text: COM(2020) 139 final.

text: Se artikel 1 2 i förslaget till förordning.

text: Se inledande anmärkningar, presskonferens, Christine Lagarde, ECB:s ordförande, Luis de Guindos, ECB:s vice ordförande, Frankfurt am Main, 30 april, 2020, finns på ECB:s webbplats www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: Se

text: artikel 8.1 i rådets förordning (EU) nr 407/2010 av den 11 maj 2010

text: om inrättandet av en europeisk finansiell stabilitetsmekanism (EUT L 118, 12.5.2010, s. 1), Europeiska centralbankens beslut ECB/2010/17 av den 14 oktober 2010 om administrationen av EU:s upplåning och utlåning inom ramen för den europeiska finansiella stabiliseringsmekanismen (EUT L 275, 20.10.2010, s. 10).

text: Se

text: artikel 9 i rådets förordning (EG) nr 332/2002 av den 18 februari 2002

text: om upprättandet av ett system för medelfristigt ekonomiskt stöd till medlemsstaters betalningsbalans (EGT L 53, 23.2.2002, s. 1), Europeiska centralbankens beslut ECB/2003/14 av den 7 november 2003 om administrationen av Europeiska gemenskapens upplåning och utlåning enligt systemet för medelfristigt ekonomiskt stöd (EUT L 297, 15.11.2003, s. 35).

publisher: Europeiska centralbanken

title: Europeiska centralbankens yttrande av den 8 maj 2020 över ett förslag till rådets förordning om inrättande av ett europeiskt instrument för tillfälligt stöd för att minska risken för arbetslöshet i en krissituation (SURE) till följd av utbrottet av covid-19 (CON/2020/14)

serie: con

text: Inledning och rättslig grund

type: rubrik

text: Den 2 april 2020 antog Europeiska kommissionen ett förslag till rådets förordning om inrättande av ett europeiskt instrument för tillfälligt stöd för att minska risken för arbetslöshet i en krissituation (SURE) till följd av utbrottet av covid-19 (nedan kallat förslaget till förordning).

type: stycke

text: ECB:s behörighet att avge ett yttrande grundas på artiklarna 127.4 andra stycket i fördraget eftersom förslaget till förordning berör ECBS monetära uppgifter och transaktioner enligt kapitel IV i stadgan för Europeiska centralbankssystemet och Europeiska centralbanken (nedan kallad ECBS-stadgan), och särskilt artiklarna 17 och 21.2 i ECBS-stadgan enligt vilka ECB och de nationella centralbankerna får öppna konton för bl.a. offentliga organ och fungera som fiskala ombud för bl.a. unionens institutioner och statlig förvaltning.

text: I enlighet med artikel 17.5 första meningen i arbetsordningen för Europeiska centralbanken har detta yttrande antagits av ECB-rådet.

text: 1. Allmänna kommentarer

text: Det instrument som ska inrättas enligt förslaget till förordning (SURE-instrumentet) gör det möjligt att ge ekonomiskt stöd till en medlemsstat i unionen som genomgår, eller allvarligt hotas av, stora ekonomiska störningar på grund av coronavirusets utbrottet (covid-19) i syfte att finansiera system för korttidsarbete eller liknande åtgärder som har till syfte att skydda anställda och egenföretagare och därmed minska arbetslöshet och förlust av inkomst. Totalt sett skulle den finansiella ramen uppgå till 100 miljarder euro. ECB har välkomnat Europeiska rådets stöd för Eurogruppens överenskommelse om tre åtgärder för att skydda arbetstagare, företag och stater, dvs. SURE-instrumentet, tillsammans med Europeiska stabilitetsmekanismens krisstöd och en europeisk garantifond.

text: 2. Specifika kommentarer

text: Enligt artikel 10.1 i förslaget till förordning kommer kommissionen att förbereda de system som behövs för att administrera lånen tillsammans med ECB. Enligt artikel 10.1 i förslaget till förordning kommer den mottagande medlemsstaten öppna ett särskilt konto hos sin nationella centralbank för det ekonomiska stödet. Medlemsstaten i fråga kommer också att överföra lånebeloppet samt upplupen ränta enligt låneavtalet till ett av unionens konton hos ECB tjugo TARGET2-bankdagar före respektive förfallodag.

text: Så som nämnts ovan får ECB och de nationella centralbankerna i enlighet med artiklarna 17 och 21.2 i ECBS-stadgan öppna konton och fungera som fiskala ombud för kommissionen och medlemsstaterna. Utifrån denna ram har ECB och de nationella centralbankerna tidigare utfört uppgifter som berör administrationen av lånen i samband med ekonomiska anpassningsprogram, t.ex. den europeiska finansiella stabiliseringsmekanismen (EFSM) och unionens system för medelfristigt ekonomiskt stöd som gör det möjligt att bevilja lån till medlemsstater vars betalningsbalans eller kapitalrörelser har drabbats av eller allvarligt hotas av svårigheter. För att säkerställa att organiseringen av ECBS verksamhet behandlas som en intern angelägenhet av ECBS, föreslås att man hänvisar till den mottagande medlemsstaten överför de belopp som ska betalas för lånen till konton hos ECBS före respektive förfallodag.

text: Utfärdat i Frankfurt am Main den 8 maj 2020.

text: ECB:s ordförande

text: Christine Lagarde

type: vagledning

utgivare: ecb


text: Grozījumi Nacionālās drošības likumā.

text: Grozījumi likumā “Par ārkārtējo situāciju un izņēmuma stāvokli”.

text: Grozījumi Mobilizācijas likumā.

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).

text: Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013

text: conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63). 8 See

text: Article 4(1)

text: (e) and

text: Article 6(4) of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013

text: . 9 See paragraphs 2.1 and 2.6 of Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 10 Informācijas tehnoloģiju drošības likums.

text: Directive (EU) 2016/1148

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 concerning measures for a high common level of security of network and information systems across the Union (OJ L 194, 19.7.2016, p. 1).

sprak: en

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 11 May 2020 on amendments to Latvian national security, emergency situation and mobilisation laws (CON/2020/15)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 11 May 2020 on amendments to Latvian national security, emergency situation and mobilisation laws (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 9 April 2020 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Latvia for an opinion on three draft laws: (a) a draft law amending the Law on national 1 2 security ; (b) a draft law amending the Law on emergency situations and states of exception ; and (c) a draft law amending the Law on mobilisation . The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and on the third and fifth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft laws relate to the Latvijas Banka, and payment and settlement systems as well as to the specific tasks conferred upon the ECB concerning the prudential supervision of credit institutions pursuant to Article 127(6) of the Treaty. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft laws

text: 1.1 Purpose of the draft law amending the Law on national security 1.1.1 The general aim of the draft law amending the Law on national security is to set out the vital or critical services which are important for the functioning of the State and the public and to ensure their continuity in case of a threat to national security. 1.1.2 This draft law amends the definition of ‘critical infrastructure’ by providing that a critical infrastructure includes not only objects and systems located in Latvia, as already provided by the current wording of the Law on national security , but also services provided in Latvia which are important for ensuring the carrying out of important public functions, human health protection, security, economic or social welfare, the destruction of or interference with which would significantly affect the carrying out of such State and public core functions. 1.1.3 The draft law adds a provision that the owner or legal possessor of a critical infrastructure, including a European critical infrastructure, must take the minimum measures necessary to ensure

text: security and operational continuity. The existing wording of the Law on national security only provides that the owner or legal possessor of a critical infrastructure, including a European critical infrastructure, must ensure planning and implementation of security measures and operational continuity . 1.1.4 The draft law includes a dedicated new section, introducing a concept of ‘critical financial sector services’, defined to include cash and non-cash settlement services provided in the Republic of Latvia by a credit institution licensed or registered in a European Union Member State. Thus, based on the amended definition of ‘critical infrastructure’, which under the draft law includes not only objects and systems located in Latvia, but also services provided in Latvia, critical financial sector services would be considered as part of a critical infrastructure. In order to ensure the availability of critical financial sector services in case of a threat to national security, a credit institution must develop an operational continuity plan stipulating the obligations of outsourced service providers used by the credit institution to ensure cash and non-cash settlements and must submit this plan to the Finanšu un kapitāla tirgus komisija (Financial and Capital Market Commission (FCMC)). 1.1.5 Under the draft law, the FCMC establishes (a) the criteria for identifying credit institutions ensuring the availability of critical financial sector services in case of a threat to national security; (b) the minimum scope of critical financial sector services in case of a threat to national security; and (c) the requirements for developing credit institutions’ operational continuity plans. 1.1.6 The FCMC, in cooperation with Latvijas Banka, will (a) monitor and control the development and implementation of credit institutions’ operational continuity plans in case of a threat to national security; and (b) evaluate the test results of credit institutions’ operational continuity plans. 1.2 Purpose of the draft law amending the Law on emergency situations and states of exception 1.2.1 The general aim of the draft law amending the Law on emergency situations and states of exception is to ensure the continuity of the functioning of the State during emergency situations and states of exception, providing for additional restrictions on rights to be imposed during a state of exception, expanding the rights of the Cabinet of Ministers and elaborating on the procedure for changing the appropriation of the State budget for the current year. 1.2.2 The draft law contains provisions related to the withdrawal of cash for overcoming a threat to national security. In particular, it provides that State institutions responsible for overcoming a threat to national security may receive cash from the Latvian State Treasury account in Latvijas Banka and Latvijas Banka will disburse cash to such institutions within the limits of the balance of the Latvian State Treasury account with Latvijas Banka. The abovementioned institutions shall repay the unused cash to Latvijas Banka, and Latvijas Banka shall accept it and credit it to the Latvian State Treasury account with Latvijas Banka. 1.3 Purpose of the draft law amending the Law on mobilisation 1.3.1 The general aim of the draft law amending the Law on mobilisation is to provide for exceptions for the conscription of certain officials and providers of critical or vital services into active military service.

text: 1.3.2 The draft law specifically provides that the Governor, Deputy Governor and Members of the Council of Latvijas Banka as well as the Chairman and Members of the Council of the FCMC are exempt from conscription into active military service. 1.3.3 The draft law also provides that depending on the type, intensity and nature of threats to the State, the Cabinet of Ministers may grant mobilisation exceptions to other officials, employees or persons having an employment relationship with a person ensuring the continuity of critical infrastructures or critical financial sector services of the State and local government institutions.

text: 2. Observations

text: 2.1 The ECB notes that under Article 127(6) of the Treaty and

text: Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013

text: specific tasks concerning the prudential supervision of credit institutions have been conferred upon the ECB. In particular, the ECB carries out the task of authorising and withdrawing the authorisations of all credit institutions. For significant credit institutions the ECB also has the task, among others, to ensure compliance with relevant Union law imposing prudential requirements on credit institutions, including the requirement to have in place robust governance arrangements, such as sound risk management processes and internal control mechanisms . To this end, the ECB is given all supervisory powers to intervene in the activity of credit institutions that are necessary for the exercise of its functions. As previously noted by the ECB, pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation under Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European Union, the Member States are obliged to assist the ECB in carrying out tasks which flow from the Treaties. This implies that Member States should refrain from taking any measures which could jeopardise the ECB’s objectives. As the tasks related to critical financial sector services which the draft law amending the Law on national security assigns to the FCMC have been partially conferred upon the ECB, the national legislative bodies might consider clarifying that the relevant provisions of that draft law are without prejudice to the tasks and powers conferred on the ECB for prudential supervisory purposes under the Treaty and

text: Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013

text: . 2.2 The ECB understands that the term ‘critical infrastructure’ under the draft law amending the Law on national security does not include financial market infrastructures, including payment, settlement and clearing systems and central securities depositories, operated and/or overseen by Latvijas Banka, whether in the framework of the Eurosystem and the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), or otherwise. The ECB understands that the term ‘critical infrastructure’ under that draft law only includes physical objects, systems and parts thereof located in Latvia as well as services provided in Latvia which are of significance for ensuring the implementation of important public functions, as well as human health protection, security, economic or social welfare and destruction of or interferences in the operation of which would significantly affect the implementation of State functions. IT systems are governed by the Law on the security of Information Technologies ,

text: which implements

text: Directive (EU) 2016/1148

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council into Latvian law. The ECB therefore understands that the only financial market activity covered by the definition of ‘critical infrastructure’ under the draft law amending the Law on national security comprises ‘critical financial sector services’, consisting of cash and non-cash settlement services provided in Latvia by credit institutions licensed (registered) in a Union Member State. However, for the avoidance of doubt, the national legislative bodies might wish to consider explicitly clarifying in the draft law that the term ‘critical infrastructure’ excludes all financial market infrastructures operated and/or overseen by the Latvijas Banka, whether in the framework of the Eurosystem and the ESCB, or otherwise. 2.3 The ECB understands that the draft law amending the Law on mobilisation allows the Cabinet of Ministers to grant mobilisation exceptions to other officials, employees and persons having an employment relationship with entities which ensure the continuity of critical infrastructures or critical financial sector services of a State and local government institutions, depending on the type, intensity and nature of endangerment to the State. The national legislative bodies might consider explicitly clarifying in the draft law that officials, employees and persons having an employment relationship with Latvijas Banka who perform tasks required for continuity of critical financial sector services provided by credit institutions may also be granted mobilisation exceptions by the Cabinet of Ministers.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 11 May 2020.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Christine LAGARDE


text: COM(2020) 310 final.

text: Se blogg av Andrea Enria, ordföranden för ECB:s tillsynsnämnd den 27 mars 2020, Flexibility in supervision: how ECB Banking Supervision is contributing to fighting the economic fallout from the coronavirus, finns på ECB:s webbplats för banktillsyn www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu. Se även FAQs on ECB supervisory measures in reaction to the coronavirus, finns på ECB:s webbplats www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu.

text: Se ECB:s pressrelease av den 12 mars 2020, ECB Banking Supervision provides temporary capital and operational relief in reaction to coronavirus, finns på ECB:s webbplats för banktillsyn www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu.

text: Se ECB:s pressrelease av den 20 mars 2020, ECB Banking Supervision provides temporary capital and operational relief in reaction to coronavirus, finns på ECB:s webbplats för banktillsyn www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu.

text: Se pressrelease av den 20 mars 2020, ECB Banking Supervision provides temporary capital and operational relief in reaction to coronavirus, finns på ECB:s webbplats för banktillsyn www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu.

text: Se ECB:s pressrelease av den 16 april 2020, ECB Banking Supervision provides temporary relief for capital requirements for market risk, finns på ECB:s webbplats för banktillsyn www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu.

text: Europeiska centralbankens rekommendation av den 27 mars 2020 om utdelningar under COVID-19-pandemin och om upphävande av rekommendation ECB/2020/1 (ECB/2020/19) (EUT C 102 I, 30.3.2020, s. 1).

text: Se avsnitt 1 i motiveringen till förslaget till förordning.

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning (EU) nr 575/2013 av den 26 juni 2013

text: om tillsynskrav för kreditinstitut och värdepappersföretag och om ändring av förordning

text: (EU) nr 648/2012

text: (EUT L 176, 27.6.2013, s. 1).

text: Se

text: artikel 141 i Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 2013/36/EU av den 26 juni 2013

text: om behörighet att utöva verksamhet i kreditinstitut och om tillsyn av kreditinstitut och värdepappersföretag, om ändring av direktiv

text: och om upphävande av direktiv

text: och

text: (EUT L 176, 27.6.2013, s. 338).

text: Se avsnitt 5 i motiveringen till förslaget till förordning.

text: Se pressrelease av den 3 April 2020, Baselkommittén anger ytterligare åtgärder för att mildra effekterna av covid-19, finns på https://www.bis.org/press/p200403.htm.

text: BCBS, Åtgärder för att spegla effekterna av covid-19, finns på https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d498.pdf.

text: Punkterna a–e i artikel 201.1 i kapitalkravsförordningen avser a) nationella regeringar och centralbanker, b) Delstatliga eller lokala självstyrelseorgan eller myndigheter, c) multilaterala utvecklingsbanker, d) Internationella organisationer, om exponeringar mot dem ska åsättas 0% riskvikt enligt

text: artikel 117

text: , e) offentliga organ, om fordringar på dem ska behandlas i enlighet med

text: artikel 116

text: Se den föreslagna nya artikeln 500a i kapitalkravsförordningen.

text: Se FAQs on ECB supervisory measures in reaction to the coronavirus.

text: Se de föreslagna ändringarna av

text: artikel 3.5 i Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning (EU) 2019/876 av den 20 maj 2019

text: om ändring av förordning

text: (EU) nr 575/2013

text: vad gäller bruttosoliditetsgrad, stabil nettofinansieringskvot, krav för kapitalbas och kvalificerade skulder, motpartsrisk, marknadsrisk, exponeringar mot centrala motparter, exponeringar mot företag för kollektiva investeringar, stora exponeringar, rapporteringskrav och krav på offentliggörande av information, samt av förordning

text: (EU) nr 648/2012

text: (EUT L 150, 7.6.2019, s. 1).

text: BCBS, Basel III: Finalising post-crisis reforms, s. 144, finns på https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d424.pdf.

text: Se punkterna 1 n och 7 i

text: artikel 429

text: a i kapitalkravsförordningen ändrad genom förordning

text: (EU) 2019/876

text: Se ECB:s pressmeddelande av den 12 mars 2020, Penningpolitiska beslut, finns på ECB:s webbplats www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: Se även EBA:s Statement on the application of the prudential framework on targeted aspects in the area of market risk in the COVID-19 outbreak av den 22 april 2020, finns på EBA:s webbplats www.eba.europa.eu.

text: BCBS, MAR Calculation of RWA for market risk, punkterna 99.65–99.69, finns på https://www.bis.org/basel_framework/standard/MAR.htm.

sprak: sv

title: Europeiska centralbankens yttrande av den 20 maj 2020 om ändringar av unionens tillsynsregelverk som svar på covid-19-pandemin (CON/2020/16) 2020/C 180/04

text: Inledning och rättslig grund

text: Den 6 och den 12 maj 2020 mottog Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) en begäran från Europeiska unionens råd respektive Europaparlamentet om ett yttrande över ett förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning om ändring av förordningarna

text: (EU) nr 575/2013

text: och

text: (EU) 2019/876

text: vad gäller anpassningar mot bakgrund av covid-19-pandemin (nedan kallat förslaget till förordning).

text: ECB:s behörighet att avge ett yttrande grundas på artiklarna

text: och

text: i fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt eftersom förslaget till förordning innehåller bestämmelser som berör 1) Europeiska centralbankssystemets (ECBS) uppgift att utforma och genomföra unionens monetära politik i enlighet med

text: artikel 127.2

text: första strecksatsen i fördraget, 2) ECB:s uppgifter i samband med tillsynen över kreditinstitut i enlighet med artikel 127.6 i fördraget samt 3) ECBS medverkan till att de behöriga myndigheterna smidigt kan genomföra sin politik när det gäller det finansiella systemets stabilitet som avses i artikel 127.5 i fördraget. I enlighet med

text: artikel 17.5

text: första meningen i arbetsordningen för Europeiska centralbanken har detta yttrande antagits av ECB-rådet.

text: Allmänna kommentarer

text: De unika utmaningarna som den globala krisen som utlösts av covid-19-pandemin medför, har lett myndigheter runt om i världen att snabbt och beslutsamt vidta åtgärder så att kreditinstituten kan fortsätta att fylla sin funktion när det gäller att finansiera den reala ekonomin och stödja den ekonomiska återhämtningen, trots de förluster som de sannolikt kommer att utsättas för stigande förluster på grund av krisen.

text: ECB har använt sig av den flexibilitet i tillsynsarbetet som den aktuella rättsliga ramen medger för att stödja kreditinstituten så att dessa fortsätter att förse hushållen och de hårdast drabbade lönsamma företagen med kredit i den aktuella krissituationen. I detta sammanhang har ECB gett tillfälliga kapital- och verksamhetslättnader och meddelat ytterligare flexibilitet i tillsynen vid behandlingen av lån som omfattas av offentliga garantier. ECB har också uppmanat institutioner att undvika alltför stora procykliska effekter när de tillämpar den internationella finansiella redovisningsstandarden IFRS 9, tillfälligt reducerat den kvalitativa multiplikatorn för marknadsrisk för att beakta den extraordinarie volatiliteten på marknaderna och antagit en rekommendation om utdelningsregler med målsättningen att behålla kapital inom banksystemet för att förbättra dess förmåga att stödja den reala ekonomin. Dessa åtgärder utgör ett betydande stöd under den aktuella krisen, med betydande synergier mellan ECB:s åtgärder i egenskap av tillsynsmyndighet och de penningpolitiska åtgärderna i egenskap av centralbank.

text: Andra myndigheter har också vidtagit åtgärder, t.ex. Baselkommittén för banktillsyn (BCBS) och Europeiska bankmyndigheten (EBA), genom kompletterande tillsynsåtgärder som dragit fördel av internationell samordning. Därutöver har de nationella regeringarna inlett mycket omfattande stödprogram, inklusive offentliga garantier och moratorier avseende återbetalningen av krediter.

text: Mot denna bakgrund stöder ECB fullt ut kommissions initiativ att öka kreditinstitutens kapacitet att låna ut och absorbera förluster i samband med covid-19-pandemin samtidigt som deras fortsatta motståndskraft säkerställs. De riktade ändringarna av

text: (CRR) är välkomna, eftersom de ytterligare ökar banksystemets förmåga att dämpa pandemins ekonomiska konsekvenser och stödja återhämtningen, samtidigt som huvuddragen i tillsynsregelverket bibehålls. Därutöver kompletterar delar av förslaget till förordning de stödjande tillsynsåtgärderna som ECB vidtagit, och vissa åtgärder som nyligen beslutats av Baselkommittén kräver ändringar av unionens rättslig ram för att få effekt. Eventuella ytterligare ändringar av förslaget till förordning bör inte att medföra någon grundläggande ändring av tillsynsregelverket, vilket även fortsättningsvis bör respektera överenskomna Basel-standarder och undvika en ytterligare fragmentering av den enda europeiska regelboken.

text: ECB vill också, som en ytterligare allmän kommentar om förmågan att ge lån till ekonomin, poängtera följande: Om ett kreditinstituts kärnprimärkapitalrelation (CET1) faller under det kombinerade buffertkravet, kan kreditinstitutet endast dela ut tillgångar inom ramen för det maximala utdelningsbara beloppet. Om företaget uppvisar en förlust, kan ingen utdelning ske, oavsett storlek på brottet. Kreditinstitut kan vara ovilliga att använda sina buffertar för ytterligare utlåning eftersom de befarar att de kan tvingas ställa in kupongbetalningar på det övriga primärkapitalet och då utsättas för negativa reaktioner från marknadsaktörernas sida. Ett sådant beteende skulle minska de positiva effekterna som eftersträvas med kapitalbuffertarna.

text: Specifika kommentarer

text: 1. Övergångsarrangemang för att mildra inverkan av avsättningar enligt IFRS på det lagstadgade kapitalet

text: Artikel 473

text: a i kapitalkravsförordningen innehåller övergångsarrangemang som gör det möjligt för institut att till sitt kärnprimärkapital återföra en del av de ökade avsättningar som beror på införandet av redovisning av förväntade kreditförluster enligt IFRS 9. Övergångsarrangemangen består av två delar: en statisk och en dynamisk del. Den statiska delen gör det möjligt för kreditinstituten att delvis neutralisera den inverkan dag 1 på kärnprimärkapitalet som följer av de ökade redovisade avsättningarna till följd av införandet av IFRS 9. Den dynamiska delen ger kreditinstituten möjlighet att delvis neutralisera inverkan av de ytterligare (dvs. efter dag 1) ökade avsättningarna för exponeringar som inte är kreditförsämrade. De befintliga övergångsarrangemangen omfattar perioden 2018–2022.

text: 1.2 Mot bakgrund av covid-19-pandemin beslutade Baselkommittén den 3 april 2020 att ändra de befintliga övergångsarrangemangen avseende reglerna om förväntade kreditförluster. Baselkommittén förtydligade också att de jurisdiktioner som redan genomfört övergångsarrangemangen (inklusive EU) får välja att återföra mindre än 100 procent under 2020 och 2021, eller vidta andra åtgärder för att förhindra att återföringen inkluderar förväntade kreditförluster som uppkommit innan covid-19 bröt ut. För att beakta detta anger förslaget till förordning att man bör skjuta fram den övergångsperiod på fem år som inleddes 2018 endast vad gäller den dynamiska delen.

text: 1.3 ECB stöder en ändring av

text: artikel 473

text: a i kapitalkravsförordningen så att det blir möjligt för kredititinstituten att till fullo återföra till sitt kärnprimärkapital ett belopp som inte överstiger den del av ökningen som hänför sig till den dynamiska delen av avsättningarna för förväntade kreditförluster efter den 31 december 2019. För det första skulle denna lösning göra det möjligt att anpassa de ytterligare åtgärderna för att hantera effekterna som är relaterade till covid‐19, och särskilja dessa från den inverkan dag 1 hade på kärnprimärkapitalet pga. av de ökade avsättningarna till följd av införandet av IFRS 9. För det andra skulle denna lösning fullt ut överensstämma med Baselkommitténs beslut av den 3 april 2020.

text: 2. Behandling av offentligt garanterade lån inom ramen för säkerhetsmekanismen för nödlidande exponeringar

text: 2.1 Enligt

text: artikel 47

text: c.4 i kapitalkravsförordningen får nödlidande exponeringar som garanteras av statliga exportkreditorgan en förmånsbehandling när det gäller kraven avseende avdragen enligt

text: artikel 47

text: c.3 i kapitalkravsförordningen (den så kallade säkerhetsmekanism för nödlidande exponeringar). När det gäller nödlidande exponeringar som garanteras av statliga exportkreditorgan, behöver den del av exponeringen som omfattas av en sådan garanti först dras av fullständigt efter att ha klassats som nödlidande exponering under sju år, innan denna tidpunkt finns inget krav på avdrag. För alla andra nödlidande exponeringar som helt eller delvis helt omfattas av godkända säkerheter, ökar kraven på minsta avdrag stegvis fram till dess att de berörda nödlidande exponeringarna är helt täckta.

text: 2.2 Enligt förslaget till förordning bör man tillfälligt utvidga den behandling som nu gäller för nödlidande exponeringar som garanteras av statliga exportkreditorgan till att även omfatta nödlidande exponeringar som garanteras av nationella regeringar eller andra offentliga organ som är godtagbara tillhandahållare av kreditriskskydd enligt reglerna för kreditriskreducering förutsatt att garantin eller motgarantin tillhandahålls som en del av stödåtgärderna för att hjälpa låntagare i samband med covid-19-pandemin.

text: 2.3 ECB välkomnar förslaget att tillfälligt utvidga den förmånligare behandlingen av

text: artikel 47

text: c.4 i kapitalkravsförordningen till nödlidande exponeringar som garanteras av statliga exportkreditorgan, vilket även överensstämmer med ECB:s förslag. Förslaget undanröjer den godtyckliga åtskillnaden mellan garantier som ställs av olika offentliga enheter med liknande kreditvärdighet.

text: 3. Datum för tillämpning av bruttosoliditetsbufferten

text: 3.1 Den 27 mars 2020 enades gruppen av centralbankschefer och tillsynschefer (GHOS) som utgör ledningsorganet för Baselkommittén om att förlänga tidsfristen för att genomföra de sista delarna av Basel III-regelverket med ett år, inklusive bruttosoliditetsbufferten för globala systemviktiga banker, som kommer att börja tillämpas i unionen den 1 januari 2022. Enligt förslaget till förordning bör tidsplanen enligt kapitalkravsförordningen samordnas med den reviderade tidsplanen från GHoS, dvs. den 1 januari 2023 snarare än den 1 januari 2022.

text: 3.2 ECB stöder beslutet att använda den förlängda tidsfristen som överenskommits på internationell nivå för att slutföra Basel III-reformerna med målet att införliva dessa i unionsrätten. Genom att senarelägga tillämpningen av bruttosoliditetsbufferten för globala systemviktiga banker blir kreditinstitutens anpassning smidigare, samtidigt som man fullt ut upprätthåller både innehållet och tidsplaneringen som överenskommits på internationell nivå. Detta kommer att göra det möjligt för kreditinstituten att fokusera sin operativa verksamhet på sådana åtgärder som är nödvändiga för att tackla den aktuella krisen och främja en ekonomisk återhämtning.

text: 4. Kompensation för inverkan av att vissa exponeringar utesluts från beräkningen av bruttosoliditetsgraden

text: 4.1 Enligt den slutliga standarden för bruttosoliditet som offentliggjordes av Baselkommittén i december 2017 får en jurisdiktion, för att underlätta genomförandet av penningpolitiken, under exceptionella omständigheter tillfälligt undanta centralbanksreserver från bruttosoliditetsgraden. Om detta handlingsutrymme utnyttjas, kräver Basel-standarden en omkalibrering (dvs. en ökning) av bruttosoliditetskravet för att kompensera att centralbanksreserverna undantas. Denna valmöjlighet, som introducerats i unionslagstiftningen, blir tillämplig den 28 juni 2021.

text: 4.2 ECB anser att den globala finanskrisen tydligt visat att det behövs ett obligatoriskt krav avseende bruttosoliditet under pelare 1. Det är allmänt accepterat att en alltför hög skuldsättningsgrad i det finansiella systemet var en underliggande orsak till den globala finanskrisen. ECB anser därför att det är viktigt att fullt ut bibehålla bruttosoliditeten som en trovärdig, icke-riskbaserad, säkerhetsmekanism och undvika att någon av dessa huvudkomponenter exkluderas.

text: 4.3 Enligt förslaget till förordning ska den nuvarande omkalibreringsmekanismen enligt kapitalkravsförordningen ändras. I synnerhet kommer kreditinstitutet att behöva beräkna den justerade bruttosoliditetsgraden endast en gång, på värdet av institutets godtagbara centralbanksreserver och totala exponeringsmått den dag då institutets behöriga myndighet förklarar att det föreligger exceptionella omständigheter som motiverar utnyttjandet av ett sådant handlingsutrymme. Den justerade bruttosoliditetsgraden kommer att gälla under hela den period då handlingsutrymmet utnyttjas och kommer inte att ändras, till skillnad från den aktuellt gällande omkalibreringsmekanismen.

text: 4.4 ECB välkomnar det faktum att förslaget till förordning genomför ett riktat undantag av en ökning av centrabanksreserverna, som kan stödja en väl fungerande penningpolitisk transmissionsmekanism. ECB noterar att en ökning av centralbankslikviditeten som blir resultatet av genomförandet av penningpolitiken kommer att medföra att mängden reserver som banksystemet innehar ökar, vilket är fallet för de nyligen offentliggjorda penningpolitiska åtgärderna avseende covid‐19-krisen. Även om individuella kreditinstitut kan omfördela dessa reserver, kommer banksystemet inte att kunna undvika att inneha dessa ytterligare reserver och den därmed förknippade ökningen av det sammanlagda exponeringsmåttet för bruttosoliditetsgraden. För att exkluderingen ska få full effekt föreslår ECB följande ändringar.

text: 4.5 Den förändrade omkalibreringsmekanismen tillämpas från den 28 juni 2021. Vid den tidpunkt då en behörig myndighet väljer att utnyttja sitt handlingsutrymme, vilket kan vara den 28 juni 2021 eller därefter, kan de centralbanksreserver som ett kreditinstitut innehar redan ha ökat avsevärt pga. penningpolitiska åtgärder. En omkalibrering baserad på de centralbanksreserver som ett kreditinstitut innehar vid den tidpunkt då en behörig myndighet utnyttjar sitt handlingsutrymme, underlättar eventuellt inte genomförandet, och en effektiv transmission, av penningpolitiska åtgärder. Detta beror på att ökningen av centralbanksreserverna som dessa åtgärder implicerar i stort sett förväntas ha skett vid den tidpunkten. Därför kommer exkluderingen av centralbanksreserver vid beräkningen den dagen skapa mindre möjligheter för bankerna att öka sin utlåning till den reala ekonomin. Skulle det dessutom vara nödvändigt att förnya exkluderingen i slutet av den period då handlingsutrymmet utnyttjas (initialt under högst 1 år) skulle omkalibreringen baseras på de reserver som innehas den dag de förnyas, och dessa kan då ha ökat ytterligare. Eftersom ingen vet hur länge de exceptionella omständigheterna kommer att bestå, kan omkalibreringsmekanismen få kraftigt negativa konsekvenser för åtgärdens möjligheter att underlätta genomförandet och transmissionen av penningpolitiken.

text: 4.6 De behöriga myndigheterna bör därför ges möjlighet att fastställa referensdagen för omkalibreringen så, att omkalibreringen förblir stabil under hela den period som de exceptionella omständigheterna består. Detta skulle ge de behöriga myndigheterna möjlighet att, i samråd med centralbanker, välja ett datum som startdatum för perioden med exceptionella omständigheter, så som detta framgår av viktiga penningpolitiska beslut. Detta skulle ge marknadsaktören säkerhet, och främja en väl fungerande penningpolitisk transmissionsmekanism.

text: 4.7 Därutöver bör behöriga myndigheter ha möjlighet att utföra omkalibreringar utifrån en referensperiod, istället för ett referensdatum. Då skulle man vid omkalibreringen beakta de genomsnittliga godtagbara centralbanksreserverna under en period. På så sätt skulle behöriga myndigheter kunna bortse från de dagliga variationerna i centralbanksreserverna när de fastställer nya minimikrav för varje institut.

text: 5. Andra tänkbara ändringar av vissa aspekter på marknadsriskkrav

text: 5.1 Den extraordinarie volatiliteten på finansmarknaderna sedan covid-19-utbrottet påverkar kapitalkraven för marknadsrisk för institut som använder internmodellmetoden för marknadsrisk på två sätt: a) Value-at-Risk-värdena ökar pga. den ökade volatiliteten, och b) de kvalitativa multiplikatorerna för marknadsrisk som speglar antalet överskridanden enligt utfallstest ökar. Detta påverkar kreditinstitutens kärnprimärkapitalrelation och kan också påverka kreditinstitutens fortsatta förmåga att agera marketmaker och skapa marknadslikviditet, vilket kan påverka en väl fungerande marknad negativt. Dessutom skulle en överdriven ökning av kapitalkraven för marknadsrisk vara negativ för målet att frigöra kapital för utlåning till den reala ekonomin.

text: 5.2 Baselkommitténs standard för interna modeller avseende marknadsrisk medger tillräcklig flexibilitet för behöriga myndigheter avseende hur man behandlar överskridanden enligt utfallstest under extraordinära omständigheter. Baselkommitténs standard anger uttryckligen att även välkonstruerade modeller kan missa att förutse oväntat hög volatilitet på marknaden. Under dessa extraordinära omständigheter kan även en tillförlitlig modell leda till många undantag under en relativt kort tidsperiod.

text: 5.3 Trots att kapitalkravsförordningen inte innehåller någon uttrycklig hänvisning till de extraordinära omständigheter som beskrivs i Baselkommitténs text, ges den behöriga myndigheten viss flexibilitet vid bedömningen av resultaten av utfallstest. Av artikel 366.4 i kapitalkravsförordningen framgår att tillsynsmyndigheten har möjlighet att inte beakta överskridanden på grund faktiska förluster om dessa beror på andra faktorer än brister i modellen, t.ex. extraordinära omständigheter på marknaderna. Kapitalkravsförordningen tillåter dock inte att den behöriga myndigheten behandlar hypotetiska överskridanden på ett liknande sätt och ignorerar dem vid beräkningen av utfallstesternas addend. De marknadsstörningar som orsakas genom covid‐19 förväntas påverka antalet hypotetiska överskridanden, på ett liknande sätt som antalet faktiska överskridanden.

text: 5.4 Till följd av detta hindras tillsynsmyndigheterna, jämfört med internationella standarder, på grund av ett begränsat antal tillsynsåtgärder från att uppnå sitt mål att upprätthålla kreditinstitutens förmåga att tillhandahålla marknadslikviditet och fortsätta sin marknadsgarantverksamhet under extraordinära omständigheter, som har en viktig funktion som stöd för den reala ekonomin. Ytterligare åtgärder, som att ignorera överskridanden (som är resultatet av både faktiska och hypotetiska förluster) under extraordinära omständigheter skulle uppnå detta mål på ett bättre sätt. Därför bör kapitalkravsförordningen ändras för att säkerställa att de behöriga myndigheterna kan vidta lämpliga åtgärder under extraordinära omständigheter i linje med Baselkommitténs standard. För detta ändamål bör de behöriga myndigheterna ges ytterligare flexibilitet så att de tillfälligt får justera antalet överskridanden (som är resultatet av både faktiska och hypotetiska förluster) eller vidta andra lämpliga åtgärder. Eftersom de extraordinära omständigheterna på marknaderna inte är kopplade bara till några specifika enheter utan hela marknaden, vore det också viktigt att den behöriga myndigheten inte utövar sin befogenhet avseende de interna modellerna individuellt, utan för alla enheter som står under dess tillsyn. Detta yttrande kommer att offentliggöras på ECB:s webbplats.

text: Utfärdat i Frankfurt am Main den 20 maj 2020.

text: Christine Lagarde

text: ECB:s ordförande


text: 21 amended by

text: Directive (EU) 2019/878

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council (‘CRD V’) ) and not by the AML Directive. The ECB therefore understands that the requirement set out in the draft law is a national obligation imposed on Belgian prudential supervisory authorities, which will later be adapted in line with the CRD V requirements in the course of transposing the CRD V in Belgium. The ECB would recommend clarifying this in the explanatory memorandum. 2.2.3 Regarding the conditions applicable to the exchange of information in the context of the cooperation regime, the draft law requires that foreign prudential supervisory authorities, which according to the draft law includes the ECB, must apply a regime of professional secrecy that is at least equivalent to the one that applies to the Belgian AML/CFT supervisory authorities concerned. The ECB understands that the draft law aims, inter alia, to align the professional secrecy regime that applies to the Belgian AML/CFT supervisory authorities in the financial field with the harmonised regime set out in the AML Directive. In its

text: Article 57

text: a(2)(b) the AML Directive notes that the exchange of information between the AML/CFT supervisory authorities and the prudential supervisory authorities, including the ECB, ‘shall be subject to the conditions of professional secrecy indicated in

text: Article 57

text: a(1)’. The explanatory memorandum of the draft law specifies that the professional secrecy regime applicable to certain prudential supervisory authorities is harmonised under Union law, notably citing Directive

text: . In the present case, the professional secrecy regime applicable to prudential supervisory authorities pursuant to

text: Article 53(1) of Directive 2013/36/EU

text: is similar to the regime provided for by

text: Article 57

text: a(1) of the AML Directive. Therefore, the ECB understands that the equivalence of professional secrecy regimes required by the draft law, interpreted together with the AML Directive, would be automatically met for prudential supervisory authorities subject to

text: Article 53(1) of Directive 2013/36/EU

text: , including the ECB . It would be helpful if the draft law or the explanatory memorandum could confirm this interpretation. 2.2.4 Another condition laid down by the draft law is that of reciprocity as regards the exchange of information. According to the AML Directive, the condition of reciprocity only applies to cooperation with the AML/CFT supervisory authorities of third countries. The draft law imposes a general reciprocity condition, which would seem to apply not only to the AML/CFT supervisory authorities of third countries but also to the exchange of information with authorities of other Member States and with the ECB when acting in its prudential supervisory capacity. In the context of the European

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 25 May 2020 on cash limitations concerning postal payments and anti-money laundering measures (CON/2020/17)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 25 May 2020 on cash limitations concerning postal payments and anti-money laundering measures (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 8 April 2020 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Nationale Bank van België/Banque Nationale de Belgique (‘NBB’) on a draft law implementing

text: Directive (EU) 2018/843

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council (‘AMLD V’) under Belgian law (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the second and third indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft law relates to means of payment, the NBB and the ECB’s tasks concerning the prudential supervision of credit institutions conferred on them pursuant to Article 127(6) of the Treaty. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The draft law mainly amends the Belgian Law of 18 September 2017 on the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing and on the restriction of the use of cash (‘Law on AML/CFT’) . The main purpose of the draft law is to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing. 1.2 The draft law modifies the cash limitation system applicable to postal payments. According to the explanatory memorandum of the draft law, postal payments serve the same purpose as cash payments. Moreover, it appears that dishonest natural or legal persons have been able to circumvent limitations that apply to cash payments by using the postal payments system. Therefore, the Belgian government considers that restrictions similar to those that apply to cash payments should be applied to postal payments. To achieve this objective, the draft law introduces two new elements. First, the draft law confines the use of postal payments to consumers, thus excluding the use of such payments by professionals. According to the explanatory memorandum,

text: Directive (EU) 2018/843

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 amending

text: Directive (EU) 2015/849

text: on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, and amending Directives

text: and

text: (OJ L 156, 19.06.2018, p. 43).

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).

text: 3 Loi du 18 septembre 2017 relative à la prévention du blanchiment de capitaux et du financement du terrorisme et à la limitation de l'utilisation des espèces/ Wet van 18 september 2017 tot voorkoming van het witwassen van geld en de financiering van terrorisme en tot beperking van het gebruik van contanten, telle que modifiée/zoals nader gewijzigd, Moniteur Belge/Belgisch Staatsblad, 06.10.2017, p. 90839. the exclusion of professionals is justified because it is safe to assume that anyone who is a legal person, a self-employed person or a member of a liberal profession, has a bank account that allows them to respect their financial obligations, and have broad access to other lawful means for settling monetary debts. Second, the draft law introduces a maximum limit of € 3,000 for postal payments to bank accounts and postal current accounts made by consumers. The draft law makes it clear that payments of lower amounts that appear to be linked will be grouped together when assessing compliance with the € 3,000 limit. 1.3 The draft law establishes an exchange of information regime between (among others) foreign prudential supervisory authorities responsible for supervision of credit or financial institutions, which includes the ECB, and the Belgian authorities responsible for supervising credit or financial institutions as regards anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (hereinafter the ‘Belgian AML/CFT supervisory authorities in the financial field’). In that respect, the draft law implements

text: Article 57

text: a of

text: Directive (EU) 2015/849

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council (‘AML Directive’). Furthermore, the draft law sets out several conditions applicable to the exchange of information regime. Notably, the draft law requires that foreign prudential supervisory authorities that supervise entities in the financial field, who are defined as including the prudential supervisory authorities of a Member State, the ECB and the prudential supervisory authorities of a third State, be subject to a regime of professional secrecy that is at least equivalent to the one that applies to the Belgian AML/CFT supervisory authorities in the financial field concerned. 1.4 The draft law strengthens the legal basis for the NBB’s injunctive powers with regard to an obliged entity’s duty to comply with requirements set by the NBB pursuant to, or as conditions for a decision made pursuant to, the Belgian law of 18 September 2017, the implementing measures under the AML Directive and

text: Regulation (EU) 2015/847

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council , and the duty of care under the binding provisions on financial embargoes. The explanatory memorandum points out that the purpose of the draft law in this respect is, insofar as necessary, to clarify the legal basis of the NBB’s injunctive power based on a non-compliance with the NBB’s requirements, even if the rationale for these decisions can be deduced from a reasonable interpretation of existing legislation. 1.5 The draft law also specifies that the NBB is entitled to ask the statutory auditor of an obliged entity to draft a special report on the entity’s compliance with the Belgian law of 18 September 2017 and the measures implementing

text: Directive (EU) 2015/849

text: and

text: Regulation (EU) 2015/847

text: , and the duty of care under the binding provisions on financial embargoes. If the relevant obliged entity does not have a statutory auditor, the NBB is entitled to appoint an auditor in order to draft the special report. The explanatory memorandum clarifies that the purpose of this measure is to improve the NBB’s control over obliged entities by ensuring a closer collaboration with statutory auditors.

text: Directive (EU) 2015/849

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, amending

text: Regulation (EU) No 648/2012

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council and

text: Commission Directive 2006/70/EC

text: (OJ, L 141, 05.06.2015, p. 73).

text: Regulation (EU) 2015/847

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on information accompanying transfers of funds and repealing

text: Regulation (EC) No 1781/2006

text: (OJ, L 141, 05.06.2015, p.1).

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 Limitation of the use of postal payments 2.1.1 The ECB understands that a Belgian postal payment is a financial transaction whereby an order is given to the postal service to credit a sum of money to a postal current account or a bank account registered with a financial institution established in Belgium, and that such payments generally involve cash. Under the current Belgian Law on AML/CFT professionals, whether legal or natural persons, may only make cash payments up to an amount of € 3,000 per payment, this limit does not currently apply to postal payments . However, the ECB understands that legal persons are only entitled to make postal payments if the payment is made to a postal current account held by the Belgian State or a public institution . The ECB also understands that a limit of € 3,000 is applicable in practice for postal payments made by natural persons to bank accounts registered with a financial institution established in Belgium, based on the general conditions applicable to postal payments, which is more restrictive than under applicable law . Given these constraints the ECB understands that, in practice, the postal payments system is rarely used in Belgium, and that most natural persons and companies make payments using cash or bank accounts. 2.1.2 The ECB understands that, following the adoption of the draft law, professionals will have to make payments either from their bank accounts or, subject to the € 3,000 limit, in cash. As far as concerns postal payments made by natural persons, while there is currently no legal limit on the amount of such payments, the ECB understands that, in order to strengthen the Belgian AML/CFT framework, the draft law merely confirms the restriction currently imposed by bpost’s terms and conditions to limit postal payments made by customers to bank accounts registered with a financial institution established in Belgium to € 3,000, and extends this € 3,000 limit to postal payments made to postal current accounts. 2.1.3 The ECB understands that the qualification of postal payments is a matter of Belgian law, but that it could be considered that the restrictions inserted by the draft law have an impact on cash payments. In this respect, the ECB recalls that

text: Commission Recommendation 2010/191/EU

text: states that the acceptance of cash payments should be the rule, however it also acknowledges that cash may be refused for reasons related to the ‘good faith principle’, without this constituting a breach of the legal tender status of cash. In considering whether, or to what extent, it may be permissible to introduce a more general limitation of the obligation to accept cash payments in euro, regard must be had to Article 63(2) of the Treaty, which provides that, within the framework of the provisions set out in Chapter 4 (Capital and payments) of Title IV (Free Movement of Persons, Services and Capital) of the Treaty, all restrictions on payments between Member States and between Member States and third countries shall be prohibited. Under Article 65(1) of the Treaty, the provisions of

text: Article 67

text: , § 2, Loi du 18 septembre 2017 relative à la prévention du blanchiment de capitaux et du financement du terrorisme et à la limitation de l'utilisation des espèces/ Wet van 18 september 2017 tot voorkoming van het witwassen van geld en de financiering van terrorisme en tot beperking van het gebruik van contanten, telle que modifiée/zoals nader gewijzigd, Moniteur Belge/Belgisch Staatsblad, 06.10.2017, p. 90839.

text: 7 Article 3 of the General Terms and Conditions of the Belgian post office (‘bpost’) which applies to postal payments, available at: https://www.bpost.be/sites/default/files/free_form/GTC_versement_2019_FR.pdf.

text: Article 9

text: , § 1 of the General Terms and Conditions of bpost which applied to postal payments, available at: https://www.bpost.be/sites/default/files/free_form/GTC_versement_2019_FR.pdf.

text: Commission Recommendation 2010/191/EU of 22 March 2010

text: on the scope and effects of legal tender of euro banknotes and coins (OJ L 83, 30.3.2010, p. 70).

text: Article 63

text: shall be without prejudice to the right of Member States to, inter alia, take all requisite measures to prevent infringements of national laws and regulations, in particular in the field of, inter alia, taxation, or to take measures which are justified on grounds of public policy or public security. Under Article 65(3) of the Treaty, these measures shall not constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on the free movement of payments as defined in

text: Article 63

text: . The draft law’s purpose of reinforcing the measures taken to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing may, in general, constitute ‘grounds of public policy or public security’ that justifies the establishment of limitations on cash payments. 2.1.4 Also, Union law must be interpreted in order to ascertain the conditions that a limitation on payments in euro banknotes and coins should fulfil in order to comply with the legal tender status of euro banknotes and coins when general limitations to the obligation to accept cash payments are 10 11 introduced . In this respect,

text: Recital 19

text: of

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 974/98

text: states that ‘limitations on payments in notes and coins, established by Member States for public reasons, are not incompatible with the status of legal tender of euro banknotes and coins, provided that other lawful means for the settlement of monetary debts are available’ . Other lawful means for the settlement of monetary debts, ensuring similar benefits to those of cash, are generally available in Belgium for the transactions that are subject to the limits on cash postal payments under the draft law. The draft law’s purpose of reinforcing the measures taken to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing may, in general, constitute a ‘public reason’ that justifies the establishment of limitations on cash payments . 2.1.5 Moreover, limitations on cash payments should be proportionate to the objectives pursued and should not go beyond what is necessary to achieve such objectives. This condition is particularly relevant in the present case as one of the two limitations introduced by the draft law applies to consumers. Any negative impact of the proposed limitations should therefore be carefully weighed against the anticipated public benefits. When considering whether a limitation is proportionate attention should also be given to whether any alternative measures could be adopted that would fulfil the relevant objective and have a less adverse impact . 2.1.6 Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that the ability to pay in cash remains particularly important for certain groups in society that, for various legitimate reasons, prefer to use cash rather than other payment methods. Cash is generally also appreciated as a payment instrument because it is widely accepted, fast and facilitates control over the payer’s spending. Cash is also a convenient fall-back solution in case the technical infrastructure for wireless payments is unavailable, e.g. due to power failures or natural disasters. In addition, cash is the only means of payment that allows citizens to instantly settle a transaction in central bank money and at face value, without the legal

text: 10 See paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 3.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 974/98 of 3 May 1998

text: on the introduction of the euro (OJ L 139, 11.5.1998, p. 1).

text: 12 See for example paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: 13 See, for example, paragraph 2.5 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: 14 See for example paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.3. of Opinion

text: , paragraphs 2.6 and 2.7 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 3.3 of Opinion

text: . possibility of imposing a fee for the payment in question. Moreover, cash payments facilitate the inclusion of the entire population in the economy since it may be used to settle any kind of financial transaction. 2.1.7 The ECB welcomes that the complete prohibition to proceed with postal payments does not apply to consumers. In addition, the ECB understands, as noted above, that the € 3,000 euro limit is already applicable if consumers want to make a postal payment to a bank account. Furthermore, the ECB understands, that the practical impact of the extension of this limitation to postal cash payments made to postal current accounts would be rather limited. 2.1.8 As regards the complete prohibition on professionals using postal payment services, the ECB understands that this measure has in practice a marginal effect on professionals’ use of this particular means of payment. As noted in paragraph 2.1.1, professionals who are legal persons currently have limited access to postal payment services, as they may only make postal payments to certain postal current accounts. It also seems that the number of professionals who are legal persons or natural persons who use postal payment services is quite limited in Belgium. 2.2 Exchange of information 2.2.1 The ECB welcomes the provisions of the draft law which establish an obligation for the Belgian AML/CFT supervisory authorities in the financial field to cooperate and exchange information with the prudential supervisory authorities of Member States and the ECB . The task of supervising credit institutions in relation to the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering and the financing of terrorism has not been conferred upon the ECB. However, the outcome of AML/CFT supervision is important to consider for discharging the specific tasks conferred upon the ECB concerning the prudential supervision of credit institutions under Article 127(6) of the Treaty and

text: Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013

text: . It is therefore of the utmost importance that the ECB, as well as other prudential supervisors, receive timely and reliable information from AML/CFT supervisors about risks relating to money laundering or the financing of terrorism that concern the entities under their supervision, as well as any breaches of AML/CFT requirements by these supervised entities . 2.2.2 The ECB notes that the draft law also imposes an obligation on the Belgian prudential supervisory authorities to cooperate and exchange information with AML/CFT supervisory authorities in the financial field . This requirement does not appear to be based on the new

text: Article 57

text: a of the AML Directive, as the cooperation requirement for prudential supervisory authorities in this respect is covered by Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council (‘CRD IV’) (as

text: Article 131

text: /1, § 1 al. 1 of the Law on AML/CFT, as amended by the draft law.

text: Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013

text: conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63).

text: 17 See paragraph 1.2 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 4.1 of Opinion

text: Article 131

text: /1, § 2 of the Law on AML/CFT, as amended by the draft law.

text: 19 Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive

text: and repealing Directives

text: and

text: Text with EEA relevance (OJ L 176, 27.06.2013, p. 338).

text: Directive (EU) 2019/878

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2019 amending Directive

text: as regards exempted entities, financial holding companies, mixed financial holding companies, remuneration, supervisory measures and powers and capital conservation measures (OJ L 150, 7.6.2019, p. 253).

text: 21 The explanatory memorandum of the draft law does not refer to the implementation of the CRD V, however, for the sake of completeness, the ECB notes that the draft law does not contain all the requirements set out in Article 117(5) of the CRD IV. Indeed, Article 117(5) of the CRD IV establishes a cooperation regime and information exchange between prudential and AML/CFT supervisory authorities, provided that such exchange does ‘not impinge on an ongoing inquiry, investigation or proceedings in accordance with the criminal or administrative law’ of the relevant Member State. This condition is not set out in the draft law. At the same time,

text: Article 131

text: /1, § 2 of the Law on AML/CFT, as amended by the draft law which makes reference to § 1, also imposes on Belgian prudential supervisory authorities a requirement to make use of their statutory prerogatives in order to lend their support to the AML/CFT supervisory authorities of other Member States in the context of investigations. This requirement does not appear to be based on the AML Directive and is also not a part of Article 117(5) of the CRD IV.

text: 22 The professional secrecy regime applicable to the ECB with regard to the tasks conferred on it by

text: Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013

text: is set out in Article 27 of the Regulation and refers to the Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB and to the relevant acts of Union law. In this context the term ‘relevant acts of the Union law’ should mainly be understood as referring to Directive

text: . Economic Area (EEA), however, reciprocity already appears to be ensured by the requirements laid down in Union law. Pursuant to

text: Article 117(5) of Directive 2013/36/EU

text: the AML/CFT supervisory authorities of credit and financial institutions, the financial intelligence units and the prudential supervisory authorities in the Member States are subject to cooperation and information exchange obligations. In addition, as regards information exchange between the ECB and the AML/CFT supervisory authorities of credit and financial institutions in the EEA, mutual information exchange is ensured by the multilateral agreement on the practical modalities of exchange of information in line with

text: Article 57

text: a(2) of

text: Directive (EU) 2015/849

text: . This condition of the draft law should therefore not affect the exchange of information between prudential supervisory authorities in the EEA, including the ECB in its supervisory role. The ECB would recommend that this aspect be clarified in the explanatory memorandum or the draft law. 2.2.5 The ECB also notes that Article 132 of the draft law states that cooperation and the exchange of information is subject to a prohibition to communicate the received information to a third party without prior written authorisation from the authority that originally provided the information. Article 132 of the draft law further introduces an exception to this principle: in the event of cooperation between: (i) a Belgian AML/CFT supervisory authority supervising entities in the financial field and a prudential supervisory authority of a Member State, which, according to the draft law includes the ECB; or (ii) a Belgian prudential supervisory authority and another Member State’s AML/CFT supervisory authority supervising entities in the financial field, the consent of the authority that originally provided the information is not required if the subsequent communication by the authority that has received the information from the Belgian AML/CFT supervisory authority in the financial field is made to: (i) a Member State’s AML/CFT supervisory authorities; or (ii) a Member State’s prudential supervisory authorities. The ECB notes that under the applicable Union law, in particular

text: Article 56 of Directive 2013/36/EU

text: , prudential supervisory authorities may transmit information they have received to a set of subsequent recipient authorities in Member States, which is broader than that envisaged by the draft law, without having to obtain the prior consent of the originating authorities. The ECB would recommend clarifying that these existing information exchange procedures and permissions set out in the Directive

text: are not affected by the draft law. 2.3 Powers of the NBB 2.3.1 The draft law addresses the NBB’s powers to sanction violations of the Belgian Law on AML/CFT, the measures implementing the AML Directive and

text: Regulation (EU) 2015/847

text: , and the duty of care imposed by the binding provisions on financial embargoes. Insofar as necessary the draft law elaborates the legal basis for the NBB to issue injunctions in the event that an obliged entity breaches its duty to comply with requirements set by the NBB pursuant to, or as conditions for a decision made pursuant to, these legal acts. The draft law also strengthens the collaboration of the NBB with the statutory auditors of the concerned obliged entities. The ECB welcomes the fact that insofar as is necessary the draft law specifies the legal basis of the NBB’s powers, and therefore strengthens the NBB’s role as an AML/CFT supervisory authority. The ECB understands that the draft law only clarifies the NBB’s role in this respect, and does not materially alter the NBB’s mandate or tasks. Therefore, the need to assess whether the conferral of new tasks on a national central bank complies with the prohibition of monetary financing does not arise in the present case. This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 25 May 2020. [signed] The President of the ECB Christine LAGARDE


text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42). 2

text: Directive (EU) 2015/849

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, amending

text: Regulation (EU) No 648/2012

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council and

text: Commission Directive 2006/70/EC

text: (OJ L 141, 5.6.2015, p. 73). 3

text: Directive (EU) 2018/843

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 amending

text: Directive (EU) 2015/849

text: on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, and amending Directives

text: and

text: (OJ L 156, 19.6.2018, p. 43).

text: See European Union (Anti-Money Laundering: Beneficial Ownership of Corporate Entities) Regulations 2019 (S.I. No. 110 of 2019) (hereinafter the ‘2019 Regulations’).

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 of 13 December 1993

text: specifying definitions for the application of the prohibitions referred to in Articles

text: and

text: b(1) of the Treaty (OJ L 332, 31.12.1993, p. 1). 6 Article 123 of the Treaty also serves the objective of maintaining price stability and reinforces central bank independence.

text: See, for example, Opinions

text: and

text: (Belgium),

text: (Czech Republic) and

text: (Bulgaria). All ECB opinions are available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 8 See paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 3.1.3 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 3.1.3 of Opinion

text: and para. 2.2.5.1 of Convergence Report, May 2018. 9 See paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 3.1.3 of Opinion

text: , and paragraph 3.1.3 of Opinion

text: . 10 See, for example, paragraph 4.6.1 of Opinion

text: See Regulation 31A(2) of the draft regulations, Section 36 of the draft law (adding Section 45(2) of the Investment Limited Partnerships Act 1994 (hereinafter, the ‘1994 Act’) and Section 61 of the draft law (adding Section 5(2) of the Investment Funds, Companies and Miscellaneous Provisions Act 2005 (hereinafter, the ‘2005 Act’)). 12 See Regulation 31A(3) of the draft regulations, Section 36 of the draft law (adding Section 45(3) of the 1994 Act), Section 61 of the draft law (adding Section 5(3) of the 2005 Act) and Section 32D of the Central Bank Act, 1942, as amended. 13 See Regulation 31A(4) of the draft regulations, Section 36 of the draft law (adding Section 45(4) of the 1994 Act) and Section 61 of the draft law (adding Section 5(4) of the 2005 Act). 14 See Regulation 31A(5) of the draft regulations, Section 36 of the draft law (adding Section 45(5) of the 1994 Act) and Section 61 of the draft law (adding Section 5(5) of the 2005 Act). 15 See Section 61 of the draft law (adding Section 5(2)-(4) of the 2005 Act), which only makes reference to the defrayal of the CBI’s expenses associated with its functions under Sections 18O to 18T of the 2005 Act. No reference is made to the defrayal of the CBI’s expenses associated with its functions under Sections 18L to 18N of the 2005 Act.

text: See Section 33AJ(2) of the Central Bank Act 1942. 17 See paragraph 2 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 3.2 of Opinion

text: , paragraphs 2.2, 3.2 and 3.8 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 4.4 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , and the ECB’s Convergence Report, May 2018, p, 30.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 18 June 2020 on the appointment of the Central Bank of Ireland as registrar for registers of beneficial ownership for certain financial entities (CON/2020/18)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 18 June 2020 on the appointment of the Central Bank of Ireland as registrar for registers of beneficial ownership for certain financial entities (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 27 May 2020 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Irish Minister for Finance for an opinion on draft European Union (Modifications of Statutory Instrument No. 110 of 2019) (Registration of Beneficial Ownership of Certain Financial Vehicles) Regulations 2020 (hereinafter the ‘draft regulations’). In addition, on 9 June 2020 the ECB received a further request for an opinion on a draft Investment Limited Partnerships (Amendment) Bill 2020 (hereinafter the ‘draft law’, and together with the draft regulations, the ‘draft laws’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft laws relate to the Central Bank of Ireland (CBI). In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft regulations and laws

text: 1.1 Draft regulations The draft regulations provide, inter alia, for the establishment and maintenance of the Central Register of Beneficial Ownership of Irish Collective Asset-management Vehicles, Credit Unions and Unit Trusts (hereafter the ‘Register’) in Ireland. The draft regulations give further effect to 2 3 Article 30 of Directive EU/2015/849 as amended by Article 1(15) of Directive EU/2018/843 , in order to facilitate the prevention, detection or investigation of money laundering or terrorist financing. The draft regulations require certain financial vehicles, including Irish collective asset management vehicles, unit trusts and credit unions, to register information on this central register in Ireland. The Register will co-exist alongside the existing Central Register of Beneficial Ownership

text: of Companies and Industrial and Provident Societies, which is operated by the Irish Companies Registration Office, and in respect of which corporate and other legal entities incorporated in Ireland are required to obtain and hold adequate, accurate and current information in relation to their beneficial owners. 1.2 The draft regulations facilitate the appointment by the Irish Minister for Finance as the registrar responsible for the establishment and maintenance of the Register. 1.3 Draft law The draft law amends the Investment Limited Partnerships Act 1994, the Irish Collective Assetmanagement Vehicles Act 2015 and the Investment Funds, Companies and Miscellaneous Provisions Act 2005 and provides for related matters. The draft law proposes to establish central registers in Ireland which will be established and operated by the CBI and will be called the Central Register of Beneficial Ownership of Common Contractual Funds and Investment Limited Partnerships (together with the Register, the ‘Registers’). 1.4 Key attributes of the Registers under the draft laws As registrar, the CBI will be required under the draft laws to enter the required information in the Registers and to keep the Registers in such form as the CBI considers appropriate. In the context of discrepancies, the CBI may make an entry into the Registers that specifies the particulars as regards the notice of discrepancies received from a relevant entity required to register. 1.5 As registrar, the CBI will be required under the draft laws to afford the maker of a request for inspection access, in a timely manner, to the Registers. While the Registers are available for public inspection, persons who have a right to inspect the Registers for specific information (i.e. unrestricted access) include specified entities, including members/officers of the Garda Síochána (Irish police), the Irish Finance Intelligence Unit, the Revenue Commissioners, the Criminal Assets Bureau, or a competent authority engaged in the prevention, detection or investigation of possible money laundering or terrorist financing, and do not include members of staff of the CBI, unless they are authorised and of a specified grade. The CBI will not alert any relevant entity to the fact that unrestricted access to the Registers has been afforded to any other entities. The CBI will also arrange for the connection of the Registers to registers in other Member States. 1.6 The draft laws provide that the Commission of the CBI will make regulations prescribing dedicated levies to be paid by entities that are required to register information on the Registers. The moneys received by the CBI by way of such levies will be used to defray the CBI’s expenses associated with its functions under the draft laws. The CBI shall not provide any funds from its own resources other than the dedicated levies to defray the CBI’s expenses incurred in the performance of its functions under the draft laws. Where in any year the CBI reasonably apprehends that it will be unable to defray all of its expenses arising in that year from moneys received by way of the dedicated levies, or where for any reason there is an insufficiency in any year of moneys available to the CBI to defray all of its expenses, the Irish Minister for Finance will, on written request of the CBI, advance to the CBI such sums as he or she thinks proper to enable the CBI to defray all of its

text: expenses. The advancement of these sums will be made on such terms as regard to repayment, interest and other matters as may be determined by the Minister after consulting the CBI. As soon as may be after the commencement of the draft regulations, the CBI will consult, with the Minister in relation to what the CBI estimates, as best it may, to be the likely amount of expenses incurred by the performance of the functions under the draft regulations, and will have regard to recommendations the Minister may decide to make to the CBI insofar as the Minister considers them likely to limit the amount of those expenses.

text: 2. Conferral of a new task on the Central Bank of Ireland

text: 2.1 New task of the Central Bank of Ireland 2.1.1 It is foreseen that the establishment and maintenance of the Registers will be conferred on the CBI. The establishment and maintenance by the CBI of the Registers is distinct and separate to the CBI’s existing role as supervisor of compliance by credit and financial institutions with anti-money laundering (AML) requirements and combating the financing of terrorism (CFT) requirements. Rather, the maintenance of the Registers will facilitate the investigative role of the law enforcement authorities in Ireland, which have access to the Registers, and will enable obliged entities to meet their obligations under AML law to identify beneficial owners. 2.1.2 The ECB underlines that a proposed conferral of new tasks on a national central bank (NCB) in the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) must be assessed against the prohibition on monetary financing under Article 123 of the Treaty. For the purposes of that prohibition,

text: Article 1(1)

text: (b)(ii) of

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93

text: defines ‘other type of credit facility’, inter alia, as ‘any financing of the public sector’s obligations vis-à-vis third parties’. 2.1.3 Ensuring that Member States implement a sound budgetary policy is one of the key objectives of the monetary financing prohibition, which may not be circumvented . Therefore, the task of financing measures, which are normally the responsibility of the Member States, and which are financed from their budgetary sources rather than by the NCBs, must not be entrusted to NCBs. To decide what constitutes financing of the public sector’s obligations vis-à-vis third parties, which can be translated as the provision of central bank financing outside the scope of central bank tasks, it is necessary to carry out, on a case-by-case basis, an assessment of whether the task to be undertaken by an NCB is a central bank task or a government task, i.e. a task within the responsibility of the Member States. In other words, adequate safeguards must be in place to ensure that circumventions of the objective of the monetary financing prohibition of maintaining a sound budgetary policy of Member States do not take place. 2.1.4 As part of its discretion in the exercise of its duty, on the basis of

text: Article 271

text: (d) of the Treaty and Article 35.6 of the Statute of the ESCB, to ensure that NCBs honour the obligations laid down by the Treaty, the Governing Council has endorsed safeguards of that kind in the form of criteria for determining what may be seen as falling within the scope of a public sector obligation within the

text: meaning of

text: Article 1(1)

text: (b)(ii) of

text: Regulation (EC) No 3603/93

text: or, in other words, what constitutes a government task as follows: First, central bank tasks are in particular those tasks that are related to the tasks that have been conferred upon the ECB and the NCBs by the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB. These tasks are mainly defined in

text: Article 127(2)

text: , (5) and (6) and Article 128(1) of the Treaty, as well as

text: Article 22

text: and Article 25.1 of the Statute of the ESCB. Second, as Article 14.4 of the Statute of the ESCB allows NCBs to perform ‘other functions’, new tasks, i.e. tasks that are not related to tasks that have been conferred upon the ECB and the NCBs, are not precluded per se. However, new tasks that are undertaken by an NCB and which are atypical of NCB tasks or which are clearly discharged on behalf of, and in the exclusive interest of the government or of other public sector entities should be considered government tasks. Third, an important criterion for qualifying a new task as atypical of an NCB task or as being clearly discharged on behalf of and in the exclusive interest of the government or other public sector entities is the impact of the task on the institutional, financial and personal independence of that NCB. In particular, the following aspects should be taken into account: (a) whether the performance of the new task creates conflicts of interest with existing central bank tasks, which are not adequately addressed, and does not necessarily complement those existing central bank tasks. If a conflict of interest arises between existing and new tasks, sufficient safeguards to mitigate that conflict should be in place. The complementarity between a new task and existing central bank tasks should not be interpreted broadly, so as to lead to the creation of an indefinite chain of ancillary tasks. Such complementarity should be examined in relation to the financing of those tasks; (b) whether without new financial resources the performance of the new task is disproportionate to the NCB’s financial or organisational capacity, and may have a negative impact on the capacity to properly perform the existing central bank tasks; (c) whether the performance of the new task fits into the institutional set-up of the NCB in the light of central bank independence and accountability considerations; (d) whether the performance of the new task harbours substantial financial risks; (e) whether the performance of the new task exposes the members of the NCB decision-making bodies to political risks that are disproportionate and may also have an impact on their personal independence and, in particular, on the guarantee of term of office set out in Article 14.2 of the Statute. 2.1.5 Based on the criteria set out above, the following paragraphs assess whether the CBI’s new task is in line with the prohibition of monetary financing.

text: 2.2 Tasks related to the tasks conferred upon the European Central Bank and the National Central Banks by the Treaty and the Statute of the European System of Central Banks The task of operating the Registers for the purposes of the prevention, detection or investigation of possible money laundering or terrorist financing is not in any respect related to the tasks conferred upon the ECB and the NCBs by the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB. 2.3 Tasks which are atypical of central bank tasks The task of operating the Registers is an atypical task for a NCB. The ECB understands that this task has not been allocated to any NCB in the ESCB. However, NCBs have been given – in certain Member States – the task of operating registers of bank accounts for criminal law enforcement purposes, including the investigation of money laundering and terrorist financing . It should be recalled in this respect that the ECB has previously opined that tasks entrusted to an NCB relating to the establishment of a central register of bank accounts are not central bank tasks nor do they facilitate the enforcement of such tasks . 2.4 Tasks clearly discharged on behalf of and in the exclusive interest of the government This task is not part of the CBI’s AML/CFT supervisory role. The new task conferred on the CBI is essentially a government task as its purpose is to further the State’s interest in being able to efficiently access information for the prevention, detection or investigation of money laundering or terrorist financing by specified State authorities, such as the Garda Síochána, the Criminal Assets Bureau and the Revenue Commissioners, and thereby protect the financial interests and security of the State and to require obliged entities to meet their AML obligations. This new task is therefore discharged primarily in the interest of the government, and cannot be regarded in any respect as a central bank task . The Registers could be operated by any competent State authority. In this regard, it is noted that corporate and other legal entities incorporated in Ireland, other than the financial vehicles subject to the draft laws, are required to register beneficial ownership information with a register operated by the Companies Registration Office, which is a central government body. 2.5 Extent to which performance of the new task creates conflicts of interest with existing central bank

text: tasks

text: It is difficult to perceive any conflicts of interest arising with other aspects of the CBI’s mandate. 2.6 Extent to which performance of the new task is disproportionate to the financial or organisational

text: capacity of the Central Bank of Ireland

text: 2.6.1 As previously noted by the ECB , the principle of financial independence requires that Member States not put their NCBs in a position where they have insufficient resources to carry out both their ESCB-related tasks and their national tasks, from an operational and financial perspective. Furthermore, when allocating specific new tasks to NCBs, each NCB concerned should have

text: sufficient financial and human resources at its disposal to ensure that the tasks can be carried out without impacting on the NCB’s financial or operational capacity to perform its ESCB-related tasks. In order to ensure that the CBI’s capacity to perform its ESCB-related tasks is not impaired, the CBI must, therefore, be able to avail itself of the necessary resources to carry out its duties under the draft laws. At this stage it is not possible for the ECB to comment on what additional resources the CBI will require in order to perform its new task. 2.6.2 It seems clear that the CBI’s performance of the new task is not disproportionate to the financial capacity of the CBI, since the draft laws expressly provide that the CBI may not use funds from its own resources to defray expenses incurred by discharging its functions . Rather, these expenses are to be met by the industry levies to be paid by those entities required to register information on the registers . In addition, if the CBI reasonably anticipates that the industry levies will not suffice to defray all of its expenses, or if there is an insufficiency in any given year, the CBI may request the shortfall from the Irish Minister for Finance . Insofar as the Minister in turn may advance such sums as he or she thinks proper to enable the CBI to defray all of its expenses, the draft laws retain an element of discretion for the Minister in regard to the advancement of sums requested by the CBI to defray its costs. In addition, the draft laws provide that sums advanced by the Minister can be subject to repayment, interest and other terms set by the Minister after consulting with the CBI . These repayments, interest and other terms are, however, not specified further or limited in the draft laws. It would not seem appropriate to charge interest on any moneys advanced by the Minister to the CBI insofar as the task performed by the CBI is a government task discharged in the interest of the government. Finally, it is noted that the current wording of the draft law in relation to the defrayal of the CBI’s expenses incurred in discharging its functions with respect to the Central Register of Beneficial Ownership of Common Contractual Funds does not cover all of the specified functions allocated to the CBI in respect of this particular register . 2.7 Extent to which performance of the new task fits into the institutional set-up of the Central Bank of Ireland, in the light of central bank independence and accountability considerations 2.8 The performance of the new task does not fit smoothly into the institutional set-up of the CBI. The new task does not complement the CBI’s other tasks. The operation of the Registers will be functionally separated from the AML/CFT and prudential supervisory roles of the CBI.

text: 2.9 Extent to which the performance of tasks harbours substantial financial risks The performance of the new task does not harbour substantial financial risks for the CBI. As noted above, the draft laws expressly provide that the CBI may not use funds from its own resources to defray expenses it incurs in discharging its functions. In addition, if the CBI reasonably anticipates that the industry levies will not suffice to defray all of its expenses, or if there is an insufficiency in any given year, the CBI may request the shortfall from the Irish Minister for Finance. Moreover, the CBI is not liable for damages for anything done or omitted in the performance or purported performance or exercise of any of its functions or powers, unless it is proved that the act or omission was in bad faith . 2.10 Extent to which the performance of the new task exposes members of the decision-making bodies of the Central Bank of Ireland to disproportionate political risks and impacts on their personal

text: independence

text: The performance of the new functions conferred under the draft laws do not appear to expose the CBI’s decision-making bodies to any disproportionate political risk or have an impact on their personal independence. However, the possibility cannot be entirely excluded that the CBI would be exposed to reputational risks should the information in the Registers be accessed by nonauthorised persons. 2.11 Conclusions 2.11.1 The new task conferred on the CBI is essentially a government task as its purpose is to further the State’s interest in being able to efficiently access information for the prevention, detection or investigation of money laundering or terrorist financing by specified State authorities, such as the Garda Síochána, the Criminal Assets Bureau and the Revenue Commissioners, and thereby protect the financial interests and security of the State. This new task is therefore discharged primarily in the interest of the government, and cannot be regarded in any respect as a central bank task. Consequently, as a safeguard against the circumvention of the monetary financing prohibition, the CBI needs to be fully and adequately remunerated when carrying out its tasks in relation to the registers . 2.11.2 In this respect, the ECB strongly welcomes the provisions of the draft laws providing that the CBI may not use funds from its own resources to defray expenses it incurs in discharging its functions, and that if the CBI reasonably anticipates that industry levies will not suffice to defray all of its expenses, or if there is an insufficiency in any given year, the CBI may request the shortfall from the Irish Minister for Finance. These provisions should greatly help to ensure compliance by the CBI with the prohibition of monetary financing. 2.11.3 For the avoidance of doubt, and for the sake of legal certainty, the consulting authority is invited to clarify through appropriate amendments to the draft laws that any anticipated or actual shortfall of funds to defray the CBI’s expenses will be granted by the Irish Minister for Finance on a regular

text: and prompt basis as the costs arise in order to ensure that the CBI does not have to fund the cost of its task under the draft laws from its own funds under any circumstances. In addition, it would be helpful to clarify that repayment terms for amounts advanced by the Minister are, in all cases, subject to the overarching principle that the CBI may not use funds from its own resources to defray its expenses arising under the draft laws. Finally, it should be clarified that the CBI’s expenses incurred in discharging all of its functions with respect to the Central Register of Beneficial Ownership of Common Contractual Funds will be defrayed.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 18 June 2020.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Christine LAGARDE