text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: BGBl. I p. 1507.

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 1338/2001 of 28 June 2001

text: laying down measures necessary for the protection of the euro against counterfeiting (OJ L 181, 4.7.2001, p. 6).

text: Decision ECB/2010/14 of 16 September 2010 on the authenticity and fitness checking and recirculation of euro banknotes (OJ L 267, 9.10.2010, p. 1).

text: Paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 30 October 2012 on the checking of cash (CON/2012/82)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 30 October 2012 on the checking of cash (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 4 October 2012, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Deutsche Bundesbank for an opinion on a draft regulation on the checking of cash (hereinafter the ‘draft regulation’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Article 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the first, second and third indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft legislation concerns currency matters, means of payment and the Deutsche Bundesbank. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Legal basis und purpose of the draft regulation

text: 1.1 The draft regulation is based on Section 36a of the Law on the Deutsche Bundesbank in conjunction with Section 1 of the Regulation on the delegation of power to the Bundesbank to adopt regulations pursuant to Section 36a of the Law on the Deutsche Bundesbank . According to these provisions, the Deutsche Bundesbank’s Executive Board is empowered to adopt regulations relating to cash checking which are subject to the approval of the Ministry of Finance. 1.2 The purpose of the draft regulation is to implement requirements provided for in Article 6 of 3 4

text: Regulation (EC) No 1338/2001

text: and in Decision ECB/2010/14 . The draft regulation establishes detailed rules concerning the taking of samples during on-site inspections of entities subject to the obligations laid down in

text: Article 6 of Regulation (EC) No 1338/2001

text: , and relating to the scope and manner of the reporting obligations of those entities in the context of euro banknote authentication and fitness checking. Furthermore, the draft regulation lays down the minimum information to be

text: included in reports which must be submitted under Section 36 of the Law on the Deutsche Bundesbank and which concern counterfeit euro banknotes and coins, or euro banknotes and coins suspected of being counterfeit, and other items specified in Section 35 of the Law on the Deutsche Bundesbank.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 The ECB welcomes the draft regulation and the fact that the Deutsche Bundesbank exercises its delegated power, in accordance with Sections 36a and 37a of the Law on the Deutsche Bundesbank, to adopt detailed provisions concerning the checking of cash and related reporting obligations. It is important that the Deutsche Bundesbank is in a position to monitor the authentication and fitness checking of euro banknotes pursuant to Decision ECB/2010/14. In general, the ECB is confident that the provisions of the draft regulation will help to protect the integrity of euro banknotes in circulation, resulting in continued public confidence in euro banknotes . 2.2 In particular, the draft regulation provides in Section 1 that, in the course of its inspections of staffoperated banknote processing systems pursuant to Section 37(a)(2) of the Law of the Deutsche Bundesbank, the Deutsche Bundesbank may take samples of euro banknotes that have been processed and are deemed fit for recirculation. It also provides that the party obliged to take measures shall deposit the sample with a branch of the Deutsche Bundesbank within five business days. The ECB notes that the draft regulation refers to, and even goes beyond, Article 10(2) of Decision ECB/2010/14 by providing for an obligation to deposit samples of processed euro banknotes at the Deutsche Bundesbank. Article 10(2) of Decision ECB/2010/14 stipulates that, subject to national law requirements, NCBs are authorised to take samples of processed euro banknotes to check them at their own premises. The ECB welcomes the fact that the Deutsche Bundesbank has made use of its competence to adopt a specific national rule which is in accordance with Article 10(2) of Decision ECB/2010/14. The provisions of Section 1 enable the entities involved to check whether euro banknotes were processed in accordance with Decision ECB/2010/14. The ECB also welcomes the fact that the objective of Section 1 is to maintain the high quality of euro banknotes in circulation and to enable the entities referred to in

text: to detect counterfeits as quickly as possible. 2.3 Section 2 of the draft regulation is aimed at improving and harmonising the transmission of data concerning counterfeit money. The ECB welcomes the fact that under this provision more detailed information is required for the reports accompanying the submission of counterfeit money, in order to enable judicial authorities to take measures to prosecute offenders and to issue warnings to groups likely to be targeted by distributors of counterfeit money.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 30 October 2012. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: See the first and second paragraphs of the general part of the explanatory memorandum to the draft law. 3 Article I, Section 4(1) of the draft law. 4 Article I, Section 4(2) of the draft law.

text: See point (c) of the sixth paragraph of the general part of the explanatory memorandum to the draft law.

text: EUR 10 000 in the case of offences committed by natural persons not registered as sole traders. 10 Article II of the draft law. 12 Consistently confirmed by the ECB, most recently in Opinion

text: . All ECB Opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu

publisher: Europeiska centralbanken

sprak: en

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 31 October 2012 on restrictions on cash payments (CON/2012/83)

serie: con

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 31 October 2012 on restrictions on cash payments (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

type: rubrik

text: On 2 October 2012, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Slovak Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft law on restrictions on cash payments (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the second and third indents of

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to means of payment and Národná banka Slovenska. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

type: stycke

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The draft law aims at combating tax fraud and evasion by means of prohibiting cash payments in euro or in another currency, where such payments exceed certain limits. As a general rule, the draft law prohibits cash payments in excess of EUR 5 000 . Cash payments of up to EUR 15 000 will only be permitted between natural persons not registered as sole traders . 1.2 The prohibition will also apply to the transfer/receipt of cash abroad where it relates to an agreement implemented in Slovakia and where the transferring/receiving party has a permanent residence, temporary residence or tolerated stay, or a registered office, plant or place of business in Slovakia . 1.3 The draft law also contains a list of exemptions from the prohibition . In principle, the abovementioned limits will not apply where the party making the payment is the State or another public authority or where there is a compelling reason for the exemption .

text: 1.4 Infringement of the prohibition under the draft law will be without prejudice to the validity of the act of law underlying the cash payment . However, infringement thereof will constitute an administrative offence for which a fine of up to EUR 150 000 will be imposed . 1.5 The draft law should enter into force on 1 January 2013 .

text: 2. Specific observations

text: 2.1 The ECB notes that the draft law is in compliance with Union law, and in particular with

text: recital 19

text: of

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 974/98 of 3 May 1998

text: on the introduction of the euro , which states that ‘limitations on payments in notes and coins, established by Member States for public reasons, are not incompatible with the status of legal tender of euro banknotes and coins, provided that other lawful means for the settlement of monetary debts are available’ . The ECB acknowledges that: (i) such other lawful means for the settlement of monetary debts, other than cash, are available in Slovakia; and (ii) the draft law’s objective of combating tax fraud and evasion qualifies as a public-interest objective outweighing the impact of the limits on cash payments. 2.2 In any event, limits on settlements in cash should be proportionate to the objectives pursued and should not go beyond what is necessary to achieve such objectives. Any impact of the proposed limits should be carefully weighed against the public benefits expected to be derived from the proposed restrictions on settlements in cash. Also, in view of the fact that the measures affect relatively low-value payments, the competent authorities should ensure that the effects of these measures do not go beyond what is necessary for achieving the objective of combating tax fraud and evasion.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 31 October 2012.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI

type: vagledning

utgivare: ecb


text: COM(2012) 167 final.

text: Se skäl

text: och

text: artikel 9 i förordning (EG) nr 223/2009

text: artikel 5 i stadgan

text: för Europeiska centralbankssystemet (ECBS) och Europeiska centralbanken (nedan kallad ECBS-stadgan),

text: artiklarna 2

text: a och 8a i

text: rådets förordning (EG) nr 2533/98 av den 23 november 1998

text: om Europeiska centralbankens insamling av statistiska uppgifter (EUT L 318, 27.11.1998, s. 8) samt

text: skäl 8

text: i

text: rådets förordning (EG) nr 951/2009 av den 9 oktober 2009

text: om ändring av förordning

text: (EG) nr 2533/98

text: om Europeiska centralbankens insamling av statistiska uppgifter (EUT L 269, 14.10.2009, s. 1). Jämför punkt 1.1 i Europeiska centralbankens yttrande

text: av den 14 november 2007 på begäran av Europeiska unionens råd över ett förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning om europeisk statistik (EUT C 291, 5.12.2007, s. 1).

text: Se

text: artikel 5 i förordning (EG) nr 223/2009

text: , i dess lydelse enligt artikel 1.2 i förslaget till förordning.

text: Se den nya artikeln 5a införd i förordning

text: (EG) nr 223/2009

text: genom

text: artikel 1.3

text: förslaget till förordning, jfr. artiklarna

text: och

text: i kommissionens beslut 2012/504/EU av den 17 september 2012 om Eurostat (EUT L 251, 18.9.2012, s. 49).

text: Se det nya tredje stycket i

text: artikel 11

text: som införs i förordning

text: (EG) nr 223/2009

text: genom artikel 1.5 i förslaget till förordning.

text: Se den nya artikeln 17a som införs i förordning

text: (EG) nr 223/2009

text: genom artikel 1.8 i förslaget till förordning.

text: Se

text: artikel 5.1 första stycket i förordning (EG) nr 223/2009

text: Se

text: artikel 5.1 andra stycket i förordning (EG) nr 223/2009

text: Se skäl 6 i förslaget till förordning.

text: EGT L 318, 27.11.1998, s. 8. Jmf. punkt 1.2 i ECB:s yttrande

text: Se

text: skäl 9

text: i

text: förordning (EG) nr 223/2009

text: . Nationell lagstiftning kan i vissa fall uppdra åt individuella de nationella centralbanker, förutsatt att detta är förenligt med deras ECBS-uppgifter, att producera statistik inom ramen för programmet för europeisk statistik som vanligtvis samlas in genom ESS enligt förordning

text: (EG) nr 223/2009

text: Se

text: skäl 11

text: i

text: förordning (EG) nr 2533/98

text: Såsom framgår av

text: rådets förordning (EG) nr 2223/96

text: av 25 juni 1996 om det europeiska national- och regionalräkenskapssystemet i gemenskapen (EGT L 310, 30.11.1996, s. 1). Se även

text: skäl 9

text: i

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning (EG) nr 184/2005 av den 12 januari 2005

text: om gemenskapsstatistik över betalningsbalansen, internationell handel med tjänster och utländska direktinvesteringar (EUT L 35, 8.5.2005, s. 23). Se även riktlinje ECB/2004/15 av den 16 juli 2004 om Europeiska centralbankens krav på rapportering av statistik över betalningsbalansen och utlandsställningen samt likviditeten i utländsk valuta har ändrats väsentligt (EUT L 354, 30.11.2004, s. 34).

