text: Annex to ED Decision 2014/032/R

text: Decision 2014/018/R of the Executive Director of the Agency of 24 April 2014 on adopting Acceptable Means of Compliance and Guidance Material to Part-SPO of

text: Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012

text: Annex to ED Decision 2014/032/R

text: Annex to ED Decision 2014/032/R

text: http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/33/CAP%20789.pdf. http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/33/CAPAP2003_04.PDF.

identifier: AMC & GM to Part-SPO — Amendment 1

beslut: ED Decision 2014/032/R

publisher: Europeiska unionens byrå för luftfartssäkerhet

sprak: en

title: AMC & GM to Part-SPO — Amendment 1

serie: amc-gm

text: Annex to Decision 2014/032/R

type: stycke

text: AMC and GM to Part-SPO – Amendment 1’

text: The Annex to Decision 2014/018/R is hereby amended as follows: The text of the amendment is arranged to show deleted, new or amended text as shown below:

text: 1. deleted text is marked with strike through;

text: 2. new or amended text is highlighted in grey; and

text: 3. an ellipsis (…) indicates that the remaining text is unchanged in front of or following the reflected amendment.

text: GM1 SPO.GEN.130 is amended as follows:

text: GM1 SPO.GEN.130 Portable electronic devices

text: DEFINITIONS (a) Definition and categories of PEDs PEDs are any kind of electronic device, typically but not limited to consumer electronics, brought on board the aircraft by crew members, passengers, or as part of the cargo and that are not included in the approved aircraft configuration. All equipment that is able to consume electrical energy falls under this definition. The electrical energy can be provided from internal sources as batteries (chargeable or non-rechargeable) or the devices may also be connected to specific aircraft power sources. PEDs fall intoinclude the following two categories: (1) Non-intentional transmitters can non-intentionally radiate RF transmissions, sometimes referred to as spurious emissions. This category includes, but is not limited to, computing equipmentcalculators, cameras, radio receivers, audio and video reproducersplayers, electronic games and toys; when these devices are not equipped with a transmitting function. In addition, portable, non-transmitting devices provided to assist crew members in their duties are included in this category. The category is identified as PED. (2) Intentional transmitters can radiate RF transmissions on specific frequencies as part of their intended function. In addition, they may radiate non-intentional transmissions like any PED. The term ‘transmitting PED’ (T-PED) is used to identify the transmitting capability of the PED. Intentional transmitters are transmitting devices such as RF-based remote control equipment, which may include some toys, two-way radios (sometimes referred to as private mobile radio), mobile phones of any type, satellite phones, computers with mobile phone data connection,

text: wireless fidelity (WIFI)wireless local area network (WLAN) or Bluetooth capability. After deactivation of the transmitting capability, e.g. by activating the so-called ‘flight mode’ or ‘flight safety mode’, the T-PED remains a PED having non-intentional emissions. (b) Definition of the switched-off status Many PEDs are not completely disconnected from the internal power source when switched off. The switching function may leave some remaining functionality e.g. data storage, timer, clock, etc. These devices can be considered switched off when in the deactivated status. The same applies for devices having no transmitting capability and are operated by coin cells without further deactivation capability, e.g. wrist watches.

text: GM2 SPO.GEN130 is amended as follows:

text: GM2 SPO.GEN.130 Portable electronic devices

text: GENERAL (a) PEDs can pose a risk of interference with electronically operated aircraft systems. Those systems could range from the electronic engine control, instruments, navigation or communication equipment and autopilots to any other type of avionic equipment on the aircraft. The interference can result in on-board systems malfunctioning or providing misleading information and communication disturbance. These can also lead to an increased workload for the flight crew. (b) Interference may be caused by transmitters being part of the PED’s functionality or by unintentional transmissions from the PED. Due to the likely proximity of the PED to any electronically operated aircraft system and the generally limited shielding found in small aircraft, the risk of interference is to be considered higher than that for larger aircraft with metal airframes. (c) During certification of the aircraft, when qualifying the aircraft functions consideration may only have been made of short-term exposure to a high radiating field, with an acceptable mitigating measure being a return to normal function after removal of the threat. This certification assumption may not be true when operating the transmitting PED on board the aircraft. (d) It has been found that compliance with the electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) Directive

text: and related European standards as indicated by the CE marking is not sufficient to exclude the existence of interference. A well-known interference is the demodulation of the transmitted signal from GSM (global system for mobile communications) mobile phones leading to audio disturbances in other systems. Similar interferences are difficult to predict during the PED design and protecting the aircraft’s electronic systems against the full range of potential interferences is practically impossible. Therefore, not operating PEDs on-board aircraft is the safest option, especially as effects may not be identified immediately but under the most inconvenient circumstances. (e) Guidance to follow in case of fire caused by PEDs is provided by the International Civil Aviation Organisation, ‘Emergency response guidance for aircraft incidents involving dangerous goods’, ICAO Doc 9481-AN/928.

text: GM3.SPO.GEN.130 is deleted:

text: GM3 SPO.GEN.130 Portable electronic devices

text: FIRE CAUSED BY PED A detailed discussion of fire caused by PEDs can be found in CAA UK CAP 789 edition 2, chapter 31, section 6 Fires in the cabin caused by PEDs and CAA PAPER 2003/4, Dealing With In-Flight Lithium Battery Fires in Portable Electronic Devices, M.J. Lain, D.A. Teagle, J. Cullen, V. Dass .

type: vagledning

utgivare: easa


identifier: AMC & GM to Part-SPO — Amendment 10

beslut: ED Decision 2018/003/R

title: AMC & GM to Part-SPO — Amendment 10

text: Annex V to ED Decision 2018/003/R

text: Annex V to Decision 2018/003/R

text: ‘AMC/GM to Part-SPO – Amendment 10’

text: The Annex to Decision 2014/018/R of 24 April 2014 is hereby amended as follows: The text of the amendment is arranged to show deleted, new or amended text as shown below:

text: GM1 SPO.GEN.107 is amended as follows:

text: GM1 SPO.GEN.107 Pilot-in-command responsibilities and authority

text: GENERAL In accordance with 1.c. of Annex IV to

text: Regulation (EC) No 216/2008

text: (Essential Requirements for air operations), the pilot-in-command is responsible for the operation and safety of the aircraft and for the safety of all crew members, task specialists and cargo on board. This includes the following: (a) the safety of all persons and cargo on board, as soon as he/she arrives on board, until he/she leaves the aircraft at the end of the flight; and (b) the operation and safety of the aircraft: (1) for aeroplanes, from the moment it is first ready to move for the purpose of flight until the moment it comes to rest at the end of the flight and the engine(s) used as primary propulsion unit(s) is/are shut down; (2) for helicopters, from the moment the engine(s) are started until the helicopter comes to rest at the end of the flight with the engine(s) shut down and the rotor blades stopped; or (3) for sailplanes, from the moment the launch procedure is started until the aircraft comes to rest at the end of the flight. ; or (4) for balloons, from the moment the inflating of the envelope is started until the envelope is deflated.

text: GM1 SPO.GEN.108(c) is deleted:

text: GM1 SPO.GEN.108(c) Pilot-in-command responsibilities and authority — balloons

text: PROTECTIVE CLOTHING Protective clothing includes: (a) long sleeves and trousers preferably made out of natural fibres; (b) stout footwear; and

text: Annex V to ED Decision 2018/003/R

text: (c) gloves.

text: GM1 SPO.OP.100 is deleted:

text: GM1 SPO.OP.100 Use of aerodromes and operating sites

text: ADEQUATE SITES — BALLOONS An adequate site is a site that the pilot-in-command considers to be satisfactory, taking account of the applicable performance requirements and site characteristics.

text: GM1 SPO.OP.225 is deleted:

text: GM1 SPO.OP.225 Operational limitations — hot-air balloons

text: AVOIDANCE OF NIGHT LANDING The intent of rule is to ensure that when the balloon takes off during night, sufficient fuel is on board for landing under VFR by day. The risk of collision with overhead lines is considerable and cannot be overstated. The risk is considerably increased during night flights in conditions of failing light and visibility when there is increasing pressure to land. A number of incidents have occurred in the late evening in just such conditions, and may have been avoided had an earlier landing been planned. Night landings should therefore be avoided by taking appropriate measures, including a larger quantity of fuel and/or additional safety equipment.

text: GM1 SPO.POL.105 is amended as follows:

text: GM1 SPO.POL.105 Mass and balance

text: GENERAL — OPERATIONS WITH OTHER-THAN-COMPLEX MOTOR-POWERED AIRCRAFT (a) New aircraft that have been weighed at the factory may be placed into operation without reweighing if the mass records and, except for balloons, balance records have been adjusted for alterations or modifications to the aircraft. Aircraft transferred from one EU operator to another EU operator do not have to be weighed prior to use by the receiving operator unless the mass and balance cannot be accurately established by calculation. (b) For aircraft other than balloons, theThe mass and the centre of gravity (CG) position of an aircraft should be revised whenever the cumulative changes to the dry operating mass exceed ± 0.5 % of the maximum landing mass or for aeroplanes the cumulative change in CG position exceeds 0.5 % of the mean aerodynamic chord. This may be done by weighing the aircraft or by calculation. If the AFM requires to record changes to mass and CG position below these thresholds, or to record changes in any case, and make them known to the pilot-in-command, mass and CG position should be revised accordingly and made known to the pilot-in-command. (c) The initial empty mass for a balloon is the balloon empty mass determined by a weighing performed by the manufacturer of the balloon before the initial entry into service (d) The mass of a balloon should be revised whenever the cumulative changes to the balloon empty mass due to modifications or repairs exceed ± 10 % of the initial empty mass. This may be done by weighing the balloon or by calculation.

text: Annex V to ED Decision 2018/003/R

text: In Subpart D (‘Instruments, data and equipment’), Section 4 (‘Balloons’) is deleted:

text: Section 4 Balloons

text: GM1 SPO.IDE.B.100(a) Instruments and equipment — general

text: APPLICABLE AIRWORTHINESS REQUIREMENTS The applicable airworthiness requirements for approval of instruments and equipment required by this Part are the following: (a)

text: Commission Regulation (EU) No 748/2012

text: for balloons registered in the EU; and (b) Airworthiness requirements of the state of registry for balloons registered outside the EU.

text: GM1 SPO.IDE.B.100(b) Instruments and equipment — general

text: REQUIRED INSTRUMENTS AND EQUIPMENT THAT DO NOT NEED TO BE APPROVED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE APPLICABLE AIRWORTHINESS REQUIREMENTS The functionality of non-installed instruments and equipment required by this Subpart and that do not need an equipment approval, as listed in SPO.IDE.B.100(b), should be checked against recognised industry standards appropriate to the intended purpose. The operator is responsible for ensuring the maintenance of these instruments and equipment.

text: GM1 SPO.IDE.B.100(c) Instruments and equipment — general

text: NOT REQUIRED INSTRUMENTS AND EQUIPMENT THAT DO NOT NEED TO BE APPROVED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE APPLICABLE AIRWORTHINESS REQUIREMENTS, BUT ARE CARRIED ON A FLIGHT (a) The provision of this paragraph does not exempt any installed instrument or item of equipment from complying with the applicable airworthiness requirements. In this case, the installation should be approved as required in the applicable airworthiness requirements and should comply with the applicable Certification Specifications. (b) The failure of additional non-installed instruments or equipment not required by this Part or by the applicable airworthiness requirements or any applicable airspace requirements should not adversely affect the airworthiness and/or the safe operation of the balloon. Examples may be portable electronic devices carried by crew members or task specialists.

text: AMC1 SPO.IDE.B.110 Operating lights

text: ANTI-COLLISION LIGHTS An acceptable means of compliance is the anti-collision light required for free manned balloons certified for VFR at night in accordance with CS-31HB/GB.

text: ILLUMINATION FOR INSTRUMENTS AND EQUIPMENT A means to provide adequate illumination to instruments and equipment essential to the safe operation of the balloon may be an independent portable light.

text: AMC1 SPO.IDE.B.115(a) Operations under VFR — flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment

text: MEANS OF DISPLAYING DRIFT DIRECTION The drift direction may be determined by using a map and reference to visual landmarks.

text: Annex V to ED Decision 2018/003/R

text: AMC1 SPO.IDE.B.115(b)(1) Operations under VFR — flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment

text: MEANS OF MEASURING AND DISPLAYING THE TIME A means of measuring and displaying the time in hours, minutes and seconds may be a wrist watch capable of the same functions.

text: GM1 SPO.IDE.B.115(b)(2) Operations under VFR — flight and navigational instruments

text: MEANS OF MEASURING AND DISPLAYING VERTICAL SPEED The necessity of a vertical speed indicator depends on the balloon design. Some envelope shapes have a high drag and will therefore not develop a high ascent/descent speed. Such balloons usually do not require a vertical speed indicator. More slender envelope shapes such as special shape balloons may have a significantly lower drag. Their ascent/descent speed is usually limited to a certain value so that controllability of the balloon is maintained. To be able to stay within this limitation of the AFM, a vertical speed indicator is required for such balloons.

text: GM1 SPO.IDE.B.115(b)(3) Operations under VFR — flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment

text: MEANS OF MEASURING AND DISPLAYING PRESSURE ALTITUDE A means of measuring and displaying pressure altitude is needed when required by ATC, or by Commission Implementing

text: Regulation (EU) No 923/2012

text: , or when altitude needs to be checked for flights where oxygen is used, or the limitations in the AFM require to limit altitude and/or rate of climb/descent.

text: AMC1 SPO.IDE.B.120 First-aid kit

text: CONTENT OF FIRST-AID KITS (a) First-aid kits should be equipped with appropriate and sufficient medications and instrumentation. However, these kits should be amended by the operator according to the characteristics of the operation (scope of operation, flight duration, number and demographics of passengers, etc.). (b) The following should be included in the FAKs: (1) bandages (assorted sizes), (2) burns dressings (large and small), (3) wound dressings (large and small), (4) adhesive dressings (assorted sizes), (5) antiseptic wound cleaner, (6) safety scissors, and (7) disposable gloves.

text: AMC2 SPO.IDE.B.120 First-aid kit

text: MAINTENANCE OF FIRST-AID KIT To be kept up to date, first-aid kits should be: (a) inspected periodically to confirm, to the extent possible, that contents are maintained in the condition necessary for their intended use; (b) replenished at regular intervals, in accordance with instructions contained on their labels, or as circumstances warrant; and

text: Annex V to ED Decision 2018/003/R

text: (c) replenished after use in-flight at the first opportunity where replacement items are available.

text: AMC1 SPO.IDE.B.125 Hand fire extinguishers

text: CERTIFICATION SPECIFICATIONS The applicable Certification Specification for hot-air balloons should be CS-31HB or equivalent.

text: AMC1 SPO.IDE.B.130 Flight over water

text: RISK ASSESSMENT (a) When conducting the risk assessment, the pilot-in-command should base his/her decision, as far as is practicable, on the Implementing Rules and AMCs applicable to the operation of the balloon. (b) The pilot-in-command should, for determining the risk, take the following operating environment and conditions into account: (1) sea state; (2) sea and air temperatures; (3) the distance from land suitable for making an emergency landing; and (4) the availability of search and rescue facilities.

text: AMC1 SPO.IDE.B.130(a) Flight over water

text: MEANS OF ILLUMINATION FOR LIFE-JACKETS Each life-jacket or equivalent individual flotation device should be equipped with a means of electric illumination for the purpose of facilitating the location of persons.

text: AMC1 SPO.IDE.B.130(b) Flight over water

text: BATTERIES (a) All batteries used in ELTs or PLBs should be replaced (or recharged, if the battery is rechargeable) when the equipment has been in use for more than 1 cumulative hour or in the following cases: (1) Batteries specifically designed for use in ELTs and having an airworthiness release certificate (EASA Form 1 or equivalent) should be replaced (or recharged, if the battery is rechargeable) before the end of their useful life in accordance with the maintenance instructions applicable to the ELT. (2) Standard batteries manufactured in accordance with an industry standard and not having an airworthiness release certificate (EASA Form 1 or equivalent), when used in ELTs should be replaced (or recharged, if the battery is rechargeable) when 50 % of their useful life (or for rechargeable, 50 % of their useful life of charge), as established by the battery manufacturer, has expired. (3) All batteries used in PLBs should be replaced (or recharged, if the battery is rechargeable) when 50 % of their useful life (or for rechargeable, 50 % of their useful life of charge), as established by the battery manufacturer, has expired. (4) The battery useful life (or useful life of charge) criteria in (1),(2) and (3) do not apply to batteries (such as water-activated batteries) that are essentially unaffected during probable storage intervals. (b) The new expiry date for a replaced (or recharged) battery should be legibly marked on the outside of the equipment.

text: Annex V to ED Decision 2018/003/R

text: AMC2 SPO.IDE.B.130(b) Flight over water

text: TYPES OF ELT AND GENERAL TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS (a) The ELT required by this provision should be one of the following: (1) Automatic fixed (ELT(AF)). An automatically activated ELT that is permanently attached to an aircraft and is designed to aid SAR teams in locating the crash site. (2) Automatic portable (ELT(AP)). An automatically activated ELT that is rigidly attached to an aircraft before a crash, but is readily removable from the aircraft after a crash. It functions as an ELT during the crash sequence. If the ELT does not employ an integral antenna, the aircraftmounted antenna may be disconnected and an auxiliary antenna (stored on the ELT case) attached to the ELT. The ELT can be tethered to a survivor or a life-raft. This type of ELT is intended to aid SAR teams in locating the crash site or survivor(s). (3) Automatic deployable (ELT(AD)). An ELT that is rigidly attached to the aircraft before the crash and which is automatically ejected, deployed and activated by an impact, and, in some cases, also by hydrostatic sensors. Manual deployment is also provided. This type of ELT should float in water and is intended to aid SAR teams in locating the crash site. (4) Survival ELT (ELT(S)). An ELT that is removable from an aircraft, stowed so as to facilitate its ready use in an emergency and manually activated by a survivor. An ELT(S) may be activated manually or automatically (e.g. by water activation). It should be designed to be tethered to a life-raft or a survivor. (b) To minimise the possibility of damage in the event of crash impact, the automatic ELT should be rigidly fixed to the aircraft structure, as far aft as is practicable, with its antenna and connections arranged so as to maximise the probability of the signal being transmitted after a crash. (c) Any ELT carried should operate in accordance with the relevant provisions of ICAO Annex 10, Volume III and should be registered with the national agency responsible for initiating search and rescue or other nominated agency.

text: AMC3 SPO.IDE.B.130(b) Flight over water

text: PLB TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS (a) A personal locator beacon (PLB) should have a built-in GNSS receiver with a cosmicheskaya sistyema poiska avariynich sudov — search and rescue satellite-aided tracking (COSPAS-SARSAT) type approval number. However, devices with a COSPAS-SARSAT with a number belonging to series 700 are excluded as this series of numbers identifies the special-use beacons not meeting all the technical requirements and all the tests specified by COSPAS-SARSAT. (b) Any PLB carried should be registered with the national agency responsible for initiating search and rescue or other nominated agency.

text: AMC4 SPO.IDE.B.130(b) Flight over water

text: BRIEFING ON PLB use When a PLB is carried by a task specialist, he/she should be briefed on its characteristics and use by the pilot-in-command before the flight.

text: GM1 SPO.IDE.B.130(b) Flight over water

text: Annex V to ED Decision 2018/003/R

text: TERMINOLOGY (a) An ELT is a generic term describing equipment that broadcasts distinctive signals on designated frequencies and, depending on application, may be activated by impact or may be manually activated. (b) A PLB is an emergency beacon other than an ELT that broadcasts distinctive signals on designated frequencies, is standalone, portable and is manually activated by the survivors.

text: GM1 SPO.IDE.B.130(c) Flight over water

text: SIGNALLING EQUIPMENT The signalling equipment for making distress signals is described in ICAO Annex 2, Rules of the Air.

text: AMC1 SPO.IDE.B.135 Survival equipment

text: GENERAL Balloons operated across land areas in which search and rescue would be especially difficult should be equipped with the following: (a) signalling equipment to make the distress signals; (b) at least one ELT(S) or a PLB; and (c) additional survival equipment for the route to be flown taking account of the number of persons on board.

text: AMC2 SPO.IDE.B.135 Survival equipment

text: ADDITIONAL SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT (a) The following additional survival equipment should be carried when required: (1) 500 ml of water for each four, or fraction of four, persons on board; (2) one knife; (3) first-aid equipment; and (4) one set of air/ground codes. (b) If any item of equipment contained in the above list is already carried on board the balloon in accordance with another requirement, there is no need for this to be duplicated.

text: GM2 SPO.IDE.B.135 Survival equipment

text: AREAS IN WHICH SEARCH AND RESCUE WOULD BE ESPECIALLY DIFFICULT The expression ‘areas in which search and rescue would be especially difficult’ should be interpreted, in this context, as meaning: (a) areas so designated by the authority responsible for managing search and rescue; or (b) areas that are largely uninhabited and where: (1) the authority referred to in (a) cue has not published any information to confirm whether search and rescue would be or would not be especially difficult; and (2) the authority referred to in (a) does not, as a matter of policy, designate areas as being especially difficult for search and rescue.

text: Annex V to ED Decision 2018/003/R

text: AMC1 SPO.IDE.B.140(a)(3) Miscellaneous equipment

text: FIRE BLANKET A fire blanket should comply with EN 1869 or equivalent. The size should be at least 1.5 m x 2 m. Smaller sizes are not recommended as they cannot sufficiently cover the source of developing propane fire.

text: AMC1 SPO.IDE.B.140 (b)(1) Miscellaneous equipment

text: KNIFE The knife, hook knife or equivalent, should be capable of cutting any control line or handling rope that is accessible to the pilot-in-command or a crew member from the basket.

text: GM1 SPO.IDE.B.145 Radio communication equipment

text: APPLICABLE AIRSPACE REQUIREMENTS For balloons being operated under European air traffic control, the applicable airspace requirements include the Single European Sky legislation.

text: AMC1 SPO.IDE.B.150 Transponder

text: GENERAL (a) The SSR transponders of balloons being operated under European air traffic control should comply with any applicable Single European Sky legislation. (b) If the Single European Sky legislation is not applicable, the SSR transponders should operate in accordance with the relevant provisions of Volume IV of ICAO Annex 10.


identifier: AMC & GM to Part-SPO — Amendment 3

beslut: ED Decision 2015/021/R

title: AMC & GM to Part-SPO — Amendment 3

text: Annex III to ED Decision 2015/021/R

text: ‘AMC and GM to Part-SPO — Amendment 3’

type: rubrik

text: The Annex to Decision 2014/018/R (AMC/GM to Annex VIII (Part-SPO) to

text: Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012

text: ) is amended as follows: The text of the amendment is arranged to show deleted, new or amended text as shown below:

text: 1. deleted text is marked with strike through;

text: 2. new or amended text is highlighted in grey; and

text: 3. an ellipsis (…) indicates that the remaining text is unchanged in front of or following the reflected amendment.

text: 1. AMC1 SPO.GEN.145(b) has been amended as follows: AMC1 SPO.GEN.145(b) Preservation, production and use of flight recorder recordings OPERATIONAL INSPECTIONS AND CHECKS OF RECORDINGS Whenever a flight recorder is required to be carried, the operator should: (a) the operator should perform an annual inspection of flight data recorder (FDR) recording and cockpit voice recorder (CVR) recording the FDR recording and the CVR recording every year unless one or more of the following applies: (1) If the flight recorder records on magnetic wire or uses frequency modulation technology, the time interval between two inspections of the recording should not exceed three months. (1) Where two solid-state FDRs both fitted with internal built-in-test equipment sufficient to monitor reception and recording of data share the same acquisition unit, a comprehensive recording inspection need only be performed for one FDR. For the second FDR, checking its internal built-in-test equipment is sufficient. The inspection should be performed alternately such that each FDR is inspected once every other year. (2) If the flight recorder is solid-state and the flight recorder system is fitted with continuous monitoring for proper operation, the time interval between two inspections of the recording may be up to two years. (3) In the case of an aircraft equipped with two solid-state flight data and cockpit voice combination recorders, where (i) the flight recorder systems are fitted with continuous monitoring for proper operation, and (ii) the flight recorders share the same flight data acquisition, a comprehensive inspection of the recording needs only to be performed for one flight recorder position. The inspection of the recordings should be performed alternately so that each flight recorder position is inspected at least every four years. (2)(4) Where all of the following conditions are met, the FDR recording inspection of FDR recording is not needed: (i) the aircraft flight data are collected in the frame of a flight data monitoring (FDM) programme; (ii) the data acquisition of mandatory flight parameters is the same for the FDR and for the recorder used for the FDM programme; (iii) an inspection similar to the inspection of the FDR recording and covering all mandatory flight parameters is conducted on the FDM data at time intervals not exceeding two years the integrity of all mandatory flight parameters is verified by the FDM programme; and (iv) the FDR is solid-state and the FDR system is fitted with ‘continuous monitoring for proper operation’ an internal built-in-test equipment sufficient to monitor reception and recording of data. (3) Where two solid-state CVRs are both fitted with internal built-in-test equipment sufficient to monitor reception and recording of data, a comprehensive recording inspection need only to be performed for one CVR. For the second CVR, checking its internal built-in-test equipment is sufficient. The inspection should be performed alternately such that each CVR is inspected once every other year. (b) the operator should perform every 5 five years an inspection of the data link recording. (c) when installed, the aural or visual means for preflight checking the flight recorders for proper operation should be used every day. When no such means is available for a flight recorder, the operator should perform an operational check of this flight recorder at time intervals not exceeding seven calendar days of operation. (c)(d) the operator should check every 5 five years, or in accordance with the recommendations of the sensor manufacturer, that the parameters dedicated to the FDR and not monitored by other means are being recorded within the calibration tolerances and that there is no discrepancy in the engineering conversion routines for these parameters.

text: 2. GM1 SPO.GEN.145(b) has been amended as follows: GM1 SPO.GEN.145(b) Preservation, production and use of flight recorder recordings INSPECTION OF THE FLIGHT RECORDERS RECORDINGS (a) The inspection of the FDR recording usually consists of the following: (1) Making a copy of the complete recording file. (2) Converting the recording to parameters expressed in engineering units in accordance with the documentation required to be held. (2)(3) Examining a whole flight in engineering units to evaluate the validity of all mandatory parameters - this could reveal defects or noise in the measuring and processing chains and indicate necessary maintenance actions. The following should be considered: (i) when applicable, each parameter should be expressed in engineering units and checked for different values of its operational range - for this purpose, some parameters may need to be inspected at different flight phases; and (ii) if the parameter is delivered by a digital data bus and the same data are utilised for the operation of the aircraft, then a reasonableness check may be sufficient; otherwise a correlation check may need to be performed;: (A) a reasonableness check is understood in this context as a subjective, qualitative evaluation, requiring technical judgement, of the recordings from a complete flight; and (B) a correlation check is understood in this context as the process of comparing data recorded by the flight data recorder against the corresponding data derived from flight instruments, indicators or the expected values obtained during specified portion(s) of a flight profile or during ground checks that are conducted for that purpose. (3)(4) Retaining the most recent copy of the complete recording file and the corresponding recording inspection report that includes references to the documentation required to be held. (b) The inspection of the CVR recording usually consists of: (1) checking that the CVR operates correctly for the nominal duration of the recording; (2) examining, where practicable and subject to prior approval by the flight crew, a sample of inflight recording of the CVR for evidence that the signal is acceptable on each channel; and (3) preparing and retaining an inspection report. (…)

text: 3. A new GM2 SPO.GEN.145(b) has been introduced: GM2 SPO.GEN.145(b) Preservation, production and use of flight recorders recordings MONITORING AND CHECKING THE PROPER OPERATION OF FLIGHT RECORDERS — EXPLANATION OF TERMS For the understanding of the terms used in AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(b): (a) ‘operational check of the flight recorder’ means a check of the flight recorder for proper operation. It is not a check of the quality of the recording and, therefore, it is not equivalent to an inspection of the recording. This check can be carried out by the flight crew or through a maintenance task. (b) ‘aural or visual means for preflight checking the flight recorders for proper operation’ means an aural or visual means for the flight crew to check before the flight the results of an automatically or manually initiated test of the flight recorders for proper operation. Such a means provides for an operational check that can be performed by the flight crew. (c) ‘flight recorder system’ means the flight recorder, its dedicated sensors and transducers, as well as its dedicated acquisition and processing equipment. (d) ‘continuous monitoring for proper operation’ means for a flight recorder system, a combination of system monitors and built-in test functions which operates continuously in order to detect the following: (1) loss of electrical power to the flight recorder system; (2) failure of the equipment performing acquisition and processing; (3) failure of the recording medium and/or drive mechanism; and (4) failure of the recorder to store the data in the recording medium as shown by checks of the recorded data including, as reasonably practicable for the storage medium concerned, correct correspondence with the input data.

text: 4. AMC1 SPO.IDE.A.140 has been amended as follows: AMC1 SPO.IDE.A.160 Cockpit voice recorder GENERAL (a) The operational performance requirements for cockpit voice recorders (CVRs) should be those laid down in the European Organisation for Civil Aviation Equipment (EUROCAE) Document ED-112 (Minimum Operational Performance Specification for Crash Protected Airborne Recorder Systems), dated March 2003, including amendments n°1 and 2, or any later equivalent standard produced by EUROCAE. (b) The operational performance requirements for equipment dedicated to the CVR should be those laid down in the European Organisation for Civil Aviation Equipment (EUROCAE) Document ED-56A (Minimum Operational Performance Requirements For Cockpit Voice Recorder Systems) dated December 1993, or EUROCAE Document ED-112 (Minimum Operational Performance Specification for Crash Protected Airborne Recorder Systems) dated March 2003, including Amendments n°1 and n°2 , or any later equivalent standard produced by EUROCAE.

text: 5. In AMC1 SPO.IDE.A.145, the content of the last row of Table 1 (Parameter No 75) has been deleted from this table and inserted into Table 2, between Parameters Nos 74 and 76.

text: 6. In Table 1 of AMC1 SPO.IDE.A.145, the description of Parameter No 18 has been amended as follows: 18 Primary flight control surface and/or primary flight control pilot input (for aeroplanes with control systems in which movement of a control surface will back drive the pilot’s control, ‘or’ applies. For aeroplanes with control systems in which movement of a control surface will not back drive the pilot’s control, ‘and’ applies. Ffor multiple or split surfaces, a suitable combination of inputs is acceptable in lieu of recording each surface separately. For aeroplanes that have a flight control break-away capability that allows either pilot to operate the controls independently, record both inputs): 18a Pitch axis 18b Roll axis 18c Yaw axis

text: 7. AMC1 SPO.IDE.H.140 has been amended as follows: AMC1 SPO.IDE.H.140 Cockpit voice recorder GENERAL (a) The operational performance requirements for cockpit voice recorders (CVRs) should be those laid down in EUROCAE Document ED-112 (Minimum Operational Performance Specification for Crash Protected Airborne Recorder Systems), dated March 2003, including amendments n°1 and 2, or any later equivalent standard produced by EUROCAE. (b) The operational performance requirements for equipment dedicated to the CVR should be those laid down in the European Organisation for Civil Aviation Equipment (EUROCAE) Document ED-56A (Minimum Operational Performance Requirements For Cockpit Voice Recorder Systems) dated December 1993, or EUROCAE Document ED-112 (Minimum Operational Performance Specification for Crash Protected Airborne Recorder Systems) dated March 2003, including amendments n°1 and n°2 , or any later equivalent standard produced by EUROCAE.


identifier: AMC & GM to Part-SPO — Amendment 4

beslut: ED Decision 2015/030/R

title: AMC & GM to Part-SPO — Amendment 4

text: Annex IV to ED Decision 2015/030/R ‘AMC and GM to Part-SPO — Amendment 4’

text: The Annex to Decision 2014/018/R is amended as follows: The text of the amendment is arranged to show deleted text, new or amended text as shown below: (a) deleted text is marked with strikethrough; (b) new or amended text is highlighted in grey; (c) an ellipsis (…) indicates that the remaining text is unchanged in front of or following the reflected amendment.

text: 1. A new GM to sub-paragraph (a)(9) of SPO.GEN.107 is introduced: GM1 SPO.GEN.107(a)(9) Pilot-in-command responsibilities and authority IDENTIFICATION OF THE SEVERITY OF AN OCCURRENCE BY THE PILOT-IN-COMMAND The definitions of an accident and a serious incident as well as examples thereof can be found in

text: Regulation (EU) No 996/2010

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council.

text: 2. A new AMC to sub-paragraph (a) of SPO.GEN.145 is developed: AMC1 SPO.GEN.145(a) Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection and use PRESERVATION OF RECORDED DATA FOR INVESTIGATION (a) The operator should establish procedures to ensure that flight recorder recordings are preserved for the investigating authority. (b) These procedures should include: (1) instructions for flight crew members to deactivate the flight recorders immediately after completion of the flight and inform relevant personnel that the recording of the flight recorders should be preserved. These instructions should be readily available on board; and (2) instructions to prevent inadvertent reactivation, test, repair or reinstallation of the flight recorders by operator personnel or during maintenance or ground handling activities performed by third parties.

text: 3. GM1 SPO.GEN.145(a) is amended as follows: GM1 SPO.GEN.145(a) Preservation, production and use of flight recorder recordings Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection and use REMOVAL OF RECORDERS IN CASE OF AN INVESTIGATION The need for removal of the recorders from the aircraft is determined by the investigating authority with due regard to the seriousness of an occurrence and the circumstances, including the impact on the operation.

text: 4. AMC1 SPO.GEN.145(b) is amended as follows: AMC1 SPO.GEN.145(b) Preservation, production and use of flight recorder recordings Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection and use

text: 5. GM1 SPO.GEN.145(b) is amended as follows: GM1 SPO.GEN.145(b) Preservation, production and use of flight recorder recordings Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection and use (…) (b) When performing the CVR recording inspection, precautions need to be taken to comply with SPO.GEN.145(f)(1a). The inspection of the CVR recording usually consists of (…)

text: 6. GM2 SPO.GEN.145(b) is amended as follows: GM2 SPO.GEN.145(b) Preservation, production and use of flight recorder recordings Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection and use

text: 7. A new GM3 SPO.GEN.145(b) is introduced: GM3 SPO.GEN.145(b) Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection and use CVR AUDIO QUALITY Examples of CVR audio quality issues and possible causes thereof may be found in the document of the French Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses, titled ‘Study on detection of audio anomalies on CVR recordings’ and dated September 2015 .

