text: The Eurosystem comprises the ECB and the national central banks of the Member States which have adopted the euro as their single currency.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 21 September 2001 at the request of the Finnish Ministry of Finance on a draft proposal concerning legislation on the reorganisation and winding-up of credit institutions (CON/2001/27)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 21 September 2001 at the request of the Finnish Ministry of Finance on a draft proposal concerning legislation on the reorganisation and winding-up of credit institutions (

text: 1. On 21 May 2001 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Finnish Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft Government proposal concerning legislation on the reorganisation and winding up of credit institutions (hereinafter referred to as the “proposal”). The proposal contains three different elements. First, it intends to introduce in Finland a new Law on the temporary suspension of the activities of a deposit bank (hereinafter to as the “draft law”). Secondly, it intends to amend certain related provisions in the existing laws governing the different legal forms of credit institutions in Finland as well as in a number of other related laws. Thirdly, the proposal also consolidates the existing laws on the different legal forms of credit institutions, i.e. the laws on commercial banks and other credit institutions in the form of a limited company, on cooperative banks and other cooperative-based credit institutions, and on saving banks.

text: 2. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Article 105(4) of the Treaty establishing the European Community (hereinafter referred to as the “Treaty”) and the fifth and sixth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the ECB by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the proposal contains provisions concerning payment systems and rules applicable to financial institutions which could materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, this opinion has been adopted by the Governing Council of the ECB.

text: 3. The proposal mainly intends to complement Finnish legislation concerning the voluntary reorganisation measures in the Finnish banking sector by extending the application of general company law provisions on voluntary reorganisation measures, such as mergers, divisions and transfers of business, to cover also all credit institutions in Finland. However, in order to take into account the specific features of the banking sector, the proposal introduces the draft law. In addition, the proposal will harmonise the rules applied to different legal forms of credit institutions with regard to their reorganisation and winding-up. These uniform rules will ensure that the same principles for safeguarding the rights of creditors will apply to all such measures, and that they will be equal irrespective of the legal form of credit institution concerned. The rights of depositors in Finland are safeguarded by specific legislation on the Deposit Guarantee Fund. The proposal does not intend to change this legislation. The ECB welcomes the proposal in general as it aims to facilitate through voluntary reorganisation measures the developments in the banking sector and in general in the financial markets.

text: 4. The ECB notes that according to the Finnish legislation currently in force, the voluntary reorganisation measures concerning credit institutions require the authorisation of the Finnish Ministry of Finance. As the preconditions for granting such an authorisation are at the moment not covered by legislation, the Ministry of Finance has until now had a wide discretionary power in considering the authorisation and safeguarding the creditors’ rights in different reorganisation measures. The proposal intends to abolish this role of the Ministry of Finance. As a result, the existing control exercised by the Ministry of Finance in safeguarding creditors’ rights would be replaced by a procedure for creditor consultation following the provisions of general company law in Finland. These provisions provide the creditors with the right to oppose the planned reorganisation measures. The Finnish Trade Register Authority approves the execution of the planned reorganisation measures only if none of the creditors opposes the measures. The ECB welcomes the fact that in such a consultation procedure the Finnish Financial Supervisory Authority (FSA) will also be consulted in order to ensure that the conditions regarding the authorisation of a credit institution are not endangered. The FSA would have the right to oppose the reorganisation measures if it considers that the measures would have negative effects on such conditions, inter alia, as liquidity, solvency, or procedures for controlling the risk exposure of the credit institution concerned. In such case, the Finnish Trade Register Authority cannot approve the execution of the planned reorganisation measures. If there were appeals against the opposition of the FSA, the Supreme Administrative Court would take the final decision.

text: 5. The ECB would like to recall that the Treaty and the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter referred to as the “Statute”) entrust the Eurosystem and Suomen Pankki, as a component member of the Eurosystem, with, inter alia, the tasks of defining and implementing the monetary policy of the Community. Furthermore, the Treaty and the Statute entrust the Eurosystem with the task of overseeing payment systems in order to promote the smooth operation of payment systems and thus contribute to financial stability. The Eurosystem may provide facilities, and the ECB may make regulations, to ensure efficient and sound clearing and payment systems within the Community and with other countries. The ECB observes that all reorganisation measures, as well as the winding-up of credit institutions in Finland, would affect the role of Suomen Pankki, as a component member of the Eurosystem, in assessing the risks involved when undertaking credit operations, both in the context of implementing monetary policy as well as in providing intraday credit for payment system purposes. Furthermore, such measures may have an impact on the smooth functioning of payment systems, and thus affect Suomen Pankki in its roles of both payment systems overseer and provider of payment services. Therefore, the ECB submits that the proposal and the draft law should enhance and ensure transparency vis-à-vis Suomen Pankki, which should be adequately informed of all measures involved in the reorganisation and winding-up of credit institutions, and should have the right to request all information needed in fulfilling its tasks under the Treaty and the Statute as a component member of the Eurosystem.

text: 6. The ECB notes that, according to the draft law concerning the temporary suspension of the activities of a deposit bank, if the liquidity of a deposit bank is impaired to the extent that it may be unable to fulfil its obligations, the role of the Ministry of Finance would remain strong compared to its role in voluntary reorganisation and the winding-up of credit institutions. The Ministry of Finance would assess whether the liquidation of a deposit bank can be avoided, in particular if the stability of the financial market requires the continuation of the activities of the bank concerned. The draft law lays down the conditions according to which the Ministry of Finance can order a temporary suspension. The activities of a deposit bank would have to be suspended when its financial position is weakened to the extent that the continuation of its activities would jeopardize the position of the depositors and other creditors or the stability of the financial market, or otherwise cause severe distortions to the financial markets. The aim of the suspension is to prevent the bankruptcy of a deposit bank and provide for the continuation of its activities in the future, if the adequate reorganisation measures are feasible. If the reorganisation measures are not deemed possible, the suspension aims to prepare the liquidation of the bank in a controlled way. The activities of a deposit bank may be suspended for a maximum period of six months. The ECB welcomes the possibility for the Ministry to temporarily suspend the activities of a deposit bank, as it could help prevent disturbance to the stability of financial markets due to temporary problems within the bank. Moreover, the ECB welcomes the obligation for the Ministry to consult Suomen Pankki before adopting the decision to order the temporary suspension. This will allow Suomen Pankki to provide the process with a central banking perspective, in particular on the basis of financial stability concerns.

text: 7. The intended legal effects of the suspension procedure of a deposit bank correspond to a large extent to the legal effects of the company reorganisation measures provided in the Finnish Company Reorganisation Law No 47/1993 (Company Reorganisation Law). Both the suspension of the activities of a deposit bank, and the reorganisation measures according to the Company Reorganisation Law, aim at a continuation of the business by impacting on the position of the creditors to the least possible extent. Therefore, according to the draft law the provisions of the Company Reorganisation Law would apply, with certain restrictions, to the legal effects of initiating the suspension of activities of a deposit bank and control of its assets during the suspension period. According to the draft law, and the applicable provisions of the Company Reorganisation Law, during the suspension the bank is not allowed to take deposits or other refundable assets from the public without the permission of the Ministry of Finance. Furthermore, the bank is not allowed to grant or otherwise obtain new loans, or to enter into or otherwise obtain financial agreements. Moreover, during the suspension the liabilities of the bank are frozen, the fulfilment of its obligations towards the depositors and other creditors is prevented, the bank is not allowed to provide any additional collateral and the creditors are not allowed to realise the collateral already provided. These measures are established in order to secure the equal treatment of the creditors irrespective of the outcome of the suspension procedure. In addition, they will help to avoid the risk of sudden large-scale withdrawal of deposits.

text: 8. The ECB notes that the principles of the Finnish Company Reorganisation Law intend to lead to the restructuring of viable enterprises and the avoidance of unnecessary bankruptcies. Such a restructuring procedure is a long-term process lasting possibly several years. Instead, the principal aim of a temporary suspension of the activities of a deposit bank should be to ensure the continued smooth and stable functioning and operation of financial markets. The temporary suspension of the activities of a deposit bank should be an extreme measure by the authorities in order to safeguard the stability of financial markets. Such a suspension should therefore be a short-term measure. Furthermore the ECB notes the differences between the nature of activities of a credit institution, on the one hand, and the nature of activities of companies in general, on the other hand. In particular, the debt structure of a credit institution is by definition of a special nature compared to any other company in general. The ECB understands that the Company Reorganisation Law does not take into account the special features, as a consequence of such differences, inherent in the resolution of financial problems of credit institutions, and that the Company Reorganisation Law is therefore designed to govern general company restructuring measures and procedures. Therefore, the ECB considers that the application of the Company Reorganisation Law with regard to the temporary suspension of the activities of credit institutions pursuant to the draft law might be problematic.

text: 9. The ECB would see the need for the draft law to better take into account the role of the Eurosystem, and in particular the role of Suomen Pankki as a component member of the Eurosystem, on certain issues, as addressed below. The ECB would like to point out that the Statute requires that all credit operations extended by the ECB or the national central banks of the Eurosystem to credit institutions and other market participants be based on adequate collateral. Following this primary law requirement,

text: Article 9 of Directive 98/26/EC

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 1998 on settlement finality in payment and securities settlement systems (the Settlement Finality Directive, SFD) provides that the rights of a national central bank of the Member States or of the ECB to collateral security provided to them “shall not be affected by insolvency proceedings” against the credit institution or another market participant which has provided the collateral security. Such collateral may always be realised for the satisfaction of these rights. The ECB notes that this provision of Community law has been implemented in Finland by a specific law on netting in clearing and settlement systems (Laki eräistä arvopaperi- ja valuuttakaupan sekä selvitysjärjestelmän ehdoista 1084/1999) (the Netting law). Section 10 provides that the rights relating to the collateral provided to the central bank in connection with central bank operations may be realised notwithstanding the initiation of an insolvency procedure or any other comparable procedure thereto. However, in order to avoid any misunderstandings with regard to the application of this provision also to all cases of temporary suspension of the activities of a deposit bank in Finland, as well as any reorganisation procedure started as a consequence of such suspension, the ECB considers it essential that the priority of the provision of Section 10 of the Netting law over the rules of the draft law be guaranteed by necessary clarifications in the proposal. Furthermore, the ECB submits that in order to be in line with the above, the draft law should also entitle Suomen Pankki to require additional collateral according to the risk management provisions of the Eurosystem or to call in its credit contracts irrespective of the rules of the draft law.

text: 10. The ECB would also like to draw attention to the minimum reserve requirements imposed on credit institutions by Regulation ECB/1998/15 of 1 December 1998 on the application of 4 5 minimum reserves , as amended by Regulation ECB/2000/8 , and to the statistical reporting requirements imposed on monetary financial institutions by Regulation ECB/1998/16 of 1 December 1998 concerning the consolidated balance sheet of the monetary financial institutions sector, as amended by Regulation ECB/2000/8 . The ECB’s statistical requirements will need to be fulfilled also during a temporary suspension of the activities of a deposit bank, in case a bank continues to hold its authorisation to act as a deposit bank. According to Regulation ECB/1998/15, the ECB may exempt from minimum reserve requirements an institution subject to winding-up proceedings or reorganisation measures.

text: 11. Regarding the draft amendment of the Credit Institution Act No 1607/1993, the ECB notes that the Ministry of Finance, when granting authorisation to a credit institution, will provide this new authorisation for registration to the Finnish Trade Register and for information to the FSA. Since the new credit institution would be entitled to become a monetary policy counterparty and participate in payment systems, it would be preferable that also Suomen Pankki, as the monetary policy and payment systems oversight authority in Finland, be promptly informed thereof.

text: 12. Finally, the ECB recalls Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 April 2001 on the reorganisation and winding up of credit institutions , which provides for mutual recognition of such proceedings. While the national implementation of this Directive does not need to take place before May 2004, the ECB suggests, without having made an assessment in this regard, that the proposal should already now be brought broadly in line with the provisions of this Directive in order to avoid any abrupt regime changes when the Directive is formally implemented in Finnish law.

text: 13. The ECB confirms that it has no objection to the competent national authorities making this opinion publicly available at their discretion. Done at Frankfurt am Main on 21 September 2001. The President of the ECB [signed] Willem F. DUISENBERG


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 2 Consolidated version, Mémorial (Luxembourg Official Journal) No 95, 10.11.1998, p 2364.

publisher: Europeiska centralbanken

sprak: en

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 26 September 2001 at the request of the Ministry of Finance of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg on a draft Grand- Duchy regulation relating to a derogation from the provisions concerning State officials or probationer officials in respect of agents of the Banque centrale du Luxembourg subjected to public law status as defined by Article 14(3)(a) of the Law of 23 December 1998 relating to monetary status and the Banque centrale du Luxembourg (CON/2001/28)

serie: con

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 26 September 2001 at the request of the Ministry of Finance of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg on a draft Grand- Duchy regulation relating to a derogation from the provisions concerning State officials or probationer officials in respect of agents of the Banque centrale du Luxembourg subjected to public law status as defined by Article 14(3)(a) of the Law of 23 December 1998 relating to monetary status and the Banque centrale du Luxembourg (

type: rubrik

text: 1. On 7 August 2001, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Ministry of Finance of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg on a draft Grand-Duchy regulation concerning the status of certain agents of the Banque centrale du Luxembourg (BCL).

type: stycke

text: 2. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on the third indent of

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , since the draft Regulation lays down provisions concerning the national central bank. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, this opinion has been adopted by the Governing Council of the ECB.

text: 3. The draft Regulation implements

text: Article 14(3)

text: (a) of the Law of 23 December 1998 defining the status of the BCL. A translation of this Article reads: “Central Bank agents who occupy the posts specified in the organisational chart referred to in

text: Article 29(2)

text: , which involve, either directly or indirectly, the exercise of public power and tasks safeguarding the general interests of the State or other public authorities, have public law status consisting in the application, if necessary by analogy, of the provisions relating to officials and probationer officials, save as otherwise provided in a Grand-Ducal regulation to be adopted in the interests of the proper functioning of the Central Bank.”

text: 4. Taking into account the particular constraints of the BCL, the draft Regulation defines the areas of derogation from the general status of State officials . The main reason for this derogation is due to the fact that the BCL forms part of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB). As such, the BCL must be granted the means to accomplish its objectives and missions independently from inter alia national authorities, as laid down in the Treaty establishing the European Community.

text: 5. The ECB welcomes the draft Regulation as it presently reads, since it appears to grant the BCL adequate autonomy and independence in the management of its staff in order to perform its objectives and missions in relation to the ESCB.

text: 6. The ECB confirms that it has no objection to the competent national authorities making this opinion publicly available at their discretion. Done at Frankfurt am Main on 26 September 2001. The President of the ECB [signed] Willem F. DUISENBERG

type: vagledning

utgivare: ecb


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 28 September 2001 at the request of the Austrian Ministry of Justice on a draft law amending court fees (Euro- Gerichtsgebühren-Novelle) (CON/2001/29)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 28 September 2001 at the request of the Austrian Ministry of Justice on a draft law amending court fees (Euro- Gerichtsgebühren-Novelle) (

text: 1. On 11 September 2001 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request for an opinion from the Austrian Ministry of Justice on a draft law amending court fees (Euro- Gerichtsgebühren-Novelle), hereinafter referred to as the “draft law”.

text: 2. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on the second indent of Article 105(4) of the Treaty establishing the European Community, the second indent of Article 4(a) of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank and the first indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the ECB by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the legislative proposal contains provisions concerning currency matters. The Governing Council of the ECB has adopted this opinion in accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the ECB.

text: 3. The main purpose of the draft law is the conversion of amounts and thresholds relating to court fees from schillings into euro. Furthermore, the draft law is intended to take additional measures to modernise the law concerning court fees, for example, by replacing traditional methods of payment with modern electronic methods of payment. In addition, it contains provisions allowing for the facilitation of conversion to the euro of financing for companies limited by shares and limited liability companies.

text: 4. The substitution of schilling amounts with euro amounts is based on the following principles. - Thresholds are to be rounded up or down to whole 10 euro amounts in order to obtain convenient and practical figures. - Generally, single amounts of court fees are to be rounded to whole euro amounts for reasons of practicality. There are some exceptions to the rule concerning low amounts and very low amounts (e.g. the fee of 20 schillings is converted into 1.5 euro;

text: Article 6

text: a of the Court Fees Act introduces an amount of 0.04 cent). - The explanatory memorandum of the draft law expressly states that in order to comply with the principle of “no impact on costs”, amounts have not been smoothed.

text: 5. The ECB welcomes the draft law that provides for the replacement of schilling amounts with euro amounts for court fee purposes. Such adjustments are in the interests of legal clarity and transparency of the national legal system.

text: 6. The ECB welcomes the intention of the draft law to observe the principle of cost neutrality. In its opinions of 17 May 2001 on a draft Second Federal Law containing ancillary measures for the introduction of the euro (2. Euro-Justiz-Begleitgesetz) and of 24 August 2001 on a draft law amending Austrian criminal law (Strafrechtsänderungsgesetz 2001) the ECB underlined the importance of this principle in the context of the introduction of the euro. Furthermore, it is recalled that at the meeting of the Eurogroup on 4 June 2001, the ministers reiterated their policy that, overall, conversion into euro of all prices, charges and fees administered by their Governments will be price neutral or smoothed in favour of the consumer.

text: 7. The ECB confirms that it has no objection to the competent national authorities making this opinion publicly available at their discretion. Done at Frankfurt am Main on 28 September 2001. The President of the ECB [signed] Willem F. DUISENBERG


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the supplementary supervision of credit institutions, insurance undertakings and investment firms in a financial conglomerate and amending other relevant Directives (COM/2001/0213 final). 3 Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 June 1995, OJ L 168, 18.7.1995, p. 7.

text: The Eurosystem comprises the ECB and the national central banks of the Member States that have adopted the euro as their single currency.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 3 October 2001 at the request of the Finnish Ministry of Finance on a draft proposal concerning legislation on the supervision of financial conglomerates (CON/2001/30)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 3 October 2001 at the request of the Finnish Ministry of Finance on a draft proposal concerning legislation on the supervision of financial conglomerates (

text: 1. On 28 June 2001 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Finnish Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft Government proposal concerning legislation on the supervision of financial conglomerates (hereinafter referred to as the “proposal”). The proposal intends to introduce in Finland a new law on the supervision of financial conglomerates (hereinafter referred to as the “draft Law”). In addition, the proposal intends to introduce certain other revisions to existing related laws. The proposal intends to clarify the powers of the Finnish supervisory authorities in respect of financial conglomerates in order to ensure that the financial conglomerates do not give rise to risks which might distort the stability of financial market or payment and settlement systems and thus endanger the position of depositors and investors and the interests of the insured.

text: 2. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Article 105(4) of the Treaty establishing the European Community (hereinafter referred to as the “Treaty”) and the fifth and sixth indents of

text: on the consultation of the ECB by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the proposal contains provisions concerning payment and settlement systems as well as rules applicable to financial institutions which could materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, this opinion has been adopted by the Governing Council of the ECB.

text: 3. According to Finnish legislation, the Finnish Financial Supervision Authority (FSA), which is functionally independent but operates in connection with Suomen Pankki, supervises the financial markets and entities operating therein. The powers and tasks of the FSA are governed by the Act on the Financial Supervision Authority (rahoitustarkastuslaki 503/1993). Separate legislation applies to the supervision of insurance and pension institutions that are supervised by the Finnish Insurance Supervisory Authority. The Insurance Supervisory Authority operates under the control of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health and the rules on its administration are governed by the Act on Insurance Supervisory Authority (laki Vakuutusvalvontavirastosta 78/1999). However, the powers of this Authority are governed by various specific laws concerning different types of insurance institutions.

text: 4. A financial conglomerate characteristically consists of entities active in different sectors; it includes at least one credit institution and one insurance undertaking. Therefore, from the system outlined above, it follows that in Finland two separate authorities will supervise the entities belonging to a financial conglomerate. Such divided supervision does not necessarily cover the conglomerate as a whole, in particular because the scope of application of the sectoral supervision provisions is focused only on the entities which are subject to authorisation for their activities. Although the provisions on the consolidation of banking groups and on the supplementary supervision of insurance undertakings in insurance groups, both based on the respective Community directives, provide rules for additional group supervision, this does not cover a financial conglomerate as such. In other words, insurance undertakings belonging to a financial conglomerate are not fully taken into account by the provisions on the consolidation of banking groups, and vice versa the rules on the supplementary supervision of insurance undertakings in insurance groups concentrate on supervision only in this sector.

text: 5. Since the first financial conglomerate engaged both in banking and insurance business commenced operations in Finland, the two Finnish supervisory authorities have agreed by way of a memorandum of understanding on key principles to facilitate their coordinated supervision of such financial conglomerates. However, according to the proposal, urgent legislative measures are needed in order to establish a firm legal basis for supervision of the conglomerates. Therefore, the proposal introduces a new law on the supervision of financial conglomerates. This draft Law would be based to the extent possible on the existing powers and distribution of tasks of the two respective supervisory authorities. The ECB takes note of the fact that the draft Law would thus not establish a single authority responsible for the overall supervision of financial conglomerates. The rights and obligations of the two supervisory authorities in their respective sectors would not be restricted or modified. The draft Law intends only to enhance and strengthen the gathering of information concerning a financial conglomerate as a whole in order to avoid loopholes and opportunities for regulatory arbitrage.

text: 6. The ECB takes note that the draft Law regulates the matter of supplementary supervision of financial conglomerates on which the Commission has presented a proposal for a Community directive on the supplementary supervision of credit institutions, insurance undertakings and investment firms in a financial conglomerate (hereinafter referred to as the “draft Directive”). According to the proposal, the adoption of the draft Law is urgent and therefore the proposal does not intend to fully comply with the draft Directive. As a consequence, once the draft Directive has been adopted, Finnish legislation would have to be amended in order to be brought in line with the provisions of the future Directive.

text: 7. The draft Law would provide rules concerning: (i) the definition of a financial conglomerate; and (ii) the identification of one of the two supervisory authorities to act as a coordinating supervisor; and (iii) the tasks and rights of this coordinating supervisor; and (iv) the rules on the cooperation and exchange of information between the two supervisory authorities.

text: 8. The ECB observes that the definition of a financial conglomerate in the draft Law differs from the definition of a financial conglomerate in the draft Directive. The ECB notes that the draft Directive considers the definition of a group as a core concept, which in turn is based on the concept of “close links” as introduced by the so-called post-BCCI Directive . In contrast, the definition in the draft Law is mainly based on the concept of dominant influence as defined in the Accounting Act (kirjanpitolaki 1336/1997). This may eventually cause confusion regarding the conformity of the draft Law with the draft Directive. In this respect, the proposal states that revision of the definition of a financial conglomerate is foreseen once the draft Directive has been adopted. Therefore, the ECB submits that the draft Law should be brought in line with the future Directive as soon as an agreement in the EU Council has been reached on the contents of the draft Directive. The ECB further notes that the proposal complies with the draft Directive in respect of the thresholds for determining a financial conglomerate i.e. whether the activities of a group consist mainly in providing financial services and whether its cross-sectoral activities are significant within the meaning of the Directive.

text: 9. According to the draft Law, a holding company of a financial conglomerate is under an obligation to notify the FSA or the Insurance Supervisory Authority immediately upon creation of a financial conglomerate. The ECB welcomes this provision. However, the ECB does not see why the obligation to notify cannot be extended to cover also the entities comprising such a conglomerate, and therefore submits that such an obligation should be included in the draft Law.

text: 10. According to the draft Law, a financial conglomerate would always have one coordinating supervisor. The draft Law provides the criteria according to which the coordinating supervisor is identified: the coordinating supervisor would be the supervisory authority which is responsible for the supervision of the parent undertaking of a financial conglomerate; in other words the FSA would be the coordinating supervisor, if the parent undertaking of a conglomerate is a credit institution or an investment company and the Insurance Supervision Authority would in turn act as the coordinating supervisor, if the parent company is an insurance company. In a case where the parent company is a holding company supervised by neither the FSA nor the Insurance Supervision Authority, the coordinating supervisor would be defined and identified on the basis of the principal sector of business (banking or insurance sector) of the conglomerate. The proportional share of each sector in a financial conglomerate would be calculated and the coordinating supervisor identified on the basis of this calculation. The draft Law also contains an exception to the above-mentioned quantitative criteria for identifying the coordinating supervisor. The identified coordinating supervisor would be able to waive its tasks as a coordinating supervisor if the other supervisor has agreed to take responsibility for these tasks, for example in cases where a certain degree of continuity is needed. The ECB welcomes the fact that the above-mentioned objective criteria prevails over the discretion of the competent authorities to reach an ad hoc agreement on the coordinator, since the latter remains as an alternative solution. This is justified on the basis that objective criteria for the appointment of the coordinator better serve the requirements of transparency, clarity and legal certainty regarding the supplementary supervision of financial conglomerates.

text: 11. According to the draft Law, the holding company of a financial conglomerate would have to report regularly to the coordinating supervisor on the structure of the conglomerate, the consolidated accounts, risk exposure and relevant intra-group transactions. In addition, the coordinating supervisor would have the right to inspect and obtain information on the entities outside the sectoral supervision but which belong to a conglomerate, such as holding companies which are not credit institutions, investment service companies or insurance undertakings. The coordinating supervisor would in addition have a right to obtain information from entities which do not belong to the financial conglomerate but which are linked to entities inside the financial conglomerate in a way which is relevant to the aim of supervision. These entities outside the financial conglomerate, such as pension insurance funds, would have an obligation to inform the coordinating supervisor on inter alia intra-group transactions. The coordinating supervisor would also have the right to propose supervisory measures to be taken by the other authority, i.e. the one not being assigned as a coordinator, in its respective sector. The ECB notes that in the draft Law, the parent company is also required to have in place its own internal control and risk management systems that are adequate with regard to the operation of the whole financial conglomerate. The ECB welcomes these provisions.

text: 12. In addition, the proposal seeks to harmonise the provisions in the banking and insurance legislation in respect of the exchange of customer information between an insurance company and a bank within the same financial conglomerate. Such exchange of information is not permitted under existing laws, hampering thus the effective risk management within a financial conglomerate. The ECB welcomes these harmonisation intentions and notes that they are in line with Article 11 of the draft Directive.

text: 13. The ECB notes that the proposal does not address the capital adequacy of a conglomerate, one of the key elements in the draft Directive. According to the proposal, it is not yet appropriate to provide for rules on capital adequacy since the outcome concerning this issue in the draft Directive is uncertain. In other words, limits concerning capital adequacy and other substantive issues requiring the harmonisation of calculation methods in the banking and insurance sector are not provided; instead the proposal provides tools for the gathering of information on the financial position of a conglomerate and its assessment. Therefore the ECB submits also here that the draft law should be brought in line with the future Directive as soon as an agreement in the EU Council has been reached on the contents of the draft Directive.

text: 14. Finally, the ECB notes that the Treaty and the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter referred to as the “Statute”) entrust the Eurosystem and Suomen Pankki, as its component member, with, inter alia, the task of payment systems oversight in order to promote the smooth operation of payment systems and thus contribute to financial stability. The ECB and national central banks of the Eurosystem may also provide facilities, and the ECB may make regulations, to ensure efficient and sound clearing and payment systems within the Community and with other countries. Moreover, the Treaty and the Statute provide that the Eurosystem shall contribute to the smooth conduct of policies pursued by the competent authorities relating to the prudential supervision of the credit institutions and the stability of the financial system. The establishment, functioning, reorganisation and, in particular, possible failure of a financial conglomerate may have implications for the smooth functioning of payment systems and the stability of the financial market. Therefore, the ECB would welcome provision by the draft law of adequate means and procedures for informing Suomen Pankki of any issue which may have such implications. The ECB would like to draw attention to Article 9 of the draft Directive according to which the competent authorities may also exchange information with central banks. This reference may serve as an acknowledgment of the contribution by central banks to the prudential supervisory framework for financial conglomerates. The central banks’ traditional focus on systemic risk, together with their knowledge of money and securities markets and market infrastructures and their function in the oversight of payment and settlement systems, places them in a unique position to identify threats to the stability of the financial system. In this context, informationsharing with Suomen Pankki as a component member of the Eurosystem will contribute to the monitoring and pursuit of systemic stability in the Community.

text: 15. The ECB confirms that it has no objection to the competent national authorities making this opinion publicly available at their discretion. Done at Frankfurt am Main on 3 October 2001. The President of the ECB [signed] Willem F. DUISENBERG


sprak: sv

title: Yttrande av Europeiska centralbanken av den 9 oktober 2001 på begäran av Europeiska unionens råd om ett förslag till rådets beslut om inrättandet av ett handlingsprogram för utbildning, utbyte och stöd med avseende på skydd av euron mot förfalskning (Perikles-programmet) (CON/2001/31)

text: 1. Den 3 juli 2001 mottog Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) en skrivelse från Europeiska unionens råd (nedan kallat rådet) med begäran om ett yttrande om kommissionens förslag av den 22 maj 2001 KOM(2001) 248 slutlig till rådets beslut om inrättandet av ett handlingsprogram för utbildning, utbyte och stöd med avseende på skydd av euron mot förfalskning (Perikles-programmet) (nedan kallat förslaget).

text: 2. ECB:s behörighet att avge ett yttrande grundar sig på artikel 105.4 i Fördraget om upprättandet av Europeiska gemenskapen (nedan kallat fördraget). I enlighet med artikel 17.5 första meningen i arbetsordningen för ECB har detta yttrande antagits av ECB-rådet.

