text: KOM(2010) 53 slutlig.

text: EUT L 145, 10.6.2009, s. 1.

text: EGT L 310, 30.11.1996, s. 1.

text: Text markerad med fet stil anger ECB:s förslag till ny text. Genomstruken text anger de strykningar som ECB föreslår.

text: Publicerat på ECB:s webbplats http://www.ecb.europa.eu

title: Europeiska centralbankens yttrande av den 31 mars 2010 om ett förslag till rådets förordning om ändring av förordning (EG) nr 479/2009 med avseende på kvaliteten på statistiken i samband med förfarandet vid alltför stora underskott (CON/2010/28)

text: Den 8 mars 2010 mottog Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) en begäran om yttrande från Europeiska unionens råd om ett förslag till rådets förordning om ändring av förordning

text: (EG) nr 479/2009

text: med avseende på kvaliteten på statistiken i samband med förfarandet vid alltför stora underskott (nedan kallat förslaget till förordning).

text: ECB:s behörighet att avge ett yttrande grundas på artiklarna

text: och

text: i fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt eftersom nationella centralbanker hjälper till med, eller bidrar till, sammanställningen av statistik enligt

text: rådets förordning (EG) nr 479/2009 av den 25 maj 2009

text: om tillämpningen av protokollet om förfarandet vid alltför stora underskott som är fogat till fördraget om upprättandet av Europeiska gemenskapen. Dessutom rapporterar de statistik över den offentliga sektorns finanser till ECB så att Europeiska centralbankssystemet (ECBS) kan utföra de uppgifter som avses i artikel 127.5 i fördraget. I enlighet med

text: artikel 17.5

text: första meningen i arbetsordningen för Europeiska centralbanken har detta yttrande antagits av ECB-rådet.

text: Allmän kommentar

text: ECB stöder förslaget till förordning som är ett viktigt steg på vägen för att öka kvaliteten på den statisk som omfattas av förordning

text: (EG) nr 479/2009

text: Specifika kommentarer

text: ECB understryker vikten av att alla medlemsstater ger kommissionen (Eurostat) tillgång till all information som kommissionen behöver för att bedöma uppgifternas kvalitet. ECB anser även att man för detta ändamål bör inkludera en mer utförlig uppräkning än den föreslagna i

text: artikel 8.2

text: , så att det blir ännu tydligare vilken typ av information som kan begäras in. Det bör även tydligt framgå att uppräkningen inte är uttömmande.

text: På samma sätt anser ECB att man i

text: artikel 11.3

text: med hjälp av exempel kunde ange när metodiska besök är påkallade. ECB anser att ofta förekommande och omfattande revideringar av uppgifter, justeringar av stockar/flöden som inte förklaras samt olösta metodproblem kan ge anledning till oro som nödvändiggör metodiska besök, som ECB anser är ett utmärkt sätt att förbättra kvaliteten på uppgifter. Självfallet kan bestämmelserna om dessa besök i förordning

text: (EG) nr 479/2009

text: , samt även andra bestämmelser som vars mål är att förbättra uppgiftskvaliteten, endast få effekt om de tillämpas fullt ut.

text: ECB anser att definitionen underskottet (överskottet) i förordning

text: (EG) nr 479/2009

text: bör anpassas till internationella statistiska standarder. ECB föreslår därför att man när det gäller förfarandet vid alltför stora underskott använder nettoupplåning (B.9) från nationalräkenskaperna såsom man gjorde under tidigare år. Detta skulle också bidra till att öka öppenheten kring rapporteringsförfarandet eftersom ett underskott, om man undantar betalningar som grundar sig på svappar och framtida räntesäkringsavtal från det underskottsbegrepp som används för förfarandet vid alltför stora underskott, blir svårare att manipulera genom komplicerade finansiella transaktioner.

text: För att öka uppgiftskvaliteten skulle ECB dessutom vilja säkerställa att sammanställningen av de förväntade uppgifterna baseras på de mest aktuella uppgifterna som finns tillgängliga, och att man i möjligaste mån använder månads- och kvartalsvisa uppgifter. Om möjligt bör även kvaliteten på dessa förväntade uppgifter granskas.

text: ECB anser också att kommissionen bör ges mer tid för att bedöma de faktiska uppgifterna och förordar därför att den tidsperiod som avses i

text: artikel 14

text: förlängs med en vecka till sammanlagt fyra veckor. Om denna period förlängs måste även medlemsstaterna överföra uppgifterna tidigare så att administrativa förfaranden i vilka uppgifterna används (t.ex. framtagandet av konvergensrapporter) inte störs. ECB föreslår därför att man i framtiden tidigarelägger tidsfristerna för uppgiftsrapportering. ECB har informerats om att man för närvarande planerar en ändring av

text: rådets förordning (EG) nr 2223/96 av den 25 juni 1996

text: om det europeiska national- och regionalräkenskapssystemet i gemenskapen (d.v.s. leveransprogrammet för ENS) och man bör då samordna respektive tidsfrister så att inga konsistensproblem uppstår.

text: Slutligen anser ECB att det är viktigt att de nationella statistikkontoren har tillgång till sådan information som behövs för att kontrollera att inrapporterade uppgifter stämmer överens med

text: artikel 1 i förordning (EG) nr 479/2009

text: samt de ENS-redovisningsregler som denna bygger på.

text: I de fall där ECB rekommenderar att förslaget till förordning ändras anges de specifika förslagen i bilagan tillsammans med en förklaring.

text: BILAGA

text: Ändringsförslag

text: Kommissionens förslag | ECB:s ändringsförslag

text: Artikel 82

text: . Medlemsstaterna ska så snart som möjligt ge kommissionen (Eurostat) åtkomst till all information som begärs för att kunna bedöma uppgifternas kvalitet, inklusive statistisk information såsom uppgifter från nationalräkenskaper, förteckningar, anmälningstabeller för förfarande vid alltför stora underskott, ytterligare enkäter och klargöranden som rör anmälningarna. Frågeformulärens utformning ska fastställas av kommissionen (Eurostat) efter samråd med kommittén för valuta-, finans och betalningsbalansstatistik. |

text: Artikel 82

text: . Medlemsstaterna ska så snart som möjligt ge kommissionen (Eurostat) åtkomst till all statistisk och bugetrelaterad information som begärs för att kunna bedöma uppgifternas kvalitet., inklusive statistisk information såsom uppgifter från nationalräkenskaper, förteckningar, anmälningstabeller för förfarande vid alltför stora underskott, ytterligare enkäter och klargöranden som rör anmälningarna. Statistisk och bugetrelaterad information omfattar särskilt a) uppgifter från nationalräkenskaperna, b) lagerstockar, c) anmälningstabeller för förfarande vid alltför stora underskott, d) ytterligare enkäter och klargöranden som rör anmälningar om alltför stora underskott, e) information från riksgäld/finansministerium/behörig myndighet med ansvar för stats- och regionbudget, f) konton för enheter som inte ingår i budgeten/ideella organisationer och liknande enheter som är en del av den offentliga sektorn i nationalräkenskaperna, g) socialförsäkringssystemens konton, h) granskningar av kommuner. Frågeformulärens utformning ska fastställas av kommissionen (Eurostat) efter samråd med kommittén för valuta-, finans och betalningsbalansstatistik.

text: Förklaring Förslaget till förordning bör ange att den information som efterfrågas kan avse både statistiska och bugetrelaterade uppgifter, och bör av tydlighetsskäl exemplifiera olika sådana informationskategorier.

text: Artikel 113

text: . Syftet med de metodiska besöken är att kontrollera de rutiner och räkenskaper som ligger till grund för de faktiska rapporterade uppgifterna och att dra detaljerade slutsatser om de rapporterade uppgifternas kvalitet, i enlighet med

text: artikel 8.1

text: . Metodiska besök ska endast genomföras i undantagsfall där man tydligt identifierat betydande risker eller problem rörande statistikuppgifternas kvalitet. |

text: Artikel 113

text: artikel 8.1

text: . Metodiska besök ska endast genomföras i undantagsfall där man tydligt identifierat betydande risker eller problem rörande statistikuppgifternas kvalitet, t.ex. ofta förekommande och omfattande revideringar av uppgifter, justeringar av stockar/flöden som inte förklaras samt olösta metodproblem.

text: Förklaring ECB föreslår att man i form av en ofullständig uppräkning anger i vilka undantagsfall metodiska besök är nödvändiga.

text: Nuvarande ordalydelse | ECB:s ändringsförslag

text: 3. Med underskottet (överskottet) i den offentliga sektorns finanser avses den offentliga sektorns (S.13) nettoupplåning (finansiella sparande) (EDP B.9) enligt definitionen i ENS 95. De räntebelopp som ingår i underskottet i den offentliga sektorns finanser är räntorna (EDP D.41) enligt definitionen i ENS 95. | 3. Med underskottet (överskottet) i den offentliga sektorns finanser avses den offentliga sektorns (S.13) nettoupplåning (finansiella sparande) (EDP B.9) enligt definitionen i ENS 95. De räntebelopp som ingår i underskottet i den offentliga sektorns finanser är räntorna (EDP D.41) enligt definitionen i ENS 95.

text: Förklaring Såsom framgår av de specifika kommentarerna ovan föreslår ECB att man ökar öppenheten kring rapporteringsförfarandet genom att använda nettoupplåning (B.9) för förfarandet vid alltför stora underskott.

text: 1. Med uppgifter om nivån på det förväntade offentliga underskottet och den förväntade offentliga skuldnivån avses de uppgifter som medlemsstaterna fastställt för det innevarande året. De ska vara de senaste officiella prognoserna och beakta de senaste budgetbesluten och den ekonomiska utvecklingen och de ekonomiska utsikterna. De bör utarbetas så kort tid som möjligt innan tidsfristen för rapportering löper ut. | 1. Med uppgifter om nivån på det förväntade offentliga underskottet och den förväntade offentliga skuldnivån avses de uppgifter som medlemsstaterna fastställt för det innevarande året. De ska vara de senaste officiella prognoserna och beakta de senaste budgetbesluten och den ekonomiska utvecklingen och de ekonomiska utsikterna samt de månads- och kvartalsvisa utfallen. De bör utarbetas så kort tid som möjligt innan tidsfristen för rapportering löper ut.

text: Förklaring ECB anser att kvaliteten på de förväntade uppgifterna skulle öka om dessa sammanställdes med hjälp av de mest aktuella uppgifterna som finns tillgängliga.

text: 1. Senast tre veckor efter den sista rapporteringsdag som avses i

text: artikel 3.1

text: eller efter de revideringar som avses i

text: artikel 6.1

text: ska kommissionen (Eurostat) tillhandahålla de uppgifter om det faktiska underskottet och den faktiska skuldsättningen som krävs för tillämpningen av protokollet om förfarandet vid alltför stora underskott. Uppgifterna ska tillhandahållas genom offentliggörande. | 1. Senast tre fyra veckor efter den sista rapporteringsdag som avses i

text: artikel 3.1

text: eller efter de revideringar som avses i

text: artikel 6.1

text: Förklaring ECB föreslår en mindre justering av tidsfristen för att kommissionen ska få mer tid att bedöma kvaliteten på de uppgifter som medlemsstaterna rapporterar.

text: artikel 10 i förordning (EG) nr 322/97

text: . I detta avseende ska de nationella statistiska myndigheterna ha ansvaret för att de rapporterade uppgifterna uppfyller kraven i artikel 1 i denna förordning och de redovisningsregler enligt ENS 95 som utgör underlaget. | 1. Medlemsstaterna ska se till att de faktiska uppgifter som rapporteras till kommissionen (Eurostat) tillhandahålls i enlighet med principerna i artikel 102 i förordning (EG) nr 322/97223/2009. I detta avseende ska de nationella statistiska myndigheterna ha ansvaret för att de rapporterade uppgifterna uppfyller kraven i artikel 1 i denna förordning och de redovisningsregler enligt ENS 95 som dessa bygger på. Medlemsstaterna ska säkerställa att de nationella statistikkontoren får tillgång till all information som de behöver för att utföra sina uppgifter.

text: Förklaring De nationella statistiska myndigheterna bör få tillgång till all information de behöver för att kontrollera att inrapporterade uppgifter uppfyller kraven i

text: artikel 1 i förordningen

text: och de redovisningsregler enligt ENS 95 som dessa bygger på. Denna fråga har även diskuterats i ECB:s yttrande

text: av den 23 februari 2010 om inrättandet av det grekiska statistiksystemet och en oberoende statistikmyndighet.


text: EGT L 189, 3.7.1998, s. 42. 2 Alla ECB:s yttrande finns på ECB:s webbplats www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: Se ECB:s yttranden

text: punkt 3.1,

text: punkt 2.5.2 och

text: punkt 3.2. 4 Se ECB:s yttranden

text: punkt 2.2,

text: punkt 3.3 samt CON/2009/73punkt 3.2 och

text: punkt 3.6.

publisher: Europeiska centralbanken

sprak: sv

title: Europeiska centralbankens yttrande av den 6 mars 2010 om en förlängning av de statliga garantierna till banker m.fl. (CON/2010/29)

serie: con

text: EUROPEISKA CENTRALBANKENS YTTRANDE av den 6 mars 2010 om en förlängning av de statliga garantierna till banker m.fl. (

text: ) Inledning och rättslig grund

type: rubrik

text: Den 19 mars 2010 mottog Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) en begäran från Finansdepartementet om ett yttrande över ett utkast till förordning om ändring i förordningen (2008:819) om statliga garantier till banker m.fl. (nedan kallad förslaget till förordning). ECB:s behörighet att avge ett yttrande grundas på artiklarna

text: och

text: i fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt och artikel 2.1 sjätte strecksatsen i

text: rådets beslut 98/415/EG av den 29 juni 1998

text: om nationella myndigheters samråd med Europeiska centralbanken rörande förslag till rättsregler , eftersom förslaget till förordning innehåller regler som gäller finansiella institut som har en påtaglig inverkan på de finansiella institutens och marknadernas stabilitet. I enlighet med

text: artikel 17.5

text: första meningen i arbetsordningen för Europeiska centralbanken har detta yttrande antagits av ECB-rådet.

type: stycke

text: 1. Syftet med förslaget till förordning

text: Förslaget till förordning ändrar förordning 2008:819 om statliga garantier till banker m.fl. som antogs av Finansdepartementet den 29 oktober 2008. ECB ombads yttra sig över utkastet till förordning 2008:819 och avgav sitt yttrande

text: den 29 oktober 2008 . I mars 2009 ombads ECB yttra sig över ett förslag till ändring av förordning 2008:819 och avgav sitt yttrande

text: och i oktober 2009 ombads ECB yttra sig över ytterligare ett förslag till ändring av förordning 2008:819 och avgav sitt yttrande

text: . Enligt det gällande regelverket upphör det svenska garantiprogrammet att gälla den 30 april 2010. I promemorian som åtföljer förslaget till förordning gör den svenska regeringen bedömningen att programmet och andra åtgärder har bidragit till att stabilisera de finansiella marknaderna, men att dessa ännu inte har återgått till det normala. I promemorian påpekar den svenska regeringen också att garantiprogram i flera andra EU-länder löper ut den 30 juni 2010, och att det på europeisk nivå pågår en

text: diskussion om harmoniserade villkor för en eventuell förlängning av dessa program efter den 30 juni 2010. Mot bakgrund av detta föreslår den svenska regeringen att garantiprogrammet förlängs med två månader, till den 30 juni 2010, med i övrigt oförändrade villkor.

text: 2. Allmänna kommentarer

text: I tillämplig utsträckning gäller kommentarerna i yttrandena

text: och

text: även för förslaget till förordning. ECB vill även i det aktuella fallet påpeka att alla initiativ som behöriga myndigheter i medlemsstaterna vidtar för att återupprätta förtroendet på finansmarknaderna bör samordnas och ha som mål att genomföra de gemensamma riktlinjerna i nära samarbete med andra medlemsstater och EU:s institutioner, eftersom större skillnader mellan ländernas nationella genomförandeåtgärder skulle kunna leda till obalanser på de globala bankmarknaderna. ECB anser det viktigt att giltighetstiden på de nationella stödåtgärderna som vidtas i Unionen samordnas så att konkurrens på lika villkor kan säkerställas . ECB understryker också att nationella stödåtgärder bör vara tidsbegränsade . ECB understryker därför att garantiprogrammet är tillfälligt till sin natur och det faktum att den svenska statens engagemang kommer att vara tidsbegränsat.

text: Detta yttrande kommer att offentliggöras på ECB:s webbplats.

text: Utfärdat i Frankfurt am Main den 6 mars 2010.

text: [Namnteckning]

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET

text: ECB:s ordförande

type: vagledning

utgivare: ecb


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: See Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1.1, which specifically anticipated the present proposed reform of the internal structures of the CBSFAI. All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: With one small amendment, however, to section 21(2) of the CBA, involving the deletion of the words ‘if the other members have passed a unanimous resolution requesting the President to remove the Governor from office’. The effect is that the Government may ask the President to remove the Governor for stated serious misconduct on its own initiative.

text: See, for example, paragraph 17 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 9 of Opinion

text: See Opinion

text: , paragraph 6.

text: See Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.3; Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1.2; Opinion

text: , paragraph 4; and Opinion

text: , paragraph 5.

text: See ECB Convergence Report of May 2008, pp. 17-18.

text: The legislative provision which specifies the Governor’s functions and powers are set out in Section 19A of the CBA.

text: See Opinions

text: and

text: CR 2008 p. 20.

text: See head 33 of the draft heads.

text: Public sector bodies are to be understood within the meaning of Article 21.1 of the Statute of the ESCB which reads as follows: ‘In accordance with Article 123 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, overdraft facilities and any other type of credit facility with the European Central Bank or with the national central banks of the Member States (hereinafter referred to as ‘national central banks’) in favour of Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of Member States shall be prohibited, as shall the purchase directly from them by the European Central Bank or national central banks of debt instruments’. 13 OJ L 332, 31.12.1993, p. 1. 14 See Opinions

text: and

sprak: en

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 7 April 2010 on the restructuring of the Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland (CON/2010/30)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 7 April 2010 on the restructuring of the Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 22 February 2010 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Irish Minister for Finance (hereinafter the ‘Minister’) for an opinion on draft heads (hereinafter the ‘draft heads’) relating to a proposed draft law entitled ‘the Central Bank of Ireland Bill 2010’ (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the third indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to the Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland (CBFSAI). In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft heads

text: The purpose of the draft heads is to provide a framework pursuant to which the draft law will be prepared. The draft heads implement a decision of the Irish Government of 16 June 2009 approving the reform of the internal structures of the CBFSAI . The draft law will amend certain provisions of the Central Bank Act 1942 (CBA) to provide, among other things, that: (a) the CBFSAI will be renamed the Central Bank of Ireland (hereinafter the ‘Bank’); (b) the Bank will be a single fully-integrated structure, replacing the two-pillar structure of the existing CBFSAI with a unitary board called the Central Bank Commission (hereinafter the ‘Commission’), which will be chaired by the Governor; (c) the Irish Financial Services Regulatory Authority (IFSRA) which is a constituent part of the CBFSAI and responsible at present for the regulation of financial institutions, will be dissolved; (d) the posts of Chief Executive of the IFSRA and Consumer Director will be abolished; and (e) two new posts, Head of Financial Regulation, responsible for the regulatory and supervisory functions and objectives of the Bank, and Head of Central Banking, responsible for the performance of

text: central banking functions, will be established and there will be new enhanced accountability and oversight mechanisms. The Commission is to consist of a minimum of 10 and maximum of 12 members. 4 members are to be ex-officio members: (i) the Governor of the Bank; (ii) the Head of Central Banking (who is to be appointed by the Commission with consent of the Minister); (iii) the Head of Financial Regulation (who is to be appointed by the Commission with consent of the Minister); and (iv) the Secretary General of the Irish Department of Finance. The other members (at least 6 and up to 8 in number) are to be appointed by the Irish Minister of Finance from amongst people who, in his opinion, have relevant knowledge of accountancy, banking, consumer interests, corporate governance, economics, financial regulation, financial services, law, and social policy. According to the draft heads, sections 19, 20, 21 and 22 of the CBA, as regards the Governor's appointment and tenure of office, prohibition on shareholding and removal from office, continue to apply . The current Chief Executive of the Office of the Financial Regulator is specifically stated to be the first Head of Financial Regulation. As regards the current Head of Central Banking, the draft heads state that there should be a transition arrangement for the present Director General. The procedures of the Commission (relating to meetings and procedural issues) are to be the same as currently apply to the Board of the CBFSAI. The Governor remains solely responsible for the functions related to the European System of Central Banks (ESCB). The Bank will be responsible for the prudential supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system. Moreover, Head 8 of the draft heads states that the Bank will ‘assume the functions and powers of the Consumer Director’, so the Bank will be responsible for the protection of consumer interests, noting that such powers are already contained in the CBA.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 Consolidation of Ireland’s central bank statutes As stated in previous opinions , without a consolidated central bank statute the legal structure for Ireland’s central bank is lacking in transparency. The requirements for legal clarity and transparency suggest that the Irish Government should take the first suitable opportunity for a consolidation exercise, and the ECB welcomes the indication from the consulting authority that such an exercise is envisaged. Consolidation of Ireland’s central bank statutes would greatly assist the ECB in responding to consultations from the Irish authorities on draft legislative provisions within the ECB’s field of competence as well as ensuring that Irish legislation, including the statutes of Ireland’s central bank, is compatible with the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the TFEU (hereinafter together the ‘Treaties’), as well as the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter the ‘Statute of the ESCB’).

text: 2.2 Reform of supervision in Ireland 2.2.1 The ECB understands that the draft law is the first step in the legislative reform of the Irish central banking and financial regulatory regime, and that further legislation will be introduced to: (a) enhance the regulatory powers and functions of the Bank, and (b) consolidate all legislation relating to the Bank. The ECB notes that the draft law and such further legislation should be the subject of separate consultations. 2.2.2 The ECB welcomes the purpose of the draft heads. The ECB has consistently favoured the involvement of central banks in prudential supervision. Previous ECB opinions on draft national legislation to reform the institutional framework for prudential supervision in Member States have noted that central banks have been closely involved in the prudential supervision of credit institutions, due to their pivotal role in the financial system, in particular regarding the implementation of monetary policy and ensuring the proper functioning of payment systems . Previous ECB opinions have also noted that maintaining the close involvement of national central banks (NCBs) in prudential supervision is an important condition for allowing the Eurosystem to contribute adequately to monitoring the risks to financial stability in the euro area, in accordance with Article 127(5) of the TFEU, and to safeguard smooth cooperation between the central bank functions exercised at Eurosystem level and the supervisory functions carried out at national level . Such involvement should not prejudice the primary objective of the ESCB of price stability. 2.2.3 The ECB welcomes the establishment of institutional frameworks in Member States that recognise the essential role of NCBs in promoting the soundness and security of credit and financial institutions and the stability of the financial system as a whole. Thus, the ECB welcomes the proposed restructuring of the CBFSAI so as to make the Bank fully and directly responsible for the supervision of credit and financial institutions.

text: 3. Specific observations

text: 3.1 Central bank independence The new framework should ensure that the central bank will be a fully independent institution functioning in compliance with the central bank independence principle and with the role of the central bank as part of the ESCB. The draft heads are not sufficiently clear as to whether Ireland’s central bank will be a fully independent institution entrusted with ESCB-related tasks as well as with other tasks that should not interfere with the ESCB’s objectives and tasks. Therefore, the ECB has concerns as regards the new design of the Irish central bank which should be clarified once the proposed bill has been published. As stated in the ECB’s convergence reports, the central bank must be a fully independent institution with a precisely defined mandate. In particular, the central

text: bank, its decision-making bodies and their members must be independent and must not seek or take instructions from the Government as far as the ESCB-related tasks and objectives are concerned . More specifically, for ESCB-related tasks not only the Governor, but Ireland’s central bank as a whole as an institution, and the Commission which will be responsible and accountable for the Bank in the achievement of its primary objective of price stability, and for managing and controlling the Bank, must be independent and not take instructions from the Government. Any other member of the central bank’s decision-making bodies involved in the performance of ESCBtasks should also enjoy the same personal independence safeguards as the Governor. Although the draft heads provide for an independent governor solely responsible for the ESCB-related tasks, the Governor may not be seen in isolation from the central banking structure. Therefore, the new setup must ensure respect of the central bank’s independence and must clarify the roles of the Commission and the Governor. Assuming that the above interpretation will be clarified in the proposed bill and expecting to be consulted thereon, in the interim the ECB has a number of reservations regarding the draft heads. 3.1.1 Head 7 of the draft heads proposes the replacement of Section 6A(1) and (2) of the CBA as regards the objectives of the Bank. The draft law should expressly provide that the secondary objectives of the Bank set out in the new Section 6A(2) (hereinafter the 'secondary objectives'), including the new objective to support national economic policy development, should be without prejudice to the primary objective of maintaining price stability set out in Articles 127(1) and 282(2) of the Treaty and Article 2 of the Statute of the ESCB. Furthermore, the draft bill should expressly provide that the secondary objectives must be consistent and not interfere with the Bank’s obligation to support the general economic policies of the European Union with a view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of that Union as laid down in Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), which is itself an objective expressed to be without prejudice to the objective of maintaining price stability. 3.1.2 According to Head 7, the new Section 6A(2)(e) will provide that one of the other objectives of the Bank will be ‘the discharge of such other functions and powers as are conferred on it by law’. The ECB reminds the consulting authority that functions of the Bank must be performed in a manner that is fully compatible with the Treaties and the Statute of the ESCB. The ECB recommends that the draft law should clarify that the Bank’s objective to discharge ‘such other functions and powers as are conferred on it by law’ is subject to the requirements of the Treaties and the Statute of the ESCB. 3.1.3 The new Section 6A(2) will state that ‘the Commission is to be responsible and accountable for the performance of the Bank in the achievement of its objectives’. In order to eliminate any legal risks associated with the independent discharge of the Bank’s ESCB-related tasks, the Commission’s responsibility and accountability should be specified to be without prejudice to the Governor’s sole

text: responsibility for the performance of the Bank’s objectives relating to ESCB-related obligations and functions and should not compromise the ability to fulfil those obligations and functions independently. The draft law should expressly clarify that no member of the Commission, other than the Governor, has decision-making powers on ESCB-related matters. 3.1.4 Head 8 states that ‘subject to certain exceptions, the functions and powers … of the Governor (excluding ESCB functions) … are to be transferred to the Bank’. While the ECB welcomes the clarification that the Governor’s ESCB-related functions will not be transferred to the Bank (as further clarified by the statement in Head 14 that ‘the Governor will continue to be solely responsible for all ESCB-related functions’), it is unclear which of the Governor’s functions and powers (albeit outside of his ESCB-related functions) are intended to be transferred to the Bank. Therefore, at this stage, the ECB is not able to properly assess the full impact of this draft head. Moreover, this provision should be amended as it might give the impression that the Bank is a dependent supervisory authority entrusted with ESCB-related tasks and objectives. 3.1.5 Head 8 contains a further statement that ‘the Commission is to ensure that the existing powers and functions of the Bank under Section 5A and Section 5B (the core functions of the Bank under the existing provisions) are properly discharged by the Bank’. As stated above at paragraph 3.1.2, and according to Section 5A(4) of the CBA, ‘the Bank is required to perform its functions and exercise its powers in a manner consistent with the [Treaties] and the ESCB Statute’. The ECB trusts that Section 5A(4) of the CBA will continue to apply. Also, the ECB recommends that it should be clarified that the Commission’s responsibility for ensuring the proper discharge by the Bank of its ESCB-related functions is without prejudice to the Governor’s sole responsibility for the performance of the functions imposed, and the exercise of powers conferred, on the Bank under the Treaties or the Statute of the ESCB and should not compromise the ability to fulfil those functions and the obligations under the Treaties or the Statute of the ESCB independently. For reasons of legal certainty, the last sentence should be clarified with regard to the scope of the functions covered by it, and its reference to ESCB-related tasks. 3.1.6 Head 11 proposes that only a minority of the members of the Commission will exercise their function ex officio, the remaining (at least six) members being appointed by the Minister. Head 13 states that the current provisions of the CBA regarding removal from membership are to be the same as currently apply to the Board of the CBFSAI. According to Section 25(4) of the CBA, the Minister of Finance may remove from office a director (being any of the (at least 6) directors appointed by him as above) for proven misconduct or incompetence, or in order to enable the Board to function effectively, or in order to facilitate a restructuring of the Board and IFSRA so as to enable a closer working relationship between them. Of the ex officio members of the Commission, one will be the Secretary General of the Department of Finance, and the other two will be the Head of Central Banking and the Head of Financial Regulation, both to be appointed by the Commission with the consent of the Minister. As a result the Minister’s influence over the

text: central bank’s supervisory role will be greatly increased and the operational independence of such supervisory role will be endangered. The legislative framework must be redrafted so as to ensure the operational independence of the central bank’s supervisory role, in line with international standards for the operational independence of financial supervisors. In particular, the legislative framework should provide that the members of the Commission have appropriate qualifications and technical expertise, and provide for the avoidance of conflicts of interests. The legislative framework must provide for autonomous decision-making of the Commission’s members in fulfilment of the supervisory mandate. Moreover, the nomination of persons implementing the policies of the Commission (Head of Financial Regulation and Head of Central Banking) should be within the autonomous judgement of the Commission. 3.1.7 Head 12 proposes that ‘The Commission is to manage and control the Bank’. As stated at paragraph 3.1.3 above, the ECB recommends the draft law should clarify that the Commission’s obligation to manage and control the Bank is without prejudice to the exclusive authority of the Governor in relation to ESCB-related matters and should not compromise the ability to fulfil obligations in that field independently. Furthermore, it is important that the other members of the Commission do not seek to influence or to give instructions to the Governor in his capacity as the sole member responsible for the performance of Bank’s ESCB-related tasks. 3.1.8 Head 13 states that certain provisions relating to membership of the Commission are to be the same as those that currently apply to the board of the CBSFAI. To the extent that any provisions in the draft law relating to the Governor differ from those relating to the other Commission members, the ECB recommends that the draft law should clarify that, in the event of any conflict between the conditions applicable to all members of the Commission and those applying to the Governor, the Governor should be bound by the provisions applying specifically to him or her. Moreover, to the extent that the other members of the Commission other than the Governor would be involved in the achievement of the ESCB-related tasks and the primary objective of price stability, the draft bill should provide safeguards for their personal independence similar to those provided for the Governor. 3.1.9 Head 14 proposes that ‘The Commission will delegate to the Governor such functions and powers relating to the day-to-day management of the Bank, the Heads of Function and staff of the Bank as the Commission deems appropriate to ensure the efficient and effective management of the Bank and the exercise of its powers, functions and obligations’. As stated above at paragraphs 3.1.3 and 3.1.6, the ECB recommends that the draft law should clarify that the Commission’s authority to delegate to the Governor is without prejudice to the Governor’s exclusive authority in relation to ESCB-related matters and should not compromise the ability to fulfil obligations in that field independently.

text: 3.1.10 Head 15 states that Section 19 of the CBA will continue to apply. Section 19(6) and (7) of the CBA provide for the automatic termination of office of the Governor for reasons such as bankruptcy, imprisonment or holding shares in a financial institution. Head 15 also states that Section 21 of the CBA (regarding removal of the Governor from office) will continue to apply. This Section allows for the Governor’s removal from office on grounds of permanent incapacity due to ill-health and for one or more specified grounds of serious misconduct. To ensure compliance with the conditions for dismissal of a Governor in Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB, Sections 19 and 21 need to reflect the language used in

text: Article 14.2

text: which states that a Governor ‘may be relieved from office only if he no longer fulfils the conditions required for the performance of his duties or if he has been guilty of serious misconduct’. 3.1.11 Head 18 relates to the Head of Central Banking and the Head of Financial Regulation. Although it is clear from this head that the current Chief Executive of the Office of the Financial Regulator is to be the first Head of Financial Regulation and that his first term is to run for the remainder of his contract with IFSRA, the ECB recommends that the draft law should have similar clarity as regards the position of Head of Central Banking, as Head 18(3) simply states that ‘there should be a transition arrangement for the present Director General of the Bank’. According to Section 22A of the CBA (relating to the Director General of the Bank carrying out certain responsibilities of the Bank), the Director General is required to carry out the Governor’s ESCB-related responsibilities whenever: (a) the Governor is unable to carry out those responsibilities because of absence because of ill-health or any other reason, or (b) the office of Governor is vacant. The ECB reminds the consulting authority that, in the context of personal independence, the rules on security of tenure of office of the Governor apply equally to other members of NCB decision-making bodies who are involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks , so the Director General has the same independence as the Governor in the performance of ESCB-related tasks. The ECB therefore emphasises that the present Director General must remain and must be able to see out his full term of office. In order to safeguard the independent exercise of the Bank’s ESCB-related functions, the ECB recommends that the draft law retains Section 22A of the CBA, so that the Head of Central Banking will continue to carry out the Governor’s ESCB-related responsibilities when the Governor is unable to do so or when the Governor’s office is vacant. Head 18(7) also proposes that the Governor should be able to engage in other remunerative employment with the consent of the Commission. The draft law should provide for safeguards against conflicts of interest that could jeopardise the personal independence of the Governor. As stated in the ECB Convergence Report of May 2008, ‘as a matter of principle, membership of a decision-making body involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks is incompatible with the exercise of other functions that might create a conflict of interest. In particular, members of such decision-making bodies may not hold an office or have an interest that may influence their

text: activities, whether through office in the executive or legislative branches of the state or in regional or local administrations, or through involvement in a business organisation’ . 3.1.12 Head 22 states that the Bank prepares annual accounts in accordance with Section 6H, which stipulates that the form of statement of accounts must be approved by the Minister after consulting the Bank. Head 22, and consequently Section 6H, should reflect the Bank’s obligation to comply with the Eurosystem’s regime for financial reporting of the Bank operations pursuant to Article 26 of the Statute of the ESCB. Moreover, under Section 6H, the Comptroller and the Auditor General will have the power to audit the Bank’s accounts. Such powers should be without prejudice to the audit by the Bank’s external auditors. 3.1.13 Head 23 states that ‘The Bank is to prepare an annual estimate of income from levies, subvention from the Bank and any other income and expenditure in relation financial regulation. This is to be submitted to the Minister not later than 2 months before the end of the preceding year. The Minister is to approve these’. As noted in the 1998 European Monetary Institute (EMI) Convergence Report, and reiterated in paragraph 8 of Opinion

text: , where third parties, and particularly the government, are in a position, directly or indirectly, to exercise influence on the determination of an NCB’s budget, the relevant statutory provisions should contain a safeguard clause to ensure that this does not impede the proper performance of the NCB’s ESCB-related tasks. More specifically, in order to eliminate the potential exposure of the Bank to liabilities resulting from funding and budgetary decisions in respect of financial regulation (including in respect of the Registrar of Credit Unions ), the ECB recommends that the draft law should clarify that the Governor has the sole right to determine any funding and budgetary decisions pertaining not only to the Bank’s ESCB-related tasks and their implementation, but also to financial regulation (including in respect of the Registrar of Credit Unions), which may have implications for the Bank’s independence, in particular its institutional and financial independence, or which may be deemed otherwise incompatible with the exercise by the Governor of the Bank’s ESCBrelated functions. The Governor could be granted an explicit right to oppose any funding, budgetary and staffing decisions in respect of financial regulation (including in respect of the Registrar of Credit Unions) which might have such implications. 3.1.14 Head 24 states that ‘The Bank is to have the power to impose levies and fees for the purpose of funding the regulation of financial service providers as set out in Sections 33J and 33K. The proceeds of the levies and fees are to be applied to the associated costs and overheads of those functions set out in Schedule 2 of the Central Bank Act 1942 and functions previously carried out by the Consumer Director and currently carried out by the Registrar of Credit Unions’. The ECB recommends that the draft law should clarify that proceeds from such levies and fees raised will not be applied so as to apply central bank funding to non-central banking functions, thereby having a negative impact on the performance of ESCB-related obligations and functions.

text: 3.1.15 Head 26 states that ‘where the proceeds of the levies and fees are likely to be insufficient to meet the total costs of the financial regulation functions, then the Bank may provide additional funds from the general fund to subsidise the funding of the financial regulation functions. The same safeguards are to apply as do currently, i.e. approval of the Minister and confirmation by the Governor that such subsidisation will not affect the exercise of his ESCB functions’. In addition, as stated in Section 5A(4) of the CBA, the Bank is required to perform its functions and exercise its powers in a manner consistent with [the Treaties] and the ESCB Statute. Although it is proposed that the draft law will contain these safeguards, the ECB reiterates the concerns expressed in paragraph 7 of ECB Opinion

text: as regards central bank independence and the uncertainty as to whether the Governor would enjoy a sufficient degree of control over any decisions by the Bank to provide funding for the financial regulation functions, and whether this would affect the performance of the ESCB-related tasks. The ECB therefore repeats its recommendation under paragraph 3.1.13 of this opinion that the Governor should be granted an explicit right to oppose any funding, budgetary and staffing decisions in respect of financial regulation (including in respect of the Registrar of Credit Unions) which might have such implications. 3.1.16 Head 27 (dealing with Co-operation in the Collection of Levies) states that ‘the Bank may cooperate with a list [of] persons to be prescribed by the Minister (including the Pensions Board, The Financial Services Ombudsman and the National Consumer Agency) for the collection of levies under the Central Bank Acts, the Pensions Board legislation and any other legislation. This means that the Bank or a prescribed body may collect the various industry levies as the agent of the others. The purpose of this is to encourage administrative efficiencies for both the regulators and the industry. Costs associated with the collection of levies on behalf of other bodies are to be met by the Principal.’ The ECB recommends that the draft law should clarify that proceeds from such levies and fees raised will not be applied in such a way as could result in applying central bank funding to non-central banking functions, thereby having a negative impact on the performance of ESCB-related obligations and functions. 3.2 Monetary financing 3.2.1 As set out in paragraph 3.1.14, Head 24 states that ‘the Bank is to have the power to impose levies and fees for the purpose of funding the regulation of financial service providers as set out in Sections 33J and 33K. The proceeds of the levies and fees are to be applied to those functions set out in Schedule 2 of the Central Bank Act 1942 and functions previously carried out by the Consumer Director and currently carried out by the Registrar of Credit Unions, and associated costs. This is to include overheads and other associated costs’. The ECB understands that the draft head proposes that the Bank may impose such levies and fees for funding its regulatory activities. In this regard, the ECB reminds the consulting authority that the tasks performed by the Bank must comply with the monetary financing prohibition in Article 123(1) of the TFEU which prohibits, among other things, overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facility with the national central

text: banks in favour of ‘bodies, offices or agencies, central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of Member States’. The ECB recommends that the draft law should clarify that proceeds from such levies and fees will not be applied in such a way as might constitute monetary financing as prohibited under Article 123(1) of the TFEU. 3.2.2 As set out in paragraph 3.1.16, Head 27 provides for cooperation in the collection of levies, with the Bank acting as the agent for the collection of levies on behalf of other public bodies, with the costs associated with the collection of levies on behalf of other bodies to be met by the principal. Under Article 21.2 of the Statute of the ESCB, the ECB and the national central banks may act as fiscal agents for public sector bodies. The Bank may therefore act as fiscal agent through cooperation with public sector bodies in the collection of levies, on an agency, but not on a principal basis. Taking the above into account, the ECB has two comments. First, the Bank may only act as fiscal agent for public sector bodies. The ECB therefore recommends that the draft law should clarify that the Minister may only prescribe parties who fall within the definition of ‘public sector bodies’ as persons for whom the Bank, as fiscal agent, may cooperate in the collection of levies. Second, the ECB notes that Head 27 also refers to the cooperation by the Bank with persons for ‘the collection of levies under the Central Bank Acts’. The ECB understands that levies and fees collected under the CBAs will be collected in connection with the performance of central banking tasks only, and not in connection with the performance of the tasks of other public bodies. The monetary financing prohibition in

text: Article 123

text: TFEU applies to Head 27 in this respect. As supplemented, in particular, by

text: Article 1

text: (b)(ii) of

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 of 13 December 1993

text: specifying definitions for the application of the prohibitions referred to in Articles

text: and

text: b (1) of the Treaty , the financing by an NCB of (a) the performance of functions by other public sector bodies, or (b) the public sector’s obligations vis-à-vis third parties, is prohibited. Therefore, national legislation authorising or requiring NCBs to finance such functions, without any corresponding activity or function on the part of the NCB, would not be compatible with the prohibition on monetary financing. Moreover, under

text: Article 271

text: (d) TFEU the ECB is responsible for ensuring the compliance by NCBs with their obligations under the Treaties, which includes compliance with the prohibition of monetary financing. For these reasons, in order to avoid any risk of a breach of the prohibition of monetary financing by the Bank, the draft law will need to clarify that any levies collected by the Bank for other public bodies, whether under the CBAs or otherwise, are collected by the Bank as agent for and on behalf of such other bodies. In particular, Irish law needs to clarify that such other public bodies, acting as principals, have the

text: necessary power to impose levies and fees for the purpose of performing their respective tasks, to avoid any possible ambiguity as to whether funds belonging to the Bank are used to finance other public sector bodies and/or their obligations vis-à-vis third parties. 3.2.3 Head 28 relates to the transfer to the National Consumer Agency (NCA) of the specific function of the Consumer Director to give information to consumers relating to financial services. Head 30 proposes for the secondment and potential transfer of IFSRA staff to the NCA in order to implement the transfer of that function. Head 30 further provides that ‘the seconded staff currently contribute to a Central Bank superannuation scheme and provision is to be made for the preservation of the rights of staff transferring to the employment of the Agency’. In order to ensure full compliance with the prohibition of monetary financing, the ECB recommends that the draft law should clarify that no resources of the Bank will be applied towards the payment of pensions in respect of Bank staff seconded or transferred to the NCA pursuant to Head 30 following such secondment or transfer, other than solely in respect of ensuring rights and entitlements already accrued by those Bank staff up to the time of secondment or transfer.

text: 4. Final observations

text: The ECB notes that the publication of the draft law would require a further ECB consultation by the consulting authority under

text: . The ECB reserves its position to further opine on the draft legislative provisions of the proposed bill when it is published.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 7 April 2010.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: Law CXII of 1996, Magyar Közlöny, 1996/109 XII. 12. 2 Law CXXXV of 2007, Magyar Közlöny, 2007/162 XI. 28. 3 OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 4 For previous stabilisation measures taken by the Hungarian Government see ECB Opinions

text: and

text: . All ECB opinions are available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: See Opinions

text: and

text: . 6 For guidance to the Member States in the conclusions of the Ecofin meeting see ‘Immediate responses to financial turmoil’, Ecofin Council Conclusions of 7 October 2008, available on the Council’s website at www.consilium.europa.eu. 7 The text of the Declaration of 12 October 2008 is available on the former French Presidency’s website at www.ue2008.fr.

text: See

text: and

text: . 9 See Eurosystem’s reply of 8 February 2010 to the public consultation by the Commission launched in its Communication on an EU Framework for Cross-Border Crisis Management in the Banking Sector on 20 October 2009. 10 See in particular ‘Report and Recommendations of the Cross-border Bank Resolution Group’, March 2010, available at www.bis.org and ‘Practical Guide on Cross-Border Insolvency Cooperation’ adopted by UNCITRAL on 1 July 2009, available at www.uncitral.org.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 13 April 2010 on the amendment to the Law on credit institutions and financial undertakings introducing further financial market stabilisation measures (CON/2010/31)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 13 April 2010 on the amendment to the Law on credit institutions and financial undertakings introducing further financial market stabilisation measures (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 11 March 2010, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Hungarian Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft law amending the Law on credit institutions and financial enterprises (CIFE) and the Law on the Financial Supervisory Authority (FSA) (hereinafter referred to as the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third and sixth indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (MNB) and rules applicable to financial institutions in so far as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The draft law is motivated by the financial market crisis and, in particular, the need to avoid potential systemic risks, thus maintaining confidence in the national financial system and enhancing its stability and solvency. Ensuring the uninterrupted operation of key banking services is important to maintain investor confidence, while the interests of the individual institutions and that of the public need to be balanced. The Hungarian Government has already taken steps to stabilise the financial markets . The provisions of the draft law aim at strengthening the supervisory framework by providing the FSA with enhanced powers in crisis prevention and resolution.

text: 1.2 Against this background, the draft law enhances the supervisory and resolution powers of the FSA by providing, inter alia, for: (i) a recovery plan for the financial institutions; (ii) the possibility of appointing a supervisory commissioner and his/her tasks; (iii) specific procedures aimed at financially distressed financial institutions, including, inter alia, the transfer of assets and liabilities from a credit institution and the possible establishment of a ‘bridge bank’ based on a Government decision; (iv) basic valuation principles and procedures to determine the acquisition value of assets and liabilities; (v) the rules and conditions for compensating a credit institution; (vi) the possible legal remedies against certain FSA decisions; (vii) specific administrative deadlines. 1.3 The draft law specifies qualitative and quantitative thresholds triggering FSA specific powers that would increase in intensity, depending on the seriousness of the situation of the ailing financial institution. Under the new proposed Article 151(4) of the CIFE to maintain the stability of the financial intermediary system and to protect the interest of depositors and account holders, and to minimise public expenditure, the FSA will be liable to take the exceptional and necessary measures subject to the fulfilment of each of the following conditions: (i) the owners of a credit institution refuse to cooperate with the FSA or the supervisory commissioner; (ii) the credit institution is likely to fail to fulfil its obligations; (iii) the credit institution’s insolvency would potentially jeopardise the stability of the financial system; and (iv) other measures taken by the FSA have failed to achieve their purpose. 1.4 Moreover, the draft law establishes a legal framework which would enable the FSA to transfer assets and liabilities from the balance sheet of a systemically important credit institution to either another credit institution or to a wholly State-owned special purpose bank, i.e. a ‘bridge bank’ to be established as explained in paragraph 2.2 below.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 The ECB has issued a number of opinions at the request of the Member States on national measures adopted in response to the global financial crisis. The ECB invites the Ministry of Finance to take into account the relevant observations made in its recent opinions on similar draft legislative provisions in other Member States, some of which are repeated below. The ECB also refers to the importance of the guidance provided by the Ecofin Council , as well as the Declaration issued by the Heads of State of the euro area . In particular, the ECB emphasises that any initiatives put in place by the competent national authorities to restore confidence in the financial markets should be coordinated and should aim to implement the common principles, in a spirit of close cooperation with other Member States and the Union institutions. As a general remark in this

text: context, the ECB, in line with its previous opinions , notes the importance of a transparent and predictable framework as regards the parameters of and limitations to the exercise by the authorities of their powers. 2.2 Under the new legal framework proposed by the draft law, the FSA will have the right to transfer assets and liabilities from the balance sheet of a systemically important credit institution to a sound institution, that is to another operational credit institution or to a newly established and organisationally and financially independent bridge bank, wholly owned by the State and separately established for this specific purpose. The establishment of a bridge bank may be necessary if, at the relevant time, no credit institution is available on the market to take over the assets and liabilities of an ailing credit institution. The ECB welcomes the introduction in the draft law of the option of addressing a possible crisis situation through the transfer of a distressed bank’s assets and liabilities to a bridge bank. The Eurosystem highlighted the importance of such a resolution tool in ensuring the continuity of essential business operations of systemically important credit institutions when replying to the Commission’s initial analysis of the possible orientation of a future Union framework for crisis management and resolution . The availability of a bridge bank is recognised as part of the trend towards enhanced convergence of national legal schemes for crisis management and resolution developing at both international and European level . Taking the growing inter-dependencies between financial systems into account and the need for appropriate action to address the possible systemic impact of failing cross-border institutions, the ECB highlights that the domestic legal framework for crisis management and resolution may need to be further adapted to future regulatory initiatives at Union level addressing existing problems in the coordination of resolution and insolvency proceedings concerning cross-border banks. 2.3 With these general observations in mind, and against the background of the guidance previously given by the ECB and the Union institutions in this regard, the ECB has the following specific observations on the draft law.

text: 3. Specific observations

text: 3.1 Role of the MNB

text: Under the new proposed

text: Article 168

text: A(2) of the CIFE, the draft law provides for the conditions for the MNB’s involvement, which is limited only to the process of issuing an assessment at the request of the FSA of whether a credit institution’s insolvency would potentially jeopardise the stability of the financial system in Hungary under the new proposed

text: Article 151(4)

text: (c). The ECB welcomes the recognition of the MNB’s expertise in assessing financial stability. Moreover, to

text: make such assessment, a smooth exchange of information on the situation of individual credit institutions must be in place. The ECB emphasises that functions to be performed by the MNB in this regard for the benefit of the resolution regime must be conducted in a manner that will fully comply with the Treaty obligations. In particular, it is expected that the MNB’s new task laid down in the draft law will neither affect the MNB’s institutional, functional and financial independence, nor the performance of its tasks under the Treaty and the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank. 3.2 Transfer of assets According to the new proposed

text: Article 168

text: A of the CIFE, the establishment of a bridge bank will be restricted to cases where no other resolution to the financial difficulties of a credit institution was effective and it is necessary to ensure the stability of the financial system. This Article furthermore broadly formulates rules for the terms and conditions for bidding on the transfer of assets and liabilities to another operational credit institution, as it specifically leaves the FSA to determine the detailed rules for the bidding process in an ad hoc decision. For reasons of legal clarity, the basic rules for bidding could also be reflected in the draft law. Additionally, the draft law does not specify the criteria for an operating credit institution to qualify as eligible to take over these assets based on the bidding process. The ECB would welcome further clarifications of the conditions for transferring assets to operating credit institutions. The ECB also advises considering the possibility of including further provisions in the draft law to provide for a smooth and swift continuation of the legal relationship with clients relating to the debts taken over and the new credit institution taking over the debts. 3.3 Valuation of the transferred assets and the pricing of compensation Under the new proposed

text: Article 168

text: A(7) to (9) of the CIFE, the draft law provides that transferred assets will be valued at a rate applicable on the day before transfer. The same article sets out further requirements concerning the valuation. In particular, the valuation will also have to be regarded as a revaluation affecting the book value of assets and liabilities which will also be reflected in the income of the transferring credit institution. Under the new proposed

text: Article 168

text: C of the CIFE, the draft law regulates the pricing rules and the conditions for compensation. The transparency of criteria for valuation is of the essence in pricing. In this respect, it may be advisable to further specify how a valuation is obtained when no valid market prices are available for the assets in question. Furthermore, the ECB suggests including in the draft law the possibility of bringing a judicial appeal against the pricing of compensation. Such court procedure should be expedited to avoid jeopardising the aim of the transfer of the assets. 3.4 Property rights According to the new proposed

text: Article 168

text: B(3) of the CIFE, the cost of purchasing assets by the bridge bank will be covered by the central budget and, as detailed in the new proposed

text: Article 168

text: C(3), compensation will only be due if the equity capital of the transferring credit institution (i)

text: has been decreased as a result of the FSA’s decision to transfer the assets, and (ii) was positive on the day before the time of transfer. The compensation also has to be in accordance with the provisions of the Hungarian Constitution on property rights. The ECB notes that any such compensation must be ‘fair’ according to law. 3.5 The possible winding up of affected credit institutions and going concerns The draft law is silent on whether after removing certain assets and liabilities from the portfolio of a credit institution, the transferring institution will continue as a going concern, or be wound up after the transfer takes place. Therefore, the ECB suggests including further provisions on these matters in the draft law, ensuring that if the transferring credit institution continues its operations, it will base its transactions on a sound business policy and a solid business model. 3.6 The future role, operation and temporary nature of the bridge bank

text: The ECB reiterates the importance of ensuring that the State’s involvement is limited in time to the extent deemed necessary for the success of the reorganisation measure. Transferring assets from credit institutions in distress should remain a measure for use in clearly defined and exceptional circumstances. The ECB stresses that it should be ensured that such a measure is only used as a last resort, that disruption of the level playing-field is minimised and that the State’s role is limited in time. Against this background, the ECB notes that in the new proposed

text: Article 168

text: A of the CIFE, the draft law provides for the possibility for the FSA to propose the establishment of a bridge bank as a general measure if any other measures have proved inefficient, but the draft law does not specify a possible end-date for the operations of a bridge bank. Since the duration of the operation of the bridge bank has to reflect the amount and the nature of the assets and, in particular, their maturity structure, the ECB would welcome a generally defined exit strategy in the draft law for the operations of a bridge bank based on, for example, the basis of a period of time or the development of market conditions, to ensure the temporary nature of the State’s involvement and at the same time preserve the value of the transferred assets and liabilities.

text: 3.7 Procedural issues The ECB is aware that the draft law was submitted to the Hungarian Parliament at a time when it was no longer possible for the legislators to discuss the draft law in detail as the Parliament has been dissolved due to the general elections in Hungary. The ECB would like to remind the consulting authority of the guidance given on

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: and, in particular, that the duty to consult the ECB also applies to additional substantial amendments to draft legislative provisions that have already been submitted to the ECB for an opinion.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 13 April 2010. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: Draft resolution of 16 March 2010. 3 Law of 29 August 1997 on Narodowy Bank Polski (consolidated text: Dziennik Ustaw (Dz. U.) of 2005 No 1, Item 2). 4 As published in Dziennik Urzędowy NBP of 20 December 2006 No 13, item 16.

text: Paragraph 1(2) of Resolution No 9/2006. 6 Paragraph 1(2)(c) of Resolution No 9/2006 as amended by paragraph 1(1) of the draft resolution; according to the explanatory memorandum attached to the draft resolution, this deletion results from the fact that the unrealised foreign exchange losses are included in the financial result as at the balance sheet date. 7 New paragraph 1(3) added by paragraph 1(2) of the draft resolution. 8 Paragraph 2 of the draft resolution. 9 See paragraph 3.4 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 3.2 of Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 10 See the ECB’s Convergence Report May 2008, pp. 20-21. 11 See Opinions

text: and

text: ; paragraph 2.2.(a) of Opinion

text: ; paragraph 3.2 of Opinion

text: ; paragraph 3.3 of Opinion

text: ; paragraphs 11 and 12 of Opinion

text: . 12 See the ECB’s Convergence Report May 2008, p. 20. See also paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: ; paragraph 2.2.(a) of Opinion

text: ; paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: ; paragraph 6 of Opinion

text: See paragraph 2.4 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 3.3 of Opinion

text: . 16 As introduced in Resolution No 9/2006 by paragraph 1(2) of the draft resolution.

text: According to Article 69(3) of the Law on Narodowy Bank Polski, NBP’s annual accounts should be submitted by the NBP President to the Council of Ministers for its approval by 30 April of the year following the financial year to which the accounts relate. Therefore, between the end of the financial year and 30 April of the following year, the accounts should be: (i) drawn up by NBP’s Management Board (under

text: Article 17(4)

text: (12)), (ii) audited by an external auditor (under

text: Article 69(1)

text: ), and (iii) adopted by the Monetary Policy Council (under

text: Article 12(2)

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 21 April 2010 on an amendment to the rules governing Narodowy Bank Polski’s provision against foreign exchange rate risk (CON/2010/32)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 21 April 2010 on an amendment to the rules governing Narodowy Bank Polski’s provision against foreign exchange rate risk (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 18 March 2010 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the President of Narodowy Bank Polski (NBP) for an opinion on a Monetary Policy Council draft resolution amending the resolution on the principles for creating and releasing the provision against the foreign exchange rate risk of the zloty at the National Bank of Poland (hereinafter the ‘draft resolution’) . The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft resolution relates to NBP. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft resolution

text: 1.1 Under Article 65 of the Law on Narodowy Bank Polski , NBP is obliged to create a provision to cover the risk of changes in the exchange rate of the zloty against other currencies, with the specific rules governing the creating and releasing of the provision being defined by the Monetary Policy Council. Pursuant to this mandate, the relevant rules were defined in Resolution No 9/2006 of the Monetary Policy Council of 19 December 2006 on the principles for creating and releasing the provision against the foreign exchange rate risk of the zloty at the National Bank of Poland . The ECB was not consulted on the draft provisions of Resolution No 9/2006. 1.2 The draft resolution changes the way the provision against the foreign exchange rate risk is calculated by NBP. Under Resolution No 9/2006, the following factors are taken into account in estimating the amount of the provision: (i) the amount of the foreign exchange holdings exposed to the foreign exchange rate risk; (ii) the assessment of the foreign exchange rate risk based on

text: generally accepted and consistently applied methods of financial risk assessment; (iii) the existing and anticipated balance of the revaluation account and unrealised foreign exchange gains and losses . The draft resolution proposes to change the treatment of unrealised foreign exchange gains and losses by: (i) deleting the reference to unrealised foreign exchange losses ; and (ii) adding an explicit requirement that the amount of the provision should be reduced by the amount of unrealised foreign exchange gains (except for those relating to gold) . 1.3 The draft resolution proposes to apply the new calculation method to NBP’s annual accounts for the year 2009 .

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 The purpose of national central bank (NCB) capital and reserves is to ensure that the NCB has at its disposal, at all times, the necessary financial resources to conduct monetary policy. A long-term perspective must be taken when establishing an appropriate level of the risk provision, therefore sufficient financial buffers should be created in years of profit to allow an NCB to absorb possible losses without weakening its financial means for implementing monetary policy. As stated in the 10 11 ECB’s Convergence Reports and previous ECB opinions , an NCB must be free to independently (which means without interference from any third party, such as a state audit office) create financial provisions to safeguard the real value of its capital and assets. An NCB must also, at all times, have sufficient financial means to carry out its other functions, i.e. to perform its national tasks, to meet its international obligations and properly cover its administrative and operational expenses . 2.2 National rules on the distribution of NCBs’ profits must also comply with the monetary financing prohibition laid down in Article 123(1) of the Treaty and

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 of 13 December 1993

text: specifying definitions for the application of the prohibitions referred to in Articles

text: and

text: b(1) of the Treaty. As mentioned in previous ECB opinions, to comply with the monetary financing prohibition, it is of crucial importance that the distribution of profits, by instalments or in full, does not imply advances on future or provisional profits but is rather the

text: result only of profits that are fully realised, accounted for and audited, which in turn requires due calculation of profits and losses .

text: 3. Specific comments

text: 3.1 Calculation method 3.1.1 Although the NBP is not subject to Guideline ECB/2006/16 of 10 November 2006 on the legal framework for accounting and financial reporting in the European System of Central Banks , the ECB appreciates that the NBP has adopted the Eurosystem legal framework in relation to accounting and financial reporting in order to achieve consistency with Eurosystem standards. 3.1.2 The draft resolution includes an amendment to the calculation method of the size of the foreign exchange rate risk provision. The calculation method for the size of this provision, in turn, directly affects the allocation of NBP’s profit and its remittance to the State budget under Article 69(4) of the Law on Narodowy Bank Polski. 3.1.3 The ECB understands that in the period 2004 to 2006 the unrealised foreign exchange losses led to a depletion of the revaluation account in foreign currencies. In 2007 NBP was not in a position to build up its provision as it posted a net loss. Only in 2008 was it possible to transfer funds into the foreign exchange rate risk provision. The ECB also understands that the proposed changes would lead to NBP establishing a level of the foreign exchange rate risk provision that is significantly less conservative than the level set using the existing calculation method. In this context, the ECB notes that the loss relating to 2007 was carried over into 2008 because of the lack of financial buffers. Therefore, to prevent such a situation in the future, NBP should carefully consider any amendment to the mechanism for building up the provision which may impede the ability of the NBP to maintain an adequate level of financial buffers. 3.1.4 The wording of the proposed paragraph 1(3) could be made clearer. This provision may be understood as a mere clarification that the unrealised foreign exchange gains mentioned in paragraph 1(2)(c) should reduce the amount of the provision and should exclude unrealised gains on gold. However, it may also be implied that, under the new calculation method proposed in the draft resolution, the treatment of unrealised foreign exchange gains would be double: they would be taken into account under paragraph 1(2)(c) and subtracted from the amount of the provision under the new paragraph 1(3). 3.2 Retroactive application 3.2.1 The financial statements for the year 2009 were drawn up as at 31 December 2009, and thereafter audited by an independent auditor, based on the legal framework which was in force at that time, including the rules governing the provision against foreign exchange rate risk contained in Resolution No 9/2006. The draft resolution proposes to apply the new calculation method to the

text: NBP’s financial statements for the year 2009. This means, first, that the rules according to which the NBP’s 2009 financial statements were compiled would be retroactively changed, thereby affecting the size of the foreign exchange rate risk provision; and, second, in terms of procedure, that the entry into force of the retroactively applicable draft resolution would coincide in time with the process of preparation, auditing, authorisation and taking a decision on the approval of the 2009 financial statements by the competent bodies. For these reasons, concerns may arise about whether this process is sound, well-coordinated and transparent . 3.2.2 Furthermore, the practical implication of applying the new calculation method before the NBP 2009 financial statements are adopted affects the amount of the risk provision and, consequently, the amount to be transferred by NBP to the State budget under Article 69(4) of the Law on Narodowy Bank Polski. Under the draft resolution, the amount of the risk provision would be reduced after the financial statements were prepared by the NBP’s Management Board and after they were audited by an independent auditor; as a consequence, the amount of the profit would be increased by the amount of provisional foreign exchange profit. Hence, the portion of NBP’s 2009 annual profit that would be remitted to the State budget would need to be accounted for again and audited. Otherwise, payments to be made to the State budget would effectively include advances on provisional profits in violation of the monetary financing prohibition under Article 123 of the Treaty. Against this background, the ECB stresses the importance of complying with the monetary financing prohibition. 3.3 Timing of the consultation As already mentioned, the ECB received the consultation request on 18 March 2010. The draft resolution was adopted by the Monetary Policy Council on 30 March 2010, i.e. before the ECB’s opinion was adopted. In this context the ECB would like to draw attention to certain provisions of

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: regulating the timing of consultation requests. According to

text: Article 4 of Decision 98/415/EC

text: , Member States are required to ensure that the ECB is consulted at an appropriate point in time to allow the consulting authority to take its opinion into consideration before deciding on the substance of the draft legislative provisions. It also follows from

text: Article 3(4) of Decision 98/415/EC

text: that Member States are obliged to suspend the process for the adoption of draft legislative provisions pending submission of the ECB’s opinion. The ECB expects that in the future the obligation to consult the ECB at an appropriate stage of the legislative procedure will be respected.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 21 April 2010. [signed]

text: The Vice-President of the ECB

text: Lucas D. PAPADEMOS