text: 57 institutions , and does not extend to other regulated entities . The ECB highlights that the draft law should be without prejudice to the Eurosystem and SSM Ethics Frameworks which the ECB has established and to the Single Code, as it may be amended from time to time, and must not prevent the possibility of extending such prohibition to financial instruments issued by regulated entities to members of the Bank Board of NBS and NBS employees.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 20 October 2025 on the supervisory independence of Národná banka Slovenska and the prevention of conflicts of interest (CON/2025/32)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 20 October 2025 on the supervisory independence of Národná banka Slovenska and the prevention of conflicts of interest (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 18 September 2025 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Ministry of Finance of the Slovak Republic for an opinion on a draft law amending the Law on Banks and on amendments to certain laws (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 2(1), third indent, of

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft law relates to Národná banka Slovenska (NBS) and the specific tasks conferred upon the ECB concerning the prudential supervision of credit institutions pursuant to Article 127(6) of the Treaty. In accordance with

text: Article 17.5

text: , first sentence, of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The main purpose of the draft law is to transpose into Slovak law the amendments to Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council introduced by

text: Directive (EU) 2024/1619

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council (hereinafter the ‘CRD6’). In particular, several provisions of the draft law seek to transpose

text: Article 4

text: a of Directive

text: , which relates to the supervisory independence of competent authorities and the prevention of conflicts of interest in relation to the officials and employees of such authorities. 1.2 The draft law provides that, in order to secure the independence of supervision and to avoid conflict of interests, the relevant provisions of the draft law apply to (a) the head of the financial market supervision unit in the area of banking who is also a member of the Bank Board of NBS other than the Governor of NBS (hereinafter the ‘Head of Banking Supervision’) and (b) employees of NBS who

text: 1 Návrh zákona ktorým sa mení a dopĺňa zákon č. 483/2001 Z. z. o bankách a o zmene a doplnení niektorých zákonov v znení neskorších predpisov a ktorým sa menia a dopĺňajú niektoré zákony.

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/1998/415/oj).

text: 3 Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions, amending Directive

text: and repealing Directives

text: and

text: (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 338, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2013/36/oj).

text: Directive (EU) 2024/1619

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2024 amending Directive

text: as regards supervisory powers, sanctions, third-country branches, and environmental, social and governance risks (OJ L, 2024/1619, 19.6.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1619/oj). perform supervision in the field of banking (hereinafter together with the Head of Banking Supervision ‘designated persons’) . 1.3 The draft law provides that the total term of office of the Head of Banking Supervision must not exceed 14 years, unless otherwise provided in the transitional provisions of the draft law , i.e. if the person referred to in the relevant provision was appointed before 11 January 2026. 1.4 The draft law provides that if the Head of Banking Supervision is removed from office, the respective decision will be published, unless the member objects to such publication . 1.5 The draft law provides that designated persons must file a declaration on the prevention of conflicts of interest, including information on ownership of financial instruments (as described in paragraph 1.6), and any interests held by designated persons in the form of shares, bonds, or similar securities and units in collective investment funds pursuant to a separate regulation, if such ownership or holding could give rise to concerns about conflicts of interest . This is without prejudice to the provisions of special regulations . The declaration must be made as of the day preceding the day when the designated person became subject to the draft law , and thereafter annually by 31 January of the calendar year concerned, according to the status as of the date on which that declaration was made . 1.6 The draft law provides that in order to avoid conflicts of interest designated persons must not trade in financial instruments (a) issued by a credit institution supervised by NBS; (b) issued by a direct or indirect parent company of a credit institution supervised by NBS; (c) issued by a direct or indirect subsidiary of a credit institution supervised by NBS; (d) issued by a company that is an affiliate of a credit institution supervised by NBS, its direct or indirect parent company or its direct or indirect subsidiary; or (e) any financial instrument the value of which is linked to the value of a financial instrument as issued by the entities referred to in (a) to (d) . 1.7 The draft law provides for a few exemptions for designated persons from the above prohibition on trading in financial instruments. More specifically, if the third party or collective investment entity does not invest predominantly in the financial instruments listed in paragraph 1.6, the prohibition does not apply to (a) trades in a financial instrument managed by a third party in the context of the provision of a portfolio management investment service in accordance with a separate regulation, and designated persons as the owner of that instrument cannot intervene directly or indirectly in portfolio management; or (b) investments in collective investment entities.

text: 5 See

text: Article 6

text: b(1), points (a) and (b), of the draft law.

text: 6 See

text: Article 6

text: b(2) of the draft law.

text: 7 See

text: Article 6

text: b(3) of the draft law.

text: 8 As set out in

text: Article 6

text: b(6) of the draft law.

text: 9 See

text: Article 6

text: b(4) of the draft law.

text: 10 The footnote to

text: Article 6

text: b(4) of the draft law refers, as an example, to Constitutional Law No 357/2004 Coll. on the protection of the public interest in the performance of the functions of public officials, as amended.

text: 11 See

text: Article 6

text: b(5) of the draft law.

text: 12 See

text: Article 6

text: b(5) of the draft law.

text: 13 See

text: Article 6

text: b(6) of the draft law.

text: 14 See

text: Article 6

text: b(8) to (10) of the draft law. 1.8 The draft law provides NBS with the possibility to require designated persons to sell or otherwise dispose of the financial instruments in their possession as of the date of taking office or acquired during the term of office, within a reasonable period of time, if the designated persons do not comply with the prohibition . The draft law also provides designated persons with the possibility to request authorisation from NBS for the sale or other disposal of financial instruments in their possession as of the date of taking office . 1.9 The draft law provides that designated persons must have a cooling-off period following the end of the decision-making in a supervisory capacity or of the performance of supervision. During the cooling-off period designated persons must refrain from entering into any employment relationship with, or performing a gainful activity for, or entering into any contract for the provision of professional activities with, (a) any credit institution in the supervision of which the designated persons were directly involved, including direct or indirect parent companies, direct or indirect subsidiaries, or affiliates of such credit institution; (b) any persons providing services to any entity listed in point (a), except if the designated persons are excluded from participating in any provision of services to the credit institution listed in point (a) during the cooling-off period; or (c) any persons who promote or defend interests in relation to NBS in matters for which the designated persons were responsible during the performance of their duties. The cooling-off period starts on the day when the designated persons ended their decision-making in the supervisory capacity or the performance of supervision over the credit institutions referred to in point (a) . 1.10 The draft law sets out different cooling-off periods for different categories of designated persons. For the Head of Banking Supervision the cooling-off period must be at least 12 months in respect of entities listed in points (a) and (b) of paragraph 1.9. For NBS banking supervisors the cooling-off period must be at least six months in respect of the same type of entities. However, for all designated persons the cooling-off period must be at least three months in respect of entities listed in point (c) of paragraph 1.9 . 1.11 The draft law provides that NBS may also apply a cooling-off period for designated persons when concluding an employment relationship, an employment contract or a contract for the provision of professional activities with direct competitors of a credit institution in the supervision of which designated persons were directly involved, including direct or indirect parent companies, direct or indirect subsidiaries, or affiliates of such credit institution. For such cases, the length of the coolingoff period must be at least six months for the Head of Banking Supervision, and at least three months for NBS banking supervisors . 1.12 The draft law provides that NBS may shorten the cooling-off period to a minimum of three months for NBS banking supervisors, if (a) the cooling-off period of a minimum of six months in relation to credit institutions in the supervision of which NBS banking supervisors were directly involved, including direct or indirect parent companies, direct or indirect subsidiaries, or affiliates of such credit

text: 15 See

text: Article 6

text: b(8) and (9) of the draft law.

text: 16 See

text: Article 6

text: b(10) of the draft law.

text: 17 See

text: Article 6

text: b(11) and (12) of the draft law.

text: 18 See

text: Article 6

text: b(13) and (14) of the draft law.

text: 19 See

text: Article 6

text: b(15) of the draft law. institution, could adversely restrict NBS in its ability to hire persons with adequate skills or skills to ensure the performance of supervision of banks, or (b) it has been proven that the cooling-off period is contrary to the Constitution or to special regulations . 1.13 The draft law entitles NBS to take measures to ensure that from the beginning of the cooling-off period, designated persons do not have access to any information pursuant to a separate regulation concerning credit institutions in the supervision of which designated persons were directly involved, including direct or indirect parent companies, direct or indirect subsidiaries, or affiliates of such credit institution. If, despite the measures taken by NBS, designated persons gain access to such information during the cooling-off period, the cooling-off period restarts from the date following the day on which NBS became aware of designated persons having gained access to such information . 1.14 The draft law provides that, during the cooling-off period, designated persons are entitled to monetary compensation from NBS for a period when they are not in an employment relationship or other similar relationship with NBS, meet the conditions set out in the draft law and have not misused the information accessed pursuant to a separate regulation concerning a credit institution in the supervision of which the designated persons were directly involved, including direct or indirect parent companies, direct or indirect subsidiaries, or affiliates of such credit institution. Where the relevant cooling-off period is restored, the monetary compensation must be paid to such person only within the scope of the original cooling-off period . The amount of the monetary compensation is to be set out in a separate regulation .

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 Article 130 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter the ‘Statute of the ESCB’) address the independence of central banks in the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) , stipulating that when exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties conferred upon them by the Treaties and the Statute of the ESCB, neither the ECB, nor a national central bank (NCB), nor any member of their decisionmaking bodies, are to seek or take instructions from Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, from any government of a Member State or from any other body. This independence was thus entrusted to the ECB and NBS, as an NCB, by primary law. 2.2 Based on considerations of central bank independence, and in order to ensure the independence of NCBs such as NBS when exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties conferred upon them by the Treaties and the Statute of the ESCB, the ECB has established an ethics framework. This includes the ECB’s Code of Conduct for high-level ECB officials (hereinafter the

text: 20 See

text: Article 6

text: b(16) of the draft law.

text: 21 See

text: Article 6

text: b(17) of the draft law.

text: 22 See

text: Article 6

text: b(11) of the draft law.

text: 23 See

text: Article 6

text: b(18), second sentence, of the draft law.

text: 24 See

text: Article 6

text: b(18) and (19) of the draft law.

text: 25 Regarding the doctrine of the ECB as to the independence and its ramifications, see the ECB Convergence Report 2025, Section 2.2. Available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: 26 Code of Conduct for high-level ECB officials (OJ C 478, 16.12.2022, p. 3). ‘Single Code’), which applies, among others, to the members of the Governing Council of the ECB when exercising their functions as members of a high-level ECB body, and Guideline (EU) [2021/2253] of the European Central Bank (ECB/2021/49) , which is addressed to the NCBs of the Eurosystem and establishes ethics requirements applicable to the members of the decision-making bodies and staff of the NCBs. 2.3 The NCBs, as an integral part of the ESCB, must act in accordance with the guidelines of the ECB . Hence, national legislation is without prejudice to the ethics framework which the ECB has established to ensure the independence of the ECB and the NCBs when exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties conferred upon them by the Treaties and the Statute of the ESCB, as both frameworks have their own scope and legal basis. 2.4 Furthermore,

text: Article 19 of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013

text: (hereinafter the ‘SSM Regulation’) stipulates that when carrying out the tasks conferred on it by the SSM Regulation, the ECB and the national competent authorities acting within the SSM must act independently. Article 31(3) of the SSM Regulation furthermore requires the ECB, in cooperation with the national competent authorities, to: (a) establish and maintain comprehensive and formal procedures including ethics procedures and proportionate periods to assess in advance and prevent possible conflicts of interest resulting from subsequent employment within two years of members of the Supervisory Board; and (b) provide for appropriate disclosures. Those procedures are without prejudice to the application of stricter national rules . The legal basis for these provisions of the SSM Regulation is Article 127(6) of the Treaty. 2.5 In view of this independence and these requirements of the SSM Regulation, the ECB has established an ethics framework to ensure the independence of national competent authorities, such as NBS, when assisting the ECB in carrying out the tasks conferred on it by the SSM Regulation. This ethics framework includes the Single Code, which applies, among others, to the members of the Supervisory Board of the ECB when exercising their functions as members of a high-level ECB body, and Guideline

text: (EU) 2021/2256

text: of the European Central Bank (ECB/2021/50) , which is addressed to the national competent authorities of the SSM and establishes ethics requirements applicable to the members of their bodies and the members of staff of the national competent authorities. In view of the responsibility of the ECB for the effective and consistent functioning of the SSM , the national competent authorities must comply with Guideline

text: (EU) 2021/2256

text: 27 Guideline (EU) [2021/2253] of the European Central Bank of 2 November 2021 laying down the principles of the Eurosystem Ethics Framework (ECB/2021/49) (OJ L 454, 17.12.2021, p. 7, http://data.europa.eu/eli/guideline/2021/2253/oj). 28 See Article 14.3 of the Statute of the ESCB. 29

text: Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013

text: conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2013/1024/oj). 30 See paragraph 2.4 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.4 of Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on EUR-Lex. 31 Guideline

text: (EU) 2021/2256

text: of the European Central Bank of 2 November 2021 laying down the principles of the Ethics Framework for the Single Supervisory Mechanism (ECB/2021/50) (OJ L 454, 17.12.2021, p. 21, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/guideline/2021/2256/oj). 32 See Article 6(1) of the SSM Regulation. 2.6 In contrast to the ethics framework, which is ultimately based on Article 127(6) of the Treaty, the CRD6, including its provision on supervisory independence of competent authorities , is based on Article 53(1) of the Treaty. A legal act based on this provision cannot alter the rights and obligations of the ECB and the national competent authorities when carrying out the tasks conferred on them by the SSM Regulation based on Article 127(6) of the Treaty. It follows from settled case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union that the different legal bases, namely

text: Article 53(1)

text: and Article 127(6) of the Treaty, cannot be combined as the legal basis for a legal act, in view of the different procedures involved. In particular, the measures adopted under Article 53(1) of the Treaty are adopted by the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee (and, if relevant, the ECB in accordance with Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty). By contrast, the regulations adopted under Article 127(6) of the Treaty are adopted by the Council alone, in a special legislative procedure in which the Council acts unanimously, after consulting the European Parliament and the ECB . 2.7 Hence, the amendments made by the CRD6 are without prejudice to the ethics framework which the ECB has established to ensure the independence of the national competent authorities in the context of the SSM, as both frameworks have their own scope and legal basis. The Union legislator acknowledged this through the CRD6’s amendments to Directive

text: , which provide that

text: Article 4

text: a(2) of Directive

text: is without prejudice to the rights and obligations of the national competent authorities pursuant to the SSM established by the SSM Regulation . For the avoidance of doubt, the national legislator may wish to clarify this within the text of the draft law. From an ECB perspective, the provisions from the CRD6 may nevertheless serve as guidance for establishing safeguards for the independence of the ECB and the national competent authorities when carrying out the tasks conferred on them by the SSM Regulation .

text: 3. Specific observations

text: 3.1 The draft law proposes to limit the maximum term of office of the Head of Banking Supervision to 14 years, whereas currently he or she may be appointed to unlimited six-year terms . In this context, the ECB highlights that in accordance with Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB, statutes of NCBs must provide for a minimum term of office of five years for a Governor. This does not preclude longer terms of office. Applying the rules regarding the term of office of Governors to other members of the decision-making bodies of NCBs involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks also safeguards

text: 33 See

text: Article 1

text: , point (4), of the CRD6, which inserts

text: Article 4

text: a in Directive

text: . 34 See judgment of the Court of Justice of 29 April 2004, v ,

text: , ECLI:EU:C:2004:253, Commission Council paragraphs 57 and 58; and judgment of the Court of Justice of 10 January 2006, Commission v Parliament and Council,

text: , ECLI:EU:C:2006:4, paragraphs 43 to 60. 35 See paragraph 2.6 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.6 of Opinion

text: . 36 See

text: Article 4

text: a(2), fourth subparagraph, of Directive

text: , as inserted by the CRD6. This acknowledgement refers directly to the dismissal requirements included in

text: Article 4

text: a(2), second subparagraph, of Directive

text: , as inserted by the CRD6. 37 See paragraph 2.7 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.7 of Opinion

text: . 38 Article 7(4) of Law No 566/1992 Coll. on Národná banka Slovenska, as amended (hereinafter the ‘Law on NBS’). The term of office of the Governor and Vice-Governors is limited to two six-year terms. the personal independence of those persons . The application of the same rules regarding the minimum term of office to both Governors and members of decision-making bodies is particularly pertinent where a Governor is ‘first among equals’ alongside other members who have equivalent voting rights, or where other members are involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks , as is the case in NBS. 3.2 As noted in paragraph 1.3, under the draft law the total term of office of the Head of Banking Supervision must not exceed 14 years. The term of office for the members of the Bank Board of NBS, including the Head of Banking Supervision, is six years in line with the Law on NBS. The ECB understands that in practice the maximum term of office of 14 years as set out in the draft law is unlikely to be reached very often, due to the combination of (a) the term of office of six years of the members of the Bank Board of NBS applicable under the Law on NBS; and (b) the minimum term of office of five years applicable to the members of the Bank Board of NBS, including the Head of Banking Supervision, under the Statute of the ESCB, as specified in paragraph 3.1. Consequently, if the Head of Banking Supervision serves two full six-year terms, the dual requirements that his or her term must not exceed 14 years and that he or she must serve a minimum term of office of five years could only be complied with by ensuring that he or she cannot be reappointed to serve a further term of office. Based on the above, the ECB understands that the Head of Banking Supervision cannot be appointed as a member of the Bank Board of NBS if, during the term of office for which he or she would have been appointed, the performance of his or her duties as a member of the Bank Board of NBS would exceed 14 years, taking into account all previous terms of office . 3.3 The CRD6 provides that Member States must ensure that members of a competent authority’s governance body can be dismissed if they no longer meet the criteria of appointment or have been convicted of a serious criminal offence . Under the Law on NBS, the Governor, the Deputy Governors and the other members of the Bank Board of NBS can only be dismissed prior to the expiration of their term of office if they no longer fulfil the conditions required for the performance of their duties or if they have been found guilty of serious misconduct within the meaning of

text: Article 14.2

text: , of the Statute of the ESCB . Against this background, the ECB understands that the current provisions of the Law on NBS regulating the appointment and dismissal of members of the Bank Board of NBS are consistent with the principles of the CRD6 and that, therefore, it is not necessary for the draft law to include any provisions in this respect. Furthermore, the ECB understands that the draft law only supplements the Law on NBS by adding new provisions concerning the public disclosure of grounds for dismissal that transpose the amendments to that effect made by the CRD6 to Directive

text: 39 Article 130 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB, which address the independence of central banks in the ESCB, refer to ‘members of the decision-making bodies’ of NCBs, rather than to Governors specifically. 40 See the ECB Convergence Report 2025, Section 2.2.3, p. 26. 41 See, for example, paragraph 1.3 of Opinion

text: . 42 See

text: Article 4

text: a(2), second subparagraph, of Directive

text: , as inserted by the CRD6. 43 See Article 7(9) of the Law on NBS. 44 See Article 7 of the Law on NBS. 45 See

text: Article 4

text: a(2), second subparagraph, second and third sentences, of Directive

text: , as inserted by the CRD6. 3.4 In this context, the ECB highlights that, pursuant to

text: Article 14.2

text: , second paragraph, first sentence, of the Statute of the ESCB, ‘a Governor may be relieved from office only if he no longer fulfils the conditions required for the performance of his duties or if he has been guilty of serious misconduct’. Applying the same rules regarding the grounds for relieving Governors from office to other members of the decision-making bodies of NCBs involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks also safeguards the personal independence of those persons . The application of the same rules regarding dismissal to both Governors and members of decision-making bodies is particularly pertinent where a Governor is ‘first among equals’ with other members who have equivalent voting rights, or where other members are involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks , as is the case in NBS. The ECB considers that the relevant provisions of the Law on NBS are consistent with the requirements of Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB. 3.5 The minimum 12-month cooling-off period applicable to the Head of Banking Supervision under the draft law is in line with the requirements of the Single Code. In this respect, the ECB understands that under the draft law NBS could apply a cooling-off period of a maximum of two years when such an extended period is applied based on the Single Code . 3.6 In addition, the Single Code sets limits on the establishment of post-employment relationships, not only directly with significant or less significant credit institutions, but also with ‘other financial institutions’ or ‘any entity engaged in lobbying in relation to the ECB, or consultancy and/or advocacy for the ECB or for any [supervised] institution’ . In contrast, the categories of entities in respect of which a cooling-off period is applied, extends only to those listed in paragraph 1.9 of this opinion, i.e. ‘other financial institutions’ or entities ‘engaged in lobbying in relation to the ECB, or consultancy and/or advocacy for the ECB of for any [supervised] institution’ do not seem to be covered by the relevant provisions of the draft law . In any event, the ECB notes further that the draft law must be interpreted without prejudice to the Single Code, as it may be amended from time to time . 3.7 The prohibition on the trading by designated persons of certain financial instruments is less restrictive 53 54 as regards the relevant entities than the requirements of the Eurosystem and SSM Ethics Frameworks which the ECB has established and the requirements of the Single Code insofar as it limits the prohibition to financial instruments issued by, or referring to, credit institutions supervised by NBS and the direct or indirect parent companies, subsidiaries, or affiliates of such credit

text: 46 Article 130 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB refer to ‘members of the decision-making bodies’ of NCBs, rather than to Governors specifically. 47 See the ECB Convergence Report 2025, Section 2.2.3, p. 26. 48 See

text: Article 6

text: b(13) of the draft law. 49 See

text: Article 17.3

text: , point (b), of the Single Code; see also paragraph 3.2.2 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 3.3 of Opinion

text: .50 See Articles 17.1 and 17.2 of the Single Code. 50 See Articles 17.1 and 17.2 of the Single Code. 51 See

text: Article 6

text: b(11) of the draft law. 52 See paragraph 3.4 of Opinion

text: . 53 See Article 11 of Guideline (EU) [2021/2253] (ECB/2021/49). 54 See Article 11 of Guideline

text: (EU) 2021/2256

text: (ECB/2021/50). 55 See Article 16 of the Single Code. This opinion will be published on EUR-Lex. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 20 October 2025. [signed] The President of the ECB Christine LAGARDE

text: 56 See

text: Article 6

text: b(6) of the draft law. 57 As defined in Article 2(8) of Guideline (EU) [2021/2253] (ECB/2021/49); Article 2(7) of Guideline

text: (EU) 2021/2256


publisher: Europeiska centralbanken

sprak: en

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 3 November 2025 on the independence of the members of the Governing Board of Banka Slovenije and the prevention of conflicts of interest (CON/2025/33)

serie: con

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 3 November 2025 on the independence of the members of the Governing Board of Banka Slovenije and the prevention of conflicts of interest (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

type: rubrik

text: On 29 September 2025 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Slovenian Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a new draft law on banking (hereinafter the ‘draft law’) , which would repeal and replace the existing Law on banking . The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 2(1), third indent, of

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft law relates to Banka Slovenije and the specific tasks conferred upon the ECB concerning the prudential supervision of credit institutions pursuant to Article 127(6) of the Treaty. In accordance with

text: Article 17.5

text: , first sentence, of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

type: stycke

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The main purpose of the draft law is to amend and replace the existing Law on banking in order to transpose into Slovenian law the amendments to Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council introduced by

text: Directive (EU) 2024/1619

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council (hereinafter the ‘CRD6’). In particular, several provisions of the draft law seek to transpose

text: Article 4

text: a of Directive

text: , which relates to the supervisory independence of competent authorities and the prevention of conflicts of interest involving their officials and employees. 1.2 According to the explanatory memorandum accompanying the draft law (hereinafter the ‘explanatory memorandum’), while the application of the requirements of the CRD6 to governors of national central banks (NCBs) is excluded, since their position is regulated by the Treaty and the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter, the ‘Statute

text: 1 Law on Banking (Zakon o bančništvu (ZBan-4)).

text: 2 Law on Banking (Zakon o bančništvu (ZBan-3) Uradni list RS, št. 92/21 z dne 8. 6. 2021).

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).

text: 4 Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions, amending Directive

text: and repealing Directives

text: and

text: (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 338).

text: Directive (EU) 2024/1619

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2024 amending Directive

text: as regards supervisory powers, sanctions, third-country branches, and environmental, social and governance risks (OJ L, 2024/1619, 19.6.2024). of the ESCB’), those provisions are general in nature and still require concretisation in national law. The Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB only specify that governors must serve a minimum term of five years and set out restrictions on dismissal, but they do not regulate conditions for appointment, which are left to Member States to regulate. The explanatory memorandum clarifies that the abovementioned exclusion in the CRD6 is to be understood as meaning that the requirements of the Member States for governors may differ, and not that such requirements may not be introduced under national law at all. As the Law on Banka Slovenije does not specify any specific objective conditions for the Governor and Vice-Governors, it is, according to the explanatory memorandum, considered reasonable to lay down such conditions for all members of the Governing Board of Banka Slovenije, including the Governor, given that it would not be logical for the Vice-Governors, who have fewer powers compared to the Governor, to be subject to stricter conditions than the Governor. According to the explanatory memorandum, the same applies, to the limitation of the term of office for members of the competent authority’s governance body. 1.3 The draft law provides that Banka Slovenije, the members of its Governing Board and its employees are independent in the exercise of supervision and act objectively in the performance of their tasks under the draft law, and are not bound by the decisions, positions or instructions of supervised institutions, the Government of the Republic of Slovenia, any Union body, any government of a Member State, State bodies, or any other public or private entity, State or any other body, nor may they request or receive instructions from them or turn to them for instructions for their work or guidelines. The draft law further provides that the requirements concerning the supervisory independence of Banka Slovenije are implemented with regard to the role and responsibilities of the members of its Governing Board and its employees under the principle of proportionality . The explanatory memorandum notes in this respect that the European Banking Authority (EBA) is required, by 10 July 2026, to issue guidelines on the proportionate application of

text: Article 4

text: a of Directive

text: . 1.4 The draft law provides that the provisions of the chapter on supervisory independence of Banka Slovenije do not prejudice the requirements regarding the handling of conflicts of interest (including reporting of personal interests), prohibitions on private financial transactions and cooling-off periods that apply to members of the Governing Board and employees of Banka Slovenije under other regulations and internal acts adopted on the basis thereof . The draft law also provides that Banka Slovenije, by an internal act, determines the requirements, procedures and measures to prevent conflicts of interest among Banka Slovenije’s Governing Board members and employees, in connection with the performance of their professional duties at Banka Slovenije, taking into account the principle of proportionality in relation to the role and responsibilities involved in the exercise of Banka Slovenije’s powers and tasks of under the law . 1.5 The draft law amends the current Law on Banka Slovenije by introducing, inter alia, conditions for the appointment of members of the Governing Board of Banka Slovenije, and a provision limiting the

text: 6 See Article 22 of the draft law.

text: 8 See Article 23 of the draft law. maximum combined duration of their terms of office to 14 years, regardless of any interim interruptions, with this restriction applying only to appointments made after 11 January 2026 . 1.6 According to the explanatory memorandum, the requirement in CRD6 concerning the dismissal of a member of a competent authority’s governance body in the event of a conviction of a serious criminal offence is already reflected in the Law on Banka Slovenije, which provides for dismissal in the event that a member of the Banka Slovenije Governing Board has committed a serious violation . In this regard, the explanatory memorandum notes that

text: Article 4

text: a of the CRD6 is generally speaking a minimum harmonisation provision, meaning that Member States may introduce stricter requirements. With regard to the obligation to publish the reasons for dismissal, the explanatory memorandum clarifies that the Rules of Procedure of the National Assembly ensure the publicity of dismissal proceedings, which allow non-public sessions where the chairperson determines the text of the official notification of such sessions. 1.7 The draft law provides that Banka Slovenije is competent and responsible for the supervision of banks in accordance with the draft law and that it must adopt and publish the objectives regarding the implementation of this supervision at least once a year . 1.8 The draft law prohibits Banka Slovenije’s Governing Board members and employees from trading in financial instruments issued by, or relating to, credit institutions or investment firms, including their direct or indirect parent companies, subsidiaries or affiliated companies, except for: (1) instruments managed by third parties, provided that the owner of such instruments is prohibited from interfering in the management of the portfolio and the third party does not invest predominantly in instruments issued by or relating to credit institutions or investment firms, or (2) units of collective investment undertakings, provided that the collective investment undertakings concerned do not invest predominantly in instruments issued by or relating to credit institutions or investment firms. The draft law provides that more detailed requirements, procedures and measures regarding the ownership and disposal of financial instruments are to be determined by an internal act of Banka Slovenije . 1.9 The draft law further provides that Banka Slovenije’s Governing Board members and the employees that are directly involved in decision-making or the performance of supervisory tasks are subject to a cooling-off period following the termination of their office or employment. During this period, they may not take up employment or accept any contract for the provision of professional services with at least: (1) credit institutions or investment firms established in the Republic of Slovenia, including their direct or indirect parent companies, subsidiaries or affiliated companies of such credit institutions or investment firms, (2) credit institutions or investment firms established in other Member States with which the employee has directly cooperated for the purposes of supervision or decision-making, including direct or indirect superiors, subsidiaries or affiliated companies of such credit institutions or investment firms; (3) entities that provide services to any of the credit institutions or investment firms referred to under (1) and (2), unless the employee is strictly prohibited from participating in the provision of such services during the cooling-off period; (4) entities that carry out lobbying and interest

text: 9 See Article 522 of the draft law.

text: 10 See Article 39 of the Law on Banka Slovenije.

text: 11 See Article 9 of the draft law.

text: 12 See Article 24 of the draft law. representation activities at Banka Slovenije in relation to matters for which the employee was responsible during their employment with Banka Slovenije. The cooling-off period begins on the day on which the member of the Governing Board of Banka Slovenije ceases to hold office or when the Banka Slovenije employee ceases to directly participate in decision-making or the performance of supervisory tasks over the abovementioned entities. During the cooling-off period, Banka Slovenije prevents the abovementioned Banka Slovenije Governing Board members and employees from having access to confidential or sensitive information relating to the abovementioned entities. The draft law further provides that the cooling-off period lasts for members of the Governing Board of Banka Slovenije for at least 12 months for employment in the entities referred to in (1), (2), and (3), and for at least three months for employment in the entities referred to in (4). For other employees directly involved in the performance of supervisory tasks, the draft law provides that the cooling-off period lasts for six months for employment in the entities referred to in (1), (2), and (3) and for three months for employment in the entities referred to in (4) . 1.10 The draft law provides that Banka Slovenije’s Governing Board members and the employees that are subject to a cooling-off period are entitled to appropriate financial compensation for compliance with the related restrictions . 1.11 The draft law provides that Banka Slovenije’s Governing Board members and employees must submit a declaration of personal interests before their appointment or employment and annually thereafter. Banka Slovenije is to specify the detailed content of such declarations in an internal act. The declaration must at least include information on holdings in the form of stocks, equity financial instruments, bonds of mutual funds, investment funds, mixed-type funds, hedge funds and investment funds traded on the stock exchange, that could give rise to a conflict of interest for Banka Slovenije . 1.12 The draft law provides that where Banka Slovenije’s Governing Board members or other employees own financial instruments, whether upon taking up employment or at any time thereafter, that could give rise to a conflict of interest, Banka Slovenije may, on a case-by-case basis, determine measures that the Governing Board member or employee must take into account regarding the ownership or disposal of those financial instruments, including the requirement that these instruments be sold or disposed of within a reasonable period of time and that the holder obtains the permission of Banka Slovenije before disposal .

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 Article 130 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB address the independence of central banks in the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) , stipulating that when exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties conferred upon them by the Treaties and the Statute

text: 13 See Article 25 of the draft law.

text: 14 See Article 26 of the draft law.

text: 17 Regarding the doctrine of the ECB as to independence and its ramifications, see the ECB’s Convergence Report 2025, Section 2.2. Available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. of the ESCB, neither the ECB, nor an NCB, nor any member of their decision-making bodies, are to seek or take instructions from Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, from any government of a Member State or from any other body. This independence was thus entrusted to the ECB and Banka Slovenije, as an NCB, by primary law . 2.2 Based on considerations of central bank independence, and in order to ensure the independence of NCBs such as Banka Slovenije when exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties conferred upon them by the Treaties and the Statute of the ESCB, the ECB has established an ethics framework. This includes the ECB’s Code of Conduct for high-level ECB officials (hereinafter the ‘Single Code’), which applies, among others, to the members of the Governing Council of the ECB when exercising their functions as members of a high-level ECB body, and Guideline (EU) [2021/2253] of the European Central Bank (ECB/2021/49) , which is addressed to the NCBs of the Eurosystem and establishes ethics requirements applicable to the members of the decision-making bodies and staff of the NCBs . 2.3 The NCBs, as an integral part of the ESCB, must act in accordance with the guidelines of the ECB . Hence, national legislation transposing the CRD6 into Slovenian law is without prejudice to the ethics framework which the ECB has established in order to ensure the independence of the ECB and the NCBs when exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties conferred upon them by the Treaties and the Statute of the ESCB, as both frameworks have their own scope and legal basis . 2.4 Furthermore,

text: Article 19 of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013

text: (hereinafter the ‘SSM Regulation’) stipulates that when carrying out the tasks conferred on it by the SSM Regulation, the ECB and the national competent authorities acting within the SSM must act independently. Article 31(3) of the SSM Regulation furthermore requires the ECB, in cooperation with the national competent authorities, to: (a) establish and maintain comprehensive and formal procedures including ethics procedures and proportionate periods to assess in advance and prevent possible conflicts of interest resulting from subsequent employment within two years of members of the Supervisory Board; and (b) provide for appropriate disclosures. Those procedures are without prejudice to the application of stricter national rules . The legal basis for these provisions of the SSM Regulation is Article 127(6) of the Treaty.

text: 18 See paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , and paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on EUR-Lex.

text: 19 Code of Conduct for high-level ECB officials (OJ C 478, 16.12.2022, p. 3).

text: 20 Guideline (EU) [2021/2253] of the European Central Bank of 2 November 2021 laying down the principles of the Eurosystem Ethics Framework (ECB/2021/49) (OJ L 454, 17.12.2021, p. 7, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/guideline/2021/2253/oj).

text: 21 See paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: , and paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: 22 See Article 14.3 of the Statute of the ESCB.

text: 23 See paragraph 2.1.4 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: , and paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013

text: conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2013/1024/oj).

text: 25 See paragraph 2.1.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.4 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.4 of Opinion

text: , and paragraph 2.4 of Opinion

text: . 2.5 In view of this independence and these requirements of the SSM Regulation, the ECB has established an ethics framework to ensure the independence of national competent authorities, such as Banka Slovenije, when assisting the ECB in carrying out the tasks conferred on it by the SSM Regulation. This ethics framework includes the Single Code, which applies, among others, to the members of the Supervisory Board of the ECB when exercising their functions as members of a highlevel ECB body, and Guideline

text: (EU) 2021/2256

text: of the European Central Bank (ECB/2021/50) , which is addressed to the national competent authorities of the SSM and establishes ethics requirements applicable to the members of their bodies and the members of staff of the national competent authorities. In view of the responsibility of the ECB for the effective and consistent functioning of the SSM , the national competent authorities must comply with Guideline

text: (EU) 2021/2256

text: (ECB/2021/50) . 2.6 In contrast to the ethics framework, which is ultimately based on Article 127(6) of the Treaty, the CRD6, including its provision on the supervisory independence of competent authorities , is based on Article 53(1) of the Treaty. A legal act based on this provision cannot alter the rights and obligations of the ECB and the national competent authorities when carrying out the tasks conferred on them by the SSM Regulation based on Article 127(6) of the Treaty. It follows from settled caselaw of the Court of Justice of the European Union that the different legal bases, namely

text: Article 53(1)

text: and Article 127(6) of the Treaty, cannot be combined as the legal basis for a legal act, in view of the different procedures involved. In particular, the measures adopted under Article 53(1) of the Treaty are adopted by the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee (and, if relevant, the ECB in accordance with Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty). By contrast, the regulations adopted under Article 127(6) of the Treaty are adopted by the Council alone, in a special legislative procedure in which the Council acts unanimously, after consulting the European Parliament and the ECB . 2.7 Hence, the amendments made by the CRD6 are without prejudice to the ethics framework which the ECB has established to ensure the independence of the national competent authorities in the context of the SSM, as both frameworks have their own scope and legal basis. The Union legislator acknowledged this through the CRD6’s amendments to Directive

text: , which provide that

text: Article 4

text: a(2) of Directive

text: is without prejudice to the rights and obligations of the national

text: 26 Guideline

text: (EU) 2021/2256

text: of the European Central Bank of 2 November 2021 laying down the principles of the Ethics Framework for the Single Supervisory Mechanism (ECB/2021/50) (OJ L 454, 17.12.2021, p. 21, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/guideline/2021/2256/oj).

text: 28 See paragraph 2.5 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.5 of Opinion

text: , and paragraph 2.5 of Opinion

text: 29 See

text: Article 4

text: a of Directive

text: as inserted by the CRD6.

text: 30 See judgment of the Court of Justice of 29 April 2004, Commission v Council,

text: , ECLI:EU:C:2004:253, paragraphs 57 and 58; and judgment of the Court of Justice of 10 January 2006, Commission v Parliament and Council,

text: , ECLI:EU:C:2006:4, paragraphs 43 to 60.

text: 31 See paragraph 2.6.2 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1.3 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.6 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.6 of Opinion

text: , and paragraph 2.6 of Opinion

text: . competent authorities pursuant to the SSM established by the SSM Regulation . For the avoidance of doubt, the national legislator may wish to clarify this within the text of the draft law. From an ECB perspective, the provisions from the CRD6 may nevertheless serve as guidance for establishing safeguards for the independence of the ECB and the national competent authorities when carrying out the tasks conferred on them by the SSM Regulation . 2.8 The ECB considers that Article 22(3) of the draft law adequately reflects the relationship with the rules mentioned in the previous paragraphs by stating that the provisions of the chapter of the draft law on the supervisory independence of Banka Slovenije do not prejudice the existing rules on conflicts of interest (including the reporting of personal interests), prohibitions on private financial transactions and cooling-off periods that apply to members of the Governing Board and employees of Banka Slovenije .

text: 3. Specific observations

text: 3.1 The draft law proposes to limit the maximum combined duration of all terms of office of each member of the Governing Board of Banka Slovenije, i.e. Governor or Vice-Governor, to 14 years , whereas currently they may be appointed for an unlimited number of six-year terms . In this context, the ECB highlights that, in accordance with Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB, statutes of NCBs must provide for a minimum term of office of five years for a Governor. This does not preclude longer terms of office. Applying the rules regarding the term of office of Governors to other members of the decision-making bodies of NCBs involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks also safeguards the personal independence of those persons . The application of the same rules regarding the term of office to both Governors and members of decision-making bodies is particularly pertinent where a Governor is ‘first among equals’ alongside other members who have equivalent voting rights, or where other members are involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks , as is the case in Banka Slovenije. 3.2 It is therefore worth noting that a member of Banka Slovenije’s Governing Board may not be appointed as a member of the Governing Board if, during the term of office for which they would have been appointed, the performance of their duties as a member of the Governing Board would exceed 14 years, taking into account the combined duration of all previous terms of office after 11 January 2026. Against this background, the ECB considers that the relevant provisions of the Law on Banka Slovenije are consistent with the requirements of Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB. 3.3 The CRD6 provides that Member States must ensure that members of a competent authority’s governance body can be dismissed if they no longer meet the criteria of appointment or have been

text: 32 See

text: Article 4

text: a(2), fourth subparagraph, of Directive

text: Article 4

text: a(2), second subparagraph, of Directive

text: , as inserted by the CRD6.

text: 33 See paragraph 2.1.4 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.7 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.7 of Opinion

text: , and paragraph 2.7 of Opinion

text: 36 See Articles 35 and 36 of the Law on Banka Slovenije.

text: 37 Article 130 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB, which address the independence of central banks in the ESCB, refer to ‘members of the decision-making bodies’ of NCBs, rather than to Governors specifically.

text: 38 See the ECB’s Convergence Report 2025, Section 2.2.3, p. 26. convicted of a serious criminal offence . Under the Law on Banka Slovenije, the members of Banka Slovenije’s Governing Board may only be dismissed prior to the expiration of their term of office if they no longer meet the conditions required for the performance of their duties or if they have committed a serious violation . Against this background, the ECB understands that the provisions of the of the Law on Banka Slovenije regulating the appointment and dismissal of members of Banka Slovenije’s Governing Board are consistent with the principles of the CRD6 and that, therefore, it is not necessary for the draft law to include any provisions in this respect. 3.4 In this context, the ECB highlights that, pursuant to

text: Article 14.2

text: , second paragraph, first sentence, of the Statute of the ESCB, ‘a Governor may be relieved from office only if he no longer fulfils the conditions required for the performance of his duties or if he has been guilty of serious misconduct’. Applying the same rules regarding the grounds for relieving Governors from office to other members of the decision-making bodies of NCBs involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks also safeguards the personal independence of those persons . The application of the same rules regarding dismissal to both Governors and members of decision-making bodies is particularly pertinent where a Governor is ‘first among equals’ with other members who have equivalent voting rights, or where other members are involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks , as is the case in Banka Slovenije. The ECB considers that the relevant provisions of the Law on Banka Slovenije are consistent with the requirements of Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB . 3.5 The minimum 12-month cooling-off period applicable to the members of the Governing Board of Banka Slovenije under the draft law is in line with the provisions of the Single Code, which allow for the imposition or extension of a cooling-off period of up to two years, when such an extension is justified under the Single Code . In this respect, the ECB considers that the internal act to be adopted by Banka Slovenije laying down the requirements, procedures and measures to prevent conflicts of interest among Banka Slovenije’s Governing Board members and employees, in connection with the performance of their professional duties at Banka Slovenije, could facilitate, from a legal perspective, the possibility of imposing and extending a cooling-off period of a maximum of two years. 3.6 In addition, the Single Code sets limits on the establishment of post-employment relationships, not only directly with credit institutions, but also with ‘other financial institutions’ or ‘any entity engaged in lobbying in relation to the ECB, or consultancy and/or advocacy for the ECB or for any [supervised] institution’ . For these two categories, the Single Code establishes a cooling-off period of six months

text: 39 See

text: Article 4

text: a(2), second subparagraph, of Directive

text: , as inserted by the CRD6.

text: 40 See Article 39 of the Law on Banka Slovenije. On the issue of reproduction of relevant provisions of Union law directly applicable in the legal order of the Member State, see the ECB’s Convergence Report 2025, [Section 2.2.2, pp. 17- 19].

text: 41 See Articles 36 and 39 of the Law on Banka Slovenije.

text: 42 Article 130 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB refer to ‘members of the decision-making bodies’ of NCBs, rather than to Governors specifically.

text: 43 See the ECB’s Convergence Report 2025, Section 2.2.3, p. 26.

text: 44 See the ECB’s Convergence Report 2006, Section 7.2.2, p. 75-76.

text: 46 See

text: Article 17.3

text: , point (b), of the Single Code.

text: 47 See

text: Articles 17.1

text: , points (b) and (c), and 17.2, points (b) and (c), of the Single Code. for ‘members’ and three months for ‘alternates’ . In contrast, under the draft law, the categories of entities in respect of which a cooling-off period is applied extend to credit institutions and investment firms, entities that provide services to credit institutions and investment firms, and ‘entities that carry out lobbying and interest representation activities at Banka Slovenije in relation to matters for which the employee was responsible during their employment with Banka Slovenije’ . From this perspective, the cooling-off regime under the draft law appears to introduce slightly different provisions from those contained in the Single Code. The ECB notes further that the draft law must be interpreted without prejudice to the Single Code, as it may be amended from time to time. In addition, the ECB considers that the internal act to be adopted by Banka Slovenije could support alignment with the Single Code. 3.7 The prohibition on the trading by Banka Slovenije’s Governing Board members and employees of certain financial instruments is slightly less restrictive than the requirements of the Eurosystem and SSM Ethics Frameworks, which the ECB has established, and the requirements of the Single Code insofar as it limits the prohibition to financial instruments issued by, or referring to, credit institutions and investment firms and their direct or indirect parent companies, subsidiaries, or 53 54 affiliates , and does not extend to other regulated entities . The ECB understands that, as is explicitly clarified in the text of the draft law , the draft law is without prejudice to the Eurosystem and SSM Ethics Frameworks and to the Single Code, as it may be amended from time to time, and notes that it must not prevent the possibility of extending such prohibition to financial instruments issued by other regulated entities. Finally, the ECB considers that the internal act to be adopted by Banka Slovenije could support alignment with the Single Code. This opinion will be published on EUR-Lex. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 3 November 2025. [signed] The President of the ECB Christine LAGARDE

text: 48 See

text: Articles 17.1

text: 50 See Article 11 of Guideline (EU) [2021/2253] (ECB/2021/49).

text: 51 See Article 11 of Guideline

text: (EU) 2021/2256

text: 52 See Article 16 of the Single Code.

text: 53 See Article 24 of the draft law.

text: 54 As defined in

text: Article 2

text: , point (8), of Guideline (EU) [2021/2253] (ECB/2021/49) and

text: Article 2

text: , point (7), of Guideline

text: (EU) 2021/2256

type: vagledning

utgivare: ecb


text: COM(2025) 462 final.

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning (EU) 2021/840 av den 20 maj 2021

text: om inrättande av ett program för utbyte, stöd och utbildning för att skydda euron mot förfalskning under perioden 2021–2027 (Perikles IV-programmet) och om upphävande av förordning

text: (EU) nr 331/2014

text: (EUT L 186, 27.5.2021, s. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/840/oj).

text: Se punkt 1 i Europeiska centralbankens yttrande

text: av den 5 juli 2006 på begäran av Europeiska unionens råd över två förslag till rådets beslut om handlingsprogrammet för utbyte, stöd och utbildning med avseende på skydd av euron mot förfalskning (Perikles-programmet) (EUT C 163, 14.7.2006, s. 7), punkt 1.1 i Europeiska centralbankens yttrande

text: av den 2 mars 2012 om ett förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning om inrättande av ett program för utbyte, stöd och utbildning för att skydda euron mot penningförfalskning (Periklesprogrammet 2020) (EUT C 137, 12.5.2012, s. 7) och punkt 1.2 i Europeiska centralbankens yttrande

text: av den 16 augusti 2018 om ett förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning om inrättande av ett program för utbyte, stöd och utbildning för att skydda euron mot penningförfalskning (Perikles IV-programmet) (EUT C 378, 19.10.2018, s. 2). Samtliga ECB-yttranden publiceras i EUR-Lex.

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 av den 23 september 2024 om finansiella regler för unionens allmänna budget ( EUT L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj).

text: Se punkt 8 i Europeiska centralbankens yttrande

text: av den 21 juni 2005 på begäran av Europeiska unionens råd över två förslag till rådsbeslut om handlingsprogrammet för utbyte, stöd och utbildning med avseende på skydd av euron mot förfalskning (Perikles-programmet) (EUT C 161, 1.7.2005, s. 11), punkt 2.2 i yttrande

text: , punkt 2.4 i yttrande

text: och punkt 2.2 i yttrande

text: Se punkt 2.5 i yttrande

text: och punkt 2.2 i yttrande

sprak: sv

title: Europeiska centralbankens yttrande av den 7 november 2025 om ett förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning om inrättande av ett program för utbyte, stöd och utbildning för att skydda euron mot förfalskning under perioden 2028–2034 (Perikles V-programmet) och om upphävande av förordning (EU) 2021/840 (CON/2025/34)

text: Inledning och rättslig grund

text: Den 8 och 15 oktober 2025 mottog Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) en begäran från Europeiska unionens råd respektive Europaparlamentet om ett yttrande över ett förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning om inrättande av ett program för utbyte, stöd och utbildning för att skydda euron mot förfalskning under perioden 2028–2034 (Perikles V-programmet) och om upphävande av förordning

text: (EU) 2021/840

text: (nedan kallat förslaget till förordning).

text: ECB:s befogenhet att avge ett yttrande grundas på

text: artikel 133 i fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt

text: enligt vilken, utan att det påverkar ECB:s behörighetsområde, Europaparlamentet och rådet ska föreskriva nödvändiga åtgärder när det gäller användningen av euron som gemensam valuta, efter det att ECB har hörts. I enlighet med

text: artikel 17.5

text: första meningen i arbetsordningen för Europeiska centralbanken har detta yttrande antagits av ECB-rådet.

text: 1. Allmänna kommentarer

text: 1.1 ECB noterar att förslaget till förordning kommer att ersätta det aktuella Perikles IV-programmet för perioden 2021–2027, som inrättades genom

text: . Perikles V-programmet kommer att tillämpas från 2028 till 2034.

text: 1.2 ECB upprepar att den finner att Periklesprogrammet är ett viktigt bidrag till den verksamhet som redan utförs av ECB, Europol och nationella myndigheter i kampen mot förfalskning av eurosedlar och euromynt. ECB är övertygad om att Perikles V-programmet även i framtiden kommer att bidra till att säkerställa eurosedlarnas och euromyntens integritet samt att motverka potentiella hot mot användningen av euron som gemensam valuta.

text: 1.3 ECB understryker sitt aktiva arbete i kampen mot förfalskningar. ECB vidareutvecklar utformningen av sedlar samt säkerhetsdetaljer för eurosedlarna som gör att både lekmän och experter kan skilja mellan äkta sedlar och förfalskningar, något som även avskräcker förfalskare.

text: 1.4 Den första serien eurosedlar infördes den 1 januari 2002. Sedan 2013 har sedlarna i den andra serien, dvs. Europaserien, gradvis införts. Innan nya sedlar med förbättrade säkerhetsdetaljer införs erbjuder ECB och de nationella centralbankerna i Eurosystemet omfattande information till tillverkare och leverantörer av sedelutrustning, samt även kommersiella banker, detaljhandeln och andra aktörer som dagligen använder sedelutrustning eller hanterar kontanter. Därutöver erbjuder ECB även utbildningar och utbildningsmaterial som komplement till den utbildning som aktörer som yrkesmässigt hanterar kontanter själva anordnar. Information om den nya designen och säkerhetsdetaljerna görs även tillgänglig för allmänheten när en ny sedelserie ges ut. ECB förbereder just nu en ny serie eurosedlar för att säkerställa att de är säkra, effektiva och hållbara. Både allmänheten och experter deltar aktivt i processen. ECB-rådet fattar det slutliga beslutet om tema och utformning, medan startdatum för den nya serien eurosedlar beslutas längre fram.

text: 1.5 ECB analyserar dessutom nya typer av förfalskade eurosedlar vid sitt Centrum för analys av sedelförfalskningar (CAC) och använder kunskapen för att bistå brottsbekämpande myndigheter med rådgivning. CAC samordnar spridningen av alla kända tekniska och statistiska uppgifter om förfalskningar av euron till alla berörda parter.

text: 1.6 Förfalskare använder en rad olika typer av hård- och mjukvara för digital bildbearbetning samt även andra metoder. Som reaktion på detta stöder och använder Central Bank Counterfeit Deterrence Group, där ECB är medlem, teknik som bl.a. ska förhindra förfalskningar, t.ex. genom att den förhindrar att bilder av skyddade sedlar kan läsas eller reproduceras.

text: 1.7 ECB instämmer i att det krävs kontinuerlig vaksamhet för att motverka nya förfalskningshot. ECB välkomnar därför att Perikles V-programmet syftar till att motverka potentiella hot mot den digitala euron, om en sådan ges ut i framtiden, för att bevara eurovalutans integritet i alla dess former. På samma sätt välkomnar ECB att både de hot och de utredningsmöjligheter som artificiell intelligens medför beaktas i programmets mål. Åtgärder som berättigar till finansiering bör omfatta potentiell framtida utveckling inom dessa områden.

text: 2. Specifika kommentarer

text: 2.1 I förslaget till förordning bör titeln och

text: artikel 1

text: utökas med en hänvisning till andra potentiella hot för att täcka in senare utveckling, bland annat i samband med den framtida digitala euron, i linje med skäl 12 och artikel 2.2 i förslaget till förordning, liksom dess bilaga.

text: 2.2 Enligt artikel 7 i förslaget till förordning ska Perikles V-programmet genomföras i enlighet med Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509, genom direkt förvaltning eller genom indirekt förvaltning med de enheter som avses i

text: artikel 62.1 c i den förordningen

text: . Enligt motiveringen som åtföljer förslaget till förordning anses Perikles V-programmet komplettera och vara förenligt med initiativ som genomförs av ECB och Europol. Det finns därför ett fundamentalt behov av att säkerställa förenlighet och undvika onödiga överlappningar med relevanta åtgärder som andra behöriga enheter, framför allt ECB och Europol, vidtar i fråga om förfalskning av sedlar och mynt. När det vidtas åtgärder som berättigar till stöd från Perikles V-programmet bör kommissionen därför överväga ECB:s och Europols nuvarande och planerade verksamhet gällande hot mot den gemensamma valutan, t.ex. förfalskning och relaterade bedrägerier, inklusive tillverkning och distribution av förfalskade banksedlar. Detta är förenligt med

text: artikel 4.2 i förordning (EU) 2021/840

text: , som förslaget till förordning skulle upphäva. ECB uppmanar kommissionen att fullt ut utnyttja ECB:s erfarenhet av att anordna utbildningar och informera om eurosedlar, och att säkerställa att förslaget till förordning föreskriver att ECB fullt ut involveras i detta hänseende.

text: 2.3 Med avseende på det välfungerande samarbetet mellan aktörerna i Perikles V-programmet upprepar ECB sin ståndpunkt att det vore fördelaktigt om kommissionen samråder med och involverar ECB och Europol inför sina beslut om vilka åtgärder som ska finansieras genom Perikles V-programmet, framför allt genom att gemensamt granska olika initiativ. Detta skulle undvika eventuella överlappningar mellan Perikles V-programmet, andra relevanta program och ECB:s utbildningsverksamhet. Ett sådant samarbete skulle även underlätta tillämpningen av en gemensam strategi för att bekämpa förfalskning av euron och relaterade bedrägerier. Mot bakgrund av detta bör artikel 8.1 i förslaget till förordning ändras så att den stadgar att de viktigaste parterna som involveras, inklusive ECB och Europol, ska höras i förväg av kommissionen avseende åtgärder som ska vidtas. Kommissionen bör ge ECB tillräckligt med tid för att sätta sig in i dokumentationen avseende de åtgärder som ska vidtas i enlighet med artikel 8.1 i förslaget till förordning liksom punkterna 1 och 3 i dess bilaga.

text: 2.4 Artikel 4.2 i förslaget till förordning bör också ändras så att den stadgar att de viktigaste parterna som involveras, inklusive ECB och Europol, ska höras i förväg när kommissionen implementerar ytterligare resurser i enlighet med förordning (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509, genom direkt förvaltning eller genom indirekt förvaltning med de enheter som avses i

text: artikel 62.1 c i den förordningen

text: 2.5 ECB understryker vikten av att 1) regelbundet involveras i framtagandet av utvärderingsrapporterna under programmets gång för att spegla de åtgärder ECB vidtagit och dess aktiva roll i bekämpningen av penningförfalskningar och relaterade bedrägerier, 2) feedback från enheter som aktivt deltar i relevanta åtgärder tillsammans med kommissionen på ett lämpligt sätt inkluderas i utvärderingsrapporterna och meddelandena, samt att 3) ECB i framtiden regelbundet hålls informerad om programmet och 4) ECB hörs innan en eventuell delegerad akt antas för att utarbeta föreskrifter för övervakning och utvärdering av ramverket. I detta hänseende noteras att ECB enligt artikel 133 i fördraget ska höras innan man föreskriver nödvändiga åtgärder när det gäller användningen av euron som gemensam valuta. Denna skyldighet är inte begränsad till förslaget till förordning utan gäller för delegerade rättsakter som berör befogenhetsområden som avgränsas i lagstiftningsakterna. ECB hörs om förslaget till förordning i enlighet med artikel 133 i fördraget och bör följaktligen även höras innan man antar genomförandeåtgärder i delegerade rättsakter med avseende på att skydda euron mot förfalskning och relaterade bedrägerier, vilka är nödvändiga när det gäller användningen av euron som gemensam valuta.

text: 2.6 Vad gäller de åtgärder som avses i

text: artikel 8.5

text: och som ingår i punkterna 1 och 2 i bilagan till förslaget till förordning föreslår ECB slutligen att det ska inkluderas gemensamma åtgärder inriktade på tillverkning av förfalskade sedlar och mynt utanför euroområdet och distribution av dessa sedlar i euroområdet. Enligt motiveringen som åtföljer förslaget till förordning är det genomsnittliga antalet förfalskade eurosedlar som upptäcks per år visserligen fortfarande under kontroll, men det krävs fortsatt vaksamhet, vilket framgår av den ökade tillgången till förfalskade euro och säkerhetsdetaljer av hög kvalitet på internet/darknet, framväxten av sedlar med ändrad design och förekomsten av hotspots för förfalskning, t.ex. i Turkiet och Kina.

text: I de fall där ECB rekommenderar att förslaget till förordning ska ändras anges de specifika förslagen i ett separat tekniskt arbetsdokument som åtföljs av en förklaring. Det tekniska arbetsdokumentet finns på engelska i EUR-Lex.

text: Utfärdat i Frankfurt am Main den 7 november 2025.

text: Christine Lagarde

text: ECB:s ordförande

text: (EU) 2021/840

text: Europeiska unionens officiella tidning

text: III Förberedande akter

text: EUROPEISKA CENTRALBANKEN

text: Europeiska centralbanken