text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).

text: See Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending

text: Council Directive 82/891/EEC

text: , and Directives

text: and

text: , and Regulations

text: (EU) No 1093/2010

text: and

text: (EU) No 648/2012

text: , of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 190); Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 April 2001 on the reorganisation and winding up of credit institutions (OJ L 125, 5.5.2001, p. 15); Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on deposit guarantee schemes (recast) (OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 149);

text: Directive (EU) 2017/2399

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2017 amending Directive

text: as regards the ranking of unsecured debt instruments in insolvency hierarchy (OJ L 345, 27.12.2017, p. 96);

text: Directive (EU) 2019/879

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2019 amending Directive

text: as regards the loss-absorbing and recapitalisation capacity of credit institutions and investment firms and Directive

text: (OJ L 150, 7.6.2019, p. 296). 3 Authorised credit institution is defined in Article 2 of the Business of Credit Institutions Law (Law 66(I)/1997, as amended) as any of the following: (a) credit institution incorporated in the Republic to which a licence has been granted under the provisions of this Law, (b) branch of third country institution, (c) the Housing Finance Corporation which is governed by the Housing Finance Corporation Law. 4 Companies Law, Cap. 113. 5 See Article 3(1) of the draft law. 6 Pursuant to the provisions of section 45(6) of the Law on Resolution of Credit Institutions and Investment Firms Law of 2016. 8 See Article 6(1) of the draft law. 9 See

text: Article 6(3)

text: and Article 15 of the draft law.

text: See Articles 8 and 16 of the draft law. 12 See Articles

text: and

text: to 24 of the draft law. 13 See

text: Articles 10

text: to 14 of the draft law. 14 See the Deposit Guarantee Scheme and Resolution Scheme of Credit and Other Institutions Regulations of 2016, as amended, R.A.D.P. 27/2016, published in the Official Gazette of the Republic on 11 February 2016, p.181.

text: See Article 31 of the draft law. 16 See Article 42 of the draft law. 17 See Article 6(1) of the draft law. 18

text: Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013

text: conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63).

text: See

text: Article 4

text: A or

text: Article 30(1)

text: (e) of the Business of Credit Institutions Law, Law 66(I)/1997, as amended. 20 See

text: Article 4(1)

text: (a) of the SSM Regulation. 21 See Article 3 of the draft law amending the Business of Credit Institutions Law, Law 66(I)/1997, as amended. 22 See Article 8 of the draft law. 23 See Article 6 of the draft law. 24 See

text: Article 32

text: b of Directive

text: Council Directive 82/891/EEC

text: , and Directives

text: and

text: , and Regulations

text: (EU) No 1093/2010

text: and

text: (EU) No 648/2012

text: , of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 190). 25 See Article 41(1) of the draft law. 26 Pursuant to

text: Article 32

text: See Article 6 of the draft law amending the Business of Credit Institutions Law, inserting a new

text: Article 30

text: Z into the Business of Credit Institutions Law. 28 As provided for in

text: Article 32

text: C of the Business of Credit Institutions Law. 29 Law 5(1)/2016, as amended. 30 See paragraph 5.1 of ECB Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are available on EUR-Lex. 31 See Article 6(1) of the draft law. 32 See

text: Article 32

text: b of the BRRD. 33 The legal framework currently in force on special liquidation of credit institutions provides that the CBC must demonstrate, inter alia, that special liquidation of a credit institution is in the public interest.

text: See Article 38 of the draft law.

text: See Article 10(4) of the Deposit Guarantee Scheme and Resolution Scheme Law. 41 See Article 4 of the draft law amending the Deposit Guarantee Scheme and Resolution Scheme Laws.

publisher: Europeiska centralbanken

sprak: en

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 19 May 2023 on the liquidation of credit institutions (CON/2023/12)

serie: con

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 19 May 2023 on the liquidation of credit institutions (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

type: rubrik

text: On 24 February 2023 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Cypriot Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft law on the liquidation of credit institutions (the ‘draft law’), together with draft laws amending a number of existing laws, including the Resolution of Credit Institutions and Investment Firms Laws, the Business of Credit Institutions Laws, and the Deposit Guarantee and Resolution of Credit and Other Institutions Scheme Laws and the Deposit Guarantee and Resolution of Credit and Other Institutions Scheme Regulations (such draft amendments together with the draft law are hereinafter collectively referred to as the ‘draft legislative framework’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third and sixth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft legislative framework relates to the Central Bank of Cyprus (CBC) and rules applicable to financial institutions in so far as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets and the ECB’s tasks concerning the prudential supervision of credit institutions pursuant to Article 127(6) of the Treaty. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

type: stycke

text: 1. Purpose of the draft legislative framework

text: 1.1 As stated in the explanatory note accompanying the draft legislative framework, the main purpose of the draft law is to adopt an effective insolvency framework for credit institutions that ensures rapid intervention by the CBC in order to maintain financial stability and secure the continuity of depositors’ access to their deposits, through the appointment of a temporary liquidator. The primary duty of the temporary liquidator is the sale of assets and liabilities of the credit institution under liquidation to another credit institution. If the sale of assets and liabilities is not possible within a reasonable time, the temporary liquidator appointed by the CBC will assist in the compensation of covered depositors by the Deposit Guarantee Scheme (DGS) and the liquidation of the credit institution with the aim of reaching the best possible results for all creditors, in particular the maximisation of the liquidation value of the credit institution’s assets. The winding-up of the credit institution is completed by a court-appointed liquidator following the recommendation of the CBC.

text: 1.2 As also noted in the explanatory memorandum, the draft legislative framework partially reharmonises some features of various Union directives on, inter alia, the recovery, resolution, reorganisation and winding-up of credit institutions and on deposit guarantee schemes . 1.3 As noted in the explanatory memorandum, the draft law is the core of the draft legislative framework. The draft law applies to all authorised credit institutions , except authorised credit institutions whose licences have been withdrawn by the ECB or the CBC and which do not maintain any deposits or other repayable funds from the public, in which case such credit institutions may 4 5 be liquidated under the Cypriot Companies Law without the involvement of the CBC . This exception does not apply in respect of the liquidation of a residual authorised credit institution (with no deposits or other repayable funds from the public) , in which case such residual authorised credit institution would be liquidated pursuant to the draft law. 1.4 The draft law provides for the jurisdiction of the Cypriot courts as regards the liquidation of authorised credit institutions . As noted in the explanatory memorandum, the framework governing the liquidation of authorised credit institutions will remain court-based, in the sense that a liquidation order and the appointment of a liquidator is under the absolute jurisdiction of the court and may take place only after the CBC submits an application to the court. In particular, the draft law provides that the court will issue a liquidation order and appoint a liquidator in respect of an authorised credit institution in two situations: (1) the credit institution’s licence has been withdrawn by the ECB or the CBC or (2) either the CBC as the national resolution authority or the Single Resolution Board has determined that all conditions for resolution under the applicable resolution legal framework are met except the public interest criterion . The liquidator is appointed by the court following a recommendation by the CBC and based on the CBC’s policy and criteria for taking up such a position . 1.5 Under the draft law the CBC is also granted the administrative power to appoint a temporary liquidator either (1) prior to the submission of the application to the court for the liquidation of an authorised credit institution, as soon as it determines that at least one of the conditions for

text: liquidation under the draft law is met, or (2) any time after the submission of the application but prior to the issuance of the court order. The temporary liquidator’s appointment will expire if the request for liquidation is not submitted by the CBC within 75 days or, in exceptional circumstances, two months from the temporary liquidator’s appointment. The temporary administrator will hold office until the appointment of a liquidator by the court or the winding-up petition by the CBC is dismissed by the court. The temporary liquidator’s powers and duties are subject to the CBC’s control and supervision . 1.6 Under the draft law the liquidation of an authorised credit institution will be deemed to have commenced on the day the application for liquidation is submitted to the court by the CBC or from the date the temporary liquidator is appointed by the CBC, whichever event takes place first, provided that, in the meantime, a liquidation order is issued by the court . 1.7 The draft law also lays down a framework governing the compensation, general powers and responsibilities, notifications to various parties, liquidators’ reports, accounting books and records of a temporary or court-appointed liquidator . The draft law further provides for the effects of the application for the court order for the liquidation of a credit institution on, inter alia, the credit institution’s property rights and contracts and the rights of third parties . 1.8 The draft law provides that once the court orders the liquidation of an authorised credit institution, the applicable hierarchy of claims is as follows: (1) debts or claims secured by a charge on the assets of the credit institution up to the amount resulting from the realisation of the collateral or the delivery of the guarantee to the beneficiary creditor; (2) all necessary and reasonable expenses incurred by the liquidator or the temporary liquidator, including professional expenses in the application of the winding-up provisions; (3) with the same priority ranking, all local, government taxes due from the liquidating credit institution, outstanding employees’ fees and any claim of the resolution authority and the (national) Resolution Fund; (4) the following with the same priority ranking: claims arising from financing or credit granted to the liquidating credit institution after the appointment of the liquidator or temporary liquidator and claims of the DGS for financing measures aiming to preserve depositors’ access to their deposits; (5) claims arising from credit granted by the CBC prior to the appointment of the liquidator or temporary liquidator; (6) with the same priority ranking: covered deposits, the DGS subrogating to the rights and obligations of covered depositors in insolvency, the DGS financing alternative measures under the Deposit Guarantee Scheme and Resolution of Credit and Other Institutions Law, (7) with the same priority ranking: the part of eligible deposits of natural persons and micro, small and medium sized enterprises exceeding the coverage level provided for by law and deposits of natural persons and micro, small and medium sized enterprises that would have been eligible had they not been made through non-Union branches of credit institutions established in the Union; (8) with the same priority ranking: remaining deposits, claims from commercial creditors or suppliers, claims secured with a floating charge over

text: the assets of the liquidating credit institution, common unsecured claims, including claims on derivatives, unsecured claims resulting from debt instruments that cumulatively meet the following conditions: (a) the original contractual maturity of the debt instruments is of at least one year, (b) the debt instruments contain no embedded derivatives and are not derivatives themselves, and (c) the relevant contractual documentation and, where applicable, the prospectus related to the issuance, explicitly refer to the lower ranking under unsecured claims from the foregoing debt instruments; and (9) debt or claims from subordinated debt instruments, except for claims on Tier 2 instruments, claims from additional Tier 1 instruments or Common Equity Tier 1 . 1.9 As noted in the explanatory memorandum, a number of safeguards and procedural requirements are introduced that aim to ensure that customers affected by a potential sale of business of the liquidating credit institution to another credit institution will continue to receive banking services until the acquiring credit institution integrates the acquired assets and liabilities within its systems’ processes and procedures. If there is a funding gap, this may be covered initially by the DGS, provided that the least-cost conditions under the applicable legal framework on DGS are met. Subsequently this may be covered by the State, provided that the applicable State aid rules are also met. 1.10 The CBC’s liability in the event of an action for damages relating to any act or omission in the exercise of its powers and responsibilities under the draft law is limited to an act or omission in bad faith or gross negligence .

text: 2. General observations

text: The ECB welcomes the draft legislative framework, which seeks to establish an effective framework for the liquidation of credit institutions in line with the objectives of maintaining financial stability and securing depositors’ access to their deposits. Given that several stakeholders are involved in the liquidation of credit institutions, establishing a sound, effective and orderly liquidation of credit institutions is essential. Therefore, developing the Cypriot legal framework governing the liquidation of credit institutions is an important step towards increasing the protection of the value of the assets in liquidation and, ultimately, of creditors’ interests.

text: 3. Specific observations on the draft legislative framework

text: 3.1 Withdrawal of licences 3.1.1 The draft law stipulates , inter alia, that the liquidation of authorised credit institutions and the appointment of a liquidator will only be carried out by the court under the provisions of the draft law if the credit institution’s licence has been withdrawn by the ECB pursuant to

text: Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013

text: (hereinafter the ‘SSM Regulation’) or by the CBC pursuant to the applicable

text: provisions of Cypriot law . Considering the ECB’s exclusive competence under the provisions of the SSM Regulation for granting and withdrawing authorisations to take up the business of credit institutions, the ECB suggests that it be clarified that the CBC’s competence is restricted to the withdrawal of licences in matters for which the ECB is not exclusively competent under the SSM Regulation, such as withdrawing the licences of third country branches. 3.1.2 Based on the provisions of the draft law amending the Business of Credit Institutions Laws , the CBC may withdraw the licence of a credit institution if liquidation proceedings have started pursuant to the draft law , while no resolution measures have been adopted or have failed. If the licence is withdrawn, the liquidator is not prohibited from providing specific banking services to the extent this is deemed necessary or appropriate for liquidation purposes, provided that such activities are carried out with the consent and under the control of the CBC. Under the draft law , the withdrawal of the licence of a credit institution still holding deposits falls under the cases in which the court might decide to put a credit institution into liquidation. The ECB understands that these provisions aim to empower the competent authority to withdraw the licence of a credit institution which is failing or likely to fail, but which has not been put into resolution. In this respect, the ECB would like to clarify that the withdrawal of the licence of a credit institution is a discretionary power granted to the competent authority. In particular, considering the ECB’s exclusive competences as concerns withdrawals of licences of credit institutions within the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) under the SSM Regulation, the ECB would like to underline that its discretion in exercising these powers will remain unaffected. In this respect, the ECB also notes that, in accordance with Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council (hereinafter the ‘BRRD’) , an institution in relation to which the resolution authority considers that the conditions set out in points (a) and (b) of Article 32(1) of the BRRD are met, but in respect of which a resolution action would not be in the public interest, must be wound up in an orderly manner in accordance with the applicable national law. 3.2 Suspension of payments 3.2.1 The draft law stipulates that the CBC is empowered to suspend any payment or delivery obligations of a credit institution that are derived from a contract to which the credit institution is a party, at any time after the decision to put the credit institution into liquidation, or prior to the start of liquidation, for a period of 10 working days, provided that the CBC has determined that the credit institution is failing or likely to fail . The draft law further provides that if the suspension of some of the contractual obligations of that credit institution concerns covered deposits, these deposits will

text: not be considered as unavailable for the purposes of the Deposit Guarantee Scheme and the Resolution Scheme of Credit and Other Institutions Law. 3.2.2 The draft law amending the Business of Credit Institutions Laws seems to grant a similar power to the CBC, acting in this case in its capacity as competent authority for the prudential supervision of credit institutions . In particular, the CBC may suspend any payment or delivery obligations of the credit institution prior to the determination that the credit institution is failing or likely to fail , for a period of two working days, with the possibility of extending for a further two working days, provided that the exercise of this power is deemed necessary in order to avoid a further deterioration in the liquidity or general financial situation of the credit institution. If the suspension of some of the credit institution’s contractual obligations concerns covered deposits, these deposits are not to be considered as unavailable for the purposes of the Deposit Guarantee Scheme and the Resolution Scheme of Credit and Other Institutions Law . 3.2.3 While the ECB generally welcomes the introduction of the powers to impose the suspension of payments or delivery obligations, the ECB expects these far reaching powers to be exercised prior to the determination that a credit institution is failing or likely to fail only in extreme circumstances, if at all. Due to its exceptional nature and its disruptive impact on contracts, the moratorium tool should be decided in close coordination between all relevant authorities . 3.3 Commencement of liquidation proceedings 3.3.1 The draft law provides that a liquidation of a credit institution is to be decided by the court if the court is convinced that the conditions for liquidation are met - either that the CBC as national resolution authority or the Single Resolution Board has determined that all conditions for resolution under the applicable resolution legal framework are met except the public interest criterion or the credit institution’s licence has been withdrawn by the ECB or the CBC. This provision seems to go in the direction of correctly implementing the provisions of the BRRD introduced to address the ‘limbo risk’ for failed credit institutions for which the public interest assessment was negative, which require that those credit institutions are to be wound up in an orderly manner in accordance with the applicable national law . 3.3.2 The ECB understands that although the CBC has the power to apply to the court for the commencement of liquidation proceedings, the court might reject the CBC’s application if the conditions for issuing a liquidation order are not met. The ECB understands that although the conditions for issuing a liquidation order have been significantly narrowed down in scope compared to the legal framework currently in force , the possibility of not commencing liquidation still exists. Additionally, the draft provision concerning the automatic termination of the temporary liquidator’s

text: appointment in the theoretical scenario that the application for liquidation is not submitted to the court by the CBC within 75 days from the temporary liquidator’s appointment (or, in exceptional circumstances, a further two months) would also lead to the non-commencement of the liquidation procedure. In both these cases, the ECB understands that a liquidation procedure would not commence. Under these scenarios uncertainty could be created regarding the future of the credit institution, which is unwarranted. 3.4 Sale of assets and liabilities in liquidation proceedings 3.4.1 The draft law provides for a power of sale in respect of the liquidating credit institution’s business to another credit institution through transfer of its assets and liabilities (including secured deposits up to the secured amount pursuant to the Deposit Guarantee Scheme Regulations), following an independent valuation process and subject to the CBC’s prior approval. In particular, it is provided that the temporary liquidator or the liquidator appointed by the court may transfer any assets, rights and/or liabilities of the liquidating credit institution through the sale of business tool, in order to ensure that depositors have access to their deposits . 3.4.2 Any such transfer or sale of assets under the draft law must be considered to be valid and apply to third parties without the need to obtain the consent of the credit institution’s contributors, creditors or any other third party, other than the consent of the acquiring credit institution, and irrespective of the validity of any restriction imposed by law or contract terms or by any other means, including compliance with legal procedures that would otherwise apply . 3.4.3 The liquidator or the temporary liquidator must take any reasonable measure to ensure commercial terms as regards the sale of business that are consistent with the valuation carried out for this purpose . The valuation is to be carried out by an independent valuer with the aim of providing a prudent and realistic valuation of the assets, rights and liabilities of the credit institution . 3.4.4 The sale of business under the provisions of the draft law requires the prior approval of the CBC . 3.4.5 The ECB understands that the abovementioned sale of business tool may be used by the temporary liquidator appointed by the CBC or the liquidator to be appointed by the court after the commencement of liquidation proceedings with the primary aim of ensuring depositors’ access to their deposits. However, considering that the temporary administrator may be appointed by the CBC even prior to the submission of the application to the court for the liquidation of the credit institution and the commencement of the liquidation procedure issued by the court, the question arises as to whether the exercise of the sale of business tool under the draft law may affect any of the powers of the competent supervisory authority. 3.5 Use of the deposit guarantee fund to finance the liquidation of a credit institution 3.5.1 Pursuant to the draft law , the DGS’s available financial means may be used to cover any funding gap in respect of a sale of the business of the liquidating credit institution to another credit

text: institution; this is subject to a decision of the DGS Committee taken based on a recommendation of the CBC and subject to the consent of the Minister for Finance. In order to formulate its recommendation, the CBC must prepare and submit to the Deposit Guarantee Scheme Committee, inter alia, an assessment of whether the proposed sale of business meets its objective, the amount of the funding gap and the funding request from the DGS, together with an assessment of whether the requested funding meets the requirements under the relevant provisions of the law and whether State aid may also be necessary. In order to utilise the DGS to cover a funding gap, the CBC in cooperation with the Ministry of Finance, must ensure compliance with the Commission’s State aid rules, to the extent applicable. 3.5.2 The amending Deposit Guarantee Scheme Law provides for the use of the Deposit Guarantee Fund to finance (1) alternative measures to prevent the liquidation of credit institutions in accordance with the draft law, and (2) sales of businesses under the draft law . In particular, the draft law provides that the available financial means of the Deposit Guarantee Fund may also be used to finance measures aimed at ensuring depositors’ access to their covered deposits, including the transfer of assets and liabilities and the transfer of deposits in the liquidation of a credit institution pursuant to the draft law, provided that the direct or indirect costs borne by the Deposit Guarantee Scheme do not exceed the net amount of compensation paid in respect of covered deposits in that credit institution. 3.5.3 Alternative measures can help to preserve value for creditors, facilitate uninterrupted access to deposits and protect financial stability. At the same time, the least-cost test helps to limit costs for the DGS. The ECB therefore welcomes the option of using alternative measures to improve the management of bank failures in the Republic of Cyprus.

text: This opinion will be published on EUR-Lex.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 19 May 2023.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Christine LAGARDE

type: vagledning

utgivare: ecb


title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 30 May 2023 on increasing a cash payment limit (CON/2023/13)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 30 May 2023 on increasing a cash payment limit (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 19 April 2023 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Chairman of the Financial and Budgetary Committee of the National Council of the Slovak Republic, for an opinion on a draft law amending Law No 394/2012 on restricting cash payments (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the second indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft law relates to means of payment. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: Law No 394/2012 on restricting cash payments prohibits: (a) cash payments in excess of EUR 5 000 by or from legal persons or natural persons who are entrepreneurs; and (b) cash payments in excess of EUR 15 000 between natural persons who are not entrepreneurs. The draft law amends Law No 394/2012 on restricting cash payments by applying a uniform restriction of EUR 15 000 for cash payments by or from all legal and natural persons, thus effectively increasing the amount permitted to be settled in cash from EUR 5 000 to EUR 15 000 for both legal persons and natural persons who are entrepreneurs.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 Cash plays an important role in society. Cash is generally useful as a payment instrument because it is legal tender, widely accepted, fast and facilitates control over the payer’s spending. Moreover, it is the only payment instrument that allows citizens to settle a transaction in central bank money, which is also settled instantly, while ensuring privacy . In addition, the ability to pay in cash remains particularly important for certain groups in society that, for various legitimate reasons, prefer to use cash rather than other payment instruments, or do not have access to the banking system and electronic means of payments. These groups include not only elderly people, but also some disabled

text: 1 Návrh zákona ktorým sa mení zákon č. 394/2012 Z. z. o obmedzení platieb v hotovosti. 2 Council Decision of 29 June 1998 on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).

text: 3 Zákon č. 394/2012 Z. z. z 29, novembra 2012 o obmedzení platieb v hotovosti.

text: 4 See paragraph 2.4 of Opinion

text: ; paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: ; paragraph 9.2.1 of Opinion

text: ; paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: ; paragraph 7.2.1 of Opinion

text: ; paragraph 2.1 of

text: and paragraph 2.1 of

text: . All ECB opinions are published on EUR-Lex. citizens, immigrants, socially vulnerable citizens, minors, and others with limited or no access to digital payment services . Against this backdrop, the ECB closely monitors any national law developments that aim to limit cash payment possibilities for natural or legal persons and thereby interfere with citizens' right to pay in cash. 2.2 Under the Treaty, the European System of Central Banks has the basic task of promoting the smooth operation of payment systems , and the ECB has the exclusive right to authorise the issue of euro banknotes within the Union . The euro banknotes issued by the ECB and the national central banks of the euro area are the only banknotes with legal tender status within the euro area . 2.3 The concept of ‘legal tender’ of a means of payment denominated in a currency unit has been considered by the Court of Justice of the European Union. In particular, the Court has clarified that the concept of ‘legal tender’ signifies that this specific means of payment cannot generally be refused in settlement of a debt, denominated in the same currency unit at its full face value, with the effect of discharging the debt. In clarifying the concept of ‘legal tender’ under Union law, the Court has taken into consideration Commission Recommendation 2010/191 of 22 March 2010 on the scope and effects of legal tender of euro banknotes and coins , which provides useful guidance for the interpretation of the relevant provisions of Union law. Point 1 of Recommendation 2010/191 states that, where a payment obligation exists, the legal tender of euro banknotes and coins should imply: (i) mandatory acceptance of those banknotes and coins; (ii) their acceptance at full face value; and (iii) their power to discharge from payment obligations. According to the Court, this shows that the concept of ‘legal tender’ encompasses, inter alia, an obligation in principle to accept banknotes and coins denominated in euro for payment purposes . 2.4 Insofar as it allows the Union legislature to lay down the measures necessary for the use of the euro as the single currency, the Court clarified that Article 133 of the Treaty empowers the Union legislature alone to specify the legal rules governing the status of legal tender accorded to banknotes and coins denominated in euro, insofar as that is necessary for the use of the euro as the single currency. Such exclusive competence precludes any competence on the part of the Member States in the matter, unless they have been empowered by the Union to do so or for the implementation of Union acts . 2.5 However, the Court further clarified that the status of legal tender calls only for acceptance in principle of banknotes and coins denominated in euro as a means of payment, not for absolute acceptance. The Union’s exclusive competence in matters of monetary policy is without prejudice to the competence of the Member States whose currency is the euro to regulate the procedures for settling pecuniary obligations, which do not affect the principle that, as a general rule, it must be possible to

text: 5 See paragraph 1.5 of Opinion

text: ; and paragraph 2.1 of

text: 6 Article 127(2) of the Treaty and Article 3.1 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter the ‘Statute of the ESCB’).

text: 9 OJ L 83, 30.3.2010, p. 70.

text: 10 See judgment of the Court of Justice of 26 January 2021, Hessischer Rundfunk,

text: and

text: , ECLI:EU:C:2021:63, paragraphs 46 to 49.

text: 11 See judgment of the Court of Justice of 26 January 2021, Hessischer Rundfunk,

text: and

text: , ECLI:EU:C:2021:63, paragraphs 50 to 52. discharge a payment obligation in cash. Thus, that exclusive competence does not prevent a Member State from adopting a measure falling within one of the Member State’s competences; for instance, a Member State may, based on its competence to regulate administrative procedures, oblige the public administration to accept cash payments from citizens. Neither does it prevent a Member State, in the exercise of its own powers, from introducing, on legitimate public interest grounds, a derogation from that obligation for statutorily imposed payments, subject to compliance with certain conditions. In particular, the obligation to accept euro banknotes and coins may, in principle, be restricted by the Member States for reasons of public interest and subject to the principle of proportionality. This means that any such restrictions must be proportionate to the public interest objective pursued. When limiting the possibility, recognised by Union law, of generally discharging a payment obligation in banknotes and coins denominated in euro, Member States must ensure that any measures comply with the principle of proportionality, which requires in particular that they are appropriate for achieving the legitimate objectives pursued by the legislation at issue and do not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives . 2.6 The Court has established that restrictions of the legal tender status of euro banknotes in particular require that the legislation: (i) does not have the object or effect of establishing legal rules governing the status of legal tender of euro banknotes; (ii) does not lead, in law or in fact, to abolition of those banknotes, in particular by calling into question the possibility, as a general rule, of discharging a payment obligation in cash; (iii) has been adopted for reasons of public interest; (iv) only entails a limitation on payments in cash that is appropriate for attaining the public interest objective pursued; and (v) only entails a limitation on payments in cash that does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve the public interest objective pursued . 2.7 Regarding the proportionality of a restriction of the legal tender status of euro banknotes, the Court requires not only that the measure is appropriate for attaining the public interest objective pursued, but also that it must not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve that objective. The ECB has undertaken additional reflection in its opinions with respect to whether limitations may be considered proportionate . In particular, the ECB has noted that the broader and more general a limitation is, the stricter should be the interpretation of the requirement for the limitation to be proportionate to the objective pursued. When considering whether a limitation is proportionate, the adverse impact of the limitation in question and whether alternative measures could be adopted that would fulfil the relevant objective with a less adverse impact should always be considered .

text: 3. Specific observations

text: 3.1 The draft law, similarly to Law No 394/2012 on restricting cash payments, has neither the objective nor the effect of amending the legal rules governing the status of legal tender of euro banknotes or

text: 12 See judgment of the Court of Justice of 26 January 2021, Hessischer Rundfunk,

text: and

text: , ECLI:EU:C:2021:63, paragraphs 55 to 56 and 67 to 70.

text: 13 See judgment of the Court of Justice of 26 January 2021, Hessischer Rundfunk,

text: and

text: , ECLI:EU:C:2021:63, paragraph 78.

text: 14 See paragraph 4 of Opinion

text: of the European Central Bank of 16 February 2022 on a proposal for a directive and a regulation on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing (OJ, OJ C 210, 25.5.2022, p. 15).

text: 15 See paragraph 2.7 of Opinion

text: . coins. Given that the draft law materially broadens the legal use of cash, it does not, of course, lead, in law or in fact, to the abolition of euro banknotes in the Slovak Republic . 3.2 The draft law was adopted for reasons of public interest. Firstly, Law No 394/2012 on restricting cash payments aims at combating tax fraud and evasion . Secondly, the explanatory memorandum to the draft law reflects on the effectiveness of Law No 394/2012 on restricting cash payments in achieving these aims, noting that these declared objectives were not achieved . Thirdly, by increasing from EUR 5 000 to EUR 15 000 the permitted amount to be settled in cash by or from legal persons or natural persons who are entrepreneurs, the draft law aims at reflecting the increase in wage and price levels since 2013 and to set one uniform threshold . 3.3 Regarding the proportionality of the draft law, the threshold of EUR 15 000 introduced by the draft law does not seem to go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve the objective of combatting tax fraud and evasion. The increased limit seems to be more aligned with the fact that Law No 394/2012 on restricting cash payments imposes a general limitation on cash payments . 3.4 The ECB notes, however, that

text: Article 11

text: (c) of

text: Directive (EU) 2015/849

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council requires Member States to ensure that persons trading in goods apply customer due diligence measures when carrying out occasional transactions in cash amounting to EUR 10 000 or more. Furthermore, a Commission proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing (hereinafter the ‘proposed AML Regulation’) proposes to introduce a prohibition on persons trading in goods and providing services who accept or make payments in cash exceeding EUR 10 000 or the equivalent amount in other currencies. The proposed AML Regulation also proposes to allow Member States to retain lower limits or, following a consultation of the ECB, adopt lower limits. It follows that, if the proposed AML Regulation is adopted in its current form, the Slovak authorities would have to either abolish the common limit or adjust the common limit proposed by the draft law so that it is below the limit imposed by the AML Regulation. This opinion will be published on EUR-Lex.

text: 16 See paragraph 4.6 of Opinion

text: 17 See third paragraph of the general part of the explanatory memorandum to the draft law and paragraph 1.1 of Opinion

text: 18 See fourth and fifth paragraphs of the general part of the explanatory memorandum to the draft law.

text: 19 See sixth paragraph of the general part of the explanatory memorandum to the draft law. 20 See paragraph 4.8 of Opinion

text: in which the ECB notes that the broader and more general the limitation, the stricter the interpretation of the requirement for the limitation to be proportionate to the objective pursued should be. 21

text: Directive (EU) 2015/849

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, amending

text: Regulation (EU) No 648/2012

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council and

text: Commission Directive 2006/70/EC

text: (OJ L 141, 5.6.2015, p. 73). 22 COM(2021) 420 final. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 30 May 2023. [signed] The President of the ECB Christine LAGARDE


text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42). 2 See section 44a(1) of the Law on the OeNB.

text: See section 44a(3) of the Law on the OeNB. 4 Available on the Bank for International Settlements’ website at www.bis.org. 6 See section 4(1) of the draft ordinance. 7 See Annex 1 of the draft ordinance.

text: See section 8 of the draft ordinance. 12 See section 9 of the draft ordinance. 13 See section 10 of the draft ordinance. 14 See section 15 of the draft ordinance. 15 See section 17 of the draft ordinance. 16

text: See section 18 of the draft ordinance. 23 See section 19 of the draft ordinance. 24 See section 21 of the draft ordinance. 25 See section 22 of the draft ordinance. 26 See section 23 of the draft ordinance. 27 Eurosystem, ‘Revised oversight framework for retail payment systems’, February 2016, available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 28 Eurosystem, ‘Oversight expectations for links between retail payment systems’, 29 November 2012, available on the ECB’s website. 29 Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures of the Bank for International Settlements and the International Organization of Securities Commissions, ‘Guidance on cyber resilience for financial market infrastructures’, CPMI Papers No 146, 29 June 2016, available on the Bank for International Settlements’ website. 30 ‘Cyber resilience oversight expectations for financial market infrastructures’, December 2018, available on the ECB’s website.

text: Regulation (EU) No 795/2014

text: of the European Central Bank of 3 July 2014 on oversight requirements for systematically important payment systems (ECB/2014/28) (OJ L 217, 23.7.2014, p. 16).

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 1 June 2023 on the system security oversight of payment systems (CON/2023/14)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 1 June 2023 on the system security oversight of payment systems (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 26 April 2023 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Oesterreichische Nationalbank (OeNB) for an opinion on a draft ordinance on the system security of payment systems (hereinafter the ‘draft ordinance’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third, fifth and sixth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft ordinance relates to the OeNB, payment and settlement systems, and rules applicable to financial institutions that materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft ordinance

text: 1.1 According to the Law on the Oesterreichische Nationalbank (hereinafter the ‘Law on the OeNB’), one of the basic tasks of the OeNB is to exercise oversight of payment systems. This oversight includes the examination of the systemic security of payment systems and extends to (1) operators of payment systems governed by Austrian law and (2) payment system participants established in Austria (hereinafter the ‘obliged parties’) . 1.2 The OeNB has broad oversight powers under the Law on the OeNB and can request the obliged parties to provide information and documents on the measures they have taken to ensure the system security of, and security of participation in, a payment system. The OeNB is also entitled to have onsite inspections carried out at the premises of obliged parties and may request them to remedy identified deficiencies within a reasonable period. Further, the OeNB can prohibit the operation of, or participation in, a payment system if the obliged parties do not (fully) comply with their duties under the Law on the OeNB and the draft ordinance. Lastly, the OeNB is entitled to publish, in the Official Gazette of the Wiener Zeitung or in any other official gazette with nationwide circulation, the supervisory measures it has imposed.

text: 1.3 Pursuant to the Law on the OeNB, the OeNB is entitled to determine by ordinance the content of recommendations of the ECB and of the Basel Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (now the Committee on Payment and Market Infrastructures), which constitute international principles for the systemic security of payment systems, as binding in the area of payment system oversight . The draft ordinance is the first regulation issued by the OeNB based on this competence and aims to implement the Committee on Payment and Market Infrastructures (CPMI) and the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) principles for financial market infrastructures (hereinafter the ‘CPMI-IOSCO principles’) in a legally binding ordinance. 1.4 The OeNB found during its oversight activities that the operators of and participants in payment systems are sometimes not fully aware of the requirements for ensuring the system security of payment systems. Thus, the draft ordinance seeks to increase the transparency of these requirements, primarily for the obliged parties. 1.5 Against this backdrop, the draft ordinance sets out the requirements for obliged parties that are used by the OeNB to verify payment system security. The OeNB can explicitly stipulate further requirements by exercising its oversight powers under the Law on the OeNB. However, the draft ordinance also proposes that the checks to be carried out by the OeNB should depend on the size and systemic relevance of the obliged parties, as well as on the type, scope and complexity of their transactions . Thus, depending on the structure of the payment system, not all the sections of the draft ordinance need apply. 1.6 Under the draft ordinance, payment system operators are required to notify the OeNB within two weeks of the taking-up and termination of their operation, the participants in their payment systems and any changes in this regard . Payment system operators must also notify the OeNB of severe security and operational incidents using a standardised template . 1.7 Legal framework and organisational requirements The draft ordinance proposes that payment systems should have a solid, clear, transparent and enforceable legal basis for all of their essential activities . Further, the management structures of a payment system should be regulated in a clear and transparent manner in order to promote the security and effectiveness of the payment system . 1.8 Risk management The draft ordinance proposes that a payment system should have a robust risk management to manage legal, credit, liquidity, operational and other risks . The risk management is described in more detail for the risk categories mentioned. In particular, a payment system should ensure the effective monitoring and management of its credit risk exposures to participants or those credit risk

text: exposures arising from payment, clearing and settlement processes of the payment system . A payment system should therefore also request collateral with low credit, liquidity and market risks to secure its own and participants’ credit risk exposures . For the effective management of liquidity risks, a payment system must have sufficient liquid funds available in all currencies that are relevant to the payment system in order to fulfil any payment obligations on the same day or at the latest on one of the following days . It must also ensure that general commercial risks are identified and that sufficient liquid net assets are available to allow transactions and services to continue in the event of a loss . A payment system must furthermore, through the use of appropriate systems, processes and controls, identify internal and external factors that could give rise to operational risks and limit their effects . Lastly, for a payment system linked to one or other payment systems, the associated risks must be identified, monitored and controlled . 1.9 Settlement The draft ordinance proposes that a payment system should ensure clear and irrevocable settlement by the end of the value date at the latest and, where necessary, offer irrevocable settlement on the same day or in real time . Further, cash settlement on behalf of a payment system should take place via central bank accounts depending on availability and practicability . Lastly, if a payment system settles transactions from which multiple obligations arise, such as securities or foreign exchange transactions, it should eliminate settlement risk by making the final settlement of one obligation conditional on the final settlement of the other obligation . 1.10 Rules for participant default The draft ordinance proposes that a payment system should establish effective and clearly defined rules for participant default. This would enable that payment system to limit losses and liquidity shortfalls in good time while meeting its obligations . 1.11 Investment policy Currently, there is no express binding requirement for a payment system to have an investment policy. Therefore, the draft ordinance proposes that a payment system should protect its own assets and its participants’ assets and minimise the risk of loss and/or delayed access to these assets. The draft ordinance also proposes that a payment system should invest its funds in instruments with minimal credit, market and liquidity risks .

text: 1.12 Participant conditions The draft ordinance proposes that a payment system should have objective, risk based and publicly accessible participant criteria that allow fair and open access . Further, a payment system should identify, monitor and control significant risks linked to an indirect or tiered participant structure . Regarding the participants of a payment system, the draft ordinance also proposes that a payment system should meet its requirements, and the markets that it serves, efficiently and effectively . 1.13 Communication processes and publications Lastly, the draft ordinance proposes that a payment system should use the relevant internationally recognised communication processes and standards that enable their use to improve the efficiency of payments, clearing, settlement and recording . A payment system should also have clear and comprehensive rules and processes. These serve to make sufficient information available to give participants a precise understanding of the risks, fees and other major costs that arise through participation in a payment system. All relevant rules and processes should be disclosed in this regard .

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 The ECB welcomes the draft ordinance, which aims to achieve alignment with the CPMI-IOSCO principles. The ECB also welcomes the OeNB’s intention of supporting its role as overseer of payment system security by increasing transparency regarding the binding requirements for obliged parties. The draft ordinance will thus facilitate the consistent and harmonised application by OeNB of Eurosystem standards when conducting its oversight of payment systems in Austria. 2.2 The ECB understands that the draft ordinance, due to its broad definition of ‘payment systems’, also applies to Austrian prominently important retail payment systems and other retail payment systems. The ECB understands that the OeNB continues to apply the Eurosystem’s revised oversight framework for retail payment systems and oversight expectations for links between retail payment systems that have been implemented by the Eurosystem for non-systemically important retail payment systems operating in the euro area. 2.3 The ECB notes that the CPMI-IOSCO principles have been supplemented by the CPMI-IOSCO’s guidance on cyber resilience for financial market infrastructures , which the ECB has operationalised in its cyber resilience oversight expectations for financial market infrastructures .

text: The ECB understands that the OeNB already applies this guidance for its oversight activities in the area of cyber resilience as it forms part of the CPMI-IOSCO principles. This understanding is supported by section 1(3) of the draft ordinance, according to which the OeNB may stipulate further requirements by exercising its oversight powers under section 44a of the Law on the OeNB. 2.4 The ECB understands that the draft ordinance is exclusively concerned with payment systems governed by Austrian law or registered in Austria and that it does not interfere with the implementation of ECB and Eurosystem oversight policy for payment systems and payment instruments, as set out in

text: Regulation (EU) No 795/2014

text: of the European Central Bank (hereinafter the ‘SIPS Regulation’) . The only systematically important payment system (SIPS) in Austria is the Austrian component in TARGET. However, the ECB understands that this component is not regulated by the draft ordinance because under the SIPS Regulation, which is directly applicable, the ECB is responsible for overseeing TARGET, which also encompasses the Austrian component in TARGET. The ECB further understands that if a SIPS were to emerge in Austria in the future, it would be regulated by the SIPS Regulation, given the supremacy of Union law, and especially the principle of priority of application.

text: This opinion will be published on EUR-Lex.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 1 June 2023.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Christine LAGARDE


text: COM(2022) 71 final.

text: Se artikel 4 i direktivförslaget.

text: Se artikel 6 i direktivförslaget.

text: Se artikel 5 i direktivförslaget.

text: Se artiklarna 7 och 8 i direktivförslaget.

text: Se artikel 9 i direktivförslaget.

text: Se artikel 10 i direktivförslaget.

text: Se artikel 11 i direktivförslaget.

text: Se

text: artikel 3 a

text: iv i direktivförslaget.

text: Se

text: artikel 4.1

text: .1 i

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning (EU) nr 575/2013 av den 26 juni 2013

text: om tillsynskrav för kreditinstitut och värdepappersföretag och om ändring av förordning

text: (EU) nr 648/2012

text: (EUT L 176, 27.6.2013, s. 1).

text: Se artikel 6.1 i direktivförslaget.

text: Se artikel 3 g i direktivförslaget.

text: Se

text: artikel 49 i Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv (EU) 2015/849 av den 20 maj 2015

text: om åtgärder för att förhindra att det finansiella systemet används för penningtvätt eller finansiering av terrorism, om ändring av

text: och om upphävande av

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 2005/60/EG

text: och rådets och

text: kommissionens direktiv 2006/70/EG

text: (EUT L 141, 5.6.2015, s. 73), punkterna 3.1–3.8 i ECB:s yttrande

text: . Alla ECB:s yttranden finns i EUR-Lex.

text: Se

text: artikel 79 i Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 2014/65/EU av den 15 maj 2014

text: om marknader för finansiella instrument och om ändring av direktiv

text: och av direktiv

text: (EUT L 173, 12.6.2014, s. 349).

text: Se

text: artikel 84 i Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning (EU) nr 648/2012 av den 4 juli 2012

text: om OTC-derivat, centrala motparter och transaktionsregister (EUT L 201, 27.7.2012, s. 1).

text: Se artikel 22 i direktivförslaget.

text: Se även ECB:s Guide on climate-related and environmental risks, finns på ECB:s webbplats för banktillsyn www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu. Se även pressreleasen ECB sets deadlines for banks to deal with climate risks, finns på ECB:s webbplats för banktillsyn www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu

text: Se Frank Eldersons tal Running up that hill – how climate-related and environmental risks turned mainstream in banking supervision and next steps for banks’ risk management practices, finns på ECB:s webbplats www.ecb.europa.eu

text: Se artikel 15 i direktivförslaget.

text: Se

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv (EU) 2022/2464 av den 14 december 2022

text: om ändring av förordning

text: (EU) nr 537/2014

text: , direktiv

text: , direktiv

text: och direktiv

text: vad gäller företagens hållbarhetsrapportering (EUT L 322, 16.12.2022, s. 15).

text: Se

text: artikel 76 i Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 2013/36/EU av den 26 juni 2013

text: om behörighet att utöva verksamhet i kreditinstitut och om tillsyn av kreditinstitut och värdepappersföretag, om ändring av direktiv

text: och om upphävande av direktiv

text: och

text: (EUT L 176, 27.6.2013, s. 338).

text: Artikel 17.1 i direktivförslaget.

text: Artikel 17.5 i direktivförslaget.

text: Se

text: artikel 2.2 i rådets förordning (EU) nr 1024/2013 av den 15 oktober 2013

text: om tilldelning av särskilda uppgifter till Europeiska centralbanken i fråga om politiken för tillsyn över kreditinstitut (EUT L 287, 29.10.2013, s. 63).

text: Artikel 21 i direktivförslaget.

text: Se European Financial Reporting Advisory Group, First Set of draft ESRS”, november 2022, finns på EFRAG:s webbplats www.efrag.org

sprak: sv

title: Europeiska centralbankens yttrande av den 6 juni 2023 om förslaget till direktiv om tillbörlig aktsamhet för företag i fråga om hållbarhet (CON/2023/15) 2023/C 249/03

text: Inledning och rättslig grund

text: Den 23 februari 2022 offentliggjorde Europeiska kommissionen förslaget till direktiv om tillbörlig aktsamhet för företag i fråga om hållbarhet och om ändring av

text: direktiv (EU) 2019/1937

text: (nedan kallat direktivförslaget).

text: Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) har beslutat att avge ett yttrande på eget initiativ över direktivförslaget. ECB:s behörighet att avge ett yttrande grundas på artiklarna

text: och

text: i fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt eftersom direktivförslaget innehåller bestämmelser som påverkar ECB:s uppgifter i fråga om tillsyn över kreditinstitut i enlighet med artikel 127.6 i fördraget och Europeiska centralbankssystemets medverkan till att de behöriga myndigheterna smidigt kan genomföra sin politik när det gäller det finansiella systemets stabilitet, enligt vad som avses i artikel 127.5 i fördraget. I enlighet med

text: artikel 17.5

text: första meningen i arbetsordningen för Europeiska centralbanken har detta yttrande antagits av ECB-rådet.

text: 1. Allmänna kommentarer

text: 1.1. Enligt direktivförslaget ska vissa större företag uppfylla krav på tillbörlig aktsamhet i fråga om mänskliga rättigheter och miljö, inklusive att identifiera faktiska och potentiella negativa effekter, integrera tillbörlig aktsamhet i företagens policyer, förhindra eller minimera negativa effekter, inrätta och upprätthålla ett klagomålsförfarande, övervaka åtgärder och riktlinjer samt rapportering. För detta ändamål definierar direktivförslaget ett företag som omfattas av direktivet så att detta även inkluderar ett reglerat finansiellt företag, vilket i sin tur bl.a. omfattar kreditinstitut enligt definitionen i

text: (nedan kallade kreditinstitut).

text: 1.2. Dessutom ska de företag som omfattas av direktivförslaget vidta lämpliga åtgärder för att identifiera faktiska och potentiella negativa effekter för de mänskliga rättigheterna och negativa miljöeffekter som härrör från deras egen eller dotterbolagens verksamhet och, i de fall de har anknytning till deras värdekedjor, från deras etablerade affärsförbindelser. När det gäller reglerade finansiella företag, inklusive kreditinstitut, definieras termen värdekedja i direktivförslaget som verksamhet som bedrivs av kunder som mottar lån, krediter och andra finansiella tjänster. Tillbörlig aktsamhet i fråga om mänskliga rättigheter och miljö faller utanför ECB:s behörighetsområde men direktivförslaget kan få betydande praktiska konsekvenser för kreditinstitut. Mot denna bakgrund rekommenderas att direktivförslaget bör innehålla bestämmelser om samarbete och informationsutbyte mellan de myndigheter som ansvarar för tillsynen över kreditinstitutens efterlevnad av direktivförslaget och de myndigheter som ansvarar för tillsynen över kreditinstitut, däribland ECB. I detta avseende noterar ECB att unionens medlagstiftare har inrättat arrangemang för samarbete och informationsutbyte mellan å ena sidan tillsynsmyndigheter och å andra sidan de behöriga tillsynsmyndigheter som ansvarar för tillsynen av kreditinstitutens efterlevnad av unionslagstiftning som reglerar andra verksamhetsområden som faller utanför ECB:s behörighet för tillsyn över kreditinstitut. Sådana arrangemang har inrättats till exempel på områdena för bekämpning av penningtvätt och finansiering av terrorism, marknader för finansiella instrumentoch marknadsinfrastruktur.

text: 1.3. Genom direktivförslaget införs civilrättsligt ansvar för företag som inte fullgör sina skyldigheter att förebygga potentiella negativa effekter och få de faktiska negativa konsekvenserna att upphöra, om en sådan underlåtenhet leder till skador. Även om ytterligare detaljer om systemet för civilrättsligt ansvar (till exempel definitionen av täckta skador och bevisbördan) behöver definieras, förväntas risken för rättstvister för banker att öka avsevärt till följd av denna ansvarsordning. TECB förväntar sig att de kreditinstitut som står under tillsyn hanterar dessa risker i linje med ECB:s förväntningar på tillsyn som ECB har informerat om. Det noteras i detta sammanhang att ECB hittills har använt sig av en riskbaserad metod vid bedömningen av en banks exponering för risker avseende miljö-, samhällsansvars- eller bolagsstyrningsrisker (ESG-risker). ECB har till exempel meddelat att bankerna måste förstå de konsekvenser som övergången till en mer hållbar ekonomi medför för deras transaktioner och exponeringar och återspegla sådana risker i sin övergripande riskhanteringsstrategi. Ur detta perspektiv kan fortsatt utlåning för att finansiera verksamhet som är exponerad för höga omställningsrisker anses vara förenlig med en sund riskhantering endast om låntagaren har en trovärdig och vetenskapligt baserad övergångsplan som är anpassad till Parisavtalet för att hantera och minska sin omställningsrisk över tid. I synnerhet omfattar en sund hantering av övergångsrisker också en sund hantering av risken för rättstvister. I detta sammanhang betonar ECB att införandet av civilrättsligt ansvar i samband med de negativa effekterna av sådan utlåning måste ta hänsyn till och erkänna betydelsen av företagens övergångsplanering. I linje med ovannämnda tillsynsmetod kan utlåning till finansiering av verksamhet som är exponerad för stora omställningsrisker ändå anses vara förenlig med sunda riskhanteringsmetoder, förutsatt att det marginella bidraget från den planerade eller genomförda verksamheten förblir förenlig med trovärdiga övergångsplaner. Detta är ytterst viktigt för att säkerställa att bankerna kan finansiera omställningsinsatser för kunder som ännu inte är – men som har planer på att bli – anpassade till EU:s klimatmål och Parisavtalet.

text: 1.4. De företag som omfattas av direktivförslaget ska anta en plan för att säkerställa att företagets affärsmodell och företagsstrategi är förenliga med omställningen till en hållbar ekonomi och med begränsningen av den globala uppvärmningen till 1,5°C i linje med Parisavtalet. Mer specifikt ska företagen inkluderar utsläppsminskningsmål i sin plan, om klimatförändringar identifieras som en betydande risk. Skyldigheten att anta en övergångsplan föreskrivs i direktivförslaget, men innehållet i, och de praktiska kraven för offentliggörande av, en omställningsplan föreskrivs separat i

text: (nedan kallat direktivet om företagens hållbarhetsrapportering). Det är därför av yttersta vikt att det finns en nära samordning och samstämmighet mellan definitionerna och kraven i direktivförslaget och direktivet om företagens hållbarhetsrapportering. ECB betonar behovet av att säkerställa konsekvens och interoperabilitet för övergångsplaner enligt dessa två rättsakter. Det är viktigt att notera att de övergångsplaner som krävs enligt direktivförslaget och direktivet om företagens hållbarhetsrapportering kan skilja sig både vad gäller mål och syfte från de övergångsplaner som krävs ur ett tillsynsperspektiv enligt

text: (nedan kallat kapitalkravsdirektivet eller CRD), som för närvarande håller på att ses över. Målet för medkapitalkravsdirektivet är att säkerställa att kreditinstituten gör heltäckande bedömningar av ESG-risker och integrerar framåtblickande aspekter från dessa risker i sina strategier, prissättning, löpande övervakning och riskhantering, i syfte att säkerställa kreditinstitutets motståndskraft.

text: 1.5. Enligt direktivförslaget ska medlemsstaterna utse en eller flera tillsynsmyndigheter med uppgift att övervaka efterlevnaden av de skyldigheter som fastställs förslaget. I detta sammanhang kan de myndigheter som för närvarande utsetts till behöriga myndigheter för tillsyn över reglerade finansiella företag också utses till tillsynsmyndigheter enligt direktivförslaget med avseende på de finansiella företag som omfattas av direktivförslaget. ECB betonar att tillsynen av efterlevnaden av de skyldigheter som fastställs i direktivförslaget utgör en uppgift som skiljer sig från de nationella behöriga myndigheternas tillsynsuppgifter inom ramen för den gemensamma tillsynsmekanismen. Om de nationella behöriga myndigheterna inom den gemensamma tillsynsmekanismen ska utses till tillsynsmyndighet av medlemsstaterna enligt direktivförslaget bör de ges de medel och resurser som krävs för att utföra dessa nya uppgifter utan att deras nuvarande tillsynsansvar påverkas negativt.. ECB upprepar dessutom behovet av lämpliga arrangemang för samordning, samarbete och informationsutbyte mellan å ena sidan de myndigheter som ansvarar för tillsynen av att kreditinstituten fullgör sina skyldigheter enligt direktivförslaget och de myndigheter som ansvarar för tillsynen över kreditinstitut , å andra sidan, däribland ECB. Sådana arrangemang bör i möjligaste mån bidra till att förhindra dubbla rapporteringskrav och inkonsekvent beslutsfattande avseende de kreditinstitut som står under tillsyn.

text: 1.6. Kommissionen ska inrätta ett europeiskt nätverk av tillsynsmyndigheter bestående av företrädare för de tillsynsmyndigheter som utsetts av medlemsstaterna, till vilket kommissionen kan bjuda in europeiska byråer att delta i syfte att utbyta information, tillhandahålla ömsesidigt stöd och fastställa åtgärder för ett effektivt samarbete. I direktivförslaget utesluts med rätta möjligheten att ECB ges uppgiften att övervaka efterlevnaden av direktivförslaget av de betydande kreditinstitut som står under dess direkta tillsyn. Detta överensstämmer med ECB:s uppfattning att denna uppgift inte omfattas av de tillsynsuppgifter som kan tilldelas ECB enligt artikel 127.6 i fördraget. ECB anser dock att det är av avgörande betydelse att det föreslagna europeiska nätverket av tillsynsmyndigheter utvidgas till att även omfatta ECB i dess egenskap av tillsynsmyndighet över kreditinstitut. Detta skulle säkerställa samordning och ge en sund rättslig grund för inrättandet av arrangemang för samarbete och informationsutbyte mellan ECB och de tillsynsmyndigheter som utsetts enligt direktivförslaget, särskilt när det gäller sådana reglerade finansiella företag som omfattas av direkt tillsyn av ECB (dvs. betydande kreditinstitut), men som samtidigt också skulle vara föremål för tillsyn av de nationella tillsynsmyndigheter som utsetts av medlemsstaterna för tillämpningen av direktivförslaget.

text: 1.7. Direktivförslaget innehåller en definition av reglerade finansiella företags värdekedja. Detta skulle kunna påverka framtida regelverk, till exempel de europeiska standarder för hållbarhetsrapportering som tas fram av European Financial Reporting Advisory Group och ska antas av kommissionen inom ramen för direktivet om företagens hållbarhetsrapportering. Definitionen bör bedömas noggrant inom ramen för tillsynsregelverk, eftersom det eventuellt inte är lämpligt att använda den i tillsynsregelverk. Detta beror på att det ur tillsynssynpunkt är viktigt att reglerade finansiella företag har en heltäckande överblick över de omställningsrisker som är inneboende i deras värdekedja. Därför kan det behövas en mer djupgående analys och ytterligare övervägande av definitionen av värdekedjan i den mån den avser reglerade finansiella företag..

text: 1.8. Slutligen betonar ECB vikten av ett gradvist och ordnat ikraftträdande av direktivförslaget för att göra det möjligt för företag att anpassa sina interna processer och affärsförbindelser till de nya kraven. Detta är särskilt viktigt för att reglerade finansiella företag ska kunna säkerställa en ordnad omvärdering av risker och undvika tröskeleffekter som kan leda till plötsliga avbrott av finansiella tjänster med potentiellt negativa effekter på den finansiella stabiliteten. I de fall där ECB rekommenderar att direktivförslaget ska ändras anges de specifika förslagen i ett separat tekniskt arbetsdokument som åtföljs av en förklaring. Det tekniska arbetsdokumentet finns på engelska i EUR-Lex.

text: Utfärdat i Frankfurt am Main den 6 juni 2023.

text: Christine Lagarde

text: ECB:s ordförande


text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42). 2 10/2005. (VI.11.) MNB rendelet a kötelező jegybanki tartalék kiszámításáról, illetve képzésének és elhelyezésének módjáról, published in Magyar Közlöny 2005/78. 3 The amendments on which the ECB adopted opinions were introduced by 43/2018. (XI.21.) MNB rendelet a kötelező jegybanki tartalék kiszámításáról, illetve képzésének és elhelyezésének módjáról szóló 10/2005. (VI. 11.) MNB rendelet módosításáról, published in Magyar Közlöny 2018/182, and 36/2022. (IX. 15.) MNB rendelet a kötelező jegybanki tartalék kiszámításáról, illetve képzésének és elhelyezésének módjáról szóló 10/2005. (VI. 11.) MNB rendelet módosításáról, published in Magyar Közlöny 2022/150. 4 Opinions

text: and

text: . All ECB opinions are available on EUR-Lex. 5 6/2023. (III. 8.) MNB rendelet a kötelező tartalékráta mértékéről, published in Magyar Közlöny 2023/34.

text: A Kormány 89/2023. (III. 22.) Korm. rendelete gazdasági, finanszírozási tárgyú intézkedésekről, published in Magyar Közlöny 2023/41. 7 See, for example, paragraph 2 of

text: , paragraph 2.6 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: . 8 Article 282(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 42.2 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 12 June 2023 on the minimum reserve requirements of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (CON/2023/16)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 12 June 2023 on the minimum reserve requirements of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 25 May 2023, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (MNB) for an opinion on a draft MNB decree (hereinafter the ‘draft decree’) amending the MNB Decree on the calculation, method of allocation and placement of minimum reserves. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and

text: Article 2(2) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft decree relates to instruments of monetary policy of a Member State that has not adopted the euro. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Background and purpose of the draft decree

text: 1.1 In 2005 the Governor of the MNB adopted Decree 10/2005 on the calculation, method of allocation 2 3 and placement of minimum reserves , which was amended several times . The ECB adopted several opinions in relation to the proposed draft changes . 1.2 As noted in the explanatory memorandum accompanying the draft decree, the purpose of the current amendment is to ‘ensure that the level of the reserve requirement for maintenance periods better reflects the development of the reserve base of credit institutions’ and to ‘reduce the likelihood and magnitude of ad hoc turbulence in financial markets impairing monetary policy’. Prior to the present proposed amendment, the reserve base of credit institutions subject to reserve requirements was determined based on the monthly outstanding data for the last calendar day of the reference period preceding the relevant calendar month. The draft decree is introduced in the light of recent regulatory changes in Hungary. First, the reserve ratio was increased , in relation to which the ECB adopted Opinion

text: . Second, the negotiability of discount bills issued by the MNB was restricted

text: and an interest rate cap on certain demand deposits was extended , in relation to which the ECB adopted Opinion

text: . To react to these regulatory changes, and in order to prevent excessive adjustments of credit institutions’ balance sheets (i.e. around the last calendar day of the reference period preceding the relevant calendar month), the MNB is planning to introduce a monthly averaging calculation method based on daily balance sheet items subject to reserve requirements that will be applicable to every subjected credit institution. As a provisional solution until the infrastructural developments are completed for the new calculation method, the draft decree provides that the credit institution balance sheet date will be temporarily fixed as a calculation basis for required reserves as of 31 March 2023 on a spot basis and without recourse to averaging. 1.3 The draft decree also proposes to introduce an additional way to comply with reserve requirements in the form of term deposit instruments with an original maturity of at least 14 days and up to an amount equivalent to 15 % of the minimum reserve requirements.

text: 2 Observations

text: 2.1 The ECB notes that the draft decree does not determine when the monthly averaging method would be introduced to calculate the basis of required reserves, thus ceasing the application of a fixed credit institution balance sheet as of 31 March 2023 as a calculation basis. The ECB understands that the latter is a provisional solution, that the MNB is consulting with credit institutions on an ongoing basis on when the monthly averaging calculation method can be introduced, and that the MNB is committed to keeping the transition period as short as possible. 2.2 The ECB has noted in earlier opinions that Member States whose currency is not the euro retain their powers in the field of monetary policy according to national law . Once the euro is introduced, Hungary’s monetary policy will be the single monetary policy and will need to be consistent with the Eurosystem’s operational framework. Credit institutions should therefore be familiar with the requirements that would apply to them once the single monetary policy is implemented in Hungary.

text: This opinion will be published on EUR-Lex.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 12 June 2023. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Christine LAGARDE