text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/1998/415/oj).

text: The Finance (Provision of Access to Cash Infrastructure) Act 2025 was adopted by the Oireachtas (Irish National Parliament) on 20 May 2025.

text: See section 5 of the 2025 Act.

text: The NUTS 3 regions are those regions which have been established for statistical purposes, as set out in Annex I to

text: Regulation (EC) No 1059/2003

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 May 2003 on the establishment of a common classification of territorial units for statistics (NUTS) (OJ L 154, 21.6.2003, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2003/1059/oj ). The eight NUTS 3 regions in Ireland are: Border, West, Mid-West, South- East, South-West, Dublin, Mid-East, Midlands.

text: The 2025 Act defines ‘cash service’ as any service by which cash may be deposited and withdrawn by individuals and SMEs, to or from an account, and in-person assistance is available in connection with that service; and ‘cash service point’ as a location at which cash services are provided by or on behalf of a designated entity.

text: Section 10 of the 2025 Act.

text: See Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on EUR-Lex. 9 See paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 3.3 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 3.2 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.5 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 3.1 of Opinion

text: . 10 See paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 1.2 of Opinion

text: of the European Central Bank of 13 October 2023 on a proposal for a regulation on the legal tender of euro banknotes and coins (OJ C, C/2023/1355, 1.12.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/1355/oj ), paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 3.2 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.6 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 3.1 of Opinion

text: . See also Principle 6 of ELTEG III in the Final report of the Euro Legal Tender Expert Group (ELTEG) of 6 July 2022, available on the Commission’s website at www.ec.europa.eu .

text: Section 5(3) and (6) of the 2025 Act. 12 Section 7 of the 2025 Act. See paragraph 2.6 of Opinion

text: . 13 COM(2023) 364 final. 14 Recitals 8, 9 and 12, and

text: Article 9(2)

text: and (5) of the proposed regulation on the legal tender of euro cash.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 14 August 2025 on implementing measures concerning access to cash (CON/2025/22)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 14 August 2025 on implementing measures concerning access to cash (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 16 July 2025, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Irish Minister for Finance (hereinafter the ‘Minister’) for an opinion on a draft Finance (Provision of Access to Cash Infrastructure) (Section 5) Order 2025 (hereinafter the ‘first draft law’) and a draft Finance (Provision of Access to Cash Infrastructure) (Section 10) Order 2025 (hereinafter the ‘second draft law’, and together with the first draft law, the ‘draft laws’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 2(1), first, second and third indents, of

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft laws relate to currency matters, means of payment and the Central Bank of Ireland (CBI). In accordance with

text: Article 17.5

text: , first sentence, of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft laws

text: 1.1 The overall purpose of the draft laws is to implement certain aspects of the Finance (Provision of Access to Cash Infrastructure) Act 2025 (hereinafter the ‘2025 Act’) . 1.2 The first draft law implements the provision of the 2025 Act that requires the Minister, in consultation with the CBI, to specify criteria to ensure sufficient and effective access to cash infrastructure in respect of each of the eight NUTS 3 regions in Ireland (hereinafter the ‘access to cash criteria’). The access to cash criteria must specify: (a) the minimum percentage of the population of the region concerned that ought to be within a radius of not less than 5 kilometres and not more than 10 kilometres of an automated teller machine (ATM); (b) the minimum number of ATMs that ought to be available per 100 000 people in the region concerned; and (c) the minimum percentage of the population of the region concerned that ought to be within a radius of not less than 5 kilometres and not more than 10 kilometres of a cash service point. In setting the access to cash criteria the Minister must take into account: (a) the need to ensure the continued provision of sufficient and effective access to cash for individuals and SMEs, and (b) in the case of the first draft law, the level of access

text: to the cash infrastructure available to individuals and SMEs as at 31 December 2022, adjusting for the exit of two banks from the Irish market: Ulster Bank Ireland DAC and KBC Bank Ireland plc . On that basis, the first draft law proposes, in respect of each NUTS 3 region in Ireland, the access to cash criteria of: (a) a specified percentage of the population that must be within a radius of no more than 10 kilometres of an ATM, ranging from 96 % to 100 %; (b) a minimum number of ATMs per 100 000 people, ranging from 73 to 94; and (c) a specified percentage of the population that must be within a radius of no more than 10 kilometres of a cash service point, specified at 100 % or 99 % . As outlined in the consultation letter from the Minister, the access to cash criteria in the first draft law are indicative and will be finalised following consultation with the CBI. 1.3 The second draft law implements the provision of the 2025 Act that concerns the designated entities responsible for maintaining access to cash levels in Ireland . Designated entities are credit institutions that meet certain conditions as outlined in the 2025 Act. These conditions are met where, for two consecutive quarters, a credit institution holds (a) a percentage share of current accounts in Ireland, and (b) a percentage share of household deposits in Ireland. The 2025 Act empowers the Minister, following consultation of the CBI, to set the percentage shares for current accounts and household deposits, respectively. The respective percentage shares must be set between the following ranges: (a) at least 5 % and not greater than 15 % of the total number of current accounts of credit institutions in Ireland; and (b) a share of at least 5 % and not greater than 15 % of the total value of household deposits of credit institutions in Ireland. On that basis, the second draft law provisionally proposes the percentage share of current accounts at 10 %, and the percentage share of household deposits at 10 %, as this is the mid-point between the minimum and the maximum range. The second draft law and the respective percentage shares will also be finalised following consultation with the CBI.

text: 2. Observations

text: 2.1 The ECB was consulted on a draft version of the 2025 Act and adopted an opinion thereon . 2.2 The ECB considers it important that all Member States take appropriate measures to ensure that credit institutions and branches operating within their territories provide adequate access to cash services, in order to facilitate the continued use of cash . Sufficient and effective access to cash is necessary to preserve the effectiveness of the legal tender status of cash. If citizens do not have easy access to cash, they will not be able to use it as a means of payment and store of value . The ECB welcomes the establishment of the access to cash criteria in the first draft law, to ensure a

text: minimum availability of ATMs and cash service points that credit institutions have to maintain in Ireland in accordance with the 2025 Act. The ECB notes that the 2025 Act provides for situations that may trigger a review of these values . Moreover, the ECB notes that, in addition to ensuring the adequacy of access to cash through the access to cash criteria set in the first draft law, the 2025 Act also includes the possibility to remedy local deficiencies for individuals and SMEs . 2.3 The access to cash criteria and the conditions for identification of designated entities in the draft laws are indicative. The ECB understands that the CBI is conducting related data collection exercises and that these values are therefore subject to consultation with the CBI and consideration by the Minister of the data collected. 2.4 On 28 June 2023 the Commission published a proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the legal tender of euro banknotes and coins (hereinafter the ‘proposed regulation on the legal tender of euro cash’), which includes an obligation for Member States to ensure sufficient and effective access to cash throughout their territory. The proposed regulation on the legal tender of euro cash provides that, following its adoption, the Commission will adopt implementing acts on a set of common indicators of general application in the euro area, which would allow Member States to effectively monitor and assess the acceptance of payments in cash and access to cash throughout their territory, in all their different regions, including urban and non-urban areas. The ECB will be consulted by the Commission on the preparation of such implementing acts . Once the implementing acts on the common indicators are adopted by the Commission, the access to cash criteria set out in the first draft law would need to be reviewed and, if necessary, adjusted accordingly.

text: This opinion will be published on EUR-Lex.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 14 August 2025.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Christine LAGARDE


text: 2 3 1 Amending Articles 12, 16, 18, 42 , 51 as well as Annex 3 and supplementing the Law by Articles 18 , 18 and 18 of the Republic of Lithuania Law No I-678 on Lietuvos bankas.

text: Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions, amending Directive

text: and repealing Directives

text: and

text: (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 338, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2013/36/oj).

text: Guideline

text: (EU) 2021/2256

text: of the European Central Bank of 2 November 2021 laying down the principles of the Ethics Framework for the Single Supervisory Mechanism (ECB/2021/50) (OJ L 454, 17.12.2021, p. 21, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/guideline/2021/2256/oj).

text: See

text: Article 1

text: , point (4), of the CRD6, which inserts

text: Article 4

text: a in Directive

text: See judgment of the Court of Justice of 29 April 2004, Commission v Council,

text: , ECLI:EU:C:2004:253, paragraphs 57 and 58; and judgment of the Court of Justice of 10 January 2006, Commission v Parliament and Council,

text: , ECLI:EU:C:2006:4, paragraphs 43 to 60.

text: See paragraph 2.6.2 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.1.3 of Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on EUR-Lex.

publisher: Europeiska centralbanken

sprak: en

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 14 August 2025 on the supervisory independence of Lietuvos bankas and the prevention of conflicts of interest of its members of staff and governance bodies (CON/2025/23)

serie: con

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 14 August 2025 on the supervisory independence of Lietuvos bankas and the prevention of conflicts of interest of its members of staff and governance bodies (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

type: rubrik

text: On 7 July 2025 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Minister of Finance of the Republic of Lithuania for an opinion on a draft law amending certain provisions of and supplementing the Law on Lietuvos bankas (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 2(1), third indent, of

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft law relates to Lietuvos bankas and the specific tasks conferred upon the ECB concerning the prudential supervision of credit institutions pursuant to Article 127(6) of the Treaty. In accordance with

text: Article 17.5

type: stycke

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The main purpose of the draft law is to transpose into Lithuanian law the amendments to Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council introduced by

text: Directive (EU) 2024/1619

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council (hereinafter the ‘CRD6’) that relate to the supervisory independence of competent authorities and the prevention of conflicts of interest in relation to the officials and employees of such authorities. 1.2 With regard to the maximum term of office for members of the governing bodies of supervisory authorities (excluding Governors of national central banks (NCBs)) the consultation request accompanying the draft law states that under the Law on Lietuvos bankas as it currently stands, the Deputy Chairs and members of the Board of Lietuvos bankas may be appointed for no more than

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/1998/415/oj).

text: Directive (EU) 2024/1619

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2024 amending Directive

text: as regards supervisory powers, sanctions, third-country branches, and environmental, social and governance risks (OJ L, 2024/1619, 19.6.2024, http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1619/oj). two consecutive terms of office. The consultation request further notes that these provisions of the Law on Lietuvos bankas comply with the provision relating to the maximum term of office for members of the governing bodies of supervisory authorities (excluding Governors of NCBs) laid down in the CRD6. In addition, the consultation request states that the current provisions of the Law on Lietuvos bankas regulating the appointment and dismissal of members of the Board of Lietuvos bankas are consistent with the principles of the CRD6 and that the draft law only supplements them with new provisions concerning the public disclosure of grounds for dismissal. In this respect, the draft law provides that Lietuvos bankas must publish on its website the grounds for dismissal within five working days of dismissal of the Chair of the Board, a Deputy Chair, or a member of the Board of Lietuvos bankas. 1.3 The draft law adds to the categories of entities set out in the Law on the Coordination of Public and Private Interests of the Republic of Lithuania in relation to which a cooling-off period is applied to former staff and members of the governing bodies of Lietuvos bankas who take up employment or positions with such entities. The additional categories include not only supervised entities but also their direct and indirect parent undertakings, subsidiaries, undertakings in which the relevant supervised entity holds a participation interest, entities providing services to any of the abovementioned entities under outsourcing agreements, and entities engaged in lobbying or interest representation activities directed at Lietuvos bankas. 1.4 The draft law specifies the duration of the cooling-off period: a 12-month period is applicable to the Chair of the Board of Lietuvos bankas, as well as to his/her deputies, and to Board members; a 12month period also applies to staff of Lietuvos bankas who served as members or alternate members of bodies established by the Board that operate on a collegial basis and are tasked with performing certain functions ; a shorter period of six months is applicable to other staff of Lietuvos bankas. The draft law also provides that a shorter cooling-off period of no less than three months may be applied if a longer period would disproportionately restrict a former employee’s right to take up employment after leaving Lietuvos bankas and if such an exemption aligns with the interests of Lietuvos bankas. 1.5 The draft law provides that staff of Lietuvos bankas are entitled to receive compensation during the cooling-off period in accordance with procedures and conditions established by the Board of Lietuvos bankas. However, no compensation is to be paid if the employment contract with the employee of Lietuvos bankas was terminated due to gross misconduct or a second, identical, breach of work duties committed within the previous 12 months, or if the employee was dismissed from Lietuvos bankas on the grounds of being found guilty of committing a crime or criminal offence. 1.6 In addition, the draft law introduces amendments clarifying the rights of officials authorised by Lietuvos bankas to carry out inspections under the Law on Lietuvos bankas. In particular, the draft law establishes the right of such officials, when conducting inspections having obtained a court authorisation, to: (a) temporarily seize items and storage media of legal entities that may be used as

text: 5 The Republic of Lithuania Law No VIII-371 on the Coordination of Public and Private Interests of the Republic of Lithuania. evidence of breaches; and (b) seal documents, notes on employees, and storage media for the period and to the extent necessary to carry out the inspection.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 Article 130 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and the European Central Bank (hereinafter the ‘Statute of the ESCB’) address the independence of central banks in the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) , stipulating that when exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties conferred upon them by the Treaties and the Statute of the ESCB, neither the ECB, nor an NCB, nor any member of their decision-making bodies, are to seek or take instructions from Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, from any government of a Member State or from any other body. This independence was thus entrusted to the ECB and Lietuvos bankas, as an NCB, by primary law. 2.2 Based on considerations of central bank independence, and in order to ensure the independence of NCBs such as Lietuvos bankas when exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties conferred upon them by the Treaties and the Statute of the ESCB, the ECB has established an ethics framework. This includes the ECB’s Code of Conduct for high-level ECB officials (hereinafter the ‘Single Code’), which applies, among others, to the members of the Governing Council of the ECB when exercising their functions as members of a high-level ECB body, and Guideline (EU) [2021/2253] of the European Central Bank , which is addressed to the NCBs of the Eurosystem and establishes ethics requirements applicable to the members of the decision-making bodies and staff of the NCBs. 2.3 The NCBs, as an integral part of the ESCB, must act in accordance with the guidelines of the ECB . Hence, national legislation is without prejudice to the ethics framework which the ECB has established in order to ensure the independence of the ECB and the NCBs when exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties conferred upon them by the Treaties and the Statute of the ESCB, as both frameworks have their own scope and legal basis. 2.4 Furthermore,

text: Article 19 of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013

text: (hereinafter the ‘Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) Regulation’) stipulates that when carrying out the tasks conferred on it by the SSM Regulation, the ECB and the national competent authorities acting within the SSM must act independently. The legal basis for this provision is Article 127(6) of the Treaty. Article 31(3) of the SSM Regulation furthermore requires the ECB, in cooperation with the national competent authorities, to: (a) establish and maintain comprehensive and formal procedures including ethics procedures and proportionate periods to assess in advance and prevent possible conflicts of interest

text: 7 Regarding the doctrine of the ECB as to the independence and its ramifications, see the ECB Convergence Report 2025, Section 2.2. Available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: 8 Code of Conduct for high-level ECB officials (OJ C 478, 16.12.2022, p. 3).

text: 9 Guideline (EU) [2021/2253] of the European Central Bank of 2 November 2021 laying down the principles of the Eurosystem Ethics Framework (ECB/2021/49) (OJ L 454, 17.12.2021, p. 7, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/guideline/2021/2253/oj).

text: 10 See Article 14.3 of the Statute of the ESCB.

text: Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013

text: conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2013/1024/oj). resulting from subsequent employment within two years of members of the Supervisory Board; and (b) provide for appropriate disclosures. Those procedures are without prejudice to the application of stricter national rules. 2.5 In view of this independence and these requirements of the SSM Regulation, the ECB has established an ethics framework to ensure the independence of national competent authorities, such as Lietuvos bankas, when assisting the ECB in carrying out the tasks conferred on it by the SSM Regulation. This ethics framework includes the Single Code, which applies, among others, to the members of the Supervisory Board of the ECB when exercising their functions as members of a highlevel ECB body, and Guideline

text: (EU) 2021/2256

text: of the European Central Bank , which is addressed to the national competent authorities of the SSM and establishes ethics requirements applicable to the members of their bodies and the members of staff of the national competent authorities. In view of the responsibility of the ECB for the effective and consistent functioning of the SSM , the national competent authorities must comply with Guideline

text: (EU) 2021/2256

text: . 2.6 In contrast to the ethics framework ultimately based on Article 127(6) of the Treaty, the CRD6, including its provision on supervisory independence of competent authorities , is based on Article 53(1) of the Treaty. A legal act based on this provision cannot alter the rights and obligations of the ECB and the national competent authorities when carrying out the tasks conferred on them by the SSM Regulation based on Article 127(6) of the Treaty. It follows from settled case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union that the different legal bases, namely

text: Article 53(1)

text: and Article 127(6) of the Treaty, cannot be combined as the legal basis for a legal act, in view of the different procedures involved. In particular, the measures adopted under Article 53(1) of the Treaty are adopted by the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee (and, if relevant, the ECB in accordance with Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty). By contrast, the regulations adopted under Article 127(6) of the Treaty are adopted by the Council alone, in a special legislative procedure in which the Council acts unanimously, after consulting the European Parliament and the ECB . 2.7 Hence, the amendments made by the CRD6 are without prejudice to the ethics framework which the ECB has established to ensure the independence of the national competent authorities in the context of the SSM, as both frameworks have their own scope and legal basis. The Union legislator acknowledged this through the CRD6’s amendments to Directive

text: , which provide that

text: Article 4

text: a(2) of Directive

text: is without prejudice to the rights and obligations of the national competent authorities pursuant to the SSM established by the SSM Regulation . Such provisions may serve as guidance for establishing safeguards for the independence of the ECB and the national competent authorities when carrying out the tasks conferred on them by the SSM Regulation .

text: 3. Specific observations

text: 3.1 The consultation request states that the Law on Lietuvos bankas already complies with the provisions of the CRD6 on the maximum term of office for members of the governance bodies of competent authorities – excluding Governors of NCBs – which provide that Member States must ensure that no member of a competent authority’s governance body who is appointed after 11 January 2026 remains in office for more than 14 years . The ECB understands, therefore, that it is not necessary for the draft law to include any provisions in this respect. Under the Law on Lietuvos bankas the Chair of the Board is appointed for a term of five years and may be appointed to his or her position for an unlimited number of terms of office, while the Deputy Chairs and members of the Board are appointed for a term of six years and may be appointed to their respective positions for no more than two consecutive terms . In this context, the ECB highlights that in accordance with Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB, statutes of national central banks must provide for a minimum term of office of five years for a Governor. This does not preclude longer terms of office. Applying the rules regarding the term of office of Governors to other members of the decision-making bodies of NCBs involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks will also safeguard the personal independence of those persons. Article 130 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB, which address the independence of central banks in the ESCB, refer to ‘members of the decision-making bodies’ of NCBs, rather than to Governors specifically. The application of the same rules regarding term of office to both Governors and members of decision-making bodies is particularly pertinent where a Governor is ‘first among equals’ alongside other members who have equivalent voting rights, or where other members are involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks , as is the case in Lietuvos bankas. The ECB considers that the relevant provisions of the Law on Lietuvos bankas are consistent with the requirements of Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB . 3.2 As noted in the consultation request and in paragraph 1.2, the provisions of the Law on Lietuvos bankas as they currently stand that regulate the appointment and dismissal of members of the Board of Lietuvos bankas are consistent with the principles of the CRD6 and the draft law only supplements them with new provisions concerning the public disclosure of grounds for dismissal. The CRD6 provides in this respect that Member States must ensure that members of a competent authority’s governance body are appointed on the basis of published criteria that are objective and transparent and that those members can be dismissed if they no longer meet the criteria of appointment or have

text: 17 See the fourth subparagraph of

text: Article 4

text: a(2) of Directive

text: , as inserted by the CRD6. This acknowledgement refers directly to the dismissal requirements included in

text: Article 4(2)

text: , second subparagraph, of the CRD6.

text: 18 See paragraph 2.1.4 of Opinion

text: 19 See

text: Article 4

text: a(2), second paragraph, first sentence, of the CRD6.

text: 21 See ECB Convergence Report, June 2025, p. 26.

text: 22 See ECB Convergence Report, May 2006, p. 75 and ECB Convergence Report, May 2008, p. 238. been convicted of a serious criminal offence. The reasons for dismissal are to be made public unless the member of the competent authority’s governance body concerned objects to the publication . The ECB understands, therefore, that it is not necessary for the draft law to include any provisions in this respect. Under the Law on Lietuvos bankas, the Chair of the Board, Deputy Chairs and members of the Board can only be dismissed prior to the expiration of their term of office if they do not fulfil the conditions required for the performance of their duties or they have been found guilty of serious misconduct . In this context, the ECB highlights that, pursuant to

text: Article 14.2

text: , second paragraph, first sentence, of the Statute of the ESCB, ‘a Governor may be relieved from office only if he no longer fulfils the conditions required for the performance of his duties or if he has been guilty of serious misconduct’. Applying the same rules regarding the grounds for relieving Governors from office to other members of the decision-making bodies of NCBs involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks will also safeguard the personal independence of those persons. As noted in paragraph 3.1, Article 130 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB refer to ‘members of the decision-making bodies’ of NCBs, rather than to Governors specifically. The application of the same rules regarding appointment and dismissal to both Governors and members of decisionmaking bodies is particularly pertinent where a Governor is ‘first among equals’ with other members who have equivalent voting rights, or where other members are involved in the performance of ESCBrelated tasks , as is the case in Lietuvos bankas. The ECB considers that the relevant provisions of the Law on Lietuvos bankas are consistent with the requirements of Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB . 3.3 The maximum 12-month cooling-off period applicable to the Chair of the Board, Deputy Chairs and members of the Board of Lietuvos bankas under the draft law is less restrictive than the requirements of the Single Code. The ECB highlights that the draft law should be without prejudice to the Single Code, as it may be amended from time to time, and must not prevent the possibility of imposing and extending a cooling-off period of a maximum of two years when such an extended period is applied based on the Single Code . 3.4 In addition, the Single Code sets limits on the establishment of post-employment relationships, not only directly with significant or less significant credit institutions, but also with ‘other financial institutions’ or ‘any entity engaged in lobbying in relation to the ECB, or consultancy and/or advocacy for the ECB or for any [supervised] institution’ . In contrast, under the draft law the categories of entities in respect of which a cooling-off period is applied – in cases where staff or members of the governing bodies of Lietuvos bankas take up employment after termination of their employment with Lietuvos bankas – extend only to financial institutions other than supervised credit institutions. Furthermore, while both the Single Code and the draft law include limitations with respect to categories of entities such as supervised credit institutions and entities involved in lobbying or advocacy, their definitions of these categories differ. As regards supervised credit institutions, the

text: 23 See

text: Article 4

text: a(2), second paragraph, second and third sentences, of the CRD6.

text: 25 See ECB Convergence Report, June 2025, p. 26.

text: 26 See ECB Convergence Report, May 2006, p. 75, and ECB Convergence Report, May 2008, p. 238.

text: 27 See

text: Article 17.3

text: , point (b), of the Single Code; see also paragraph 2.2.3 of Opinion

text: 28 See Articles 17.1 and 17.2 of the Single Code. draft law refers to entities ‘with respect to which, during the last 12 months of their employment at Lietuvos bankas, the Chair of the Board of Lietuvos bankas, the Deputy Chairs, and the Board members directly prepared, considered, or adopted decisions related to [their] supervision or control’ . In relation to lobbying or advocacy, the draft law refers to entities engaged in activities ‘directed toward Lietuvos bankas’ on ‘matters for which the Chair of the Board of Lietuvos bankas, the Deputy Chairs, and the Board members were responsible during their tenure’ . From this perspective, the cooling-off regime under the draft law appears to introduce less restrictive provisions than those contained in the Single Code. The ECB notes further that the draft law must be interpreted without prejudice to the Single Code, as it may be amended from time to time. This opinion will be published on EUR-Lex. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 14 August 2025. [signed] The President of the ECB Christine LAGARDE

type: vagledning

utgivare: ecb


text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/1998/415/oj). 2 Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on the comparability of fees related to payment accounts, payment account switching and access to payment accounts with basic features (OJ L 257, 28.8.2014, p. 214, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/92/oj). 3 This transposition was achieved by amending Book VII of the Belgian Code of Economic Law, which deals with payment and credit services. See Code de droit économique du 28 février 2013/Wetboek van economisch recht van 28 februari 2013, tel que modifié/zoals nader gewijzigd, Moniteur belge/Belgisch Staatsblad, 29.03.2013, p. 19975.

text: Regulation (EC) No 2560/2001

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 2001 on cross-border payments in euro (OJ L 344, 28.12.2001, p.13, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2001/2560/oj); no longer in force. 5 See paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: of the European Central Bank of 6 January 2009 on a proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on cross-border payments in the Community (OJ C 21, 28.1.2009, p. 1). 6

text: Regulation (EU) No 260/2012

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2012 establishing technical and business requirements for credit transfers and direct debits in euro and amending

text: Regulation (EC) No 924/2009

text: (OJ L 94, 30.3.2012, p. 22, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2012/260/oj); see

text: Article 2

text: , point (15). 7 ISO 13616-1 :2020, available on the ISO website at www.iso.org.

text: See in particular (1)

text: Article 5(1)

text: , point (a) of the SEPA Regulation (in conjunction with point (1)(a) of the Annex); (2)

text: Article 5(1)

text: , point (c) of the SEPA Regulation (in conjunction with point (1)(a) of the Annex); and (3)

text: Article 5

text: c of the SEPA Regulation (in conjunction with point (1)(a) of the Annex). 9

text: Regulation (EU) 2021/1230

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 July 2021 on cross-border payments in the Union (OJ L 274, 30.7.2021, p. 20, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1230/oj); see

text: Article 6

text: . 10 European Commission: Directorate-General for Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union and Deloitte, Study on tools designed to facilitate switching and cross-border opening of payment accounts on the EU payment accounts market – Final report, Publications Office, 2021, https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2874/906198 (hereinafter the ‘Commission’s April 2021 Report’); see page 42. 11 See (1) European Commission: Directorate-General for Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union (European Commission), Grimaldi, ICF, Andruszkiewicz, O., Herrera, F. et al., Study on switching of financial services and products – Final report, Publications Office, 2019, https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2874/090150 (hereinafter the ‘Commission’s November 2019 Report); (2) European Commission: Directorate-General for Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union and Deloitte, Study on EU payment accounts market – Final report, Publications Office, 2021, https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2874/45634 (hereinafter the ‘Commission’s April 2020 Report’); (3) the Commission’s April 2021 Report; (4) Answer given by Ms McGuinness on behalf of the European Commission to Parliamentary question – E-003259/2022(ASW), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E- 9-2022-003259-ASW_EN.html; (5) Report from the Commission assembling specific payment account related data from Member States as required by Article 27 of the Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council on the comparability of fees related to payment accounts, payment account switching and access to payment accounts with basic features, COM(2023) 248 final, https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/9b630c98f0c0-11ed-a05c-01aa75ed71a1/language-en (hereinafter the ‘Commission’s first May 2023 Report’); and (6) Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the application of Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council on the comparability of fees related to payment accounts, payment account switching and access to payment accounts with basic features, COM(2023) 249 final, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2023:249:FIN (the ‘Commission’s second May 2023 Report’). 12 See for instance the numerous references to the discussions that took place in the Netherlands included in the Commission’s November 2019 Report. 13 Conclusions of the Executive Summary of the Commission’s April 2021 Report.

text: See paragraph 5.3 of the Commission’s Second May 2023 Report, page 14. 15 Chapter III of the Payment Accounts Directive. 16 The Commission’s April 2021 Report, page 13. 17 See the Special Eurobarometer Report on E-Communications in the Single Market, June 2021, page 27.The proportion of those who have never changed provider has decreased by 9 percentage points from April 2017 to November 2020, . https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/2232

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 19 August 2025 on the portability of IBAN numbers for bank accounts (CON/2025/24)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 19 august 2025 on the portability of IBAN numbers for bank accounts (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 25 June 2025 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Chairman of the Committee on the Economy, Consumer Protection and Digitalisation of the Belgian Chamber of Representatives for an opinion on a draft law amending the Belgian Code of Economic Law to introduce a system for the portability of IBAN numbers for bank accounts (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 2(1), second indent, of

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft law relates to means of payment. In accordance with

text: Article 17.5

text: , first sentence, of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 By way of background, Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council (hereinafter the ‘Payment Accounts Directive’) , which includes, inter alia, rules on the switching of payment accounts, has been transposed into Belgian law . The account switching service allows consumers to switch from one payment service provider (PSP) to another in the same Member State at no direct cost. 1.2 According to the explanatory memorandum accompanying the draft law, Belgian consumers are fairly conservative when it comes to changing banks. This conservatism can largely be explained by the administrative obstacles involved in switching banks. To ensure optimal competition, it is essential that payment service users (PSUs) are able to choose, and therefore also change, their PSP easily, quickly and free of charge, according to their needs. The draft law aims at facilitating account switching. 1.3 In particular, the draft law (1) extends the account switching rules currently only applicable to payment accounts to regulated savings accounts, (2) introduces the principle of account number

text: portability (via the IBAN identifier) and (3) provides that the complete transaction history of the relevant account for the last 10 years must be transferred to the receiving PSP. 1.4 The explanatory memorandum justifies the account number portability, stating that it enables consumers who keep their account number to avoid having to inform their creditors and debtors of the existence of a new account number. 1.5 The draft law provides that PSPs must offer the facility of portability of IBAN numbers and provides that the King is required to set out by decree adopted by the Council of Ministers (1) the arrangements for the portability of IBAN numbers for payment accounts, including the allocation of tasks between the parties involved in the transfer, (2) the obligations of PSPs regarding the provision of information to consumers on the portability of IBAN numbers of payment accounts, (3) the methodology for determining the costs of implementing this facility and the allocation of these costs between the parties concerned; the methods and rules for allocating costs may not result in any charges to consumers for the portability of IBAN numbers of payment accounts that would distort competition or discourage switching, and no direct charges are to be levied on consumers; and (4) the compensation to be paid to consumers in the event of delays in the execution of the transfer.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 IBAN 2.1.1 The International Bank Account Number (IBAN) was introduced as a mandatory requirement for equal charging under

text: Regulation (EC) No 2560/2001

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council . The IBAN has proven to be a cornerstone for the standardisation of payments in the context of the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) as it enhances straight through processing and facilitates the verification of account numbers . 2.1.2 The IBAN as defined in

text: Regulation (EU) No 260/2012

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council (hereinafter the ‘SEPA Regulation’) is an international payment account number identifier, which unambiguously identifies an individual payment account in a Member State, the elements of which are specified by the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO). In accordance with the standards adopted by ISO , the IBAN includes alphanumeric characters that identify in which country and with which PSP the account is located. Through its ledger, the PSP can identify the account holder.

text: 2.1.3 At least two Union legal acts, namely the SEPA Regulation and

text: Regulation (EU) 2021/1230

text: of the

text: European Parliament and of the Council , refer to the IBAN as an account identifier, requiring PSPs

text: to (1) use the IBAN when carrying out credit transfer and direct debit transactions, (2) ensure that

text: PSUs use the IBAN for identification of payment accounts and (3) offer payers the service of ensuring

text: verification of the payee by comparing the IBAN and the name of the payee. The ECB understands

text: that the IBAN is also used for payment activities, such as the routing or reporting of payments,

text: balance of payments, or AML/CFT screening, and also for reporting purposes to support the fight

text: against VAT fraud .

text: 2.2 Portability of IBAN

text: 2.2.1 The issue of account number portability has been the subject of numerous studies and discussions

text: in recent years at Union level and in some Member States .

text: 2.2.2 The study which gave rise to the Commission’s April 2021 Report assessed different types of options

text: for implementing a Union-wide account number portability but concluded that none of these options

text: would be viable from an efficiency standpoint. Although the tools for account number portability would

text: greatly facilitate switching in the Union, they come with high implementation and running costs

text: compared to their expected benefits . In the Commission’s second May 2023 Report, the

text: Commission, after having described the different options available to organise payment account

text: number portability, states that sectoral organisations do not see account number portability as a

text: major game-changer for account switching and that consumer organisations have mixed views. The

text: report concludes on this point that, while it is clear that possible additional measures could make it

text: even easier to switch payment accounts within the Union, based on estimated switching rates and

text: given that the expected costs (including both one-off costs and recurring costs) would largely outweigh their expected benefits, such measures did not seem justifiable at that stage . 2.2.3 The IBAN as it stands today is not portable since in the current legal and technical framework the IBAN identifies the PSP holding the payment account. 2.2.4 Introducing account number portability based on the IBAN may be complex, as it requires technical and operational changes to infrastructure across the whole chain of payments and entails large investments in time and money by banks to change their infrastructure. 2.2.5 While introducing account number portability on a national level is technically possible, though rather complex, it would most probably be too costly and economically not feasible if only a small percentage of PSUs is inclined to switch bank accounts. Although the Payment Accounts Directive lays down rules on switching accounts domestically, by obliging PSPs to facilitate account switching at customers’ requests , there is a still low mobility of PSPs’ customers in the Union. Despite the fact that these rules make switching easier for consumers, the percentage of consumers not satisfied with their PSPs is still much higher than the percentage of consumers who have considered switching accounts. The Commission’s April 2021 Report estimates that only 0.7% of the Union banked population over 15 years old is using the domestic switching service provided by the Payment Accounts Directive. Room for improvement therefore seems to exist when comparing account switching with switching services in other sectors. In the telecommunications sector, for example, the Eurobarometer on E-communications in the Union estimated in 2021 that around 60 % of European consumers have changed telecommunications service providers at least once. The portability of a phone number is a key element in this process. 2.2.6 As mentioned, the Commission’s second May 2023 Report concludes that the expected costs of switching accounts would largely outweigh the expected benefits. While this conclusion is recent, in the future it could be challenged by trends like the growth of neobanks offering online services across Member States without physical branches, the growing percentage of Union citizens moving to live in another Member State, and developments in information technology. These elements could increase demand for switching services, making them more economically sustainable. In a time when digitalisation makes services faster and even instant, it may become difficult for consumers to accept that they must wait for days to transfer payment services from one account to another. Should initiatives be taken in that direction, it is essential that they facilitate faster, easier and efficient account switches on a Union-wide basis, both within and across Member States.

text: 3. Specific observations

text: 3.1 The draft law merely lays down the principle of IBAN portability, and provides that the arrangements for the portability, including the allocation of tasks between the parties involved in the transfer, the

text: obligations of PSPs regarding the provision of information to consumers, the methodology for determining the costs of implementing this facility and the allocation of these costs between the parties concerned and the compensation to be paid to consumers in the event of delays in the execution of the transfer, are to be determined by a royal decree adopted by the Council of Ministers. The ECB should be consulted on any royal decree implementing the draft law. 3.2 The national portability solution retained should remain consistent with the Union legal framework. In particular, considering the articulation between Union law and the ISO standards defining the current format of the IBAN, the portable payment account number should continue to be compliant with the format defined in accordance with the ISO standards in order to be recognized as an IBAN.

text: This opinion will be published on EUR-Lex.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 19 August 2025.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Christine LAGARDE


text: COM(2025) 100 final.

text: Se Europeiska systemrisknämndens rekommendation

text: av den 1 december 2022 om sårbarheter inom sektorn kommersiella fastigheter i Europeiska ekonomiska samarbetsområdet (EUT C 39, 1.2.2023, s. 1).

text: Se följande rapporter: Report on commercial real estate and financial stability in the EU, december 2015, Report on vulnerabilities in the EU commercial real estate sector, november 2018, Methodologies for the assessment of real estate vulnerabilities and macroprudential policies: commercial real estate, december 2019, samt Vulnerabilities in the EEA commercial real estate sector, januari 2023, finns på ESRB:s webbplats www.esrb.europa.eu.

text: av den 31 oktober 2016 om förbättrad statistik över fastighetssektorn (EUT C 31, 31.1.2017, s. 1), och Europeiska systemrisknämndens rekommendation

text: av den 21 mars 2019 om ändring av rekommendation

text: om förbättrad statistik över fastighetssektorn (EUT C 271, 13.8.2019, s. 1).

text: Se Ryan, E., Horan, A. och Jarmulska, B., Commercial real estate and financial stability – new insights from the euro area credit register, ECB Macroprudential Bulletin 19, oktober 2022.

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning (EG) nr 223/2009 av den 11 mars 2009

text: om europeisk statistik och om upphävande av Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning (EG, Euratom) nr 1101/2008 om utlämnande av insynsskyddade statistiska uppgifter till Europeiska gemenskapernas statistikkontor,

text: rådets förordning (EG) nr 322/97

text: om gemenskapsstatistik och

text: rådets beslut 89/382/EEG

text: , Euratom om inrättande av en kommitté för Europeiska gemenskapernas statistiska program (EUT L 87, 31.3.2009, s. 164, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2009/223/oj).

text: Se t.ex. punkt 1.2 i Europeiska centralbankens yttrande

text: om ett förslag till förordning om ändring av förordningen om värdepapperscentraler (EUT C 367, 26.9.2022, s. 3).

sprak: sv

title: Europeiska centralbankens yttrande av den 2 september2025 över ett förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning om icke-finansiell statistik över kommersiella fastigheter (CON/2025/25)

text: Inledning och rättslig grund

text: Den 17 juni 2025 mottog Europeiska central-banken (ECB) en begäran från Europaparlamentet om ett yttrande över ett förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning om icke-finansiell statistik över kommersiella fastigheter (nedan kallat förslaget till förordning).

text: ECB:s behörighet att avge ett yttrande grundas på artiklarna

text: och

text: i fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt (EUF-fördraget) eftersom förslaget till förordning innehåller bestämmelser som berör Europeiska centralbankssystemets medverkan till ett smidigt genomförande av åtgärder som avser det finansiella systemets stabilitet, som avses i

text: artikel 127.5 i EUF-fördraget

text: , ECB:s uppgifter i samband med tillsynen över kreditinstitut som avses i

text: artikel 127.6 i EUF-fördraget

text: , samt ECB:s uppgift att vid behov bidra till harmoniseringen av de regler och den praxis som gäller för insamling, sammanställning och distribution av statistik inom dess behörighetsområde enligt

text: artikel 5.3 i stadgan

text: för Europeiska centralbankssystemet och Europeiska centralbanken. Förslaget till förordning innehåller även bestämmelser som påverkar den grundläggande uppgiften för Europeiska centralbankssystemet (ESCB) att utforma och genomföra den monetära politiken enligt artikel 127.2 första strecksatsen i EUF-fördraget.

text: I enlighet med artikel 17.5 första meningen i arbetsordningen för Europeiska centralbanken har detta yttrande antagits av ECB-rådet.

text: Allmänna kommentarer

text: 1.1 För sina uppgifter och sin verksamhet är det viktigt för ECB att man använder jämförbara, harmoniserade indikatorer som säkerställer att de uppgifter som rapporteras i unionen är enhetliga, tillförlitliga och medger sektorsövergripande jämförbarhet. ECB förlitar sig så långt som möjligt på befintliga uppgifter för att begränsa rapporteringsbördan för uppgiftslämnarna. Mot denna bakgrund välkomnar ECB kommissionens initiativ att förbättra insamlingen av, och tillgången till, viktiga uppgifter om marknaden för kommersiella fastigheter, samtidigt som man förenklar rapporteringsskyldigheterna och minskar onödiga administrativa bördor, särskilt mot bakgrund av den ökande efterfrågan på aktuella, detaljerade och högkvalitativa uppgifter som behövs för att ta fram icke-finansiell statistik över kommersiella fastigheter. ECB uppskattar även kommissionens initiativ att granska och använda befintliga datakällor i administrativa eller privatägda databaser och införa nya datakällor, inbegripet data som härrör från ny teknik, stordatamiljöer eller administrativa register som inte tidigare använts för statistiska ändamål. Ett proaktivt införlivande av sådana källor bidrar inte bara till att förbättra det statistiska ramverkets övergripande kvalitet och representativitet, utan också till att stärka unionens förmåga att reagera effektivt på oförutsedda händelser eller systemkriser, t.ex. finansiella störningar eller makroekonomiska chocker.

text: 1.2 ECB välkomnar att man inför de föreslagna indikatorerna för icke-finansiella kommersiella fastigheter som centrala inslag i den analytiska ramen för att bedöma den finansiella stabiliteten inom unionen och för att stödja ett effektivt genomförande av finans-, penning- och tillsynspolitiken. Genom att integrera sådana indikatorer, med en bredare täckning i euroområdet och högre kvalitet, uppnår man betydande framsteg när det gäller beslutsfattarnas möjligheter att övervaka den makroekonomiska utvecklingen, identifiera framväxande hot och utforma snabba och evidensbaserade åtgärder.

text: 1.3 Europeiska systemrisknämnden (ESRB) har inom ramen för sitt uppdrag att utöva makrotillsyn över det finansiella systemet inom unionen och bidrar till att minska och förhindra systemrisker noga övervakat marknaden för kommersiella fastigheter. I slutet av 2022, under en period då marknaden för kommersiella fastigheter drabbades av cykliska risker i samband med ökad inflation och försämrade tillväxtutsikter till följd av geopolitiska spänningar, antog ESRB en rekommendation om sårbarheter i sektorn för kommersiella fastigheter i Europeiska ekonomiska samarbetsområdet, där medlemsstaterna uppmanades att förbättra övervakningen av risker i sektorn kommersiella fastigheter, säkerställa sund finansiering inom sektorn och öka finansinstitutens motståndskraft. Dessutom ESRB har i olika rapporter betonat hur viktig marknaden för kommersiella fastigheter är för den finansiella stabiliteten. I alla dessa rapporter identifieras bristen på nyckelindikatorer i de flesta medlemsstater, vilket försvårar bedömningen av vilka risker marknaderna för kommersiella fastigheter utgör för den finansiella stabiliteten. ESRB har utfärdat en rekommendation, som senare ändrats, om förbättrad statistik över fastighetssektorn och efterlyser där gemensamma minimibestämmelser för den fysiska marknaden för kommersiella fastigheter. ESRB har rekommenderat kommissionen (Eurostat) bör lägga fram ett förslag till unionslagstiftning om upprättande av ett ramverk med gemensamma minimibestämmelser för utveckling, framställning och spridning av en databas med indikatorer över den fysiska marknaden för kommersiella fastigheter och utveckla och främja statistiska standarder, källor, metoder och förfaranden för att utveckla denna databas med indikatorer över den fysiska marknaden för kommersiella fastigheter, i synnerhet för att säkerställa dessa indikatorers kvalitet samt för att minimera rapporteringsbördan.

text: 1.4 Marknadens komplexitet och bestående dataluckor innebär utmaningar för riskbedömning och riskreducering, men det står klart att dynamiken på marknaderna för kommersiella fastigheter kan få allvarliga konsekvenser för den finansiella stabiliteten. Till exempel saknas tillgång till viktiga indikatorer som prisindex för kommersiella fastigheter i nästan hälften av de medlemsstater som har euron som valuta. Där index finns tillgängliga produceras de av olika leverantörer med hjälp av olika metoder och är därför inte alltid jämförbara mellan medlemsstaterna. Liknande problem finns för annan icke-finansiell statistik som identifierats i ESRB:s rekommendationer. Detta har allvarliga konsekvenser för ECB:s, de nationella myndigheternas och marknadsaktörernas förmåga att förstå hur systemrisker utvecklas i de medlemsstater för vilka uppgifter saknas. Jämförelser mellan olika länder är en viktig del av ECB:s bedömningar av den finansiella stabiliteten. Avsaknaden av viktiga indikatorer för ett stort antal medlemsstater som har euron som valuta, och inkonsistenta metoder för befintliga uppgifter mellan medlemsstaterna, gör det svårt att göra jämförelser mellan länder när man analyserar alla medlemsstater som har euron som valuta. Denna försvårar ECB:s möjligheter att analysera marknaden för kommersiella fastigheter avsevärt. En sådan analys har avgörande betydelse för den finansiella stabiliteten, eftersom både ECB och ESRB vanligtvis avstår från att utfärda makrotillsynsrekommendationer på landsnivå på denna marknad. Till följd av detta skulle Eurostats arbete med att ta fram enhetliga indikatorer för unionens alla medlemsstater ha en mycket positiv inverkan på ECB:s möjligheter att analysera systemrisker.

text: 1.5 ECB anser att förslaget till förordning är mycket relevant även för mikrotillsynen, med tanke på den viktiga roll som fastighetsverksamhet har som en viktig sektor för många banker inom den gemensamma tillsynsmekanismen (SSM). En anpassning, förbättring och harmonisering av uppgifter om icke-finansiella kommersiella fastigheter kommer att avsevärt stärka tillsynsverksamheten genom att möjliggöra en mer heltäckande bedömning av kreditinstitutens exponeringar mot denna sektor. Jämförbara uppgifter av hög kvalitet kommer att öka ECB:s förmåga att övervaka potentiella sårbarheter, förbättra riskbedömningar och säkerställa att banksektorns motståndskraft är i linje med målen för den gemensamma tillsynsmekanismen.

text: 1.6 Det europeiska statistiksystemet (ESS) tillhandahåller officiell statistik i linje med högkvalitativa och harmoniserade statistiska standarder och metoder. Officiell statistik tillhandahålls regelbundet, datum för offentliggörande offentliggörs i en specifik kalender och statistikmyndigheterna tillhandahåller även metadata som kompletterar uppgifterna som tillhandahålls. Tillhandahållandet av icke-finansiell statistik över kommersiella fastigheter i enlighet med dessa standarder och enligt kvalitetskriterierna för officiell statistik skulle innebära ett viktigt steg mot en heltäckande och jämförbar rapportering av uppgifter på fastighetsområdet. Det skulle innebära en avsevärd förbättring jämfört med den nuvarande fragmenterade strategin, som kännetecknas av ofullständiga och icke-representativa uppgifter som sammanställs utifrån mycket olika koncept och metoder.

text: 2. Specifika kommentarer

text: 2.1 Ytterligare nyckelindikatorer

text: 2.1.1 I linje med ESRB:s rekommendationer anser ECB att man i den förslaget till förordning bör prioriterar pilotstudier om index för hyresavkastning och vakansgrad för att bedöma genomförbarheten, den metodologiska sundheten och de operativa konsekvenserna av att införliva sådana indikatorer i ramverk för regelbunden insamling och spridning av uppgifter. Pilotstudier skulle ge en kontrollerad miljö för att testa nya datakällor och metoder, vilket skulle möjliggöra en noggrann utvärdering av kvalitetsförbättringar utan att förhastat införa rättsliga skyldigheter. När det gäller utformning och sammanställning av index för hyresavkastning och vakansgrad skulle pilotstudier kunna bygga på undersökningar som hittills genomförts både inom och utanför ESS, inbegripet arbete inom ECBS. God statistisk praxis kan utvecklas steg för steg, samtidigt som man använder befintlig statistik och dess användning som riktmärken under hela utvecklingsprocessen.

text: 2.1.2 Dessa kompletterande indikatorer är avgörande för att förbättra riskbedömningarna avseende fastighetsmarknader, som ofta är systemiska till sin karaktär och av avgörande betydelse för makrotillsynen. Dessa uppgifter är också viktiga för att ECBS och ECB ska kunna utföra sina uppgifter. Icke-finansiella uppgifter om kommersiella fastigheter kompletterar statistiken över bostadsfastigheter, vilket möjliggör mer omfattande analyser av investeringar i fastigheter ur ett makroekonomiskt perspektiv och en effektiv övervakning av de risker som kan utgå från marknaden för kommersiella fastigheter. I synnerhet är hyresintäkter och vakansgraden två nyckeltal över lönsamheten på marknaderna för kommersiella fastigheter. Dessa uppgifter gör det i sin tur möjligt för ECB att bedöma marknadens tillstånd och, när priserna överstiger fastigheternas intäkter, risken för en eventuell övervärdering. Dessutom kan en försämring av hyresavkastningen och/eller vakansgraden vara en tidig varningssignal avseende den finansiella sundheten och förmågan att återbetala sina lån hos de företag som är verksamma inom sektorn kommersiella fastigheter. Denna typ av bedömning är mycket viktig för att förstå hur utvecklingen på marknaden för kommersiella fastigheter kan påverka den finansiella stabiliteten.

text: 2.1.3 ECB är samtidigt också medveten om vikten av att säkerställa proportionalitet och kostnadseffektivitet när det gäller de potentiella administrativa och tekniska bördor som åläggs nationella statistikinstitut och uppgiftslämnare i den privata sektorn, mot bakgrund av den begränsade tillgången till uppgiftskällor och statistikens otillräckliga kvalitet. I detta syfte rekommenderar ECB att tillämpningsområdet för de kompletterande indikatorerna i inledningsskedet av genomförandet bör begränsas till uppgifter som är allmänt tillgängliga i aggregerad form, vilket skulle underlätta ett snabbt genomförande samtidigt som onödiga bördor för rapporterande enheter minimeras.

text: 2.2 Delning och överföring av uppgifter med ECBS

text: I

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning (EU) nr 223/2009

text: föreskrivs att uppgifter ska delas och överföras mellan ESS och ECBS-medlemmarna på de villkor som anges i den förordningen. Ett gott samarbete mellan ESS och ECBS är viktigt för att säkerställa aktuell, korrekt och högkvalitativ statistik.

text: 2.3 Samråd med ECB om delegerade rättsakter

text: De delegerade akter och genomförandeakter som antas enligt förslaget till förordning kommer att spela en avgörande roll för att fastställa de detaljerade variabler, metoder och förfaranden som krävs för att uppnå de mål som fastställs i förslaget till förordning. ECB är redo att stödja unionslagstiftaren i utarbetandet av dessa förtydliganden och noterar att kommissionens utkast till delegerade akter kan betecknas som förslag till unionsrättsakt enligt artiklarna

text: och

text: i EUF-fördraget, där det föreskrivs att ECB ska höras om varje förslag till unionsrättsakt inom dess behörighetsområde. Sådana samråd är avgörande för att säkerställa samstämmighet, rättssäkerhet och operativ effektivitet i unionens finansiella, monetära och tillsynsmässiga ramar.

text: I de fall där ECB rekommenderar att förslaget till förordning ska ändras anges de specifika förslagen i ett separat tekniskt arbetsdokument som åtföljs av en förklaring. Det tekniska arbetsdokumentet finns på engelska i EUR-Lex.

text: Utfärdat i Frankfurt am Main den 2 september 2025.

text: Christine Lagarde

text: ECB:s ordförande

text: Europeiska unionens officiella tidning

text: III Förberedande akter

text: EUROPEISKA CENTRALBANKEN

text: Europeiska centralbanken


text: Predlog Ustavnega zakona o dopolnitvi III. poglavja Ustave Republike Slovenije. 2

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42, ELI: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/1998/415/oj ). 3

text: Article 74

text: a of the Constitution as proposed by the draft constitutional law.

text: See Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on EUR-Lex .

text: See Opinion

text: . 6 See, for example, paragraph 2.4 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 9.2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 7.2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 1.7 of Opinion

text: of the European Central Bank of 13 October 2023 on a proposal for a regulation on the legal tender of euro banknotes and coins (OJ C, C/2023/1355, 1.12.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/1355/oj ), paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.4 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: . 7 See, for example, paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 9.2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.4 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: . 8 See paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.4 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: . 9 See paragraph 2.2 of Opinions

text: and

text: , and paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: See ‘The Eurosystem cash strategy’, available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu . See also paragraph 1.7 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: . 11 See paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.7 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.4 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: . 12 COM(2023) 364 final. 13 Recitals 8, 9 and 12, and

text: Article 9(2)

text: and (5) of the proposed regulation on the legal tender of euro cash. See also paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: . 14 See paragraph 2.4 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.4 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: . 15

text: Article 128(1)

text: , first and third sentences, of the Treaty and

text: Article 16

text: , first and third sentences, of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank. See also paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: . 16

text: Article 11 of Council Regulation (EC) No 974/98 of 3 May 1998

text: on the introduction of the euro (OJ L 139, 11.5.1998, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/1998/974/oj ). See also paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: Commission Recommendation 2010/191/EU of 22 March 2010

text: on the scope and effects of legal tender of euro banknotes and coins (OJ L 83, 30.3.2010, p. 70, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reco/2010/191/oj ). See also paragraph 2.4 of Opinion

text: . 18 See judgment of the Court of Justice of 26 January 2021, Hessischer Rundfunk,

text: and

text: , ECLI:EU:C:2021:63, paragraphs 46 to 49. See also paragraph 2.4 of Opinion

text: . 19 See judgment of the Court of Justice of 26 January 2021, Hessischer Rundfunk,

text: and

text: , ECLI:EU:C:2021:63, paragraph 45. See also paragraph 2.5 of Opinion

text: . 20 See judgment of the Court of Justice of 26 January 2021, Hessischer Rundfunk,

text: and

text: , ECLI:EU:C:2021:63, paragraphs 50 to 52. See also paragraph 2.5 of Opinion

text: . 21 The ECB has consistently welcomed legislative proposals aimed at ensuring access to cash in euro area Member States. See, for example, Opinion

text: , Opinion

text: , paragraph 3.4.2 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 3.3.2 of Opinion

text: . See also paragraph 1.2 of Opinion

text: , in which the ECB particularly welcomes the measures laid down in the proposed regulation on the legal tender of euro cash regarding the need for Member States whose currency is the euro to ensure sufficient and effective access to cash.

text: See also, in this respect, paragraphs 2.5 to 2.7 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 3.3.3 of Opinion

text: . 23 See judgment of the Court of Justice of 26 January 2021, Hessischer Rundfunk,

text: and

text: , ECLI:EU:C:2021:63, paragraph 55. See also paragraph 3.2.2 of Opinion

text: . 24 See judgment of the Court of Justice of 26 January 2021, Hessischer Rundfunk,

text: and

text: , ECLI:EU:C:2021:63, paragraphs 56 to 58. See also paragraph 3.2.2 of Opinion

text: In accordance with Article 15 of the Slovenian Constitution the manner in which human rights and fundamental freedoms enshrined in the Constitution are exercised may be regulated by law whenever the Constitution so provides or where this is necessary due to the particular nature of an individual right or freedom. 26 See paragraph 3.2.2. 27 See paragraph 3.2.4 of Opinion

text: . 28 See judgment of the Court of Justice of 7 February 1973, Commission v Italy,

text: , ECLI:EU:C:1973:13, paragraphs 16 and 17; judgment of the Court of Justice of 10 October 1973, Variola,

text: , ECLI:EU:C:1973:101, paragraphs 9 to 11; and judgment of the Court of Justice of 2 February 1977, Amsterdam Bulb,

text: , ECLI:EU:C:1977:13, paragraphs 5 to 8. See also paragraph 12 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.4 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.2.5 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 3.3.1 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 3.1.2 of Opinion

text: . 29 See paragraph 12 of Opinion

text: with reference to the judgment of the Court of Justice of 28 March 1985, Commission v Italian Republic,

text: , ECLI:EU:C:1985:147, paragraph 2.4 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.2.6 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 3.3.2 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 3.1.3 of Opinion

text: . See a contrario also paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: . 30 See paragraph 2.2 (footnote 6) of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.4 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.2.6 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 3.3.2 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 3.1.3 of Opinion

text: . 31 See paragraph 13 of Opinion

text: , paragraphs 2.2 and 3.2 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.4 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.2.6 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 3.3.2 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 3.1.3 of Opinion

text: Hessischer Rundfunk,

text: and

text: , See judgment of the Court of Justice of 26 January 2021, ECLI:EU:C:2021:63, paragraphs 45 to 48. 33 See point 1(a) of Recommendation

text: . 34 See Article 4(1) of the proposed regulation on the legal tender of euro cash.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 2 september 2025 on a constitutional law on the right to use cash (CON/2025/26)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 2 September 2025 on a constitutional law on the right to use cash (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 1 August 2025 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Slovenian National Assembly for an opinion on a draft proposal to amend the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia to include a right to use cash in the Constitution (hereinafter the ‘draft constitutional law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 2(1), first and second indents, of

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft constitutional law relates to currency matters and means of payment. In accordance with

text: Article 17.5

text: , first sentence, of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft constitutional law

text: 1.1 The draft constitutional law would supplement the Slovenian Constitution by inserting a new

text: Article 74

text: a in Chapter Three of the Constitution, titled ‘Economic and Social Relations’, to provide that everyone has the right, in accordance with the law, to use cash in banking transactions and other forms of legal transactions . 1.2 The consultation request and the explanatory memorandum accompanying the draft constitutional law (hereinafter the ‘explanatory memorandum’) explain that the aim of the draft constitutional law is to provide a constitutional basis and direction for the Slovenian legislator to ensure, to the extent appropriate and permissible and in a manner consistent with the Union legal order, the preservation and potential enhancement of the possibility to use cash in legal transactions. 1.3 The explanatory memorandum notes that the draft constitutional law is not necessary in the light of the current Union monetary law framework. It explains that the purpose of the amendment is to affirm and consolidate, at the constitutional level, a regulatory framework that is already in force at the level of the Union and the euro area. The explanatory memorandum, however, argues that the draft

text: constitutional law can be justified if the National Assembly considers it reasonable and beneficial to constitutionally affirm the existing Union framework and to explicitly empower the national legislator to adopt further measures regulating the right to use cash. 1.4 The explanatory memorandum recalls the content and justification set out in the explanatory memorandum accompanying the initial voters’ proposal to initiate the constitutional amendment procedure (hereinafter the ‘initial draft constitutional law’), the relevant article of which has since been amended by the draft constitutional law. The explanatory memorandum summarises and reaffirms these earlier arguments, referring to the Eurosystem’s cash strategy and its objective of ensuring that cash remains broadly available and widely accepted as a means of payment and a store of value, Banka Slovenije’s commitment to ensuring the continued use of cash through a range of measures, the advantages of cash such as the protection of the fundamental right to privacy and inclusivity towards individuals with limited access to digital means of payment, and the premise that the future use of cash as legal tender in Slovenia might be at risk in the event of the imposition of more severe restrictions on the use of euro banknotes and coins or their complete abolition. The explanatory memorandum reiterates the concern regarding the global trend towards increasing digitalisation, and states that the draft constitutional law seeks to prevent any future deterioration or abolition of euro cash. The draft constitutional law aims at allowing for improvements in areas where cash payments are currently restricted, rather than at substantially changing the existing situation which reflects the acceptance of cash as a means of payment across the euro area. 1.5 The explanatory memorandum further refers to the Union’s existing legislation governing and defining the status of euro banknotes and coins as legal tender, and to the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, which protects this status, subject to the possibility for Member States to impose certain limitations under a set of conditions, including the need to respect the principle of proportionality. According to the explanatory memorandum, the Government of the Republic of Slovenia has also stated that, should a digital euro be introduced – a decision falling within the ECB’s exclusive competence – it would not replace physical cash but complement it as an additional form of the single currency, and that this position was supported by Banka Slovenije and the ECB in its opinion on the initial draft constitutional law . 1.6 The explanatory memorandum notes that

text: Article 3

text: a of the Slovenian Constitution guarantees that the provisions of the national legislation are understood and applied within the Union legal framework, and explains that the purpose of the draft constitutional law is best understood as a Slovenian constitutional affirmation of the existing and planned future Union monetary law framework, which ensures the continued availability of euro cash (banknotes and coins) as a means of payment throughout the euro area. According to the explanatory memorandum, the draft constitutional law has both a regulatory and a preventative purpose. The regulatory purpose is to establish a constitutional foundation and mandate for the legislator to ensure that cash can continue to be used as a means of payment, particularly where this right is not sufficiently protected in practice, and to provide a basis for regulating reasonable and proportionate restrictions on the use of cash in line with Union and Slovenian constitutional law. The preventative purpose is to ensure that any

text: future changes at Union level that would significantly impede the use of cash would not have direct or automatic effect in Slovenia. The explanatory memorandum notes that this preventative purpose has two aspects. First, it serves as a political safeguard, by discouraging Slovenian representatives from supporting future Union initiatives that would impede this right. Second, it serves as a constitutional (legal) safeguard, in that, should such Union-level changes occur – for example, through a decision by the ECB – Slovenia would need to determine whether to reassert its sovereign powers in the field of monetary policy, in the light of its constitutional framework, despite a different legal framework being adopted at Union level. 1.7 Regarding the nature of the proposed right in the draft constitutional law, the explanatory memorandum states that it introduces a highly specific constitutional provision, which is not typically found in classical constitutional texts, with only Slovakia and Hungary cited as examples of Union Member States with such a provision. The explanatory memorandum explains that the constitutional right to cash can be understood as part of the broader category of economic human rights or fundamental constitutional rights, thereby elevating its status to that of a constitutionally guaranteed human right. The explanatory memorandum further explains that, while the recognition of the human right to use cash is the central focus of the proposed article, the provision should also be understood to apply, insofar as possible, to legal persons and other entities acting with legal effect in the context of legal transactions. The explanatory memorandum also notes that this right does not fall within the category of absolute constitutional rights, which may never be limited or derogated from, but constitutes a relative constitutional right, which may be subject to restrictions, that need to be constitutionally legitimate, appropriate, reasonable and proportionate. 1.8 The explanatory memorandum considers that the positioning of the new article in Chapter III of the Slovenian Constitution, entitled ‘Economic and Social Relations’, is the most appropriate for the right to use cash, as this chapter specifically governs the framework of economic constitutional relations and the rights of individuals. 1.9 In the explanation of the individual provisions of the draft constitutional law, the explanatory memorandum states that the phrase that ‘everyone has the right, in accordance with the law, to use cash’ affirms, on one hand, that the exercise of the right to use cash requires statutory regulation, and, on the other hand, that this reference to statutory regulation also permits limitations on the use of cash where justified by legitimate and proportionate reasons. The explanatory memorandum explains that the term ‘cash’, as used in the draft constitutional law, refers not only to euro banknotes and coins, but also to any other form of cash holding the legally recognised status of a means of payment within the Republic of Slovenia. 1.10 The explanatory memorandum adds that the right to use cash under the draft constitutional law also implicitly entails a right of access to cash, such as cash withdrawal from automated teller machine (ATMs), with the exercise of this right to be regulated by law in a manner that does not impose a disproportionate burden on the user, taking into account factors such as the geographical distribution of cash access points across Slovenia, the affordability and reasonableness of the fees charged for cash services, and the possibility of free access to such services.

text: 1.11 The explanatory memorandum states that the draft constitutional law refers broadly to all ‘legal transactions’, going beyond the purchase of goods or services to encompass all legal acts and arrangements involving the creation, modification, or transfer of rights and obligations between legal subjects. Finally, the explanatory memorandum notes that the explicit reference to ‘banking transactions’ in the first part of the article is intended to highlight and emphasise the particular importance of the right to use cash in the context of banking.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 As noted in paragraph 1.5, the ECB was previously consulted by the National Assembly on, and adopted an opinion on, the initial draft constitutional law . 2.2 Although electronic payment instruments are increasingly used for retail payments in a number of Member States, cash continues to play an important role in society and is still widely used throughout the entire population. The ability to pay in cash remains particularly important for those who, for various legitimate reasons, prefer to use physical money for payments rather than other payment instruments, or do not have access to the banking system and electronic means of payment. These groups include not only elderly people but also people with disabilities, immigrants, socially vulnerable people, minors and others with limited or no access to digital payment services . Cash is generally also useful as a payment instrument because it is widely accepted, fast and facilitates control over the payer’s spending. Moreover, it is currently the only payment instrument that allows everyone to instantly settle a payment transaction in central bank money, benefiting both payers and payees while ensuring privacy. Furthermore, cash could play an important role in the event of a 7 8 disturbance in the payment system and it is robust against cyber-crime . Cash also has an important function as a store of value. The availability and accessibility of cash and its fallback function in case of disruptions to electronic payment systems contribute to trust in the financial system, which is important for the smooth functioning of monetary policy . Against this backdrop, the ECB welcomes the core objective of the draft constitutional law to strengthen the availability and acceptance of cash in Slovenia. 2.3 The ECB is fully committed to ensuring that euro cash remains available, including in peripheral regions, and accepted in payments throughout the euro area, in line with the Eurosystem’s cash

text: strategy . The ECB considers it crucial that all Member States take appropriate measures to ensure that credit institutions and branches operating within their territories provide adequate access to cash services, for instance by enabling the convertibility of bank deposits into cash and vice versa, in order to facilitate the continued use of cash. Sufficient and effective access to cash is necessary to preserve the effectiveness of the legal tender status of cash. If citizens do not have easy access to cash, they will not be able to use it as a means of payment and store of value . On 28 June 2023 the Commission published a proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the legal tender of euro banknotes and coins (hereinafter the ‘proposed regulation on the legal tender of euro cash’), which includes an obligation for Member States to ensure sufficient and effective access to cash throughout their territory. The proposed regulation on the legal tender of euro cash provides that, following its adoption, the Commission will adopt implementing acts on a set of common indicators of general application in the euro area, which would allow Member States to effectively monitor and assess both the acceptance of payments in cash and access to cash throughout their territory, in all their different regions, including urban and non-urban areas. The ECB will be consulted by the Commission on the preparation of such implementing acts . The specific observations presented below should therefore not be read as undermining the ECB’s commitment to these objectives. Where measures contributing to the protection of euro cash fall within the Union’s exclusive competence for monetary policy, as is the case for legal rules governing the legal tender status of euro banknotes and coins (as explained in paragraph 2.5), the ECB is of the view that such protection should be achieved by rules established in a harmonised manner at Union, rather than at national, level . 2.4 The ECB has the exclusive right to authorise the issue of euro banknotes within the Union, and the euro banknotes issued by the ECB and the national central banks of the euro area are the only banknotes with legal tender status within the euro area . The legal tender status of euro coins is provided for in secondary Union law . 2.5 The concept of ‘legal tender’ as a means of payment denominated in a currency unit has been considered by the Court of Justice of the European Union. In particular, the Court of Justice has clarified that the concept of ‘legal tender’ signifies that this specific means of payment cannot generally be refused in settlement of a debt denominated in the same currency unit, at its full face value, with the effect of discharging the debt. In clarifying the concept of ‘legal tender’ under Union

text: law, the Court of Justice took into consideration

text: Commission Recommendation 2010/191/EU

text: , which provides useful guidance for the interpretation of the relevant provisions of Union law. Point 1 of Recommendation

text: states that, where a payment obligation exists, the legal tender of euro banknotes and coins should imply (a) mandatory acceptance of those banknotes and coins; (b) their acceptance at full face value; and (c) their power to discharge from payment obligations. According to the Court of Justice, this shows that the concept of ‘legal tender’ encompasses, inter alia, an obligation in principle to accept banknotes and coins denominated in euro for payment purposes . 2.6 The Court of Justice has clarified that the concept of ‘legal tender’ is a concept of Union law that must be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the Union . Insofar as it allows the Union legislature to lay down the measures necessary for the use of the euro as the single currency, the Court of Justice clarified that Article 133 of the Treaty empowers the Union legislature alone to specify the legal rules governing the status of legal tender accorded to banknotes and coins denominated in euro, insofar as that is necessary for the use of the euro as the single currency. Furthermore, the Union legislature’s exclusive competence precludes any competence on the part of the Member States in the matter, unless they have been empowered by the Union to do so or for the implementation of Union acts .

text: 3. Specific observations

text: 3.1 Constitutional right to use cash in banking transactions in accordance with the law 3.1.1 The first part of

text: Article 74

text: a of the Constitution, as proposed by the draft constitutional law, specifies that everyone has the right to use cash in banking transactions in accordance with the law. 3.1.2 The ECB welcomes the core objective of strengthening the availability of cash in Slovenia. Sufficient and effective access to cash is necessary to preserve the effectiveness of the legal tender status of cash. If there is no sufficient or effective access to cash, cash will not be available as a means of payment. In this regard, the proposed regulation on the legal tender of euro cash includes an obligation for Member States to ensure sufficient and effective access to cash throughout their territory .

text: 3.1.3 However, the ECB understands that the scope and extent of the strengthened constitutional protection of the right to use cash in banking transactions would be clarified by means of secondary legislation. For example, it is not fully clear which operations (e.g. dispensing euro banknotes and coins by debiting a payment account, receiving deposits of euro banknotes and coins in order to credit a payment account) would fall under the scope of the banking transactions. It is also not clear whether under the proposed constitutional regime banks would have to perform cash transactions for anyone or only for their clients that hold a payment account, or whether there are further conditions and limitations on the right to use cash in banking transactions . In this context, the costs of implementation of obligations for credit institutions related to cash transactions would need to be adequately accounted for. The ECB therefore understands that the conditions applicable to the right to use cash in banking transactions pursuant to the first part of

text: Article 74

text: a of the Constitution, as proposed by the draft constitutional law, would be properly specified in secondary legislation. 3.2 Constitutional right to use cash in other forms of legal transactions in accordance with the law 3.2.1 The second part of

text: Article 74

text: a of the Constitution, as proposed by the draft constitutional law, further specifies that, besides banking transactions, everyone has the right to use cash in other forms of legal transactions in accordance with the law. This entails the general right to use euro banknotes and coins as a means of payment in settlement of monetary debts. 3.2.2 In this respect the ECB recalls that the Court of Justice has held that the status of banknotes denominated in euro as legal tender calls only for acceptance in principle of such banknotes as a means of payment, not for absolute acceptance . The Court of Justice held that the Union’s exclusive competence in matters of monetary policy is without prejudice to the competence of the Member States whose currency is the euro in the exercise of their own powers, to regulate the procedures for settling pecuniary obligations, whether under public law or private law, provided, in particular, that the legislation does not affect the principle that, as a general rule, it must be possible to discharge a payment obligation in cash. This also includes that Member States may introduce stricter rules, which will strengthen the mandatory acceptance of euro cash in their territory, in the exercise of their own powers, such as the organisation of their public administration or in the field of consumer protection. The Court of Justice has also held that one must assess the objective and content of a national law measure that provides for an obligation to accept euro cash to determine whether that measure has been adopted within the framework of the Member States’ own competences . 3.2.3 It must therefore be considered whether the second part of

text: Article 74

text: a of the Constitution, as proposed by the draft constitutional law, in the light of its objective and content, establishes legal rules governing the status of legal tender of euro banknotes, an area of exclusive competence of the Union under Article 133 of the Treaty, or is a measure taken in the exercise of a competence of the Member States.

text: 3.2.4 The second part of

text: Article 74

text: a of the Constitution effectively sets out the mandatory acceptance of euro cash as a means of payment as a general rule . This can be seen from the fact that the right to pay in cash is recognised in respect of everyone and in relation to all kinds of legal transactions in accordance with the law. It therefore appears that the content and objective of the second part of

text: Article 74

text: a, of the Constitution, as proposed by the draft constitutional law, is to ensure the acceptance of euro cash as a right of general application. The ECB thus understands that, in the light of its objective and content, the second part of

text: Article 74

text: a of the Constitution, as proposed by the draft constitutional law, does not regulate the procedures for settling pecuniary obligations in the 26 27 exercise of national powers but rather appears to regulate the status of euro cash as legal tender . 3.2.5 Furthermore, it must also be considered whether the second part of

text: Article 74

text: a of the Constitution, as proposed by the draft constitutional law, laying the right for everyone to use cash in legal transactions, can be said to reproduce provisions of Union law. 3.2.6 The ECB underlines that the reproduction in national law of a provision of Union law that is directly applicable in the legal order of the Member State may create uncertainty both as to the legal nature of the applicable provision and as to the date of its entry into force. This would not align with the uniform application and interpretation of Union law throughout the Union . 3.2.7 Furthermore, the ECB also underlines that the incorporation of some elements of Union law into national law is warranted only in exceptional circumstances for the sake of coherence and to make them comprehensible to the persons to whom they apply . If such exceptional circumstances do exist, the reproduction of elements of directly applicable provisions of Union law should be done precisely, by incorporation or reference , and only to the extent warranted by the exceptional circumstances. However, such exceptional circumstances do not exist if the directly applicable provisions of Union law are sufficiently coherent and comprehensive, making it unnecessary to repeat or reflect them in national law . 3.2.8 From this perspective, it must be stated that the second part of

text: Article 74

text: a of the Constitution, as proposed by the draft constitutional law, uses significantly different terms than those used in Union law. According to Recommendation

text: , on which the Court of Justice relied when

text: interpreting Article 128(1) of the Treaty and

text: Article 11 of Regulation (EC) No 974/98

text: , the first defining element of the concept of legal tender is the mandatory acceptance of euro banknotes and coins where a payment obligation exists . In the same vein, it is clear from the prominence given to the provision on this issue in the proposed regulation on the legal tender of euro cash, which is currently being negotiated by the co-legislators, that mandatory acceptance of euro banknotes and coins is one of the key elements of the legal tender status of euro banknotes and coins . Thus, to the extent that the second part of

text: Article 74

text: a of the Constitution, as proposed by the draft constitutional law, uses wording different from its legal sources in Union law, it potentially creates regulatory content of its own, which would not be in line with the Union’s exclusive competence in matters of monetary policy for the Member States whose currency is the euro. 3.2.9 In the light of the above, the ECB recommends that the second part of

text: Article 74

text: a of the Constitution, as proposed by the draft constitutional law, which pertains to everyone’s right to use cash in legal transactions in accordance with the law, should be deleted. Alternatively, if the intention of the draft constitutional law was to reproduce Union law, the provision should either be deleted or amended to merely refer to the relevant provisions of Union law.

text: This opinion will be published on EUR-Lex.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 2 September 2025.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Christine LAGARDE