text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: See

text: Article 4 of Decision 98/415/EC

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 15 February 2012 on the reorganisation of the Spanish financial sector (CON/2012/11)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 15 February 2012 on the reorganisation of the Spanish financial sector (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 2 February 2012, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Deputy Minister for Economic Affairs and Competitiveness for an opinion on Royal Decree-Law 2/2012 on the Reorganisation of the financial sector (hereinafter the ‘Royal Decree-Law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and on the third and sixth indents of

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the Royal Decree-Law relates to the Banco de España and to rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the Royal Decree-Law

text: The Royal Decree-Law is primarily aimed at addressing market concerns over the valuation of real estate assets to which credit institutions and consolidated groups of credit institutions have large exposures through loans to real estate developers and repossessed assets. It provides for the ‘cleaning-up’ of bank balance sheets by increased (generic and specific) provisioning combined with a requirement for an additional capital buffer on impaired assets. The total amount to be provisioned is estimated at EUR 50 billion. The Royal Decree-Law is also aimed at promoting consolidation of the sector to strengthen profitability and to eliminate overcapacity, encouraging as much as possible private solutions in the consolidation process. In this context, entities involved in a merger will have to present a viability plan and corporate governance measures that allow for quick and efficient integration; additionally, they must commit to increasing the number of loans granted to the private sector. In this regard, the Royal Decree-Law introduces operational changes to the Fund for Orderly Bank Restructuring (FROB) by enabling it to provide financing through convertible bonds in the merger process. The FROB’s own resources are increased from EUR 9 billion to 15 billion.

text: The Royal Decree-Law strengthens corporate governance of savings banks that indirectly exercise their financial activity by simplifying their legal framework, with management remuneration limits for the institutions assisted by public funds. Finally, the Royal Decree-Law streamlines the procedures for mobilising collateral in favour of the Eurosystem. Following the Royal-Decree Law, two significant changes can be introduced in the Eurosystem collateral management procedures. As regards marketable securities, besides the current method of earmarking, counterparties could create pledges by transferring the relevant securities to a dedicated securities account of the beneficiary, in line with the collateral management procedures currently used within the Eurosystem. As regards credit claims, the Royal Decree-Law sets the basis for counterparties to create valid security interest s over credit between the parties by merely including the relevant credit claims in a list submitted to the collateral taker. The Royal Decree-Law expressly clarifies that the express consent of the guarantor or the debtor of the credit claims granted as collateral is not required for the valid creation of the security.

text: 2. General observations

text: The ECB only received the consultation request on 2 February 2012, although the Royal Decree-Law was approved by the Spanish Government on 3 February. The consultation request did not state the dates of approval by the Government or validation by the Parliament, nor did it establish a specific time limit. As underlined in several ECB opinions,

text: Article 3 of Decision 98/415/EC

text: provides that the consulting authorities may set a time limit for the submission of an ECB opinion, but it may not be less than one month, unless a shorter time limit is justified with reasons for the extreme urgency. The ECB reminds the consulting authority of the importance of consulting the ECB at an appropriate point in time ‘enabling the authority initiating the draft legislative provision to take into consideration the ECB’s opinion before taking its decision on the substance’ .

text: 3. Specific comments

text: 3.1 Rules regarding the one-off increase in provisioning and capital buffers Title I of the Royal Decree-Law aims at addressing banks’ impaired exposures to land and real estate under development in Spain through increased provisions and additional capital buffers for those exposures. The assets concerned are those classified as doubtful, substandard or foreclosed. It also requires banks to provision against the performing (normal) exposures to the abovementioned assets. These measures are broadly welcomed by the ECB as strengthening the resilience of the Spanish banking sector at the current juncture while limiting the scope for public intervention. In this context, the ECB has two observations. First, in the current situation in the Spanish real estate market, where market activity is very low or even non-existent in some segments, it is appropriate to apply the same treatment of the valuation of real estate properties across the market to ensure simplicity and transparency of valuations;

text: however, once market activity recovers, market values should be applied for valuing real estate assets and collateral. Second, the new measures apply to the classified assets as of end-December 2011 and need to be fulfilled by banks by end-2012, and, for some credit institutions involved in merger processes, by 2013. The ECB recommends providing additional guidance in order to avoid ambiguity as to how the provisioning and capital buffers should be made for those classified assets that may be recovered or disposed in 2012 or in the following period, if the measures are extended. 3.2 Integration process and corporate governance of savings banks The ECB welcomes the implicit incentives provided by the Royal Decree-Law for banks to engage in further integration activity through: (a) an extension of the deadline to comply with the new provisioning requirements; and (b) a possibility to obtain financing from the FROB to facilitate the integration process. The Royal Decree-Law also contains a requirement for those banks that opt for public support via the FROB to further improve their corporate governance, which is aimed at improving the professionalism and dedication of the members of their decision-making bodies. The ECB generally supports the measures while highlighting that mergers only among the weaker institutions might limit the overall benefits of the reform. 3.3 Rules regarding the posting of collateral in favour of the Eurosystem The Royal Decree-Law updates the wording of the sixth additional provision of Law 13/1994 of 1 June 1994 on the Banco de España’s autonomy, which contains the rules on creating and enforcing security interests granted in favour of the Banco de España, the ECB and Union central banks in general. The ECB welcomes this initiative, as it will enhance legal certainty and will increase operational efficiency, streamlining the procedures for the posting of collateral in favour of the Eurosystem. These streamlined procedures for mobilising collateral in a more timely and efficient manner will amplify the operational capacity of the Spanish counterparties while, at the same time, preserving the protection of the Banco de España and, more generally, of the Eurosystem from incurring losses when conducting credit operations with them. Moreover, the alignment of the procedures for the mobilisation of collateral with those applied in other Member States is regarded as a step forward in ensuring an equal level playing field for counterparties across the euro area.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 15 February 2012. [signed]

text: The Vice-President of the ECB

text: Vítor CONSTÂNCIO


text: All ECB opinions are available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 3 See in particular paragraph 14 of Opinion

text: in which the ECB stressed that Lithuanian credit unions fall under the definition of a credit institution within the meaning of the Consolidated Banking Directive, and will therefore be subject to the Eurosystem reserve requirements when Lithuania adopts the euro.

publisher: Europeiska centralbanken

sprak: en

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 21 December 2012 on the reserve requirements for credit institutions (CON/2012/110)

serie: con

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 21 December 2012 on the reserve requirements for credit institutions (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

type: rubrik

text: On 4 December 2012, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from Lietuvos bankas for an opinion on a draft resolution amending the Rules on reserve requirements for credit institutions (hereinafter the ‘draft resolution’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and

text: Article 2(2) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft resolution relates to instruments concerning monetary policy of a non-euro area Member State. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

type: stycke

text: 1. Purpose of the draft resolution

text: 1.1 The draft resolution aims: (a) to amend the formula for calculating the remuneration of credit institutions’ holdings of required reserves in order to reflect the current factual situation in the euro area money market, where financial instruments with perceived low credit risk are traded at close to 0 % or even negative yields, and link the remuneration rate to the ECB deposit facility rate rather than the ECB rate for the main refinancing operations, and (b) to reduce the reserve ratio from 4 % to 3 % for the liabilities included in the reserve base. As an exception to the normal reserve ratio, deposits with an agreed maturity period of over two years, deposits redeemable at a notice period of over two years, debt securities issued with an original maturity of over two years and repurchase agreements continue to be subject to a reserve ratio of 0 %. 1.2 The new reserve requirements are to apply from the maintenance period starting on 24 January 2013.

text: 2. Aligning the minimum reserves regime with Eurosystem standards

text: The ECB notes that, although Member States that have not adopted the euro retain competence in the field of monetary policy, it is nevertheless beneficial for them to achieve consistency with Eurosystem

text: standards so that credit institutions in those Member States can become familiar with the reserve requirements that will apply to them once the euro is introduced. In ECB Opinions

text: and

text: on the Lithuanian minimum reserves regime , the ECB emphasised in particular the need for further alignment of the Lithuanian minimum reserves regime with Eurosystem standards. In particular, the ECB made the point that Lithuanian credit unions should also be subject to reserve requirements . Consequently, it should be noted that the comments that the ECB has made on previous occasions concerning the Lithuanian minimum reserves regime remain valid.

text: 3. Basis for the remuneration

text: The ECB notes that the holdings of required reserves will be remunerated not by reference to the ECB rate for the main refinancing operations, as stipulated in

text: Article 8 of Regulation (EC) No 1745/2003

text: of the European Central Bank of 12 September 2003 on the application of minimum reserves (ECB/2003/9) , but by reference instead to the ECB deposit facility rate.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 21 December 2012.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI

type: vagledning

utgivare: ecb


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 2 All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: See paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 4 of

text: . 4 See Section 25 of the draft law.

text: Available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 6 The Personal Insolvency Bill 2012 was passed by the Dáil (lower house of the Irish Parliament) on 7 November 2012 and is currently being debated in the Seanad (upper house of the Irish parliament). The ECB understands that the Insolvency Service will be responsible under the Personal Insolvency Act 2012 for the maintenance of the insolvency registers established under that Act.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 21 December 2012 on new credit register measures in Ireland (CON/2012/111)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 21 December 2012 on new credit register measures in Ireland (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 6 November 2012, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Irish Minister for Finance for an opinion on the Credit Reporting Bill 2012 (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third and sixth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to the Central Bank of Ireland (CBI) and contains rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: The publication of the draft law is a structural benchmark commitment of the Irish Government under the EU/IMF Programme of Financial Support for Ireland. The objective of the draft law is to establish a comprehensive and reliable register of credit information, called the Central Credit Register (CCR), to assist in achieving public policy objectives and improving financial stability by providing information for the assessment of creditworthiness and other purposes. The CCR will be established, owned and operated by the CBI. The ECB was consulted on the General Scheme of the draft law and adopted its Opinion

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 The ECB refers to its Opinion

text: and welcomes the fact that a number of the points made in that opinion have been addressed in the draft law. The ECB welcomes in particular the fact that, under the draft law, information about the credit histories and borrowings of both natural and legal persons will be recorded.

text: 2.2 As the ECB has pointed out in previous opinions, the principle of financial independence requires that, when allocating specific non-ESCB tasks to the national central banks (NCBs), additional human and financial resources must also be allocated for these tasks to be carried out in a manner that will not affect the NCBs’ operational capacity to perform their ESCB-related tasks . Under the draft law the CBI may, with the consent of the Minister, make regulations prescribing a levy to be paid to the CBI by credit information providers (CIPs) for the purpose of meeting expenses properly incurred in the performance of its functions under the draft law that are not met through other means . The ECB understands that this provision aims to clarify that all CBI expenses in connection with the establishment, operation and maintenance of the CCR will be covered by levies prescribed by the CBI.

text: 3. Credit information providers and credit information subjects

text: 3.1 The ECB considers that it would be useful to clarify whether the defined term ‘credit information provider’ includes financial service providers in other Union Member States, and whether the term ‘credit information subject’ (CIS) includes natural and legal persons with residency or registration outside Ireland. 3.2 Section 6 of the draft law lists a number of attributes to be collected as regards the identification of credit information subjects. The ECB reiterates its recommendation for including a reference to the need to identify legal persons in compliance with international or European standards, in order to facilitate cross-border access and use, provided that confidentiality is protected appropriately. In this regard, the ECB also recommends the use of a unique identifier for all natural and legal persons as well as for each loan agreement. 3.3 The ECB recommends the substitution of ‘any value-added tax registration number’ in Section 6(3)(d) with ‘the value-added tax registration number’ or ‘all value-added tax registration numbers’ in order to avoid any ambiguity.

text: 4. Access to the register

text: 4.1 The ECB notes that Section 16 of the draft law contains details of those who may access the register. The ECB recommends a general reference in this section to, e.g. the ‘competent authorities’ who may access the register, which access rights would be subject to change by order of the CBI or the Minister. 4.2 The ECB welcomes the fact that the draft law lists parties who have the power and the duty to access the information on the CCR, but reiterates that a reference to the tasks performed by the ESCB under Article 5 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank would be useful.

text: 4.3 The draft law restricts access to information on the CCR to CISs for the purpose of accessing information relating to the CIS, to CIPs in the context of credit applications and credit agreements, and to the CBI for the purposes of meeting its statutory obligations or functions. Under the draft law in its current form, other NCBs operating a CCR will be able to access information on the CCR only in circumstances where the CBI, under its obligations and functions as part of the ESCB, is required to provide such data. The ECB recommends that those granted access to information on the CCR are expanded to include NCBs operating CCRs, similar to the provisions set out in the ‘Memorandum of Understanding on the exchange of information among national CCRs for the purpose of passing it on to reporting institutions’ (MoU) . The MoU provides a framework for the regular exchange of information among national CCRs and allows a CIP to obtain a more complete overview of the indebtedness of a borrower on a cross-border basis.

text: 5. Compatibility of registers

text: The CBI will have the power to collect and record credit information in respect of CISs, including registered insolvency information, namely (a) Debt Relief Certificates; (b) Debt Settlement Arrangements; and (c) Personal Insolvency Arrangements registered in accordance with the Personal Insolvency Act 2012 . The ECB recommends requiring the Insolvency Service to provide the registered insolvency information to the CBI for inclusion on the CCR. In addition, such registered insolvency information, as well as any information from other registers to be included on the CCR, should be provided in a manner consistent with the format and scope of the CCR, to ensure a level of consistency and compatibility across these registers.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 2 The process manager will be the Bank of Greece, as operator of the dedicated system for monitoring transactions in book-entry securities under Law 2198/1994 (hereinafter the ‘System’), including in Greek government bonds.

text: Euro Summit Statement, Brussels, 26 October 2011, available on the website of the Council of the European Union at www.consilium.europa.eu. 4 Report of the G-10 Working Group on Contractual Clauses, 26 September 2002, available on the website of the Bank for International Settlements at www.bis.org. 5 See ‘Common understanding on implementing the EU commitment regarding the use of Collective Action Clauses (CACs)’, available at http://europa.eu/efc/sub_committee/pdf/common_understanding_cacs_en.pdf. See also ‘Implementation of the EU commitment on Collective Action Clauses in documentation of International Debt Issuance’, available at http://europa.eu/efc/sub_committee/pdf/cacs_en.pdf.

text: See Report of the G-10 Working Group on Contractual Clauses, p. 5.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 17 February 2012 on the terms of securities issued or guaranteed by the Greek State (CON/2012/12)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 17 February 2012 on the terms of securities issued or guaranteed by the Greek State (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 2 February 2012, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Greek Ministry of Finance for an opinion on draft legislative provisions introducing rules for the modification of the terms of securities issued or guaranteed by the Greek State on the agreement of bondholders. Later on, these draft provisions have been further revised. This opinion refers to the latest received revised draft provisions of 16 February 2012 (hereinafter the ‘draft provisions’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and on the third and sixth indents of

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft provisions relate to the Bank of Greece and to rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft provisions

text: The draft provisions authorise the Greek Ministerial Council, on a recommendation of the Minister for Finance, to launch a process for the modification of the terms of eligible securities, as defined in paragraph 1 of the first Article of the draft provisions, to determine such eligible securities and, in the event of an exchange, to define the principal, the interest rate, the duration and the English or other law governing the new securities to be issued by the Greek State. The Greek Public Debt Management Agency (PDMA) will invite the holders of eligible securities to decide, within a specific deadline, on the modification of the eligible securities’ legal documentation. This invitation, which is to be notified to the process manager and published on the Internet, will specify: (a) the eligible securities, (b) the terms on which modifications are proposed, (c) the new content of the terms, (d) any new terms, (e) in case of an exchange of eligible securities, the terms of the new securities, as determined by the Ministerial Council,

text: and any additional terms thereof, (f) the deadline by which bondholders will be invited to decide on the modification, and (g) other specific issues, including the bondholders’ participation in the decisionmaking process. A quorum of bondholders holding at least half of the aggregate outstanding principal of all eligible securities is required, together with a majority of at least two thirds of the outstanding principal of eligible securities held by participating bondholders.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 As a general proposition, it is important that the Member States preserve their ability to honour at all times their commitments, also with a view to ensuring financial stability. The case of the Hellenic Republic is exceptional and unique. 2.2 The aim of the draft provisions is to facilitate private sector involvement agreed by the Heads of State or Government of the euro area Member States on 26 October 2011 , exceptionally and only for the Hellenic Republic, by introducing into Greek law a procedure to facilitate, in accordance with collective action clauses (CACs), bondholder negotiation of and agreement to an exchange offer by the Hellenic Republic for its government bonds. The adoption of the draft provisions, together with other fiscal and structural measures, will facilitate a possible restructuring of the sovereign debt of the Hellenic Republic to help place it on a path of debt sustainability. 2.3 The ECB welcomes that the terms of such exchange is the result of negotiations held between the Hellenic Republic and the institutions representing its bondholders. 2.4 The use of CACs as a procedure to achieve an exchange of bonds is broadly aligned with general practice. In 2002 the Group of Ten recommended to issuers of sovereign bonds the introduction of CACs to allow amendments to their payment terms with the approval of a supermajority of bondholders and without a minority being able to obstruct the process. Subsequently, the Member States agreed in April 2003 that the Member States should include CACs in their international debt issuance to promote international efforts for orderly restructuring in the event of sovereign debt crises . The terms and conditions of the sovereign debt issued by the Hellenic Republic under non- Greek law normally contain CACs. The Euro Group stated on 28 November 2010 that CACs should be included in the terms and conditions of all new euro area government bonds. Article 12(3) of the Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism signed by all euro area Member States on 2 February 2012 provides that following 1 January 2013, CACs must be included in all new euro area government securities with maturity above one year.

text: 2.5 The explanatory memorandum to the draft provisions provides that “The public sector (ΕU, ECB) has demonstrated its support to the programme of reforms of the Greek economy, including the earmarking of an amount of EUR 30 billion for the restructuring of debt held by private sector creditors; it has also demonstrated, via the Eurosystem and the European Central Bank’s programme for intervening in the bond markets SMP, its commitment to the stability of the European financial sector. In the context of materializing the above-mentioned commitments and while waiting for the exchange to be proposed to private sector creditors, the Hellenic Republic acknowledges the above support of the European Central Bank and the other Eurosystem members considering the higher interests of the Greek economy and the continued functioning of the Eurosystem monetary policy framework.” 2.6 The ECB notes that it remains the sole responsibility of the Government of the Hellenic Republic to take the necessary action that will ultimately ensure its debt sustainability.

text: 3. Definition of bondholders

text: The draft provisions define bondholders as participants in the System rather than as the beneficiaries of the bonds. However, they do not explain how System participants are to vote for the modification of the terms of eligible securities, including where they have no active portfolio management rights over them, or how the voting is to take place, both procedurally and substantively. For reasons of legal certainty, and with a view to protecting the legitimate expectations of the bondholders of eligible securities, the draft provisions should include such details.

text: 4. Disenfranchisement

text: Paragraph 5 of the first Article of the draft provisions provides for the disenfranchisement of eligible securities directly owned by the Greek State, and also in the case of eligible securities guaranteed by the Greek State, eligible securities directly owned by the issuer. The ECB understands that, as provided for in the explanatory memorandum to the draft provisions, this provision does not disenfranchise certain public sector entities not forming part of the Greek State, i.e. public law legal persons, local government authorities or private law legal persons of the public sector. The Report of the G-10 Working Group on Contractual Clauses recommended a mechanism for disenfranchising bonds directly or indirectly owned or controlled by the sovereign issuer, and its public sector instrumentalities, to address creditor concerns about manipulation of votes by a sovereign. The disenfranchisement provisions of the draft provisions could be widened to protect the integrity of the voting process.

text: 5. Calculation method

text: The draft provisions do not stipulate the calculation method for the outstanding principal of eligible securities issued as zero coupon, stripped or index-linked bonds. The matter is, instead, left to the PDMA’s invitation. For reasons of legal certainty, reliable statistical measurement of the debt and protection of the legitimate expectations of the bondholders, the draft provisions should specify the calculation method for the above types of eligible securities.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 17 February 2012.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: See Communication from the Commission on the application, from 1 January 2012, of State aid rules to support measures in favour of banks in the context of the financial crisis (OJ C 356, 6.12.2011, p. 7). 3 Opinion

text: , paragraph 3.2, Opinion

text: , paragraph 3.3.2, Opinion

text: , paragraph 3.9 and Opinion

text: , paragraph 3.1.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 20 February 2012 on State guarantees (CON/2012/13)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 20 February 2012 on State guarantees (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 27 January 2012 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Governor of the Banco de España, on behalf of the Spanish State Secretary for Economic Affairs, for an opinion on a draft order developing Article 49(2)(b) of Law 39/2010 of 22 December 2010 on the State General Budget for 2011, on State guarantees (hereinafter the ‘draft order’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and on the third and sixth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft provisions relate to the Banco de España and to rules applicable to financial institutions that materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft order

text: The draft order lays down further details concerning

text: Article 49(2)

text: (b) of Law 39/2010 of 22 December 2010 on the State General Budget for 2011 by laying down rules on the conditions for the State guarantees, the eligibility of institutions and operations, the applicable fees and the requesting and granting procedures. The draft order covers credit institutions with a registered office in Spain and which have issued, with or without State guarantees, similar securities to those covered by the present State guarantees scheme. The eligible bank bonds are non-subordinated securities, without any other type of guarantee, traded in Spanish secondary markets. The securities can be issued until 30 June 2012, and have a maturity of between one and five years. The interest rate can be fixed or variable. The minimum amount of each issue is EUR 10 000 000.

text: The scheme contemplates two types of fees: a fee on the granting of the guarantee amounting to 0.5% of the guaranteed amount, and a fee on every guaranteed issue of securities. This fee will be calculated in accordance with a formula set out in an annex to the draft order, taking into account several factors and following European Commission criteria . The maximum amount of the State guarantees is EUR 100 000 million.

text: 2. General observations

text: The consultation request was submitted on 27 January, and the consulting authority requested the ECB to consider the consultation as a matter of urgency, without however setting a time limit. On 1 February, without further notice, the draft order was adopted and published in the Boletín Oficial del Estado including an annex on the fee structure that had not been included in the draft text submitted to the ECB. In this context, the ECB would like to remind the Spanish authorities that, according to

text: Article 4 of Decision 98/415/EC

text: , the ECB must be consulted at an appropriate stage enabling the authority initiating the draft legislative provision to take into consideration the ECB’s opinion before taking its decision on the substance. Furthermore, it should be ensured that the ECB is able to perform its advisory role in an appropriate manner by making available the full draft text to it.

text: 3. Specific comments

text: 3.1 Pricing The ECB welcomes that

text: Article 4

text: (b) of the draft order specifies that guarantee fees applied to financial institutions benefiting from the State guarantees will be in line with criteria adopted by the Commission The ECB reiterates its view that coordination of the duration of national financial support schemes across the Union is of crucial importance to ensure a level playing field. In addition, the ECB notes the need for national support measures to be temporary in nature. 3.2 Relationship with the single monetary policy According to Article 3 of the draft order, only bank bonds (‘obligaciones’ and ‘bonos’) may be guaranteed. The ECB understands that interbank deposits will not be guaranteed. This is in line with the view stated by the ECB in previous opinions , whereby the extension of State guarantees to interbank deposits should be avoided, as it could entail a substantial distortion in the various national segments of the euro area money market by potentially increasing short-term debt issuance activity across Member States and therefore impairing the implementation of the single monetary policy.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 20 February 2012. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: Annex V to Law 4046/2012. FEK A 28/14.2.2012.

text: OJ L 168, 27.6.2002, p. 43.

text: Pursuant to

text: Article 63

text: E of the Law on banking, the Minister for Finance may decide in the public interest and on recommendation from the Bank of Greece to establish a TCI to whom the Bank of Greece may compel a credit institution to transfer the whole or part of its assets and /or liabilities under the procedure set out in

text: Article 63

text: D.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 28 February 2012 on the recapitalisation and resolution of credit institutions in Greece (CON/2012/14)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 28 February 2012 on the recapitalisation and resolution of credit institutions in Greece (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 25 February 2012 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Greek Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft law amending the legal framework for the recapitalisation and resolution of credit institutions in Greece (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union and the third and sixth indents of

text: on the consultation of the ECB by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions, as the draft law relates to the Bank of Greece and to rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The draft law amends the Greek legal framework for the recapitalisation and resolution of credit institutions.

text: Article 1

text: amends Law 3864/2010 on the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund (hereinafter the ‘Law on the HFSF’).

text: Article 2

text: amends Law 3601/2007 (hereinafter the ‘Law on banking’) and

text: Article 3

text: amends Law 3746/2009 on the Hellenic Deposits and Investment Guarantee Fund (hereinafter the ‘Law on HDIGF’). These amendments are required by the Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies . 1.2 Amendments to the Law on the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund The draft law reforms the governance structure of the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund (HFSF) by establishing a General Council and an Executive Board and clarifying that the two bodies have responsibility for different functions. Furthermore, the draft law is intended to improve performance by the HFSF of its twofold mandate: management of its ownership interest in credit

text: institutions, on behalf of the Government, and management of transitional credit institutions (TCIs) established in accordance with

text: Article 63

text: E of the Law on banking. 1.3 Amendments to the Law on banking The amendments to the Law on banking aim to clarify the procedures and allocation of tasks for valuing assets and liabilities and, thus, for the opening balance sheets of TCIs. Future resolutions will initially use, as their starting point, conservative asset valuations of failed banks’ assets, based on their fair value, and subsequently allow for proper due diligence and revaluation followed by complementary asset transfers within a specified time period. 1.4 Amendments to the Law on the Hellenic Deposits and Insurance Guarantee Fund The amendments to the Law on the HDIGF will strengthen the funding of the HDIGF depositor branch, inter alia, by: (i) increasing fees if its funds fall below a certain level of coverage of insured deposits, taking due account of developments in the financial system; and (ii) ensuring adequate diversification of re-deposits of HDIGF funds and gradually eliminating re-deposits in covered banks, in line with the restructuring of the Greek banking sector. The draft law also introduces rules on the management of conflicts of interest for HDIGF Board members.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 The draft law will align the Greek legislative framework for recapitalisation and resolution of credit institutions with the financial sector objectives outlined by the Greek authorities in the Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies. Moreover, the ECB understands that in addition, the national authorities also intend to harmonise the Greek financial legislative framework with other objectives in the Memorandum in accordance with the time frame foreseen therein. These other objectives relate, inter alia, to the need to: (i) clarify that the HDIGF’s status as privileged creditor does not impinge on claims secured with financial collateral in the sense of Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 June 2002 on financial collateral arrangements and follows best practice with respect to secured creditors in general; (ii) introduce a clear separation of the supervisory and resolution responsibilities within the Bank of Greece; and (iii) reform governance arrangements in the Bank of Greece and revise the structure and rights of Bank of Greece shareholders to eliminate possible conflicts of interest in the Bank of Greece’s public policy role by end-December 2012. 2.2 The ECB notes the strengthening of the HFSF’s role and emphasises the need to clearly define its responsibilities, to ensure that the HFSF does not inadvertently interfere with the powers of the Bank of Greece as supervisory and resolution authority and as guarantor of the stability of the financial system.

text: 3. Amendments to the law on the HFSF

text: 3.1 In terms of the HFSF’s new dual governance structure, the ECB notes that to enable practical decision-making and in line with usual corporate governance principles, it is important for the Executive Board members to be at the same time members of the General Council. In this respect, the ECB recommends amending the draft law to enable this governance structure within the HFSF. 3.2 The ECB welcomes the draft law’s requirement for ECB observers and their alternates to be invited to participate without voting rights in the HFSF’s General Council and Executive Board meetings . The ECB’s observer status in the HFSF’s two bodies is consistent with the rationale of Law 3864/2010 establishing the HFSF, under which an ECB observer was to be invited to participate in the Board of Director meetings . 3.3 In view of the Bank of Greece’s role as prudential supervisor and guarantor of the stability of the financial system, the ECB also welcomes the fact that the Bank of Greece will appoint one member of the General Council and will designate one of the persons to be appointed as members of the Executive Board by the Minister for Finance. Moreover, the ECB welcomes that the Bank of Greece will also be represented in the Committee selecting the President and members of the General Council, the Managing Director and the members of the Executive Board . The ECB notes that the draft law does not provide whether the member of the Executive Board designated by the Bank of Greece will at the time of appointment be a member of staff or an official of the Bank of Greece and suggests clarifying this in the draft law. Moreover, the ECB suggests that the draft law could provide for participation in this Selection Committee by a representative from the ECB, in addition to one from the European Commission. 3.4 The ECB draws attention to the fact that the draft law should foster best practice in terms of decision-making transparency and accountability within the HFSF’s General Council and Executive Board. In this respect, the draft law should provide for the HFSF to adopt more detailed rules on how its affairs are managed as well as a code of conduct for members of the General Council and of the Executive Board. These should regulate, inter alia, procedures for both bodies’ meetings and the preparation of agendas and minutes. They should also provide rules and procedures for decision-making in emergency situations. 3.5 According to Article 1(5) of the draft law, the HFSF may participate in the increase of the share capital of credit institutions also through the issuance of contingent convertible bonds. Article 1(7) of the draft law, inserting a new

text: Article 7

text: a in Law 3864/2010, provides that, in case of a capital increase of such a credit institution, the voting rights attached to the HFSF’s shares will be restricted, if the participation of private sector investors in the capital increase is at least 10% of the

text: amount of the share capital increase. The ECB understands that the contingent convertible bonds eligible for the own funds of the credit institution would not be included in the share capital increase of the bank when determining the Fund’s voting rights unless and until the event for their conversion into common shares has been triggered. Furthermore, the ECB considers that the rights of private investors could be clarified if the 10% threshold of private sector participation in the capital increase under proposed

text: Article 7

text: a(3) is not reached. In that case the ECB understands the private investors would still be issued certificates representing rights to shares in proportion to their percentage participation in the capital increase, but this is not expressly stated. Indeed, the first sentence of proposed

text: Article 7(1)

text: suggests the share certificates are only issued if the 10% threshold in

text: Article 7

text: a(3) is reached.

text: 4. Amendments to the Law on banking

text: 4.1 Article 2(4) of the draft law amends

text: Article 63

text: Β(4) of Law 3601/2007 on the conditions for activating resolution measures, which will provide that the Bank of Greece will, at its discretion, use adequate measures for the resolution of a credit institution, considering, inter alia, the need to allocate the eventual losses arising from the resolution of the credit institution to shareholders, to unsecured creditors and to depositors not covered by Law 3746/2009. While the ECB understands this reflects the need to limit the costs of resolution, it nevertheless notes that this may compromise, if not exclude, the transfer of uncovered deposits, which should in any case remain an option. 4.2 Article 2(6) of the draft law allows the Bank of Greece, within six months from the issuance of a decision activating a transfer of assets, to transfer further assets of the credit institution subject to the resolution measure or to transfer back to the latter assets that have already been transferred to the transferee credit institution. The difference between the value of the transferred liabilities and the value of the transferred assets will be adjusted accordingly. The same holds under Article 2(9) of the draft law in respect of further transfers to or from the TCI . The ECB understands that these provisions serve the purposes of the resolution procedure, as defined in the Law on banking, and, therefore underlines that, for the sake of efficiency of the procedure and legal certainty, such decisions by the Bank of Greece should be implemented also by the HFSF in a timely and efficient manner.

text: 5. Amendments to the Law on the HDIGF

text: As regards the regime on conflicts of interest for members of the Executive Board of the HDIGF, Article 3(5) of the draft law, which replaces the last sentence of Article 23(4) of Law 3746/2009, provides that ‘the two members of the Executive Board nominated by the Hellenic Banks Association must not be

text: actively involved in the credit institutions participating in the HDIGF and, in relation to these, there must be no ground for conflict of interests stemming, on the one hand, from their participation in HDIGF’s Board and, on the other hand, from any relationship they may have with participating credit institutions’. The ECB considers the criterion of ‘active involvement in credit institutions participating in the HDIGF’ is too vague to prevent conflicts of interest in respect of HDIGF Board members. The regime for members of the Executive Board of the HSFS should also apply to the HDIGF Board .

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 28 February 2012.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: OJ L 181, 4.7.2001, p. 6.

text: OJ L 339, 22.12.2010, p. 1. Decision No 2/2047/0025 of the Minister of Finance of 7 January 2011 (FEK Β 4, 7.1.2011) already aligned Greek legislation since Chapter III already applied from the date of entry into force of the Regulation, i.e. 11 January 2011 in accordance with

text: Article 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1210/2010

text: According to Article 1 of the draft law, other economic agents, such as traders and casinos, will also be subject to this obligation to withdraw from circulation suspected counterfeit euro coins and hand them over to the police authority. However, these economic agents are not subject to authentication requirements; see

text: Article 2

text: (d) in conjunction with Article 3(1) of Regulation 1210/2010.

text: In particular in terms of testing requirements for coin-processing machines provided for in Articles

text: and

text: of Regulation (EU) No 1210/2010.

text: FEK B 17, 14.1.2011. The ECB was consulted on the relevant draft provisions aimed at applying the withdrawal obligation under

text: Article 6(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1338/2001

text: as regards euro coins only to credit institutions and bureaux de change, as in the field of euro coins the Bank of Greece has competence only as regards the institutions it supervises, including credit institutions and bureaux de change. In that respect, paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: referred to the imminent application of

text: Regulation (EU) No 1210/2010

text: from 1 January 2012 to all institutions referred to in

text: See e.g.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 29 February 2012 on the protection of the euro against counterfeiting and on the authentication of euro coins (CON/2012/15)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 29 February 2012 on the protection of the euro against counterfeiting and on the authentication of euro coins (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 27 January 2012, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Greek Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft law on measures for the protection of the euro against counterfeiting and on the authentication of euro coins. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the first, second and third indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the ECB by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law concerns currency matters, means of payment and the Bank of Greece. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the ECB, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The draft law will align the Greek legal framework for the protection of the euro against counterfeiting with the following Union legislation: (i)

text: Article 6 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1338/2001 of 28 June 2001

text: laying down measures necessary for the protection of the euro against counterfeiting ; and (ii) Chapters II and IV of

text: Regulation (EU) No 1210/2010

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 2010 concerning authentication of euro coins and handling of euro coins unfit for circulation . 1.2 More specifically: (i) under Article 1 of the draft law the addressees will have to ensure that euro coins that they have received and intend to put back into circulation are subject to an authentication procedure in accordance with

text: Article 3(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1210/2010

text: . Following

text: authentication, the addressees will hand all suspected counterfeit coins over to the designated police authority, who will further them to the Coin National Analysis Centre, and they will hand over euro coins unfit for circulation to the Bank of Greece; (ii) Article 2 of the draft law designates the Bank of Greece as the competent authority to ensure compliance with the abovementioned provisions of Regulations

text: (EC) No 1338/2001

text: and No 1210/2010 ; (iii) Article 3 of the draft law sets out the relevant reporting obligations of the Bank of Greece and its powers to adopt the necessary instruments to facilitate the addressees’ implementation of the draft law; (iv) Article 4 of the draft law sets out the fines that the Bank of Greece may impose in cases of non-compliance by the addressees with the abovementioned provisions of

text: Regulation (EC) No 1338/2001

text: and No 1210/2010. Consequently, Article 5 of the draft law repeals Law No 2639/2010 of the Governor of the Bank of Greece imposing sanctions on credit institutions and bureaux de change failing to withdraw counterfeit euro coins from circulation .

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 The draft law will lay down measures for the protection of the euro against counterfeiting and on the authentication of euro coins, in line with

text: Article 6 of Regulation (EC) No 1338/2001

text: and Chapters II and IV of

text: Regulation (EU) No 1210/2010

text: . In this respect, the ECB welcomes the draft law as a means to further safeguard the integrity of euro coins as a means of payment and therefore maintain the general public’s confidence in euro coins. 2.2 National authorities are not formally obliged to consult the ECB on the implementation of the Member States’ obligation to take the necessary measures to ensure that breaches of

text: Article 6(1) of Regulation (EC) 1338/2001

text: are subject to effective, proportionate and deterrent sanctions. However, to preserve the integrity of euro coins as means of payment, the ECB considers it beneficial to harmonise throughout the Union the national measures implementing the abovementioned obligation in relation to euro coin authentication to the extent possible, subject to national peculiarities. In this respect, the ECB welcomes the draft Greek law, which lays down effective, proportionate and deterrent sanctions.

text: 3. Specific observations

text: Article 2 of the draft law designates the Bank of Greece as the competent authority to ensure compliance with Regulations

text: (EC) No 1338/2001

text: and No 1210/2010. In view of the human and financial resources required for the performance of these tasks, the ECB has consistently expressed its concern that, when allocating additional tasks to national central banks, it must be ensured that they have sufficient human and financial resources, both in terms of quantity and quality, for all their tasks, and in particular that their capacity to perform their European System of Central Banks or Eurosystem-related tasks is not affected .

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 29 February 2012.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: OJ L 318, 27.11.1998, p. 1. 3 OJ L 250, 2.10.2003, p. 10. 4 OJ L 15, 20.1.2009, p. 14. 5 See ECB Opinions

text: and

text: . All ECB opinions are available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 6 See Section III of the draft regulation. 7 See Section V of the draft regulation. 8 See Section VI of the draft regulation.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 29 February 2012 on minimum reserve requirements (CON/2012/16)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 29 February 2012 on minimum reserve requirements (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 6 February 2012 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from Latvijas Banka for an opinion on a draft regulation on the minimum reserve requirements for credit institutions (hereinafter the ‘draft regulation’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and

text: Article 2(2) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft regulation relates to instruments of monetary policy. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft regulation

text: The draft regulation replaces the current regulation with the aim of further harmonising the Latvian minimum reserve requirements with those of Eurosystem. It clarifies the application of minimum reserve requirements, in particular, the reporting procedures and calculations following mergers or divisions of credit institutions. It also amends the criteria for granting exemptions from reserve requirements and aligns terminology with other legal acts.

text: 2. General observations

text: Member States that have not adopted the euro retain their monetary policy powers, including in connection with their minimum reserves frameworks. Nevertheless, it is beneficial to achieve consistency with the Eurosystem minimum reserves framework so that their credit institutions become acquainted with the reserve requirements that will apply to them following the adoption of the euro by the Member State where they are established. The legal framework for the Eurosystem’s minimum reserve system consists of: (i) Article 19 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank; (ii)

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 2531/98 of 23 November 1998

text: concerning the application

text: of minimum reserves by the European Central Bank ; (iii) Regulation ECB/2003/9 of 12 September 2003 on the application of minimum reserves ; and (iv) in relation to the definition and calculation of the reserve base, Regulation ECB/2008/32 of 19 December 2008 concerning the balance sheet of the monetary financial institutions sector .

text: Article 11

text: and Annex III to Regulation ECB/2008/32 require the use of statistical information by credit institutions reported under this Regulation for minimum reserve purposes.

text: 3. Credit unions

text: Previous ECB opinions on Latvijas Banka’s minimum reserve requirements and other monetary policy instruments emphasised the need to further align the Latvian minimum reserves regime with Eurosystem standards. In particular, Latvian credit unions will be subject to the Eurosystem’s minimum reserve requirements when Latvia adopts the euro.

text: 4. Reserve ratios

text: ECB has also previously commented on the provision entitling Latvijas Banka to establish different reserve ratios for deposits with an agreed maturity over two years, deposits redeemable at notice over two years, debt securities issued with an agreed maturity over two years, repos and other liabilities. Under this provision, reserve ratios applied by Latvijas Banka could differ from the fixed reserve ratios in Article 4 of Regulation ECB/2003/9. These differences between the Eurosystem and Latvia will need to be eliminated on Latvia’s accession to the euro area.

text: 5. Reporting procedures

text: The ECB welcomes the introduction of a time limit for revising calculations of credit institutions’ minimum reserves that further aligns Latvian reporting requirements with those of the Eurosystem. The ECB also welcomes the modifications to the procedures following mergers or divisions of credit institutions .

text: 6. Exemptions and lists

text: The ECB welcomes the introduction of separate lists for institutions subject to reserve requirements and institutions exempt from reserve requirements which brings the Latvian minimum reserves regime more in line with the procedures in Article 2(3) of Regulation ECB/2003/9. The ECB notes that the Latvian

text: minimum reserve regime, as provided in the draft regulation, does not provide for exempting institutions from reserve requirements because they are subject to freezing of funds and/or other measures imposed by the European Union or a Member State under Article 75 of the Treaty or a decision by the ECB’s Governing Council. The ECB welcomes amendments to the criteria for granting exemptions. However, the grounds for exempting credit institutions from reserve requirements provided for in Article 27 of the draft regulation are narrower than those provided for in Article 2(2) of Regulation ECB/2003/9. Therefore, the ECB recommends further alignment with Regulation ECB/2003/9.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: COM(2011) 913 final.

text: Perikles-programmet inrättades genom

text: rådets beslut 2001/923/EG av den 17 december 2001

text: om inrättande av ett handlings-program för utbyte, stöd och utbildning med avseende på skydd av euron mot förfalsk-ning (Perikles-programmet) (EGT L 339, 21.12.2001,s. 50). Beslut

text: utvidgades att omfatta även medlemsstater utanför euroområdet genom rådets beslut av den 17 december 2001 om att låta verkningarna av beslutet om inrättande av ett handlingsprogram för utbyte, stöd och utbildning med avseende på skydd av euron mot förfalskning (Periklesprogrammet) även omfatta de medlemsstater som inte har antagit euron som gemensam valuta (EGT L 339, 21.12.2001, s. 55). Senare ändringar av rådets beslut 2001/923/EC förlängde Periklesprogrammets giltighet till 31 december 2013.

text: Se punkt 1 i ECB:s yttrande

text: av den 5 juli 2006 på begäran av Europeiska unionens råd över två förslag till rådets beslut om handlingsprogrammet för utbyte, stöd och utbildning med avseende på skydd av euron mot förfalskning (Periklesprogrammet) (EUT C 163, 14.7.2006, s. 7). Alla ECB:s yttranden finns på ECB:s webbplats http://www.ecb.europa.eu

text: Dessutom är det, med beaktande av konsekvensbedömningen (SEC(2011) 1615 slutlig), tydligt att möjligheten att finansiera inköp av utrustning avser behöriga nationella myndigheter (i tredje länder) som ska skydda euron mot förfalskning med särskild inriktning på specialiserade myndigheter verksamma i känsliga tredje länder med andra målsättningar än kampen mot förfalskade eurosedlar.

text: Se punkt 8 i ECB:s yttrande

text: av den 21 juni 2005 på begäran av Europeiska unionens råd över två förslag till rådsbeslut om handlingsprogrammet för utbyte, stöd och utbildning med avseende på skydd av euron mot förfalskning (Perikles-programmet) (EUT C 161, 1.7.2005, s. 11) samt punkt 2.2 i ECB:s yttrande

text: Se punkt 8 i yttrande

text: Text markerad med fet stil anger ECB:s förslag till ny text. Genomstruken text anger de strykningar som ECB föreslår.

sprak: sv

title: Europeiska centralbankens yttrande av den 2 mars 2012 om ett förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning om inrättande av ett program för utbyte, stöd och utbildning för att skydda euron mot penningförfalskning (Periklesprogrammet 2020) (CON/2012/17)

text: Inledning och rättslig grund

text: Den 26 januari 2012 mottog Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) en begäran från Europeiska unionens råd om ett yttrande över ett förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning om inrättande av ett program för utbyte, stöd och utbildning för att skydda euron mot penningförfalskning (Periklesprogrammet 2020) (nedan kallat förslaget till förordning). Den 6 februari 2012 mottog ECB en andra begäran från Europaparlamentet om ett yttrande över samma förslag till förordning.

text: ECB:s behörighet att avge ett yttrande grundar sig på artikel 133 och artiklarna

text: och

text: i fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt (EUF-fördraget). I enlighet med artikel 17.5 första meningen i arbets-ordningen för Europeiska central-banken har detta yttrande antagits av ECB-rådet.

text: 1. Allmänna kommentarer

text: 1.1 Periklesprogrammet är ett program för utbyte, stöd och utbildning för att skydda euron mot penningförfalskning etc. Förslaget till förordning är tänkt att ersätta den rättsliga grunden för Periklesprogrammet som upphör att gälla vid utgången av 2013 och förlänga programmet till utgången av 2020. ECB upprepar att den finner att Periklesprogrammet är ett viktigt bidrag till den verksamhet som redan bedrivs av ECB, Europol och nationella myndigheter i kampen mot förfalskning av euron. ECB stöder Periklesprogrammet 2020 och anser att programmet även i framtiden kommer att bidra till att säkerställa eurosedlarnas ställning, inklusive en andra serie eurosedlar.

text: 1.2 ECB understryker sitt aktiva arbete i kampen mot förfalskning av euron. ECB vidareutvecklar utformningen av sedlar samt avancerade tekniska detaljer för eurosedlarna som gör att både lekmän och experter kan skilja mellan äkta sedlar och förfalskningar. När sedlar använts några år är det normal praxis att byta ut dem mot en ny serie för att behålla försprånget gentemot förfalskarna. Även Eurosystemet planerar en sådan förebyggande åtgärd och kommer inom kort att påbörja tillverkningen av en andra serie eurosedlar. ECB analyserar dessutom nya typer av förfalskningar vid sitt Centrum för analys av sedelförfalskningar (CAC) och använder kunskapen för att bistå brottsbekämpande myndigheter med rådgivning. CAC samordnar spridningen av alla kända tekniska och statistiska uppgifter om förfalskningar av euron till alla berörda parter.

text: 2. Specifika kommentarer

text: 2.1 I andra stycket av artikel 4 i förslaget till förordning beskrivs en metod för att bedöma huruvida Periklesprogrammets särskilda mål uppnåtts. I denna aspekt beror resultaten inte bara på effektiva åtgärder inom ramen för Periklesprogrammet 2020 utan även på ett antal externa faktorer - t.ex. antalet förfalskade sedlar i omlopp samt huruvida finansiella, tekniska och rättsliga myndigheter har tillräckliga resurser vad gäller personal, ekonomi och teknik samt hur utbildningsåtgärderna för dessa myndigheter utformas. Programmet bör därför utvärderas mot alla de aspekter som har betydelse för att skydda euron mot förfalskning. ECB rekommenderar därför att ECB och Europol fullt ut deltar i utvärderingen av Periklesprogrammet 2020 enligt vad som framgår av artikel 12.3 och 12.4 i förslaget till förordning.

text: 2.2 Enligt Periklesprogrammet 2020 får förslag från de deltagande medlemsstaterna avse även deltagare från tredjeland, om deras närvaro är viktig för skyddet av euron. Även om deltagare Periklesprogrammet 2020 från tredjeland i främjar skyddet för euron och ökar skyddet mot förfalskningar bör dessa deltagare dock användas med eftertanke och på ett rimligt sätt.

text: 2.3 ECB noterar att artikel 8.2 a och 8.2 c samt artikel 10.3 i förslaget till förordning berör användningen av undersökningsverktyg samt stöd för att finansiera inköp av utrustning. ECB stöder förslaget att bevilja stöd för inköp av allmän laboratorieutrustning som t.ex. mikroskop, infrarödläsare, mikrometermått, utrustning för att mäta ström och magnetism etc. som är till allmän hjälp för undersökningar men inte speciellt framtagna för, eller marknadsförs som, utrustning för att upptäcka förfalskningar. ECB anser att de enda tillförlitliga maskinerna för att upptäcka förfalskade sedlar är de maskiner för vilka man på ECB:s webbplats anger att de på ett framgångsrikt sätt testats med en uppsättning falska sedeltyper samt äkta sedlar som uppvisar olika typer av förslitning. Dessa maskiner är dock avsedda för de som yrkesmässigt hanterar sedlar och går i allmänhet utöver de behov som myndigheter som är specialiserade på insatser mot penningförfalskning har, och som anges som målgrupp enligt artikel 8.2 c i förslaget till förordning. ECB anser därför inte att det är lämpligt att finansiera inköp av maskiner för äkthetskontroll med medel från Periklesprogrammet 2020 eller att använda maskiner för äkthetskontroll av myndigheter som är specialiserade på insatser mot penningförfalskning.

text: 2.4 Det vore därför fördelaktigt för kommissionen, ECB och Europol att tillsammans granska de åtgärder som ska finansieras via Periklesprogrammet 2020 så att man undviker överlappningar mellan Periklesprogrammet 2020 och andra relevanta program eller åtgärder samt för att ta fram en gemensam strategi för att bekämpa penningförfalskning och liknande bedrägerier. Mot bakgrund av detta bör skäl 7 och artikel 11 i förslaget till förordning ändras så att de omfattar att man a) i god tid hör de viktigaste parterna som involverats av kommissionen avseende det årliga arbetsprogrammet och b) inhämtar ECB:s och Europols samtycke avseende det årliga arbetsprogrammet så att detta kan antas. ECB and Europol bör ges tillräckligt med tid för att granska utkastet till årligt arbetsprogram och inkomma med synpunkter innan programmet diskuteras i den behöriga rådgivande kommittén.

text: 2.5 ECB välkomnar artikel 12.1 i förslaget till förordning enligt vilken kommissionen ska genomföra Periklesprogrammet 2020 i samarbete med medlemsstaterna, via samråd i olika stadier av programmets genomförande, med beaktande av relevanta åtgärder som vidtagits av andra behöriga instanser, i synnerhet ECB och Europol. Artikel 12.1 i förslaget till förordning säkerställer ett tillräckligt samarbete på unionsnivå samt konsekvens mellan Periklesprogrammet 2020 och andra relevanta program och åtgärder, men ECB rekommenderar kommissionen att den tillåter tillräckligt med tid för att sätta sig in i dokumentationen avseende de årliga arbetsprogrammet innan den inhämtar ECB:s och Europols synpunkter genom den behöriga rådgivande kommittén.

text: 2.6 ECB rekommenderar att man ändrar den föreslagna artikeln 12.3 och 12.4 så att ECB och Europol inkluderas i utvärderingen av hur effektivt Periklesprogrammet 2020 varit samt huruvida programmet bör förnyas, förändras eller upphävas.

text: BILAGA

text: Kommissionens förslag | ECB:s ändringsförslag

text: (7) Man bör se till att det här åtgärdsprogrammet överensstämmer med och kompletterar EU:s andra program och verksamheter. För att kunna utvärdera eurons skyddsbehov bör kommissionen samråda med de berörda huvudaktörerna (i synnerhet de behöriga nationella myndigheter som medlemsstaterna utsett, Europeiska centralbanken och Europol) i den rådgivande kommitté som avses i förordning

text: (EG) nr 1338/2001

text: , bland annat när det gäller utbyte, bistånd och fortbildning i samband med genomförandet av programmet. | (7) Man bör se till att det här åtgärdsprogrammet överensstämmer med och kompletterar EU:s andra program och verksamheter. Inom en rimlig tid innan det årliga arbetsprogrammet antas bör, Fför att kunna utvärdera eurons skyddsbehov, bör kommissionen samråda med de berörda huvudaktörerna. (i I synnerhet bör kommissionen höra de behöriga nationella myndigheter som medlemsstaterna utsett, och söka samråda med Europeiska centralbanken och Europol om det årliga arbetsprogrammet) i den rådgivande kommitté som avses i förordning

text: (EG) nr 1338/2001

text: Förklaring Det vore fördelaktigt om kommissionen, ECB och Europol tillsammans granskar de åtgärder som ska finansieras via Periklesprogrammet 2020 inom ramen för det årliga arbetsprogrammet. Genom en gemensam granskning kan man undvika dubbelarbete och överlappningar mellan Periklesprogrammet 2020 och andra relevanta program eller åtgärder som drivs av ECB, Europol och andra behöriga nationella myndigheter. Detta tillvägagångssätt skulle dessutom säkerställa en gemensam strategi för att bekämpa penningförfalskning och liknande bedrägerier. ECB föreslår därför att man ändrar skäl 7 i förslaget till förordning ändras så att det omfattar att man a) i god tid ska höra de viktigaste parterna som involverats av kommissionen avseende det årliga arbetsprogrammet och b) inhämtar ECB:s och Europols samtycke avseende det årliga arbetsprogrammet så att detta kan antas.

text: Artikel 11

text: Årligt arbetsprogram Kommissionen ska anta årliga arbetsprogram för att genomföra programmet. Arbetsprogrammen ska innehålla målbeskrivningar, förväntade resultat, en metodbeskrivning och uppgifter om totalkostnader. De ska också innehålla en kortfattad beskrivning av de insatser som ska finansieras, uppgifter om finansieringsbelopp för varje åtgärd och en vägledande tidsplan för deras genomförande. […] |

text: Artikel 11

text: Årligt arbetsprogram Kommissionen ska anta årliga arbetsprogram för att genomföra programmet efter att i god tid ha hört de viktigaste parter som berörs av de årliga utkasten till arbetsprogram och efter att ha inhämtat ECB:s och Europols samtycke. De årliga Aarbetsprogrammen ska innehålla målbeskrivningar, förväntade resultat, en metodbeskrivning och uppgifter om totalkostnader. De ska också innehålla en kortfattad beskrivning av de insatser som ska finansieras, uppgifter om finansieringsbelopp för varje åtgärd och en vägledande tidsplan för deras genomförande. […]

text: Förklaring Det vore fördelaktigt om kommissionen, ECB och Europol tillsammans granskar de åtgärder som ska finansieras via Periklesprogrammet 2020. Genom en sådan gemensam granskning undviker man dubbelarbete och överlappningar mellan Periklesprogrammet 2020 och andra relevanta program eller åtgärder som drivs av ECB, Europol och andra behöriga nationella myndigheter. Detta tillvägagångssätt skulle dessutom säkerställa en gemensam strategi för att bekämpa penningförfalskning och liknande bedrägerier. ECB föreslår därför att man ändrar artikel 11 i förslaget till förordning ändras så att det omfattar att man a) i god tid ska höra de viktigaste parterna som involverats av kommissionen avseende det årliga arbetsprogrammet och b) inhämtar ECB:s och Europols samtycke avseende det årliga arbetsprogrammet så att detta kan antas.

text: (3) Det är kommissionen som ska utvärdera programmet. Kommissionen ska senast den 31 december 2017 […]. | (3) Det är kommissionen som ska utvärdera programmet. Kommissionen ska översända ett utkast till utvärderingsrapport till de behöriga nationella myndigheter som medlems-staterna utsett och söka samråd med Europeiska centralbanken och Europol om innehållet i utvärderingsrapporten i den rådgivande kommitté som avses i förordning

text: (EG) nr 1338/2001

text: Förklaring Det är viktigt att Periklesprogrammet 2020 blir effektivt så att det kan uppnå sina allmänna och särskilda mål. ECB anser att det är av avgörande betydelse att Periklesprogrammet 2020 samordnas med andra unionsprogram eller nationella program, samt även med Europols och ECB:s projekt. I detta sammanhang anser ECB att utvärderingsrapporten bör diskuteras och beslutas mellan alla viktiga parter inom den behöriga rådgivande kommittén i enlighet med förordning

text: (EG) nr 1338/2001

text: . För detta ändamål föreslår ECB ovanstående ändring vilket även ökar ECB:s och Europols roll vid utvärderingen av hur effektivt Periklesprogrammet 2020 varit, samt huruvida programmet bör förnyas, förändras eller upphävas.

text: (4) Senast den 31 december 2021 ska kommissionen även lägga fram en rapport för Europaparlamentet och rådet om hur programmets mål har uppfyllts. | (4) Kommissionen ska även översända ett utkast till rapport om hur programmets mål uppnåtts till de behöriga nationella myndigheter som medlems-staterna utsett och söka samråd med ECB och Europol om utvärderingsrapporten i den rådgivande kommitté som avses i förordning

text: (EG) nr 1338/2001

text: . Senast den 31 december 2021 ska kommissionen även lägga fram en rapport för Europaparlamentet och rådet om hur programmets mål har uppfyllts.

text: Förklaring För att kunna bedöma huruvida Periklesprogrammets särskilda mål har uppnåtts krävs omfattande expertis, kunskap och information. Detta framgår av

text: artikel 4

text: som räknar upp ett antal olika aspekter mot vilka resultaten ska mätas. I denna aspekt beror resultaten inte bara på effektiva åtgärder inom ramen för Periklesprogrammet 2020 utan även på ett antal externa faktorer – t.ex. antalet förfalskade sedlar i omlopp samt huruvida finansiella, tekniska och rättsliga myndigheter har tillräckliga resurser vad gäller personal, ekonomi och teknik samt hur de utbildningsåtgärder för dessa myndigheter utformas. Periklesprogrammet 2020 bör därför utvärderas mot alla de aspekter som har betydelse för att skydda euron mot förfalskning. Därför bör ECB, Europol och de andra behöriga nationella myndigheterna, som alla har omfattande expertis och kunskaper, fullt ut involveras i utvärderingen av målsättningarna för Periklesprogrammet 2020. Man bör även söka ECB:s och Europols samtycke till den slutliga utvärderingsrapporten.