text: Directive (EU) 2019/878

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2019 amending Directive

text: as regards exempted entities, financial holding companies, mixed financial holding companies, remuneration, supervisory measures and powers and capital conservation measures (OJ L 150, 7.6.2019, p. 253);

text: Directive (EU) 2019/879

text: as regards the loss-absorbing and recapitalisation capacity of credit institutions and investment firms and Directive

text: (OJ L 150, 7.6.2019, p. 296).

text: Regulation (EU) 2019/876

text: Regulation (EU) No 575/2013

text: as regards the leverage ratio, the net stable funding ratio, requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities, counterparty credit risk, market risk, exposures to central counterparties, exposures to collective investment undertakings, large exposures, reporting and disclosure requirements, and

text: Regulation (EU) No 648/2012

text: (OJ L 150, 7.6.2019, p. 1).

text: Projet de loi portant: 1. transposition: a) de la directive (UE) 2019/878 du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 20 mai 2019 modifiant la directive 2013/36/UE en ce qui concerne les entités exemptées, les compagnies financières holding, les compagnies financières holding mixtes, la rémunération, les mesures et pouvoirs de surveillance et les mesures de conservation des fonds propres; et b) de la directive (UE) 2019/879 du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 20 mai 2019 modifiant la directive 2014/59/UE en ce qui concerne la capacité d'absorption des pertes et de recapitalisation des établissements de crédit et des entreprises d'investissement et la directive 98/26/CE; 2. mise en oeuvre du règlement (UE) 2019/876 du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 20 mai 2019 modifiant le règlement (UE) n° 575/2013 en ce qui concerne le ratio de levier, le ratio de financement stable net, les exigences en matière de fonds propres et d'engagements éligibles, le risque de crédit de contrepartie, le risque de marché, les expositions sur contreparties centrales, les expositions sur organismes de placement collectif, les grands risques et les exigences de déclaration et de publication, et le règlement (UE) n° 648/2012; et 3. modification: a) de la loi modifiée du 5 avril 1993 relative au secteur financier; b) de la loi modifiée du 18 décembre 2015 relative à la défaillance des établissements de crédit et de certaines entreprises d'investissement ; c) de la loi modifiée du 24 mars 1989 sur la Banque et Caisse d'Epargne de l'Etat, Luxembourg; d) de la loi modifiée du 23 décembre 1998 portant création d'une commission de surveillance du secteur financier; e) de la loi modifiée du 12 novembre 2004 relative à la lutte contre le blanchiment et contre le financement du terrorisme; f) de la loi modifiée du 10 novembre 2009 relative aux services de paiement, à l'activité d'établissement de monnaie électronique et au

text: titres; et g) de la loi modifiée du 7 décembre 2015 sur le secteur des assurances.

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).

text: Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive

text: and repealing Directives

text: and

text: (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 338).

text: Directive (EU) 2014/59

text: /EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending

text: Council Directive 82/891/EEC

text: , and Directives

text: and

text: , and Regulations

text: (EU) No 1093/2010

text: and

text: (EU) No 648/2012

text: , of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 173,12.6.2014, p. 190).

text: Regulation (EU) No 575/2013

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending

text: Regulation (EU) No 648/2012

text: (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 1).

text: The draft law also amends the following laws: the Law of 23 December 1998 establishing the Financial Sector Supervisory Commission (Loi du 23 décembre 1998 portant création d'une commission de surveillance du secteur financier, Mém. A 1998, N°112), the Law of 12 November 2004 on combating money laundering and terrorism financing (Loi du 12 novembre 2004 relative à la lutte contre le blanchiment et contre le financement du terrorisme portant transposition de la directive 2001/97/CE du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 4 décembre 2001 modifiant la directive 91/308/CEE du Conseil relative à la prévention de l’utilisation du système financier aux fins du blanchiment de capitaux, Mémorial A 2004, n° 183), the Law of 10 November 2009 on payment services (Loi du 10 novembre 2009 relative aux services de paiement, à l’activité d’établissement de monnaie électronique et au caractère définitif du règlement dans les systèmes de paiement et les systèmes de règlement des opérations sur titres, Mémorial A 2009, N° 215) and the Law of 7 December 2015 on the insurance sector (Loi du 7 décembre 2015 sur le secteur des assurances, Mémorial A 2015, N° 229). 9 Loi du 5 avril 1993 relative au secteur financier, Mémorial A 1993 N° 27; Loi du 18 décembre 2015 relative aux mesures de résolution, d’assainissement et de liquidation des établissements de crédit et de certaines entreprises d’investissement ainsi qu’aux systèmes de garantie des dépôts et d’indemnisation des investisseurs, Mémorial A 2015 N° 246. 10

text: Article 32

text: b of the BRRD, introduced by

text: Directive (EU) 2019/879

text: states as follows: ‘Member States shall ensure that an institution or entity referred to in points (b), (c) or (d) of

text: Article 1(1)

text: in relation to which the resolution authority considers that the conditions in points (a) and (b) of

text: Article 32(1)

text: are met, but that a resolution action would not be in the public interest in accordance with point (c) of

text: Article 32(1)

text: , shall be wound up in an orderly manner in accordance with the applicable national law’. 11 Article 154(1) of the Law of 18 December 2015 on the failure of credit institutions and certain investment

text: Loi du 24 mars 1989 sur la Banque et Caisse d'Epargne de l'Etat, Mémorial A 1989 N° 16. 13

text: Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and amending

text: Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010

text: (OJ L 225, 30.7.2014, p.1). 14 See paragraph 4.1 of Opinion

text: ; paragraph 3 of Opinion

text: See e.g. for Belgium, Royal Decree of 16 March 2009 on the protection of deposits and life insurances by the special protection fund for deposits and life insurances; for Bulgaria, the Law on bank deposit guarantee; for Croatia, Article 13(3) of the Law on deposit insurance; for Estonia, Section 86(2) of the Law on the guarantee fund; for Greece, Article 29 of Law 4370/2016 implementing the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive; for Latvia, the Law on the deposit guarantee; for Netherlands, the Decree on special prudential measures, investor compensation and deposit guarantees; for Romania, the Law on deposit guarantee schemes and the bank deposit guarantee fund, for Sweden, the Law on deposit insurance. 16 See Article 129 of the Law of 18 December 2015 on the failure of credit institutions and certain investment

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 27 October 2020 on the deposit guarantee scheme and other amendments to the financial services legislation (CON/2020/25)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 27 October 2020 on the deposit guarantee scheme and other amendments to the financial services legislation (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 5 August 2020 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Luxembourg Ministry of

text: Finance for an opinion on a draft law which seeks to implement Directives

text: (EU) 2019/878

text: and (EU)

text: 2019/879 of the European Parliament and of the Council and

text: Regulation (EU) 2019/876

text: of the European

text: Parliament and of the Council and to amend various provisions of Luxembourg financial sector

text: legislation (hereinafter the ‘draft law’).

text: the draft law concerns rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the

text: stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the

text: Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The main purpose of the draft law is to implement into Luxembourg law

text: Directive (EU) 2019/878

text: which amends the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) ,

text: Directive (EU) 2019/879

text: , which amends

text: the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) and

text: Regulation (EU) 2019/876

text: which

text: amends the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR) . For this purpose, the draft law seeks to

text: amend primarily the Law of 5 April 1993 on the financial sector and the Law of 18 December 2015

text: on the failure of credit institutions and certain investment undertakings . In that context, in order to

text: transpose

text: Article 32

text: b of the BRRD , the draft law introduces in the latter Law a new Article

text: on insolvency proceedings for the institutions and entities which are not subject to a resolution

text: action. This provision specifies that where the Resolution Board considers that an institution is

text: failing or likely to fail without the prospect of an alternative measure to prevent this, but a resolution

text: measure is not in the public interest, it requests the Court to wind up the institution in accordance

text: with a normal insolvency procedure or, where applicable, in accordance with the provisions of the

text: Code of Commerce.

text: 1.2 In addition, the draft law aims at reinforcing the protection of depositors by introducing an additional

text: backstop for the benefit of the national deposit guarantee fund, Fonds de garantie des dépôts

text: Luxembourg (FGDL). The FGDL has the status of établissement public (public body). It is vested

text: with legal personality and is placed under the authority of the Minister responsible for the financial

text: sector .The backstop takes the form of a State guarantee for a maximum amount of one billion

text: euro, which the Government is authorised to grant in respect of credit facilities that the FGDL may contract in order to avail itself of adequate financial means. The draft law further provides that when the State guarantee has been used, the payment of contributions to the FGDL must continue until the State has been repaid in full, even if the FGDL’s target level has been reached. It also specifies that the FGDL’s available financial means will be used to repay the State guarantee, including principal and interest. According to the explanatory memorandum, the State guarantee will be provided against remuneration. 1.3 Furthermore, the draft law amends the Law of 24 March 1989 on the Banque et Caisse d’Epargne de l’Etat , which is an autonomous legal entity under public law, in order to ensure the resolvability of the Banque et Caisse d’Epargne de l’Etat (BCEE), in line with the BRRD and the Single Resolution Mechanism Regulation . As noted in the explanatory memorandum, the objective of the draft law in this respect is to allow, in case of bail-in, the conversion of liabilities towards the BCEE’s creditors into participation certificates issued by the BCEE, which meet the criteria for Common Equity Tier 1 instruments. To that end, the draft law requires that the participation certificates issued by the BCEE comply with the criteria laid down in Article 28 of the CRR. The draft law also provides that these participation certificates may be held by the State or the public. The draft law amends the provisions in the Law of 24 March 1989 on the available profit of the BCEE, by specifying that interest may be paid on the participation certificates on the basis of the available profit on the endowment capital (held by the State).

text: 2. General observations

text: This opinion focuses on the following aspects of the draft law: (1) the backstop arrangements of the FGDL, (2) the orderly winding-up of failing or likely to fail institutions that are not subject to a resolution action and (3) the issuance of participation certificates by the BCEE.

text: 3. Specific observations

text: 3.1 Backstop to the deposit guarantee fund The ECB recalls that, as noted previously ,the efficiency of the deposit guarantee schemes (DGSs) in the EU currently ultimately rests on the credibility of national backstop arrangements, which are therefore highly important. Therefore, the ECB welcomes the draft law which aims at ensuring that the FGDL is adequately funded. An adequately funded DGS provides protection for smaller depositors, while enhancing financial stability. Sound funding arrangements ensure an effective deposit guarantee and foster the maintenance of public confidence . The ECB notes, as pointed out in the explanatory memorandum to the draft law, that several other Member States have introduced backstop mechanisms in order to support the funding of their

text: respective national DGSs. Member States have followed various paths for the set-up of their backstops. In some instances, the backstops are based on mandatory arrangements, while in others the provision of the backstop is optional. Some backstops are of a private nature, while other backstops are provided by the State . 3.2 Orderly winding-up of failing or likely to fail institutions that are not subject to resolution action The explanatory memorandum to the draft law clarifies that the concept of winding-up used in Article 33-2 of the draft law is to be interpreted broadly, and includes procedures such as the suspension of payments, which allow for the restructuring of failing entities. In accordance with the current provisions of the Law of 18 December 2015 on the failure of credit institutions and certain investment undertakings , the winding-up may take place where it is apparent that the suspension of payments scheme previously decided upon is not able to rectify the situation which caused it. It is important that the provisions of

text: Directive (EU) 2019/879

text: are transposed in a comparable manner across EU Member States to ensure a level playing field within the Banking Union. The ECB therefore recommends clarifying that all procedures applicable to the institution meeting the conditions of

text: Article 32

text: b of the BRRD lead to its winding-up in an orderly manner with the eventual realisation of all of its assets. 3.3 Issuance of participation certificates by the BCEE The ECB takes note of the amendments to the Law on the Banque et Caisse d’Epargne de l’Etat, which the ECB understands are aimed at ensuring compliance with the conditions for these instruments to qualify as Common Equity Tier 1 pursuant to Article 28 of the CRR.

text: This opinion will be published on EUR-Lex.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 27 October 2020.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Christine LAGARDE


text: EUT C 338, 12.10.2020, s. 2.

publisher: Europeiska centralbanken

sprak: sv

title: ECB-Rådets Yttrande av den 28 oktober 2020 om en rekommendation från rådet om utnämning av en ledamot i Europeiska centralbankens direktion (CON/2020/26) 2020/C 372/03

serie: con

text: Inledning och rättslig grund

type: rubrik

text: Den 14 oktober 2020 mottog Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) en begäran från Europeiska rådets ordförande om ett yttrande över rådets rekommendation av den 9 oktober 2020om utnämning av en ledamot i Europeiska centralbankens direktion.

type: stycke

text: ECB-rådets behörighet att avge ett yttrande grundar sig på

text: artikel 283.2 i fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt

text: Allmänna kommentarer

text: 1. I rådets rekommendation, som överlämnats till Europeiska rådet och som Europaparlamentet och ECB-rådet nu ska yttra sig över, föreslås att Frank Elderson utnämns till direktionsledamot i Europeiska centralbanken för en tid av åtta år från och med den 15 december 2020.

text: 2. ECB-rådet anser att den förslagna kandidaten är en person som besitter den allmänt erkända auktoritet och yrkeserfarenhet inom den finansiella sektorn som krävs enligt artikel 283.2 i fördraget.

text: 3. ECB-rådet har ingen invändning mot rådets rekommendation att utnämna Frank Elderson till ledamot i Europeiska centralbankens direktion.

text: Utfärdat i Frankfurt am Main den 28 oktober 2020.

text: Christine Lagarde

text: ECB:s ordförande

type: vagledning

utgivare: ecb


text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).

text: Bundesgesetz über die Aufstockung der Neuen Kreditvereinbarungen mit dem Internationalen Währungsfonds, BGBl. Nr. 114/2010.

text: Vereinfachte wirkungsorientierte Folgenabschätzung zum Bundesgesetz über die Neuen Kreditvereinbarungen mit dem Internationalen Währungsfonds.

text: IMF Press release No. 20/10 dated 17 January 2020, whereby IMF Executive Board Approves Decisions to Implement a Package on Resources and Governance Reform.

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 of 13 December 1993

text: specifying definitions for the application of the prohibitions referred to in Articles

text: and

text: b(1) of the Treaty (OJ L 332, 31.12.1993, p. 1).

text: See, for example, paragraph 3.1 of ECB Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on EUR-Lex. 8 See International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual (Sixth ed., 2009), paragraph 6.64.

text: See paragraph 3.2 of ECB Opinion

sprak: en

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 30 October 2020 on the New Arrangements to Borrow with the International Monetary Fund (CON/2020/27)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 30 October 2020 on the New Arrangements to Borrow with the International Monetary Fund (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 2 October 2020 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Austrian Ministry of Finance (MoF) for an opinion on a draft law on New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB) with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (hereinafter the ‘draft law’) . The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and on the third indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft law relates to the Oesterreichische Nationalbank (OeNB). In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The draft law authorises the OeNB, on behalf of the Republic of Austria, to grant the IMF a credit line of up to 3,636.98 million Special Drawing Rights (SDR) as part of the NAB. This corresponds to an increase of 36.98 million SDR (currently equivalent to approximately EUR 44.3 million) as compared with the currently permitted maximum credit line of 3,600 million. The draft law would replace the existing Federal Law on an increase of the new borrowing arrangements with the IMF . 1.2 As noted in the MoF’s impact assessment of the draft law , the draft law relates to the failure of the members of the IMF to reach a majority vote on an increase of the IMF quotas as part of the 15th quota reform in October 2019. In order to prevent the financial resources available to the IMF declining drastically upon expiry of the existing NAB and the existing Bilateral Borrowing Agreements (BBA), the participants in the NAB agreed to double the potential resources made available via the NAB from 182.4 billion SDR to 364.7 billion SDR, for a new NAB period from 2021

text: to 2025 . Taking into account the Republic of Austria’s current maximum credit line, its maximum possible contribution to the NAB should increase from 1,818.49 million SDR to 3,636.98 million SDR. 1.3 As noted above, the OeNB is currently permitted to provide, on behalf of the Republic of Austria, a maximum credit line of 3,600 million SDR to the IMF under the existing NAB. Thus, in order to implement the new NAB, the draft law envisages an increase of 36.98 million SDR. The aim of the draft law is to ensure that the Republic of Austria’s potential contribution to the NAB of the IMF remains the same in relative terms. 1.4 The MoF’s impact assessment of the draft law explains that in the event that the IMF makes a claim on NAB resources, the OeNB would receive interest on the OeNB’s contribution at the rates applied to SDR throughout the period during which the IMF claims those resources. The budgetary impact of the draft law may be either positive or negative, depending on whether those rates applied to SDR are higher or lower, respectively, than the ECB’s main refinancing operations rate. In any event, the MoF estimates that the increase in the credit line granted to the IMF by the Republic of Austria as part of the NAB will not affect the Federal budget by more than EUR 20 million.

text: 2. Monetary financing prohibition

text: 2.1 As the draft law concerns the financing of the IMF by a national central bank (NCB), the compatibility of the draft law with the prohibition of monetary financing laid down in Article 123 of the Treaty must be assessed in light of the specific exemption contained in

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93

text: . In particular,

text: Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 3603/93

text: provides that the financing by NCBs of obligations falling upon the public sector vis-à-vis the IMF is not regarded as a credit facility within the meaning of

text: Article 123

text: of the Treaty.

text: Recital 14

text: of

text: Regulation (EC) No 3603/93

text: clarifies the rationale behind this exemption, stating that it is appropriate to authorise the financing by the NCBs of obligations falling upon the public sector vis-à-vis the IMF because such financing ‘results in foreign claims which have all the characteristics of reserve assets’. Therefore, the exemption in

text: Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 3603/93

text: must be interpreted in line with this rationale . 2.2 Reserve assets are defined as those external assets that are readily available to and controlled by monetary authorities for meeting balance of payments financing needs, for interventions in exchange markets to affect the currency exchange rate, and for other related purposes, such as maintaining confidence in the currency and the economy, and serving as a basis for foreign borrowing . Under this definition, reserve assets must be foreign currency assets and, except in the

text: case of gold bullion, must be claims on non-residents . The granting of loans by the OeNB under the NAB with the IMF on behalf of the Republic of Austria, as set out in the draft law, falls within the exemption of

text: Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 3603/93

text: because this financing results in foreign currency (SDR)-denominated claims of the OeNB against the IMF (a non-resident) that have all the characteristics of reserve assets. 2.3 Based on the foregoing, the ECB considers that the authorisation of the OeNB to grant loans under the NAB with the IMF as envisaged by the draft law is compatible with the monetary financing prohibition.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 30 October 2020.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Christine LAGARDE


text: Návrh zákona o zrušení osobitného odvodu vybraných finančných inštitúcií a o niektorých opatreniach súvisiacich s jeho zrušením. 2

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42). 3 Zákon č. 384/2011 Z.z. o osobitnom odvode vybraných finančných inštitúcií a o doplnení niektorých zákonov. 4 Zákon č.523/2004 Z.z. o rozpočtových pravidlách verejnej správy a o zmene a doplnení niektorých zákonov.

text: Although the Memorandum of Understanding expresses the intention regarding supporting and financing development programs of the Slovak Government, the exact modalities of the distribution of funds is not yet specified by law. 6 See the Memorandum of Understanding concluded between the Ministry of Finance of the Slovak Republic and the Slovak Banking Association in June 2020. 7 Zákon č.371/2014 Z.z. o riešení krízových situácií na finančnom trhu a o zmene a doplnení niektorých zákonov. 8 See paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on EUR-Lex. 9 See, for example, paragraph 3.2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 3.2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraphs 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 4 November 2020 on the abolition of the special levy on selected financial institutions (CON/2020/28)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 4 November 2020 on the abolition of the special levy on selected financial institutions (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 30 September 2020 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Ministry of Finance of the Slovak Republic for an opinion on a draft law abolishing a special levy on selected financial institutions and on certain measures in connection with this abolition (hereinafter the ‘draft law’) . The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the sixth indent of

text: , as the draft law relates to rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 Law No 384/2011 Coll. on a special levy on selected financial institutions and on amendments of certain laws (hereinafter the ‘Law No 384/2011’) imposes an obligation on banks and branches of foreign banks operating in Slovakia (hereinafter collectively referred to as the ‘banks’) to pay a special levy. The proceeds of this special levy are State financial assets with the designated purpose of covering costs related to the resolution of financial crises in the banking sector and protecting the financial stability of the Slovak banking sector, including the replenishment of the Deposit Protection Fund necessary for expenses due to the payment of compensation for unavailable deposits. The draft law abolishes the special levy on selected financial institutions as of 1 January 2021 and repeals Law No 384/2011. 1.2 The draft law stipulates that the balances of the collected levies will remain State financial assets in accordance with Law No 523/2004 on general government budgetary rules and amending certain laws . The explanatory memorandum to the draft law states that the intention is to use these assets in accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding concluded between the Ministry of

text: Finance of the Slovak Republic and the Slovak Banking Association in June 2020 to fund the activities of the Slovak Development Fund, which will focus on supporting and financing 5 6 development programs of the Slovak Government . A smaller part of the funds will also be used to strengthen the Slovak Deposit Protection Fund and the Slovak Crisis Resolution Fund, and to reimburse eligible expenses of the Crisis Resolution Council pursuant to Law No 371/2014 on resolution in the financial market and on amendments to certain laws .

text: 2. Abolition of the levy and the use of proceeds

text: The abolition of the levy may contribute to an increase of the capital generation capacity of credit institutions and support lending to the real economy. The ECB welcomes the intended use of part of the collected funds for strengthening the Slovak Deposit Protection Fund and the Slovak Crisis Resolution Fund, which will contribute to improving the resilience of, and confidence in, the financial sector. However, following up on its observations in its past opinions , the ECB is of the view that the use of a large portion of levies already collected for purposes unrelated to financial stability would weaken the overall robustness of the financial sector if no concomitant safeguards to enhance its stability are put in place. An example of such a safeguard would be a mechanism designed to allow all the funds that have been already collected from the financial sector to be available in the event of a crisis.

text: This opinion will be published on EUR-Lex.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 4 November 2020.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Christine LAGARDE


text: Meldeverordnung ZABIL 1/2022 der OeNB betreffend die statistische Erfassung des grenzüberschreitenden Kapitalverkehrs.

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).

text: Meldeverordnung ZABIL 1/2013 der OeNB betreffend die statistische Erfassung des grenzüberschreitenden Kapitalverkehrs in der novellierten Form ZABIL 1/2016.

text: Devisengesetz 2004, BGBl I 123/2003 idF BGBl I 37/2018.

text: Guideline

text: (EU) 2012/120

text: of the European Central Bank of 9 December 2011 on the statistical reporting requirements of the European Central Bank in the field of external statistics (ECB/2011/23) (OJ L 65, 3.3.2012, p. 1).

text: Guideline

text: (EU) 2018/1151

text: of the European Central Bank of 2 August 2018 amending Guideline ECB/2011/23 on the statistical reporting requirements of the European Central Bank in the field of external statistics (ECB/2018/19) (OJ L 209, 20.8.2018, p. 2).

text: Commission Regulation (EU) No 555/2012 of 22 June 2012

text: amending

text: Regulation (EC) No 184/2005

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council on Community statistics concerning balance of payments, international trade in services and foreign direct investment, as regards the update of data requirements and definitions (OJ L 166, 27.6.2012, p. 22).

text: Available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 17 November 2020 on balance of payments reporting (CON/2020/29)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 17 November 2020 on balance of payments reporting (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 8 October 2020 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Oesterreichische Nationalbank (OeNB) for an opinion on a draft regulation of the OeNB governing balance of payments reporting (hereinafter the ‘draft regulation’) . The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and on the third and fourth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft regulation relates to the OeNB and the collection of balance of payments statistics. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft regulation

text: 1.1 The draft regulation replaces the existing reporting regulation of the OeNB on cross-border financial transactions . The draft regulation implements Article 6 of the Law of 2004 on exchange control , under paragraph 1 of which the OeNB is responsible for compiling Austrian balance of payments statistics, international investment position statistics, and direct investment statistics. Under paragraph 1 of

text: Article 6

text: , the OeNB is also responsible for compiling all statistics regarding cross-border transactions and positions in the context of the three categories of statistics abovementioned; this responsibility is based on EU law requirements. The draft regulation shall become effective on 1 January 2022 and shall first apply to reports as of the reporting date of 31 December 2021. 1.2 According to the consultation request accompanying the draft regulation, the draft regulation aims to establish a new survey structure by reducing the number of reports addressed to the same company and providing a modern online reporting channel. At the same time, the draft regulation requires more detailed information to be reported by companies in each area in which the OeNB is

text: responsible for compiling statistics compared to what companies report under the existing regulation. As a result, while reporting agents will benefit from a more integrated and efficient data collection framework, more granular data will lead to enhanced statistical analysis. 1.3 The draft regulation requires the following seven data collection surveys to be undertaken: (1) cross-border shareholders and participations – transactions, (2) cross-border shareholders and participations – stocks, (3) cross-border receivables and payables, (4) cross-border asset transfers and real estate-related transactions, (5) cross-border financial derivatives, (6) domestic securities stocks and (7) securities accounts abroad, own holdings of securities and crypto asset investments. 1.3.1 According to the consultation request, the draft regulation aims to reflect recent developments in cross-border capital movements, including changed financing behaviour of multinational corporations, and in particular increasing group financing and intercompany financial flows. Accordingly, the status of cross-border receivables and payables (including non-transaction-related changes and interest) with respect to other cross-border investments is to be reported either on a regional basis or broken down into foreign group entities or counterparties. 1.3.2 Furthermore, the draft regulation envisages the collection of significant information about foreign minority shareholdings in the surveys addressed to foreign direct investments by Austrian entities, which require equity interests below 10% to be reported if a transaction is EUR 500,000 or higher. The draft regulation requires transaction types to be reported in more detail compared to the current regulation. 1.3.3 As regards cross-border financial derivatives data, the draft regulation decreases the reporting threshold to EUR 1 million. Furthermore, a new classification is introduced in connection with derivatives, which gives more detailed information about the underlying asset class. In this respect, the draft regulation introduces an additional breakdown of financial derivatives into two more types: forwards and swaps. 1.3.4 In connection with holdings of securities, the draft regulation introduces the requirement to report investments in crypto assets, as well as investments in domestic and foreign securities held with custodians abroad. The definition of a crypto asset will be defined in a guideline accompanying the draft regulation. This accompanying guideline will provide some flexibility to the OeNB to change definitions when considered necessary, without changing the regulation.

text: 2. General Observations

text: 2.1 The ECB generally welcomes that the draft regulation ensures consistency with the reporting requirements under Guideline ECB/2011/23 of the European Central Bank , as amended by Guideline ECB/2018/1151 of the European Central Bank and Commission Regulation (EU)

text: No 555/2012 as regards the update of data requirements and definitions, and that it follows the basic principles of the ECB Statistics Quality Framework (SQF) . The main purpose of statistics on euro area balance of payments and international investment positions is to support the ECB’s monetary policy and other Eurosystem tasks. 2.2 The ECB welcomes the proposed changes in the draft regulation as concerns the content and procedures envisaged for the reports on portfolio investments, direct investments, financial derivatives and other investments. These changes will help to avoid duplicating information over multiple reports, hence increasing the general efficiency of the balance of payments reporting system and reducing the burden of reporting on respondents. These changes will also improve the understanding of group financing and intercompany financial lending, taking into consideration the changed financing behaviour of multinational corporations. The ECB also welcomes the additional information that will be obtained regarding financial derivatives, which is in line with the current methodological developments and the need for a better understanding of the exposure and vulnerability of the Austrian economy to those financial instruments. Finally, the ECB welcomes the updating of definitions and references to ECB and Union legislation in a live electronic and transparent way, which will improve consistency and make the system more agile in respect of future changes.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 17 November 2020.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Christine LAGARDE


text: Kungörelse (1974:152) om beslutad ny regeringsform.

text: Riksdagsordningen (2014:801). 3 2020/21:URF1 2019 års riksdagsöversyn. Finns på www.riksdagen.se. 4 Rådets beslut

text: av den 29 juni 1998 om nationella myndigheters samråd med Europeiska centralbanken rörande förslag till rättsregler (EGT L 189, 3.7.1998, s. 42). 5 Se 12 kap. § 13 andra stycket och tilläggsbestämmelsen 12.13.1 i lagförslaget. 7 Se 3 kap. 1 § i regeringsformen. Se även sidorna 107 och 108 i betänkandet.

text: Se avsnitt 9.7 i betänkandet. 9 Se 9 kap. 17a § i lagförslaget. 10 Se avsnitt 19.9.2 i betänkandet. 11 Se 9 kap. 17b § första stycket i lagförslaget. 12 Se avsnitt 19.9.2 i betänkandet. 13 Se avsnitt 19.9.2 i betänkandet. 14 Se 9 kap. 1a § i lagen (1988:1385) om Sveriges riksbank. 15 Se 1 kap. 4 § i lagen om Sveriges riksbank. 16 Se 4 kap. 5 § i lagen om Sveriges riksbank. 17 Se 9 kap. 13 § i regeringsformen. 18 Detta är korrekt även om det inte uttryckligen framgår av lagen om Sveriges riksbank (se t.ex. sidorna 1370–1371 i SOU 2019:46, En ny riksbankslag). 19 Se 9 kap. 2 och 2a §§ i lagen om Sveriges riksbank. 20 Se 10 kap. 3 § i lagen om Sveriges riksbank. 21 Se 5 kap. 1 § i lagen om Sveriges riksbank.

text: Se punkt 14.2.4 i yttrande

text: . Se även punkt 6 i yttrande

text: , punkt 2.3 yttrande

text: och punkt 2.1 yttrande

text: . 23 Se 9 kap. 13 § i regeringsformen. 24 Se 12 kap. 2 § i riksdagsordningen. 25 Se 13 kap. 21 § och 12 kap. 5 § i riksdagsordningen. 26 Se 12 kap. 7–8 §§ i riksdagsordningen och avsnitt 9.3.1 i betänkandet. 27 Eesti Pank (Estlands centralbank) är ett exempel på en annan nationell centralbank i Europeiska centralbankssystemet som har en styrelse med liknande funktioner som fullmäktige i Sveriges riksbank, där ledamöterna delvis består av parlamentariker som representerar sina olika politiska fraktioner. Se punkterna 1.6 och 2.1 i yttrande

title: Europeiska centralbankens yttrande av den 30 november 2020 om ändring av riksdagsordningen (CON/2020/30)

text: EUROPEISKA CENTRALBANKENS YTTRANDE av den 30 november 2020 om ändring av riksdagsordningen (

text: ) Inledning och rättslig grund

text: Den 19 oktober 2020 mottog Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) en begäran från Sveriges riksdag (nedan kallad riksdagen) om ett yttrande över ett författningsförslag som bl.a. innehåller förslag till ändringar av 1 2 regeringsformen (som utgör en del av den svenska grundlagen) och riksdagsordningen , vad gäller aspekter som berör riksdagens funktionssätt som har konsekvenser för myndigheter, bland dem Riksbanken (nedan kallat lagförslaget). Lagförslaget utgör en del av betänkandet (nedan kallat betänkandet) från kommittén för 2019 års riksdagsöversyn (nedan kallad kommittén). ECB:s behörighet att avge ett yttrande grundar sig på artiklarna

text: och

text: i fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt och artikel 2.1 tredje strecksatsen i

text: rådets förordning (EG) nr 98/415

text: eftersom lagförslaget rör Sveriges riksbank.

text: 1. Syftet med lagförslaget

text: 1.1 Sammansättningen på Riksbankens fullmäktige Enligt lagförslaget ska, när en riksdagsledamot av någon orsak upphör att vara medlem i ett politisk parti som är representerat i riksdagen, denna ledamots uppdrag i kommittéer och andra parlamentariska organ och delegationer upphöra – inklusive i Riksbankens fullmäktige – till vilka ledamoten har valts på grund av sitt medlemskap i det politiska partiet . Enlig kommittén är motivet till detta element i lagförslaget att säkerställa att sammansättningen på kommittéer och andra parlamentariska organ och delegationer speglar riksdagens politiska sammansättning . Även under den aktuellt gällande lagstiftningen krävs medlemskap i ett politiskt parti för att bli riksdagsledamot , dock är ledamotsuppdraget är personligt och en ledamot som har valts kan normalt inte tvingas att lämna uppdraget. Att vara medlem i en kommitté eller något annat parlamentariskt

text: organ eller en delegation är dock inte någon personlig position, utan ledamoten har fått denna genom att tillhöra ett politiskt parti som är representerat i riksdagen .

text: riksdagen

text: Enligt lagförslaget ska ett parlamentariskt organ eller en delegation – vilket inkluderar Riksbankens fullmäktige och Riksbankens direktion – inhämta behövliga upplysningar och yttranden innan det gör en framställning hos riksdagen . Enlig kommittén är motivet till detta element i lagförslaget att förberedelserna innan ett parlamentariskt organ eller en delegation – som Riksbankens fullmäktige och Riksbankens direktion – lägger fram ett förslag till riksdagen bör samordnas med de beredningskrav som gäller för lagförslag från regeringen till riksdagen . Av lagförslaget framgår dock också att det är riksdagsstyrelsen, och inte Riksbankens fullmäktige och Riksbankens direktion, som ska inhämta behövliga upplysningar från Lagrådet . Kommittén skriver också att ett ytterligare skäl för att inte kräva att Riksbankens fullmäktige och Riksbankens direktion ska inhämta ett yttrande från Lagrådet är att Riksbankens fullmäktige och Riksbankens direktion har en mer begränsad förslagsrätt än riksdagsstyrelsen . Riksbankens fullmäktige och Riksbankens direktion lägger normalt inte fram lagförslag, och det är mycket ovanligt att ett lagförslag från Riksbankens fullmäktige eller Riksbankens direktion remitteras till Lagrådet. Om ett yttrande från Lagrådet ändå skulle behöva inhämtas över ett förslag från Riksbankens fullmäktige eller Riksbankens direktion kan ett yttrande begäras under beredningen av ärendet .

text: 2. Allmänna kommentarer

text: 2.1 Sammansättningen på Riksbankens fullmäktige 2.1.1 Det yttersta ansvaret för Riksbankens verksamhet ligger hos direktionen , och denna är det beslutande organet i frågor som gäller utförandet av Sveriges riksbanks ECBS-relaterade uppgifter. Riksbankens fullmäktige får bl.a. utse Riksbankens direktion samt riksbankschefen och vice 15 16 riksbankschef , fastställa direktionsledamöternas ersättning , under vissa förutsättningar skilja en 17 18 ledamot av direktionen från hans anställning , granska direktionens arbete , leda revisionsarbetet i samband med direktionens arbete , göra förslag avseende hur Riksbanken vinst ska 20 21 disponeras samt bidra till utformningen av sedlar och mynt som ges ut av Sveriges riksbank .

text: Ansvarsfördelningen mellan Riksbankens direktion och fullmäktige faller visserligen utanför ramen för detta yttrande, men ECB vill ändå upprepa att, med beaktande av både fullmäktiges struktur, som en grundläggande del av Riksbanken, och dess uppgifter, fullmäktige inte får försöka påverka direktionen i dess roll som beslutande organ i frågor som gäller utförandet av Sveriges riksbanks ECBS-relaterade uppgifter . 2.1.2 Riksbanken har elva fullmäktige som väljs av riksdagen . Ledamöterna i fullmäktige utses av Riksdagens valberedning för samma mandatperiod som riksdagsledamöterna; ledamöterna utses så snart som möjligt efter allmänna val . I normalfallet lägger Riksdagens valberedning fram en lista över ledamöter som kan väljas till fullmäktige utifrån hur de olika politiska partierna är representerade i riksdagen, och riksdagen röstar sedan om denna . Enligt den information som ECB fått, är sex av de elva fullmäktige just nu riksdagsledamöter, och alla elva är medlemmar i politiska partier som är representerade i riksdagen . Det finns dock inget krav på att en ledamot i fullmäktige måste vara riksdagsledamot eller medlem i ett politisk parti som är representerat i riksdagen . 2.1.3 ECB förstår det som att den aktuellt gällande lagstiftningen är sådan att, om en person upphör att vara riksdagsledamot, denna person också upphör att vara ledamot i de kommittéer och andra parlamentariska organ och delegationer till vilka ledamoten har valts i egenskap av riksdagsledamot . Om en person upphör att vara ledamot i en kommitté eller annat parlamentariskt organ eller en delegation – t.ex. Riksbankens fullmäktige – utser det parti som nominerat personen även dennes efterföljare och informerar riksdagens talman om detta som sedan bekräftar nomineringen . För närvarande finns det dock inget krav på att en riksdagsledamot som upphör att vara medlem i ett politisk parti som är representerat i riksdagen också ska lämna sina uppdrag i kommittéer och andra parlamentariska organ och delegationer (inklusive i Riksbankens fullmäktige) till vilka ledamoten har valts på grund av sitt medlemskap i det politiska partiet . Enligt vad ECB förstår förekommer det relativt ofta att en riksdagsledamot upphör att vara medlem i ett politisk parti . Mot denna bakgrund tolkar ECB det som att den föreslagna ändringen avseende sammansättningen på Riksbankens fullmäktige utgör en mindre ändring för att säkerställa att sammansättningen av kommittéerna och de andra parlamentariska organen och delegationerna i största möjliga utsträckning speglar riksdagsmajoriteten.

text: Så som ECB förstår det får både Riksbankens fullmäktige och Riksbankens direktion göra framställningar till riksdagen i) avseende frågor som rör Riksbanken kompetens, organisation, personal 33 34 och verksamhetsformer , och ii) inom sitt egna behörighetsområde . ECB har förstått att sådana framställningar inte bara kan bestå av lagförslag, utan även av andra former av rättsakter och dokument. ECB välkomnar det föreslagna beredningskravet för framställningar till riksdagen, eftersom det kan förbättra lagstiftningsförfarandet och kvaliteten på den lagstiftning som riksdagen antar.

text: Detta yttrande kommer att offentliggöras i EUR-Lex.

text: Utfärdat i Frankfurt am Main den 30 november 2020.

text: [Namnteckning]

text: Christine LAGARDE

text: ECB:s ordförande


text: COM/2020/658 final.

text: Rådets beslut av den 23 november 1998 angående växelkursfrågor som har samband med CFA-francen och den komoriska francen (

text: ) EUT L 320, 28.11.1998, s. 58).

text: Se

text: skäl 7

text: i

text: rådets beslut 98/683/EG

text: , se även punkt 3 i ECB:s yttrande

text: . Alla ECB:s yttranden publiceras i EUR-Lex.

title: Europeiska Centralbankens Yttrande av den 1 december 2020 angående växelkursfrågor som har samband med CFA-francen och den komoriska francen (CON/2020/31) 2020/C 452/01

text: Inledning och rättslig grund

text: Den 3 november 2020 mottog Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) en begäran från Europeiska unionens råd om ett yttrande över en ändring av rådets beslut av den 23 november 1998 angående växelkursfrågor som har samband med CFA-francen och den komoriska francen (

text: ) (nedan kallad rekommendationen). ECB:s behörighet att avge ett yttrande grundar sig på

text: artikel 219.3 i fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt

text: I enlighet med

text: artikel 17.5

text: första meningen i arbetsordningen för ECB har detta yttrande antagits av ECB-rådet.

text: 1. Allmänna kommentarer

text: 1.1. I rekommendationen föreslås mindre ändringar av rådets beslut 98/683/EC för att uttryckligen ge Frankrike och de berörda tredjeländerna i Union économique et monétaire ouest-africaine (WAEMU, Västafrikanska ekonomiska och monetära unionen), Communauté économique et monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale (Cemac, Centralafrikanska ekonomiska och monetära gemenskapen) samt Komorerna möjlighet att ingå nya avtal som helt ersätter nuvarande avtal som avses i

text: rådets beslut 98/683/EG

text: , istället för att ändra nuvarande avtal. Enligt rekommendationen skulle också namnen på valutorna i WAEMU, Cemac och Komorerna ändras.

text: 1.2. ECB noterar att de aktuellt gällande avtalen angående växelkursfrågor mellan Frankrike och WAEMU, Cemac samt Komorerna säkerställer konvertibilitet mellan euron och valutorna i WAEMU, Cemac och Komorerna till en fast kurs. Enligt dessa avtal garanteras konvertibiliteten genom ett budgetåtagande från det franska finansministeriet, och inte något åtagande av Banque de France. Enligt vad som framgår av skälen till beslut

text: , något ECB även påpekat tidigare, är det inte troligt att dessa avtal i någon betydande utsträckning kommer att påverka euroområdets gemensamma penning- och valutapolitik, ingenting i dem kan tolkas som att det skulle föreligga en skyldighet för ECB eller någon nationell centralbank inom Europeiska centralbankssystemet att stödja konvertibiliteten för dessa valutor, och ändringarna av de nuvarande avtalen kommer inte att leda till att ECB eller någon nationell centralbank ikläds några skyldigheter.

text: 2. Specifika kommentarer

text: 2.1. ECB noterar att man rekommenderar att ändra hänvisningarna till CFA-francen och ersätter dessa med den allmänna termen valuta för respektive valutaområde, något som speglar det faktum att beteckningarna på CFA-francen och den komoranska francen kan komma att ändras i ett nytt avtal som ingås mellan Frankrike och de berörda tredjeländerna.

text: 2.2. Enligt

text: rådets beslut 98/683/EG

text: , bemyndigas Frankrike att förhandla och genomföra ändringar av sina nuvarande avtal med WAEMU, Cemac och Komorerna. Förslaget enligt rekommendationen är att Frankrike även ska bemyndigas, med rådets godkännande, att ersätta sina nuvarande avtal. Enligt ECB:s tolkning ändrar rekommendationens föreslagna, begränsade ändringar av

text: rådets beslut 98/683/EG

text: inte i övrigt den rättsliga ramen som inrättats genom det beslutet. I detta hänseende föreslår rekommendationen inte några ändringar av bestämmelserna i

text: rådets beslut 98/683/EG

text: vad gäller ECB:s rådgivande funktion vid framtida ändringar av avtalens karaktär eller räckvidd, eller ECB:s rätt att informeras av tillämpningen av dessa avtal, eller ändringar av dem i den mån det inte ändrar avtalens karaktär eller räckvidd. Detta yttrande kommer att offentliggöras i EUR-Lex.

text: Utfärdat i Frankfurt am Main den 1 december 2020.

text: Christine Lagarde

text: ECB:s ordförande


text: Κύρωση της υπ’ αριθμ. 16645 - (20/5) απόφασης της 16 Ιανουαρίου 2020 του Εκτελεστικού Συμβουλίου του Διεθνούς Νομισματικού Ταμείου σχετικά με τις Νέες Συμφωνίες Δανεισμού (New Arrangements to Borrow).

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 of 13 December 1993

text: specifying definitions for the application of the prohibitions referred to in Articles

text: and

text: b(1) of the Treaty (OJ L 332, 31.12.1993, p. 1).

text: See e.g. Opinions

text: and

text: . All ECB Opinions are available on EUR-Lex.

text: See International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual (Sixth ed., 2009), paragraph 6.64.

text: See paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 3.2 of Opinion

text: For example, see Opinions

text: , and

text: See paragraph 1.5 of Opinion

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 11 December 2020 on Greece’s adherence to the New Arrangements to Borrow with the International Monetary Fund (CON/2020/32)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 11 December 2020 on Greece’s adherence to the New Arrangements to Borrow with the International Monetary Fund (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 23 November 2020 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Greek Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft law on New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB) with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (hereinafter the ‘draft law’) . The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft law relates to the Bank of Greece. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The draft law ratifies Decision No. 16645 – (20/5) of the Executive Board of the IMF on the NAB of 16 January 2020. As clarified in the explanatory memorandum to the draft law, the NAB was first introduced by Decision No. 11428-(97/6) of the Executive Board of the IMF of 27 January 1997 (the ‘NAB Decision’), in order to enable the IMF to more effectively fulfill its role in the international monetary system. Decision No. 16645 amends the NAB Decision and changes the credit arrangements of NAB participants. The amendments to the NAB Decision and the changes in the credit arrangements of NAB participants will become effective when the following conditions are met, but not earlier than 1 January 2021: (a) participants representing 85% of total credit arrangements have agreed to the amendments to the NAB Decision; and (b) participants representing 85% of total credit arrangements have agreed to the changes in credit arrangements, including each participant whose credit arrangement is being changed. If a participant has not agreed to the proposed changes in credit arrangements by 31 December 2020, or at any later date as determined by the Executive Board of the IMF, the proposed change to the credit arrangement of such participant will be deemed to have been withdrawn, and the credit arrangement of such participant will remain unchanged. Greece did not adhere to the NAB when they were first introduced by the NAB Decision, but it now intends to take the necessary steps in order to adhere to that Decision, as amended. The draft law further stipulates that the Greek Minister for Finance

text: will declare to the IMF the adherence of Greece to the NAB Decision as amended (as required by paragraph 3(c) of the NAB Decision) and will sign any relevant agreement. 1.2 The draft law authorises the Bank of Greece to provide loans to the Greek State for the provision of Greece’s resources to the IMF in accordance with the credit arrangement of Greece and the terms of the NAB Decision as applicable at any given moment. The draft law further authorises the Governor of the Bank of Greece and the Greek Minister for Finance, as a representative of the Greek State, to sign the relevant loan agreement. The draft law stipulates that the loan is paid by the Bank of Greece directly to the IMF, in accordance with the instructions of the Minister for Finance, and that this loan will be repaid to the Bank of Greece by the IMF, at the time and in the form and currency set out in the NAB Decision and in accordance with the other terms of the NAB Decision as applicable at any given moment.

text: 2. Monetary financing prohibition

text: 2.1 Article 123(1) of the Treaty prohibits the national central banks from granting overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facility to public authorities and bodies of the Member States. The monetary financing prohibition is however subject to certain exemptions laid down in

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93

text: . In particular,

text: Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 3603/93

text: provides that the financing by national central banks of obligations falling upon the public sector vis-à-vis the IMF is not regarded as a credit facility within the meaning of Article 123(1) of the Treaty.

text: Recital 14

text: of

text: Regulation (EC) No 3603/93

text: clarifies the rationale behind this exemption, stating that it is appropriate to authorise the financing by the central banks of obligations falling upon the public sector vis-à-vis the IMF because such financing ‘results in foreign claims which have all the characteristics of reserve assets’. Therefore, the exemption in

text: Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 3603/93

text: must be interpreted in line with this rationale . 2.2 Reserve assets are defined as those external assets that are readily available to and controlled by monetary authorities for meeting balance of payments financing needs, for interventions in exchange markets to affect the currency exchange rate, and for other related purposes, such as maintaining confidence in the currency and the economy, and serving as a basis for foreign borrowing . Under this definition, reserve assets must be foreign currency assets and, except in the case of gold bullion, must be claims on non-residents . 2.3 In the case under consideration, the ECB understands that the Bank of Greece will provide a loan to the Greek State in order for the latter to contribute to the IMF the resources corresponding to Greece’s participation in the NAB. For this purpose, the Bank of Greece will credit the IMF’s account with the Bank of Greece on behalf of the Greek State. The ECB understands that Greece’s participation in the NAB will result in an SDR-denominated claim of the Bank of Greece against the

text: IMF, using the funds stemming from the loan to the Greek State. 2.4 The ECB has considered past cases where national central banks (NCBs) directly financed the NAB-related obligations of their respective Member States vis-à-vis the IMF as falling within the exemption in

text: Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 3603/93

text: given that the financing arrangements resulted in foreign claims having all the characteristics of foreign reserve assets . However, technically, these financing arrangements did not involve any formal loan by the NCB directly to the Member State which could be seen as tantamount to a credit facility within the meaning of Article 123(1) of the Treaty . 2.5 In this context, the ECB notes that Member States have put in place a variety of arrangements to ensure the performance of their respective rights and obligations arising from their membership in the IMF. NCBs finance their respective Member States’ obligations and commitments vis-à-vis the IMF under different constructions which are governed by their respective national laws . From this perspective, the ECB considers that the provision of loans by the Bank of Greece for the purpose of financing Greece’s provision of financial resources to the IMF in accordance with the credit arrangement of Greece and the terms of the NAB Decision, as amended, as set out in the draft law, would fall within the exemption under

text: Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 3603/93

text: , because using these funds would result in SDR-denominated claims against the IMF that have the characteristics of reserve assets. Therefore, these loans are not regarded as a credit facility within the meaning of Article 123 of the Treaty.

text: 3. Miscelanneous issue

text: The draft law does not stipulate whether the loan to be provided as set out in the draft law will bear interest or not. The ECB invites the consulting authority to consider related remuneration aspects when promulgating the ministerial decision authorised to be issued under the draft law in order to regulate specific matters for the implementation of the NAB Decision as amended.

text: This opinion will be published on EUR-Lex.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 11 December 2020.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Christine LAGARDE


title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 11 December 2020 on limitations on cash payments (CON/2020/33)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 11 December 2020 on limitations on cash payments (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 9 November 2020, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Danish Finanstilsynet (Financial Supervisory Authority) for an opinion on a draft law amending the Law on Danmarks Nationalbank, the Law on capital markets, the Law on measures to prevent money laundering and financing of terrorism, and various other laws (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the second, third, fourth and fifth indents of

text: , as the draft relates to means of payment, Danmarks Nationalbank, the collection of statistics, and payment and settlement systems. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose and description of the draft law

text: 1.1 This opinion addresses the three parts of the draft law which: (a) lower the existing threshold for certain cash payments to professionals from a maximum of 50 000 DKK to 20 000 DKK (from approximately EUR 6 700 to EUR 2 700); (b) ensure that the opening of insolvency proceedings against a participant in a payment or securities settlement system does not prevent funds or securities available on the participant´s settlement account from being used to fulfil its obligations in the system on the day of the opening of insolvency proceedings; and (c) amend the Law on Danmarks Nationalbank to ensure both an enhanced legal basis for Danmarks Nationalbank’s collection and use of data, including for statistical purposes, and to strengthen the confidentiality requirements applicable to employees and members of the decision-making bodies of Danmarks Nationalbank, including when such data is shared with, inter alia, the ECB. 1.2 The lowering of the threshold for certain cash payments applies to professionals who are not covered by the scope of application of the Law on measures to prevent money laundering and

text: 1 Forslag til lov om ændring af lov om en garantifond for skadesforsikringsselskaber, lov om investeringsforeninger m.v., hvidvaskloven og forskellige andre love.

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).

text: 3 Lov om Danmarks Nationalbank, Lov nr. 116 af 7. april 1936. som ændret ved lov nr. 166 af 13. april 1938, § 44 i lov nr. 88 af 15. marts 1939, lov nr. 67 af 15. marts 1967, § 90 i lov nr. 174 af 30. april 1969 og § 16 i lov nr. 579 af 1. juni 2010. financing of terrorism , and applies to this specific group of business-to-business payments and to customer-to-business payments. According to the explanatory notes to the draft law (hereinafter ‘explanatory notes’), the proposal is made with a view to combating money laundering and they refer to

text: recital 6

text: of

text: Directive (EU) 2015/849

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council in this context, which provides, inter alia, that the use of large cash payments is highly vulnerable to money laundering and terrorist financing, and that Member States should be able to make additional general limitations to the use of cash and further stricter provisions. Further, the explanatory notes detail how continuous technological and digital developments have in general reduced cash payments of larger amounts, therefore the lowering of the threshold for certain cash payments is expected to have a limited impact on professionals and consumers. 1.3 The draft law also introduces the option given to Member States under

text: Article 4 of Directive 98/26/EC

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council , according to which the opening of insolvency proceedings against a participant in a payment or securities settlement system does not prevent funds or securities available on the participant´s settlement account from being used to fulfil its obligations in the system on the day of the opening of insolvency proceedings. The explanatory notes clarify that currently and going forward, Danmarks Nationalbank provides a credit line (i.e. a guarantee) for settlements in VP Securities, the Danish national central securities depository. Settlements are processed either in real time or in batches (at fixed times during the day), and a credit line provided by Danmarks Nationalbank applies to real-time and dedicated batch settlement in VP Securities. National insolvency law provides that, in the case of insolvency proceedings opened against a participant, its settlement account at Danmarks Nationalbank is frozen and the participant is no longer able to dispose of its funds, which Danmarks Nationalbank can apply by way of security interest to secure the credit line provided. However, the explanatory notes state that Danmarks Nationalbank has joined TARGET2-Securities (hereinafter ‘T2S’), the common platform for cross-border security settlements in Europe owned by the Eurosystem. T2S settles transactions mostly in real time on a delivery-versus-payment (DvP) basis, i.e. the money and securities change hands simultaneously and with finality in accordance with Directive

text: . Therefore, according to the explanatory notes, as a result of Danmarks Nationalbank’s affiliation to T2S, doubts have arisen as to whether settlement in T2S is protected against the insolvency of a Danish participant in the course of a settlement day. In case of settlement failures due to insolvency in the course of a day, there is a risk that the failure to settle will have a knock-on effect in the system and create problems for other participants, which may undermine confidence that orders are executed in the system. It is therefore seen as important to ensure that resolution

text: 4 Lov om forebyggende foranstaltninger mod hvidvask of finansiering af terrorisme, Lovbekendtgørelse nr. 380 af 2. april 2020.

text: 5 See point 2.13.2 of the general comments to the draft law.

text: Directive (EU) 2015/849

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, amending

text: Regulation (EU) No 648/2012

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council and

text: Commission Directive 2006/70/EC

text: (OJ, L 141, 5.6.2015, p. 73).

text: 7 Directive 98/26//EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 1998 on settlement finality in payment and securities settlement systems (OJ L 166,11.6.1998, p.45).

text: 8 See point 1.12.1 of the general comments to the draft law. can take place in the event of bankruptcy through the funds made available on Danmarks Nationalbank’s dedicated settlement account. Ultimately, failure to settle due to bankruptcy is seen a possible cause for mistrust in the financial system. 1.4 Finally, the draft law contains two amendments to the Law on Danmarks Nationalbank. 1.5 The first amendment proposes to establish an enhanced legal basis for the Danmarks Nationalbank to collect and use data for purposes falling within its fields of competence. The explanatory notes state that data collection undertaken today by Danmarks Nationalbank is understood mainly to take place with a view to producing statistics. According to the draft law, Danish undertakings registered in the Central Business Register will be obliged, upon request by Danmarks Nationalbank, to provide all data necessary for the Danmarks Nationalbank in order for it to fulfill its objectives as defined in the Law on Danmarks Nationalbank. As stated in the explanatory notes , the assessment of what information it is necessary to obtain from the undertakings will depend on Danmarks Nationalbank’s actual performance of its tasks, and the Danmarks Nationalbank therefore arguably has considerable discretion to decide what data is relevant for the fulfilment of its objectives. According to the explanatory notes , data will be collected for conclusions and decisions taken by the Danmarks Nationalbank in relation to the monitoring of the Danish economy, financial stability, including credit risk, systemic risk, the capital and foreign exchange markets, and the establishment of financial statistics. 1.6 The second amendment to the Law on Danmarks Nationalbank introduces a specific professional confidentiality regime for the employees and members of the decision-making bodies of Danmarks Nationalbank, including external hired help, an obligation which in all cases continues to apply after the end of the provision of services . This confidentiality regime entails that these persons must keep confidential information, which they become aware of when executing their duties, confidential. In case of a breach, the Criminal Code applies, as a result of which fines or imprisonment of up to 6 months, which in case of aggravating circumstances can be up to 2 years, can be imposed. The draft law maintains the existing rules on the transmission of confidential information to central banks in the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), and also introduces an exhaustive list of other domestic, European and international bodies and institutions, including central banks located in other European Economic Area (EEA) countries, to whom confidential data may be transmitted. The draft law further provides that persons who receive confidential information from Danmarks Nationalbank, including persons at ESCB central banks, are bound by the same professional secrecy obligation applicable to the employees and members of the decision-making bodies of Danmarks Nationalbank. According to the explanatory notes , the performance of tasks relating to international statistical cooperation may also be carried out either on the basis of European Union

text: 9 See point 2.20.3 of the general comments to the draft law.

text: 10 See point 2.20.2 of the general comments to the draft law.

text: 11 See 20.1 to 20.3 of the amended Law on Danmarks Nationalbank (Lov om Danmarks Nationalbank).

text: 12 See Sections 152 to152e of the Criminal Code, Straffeloven, Lovbekendtgørelse nr. 976 af 17. september 2019.

text: 13 See point 2.21.2 of the general comments to the draft law. regulations or, in the case of the Bank for International Settlements and the International Monetary Fund, on the basis of an agreement concluded with these organisations.

text: 2. Cash limitation

text: 2.1 The ECB notes that Denmark has an exemption from participating in the third stage of economic and monetary union . Against this specific institutional backdrop, the ECB has prepared an assessment of the relevant provisions of the draft law against relevant practices in the euro area, in particular the legal requirements for the euro and the legal tender status of euro banknotes. 2.2 Under the Treaty, the ECB has the exclusive right to authorise the issue of euro banknotes within the Union . The euro banknotes issued by the ECB and the national central banks of the euro area are the only banknotes with legal tender status within the Union . 2.3 The scope and effects of the legal tender status of euro banknotes and coins has not yet been defined in Union law. According to

text: Commission Recommendation 2010/191/EU

text: (hereinafter the ‘Commission Recommendation’), the concept of legal tender of the euro should rely on three main elements. First, there should be a mandatory acceptance of banknotes and coins unless the parties have agreed on other means of payment. The acceptance of euro banknotes and coins as a means of payment in retail transactions should be the rule. A refusal to accept cash should be possible only if it is based on reasons related to the ‘good faith principle’. Second, banknotes and coins should be accepted at full face value. Third, banknotes and coins should have the power to discharge debts. 2.4 The ECB notes that cash continues to play an important role in society irrespective of the fact that electronic payment instruments are increasingly used for retail payments in Member States, including Denmark . As digital transformation progresses rapidly, Denmark is currently among the most digitalised countries in the world , which, inter alia, enables the use of alternative means of payment. While in 2009 cash payments accounted for 48% of the total number of payments in physical trade in Denmark, the 2019 figure was down to 16% . It is recognised, however, that the ability to pay in cash remains particularly important for certain groups in society that, for various legitimate reasons, prefer to use cash rather than other payment instruments. These groups include not only elderly people but also some disabled citizens, immigrants, socially vulnerable citizens, minors and others with limited or no access to digital payment services . The ECB notes, however, that the use of cash is declining in Denmark, also e.g. by elderly people, as cash

text: 14 See Protocol (No 16) to the Treaty on certain provisions relating to Denmark.

text: Article 128(1)

text: , first sentence, of the Treaty and

text: Article 16

text: , first sentence, of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (‘Statute of the ESCB’).

text: Commission Recommendation 2010/191/EU of 22 March 2010

text: on the scope and effects of legal tender of euro banknotes and coins (OJ L 83, 30.3.2010, p 70).

text: 18 See paragraph 2.4 of Opinion

text: . All ECB Opinions are published on EUR-Lex.

text: 19 See page 2 of Danmarks Nationalbank’s report ‘Danes primarily opt for electronic payment solutions’, September 2020.

text: 20 See page 9 of Danmarks Nationalbank’s report ‘Cash payments are declining’, February 2020.

text: 21 See paragraph 1.5 of Opinion

text: . payments as a share of the total number of payments broken down by age shows that people in the age group 70-79 years in 2017 used cash in 40% of their payments in physical trade, a number that had declined to 22% in 2019 . Still, cash is generally appreciated as a payment instrument because it is widely accepted, fast and facilitates control over the payer’s spending. In addition, it is the only payment instrument that allows citizens to settle a transaction directly, without relying on a third party service provider. Furthermore, the transaction can be settled in central bank money instantly and at face value, without the legal possibility of imposing a fee for the payment in 23 24 question , appreciating that surcharges on card payments are also now prohibited by Union law . Moreover, cash payments facilitate the inclusion of the entire population in the economy since it may be used to settle any type of financial transaction . 2.5 The Commission Recommendation states that the acceptance of payments in cash should be the rule, as noted above, but acknowledges that cash may be refused for reasons related to the good faith principle, without this being a breach of the legal tender status of cash. Neither Union law nor the Commission Recommendation explicitly addresses if and to what extent it may be permissible to introduce a more general limitation to the obligation to accept euro cash payments. Therefore, Union law has to be interpreted in order to ascertain the conditions that a limitation on payments in euro notes and coins must fulfil, including which conditions should be fulfilled to comply with the legal tender status of euro banknotes and coins when introducing general limitations to the obligation to accept cash payments. In particular, with respect to limiting cash payments,

text: recital 19

text: of

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 974/98

text: should be taken into consideration. This recital states that limitations on payments in notes and coins, established by Member States for public reasons, are not incompatible with the status of legal tender of euro banknotes and coins, provided that other lawful means for the settlement of monetary debts are available. The prevention of money laundering and financing of terrorism qualifies as a public reason outweighing the impact of the limitations on cash payments . 2.6 However, limitations on cash payments should also be effective and proportionate to the objectives pursued and should not go beyond what is necessary to achieve such objectives . This requires, inter alia, that, for the settlement of monetary debts other lawful means of payment are available. These other lawful means of payment should be readily accessible to all citizens in the respective Member State. Any negative impact of the proposed limitations should be carefully weighed against the anticipated public benefits.

text: 22 See page 9 of Danmarks Nationalbank’s report ‘Cash payments are declining’, February 2020.

text: 23 See paragraph 2.1.6 of Opinion

text: 24 See

text: Article 62 of Directive (EU) 2015/2366

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on payment services in the internal market, amending Directives

text: and

text: and

text: Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010

text: , and repealing Directive

text: (OJ L 337, 23.12.2015, p. 35).

text: 25 See paragraph 2.1.6 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.6 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.7 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 3.4 of Opinion

text: , and paragraph 2.8 of Opinion

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 974/98 of 3 May 1998

text: on the introduction of the euro (OJ L 139, 11.5.1998, p. 1).

text: 27 See paragraph 2.2 of

text: 28 See paragraph 2.1.5 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: . 2.7 With respect to the requirement for limitations to be proportionate, the ECB notes that the broader and more general a limitation is, the stricter should be the interpretation of the requirement for the limitation to be proportionate to the objective pursued. When considering whether a limitation is proportionate, the adverse impact of the limitation in question should always be considered and it should also be considered whether alternative measures could be adopted that would fulfil the relevant objective with a less adverse impact . 2.8 Finally, it is of relevance to note in this context that Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council has made it easier for Union citizens to obtain payment accounts and related electronic payment services as an alternative to cash . 2.9 In respect of the lowering of the threshold for certain cash payments, the proposal follows a previous reduction in the threshold amount in 2013, when it was reduced from DKK 100 000 32 33 (approximately EUR 13 500), to the current threshold of DKK 50000. At the time, the ECB noted that any impact of the proposed provisions should be carefully weighed against the public benefits expected to be derived from them. Also, in view of the fact that the measures affect relatively low value payments, competent authorities should ensure that the effects of these measures do not go beyond what is necessary for achieving the objective of combating money laundering and financing of terrorism. The explanatory notes do not clarify what the impact has been of the lowering of the threshold for certain cash payments since its introduction and adoption in 2013. The explanatory notes also do not clarify why, seven years after the lowering of the threshold for certain cash payments, the threshold needs to be further reduced to just around one fifth of the pre-2013 threshold. 2.10 However, the ECB acknowledges that other lawful means for the settlement of monetary debts with similar benefits to those of cash are generally available in Denmark also above the proposed threshold of approximately EUR 2 700. Moreover, as noted in paragraph 1.2, the proposal to further lower the threshold for certain cash payments applies only to professionals who are not covered by the scope of application of the Law on measures to prevent money laundering and financing of terrorism, when receiving cash. Thus, the lowering of the threshold applies only to this specific group of business-to-business and customer-to-business payments. In this respect, the ECB welcomes the fact that this restriction is not intended to apply to payments between consumers. Taking this into account, and in addition to the above general observations, the lowering of the threshold for certain cash payments as set out in the draft law could be deemed proportionate to the objectives pursued and to not go beyond what is necessary to achieve such objectives. However, the ECB cannot elaborate on the effectiveness of the draft law on this point, since no substantiation has been provided to this effect in the explanatory notes, and since the

text: 29 See paragraph 2.1.5 of Opinion

text: 30 Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on the comparability of fees related to payment accounts, payment account switching and access to payment accounts with basic features (OJ L 257, 28.8.2014, p. 214).

text: 31 Directive

text: has been implemented in Denmark by Law No 375 of 27 April 2016 (Lov om betalingskonti).

text: 32 See Opinion

text: 33 See paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: 34 See paragraph 2.5 of Opinion

text: . effect of the above 2013 reduction of the cash limitation ban has not been clarified. Also, in case of contingencies where alternative means of payment are temporarily not functioning, flexibility should be ensured for the settlement of payment obligations in cash.

text: 3. Settlement finality in case of insolvency of system participants

text: Directive

text: is decisive for ensuring harmonised rules on irrevocability of payments and securities transactions across the Union, thereby helping to avoid systemic risks in the financial system. The Directive ensures that collateral security is insulated, on the day of the insolvency of a participant in a system, from the effects of the insolvency law applicable to that participant. The ECB agrees with the arguments made in the explanatory notes to the effect that the unwinding of a settlement in a securities settlement system may have a negative impact on the stability of financial markets and institutions in general, and arguably in particular for interconnected systems like T2S. The irrevocability of transfer orders is a prerequisite for the smooth and efficient functioning of T2S in the event of a participant becoming insolvent in the course of a settlement day. For these reasons the ECB strongly welcomes the draft law’s proposed amendments to Danish law to ensure settlement finality in case of the insolvency of a system participant.

text: 4. Collection and confidentiality of data collected and shared by Danmarks Nationalbank

text: 4.1 The ECB welcomes the provisions of the draft law enhancing the legal basis for the Danmarks Nationalbank to collect and use data for purposes falling within its fields of competence, including but not limited to the production of financial statistics. The proposed provision is formulated very broadly allowing the Danmarks Nationalbank flexibility to define the required data depending on the task it is undertaking to fulfill its objectives. 4.2 The ECB also welcomes that the existing rules on the transmission of confidential information to central banks in the ESCB and the ESRB are maintained, and that the draft law extends the transmission of confidential information to other domestic, European and international bodies and institutions, including central banks located in other EEA countries.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Christine LAGARDE


text: A draft legal act entitled Malta Membership of the International Monetary Fund (2020 Borrowing Agreement) Order and a draft bill to amend the Malta Membership of the International Monetary Fund Act, Chapter 209 of the Laws of Malta.

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 of 13 December 1993

text: specifying definitions for the application of the prohibitions referred to in Articles

text: and

text: b(1) of the Treaty (OJ L 332, 31.12.1993, p. 1). 4 See e.g. Opinions

text: and

text: . All ECB Opinions are available on EUR-Lex. 5 See International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual (Sixth ed., 2009), paragraph 6.64. 6 See paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 3.2 of Opinion

text: . 7 Chapter 209 of the Laws of Malta

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 18 December 2020 on a bilateral borrowing agreement between the Central Bank of Malta and the International Monetary Fund (CON/2020/34)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 18 December 2020 on a bilateral borrowing agreement between the Central Bank of Malta and the International Monetary Fund (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 4 December 2020 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Central Bank of Malta (CBM) for an opinion on two draft laws concerning a bilateral borrowing agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (hereinafter the ‘draft laws’) . The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft laws relate to the CBM. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft laws

text: 1.1 In March 2020, the IMF Executive Board approved a new round of bilateral borrowing to supplement the more permanent quota resources. Such borrowing will help maintain the IMF’s overall lending capacity and thus preserve the IMF’s ability to support its members, especially in the current environment of global challenges arising from the COVID-19 pandemic. Subsequently, in April 2020, the IMF’s Managing Director sought Malta’s participation in this new round of the 2020 Bilateral Borrowing Agreements, and Malta agreed to participate. 1.2 By virtue of the draft laws, Malta will enter into a bilateral borrowing agreement whereby CBM will initially lend to the IMF a special drawings rights (SDR)-denominated amount up to the equivalent of EUR 260 000 000. This credit will be automatically reduced to EUR 112 000 000 once the IMF’s primary source for temporary resources, namely, the New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB), is doubled. Malta does not participate in the NAB. The term of this agreement will end on 31 December 2023, and it is provided that the IMF may extend the term for one further year through 31 December 2024 by a decision of the Executive Board of the IMF and with the consent of the CBM, taking into account the IMF’s overall liquidity situation and actual and prospective

text: borrowing requirements. The ECB understands that Malta’s participation in a bilateral loan agreement will result in an SDR-denominated claim of the CBM against the IMF. 1.3 The legal basis for the bilateral borrowing agreement is Article VII, Section 1(i), of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, which authorises the IMF to propose borrowing from its members if it deems such action appropriate to replenish its holdings.

text: 2. Monetary financing prohibition

text: 2.1 Article 123(1) of the Treaty prohibits the national central banks from granting overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facility to public authorities and bodies of the Member States. The monetary financing prohibition is however subject to certain exemptions laid down in

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93

text: . In particular,

text: Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 3603/93

text: provides that the financing by national central banks of obligations falling upon the public sector vis-à-vis the IMF is not regarded as a credit facility within the meaning of Article 123(1) of the Treaty.

text: Recital 14

text: of

text: Regulation (EC) No 3603/93

text: clarifies the rationale behind this exemption, stating that it is appropriate to authorise the financing by the central banks of obligations falling upon the public sector vis-à-vis the IMF because such financing ‘results in foreign claims which have all the characteristics of reserve assets’. Therefore, the exemption in

text: Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 3603/93

text: must be interpreted in line with this rationale . 2.2 Reserve assets are defined as those external assets that are readily available to and controlled by monetary authorities for meeting balance of payments financing needs, for interventions in exchange markets to affect the currency exchange rate, and for other related purposes, such as maintaining confidence in the currency and the economy, and serving as a basis for foreign borrowing . Under this definition, reserve assets must be foreign currency assets and, except in the case of gold bullion, must be claims on non-residents . 2.3 The ECB notes that under the Malta Membership of the International Monetary Fund Act it is the function of the CBM to (1) pay the amounts from time to time payable to the IMF on Malta’s account, (2) perform all of Malta’s rights, obligations and functions ensuing from Malta’s participation in the Special Drawing Account, and (3) issue to the IMF non-interest bearing and non-negotiable notes or other obligations as provided for by the IMF’s Articles of Agreement. 2.4 The ECB considers that the financing by the CBM of Malta’s obligations under the bilateral borrowing agreement with the IMF, as set out in the draft laws, falls within the exemption of

text: Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 3603/93

text: because this financing results in SDR denominated-claims

text: of the CBM against the IMF that have all the characteristics of reserve assets. Therefore, the draft laws are compatible with the monetary financing prohibition. This opinion will be published on EUR-Lex. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 18 December 2020. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Christine LAGARDE