text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42-43.

text: OJ L 310, 11.12.2000, p. 1. 3

text: Council Directive 88/220/EEC of 22 March 1988

text: amending, as regards the investment policies of certain UCITS, Directive

text: on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to undertakings for collective investments in transferable securities (UCITS), OJ L 100, 19.04.1988 p. 31.

text: Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993

text: on investment services in the securities field, OJ L 141, 11.06.1993, p. 27 ff. 5

text: Council Directive 89/298/EEC of 17 April 1989

text: coordinating the requirements for the drawing-up, scrutiny and distribution of the prospectus to be published when transferable securities are offered to the public, OJ L 124, 5.5.1989, p. 8 ff. 6 Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 March 2000 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions, OJ L 126, 26.5.2000, p. 1.

text: Council Directive 93/6/EEC of 15 March 1993

text: on the capital adequacy of investments firms and credit institutions, OJ L 141, 11.6.1993, p. 1 ff.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 25 April 2001 at the request of the Irish Department of Finance on a draft legislative proposal on a Mortgage and Public Credit Bond Bill (CON/2001/6)

text: 1. On 14 March 2001 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Irish Department of Finance for an ECB opinion on a preliminary draft Mortgage and Public Credit Bond Bill.

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the legislative proposal contains provisions concerning a national central bank, as well as rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with

text: Article 17.5

text: 3. The draft Bill makes provision for the designation and regulation by the Central Bank of Ireland (CBI) of special-purpose credit institutions designated by the CBI as a ‘mortgage credit institution’ and/or a ‘public credit institution’, respectively. Such designated mortgage and public credit institutions may issue mortgage and public credit securities, and these securities or any related hedge contracts would be secured on pools of underlying mortgage or public credit assets and other specified assets (i.e., deposits, tier one assets for ESCB monetary policy operations and other assets acceptable to the CBI). The CBI would be empowered to designate as a mortgage and/or public credit institution a credit institution which is carrying on relevant ‘qualifying activities’ only, which relate broadly to dealings in mortgage and public credit and related financing (including deposit-taking) and hedging activities. The ECB notes that, under the draft Bill, qualifying activities also include dealings in tier one assets for ESCB monetary policy operations and/or property which is, from time to time, included by a NCB, with approval of the ECB, in its national list of eligible tier two assets for ESCB monetary policy operations. The ‘qualifying activities’ requirement would imply that the majority of Irish credit institutions would have to establish special purpose credit institutions in order to issue mortgage or public credit securities.

text: 4. The ECB welcomes this initiative to lay the legislative foundations for the issuance of mortgage and public credit bonds by Irish credit institutions. The ECB notes that the legislative and regulatory framework envisaged for the issuance of these asset-backed securities shares many common characteristics with similar structures in other member states of the European Community, including Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg and Spain. The ECB notes that the legislation has been explicitly designed by the Irish Government to bring Ireland in line with best practices in other European financial centres, taking into account that the introduction of the euro and the new monetary policy framework have led to the development of an integrated and competitive money market in the euro area. In this regard, the ECB understands that this initiative enjoys the support of both domestic Irish banks and building societies as well as credit institutions conducting cross-border operations out of Dublin’s International Financial Services Centre. The ECB considers that the Irish Government’s initiative will make a positive contribution to the integration of capital markets in the euro area.

text: 5. The ECB draws attention to the criteria which assets must fulfil in order to be eligible as collateral for Eurosystem monetary policy and intra day credit operations. Under the ECB Guideline of 31 August 2000 on monetary policy instruments and procedures of the Eurosystem (ECB/2000/7) , Annex I (General Documentation on Eurosystem monetary policy operations and procedures), Chapter 6.2 (Eligible Assets – Tier one assets), a number of eligibility criteria are specified to tier one assets consisting of marketable debt instruments fulfilling uniform euro area-wide eligibility for Eurosystem monetary policy and intra day credit operations. First, the assets must be debt instruments. It is understood that the mortgage and public credit securities envisaged by the draft Bill will be structured as mortgage and public credit bonds only, and would therefore fulfil this requirement. Second, the assets must meet high credit standards, and in the assessment of the credit standard of debt instruments, the ECB takes into account, inter alia, available ratings by market agencies as well as certain institutional criteria which would ensure particularly high protection of the holders. In this regard, debt instruments issued by credit institutions which do not comply strictly with the criteria set out in Article 22(4) of the UCITS Directive are accepted in tier one only if each issue as such is awarded a rating (by a rating agency) which indicates, in the view of the Eurosystem, that the debt instrument meets high credit standards. The ECB notes that it is the intention of the Irish Government that certain features of the instruments, including the high quality of the underlying assets and the preferential creditor status afforded to investors in the bonds, are designed to achieve a triple A rating. Third, the assets must be located in the euro area (so that realisation is subject to the law of a Member State of the euro area), transferable in book-entry form and deposited with a national central bank or with a central securities depository which fulfils the minimum standards established by the ECB. The description of the standards for the use of eligible SSSs in the euro area can be found on the ECB’s website (www.ecb.int). The ECB assumes that, following the establishment of mortgage and public credit institutions pursuant to the provisions of the draft Bill, further information will become available regarding the proposed procedures surrounding the issuance, custody and settlement of mortgage and public credit bonds. Fourth, the assets must be denominated in euro. Fifth, the assets must be issued (or guaranteed) by entities established in the EEA. In this regard, the ECB notes that under the draft Bill the CBI may only designate credit institutions that are incorporated in Ireland. Sixth, the assets must, at least, be listed or quoted on a regulated market as defined according to the Investment Services Directive, or listed, quoted or traded on certain non-regulated markets as specified by the ECB. In this regard, debt instruments issued by credit institutions which do not comply strictly with the criteria set out in Article 22(4) of the UCITS Directive are accepted in tier one only if they are listed or quoted on a regulated market as defined according to the Investment Services Directive and comply with the requirements of the Prospectus Directive . Furthermore, market liquidity may be taken into account by the ECB when determining the eligibility of individual debt instruments. The ECB assumes that, following the establishment of mortgage and public credit institutions pursuant to the provisions of the draft Bill, further information will become available regarding the listing, quotation or trading of issued mortgage and public credit bonds on applicable markets. Despite their eligibility, national central banks shall not, in general, accept as underlying assets debt instruments issued or guaranteed by the counterparty, or by any other entity with which the counterparty has close links, as defined according to Article 1(26) of the Banking Consolidation Directive. However, exempt from the definition of close links are cases in which such debt instruments are protected by specific legal safeguards, e.g. instruments which comply strictly with the criteria set out in Article 22(4) of the UCITS Directive. Finally, all eligible assets must be usable in a cross-border context, implying that a counterparty can receive credit from the national central bank of the Member State in which the counterparty is established by making use of tier one instruments located in another Member State. The ECB assumes that, following the establishment of mortgage and public credit institutions pursuant to the provisions of the draft Bill, additional information will become available regarding the proposed cross-border usage of the mortgage and public credit bonds.

text: 6. With respect to the question of close links, the ECB notes that the mortgage and public credit securities envisaged by the draft Bill would appear to be designed to comply strictly with the three criteria set out in Article 22(4) of the UCITS Directive. If, as laid down in Article 22(4) of the UCITS Directive, the Irish Government sends the Commission a list of the categories of bonds together with the categories of issuers authorised, in accordance with the draft Bill and the supervisory arrangements contemplated by the draft Bill, to issue bonds complying with the criteria set out in

text: Article 22(4)

text: , and assuming the procedure laid down in

text: Article 22(4)

text: is applied, the mortgage and public credit bonds will normally, without further action, automatically qualify as tier one assets eligible for Eurosystem monetary policy and intra day credit operations both by the parent entity of the relevant designated credit institution and by other Eurosystem counterparties.

text: 7. The first criterion set forth in the UCITS Directive arises out of the reference in

text: Article 22(4)

text: to “certain bonds when issued by a credit institution which has its registered office in a Member State and is subject by law to special public supervision designed to protect bond-holders”. In this regard, as noted above, under the draft Bill the CBI may designate any credit institution that is established in Ireland and holds an authorisation from the CBI as a mortgage or public credit institution eligible to issue mortgage or public credit securities, and that the issuance of such securities would be confined to such institutions. The ECB notes that, under the draft Bill, it shall be a criminal offence for any person to act as a mortgage or public credit institution or hold itself out as such unless designated as a mortgage and/or a public credit institution by the CBI. The ECB also notes that the draft Bill makes provision for the revocation by the CBI of an entity’s designated credit institution status, that the CBI may also apply to the Irish High Court for an order revoking an institution’s designation in a wide variety of circumstances and that such a revocation would be without prejudice to either a designated credit institution’s obligations in respect of any mortgage or public credit securities issued by it prior to revocation or the security of the holders of such securities over underlying mortgage or public credit assets. The ECB also notes that, under the draft Bill, every mortgage or public credit institution is required to establish and maintain separate mortgage and public credit asset registers containing particulars of every pool asset securing its obligations under mortgage or public credit securities and related hedge contracts, as well as a separate hedge contract register, and that no entries in these registers may be made or altered without the approval of the ‘cover asset monitor’, a person appointed by the designated credit institution with the approval of the CBI to monitor observance by the credit institution of its obligations under the draft Bill (and in particular that the required level of assets is maintained in the relevant asset pools following the issuance of securities or entry into related hedge contracts). The ECB also notes that the CBI may make regulations in respect of cover asset monitors, including the qualification, selection, appointment, removal and functions of cover asset monitors and requirements concerning information reporting by the cover asset monitor to the CBI. The ECB also notes that, under the draft Bill, on the occurrence of a potential insolvency event with respect to a designated credit institution or a matured insolvency event with respect to its parent entity or the revocation by the CBI of a credit institution’s designated status, the CBI may request the Irish National Treasury Management Agency (NTMA) to locate an alternative service provider to perform the designated credit institution’s functions in relation to the administration and servicing of mortgage or public asset securities, related hedge contracts, assets, asset pools and registers, or locate a parent entity for the designated credit institution or act itself as alternative service provider for the institution. Finally, the ECB notes that under the draft Bill, it shall be a criminal offence for any person to knowingly provide false or misleading information to the CBI, a cover asset monitor, the NTMA or any alternative service provider in the exercise of their respective functions.

text: 8. The second criterion to which Article 22(4) of the UCITS Directive refers is that “sums deriving from the issue of these bonds must be invested in conformity with the law in assets which, during the whole period of the validity of the bonds, are capable of covering claims attaching to the bonds”. In this regard, the ECB notes that the draft Bill specifies numerous conditions applicable to mortgage or public credit securities and pools, including matching requirements in relation to the duration, aggregate principal amount and currency denomination of, or interest payable on, assets comprised in the mortgage or public credit pools, as compared to outstanding mortgage or public credit securities issued. With respect to mortgage credit assets in particular, the draft Bill contains required loan-to-value (LTV) ratios with respect to underlying property assets, as well as an overall limitation on mortgage assets secured on commercial property. The ECB notes that while no limit or restriction applies to the inclusion in a mortgage or public credit pool of mortgage or public credit assets situated in a member state of the European Economic Area (EEA), an overall limitation applies to the inclusion of mortgage or public credit assets situated in Canada, the U.S., Switzerland and/or Japan, while mortgage or public assets situated in any other state which is a ‘Zone A’ state for purposes of the Banking Consolidation Directive, as amended, supplemented or replaced) may only be included in the mortgage or public credit pool if so provided in, and in accordance with, regulations made by the Minister for Finance. The ECB also notes that, under the draft Bill, the CBI may by regulations provide for the valuation basis, valuation methodology, time of valuation and any other matter relating the prudent market valuation of mortgage credit assets. Finally, it is noted that a designated credit institution shall not at any time issue mortgage or public credit securities if the aggregate principal amount of such securities that are in issue would exceed a multiple of 50 (or such other multiple as may be specified from time to time) of its own funds (determined in accordance with the Banking Consolidation Directive and the Capital Adequacy Directive , as amended, supplemented or replaced).

text: 9. The third criterion to which Article 22(4) of the UCITS Directive refers is that “in the event of a failure of the issuer, [such assets] would be used on a priority basis for the reimbursement of the principal and payment of the accrued interest.” In this regard, the ECB notes that the draft Bill provides, inter alia, that, notwithstanding any rule of Irish insolvency law, or the occurrence of a potential or matured insolvency event with respect to a designated credit institution or related company, the claims of a holder of mortgage or public credit securities issued by that designated credit institution shall continue to be valid and legally enforceable against the issuer, and that the assets comprised in the cover asset registers and related asset pools shall not form part of the designated credit institution’s assets for the purpose of any insolvency proceeding. The ECB takes particular note of the draft Bill’s provisions to the effect that the claims of a holder of mortgage or public credit securities issued by a designated credit institution shall, subject to considerations of fraud or misrepresentation under Irish law, rank, as respects recourse to assets comprised in the relevant asset pools, (a) senior and in priority to all claims and rights of any member, shareholder and other creditors of whatever kind (whether secured, unsecured or preferred by any other statute or laws) of that institution; (b) rateably and pari passu in all respects with other holders of mortgage or public credit securities, related hedge counterparties and cover asset monitors; and (c) junior to any fees or costs payable to the NTMA or any other alternative service provider appointed on the occurrence of a potential or matured insolvency event with respect to a designated credit institution or its parent entity, or upon the revocation by the CBI of a credit institution’s designated status. Also, it is noted that while the draft Bill provides that a designated credit institution which has any mortgage or public credit securities outstanding shall not grant or suffer to subsist any security over pool assets or property situated in Ireland, a designated credit institution may grant or permit to subsist security over mortgage or public credit assets in an asset pool where the relevant assets are situated outside Ireland and the persons having the benefit of such security are those entitled to security over the relevant assets under the draft Bill (e.g., the holders of securities). It is suggested that it may be appropriate to extend the prohibition on the creation of security interests in favour of third parties to pool assets or property situated outside Ireland.

text: 10. The ECB notes that the draft Bill provides that the Minister for Finance may, after consultation with the CBI, by regulations (i.e., secondary legislation) confer on the CBI such additional functions connected with the CBI’s functions under the Bill as the Minister considers appropriate, and that the draft Bill also provides that the Minister and the CBI may make regulations in respect of designated credit institutions generally, and with respect to a wide variety of specific matters addressed by the Bill. The ECB notes that, insofar as any Ministerial regulations affect the powers of the CBI as designator and regulator of designated mortgage and public credit institutions, consideration may need to be given to consulting the ECB in accordance with

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions.

text: 11. The ECB understands that a number of the draft Bill’s provisions, including some of the provisions discussed in this opinion, are still under discussion by interested parties, including the CBI and interested market participants. Insofar as those provisions of the draft Bill which delineate the precise powers of the CBI as designator and regulator of designated mortgage and public credit institutions are the subject of substantive amendments, the ECB would appreciate being provided with the final draft Bill that will be presented by the Minister for Finance to the Oireachtas.

text: 12. The ECB confirms that it has no objection to this ECB opinion being made public by the competent national authorities at their discretion. Done at Frankfurt am Main on 25 April 2001. The President of the ECB [signed] Willem F. DUISENBERG


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, pp. 42-43. 2 In French: “Loi portant adaptation de certains montants libellés en francs”. 3 In French: “Règlement grand-ducal portant adaptation de certains montants libellés en francs”.

publisher: Europeiska centralbanken

sprak: en

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 26 April 2001 at the request of the Ministry of Finance of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg on a draft law and a draft Grand-Duchy regulation concerning the 2002 euro cash changeover and modifying certain legislative provisions (CON/2001/7)

serie: con

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 26 April 2001 at the request of the Ministry of Finance of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg on a draft law and a draft Grand-Duchy regulation concerning the 2002 euro cash changeover and modifying certain legislative provisions

type: rubrik

text: 1. On 26 February 2001, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Ministry of Finance of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg on a draft law and a draft Grand-Duchy regulation concerning the 2002 euro cash changeover.

type: stycke

text: 2. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on

text: Article 2 of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions1. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, this opinion has been adopted by the Governing Council of the ECB.

text: 3. The draft legislative documents are respectively entitled (i) “Draft Law relating to the cash changeover on 1 January 2002 and modifying certain legislative provisions”; and (ii) “Draft Grand-Duchy Regulation relating to the cash changeover on 1 January 2002 and modifying certain legislative provisions”.

text: 4. As the content of both drafts consists essentially of converting and adapting legislative provisions previously expressed in francs and now expressed in euro, it is recommended to name both documents respectively: (i) “Draft Law relating to the adaptation of certain amounts expressed in francs” and (ii) “Draft Grand-Duchy Regulation relating to the adaptation of certain amounts expressed in francs” .

text: 5. The ECB notes that the laws on financial, banking and commercial activities are not covered by the draft Law and the draft Regulation.

text: 6. The ECB confirms that it has no objection to publication of this opinion by the competent national authorities at their discretion. Done at Frankfurt am Main on 26 April 2001. The President of the ECB [signed] Willem F. DUISENBERG

type: vagledning

utgivare: ecb


text: The European Monetary Institute was consulted on the 1.Euro-Justiz-Begleitgesetz and delivered an opinion on 13 February 1998 (CON/98/01). The 1. Euro-Justiz-Begleitgesetz dealt with the adjustments necessary for 1 January 1999 and in particular introduced the “euro options” in the fields of accounting and the establishment of companies.

text: OJ L 162, 19.6.1997, p. 1.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 17 May 2001 at the request of the Austrian Ministry of Justice on a draft Second Federal Law containing ancillary measures for the introduction of the euro (2. Euro-Justiz-Begleitgesetz) (CON/2001/9)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 17 May 2001 at the request of the Austrian Ministry of Justice on a draft Second Federal Law containing ancillary measures for the introduction of the euro (2. Euro-Justiz-Begleitgesetz)

text: 1. On 25 April 2001 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Austrian Ministry of Justice on a draft Second Federal Law containing ancillary measures for the introduction of the euro (hereinafter referred to as the “draft law”).

text: 2. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on the second indent of Article 105(4) of the Treaty establishing the European Community, the second indent of Article 4(a) of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank and the first indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the ECB by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the legislative proposal contains provisions concerning currency matters. The Governing Council of the ECB has adopted this opinion in accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the ECB.

text: 3. The main purpose of the draft law is the conversion of amounts and thresholds in schillings into euro, to the extent that this replacement was not accomplished by the First Federal Law containing ancillary measures for the introduction of the euro (1. Euro-Justiz-Begleitgesetz) .

text: 4. The substitution of schilling amounts with euro amounts is based on the following principles. · In line with the Austrian national changeover scenario the draft law provides for a smoothing of “signal amounts and thresholds” whereas the conversion of amounts of less significance for the general public are directly converted by applying the irrevocably fixed conversion rate. · The conversion to the euro was partly prepared in previous legislative amendments by setting the schilling amounts to enable a relatively simple conversion into convenient and round euro amounts (e.g. the Ceiling Amending Law 1997 in the area of civil procedure, Erweiterte Wertgrenzen-Novelle 1997). · Provisions concerning fees (e.g. notary and expert fees) are to have no impact on costs. Consequently, limited smoothing is foreseen (rounding to whole 10 cent amounts), which should have no impact on costs. The introduction of the euro should not result in advantages or disadvantages for specific groups (such as notaries, experts or interpreters on the one hand, or their clients or customers on the other). · In the field of consumer protection, the amounts have been smoothed to the benefit of the consumer. · Some penal provisions have been smoothed down which is deemed to be in the interest of the citizens. However, the Penal Code is adapted to the euro in a separate amendment, which will also contain a general revision of penal provisions.

text: 5. The ECB welcomes the draft law, which provides for the replacement of schilling amounts with euro amounts in the area of civil law. Such adjustments are in the interest of legal clarity and transparency of the national legal system.

text: 6. The ECB takes note that a direct conversion of amounts contained in legal acts according to the provisions laid down by

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 1103/97 of 17 June 1997

text: on certain provisions relating to the introduction of the euro is not always regarded as appropriate by the Austrian Ministry of Justice. With regard to a number of legislative provisions, a smoothing of signal amounts is considered necessary for reasons of transparency and practicability. The ECB also notes the underlying principles regarding the extent and the direction of such smoothing. In particular, the ECB welcomes and underlines the importance of the principle of “no impact on costs”. It is noted that as regards specific provisions of the Consumer Protection Act implementing

text: Council Directive 87/102/EEC of 22 December 1986

text: for the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning consumer credit , the draft law introduces higher thresholds than provided by the Directive. This is possible as the Directive represents a minimum harmonisation measure.

text: 7. The ECB notes that the 2. Euro-Justiz-Begleitgesetz enters into force on 1 January 2002 unless provided otherwise. The ECB welcomes the transitory regime regarding fees described in the explanatory memorandum, which makes reference to

text: Article 14 of Regulation (EC) No 974/98

text: on the introduction of the euro and to Articles

text: and

text: of Regulation (EC) No 1103/97.

text: 8. The ECB confirms that it has no objections to publication of this opinion by the competent national authorities. Done at Frankfurt am Main on 17 May 2001. The President of the ECB [signed] Willem F. DUISENBERG


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: Published on the ECB’s website (http://www.ecb.int); see the ECB press release of 22.3.2001.

text: Article 4 of the

text: European Parliament and Council Directive 95/26/EC of 29 June 1995

text: amending Directives

text: and

text: in the field of credit institutions, Directives

text: and

text: in the field of non-life insurance, Directives

text: and

text: in the field of life assurance, Directive

text: in the field of investment firms and Directive

text: in the field of undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (Ucits), with a view to reinforcing prudential supervision, OJ L 168 , 18.7.1995 p. 7.

text: The Economic and Financial Committee’s “Report on financial crisis management”, 17.4.2001, EFC/ECFIN/251/01en-Final. Article 9(1) of the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the supplementary supervision of credit institutions, insurance undertakings and investment firms in a financial conglomerate and amending Council Directives

text: and

text: , and Directives

text: and

text: of the European Parliament and the Council, COM (2001) 213 final.

text: “The basic tasks to be carried out through the ESCB shall be: […] to promote the smooth operation of payment systems”. 7 “In accordance with Article 105(2) of the Treaty, the basic tasks to be carried out through the ESCB shall be: […] to promote the smooth operation of payment systems”. 8 See Article 34.2 of the Statute: “A regulation shall have general application. It shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States”.

text: “The Governing Council shall adopt the guidelines and take the decisions necessary to ensure the performance of the tasks entrusted to the ESCB under this Treaty and this Statute”. 10 “To the extent deemed possible and appropriate and without prejudice to the provisions of this Article, the ECB shall have recourse to the national central banks to carry out operations which form part of the tasks of the ESCB”.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 25 May 2001 at the request of the Austrian Ministry of Finance on a draft Article of the Federal law establishing and organising the financial market supervisory authority and amending the laws relating to banking, securities supervision, investment funds, equities funds, savings banks, building societies, mortgage banks, mortgage bonds, the IAPL, the stock exchange (1989), insurance supervision, motor vehicle third party liability insurance (1994), pension funds, capital markets, the Commercial Code, companies limited by shares, limited liability companies and the National Bank (1984) (Finanzmarktaufsichtgesetz  FMAG) (CON/2001/10)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 25 May 2001 at the request of the Austrian Ministry of Finance on a draft Article of the Federal law establishing and organising the financial market supervisory authority and amending the laws relating to banking, securities supervision, investment funds, equities funds, savings banks, building societies, mortgage banks, mortgage bonds, the IAPL, the stock exchange (1989), insurance supervision, motor vehicle third party liability insurance (1994), pension funds, capital markets, the Commercial Code, companies limited by shares, limited liability companies and the National Bank (1984) (Finanzmarktaufsichtgesetz – FMAG) (

text: 1. On 19 April 2001 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Austrian Federal Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft Federal law establishing and organising the financial market supervisory authority and amending the laws relating to banking, securities supervision, investment funds, equities funds, savings banks, building societies, mortgage banks, mortgage bonds, the IAPL, the stock exchange (1989), insurance supervision, motor vehicle third party liability insurance (1994), pension funds, capital markets, the Commercial Code, companies limited by shares, limited liability companies and the National Bank (1984) (Finanzmarktaufsichtgesetz – FMAG). The intention of this draft Law is the reorganisation of prudential supervision in Austria and the grant to the Oesterreichische Nationalbank (OeNB) of the oversight function of payment systems (hereinafter referred to as the “draft Law”).

text: 2. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Article 105(4) of the Treaty establishing the European Community (hereinafter referred to as the “Treaty”), Article 3.1 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter referred to as the Statute), and the third, fifth and sixth indents of

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft Law contains provisions concerning a national central bank, payment and settlement systems as well as rules applicable to financial institutions which could materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, this opinion has been adopted by the Governing Council of the ECB.

text: 3. One aim of the draft Law is to concentrate the capacities of those authorities which are currently involved in Austria in the various fields of supervision, namely the Federal Ministry of Finance, the securities supervisory authority and the OeNB, in a newly established authority, the “Finanzmarktaufsichtsbehörde” (FMA), which is not bound by instructions. The FMA will be established as a public law entity with legal personality and will, as a global-finance supervisory authority, be competent for banking, insurance, securities and pension funds supervision. The Federal Ministry of Finance will be entrusted with supervision of the overall fulfilment of the legal obligations of the FMA. The FMA will be funded by the supervised entities themselves as well as by an annual contribution of the federal government. The official explanatory memorandum accompanying the draft Law argues that the establishment of a stand-alone financial regulatory agency in Austria inter alia pursues the objectives of ensuring operational independence of the regulatory agency and regulatory flexibility. The operational independence and freedom from instruction of the FMA corresponds fully to Principle 1 of the “Core principles for effective banking supervision” of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.

text: 4. As a general observation, the ECB notes that the role of the OeNB in the field of prudential supervision will diminish as a result of the adoption of the draft Law. This contrasts with the position expressed by the ECB in the note on “The role of central banks in prudential supervision” . The ECB considers that maintaining a close involvement of national central banks in prudential supervision is a condition necessary to allow the Eurosystem to contribute adequately to monitoring the risks to financial stability in the euro area. This is of particular importance in a context in which the nature and scope of these risks are affected by the introduction of the single currency and the consequent enhanced integration of financial markets. In addition, it safeguards the smooth coordination between the central banking functions exercised at the Eurosystem level and the supervisory functions carried out at the national level. In the ECB’s opinion, the objective of achieving more effective coordination between the conduct of supervisory functions in all segments of financial activity could be pursued also with means that do not imply a reduced role of the central bank in this field. In support of a continued and even reinforced involvement of the OeNB in prudential supervision, it may be argued that also the Treaty contains a provision relying on the central bank to address supervisory issues which may arise in increasingly integrated financial markets. In fact, Article 105(6) of the Treaty envisages a simplified procedure to confer upon the ECB specific tasks in the context of supervision of credit institutions and other financial institutions with the exception of insurance firms. Furthermore, Article 105(5) of the Treaty entrusts the Eurosystem with the task of contributing to the smooth conduct of policies pursued by the competent authorities relating to prudential supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system. A reduced role of the OeNB in prudential supervision could generally make compliance with the obligations arising from this provision more difficult. In the opinion of the ECB, the draft law does not provide sufficient safeguards for the OeNB to assume its full responsibilities in the context of the prudential functions which the Eurosystem has been entrusted with in the interest of financial system stability and soundness.

text: 5. The ECB notes, moreover, that the draft Law also intends to maintain some of the advantages stemming from the institutional framework in place, including the current involvement of the OeNB in prudential supervision – with the fundamental and objectively unfounded exception of limiting on-site inspections to market risk (see paragraph 9 below). Such involvement, according to the explanatory memorandum, should be supported regardless of the organisational form chosen for the attribution of supervisory responsibilities. This, in practice, is reflected in the provisions of the draft Law concerning inter alia the procedures for the nomination of the members of the FMA's executive board (Vorstand) and supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat), the composition of the FMA's advisory board (Beirat), the composition of the Financial Market Committee (Finanzmarktkomitee), the possible operational involvement of the OeNB in supervisory tasks, the institutional exchange of information between the two bodies, and the consultative role of the OeNB vis-à-vis the FMA and the Federal Minister of Finance.

text: 6. Against this background, the ECB believes that improvements in the draft legislative provisions in defining the role of the OeNB with regard to financial stability and the conduct of prudential supervision tasks are required. This would comply with the meaning and intention of the relevant provisions of the Treaty establishing the European Community.

text: 7. First, the specific role of the OeNB in financial stability and prudential supervision. The draft Law should make it clear that the OeNB has responsibility for the overall stability of the financial system as a whole, as a separate function from hands-on supervision and financial regulation. The express attribution of such a role seems particularly useful, given the formal attribution of the responsibility for prudential supervision of individual institutions to the FMA. This would prove beneficial to the institutional framework being proposed in the draft Law. Central banks are in general in an advantageous position to fulfil the responsibility for financial stability, given their insight into money and financial market developments and involvement in payment systems and monetary policy operations. This is both on an ongoing basis and in crisis management situations. In this context, the ECB welcomes the establishment of the Financial Market Committee as a body fostering cooperation and information sharing among the authorities jointly responsible for financial market stability. Moreover, in view of its financial stability role, the OeNB should be expressly assigned the task of contributing to the conduct of prudential supervision of financial intermediaries, in close cooperation with the FMA.

text: 8. Secondly, while the draft Law responds in various ways to the need to bridge the supervisory and the central banking functions, the ECB considers that it could be useful to insert in the draft Law the basic principle that a smooth interaction between the FMA and the OeNB warrants close cooperation between them in all fields of common interest. This principle, which is for instance reflected in the draft provisions for Articles 79 and 80 of the Banking Act (Bankwesengesetz) contained in Section II of the draft Law, should be further reflected in a general provision stipulating a duty of cooperation, whose ultimate purpose would be to have in place effective and practical arrangements for cooperation and information sharing between the FMA and the OeNB. Such a provision could go beyond the proposed provisions in Article 1 of the draft Law concerning Article 21(2) of the Financial Market Law.

text: 9. Thirdly, it follows that the issue of access to information and information sharing in general could be further specified in the draft Law than as provided in the amendments to Articles 79 and 80 of the Banking Act contained in Section II of the draft Law. In this context, the ECB notes first that in Article 43 of the National Bank Act, as in Article 77 of the Banking Act and in the provisions proposed in Article II of the draft Law concerning Article 21(2) of the Financial Market Law, there are indeed provisions in this regard. The ECB would however welcome for the following reasons further clarification of the access to information and information exchange. In particular, the exchange of information would not be dependent on the occurrence of specific events, as currently foreseen in these draft provisions, but would occur on an ongoing basis, which would imply regular flows of information. Furthermore, the ECB would welcome the express removal of possible legal obstacles to information sharing between the FMA and the OeNB. The relevant provisions of the “post-BCCI Directive” , which were incorporated in all sectoral directives, stipulate that information subject to confidentiality and professional secrecy requirements may be shared between supervisory authorities and central banks, and vice versa, for the purposes of the exercise of their respective tasks. In view of the fact that the draft Law will establish a new supervisory authority, the ECB would welcome the express inclusion of such a principle both in the Law establishing the FMA and in the OeNB Act. Central banking is a valuable input to the supervisory process, while access by central banks to supervisory resources benefits the conduct of monetary policy operations, the oversight of payment systems and the pursuance of financial stability. It may be noted that information sharing may entail a cross-border dimension, since information concerning Eurosystem-related tasks might need to be conveyed to other national central banks of the Eurosystem and the ECB. A provision reflecting this aspect would be welcome. This suggestion is in line with the recommendations put forward by the recent Economic and Financial Committee's "Report on financial crisis management" , to remove any legal impediments to the cross-border exchange of information among supervisors and central banks on a cross-border basis. With regard to access to information from financial institutions, the ECB welcomes the proposed amendments to

text: Article 22

text: e and Article 26 of the Banking Act contained in Section II of the draft Law, stipulating that the OeNB will remain a recipient of information from reporting institutions. In the same manner,

text: Article 79(2)

text: and (3) of the Banking Act are also welcome, since they foresee that both the FMA and the OeNB will be able to access the reports which each of them receives from credit institutions. In line with the foregoing given the enhanced integration of financial services, access to supervisory information by the OeNB should not be limited to information on the banking sector but should also include the other sectors of the financial system which may be deemed relevant for the stability of the financial system. The central bank should have the means to assess possible systemic implications of the behaviour of complex financial groups on money and capital markets as well as on payment and settlement systems. This would for instance also be in line with the European Commission's recent proposal for a Community directive on the supervision of financial conglomerates , which purports to lift the legal obstacles for supervisory information sharing with central banks.

text: 10. Fourthly, the operational involvement of the OeNB in prudential supervision. The involvement of the OeNB in on-site inspections is substantially reduced by the draft Law as a consequence of the full attribution of supervisory responsibilities to the FMA. The on-site examination powers will be limited to the examination of market risks under the proposed amendments to Article 70 of the Banking Act contained in Section II of the draft Law. The possibility remains, under the proposed amendments to

text: Articles 26

text: b, 27 and 70 of the Banking Act, that the FMA may request the OeNB to carry out inspections in respect of market risks. This is conditional, under draft Article 70 of the Banking Act, on the process being substantially streamlined or being made more expeditious or being in the interests of expediency, simplicity, speed or cost-saving. The ECB would like to note that, in line with the intention of the draft Law, the operational involvement of the OeNB might represent a considerable advantage to the activities of the FMA in view of the experience and expertise of the central bank as well as of the central bank's infrastructure. The possibility of the involvement of the OeNB seems however to be very restricted by the provisions of the draft Law. On the one hand, such involvement may well go beyond the mere assessment of market risks and could include full on-site examination tasks. On the other hand, the conditions set for the FMA to have recourse to the OeNB could be drafted in a broader manner so that the contribution of the central bank would not be envisaged as an exceptional procedure. In addition, it is to be recalled that market and credit risk are related in many respects. Hence, the specific exchange rate risk does indeed form part of market risk, but it is also an indication of creditworthiness of current issuers in close connection with solvency provisions. It should also be borne in mind that the methods of measurement and management of credit and market risks are continuously growing closer. The ECB therefore considers it to be desirable for the draft Law to create the legal basis to confer on the OeNB not only the procedural limitation of market risk but – in any event – also credit risk. This is particularly significant since provision for the participation of the OeNB in the inspection of credit risk impairs the contributions of the OeNB to new activities arising from the current reworking of the Basle Capital Accord and the EU provisions on capital adequacy.

text: 11. Fifthly, the ECB welcomes the proposed Article 80(2) of the Banking Act contained in Section II of the draft Law, which provides the OeNB with the right to be consulted by the FMA and the Federal Minister of Finance on legal acts issued under the Banking Act. The ECB would suggest that, in view of its financial stability role, the OeNB be provided with an advisory role for all national legislation falling within such field of competence, without any restriction to legal acts in the banking field. The ECB refers in this context to the special meaning of Article 7(3) of the National Bank Act according to which the OeNB has the right to be consulted on all drafts with political implications for the financial market or otherwise the interests of the OeNB.

text: 12. The ECB would welcome the inclusion in the draft Law of a provision stipulating that the FMA will respect all pre-existing commitments to cooperate and share information undertaken by the Federal Minister of Finance in its capacity as former supervisory authority vis-à-vis other supervisory authorities and central banks of the EU Member States.

text: 13. The ECB welcomes the provisions directed at enhancing and reinforcing the supervisory framework for credit institutions. In particular the ECB welcomes the proposed provisions for the Banking Act allowing for the possibility of the FMA to inform the public about the licence status and about supervisory measures that are taken vis-à-vis an institution (proposed amendments in Section II of the draft Law to

text: Article 4

text: , new paragraph 7 and

text: Article 70

text: , new paragraph 7), the strengthening of the credit institutions' advisory boards (Aufsichtsräte) (proposed new

text: Article 63

text: a of the Banking Act), and the rotation principle of bank auditors (proposed amendments to Article 62 of the Banking Act), according to which auditors of banks must be changed after a certain number of years in order to ensure their impartiality and independence.

text: 14. In addition to the issues described above, the draft Law proposes changes to the National Bank Act dealing with payments systems oversight. According to these draft provisions, the OeNB will be the competent authority in Austria for the oversight of payment systems. Section XIX of the draft Law (proposed new

text: Article 44

text: a(1) of the National Bank Act) provides that the OeNB will be competent to oversee (i) payment systems to which Austrian law applies; (ii) participants in payment systems which are located in Austria and to which Austrian laws applies; and (iii) participants in payment systems which are located in Austria, which are not subject to Austrian law. Section XIX of the draft Law (proposed new

text: Article 44

text: a(5) of the National Bank Act) provides that the OeNB will be competent to make regulations in order to implement any relevant recommendations of the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS). In the fulfilment of its tasks as overseer of payments systems, the OeNB will also be entitled to request information concerning payment systems, to carry out on-site inspections (either in its own name or via the FMA), and to impose sanctions in cases of non-compliance with its regulations.

text: 15. In this context, the ECB would like to state first of all that payment systems oversight is an essential function of central banks. The aim of the oversight of clearing and payment systems is the maintenance of systemic stability, the promotion of efficiency and the safeguarding of the transmission channel for monetary policy. These concerns are material to both the confidence of the users of the payment systems and of the users of the payment instruments and, ultimately, to the maintenance of public confidence in the currency. Article 105(2) of the Treaty and Article 3.17 of the Statute provide for the legal basis for the oversight activities of the Eurosystem. In addition, the competence of the Eurosystem for the system’s oversight results from Article 22 of the Statute, which provides: “The ECB and national central banks may provide facilities, and the ECB may make regulations , to ensure efficient and sound clearing and payment systems within the Community and with other countries”. Within the Eurosystem, the Governing Council of the ECB formulates the common policy stance, determining the objectives and core principles of the common oversight policy of the Eurosystem. The national central banks (NCBs) and the ECB are responsible for the implementation of the common policy stance and for the performance of the regular oversight activities over the systems under their respective responsibility. In addition, for areas not specifically covered by the common oversight policy, policies defined at the level of an individual NCB apply which must be consistent with the objectives and principles defined at the level of the Eurosystem.

text: 16. Against this general background, the ECB welcomes the grant by law to the OeNB of the competence of payment systems oversight in Austria. This step enhances the transparency of the central bank’s policies and is in line with the IMF’s Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial Policies. However, the ECB notes that Section XIX of the draft Law (proposed new

text: Article 44

text: a(1) of the National Bank Act) seems to restrict the oversight function of the OeNB to the protection of security of payment systems. Although this task is of primary importance within the oversight function, it is only one aspect of a broader spectrum, as described above. Therefore, the ECB suggests replacing the proposed new

text: Article 44

text: a(1) of the National Bank Act with a more general provision in line with the Treaty. It should provide that the OeNB is under an obligation to ensure the sound and efficient operation of payment systems, which includes the security of the payment instruments, within the framework of the task of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) relating to the promotion of the smooth operation of payment systems as specified by Article 105(2) of the Treaty.

text: 17. According to Section XIX of the draft Law (proposed new

text: Article 44

text: a(1)1 of the National Bank Act) oversight shall be applicable “to payment systems to which Austrian laws apply”. The ECB notes that for systems which have no clear domestic anchorage, the body entrusted with oversight responsibility is the NCB where the system is legally incorporated, unless the Governing Council of the ECB decides otherwise on the basis of the features of the system and entrusts oversight responsibilities to the ECB. Obviously, this can also affect systems that are established and operated on the basis of the laws of individual Member States. Therefore, the ECB suggests clarifying in the draft Law that the proposed new

text: Article 44

text: a(1)1 of the National Bank Act does not interfere with any oversight function of the ECB that has been determined by its Governing Council.

text: 18. The ECB notes that according to Section XIX of the draft Law (proposed new

text: Article 44

text: a(1)3 of the National Bank Act) oversight shall be exercised with regard “to the participants of payment systems based in Austria, which are not subject to Austrian law”. The ECB understands that this provision applies to participants located in Austria who participate through remote access in a payment system governed by foreign law and that those participants would fall under Austrian oversight of payment systems. Clarification should be introduced in the draft Law in this respect.

text: 19. The ECB would also like to comment on the proposed new

text: Article 44

text: a(5) contained in Section XIX of the draft Law as well as on the related section in the explanatory memorandum. These provisions specify that OeNB is entitled by means of regulations to officially establish the content of the recommendations made by the CPSS, which is an international standard setting body with the function of elaborating recommendations for clearing and payment transactions and systems. On the basis of the Articles of the Treaty and of the Statute referred to in paragraph 15 above, in conjunction with the first paragraph of Article 12.1 of the Statute, the Governing Council of the ECB is the decision-making body responsible for the definition of the common policy stance of the Eurosystem in the field of oversight. According to the third paragraph Article 12.1 of the Statute, within the Eurosystem, the NCBs shall be available, and the ECB shall have recourse to them to the extent deemed possible and appropriate, for the implementation of the oversight policy stance. Against this background, it will be in the first instance within the competence of the Governing Council of the ECB to decide on any adoption and enforcement of the CPSS’s recommendations at the level of the Eurosystem. It is within this general institutional framework and the general appreciation pertaining to the Governing Council of the ECB that the OeNB, like the other NCBs within the Eurosystem, may implement at a national level the CPSS’s recommendations. Consequently and more in general, the ECB would appreciate amendment of the proposed new

text: Article 44

text: a(5) contained in Section XIX of the draft Law to make it clear that exercise of the regulatory power of the OeNB in the field of payment systems oversight should be in line with the common policy stance that the Governing Council of the ECB has adopted for the Eurosystem.

text: 20. The ECB welcomes the grant to the OeNB of a regulatory power in the field of payment system oversight. It should, however, be recalled that any ECB regulation would supersede an OeNB regulation adopted by virtue of the regulatory power conferred by the draft Law on the OeNB. Although the ECB has not yet used the possibility provided by Article 22 of the Statute to adopt regulations to ensure efficient and sound clearing and payment systems, as pointed out in the explanatory memorandum to the draft Law, it should be noted that the Governing Council of the ECB can always take an initiative, where necessary. The ECB would therefore appreciate amendment of the explanatory memorandum to the draft Law to avoid the impression of impairing the competencies of the ECB in this field.

text: 21. The proposed new

text: Article 44

text: a(6) contained in Section XIX of the draft Law stipulates that “upon agreement with the FMA, on-site inspections can also be carried out by the auditing divisions of the FMA, on behalf of and at the expense of the Oesterreichische Nationalbank.” The ECB understands that for the tasks performed under this provision, and whenever the OeNB makes recourse to the FMA in the performance of its oversight functions, the personnel of the FMA will be accountable to the OeNB only and not be bound by instructions from the FMA or any other third party.

text: 22. According to the new draft Article 69 of the Banking Act contained in Section II of the draft Law, the oversight of securities settlement systems (SSSs), currently a competence of the Federal Ministry of Finance, will be transferred to the FMA. In this respect, it should be recalled that the smooth operation of securities settlement systems is crucial for the smooth functioning of payment systems. It has been recognised by international fora such as the Wise Men Committee, the CPSS and IOSCO that the oversight of securities settlement systems also require the expertise of the central bank, due to the interdependency between the payment systems and the securities settlement systems. Consequently, the OeNB could also be involved in the oversight of securities settlement systems. In addition, as also stated in the recommendation being finalised by the CPSS-IOSCO Joint Task Force on Securities Settlement Systems of the G10 States (CPSS-IOSCO Recommendation 18), SSSs should be subject to regulation and oversight. In particular, the responsibilities and objectives of the securities regulator and the central bank with respect to SSSs should be clearly defined, and their roles and major policies should be publicly disclosed. In addition, they should have the ability and the resources to perform their responsibilities, including assessing and promoting implementation of these recommendations. The ECB stresses the importance of compliance by the draft Law with the principles of the abovementioned CPSS-IOSCO Recommendation 18. Done at Frankfurt am Main on 25 May 2001. The President of the ECB [signed] Willem F. DUISENBERG


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42-43.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 31 May 2001 at the request of the Irish Department of Finance on a draft legislative proposal on certain provisions included in a Dormant Accounts Bill, 2001 (CON/2001/11)

text: 1. On 14 May 2001 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Irish Department of Finance for an opinion on certain provisions included in a draft Dormant Accounts Bill, 2001.

text: 2. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on

text: Article 2 of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the legislative proposal contains provisions concerning a national central bank. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, this opinion has been adopted by the Governing Council of the ECB.

text: 3. Generally speaking, the draft Bill makes provision for the transfer, beginning in 2003, of moneys from deposit and share accounts and specified savings schemes at credit institutions, building societies, trustee savings banks and An Post (Post Office) that have been dormant for a period of 15 years to a new Dormant Accounts Fund controlled and managed by the Irish National Treasury Management Agency, and for the disbursement of moneys from the Fund. The ECB notes that the draft Bill confers an administrative function on the Central Bank of Ireland (CBI) whereby, where an institution has been wound up, the liquidator appointed to the institution shall submit the institution’s register of dormant accounts to the CBI for the purpose of processing claims for repayment of any moneys to the persons entitled to any such moneys that have been previously transferred by the institution concerned to the Fund. The ECB also notes that under the draft Bill the Minister for Social, Community and Family Affairs may, following consultation with the CBI, make regulations providing (a) that the Bill shall apply to a broader range of accounts that are deemed by such regulations to be dormant accounts; and (b) for the disclosure, for statistical purposes only, of information concerning dormant accounts.

text: 4. The ECB notes with interest the new functions conferred upon the CBI by the draft Bill.

text: 5. The ECB confirms that it has no objection to publication of this opinion by the competent national authorities at their discretion. Done at Frankfurt am Main on 31 May 2001. The President of the ECB [signed] Willem F. DUISENBERG


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: OJ L 275, 27.10.2000, p.37. 3 OJ L 275, 27.10.2000, p. 39 4 “The basic tasks to be carried out through the ESCB shall be: […] to promote the smooth operation of payment systems.” “In accordance with Article 105 (2) of the Treaty, the basic tasks to be carried out through the ESCB shall be: […] to promote the smooth operation of payment systems.”

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 31 May 2001 at the request of the Spanish Ministry of the Economy on a draft law introducing amendments to several laws governing the Spanish financial market (CON/2001/12)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 31 May 2001 at the request of the Spanish Ministry of the Economy on a draft law introducing amendments to several laws governing the Spanish financial market (

text: 1. On 23 April 2001 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Spanish Secretary of State of the Economy, Energy and Small and Medium-sized Enterprises for an opinion on a draft law amending several legal acts pertaining to the financial legal framework (hereinafter the “Draft Law”).

text: 2. The competence of the ECB to deliver an opinion on the Draft Law does not extend to the entire content of the Draft Law, but is confined to certain areas: securities settlement systems (Article 1, fourth additional provision, and first and second transitory provisions of the Draft Law), collateral for Eurosystem operations (Articles 11, 12 and 15 of the Draft Law), electronic money (Article 19 of the Draft Law), the prudential supervision of credit institutions (Article 30 of the Draft Law) and provisions affecting the powers of the Banco de España (Chapter Six on the Centre for Risk Information, and the Abrogating Provision of the Draft Law). The enumeration of the above areas is based on the third, fifth and sixth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the ECB by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions . In addition, according to Article 1(2) of the said Council Decision, the ECB does not need to be consulted on draft legislative provisions which serve the sole purpose of transposing Community Directives into the law of Member States. However, when such consultation is effected on a voluntary basis on a topic closely related to ESCB tasks, the ECB is ready to provide its opinion; this is the case in this consultation with regard to the provisions relating to electronic money. Articles of the Draft Law other than those listed above fall outside the advisory competence of the ECB. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, this Opinion has been adopted by the Governing Council of the ECB.

text: 3. The ECB welcomes the legislative methodology chosen to address various needs for the modernisation and enhancement of financial regulation in Spain. The use of a horizontal law which addresses various requirements to upgrade existing legislation is a method which has been used by several Member States to cope with the pace of development of financial markets. Changes in such markets in Europe follow the introduction of the euro and the consequent tendency to replace national markets by the euro market, the globalisation of financial markets, the impact of new technology, and other factors. Since the evolution of such markets will in all likelihood continue, perhaps at an even greater pace, regular legislative adaptation of the overall financial legal framework seems to be the best legislative technique for such a period of change.

text: 4. Article 1 of the Draft Law is aimed at providing a legal basis for the incorporation as a société anonyme of the central depository services and at unifying in one single central securities settlement system the various systems existing for the settlement of different kinds of securities. The ECB welcomes all measures aimed at fostering the consolidation of euro securities settlement systems and thus the overall objective of the proposed reform. Within the context of this general support, the ECB would, however, make the following comments. (a) The regime which the Draft Law establishes appears to grant to the resulting consolidated system (“la Sociedad de Sistemas”) exclusive central register rights for securities admitted to trading; (i) on the public debt market; and (ii) on national stock exchanges. For the regional stock exchanges and for securities being traded over-thecounter, other alternatives are permitted. The ECB understands that such exclusive rights are limited to the primary or central registry function to be performed by the Sociedad de Sistemas, as previously performed by two securities settlement systems, which qualify as a “public function” under Spanish Law, and notes that (i) there are no exclusivity rights for secondary registers which may be managed on a free-market basis; and (ii) foreign participation in the capital of the Sociedad de Sistemas is permitted. Following the introduction of the euro, the ECB favours the integration of European financial markets and notes that the Explanatory Memorandum of the Draft Law reflects the aim of such integration and justifies the Draft Law on the basis of the implications of such integration. It thus appears important that national laws do not lend support to a perpetuation of national fragmentation of such markets, but rather allow for such integration. The ECB welcomes the legislative proposal to consolidate the central registry function in Spain into one main system, under terms which will increase the safety and efficiency of securities settlement and thereby contribute to financial stability in Spain. The legislative proposal paves the way for future processes of integration of Spanish securities markets with others in the euro area, as the proposed scheme is more in line with the structure of the majority of euro area securities settlement systems. The ECB notes that the process of consolidation of securities settlement systems in Spain is not completed with the Draft Law, and that autonomous regional systems continue. Such continued domestic fragmentation does not serve the cause of enhanced efficiency of post-trading structures. (b) The Draft Law allows the Ministry of the Economy to authorise and to regulate the establishment of one or, exceptionally, several central counterparties for the securities markets. The ECB welcomes this possibility because central counterparties, when properly regulated, enhance the efficiency of the securities markets. However, some comments are necessary: - The Draft Law subjects the provision of central counterparty services in Spain to government authorisation. Such government authorisation has the function of ensuring that central counterparty services are properly regulated and supervised, but should not be seen as a mechanism to impede the provision of central counterparty services by other central counterparties incorporated in the EU, when properly regulated and supervised, on a cross-border or remote basis. Once more, domestic legislation should not perpetuate the fragmentation of financial markets following the introduction of the euro. - Central counterparties have a pivotal role with regard to the stability of financial markets; they operate at the centre of trading, and should be able to cope with the failures of market participants in order to avoid systemic risks. The solvency and liquidity of central counterparties need to be ensured; they should be supervised and have access to central bank liquidity and to real-time payment systems. The ECB recalls that, in choosing whether to establish a central counterparty, CPSS- IOSCO Recommendation 4 should always be followed, according to which a central counterparty, where introduced, should be subject to a rigorous requirement to control the risks it assumes. Within the regime to be adopted for a central counterparty, it may be worth considering the advantages of requiring any new central counterparty to adopt the form of a credit institution which satisfies such requirements, in which case such a basic criterion may be established in the Draft Law, rather than leaving it to ministerial regulation. - The Draft Law attributes the supervision of the central counterparty to the National Securities Market Commission and to the Banco de España, without specifying the respective competences. In this regard, it is necessary to recall that, following CPSS-IOSCO Recommendation 18, (i) central counterparties should be subject to public regulation and oversight; (ii) the responsibilities and objectives of the securities regulator and the central bank with respect to the central counterparty should be clearly defined; (iii) their roles and major policies should be publicly disclosed; and (iv) they should have the ability and the resources to perform their responsibilities, including assessing and promoting the implementation of these CPSS-IOSCO Recommendations. In taking account of the above, it should be borne in mind that the solvency risks, liquidity risks, access to RTGS and the resulting systemic risks imply that central banks have a direct interest in the good functioning and supervision of central counterparties. The ECB would therefore advise that CPSS-IOSCO Recommendation 18, as stated above, be duly followed.

text: 5. The Draft Law modifies

text: Article 36(7)

text: (b) of the Securities Market Law in order to allow loans of securities only if the securities are the property of the lender. The ECB considers that such a provision prohibits on-lending activities and thus introduces an important limitation to the securities loan market. In this regard, it should also be recalled that CPSS-IOSCO Recommendation 5 affirms that securities lending and borrowing should be encouraged as a method for expediting the settlement of securities transactions and that barriers which inhibit the practice of lending securities for this purpose should be removed.

text: Article 12

text: introduces a sixth additional provision to Law 13/1994 on the Autonomy of the Banco de España which establishes the legal regime for collateral for ESCB operations. The ECB welcomes the proposal, which is aimed at simplifying the formalities required for the creation and enforcement of the collateral, including cash collateral; this proposal provides a legal basis for margin maintenance and top-up provisions, and for assigning bank loans under simplified formal requirements. While those reforms improve the existing regime, one observation may be made: the regime for assigning bank loans seems to continue to require cumbersome formalities; namely, paper form, registration with two public registries and handover of the loan contract. The ECB would favour, if legally possible, further simplification of such a procedure with an enhanced use of computerised systems.

text: Article 12

text: further introduces a seventh additional provision to Law 13/1994 on the Banco de España which provides for collateral for Treasury cash management operations. This provision supplements the introduction in Article 11 of the Draft Law of a Treasury power to perform repo and loan operations in the management of its liquidity.

text: Article 12

text: provides for a specific procedure for the execution of pledges in favour of the Treasury of collateral placed with the Banco de España by credit institutions in the context of monetary policy operations, following which the relevant assets would be re-attached as collateral for the Banco de España once the obligations of the Treasury have been discharged. The ECB welcomes the proposed procedure for the collateralisation of the temporary transfers to credit institutions of the liquidity balances until now held by the Treasury with the Banco de España, optimising the use of available collateral.

text: Article 13

text: introduces a new kind of security: the “cédulas territoriales”. These are securities issued by credit institutions and backed by claims on public administrations. The ECB welcomes such innovation, which is aimed at introducing a new and sound instrument for the capital markets, in line with similar instruments successfully existing in other Member States, and which will contribute to increasing the volume of collateral available in Spain.

text: 9. Article 15 of the Draft Law modifies the tenth additional provision of Law 37/1998 amending the Securities Market Law of 1988, which provided for the legal validity and enforceability of the close-out and netting provisions included in the standard documentation of the repo markets, securities loans and other trading in securities. The new wording satisfies the need for clarity arising from the current provision and is thus welcomed.

text: 10. Article 19 of the Draft Law relates to electronic money (e-money). The ECB understands Article 19 of the Draft Law as aiming principally at implementing Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 September 2000 amending Directive

text: relating to the taking-up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions (of which the latter is referred to as “the Banking Directive”) and Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 September 2000 on the taking-up, pursuit of and prudential supervision of the business of electronic money institutions (“the E-money Directive”). The ECB would like to make the following comments: - According to

text: Article 19(5)

text: , the Ministry of the Economy, following a report from the Banco de España, will be in charge of authorising the creation of e-money institutions. The control and inspection of all e-money institutions and their registration on the register created for this purpose will be incumbent upon the Banco de España. The ECB welcomes the powers therefore conferred upon the Banco de España. In this respect, the ECB would like to emphasise the interest of the Eurosystem in e-money. This interest stems from monetary policy concerns and the primary objective of maintaining price stability, as well as from the Eurosystem’s role in contributing to the smooth conduct of policies pursued by the competent authorities in relation to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system. This interest also relates to the Eurosystem’s basic task of promoting the smooth operation of payment systems as stated in Article 105 (2) of the Treaty and Article 3.1 of the Statute of the ESCB. These provisions provide the legal basis for the oversight activities of the Eurosystem. As part of its oversight task, the Eurosystem pursues the objectives of soundness and efficiency of e-money schemes and pays specific attention to their technical security, in order to ensure confidence in the currency. Against this general background, the ECB suggests that the competence of the Banco de España, as stated in Article 19 of the Draft Law, be extended to the functioning and security of the emoney schemes themselves, as distinct from the e-money institutions. - Article 19(7) of the Draft Law implements Article 8 of the E-money Directive, according to which Member States may allow their competent authorities to waive the application of some or all provisions of the same Directive and of the Banking Directive. The paragraph provides for a waiver with regard to the e-money institutions specified more specifically in

text: Article 8(1)

text: (b) of the E-money Directive. Paragraph 7 covers the cases where the e-money issued by this institution is accepted as a means of payment only by a subsidiary of the institution performing operational or other auxiliary functions relating to e-money issued or distributed by the institution, by any parent undertaking or by any other subsidiary of that parent undertaking. Paragraph 7 states that such e-money institutions may be exempt from the application of the provisions of this Law and the norms developing it “according to the procedure to be determined by the Government”. As indicated above, the development of emoney raises issues relating to monetary policy, payment systems oversight and the prudential supervision of financial intermediaries. In order for the regulatory framework currently being implemented in the EU to provide adequate safeguards, the ECB regards it as important that the waiving of regulatory requirements under Article 8 of the E-money Directive be implemented into the national legislation with prudence and in a restrictive manner. In this respect, the ECB would recommend, inter alia, that the national legislation should not grant the possibility of waiving Article 3 of the E-money Directive on redeemability. - Finally, the last sub-paragraph of Article 8(1) of the E-money Directive states that “[t]he underlying contractual arrangements must provide that electronic storage device at the disposal of bearers for the purpose of making payments is subject to a maximum storage amount of not more than EUR 150.” The ECB notes that this protective provision of the Emoney Directive, which applies when a national authority implements the possibility of a waiver under

text: Article 8

text: , is not stated in the Draft Law.

text: 11. Article 30 of the Draft Law authorises the Banco de España, acting as a prudential supervisor of credit institutions (and the Securities Commission with respect to investment firms), to entrust to external auditors the performance of specific supervisory tasks in certain cases of complex groups, the international activity of credit institutions, as well as in other cases. Such external auditors are roughly equivalent to bank inspectors of the Banco de España in the execution of such tasks. The ECB welcomes such a possibility for an enhanced prudential supervision capacity on the part of the Banco de España, namely in the current climate in which a surge of conglomerates in the context of the internationalisation of financial markets is giving a new dimension to the supervision function.

text: 12. Chapter Six of the Draft Law establishes a revised regime for the Central Risk Information system (CRI) of the Banco de España. The ECB generally welcomes the proposed regime, in particular as regards the aims, inter alia, of facilitating the use of information stored in the CRI for supervisory purposes and enhancing supervisory co-operation on a cross-border basis, both with authorities of other Member States and third countries. The ECB further welcomes the proposed

text: Article 43

text: , which will enhance the possibilities for co-operation between the CRI and central credit registers based in other countries. The proposed

text: Article 43

text: will allow the CRI to exchange information on relevant borrowers on a cross-border basis, within a regime of reciprocity and on terms to be determined by the Banco de España. This possibility will be particularly relevant for those EU Member States which operate central credit registers of a similar nature, and with similar functions, to the CRI. Such information-sharing will, however, only be possible if the recipient central credit register or a reporting institution is subject to rules on the use of data, confidentiality and data protection which are comparable to those stipulated in Spanish law. The ECB expects that practical solutions will be elaborated in the ongoing co-operation among central credit registers in the EU.

text: 13. The Abrogatory Provision of the Draft Law abrogates Article 15.3 of Law 13/1994 on the Autonomy of the Banco de España. This

text: Article 15.3

text: refers to the regime for those banknotes withdrawn from circulation but not yet returned to the Banco de España. The abrogation allows the ECB to establish the regime which will apply to such banknotes in a harmonised manner throughout the Eurosystem, namely within the forthcoming cash changeover. The proposed abrogation is thus most welcome.

text: 14. The ECB confirms that it has no objection to the publication of this opinion by the competent national authorities at their discretion. Done at Frankfurt am Main on 31 May 2001. The President of the ECB [signed] Willem F. DUISENBERG


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 2 OJ L 55, 24.2.2001, p. 80.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 18 June 2001 at the request of the Spanish Ministry of Economy on a draft Order on the frontloading of banknotes and coins denominated in euro (CON/2001/14)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 18 June 2001 at the request of the Spanish Ministry of Economy on a draft Order on the frontloading of banknotes and coins denominated in euro (

text: 1. On 28 May 2001 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Spanish Secretary of State for the Economy, Energy and Small and Medium-sized Enterprises for an opinion on a draft Order on the frontloading of banknotes and coins denominated in euro (“the draft Order”).

text: 2. The competence of the ECB to deliver an opinion on the draft Order is based on

text: Article 2 of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the ECB by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the ECB, this opinion has been adopted by the Governing Council of the ECB.

text: 3. Article 20(2) of Guideline ECB/2001/1 of 10 January 2001 adopting certain provisions on the 2002 cash changeover recommended that the provisions of the Guideline applied also to the frontloading of coins, which is the competence of each of the governments of the Member States participating in the euro. Hence, the draft Order lays down certain aspects of a common regime for the frontloading of euro banknotes and coins. In particular, the draft Order (1) lays down the starting date for the frontloading of euro banknotes and coins, (2) establishes the parties to whom credit institutions may deliver euro banknotes and coins prior to 1 January 2002, and (3) enables the Banco de España to adopt implementing measures regarding the frontloading of euro coins.

text: 4. Paragraph 3 of the Sole Article of the draft Order lays down that the delivery of euro coins by the Treasury, through the Banco de España, and the delivery of euro banknotes to credit institutions by the Banco de España shall take place as from 1 September 2001. The ECB welcomes this provision which is in line with Article 3 of Guideline ECB/2001/1.

text: 5. According to paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Sole Article of the draft Order, frontloading of euro banknotes and coins would be carried out in accordance with the distribution contracts to which the Banco de España and credit institutions are party. These contracts may provide for subfrontloading as from 1 September 2001 for general commercial distribution and large money traders. Furthermore, credit institutions may deliver limited quantities of euro banknotes and coins to retailers as from 1 December 2001 in accordance with the terms laid down in relevant contracts for frontloading. The ECB welcomes the broad definition of general commercial distribution (meaning retail activities with a large sales volume and a quantity of commercial outlets allowing for a large influx of customers, and a network covering most of the national territory) and of retailers (as including any activity carried out professionally for profit that consist of offering for sale any article or the provision of any service to the final destination, whether or not they use an establishment). The provisions of the draft Order would thus guarantee a pre-distribution of euro banknotes and coins to economic agents across the national territory that would ensure a smooth process for the cash changeover to the euro. Provided that the distribution contracts concluded between the Banco de España and credit institutions comply with the requirements of Guideline ECB/2001/1, sub-frontloading of euro banknotes would not have the effect of anticipated circulation of euro banknotes among the general public.

text: 6. The ECB would like to note that paragraph 2 of the First Final Provision of the draft Order may give rise to confusion as regards the sub-frontloading of euro banknotes and coins to retailers. According to paragraph 2 of the First Final Provision, the General Director of the Treasury and Financial Policy shall be empowered to authorise the sub-frontloading of euro banknotes and coins, as referred to in Article 4 of the draft Order, to third parties other than general commercial distribution or other money handlers, when appropriate. This provision would seem to suggest that sub-frontloading of limited quantities of euro banknotes and coins to retailers by credit institutions would require specific authorisation from the Treasury. This would conflict with the objective of a smooth and efficient pre-distribution stage for the cash changeover. The ECB thus recommends further clarification on the application of this provision.

text: 7. The First Final Provision of the draft Order empowers the Banco de España to develop and implement the draft Order, and to approve the model frontloading contracts with credit institutions for euro coins. The ECB welcomes this provision, as it will facilitate the consistency and co-ordination of the frontloading and sub-frontloading of euro banknotes and coins, and the fulfilment of the recommendation of Guideline ECB/2001/1 that national central banks apply the provisions of the Guideline to euro coins.

text: 8. The ECB confirms that it has no objection to the publication of this Opinion at the discretion of the consulting authority. Done at Frankfurt am Main on 18 June 2001. The President of the ECB [signed] Willem F. DUISENBERG


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 2 OJ L 125, 19.5.1999, p 34. 3 OJ L 139, 11.5.1998, p 1.

text: Articles 7

text: to 18 of the Draft Law deal also with coins.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 26 June 2001 at the request of the Nationale Bank van België/Banque Nationale de Belgique on a draft law relating to the cash changeover to the euro in Belgium (CON/2001/15)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 26 June 2001 at the request of the Nationale Bank van België/Banque Nationale de Belgique on a draft law relating to the cash changeover to the euro in Belgium (

text: 1. On 11 June 2001 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Nationale Bank van België/Banque Nationale de Belgique (NBB) for an opinion on a draft law relating to the cash changeover to the euro in Belgium (hereinafter referred to as the “Draft Law”).

text: 2. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Article 105(4) of the Treaty establishing the European Community (hereinafter referred to as the “Treaty”), Article 3(1) of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank and

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions . In accordance with such Articles, the scope of this opinion is limited to those provisions of the Draft Law that relate to the powers of the ECB.

text: 3. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17(5) of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank , this opinion has been adopted by the Governing Council of the ECB.

text: 4. The ECB notes that in line with

text: Article 15 of Council Regulation (EC) No 974/98 of 3 May 1998

text: on the introduction of the euro , Articles 2 and 3 of the Draft Law introduce a dual circulation period, which will be limited to the period running from 1 January 2002 to 28 February 2002. From 1 March 2002, banknotes and coins denominated in Belgian francs will cease to be legal tender.

text: 5. As per

text: Article 2(2)

text: , banknotes denominated in Belgian francs will be exchangeable without time limit at the NBB as, according to the NBB, was traditionally the case in Belgium.

text: Article 2(3)

text: stipulates that exchanges of Belgian franc banknotes which take place after the NBB has credited the Belgian Treasury for the amount of the banknotes, which have not been presented for exchange to the NBB, will be charged to the account of the Belgian Treasury. This provision results from Article 9 of the Organic Law on the NBB, which will be repealed from 28 February 2002. However, this law produces legal effects after this date that need to be settled in order to avoid double payment by the NBB with respect to the withdrawn notes. This provision does not appear to interfere with the accounting rules applying to banknotes that cease to be legal tender nor with the decision of when the NBB and the Belgian Treasury settle the payment referred to in

text: Article 2(3)

text: . The ECB understands that this time of payment will depend upon a separate agreement, between the Belgian Treasury and the NBB, implementing

text: Article 9

text: , which agreement has yet not been finalised. This matter was among others addressed in the context of an ex-post informal opinion of the ECB delivered to the NBB at the end of February 2001.

text: 7. The ECB notes that coins denominated in Belgian francs will only be exchangeable at the NBB and DE POST/LA POSTE until 31 December 2004, as provided by Article 3 of the Draft Law. There seem to be no limits or fees imposed on the exchange of coins as, according to the NBB, this was traditionally the case for withdrawn coins .

text: 8. The NBB has confirmed to the ECB that Article 4 of the Draft Law refers to the existing practice in Belgium. Following this practice,

text: Article 4

text: authorises both the NBB and DE POST/LA POSTE to accept coins without limits, and implements the possibility provided for by Article 11 of the aforementioned

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 974/98

text: for Member States to appoint persons/institutions to accept more than 50 coins in any single payment (“Except for the issuing authority and for those persons specifically designated by the national legislation of the issuing Member State, no party shall be obliged to accept more than 50 coins in any single payment”).

text: 9. The NBB also confirmed that

text: Article 4

text: maintains the existing practice of the NBB according to which this service is without charge, in order to meet the needs of individuals and households and that, in so far as this service goes beyond these needs, the NBB or DE POST/LA POSTE would be entitled to charge a fee.

text: 10. Article 5 of the Draft Law allows the transfer of the capital gains realised on the transfer of assets in gold from the NBB to the ECB for an amount of EUR 177,114,566. The ECB has confirmed in an earlier opinion that this transfer may be considered to give rise to a realised capital gain. For this reason such gain may be accounted for in the profit and loss account and may be subject to distribution. The distribution avoids treating the income as current income in the budget but affects it to the Zilverfonds, being a legal entity, created by law as a long-term funding structure for pension liabilities. The ECB understands that this fund invests mainly in public government bonds and therefore contributes to the decrease of the Belgian public debt.

text: 11. The ECB welcomes Article 6 of the Draft Law to the extent that it confirms the responsibility of the NBB for the quality of banknote circulation. This task constitutes a public mission and is a natural corollary of the issuance. It is performed free of charge by the NBB. The NBB confirms that supplementary services provided at customer demand may be subject to a fee.

text: 12. The ECB understands that Article 19 of the Draft Law transposes two existing provisions of Belgian criminal law into the Penal Code and adapts them to the introduction of the euro. The new

text: Article 178

text: bis of the Penal Code is intended to prevent fanciful means of payment from being put into circulation which might confuse the consumers as to which is the real legal tender. The new

text: Article 178

text: ter of the Penal Code protects the banknotes and coins against all kinds of damage which would jeopardise their use as legal tender.

text: 13. The ECB understands that the purpose of Article 23 of the Draft Law is to facilitate and protect the withdrawal of banknotes denominated in Belgian francs. The ECB is of the view that national measures taken in the context of the withdrawal of national banknotes (including the marking or neutralisation of such banknotes) should be possible. However, once the characteristics of this marking will have been decided by Royal Decree, the ECB should be informed about them considering that article 52 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank requires national central banks to exchange at par banknotes of all participating Member States.

text: 14. The ECB notes that Article 35 of the Draft Law protects the frontloading and subfrontloading operations in Belgium by penalising the use of euro banknotes as a means of payment before 1 January 2002. Banknotes used before this date as a means of payment may moreover be confiscated.

text: 15. The ECB welcomes Article 37(8) of the Draft Law which abrogates Article 76 of the Programme Law of 2 January 2001 as this

text: Article 76

text: might have allowed for credit facilities, prohibited under Article 101 of the Treaty (see the opinion of the ECB of 27 February 2001).

text: 16. The ECB confirms that it has no objection to the publication of this opinion at the discretion of the competent national authority. Done at Frankfurt am Main on 26 June 2001. The President of the ECB [signed] Willem F. DUISENBERG