text: Se

text: rådets beslut 91/115/EEG

text: om upprättandet av en kommitté för valuta-, finans- och betalningsbalansstatistik (EGT L 59, 6.3.1991, s. 19).

text: Se den nya artikeln 5a som införs i förordning

text: (EG) nr 223/2009

text: genom artikel 1.3 i förslaget till förordning.

text: Se ändringsförslagen 1, 2 samt 4–6 i bilagan till detta yttrande.

text: Se den nya artikeln 17a.1 som införs i förordning

text: (EG) nr 223/2009

text: Se

text: artikel 24 i förordning (EG) nr 223/2009

text: , som ströks genom artikel 1.10 i förslaget till förordning.

text: Se punkt 1.4 i ECB:s yttrande

text: Framgår för närvarande av

text: artikel 24 andra stycket i rådets förordning (EG) nr 223/2009

text: . Se ändringarna 3 och 7 i bilagan till detta yttrande.

text: Se den nya artikeln 17a.2 som införs i förordning

text: (EG) nr 223/2009

text: Se artikel

text: och

text: i fördraget om Europeiska unionen.

text: Se ändring 7 i bilagan till detta yttrande.

text: Text markerad med fet stil anger ECB:s förslag till ny text. Genomstruken text anger de strykningar som ECB föreslår.

text: EUT L 318, 27.11.1998, s. 8.

sprak: sv

title: Europeiska centralbankens yttrande av den 6 november 2012 om ett förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning om ändring av förordning (EG) nr 223/2009 om europeisk statistik (CON/2012/84)

text: Inledning och rättslig grund

text: Den 15 maj 2007 mottog Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) en begäran från Europeiska unionens råd om ett yttrande över ett förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning om ändring av förordning

text: (EG) nr 223/2009

text: om europeisk statistik (nedan kallat förslaget till förordning).

text: ECB:s behörighet att avge ett yttrande grundas på artiklarna

text: och

text: i fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt eftersom förslaget till förordning faller inom ECB:s behörighetsområde. I enlighet med

text: artikel 17.5

text: första meningen i arbetsordningen för Europeiska centralbanken har detta yttrande antagits av ECB-rådet.

text: Allmänna kommentarer

text: Europeisk statistik utvecklas, produceras och sprids av både europeiska statistiksystemet (ESS) och Europeiska centralbankssystemet (ECBS) som arbetar enligt olika rättsliga förutsättningar men har ett nära samarbete för att genomföra sina respektive statistikuppdrag. ECB välkomnar därför förbättringar av den rättsliga ramen för ESS som ökar dess effektivitet och som ger den en liknande grad av oberoende som ECBS. Mer specifikt stöder ECB målet att förbättra styrningen av ESS genom att a) stärka den samordnande rollen för de nationella statistikbyråernas (NSI) i förhållande till andra nationella myndigheter som arbetar med europeisk statistik som uteslutande faller inom ESS ansvarsområde, b) stärka det yrkesmässiga oberoendet för NSI-cheferna och Eurostats chef, c) stärka genomförandet av riktlinjerna för europeisk statistik genom att kräva att medlemsstaterna genomför ett åtagande om att skapa förtroende för statistiken och att kommissionen granskar detta arbete samt d) förbättrar tillgången till, och användning av, alla administrativa register genom NSI.

text: 1. NSI:s mer samordnande roll inom ESS och samarbetet med ECBS

text: 1.1 Enligt förslaget till förordning ska NSI fungera som kommissionens (Eurostats) enda kontaktpunkt för statistikfrågor, och ska i synnerhet ha ansvaret på nationell nivå för att samordna statistisk program-planering och rapportering, kvalitets-övervakning, metodik, överföring av uppgifter samt information om ESS:s statistikåtgärder. ECB välkomnar att förslaget avser att stärka NSI:s ansvar på nationell nivå eftersom detta kommer att främja att fullständig och sammanhängande europeisk statistik kan produceras. Samtidigt uppfattar ECB det som att den ökade samordningen bör gälla för all europeisk statistik som utvecklas, framställs och sprids av ESS. ECB vill påminna om att de nationella centralbanker som är ECBS-medlemmar a) producerar europeisk statistik enligt artiklarna

text: och

text: i stadgan för Europeiska centralbankssystemet och Europeiska centralbanken, ytterligare specificerat i

text: om Europeiska centralbankens insamling av statistiska uppgifter men b) inte deltar i produktionen av europeisk statistik enligt förordning

text: (EG) nr 223/2009

text: även om NSI under särskilda omständigheter får använda data som producerats av de nationella centralbankerna, andra nationella myndigheter och unionens statistikmyndighet för produktionen av europeisk statistik. De nationella centralbankernas statistikuppgifter som utförs genom ECBS samordnas av ECB-rådet. ECB-rådet beslutar bl.a. om arbetsfördelningen inom ECBS när det gäller insamling och verifikation av statistiska uppgifter samt ser till att de statistiska rapporteringskraven uppfylls. Därför förväntar sig ECB att NSI:s samordnande roll inte kommer att avse europeisk statistik som produceras genom ECBS enligt artiklarna 3 och 5 i ECBS-stadgan och förordning

text: (EG) nr 2533/98

text: 1.2 Trots att medlemmarna i ESS och ECBS fullgör sina egna statistikuppgifter har de ett nära samarbete, särskilt inom de områden där de har ett gemensamt ansvar som t.ex. produktionen av statistik avseende nationalräkenskaperna och betalningsbalansen. Inom de statistikområden där ESS och ECBS har ett gemensamt ansvar är det viktigt att upprätthålla och fördjupa det aktuella samarbetet på unionsnivå som sker genom Kommittén för valuta-, finans- och betalningsbalansstatistik samt alla de nationella samarbetsavtal som speglar en fördelning av uppgifterna i enskilda fall.

text: 1.3 Enligt förslaget till förordning ska cheferna för NSI ensamma ansvara för att besluta om processer, statistiska metoder, standarder och förfaranden samt om statistikens innehåll och tidsplaner för offentliggöranden och publikationer vad gäller all europeisk statistik. ECB välkomnar att förslaget till förordning stärker det yrkesmässiga oberoendet för NSI-cheferna i frågor som rör ESS-verksamheten på nationell nivå, men tolkar det som att deras ökade samordningsroll inte påverkar hur de nationella centralbankerna utför sina statistikuppgifter enligt ECBS-stadgan och förordning

text: (EG) nr 2533/98

text: som omfattas av reglerna om oberoende som framgår av artikel 130 i fördraget och artikel 7 i ECBS-stadgan.

text: 1.4 ECB rekommenderar därför att man förtydligar detta för att säkerställa att förslaget till förordning beaktar den institutionella skillnaden mellan ESS och ESCB. Dessutom bör man understryka vikten av ett lämpligt samarbete så att de två systemen på bästa sätt kan utföra sina kompletterande funktioner för att utveckla, framställa och sprida europeisk statistik.

text: 2. Förbättrad tillgång till, och användning av, administrativa register genom NSI

text: 2.1 Enligt förslaget till förordning ska NSI, andra nationella myndigheter och kommissionen (Eurostat) kostnadsfritt och utan dröjsmål få tillgång till och kunna använda alla administrativa register och kunna integrera dessa administrativa register med statistik, i den utsträckning som detta är nödvändigt för att utveckla, framställa och sprida europeisk statistik. ECB anser att de nya koncepten administrativa register (som tidigare kallades administrativa uppgiftskällor) och kostnadsfritt och utan dröjsmål kan nödvändiggöra ytterligare förtydliganden. Som ECB redan noterat bör tillgången till offentliga källor styras av de regler som medlemsstaterna och kommissionen antar inom sina respektive behörighetsområden.

text: 2.2 Förslaget till förordning stadgar att NSI och kommissionen (Eurostat) ska rådfrågas om och delta i den ursprungliga utformningen, den efterföljande utvecklingen och avslutandet av administrativa register som andra organ byggt upp och upprätthållit och de ska ha rätt att samordna standardiseringsarbetet för administrativa register som är relevanta för statistikframställning. ECB välkomnar de föreslagna ändringarna som, om de tillämpas i enlighet med fördragets allmänna principer, inkl. subsidiaritets- och proportionalitetsprincipen, skulle göra det möjligt för ESS att använda administrativa uppgiftskällor på ett mer effektivt sätt, minska rapporteringsbördan samt förbättra kvaliteten på den europeiska statistiken som produceras av ESS. ECB noterar dock att de föreslagna ändringarna inte bör påverka principen om centralbanksoberoendet som grundar sig på artikel 130 i fördraget och artikel 7 i ECBS-stadgan, samt sekretessreglerna som framgår av artikel 37 i ECBS-stadgan. Därför är ett förtydligande nödvändigt angående NSI:s och kommissionens tillgång till administrativa källor som underhålls av ECBS-medlemmar, särskilt de administrativa källor som rör ECBS-relaterade uppgifter.

text: I de fall där ECB rekommenderar att förordningsförslaget ändras anges de specifika förslagen i bilagan tillsammans med en förklaring.

