text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 2 OJ L 140, 14.6.2000, p. 1.

text: OJ L 139, 11.5.1998 p. 1.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 28 June 2001 at the request of the Luxembourg Ministry of Finance on a draft Act concerning 1. approval of the International Convention for the Suppression of Counterfeiting Currency, signed in Geneva on 20 April 1929, and the Protocol thereto; and 2. modification of certain provisions of the Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure (CON/2001/16)

text: 1. On 7 May 2001 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Luxembourg Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft Act (hereinafter referred to as the ‘draft Act’) concerning (1) approval of the International Convention for the Suppression of Counterfeiting Currency, signed in Geneva on 20 April 1929 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Geneva Convention’), and the Protocol thereto; and (2) modification of certain provisions of the Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure. 2. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on

text: Article 2 of Council Decision (EC) 98/415 of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft Act contains provisions concerning currency matters. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the ECB, this opinion has been adopted by the Governing Council of the ECB.

text: 3. Under Article 2 of the Council framework Decision of 29 May 2000 on increasing protection by criminal penalties and other sanctions against counterfeiting in connection with the introduction of the euro (hereinafter referred to as the ‘framework Decision’) , the Member States that have not yet done so undertake to accede to the Geneva Convention and its Protocol. The ECB understands that, in terms of the first Article of the draft Act, Luxembourg approves the Convention and its Protocol. However, the ECB notes that under Luxembourg law, in order to bring the Convention and its Protocol into force in Luxembourg, this approval has to be supplemented by deposit of the ratifying instrument signed by the Grand-Duke. The ECB further recalls that a text evidencing the transposition of the Convention and its Protocol into

text: 4. Article 3(2) of the framework Decision requires each Member State to take the necessary measures to ensure that participating in and instigating the conduct referred to in

text: Article 3(1)

text: , and attempting the conduct referred to in points (a) to (c) of

text: Article 3(1)

text: , are punishable. The ECB notes that apart from specific provisions of the draft Act, provisions of general Luxembourg criminal law are also relevant in so far as they provide that attempts to commit, or the commission of the said offences, are punishable. These general provisions therefore have to be transmitted to the ECB not later than 29 May 2001 in accordance with article 11(2) of the framework Decision. However, as far as the offence of instigating is concerned, the present wording of the draft Act does not seem to make this offence punishable at all. There is furthermore no indication in the statement of reasons that such offences would be punishable on the grounds of any provision of general Luxembourg criminal law.

text: 5. Furthermore, the present draft Act does not foresee a specific provision on the liability of legal persons. The ECB recalls that under Article 8 of the framework Decision, each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that legal persons can also be held liable for counterfeiting offences.

text: 6. The ECB notes that at present the draft Act does not ensure that conduct referred to in Articles 3 and 4 of the framework Decision is punishable if it relates to banknotes and coins in national currency units of Member States which will lose their status as legal tender with the introduction of the euro banknotes and coins. Indeed, the Luxembourg draft Act limits criminal conduct to coins and banknotes that are legal tender in Luxembourg or in a foreign country or whose issue is authorised by a law of a foreign State or by virtue of a provision having the force of law in such a State. In accordance with

text: Article 15(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 974/98 of 3 May 1998

text: on the introduction of the euro , banknotes and coins denominated in a national currency unit lose their status as legal tender after the end of the transitional period. In Luxembourg, the end of the transitional period for Luxembourg and Belgian francs has been set at 28 February 2002. However, any Luxembourg and Belgian francs remaining in the public’s hands after that date will continue to be exchanged after 28 February 2002, without charge, against euro notes and coins at the Banque centrale du Luxembourg (BCL) and certain credit institutions established in Luxembourg. Similar provisions exist in the other Member States participating in the euro for the banknotes and coins denominated in their respective national currency units. The ECB shares the concern expressed in this respect by the Luxembourg State Council in its opinion of 29 May 2001. It therefore considers that the draft Act should include fraudulent conduct in relation to the old banknotes and coins since, although no longer legal tender themselves, they will be directly exchangeable with euro banknotes and coins. The principle of legality indeed requires the inclusion of such an express provision. Taking into account the ease with which old banknotes can be converted into euro banknotes, the draft Act should provide for the same effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties as for offences relating to banknotes being legal tender. Such a provision should be formulated sufficiently broadly in order to also encompass the possible scenario whereby euro banknotes were no longer legal tender.

text: 7. The ECB suggests that the fines mentioned in Articles

text: and

text: , currently expressed in Luxembourg francs, should be expressed in euro.

text: 8. The ECB further notes that the present draft Act does not include any provisions on the involvement of the BCL in the fight against counterfeiting. Specific provisions on such involvement would be desirable to facilitate the fulfilment of obligations undertaken by Luxembourg under Article 14 of the Geneva Convention and Articles 4 and 5 of the draft Council Regulation laying down the measures necessary for the protection of the euro against counterfeiting, which is about to be adopted.

text: 9. This opinion does not cover Articles

text: , and 187 of the Penal Code, which are introduced by the draft Act, as these Articles do not fall within the competence of the ECB.

text: 10. This opinion shall be without prejudice to the obligation of Luxembourg to transmit to the ECB the text of the provisions transposing into Luxembourg law the obligations imposed on it under Article 11(2) of the framework Decision.

text: 11. The ECB confirms that it has no objection to publication of this opinion by the competent national authorities at their discretion. Done at Frankfurt am Main on 28 June 2001. The President of the ECB [signed] Willem F. DUISENBERG


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

publisher: Europeiska centralbanken

sprak: en

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 2 August 2001 at the request of the German Ministry of Finance on a draft Seventh Law amending the Deutsche Bundesbank Act (CON/2001/17)

serie: con

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 2 August 2001 at the request of the German Ministry of Finance on a draft Seventh Law amending the Deutsche Bundesbank Act (

type: rubrik

text: 1. On 20 June 2001, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the German Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft Seventh Law amending the Bundesbank Act (hereinafter referred to as the ‘draft Act’).

type: stycke

text: 2. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Article 105(4) of the Treaty establishing the European Community (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Treaty’) and the third indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions . In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, this opinion has been adopted by the Governing Council of the ECB.

text: 3. The express intention of the draft Act is mainly the design of the structure of the Deutsche Bundesbank in such a way that it is better suited to the current and future requirements of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB). Therefore, the draft Act is intended to strengthen and centralise the decision-making structure and management of the Deutsche Bundesbank and to strengthen the position of its President. This is justified as a consequence of the start of Stage III of economic and monetary union on 1 January 1999 and the transfer of monetary policy and exchange rate policy decision-making powers to the Eurosystem. In this respect, the draft Act provides for the following amendments: (i) the abolition of the Central Bank Council (Zentralbankrat), the Directorate (Direktorium) and the Executive Boards of the main offices of the Deutsche Bundesbank (Vorstände der Landeszentralbanken) including their independent decision-making powers (known as reserved spheres of responsibility) and the appointment of a Bundesbank Executive Board (Vorstand) (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Board’) consisting of the President, the Vice-President and four other members; and (ii) the repeal of the right of members of the Federal Government to attend the meetings of the Central Bank Council and their right to propose motions.

text: 4. The ECB very much welcomes these amendments as they enhance the ability of the Deutsche Bundesbank to act efficiently as an integral part of the Eurosystem and of its President, in particular, as a member of the Governing Council and the General Council.

text: 5. The draft Act furthermore clarifies for the first time that the tasks of holding and managing the foreign reserves of the Federal Republic of Germany, as well as contributing to the stability of payment and clearing systems, fall to the Deutsche Bundesbank. The draft Act also stipulates that the Deutsche Bundesbank's transactions with credit institutions will no longer be limited to counterparties that are established in the Federal Republic of Germany. The ECB takes note of these amendments and welcomes them in so far as the powers of the Deutsche Bundesbank are clarified and the wording of the Bundesbank Act has been brought further in line with the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Statute’). In addition, regarding the Deutsche Bundesbank's transactions with public authorities, the provision referring to the involvement of the Deutsche Bundesbank in the issuance of federal debt securities (paragraph 2 of Section 20 of the Bundesbank Act) has been repealed. The ECB understands that this repeal does not impair the competence of the Deutsche Bundesbank to act as a fiscal agent of the Government.

text: 6. The ECB notes that the expanded definition of the functions of the Deutsche Bundesbank under the second sentence of Section 3 of the draft Act does not include the responsibilities of the Deutsche Bundesbank with regard to the pursuance of financial stability. The ECB considers that, in view of the express intention of the draft Act of optimising the central banking functions of the Deutsche Bundesbank in the Eurosystem context, the draft Act is the appropriate legal instrument in which to clarify that the Deutsche Bundesbank has the responsibility for contributing to the overall stability of the financial system as a whole, as a separate function from hands-on supervision and financial regulation. This clarification would, first, confirm the concrete role played by the Deutsche Bundesbank in the institutional framework for financial stability in the Federal Republic of Germany. Secondly, the formal attribution of such responsibility to the Deutsche Bundesbank would support the role of the Eurosystem in monitoring the risks to financial stability in the euro area. In this context, it is recalled that, in accordance with Article 105(5) of the Treaty, the Eurosystem is entrusted with the task of contributing to the smooth conduct of policies pursued by the competent authorities relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system. Thirdly, considering the envisaged integration of supervision of financial intermediaries in the Federal Republic of Germany, it would contribute to a smooth interaction between central banking and supervisory functions.

text: 7. The ECB understands that the definition of the responsibilities of the Deutsche Bundesbank with regard to prudential supervision will be specifically dealt with in the German Government’s forthcoming proposal for legislation to set up integrated supervision of financial intermediaries. Without prejudice to the opinion which will be given in that context, the ECB suggests that assignation to the Deutsche Bundesbank in the draft Act of the statutory responsibility of contributing to the prudential regulation and supervision of financial intermediaries might be considered. This would follow from the clarification that the Deutsche Bundesbank has a clear mandate regarding achievement of financial stability as mentioned above. With regard to the more specific operational involvement of the Deutsche Bundesbank in prudential supervision, the ECB will present its views once it has been consulted on the German Government’s proposal.

text: 8. The draft Act strengthens the position of the President of the Deutsche Bundesbank by empowering him to nominate, with the exception of the Vice-President, the four other members of the Board, in addition to his right to appoint civil servants within the Deutsche Bundesbank. In addition, he is granted a right of veto with regard to the annual accounts and, particularly importantly, the standard costs account and the investment plan.

text: 9. While realising that the Treaty and the Statute are silent on the organisational structure of the decision-making bodies of the national central banks, the ECB wishes to point out that, in the case that a decision is made in favour of a collegiate body, a right of veto given to the President, who is also a Member of the Board, with regard to the standard cost account, the investment plan and the annual accounts could, in particular, be regarded as being in conflict with the collegiate nature of the Board. By providing that the Board is to take its decisions by simple majority voting, the draft Act establishes the principle of collegiate responsibility. This principle is based on equal participation by the Board members in the adoption of decisions, from which it follows in particular that decisions are adopted on the basis of collective deliberations and that all members of the Board bear collective responsibility at a political level for adopted decisions.

text: 10. Finally, it is particularly significant that the draft Act introduces for the first time compulsory preparation of a budget including a cost estimate (standard cost account) and an investment estimate (investment plan) for the Deutsche Bundesbank (following the practice in the past), specific veto rights of its President (see Section 7 of the draft Act) and the right of the German Federal Parliament to propose recommendations to improve the efficiency of the Deutsche Bundesbank. The details of the new regime are as follows: (i) the Board of the Deutsche Bundesbank prepares the annual accounts; (ii) in order to support its management and administration, the Deutsche Bundesbank prepares a standard cost account; (iii) for each financial year, the Deutsche Bundesbank draws up a standard cost account and an investment plan before the beginning of each financial year and a comparative analysis of the budgeted figures and the actual costs and investment (hereinafter referred to as the “comparative analysis”) at the end of each financial year. The comparative analysis is to be reviewed separately by the auditors; (iv) the annual accounts, the standard cost account, the investment plan, the comparative analysis and the reports of the auditors are to be forwarded to the Federal Ministry of Finance and the Federal Court of Auditors; (v) the German Federal Parliament will be provided with the annual accounts, the comparative analysis and the reports of the auditors; (vi) the Federal Court of Auditors is to report its findings to the German Federal Parliament; and finally (vii) the German Federal Parliament may use the report of the auditors and the report of the Federal Court of Auditors as a basis for recommendations to improve the efficiency of the Deutsche Bundesbank.

text: 11. The ECB is concerned that the new Bundesbank Act will carry risks for the current high level of independence of the Deutsche Bundesbank. The ECB notes, however, that the draft Act, which has been submitted to the ECB for consultation, differs from the draft published on the website of the Federal Ministry of Finance in April 2001. This previous version provided that the German Federal Parliament could not only adopt recommendations concerning expenditure of the Deutsche Bundesbank but could also decide on the discharge of the Board of the Deutsche Bundesbank on the basis of the report by the auditors and the report of the Federal Court of Auditors. The ECB is pleased to note that the draft Act submitted to the ECB no longer foresees such a discharge procedure. Article 108 of the Treaty requires that the Member States and, in particular, the Governments of the Member States, undertake to respect the independence of the national central banks and not seek to influence the members of their decision-making bodies in the performance of their ESCB-related tasks. The ECB considers that such a discharge procedure or similar procedures would lead to an increase in external political influence, enabling pressure to be exercised over the members of the Board and, in particular, the President. This would be incompatible with the independence of decision-making bodies required by Article 108 of the Treaty. The draft Act submitted at this stage assigns a right to the German Federal Parliament to adopt recommendations. This formulation is justified in the Explanatory Memorandum on the grounds that it is modelled on relevant provisions under Community Law. According to Article 248 of the Treaty, the European Court of Auditors reports to the European Parliament. However, an explicit statutory right of the European Parliament to issue recommendations concerning possible improvements in the efficiency of the ECB is clearly not foreseen. Furthermore, the scope of the recommendations that could be adopted by the German Federal Parliament is particularly wide, since their objective is ‘an improvement in the efficiency of the Deutsche Bundesbank’ in general and, therefore, could also cover Eurosystem-related activities, for instance the implementation of monetary policy decisions. Although recommendations adopted by the German Federal Parliament are by definition not legally binding on the Deutsche Bundesbank, it will be virtually impossible in practice for the Deutsche Bundesbank to ignore them, given the political pressure which would be exercised over the Board. Such external political pressure would also affect the President's position as a member of the Governing Council of the ECB and, as a consequence, the independence of a decision-making body of the ECB. Therefore, the right of the German Federal Parliament as foreseen in the present draft Act to adopt recommendations to improve the efficiency of the Deutsche Bundesbank is incompatible with the independence of the Deutsche Bundesbank and the ECB. Moreover, such a provision will send negative and incorrect signals. Traditionally, the Deutsche Bundesbank has always been a model of central bank independence. In preparation for the Maastricht Treaty, Germany always took a particularly strong position as regards extensive central bank independence and insisted that the new ESCB and the ECB enjoy the same degree of independence as the Deutsche Bundesbank. If the amendments are now adopted as proposed, this might be interpreted by the financial markets and the general public as a fundamental change in approach. The simple reference to Article 108 of the Treaty in the relevant provision of the draft Act, without further clarification, does not allow for any other conclusion. Done at Frankfurt am Main on 2 August 2001. The President of the ECB [signed] Willem F. DUISENBERG

type: vagledning

utgivare: ecb


title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 24 August 2001 at the request of the Austrian Ministry of Justice on a draft law amending Austrian criminal law (Strafrechtsänderungsgesetz 2001) (CON/2001/19)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 24 August 2001 at the request of the Austrian Ministry of Justice on a draft law amending Austrian criminal law (Strafrechtsänderungsgesetz 2001) (

text: 1. On 30 July 2001 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Austrian Ministry of Justice on a draft law amending Austrian criminal law (Strafrechtsänderungsgesetz 2001) (hereinafter referred to as the “draft law”).

text: 2. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on the second indent of Article 105(4) of the Treaty establishing the European Community, the second indent of Article 4(a) of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank and the first indent of

text: on the consultation of the ECB by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions1, as the legislative proposal contains provisions concerning currency matters. The Governing Council of the ECB has adopted this opinion in accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the ECB.

text: 3. The main purpose of the draft law is the conversion of amounts and thresholds in schillings into euro. At the same time, its intention is the adjustment of amounts and thresholds for inflation or their increase on the grounds of criminal law policy.

text: 4. The substitution of schilling amounts with euro amounts is based on the following principles. · Thresholds, which, if exceeded, result in a higher punishment, will be adjusted in the light of social considerations. In particular, this concerns offences against property. · In respect of minimum and maximum amounts for penalties, it provides for an adjustment for inflation and introduces rounded amounts, which can easily be remembered. · In the area of fees, the draft law proposes for budgetary reasons a direct conversion according to the conversion rules.

text: 5. The ECB welcomes the draft law, which provides for the replacement of schilling amounts with euro amounts in the area of criminal law. Such adjustments are in the interests of legal clarity and transparency of the national legal system.

text: 6. The ECB notes that as regards certain “signal amounts”, smoothing in order to obtain round and convenient figures is considered necessary for reasons of transparency and practicability.

text: 7. The ECB notes that the draft law provides for an adjustment for inflation for the purpose of fines. In its opinion of 17 May 2001 on a draft Second Federal Law containing ancillary measures for the introduction of the euro (2. Euro-Justiz-Begleitgesetz), the ECB underlined the importance of the principle of “no impact on costs” in the context of the introduction of the euro. In this respect, it is essential for the legislator to clearly state the reason for the increase of administrative fees or pecuniary penalties, which, of course, is not related to the changeover to the euro. The ECB notes that the explanatory memorandum of the draft law specifies the grounds for the proposed increases, namely the rise of the consumer price index since the last adjustment in 1988 of 35,8 % and the intention to avoid repeated adjustments within a short period of time.

text: 8. The ECB notes that the upward adjustment of thresholds in the field of offences against property is due to criminal law policy. The ECB does not consider itself to be competent to comment on issues of general criminal law policy.

text: 9. The ECB suggests that for the purposes of direct conversion (e.g. Article 52 of the Penal Code (StVG)), the explanatory memorandum make reference to the conversion and rounding rules in Articles

text: and

text: of Council Regulation (EC) No 1103/97 of 17 June 1997 on certain provisions relating to the introduction of the euro .

text: 10. The ECB confirms that it has no objections to the publication of this opinion by the competent national authorities. Done at Frankfurt am Main on 24 August 2001. The President of the ECB [signed] Willem F. DUISENBERG


text: 3 Annex 1 to the draft decree. 4 Annex 2 to the draft decree.

text: Draft decree,

text: Article 2

text: . 6 Draft decree,

text: Article 1

text: . 7 Ibidem. 8 Draft decree,

text: Article 3

text: . 9 Ibidem. 10 Ibidem. 11

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 30 August 2001 at the request of the French Ministry of Economy, Finance and Industry on a draft decree relating to the marking of banknotes denominated in francs (CON/2001/20)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 30 August 2001 at the request of the French Ministry of Economy, Finance and Industry on a draft decree relating to the marking of banknotes denominated in francs (

text: 1. On 6 August 2001 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the French Ministry of Economy, Finance and Industry for an opinion on a draft decree (hereinafter referred to as the “draft decree”) concerning the marking by perforation of certain banknotes in francs that will be returned to credit institutions, the Post Office and the accountants of the Treasury for exchange operations between francs and euro between 1 January and 30 June 2002.

text: 2. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Article 105(4) of the Treaty establishing the European Community (hereinafter referred to as the “Treaty”), the first indent of Article 4(a) of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank and the first indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , since the draft decree relates to currency matters. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank , this opinion has been adopted by the Governing Council of the ECB.

text: 3. The draft decree provides for the perforation of banknotes denominated in francs that will be returned to credit institutions empowered to perform a banking service in France, the Post Office and the accountants of the Treasury for exchange operations between francs and euro between 1 January and 30 June 2002. All banknotes, except the 20 francs banknote, may be subject to the perforation . The draft decree sets forth the manner in which the banknotes are to be perforated and provides that only credit institutions empowered to perform a banking service in France, the Post Office and the Treasury’s accountants may perform such perforation .

text: 4. Pursuant to the draft decree, the perforated banknotes and banknotes in francs whose condition prevents verification of the possible presence of this perforation shall be neither exchangeable nor redeemable . However, perforated banknotes may be accepted by the Banque de France or the Institut d’émission des départements d’outre-mer, acting for and on behalf of the Banque de France, when deposited at the counters of the Banque de France or the Institut d’émission des départements d’outre-mer by a credit institution, the financial services of the Post Office, the accountants of the Treasury or a company transporting funds to be credited to its account . Furthermore, the draft decree provides that, except in the cases foreseen in Articles 1 and 2 of the draft decree, accepting, holding or using a perforated banknote or a banknote in francs whose condition prevents verification of this perforation shall be sanctioned by a fine . The draft decree also provides that the object that has been used or was intended to be used for the offence or that is the product thereof, and the perforated banknotes or banknotes in francs whose condition prevents verification of the possible presence of this perforation, shall be confiscated . Furthermore, legal persons may be held liable under criminal law for the offence of accepting, holding or using the above-mentioned banknotes .

text: 5. As stated in paragraph 13 of Opinion

text: of 26 June 2001 at the request of the Nationale Bank van België/Banque Nationale de Belgique on a draft law relating to the cash changeover to the euro in Belgium, the ECB considers that national measures may be taken in the context of the withdrawal of national banknotes (including the marking or neutralisation of such banknotes). Indeed, national measures taken to facilitate the withdrawal of national banknotes are envisaged and provided for in

text: Article 15 of Council Regulation (EC) No 974/98 of 3 May 1998

text: on the introduction of the euro .

text: 6. The ECB understands that the perforation of certain banknotes denominated in francs, the prohibition (except for credit institutions, the Post Office and the accountants of the Treasury in the cases laid down in Articles 1 and 2 of the draft decree) against accepting, holding and using the perforated banknotes and banknotes in francs whose condition prevents verification of the possible presence of this perforation, and the confiscation described above constitute specific security measures, which should facilitate the smooth withdrawal of banknotes denominated in francs. Insofar as the proposed measures facilitate the withdrawal of such banknotes, the ECB welcomes the draft decree.

text: 7. Based on the assumption that the perforated banknotes should be treated as mutilated banknotes, the fact that the perforated banknotes may only be exchanged at the counters of the Banque de France or the Institut d’émission des départements d’outre-mer does not infringe Article 52 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, which requires national central banks to exchange at par banknotes of all participating Member States.

text: 8. The ECB understands that the perforated banknotes and banknotes denominated in francs whose condition prevents verification of the possible presence of the perforation will continue to be legal tender during the dual circulation period but their use and circulation will be restricted by the draft decree. In this context, the ECB notes that the Code Monétaire et Financier already provides for other restrictions on the use of banknotes which are legal tender for payments above a certain amount and in the context of certain transactions.

text: 9. The ECB confirms that it has no objection to the publication of this opinion at the discretion of the competent national authority. Done at Frankfurt am Main on 30 August 2001. The President of the ECB [signed] Willem F. DUISENBERG


text: OJ L 139, 11.5.1998, p 1. Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, European Commission, Euro coins, From design to circulation, May 2000, p. 8. 6

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 30 August 2001 at the request of the Bank of Greece on a draft law presented to the Greek Parliament by the Minister of National Economy and Finance with respect to the circulation of euro banknotes and coins and other related provisions (CON/2001/21)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 30 August 2001 at the request of the Bank of Greece on a draft law presented to the Greek Parliament by the Minister of National Economy and Finance with respect to the circulation of euro banknotes and coins and other related provisions (

text: 1. On 1 August 2001 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Bank of Greece for an opinion on a draft law with respect to the circulation of euro banknotes and coins and other related provisions (hereinafter referred to as the “Draft Act”).

text: 2. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Article 105(4) of the Treaty establishing the European Community (hereinafter referred to as the “Treaty”) and the first and second indents of

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions since the Draft Act deals with currency matters and means of payment. Article 11(2) of the Council framework Decision of 29 May 2000 on increasing protection by criminal penalties and other sanctions against counterfeiting in connection with the introduction of the euro (hereinafter referred to as the “framework Decision”) provides the ECB with the possibility to contribute in relation to the provisions transposing into national law the obligations imposed on Member States under the framework Decision. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank , this opinion has been adopted by the Governing Council of the ECB.

text: 3. In line with

text: on the introduction of the euro , Article 1 of the Draft Act introduces a parallel circulation period, which will be limited to the period running from 1 January 2002 to 28 February 2002.

text: 4. The Draft Act provides that the right to issue coins is vested in the Greek State and that approval by the ECB is necessary for issuance. A reference to Article 106(2) of the Treaty is made in connection with this issuance and also in respect of commemorative coins. Features and designs of the national side of the first series of coins, the procedure to select the designs of the national side for future series and the production of coins, as well as the withdrawal of coins, are stipulated in the Draft Act. The Bank of Greece, according to the national cash changeover scenario, shall have the obligation to exchange banknotes denominated in drachmae for euro until 1 March 2012, while the Bank of Greece and the Internal Revenue Offices shall exchange coins denominated in drachmae for euro until 1 March 2004.

text: 5. Member States are free to design the national sides of euro coins provided that 12 stars are displayed on such national side . For the sake of legal clarity, the ECB appreciates that appropriate wording regarding this condition applying to the national sides has been introduced in Article 3(4) of the Draft Act.

text: 6. The Draft Act prohibits frontloading and sub-frontloading beyond the conditions set out in Article 7(2) of the Draft Act and pursuant to the provisions of Guideline ECB/2001/1 of 10 January 2001 adopting certain provisions on the 2002 cash changeover . The ECB welcomes that the eligible institutions for frontloading are stipulated in the Draft Act. The conditions for sub-frontloading are broadly laid down, while the general public may be provided with euro coins in the form of “starter kits” from 17 December 2001. In addition to the credit institutions, the Bank of Greece, and other institutions designated by the Minister of Finance following a proposal by the Bank of Greece may sub-frontload the general public with euro coins in the form of “starter kits”, from the same date. By a similar decision, the Bank of Greece and eligible credit institutions may be authorised to supply retailers with euro coins. The ECB welcomes that the Bank of Greece may modify the terms and conditions for frontloading and sub-frontloading in accordance with the relevant guidelines and decisions of the European Central Bank. In

text: Article 7(3)

text: , the Draft Act makes provision for adequate collateral for frontloading.

text: 7. Furthermore, the ECB welcomes the provision in

text: Article 7(5)

text: specifying the parameters for the imposition of administrative sanctions by the Bank of Greece on credit institutions in the case of violation of their obligations under frontloading agreements. Following harmonisation in the respective field with other participating NCBs, the administrative sanction has been set at the level of 10 % of the amount of the violation or, if such amount cannot be determined, as a lump sum between 10,000 and up to one million euro.

text: 8. From the publication of the Draft Act until 31 December 2001, Article 7(6) of the Draft Act prohibits the production, issuance, distribution or supply of collectors’ coins, medals or tokens bearing the words “euro” or “lepta/cent” or designs, similar to those appearing on the common sides of the euro coins.

text: 9. The ECB welcomes the provision of Article 7(4) of the Draft Act that frontloading and subfrontloading agreements in respect of euro banknotes and coins shall not be subject to any tax or levy or any other fiscal burden, direct or indirect. This underlines the principle that the cash changeover should have no impact on costs.

text: 10. Article 3(2) of the framework Decision requires each Member State to take the necessary measures to ensure that participating in and instigating the conduct referred to in Article 3(1) of the framework Decision, and attempting the conduct referred to in points (a) to (c) of

text: Article 3

text: , paragraph 1 of the framework Decision, are punishable. The ECB notes that apart from specific provisions of the Draft Act, provisions of general Greek criminal law are also relevant in so far as they provide that all forms of participation to the commission of the said offences are punishable. In that regard, specific provisions of the Penal Code are to be amended by means of Article 8 of the Draft Act, which transposes into Greek law the provisions of Articles 3 and 4 of the framework Decision. Furthermore, legislation regarding the protection of national currency continues to apply according to Article 8(6) of the Draft Act. With regard to the offences of instigating, participating in and attempting the conduct referred to in

text: Article 3(1)

text: points (a) to (c) of the framework Decision, the present wording of the Draft Act does not address these issues. It is understood that these offences should be punishable under the general provisions of Greek criminal law (

text: Articles 42

text: to 49 of the Greek Penal Code). It is noted that the minimum punishment of incarceration will be augmented for all offences covered by the framework Decision.

text: 11. The Draft Act provides for administrative sanctions imposed on legal entities in the case that individuals with a power of representation of that legal person, or authority to take decisions on behalf of it, or authority to exercise control within it, pursue activities described in the provisions of Article 8 of the Draft Act implementing Articles 3 and 4 of the framework Decision.

text: 12. The ECB welcomes that the Draft Act provides that conduct referred to in Articles 3 and 4 of the framework Decision is punishable if it relates to banknotes and coins in national currency units of Member States which are accepted for exchange by competent agencies.

text: 13. The ECB further notes that the Draft Act does not include any provisions allowing Greece to comply with its obligations under Articles

text: and

text: of Council Regulation (EC) No 1338/2001 of 28 June 2001 laying down the measures necessary for the protection of the euro against counterfeiting . It is understood that the Greek authorities are bound to take the necessary measures to comply with the obligations under the above Regulation prior to its entry into force.

text: 14. The ECB welcomes that Article 7 of the Draft Act protects the frontloading and subfrontloading operations in Greece by penalising the use of euro banknotes as a means of payment before 1 January 2002.

text: 15. The ECB takes note of Article 8(7) of the Draft Act empowering the Government, by joint decision of the competent Ministers, to adjust financial amounts in drachmae, such as fines, fees, pecuniary penalties, charges, levies etc., after rounding into euro from 1 January 2002. With regard to a number of legislative provisions, a smoothing of rounded amounts is considered necessary for greater legal certainty and transparency. In this context, the ECB should like to recall the joint statement by the members of the Eurogroup of 4 June 2001, whereby, overall, conversion into euro of all prices, charges and fees administered by governments will be price neutral or smoothed in favour of the consumer.

text: 16. The ECB confirms that it has no objection to the publication of this opinion at the discretion of the consulting authority. Done at Frankfurt am Main on 30 August 2001. The President of the ECB [signed] Willem F. DUISENBERG


text: 3 OJ L 125, 19.5.1999, p. 34.

text: OJ C 303, 24.10.2000, p. 6.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 30 August 2001 at the request of the Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance on a draft Decree Law introducing urgent provisions for the introduction and safeguard of the euro (CON/2001/22)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 30 August 2001 at the request of the Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance on a draft Decree Law introducing urgent provisions for the introduction and safeguard of the euro (

text: 1. On 10 August 2001 the European Central Bank (ECB) received an urgent request from the Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance for an opinion on a draft Decree Law containing urgent provisions for the introduction and safeguard of the euro (the Draft Act).

text: 2. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Article 105(4) of the Treaty establishing the European Community, and on the first, fifth and sixth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions . In addition, Article 11(2) of the Council Framework Decision of 29 May 2000 on increasing protection by criminal penalties and other sanctions against counterfeiting in connection with the introduction of the euro provides the ECB with the possibility to contribute to the drafting of the provisions transposing the obligations imposed on Member States under the Framework Decision into national law. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank , this opinion has been adopted by the Governing Council of the ECB.

text: 3. The Draft Act is composed of two sections. Section I (Disposizioni per il passaggio all’euro del sistema bancario e finanziario) deals with the introduction of the euro and the smooth operation of banks and other providers of financial services, along the lines of the provisions of the Commission Recommendation of 11 October 2000 on measures to facilitate the preparation of economic operators for the changeover to the euro . The Draft Act intends to ensure that all financial institutions concerned by the euro changeover are covered. Furthermore, this section contains provisions regarding the closure of the Italian TARGET component BI-REL, on the basis of decisions of the Governing Council of the ECB on the TARGET operating days calendar. 4. Section II (Disposizioni contro la falsificazione dell’euro) focuses on the implementation of the Framework Decision, and of

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 1338/2001 of 28 June 2001

text: laying down measures necessary for the protection of the euro against counterfeiting .

text: Article 1(1)

text: and (2) provides for the possibility for banks to convert accounts denominated in euro area currencies to euro with effect from the date of entry into force of the Decree Law. Any such conversion will be formally announced in the Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica Italiana. Customers will be entitled to expressly request, within 15 days of publication, that their accounts continue to be denominated in lire. Moreover,

text: Article 1(3)

text: lays down several provisions concerning the denomination of cheques and other credit instruments from 1 January 2002. The ECB understands that the provisions on early conversion of accounts are fully in line with the principle of “no compulsion, no prohibition” and welcomes the legal clarification provided by

text: Article 1(3)

text: 6. The ECB understands that Article 3 of the Draft Act enables the Banca d’Italia to close, in compliance with the decisions taken within the European System of Central Banks, the Italian TARGET component BI-REL on national working days which are TARGET closing days, as determined by decisions of the Governing Council of the ECB. The ECB notes that, according to the Draft Act, any such closure of the BI-REL is subject to an announcement being made in the Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica Italiana at least 15 days in advance of the scheduled closure day. Furthermore, this Article provides for the automatic extension of a maturity date for an obligation to be settled in the BI-REL system to the next business day, whenever the maturity date in question falls on a TARGET, and thus BI-REL, closing day, which is a national working day in Italy. The ECB welcomes the proposed Article, since it provides legal certainty as to when the obligations need to be settled if they fall due on a TARGET, and thus BI-REL, closing day, which is also an Italian national working day.

text: 7. The ECB welcomes Article 5 of the Draft Act, which partially implements Article 3 of the Framework Decision. It provides that fraudulent conduct relating to holograms or other components of currency, which serve to protect against counterfeiting, are punishable. The ECB recalls that fraudulent making, receiving, obtaining or possession of computer programs adapted for the counterfeiting or altering of currency needs to be punishable to fully comply with

text: Article 3(1)

text: (d) of the Framework Decision.

text: 8. The Draft Act does not implement Article 4 of the Framework Decision as regards making punishable the fraudulent use of legal facilities or materials. This Article cannot be interpreted narrowly, as though it referred only to State officials and employees directly involved in the process leading to the issuance of coins and banknotes. Rather, it should be seen as applying to all persons who may be involved in this process (e.g. suppliers of material needed for the issuance of coins and banknotes). The ECB takes note that the Italian authorities consider it unnecessary to provide a specific criminal sanction for illegal activities covered by

text: Article 4

text: . The explanatory memorandum to the Draft Act points out that in Italy no private companies are currently involved in manufacturing banknotes and coins. Italian authorities have informed the ECB that, for the time being, the violations considered in Article 4 of the Framework Decision could be committed by public officials only and are therefore already sanctioned by existing criminal law.

text: 9. As regards the obligation set forth in Article 2(2) of the Framework Decision concerning the International Convention of 20 April 1929 for the Suppression of Counterfeiting Currency and its Protocol (the Geneva Convention), the ECB recalls that the text of the provisions transposing the Geneva Convention into Italian Law should be transmitted to the ECB in accordance with Article 11(2) of the Framework Decision.

text: 10. As far as compliance with

text: Regulation (EC) No 1338/2001

text: is concerned, the ECB understands that the role conferred on the Ministry of Economy and Finance and the Banca d’Italia by

text: Article 7(4)

text: is that of the “competent national authority” as referred to in

text: Article 2

text: (b) of the above-mentioned Regulation. The ECB is aware that the Banca d’Italia has been designated as the National Analysis Centre for Italy (NAC), in a letter of 20 June 2001 sent to the President of the ECB by the Director General of the Ministry of Finance, Balance of Payments and Economic Programming. The ECB confirms its agreement with this designation by means of a separate letter.

text: 11. This opinion shall be without prejudice to Italy’s obligation to transmit to the ECB the text of the provisions transposing into Italian law the obligations imposed on it under the Framework Decision.

text: 12. The ECB confirms that it has no objection to the publication of this opinion at the discretion of the competent national authority. Done at Frankfurt am Main on 30 August 2001. The President of the ECB [signed] Willem F. DUISENBERG


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: OJ L 318, 27.11.1998, p. 8.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 30 August 2001 at the request of the Belgian Minister of Finance on a draft law on the compilation of the balance of payments and the international investment position of Belgium and amending the Decree Law of 6 October 1944 on foreign exchange controls and various legal provisions (CON/2001/23)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 30 August 2001 at the request of the Belgian Minister of Finance on a draft law on the compilation of the balance of payments and the international investment position of Belgium and amending the Decree Law of 6 October 1944 on foreign exchange controls and various legal provisions (

text: 1. On 24 July 2001, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Belgian Minister of Finance for an opinion on a draft law on the compilation of the balance of payments and the international investment position of Belgium and amending the Decree Law of 6 October 1944 on foreign exchange controls and various legal provisions.

text: 2. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on the second indent of Article 105(4) of the Treaty establishing the European Community (hereinafter referred to as the “Treaty”), the second indent of Article 4(a) of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter referred to as the “Statute”), and on the third and fourth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the legislative proposal contains provisions concerning the collection, compilation and distribution of monetary, financial, banking, payment systems and balance of payments statistics by the Nationale Bank van België/Banque Nationale de Belgique. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the ECB, this opinion has been adopted by the Governing Council of the ECB.

text: 3. The main purpose of the draft law is to entrust to the Nationale Bank van België/Banque Nationale de Belgique from 1 January 2002 the task of collecting the appropriate basic data enabling it to compile statistics related to Belgium’s balance of payments and international investment position. The Nationale Bank van België/Banque Nationale de Belgique would thus assume responsibility for the statistical work currently performed by an institution common to Belgium and the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Belgisch-Luxemburgs Wisselinstituut/Institut belgo-luxembourgeois du change, which the Belgian and Luxembourg Governments have decided to abolish when the reason for the monetary association between the two countries has ceased to exist with the introduction of euro banknotes and coins on 1 January 2002.

text: 4. As a general observation, the ECB notes that the innovations introduced by the draft law relate mainly to the explicit reference, on the one hand, to the international investment position of Belgium as such, while this was previously considered to be a statistic ancillary to the balance of payments, and, on the other hand, to the participation by the Nationale Bank van België/Banque Nationale de Belgique in the European System of Central Banks (ESCB). As a consequence, the restrictive list of authorised uses of data collected specifies that this is without prejudice to compliance with the obligations relating to duties in respect of the ESCB. The ECB welcomes this clarification and notes that the draft law in this respect does not give rise to any specific remarks.

text: 5. Article 4 of the draft law, which provides that the individual information collected shall be used by the Nationale Bank van België/Banque Nationale de Belgique for the purposes of establishing the balance of payments and the international investment position of Belgium, specifies the restrictive conditions under which this information can be disclosed, notably with respect to third parties. Article 4(5) of the draft law provides, however, for a limit to statistical secrecy in the two specific cases of money laundering and financial embargo measures. The draft law provides in particular that the compulsory regulations issued in order to implement financial embargo measures will take precedence over the principle of statistical secrecy, which implies that the Nationale Bank van België/Banque Nationale de Belgique will have to communicate information in its possession to the competent authority in charge of monitoring compliance with financial embargo measures.

text: 6. The ECB is of the view that Article 4(5) of the draft law does not imply any infringement of the confidentiality regime as defined in

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 2533/98 of 23 November 1998

text: concerning the collection of statistical information by the European Central Bank .

text: Article 8(5)

text: (c) of the abovementioned Regulation allows national central banks to use the confidential statistical information collected to fulfil the ECB’s statistical reporting requirements exclusively for the exercise of the tasks of the ESCB, except if it is used in the field of prudential supervision or for the exercise in accordance with Article 14(4) of the Statute of functions other than those specified in the Statute. In addition, the principle of statistical secrecy is further strengthened by Article 5(2) of the draft law, which reinforces the standards of confidentiality applying to the entire staff of the Nationale Bank van België/Banque Nationale de Belgique in the field of statistics. The obligations imposed by law on the Nationale Bank van België/Banque Nationale de Belgique, when it acts as a collector of statistical information relating to capital transfers to zones affected by an embargo, are not regarded by the ECB as falling within the statistical functions of the ESCB. As a result, the ECB would welcome a clarification in the draft law further specifying that such obligations are not related to the statistical purpose of ESCB reporting requirements.

text: 7. The ECB confirms that it has no objection to the publication of this opinion at the discretion of the competent national authorities. Done at Frankfurt am Main on 30 August 2001. The President of the ECB [signed] Willem F. DUISENBERG


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 13 September 2001 at the request of the Austrian Ministry of Finance on a draft federal law concerning real estate funds (Real Estate Investment Fund Act  ImmoInvFG) and to amend the Banking Act, the 1993 Investment Fund Act, the Money Market Act, the Securities Regulation Act, the Insurance Regulation Act, the Pension Fund Act, the Finance Market Regulator Act, the Income Tax Act, the Corporation Tax Act and the Federal Law establishing a Federal Pension Fund Public Limited Company [Bundespensionskasse AG] (CON/2001/24)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 13 September 2001 at the request of the Austrian Ministry of Finance on a draft federal law concerning real estate funds (Real Estate Investment Fund Act – ImmoInvFG) and to amend the Banking Act, the 1993 Investment Fund Act, the Money Market Act, the Securities Regulation Act, the Insurance Regulation Act, the Pension Fund Act, the Finance Market Regulator Act, the Income Tax Act, the Corporation Tax Act and the Federal Law establishing a Federal Pension Fund Public Limited Company [Bundespensionskasse AG] (

text: 1. On 30 July 2001 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Austrian Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft federal law concerning real estate funds (Real Estate Investment Fund Act – ImmoInvFG) and to amend the Banking Act, the 1993 Investment Fund Act, the Money Market Act, the Securities Regulation Act, the Insurance Regulation Act, the Pension Fund Act, the Finance Market Regulator Act, the Income Tax Act, the Corporation Tax Act and the Federal Law establishing a Federal Pension Fund Public Limited Company (Bundespensionskasse AG) (hereinafter referred to as the “draft law”).

text: 2. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on the second indent of Article 105(4) of the Treaty establishing the European Community, the second indent of Article 4(a) of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank and the fifth indent of

text: on the consultation of the ECB by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions1, as the legislative proposal contains rules applicable to financial institutions which materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. The Governing Council of the ECB has adopted this opinion in accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the ECB.

text: 3. The main features of the draft law are: (i) that the issue and administration of real estate funds represent a bank transaction, and are therefore subject to prudential supervision; (ii) that the valuation of property in real estate funds will be undertaken at least once a year by two independent experts; (iii) the establishment of statutory minimum spread requirements for individual funds; (iv) the requirement of involvement by a deposit bank (“Depotbank”) and the establishment of insolvency protection measures in favour of investors. The explanatory memorandum to the draft law notes that the rapid advance of foreign real estate funds on the Austrian market requires the introduction of an Austrian Real Estate Investment Fund Act and a number of accompanying amendments. The intention of the Amendment to the 1993 Investment Fund Act and the Amendment to the Money Market Act is to treat foreign real estate funds as equivalent to all other foreign investment funds in terms of public sales in Austria. The investment rules will extend to Austrian real estate funds that are currently regulated by the Amendments to the Insurance Regulation Act and the Pension Fund Act.

text: 4. The ECB welcomes the draft law as it establishes a regulatory framework to supervise Austrian Real Estate Investment Funds with particular attention paid to achieving the level playing field by harmonising the regulation of investment funds. Another item worth particular attention is the forward-looking perspective of the draft law as it aims to address future capital flows due to pension provisions. Specifically, the intention of the draft law is to ensure secure long-term high yield investment opportunities also for investors with limited funds. Finally, the draft law recognises the close relationship between banks and investment funds by particularly highlighting the role of the deposit bank in

text: Article 35

text: 5. The ECB would like to highlight the fact that investment funds may face liquidity shortages, even when they are considered solvent, in cases where long-term investments are illiquid while the funding is potentially of shorter maturity. Investments in real estate assets can generally be considered as long term and illiquid. Furthermore, Article 11 of the draft law provides for the possibility that the share certificates may be returned to the fund for redemption of the share at the request of the shareholder. Consequently, this concern may materialise for individual real estate investment funds. The ECB recognises that Article 32 of the draft law expressly addresses concerns over liquidity and also provides for a temporary waiver of the investor’s payment of the redemption price under extenuating circumstances in

text: Article 11

text: . Nevertheless, as a limit on this waiver to one year (or to two years where foreseen by the fund’s rules) is also implemented, liquidity shortage may arise in extreme circumstances. As the real estate sector has been the source of instability in many countries, the ECB would like to emphasise that supervision should continue to focus on liquidity issues. In the implementation of the law, supervisors should actively monitor the funds’ liquidity. Furthermore, the ECB would like to draw attention to the possible impact on asset prices of the expected capital inflows from investors into the real estate sector through real estate investment funds. As the reaction of the supply-side tends to be sluggish in the real estate sector, an increase in demand may predominantly influence prices and also increase price volatility. Furthermore, the determination of asset value may be of particular concern as the valuation of the share certificate will mostly not be verifiable by market prices. Article 29 of the draft law provides for the appointment of at least two suitable experts for the valuation of the fund’s assets. Thus, the ECB would recommend that supervisors, in implementing the law, focus their attention particularly on price development in those assets that are eligible for investment under

text: Article 21

text: 6. The ECB notes that the continuous monitoring of business conduct by deposit banks is to become mandatory. The ECB welcomes the supervision of companies investing in real estate by the financial markets supervisory authority (Finanzmarktaufsichtsbehörde).

text: 7. The ECB notes that the draft law aims, inter alia, at facilitating the management of: (i) real estate funds for the public at large; and (ii) the management of special real estate funds for major investors who are not natural persons by Austrian real estate companies (which must pay particular attention to the protection of the interests of the investors).

text: 8. The ECB notes that the draft law defines “real estate fund” and “real estate investment companies”. The ECB welcomes the detailed provisions on liability conditions, the mandatory involvement of a deposit bank, the winding up of real estate funds, property companies, the valuation of assets, risk spread, liquidity provisions and derivative products in the draft law.

text: 9. The ECB welcomes criminal law provisions in the draft law, which are similar to those of the Investment Fund Act, with the intention of creating an efficient tool guaranteeing adherence to the provisions of the draft law. In this context, the draft law also imposes fines for deposit banks violating the rules laid down in the draft law.

text: 10. The ECB recommends that the draft law expressly acknowledge that the reporting obligations it imposes do not prejudice any statistical reporting requirements imposed by the ECB on the entities subject to the draft law in accordance with

text: Article 2 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2533/98 of 23 November 1998

text: concerning the collection of statistical information by the European Central Bank.

text: 11. The ECB confirms that it has no objection to the publication of this opinion by the competent national authorities. Done at Frankfurt am Main on 13 September 2001. The President of the ECB [signed] Willem F. DUISENBERG


sprak: sv

title: Yttrande från Europeiska centralbanken av den 13 september 2001 på begäran av Europeiska unionens råd om ett förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv om extra tillsyn över kreditinstitut, försäkringsföretag och värdepappersföretag i ett finansiellt konglomerat och om ändring av rådets direktiv 73/239/EEG, 79/267/EEG, 92/49/EEG, 92/96/EEG, 93/6/EEG och 93/22/EEG samt Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 98/78/EG och 2000/12/EG (KOM(2001) 213 slutlig) (CON/2001/25)

text: 1. Den 21 maj 2001 mottog Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) en begäran från Europeiska unionens råd om ett yttrande om ett förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv om extra tillsyn över kreditinstitut, försäkringsföretag och värdepappersföretag i ett finansiellt konglomerat och om ändring av

text: rådets direktiv 73/239/EEG

text: och

text: samt

text: och

text: (KOM(2001) 213 slutlig) (nedan kallat förslaget). Förslaget syftar till att fastställa gemensamma normer för tillsyn över finansiella konglomerat i hela Europa. I förslaget specificeras att kreditinstitut, försäkringsföretag och värdepappersföretag med huvudkontor i EU som tillhör ett finansiellt konglomerat skall vara föremål för extra tillsyn. En samordnande myndighet (samordnaren) skall enligt förslaget utses bland berörda behöriga myndigheter för att säkerställa en lämplig ram för verksamheten. Genom förslaget införs dessutom vissa ändringar i den sektorsvisa lagstiftningen om tillsyn för att undvika orättvisa konkurrensregler mellan reglerade enheter inom olika finansiella sektorer.

text: 2. ECB:s behörighet att avge ett yttrande grundar sig på

text: artikel 105.4

text: första strecksatsen i Fördraget om upprättandet av Europeiska gemenskapen (nedan kallat fördraget) och på

text: artikel 3.3 i Stadgan

text: för Europeiska centralbankssystemet och Europeiska centralbanken, eftersom förslaget innehåller bestämmelser om tillsyn över kreditinstitut och har som mål att främja stabiliteten i det finansiella systemet. I enlighet med

text: artikel 17.5

text: första meningen i arbetsordningen för ECB har detta yttrande antagits av ECB-rådet.

text: 3. Förslaget syftar till att införa en särskild tillsynslagstiftning för finansiella konglomerat och fyller därmed en väsentlig lucka i EU:s regelverk avseende tillsyn, eftersom vissa grupper bestående av finansinstitut inte omfattas som sådana av den befintliga sektorsvisa lagstiftningen. Genom förslaget införs en extra tillsynsform, som skall avse reglerade enheter i ett finansiellt konglomerat och med särskild inriktning på kapitaltäckning, gruppinterna transaktioner och riskkoncentration. Eftersom finansiella konglomerat innefattar reglerade enheter som vanligen är föremål för tillsyn genom olika sektoriella myndigheter i varje medlemsstat, eller eventuellt av företag som är etablerade i olika länder, är det dessutom nödvändigt med en hög grad av samordning mellan alla berörda myndigheter. Behovet av ökad samordning mellan berörda myndigheter tillfredsställs genom att det enligt förslaget införs åtgärder för att underlätta extra tillsyn, nämligen vad avser utseendet av en samordnande myndighet, dess uppgifter och utbytet av information mellan behöriga myndigheter. Genom kapitel IV i förslaget införs vissa ändringar i gemenskapens sektorsvisa lagstiftning för att säkerställa rättvisa konkurrensregler mellan finansiella konglomerat och "homogena" finansiella grupper som enbart är verksamma i en finansiell sektor.

text: 4. ECB välkomnar och stöder i stort förslaget. ECB ser förslaget mot bakgrund av behovet att ge de alltmer integrerade finansmarknaderna i Europa ett lämpligt regelverk på gemenskapsnivå för att säkra den finansiella stabiliteten. Ur ECB:s synvinkel kräver de förändringar på finansmarknaderna som orsakats av införandet av euron att mekanismerna för samarbetet mellan de nationella myndigheterna, och även med Eurosystemet, förbättras i väsentlig grad. I förslaget skisseras ett första regelverk för tillsynen över finansiella konglomerat, vilket kan anses vara i stort sett sammanhängande. ECB välkomnar att förslaget bland annat syftar till att behandla frågan om kapitaltäckningen i finansiella konglomerat, med särskild inriktning på att undvika dubbelräkning av tillgångar, att införa tillsyn över gruppinterna transaktioner och att säkerställa lämpliga samarbetsformer för de behöriga myndigheterna. Även ECB anser det viktigt att ett stabilt institutionellt regelverk för tillsynen över finansiella konglomerat kan komma till stånd inom gemenskapen och att detta sker med vederbörligt beaktande av de allmänna kraven om öppenhet och tydliga anordningar, rättssäkerhet och en lämplig fördelning av uppgifter och befogenheter mellan berörda myndigheter. I ett sådant regelverk bör även hänsyn tas till centralbankernas betydelse för den finansiella stabiliteten och till vad de kan bidra med när det gäller att utöva tillsyn. ECB kan allmänt sett föreställa sig att man i förslaget bör kunna gå längre än vad som nu förutses, när det gäller att klargöra vissa frågor om tillsynen över finansiella konglomerat. Detta framgår av följande punkter.

text: 5. För det första: Definitionen och identifieringen av ett finansiellt konglomerat. ECB anser inledningsvis att det för förståelsen av förslagets inverkan och räckvidd är viktigt att göra en ingående kartläggning av vilka konglomerat som redan finns i medlemsstaterna. När det gäller att konkret identifiera ett finansiellt konglomerat enligt

text: artikel 2.13

text: och artikel 3 i förslaget, anser ECB att det skulle kunna fastställas ett förfarande för identifiering av finansiella konglomerat. Ansvaret för att ta initiativ till att lämna underrättelse om ett finansiellt konglomerat kan i princip åligga de enheter som ingår i ett sådant konglomerat. De behöriga myndigheterna kan å andra sidan ha ansvar för att undersöka om reglerade enheter utgör ett konglomerat och för att bekräfta rapporteringen från de enheter som ingår i konglomeratet. De behöriga myndigheterna skulle under alla förhållanden ha det yttersta ansvaret för att det uppnås enighet om identifieringen av finansiella konglomerat. Det kan i det avseendet vara ytterligare en uppgift för samordnaren att ge in anmälan till kommissionen om finansiella konglomerat, exempelvis på liknande sätt som nu gäller för auktoriserade kreditinstitut (

text: artikel 11 i direktiv 2000/12/EG

text: )(1). En förteckning över de finansiella konglomerat som är föremål för extra tillsyn och de reglerade enheter som ingår i varje konglomerat samt deras respektive samordnare skulle dessutom kunna offentliggöras, exempelvis på årlig basis, i Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning. För att förbättra redovisningen av och medvetenheten om omständigheter som är av betydelse skulle det kunna vara ändamålsenligt att upprätta ett gemenskapsregister över finansiella konglomerat och deras respektive samordnare.

text: 6. Tillämpningsområdet beror på definitionen av finansiella konglomerat, vilken inbegriper följande element: att det i gruppen ingår både ett försäkringsföretag eller ett återförsäkringsföretag och minst en enhet från en annan finansiell sektor, att där ingår minst en reglerad enhet (kreditinstitut, värdepappersföretag eller försäkringsföretag), att där finns betydande sektorsöverskridande verksamhet och att det tillhandahålls i huvudsak finansiella tjänster. När det gäller detta sista kriterium vill ECB peka på tre omständigheter. För det första är frågan om i huvudsak finansiella tjänster tillhandahålls avhängig definitionen av finansiell sektor. Definitionen av denna, som fastställs i

text: artikel 2.7

text: , inbegriper sektorerna för bank-, försäkrings- och investeringstjänster. ECB noterar att en betydande del av fondförvaltningsverksamheten genom denna definition utesluts från den finansiella sektorn. Mot bakgrund av arten och betydelsen av detta affärssegment inom den finansiella tjänstesektorn förefaller detta inte vara tillfredsställande. ECB erinrar i detta sammanhang om att förvaltningsbolag, efter det definitiva antagandet av förslaget till direktiv om ändring av direktiv

text: om samordning av lagar och andra författningar som avser företag för kollektiva investeringar i överlåtbara värdepapper (fondföretag) i syfte att införa regler för förvaltningsbolag och förenklade prospekt(2), kommer att bli föremål för harmoniserade tillsynsregler. Genom ändringarna av det direktivet kommer förvaltningsbolag att tillåtas förvalta enskilda kunders investeringsportföljer avseende finansiella instrument, en tjänst som även tillhandahålls av banker och värdepappersföretag. Tillhandahållandet av förvaltningstjänster bör därför ingå i definitionen av den finansiella sektorn. Det skall dessutom noteras att artikel 4 i förslaget föreskriver att bestämmelser om extra tillsyn skall tillämpas på alla sådana reglerade enheter inom det finansiella konglomeratet som antingen leder konglomeratet eller är dotterbolag till ett blandat finansiellt holdingbolag med huvudkontor i gemenskapen, eller som har sådan anknytning som avses i

text: artikel 12.1 i direktiv 83/349/EEG

text: (3), eller på annat sätt faller inom förslagets räckvidd i enlighet med

text: artikel 4

text: . I artikel 2.4 i förslaget definieras begreppet "reglerad enhet" som kreditinstitut, försäkringsföretag och värdepappersföretag. Mot bakgrund av vad som ovan anförts föreslår ECB att förvaltningsbolag - utifrån en cost benefit-analys - skall ingå i definitionen av "reglerad enhet" i artikel 2.4 i förslaget och bli föremål för extra tillsyn.

text: För det andra skulle ECB vilja föreslå att tröskelvärdet i

text: artikel 3.1

text: även kunde innefatta poster utanför balansräkningen, när det gäller att beräkna betydelsen av bank- och värdepapperssektorn inom en grupp. Enligt artikel 3.3 c i förslaget krävs att de behöriga myndigheterna fattar ett gemensamt beslut om att ta med poster utanför balansräkningen. Rapportering som enbart grundas på poster i balansräkningen kan ses som otillräcklig i sådana fall där poster utanför balansräkningen utgör en betydande del av samtliga verksamheter.

text: För det tredje noterar ECB, fortfarande avseende

text: artikel 3.1

text: , att förslaget inte tar upp eventuellt delägda enheter. I dessa fall kan en beräkning av tröskelvärden utifrån den totala balansräkningen bli något missledande. Enligt

text: artikel 3.1

text: borde det därför även vara möjligt att beräkna tröskelvärden utifrån pro rata-belopp.

text: 7. För att enheterna i ett finansiellt konglomerat skall kunna identifieras definieras i artikel 2.11 i förslaget en grupp med hänvisning till förekomsten av "nära förbindelser" mellan fysiska eller juridiska personer. Detta begrepp stöder sig på begreppet nära förbindelser såsom detta infördes i de sektoriella direktiven genom det så kallade post-BCCI-direktivet (direktiv

text: )(4), vilket i huvudsak avser företag som enligt direktiv

text: har att upprätta sammanställd redovisning. Den definition som används i artikel 2.12 i förslaget täcker dessutom andra fall, såsom att "en eller flera personer utövar enligt de behöriga myndigheterna i praktiken ett dominerande inflytande över andra personer", oavsett om detta sker i enlighet med avtal eller bestämmelser i företagets bolagsordning (vilket däremot krävs i det ovannämnda direktivet för sammanställd redovisning). Samtidigt som den behöriga myndigheten naturligtvis måste ha tillräckligt utrymme för en flexibel bedömning när den fastställer vilka enheter som skall anses ingå i ett finansiellt konglomerat, och som skall vara föremål för extra tillsyn, skall det framhållas att detta inte får hindra den enhetlighet som krävs vid tillämpningen av direktivet i alla medlemsstater.

text: 8. För det andra: Utövandet av extra tillsyn och samordnarens roll. ECB noterar att det inte finns någon formell definition av det regelbundet återkommande uttrycket "behöriga myndigheter som ansvarar för utövandet av extra tillsyn", i exempelvis artiklarna 5.1, 6.1 och 7 i förslaget. Rubriken till

text: artikel 7

text: och ordalydelsen i

text: artikel 7.1

text: låter förstå att den behöriga myndighet som ansvarar för denna extra tillsyn i själva verket är samordnaren. Denna punkt bör klargöras ytterligare. Enligt ECB kan det inte förväntas vara någon praktisk lösning att samordnaren enligt

text: artikel 7.1

text: kan bestå av mer än en behörig myndighet. Eventuellt kan samordnaren därigenom inbegripa flera behöriga myndigheter. ECB uppfattar att samordnarens roll bör vara att bidra till att minska snarare än att öka komplexiteten. ECB skulle därför föredra att endast en behörig myndighet utses i rollen som samordnare. ECB noterar även att enligt artikel 7.3 i förslaget skall samordnaren av den extra tillsynen över ett finansiellt konglomerat underrätta de behöriga myndigheterna i övriga berörda medlemsstater och kommissionen om sin utnämning. ECB anser att kraven på öppenhet i gemenskapens institutionella regelverk för finansiell tillsyn innebär att utnämningen av samordnaren, enligt lag, även bör meddelas till de reglerade och oreglerade enheter som ingår i det finansiella konglomeratet, exempelvis via konglomeratets moderbolag eller en reglerad enhet som är etablerad inom samordnarens behörighetsområde, samt till allmänheten. I detta avseende anges exempelvis i avdelning 5.1.2 i Internationella valutafondens rekommendationer rörande öppenhet i penning- och finanspolitiken (Code of good practices on transparency in monetary and financial policies) att finansorganens skyldigheter och deras finanspolitiska behörighet bör offentliggöras. ECB vill i det sammanhanget peka på att de flesta bestämmelserna i förslaget grundar sig på samarbete och samordning mellan de behöriga myndigheterna. Detta är till exempel fallet i artiklarna

text: och i bilagorna I och II. Den praktiska tillämpningen av alla dessa bestämmelser är därför beroende av att det fastställs konkreta och skriftliga dispositioner och avtal mellan de behöriga myndigheterna för de reglerade enheter som ingår i konglomeratet. ECB anser att de behöriga myndigheterna bör ha möjlighet att offentliggöra sådana avtal, företrädesvis i Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning. Med hänsyn till genomförandet härav anser ECB dessutom att en viss harmonisering bör åstadkommas av de huvudsakliga delarna, samtidigt som för tillsynen nödvändig flexibilitet bevaras, för att såväl en tillfredsställande öppenhet och tydlighet i tillsynsreglerna som likabehandling och effektivitet i tillsynen över finansiella konglomerat skall kunna uppnås.

text: 9. I fråga om bestämmelserna i

text: artikel 7.2

text: om utseendet av en samordnare ser ECB hellre att de objektiva kriterierna i denna bestämmelse skall gälla framför de behöriga myndigheternas frihet att träffa ett ad hoc-avtal i fråga om samordnaren. Ett ad hoc-avtal kan kvarstå som en alternativ lösning. Detta motiveras av att objektiva kriterier bättre svarar mot kraven på öppenhet, tydlighet och rättssäkerhet för den extra tillsynen av finansiella konglomerat. ECB noterar dessutom att vissa av de kriterier som gäller för valet av samordnare enligt

text: artikel 7.2 b

text: ii-iv beror på faktorer som kan förändras med tiden, exempelvis "den största balansomslutningen". ECB anser att samordnaren i samtliga fall bör utses för en viss minsta tid, som skulle kunna anges i förslaget, oberoende av skillnader i sådana dynamiska faktorer, såvida inte större förändringar i sammansättningen av konglomeratet inträffar. Detta innebär inte endast att en viss grad av kontinuitet i den extra tillsynen säkerställs utan motiveras även av kraven på öppenhet, tydlighet och rättssäkerhet.

text: 10. ECB välkomnar den föreslagna förteckningen i

text: artikel 8

text: över samordnarens obligatoriska arbetsuppgifter. ECB anser att samordnaren bör anförtros en aktiv roll beträffande övervakningen av finansiella konglomerat. Av hänsyn till öppenheten och tydligheten gentemot intressenterna på marknaden och allmänheten föreslår ECB att samordnaren, förutom de uppgifter som anges i

text: artikel 8.1

text: , kan ges uppgiften att i samråd med de övriga behöriga myndigheterna och med beaktande av sektorsrelaterade regler samordna informationen till allmänheten om sådana beslut som är av betydelse för det finansiella konglomeratet som helhet.

text: 11. ECB noterar att även utövandet av extra tillsyn i fråga om kapitaltäckning, gruppinterna transaktioner och riskkoncentration är beroende av effektiva samarbetsformer mellan de behöriga myndigheterna. Detta kan leda till en viss osäkerhet beträffande utformningen av tillsynsramen, vilken i princip bör vara väl definierad och inte störas av någon oklarhet beträffande dess ändamålsenlighet. Frågan om rättvisa konkurrensregler för finansinstitut kan komma att få ökad betydelse inom det föreslagna regelverket och risken för regelarbitrage bör minskas i så stor utsträckning som möjligt. Exempelvis bör det ges en definition av sektorsöverskridande kapital inom finansiella konglomerat för att undvika eventuella oklarheter på grund av att sektorsdirektiven inte är överensstämmande vad gäller egna medel. I förslaget klargörs dessutom inte vilken nationell lagstiftning som är tillämplig på den extra tillsynen över konglomeratet. Enligt

text: artikel 8.1 b

text: är det till synes lagen i den medlemsstat där samordnaren finns, som är tillämplig. Denna tolkning kan emellertid komma att ifrågasättas genom bilaga I och II, vilka allmänt sett anger att de behöriga myndigheterna skall komma överens om tillämpningen av tillsynsregler. ECB anser att ett medel för att uppnå större klarhet kan vara att föreskriva att gällande nationell lagstiftning i den medlemsstat där samordnaren finns skall tillämpas på samordnarens arbete med den extra tillsynen över finansiella konglomerat. I förslaget måste emellertid fastställas vilken lagstiftning som skall tillämpas i de fall samordnaren består av mer än en behörig myndighet. Å andra sidan ger vissa bestämmelser i förslaget utrymme för de behöriga myndigheterna att delta i utövandet av den extra tillsynen. De behöriga myndigheterna har enligt

text: artikel 13

text: exempelvis befogenhet att vidta åtgärder för att få konstaterade överträdelser att upphöra. En tillsynsmyndighets åtgärder avseende enheter i ett finansiellt konglomerat som är etablerade i en annan medlemsstat kan i det avseendet ge upphov till problem i fråga om lagval och om fastställande av behörig domstol för förnyad prövning. ECB föreslår därför att det i förslaget görs en tydligare åtskillnad mellan sådana tillsynsuppgifter som skall utföras av de behöriga myndigheterna och sådana som faller på samordnaren.

text: 12. För det tredje: Krishanteringen. ECB utgår ifrån att tillsynsreglerna enligt förslaget omfattar krishanteringssituationer inom finansiella konglomerat. Samordnarens uppgifter enligt

text: artikel 8.1

text: inbegriper särskilt "samordning när det gäller att samla in och sprida relevant eller väsentlig information (...) i nödsituationer" och "planering och samordning av tillsynen (...) i nödsituationer". Detta påverkar inte utövandet av de nationella befogenheterna och inte heller övriga behöriga myndigheters uppgifter som krishanterare. ECB anser dock inte att den mycket allmänna utformningen av regeln i

text: artikel 9.1

text: sista stycket kan utgöra något stöd för samordnarens roll i sådana situationer, eftersom den förefaller att i synnerhet vara oförenlig med uppgifter som har samband med krissituationer. ECB välkomnar inte desto mindre att samordnaren tilldelas en sådan roll, eftersom man därigenom följer rekommendationerna i Ekonomiska och finansiella kommitténs (EFK) rapport om finansiell krishantering. ECB erinrar även om att denna rapport rekommenderar att eventuellt berörda myndigheter skall underrättas snarast möjligt i krissituationer. I enlighet med EFK-rapporten skulle detta även innefatta centralbanker och organ som utövar tillsyn över betalningssystemen. ECB upprepar därför att centralbankernas roll för att säkra finansiell stabilitet är ett giltigt skäl för de behöriga myndigheterna och samordnaren att även i krissituationer inom finansiella konglomerat lämna underrättelse till centralbankerna.

text: 13. För det fjärde: Samarbetet och utbytet av information mellan behöriga myndigheter. ECB välkomnar artikel 9 i förslaget. Enligt ECB åläggs genom

text: artikel 9.1

text: de behöriga myndigheterna att både allmänt och i särskilda fall samarbeta och utbyta information. ECB välkomnar även att information skall utbytas både på begäran och på en behörig myndighet eget initiativ. Enligt ECB:s uppfattning bör det därför inte föreligga några restriktioner för samarbetet och utbytet av information mellan de behöriga myndigheterna för de reglerade enheterna inom ett visst finansiellt konglomerat. Som redan nämnts ovan i fråga om krishantering anser ECB att det sista stycket i

text: artikel 9.1

text: är för allmänt, sammanställt med de obligatoriska bestämmelserna i samma 9.1. Samtidigt som ECB erkänner behovet av flexibilitet i förhållandet mellan behöriga myndigheter, särskilt med avseende på fullföljandet av deras respektive mandat, tror ECB även att en sådan flexibilitet i praktiken kan uppnås i samband med de dispositioner som skall fastställas mellan de behöriga myndigheterna.

text: 14. För det femte: Hänvisningen i förslaget till centralbanker och Eurosystemet. ECB välkomnar avsnittet i

text: artikel 9.1

text: där det anges att "när det är nödvändigt för utförandet av deras respektive uppgifter kan de behöriga myndigheterna också utbyta upplysningar om reglerade enheter i ett finansiellt konglomerat med följande myndigheter i enlighet med bestämmelserna i särreglerna: centralbanker, andra organ med liknande funktion i deras roll som monetär myndighet och i förekommande fall andra myndigheter med ansvar för tillsyn över betalningssystemen." Enligt ECB:s uppfattning undanröjs härigenom alla eventuella rättsliga hinder inom gemenskapen för informationsutbyte rörande finansiella konglomerat mellan behöriga myndigheter, oberoende av dessas sektorsvisa ansvar, och centralbanker och enheter med ansvar för tillsyn över betalningssystemen. ECB vill med anledning härav först ta upp en fråga om terminologi. Å ena sidan är alla monetära myndigheter inom EU centralbanker. Detta gäller såväl i praktiken som enligt fördraget i samband med EMU. Eurosystemet är den monetära myndigheten för tolv medlemsstater. Å andra sidan är även medlemsstaternas centralbanker och Eurosystemet de enda myndigheter i gemenskapen som ansvarar för kontrollen av betalningssystemen. Den skriftliga överenskommelsen om samarbete mellan myndigheter med ansvar för kontroll av betalningssystemen respektive tillsyn över bankväsendet i etapp tre av Europeiska monetära unionen(5) återspeglar till fullo detta regelverk. ECB vill därför hävda att det ifrågavarande stycket i

text: artikel 9.1

text: bör omformuleras enligt följande: "... centralbanker, Europeiska centralbankssystemet och Europeiska centralbanken". Det finns två skäl för att inbegripa ESCB och ECB. För det första innefattar utbyte av information med centralbankerna i Eurosystemet efter upprättandet av Eurosystemet en gränsöverskridande dimension som ännu inte har beaktats i de sektorsvisa direktiven. För det andra kan information som överlämnas till en centralbank i Eurosystemet förmedlas till övriga centralbanker i Eurosystemet. ECB anser att ordalydelsen i förslaget endast ytterligare befäster föråldrade begrepp. Det skulle i det avseendet vara välkommet med ett skäl i förslaget där upprättandet av Europeiska centralbankssystemet och Europeiska centralbanken kommer till uttryck.

text: 15. ECB noterar vidare att hänvisningen i

text: artikel 9.1

text: till utbyte av tillsynsinformation med centralbankerna kan fungera som ett erkännande av centralbankernas bidrag till tillsynssystemet för finansiella konglomerat. ECB vill understryka att centralbankerna har ett direkt intresse av den övervakning av risker som ligger i stora och komplexa multinationella instituts finanstransaktioner. Centralbankernas traditionella inriktning på systemrisker och deras kunskaper om penning- och värdepappersmarknaderna och marknadernas infrastruktur, liksom deras uppgifter när det gäller tillsynen av betalnings- och avvecklingssystemen, placerar dem i en unik position för att upptäcka hot mot stabiliteten i det finansiella systemet. Utbyte av tillsynsinformation med centralbankerna kan i detta sammanhang bidra till övervakningen av systemstabiliteten och ansträngningarna att säkra den inom gemenskapen. ECB anser dessutom att mot bakgrund av att förslaget syftar till att göra det möjligt att bedöma systemrisker i finansiella konglomerat inom gemenskapen blir euroområdesperspektivet särskilt viktigt. Stora och komplexa finansgruppers åtgärder kan antas, långt utanför de nationella gränserna, påverka såväl penning- och kapitalmarknaderna som betalnings- och avvecklingssystemen. Nätverket av centralbanker i Eurosystemet kan i detta sammanhang sörja för en förbättrad övervakning av riskerna för finansiell instabilitet inom det gemensamma valutaområdet.

text: 16. För det sjätte: Kommittéförfarandet. ECB välkomnar det kommittéförfarande som föreslås i artiklarna

text: och

text: . Dess huvudsakliga syfte är att komplettera förslagets huvudprinciper med utvecklingen på finansmarknaderna och lagstiftningsområdet och att säkerställa att principerna tillämpas enhetligt. Inrättandet av en kommitté för finansiella konglomerat är därför en central punkt i förslaget. ECB välkomnar det föreslagna tillvägagångssättet, vilket på senare tid fått ökat stöd genom rapporten från de vises kommitté om regleringen av den europeiska värdepappersmarknaden. Det skall dock erinras om att ett kommittéförfarandes berättigande inte enbart beror på om det är tekniskt sett lätt att tillämpa. Det måste även finnas lämpliga garantier för öppenhet och för hänsynstagande till berörda gemenskapsinstitutioners och gemenskapsorgans ställning. ECB vill även erinra om vad som sägs i slutsatserna från de vises kommitté om behovet av att konstruera ett regelverk inom gemenskapen som är flexibelt och som lätt kan anpassas till växlande behov. I detta sammanhang vill ECB betona att samarbetet inom tillsynsområdet för att samordna tillsynsmetoder och genomföra det föreslagna direktivet, särskilt vad avser huvuddelarna av de behöriga myndigheternas samarbetsformer, bör vara en viktig del av gemenskapens lagstiftning för finansiella konglomerat. En periodiskt återkommande kartläggning av finansiella konglomerat skulle även vara till stor hjälp.

text: 17. Detta yttrande skall offentliggöras i Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning.

text: Utfärdat i Frankfurt am Main den 13 september 2001.

text: ECB:s ordförande

text: Willem F. Duisenberg

text: (1) EGT L 126, 26.5.2000, s. 1.

text: (2) Meddelande från kommissionen till Europaparlamentet enligt artikel 251.2 andra stycket i EG-fördraget om gemensam ståndpunkt antagen av rådet inför antagandet av Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv om ändring av direktiv

text: om samordning av lagar och andra författningar som avser företag för kollektiva investeringar i överlåtbara värdepapper (fondföretag) i syfte att införa regler för förvaltningsbolag och förenklade prospekt (COD)1998 0242).

text: (3) EGT L 193, 18.7.1983, s. 1.

text: (4) EGT L 168, 18.7.1995, s. 7.

text: (5) ECB:s pressmeddelande av den 2 april 2001, memorandum of understanding on cooperation between payment systems overseers and banking supervisors in stage three of economic and monetary union.


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: OJ L 125, 19.5.1999, p 34

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 19 September 2001 at the request of the Netherlands Ministry of Finance on an amendment of the current Decision dated 27 July 1998 on the establishment of rules concerning the exchange, withdrawal and cancelling of banknotes by De Nederlandsche Bank and the information thereon to be provided to the general public (CON/2001/26)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 19 September 2001 at the request of the Netherlands Ministry of Finance on an amendment of the current Decision dated 27 July 1998 on the establishment of rules concerning the exchange, withdrawal and cancelling of banknotes by De Nederlandsche Bank and the information thereon to be provided to the general public

text: 1. On 10 August 2001 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Netherlands Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft Decision amending the Decision of 27 July 1998 on the establishment of rules concerning the exchange, withdrawal and cancelling of banknotes by De Nederlandsche Bank and the information thereon to be provided to the general public (hereinafter the “draft Decision”).

text: 2. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Article 105(4) of the Treaty establishing the European Community, Article 4 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank and Article 2(1), first, second and third indents, of

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions .

text: Article 1

text: A of the draft Decision amends Article 1 of the existing Decision and it clarifies that withdrawn banknotes denominated in guilders can be exchanged during office hours at De Nederlandsche Bank's branches. The new wording set out in

text: Article 1

text: A of the draft Decision is marginally more restrictive in that De Nederlandsche Bank's offices might, in addition to the list of public holidays contained in Article 1 of the existing Decision, also be closed on Liberation Day and on days falling between a public holiday and a weekend. However, as this concerns only a small restriction of the general public's rights to exchange guilder banknotes at De Nederlandsche Bank's branches, the ECB does not raise any objections to

text: Article 1

text: A of the draft Decision.

text: Article 1

text: B of the draft Decision deletes Article 2(1) of the current Decision, which holds that De Nederlandsche Bank shall decide the denominations and the form of guilder banknotes. The deletion of this Article is appropriate in view of the withdrawal of banknotes denominated in guilders as from 1 January 2002.

text: 5. Finally,

text: Article 1

text: C of the draft Decision deletes Article 4(5) of the current Decision. This Article deals with the inclusion in De Nederlandsche Bank's profit and loss account of the profit accruing from guilder banknotes that have been withdrawn from circulation and which, 10 years after their withdrawal, still have not been submitted for exchange. The Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the draft Decision notes that this is a private law matter, which will be incorporated in a separate agreement between De Nederlandsche Bank and the Ministry of Finance.

text: 6. This separate agreement has not yet been finalised, but the Explanatory Memorandum envisages the following scenario: in 2003 65% of the withdrawn guilder banknotes that are reasonably estimated on 1 January 2003 not to be submitted for exchange in that year, will be included in De Nederlandsche Bank's profit and loss account for 2002. In 2008 90% of the withdrawn guilder banknotes that are reasonably estimated on 1 January 2008 not to be submitted for exchange in 2008, will be included in De Nederlandsche Bank's profit and loss account for 2007 after deduction of the amount which has been included in the profit and loss account for 2002. Finally, in 2013 the remainder of the withdrawn guilder banknotes that have not by then been submitted for exchange will be included in De Nederlandsche Bank's profit and loss account for 2012 after deduction of the amounts which have been included in the De Nederlandsche Bank's profit and loss accounts for 2002, respectively for 2007. The ECB has no objections as such to

text: Article 1

text: C of the draft Decision. The ECB understands that the draft agreement will merely incorporate the aforementioned rules without affecting more general financial matters.

text: 7. In accordance with

text: Article 17.5

text: , first sentence, of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, this ECB opinion has been adopted by the Governing Council of the ECB.

text: 8. The ECB confirms that it has no objection to the competent national authorities making this opinion publicly available at their discretion. Done at Frankfurt am Main on 19 September 2001. The President of the ECB [signed] Willem F. DUISENBERG