text: 8. A new GM to sub-paragraph (a) of SPO.IDE.A.150 is introduced: GM1 SPO.IDE.A.150(a) Data link recording APPLICABILITY OF THE DATA LINK RECORDING REQUIREMENT (a) If it is certain that the aeroplane cannot use data link communication messages for ATS communications corresponding to any application designated by SPO.IDE.A.150(a)(1), then the data link recording requirement does not apply. (b) Examples where the aeroplane cannot use data link communication messages for ATS communications include but are not limited to the cases where: (1) the aeroplane data link communication capability is disabled permanently and in a way that it cannot be enabled again during the flight; (2) data link communications are not used to support air traffic service (ATS) in the area of operation of the aeroplane; and (3) the aeroplane data link communication equipment cannot communicate with the equipment used by ATS in the area of operation of the aeroplane.

text: 9. A new GM to sub-paragraph (a) of SPO.IDE.H.150 is introduced: GM1 SPO.IDE.H.150(a) Data link recording APPLICABILITY OF THE DATA LINK RECORDING REQUIREMENT (a) If it is certain that the helicopter cannot use data link communication messages for ATS communications corresponding to any application designated by SPO.IDE.H.150(a)(1), then the data link recording requirement does not apply. (b) Examples where the helicopter cannot use data link communication messages for ATS communications include but are not limited to the cases where: (1) the helicopter data link communication capability is disabled permanently and in a way that it cannot be enabled again during the flight; (2) data link communications are not used to support air traffic service (ATS) in the area of operation of the helicopter; and (3) the helicopter data link communication equipment cannot communicate with the equipment used by ATS in the area of operation of the helicopter.


identifier: AMC & GM to Part-SPO — Amendment 5

beslut: ED Decision 2016/021/R

title: AMC & GM to Part-SPO — Amendment 5

text: Annex to ED Decision 2016/021/R

text: Annex to Decision 2016/021/R

text: ‘AMC/GM to Part-SPO — Amendment 5’

text: The Annex to Decision 2014/018/R is hereby amended as follows:

text: The text of the amendment is arranged to show deleted, new or amended text as shown below:

text: 1. deleted text is marked with strike through;

text: 2. new or amended text is highlighted in grey; and

text: 3. an ellipsis (…) indicates that the remaining text is unchanged in front of or following the reflected amendment.

text: 1. The following AMC/GM have been introduced:

text: Subpart A — General requirements

text: AMC1 SPO.GEN.107 Pilot-in-command responsibilities and authority

text: FLIGHT PREPARATION FOR PBN OPERATIONS (a) The flight crew should ensure that RNAV 1, RNAV 2, RNP 1 RNP 2, and RNP APCH routes or procedures to be used for the intended flight, including for any alternate aerodromes, are selectable from the navigation database and are not prohibited by NOTAM. (b) The flight crew should take account of any NOTAMs or operator briefing material that could adversely affect the aircraft system operation along its flight plan including any alternate aerodromes. (c) When PBN relies on GNSS systems for which RAIM is required for integrity, its availability should be verified during the preflight planning. In the event of a predicted continuous loss of fault detection of more than five minutes, the flight planning should be revised to reflect the lack of full PBN capability for that period. (d) For RNP 4 operations with only GNSS sensors, a fault detection and exclusion (FDE) check should be performed. The maximum allowable time for which FDE capability is projected to be unavailable on any one event is 25 minutes. If predictions indicate that the maximum allowable FDE outage will be exceeded, the operation should be rescheduled to a time when FDE is available. (e) For RNAV 10 operations, the flight crew should take account of the RNAV 10 time limit declared for the inertial system, if applicable, considering also the effect of weather conditions that could affect flight duration in RNAV 10 airspace. Where an extension to the time limit is permitted, the flight crew will need to ensure that en route that radio facilities are serviceable before departure, and to apply radio updates in accordance with any AFM limitation.

text: Annex to ED Decision 2016/021/R

text: AMC2 SPO.GEN.107 Pilot-in-command responsibilities and authority

text: DATABASE SUITABILITY (a) The flight crew should check that any navigational database required for PBN operations includes the routes and procedures required for the flight. DATABASE CURRENCY (b) The database validity (current AIRAC cycle) should be checked before the flight. (c) Navigation databases should be current for the duration of the flight. If the AIRAC cycle is due to change during flight, the flight crew should follow procedures established by the operator to ensure the accuracy of navigation data, including the suitability of navigation facilities used to define the routes and procedures for the flight. (d) An expired database may only be used if the following conditions are satisfied: (1) the operator has confirmed that the parts of the database which are intended to be used during the flight and any contingencies that are reasonable to expect are not changed in the current version; (2) any NOTAMs associated with the navigational data are taken into account; (3) maps and charts corresponding to those parts of the flight are current and have not been amended since the last cycle; (4) any MEL limitations are observed; and (5) the database has expired by no more than 28 days. …

text: Subpart B — Operational procedures

text: AMC1 SPO.OP.116 Performance-based navigation — aeroplanes and helicopters

text: PBN OPERATIONS For operations where a navigation specification for performance-based navigation (PBN) has been prescribed and no specific approval is required in accordance with SPA.PBN.100, the operator should: (a) establish operating procedures specifying: (1) normal, abnormal and contingency procedures; (2) electronic navigation database management; and (3) relevant entries in the minimum equipment list (MEL); (b) specify the flight crew qualification and proficiency constraints and ensure that the training programme for relevant personnel is consistent with the intended operation; and (c) ensure continued airworthiness of the area navigation system.

text: Annex to ED Decision 2016/021/R

text: AMC2 SPO.OP.116 Performance-based navigation — aeroplanes and helicopters

text: MONITORING AND VERIFICATION (a) Preflight and general considerations (1) At navigation system initialisation, the flight crew should confirm that the navigation database is current and verify that the aircraft position has been entered correctly, if required. (2) The active flight plan, if applicable, should be checked by comparing the charts or other applicable documents with navigation equipment and displays. This includes confirmation of the departing runway and the waypoint sequence, reasonableness of track angles and distances, any altitude or speed constraints, and, where possible, which waypoints are fly-by and which are fly-over. Where relevant, the RF leg arc radii should be confirmed. (3) The flight crew should check that the navigation aids critical to the operation of the intended PBN procedure are available. (4) The flight crew should confirm the navigation aids that should be excluded from the operation, if any. (5) An arrival, approach or departure procedure should not be used if the validity of the procedure in the navigation database has expired. (6) The flight crew should verify that the navigation systems required for the intended operation are operational. (b) Departure (1) Prior to commencing a take-off on a PBN procedure, the flight crew should check that the indicated aircraft position is consistent with the actual aircraft position at the start of the take-off roll (aeroplanes) or lift-off (helicopters). (2) Where GNSS is used, the signal should be acquired before the take-off roll (aeroplanes) or lift-off (helicopters) commences. (3) Unless automatic updating of the actual departure point is provided, the flight crew should ensure initialisation on the runway or FATO by means of a manual runway threshold or intersection update, as applicable. This is to preclude any inappropriate or inadvertent position shift after take-off. (c) Arrival and approach (1) The flight crew should verify that the navigation system is operating correctly and the correct arrival procedure and runway (including any applicable transition) are entered and properly depicted. (2) Any published altitude and speed constraints should be observed. (3) The flight crew should check approach procedures (including alternate aerodromes if needed) as extracted by the system (e.g. CDU flight plan page) or presented graphically on the moving map, in order to confirm the correct loading and the reasonableness of the procedure content.

text: Annex to ED Decision 2016/021/R

text: (4) Prior to commencing the approach operation (before the IAF), the flight crew should verify the correctness of the loaded procedure by comparison with the appropriate approach charts. This check should include: (i) the waypoint sequence; (ii) reasonableness of the tracks and distances of the approach legs and the accuracy of the inbound course; and (iii) the vertical path angle, if applicable. (d) Altimetry settings for RNP APCH operations using Baro VNAV (1) Barometric settings (i) The flight crew should set and confirm the correct altimeter setting and check that the two altimeters provide altitude values that do not differ more than 100 ft at the most at or before the FAF. (ii) The flight crew should fly the procedure with: (A) a current local altimeter setting source available — a remote or regional altimeter setting source should not be used; and (B) the QNH/QFE, as appropriate, set on the aircraft’s altimeters. (2) Temperature compensation (i) For RNP APCH operations to LNAV/VNAV minima using Baro VNAV: (A) the flight crew should not commence the approach when the aerodrome temperature is outside the promulgated aerodrome temperature limits for the procedure unless the area navigation system is equipped with approved temperature compensation for the final approach; (B) when the temperature is within promulgated limits, the flight crew should not make compensation to the altitude at the FAF and DA/H; and (C) since only the final approach segment is protected by the promulgated aerodrome temperature limits, the flight crew should consider the effect of temperature on terrain and obstacle clearance in other phases of flight. (ii) For RNP APCH operations to LNAV minima, the flight crew should consider the effect of temperature on terrain and obstacle clearance in all phases of flight, in particular on any step-down fix. (e) Sensor and lateral navigation accuracy selection (1) For multi-sensor systems, the flight crew should verify, prior to approach, that the GNSS sensor is used for position computation. (2) Flight crew of aircraft with RNP input selection capability should confirm that the indicated RNP value is appropriate for the PBN operation.

text: Annex to ED Decision 2016/021/R

text: AMC3 SPO.OP.116 Performance-based navigation — aeroplanes and helicopters

text: MANAGAMENT OF THE NAVIGATION DATABASE (a) For RNAV 1, RNAV 2, RNP 1, RNP 2, and RNP APCH, the flight crew should neither insert nor modify waypoints by manual entry into a procedure (departure, arrival or approach) that has been retrieved from the database. User-defined data may be entered and used for waypoint altitude/speed constraints on a procedure where said constraints are not included in the navigation database coding. (b) For RNP 4 operations, the flight crew should not modify waypoints that have been retrieved from the database. User-defined data (e.g. for flex-track routes) may be entered and used. (c) The lateral and vertical definition of the flight path between the FAF and the missed approach point (MAPt) retrieved from the database should not be revised by the flight crew.

text: AMC4 SPO.OP.116 Performance-based navigation — aeroplanes and helicopters

text: DISPLAYS AND AUTOMATION (a) For RNAV 1, RNP 1, and RNP APCH operations, the flight crew should use a lateral deviation indicator, and where available, flight director and/or autopilot in lateral navigation mode. (b) The appropriate displays should be selected so that the following information can be monitored: (1) the computed desired path; (2) aircraft position relative to the lateral path (cross-track deviation) for FTE monitoring; and (3) aircraft position relative to the vertical path (for a 3D operation). (c) The flight crew of an aircraft with a lateral deviation indicator (e.g. CDI) should ensure that lateral deviation indicator scaling (full-scale deflection) is suitable for the navigation accuracy associated with the various segments of the procedure. (d) The flight crew should maintain procedure centrelines unless authorised to deviate by ATC or demanded by emergency conditions. (e) Cross-track error/deviation (the difference between the area-navigation-system-computed path and the aircraft-computed position) should normally be limited to ± ½ time the RNAV/RNP value associated with the procedure. Brief deviations from this standard (e.g. overshoots or undershoots during and immediately after turns) up to a maximum of 1 time the RNAV/RNP value should be allowable. (f) For a 3D approach operation, the flight crew should use a vertical deviation indicator and, where required by AFM limitations, a flight director or autopilot in vertical navigation mode. (g) Deviations below the vertical path should not exceed 75 ft at any time, or half-scale deflection where angular deviation is indicated, and not more than 75 ft above the vertical profile, or half-scale deflection where angular deviation is indicated, at or below 1 000 ft above aerodrome level. The flight crew should execute a missed approach if the vertical deviation exceeds this criterion unless the flight crew has in sight the visual references required to continue the approach.

text: Annex to ED Decision 2016/021/R

text: AMC5 SPO.OP.116 Performance-based navigation — aeroplanes and helicopters

text: VECTORING AND POSITIONING (a) ATC tactical interventions in the terminal area may include radar headings, ‘direct to’ clearances which bypass the initial legs of an approach procedure, interceptions of an initial or intermediate segments of an approach procedure or the insertion of additional waypoints loaded from the database. (b) In complying with ATC instructions, the flight crew should be aware of the implications for the navigation system. (c) ‘Direct to’ clearances may be accepted to the IF provided that it is clear to the flight crew that the aircraft will be established on the final approach track at least 2 NM before the FAF. (d) ‘Direct to’ clearance to the FAF should not be acceptable. Modifying the procedure to intercept the final approach track prior to the FAF should be acceptable for radar-vectored arrivals or otherwise only with ATC approval. (e) The final approach trajectory should be intercepted no later than the FAF in order for the aircraft to be correctly established on the final approach track before starting the descent (to ensure terrain and obstacle clearance). (f) ‘Direct to’ clearances to a fix that immediately precede an RF leg should not be permitted. (g) For parallel offset operations en route in RNP 4 and A-RNP, transitions to and from the offset track should maintain an intercept angle of no more than 45° unless specified otherwise by ATC.

text: AMC6 SPO.OP.116 Performance-based navigation — aeroplanes and helicopters

text: ALERTING AND ABORT (a) Unless the flight crew has sufficient visual reference to continue the approach operation to a safe landing, an RNP APCH operation should be discontinued if: (1) navigation system failure is annunciated (e.g. warning flag); (2) lateral or vertical deviations exceed the tolerances; and (3) loss of the on-board monitoring and alerting system. (b) Discontinuing the approach operation may not be necessary for a multi-sensor navigation system that includes demonstrated RNP capability without GNSS in accordance with the AFM. (c) Where vertical guidance is lost while the aircraft is still above 1 000 ft AGL, the flight crew may decide to continue the approach to LNAV minima, when supported by the navigation system.

text: AMC7 SPO.OP.116 Performance-based navigation — aeroplanes and helicopters

text: CONTINGENCY PROCEDURES (a) The flight crew should make the necessary preparation to revert to a conventional arrival procedure where appropriate. The following conditions should be considered: (1) failure of the navigation system components including navigation sensors, and a failure effecting flight technical error (e.g. failures of the flight director or autopilot); (2) multiple system failures affecting aircraft performance;

text: Annex to ED Decision 2016/021/R

text: (3) coasting on inertial sensors beyond a specified time limit; and (4) RAIM (or equivalent) alert or loss of integrity function. (b) In the event of loss of PBN capability, the flight crew should invoke contingency procedures and navigate using an alternative means of navigation. (c) The flight crew should notify ATC of any problem with PBN capability. (d) In the event of communication failure, the flight crew should continue with the operation in accordance with published lost communication procedures.

text: AMC8 SPO.OP.116 Performance-based navigation — aeroplanes and helicopters

text: RNAV 10 (a) Operating procedures and routes should take account of the RNAV 10 time limit declared for the inertial system, if applicable, considering also the effect of weather conditions that could affect flight duration in RNAV 10 airspace. (b) The operator may extend RNAV 10 inertial navigation time by position updating. The operator should calculate, using statistically-based typical wind scenarios for each planned route, points at which updates can be made, and the points at which further updates will not be possible.

text: GM1 SPO.OP.116 Performance-based navigation — aeroplanes and helicopters

text: DESCRIPTION (a) For both, RNP X and RNAV X designations, the ‘X’ (where stated) refers to the lateral navigation accuracy (total system error) in NM, which is expected to be achieved at least 95 % of the flight time by the population of aircraft operating within the airspace, route or procedure. For RNP APCH and A-RNP, the lateral navigation accuracy depends on the segment. (b) PBN may be required on notified routes, for notified procedures and in notified airspace. RNAV 10 (c) For purposes of consistency with the PBN concept, this Regulation is using the designation ‘RNAV 10’ because this specification does not include on-board performance monitoring and alerting. (d) However, it should be noted that many routes still use the designation ‘RNP 10’ instead of ‘RNAV 10’. ‘RNP 10’ was used as designation before the publication of the fourth edition of ICAO Doc 9613 in 2013. The terms ‘RNP 10’ and ‘RNAV 10’ should be considered equivalent. …

text: AMC1 SPO.OP.152 Destination aerodromes — instrument approach operations

text: PBN OPERATIONS The pilot-in-command should only select an aerodrome as a destination alternate aerodrome if an instrument approach procedure that does not rely on GNSS is available either at that aerodrome or at the destination aerodrome.

text: Annex to ED Decision 2016/021/R

text: GM1 SPO.OP.152 Destination aerodromes — instrument approach operations

text: INTENT OF AMC1 (a) The limitation applies only to destination alternate aerodromes for flights when a destination alternate aerodrome is required. A take-off or en route alternate aerodrome with instrument approach procedures relying on GNSS may be planned without restrictions. A destination aerodrome with all instrument approach procedures relying solely on GNSS may be used without a destination alternate aerodrome if the conditions for a flight without a destination alternate aerodrome are met. (b) The term ‘available’ means that the procedure can be used in the planning stage and complies with planning minima requirements. …

text: Subpart D — Instruments, data and equipment Section 1 — Aeroplanes

text: AMC1 SPO.IDE.A.160 Seats, seat safety belts, restraint systems

text: UPPER TORSO RESTRAINT SYSTEM FOR OTHER-THAN-COMPLEX MOTOR-POWERED AEROPLANES (a) The following systems are deemed to be compliant with the requirement for an upper torso restraint system: (a1) A seat belt with a diagonal shoulder strap; (b2) For all aeroplanes, aA restraint system having a seat belt and two shoulder straps that may be used independently; (c3) For all aeroplanes, aA restraint system having a seat belt, two shoulder straps and additional straps that may be used independently. (b) The use of the upper torso restraint independently from the use of the seat belt is intended as an option for the comfort of the occupant of the seat in those phases of flight where only the seat belt is required to be fastened. A restraint system including a seat belt and an upper torso restraint that both remain permanently fastened is also acceptable. UPPER TORSO RESTRAINT SYSTEM FOR COMPLEX MOTOR-POWERED AEROPLANES (a) A restraint system, including a seat belt, two shoulder straps and additional straps is deemed to be compliant with the requirement for restraint systems with two shoulder straps. (b) An upper torso restraint system which restrains permanently the torso of the occupant is deemed to be compliant with the requirement for an upper torso restraint system incorporating a device that will automatically restrain the occupant’s torso in the event of rapid deceleration. (c) The use of the upper torso restraint independently from the use of the seat belt is intended as an option for the comfort of the occupant of the seat in those phases of flight where only the seat belt is required to be fastened. A restraint system including a seat belt and an upper torso restraint that both remain permanently fastened is also acceptable. SEAT BELT

text: Annex to ED Decision 2016/021/R

text: A seat belt with a diagonal shoulder strap (three anchorage points) is deemed to be compliant with the requirement for a seat belt (two anchorage points).

text: GM1 SPO.IDE.A.160 Seats, seat safety belts, restraint systems

text: EMERGENCY LANDING DYNAMIC CONDITIONS Emergency landing dynamic conditions are defined in 23.562 of CS-23 or equivalent and in 25.562 of CS-25 or equivalent. …

text: GM1 SPO.IDE.A.220 Navigation equipment

text: AIRCRAFT ELIGIBILITY FOR PBN SPECIFICATION NOT REQUIRING SPECIFIC APPROVAL (a) The performance of the aircraft is usually stated in the AFM. (b) Where such a reference cannot be found in the AFM, other information provided by the aircraft manufacturer as TC holder, the STC holder or the design organisation having a privilege to approve minor changes may be considered. (c) The following documents are considered acceptable sources of information: (1) AFM, supplements thereto, and documents directly referenced in the AFM; (2) FCOM or similar document; (3) Service Bulletin or Service Letter issued by the TC holder or STC holder; (4) approved design data or data issued in support of a design change approval; (5) any other formal document issued by the TC or STC holders stating compliance with PBN specifications, AMC, Advisory Circulars (AC) or similar documents issued by the State of Design; and (6) written evidence obtained from the State of Design. (d) Equipment qualification data, in itself, is not sufficient to assess the PBN capabilities of the aircraft, since the latter depend on installation and integration. (e) As some PBN equipment and installations may have been certified prior to the publication of the PBN Manual and the adoption of its terminology for the navigation specifications, it is not always possible to find a clear statement of aircraft PBN capability in the AFM. However, aircraft eligibility for certain PBN specifications can rely on the aircraft performance certified for PBN procedures and routes prior to the publication of the PBN Manual. (f) Below, various references are listed which may be found in the AFM or other acceptable documents (see listing above) in order to consider the aircraft’s eligibility for a specific PBN specification if the specific term is not used. (g) RNAV 5 (1) If a statement of compliance with any of the following specifications or standards is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above, the aircraft is eligible for RNAV 5 operations. (i) B-RNAV;

text: Annex to ED Decision 2016/021/R

text: (ii) RNAV 1; (iii) RNP APCH; (iv) RNP 4; (v) A-RNP; (vi) AMC 20-4; (vii) JAA TEMPORARY GUIDANCE MATERIAL, LEAFLET NO. 2 (TGL 2); (viii) JAA AMJ 20X2; (ix) FAA AC 20-130A for en route operations; (x) FAA AC 20-138 for en route operations; and (xi) FAA AC 90-96. (h) RNAV 1/RNAV 2 (1) If a statement of compliance with any of the following specifications or standards is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above, the aircraft is eligible for RNAV 1/RNAV 2 operations. (i) RNAV 1; (ii) PRNAV (iii) US RNAV type A; (iv) FAA AC 20-138 for the appropriate navigation specification; (v) FAA AC 90-100A; (vi) JAA TEMPORARY GUIDANCE MATERIAL, LEAFLET NO. 10 Rev1 (TGL 10); and (vii) FAA AC 90-100. (2) However, if position determination is exclusively computed based on VOR-DME, the aircraft is not eligible for RNAV 1/RNAV 2 operations. (i) RNP 1/RNP 2 continental (1) If a statement of compliance with any of the following specifications or standards is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above, the aircraft is eligible for RNP 1/RNP 2 continental operations. (i) A-RNP; (ii) FAA AC 20-138 for the appropriate navigation specification; and (iii) FAA AC 90-105. (2) Alternatively, if a statement of compliance with any of the following specifications or standards is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above and position determination is primarily based on GNSS, the aircraft is eligible for RNP 1/RNP 2 continental operations. However, in these cases, loss of GNSS implies loss of RNP 1/RNP 2 capability. (i) JAA TEMPORARY GUIDANCE MATERIAL, LEAFLET NO. 10 (TGL 10) (any revision); and

text: Annex to ED Decision 2016/021/R

text: (ii) FAA AC 90-100. (j) RNP APCH — LNAV minima (1) If a statement of compliance with any of the following specifications or standards is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above, the aircraft is eligible for RNP APCH — LNAV operations. (i) A-RNP; (ii) AMC 20-27; (iii) AMC 20-28; (iv) FAA AC 20-138 for the appropriate navigation specification; and (v) FAA AC 90-105 for the appropriate navigation specification. (2) Alternatively, if a statement of compliance with RNP 0.3 GNSS approaches in accordance with any of the following specifications or standards is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above, the aircraft is eligible for RNP APCH — LNAV operations. Any limitation such as ‘within the US National Airspace’ may be ignored since RNP APCH procedures are assumed to meet the same ICAO criteria around the world. (i) JAA TEMPORARY GUIDANCE MATERIAL, LEAFLET NO. 3 (TGL 3); (ii) AMC 20-4; (iii) FAA AC 20-130A; and (iv) FAA AC 20-138. (k) RNP APCH — LNAV/VNAV minima (1) If a statement of compliance with any of the following specifications or standards is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above, the aircraft is eligible for RNP APCH — LNAV/VNAV operations. (i) A-RNP; (ii) AMC 20-27 with Baro VNAV; (iii) AMC 20-28; (iv) FAA AC 20-138; and (v) FAA AC 90-105 for the appropriate navigation specification. (2) Alternatively, if a statement of compliance with FAA AC 20-129 is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above, and the aircraft complies with the requirements and limitations of EASA SIB 2014-04 , the aircraft is eligible for RNP APCH — LNAV/VNAV operations. Any limitation such as ‘within the US National Airspace’ may be ignored since RNP APCH procedures are assumed to meet the same ICAO criteria around the world.

text: Annex to ED Decision 2016/021/R

text: (l) RNP APCH — LPV minima (1) If a statement of compliance with any of the following specifications or standards is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above, the aircraft is eligible for RNP APCH — LPV operations. (i) AMC 20-28; (ii) FAA AC 20-138 for the appropriate navigation specification; and (iii) FAA AC 90-107. (2) For aircraft that have a TAWS Class A installed and do not provide Mode-5 protection on an LPV approach, the DH is limited to 250 ft. (m) RNAV 10 (1) If a statement of compliance with any of the following specifications or standards is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above, the aircraft is eligible for RNAV 10 operations. (i) RNP 10; (ii) FAA AC 20-138 for the appropriate navigation specification; (iii) AMC 20-12; (iv) FAA Order 8400.12 (or later revision); and (v) FAA AC 90-105. (n) RNP 4 (1) If a statement of compliance with any of the following specifications or standards is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above, the aircraft is eligible for RNP 4 operations. (i) FAA AC 20-138B or later, for the appropriate navigation specification; (ii) FAA Order 8400.33; and (iii) FAA AC 90-105 for the appropriate navigation specification. (o) RNP 2 oceanic (1) If a statement of compliance with FAA AC 90-105 for the appropriate navigation specification is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above, the aircraft is eligible for RNP 2 oceanic operations. (2) If the aircraft has been assessed eligible for RNP 4, the aircraft is eligible for RNP 2 oceanic. (p) Special features (1) RF in terminal operations (used in RNP 1 and in the initial segment of the RNP APCH) (i) If a statement of demonstrated capability to perform an RF leg, certified in accordance with any of the following specifications or standards, is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above, the aircraft is eligible for RF in terminal operations: (A) AMC 20-26; and (B) FAA AC 20-138B or later.

text: Annex to ED Decision 2016/021/R

text: GM2 SPO.IDE.A.220 Navigation equipment

text: GENERAL (a) The PBN specifications for which the aircraft complies with the relevant airworthiness criteria are set out in the AFM, together with any limitations to be observed. (b) Because functional and performance requirements are defined for each navigation specification, an aircraft approved for an RNP specification is not automatically approved for all RNAV specifications. Similarly, an aircraft approved for an RNP or RNAV specification having a stringent accuracy requirement (e.g. RNP 0.3 specification) is not automatically approved for a navigation specification having a less stringent accuracy requirement (e.g. RNP 4). RNP 4 (c) For RNP 4, at least two LRNSs, capable of navigating to RNP 4, and listed in the AFM, may be operational at the entry point of the RNP 4 airspace. If an item of equipment required for RNP 4 operations is unserviceable, then the flight crew may consider an alternate route or diversion for repairs. For multisensor systems, the AFM may permit entry if one GNSS sensor is lost after departure, provided one GNSS and one inertial sensor remain available. …

text: Section 2 — Helicopters

text: GM1 SPO.IDE.H.220 Navigation equipment

text: Annex to ED Decision 2016/021/R

text: (4) approved design data or data issued in support of a design change approval; (5) any other formal document issued by the TC or STC holders stating compliance with PBN specifications, AMC, Advisory Circulars (AC) or similar documents issued by the State of Design; and (6) written evidence obtained from the State of Design. (d) Equipment qualification data, in itself, is not sufficient to assess the PBN capabilities of the aircraft, since the latter depend on installation and integration. (e) As some PBN equipment and installations may have been certified prior to the publication of the PBN Manual and the adoption of its terminology for the navigation specifications, it is not always possible to find a clear statement of aircraft PBN capability in the AFM. However, aircraft eligibility for certain PBN specifications can rely on the aircraft performance certified for PBN procedures and routes prior to the publication of the PBN Manual. (f) Below, various references are listed which may be found in the AFM or other acceptable documents (see listing above) in order to consider the aircraft’s eligibility for a specific PBN specification if the specific term is not used. (g) RNAV 5 (1) If a statement of compliance with any of the following specifications or standards is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above, the aircraft is eligible for RNAV 5 operations. (i) B-RNAV; (ii) RNAV 1; (iii) RNP APCH; (iv) RNP 4; (v) A-RNP; (vi) AMC 20-4; (vii) JAA TEMPORARY GUIDANCE MATERIAL, LEAFLET NO. 2 (TGL 2) (viii) JAA AMJ 20X2; (ix) FAA AC 20-130A for en route operations; (x) FAA AC 20-138 for en route operations; and (xi) FAA AC 90-96. (h) RNAV 1/RNAV 2 (1) If a statement of compliance with any of the following specifications or standards is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above, the aircraft is eligible for RNAV 1/RNAV 2 operations. (i) RNAV 1; (ii) PRNAV; (iii) US RNAV type A; (iv) FAA AC 20-138 for the appropriate navigation specification;

text: Annex to ED Decision 2016/021/R

text: (v) FAA AC 90-100A; (vi) JAA TEMPORARY GUIDANCE MATERIAL, LEAFLET NO. 10 Rev1 (TGL 10); (vii) FAA AC 90-100. (2) However, if position determination is exclusively computed based on VOR-DME, the aircraft is not eligible for RNAV 1/RNAV 2 operations. (i) RNP 1/RNP 2 continental (1) If a statement of compliance with any of the following specifications or standards is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above, the aircraft is eligible for RNP 1/RNP 2 continental operations. (i) A-RNP; (ii) FAA AC 20-138 for the appropriate navigation specification; and (iii) FAA AC 90-105. (2) Alternatively, if a statement of compliance with any of the following specifications or standards is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above and position determination is primarily based on GNSS, the aircraft is eligible for RNP 1/RNP 2 continental operations. However, in these cases, loss of GNSS implies loss of RNP 1/RNP 2 capability. (i) JAA TEMPORARY GUIDANCE MATERIAL, LEAFLET NO. 10 (TGL 10) (any revision); and (ii) FAA AC 90-100. (j) RNP APCH — LNAV minima (1) If a statement of compliance with any of the following specifications or standards is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above, the aircraft is eligible for RNP APCH LNAV operations. (i) A-RNP; (ii) AMC 20-27; (iii) AMC 20-28; (iv) FAA AC 20-138 for the appropriate navigation specification; and (v) FAA AC 90-105 for the appropriate navigation specification. (2) Alternatively, if a statement of compliance with RNP 0.3 GNSS approaches in accordance with any of the following specifications or standards is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above, the aircraft is eligible for RNP APCH — LNAV operations. Any limitation such as ‘within the US National Airspace’ may be ignored since RNP APCH procedures are assumed to meet the same ICAO criteria around the world. (i) JAA TEMPORARY GUIDANCE MATERIAL, LEAFLET NO. 3 (TGL 3); (ii) AMC 20-4; (iii) FAA AC 20-130A; and (iv) FAA AC 20-138. (k) RNP APCH — LNAV/VNAV minima

text: Annex to ED Decision 2016/021/R

text: (1) If a statement of compliance with any of the following specifications or standards is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above, the aircraft is eligible for RNP APCH — LNAV/VNAV operations. (i) A-RNP; (ii) AMC 20-27 with Baro VNAV; (iii) AMC 20-28; (iv) FAA AC 20-138; and (v) FAA AC 90-105 for the appropriate navigation specification. (2) Alternatively, if a statement of compliance with FAA AC 20-129 is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above, and the aircraft complies with the requirements and limitations of EASA SIB 2014-04 , the aircraft is eligible for RNP APCH — LNAV/VNAV operations. Any limitation such as ‘within the US National Airspace’ may be ignored since RNP APCH procedures are assumed to meet the same ICAO criteria around the world. (l) RNP APCH — LPV minima (1) If a statement of compliance with any of the following specifications or standards is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above, the aircraft is eligible for RNP APCH — LPV operations. (i) AMC 20-28; (ii) FAA AC 20-138 for the appropriate navigation specification; and (iii) FAA AC 90-107. (2) For aircraft that have a TAWS Class A installed and do not provide Mode-5 protection on an LPV approach, the DH is limited to 250 ft. (m) RNAV 10 (1) If a statement of compliance with any of the following specifications or standards is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above, the aircraft is eligible for RNAV 10 operations. (i) RNP 10; (ii) FAA AC 20-138 for the appropriate navigation specification; (iii) AMC 20-12; (iv) FAA Order 8400.12 (or later revision); and (v) FAA AC 90-105. (n) RNP 4 (1) If a statement of compliance with any of the following specifications or standards is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above, the aircraft is eligible for RNP 4 operations. (i) FAA AC 20-138B or later, for the appropriate navigation specification; (ii) FAA Order 8400.33; and 2 http://ad.easa.europa.eu/ad/2014-04

text: Annex to ED Decision 2016/021/R

text: (iii) FAA AC 90-105 for the appropriate navigation specification. (o) RNP 2 oceanic (1) If a statement of compliance with FAA AC 90-105 for the appropriate navigation specification is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above, the aircraft is eligible for RNP 2 oceanic operations. (2) If the aircraft has been assessed eligible for RNP 4, the aircraft is eligible for RNP 2 oceanic. (p) Special features (1) RF in terminal operations (used in RNP 1 and in the initial segment of the RNP APCH) (i) If a statement of demonstrated capability to perform an RF leg, certified in accordance with any of the following specifications or standards, is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above, the aircraft is eligible for RF in terminal operations: (A) AMC 20-26; (B) FAA AC 20-138B or later. (ii) If there is a reference to RF and a reference to compliance with AC 90-105, then the aircraft is eligible for such operations. (q) Other considerations (1) In all cases, the limitations in the AFM need to be checked, in particular the use of AP or FD which can be required to reduce the FTE primarily for RNP APCH, RNAV 1, and RNP 1. (2) Any limitation such as ‘within the US National Airspace’ may be ignored since RNP APCH procedures are assumed to meet the same ICAO criteria around the world.

text: GM2 SPO.IDE.H.220 Navigation equipment

text: Annex to ED Decision 2016/021/R