text: BILAGA

text: Kommissionens förslag | ECB:s ändringsförslag

text: (9) Vidare bör den samordnande roll som NSI redan har förtydligas vad gäller tillämpningsområdet, för att man ska uppnå en effektivare samordning av den statistiska verksamheten på nationell nivå, inklusive kvalitetsledning. | (9) Vidare bör den samordnande roll som NSI redan har avseende europeisk statistik som produceras genom ESS förtydligas vad gäller tillämpningsområdet, för att man ska uppnå en effektivare samordning av den statistiska ESS-verksamheten på nationell nivå, inklusive kvalitetsledning.

text: Förklaring Se ändring 2.

text: Ingen text. | (9a) I enlighet med

text: artikel 9 i förordning (EG) nr 223/2009

text: och

text: artikel 2

text: a i

text: om Europeiska centralbankens insamling av statistiska uppgifter ska ESS och Europeiska centralbankssystemet (ECBS) ha ett nära samarbete för att säkerställa att fullständig och sammanhängande europeisk statistik produceras inom deras behörighetsområde i enlighet med respektive arbetsprogram. Samarbete sker särskilt inom områdena nationalräkenskaper och statistik över betalningsbalansen samt även vad gäller rådgivning till kommissionen om statistik som rör förfarande vid alltför stora underskott.

text: Förklaring I enlighet med förordningarna

text: (EG) nr 223/2009

text: och 2533/98 utvecklas, produceras och sprids europeisk statistik av både ESS och ECBS som dock arbetar enligt olika rättsliga förutsättningar. Såsom framgår av

text: skäl 9

text: i

text: förordning (EG) nr 223/2009

text: deltar medlemmarna av ECBS inte i framställningen av europeisk statistik enligt den förordningen. Trots detta finns ett nära samarbete mellan ESS och ECBS så att båda kan utföra sina respektive statistiska funktioner. Exempelvis kan en nationell centralbank avtala med unionens statistikmyndighet, inom sina respektive behörigheter och utan att det påverkar nationella arrangemang, att NSI:s, andra nationella myndigheter och unionens statistikmyndighet direkt eller indirekt får använda uppgifter som produceras av den nationella centralbanken för produktionen av europeisk statistik. Den föreslagna ändringen speglar dessa existerande arrangemang.

text: (10) För att minska belastningen på statistikmyndigheterna och uppgiftslämnarna bör NSI och de andra nationella myndigheterna kostnadsfritt och utan dröjsmål få tillgång till och kunna använda administrativa register, bland annat sådana som fyllts i på elektronisk väg, samt kunna integrera dessa register med statistik. (11) NSI bör dessutom få yttra sig på ett tidigt stadium om utformningen av nya administrativa register som kan tillhandahålla uppgifter för statistiska ändamål och om planerade förändringar, eller upphörande, av befintliga administrativa källor. De bör också få relevant metadata från ägarna till administrativa uppgifter och samordna standardiseringsarbeten för administrativa register som är relevanta för statistikframställning. | (10) För att minska belastningen på statistikmyndigheterna och uppgiftslämnarna bör NSI och de andra nationella myndigheterna kostnadsfritt och utan dröjsmål få tillgång till och kunna använda administrativa register, bland annat sådana som fyllts i på elektronisk väg, samt kunna integrera dessa register med statistik. (11) NSI bör dessutom få yttra sig på ett tidigt stadium om utformningen av nya administrativa register som kan tillhandahålla uppgifter för statistiska ändamål och om planerade förändringar, eller upphörande, av befintliga administrativa källor. De bör också få relevant metadata från ägarna till administrativa uppgifter och samordna standardiseringsarbeten för administrativa register som är relevanta för statistikframställning. När NSI och andra nationella myndigheter utför arbete som berör tillgång, användning, standardisering, initial utformning, vidareutveckling och upphörande av ECSB administrativa källor bör detta inte stå i konflikt med utövandet av de ECBS-relaterade uppgifter som framgår av artikel 127 i fördraget och centralbankernas oberoende enligt artiklarna 130 och 282.3 i fördraget samt

text: artikel 7 i stadgan

text: Förklaring Se ändring 7.

text: (2) I

text: artikel 5

text: ska punkt 1 ersättas med följande:1. Den nationella statistikmyndighet som utsetts av var och en av medlemsstaterna som det organ som ska ansvara för samordningen av all verksamhet på nationell nivå när det gäller utveckling, framställning och spridning av europeisk statistik (dvs. NSI) ska fungera som kommissionens (Eurostats) enda kontaktpunkt för statistikfrågor. NSI:s samordningsansvar ska omfatta alla andra nationella myndigheter med ansvar för utveckling, framställning och spridning av europeisk statistik. NSI ska i synnerhet ha ansvaret på nationell nivå för att samordna statistisk programplanering och rapportering, kvalitetsövervakning, metodik, överföring av uppgifter samt information om ESS:s statistikåtgärder. | (2) I

text: artikel 5

text: ska punkt 1 ersättas med följande:1. Den nationella statistikmyndighet som utsetts av var och en av medlemsstaterna som det organ som ska ansvara för samordningen av all verksamhet på nationell nivå när det gäller utveckling, framställning och spridning av europeisk statistik på nationell nivå inom ramen för denna förordning (dvs. NSI) ska fungera som kommissionens (Eurostats) enda kontaktpunkt för statistikfrågor. NSI:s samordningsansvar ska omfatta alla andra nationella myndigheter med ansvar för utveckling, framställning och spridning av europeisk statistik enligt denna förordning. NSI ska i synnerhet ha ansvaret på nationell nivå för att samordna statistisk programplanering och rapportering, kvalitetsövervakning, metodik, överföring av uppgifter samt information om ESS:s statistikåtgärder och ska samarbeta med respektive nationell centralbank för att säkerställa att fullständig och sammanhängande europeisk statistik produceras av ESS och ECBS inom deras respektive behörighetsområden.

text: Förklaring Se ändring 2.

text: 3. Följande artikel ska införas som

text: artikel 5

text: a:

text: Artikel 5

text: a Chefer för nationella statistikbyråer 1. Inom det nationella statistisksystemet ska cheferna för NSI ensamma ansvara för att besluta om processer, statistiska metoder, standarder och förfaranden samt om statistikens innehåll och tidsplaner för offentliggöranden och publikationer vad gäller all europeisk statistik. De ska ha behörighet att besluta om alla frågor som rör NSI:s interna förvaltning. De ska samordna statistikarbetet i alla nationella myndigheter som medverkar till att utveckla, framställa och sprida europeisk statistik. När cheferna för NSI utför dessa uppgifter ska de agera oberoende. De ska inte begära eller ta emot instruktioner från någon regering, någon institution, något organ eller någon byrå. De ska avhålla sig från varje handling som är oförenlig med utförandet av dessa uppgifter. | 3. Följande artikel ska införas som

text: artikel 5

text: a:

text: Artikel 5

text: a Chefer för nationella statistikbyråer 1. Inom det nationella statistiksystemet ska cheferna för NSI ensamma ansvara för att besluta om processer, statistiska metoder, standarder och förfaranden samt om statistikens innehåll och tidsplaner för offentliggöranden och publikationer vad gäller all europeisk statistik som produceras enligt denna förordning. De ska ha behörighet att besluta om alla frågor som rör NSI:s interna förvaltning. De ska samordna statistikarbetet i alla nationella myndigheter som medverkar till att utveckla, framställa och sprida europeisk statistik som produceras genom ESS. Därutöver ska de samarbeta med respektive nationell centralbank i frågor som rör produktionen av europeisk statistik som har betydelse för både ESS och ECBS. När cheferna för NSI utför dessa uppgifter ska de agera oberoende. De ska inte begära eller ta emot instruktioner från någon regering, någon institution, något organ eller någon byrå. De ska avhålla sig från varje handling som är oförenlig med utförandet av dessa uppgifter.

text: Förklaring Se ändring 2.

text: (5) I

text: artikel 11

text: ska följande punkt läggas till som punkt 3:3. Medlemsstaterna ska vidta alla nödvändiga åtgärder för att genomföra uppförandekoden i syfte att upprätthålla förtroendet för statistiken. Varje medlemsstat, företrädd av sin regering, ska därför underteckna och genomföra ett åtagande om att skapa förtroende för statistiken, varigenom särskilda politiska åtaganden görs för att genomföra uppförandekoden och upprätta ett nationellt program för kvalitetssäkring, inklusive självutvärderingar och förbättringsåtgärder. Kommissionen ska kontrasignera åtagandet. Dessa åtaganden ska regelbundet övervakas av kommissionen genom de årsrapporter som medlemsstaterna skickar in. Kommissionen ska rapportera till Europaparlamentet och rådet om genomförandet av åtagandena senast tre år efter det att denna förordning trätt i kraft. | (5) I

text: artikel 11

text: skall följande punkt läggas till:3. Medlemsstaterna ska vidta alla nödvändiga åtgärder för att genomföra uppförandekoden i syfte att upprätthålla förtroendet för deras bidrag till den europeiska statistiken som produceras av ESS. Varje medlemsstat, företrädd av sin regering, ska därför underteckna och genomföra ett åtagande om att skapa förtroende för statistiken, varigenom särskilda politiska åtaganden görs för att genomföra uppförandekoden och upprätta ett nationellt program för kvalitetssäkring, inklusive självutvärderingar och förbättringsåtgärder. Kommissionen ska kontrasignera åtagandet. Dessa åtaganden ska regelbundet övervakas av kommissionen genom de årsrapporter som medlemsstaterna skickar in. Kommissionen ska rapportera till Europaparlamentet och rådet om genomförandet av åtagandena senast tre år efter det att denna förordning trätt i kraft.

text: Förklaring Se ändring 2.

text: (8) Följande artikel ska införas som

text: artikel 17

text: a:

text: Artikel 17

text: a Tillgång till samt användning och integrering av administrativa register 1. För att minska uppgiftslämnarbördan ska NSI och andra nationella myndigheter som avses i

text: artikel 4

text: samt kommissionen (Eurostat) kostnadsfritt och utan dröjsmål få tillgång till och kunna använda alla administrativa register och kunna integrera dessa administrativa register med statistik, i den utsträckning som detta är nödvändigt för att utveckla, framställa och sprida europeisk statistik. 2. NSI och kommissionen (Eurostat) ska rådfrågas om och delta i den ursprungliga utformningen, den efterföljande utvecklingen och avslutandet av administrativa register som andra organ byggt upp och upprätthållit, vilket underlättar ytterligare användning av dessa uppgifter för statistikändamål. De ska ha rätt att samordna standardiseringsarbetet för administrativa register som är relevanta för statistikframställning. 3. NSI:s, andra nationella myndigheters och kommissionens (Eurostat) tillgång till register och deltagande enligt punkterna 1 och 2 ska endast gälla administrativa register inom deras respektive offentliga administrativa system. 4. NSI ska få relevanta metadata från ägarna till administrativa register som används för statistiska ändamål. 5. NSI och ägare till administrativa register ska upprätta de nödvändiga mekanismerna för samarbete. | (8) Följande artikel ska införas som

text: artikel 17

text: a:

text: Artikel 17

text: artikel 4

text: samt kommissionen (Eurostat) kostnadsfritt och utan dröjsmål få tillgång till och kunna använda alla administrativa register och kunna integrera dessa administrativa register med statistik, i den utsträckning som detta är nödvändigt för att utveckla, framställa och sprida europeisk statistik som produceras enligt denna förordning. 2. NSI och kommissionen (Eurostat) ska rådfrågas om och delta i den ursprungliga utformningen, den efterföljande utvecklingen och avslutandet av administrativa register som andra organ byggt upp och upprätthållit, vilket underlättar ytterligare användning av dessa uppgifter för statistikändamål. De ska ha rätt att samordna standardiseringsarbetet för administrativa register som är relevanta för statistikframställning. 3. Varje medlemsstat och kommissionen ska inom sina respektive behörighetsområden vid behov fastställa de praktiska rutinerna och villkoren för att uppnå en effektiv tillgång. När det gäller administrativa källor som skapats och underhålls av ECSB ska utövandet av sådana behörigheter som avses i punkterna 1 och 2 och utförs av NSI, andra nationella myndigheter och kommissionen (Eurostat) inte stå i konflikt med utövandet av de ECBS-relaterade uppgifter som framgår av artikel 127 i fördraget och centralbankernas oberoende och sekretessreglerna enligt artiklarna 130 och 282.3 i fördraget samt artiklarna

text: och

text: i stadgan för Europeiska centralbankssystemet och Europeiska centralbanken. 34. NSI:s, andra nationella myndigheters och kommissionens (Eurostat) tillgång till register och deltagande enligt punkterna 1, 2 och 23 ska endast gälla administrativa register inom deras respektive offentliga administrativa system. 45. NSI ska få relevanta metadata från ägarna till administrativa register som används för statistiska ändamål. 56. NSI och ägare till administrativa register ska upprätta de nödvändiga mekanismerna för samarbete.

text: Förklaring Tillgången till offentliga källor bör även fortsättningsvis styras av de regler som medlemsstaterna och kommissionen antar inom ramen för sina respektive behörigheter i enlighet med

text: artikel 24 andra stycket i förordning (EG) nr 223/2009

text: . Sådana regler bör särskilt klargöra betydelsen av offentliga källor och utan kostnad. De föreslagna ändringarna av reglerna om tillgången till offentliga källor bör inte påverka utförandet av ECBS-uppgifter enligt artikel 127 i fördraget och principen om centralbanksoberoende samt sekretessreglerna enligt artikel 130 i fördraget och artiklarna 7 och 37 i ECBS-stadgan. Därför är ett förtydligande nödvändigt angående NSI:s och kommissionens tillgång till sådana administrativa källor som underhålls av ECBS, särskilt de administrativa källor som rör ECBS-relaterade uppgifter.


title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 6 November 2012 on government guarantees for credit institutions (CON/2012/85)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 6 November 2012 on government guarantees for credit institutions (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 17 October 2012, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Cypriot Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft law establishing a scheme for the granting of government guarantees to Cypriot credit institutions (hereinafter the ‘draft law’) and an accompanying draft decree in the same matter (hereinafter the ‘draft decree’ and, jointly, ‘the draft legal acts’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and on the sixth indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions, as the draft law relates to rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose and main features of the draft legal acts

text: 1.1 According to the explanatory memorandum to the draft law, its purpose is to establish a government guarantee scheme for loans and bonds issued by credit institutions, thereby enhancing their access to liquidity and helping them overcome the impact of the ongoing economic crisis. Credit institutions have six months from the entry into force of the draft decree within which to request support in the form of a government guarantee. Government guarantees are to be granted for a term of no less than three months and no more than five years. The scheme’s total budget is EUR 6 billion, which the Cypriot authorities consider sufficient to cover the needs of the Cypriot banking sector. Government guarantees are to be provided against: (a) the payment of an appropriate commission by the requesting credit institution; and (b) adequate collateral for the benefit of the Cypriot Government, except in extraordinary cases, and based on the reasoned opinion of the Central Bank of Cyprus.

text: 1 OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 1.2 The draft decree lays down rules for the scheme, the terms for the granting of government guarantees and their pricing, the type and adequacy of eligible collateral, the criteria concerning the allocation of the government guarantees and compliance monitoring and coordination procedures relevant to the draft law.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 The ECB welcomes the draft legal acts as a means of enhancing financial stability in Cyprus. 2.2 The ECB reminds the consulting authority that government guarantees for bank debt should, when implemented: (a) address the funding problems of liquidity-constrained solvent banks by improving the functioning of the market for bank debt of longer-term maturity; (b) preserve the level playing field among financial institutions and avoid market distortions; and (c) ensure consistency in the management of Eurosystem liquidity . With the above general considerations in mind, the ECB has the following specific observations to make on the draft legal acts.

text: 3. Interaction with other legislation

text: 3.1 Interaction with the Law on the management of financial crises In a previous opinion, the ECB commented on certain draft legislative provisions, which are similar to those set out in the draft legal acts . The provisions in question have since been enacted in the Law on the management of financial crises (hereinafter the ‘Law’) . It follows from Section 4(1) of the Law that the Ministerial Council may, following a recommendation of the Central Bank of Cyprus, take any of a number of support measures in relation to troubled financial institutions, including granting government guarantees for loans to be taken by financial institutions and/or government guarantees for bonds to be issued by financial institutions, at an appropriate price. In the interests of legal certainty, and with a view to avoiding legislative duplication, the consulting authority may wish to carefully consider the interaction between the Law and the draft legal acts. 3.2 Interaction with forthcoming legislation The ECB notes that the choice of the type and eligibility criteria of collateral, as well as the haircuts applied, may influence the restructuring activities envisaged by troubled Cypriot credit institutions, in particular as regards any decision to dispose of certain assets or wind down certain activities. In light of the long duration of guarantees issued under the draft law and the prospective restructuring of banks in receipt of state aid, the consulting authority may therefore wish to ensure

text: 2 In this regard see most recently Opinion

text: , paragraph 3. All ECB Opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu 3 See Opinions

text: and

text: 4 Law 200(I)/2011. that the draft decree would not interfere with the aims of any forthcoming legislation designed to facilitate the restructuring of credit institutions and the wider banking system.

text: 4. Eligible credit institutions and scope of guarantees

text: 4.1 The ECB understands that, with the exception of branches of credit institutions registered outside Cyprus, which are ineligible to benefit from government guarantees, the draft law applies to credit institutions incorporated in Cyprus and licensed by the Central Bank of Cyprus or the 5 6 Commissioner , including the Cyprus-based subsidiaries of foreign credit institutions . In addition, the ECB understands that the government guarantees will be allocated on the basis of domestic deposits and loans (excluding interbank deposits and loans) irrespective of the nationality or place of residence of the depositors or borrowers . The ECB welcomes the non-discriminatory application of the draft law, which is conducive to maintaining a level playing field in the treatment of domestic and foreign financial institutions in Cyprus. The draft law is, in this respect, also in line with the Commission’s guidance on the eligibility criteria for beneficiary institutions . 4.2 Moreover, the ECB understands that guarantees can only be issued to cover loans made to Cypriot credit institutions and bonds issued by those credit institutions, to the exclusion of interbank deposits, as well as subordinated or collateralised liabilities (such as covered bonds) . The ECB reiterates its view that State guarantees should not cover interbank deposits, since this could: (a) entail a substantial distortion in the various national segments of the euro area money market by potentially increasing, across Member States, short-term debt issuance activity, to the detriment of the implementation of the single monetary policy; and (b) affect the transmission of monetary policy, making it difficult to maintain the necessary level playing field between financial institutions that benefit from State guarantees and those that do not .

text: 5 Pricing of guarantees

text: The ECB welcomes that Article 8 of the draft law explicitly provides that guarantee fees applied to financial institutions benefiting from the State guarantees are to be in line with the criteria established by the Commission, which incorporate the pricing formula recommended by the ECB’s Governing

text: 5 Commissioner of the Authority for the Supervision and Development of Cooperative Societies.

text: 6 See Article 3 of the draft law.

text: 7 See Article 5.4 and 5.10 of the draft decree.

text: 8 See paragraph 18 of the Communication from the Commission on the application of State aid rules to measures taken in relation to financial institutions in the context of the current global financial crisis (OJ C270, 25.10.2008, p. 8),

text: 9 See Article 3 of the draft law.

text: 10 In this regard see, most recently, paragraph 3 of Opinion 2012/4. Council . The pricing formula in the Annex to the draft decree corresponds to the one established by the Commission.

text: 6 Temporary nature of guarantees

text: In line with the Commission’s criteria , the ECB notes the need for national support measures to be temporary in nature, and reiterates the views expressed in its previous opinions that coordination of the duration of national financial support schemes across the Union is of crucial importance in order to ensure a level playing field . The financing to be covered by the guarantee scheme established under the draft law may only be requested within six months from the entry into force of the draft decree and granted for a term not exceeding five years . Thus, the guarantee scheme established under the draft law can be considered to be of a temporary nature. The consulting authority may nevertheless want to clarify what the date appearing in Article 4 of the draft decree relates to, as the date in question does not appear to be consistent either with the duration of the government guarantees nor with the duration of their offer to eligible credit institutions.

text: 7. Interaction with the monetary policy of the euro area

text: The ECB also reiterates that granting government guarantees for bank debt with a maturity of less than three months should be avoided to the extent possible . The ECB welcomes that the draft law does not allow government guarantees for bank debt with a maturity of less than three months . Moreover, the ECB stresses that it is of the utmost importance that support operations conducted by national authorities do not in any way affect the conduct and the implementation of monetary policy in the euro area .

text: 8. Role of the Central Bank of Cyprus

text: 8.1 The ECB notes that, under the draft law, the Minister consults the Governor of the Central Bank of Cyprus prior to deciding whether or not to issue a state guarantee for the benefit of an eligible credit institution. The Governor’s advice is also sought in respect of the type and eligibility criteria for the collateral covering the amount of government guarantees granted to eligible credit institutions and for any dispensations from the duty to provide adequate eligible collateral to the

text: 11 See the Recommendations of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank on government guarantees for bank debt, 20 October 2008, available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: 12 See paragraphs 15 and 20 of the Communication from the Commission, on the application, from 1 January 2012, of State aid rules to support measures in favour of banks in the context of the financial crisis (OJ C356, 6.12.2011, p. 7).

text: 13 In this regard see, most recently, paragraph 3.2 of Opinion

text: 14 See Article 5 of the draft law.

text: 15 See Article 4 of the draft law.

text: 16 In this regard see, most recently, paragraph 3 of Opinion

text: 17 See Article 4 of the draft law.

text: 18 In this regard see, most recently,, paragraph 3 of Opinion

text: . Government. The ECB notes, however, that the Minister does not seek the Governor’ advice regarding the extent of collateral haircuts to apply . While appreciating the draft law’s recognition of the expertise of the Central Bank of Cyprus, the ECB also expects its involvement in the scheme not to extend beyond the provision of advice and to otherwise comply fully with the prohibition on monetary financing laid down in Article 123(1) of the Treaty, read in conjunction with

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 of 13 December 1993

text: specifying definitions for the application of the prohibitions referred to in Articles

text: and

text: b(1) of the Treaty . In particular, the ECB expects that the guarantees envisaged by the draft law will be exclusively financed from the State budget and that, to the extent that their funding may require State borrowing, this will not include prefinancing or refinancing of the State budget by the Central Bank of Cyprus . 8.2 The ECB also expects that the Minister will use the powers under the draft law in a manner fully compatible with the institutional and financial independence of the Central Bank of Cyprus, thereby safeguarding the proper performance of its tasks under the Treaty and the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank.

text: 9. Lending to the real economy and monitoring mechanism

text: 9.1 The ECB is of the view that the guarantee scheme should clearly state that one of its legislative objectives is to foster Cypriot banks’ lending to the real economy. The consulting authority may therefore consider it beneficial to include this objective, for instance in the draft decree, providing for the terms of conduct for credit institutions benefiting from government guarantees. This would facilitate the monitoring of the lending-behaviour of banks by the Committee set up under Article 7 of the draft decree. 9.2 The ECB notes that the draft decree does not provide for any follow-up to the monitoring activity. Efficient monitoring should allow for control of the beneficiary credit institutions’ compliance with the guarantee-scheme and the ECB would welcome more clarity in this respect.

text: 20 OJ L 332, 31.12.1993, p. 1.

text: 21 In this regard see, most recently,, paragraph 3.5 of Opinion

text: ,. This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 6 November 2012. [signed] The President of the ECB Mario DRAGHI


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: As stated in the ECB’s convergence reports and in several of its opinions, any amendment to the legislative provisions on the remuneration for members of an NCB’s decision-making bodies and its employees should be decided in close and effective cooperation with the NCB, taking due account of its views, to ensure the ongoing ability of the NCB to carry out its tasks independently. Autonomy in staff matters extends to issues relating to staff pensions. See Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 3 See Opinion

text: paragraphs 2 and 3. In addition, see Opinion

text: . 4 OJ L 332, 31.12.1993, p. 1. Articles

text: and

text: b(1) of the Treaty establishing the European Community are now Articles 123 and 125(1) of the Treaty (on the Functioning of the European Union).

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 9 November 2012 on the Banco de Portugal’s staff remuneration and the budget (CON/2012/86)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 9 November 2012 on the Banco de Portugal’s staff remuneration and the budget (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 23 October 2012, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the President of the Portuguese Parliament for an opinion on several provisions contained in the draft law on the 2013 state budget proposed by the Government (hereinafter the ‘2013 draft budget law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and on the third indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as Chapter III of the 2013 draft budget law may have implications for the Banco de Portugal (BdP). In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the 2013 draft budget law

text: 1.1 The 2013 draft budget law contains exceptional austerity measures aimed at restoring the budgetary balance, mainly by way of tax increases and public spending cuts. 1.2 Once approved, the planned measures will apply to the public sector generally and supersede all currently applicable lex specialis regimes, collective bargaining agreements and individual employment contracts. 1.3 One provision of the 2013 draft budget law refers specifically to the BdP.

text: Article 28(8)

text: expressly provides that the BdP shall ‘take into account the efforts to generally contain costs in the public sector, as reflected in the [draft] law’ and authorises it to decide, ‘as an alternative to measures with equivalent effect that have already been decided’, to suspend payment of the holiday allowance or th any other 14 month equivalent payment to its workers in 2013, in derogation from its obligations under labour law and from the relevant collective bargaining instruments.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 The ECB understands and welcomes that the 2013 draft budget law is intended to reduce public expenditure.

text: 2.2 The ECB already commented on a similar draft law in 2010 in Opinion

text: . The comments made in that Opinion remain valid and are hereby referred to, while the present opinion concentrates on some particularly relevant aspects.

text: 3. Central bank independence

text: 3.1 To the extent that it applies to the BdP, the 2013 draft budget law has implications as regards the principle of central bank independence, in particular for the financial and institutional independence of the BdP, as well as for the personal independence of the members of the BdP’s decision-making bodies. 3.2 As regards the principle of financial independence, and in addition to the remarks made in

text: , the ECB understands that during the parliamentary procedure the BdP shall still be given the opportunity to express its opinion, with a view to reaching a solution which gives proper consideration to the requirements for the BdP’s financial independence , including issues relating to staff remuneration and staff pensions. Opinion

text: recently considered one form of effective cooperation between a government and an NCB: the draft legislative provisions in question established that the public service pension reduction scheme would only be applicable to the Central Bank of Ireland with the consent of its Governor . 3.3 As regards the BdP’s institutional independence and the personal independence of the members of the BdP’s decision-making bodies, the ECB refers to the comments made in

text: , in particular paragraphs 3.2.7 to 3.2.10.

text: 4. Prohibition of monetary financing

text: The provisions in the 2013 draft budget law must comply with the monetary financing prohibition laid down in Article 123 of the Treaty, as further clarified in

text: specifying the definitions for the application of the prohibitions referred to in Articles

text: and

text: b(1)(1) of the Treaty . In addition to the remarks already made in paragraph 3.3 of Opinion

text: in that respect, the ECB would like to comment on the newly introduced Article 31 of the 2013 draft budget law. This Article provides that the entities referred to in

text: Article 26(9)

text: (q) which are responsible for processing the remuneration of workers ‘shall hand over to the Treasury those amounts of the allowance whose payment is suspended pursuant to

text: Article 28

text: ’. To the extent that this provision applies to BdP, the ECB emphasises that any direct financial transfer of this nature from the BdP to the State budget, without the opportunity

text: on the part of the BdP to use the resources in question as it sees fit for the fulfilment of its tasks, represents an increase in the funding of the Portuguese State at the BdP’s expense and could be considered monetary financing under Article 123 of the Treaty. This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 9 November 2012. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 2 See the ECB’s Convergence Report 2012, p. 239.

text: See the ECB’s Convergence Report 2012, pp. 31-32.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 13 November 2012 on the spelling of the single currency (CON/2012/87)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 13 November 2012 on the spelling of the single currency (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 5 October 2012, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Latvian Ministry of Justice for an opinion on an amendment (hereinafter the ‘draft amendment’) to Regulation No 564 of 26 July 2005 on the rendering of the name of the single currency of the European Union in Latvian (hereinafter ‘Regulation No 564’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the first indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft amendment relates to currency matters. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft amendment

text: The Latvian Ministry of Justice states that the main objective of the draft amendment is to correct a discrepancy between the name of the single currency in Latvian established for non-legal acts in Regulation No 564 (‘eiro’) and the name of the single currency in Latvian as established by Union law (‘euro’). The ECB has drawn attention to this discrepancy in its convergence reports . Until December 2007, Regulation No 564 provided that the name of the single currency in Latvian is the ‘eiro’. On 18 December 2007, the Latvian Government amended Regulation No 564. While the original provision establishing the name ‘eiro’ remained intact, a new paragraph 3 was added providing that in legal acts the name of the single currency is the ‘euro’. The Latvian Ministry of Justice now proposes to replace the current wording of paragraph 2 of Regulation No 564: ‘2. The name of the single currency of the European Union in Latvian shall be in the masculine gender indeclinable form: “eiro” ’ with the following: ‘The name of the single currency of the European Union in common spelling in the Latvian language shall be used in accordance with the grammar principles of the Latvian language and historical traditions.’.

text: 2. General observations

text: The ECB welcomes the consulting authority’s intention to address the above discrepancy in Latvian law regarding the name of the single currency. The ECB notes that Article 3(4) of the Treaty on European Union lays down that the ‘Union shall establish an economic and monetary union whose currency is the euro’. All language versions of this Treaty and the TFEU in the Roman alphabet, including Latvian, consistently refer to the single currency in the nominative singular case as the ‘euro’ . The ECB also acknowledges that the need to correct any discrepancy between Latvian and Union law regarding the name of the single currency is without prejudice to the use of variants of the name of the single currency in common usage in Latvia, consistent with Latvia’s cultural and linguistic heritage. The spelling of the name of the euro has no effect on the existing rules of the Latvian language.

text: 3. Specific observations

text: 3.1 The ECB considers that the draft amendment would lay down in Latvian law the possibility of writing the name of the single currency differently from its name as laid down in Union primary law. In addition, given the non-specific wording of the draft amendment, the name could be written in ways that deviate further from the name as laid down in Union law. The ECB considers that paragraph 3 of Regulation No 564 specifying that in legal acts the single currency must be given the name ‘euro’ is compatible with Union law. 3.2 In view of the Union’s exclusive competence to determine the name of the single currency, the ECB invites the Latvian authorities to consider repealing Regulation No 564 altogether, as this Union competence has been exercised by adopting directly applicable provisions of Union law, making it unnecessary to legislate at national level on this issue. If this is not feasible, the ECB invites the Latvian authorities to repeal paragraph 2 of Regulation No 564 rather than replace it.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 13 November 2012.

text: [signed]

text: The Vice-President of the ECB

text: Vítor CONSTÂNCIO


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 2 [2008] Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1982. 3 See Opinions

text: and

text: . All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 4 COM(2012) 280 final. 5 [2012] Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 206.

text: See Opinions

text: and

text: . 7 Article 1(5) of the draft law, amending Section 4(1)(5) of the Law on the Financial Market Stabilisation Fund. 8 See, inter alia, ECB Opinion

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 14 November 2012 on the stabilisation of the financial market (CON/2012/88)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 14 November 2012 on the stabilisation of the financial market (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 31 October 2012, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the German Federal Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft third law implementing measures for the stabilisation of the financial market (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the sixth indent of

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The draft law is based on the Law of 17 October 2008 on financial market stabilisation and its extensions on, inter alia, the nationalisation of credit institutions and bad bank schemes . Some of the provisions have subsequently been phased out. The draft law amends the Law on the Financial Market Stabilisation Fund and several related Laws, as well as the Law on the Restructuring Fund. The draft law has the following main objectives: (a) Extension of the operation of the Financial Market Stabilisation Fund. The explanatory memorandum to the draft law points out that the transposition of the proposed directive establishing a framework for recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms may take until 2015. Until that time the national arrangements will need to remain in force. However, the Second Law on financial market stabilisation only allows new requests for Financial Market Stabilisation Fund measures until the end of 2012. Therefore, the draft

text: law prolongs measures introduced by the Law on financial market stabilisation until 31 December 2014. (b) Financial interlinking of the Financial Market Stabilisation Fund and the Restructuring Fund. Currently, two separate systems finance the Financial Market Stabilisation Fund, providing pre-emptive recapitalisation support to credit institutions, and the Restructuring Fund, supporting the orderly recovery or resolution of ailing credit institutions. The Financial Market Stabilisation Fund is backed by the federal budget and the Restructuring Fund by the banking industry, with possible bridge financing from the federal budget. The draft law reduces budget risks by closer financial interconnection between both systems. In particular, for any possible losses resulting from future measures financed by the Financial Market Stabilisation Fund, recourse will be taken to the Restructuring Fund. Thus, the banking sector will bear the burden of future stabilisation measures. 1.2 Furthermore, the draft law aligns the scope of institutions eligible for measures financed by the Financial Market Stabilisation Fund with the institutions eligible for restructuring measures that are generally subject to contributions to the Restructuring Fund. In addition, the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) will be consulted before initiating stabilisation measures that may affect operation of the restructuring measures by BaFin in relation to a credit institution. Moreover, the Bundestag will need to agree to dissolve the Financial Market Stabilisation Fund. Recourse to the Financial Market Stabilisation Fund for measures having their basis until 2010 will not be subject to the debt brake. Lastly, the employment contracts of the heads of resolution agencies are to be limited to five years, and their renewed appointment will be subject to agreement of the Federal Financial Market Stabilisation Authority.

text: 2. General observations

text: In line with its previous opinions , the ECB emphasises that when adopting measures to deal with the financial crisis, Member States should act in a coordinated manner. While the extension of measures introduced by the Law on financial market stabilisation is based on legitimate grounds, the Member States will ultimately need to phase out such harmonised measures to maintain a level playing field in the Union . It is expected that the German legislator will have to adjust German restructuring law once the harmonised Union regime for the restructuring and resolution of credit institutions has been introduced.

text: 3. Financing of the Financial Market Stabilisation Fund

text: The ECB welcomes the intention to decrease moral hazard in the budgetary financing of the Financial Markets Stabilisation Fund by the proposed financial interconnection between this Fund and the

text: Restructuring Fund which is already financed by banking industry contributions . The ECB notes the need to ensure that the financial resources of resolution funds are adequate and the contributions to such funds raised from credit institutions are set at a level which is appropriately calibrated to ensure financial stability.

text: 4. Consultation of BaFin regarding application of the stabilisation measures

text: The ECB welcomes the introduction of the requirement to consult BaFin before stabilisation measures are introduced. This will facilitate the optimal selection of stabilisation and restructuring measures for an ailing credit institution . This is further justified in view of the proposed financial interconnection between the Financial Market Stabilisation Fund and the Restructuring Fund, which has direct implications for the financial resources available for stabilisation and restructuring measures.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 14 November 2012.

text: [signed]

text: The Vice-President of the ECB

text: Vítor CONSTÂNCIO


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: OJ L: 339, 22.12.2010, p. 1. OJ L 181, 4.7.2001, p. 6. OJ L 267, 9.10.2010, p. 1. OJ L 139, 11.5.1998, p. 1.

text: See Opinion

text: , paragraph 3.4. All ECB documents are available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: 7,8 financial resources . The ECB has consistently recommended in the past in its opinions and convergence reports (see reference in footnote 8) that any amendment to the legislative provisions on remuneration of members of an NCB’s decision-making bodies and staff should be decided in close and effective cooperation with the NCB, taking due account of its views, to ensure the ongoing ability of the NCB to independently carry out its tasks, and that Member States should not impair the autonomy of their NCBs in staff-related matters. Autonomy in such matters extends to issues relating to staff salaries and pensions . It is therefore essential that measures such as those in the draft law do not prevent the Banco de España or its staff from performing independently the tasks conferred on them by the Treaty, the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter the ‘Statute of the ESCB’) and Spanish legislation, including Law 13/1994 of 1 June on the autonomy of the Banco de España. The ECB understands that pursuant to

text: Article 22

text: and the Third Final Provision of the draft law, the Banco de España is required to apply autonomously measures to save staff costs equivalent to those in the Laws on the State General Budget adopted each year, while ensuring that the Banco de España’s institutional and financial independence are respected and to the extent that the Banco de España’s ongoing ability to carry out its tasks is not affected. Conversely, the ECB understands that the Banco de España must not take measures to save staff costs equivalent to those established for public service staff that would interfere with the Banco de España’s ongoing ability to independently carry out its tasks . In particular, an NCB may not be put into a position where it has limited control or no control over its staff or where the government of a Member State can influence is policy on staff matters . For instance, a combination of measures to reduce staff costs with a prohibition on recruiting new staff would directly impair the ability of Banco de España to employ and even possibly retain qualified staff and may amount de jure to depriving its decision-making bodies of their powers of internal organisation and control over staff, or at least to significantly limiting them . In the light of the Banco de España’s recently expanded competences in the field of early intervention, restructuring and resolution of credit institutions, the ECB is particularly concerned that qualified and sufficient human resources will be required, in addition to adequate financing. The ECB therefore recommends confirmation in the Third Final Provision that the Banco de España will not be obliged to take measures if these interfere with its ability to independently carry out its tasks. Based on this understanding,

text: Article 22

text: and the Third Final Provision of the draft law are compatible with the principle of central bank independence.

text: See, for example, the ECB’s Convergence Report 2012, p. 26. 8 See the latest Opinion

text: . See Opinion

text: , paragraph 3.2.1 and ECB’s Convergence Report 2012, p. 27. See Opinion

text: , paragraph 3.2.2. See ECB Convergence Report 2012, p. 27. See by analogy Opinion

text: , paragraph 3.2.3.

text: See for example the ECB’s Convergence Report 2012, p. 24.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 15 November 2012 on euro banknotes and coins and amendments to the Banco de España’s Statute (CON/2012/89)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 15 November 2012 on euro banknotes and coins and amendments to the Banco de España’s Statute (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 20 September 2012, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Governor of the Banco de España, on behalf of the Spanish State Secretary for Economic Affairs and Support for Business, for an opinion on a series of draft amendments to Law 10/1975 of 12 March on the regulation of coinage, Law 46/1998 of 17 December on the introduction of the euro, and Law 13/1994 of 1 June, on the autonomy of the Banco de España (hereinafter the ‘draft laws’). On 4 October 2012 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Governor of the Banco de España, on behalf of the Spanish State Secretary for Economic Affairs and Support for Business, for an opinion on draft Article 22 (‘Fundamentals and coordination of the general planning for economic activity as regards public sector staff expenses’) of the Law on the State General Budget for 2013 and its Third Final Provision (‘Amendment to Law 13/1994, of 1 June, on the autonomy of the Banco de España’) (hereinafter the ‘draft Law on the State General Budget for 2013’). For the purpose of this opinion, the draft laws and the draft Law on the State General Budget of 2013 are referred to collectively as the ‘draft provisions’. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and on the first, third and sixth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft provisions relate to the Banco de España and to rules applicable to financial institutions that materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets; also, the draft laws relate to currency matters. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft provisions

text: Draft laws The new

text: Article 8

text: bis in Law 10/1975 entrusts to the Banco de España the functions referred to by

text: Regulation (EU) No 1210/2010

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 2010

text: concerning authentication of euro coins and handling of euro coins unfit for circulation . Also, given the amount of time that has passed since the introduction of the euro in Spain, an amendment is proposed to Article 25 of Law 46/1998 of 17 December on the introduction of the euro, to establish 31 December 2020 as the deadline for exchanging pesetas for euro. The amendment to the Fourth Additional Provision of Law 46/1998 aims to ensure compliance with Article 6(3) of Council Regulation 1338/2001 (EC) No of 28 June 2001 laying down measures necessary for the protection of the euro against counterfeiting and adapting the sanctions regime for breach of Article 6(1) of the Regulation. Likewise, a sanctions regime is introduced for breach of

text: Regulation (EU) No 1210/2010

text: and Decision ECB/2010/14 of 16 September 2010 on the authenticity and fitness checking and recirculation of euro banknotes . The amendment to Article 15 of Law 13/1994 of 1 June on the autonomy of the Banco de España adapts the wording to Decision ECB/2010/14. Finally, the amendments to Article 25 of Law 13/1994 remove the simultaneous nature of the roles of Governor and Deputy Governor and the age limit for members of the governing bodies of the Banco de España.

text: Article 22

text: freezes increases in salaries and prohibits contributions to pension plans with the aim of reducing public expenditure. This is generally applicable to the public sector and the Banco de España is expressly included, albeit under the terms established in Law 13/1994 of 1 June on the autonomy of the Banco de España. The amendment introduced by the Third Final Provision in

text: Article 6

text: bis of Law 13/1994 provides that the Banco de España must adopt measures equivalent to those generally established for public sector staff, expressly prohibiting remuneration increases that overall increase the payroll beyond the limits established in the Draft Law on the State General Budget for 2013.

text: 2. The Banco de España as the competent authority for counterfeit coin authentication and coin recirculation

text: The ECB welcomes the Banco de España’s appointment as the competent authority for counterfeit coin authentication and coin recirculation matters.

text: 3. Redeeming peseta banknotes and coins

text: Peseta banknotes and coins will cease to be redeemable from 1 January 2021.

text: Article 16 of Council Regulation (EC) No 974/98 of 3 May 1998

text: on the introduction of the euro provides that ‘In accordance

text: with the laws or practices of participating Member States, the respective issuers of banknotes and coins of the Member States shall continue to accept, against euro at the conversion rate, the banknotes and coins previously issued by them’. The ECB takes note of the current draft provision of Article 25 of Law 46/1998, which explicitly clarifies the terms for the lapse of the right of exchange of peseta notes and coins into euro at the Banco de España.

text: 4. Sanctions regime for cash handlers

text: The ECB welcomes the establishment of a deterrent sanctions regime for non-compliant cash handlers. The ECB emphasises that national law should impose fines that do not go beyond their objective and are proportional. Sanctions regimes in all Member States that have aligned their laws with

text: Regulation (EC) No 1338/2001

text: in conjunction with Decision ECB/2010/14 could merit harmonisation insofar as the ECB procedures in the Decision apply equally to all euro area cash handlers. Therefore, the ECB considers it important for national authorities to contribute to establishing a level playing field among cash handlers falling within the scope of

text: Regulation (EC) No 1338/2001

text: , without prejudice to (i) the particularities of the cash cycle and the national organisation of cash handlers, and (ii) the consistency of the levels of fines in their legal orders .

text: 5. References to Union legislation

text: According to the Fourth Additional Provision, paragraph 4 in fine of Law 46/1998, the Banco de España may lay down precise rules for the application of

text: Article 6(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1338/2001

text: . The ECB encourages the Spanish national authorities to insert a provision confirming that any such rules are without prejudice to the ECB procedures for authenticity and fitness checking of euro banknotes in Decision ECB/2010/14. The reference in

text: Article 15(1)

text: in fine to ‘the provisions of the Community rules in force’ should be replaced with ‘the provisions of the European Union rules in force, including the relevant ECB legal acts’. In

text: Article 15(2)

text: in fine of Law 13/1994 identical wording should be introduced, ensuring that the mentioned criteria and operating procedures are in line with Union law, including the relevant ECB legal acts.

text: 6. Remuneration of the Banco de España’s staff

text: The principle of central bank independence in Article 130 of the Treaty prohibits third parties, including the governments of the Member States, from issuing instructions to the national central banks (NCBs). Also, the principle of central bank independence means that third parties may not exercise direct or indirect influence over an NCB, whether relating to the performance of its tasks or its financial ability to fulfil its mandate, both operationally in terms of manpower, and financially in terms of appropriate

text: 7. Termination of office of the members of the decision making bodies of Banco de España

text: The ECB welcomes the amendment to Article 25(4) of the Law on the autonomy of the Banco de España, to the effect that reaching a certain age would no longer be a ground for termination of office of the Governor, the Deputy Governor and the non-ex officio Directors of the Banco de España in line with Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB. The ECB understands that by this amendment no compulsory retirement age would apply to the Governor, the Deputy Governor and the non-ex officio Directors of the Banco de España. In addition,

text: Article 25(4)

text: (c) of the draft law enumerates grounds for dismissal of the Governor, Deputy Governors and the non-ex officio Directors other than those in Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB. Namely,

text: Article 25(4)

text: (c) provides that the Governor, the Deputy Governor and the non-ex officio Directors may be dismissed ‘due to permanent incapacity to exercise his/her role, serious failure to comply with his/her obligations, professional disqualification or proceedings for a wilful offence’. As consistently stated in the ECB’s convergence reports, NCB statutes should either contain grounds for dismissal which are compatible with those laid down in Article 14.2 of the Statute, or omit any mention of grounds for dismissal since

text: Article 14.2

text: is directly applicable Therefore,

text: Article 25(4)

text: (c) should be aligned with Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB. The ECB welcomes that Article 25(5) of the draft law provides that any replacement for the Governor, the Deputy Governor or a non-ex officio Director, if their position becomes vacant before expiry of their term of office, will serve for a full term. As regards the appointment process as such, and being aware that appointment to any of these positions has to follow a series of procedural steps involving several public bodies and authorities, the ECB also sees the need to ensure the timely appointment of the new Governor, new Deputy Governors or new non-ex officio Directors, as the case may be, safeguarding the smooth and continuous functioning of the NCBs’ decision-making bodies.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 15 November 2012.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 2 FEK Α 138/9.8.2010.

text: It amends, inter alia, Article 4(5) of the HFSF Law to provide that the members of the HFSF’s General Council (GC) and Executive Committee (EC) will be appointed for a term of office equal to the HFSF’s duration (until 30 June 2017), with the possibility of renewal thereof for a period equal to the extension of the HFSF’s duration under Article 2(2) of the HFSF Law. With regard to the HFSF dual governance structure, see also paragraph 3.1 of Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 4 Article 1(17) of the draft law repeals the delegation to the Cabinet currently included in Article 7 of the HFSF Law to regulate any details arising from the provision of capital support by the HFSF under

text: Article 7

text: ; instead, such details are now directly provided for in the draft law. 5 Moreover, it is specified that both the HFSF and other shareholders of the recapitalised credit institutions are subject to additional information requirements deriving from their relevant shareholding and voting rights in accordance with Law No 3556/2007 on transparency requirements for companies with stock listed in a regulated market (FEK Α΄ 91), which implements Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 2004 on the harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to information about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market and amending Directive

text: (OJ L 390, 31.12.2004, p. 38). 6 The use of warrants is already provided for in Article 7 of the HFSF Law, as currently in force. While newly-inserted

text: Article 7

text: b(11) introduces a delegation clause to the competent Minister to specify any necessary details relating to the implementation of

text: Article 7

text: , the Greek legislator, according to the explanatory memorandum, has opted to regulate several modalities relating to the issuance, conversion and exercise of warrants directly in the draft law.

text: Annex V to Law No 4046/2012 on the approval of the draft financing agreements between the European Financial Stability Fund, the Hellenic Republic and the Bank of Greece and of the draft Memorandum of Understanding between the Hellenic Republic, the European Commission and the Bank of Greece and other provisions of utmost importance for reducing the public debt and saving the national economy (FEK A 28/14.12.2012). 8 See in particular Opinions

text: and

text: . 9 See, e.g. Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.2. 10 Article 1(13) of the draft law.

text: COM(2012) 280/3. 12 If payment of interest cannot be effected, it is substituted by a payment in kind through the issuance of new common shares by the credit institution, at a price equal to the greater of (i) the volume-weighted average price of the share over the 50 trading days preceding interest payment date; or (ii) the nominal share value. The credit institution may decide to cancel any interest payment but then CoCos are immediately converted into common stock at a discount of 75% while their normal conversion price at the end of the fifth year from the issuance (mandatory conversion) is 50% of the issue price of the common stock initially subscribed by the HFSF. 13 On these principles see Commission Communications 2009/C 10/03 (OJ C 10, 15.1.2009, p.2), point I.3, 2009/C 195/04 (OJ C 195, 19.8.2009, p. 9) and 2011/C 356/02 (OJ C 356, 6.12.2011, p. 7). 14 See the ECB Governing Council Recommendations of 20 November 2008. 15 See, e.g., Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.6.

text: Law No 2190/1920 on limited liability companies. 17 Notably Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the exercise of certain rights of shareholders in listed companies (OJ L 184, 14.7.2007, p. 17).

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank 16 November 2012 on amendments to the framework for the recapitalisation of credit institutions (CON/2012/90)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 16 November 2012 on amendments to the framework for the recapitalisation of credit institutions (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 23 October 2012, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Greek Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft law amending the legal framework for the recapitalisation of credit institutions in Greece (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). On 2 November 2012, the ECB received a revised version of the draft law. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union and the third and sixth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to the Bank of Greece and to rules applicable to financial institutions, insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 According to the explanatory memorandum of the draft law, its purpose is to complete the legal framework for the recapitalisation of credit institutions in Greece via the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund (HFSF). The draft law therefore amends Law No 3864/2010 establishing the HFSF (hereinafter the ‘HFSF Law’), mainly by refining the modalities for the recapitalisation of credit institutions by the HFSF; moreover, it further specifies some aspects related to the HFSF’s governance structure and introduces some editorial improvements to some provisions of the HFSF Law. 1.2 More specifically, the following provisions of the draft law may be noted: (i) Article 1(1) of the draft law supplements Article 2(2) of the HFSF law to provide that, if outstanding warrants exist on the date of initial termination of the HFSF’s duration, its duration is automatically extended by one

text: more year, and that by ministerial decision the HFSF’s duration may be extended by up to two years, if this is necessary for the fulfilment of its purpose; (ii)

text: Article 1(6)

text: codifies Article 4 of the HFSF Law setting out the HFSF’s governing bodies and introduces amendments mainly with a view to aligning the term of office of members of the governance bodies with the HFSF’s duration, and to further specifying the exercise of their tasks ; (iii)

text: Article 1(8)

text: sets out the terms for the remuneration of HFSF staff; (iv)

text: Article 1(9)

text: provides clarification as to credit institutions’ obligation to submit business plans; (v)

text: Article 1(13)

text: amends Article 6(10) of the HFSF Law to provide that the Bank of Greece, when deciding on the recapitalisation of a credit institution, takes into account the need to preserve the stability of the financial system and to ensure its contribution to growth and to the economy; (vi)

text: Article 1(16)

text: supplements Article 6 of the HFSF Law authorising the Cabinet to specify the terms of the pre-subscription agreements entered into by credit institutions, the European Financial Stability Facility and the HFSF for the purposes of the subscription by the HFSF to the convertible instruments to be issued by the credit institutions being recapitalised; (vii)

text: Article 1(17)

text: replaces Articles

text: and

text: a of the HFSF Law with a view to specifying the process and modalities for HFSF participation in credit institutions’ share capital increase through the issuance of common stock and/or contingent convertible bonds (‘CoCos’) , as well as the HFSF’s voting rights in relation to the threshold for private investor participation ; (viii)

text: Article 1(18)

text: inserts a new

text: Article 7

text: b in the HFSF Law on the detailed terms for the issuance of warrants by the HFSF as a means of providing incentives for private sector participation and a new

text: Article 7

text: c setting out the details concerning the issuance of CoCos by credit institutions; (ix)

text: Article 1(26)

text: clarifies the secrecy and confidentiality regime applicable to the members of the HFSF’s governance bodies and to the representatives of the ECB and the European Commission; (x) finally,

text: Article 2

text: introduces a transitional provision stipulating that, until the appointment of the GC and EC members, the HFSF will be managed by the existing Board of Directors; thereafter, the Board of Directors will be repealed and the term of office of its members will cease, without any payment.

text: 2. General observations

text: The ECB welcomes the draft law, which aims at complementing the Greek legal framework for the recapitalisation of credit institutions, established in line with the financial sector objectives outlined by the Greek authorities in the Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies . In relation to the development of such a national legal framework, the ECB would like to refer to its previous relevant opinions . The ECB continues to attach the utmost importance to the completion of the recapitalisation of credit institutions in Greece and considers that the draft law should allow for a timely and efficient recapitalisation, with the participation of private investors. Without prejudice to this general observation, the ECB has the following specific observations.

text: 3. Duration of the HFSF

text: Article 1(1) of the draft law provides that, if warrants exist, the HFSF’s duration will be automatically extended by one more year, i.e. until 30 June 2018, and that by ministerial decision the HFSF’s duration may be extended by up to two years, if this is necessary for the fulfilment of its purpose. Furthermore, Article 8(1) of the HFSF law, as amended by Article 1(19) of the draft law, authorises the Minister to extend all time limits provided for therein with regard to the sale of shares owned by the HFSF. The ECB has consistently underlined the need for any national support scheme to be temporary in nature . The current Greek formulation in the draft law suggests that the Minister may issue decisions extending the HFSF’s duration more than once. The ECB notes that the draft law should not leave any ambiguity as to the finite duration of the HFSF.

text: 4. Objectives taken into account by the Bank of Greece in the recapitalisation process

text: The draft law requires the HFSF’s advanced contribution to a capital increase to be necessary to preserve financial stability and to ensure contribution to growth and the real economy. The ECB notes that such contribution is only envisaged for credit institutions which have already been assessed as viable by the Bank of Greece. Therefore, the ECB understands that this criterion will in no event affect the viability assessment by the Bank of Greece. It also understands that it will also not compromise the resolution objectives and other restructuring measures, notably that non-viable banks should be resolved. In this respect attention needs to be drawn to the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and

text: of the Council establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions , which should serve as a benchmark.

text: 5. Pricing of recapitalisation instruments

text: 5.1 Article 1(17) of the draft law provides for the subscription of common stock by the HFSF under specific conditions and sets out in detail the modalities for determining the issue price for such common stock.

text: Article 1(18)

text: lays down the terms of issuance of warrants by the HFSF. The price for the exercise of each warrant will be equal to the issue price for each common stock, with an interest rate of 3% plus a spread increasing by 100 bps on an annual basis; this is expected to motivate private investors to exercise their rights as soon as possible. Moreover,

text: Article 1(18)

text: stipulates that CoCos bear an annual interest rate of 7%, increased by 50 bps per annum, payable in cash on an annual basis, provided that capital adequacy and profitability requirements are met . Their conversion rate will be equal to 50% of the offer price of the common stock subscribed for by the HFSF. 5.2 The ECB welcomes the pricing under the draft law, which ensures market-oriented remuneration rates, appropriate behavioural safeguards and regular review mechanisms , and is broadly in line with the methodology laid down by the ECB for benchmarking the pricing of State recapitalisation measures . It has repeatedly stressed the importance of appropriate pricing for recapitalisations to enhance the stability of the financial system, facilitate a return to normal market conditions and ensure a level playing field and the proper financing of the economy . More specifically, the ECB welcomes the remuneration of the capital injection on the basis of the issue price and the sufficient discount ensured both by the exercise of warrants and by the CoCos conversion mechanisms. Moreover, it welcomes the quoted market price being the benchmark price and the alternative coupon satisfaction mechanism contained in the CoCos and underscores the importance of its inclusion in order to ensure a market-oriented remuneration rate. The ECB considers that the proposed pricing framework contains appropriate incentives to encourage Greek credit institutions to exit State support as soon as possible.

text: 6. Timely completion of corporate proceedings for the recapitalisation

text: 6.1 According to the new Article 7(7) of the HFSF Law, as inserted by Article 1(17) of the draft law, the time limit for the convocation of a general meeting of shareholders and any adjourned meetings thereof for the purposes of deciding on the issuance of CoCos, as well as for the submission of documentation to the supervisory authorities, will be shortened to one-third of the time limits provided for in Greek company law . In this respect, the ECB stresses the importance of the timely completion of the issuance of common stock which is also of essence to ensure the prompt finalisation of the recapitalisation process. The ECB thus invites the consulting authority to consider this element, having regard to both the Greek corporate law framework and to the relevant Union legislation . 6.2 Consistently with the above observation, the ECB considers that, without prejudice to the Greek legislator’s prerogative to choose the statutory channel to address technical or other special issues that may arise from the capital increase through the issuance of common stock, including a delegation clause in Article 7 of the HFSF Law would provide the necessary flexibility to allow such issues to be addressed promptly, given that the timing element is important for the successful recapitalisation of credit institutions. Furthermore, the inclusion of such a clause in

text: Article 7

text: would be in line with similar clauses in Articles

text: b and 7c of the HFSF Law, as amended or inserted by the draft law.

text: 7. Voting rights of the HFSF

text: Article 7

text: a(1) of the HFSF Law, as amended by Article 1(17) of the draft law, provides that where private sector participation in the capital increase referred to in Article 7(3) of the HFSF Law is at least equal to 10% of the amount of the share capital increase, the HFSF will exercise its voting rights in the general meeting of shareholders only for decisions regarding charter modifications, including capital increase or reduction or providing proxy powers to the Board of Directors to that effect, merger, division, conversion, revival, extension of duration or dissolution of the company, material asset transfers, including sales of subsidiaries but excluding current transactions, or any other matters requiring an increased majority under Law No 2190/1920. The ECB notes that the concept of ‘current transactions’, which are excluded, is not defined in the draft law and could create ambiguities in relation to the scope of the HFSF’s voting rights. The ECB is of the view that the law should clearly stipulate that the HFSF is always able to exercise its voting rights, in relation to decisions regarding charter amendments or any other issue that requires an increased majority at the general meeting pursuant to Greek corporate law.

text: 8. ECB representative

text: Finally, the ECB welcomes the amendment to

text: Article 16

text: B(9) of the HFSF Law, as inserted by Article 1(26) of the draft law, whereby it is clarified that the HFSF confidentiality regime does not apply vis-à-vis the ECB. In the exercise of their mandate as observer in the HFSF, the ECB representative acts as an ECB staff member and is solely subject to the ECB’s confidentiality regime. The very reason for the ECB representative’s mandate is to share with the ECB any information obtained from the HFSF and, in so doing, the ECB representative is bound by the ECB’s strict confidentiality regime. Regarding the ECB representative’s mandate within the HFSF more generally, the ECB reiterates that this mandate has always been limited to observer status and therefore does not have an impact on decision making, which currently is the sole responsibility of the members of the current Board of Directors and will be the sole responsibility of the members of the EC and the GC, as soon as such bodies are constituted. Therefore, the ECB welcomes that Article 4(15) of the HFSF Law clarifies that the ECB representative’s mandate is only to observe, without having voting rights. However, as regards the ECB representative’s right under the new governance structure to request the future president to call for a meeting of the GC, the ECB considers that this goes beyond its observer status and thus should be deleted from the draft law.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 16 November 2012.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI