text: Zakon o Banki Slovenije (ZBS-1) (Ur. l. RS No 72/2006 – official consolidated text, 59/11).

text: See, for example, the ECB’s Convergence Report 2013, pp. 23 to 24. All ECB Convergence Reports are available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 4 In connection with

text: Article 39

text: .a of the Law which stipulates the application of certain provisions of law governing the prevention of corruption.

text: This procedure is governed by a Decision on the Procedure of Establishing Responsibility of Members of the Governing Board of Banka Slovenije, adopted by Banka Slovenije in agreement with the Finance Minister (Sklep o postopku ugotavljanja odgovornosti članov Sveta Banke Slovenije) (Ur. l. RS No 24/2003). 6 See, for example, the ECB’s Convergence Report 2013, p. 22. 7 Pursuant to Article 2 of the Law, the principle of central bank independence should be respected not only when Banka Slovenije performs ESCB-related tasks, but also when it performs national tasks.

text: In connection with the proposed deletion of point 1 of Article 32(1) of the Law. 9 For the activities of the independent external auditors of the NCBs see Article 27.1 of the Statute of the ESCB. 10 See, for example, p. 26 of the ECB’s Convergence Report 2013, Opinions

text: and

text: . All ECB Opinions are available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu 11 See, for example, p. 27 of the ECB’s Convergence Report 2013.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 11 April 2014 on the independence of Banka Slovenije (CON/2014/25)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 11 April 2014 on the independence of Banka Slovenije (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 19 February 2014, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the President of the Slovenian Parliament for an opinion on a draft law amending the Law on Banka Slovenije (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third indent of

text: , as the draft law relates to Banka Slovenije. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 Pursuant to the explanatory memorandum to the draft law submitted to the National Assembly for the legislative procedure by a group of its deputies, the purpose of the draft law is to strengthen the democratic accountability of Banka Slovenije and to enhance the transparency of its operations, in particular in the context of its banking supervisory role. 1.2 The draft law amends the provisions of the Law on Banka Slovenije (hereinafter the ‘Law’) relating to Banka Slovenije’s reporting to the National Assembly. It contains exemptions from the duty to safeguard confidential information in respect of credit institutions which are recipients of state aid where such information is requested by the National Assembly or its committees. The draft law also proposes that additional representatives of the National Assembly’s committees may participate in meetings of Banka Slovenije’s Governing Board. 1.3. The draft law stipulates a larger voting majority for the appointment of the Governor and other members of Banka Slovenije’s Governing Board by the National Assembly and also contains amendments to the rules on their reappointment, limiting the number of their terms of office to two. 1.4 Furthermore, the draft law introduces a new ground for the dismissal of members of Banka Slovenije’s decision-making bodies and gives the Governor of Banka Slovenije the right to dismiss directors or deputy directors of its departments without needing to provide any grounds.

text: 1.5 Finally, the draft law provides for the auditing of Banka Slovenije’s operations by an external auditing company appointed by the National Assembly, on a proposal from the Committee for the control of public finance. This external auditor would also be empowered to establish the incompatibility of functions of the members of Banka Slovenije’s Governing Board, rather than Banka Slovenije itself.

text: 2. Dismissal of members of Banka Slovenije’s decision-making bodies

text: 2.1 Article 130 of the Treaty lays down the principle of personal independence, which is a key aspect of the principle of central bank independence for the members of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB). This principle is reflected in

text: Article 7

text: and Article 14.2 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter the ‘Statute of the ESCB’). In particular,

text: Article 14.2

text: provides, inter alia, that governors may only be relieved from ofﬁce if they no longer fulﬁl the conditions required for the performance of their duties or if they have been guilty of serious misconduct, with the possibility of recourse to the Court of Justice of the European Union. The purpose of Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB is to prevent the authorities involved in the appointment of governors, particularly the government or parliament, from exercising their discretion to dismiss a governor. Since

text: Article 14.2

text: is directly applicable, national central bank (NCB) statutes should either contain grounds for dismissal in line with

text: Article 14.2

text: , or should omit any mention of such grounds. Once elected or appointed, governors may not be dismissed under conditions other than those mentioned in Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB even where they have not yet taken up their duties. Personal independence would be jeopardised if the same rules did not also apply to other members of the decision-making bodies of NCBs involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks. Various provisions of the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB require comparable security of tenure. Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB does not restrict the security of tenure of ofﬁce to governors, while Article 130 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the ESCB Statute refer to ‘members of the decision-making bodies’ of NCBs rather than to governors specifically. This applies in particular where a governor is ‘ﬁrst among equals’ with colleagues with equivalent voting rights or where such other members are involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks . 2.2 Article 39(1) of the Law provides that the members of Banka Slovenije’s Governing Board may only be removed from office before expiry of the term if they ask to be relieved (indent 1), if grounds for the incompatibility of functions arise during their term of office (indent 2), or if it has

text: been found in a prescribed procedure that they no longer fulfil the conditions required for the performance of their duties or that they have been guilty of serious misconduct (indent 3). 2.3 The proposed amendment to Article 39 of the Law also provides for the dismissal of a member of Banka Slovenije’s Governing Board on a proposal from the Slovenian President, by a majority of two thirds of all deputies of the National Assembly. This adds a new ground for dismissal to the two existing ones provided by Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB and is thus incompatible with the Statute. The proposed amendment should therefore be deleted. 2.4 The incompatibility of functions referred to in indent 2 of Article 39(1) of the Law only addresses the situations defined in Article 38 of the Law. In this respect, the ECB would reiterate the view expressed in its Convergence Report of May 2006 that inserting a cross-reference to

text: Article 38

text: in point 2 of

text: Article 39(1)

text: would be welcome for legal certainty reasons. In addition, it should be clarified that point 2 of Article 39(1) of the Law is a condition required for the performance of duties and not a ground for dismissal in addition to the two grounds provided by Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB.

text: 3. Participation by representatives of third parties in Banka Slovenije’s Governing Board meetings

text: The principle of central bank institutional independence, enshrined in Article 130 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB, renders the participation by representatives of third parties in an NCB’s decision-making body with a right to vote on matters concerning the performance by the NCB of ESCB-related tasks incompatible with the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB, even if such a vote is not decisive . Furthermore, the principle of central bank institutional independence also renders the participation of third party representatives, without a right to vote in the meetings of an NCB’s decision-making body entrusted with the performance of ESCB-related tasks, incompatible with the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB, if such participation interferes with the performance of ESCB-related tasks by that decision-making body or endangers compliance with the ESCB’s confidentiality regime.

text: 4. External audit of Banka Slovenije’s operations

text: 4.1 The draft law proposes the introduction of a new

text: Article 41

text: .a into the Law, pursuant to which the operations of Banka Slovenije would be audited by an auditing company, selected by the National Assembly on a proposal from the Committee for public finance control. 4.2 Article 27.1 of the Statute of the ESCB requires the accounts of the ECB and NCBs to be audited by independent external auditors recommended by the Governing Council and approved by the Council and this is duly reflected in Articles 52 and 65 of the Law. The proposed amendment is thus incompatible with Article 27.1 of the Statute of the ESCB and contradicts the existing provisions of Articles 52 and 65 of the Law. 4.3 Where an NCB’s operations are subject to the control of a state audit ofﬁce or similar body charged with controlling the use of public ﬁnances, a number of safeguards of central bank independence should apply: (a) the scope of the control should be clearly deﬁned by the legal framework; (b) the activities of the NCB’s independent external auditors should not be prejudiced ; (c) in line with the principle of institutional independence, as enshrined in Article 130 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB, the audit should: (i) comply with the prohibition on giving instructions to an NCB and its decision-making bodies, (ii) not interfere with the NCB’s ESCB-related tasks, and (iii) be carried out on a non-political, independent and purely professional basis . The proposed amendments of the Law do not meet all these requirements.

