text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).

text: See Section 4(5) of the Federal Act on the Foundation. The ECB has addressed this matter in a previous opinion (see Opinion

text: ). All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu .

text: Under Section 69(3) of the law on the OeNB, the Austrian Federation shall first receive 90 % of the net profits remaining after certain specified deductions have been made. Of the earnings retained after these deductions have been made, the shareholder shall, by decision of the General Meeting, receive a dividend of up to 10 % of its share of the capital. The amount remaining shall be transferred as decided by the General Meeting.

text: Under Section 69(1) of the law on the OeNB, this income is derived pursuant to Articles 32, 33 and 51 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank.

text: Pursuant to Section 69(1) of the law on the OeNB, the following sums shall, irrespective of the operating profit, be deducted and not recognised as profit: (1) earnings from the assets in which the pension reserve, i.e. the reserve fund serving to meet the pension claims of the OeNB’s employees, has been invested, and which shall be paid into that reserve fund; (2) amounts of interest which, pursuant to the agreement between the OeNB and the European Recovery Program Fund concluded in accordance with Section 3(4) of the European Recovery Program Fund Act, were credited during the year to the temporary reserve account for European Recovery Program loans extended by the OeNB; and (3) earnings from the assets in which the fund for the promotion of scientific research and teaching set up by the OeNB is invested, which shall be endowed to this fund.

text: See Section 7a(1) of the Stability Fee Act.

text: See Section 7a(3) of the Stability Fee Act.

text: See the main remarks on the draft law introducing a stability fee in part I of the explanatory note to the Stability Fee Act (page 7).

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 23 June 2017 on a law on the National Foundation for Research, Technology and Development (CON/2017/26)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 23 June 2017 on a law on the National Foundation for Research, Technology and Development (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 7 June 2017, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Austrian Federal Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft law amending the Federal Act governing the National Foundation for Research, Technology and Development (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and on the third indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft law relates to the Oesterreichische Nationalbank (OeNB). In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The purpose of the National Foundation for Research, Technology and Development (hereinafter the ‘Foundation’) is to finance research, technology and development in Austria, especially research activities that promise to be of long-term benefit, as well as interdisciplinary research. According to the current legal framework governing the Foundation, the Foundation shall be annually endowed with, inter alia, a contribution from the OeNB . In particular, the OeNB is authorised to transfer EUR 1.5 billion from its general reserve fund and its free reserves to a fund established by the OeNB to sponsor scientific research and teaching tasks, and to make a dividend payment of up to EUR 75 million to the Foundation . 1.2 In November 2016, the Austrian Federal Government resolved that additional funds should be allocated to the Foundation. To this end, the draft law authorises, but does not require, the OeNB, over and above the existing provisions laid down in the Federal Act governing the National foundation for Research, Technology and Development (hereinafter the ‘Federal Act on the Foundation’), to transfer to the Foundation, in the OeNB’s name, an additional amount to be taken from the 90 % share of the OeNB’s net profits to which the Austrian Federation is entitled by virtue of Section 69(3) of the Law on the Oesterreichische Nationalbank (hereinafter the ‘law on the

text: OeNB’) . The additional amount that is authorised to be paid, including the dividend payment made to the Foundation by the OeNB under the Federal Act on the Foundation, shall not exceed a total amount of EUR 100 million per annum. The amount to be met from sums paid in under the stability fee (see paragraph 1.3) shall form part of this amount of EUR 100 million. The application of this provision of the draft law shall be restricted to a period of three years, from 2018 to 2020. 1.3 According to the draft law, the Foundation shall be endowed with an amount of EUR 100 million, to be met from sums paid in under the Federal Stability Fee Act (hereinafter the ‘Stability Fee Act’), under which a stability fee is paid by credit institutions authorised under the Banking Act as well as by branches of foreign credit institutions providing services in Austria. This endowment related to the stability fee is to be limited to a period of three years and may, therefore, result in the payment of a sum of EUR 33.33 million per year. 1.4 Therefore, during the three-year period from 2018 to 2020, the draft law envisages that only the residual amount of the additional authorised allocation of EUR 100 million to the Foundation that is financed neither by the additional endowment related to the stability fee nor by the dividend payment made by the OeNB to the Foundation under the Federal Act on the Foundation shall be taken from the 90 % share of the OeNB’s net profits to which the Austrian Federation is entitled by virtue of Section 69(3) of the law on the OeNB. 1.5 Finally, the draft law provides that the amounts transferred by the OeNB to the Foundation under the draft law shall cause the OeNB’s corporate tax base for the assessment periods of 2018 to 2020 to be reduced.

text: 2. Observations

text: 2.1. The ECB understands that although the contribution envisaged by the draft law may be transferred to the Foundation by the OeNB in its own name, this contribution does not reduce the OeNB’s total annual income, and does not therefore impact on its profit situation. Rather, the draft law authorises the OeNB to transfer a dedicated contribution that is deducted from its net profit to which the Austrian Federation is entitled by virtue of Section 69(3) of the law on the OeNB. In this respect, it is noted that Section 69(3) of the law on the OeNB explicitly refers to the distribution of the OeNB’s net profits and the right of the Austrian Federation to receive a share of 90 % of the OeNB’s net profits, while Section 69(1) of the law on the OeNB governs the total annual income of 5 6 the OeNB and lists specific amounts that have to be deducted from this income . The ECB

text: understands that, in contrast to the amounts listed in Section 69(1) of the law on the OeNB that reduce the annual income of the OeNB, the dedicated contribution envisaged by the draft law is to be made solely from profits which have been fully realised and accounted for, and only insofar as there is in fact a distributable profit of the OeNB within the meaning of Section 69(3) of the law on the OeNB. Furthermore, the profits distributed to the Austrian Federation will thus be reduced only if the OeNB decides, at its discretion, to make use of its authorisation to contribute the Foundation as provided for in the draft law. 2.2 As regards the endowment to the Foundation to be met from the stability fee, the ECB understands that the Stability Fee Act does not provide that the sum of money obtained by levying the stability fee should be used for any specific purpose. It does, however, make explicit reference to a special contribution that credit institutions have to pay in addition to the stability fee. This special contribution is invested in a fund that may only be drawn upon for the purposes of measures set out in the Federal Act on measures for securing the stability of the financial market. This fund was established for a limited period of time, from 2012 until 2017 . However, according to the explanatory note to the Stability Fee Act , the stability fee shall ensure credit institutions’ contribution to the costs of the financial crisis and promote the stability of the financial market. Furthermore, the fee shall constitute a general safeguard for the State’s contribution in times of financial crisis. The wording of the Stability Fee Act as well as the explanatory note thereto indicate that the Stability Fee Act does not stipulate the exact use to which the sum of money obtained by levying the stability fee should be put. Therefore, it is assumed that this sum of money does not have to be invested in another specific fund, such as the national resolution fund.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 23 June 2017.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


publisher: Europeiska centralbanken

sprak: en

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 11 July 2017 on limitation of cash payments (CON/2017/27)

serie: con

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 11 July 2017 on limitation of cash payments (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

type: rubrik

text: On 27 June 2017 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Bulgarian Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft amendment to the law on limitation of cash payments (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the second indent of

text: , as the draft law relates to means of payment. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

type: stycke

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The draft law seeks to gradually decrease the maximum limit for cash payments in Bulgaria from the current limit of BGN 10 000 to BGN 1 000 by 2019. The same maximum limit would apply to the payment of instalments in performance of a contractual obligation where the total amount is above the maximum limit. 1.2 As in the currently applicable law, the maximum limit would apply both to payments in BGN, as well as payments in foreign currencies which are of equivalent amounts. 1.3 In the explanatory memorandum accompanying the draft law the consulting authority explains that the draft law is in line with the Government’s objectives to reduce the shadow economy and perceives that this is in conformity with the current practice in other Member States. The consulting authority also explains that the draft law will help reduce the possibility of concealing accounting information concerning revenue generated by the sale of goods and services, and paid salaries and wages for which no taxes and social security contributions are deducted.

text: 2. Observations

text: 2.1 The ECB notes that Bulgaria is a Member State with a derogation pursuant to Article 139 of the Treaty, and has obligations regarding the achievement of economic and monetary union pursuant to Article 140 of the Treaty. Against this backdrop, the ECB has prepared an assessment of the

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42). draft law’s provisions against relevant practices in the euro area, in particular the legal requirements for the euro and the legal tender status of euro banknotes . 2.2 Under the Treaty, the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) is required to act, inter alia, in accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free competition, favouring an efficient allocation of resources . The ESCB has the basic task of promoting the smooth operation of payment systems , and the ECB has the exclusive right to authorise the issue of euro banknotes within the Union . The euro banknotes issued by the ECB and the national central banks of the euro area shall be the only banknotes to have the status of legal tender status within the euro area . 2.3 The Commission Recommendation of 22 March 2010 on the scope and effects of legal tender of euro banknotes and coins (hereinafter the ‘Commission Recommendation’) states that the acceptance of payments in cash should be the rule, but acknowledges that cash may be refused for reasons related to the ‘good faith principle’, without this constituting a breach of the legal tender status of cash. Neither Union law nor the Commission Recommendation explicitly address whether, nor to what extent, it may be permissible to introduce a more general limitation to the obligation to accept euro cash payments. Therefore, Union law must be interpreted in order to ascertain the conditions that a limitation on payments in euro notes and coins should fulfil, including the conditions that should be fulfilled to comply with the legal tender status of euro banknotes and coins when general limitations to the obligation to accept cash payments are introduced . 2.4

text: Recital 19

text: of

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 974/98

text: , which states that ‘limitations on payments in notes and coins, established by Member States for public reasons, are not incompatible with the status of legal tender of euro banknotes and coins, provided that other lawful means for the settlement of monetary debts are available’ , has been taken into account in previous ECB opinions considering the introduction of cash limitations under draft national laws. While other lawful means for the settlement of monetary debts, which ensure similar benefits to those of cash, are available in Bulgaria for business involving transactions with consumers, their general availability to all parts of society, at comparable costs as cash, should be closely verified by the consulting authority. 2.5 In this respect, Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council has made it easier for Union citizens to obtain payment accounts and related electronic payment services as

text: 2 See paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu

text: 3 See Article 127(1) of the Treaty and Article 2 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter the ‘Statute of the ESCB’).

text: 7 OJ L 83, 30.3.2010, p. 70.

text: 8 See paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 3.1 of Opinion

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 974/98 of 3 May 1998

text: on the introduction of the euro (OJ L 139, 11.5.1998, p. 1).

text: 10 See, for example, Opinions

text: and

text: 11 Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on the comparability of fees related to payment accounts, payment account switching and access to payment accounts with basic features (OJ L 257, 28.8.2014, p. 214). alternatives to cash . In Bulgaria the law on payment services and payment systems aims to create the conditions for making a minimum set of banking services accessible to all citizens. However, such banking services and electronic payment services offered by commercial entities may be subject to charges. 2.6 The ECB acknowledges that the draft law’s objectives of limiting the share of the shadow economy and combating tax evasion might, in general, constitute ‘public reasons’ justifying the establishment of limitations on cash payments. However, any limitation needs to comply with the legal tender status of euro banknotes. Therefore, it would need to be demonstrated that the proposed cash payment limitations affecting the legal tender status of euro banknotes would be effective as regards the achievement of the public objectives that are being legitimately pursued by the limitations. Hence, there should be clear evidence that such limitations are likely, in fact, to achieve the stated public goal of reducing the size of the shadow economy and combating tax evasion. 2.7 Limitations on cash payments should also be proportionate to the objectives pursued and should not go beyond what is necessary to achieve such objectives, especially in view of the fact that the measures set out in the draft law affect transactions between natural persons and involve payments for relatively small amounts. Any negative impact of the proposed limitations should therefore be carefully weighed against the anticipated public benefits. When considering whether a limitation is proportionate, the adverse impact of the limitation in question should always be considered, as well as whether alternative measures could be adopted that would fulfil the relevant objective and have a less adverse impact . Cashless means of payments that provide similar advantages as payments in cash are currently not available for transactions between private persons. 2.8 Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that the ability to pay in cash remains particularly important for certain groups in society that, for various legitimate reasons, prefer to use cash rather than other payment instruments. Cash is generally also appreciated as a payment instrument because it is, as legal tender, widely accepted, fast and facilitates control over the payer’s spending. Moreover, it is still the only means of payment that allows citizens to instantly settle a transaction in central bank money and at face value, without the legal possibility to impose a fee for the use of this means of payment. Additionally, cash payments facilitate the inclusion of the entire population in the economy by allowing it to settle any kind of financial transaction in this way. 2.9 Establishing a cash limit for all transactions between private individuals (as opposed to only sectorspecific cash limitations over taxable transactions) does not mitigate the risk of tax evasion as in many circumstances such transactions are not taxable. Instead, it only makes it more difficult to settle legitimate private transactions using cash as a means of payment, thus endangering the concept of legal tender enshrined in the Treaty.

text: 12 Within the framework previously created by Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2007 on payment services in the internal market amending Directives

text: and

text: and repealing Directive

text: (OJ L 319, 5.12.2007, p. 1), which introduced the legal basis for the creation of an internal market for payments within the Union and allowed for the creation of the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA).

text: 13 See, for example, paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: and paragraphs 2.6 and 2.7 of Opinion

text: . 2.10 In particular, the decreasing limits on cash payments proposed by the draft law need to take into account the advantages of having limits on cash payments in place and the potential inconvenience thereof for citizens’ regular transactions in certain market segments. Setting the limitation at these levels may make it difficult to implement the limit in practice. In this regard, it should be noted that

text: Directive (EU) 2015/849

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council , whilst confirming the vulnerability of large cash payments to money laundering and terrorist financing, nevertheless applied customer due diligence measures to cash payments of EUR 10 000 or more. This implies that the draft law should establish a proportionate threshold for limits to cash payments, taking into account the objectives of such limits. 2.11 Against this background, the ECB considers the lowering of the limit on cash payments to BGN st 1000 (approximately EUR 500) by the 1 of January 2019 as disproportionate, in the light of the potentially adverse impact on the cash payment system. In case the legislator wishes to pursue the proposed cash payment limitations a higher threshold should be chosen and a degree of flexibility should be introduced in the draft laws by, for example, allowing the delivery and receipt of cash payments for compelling reasons or for reasons that are outside the individual’s control , such as where no payment service provider is available at the place or time of the payment. It might also be advisable to allow cash transactions above the defined thresholds as long as the parties are able to ensure that the payment is traceable by identifying the amount, the reason for the transaction and the parties involved. This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 11 July 2017. [signed] The President of the ECB Mario DRAGHI

text: Directive (EU) 2015/849

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 May 2015 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, amending

text: Regulation (EU) No 648/2012

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council and

text: Commission Directive 2006/70/EC

text: (OJ L 141, 5.6.2015, p. 73).

text: 15 See Opinions

text: and

type: vagledning

utgivare: ecb


text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42). 2

text: Directive (EU) 2015/2366

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on payment services in the internal market, amending Directives

text: and

text: and

text: Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010

text: , and repealing Directive

text: (OJ L 337, 23.12.2015, p. 35). 3 Published in Darjaven Vestnik No 46, 10 June 1997.

text: Published in Darjaven Vestnik No 59, 21 July 2006.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 2 August 2017 on access to the central credit register and the register of bank accounts (CON/2017/28)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 2 August 2017 on access to the central credit register and the register of bank accounts (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 3 July 2017 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from Българска народна банка (Bulgarian National Bank) (BNB), following correspondence exchanged between BNB and the Minister of Finance, for an opinion on a draft law on payment services and payment systems (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft law relates to BNB. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1. The main purpose of the draft law is to implement

text: Directive (EU) 2015/2366

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council in national law. 1.2. The draft law also amends the Law on Българска народна банка (Bulgarian National Bank) by repealing the provision pursuant to which BNB may open cash accounts for primary dealers in government securities, sub-depositories of government securities and other entities for the purposes of cash settlement on government securities transactions by investment intermediaries. The explanatory memorandum states that the practice of keeping such cash accounts has been discontinued by BNB and that non-bank participants in the settlement system for government securities can instead ensure cash settlement through commercial banks that participate in the Real-time Interbank Gross Settlement System, which is the national real-time gross settlement system, and in the second generation of the Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross settlement Express Transfer system (TARGET 2). 1.3. The draft law also empowers BNB to adopt an ordinance defining the procedure under which the government and municipal authorities, as well as legal entities and natural persons, provide

text: information to BNB in relation to the compilation of balance of payments, monetary and interest rate statistics and financial account statistics. 1.4. The draft law also amends the Law on credit institutions with regard to access to the central credit register and the register of bank accounts operated by BNB. In particular, the draft law seeks to achieve a unified approach to the provision of access to information contained in the two registers. Only certain State bodies shall have access to the central credit register in order to fulfil their legal tasks. In all other cases access to information in the system shall only be provided pursuant to a court ruling for the disclosure of information that is protected by bank secrecy requirements, or with the consent of the account holder.

text: 2. General observations

text: The ECB welcomes the draft law, to the extent that it enhances legal certainty and provides clarity regarding the exercise of several of the existing tasks of BNB.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 2 August 2017.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: Rådets beslut

text: av den 29 juni 1998 om nationella myndigheters samråd med Europeiska centralbanken rörande förslag till rättsregler (EGT L 189, 3.7.1998, s. 42).

text: Se ECB:s yttrande

text: . Alla ECB:s yttranden finns på ECB:s webbplats www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: 6 kap 3b § och 16 kap 1 §4 i bank- och finansieringsrörelselagen, som trädde i kraft den 1 maj 2016. 4 5 kap 2a § i förordning (2004:329) om bank- och finansieringsrörelse, som trädde i kraft den 1 maj 2016.

text: Se punkt 2.2 i ECB:s yttrande

text: och punkt 2.1 i ECB:s yttrande

text: . 6 1 § i Finansinspektionens föreskrifter om amortering av krediter mot säkerhet i bostad, FFFS 2016:16. 7 Finansinspektionens beslutspromemoria Föreskrifter om krav på amortering av bolån av den 16 maj 2016, FI Dnr 14-16628. 8 Se avsnitt 2.7 i Finansinspektionens remisspromemoria Förslag till ett skärpt amorteringskrav för hushåll med höga skuldkvoter av den 22 juni 2017, FI Dnr 17-9236. 9 Se punkt 2.2 i ECB:s yttrande

text: och punkt 2.1 i ECB:s yttrande

sprak: sv

title: Europeiska centralbankens yttrande av den 4 augusti 2017 om ett ytterligare amorteringskrav för bolån (CON/2017/29)

text: EUROPEISKA CENTRALBANKENS YTTRANDE av den 4 augusti 2017 om ett ytterligare amorteringskrav för bolån (

text: ) Inledning och rättslig grund

text: Den 3 juli 2017 mottog Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) en begäran från Finansinspektionen om ett yttrande över ett utkast till föreskrifter om ett ytterligare amorteringskrav för bolån (nedan kallat förslaget). ECB:s behörighet att avge ett yttrande grundas på artiklarna

text: och

text: i fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt och artikel 2.1 sjätte strecksatsen i

text: rådets beslut 98/415/EG

text: , eftersom förslaget innehåller regler som gäller finansiella institut i den mån de har en påtaglig inverkan på de finansiella institutens och marknadernas stabilitet. I enlighet med

text: artikel 17.5

text: första meningen i arbetsordningen för Europeiska centralbanken har detta yttrande antagits av ECB-rådet.

text: 1. Syftet med förslaget

text: 1.1 Förslagets övergripande syfte är att ytterligare begränsa hushållens skuldsättning, att motverka makrorisker och risker för den finansiella stabiliteten som är kopplade till en alltför hög skuldsättning samt att ytterligare stärka hushållens motståndskraft mot makroekonomiska störningar. Bestämmelserna i förslaget gäller nya bolån avseende den inhemska bostadsmarknaden i Sverige. Alla institut som står under Finansinspektionens tillsyn skulle omfattas av föreskrifterna. Föreskrifterna skulle alltså tillämpas på i princip alla institut som beviljar lån till enskilda personer, dvs. banker, sparbanker, medlemsbanker och andra kreditinstitut. 1.2 Finansinspektionen införde 2016 ett progressivt amorteringskrav, som baserades på belåningsgrad . Enligt det kravet ska nya bolån som överstiger 70 procent av bostadens marknadsvärde amorteras med minst 2 procent per år av det totala lånebeloppet, och med minst 1 procent per år av det totala lånebeloppet om ett nytt bolån överstiger 50 procent men är lägre än 70 procent av bostadens marknadsvärde (nedan kallat 2016 års amorteringskrav). Enligt Finansinspektionen har 2016 års amorteringskrav lett till att skuldvolymen har minskat hos nya bolåntagare i Sverige, vilket i sin tur har stärkt dessa låntagares motståndskraft mot makroekonomisk instabilitet. Bolåntagarnas skuldsättning i förhållande till inkomster ("skuldkvot") har emellertid fortsatt att öka. Finansinspektionen anser därför att 2016 års amorteringskrav inte på sikt säkerställer en tillräcklig

text: minskning av bolåntagarnas skuldkvot. Hushållens bolåneskulder kommer därmed sannolikt att öka betydligt snabbare än deras inkomster. 1.3 Eftersom makroriskerna ökar korrelerat till de svenska hushållens höga skuldkvoter innehåller detta förslag ett amorteringskrav som baseras på låntagarens skuldkvot. Detta innebär närmare bestämt att personer vars sammanlagda bolåneskuld överstiger 450 procent av bruttoinkomsten (dvs. den årliga inkomsten före skatt) ska amortera nya bolån som beviljats efter den 31 december 2017 med ett årligt belopp som motsvarar (minst) 1 procent av deras sammanlagda bolåneskuld (dvs. befintliga bolåneskulder samt det nya bolånet). 1.4 De nya reglerna kommer att gälla utöver 2016 års amorteringskrav. Om en person med skuldkvot över 450 procent beviljas ett nytt bolån efter den 31 december 2017 ska lånet sålunda amorteras med minst 1 procent om skuldkvoten understiger 50 procent, med minst 2 procent om skuldkvoten överstiger 50 men understiger 70 procent samt med minst 3 procent om skuldkvoten överstiger 70 procent. 1.5 Förslaget innehåller även en möjlighet för långivare att erbjuda kunderna ett annat amorteringsalternativ. Som alternativ till amorteringskravet ovan i punkt 1.4 om ytterligare 1 procent kan en person med befintlig bolåneskuld som beviljats före den 1 januari 2018 och som beviljats ett nytt bolån efter den 1 januari 2018, förutsatt att samma bostad som innehas med äganderätt står som säkerhet för både det nya och det befintliga bolånet, välja att årligen amortera det nya bolånet med ett belopp motsvarande minst 10 procent av det initiala nya lånebeloppet. 1.6 Eftersom skuldkvoten enligt förslaget ska fastställas på grundval av personens bruttoinkomst, kommer amorteringskravet endast att vara tillämpligt på enskilda personer och inte på juridiska personer. 1.7 På liknande sätt som 2016 års amorteringskrav omfattar förslaget en möjlighet för långivare att inte tillämpa amorteringskraven under den första femårsperioden för lån som beviljats för att finansiera köp av nyproducerade bostäder. Enligt förslaget ska även ett tillfälligt undantag kunna beviljas i flera olika fall, t.ex. vid arbetslöshet, sjukdom eller vid dödsfall i familjen. Dessa undantag gäller under särskilda omständigheter då en låntagare saknar förmåga att amortera bolånet. Undantagen fastställs av långivaren och beskrivs inte närmare i förslaget. 1.8 Förslaget har slutligen samma rättsliga grund som 2016 års amorteringskrav . Detta innebär också att Finansinspektionen måste inhämta regeringens medgivande innan de nya amorteringsföreskrifterna träder i kraft .

text: 2. Allmänna kommentarer

text: 2.1 ECB bedömer att makroriskerna ökar efterhand som hushållens skuldkvot, och i synnerhet skuldkvoten för bolån, stiger. ECB framhåller också på nytt sin positiva syn på genomförandet av makrotillsynsverktyg för att främja en sund amorteringskultur och förebygga alltför höga skuldsättning hos

text: hushållen samt finansiella störningar. Mot denna bakgrund välkomnar ECB huvudmålen med förslaget, dvs. att begränsa hushållens alltför höga skuldsättning och motverka makrorisker och risker kopplade till finansiell stabilitet samt att ytterligare stärka hushållens motståndskraft mot makroekonomiska störningar. 2.2 Trots att föreskrifterna med 2016 års amorteringskrav (nedan kallade föreskrifterna) uttryckligen stadgar att alla svenska kreditinstitut som står under Finansinspektionens tillsyn ska omfattas av föreskrifterna, framgår det av beslutspromemorian avseende föreskrifterna att även utländska företag som genom filial eller på annat sätt lämnar bolån i Sverige ska omfattas av 2016 års amorteringskrav. Eftersom förslagets syfte, utöver att hantera de makroekonomiska risker som utgår från hushållens skuldsättning, är att skydda svenska konsumenter, kommer de nya föreskrifterna att gälla för alla institut verksamma i Sverige . Mot bakgrund av detta är det ECB:s tolkning att föreskrifterna inte kommer att gälla för svenska institut som beviljar bolån till konsumenter utanför Sverige genom filialer eller på annat sätt. 2.3 ECB avstår från att kommentera de tänkbara institutionella konsekvenserna för Finansinspektionens operativa oberoende som makrotillsynsmyndighet som kan uppstå pga. av kravet att Finansinspektionen ska inhämta regeringens medgivande innan föreskrifter om makrotillsynsverktyg träder i kraft. .

text: Detta yttrande kommer att offentliggöras på ECB:s webbplats.

text: Utfärdat i Frankfurt am Main den 4 augusti 2017.

text: [Namnteckning]

text: Mario DRAGHI

text: ECB:s ordförande


text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42). 2 See

text: Articles 1

text: to 19 of the draft decision. 3 See

text: Articles 20

text: to 34 of the draft decision.

text: See

text: Articles 35

text: to 40 of draft decision. 5 See

text: Articles 41

text: to 45 of draft decision. 6 Article 282(4) of the Treaty and Article 42.2 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 4 August 2017 on a draft decision on the monetary policy implementation of Hrvatska narodna banka (CON/2017/30)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 4 August 2017 on a draft decision on the monetary policy implementation of Hrvatska narodna banka (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 11 July 2017 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from Hrvatska narodna banka (HNB) for an opinion on a draft Decision on monetary policy implementation of the Hrvatska narodna banka (hereinafter the ‘draft decision’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and

text: Article 2(2) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft decision comprises draft legislative provisions on the instruments of monetary policy in a Member State which has not adopted the euro. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft decision

text: 1.1 The draft decision lays down HNB’s monetary policy operations and instruments and the related obligations of HNB’s counterparties. The purpose of the draft decision is to: (a) recast in a single act the national legislation on monetary policy operations; (b) introduce a pooling collateral management system for all of HNB’s credit operations; and (c) introduce discretionary measures that HNB is authorised to take regarding eligibility and the obligations of HNB’s counterparties. 1.2 The draft decision sets out, in particular: (a) an overview of the operations and instruments of HNB’s monetary policy and rules for their implementation ; (b) the conditions for participation in monetary policy operations, including eligible counterparties (banks and savings banks with head offices in the Republic of Croatia, branches of credit institutions of other Member States whose establishment has been notified to HNB by the competent authorities and branches of third country credit institutions that have been authorised by HNB), eligible assets, eligible securities, valuation and risk control and HNB’s eligible assets pooling system for collateralisation of HNB’s credit operations ; (c) the discretionary measures which HNB is authorised to take on the grounds of prudence, risk protection and in the case of breach by a counterparty of its obligations arising from

text: transactions conducted on the basis of the draft decision, together with the consequences in the case of a breach of obligations and the expiry of the validity of a bank’s authorisation by HNB ; (d) additional rules for conducting the monetary policy operations of HNB, including reporting obligations and the protection of confidential data .

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 The ECB has no comments on the draft decision. 2.2 As a Member State whose currency is not the euro Croatia and, in turn, HNB retain their powers in the field of monetary policy according to national law until such time as the relevant derogation is lifted and Croatia adopts the euro.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 4 August 2017.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).

text: Directive (EU) 2016/1148

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 concerning measures for a high common level of security of network and information systems across the Union (OJ L 194, 19.7.2016, p. 1).

text: See paragraph 2.2. of Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on the ECB's website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: Decision ECB/2014/35 of the European Central Bank of 13 August 2014 on the identification of TARGET2 as a systemically important payment system pursuant to

text: Regulation (EU) No 795/2014

text: on oversight requirements for systemically important payment systems (OJ L 245, 20.8.2014, p. 5).

text: Regulation (EU) No 795/2014

text: of the European Central Bank of 3 July 2014 on oversight requirements for systemically important payment systems (ECB/2014/28) (OJ L 217, 23.7.2014, p. 16).

text: Guideline ECB/2012/13 of the European Central Bank of 18 July 2012 on TARGET2-Securities (OJ L 215, 11.8.2012, p. 19).

text: Published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: See Section 4.4 of the Eurosystem Oversight Policy Framework, available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: Regulation (EU) No 648/2012

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories (OJ L 201, 27.7.2012, p. 1).

text: Regulation (EU) No 909/2014

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on improving securities settlement in the European Union and on central securities depositories and amending Directives

text: and

text: and

text: Regulation (EU) No 236/2012

text: (OJ L 257, 28.8.2014, p. 1).

text: Supervision of KDD, d.d. is shared between Banka Slovenije and the Slovenian Securities Market Agency pursuant to the Financial Instruments Market Act (2007) and the Decree on the implementation of the Regulation (EU) on improving securities settlement in the European Union and on central securities depositories (2016). The Slovenian Securities Market Agency issues authorization to, and supervises, KDD, d.d. in the provision of notary services and central maintenance services and other related non-banking-type ancillary services.

text: Directive (EU) 2015/2366

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on payment services in the internal market, amending Directives

text: and

text: and

text: Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010

text: , and repealing Directive

text: (OJ L 337, 23.12.2015, p. 35). 13 Payment Services and Systems Act (2009).

text: Published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu . 15 Available on the Bank for International Settlement’s website at www.bis.org . 16 This includes Key Considerations 1, 3 and 5 from Principle 17. 17

text: Article 60

text: (a) of the Bank of Slovenia Act (2002). 18 Article 12 of the Bank of Slovenia Act and the Provision of Payment Services to Budget Users Act (2016).

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 14 August 2017 on an Act on critical infrastructure (CON/2017/31)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 14 August 2017 on an Act on critical infrastructure (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 4 July 2017 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Slovenian Ministry of Defence for an opinion on a draft Act on critical infrastructure (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third and fifth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: as the draft law relates to Banka Slovenije and payment and settlement systems. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The purpose of the draft law is to systemically regulate the protection of critical infrastructures of national importance to the Republic of Slovenia. Pursuant to the draft law European critical infrastructures in the territory of the Republic of Slovenia are also considered to be critical infrastructures of the Republic of Slovenia. However legislation and regulations regulating European critical infrastructures apply for the protection of these infrastructures. The draft law defines critical infrastructures and their owners/operators, and sets out measures and activities for the protection of critical infrastructures, as well as reporting and other tasks of the competent authorities with respect to their protection. 1.2 The draft law identifies Banka Slovenije as a potential owner/operator of a critical infrastructure and a (financial) critical infrastructure sector holder. It also identifies the financial sector as one of the sectors of critical infrastructures, without further specification. It is envisaged that each sector will have an identified holder that will be designated by the Slovenian Government. The criteria for the identification of a critical infrastructure are sectoral and cross-cutting and will be adopted by the Slovenian Government. The Slovenian Government will also designate critical infrastructures and operators of critical infrastructures. 1.3 Operators of critical infrastructures have the following responsibilities: (1) to draw up, regularly update (at least once a year or in the case of new relevant developments within one month of such events) and retain operator security plans, which include a risk assessment and measures for the protection of critical infrastructures; (2) to obtain the consent of the critical infrastructure sector holder to the operator security plans; (3) to present to the critical sector infrastructure holder and

text: the Ministry of Defence, at their request, operator security plans; and (4) to inform the critical infrastructure sector holder and the National Centre for Crisis Management as soon as possible about a break of functioning of a critical infrastructure, if the operator deems that that break may have negative material or other consequences on the functioning of the critical infrastructure sector and previously implemented measures for the protection of critical infrastructures. The role of an operator of a critical infrastructure is to provide uninterrupted continuity of services of the critical infrastructure. 1.4 Critical infrastructure sector holders have an advisory role in relation to the identification of a critical infrastructure, a coordinating role in relation to the adoption of proposals for measures for the protection of a critical infrastructure, and a role to provide assistance to the operators of critical infrastructures and to prepare and amend legislation dealing with critical infrastructures within their competence from the perspective of the protection of critical infrastructures. Once a year a competent critical infrastructure holder has to prepare a report on the provision of the uninterrupted functioning of the critical infrastructure for its sector based on annual reports prepared by the operators, which is then included in a joint report prepared by the Ministry of Defence and delivered to the Government by May of each year in respect of the previous year. 1.5 The draft law explicitly states that it does not apply to critical infrastructures operated by the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) or critical infrastructures operated by Banka Slovenije which are supervised by the ESCB. 1.6 The draft law provides that it does not encroach on the supervision of a critical infrastructure falling within the competence of Banka Slovenije or the ESCB governed by European Union legislation and regulations or legislation of the Republic of Slovenia adopted on the basis of such legislation and regulations. 1.7 The draft law provides that the authorized bodies pursuant to the draft law may only with the consent of Banka Slovenije adopt decisions relating to any critical infrastructure of Banka Slovenije which is not operated by the ESCB nor by Banka Slovenije under the supervision of the ESCB, but which is used by Banka Slovenije for the discharge of its duties pursuant to the Bank of Slovenia Act, the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (the ‘Statute of the ESCB’) or Union legislation or regulations. 1.8 The draft law provides that data relating to the determination, establishment and protection of critical infrastructures designated as restricted or confidential must be treated as such in line with relevant applicable legislation. The draft law specifically provides that data available to Banka Slovenije which is held pursuant to the Bank of Slovenia Act, the Statute of the ESCB or other legislation and is designated as confidential may only be used in line with such legislation.

text: 2. Observations

text: 2.1 The ECB understands that the draft law does not purport to implement

text: Directive (EU) 2016/1148

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council into Slovenian law.

text: 2.2 The ECB understands that the term ‘supervision’ (Slovene: “nadzor”) as used in the draft law includes both ‘supervision’ and ‘oversight’. Under Slovenian law the term ‘supervision’ may be understood as referring to both the concepts of ‘supervision’ and ‘oversight’, as those terms are understood in, for example, the English language. 2.3 Critical infrastructures operated by ESCB central banks and critical infrastructures operated by Banka Slovenije which are supervised or overseen by ESCB central banks 2.3.1 The ECB understands that critical infrastructures operated by ESCB central banks and operated by Banka Slovenije which are supervised or overseen by ESCB central banks are exempted from the draft law’s scope of application. The ECB welcomes this, as it should help to ensure that Slovenian legislation on the protection of critical infrastructures does not encroach on the ESCB’s competences, consistent with the principle of the primacy of Union law and of central bank independence pursuant to Article 130 of the Treaty . 2.3.2 The ECB understands that, pursuant to the draft law, the Slovenian component of the TARGET2 payment system would be exempt from its scope of application. The TARGET2 payment system has been identified, pursuant to Decision ECB/2014/35 of the European Central Bank , as a systematically important payment system and is overseen by the ECB as competent authority under

text: Regulation (EU) No 795/2014

text: of the European Central Bank (ECB/2014/28) . Banka Slovenije acts as the operator of the Slovenian component of the TARGET2 payment system. 2.3.3 The ECB understands that the TARGET2-Securities (T2S) services would be exempt from the scope of the draft law, since pursuant to Article 6 of the Guideline ECB/2012/13 of the European 6 7 Central Bank and Article 7 of the T2S Framework Agreement , T2S is operated by the ESCB. Furthermore, in line with the Governing Council’s decision in its Eurosystem Oversight Policy Framework of July 2016, T2S falls under Eurosystem oversight competences under Articles 127(2) of the Treaty and Articles 3(1) and 22 of the Statute of the ESCB . 2.3.4 The ECB understands that the issue of euro banknotes by Banka Slovenije and ESCB central banks, insofar as this might be considered as falling within the concept of a critical infrastructure under the draft law, would be exempt from the draft law’s scope of application, since the ECB has the exclusive right to authorise the issue of euro banknotes within the Union under Article 128(1) of the Treaty. 2.4 Impact of the draft law on supervision and oversight of critical infrastructures subject to supervision or oversight by Banka Slovenije or ESCB central banks pursuant to Union legislation or regulations

text: 2.4.1 The draft law provides that it does not encroach on the supervision of critical infrastructures falling within the competence of Banka Slovenije or the ESCB governed by Union legislation or regulations or Slovenian legislation or regulations based on Union legislation. The ECB understands that this provision aims to ensure that the draft law does not encroach on the supervision or oversight of financial infrastructures which are not operated by Banka Slovenije or ESCB central banks, but which are subject to supervision or oversight by Banka Slovenije or ESCB central banks pursuant to Union legislation or regulations. In the interests of legal certainty, it may be useful to explicitly clarify in the draft law whether this provision is intended to entirely exclude such infrastructures from its scope of application, as is the case for critical infrastructures operated by ESCB central banks or operated by Banka Slovenije subject to the supervision or oversight of ESCB central banks. 2.4.2 The ECB understands that, based on this provision, the draft law would not encroach on the supervision or oversight of KDD, d.d., a central securities depository supervised by Banka Slovenije pursuant to

text: Regulation (EU) No 648/2012

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council 10 11 and

text: Regulation (EU) No 909/2014

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council . 2.4.3 The Eurosystem Oversight Policy Framework identifies payment instruments, such as cards, credit transfers, direct debit and e-money, as an ‘integral part of payment systems’, and thus includes these within the scope of its central bank oversight. For payment instruments, the role of primary overseer (for the Eurosystem) is assigned by reference to the national anchor of the payment scheme and the legal incorporation of its governance authority. For credit transfer and direct debit schemes within the Single Euro Payments Area, as well as some of the international card payment schemes, the ECB has the primary oversight role. Payment service providers (PSPs) are subject to

text: Directive (EU) 2015/2366

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council, which is applicable as of January 2018 . While PSPs are therefore subject to Union legislation and Slovenian legislation and regulations based on Union legislation , the oversight of international and domestic card schemes are not subject to Union legislation and regulations as such. If it is intended that such schemes will be excluded from the scope of the draft law, it is suggested, in the interests of legal certainty, that the draft law should explicitly clarify that it does not encroach on the oversight of card schemes by Banka Slovenije or the ESCB that are subject to applicable oversight frameworks, guidelines and principles. 2.4.4 Prominently important retail payment systems (PIRPS) and other retail payment systems (ORPS) are subject to oversight standards but are not subject to Union legislation and regulations as such.

text: Oversight of both PIRPS and ORPS is conducted in accordance with the Eurosystem Revised Oversight Framework for retail payment systems subject to the Principles for financial market infrastructures published by the Committee on Payment and Market Infrastructures and the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) , in particular Principle 17 on operational risk . There is however, strictly speaking, no Union regulation or legislation regulating the oversight or supervision of these systems. Banka Slovenije is given supervisory and oversight competence pursuant to the Payment Services and Systems Act (2009), which in this matter does not implement Union legislation or regulations. The ECB understands that in this particular case the PIRPS and ORPS would fall within the scope of the draft law, insofar as they would be considered as falling within the concept of a critical infrastructure under the draft law, as the term Union legislation and regulations would not seem to include ‘soft law’ instruments such as oversight frameworks, guidelines and principles. If it is intended that PIRPS and ORPS should be excluded from the scope of the draft law it is suggested, in the interests of legal certainty, that the draft law should explicitly clarify that it does not encroach on the oversight of critical infrastructures by Banka Slovenije or the ESCB that are subject to applicable oversight frameworks, guidelines or principles. 2.5 Other critical infrastructures of Banka Slovenije The draft law relates to any critical infrastructure of Banka Slovenije which is not operated by the ESCB, nor by Banka Slovenije under the supervision of the ESCB, but which infrastructure is used by Banka Slovenije for the discharge of its duties pursuant to the Bank of Slovenia Act, the Statute of the ESCB and the ECB or Union legislation or regulations. The ECB understands that examples of critical infrastructures that would fall within the scope of this provision would be the infrastructure for the issuing and supply of euro coins, with respect to which Banka Slovenije acts as distributor , and the maintenance of the treasury account system, with respect to which Banka Slovenije maintains the accounts of state bodies . However, before decisions can be adopted under the draft law relating to any such critical infrastructure of Banka Slovenije, the consent of Banka Slovenije is required which safeguards its institutional independence.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 14 August 2017

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).

text: Regulation (EU) No 655/2014

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a European Account Preservation Order procedure to facilitate cross-border debt recovery in civil and commercial matters (OJ L 189 27.6.2014, p. 59).

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 of 13 December 1993

text: specifying definitions for the application of the prohibitions referred to in Articles

text: and

text: b(1) of the Treaty (OJ L332, 31.12.1993, p. 1).

text: Article 123 of the Treaty also serves the objective of maintaining price stability and reinforces central bank independence.

text: See paragraph 2.4.1 of Opinion

text: Similarly, the ECB considers that tasks relating to the establishment of a central register of bank account numbers are not central bank tasks, nor do they facilitate the enforcement of such tasks. See, e.g., Opinions

text: and

text: See Recital (47) of the Regulation.

text: e.g. in France and Belgium.

text: e.g. in Italy, Latvia and Czech Republic.

text: e.g. in Germany.

text: e.g. in Ireland, Bulgaria and Spain. More information is available on the European Commission’s website at www.ejustice.europa.eu.

text: See recital 20 of the Regulation.

text: See paragraph 2.4.3 of Opinion

text: See Article 2.1 of the Regulation.

text: See Article 3.1 of the Regulation.

text: See paragraphs 2.1 and 2.2 of Opinion

text: See Article 44 of the Regulation.

text: See paragraphs 2.1 and 2.2 of Opinion

text: See Article 32 of the Business of Credit Institutions Law of 1997 (66(I)/1997) as amended.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 21 August 2017 on the designation of the Central Bank of Cyprus as the information authority and inclusion of relevant exception to bank secrecy requirement (CON/2017/32)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 21 August 2017 on the designation of the Central Bank of Cyprus as the information authority and inclusion of relevant exception to bank secrecy requirement (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 31 July 2017 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Ministry of Justice and Public Order of the Republic of Cyprus for an opinion on: (a) a draft law amending the Law on the Central Bank of Cyprus (hereinafter the ‘first draft law’); and (b) a draft law amending the Law on the business of credit institutions (hereinafter the ‘second draft law’) (hereinafter, collectively, the ‘draft laws’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the second and third indents of

text: , as the draft laws relate to means of payment and the Central Bank of Cyprus (CBC). In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft laws

text: 1.1. The purpose of the draft laws is to implement

text: Article 14(5) of Regulation (EU) No 655/2014

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council (hereinafter the ‘Regulation’) into Cypriot law. Article 14(4) of the Regulation provides that in order to obtain the account information referred to in paragraph 1 of that Article, the information authority in the Member State of enforcement shall use one of the methods available in that Member State pursuant to paragraph 5 of

text: Article 14

text: Article 14(5)

text: lists these methods of obtaining information and the Member States are required to make at least one of these methods available in their national law. The first method requires all banks in the territory of a Member State to disclose, upon request by the information authority, whether the debtor holds an account with them. 1.2. The first draft law designates the CBC as the information authority for the purposes of the Regulation. The Regulation requires the Member States to designate the authority competent for the purposes of obtaining the necessary information on the debtor’s account or accounts pursuant

text: to

text: Article 14

text: . The second draft law provides for an additional exception to bank secrecy provisions laid down in Article 29(2) of the Law on the business of credit institutions in order to allow credit institutions in Cyprus to provide the CBC with information when acting in its capacity as information authority. The draft laws therefore, when read together, transpose the first method of obtaining information found in paragraph (a) of Article 14(5) of the Regulation. As noted in the consultation request of the Ministry of Justice and Public Order of the Republic of Cyprus, the first draft law and second draft law are interconnected.

text: 2. Observations

text: 2.1. General observations

text: 2.1.1. This opinion does not address whether the draft laws effectively implement into Cypriot law the provisions of the Regulation that require transposition into national law. The ECB only assesses those provisions of the draft laws that may have an impact on the role and tasks of the CBC as a central bank, national supervisory authority and member of the Eurosystem and the European System of Central Banks (ESCB). 2.1.2. As noted in paragraph 1.2, the draft laws confer new tasks on the CBC. The ECB underlines that, in the context of a proposed conferral of tasks on a national central bank (NCB) in the ESCB, it is necessary to assess such a conferral against the prohibition on monetary financing under Article 123 of the Treaty. For the purposes of that prohibition,

text: Article 1(1)

text: (b)(ii) of

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93

text: defines ‘other type of credit facility’, inter alia, as ‘any financing of the public sector’s obligations vis-à-vis third parties’. As one of the objectives of the monetary financing prohibition, which may not be circumvented, is ensuring a sound budgetary policy of Member States , the task of financing measures which are normally the responsibility of the Member States, and financed from their budgetary sources rather than by the NCBs, must not be entrusted to NCBs by law. In order to decide what constitutes a form of financing of the public sector’s obligations vis-à-vis third parties, which can be translated as the provision of central bank financing outside the scope of the central bank tasks, an assessment of whether the task to be undertaken by an NCB is a central bank task or a government task, i.e. a task within the responsibility of the Member States, needs to be carried out on a case-by-case basis. In other words, sufficient safeguards must be in place to ensure that circumventions of the objective of the monetary financing prohibition of maintaining a sound budgetary policy of Member States do not take place. 2.1.3. As part of its discretion in the exercise of its duty, on the basis of

text: Article 271

text: (d) of the Treaty and Article 35.6 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central

text: Bank (hereinafter the ‘Statute of the ESCB’), to ensure that NCBs honour the obligations laid down by the Treaty, the Governing Council has endorsed safeguards of that kind in the form of criteria for determining what may be seen as falling within the scope of a public sector’s obligation within the meaning of

text: Article 1(1)

text: (b)(ii) of

text: Regulation (EC) No 3603/93

text: or, in other words, what constitutes a government task as follows: First, central bank tasks are in particular those tasks that are related to the tasks that have been conferred upon the ECB and the NCBs by the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB. These tasks are mainly defined in

text: Article 127(2)

text: , (5) and (6) and Article 128(1) of the Treaty, as well as

text: Article 22

text: and Article 25.1 of the Statute of the ESCB. Second, as Article 14.4 of the Statute of the ESCB allows NCBs to perform ‘other functions’, new tasks, i.e. tasks that are not related to tasks that have been conferred upon the ECB and the NCBs, are not precluded per se. However, new tasks that are undertaken by an NCB and which are atypical of NCB tasks or which are clearly discharged on behalf of and in the exclusive interest of the government or of other public sector entities should be considered government tasks. Third, an important criterion for qualifying a new task as atypical of an NCB task or as being clearly discharged on behalf of and in the exclusive interest of the government or other public sector entities is the impact of the task on the institutional, financial and personal independence of that NCB. In particular, the following aspects should be taken into account: (a) whether the performance of the new task creates conflicts of interest with existing central bank tasks which are not adequately addressed and does not necessarily complement those existing central bank tasks. If a conflict of interest arises between existing and new tasks, sufficient safeguards to mitigate that conflict should be in place. The complementarity between a new task and the existing central bank tasks should not be interpreted broadly, so as to lead to the creation of an indefinite chain of ancillary tasks. Such complementarity should be examined also in relation to the financing of those tasks; (b) whether without new financial resources the performance of the new task is disproportionate to the NCB’s financial or organisational capacity and may have a negative impact on the capacity to perform properly the existing central bank tasks; (c) whether the performance of the new task fits into the institutional set-up of the NCB in the light of central bank independence and accountability considerations; (d) whether the performance of the new task harbours substantial financial risks; (e) whether the performance of the new task exposes the members of the NCB decision-making bodies to political risks which are disproportionate and may also have an impact on their personal independence and, in particular, on the guarantee of term of office set out in Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB.

text: 2.2. Specific observations

text: On the basis of the criteria set out above, the following paragraphs assess whether the new tasks of the CBC are in line with the monetary financing prohibition.

text: 2.2.1. Tasks related to the tasks conferred upon the ECB and the NCBs by the Treaty and the Statute of

text: the ESCB

text: The tasks of the CBC as the information authority designated to obtain account information upon a request made by a court with which an application for a preservation order has been made, and the subsequent transmission of such information to the relevant court for the purpose of facilitating the enforcement of debt recovery in civil and commercial cases, are neither among the tasks conferred upon the ESCB by

text: Article 127(2)

text: , (5) and (6) and Article 128(1) of the Treaty, or Article

text: and

text: 7 Article 25.1 of the Statute of the ESCB , nor are they related to such tasks . The draft laws designate the CBC as the information authority for the purpose of facilitating the cross-border enforcement of claims. The preamble of the Regulation specifically states that its objective is to establish a Union procedure for a protective measure which enables a creditor to obtain a Preservation Order preventing the subsequent enforcement of the creditor’s claim from being jeopardised through the transfer or withdrawal of funds held by the debtor in a bank account within the Union . Furthermore, these new tasks do not have a prudential supervisory dimension, as they do not rely on information that the CBC collects in its capacity as supervisory authority. Against this backdrop, the conferral of these tasks on the CBC must be closely scrutinised to assess whether these tasks constitute government tasks and whether the related funding gives rise to monetary financing concerns.

text: 2.2.2. Tasks which are atypical of NCB tasks

text: The designation of a competent authority as the information authority for the purposes of the Regulation is a new task for national authorities in the Union. No other Member State has so far designated its NCB as the information authority for the purposes of the Regulation. Most of the Member States have designated judicial officials, such as bailiffs , the district courts or their president , or other officials involved in the administration of justice, such as the Federal Office of 11 12 Justice or the Ministry of Justice . In this respect, the new tasks conferred upon the CBC by the draft laws can be regarded as atypical of a central bank. 2.2.3. Tasks clearly discharged on behalf of and in the exclusive interest of the government As the role of the information authority is needed to overcome existing practical difficulties in obtaining information about the location of a debtor’s bank account in a cross-border context , the ECB understands that this role is, with regard to the draft laws, intended to alleviate the work

text: involved in the administration of justice, which is a government task . The rules of the Regulation apply to pecuniary claims in civil and commercial matters in cross-border cases , meaning cases in which the bank accounts to be preserved by the Preservation Order are maintained in a Member State other than the Member State of the court seised of the application for the Preservation Order pursuant to

text: Article 6

text: thereof or the Member State in which the creditor is domiciled . The fact that the CBC is the competent authority responsible for the authorisation and prudential supervision of credit institutions does not appear to be relevant to the new role conferred upon it by the first draft law as the supervisor is not expected to already possess, in the context of banking supervision tasks, the account information that is necessary under the Regulation and will thus need to contact the credit institutions established in Cyprus to obtain this information. The new task of the CBC of being the competent authority for the collection and transmission of account information does not seem to complement its existing tasks. Therefore, the new tasks conferred on the CBC can be considered as performed exclusively in the interest of the government. 2.2.4. Extent to which performance of the new task creates conflicts of interest with existing central bank

text: tasks

text: Carrying out the new task conferred upon the CBC by the draft laws does not appear to create conflicts of interest with other central bank tasks performed by the CBC. 2.2.5. Extent to which performance of the new task is disproportionate to the financial or organisational

text: capacity of the CBC

text: The principle of financial independence requires that the Member States may not put their NCBs in a position where they have insufficient financial resources to carry out not only their ESCB-related tasks, but also their national tasks, both from an operational and financial perspective. Furthermore, when allocating specific non-ESCB-related tasks to the NCBs, additional personnel and financial resources must also be allocated so that these tasks may be carried out in a manner that will not affect the NCBs’ operational or financial capacity to perform their ESCB-related tasks . It is noted that the Regulation provides that the fees charged by any authority or other body in the Member State of enforcement which is involved in providing account information pursuant to

text: Article 14

text: thereof shall be determined on the basis of a scale of fees or other set of rules established in advance by each Member State and transparently setting out the applicable fees . The first draft law, however, does not specify how the costs related to the collection and transmission of account information by the CBC are to be financed. The Cypriot authorities should in any case ensure that the CBC can avail itself of sufficient resources for the performance of the new duties relating to its role as the information authority under the first draft law, so that the capacity of the CBC to perform its ESCB-related tasks is not affected .

text: 2.2.6. Extent to which performance of the new task fits into the institutional set-up of the CBC, in the light of central bank independence and accountability considerations The performance of the new tasks does not appear to be problematic from the perspective of the institutional set-up of the CBC, nor to raise accountability or personal and institutional independence concerns. Although the information requested by the CBC from credit institutions in its capacity as information authority under the draft laws is not relevant to the information-gathering conducted by the CBC as competent supervisory authority, the institutional set-up of the CBC appears to facilitate the performance of information exchange functions. 2.2.7. Extent to which the performance of tasks harbours substantial financial risks Neither the first draft law, nor the Regulation, contain any specific provisions on the liability of the information authority for the performance of its tasks. This is in contrast with existing legal frameworks assigning specific tasks to the CBC, such as the Law on the business of credit institutions, which excludes the liability of the CBC, and the liability of any director or officer of the CBC, unless it is proven that any act or omission in the discharge of their relevant functions and responsibilities was done in bad faith or was the result of gross negligence . Along the same lines,

text: Article 47

text: A of the Law on the Central Bank of Cyprus regulates liability with regard to the task of macroprudential oversight. Given that liability issues could give rise to financial risks for the CBC, the ECB invites the consulting authority to consider introducing a provision on the liability of the CBC in relation to the tasks undertaken by the CBC in carrying out its role as the information authority for the purposes of the Regulation. 2.2.8. Extent to which performance of the new task exposes members of the decision-making bodies of the CBC to disproportionate political risks and impacts on their personal independence The performance of the tasks conferred under the draft laws does not appear to be exposing the decision-making bodies of the CBC to any disproportionate political risk or to impact their personal independence.

text: 2.2.9. Conclusion

text: The ECB considers that the new tasks conferred on the CBC under the draft laws constitute government tasks for the purposes of the monetary financing prohibition. These new tasks are not related to those conferred upon the ECB and the NCBs by the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB, are atypical for a central bank as the role of information authority in other Member States has been assigned to representatives from the judicial system or ministries of justice, and are performed in the exclusive interest of the government as they are intended to alleviate the work involved in the administration of justice. The ECB strongly recommends that further consideration should be given to the designation of the CBC as the information authority for the purposes of the Regulation. In

text: any case, CBC’s liability should be properly regulated and the CBC should be fully and adequately reimbursed for any costs incurred in relation to the performance of its new tasks in order to ensure compliance with the prohibition of monetary financing.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 21 August 2017. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: Bundesgesetz, mit dem das Bankwesengesetz, das Investmentfondsgesetz und das Nationalbankgesetz geändert werden. 2

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42). 3

text: Regulation (EU) 2016/867

text: of the European Central Bank of 18 May 2016 on the collection of granular credit and credit risk data (ECB/2016/13) (OJ L 144, 1.6.2016, p. 44).

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 2533/93 of 23 November 1998

text: concerning the collection of statistical information by the European Central Bank (OJ L 318, 27.11.1998, p. 8).

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 21 August 2017 on the reporting of credit data (CON/2017/33)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 21 August 2017 on the reporting of credit data (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 21 July 2017 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Austrian Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft law regarding amendments to the Banking Act, the Investment Fund Act and the Law on the National Bank in connection with

text: Regulation (EU) 2016/867

text: (hereinafter the ‘draft law’) . The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and on the third and fourth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft law relates to the Oesterreichische Nationalbank (OeNB) and the collection of financial statistics. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1. The main purpose of the draft law is to ensure the effective implementation of Regulation (EU) 3 2016/867 of the European Central Bank (ECB/2016/13) . To this end, the draft law amends national reporting requirements for credit institutions in order to avoid a duplication of reporting requirements. These requirements mainly relate to the reporting of credit data, which is currently reported through the central credit register established pursuant to section 75 of the Banking Act. With a view to enabling the collection of data in an integrated and efficient manner, the draft law also aligns the current terminology in the Banking Act with the terms used in

text: Regulation (EU) 2016/867

text: . 1.2. Under the draft law, the OeNB must ensure that the Financial Market Authority (FMA) is able to access the data reported by reporting agents in accordance with the draft law and within the scope of the right of reciprocity by other reporting Member States and the right of national central banks (NCBs) to deny access to other NCBs at all times, as set out in

text: Regulation (EU) 2016/867

text: . Where there is reciprocity, the OeNB has to make available data provided by reporting Member States

text: under

text: Regulation (EU) 2016/867

text: to reporting agents and other third parties. 1.3. Furthermore, the draft law seeks to strengthen the OeNB’s mandate of maintaining stability on the financial markets. In this respect, data not covered by

text: Regulation (EU) 2016/867

text: is currently only collected from credit institutions. According to the draft law’s explanatory memorandum, this restriction has hindered the collection of data relevant to the stability of the financial markets from other companies. The draft law clarifies that the OeNB may also collect such data from other companies active in the financial sector, including investment firms, capital management companies, financial institutions, (re)insurance companies and pension funds. From a technical perspective, the amendments ensure that the data collected pursuant to

text: Regulation (EU) 2016/867

text: can be included in the OeNB’s data model, which will facilitate the efficient collection of data within the scope of a multi-dimensional data model.

text: 2. Observations

text: 2.1 The ECB welcomes the fact that the draft law amends national reporting requirements with a view to ensuring the efficient reporting of credit data and avoiding reporting redundancies. This approach is in line with the spirit of

text: Regulation (EU) 2016/867

text: , the recitals of which note that, with a view to ensuring efficient reporting and adequate interoperability with other existing or new reporting frameworks, national central banks should be allowed to collect the information to be transmitted to the ECB as a part of a broader national reporting framework and to extend the reporting of credit data beyond the scope outlined in

text: Regulation (EU) 2016/867

text: , for their own 4 statutory purposes, in line with relevant national law . 2.2 The ECB notes that the previous reporting limit of EUR 350 000 per debtor should remain unchanged for counterparties and reporting agents that do not fall within the scope of

text: Regulation (EU) 2016/867

text: . The ECB understands that this also applies to financial institutions which do not fall within the scope of

text: Regulation (EU) 2016/867

text: . 2.3 The draft law contains provisions pursuant to which the OeNB must ensure that the FMA is able to access data within the scope of reciprocal use by other reporting Member States and must make available to certain third parties, where there is the right to reciprocity, data provided by reporting Member States under

text: Regulation (EU) 2016/867

text: . The ECB understands that these provisions of the draft law are intended to ensure that such data is only transmitted in full compliance with the provisions of

text: Regulation (EU) 2016/867

text: . In this respect, it is recalled that, pursuant to

text: Article 10 of Regulation (EU) 2016/867

text: , NCBs shall use credit data reported under

text: Regulation (EU) 2016/867

text: to the extent and for the purposes defined in

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 2533/98

text: of 23 November 5 1998 , including the confidentiality regime set out therein. Such data may be used, in particular, to establish and maintain a feedback loop in accordance with

text: Article 11 of Regulation (EU) 2016/867

text: This Regulation does not give reporting agents any right to a feedback loop. Additionally, NCBs have the right to deny access to other NCBs to the granular credit data that they collect for the

text: purposes of a feedback loop, except for information on an institutional unit of a reporting agent established in another reporting Member State. Further, pursuant to this Regulation, NCBs have the right to require reciprocity as regards provision of granular credit data with any NCB that requests data from another NCB for the purposes of a feedback loop. For the sake of legal certainty, it is suggested that the draft law, or alternatively the explanatory memorandum accompanying the draft law, could be usefully adapted to reflect these provisions of

text: Regulation (EU) 2016/867

text: . 2.4 The ECB welcomes the proposed amendments to the National Bank Act, which aim to strengthen the OeNB’s mandate to maintain financial market stability. These amendments are in line with the aim of

text: Regulation (EU) 2016/867

text: to ensure, inter alia, financial stability surveillance .

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 21 August 2017.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: Council Decision of 29 June 1998 on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42). 2 See Opinions

text: and

text: See Opinions

text: and

text: ; ECB Convergence Report 2016, pp. 23 to 25.

text: See Opinions

text: , paragraph 2.3 and

text: , paragraph 3.3.

text: See

text: , especially paragraph 5.1, and

text: , paragraph 2.5.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 24 August 2017 on a draft law amending the NBB Organic Statute with regard to the number of directors on the NBB’s Board (CON/2017/34)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 24 August 2017 on a draft law amending the NBB Organic Statute with regard to the number of directors on the NBB’s Board (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 27 July 2017 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Governor of the Nationale Bank van België/Banque Nationale de Belgique (NBB), on behalf of the Minister for Finance, for an opinion on a draft law on various financial provisions (hereinafter the ‘draft law’) which amends, inter alia, the Law of 22 February 1998 etablishing the Organic Statute of the Nationale Bank van België/Banque Nationalie de Belgique (hereinafter the ‘NBB Organic Law’) in order to reduce the number of directors on the NBB’s Board of Directors. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft law concerns the NBB. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1 Purpose of the draft law

text: The purpose of the draft law is to reduce the number of directors on the NBB’s Board. Currently, under the NBB Organic Law, in addition to the Governor, who acts as chair, the Board is composed of at least five but not more than seven directors, one of whom is the Vice Governor. Under the draft law, in addition to the Governor, the Board is composed of a maximum of five members (including the Vice Governor). The draft law provides that the King determines the entry into force of this new provision.

text: 2 General observation

text: In principle, the ECB welcomes any legislative amendment which seeks to establish more efficient decision-making structures within a national central bank (NCB) , provided that these amendments do not interfere with the NCB’s independence.

text: 3 Specific observations

text: 3.1 Transitional provisions and security of tenure of existing members of the Board 3.1.1 Article 130 of the Treaty prohibits national governments and any bodies from influencing the members of NCBs’ decision-making bodies in the performance of their tasks. The concept of central bank independence includes various types of independence, including personal independence. Personal independence would be jeopardised if the rules on security of tenure and grounds for dismissal of Governors under the Treaty and the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter the ‘Statute of the ESCB’) did not apply to other members of the decision-making bodies of NCBs involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks. Various Treaty and Statute of the ESCB provisions require comparable security of tenure. Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB does not restrict the security of tenure of office to Governors, while Article 130 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB refer to ‘members of the decision-making bodies’ of NCBs, rather than to Governors specifically. This applies in particular where a Governor is ‘first among equals’ with other members with equivalent voting rights or where other members are involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks . As a consequence, any reorganisation measure affecting the tenure of office of the members of an NCB’s decision-making bodies involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks should expressly ensure that they continue to perform their duties until the end of their appointed term, in accordance with Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB . 3.1.2 Against this backdrop, the ECB understands that the date on which the draft law will enter into force will be determined by means of a Royal Decree. The ECB understands that this mechanism is designed to align the entry into force with the outflow of directors in the course of time in order to safeguard the personal independence of existing directors. The ECB assumes that the intention is for the Royal Decree to be issued following the expiry of a director’s term of office which brings the composition of the Board to five directors not including the Governor. However, given the importance of protecting the personal independence of existing directors, and to avoid any ambiguity and satisfy the principle of legal certainty, the ECB suggests that the draft law contains transitional provisions which set out in clear terms when the amendments will come into force. This could be done, for example, by stating that the Royal Decree may be issued, at the earliest, following the expiry or termination of a director’s term of office which results in the Board being composed of five directors or fewer not including the Governor.

text: 3.2 Number of directors on the Board

text: 3.2.1 While the draft law provides that Article 19 of the NBB Organic Law is to be amended to provide that the Board will have, in addition to the Governor, a maximum of five directors, instead of a maximum of seven as is currently the case, it does not provide for a minimum number of directors, unlike the minimum of five directors as is currently the case.

text: 3.2.2 Under the NBB Organic Law, the King is vested with the power to appoint the Governor and the other members of the Board . As the amendments foreseen by the draft law do not include a minimum number of other members for the Board, the size of the Board will, in effect be determined in a Royal Decree, with the involvement of the Government and the King. Based on a literal construction of this provision, the Board could theoretically be reduced to one director (who would, incidentally, hold the title of Vice-Governor) and the Governor, on the basis of the requirement in the draft law of parity between Dutch and French speakers. While the statutes of ESCB NCBs set out different compositions for their decision-making bodies, depending on national preferences and legal traditions, an institutional framework which provides a stable and long-term basis for a central bank’s functioning is important from the perspective of central bank independence . A legal framework which permits frequent changes to the institutional set-up of an NCB, thus affecting its organisational or governance stability, could adversely affect the NCB’s institutional independence. 3.2.3 The draft law should seek to avoid a situation in which the government may, on a discretionary basis, decide on the size of the Board, with potentially wide and frequent variations. Because the size of the Board directly impacts the institutional set-up of the NBB and the functioning of the Board as a decision-making body whose mandate includes involvement in the performance of ESCB-related tasks, the draft law should contain provisions which facilitate consistency in, and predictability of, the size of the Board. This will contribute to the NBB’s institutional stability and could be achieved, as it is for decision-making bodies of other ESCB NCBs, through, for example, the inclusion in the draft law of a fixed number of directors or a reasonably narrow range setting out a minimum and maximum number of directors.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 24 August 2017.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: Bundesgesetz, mit dem das Bankwesengesetz, das Einlagensicherungs- und Anlegerentschädigungsgesetz, das Finanzmarktaufsichtsbehördengesetz, das Kapitalmarktgesetz und das Versicherungsaufsichtsgesetz 2016 geändert werden.

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).

text: Commissioner’s Office ; (b) improving the functioning of on-site audits and respective follow-up measures; (c) introducing an electronic prospectus approval process; and (d) clarifying the riskbased approach in the area of supervision of credit institutions. Furthermore, the draft law introduces the possibility for an accelerated, consensual termination of administrative proceedings. According to the draft law, a party may waive the right to appeal before a decision has been issued by the FMA in the context of an administrative procedure or an administrative fines procedure. 1.4. In order to improve legal certainty for supervised credit institutions, the draft law explicitly determines the legal framework for outsourcing of banking operations. While the outsourcing of banking operations is already permitted to a certain extent, the current legal regime does not set out the requirements and limits for such activities. The draft law’s outsourcing provisions are based on outsourcing provisions contained in various areas of Union and national financial market regulation, including the 2009 Law on payment services (Zahlungsdienstegesetz)), the 2007 Law on securities supervision (Wertpapieraufsichtsgesetz) and the Committee of European Banking 4 Supervisor’s Guidelines on Outsourcing . 1.5. In the future, natural and legal persons may request from the FMA issuance of a legally binding advance ruling regarding the supervisory evaluation of circumstances that lie in the future at the time of the application, if there is a particular interest in obtaining such a ruling in view of the major regulatory impact. This includes the evaluation whether new business models trigger any licensing obligations. 1.6. Finally, the draft law aims to provide organisational relief to smaller credit institutions. To this end, only significant credit institutions are required to form supervisory board committees. Furthermore, it raises the threshold for the obligatory establishment of an in-house internal audit department. The rationale for this latter provision is to increase the ability of smaller credit institutions to outsource the internal audit function to external experts.

text: The State Commissioner and Deputy State Commissioner have to be invited by the credit institution to the general meetings, general assemblies, meetings of the supervisory board, meetings of the audit committees and meetings of executive committees of the supervisory board. Their role is to report to the FMA on issues of relevance to supervision in the meetings of the supervisory board and its committees, to promptly point out generally unsound circumstances within a credit institution and to raise objections to decisions of the supervisory board or its respective committees that breach supervisory law.

text: Available on the European Banking Authority’s website at www.eba.europa.eu .

text: Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013

text: conferring specific tasks on the ECB concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63).

text: Regulation (EU) No 575/2013

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending

text: Regulation (EU) No 648/2012

text: (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 1).

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 25 August 2017 on amendments to the financial market supervisory regime (CON/2017/35)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 25 August 2017 on amendments to the financial market supervisory regime (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 26 July 2017 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Austrian Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft law regarding amendments to the financial market supervisory regime (hereinafter the ‘draft law’) . The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, on the third indent of

text: , as the draft law relates to the Oesterreichische Nationalbank (OeNB), and the ECB’s tasks pursuant to Article 127(6) of the Treaty concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1. According to its explanatory memorandum, the draft law is intended to: (a) increase the transparency of Austrian financial market supervision; (b) improve the quality of supervision and the functioning of supervisory processes; (c) enhance the legal certainty for supervised firms and for other legal entities wanting to operate in the financial services area; and (d) relax organisational requirements for smaller credit institutions. 1.2. In order to increase the transparency of financial market supervision in Austria, the draft law requires the Austrian Financial Market Authority (FMA) to conduct public tender procedures regarding second level management posts, to establish a mandatory internal audit function within the FMA and to conduct public consultation procedures before issuing regulations, circulars and minimum standards. The draft law also requires the FMA to publish annual auditing areas on which to focus. Furthermore, the draft law increases the OeNB’s cost transparency for performing tasks related to the supervision of credit institutions. 1.3. The draft law aims to increase the quality of supervision by: (a) strengthening the State

text: 2. Observations

text: 2.1 The ECB welcomes the draft law’s aim to improve transparency, quality and legal certainty of banking supervision in Austria. The principles of due process and transparency are also principles guiding the work of the ECB within the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), as set out in recital 5 58 of

text: Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013

text: . The ECB recognises that the possibility to issue a legally binding advance ruling applies to the FMA without limiting the ECB’s competence regarding

text: the authorisation of credit institutions as defined in point (1) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 6 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council . 2.2 In order to improve legal certainty for supervised credit institutions, the ECB also welcomes the introduction of explicit rules regulating the outsourcing of banking operations. In this context, this legal regime will also apply to significant credit institutions in Austria which are directly supervised by the ECB within the SSM framework. The ECB also understands that these rules apply to Austrian credit institutions, and do not have an impact on their subsidiaries in other Members States. 2.3 As regards the introduction of the possibility to accelerate the termination of administrative procedures and administrative fines procedures by the FMA, the ECB notes that this possibility only applies to the FMA without limiting the ECB’s competence within the SSM framework.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 25 August 2017.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI