government Gazette A147/1990); vi) leasing companies within the meaning of

text: Article 2(1)

text: (a) of Law 1665/1986 (Government Gazette A 194/1986); vii) branches in Greece of financial institutions within the meaning of

text: Article 3(1)

text: (22) of Law 4261/2014 established abroad; viii) loan and credit debt management companies within the meaning of

text: Article 1(1)

text: (a)(aa) of Law 4354/2015 and branches within the meaning of

text: Article 1(1)

text: (a)(bb) of Law 4354/2015; ix) credit agencies within the meaning of Article 3(2) of Law 4438/2016; x) microfinance institutions within the meaning of

text: Article 2

text: (b) of Law 4701/2020; xi) payment institutions within the meaning of

text: Article 4(4)

text: (f) of Law 4537/2018, inasmuch as they provide credit; xii) e-money institutions within the meaning of Article 10(3) of Law 4021/2011, inasmuch as they provide credit; xiii) card issuing and management companies; and xiv) other financial institutions within the meaning of

text: Article 4(1)

text: (26) of

text: Regulation (EU) No 575/2013

text: . 4 See Article 1(3) of the draft law. 5 Available here: https://greece20.gov.gr/en/the-complete-plan/. 6 The Recovery and Resilience Facility was established by

text: Regulation (EU) 2021/241

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 (OJ L 57, 18.2.2021, p. 17–75).

text: Government Gazette A 78/2019.

text: ‘Identification information’ and ‘general information’ are defined in Article 2 of the draft law. 9

text: Regulation (EU) 2016/867

text: of the European Central Bank of 18 May 2016 on the collection of granular credit and credit risk data (ECB/2016/13) (OJ L 144, 1.6.2016, p. 44).

text: Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013

text: conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63). 11 This understanding is based on

text: Article 6(2) of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013

text: conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63) and

text: Article 21 of Regulation (EU) No 468/2014 of 16 April 2014

text: of the European Central Bank establishing the framework for cooperation within the Single Supervisory Mechanism between the European Central Bank and national competent authorities and with national designated authorities (SSM Framework Regulation) (ECB/2014/17) (OJ L 141, 14.05.2014, p. 1). This understanding is also based on

text: Article 55

text: C of the Statute of the Bank of Greece but in that case, the Bank of Greece would only be able to share the information it has received on an aggregated basis. Prudential supervisionrelated information can also be shared with the ECB on the basis of Article 54 of Law No 4261/2014 (Government Gazette A 107/2014). 12

text: Article 5 of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013

text: . 13 See paragraph 3.2 of Opinion

text: . 14 See paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: See, e.g., paragraph 1.3 of Opinion

text: ; paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: ; paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: . 16 Council Regulation No

text: (EC) 2533/98

text: of 23 November 1998 concerning the collection of statistical information by the European Central Bank (OJ L 318, 27.11.1998, p. 8). For example,

text: article 8(1)

text: Article 8(1) of Regulation (EC) No 2533/98

text: allows for the use of confidential statistical information by the ESCB “exclusively for the exercise of the tasks of the ESCB”, except in a number of defined circumstances. Moreover, paragraphs 4, 4a and 5 of Article 8 of the same regulation allow for the transmission of confidential statistical information within and outside the ESCB, subject to the fulfilment of a number of requirements and conditions. These latter provisions are particularly important when it comes to information collected by other NCBs in accordance with the AnaCredit

text: Regulation (EU) 2016/867

text: to which the Bank of Greece may have access. 17 See also paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: . 18 See

text: recital 15

text: of

text: Regulation (EU) 2016/867

text: and paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: . 19 See

text: recital 17

text: of

text: Regulation (EU) 2016/867

text: See

text: recital 16

text: of

text: Regulation (EU) 2016/867

text: (ECB/2016/13). 21

text: Article 18 of Regulation (EU) 2016/867

text: . 22

text: Regulation (EC) No 2157/1999 of 23 September 1999

text: on the powers of the European Central Bank to impose sanctions (ECB/1999/4) (OJ L 264, 12.10.1999, p. 21). 23 See paragraph 3.5 of Opinion

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 of 13 December 1993

text: specifying definitions for the application of the prohibitions referred to in Articles

text: and

text: b(1) of the Treaty (OJ L 332, 31.12.1993, p. 1). 25 Article 123 of the Treaty also serves the objective of maintaining price stability and reinforces central bank independence.

text: For the relevance of the purpose in determining ESCB-related tasks, see paragraph 2.4.1 of

text: , paragraph 3.3.4.1 of

text: , and paragraph 3.2 of

text: . Regarding the purpose of a specific credit register, see

text: . Also compare

text: Article 5.1

text: Statute of the ESCB: ‘In order to undertake the tasks of the ESCB, the ECB, assisted by the national central banks, shall collect the necessary statistical information ...’ 27 Article 3(5) of the draft law stipulates that credit information which the Bank of Greece may hold in the Register also encompasses analyses and statistics produced by the Bank; Article 4(3) of the draft law allows the Bank of Greece to request additional data from creditors so that they can be processed for the purpose of preparing financial analyses and statistical reports. 28 See Article 1(3) of the draft law. 29

text: Article 55

text: A of the Statute of the Bank of Greece.

text: See, for example, Opinions

text: and

text: (Bulgaria);

text: and

text: (Belgium);

text: and

text: (Malta);

text: (Austria);

text: (Slovenia);

text: (Portugal);

text: and

text: (Latvia);

text: and

text: (Ireland). 31 See also paragraph 2.11 above. 32 See, for example, paragraph 4.6.1 of Opinion

text: . 33 See Article 6(3) of the draft law.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 25 August 2022 on the establishment and operation of a Central Credit Register (CON/2022/28)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 25 August 2022 on the establishment and operation of a Central Credit Register (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 29 July 2022 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Greek Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft law on the establishment and operation of a central credit register (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third, fourth and sixth indents of

text: , as the draft law relates to the Bank of Greece, the collection, compilation and distribution of monetary, financial, banking, payment systems and balance of payments statistics, and to rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The draft law establishes a central credit register (hereinafter the ‘Register’) as a national personal data filing system as defined in

text: Article 4

text: , point (6), of

text: Regulation (EU) 2016/679

text: (hereinafter the ‘GDPR’). The Register will operate as an electronic database, be established, maintained and operated by the Bank of Greece, and record, at a granular level, inter alia, the payment history, type of collateral provided and any other information relating to any form of credit granted to natural and legal persons including guarantors (hereinafter ‘data subjects’) by credit and financial institutions that have their registered office in Greece and by branches of foreign credit and financial institutions operating in Greece. The exact scope of credit covered by the draft law, namely the relevant credit thresholds and the relevant creditors to be covered , will be specified in an act of the Governor of the Bank of Greece.

text: The Register will allow, among others: (a) the collection and extraction of (positive and negative) financial history data on natural and legal persons by creditors which hold and manage such data; (b) the production and provision of credit reports on data subjects; (c) the retention and processing of financial history data, in keeping with the applicable institutional framework for the protection of personal data and information security; (d) the provision of a single contact point from which data subjects can obtain credit reports; and (e) the provision of a single contact point to which data subjects can apply to have financial history data that is collected by third-party agencies updated or rectified, or generally to exercise their rights under the GDPR. 1.2 Objectives of the draft law The primary aim of establishing and operating the Register is to enhance the financing of the real economy by the Greek financial system and to safeguard financial stability by improving the quality of available information and thereby enabling a more rational assessment of the creditworthiness of potential borrowers and generally contributing to more informed decision-making in relation to credit granting . According to the explanatory note accompanying the proposal on the establishment of the Register submitted by Greece to the European Commission to obtain funding from the Recovery and Resilience Facility , the Register is also expected to increase available information regarding the credit history of potential debtors, have a positive impact on the quantity and quality of investment spending, encourage competition among financial institutions, result in a lower cost of capital for Greek borrowers, and greatly increase the ability of investors to price risk in the secondary market for non-performing loans (NPLs). This will increase NPL valuations, boost recovery rates and, thereby, help banks to resolve legacy NPL challenges faster and more efficiently in terms of use of capital. The explanatory note also states that the Register, since it is maintained and operated by the Bank of Greece, supports the Bank’s obligations and functions in supervising the financial sector and ensuring financial stability. 1.3 Information to be recorded with the Register The Bank of Greece may hold the following in the Register: (a) identification information and general information on the data subject; (b) financial history data relating to any credit application or credit agreement entered into by the data subject (including in its capacity as guarantor); (c) information linking data subjects that are parties to the same credit agreement or have provided a guarantee in connection

text: with the same credit agreement; and (d) any credit commentary or other analysis produced by the Bank of Greece in connection with a data subject. The credit information that the Bank of Greece may hold in the Register may be used for the production of general reports, analyses and statistics produced by the Bank of Greece and held in a form that prevents identification of the data subject. 1.4 Credit report Based on the aforementioned information and data recorded therewith, the Register will also produce, upon application, a credit report for all credit receivers. The exact contents of the report will be determined by an act of the Governor of the Bank of Greece and will vary depending on the recipient of the report and the purpose for which the report was requested. These purposes are listed in the draft law: (a) to verify information provided by the data subject in connection with a credit application to a creditor; (b) to assess the risks incurred by the creditor in granting credit to the data subject or accepting the data subject’s guarantee for the credit agreement; (c) to assess the risks attached to credit granted to the data subject or a change to the nature or term of the respective credit agreement or guarantee; (d) to monitor and assess failure to comply with the terms of a credit agreement relating to credit granted by the creditor to a data subject or to a guarantee provided by that data subject; (e) to evaluate a data subject’s application to a creditor for a debt payment plan; and (f) to analyse portfolios of credit agreements held by financial institutions. The report may not, however, assign a credit rating or a creditworthiness score for the credit receiver. 1.5 Role of the Bank of Greece The draft law requires the Bank of Greece to establish, maintain and operate the Register. The Bank of Greece is also responsible for its technical design and the implementation of its filing system, collecting and organising personal and other data from all sources, keeping them in a way that safeguards data integrity, confidentiality and availability, complying with data protection legislation and, in general, ensuring the seamless operation of the Register. The Bank of Greece is also appointed as the ‘controller’ within the meaning of the GDPR and Law No 4613/2019 , both of which apply to the processing of data by the Bank of Greece and third parties that receive the credit report produced by the Register. The Bank of Greece must also inform data subjects that their data have been shared with the Register, as required by the GDPR. 1.6 Information and data provided to the Register Where the relevant credit falls within the scope of the draft law, creditors must provide financial history data to the Register by giving the Register access to, and allow the electronic transmission from, their electronic systems covering a period of at least the past 12 months. The draft law requires creditors to transmit data (and update already provided data) on a monthly basis and to connect online to the Register within 12 months of the adoption of the act of the Governor of the Bank of Greece (see paragraph 1.9 below). The Bank of Greece may request creditors to provide additional data that may be used for financial analyses and the compilation of statistics produced by the Bank. The draft law defines ‘financial history data’ as all information on debts (whether due, repaid or outstanding) of natural and legal persons, including in particular: data identifying the debt; the type of debt and its basic terms; the real and contractual collateral for the debt; the payments made, the time of payment and the outstanding balance of the debt; debt payment plans; changes to the identity of the debtor; information on

text: any litigation between the debtor and creditors, on any administrative or enforcement measures taken, on any criminal proceedings for default where default is a criminal offence, as further specified in the draft law; and whether the data subject is unemployed or bankrupt or has been discharged and the debt has been written off. 1.7 Persons entitled to access the data held in the Register, and related purposes Under the draft law, the data held in the Register will only be accessible upon request to: the data subject, whose access will be restricted exclusively to data relating to them personally; any creditor to which credit is owed or to which an application for credit has been submitted and which has connected to the Register; the Personal Data Protection Authority for the purposes of verifying compliance with data protection legislation; and judicial and prosecutorial authorities for the purposes of dispensing justice and, in particular, preventing and combating money laundering and terrorism financing. Creditors may only use data to which the Register provides access for the sole purpose of managing credit risk and improving the quality of the credit information at their disposal on data subjects. Creditors which further process data received from the Register must be acting as ‘controllers’ within the meaning of the GDPR; and, for the purposes of the transmission of data to the Register, they must be regarded as processors and must conclude a contract for that purpose with the Bank of Greece in accordance with Article 28 of the GDPR. A similar contract must also be concluded between the Bank of Greece and Teiresias S.A., a privately owned and operated credit bureau that also processes and stores financial history data. Data subjects whose data are filed with the Register, have the rights provided for in the GDPR and may also challenge said data and the credit report produced by the Register on the basis of the said data, and request the Bank of Greece to correct inaccurate data. 1.8 Interoperability of the Register with other databases The draft law provides that the Register must complement and be fully harmonised and interoperable with the Public Debt Office, the Independent Credit Rating Authority, the Private Debt Monitoring Register (all of which will be established under separate legislation) and the existing system of Teiresias S.A.. For the purpose of cross-checking and corroborating identification information and general information held therein , the Register may have recourse to the IT systems of the Independent Authority for Public Revenue and of the General Commercial Registry, ERGANI and of any other public sector entity. In addition, the Register must also interoperate with GR-AnaCredit, the analytical credit dataset operated by the Bank of Greece in accordance with

text: Regulation (EU) 2016/867

text: of the European Central Bank (ECB/2016/13) and Act 2677/19.05.2017 of the Governor of the Bank of Greece, which is used to collect information on loans granted by credit institutions to legal persons. In order to achieve its purposes, the Register may collaborate with similar central credit registries abroad. Furthermore, in order to be able to provide information in the context of producing financial analyses or statistical reports based on the data it holds, the Register must also interoperate and exchange information

text: (while preventing the identification of the data subject) with the databases and electronic systems of the public or the private sector or of credit rating agencies. 1.9 Secondary legislation to be adopted by the Bank of Greece The draft law authorises the Bank of Greece to adopt secondary legislation, in the form of an act of the Governor of the Bank of Greece, determining several aspects of the draft law, including the following: (a) credit thresholds falling within the scope of the draft law; (b) when and how often the Register accesses and extracts financial history data held by creditors; (c) the technical details and operating specifications of the Register and the method used to interconnect it with the agencies referred to in the draft law; (d) what an application for credit reports should contain, how it will be submitted to the Register and how data subjects may exercise their rights; (e) how the Register will process data; (f) for how long the Register is required to retain data, depending on the category of data and on whether or not the relevant debt has been repaid; (g) what credit reports will contain, depending on their recipient; (h) any other details conducive to or necessary for the operation of the Register. Moreover, the draft law authorises the Bank of Greece to adopt an operations regulation for the Register, detailing how creditors and data subjects interconnect and communicate with the Register, how information and data will be recorded to ensure that they are mapped and transmitted in an appropriate manner, the format in which information and details must be provided, and any other matter relating to the operational management of the Register.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 The ECB notes that several important aspects of the Register are expected to be determined by means of secondary legislation to be adopted by the Bank of Greece. In that respect, the ECB should be consulted on such legislation before it is adopted. 2.2 The ECB in principle welcomes the establishment of the Register, insofar as it is envisaged to contribute to a comprehensive and efficient centralisation of granular credit data, which in turn should contribute to improving existing and developing new ESCB statistics since it provides important breakdowns and details not available from currently used data sources, such as information on the structure and risk patterns of credit granted by the financial sector. In addition, the Register should enable more informed assessments of credit risk by credit and financial institutions (both in terms of the initial decision to grant credit and in terms of ongoing assessments of existing exposures) and should therefore enhance the risk management capabilities of these institutions. In this sense, the data held in the Register are considered to constitute a useful tool for micro- and macroprudential supervision. The data to be held in on the Register, and access thereto, are also considered to be useful from a financial stability and macroprudential supervision perspective, as it would allow the monitoring and assessment of the build-up of and appetite for credit risk in the banking and financial system more generally, thereby helping to calibrate the use of macroprudential instruments. 2.3 However, the draft law does not contain any provision explicitly allowing the Bank of Greece, the ECB, or the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) to access data held in the Register. 2.4 Regarding microprudential supervision, the ECB understands that, subject to data protection requirements, the ECB may, in the exercise of its supervisory duties that relate to credit institutions,

text: require the Bank of Greece, as ‘national competent authority’ within the meaning of Article 2(2) of 10 11

text: Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013

text: , to request and pass on information held in the Register . This point is also relevant in the context of the macroprudential tasks conferred on the ECB under

text: Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013

text: , which requires the ECB to take into account the specific situation of the financial system, economic situation and the economic cycle in the individual Member States or parts thereof . However, in view of the exhaustive list of persons granted access to the information held in the Register according to Article 6 of the draft law, any such access would be limited and granted on a case-by-case basis. Given the scope and the significance that the data to be held on the Register has for micro- and macroprudential supervision purposes and, therefore, for the tasks concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and other financial institutions with the exception of insurance undertakings conferred on the ECB pursuant to Article 127(6) of the Treaty, the ECB would welcome the explicit inclusion of these purposes in the aims of the draft law and a provision in the draft law explicitly giving the Bank of Greece and the ECB access to the Register. 2.5 The consulting authority could also consider wider access rights to the Register, for example by other bodies and agencies of the Union that play a role in banking supervision, such as the European Systemic Risk Board, the European Banking Authority and other relevant bodies established at Union level, such as the European Stability Mechanism and the European Single Resolution Mechanism, as has been done by other Member States , and provided that the purposes for which the data can be shared with each specific body are clearly stipulated in the draft law and that the confidentiality of the said data is ensured. In that respect, the ECB notes that the draft law already provides that the Register may collaborate with similar central credit registries abroad in order to achieve its purposes. The ECB therefore notes that facilitating supervisory purposes could be usefully listed among the objectives of the Register, so that such wider access may be permitted. 2.6 Regarding the access of the ECB and the Bank of Greece to the data held in the Register for statistical and monetary policy (as distinct from supervisory) purposes, without an explicit legal basis in the draft law, such access would either be limited or completely impossible. Although the draft law does not explicitly list among the objectives of the Register that it would contribute to the tasks of the ESCB as laid down in Article 127 of the Treaty, the ECB considers that accessing the Register would be beneficial for, and materially support, the exercise of these tasks. Consideration should therefore be given to adding the contribution to the tasks of the ESCB to the objectives that the Register is

text: intended to serve and to further amending the draft law to explicitly include these purposes in the aims of the draft law and to ensure a clear legal basis establishing the said access rights, as has been done in other Member States , and taking into account the provisions of

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 2533/98

text: . The ECB understands that such an explicit authorisation is necessary from a national law perspective to ensure that the Bank of Greece has a robust legal basis for disclosing data held in the Register to the ECB for the purposes of discharging its obligations under

text: Regulation (EU) 2016/867

text: (ECB/2016/13) . Such a legal basis is required because the draft law prohibits the disclosure of information held in the Register unless such disclosure is explicitly provided for. This provision is without prejudice to the requirements of

text: Article 10 of Regulation (EU) 2016/867

text: (ECB/2016/13), which regulates the use of credit data reported under that Regulation by the ECB and national central banks (NCBs). 2.7 In considering whether to grant access to the ECB and the Bank of Greece, as noted in paragraph 2.6 above, regard should be had to reducing and simplifying the reporting obligations of credit and financial institutions and avoiding the duplication of reporting requirements for credit-related data in line with the recitals of

text: Regulation (EU) 2016/867

text: (ECB/2016/13), the recitals of which note that, with a view to ensuring efficient reporting and adequate interoperability with other existing or new reporting frameworks, NCBs should be allowed to collect the information to be transmitted to the ECB as a part of a broader national reporting framework and to extend the reporting of credit data beyond the scope outlined in

text: Regulation (EU) 2016/867

text: (ECB/2016/13), for their own statutory purposes, in line with relevant national law . It is all the more important to avoid reporting redundancies given that the Register will, according to the draft law, ‘interoperate’ or ‘cooperate’, or ‘have recourse to’, several other public and private sector databases, some of which have not yet been established. 2.8 In considering whether to grant access to the ECB and the Bank of Greece as noted in paragraph 2.6 above, regard should be had to full compliance of the national framework with the objectives and requirements of

text: Regulation (EU) 2016/867

text: (ECB/2016/13), including with legal requirements concerning feedback loops since further provisions on the scope and implementation of feedback loops by the NCBs may be laid down in separate legal acts to be adopted by the ECB, and NCBs may enter into Memoranda of Understanding regarding their respective cooperation in the feedback loops based on the applicable legal frameworks . 2.9 The recitals of

text: Regulation (EU) 2016/867

text: (ECB/2016/13) also note that the framework for the collection of credit data under that Regulation should be set up with a view to ensuring interoperability

text: with central credit registers and other relevant credit data sets established by public sector entities, including databases on securities statistics as well as the ESCB Register of Institutions and Affiliates Dataset . The ECB understands that the Register will interoperate with GR-AnaCredit. In that respect and for reasons of legal certainty, it is suggested that the draft law or the secondary legislation to be adopted thereunder could more clearly incorporate the reporting obligations that have direct effect by reason of

text: Regulation (EU) 2016/867

text: (ECB/2016/13) with the additional obligations imposed by the draft law on reporting agents that are covered by both frameworks. This would ensure full compliance of the draft law with the provisions of

text: Regulation (EU) 2016/867

text: (ECB/2016/13). 2.10 The draft law does not contain any explicit provisions regarding sanctions to be imposed in cases of non-compliance of reporting agents with reporting obligations established in the draft law. The ECB understands that this may be one of the points regarding the Register that will be addressed in the secondary legislation that the Bank of Greece is authorised to adopt under the draft law. In that respect, the ECB wishes to draw the attention of the consulting authority to the sanctioning regime that applies in respect of a failure by reporting agents to comply with the ECB’s statistical reporting requirements, and which is referred to in

text: Regulation (EU) 2016/867

text: (ECB/2016/13) , and to note that: (a) the sanctioning regime to be established for the Bank of Greece under national law should operate without prejudice to the ECB’s sanctioning regime under Union law; and (b) national law should ensure the compliance of both the ECB and the Bank of Greece with the non bis in idem principle, which is reflected in

text: Article 2(1) of Regulation (EC) No 2157/1999

text: of the European Central Bank (ECB/1999/4) and whereby no legal action may be instituted twice in respect of the same cause of action. National law should therefore facilitate the provision of information and consultations between the ECB and the Bank of Greece before any decision to initiate an infringement procedure is taken by either . 2.11 Lastly, the ECB notes that the draft law does not explicitly state that the Register will be owned by the Bank of Greece. However, the ECB understands that the Bank of Greece will be the exclusive owner of the Register and would therefore welcome, for the sake of legal clarity, the inclusion of a provision in the draft law explicitly stating that the Bank of Greece is not only the sole operator but also the exclusive owner of the Register.

text: 3. Conferral of a new task on the Bank of Greece

text: 3.1 The draft law confers on the Bank of Greece the new task of establishing and operating a credit register as a centralised collection of granular credit and credit risk data. 3.2 The ECB underlines that a proposed conferral of new tasks on a national central bank (NCB) in the ESCB must be assessed against the prohibition on monetary financing laid down in Article 123(1) of the

text: Treaty. For the purposes of that prohibition,

text: Article 1(1)

text: (b)(ii) of

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93

text: defines ‘other type of credit facility’, inter alia, as ‘any financing of the public sector’s obligations vis-à-vis third parties’. 3.3 Ensuring that Member States implement a sound budgetary policy is one of the key objectives of the monetary financing prohibition, which may not be circumvented . Therefore, the task of financing measures, which are normally the responsibility of the Member States, and which are financed from their budgetary sources rather than by the NCBs, must not be entrusted to NCBs. To decide what constitutes financing of the public sector’s obligations vis-à-vis third parties, which can be translated as the provision of central bank financing outside the scope of central bank tasks, it is necessary to carry out, on a case-bycase basis, an assessment of whether the task to be undertaken by an NCB is a central bank task or a government task, i.e. a task within the responsibilities of the Member States. 3.4 As part of its discretion in the exercise of its duty, on the basis of

text: Article 271

text: (d) of the Treaty and Article 35.6 of the Statute of the ESCB and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter the ‘Statute of the ESCB’), to ensure that NCBs honour the obligations laid down by the Treaty, the Governing Council has endorsed criteria for determining what may be seen as falling within the scope of a public sector obligation within the meaning of

text: Article 1(1)

text: (b)(ii) of

text: Regulation (EC) No 3603/93

text: or, in other words, what constitutes a government task as follows: First, central bank tasks are in particular those tasks that are related to the tasks that have been conferred on the ECB and the NCBs by the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB. These tasks are mainly defined in

text: Article 127(2)

text: , (5) and (6) and Article 128(1) of the Treaty, as well as

text: Article 22

text: and Article 25.1 of the Statute of the ESCB. Second, as Article 14.4 of the Statute of the ESCB allows NCBs to perform ‘other functions’, new tasks, i.e. tasks that are not related to tasks that have been conferred on the ECB and the NCBs, are not precluded per se. However, new tasks that are undertaken by an NCB and which are atypical of NCB tasks or which are clearly discharged on behalf of, and in the exclusive interest of the government or of other public sector entities should be considered government tasks. Third, an important criterion for qualifying a new task as atypical of an NCB task or as being clearly discharged on behalf of and in the exclusive interest of the government or other public sector entities is the impact of the task on the institutional, financial and personal independence of that NCB. In particular, the following aspects should be taken into account: (a) whether the performance of the new task creates conflicts of interest with existing central bank tasks, which are not adequately addressed, and does not necessarily complement those existing central bank tasks. If a conflict of interest arises between existing and new tasks, sufficient safeguards to mitigate that conflict should be in place. The complementarity between a new task and existing central bank tasks should not be interpreted broadly, so as to lead to the creation of an indefinite chain of ancillary tasks. Such complementarity should be examined in relation to the financing of those tasks;

text: (b) whether without new financial resources the performance of the new task is disproportionate to the NCB’s financial or organisational capacity, and may have a negative impact on the capacity to properly perform the existing central bank tasks; (c) whether the performance of the new task fits into the institutional set-up of the NCB in the light of central bank independence and accountability considerations; (d) whether the performance of the new task harbours substantial financial risks; (e) whether the performance of the new task exposes the members of the NCB decision-making bodies to political risks that are disproportionate and may also have an impact on their personal independence and, in particular, on the guarantee of term of office set out in Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB. 3.5 Based on the criteria set out above, the following paragraphs assess whether the new task proposed to be conferred on the Bank of Greece under the draft law is in line with the prohibition of monetary financing. 3.6 Tasks related to the tasks conferred on the ECB and the NCBs by the Treaty and the Statute of the

text: ESCB

text: Generally, it is noted that granular credit and credit risk data based on central credit registers are necessary for the development and production of new ESCB statistics, as well as to improve the quality of ESCB statistics. These new or improved statistics are, in turn, necessary for the performance of ESCB tasks. To assess whether the establishment and operation of a register holding such credit data is an ESCBrelated task, it is necessary to examine whether the purpose of that register is ESCB-related, i.e. whether the credit data are collected and analysed in order to support the performance of an ESCB-related task. Such an assessment needs to consider the legislator’s intention, as manifested in the provisions regarding the aims of the credit register as well as the access to and specific set-up of the register. While some provisions of the draft law seem to imply that the credit data held in the Register may be used by the Bank of Greece for statistical purposes , such purposes are not included in the wording of the draft law’s explicit provision on its primary aim and are not reflected in the rules governing access to the Register (see paragraphs 2.4 to 2.6 above). However, the draft law explicitly lists ‘safeguarding financial stability’ as one of the primary aims of the Register . Bank of Greece’s new task of establishing and operating the Register can thus be considered a task related to the ESCB’s contribution to the stability of the financial system under Article 127(5) of the Treaty. 3.7 Tasks which are atypical of central bank tasks Safeguarding financial stability is a task that is not atypical of a central bank. Moreover, the Bank of Greece already has a financial stability mandate . Consequently, the task of establishing and operating the

text: Register with the explicit primary aim of safeguarding financial stability is not an atypical task for the Bank of Greece. It is also noted that a number of Member States have established central credit registers and conferred the tasks involved in operating them upon NCBs, albeit for different purposes . Also, all Eurosystem NCBs are required to operate national granular credit datasets under

text: Regulation (EU) 2016/867

text: (ECB/2016/13). 3.8 Tasks clearly discharged on behalf of and in the exclusive interest of the government The Bank of Greece is designated by the draft law as the sole operator of the Register . There is no indication that, in carrying out its task, the Bank of Greece would act exclusively in the interest of the government or another public entity. 3.9 Extent to which performance of the new task creates conflicts of interest with existing central bank

text: tasks

text: The performance of the new task of establishing and operating the Register is unlikely to give rise to any conflicts of interest in connection with the Bank of Greece’s existing central bank tasks. 3.10 Extent to which performance of the new task is disproportionate to the financial or organisational

text: capacity of the Bank of Greece

text: As previously noted by the ECB , Member States must not put their NCBs in a position where they have insufficient resources to carry out both their ESCB-related tasks and their national tasks, from an operational and financial perspective. In order to ensure that the Bank of Greece’s capacity to perform its ESCB-related tasks is not impaired, the Bank of Greece must, therefore, be able to avail itself of the necessary resources to carry out its responsibilities under the draft law. The draft law does not cover the costs/funding of the Bank of Greece’s new task and currently provides that access to financial history data shall be granted free of charge . However, the ECB understands that on condition that the draft provision is revised, the secondary legislation that the Bank of Greece is authorised to adopt under the draft law may contain provisions regarding such funding, e.g. in the form of fees to be levied on the reporting agents under the draft law which the secondary legislation will ultimately determine. The ECB also understands that the Bank of Greece has already taken the necessary measures to ensure that sufficient resources are available for establishing and operating the Register. 3.11 Extent to which performance of the new tasks fits into the institutional set-up of the Bank of Greece, in the light of central bank independence and accountability considerations Given the Bank of Greece’s existing financial stability mandate, the performance of the new tasks appears to fit into the Bank of Greece’s current institutional set-up. 3.12 Extent to which the performance of tasks harbours substantial financial risks The draft law does not contain any specific provisions on liability for the operation of the Register. Under the draft law the Bank of Greece will assume liability for processing personal data, under both the GDPR and national law. The Bank of Greece may also incur potential contractual or non-contractual liability vis-à-

text: vis the reporting agents or data subjects, stemming from the establishment of the Register, under national law. This potential liability does not appear to be disproportionate to the new tasks conferred on the Bank of Greece. 3.13 Extent to which the performance of the new task exposes members of the decision-making bodies of the Bank of Greece to disproportionate political risks and impacts on their personal independence The performance of the new task conferred under the draft law does not appear to expose the Bank of Greece’s decision-making bodies to any disproportionate political risk or have an impact on their personal independence. 3.14 Conclusion The ECB considers that the Bank of Greece’s new tasks relating to the Register qualify as central banking tasks and are therefore in line with the prohibition on monetary financing.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Christine LAGARDE


text: 3 1.1. The draft law concerns the Law on the development and maintenance of a statistical register , which deals, among other things, with the obligation of the Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt) to transmit statistical information to Deutsche Bundesbank . For reasons of legal certainty, the draft law updates the reference to the relevant Union legal act and subclassifies the statistical entry ‘number of employees’ by types of employment relationship . 1.2. The draft law also amends the Law on the use of administrative data for the purposes of economic statistics . This amendment relates to the transmission of statistical information by Deutsche

publisher: Europeiska centralbanken

sprak: en

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 26 August 2022 on the development and maintenance of a statistical register and related laws (CON/2022/29)

serie: con

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 26 August 2022 on the development and maintenance of a statistical register and related laws (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

type: rubrik

text: On 28 July 2022 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the German Minister for Economic Affairs and Climate Protection for an opinion on a draft law amending the Law on the development and maintenance of a statistical register and related laws (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third and fourth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft law relates to Deutsche Bundesbank and the collection, compilation and distribution of monetary, financial, banking, payment systems and balance of payments statistics. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

type: stycke

text: 1. The relevant provisions of the draft law

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).

text: 2 See Article 1 of the draft law.

text: 3 Gesetz über den Aufbau und die Führung eines Statistikregisters.

text: 4 Section 10 of the Law on the development and maintenance of a statistical register.

text: 5 Section 10, paragraph 2, first sentence, No 1, of the Law on the development and maintenance of a statistical register. The update concerns the addition of the wording ‘in accordance with Annex VIII of Commission Implementing

text: Regulation (EU) 2020/1197

text: ’. This update refers to Commission Implementing

text: Regulation (EU) 2020/1197 of 30 July 2020

text: laying down technical specifications and arrangements pursuant to

text: Regulation (EU) 2019/2152

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council on European business statistics repealing 10 legal acts in the field of business statistics (OJ L 327, 17.12.2019, p. 1). Annex VIII deals with the ‘variables linked to the detailed topics for the European framework for statistical business registers’. The update replaces the reference to Regulation (EG) 177/2008 which is no longer applicable.

text: 6 Section 10, paragraph 2, first sentence, No 2 of the Law on the development and maintenance of a statistical register.

text: 8 Verwaltungsdatenverwendungsgesetz. Bundesbank to the Federal Statistical Office following the entry into force of

text: Regulation (EU) 2019/2152

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council . In order to implement the requirement of the Federal Statistical Office to deliver statistical information to Eurostat under

text: Regulation (EU) 2019/2152

text: , the draft law stipulates that the Federal Statistical Office receives from Deutsche Bundesbank, in addition to statistical information relating to credit institutions and specialised credit institutions, statistical information for other parts of the area of financial services relating to central banks, other financial institutions and activities auxiliary to financial intermediation, where such statistical information is at the disposal of Deutsche Bundesbank .

text: 2. Observations

text: 2.1. The ECB welcomes the draft law as it fosters good relationships between the statistical authorities at both the European and the national level . The ECB also welcomes that the draft law does not envisage any additional reporting burden to be imposed on data subjects to provide statistical information to Deutsche Bundesbank and the Federal Statistical Office and clarifies that only statistical information ‘as far as is available at the Deutsche Bundesbank’ must be transmitted to the Federal Statistical Office. 2.2. Furthermore, the ECB welcomes that the draft law aims at enhancing legal certainty, in particular by clarifying that the reference to

text: Regulation (EC) No 1893/2006

text: included in the draft law is of a dynamic nature by referring to the current version of that act. The ECB understands that in German law it should be clarified whether references to other legal acts are dynamic or not, as opposed to Union law which is dynamic by nature . 2.3. Finally, the ECB understands that, as far as the obligation of Deutsche Bundesbank to transmit statistical information to the Federal Statistical Office for other parts of the area of financial service (including central banks) is concerned, Deutsche Bundesbank must only transmit, as far as is available, reference data, which consists of the name, address, legal form, economic sector, place and number of entry in the commercial register, legal entity identifier, and data of the profit and loss account, as well as the recorded data on headcount, as already exhaustively listed in the current version of the Law on the use of administrative data for the purposes of economic statistics .

text: Regulation (EU) 2019/2152

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2019 on European business statistics, repealing 10 legal acts in the field of business statistics (OJ L 327, 17.12.2019, p. 1). 10 The draft law follows the classifications included in Annex I to

text: Regulation (EC) No 1893/2006

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 establishing the statistical classification of economic activities NACE Revision 2 and amending

text: Council Regulation (EEC) No 3037/90

text: as well as certain EC Regulations on specific statistical domains (OJ L 393, 30.12.2006, p. 1). 11 See Article 5.1 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and of the European Central Bank; see also

text: recital 11

text: of

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 951/2009 of 9 October 2009

text: amending

text: Regulation (EC) No 2533/98

text: concerning the collection of statistical information by the European Central Bank (OJ L 269, 14.10.2009, p. 1), which provides that, in line with Article 5.1 of the Statute, the ESCB and the European Statistical System (ESS) cooperate closely to ensure the coherence necessary to develop, produce and disseminate European statistics. 13 References in Union legal acts to other Union legal acts are always to the version of the latter which is currently in force. 14 Current version of Section 3b of the Law on the use of administrative data for the purposes of economic statistics. This opinion will be published on EUR-Lex. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 26 August 2022. [signed] The President of the ECB Christine LAGARDE

type: vagledning

utgivare: ecb


text: COM(2022) 68 final.

text: COM(2020) 66 final.

text: Se artikel 41 i förslaget till förordning.

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv (EU) 2015/2366 av den 25 november 2015

text: om betaltjänster på den inre marknaden, om ändring av direktiven

text: och

text: samt förordning

text: (EU) nr 1093/2010

text: och om upphävande av direktiv

text: (EUT L 337, 23.12.2015, s. 35).

text: Se artikel 2.2 i förslaget till förordning.

text: Se skäl 1 i förslaget till förordning.

text: Se artikel 21 i förslaget till förordning.

text: Se skäl 58 i förslaget till förordning.

text: Artikel 2

text: a i

text: rådets förordning (EG) nr 2533/98 av den 23 november 1998

text: om Europeiska centralbankens insamling av statistiska uppgifter (EGT L 318, 27.11.1998, s. 8), och

text: artikel 9 i Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning (EG) nr 223/2009 av den 11 mars 2009

text: om europeisk statistik och om upphävande av Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning (EG, Euratom) nr 1101/2008 om utlämnande av insynsskyddade statistiska uppgifter till Europeiska gemenskapernas statistikkontor,

text: rådets förordning (EG) nr 322/97

text: om gemenskapsstatistik och

text: rådets beslut 89/382/EEG

text: , Euratom om inrättande av en kommitté för Europeiska gemen-skapernas statistiska program (EUT L 87, 31.3.2009, s. 164).

text: Se artikel 15 i förslaget till förordning.

text: Se skäl 57 i förslaget till förordning.

text: Se kapitel VIII i förslaget till förordning.

text: Se artikel 28.6 i förslaget till förordning.

text: Se artikel 2.19 i förslaget till förordning.

text: Se artikel 28 i förslaget till förordning.

text: Se artikel 2.5 i förslaget till förordning.

text: Se skäl 20 i förslaget till förordning.

sprak: sv

title: Europeiska centralbankens yttrande av den 5 september 2022 om ett förslag till en förordning om harmoniserade regler för rättvis åtkomst till och användning av data (dataakten) (CON/2022/30) 2022/C 402/05

text: Inledning och rättslig grund

text: Den 23 februari 2022 antog Europeiska kommissionen ett förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning om harmoniserade regler för skälig åtkomst till och användning av data (dataakten) (nedan kallat förslaget till förordning). Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) anser att förslaget till förordning omfattas av ECB:s behörighet att avge ett yttrande, och ECB utövar därför sin rätt enligt artikel 127.4 andra meningen och

text: artikel 285.5 i fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt

text: att avge sitt yttrande.

text: ECB:s behörighet att avge ett yttrande grundas på artiklarna 127.4 och 282.5 i fördraget eftersom förslaget till förordning innehåller bestämmelser som berör ECB:s uppgifter att utforma och genomföra den monetära politiken och främja väl fungerande betalningssystem i enlighet med artikel 127.2 första och fjärde strecksatsen samt artikel 282.1 i fördraget, samt insamlingen av statistiska uppgifter enligt

text: artikel 5 i stadgan

text: för Europeiska centralbankssystemet och Europeiska centralbanken (nedan kallad ECBS-stadgan). I enlighet med artikel 17.5 första meningen i arbetsordningen för Europeiska centralbanken har detta yttrande antagits av ECB-rådet.

text: 1. Allmänna kommentarer

text: 1.1 Förslaget till förordning är en viktig aspekt av genomförandet av EU-strategin för data. Inrättandet av en stark rättslig ram kommer att underlätta utvecklingen av den europeiska dataekonomin. ECB välkomnar därför förslaget till förordning och införandet av en ram för tillgång till och användning av data från källor i den privata sektorn som omfattar krav på datadelning, transparens och skydd av konfidentialitet.

text: 1.2 ECB välkomnar att kommissionen har för avsikt att göra en utvärdering av förslaget till förordning två år efter den dag då den börjar tillämpas. Utvärderingen bör omfatta ändamålsenligheten och effektiviteten hos den tekniska ram och de förfaranden som införts för att uppfölja kraven enligt förslaget till förordning.

text: 1.3 Förslaget till förordning är en övergripande förordning som fastställer grundläggande regler som kommer att gälla för alla sektorer och som framtida sektorsspecifik lagstiftning i princip bör anpassas till, inbegripet lagstiftning som faller inom ECB:s behörighetsområde, t.ex.

text: (nedan kallat PSD2). Det är viktigt att beakta ECB:s yttrande om denna övergripande förordning, eftersom den sannolikt kommer att få konsekvenser för sektorsspecifik lagstiftning som ECB kan anta ytterligare yttranden om när sådan lagstiftning ändras.

text: 1.4 Ytterligare lagstiftning kan komma att behövas för att fastställa mer detaljerade regler än de som ingår av förslaget till förordning för att ge ECB tillgång till de uppgifter som krävs för att den ska kunna utföra sina uppgifter. ECB kan behöva anta ytterligare yttranden om sådan lagstiftning.

text: 1.5 Det är Europeiska kommissionens och unionslagstiftarnas sak att bedöma huruvida förslaget till förordning är förenlig med unionens dataskyddsregler.

text: 2. Specifika kommentarer

text: 2.1 Tillämpningsområde för förslaget till förordning

text: 2.1.1 Den föreslagna förordningen syftar till att reglera och underlätta tillgången till och användningen av data som erhållits från eller genererats genom användning av produkter eller tillhörande tjänster. Termen produkt definieras som alla lösa saker, även när de ingår i ett fast föremål, som erhåller, genererar eller samlar in data om sin användning eller om miljön, och som kan kommunicera data via en allmänt tillgänglig elektronisk kommunikationstjänst och vars huvudfunktion inte är att lagra eller behandla data. Även om denna breda definition verkar ligga i linje med syftet med förslaget till förordning, att öka värdet av data för konsumenter, företag och samhället, kan vissa typer av data, t.ex. data som produceras av den offentliga sektorn, omfattas av förordningens tillämpningsområde. Tillämpningsområdet för förslaget till förordning bör förtydligas så att vissa typer av data, t.ex. data som produceras av den offentliga sektorn, utesluts.

text: 2.1.2 När det gäller finansiella tjänster rekommenderar ECB att man klargör vilka produkter som skulle kunna omfattas av definitionen i förslaget till förordning. Finansiella tjänster eller relaterade produkter, såsom betalkonton, betalkort och appar på en användares smarttelefon, skulle eventuellt kunna omfattas av definitionerna av produkt och tillhörande tjänst i förslaget till förordning. I motiveringen till förslaget till förordning hänvisas dessutom till PSD2 som ett exempel på sektorsspecifik lagstiftning som berör tillgången till data. PSD2 handlar om tillgången till betalkonton som är elektroniskt nåbara. Det är oklart om sådana betalkonton betraktas som produkter enligt definitionen i förslaget till förordning. ECB vill lyfta fram komplexiteten och mångfalden på marknaderna när det gäller betaltjänster och instrument, och att förslaget till förordning inte bör leda till oförutsebara begränsningar och komplikationer inom detta område. Endast produkter som innehas av användaren bör omfattas av förslaget till förordning.

text: 2.2 Standardisering

text: 2.2.1 Förslaget till förordning behandlar inte det tekniska genomförandet av den rättsliga ramen för tillgång till och användning av data. Analysen av bidragen till det offentliga samrådet om förslaget till förordning har visat att 69 % av svaren från företag uppger att svaranden haft svårigheter med utbyte av data mellan företag och att hindren varit av teknisk natur (format, brist på standarder. En av lärdomarna från genomförandet av PSD2, som också ger tillgång till vissa typer av transaktions- och kontoinformation under vissa förutsättningar, är att det tekniska genomförandet försenar uppnåendet av målen för PSD2. För att undanröja hindren för att byta mellan databehandlingstjänster bör förslaget till förordning kräva att de europeiska standardiseringsorganen utvecklar nödvändiga standarder och öppna interoperabilitetsspecifikationer. Därutöver stadgar förslaget till förordning att kommissionen bör anta gemensamma specifikationer på de områden där det saknas harmoniserade standarder eller där dessa är otillräckliga för att ytterligare förbättra interoperabiliteten för gemensamma europeiska dataområden, applikationsprogrammeringsgränssnitt (API), leverantörer av databehandlingstjänster, byte av molntjänst samt smarta kontrakt. Man bör inte underskatta svårigheten med det kommande arbetet och antalet år som krävs för att slutföra det.

text: 2.2.2 Om standardiseringen av uppgifter inte uppnås genom förslaget till förordning kan det vara svårt att vid exceptionella behov bedöma hur användbar datan är. Icke-standardiserade uppgifter kan också vara oanvändbara för beslutsfattande.

text: 2.3 ECB:s tillgång till och användning av data

text: 2.3.1 Det finns stora fördelar med att göra det möjligt för den offentliga sektorn att få tillgång till och använda privatägda uppgifter för ett antal fastställda ändamål av allmänt intresse. Vid utförandet av sina penningpolitiska uppgifter använder Eurosystemet i stor utsträckning officiell statistik som framställs av ECB, medlemmarna i Europeiska centralbankssystemet (ECBS) och det europeiska statistiksystemet (ESS) samt icke-officiella och icke-traditionella datakällor. Icke-traditionella datakällor kan omfatta indikatorer för populationsmobilitet med hög frekvens baserade på uppgifter från mobilnätsoperatörer, som t.ex. kan användas för att kontrollera effekterna av begränsningar av rörligheten i samband med en pandemi eller ett krig, konsumentprisindex baserade på skannerdata från större detaljhandlare, samt statistik över hushållens konsumtion eller nationalräkenskaper som stöds av uppgifter om finansiella transaktioner såsom inköpsorder, fakturor, kortavgifter och bokföringsposter. Dessutom har digitaliseringen och krishanteringen under de senaste åren ökat ECB:s beslutande organs behov av att använda atypiska uppgifter i beslutsfattandet, särskilt: a) i nöd- och krissituationer när den utför sina penningpolitiska uppgifter, och b) för statistiska ändamål för att bedöma uppgiftskvaliteten på icke standardiserad statistik innan man antar eller ändrar rättsakter om insamling av statistiska uppgifter, eller för att bedöma deras användbarhet innan nöd- eller krissituationer uppstår.

text: 2.3.2 Av dessa skäl anser ECB att den tillgång som beviljas ECB och de nationella centralbankerna bör vara bredare än vad som anges i förslaget till förordning. ECBS-medlemmarna bör ha rätt att få tillgång till och använda uppgifter som omfattas av förslaget till förordning, inte bara när det uppstår ett exceptionellt behov av att använda uppgifterna för att utföra ECBS-uppgifter, utan även för statistiska ändamål, om detta skulle hjälpa ECB att samla in officiell statistik med hjälp av de nationella centralbankerna. Detta skulle i sin tur vara till hjälp för ECB när den bidrar till att harmonisera regler och praxis för insamling, sammanställning och distribution av statistik inom ECB:s behörighetsområde. Om man tillåter att uppgifter begärs för statistiska ändamål skulle detta vara mycket fördelaktigt för slutanvändarna, eftersom detta skulle göra det möjligt att analysera uppgifterna för att identifiera trender/mönster och spara tid innan man antar förordningar samt även bidra till att analysera ECBS behov av uppgifter i nöd- och krissituationer. Det är dock av yttersta vikt att en bredare åtkomst åtföljs av skyddsåtgärder för att säkerställa att tillgång till, och användning av, data endast sker i den utsträckning och på den detaljnivå som krävs för att fullgöra lagstadgade uppgifter, såsom framtagande, produktion och spridning av officiell statistik, och att unionens institutioner och offentliga myndigheter vidtar alla nödvändiga regleringsmässiga, administrativa, tekniska och organisatoriska åtgärder för att säkerställa skyddet av uppgifterna.

text: 2.3.3 Även om data som görs tillgänglig för att hantera ett allmänt nödläge bör tillhandahållas kostnadsfritt, kan data som görs tillgänglig för unionens institutioner, byråer eller organ samt offentliga myndigheter i andra fall bli föremål för ersättning till datainnehavarna. Denna ersättning bör inte överstiga de tekniska och organisatoriska kostnaderna för att tillhandahålla uppgifterna, dvs. kostnader för anonymisering och teknisk anpassning utan tillämpning av någon rimlig marginal. När unionens institutioner beviljas tillgång till privatägd data bör de inte belastas med orimliga kostnader. Med tanke på att varje begäran om information tjänar allmänintresset bör uppgifterna göras tillgängliga till självkostnadspris och utan att det läggs på någon rimlig marginal, särskilt i fall där den rimliga marginalen tas ut mer än en gång för samma uppgifter, eller om en rimlig marginal i praktiken kan göra det omöjligt att inhämta uppgifterna på grund av begränsade resurser.

text: 2.4 Användning av uppgifter som unionens institutioner erhållit för statistiska ändamål

text: 2.4.1 Förslaget till förordning gör det möjligt för offentliga myndigheter eller unionens institutioner, byråer eller organ att dela data som mottagits med enskilda personer eller organisationer i syfte att bedriva vetenskaplig forskning eller analys som är förenlig med det ändamål för vilket data begärdes, eller till nationella statistikbyråer och Eurostat för sammanställning av officiell statistik. I skälen till förslaget till förordning utvidgas denna rätt genom att det klargörs att ett exceptionella behov också kan uppträda när det gäller att i rätt tid sammanställa officiell statistik och data inte finns tillgängliga på annat sätt eller när det innebär en avsevärt minskad börda för uppgiftslämnarna.

text: 2.4.2 Förslaget till förordning bör ändras så att ECB och andra ECBS-medlemmar uttryckligen får använda de uppgifter som de kan få i enlighet med förslaget till förordning för sammanställning av officiell statistik på samma sätt som det är tillåtet för Eurostat och andra ESS-medlemmar. ECBS och ESS utgör de två pelarna i den europeiska statistiken, eftersom de tillsammans utvecklar, framställer och sprider europeisk statistik inom sina respektive behörighetsområden, och har ett nära samarbete med varandra vid framställningen av europeisk statistik för att minimera rapporteringsbördan och säkerställa nödvändig samstämmighet i enlighet med statistiska principer, inbegripet principen om hög kvalitet på slutprodukten. I den mån Eurostat och andra ESS-medlemmar får använda de uppgifter som erhålls i enlighet med förslaget till förordning för sammanställningen av officiell statistik, bör en sådan rätt i tillämpliga delar även ges ECBS. Dessutom bör förslaget till förordning göra det möjligt för ECB och andra ECBS-medlemmar att ta emot den information som Eurostat har tillgång till, när detta är nödvändigt för att utföra ECB:s uppgifter i fall där Eurostat erhållit dessa uppgifter för statistiska ändamål. I detta sammanhang skulle det vara lämpligt att ändra förslaget till förordning genom att definiera begreppet officiell statistik, som visserligen nämns men inte definieras, i förslaget till förordning.

text: 2.5 Allmänna nödlägen

text: 2.5.1 I förslaget till förordning föreskrivs att det finns ett exceptionellt behov för ett offentligt organ eller en unionsinstitution, en unionsbyrå eller ett unionsorgan att använda data som omfattas av tillämpningsområdet för förslaget till förordning, bl.a. om de begärda uppgifterna är: a) nödvändiga för att hantera ett allmänt nödläge, eller b) begränsade i tid och omfattning, och nödvändiga för att förhindra ett allmänt nödläge eller bidra till återhämtningen från ett allmänt nödläge. Ett allmänt nödläge definieras som en exceptionell situation med negativa konsekvenser för befolkningen i unionen, en medlemsstat eller en del av en medlemsstat, och som medför en risk för allvarliga och bestående återverkningar på levnadsvillkoren och den ekonomiska stabiliteten, eller avsevärd värdeminskning av ekonomiska tillgångar i unionen eller berörda medlemsstater. I skälen i förslaget till förordning förklaras att detta kan omfatta folkhälsohot, nödsituationer till följd av miljöförstöring och större naturkatastrofer, inbegripet sådana som förvärras av klimatförändringar, samt vid större katastrofer orsakade av människor, såsom större cybersäkerhetsincidenter.

text: 2.5.2 Det kan också finnas exceptionella situationer som negativt påverkar befolkningen i unionen eller i en medlemsstat och som riskerar att få allvarliga och bestående konsekvenser inte bara för ekonomin utan även för den finansiella stabiliteten. Dessa kan inbegripa nödsituationer i banksystemet och på finansmarknaderna eller det finansiella systemet mer allmänt, vilket tydligt visat sig under både covid-19-pandemin och kriget i Ukraina. ECB rekommenderar därför att definitionen av allmänt nödläge utvidgas till att omfatta situationer som kan påverka det finansiella systemets stabilitet i unionen eller i en berörd medlemsstat.

text: 2.6 Interoperabilitet

text: 2.6.1 ECB välkomnar den tonvikt som läggs på, och vikten av, interoperabilitet i förslaget till förordning och att det ger kommissionen befogenhet att anta specifikationer för att säkerställa interoperabiliteten för gemensamma europeiska dataområden. Organ som för närvarande fastställer europeiska standarder kan, tillsammans med eller som ett alternativ till kommissionen i fall där så är möjligt, utarbeta eller tillhandahålla harmoniserade standarder avseende de grundläggande kraven på dataåtkomst, portabilitet och interoperabilitet.

text: 2.6.2 I förslaget till förordning definieras termen interoperabilitet, men inte termen dataområde, som används i definitionen av interoperabilitet. I förslaget till förordning specificeras inte heller vad operatörer av dataområden är. Av rättssäkerhetsskäl vore det viktigt att tydligt definiera dessa båda termer.

text: 2.7 Ytterligare kommentarer

text: I förslaget till förordning definieras termen användare som en fysisk eller juridisk person som äger, hyr eller leasar en produkt eller erhåller en tjänst. ECB förstår att begreppet tjänst i definitionen av användare även är avsedd att omfatta mottagandet av en tillhörande tjänst, eftersom det annars är oklart vad den tjänst som nämns i definitionen avser. ECB noterar att det finns en inkonsekvens mellan denna definition och beskrivningen i skäl 20 i förslaget till förordning, som implicerar att användarna får använda de uppgifter som de själva genererar. Detta kan vara tydligt om det finns en enda användare, men det är oklart vad som händer i de fall då flera personer eller enheter äger en produkt eller omfattas av ett leasing- eller hyresavtal, vilket också omnämns i det skälet. I sådana fall kan det förekomma att de personer eller enheter som äger produkten inte är de personer eller enheter som genererar data genom dess användning. Förslaget till förordning bör förtydliga att de personer eller enheter som äger en produkt i sådana fall får ges tillgång till data som genereras genom dess användning.

text: I de fall där ECB rekommenderar att förslaget till förordning ska ändras anges de specifika förslagen i ett separat tekniskt arbetsdokument som åtföljs av en förklaring. Det tekniska arbetsdokumentet finns på engelska i EUR-Lex.

text: Utfärdat i Frankfurt am Main den 5 september 2022.

text: Christine Lagarde

text: ECB:s ordförande


text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42). 2 See Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are available on EUR-Lex.

text: See paragraph 15.4.2. of the draft regulation on the submission, acceptance, identification and replacement of banknotes and coins at Latvijas Banka. 4 See paragraph 31 of the draft regulation on the submission, acceptance, identification and replacement of banknotes and coins at Latvijas Banka.

text: Decision ECB/2013/10 of the European Central Bank of 19 April 2013 on the denominations, specifications, reproduction, exchange and withdrawal of euro banknotes (OJ L 118, 30.4.2013, p. 37). 6 See paragraph 33 on the submission, acceptance, identification and replacement of banknotes and coins at Latvijas Banka .

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 6 September 2022 on the replacement of banknotes and coins and on cash handlers (CON/2022/31)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 6 September 2022 on the replacement of banknotes and coins and on cash handlers (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 12 July 2022 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from Latvijas Banka for an opinion on a draft regulation on the submission, acceptance, identification and replacement of banknotes and coins at Latvijas Banka and on a draft regulation on the processing and recirculating of euro banknotes and coins (hereinafter collectively, the ‘draft regulations’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the first, third and fourth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft regulations relate to currency matters, Latvijas Banka and the collection, compilation and distribution of monetary, financial, banking, payment systems and balance of payments statistics. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft regulations

text: Both draft regulations pertain to the implementation of the new Law on Latvijas Banka, which will enter into force on 1 January 2023 . The objective of both draft regulations is to regulate procedural aspects related to material law provisions contained in ECB and Union legal acts with regard to the retrieval, replacement and recirculation of euro banknotes and coins. The draft regulation on the submission, acceptance, identification and replacement of banknotes and coins at Latvijas Banka regulates the replacement of damaged euro banknotes and coins, the replacement of euro banknotes fit for circulation, and the handling of euro banknotes and coins with signs of counterfeiting. This draft regulation does not govern all cash services provided by Latvijas Banka, i.e., it does not cover services provided by Latvijas Banka that are governed by private law (e.g. the sale of numismatic coins and replacement of non-cash means of payment with uncirculated euro commemorative coins where the transaction is carried out according to the distance contract concluded between Latvijas Banka and the person concerned on Latvijas Banka's website). According to the explanatory memorandum accompanying it, the draft regulation on the processing and recirculating of euro banknotes and coins replicates and elaborates on the requirements to be fulfilled by

text: cash handlers that are provided for in Latvijas Banka regulation currently in force and in Union legislation binding on cash handlers. The ECB notes that this draft regulation also contains a number of new legal provisions aimed at clarifying the existing legal framework. Firstly, the legal framework on the provision of statistics and protection of statistical data and information referred to in Section XI of the Law on Latvijas Banka is to be applicable to data submitted by cash handlers in relation to the euro banknote and coin handling machines used as well as the volume of euro banknotes and coins processed by those machines, and Latvijas Banka must store such statistics permanently. Secondly, this draft regulation specifies the cases in which the Commission for the Management of Banknotes and Coins of Latvijas Banka (hereinafter the ‘Commission’) may refuse to register a cash handler. Thirdly, this draft regulation specifies the information that the cash handler must provide to the Commission before using the euro banknote or coin handling machine, and provides for the Commission’s right to request from the cash handler information relating to cooperation with other cash handlers or delivery of euro banknotes and coins from the national central bank of the Member State which has adopted the euro. Fourthly, this draft regulation requires the cash handler to draw up and maintain written internal procedures and to establish the maintenance plan of the euro banknote and coin handling machine. Fifthly, this draft regulation requires statistical data on the euro banknote handling machines used in the previous half year and the volume of euro banknotes processed by these machines to be encrypted and signed digitally by the cash handler in a manner agreed upon with the Commission. Finally, this draft regulation provides that the plan for on-site inspections on the premises of the cash handler or at its designated locations where euro banknotes and coins are processed must be prepared yearly and published on Latvijas Banka's website.

text: 2. General observations

text: The ECB welcomes both draft regulations as they are in line with the relevant Union and ECB legal frameworks and contain useful procedural norms needed for the smooth application of these frameworks.

text: 3. Specific observations regarding replacement of damaged banknotes and coins

text: 3.1. The draft regulation on the submission, acceptance, identification and replacement of banknotes and coins at Latvijas Banka establishes that, where part of a damaged banknote that constitutes 50 % or less than 50 % of the original size of the banknote is submitted, the applicant must submit evidence, if available, that the missing part of the banknote has been destroyed . This draft regulation further determines that the Commission, based on the opinion by the competent authority, must decide on the replacement or non-replacement of damaged banknotes in cases where the submitted part of the damaged euro banknote is 50 % or less of the original banknote size, without referring to the need to prove the destruction of the missing parts. This could be interpreted to mean that the Commission may decide to replace a banknote that is unfit for circulation where 50 % or less of the banknote is presented without the applicant having proven that the missing part or parts has or have been destroyed. In order to avoid any legal certainty concerns as regards the application of Article 3(1) of Decision ECB/2013/10 of

text: the European Central Bank , this draft regulation should be amended to clarify that 50 % or less of a banknote that is unfit for circulation may only be replaced if the applicant proves that any missing part has been destroyed. 3.2. The draft regulation on the submission, acceptance, identification and replacement of banknotes and coins at Latvijas Banka provides that the Commission decides on the replacement or non-replacement of damaged banknotes, amongst others, in cases where the euro banknotes have been deliberately damaged . In order to avoid any concerns about legal certainty as regards the application of Article 3(3) of Decision ECB/2013/10, this draft regulation should be redrafted with a view to clarifying that intentionally damaged banknotes may not be replaced unless Latvijas Banka knows or has sufficient reason to believe that an applicant is (or can prove that he is) acting in good faith.

text: This opinion will be published on EUR-Lex.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 6 September 2022.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Christine LAGARDE


text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).

text: See Central Bank of Ireland, Behaviour and Culture of the Irish Retail Banks (July 2018) available on the Central Bank of Ireland’s website at centralbank.ie. The report was prepared by the CBI in collaboration with De Nederlandsche Bank.

text: See Central Bank Act 1942, Central Bank Reform Act 2010 and Central Bank (Supervision and Enforcement) Act 2013.

text: Persons performing a ‘pre-controlled function’ within the meaning of Section 18 of the Central Bank Reform Act 2010.

text: Part 2, Chapter 1 of the draft law.

text: Part 3 of the draft law.

text: Persons performing a ‘controlled function’ within the meaning of Section 18 of the Central Bank Reform Act 2010.

text: Part 2 of the draft law. 10 Part 4 of the draft law.

text: Parts 4 and 5 of the draft law. 12 Section 10 of the draft law replacing Section 21 of the Central Bank Reform Act 2010. 13 Section 16 and 27 of the draft law amending Section 26 and 43 of the Central Bank Reform Act 2010. 14

text: Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013

text: conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63). 15 Section 13 of the draft law replacing section 23A of the Central Bank Reform Act 2010. 16 See Section 22(2) of the Central Bank Reform Act 2010. 17 See the CBI’s website for a full list of PCFs: https://www.centralbank.ie/docs/default-source/regulation/how-weregulate/fitness-probity/regulated-financial-service-providers/list-of-54-pre-approval-controlledfunctions.pdf?sfvrsn=6. 18 Section 13 of the draft law.

text: See Commission of Investigation into the Banking Sector in Ireland, Misjudging Risk: Causes of the Systemic Banking Crisis in Ireland (2011), as referred to in the Central Bank of Ireland’s report, Behaviour and Culture of the Irish Retail Banks (July 2018), p. 3. 20 See Financial Stability Board (FSB), Guidance on Supervisory Interaction with Financial Institutions on Risk Culture (7 April 2014), p.1, available on the FSB’s website at www.fsb.org. 21 See

text: recital 53

text: of

text: Directive 2013/36/EU

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive

text: and repealing Directives

text: and

text: Text with EEA relevance (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 338). 22 Available on the ECB’s website at www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu 23 See Frank Elderson, Member of the Executive Board and Vice-Chair of the Supervisory Board of the ECB, Supervising banks’ governance: structure, behaviour and culture (11 June 2022), available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu; see also FSB, Guidance on Supervisory Interaction with Financial Institutions on Risk Culture (7 April 2014), pp. 3-4; De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB), Behaviour and culture in the financial sector, available on DNB’s website at www.dnb.nl.

text: See Article 3(1) of the European Union (Single Supervisory Mechanism) Regulations 2014 (S.I. No. 495 of 2014). 25 See sections 45, 45A and 46 of the Central Bank Reform Act 2010, as amended by sections 29-31 of the draft law. 26 See

text: Article 162(4) of Directive 2013/36/EU

text: and repealing Directives

text: and

text: (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 338).

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 13 September 2022 on the enhancement of individual accountability and governance relating to senior executives in the Irish financial services industry (CON/2022/32)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 13 September 2022 on the enhancement of individual accountability and governance relating to senior executives in the Irish financial services industry (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 15 July 2022 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Irish Minister for Finance for an opinion on the Central Bank (Individual Accountability Framework) Bill 2022 (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third and sixth indents of

text: , as the draft law relates to the Central Bank of Ireland (CBI), rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets, and the ECB’s tasks concerning the prudential supervision of credit institutions pursuant to Article 127(6) of the Treaty. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The purpose of the draft law is to confer powers on the CBI to strengthen and enhance individual accountability and responsibility of senior executives in the Irish financial services industry. 1.2 The draft law arises out of recommendations made in a report by the CBI to the Minister for Finance on the behaviour and culture of the Irish retail banks. The recommendations in the CBI’s report include that it be given the power under legislation to introduce an enhanced individual accountability framework, that would apply to credit institutions and other regulated financial service providers (hereinafter ‘firms’), and would include: (1) a ‘senior executive accountability regime’ which would ensure clearer accountability by placing obligations on firms and senior individuals within them to set out clearly where responsibility and decision-making lies for their business, (2) standards of behaviour for firms and individuals working for those firms, and (3) an enhancement of the existing legislative framework in relation to fit and proper matters, and administrative sanctions.

text: 1.3 The draft law introduces a comprehensive set of amendments to three pieces of Irish legislation . In particular, the draft law proposes that the CBI be granted the power to prescribe the senior executive accountability regime by way of regulation. It is intended that the senior executive accountability regime would apply to credit institutions, including significant credit institutions subject to prudential supervision by the ECB within the framework of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), as well as certain insurance undertakings and investment firms, and incoming third country branches of all three types of entities. The senior executive accountability regime would allow the CBI to prescribe inherent responsibilities which are inseparable from and inherent to the functions of a senior function holder . The CBI would have the power to prescribe ‘allocated responsibilities’ that the firm must allocate to its senior function holders. Firms would have obligations to prepare and maintain statements of responsibilities for each senior function holder, and to establish and maintain a ‘management responsibilities map’ documenting key management and governance arrangements in the firm . 1.4 The draft law introduces a legal duty for individuals performing senior functions in firms that are within the scope of the senior executive accountability regime to take any steps that are reasonable in the circumstances to avoid the firm committing or continuing to commit contraventions of laws, including any regulations that may be made by the CBI, in relation to the areas of the business for which they are individually responsible. 1.5 Apart from the senior executive accountability regime, the draft law also provides for a regulationmaking power that allows the CBI to impose conduct standards for businesses that would apply to all firms . The draft law also provides the CBI with the power to set individual common conduct standards and additional conduct standards of behaviour for certain individuals and senior executives in firms. Furthermore, the draft law introduces a legal duty requiring that the relevant individuals and senior executives take any steps that are reasonable in the circumstances to ensure that these standards are met. 1.6 To ensure individuals are held accountable for their actions, the draft law breaks the existing ‘participation link’ requiring wrongdoing by a firm to be demonstrated before enforcement action can be taken against those persons involved in the management of the firm who participated in that wrongdoing. In this respect, the draft law proposes a series of amendments, in particular regarding the CBI’s administrative sanctions procedure, to make the changes necessary to break the participation link, and therefore facilitate enhanced individual accountability. The effect of the draft law is that the CBI can pursue individuals directly for their misconduct rather than only where they have participated in a firm’s wrongdoing.

text: 1.7 The draft law includes a significant number of amendments to investigation and enforcement processes relating to the administrative sanctions procedure and the fitness and probity regime . The draft law extends the CBI’s fit and proper regime to holding companies and individuals in those holding companies to which it did not previously apply. The draft law also includes new requirements in respect of certification by a firm so that it shall not permit a person to perform a controlled function in relation to it unless a certificate of compliance with standards of fitness and probity is in force in relation to the person . The draft law also amends existing powers in respect of persons carrying out controlled functions . Additionally, the draft law incorporates amendments relating to fair procedures and the administration of justice more generally. 1.8 The draft law provides that a significant institution within the meaning of the SSM Regulation shall not appoint a person: (a) to its management body, or (b) to perform a prescribed ‘pre-approval controlled function’ in relation to it, unless the CBI has notified the significant institution in writing that the ECB has approved the appointment . A pre-approval controlled function is a feature of the national regulatory regime whereby the CBI has a power to prescribe functions as a pre-approval controlled function if the function may allow a person to exercise a “significant influence on the conduct of a regulated financial service provider's affairs” . The full list of pre-approval controlled functions in the domestic regime is not limited to members of the management body and key function holders; these functions can be regarded as a subset of the overall list of pre-approval controlled functions . Depending on whether a firm is a significant institution or not, either the CBI or ECB may be competent for the purposes of providing prior approval in writing for the appointment of a person to perform a pre-approval controlled function in that firm. The draft law provides an additional regulation-making power for the CBI which would allow it to prescribe a pre-approval controlled function if it appears to the CBI that the approval for the appointments to that function is subject to the exclusive competence of the ECB pursuant to

text: Article 4(1)

text: (e) of the SSM Regulation .

text: 2. Observations

text: 2.1 The ECB strongly welcomes the measures envisaged by the draft law regarding the individual responsibilities of senior persons, including management board members and key function holders. Cultural failings within the banking sector were considered to be a significant contributory factor in

text: Ireland’s financial crisis . Weaknesses in risk culture are often considered a root cause of the global financial crisis . Weaknesses in corporate governance in a number of institutions have contributed to excessive and imprudent risk-taking in the banking sector which has led to the failure of individual institutions and systemic problems in Member States and globally . 2.2 Within the SSM, the draft law’s measures will support suitability assessments and enable a better and more accurate grounding when material concerns lead to the need for ancillary provisions, negative outcomes or reassessments, in line with the ECB Guide to fit and proper assessments . The draft law’s measures will reinforce the governance framework of credit institutions. The behavioural patterns exhibited by management, as well as the drivers that underpin that behaviour, are elements that determine how robust a credit institution’s governance framework is. It is imperative to adequately address unwarranted behaviour by individual senior managers at a credit institution who decide to take on too much risk, putting the immediate interests of a credit institution before its longer-term interests, or even breaking the law. If such acts have no apparent consequence, that will be noticed by staff in the credit institution, leading to the development of a new group norm. The overriding behaviour and culture within a credit institution are thus the product of both individual behaviour and the underlying culture that acts as a breeding ground for that behaviour. It is important for a credit institution to identify and be aware of the structures, beliefs and group dynamics which echo throughout the entire institution and which may pose a risk to its performance and stability. Credit institutions’ management bodies should be attentive to these intangible but real underlying drivers of behaviour and, if warranted, acknowledge the need to shift the paradigm before it is too late and negative practices become the norm . 2.3 Regarding the proposed power to be granted to the CBI to prescribe by regulations a pre-approval controlled function, it is recalled that, in the case of significant credit institutions, the approval of appointments to that function is subject to the exclusive competence of the ECB under

text: Articles 4(1)

text: (e) and 9 of the SSM Regulation. The prudential power to grant and notify the supervisory approval to carry out pre-approval functions is an exclusive competence of the ECB under

text: Articles 4(1)

text: (e) and 9 of the SSM Regulation. The consulting authority is invited to refrain from conferring regulatory authority and tasks on the CBI under Irish law which may impinge upon this exclusive competence. In this respect, Section 23A of the Central Bank Reform Act 2010 should be clarified so that the role of the ECB in respect of the supervision of significant supervised entities is maintained in line with the SSM Regulation.

text: 2.4 In line with Articles 4 and 9 of the SSM Regulation, where there is a power of the CBI in Irish legislation falling within the tasks conferred on the ECB and underpinning supervisory functions, the ECB would be the authority responsible for the exercise of that power in respect of a significant supervised entity. Consistent with this, the Irish regulations adapting Irish law to the SSM Regulation provide that the functions (other than a power to bring and prosecute proceedings for an offence) of the CBI under Irish financial services legislation shall, in addition to being performable by the CBI, be performable by the ECB to the extent only that their performance is necessary for the performance of functions conferred on the ECB by the SSM Regulation and, accordingly, references to the CBI shall, insofar as they relate to a function so conferred, be construed as including references to the ECB. In addition, the ECB understands that the process for making applications to the Irish High Court to, inter alia, confirm, vary or revoke prohibition notices under the applicable legislation operates without prejudice to the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union so far as concerns the tasks conferred on the ECB and underpinning supervisory functions. It might be useful, for the avoidance of doubt, that this jurisdictional point be explicitly clarified in the Irish regulations adapting Irish law to the SSM Regulation. 2.5 Insofar as the draft law aims at implementing Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council, it is recalled that, when Member States implement this Directive, the implementing provisions should contain or be accompanied by a reference to this Directive .

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 13 September 2022.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Christine LAGARDE