text: 5. Reporting by Banka Slovenije to the National Assembly and confidentiality of information

text: 5.1 As pointed out by the ECB in its Convergence Reports , the obligation of professional secrecy for ECB and NCB staff under Article 37 of the Statute of the ESCB may give rise to similar provisions in NCBs’ statutes or in Member States’ legislation. The primacy of Union law and rules adopted thereunder also means that national laws on third party access to documents may not result in infringements of the ESCB’s confidentiality regime. Access to an NCB’s information and documents must be without prejudice to the ESCB’s confidentiality regime, to which the members of NCBs’ decision-making bodies and staff are subject. NCBs should ensure that such bodies protect the confidentiality of information and documents disclosed at a level corresponding to that applied by the NCBs. Therefore, any provision of information permitted by the proposed amendments to Article 26 of the Law on the reporting of Banka Slovenije to the National Assembly and the proposed amendment to Article 47 of the Law on protection of confidential data should comply with the relevant Union laws, including those governing the exchange of supervisory and statistical information, as well as the obligation of safeguarding professional secrecy. Therefore, Article 26 of the Law should refer not only to national laws in this respect but also to Union law

text: including Article 37 of the Statute of the ESCB. The ECB emphasises that confidential information may be exchanged only if necessary for the performance of the tasks of the body that receives the information. In this context, the ECB notes that a representative of the National Assembly’s Committee for finance and monetary policy may participate in meetings of the Governing Board of Banka Slovenije where they can get acquainted with any confidential information, including the details relating to granting state aid to credit institutions. 5.2 The proposed new Article 26(3) of the Law provides that the report addressed to the National Assembly should contain a report on the work and on the performance of tasks of the members of the Governing Board of Banka Slovenije. However, the Governing Board is a collegial body accountable to the National Assembly as a whole. Depending on the level of detail of this report, this provision raises concerns regarding the institutional independence of Banka Slovenije and the personal independence of the members of the Governing Board of Banka Slovenije. The Law should contain adequate safeguards in order to ensure that: (a) the reporting obligations do not result in interference with the independence of the members of Banka Slovenije’s Governing Board as provided by Article 130 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB; (b) the special status of governors in their capacity as members of the ECB’s decision-making bodies is fully respected; and (c) confidentiality requirements resulting from the Statute of the ESCB are observed .

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 11 April 2014.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: Published in Monitorul Oficial al României, Part I No 882/2005. 2

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).

publisher: Europeiska centralbanken

sprak: en

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 14 April 2014 on operations relating to government securities (CON/2014/26)

serie: con

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 14 April 2014 on operations relating to government securities (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

type: rubrik

text: On 21 March 2014, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from Banca Naţională a României (BNR) for an opinion on a draft BNR regulation amending BNR Regulation No 12/2005 on the secondary market for government securities managed by BNR (hereinafter the ‘draft regulation’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third and fifth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft regulation relates to BNR and payment and settlement systems. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

type: stycke

text: Purpose of the draft regulation

text: BNR manages the primary and secondary markets for government securities in Romania. Transactions on these markets are settled in the system for Settlement and Financial Instruments Registration (SaFIR), the sole depository of government securities in Romania, which is also managed by BNR. Transactions on the secondary market for government securities in Romania take place by direct negotiation between intermediaries, and participants can only perform such operations through accounts with SaFIR. In order to reduce fragmentation of the interbank money market for government securities and to facilitate the processing of transactions in government securities in SaFIR, the draft regulation repeals a provision of BNR Regulation No 12/2005 that states that operations relating to government

text: bonds are to be conducted only in the currency of issue. As a result, transactions could be settled in SaFIR in the currency agreed between the parties. The ECB has no comments on this draft regulation. This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 14 April 2014. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI

type: vagledning

utgivare: ecb


text: Article 6(3) of the Law on Lietuvos bankas. This provision was the subject of Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on the ECB website at: http://www.ecb.europa.eu 3

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 1338/2001 of 28 June 2001

text: laying down measures necessary for the protection of the euro against counterfeiting (OJ L 181, 4.7.2001, p. 6). See, further,

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 1339/2001 of 28 June 2001

text: extending the effects of

text: Regulation (EC) No 1338/2001

text: laying down measures necessary for the protection of the euro against counterfeiting to those Member States which have not adopted the euro as their single currency (OJ L 181, 4.7.2001, p. 11). 4 See Opinion

text: , paragraph 6.1. 5 See Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.3.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 16 April 2014 on currency exchange operators (CON/2014/27)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 16 April 2014 on currency exchange operators (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 14 March 2014, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Lithuanian Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft law on currency exchange operators (hereinafter the ‘draft law’) and on draft amendments to the law on Lietuvos bankas (hereinafter the ‘draft amending law’) (jointly the ‘draft laws’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the first, second and third indents of

text: , as the draft laws relate to currency matters, means of payment and Lietuvos bankas. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft laws

text: 1.1 The draft law aims to simplify the regulation of entities providing currency exchange services in Lithuania. It establishes a separate legal framework for the provision of currency exchange services and introduces a new entity into the Lithuanian financial market, i.e. the ‘currency exchange operator’. At present, currency exchange services in Lithuania can be provided by: (1) credit institutions having a licence to provide such services; (2) other payment service providers and e-money institutions (when related to payment services or issue of e-money); and (3) financial brokerage firms (when related to investment services). 1.2 The draft law outlines the procedure for inclusion in the list of currency exchange operators, the procedure for commencement and termination of currency exchange activities, and the supervision of such activities. It also lays down the requirements applicable to currency exchange offices. 1.3 The draft law requires that a currency exchange office is equipped so as to ensure, inter alia, the proper protection of cash and the fulfilment of obligations laid down in legal acts regulating cash

text: management. Such requirements, as well as the procedure for their implementation, are to be further specified by the supervisory authority. 1.4 The draft laws provide for Lietuvos bankas to be designated as the supervisory authority for currency exchange operators.

text: 2. Specific comments

text: 2.1 As regards the proper protection of cash as referred to in Article 8 of the draft law, Lietuvos bankas is entrusted with setting requirements for credit and payment institutions and other economic entities engaged in the collecting, handling and recycling of banknotes and coins, as regards the verification of the authenticity of Lithuanian litas banknotes and coins and of the euro, and the detection of counterfeit money. Lietuvos bankas also monitors the fulfilment of such requirements. Lietuvos bankas is accordingly responsible for ensuring that entities engaged in the processing and distribution to the public of euro notes and coins discharge their obligations under

text: Article 6(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1338/2001

text: . The ECB therefore recommends that the draft law is clarified to ensure that the protection of “cash” includes the protection of the euro. 2.2 Furthermore, as Lietuvos bankas will be entrusted with new supervisory tasks, requiring additional human and financial resources, the ECB emphasises that any involvement of Lietuvos bankas should be fully compatible with its institutional and financial independence, in order to safeguard the proper performance of its tasks under the Treaty and the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank. The principle of central bank independence requires, inter alia, that Member States do not put their national central banks in a position where they have insufficient financial resources and inadequate net equity to carry out their tasks related to the European System of Central Banks or the Eurosystem . Accordingly, the ECB expects that

text: Lietuvos bankas will have sufficient human and financial resources to perform its new tasks .

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 16 April 2014. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42). 2

text: Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 on credit rating agencies (OJ L 302, 17.11.2009, p. 1).

text: Entities referred to in the first subparagraph of Article 4(1) of the Regulation, i.e. credit institutions, investment firms, insurance undertakings, reinsurance undertakings, institutions for occupational retirement provision, management companies, investment companies, alternative investment fund managers and central counterparties.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 22 April 2014 on monitoring the use of credit ratings by market participants (CON/2014/28)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 22 April 2014 on monitoring the use of credit ratings by market participants (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 28 March 2014, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Lithuanian Ministry of Finance for an opinion on draft amendments to the Law on Lietuvos bankas (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft law relates to Lietuvos bankas. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The main objective of the draft law is to designate a competent authority for the purpose of

text: Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council (hereinafter the ‘Regulation’). 1.2 The draft law amends Article 42 of the Law on Lietuvos bankas which sets out the aim, functions, rights and obligations of Lietuvos bankas in performance of financial market supervision. The draft law provides that Lietuvos bankas is to carry out the functions of a competent authority assigned to it by the Regulation.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 The ECB understands that Lietuvos bankas has been performing the functions of a competent authority for the purpose of the Regulation since 1 January 2012, when supervision of the entire Lithuanian financial market was integrated within Lietuvos bankas. This function was provided for in the Law on markets in financial instruments and not in the Law on Lietuvos bankas.

