text: Küberturvalisuse seadus, eelnõu.

text: Directive (EU) 2016/1148

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 concerning measures for a high common level of security of network and information systems across the Union (OJ L 194, 19.7.2016, p. 1).

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42). 4 Korrakaitseseadus, RT I, 22.03.2011, 4, RT I, 02.12.2016, 6.

text: See Section 15(1) of the draft law and Sections 30, 31, 32, 49, 50 and 51 of the Law on law enforcement. 6 See Section 15(2) of the draft law and Section 52 of the Law on law enforcement. 7 See Sections 16 and 17 of the draft law. 8 See Sections 18 and 19 of the draft law. 9 Hädaolukorra seadus, RT I, 03.03.2017, 1, RT I, 28.12.2017, 49. 10 According to the drafting notes of the Law on emergency, a cash circulation service includes services that permit cash to be paid into and funds withdrawn from a payment account and for which infrastructure involving buildings, e.g. bank offices, devices, e.g. automated teller machines and other similar items and integrated services, including the uninterrupted transportation of cash, are needed. The drafting notes of the Law on emergency are available on the website of the Riigikogu (Estonian Parliament) at www.riigikogu.ee. It is understood that Eesti Pank will specify the exact services that are considered cash circulation services in a decree of the Governor of Eesti Pank following the enactment of the draft law. 11 According to the drafting notes of the Law on emergency, a payment service includes services that permit payment transactions to be carried out, including the transfer of funds to a payment account opened with the payment service providers and transfer of funds that have been provided to the client as credit. A payment service also covers the fulfilment of the payment instructions via telecommunication, digital or IT devices. The drafting notes also specify that provision of payment services requires a continuous operation of telecommunication and information or similar networks and continuous operation of payment cards and other similar payment instruments. It is understood that Eesti Pank will specify the exact services that are considered payment services in a decree of the Governor of Eesti Pank following the enactment of the draft law. 12 See Section 36(3) of the Law on emergency. 13 1 See Section 3(3) of the Law on credit institutions, Krediidiasutuste seadus , RT I 1999, 23, 349, RT I, 30.12.2017, 31. 14 See Section 3(2) of the Law on credit institutions. 15 See Section 2(1) of Decree No. 4 of the Governor of Eesti Pank dated 28 February 2017.

text: See Opinion

text: and Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 17 See paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: . 18 See Section 7(3) of the draft law.

text: 20 Central Bank (ECB/2014/28) and the Eurosystem’s oversight policy framework .

text: Regulation (EU) No 795/2014

text: , as amended , requires the operators of systemically important payment systems to establish an effective cyber resilience framework with appropriate governance measures in place to manage cyber risk. 3.1.2

text: Regulation (EU) No 795/2014

text: was adopted on the basis of Article 127(2) of the Treaty and Articles 3.1, 22 and 34.1 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter the ‘Statute of the ESCB’). According to the fourth indent of Article 127(2) of the Treaty, the promotion of the smooth operation of payment systems is one of the core tasks of the European System of Central Banks. Furthermore, pursuant to Article 22 of the Statute of the ESCB, the ECB and the national central banks (including Eesti Pank) may provide facilities, and the ECB may make regulations, to ensure efficient and sound clearing and payment systems within the Union. Among listed SIPS, TARGET2 plays a distinct role, as it is owned and operated by the Eurosystem, and subject to strict regulation and oversight . 3.1.3 As noted previously, the ECB understands that SIPS could not be designated as providers of vital services. Hence, the draft law could not directly apply to the SIPS operators. Moreover, the draft law provides that if the requirements for running the network or information system are regulated by an international treaty or by another law, then the draft law shall be applied subject to the differences arising from the international treaty or from another law. Based on this, the ECB understands that

text: Regulation (EU) No 795/2014

text: is to be understood as another law or as a regulation under an international treaty, and that there is therefore no scope for the draft law to apply to SIPS, even indirectly. Based on this, the ECB also understands that the supervisory powers of the RIA under the draft law will, in any case, not directly or indirectly encompass SIPS regulated by

text: Regulation (EU) No 795/2014

text: . This interpretation is also consistent with the status of Union law as part of the Estonian constitutional order . For the sake of legal certainty, the ECB suggests that the Estonian legislator should explicitly clarify that the draft law should be without prejudice to the tasks and powers of the ECB under

text: Regulation (EU) No 795/2014

text: . 3.2 Impact of the draft law on non-SIPS 3.2.1 Non-SIPS include non-systemically important large-value payment systems (LVPS) and nonsystemically important retail payment systems (non-SIRPS). The following focuses on non-SIRPS

text: Regulation (EU) No 795/2014

text: of the European Central Bank of 3 July 2014 on oversight requirements for systemically important payment systems (ECB/2014/28) (OJ L 217, 23.7.2014, p. 16), here and below as amended by

text: Regulation (EU) 2017/2094

text: of the European Central Bank of 3 November 2017 amending

text: Regulation (EU) No 795/2014

text: on oversight requirements for systemically important payment systems (ECB/2017/32). 20 See paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: . 21

text: Regulation (EU) 2017/2094

text: Regulation (EU) No 795/2014

text: on oversight requirements for systemically important payment systems (ECB/2017/32) (OJ L 299, 16.11.2017, p. 11). 22 See paragraph 3.1 of Opinion

text: . 23 See Section 2 of the Law amending the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia; Decision No 3-4-1-33-09 of the Estonian Supreme Court (paragraph 39); Eesti Põhiseaduse kommenteeritud väljaanne, Juura 2017, 715; Costa v E.N.E.L.,

text: , ECLI:EU:C:1964:66; Bernhard Pfeiffer (

text: ), Wilhelm Roith (

text: ), Albert Süß (

text: ), Michael Winter (

text: ), Klaus Nestvogel (

text: ), Roswitha Zeller (

text: ) and Matthias Döbele (

text: ) v Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, Kreisverband Waldshut eV,

text: to

text: , ECLI:EU:C:2004:584.

text: It is noted that non-systemically important LVPSs have to respect the PFMIs in their entirety (see the Eurosystem’s ‘Assessment methodology for payment systems’, available on the ECB’s website). 25 See the Eurosystem’s ‘Revised oversight framework for retail payment systems’ (February 2016), available on the ECB’s website. 26 See the Eurosystem’s ‘Overview of payment systems’, available on the ECB’s website. 27 See the Bank for International Settlement’s CPSS and the IOSCO Technical Committee Principles for financial market infrastructures, available on the Bank for International Settlement’s website at www.bis.org. 28 See the Eurosystem’s ‘Oversight expectations for links between retail payment systems’, available on the ECB’s website. 29 See paragraph 2.4.4 of ECB Opinion

text: See the Eurosystem’s ‘Eurosystem oversight policy framework’ (revised version), p. 9, available on the ECB’s website. 31

text: Directive (EU) 2015/2366

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on payment services in the internal market, amending Directives

text: and

text: and

text: Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010

text: , and repealing Directive

text: (OJ L 337, 23.12.2015, p. 35). 32 See ‘Eurosystem oversight policy framework’ (revised version), p. 2. 33 See paragraph 5.2 of Opinion

text: Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013

text: conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63). 35 See

text: Articles 4(1)

text: (e) and 6(4) of

text: Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013

text: . 36 See

text: Article 64(1) of Directive 2013/36/EU

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive

text: and repealing Directives

text: and

text: . 37 See paragraph 1.3. A list of SSM supervised entities is available on the SSM’s website at https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu. 38 See

text: Article 4(1)

text: (52) of

text: Regulation (EU) No 575/2013

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending

text: Regulation (EU) No 648/2012

text: (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 1);

text: Article 3(1)

text: (48) of Directive

text: and repealing Directives

text: and

text: (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p 338). 39 See paragraph 3.5 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.12 of Opinion

text: See

text: Article 16(2)

text: (e) of

text: Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013

text: . 41 See Section 8(5) and (6) of the draft law. 42 See

text: Articles 27

text: to 30 of Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending

text: Council Directive 82/891/EEC

text: , and Directives

text: and

text: , and Regulations

text: (EU) No 1093/2010

text: and

text: (EU) No 648/2012

text: , of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 190). 43 See

text: Article 32(1)

text: (a) of Directive

text: . 44 See

text: Article 31(2)

text: (a) of Directive

text: Article 6(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1338/2001 of 28 June 2001

text: laying down measures necessary for the protection of the euro against counterfeiting (OJ L 181, 4.7.2001, p. 6). 46 See Decision ECB/2010/14 of the European Central Bank of 16 September 2010 on the authenticity and fitness checking and recirculation of euro banknotes, (OJ L 267, 9.10.2010, p. 1).

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 27 April 2018 on the identification and supervision of critical infrastructure for the purpose of information technology security (CON/2018/22)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 27 April 2018 on the identification and supervision of critical infrastructure for the purpose of information technology security (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 5 April 2018 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Estonian Minister for Entrepreneurship and Information Technology for an opinion on a draft law on cyber security implementing

text: Directive (EU) 2016/1148

text: of the Parliament and of the Council (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the second, third, fifth and sixth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft law relates to means of payment, Eesti Pank, payment and settlement systems, rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets and the ECB’s tasks concerning the prudential supervision of credit institutions pursuant to Article 127(6) of the Treaty. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The purpose of the draft law is to identify critical infrastructures and their operators and to stipulate the obligations of such operators to take appropriate organisational, physical and information security measures prior to, during and after a cyber incident to protect infrastructure-related information technology (IT) systems and to report severe IT incidents to the Riigi Infosusteemi Amet (RIA, Republic of Estonia Information System Authority). In addition, the RIA is obliged to take measures to prevent and resolve cyber incidents and to maintain a register of cyber incidents. 1.2 The draft law empowers the RIA to supervise and enforce compliance with the obligations specified in the draft law. The draft law, in conjunction with the Law on law enforcement , gives the RIA the authority to question a person and request information and/or originals (or copies) of documents; summon a person to the RIA’s offices and require a person’s presence during procedural acts; take steps to establish a person’s identity; examine movable assets, e.g. in the current case servers or

text: other technical equipment; enter into and examine premises . In addition the RIA has the authority

text: to put into storage a movable asset (e.g. servers or other technical equipment). Under the draft

text: law, the RIA is also authorised, in the event of a cyber incident or upon exercise of administrative

text: supervision, as an ultima ratio measure, to restrict the use of or access to the system if: (a) a cyber

text: incident poses a risk to or damages the security of another system; (b) the system operator cannot

text: avert the higher risk or eliminate the violation itself or cannot do it at the right time; (c) no less

text: intrusive measures are available; and (d) the planned measure will not cause disproportionate

text: damage . Lastly, the RIA is also the body conducting extrajudicial misdemeanour proceedings in

text: relation to a breach of the draft law .

text: 1.3 The draft law defines the service providers to whom it applies and includes in this respect a cross-

text: reference to the Law on emergency . In particular, the draft law specifies that the providers of vital

text: services, as specified in the Law on emergency, are subject to the draft law. The Law on

text: emergency, in turn, lists cash circulation and payment services as vital services . The power to

text: designate the providers of vital services in cash circulation and payment services is delegated to

text: Eesti Pank . Under the Law on credit institutions, Eesti Pank may only designate credit institutions

text: or Estonian branches of credit institutions as providers of vital services . Eesti Pank has

text: designated AS SEB Pank, Swedbank AS and Luminor Bank AS as providers of vital services in

text: cash circulation and payment services . The draft law obliges providers of vital services to take

text: measures to prevent and resolve cyber incidents and report to the RIA serious cyber incidents.

text: 1.4 According to the draft law, if the requirements for running the network or information system are

text: regulated by an international treaty or by another law, then the draft law shall be applied with the

text: specifications arising from the international treaty or from another law.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 The draft law implements

text: Directive (EU) 2016/1148

text: in relation to which the ECB has issued two opinions . According to

text: Article 3 of Directive (EU) 2016/1148

text: Directive (EU) 2016/1148

text: is a minimum harmonisation directive, meaning that Member States may adopt or maintain provisions with a view to achieving a higher level of security of network and information systems than provided for under the directive. The ECB notes in this regard that, in a number of respects, the draft law goes further than provided for under

text: Directive (EU) 2016/1148

text: . 2.2 In previous opinions , the ECB has supported the aim of

text: Directive (EU) 2016/1148

text: to ensure a high common level of network and information security (NIS) across the Union and to achieve a consistency of approach in this field across business sectors and Member States. It is important to ensure that the internal market is a safe place to do business and that all Member States have a certain minimum level of preparedness for cyber-security incidents. 2.3 The ECB has also previously called for establishing effective cooperation and information-sharing arrangements between the competent national authorities, including the RIA, and the other competent national authorities, including Eesti Pank, the Finantsinspektsioon (the Estonian Financial Supervision Authority) and, through Eesti Pank and the Finantsinspektsioon, the ECB. 2.4 According to the draft law, if the providers of vital services use third-party service providers for the provision of vital services, then providers of vital services must ensure that such third-party service providers comply with specific elements of the draft law . It is the understanding of the ECB that based on this, the requirements under the draft law for running a network or information system could also become indirectly applicable to payments system operators and critical service providers and that the providers of vital services using payment systems or critical service providers for the provision of cash circulation and payment services could be required to ensure that such third-party operators comply with any supervisory orders from the RIA.

text: 3. Impact of the draft law on payment and securities settlement systems

text: 3.1 Impact of the draft law on systemically important payments systems (SIPS) 3.1.1 While the draft law seeks to enhance the overall resilience of critical infrastructures by identifying infrastructures that have key functions for society, providing rules for such infrastructure providers and ensuring supervision over and enforcement of the said rules, it should be ensured that the provisions of the draft law do not encroach on the Eurosystem’s competences. This could be achieved by explicitly exempting payment systems overseen and/or operated by the Eurosystem (including Eesti Pank) from the scope of application of the draft law, as these are subject to comparable or more stringent requirements. Essentially, it must be ensured that implementation of the draft law’s requirements does not conflict with

text: Regulation (EU) No 795/2014

text: of the European

text: as the ECB understands that LVPS are not covered by the draft law . 3.2.2 Under the revised oversight framework for retail payment systems non-SIRPS have been divided into two distinct groups: prominently important retail payments systems (PIRPS) and other important retail payments systems (ORPS). The Estonian local clearing system for card payments has been classified as a PIRPS . 3.2.3 Under the above referenced oversight framework, non-SIRPS must follow the Principles for financial market infrastructures (PFMIs) of the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) of the Bank for International Settlements and the Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) and the oversight expectations for links between retail payment systems (OELRPS) . Both the CPSS-IOSCO PFMIs and the OELRPS are soft law instruments, meaning that PIRPS and ORPS are subject to oversight standards, but there is, strictly speaking, no Union regulation or legislation regulating the oversight or supervision of these systems . The possibility cannot therefore be excluded that the draft law and the supervisory powers of the RIA thereunder could cover (indirectly through credit institutions designated as vital service providers) non-SIRPS, such as the Estonian local clearing system for card payments, as the CPSS-IOSCO PFMIs and OELRPS would not be considered a law or international treaty within the meaning of the draft law. 3.2.4 The revised oversight framework for retail payment systems specifies that all retail payment systems are an integral part of the payment and settlement landscape of the euro area and thus fall within the scope of oversight. Hence, the Eurosystem has an interest in ensuring that the oversight framework and standards applicable to such systems would not be prejudiced through the implementation of

text: Directive (EU) 2016/1148

text: or when introducing other NIS-related laws or regulations. If the Estonian authorities wish to exclude non-SIRPS from the scope of application of the draft law, then this could be done expressly. If the Estonian authorities consider it necessary to include the non-SIRPS within the (indirect) scope of application of the draft law, then the ECB suggests that effective information-sharing and cooperation arrangements should be put in place(as specified below in Section 6) to ensure that the RIA shares information about actual and potential cyber incidents affecting non-SIRPS with Eesti Pank in a timely and efficient manner in order to enable the Eesti Pank to fulfil the tasks assigned to them under the Treaty and applicable Estonian law. It would, in any case, be advisable to clarify the exact scope of application of the draft law in relation to non-SIRPS to avoid potential confusion on the applicable standards and powers of the relevant authorities.

text: 3.3 Critical service providers 3.3.1 The revised Eurosystem oversight policy framework covers critical service providers (CSPs). Similar to the case of non-SIPS, the possibility cannot be excluded that the draft law and the supervisory powers of the RIA thereunder could cover (indirectly through credit institutions designated as vital service providers) critical service providers for which the above applicable oversight frameworks would not be considered a law or international treaty within the meaning of the draft law. In light thereof, it is suggested that the Estonian authorities take existing oversight arrangements into consideration in the application of the draft law to providers of vital services. 3.4 Impact of the draft law on payment services and payment instruments and schemes 3.4.1

text: Directive (EU) 2015/2366

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council , as implemented into national law, regulates payment services. Even though

text: Directive (EU) 2015/2366

text: includes provisions on the management of operational risk, which have also been transposed into Estonian law, this directive and applicable national law do not directly prevent any other laws from being, at least partially, applicable. Hence, the ECB understands that the draft law is still partially applicable to such services, and that this also extends the supervisory powers of the RIA. 3.4.2 The revised Eurosystem oversight policy framework identifies payment instruments, such as payment cards, credit transfers, direct debits and e-money, as an ‘integral part of payment systems’, and thus includes these within the scope of its central bank oversight. For payment instruments, the role of primary overseer for the Eurosystem is assigned by reference to the national anchor of the payment scheme and the legal incorporation of its governance authority. For credit transfer and direct debit schemes within the Single Euro Payments Area, as well as some of the international card payment schemes, the ECB has the primary oversight role . 3.4.3 If the Estonian authorities wish to exclude payment schemes and instruments from the direct and indirect scope of application of the draft law, this could be done expressly. If the Estonian authorities consider it necessary to include various payment schemes and instruments within the direct and/or indirect scope of application of the draft law, then the ECB suggests that an effective information sharing and cooperation framework should be put in place (as specified below in Section 6) to ensure that the RIA shares information about actual and potential cyber incidents affecting card schemes and other payment instruments with the Eesti Pank in a timely and efficient manner in order to enable Eesti Pank to fulfil the tasks assigned to them under the Treaty and applicable Estonian law. It would, in any case, be advisable to clarify the exact scope of application of the draft law and the supervisory powers of the RIA in relation to payment instruments to avoid potential confusion on the applicable standards and powers of the relevant authorities.

text: 3.5 Impact of the draft law on securities settlement systems The ECB understands that the draft law does not apply to securities settlement systems or to TARGET2-securities.

text: 4. Impact of the draft law on the prudential supervision of credit institutions

text: Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013

text: confers tasks on the ECB concerning the prudential supervision of credit institutions with a view to contributing to their safety and soundness and in order to protect the stability of the financial system of the Union and each Member State. The ECB is responsible for the effective and consistent functioning of the single supervisory mechanism (SSM) and exercises oversight over the system’s functioning, based on the distribution of responsibilities between the ECB and national competent authorities (NCAs), including the Finantsinspektsioon in Estonia. In particular, the ECB carries out its task to authorise and withdraw the authorisations of all credit institutions. For significant credit institutions the ECB also has the task, among others, to ensure compliance with the relevant Union law acts which impose prudential requirements on credit institutions, including the requirement to have in place robust governance arrangements, including sound risk management processes and internal control mechanisms . To this end, the ECB shall be given all supervisory powers to intervene in the activity of credit institutions that are necessary for the exercise of its functions . 4.2 All Estonian credit institutions that would fall within the scope of the draft law upon its enactment are significant credit institutions subject to ECB prudential supervision . Nonetheless, the application of the draft law to non-significant credit institutions thereafter cannot be excluded. 4.3 The prudential supervision of credit institutions also covers NIS-related topics as part of the prudential supervision of operational risk, meaning the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or from external events . Since the assessment of the adequacy of the internal governance arrangements of credit institutions is one of the core competences of prudential supervisors, the requirements under the draft law should not interfere with the tasks of prudential supervisors . In this respect, the ECB has the power, inter alia, to

text: restrict or limit the business, operations or network of institutions or to request the divestment of activities that pose excessive risks to the soundness of an institution . 4.4 It is acknowledged that the tasks of the ECB and the Finantsinspektsioon as prudential supervisors are in a number of critical respects distinct from the tasks and authorities of computer security incident response teams (CSIRTs). Nevertheless, there is an overlap where the actions of a CSIRT, such as the RIA in Estonia, can affect the prudential supervision of credit institutions under relevant Union and Estonian laws. 4.5 This would be most evident should the RIA choose, when potentially using its ultima ratio authorities under the draft law, to restrict the use of a system. If the RIA uses its authority to restrict the use of an information system used by a significant credit institution for the provision of payment services, then this could significantly impact the continuous operation and financial standing of the credit institution. Additionally, informing the affected persons or the general public about cyber incidents, as anticipated in the draft law , may have an impact on public confidence in the affected credit institution. The ECB and the NCAs within the SSM are responsible for the assessment of recovery plans and taking early intervention measures under Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council (as implemented into national law). Further, the primary responsibility for determining that a significant credit institution is failing or likely to fail as a condition to the resolution of a credit institution lies with the ECB . In the case of resolution, one of the resolution objectives is to ensure the continuity of critical functions , which can include the continuing functioning of the credit institution’s payment and cash circulation systems. 4.6 To enable the ECB and the Finantsinspektsioon to fulfil the tasks assigned to them within the SSM, the ECB suggests explicitly clarifying the scope of the draft law and any powers granted to the RIA in this respect. The ECB also suggests clarifying that the scope of the draft law and any powers granted to the RIA thereunder are without prejudice to the tasks and powers of the ECB and the Finantsinspektsioon under

text: Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013

text: and applicable Estonian law. The ECB also recommends that an effective framework should be put in place (as specified in Section 6 below) to ensure that the RIA shares information about actual and potential cyber incidents affecting significant supervised entities, as well as measures planned or adopted by the RIA. Where relevant, the RIA should share information with the Finantsinspektsioon and, through the Finantsinspektsioon, with the ECB in a timely and efficient manner. The Estonian legislator may also wish to consider the interaction of the RIA’s powers under the draft law with the resolutionrelated procedures and powers of the relevant authorities.

text: 5. Impact of the draft law on cash circulation

text: 5.1 Under Article 128(1) of the Treaty, the ECB has the exclusive right to authorise the issue of euro banknotes within the Union. The ECB, together with the national central banks, may issue such notes. The euro banknotes issued are the only such notes to have the status of legal tender within the Union. Under

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 1338/2001

text: credit institutions and other cash handlers are obliged to ensure that euro notes which they have received and which they intend to put back into circulation are checked for authenticity and that counterfeits are detected in line with procedures defined by the ECB. Eurosystem national central banks, including Eesti Pank, play an important role in these procedures . From a practical perspective, the interest of the ECB and the Eurosystem encompasses the adequate NIS protection of the systems ensuring the circulation of euro banknotes, such as automated teller machine (ATM) networks and cash circulation support networks, in view of the further increasing automation of the cash supply infrastructure. This trend not only concerns the banking sector and the cash-handling industry, but is also becoming a more pronounced trend in the retail sector. 5.2 Therefore, the ECB suggests that an effective information-sharing and cooperation framework should be put in place (as specified below in Section 6) to ensure that the RIA shares information about actual and potential cyber incidents affecting ATM and cash circulation support networks with Eesti Pank. Additionally, the RIA should, through Eesti Pank, share information with the ECB in a timely and efficient manner in order to enable the ECB and Eesti Pank to fulfil the tasks assigned to them under the Treaty and applicable Estonian law.

text: 6. Conclusion

text: 6.1 To sum up, the ECB suggests that the Estonian legislator explicitly clarifies that the draft law, including the tasks and powers of the RIA, should be without prejudice to the tasks and powers of the ECB under

text: Regulation (EU) No 795/2014

text: and to the tasks and powers of the ECB and the Finantsinspektsioon under

text: Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013

text: and applicable Estonian law. 6.2 Arrangements should be put in place to ensure that the RIA shares information about actual and potential cyber incidents, as well as measures planned or adopted by the RIA where relevant, which affect significant credit institutions, non-SIPS, CSPs, payment services and instruments/schemes, ATM and cash circulation support networks with Eesti Pank, and the Finantsinspektsioon. Additionally, the ECB suggests ensuring that the RIA shares this information, through Eesti Pank and the Finantsinspektsioon, with the ECB in a timely and efficient manner, within the framework of their respective responsibilities for the oversight of payment systems, the prudential supervision of credit institutions and the authorisation of the issuance of euro banknotes.

text: 6.3 For its part, the ECB stands ready, within the framework of its responsibilities for the oversight of payment systems, the prudential supervision of credit institutions and the issuance and circulation of euro banknotes, to cooperate in ensuring that best practices with regard to NIS are established and followed. This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 27 April 2018. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: Ο περί της Κεντρικής Τράπεζας της Κύπρου Νόμος του 2002 (Ν. 138(I)/2002).

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).

text: Ο Περί της Διαχείρισης του Δημόσιου Χρέους Νόμος του 2012 (Ν. 195(I)/2012).

text: Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013

text: conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63). 5

text: Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and amending

text: Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010

text: (OJ L 225, 30.7.2014, p. 1). 6 According to Article 5 of the CBC Law, the primary objective of the CBC is to ensure price stability. Without prejudice to this primary objective, the CBC shall support the general economic policy of the State.

text: Article 5

text: A provides that the CBC is an integral part of the ESCB. The CBC shall perform all tasks required for the achievement of its objectives including those under

text: Article 6

text: Article 6

text: lists the main tasks of the CBC, which reflect the basic ESCB tasks under Article 127 (2) of the Treaty and which also include, among others, the licensing and supervision of authorised credit institutions, the macroprudential supervision of the financial system in order to ensure the stability of the financial system and the provision of services or performance of the role of banker and financial agent for Cyprus in financial matters.

text: Η περί της Αξιολόγησης της Ικανότητας και Καταλληλότητας Μελών Διοικητικού Οργάνου και Διευθυντών των Αδειοδοτημένων Πιστωτικών Ιδρυμάτων Οδηγία του 2014.

text: See paragraph 3.1 of Opinion

text: . 9 See paragraphs 2.3 and 2.4 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 4 of Opinion

text: . 10

text: Το Σύνταγμα της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας. 12 See paragraph 3.4.2 of Opinion

text: . 13 See paragraph 1 of Opinion

text: where it was noted that the CBC could not recruit permanent staff or promote, dismiss or suspend employees when there was a vacant position on its personnel committee. 14 See

text: Article 15(1)

text: (k) of the draft law. 15 Guideline

text: (EU) 2016/2249

text: of the ECB of 3 November 2016 on the legal framework for accounting and financial reporting in the European System of Central Banks (ECB/2016/34) (OJ L 347, 20.12.2016, p. 3).

text: It is recalled that Article 13(3) of the CBC Law previously gave the Council of Ministers the right to appoint a member to the board of directors for a term of less than five year. This provision was removed following a recommendation in the ECB Convergence Report of December 2006 that the relevant provision needed to comply with Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB. The ECB Convergence Report of May 2007 confirmed the removal of the aforementioned incompatibility. 17 See paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: . 18 See page 24 of the ECB Convergence Report of June 2016.

text: See

text: Articles 17

text: A(2) and 19(1) of the CBC Law. 20 See paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: . 21 See, e.g., page 25 of the ECB Convergence Report of June 2016. 22 See paragraph 2.5 of Opinion

text: . 23 See paragraph 3.3.7 of Opinion

text: See paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: . 25 See paragraph 3.1 of Opinion

publisher: Europeiska centralbanken

sprak: en

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 11 May 2018 on the governance and financial independence of the Central Bank of Cyprus (CON/2018/23)

serie: con

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 11 May 2018 on the governance and financial independence of the Central Bank of Cyprus (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

type: rubrik

text: On 8 February 2018 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Cyprus for an opinion on a draft law amending the Central Bank of Cyprus Law of 2002 (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft law relates to the Central Bank of Cyprus (CBC). In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

type: stycke

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The draft law introduces amendments to the Central Bank of Cyprus Law of 2002 (hereinafter the ‘CBC Law’) in respect of (a) the governance structure of the CBC; (b) the provisions relating to the independence of the directors of the CBC; and (c) the capital of the CBC and its alteration. The draft law also contains a provision that removes the task of managing public debt from the CBC, as this function is performed by the Public Debt Management Office (Γραφείο Διαχείρισης Δημόσιου Χρέους) pursuant to the Law of 2012 on public debt management . 1.2 The CBC’s governance structure 1.2.1 The explanatory memorandum for this opinion notes that the draft law reorganises the governance of the CBC with a view to rendering it more efficient and effective. The draft law establishes a new decision-making body, the executive committee, comprised of the governor, the deputy governor and two executive directors. The composition of the board of directors remains as it is, consisting of the governor, the deputy governor, two executive directors and five non-executive directors. 1.2.2 The draft law redefines the duties of the CBC’s decision-making bodies in order to reflect the new governance structure. In particular, the board of directors is responsible, inter alia, for (a) oversight of the CBC’s administration; (b) defining the CBC’s strategy, except for matters falling within the

text: fields of competence of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), the competence of the ECB pursuant to

text: Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013

text: , and the competent of the Single Resolution Board (SRB) pursuant to

text: Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council ; (c) the approval of the CBC’s budget, annual accounts and financial statements; and (d) the organisation of the CBC, including the general framework establishing the powers and duties of the CBC’s employees, the framework for the appointment, promotion and disciplinary procedure of the CBC’s employees and the internal procedures of the CBC. The draft law confers on the board of directors all powers under the CBC Law that are not specifically reserved for the governor, the deputy governor or the executive committee. The board may from time to time delegate any of its powers to any of its members, to the executive committee or to any employees of the CBC on such terms and for such periods as the board will decide. 1.2.3 The executive committee is responsible, amongst other tasks, for (a) the day-to-day activities of the CBC and the management of the CBC’s business; (b) the implementation of policy decisions taken by the ECB and SRB; (c) the carrying out of tasks and the exercise of powers granted to the CBC by virtue of the Treaty and the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter the ‘Statute of the ESCB’); (d) the implementation of the CBC’s objectives, in particular the CBC’s primary objective to ensure price stability, and the CBC’s tasks pursuant to Articles

text: A and 6 of the CBC Law, including the CBC’s ESCB-related tasks, the supervision of authorised credit institutions, the macroprudential supervision of the financial system and the provision of services or performance of the role of banker and financial agent for Cyprus in financial matters ; (e) the oversight of payment, clearing and settlement systems; and (f) the submission of recommendations to the board with respect to the CBC’s strategy, except for matters which fall within the fields of competence of the ESCB, the competence of the ECB pursuant to

text: Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013

text: , and the competence of the SRB pursuant to

text: Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

text: . 1.2.4 In addition, the draft law removes the provisions on the establishment and operation of the CBC personnel committee and confers on the executive committee the power to appoint, suspend or dismiss any employees of the CBC, except as regards senior directors whose appointment, suspension and dismissal falls within the competence of the board of directors, and to conduct other relevant tasks of the personnel committee and generally act as a personnel committee. 1.2.5 The draft law further provides that the members of the executive committee will head certain directorates and/or departments of the CBC and will each be responsible for separate executive

text: tasks within the CBC. The executive committee will confer on each executive director executive responsibility for one or more divisions of the CBC. The draft law also requires the executive committee to provide the board of directors, on a regular basis or as requested, with detailed information required for the exercise of the board’s powers. The executive committee members will have no voting rights at meetings of the board of directors on matters pertaining to the oversight of the administration of the CBC, for which the board is responsible, and in connection with the management of the day-to-day activities of the CBC, for which the executive committee is responsible. 1.2.6 The draft law replaces the section on the tasks of the governor and provides that the governor (a) participates ex officio, as an independent personality, in the Governing Council and the General Council of the ECB; (b) represents the CBC in its relations with external persons, including the Cypriot government, and in legal proceedings to which the CBC is a party; and (c) signs any contracts concluded by the CBC, its annual reports, financial statements and other documents on behalf of the CBC. In addition, the governor will chair the meetings of the board of directors and the executive committee and will have the casting vote. 1.2.7 Under the draft law the governor will no longer be responsible for the tasks of implementing the CBC’s policy; managing and controlling the CBC’s business; appointing, suspending or dismissing CBC employees; carrying out the tasks and powers granted to the CBC by virtue of the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB; and overseeing the payment, clearing and settlement systems. The provision granting the governor the power to take decisions as to the issuing of licenses to credit institutions and the carrying out of the business of credit institutions is also removed from the CBC Law. In addition, the draft law introduces a new provision stating that without prejudice to the provisions of Article 10.2 of the Statute of the ESCB, the Governor may appoint an alternate as a member of the Governing Council of the ECB. 1.3 The independence of directors 1.3.1 The draft law introduces a fit and proper criterion to the eligibility criteria for the appointment of the CBC’s executive and non-executive directors. This criterion aims to fulfil the requirements laid down in Article 11 of the CBC’s Directive of 2014 on the assessment of the fitness and probity of the members of the management body and managers of authorised credit institutions . The Directive sets out the reputational criteria to be complied with by members of the management body and managers of authorised credit institutions and the means of assessment. A number of factors are taken into account during the assessment, including criminal record, the cumulative effect of more minor incidents, which individually do not impinge on a person’s reputation, but may in sum have a material impact, as well as other factors, such as evidence that the relevant person has not been transparent, open and cooperative in his/her dealings with supervisory or regulatory authorities, a declaration of personal bankruptcy or inclusion on a list of unreliable debtors. A person may be considered to be of good repute if there is no evidence to suggest otherwise and nothing to cast reasonable doubt on the presumption of his/her good repute. A person will not be considered to be of good repute if his/her personal or business conduct gives rise to any material

text: doubt as to his/her ability to ensure the sound and prudent management of an authorised credit institution. The draft law adds that the eligible candidate should also have recognised and continuous professional experience in monetary, financial and banking matters. 1.3.2 The draft law also sets out the procedure for the appointment of the CBC’s directors. The Cypriot Council of Ministers appoints the directors following receipt of a formal reasoned opinion by a newly-established independent selection committee. This selection committee will be comprised of three members appointed by the Council of Ministers for a term of five years and will have the mandate of identifying at least three eligible and qualified candidates for every vacancy. Directors are appointed for a period of five years and may be re-appointed for one additional term of office, provided that the term of office for three of the five members appointed for the first time after the entry into force of the draft law would be three years and the term of office of two members would be four years. 1.3.3 The draft law extends the grounds for the dismissal of board members to include (i) a conviction for infringement of a confidentiality or professional secrecy obligation; (ii) a conviction for a dishonourable or morally reprehensible offence that constitutes an impediment to the appointment of public office; or (iii) a sentencing to a term of imprisonment for any offence. Where such grounds are applicable, the member, on a proposal from the Minister for Finance, will be dismissed from the board of directors by the Council of Ministers, after she/he has been invited to present her/his defence. 1.3.4 A conflict of interest provision has been added whereby persons who themselves or whose relatives up to the first degree have an interest in entities or are members of the board of entities under the supervision of the CBC are ineligible to be appointed as executive or non-executive directors. A similar provision has been added in relation to the appointment of the governor and deputy governor. 1.3.5 The draft law further provides that any expenses and damages awarded by the courts in relation to any act or omission of the governor, the deputy governor and any members of the board in the exercise of their duties will be borne by the CBC. This provision will apply irrespective of whether their term of office has expired. 1.3.6 Finally, the draft law contains a transitional provision according to which a person who holds a position on the board of directors of the CBC on the date on which the draft law enters into force will retain that position on the same terms until the expiry of his/her term of office. 1.4 The CBC’s capital and its alteration 1.4.1 The draft law provides for an automatic recapitalisation of the CBC whenever the CBC’s net equity falls below the level of the CBC’s capital provided in the CBC Law. Under the draft law, the level of CBC’s capital will be raised from EUR 30 million to EUR 90 million. The capital of the CBC can be altered by a decision of the board of directors, which must be notified to the Council of Ministers, provided that any increase in capital entailing additional payments by the State is agreed between the CBC and the Council of Ministers. In addition, the general reserve of the CBC should not exceed twice its capital.

text: 1.4.2 Furthermore, the draft law confers on the board of directors the power to set the maximum level of possible reserves, which include capital, general reserves and provisions. Any additional net profit will be attributed to the State irrespective of any other provision in the CBC Law. The precise level of reserves will be based on an annual report which takes into account the possible risks and means of addressing them, as well as the provisions and the total amount of reserves that need to be held.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 When a statute of a national central bank (NCB) (in this case the CBC Law) is amended, the amending law should ensure that central bank independence, guaranteed under Article 130 of the Treaty and Articles 7 and 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB, is respected. The compatibility of a Member State’s legislation, including its NCB’s statute, with the requirements of the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB concerning central bank independence must be ensured on accession to the Union. Compatibility with Article 130 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB is a fundamental aspect of the legal convergence in a Member State, which is examined in the convergence reports required by Article 140(1) of the Treaty to assess a country’s readiness to join the euro area . 2.2 The ECB notes the establishment of an executive committee and the restructuring of the CBC’s decision-making structure. The introduction of a collegiate decision-making process aims at strengthening the quality of the CBC internal deliberations with respect to the exercise of its tasks and is comparable with the regimes applicable in other jurisdictions across the EU. The ECB therefore understands that the establishment of a new collegiate decision-making body serves the purpose of greater responsibility-sharing. 2.3 The ECB welcomes the amendments introduced into the CBC Law clarifying the division of competences between the decision-making bodies of the CBC, in line with past ECB opinions on the CBC’s governance . The ECB understands that the executive committee will be exclusively responsible for carrying out all of the CBC’s tasks and exercising all of the CBC’s powers under the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB. The ECB further understands that the executive committee will be responsible for carrying out the CBC’s tasks in relation to the supervision of, but not the granting of licenses to, credit institutions, without prejudice to the provisions of the SSM Regulation . In this respect the ECB recommends that

text: Article 6(2)

text: (d) of the CBC Law be amended so as to remove the licensing of credit institutions as one of the tasks of the CBC and to note that the supervision of credit institutions is without prejudice to the SSM Regulation. 2.4 With respect to the provision of the draft law on the limited voting rights of members of the executive committee (see paragraph 1.2.5 above), the ECB understands that this provision applies only to the CBC’s day-to-day activities and management of its work under the newly amended

text: Article 17

text: A(1)(a) of the CBC Law and that it will not, in any case, affect the independence and

text: powers of the executive committee to carry out its ESCB-related and other tasks. For the sake of legal certainty it is suggested to reformulate this provision to reflect this understanding. 2.5 The ECB understands that under Article 119 of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus the governor is responsible for the management of the CBC and exercises all powers and performs all functions and duties within the scope of the CBC’s competences, assisted by the deputy governor. The ECB therefore understands that given that the draft law confers on the executive committee all ESCB-related competences and on the board of directors all residual competences, the draft law and Article 119 of the Constitution may need to be aligned . In such an event, the ECB would like to remind the consulting authority of the obligation to consult the ECB on any relevant draft legislation. 2.6 The ECB notes the amendments in relation to the appointment, suspension and dismissal of the CBC employees and understands that the removal of the provisions relating to the personnel committee will facilitate the internal functioning of the CBC . 2.7 As regards the provision of the draft law which confers upon the board of directors the power to adopt the accounting policies and procedures of the CBC in accordance with international accounting standards , the ECB understands that for the purpose of Eurosystem financial reporting the CBC adheres to the Eurosystem accounting and financial reporting framework as set out in Guideline

text: (EU) 2016/2249

text: of the European Central Bank (ECB/2016/34) . 2.8 The ECB notes that the provision of the draft law concerning the appointment of an alternate as a member of the Governing Council of the ECB should be in line with Article 10.2 of the Statute of the ESCB and with the relevant provisions of the Rules of Procedure of the ECB. The provisions stipulate, inter alia, that, if a member of the Governing Council is prevented from voting for a prolonged period (i.e. more than one month), he/she may appoint an alternate as member of the Governing Council.

text: 3. Specific observations

text: 3.1 Central bank independence

text: Personal independence

text: 3.1.1 The personal independence of the CBC would be at stake if the same rules for the security of tenure and grounds for dismissal of governors did not also apply to other members of the decisionmaking bodies of NCBs involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks. As the draft law entrusts the executive committee with the performance of the CBC’s ESCB-related tasks, then the same rules must be applicable to the executive directors of the CBC. 3.1.2 With regard to security of tenure, the draft law ensures that all board members have a term of office

text: of five years. There is, however, a transitional period in which the term of office of three of the five members appointed for the first time after the entry into force of the draft law would be three years and the term of office of two members would be four years. The ECB understands that the transitional period would be applicable only in relation to the non-executive directors of the CBC, since members of the executive committee must have a term of office of five years. The ECB notes that the reasons for the different periods of appointment for members of the board of directors and the relevant criteria for appointing some members for three years and others for four years are not clear . 3.1.3 As noted in the ECB Convergence Reports, NCB statutes must ensure that governors are not dismissed for reasons other than those mentioned in Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB, that is, where they no longer fulfil the conditions required for the performance of their duties or have been guilty of serious misconduct. This principle also applies to other members of NCB decision making-bodies involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks, especially where a governor is ‘first among equals’ with colleagues with equivalent voting rights, or where other such members are involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks . With respect to the governor and the deputy governor, the current version of the CBC Law is in line with Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB. The introduction under the draft law of new grounds for the dismissal of executive committee members, including for the governor and the deputy governor, raises concerns as these are not aligned with Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB. In the light of this, the ECB would support using the current wording of the CBC Law in respect of members of the executive committee. It is also noted that on the basis of Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB, a decision to relieve a Governor from office may be referred to the Court of Justice by the Governor concerned or the ECB Governing Council on grounds of infringement of the TFEU or of any rule of law relating to its application. 3.1.4 Personal independence also entails ensuring that no conflict of interest arises between the duties of members of NCB decision-making bodies involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks in relation to their respective NCBs (and of Governors in relation to the ECB) and any other functions which such members of decision-making bodies may have and which may jeopardise their personal independence. As a matter of principle, membership of a decision-making body involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks is incompatible with the exercise of other functions that might create a conflict of interest. In particular, members of such decision-making bodies may not have an office or have an interest that may influence their activities, whether through office in the executive or legislative branches of the State or in regional or local administrations, or through involvement in a business organisation. Particular care should be taken to prevent potential conflicts of interest on the part of non-executive members of decision-making bodies . The ECB therefore welcomes the new provisions on the eligibility criteria for the appointment of individuals to

text: the positions of executive director, deputy governor and governor of the CBC, which aim to strengthen the independence of these posts. These new provisions reinforce the current provisions of the CBC Law which require the executive directors, the deputy governor and the governor to perform their duties full-time and not to take up any other employment . In addition, and considering that the board of directors is comprised of five non-executive directors, the ECB understands that the obligation imposed by the draft law on the executive committee to provide the board of directors with detailed information required for the exercise of the board’s powers would not compromise the independence of the governor and the rest of the executive committee.

text: Financial independence

text: 3.1.5 The independence of an NCB, as required under Article 130 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB, would be at stake if it could not autonomously avail itself of sufficient financial resources to fulfil its mandate (i.e. the performance of ESCB-related tasks required under the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB) . The principle of financial independence requires an NCB to have sufficient means not only to perform its ESCB-related tasks but also its own national tasks, e.g. financing its administration and own operations. Therefore, a Member State may not put its NCB in a position where it has insufficient financial resources and inadequate net equity to carry out its tasks. For these reasons, financial independence implies that an NCB should always be sufficiently capitalised . In particular, any situation should be avoided whereby for a prolonged period of time an NCB’s net equity is below the level of its statutory capital or is even negative, including where losses beyond the level of capital and the reserves are carried over . Any such situation may negatively impact on the NCB’s ability to perform both its national tasks and its ESCB-related tasks. Moreover, such a situation may affect the credibility of the Eurosystem’s monetary policy. Therefore, where an NCB’s net equity is less than its statutory capital or even negative the respective Member State must provide the NCB with sufficient financial means to raise the net equity level at least up to that of the statutory capital within a reasonable period of time so as to avoid compromising the principle of financial independence. 3.1.6 In light of this, the ECB welcomes the provision of the draft law providing that the CBC will be recapitalised to the level prescribed under the CBC Law whenever the net equity of the CBC falls below this level. The CBC must have, at all times, sufficient financial resources and adequate net equity for the performance of its ESCB-related tasks . In this context, the ECB takes note of the proposed increase of the CBC’s capital from EUR 30 million to EUR 90 million and of the fact that the current capital of the CBC amounts to EUR 150 million. The ECB understands that the capital of the CBC has been raised to its current level by a decision of the board of directors pursuant to Article 56(2) of the CBC Law. The ECB understands that the proposed increase of the capital under the draft law will not impact the current level of the CBC’s capital. In view of this, the difference between the capital referred to under the draft law and the actual capital of the CBC could result in uncertainty and will, therefore, require further clarification.

text: 3.1.7 Furthermore, clarifications may be needed in respect of the requirement in the draft law that the general reserve of the CBC should not exceed twice its capital, in particular, whether this requirement refers to the amount of the capital proposed under the draft law or of the actual capital of the CBC. The ECB also wishes to emphasise that the CBC is best positioned to assess the risks involved in its operations and what financial precautions need to be taken to guard against these risks, including the establishment of the necessary level of general reserves within the limits set by the legislator or any other types of appropriate financial buffers. In addition, it should be considered whether the power to define the level and the limit of the general reserves should be conferred only on the board of directors, which has the overall responsibility for the financial soundness of the CBC. 3.1.8 With regard to the alteration of the capital, the ECB understands that according to the newly inserted provisions of the draft law, the CBC will be entitled to be automatically recapitalised up to the level of the prescribed capital referred to in the CBC Law (as amended by the draft law). 3.1.9 Under the principle of financial independence, an NCB, in the performance of its tasks, can independently assess the risks involved and has the power to decide on any necessary precautions to take. An NCB is best placed to make these assessments and must have the necessary tools to evaluate the relevant circumstances and to make forecasts . In particular, the ECB is of the view that the higher the level of capital, reserves and provisions against financial risks, the higher the safeguards will be against future losses . Consequently NCBs should be given the ability to safeguard the real value of their capital and assets by being free to independently create adequate financial buffers. The ECB therefore welcomes the provision of the draft law conferring powers on the board of directors to determine the level of “maximum reserves” and understands that this provision intends to address financial buffers comprising general reserves, capital and financial risk provisions. The ECB furthermore understands that the “maximum reserves” exclude (i) specific provisions against already incurred losses and (ii) any amounts recorded by the CBC on revaluation accounts, and that the profit to be distributed by the CBC to the general government account is determined following the establishment of adequate “maximum reserves”.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 11 May 2018.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI

type: vagledning

utgivare: ecb


text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).

text: Part IIIC of the Central Bank Act 1942, as amended.

text: See for example the fourth subparagraph of

text: Article 99(5)

text: ; the fourth subparagraph of

text: Article 99(6)

text: ; the third subparagraph of

text: Article 101(4)

text: ; the third subparagraph of

text: Article 394(4)

text: ; and the fourth subparagraph of

text: Article 415(3)

text: and the third subparagraph of

text: Article 430(2) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending

text: Regulation (EU) No 648/2012

text: (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 1).

text: Section 7 of the Central Bank of Ireland Code of Practice on Lending to Related Parties, 2013.

text: Section 20 of the Central Bank Act 2010 and Statutory Instrument No 437 of 2011, Central Bank Reform Act 2010 (sections 20 and 22) Regulations 2011, as amended.

text: Section 21 of the Central Bank (Supervision and Enforcement) Act 2013.

text: Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013

text: conferring specific tasks on the ECB concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63).

text: Regulation 55 of Statutory Instrument No 158/2014 European Union (Capital Requirements) Regulations 2014. This statutory instrument seeks to implement Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive

text: and repealing Directives

text: and

text: (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 338). 9

text: Regulation (EU) No 575/2013

text: Regulation (EU) No 648/2012

text: (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p.1). 10 Regulations 147 and 148 of Statutory Instrument No 158/2014; and Regulations 5 and 6 of Statutory Instrument No 159/2014 European Union (Capital Requirements) (No 2) Regulations 2014. 11 See Articles

text: of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013. 12 See

text: Article 9(1)

text: and (2) and

text: Article 18(5) of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013

text: . See also

text: Article 134 of Regulation (EU) No 468/2014

text: of the European Central Bank of 16 April 2014 establishing the framework for cooperation within the Single Supervisory Mechanism between the European Central Bank and national competent authorities and with national designated authorities, OJ L 141, 14.05.2014, p. 1.

text: See for example, sections 18 and 32 of the Central Bank (Supervision and Enforcement) Act 2013, section 27I of the Central Bank Act 1997, as amended, and section 33BA(9) of the Central Bank Act 1942, as amended. 14 Central Bank of Ireland, Response to the Law Reform Commission Issues Paper ‘Regulatory Enforcement and Corporate Offences’, December 2017. 15 Law Reform Commission, Issues Paper: Regulatory Enforcement of Corporate Offences, 27 January 2016, LRC IP 8-2016.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 11 May 2018 on administrative sanctions and criminal offences in connection with the provision of false or misleading information to the Central Bank of Ireland (CON/2018/24)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 11 May 2018 on administrative sanctions and criminal offences in connection with the provision of false or misleading information to the Central Bank of Ireland (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 4 April 2018 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Chairman of the Oireachtas (the Irish National Parliament) Joint Committee on Finance, Public Expenditure and Reform and Taoiseach (the Irish Prime Minister), for an opinion on the Central Bank Bill 2018 (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft law relates to the Central Bank of Ireland (CBI) and to the tasks conferred upon the ECB concerning the prudential supervision of credit institutions pursuant to Articles 127(6) of the Treaty. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The draft law confers on the CBI the powers to conduct inquiries into the suspected provision of false or misleading information to the CBI. It furthermore sets out the administrative sanctions that may be imposed by the CBI in such circumstances. In order to achieve this, the draft law extends the scope of application of certain existing provisions of Irish law, which set out the powers of the CBI for the enforcement of designated legislative acts (enactments and statutory instruments) , to three categories of additional addressees, including both natural and legal persons. 1.2 First, the draft law extends the scope of application of existing enforcement powers to persons who are either (i) under an express or implied duty to provide information to the CBI pursuant to a legislative enactment or to a European act, or at law, or in equity, or (ii) indirectly under that duty, whether by being obliged to co-operate in providing that information, or to procure the provision of that information, or otherwise. The draft law does not further define these persons. Thus, this provision of the draft law must be read together with other legislative enactments, such as those

text: which oblige credit institutions to report information for supervisory purposes or those which oblige credit institutions to report to the CBI on lending to related parties . 1.3 Second, the draft law extends the scope of application of the existing enforcement powers to natural persons performing functions that may be described as ‘controlled functions’ by the CBI. These include those natural persons holding a managerial function in a regulated financial service provider, such as a credit institution, financial holding company, mixed-financial holding company or mixed-activity holding company . 1.4 Third, the draft law extends the scope of application of the existing provisions on enforcement to persons who could potentially be the subject of an obligation to provide the CBI with information, records or forecasts, plans, accounts, explanations, answers to questions, or other documents requested by the CBI under its information-gathering power, regardless of whether such obligation has already been imposed on them. These persons include regulated financial service providers, such as credit institutions, and natural persons who are or have been an officer, employee or agent of such financial service providers . 1.5 With regard to the nature of the CBI’s enforcement powers, the existing provisions allow the CBI to (i) hold an inquiry into the conduct of a regulated financial service provider, such as a credit institution, or a person concerned in its management; (ii) make a finding as to whether the financial service provider or person concerned is committing or has committed the prescribed contravention to which the inquiry relates; and (iii) impose on the financial service provider or person concerned in its management one or more sanctions. These sanctions can include a monetary penalty to be paid to the CBI; suspension or revocation of the authorisation of a financial services provider in respect of any one or more of its activities; the submission of a proposal to the ECB to suspend or withdraw the authorisation of a financial service provider, i.e. a credit institution authorised by the ECB under

text: Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013

text: in respect of any one or more of its activities; and, if the financial service provider is a natural person, a direction disqualifying the person from being concerned in the management of a regulated financial service provider. 1.6 The draft law also creates a criminal offence of providing false or misleading information to the CBI. A person who commits an offence is liable on summary conviction to a class A fine or imprisonment of a term not exceeding 12 months (or both), or, on conviction on indictment, to a fine not exceeding EUR 250 000 or imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years (or both). 1.7 Finally, the draft law amends the Criminal Justice Act 2011 to include the offence of contravening the above new provisions.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 The draft law complements the CBI’s existing tasks, in particular in the field of supervision of financial service providers (including credit institutions), and, hence, does not confer genuinely new tasks on the CBI in this area. For example, in respect of credit institutions and investment firms, the CBI’s enforcement regime already applies to an institution which fails to report information or provides incomplete or inaccurate information contrary to various obligations arising from

text: Regulation (EU) No 575/2013

text: . It is an offence for a person to provide the CBI with false, misleading or inaccurate information in relation to any requirement arising from those provisions . 2.2 Pursuant to the provisions of

text: Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013

text: , the ECB has various supervisory and investigatory powers for the exclusive purpose of carrying out the tasks conferred upon the ECB in respect of the prudential supervision of credit institutions, including in Ireland. To the extent necessary to carry out the tasks conferred on the ECB by

text: Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013

text: , the ECB may require, by way of instructions, the CBI to make use of its powers under, and in accordance with, the conditions set out in Irish law, where this Regulation does not confer such powers on the ECB. Moreover, in the cases provided for by

text: Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013

text: , the ECB may require the CBI to open proceedings with a view to ensuring that appropriate penalties are imposed. In such cases, the CBI may only open proceedings at the request of the ECB but may ask the ECB to issue such request. The ECB and the CBI cooperate closely in the exercise of their respective supervisory and investigatory powers and in respect of the imposition of penalties . 2.3 The draft law would increase the CBI’s powers to take enforcement measures against those who provide false or misleading information to it and would allow such enforcement measures to be applied to a broad range of addressees, including credit institutions and natural persons who are or have been an officer or employee or agent of those credit institutions. Thus, for the purpose of carrying out the tasks conferred upon the ECB in respect of the prudential supervision of credit institutions, the ECB may require, by way of instructions, the CBI to make use of these new powers under Irish law. 2.4 Finally, it is not fully clear how the provisions of the draft law will interact with existing provisions that either: (i) set out the administrative sanctions that can be imposed by the CBI; or (ii) make the

text: provision of false or misleading information to the CBI a criminal offence . It may be useful to further examine whether there are specific gaps in the CBI’s powers to sanction financial service providers and their senior managers. In that respect, the ECB notes that the CBI has already provided comments to the Law Reform Commission in the context of its Issues Paper on ‘Regulatory Enforcement and Corporate Offences’ . The work of the Law Reform Commission and the comments of the CBI may also be of use in order to ensure that the draft law is targeted and effective and ensures the overall coherence of the regulatory and enforcement framework available to the CBI.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 11 May 2018.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: COM(2017) 824 final.

text: Se yttrande

text: och yttrande

text: . Alla ECB:s yttranden finns på ECB:s webbplats www.ecb.europa.eu

text: Rådets förordning

text: (EG) nr 1466/97

text: av den 7 juli 1997 om förstärkning av övervakningen av de offentliga finanserna samt övervakningen och samordningen av den ekonomiska politiken (EGT L 209, 2.8.1997, s. 1).

text: Rådets förordning

text: (EG) nr 1467/97

text: av den 7 juli 1997 om påskyndande och förtydligande av tillämpningen av förfarandet vid alltför stora underskott (EGT L 209, 2.8.1997, s. 6).

text: Stabilitets- och tillväxtpakten var en del av det lagstifningspaket som kallades för sexpacket (

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning (EU) nr 1173/2011 av den 16 november 2011

text: om effektiv övervakning av de offentliga finanserna i euroområdet (EUT L 306, 23.11.2011, s. 1),

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning (EU) nr 1174/2011 av den 16 november 2011

text: om verkställighetsåtgärder för att korrigera alltför stora makroekonomiska obalanser i euroområdet (EUT L 306, 23.11.2011, s. 8),

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning (EU) nr 1175/2011 av den 16 november 2011

text: om ändring av

text: rådets förordning (EG) nr 1466/97

text: om förstärkning av övervakningen av de offentliga finanserna samt övervakningen och samordningen av den ekonomiska politiken (EUT L 306, 23.11.2011, s. 12),

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning (EU) nr 1176/2011 av den 16 november 2011

text: om förebyggande och korrigering av makroekonomiska obalanser (EUT L 306, 23.11.2009, s. 25),

text: rådets förordning (EU) nr 1177/2011 av den 8 november 2011

text: om ändring av förordning

text: (EG) nr 1467/97

text: om påskyndande och förtydligande av tillämpningen av förfarandet vid alltför stora underskott (EUT L 306, 23.11.2011, s. 33), och

text: rådets direktiv 2011/85/EU av den 8 november 2011

text: om krav på medlemsstaternas budgetramverk (EUT L 306, 23.11.2011, s. 41) som trädde i kraft den 13 december 2011, samt det s.k. tvåpacket (

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning (EU) nr 472/2013 av den 21 maj 2013

text: om förstärkning av den ekonomiska övervakningen och övervakningen av de offentliga finanserna i medlemsstater i euroområdet som har, eller hotas av, allvarliga problem i fråga om sin finansiella stabilitet (EUT L 140, 27.5.2013, s. 1), och

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning (EU) nr 473/2013 av den 21 maj 2013

text: om gemensamma bestämmelser för övervakning och bedömning av utkast till budgetplaner och säkerställande av korrigering av alltför stora underskott i medlemsstater i euroområdet (EUT L 140, 27.5.2013, s. 11)) som trädde i kraft den 30 maj 2013.

text: Enligt artikel 16 i SSS-fördraget ska, på grundval av en utvärdering av erfarenheterna från dess genomförande, nödvändiga åtgärder vidtas i syfte att införliva innehållet i SSS-fördraget i unionens rättsliga ramar inom högst fem år efter det att SSS-fördraget har trätt i kraft, dvs. den 1 januari 2018. Detta är även i linje med de fem ordförandenas rapport, Färdigställandet av EU:s ekonomiska och monetära union, Rapport av Jean-Claude Juncker i nära samarbete med Donald Tusk, Jeroen Dijsselbloem, Mario Draghi och Martin Schulz, 22 juni 2015, finns på kommissionens webbplats www.ec.europa.eu

text: Den s.k. finanspakten framgår av avdelning III i SSS-fördraget.

text: Detta är något som måste beslutas av de fördragsslutande parter till SSS-fördraget.

text: Bilaga till EUF-fördraget.

text: Se artikel 3.2 b i direktivförslaget.

sprak: sv

title: Europeiska centralbankens yttrande av den 11 maj 2018 över ett förslag till rådets direktiv om fastställande av bestämmelser för att stärka det finanspolitiska ansvarstagandet och den medelfristiga budgetpolitiska inriktningen i medlemsstaterna (CON/2018/25)

text: Inledning och rättslig grund

text: Den 1 februari 2018 mottog Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) en begäran från Europeiska unionens råd om ett yttrande över ett förslag till rådets direktiv om fastställande av bestämmelser för att stärka det finanspolitiska ansvarstagandet och den medelfristiga budgetpolitiska inriktningen i medlemsstaterna (nedan kallat direktivförslaget).

text: ECB:s behörighet att avge ett yttrande grundas på artiklarna

text: och

text: i fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt (EUF-fördraget) eftersom direktivförslaget har betydelse för Europeiska centralbankssystemets huvudmål att upprätthålla prisstabilitet enligt artiklarna

text: och

text: i EUF-fördraget och

text: artikel 2 i stadgan

text: för Europeiska centralbankssystemet och Europeiska centralbanken (nedan kallad ECBS-stadgan). ECB är också behörig att avge ett yttrande om direktivförslaget enligt

text: artikel 126.14 i fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt

text: (EUF-fördraget), som är den rättsliga grunden för direktivförslaget, enligt vilken Europeiska unionens råd, med enhällighet i enlighet med ett särskilt lagstiftningsförfarande och efter att ha hört Europaparlamentet och ECB, får anta lämpliga bestämmelser som sedan ersätter protokoll (nr 12) om förfarandet vid alltför stora underskott, fogat till EUF-fördraget och fördraget om Europeiska unionen. I enlighet med artikel 17.5 första meningen i arbetsordningen för Europeiska centralbanken har detta yttrande antagits av ECB-rådet.

text: 1. Allmänna kommentarer

text: 1.1 Den finansiella och ekonomiska krisen har tydligt visat att en ambitiös reform av ramverket för den ekonomiska styrningen är ytterst viktig för Europeiska unionen, medlemsstaterna samt särskilt euroområdet. Stabilitets- och tillväxtpakten, som genomfördes och förstärktes genom sekundärlagstiftning i form av

text: rådets förordning (EG) nr 1466/97

text: och

text: rådets förordning (EG) nr 1467/97

text: , skapade ett starkare ramverk för övervakning och samordning av den ekonomiska politiken och finanspolitiken inom unionen.

text: 1.2 I linje med de ståndpunkter som uttryckts i samband med antagandet av ovan nämnda rättsakter välkomnar ECB direktivförslaget, vars mål är att integrera de bärande delarna av fördraget om stabilitet, samordning och styrning inom Ekonomiska och monetära unionen (SSS-fördraget) i unionens rättslig ram. Direktivförslaget är avsett att genomföra artikel 16 i SSS-fördraget enligt vilken nödvändiga åtgärder ska vidtas i syfte att införliva innehållet i SSS-fördraget i unionens rättsliga ramar inom högst fem år efter det att SSS-fördraget har trätt i kraft, dvs. den 1 januari 2018. Europeiska kommissionen anser att innehållet i SSS-fördraget överensstämmer med den s.k. finanspakten. ECB anser att flera ändringar av direktivförslaget är nödvändig för att ytterligare stärka det finanspolitiska ansvarstagandet i medlemsstaterna, förenkla regelverket och säkerställa ett mer effektivt genomförande och bättre efterlevnad av de finanspolitiska reglerna på både EU-nivå och nationell nivå.

text: 2. Specifika kommentarer

text: 2.1 Förenkling av den aktuella rättsliga ramen

text: 2.1.1 Direktivförslaget har som mål att förenkla lagstiftningen och säkerställa en effektivare och mer systematisk övervakning av genomförandet och efterlevnaden av de finanspolitiska reglerna på både unionsnivå och nationell nivå, som en del av unionens övergripande ram för ekonomisk styrning. Direktivförslaget har också som mål att minska den risk för dubbelarbete och motstridiga åtgärder som följer av att mellanstatliga arrangemang existerar jämsides med unionsrättsliga mekanismer. Enligt vad som framgår av punkt 1.2 välkomnar ECB direktivförslagets målsättningar, men ECB hyser tvivel om huruvida direktivförslaget kommer att uppnå dessa mål.

text: 2.1.2 Vad gäller SSS-fördraget är direktivförslagets mål att integrera finanspakten i unionsrätten. Bestämmelserna i direktivförslaget avviker dock på viktiga punkter från finanspakten, vilket kan leda till att bestämmelserna i finanspakten försvagas och att osäkerheten ökar om det finns flera uppsättningar finanspolitiska regler. Finanspaktens regler försvagas särskilt genom att direktivförslaget inte innehåller någon hänvisning till medlemsstaternas skyldigheter enligt finanspakten att de offentliga finanserna ska vara i balans eller uppvisa överskott, eller att begränsa det strukturella underskottet till högst 0,5 procent av bruttonationalprodukten, som får uppgå till högst 1 procent av bruttonationalprodukten om skuldsättningen ligger väsentligt under 60 procent av bruttonationalprodukten och när risken i fråga om långsiktiga hållbarhet är låg. Finanspakten innehåller också en skyldighet att säkerställa en snabb konvergens mot det medelfristiga målet i linje med stabilitets- och tillväxtpakten. ECB anser att dessa skyldigheter tydligt bör framgå av direktivförslaget.

text: 2.1.3 Dessutom kommer direktivförslaget inte att ersätta SSS-fördraget eftersom detta fördrag innehåller bestämmelser som går utöver direktivförslagets räckvidd. Eftersom SSS-fördraget även fortsättningsvis gäller för alla medlemsstater utom Republiken Tjeckien och Förenade kungariket, tycks direktivförslaget inte minska risken för duplicering och divergerande åtgärder som resultat av att mellanstatliga arrangemang existerar parallellt med de mekanismer som framgår av unionsrätten. I motiveringen till direktivförslaget anges att direktivförslaget inte påverkar de fördragsslutande parternas åtaganden enligt artiklarna 7 och 13 i SSS-fördraget. Direktivförslaget kommer dock att påverka åtagandena som medlemsstater som är fördragsslutande parter i SSS-fördraget har enligt artikel 3 i SSS-fördraget, som innehåller bestämmelserna om finanspakten, utan att dessa upphävs eller ersätts. Genom att samordna bestämmelserna i direktivförslaget med artikel 3 i SSS-fördraget skulle det skapas klarhet i hur SSS-fördraget och direktivförslaget samverkar, vilket skulle bidra till att nå direktivförslagets målsättningar.

text: 2.1.4 Enligt vad ECB förstår har de flesta medlemsstaterna som är fördragsslutande parter i SSS-fördraget redan genomfört bestämmelserna enligt finanspakten i sin nationella lagstiftning. I vissa fall har genomförandet skett på grundlagsnivå eller motsvarande. Eftersom finanspakten innehåller strängare bestämmelser än direktivförslaget, särskilt vad gäller den övre gränsen för det strukturella underskottet på högst 0,5 procent av bruttonationalprodukten, måste man utgå från att denna nationella lagstiftning också innehåller strängare finanspolitiska krav. Om medlemsstater som ännu inte fullt ut har införlivat finanspakten i sin nationella lagstiftning beslutar att genomföra finanspaktens bestämmelser på ett mindre strängt sätt pga. att direktivförslaget antas, eller om vissa medlemsstater beslutar att ändra sin nationella lagstiftning i denna riktning, kan resultatet bli att de finanspolitiska reglerna inom unionen varierar. Denna problemställning understryker ECB:s förslag, vilket framgår av punkt 2.1.2, att direktivförslaget tydligt bör återge de skyldigheter som framgår av finanspakten. Genom att säkerställa att de skyldigheter som framgår av finanspakten tydligt återges uppnår man ökad rättssäkerhet och likabehandling i hela unionen.

text: 2.1.5 Slutligen, vad gäller unionens finanspolitiska ram som helhet betraktad, tycks direktivförslaget innehålla bestämmelser som är snarlika eller hör samman med bestämmelser i stabilitets- och tillväxtpakten, sexpacket eller tvåpacket. Detta gäller t.ex. de bestämmelser genom vilka oberoende organ inrättas och som återfinns i direktivförslaget och i förordning

text: (EU) nr 473/2013

text: , samt bestämmelserna om numeriska finanspolitiska regler och medelfristiga budgetramverk enligt direktiv

text: . ECB anser att direktivförslaget i dessa fall måste förtydliga hur dess bestämmelser i praktiken kommer att samverka med existerande unionsrätt och, vid behov, ändra de relevanta rättsakterna för att uppnå rättssäkerhet.

text: 2.2 Medelfristiga mål

text: 2.2.1 Enligt direktivförslaget ska varje medlemsstat inrätta sin egen ram av bindande och permanenta numeriska finanspolitiska regler. Detta ramverk bör fastställa ett medelfristigt mål i termer av strukturellt saldo för att säkerställa att kvoten mellan skulden i den offentliga sektorn och bruttonationalprodukten till marknadspris inte överstiger det referensvärde som anges i artikel 1 i protokoll nr 12 om förfarandet vid alltför stora underskott eller närmar sig referensvärdet i tillfredsställande takt. ECB tolkar det som att detta medelfristiga mål inte avser det medelfristiga mål som definieras inom ramen för stabilitets- och tillväxtpakten, och särskilt förordning

text: (EG) nr 1466/97

text: , och att kommissionens mål är att skapa en skyldighet för medlemsstaterna att i sina finanspolitiska ramverk förankra ett medelfristigt mål som kan avvika från det medelfristiga målet enligt stabilitets- och tillväxtpakten. ECB anser att direktivförslaget på ett tydligt och heltäckande sätt måste definiera hur detta nya medelfristiga mål avseende den strukturella balansen definieras och, såsom framgår av punkt 2.1.2, hur det speglar finanspaktens övre gräns för det strukturella underskottet på 0,5 procent av bruttonationalprodukten. Genom att skapa en sådan definition skulle man säkerställa att medlemsstaterna känner till sina skyldigheter och att det finns enhetliga och harmoniserade finanspolitiska regler i unionen.

text: 2.2.2 Finanspakten innehåller också en skyldighet för de fördragsslutande parterna att säkerställa en snabb konvergens mot deras respektive medelfristiga mål i linje med stabilitets- och tillväxtpakten, där tidsramen för denna konvergens tar hänsyn till de landsspecifika aspekter i fråga om hållbarhet. ECB noterar att en skyldighet om att snabbt uppnå konvergens bör införas i direktivförslaget. ECB anser att konvergensen mot det medelfristiga mål som avses i direktivförslaget bör definieras mer i detalj, och att stabilitets- och tillväxtpaktens regler bör utgör ett minimimål för konvergenstakten.

text: 2.2.3 Slutligen välkomnar ECB medlemsstaternas skyldighet att i sin finanspolitiska planering inkludera en tillväxtbana på medellång sikt för de offentliga utgifterna rensade för diskretionära åtgärder på inkomstsidan som är bindande och permanent. Till skillnad från utgiftsreglerna som avses i finanspakten, som speglar bestämmelserna i stabilitets- och tillväxtpakten, uppställer direktivförslaget regler om fasta fleråriga utgiftsmål som ska tillämpas under en mandatperiod så snart en ny regering tillträder. Dessa mål ska följas i de årliga budgetarna under hela den perioden. Även om en sådan fast regel kan främja budgetdisciplin och skapa ytterligare finanspolitiskt utrymme när ekonomin växer, bör man förtydliga hur denna regel ska genomdrivas på medellång sikt. Direktivförslaget bör också förtydliga huruvida medlemsstaterna måste anpassa sina årliga utgiftsmål om ekonomin inte utvecklas så som medlemsstaterna planerat när de antog sina fleråriga utgiftsmål.

text: 2.3 Automatisk korrigeringsmekanism

text: 2.3.1 ECB välkomnar att det införs en automatisk korrigeringsmekanism, i linje med artikel 3.1 e i SSS-fördraget, som går utöver förfarandet för att korrigera avvikelser enligt

text: artikel 6.2 i förordning (EG) nr 1466/97

text: . Detta verktyg kommer att göra det möjligt för medlemsstaterna att korrigera avvikelser från det medelfristiga målet och anpassningsbanan mot det, och kompensera för avvikelser från regeringens bana för de offentliga utgifterna som avses i direktivförslaget.

text: 2.3.2 Trots detta har ECB identifierat ett antal aspekter på denna mekanism som kan förbättras för att säkerställa att den tillämpas på ett mer effektivt sätt i medlemsstaterna. Direktivförslaget anger visserligen att korrigeringsmekanismen automatiskt skulle aktiveras om betydande avvikelser konstateras, men direktivförslaget definierar inte detta uttryck och innehåller heller inga anvisningar om hur det ska tolkas. ECB föreslår att uttrycket betydande avvikelser konstateras definieras i direktivförslaget så att man uppnår rättslig klarhet om korrigeringsmekanismens tillämplighet.

text: 2.4 Oberoende organ

text: 2.4.1 ECB stöder de bestämmelser i direktivförslaget vars mål är att stärka de oberoende organens roll genom att ge dem mandat som går utöver deras aktuella uppgifter enligt förordning

text: (EU) nr 473/2013

text: . ECB välkomnar särskilt att principen om att följa eller motivera förankras i unionslagstiftningen, eftersom detta ger de oberoende organen en ökad betydelse för den finanspolitiska övervakningen. Förordning

text: (EU) nr 473/2013

text: innehåller dock redan bestämmelser om inrättandet av dessa oberoende organ och ger dem ett antal uppgifter. Direktivförslaget bör därför inte duplicera existerande unionslagstiftning, utan snarare utöka dessa oberoende organs uppgifter för att säkerställa att de har möjlighet att hantera direktivförslagets alla aspekter.

text: I de fall där ECB rekommenderar att direktivförslaget ska ändras anges de specifika förslagen i ett separat tekniskt arbetsdokument som åtföljs av en förklaring. Det tekniska arbetsdokumentet finns på engelska på ECB:s webbplats.