text: 3. ECB välkomnar allmänt detta initiativ för att skydda euron mot förfalskning genom utbildning, utbyte och stöd till särskilda nyckelgrupper. Eftersom ECB tagit del av de framsteg och förbättringar som gjorts i rådets arbetsgrupp i samband med utarbetandet av förslaget, har hänsyn tagits härtill i detta yttrande.

text: 4. ECB vill understryka nödvändigheten av att undvika dubbelarbete eller överlappning med andra program inom gemenskapen eller med program som upprättats i enlighet med avdelning VI i Fördraget om upprättandet av Europeiska unionen (tredje pelaren). Samtidigt menar ECB att en samordning av Perikles-programmet med befintliga gemenskaps- eller EU-program liksom med projekt inom Europol eller ECB är av avgörande betydelse. Genom en informell styrgrupp som bildats mellan Europol, kommissionen och ECB har visst samarbete och samordning skett mellan dessa organ i form av åtgärder för att hindra förfalskning av euron. ECB anser därför att styrgruppen bör yttra sig över åtgärder som skall finansieras genom Perikles-programmet. Det är viktigt att Perikles-programmet fungerar effektivt, så att syftet att skydda euron mot förfalskning uppnås. I det sammanhanget noterar ECB att Europol och ECB tilldelas lämpliga uppgifter enligt förslaget. Mot bakgrund av vad som sagts ovan räknar ECB med att medverka fullt ut i förberedelserna för Perikles-programmets olika åtgärder.

text: 5. För att uppnå Perikles-programmets mål är det nödvändigt att de verksamheter som finansieras enligt Perikles-programmet organiseras så att man höjer nivån på den tekniska och operationella sakkunskapen när det gäller att förhindra förfalskning av euron i medlemsstaterna och i tredje länder. Detta är skälet till att det är viktigt och önskvärt att ha en gemensam samordnad strategi (Europol, kommissionen och ECB) för att fastställa innehållet, målgrupperna och metoder för Perikles-programmet.

text: 6. Innehållet i Perikles-programmet enligt förslaget förefaller vara mycket allmänt. En sådan inriktning kan brista i kontinuitet och konsekvens. Även om de olika åtgärderna kan vara lämpliga från en enskild synpunkt finns risken att de från en kollektiv synpunkt inte lyckas höja eller fastställa normerna inom gemenskapen. Detta gäller alldeles särskilt eftersom Perikles-programmet riktar sig till så många olika målgrupper och har en så begränsad budget (fyra miljoner euro över en period på fyra år). Vad avser åtgärder angående tekniskt, vetenskapligt och operationellt utbyte krävs det en hel del försiktighet innan man kan tillåta ad hoc-åtgärder på detta område.

text: 7. Vad avser rättslig grund vill ECB framhålla att artikel 123.4 i fördraget möjligen inte räcker om Perikles-programmet skall fortsätta efter eurons inledande fas, eftersom den artikeln endast gäller det "snabba införandet" av euron. ECB tvivlar dessutom på att det kommer att bli nödvändigt att utsträcka Perikles-programmet till tiden efter införandet av euron. ECB anser därför att den bör medverka i utvärderingen av programmets betydelse, effektivitet och verkan för att kunna avge ett yttrande till rådet när rådet skall besluta om Perikles-programmet skall fortsätta eller inte.

text: 8. ECB noterar slutligen att det i enlighet med rådets tidigare förordningar

text: (EG) nr 1338/2001

text: och 1339/2001(1) kommer att tas ett parallellt beslut som utsträcker förslaget till de medlemsstater som inte infört euron som gemensam valuta. Lämpligheten härav måste bedömas av rådet.

text: 9. Detta yttrande skall offentliggöras i Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning.

text: Utfärdat i Frankfurt am Main den 9 oktober 2001.

text: Willem F. Duisenberg

text: ECB:s ordförande

text: (1) EGT L 181, 4.7.2001, s. 6 och 11.


text: OJ L 275, 27.10.2000, p. 37. 3 Law No 5/98 of 31 January, as amended by Decree Law No 118/2001 of 17 April.

text: OJ L 356, 30.12.1998, p. 1. OJ L 229, 9.9.2000, p. 34. 8 It is noted that Regulation ECB/1998/15 is currently under review.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 11 October 2001 at the request of the Portuguese Ministry of Finance on a draft decree law amending the legal framework of credit institutions and financial companies (CON/2001/32)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 11 October 2001 at the request of the Portuguese Ministry of Finance on a draft decree law amending the legal framework of credit institutions and financial companies

text: 1. On 10 July 2001 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Portuguese Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft decree law (hereinafter referred to as the ‘draft decree law’), which amends the legal framework of credit institutions and financial companies approved by Decree Law No 298/92 of 31 December (‘Regime Geral das Instituições de Crédito e Sociedades Financeiras’).

text: 2. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Article 105(4) of the Treaty establishing the European Community and the third and sixth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: on the consultation of the ECB by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the legislative proposal contains provisions dealing with national central banks and with rules applicable to financial institutions which can have a material influence on the stability of financial institutions and financial markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the ECB, this opinion has been adopted by the Governing Council of the ECB.

text: 3. The draft decree law provides for a comprehensive review of the legal framework of credit institutions and financial companies in Portugal. The draft decree law addresses five main aspects. First, it restates the central banking tasks of the Banco de Portugal within this legal framework, which are relevant for the surveillance and oversight of markets and markets infrastructure. Secondly, it updates the list of types of credit institutions and financial companies and introduces the definition of electronic money institutions as credit institutions, which corresponds to a partial implementation of Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 September 2000 amending Directive

text: relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions . Thirdly, the draft decree law simplifies the authorisation procedures for credit institutions and financial companies, including the authorisation of subsidiaries of credit institutions located in third countries to the European Union. Fourthly, the draft decree law contains a number of provisions aimed at enhancing the framework for the conduct of prudential supervision. These include rules regarding the notification of qualified holdings in credit institutions and the suspension of voting rights in cases of a failure to notify, the fitness and propriety of holders of such qualified holdings and also of members of corporate bodies, the supervisory powers of the Banco de Portugal and, lastly, adjustments relating to prudential ratios and limits. Finally, the draft decree law modifies certain provisions regarding the procedures of reorganisation of credit institutions, in particular by enhancing the scope of the supervisory powers of Banco de Portugal and by assigning a more operational role to the Deposit Guarantee Fund. The following comments of the ECB regard primarily these aspects of the draft decree law. It may be recalled that some of the proposed amendments to the legal framework of credit institutions and financial companies were already considered by the ECB in its Opinion CON/99/15 of 27 October 1999 at the request of the Portuguese Ministry of Finance on two draft legislative provisions amending (i) the legal framework of credit institutions and financial companies concerning the Deposit Guarantee Fund and (ii) the executive order governing the activities of the Deposit Guarantee Fund.

text: 4. First, in accordance with the proposed Article 92 of the draft decree law, the central banking tasks of the Banco de Portugal defined in

text: Article 13(1)

text: Article 14

text: and Article 15 of its Organic Law are recalled and reproduced in the legal framework of credit institutions and financial companies under the common heading of ‘Guidance and surveillance’ (in the original ‘Orientação e fiscalização’). The ECB understands that the reference to these functions (namely of (i) surveillance of the monetary and foreign exchange markets; (ii) regulation, oversight, and promotion of the smooth operation of payment systems; and (iii) collection and compilation of monetary, financial, foreign exchange and balance of payments statistics) in the context of the legal and supervisory framework of credit institutions and financial companies does not in any manner imply that they correspond to financial supervision functions. The tasks enumerated in the proposed

text: Article 92

text: are typical central banking tasks and therefore remain within this sphere. For this reason, the ECB considers that it is unnecessary to maintain the proposed

text: Article 92

text: in the draft decree law and suggests the deletion of its contents. The mere reproduction of central banking tasks assigned to the Banco de Portugal by its Organic Law and their re-classification and re-ordering under the common heading of ‘Guidance and surveillance’ does not seem to add value to the legal framework of credit institutions and financial companies and may not be seen as useful from the central banking perspective.

text: 5. Secondly, with regard to the introduction of electronic money institutions as credit institutions, the ECB understands that the authorisation and the commencement of activities of electronic money institutions may only be allowed when the relevant special legislation, implementing Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 September 2000 on the taking up, pursuit of and prudential supervision of the business of electronic money institutions has been adopted in Portugal.

text: 6. Thirdly, with regard to the simplification of the authorisation procedures for credit institutions and financial companies, including the authorisation of subsidiaries of credit institutions located in third countries to the European Union, the ECB welcomes the revised procedures, which are broadly in line with international standards regarding the licensing of credit institutions.

text: 7. Fourthly, the ECB welcomes the provisions of the draft decree law directed at enhancing and reinforcing the supervisory framework for credit institutions and financial companies. In particular, the ECB welcomes the revised concept of a qualifying holding, as established in the proposed Article 13(7) of the draft decree law. The ECB also welcomes the reinforcement of notification duties regarding qualified holdings, together with the suspension of voting rights in cases of a failure to notify in the proposed Articles

text: and

text: , respectively, since they provide for an enhancement of the prudential tasks of the Banco de Portugal in this field. The ECB welcomes the possibility, under the proposed

text: Article 116(2)

text: , for the Banco de Portugal to request special audits to be performed by independent entities. In addition, in accordance with the proposed

text: Article 120(6)

text: , the Banco de Portugal may also request credit institutions to present reports on prudential supervision prepared by specialised entities. The ECB believes that these provisions, by providing a certain degree of flexibility, also enhance the effectiveness of prudential supervision which may contribute to an increased integration of financial markets in Europe, while respecting free competition among credit institutions.

text: 8. The ECB notes that, in accordance with the proposed

text: Article 118(2)

text: , the Banco de Portugal will be able to request a credit institution to abstain from engaging in an operation which may lead to the infringement or increase the gravity of an infringement of prudential rules or, alternatively, which may lead to the disregard of rules of prudent and sound management. The ECB recognises the need to provide the supervisory authority with adequate and flexible instruments to ensure the observance of prudential rules, with particular regard to institutions in difficulty. Notwithstanding, the attribution of such broad supervisory powers may involve certain risks for the Banco de Portugal itself since it may be seen by market participants as being entitled to oversee the credit institutions' managerial decisions. In addition, such attribution of powers should also not give rise to uncertainties regarding transactions among market participants. Therefore, the ECB suggests that the wording of the proposed

text: Article 118(2)

text: might merit some clarification in order to reduce the potential scope of supervisory influence over managerial decisions and market transactions.

text: 9. The ECB takes note of the proposed

text: Article 117

text: A, according to which the Banco de Portugal may declare subject to its supervision those entities that perform activities deemed relevant for the functioning of payment systems. The ECB understands that the provisions of this Article will not limit the competences of the Banco de Portugal in its role as the payment system overseer.

text: 10. Finally, the ECB would like to address the provisions relating to the procedures of reorganization of a credit institution and the role of Deposit Guarantee Fund, namely the proposed Articles

text: and

text: -A. The main purpose of these provisions is to enhance the supervisory powers of the Banco de Portugal relating to corrective action when an institution fails to meet prudential requirements, to enlarge the scope of activities of the Deposit Guarantee Fund, allowing for its intervention in situations of financial reorganisation of credit institutions and to provide for co-operation between the Banco de Portugal and the Deposit Guarantee Fund in such situations. The ECB would like to recall that it has already adopted Opinion CON/99/15 on the substance of similar draft. The ECB therefore recalls some of the comments put forward in that opinion, where applicable and with the necessary adaptations.

text: 11. According to the legal framework of credit institutions and financial companies, the Banco de Portugal may decide to take exceptional measures whenever the interests of depositors, investors and other creditors, or the safeguard of the normal functioning of the money, financial and foreign exchange markets, are threatened. Among these measures, the Banco de Portugal may require the institution concerned to prepare a reorganisation plan, whose acceptance by the Banco de Portugal may be made conditional upon a capital reduction or increase, or disposal of shareholdings and other assets. The draft decree law allows the Banco de Portugal, in the context of its intervention in the institution concerned, to invite the Deposit Guarantee Fund to co-operate in the reorganisation process, particularly by granting monetary or financial support or by participating in possible capital increases. The ECB considers that the amendments in the proposed Article 142 of the draft decree law achieve this objective.

text: 12. The ECB notes that, in relation to the amendments to

text: Article 142

text: , the Banco de Portugal will have an extended role over the financial reorganisation of a troubled institution. Namely, the Banco de Portugal may present an intervention plan defining a capital increase and further requiring that the capital increase is preceded by the absorption of the institution’s losses by the relevant ‘positive’ items of own funds. The Banco de Portugal may also invite the Deposit Guarantee Fund or other institutions to co-operate in the reorganisation process, in particular, by granting adequate monetary or financial support, or through their participation in the capital increase decided by the Banco de Portugal, which shall be also responsible for guiding and defining such co-operation in terms of the timeframe. The ECB understands, in accordance with the proposed

text: Article 142(7)

text: , that such an intervention plan, as decided by the Banco de Portugal on a capital increase, does not give rise to an obligation for the shareholders of the institution or for any other investors and institutions, including the Deposit Guarantee Fund, to indeed subscribe to a capital increase.

text: 13. The ECB notes, in relation to the proposed

text: Article 159(2)

text: , that the Banco de Portugal will be able, in an urgent situation and under the conditions laid down in its Organic Law, to grant temporarily to the Deposit Guarantee Fund the financial resources required to meet the latter’s immediate needs. The ECB takes note that the financial resources granted by the Banco de Portugal to the Fund under this provision are granted without prejudice to its obligations as part of the ESCB and based on adequate collateral (see

text: Articles 24(1)

text: (c) and

text: Article 25

text: (b) of the Organic Law of the Banco de Portugal). In this context, the ECB would like to recall that according to Article 14.4 of the ESCB Statute, national central banks may perform functions other than those specified in the ESCB Statute unless the Governing Council of the ECB finds, by a majority of two-thirds of the votes cast, that these interfere with the objectives and tasks of the ESCB. The ECB does not anticipate that the possibility given to the Banco de Portugal under

text: Article 159(2)

text: would interfere with the objectives and tasks of the ESCB.

text: 14. The ECB notes, in relation to the proposed

text: Article 167

text: A(1) relating to financial support rules, that the Deposit Guarantee Fund will be able to participate in operations deemed adequate to put an end to situations of financial distress involving member credit institutions. Moreover, the proposed

text: Article 167

text: A(2) provides that the Fund shall confine its financial support operations to the cases in which financial distress situations are likely to come to an end within a short period of time, the objectives are clearly outlined and defined and the manner in which the Fund’s support will end is specified. In this respect, the ECB notes that the wording of the proposed

text: Article 167

text: A(2), compared with the previous wording of this Article as discussed in ECB Opinion CON/99/15, no longer specifies that the Fund shall confine its financial support operations to situations which do not involve recourse to loans or to special contributions from member credit institutions. The ECB therefore understands that, under the proposed

text: Article 159(2)

text: , the Banco de Portugal may also grant financial resources to the Deposit Guarantee Fund for the purposes foreseen under the proposed

text: Article 167

text: A(1), which was not the case under the previous draft presented for consultation submitted to the ECB for its opinion. Therefore, the Banco de Portugal may decide to grant financial resources to the Deposit Guarantee Fund in order to finance any financial support operation involving credit institutions to be carried out by the Fund. On this issue, the ECB considers that the possibility that the Banco de Portugal grants financial resources to the Fund should in practice have a narrow scope, namely where systemic stability considerations are involved, in view of the responsibilities of the Banco de Portugal as overseer of the stability of the Portuguese financial system, in accordance with

text: Article 12

text: (c) of the Organic Law of the Banco de Portugal. Lastly, the ECB welcomes that the execution of any financial support operation by the Deposit Guarantee Fund is made dependent on the Banco de Portugal’s confirmation of the adequacy of the operation to resolve the situation in question.

text: 15. The ECB would also like to draw attention to the minimum reserve requirements imposed on credit institutions by Regulation ECB/1998/15 of 1 December 1998 on the application of 5 6 minimum reserves , as amended by Regulation ECB/2000/8 , and to the statistical reporting requirements imposed on monetary financial institutions by Regulation ECB/1998/167 of 1 December 1998 concerning the consolidated balance sheet of the monetary financial institutions sector, as amended by Regulation ECB/2000/8. According to the present wording of Regulation ECB/1998/15, the ECB may exempt from minimum reserve requirements an institution subject to winding-up proceedings or reorganisation measures8. In case a credit institution continues to hold its authorisation while being subject to reorganisation measures, its obligations as a reporting monetary financial institution (MFI) continue.

text: 16. The ECB confirms that it has no objection to publication of this opinion by the competent national authorities at their discretion. Done at Frankfurt am Main on 11 October 2001. The President of the ECB [signed] Willem F. DUISENBERG


title: Yttrande av Europeiska centralbanken av den 11 oktober 2001 på begäran av Europeiska unionens råd om ett förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning om arbetskraftskostnadsindex (CON/2001/33)

text: 1. Den 17 september 2001 mottog Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) en begäran från Europeiska unionens råd om yttrande över ett förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning om arbetskraftskostnadsindex (nedan kallat utkast till förordning).

text: 2. ECB:s behörighet att avge ett yttrande grundar sig på artikel 105.4 i Fördraget om upprättandet av Europeiska gemenskapen. I enlighet med artikel 17.5 första meningen i arbetsordningen för ECB har detta yttrande antagits av ECB-rådet.

text: 3. Utkastet till förordning syftar till att skapa ett gemensamt regelverk för produktion, överföring och utvärdering av jämförbara arbetskraftskostnadsindex inom gemenskapen. Enligt utkastet till förordning skall medlemsstaterna kvartalsvis överföra uppgifter om arbetskraftskostnader till Europeiska kommissionen (Eurostat).

text: 4. ECB välkomnar utkastet till förordning som utgör en del av den handlingsplan för statistikkrav avseende Ekonomiska och monetära unionen (nedan kallad handlingsplanen) som på uppdrag av Ecofin-rådet tagits fram av Europeiska kommissionen (Eurostat) i nära samarbete med ECB. Handlingsplanen är ett svar på Monetära kommitténs rapport om informationskraven inom EMU, som godkändes av Ecofin-rådet den 18 januari 1999, samt de två första lägesrapporterna om informationskraven i EMU, som utarbetades av Ekonomiska och finansiella kommittén. I den tredje lägesrapporten, som godkändes av Ecofin-rådet den 19 januari 2001, specificerades även tidtabellen för ändringar av gällande statistikförordningar.

text: 5. Tillgången på harmoniserade uppgifter om arbetskraftskostnader breddar och fördjupar de uppgifter som kan användas för den analys och bedömning av hoten mot prisstabiliteten som utförs enligt den andra pelaren av ECB:s monetära politik. Arbetskraftskostnader utgör en viktig del av produktionskostnaderna för ekonomin som helhet och har en betydande inverkan på prisbildningen. Arbetskraftskostnaden ger dessutom underlag för indikatorer rörande konkurrenskraften. De samlade europeiska uppgifterna om arbetskraftskostnader, som för närvarande finns tillgängliga, bygger på uppgifter som de nationella statistikinstituten på frivillig väg överför till Europeiska kommissionen (Eurostat) och de återspeglar de betydande skillnader som finns vid framtagningen av de nationella serier som används för beräkningen av euroserierna. De kvartalsuppgifter om löner och andra ersättningar som kan fås från de nationella räkenskaperna inom ENS 95 kan inte heller användas, eftersom de inte är tillräckligt detaljerade och kvaliteten beror på den underliggande primära arbetskraftskostnadsstatistiken.

text: 6. ECB vill understryka den vikt som den fäster vid ett antal komponenter i utkastet till förordning, vilka redan ingår i handlingsplanen, samtidigt som ECB är fullt medveten om att behovet att begränsa rapporteringsbördan för företagen har medfört betydande kompromisser.

text: a) Den föreslagna omfattningen av NACE Rev. 1, inbegripet servicesektorn: Utkastet till förordning täcker över 90 % av sysselsättningen i euroområdet, medan de aktuella uppgifterna täcker cirka 65 %. Det är en betydande förbättring, eftersom det ger en bättre förståelse för arbetskraftskostnadsutvecklingen över hela det ekonomiska fältet, och i synnerhet med en förbättrad täckning av kostnaderna inom servicesektorn.

text: b) Den föreslagna uppdelningen av NACE Rev. 1: Enligt utkastet till förordning blir de uppgifter som skall hämtas in mer detaljerade, med en uppdelning efter ekonomisk verksamhet, vilket är viktigt när det gäller att förklara förändringar i det samlade resultatet.

text: c) Tillgången till ett index över arbetskraftskostnader som både innefattar och utesluter bonusutbetalningar: Bonusutbetalningar brukar vara cykliska komponenter i den totala arbetskraftskostnaden. Analysen av uppgifter rörande arbetskraftskostnader kommer att underlättas betydligt om det blir möjligt att särskilja denna komponent i den totala arbetskraftskostnaden.

text: d) Förslaget att uppgifter skall överföras inom 70 dagar: Detta skulle innebära en förbättring eftersom tillgången på uppgifter för närvarande är mycket dålig. De första sammanställda europeiska beräkningarna blir inte tillgängliga förrän efter cirka 100 dagar.

text: e) Tillgången till en lämplig mängd historiska uppgifter: För analysändamål är det viktigt att kunna bedöma arbetskraftskostnadsindex över tiden. ECB är emellertid också medveten om vilken arbetsbörda som skulle läggas på medlemsstaterna, om de skulle bli tvungna att tillhandahålla fullständiga historiska uppgifter, och stöder därför tanken att begränsa överföringen av historiska uppgifter till ett urval av arbetskraftskostnadsposter och endast för NACE-avdelningarna C-K.

text: f) Den förbättring av jämförbarheten som behövs för att uppnå bra aggregat inom euroområdet: Eftersom medlemsstaterna fortfarande skulle ha möjlighet att använda en kombination av olika källor, skulle det vara värdefullt om genomförandeåtgärderna i artikel 10 kunde innefatta en återkommande bedömning av vilken effekt användningen härav har på de nationella resultaten, liksom en bedömning av andra möjliga orsaker till utebliven jämförbarhet.

text: 7. ECB vill uttala starkt stöd för den föreslagna tidtabellen för genomförandet av utkastet till förordning och uppmanar medlemsstaterna att avstå från att begära undantag. Om medlemsstaterna utnyttjar möjligheten till undantag fullt ut, skulle fullständigt harmoniserade europeiska aggregat för NACE-avdelningarna C-K bli tillgängliga först 2004 och fullständiga europeiska aggregat som omfattar NACE-avdelningarna L-O först 2007. Även målet på 80 % täckning av euroområdet vid slutet av 2002 - ett mål som stöds av Ecofin-rådet - skulle äventyras.

text: 8. Det här yttrande skall offentliggöras i Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning.

text: Utfärdat i Wien den 11 oktober 2001.

text: Willem F. Duisenberg

text: ECB:s ordförande


title: Yttrande från Europeiska Centralbanken av den 26 oktober 2001 på begäran av Europeiska unionens råd över Europaparlamentets och rådets förslag till förordning om gränsöverskridande betalningar i euro (CON/2001/34)

text: 1. Den 26 september 2001 erhöll Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) en begäran från Europeiska unionens råd om yttrande över Europaparlamentets och rådets förslag till förordning om gränsöverskridande betalningar i euro (nedan kallat förordningsförslaget). Dess huvudsakliga syfte är att fastställa principen att avgifter som ett institut tar ut för gränsöverskridande betalningar i euro skall vara desamma som de avgifter som samma institut tar ut för motsvarande inhemska betalningar.

text: 2. ECB:s behörighet att avge yttrandet grundas på artikel 105.4 första strecksatsen i Fördraget om upprättandet av Europeiska gemenskapen (nedan kallat fördraget) och på artiklarna

text: 4 a

text: och

text: i Stadgan för Europeiska centralbankssystemet och Europeiska centralbanken, eftersom förordningsförslaget innehåller bestämmelser som rör väl fungerande betalningssystem och insamlandet av betalningsbalansstatistik. Detta yttrande har antagits av ECB-rådet i enlighet med artikel 17.5 första meningen i ECB:s arbetsordning.

text: 3. I förordningsförslaget föreskrivs att de avgifter som ett institut tar ut för gränsöverskridande betalningar i euro på upp till 50000 euro skall vara desamma som de avgifter som samma institut tar ut för motsvarande betalningar inom den medlemsstat där det kontor, tillhörande institutet, som utför den gränsöverskridande betalningen är beläget. Förordningsförslaget är avsett att tillämpas från och med den 1 januari 2002 på gränsöverskridande elektroniska betalningar, dvs. främst på betalningar som görs med kontokort och genom kontantuttag i uttagsautomater, och från och med den 1 januari 2003 på gränsöverskridande gireringar och gränsöverskridande checkar. För att öka öppenheten innehåller förordningsförslaget även bestämmelser som förpliktar institut att i förväg ge kunderna information om avgifterna. Dessutom innehåller förslaget bestämmelser som underlättar en automatiserad hantering av gränsöverskridande betalningar genom att det ålägger institut och kunder en ömsesidig skyldighet att på begäran informera varandra om tillämpliga internationella bankkontonummer (International Bank Account Number, IBAN) och bankidentifieringskoder (Bank Identifier Code, BIC). I förordningsförslaget fastställs även en beloppsgräns avseende rapporteringskraven för upprättande av betalningsbalansstatistik på 12500 euro från och med den 1 januari 2002, och denna beloppsgräns höjs till 50000 euro från och med den 1 januari 2004.

text: 4. Förordningsförslaget grundas på artikel 95.1 i fördraget, som fastslår att rådet skall "besluta om åtgärder för tillnärmning av sådana bestämmelser i lagar och andra författningar i medlemsstaterna som syftar till att upprätta den inre marknaden och få den att fungera." Vad gäller valet av rättslig grund skulle ECB välkomna en bedömning av rådet av förordningsförslagets förenlighet med principen i artikel 4 i fördraget om en öppen marknadsekonomi med fri konkurrens, med rätten till egendom och med proportionalitetsprincipen.

text: 5. Artiklarna 1-3 i förordningsförslaget föreskriver att avgifter för gränsöverskridande och inrikes betalningar skall vara desamma i syfte att upprätta ett gemensamt betalningsområde för euron. I den meningen är förordningsförslagets mål "helt i linje med Eurosystemets policy alltsedan offentliggörandet av dess rapport 1999 med titeln Improving cross-border retail payment services: the Eurosystem's view", dvs. att upprätta ett gemensamt betalningsområde för euron. I detta hänseende delar ECB uppfattningen att begreppet "gräns" inte i sig skall utgöra en faktor som motiverar en differentiering av betalningar inom euroområdet. ECB har alltid verkat för ett integrerat betalningsområde för euron, där skillnader i kostnader och tillgången till inrikes och gränsöverskridande betalningar bör minska avsevärt och så småningom försvinna. I linje med de uppgifter som ECB tilldelats genom fördraget delar ECB även den uppfattning som anges i motiveringen, som innebär att upprättandet av ett gemensamt betalningsområde för euron är önskvärt för att förbättra allmänhetens tilltro till den gemensamma valutan. ECB stöder därför alltjämt fullt och fast det slutliga målet med ett fullständigt integrerat gemensamt betalningsområde för euron. Samtidigt som ECB ansluter sig till det mål som anges i förordningsförslaget, vill ECB emellertid framhålla sina reservationer mot en förordning som inverkar på priset för tjänster, vilket kan medföra störningar i marknadsekonomin. Även om ECB har förståelse för övervägandena bakom förordningsförslaget, skulle man föredra att den ekonomiska sakfrågan angrips genom att bankerna medges en längre, men definitiv, tidsgräns för att stegvis justera sina priser i takt med sjunkande kostnader. Den prisreglering som förs fram i förordningsförslaget kommer avgjort inte att avhjälpa den existerande splittringen av betalningskanaler och den kostnadskrävande hanteringen mellan bankerna när det gäller gränsöverskridande betalningar, vilka är några av de viktigaste orsakerna till de höga avgifterna. Med en sådan utgångspunkt framstår förordningsförslaget som inriktat snarare på konsekvenserna av den underliggande bristande effektiviteten än på orsakerna.

text: 6. I detta hänseende avser följande allmänna kommentar tidpunkten för förordningsförslagets ikraftträdande. ECB har arbetat intensivt med banksektorn sedan 1999 som en katalysator för förändring. Alltsedan dess har framsteg gjorts och hinder som ansetts vara hämmande för gränsöverskridande betalningar har undanröjts. ECB förväntar sig därför - som ett resultat av genomförda åtgärder - att en väsentlig sänkning av avgiften för gränsöverskridande betalningar kommer att införas redan från och med den 1 januari 2002. Ett fullständigt integrerat gemensamt betalningsområde, som är nödvändigt för en total utjämning av priser grundade på verkliga kostnader och kapacitet, bör följa i nästa steg, inom en tidsram som är så kort som realistiskt sett är möjligt med hänsyn till den nödvändiga strukturanpassningen. I varje fall när det gäller gireringar behöver emellertid bankerna ytterligare tid, exempelvis till år 2005, för att skapa den nödvändiga infrastrukturen och den logistik som tillåter en ekonomiskt genomförbar utjämning av priser mellan inhemska och gränsöverskridande överföringar. Det bör beaktas att medan en konsolidering av betalningssystemens infrastruktur efter införandet av euron redan har skett när det gäller överföringssystemen för stora belopp, har det däremot inte skapats någon all-europeisk infrastruktur för detaljistbetalningar. Konsolideringen på detta område förväntas inledas efter den slutliga övergången till euro.

text: 7. Vidare är ECB av den uppfattningen att likställandet av avgifter för inhemska och gränsöverskridande betalningar vid en alltför tidig tidpunkt kan komma att utlösa vissa kontraproduktiva reaktioner från instituten, som exempelvis att man minskar utbudet av tjänster för gränsöverskridande betalningar eller att det sker en höjning av de inhemska avgifterna eller de avgifter som tas ut för andra tjänster. Dessutom är inhemska gireringar avgiftsfria i vissa länder eller utförs mot låga avgifter, medan avgifterna är ganska höga i andra länder. En icke önskvärd effekt av förordningsförslaget skulle kunna bli en förlängning av nuvarande olikheter mellan länderna och att prisskillnaderna för gränsöverskridande betalningar mellan olika länder i euroområdet består.

text: 8. Därutöver noterar ECB att dagens praxis avseende vem som faktiskt påförs avgift för inhemska gireringar - avsändaren, mottagaren eller båda - kan skilja sig mellan medlemsstaterna. Att flytta över sådan inhemsk praxis till gränsöverskridande betalningar mellan länder med olika praxis är således inte okomplicerat. Det är inte heller klart huruvida förordningsförslaget lämnar någon frihet för avsändaren och mottagaren att avtala om vem som skall bära kostnaden för överföringen. Dessutom bör man i detta avseende närmare överväga hur förordningsförslaget förhåller sig till

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 97/5/EG av den 27 januari 1997

text: om gränsöverskridande betalningar(1). Rent allmänt skulle en standardisering av avgiftshanteringen kunna visa sig värdefull och detta bör undersökas.

text: 9. ECB håller med om att skapandet av ett gemensamt eurobetalningsområde kräver förbättrade förfaranden för kontantuttag, betalningar med kontokort och gireringar. Emellertid inkluderas, i

text: artikel 3

text: , även checkar i förordningsförslagets tillämpningsområde. Samtidigt som ECB noterar att checkar fortfarande spelar en viktig roll på några få nationella marknader, så anser ECB att alla åtgärder som skulle kunna gynna en gränsöverskridande användning av detta betalningsinstrument bör undvikas. Mot bakgrund av ECB:s lagstadgade bemyndigande att främja väl fungerande betalningssystem, skulle ECB hellre avråda från gränsöverskridande och inhemsk användning av checkar till förmån för säkrare och effektivare betalningsmedel, av bland annat den anledningen att checkar är pappersbaserade och inte kan hanteras lika effektivt som elektroniska betalningsinstrument. Att checkar inkluderas i förordningsförslagets tillämpningsområde innebär dessutom att bankerna tvingas investera i infrastruktur för att hantera gränsöverskridande checkar, samtidigt som de måste investera kraftigt för att förbättra hanteringen av gränsöverskridande gireringar.

text: 10. ECB välkomnar initiativet i artikel 4 i förordningsförslaget att stödja öppenheten när det gäller de avgifter som tas ut för gränsöverskridande betalningar och för betalningar som utförs inom den medlemsstat där ett institut är beläget. Den bestämmelsen kommer att förbättra konkurrensen, bidra till upprättandet av ett gemensamt betalningsområde och förstärka fördelarna för konsumenterna på den inre marknaden.

text: 11. I artikel 5 i förordningsförslaget föreskrivs en ömsesidig skyldighet för institut och kunder att på begäran informera varandra om sina internationella bankkontonummer (IBAN) och bankidentifieringskoder (BIC). ECB har alltid förordat standarder som ett medel för att underlätta utförandet av gränsöverskridande betalningar. ECB har initierat diskussioner och arbetat intensivt med banksektorn för att införa standarder som exempelvis IBAN. ECB stödjer därför målet enligt artikel 5 i förordningsförslaget att påskynda och underlätta tillämpningen av angivna standarder. ECB föreslår emellertid att tillräcklig flexibilitet lämnas för den framtida utvecklingen av tekniska standarder för att säkerställa betalningssystemens långsiktiga effektivitet. Slutligen noteras att förordningsförslaget inte medger instituten och deras kunder någon tid för att rätta sig efter artiklarna

text: och

text: . Rådet ombeds att överväga huruvida detta i praktiken kommer att bli genomförbart.

text: 12. Enligt artikel 6.1 i förordningsförslaget skall medlemsstaterna senast den 1 januari 2002 ta bort alla nationella rapporteringskrav för upprättande av betalningsbalansstatistik när det gäller gränsöverskridande betalningar på upp till 12500 euro. Beloppsgränsen kommer att höjas till 50000 euro från och med den 1 januari 2004. I juni 2000 enades man inom kommittén för valuta-, finans- och betalningsbalansstatistik (CMFB) om ett generellt undantag från och med den 1 januari 2002 vid en beloppsgräns på 12500 euro för de medlemsstater som använder sig av avvecklingsbaserad rapportering från banker för kundernas räkning. Beloppet valdes för att befria i stort sett alla gränsöverskridande detaljisttransaktioner och omkring två tredjedelar av samtliga transaktioner från pportering. Med gränsen vid ett belopp på 12500 euro undantas i praktiken gränsöverskridande betalningar av konsumenter från alla rapporteringskrav. ECB är av den uppfattningen att en alltför tidig höjning av gränsbeloppet till 50000 euro inte avsevärt skulle öka proportionen gränsöverskridande transaktioner som är undantagna, men att det skulle medföra allvarliga konsekvenser för kvaliteten på statistiken på grund av den förlust av information som rör vissa poster i betalningsbalansen, huvudsakligen tjänster, inkomster och transfereringar. Exakta betalningsbalansuppgifter krävs för beslutsfattande. Dessutom skulle en försämring av de nationella betalningsbalansuppgifterna minska kvaliteten på nationalräkenskapsaggregaten, särskilt avseende bruttonationalprodukten och bruttonationalinkomsten. En grundläggande reform när det gäller systemen för uppgiftsinsamlandet i vissa medlemsstater för att upprätthålla uppgiftskvaliteten skulle ta tid och förmodligen direkt öka rapporteringsbördan, särskilt för små och medelstora företag. Ett system med två gränsbelopp, med separata gränsbelopp för betalningar inom och utanför EU - ett system som skulle kunna begränsa påverkan på hela euroområdets betalningsbalansstatistik - skulle kunna bli ohanterligt och öka bankernas rapporteringskostnader. På dessa grunder vill ECB starkt rekommendera att man skjuter upp höjningen av gränsbeloppet till 50000 euro fram till år 2006, så att det finns tillräckligt med tid för att utveckla alternativa källor. I förordningsförslaget bör det också klargöras att gränsbeloppen gäller för bankers rapportering av gränsöverskridande betalningar som initieras av deras kunder, och påverkar inte skyldigheten att uppfylla de statistikkrav som fastställs i förordningen om ESA 95. ECB föreslår också att man till 2004 skjuter upp borttagandet av alla minimikrav beträffande uppgifter om mottagaren som förhindrar att betalningar utförs automatiskt, vilket finns intaget i artikel 6.2 i förordningsförslaget, särskilt eftersom detta kan nödvändiggöra konsultationer med olika parter på nationell nivå.

text: 13. Vad gäller tillämpningen av förordningsförslaget i de tre länder som inte deltar i den ekonomiska och monetära unionen, tycks det finnas ett behov av ytterligare klargöranden. Eftersom euron kommer att fortsätta att vara en utländsk valuta i dessa länder, kan det bli svårt att bestämma en korrekt referens till en motsvarande inhemsk betalning, exempelvis om jämförelsevärdet bör vara antingen en överföring i den inhemska valutan eller en överföring i euro inom samma icke-deltagande land. På samma sätt är det oklart vad som skall utgöra referensavgiften för ett kontantuttag i något av dessa länder.

text: 14. Detta yttrande skall offentliggöras i Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning.

text: Utfärdat i Frankfurt am Main den 26 oktober 2001.

text: Willem F. Duisenberg

text: ECB:s ordförande

text: (1) EGT L 43, 14.2.1997, s. 25.


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: ECB opinion of 2 August 2001 on a draft Seventh Law amending the Deutsche Bundesbank Act (

text: Article 9(1) of the proposal for adirective of the European Parliament and of the Council on the supplementary supervision of credit institutions, insurance undertakings and investment firms in a financial conglomerate and amending Council Directives

text: and

text: , and Directives

text: and

text: of the European Parliament and the Council, COM (2001) 213 final.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 8 November 2001 at the request of the German Ministry of Finance on a draft law establishing an integrated financial services supervision (Gesetz über die integrierte Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht) (CON/2001/35)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 8 November 2001 at the request of the German Ministry of Finance on a draft law establishing an integrated financial services supervision (Gesetz über die integrierte Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht) (

text: 1. On 21 August 2001 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Federal Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft law establishing an integrated financial services supervision (Gesetz über die integrierte Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht -hereinafter referred to as the “draft Law”).

text: 2. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Article 105(4) of the Treaty establishing the European Community (hereinafter referred to as the “Treaty”), and the third and sixth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft Law contains provisions concerning a national central bank as well as rules applicable to financial institutions which could materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, this opinion has been adopted by the Governing Council of the ECB.

text: 3. The objective of the draft Law is to create a new Federal Authority for Financial Services Supervision (Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht - BAF) with responsibility for the supervision of credit institutions, insurance companies, investment firms and other financial institutions. This new supervisory authority is the result of a merger between the existing sectoral authorities, namely, the Federal Banking Supervisory Office (Bundesaufsichtsamt für das Kreditwesen - BAKred), the Federal Insurance Supervisory Office (Bundesaufsichtsamt für das Versicherungswesen - BAV) and the Federal Securities Supervisory Office (Bundesaufsichtsamt für den Wertpapierhandel - BAWe). The regulatory and supervisory powers of the new integrated supervisory authority will cover the entire range of financial intermediaries. As explained in the explanatory memorandum to the draft Law, this development is a response to substantial changes taking place in the financial markets, which required adaptation of the former institutional structure of three separate supervisory bodies. According to the explanatory memorandum, the substantive law relating to the supervision of credit institutions, insurance companies, investment firms and other financial institutions will not be affected by the draft Law, as the provisions deal mainly with organisational matters. The cooperation between the supervisory authorities and the Deutsche Bundesbank, which up until now has not been laid down by law in detail, will be governed by specific provisions in the Banking Act (Gesetz über das Kreditwesen). This applies in particular to cooperation concerning the day-to-day supervision of credit and financial institutions to be carried out by the Deutsche Bundesbank.

text: 4. The ECB notes that the explanatory memorandum accompanying the draft Law points out several benefits resulting from the merger of the three sectoral authorities into a new financial regulatory and supervisory authority in the Federal Republic of Germany. Those benefits involve namely strengthening the efficiency of supervision of the financial system as a whole, achieving synergy in central supervisory tasks and making regulation and supervision more cost-effective. As a complement to such objectives, the ECB suggests integrating and modernising the underlying substantive law relating to financial regulation and supervision.

text: 5. The ECB welcomes the draft Law in so far as the involvement of the Deutsche Bundesbank in the field of prudential supervision will be laid down in more detail. By virtue of the draft Law, a clear legal basis for coordination and cooperation between the BAF and the Deutsche Bundesbank will be established, encompassing matters relating to the stability of the German financial system, to the development of supervisory practice as well as to aspects of day-to-day supervision of credit and financial services institutions. This is in line with the ECB's view that maintaining the close involvement of national central banks in prudential supervision is a mandatory condition to allow the Eurosystem to contribute adequately to monitoring the risks to financial stability in the euro area. This is of particular importance in a context in which the nature and scope of these risks are affected by the introduction of the single currency and the related enhanced integration of financial markets. In addition, it safeguards smooth coordination between the central banking functions exercised at the Eurosystem's level and the supervisory functions carried out at national level. Against this background, the ECB would like to put forward some specific comments on the provisions of the draft Law.

text: 6. First, the institutional set-up for coordination and cooperation between the BAF and the Deutsche Bundesbank. First, the ECB welcomes the institutionalisation of the financial markets regulation forum (Forum für Finanzmarktaufsicht), under Article 3 of Section 1 of the draft Law, which already exists on the basis of an agreement between the federal supervisory offices and the Deutsche Bundesbank. The forum comprises the BAF and the Deutsche Bundesbank and will coordinate their respective work in regulatory and supervisory matters, including those matters that might have a bearing on financial market stability. The ECB understands that the scope of the work of the forum may include additionally crisis situations and suggests that this could be clarified in the draft Law. The ECB deems that the establishment of this forum duly acknowledges the role of the BAF and the Deutsche Bundesbank as the authorities jointly responsible for stability of the financial system. In this respect, the ECB considers, in line with the ECB’s opinion on the proposed amendments to the Act on the Deutsche Bundesbank (Gesetz über die Deutsche Bundesbank) , and on the basis of the reasons expressed therein, that the draft Law could be supplemented by clarifying that the Deutsche Bundesbank has responsibility for contributing to the overall stability of the financial system. Therefore, the definition of such a role by means of a specific provision in the Banking Act or the Act on the Deutsche Bundesbank would be welcome. Furthermore, the ECB takes note of the establishment of an advisory committee (Fachbeirat) in Article 8 of Section 1 of the draft Law. It will be composed of 20 members to be elected by the Ministry of Finance with appropriate representation from the financial, credit and insurance industries, the Deutsche Bundesbank and consumer protection associations. The ECB understands that the purpose of the Advisory Committee will be to advise the BAF on its activities and to give recommendations on how to develop supervisory practices. However, as far as banking supervision issues are concerned, the ECB suggests that the Deutsche Bundesbank should not play an advisory role within the Committee. Instead, the BAF and the Deutsche Bundesbank, as the responsible entities in the field of banking supervision, should both be given advice by the Committee. Finally, the ECB takes note of the establishment of an administrative council (Verwaltungsrat) in Article 7 of Section 1 of the draft Law, which will supervise the activities of the Executive Board of the BAF and support it in the conduct of its activities. The Deutsche Bundesbank will be represented in this Administrative Council, although without voting rights. This will ensure that, as an integral part of the institutional framework for prudential supervision and financial stability, the Deutsche Bundesbank will be informed where necessary of the activities of the BAF.

text: 7. Secondly, cooperation and exchange of information between the BAF and the Deutsche Bundesbank on an ongoing basis. The ECB considers that, notwithstanding the abovementioned mechanisms for institutional cooperation, interaction between the overall supervisory competences of the BAF and the central banking functions of the Deutsche Bundesbank could be further enhanced in the draft Law. First, the ECB suggests including in the draft Law the basic principle that smooth interaction between the BAF, as a fully integrated supervisory institution, and the Deutsche Bundesbank should entail the obligation to cooperate closely in all fields of common interest However, the current draft Law limits such obligation to cooperate to the matters laid down in Article 7 of the Banking Act (see Article 9 of Section 2 of the draft Law). Furthermore, the ECB understands that there are no legal impediments to access to information and information sharing on all matters relating to financial stability on an ongoing basis between the BAF and the Deutsche Bundesbank. However, the ECB notes that, in accordance with Article 11 of Section 1 of the draft Law, the current sectoral confidentiality rules will continue to apply in the new framework. In this context, the ECB would welcome a new provision expressly removing possible legal obstacles to information sharing between the BAF and the Deutsche Bundesbank without being limited to the matters covered by Article 9 of the Banking Act (see Article 12 of Section 2 of the draft Law). Given the enhanced integration of financial services and the establishment of the new supervisory authority with cross-sectoral responsibilities, it may be considered necessary for access to supervisory information by the Deutsche Bundesbank to include all the sectors which may be deemed relevant for overall stability of the financial system. The central bank should have the means to assess possible systemic implications stemming from cross-sectoral linkages and from the behaviour of complex financial groups for the money and capital markets as well as for payment and settlement systems. This would also be in line with the recent European Commission's proposal for a directive on the supervision of financial conglomerates , which purports to lift the legal obstacles for supervisory information sharing regarding financial conglomerates with central banks. Lastly, it may be noted that information sharing may entail a cross-border dimension, since it may be necessary to provide other national central banks of the Eurosystem and the ECB with information on Eurosystem-related tasks. Including a new provision reflecting this aspect in the draft Law would also be welcome.

text: 8. Thirdly, the operational involvement of the Deutsche Bundesbank in the field of prudential supervision. The ECB welcomes Article 9 of Section 2 of the draft Law, proposing a new Article 7(1) of the Banking Act. The new provision maintains the general principle contained already in the present version of the Banking Act, whereby the BAF and the Deutsche Bundesbank cooperate as regards the supervision of credit and financial institutions as defined by the Banking Act. Furthermore, it clarifies further the extent of operational involvement by the Deutsche Bundesbank. The ECB understands that the main function of the Deutsche Bundesbank in this process will be the day-to-day supervision of these institutions (c.f. the second sentence of Article 7(1) of the proposal for a Banking Act in Article 9 of Section 2 of the draft law). Moreover, the BAF will generally base its supervisory activities on the assessments established by the Deutsche Bundesbank (c.f. the fourth sentence of Article 7(2) of the proposal for a Banking Act). Therefore, the new legal framework will benefit from a continuation and even expansion of the current involvement of the Deutsche Bundesbank in day-to-day supervision. This is particularly significant in respect of the participation of the Deutsche Bundesbank in the inspection of capital adequacy and risk management of the supervised institutions. Moreover, this should ensure that the Deutsche Bundesbank is in a position to further contribute to the new supervisory activities arising from the new legal framework under the Basel Capital Accord and Community provisions on capital adequacy. In this context, the ECB welcomes also Article 44 of the proposal for a Banking Act, (see Article 46 of Section 2 of the draft Law) which now expressly provides that the Deutsche Bundesbank may carry out special audits. As regards the aforementioned proposed fourth sentence of Article 7(2) of the Banking Act, according to which the BAF will generally base its supervisory activities on the assessments established by the Deutsche Bundesbank, the ECB points to the importance that the formulation of this provision does not give rise to uncertainties as regards the exclusive responsibility of the BAF for the supervisory measures taken in fulfilment of its tasks under the Banking Act.

text: 9. Fourthly, the advisory role of the Deutsche Bundesbank on specific regulatory matters. The ECB welcomes the new second sentence of Article 7(2) of the proposal for a Banking Act (csee Section 2, Article 9 of the draft Law), and the proposed Article 35(6) of the Securities Trading Act (see Article 26 of Section 4 of the draft Law), in so far as they provide the Deutsche Bundesbank with the right to be consulted by the BAF on guidelines (Richtlinien) issued under the Banking Act and also under the Securities Trading Act (Wertpapierhandelsgesetz), to the extent that the Acts do not already oblige the BAF to act in agreement with the Deutsche Bundesbank. These provisions further strengthen cooperation as regards the regulatory framework for prudential supervision. However, bearing in mind the far-reaching impact of the aforementioned guidelines issued under the Banking Act for the work of the Deutsche Bundesbank in this area and for its personnel and equipment, these guidelines should only be adopted in agreement with the Deutsche Bundesbank. The ECB would suggest, in view of its financial stability role, providing the Deutsche Bundesbank with an advisory role vis-à-vis the BAF for all legal acts falling within its field of competence. This advisory role would be not limited to legal acts falling strictly under the banking or securities fields.

text: 10. Fifthly, the ECB would welcome including in the draft Law, as part of its transitional provisions, a provision stipulating that the BAF will engage in those legal or non-legally binding commitments to cooperation and information sharing undertaken by former supervisory authorities vis-à-vis other supervisory authorities and the central banks of the Member States. Done at Frankfurt am Main on 8 November 2001. The President of the ECB [signed] Willem F. DUISENBERG