title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 8 July 2026 on increasing the cash payment limit for business-to-business transactions (CON/2026/22)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 8 July 2026 on increasing the cash payment limit for business-to-business transactions (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 11 May 2026 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Marshal of the Polish Parliament for an opinion on a draft law amending, inter alia, the Law on entrepreneurs (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 2(1), second indent, of

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft law relates to means of payment. In addition,

text: Article 80(1)

text: and (2) of

text: Regulation (EU) 2024/1624

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council provide that persons trading in goods or providing services may accept or make a payment in cash only up to an amount of EUR 10 000 or the equivalent in national or foreign currency, whether the transaction is carried out in a single operation or in several operations which appear to be linked, and that Member States may adopt lower limits following consultation of the ECB in accordance with

text: Article 2(1) of Decision 98/415/EC

text: . In accordance with

text: Article 17.5

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The purpose of the draft law is to increase the limit below which payments for business to business (B2B) transactions may be made in cash. 1.2 Under the existing provisions of the Law on entrepreneurs, payments related to the economic activity of an entrepreneur are to be made or received via the entrepreneur's payment account whenever: (a) a party to the transaction from which the payment results is another entrepreneur, and (b) the one-off value of the transaction, irrespective of the number of payments involved, exceeds Polish zloty (PLN) 15 000 or the equivalent of this amount, with transactions in foreign currencies converted into PLN at the average exchange rate announced by Narodowy Bank Polski (NBP) on the last working day preceding the date of the transaction. The draft law amends these provisions by increasing the PLN 15 000 limit (equivalent to approximately EUR 3 500) to PLN 25 000 (equivalent to approximately EUR 5 800). Under the draft law, the limit above which B2B payments must be

text: 1 Ustawa z dnia 6 marca 2018 r. Prawo przedsiębiorców, Dz.U.2025.1480.

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/1998/415/oj).

text: Regulation (EU) 2024/1624

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2024 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing (OJ L 2024/1624, 19.6.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1624/oj). routed through a payment account would accordingly be raised to PLN 25 000, irrespective of the number of partial payments arising from a single transaction. Payments made after the date of entry into force of the draft law would be governed by the increased limit, even where those payments arise from transactions concluded before that date. 1.3 According to the explanatory memorandum accompanying the draft law (hereinafter the ‘explanatory memorandum’), the B2B cash payment limit of PLN 15 000 has been frozen at the same nominal level since the Law on entrepreneurs entered into force in 2018. Due to nominal price increases since 2018, transactions that used to be routine and low risk now fall within mandatory cashless payment requirements or become subject to formal banking obligations, or severe tax sanctions. According to the explanatory memorandum, this situation has worsened the liquidity of the smallest enterprises and increased their transaction costs, with over 2.3 million micro, small and mediumsized enterprises representing 99,8 % of all businesses in Poland) currently affected. Therefore, the draft law is intended to restore the constitutional balance and ensure that administrative burdens are proportionate to the public objective of preventing tax fraud and money laundering. 1.4 According to the explanatory memorandum, the increased limit proposed is based on a compound inflation calculation using data published by the Central Statistical Office and projections of NBP. The cumulative loss of purchasing power since 2018 is calculated to be approximately 60 %, yielding an inflation-adjusted equivalent of PLN 23 961, rounded up to PLN 25 000 in accordance with legislative drafting rules and to provide a buffer against any immediate further loss of purchasing power. 1.5 According to the explanatory memorandum, the draft law’s amendments have far-reaching, cascading effects on a number of other laws such as the Law on personal income tax , the Law on flat-rate income tax on certain income received by natural persons and the Law on corporate income tax . 1.6 The draft law provides that it shall enter into force on 1 January 2027.

text: 2. Role and importance of cash payments in society

text: 2.1 As the ECB has noted previously, cash plays an important role in society. Cash is generally useful as a payment instrument because it is legal tender, widely accepted, fast and facilitates control over the payer’s spending. Moreover, it is currently the only payment instrument that allows citizens to settle a transaction instantly and directly between two parties in central bank money, while ensuring privacy . Cash payments facilitate the inclusion of the entire population in the economy by allowing

text: 4 Ustawa z dnia 26 lipca 1991 r. o podatku dochodowym od osób fizycznych (Dz.U. z 2026 r. poz. 592).

text: 5 Ustawa z dnia 20 listopada 1998 r. o zryczałtowanym podatku dochodowym od niektórych przychodów osiąganych przez osoby fizyczne (Dz.U. z 2025 r. poz. 843, z późn. zm.).

text: 6 Ustawa z dnia 15 lutego 1992 r. o podatku dochodowym od osób prawnych (Dz.U. z 2026 r. poz. 554).

text: 7 See, for example, paragraph 2.4 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 9.2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 7.2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 1.8 of Opinion

text: of the European Central Bank of 13 October 2023 on a proposal for a regulation on the legal tender of euro banknotes and coins (OJ C, C/2023/1355, 1.12.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/1355/oj), paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.5 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: , and it to settle any kind of financial transaction in this way, thus ensuring freedom of choice as to the method of payment for all citizens .The ability to pay in cash remains particularly important for those who, for various legitimate reasons, prefer to use physical money for payments rather than other payment instruments, or do not have access to the banking system and electronic means of payment. These groups include not only elderly people but also people with disabilities, immigrants, socially vulnerable people, minors and others with limited or no access to digital payment services . Given the high relevance of cash for citizens and the wide use of cash as a means of payment, it is also important that businesses can effectively use cash in their transactions with other businesses. 2.2 Furthermore, cash may play an important role in the event of a disturbance in the payment system and it is robust against cybercrime and power outages as it guarantees person-to-person payment transactions in such situations. Cash also has an important function as a store of value. The availability and accessibility of cash and its fallback function in case of disruptions to electronic payment systems contribute to trust in the financial system, which is important for the smooth functioning of monetary policy . 2.3 Against this backdrop, the ECB closely monitors any national law developments that aim to put a limit on cash payments which, as a result, interfere with citizens' or entrepreneurs’ right to pay in cash.

text: 3. Limits on cash payments in Member States with a derogation

text: 3.1 In Poland, PLN cash is legal tender, meaning that an obligation exists to accept PLN banknotes and coins as a means of payment or store of value. However, as noted in the explanatory memorandum, exceptions to this obligation can be made in legislation. 3.2 Although Member States with a derogation, including Poland, do not yet participate in the third stage of economic and monetary union, they have a legal duty to adapt the statutes of their national central banks (NCBs) to ensure compatibility with the Treaty and the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter the ‘Statute of the ESCB’). Any legislative reform in any such Member State should aim to gradually achieve consistency with ESCB

text: paragraph 2.1 of

text: . All ECB opinions are published on EUR-Lex.

text: 8 See paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , and paragraph 2.1 of

text: 9 See, for example, paragraph 2.4 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 9.2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 7.2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 1.7 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.4 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.5 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: , and paragraph 2.2 of

text: 10 See, for example, paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 9.2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.4 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.5 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: , and paragraph 2.1 of

text: 11 See, for example, paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.4 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.5 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: , and paragraph 2.1 of

text: 12 See, for example, paragraph 2.2 of Opinions

text: , paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.5 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.5 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: , and paragraph 2.1 of

text: 13 See Article 131 of the Treaty. standards . Furthermore, although Union law only regulates the legal tender status of euro banknotes and coins, the Union framework applicable to the legal tender status of euro banknotes and coins will become directly applicable in Poland if and when the euro is introduced in Poland. Against this institutional backdrop, the ECB has prepared an assessment of the draft law’s provisions compared with relevant practices in the euro area, in particular as concerns the legal tender status of euro banknotes. 3.3 The ECB has the exclusive right to authorise the issue of euro banknotes within the Union, and the euro banknotes issued by the ECB and the NCBs of the euro area are the only banknotes with legal tender status within the euro area . The legal tender status of euro coins is provided for in secondary Union law . 3.4 The concept of ‘legal tender’ as a means of payment denominated in a currency unit has been considered by the Court of Justice of the European Union. In particular, the Court of Justice clarified that the concept of ‘legal tender’ signifies that this specific means of payment cannot generally be refused in settlement of a debt, denominated in the same currency unit at its full-face value, with the effect of discharging the debt. In clarifying the concept of ‘legal tender’ under Union law, the Court of Justice took into consideration

text: Commission Recommendation 2010/191/EU

text: , which provides useful guidance for the interpretation of the relevant provisions of Union law. Point 1 of Recommendation 2010/191 states that, where a payment obligation exists, the legal tender of euro banknotes and coins should imply: (a) mandatory acceptance of those banknotes and coins; (b) their acceptance at full face value; and (c) their power to discharge from payment obligations. According to the Court of Justice, this shows that the concept of ‘legal tender’ encompasses, inter alia, an obligation in principle to accept banknotes and coins denominated in euro for payment purposes . 3.5 However, the Court of Justice further clarified that the status of legal tender calls only for acceptance in principle of banknotes and coins denominated in euro as a means of payment, not for absolute acceptance. The Union’s exclusive competence in matters of monetary policy is without prejudice to the competence of the Member States whose currency is the euro to regulate the procedures for settling pecuniary obligations, provided, in particular, that the legislation does not affect the principle that, as a general rule, it must be possible to discharge a payment obligation in cash. Thus, that exclusive competence does not prevent a Member State from adopting a measure falling within one of the Member State’s competences. For instance, a Member State may, based on its competence to organise its public administration, oblige the public administration to accept cash payments from citizens. Neither does it prevent a Member State, in the exercise of its own powers, from introducing, on legitimate public interest grounds, a derogation from that obligation for statutorily imposed payments, subject to compliance with certain conditions. In particular, the obligation to accept euro

text: 14 See paragraph 3.4 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 4.2.1 of Opinion

text: Article 11 of Council Regulation (EC) No 974/98 of 3 May 1998

text: on the introduction of the euro (OJ L 139, 11.5.1998, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/1998/974/oj).

text: Commission Recommendation 2010/191/EU of 22 March 2010

text: on the scope and effects of legal tender of euro banknotes and coins (OJ L 83, 30.3.2010, p. 70, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reco/2010/191/oj).

text: 18 See judgment of the Court of Justice of 26 January 2021, Hessischer Rundfunk,

text: and

text: , ECLI:EU:C:2021:63, paragraphs 46 to 49. banknotes and coins may, in principle, be restricted by the Member States for reasons of public interest and subject to the principle of proportionality. This means that any such restrictions must be proportionate to the public interest objective pursued. When limiting the possibility, recognised by Union law, of generally discharging a payment obligation in banknotes and coins denominated in euro, Member States must ensure that all measures comply with the principle of proportionality, which requires in particular that they are appropriate for achieving the legitimate objectives pursued by the legislation at issue and do not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives . 3.6 The Court of Justice has established that restrictions of the legal tender status of euro banknotes in particular require that the legislation (a) does not have the object or effect of establishing legal rules governing the status of legal tender of euro banknotes; (b) does not lead, in law or in fact, to abolition of those banknotes, in particular by calling into question the possibility, as a general rule, of discharging a payment obligation in cash; (c) has been adopted for reasons of public interest; (d) only entails a limitation on cash payments that is appropriate for attaining the public interest objective pursued; and (e) only entails a limitation on cash payments that does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve the public interest objective . 3.7 Regarding the proportionality of a restriction of the legal tender status of euro banknotes, the Court requires not only that the measure is appropriate for attaining the public interest objective pursued, but also that it must not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve that objective. The ECB has undertaken additional reflection in its opinions with respect to whether limitations may be considered proportionate . In particular, the ECB has noted that the broader and more general a limitation is, the stricter the interpretation of the proportionality requirement should be. When considering whether a limitation is proportionate, the adverse impact of the limitation in question and whether alternative measures capable of fulfilling the relevant objective with a less adverse impact should always be considered . 3.8 The Court of Justice has clarified that the concept of ‘legal tender’ is a concept of Union law that must be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the Union . It has also established that Article 133 of the Treaty empowers the Union legislature alone to specify the legal rules governing the status of legal tender accorded to banknotes and coins denominated in euro, insofar as that is necessary for the use of the euro as the single currency. Furthermore, the Union legislature’s exclusive competence precludes any competence on the part of the Member States in the matter, unless they have been empowered by the Union to do so or for the implementation of Union acts . In this respect, the ECB notes that, on 28 June 2023, the Commission published a

text: 19 See judgment of the Court of Justice of 26 January 2021, Hessischer Rundfunk,

text: and

text: , ECLI:EU:C:2021:63, paragraphs 55 to 56 and 67 to 70.

text: 20 See judgment of the Court of Justice of 26 January 2021, Hessischer Rundfunk,

text: and

text: , ECLI:EU:C:2021:63, paragraph 78.

text: 21 See paragraph 4 of Opinion

text: of the European Central Bank of 16 February 2022 on a proposal for a directive and a regulation on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing (OJ C 210, 25.5.2022, p. 15).

text: 22 See paragraph 2.7 of Opinion

text: , and paragraphs 2.8 and 2.9 of Opinion

text: 23 See judgment of the Court of Justice of 26 January 2021, Hessischer Rundfunk,

text: and

text: , ECLI:EU:C:2021:63, paragraph 45.

text: 24 See judgment of the Court of Justice of 26 January 2021, Hessischer Rundfunk,

text: and

text: , proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the legal tender of euro banknotes and coins (hereinafter the ‘proposed regulation on the legal tender of euro cash’), which will establish rules on the legal tender of euro banknotes and coins in binding Union secondary law The explanatory memorandum accompanying the proposed regulation on the legal tender of euro cash states that discussions within the Euro Legal Tender Expert Group (ELTEG) confirmed the existence of legal uncertainty regarding the legal tender of euro cash and differing application of its principles in the euro area . These differences would justify establishing rules on the legal tender of euro cash in a regulation adopted under Article 133 of the Treaty.

text: 4. Specific observations

text: The ECB welcomes the proposed increased limit of PLN 25 000 on cash payments for B2B transactions with the intention of preserving the function of cash as legal tender, remaining proportionate to the objectives of preventing tax fraud and money laundering .

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 8 July 2026.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Christine LAGARDE

text: ECLI:EU:C:2021:63, paragraphs 50 to 52.

text: 25 COM (2023) 364 final.

text: 26 See section 3 on page 4 of the explanatory memorandum accompanying the proposed regulation on the legal tender of euro cash and Principle 6 of the final report of ELTEG of 6 July 2022, available on the Commission’s website at www.ec.europa.eu. See also Opinion

text: 27 See paragraph 3.3 of Opinion


publisher: Europeiska centralbanken

sprak: en

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 28 July 2026 on the Polish Defence Investment Fund (CON/2026/23)

serie: con

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 28 July 2026 on the Polish Defence Investment Fund (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

type: rubrik

text: On 15 April 2026 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Marshal of the Polish Parliament for an opinion on two alternative draft laws on the Polish Defence Investment Fund : a draft law submitted by the President of Poland on 10 March 2026 (hereinafter the ‘presidential draft law’), and a draft law submitted by a group of Members of the Polish Parliament on 24 March 2026 (hereinafter the ‘parliamentary draft law’, and together with the presidential draft law, the ‘draft laws’). On 14 July 2026 the Marshal confirmed to the ECB that he maintains his request of 15 April 2026 for an opinion on the draft laws. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 2(1), third indent, of

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft laws concern Narodowy Bank Polski (NBP). In accordance with

text: Article 17.5

text: , first sentence, of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

type: stycke

text: 1. Purpose of the draft laws

text: 1.1 The draft laws establish the Polish Defence Investment Fund (hereinafter the ‘Fund’) as a specialpurpose public fund administered by Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego (BGK), Poland’s wholly Stateowned development bank. As noted in the explanatory memoranda accompanying the draft laws (hereinafter the ‘explanatory memoranda’), BGK was selected due to its experience in managing statutory funds and its operational capacity in areas such as cash pooling, accounting, debt servicing and liquidity management. 1.2 The Fund's primary purpose is to finance the technical modernisation of the Polish Armed Forces and other tasks aimed at strengthening national security. Expenditure is to be governed by a multiannual defence investment programme (hereinafter the ‘Multiannual Programme’) prepared by the Minister for National Defence and adopted by the Fund's governing bodies. The Multiannual Programme is to cover a period of at least three years and set out the timetable, priorities and expenditure limits for all tasks financed from the Fund. 1.3 The draft laws provide that the Fund is to be financed from: (a) payments from NBP’s annual profit

text: 1 Ustawa o Polskim Funduszu Inwestycji Obronnych.

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/1998/415/oj). pursuant to the amended Article 69(4) of the Law on NBP ; (b) loans and bonds issued by BGK on domestic and foreign markets; (c) interest on the Fund’s deposited cash resources; and (d) other sources. The draft laws provide that if the amount of the payment made by NBP to the Fund in a given financial year is lower than the amount provided for that year in the Multiannual Programme, BGK is to grant the Fund a loan reflecting the difference between these amounts, which is to be repaid from funds of the Fund derived from payments of the profits of NBP made in subsequent financial years. 1.4 The context for the NBP profit distribution mechanism is set out in both explanatory memoranda, noting that, according to a concept jointly presented by the President of Poland and the Governor of NBP on 4 March 2026, NBP’s profit resulting from, inter alia, the rising market valuation of Poland’s gold reserves is to be directed to the Fund. Both memoranda further note that NBP has increased its gold reserves to over 550 tonnes in recent years and that the sharp rise in global gold prices means that Poland holds substantial reserve assets that could support defence modernisation. 1.5 The draft laws are broadly similar in structure and share the same underlying objective, but differ on (a) the minimum level of the NBP profit payment to the Fund; (b) the composition and voting rules of the Fund's governing bodies; and (c) the degree of presidential control over the Fund’s strategic decisions. 1.6 In particular, the presidential draft law replaces Article 69(4) of the Law on NBP with a requirement that part of NBP’s annual profit is to be transferred to the Fund within 14 days of the date of approval of NBP’s annual accounts, without specifying any minimum proportion. The parliamentary draft law replaces Article 69(4) of the Law on NBP with a requirement that part of NBP’s annual profit is to be transferred to the Fund and explicitly stipulates that, for the years 2026 to 2035, the amount of the transfer may not be less than nine-tenths of the annual profit. 1.7 Both draft laws address the scenario in which NBP profits are insufficient to meet the financing needs under the Multiannual Programme. In such cases, BGK would be required to grant the Fund a loan equivalent to the shortfall, guaranteed by the State Treasury and to be repaid from funds of the Fund derived from payments of the profits of NBP. A similar mechanism would apply in the period between the entry into force of the draft laws and the first NBP profit payment for 2026. 1.8 The regulatory impact assessment attached to the parliamentary draft law identifies several elements that depart from the standard model of State financial management, including the statutory earmarking of NBP profit for the Fund, the possibility of incurring significant multiannual liabilities, the bridging loan and BGK loan mechanisms, and the State Treasury guarantee. The regulatory impact assessment also highlights a constitutional risk in the light of Article 227 of the Polish Constitution, which governs NBP’s institutional position and independence as the State’s central bank, as well as a material economic risk arising from the reliance of a significant portion of the Fund's financing on NBP profits, which are inherently volatile and not fully predictable. 1.9 Both explanatory memoranda present the Fund as an option vis-à-vis the Union’s Security Action for

text: 3 Ustawa z dnia 29 sierpnia 1997 r. o Narodowym Banku Polskim (consolidated text: Dziennik Ustaw z 2022 r., poz. 2025). Article 69(4) of the Law on NBP provides that within 14 days from the date of approval of the annual financial statements of NBP, part of NBP’s annual profit (payment from NBP’s profit) is transferred to the State budget. Europe (‘SAFE’) programme, though the presidential draft law frames it as a full sovereign substitute, while the parliamentary draft law treats it as complementary to SAFE.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 This opinion examines the provisions of the draft laws in the light of their context, specifically the scheme established for financing the Fund, which involves an amendment of the Law on NBP concerning NBP’s finances. 2.2 Background context of the draft laws On 4 March 2026 the President of the Republic of Poland and the Governor of NBP issued a joint statement on a concrete, Polish, secure and sovereign alternative to SAFE that would entail no financial interest costs whatsoever. The ECB notes the Governor of NBP’s statement to the effect that NBP had developed a concept to support Poland’s defence efforts and the Governor of NBP’s further statement, on 5 March 2026, that NBP would generate a very large profit using standard methods, without depleting the reserves, ensuring that the initiative serves solely to strengthen Poland’s defence . 2.3 Source of NBP’s profits to be transferred to the Fund 2.3.1 The ECB notes that in line with the prevailing European System of Central Banks (ESCB) accounting standards established in Guideline

text: (EU) 2024/2941

text: of the European Central Bank (ECB/2024/31) , to which NBP accounting principles should conform pursuant to the Law on NBP , the rising market valuation of NBP’s gold reserves has resulted in an increase in NBP’s revaluation accounts. In these circumstances, sales of gold would result in realised gains, impacting on NBP’s profit and loss account for the relevant financial year. At the same time, the transfer of these gains to the Fund would reduce NBP’s net equity, which currently benefits from the unrealised gains generated by the increase in the market price of gold. 2.3.2 The ECB also notes that NBP has reported losses, not profits, since 2022. The amount of these 8 9 accumulated losses is such that NBP would have to make significant sales of gold to offset them .

text: 3. Specific observations

text: 3.1 Principle of central bank independence 3.1.1 As reflected in the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the authors of the Treaty intended to ensure that the ESCB should be in a position to carry out independently the tasks

text: 4 Office of the President of the Republic of Poland, Conference on the ‘Polish SAFE 0%’, 4 March 2026, available on the official website of the President of the Republic of Poland at www.president.pl.

text: 5 National Bank of Poland, Press conference of NBP Governor Adam Glapiński on the financing of defence needs and the ‘Polish SAFE 0%’ initiative, video transmission, 11 March 2026, available on NBP’s website at www.nbp.pl.

text: 6 Guideline

text: (EU) 2024/2941

text: of the European Central Bank of 14 November 2024 on the legal framework for accounting and financial reporting in the European System of Central Banks (ECB/2024/31) (OJ L, 2024/2941, 11.12.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/guideline/2024/2941/oj).

text: 7 Article 67 of the Law on NBP.

text: 8 Uncovered losses of previous financial years amounted to PLN -97,2 billion of which PLN -35,7 billion occurred in 2025.

text: 9 Gold revaluation gains as at end-2025 stood at PLN 139,7 billion. conferred upon it . The main evidence of that intention is set out in Article 130 of the Treaty, which expressly prohibits the ECB, the national central banks (NCBs), and the members of their decisionmaking bodies from seeking or taking instructions from Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, from any government of a Member State or from any other body, on the one hand, and prohibits those Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies and any government of a Member State from seeking to influence the members of the decision-making bodies of the ECB and the NCBs in the performance of their tasks, on the other. 3.1.2 Taking into account the NCBs’ hybrid status, the Court of Justice clarified that the principle of central bank independence does not necessarily apply in the same way when NCBs carry out tasks within the scope of the ESCB compared to when they perform tasks outside that scope . Specifically, this includes tasks assigned to them under national law which, in the case of Member States with a derogation, have not yet been conferred on the Union, such as the management of foreign reserves. However, as highlighted by the Court of Justice, the national rules established for that purpose cannot, without infringing Article 130 of the Treaty, place the NCB concerned in a situation which in any way undermines its ability to carry out independently tasks within the scope of the ESCB . 3.1.3 Based on the reference in the explanatory memoranda to operations involving NBP’s gold reserves for the purpose of supporting defence modernisation, the ECB understands that such operations would not be driven by considerations relating to NBP’s task of managing foreign reserves. These gold operations are rather aimed at generating profits to finance the Fund. 3.1.4 Considering the functional nature of Article 130 of the Treaty, the ECB notes that to ensure that NBP is in a position to act independently in pursuit of its objectives and in performing its tasks within the scope of the ESCB, the members of NBP’s decision-making bodies must not seek instructions from the government or from any other body to undertake operations involving NBP’s gold reserves for the purpose of financing the Fund. Likewise, the government must respect the principle of central bank independence and not seek to influence the members of NBP’s decision-making bodies to undertake operations involving NBP’s gold reserves for the purpose of financing the Fund. 3.1.5 Member States may not hamper NCBs from building up their reserve capital to the level necessary for a member of the ESCB to fulfil its tasks . Such obstruction would occur if NBP was required to transfer to the Fund the profits generated from realised gains on gold sales without first covering its accumulated losses and creating adequate financial provisions to safeguard the real value of its capital and assets. In respect of the allocation of profits, the ECB has consistently held that profits may be distributed to the State budget only after any accumulated losses from previous years have been covered and financial provisions deemed necessary to safeguard the real value of the NCB’s

text: 10 Judgment of 26 February 2019, Rimšēvičs and ECB v Latvia,

text: and

text: , ECLI:EU:C:2019:139, paragraph 46; Judgment of 13 September 2022, Banka Slovenije,

text: , ECLI:EU:C:2022:670, paragraph 93.

text: 11 Judgment of 13 September 2022, Banka Slovenije,

text: , ECLI:EU:C:2022:670, paragraph 95.

text: 12 Judgment of 13 September 2022, Banka Slovenije,

text: , ECLI:EU:C:2022:670, paragraph 97.

text: 13 See, for example, paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 3.3.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1.3 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.6 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 13.3.6 of Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on EUR-Lex. capital and assets have been created . Hence, a transfer of profits to the Fund without first covering NBP’s accumulated losses would not be in line with the financial dimension of the principle of central bank independence. 3.1.6 In addition, the requirement under the draft laws for repayment of BGK’s loan from funds of the Fund derived from payments of the profits of NBP could – particularly where NBP profits were insufficient to meet the financing needs under the Multiannual Programme – further hinder NBP from building up its reserve capital to the level necessary to fulfil its tasks within the scope of the ESCB. 3.2 Monetary financing prohibition 3.2.1 As reflected in the case-law of the Court of Justice, Article 131 of the Treaty expressly requires each Member State to ensure that its national legislation, including its NCB’s statutes, is compatible with the Treaties. The standards which are binding on the Member States on that basis include, in particular, Article 123 of the Treaty . Article 123 of the Treaty prohibits the central banks of the Member States from granting any type of credit facility to public authorities and bodies of the Member States. Based on

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93

text: , which seeks to define the scope of the monetary financing prohibition, this includes the central bank assuming obligations vis-à-vis third parties which could potentially be incumbent on other public authorities and bodies . Considering the objective of Article 123 of the Treaty, the central bank could thus not validly be responsible, in place of the other public authorities and bodies, for the effective financing of obligations vis-à-vis third parties which might result from the economic policy choices made by those public authorities . 3.2.2 It is apparent from the above that, with a view to maintaining the impetus for a sound budgetary policy, the monetary financing prohibition does not allow an NCB to assume the financing of public expenditure, such as expenditure for defence policy. 3.2.3 While gains resulting from the central bank’s management of gold reserves may generally have a positive impact on the financial result to be distributed to the State budget through the ordinary profit distribution mechanism, the relevant provisions on NBP finances must be compatible with Article 123 of the Treaty . 3.2.4 The draft laws, which include an amendment to Article 69(4) of the Law on NBP, provide for the Fund to be primarily financed from transfers from the annual profit of NBP. NBP would therefore in effect be primarily responsible for the financing of the Fund and therefore assume – contrary to the objective of the monetary financing prohibition – responsibility for the financing of economic policy choices made by public authorities and bodies relating to the technical modernisation of the Polish Armed

text: 14 See paragraph 4.3 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 3.2.5 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 3.8 of Opinion

text: 15 Judgment of 13 September 2022, Banka Slovenije,

text: , ECLI:EU:C:2022:670, paragraphs 58 and 59.

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 of 13 December 1993

text: specifying definitions for the application of the prohibitions referred to in Articles

text: and

text: b (1) of the Treaty (OJ L 332, 31.12.1993, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/1993/3603/oj).

text: 17 Judgment of 13 September 2022, Banka Slovenije,

text: , ECLI:EU:C:2022:670, paragraph 67.

text: 18 Judgment of 13 September 2022, Banka Slovenije,

text: , ECLI:EU:C:2022:670, paragraphs 72 to 75.

text: 19 See paragraph 3.6 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.8 of Opinion

text: . Forces and other tasks aimed at strengthening national security. Sales of NBP’s gold reserves aimed at generating profits to be transferred to the Fund would constitute a circumvention of the prohibition under Article 123 of the Treaty which precludes central bank financing of public expenditure. This opinion will be published on EUR-Lex. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 28 July 2026. [signed] The President of the ECB Christine LAGARDE

type: vagledning

utgivare: ecb


text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/1998/415/oj).

text: For this purpose, section 2 of the draft law defines the RST as the trust established in accordance with Article V, Section 2(b), of the Articles of Agreement of the IMF pursuant to Decision No. 17231-(22/37) of the Executive Board of the IMF taken on 13 April 2022.

text: Section 6(1) and 6(2) of the draft law. 7 Section 6(4) and (6) of the draft law. 9 See Part 3 of the draft law. 11 See International Monetary Fund, IMF Executive Board Approves Establishment of the Resilience and Sustainability Trust (13 April 2022). See also paragraph 1.1 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 1.2 of Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on EUR-Lex.

text: specifying definitions for the application of the prohibitions referred to in Articles referred to in Articles

text: and

text: (b)(1) of the Treaty, OJ L 332, 31.12.1993, p. 1., ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/1993/3603/oj). 13 Consistent with this interpretation, see Opinions

text: and

text: . 14 See International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual (White Cover (preedited) Version, seventh edn., 2025), Chapter 6, Section F, p. 265. 15 See also paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: . 16 See section 6 of the Borrowing Agreement and section 8 of the Deposit Agreement included in the template Contribution Agreement accompanying the draft law. See also paragraph 2.4 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.4 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 3.2.1 of

text: . 17 See also Opinions

text: and

text: . 18 Under the financial dimension of central bank independence, Member States may not put their NCBs in a position where they have insufficient financial resources to carry out their ESCB or Eurosystem-related tasks required of them under the Treaty. See ECB Convergence Report 2026, paragraph 2.2.3.5. 19 See also Opinions

text: and

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 12 August 2026 on Ireland's participation in the International Monetary Fund’s Resilience and Sustainability Trust (CON/2026/24)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 12 August 2026 on Ireland's participation in the International Monetary Fund’s Resilience and Sustainability Trust (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 8 July 2026 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Irish Minster for Finance (hereinafter the ‘Minister’) for an opinion on the Finance (International Financial Institutions) Bill 2026 (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 2(1), third indent, of

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft law relates to the Central Bank of Ireland (CBI). In accordance with

text: Article 17.5

text: , first sentence, of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The primary objective of the draft law is to provide for Ireland’s participation in the Resilience and Sustainability Trust (RST) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) . 1.2 Agreement between the CBI and the IMF to transfer special drawing rights (SDRs) to the RST loan and

text: deposit accounts

text: The draft law provides that the CBI may enter into an agreement with the IMF on behalf of the Irish State for the purposes of transferring SDRs held by the CBI to the RST (a) on loan to the loan account of the RST and (b) on deposit to the deposit account of the RST . The draft law specifies that the amount of SDRs to which such agreement may apply is set at SDR 551 095 665 for the loan and SDR 110 219 133 for the deposit . For this purpose, the draft law is accompanied by a template contribution agreement between contributors and the IMF for participation in the RST. 1.3 Agreement between the Minister and the IMF to make grants to the RST’s reserve account The draft law authorises the Minister to enter into an agreement with the IMF on behalf of the Irish State to make a grant to the reserve account of the RST and sets the limit (EUR 15 million) for such grant . The template contribution agreement may be used for this purpose.

text: 1.4 Guarantee by the Minister in respect of SDRs transferred by the CBI to the RST loan and deposit

text: accounts

text: The draft law authorises the Minister, following consultation with the CBI, to guarantee the payment to the CBI up to the value of any SDRs loaned or deposited by the CBI to the RST pursuant to the draft law, as well as any interest payable under the agreement with the IMF, payable out of the State’s central fund . The draft sets out further parameters in respect of the guarantee and obligations on the CBI, including that the guarantee shall include provision for repayment to the Minister by the CBI, if the CBI recovers SDRs or interest, and a continuing obligation on the CBI to use all reasonable means to recover such SDRs and interest . 1.5 The CBI’s reporting obligations to the Minister The draft law sets out annual reporting obligations of the CBI to the Minister in relation to, inter alia, amounts of SDRs loaned or deposited to the RST over the past two-year period, outstanding SDRs on loan or deposit, and any guarantee payments and repayments as well as any recovery efforts in respect of such guarantee payments . 1.6 Ireland’s membership of the IMF The draft law also amends the legislation that underpins Ireland’s membership of a number of international financial institutions, including the IMF, so that amendments to the articles of any agreement or convention of those institutions that are technical or administrative in nature, or that have already been approved by a decision of the Union, or that do not raise a charge on public funds, can be approved by way of resolution to Dáil Éireann (the Irish House of Representatives), rather than by way of a primary legislative amendment . 1.7 Miscellaneous provisions The draft law repeals an existing provision of Irish law dating from 1999 which provides for the Minister to guarantee the participation by the CBI in a credit facility of the Bank of International Settlements in favour of Banco Central do Brasil .

text: 2. General observation

text: 2.1 The RST was established by the IMF in May 2022. It is a loan-based trust. The RST resources are mobilised on a voluntary basis from members with strong external positions that wish to channel their SDRs or currencies to support low-income and vulnerable middle-income countries regarding longerterm structural challenges that entail significant macroeconomic risks, such as climate change and pandemic preparedness .

text: 3. Monetary financing prohibition

text: 3.1 Prohibition on granting credit facilities to public authorities Article 123(1) of the Treaty prohibits the national central banks (NCBs) from granting overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facility to public authorities and bodies of the Member States. When specifying definitions for the application of this prohibition,

text: Article 1(1)

text: , point (b), of

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93

text: defines the concept of credit facility inter alia as ‘any financing of the public sector’s obligations vis-à-vis third parties’ or ‘any transaction with the public sector resulting or likely to result in a claim against that sector’. Further, the monetary financing prohibition is subject to certain exemptions contained in

text: Regulation (EC) No 3603/93

text: . In particular,

text: Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 3603/93

text: provides that the financing by NCBs of obligations falling upon the public sector vis-à-vis the IMF is not regarded as a credit facility within the meaning of Article 123 of the Treaty. The fourteenth recital of

text: Regulation (EC) No 3603/93

text: clarifies the rationale behind this exemption, stating that it is appropriate to authorise the financing by the NCBs of obligations falling upon the public sector vis-à-vis the IMF because such financing ‘results in foreign claims which have all the characteristics of reserve assets’. Therefore, the exemption in

text: Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 3603/93

text: must be interpreted in line with this rationale . 3.2 Contribution to the RST loan and deposit accounts 3.2.1 Reserve assets are defined as those external assets, including gold, that are readily available to and controlled by monetary authorities for meeting balance of payments financing needs, for interventions in exchange markets to affect the currency exchange rate, and for other related purposes, such as maintaining confidence in the currency and the economy and serving as a basis for foreign borrowing. Under this definition, reserve assets must be denominated and settled in foreign currency and, other than gold bullion, must be claims on non-residents . The need for availability on demand to meet balance of payments financing needs and other related purposes implies that the credit quality and liquidity of the claims must be ensured . 3.2.2 For the exemption laid down in

text: Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 3603/93

text: to apply to the CBI’s transfers to the RST loan and deposit accounts envisaged by the draft law, the terms and conditions of the agreement with the IMF must provide for a potential early repayment of the principal amount of the resources borrowed from the CBI. On the basis of the template contribution agreement, the CBI would have the right to seek early repayment of all or part of the principal amount of its outstanding claims on the RST's loan and deposit accounts if the CBI represents that Ireland’s balance of payments and reserve assets position justifies early repayment. Under this arrangement, the SDRs transferred by the CBI to the RST would be readily repayable, to meet balance of payments and reserve needs, so that the liquidity of the claims of the CBI is safeguarded with a view to ensuring their reserve asset status .

text: 3.2.3 Subject to the above arrangement, the ECB considers that the CBI’s loan to the IMF’s RST loan and deposit accounts is compatible with the monetary financing prohibition, as it results in SDRdenominated claims of the CBI against the RST that have all the characteristics of reserve assets . 3.3 Guarantee by the Minister with respect to the reimbursement of principal and interest on the RST loan

text: and deposit by the IMF

text: 3.3.1 The ECB considers that section 6(4) of the draft law is drafted in a way that allows for an interpretation that would be incompatible with the monetary financing prohibition. 3.3.2 Specifically, this results from the unclear wording of section 6(4) which states that the guarantee shall include such provision ‘as the Minister thinks fit, following consultation with the [CBI]’, for the repayment of an amount to the Minister by the CBI ‘(with such interest, if any, as may be provided for)’ if the CBI recovers SDRs or interest in respect of which a guarantee payment was made. If ‘amount’ refers to both SDRs and interest, the text in brackets could be interpreted as obliging the CBI to pay additional interest to the Minister, as the Minister thinks fit, in addition to the recovered SDRs or interest. As the payment the CBI received under the guarantee would not constitute an advance or loan from the Minister, an obligation on the CBI to pay the Minister additional interest would constitute a form of prohibited financing of the public sector. There is no basis for an additional interest payment obligation from the CBI to the Minister beyond interest recovered from the RST. 3.3.3 In the light of the above, the ECB considers that the wording of section 6(4) of the draft law should clarify that the only interest the CBI must repay is the interest it has recovered from the RST.

text: 4. Financial dimension of central bank independence

text: From the perspective of the financial dimension of central bank independence laid down in Article 130 of the Treaty , the ECB takes note of the guarantee provided by the Minister under the draft law with respect to the reimbursement of principal and interest on the RST loan and deposit by the IMF .

text: This opinion will be published on EUR-Lex.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 12 August 2026.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Christine LAGARDE


text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/1998/415/oj). 2 Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions amending Directive

text: and repealing Directives

text: and

text: (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 338, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2013/36/2026-07-11). 3

text: Directive (EU) 2024/1619

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2024 amending Directive

text: as regards supervisory powers, sanctions, third-country branches, and environmental, social and governance risks (OJ L, 2024/1619, 19.6.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1619/oj). 4

text: Directive (EU) 2024/2994

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2024 amending Directives

text: and

text: (EU) 2019/2034

text: as regards the treatment of concentration risk arising from exposures towards central counterparties and of counterparty risk in centrally cleared derivative transactions (OJ L, 2024/2994, 4.12.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/2994/oj). 5 BaFin-Integritäts-Verordnung as published in the announcement of 24 March 2025, Bundesgesetzblatt I, Nr. 96.

text: See Article 1 of the draft ordinance, stipulating Section 14(1) of the Ordinance on the conduct and integrity of Bafin’s staff members and the members of Bafin’s Executive Board in connection with Section 11a of Finanzdienstleistungsaufsichtsgesetz as published in the announcement of 22 April 2002, Bundesgesetzblatt I, p. 1782, as amended. 7 See Article 1 of the draft ordinance, stipulating Section 14(1) of the Ordinance on the conduct and integrity of Bafin’s staff members and the members of Bafin’s Executive Board in connection with Section 11a(1) of the Law on Bafin. 8 See Article 1 of the draft ordinance, stipulating Section 3(1) of the Ordinance on the conduct and integrity of Bafin’s staff members and the members of Bafin’s Executive Board. 9 See Article 1 of the draft ordinance, stipulating Section 6 of the Ordinance on the conduct and integrity of Bafin’s staff members and the members of Bafin’s Executive Board. 10 See Article 1 of the draft ordinance, stipulating Section 5 of the Ordinance on the conduct and integrity of Bafin’s 11 See

text: Article 4

text: a(3) of the CRD, as inserted by

text: Article 1

text: , point (4), of the CRD6. 12 See Article 1 of the draft ordinance, stipulating Section 15(1) of the Ordinance on the conduct and integrity of Bafin’s 13 See Article 1 of the draft ordinance, stipulating Section 15(3) of the Ordinance on the conduct and integrity of Bafin’s

text: See Article 1 of the draft ordinance, stipulating Section 15(4) of the Ordinance on the conduct and integrity of Bafin’s staff members and the members of Bafin’s Executive Board. 15 See

text: Article 4

text: a(7) of the CRD, as inserted by

text: Article 1

text: , point (4), of the CRD6. 16 See Article 1 of the draft ordinance, stipulating Section 9 of the Ordinance on the conduct and integrity of Bafin’s staff members and the members of Bafin’s Executive Board. 17 See

text: Article 4

text: a(8) of the CRD, as inserted by

text: Article 1

text: , point (4), of the CRD6. 18 See Article 1 of the draft ordinance, stipulating Section 10(1) of the Ordinance on the conduct and integrity of Bafin’s 19 See Article 1 of the draft ordinance, stipulating Sections 10(1) and 14(1) and (4) of the Ordinance on the conduct and integrity of Bafin’s staff members and the members of Bafin’s Executive Board. 20 See Article 1 of the draft ordinance, stipulating Section 7(1) of the Ordinance on the conduct and integrity of Bafin’s 21 See Article 1 of the draft ordinance, stipulating Section 7(2) of the Ordinance on the conduct and integrity of Bafin’s

text: Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013

text: conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2013/1024/oj). 23 See paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on EUR-Lex. 24 See also paragraph 2.4 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.4 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.4 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.4 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.4 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.4 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.4 of Opinion

text: . 25 See paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: . 26 Code of Conduct for high-level ECB officials (OJ C 478, 16.12.2022, p. 3). 27 Guideline

text: (EU) 2021/2256

text: of the European Central Bank of 2 November 2021 laying down the principles of the Ethics Framework for the Single Supervisory Mechanism (ECB/2021/50) (OJ L 454, 17.12.2021, p. 21, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/guideline/2021/2256/oj). 28 See Article 6(1) of the SSM Regulation. 29 See also paragraph 2.5 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.5 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.5 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.5 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.5 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.5 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.5 of Opinion

text: . 30 See

text: Article 4

text: a of the CRD, as inserted by

text: Article 1

text: , point (4), of the CRD6. 31 See paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: See judgment of the Court of Justice of 29 April 2004, Commission v Council,

text: , ECLI:EU:C:2004:253, paragraphs 57 and 58; and judgment of the Court of Justice of 10 January 2006, Commission v Parliament and Council,

text: , ECLI:EU:C:2006:4, paragraphs 43 to 60. 33 See also paragraph 2.6.2 of Opinion

text: of the European Central Bank of 21 June 2024 on a proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards certain reporting requirements in the fields of financial services and investment support (OJ C, C/2024/5048, 16.8.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/5048/oj). 34 See paragraph 2.4 of Opinion

text: . 35 See

text: Article 4

text: a(2), fourth subparagraph, of Directive

text: , as inserted by the CRD6. This acknowledgement refers directly to the dismissal requirements included in

text: Article 4(2)

text: , second subparagraph, of the CRD6. 36 See also paragraph 2.7 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.7 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.7 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.7 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.7 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.7 of Opinion

text: . 37 Bafin’s Executive Board consists of the President and the members of Bafin’s Executive Board (see Section 6(1) of the Law on Bafin), one of whom is a member of the ECB’s Supervisory Board (see Section 2(4) of the Satzung der Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht as published in the announcement of 29 April 2002, Bundesgesetzblatt I, S. 1500, as amended.

text: See Article 6(3) of Guideline

text: (EU) 2021/2256

text: . 39 See

text: Article 17.3

text: , point (b), of the Single Code. 40 See Article 1 of the draft ordinance, stipulating Section 15 of the Ordinance on the conduct and integrity of Bafin’s 41 See Article 1 of the draft ordinance, stipulating Section 15(1) and (4) of the Ordinance on the conduct and integrity of Bafin’s staff members and the members of Bafin’s Executive Board. 42 See Article 17.1 and 17.2 of the Single Code.

text: See Article 1 of the draft ordinance, stipulating Section 15(4) of the Ordinance on the conduct and integrity of Bafin’s staff members and the members of Bafin’s Executive Board. 44 See Article 16 of the Single Code. 45 See Article 11 of Guideline

text: (EU) 2021/2256

text: . 46 See Article 1 of the draft ordinance, stipulating Section 7(2) of the Ordinance on the conduct and integrity of Bafin’s staff members and the members of Bafin’s Executive Board. 47 See Article 16 of the Single Code. 48 See Article 11 of Guideline

text: (EU) 2021/2256

text: . 49 See Article 16(4) of the Single Code. 50 See Article 1 of the draft ordinance, stipulating Section 3 of the Ordinance on the conduct and integrity of Bafin’s 51 See

text: Article 10

text: . 52 See Article 2 of the draft ordinance, stipulating Section 14(1) and Section 9 of the Ordinance on the conduct and integrity of Bafin’s staff members and the members of Bafin’s Executive Board.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 14 August 2026 on rules concerning the conduct and integrity of staff members of a supervisory authority and of the members of its executive board (CON/2026/25)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 14 August 2026 on rules concerning the conduct and integrity of staff members of a supervisory authority and of the members of its executive board (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 3 July 2026 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the German Federal Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft ordinance on the conduct and integrity of the staff members and members of the Executive Board of the Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (Bafin, Federal Financial Supervisory Authority) (hereinafter the ‘draft ordinance’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft ordinance relates to the specific tasks conferred upon the ECB concerning the prudential supervision of credit institutions pursuant to Article 127(6) of the Treaty. In accordance with

text: Article 17.5

text: , first sentence, of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft ordinance 1.1 The main purpose of the draft ordinance is to transpose into German law the amendments to Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council (hereinafter the ‘CRD’), introduced by

text: Directive (EU) 2024/1619

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council (hereinafter the ‘CRD6’) as well as

text: Directive (EU) 2024/2994

text: of the European Parliament and of 4 5 the Council by recasting the Ordinance on strengthening integrated financial supervision . In particular, the draft ordinance transposes

text: Article 4

text: a of the CRD as introduced by the CRD6, regarding the prevention of conflicts of interest among the members of Bafin’s Executive Board.

text: 1.2 The draft ordinance makes use of the Federal Ministry of Finance’s competence to determine by means of an ordinance, to the extent that is appropriate, complementary ethics rules applicable to the members of Bafin’s Executive Board relating, first, to private transactions regarding financial instrument and crypto-assets, and, second, to cooling-off periods, including rules related to the prohibition of and compensation for activities within 24 months after their term of office as members of Bafin’s Executive Board. 1.3 The draft ordinance applies by way of cross-reference to the existing rules on private transactions applicable to Bafin’s staff members and to the members of Bafin’s Executive Board set out in the Law on the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (hereinafter the ‘Law on Bafin’) . These rules prohibit private financial transactions involving (a) financial instruments admitted to trading on an organised market within Germany; (b) financial instruments issued by financial corporations having their registered office or a branch in the Union; and (c) financial instruments issued by undertakings supervised by Bafin . The draft ordinance complements this with provisions on short-term trading within 90 days of the purchase or sale of the financial instrument and on approval of the sale of financial instruments that are subject to trading prohibitions . The draft ordinance also confers on Bafin the competence to approve (a) the participation of members of staff or members of the Executive Board of Bafin in investment clubs or comparable associations and (b) the acquisition of income rights and other fiduciary rights . 1.4 To transpose the cooling-off periods as laid down by the relevant provisions of the CRD6 , the draft ordinance provides for rules on cooling-off periods. The draft ordinance requires that a member of Bafin’s Executive Board who intends to take up employment outside the public sector within 24 months after leaving office must notify the compliance office of Bafin and the Federal Ministry of Finance . The draft ordinance states that this provision is without prejudice to European requirements (as discussed in paragraph 3.3). 1.5 The Federal Ministry of Finance is competent to take decisions on cooling-off period. In principle, cooling-off periods of up to 24 months may be applied if concerns for public interest exist . The draft ordinance lists the cases in which concerns for public interest exist, and the rules that apply in those cases, as follows: (a) the Federal Ministry of Finance must apply cooling-off periods of at

text: least 12 months in cases where the Executive Board member will be employed by an undertaking supervised by the department headed by the Executive Board member or an undertaking belonging to the same group as such supervised undertaking; (b) a 12-month cooling-off period must also be applied if the Executive Board member is taking up employment in an undertaking typically providing services to supervised undertakings or undertakings of the same group, such as law firms and consultancies, unless it is ensured that the Executive Board member will not be providing services to supervised undertakings; and (c) the cooling-off period must be at least three months if the Executive Board member will be employed by lobbying organisations and interest groups of supervised undertakings and undertakings within the same group. 1.6 In other cases of public interest not explicitly listed in the draft ordinance, cooling-off periods must be no longer than 12 months . However, in cases of serious concern, cooling-off periods of up to 18 months and, in exceptional cases, up to 24 months may be applied. The draft ordinance states that these rules are without prejudice to European requirements. 1.7 The draft ordinance recasts the Ordinance on the conduct and integrity of Bafin’s staff members and the members of Bafin’s Executive Board. It contains, inter alia, rules on trading in certain classes of crypto assets and financial instruments, short-term trading as well as notification requirements. In particular, the draft ordinance includes provisions on declarations of interest applying to Bafin’s staff members and to members of Bafin’s Executive Board, transposing the relevant provisions of the CRD6 . The declaration of interest must include information on the crypto assets and financial instruments subject to trading restrictions laid down in the Law on the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (hereinafter the ‘Law on Bafin’). The declaration must be made before taking up a position at Bafin and annually thereafter. 1.8 To transpose the relevant provisions of the CRD6 , the draft ordinance empowers Bafin to require Bafin’s staff members to dispose of assets they hold in the event of a conflict of interest . The rules also apply to the members of Bafin’s Executive Board with the exception that the decision to sell or dispose of the assets is taken by the Federal Ministry of Finance . 1.9 The draft ordinance empowers Bafin to complement by means of an ordinance the rules on private transactions involving crypto assets and financial instruments . Bafin must review these ordinances against the established standards of compliance and amend them accordingly .

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 As previously noted by the ECB,

text: Article 19 of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013

text: (hereinafter the ‘SSM Regulation’) stipulates that when carrying out the tasks conferred on it by the SSM Regulation, the ECB and the national competent authorities acting within the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) must act independently . Article 31(3) of the SSM Regulation furthermore requires the ECB, in cooperation with the national competent authorities, to: (a) establish and maintain comprehensive and formal procedures including ethics procedures and proportionate periods to assess in advance and prevent possible conflicts of interest resulting from subsequent employment within two years of members of the Supervisory Board; and (b) provide for appropriate 24. disclosures. Those procedures are without prejudice to the application of stricter national rules The legal basis for those provisions of the SSM Regulation is Article 127(6) of the Treaty. 2.2 As previously noted by the ECB, in view of this independence and these requirements of the SSM Regulation, the ECB has established an ethics framework to ensure the independence of national competent authorities, such as Bafin, when assisting the ECB in carrying out the tasks conferred on it by the SSM Regulation . This ethics framework includes the ECB’s Code of Conduct for highlevel ECB officials (hereinafter the ‘Single Code’), which applies, among others, to the members of the Supervisory Board of the ECB when exercising their functions as members of a high-level ECB body, and Guideline

text: (EU) 2021/2256

text: of the European Central Bank (ECB/2021/50) , which is addressed to the national competent authorities of the SSM and establishes ethics requirements applicable to the members of their bodies and the members of staff of the national competent authorities. In view of the responsibility of the ECB for the effective and consistent functioning of the SSM , the national competent authorities must comply with Guideline

text: (EU) 2021/2256

text: (ECB/2021/50) . 2.3 As previously noted by the ECB, in contrast to the ethics framework, which is ultimately based on Article 127(6) of the Treaty, the CRD6, including its provision on the supervisory independence of 30 31 competent authorities , is based on Article 53(1) of the Treaty . A legal act based on this provision cannot alter the rights and obligations of the ECB and the national competent authorities when carrying out the tasks conferred on them by the SSM Regulation based on Article 127(6) of the

text: Treaty. It follows from settled case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union that the different legal bases, namely

text: Article 53(1)

text: and Article 127(6) of the Treaty, cannot be combined as the legal basis for a legal act, in view of the different procedures involved . In particular, measures under Article 53(1) of the Treaty are adopted by the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee (and, if relevant, the ECB in accordance with Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty). By contrast, regulations under Article 127(6) of the Treaty are adopted by the Council alone, by way of a special legislative procedure, in which the Council acts unanimously, after consulting the European Parliament and the ECB . 2.4 Hence, as previously noted by the ECB , the amendments made by the CRD6 are without prejudice to the ethics framework, which the ECB has established to ensure the independence of the national competent authorities in the context of the SSM, as both frameworks have their own scope and legal basis. The Union legislator acknowledged this through the CRD6’s amendments to the CRD, which provide that

text: Article 4

text: a(2) of the CRD is without prejudice to the rights and obligations of the national competent authorities pursuant to the SSM established by the SSM Regulation . For the avoidance of doubt, the national legislator may wish to clarify this within the text of the draft ordinance. From an ECB perspective, the CRD6 provisions may nevertheless serve as guidance for establishing safeguards for the independence of the ECB and the national competent authorities when carrying out the tasks conferred on them by the SSM Regulation .

text: 3. Specific observations

text: 3.1 The Single Code applies, inter alia, to the members of the Supervisory Board of the ECB, including the Bafin representative , when exercising their functions as members of the Supervisory Board of the ECB. It also applies to persons replacing the members in meetings of the Supervisory Board in the performance of their duties and responsibilities relating to that high-level body where explicitly provided for in the Single Code.

text: 3.2 National competent authorities, including Bafin, are required to take the necessary measures to implement and comply with Guideline

text: (EU) 2021/2256

text: and must inform the ECB of any obstacles that national law poses to their implementation. 3.3 Guideline

text: (EU) 2021/2256

text: requires national competent authorities to have mechanisms in place to assess and avoid possible conflicts of interest arising from post-employment occupational activities undertaken by their members of staff and the members of their bodies, including appropriate cooling-off periods . In addition, the Single Code provides for cooling-off periods for members of the ECB’s Supervisory Board of one year (for gainful occupational activity with a significant or less significant credit institution) or six months (for gainful occupational activity with any other financial institution or with any entity engaged in lobbying in relation to the ECB, or consultancy and/or advocacy for the ECB or for any financial institution). With regard to gainful occupational activity with a significant or less significant credit institution, the ECB Ethics Committee may recommend an extension of the cooling-off period up to a maximum of two years is possible where the possibility of conflicts of interest resulting from such gainful occupational activities so requires . As noted in paragraphs 1.5 and 1.6, the draft ordinance provides the legal basis for cooling-off periods for the members of Bafin’s Executive Board which must last at least 12 months in cases of employment in supervised undertakings and may be extended by the Federal Ministry of Finance to up to 24 months . In this respect, the draft ordinance states that it operates without prejudice to European requirements . The ECB understands that such European requirements include the Single Code and Guideline

text: (EU) 2021/2256

text: , as amended from time to time. The ECB therefore understands that the cooling-off regime established by the draft ordinance does not prevent the application of the differently structured cooling-off regime established by the Single Code and Guideline

text: (EU) 2021/2256

text: . 3.4 In addition, the Single Code sets limits on the establishment of post-employment relationships not only directly with significant or less significant credit institutions, but also with other financial institutions and with ‘any entity engaged in lobbying in relation to the ECB, or consultancy and/or advocacy for the ECB or for any [supervised] institution’ . As noted in paragraph 1.5, under the draft ordinance, the cooling-off period also applies to employment in undertakings that typically provide services to supervised undertakings, including law firms, consultancies, lobbying groups and advocacy associations of supervised undertakings. With respect to the broader category of ‘other financial institutions’, the wording of the draft ordinance does not distinguish between significant and less significant institutions or ‘other financial institutions’. The draft ordinance instead provides for the general application of post-employment restrictions where required by public interest. As noted above, the draft ordinance operates without prejudice to European

text: requirements , meaning that the cooling-off regime established by the draft ordinance does not prevent the application of the differently structured cooling-off regime established by the Single Code and Guideline

text: (EU) 2021/2256

text: . 3.5 The prohibition on trading by the members of Bafin’s Executive Board and staff members as laid down in the draft ordinance is structurally different from the relevant provisions set out in the Single 44 45 Code and Guideline

text: (EU) 2021/2256

text: . However, the categories of entities and financial instruments listed in the draft ordinance cover the financial instruments subject to trading prohibitions pursuant to the Single Code and Guideline

text: (EU) 2021/2256

text: . Furthermore, the draft ordinance empowers Bafin to adopt by way of ordinance further rules on private transactions in line with the established standards of compliance . The ECB invites the Federal Ministry of Finance to clarify what is meant by ‘established standards of compliance’ in this context. The ECB understands that these provisions on the prohibition of trading operate without prejudice to the Single Code and Guideline

text: (EU) 2021/2256

text: . However, the draft ordinance does not contain an explicit provision clarifying that these provisions operate without prejudice to European requirements. The Federal Ministry of Finance is invited, for the sake of legal certainty, to clarify that the draft ordinance taken as a whole operates without prejudice to European requirements. 3.6 The draft ordinance also establishes rules for short term trading which are less restrictive than those in the Single Code . Guideline

text: (EU) 2021/2256

text: stipulates that the national competent authorities are to establish internal rules, inter alia, restricting short-term trading . The Single Code lays down a one-year holding period, with the exception of unforeseen personal expenditures . By contrast, the draft ordinance requires only a 90-day holding period . The draft ordinance must therefore be applied without prejudice to the Single Code. Again, the Federal Ministry of Finance is invited, for the sake of legal certainty, to clarify that the draft ordinance taken as a whole operates without prejudice to European requirements. 3.7 The Single Code also contains rules, inter alia, on declarations of interests , which are more restrictive than the provisions of the draft ordinance . The draft ordinance limits the declaration of interests to information on private financial transactions. The application of the draft ordinance’s less restrictive provisions would be without prejudice to the application of the stricter rules of the Single Code to members of Bafin’s Executive Board and staff members of Bafin who are subject to the Single Code. Again, the Federal Ministry of Finance is invited, for the sake of legal certainty,

text: to clarify that the draft ordinance taken as a whole operates without prejudice to European requirements. This opinion will be published on EUR-Lex. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 14 August 2026. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Christine LAGARDE


text: Projekt ustawa z dnia o zmianie ustawy o przeciwdziałaniu nieuczciwym praktykom rynkowym.

text: Projekt ustawa z dnia o rynku kryptoaktywów.

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/1998/415/oj).

text: Regulation (EU) 2023/1114

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2023 on markets in cryptoassets, and amending Regulations

text: (EU) No 1093/2010

text: and

text: (EU) No 1095/2010

text: and Directives

text: and (EU)

text: As defined in

text: Article 3

text: , point (19), of

text: Regulation (EU) 2023/1113

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2023 on information accompanying transfers of funds and certain crypto-assets and amending Directive (EU)

text: Opinion

text: of the European Central Bank of 19 February 2021 on a proposal for a regulation on Markets in Crypto-assets, and amending

text: Directive (EU) 2019/1937

text: (OJ C 152, 29.4.2021, p. 1). All ECB opinions are published on EUR-Lex.

text: COM(2020) 593 final.

text: See paragraph 1.1 of Opinion

text: See, for example, https://www.gov.pl/web/pr-katowice/sledztwo-w-sprawie-zondacrypto, Polish public prosecutor press release, published on 17 April 2026. 12 See

text: Article 59(7)

text: and Articles 63 and 65 of MiCAR.

text: The ECB notes that the European Commission has initiated an infringement procedure against Hungary (INFR(2025)2174) for failing to fully comply with MiCAR following the introduction of a new authorisation regime for ‘exchange validation services’ with criminal liability, which is not provided under MiCAR; see European Commission, January infringements decisions, available on the Commission’s website at www.ec.europa.eu. 14 According to Article 105 of MiCAR, national authorities may prohibit or restrict the marketing, distribution or sale of certain crypto-assets or crypto-assets with certain specified features; or a type of activity or practice related to crypto assets, only following prior notification to the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) or European Banking Authority (EBA) and in a targeted and temporary way. 16 See Article 111 of MiCAR. 17 See

text: Article 93

text: and Article 143(3) of MiCAR.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 12 August 2026 on the introduction of a ban on crypto-asset activities, and measures concerning the application of Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 (CON/2026/26)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 12 August 2026 on the introduction of a ban on crypto-asset activities, and measures concerning the application of

text: Regulation (EU) 2023/1114

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 28 May 2026 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Marshal of the Polish Parliament for an opinion on a draft law amending the Law on unfair commercial practices (hereinafter the ‘first draft law’). On 10 July 2026 the ECB received another request from the Marshal, for an opinion on a draft Law on the crypto-asset market (hereinafter the ‘second draft law’ and, together with the first draft law, the ‘draft laws’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and

text: Article 2(1)

text: , fifth and sixth indents, of

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft laws relate to payment and settlement systems and rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with

text: Article 17.5

text: , first sentence, of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft laws

text: 1.1 Purpose of the first draft law 1.1.1 The purpose of the first draft law is to introduce a ban on the carrying out of activities related to ‘crypto-assets’, as defined in

text: Regulation (EU) 2023/1114

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council (hereinafter ‘MiCAR’), in Poland. 1.1.2 In particular, the first draft law amends the Law on unfair commercial practices by adding, as an unfair market practice, the carrying out of ‘crypto-asset activities’ irrespective of whether they meet the general criteria for establishing unfair market practices, in particular, that such activities are contrary to good business practices and significantly distort or are likely to distort the market behaviour of the average consumer before, during or after the conclusion of the contract for their provision. For this purpose, in the first draft law, a ‘crypto-asset’ is defined by a cross-reference to

text: the definition in MiCAR and ‘crypto-asset activities’ is defined to mean the issuance, offer to the public, admission to trading of crypto-assets or other services related to crypto-assets, in particular ‘crypto-asset services’ as defined in MiCAR. 1.1.3 The first draft law provides that where there is a reasonable suspicion of crypto-asset activity, the Internal Security Agency must block the crypto-asset account on written request from the President of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection, in which case a telecommunications undertaking providing internet access services must prevent access to the websites using an internet domain to conduct crypto-asset activities by removing it from the information and communication technology (ICT) systems of telecommunications undertakings. 1.1.4 The first draft law establishes a new criminal offence of carrying out crypto-asset activities, with proposed penalties ranging from six months to eight years of imprisonment, and up to ten years if the value of the property accumulated as a result of the crypto-asset activity is high, without however defining what constitutes such high value. 1.1.5 The first draft law provides that entities carrying out crypto-asset activities on the date of its entry into force must cease all crypto-asset activities within two months of that date. Entities must stop accepting new funds or crypto-assets from clients; close trading platforms for crypto-assets, associated accounts, communication and information systems, and websites; and settle all liabilities owed to customers. Moreover, they are required to return all client funds, together with any resulting financial benefits or crypto-asset equivalents due to clients derived from the contracts or investments, within the same two-month period, without imposing any fees or charges on clients. If they fail to comply, such obligations will be transferred to designated entities. 1.1.6 According to the explanatory memorandum accompanying the first draft law, the policy rationale behind the first draft law is primarily consumer protection in the light of the rapid growth of the cryptoassets market and its lack of regulation in Poland, and therefore its propensity for fraud and manipulation. In addition, the explanatory memorandum also points to financial stability-related considerations. 1.2 Purpose of the second draft law 1.2.1 The purpose of the second draft law is to ensure the application in Poland of MiCAR and

text: Regulation (EU) 2023/1113

text: . 1.2.2 In particular, the second draft law designates Komisja Nadzoru Finansowego (KNF, Financial Supervision Authority) as the competent authority responsible for carrying out the various functions and duties under MiCAR. It also introduces tools for the effective exercise of supervision by the KNF and the implementation of the provisions of MiCAR. 1.2.3 The second draft law specifies the obligations of issuers of asset-referenced tokens and e-money tokens and of crypto-asset service providers (CASPs), including the obligation for these issuers to provide the KNF with information on their activities for the carrying out of KNF’s assessment.

text: 1.2.4 Pursuant to the second draft law, the KNF is to be authorised to impose sanctions on offerors, issuers of asset-referenced tokens or e-money tokens, persons seeking admission to trading of cryptoassets and CASPs. In addition, the KNF’s supervisory powers will extend to the imposition of pecuniary penalties on professionals arranging or executing transactions related to crypto-assets. The KNF will also have the power to impose administrative sanctions on CASPs. 1.2.5 The second draft law introduces criminal liability for offences committed, among other things, in connection with the issuance of asset-referenced tokens or e-money tokens or the provision of crypto-asset services. 1.2.6 The second draft law also determines the scope of professional confidentiality related to the provision of crypto-asset services and the sharing of confidential information. 1.2.7 Lastly, the second draft law introduces the possibility to make statements in electronic form for activities relating to crypto-asset services or concerning the offer to the public and other activities carried out as part of the activities of the entities regulated by MiCAR.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 The ECB refers to its opinion on the European Commission’s proposal for a regulation on markets in crypto-assets in which the ECB welcomed the original initiative of the Commission to establish a harmonised framework at Union level for crypto-assets and related activities and services and the aim of addressing the different levels of risk posed by each type of crypto-asset, balanced with the need to support innovation. The ECB also expressed its belief that a Union harmonised framework is critical to prevent fragmentation within the single market . 2.2 The ECB understands that one of the main reasons for the first draft law was the recent collapse of Zondacrypto, a cryptocurrency exchange and trading platform for digital assets operating in Poland, which is now subject to investigation for suspected fraud, misappropriation and possible links to organised networks and political interference .

text: 3. Compliance of the draft laws with MiCAR

text: 3.1 MiCAR lays down uniform and directly applicable requirements for the offer to the public and admission to trading on a trading platform of crypto-assets other than asset-referenced tokens and e-money tokens, of asset-referenced tokens and of e-money tokens, as well as requirements for CASPs. Pursuant to MiCAR, uniform requirements include an authorisation for CASPs that can be seamlessly ‘passported’ across all 27 Member States . MiCAR does not permit Member States to derogate from its uniform rules by imposing either stricter or more lenient rules.

text: 3.2 As the first draft law introduces an outright prohibition on the provision of crypto-asset services with criminal liability, the ECB considers that it would be incompatible with MiCAR . A complete national ban on CASPs would directly contradict MiCAR’s objective of creating a unified single market for crypto-assets . In addition, such a ban would not recognise the right of CASPs authorised in a Member State to provide their crypto-asset services across all 27 Member States. National law cannot block or ban a passported entity that complies with MiCAR. 3.3 MiCAR requires Member States, among other things, to designate the competent authorities responsible for carrying out the functions and duties provided for in that Regulation (such as granting authorisation to a CASP) and to ensure that these competent authorities have the power to impose appropriate administrative penalties and take other administrative measures in relation to the infringements specified therein . 3.4 As the second draft law, among other things, designates the KNF as competent authority under MiCAR, and the relevant transitional period to ensure full compliance of CASPs with MiCAR (i.e. also to obtain an authorisation from their competent national authority) expired on 1 July 2026 , the ECB understands that the second draft law aims to ensure Poland’s compliance with MiCAR. 3.5 The ECB notes that Article 57 of the second draft law specifies that the Governor of Narodowy Bank Polski issues opinions, observations or comments on behalf of Narodowy Bank Polski in the cases provided for in MiCAR. To ensure consistency with MiCAR, the ECB recommends that Article 57 of the second draft law also refers to Article 43(8) of MiCAR which provides for the relevant central bank’s competence to submit observations and comments to the EBA in the context of the reassessment of whether certain asset-referenced tokens still classify as significant.

text: This opinion will be published on EUR-Lex.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 12 August 2026.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Christine LAGARDE