text: Article 5

text: a(2) of the Regulation requires sectoral competent authorities in charge of supervising credit and other financial institutions , taking into account the nature, scale and complexity of their activities, to monitor the adequacy of their credit risk assessment processes, assess the use of contractual references to credit ratings and, where appropriate, encourage them to mitigate the impact of such references, with a view to reducing sole and mechanistic reliance on credit ratings, in line with specific sectoral legislation. 2.3 The ECB understands that Lietuvos bankas’ designation as a ‘competent authority for the purpose of the Regulation’ covers functions of the ‘competent authority’ specified in Article 22 of the Regulation and of the ‘sectoral competent authority’ specified in

text: Article 25

text: a of the Regulation. The ECB understands that the aim of the draft law is to extend and clarify the scope of Lietuvos bankas’ competence for the purposes of the Regulation. In particular, according to the draft law, this function of Lietuvos bankas is now provided for in the Law on Lietuvos bankas along with its other functions, rights and obligations in performance of the supervision of all financial market participants and not in sectoral financial legislation regulating a specific sector of the financial market. The enactment of the draft law should result in clarifying and enhancing Lietuvos bankas’ supervisory and regulatory powers in this field.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 22 April 2014.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 29 April 2014 on the legal framework for the recapitalisation through the HFSF of credit institutions in Greece (CON/2014/29)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 29 April 2014 on the legal framework for the recapitalisation through the HFSF of credit institutions in Greece (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 24 Μarch 2014 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Greek Ministry of Finance for an opinion on legislative provisions amending Law 3864/2010 on the establishment of the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund (HFSF) (hereinafter the ‘draft provisions’). On 30 March 2014, in accordance with an expedited parliamentary procedure, the Greek Parliament adopted the draft provisions as part of the law entitled ‘Measures for the support and growth of the Greek economy in the context of implementation of Law 4046/2012 and other provisions’ . The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third and sixth indents of

text: , as the draft provisions relate to the Bank of Greece and to rules applicable to financial institutions, insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft provisions

text: 1.1 The purpose of the draft provisions is to reform the legal framework governing the provision of capital support to credit institutions in Greece through the HFSF, with a view to maintaining financial stability in the banking sector in Greece for the sake of the public interest, following restructuring of that sector in recent years. Furthermore, the draft provisions aim to align that legal framework with the guidance set out in the Communication from the Commission on the application, from 1 August 2013, of State aid rules to support measures in favour of banks in the context of the financial crisis (hereinafter the ‘Banking Communication’). 1.2 The proposed reform concerns mainly: (a) the objective of the HFSF and the rules and principles governing its function; (b) the circumstances in which the HFSF can provide support; (c) the

text: 1 FEK A 119/21.7.2010.

text: 2 FEK A 85/7.4.2014.

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).

text: 4 Communication from the Commission on the application, from 1 August 2013, of State aid rules to support measures in favour of banks in the context of the financial crisis (‘Banking Communication’), OJ C 216, 30.7.2013, p. 1. adoption of mandatory measures aimed at reducing the capital needs of credit institutions requesting capital support from the HFSF, in line with the Banking Communication; (d) the procedure and conditions for the provision of capital support to credit institutions through the subscription by the HFSF for shares or other contingent convertible bonds; (e) the exercise of the shareholding rights of the HFSF in credit institutions to which it has provided capital support; (f) the procedure and conditions for the disposal of the HFSF’s holding in credit institutions; and (g) rules on the corporate governance and operation of the HFSF. 1.3 The draft provisions clarify that the objective of the HFSF is to contribute to the maintenance of the stability of the Greek banking system for the sake of the public interest . The draft provisions expressly provide that the HFSF shall act in line with the commitments of Greece under Law 4046/2012 on the approval of the draft financing agreements between the European Financial Stability Fund, the Hellenic Republic and the Bank of Greece and of the draft Memorandum of Understanding between the Hellenic Republic, the European Commission and the Bank of Greece and other provisions of utmost importance for reducing the public debt and saving the national 6 7 economy . The draft provisions specify that, with a view to achieving its objective, the HFSF exercises the following main tasks: (a) it provides capital support to credit institutions and to transitional credit institutions under terms and conditions which take account of rules on the prudent management of its assets; (b) it monitors and assesses the compliance of credit institutions with their restructuring plans, safeguarding their business autonomy, their operation on market terms and increasing private sector participation in such credit institutions in a transparent manner and in accordance with the State aid rules of the Union; (c) it exercises its shareholder rights in credit institutions to which it has provided capital support in compliance with the rules on the prudent management of its assets and in line with the State aid rules of the Union; (d) it disposes of financial instruments issued by the credit institutions in which it has a holding in accordance with the specific requirements set out in the draft provisions; and (e) it exercises its rights in transitional credit institutions in accordance with the specific requirements set out in the Law on the HFSF and 8 9 the Law on Banking (Law 3601/2007 ) . The draft provisions state that monitoring and supervision of tasks performed by bodies responsible for the special liquidation of credit institutions do not fall within the functions of the HFSF . 1.4 The procedure to activate support by the HFSF is redefined in line with the Banking Communication. A credit institution assessed and deemed as viable by the Bank of Greece may request capital support from the HFSF for an amount not exceeding its capital needs as identified by the Bank of Greece . The request must be accompanied by a restructuring plan and a letter from

text: 6 FEK A 28/14.12.2012.

text: 8 FEK A 178/1.8.2007. the Bank of Greece determining the capital needs of the relevant credit institution and confirming that the credit institution, subject to meeting its capital needs, is viable. Credit institutions that have already received capital support from the HFSF are required to submit an amended restructuring plan. The restructuring plan must set out voluntary measures to be undertaken by the credit institution in order to raise capital or mitigate its capital needs. These measures may include the retention of earnings, the implementation of a share capital increase, the voluntary conversion of subordinated debt instruments into Tier 1 capital instruments and the compilation of a list of instruments that may be subject, where necessary, to mandatory measures aimed at reducing the credit institution’s capital needs . Following consultation with the Bank of Greece, the HFSF may request amendments to the restructuring plan. The provision of HFSF support is conditional on European Commission approval of the restructuring plan and, where necessary, the implementation of mandatory measures aimed at reducing the credit institution’s capital needs, in line with the Banking Communication . 1.5 To reduce the use of public funds in support of credit institutions to a minimum, the draft provisions authorise the Cabinet of Ministers to enforce, following a recommendation by the Bank of Greece, mandatory measures aimed at allocating the capital needs of credit institutions requesting capital support from the HFSF to their capital holders and subordinated creditors in line with the Banking Communication (hereinafter the ‘mandatory measures’). Such measures shall be adopted where: (a) the voluntary measures set out in the credit institution’s restructuring plan are insufficient to address its total capital needs as determined by the Bank of Greece; and (b) the liquidation or resolution of the credit institution concerned, which would be required under Greek law were the institution unable to restore its capital position, could result in serious disturbances to the economy with adverse effects upon the public . The mandatory measures may include, under the specific conditions set out in the draft provisions: (a) a reduction in the nominal value of common shares, following a decision of the credit institution’s competent body; (b) a reduction in the nominal value of preference shares and other Tier 1 liabilities; and (c) the conversion of preference shares, other Tier 1 liabilities and subordinated liabilities into Tier 1 capital instruments . The mandatory measures may apply also to subordinated liabilities of the credit institution concerned that stem from agreements it has concluded with third entities included in its consolidated financial statements (guarantees for the issue of debt or equity instruments and credit arrangements) . The draft provisions allow the authorities, subject to the approval of the European Commission, not to enforce mandatory measures where their implementation would endanger financial stability or lead to disproportionate results. The draft provisions require that, following the implementation of mandatory measures, the financial position of the capital holders or subordinated creditors affected should not be worse than it would be were the credit institution

text: 14 See draft

text: Article 6

text: 15 See draft

text: Article 6

text: 16 See draft

text: Article 6

text: a(3). placed into liquidation (‘no-creditor-worse-off-than-in-insolvency’ principle) . The draft provisions set out publication requirements in relation to the implementation of mandatory measures . A Cabinet act will set out the necessary details for the implementation of mandatory measures of this kind . 1.6 The draft provisions clarify that the HFSF may provide capital support to credit institutions only to the extent that their capital needs, as determined by the Bank of Greece, remain uncovered following the application of voluntary and mandatory measures aimed at reducing such and following any participation of private sector investors . The HFSF shall provide capital support through the subscription of shares or contingent convertible bonds or other convertible instruments issued in the context of a capital increase . The subscription price for these instruments shall be determined by a decision of the General Council of the HFSF on the basis of two valuation reports prepared by independent financial advisers. New shares in the relevant credit institution offered to the private sector in the context of the same issuance shall have an offer price no lower than the subscription price for the HFSF. In contrast, the offer price may be lower than the price at which the HFSF previously subscribed for shares in the credit institution or lower than the current stock market price . The independent financial advisers shall be requested to take account of all relevant information, including any available asset quality review and stress test results, as well as market conditions. A summary of the elements and methodology used by the advisers will be published on the HFSF’s website within 10 days of completion of the transactions . 1.7 According to the draft provisions, the HFSF shall be entitled to exercise without limitations the voting rights attached to the common shares it acquires in the context of the provision of capital support to credit institutions . The draft provisions specify certain cases where the HFSF may exercise its voting rights only in relation to decisions amending the bylaws of the credit institution, including decisions concerning capital increase, merger, extension of duration and dissolution . The draft provisions introduce certain amendments regarding the notification of information relating to shareholding and voting rights in credit institutions to which the HFSF has provided capital support, in accordance with Law 3556/2007 on transparency requirements for companies 26 27 with stock listed on a regulated market .

text: 17 See draft

text: Article 6

text: 18 See draft

text: Article 6

text: 19 See draft

text: Article 6

text: 24 See draft

text: Article 7

text: 25 See draft

text: Article 7

text: 26 FEK Α 91/30.4.2007. Law 3556/2007 implements Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 2004 on the harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to information about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market and amending Directive

text: (OJ L 390, 31.12.2004, p. 38).

text: 27 See draft

text: Article 7

text: a(6). 1.8 The draft provisions specify that the HFSF shall decide on how to dispose of its shareholding in a credit institution to which it has provided capital support within five years of acquiring that holding. The relevant decision shall be taken by the General Council of the HFSF on the basis of a report prepared by a financial expert, accompanied by a comprehensive time schedule for the disposal. The disposal shall be carried out in compliance with the objectives of the HFSF . The HFSF may sell its shares to the market or to specific investors or groups of investors through different procedures, including through an open tender procedure, the exchange of shares for cash or other securities and book building . The disposal price, which may be lower than the price at which the shares were acquired by the HFSF or their current market price, shall be determined by the General Council of the HFSF on the basis of two valuation reports of independent advisers . With regard to the exchange and adjustment of warrants issued by the HFSF, a Cabinet act shall determine the methodology to adjust their terms and conditions in the case of corporate actions consisting of a split, a reverse split and a share capital increase without abolition of pre-emptive rights . In the latter case, the draft provisions allow for an adjustment only as regards the price and only up to the amount of the proceeds realised from the sale of pre-emption rights of the HFSF. 1.9 The draft provisions amend certain rules relating to the corporate governance and operation of the HFSF. These amendments include in particular: (a) an increase in the number of the independent members of the General Council of the HFSF from five to seven ; (b) strengthening of the eligibility criteria for members of the governing bodies of the HFSF ; (c) broadening of the limitations to which the members of the governing bodies of the HFSF are subject when taking up a position subsequent to their employment at the HFSF ; and (d) further specification of the liability of the members of the governing bodies of the HFSF .

text: 2. Appropriate time to consult the ECB

text: 2.1 According to

text: Article 4 of Decision 98/415/EC

text: , the ECB must be consulted at an appropriate stage in the legislative process enabling the consulting authority to take the ECB’s opinion into consideration before the draft provisions are adopted. This requires, in turn, that the ECB should have sufficient time to adopt its opinion. 2.2. The ECB notes that, in this case, the consultation request was submitted a few days before the adoption of the draft provisions into law. As the ECB appreciates this urgency, the observations made in this opinion are limited to what is considered strictly necessary, having regard to the fact

text: 34 See draft

text: Article 16

text: 35 See draft

text: Article 16

text: C(4). that the draft provisions have already been voted into law and entered into force.

text: 3. General observations

text: 3.1 The ECB welcomes the reform of the legal framework governing the operation of the HFSF and the recapitalisation of credit institutions, which aims at safeguarding the stability of the Greek banking system for the sake of the public interest . In the context of the current economic and financial crisis, the proposed reform should generally contribute to reducing the amount of State aid that the beneficiary credit institutions may require and to safeguarding and protecting taxpayers’ interests more effectively. 3.2 The ECB wishes to emphasise the importance it attaches to the stabilisation of the financial system in Greece, such that the latter may resume lending to the real economy and support growth, while also restoring a sustainable broad-based funding model. The timely and efficient recapitalisation of Greece’s financial system is crucial to the achievement of this objective. Furthermore, the ECB reiterates that it is equally essential to ensure that the amended recapitalisation framework will allow credit institutions to benefit from capital support provided by the HFSF only after having fully exhausted all possibilities to generate capital through mitigating measures (such as divestments) and through private capital-raising. This will enable the HFSF to maintain significant State resources as a safety net against the challenges that Greek banks continue to face as a result of the recession and the problems of some borrowers to service their debt obligations, to the benefit of the financial system, the economy and the public at large. Without prejudice to these general observations, the ECB has the following specific observations to make.

text: 4. Objective and operation of the HFSF

text: 4.1 The ECB welcomes the clarification that the objective of the HFSF is to contribute to the maintenance of the stability of the Greek banking system, for the sake of the public interest, and that the HFSF shall act in line with the commitments of Greece under the second economic adjustment programme for Greece. Moreover, the ECB welcomes the specification of the tasks conferred upon the HFSF for the fulfilment of this objective, and the principles governing the performance of these tasks. Of particular importance is the requirement that, in exercising its tasks, the HFSF shall take account of rules on the prudent management of its assets. The prudent use and management of the assets of the HFSF is crucial from a financial stability perspective, as these assets include both the holdings of the HFSF in credit institutions that have benefited from HFSF support and the capital of the HFSF, paid in by the Greek Government with funds raised from the European Union and International Monetary Fund (IMF) financial assistance for Greece. The ECB supports the financial sector strategy set out in the Memorandum of Economic and Financial

text: 36 In relation to the development of the relevant legal framework, the ECB refers to its previous relevant opinions. See in particular opinions

text: and

text: . All ECB opinions are available on the ECB website at www.ecb.europa.eu. Policies and the recent statement on Greece by the Eurogroup to strengthen Greek banks by meeting ‘capital needs swiftly first and foremost from private investors’ . Private capital injections should help to strengthen the management, efficiency and solvency of Greek banks, thereby also contributing to the prudent use and management of the existing assets of the HFSF. 4.2 The ECB notes that the draft provisions increase the number of members of the General Council of the HFSF, other than the representative of the Ministry of Finance and the person appointed by the Bank of Greece, from five to seven, and understands that this amendment aims at increasing the participation of persons with international experience in banking matters in the governing bodies of the HFSF. As regards the role of the person appointed by the Bank of Greece, the ECB notes that as a full voting member of the General Council of the HFSF, the Bank of Greece appointee might be required to take a position on issues falling outside the tasks and responsibilities of the Bank of Greece as national supervisory authority. This might give rise to perceived conflicts of interest, such as in connection with business decisions relating to the exercise of the shareholding rights of the HFSF. The ECB considers that the role of the person appointed by the Bank of Greece could be usefully transformed into that of a representative of the Bank of Greece without voting rights, who would act in an observer capacity, and who would, in practice, be called to provide input only from a prudential supervisory perspective.

text: 5. Procedure and conditions for the provision of capital support by the HFSF

text: 5.1 Circumstances in which the HFSF may provide support 5.1.1 The ECB welcomes the fact that, under the draft provisions, only credit institutions that have been assessed and deemed viable by the Bank of Greece are deemed eligible to receive support from the HFSF. In addition, it welcomes the fact that the draft provisions require credit institutions requesting capital support to submit a restructuring plan setting out the measures that they will undertake in order to raise capital from private resources or mitigate their capital needs, so as to minimise State aid support. These safeguards are necessary to ensure that the provision of State support will strengthen the capital position of fundamentally sound financial institutions in order to improve the functioning and stability of the banking system and to foster an adequate flow of credit to the economy. 5.1.2 The ECB is of the view that the Bank of Greece, as the national supervisory authority, is the institution best placed to: (a) assess whether there is a residual shortfall in capital; (b) assess the viability of credit institutions facing capital shortfalls, taking into consideration their restructuring plans also including measures relating to voluntary liability management; and (c) instruct credit institutions that have been deemed viable, subject to meeting their capital needs, to submit a request for capital support to the HFSF.

text: 37 Annex V to Law No 4046/2012, as revised from time to time (FEK A 28/14.12.2012). 38 See Eurogroup statement on Greece of 1 April 2014, available at: http://www.eurozone.europa.eu/newsroom/news/2014/04/eurogroup-statement-on-greece/. 5.1.3 The ECB notes that the implementation of HFSF support is further conditional on the adoption of mandatory measures aimed at allocating any residual capital needs, following the adoption of voluntary measures, to capital holders and subordinated creditors of the credit institution concerned, in compliance with the Banking Communication. The ECB understands that the relevant measures aim to address public interest considerations and in particular: (a) the need to ensure that the use of public funds remains at the minimum necessary; (b) the need to prevent serious disturbances to the economy with adverse effects upon the public that in certain cases could result from the liquidation or resolution of the credit institution concerned; and (c) the need to protect the integrity of the single market and ensure a level playing field as well as the State’s fiscal strength . 5.1.4 The ECB notes that the Banking Communication requires the adoption of mandatory measures of the kind specified in the draft provisions, provided that fundamental rights are respected and financial stability is not put at risk . In this regard, adherence to the ‘no-creditor-worse-off-than-ininsolvency’ principle established in the draft provisions will be crucial. Furthermore, the ECB welcomes the fact that the draft provisions refer explicitly to the public interest considerations which underpin the adoption of mandatory measures and allow also for exceptions to the adoption of mandatory measures, where their implementation would endanger financial stability or lead to disproportionate results. 5.1.5 The ECB notes that the draft provisions include among the instruments that may be subject to mandatory measures subordinated liabilities of the credit institution concerned that stem from the provision of guarantees to third entities or from credit arrangements with such entities. The ECB understands that these provisions will only be relevant in the event that the guarantee is activated. Implementation of mandatory measures in relation to obligations of that kind requires further specification. 5.2 Provision of capital support and pricing of recapitalisation instruments 5.2.1 The ECB welcomes the fact that, under the draft provisions, the HFSF shall provide capital support only for the purpose of covering the capital shortfall determined by the Bank of Greece and only to the extent that the shortfall remains uncovered following the application of voluntary and mandatory mitigating measures and the participation of private sector investors. This provision is necessary to enable the HFSF to adequately fulfil its objective to maintain the stability of the financial system, for the sake of the public interest. 5.2.2 According to the draft provisions, the decision by the HFSF determining the price for its subscription of common shares will take account of its objectives along with the prevailing market conditions. These principles, which require the HFSF, alongside other aims, to take account of the rules on the prudent management of its assets, will enable the HFSF to ensure the appropriate

text: 39 See ECB opinion

text: , paragraph 3.1 et seq. 40 According to paragraph 19 of the Banking Communication, all capital generating measures should be exhausted before the State may recapitalise a credit institution, provided that fundamental rights are respected and financial stability is not put at risk. pricing of recapitalisations with State support, thus avoiding the situation that private investors prepared to inject capital in line with prevailing market conditions are crowded out as a result of the HFSF setting a price that is too high. The ECB emphasises the importance of ensuring that the valuations provided to the HFSF by independent financial advisers take account of all pertinent information and are subject to all necessary transparency requirements. The reference to that effect in the draft provisions will provide an additional safeguard to promote financial stability. 5.2.3 The provision of capital support by the HFSF under the draft provisions will be subject to the assessment and control of the European Commission in accordance with the State aid rules laid down in the Treaty. In particular, the European Commission’s role will contribute to ensuring that the recapitalisation of credit institutions with capital support from the HFSF will not result in the granting of State aid which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings.

text: 6. Disposal of the HFSF’s shareholding in credit institutions

text: 6.1 The draft law contains detailed provisions governing the disposal of the HFSF’s shareholding in credit institutions. These provisions aim at setting out clear rules and principles to guide the HFSF’s decision-making process with regard to increasing private sector participation in credit institutions in which the HFSF holds shares. The ECB considers that the relevant provisions will promote the re-privatisation of Greek banks and thus the operation of the credit institutions concerned on market terms, thereby facilitating the return to normal market conditions and ensuring the proper financing of the Greek economy. 6.2 The ECB notes that, according to the draft provisions, the disposal price may be lower than the price at which the shares were acquired by the HFSF or their current market price. The ECB welcomes the fact that, when determining the disposal price, the HFSF will be required to act in compliance with its objective, as specified under the draft provisions. Furthermore, the ECB considers it important that the rules concerning the information to be taken into account by the independent financial advisers and the transparency requirements concerning the elements and

text: methodology used by those advisers also apply in relation to the determination of the disposal price. In this connection, it is also noted that disposal of HFSF shareholdings in credit institutions will be subject to the State aid rules. This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 29 April 2014. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).

text: The TSCG was signed by 25 Member States on 2 March 2012. It entered into force on 1 January 2013, on the basis that 12 euro area Member States had deposited their ratification instruments by that date. The Lithuanian Parliament ratified the TSCG on 28 June 2012 and deposited the ratification instrument with the Council of the European Union on 6 September 2012.

text: Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: Article 3 of the draft constitutional law.

text: Article 3(1)

text: and Article 7 of the draft constitutional law and

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997

text: on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies (OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 1).

text: Article 9(3) of the draft constitutional law. 10 See paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: . 11 See paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: . 12 Titles III (Fiscal Compact) and IV (Economic Policy Coordination and Convergence). 13 See paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: . 14 COM (2012) 342 final. 15 See paragraph 3.2 of Opinion

text: Article 8 of the draft constitutional law. 17 See paragraph 4.2 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 3.3 of Opinion

text: Principle 7 (the role and independence of monitoring institutions). These criteria include; (i) a statutory regime grounded in law; (ii) freedom from interference, whereby such institutions should not take instructions, and should be in a capacity to communicate publicly in a timely manner; (iii) nomination procedures based on experience and competence; (iv) adequacy of resources and appropriate access to information to carry out the given mandate. 20 See paragraph 4.3 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 5.5 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 5.5 of Opinion

text: . 21 See paragraph 4.3 of Opinion

text: . 22 Available on Lietuvos bankas’ website at http://www.lb.lt/macroeconomic_forecast 23 See paragraph 5.4 of Opinion

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 479/2009 of 25 May 2009

text: on the application of the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to the Treaty establishing the European Community (OJ L 145, 10.06.2009, p. 1). 25 Available on www.ecb.europa.eu

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 30 April 2014 on public finances (CON/2014/30)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 30 April 2014 on public finances (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 27 March 2014, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Lithuanian Ministry of Finance for an opinion on the draft constitutional law on the implementation of the fiscal treaty (hereinafter the ‘draft constitutional law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft constitutional law relates to Lietuvos bankas. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft constitutional law

text: 1.1 The purpose of the draft constitutional law is to ensure the sustainability of the general government sector finances and a stable development of the economy. The draft constitutional law aims to implement the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG) , and takes into account the earlier ECB opinion on the implementation of the TSCG in Lithuania . 1.2 The objectives of the TSCG are to be achieved by managing the structural balance of the general government sector in order to ensure that the general government sector finances are in surplus or balanced. 1.3 The draft constitutional law sets two ratios for assessing the management of the structural balance of the general government sector: (i) the medium-term objective and (ii) the structural impetus target. The medium-term objective sets a structural general government sector balance indicator. This must be reached within four successive years, excluding years when an unusual event occurs.

text: The structural impetus target sets a targeted annual change (impetus) in the structural general government sector balance indicator towards the medium-term objective, and is measured in GDP percentage. 1.4 The draft constitutional law also lays down rules limiting the increase in the general government sector expenditure . More particularly, if the average of the general government sector’s balance indicators during the last five years is in deficit, the average increase in expenditure of any individual general government sector budget that exceeds 3 % of GDP cannot exceed half of the average multi-annual potential GDP growth. 1.5 The draft constitutional law provides for several exemptions. First, the rules governing the structural balance of the general government sector do not apply in the case of an unusual event as defined in

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97

text: . Second, the draft constitutional law provides for five exceptions to the rules on the limits on growth in public expenditure . Third, the State Social Insurance Fund budget and the budgets of government sectors whose planned expenditure does not exceed 0.3 % of GDP are not subject to the requirement to have a surplus or balanced budget . The rules and requirements applying to them are instead set out in

text: Article 4(2)

text: and (3) of the draft constitutional law. 1.6 Article 8 of the draft constitutional law lays down the procedures to be followed in the event of a failure to implement the ‘structural impetus target’ defined in

text: Article 2

text: . These procedures shall start after the submission, no later than 1 May, of the report of the Government or its authorised institution to the Parliament for the preceding year on the implementation of the structural impetus target and on the indicator of the structural balance of the general government sector. The Prime Minister is required to provide to the Parliament and the control institution information on the reasons for such failure and ‘guidelines on the measures for implementation’ of the target, and to make an oral presentation in the Parliament. Moreover, within 30 working days of receipt of this information, the control institution is required to provide the Parliament with a conclusion on the validity of the reasons for failure to implement the target and the appropriateness of the guidelines on the measures to be taken. Finally, within one month after receipt of the conclusion of the control institution, the Prime Minister is required to provide the Parliament with the information on the final reasons for failure and guidelines on the measures to be taken to meet the target. 1.7 The State Audit Office is designated as a budget policy control institution (hereinafter ‘control institution’) responsible for monitoring the implementation of the structural impetus target and the achievement of the medium-term objective .

text: 1.8 Lietuvos bankas is required to submit its macroeconomic projections to the control institution each time these projections are updated, and at least twice per calendar year .

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 The ECB welcomes the consulting authority’s initiative and the objective of implementing the TSCG . Although Lithuania is no longer subject to an excessive deficit procedure, enactment of the draft constitutional law is important in modernising the Lithuanian legal framework in relation to the budgetary process . 2.2 Article 14(5) of the TSCG provides Lithuania, as a Member State with a derogation, with the opportunity to declare its intention to be bound by all or part of the provisions in Titles III (Fiscal Compact) and IV (Economic Policy Coordination and Convergence) of the TSCG at an earlier date than that when the abrogation of the derogation in accordance with Article 140(2) of the TFEU takes effect. Lithuania has not made such a declaration and the ECB notes that the draft constitutional law will only enter into force as from the date when the abrogation of the derogation takes effect, i.e. once the euro is introduced in Lithuania .

text: 3. Form of implementation of the balanced budget rule and correction mechanism

text: 3.1 Article 3(2) of the TSCG provides that the ‘balanced budget rule’ shall take effect in national law through ‘provisions of binding force and permanent character, preferably constitutional, or otherwise guaranteed to be fully respected and adhered to throughout the national budgetary processes’. In accordance with the Communication from the Commission on Common principles on national fiscal correction mechanisms adopted in accordance with Article 3(2) of the TSCG (hereinafter the ‘Common Principles’) , the legal status of the correction mechanisms to be triggered in case of significant observed deviations ‘should be such that their provisions cannot be simply altered by the ordinary budgetary law’. 3.2 The ECB welcomes that the draft law has been designed as a constitutional law, which represents a ranking in the Lithuanian hierarchy of laws in line with the requirements of the TSCG .

text: 4. The nature of the correction mechanisms

text: Article 3(1)

text: (e) of the TSCG requires the automatic triggering of a correction mechanism in the event of significant observed deviations from the medium-term objective or the adjustment path

text: towards it. This mechanism shall include the obligation to implement measures to correct deviations over a defined period of time. Common Principle 4 further provides that the size and timeline of the correction shall be framed by predetermined rules, thereby limiting, though not entirely ruling out, the scope for discretion in devising a response to a significant budgetary deviation. In addition, a Member State is expected to restore the medium-term objective as fast as is reasonably possible, which generally means either in the year immediately following the occurrence of the deviation or the subsequent year. 4.2 The draft constitutional law specifies procedural steps in three layers of reporting, as described in paragraph 1.6 above. However, it does not stipulate the automatic triggering of the measures to be taken, but leaves it to the Government’s and the Parliament’s discretion. This is not in line with the above-mentioned provisions of the TSCG and Common Principle 4 . In particular, a correction mechanism that implements consolidation measures automatically, e.g. unless the Parliament vetoed them with a qualified majority, would provide a better guarantee of future fiscal stability. 4.3

text: Article 3(1)

text: (c) of the TSCG provides that in exceptional circumstances there may be temporary deviations from the medium-term objective or the adjustment path towards it. This would include an unusual event outside the control of the concerned Member State that has a major impact on the government’s financial position, or periods of severe economic downturn as defined in the Stability and Growth Pact, including at euro area level. Common Principle 6 makes it clear that any suspension of the correction mechanism due to the use of an escape clause may only be temporary. Once the escape clause no longer applies, the correction mechanism may provide for a minimum of structural adjustment, with the requirement of the Stability and Growth Pact being the lower limit. In addition, once the escape clause no longer applies, the Member State shall adopt a corrective plan in respect of the budget that must be adhered to during the correction period. 4.4 The escape clauses provided for in the draft constitutional law, as described in paragraph 1.5 above, go beyond the temporary deviations permitted by the TSCG ‘in exceptional circumstances’. In finalising the draft constitutional law, it should be ensured that escape clauses adhere to the concept of ‘exceptional circumstances’ laid down in

text: Article 3(3)

text: (b) of the TSCG and to the requirements of Common Principle 6.

text: 5. Medium-term objective

text: The ECB notes that

text: Article 3(1)

text: (b) of the TSCG requires Lithuania to ensure rapid convergence towards its medium-term objective. The timeframe for such convergence will be proposed by the Commission taking into consideration sustainability risks specific to Lithuania.

text: 6. Control institution

text: 6.1 The State Audit Office is designated as a control institution responsible for monitoring compliance with the rules laid down in the draft constitutional law. In this regard, the ECB notes that a control institution has to comply with criteria laid down in the Common Principles . 6.2 The ECB understands that fulfilment of the criteria under the Common Principles will be facilitated, inter alia, by recruiting independent experts both from Lithuania and abroad as provided for in the draft constitutional law . It should be ensured that the State Audit Office complies with all criteria laid down under the Common Principles, in order for it to effectively carry out the tasks of a control institution.

text: 7. Lietuvos bankas’ role

text: 7.1 As indicated by the ECB in recent opinions, the role of a national central bank (NCB) should not go beyond monitoring activities that result from or are linked – directly or indirectly – to the discharge of their monetary policy mandate . Ensuring compliance with the obligations under Article 3(1) of the TSCG is the responsibility of the Lithuanian government . 7.2 Lietuvos bankas is already producing macroeconomic projections as provided for in Article 9(3) of the draft constitutional law. These are made publicly available . The ECB understands that the draft constitutional law provides that Lietuvos bankas will merely forward its existing projections produced for monetary policy purposes to the control institution. Consequently, the draft constitutional law raises no concerns relating to compliance with the prohibition on monetary financing, to the principle of central bank independence or to interference with monetary policy. 7.3 In any event, even outside the scope of the draft constitutional law, Lietuvos bankas should retain its existing role regarding the production and quality control of government finance statistics in

text: accordance with

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 479/2009

text: , Guideline ECB/2013/23 on government finance statistics, and the memorandum of understanding on the cooperation between the members of the European Statistical System (ESS) and the members of the ESCB, dated 24 April 2013 . This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 30 April 2014. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42). 2 Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms (COM (2012) 280 final). 3 Proposal for a directive …/…/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on Deposit Guarantee Schemes (COM (2010) 368 final).

text: Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Bank Resolution Fund (COM (2013) 520 final). 5

text: Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013

text: conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63). 6 See Protocol (No 4) on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, p. 230).

text: See, for example, the ECB’s Convergence Report 2013, p. 27. 8 See Chapter 11,

text: Article 5

text: a, paragraph 4, of the proposed Law on credit institutions.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 2 May 2014 on the resolution of crises in the financial markets (CON/2014/31)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 2 May 2014 on the resolution of crises in the financial markets (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 27 March 2014, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Finnish Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft law on the resolution of credit institutions and investment firms, a draft law on the Financial Crisis Resolution Authority and several related draft laws (hereinafter ‘the draft laws’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third and sixth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft laws relate to Suomen Pankki and to rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft laws

text: 1.1 The main purpose of the draft laws is to introduce legislative changes in Finland relating to the Banking Union and in particular to implement the proposed Bank Recovery and Resolution 2 3 Directive (BRRD) and the proposed recast Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive (DGSD). The draft laws foresee the establishment of a new Resolution Authority and a new Deposit Guarantee and Resolution Fund, while the Financial Supervisory Authority (i.e. the national competent authority for banking supervision) will be given new ex-ante powers. Law No 379/1992 on the Government Guarantee Fund, which concerns public assistance, and Law No 986/2012 on the temporary bank levy would both be repealed. The funds raised by the bank levy will be transferred to the proposed Deposit Guarantee and Resolution Fund, which would be a fund outside the central government budget and managed by the Resolution Authority and, from 2016 onwards, could be

text: transferred to the Single Resolution Fund of the Member States participating in the Banking Union. It is intended that the draft laws will enter into force on 1 January 2015. 1.2 The Resolution Authority, the Ministry of Finance, the Financial Supervisory Authority and Suomen Pankki would be required to cooperate in the planning and preparation of crisis resolution measures outlined in the draft law on the resolution of credit institutions and investment firms, as well as in monitoring the decisions made. In addition to the general duty to cooperate, the draft laws propose that the Resolution Authority will be required to decide, in cooperation with the Financial Supervisory Authority and Suomen Pankki, whether payments are to be made from the Deposit Guarantee and Resolution Fund. The draft laws also contain several provisions concerning the duty of the Resolution Authority, the Financial Supervisory Authority and the Ministry of Finance to request Suomen Pankki’s opinion prior to making decisions and to notify Suomen Pankki of the decisions made. In addition, both the Resolution Authority and Suomen Pankki would have the duty to share with each other, without delay, any data in their possession concerning: (a) matters that may have a significant impact on the stability of the financial markets or otherwise on the development of the financial markets; and (b) matters that may result in significant disruption to the operation of the financial system or to the continuation of the operations of a credit institution or investment firm. 1.3 Moreover, the Resolution Authority would have an Advisory Committee consisting of representatives appointed by the Ministry of Finance on the proposals of the Resolution Authority, Suomen Pankki and the Financial Supervisory Authority. The Advisory Committee would have the task to ensure cooperation and communication between the said authorities. 1.4 Although Suomen Pankki would have a predominantly cooperative and consultative role in the resolution of credit institutions and investment firms, the draft laws propose that in a crisis situation the Resolution Authority’s staff could be increased through the temporary secondment of civil servants from the Ministry of Finance, Suomen Pankki or the Financial Supervisory Authority. A decision to second a civil servant would require the consent of the civil servant in question and would be made by the Government, on the proposal of the Director General of the Resolution Authority, after hearing the employer of the civil servant in question.

text: 2. General observations

text: The ECB notes that the Finnish authorities have decided in advance of the adoption of the BRRD and the DGSD to transpose provisions which they consider to be close to finalisation. The ECB understands that, once the BRRD is adopted, the framework established under the draft laws will be reviewed in order to ensure full consistency with any further developments at Union level. The ECB also notes that, whereas the draft laws take due account of the forthcoming Regulation on the

text: Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) and are intended to enter into force at the same time as that Regulation, there is a need to ensure consistency during the period after which the ECB has assumed its tasks under

text: Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013

text: but before all of the provisions of the proposed SRM Regulation are applicable (i.e. 1 January 2016). Hence, where appropriate, the draft laws should refer to the competent authority as including the ECB and not just the Financial Supervisory Authority.

text: 3. The Resolution Authority’s competence

text: The ECB notes that, once the SRM Regulation is applicable, the Resolution Authority will only be responsible for those institutions which are not under direct ECB supervision and are not cross-border institutions. However, it will not be limited in its tasks to such institutions. According to the proposed SRM Regulation, the Resolution Authority is to assist the Single Resolution Board (hereinafter ‘the Board’) in resolution planning and in preparing resolution decisions for banks under the Board’s responsibility. The Resolution Authority will also assist in the implementation of a resolution scheme established by the Board by exercising resolution powers and tools in relation to the entities in question. It is important that the Resolution Authority has adequate resources for its tasks, especially considering that, at times, there may be a lot of work to be done in a limited time frame and sometimes at short notice.

text: 4. Suomen Pankki’s involvement

text: The ECB understands that the tasks allocated to Suomen Pankki by the draft laws do not interfere with the performance of its Eurosystem-related tasks under the Treaty and do not prejudice the financial means necessary to carry out those tasks. Any involvement of Suomen Pankki or the members of its decisionmaking bodies in measures to strengthen financial stability must be compatible with the Treaty and, consequently, with Suomen Pankki’s institutional and financial independence and the personal independence of the members of its decision-making bodies safeguarding the proper performance of their tasks under the Treaty and the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank . The ECB welcomes the tasks allocated to Suomen Pankki under the draft laws, which are broadly consistent with its financial stability role. The ECB notes, as regards the secondment of Suomen Pankki staff to the Resolution Authority, that the draft laws require the consent of the civil servant concerned but that the employer will only be heard. The draft laws should also require Suomen Pankki’s consent in order to respect the principle of central bank independence, in particular the principle of financial independence. One aspect of the principle of financial independence is the autonomy of a national central bank (NCB) in staff matters which means,

text: inter alia, that an NCB may not be put into a position where it has limited control or no control over its staff, or where the Government of a Member State can influence its policy on staff matters .

text: 5. The ECB’s involvement as regards significant credit institutions

text: The draft law on the resolution of credit institutions and investment firms foresees arrangements for cooperation between the Financial Crisis Resolution Bureau (i.e. the national resolution authority) and the Financial Supervisory Authority in a number of circumstances. For instance, if the Financial Crisis Resolution Bureau considers that the preconditions for placing an institution under resolution management have been met, it is to take a decision to place the institution under resolution management after hearing the Financial Supervisory Authority on the matter (or after having received a notice from the Financial Supervisory Authority ). The ECB understands that the Financial Crisis Resolution Bureau will be competent for the resolution and planning of the resolution of institutions that do not fall within the scope of the proposed SRM Regulation. As a consequence, the Financial Supervisory Authority should only be heard in respect of institutions that are not directly supervised by the ECB. In this regard, the ECB notes that it will assume the supervisory tasks conferred on it by

text: Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013

text: on 4 November 2014. However, not all of the provisions of the proposed SRM Regulation will apply on its planned date of entry in force; certain provisions will only apply as of 1 January 2016. Therefore, there is a need to take into account the period between the date when the ECB assumes the direct supervision of credit institutions and the date of full application of the proposed SRM Regulation, as during this period elements of the draft law will apply to credit institutions under ECB supervision. In this period, the Financial Crisis Resolution Bureau should closely cooperate with the competent authority, including the ECB. Pursuant to Chapter 16, Article 2 of the draft law on the resolution of credit institutions and investment firms, the Ministry of Finance is to request an opinion from both Suomen Pankki and the Financial Supervisory Authority before placing limits on the operations of credit institutions. The ECB understands

text: that this is without prejudice to the cooperation to be undertaken with the ECB, as competent authority, once the ECB assumes its supervisory powers on 4 November 2014. This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 2 May 2014. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: Rådets beslut

text: av den 29 juni 1998 om nationella myndigheters samråd med Europeiska centralbanken rörande förslag till rättsregler (EGT L 189, 3.7.1998, s. 42).

sprak: sv

title: Europeiska centralbankens yttrande av den 5 maj 2014 om att vissa sedlar och mynt upphör att vara lagliga betalningsmedel (CON/2014/32)

text: EUROPEISKA CENTRALBANKENS YTTRANDE av den 5 maj 2014 om att vissa sedlar och mynt upphör att vara lagliga betalningsmedel (

text: ) Inledning och rättslig grund

text: Den 28 mars 2014 mottog Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) en begäran från Sveriges riksbank om ett yttrande över två relaterade lagförslag, dels ett lagförslag om vissa sedlars upphörande som lagliga betalningsmedel och dels ett lagförslag om vissa mynts upphörande som lagliga betalningsmedel (nedan tillsammans kallade lagförslagen). ECB:s behörighet att avge ett yttrande grundar sig på artiklarna

text: och

text: i fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt och artikel 2.1 andra strecksatsen i

text: rådets förordning (EG) nr 98/415

text: eftersom lagförslagen rör betalningsmedel. I enlighet med

text: artikel 17.5

text: första meningen i arbetsordningen för Europeiska centralbanken har detta yttrande antagits av ECB-rådet.

text: 1. Syftet med lagförslagen

text: Enligt lagförslagen ska de aktuella sedlarna med valörerna SEK 20, SEK 50 och SEK 1 000 upphöra som lagliga betalningsmedel vid utgången av juni 2016 och de aktuella sedlarna med valörerna SEK 100 och SEK 500 kommer att upphöra som lagliga betalningsmedel vid utgången av juni 2017. Därutöver stadgar förslagen att de nu gällande mynten med valörerna SEK 1, SEK 2 och SEK 5 ska upphöra som lagliga betalningsmedel vid utgången av juni 2017.

text: 2. Allmänna kommentarer

text: Sveriges riksbank började planeringen för att införa nya sedel- och myntserier 2010. De nya sedlarna och mynten kommer att introduceras i två steg. ECB har förstått att de första nya sedlarna med valörerna SEK 20, SEK 50, SEK 200 och SEK 1 000 kommer att ges ut i oktober 2015, och de nya sedlarna med valörerna SEK 100 och SEK 500 kommer att ges ut i oktober 2016. De aktuella versionerna av sedlar med samma valörer kommer att upphöra som lagliga betalningsmedel nio månader efter det att motsvarande nya sedelserier getts ut.

text: Mot bakgrund av den information som ECB erhållit har ECB förstått att den korta period under vilken både de aktuella och de nya sedlarna av samma valör är i omlopp parallellt har valts för att minimera onödiga kostnader för samhället. Av detta skäl har Sveriges riksbank försökt minimera den period då två sedelserier med samma valörer är i omlopp parallellt.

text: 3. Specifika kommentarer

text: Sveriges riksbank är behörig myndighet och har ensamrätt att ge ut sedlar och mynt samt besluta om utformningen av dessa, inklusive valet av valörer. ECB välkomnar att Sveriges riksbank haft en ingående dialog med kontantmarknadens aktörer och beaktat de synpunkter som bl.a. banker, handel och värdetransportföretag framfört när Riksbanken bestämt om längden på den övergångsperiod om nio månader efter vars utgång de sedlar och mynt som omnämns i punkt 2 ovan upphör som lagliga betalningsmedel. Trots att ECB anser att denna period är relativt kort så ser ECB fördelarna med att begränsa kostnaderna för alla berörda aktörer. ECB noterar att aktörerna själva förordat denna korta övergångsperiod. Enligt gällande svensk lagstiftning finns det heller ingen tidsmässig begränsning under vilken svenska sedlar och mynt kan lösas in av Sveriges Riksbank även efter det att de upphört vara lagliga betalningsmedel.

text: Detta yttrande kommer att offentliggöras på ECB:s webbplats.

text: Utfärdat i Frankfurt am Main den 5 maj 2014.

text: [Namnteckning]

text: Mario Draghi

text: ECB:s ordförande


text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).

text: The Principles for financial market infrastructures issued jointly by the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and the Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) (http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss101a.pdf).

text: The Principles for financial market infrastructures: disclosure framework and assessment methodology.

text: Press release of the ECB of 7 June 2013, announcing public consultation on a draft SIPS Regulation, available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: Paragraph 2.3 of the draft resolution.

text: Systemic risk is defined in Annex H of the CPSS-IOSCO principles as ‘the risk that the inability of one or more participants to perform as expected will cause other participants to be unable to meet their obligations when due’.

text: Every one to two years. 10 See paragraphs 14, 15 and 16.3 of the draft resolution. 12 Article 38(2) of Annex II to Guideline ECB/2012/27 of 5 December 2012 on a Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross settlement Express Transfer system (TARGET2) (OJ L 30, 30.1.2013, p. 1).

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 15 May 2014 on oversight of payment and securities settlement systems (CON/2014/33)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 15 May 2014 on oversight of payment and securities settlement systems (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 7 April 2014, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from Lietuvos bankas for an opinion on a draft resolution on the framework for the conduct of payment and securities settlement systems oversight (hereinafter the ‘draft resolution’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third and fifth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft resolution relates to Lietuvos bankas and payment and settlement systems. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft resolution

text: 1.1 The draft resolution recasts the framework for the conduct of payment and securities settlement systems oversight by Lietuvos bankas, which was approved by the Board of Lietuvos bankas in 2003. 1.2 The draft resolution aims to implement the Principles for financial market infrastructures (hereinafter the ‘CPSS-IOSCO principles’) and provide the basis for effective oversight of payment and securities settlement systems conducted by Lietuvos bankas. The draft resolution sets out the tasks that Lietuvos bankas carries out in performing systems oversight, namely: (1) registration of systems; (2) assessment of systemically important payment and securities settlement systems, performed on the basis of CPSS-IOSCO principles ; and (3) monitoring of systems. The draft resolution also contains provisions as regards cross-border cooperation in the field of systems oversight.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 The ECB understands that the draft resolution aims to mirror the core principles for systemically important payment systems included within the CPSS-IOSCO principles. Currently, the Eurosystem is in the process of drafting an ECB regulation on oversight requirements for systemically important payment systems (hereinafter the ‘SIPS Regulation’). The SIPS Regulation aims to implement the CPSS-IOSCO principles in the euro area in a legally binding way. It will define inter alia the criteria for qualifying a payment system as systemically important and will set requirements aimed at ensuring efficient management of legal, credit, liquidity, operational, general business, custody, investment and other risks. It will also set requirements for sound governance arrangements, objective and open access and the efficiency and effectiveness of systemically important payment systems. 2.2 Once adopted, the SIPS Regulation will be directly applicable in the euro area. Lithuania is a Member State with a derogation pursuant to Article 139 of the Treaty. Once Lithuania adopts the euro and Lietuvos bankas becomes a fully integrated member of the Eurosystem, the SIPS Regulation will also apply to Lietuvos bankas and amendments to the draft resolution will be required.

text: 3. Definition of systemic risk

text: The draft resolution defines systemic risk as ‘the probability that a failure of one or more system participants to meet its obligations and/or a disruption in the system itself will cause the inability of other system participants to meet their obligations, affect other systems and/or the financial market’ . This definition is constructed cumulatively and therefore is narrower than that included in the CPSS-IOSCO principles , since, under the draft resolution, for a risk to be considered systemic, the failure of a system participant to meet its obligations should not only cause other participants to be unable to meet their obligations, but also ‘affect other systems and/or the financial market’. In order to ensure consistency with the SIPS Regulation and the CPSS-IOSCO principles and a harmonised concept of systemic risk throughout the euro area, the draft resolution will need to be amended in this regard once the SIPS Regulation becomes applicable to Lietuvos bankas.

text: 4. Assessment of systems

text: 4.1 The draft resolution provides that the assessment of systems should be the assessment of ‘systems operation for its compliance with the CPSS-IOSCO principles’ . The ECB notes that payment and

text: settlement systems themselves, and not only systems operation, should be assessed against the CPSS-IOSCO principles, and recommends amending the draft resolution accordingly. 4.2 The ECB understands that Lietuvos bankas is also the competent authority to oversee central counterparties and systems operated by the central counterparties and recommends clarifying the draft resolution accordingly. 4.3 The draft resolution provides for the systems assessment to be performed every three years or when substantial changes to a system are made . The ECB notes that the SIPS Regulation will provide for a higher frequency of assessment . The draft resolution will need to be amended in this regard once the SIPS Regulation becomes applicable to Lietuvos bankas.

text: 5. Collection and sharing of information

text: 5.1 The draft resolution entitles Lietuvos bankas to determine the information ‘necessary for the conduct of systems monitoring’ and the frequency of such reporting . The ECB suggests that the draft resolution is amended to ensure that the data collected may be used for tasks of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) other than systems monitoring. 5.2 In the same vein, as regards ensuring confidentiality of the information ‘necessary for the conduct of systems oversight’ and the sharing of such information with the ECB and/or foreign competent authorities , the draft resolution should be amended, by analogy with the harmonised conditions provided for in Guideline ECB/2012/27 , to ensure that the information may also be shared with other central banks of the ESCB, to the extent that this is necessary for the efficient functioning of payment and securities settlement systems, or with supervisory and oversight authorities of Member States and the Union, to the extent that this is necessary for the performance of their public tasks.

text: 6. Organisational separation of operator and oversight functions

text: The ECB welcomes the fact that the draft resolution provides for organisational separation between the functions of Lietuvos bankas as payment systems operator and in the oversight of systems. This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 15 May 2014. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI