text: COM(2013) 266 final.

text: Se kapitel II i direktivförslaget.

text: Se kapitel III i direktivförslaget.

text: Se kapitel IV i direktivförslaget.

text: Se kapitlen V och VI i direktivförslaget.

text: Se punkt 2.4 i yttrande

text: , punkt 1.1 i yttrande

text: och punkt 3 i de allmänna kommentarerna i yttrande

text: . Samtliga ECB-yttranden offentliggörs på ECB:s webbplats http://www.ecb.europa.eu

text: Se punkt 11 i yttrande

text: Se

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 2007/64/EG av den 13 november 2007

text: om betaltjänster på den inre marknaden (EUT L 319, 5.12.2007, s. 1).

text: Se artikel 2 i direktivförslaget.

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning (EU) nr 260/2012 av den 14 mars 2012

text: om antagande av tekniska och affärsmässiga krav för betalningar och autogireringar i euro (EUT L 94, 30.3.2012, s. 22).

text: Se ändringsförslagen 1–3. Se även punkt 3.3 i yttrande

text: Se punkterna 4 och 5 i artikel 3.2 i direktivförslaget.

text: Se ändringsförslag 4.

text: Se artikel 15 i direktivförslaget.

text: Se ändringsförslag 5.

text: Se artikel 20.2 i direktivförslaget.

text: Se ändringsförslag 6.

text: Text markerad med fet stil anger ECB:s förslag till ny text. Genomstruken text anger de strykningar som ECB föreslår.

title: Europeiska centralbankens yttrande av den 19 november 2013 om förslaget till Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv om jämförbarhet för avgifter som avser betalkonto, byte av betalkonto och tillgång till betalkonto med grundläggande funktioner (CON/2013/77)

text: Inledning och rättslig grund

text: Den 24 september 2013 mottog Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) en begäran från Europeiska unionens råd om ett yttrande över ett förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv om jämförbarhet för avgifter som avser betalkonto, byte av betalkonto och tillgång till betalkonto med grundläggande funktioner (nedan kallat direktivförslaget).

text: ECB:s behörighet att avge ett yttrande grundas på artiklarna

text: och

text: i fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt eftersom direktivförslaget innehåller vissa bestämmelser som berör Europeiska centralbankssystemets uppgifter att främja ett väl fungerande betalningssystem och medverka ett smidigt genomförande av politik när det gäller det finansiella systemets stabilitet i enlighet med artikel 127.2 fjärde strecksatsen och artikel 127.5 i fördraget. I enlighet med artikel 17.5 första meningen i arbetsordningen för Europeiska centralbanken har detta yttrande därför antagits av ECB-rådet.

text: 1. Direktivförslaget – syfte och innehåll

text: Genom direktivförslaget inrättas en gemensam unionsram för skydd av konsumenternas rättigheter i samband med tillgång till och nyttjande av betalkonton. Ramen kommer att innehålla regler för följande områden: a) insyn i och jämförbarhet hos de avgifter som tas ut av konsumenter för betalkonton som de innehar i unionen, b) tjänster för byte av betalkonton som tillhandahålls av betaltjänstleverantörer till konsumenter, c) rätt för konsumenter lagligen bosatta i unionen att öppna och nyttja ett betalkonto med grundläggande funktioner, oberoende av nationalitet eller bosättningsstat, d) relaterade frågor som utnämning av behöriga myndigheter och deras arbetsuppgifter samt sanktioner för betaltjänstleverantörer om de inte efterlever bestämmelserna.

text: 2. Allmänna kommentarer

text: ECB stöder starkt direktivförslaget. Vid tidigare tillfällen har ECB gett sitt stöd åt införandet av särskilda insynskrav för finansiella transaktioner i kombination med effektiv övervakning av efterlevnaden av kraven i syfte att underlätta jämförelser av olika produkter och tjänster och därmed förbättra konkurrensen mellan de finansiella aktörerna. ECB har även verkat för införande av standarder som ett sätt att förenkla verkställandet av gränsöverförande betalningar. Avslutningsvis bör direktivförslaget bidra till att förenkla konsumenternas tillgång till betalkonton och till inrättandet av ett unionsomfattande betalningsområde, ett mål som ECB konsekvent har stött.

text: 3. Specifika kommentarer

text: 3.1 Definierade begrepp

text: De begrepp som definieras i direktivförslaget bör anpassas till begreppen i

text: (nedan kallat betaltjänstdirektivet) och

text: (nedan kallad Sepa-förordningen), om det inte finns objektiva skäl för att frångå dessa fastställda begrepp. Detta gäller särskilt definitionerna av begreppen varaktigt medium och autogirering. Genom användning av standardiserad terminologi som grundas på befintlig unionslagstiftning om betaltjänster blir unionens rättsakter mer konsekventa och enklare att förstå. För att skapa klarhet och konsekvens förefaller det också vara lämpligt att helt enkelt koppla samman definitionen av byte med de tjänster som får tillhandahållas enligt artikel 10 i direktivförslaget.

text: 3.2 Förteckning över tjänster som omfattas samt myndigheternas befogenheter att erhålla information

text: Även betaltjänster som motsvarar minst 80 % av de mest representativa betaltjänster som omfattas av en avgift på nationell nivå bär ingå i förteckningen över de grundläggande betaltjänster som omfattas av direktivförslaget. Mer långtgående villkor med krav på ett visst antal tjänster på förteckningen kan dock visa sig vara överdrivet. Dessutom bör det klargöras att de behöriga myndigheterna för att kunna sammanställa förteckningen över de mest representativa betaltjänsterna har rätt att erhålla information från betaltjänstleverantörer om lönsamheten för individuella tjänster som tillhandahålls i anslutning till betaltjänster. Det kan således bli nödvändigt att fastställa specifika rapporteringskrav för detta ändamål, samtidigt som betaltjänstleverantörernas rätt att skydda företagshemligheter från sina konkurrenter säkerställs.

text: 3.3 Rätt att öppna ett bankkonto med grundläggande funktioner – begränsningar av kontots valuta

text: Genom direktivförslaget införs en rättighet för konsumenter som är lagligen bosatta i unionen att öppna och nyttja ett bankkonto med grundläggande funktioner i alla medlemsstater. Ordalydelsen i artikel 15 i direktivförslaget kan emellertid tolkas som att detta innebär att betaltjänstleverantörer på begäran är tvungna att öppna ett betaltjänstkonto med grundläggande funktioner i vilken medlemsstats valuta som helst. Med tanke på att ett så allmänt krav kanske inte är ekonomiskt genomförbart är det tillräckligt att begränsa rätten att öppna och nyttja ett betalkonto till betalkonton i valutan för den medlemsstat där betaltjänstleverantören är etablerad.

text: 3.4 Gränsöverskridande samarbete

text: Slutligen bör det föreslagna kravet att de behöriga myndigheterna inom en medlemsstat ska samarbeta för att säkerställa att direktivförslaget följs effektivt utvidgas till att omfatta en skyldighet för medlemsstaternas behöriga myndigheter att föra ett gränsöverskridande samarbete. Syftet med detta är att se till att de nationella genomförandeåtgärderna och nationell praxis inte skiljer sig i en utsträckning som äventyrar direktivförslagets mål att tillnärma lagstiftning och åtgärder för att skapa en inre marknad för betaltjänster i unionen.

text: I de fall där ECB rekommenderar att direktivförslaget ska ändras anges de specifika förslagen i bilagan åtföljt av en förklaring.

text: BILAGA

text: Kommissionens förslag | ECB:s ändringsförslag

text: l) varaktigt medium varje medel som gör det möjligt för konsumenten eller betaltjänstleverantören att bevara information, som riktas till denne personligen, på ett sätt som är tillgängligt för användning i framtiden under en tidsperiod som är lämplig med hänsyn till vad som är avsikten med informationen och som tillåter oförändrad återgivning av den bevarade informationen, | l) varaktigt medium varje medel som gör det möjligt för konsumenten eller betaltjänstleverantören att bevara information, som riktas till denne personligen, på ett sätt som är tillgängligt för användning i framtiden under en tidsperiod som är lämplig med hänsyn till vad som är avsikten med informationen och som tillåter oförändrad återgivning av den bevarade informationen,

text: Förklaring Denna definition bör anpassas till definitionen i

text: artikel 4.25 i betaltjänstdirektivet

text: , som inte innehåller någon hänvisning till betaltjänstleverantörer. Enligt den definitionen avser varaktigt medium endast instrument som finns tillgängliga för betaltjänstanvändaren, dvs. konsumenten i detta fall.

text: m) byte överföring på en konsuments begäran av information från en betaltjänstleverantör till en annan om alla eller vissa stående betalningsuppdrag, autogireringar och återkommande inbetalningar som utförs för ett betalkonto, med eller utan överföring av det positiva saldot från ett betalkonto till ett annat, eller avslutande av det tidigare kontot, | m) byte en tjänst som utförs i enlighet med artikel 10 i detta direktivöverföring på en konsuments begäran av information från en betaltjänstleverantör till en annan om alla eller vissa stående betalningsuppdrag, autogireringar och återkommande inbetalningar som utförs för ett betalkonto, med eller utan överföring av det positiva saldot från ett betalkonto till ett annat, eller avslutande av det tidigare kontot,

text: Förklaring Den föreslagna definitionen av byte antyder att själva betalningskontot flyttas, vilket inte är korrekt. Om denna definition är nödvändig bör den endast innehålla en hänvisning till artikel 10 i stället för en förkortad beskrivning.

text: n) autogirering en betaltjänst för debitering av en betalares betalkonto, där en betalningstransaktion initieras av betalningsmottagaren med betalarens medgivande, | n) autogirering en nationell eller gränsöverskridande betaltjänst för debitering av en betalares betalkonto, där en betalningstransaktion initieras av betalningsmottagaren medpå grundval av betalarens medgivande,

text: Förklaring Detta begrepp bör anpassas till definitionerna av autogiro i betaltjänstdirektivet och Sepa-förordningen, där denna betalningsform definieras som antingen en nationell eller en gränsöverskridande betalningstjänst för debitering av en betalares betalkonto.

text: Artikel 3

text: Förteckning över de mest representativa betaltjänster som omfattas av en avgift på nationell nivå samt standardiserad terminologi 1. Medlemsstaterna ska se till att de behöriga myndigheter som avses i

text: artikel 20

text: upprättar en preliminär förteckning över minst 20 betaltjänster som motsvarar minst 80 % av de mest representativa betaltjänster som omfattas av en avgift på nationell nivå. Förteckningen ska innehålla standardiserade begrepp och definitioner för var och en av de identifierade tjänsterna. […] 3. Medlemsstaterna ska översända de preliminära förteckningar som avses i punkt 1 till kommissionen senast ett halvår efter ikraftträdandet av detta direktiv. 4. Kommissionen ska ges befogenhet att anta delegerade akter i enlighet med

text: artikel 24

text: för att på grundval av de preliminära förteckningar som har överlämnats enligt punkt 3 upprätta en standardiserad EU-terminologi för de betaltjänster som är gemensamma för åtminstone en majoritet av medlemsstaterna. Den standardiserade EU-terminologin ska omfatta gemensamma begrepp för och definitioner av de gemensamma tjänsterna. 5. När de delegerade akter som avses i punkt 4 har offentliggjorts i Europeiska unionens officiella tidning ska varje medlemsstat utan dröjsmål införliva den standardiserade EU-terminologi som har antagits enligt punkt 4 i den preliminära förteckning som avses i punkt 1 och offentliggöra den förteckningen. |

text: Artikel 3

text: artikel 20

text: upprättar en preliminär förteckning över minst 20 betaltjänster som motsvarar minst 80 % av de mest representativa betaltjänster som omfattas av en avgift på nationell nivå. Förteckningen ska innehålla standardiserade begrepp och definitioner för var och en av de identifierade tjänsterna. […] 3. De behöriga myndigheterna ska ha rätt att från betaltjänstleverantörerna erhålla nödvändig information för att fastställa de indikatorer som anges i leden 1–5 i punkt 2. När de gör detta ska de säkerställa skyddet av konfidentiell företagsinformation. 3.4. Medlemsstaterna ska översända de preliminära förteckningar som avses i punkt 1 till kommissionen senast ett halvår efter ikraftträdandet av detta direktiv. 4 5. Kommissionen ska ges befogenhet att anta delegerade akter i enlighet med

text: artikel 24

text: för att på grundval av de preliminära förteckningar som har överlämnats enligt punkt 3 4 upprätta en standardiserad EU-terminologi för de betaltjänster som är gemensamma för åtminstone en majoritet av medlemsstaterna. Den standardiserade EU-terminologin ska omfatta gemensamma begrepp för och definitioner av de gemensamma tjänsterna. 56. När de delegerade akter som avses i punkt 45 har offentliggjorts i Europeiska unionens officiella tidning ska varje medlemsstat utan dröjsmål införliva den standardiserade EU-terminologi som har antagits enligt punkt 45 i den preliminära förteckning som avses i punkt 1 och offentliggöra den förteckningen.

text: Förklaring Det bör klargöras hur de behöriga myndigheterna kan erhålla uppgifter som är relevanta för sammanställningen av förteckningen över de mest representativa betaltjänsterna, särskilt när det gäller de indikatorer som nämns i punkterna 4 och 5 i

text: artikel 3.2

text: . Eftersom vissa kategorier av sådana uppgifter vanligen utgör konfidentiell företagsinformation bör nödvändiga garantier för betaltjänstleverantörerna säkerställas.

text: 1. Medlemsstaterna ska se till att minst en betaltjänstleverantör inom deras territorium erbjuder konsumenterna ett betalkonto med grundläggande funktioner. Medlemsstaterna ska se att betalkonton med grundläggande funktioner inte enbart erbjuds av betaltjänstleverantörer som endast tillhandahåller kontot med banktjänster online. | 1. Medlemsstaterna ska se till att minst en betaltjänstleverantör etablerad inom deras territorium erbjuder konsumenterna ett betalkonto med grundläggande funktioner i den berörda medlemsstatens valuta. Medlemsstaterna ska se att betalkonton med grundläggande funktioner inte enbart erbjuds av betaltjänstleverantörer som endast tillhandahåller kontot med banktjänster online.

text: Förklaring Ett krav att betaltjänstleverantörerna på begäran ska öppna ett betalkonto i valutan för vilken medlemsstat som helst kanske inte är ekonomiskt genomförbart för dem. Det är tillräckligt att rätten till tillgång omfattar rätten att öppna och nyttja ett betalkonto med grundläggande funktioner i valutan för den medlemsstat där betaltjänstleverantören är etablerad.

text: 2. De myndigheter som avses i punkt 1 ska ha alla befogenheter som krävs för att fullgöra sina uppdrag. När mer än en behörig myndighet bemyndigas att säkerställa och övervaka att detta direktiv följs effektivt ska medlemsstaterna se till att de myndigheterna har ett nära samarbete, så att de kan fullgöra sina respektive uppdrag effektivt. | 2. De myndigheter som avses i punkt 1 ska ha alla befogenheter som krävs för att fullgöra sina uppdrag. När mer än en behörig myndighet bemyndigas att säkerställa och övervaka att detta direktiv följs effektivt ska medlemsstaterna se till att de myndigheterna har ett nära samarbete, så att de kan fullgöra sina respektive uppdrag effektivt.” De behöriga myndigheterna ska samarbeta med varandra enligt vad som anges i

text: artikel 24 i direktiv 2007/64/EG

text: Förklaring Enligt direktivförslagets mål att stärka den inre marknaden bör de nationella behöriga myndigheterna även vara skyldiga att föra ett gränsöverskridande samarbete inom unionen, vilket för närvarande krävs enligt betaltjänstdirektivet för att se till att skillnaderna mellan de nationella åtgärderna för att införliva direktivförslaget minskas.

type: vagledning

utgivare: ecb


text: Law 138(I)/2002. 2 OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 3 Law 66(I)/1997.

text: Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013

text: of October 15 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63).

text: All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 6 See paragraphs 2.3 and 2.4 of Opinion

publisher: Europeiska centralbanken

sprak: en

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 22 November 2013 on changes to decision-making powers at the Central Bank of Cyprus (CON/2013/78)

serie: con

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 22 November 2013 on changes to decision-making powers at the Central Bank of Cyprus (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

type: rubrik

text: On 30 September 2013, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the President of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Cyprus (hereinafter the ‘consulting authority’) for an opinion on a proposed amendment (hereinafter the ‘draft law’) to the Central Bank of Cyprus Laws of 2002 to 2013 (hereinafter the ‘Law on the CBC’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to the Central Bank of Cyprus (CBC). In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

type: stycke

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The draft law amends

text: Article 15

text: A of the Law on the CBC to extend the range of decisions that the Governor takes with the assent of the CBC’s Board of Directors by including those decisions the CBC is assigned to take pursuant to the Law on credit institutions . 1.2

text: Article 15

text: A of the Law on the CBC was originally introduced by Amending Law No 86(I)/2013 on 26 July 2013, and provided for decisions on the licencing of banks and on the exercise of banking business to be taken by the Governor with the assent of the Board of Directors. The same article was later amended by Amending Law No 103(I)/2013 on 9 September 2013, to provide that decisions on granting licences and on the exercise of business by credit institutions are to be taken by the Governor with the assent of the Board of Directors. 1.3 The Law on credit institutions sets out the CBC’s competence in relation to credit institutions operating in Cyprus and their officials. This competence covers a wide range of matters, inter alia, in relation to (a) granting and revoking licences to credit institutions; (b) providing cross-border

text: services; (c) foreign credit institutions setting up branches in Cyprus; and (d) Cypriot credit institutions setting up branches abroad.

text: 2. General observations

text: The ECB notes that there is an overlap within the proposed amendment, as the powers that are assigned to the CBC pursuant to the Law on credit institutions include decisions concerning licencing and the exercise of business by credit institutions. Accordingly, the consulting authority may wish to reconsider the wording of the proposed amendment.

text: 3. Decisions regarding licensing and supervision of credit institutions

text: 3.1 With regard to

text: Article 15

text: A of the Law on the CBC, according to which the Governor is required to obtain the Board of Director’s assent for decisions regarding the licencing and supervision of credit institutions, the ECB notes that, pursuant to

text: Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013

text: , the ECB has the exclusive competence to grant authorisations for taking up the business of a credit institution to be established in a participating Member State and to supervise the significant credit institutions in that participating Member State as of 4 November 2014. Therefore, the ECB understands that the Governor’s decisions regarding licencing of credit institutions, as well as the supervision of significant credit institutions, constitute decisions regarding the CBC’s contribution to these exclusive tasks of the ECB under

text: Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013

text: . The ECB is required to perform these tasks independently according to Article 130 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter the ‘Statute of the ESCB’). The NCBs’ Governors, in their capacity as members of the Governing Council, are therefore required to exercise their duties with regard to the ECB’s specific tasks concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions in full independence according to Article 130 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB. 3.2 This implies that, without prejudice to the mandate of the members of the ECB’s Supervisory Board, the NCBs’ Governors should be responsible for the NCBs’ contribution to the specific tasks conferred on the ECB by

text: Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013

text: . Any national law provisions assigning duties with regard to the ECB’s specific tasks concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions to other members of an NCB’s board who do not enjoy the same level of independence as the Governor for the performance of such duties, or requiring the approval of an NCB’s board for decisions of the NCB’s Governor in relation to such duties, raise concerns about the Governor’s independence being hindered in the performance of functions related to those tasks.

text: Article 15

text: A of the Law on the CBC should be amended to address these concerns.

text: 4. CBC Governance

text: The ECB refers to its Opinion

text: on changes to the governance of the CBC , which concerns previous amendments to the Law on the CBC. A number of observations made in that Opinion were not taken into account and the ECB invites the relevant Cypriot authorities to address them in this draft law. In Opinion

text: , the ECB noted that unless an NCB’s executive directors and board members are subject to the same legal requirements as that NCB’s Governor, any provisions assigning Eurosystemrelated tasks (such as monetary policy, payment systems, statistics) to the executive directors and other members of the CBC’s Board, or requiring the approval of the CBC’s Board for the Governor’s decisions, raise concerns about the Governor’s ability to independently carry out the ESCB-related tasks assigned to the Governor. This would not be compatible with Article 130 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB. From this perspective, as noted in Opinion

text: , the nature of the executive directors’ powers as well as the interplay between the powers granted to the two executive directors and the governance structure’s compliance with the requirement of central bank independence still need to be clarified .

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 22 November 2013.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 2531/98 of 23 November 1998

text: concerning the application of minimum reserves by the European Central Bank (OJ L 318, 27.11.1998, p. 1). 3 Regulation ECB/2003/9 of 12 September 2003 on the application of minimum reserves (OJ L 250, 2.10.2003, p. 10). 4 Regulation ECB/2008/32 of 19 December 2008 concerning the balance sheet of the monetary financial institutions sector (OJ L 15, 20.1.2009, p. 14).

text: See paragraph 2 of

text: and paragraph 14 of Opinion

text: , in which the ECB stressed that Lithuanian credit unions fall under the definition of a credit institution within the meaning of the Consolidated Banking Directive, and will therefore be subject to the Eurosystem reserve requirements when Lithuania adopts the euro. All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: See

text: See Explanatory memorandum to the draft resolution.

text: Also see paragraph 1.1 of

text: Also see paragraph 3 of

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 22 November 2013 on the reserve requirements for credit institutions (CON/2013/79)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 22 November 2013 on the reserve requirements for credit institutions (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 11 October 2013, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from Lietuvos bankas for an opinion on a draft resolution amending the Rules on reserve requirements for credit institutions (hereinafter the ‘draft resolution’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and

text: Article 2(2) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft resolution relates to instruments concerning monetary policy of a non-euro area Member State. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft resolution

text: 1.1 The draft resolution aims to: (a) extend the scope of reserve requirements by making credit unions subject to those requirements; (b) align the Lithuanian minimum reserves regime with Eurosystem standards; (c) change the procedure of calculating and approving reserve requirements, and (d) make some technical amendments to the Rules on reserve requirements in order to take into account the special characteristics of credit unions. 1.2 The draft resolution is to apply from 1 April 2014. As regards credit unions, the reserve requirements are to apply to credit unions from the maintenance period starting after 1 January 2015.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 Member States that have not adopted the euro retain their monetary policy powers, including in connection with their minimum reserves frameworks. Nevertheless, it is beneficial for them to achieve consistency with the Eurosystem minimum reserves framework so that their credit institutions become acquainted with the reserve requirements that will apply to them following the adoption of the euro by the Member State where they are established. The legal framework for the

text: Eurosystem’s minimum reserve system consists of: (a) Article 19 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank; (b) Council Regulation (EC) 2 3 No 2531/98 ; (c) Regulation ECB/2003/9 ; and (d) in relation to the definition and calculation of the reserve base, Regulation ECB/2008/32 .

text: Article 11

text: and Annex III to Regulation ECB/2008/32 require that each credit institution uses the statistical information reported by credit institutions under this Regulation for minimum reserve purposes. 2.2 The ECB welcomes the changes to Lithuanian law that will be brought about under the draft resolution as part of the preparations for the introduction of the euro in Lithuania. Within the framework of monetary policy, which remains a competence of Lietuvos bankas until the introduction of the euro, the draft resolution will further harmonise the current Lithuanian minimum reserve system with the Eurosystem standards that will apply after the introduction of the euro.

text: 3. Institutions subject to reserve requirements

text: The ECB welcomes the initiative to include Lithuanian credit unions under the scope of the Lithuanian minimum reserves regime. As the ECB has pointed out in several earlier opinions, Lithuanian credit unions should also be subject to reserve requirements .

text: 4. Reserve base

text: 4.1 The ECB understands that the regulatory and supervisory framework for credit unions is currently being revised in Lithuania . In the future, there will be a differentiation between a credit union’s different share contributions. Primary share contributions will carry both voting and dividend rights, with a number of restrictions on their redemption. Supplementary share contributions will carry the right to receive dividends, but no voting rights, and it will be possible to redeem them according to the rules set by the credit union itself . 4.2 According to Article 3(1) of Regulation ECB/2003/9, the liabilities resulting from the acceptance of funds that comprise an institution’s reserve base, i.e. deposits and debt securities issued, are defined within the ECB’s reporting framework for money and banking statistics. According to Regulation ECB/2008/32, the definition of ‘deposits’ includes ‘shares issued by monetary financial institutions (MFIs)’. Such shares are classified as deposits rather than capital

text: and reserves if: (a) there is a debtor-creditor economic relationship between the issuing MFI and the holder (regardless of any property rights in these shares); and (b) the shares can be converted into currency or redeemed without significant restrictions or penalties. A notice period is not considered to be a significant restriction. In addition, such shares must comply with the following conditions. First, the issuing MFI has no unconditional right to refuse redemption of its shares. Second, the shares are ‘value certain’, i.e. under normal circumstances they will be paid out at their nominal value in the event of redemption. Third, in the event of the MFI’s insolvency, the holders of its shares are not legally subject to either: (a) the obligation to cover outstanding liabilities in addition to the nominal value of the shares, i.e. the shareholders’ participation in the subscribed capital, or (b) any other onerous supplementary obligations. The subordination of shares to any other instrument issued by the MFI does not qualify as an onerous supplementary obligation. 4.3 If, according to the future regulatory framework for credit unions in Lithuania, the supplementary share contributions will comply with the above-mentioned criteria, such share contributions are to be considered as deposits and, accordingly, included in an institution’s reserve base for the purpose of calculating minimum reserves. 4.4 On the basis of the information provided in the consultation letter, the ECB also understands that, according to the future regulatory framework for credit unions in Lithuania, primary share contributions will not fulfil the criteria of ‘shares issued by MFIs’. Therefore, primary share contributions are not to be considered as deposits and should not be included in an institution’s reserve base.

text: 5. Reserve ratios

text: 5.1 The ECB notes that a reserve ratio of 3 % is applied to most of the liabilities included in the reserve base, while the Eurosystem applies 1 %. 5.2 Similar to the Eurosystem standards: (a) deposits with an agreed maturity period of over two years; (b) deposits redeemable at a notice period of over two years; (c) debt securities issued with an original maturity of over two years; and (d) repurchase agreements continue to be subject to a reserve ratio of 0 % under the Lithuanian minimum reserves regime.

text: 6. Remuneration

text: The ECB notes that under the Lithuanian minimum reserves regime, the holdings of required reserves are remunerated not by reference to the ECB rate for the main refinancing operations, as stipulated in Article 8 of Regulation ECB/2003/9, but rather by reference to the ECB deposit facility rate.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 22 November 2013 [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: Published in Monitorul Oficial al României, Part One, No 1027, 27.12.2006. 2 Republished in Monitorul Oficial al României, Part One, No 587, 19.8.2010. 3 OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: See ECB Opinion

text: , explanation to Amendment 14. All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 25 November 2013 on stabilisation measures and the deposit guarantee fund (CON/2013/80)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 25 November 2013 on stabilisation measures and the deposit guarantee fund (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 29 October 2013, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from Banca Naţională a României (BNR) for an opinion on a draft government emergency ordinance amending and supplementing Government Emergency Ordinance No 99/2006 on credit institutions and capital adequacy (GEO No 99/2006) and Government Ordinance No 39/1996 on the setting up and operation of the deposit guarantee fund in the banking system (GO No 39/1996) (hereinafter the ‘draft ordinance’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third, fifth and sixth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft ordinance relates to BNR, to payments and settlement systems and to rules applicable to the financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft ordinance

text: The purpose of the draft ordinance is to enhance the clarity and legal certainty of the framework on stabilisation measures that BNR can adopt. The draft ordinance amends GEO No 99/2006 and GO No 39/1996 with regard to: (a) the separation of tasks between BNR and the Deposit Guarantee Fund; (b) issues related to the sources, levels and uses of financing of stabilisation measures; (c) conditions for the establishment, operation and closure of a bridge bank; and (d) the settlement finality regime in case of enforcement procedures against any payment system participants.

text: 2. Observations

text: The ECB notes that the draft ordinance enhances the clarity and legal certainty of the framework on stabilisation measures in Romanian legislation. With regard to the proposed amendment concerning the bridge bank’s access to payment and settlement systems and other financial market infrastructures, the ECB notes that it does not address the issue of the possible non-compliance of the bridge bank with the rules of the relevant system or infrastructure. System operators should only be obliged to allow the bridge bank to access the systems or infrastructures that they operate and to continue the operations which are subject to the contractual and operational obligations of the transferor credit institution, provided the bridge bank complies with the rules of the system or infrastructure, including criteria for membership or participation, payment and delivery obligations, and provision of collateral . If the bridge bank does not comply with all of the rules prior to the time of transfer, there may exceptionally be a need for the resolution authority to lay down a reasonably short period of time during which the bridge bank may exercise rights arising from participation in the system or infrastructure on condition that it makes the necessary adjustments in order to become compliant with the relevant rules by the end of that period.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 25 November 2013.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: See, inter alia, the ECB’s Convergence Report of June 2013, p. 30, paragraph 3 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: .All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: See paragraph 3.2.3 of Opinion

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 26 November 2013 on the licensing, regulation and supervision of cooperative credit institutions (CON/2013/81)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 26 November 2013 on the licensing, regulation and supervision of cooperative credit institutions (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 3 September 2013, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Minister for Finance of the Republic of Cyprus for an opinion on a series of proposed amendments to Cypriot banking legislation (hereinafter the ‘amending laws’). The amending laws were adopted by the House of Representatives on 5 September 2013 and published in the Official Gazette on 9 September 2013. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third and sixth indents of

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the amending laws relate to rules applicable to the Central Bank of Cyprus (CBC) and to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the amending laws

text: 1.1 General The amendments follow the need to implement the Memorandum of Understanding between the Republic of Cyprus and the European Stability Mechanism, and specifically to bring the licensing, regulation and supervision of cooperative credit institutions (CCIs) into line with the regime for commercial banks by integrating these functions into the CBC. The amending laws are also intended to strengthen the corporate governance of commercial banks and CCIs. Additionally, the amending laws put the Deposit Protection Fund (DPF) for CCIs under the CBC’s general responsibility and specifically under the administration of the Deposit Protection and Resolution of Credit and Other Institutions Scheme. The amending laws amend the following legislative and regulatory instruments: 1.2 The Business of Credit Institutions Laws of 1997 to (No. 3) 2013 Several new provisions refer to the CBC’s licencing, regulation and supervision of CCIs. All legislative provisions currently applicable to banks are made applicable to authorised credit

text: institutions (ACIs), which are defined to include CCIs. CCIs are required to obtain a licence from the CBC before accepting deposits from the public and lending funds in the Republic of Cyprus or abroad. A CCI’s affiliation to the Cooperative Central Bank (CCB), which is the CCI’s central institute, requires the CBC’s prior approval under conditions that are set by the CBC. Additionally, the solvency and liquidity of the CCB and the CCIs are subject to the CBC’s supervision, and CCIs are subject to the same liquidation and winding up rules applicable to commercial banks. CCIs are prohibited from providing cross-border services prior to 31 March 2014. Additionally, existing regulations, directives and other administrative acts also apply to and shall be implemented by CCIs. Several amendments pertain to the corporate governance of commercial banks and CCIs. ACIs are prohibited from having any credit exposure to independent members of their management bodies; credit exposure to non-independent members of ACIs’ management bodies is permitted under certain conditions. The level of credit facilities available to all non-independent members of ACIs’ management bodies is reduced to 10% of own funds and the level of unsecured credit facilities to 1% of own funds. Credit facilities available to any non-independent member of the ACIs’ management bodies are limited to EUR 500 000, whereas independent members are not allowed to obtain any credit facilities. An ACI’s credit exposure to shareholders who directly or indirectly hold more than 10% of their share capital is limited to 20% of own funds, and to 2% if the credit exposure is not secured with tangible security. ACIs are obliged to terminate the appointment of members of a management body whose facilities are in arrears, and the restrictions imposed in relation to members of a management body extend to their related persons, including their spouses and dependents. ACIs are prohibited from acquiring or dealing in their own shares for their own account without the CBC’s prior approval. They are also prohibited from financially assisting in the acquisition of their own shares, or shares of their holding or subsidiary companies. 1.3 The Laws on Cooperative Societies of 1985 to (No. 3) of 2013 Several provisions refer to the transfer of the licensing, regulatory and supervisory powers over CCIs from the Cooperative Societies Authority to the CBC. Basic terms have been introduced which will govern CCIs’ ordinary shares so they are classified as Common Equity Tier-1 capital in accordance with

text: Regulation (EU) 575/2013

text: of the European Parliament and the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms . The external audit of CCIs’ accounts whose size exceeds the limit set by the CBC will be performed by independent auditors instead of the Cooperative Societies Audit Service. The independent auditors will be appointed by a CCI’s general assembly and will be approved by the CBC.

text: Arrangements are introduced for the recapitalisation of the CCB and CCIs through the acquisition of capital from the Republic of Cyprus, and CCIs are prohibited from lending to individuals who are not their members. The liquidation of CCIs will be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the Business of Credit Institutions Laws and the Companies Law, and provisions have been introduced to facilitate CCI mergers. The amendments also include provisions under which the Law on the Financial Ombudsman is applied to the arbitration framework of CCIs. In addition, the CBC Code of Conduct in relation to the management of loans or other credit facilities in arrears is also applied to CCIs. The Deposit Protection Scheme for CCIs is under the CBC’s responsibility and will be governed by the provisions of the Law on the Deposit Protection and Resolution of Credit and Other Institutions Scheme. 1.4 The Laws on the Central Bank of Cyprus of 2002 to 2013 Amendments have been introduced to generally reflect that the supervision of CCIs is brought within the CBC’s regulatory and supervisory competence, and restrictions have been imposed on CBC officers from holding office in ACIs or from participating in the capital of ACIs, without first obtaining approval from the CBC’s Board. 1.5 The Law on the Deposit Protection and Resolution of Credit and Other Institutions Scheme The main purpose of the amendments is to implement the transfer of the DPF of CCIs under the administration of the Management Committee of the Deposit Protection and Resolution of Credit and Other Institutions Scheme.

text: 2. Appropriate time to consult the ECB

text: The consulting authority sent the request for an opinion only two days before the amending laws were adopted by parliament. The consultation request did not make any reference to such timetable and did not indicate such a deadline for preparing the opinion. Pursuant to

text: Article 4 of Decision 98/415/EC

text: , the ECB must be consulted at an appropriate stage in the legislative process. This implies that the consultation should take place at a point in the legislative process that allows the ECB sufficient time to examine the draft legislative provisions and adopt its opinion, and the national authorities to take into account the ECB’s views in accordance with Decision

text: . Therefore, the ECB would appreciate the consulting authority honouring its obligation to consult the ECB in good time in future.

text: 3. Principle of central bank independence

text: 3.1 The principle of central bank independence requires Member States to ensure that national central banks (NCBs) have sufficient financial resources to perform European System of Central Banks or

text: Eurosystem-related tasks as well as their own national tasks . Pursuant to the Laws on Cooperative Societies of 1985 to (No. 3) of 2013, the powers of licencing, regulation, supervision and imposition of supervisory measures over CCIs are transferred from the Cooperative Societies Authority to the CBC. The transfer of these tasks to the CBC should not affect the CBC’s ability to carry out its Eurosystem-related tasks from an operational and financial point of view. In this respect, the new CBC functions should be performed in a manner that is fully compatible with the CBC’s institutional and financial independence and consequently should not impede the proper performance of its Eurosystem-related tasks. The CBC should be able to collect fees for the performance of its new supervisory tasks that began on 9 September 2013. In this respect, the ECB welcomes that pursuant to Section 26(3) of the Business of Credit Institutions Laws, the CBC has the power to demand that authorised credit institutions, including CCIs, pay to it the costs relating to their supervision, thereby safeguarding its financial independence. The ECB understands that the CBC has put in place a regulatory framework implementing Section 26(3) of the Business of Credit Institutions Laws under which the supervised entities pay supervisory fees. 3.3 The ECB understands that the transfer of jurisdiction and power from the Cooperative Societies Authority to the CBC as regards CCIs provided by the Laws on Cooperative Societies of 1985 to (No. 3) of 2013 does not involve any transfer of liabilities. Provisions under which an NCB becomes the legal successor to any liabilities of a specific supervisory authority may raise issues in regard to financial independence and compliance with the prohibition of monetary financing laid down in Article 123(1) of the Treaty , read in conjunction with

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 of 13 December 1993

text: specifying definitions for the application of the prohibitions referred to in Articles

text: and

text: b (1) of the Treaty .

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 26 November 2013.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 338). 3

text: Regulation (EU) No 575/2013

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 1).

text: Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013

text: conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63). 5 G-SII stands for global systemically important institutions. 6 O-SII stands for other systemically important institutions. 7

text: Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority (OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 12).

text: Articles

text: and

text: of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013. 9 Available on the EBA’s website at www.eba.europa.eu. 10 Recommendation

text: of the European Systemic Risk Board of 22 December 2011 on the macro-prudential mandate of national authorities(OJ C 41, 14.2.2012, p.1). 11 See paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 on European Union macro-prudential oversight of the financial system and establishing a European Systemic Risk Board (OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 1).

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 2 December 2013 on the prudential supervision of credit institutions and on macro-prudential oversight (CON/2013/82)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 2 December 2013 on the prudential supervision of credit institutions and on macro-prudential oversight (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 11 October 2013, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Finnish Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft law amending the Law on credit institutions and certain other related laws (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third, fifth and sixth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to Suomen Pankki, payment and settlement systems and rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The draft law aims to implement Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council (hereinafter the ‘Capital Requirements Directive’) into Finnish law, as well as effecting changes and clarifications to Finnish law made necessary by

text: Regulation (EU) No 575/2013

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council . The draft law proposes replacing the Law on credit institutions with a new law under the same name and amending its content with regard to, inter alia, capital buffers, risk management, corporate governance and administrative sanctions, as required by the Capital Requirements Directive. It also proposes amendments to several related laws, such as the Law on the Financial Supervisory Authority and the Law on investment services. 1.2 The draft law further aims to clarify that the Financial Supervisory Authority (FSA) would only be responsible for those statutory tasks that have not been conferred on the ECB under Council

text: Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013

text: (hereinafter the ‘Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) Regulation’) . 1.3 The draft law also assigns the task of macro-prudential oversight of the financial system to the FSA. The FSA’s Board will make decisions concerning the institution-specific countercyclical buffer, minimum risk weights and loss given default (LGD) floors on exposures secured by mortgages, as well as concerning the classification of credit institutions for the purposes of the G- 5 6 SII and O-SII buffers. 1.4 The draft law would slightly amend the rules on information exchange contained in Section 26(4) of the Law on Suomen Pankki. Other confidentiality provisions notwithstanding, Suomen Pankki would be obliged to immediately notify various other authorities, such as the FSA, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, any authorities responsible for the smooth functioning of the financial markets of other European Economic Area Member States, the European Supervisory Authorities and the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) of emergency situations referred to in

text: Article 18 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 The proposed changes relate largely to implementation of the Capital Requirements Directive. It is important that the transposition and application into national law of the Capital Requirements Directive’s micro- and macro-prudential tools and the requirements that fall under the remit of the SSM Regulation are implemented precisely. This will also increase the consistency in the application of these tools and processes across all participating Member States, thereby helping to ensure a level playing field and lowering the risk of regulatory arbitrage.

text: 3. Implementation of the Capital Requirements Directive

text: 3.1 The ECB notes that the draft law proposes implementing the Capital Requirements Directive into Finnish law in accordance with the minimum requirements of that Directive. The capital conservation buffer, which is referred to in the draft law as ‘fixed additional own funds’, would be 2.5 % according to Section 3 of Chapter 10 of the draft law. The institutionspecific countercyclical buffer, which is referred to in the draft law as ‘variable additional own funds’, would be determined by the FSA’s Board, in accordance with the criteria in Section 5 of Chapter 10 of the same law.

text: 3.2 The draft law contains provisions relating to four macro-prudential tools, namely the countercyclical capital buffer, minimum risk weights and LGD floors on exposures secured by mortgages , the G-SII buffer and the O-SII buffer. However, it does not contain provisions on the systemic risk buffer. The ECB acknowledges that the systemic risk buffer is optional and understands that the decision not to implement the systemic risk buffer into Finnish law is based on an analysis of the current state of the Finnish financial sector and the possible consequences for the real economy of its activation over the course of the current economic cycle. The systemic risk buffer, if implemented in national law, would fall under the scope of Article 5 of the SSM Regulation as one of the capital buffers provided for by relevant Union law. Due to the importance of both the ECB and national competent authorities or designated authorities having the broadest possible range of macro-prudential tools at their disposal, the ECB would welcome the implementation of a systemic risk buffer in order to ensure consistency of the available macroprudential tools and lowering the risk of regulatory arbitrage. 3.3 The draft law should at all times be compatible with the guidelines of the European Banking Authority (EBA) on the criteria, e.g. size for identifying O-SIIs. At the same time, from a financial stability and level playing field perspective, this will ensure that similar criteria apply across all Union Member States in the identification of G-SIIs and O-SIIs.

text: 4. Macro-prudential oversight

text: 4.1 The draft law proposes assigning the task of macro-prudential oversight to the FSA. Decisions on the institution-specific countercyclical buffer will be made by the FSA’s Board. The Board is composed of five members, three of whom are appointed on the basis of proposals by Suomen Pankki, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, respectively. The FSA will be required to prepare decisions relating to the institution-specific countercyclical buffer in cooperation with Suomen Pankki and the Ministry of Finance, and also to consult them and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health before any decision-making. 4.2 The ECB supports the design of effective macro-prudential policy frameworks within Member States, in line with the guiding principles set out in Recommendation

text: of the European Systemic Risk Board . Moreover, the ECB considers that the ECB and the national central banks should play a leading role in macro-prudential oversight, given their expertise and existing responsibilities in the area of financial stability .

text: 4.3 This opinion is without prejudice to the conclusions of the ESRB’s follow-up assessment, which will be prepared pursuant to

text: Article 17 of Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council . This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 02 December 2013. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 5 December 2013 on the Financial Supervisory Authority’s governance (CON/2013/83)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 5 December 2013 on the Financial Supervisory Authority’s governance (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 6 November 2013, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Danish Financial Supervisory Authority (FSA) (Finanstilsynet) for an opinion on a draft law amending the Law on financial business, the Law on securities trading, the Law on mortgage credit loans and mortgage credit bonds, the Law on managers of alternative investment funds and various other laws (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the sixth indent of

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The draft law addresses the FSA’s governance and management structure by establishing a governing board tasked with providing technical, organisational and managerial assistance to the FSA’s management and with taking supervisory decisions . The Financial Council, which is the FSA’s current decision-making body, will be dissolved once this governing board has been established. According to the draft law, the purpose of the amendment is to provide an efficient organisational set-up for the FSA to strengthen its supervisory powers .

text: 1 The draft law implements the requirements with regard to liquidity coverage, capital buffers and systemically important financial institutions in Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 338) and contains the amendments made necessary by

text: Regulation (EU) No 575/2013

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 1).

text: 2 OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: 4 See Section 2.4 of the explanatory memorandum to the draft law. 1.2 In accordance with the draft law, the FSA will be managed by the governing board and a managing director who will between them have legal, economic and financial expertise. The governing board will be responsible for the following tasks: (a) approving the organisation of supervisory activities; (b) laying down the strategic targets for the FSA’s supervisory activities; (c) approving the FSA’s annual report; (d) deciding on supervisory matters of a fundamental nature and those having significant consequences; (e) deciding to transfer cases for criminal investigation; and (f) approving executive orders and guidelines in areas where the FSA is authorised to issue regulations . The governing board may delegate some of its powers to the FSA’s managing director by issuing an instruction . 1.3 The Minister for Business and Growth will appoint seven members of the governing board: three with an academic background in law, economics or finance; two with management experience in the financial sector; one with management experience in the general business community; and one member from Danmarks Nationalbank. The Minister for Business and Growth will appoint a chairperson and a deputy chairperson from among the board members . A representative from the Ministry of Business and Growth will hold a seat as an observer on the board. The governing board will adopt decisions based on a simple majority voting procedure. In the event of an equal number of votes, the chairperson will cast the deciding vote . 1.4 Furthermore, a panel of experts will be appointed. They will between them possess broad technical knowledge of the financial sector, e.g. banking business, mortgage-credit business, insurance and pension business, securities trading, stockbroking business, etc., as well as of financial consumerrelated matters. As required, the governing board may request assistance from such panel in conjunction with the discussion of specific supervisory matters .

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 The ECB welcomes the establishment of the governing board, which should provide an efficient organisational set-up for the FSA in order to strengthen its supervisory powers. Such a governing board will ensure the FSA’s operational independence from political authorities , which is in line with essential and internationally recognised standards for financial market supervision .

text: 11 See Principle 2 of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, available on the Bank for International Settlements’ website at www.bis.org. 2.2 With regard to the composition of the governing board, the ECB welcomes the fact that Danmarks Nationalbank will provide one member of the governing board , which is in line with the current practice for nominating Financial Council members. 2.3 Finally, the minimum term of office for governing board members is set at two years. Currently, Financial Council board members serve a four-year term. For the sake of continuity and stability, the ECB suggests considering a longer duration for such term of office, in line with international practice, with a possible limitation on the number of reappointments. This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 5 December 2013. [signed] The President of the ECB Mario DRAGHI

text: 12 The existing legislation provides that Danmarks Nationalbank may nominate a member of the Financial Council, see the current Section 345(1), point 1 of the Law on financial business.


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: See Opinions CON/98/12, CON/98/35 and CON/99/20. All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: See footnote 1.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 5 December 2013 on means of payment and payment systems (CON/2013/84)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 5 December 2013 on means of payment and payment systems (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 24 October 2013, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the French Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance for an opinion on draft amendments to the Monetary and Financial Code (COMOFI) regarding means of payment and payment systems (hereinafter the ‘draft provisions’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the second, third and fifth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to means of payment, the Banque de France and payment systems. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft provisions

text: 1.1 The main purpose of the draft provisions is to make it possible for the Banque de France to use third parties, e.g. auditing bodies, external auditors, experts registered on a list of judicial experts, or competent persons or authorities, to carry out the checks necessary for the performance of some of the Banque de France’s tasks, in accordance with the conditions laid down by a decree of the Conseil d’État. Such third parties may receive remuneration from the Banque de France. 1.2 First, one provision will be inserted in Article L.141-4 of COMOFI relating to the Banque de France’s task pertaining to the oversight of payment systems, and its task of maintaining the security of clearing houses, the means of payment and the systems used to clear, settle and deliver financial instruments. These tasks are referred to in COMOFI as tasks related to the European System of Central Banks (ESCB).

text: 1.3 Second, another similar provision will be inserted in Article L.525-4 of COMOFI, which relates to special electronic payment vouchers that are only to be used for purchasing a limited and defined number of categories of goods or services or to be used within a limited network of providers, and that are not considered electronic money. The Banque de France ensures the security of such special electronic payment vouchers.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 Legal basis for the Eurosystem’s oversight function concerning clearing and payment systems 2.1.1 Under the fourth indent of Article 127(2) of the Treaty and the fourth indent of

text: Article 3.1

text: and Article 22 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter the ‘Statute of the ESCB’), the Eurosystem has the task of promoting the smooth operation of payment systems and is responsible for the oversight of clearing and payment systems. The aims of such oversight are to maintain systemic stability, promote efficiency and safeguard the transmission channel for monetary policy. 2.1.2 In general, within the Eurosystem, oversight activities are performed by the national central banks (NCBs), in line with the Governing Council’s common oversight policy. This prohibits interference with the Eurosystem’s oversight role by any Union or national body other than central banks acting within the framework of the Eurosystem. 2.2 Limits on and conditions for entrusting certain activities related to Eurosystem tasks to third

text: parties

text: 2.2.1 As noted in previous ECB opinions , the ECB emphasises the general principle that the tasks assigned to the Eurosystem by the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB have to be fulfilled exclusively by the ECB and the NCBs. It is the NCBs that are responsible for fulfilling the obligations arising from the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB or from guidelines and instructions issued by the ECB. Member States cannot, therefore, entitle their NCBs to delegate competencies in Eurosystem-related tasks to third parties. An entity other than an NCB, even if entirely controlled by it, could only be entrusted with the performance of ancillary and preparatory activities related to Eurosystem tasks of the NCBs, whilst the legal responsibility for the implementation of ECB legal instruments should be retained at the NCB . 2.2.2 The tasks that have been assigned by the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB to the Eurosystem central banks and require the exercise of discretionary powers, including taking Eurosystem policy decisions, and the exercise of public authority, cannot be delegated. Furthermore, activities that are directly related to the execution of core tasks, as well as any critical functions related to Eurosystem tasks, must not be delegated.

text: 2.2.3 Third parties could be entrusted by an NCB with the conduct of activities that offer limited room for discretion, provided that the activities are of an ancillary and preparatory nature, the assessment of any discretionary elements remains with the commissioning NCB, and certain additional conditions are fulfilled. 2.2.4 The key criteria developed from the principles of Union law, the case-law of the European courts and previous ECB opinions in assessing whether activities of a ancillary and preparatory nature can be entrusted by an NCB to third parties are the following: (a) the activities entrusted to third parties must relate to the pure implementation of public tasks, in such a way that they are ancillary or preparatory in nature, and must not confer any decision-making power (discretion) to the third party/external service provider; (b) legal responsibility for the public task must remain with the NCB; (c) the entrusting of activities to third parties by the NCB must not jeopardise the application of any relevant ECB legal instruments or policies and the third party/external service provider must implement equivalent legal instruments and policies to those the NCB must fulfil; (d) the possibility of entrusting such activities to third parties must be provided for in law, or at least not specifically prohibited by the law; (e) the entrusting of activities to third parties must not prevent the exercise of supervisory and oversight functions by the NCB over those activities and must not result in depriving the NCB of the necessary systems and controls to manage the risks it faces; (f) the NCB must have direct access to the relevant information of those activities; (g) the NCB must evaluate the quality of the services provided and retain the necessary expertise and resources to do so; (h) appropriate measures for the management and avoidance of conflicts of interest pertaining to the NCB and the third party to which the activity was entrusted must be put in place by the NCB; (i) the NCB must take appropriate measures to ensure that the third party/external service provider complies with the applicable confidentiality regime, including any ESCB confidentiality rules and minimum standards, and the service provider must protect any confidential information relating to the NCB.

text: 3. Specific observations

text: 3.1 The draft provisions refer to a decree of the Conseil d’État intended to lay down the conditions for recourse to third parties by the Banque de France. In this respect, the provision to be introduced in Article L.141-4 of COMOFI should be distinguished from the one to be inserted in Article L.525-4 of COMOFI. 3.2 As regards the provision to be introduced in Article L.141-4 of COMOFI, it is not clear what kinds of activities the Banque de France may entrust to third parties and whether the Banque de France remains responsible for the task in question. Since the tasks conferred upon the Banque de France in Article L.141-4 of COMOFI are Eurosystem tasks, if the Banque de France uses third parties in relation to them, this should only take place in relation to activities of an ancillary and preparatory nature that meet all of the conditions laid down above.

text: 3.3 Special electronic payment vouchers, which the Banque de France oversees pursuant to Article L.525-4 of COMOFI, are not considered to be part of the Eurosystem’s tasks. Therefore, the entrusting to third parties of activities related to special electronic payment vouchers is subject to the conditions stipulated under French law. This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 5 December 2013. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: See the ECB’s Convergence Report, of 2012, p. 242.

text: Article 2 of the draft amendments to the Law on Lietuvos bankas.

text: See paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: ; paragraph 4.3.1 of Opinion

text: ; and paragraph 3.4.2. of Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: See the ECB’s Convergence Report, 2012, p. 242.

text: Law amending Articles

text: , titles of fourth and fifth sections, repealing Articles

text: and supplementing the Annex to the Law on Lietuvos bankas. Valstybės žinios, 29-04-2006, No 48–1699. Pursuant to Article 33 of this Law, it will come into force on the date on which the Council of the European Union abrogates the derogation of Lithuania in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 140(2) of the Treaty.

text: See ECB’s Convergence Report, 2012, p. 242.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 5 December 2013 on the legal status of Lietuvos bankas’ assets and the scope of its public audit (CON/2013/85)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 5 December 2013 on the legal status of Lietuvos bankas’ assets and the scope of its public audit (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 11 November 2013, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Lithuanian Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft law amending the Law on Lietuvos bankas and on a draft law amending the Law on the State Audit Office (hereinafter together the ‘draft laws’). On 26 November 2013, the ECB received updated draft laws, which form the basis of this opinion. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third indent of

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft laws relate to Lietuvos bankas. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft laws

text: 1.1 The draft amendments to the Law on Lietuvos bankas are aimed at specifying the legal status of Lietuvos bankas’ assets in order to address concerns about the institutional and financial independence of Lietuvos bankas. The draft amendments to the Law on the State Audit Office are intended to define the scope of the public audit of Lietuvos bankas conducted by the State Audit Office. As part of the preparations for the introduction of the euro in Lithuania, the draft laws aim at dealing with the Lithuanian legal non-convergence issues referred to in the ECB’s Convergence Reports of 2010 and 2012 . 1.2 The draft amendments to the Law on Lietuvos bankas explicitly specify that the Lithuanian State’s ownership in Lietuvos bankas is expressed by the capital of Lietuvos bankas and that Lietuvos bankas has legal title to the assets belonging to it. 1.3 The draft amendments to the Law on the State Audit Office specify that the public audit of Lietuvos bankas conducted by the State Audit Office: (a) is without prejudice to the activities of

text: Lietuvos bankas’ independent external auditors; (b) covers Lietuvos bankas’ performance audit, with the exception of its European System of Central Banks and Eurosystem tasks; and (c) respects Lietuvos bankas’ independence and prohibits the State Audit Office from giving instructions to Lietuvos bankas, the members of its decision-making bodies and staff as regards the performance of their tasks. In the Law on the State Audit Office, the term ‘performance audit’ is defined as ‘evaluation of the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of the public and internal administration activities of the audited entity’ .

text: 2. Legal status of Lietuvos bankas’ assets

text: 2.1 The ECB welcomes the fact that the draft amendments to the Law on Lietuvos bankas clarify the legal status of Lietuvos bankas’ assets as well as the State’s ownership in Lietuvos bankas, which is expressed by the capital of Lietuvos bankas. 2.2 The ECB also welcomes the fact that the legal status of Lietuvos bankas’ assets is specified by virtue of the law. The ECB understands that the requirement for Lietuvos bankas to apply to an administrative authority, i.e. the State Enterprise Centre of Registers, with regard to the change of the rights in rem of its assets, for which no deadline is given , is part of national administrative procedures and does not make the specification of the legal status of Lietuvos bankas’ assets conditional upon the actions of Lietuvos bankas or of those of the administrative authorities. 2.3 Based on this understanding, the draft amendments to the Law on Lietuvos bankas address the ECB’s concerns as regards the institutional and financial independence of Lietuvos bankas, as 5 6 raised in previous ECB opinions and Convergence Reports . 2.4 Since that clarification will continue to apply if and when Lithuania adopts the euro, the Law on Lietuvos bankas that will enter into force on the introduction of the euro in Lithuania should also be amended accordingly. Additionally, if the provisions of such future draft law amending the abovementioned Law on Lietuvos bankas that will enter into force on the introduction of the euro in Lithuania are different from the provisions of the current draft amendments to the Law on Lietuvos bankas, the ECB should be consulted on such a future draft law.

text: 3. Scope of the public audit of Lietuvos bankas

text: The ECB welcomes the fact that the scope of the public audit of Lietuvos bankas conducted by the State Audit Office is clarified in national legislation, which addresses the ECB’s concerns stated in the Convergence Reports as regards Lietuvos bankas’ independence . This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: Zakon o ukrepih Republike Slovenije za krepitev stabilnosti bank (Uradni list Republike Slovenije No 105/2012).

text: Uredba o izvajanju ukrepov za krepitev stabilnosti bank (Uradni list Republike Slovenije Nos 22/2013 and 51/2013).

text: Opinions

text: and

text: . All ECB Opinions are published on the ECB's website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 5 Dedicated companies are companies that take over the risks of banks. They may be established by the banks or by the banks together with the BAMC, as joint-stock companies, pursuant to Articles 2 and 21 of the Law on bank stability.

text: See, in particular, Articles 4(2), 7(4), 8(3) and 9(2) of the draft regulation. 7 See Article 12 of the draft regulation. 8 The relevant content of Articles 25 and 26 of the Regulation is not included in the draft regulation. 9 See

text: Articles 36

text: to 47 of the draft regulation. 10 Annex 2 of the Regulation. 11 See Article 18 of the draft regulation. 12 See Articles 19(1), 20(4), 21(3), 22(5) and 23(4) of the draft regulation. 13 See

text: Article 13(5)

text: and

text: Article 14(2)

text: and (3) of the draft regulation.

text: See

text: Articles 37

text: to 40 and Articles 44 and 45 of the draft regulation. 17 See Articles 41 and 42 of the draft regulation. 18 See Articles 40 and 44 of the draft regulation, and in particular the imprecise criterion that ‘it is not expected that the BAMC will realise higher returns on investments than the return it has to pay to holders of issued securities’. 19 See paragraph 6 of Opinion

text: See paragraph 3.5 of Opinion

text: . 21 See

text: Article 2(2)

text: Article 13(5)

text: and

text: Article 14(2)

text: and (3) of the draft regulation. 22 See paragraph 9 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 4 of Opinion

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 9 December 2013 on measures to strengthen bank stability (CON/2013/86)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 9 December 2013 on measures to strengthen bank stability (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 25 November 2013, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Slovenian Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft regulation on the implementation of measures to strengthen bank stability (hereinafter the ‘draft regulation’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third and sixth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft regulation relates to Banka Slovenije and to rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft regulation

text: 1.1 The draft regulation implements the Law on Slovenia’s measures to strengthen bank stability (hereinafter the ‘Law on bank stability’). It replaces the Regulation on the implementation of 3 4 measures to strengthen bank stability which was subject to earlier ECB opinions , and which principally governs the detailed rules and procedures for the implementation of measures to strengthen the stability of banks. These measures, as envisaged by the Law on bank stability, include: (a) the transfer of bank assets to the State-owned Bank Asset Management Company (BAMC) or to dedicated companies ; (b) the issuance of State guarantees for the liabilities of the BAMC and of the dedicated companies; and (c) the recapitalisation of banks by the State or the BAMC (hereinafter the ‘measures’). While maintaining the general structure and the majority of

text: the provisions of the above-mentioned Regulation, the draft regulation contains several new and amended provisions, as further described below. 1.2 According to the explanatory memorandum of the draft regulation, the measures laid down in the Law on bank stability may be extended to banks that are not expected to continue to operate in the long term and that will be subject to supervised wind-down. The draft regulation reflects the potential application of the measures to such banks and lays down, inter alia, the definition and content of the wind-down plan to be prepared by the bank in question and assessed in the process of approving the application of measures by the Government . 1.3 The draft regulation lays down an additional condition relating to the application of any measures approved with respect to a bank under the Law on bank stability, which is that a contract be concluded between the bank in question and the State in which the bank agrees, inter alia, to: (a) comply with any commitments given by the State to the European Union in accordance with Union State aid rules; (b) provide the Ministry of Finance with any information required to assess its compliance with such commitments; and (c) reimburse the State in respect of any financial penalties imposed on it by Union bodies due to non-compliance with such commitments . 1.4 The draft regulation no longer limits the financial amount of State guarantees that may be issued in respect of the BAMC’s liabilities to the value of the assets transferred by banks to the BAMC . 1.5 A new Section 6 has been added governing the rules on the BAMC’s borrowing and debt management, use of available cash assets and payment of dividends . 1.6 The draft regulation no longer stipulates any detailed methodology for assessing the real long-term economic value of claims and potential claims to be transferred to the BAMC . The explanatory memorandum states that the current methodology ‘does not meet the requirements of the European Commission’. In the context of the valuation of assets for the purpose of the measures, the draft regulation requires the Ministry of Finance to agree with the Commission as to which entity would carry out the valuation of assets . If such a valuation is performed by the Commission, the bank subject to the measures would not be required to perform the valuation itself . 1.7 To further streamline the processes involved in the implementation of the measures, the draft regulation now allows the results of a bank’s asset quality review performed ‘in accordance with instructions’ by the Commission or the ECB to be used in the context of recapitalisation measures, in order to determine the value of the relevant bank’s shares, their issue value and the rate of return of the bank’s other capital instruments used to increase its capital .

text: 1.8 As regards the measure under the Law on bank stability relating to the recapitalisation of banks, the draft regulation now explicitly includes the possibility for such recapitalisation to be done by noncash contributions, subject to the general conditions for such contributions laid down in the Law on banking .

text: 2. Monitoring the BAMC and dedicated companies

text: The ECB has encouraged the establishment of an independent body that is not involved in the activities of asset management companies established in other euro area countries to which bank assets have been transferred (a) to monitor the operations of the companies concerned; and (b) to have access to relevant information . No such mechanism is envisaged for the BAMC and any dedicated companies that may be established. The ECB believes that such arrangements may prove useful to enhance the acceptance of the BAMC and its work. The consulting authority should consider establishing such a body under the draft regulation or any other appropriate legal act.

text: 3. Financing the BAMC’s operations

text: Article 36(1) of the draft regulation provides that the BAMC may borrow funds when necessary to compensate banks for the assets they have transferred to the BAMC, or to ensure the availability of the resources required by the BAMC to carry on its business. Unlike the current Regulation, the draft regulation also allows for part of such borrowing that exceeds the value of assets transferred by the banks to the BAMC to be backed by State guarantee. It is important that the BAMC is provided with sufficient resources to efficiently conduct its operations, including the maintenance or increase of the value or marketability of the assumed assets before their ultimate sale. To ensure the BAMC’s financial soundness, its capital should be bolstered, preferably through cash contributions.

text: 4. Use of excess cash holdings by the BAMC and dividend payments

text: 4.1 The ECB notes that Section 6 of the draft regulation aims, inter alia, to follow the ECB’s previous recommendation to provide for the necessary legal arrangements to ensure, in a transparent manner, the timely redemption of State-guaranteed BAMC bonds, other financial instruments and credit claims of transferring banks. As stated in paragraph 6 of Opinion

text: , this may be accomplished by additional provisions that limit dividend payments by the BAMC and by ensuring that cash held by the BAMC is, as a priority, used to make timely or early repayment of the Stateguaranteed bonds, such other financial instruments as may potentially have been issued by the BAMC or credit claims of the transferring banks. The ECB reiterates its view that such cash protocol arrangements should also apply to any entity to which the BAMC’s liabilities towards

text: banks, arising from bonds or other potential financial instruments or credit claims, would be transferred following expiry of the BAMC’s term in 2017, as envisaged by the Law on bank stability. The same requirements should apply in respect of any dedicated companies. 4.2 Article 38 of the draft regulation defines the content of a financial plan to be prepared by the BAMC, including a plan on the use of ‘available cash assets’, and the draft regulation also stipulates the manner in which such available cash assets should be calculated. The plan for using available cash assets shall stipulate the portion of available cash assets to be transferred to a special ‘fund for payment of issued debt securities’. The assets held in this fund, to be managed by the BAMC, may then be used to meet obligations due in relation to securities issued by the BAMC. They may also be used to redeem issued securities when this is economically justified. However, subordinated creditor claims may only be paid when they fall due . The ECB broadly welcomes the introduction of these provisions as they define the basic framework for the redemption of Stateguaranteed BAMC bonds and other financial instruments. 4.3 If the BAMC’s liabilities are secured by State guarantee, the financial plan shall be submitted to the Ministry of Finance, which may propose amendments to it. If the BAMC does not take such proposed amendments into account, it shall provide reasons for such a decision. Otherwise, the BAMC’s management board acts autonomously in adopting the financial plan , including the calculation and use of available cash assets, and in deciding on the redemption of issued securities. Given the importance of the management board’s decision-making powers in applying the relevant provisions, effective supervision of the BAMC and its board is necessary to ensure that these provisions are applied in line with their underlying purpose. Additionally, the relevant provisions should be more precise by defining the notion of ‘excess cash’ to facilitate early repayment of the BAMC’s liabilities, specifying clearer criteria for assessing when using such excess cash for early repayment of the BAMC’s liabilities is ‘economically justified’, and determining who is responsible for carrying out such assessment . 4.4 Amendment of the financial plan is envisaged if substantial differences arise between actual and planned receivables and expenditure in any given financial year. The ECB considers it important that the plan for receivables and expenditure (as part of the financial plan) includes an appropriate temporal breakdown so that any departures from the plan can be spotted and addressed quickly. 4.5 The ECB welcomes the fact that, in line with its previous suggestion, the provisions of the draft regulation introduce limitations on the payment of dividends by the BAMC . The relevant provisions introduce a significant limitation, in particular by not allowing any payment of dividends as long as the BAMC continues to have any liabilities which are backed by State guarantee.

text: 5. Other observations

text: 5.1 In respect of the fact that the draft regulation explicitly permits the recapitalisation of banks under the Law on bank stability using non-cash contributions, subject to the general conditions on such contributions laid down in the Law on banking, the ECB, as stated in previous opinions, generally prefers that, for reasons of financial stability, shares are issued against cash contributions . 5.2 Articles 19 and 20 of the draft regulation envisage cases when the real long-term economic value of assets to be transferred to the BAMC is to be assessed by the transferring bank, with the involvement of an independent appraiser, and audited by an independent auditor. It should be clear that any value assessed in this way is merely a suggestion for real economic value as eventually determined by the Commission in cases expected to involve State aid to the transferring bank. 5.3 The draft regulation includes several new or amended provisions reflecting the possible application of measures to banks subject to supervised wind-down. The ECB takes the view that the consulting authority should verify that all relevant provisions of the draft regulation are reviewed from that perspective. 5.4 The draft regulation contains several references to a bank’s asset quality review being performed ‘in accordance with instructions’ by the ECB . In the interests of clarity, the ECB suggests amending this wording to reflect the non-binding nature of any involvement by the ECB in the relevant asset quality review. 5.5 The ECB also invites the relevant authorities to consider implementing the other recommendations made in Opinions

text: and

text: , including (a) stipulating any further specific conditions that dedicated companies have to meet to be able to take over bank assets, as well as minimum conditions on key matters, such as corporate governance standards and conflict of interest rules with respect to such dedicated companies; and (b) taking into account the results of the stress tests (in addition to those of the asset quality review) in the preparation by the Interministerial Committee of a proposal on the execution of measures to be submitted to the Government (as envisaged in Article 8 of the current Regulation) .

text: 5.6 The ECB also considers that the draft regulation would benefit from a careful review before adoption in order to improve its clarity and consistency . This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 9 December 2013. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI