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text: Wish to minimize

text: Impose That may possess That may be reduced by Reduce

text: May be aware of

text: Based on That exploit Risks (set of)

text: That increase

text: Give Rise to To

text: Wish to abuse and/or may damage

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text: 3GPP TS 38.401 V16.2.0 (2020-07), Technical Specification 3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Radio Access Network; NG-RAN; Architecture description (Release 16), https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/38_series/38.401/, accessed October 2020.

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text: 3GPP TS 22.071 V16.0.0 (2020-07) Technical Specification 3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Location Services (LCS); Service description; Stage 1 (Release 16) https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/22_series/22.071, accessed October 2020. 41 Rupprecht, David & Dabrowski, Adrian & Holz, Thorsten & Weippl, Edgar & Pöpper, Christina. (2017). On Security Research Towards Future Mobile Network Generations. IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials. PP. 10.1109/COMST.2018.2820728, accessed October 2020 42 3GPP TR 33.825 V16.0.1 (2019-10) Technical Report 3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Study on the security of Ultra-Reliable Low-Latency Communication (URLLC) for the 5G System (5GS) (Release 16) https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.825 , accessed October 2020 43 3GPP TR 33.824 V0.6.0 (2019-11) Technical Report 3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Study on Security for NR Integrated Access and Backhaul; (Release 16) https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.824, accessed October 2020.

text: Y. Arjoune and S. Faruque, "Smart Jamming Attacks in 5G New Radio: A Review," 2020 10th Annual Computing and Communication Workshop and Conference (CCWC), Las Vegas, NV, USA, 2020, pp. 1010-1015, doi: 10.1109/CCWC47524.2020.9031175, accessed October 2020. 45 https://www.etsi.org/technologies/nfv, accessed October 2020. 46 https://www.sdxcentral.com/networking/nfv, accessed October 2020.

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text: https://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_ts/133500_133599/133501/15.01.00_60/ts_133501v150100p.pdf, accessed October 2020 67 3GPP TR 21.916 V0.5.0 (2020-07) Technical Report 3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Release 16 Description; Summary of Rel-16 Work Items (Release 16), https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.501/33501-g40.zip, accessed October 2020.

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text: To identify each threat category, use the taxonomy available in Table of Annex B.

text: David Rupprecht and Katharina Kohls and Thorsten Holz and Christina Popper, Call Me Maybe: Eavesdropping Encrypted LTE Calls With ReVoLTE, 29th USENIX Security Symposium Proceedings, 2020. isbn 978-1-939133-17-5, pages 73-88, accessed October 2020.

text: http://casewise.tmforum.org/evolve/statics/frameworx/#cwtype=index&cwview=home, accessed November 2020.

text: https://www.enersec.net/Asset_MM/ accessed October 2020. 88 https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/signalling-security-in-telecom-ss7-diameter-5g, accessed October 2020.

text: https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications accessed October 2020. 98

text: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/commerce-server/ee823878(v=cs.20)?redirectedfrom=MSDN, accessed October 2020. 91 https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/threat-risk-management/risk-management/current-risk/laws-regulation/rm-rastandards/iso-iec-standard-27001, accessed October 2020/

text: It is worth mentioning that the involvement is indicative and at a high level of abstraction (i.e. threat categories). Given the detailed vulnerability analysis presented in this document (see Annexes C-M), it is possible to infer the potential engagement of these threat agent groups in exploitation campaigns. In this way, a detailed threat agent profiling can be performed. This task has not been performed in this report. However, it will be subject of prospective ENISA activities in detailed threat/risk assessments.

text: https://5gobservatory.eu, accessed November 2020.

text: https://www.enersec.net/Asset_MM/ accessed October 2020. 123

text: Injection attacks (SQL, XSS)

text: Virus Malware Malicious code or Distributed denial of service (DDoS) software Nation state espionage Flooding of Core network components Rootkits Eavesdropping/ Corporate espionage Flooding of base stations Rogueware Interception/ Hijacking Radio network traffic manipulation Traffic sniffing Radio interference Worms/trojans Malicious diversion of traffic Jamming the radio frequency Manipulation of network traffic, network Ransomware reconnaissance and information gathering Traffic redirecting Amplification attacks Edge node overload Exploitation of flaws in the architecture, design and configuration of the network Man in the middle/ Session hijacking Abuse of roaming interconnections

text: Denial of service Landslides Theft and/or leakage from network traffic Floods Natural disasters Theft and/or leakage of data from cloud computing Abuse of Information Leakage Earthquakes Storms Environmental Disasters disasters Unfavorable climatic conditions Abuse on security data from audit tools Abuse of remote access to the network Fires Theft/breach of security keys Misconfigured or poorly configured systems/networks Pollution, dust, corrosion Zero-day exploits Exploitation of software, and/or Unintentional Abuse of edge open application programming interfaces (APIs) damages Inadequate designs and planning or lack of adaption hardware vulnerabilities Heavy winds (accidental) Application programming interface (API) exploitation Erroneous use or administration of the network, systems and devices

text: Authentication traffic spikes Information leakage/sharing due to human error

text: Manipulation of hardware equipment Abuse of authentication Data loss from unintentional deletion Abuse of user authentication/authorization data by third parties personnel Manipulation of the network resources orchestrator Lawful interception function abuse Support services Manipulation of hardware and software Memory scraping Loss of human or physical resources

text: MAC spoofing Data breach, leak, theft and manipulation of information Outages Data Network access

text: Side channels attacks Lateral movement Unauthorised activities/network intrusions Power supply Fake access network node IMSI catching attacks Nefarious activity/ abuse of assets Failures/ Failure or disruption of communication links False or rogue MEC gateway Identity spoofing Threat Identity fraud/account or service malfunctions Failure or disruption of main power supply

text: UICC format exploitation Identity theft Failure of the network, devices or systems Spectrum sensing User equipment compromising Failure or disruption from service providers (supply chain)

text: Threat from third parties personnel accessing MNO s facilities Compromised supply chain, vendor and service providers Breach of legislation

text: Network virtualisation bypassing Legal Failure to meet contractual requirements and/or legislation

text: Virtualised host abuse Abuse of virtualization mechanisms Breach of service level agreement (SLA)

text: Virtual machine manipulation Signalling storms Sabotage of network infrastructure (radio access, edge servers, etc.) Data center threats Signalling threats Abuse of cloud computational resources Signalling fraud Physical attacks Vandalism of network infrastructure (radio access, edge servers, etc.)

text: Theft of assets Manipulation of access network and radio technology configuration data Manipulation of network Exploitation of misconfigured or poorly configured systems/networks configuration/data forging Terrorist attack against network infrastructure

text: Falsification of configuration data Fraud by MNO employees

text: DNS manipulation Unauthorized physical access to based stations in shared locations

text: Routing tables manipulation

text: Registration of malicious network functions

text: R. F. Olimid and G. Nencioni, "5G Network Slicing: A Security Overview," in IEEE Access, vol. 8, pp. 99999-100009, 2020, doi: 10.1109/ACCESS.2020.2997702, accessed October 2020.

text: David Rupprecht and Katharina Kohls and Thorsten Holz and Christina Popper, Call Me Maybe: Eavesdropping Encrypted LTE Calls With ReVoLTE, 29th USENIX Security Symposium Proceedings, 2020. isbn 978-1-939133-17-5, pages 73-88, accessed October 2020

identifier: ENISA Threat Landscape for 5G Networks Report

title: ENISA Threat Landscape for 5G Networks Report

text: Updated threat assessment for the fifth generation of mobile telecommunications networks (5G) DECEMBER 2020 0 ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: ABOUT ENISA

text: The European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, ENISA, is the Union’s agency dedicated to achieving a high common level of cybersecurity across Europe. Established in 2004 and strengthened by the EU Cybersecurity Act, the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity contributes to EU cyber policy, enhances the trustworthiness of ICT products, services and processes with cybersecurity certification schemes, cooperates with Member States and EU bodies, and helps Europe prepare for the cyber challenges of tomorrow. Through knowledge sharing, capacity building and awareness raising, the Agency works together with its key stakeholders to strengthen trust in the connected economy, to boost resilience of the Union’s infrastructure, and, ultimately, to keep Europe’s society and citizens digitally secure. More information about ENISA and its work can be found at www.enisa.europa.eu. EDITORS Marco Barros Lourenço, Louis Marinos, Lampros Patseas - EU Agency for Cybersecurity CONTACT For contacting the authors please use enisa.threat.information@enisa.europa.eu For media enquiries about this paper, please use press@enisa.europa.eu. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS We would like to thank the ENISA contractor Andrei Hohan (ENERSEC), Adrian Anghel (ENERSEC) for the desk-top analysis of open-source material and all members of the ENISA ad-hoc 5G Expert Group, acting on an ad personam basis: Ioannis Askoxylakis, Pascal Bisson, Jon France, Patrik Palm and Jean-Philippe Wary, for supporting the ENISA team in information collection, knowledge transfer in the subject matter. LEGAL NOTICE Notice must be taken that this publication represents the views and interpretations of ENISA, unless stated otherwise. This publication should not be construed to be a legal action of ENISA or the ENISA bodies unless adopted pursuant to the

text: Regulation (EU) No 526/2013

text: . This publication does not necessarily represent state-of the-art and ENISA may update it from time to time. Third-party sources are quoted as appropriate. ENISA is not responsible for the content of the external sources including external websites referenced in this publication. This publication is intended for information purposes only. It must be accessible free of charge. Neither ENISA nor any person acting on its behalf is responsible for the use that might be made of the information contained in this publication. COPYRIGHT NOTICE © European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA), 2020 Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. For any use or reproduction of photos or other material that is not under the ENISA copyright, permission must be sought directly from the copyright holders. ISBN: 978-92-9204-445-9 - DOI: 10.2824/802229

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: TABLE OF CONTENTS

text: 1. INTRODUCTION 8 1.1 POLICY CONTEXT 9 1.2 SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 10 1.3 TARGET AUDIENCE 13 1.4 STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT 14 2. 5G STAKEHOLDERS 15 2.1 STAKEHOLDERS MAPPING 15 3. 5G NETWORK DESIGN AND ARCHITECTURE 17 3.1 5G USE CASES 18 3.2 GENERIC 5G ARCHITECTURE 21 3.3 CORE NETWORK ARCHITECTURE (ZOOM-IN) 22 3.4 NETWORK SLICING (NS) (ZOOM-IN) 27 3.5 MANAGEMENT AND NETWORK ORCHESTRATOR (MANO) (ZOOM-IN) 32 3.6 RADIO ACCESS NETWORK (RAN) (ZOOM-IN) 32 3.7 NETWORK FUNCTION VIRTUALISATION (NFV) – MANO (ZOOM-IN) 36 3.8 SOFTWARE DEFINED NETWORK (SDN) (ZOOM-IN) 42 3.9 MULTI-ACCESS EDGE COMPUTING (MEC) (ZOOM-IN) 45 3.10SECURITY ARCHITECTURE (SA) (ZOOM-IN) 50 3.115G PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE (ZOOM-IN) 55 3.12IMPLEMENTATION OPTIONS / MIGRATION PATHS ZOOM IN 57 3.13PROCESS MAP 61 4. 5G VULNERABILITIES 70 4.1 VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT METHOD AND SCOPE 70 4.2 VULNERABILITY GROUPS FOR CORE NETWORK 70 4.3 VULNERABILITY GROUPS FOR NETWORK SLICING 74 4.4 VULNERABILITY GROUPS FOR RADIO ACCESS NETWORK 76 4.5 VULNERABILITY GROUPS FOR NETWORK FUNCTION VIRTUALIZATION - MANO 78 4.6 VULNERABILITY GROUPS FOR SOFTWARE DEFINED NETWORKS 80 4.7 VULNERABILITY GROUPS FOR MULTI-ACCESS EDGE COMPUTING 82 4.8 VULNERABILITY GROUPS FOR SECURITY ARCHITECTURE 84 4.9 VULNERABILITY GROUPS FOR PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 84 4.10VULNERABILITY GROUPS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OPTIONS 86 4.11VULNERABILITY GROUPS FOR PROCESSES 88 5. ASSETS 93 5.1 ASSET CLASSIFICATION AND MAPPING 93 5.2 NEW ASSET CATEGORIES 94 5.3 ASSET CLASSIFICATION AND THE CIA TRIAD 100

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS December 2020 5.4 THE RELEVANCE OF ASSETS THROUGHOUT THE LIFECYCLE 100 6. 5G THREATS 102 6.1 TAXONOMY OF THREATS 102 6.2 THREAT MAP 102 7. THREAT AGENTS 118 8. RECOMMENDATIONS/ CONCLUSIONS 120 8.1 RECOMMENDATIONS 120 8.2 CONCLUSIONS 122 A ANNEX: ASSETS MAP 123 B ANNEX: THREAT TAXONOMY 124 C ANNEX: DETAILED VULNERABILITIES IN THE CORE NETWORK 129 D ANNEX: DETAILED VULNERABILITIES IN NETWORK SLICING 164 E ANNEX: DETAILED VULNERABILITIES IN THE RADIO ACCESS NETWORK 169 F ANNEX: DETAILED VULNERABILITIES IN NETWORK FUNCTION VIRTUALIZATION – MANO 189 G ANNEX: DETAILED VULNERABILITIES IN SOFTWARE DEFINED NETWORKS 196 H ANNEX: DETAILED VULNERABILITIES IN MULTI- ACCESS EDGE COMPUTING 199 I ANNEX: DETAILED VULNERABILITIES IN THE PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 206 J ANNEX: DETAILED VULNERABILITIES IN IMPLEMENTATION OPTIONS 213 K ANNEX: DETAILED VULNERABILITIES IN MNO PROCESSES 220 L ANNEX: DETAILED VULNERABILITIES IN VENDOR PROCESSES 243 M ANNEX: DETAILED VULNERABILITIES IN SECURITY ASSURANCE PROCESSES 248

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text: LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

text: ACRONYMS DESCRIPTION 3GPP 3rd Generation Partnership Project 3GPP TS 3GPP Technical Specification 3GPP TR 3GPP Technical Report 5GC 5G Core 5G-PPP 5G Infrastructure Public Private Partnership AAA Authentication, Authorisation and Accounting AF Application function AKA Authentication and key agreement AMF Access and mobility management function API Application programming interface ARLC Air radio link control ARP Address resolution protocol ARPF Authentication credential repository and processing function AS Access stratum AUSF Authentication server function CAPIF Common API Framework CGI Common Gateway Interface CN Core network COTS Commercial of the shelf CSA Cloud Security Alliance CSCF Call / Session Control Function CSMF Communication service management function CSP Communication Service Provider CTI Cyber Threat Intelligence CU Control unit (RAN) DC Data Centre DCSP Data Centre Providers DDoS Distributed Denial of Service DN Data network DNS Domain Name System DoS Denial of Service DTLS Datagram Transport Layer Security DU Distributed unit (RAN) E2E End-to-end EM Element management EU European Union eMBB Enhanced mobile broadband eNB E-UTRAN Node B, also known as Evolved Node B ECCG European Consumer Consultative Group ENISA European Union Agency for Network and Information Security EPC Evolved Packet Core ESP Encapsulating Security Payload eTOM enhanced Telecom Operation Map

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text: ACRONYMS DESCRIPTION ETSI European Telecommunications Standards Institute FOSS Free and Open Source Software gNB Next generation Node B GMLC Gateway Mobile Location Centre GNP Generic Network Product GSMA GSM Association GTP GPRS Tunnelling Protocol GTP-C GPRS Tunnelling Protocol Control GTP-U GPRS Tunnelling Protocol User HBRT Hardware-Based Root of Trust HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol IAB Integrated Access and Backhaul IE Information Element IEC International Electrotechnical Commission IETF Internet Engineering Task Force IIoT Industrial Internet of Things IKEv2 Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 IMSI International Mobile Subscriber Identity IoT Internet of things ITU International Telecommunications Unit IP Internet protocol IPsec IP Security IPX IP Exchange Service ISAC Information sharing and analysis centres ISF NFVI-based Security Function ISO International standards organisation ITU International Telecommunication Union IXP Internet Exchange Point JSON JavaScript Object Notation JWS JSON Web Signature KPI Key Performance Indicators LCM Life Cycle Management LEA Law Enforcement Agency LI Lawful Interception LMF Localisation Management Function LTE Long-Term Evolution M2M Machine to Machine MAC Media access control MANO Management and orchestration MEC Multi-access edge computing MIMO Multi-input multi-output MME Mobility Management Entity mMTC massive Machine-Type Communication MNO Mobile network operator NAS Non access stratum NCA National Certification Authorities NCSC National cybersecurity coordinator/agency/centre NEF Network exposure function NESAS Network Equipment Security Assurance Scheme NF Network function NFVI Network function virtualisation infrastructure

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text: ACRONYMS DESCRIPTION ng-eNB. Next generation - evolved Node B NG RAN Next generation Radio Access Network NIS Directive The Directive on security of network and information systems NOP Network operator NR New radio NRA National Regulator NRF Network repository function NS Network slice NSA Non-standalone NSI Network slice instance NSM NFV Security Manager NSMF Network slice management function NSSAAF Network Slice Specific Authentication and Authorisation Function NSSAI Network Slice Selection Assistance Information NSSF Network slice selection function NSSI Network Slice Subnet Instance NSSMF Network slice subnet management function NSST Network Slice Subnet Template NTC National 5G test centres OAM Operation, Administration, and Management O&M Operations & Maintenance OS Operating system OSS/BSS Operations Support System/Business Support System PCF Policy control function PDCP Packet data conversion protocol PDU Protocol data unit PLMN Public Land Mobile Network PNF Physical Network Function PSF Physical Security Function QoS Quality of service RACS Radio Capabilities Signalling RAT Radio access technology RES* Response (authentication response) RFC Request for Comments RRC Radio Resource Control RU Radio Unit SA Security architecture SaaS Software as a Service SBA Service-based architecture SBI Service-based interface SC Service customers SCAS 3GPP Security Assurance Specifications SCP Service Communication Proxy SDAP Service data adaptation protocol SDN Software defined network SEAF Security anchor functionality SECAM 3GPP Security Assurance Methodology SEPP Security edge protection proxy SFTP Secure File Transfer Protocol SGW Serving gateway SIDF Subscription identifier de-concealing function

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text: ACRONYMS DESCRIPTION SLA Service level agreement SMC Security Mode Command SMF Session management function SMS Short message service SMSF SMS function SP Service providers SSA NFV security services agent SSI Server Side Includes SSH Secure Shell SSP NFV security services provider SUCI Subscription concealed identifier SUPI Subscription Permanent Identifier TCP Transmission Control Protocol TEID Tunnel Endpoint Identifier TLS Transport Layer Security TPM Trusted platform module TSN Time Sensitive Networking UCMF UE radio Capability Management Function UICC Universal Integrated Circuit Card UDM Unified data management UDR Unified data repository UDSF Unstructured data storage function UE User equipment UP User Plane UPF User plane function URLLC Ultra-reliable low-latency communication USIM Universal subscriber identity module V2V Vehicle to vehicle protocol V2X Vehicle to everything protocol VISP Virtualisation infrastructure service providers VIM Virtualised infrastructure manager VM Virtual machine VNF Virtualised Network Function VNFD VNF descriptor VNFM VNF manager VNFI VNF Infrastructure VSF Virtual Security Function

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text: 1. INTRODUCTION

text: This report is an update of the ENISA 5G Threat Landscape, published in its first edition in 2019 . This document is a major update of the previous edition. It encompasses all novelties introduced, it captures developments in the 5G architecture and it summarizes information found in standardisation documents related to 5G. Moreover, the vulnerability and threat assessments found in this document introduce a significant advancement to the previous edition, by providing more comprehensive information about the exposure of assets of the updated 5G architecture. Beyond these changes, some additional elements have been taken into account. Firstly, implementation/migration options of a gradual migration to 5G from 4G have been taken into account. Secondly, security issues of operational processes have been considered. These two changes enlarge the scope of the assessment and include important parts for the enhancement of operational security. For all these elements, this report provides a vulnerability analysis, indicating how these vulnerabilities can be exploited through cyberthreats and how this exploitation can be mitigated through security controls. The assessed vulnerabilities are consolidated from various sources, including main 5G standardisation documents and telecommunication best practices (3GPP, ITU, ETSI, ISO, NIST and GSMA). A consolidation and mapping of cyberthreats used in these standards has also been performed. Clearly, the complexity of 5G infrastructure and the dependencies of assets, controls and threats is reflected in the complexity of the produced information. ENISA would like to develop a tool-based version of this information, so that users of the material can better navigate this complex information in a more efficient way than the static, highly interlinked tables presented in this report. This task will be accounted for in the near future. The performed assessments in this report are based on specifications of 5G infrastructure, thus potentially having a certain “distance” from actual implementations. Moreover, assessed vulnerabilities have been extrapolated from experiences of weaknesses of technical implementations of similar non-5G components. As such, they comprise rather hypothetical assumptions that are to be validated on the basis of implementations. ENISA states in this document the importance of bridging the gap between functional specifications and implemented functions. As 5G implementation are proceeding, it is important to develop ways to check the compliance of implementations towards the specified content and feedback information to the specification efforts. Initially, the creation of implementation guidelines may be a useful tool to assess the quality of implementations. In addition, security assurance methods may be a good way to support developers and/or entities that will test the compliance of implemented 5G functions. A good method to overcome these limitations and at the same to further advance the quality of this and other relevant material (ENISA, European Commission, Member States, 3GPP, BEREC, etc.) is to use it within detailed 5G threat/risk assessments in a coordinated manner. Besides validation of the produced information, such actions will contribute towards a more secure 5G infrastructure and have as consequence the creation of a competitive advantage of European stakeholders in the area of 5G. At the same time, it will increase efficiency of used resources by avoiding duplication of efforts.

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text: The authoring of this report has been performed exclusively by ENISA. It is based on Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) collection of publicly available information. Following a desk-top analysis of this material by an external contractor, an update of the 5G architecture has been performed by ENISA, vulnerabilities have been collected and consolidated and threat exposure has been assessed. Mitigation controls found in publicly available documents have been associated to the identified exposure, leading to a reduction of attack surface. An ad-hock expert group consisting of 5G experts has contributed on an ad-personam basis and has supported the work of ENISA. Their contributions were towards information collection and knowledge transfer in the subject matter. Their contributions has been considered and compiled by ENISA using it as an input. To better understand the For the time being, the material presented in this report aims at supporting various stakeholders understanding the relevant vulnerabilities and cyberthreats resulting to an exposure of 5G cyber-threats assets by exploiting the vulnerabilities. When requested, ENISA is in the position to support affecting 5G stakeholders ‘drilling down’ the analysis further, by including granular details from the Networks, it is components in focus, and examine the relevance of the assessed cyberthreats and the essential to know efficiency of developed security measures. the vulnerabilities and weaknesses 1.1 POLICY CONTEXT of assets, In January 2020, the European Commission has issued a communication calling Member assessing thus 2,3 their attack States to take steps to implement the set of measures recommended in the 5G toolbox . In June 2020, a “Report on Member States’ Progress in Implementing the EU Toolbox on 5G surface and how Cybersecurity ” has been published NIS Cooperation Group with the objective to provide an it can be overview of the state of play of the ongoing toolbox implementation process by Member States exploited by as of June 2020. malicious actors. The present report contributes to the implementation of 5G toolbox measures (SMs, TMs) and supporting actions (SAs). Its main contribution is supporting action 9 (SA09), stating “Consider the use of existing cooperation, coordination and information sharing mechanisms, including actions and support by ENISA, notably through regular threat assessments”. Moreover, by providing all details about vulnerabilities, threats, security requirements and mitigation controls, this document builds the basis for performing technical risk assessments for various subsystems and components of the 5G architecture, by delivering input to identify the main technical “risk factors” for 5G. Since the adoption of the EU 5G Toolbox in January 2020 and the publication of Member States progress report of the implementation June 2020 , Member States had paid increasing attention to the implementation of SM05 and SM06. The purpose of SM05 and SM06 is to ensure resilience through diversity while addressing risk R4 at individual MNO level and national level. However it is essential to recognize that the updated ENISA 5G Threat Landscape report has not been revised to the extent that it can provide Member States with guidance on how to implement SM05 and SM06. This is due to the fact that this report does not specify all relevant assets in the 5G ecosystem supply chain (devices, cloud and network assets) and objective criteria for key stakeholders to assess resilience and diversity in the context of SM06. Furthermore, the current report does not provide a set of common mitigation methods to proportionally apply across the 5G ecosystem and key stakeholders, at national (SM06 such as issues of number of MNO, network sharing) or at individual network level (SM05). Consequently, it is not possible from this report to make conclusions about how to consistently and proportionally implement mitigations across EU. Within this report, supporting actions SA03

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text: and SA04 are extensively covered (by numerous contributing to TM01, and TM02, as indicated in the mapping found in the vulnerability assessment). Moreover, in the new ENISA regulation, the need to analyse current and emerging risks is expressed. In line with this role, ENISA regulation stipulates that: “the Agency should, in cooperation with Member States and, as appropriate, with statistical bodies and others, collect relevant information” . More specifically, it is stated that it should “enable effective responses to current and emerging network and information security risks and threats” . Therefore, the ENISA 5G Threat Landscape aims at contributing to the EU Cybersecurity Strategy and more specifically, to ongoing policy initiatives related with the security of networks and information systems; it streamlines and consolidates available information on cyber-threats and their evolution, thus supporting EU and national risk assessment activities. 1.2 SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY Unlike the conditions of previous year regarding the state-of-play of 5G developments, in 2020 several national, European and international developments have led to a clearer picture of 5G infrastructure developments at various levels. The 5G specification has done significant progress, implementation options and migration paths from 4G to 5G have been better clarified, relevant operational processes for 5G infrastructure have been developed and taken up and specialized 5G functions for verticals have been specified. Moreover, at the EU level, a 5G toolbox has been developed and pilots towards 5G certification schemes are envisaged, in preparation of potential requests to ENISA issued by the ECCG in the future. This situation gives a far better visibility on the details of 5G infrastructures and is a better starting point for updating the ENISA 5G Threat Landscape. Having regard to these developments, the objectives, working methods and scope of this report are as follows:  The material collected and processed within this report consists of open source resources. It covers mainly the state-of-the art of the 5G specification work, white papers and good practices. No concrete implementations of 5G functions from vendors, operators, etc. have been considered or analysed for the purpose of this report.  The threat and vulnerability analysis performed is based on the extrapolation of existing threats and vulnerabilities found in collected material. In this respect, vulnerabilities referred in various processed documents have been “reverseengineered” based on their relevance to various components/assets; subsequently, they have been grouped under the various zoom-ins and reflect the assessed technical and operational weaknesses, as mentioned in the various standards/good practices. It has to be noted that this is a pure desk-top exercise based on assumed vulnerabilities and threats and is not funded by real incidents. Equivalently, threat actors assumed in this report are rather hypothetical, as no known attacks to such infrastructure do yet exist. For this reason, 5G attack vectors have not been taken into account in this work.

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text:  The comprehensive architecture of 5G developed in the previous threat landscape report has been updated to include novelties of the 3GPP specification. This work has taken into account all details that have been available in the 5G specification work.  Implementation options – migration paths from 4G to 5G infrastructures have been covered.  A process map has been developed showing the contribution of operational, life-cycle and security assurance processes to the overall security of 5G infrastructures.  A detailed technical and operational vulnerability analysis has been performed for the components of the 5G architecture. This analysis takes into account the threats exploiting those vulnerabilities and the controls reducing exposure to these threats, as defined by international organisations (3GPP, ETSI, GSMA, ISO, ITU, NIST).  Except from generic functions developed for verticals by 3GPP, no information about verticals per se (e.g. Transportation, eHealth, Industrial Internet-of-things (IIoT), Smart Environments, etc.) have been covered in this report. This is due to potential complexity of those environments and the unavailability of information due to their early specification, implementation and deployment stages of 5G verticals.  Detailed information and security requirements for various functions and interfaces are included in this report, mainly via the annexes detailing the assessed vulnerabilities. They cover security requirements, mitigation controls, involved stakeholders and references to related specifications and the EU toolbox measures. Moreover, the threats used in various reports have been consolidated by means of the threat taxonomy delivered in this report.  The scope of this report is in line with work developed by ENISA, in particular, the 5G Threat Landscape in its 2019 edition , and it also coherent to ENISA deliverables in the area of 5G Standardisation.  The development of this report followed a ‘best-effort’ approach. The collected information is not exhaustive but representative of the matters covered.  To collect relevant technical material and available 5G knowledge, ENISA has maintained an ad hoc expert group consisting of skilled individuals in the area of 5G. The selection of experts has been made based on technical experience of the selected individuals, acting ad personam. A member of the team is an active member (co-chair) of the 3GPP security sub-group and has acted as an interface between ENISA and 3GPP. The selection has aimed at covering detailed technical 5G knowledge skills from the most representative stakeholder types that are currently engaged in 5G activities.  The content of this report was restricted to components/matters found in relevant open-source material covering the entire specification, security requirements and research results related to 5G network functions (NFs). The presented material has been put together by ENISA.

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text:  Issues regarding Law Enforcement Agencies (LEA) and Lawful Interception (LI) have not been covered in this document, apart from a reference in the threat taxonomy and few references found in 3GPP specifications, both kept for the shake of completeness.  This report addresses in detail all technical aspects of 5G networks and related threats emerging from the collected material (e.g. 3GPP specification, standards, goodpractices). It does not cover non-technical threats (i.e. geopolitical), such as threats leading to regulatory risks or risks of interference from third countries through the supply chain. The method adopted for this study is in line with the methodology developed by ENISA for the preparation of its annual Cyberthreat Landscape. According to this methodology, the process requires an initial identification of relevant assets within the architecture before performing a vulnerability and a threat assessment, which evaluates the different levels of asset exposure. Finally, by assigning security controls to the exploitable vulnerabilities, it reduces the threat surface of relevant assets. The elements of cyberthreats and the relationship to risks are graphically depicted inFigure 1. The report describes the different relationships between assets, threats and threat agents. In future versions of this report, we will cover vulnerabilities and countermeasures (mitigation measures/security controls). Figure 1: Methodology adopted based on ISO 27005 Owners Countermeasures Vulnerabilities Attack vectors to Threat agents Threats Assets Threats play a central role in a risk assessment, especially when considering the different components of risks. The ISO 27005, a widely adopted risk management standard, defines that risks emerge when: “Threats abuse vulnerabilities of assets to generate harm for the organisation” . Following this methodology, we have identified assets, threats and threat agents. These constitute the core of the 5G Threat Landscape presented in this report. Furthermore, the identification and analysis of assets and cyber-threats are based on the study of specifications, white papers and literature, without attempting any interpretation/evaluation of the assumptions stated in these reports. It has to be noted, that the logical relationship between Threat Agents

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text: and Attack Vectors has not been implemented in this document for the reasons: a) the threat agent profiles are still very rudimentary and b) attack vectors in the area of 5G are unknown, while any assumptions on attack vectors based on specified functions (3GPP) would be premature. 1.3 TARGET AUDIENCE Main purpose of this report is to provide knowledge and information on 5G cybersecurity issues to the relevant community. This information may be useful to a variety of target groups:  Non-technical stakeholders such as policy-makers, regulators, law enforcement: this target group may find this report useful to understand the current state of specification work, the overall architecture of 5G, the emerging vulnerabilities and threats and respective mitigation practices and measures. For example, the threat landscape identified in this report may support policy actions in the areas of 5G networks, SDN, NFV, cybersecurity, critical infrastructure protection, and other sectors/verticals that plan to use the 5G Network.  Experts working in the telecommunication sector, such as operators, vendors, and service providers: this target group may find this report useful to carry out detailed threat analyses and risk assessments in accordance with their particular needs and mandate (e.g., protect a specific number of components based on asset impact analysis, respond to specific vulnerabilities with customized mitigation measures among others).  Businesses, consultants, product developers: this target group can draw valuable conclusions from the developed analysis and material for their offerings (products, services). This can have the form of demonstrating how vulnerabilities have been eliminated by using developed defences, use of the material within customer projects, or use the material as a benchmark for defining cybersecurity protection policies for such infrastructures (e.g. for the development of verticals). Moreover, the developed material can be used in developing security audits for 5G infrastructures.  Experts in research and innovation: the presented material provides a detailed view on security issues of 5G. This target group may use this material as basis for gap analysis, as material to evaluate the impact of research and as source for innovation actions with regard to the further development and implementation. Finally, this target group may use this material as a useful resource for numerous academic activities, such as teaching, research, support of scholars, etc. Beyond these main target groups, some individual parts of the information provided in this report may be useful to a further number of target groups. For example, the assessed vulnerabilities – as a consolidation from various sources - may be a valuable resource for standardisation work in order to check the completeness of already performed assessments. Moreover, the provided material may be used within risk assessment within certification activities, providing information about the threat exposure, as well threat actor motives and objectives. Finally, both the 5G asset inventory and the 5G threat taxonomy can be used as-is or further developed by any stakeholders in performing their own vulnerability, threat and risk assessments.

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text: 1.4 STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT This report presents the results of the performed vulnerability and threat assessment work in the following manner  Chapter 2 presents the stakeholders having a role in all phases of 5G implementation, covering specification, development, deployment, operation and supervision of the 5G infrastructure. They constitute an essential part of the 5G ecosystem. The identified, stakeholders carry the main responsibility for the implementation and management of cybersecurity controls, thus being responsible for mitigating the threats identified in this report.  Chapter 3 presents the architectural framework of 5G technology by offering a generic architecture. By means of ‘Zoom-ins’ it provides details of various components, including introduced novelties and an overview of security considerations. These details will contribute to the process of identifying the critical assets of the technology.  Chapter 4 presents the results of the vulnerability assessment of for each zoom-in. It presents vulnerability groups affecting the assets of each particular zoom-in. It provides an overview of the detailed vulnerabilities presented in the annexes (Annexes C-M) of this report. While this chapter provides an overview of vulnerability groups per zoom-in, the detailed information embraces detailed vulnerabilities, associated with threats, mitigation controls and references to corresponding collected material,  Chapter 5 presents the 5G asset inventory. It consists of a collection of important assets drawn for the components presented in the zoom-ins in the form of a mind map available in Annex A. The assets inventory contains assets whose vulnerabilities have been assessed in the previous chapter.  Chapter 6 presents an overview of the assessed cyber-threats. Interrelated threats have been grouped to form a taxonomy that is presented as a detailed mind map in Annex B.  Chapter 7 provides information on threat agents. It is a first approach towards the assessment of potential motives emerging from the abuse/misuse of 5G assets.  Chapter 8 provides recommendations and conclusions drawn from the threat analysis. The detailed vulnerabilities, emerging security requirements, corresponding threat groups exploring them, and mitigation controls are presented in the Annexes. The material used in the analysis produced for this report, which is referenced in footnotes through URLs, was last accessed on the day of publication of this study. The referenced material will help interested readers to dive into further detail in the complexity of the 5G infrastructure when needed.

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text: 2. 5G STAKEHOLDERS

text: 2.1 STAKEHOLDERS MAPPING The stakeholders of the 5G ecosystem have not considerably changed since the previous edition of the 5G Threat Landscape. However, by going into some additional details, one could amend the list of stakeholders to include some additional ones that will have a role in the 5G ecosystem, firstly due to the inclusion of processes in the scope, and secondly by reaching a degree of detail that may potentially motivate other stakeholders to take action in 5G. Stakeholders will play different roles in the 5G ecosystem. Among other things, these entities will be responsible for assuring the security of the network at different levels and in separate layers. According to the 5G-PPP White Paper on the architecture, the list of stakeholder roles in the 5G ecosystem is the following:  Service customers (SC);  Service providers (SP);  Mobile Network Operators (MNO) also known as Network Operators (NOP);  Virtualisation Infrastructure Service Providers (VISP) and  Data Centre Providers (DCSP). In the meantime, 5GPPP has issued a very comprehensive and detailed collection of 5G stakeholders. The graph can be found here . The provided stakeholder groups and the detail list of organisation types provide the full picture of entities engaging in the 5G ecosystem, including private, governmental and international organisations. The major stakeholder roles remained the same as in the previous 5G Threat Landscape edition. These were:  Network infrastructure providers;  National Regulators (NRAs);  Information sharing and analysis centres (ISACs);  National cybersecurity coordinators/agencies/centres (NCSCs);  National 5G Test Centres (NTCs);  National Certification Authorities (NCAs) and  Competent EU institutions, European Commission Services, Agencies, Bodies, Committees and Groups (including NIS-CG, ECCG, ECSO, ENISA and BEREC). Interested readers that would like to revisit the role of the above stakeholders in the 5G ecosystem, may revisit the previous 5G Threat Landscape edition . Some additional roles encountered in the collected material are worth mentioning at this point. The importance of these roles has emerged through a better understanding of 5G implementation and roll-out details on the one hand, but also from additional operational and organisational needs w.r.t. 5G in shorter and longer term. These roles are:  International standardisation bodies holding an obvious role in the development of open, publicly available and traceable 5G standards;

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text:  Accreditation bodies will be active in the assurance of security capabilities/requirements of accredited entities (e.g. 5G test-labs, auditors, skills, etc.);  Accredited 5G labs taking over testing and certification of 5G related components;  Telco/5G related professional organisations/associations developing good practices for 5G cybersecurity policies at technical and organisational level;  Audit organizations developing audit-guidelines for 5G infrastructures, services and operation;  Research organisations contributing to R&D tasks related with all kinds of innovation actions in the areas related to 5G, including verticals and  Open source organisations providing technological support and guidance in the development of 5G functions and services. When assuming these roles, the entities mentioned above should have different levels of concern regarding 5G assets, among other things carrying responsibility for the risk mitigation pertinent to the assets of concern. Although all above stakeholders do play a role in the 5G ecosystem, their engagement emerges on a rather ad-hoc manner in current 5G activities. When a more systematic description of activity-engagement is available, a more systematic role mapping will be beneficial for a clearer assignment of responsibilities and a better coordination of their actions.

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text: 3. 5G NETWORK DESIGN AND ARCHITECTURE

text: This chapter is an update of the 5G Architecture of the 2019 5G Threat Landscape report . Main source of the changes of the 5G architecture is progress made in the 3GPP specification work as it is documented in the recent version (3GPP Release 16). Just as in the 2019’s landscape, this chapter consists of a generic 5G architecture and provides the details of individual key components by means of ‘Zoom-ins’, allowing further detailing of their functionality and purpose. By doing so - besides the generic 5G architecture depicted - a number of detailed views of particular components is being presented, namely: Core Network, Management and Network Orchestrator (MANO), Radio Access Network (RAN), Network Function Virtualisation (NFV), Software Defined Network (SDN), Multi-access Edge Computing (MEC), User Equipment (UE), Security Architecture (SA) and 5G Physical Infrastructure components. These zoom-ins have been adopted from the previous version of the 5G Threat Landscape and have been updated according to the progress of the specification work. In this year’s version, some additional zoom-ins have been developed, in particular a zoom-in dedicated to implementation options and a zoom-in on processes. These zoom-ins capture some additional elements adopted/developed during 2020 that capture i) the migration options of 5G infrastructure and ii) a process map with the relevant processes for the procurement, development and maintenance of 5G infrastructure. In contrast to the rest of the presented zoom-ins, the process map consists solely of various processes. We have included this zoom-in in the 5G architecture in order to ensure a unified way of addressing vulnerabilities and threats for pertinent to matters related to processes. An additional element introduced for each zoom-in are two sections, one describing the novelties established in 2020, and a second presenting security considerations related to components of each zoom-in. While the former provides a summary of the performed changes, the latter establishes a “bridge” to the vulnerabilities chapter (see chapter 4). Not all components of 5G architecture have undergone changes. For the sake of completeness, however, unchanged components of the previous 5G Threat Landscape version are repeated in this document. They are amended with the introduced changes (marked with blue text). This redundancy has been introduced in order to make the presented content self-contained and facilitate reading. Just as in the 5G Threat Landscape of 2019, in order to deal with complexity both at the level of the generic 5G architecture and individual zoom-ins, the details of the various interfaces and protocols have not been considered. A short description of the purpose and functionality is provided in a separate table for each individual component. A generic 5G architecture and the corresponding zoom-ins facilitate the identification of assets presented in chapter 5.

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text: 3.1 5G USE CASES The 5G architecture supports the various use-cases of this infrastructure, as these have been envisaged in the 3GPP specification. An understanding of these use-cases provides the context of use for various supported functions and architectural decisions met within the 3GPP group. The new release 16 introduces new concepts and changes to the technical specifications of 5G mobile networks. The work of the various 3GPP working groups resulted in the completion of the 5G NR specifications for standalone (SA) mode. An important feature of this release is to leverage the LTE core network to support the expansion of the 5G Network. The release 16 is all about incrementing enhancements for mobile broadband in various requirements such as coverage, latency, capacity, mobility, power, reliability, ease of deployment, among others. Another core improvement with release 16 is the support to new use cases. This has led to an enrichment of use-cases. While the previous edition of the 5G specification envisaged the use cases: i) Enhanced mobile broadband (eMBB), ii) Ultra-reliable low latency communication (URLLC) and iii) Machine Type Communications (MTC), the current version enlarges significantly the scope by taking into account some verticals. The table below provides an overview of those verticals. Table 1: 5G Deployment Scenarios Deployment Scenarios

text: Intelligent transportation systems (ITS) and vehicle-to-anything (V2X) communications

text: One example of a mission-critical use case is the transport system. The use of the 5G Network to enhance automotive safety is another focus area of release 16. It includes several enhancements in support to cellular-vehicle-to-everything (C-V2X) communications and intelligent transportation systems (ITS). The improvements in C-V2X specification include vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V), vehicle-to-pedestrian (V2P), and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communications. These are all required to increase transport safety in the current environment but also in the future implementation of autonomous driving. Intelligent transportation systems are another major vertical focus area in release 16. This vertical area will provide a wide range of transport and traffic-management use cases to the network.

text: Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) and ultra-reliable low latency communication (URLLC)

text: The IIOT is also a major vertical focus area of release 16. The introduction of 5G NR into IIoT use cases will enable the research and innovation of a future wirelessly connected and reconfigurable factory. It creates an opportunity to introduce IIoT to support factory automation, electrical power distribution and transportation. It introduces important enhancements in network latency and reliability. The support for time-sensitive networking (TSN) is also included in this release, where very accurate time synchronization is essential in factory automation use IIoT.

text: Integrated access and backhaul (IAB)

text: To expand 5G NR mmWave network coverage the cost of new fibre optics backhaul installations is typically high and a major challenge when deploying additional base stations. Release 16 eliminates the need for this wired backhaul, since it introduces integrated access allowing a base station to provide both wireless access for devices and wireless backhaul connectivity.

text: NR-Based access to unlicensed spectrum (NR-U)

text: Release 16 allows 5G Networks to operate in unlicensed spectrum that is the largest available. The existing global 5 GHz and 6 GHz unlicensed band is used by Wi-Fi and LTE LAA and is attractive use case for increasing data rates and capacity to the network. The specifications define two operation modes: NR-U with an anchor in licensed-assisted (shared spectrum) and standalone NR-U with only unlicensed spectrum.

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text: Besides these verticals, the new specification adds more than 20 standard technological features, including a series of improvements for enhanced mobile broadband (eMBB) and further vertical applications. These eMBB improvements cover Massive MIMO, cell interruptionfree handover, and remote interference suppression. Moreover, introduced additional improvements may be considered as enablers that will enhance the efficiency of 5G for a series of further applications. The table below provides a summary of those improvements/features. Table 2: Additional 5G enabling features for all verticals

text: 5G EFFICIENCY

text: Important enhancements in release 16 features can be found in the areas of multiple-input, multiple-output (MIMO) and beamforming enhancements, dynamic spectrum sharing (DSS), dual connectivity (DC) and carrier aggregation (CA), positioning and user equipment (UE) power saving. The most relevant 5G efficiency improvements are as follows:

text: Interference mitigation

text: Release 16 introduces Remote Interference Mitigation (RIM) and Cross-Link Interference (CLI) features. Base stations can communicate and coordinate (Via reference signals (RIM-RS) over-the-air or in combination with backhaul signalling) mitigation of base station TDD DL-to-UL ducting interferences (to indicate the presence of interference and whether enough mitigation is in place). With CLI, devices can measure and report inter-/intra-cell interferences (Inter-cell: when devices have semi-static TDD scheduling, Intra-cell: when devices support dynamic TDD) caused by neighbouring devices with different TDD configurations.

text: MIMO Performance

text: Release 16 introduces MIMO enhancements including:  enhanced beam handling;  channel-state information (CSI) feedback;  support for transmission to a single UE from multiple transmission points (multi-TRP)  full-power transmission from multiple UE antennas in the uplink (UL).

text: Some of these enhancements are meant to increase the throughput of the network, reduce overhead, and/or provide additional robustness.

text: High-precision positioning

text: With an increase in the number of use cases and applications requiring accurate outdoor and indoor positioning, release 16 introduces various DL-based and UL-based positioning methods, to meet the accuracy requirements for different use cases. The way it is operated, the network location server collects and distributes information related to positioning of the user device (UE capabilities, assistance data, measurements, position estimates, etc.) to the other entities involved in the positioning procedures. Single and multi-cell positioning also brings precision geolocation in support of ITS/V2X communications and IIoT applications (see use cases).

text: Power consumption

text: Another important aspect of release 16 is to further reduce device power consumption in user devices. For example, the use of a wakeup signal (WUS), a low-power control channel to indicate activity or lack thereof in the corresponding DRX (discontinuous reception) monitoring period. Others examples include optimized low-power settings, efficient power controls, and overhead reduction, and more efficient power control mechanisms. Smart new power-saving features help improve device battery autonomy even in high-use applications .

text: Dual connectivity and carrier aggregation (CA/DC)

text: Release 16 also reduces latency for CA/DC setup and activation to achieving higher data rates. In this case, connectivity can be resumed after periods of inactivity. Furthermore, release 16 also introduces a triggering of CSI reference signal transmissions in case of the aggregation of carriers with different numerology.

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text: Mobility enhancements

text: Reduced interruption time 0ms handover enabled by dual active protocol stack with concurrent source/target cell transmissions/reception. Improved mobility robustness Device-driven conditional handover for single and dual connectivity, and fast handover failure recovery.  Sub-7 GHz and mmWave;  Both inter- and intra-frequency handovers;  Beneficial to high-mobility use cases (e.g., train, aerial).

text: Enhanced ultra-reliable, low-latency communication (eURLLC)

text: An important Work Item in Release 16 was aimed at enhancing support for ultra-high reliability and lowlatency communications. The main features introduced by this work item include enhancements in the 5G Core network mechanisms, physical layer enhancements for 5G New Radio and support of New Radio Industrial Internet of Things Mechanisms to increase reliability include a redundant transmission mechanism, enhanced QoS monitoring and RAN support for higher layer multi-connectivity . Mechanisms to reduce latency and to guarantee session continuity were also introduced in the 5G Core functions and supported by enhancements in the physical layer specification of the 5G New Radio. Finally, enhancements aimed specifically at industrial IoT scenarios include accurate reference timing delivery, scheduling enhancements and improved handling of Time Sensitive Communication data.

text: Self-Organised Network (SON)

text: Release 16 enhances SON with the concept of mobility robust optimization (MRO), mobility load balancing (MLB), and RACH optimization. Specifying device reporting needed to enhance network configurations and inter-node information exchange (e.g., enhancements to interfaces like N2, and Xn).

text: Concluding this section, we would like to present the planned evolution of 5G 3GPP specification. 5G specifications are in continuous development by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). Since last year’s report, the current 5G specification is Release 16, which reached specification freeze in July 2020, with items related to Radio Access Network due for finalisation in December 2020. The timeline of specification development is presented below : Figure 2: Timeline of 3GPP specification versions It is considered as meaningful to plan prospective versions of the 5G Threat Landscape in order to accommodate updates introduced by newer versions of the specification (e.g. end of 2021, covering Release 17 Stage One, and end 2022 covering Release 17 Stage Two).

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text: 3.2 GENERIC 5G ARCHITECTURE In this section, we present the evolvement of the 5G architecture as resulted from the specification updates of 3GPP Release 16 . Within this chapter, the complete architecture is being presented, whereas novelties are marked through blue coloured text in the tables detailing the zoom-in components. Updates have been implemented either at the level of descriptions, or as new components introduced by the 3GPP specification Release 16. At the level of zoom-ins, a special section describes in more details the rational and functions behind the introduced novelties. A further section describes the security considerations relating to each zoom-in. Just as in the previous version of the 5G TL, the generic 5G architecture is presented through its main components depicted as labelled boxes. These boxes have been arranged based on layers, depicting their functional role in the 5G architecture (i.e. virtualisation layer and physical infrastructure layer). This architecture aims at providing an overview of the main groups of foreseen 5G functionality and is a consolidation of components/functions found in the analysed material (e.g. 14, 19, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28). Specifically in 5G, the architecture was designed in a way that connectivity and services can be supported, enabling techniques such as Network Function Virtualisation (NFV), Network Slicing (NS) and Software Defined Networking (SDN), Slicing, etc. This service-based architecture meets multiple functional and performance requirements built upon new use cases. The generic 5G architecture presents an overview of the various components that are further detailed and depicted through specific ‘Zoom-ins’ in forthcoming sections. It is worth mentioning that for the Transport and OSS components, no ‘Zoom-in’ was developed. However, they have been included in the generic 5G architecture for consistency reasons, and relations with OSS are detailed in the corresponding zoom-ins for NVF and Network Slicing Management. Also, as an evolution from the first version of the architecture, in this version relevant processes are taken into account, as MNO, Vendor and Assurance processes are consequential for the overall security of the 5G Network. The 5G generic or high-level technical architecture is depicted in the following figure. Figure 3: Generic 5G Architecture

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text: 3.3 CORE NETWORK ARCHITECTURE (ZOOM-IN) One of the most important innovations in the 5G architecture is the complete virtualisation of the Core network. As an example, the ‘softwarisation’ of network functions will enable easier portability and higher flexibility of networking systems and services (Control-User Plane Separation, CUPS). The Software Defined Network (SDN) abstracts low-level network functionalities to simplify network management. Network Function Virtualisation (NFV) provides the enabling technology for placing various network functions in different network components on the basis of performance needs/requirements; and eliminates the need for function-or service-specific hardware. SDN and NFV, complementing each other, improve the network elasticity, simplify network control and management, break the barrier of vendor-specific or proprietary solutions, and are thus considered as highly important for future networks. These novel network technologies and concepts that rely heavily on ‘softwarisation’ and virtualisation of network functions will introduce new and complex threats. The core network is the central part of the 5G infrastructure and enables all functions related to multi-access technologies. Its main purpose is to deliver services over all kinds of networks (wireless, fixed, converged) . All in all, in the new specification Core Network has been amended with some new functions and few components, while the overall structure remained almost unchanged. The majority of added functions are related to localization issues and implementation of location services. In the figure presented below, these new functions have been added. At the same time, slicing has been omitted in the Core Network zoom-in, as it is included in a specialized zoom-in later in this chapter. The Core network has been defined by 3GPP and its structure is as follows: Figure 4: Core network architecture Zoom-in

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text: The description of the elements of 5G Core network are as follows: Element Short description

text: Access and Mobility (As defined in 3GPP TS23.501 Section 6.2.1 )

text: Management function

text: AMF may include the following functionalities:

text: (AMF)

text:  Termination of RAN CP interface;  Termination of NAS, NAS ciphering and integrity protection;  Registration management;  Connection management;  Reachability management;  Mobility Management;Provide transport for SM messages between UE and SMF;  Transparent proxy for routing SM messages;  Access Authentication;  Access Authorisation.  Provide transport for SMS messages between UE and SMSF;  Security Anchor Functionality;  Location Services management for regulatory services;  Provide transport for Location Services messages between UE and LMF as well as between RAN and LMF;  EPS Bearer ID allocation for interworking with EPS; UE mobility event notification;  Support for Control / User Plane Cellular IoT (CIoT) optimisation;  Support for Network Slice Specific Authentication and Authorisation.

text: Session Management (As defined in 3GPP TS23.501 section 6.2.2)

text: function (SMF)

text: SMF may include the following functionalities:  Session Management; UE IP address allocation & management (DHCPv4 and v6 (server and client) functions);  Respond to Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) requests and / or IPv6 Neighbour Solicitation requests;  Selection and control of UP function, including controlling the UPF to proxy ARP or IPv6 Neighbour Discovery;  Selection and control of UP function;  Configures traffic steering at UPF to route traffic to proper destination;  Termination of interfaces towards Policy control functions;Charging data collection and support of charging interfaces;  Control and coordination of charging data collection at UPF;  Termination of Session Management parts of NAS messages;  Downlink Data Notification;  Determine Session and Service Continuity mode of a session.  Support for Control Plane CIoT Optimisation  Support of header compression;  Provisioning of external parameters (Expected UE Behaviour parameters or Network Configuration parameters);  Support Proxy-CSCF discovery for IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) services;  Roaming functionality;  Handle local enforcement to apply QoS SLAs (VPLMN);  Charging data collection and charging interface (VPLMN);  Lawful intercept (in VPLMN for SM events and interface to LI System);  Support for interaction with external DN for transport of signalling for PDU Session authentication/authorisation by external DN;  Instructs UPF and NG-RAN to perform redundant transmission on N3/N9 interfaces. (NOTE: Not all of the functionalities are required to be supported in an instance of a Network Slice. In addition to the functionalities of the SMF described above, the SMF may include policy related functionalities as described in clause 6.2.2 in TS 23.503 )

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text: User plane function UPF supports: (UPF)  Packet routing & forwarding;  Packet inspection;  QoS handling;  Lawful intercept (UP collection);  Traffic usage reporting;  It acts as external PDU session point of interconnect to Data Network (DN);  Is an anchor point for intra- & inter-RAT mobility;  Functionality to respond to Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) requests and / or IPv6 Neighbour Solicitation requests based on local cache information for the Ethernet PDUs;  Time sensitive Networking (TSN) Translator functionality;  High latency communication, see clause;  Access Traffic Steering, Switching and Splitting (ATSSS) functionality to steer the Multi Access PDU Session traffic;  Inter PLMN UP Security (IPUPS) functionality.

text: Policy Control Function PCF supports: (PCF)  Unified policy framework;  Policy rules to CP functions and  Access subscription information for policy decisions in UDR.

text: Network Exposure NEF supports: Function (NEF)  Exposure of capabilities and events;  Secure provision of information from external application to 3GPP network;  Translation of internal/external information;  NEF may also support a 5GLAN Group Management Function: The 5GLAN Group Management Function in the NEF may store the 5GLAN group information in the UDR via UDM as described in TS 23.502 ;  Exposure of analytics;  Support of Non-IP Data Delivery;  When UE is capable of switching between EPC and 5GC, an SCEF+NEF is used for service exposure.

text: Network Repository NRF supports service discovery function and maintains NF profile and available NF Function (NRF) instances.  Supports Proxy-CSCF discovery for IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) services;  Supports Service Communication Proxy (SCP) discovery, and maintains SCP profile of available SCP instances;  Notifies about registered/updated/ deregistered NF and SCP instances, and maintains the health status of NFs and SCP.

text: Unified Data UDM supports: Management (UDM)  Generation of Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) credentials;  User identification handling;  Access authorisation;  Subscription management;  5GLAN group management handling;  Support of external parameter provisioning.

text: Authentication Server AUF supports authentication for 3GPP access and untrusted non-3GPP access.

text: Function (AUSF)

text: Application Function AF interacts with the Core network in order to provide services, for example to support (AF) the following:  Application influence on traffic routing;  Accessing Network Exposure Function;  Interacting with the Policy framework for policy control.  Interactions of the IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) with the 5G Core

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text: Unified Data Repository UDR supports the following functionality: (UDR)  Storage and retrieval of subscription data by the UDM;  Storage and retrieval of policy data by the PCF;  Storage and retrieval of structured data for exposure;  Application data (including Packet Flow Descriptions (PFDs) for application detection;  AF request information for multiple UEs), by the NEF.

text: (See also 3GPP TS23.501 section 6.2.11)  Storage and retrieval of NF Group ID corresponding to subscriber identifier (e.g. IMPI, IMPU, SUPI);

text: Unstructured Data The UDSF is an optional function that supports Storage and retrieval of information as Storage Function (UDSF) unstructured data by any NF.

text: Network Slice Selection The NSSF offers services to the AMF and NSSF in a different PLMN via the Nnssf Function (NSSF) service based interface (see 3GPP TS 23.501and 3GPP TS 23.502).

text: Gateway Mobile Location The GMLC contains functionality required to support Location Services (LCS). In one Centre (GMLC) PLMN, there may be more than one GMLC. A GMLC is the first node an external LCS client accesses in a PLMN. AFs and NFs may access GMLC directly or via NEF. After performing authorisation of an external LCS Client or AF and verifying target UE privacy, a GMLC forwards a location request to either a serving AMF or to a GMLC in another PLMN in the case of a roaming UE.

text: Localisation The LMF manages the overall co-ordination and scheduling of resources required for Management Function the location of a UE that is registered with or accessing 5GCN. It also calculates or (LMF) verifies a final location and any velocity estimate and may estimate the achieved accuracy. The LMF receives location requests for a target UE from the serving AMF using the Nlmf interface. The LMF interacts with the UE in order to exchange location information applicable to UE assisted and UE based position methods and interacts with the NG-RAN, N3IWF or TNAN in order to obtain location information.

text: Service Communication An NF service is one type of capability exposed by an NF (NF Service Producer) to Proxy (SCP) other authorized NF (NF Service Consumer) through a service-based interface NF services may communicate directly, or indirectly via an SCP. As defined in 3GPP TS 23.501, Clause 6.2.19, the Service Communication Proxy (SCP) includes one or more of the following functionalities:  Indirect Communication;  Delegated Discovery;  Message forwarding and routing to destination NF/NF service;  Message forwarding and routing to a next hop SCP;  Communication security (e.g. authorisation of the NF Service Consumer to access the NF Service Producer API), load balancing, monitoring, overload control, etc.

text: UE radio Capability The UCMF is used for storage of dictionary entries corresponding to either PLMN- Management Function assigned or Manufacturer-assigned UE Radio Capability IDs.

text: (UCMF)

text: An AMF may subscribe with the UCMF to obtain from the UCMF new values of UE Radio Capability ID that the UCMF assigns for the purpose of caching them locally.

text: Network Slice Specific The Network Slice Specific Authentication and Authorisation Function (NSSAAF) offers Authentication and support for Network Slice-Specific Authentication and Authorisation as specified in TS Authorisation Function 23.502 with an Authentication, Authorisation and Access Server (AAA-S).

text: (NSSAAF)

text: Nausf, Nnrf, Nudm, Nnef, These are service-based interfaces exhibited by 5G Core Control-plane functions.

text: Namf, Nmssf, Nsmf, Npcf, Naf, Nlmf, Ngmlc, Nssaaf, Nucmf

text: N1 Reference point between the UE and the AMF.

text: N2 Reference point between the RAN and the AMF.

text: N3 Reference point between the RAN and the UPF.

text: N6 Reference point between the UPF and a Data Network.

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text: 3.3.1 ELEMENTS OF NOVELTY IN RELEASE 16 The new features and enhancements brought by release 16 of the GPP specification, presented in the section Generic Architecture are reflected in updates and additions to the 5G Core functions, as highlighted in the detailed table above. The most important enhancements and their impact on the 5G Core are presented below: New functions are added to the 5G Core toolset, to support Network-Slice Specific Authentication (NSSAAF), Location Services (GMLC), and enhancements to existing functions’ specification support use-cases such as cellular IoT Support, Ultra-reliable low latency architecture, 5G LAN services, Time Sensitive Networking for Industrial IoT, Vehicle to everything. A significant enhancement for the Service Based Architecture is the enablement of indirect communication and delegated discovery through the Service Communication Proxy. This increases flexibility, allowing communication between Network Functions via Network Repository Function (NRF) and Service Communication Proxy (SCP). Enhancements in the network analytics exposure features is an important enabler for Network Automation in the 5G system. Another feature provided is Radio Capabilities Signalling (RACS) Optimization via optimized signalling of UE Radio capabilities by introducing mapping of RACS ID to UE Radio Capability in the network. The mapping between RACS ID to UE Radio capabilities will be stored in the new Network Function UE (radio) Capability Management Function (UCMF) and cached in the AMF and gNB. The network slicing function is improved beyond network-slice specific authentication with enhanced SMF/AMF topologies and with interworking support with the Evolved Packet System, in view of the Non Standalone (NSA) deployments. 3.3.2 SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS The specification of 5G Core network functions were developed as to close known vulnerabilities in existing network. The effort is ongoing; for instance, the most recent version of the 5G architecture specification further enhances the closing of a known User Plane Integrity Protection vulnerability, by adding new requirements for the UE to support User Plane Integrity Protection at full-rate. . The full set of security mechanisms in the 5G system is presented in the Security Architecture section. However, the 5G core functions rely on an underlying infrastructure of hardware, software and processes that come with their security threats and vulnerabilities. In the NFV and SDN zoomins we will address the relevant security considerations related to virtualisation, softwarisation and associated management and orchestration mechanisms. In the Processes map section, we discuss the relevant security considerations. Apart from these, the following general security considerations apply: Service-based architecture The 5G Core functions is meant to be largely composed of applications running on generalpurpose hardware that communicate through application programming interfaces (APIs). The

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text: integrity of the software, especially from open-source locations and the overall software supply chain, is an area of vulnerability. As services can be created, destroyed, and communicate with each other dynamically, systems must be properly authenticated and communications protected in order to prevent unauthorized execution of functions or access to data . Affected components: Service-based interfaces Failure to meet General Security Assurance Requirements The security assured by the 5G Core functions and the security of the 5G Core itself is built upon the permanent update of Security Assurance Requirements for critical network components such as UDM, AUSF, SEPP, NRF, NEF, SMF, AMF and UPF. However, a security update gap between new security requirements and deployment of updated versions of network functions in operational systems will unavoidably exist. There are two major factors in reducing this gap: a) vendors’ responsiveness in issuing and validating new versions of the network functions that address the updated requirements, and b) timeliness and effectiveness of MNO processes to update operational systems to recently released and SCASevaluated versions. Affected components: UDM, AUSF, SEPP, NRF, NEF, SMF, AMF, UPF. IP Based Protocol stack 5GC moves to an IP based protocol stack, allowing interoperability with a wider number of services and technologies in the future. The following protocols, schemas and processes will be adopted in 5GC:  HTTP/2 and JSON as application layer and serialization protocols, replacing Diameter over the S6a reference point  TLS as an additional layer of protection providing encrypted communication between all network functions (NF) inside a public land mobile network (PLMN)  TCP as the transport layer protocol  RESTful framework with OpenAPI 3.0.3 as the Interface Definition Language (IDL). As these protocols are used in the wider IT industry it will likely lead to a shorter vulnerability to exploitation timeline, and higher impact of vulnerabilities within these protocols. Vulnerability reporting schemes will have to manage the increased scope of these protocols. Once located the time to patch for vulnerabilities should be short. Affected components: All functions 3.4 NETWORK SLICING (NS) (ZOOM-IN) One of 5G’s key features will be the opportunity for network slicing23: enables the flexible and efficient creation of specialized end-to-end logical networks on top of shared network infrastructure. Network slicing belongs to the category of virtualization networking paradigm, together with Software-Defined Networking (SDN) and Network Function Virtualization (NFV).

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text: Network slicing can take advantage of SDN and NFV, but it can be seen as an independent technology24. 5G system is expected to be able to provide optimized support for a variety of different communication services, different traffic loads, and different end user communities . A clear benefit of 5G network slicing for operators will be the ability to tailor the functionalities and allocation of network resources to specific customers and particular market segments. In this update of the 5G architecture, we include in this zoom-in all interrelated slicing functions that are located within the scope of other zoom-ins. This decision has been made in order to have in a single picture all relevant slicing components and functions, providing thus an integrated view. Communication between autonomous cars, for instance, requires minimal latency (the lag time it takes for a signal to travel), but not necessarily high throughput (the amount of data a network can process per second) while a use-case such as augmented reality will require more bandwidth. Network Slicing components are presented in relation to the impacted elements of the network architecture, as depicted in the various ‘Zoom-ins’. This cross-reference/mapping is an alternative means for describing slice functions of 5G. The dependency of slices with the various components of the 5G generic architecture is shown in the figure below: Figure 5: Network slicing architecture Zoom-in

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text: The elements of the 3GPP Slicing Management System are as follows: Element Short description

text: Service Instance Layer The Service Instance Layer represents the services (end-user service or business (Communication Services) services) which are to be supported. Each Communication Service is represented by a Service Instance. Typically services can be provided by the network operator or by 3rd parties. In line with this, a Service Instance can either represent an operator service or a 3rd party provided service. .

text: Communication Service This function is responsible for translating the communication service related Management Function requirement to network slice related requirements.

text: (CSMF)

text: The CSMF communicates with the Network Slice Management Function (NSMF).

text: Network Slice Management This function is responsible for the management (including lifecycle) of NSIs. It derives Function (NSMF) network slice subnet related requirements from the network slice related requirements. NSMF communicates with the NSSMF and the CSMF.

text: Network Slice Subnet This function is responsible for management and orchestration of Network Slice Management Function Subnet Instances.

text: (NSSMF)

text: Network Slice Instance (NSI) The Network Slice is a logical network that provides specific network capabilities and network characteristics. The Network Slice Instance is a representation of a set of network functions and the associated resources (e.g. compute, storage and networking resources) supporting network slice. .

text: Network Slice Subnet The network slice subnet represents a group of network functions (including their Instance (NSSI) corresponding resources) that form part or complete constituents of a network slice. The grouping of the network functions allows the management of each group of network functions to be conducted independently of the network slice.

text: Network Functions (NF) A network slice instance (NSI) contains Network Functions, including the Core Network Control Plane and User Plane Network Functions in the Home Network and Core Network Functions 28 the Access Functions in the serving network .

text: (CNF)

text: Release 16 of the 3GPP specification includes improved interworking with the LTE

text: Access Network Functions

text: Evolved Packet Core (EPC).

text: (gNB)

text: NFV MANO NFV MANO includes NFV Orchestrator (NFVO), VNF manager (VNFM) and Virtualised infrastructure manager (VIM).

text: Element Management The Element Management is responsible for FCAPS management of network System (EMS) functions used in the network slice instance.

text: Operations Support System OSS functions provide management and orchestration of systems including legacy (OSS) ones and may have full end-to-end visibility of services provided by legacy network functions in an operator's network.

text: Resources layer Network functions will run as software components on top of hardware infrastructure. Virtualization enables an elastic, automated environment where network, compute and storage services can expand, or contract as needed. Many resources can now be hosted as software services and dynamically instantiated in different network segments.

text: Management Functions The management of the 3GPP network is provided by management services. Service Based Interface Management Services offer their services via standardized service interfaces (SBI) composed of individually specified components.

text: Os-Ma-nfvo The Os-Ma-nfvo reference point can be used for the interaction between 3GPP slicing related management functions and NFV-MANO. To properly interface with NFV-MANO, the NSMF and/or NSSMF consume the NFV MANO interface, exposed in the Os-Ma-nfvo , Ve-Vnfm-em and Ve-Vnfm-vnf reference points (last two not displayed in the Figure due to graphical limitations).

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text: 3.4.1 ELEMENTS OF NOVELTY In release 16 of the 3GPP specification, the network slicing function is improved with the following features: - Enhancement of interworking between LTE Evolved Packet Core (EPC) and 5G Core to manage mobility of User Equipment and its allocated Network Slice between networks - A newly introduced Network Slice Specific Authentication and Authorisation (NSSAA) mechanism that enables separate authentication and authorisation per Network Slice. The trigger of NSSAA is based on subscription information from UDM and operator policy and may be performed when UE indicates support for the feature. 3.4.2 SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS Security-as-a-Service Network slices are used to deploy services at the multi-access edge across a distributed cloud infrastructure. Network slices can be configured based upon the service-type (eMBB, mMTC, URLLC), customer, and application to provide the required latency, bandwidth, QoS, and security. While slices provide inherent security through segmentation, slices can also be used to provide additional security protection and security services specific to the use case and customer requirements. However, although realisation of Security-as-a-Service (SECaaS) offerings is feasible technically, it would rest ultimately with the Mobile Network Operator (MNO) to include such services in the offer, depending on its service strategy, market context, and in relation to vertical use-cases. Related component(s): Communication Services End-to-end security Network slices are end-to-end logical networks, so it is natural to aim for end-to-end security. The concept of end-to end security is closely connected to the concepts of isolation and orchestration. Moreover, it is dependent on the business model and on the associated trust model. Release 16 introduces the mechanism of Network Slice Specific Authorisation Identifier that enables network-slice-specific authentication and authorisation mechanisms to complement network-side authentication mechanisms. Related component(s): Network Slice Instance Resource isolation One of key expectations of network slicing is resources isolation. Each slice may be perceived as isolated set of resources configured through the network environment and providing defined set of functions. Level and strength of isolation may vary depending on requirements and usage scenarios for slicing.

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text: The isolation of the slices can be considered in at least four areas:  Isolation of traffic: the network slices should ensure that data flow of one slice does not move to another.  Isolation of bandwidth: slices should not utilize any bandwidth assigned to other slices.  Isolation of processing: while all virtual slices use the same physical resources, independent processing of packets is required.  Isolation of storage: data related to a slice should be stored separately from data used by another slice Related component(s): Network Slice Instance, Shared Resources Secure Management and Orchestration The architecture of the network slice MANO is challenging from a business model perspective because of the variety of scenarios with different actors, multi-domain environments, and several layers of imbricated tenants, which can play different roles and have different rights. Technically, this means high complexity and flexibility, which bring in higher security risks. 3GPP defines requirements for management services’ security that include use of secure communication protocols for protection of interactions at the management service interfaces and authorisation of management service requests , but it is to be noted the most recent 3GPP specifications are yet to be implemented. Another relevant issue is management of network-slice-specific log information to support postincident analysis. Such information may include proof of transit, remote attestation, as well as data to support root cause analysis. Related component(s): NSMF, NFV-MANO, Os-Ma-NFVO, SBI Trust Model In 5G three role models are envisaged for stakeholders. 1) The MNO owns and manages both the access and core network. 2) An MNO owns and manages the core network, the access network is shared among multiple operators (i.e., RAN sharing). 3) Only part of the network is owned and/or managed by the MNO, with other parts being owned and/or managed by a 3rd party. The 3GPP appropriate APIs and management functions are needed to support this extended 3rd party access and control of capabilities provided by the MNO, and to do so in a secure manner. The 3rd party has increasing control over the network capabilities that support its service. However, this control is limited to what is allowed by the MNO through the provided APIs. Related component(s): SBIs, Os-Ma-nfvo

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text: 3.5 MANAGEMENT AND NETWORK ORCHESTRATOR (MANO) (ZOOM-IN) Management and Network Orchestration (MANO) is not further maintained in the current version of the 5G architecture as a stand-alone zoom in. Rather, it has been integrated with the NFV zoom in. This is because the functions used for are covered completely in the NFV zoomin (see section Error! Reference source not found.). 3.6 RADIO ACCESS NETWORK (RAN) (ZOOM-IN) 5G New Radio (NR) is the standard the 5G wireless air interface. 5G New Radio is set to deliver faster and more responsive mobile broadband services and to extend mobile technology to connect and support a multitude of new industries. The baseline architecture described by 5G-PPP referring 3GPP Release 16 specifications on NG-RAN identifies as a main innovation the split of the F1 interface into Centralized Unit (CU) and Distributed Unit (DU), with a Service Data Adaptation Protocol (SDAP). The SDAP architecture includes a Packet Data Conversion Protocol (PDCP) located in the CU and an Air Radio Link Control (ARLC) located in the DU. Release 16 adds integrated access and backhaul (IAB) to the 5G toolkit. IAB allows base stations to provide both wireless access for devices and wireless backhaul connectivity, which can replace temporarily or permanently wired backhauls. Another key aspect of the NG-RAN is the ability to provide small-cell coverage to multiple operators “as-a-service” in two-tier architecture. These tiers are in support of the previously mentioned 5G use cases providing low latency services and high processing power. The structure of the RAN architecture is depicted in the following figure : Figure 6: RAN architecture Zoom-in

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text: The elements of the RAN architecture are as follows: Element Short description

text: User Equipment (UE) Allows a user access to network services. The User Equipment is subdivided into the UICC domain and the ME (Mobile Equipment) Domain. The ME Domain can further be subdivided into one or more Mobile Termination (MT) and Terminal Equipment (TE) components showing the connectivity between multiple functional groups.

text: gNB Next generation Node/Base Station is a node providing NR user plane and control plane protocol terminations towards the UE, and connected via the NG interface to the 5GC.

text: gNB Distributed Unit (gNB- gNB-DUa logical node hosting RLC, MAC and PHY layers of the gNB or en-gNB, and its DU) operation is partly controlled by gNB-CU. One gNB-DU supports one or multiple cells. One cell is supported by only one gNB-DU. The gNB-DU terminates the F1 interface connected with the gNB-CU.

text: gNB Central Unit (gNB-CU) gNB-Central Unit (CU) is a logical node hosting RRC, SDAP and PDCP protocols of the gNB or RRC and PDCP protocols of the en-gNB that controls the operation of one or more gNB-DUs. The gNB-CU terminates the F1 interface connected with the gNB-DU.

text: Xn Xn is a network interface between NG-RAN nodes; 3GPP TS 38.420 specifies Xn interface general aspects and principles.

text: NG interface The gNBs are connected by means of the NG interfaces to the 5G Core, more specifically to the AMF (Access and Mobility Management Function) by means of the NG-C interface and to the UPF (User Plane Function) by means of the NG-U interface.

text: NR Uu The New Radio Unified Air Interface (NR-Uu) is the radio interface between the mobile and the radio access network.

text: IAB Donor gNB that provides network access to UEs via a network of backhaul and access links .

text: IAB Node RAN node that supports New Radio access links to UEs and New Radio backhaul links to parent nodes and child nodes. The IAB-node does not support backhauling via LTE.

text: Non Access Stratum (NAS) NAS is a functional layer in the protocol stack between UE and Core Network. (NAS) protocol for 5G System (defined in 3GPP TS 24.501).

text: Access Stratum (AS) AS is a functional layer in the protocol stack between UE and RAN responsible for transporting data over the wireless connection and managing radio resources.

text: F1 The F1 interface provides means for interconnecting a gNB-CU and a gNB-DU of a gNB within an NG-RAN, or for interconnecting a gNB-CU and a gNB-DU of an en-gNB within an E-UTRAN.

text: It facilitates that a gNB-CU and a gNB-DU supplied by different manufacturers can work seamlessly .

text: 3.6.1 ELEMENTS OF NOVELTY While a significant part of the Release 16 enhancements involve the 5G-RAN to a certain extent, the following enhancements brought by Release 16 of the 3GPP specification are directly relevant for the 5G-RAN:

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text: Integrated access and backhaul (IAB) One of the major 5G challenges for operators looking to expand network coverage is the cost of deploying base stations. The limited range of mmWave signals for fiber-optics backhaul installations to service these base stations can make mmWave deployment cost intensive. IAB addresses directly this issue. IAB base stations provide both wireless access for devices and wireless backhaul connectivity, thus eliminating the need for wired backhauls. Operators may resort to these capabilities to speed up densification, and install fiber to increase backhaul capacity at a later time, as demand increases. Multiple-input and multiple-output (MIMO) enhancements MIMO multiplies a radio link’s capacity by using multiple transmission and multiple receiving antennas. Multi-user multiple-input and multiple-output (MU-MIMO) enhancements include support for multiple transmission and reception points (multi-TRP) and improved multi-beam management for enhanced link reliability. Improvements also aim at reducing peak-to-average power ratio, and improved coverage at the network’s edge. Simplified Random Access Procedure Release 16 introduces a simplified random access procedure. This reduces the number of interactions between the UE and network during the connection setup and connection resume, thereby enabling a lower control plane latency. In case of connected mode, a small amount of data can be sent via 2-step RACH procedure thus also enabling a lower latency for UL UP data for connected mode UEs. Private network support for NG-RAN The second Release 16 project aimed at expanding 5G’s reach beyond traditional public mobile networks involves improved support in the system architecture for private networks. Private networks utilize dedicated base stations that are independently managed, implement customized security and privacy controls, and deliver optimizations for local applications, such as low latency or data flow control. Private networks are directly aimed at new use cases such as industrial IoT. UE Power Saving UE battery life is an important aspect of the user’s experience. The study of the Rel-16 UE power saving had shown substantial power saving gain comparing to considered Rel-15 NR features. The work item of UE power saving in NR includes the power saving techniques, such as DRX adaptation, cross-slot scheduling, and maximum MIMO layer adaptation in CONNECTED state, fast transition out of CONNECTED state, and reduced RRM (Radio Resource Management) measurements in idle/inactive states . NR-Based Access to Unlicensed spectrum To expand 5G’s reach, 3GPP completed two projects in Release 16 that are key for new vertical use cases. One of them is 5G NR-U, that allows 5G to operate in unlicensed spectrum. It defines two operation modes, anchored NR-U requiring an anchor in licensed or shared spectrum and standalone NR-U that utilizes only unlicensed spectrum.

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text: Time sensitive networking (TSN) As part of the effort for 5G to support new Industry 4.0 use cases such as factory automation, 5G RAN Release 16 added support for TSN integration that can ensure time-deterministic delivery of data packets. Precision geolocation 3GPP support location service features, to allow new and innovative location-based services to be developed. 5G specifications make possible to identify and report the current location of the user’s terminal and to make the information available to the user, ME, network operator, service provider, value added service providers and for PLMN internal operations40 Enhancements in high-precision positioning brought by 5G NR Release 16, meet accuracy targets of 3 meters indoors and 10 meters outdoors. 3.6.2 SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS In recent years, a large body of literature has revealed numerous security and privacy issues in 4G mobile networks. Most of the published attacks at the 4G RAN layer involve Rogue Base Stations (RBSs) or IMSI catchers to target individual user(s) during the UE’s initial attach procedure to the network or paging attacks using the IMSI paging feature. In such attacks, the information obtained on IMSIs may be used later for other types of attacks . 5G NR technologies address and close known IMSI threats, but new functionalities in the Release 16 also bring security considerations that are subject to open studies: Security of Ultra-Reliable Low-Latency Communication (URLLC) URLLC needs to support both high reliability and low latency. In order to ensure the high reliability, redundant transmission in 5GS is supported on multiple user plane data paths. Accordingly, the applicable security mechanisms for supporting redundant transmission cover all aspect of the communication, including PDU session establishment, handover etc. As for the low latency aspect, the other important requirements for URLLC include QoS Monitoring to assist URLLC service and optimization for handover procedure. The security considerations in this case are covered as well. Additional security aspects are related to control plane and user plane optimizations for ensuring the high reliability and reducing latency . Related components: gNB, interfaces: Uu, F1, Xn Security of NR Integrated Access and Backhaul A study is underway at 3GPP to identify potential security threats and vulnerabilities that are applicable to the new IAB architecture . Key security issues include Topology Discovery and Masquerading, IAB Node Authentication to prevent connection of false IAB-node and manipulation of Radio Link Failure recovery and security of F1 interface.

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text: Related components: IAB Donor, IAB UE, F1 interface Vulnerability to Radio Jamming Attacks As any wireless cellular networks, 5G networks are built upon open sharing in which the communication medium is the free frequency space making them prone to interference. This weakness can be used by some adversary nodes to cause intentional interference and hinder legitimate user’s communication over specific wireless channels. 5G improves resilience against jamming attacks over the 4G LTE, but remains vulnerable to customised attacks. Massive MIMO deployment may be vulnerable to jamming attacks . Jamming attacks are a special concern for mission-critical applications. Related components: Uu Failure to meet General Security Assurance Requirements Security of 5G RAN is built upon the permanent update of Security Assurance Requirements for critical network components such as gNB. However, a security update gap between new security requirements and deployment of updated versions of network functions in operational systems will unavoidably exist. There are two major factors in reducing this gap: a) vendors’ responsiveness in issuing and validating new versions of the network functions that address the updated requirements, and b) timeliness and effectiveness of MNO processes to update operational systems to recently released and SCASevaluated versions. Affected components: gNB 3.7 NETWORK FUNCTION VIRTUALISATION (NFV) – MANO (ZOOM-IN) NFV introduces a new concept for service providers to accelerate the deployment of new network services in support of their revenue and growth plans. It translates to the use of standard IT virtualisation technologies applied to the deployment of Network Functions, aiming at a faster provision of new network services. With this, several providers formed the NFV ISG under the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI). The foundation of NFV’s 4546 basic requirements and architecture resulted from the work produced by ETSI NFV ISG . Although 5G networks will be very different compared to its predecessors in some regards (e.g. through the use of virtualisation and support for diverse and critical non-telecom-oriented services), they still share similarities and will reuse and extend existing concepts that have proved successful and are widely adopted. The NFV has a tight interaction with Virtual Network Functions (VNF), MANO and OSS/BSS and security management components. The NFV ‘Zoom-in’ presented in Figure 7 refers to all relevant Core Network and Access Network Functions, as defined by the 3GPP specification and outlined in their respective zoom-ins. The structure of NFV has remained almost unchanged. The updates of NFV introduced, constitute an evolution of previous specifications and concentrate mainly in the adaptation of functions virtualization to various requirements dictated by the needs of various components. At

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text: the same time, they contain provisions to adapt NFV to recent cloud, software, and virtualization techniques, novel management architectural styles and operationalization aspects. Also, the 3GPP Network Slicing Management system consumes management interfaces provided by NFV MANO for purposes such as Network Slice Lifecycle Management (LCM), Virtual Network Function LCM, Performance, Fault and Configuration Management. The structure of NFV architecture and its interfaces to related components is shown in the following figure. Figure 7: NFV architecture Zoom-in The elements of the NFV architecture are as follows: Element Short description

text: Operations Support OSS/BSS functions provide management and orchestration of systems including System/Business Support legacy ones and may have full end-to-end visibility of services provided by legacy System (OSS/BSS) network functions in an operator's network. Processes covered by OSS/BSS include: Network Management, Service delivery / fulfilment / assurance, Customer Relationship management and Billing.

text: Virtualised Network A VNF is a virtualisation of a network function in a legacy non-virtualised network. Function (VNF) ETSI GS NFV 001 provides a list of use cases and examples of target network functions (NFs) for virtualisation. Functional behaviour and state of a NF are largely independent of whether the NF is virtualised or not. The functional behaviour and the external operational interfaces of a Physical Network Function (PNF) and a VNF are expected to be the same. All Core and Access Network functions in the 5G system are potential subjects of virtualisation, in certain implementation scenarios.

text: Element Management The Element Management is responsible for:

text: (EM)

text:  Configuration for the network functions provided by the VNF.  Fault management for the network functions provided by the VNF.  Accounting for the usage of VNF functions.  Collecting performance measurement results for the functions provided by the VNF.  Security management for the VNF functions.

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text: Element Short description

text: NFV Infrastructure (NFVI) The NFV Infrastructure is the totality of all hardware and software components which build up the environment in which VNFs are deployed, managed and executed. The NFV Infrastructure can span across several locations, i.e. places where NFVI-PoPs are operated. The network providing connectivity between these locations is regarded to be part of the NFV Infrastructure. From the VNF's perspective, the virtualisation layer and the hardware resources look like a single entity providing the VNF with desired virtualised resources.

text: Hardware Resources In NFV, the physical hardware resources include computing, storage and network that provide processing, storage and connectivity to VNFs through the virtualisation layer (e.g. hypervisor). Computing hardware is assumed to be COTS as opposed to purpose-built hardware. Storage resources can be differentiated between shared network attached storage (NAS) and storage that resides on the server itself. Computing and storage resources are commonly pooled. Network resources are comprised of switching functions, e.g. routers, and wired or wireless links.

text: Virtualisation Layer and The virtualisation layer abstracts the hardware resources and decouples the VNF Virtualised Resources software from the underlying hardware, thus ensuring a hardware independent lifecycle for the VNFs. In short, the virtualisation layer is responsible for: •Abstracting and logically partitioning physical resources, commonly as a hardware abstraction layer. •Enabling the software that implements the VNF to use the underlying virtualised infrastructure. •Providing virtualised resources to the VNF, so that the latter can be executed.

text: Virtualised Infrastructure From NFV's point of view, virtualised infrastructure management comprises the Manager functionalities that are used to control and manage the interaction of a VNF with computing, storage and network resources under its authority, as well as their virtualisation. According to the list of hardware resources specified in the architecture, the Virtualised Infrastructure Manager performs resource and operations management.Multiple Virtualised Infrastructure Manager instances may be deployed.

text: NFV Orchestrator The NFV Orchestrator is in charge of the orchestration and management of NFV infrastructure and software resources, and realizing network services on NFVI.

text: VNF Manager VNF Manager is responsible for VNF lifecycle management (e.g. instantiation, update, query, scaling, and termination). Multiple VNF Managers may be deployed; a VNF Manager may be deployed for each VNF, or a VNF Manager may serve multiple VNFs.

text: Os-Ma-nfvo This reference point is used for exchanges between OSS/BSS and NFV Orchestrator, and supports the following: • Network Service Descriptor and VNF package management; • Network Service instance lifecycle management; • VNF lifecycle management; • Policy management and/or enforcement for Network Service instances, VNF instances and NFVI resources; • Querying relevant Network Service instance and VNF instance information from the OSS/BSS; • Forwarding of events, accounting and usage records and performance measurement results regarding Network Service instances, VNF instances, and NFVI resources to OSS/BSS, as well as and information about the associations between those instances and NFVI resources.

text: Ve-Vnfm-em This reference point is used for exchanges between EM and VNF Manager, and supports the following:

text: VNF instantiation / VNF instance query / VNF instance update / VNF instance scaling out-in, and up-down / VNF instance termination / Forwarding of configuration and events from the EM to the VNFM / Forwarding of configuration and events regarding the VNF from the VNFM to the EM.

text: NOTE: This reference point is only used if the EM is aware of virtualisation.

text: Ve-Vnfm-vnf This reference point is used for exchanges between VNF and VNF Manager, and supports the following:

text: VNF instantiation / VNF instance query / VNF instance update / VNF instance scaling out-in, and up-down / VNF instance termination / Forwarding of configuration and

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text: Element Short description

text: events from the VNF to the VNFM / Forwarding of configuration and events regarding VNF, from the VNFM to the VNF / Verification that the VNF is still alive/functional.

text: NFVI - Virtualised This reference point is used for: Specific assignment of virtualised resources in Infrastructure Manager response to resource allocation requests / Forwarding of virtualised resources state (Nf-Vi) information / Hardware resource configuration and state information (e.g. events) exchange.

text: NFV Security Manager NSM is the logical functional block for overall security management, e.g. on the behalf (NSM) of network services. In cooperation with MANO blocks dedicated to managing the virtualised network, the policy driven NSM is specialized to manage the security on a network service over its entire lifecycle. It covers the following functionalities: • Security Policy Planning designs and optimizes security policies for specific targets of protection (e.g. network services); • Security Policy Enforcement & Validation automates the deployment and supports lifecycle management of security functions as defined in the design phase, then configure security policies on the security functions. In addition, during lifetime of a network service, the validation and reconfiguration/remediation of associated security policies is supported, also in automated manner; • NFVI Security Manager (ISM) – see below.

text: NFVI Security Manager NFVI Security Manager is the logical function dedicated to security management in (ISM) NFVI layer. It builds and manages the security in NFVI to support NSM requests for managing security of network services in higher layer.

text: Security Element SEM refers to Element Manager managing Security Functions.

text: Manager (SEM)

text: Virtual Security Function This element is a special type of VNF running on top of NFVI with tailored security (VSF) functionality (e.g. firewall, IDS/IPS, virtualised security monitoring functions like vFEP, vTap). VSFs are mainly required to protect the other VNFs, which constitute a network service. VSF is managed by either dedicated VNFM or generic VNFM with respect to its lifecycle.

text: NFVI-based Security This element is a security function provided by the NFV Infrastructure. It includes Function (ISF) virtualised security appliances or software security features (e.g. hypervisor-based firewalls) and hardware-based security appliances/modules/features (e.g. Hardware Security Modules, Crypto Accelerators, or Trusted Platform Modules).

text: Physical Security This element is a conventionally realized security function in the physical part of the Function (PSF) hybrid network. Even if a telco network is virtualised, additional PSFs are still needed, for instance to protect the NFV infrastructure (and inherently, the Network Services running on top) as a whole. PSF is part of the non-virtualised traditional network and not maintained by the NFVI provider, hence it is managed by the SEM instead of the VIM.

text: NFVI - Virtualised This reference point is used for: specific assignment of virtualised resources in Infrastructure Manager response to resource allocation requests / Forwarding of virtualised resources state (NF-Vi) information / Hardware resource configuration and state information (e.g. events) exchange.

text: 3.7.1 ELEMENTS OF NOVELTY (RELEASE 4) The ETSI Industry Specification Group for Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV) has started working in 2019 on its next specification release, known as Release 4. Release 4 addresses several issues in the following technical areas: the evolution of the NFV framework to support the most recent cloud, software, and virtualization techniques; novel management architectural styles and operationalization aspects, leveraging virtualization characteristics to simplify deployments; and increased support for automation.

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text: Key areas of focus for the NFV Release 4 include :  NFVI evolution, focusing on enhancements to support lightweight virtualization technologies such as OS containers, optimizing NFV Infrastructure (NFVI) abstraction for reducing the coupling of VNFs to infrastructure  Enhancing NFV automation and capabilities, covering aspects such as: improving life-cycle management and orchestration, the simplification of VNF and NS management aspects leveraging virtualization, and handling advances in autonomous networking  Evolving the NFV-MANO (Management and Orchestration) framework, focusing primarily on optimizing internal NFV-MANO capability exposure and usage, and on enhanced reliability and availability  Accompanying operationalization aspects which include: the simplification of NFV to ease development and deployment of sustainable NFV based solutions, verification and certification procedures and mechanisms, and operationalization, integration and use of NFV with other management and network frameworks  In addition to the above technical areas, several security hardening aspects of NFV and other small specific technical enhancements necessary to maximize the impact of virtualization and future NFV deployments are also expected to be part of the work programme The "Release 4 Definition" lists all the new features proposed for the Release 4. Among other features that had not been fully completed in the previous Release and have been carried over into Release 4, the list of new features includes:  Network connectivity integration and operational for NFV  NFV-MANO automation and autonomous networks  NFV enhancements for 5G  Multi-tenancy enhancements for NFV-MANO  Service-based architecture (SBA) for NFV-MANO  VNF generic management functions, and  Continuous VNF integration However, the current network architecture of the operators differs in critical points from the envisioned ETSI NFV architecture. Even if NFV technologies have proven successful technologies in the IT industry, some adaption is needed to accommodate the special needs of the telecommunications industry. Currently, traditional network functions are coupled with underlying dedicated hardware, which are vendor proprietary. Network virtualization migration from traditional network functions to the ETSI NFV architecture involves restructuring infrastructure, service functions, and operation and maintenance (O&M) . Further consideration is needed for allocation of resources for critical infrastructure services. Sharing of such resources may not be allowed by national regulators for considerations of availability, response time and confidentiality. Similarly, NFV functions part of Release 4, such as Multi-tenancy enhancements for NFV-MANO or Continuous VNF integration, will face adoption hurdles because of national certification and authorisation schemes.

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text: 3.7.2 SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS Virtualization NFV benefits from the inherent security protection brought by the virtualization layer . The security threats associated with VNFs are the combination of the security threats on physical networking and on virtualization technologies. VNFs run over virtual resources such as VMs and cross-contamination for shared hardware resources is possible, in particular MNO should carefully investigate risks to operate VNF categorized as critical with others VNF on the same physical resources. Virtualization brings with it some new attack surface with known vulnerabilities in virtualization environments. If hypervisor is compromised, other vulnerabilities can arise exponentially. There are potential security issues associated with NFVI, considering some potential attack scenarios such as VM escape attack, attack on hypervisor management interface, denial of service (DoS), DNS amplification attack. A 3GPP Study considers the consequences of virtualisation on 3GPP architectures, in order to identify threats and subsequent security requirements. To adequate security in virtualised deployments, the underlying infrastructure needs to provide minimum security capabilities in a standardised form which can be requested and or consumed at the 3GPP layer. Related component(s): VIM, Virtualisation Layer, NFVI Management Interfaces / APIs One of the security challenges is to define the standard interface in the ETSI NFV architecture. New APIs introduce new threat vectors. Standardisation of interfaces will address security from design phase. Management Interfaces / APIs must have safeguards in place to avoid being manipulated in unintended ways to cause disruption. Security challenges are related to Web/API vulnerabilities, Account compromise, Privileged User Access, Unauthorized access, Unauthorized data/packet, Inspection / Modification of data, compromise of MANO components. Improper enforcement of security policies, or improper updating policy rules and data access procedures, allowing attackers to gain access to the NFV MANO module and further perform unauthorized control for all operations. Related component(s): Os-Ma-nfvo, Ve-Vnfm-em, Ve-Vnfm-vnf Localisation of functions Attacks aiming to place and migrate workload outside the legal boundaries were not possible using traditional infrastructure. Using NFV, violation of regulatory policies and laws becomes possible by moving one VNF from a legal location to another illegal location, because there is no mechanism to enforce georestrictions. Related component(s): NFVO, VNFM, VIM

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text: 3.8 SOFTWARE DEFINED NETWORK (SDN) (ZOOM-IN) 5G will be driven by the influence of software on network functions, known as software defined network (SDN) and network function virtualisation (NFV). The key concept that underpins SDNs is the logical centralisation of network control functions by decoupling the control and packet-forwarding functionality of the network. While SDN separates the control and forwarding planes, NFV primarily focuses on optimizing the network services themselves. NFV complements this vision through the virtualisation of these functionalities based on recent advances in general server and enterprise IT virtualisation. In this document, the provisions regarding SDN threats are the ones described in the ENISA Thematic Landscape SDN/5G . As previously mentioned, the fundamental concept of SDN relies on decoupling of the control and packet forwarding functionality of the network. In classic networks, these two functionalities were the responsibility of the forwarding devices of the network. In SDN, these two functionalities have been separated into two functionality planes: the control plane and the data plane. The separation of these two functionality planes in SDNs has two significant consequences: a) it reduces the difficulty in the configuration and alteration of the control functions of the network, as this functionality has no longer the responsibility of the forwarding devices of the network that tend to have proprietary implementations (e.g., operating systems), and b) it enables the implementation of more consistent control policies through fewer and uniformly accessible controllers. The typical SDN architecture, as described by the Open Networking Foundation , is shown in the following figure. Figure 7: SDN architecture Zoom-in

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text: The elements of the SDN architecture are as follows: Element Short description

text: SDN controller SDN Controller: The SDN Controller is a logically centralized entity in charge of: • Translating the requirements from the SDN Application layer down to the SDN Resources and • Providing the SDN Applications with an abstract view of the network (which may include statistics and events). SDN controller is the “brain” of SDN network. An SDN controller manages flow control to the switches/routers ‘below’ (via southbound APIs) and the applications and business logic ‘above’ (via northbound APIs) to deploy intelligent networks .

text: SDN Application SDN Applications are programs that explicitly, directly, and programmatically communicate their network requirements and desired network behaviour to the SDN Controller. Multiple case scenarios might be envisioned, for the position of the SDN applications in the NFV architectural framework, such as: • The network hardware might be a physical appliance talking to an SDN controller, or a complete solution including multiple SDN components, such as SDN controller + SDN application for instance; • The VIM might be an application interfacing with an SDN controller in the NFVI - for instance OpenStack Neutron as a VIM interfacing with an SDN controller in the NFVI; • The SDN application might be a VNF talking to an SDN controller, being virtualised or not. For instance, a PCRF VNF might talk to an SDN controller for some policy management for traffic steering; • The SDN application might be an element manager interfacing with an SDN controller to collect some metrics or configure some parameters; • The SDN application might be an application interfacing with an SDN controller for instance in the OSS-BSS for tenant SDN service definitions.

text: SDN resources Multiple scenarios might be envisaged for the actual location of SDN resources: • physical switch or router; • virtual switch or router; • e-switch, software based SDN enabled switch in a server NIC; • switch or router as a Virtual network function (VNF).

text: Northbound Interface SDN Northbound Interfaces are interfaces between SDN Applications and SDN Controllers and typically provide abstract network views and enable direct expression of network behaviour and requirements. This may occur at any level of abstraction (latitude) and across different sets of functionalities (longitude). One value of SDN lies in the expectation that these interfaces are implemented in an open, vendor-neutral and interoperable way .

text: Southbound Interface The SDN Southbound Interface is the interface defined between an SDN Controller and an SDN Data-path, which provides at least: • programmatic control of all forwarding operations; • capabilities advertisement; • statistics reporting, and • event notification.

text: One value of SDN lies in the expectation that the Southbound Interface is implemented in an open, vendor-neutral and interoperable way.

text: Eastbound-Westbound This interface is implemented by the different controllers of the SDN and is used to facilitate Interface communications between them (Controller – Controller interface).

text: Control Plane (CP) The plane responsible for the control functionality of the network. Part of the network that is assigned to control one or more SDN resources. CP instructs network devices how to treat and forward packets. The Control Plane (CP) communicates with Data Plane (DP) of devices using a control plane Southbound Interface (SBI).

text: Data Plane (DP) or The plane responsible for the data forwarding functionality of the network. The functionality Forwarding Plane (FP) of this plane is realized through a set of physical network devices (network elements).

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text: 3.8.1 ELEMENTS OF NOVELTY Software-defined network (SDN) radically changes the network architecture by decoupling the network logic from the underlying forwarding devices. This architectural change rejuvenates the network-layer granting centralized management and programmability of the networks. From a security perspective, SDN separates security concerns into control and data plane, and this architectural re-composition brings up exciting opportunities and challenges. The overall perception is that SDN capabilities will ultimately result in improved security. However, in its raw form, SDN could potentially make networks more vulnerable to attacks and harder to protect. Although nothing comes without risks or trade-offs, when it comes to security and SDN clearly the security benefits of SDN outweigh security risks . 3.8.2 SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS Control Plane SDN provides a logically centralized control plane to the network. The controller of the network maintains a global view of the network and programs forwarding devices as per the policies defined at the application layer. While initially controllers were developed as single devices, recently there has been a shift of trend to distributed controllers with the goal of adjusting to scalability and reliability requirements of real-world scenarios. In this case, each set of forwarding devices is assigned to a specific instance of controllers and the controllers, follow a Master/Slave deployment model. Control Plane attack refers to the case where an attacker may deduce the forwarding policy of the network just by analysing the performance metrics of a forwarding device. For example, an input buffer may be used to identify rules, and by analysing the packet processing times, an attacker could identify the forwarding policy. Related component(s): Control Plane, SDN controller Data Plane The data plane is composed of networking equipment such as switches and routers specialized in packet forwarding. However, unlike traditional networks, these are just simple forwarding elements with no embedded intelligence to take autonomous decisions. These devices communicate through standard OpenFlow interfaces with the controller - which ensures configuration and communication compatibility and interoperability among different devices. A Protocol Attack refers to attacks targeting the data plane of an SDN by exploiting network protocol vulnerabilities in the forwarding devices . A Device Attack refers to all those attacks, where the adversary aims to exploit software or hardware vulnerabilities of an SDN-capable switch to compromise SDN’s data plane. In this case, an attacker may target software bugs (e.g., firmware attacks) or hardware features (e.g., TCAM memory) of a forwarding device. Related component(s): Data Plane, SDN resources

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text: Programmable Interfaces (APIs)/ SDN Programming languages There the attacks against the Southbound API of an SDN include: Interaction, Eavesdrop, Availability and TCP-attacks. While with an Eavesdrop Attack, the attacker aims to learn about information exchanged between the control and data plane as part of a larger attack plot, in an Manipulation Attack the attacker’s goal is to corrupt the network behaviour by modifying the messages being exchanged. The Availability Attack refers to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, where the Southbound API is flooded with requests causing the network policy implementation to fail. Attackers can infer flow rules in SDN from probing packets by evaluating the delay time from probing packets and classifying them into classes. Knowing the reactive rules, attackers can launch DoS attacks by sending numerous rule-matched packets which trigger packet-in packets to overburden the controller. Similar to SDN’s Southbound API, the Northbound API is susceptible to Interception, Eavesdrop and Availability. Attacks. While the nature of both attacks is similar, there are a few key differences:  An attacker targeting the Northbound API requires higher-level of access to the system and is potentially sitting on the application plane. There may be cases that the applications do not run on the same device and in that case the attack complexity may be reduced as to Southbound API.  The impacts of a compromised Northbound API are potentially larger given that information exchanged between the control and application plane affect network-wide policies. Unlike Southbound API, where OpenFlow is adopted as the standard, the Northbound API lacks any standardization. Specifically, each controller has different specifications for the Northbound API, and this leads to insecure developments . Another issue that needs to be looked at is the potential exposure caused by SDN programming languages (e.g. P4 Programming Protocol-independent Packet Processors), used to dynamically reconfigure the network. The use of these extremely dynamic and event-based languages increases the attack surface. Although these languages have not been considered in the current document, it is proposed to perform a detailed analysis of their misuse potential in prospective, more detailed threat assessments. Related component(s): Northbound Interfaces, Southbound Interfaces, Eastbound-Westbound Interface Virtualization There are threats related to the underlying IT infrastructure used for virtualising network operations, like: Virtualised host abuse, Data-Centre threats, Network Virtualization bypassing. Related component(s): Control Plane, Data Plane 3.9 MULTI-ACCESS EDGE COMPUTING (MEC) (ZOOM-IN) Multi-access Edge Computing (MEC) stands for the provision of cloud computing capabilities at the edge of the network, that is, for high bandwidth, low latency end-user applications. MEC is located in the logical vicinity of base stations through authorised third parties willing to offer processing and storage capabilities to subscribers of the 5G network. MEC is a novel approach

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text: in the 5G ecosystem that enhances mobile user experience by covering services that, in previous generations, were using the run-time of end-user devices. MEC provides a new ecosystem and value chain. Operators can open their Radio Access Network (RAN) edge to authorized third-parties, allowing them to flexibly and rapidly deploy innovative applications and services towards mobile subscribers, enterprises and vertical segments. Multi-access Edge Computing will enable new vertical business segments and services for consumers and enterprise customers. Use cases include:  video analytics;  location services;  Internet-of-Things (IoT);  augmented reality;  optimized local content distribution and  data caching. It is expected that MEC is going to emerge following the evolution of application services and verticals and will be one of the main drivers for a wider coverage and penetration of 5G Networks. Besides offering these services, MEC takes an important role in the 5G infrastructure. It possesses orchestration functions, interacts with the 5G policy component and supports lifecycle matters of the offered applications. By deploying various services and caching content at the network edge, Mobile core networks are alleviated of further congestion and can efficiently serve local purposes. The structure of MEC and its elements is shown in the figure below: Figure 8: MEC architecture Zoom-in

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text: The elements of MEC are as follows: Element Short description

text: Customer facing service The customer facing service portal allows operators' third-party customers (e.g. (CFS) portal commercial enterprises) to select and order a set of MEC applications that meet their particular needs, and to receive back service level information from the provisioned applications.

text: Device application Device applications as defined in the present document are applications in the device (e.g. UE, laptop with internet connectivity) that have the capability to interact with the MEC system via a user application lifecycle management proxy.

text: Application Client(s) Application Client is the application resident in the UE performing the client function.

text: Edge Enabler Client (EEC) Edge Enabler Client (EEC) provides supporting functions needed for Application Client(s).

text: Functionalities of Edge Enabler Client are: • retrieval and provisioning of configuration information to enable the exchange of Application Data Traffic with the EAS; • discovery of EAS available in the Edge Data Network.

text: Edge Configuration Server Edge Configuration Server (ECS) provides supporting functions needed for the (ECS) Edge Enabler Client to connect with an EES. Functionalities of ECS are: • Provisioning of Edge configuration information to the Edge Enabler Client. The Edge configuration information includes the following: o the information for the EEC to connect to the EES (e.g. service area information applicable to LADN); and o the information for establishing a connection with EES (such as URI).

text: User application lifecycle The user application lifecycle management proxy allows device applications to management (LCM) proxy request on-boarding, instantiation, termination of user applications and when supported, relocation of user applications in and out of the MEC system. It also allows informing the device applications about the state of the user applications. The user application lifecycle management proxy authorizes requests from device applications in the device and interacts with the OSS and the multi-access edge orchestrator for further processing of these requests.

text: Multi-access edge The multi-access edge orchestrator is the core functionality in MEC system level orchestrator management, responsible for the following functions: maintaining an overall view of the MEC system; on-boarding of application packages; selecting appropriate MEC host(s) for application instantiation; triggering application instantiation and termination; triggering application relocation as needed when supported.

text: MEC host MEC host is an entity that contains a MEC platform and a virtualisation infrastructure which provides compute, storage, and network resources, for the purpose of running MEC applications.

text: Virtualisation infrastructure It provides compute, storage, and network resources for the MEC applications. The virtualisation infrastructure includes a data plane that executes the traffic rules received by the MEC platform, and routes the traffic among applications, services, DNS server/proxy, 3GPP network, other access networks, local networks and external networks.

text: MEC platform It is the collection of essential functionalities required to run MEC applications on a particular virtualisation infrastructure and enable them to provide and consume MEC services. The MEC platform can also provide services.

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text: Element Short description

text: Edge Enabler Server (EES) Edge Enabler Server (EES) provides supporting functions needed for EAS and EEC. Functionalities of EES are: • provisioning of configuration information to EEC, enabling exchange of application data traffic with the EAS; • supporting the functionalities of API invoker and API exposing function58 as specified in 3GPP TS 23.222; • interacting with 3GPP Core Network for accessing the capabilities of network functions either directly (e.g. via PCF) or indirectly (e.g. via SCEF/NEF/SCEF+NEF); • support the functionalities of application context transfer; • supports external exposure of 3GPP network capabilities to the EAS over EES interface.

text: MEC applications MEC applications are instantiated on the virtualisation infrastructure of the MEC host, based on configuration or requests validated by the MEC management.

text: Edge Application Server Edge Application Server (EAS) is the application server resident in the Edge Data (EAS) Network, performing the server functions. The Edge Application Server may consume the 3GPP Core Network capabilities: invoke 3GPP Core Network function APIs directly, invoke 3GPP Core Network capabilities through the EES or invoke the 3GPP Core Network capability through the capability exposure functions (i.e. SCEF or NEF).

text: MEC service It is a service provided via the MEC platform either by the MEC platform itself or by a MEC application.

text: Service registry In MEC, the services produced by the MEC applications are registered in the service registry of the MEC platform – as opposed to the network functions and the services they produce which are registered in the Network Resource Function (NRF).

text: Application Data Traffic Data traffic between the application installed on the User Equipment (UE) and the application server (EAS / MEC App).

text: MEC host level management It handles the management of the MEC specific functionality of a particular MEC host and the applications running on it. Is comprised of the MEC platform manager and the virtualisation infrastructure manager.

text: MEC platform manager The MEC platform manager is responsible for the following functions: • Managing the life cycle of applications including informing the multi-access edge orchestrator of relevant application related events; • Providing element management functions to the MEC platform and • Managing the application rules and requirements.

text: The MEC platform manager also receives virtualised resources fault reports and performance measurements from the virtualisation infrastructure manager for further processing.

text: Virtualisation infrastructure The functionality provided by the virtualisation infrastructure manager in this ‘Zoommanager in’ overlaps generally with the functionality provided by the VIM described in the NFV ‘Zoom-in’.

text: 3.9.1 ELEMENTS OF NOVELTY ETSI ISG MEC and 3GPP have both worked on their own architectures for edge computing within the boundaries of their different scopes. Their common purpose is to create an open and standardized IT service environment for hosting and supporting third-party applications in edge environments. Synergized Mobile Edge Cloud Architecture provides common practices to

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text: developers such that they can create a single application software module running on common edge environments. At the heart of the ETSI ISG MEC and 3GPP SA6 architectures lie the MEC Platform/Edge Enabler Server and the MEC Applications/Edge Application Servers respectively. There is a great degree of synergy in the two architectures on these aspects, and in the information carried between these functional entities. ETSI GR MEC 031 will provide solution proposals and recommendations for MEC integration into 3GPP 5G system. On the other hand, 3GPP TS 23.558 Architecture for enabling Edge Applications (Release 17) provides application layer architecture and related procedures for enabling edge applications over 3GPP networks. 3.9.2 SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS Virtualization and containerization Cloud computing will leverage on multiple virtualized systems in order to optimize available resources and deliver on its proposed benefits. Cloud native MEC provides inherent security protection due to the isolation and containerization.  Each container performs a dedicated function, enhancing behaviour profiling and anomaly detection.  Isolation of containers prevents spread of malware and viruses.  Decomposed software provides efficient software version updates and security patches.  Compute services in cloud-native applications are designed to be ephemeral, reducing the attack surface.  Resiliency is gained with increased speed to start a container and horizontal scale to dynamically respond to threats.  Segmentation with network slicing separates traffic and isolates compute resources. However, cloud native MEC architecture is exposed to a number of threats :  The uses of open source code, more interfaces, and new APIs introduce new threat vectors.  Shared hardware resources can result in cross-contamination.  Vulnerabilities in the shared host platform, Container-as-a-Service (CaaS) and Platform-asa-Service (PaaS) can impact the container security.  Containers requiring elevated privileges can cause security risk to both host as well as other tenant containers.  Dependency upon central orchestration introduces a new threat vector.  High data volume and sessions increase risk from an attack.  Applications running in a micro-service architecture are as vulnerable to the same attacks as traditional applications. Related component(s): Virtualisation infrastructure, MEC host, MEC applications Physical security Improper physical and environmental security of edge computing facilities can lead to destruction of edge computing facilities, unauthorised access at system level as an entry point to all hosted resources, theft of data on local storage.

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text: Edge computing facilities are, by their nature, seated in locations distributed geographically and this makes the physical security measures lower than a centralized Data Centre. Related component(s): MEC Host Application-Programming Interfaces (APIs) Edge Applications facilitate communication between application clients and applications deployed at the edge. The architecture enables the CAPIF (Common API Framework) to be leveraged as a standardized means of providing and accessing APIs in the Edge Cloud. The main purpose of CAPIF is to have a unified north bound API framework across several 3GPP functions. Application Programming Interface (API) Security is the design, processes, and systems that keep a web-based API responding to requests, securely processing data and functioning as intended. Like any software, APIs can be compromised and data can be stolen. Since APIs serve as conduits that reveal applications for third-party integration, they are susceptible to attacks. Related component(s): 3GPP SA6 interfaces, ETSI MEC interfaces Regulatory issues In European countries there is specific legislation on the implementation of the NIS directive The goal is to protect critical infrastructure that ensure national security. A critical service should be operated in an area with a security level compatible to this criticality. If an operator operates in a MEC environment a regulated critical service, it will have to demonstrate that its environment is compatible with the regulation imposed by the critical service in the particular country of operation. Physical and logical resources should not be shared with components which have not the same criticality. This constraint requires the right level of isolation around the service to prevent regulation pollution to its own components and infrastructures. A simple solution can be the complete segregation of physical resources between the operator's MEC functions and the 3rd party ones. Related component(s): Virtualisation infrastructure, MEC host, MEC Platform. 3.10 SECURITY ARCHITECTURE (SA) (ZOOM-IN) The 5G security architecture consists of various network functions (NF) and components that are responsible for securing end-to-end communications, providing authentication functions and various other security functions. The 5G security architecture consists of components that are part of various other architectures (“Zoom-ins” in terms of this report), acting thus in a horizontal manner across all other architectures. In particular, security functions are securing the access of users within the radio access network (RAN), they cover security functions in the core network and perimeter entities (edge computing) and they provide security functions in the Network Function Virtualization. Finally, a set of elements is covering security management functions, audit and analytics. The 5G security architecture is defined in 3GPP technical specification as spanning complementary different domains.

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text:  Network access security (I): the set of security features that enable a UE to authenticate and access services via the network securely, including the 3GPP access and Non- 3GPP access, and in particularly, to protect against attacks on the (radio) interfaces. In addition, it includes the security context delivery from SN to AN for the access security.  Network domain security (II): the set of security features that enable network nodes to securely exchange signalling data and user plane data.  User domain security (III): the set of security features that secure the user access to mobile equipment.  Application domain security (IV): the set of security features that enable applications in the user domain and in the provider domain to exchange messages securely. Application domain security is not in the scope of the present analysis.  SBA domain security (V): the set of security features that enables network functions of the SBA architecture to securely communicate within the serving network domain and with other network domains. Such features include network function registration, discovery, and authorisation security aspects, as well as the protection for the servicebased interfaces.  Visibility and configurability of security (VI): the set of features that enable the user to be informed whether a security feature is in operation or not. The detailed structure of the 5G security architecture is shown in the following figure. Figure 9: 5G Security architecture Zoom-in

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text: The elements of the 5G security architecture are as follows: Element Short description

text: Mobile Equipment (ME) ME stands for all kinds of mobile equipment that can be connected to the 5G network. ME can be sensors, IoT components, connected autonomous systems, eHealth devices, etc.

text: Universal Subscriber Identity USIM is the SIM card of 5G.It is a platform for securing access and communication Module (USIM) in 5G. It is the only security module mentioned in 3GPP specification.

text: 5G Node Base Station Central Some security requirements for gNB-CU have been formulated by 3GPPP. Though Unit (gNB-CU) not a security element per se, these requirements increase the security properties of gNB and – when implemented - are considered to be relevant to the security architecture.

text: Non-3GPP Access Network Security for non-3GPP access to the 5G Core network is achieved by a procedure using IKEv2 as defined in RFC 7296 to set up one or more IPsec ESP security associations. The role of IKE initiator (or client) is taken by the UE, and the role of IKE responder (or server) is taken by the N3IW.

text: Non-3GPP access Inter- This Network Function is responsible for interworking between untrusted non-3GPP Working Function (N3IWF) networks and the 5G Core. As such, the N3IWF supports both N2 and N3 based connectivity to the core, whilst supporting IPsec connectivity towards the device.

text: Access and Mobility The Core Access and Mobility Management Function is part of the 3GPP 5G Management Function (AMF) Architecture. Its primary tasks include registration Management, Connection Management, Reachability Management, Mobility Management and various function relating to security and access management and authorisation.

text: Security Anchor Function The SEAF will create for the primary authentication a unified anchor key KSEAF (SEAF) (common for all accesses) that can be used by the UE and the serving network to protect the subsequent communication .

text: Authentication server The Authentication server function (AUSF) shall handle authentication requests for function (AUSF) both, 3GPP access and non-3GPP access. The AUSF shall provide SUPI to the VPLMN (Core Network / Serving Network) only after authentication confirmation if authentication request with SUCI was sent by VPLMN. The AUSF shall inform the UDM that a successful or unsuccessful authentication of a subscriber has occurred.

text: Authentication credential ARPF selects an authentication method based on subscriber identity and Repository and Processing configured policy and computes the authentication data and keying materials

text: Function (ARPF)

text: User Data Management (UDM) Unified data management (UDM) manages network user data in a single, Function centralized element. UDM is similar to the 4G network's home subscriber service (HSS) but is cloud-native and designed for 5G specifically.

text: The SIDF is responsible for de-concealment of the Subscription Concealed Identifier (SUCI) and shall fulfil the following requirements: • The SIDF shall be a service offered by UDM; • The SIDF shall resolve the SUPI from the SUCI based on the protection scheme used to generate the SUCI.

text: Unstructured Data Repository Repository for management of unstructured data, designed to manage massive and (UDR) various types of unstructured data including text, image, audio and video.

text: Security Edge Protection The 5G System architecture introduces a Security Edge Protection Proxy (SEPP) Proxy (SEPP) as the entity sitting at the perimeter of the mobile network. The SEPP shall act as a non-transparent proxy node.

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text: Element Short description

text: Network Slice Specific The Network Slice Specific Authentication and Authorisation Function (NSSAAF) Authentication and supports the following functionality:

text: Authorisation Function

text: • Support for Network Slice-Specific Authentication and Authorisation as

text: (NSSAAF)

text: specified in TS 23.502 64with a AAA Server (AAA-S).

text: AAA-S In the optional-to-use Network slice-specific authentication and authorisation, an AAA server (AAA-S) may be owned by an external 3rd party enterprise.

text: AAA-P In the above-mentioned scenario, if the AAA-S belongs to a third party, the NSSAAF may contact the AAA-S via an AAA proxy. The NSSAA Function and the AAA-P may be co-located.

text: EAP-ID Network slice-specific authentication and authorisation uses a User ID and credentials, different from the 3GPP subscription credentials (e.g. SUPI and credentials used for PLMN access) and takes place after the primary authentication .

text: NFV Security Services Agent The NFV SSA exists in both the NFVI domain and in VNF domain. NFV SSA in (SSA) VNF domain may exist as a separate VSF, or within a VNF. The NFV SSA is responsible for securely receiving the Security Monitoring policy and implementing the same.

text: NFV Security Controller (SC) The NFV SC may interface with other security systems (e.g. Security Analytics), security databases and other policy engines. The NFV SC orchestrates system wide security policies. The NFV SC acts as a trusted 3rd party that resides independently.

text: An NFV SC manages NFV SSAs (like VSFs) to keep them in a consistent state according to the policy specified. SC also facilitates secure bootstrapping of SSAs (like VSFs), managing instances of SSAs, secure pairing up with SSA's VNFMs and EMs, personalize the SSAs, policy management, integrity assertion, credential management, facilitate clustering of multiple SSAs into a distributed appliance, monitoring of SSAs for failure and remediation.

text: NFV Security Services The NFV SSP is comprised within the VIM and VNFM, and is responsible for Provider (SSP) security monitoring policy orchestration received from the Security Controller (NFV SC) and interacting with the various VIM/VNFM components to implement the policy across various systems comprising the NFVI/VNF. Furthermore, NFV SSP is also responsible for receiving the telemetry data from various NFV SSAs, and optionally making some analysis based on this data.

text: NFV Security Monitoring The NFV SecM-DB is a secure database consisting of security data used for Database deploying NFV system wide Security Monitoring. This includes Security Monitoring policy and configurations, security credentials for facilitating secure communications between the various Security Monitoring components, and credentials for secure storage of telemetry, including tenant-specific security policies.

text: SA/VSF Catalogue Database The NFV VSF-VNF-CAT is a repository for Security Services Agents like the Virtual (VSF-NVNF-CAT) Security Functions (VSF) VNFs. The catalogue has capability to add and remove SSAs (VSF) packages and/or images, and also includes a VSF VNFD (VNF Descriptor) containing meta data and information about that VSF VNF. Once the SSA (VSF) package or instance is added to the catalogue, it becomes available for orchestration.

text: Audit DB The NFV AUD-DB is a secure database consisting of security audit information.

text: Security Monitoring Analytics The Security Monitoring Analytics system securely receives Security Monitoring System telemetry from across the NFV systems, including the MANO and all the NFVIs that may be geographically distributed. The analytics system applies advanced machine learning techniques on the telemetry to perform advanced detection of security anomalies and emerging threats in the system. This system also can trigger remediation actions through the NFV SC.

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text: Element Short description

text: Subscription Concealed A one-time use subscription identifier, which contains the Scheme-Output, and Identifier (SUCI) additional non-concealed information needed for home network routing and protection scheme usage.

text: Subscription Permanent In 5G, all subscribers will be allocated a globally unique 5G SUPI. Example SUPI Identifier (SUPI) formats include the IMSI and NAI (Network Access Identifier)

text: Authentication Vector A vector consisting of RAND, authentication Token (AUTN) and Hash eXpected RESponse (HXRES).

text: Anchor Key The security key KSEAF provided during authentication and used for derivation of subsequent security keys.

text: Key Hierarchy Hierarchy of cryptographic key derived from Anchor Key, (as defined in ETSI TS 133 501 section 6.2.). It includes the following keys: KAUSF, KSEAF, KAMF, KNASint, KNASenc, KN3IWF, KgNB, KRRCint, KRRCenc, KUPint and KUPenc.

text: 3.10.1 ELEMENTS OF NOVELTY While many new features in Release 16 contribute to increased security, the relevant addition at the level of Security Functions is the enhanced support for Network Slice-Specific Authentication and Authorisation. The feature allows the use of a User Identifier independent of existing identifiers relating to a 3GPP subscription or UE, for Network Slice-Specific Authentication and Authorisation. For such Network Slice Specific Identifiers, the AMF invokes an EAP-based Network Slice-Specific authentication procedure in which the AUSF exchanges AAA protocol messages with a potentially external AAA Server (AAA-S) via an optional AAA Proxy (AAA-P) to authenticate and authorize a UE for the network slice. Depending on the result of the procedure a UE is either authorized for a network slice, re-allocated to a different one or deregistered. . Other relevant security aspects of enhancing the 5G system include:  Security for enhanced Service Based Architecture  Security for User Plane Gateway Function for Inter-PLMN Security  Security aspects of Enhanced Network Slicing  Security for NR Integrated Access and Backhaul  Security aspects of Service Enabler Architecture Layer for Verticals  Security of evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System  3GPP profiles for cryptographic algorithms and security protocols Last but not least, Release 16 of 5G specifications include updated versions of the 5G Security Assurance Specifications (SCAS). SCAS provide an extensive description of the security requirements (including test cases) to demonstrate compliance of the network product with the security requirements defined by 3GPP. SCAS are continuously developed to embed solutions to disclosed vulnerabilities and ensure the security of 5G system’s critical components, and of the 5G system as a whole.

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text: The following SCAS requirements have been updated to reflect changes proposed by Release 16: TS 33.512 - Access and Mobility management Function (AMF) TS 33.514 - Unified Data Management (UDM) TS 33.515 - Session Management Function (SMF) TS 33.516 - Authentication Server Function (AUSF) TS 33.517 - Security Edge Protection Proxy (SEPP) TS 33.520 - Non-3GPP Inter-Working Function (N3IWF) 3.10.2 SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS No security considerations have been developed for this zoom-in. This is due to the fact that all security consideration covered in the rest of the zoom-ins constitute the entire set of security considerations, underlying thus its horizontal nature of security. Hence, it is considered that they cover this topic in an exhaustive manner and there is no need to be repeated in this section. 3.11 5G PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE (ZOOM-IN) One of the most relevant aspects in the transition from previous generations of mobile telecommunications into 5G is the fact that part of the network functions, previously performed by physical appliances, are now executed by software that virtualizes the functionality of physical components. Additionally, some of these physical components were mostly proprietary and incompatible with other solutions but with 5G, the network software can run in any commercial-of-the-shelf (COTS) hardware, allowing the operators to have more independence from manufacturers and share physical infrastructures among various tenants and applications. This significant change will allow great scalability, quicker deployments, cost efficiency and integration between different components of the network. On the other hand, the virtualisation of physical infrastructure components increases significantly the impact of failures: a shared physical component will serve multiple functions (e.g. virtual functions, slicing, user equipment functions, etc.), playing thus a significant role in the service provisioning chain. Nonetheless, the physical 5G architecture is going to remain exposed to more generic threats that are pertinent to physical components, such as damage/theft, sabotage, natural disasters, outages, failures and malfunctions, just to name the most important ones. While in previous mobile networks such failures had a more “restricted” influence in service provisioning, with the 5G virtualisation failures of physical components may have an amplified impact, typical to shared resources. This fact increases the criticality of 5G physical infrastructure components, as multiple services are going to depend on them. The 5G physical infrastructure is depicted in the following the figure.

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text: Figure 10: 5G physical infrastructure Zoom-in 3.11.1 ELEMENTS OF NOVELTY While 5G Release 16 does not bring any novelties to the physical infrastructure per se, a series of enhancements referred to in other sections of the document will impact the physical infrastructure and associated security considerations:  Integrated Access and Backhaul, eliminates the need for wired backhaul connection, allowing a speedier densification of the wireless network.  Improved support for non-public networks (NPN) will lead to an increase in deployment scenarios that involve private networks that utilize dedicated small cell base stations) that are independently managed to deliver locally-optimized applications. Further detail is given in section the 5G RAN zoom-in (see section Error! Reference source not f ound.). 3.11.2 SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS Impact of virtualisation Software Defined Networking (SDN) and Network Function Virtualization (NFV) allow disconnection of software execution from specific physical hardware and provide for better resilience and latency. SDN offers flexibility how to configure the routing paths between dynamically configured virtualized network functions. It should be noted, that container technology generates a bigger attack surface against systems (e.g. via supported APIs, and through intrinsically less security functions, by being a technology at initial maturity levels). However, softwarisation and virtualization of functions may increase availability and integrity requirements for shared physical resources, some of them placed in remote locations. Physical security controls for such resources should be commensurate with their respective importance. Affected components: Central DC, Local DC

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text: General Physical security considerations Physical security considerations valid for previous generations of mobile networks still apply. They focus around two general objectives: ensuring appropriate environmental conditions for equipment operations and protection of perimeters hosting sensitive assets. Special consideration must be given to equipment located in third party premises or otherwise remote facilities rooms. These should be protected using a risk-calibrated set of physical and environmental controls aimed to assure access control, monitoring, continuity of operations and protection against environmental disasters. Failure to do so may lead to unauthorised access, destruction of assets and impairment of operations. Related components: Local DC, gNB-DU, gNB-CU Threats to edge cloud computing resources The deployment of Edge Cloud computing resources at the edge of the network, in data centres or data rooms with significantly less physical control and protection than the central data centres expose important computing resources to physical security threats, which can lead to service compromise or even an access path to central resources. Affected components: Edge DC Vulnerability of air interface to jamming attacks As any wireless cellular networks, 5G networks are built upon open sharing over specific frequencies, making them prone to interference. This weakness can be used by some adversary nodes/equipment to cause intentional interference and hinder legitimate user’s communication over the spectrum of wireless channels dedicated to this technology. 5G improves resilience against jamming attacks over the 4G LTE, but remains vulnerable to customised attacks . Jamming attacks are a particular concern for mission-critical applications. Related components: Base stations 3.12 IMPLEMENTATION OPTIONS / MIGRATION PATHS ZOOM IN 5G can be deployed in different deployment options, where SA (standalone) options consist of only one generation of radio access technology and NSA options consist of two generations of radio access technologies (4G LTE and 5G). The early deployments will be adopting either nonstandalone option 3 or standalone option 2 as the standardisation of these two options have already been completed . Non-standalone option 3 is where radio access network is composed of eNBs (eNode Bs) as the master node and gNBs (gNode Bs) as the secondary node. The radio access network is connected to EPC (Evolved Packet Core). The NSA option 3, as it leverages existing 4G deployment, can be brought to market quickly with minor modification to the 4G network. This option also supports legacy 4G devices and the 5G devices only need to support NR (New Radio) protocols so device can also be developed quickly. On the other hand, NSA option 3 does not introduce 5GC and therefore may not be optimised for new 5G use cases beyond mobile broadband. In addition, depending on how 5G devices are

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text: developed, the EPC may need to be retained longer than in the case of having EPS (Evolved Packet System) for 4G alone (instead of supporting NSA Option 3). Standalone option 2 is where radio access network consists of only gNBs (gNode Bs) and connects to 5GC (5G Core), and the 5GC interworks with EPC. SA option 2 has no impact on LTE radio and can fully support all 5G use cases by enabling network slicing via cloud native service-based architecture. On the other hand, this option requires both NR and 5GC, making time-to-market slower and deployment cost higher than that of NSA option 3. Furthermore, the devices would need to support NR and core network protocols so it would take more time to develop devices. Finally, as the standalone 5G System would need to interwork with EPS to ensure service continuity depending on coverage, the interworking between EPC and 5GC may be necessary. Figure 11: Implementation options / Migration Paths The elements of the Option 3 Non-standalone architecture are: Element Short description

text: EPC Evolved Packet Core (EPC) is a framework for providing converged voice and data on a 4G Long-Term Evolution (LTE) network. 2G and 3G network architectures process and switch voice and data through two separate sub-domains: circuit-switched (CS) for voice and packet-switched (PS) for data. Evolved Packet Core unifies voice and data on an Internet Protocol (IP) service architecture and voice is treated as just another IP application.

text: EPC+ Evolved Packet Core (EPC) is the LTE Core Network. In order to support the Non-standalone deployments with LTE and NR technologies, the core network will need to undergo a series of improvements – hence the EPC+ designation. Envisaged improvements include increasing the bandwidth of the S1-U interface to meet the LTE/NSA transmission requirements. There are two typical scenarios for EPC upgrade to support 5G deployment. Scenario A: • Physical EPC is upgraded to support NSA; • Capacity expansion is based on physical EPC.

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text: Element Short description

text: Scenario B: • Build a new virtualized EPC network to support NSA independently; • Interoperability is made between the new virtualized EPC and the physical EPC; • Capacity expansion is based on the virtualized EPC.

text: At the time of this analysis, priority is given to Scenario B, which can be smoothly evolved to the target network through the expansion of virtualized EPC.

text: 5G Core Network (5GC) The core network is the central part of the 5G infrastructure and enables all functions related to multi-access technologies - see 5G Core Network zoom-in.

text: En-gNB En-gNB is a node providing NR user plane and control plane protocol terminations towards the UE, and acting as Secondary Node in EN-DC.

text: En-gNB is a gNB that supports legacy E-UTRAN interface.

text: MeNB (Master node) The LTE eNB is referred to as the MeNB to indicate that it is the ‘Master’ (M) base station controlling the ‘Secondary’ (S) 5G NR base station.

text: In MR-DC (Multi-Radio Dual Connectivity), the radio access node that provides the control plane connection to the core network. It may be a Master eNB (in EN-DC), a Master ngeNB (in NGEN-DC) or a Master gNB (in NR-DC and NE-DC).

text: X2 Interface X2 is an interface for the interconnection of two E-UTRAN NodeB (eNB) components and an E-UTRAN NodeB (eNB) and an E-UTRAN gNodeB (en-gNB) within the Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E-UTRAN) architecture. It is specified in the 3GPP 36.42x series of technical specifications.

text: The X2 interface provides capability to support radio interface mobility and Dual Connectivity either between eNBs or between eNBs and en-gNBs of UEs having a connection with E-UTRAN.

text: The list of functions on the X2 interface is the following: • Intra LTE-Access-System Mobility Support for ECM-CONNECTED UE; • Load Management; • Inter-cell Interference Coordination; • General X2 management and error handling functions; • Application level data exchange between eNBs • Trace functions; • Data exchange for self-optimisation; • E-UTRA-NR Dual Connectivity (EN-DC).

text: S1 Interface S1 interface for the interconnection of the evolved NodeB (eNB) component of the Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E-UTRAN) to the Core Network (CN) of the Evolved Packet System (EPS). It is specified in the 3GPP 36.41x series of technical specifications.

text: The S1 interface supports: • procedures to establish, maintain and release E-UTRAN Radio Access Bearers; • procedures to perform intra-LTE handover and inter-RAT handover; • the separation of each UE on the protocol level for user specific signalling management; • the transfer of NAS signalling messages between UE and EPC; • location services by transferring requests from the EPC to E-UTRAN, and location information from E-UTRAN to EPC; • mechanisms for resource reservation for packet data streams.

text: MME Mobility Management Entity (MME) is the key control-node for the LTE access-network. It is responsible for idle mode User Equipment (UE) paging and tagging procedure including retransmissions. It is involved in the bearer activation/deactivation process and is also responsible for choosing the Serving Gateway for a UE at the initial attach and at time of intra-LTE handover involving Core Network (CN) node relocation. It is responsible for authenticating the user (by interacting with the Home Subscriber Server). The Non Access Stratum (NAS) signalling terminates at the MME and it is also responsible for generation and allocation of temporary identities to UEs. It checks the authorisation of the UE to camp on the service provider's Public Land Mobile Network (PLMN) and enforces UE roaming restrictions.

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text: Element Short description

text: SGW The Serving Gateway (SGW) routes and forwards user data packets, while also acting as the mobility anchor for the user plane during inter-eNodeB handovers and as the anchor for mobility between LTE and other 3GPP technologies (terminating S4 interface and relaying the traffic between 2G/3G systems and Packet Data Network Gateway). For idle state User Equipment, the Serving Gateway terminates the downlink data path and triggers paging when downlink data arrives for the User Equipment. It manages and stores UE contexts, e.g. parameters of the IP bearer service, network internal routing information.

text: User Equipment (UE) User equipment is any device used by users to communicate within the 5G infrastructure. Besides a SIM, user equipment may be home appliances of any kind (e.g. computer, IoT devices, etc.).

text: 3.12.1 SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS Risks related to legacy technologies LTE networks and 5G NSA networks based on LTE core networks will continue to operate in the operators’ networks for years to come. Early 5G commercial launches are leveraging 3GPP’s Non-Standalone 5G specifications, meaning these early 5G NSA networks are required to use the LTE control plane protocols and the LTE Evolved Packet Core (EPC) network. Initial 5G NSA launches will deliver only Enhanced Mobile Broadband (eMBB) service so, any LTE threats and vulnerabilities will also exist in the 5G NSA network. Even after the operators upgrade their cell sites with 5G radios (gNBs) using the NSA architecture, some of these 5G NSA cell sites may operate as 5G NSA sites for years after Standalone 5G networks are operational. NSA architectures are expected to live alongside each other for a considerable period, so a series of legacy risks will remain active . Affected components: EPC, eNB INTER-RAT (Radio Access Technologies) Handover 3GPP has specified interworking that allows 5GC network functions to support interfaces to an EPC. Handover attempts to NR connected to 5GC from 4G LTE will occur, with active data sessions at risk of disruption if a roaming agreement exists for 4G, but not for 5G between PLMN’s. The MME can prevent such handover attempts by including RAT and Core Network Type restrictions in the Handover Restriction List to E-UTRAN . Roaming 5G NSA roaming is essentially 4G roaming because NSA uses the EPC for all Core Network functions. From a security perspective, a 5G NSA roaming connection introduces no new protection, since it continues to use Diameter, SIP/VoLTE and possibly SS7. Diameter and SS7 are vulnerable to eavesdropping including voice calls, reading text messages, and tracking phones. Note: This consideration is also relevant for 5G SA, as there will be a need for roaming agreements with non-5G networks, hence Diameter and SS7 attacks will still apply.

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text: For 5G SA the roaming flows will be considerably different, as HTTP/2 and JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) will be used versus the legacy Diameter protocol. Voice over New Radio (VoNR) will replace VoLTE in the 5G network and Security Edge Protection Proxy (SEPP) will establish a secure, encrypted connection with the roaming partner’s SEPP . As regards inter-operators Roaming, the following considerations need to be taken into account: - Authentication confirmation between 5G SA-Networks must be activated in order to address the voice&sms eavesdropping, as well as the tracking threats. But whether or not authentication confirmation will be activated/enforced depends on multiple parameters. -According to 33.501, SUPI “should” be encrypted while ME attaches in roaming scenario, but there are exceptions to this rule, which may become the norm if care is not taken. Affected components: EPC, eNB. Note: In roaming, components and procedures not specified by 3GPP play a role, for example those involved with CDR (Calling Data Record) exchange, such as NRTRDE (Near Real Time Roaming Data Exchange), SS7 Firewalls and SMS Firewalls. Failure to meet General Security Assurance Requirements The security assured by the EPC / 5G Core functions and the security of the Core Network itself is built upon the permanent update of Security Assurance Requirements for critical network components. Failure the ensure that early-deployed systems or sub-systems comply with updated security assurance requirements may lead to unsubstantiated trust in the security offered by the 5G system as a whole. 3.13 PROCESS MAP Telecommunication network security is more than a sum of technical specifications. Security is built and maintained by security-relevant processes, in four major areas: - Standardization: operators, vendors and other stake-holders set standards for how networks around the globe will work together. This also includes how best to protect networks and users against malicious actors. - Network design: vendors design, develop and implement the agreed standards for functional network elements and systems only, and warrant that they have a complete control and responsibility over the whole delivered systems, which play a crucial part in making the end network product both functional and secure. - Network configuration: at the deployment phase, networks are configured for a targeted security level, which is key to setting security parameters and further strengthening the security and resilience of the network. - Network deployment and operation: the operational processes which allow networks to function and deliver targeted levels of security are highly dependent on the deployment and operations of the network itself. While all stakeholders are relevant to ensure that security is embedded in the 5G System, design, implementation and operation, two stakeholders are of particular relevance to the

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text: cybersecurity of 5G network. On the one hand, mobile network operators (MNO) have a central, decision-making role, giving them leverage on the overall secure operation of their networks, and on the other hand, telecom equipment manufacturers, who are responsible for the provision of software and hardware required to operate networks and liable for any Trojan or uncontrolled piece of software delivered to MNO . To reflect this, in this section we highlight MNO and Vendor lifecycle processes and the associated security considerations, along with Security Assurance processes that span across several relevant stakeholder groups. 3.13.1 MNO Lifecycle Processes MNO Lifecycle processes are aligned with eTOM – enhanced Telecom Operation Map , and include all actions necessary to Design, Build and Operate the 5G Network. eTOM makes available a standard structure, terminology and classification scheme for describing business processes and their constituent building blocks. Of increased importance for the Secure Design, Implementation and Operation of the 5G System are the Resource and Supply Chain Development, Management and Operation Processes, as well as the Enterprise Risk management Processes. An overview of the MNO processes most critical to 5G system’s security over the Design, Build, Operate phases is presented in the figure below: Figure 12: MNO Lifecycle processes

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text: The description of MNO lifecycle processes in correlation with eTOM – enhanced Telecom Operation Map is presented below: Process Short description of the process

text: Resource capability delivery This category of processes coordinate and enact deployment of new technologies. These processes ensure that network and associated resources are deployed in timely and compliant manner.

text: This is why well-functioning of these processes is critical to coordinate major system changes such as transition to 5G

text: Resource development and This category of processes encompasses all processes in the Build phase charged retirement with development of new technologies and the associated resource types. These processes are also tasked with the initial decision to acquire external resources, therefore due needs to be taken to provide necessary controls that take into account all relevant risks. Last but not least, retirement or removal of certain technologies and associated resource types, are relevant in the context of transition to new technologies such as 5G.

text: Support Resource Support & Readiness processes are to ensure that appropriate resources are management and operation available and ready to support the Operation Phase processes.

text: - Support & Readiness

text: Key responsibilities of these processes that directly impact security of the 5G System include: operations readiness testing and acceptance, Vulnerability Management, Threat Assessments, Risk Assessment and Mitigation and Secure Configuration Activities

text: Resource provisioning Resource Provisioning process deal with allocation, installation, configuration, activation and testing of resources.

text: Key responsibilities of these processes that directly impact security of the 5G System include: verification of resource availability; allocation of resources to requests from other processes such as incident recovery, vulnerability management or security function capability; configuration management, and; activation of resources and updating of resource inventory.

text: Resource Trouble Resource Trouble Management processes are tasked with the management of Management undesired behaviour of specific resources, hence they are key for timely and effective management of security events. .

text: Resource data collection & Resource Data Collection & Distribution category of processes encompasses distribution technical monitoring of resource and service instances and monitoring of enterprise processes to support to resource and service instances.

text: Results of monitoring processes provide key input for other processes such as configuration management, performance management, security management.

text: Resource Performance Resource Performance Management processes use information received from Management monitoring processes to analyse, control and report on the performance of specific resources, in order to maintain operational objectives such as service quality and security. Performance management processes should interface with other process classes such as Resource Trouble Management, Service Quality Management or Security Management.

text: Party Tender Management Party Tender Management processes manage the entire tender lifecycle, from development of tender documents to tender decision-making.

text: These processes are key for 5GS compliance and security, as due care should be taken to include all relevant requirements in tender documents and ensure adequateness of suppliers to risk classes of purchased products or services..

text: Party Offering Development Party Offering Development & Retirement manage the on-boarding and off-boarding & Retirement of product specifications and thus are critical to ensure an adequate level of security at component and system level.

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text: Process Short description of the process

text: Party Agreement Party Agreement Management manages all aspects of agreements with suppliers Management and partners, from initiation to completion, to enable delivery of business and technical capabilities required by the 5G system.

text: Party Support Management processes to engage parties who own and manage infrastructure, provide infrastructure capabilities, or otherwise provide value to the operator.

text: Necessary facilities need to be in place to provide for interaction with parties in delivering products and/or services necessary for the operation of the 5G system.

text: Party Interaction Interaction management deals with logging partners/supplier interaction, notification Management of interacting parties and matters such as communication channels and authentication/authorisation. These processes are key to ensure service level and security at all phases of the 5GS, but also an important element in preventing unauthorised dissemination of sensitive data.

text: Party Problem Handling Tasked with timely and effective resolution of all problems related to the supplier/partner. It includes the entire problem lifecycle, from problem communication, management, to closure and reporting

text: Party Performance Along with resource performance management, this process provides key input to Management manage performance of key activities and resources outsourced to external providers.

text: Business Continuity Development of strategies, policies, plans, organizational roles, responsibilities and Management procedures for ensuring continuation of business processes and activities in the event of serious and/or sustained interruption.

text: The relevant component of BCM for the 5G system are:  Infrastructure recovery planning which provides for recovery and backup procedures for all key infrastructure capabilities;  Serious incident management planning which defines the operational procedures and escalation criteria for operational and security incidents.

text: Note: BCM practices might encompass ITIL Service continuity management.

text: Fraud Management The general objective of the Fraud Management is prevention, detection and response to fraud risk, fraudulent activities and actors.

text: The relevance of Fraud management processes for this document is given by the fact that they encompass interaction with Law Enforcement Agencies (LEA).

text: Enterprise risk audit Enterprise Risk Audit Management proactively works with the business to management understand, assess, and report on risk. This category of processes provide assurance to senior management that the processes and controls to mitigate risk are effective and conform to reference standards. This process is relevant as the migration to 5G will expose the MNO to novel risks which must be correctly identified, evaluated and managed

text: Insurance management Insurance management processes identify areas and activities within the enterprise where risk aspects are insurable and analyse the cost/benefits of undertaking specific insurance. This process is relevant as the migration to 5G will expose the MNO to novel risks, or may impact the operator’s exposure to currently insured risks.

text: Regulatory management Regulatory Management processes ensure that the enterprise complies with all applicable regulations. This might be sector-specific (telecommunications), or general, e.g. NIS Directive and subsequent national legislation. The relevant requirements must be fed in to the design and operation processes

text: Security Management Security management processes as per ISO 27011 / ITU X.1051, including Incident Management.

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text: 3.13.2 VENDOR DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCT LIFE CYCLE PROCESSES Vendor Development and Product Lifecycle processes covers all aspects potentially impacting a Network Product’s lifetime, including it being planned, designed, implemented, delivered, updated, and eventually ramped down. For new Network Products and any modifications of Network Products, the Product Development phases are executed in a cyclical fashion, starting again from the beginning once finished for the previous Network Product release . These processes must meet a clear set of security objectives and requirements to ensure that network products meet the baseline security criteria and capabilities necessary as building blocks for the overall security of the 5G network. In addition, the network products themselves must meet baseline security criteria, tailored to their product class. These criteria are defined by 3GPP in the Security Assurance Specifications (SCASs) series of Technical Specification. Specific use cases and deployment scenarios may request additional security requirements, as defined by operators or regulators. An objective assessment process that the network products and the processes at their origin meet baseline criteria is paramount for building trust in the 5G network, hence an important input for any procurement decisions. The GSMA Network Equipment Security Assurance Scheme (NESAS) and 3GPP Security Assurance Methodology (SECAM) provide the blueprint for such an evaluation process and reference criteria. While the allocation of responsibilities among the actors of an assurance scheme might vary, the activities and their flow should be always based on the principles of independence, objectivity, competence. The vendor and product lifecycle processes are presented below: Figure 13: Vendor and product lifecycle processes

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text: The description of the Vendor and product lifecycle processes is presented below. Process Sub-processes

text: Planning In case of a completely new Network Product, the requirements for the first Release are planned. In the case of a new version of an existing Network Product, the requirements for the changes to be introduced by the next release are planned based on updated functional requirements as well as bug and vulnerability reports received against prior versions, if applicable.

text: Design The implementation of the planned requirements for the Release is planned in detail.

text: Implementation The planned requirements are implemented as per the design.

text: Testing and Verification The fulfilment of the requirements by the implementation is verified. If the verification fails, the relevant requirement usually goes back to the “Implementation” phase. This phase also contains the security related testing and verification activities.

text: Release The decision to release a given revision of a tested and verified implementation.

text: Manufacturing In this phase, the development Release is converted into a deliverable Network Product. In the case of pure software delivery, this is the delivery of the Release to the provisioning process.

text: Delivery The delivery of the manufactured Network Product.

text: Product development All the phases described above.

text: process

text: First Commercial The Network Product starts its commercial lifetime by means of a first Release to be Introduction accepted for use in live commercial networks. Before that, earlier Releases may have been tested in test environments.

text: Update The Network Product is updated by means of either a minor or a major Release. This phase is usually a cycle of such Releases.

text: Minor Release A minor Release fixes vulnerabilities and other bugs found in earlier versions. It commonly introduces not more than minor feature enhancements and architectural changes.

text: Major Release A major Release fixes vulnerabilities and other bugs found in earlier versions. It may introduce major feature enhancements and architectural changes.

text: End Of Life No updates for the Network Product are supplied anymore. As this process occurs after contractual and regulatory requirements to maintain the Network Product have ceased, this commonly marks the end of a Network Product’s lifetime.

text: 3.13.3 SECURITY ASSURANCE PROCESSES The operator can use as support for its purchasing decision the results of security conformity assessments integral to the Security Assurance Methodology, as defined by 3GPP33.916 Technical Specification . The SECAM process provides the blueprint for any security assurance scheme such as product certification and vendor accreditation, and covers the following tasks:

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text:  Vendor network product development and network product lifecycle management process assurance compliance (assessing if the method used to develop the products is compliant with the Vendor network product development and network product lifecycle management process assurance requirements).  Security Compliance Testing (assessing if requested security requirements are correctly implemented in a network product). This includes Vulnerability Testing (running of a set of FOSS/COTS tools on external interfaces of the Network product). The ultimate output of the SECAM evaluation is:  An evaluation report demonstrating compliance of the network product with the 3GPP security assurance specifications;  Evidence to demonstrate to the test laboratory that the accredited vendor product and development lifecycle processes have been complied with for the network product;  Evidence that the actors performing the evaluation tasks are accredited by the SECAM Accreditation Body. The operator examines the evaluation reports together with the evidence that the actors performing the evaluation tasks have been accredited by the SECAM Accreditation Body. Note: while the actors and distribution of tasks and responsibilities among actors may vary in different Assurance schemes, the general processes and sequence of tasks will stay generally unchanged, provided that criteria for impartiality and competence of actors that perform assessment tasks are maintained. The security assurance activities are presented below. Figure 14: Security assurance activities

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text: The description of the security assurance activities is presented below. Activity Description

text: Accreditation Formal recognition by an accreditation body that a conformity assessment body is impartial and competent to carry out specific tests or types of assessments.

text: The Accreditation Body defines requirements and processes for:  vendor network product development and network product lifecycle management processes accreditation;  test laboratory (vendor owned or third party) accreditation, and  dispute resolution.

text: Product development Vendor network product development and network product lifecycle management process processes assurance requirements as well as related evaluation activities generic to all network product classes are defined by the Accreditation Body. In the SECAM scheme, the requirements are defined in the NESAS Security Assurance Requirements, but various conformity assessment schemes may define different criteria.

text: Lifecycle management consists of establishing discipline and control in the updates of network product during its development and maintenance. Lifecycle management controls are important during normal improvement of network product as well as for vulnerability/security flaw remediation (documentation used to track vulnerability/security flaw, remediation procedure with relation to corrective actions for each identified vulnerability/security flaw…).

text: The Vendor network product development and network product lifecycle management processes assessment covers a vendor's engineering processes and does not necessarily apply only to a single network product. This means that the results of one assessment may apply to more than one network product. Vendors can submit their generic network product development and network product lifecycle management processes or a subset of them for auditing and accreditation.

text: Security compliance testing Evaluation process step used to describe activities for checking the compliance of a network product with applicable Security Assurance Specifications (SCAS).

text: Vulnerability testing The process of running security tools against a network product.

text: Vulnerability testing is defined by the use of Free and Open Source Software (FOSS) and Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) security testing tools on the external interfaces of the network product, as well as manual testing procedures for specific attack scenarios.

text: Operator procurement The operator examines the network product, the security compliance testing, including decision the vulnerability testing analysis reports, the self-declaration as well as the optional evidence of accreditation from the SECAM Accreditation Body for the actors performing the evaluation task and decides if the results are sufficient according to its internal policies. In particular, the operator can perform a sample of the security compliance testing and vulnerability testing, based on the delivered test procedures.

text: Audit During an audit, the processes will be evaluated and their application on development activities in practice will be verified. An accreditation will be awarded, if the requirements are met.

text: The accreditation processes consist of:  assessing the skills of the vendor‘s or third-party test laboratories in conducting an evaluation for conformance to Security Assurance requirements for a given network product class or range of classes, and  assessing the compliance to Test methodology (for security compliance testing and vulnerability testing laboratories).

text: Monitoring The Accreditation Body monitors different kinds of accredited actors within the scheme:  Vendors development and product lifecycle processes, which are expected to comply with the Security Assurance requirements and  Test laboratories (for security compliance testing and vulnerability testing), which are expected to comply with the Test Methodology and skills requirements.

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text: Activity Description

text: Standardisation 5G security issues are addressed in the work undertaken by standards bodies, notably within the workgroup on Service and System Aspects 3 (SA3) of the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). Other relevant standardisation bodies include ETSI and GSMA.

text: Development of standards continuously evolve security specifications, taking into account ongoing research on security threats and vulnerabilities.

text: Responsible disclosure Vulnerability Disclosure of security vulnerabilities is a well-established process which allows stakeholders such as security researchers to report details of security vulnerabilities in products and services.

text: Vulnerability Disclosure Programmes, such as the GSMA Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure (CVD) programme provide a framework that sets clear expectations for constructive engagement by all parties to remediate or mitigate notified vulnerabilities. Results of vulnerability disclosure processes are an important input for standardization work, as security requirements are evolving to respond to identified vulnerabilities.

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text: 4. 5G VULNERABILITIES

text: 4.1 VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT METHOD AND SCOPE This chapter provides the vulnerability assessment for the components of the 5G architecture. The chapter is structured according to the various zoom-ins: for each zoom-in, a set of vulnerabilities for all related components is being presented. These vulnerabilities detail the security considerations formulated for each zoom-in. Due to the large number of vulnerabilities, and in order to facilitate readability, in this chapter we introduce vulnerability groups for the components of each zoom-in. The detailed vulnerabilities of each zoom-in are presented in a corresponding annex. While in the following sections a short description of vulnerability groups with highlights of the assessed weaknesses are presented, the annexes provide all details of each individual vulnerability, such as: detailed description, associated assets, threats exploiting the vulnerability, security controls to remove/reduce the exploitation surface, stakeholder responsible for the implementation of controls, as well as references to relevant sources. For the sake of completeness of vulnerability assessment, some vulnerability groups that apply to multiple assets throughout several zoom-ins, are repeated in all relevant zoom-ins. This redundancy has been introduced in order to have a complete picture of the vulnerabilities at zoom-in level. Examples of such vulnerabilities are: virtualization vulnerabilities, vulnerabilities emerging from weak hardening of software, logging vulnerabilities, etc. Each of the following sections is dedicate to a zoom-in. Besides the vulnerability groups applying to the assets of the zoom-in, it provides a reference to the cyberthreats that may lead to an exploitation, to the relevant measure foreseen in the Toolbox, as well as to references in relevant literature. As regards the target groups of vulnerability assessment, the vulnerability groups presented in this chapter targets technical experts willing to have an overview of weaknesses of various technical components included in a zoom-in. This information can be used as a check-list in order to scrutinize the development of technical and organisation security measures and/or assess future actions to assess the priorities in the implementation of measures (e.g. depending on the current status of implementation of 5G functions). The detailed vulnerabilities found in the annexes target technical experts working in the implementation of threat mitigation. It may be useful for checking the implementation status, planning/prioritizing implementation of security protection measures, assessing protection gaps, scoping of certification activities, etc. 4.2 VULNERABILITY GROUPS FOR CORE NETWORK In the security considerations of core network, we have identified the following areas of vulnerabilities: Service-based architecture: weaknesses are related with the protection of open source APIs, in particular with their integrity, authentication and protection for the data (in transit and stored). Security update gap between new security requirements and deployment of updated versions of network functions in operational systems. Two major factors are relevant for this gap: a) vendors’ responsiveness in issuing and validating new versions of the network functions that

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

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text: address the updated requirements, and b) timeliness and effectiveness of MNO processes to update (e.g. UDM, AUSF, SEPP, NRF, NEF, SMF, AMF and UPF). IP Based Protocol stack: the use of widely used IP protocols will lead to a shorted vulnerability exposure time and high impact of vulnerability disclosure. Besides these areas of vulnerability, virtualization vulnerabilities are also applicable, as well as generic vulnerabilities related to soft- and hardware maintenance and hardening. The table below provides a more exhaustive view on vulnerabilities of core network components. Relevant toolbox Threat Name Description 83 measures categories

text: Vulnerabilities in Relevant vulnerabilities in AMF implementation TM02, TM09 NAA-EXPL, implementation of include: NAA-ESH, AMF security NAA-AAA, • Incorrect implementation of authentication and functionalities NAA-DBLT, key agreement procedure; NAA-IFAS, • Incorrect implementation of security mode NAA-AIL command procedure; • Incorrect implementation of mechanisms for intra-RAT mobility; • Incorrect implementation of procedure for 5G- GUTI allocation; • Incorrect implementation of invalid or unacceptable UE security capabilities handling.

text: Vulnerabilities in Relevant vulnerabilities in UPF implementation TM02, TM09 NAA-EXPL, implementation of include: NAA-AAA, UPF security NAA-DBLT, • Incorrect user plane data protection; functionalities NAA-IFAS, • Incorrect implementation of signalling data NAA-AIL protection; • Failure to assign unique TEID for a session.

text: Vulnerabilities in Relevant vulnerabilities in UDM implementation TM02, TM09 NAA-EXPL, implementation of include: NAA-ESH, UDM security NAA-AAA, • Incorrect implementation of synchronisation functionalities NAA-DBLT, failure handling; NAA-IFAS, • Incorrect implementation of protection SUCI NAA-AIL, EIH de-concealment; • Incorrect implementation of authentication status handling by UDM.

text: Vulnerabilities in Relevant vulnerabilities in SMF implementation TM02, TM09 NAA-EXPL, implementation of include: NAA-ESH, SMF security NAA-AAA, • implementation of user plane security policy functionalities NAA-DBLT, handling; NAA-IFAS • Incorrect implementation of user plane security policy checking; • Incorrect implementation of unique Charging ID assignment.

text: Vulnerabilities in Relevant vulnerabilities in SEPP implementation TM02, TM09 NAA-EXPL, implementation of include: NAA-ESH, SEPP security NAA-AAA, • Incorrect implementation of e2e core network functionalities NAA-DBLT, interconnection security; NAA-IFAS, • Incorrect implementation of cryptographic NAA-AIL material handling; • Handling of cryptographic material beyond connection-specific scope • Incorrect implementation of protection policies mismatch handling.

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Relevant toolbox Threat Name Description 83 measures categories

text: Vulnerabilities in Relevant vulnerabilities in NEF implementation TM02, TM09 NAA-EXPL, implementation of include: NAA-ESH, NEF security NAA-AAA, • No authentication on application function; functionalities NAA-DBLT, • No Authorisation on northbound APIs. NAA-MND

text: Vulnerabilities in Relevant vulnerabilities in NRF implementation TM02, TM09 NAA-EXPL, implementation of include: NAA-ESH, NRF security NAA-AAA, • No slice specific authorisation for NF discovery functionalities NAA-DBLT, NAA-MND

text: SBA/SBI Service-Based-Interfaces of network functions TM01, TM02, TM09 NAA-EXPL, vulnerabilities of should provide adequate protection of access and of NAA-AIL, 5G Core data in transit. Relevant vulnerabilities include: NAA-AAA, components NAA-DBLT, • Improper transport layer protection, and NAA-MND improper authentication mechanisms; • Vulnerable authorisation mechanisms on service access.

text: Improper Adequate security controls are needed for protecting TM01, TM02, TM09 NAA-DBLT, protection of Data sensitive data stored, processed and transferred by NAA-IFAS, and Information of 5G Core functions. Relevant vulnerabilities include: NAA-CSVS, 5G Core NAA-ESH components • Disclosure of confidential system internal data to users and administrators; • Improper protection of data and information in storage; • Improper protection of data and information in transfer; • Failure to log access to personal data.

text: Improper Adequate security controls are needed for upholding TM01, TM02, TM07, NAA-EXPL, protection of availability and integrity of 5G Core functions. TM09 NAA-ESH, availability and Relevant vulnerabilities include: NAA-MSH

text: integrity of 5G

text: Core components • Improper handling of overload situations; • Unrestricted boot memory devices; • Weaknesses in processing of unexpected input; • Lack of / improper mechanisms for Network Product software package integrity validation.

text: Vulnerable System functions should not be used without TM01, TM02, TM09 NAA-DoS, mechanisms for appropriate authentication and authorisation and NAA-AAA, authentication and authorisation checks. Relevant vulnerabilities NAA-DBLT, authorisation of include: NAA-CSVS

text: 5G Core

text: components • Improper authentication policy; • Insecure / insufficient authentication attributes; • Insecure password policy; • Insecure authentication mechanisms to management / maintenance interfaces; • Failure to block consecutive failed login attempts; • Insecure authorisation and access control mechanisms.

text: Improper session Systems should provide adequate mechanisms for TM01, TM02, TM09 NAA-AAA, protection user session protection. Relevant vulnerabilities NAA-IFAS, mechanisms of 5G include: NAA-DBLT

text: Core components

text: • Lack of logout function; • Lack of inactivity timeout mechanisms.

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Insufficient or Adequate mechanisms for collection and processing TM01, TM02, TM05, NAA-{all}, UD, improper of security events should be in place. Relevant TM09 FM monitoring vulnerabilities include:

text: mechanisms of 5G

text: • Insufficient / inadequate logging of security

text: Core components

text: events; • Logs not transferred to centralized storage; • Improper protection of security event log files.

text: Vulnerabilities in Operating systems supporting 5G Core components TM01, TM02, TM09 NAA-MAL, Operating should provide a safe and stable environment for 5G NAA-DoS, Systems Functions. Relevant vulnerabilities include: NAA-ARA, supporting 5G NAA-AAA, • Improper / insufficient mechanisms to protect Core components NAA-ESH, availability and integrity; NAA-MSH, • Improper authentication and authorisation NAA-UANI, mechanisms. NAA-DBLT,

text: FM

text: Vulnerabilities in Web servers serving functional and management TM01, TM02, TM09 NAA-MAL, Web Servers services should provide adequate protection. NAA-DoS, supporting 5G Relevant vulnerabilities include: NAA-ARA, Core components NAA-AAA, • Failure to encrypt communication between NAA-ESH, Web client and Web server; NAA-MSH, • Failure to log webserver activity; NAA-UANI, • Improper HTTP User sessions protection; NAA-DBLT, • Improper validation of HTTP input. FM

text: Vulnerabilities of The components of 5G Core may be implemented TM01, TM02, TM09 NAA-MAL, network devices on dedicated network devices, which must be NAA-DoS, running 5G Core adequately protected. Relevant vulnerabilities NAA-ARA, components include: NAA-AAA, NAA-ESH, • Improper mechanisms for data and information NAA-MSH, protection; NAA-UANI, • Improper mechanisms for protecting availability NAA-MND, and integrity. FM

text: Improper All 5G components, including the network functions TM01, TM02, TM07, NAA-MAL, hardening of 5G in service-based architecture, should be hardened in TM09 NAA-DoS, Core components order to reduce their respective surface of NAA-ARA, vulnerability. Relevant vulnerabilities include: NAA-AAA, NAA-ESH, • Unnecessary or insecure services / protocols; NAA-MSH, • Unrestricted reachability of services; NAA-UANI, • Presence of unused software / functions / NAA-MND, components; NAA-DBLT, • Unrestricted remote login for privileged users; FM • Excessive file-system authorisation privileges; • Vulnerable OS configuration; • Vulnerable Web server configuration; • Improper separation of traffic; • Improper hardening of 5G Core components.

text: Virtualisation Vulnerabilities in the virtualisation layer may lead to TM04 NAA-AVM, vulnerabilities of risks such as unauthorised access to functions and UD, FM relevant core data Virtualisation vulnerabilities include:

text: components

text: • Vulnerabilities in virtualisation of OS layer; • Container vulnerabilities; • Vulnerabilities in function virtualization.

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Physical and Improper physical security of 5G Core Components TM07 PA, FM, OUT, environmental infrastructure may impact the overall security and DIS vulnerabilities of performance of the system. Relevant vulnerabilities relevant core include:

text: components

text: • Improper physical security of Data-Centres / Telecommunication equipment room; • Improper isolation of physical secure perimeter between tenants; • Improper environmental protection controls; • Inadequate / defective security devices.

text: A detailed list of core network vulnerabilities can be found in the Annex (see C Annex). 4.3 VULNERABILITY GROUPS FOR NETWORK SLICING In the security considerations of network slicing, we have identified the following areas of vulnerabilities: Security-as-a-Service: While slices provide inherent security through segmentation, slices can also be used to provide additional security protection and security services specific to the use case and customer requirements. The implementation of slice security for use cases would rest ultimately with the Mobile Network Operator (MNO) to include such services in the offer, depending on its service strategy, market context, and in relation to vertical use-cases. This might the source of vulnerabilities, to be checked for each particular implementation. Resource isolation: While network slicing offers the ability of isolation to be used in various scenarios, the proper isolation technique has to be suited to the use case at hand. Security requirements of the particular use case will be an important element of consideration for the selection of proper isolation mechanisms. Secure Management and Orchestration: The architecture of the network slice MANO is challenging from a business model perspective. This high complexity and flexibility, which bring in higher security risks. Due to not finalized 3GPP specifications of authorisation of service management requests, implementation weaknesses may arise. Trust Model: The building of trust to MNO capabilities for the various 5G operation models has to be based of the specified APIs. It needs to be assessed, if these APIs are sufficient for all three defined operation models and how implementation will use them, in order to avoid vulnerabilities in the management functions. Besides these areas of vulnerability, virtualization vulnerabilities are also applicable, as well as generic vulnerabilities related to soft- and hardware maintenance and hardening. The following table provides a more exhaustive view on vulnerabilities of network slicing components.

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Relevant toolbox Threat Name Description measures categories

text: Vulnerabilities in Vulnerabilities in network segment negotiation TM01, TM02, NAA-EXPL, implementation of procedures need to be secured in a standardized TM05 NAA-AAA NS security way to prevent malicious attacks, e.g. man-in-thefunctionalities middle (MitM) attacks that could modify and downgrade slice capabilities.

text: Service Based Network Slicing Management interface should be TM02, TM05 NAA-EXPL, Vulnerabilities in secured so that only authorized parties can create, NAA-AIL, Network Slicing alter, and delete network slice instances. If a NAA-AAA, Management malicious party gained access to an insecure NAA-DBLT, management interface, or if it could replay or modify NAA-MND a valid message, then it would be able to spoof a genuine network manager to compromise slice security.

text: Improper Adequate security controls are needed to protect TM02, TM05, NAA-AIL, protection of Data sensitive data stored, processed and transferred by TM07 NAA-MSH, and Information NSI. Relevant vulnerabilities include: NAA-DBLT

text: • Improper protection of Network Slice Instance supervision / reporting data; • Lack of / ineffective tamper-proofing of Network Slice Subnet Template (NSST).

text: Vulnerable System functions should not be used without TM02, TM05 NAA-AAA, mechanisms for appropriate authentication and authorisation and NAA-ARA authentication and authorisation checks. Relevant vulnerabilities authorisation in include:

text: Network Slicing

text: Management • Improper slice-specific authentication mechanisms; • Lack of protection of NSSAI and home control; • Lack of protection of the User ID and credentials.

text: Improper All 5G components, including the network functions TM01, TM02, NAA-MAL, hardening of in service-based architecture, should be hardened in TM07, TM09 NAA-DoS, network slicing order to reduce their respective surface of NAA-ARA, components vulnerability. Relevant vulnerabilities include: NAA-AAA, NAA-ESH, • Unnecessary or insecure services / protocols; NAA-MSH, • Unrestricted reachability of services; NAA-UANI, • Presence of unused software / functions / NAA-MND, components; NAA-DBLT, • Unrestricted remote login for privileged users; FM, UD • Excessive file-system authorisation privileges; • Vulnerable OS configuration; • Vulnerable Web server configuration; • Improper separation of traffic.

text: Virtualisation Vulnerabilities in the virtualisation layer may lead to TM04 NAA-AVM, vulnerabilities of risks such as unauthorised access to functions and UD, FM relevant network data Virtualisation vulnerabilities include:

text: slicing

text: components • Vulnerabilities in virtualisation of OS layer; • Container vulnerabilities; • Vulnerabilities in function virtualization.

text: Insufficient or Adequate mechanisms for collection and processing TM02, TM05 NAA-{all}; UD, improper of security events should be in place. Relevant FM monitoring vulnerabilities include:

text: mechanism of

text: Network Slice • Insufficient / inadequate logging and auditing Instance (NSI) across NSI lifecycle; • Improper protection of security event log files; • Improper isolation of monitoring capabilities and data; • Improper or insufficient end-to-end monitoring capabilities for NSI.

text: A detailed list of network slicing vulnerabilities can be found in the Annex (see D Annex).

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: 4.4 VULNERABILITY GROUPS FOR RADIO ACCESS NETWORK In the security considerations of radio access network, we have identified the following areas of vulnerabilities: Security of Ultra-Reliable Low-Latency Communication (URLLC): weaknesses in the implementation of QoS may impact low-latency requirements. Optimization issues of control and user plane will affect reliability and low latency of communications. Vulnerability to Radio Jamming Attacks: an inherent weakness of wireless cellular communications is the free frequency space that allows for intentional or unintentional interferences. They can impact access of legitimate users and cause resilience issues in parts of the network. Failure to meet General Security Assurance Requirements: a set of weaknesses will arise through the update requirements of various elements of RAN due to implementation of migration steps and the ability of early-deployed systems to comply with specification updates regarding security functions. Optional nature of security controls for F1 interface: the optionality of security controls for this protocol may lead to security weaknesses in its implementation. Besides these areas of vulnerability, virtualization vulnerabilities are also applicable, as well as generic vulnerabilities related to soft- and hardware maintenance and hardening. The table below provides a more exhaustive view on vulnerabilities of remote access network components. Relevant toolbox Threat Name Description measures categories

text: Incorrect Relevant vulnerabilities in gNB implementation TM02, TM09 NAA-AIL, NAAimplementation of include: AAA, NAAgNB security UANI, NAA-SS, • Improper Ciphering and integrity checks of RRCfunctions NAA-MND signalling; • Failure to ensure control plane data confidentiality protection over N2/Xn interface; • Improper ciphering of User data between UE and gNB; • Improper integrity protection and verification of user data; • Missing or improper replay protection mechanisms; • Lack of /improper mechanisms for prevention of bidding down at Xn-handover; • Improper Prevention of Key Reuse; • Improper mechanisms to enforce security policy.

text: Improper protection Adequate security controls are needed for protecting TM01, TM02, TM09 NAA-AIL, NAAof Data and sensitive data stored, processed and transferred by MSH, NAA- Information of gNB gNB components. Relevant vulnerabilities include: DBLT

text: Components

text: • Inadvertent disclosure of confidential system internal data; • Improper protection of data and information in storage; • Improper protection of data and information in transfer.

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Improper protection Adequate security controls are needed for upholding TM01, TM02, TM09 NAA-DoS, NAAof availability and availability and integrity of gNB functions. Relevant MSH, NAAintegrity of gNB vulnerabilities include: DBLT, UD

text: functionality

text: • Improper handling of overload situations; • Unrestricted boot memory devices; • Weaknesses in processing of unexpected input; • Lack of / improper mechanisms for software package integrity validation.

text: Vulnerable System functions should not be used without TM01, TM02, TM09 NAA-DoS, NAAmechanisms for appropriate authentication and authorisation and AAA, NAA-ARA, authentication and authorisation checks. Relevant vulnerabilities NAA-DBLT authorisation of gNB include:

text: components

text: • Improper authentication policy; • Insecure / insufficient authentication attributes, mechanisms and procedures; • Insecure authorisation and access control mechanisms.

text: Improper session Management interfaces and systems should provide TM01, TM02, TM09 NAA-AAA, protection adequate mechanisms for user session protection. NAA-ARA, mechanisms of gNB Relevant vulnerabilities include: NAA-IFAS, components NAA-DBLT • Lack of logout function; • Lack of inactivity timeout mechanisms.

text: Insufficient or Adequate mechanisms for collection and processing TM01, TM02, TM09 NAA-{all}, UD, improper monitoring of security events should be in place. Relevant FM mechanisms of gNB vulnerabilities include:

text: components

text: • Insufficient / inadequate logging of security events; • Logs not transferred to centralized storage; • Improper protection of security event log files.

text: Vulnerabilities in Operating systems supporting gNB Components TM01, TM02, TM09 NAA-MAL, Operating Systems should provide a safe and stable environment for 5G NAA-DoS, NAAsupporting gNB Functions. Relevant vulnerabilities include: ARA, NAA-AAA, components NAA-ESH, • Improper / insufficient mechanisms to protect NAA-MSH, availability and integrity; NAA-UANI, • Improper authentication and authorisation NAA-DBLT, FM mechanisms.

text: Vulnerabilities in Web servers serving functional and management TM01, TM02, TM09 NAA-MAL, Web Servers services should provide adequate protection. NAA-DoS, NAAsupporting gNB Relevant vulnerabilities include: ARA, NAA-AAA, components NAA-ESH, • Lack of or improper encryption of communication; NAA-MSH, • Failure to log webserver activity; NAA-UANI, NAA-DBLT, FM • Improper HTTP User sessions protection;

text: • Improper validation of HTTP input.

text: Vulnerabilities of The components of gNB may be implemented on TM01, TM02, TM09 NAA-MAL, network devices dedicated network devices, which must be NAA-DoS, NAArunning gNB adequately protected. Relevant vulnerabilities ARA, NAA-AAA, components include: NAA-ESH, NAA-MSH, • Improper mechanisms for data and information NAA-UANI, protection; NAA-MND, FM • Improper mechanisms for protecting availability and integrity.

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Improper hardening All 5G components should be hardened in order to TM01, TM02, TM07, NAA-MAL, of gNB components reduce their respective surface of vulnerability. TM09 NAA-DoS, NAA- Relevant vulnerabilities include: ARA, NAA-AAA, NAA-ESH, • Unnecessary or insecure services / protocols; NAA-MSH, • Unrestricted reachability of services; NAA-UANI, • Presence of unused software / functions / NAA-MND, components; NAA-DBLT, FM, • Unrestricted remote login for privileged users; UD • Excessive file-system authorisation privileges; • Vulnerable configuration of O.S. / Web server; • Improper separation of traffic.

text: Virtualisation Vulnerabilities in the virtualisation layer may lead to TM04 NAA-AVM, FM vulnerabilities of risks such as unauthorised access to functions and relevant gNB data. Virtualisation vulnerabilities include:

text: components

text: Physical and Improper physical security of gNB Components TM07 PA, FM, OUT, environmental infrastructure may impact the overall security and DIS vulnerabilities of performance of the system. Relevant vulnerabilities relevant gNB may include:

text: components

text: • Improper physical security of telecommunications equipment rooms and equipment sited in partners’ or users’ premises; • Improper physical security of physically isolated operation areas; • Inadequate / defective security devices.

text: Vulnerability to As any wireless cellular networks, 5G networks are TM01 NAA-DoS Radio Jamming prone to radio interference. This inherent weakness Attacks can be used by adversary nodes to cause intentional interference and hinder legitimate user’s communication over specific wireless channels. Jamming attacks are a special concern for missioncritical applications.

text: A detailed list of radio access network vulnerabilities can be found in the Annex (see E Annex). 4.5 VULNERABILITY GROUPS FOR NETWORK FUNCTION VIRTUALIZATION - MANO In the security considerations of NFV - MANO, we have identified the following areas of vulnerabilities: Management Interfaces / APIs: when developing management interfaces for the virtual functions, incomplete implementation of NVF security functions may lead to weaknesses related to access, storage and interception of network management data. Localisation of functions: while physical functions of previous mobile networks have not allowed for mobility of functions, the introduced virtualization may lead to moving virtualized functions outside their original location, notably outside the perimeter of protecting measures/policies. Besides these areas of vulnerability, virtualization vulnerabilities are also applicable, as well as generic vulnerabilities related to soft- and hardware maintenance and hardening. The following table provides a more exhaustive view on vulnerabilities of network function virtualization / MANO components.

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Relevant Threat Name Description toolbox categories measures

text: Service Based Service-Based-Interfaces of network functions TM04 NAA-EXPL, Vulnerabilities of should provide adequate protection of access and of NAA-AIL, NAA- NFV components data in transit. Relevant vulnerabilities include: AAA, NAA- DBLT, NAA- • Improper transport layer protection for data MND, EIH transferred over internal interfaces to MANO; • Vulnerable authorisation mechanisms on authorisation server / resource server; • Improper message and session integrity checks on internal interfaces; • Vulnerabilities in legacy PNF; • Improper verification of identity and location of transmitting party on internal interfaces.

text: Improper protection Adequate security controls are needed for protecting TM04 NAA-AIL, NAAof Data and sensitive data stored, processed and transferred by MSH, NAA- Information of NFV NFV. Relevant vulnerabilities include: DBLT

text: components

text: • Inability to provide proof of integrity of the data stores used for VM images; • Lack of encryption of control plane data; • Improper protection of data and information in storage; • Improper protection of data and information in transfer.

text: Improper hardening All NFV components, should be hardened in order to TM04 NAA-MAL, of NFV components reduce their respective surface of vulnerability. NAA-DoS, NAA- Hardening requirements must ensure that all the ARA, NAA-AAA, default configurations (including operating system NAA-ESH, software, firmware and applications) are NAA-MSH, appropriately set. Relevant vulnerabilities include: NAA-UANI, NAA-MND, • Unnecessary or insecure services / protocols; NAA-DBLT, FM, • Unrestricted reachability of services; UD • Presence of unused software / functions / components; • Unrestricted remote login for privileged users; • Excessive file-system authorisation privileges; • Improper separation of traffic; • Improper patch management process; • Misconfiguration; • No mechanism to enforce geo-restrictions; • Vulnerabilities of NTP (VNF clock); • Improper hardening of MANO interfaces utilizing Service-Based Interfaces (SBI).

text: Virtualisation Vulnerabilities in the virtualisation layer may lead to TM04, TM07 NAA-AVM, FM platform risks such as unauthorised access to functions and vulnerabilities for data Virtualisation vulnerabilities include:

text: VNF

text: • Inadequate access privileges in virtualized environments; • Improper key management system for encrypted virtual components; • Lack of mechanisms for ensuring a Hardware- Based Root of Trust (HBRT); • Vulnerabilities in cloud technology used for NFV implementation; • Hypervisor vulnerabilities conduct to crosscontamination of shared resources.

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Physical security Improper physical security of NFVI may impact the TM04, TM06 PA, FM, OUT, and environmental overall security and performance of the system. DIS vulnerabilities of Relevant vulnerabilities include:

text: NFVI

text: • Improper physical security of telecommunications equipment rooms; • Improper physical security of physically isolated operation areas; • Inadequate / defective security devices.

text: Vulnerable NFV Management and Orchestration should not be TM03, TM04 NAA-AAA, NAAmechanisms for used without appropriate authentication and ARA, NAAauthentication and authorisation and authorisation checks. Relevant MSH, NAAauthorisation of NFV vulnerabilities include: UANI, NAA- Management AVM • Improper authentication policy, such as unauthenticated access to system functions, use of generic accounts; • Insecure / insufficient authentication attributes, such as failure to protect accounts by at least one authentication attribute, active predefined authentication attributes; • Insecure password policy; • Insecure authentication mechanisms to management / maintenance interfaces; • Failure to block consecutive failed login attempts; • Insecure authorisation and access control mechanisms.

text: Insufficient or Adequate mechanisms for collection and processing TM01, TM05 NAA, FM, UD improper monitoring of security events should be in place. Relevant mechanisms of NFV vulnerabilities include: • Insufficient / inadequate logging of security events for MANO and NFVI; • Logs not transferred to centralized storage; • Improper protection of security event log files.

text: A detailed list of network function virtualization - MANO vulnerabilities can be found in the Annex (see F Annex). 4.6 VULNERABILITY GROUPS FOR SOFTWARE DEFINED NETWORKS In the security considerations software defined networks, we have identified the following areas of vulnerabilities: Control Plane: Recent practices to shift from single device controllers to distributed controllers, opens doors to control plane attacks. Such attacks are based on input buffer analysis to identify forwarding policy and eventually perform manipulations based on the analysis results. Data Plane: As SDN data planes are just simple forwarding elements with no embedded intelligence, they may become targets of protocol attacks, exploiting protocol vulnerabilities in the forwarding devices. Programmable Interfaces (APIs): The Southbound API may be misused for a series of attacks. These attacks are based on inferred flow rules in SDN through packet probing. Knowing the reactive rules, attackers can launch DoS attacks by sending numerous rule-matched packets which trigger packet-in packets to overburden the controller.

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Besides these areas of vulnerability, virtualization vulnerabilities are also applicable, as well as generic vulnerabilities related to soft- and hardware maintenance and hardening. The table below provides a more exhaustive view on vulnerabilities of software defined networks components. Relevant toolbox Threat Name Description measures categories

text: Vulnerabilities in Lack of functionality in the SDN control layer to TM01 NAA-MND, UD, implementation of support preventing flow rules confliction in order to FM SDN security avoid mandatory network policies from being functionalities bypassed.

text: SBA/SBI Service-Based-Interfaces of network functions TM01 NAA-EXPL, vulnerabilities of should provide adequate protection of access and of NAA-AIL, NAA- SDN components data in transit. Relevant vulnerabilities include AAA, NAAimproper transport layer protection, improper DBLT, NAAauthentication / authorisation mechanism for SDN MND controller, inadequate security of configuration data (including security policies and QoS policies) while being transported from SDN applications to the SDN controller over the application-control interface.

text: Vulnerable SDN controller should not be used without TM01, TM03 NAA-AAA, NAAmechanisms for appropriate authentication and authorisation checks. ARA, NAAauthentication and Relevant vulnerabilities are related to improper MSH, NAAauthorisation of authentication and/or authorisation mechanism for UANI SDN components SDN controller or defective implementations of these mechanisms.

text: Improper hardening All SDN components, should be hardened in order to TM01, TM07 NAA-MAL, of SDN components reduce their respective surface of vulnerability. NAA-DoS, NAA- Relevant vulnerabilities include: ARA, NAA-AAA, NAA-ESH, • Operating system vulnerabilities; NAA-MSH, • Software vulnerabilities of SDN controller; NAA-UANI, • Improper cryptographic key management NAA-MND, mechanisms or use of weak algorithms; NAA-DBLT, FM, • Lack of, or improper DoS protection mechanisms. UD

text: Insufficient or Improper monitoring of SDN controller may lead to TM05 NAA-{all}, FM, improper monitoring attacks or failures going undetected and therefore UD mechanisms of SDN not mitigated. Improper hardware monitoring may components compromise network security or bring down the SDN network.

text: Virtualisation Vulnerabilities in the virtualisation layer may lead to TM01, TM07 NAA-AVM, FM vulnerabilities of risks such as unauthorised access to SDN relevant SDN resources. Cloud solutions used for SDN components implementation may lead to vulnerabilities specific to cloud technology.

text: Physical security Improper physical security of SDN may impact the TM06 PA, FM, OUT, vulnerabilities of overall security and performance of the system. DIS SDN Relevant vulnerabilities may include unprotected Data Centre Interconnection channels, improper physical secure perimeter or isolation between tenants.

text: A detailed list of software defined networks vulnerabilities can be found in the Annex (see G Annex).

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: 4.7 VULNERABILITY GROUPS FOR MULTI-ACCESS EDGE COMPUTING In the security considerations of multi-access edge computing, we have identified the following areas of vulnerabilities: Virtualization and containerization: Being based on virtualization and containerization, MEC may be vulnerable to a number of threats emerging from these technologies. Examples are: possible contamination of shared hardware resources, abuse of privilege elevation vulnerabilities of containers with higher levels of privileges, dependencies to central orchestration functions, high data and session volumes that can be subject of attacks, use of open-source APIs. Physical security: flaws in physical security of MEC hardware may render such infrastructures vulnerable to physical attack. Given the fact of higher geographical distribution of such infrastructures, keeping a uniform level of physical security will be a challenge. Application-Programming Interfaces (APIs): Though a dedicated architecture (CAPIF) is proposed to cope with access to APIs, it has to be ensured that these provisions are followed during API design and implementation phases. As being exposed to user access, usually such APIs are subject to multiple attacks. Regulatory issues: European regulation (NIS-Directive), foresees an isolation of physical and logical components of critical services from services with low criticality. The implementation of requirement in MEC may lead to vulnerabilities of low criticality services, as they are going to be operated in a security domain with less security functions. The table below provides a more exhaustive view on vulnerabilities of MEC components. Relevant toolbox Threat Name Description measures categories

text: NAA-DoS, NAA- Vulnerabilities in AIL,NAA-LIFA, Relevant vulnerabilities in MEC implementation implementation of NAA-DBLT, include improper for collection, secure storage and TM01, TM02 MEC security NAA-ARA, NAAtransmission of charging-related information. functionalities MSH, NAA-SHE, NAA-IFAS

text: Service-Based-Interfaces of network functions should provide adequate protection of access and of data in NAA-EXPL, Vulnerabilities in the transit. Relevant vulnerabilities include improper NAA-AIL, NAA- Service-Based implementation of MEC / CAPIF APIs, improper TM01, TM03 AAA, NAA- Interfaces of MEC transport layer protection for data transferred over DBLT, NAAcomponents internal interfaces and improper verification of identity MND EIH, FM and access control to authorized mobile edge applications.

text: Adequate security controls are needed for protecting sensitive data stored, processed and transferred by

text: Improper protection

text: MEC applications. NAA-AIL, NAA-

text: of Data and

text: TM01, TM03 MSH, NAA- Information of MEC The mobile edge platform shall only provide a mobile DBLT

text: components

text: edge application with the information for which the application is authorized.

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: NAA-MAL, Operating systems supporting MEC Host should NAA-DoS, provide a safe and stable environment for MEC NAA-ARA, Vulnerabilities in Applications. Relevant vulnerabilities include: NAA-AAA,

text: Operating Systems

text: • Improper / insufficient mechanisms to protect TM01, TM07 NAA-ESH,

text: supporting MEC

text: availability and integrity; NAA-MSH,

text: components

text: • Improper authentication and authorisation NAA-UANI, mechanisms. NAA-DBLT, FM

text: All MEC components, should be hardened in order to reduce their respective surface of vulnerability. Hardening requirements must ensure that all the default configurations (including operating system NAA-MAL, software, firmware and applications) are appropriately NAA-DoS, set. Relevant vulnerabilities include: NAA-ARA, NAA-AAA, • Unnecessary or insecure services / protocols; Improper hardening • Unrestricted reachability of services NAA-ESH, TM01, TM07 of MEC components NAA-MSH, • Presence of unused software / functions / components; NAA-UANI, NAA-MND, • Unrestricted remote login for privileged users; • Excessive file system Authorisation privileges; NAA-DBLT, FM, UD • Improper separation of traffic; • Improper patch management process • Misconfiguration; • Lack of or improper DDoS Protection mechanism.

text: NAA-EXPL, Vulnerabilities in MEC Applications may be used as an NAA-ARA, Software entry point for attacks aiming at exploiting other MEC NAA-AAA, vulnerabilities in components or internal interfaces. Relevant TM01, TM02 NAA-ESH, MEC applications vulnerabilities include unauthorized access to data, NAA-DBLT elevation of privileges or cloud intrusion.

text: Vulnerabilities in the virtualization platform include

text: Vulnerabilities of the

text: inadequate isolation of resources in operating system / NAA-AVM, MEC virtualization TM01, TM02 container layers and vulnerabilities specific to cloud FM

text: platform

text: technologies widely used in MEC implementations.

text: Improper physical security of MEC host may impact the overall security and performance of the system. Physical security Relevant vulnerabilities include:

text: and environmental • Improper physical and environmental security of PA, FM, OUT, TM06 vulnerabilities of DIS edge computing facilities; MEC hosts • Improper security monitoring of edge computing

text: facilities; • Insecure service environment.

text: MEC authentication functions – LCM Proxy and MEC Orchestrator – should not be used without appropriate authentication and authorisation and authorisation checks. Relevant vulnerabilities include:

text: • Improper authentication policy, such as unauthenticated access to system functions, use of

text: Vulnerable

text: generic accounts; NAA-AAA, mechanisms for • Insecure / insufficient authentication attributes, such NAA-ARA, authentication and TM01, TM03 as failure to protect accounts by at least one NAA-DoS, authorisation of authentication attribute, active predefined NAA-DBLT

text: MEC components

text: authentication attributes; • Insecure password policy; • Insecure authentication mechanisms to management / maintenance interfaces; • Failure to block consecutive failed login attempts; • Insecure authorisation and access control mechanisms.

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text: Adequate mechanisms for collection and processing of security events should be in place. Relevant Insufficient or vulnerabilities include: improper monitoring NAA-{all}, FM, • Insufficient / inadequate logging of security events TM01, TM05 mechanisms of MEC UD components for MEC App and MEC host; • Logs not transferred to centralized storage; • Improper protection of security event log files.

text: A detailed list of multi-access edge computing vulnerabilities can be found in the Annex (see H Annex). 4.8 VULNERABILITY GROUPS FOR SECURITY ARCHITECTURE Given the fact that vulnerabilities in all zoom-ins cover security issues of the 5G architecture in a horizontal manner, no additional security vulnerabilities have been developed for the components of the security zoom-in. Hence, it can be considered that the entire set of vulnerabilities assessed for all other zoom-ins cover the full set of security vulnerabilities. 4.9 VULNERABILITY GROUPS FOR PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE In the security considerations of physical infrastructure, we have identified some areas of vulnerabilities. Given the fact that the physical infrastructure is the common basis for the implementation of all other zoom-ins, the assessed physical vulnerabilities are derived by the vulnerabilities of all zoom-ins by means of their relevance to the physical components. Hence, the vulnerabilities below draw consequences of the vulnerabilities mentioned in other zoom-ins, by concentrating on their physical aspects: Impact of virtualisation: The physical measures/controls will need to be derived by and be complementary to weaknesses encountered by the implementation of functions in containerized and virtualized environments (see also vulnerabilities of MEC in section 4.7 above). This will mainly impact physical availability measures for the concerned functions. General physical security considerations: General physical measures need to be developed based on vulnerabilities and resulting risk-exposure that are related to the operational needs, supply chain of various components (delivery, operation, implementation, maintenance) and criticality of services. Given the large number of roles involved in 5G infrastructures, the identification of physical vulnerabilities requires a holistic approach. Threats to edge cloud computing resources: attack surface reduction of MEC services will rely on physical measures taken for the relevant components (see also vulnerabilities in section 4.7 above). Vulnerability of wireless frequencies to jamming attacks: as a high number of wireless connections are involved in the communication within the 5G infrastructure, both in the public and non-public domain, physical measures for the reduction of impact of jamming attacks need to be taken into account, especially on availability of communication channels. The following table provides a more exhaustive view on vulnerabilities of physical infrastructure.

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text: Improper physical Communication centres should provide a full set of TM06 PA, DIS, OUT, security of physical and environmental controls aimed to assure NAA-CSVS communication access control, monitoring, continuity of operations centres and protection against environmental disasters. Failure to do so may lead to unauthorised access, destruction of assets and impairment of operations.

text: Improper physical Telecom equipment rooms should provide a risk- TM06, TM11 PA, DIS, OUT, security of calibrated set of physical and environmental controls NAA-CSVS telecommunications aimed to assure access control, monitoring, continuity equipment room of operations and protection against environmental disasters. Failure to do so may lead to unauthorised access, destruction of assets and impairment of operations.

text: Improper physical Remote equipment facilities should provide a set of TM06, TM11 PA, DIS, OUT, security of physical and environmental controls aimed to assure FM, NAAphysically isolated access control, monitoring, continuity of operations CSVS operation areas and protection against environmental disasters, taking into account its remoteness and lack of human presence. Failure to do so may lead to unauthorised access, destruction of assets and impairment of operations.

text: Improper physical Equipment located in third party facilities rooms should TM06, TM11 PA, DIS, OUT, security of be protected using a risk-calibrated set of physical and NAA-CSVS equipment sited in environmental controls aimed to assure access other carrier's or control, monitoring, continuity of operations and partner's premises protection against environmental disasters. Failure to do so may lead to unauthorised access, destruction of assets and impairment of operations.

text: Vulnerability to Wireless cellular networks are inherently vulnerable to NAA-DoS Radio Jamming interference. This weakness can be used to cause Attacks intentional interference and hinder legitimate user’s communication over specific wireless channels. 5G improves resilience against jamming attacks over the 4G LTE, but remains vulnerable to customised attacks. Jamming attacks are a special concern for missioncritical applications, in particular for their availability.

text: Vulnerabilities Softwarisation and virtualization of functions only TM04, TM06 NAA-AVM, FM related to increase availability and integrity requirements for virtualisation shared physical resources, some of them placed in technologies remote locations. Relevant vulnerabilities include: • Improper protection of access to physical interfaces; • Shared resource contamination; • Vulnerable mechanisms for Hardware-Based Root of Trust (HBRT); • Hypervisor vulnerabilities conduct to crosscontamination of shared resources; • Improper availability arrangements for hardware infrastructure.

text: A detailed list of physical infrastructure vulnerabilities can be found in the Annex (see I Annex).

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text: 4.10 VULNERABILITY GROUPS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OPTIONS In the security considerations of 5G implementation options – migration paths, we have identified the following areas of vulnerabilities: Risks related to legacy technologies: these risks materialize through exploitation of vulnerabilities that are concerned with mismatches of functionalities of non-standalone 5G networks (NSA) to the current specifications. An example hereto are the use of the LTE Evolved Packet Core (EPC) and the LTE control panel. In this way, for NSA 5G networks, threats and vulnerabilities of the LTE technology will persist. Roaming: during migration, 4G roaming is being used for 5G. This roaming does not include the new 5G security functions, while maintaining Diameter, SIP/VoLTE and possibly SS7. These protocols are vulnerable to eavesdropping and tracking. Security update gap between new security requirements and deployment of updated versions of network functions in operational systems. Two major factors are relevant for this gap: a) vendors’ responsiveness in issuing and validating new versions of the network functions that address the updated requirements, and b) timeliness and effectiveness of MNO processes to update. This may lead to vulnerabilities in operational NSA 5G infrastructures. Besides these areas of vulnerability, virtualization vulnerabilities are also applicable to implementation options. The table below provides a more exhaustive view on vulnerabilities of components used within 5G implementation options. Relevant toolbox Threat Name Description measures categories

text: Vulnerabilities of Vulnerabilities inherited from the LTE system include: TM05 NAA-AIL, NAAlegacy technologies SGN, EIH • Lack of integrity protection of over-the-air User Plane traffic; • Exposure of international mobile subscriber identities (IMSI) over the air; • Weaker cryptographic algorithms.

text: Improper The updated requirements for LTE critical components TM02 NAA-{all}, EIH, implementation of involved in Non-standalone implementations include UD, FM updated security security controls for known vulnerabilities and allow functions interoperability by the 5G Components. Failure to meet assurance specification as defined in the Security Assurance Specification for critical components leave open vulnerabilities. The affected components are: • Vulnerabilities in MME implementation; • Vulnerabilities in evolved Node B (eNB) implementation.

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text: Vulnerabilities in the Similar to 5G Core functions, the security of EPC+ TM01, TM02 NAA-{all}, EIH, technical baseline of functions relies on a secure technical baseline. FM, UD EPC+ functions Vulnerabilities relevant for 5G Core functions as detailed in the respective section apply similarly. Relevant vulnerabilities include:  Improper protection of Data and Information of EPC+ components;  Improper protection of availability and integrity of EPC+ components;  Vulnerable mechanisms for authentication and authorisation of EPC+ components;  Improper session protection mechanisms of EPC+ components;  Insufficient or improper monitoring mechanisms of EPC+ components;  Vulnerabilities in Operating Systems supporting EPC+ components;  Vulnerabilities in Web Servers supporting EPC+ components;  Vulnerabilities of network devices running EPC+ components;  Improper hardening of EPC+ components.

text: 5G New Radio Vulnerabilities for 5G New Radio components are TM02 See section Vulnerabilities referred in the 5G RAN Vulnerabilities section. above

text: SBA/SBI Service-Based-Interfaces are a common feature of 4G TM01 NAA-EXPL, vulnerabilities of and 5G NR components. Relevant vulnerabilities NAA-AIL, NAAcomponents include: AAA, NAA- DBLT, NAA-  Improper transport layer protection, such as MND EIH, FM incorrect TLS profile and improper authentication mechanisms;  Vulnerable authorisation mechanisms on service access.

text: Detailed information is presented in the 5G Core Section.

text: Virtualisation One of the main implementation scenarios focuses on TM04 NAA-AVM, FM Vulnerabilities building a new virtualized EPC network to support the Non-Standalone implementation. In this scenario, virtualization vulnerabilities are highly relevant. Virtualisation vulnerabilities are detailed in Section NFV and 5G Core.

text: LTE Roaming 5G NSA roaming is essentially 4G roaming. From a TM01, TM02, NAA-AIL, NAAvulnerabilities security perspective, a 5G NSA roaming connection TM05 SGN, EIH introduces no new protections since it continues to use Diameter, SIP/VoLTE and possibly SS7. Relevant vulnerabilities may include:  Improper protection of Data and Information of EPC+ components;  SS7 Vulnerabilities;  Diameter vulnerabilities; 84  VoLTE vulnerabilities .

text: A detailed list of implementation options – migration path vulnerabilities can be found in the Annex (see J Annex).

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text: 4.11 VULNERABILITY GROUPS FOR PROCESSES In this section we develop a set to vulnerabilities/weaknesses that arise from the absence of processes pertinent to life-cycle maintenance of systems and applications of the entire 5G infrastructure. As mentioned in section 3.13, the processes considered are MNO life-cycle processes, vendor development and product life-cycle, as well as security assurance. Though we have not developed any security considerations in section 3.13 – as we did for the 3GPP specified components - in the discussion below we enlist weaknesses that may arise from the absence of maintenance processes for life-cycle considerations regarding the entire 5G infrastructure. 4.11.1 MNO processes Security of the 5G System is achieved and maintained by upholding security objectives across the entire lifecycle of the system, in particular from the side of Mobile Network Operator (MNO). In this section, we have identified operational process weaknesses that can directly impact the security of the 5G System. As a reference model for operational processes, we used the eTOM Business Framework which defines comprehensive, industry-agreed, multi-layered view of the key business processes in the Telecommunications sector. Any other process framework could be used for this purpose. Relevant Threat Name Description toolbox categories measures

text: Improper Resource Process weaknesses that may directly impact the TM01, TM09, NAA-CSVS, Capability Delivery security of 5G system include: TM10 NAA-AIL, NAA- Processes DBLT, EIH, PA,  Improper processes to map and analyse UD, FM, OUT, resource requirements; DIS  Failure to adapt resource support and operations;  Inability to capture resource capability shortfalls;  Improper Resource Capabilities design and management of delivery;  Improper management of Handover to Resource Operations.

text: Improper Party Process weaknesses that may directly impact the TM08, TM09, NAA-CSVS, Tender Management security of 5G system include: TM10 NAA-AIL, NAA- Processes DBLT, EIH, PA,  Inadequate definition of sourcing requirements; UD, FM, OUT,  Improper process to determine Potential DIS Suppliers/Partners;  Inadequate management of the Tender Process.

text: Improper Resource Process weaknesses that may directly impact the TM01 NAA-CSVS, Development & security of 5G system include: NAA-AIL, NAA- Retirement DBLT, EIH, PA,  Improper control of Detailed Resource Processes UD, FM, OUT, Specifications development; DIS  Inadequate coordination of resource development;  Improper management of resource deployment;  Improper storage media sanitisation;  Improper management of resource exit.

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text: Improper Resource Process weaknesses that may directly impact the TM01 NAA-CSVS, management and security of 5G system include: NAA-AIL, NAAoperation Support & DBLT, EIH, PA,  Improper processes to support resource Readiness UD, FM, OUT, processes provisioning; DIS  Improper processes to support resource

text: performance management;  Improper processes to support resource trouble

text: management;  Improper management of resource inventory.

text: Improper Party Process weaknesses that may directly impact the TM08 NAA-CSVS, Agreement security of 5G system include: NAA-AIL, NAAprocesses DBLT, EIH, PA,  Insufficient / improper definition of relevant UD, FM, OUT,

text: operational and security clauses in agreements DIS with suppliers and partners;  Improper management of contract variations.

text: Improper Party Process weaknesses that directly impact the security TM01 NAA-CSVS, Support processes of 5G system include: EIH, PA, UD, FM, OUT, DIS  Improper processes to support Party Requisition

text: Management;  Support Party Performance Management;  Support Party Interface Management.

text: Improper resource Process weaknesses that directly impact the security TM01, TM02 NAA-CSVS, provisioning of 5G system include: NAA-AIL, NAAprocesses DBLT, EIH, PA,  Improper processes for resource allocation and UD, FM, OUT,

text: installation; DIS  Improper / obsolete processes to Configure &

text: Activate Resources;  Improper tracking & management of resource

text: provisioning.

text: Resource Trouble Process weaknesses that directly impact the security TM05 NAA-CSVS, Management of 5G system include: NAA-AIL, NAA- DBLT, EIH, PA,  Improper survey and analysis of resource UD, FM, OUT,

text: trouble; DIS  Improper processes for localisation of resource

text: trouble;  Improper processes for correction and resolution

text: of resource trouble.

text: Resource data Process weaknesses that directly impact the security TM05 NAA-CSVS, collection & of 5G system include: NAA-AIL, NAAdistribution DBLT, EIH, PA,  Improper processing of management and UD, FM, OUT,

text: Security Information & Data; DIS  Inadequate processes for audit of Management

text: and Security Data Collection & Distribution.

text: Resource Process weaknesses that directly impact the security TM05 UD, FM, OUT Performance of 5G system include:

text: Management

text:  Improper monitoring of resource performance;  Improper processes for controlling resource

text: performance.

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text: Party Interaction Process weaknesses that directly impact the security TM05 NAA-CSVS, Management of 5G system include improper Tracking, Management NAA-AIL, NAAand Handling of Interaction with suppliers and DBLT, EIH, PA, partners. UD, FM, OUT, DIS

text: Party Problem Process weaknesses that directly impact the security TM05 UD, FM, OUT Handling of 5G system include improper processes to Receive, Assess and Track problems related to relevant Suppliers/Partners, as well as failure to capture trends in problems related to third-parties.

text: Party Performance Process weaknesses that directly impact the security TM05 NAA-CSVS, Management of 5G system include improper processes to Monitor & UD, FM, OUT Control Supplier/Partner Performance and to track & manage party performance resolution.

text: Party Inventory Process weaknesses that directly impact the security TM05 NAA-CSVS, Management of 5G system include improper processes for manage NAA-AIL, NAA- S/P Inventory Repository and to manage and DBLT, EIH, PA, administer S/P Inventory. UD, FM, OUT, DIS

text: Business Continuity Process weaknesses that directly impact the security TM11 OUT, DIS Management of 5G system include failure to update and adapt Business Continuity plans, Infrastructure Recovery plans and Incident Management plans.

text: Fraud Management Process weaknesses that directly impact the security TM05 NAA-IFAS, of 5G system include failure to adapt fraud LEG management policies and controls.

text: Regulatory Process weaknesses that directly impact the security TM05 LEG Management of 5G system include failure to identify and comply with updated compliance requirements

text: Insurance Process weaknesses that directly impact the security TM05, TM11 NAA-CSVS, Management of 5G system include failure to identify insurable risks. EIH, PA, UD, FM, OUT, DIS, LEG

text: Security Failure to adapt security management processes to TM05, TM11 NAA, EIH, PA, Management new technologies, business models and associated UD, FM, OUT, risks will directly impact the security of the 5G System. DIS, LEG

text: A detailed list of vulnerabilities emerging from improper operational processes at the level of mobile network operator can be found in the Annex (see K Annex). 4.11.2 Vendor, development and product life-cycle processes Vendor Development and Product Lifecycle covers all aspects potentially impacting a Network Product’s lifetime. Vulnerabilities in vendor development and product lifecycle processes impact directly the security of 5G system components. While some vulnerabilities are directly connected to a specific phase in the Product Lifecycle, other process vulnerabilities are relevant for the entire Development and Product lifecycles.

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text: Design Phase Failure to apply security architectural and security TM08 NAA-EXPL, Vulnerabilities design principles and follow them throughout the entire UD, FM development lifecycle leads to structural security problems that imperil the security of the components and of the 5G system.

text: Implementation Relevant implementation phase vulnerabilities include: TM08 NAA-CSVS,

text: Phase UD, FM

text:  Ineffective code governance and improper code

text: Vulnerabilities

text: review;  Vulnerabilities in Build process and environment.

text: Testing Phase The relevant vulnerability in the testing phase refers to TM08 NAA-EXPL, Vulnerabilities lack of or improper security testing. This in turn leaves NAA-DBLT, the network products exposed to vulnerabilities and UD, FM unexpected and unspecified behaviour.

text: Release Phase Relevant release phase vulnerabilities include: TM08 NAA-EXPL,

text: Vulnerabilities NAA-DBLT,

text:  Improper verification of software integrity;

text: UD, FM

text:  Ambiguous software release identifiers;  Inaccurate / obsolete documentation.

text: Operation Phase Relevant operation phase vulnerabilities include: TM08, TM11 NAA-EXPL,

text: Vulnerabilities NAA-DBLT,

text:  Failure to provide a security contact;

text: NAA-EXPL,

text:  Insufficient vulnerability awareness;

text: NAA-DBLT,

text:  Ineffective vulnerability remedy process;

text: UD, FM

text:  Unreliable communication of software fixes.

text: Vulnerabilities The following vulnerabilities impact the security of TM11 NAA-EXPL, relevant for the network product across its entire development and NAA-DBLT,

text: entire lifecycle product lifecycle: NAA-EXPL, NAA-DBLT,

text:  Improper version control system;

text: UD, FM

text:  Improper change management process;  Insufficient security education and awareness of staff;  Ineffective Information Security Management System.

text: A detailed list of vulnerabilities emerging from improper vendor, product, development life-cycle processes can be found in the Annex (see L Annex). 4.11.3 Security assurance processes A solid and objective assessment process can contribute towards identification baseline security requirements to be met for network products and the implemented processes. This is an additional dimension to technological and operational security mitigation controls, contributing towards the assurance of their implementation levels. Following conclusions of the Toolbox, security assurance processes can only help mitigate certain risks to a limited extent given the constant need to update products and systemsmaking it impossible to create ‘trust’ through these mechanisms only. Hence, assurance

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text: processes and related measures need to be seen in combination to implementation of technical and operational ones. In this context, a series of vulnerabilities must be taken into consideration when assessing the fitness for purpose of a security assurance scheme for 5G Systems: Relevant toolbox Threat Name Description measures categories

text: Standardisation Agreed-upon and recognized standards are TM02, SA03, SA04 NAA-{all}, UD, vulnerabilities paramount for ensuring a security baseline. Potential FM vulnerabilities include:  Obsolescence of standards;  Alignment of standards;  Missing security requirements reference for verticals.

text: Accreditation Accreditation provides trust in the results of conformity TM09, TM10, SA05 NAA-{all}, UD, vulnerabilities and security assessment results. Potential FM, LEG vulnerabilities include:  Recognition of accreditation scheme;  No alignment with internationally recognized standards for accreditation and conformity assessment;  Lack of control by regulatory and supervisory bodies.

text: Conformity Security assessment activities and their results need TM09, TM10, NAA-{all}, UD, Assessment to be trustworthy, relevant and sufficient for meeting SA05, SA06 FM, LEG vulnerabilities the overall security objectives and regulatory requirements. Potential vulnerabilities include:  Not appropriate to address risks stemming from non-technical risks related to the supplier’s risk profile;  No common reference for security requirements for Mobile Network Operators;  No security evaluation of the operational environment;  Insufficient assurance of environmental assumptions;  Certification overhead and relevance;  No assessment scheme for evaluation of virtualized products;  Insufficient security assurance level;  Re-use of evidence created by conformity assessment bodies.

text: A detailed list of vulnerabilities emerging from the absence of an effective security assurance process can be found in the Annex (see M Annex).

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text: 5. ASSETS

text: 5.1 ASSET CLASSIFICATION AND MAPPING One critical and initial step in any threat assessment is to identify and classify the most sensitive assets that, if compromised, may pose a certain level of risk to an individual or organisation. These activities are part of the asset security domain that focus on collecting and handling the information required to define the model and a strategy to protect the attribute and value it represents. In the 5G context, the monetisation of asset attributes such as network slicing, cloud and Edge computing are in the centre of the value concept of this new generation of mobile communications. The 5G architecture considers four main areas that includes user equipment, radio access network, core network and data network. In this report, we cover two main areas which are the most significant on 5G evolution: the core network and radio access. We leave user equipment and data network for future analysis. In the context of this report, we consider various asset categories that relate to critical components or entities in a 5G network. These components and entities are of a heterogeneous nature and require differentiated asset security strategies from owners and/or stakeholders. For example, the interoperability, multi-level and seamless usage may result in unauthorised and opportunistic access to the network. We also identify differentiated roles assumed by various actors (presented in chapter2.1 above2.1 of this report), in the definition and implementation of these asset security strategies. These however, may change in importance, sensitivity and relevance over time, depending on the product or service lifecycle stage. Each mapped asset may expose certain vulnerabilities or weaknesses during the lifecycle that if exploited may pose a threat to the confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA triad) of systems and data transmitted of parts or the entire 5G network. The scope of this document is not to report on a specific asset inventory but to direct the reader on where to look when conducting such exercises. The responsibility of mapping the sensitive assets of network relays with the operator since it depends on the technology used, network product implemented, processes adopted, type of organisations and the services offered. A mapping of assets and the CIA Triad is presented Table 3. In the first version of the ENISA Threat Landscape Report for 5G Networks (ETL5G), we prepared a categorisation of assets based on a high-level architecture presented in the document. We also review the importance and relevance of these assets to the CIA triad properties. The categorisations considered a specific definition of assets based on a GNP (Generic Network Product) class description. A GNP is a class of network products that implement a common set of 3GPP-defined functionalities for a particular component. According to 3GPP, the critical assets of GNP to be protected are:  User account data and credentials (e.g. passwords);  Log data;  Configuration data, e.g. GNP's IP address, ports, VPN ID, Management Objects (e.g. user group, command group) etc.  Operating System (OS), i.e. the files that make up the OS and its processes (code and data);

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text:  GNP Application;  Sufficient processing capacity: that processing powers are not consumed close to limits;  Hardware, e.g. mainframe, board, power supply unit etc.  The interfaces of GNP to be protected and which are within SECAM scope: for example o Console interface, for local access: local interface on MME o OAM interface, for remote access: interface between MME and OAM system o GNP Software: binary code or executable code All the above critical assets from release 15 of the 3GPP Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) fit in the asset categories defined in the first edition of the ETL5G. In this edition, we update the asset categorisations based on new requirements introduced by release 16 of the 3GPP technical specifications and the new 5G use cases. We classified the sensitive assets considering the stages of the implementation lifecycle using the eTOM – enhanced Telecom Operation Map as a guide. We assume that certain assets gain a particular importance or sensitiveness during different stages of the GNP lifecycle. We also update the information about stakeholders from the previous edition and correlate it with the new asset categorisation. 5.2 NEW ASSET CATEGORIES The following 5G asset categories derive from the high-level architecture presented in chapter 3.2 of this report and classification based on release 16 of the 3GPP technical specifications. The high number of sensitive assets identified from the architecture resulted in a complex and large diagram, making it difficult to read and display in this report. We use part of the diagram to depict each asset group. The diagram is structured using asset groups according to their exposure to threats. By taking into account the role of assets in maintaining the security-related properties of confidentiality, availability and integrity (known as CIA triad), an initial assessment of their importance has been developed. In doing so, the emphasis has been given to asset groups responsible for maintaining the overall security and availability of the 5G infrastructure and that are known targets of cyber-attacks. This new categorisation introduces new groups at the lower or more detailed level of the asset classification, deriving from the requirements of release 16. Another important aspect is the definition of a high-level classification introducing main categories. These main categories, depicted in Figure 15, include components and entities from management & orchestration, network products, protocols, data, interconnections, services, processes and organisation. The main advantage of having this new upper level is to allow the possibility to define different asset security strategies depending on the characteristics of each asset group. The assets in these groups share important characteristics such as type of vulnerabilities, stakeholders and controls. These characteristics change quite substantially and require differentiated approaches in the asset security strategy. A complete diagram of the asset map is present in Figure in Annex A.

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text: Figure 15: Main categories of 5G network assets Network Products: This main category includes network planes, functions and elements. These derive into multiple asset groups that could be found in the previous asset mapping like core functions, physical infrastructure, security, software-defined networking (SDN), among others. The main category is a core part of the 5G architecture and one of the most critical in any 5G asset mapping. Figure 16: 5G Asset groups from the Network Products category

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text: Figure 16 depicts the second, third and fourth level groups of the Network Products asset category. However, not all levels are displayed; hence, we present the full diagram at ENISA website using an interactive tool to explore the inwards of the different asset categories. Management and orchestration: This main category includes the management of network functions, network slicing, operations support system, network/element (EMS/NMS) and SDN Controller. Figure 17 depicts the different asset groups of MANO. MANO is the most vital part of the 5G infrastructure since is responsible for controlling the entire set of network functions, their virtualisation and entire software lifecycle related hereto. The main parts of MANO are the Network Function Virtualisation (NFV) orchestrator, the Virtual Network Function (VNF) manager, and the virtualised infrastructure manager. Given its important role, MANO is going to be exposed to numerous attacks with potential major impact on the entire managed 5G infrastructure environment. The assets of MANO are also depicted in detail in the corresponding ‘Zoom-in’ in the 5G architecture chapter 3.5. Figure 17: Asset groups from the Management & Orchestration category Protocols: This main category of 5G assets include IP and cellular stack. ENISA reviewed the legacy protocols SS7 and Diameter in a study conducted in 2018 . Early generations of mobile networks such as 2G and 3G rely on these protocols that still contain many critical vulnerabilities yet to be resolved. 5G networks will need to support SS7 and Diameter for the foreseeable future (decades) in order to maintain global connectivity (roaming). Figure 18 depicts the various groups of assets associated with protocols typically implemented in a 5G Network. Figure 18: Asset groups from the Protocols category Interconnections: This main category of 5G assets include home/visitor PLMN, security Edge Protection Proxy (SEPP), packet data network gateway (PGW), N3IWF - Non-3GPP

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text: Interworking, trusted non-3GPP Gateway Function (TNGF), wireline Access Gateway Function (W-AGF) and trusted WLAN Interworking Function (TWIF) asset groups. Figure 19 depicts the various assets groups associated with interconnections that could be implemented in a 5G Network. Figure 19: Asset groups from the Interconnections category Data: This main category of 5G assets include user, application, system, network, SDN and security data. This asset group includes the entire data catalogue required in any 5G operation combined with used data. Though not necessarily exhaustive at this stage of the analysis, this asset group covers information related to: user data, system and configuration data, securityrelated data, network data (configuration, edge, logs, API-data, SDN-data, etc.). It is expected that 5G data such as user, security and configuration information will be subject to cyberattacks with the aim to breach them. Main motives are monetisation and unnoticed access to the network. Figure 20: Asset groups from the data category Services: This main of 5G assets include the use cases, multi-edge computing (MEC) and cloud service asset groups. These services are directly related with the asset monetisation model of a 5G Network and consequently represents part of the value generated that needs to be protected. In this version of the 5GTL we review assets that support the value generation model but not the

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text: model itself. These were already covered by ENISA in previous work (cloud computing, autonomous vehicles, IIOT ) or are part of recommendations for future research work. Figure 21: Asset groups from the Services category Processes: This main category of 5G assets include the MNO and the product development lifecycle processes. All these processes are vital in a secure and reliable implementation of a 5G Network. Figure 22: Asset groups from the Processes category ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Organisation: This main category of 5G assets include time, legal, policy, business support systems (BSS) and human assets. Many components in this asset category were also included in the previous mapping. For example, human assets are considered an important group since humans represent all individuals involved in the operation and use of the 5G network. Time for example plays a significant role in many time-dependent functions. With release 16 and the introduction of mission-critical uses cases requiring constant time synchronisation (e.g. ITS, V2X, IIoT and URLLC), this asset plays an even more important role in a 5G Network. Figure 23: Asset groups from the Organisation category

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: 5.3 ASSET CLASSIFICATION AND THE CIA TRIAD In the following table, we provide the relevance of the identified asset groups with regard to the CIA triad. Table 3: Relevance of asset groups to the maintenance of CIA properties Asset C CIA Triad Confidentiality Integrity Availability Management &

text: orchestration Network products ● ● ● Protocols ● ● Data ● ● ● Interconnections ● ● ● Services ● ● ● Processes ● ● ● Organisation ● ● ●

text: Legend:

text: Very high relevance of asset group to maintain the property: ● High relevance of asset group to maintain the property: ● Medium relevance of asset group to maintain the property: ● Low relevance of asset group to maintain the property: ● Very low relevance of asset group to maintain the property: ●

text: The assignment of these security properties has been performed at the level of asset groups. We recommend performance of this exercise in higher detail, depending on the focus of prospective threat assessments. In this case, to achieve a more precise mapping, users of this document should obtain a more accurate internal evaluation of these properties. Concluding this chapter, it is worth mentioning that due to its complexity and the early stage of 5G networks (development, deployment, specification) the asset mapping is an ongoing task that will need some time to reach a mature stage. This is due to a variety of reasons/issues regarding the parameters of current 5G activities (narrow time windows for the creation of reports, resource issues, knowledge transfer, vendor’s enrolment, etc.). These challenges will be sufficiently managed in future assessment of 5G threats. 5.4 THE RELEVANCE OF ASSETS THROUGHOUT THE LIFECYCLE The following table presents the relevance of the identified asset groups with regard to the 5G network lifecycle.

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Table 4: Relevance of asset categories throughout the 5G network lifecyle Asset Lifecycle process (eTOM) category Operation Operations (fulfilment and Design Build support & assurance) readiness

text: Network The technical The network The testing Management plane, control products requirements and planes, functions capabilities for plane, user plane, 5G core specifications of the and elements physical functions, 5G RAN functions, network infrastructure, legacy / non-standalone, service- SDN and based architecture, security Network functions, network function functions virtualisation (NFV), physical infrastructure, virtualisation infrastructure, software defined networking (SDN) and security functions.

text: Management The infrastructure and Virtualisation User rights NFV MANO, network slicing & virtualisation related (build) management, management, operations support orchestration requirements components such service system (OSS), network/element as scripts, programmability, management system (EMS/NMS) templates and E2E service and SDN controller schemas inventory and federation management.

text: Protocols Protocols requirements Protocol N/A IP and cellular stack configuration data

text: Data The technical, security, The technical and Test and User data, application data, legal, processual and security application data system data, network data, SDN business data configuration data data and security data generated.

text: Inter- The interconnection The Testing Home/visitor PLMN, security connections requirements between interconnection interfaces Edge protection proxy (SEPP), technologies, services APIs and between packet data network gateway and operators proprietary technical (PGW), N3IWF - Non-3GPP interfaces infrastructures, interworking, trusted non-3GPP operators and gateway function (TNGF), with providers wireline access gateway function and customers. (W-AGF), trusted WLAN interworking function (TWIF)

text: Services The use cases Cloud and tenant Use cases and Use cases, multi edge computing requirements, (Verticals configuration verticals testing (MEC) and cloud computing including on premises with vendors, and cloud requirement operators and customers

text: Processes The product design and Product Security MNO lifecycle processes, vendor procurements development and assurance and development and product requirements. Vendor security auditing, product lifecycle processes, security review data. Risk and implementation road mapping. assurance processes threat assessments

text: Organisation The legal aspects Organisational Time, policies Business support systems, related with the data and human and human organisational data, procurement of network assets assets synchronisation systems and product including policy monitoring systems tender specifications, budget, contracts, laws and regulations

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: 6. 5G THREATS

text: In the first edition of the threat landscape for 5G Networks, we identified and described multiple threat types distributed by asset categories from the network architecture (core, access and edge), traditional IP-based threats, insecure legacy 2/3/4G generations and the ones introduced by the virtualisation technology. To complement the analysis, we added the potential impact and information about the affected assets. We used ENISA threat taxonomy to group these threats in one common list. In this edition, we continued reviewing the threat landscape by updating the information from the previous edition and added new elements to the analysis. In summary, we: 1. reviewed the network architecture based on the specifications defined in release 16 for a generic network product (GNP); 2. reviewed the asset map based on the revised architecture and product lifecycle; 3. added information about vulnerabilities; 4. made a correlation between sensitive assets and vulnerabilities to look for exploitation opportunities; 5. used STRIDE model to structure the information about threats and; 6. prepared a list combining all the information available about threats, including the ones from the previous edition and other sources such as 3GPP and GSMA. As previously mentioned, we used the STRIDE model to structure information about threats. According to ISO 27001 , a threat can be defined as “the potential cause of an incident that may result in a breach of information security or compromise business operations.”. In the context of this report, we collected information about various potential causes of an incident during the design, build, operation support & readiness and operations (fulfilment and assurance) of a 5G Network structured in 6 main categories (spoofing identity, tampering, repudiation, information disclosure, denial of service and elevation of privilege). 6.1 TAXONOMY OF THREATS With the proliferation of methods, taxonomies and models, it is imperative to establish a common understanding of the different terms used to describe the threat landscape. It should start with the categorization of important elements such as assets, vulnerabilities and threats. For example, the adoption of a common taxonomy in 5G security will help improving communication among the various stakeholders in policymaking, regulation, product development, system implementation and operation. For that purpose, ENISA presents a threat taxonomy in Table 5 Annex B. 6.2 THREAT MAP At this stage, we have completed the security risk management triangle with information about assets, vulnerabilities and threats. Conducting a more detailed assessment for a particular context and use case, it will be possible to complete the entire model. In this revision of the threat map, we structured the information from the previous edition of this report and generic threats from 3GPP security assurance specification (SCAS) using the STRIDE model.

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Threat Type Threats Potential Impact Affected Assets

text: Nefarious Activity/ Manipulation of network configuration/data forging - Information integrity - SDN, NFV, MANO Abuse of assets (NAA) - Routing tables manipulation - Information destruction - RAN, RAT - CORE configuration data tampering - Service unavailability - System configuration data - DNS manipulation - Network configuration data - Manipulation of access network and radio technology configuration data - Security configuration data - Exploitation of misconfigured or poorly configured systems/networks - Business services - Registration of malicious network functions - Security data tampering (cryptography keys, security policies, access rules, etc,). - Network implementation data tampering - Operating system (OS) services tampering Exploitation of software, hardware vulnerabilities - Information integrity - SDN, NFV, MANO, RAN, RAT, MEC, API - Zero-day exploits - Information destruction - Physical infrastructure - Abuse of edge open application programming interfaces (APIs) - Service unavailability - Business applications - Application programming interface (API) exploitation - Security controls - Software tampering - Cloud, virtualisation - System execution hijack - Subscribers’ data - Application data - Security data - Network data - Business services Denial of service (DoS) - Service unavailability - SDN, NFV - Distributed denial of service (DDoS) - Outage - RAN, RAT - Flooding of core network components - MEC - Flooding of base stations - CLOUD - Amplification attacks - Network services - MAC layer attacks - Business services - Jamming the network radio - Jamming device radio interface - Jamming base station radio interface - Edge node overload - Authentication traffic spikes Remote access exploitation - System integrity - RAT, SDN, NFV, MANO, CLOUD - intra-RAT mobility mechanism hijack - Data confidentiality - Intra-RAT - RAT session hijack

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Malicious code/software - Service unavailability - Data network - Injection attacks (SQL, XSS) - Information integrity - Business applications - Rootkits - Information destruction - Security controls - Rogueware - Other software asset integrity - Cloud, virtualisation - Worms/trojan - Other software asset - Subscribers’ data destruction - Botnet - Application data - Ransomware - Security data - Malicious network functions - Network data - Malware attacks on network products - Business services - Malware attacks on business applications - Network services Abuse of remote access to the network - Information integrity - SDN, NFV, RAN, RAT - Abuse on external remote services to network products (e.g. VPN) - System integrity - Intra-RAT - Information confidentiality - Subscribers’ data - Initial unauthorised access - Application data - Persistence - Security data - Network data Abuse of information leakage - Information integrity - Data storage/ repository - Theft and/or leakage from network traffic - Information destruction - Subscribers’ data - Theft and/or leakage of data from cloud computing - Information confidentiality - Cryptographic keys - Abuse on security data from audit tools - Monitoring data - Theft/breach of security keys - User subscription profile data - Unauthorised access to user plane data - User plane data - Unauthorised access to signalling data - Signalling data Abuse of authentication - Information integrity - Security data - Authentication traffic spikes - Information destruction - Network service - Abuse of user authentication/authorisation data by third parties’ personnel - Service unavailability - Network functions - Abuse of the application management function (AMF) authentication and key - Initial unauthorised access - Subscribers’ data agreement procedure - Persistence - Application data - Abuse the credentials of existing accounts - Security data - Network data Lawful interception function abuse - Information integrity - Subscribers’ data - Information destruction - User subscription profile data

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Manipulation of hardware and software - Service unavailability - Cloud data centre equipment - Manipulation of hardware equipment - Information integrity - User equipment - Manipulation of the network resources orchestrator - Information destruction - Radio access/units - Memory scraping - Light data centres - Side channels attacks - SDN, MANO, NF, - Fake access network node - RAN, RAT - False or rogue MEC gateway - Virtualisation - UICC format exploitation - Subscribers’ data - UE compromising - Network services - Unacceptable UE security capabilities - Software backdoor Data breach, leak, theft and manipulation of information - Information integrity - Subscribers’ data - Network product log tampering - Information destruction - Subscriber geo locations - File Write Permission Abuse - Information confidentiality - Financial data - Ownership file misuse - Commercial data, IP - Breach of customer data - Configuration data - Theft of personal data - Service data - Network data Unauthorised activities/network intrusions - Information integrity - User equipment - IMSI catching attacks - System integrity - Network services - Lateral movement - Business services - Brute force - Port knocking Identity fraud/account or service - Service unavailability - User subscription profile data - Identity theft - Information destruction - Subscribers’ data - Identity spoofing - Information integrity - IP spoofing - MAC spoofing Spectrum sensing - Service unavailability - RAT - Radio access units

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Compromised supply chain, vendor and service providers - Service unavailability - SDN, NFV, MANO, RAN, RAT, MEC, API - Abuse on third parties’ personnel access to MNO’s facilities - Information integrity - Physical infrastructure - Network product development tools tampering - Information destruction - Business applications - Network product configuration tools tampering - Initial unauthorised access - Security controls - Network product source code tampering - Cloud, virtualisation - Manipulation of network product updates - Network services - Business services Abuse of virtualisation mechanisms - Service unavailability - Virtualisation - Network virtualisation bypassing - Information integrity - MANO - Virtualised host abuse - Information destruction - Cloud - Virtual machine manipulation - Network services - Data centre threats - Business services - Cloud container image implant - Cloud container image backdoor - Abuse of cloud computational resources Signalling threats - Service unavailability - RAT - Signalling storms - Information integrity - Radio access units - Signalling fraud - Information destruction - Protocols - Network services - Business services Traffic Tampering - - RAT - SDN, NFV, MANO Eavesdropping/ Nation state espionage - Information integrity - Subscribers’ data Interception/ Hijacking - Information confidentiality - Subscriber geo locations

text: (EIH)

text: Corporate espionage - Information integrity - Financial data - Information confidentiality - Commercial data - IP

text: Traffic sniffing - Information integrity - Data traffic - Information confidentiality - Subscribers’ data - Subscriber geo location

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Manipulation of network traffic, network reconnaissance and information - Information integrity - Data traffic

text: gathering

text: - Information confidentiality - Subscribers’ data - Radio network traffic manipulation - Subscriber geo locations - Malicious diversion of traffic - Traffic redirecting - Abuse of roaming interconnections

text: Man in the middle/ Session hijacking - Information integrity - Data traffic - Session hijacking via rogue base station - Information confidentiality - Subscribers’ data - Downgrade attacks via rogue base station - Subscriber geo locations Interception of information - Information integrity - Data traffic - Data eavesdropping via compromised small cell - Information confidentiality - Subscribers’ data - Air interface eavesdropping - Subscriber geo locations - Device and identity tracking via rogue base station - Eavesdropping on unencrypted message content

text: Physical Attacks (PA) Sabotage of network infrastructure (radio access, edge servers, etc.) - Service unavailability - Radio access units - Hardware additions - Information destruction - ICT equipment - Information integrity - Light data centre - Initial unauthorised access - Cloud data centre - Network services - Business services Vandalism of network infrastructure (radio access, edge servers, etc.) - Service unavailability - Radio access units - Information destruction - ICT equipment - Information integrity - Light data centre - Cloud data centre - Network services - Business services

text: Theft of physical assets - Service unavailability - Radio access units - Information destruction - ICT equipment - Information integrity - Light data centre - Cloud data centre - Network services - Business services

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Terrorist attack against network infrastructure - Service unavailability - Radio access units - Information destruction - ICT equipment - Information integrity - Light data centre - Cloud data centre - Network services - Business services Fraud by MNO employees - Service unavailability - Radio access units - Information destruction - ICT equipment - Information integrity - Light data center - Cloud data center - Network services - Business services Unauthorised physical access to based stations in shared locations - Service unavailability - RAT - Information destruction - Radio access units - Information integrity - Network services - Business services Unintentional damages Misconfigured or poorly configured systems/networks - Service unavailability - Management processes (accidental) (UD) - Information integrity - Policies - Legal - Human assets - SDN, NFV, MANO, API - RAN, RAT, MEC - Physical infrastructure - Business applications - Security controls - Cloud, virtualisation Inadequate designs and planning or lack of adaption - Service unavailability - Management processes - Outdated system or network from the lack of update or patch management - Information integrity - Policies - Errors from the lack of configuration change management - Human assets - Poorly design network and system architecture - SDN, NFV, MANO, RAN, RAT, MEC, API - Physical infrastructure - Business applications - Security controls - Cloud, virtualisation

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Erroneous use or administration of the network, systems and devices - Service unavailability - Management processes - Information integrity - Policies - Human assets - SDN, NFV, MANO, RAN, RAT, MEC, UE, API - Physical infrastructure - Business applications - Security controls - Cloud, virtualisation Information leakage/sharing due to human error - Information integrity - Data storage/repository - Information confidentiality - Management processes - Policies - Legal - Human assets - Subscribers’ data - Application data - Security data - Network data Data loss from unintentional deletion - Information integrity - Management processes - Information confidentiality - Policies - Human assets Failures or Malfunctions Failure of the network, devices or systems - Service unavailability - Cloud data centre (FM) - Information destruction - User equipment - Information integrity - RAT, Radio unit - Light data centre - Subscribers’ data - Application data - Security data - Network data

text: Failure or disruption of communication link - Service unavailability - Cloud data centre - Information destruction - Network services - Information integrity - Business services

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Failure or disruption of main power supply - Service unavailability - Cloud data centre - Information destruction - Network services - Information integrity - Business services

text: Failure or disruption from service providers (supply chain) - Service unavailability - Network services - Information destruction - Business services - Information integrity

text: Malfunction of equipment (devices or systems) - Service unavailability - Radio access units - Information destruction - ICT equipment - Information integrity - Light data centre - Cloud data centre - Network services - Business services

text: Outages (OUT) Loss of resources - Service unavailability - Human assets - Human resources - Information destruction - Legal - Physical resources - Information integrity - Network services - Business services

text: Support services - Service unavailability - Human assets - Information destruction - Management processes - Information integrity - Policies - Legal - Network services - Business services Data network (access) - Service unavailability - Cloud data centre - Information destruction - Network services - Information integrity - Business services

text: Interfering radiation - Service unavailability - CORE, RAN, MANO, UE - Information destruction - Network services - Information integrity - Business services - Cloud data centre - Network services - Business services

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Disasters (DIS) Natural disasters - Service unavailability - Radio access units - Earthquakes - Information destruction - ICT equipment - Landslides - Information integrity - Light data centre - Cloud data centre - Network services - Business services Environmental disaster - Service unavailability - Radio access units - Floods, storms - Information destruction - ICT equipment - Pollution, dust, corrosion - Information integrity - Light data centre - Fires, heavy winds - Cloud data centre - Unfavourable climatic conditions - Network services - Business services Legal (LEG) Breach of service level agreement (SLA) - Service unavailability - Network services - Information destruction - Business services - Information integrity Breach of legislation - Service unavailability - Network services - Information destruction - Business services - Information integrity Failure to meet contractual requirements and/or legislation - Service unavailability - Network services - Information destruction - Business services - Information integrity

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: In the following table we provide a mapping between the ENISA 5G threat taxonomy and the vulnerabilities/threats identified by 3GPP. This mapping establishes the correspondence between the threats assigned to the assessed vulnerabilities. Spoofing Identity Tampering Repudiation Information Disclosure Denial of Service Elevation of Privilege

text: NEFARIOUS ACTIVITY/ ABUSE OF ASSETS (NAA)

text: Malicious Code or SW Malware · Software Tampering Malware Over-Privileged (NAA-MAL) · Log Tampering Processes/Services

text: Exploitation of flaws in · Default Accounts · Software Tampering · Lack of User Activity · Poor Key Generation · Compromised/ · Misuse by Authorized Users the architecture, · Weak Password · Ownership File Misuse Trace · Poor Key Management Misbehaving User · Over-Privileged design and Policies · External Device Boot · Weak Cryptographic Equipment Processes/Services configuration of the · Malware · Log Tampering Algorithms · Implementation · Folder Write Permission network. (NAA-EXPLO) · Eavesdropping · OAM Traffic · Insecure Data Storage Flaw Abuse Tampering · System Fingerprinting · Insecure Network · Root-Owned File Write · File Write Permission · Malware Services Permission Abuse Abuse · Insecure Default · High-Privileged Files · User Session Configuration · Insecure Network Services Tampering · File/ Directory Read · Elevation of Privilege via Permissions Misuse Unnecessary Network · Insecure Network Services Services · Unnecessary Services · Unnecessary Applications · Eavesdropping · Security threat caused by lack of GNP traffic isolation.

text: Denial of Service · Software Tampering · File/ Directory Read · Compromised/ · High-Privileged Files (NAA-DoS) · File Write Permission Permissions Misuse Misbehaving User Abuse Equipment · Implementation Flaw · Insecure Network Services · Human Error

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Spoofing Identity Tampering Repudiation Information Disclosure Denial of Service Elevation of Privilege

text: Abuse of information · Malware · Software Tampering · Poor Key Generation leakage (NAA-AIL) · Eavesdropping · Ownership File Misuse · Weak Cryptographic Algorithms · Insecure Data Storage · System Fingerprinting · Malware · Personal Identification Information Violation · Security threat caused by lack of GNP traffic isolation. · Insecure Default Configuration · File/ Directory Read Permissions Misuse · Insecure Network Services · Unnecessary Services · Log Disclosure · Unnecessary Applications · Eavesdropping · Security threat caused by lack of GNP traffic isolation.

text: Abuse of remote · Direct Root Access · Unnecessary Services · Elevation of Privilege via access to the network. Unnecessary Network (NAA-ARA) Services

text: Exploitation of · Software Tampering · Lack of User Activity · System Fingerprinting · Compromised/ · Insecure Network Services software, and/or · External Device Boot Trace · Unnecessary Applications Misbehaving User · Elevation of Privilege via hardware · File Write Permission · Poor Key Generation Equipment Unnecessary Network vulnerabilities. (NAA- Abuse · Insecure Default · Implementation Services ESHV) · User Session Configuration Flaw Tampering · Unnecessary Services · Insecure Network Services · Human Error

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Abuse of · Default Accounts · OAM Traffic · Lack of User Activity · Poor Key Generation · Misuse by Authorized Users authentication (NAA- · Weak Password Tampering Trace · Poor Key Management · Over-Privileged AA) Policies · File Write Permission · Weak Cryptographic Processes/Services · Password Peek Abuse Algorithms · Folder Write Permission · Direct Root Access · Insecure Data Storage Abuse · IP Spoofing · Insecure Default · Root-Owned File Write Configuration Permission Abuse · File/ Directory Read · High-Privileged Files Permissions Misuse · Insecure Network Services · Unnecessary Applications · Elevation of Privilege via Unnecessary Network Services

text: Lawful interception · File Write Permission · Insecure Default · Folder Write Permission function abuse (NAA- Abuse Configuration Abuse LIFA) · Unnecessary Applications · Root-Owned File Write Permission Abuse

text: Manipulation of · Default Accounts · Software Tampering · Lack of User Activity · Insecure Default · Compromised/ · Insecure Network Services hardware and software · IP Spoofing · External Device Boot Trace Configuration Misbehaving User · Elevation of Privilege via (NAA-MSH) · Malware · File Write Permission · Unnecessary Applications Equipment Unnecessary Network Abuse · Implementation Services · User Session Flaw Tampering · Insecure Network Services · Human Error

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Data, breach, leak, · Default Accounts · OAM Traffic · Lack of User Activity · Poor Key Generation · Folder Write Permission theft and manipulation · Weak Password Tampering Trace · Poor Key Management Abuse of information (NAA- Policies · Weak Cryptographic · Root-Owned File Write DBLT) · Password Peek Algorithms Permission Abuse · Malware · Insecure Data Storage · Insecure Network Services · Eavesdropping · Malware · Elevation of Privilege via · Personal Identification Unnecessary Network Information Violation Services · Insecure Default Configuration · File/ Directory Read Permissions Misuse · Insecure Network Services · Security threat caused by lack of GNP traffic isolation. · Unnecessary Services · Log Disclosure · Unnecessary Applications · Eavesdropping

text: Unauthorised · Default Accounts · Personal Identification · Compromised/ · Misuse by Authorized Users activities/network · Weak Password Information Violation Misbehaving User · Insecure Network Services intrusions (NAA-UANI) Policies · Insecure Network Services Equipment · Elevation of Privilege via · Password Peek · Unnecessary Services · Insecure Network Unnecessary Network · Direct Root Access · Eavesdropping Services Services · IP Spoofing · Human Error · Malware · Eavesdropping

text: Identity fraud/account · Default Accounts · Lack of User Activity · System Fingerprinting · Compromised/ · Misuse by Authorized Users or service (NAA-IFAS) · Weak Password Trace · Malware Misbehaving User · Folder Write Permission Policies · Insecure Network Services Equipment Abuse · Password Peek · Unnecessary Services · Insecure Network · Over-Privileged · Direct Root Access Services Processes/Services · IP Spoofing · Human Error · Insecure Network Services · Malware · Elevation of Privilege via · Eavesdropping Unnecessary Network Services

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Spectrum sensing · Compromised/ (NAA-SS) Misbehaving User Equipment · Implementation Flaw · Insecure Network Services · Human Error

text: Compromised supply · Direct Root Access · External Device Boot · Lack of User Activity · Unnecessary Applications · Human Error · Elevation of Privilege via chain, vendor and Trace · Unnecessary Services Unnecessary Network service providers Services (NAA-CSVS)

text: Abuse of virtualization

text: mechanisms (NAA- AVM)

text: Signalling threats · Insecure Default · Compromised/ (NAA-ST) Configuration Misbehaving User · Security threat caused by Equipment lack of GNP traffic isolation.

text: Manipulation of · Default Accounts · Insecure Default · Compromised/ network · Weak Password Configuration Misbehaving User configuration/data Policies · Personal Identification Equipment forging. (NAA-MND) · Password Peek Information Violation · Insecure Network · Direct Root Access · Insecure Network Services Services · Eavesdropping · Unnecessary Services · Human Error · Eavesdropping

text: EAVESDROPPING/ INTERCEPTION/ HIJACKING (EIH)

text: Eavesdropping/ · Eavesdropping · Insecure Default interception/ hijacking Configuration (EIH-EV) · Eavesdropping · Security threat caused by lack of GNP traffic isolation

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: PHYSICAL ATTACKS (PA)

text: PHYSICAL ATTACKS · Software Tampering · File/ Directory Read · Folder Write Permission (PA-1) · Ownership File Misuse Permissions Misuse Abuse · External Device Boot · Security threat caused by · High-Privileged Files · Log Tampering lack of GNP traffic isolation. · OAM Traffic Tampering · File Write Permission Abuse · User Session Tampering

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: 7. THREAT AGENTS

text: The assessed threat agents engaged in attacks of 5G infrastructures remain identical to the previous edition of the 5G Threat Landscape . This is due to the fact that there are no insights about malicious activities targeting 5G infrastructures. Main reasons for this are:  Due to the early stages of 5G deployments, no incidents of attacks to 5G infrastructures have been identified during 2020;  The threat agent assessment is based on hypothetical attacks;  The current threat landscape is done at the level of specifications. Real attacks will happen against implementations. This will influence modus operandi;  As business processes that will run of 5G infrastructures are still unknown, it is difficult to assess threat actor motives other than the obvious state-sponsored interventions. There are no indications about the most frequent threat of cybercrime. These points make clear that as the next generation of Mobile Networks (5G) are being deployed, existing threat agent profiles will develop towards a new set of capabilities and motives. Nonetheless, without any analysis of specific implementations of 5G infrastructures and business processes running on these infrastructures, a threat agent assessment can be performed only at a generic hypothetical level. Given this the complexity of 5G infrastructures and the ambiguity regarding 5G related attack vectors, it is expected that the following facts will influence the attacker profile:  A whole set of new vulnerabilities related to individual 5G deployments will expand the attack surface, exposure, number and nature of critical assets.  New tools/methods to exploit those vulnerabilities will be developed.  New motives/ impacted targets are going to be observed due to the interconnected verticals/applications.  Existing threat agent groups may be expanded with ones that have an interest in novel malicious objectives emerging from the upcoming 5G use-cases. These facts may cause an unprecedented shift of capabilities and objectives of existing threat agent groups in ways that have not been seen in the past. Having regard to the above mentioned facts, in the current 5G Threat Landscape, we stick to the threat agent groups assessed in the previous edition taking into account the following threat agent groups:  Cyber criminals  Insider (own, third parties)  Nation states  Hacktivists  Cyber-fighters  Cyber-terrorists  Corporations  Script kiddies Interested readers should revisit the previous 5G Threat Landscape edition to find the descriptions and motives of these threat agent groups.

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: For the sake of completeness, we provide below a mapping between threat agents and cyberthreats used in this report. Table 5: Involvement of threat agents in cyberthreats

text: Cyber- Nation Cyber- Cyber- Script- Insiders Hacktivists Corporations criminals States warriors terrorists kiddies

text: Nefarious

text: activity/Abuse

text: Eavesdropping/

text: Interception/ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓

text: Hijacking

text: Disasters ✓ ✓ ✓

text: Unintentional

text: Damage

text: Outages ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓

text: Failures/

text: malfunctions

text: Legal ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓

text: Physical

text: attacks

text: Legend:

text: Primary group for threat: ✓ Secondary group for threat: ✓

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: 8. RECOMMENDATIONS/ CONCLUSIONS

text: 8.1 RECOMMENDATIONS Based on the assets, threats and the state-of-play of current developments, the following recommendations/courses of actions can be made for various stakeholders of the 5G ecosystem: Recommended courses of action at EU level (e.g. Member States, European Commission and ENISA)  It is essential that the EU continues to facilitate the definition of common security standards across for 5G Networks and its use cases by supporting further cooperation and information sharing among Member States.  The existing EU 5G observatory is a very useful/important resource for dissemination of content related to 5G, in support of activities of EU 5G Stakeholders. It covers developments in various areas of 5G, such as status of 5G deployments, relevant MSactions, market uptakes, economic aspects of 5G infrastructure development, etc. Besides this information offering, it is recommended to collect cybersecurity-related market information, such as the status of specifications, and certification activities, more systematically, through the appropriate mechanism or forum.  Relevant work of stakeholders (e.g. Member States, MNOs, etc.) regarding prioritisation of implementation, service criticality assessments, security requirements, etc. should be consolidated and made available to the 5G community. This could be one of the tasks of the 5G observatory mentioned above.  It is important to deliver developed CTI in a form that can be more easily utilised by interested stakeholders. A possible way to achieve this can be by means of a 5G CTI repository offering querying facilities based on various criteria (i.e. such as threat exposure, vulnerabilities per asset type, threats per attacker type, mapping of roles and assets, etc.).  In orchestration with the above-mentioned recommendations, critical 5G services should be identified and implemented. Main objective of this action is could be to develop a security assurance scheme that could drive certifications on 5G equipment, software and processes. In all cases, a risk-based approach should be followed. CTI provided within this report should be adapted where necessary and taken into account within the risk assessment and the evaluation of attacker potential.  As the proliferation of AI algorithms has reached components used in the 5G ecosystem, it is proposed to assess the threat exposure such functions throughout the components of the entire 5G ecosystem (devices, EPROMs, software, sensors, actuators, etc.). This activity overlaps with current ENISA work on an AI Threat Landscape, whereas a more deep assessment w.r.t. 5G could be done in prospective versions of the 5G Threat Landscape, when more information about such functions will be available.  Through the performed threat analysis, it has been recognised that some work needs to be done in the area of 5G threat agent profiling and in the identification of possible attack vectors. Given the rudimentary information available for both topics and the level of

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: available information processed (mainly specification level), at this point of time a profiling would be premature. Nonetheless, this work is considered as a priority for future versions of the 5G Threat Landscape, given the availability of more information on both threat agents and attack vectors. Recommendations for 5G market stakeholders (e.g. vendors, MNOs, Operators of Services, Standardisation Bodies, 5G Test Labs, etc.)  More detailed mappings of asset/role responsibilities and vulnerabilities/threats could enhance the utilisation of the produced CTI. This process could be steered by means of identified priorities and asset criticalities assessed via market analysis, stakeholder surveys and 5G rollout activities of MNOs.  A detailed cap analysis for the protection of various 5G assets needs to be performed. Besides organisational issues, such a gap analysis will be needed for migration/implementation options.  The specification of 5G provides a solid basis for the security of the entire system. Nonetheless, the final security level will heavily depend on implementation/coding practices. The development of good practices/guidelines for the secure implementation of network functions is an important step towards maintaining the security level of the specification in the resulting code-base. Such guidelines do not yet exist.  The terminology used in various published 5G documents (specifications, standardisation documentation, research projects, etc.) needs to be consolidated. This will facilitate homogeneity in references to important security concepts (e.g. threats, vulnerabilities, impact, responsibilities, stakeholders, etc.) and will contribute to an elevation of understanding and utilization of the produced material.  Some operational, general-purpose process models and frameworks do exist in the area of telecommunication. They cover network management, vendor and security assurance processes. Though making up a very good starting point for 5G infrastructures, they might entail gaps w.r.t. specialised 5G operational issues. It is proposed to perform a systematic gap analysis of these frameworks to test their 5G adequacy and fill the identified gaps. Recommendations for national competent bodies in the area of 5G cybersecurity (e.g. NRAs, NCSCs, National 5G Test Centres, etc.)  With guidance from current 5G deployments (including migration options), more exhaustive gap analysis on various areas of cybersecurity measures, should be performed. This information will contribute to the advancement of current cybersecurity practices. The delivered CTI of this report can serve as key input towards a risk and threat based approach. While the above may be advisable future actions for various stakeholder groups, ENISA envisages an involvement in the following actions e.g. on behalf/on request of EU, MS  It is important to deliver developed CTI in a form that can be more easily utilised by interested stakeholders. A possible way to achieve this can be by means of a 5G CTI repository offering querying facilities based on various criteria (i.e. such as threat exposure, vulnerabilities per asset type, threats per attacker type, mapping of roles and assets, etc.).  Fostering the use of the released CTI within implementation projects and establishment of feedback will be an important element for the improvement of the presented material and enhancement of 5G technical and operational cybersecurity.  Performance of risk assessments for specific parts of the 5G infrastructure will lead to better utilisation of the information delivered in the present report and will reveal areas of improvement of the provided analysis. A pilot on a security assurance scheme for

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: certification of identification service is planned by ENISA for the coming semester. Information from the present report will flow into this activity during the risk assessment phase.  Besides integrating feedback from implementations, processes and detailed assessments, prospective versions of the 5G threat landscape need to be linked to planned versions of 5G specification activities, in particular regarding the work of 3GPP group. 8.2 CONCLUSIONS Having reached a good degree of comprehensiveness and detail within this version of the 5G Threat Landscape, it is proposed to put the focus on utilization within upcoming activities at EU level, Member States and MNOs. By means of the identified recommendations, this objective can be achieved. Just as in the previous edition of the 5G Threat Landscape, it will be important to use this material in various stakeholder activities, identify current and future developments and try to accommodate those in future versions of the present report. Such activities, if performed in a coordinated manner, will speed up implementation of measures developed by various actors (i.e. EU toolbox measures, specified security measures, development of 5G good practices for operation and security assurance). ENISA will continue engaging within cybersecurity activities of 5G. Coordination with EU-wide activities will be key to the success of this attempt. Future ENISA actions on this matter will be agreed upon, mandated and coordinated with European Commission and Member States (NIS CG SG on 5G) as deemed necessary.

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: A ANNEX: ASSETS MAP

text: Figure 24: 5G Asset Mind Map (FULL) A full diagram of the Asset Mapping will be made available at ENISA website . ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: B ANNEX: THREAT TAXONOMY

text: The references presented in Table 5 will help the reader relating ENISA Threat Taxonomy with the vulnerabilities presented in Annexes from C to M. These references result from the intersection between ENISA and ITU threat Taxonomies. ENISA Threat Taxonomy Categories are the following:  Nefarious activity/abuse (NAA): This threat category is defined as “intended actions that target ICT systems, infrastructure, and networks by means of malicious acts with the aim to either steal, alter, or destroy a specified target”.  Eavesdropping/Interception/ Hijacking (EIH): This threat category is defined as “actions aiming to listen, interrupt, or seize control of a third party communication without consent”.  Physical attacks (PA): This threat category is defined as “actions which aim to destroy, expose, alter, disable, steal or gain unauthorised access to physical assets such as infrastructure, hardware, or interconnection”.  Damage (DAM): This threat category is defined as intentional actions aimed at causing “destruction, harm, or injury of property or persons and results in a failure or reduction in usefulness”.  Unintentional Damage (UD): This threat category is defined as unintentional actions aimed at causing “destruction, harm, or injury of property or persons and results in a failure or reduction in usefulness”.  Failures or malfunctions (FM): This threat category is defined as “Partial or full insufficient functioning of an asset (hardware or software)”.  Outages (OUT): This threat category is defined as “unexpected disruptions of service or decrease in quality falling below a required level“.  Disaster (DIS): This threat category is defined as “a sudden accident or a natural catastrophe that causes great damage or loss of life”.  Legal (LEG): This threat category is defined as “legal actions of third parties (contracting or otherwise), in order to prohibit actions or compensate for loss based on applicable law”.

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Figure 25: 5G Threat Taxonomy Categories

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Table 5: ENISA and ITU Threat Taxonomies THREAT TAXONOMY DETAILED (ITU)

text: THEFT, REMOVAL OR DESTRUCTION OF CORRUPTION OR LOSS OF DISCLOSURE OF INTERRUPTION OF ENISA THREAT TAXONOMY INFORMATION AND MODIFICATION OF INFORMATION AND INFORMATION SERVICES. OTHER RESOURCES INFORMATION OTHER RESOURCES

text: Nefarious Activity/ Abuse of assets (NAA)

text: Malicious Code or SW (NAA-MAL) NAA-MAL1 NAA-MAL2 NAA-MAL3 NAA-MAL4 NAA-MAL5 Exploitation of flaws in the architecture, design and configuration NAA-EXPLO2 NAA-EXPLO3 NAA-EXPLO4 NAA-EXPLO5 of the network. (NAA-EXPLO) Denial of Service (NAA-DoS) NAA-DoS1 NAA-DoS5 Abuse of information leakage (NAA-AIL) NAA-AIL3 NAA-AIL4 Abuse of remote access to the network. (NAA-ARA) NAA-ARA1 NAA-ARA2 NAA-ARA3 NAA-ARA4 NAA-ARA5 Exploitation of software, and/or hardware vulnerabilities. (NAA- NAA-ESHV1 NAA-ESHV2 NAA-ESHV3 NAA-ESHV4 NAA-ESHV5

text: ESHV)

text: Abuse of authentication (NAA-AA) NAA-AA1 NAA-AA2 NAA-AA3 NAA-AA4 NAA-AA5 Lawful interception function abuse (NAA-LIFA) NAA-LIFA5 Manipulation of hardware and software (NAA-MSH) NAA-MSH1 NAA-MSH2 NAA-MSH3 NAA-MSH4 NAA-MSH5 Data, breach, leak, theft and manipulation of information (NAA- NAA-DBLT2 NAA-DBLT3 NAA-DBLT4

text: DBLT)

text: Unauthorised activities/network intrusions (NAA-UANI) NAA-UANI1 NAA-UANI2 NAA-UANI3 NAA-UANI4 NAA-UANI5 Identity fraud/account or service (NAA-IFAS) NAA-IFAS1 NAA-IFAS2 NAA-IFAS3 NAA-IFAS4 NAA-IFAS5 Spectrum sensing (NAA-SS) NAA-SS5 Compromised supply chain, vendor and service providers (NAA- NAA-CSVS4 NAA-CSVS5

text: CSVS)

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Abuse of virtualization mechanisms (NAA-AVM) Signalling threats (NAA-ST) NAA-ST5 Manipulation of network configuration/data forging. (NAA-MND) NAA-MND1 NAA-MND2 NAA-MND5 Eavesdropping/ Interception Hijacking (EIH) EIH4 Physical Attacks (PA) PA1 PA3 PA5 Unintentional damages (accidental) (UD) UD1 UD2 UD3 UD4 Failures or Malfunctions (FM) FM1 FM2 FM5 Outages (OUT) OUT Disasters (DIS) DIS Legal (LEG) LEG

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Figure 26: 5G Threat Taxonomy

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: C ANNEX: DETAILED VULNERABILITIES IN THE CORE NETWORK

text: Associated Threats Name of Security Requirements /Description of Description Assets Security Controls (Threat Stakeholder Source Ref Vulnerability security controls Category Taxonomy)

text: Improper protection of Service Based Interfaces

text: Improper Use of TLS profiles forbidden in TS all Network TS 33.501 / 13.1 All network functions shall support TLS. Information Vendor, 3GPP TS transport layer 33.310 for NF mutual authentication and Function Protection at the Network functions shall support both Disclosure, SECAM 33.117 protection of NF transport layer protection. May lead (NF) within network or server-side and client-side certificates. Rogue base Accreditation 3GPP TS service-based to sensitive information/data being the 5G Core transport layer The TLS profile shall follow the profile station Body, 33.310 interfaces (SBI) disclosed and eventually tampered. (5GC) TS 33.501 / 13.3 given in clause 6.2 of TS 33.210 with the NAAx, EIH4 Accredited 3GPP TR utilizing Authentication and restriction that it shall be compliant with Test Lab 33.926 Service- static authorisation the profile given by HTTP/2 as defined in 4.2.2.2.2 Based RFC 7540. TLS shall be used for transport Interfaces protection within a PLMN unless network (SBI) security is provided by other means. NRF and NF shall authenticate each other during discovery, registration, and access token request. If the PLMN uses protection at the transport layer, authentication provided by the transport layer protection solution shall be used for mutual authentication of the NRF and NF.

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Incorrect There are the following threats if the all Network TS 33.501 13.4.1. The authorisation framework uses the Elevation of Vendor, 3GPP TS Verification of generic NF cannot correctly verify the Function OAuth 2.0 based OAuth 2.0 framework as specified in RFC Privilege, SECAM 33.117 Access Tokens access tokens: (NF) within authorisation of 6749. Access tokens shall be JSON Web Information Accreditation 4.2.2.2.3, - An access token may be tampered so the 5G Core Network Function Tokens as described in RFC 7519 and are Disclosure, Body, 4.2.2.2.4 that an attacker can arbitrarily access (5GC) service access secured with digital signatures or Message Denial of Accredited any services from any NF service utilizing Authentication Codes (MAC) based on Service. Test Lab providers within the same PLMN or in Service- JSON Web Signature (JWS) as described NAAx, EIH4 different PLMNs, which leads to Based in RFC 7515. elevation of privilege and consequently Interfaces information disclosure. (SBI) - An access token may be tampered so that an attacker can block service access by replacing the granted services/NF service providers with unavailable services/NF service providers, which leads to denial of service.

text: Vulnerabilities in implementation of AMF security functionalities

text: Incorrect If the gNB does not send the UE 5G gNB, AMF TS 33.501/6.7.3.1 The AMF shall verify that the UE's 5G Tampering Vendor, 3GPP TS implementation security capabilities, the AMF cannot Xn-handover security capabilities received from the Data, SECAM 33.511 of bidding verify 5G security capabilities are the target gNB are the same as the UE's 5G Information Accreditation 3GPP TS down same as the UE security capabilities that security capabilities that the AMF has Disclosure, Body, 33.512 prevention at the AMF has stored, the attacker may locally stored. If there is a mismatch, the Denial of Accredited 4.2.2.1.14 Xn-handover force the system to accept a weaker AMF shall send its locally stored 5G Service. Test Lab 4.2.2.4 security algorithm than the system is security capabilities of the UE to the target NAAx, EIH4 allowed, forcing the system into a gNB in the Path-Switch Acknowledge lowered security level making the message. The AMF shall support logging system easily attacked and/or capabilities for this event and may take compromised additional measures, such as raising an alarm

text: Incorrect If SMC does not include the complete AMF TS 33.512/ AMF shall support replay protection of Tampering of Vendor, TS 33.512 implementation initial NAS message if either requested 4.2.2.3.1 Replay NAS signalling messages between UE Data, SECAM 4.2.2.3.1 of NAS by the AMF or the UE sent the initial protection of NAS and AMF on N1 interface." as specified in Information Accreditation signalling NAS message unprotected, the UE can signalling TS 33.501 [2], clause 5.5.1. Disclosure Body, messages force the system to reduce the security messages Accredited NAAx, EIH4 replay level by using weaker security Test Lab protection algorithms or turning security off, making the system easily attacked and/or compromised

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Incorrect If NAS NULL integrity protection is used AMF TS 33.117 / 5.5.2 NIA0 shall be disabled in AMF in the Elevation of Vendor, 3GPP TS implementation outside of emergency call scenarios, an Signalling data deployments where support of Privilege SECAM 33.512 of attacker can initiate unauthenticated integrity unauthenticated emergency session is not Accreditation 4.2.2.3 NAAx, EIH4 cryptographic non-emergency calls a regulatory requirement." as specified in Body, protection for TS 33.501 [2], clause 5.5.2 Accredited NAS signalling Test Lab

text: messages

text: Incorrect If the highest priority NAS integrity AMF TS 33.501, 6.7.1 To establish the NAS security context, the Tampering of Vendor, 3GPP TS implementation protection is not selected by the new Procedures for AMF shall choose one NAS ciphering Data, SECAM 33.512 of procedures AMF in AMF change, the new AMF NAS algorithm algorithm and one NAS integrity protection Information Accreditation 4.2.2.5 for NAS could end up using a weaker algorithm selection algorithm. The AMF shall then initiate a Disclosure Body, Algorithm forcing the system into a lowered NAS security mode command procedure Accredited selection security level making thee system easily and include the chosen algorithm and UE NAAx, EIH4 Test Lab attacked and/or compromised security capabilities (to detect modification of the UE security capabilities by an attacker) in the message to the UE. The AMF shall select the NAS algorithm which have the highest priority according to the ordered list.

text: Incorrect A flawed AMF implementation accepting AMF TS 24.501/ If the REGISTRATION REQUEST Tampering of Vendor, 3GPP TS implementation insecure or invalid UE security 5.5.1.2.8 Abnormal message is received with invalid or Data, SECAM 33.512 of invalid or capabilities may put User Plane and Cases on the unacceptable UE security capabilities (e.g. Information Accreditation 4.2.2.6 unacceptable Control Plane traffic at risk, without the network side no 5GS encryption algorithms (all bits Disclosure Body, UE security operator being aware of it. If NULL zero), no 5GS integrity algorithms (all bits Accredited capabilities ciphering algorithm and/or NULL zero), mandatory 5GS encryption NAAx, EIH4 Test Lab handling integrity protection algorithm of the UE algorithms not supported or mandatory security capabilities is accepted by the 5GS integrity algorithms not supported, AMF, all the subsequent NAS, RRC, and etc.), the AMF shall return a UP messages will not be confidentiality REGISTRATION REJECT message." and/or integrity protected. The attacker can easily intercept or tamper control plane data and the user plane data. This can result in information disclosure as well as tampering of data.

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Incorrect If a malicious UE initiates a registration AMF/SEAF, TS 33.501 6.1.3.2. Handling of RES* verification failure in the Denial of Vendor, 3GPP TS implementation request using a SUCI and this request is AUSF Authentication SEAF or in the AUSF is defined in detail in Service SECAM 33.512 of RES* followed by primary authentication in procedure for 5G sub-clause 6.1.3.2.2 Accreditation 3GPP TS NAA5 verification which an incorrect RES* is sent to the AKA Body, 33.516 failure handling network, then the RES* verification will Accredited 4.2.2.1.2 fail. In this case, if the RES* verification Test Lab failure is not handled correctly, e.g., AMF/SEAF does not reject the registration request directly, or initiates a new authentication procedure with the UE, this would result in waste of system resources.

text: Incorrect The Security Anchor Function should AMF/SEAF; TS 33.501 6.1.3.3. The Security Anchor Function should Denial of Vendor, 3GPP TS implementation handle authentication failure message USIM; UDM Handling of handle authentication failure message with Service (TR SECAM 33.512 of with synchronisation failure (AUTS) from synchronization synchronisation failure (AUTS) from the 33.926 K.2.2.1., Accreditation 3GPP TS synchronisatio the UE, as to prevent possible failure or MAC UE, as to prevent possible exploitation TR 33.926 Body, 33.514 n failure exploitation from denial of service / failure from denial of service / resource E.2.2.2) Accredited 4.2.2.1. handling resource exhaustion attacks / incidents. exhaustion attacks / incidents. Test Lab Complementary procedures have to be Complementary procedures have to be NAA5 performed at USIM level. performed at USIM level. Synchronization failure handling and/or Storing of authentication status of UE by UDM could conduct to access denial to resources

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Vulnerabilities in implementation of UPF security functionalities

text: Inconsistent TEID, as part of the CN Tunnel UPF TS Allocation and release of CN Tunnel Info is Tampering. Vendor, 3GPP 33.513 allocation of information, is used by the UPF and 23.501/5.8.2.3.1 performed when a new PDU Session is (33.926/L.2.4, SECAM 3GPP 33.515 Tunnel gNB/ng-eNB for user plane routing. The TS 29.281 / 5.1 established or released. This functionality J.2.2.2) Accreditation 4.2.2.6 Endpoint failure to guarantee the uniqueness of TS 23.060 /14.6 is supported either by SMF or UPF, based Body, 4.2.2.1.2. r’s configuration on the SMF as NAA2, NAA3 Identifier the TEID for a PDU session interrupts on operato Accredited the routing of user traffic. It also specified in TS 23.501, clause 5.8.2.3.1. Test Lab interrupts charging. If multiple PDU Tunnel Endpoint Identifier (TEID): This sessions were to share the same TEID field unambiguously identifies a tunnel at the same time, the counts for the endpoint in the receiving GTP U protocol network usage of a single PDU session entity. The receiving end side of a GTP will be in fact the counts for the network tunnel locally assigns the TEID value the usage of multiple sessions, creating transmitting side has to use as specified in charging errors. TS 29.281, clause 5.1. The TEID is a unique identifier within one IP address of a logical node." As specified in TS 23.060, clause 14.6

text: Improper It is required that user Plane Security User Plane TS23.501, 5.10.3 It is required that user Plane Security Tampering Vendor, 3GPP TS allocation of Policy from UDM takes precedence over Data Policy from UDM takes precedence over data, SECAM 33.515 security policy locally configured User Plane Security locally configured User Plane Security Information Accreditation 4.2.2.1.1 determined by Policy in SMF. If SMF fails to comply Policy in SMF. If SMF fails to comply with Disclosure (TR Body, SMF with the requirement, user plane security the requirement, user plane security may 33.926 / J.2.2.1) Accredited may be degraded. For example, if the be degraded. For example, if the UP Test Lab NAA2, NAA3, UP security policy from the UDM security policy from the UDM mandates mandates the ciphering and integrity the ciphering and integrity protection of the NAA4 protection of the user plane data, but no user plane data, but no protection is protection is indicated in the local UP indicated in the local UP security policy at security policy at the SMF, and the local the SMF, and the local UP security policy UP security policy takes the priority, then takes the priority, then the user plane data the user plane data will be sent over the will be sent over the air without any air without any protection. protection.

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Incorrect It is required that the SMF verifies that User Plane TS 33.501/6.6.1 The SMF must provide UP security policy Tampering Vendor, 3GPP TS implementation the UP security policy received from the Data for a PDU session to the ng-eNB/gNB data, SECAM 33.515 of user plane ng-eNB/gNB is the same as that stored during the PDU session establishment Information Accreditation 4.2.2.1.3 data protection locally at the SMF. If the SMF fails to procedure. disclosure (TR Body, check, security degradation of UP traffic In particular, The SMF shall verify that the 33.926/ J.2.2.4) Accredited may occur. For example, if the UP UE's UP security policy received from the Test Lab security policy received from the ng- target ng-eNB/gNB is the same as the NAA2, NAA3, NAA4 eNB/gNB indicates no security UE's UP security policy that the SMF has protection, while the local policy locally stored. If there is a mismatch, the mandates the opposite, and SMF uses SMF shall send its locally stored UE's UP the received UP security policy without security policy of the corresponding PDU validation, then the user plane data will sessions to the target gNB. Failure to do be unprotected so may result in manipulation of UP Security policy and compromise of data

text: Vulnerabilities in implementation of UDM security functionalities

text: Incorrect If the SUPI in the UE and the SUPI UDM TS 33.501/5.8.2. The SIDF is responsible for de- Denial of Vendor, 3GPP TS implementation retrieved from Subscriber privacy concealment of the SUCI - The SIDF shall Service SECAM 33.514 of SUCI de- Nudm_Authentication_Get Response related be a service offered by UDM. (33.926/E.2.2.1) Accreditation 4.2.1.1 concealment message are not the same, the AMF key requirements to - The SIDF shall resolve the SUPI from the Body, NAA5 generated based on the SUPI in the UE UDM and SIDF SUCI based on the protection scheme Accredited is also not the same as the AMF key used to generate the SUCI. Test Lab generated in the AMF/SEAF. As a result The Home Network Private Key used for the subsequent NAS SMC procedure subscriber privacy shall be protected from will always fail. Hence, UE will never be physical attacks in the UDM. able to use the services provided by the The UDM shall hold the Home Network serving AMF Public Key Identifier(s) for the private/public key pair(s) used for subscriber privacy. The algorithm used for subscriber privacy shall be executed in the secure environment of the UDM.

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Incorrect If the UDM does not store the UDM TS 33.501 / When 3GPP credentials are used in above Denial of Vendor, 3GPP TS implementation authentication status of a UE, the 5G 6.1.4.1a Linking cases, the result of the authentication Service SECAM 33.514 of handling of network cannot support the increased authentication procedure is reported to the UDM. (33.926/E.2.2.3) Accreditation 4.2.2.2 authentication home control, which is useful in confirmation to The feature of increased home control is Body, status by UDM preventing certain types of fraud, e.g. Nudm_UECM_Re useful in preventing certain types of fraud, NAA5 Accredited fraudulent Nudm_UECM_Registration gistration e.g. fraudulent Nudm_UECM_Registration Test Lab Request sending a malicious AMF for procedure from Request for registering the subscriber's registering the malicious AMF in UDM AMF serving AMF in UDM that are not actually that is not actually present in the visited present in the visited network. But an network. Without the authentication authentication protocol by itself cannot status in the UDM, or if the stored provide protection against such fraud. The authentication status is incorrect, the authentication result needs to be linked to Nudm_UECM_Registration Request subsequent procedures, e.g. the sent from malicious AMF may be Nudm_UECM_Registration procedure accepted. from the AMF in some way to achieve the desired protection.

text: Incorrect The Security Anchor Function should AMF/SEAF; TS 33.501 6.1.3.3. The Security Anchor Function should Denial of Vendor, 3GPP TS implementation handle authentication failure message USIM; UDM Handling of handle authentication failure message with Service (TR SECAM 33.512 of handling of with synchronisation failure (AUTS) from synchronization synchronisation failure (AUTS) from the 33.926 K.2.2.1., Accreditation 3GPP TS synchronisatio the UE, as to prevent possible failure or MAC UE, as to prevent possible exploitation TR 33.926 Body, 33.514 n failure exploitation from denial of service / failure from denial of service / resource E.2.2.2) Accredited 4.2.2.1. resource exhaustion attacks / incidents. exhaustion attacks / incidents. Test Lab Complementary procedures have to be Complementary procedures have to be NAA5 performed at USIM level. performed at USIM level. Synchronization failure handling and/or Storing of authentication status of UE by UDM could conduct to access denial to resources

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Vulnerabilities in implementation of SMF security functionalities

text: Incorrect It is required that user Plane Security SMF TS23.501, 5.10.3 It is required that user Plane Security Tampering Vendor, 3GPP TS implementation Policy from UDM takes precedence over Policy from UDM takes precedence over data, SECAM 33.515 of checking of locally configured User Plane Security locally configured User Plane Security Information Accreditation 4.2.2.1.1 user plane Policy in SMF. If SMF fails to comply Policy in SMF. If SMF fails to comply with Disclosure (TR Body, security policy with the requirement, user plane security the requirement, user plane security may 33.926 / J.2.2.1) Accredited by SMF may be degraded. For example, if the be degraded. For example, if the UP Test Lab NAA2, NAA3, UP security policy from the UDM security policy from the UDM mandates mandates the ciphering and integrity the ciphering and integrity protection of the NAA4 protection of the user plane data, but no user plane data, but no protection is protection is indicated in the local UP indicated in the local UP security policy at security policy at the SMF, and the local the SMF, and the local UP security policy UP security policy takes the priority, then takes the priority, then the user plane data the user plane data will be sent over the will be sent over the air without any air without any protection. protection.

text: Incorrect It is required that the SMF verifies that SMF TS 33.501/6.6.1 The SMF must provide UP security policy Tampering Vendor, 3GPP TS implementation the UP security policy received from the for a PDU session to the ng-eNB/gNB data, SECAM 33.515 of handling of ng-eNB/gNB is the same as that stored during the PDU session establishment Information Accreditation 4.2.2.1.3 user plane locally at the SMF. If the SMF fails to procedure. disclosure (TR Body, security policy check, security degradation of UP traffic In particular, The SMF shall verify that the 33.926/ J.2.2.4) Accredited by SMF may occur. For example, if the UP UE's UP security policy received from the Test Lab NAA2, NAA3, security policy received from the ng- target ng-eNB/gNB is the same as the eNB/gNB indicates no security UE's UP security policy that the SMF has NAA4 protection, while the local policy locally stored. If there is a mismatch, the mandates the opposite, and SMF uses SMF shall send its locally stored UE's UP the received UP security policy without security policy of the corresponding PDU validation, then the user plane data will sessions to the target gNB. Failure to do be unprotected so may result in manipulation of UP Security policy and compromise of data

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Failure to At the SMF if more than one PDU SMF; TS 32.255/5.1 Requirements for handling of charging Tampering Vendor, 3GPP TS assign unique session were to share the same Charging data, including identifiers by the SMF are data, SECAM 33.515 Charging ID for charging ID, the charging information for data defined in TS 32.255. / Clause 5.1. Information Accreditation 4.2.2.1.4 a session a PDU session would be wrongly disclosure (TR Body, correlated, creating charging errors. 33.926/J.2.2.3) Accredited Test Lab NAA2, NAA3, NAA4

text: Vulnerabilities in implementation of SEPP security functionalities

text: Incorrect Incorrect / incomplete implementation of SEPP, IPX TS 33.501 5.9.3 3GPP TS 33.501 clause 5.9.3. defines Denial of Vendor, 3GPP TS implementation requirements for E2E interconnection Requirements for security requirements for E2E Service, SECAM 33.517 of e2e core between core network functions, as e2e core network interconnection between core network, Spoofing Accreditation 4.2.2.1 network defined in 3GPP TS 33.501 clause interconnection requirements to be covered generally by identity, Body, interconnectio 5.9.3. open confidentiality, integrity and security the SEPP. Tampering of Accredited n security availability risk to all data passed across Data, Test Lab requirements networks and to unprotected access to Information network functions Disclosure

text: NAA2, NAA3, NAA4

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Incorrect There are the following risks if SEPP TS 33.501 / 5.9.3.2 The SEPP shall protect application layer Denial of Vendor, 3GPP TS handling of cryptographic material of peer SEPPs Requirements for control plane messages between two NFs Service, SECAM 33.517 cryptographic and cryptographic material of IPX Security Edge belonging to different PLMNs that use the Spoofing Accreditation 4.2.2.2 material of peer providers are not clearly differentiated Protection Proxy N32 interface to communicate with each identity, Body, SEPPs and IPX and misused: (SEPP) other. The SEPP shall perform mutual Tampering of Accredited providers - The SEPP using the wrong authentication and negotiation of cipher Data, Test Lab cryptographic material will lead to the suites with the SEPP in the roaming Information failure of N32-c TLS connection network. The SEPP shall handle key Disclosure establishment with the peer SEPP; or management aspects that involve setting NAA2, NAA3, lead to rejecting genuine N32-f JSON up the required cryptographic keys needed patches from an authentic intermediate for securing messages on the N32 NAA4 IPX provider. This can result in service interface between two SEPPs. interruption as well as waste of system resources. - The SEPP will wrongly accept forged N32-f JSON patches signed by a peer SEPP, which maliciously impersonates an intermediate IPX provider. This can result in service data tampering as well as waste of system resources. - The SEPP will wrongly establish N32-c TLS connection with an intermediate IPX entity, which maliciously impersonates a peer SEPP. This can result in information disclosure as well as waste of system resources. - Threatened Asset: SEPP Application, N32-c, N32-f, Application layer security data, Sufficient Processing Capacity

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Incorrect There are following risks if the SEPP SEPP TS 33.501 / 5.9.3.2 The SEPP shall protect application layer Denial of Vendor, 3GPP TS implementation authenticates N32-f message Requirements for control plane messages between two NFs Service, SECAM 33.517 of modifications using the cryptographic Security Edge belonging to different PLMNs that use the Tampering of Accreditation 4.2.2.3 cryptographic material from an IPX provider which was Protection Proxy N32 interface to communicate with each Data, Body, material not exchanged as part of the IPX (SEPP) other. The SEPP shall perform mutual Information Accredited handling security information list via the related authentication and negotiation of cipher Disclosure Test Lab beyond N32-c connection: suites with the SEPP in the roaming NAA2, NAA3, connection- - The SEPP using the wrong network. The SEPP shall handle key specific scope cryptographic material will lead to failed management aspects that involve setting NAA4 authentication of N32-f message up the required cryptographic keys needed modifications signed by the authentic for securing messages on the N32 IPX provider, who is a part of the related interface between two SEPPs. N32-c connection. This can result in service interruption as well as waste of system resources. - The SEPP will wrongly accept N32-f JSON patches signed by an IPX provider, who is a part of a different N32-c connection. This can result in service data tampering as well as waste of system resources. - Threatened Asset: SEPP Application, N32-c, N32-f, Sufficient Processing Capacity

text: Incorrect Wrong handling of serving PLMN ID SEPP TS 33.501/13.2.4.7 The receiving SEPP shall verify that the Denial of Vendor, 3GPP TS implementation mismatch could affect the authentication Message PLMN-ID contained in the incoming N32-f Service, SECAM 33.517 of handling of process giving unauthorized access to verification by the message matches the PLMN-ID in the Information Accreditation 4.2.2.4 serving PLMN an attacker receiving SEPP related N32-f context" as specified in TS Disclosure, Body, ID mismatch TS 33.501/13.4.1.2 33.501 , clause 13.2.4.7. Spoofing Accredited Service access The pSEPP shall check that the serving Identity Test Lab authorisation in PLMN ID of subject claim in the access NAA2, NAA3, roaming scenarios token matches the remote PLMN ID corresponding to the N32-f context Id in NAA4 the N32 message as specified in TS 33.501 , clause 13.4.1.2.

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Failure to Failure to replace confidential IEs with SEPP TS If there is any attribute value that requires Information Vendor, 3GPP TS replace NULL in original N32-f message may 33.501/13.2.4.3.1. encryption, the value shall be replaced by Disclosure. SECAM 33.517 confidential IEs lead to exposure of confidential IEs in 1 null. The SEPP shall calculate a JSON Accreditation 4.2.2.5 NAA4, EIH4 with NULL in N32-f message clearTextEncapsul patch document, Body, original N32-f atedMessage dataToIntegrityProtectAndCipher (clause Accredited message 13.2.4.3.2), that replaces any nulls with Test Lab the required values.

text: Incorrect there are the following risks if the SEPP SEPP, TS 33.501/13.2.3.6 When a SEPP receives a data-type Information Vendor, 3GPP TS implementation cannot detect the mismatch between the Protection Precedence of encryption or modification policy on N32-c Disclosure. SECAM 33.517 of handling for policies received on N32-c connection Policies policies in the as specified in clause 13.2.2.2, it shall Tampering of Accreditation 4.2.2.6 protection from a specific roaming partner and the SEPP compare it to the one that has been Data, Denial of Body, policies policies manually configured on it for this manually configured for this specific Service Accredited mismatch specific roaming partner and IPX roaming partner and IPX provider. If a Test Lab NAA2, NAA3, provider: mismatch occurs for one of the two - The policies received on N32-c policies, the SEPP shall perform one of NAA4, NAA5 connection from a peer SEPP could be the following actions, according to tampered by an attacker, which is operator policy: a) Send the error however not detected. Or the policies message <TBD> to the peer SEPP; b) manually configured on the SEPP could Create a local warning be misconfigured, which is however not detected. a) If Data-type encryption policies are tampered or misconfigured, the IEs on N32-f which shall be encrypted may be disclosed due to policy tampering. This can result in information disclosure. b) If Modification policies are tampered or misconfigured, the IEs on N32-f which cannot be modified/added/removed by IPX provider may be tampered. This can result in tampering of data. - As the data-type encryption policies in the two partner SEPPs are not equal, a consistent ciphering of IEs on N32-f cannot be enforced.

text: Failure to Use of weak JWS algorithm instead of SEPP TS 33.501/13.2.4.9 SEPPs and IPXs shall follow the JWS Information Vendor, 3GPP TS comply with specific algorithm JWS profile profile as defined in TS 33.210 [3] with the Disclosure. SECAM 33.517 JWS profile restriction restriction that they shall only use ES256 Accreditation 4.2.2.7 restriction algorithm NAA4, EIH4 Body, Accredited Test Lab

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Misplacement Basic validation rules fail to be applied SEPP TS 33.501/13.2.3.4 The following basic validation rule shall Information Vendor, 3GPP TS of encrypted irrespective of the policy exchanged Modification policy always be applied irrespective of the policy Disclosure. SECAM 33.517 IEs in JSON between two roaming partners for N32 application exchanged between two roaming partners: Accreditation 4.2.2.8 NAA4, EIH4 object by IPX layer solution IEs requiring encryption shall not be Body, TS 33.501/13.2.4.1 inserted at a different location in the JSON Accredited N32-f connection object. - as specified in TS 33.501, clause Test Lab between SEPPs 13.2.3.4. A SEPP shall verify that an intermediate IPX has not moved or copied an encrypted IE to a location that would be reflected from the producer NF in an IE without encryption - as specified in TS 33.501, clause 13.2.4.1.

text: Vulnerabilities in implementation of NRF security functionalities

text: No slice If NF discovery authorisation for specific NRF, NF TS 33.501 / 5.9.2.1 NRF shall be able to ensure that NF Information Vendor, 3GPP TS specific slice is not supported by the NRF, the profile of TS 23.502 / 4.17.4. Discovery and registration requests are Disclosure, SECAM 33.518 authorisation NF instance in one slice can discover available NF authorized - as specified in TS 33.501, Elevation of Accreditation 4.2.2.2.1 for NF NF instances belonging to other slices. instances clause 5.9.2.1. privilege (TR Body, discovery This can result in reduced assurance The NRF authorizes the 33.926 / Accredited level of slice data isolation, making the Nnrf_NFDiscovery_Request. Based on the H.2.2.1) Test Lab system easily attacked as well as profile of the expected NF/NF service and NAA2, NAA3, wasting resource the type of the NF service consumer, the NRF determines whether the NF service NAA4 consumer is allowed to discover the expected NF instance(s). If the expected NF instance(s) or NF service instance(s) are deployed in a certain network slice, NRF authorizes the discovery request according to the discovery configuration of the Network Slice, e.g. the expected NF instance(s) are only discoverable by the NF in the same network slice - as specified in TS 23.502, clause 4.17.4.

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Vulnerabilities in implementation of NEF security functionalities

text: No If the authentication of the Application NEF TS 33.501/5.9.2.3 - Integrity protection, replay protection and Information Vendor, 3GPP TS authentication Function is not supported, the NEF security confidentiality protection for Disclosure, SECAM 33.519 on application application function without legal requirements communication between the NEF and tampering Accreditation 4.2.2.1.1 function certificates, or pre-shared key could be Application Function (33.926/I.2.2.1) Body, able to establish a TLS connection with - Mutual authentication between the NEF Accredited the NEF. The data stored in the NEF and Application Function NAA2, NAA3, Test Lab NAA4 may be exposed to an attacker - Internal 5G Core information such as DNN, S-NSSAI etc., shall not be sent outside the 3GPP operator domain. - SUPI shall not be sent outside the 3GPP operator domain by NEF The NEF shall be able to determine whether the Application Function is authorized to interact with the relevant Network Functions..

text: No A malicious AF without OAuth-based NEF TS 33.501/12.4 Network Entity. The NEF shall authorize Elevation of Vendor, 3GPP TS Authorisation authorisation or with an incorrect access Authorisation of the requests from Application Function Privilege, SECAM 33.519 on northbound token may invoke the NEF services Application using OAuth-based authorisation Information Accreditation 4.2.2.1.2 APIs arbitrarily. For example, an attacker may Function’s mechanism, the specific authorisation Disclosure Body, invoke the Nnef_EventExposure requests mechanisms shall follow the provisions (33.926/I.2.2.2) Accredited Subscriber service provide by the NEF given in RFC 6749 Test Lab without authorisation. The Event data NAA2, NAA3, NAA4 related with this subscribe will be leaked to the attacker.

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Improper protection of Data and Information of 5G Core components

text: System Presence of active system function(s) UPF; AMF; TS 33.117 / When the system is not under Elevation of Vendor, 3GPP TS functions that reveal confidential system internal UDM; SMF; 4.2.3.2.2 maintenance, there shall be no system Privilege, SECAM 33.117 revealing data in the clear to users and AUSF; Protecting data function that reveals confidential system Information Accreditation 3GPP TS confidential administrators. Such functions could be, SEPP; NRF; and information – internal data in the clear to users and Disclosure, Body, 33.511-519 data for example, local or remote OAM CLI or NEF Confidential administrators. Such functions could be, Tampering Accredited 4.2.3.2.2 GUI, logging messages, alarms, System Internal for example, local or remote OAM CLI or Test Lab NAA2, NAA3, configuration file exports etc. Data GUI, logging messages, alarms, Confidential system internal data configuration file exports etc. Confidential NAA4 contains authentication data (i.e. PINs, system internal data contains cryptographic keys, passwords, cookies) authentication data (i.e. PINs, as well as system internal data that is cryptographic keys, passwords, cookies) not required for systems administration as well as system internal data that is not and could be of advantage to attackers required for systems administration and (i.e. stack traces in error messages). could be of advantage to attackers (i.e. stack traces in error messages).

text: Improper For sensitive data in (persistent or UPF; gNB; TS 33.117 / For sensitive data in (persistent or Elevation of Vendor, 3GPP TS protection of temporary) storage read access rights AMF; UDM; 4.2.3.2.3 temporary) storage read access rights Privilege, SECAM 33.117 data and shall be restricted. Files of a system that SMF; AUSF; Protecting data shall be restricted. Files of a system that Information Accreditation 3GPP TS information in are needed for the functionality shall be SEPP; NRF; and information in are needed for the functionality shall be Disclosure, Body, 33.511-519 storage protected against manipulation. NEF storage protected against manipulation. Tampering Accredited 4.2.3.2.3 In addition, the following rules apply for: Test Lab - Systems that need access to NAA2, NAA3, NAA4 identification and authentication data in the clear, e.g. in order to perform an authentication. Such systems shall not store this data in the clear, but scramble or encrypt it by implementation-specific means. - Systems that do not need access to sensitive data (e.g. user passwords) in the clear. Such systems shall hash this sensitive data - Stored files on the network product: examples for protection against manipulation are the use of checksum or cryptographic methods.]

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Lack of or The transmission of data is done without UPF/User TS 33.117 / Usage of cryptographically protected Spoofing, Vendor, 3GPP TS improper proper protection (industry standard Data; 4.2.3.2.4 network protocols is required. The Information SECAM 33.117 cryptographic network protocols with sufficient security UPF/Signalli Protecting data transmission of data with a need of disclosure Accreditation 3GPP TS protection of measures and industry accepted ng Data; and information in protection shall use industry standard Body, 33.511-519 data in transfer cryptographic algorithms), as defined in gNB; AMF; transfer network protocols with sufficient security NAA3, NAA4, Accredited 4.2.3.2.4 EIH4 TS33.310/33.210 UDM; SMF; measures and industry accepted Test Lab AUSF; algorithms. In particular, a protocol version SEPP; NRF; without known vulnerabilities or a secure NEF alternative shall be used.

text: No traceability In some cases, access to personal data UPF; gNB; TS 33.117 / In some cases, access to personal data in Information Vendor, 3GPP TS of access to in clear text might be required. If such AMF; UDM; 4.2.3.2.5 Logging clear text might be required. If such disclosure SECAM 33.117 personal data access is required, access to this data SMF; AUSF; access to personal access is required, access to this data Accreditation 3GPP TS shall be logged, and the log shall contain SEPP; NRF; data shall be logged, and the log shall contain NAA4, LEG Body, 33.511-519 who accessed what data without NEF who accessed what data without revealing Accredited 4.2.3.2.5 revealing personal data in clear text. personal data in clear text. When for Test Lab When for practical purposes such practical purposes such logging is not logging is not available, a coarser grain available, a coarser grain logging is logging is allowed. allowed. In some cases, the personal data stored In some cases, the personal data stored in in the log files may allow the direct the log files may allow the direct identification of a subscriber. In such identification of a subscriber. In such cases, the revealed personal information cases, the revealed personal information may not expose the subscriber to any may not expose the subscriber to any kind kind of privacy violation of privacy violation.

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Improper protection of availability and integrity of 5G Core components

text: Failure to Overload situation could appear in the UPF; gNB; TS 33.117 / The system shall provide security Denial of Vendor, 3GPP TS address case of DoS attack or increased traffic. AMF; UDM; 4.2.3.3.1 System measures to deal with overload situations service attacks SECAM 33.117 overload Lack to deal with such events affects SMF; AUSF; handling during which may occur as a result of a denial of Accreditation 3GPP TS situation availability of information or security SEPP; NRF; overload situations service attack or during periods of NAA5, UD5 Body, 33.511-519 functionalities NEF TS 33.117 increased traffic. In particular, partial or Accredited 4.2.3.3.1, /4.2.3.3.3 System complete impairment of system availability Test Lab 4.2.3.3.3 handling during shall be avoided. excessive overload In the situation where the security situations measures are no longer sufficient., it shall be ensured that the system cannot reach an undefined and thus potentially insecure state. In an extreme case this means that a controlled system shutdown is preferable to uncontrolled failure of the security functions and thus loss of system protection.

text: Boot from The network product can boot only from UPF; gNB; TS 33.117 / The network product can boot only from Denial of Vendor, 3GPP TS unauthorized the memory devices intended for this AMF; UDM; 4.2.3.3.2 Boot from the memory devices intended for this Service, SECAM 33.117 memory purpose SMF; AUSF; intended memory purpose Spoofing Accreditation 3GPP TS devices SEPP; NRF; devices only identity, Body, 33.511-519 NEF Tampering of Accredited 4.2.3.3.2 Data, Test Lab Information Disclosure

text: NAAx

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Improper During transmission of data to a system UPF; gNB; TS 33.117 / During transmission of data to a system it Denial of Vendor, 3GPP TS handling of it is necessary to validate input to the AMF; UDM; 4.2.3.3.4 System is necessary to validate input to the Service, SECAM 33.117 unexpected network product before processing. This SMF; AUSF; robustness against network product before processing. This Spoofing Accreditation 3GPP TS input includes all data which is sent to the SEPP; NRF; unexpected input includes all data which is sent to the identity, Body, 33.511-519 system. Examples of this are user input, NEF system. Examples of this are user input, Tampering of Accredited 4.2.3.3.4 values in arrays and content in values in arrays and content in protocols. Data, Test Lab protocols. The following typical Information implementation errors shall be avoided: Disclosure - No validation on the lengths of NAAx transferred data - Incorrect assumptions about data formats - No validation that received data complies with the specification - Insufficient handling of protocol errors in received data - Insufficient restriction on recursion when parsing complex data formats - White listing or escaping for inputs outside the values margin

text: Insufficient Lack of software package integrity could UPF; gNB; TS 33.117 / 1) Software package integrity shall be Denial of Vendor, 3GPP TS assurance of affect CIA of data, services, hardware AMF; UDM; 4.2.3.3.5 Network validated in the installation/upgrade stage; Service, SECAM 33.117 software and policies during installation or SMF; AUSF; Product software 2) Network product shall support software Spoofing Accreditation 3GPP TS package upgrade phases for the envisioned SEPP; NRF; package integrity package integrity validation via identity, Body, 33.511-519 integrity product/system. Missing information NEF validation cryptographic means, e.g. digital Tampering of Accredited 4.2.3.3.5 regarding software package integrity signature. To this end, the network product Data, Test Lab checks, including details of how the has a list of public keys or certificates of Information integrity check is carried out. Missing authorised software sources, and uses the Disclosure authentication and access control keys to verify that the software update is NAAx mechanisms for software package originated from only these sources; 3) installation. Tampered software shall not be executed or installed if integrity check fails; 4) A security mechanism is required to guarantee that only authorized individuals can initiate and deploy a software update, and modify the list mentioned in bullet 2.

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Vulnerable mechanisms for authentication and authorisation of 5G Core components

text: Unauthenticated The usage of a system function without UPF; gNB; TS 33.117 / The usage of a system function without Denial of Vendor, 3GPP TS access to successful authentication on basis of the AMF; UDM; 4.2.3.4.1.1 System successful authentication on basis of the Service, SECAM 33.117 system user identity and at least one SMF; AUSF; functions shall not user identity and at least one Spoofing Accreditation 3GPP TS functions authentication attribute (e.g. password, SEPP; NRF; be used without authentication attribute (e.g. password, identity, Body, 33.511-519 certificate) opens the opportunity of NEF successful certificate) shall be prevented. System Tampering of Accredited 4.2.3.4.1.1 exploitation and limits accountability. authentication and functions comprise, for example network Data, Test Lab This includes M2M communication authorisation. services (like SSH, SFTP, Web services), Information local access via a management console, Disclosure local usage of operating system and applications. This requirement shall also NAAx be applied to accounts that are only used for communication between systems. An exception to the authentication and authorisation requirement are functions for public use such as those for a Web server on the Internet, via which information is made available to the public

text: Improper Depending of information sensitivity UPF; gNB; TS 33.117 / The usage of a system function without Denial of Vendor, 3GPP TS authentication different level of strong authentication AMF; UDM; 4.2.3.4.1.2 successful authentication on basis of the Service, SECAM 33.117 mechanisms mechanisms are required. Fail to identify SMF; AUSF; Accounts shall user identity and at least one Spoofing Accreditation 3GPP TS the proper correspondence between SEPP; NRF; allow authentication attribute (e.g. password, identity, Body, 33.511-519 levels of protection and authentication NEF unambiguous certificate) shall be prevented. Tampering of Accredited 4.2.3.4.1.2, mechanisms implemented creates the identification of the The various user and machine accounts Data, Test Lab 4.2.3.4.2.1 possibility to allow unauthorized entities user on a system shall be protected from Information 4.2.3.4.3. to access unallocated resources TS 33.117 / misuse. To this end, an authentication Disclosure 4.2.3.4.2.1 attribute is typically used, which, when NAAx Account protection combined with the user name, enables by at least one unambiguous authentication and authentication identification of the authorized user. attribute

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Predefined/ All predefined or default accounts and/or UPF; gNB; TS 33.117 / All predefined or default accounts shall be Denial of Vendor, 3GPP TS default or default authentication attributes shall AMF; UDM; 4.2.3.4.2.2 deleted or disabled. Should this measure Service, SECAM 33.117 accounts be deleted or disabled SMF; AUSF; Predefined not be possible the accounts shall be Spoofing Accreditation 3GPP TS and/or SEPP; NRF; accounts shall be locked for remote login. identity, Body, 33.511-519 authentication NEF deleted or disabled Preconfigured authentication attributes Tampering of Accredited 4.2.3.4.2.2 attributes TS 33.117 / shall be changed by automatically forcing Data, Test Lab 4.2.3.4.2.3 4.2.3.4.2.3 a user to change it on 1st time login to the Information Predefined or system or the vendor provides instructions Disclosure default on how to manually change it NAAx authentication attributes shall be deleted or disabled

text: Weak or A password policy shall address the UPF; gNB; TS 33.117 / Password policy requirements include Denial of Vendor, 3GPP TS missing password structure, password change, AMF; UDM; 4.2.3.4.3 requirements regarding Password Service, SECAM 33.117 password hiding password display capabilities, SMF; AUSF; Password policy complexity, password change, Protection Spoofing Accreditation 3GPP TS policy consecutive failed login attempts. A SEPP; NRF; against brute force and dictionary attacks, identity, Body, 33.511-519 week password structure and/or a long NEF hiding password display Tampering of Accredited 4.2.3.4.3. validity password period could lead to a Data, Test Lab successful brute force attack. Password Information display is vulnerable to eavesdropping Disclosure attack. Password policy is a security NAAx policy component.

text: Lack of mutual The network product management shall UPF; gNB; TS 33.117 / The network product management shall Denial of Vendor, 3GPP TS authentication support mutual authentication AMF; UDM; 4.2.3.4.4.1 support mutual authentication Service, SECAM 33.117 of entities for mechanisms, the mutual authentication SMF; AUSF; Authentication on mechanisms, the mutual authentication Spoofing Accreditation 3GPP TS management mechanism can rely on the protocol SEPP; NRF; Network Product mechanism can rely on the protocol used identity, Body, 33.511-519 interfaces used for the interface itself or other NEF Management and for the interface itself or other means. Tampering of Accredited 4.2.3.4.4.1 means Maintenance Data, Test Lab interfaces Information Disclosure, Operator Error NAAx, Udx

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Improper The authorisations for accounts and UPF; gNB; TS 33.117 / The authorisations for accounts and Denial of Vendor, 3GPP TS authorisation applications shall be reduced to the AMF; UDM; 4.2.3.4.6 applications shall be reduced to the Service, SECAM 33.117 and access minimum required for the tasks they SMF; AUSF; Authorisation and minimum required for the tasks they have Spoofing Accreditation 3GPP TS control policy have to perform. SEPP; NRF; access control to perform. identity, Body, 33.511-519 NEF Authorisations to a system shall be Tampering of Accredited 4.2.3.4.6 restricted to a level in which a user can Data, Test Lab only access data and use functions that he Information needs in the course of his work. Disclosure, Alongside access to data, execution of Operator Error applications and components shall also NAAx, Udx take place with rights that are as low as possible. Applications should not be executed with administrator or system rights.

text: Improper session protection mechanisms of 5G Core components

text: Improper / The system shall have a function that UPF; gNB; TS 33.117 / 4.2.3.5 The system shall have a function that Denial of Vendor, 3GPP TS missing allows a signed in user to logout at any AMF; UDM; Protecting allows a signed in user to logout at any Service, SECAM 33.117 functionality time. All processes under the logged in SMF; AUSF; sessions time. All processes under the logged in Spoofing Accreditation 3GPP TS for session user ID shall be terminated on log out. A SEPP; NRF; user ID shall be terminated on log out. The identity, Body, 33.511-519 protection permanent exposed session increases NEF network product shall be able to continue Tampering of Accredited 4.2.3.5. the vulnerability of the system as an to operate without interactive sessions. Data, Test Lab entry point for unauthorized person. An OAM user interactive session shall be Information OAM user interactive session shall be terminated automatically after a specified Disclosure, terminated automatically after a period of inactivity. It shall be possible to Operator Error specified period of inactivity. It shall be configure an inactivity time-out period possible to configure an inactivity time- NAAx, Udx" out period

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Insufficient or improper monitoring mechanisms of 5G Core components

text: Lack of or lack of security events logged together UPF; gNB; TS 33.117 / Security events shall be logged together Denial of Vendor, 3GPP TS improper with a unique system reference (e.g. AMF; UDM; 4.2.3.6.1 Security with a unique system reference (e.g. host Service, SECAM 33.117 security event host name, IP or MAC address) and the SMF; AUSF; event logging name, IP or MAC address) and the exact Spoofing Accreditation 3GPP TS logging exact time the incident occurred do not SEPP; NRF; time the incident occurred. For each identity, Body, 33.511-519 allow a correct and rapid audit in case of NEF security event, the log entry shall include Tampering of Accredited 4.2.3.6.1 security incident occurrence. Security user name and/or timestamp and/or Data, Test Lab restauration is delayed. performed action and/or result and/or Information length of session and/or values exceeded Disclosure, and/or value reached. Operator Error IETF RFC 3871, section 2.11.10 specifies NAAx, Udx" the minimum set of security events.

text: Vulnerabilities in Operating Systems supporting 5G Core components

text: Improper / Security event logs should be forwarded UPF; gNB; TS 33.117 / Log functions should upload securely of Denial of Vendor, 3GPP TS missing or uploaded to a central location or AMF; UDM; 4.2.3.6.2 Log log files to a central location or to an Service, SECAM 33.117 controls for external systems. Security event log files SMF; AUSF; transfer to external system for the Network Product Spoofing Accreditation 3GPP TS protection of shall be protected in storage and SEPP; NRF; centralized storage that is logging. Secure transport protocols identity, Body, 33.511-519 security event transfer states, too. Availability and NEF TS 33.117 / shall be used. Tampering of Accredited 4.2.3.6.2 log files integrity of security event log files could 4.2.3.6.3 The security event log shall be access Data, Test Lab 4.2.3.6.3 conduct to delays, wrong audit results, Protection of controlled (file access rights) so only Information delays in security restauration, threats security event log privileged users have access to the log Disclosure, persistence. files files. Operator Error NAAx, Udx

text: Improper Growing or dynamic content (e.g. log UPF; gNB; TS 33.117 / Growing or dynamic content (e.g. log files, Denial of Vendor, 3GPP TS handling of files, uploads) could influence system AMF; UDM; 4.2.4.1.1.1 uploads) shall not influence system service attacks, SECAM 33.117 growing functions. A file system that reaches its SMF; AUSF; Handling of functions. A file system that reaches its equipment / Accreditation 3GPP TS content by file maximum capacity could stop a system SEPP; NRF; growing content maximum capacity shall not stop a system software errors, Body, 33.511-519 system from operating properly. NEF from operating properly. Therefore, growing Accredited 4.2.4.1.1.1 countermeasures shall be taken such as dynamic Test Lab usage of dedicated file systems, separated content from main system functions, or quotas, or NAA5, UD5, at least a file system monitoring to ensure FM5 that this scenario is avoided.

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Processing of Processing of ICMPv4 and ICMPv6 UPF; gNB; TS 33.117 / Processing of ICMPv4 and ICMPv6 Denial of Vendor, 3GPP TS ICMP packets packets which are not required for AMF; UDM; 4.2.4.1.1.2 packets which are not required for service attacks, SECAM 33.117 not required for operation shall be disabled on the SMF; AUSF; Processing of operation shall be disabled on the network equipment / Accreditation 3GPP TS operation network product. In particular, there are SEPP; NRF; ICMPv4 and product. In particular, there are certain software errors, Body, 33.511-519 certain types of ICMP4 and ICMPv6 that NEF ICMPv6 packets types of ICMP4 and ICMPv6 that are not misconfiguratio Accredited 4.2.4.1.1.2 are not used in most networks, but used in most networks, but represent a ns Test Lab represent a risk. risk. Permitted, forbidden and optional NAA5, UD5, ICMP packets are detailed in TS 33.117 FM5 clause 4.2.4.1.1.2

text: Processing of IP packets with unnecessary options or UPF; gNB; TS 33.117 / IP packets with unnecessary options or Denial of Vendor, 3GPP TS IP packets with extension headers could be used by AMF; UDM; 4.2.4.1.1.3 IP extension headers shall not be processed. Service, SECAM 33.117 unnecessary attackers to get unauthorized access to SMF; AUSF; packets with IP options and extension headers (e.g. Spoofing Accreditation 3GPP TS options or system resources. SEPP; NRF; unnecessary source routing) are only required in identity, Body, 33.511-519 extensions NEF options or exceptional cases. So, all packets with Tampering of Accredited 4.2.4.1.1.3 extension headers enabled IP options or extension headers Data, Test Lab shall not be shall be filtered. Information processed Disclosure NAAx

text: Privilege Authenticated Privilege Escalation UPF; gNB; TS 33.117 / There shall not be a privilege escalation Privilege Vendor, 3GPP TS Escalation allowed without re-authentication could AMF; UDM; 4.2.4.1.2.1 method in interactive sessions (CLI or escalation SECAM 33.117 allowed permit to an authorized user to gain SMF; AUSF; Authenticated GUI) which allows a user to gain NAA3 Accreditation 3GPP TS without re- unallocated higher rights to resources, SEPP; NRF; Privilege administrator/root privileges from another Body, 33.511-519 authentication violating security policy NEF Escalation only user account without re-authentication. Accredited 4.2.4.1.2.1 Implementation example: Disable insecure Test Lab privilege escalation methods so that users are required to (re-)login directly into the account with the required permissions.

text: Recurrent UIDs Each system account in UNIX shall have UPF; gNB; TS 33.117 / Each system account in UNIX shall have a Authorisation Vendor, 3GPP TS for UNIX a unique UID, to provide for system AMF; UDM; 4.2.4.2.2 System unique UID. The term 'UNIX' includes all attacks SECAM 33.117 System account accountability SMF; AUSF; account major derivatives, including Linux. NAA3 Accreditation 3GPP TS accounts SEPP; NRF; identification Body, 33.511-519 NEF Accredited 4.2.4.2.2 Test Lab

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Vulnerabilities in Web Servers supporting 5G Core components

text: Unsecure Https The communication between Web client UPF; gNB; TS 33.117 / 4.2.5.1 The communication between Web client Spoofing Vendor, 3GPP TS connection to and Web server shall be protected using AMF; UDM; HTTPS and Web server shall be protected using identity, SECAM 33.117 web servers TLS. TLS profile should be defined in SMF; AUSF; TLS. Cipher suites with NULL encryption Tampering of Accreditation 3GPP TS compliance Annex E of TS 33.310, with SEPP; NRF; shall not be supported Data, Body, 33.511-519 the following additional requirement: NEF Information Accredited 4.2.5.1 cipher suites with NULL encryption shall Disclosure Test Lab not be supported NAA2, NAA3, NAA4, EIH4

text: Lack of / When logging information lacks UPF; gNB; TS 33.117 / 4.2.5.2 Access to the webserver shall be logged. Denial of Vendor, 3GPP TS improper completeness, integrity or timeliness it is AMF; UDM; Webserver logging The web server log shall contain the Service, SECAM 33.117 logging of impossible to detect, analyse and SMF; AUSF; following information: Access timestamp / Spoofing Accreditation 3GPP TS access to the respond to system faults and relevant SEPP; NRF; Source (IP address) / (Optional) Account identity, Body, 33.511-519 webserver security events. NEF (if known) / (Optional) Attempted login Tampering of Accredited 4.2.5.2 name (if the associated account does not Data, Test Lab exist) / Relevant fields in http request. The Information URL should be included whenever Disclosure possible / Status code of web server NAAx response

text: Lack of / Improper session protection UPF; gNB; TS 33.117 / 4.2.5.3 To protect user sessions the Network Session Vendor, 3GPP TS improper http mechanisms may lead to session AMF; UDM; HTTP User Product shall support the following session hijacking SECAM 33.117 user session hijacking, disclosure of confidential SMF; AUSF; sessions ID and session cookie requirements: NAA3 Accreditation 3GPP TS protection information, including authentication SEPP; NRF; 1. The session ID shall uniquely identify Body, 33.511-519 attributes NEF the user and distinguish the session from Accredited 4.2.5.3 all other active sessions. Test Lab 2. The session ID shall be unpredictable. 3. The session ID shall not contain sensitive information in clear text (e.g. account number, social security, etc.). 4. In addition to the Session Idle Timeout, the Network Product shall automatically terminate sessions after a configurable maximum lifetime 5. Session ID's shall be regenerated for each new session (e.g. each time a user logs in). 6. The session ID shall not be reused or renewed in subsequent sessions. 7. The Network Product shall not use persistent cookies to manage sessions but only session cookies. This means that

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: neither the "expire" nor the "max-age" attribute shall be set in the cookies. 8. Where session cookies are used the attribute 'HttpOnly' shall be set to true.

text: 9. Where session cookies are used the 'domain' attribute shall be set to ensure that the cookie can only be sent to the specified domain.

text: 10. Where session cookies are used the 'path' attribute shall be set to ensure that the cookie can only be sent to the specified directory or sub-directory.

text: 11. The Network Product shall not accept session identifiers from GET/POST variables.

text: 12. The Network Product shall be configured to only accept server generated session ID's.

text: Improper The Network Product shall have a UPF; gNB; TS 33.117 / 4.2.5.4 The Network Product shall validate, filter, Injection, cross- Vendor, 3GPP TS validation of mechanism in place to ensure that web AMF; UDM; HTTP input escape, and encode user-controllable site scripting SECAM 33.117 HTTP input application inputs are not vulnerable to SMF; AUSF; validation input before it is placed in output that is NAA3 Accreditation 3GPP TS command injection or cross-site scripting SEPP; NRF; used as a web page that is served to other Body, 33.511-519 attacks. NEF users. Accredited 4.2.5.4 Test Lab

text: Vulnerabilities of network devices running 5G Core components

text: Lack of packet Lack of, or improper mechanisms to filter UPF; gNB; TS 33.117 / The Network Product shall provide a Denial of Vendor, 3GPP TS filtering incoming IP packets on any IP interface AMF; UDM; 4.2.6.2.1 Packet mechanism to filter incoming IP packets service, packet SECAM 33.117 functionality according to defined and manageable SMF; AUSF; filtering on any IP interface, as defined in RFC flooding Accreditation 3GPP TS rules leaves the network device SEPP; NRF; 3871 and TS 33.117 clause 4.2.6.2.1 NAA5, FM5 Body, 33.511-519 vulnerable to denial-of-service attacks, NEF Accredited 4.2.6.2.1 service degradation or attack aimed at Test Lab leading the device to an exception state.

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Lack of If a network device does not have the UPF; gNB; TS 33.117 / All incoming packets, from other network Malware, Vendor, 3GPP TS robustness capability to detect and drop by AMF; UDM; 4.2.6.2.2 Interface element, that are manipulated or differing denial-of- SECAM 33.117 against incoming packets, from other network SMF; AUSF; robustness the norm shall be detected as invalid and service, packet Accreditation 3GPP TS unexpected element, that are manipulated or SEPP; NRF; requirements be discarded. The process shall not be flood Body, 33.511-519 input differing the norm, it can lead to an NEF affecting the performance of the network NAA5, FM5 Accredited 4.2.6.2.2 impairment of availability. device. This robustness shall be just as Test Lab effective for a great mass of invalid packets as for individual or a small number of packets.

text: Improper or In the absence of an effective GTP-C UPF; gNB; TS 33.117 / For each message of a GTP-C-based Authorisation Vendor, 3GPP TS absent GTP-C filtering mechanisms, the network device AMF; UDM; 4.2.6.2.3 GTP-C protocol, it shall be possible to check attacks, man-in- SECAM 33.117 Filtering is vulnerable to Border gateway SMF; AUSF; Filtering whether the sender of this message is the-middle Accreditation 3GPP TS bandwidth saturation or GTP flood. SEPP; NRF; authorized to send a message pertaining attacks Body, 33.511-519 NEF to this protocol. NAA2, NAA3, Accredited 4.2.6.2.3 At least the following actions should be NAA4 Test Lab supported when the check is satisfied: Discard: the matching message is discarded /Accept: the matching message is accepted./ Account: the matching message is accounted for, i.e. a counter for the rule is incremented.

text: Improper or In the absence of effective GTP-U UPF; gNB; TS 33.117 / For each message of a GTP-U-based Authorisation Vendor, 3GPP TS absent GTPU filtering mechanisms, the network is AMF; UDM; 4.2.6.2.4 GTP-U protocol, it shall be possible to check attacks, man-in- SECAM 33.117 Filtering exposed to malformed GTP packets, SMF; AUSF; Filtering whether the sender of this message is the-middle Accreditation 3GPP TS denial of service attacks, and out-of- SEPP; NRF; authorized to send a message pertaining attacks Body, 33.511-519 state GTP messages, and also vectors NEF to this protocol. NAA2, NAA3, Accredited 4.2.6.2.4 such as spoofed IP packets. NAA4 Test Lab

text: Improper hardening of 5G Core components

text: Unnecessary Should the network product run protocol UPF; gNB; TS 33.117 / 4.3.2.1 The network product shall only run Denial of Vendor, 3GPP TS or insecure handlers and services which are not AMF; UDM; No unnecessary or protocol handlers and services which are Service, SECAM 33.117 services / needed for its operation, or which have SMF; AUSF; insecure services / needed for its operation, and which do not Spoofing Accreditation 3GPP TS protocols known security vulnerabilities, they may SEPP; NRF; protocols have any known security vulnerabilities. identity, Body, 33.511-519 be manipulated to gain unauthorized NEF Tampering of Accredited 4.3.2.1 access to the system, impair its Data, Test Lab availability or other forms of Information manipulation. Disclosure, Software errors NAAx, FMx

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Unrestricted The network product shall restrict the UPF; gNB; TS 33.117 / 4.3.2.2 The network product shall restrict the Denial of Vendor, 3GPP TS reachability of reachability of services so that they can AMF; UDM; Restricted reachability of services so that they can Service, SECAM 33.117 services only be reached on interfaces where SMF; AUSF; reachability of only be reached on interfaces where their Spoofing Accreditation 3GPP TS their usage is required. The absence of SEPP; NRF; services usage is required. On interfaces were identity, Body, 33.511-519 appropriate mechanisms expose the NEF services are active, the reachability should Tampering of Accredited 4.3.2.2 services to risk of exploitation of known be limited to legitimate communication Data, Test Lab or unknown vulnerabilities by malicious peers. This limitation shall be realized on Information parties or technical faults. the network product itself (without Disclosure measures (e.g. firewall) at network side) NAAx according to the requirement detailed in clause 4.2.6.2.1 Packet Filtering.

text: Unused Unused software components or parts of UPF; gNB; TS 33.117 / 4.3.2.3 Unused software components or parts of Denial of Vendor, 3GPP TS software software which are not needed for AMF; UDM; No unused software which are not needed for Service, SECAM 33.117 components operation or functionality of the network SMF; AUSF; software operation or functionality of the network Spoofing Accreditation 3GPP TS product create an unnecessary attack SEPP; NRF; product shall not be installed or shall be identity, Body, 33.511-519 surface. Such unused software NEF deleted after installation. This includes Tampering of Accredited 4.3.2.3 components have a high susceptibility of also parts of a software, which will be Data, Test Lab falling outside patching and vulnerability installed as examples but typically not be Information management processes and therefore used (e.g. default web pages, example Disclosure are increasingly exposed to malicious databases, test data). NAAx attacks and technical faults.

text: Unused During installation of software and UPF; gNB; TS 33.117 / 4.3.2.4 During installation of software and Denial of Vendor, 3GPP TS software or hardware often functions will be AMF; UDM; No unused hardware often functions will be activated Service, SECAM 33.117 hardware activated that are not required for SMF; AUSF; functions that are not required for operation or Spoofing Accreditation 3GPP TS functions operation or function of the system. SEPP; NRF; function of the system. If unused functions identity, Body, 33.511-519 Such hardware and software functions NEF of software cannot be deleted or de- Tampering of Accredited 4.3.2.4 increase the IT attack surface and their installed individually, such functions shall Data, Test Lab exposure is increased by their be deactivated in the configuration of the Information susceptibility of falling outside access network product permanently. Disclosure control policies. Also, hardware functions which are not NAAx required for operation or function of the system (e.g. unused interfaces) shall be permanently deactivated. Permanently means that they shall not be reactivated again after network product reboot.

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Unsupported Unsupported components incur a high UPF; gNB; TS 33.117 / 4.3.2.5 The network product shall not contain Denial of Vendor, 3GPP TS components risk of unmitigated vulnerabilities that AMF; UDM; No unsupported software and hardware components that Service, SECAM 33.117 can be exploited by malicious actors or SMF; AUSF; components are no longer supported by their vendor, Spoofing Accreditation 3GPP TS technical faults. SEPP; NRF; producer or developer, such as identity, Body, 33.511-519 NEF components that have reached end-of-life Tampering of Accredited 4.3.2.5 or end-of-support. Excluded are Data, Test Lab components that have a special support Information contract. This contract shall guarantee the Disclosure, correction of vulnerabilities over Component components' lifetime. malfunctions NAAx, FMx

text: Remote login Unrestricted remote login for privileged UPF; gNB; TS 33.117 / 4.3.2.6 Description: Direct login as root or Authorisation Vendor, 3GPP TS of privileged users expose the network element to AMF; UDM; Remote login equivalent highest privileged user shall be attacks, SECAM 33.117 users increased risk of unauthorized access SMF; AUSF; restrictions for limited to the system console only. Root elevation of Accreditation 3GPP TS and manipulation. SEPP; NRF; privileged users user will not be allowed to login to the privilege Body, 33.511-519 NEF system remotely. NAAx Accredited 4.3.2.6 Test Lab

text: Excessive file In the presence of excessive files stem UPF; gNB; TS 33.117 / 4.3.2.7 The system shall be designed to ensure Unauthorised / Vendor, 3GPP TS system authorisation privileges, application and AMF; UDM; file system that only users that are authorized to erroneous data SECAM 33.117 Authorisation configuration data is exposed to risks of SMF; AUSF; Authorisation modify files, data, directories or file element Accreditation 3GPP TS privileges unauthorised disclosure, tampering, or SEPP; NRF; privileges systems have the necessary privileges to modification / Body, 33.511-519 destruction. NEF do so. deletion Accredited 4.3.2.7 NAA1, NAA2, Test Lab NAA3, UD1, UD2

text: Lack of IP address spoofing involving the use of UPF; gNB; TS 33.117 / Systems shall not process IP packets if Packet flood Vendor, 3GPP TS protection a trusted IP address can be used by AMF; UDM; 4.3.3.1.1 IP- their source address is not reachable via NAA5 SECAM 33.117 against IP- network intruders to overcome network SMF; AUSF; Source address the incoming interface. Accreditation 3GPP TS Source security measures, such as SEPP; NRF; spoofing mitigation Body, 33.511-519 address authentication based on IP addresses. NEF Accredited 4.3.3.1.1 spoofing IP address spoofing is most frequently Test Lab used in denial-of-service attacks, where the objective is to flood the target with an overwhelming volume of traffic, and the attacker does not care about receiving responses to the attack packets.

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Unneeded Kernel based network functions not UPF; gNB; TS 33.117 / Kernel based network functions not Exploitation of Vendor, 3GPP TS kernel network needed for the operation of the network AMF; UDM; 4.3.3.1.2 needed for the operation of the network vulnerable SECAM 33.117 functions element offer an unnecessary attack SMF; AUSF; Minimized kernel element shall be deactivated kernel functions Accreditation 3GPP TS surface. Particularly vulnerable services SEPP; NRF; network functions NAAx Body, 33.511-519 are: IP Packet Forwarding between NEF Accredited 4.3.3.1.2 different interfaces of the same Test Lab equipment, Proxy ARP (resource exhaustion attacks and man-in-themiddle attacks), Directed broadcast (Smurf, Denial of Service attack), IPv4 Multicast handling (smurf and fraggle attacks), gratuitous ARP messages (ARP Cache Poisoning attack)

text: automatic Automatic launch of removable media UPF; gNB; TS 33.117 / The network product shall not Malware, Vendor, 3GPP TS launch of provides a potential vector for AMF; UDM; 4.3.3.1.3 No automatically launch any application when bypassing of SECAM 33.117 removable unauthorized or malicious payloads SMF; AUSF; automatic launch removable media device such as CD-, security Accreditation 3GPP TS media SEPP; NRF; of removable DVD-, USB-Sticks or USB-Storage drive is controls, Body, 33.511-519 NEF media connected. If the operating system running Accredited 4.3.3.1.3 supports an automatic launch, it shall be unauthorised Test Lab deactivated unless it is required to support operating availability requirements. system NAAx

text: No SYN Flood A SYN flood is a form of denial-of- UPF; gNB; TS 33.117 / The network product shall support a Syn Flood Vendor, 3GPP TS Prevention service attack in which an attacker AMF; UDM; 4.3.3.1.4 SYN mechanism to prevent Syn Flood attacks attacks SECAM 33.117 sends a succession of SYN requests to SMF; AUSF; Flood Prevention ; (e.g. implement the TCP Syn Cookie NAA5 Accreditation 3GPP TS a target's system in an attempt to SEPP; NRF; RFC 4987 technique in the TCP stack by setting Body, 33.511-519 consume enough server resources to NEF net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies = 1 in the linux Accredited 4.3.3.1.4 make the system unresponsive to sysctl.conf file). This feature shall be Test Lab legitimate traffic enabled by default.

text: No protection In information security and UPF; gNB; TS 33.117 / The system shall support mechanisms for Buffer overflow Vendor, 3GPP TS against buffer programming, a buffer overflow, or AMF; UDM; 4.3.3.1.5 buffer overflow protection. Documentation attacks SECAM 33.117 overflows buffer overrun, is an anomaly where a SMF; AUSF; Protection from which describes these buffer overflow NAA2, NAA3 Accreditation 3GPP TS program, while writing data to a buffer, SEPP; NRF; buffer overflows mechanisms and also how to check that Body, 33.511-519 overruns the buffer's boundary and NEF they have been enabled and/or Accredited 4.3.3.1.5 overwrites adjacent memory locations. implemented shall be provided. Test Lab

text: Buffers are areas of memory set aside to hold data, often while moving it from one section of a program to another, or between programs. Buffer overflows can

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: often be triggered by malformed inputs; if one assumes all inputs will be smaller than a certain size and the buffer is created to be that size, then an anomalous transaction that produces more data could cause it to write past the end of the buffer. If this overwrites adjacent data or executable code, this may result in erratic program behaviour, including memory access errors, incorrect results, and crashes. Exploiting the behaviour of a buffer overflow is a well-known security exploit. By sending in data designed to cause a buffer overflow, it is possible to write into memory areas known to hold executable code and replace it with malicious code, or to selectively overwrite data pertaining to the program's state, therefore causing behaviour that was not intended by the original programmer. Buffers are widespread in operating system (OS) code, so it is possible to make attacks that perform privilege escalation and gain unlimited access to the computer's resources.

text: No/improper In the absence of effective external file UPF; gNB; TS 33.117 / If normal users are allowed to mount Malware, Vendor, 3GPP TS external file systems mount restrictions, the system AMF; UDM; 4.3.3.1.6 External external file systems (attached locally or bypassing of SECAM 33.117 system mount is exposed to privilege escalation and SMF; AUSF; file system mount via the network), OS-level restrictions shall security Accreditation 3GPP TS restrictions excessive access permissions due to SEPP; NRF; restrictions be set properly in order to prevent controls, Body, 33.511-519 the contents of the mounted file NEF privilege escalation or extended access running Accredited 4.3.3.1.6 systems. permissions due to the contents of the unauthorised Test Lab mounted file systems. operating system NAAx

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Directory Web servers can be configured to UPF; gNB; TS 33.117 / Directory listings (indexing) / "Directory Scanning of Vendor, 3GPP TS listings automatically list the contents of AMF; UDM; 4.3.4.10 No browsing" shall be deactivated. vulnerable SECAM 33.117 directories that do not have an index SMF; AUSF; directory listings resources Accreditation 3GPP TS page present. This can aid an attacker SEPP; NRF; NAA4 Body, 33.511-519 by enabling them to quickly identify the NEF Accredited 4.3.4.10 resources at a given path, and proceed Test Lab directly to analysing and attacking those resources. It particularly increases the exposure of sensitive files within the directory that are not intended to be accessible to users, such as temporary files and crash dumps.

text: Web server The HTTP headers sent by the remote UPF; gNB; TS 33.117 / The HTTP header shall not include Exploitation of Vendor, 3GPP TS information in web server disclose information that can AMF; UDM; 4.3.4.11 Web information on the version of the web vulnerable SECAM 33.117 HTTP headers aid an attacker, such as the server SMF; AUSF; server information server and the modules/add-ons used. components Accreditation 3GPP TS version and languages used by the web SEPP; NRF; in HTTP headers NAAx Body, 33.511-519 server. NEF Accredited 4.3.4.11 Test Lab

text: Web server The error page sent by the web server UPF; gNB; TS 33.117 / User-defined error pages shall not include Exploitation of Vendor, 3GPP TS information in discloses information that can aid an AMF; UDM; 4.3.4.12 Web version information about the web server vulnerable SECAM 33.117 error pages attacker, such as the server version, SMF; AUSF; server information and the modules/add-ons used. Error components Accreditation 3GPP TS modules/add-ons used or information SEPP; NRF; in error pages messages shall not include internal NAAx Body, 33.511-519 revealing inner workings such as internal NEF information such as internal server names, Accredited 4.3.4.12 server names, error codes, etc. error codes, etc. Default error pages of the Test Lab web server shall be replaced by error pages defined by the vendor.

text: Unused file Unused File type- or script-mappings UPF; gNB; TS 33.117 / File type- or script-mappings that are not Code injection Vendor, 3GPP TS type- or script- can be used in attacks based on delivery AMF; UDM; 4.3.4.13 Minimized required shall be deleted, e.g. php, phtml, NAAx SECAM 33.117 mappings of malicious payloads, such as code- SMF; AUSF; file type mappings js, sh, csh, bin, exe, pl, vbe, vbs Accreditation 3GPP TS injection attacks. SEPP; NRF; Body, 33.511-519 NEF Accredited 4.3.4.13 Test Lab

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Unrestricted Improperly restricted file access rights UPF; gNB; TS 33.117 / Restrictive access rights shall be assigned Direct access to Vendor, 3GPP TS access to files may lead to unauthorized delivery of AMF; UDM; 4.3.4.14 Restricted to all files which are directly or indirectly restricted data SECAM 33.117 files which are not meant to be SMF; AUSF; file access (e.g. via links or in virtual directories) in the from public Accreditation 3GPP TS delivered, and to path traversal attacks. SEPP; NRF; web server's document directory. In domain Body, 33.511-519 NEF particular, the web server shall not be able NAA4 Accredited 4.3.4.14 to access files which are not meant to be Test Lab delivered.

text: Execution Improper restriction of execute rights UPF; gNB; TS 33.117 / If CGI or other scripting technology is Code injection Vendor, 3GPP TS rights outside may lead to Remote Command AMF; UDM; 4.3.4.15 Execute used, only the CGI/Scripting directory is NAAx SECAM 33.117 CGI/Scripting Execution by unauthorized delivery of SMF; AUSF; rights exclusive for configured with execute rights. Other Accreditation 3GPP TS directory malicious payload through various SEPP; NRF; CGI/Scripting directories used or meant for web content Body, 33.511-519 vectors. NEF directory do not have execute rights Accredited 4.3.4.15 Test Lab

text: System If the web server runs under privileged UPF; gNB; TS 33.117 /4.3.4.2 No web server processes shall run with Elevation of Vendor, 3GPP TS privileges for accounts, web server compromise AMF; UDM; No system system privileges. This is best achieved if privileges SECAM 33.117 web server caused by malicious action or technical SMF; AUSF; privileges for web the web server runs under an account that NAA2, NAA3, Accreditation 3GPP TS processes fault has an increased chance to SEPP; NRF; server has minimum privileges. If a process is NAA4 Body, 33.511-519 compromise the host operating system's NEF started by a user with system privileges, Accredited 4.3.4.2 integrity and availability. execution shall be transferred to a different Test Lab user without system privileges after the start.

text: Active and Unused http methods provide an UPF; gNB; TS 33.117 / 4.3.4.3 HTTP methods that are not required shall Abuse of Vendor, 3GPP TS unused HTTP unnecessary attack surface that can AMF; UDM; No unused HTTP be deactivated. Standard requests to web unused SECAM 33.117 methods lead to security compromise of the SMF; AUSF; methods servers only use GET, HEAD, and POST. vulnerable Accreditation 3GPP TS system SEPP; NRF; If other methods are required, they shall methods Body, 33.511-519 NEF not introduce security leaks such as NAA2, NAA3, Accredited 4.3.4.3 TRACK or TRACE. NAA4 Test Lab

text: Unused web Unused server addons provide an UPF; gNB; TS 33.117 / 4.3.4.4 All optional add-ons and components of Code injection Vendor, 3GPP TS server addons unnecessary attack surface that can AMF; UDM; No unused add- the web server shall be deactivated if they NAA2, NAA3, SECAM 33.117 lead to security compromise of the SMF; AUSF; ons are not required. In particular, CGI or other NAA4 Accreditation 3GPP TS system SEPP; NRF; scripting components, Server Side Body, 33.511-519 NEF Includes (SSI), and WebDAV shall be Accredited 4.3.4.4 deactivated if they are not required. Test Lab

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Access to CGI and other server-side scripting UPF; gNB; TS 33.117 / 4.3.4.5 If CGI (Common Gateway Interface) or Code injection Vendor, 3GPP TS compiler, specifications provide opportunities to AMF; UDM; No compiler, other scripting technology is used, the CGI NAA2, NAA3, SECAM 33.117 interpreter, or read files, acquire shell access, and SMF; AUSF; interpreter, or shell directory - or other corresponding scripting NAA4 Accreditation 3GPP TS shell via CGI or corrupt file systems on server machines SEPP; NRF; via CGI or other directory - shall not include compilers or Body, 33.511-519 other server- and their attached hosts. Means of NEF server-side interpreters (e.g. PERL interpreter, PHP Accredited 4.3.4.5 side scripting gaining access include: exploiting scripting interpreter/compiler, Tcl Test Lab assumptions of the script, exploiting interpreter/compiler or operating system weaknesses in the server environment, shells). and exploiting weaknesses in other programs and system calls. Presence in the scripting directory of compilers, interpreters or operating system shells renders the system particularly vulnerable.

text: Common In upload is permitted in the UPF; gNB; TS 33.117 / 4.3.4.6 If CGI or other scripting technology is Code injection Vendor, 3GPP TS directory for CGI/Scripting, the system is vulnerable AMF; UDM; No CGI or other used, the associated CGI/script directory NAA2, NAA3, SECAM 33.117 uploads and to code injection / shell upload attacks. SMF; AUSF; scripting for shall not be used for uploads. NAA4 Accreditation 3GPP TS CGI/Scripting SEPP; NRF; uploads Body, 33.511-519 NEF Accredited 4.3.4.6 Test Lab

text: Execution of SSIs are directives present on Web UPF; gNB; TS 33.117 / 4.3.4.7 If Server Side Includes (SSI) is active, the Code injection Vendor, 3GPP TS system applications used to feed an HTML page AMF; UDM; No execution of execution of system commands shall be NAA2, NAA3, SECAM 33.117 commands with dynamic contents. The Server-Side SMF; AUSF; system commands deactivated. NAA4 Accreditation 3GPP TS with server Includes attack allows the exploitation of SEPP; NRF; with SSI Body, 33.511-519 side includes a web application by injecting scripts in NEF Accredited 4.3.4.7 (SSI) HTML pages or executing arbitrary Test Lab codes remotely. It can be exploited through manipulation of SSI in use in the application or force its use through user input fields.

text: Excessive / Improper setting of access rights for web UPF; gNB; TS 33.117 / 4.3.4.8 Access rights for web server configuration Manipulation of Vendor, 3GPP TS improper server configuration files may lead to AMF; UDM; Access rights for files shall only be granted to the owner of server SECAM 33.117 access rights unauthorized disclosure or modification SMF; AUSF; web server the web server process or to a user with configuration Accreditation 3GPP TS for web server of configuration information. SEPP; NRF; configuration system privileges. Implementation files Body, 33.511-519 configuration NEF example: Delete "read" and "write" access NAA2, NAA3 Accredited 4.3.4.8 files rights for "others." Only grant "write" Test Lab access to the user who configures the web server

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Presence of Presence of default content may UPF; gNB; TS 33.117 / 4.3.4.9 Default content (examples, help files, Abuse of Vendor, 3GPP TS default content disclose information on the web server AMF; UDM; No default content documentation, aliases) that is provided vulnerable SECAM 33.117 version, add-ons and configuration or SMF; AUSF; with the standard installation of the web content, Accreditation 3GPP TS information/file structure, and thus SEPP; NRF; server shall be removed. collection of Body, 33.511-519 facilitate information gathering for a NEF system Accredited 4.3.4.9 malicious party. Also, default content information Test Lab may include known vulnerabilities (such NAA2, NAA3, as the case of IIS Default Page). NAA4

text: Inadequate Unsegregated traffic belonging to O&M; TS 33.117 / 4.3.5.1 The network product shall support physical Lateral Vendor, 3GPP TS traffic different planes (data, control, control Traffic Separation or logical separation of traffic belonging to movement, SECAM 33.117 separation of management) increases the risk that plane; UPF; RFC 3871 / 2.3.5. different network domains. For example, elevation of Accreditation 3GPP TS traffic unauthorized individuals will be able to gNB; AMF; Support Separate O&M traffic and control plane traffic belong privileges, Body, 33.511-519 belonging to observe management traffic and/or UDM; SMF; Management to different network domains. See RFC eavesdropping Accredited 4.3.5.1 different compromise the device. AUSF; Plane IP Interfaces 3871 [3] for further information. NAA2, NAA3, Test Lab network SEPP; NRF; NAA4, EIH4 domains NEF

text: Code execution Execution of JavaScript or any other Network TS 33.117 / 4.3.6.2 Parsers used by Network Functions (NF) Code injection Vendor, 3GPP TS or inclusion of code contained in JSON objects Function No code execution shall not execute JavaScript or any other NAA2, NAA3, SECAM 33.117 external received on Service Based Interfaces (NF); or inclusion of code contained in JSON objects received NAA4 Accreditation 3GPP TS resources by (SBI) expose the system to execution of 5G Core external resources on Service Based Interfaces (SBI). Body, 33.512-519 JSON parsers malicious code delivered over the SBI. (5GC); by JSON parsers Further, these parsers shall not include Accredited 4.3.6.2 Service- any resources external to the received Test Lab Based JSON object itself, such as files from the Interfaces NF’s file system or other resources loaded (SBI); UPF; externally AMF; UDM, SMF; AUSF; SEPP; NRF; NEF

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: JSON Parser For data structures where values are Network TS 33.117 / 4.3.6.3 For data structures where values are Software error Vendor, 3GPP TS not robust accessible using names (sometimes Function Validation of the accessible using names (sometimes FMx SECAM 33.117 referred to as keys), e.g. a JSON object, (NF); unique key values referred to as keys), e.g. a JSON object, Accreditation 3GPP TS if the names/keys are not unique and 5G Core in IEs. the name shall be unique. The occurrence Body, 33.512-519 duplicated names/keys occur within (5GC); TS 33.117 / 4.3.6.4 of the same name (or key) twice within Accredited 4.3.6.3, such a structure, it can result in Service- Validation of the such a structure shall be an error and the Test Lab 4.3.6.4 inconsistent values for that names (or Based IEs limits. message shall be rejected keys), which leads to Denial of Service. Interfaces The valid format and range of values for - If the format and range of values for (SBI); UPF; each IE, when applicable, shall be defined the IEs in API messages are not AMF; UDM, unambiguously. implemented as required (e.g. when the SMF; AUSF; number of leaf IEs exceeds the SEPP; NRF; maximum number or when the size of NEF the JSON body of any HTTP request exceed the maximum size), security vulnerabilities may be introduced such as buffer overflow flow, which may lead to Denial of Service.

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: D ANNEX: DETAILED VULNERABILITIES IN NETWORK SLICING

text: Associated Security Source Name of Security Requirements /Description Threats (Threat Description Assets Stakeholder Ref/Code Vulnerability Controls of security controls Taxonomy) Category Spec

text: Service Based Vulnerabilities in Network Slicing Management

text: Unsecured This management interface will need to be Service Secure A communication service customer shall Attackers may gain MNO, CSP 3GPP TR management secured so that only authorized parties Based configuration of be authenticated by the network before access to capabilities for 33.811 V15.0.0 exposure can create, alter, and delete network slice Interfaces, Management accessing to the slice management the network management 4.1.1. interface instances. Without secure protection, an OS-Ma-NFVi Exposure Interface interface. without authorisation. attacker could: A communication service customer shall Attackers may create authenticate the network before network slice instances accessing to the slice management requiring significant - use charged for services in an interface. network resources or a unauthorized way The slice management interface shall large number of network - create a network slice instance to deny only be accessed by authorized slice instances to services to or track customers who expect communication service customers. exhaust the network to use a specific network instance The management capabilities that a resources and potentially - deny services to customers using an communication service customer is bring down the network. existing slice instance by modifying slice allowed to use are defined by the Attackers may also services HPLMN. modify the configuration - perform a man-in-the-middle attack by The slice management interface shall of other customers’ slice modifying a slice instance to reroute the be designed securely to ensure that instances to fail their traffic maliciously security features cannot be bypassed. SLA. Attackers could - deny services by deleting a slice instance It shall be possible to integrity protect replay management the slice management interface messages causing messages. repeated management It shall be possible to confidentiality operations (e.g. creating protect the slice management interface duplicated network messages. slices) and false charging It shall be possible to protect the slice etc. management interface messages NAA2, NAA3, NAA4 against replay attacks.

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Associated Security Source Name of Security Requirements /Description Threats (Threat Description Assets Stakeholder Ref/Code Vulnerability of security controls Taxonomy) Category Controls Spec

text: Improper protection of Data and Information

text: Improper During the operation phase of Network Encryption, The result of supervision/reporting An attacker can tamper MNO, CSP 3GPP TR protection of management aspects of a Network Slice Slice integrity verification should be integrity protected. the result of 33.811 V15.0.0 Network Slice Instance, supervision and performance Instance The supervision and reporting data may supervision/reporting to 4.2.1. Instance reporting (e.g. for KPI monitoring) are be confidentiality protected. cause a modification of supervision / included. NSI modification can be an NSI. This may cause reporting data triggered by the result of consumption of network supervision/reporting, so protecting the resource or changes to a integrity of the result of the running slice instance. supervision/reporting data is important. A An attacker can tampered result may cause an eavesdrop the unnecessary or improper NSI modification transmission of action such as creation or modification of supervision and reporting NSI constituents. data and extract If supervision and reporting data is not sensitive information that protected by encryption, an attacker may can be used to execute be able to extract sensitive information attacks of running such as topology. network slice instances.

text: Lack of / A network Slice Subnet Template (NSST) Network Integrity protection The network slice subnet template Attackers can tamper MNO, CSP 3GPP TR ineffective is used during on-boarding and creation of Slice Subnet of NSST should be integrity protected network slice subnet 33.811 V15.0.0 tamper- a slice instance. The template describes Instance The management system should verify template during on- 4.3.1. proofing of the structure (i.e. contained components the correctness and source of the boarding, transmission, Network Slice and connectivity between them) and network slice subnet template. and storage. Based on a Subnet configuration of the network slice subnet, The network slice subnet template tampered NSST, a slice Template as well as network capability and other should be confidentiality protected instance may not be (NSST) artifacts necessary to provision an during transmission and in storage. created correctly or instance based on the template. To detect successfully. a tampered template which could create a Attackers can get compromised NSI, the integrity of template sensitive information should be protected. The correctness and about NSIs if NSSTs can source of template should also be verified. be read in clear text The confidentiality of an NSST should be during transmission and protected to prevent attackers getting in storage - later to be sensitive information such as topology and used to attack a running configuration about the running NSI. NSI. NAA2, NAA3, NAA4

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Vulnerabilities in implementation of NS security functionalities

text: Insecure The services or network slice Network Protection of The negotiation procedure shall be Man-in-the middle (MitM) MNO, CSP 3GPP TR procedure for characteristics include radio access Slice negotiation authenticated attacks to modify and 33.811 V15.0.0 capability technology, bandwidth, latency, reliability, Instance procedure The negotiation procedure shall be downgrade the slice 4.4.1. negotiation guaranteed/non-guaranteed QoS, security integrity, replay and confidentiality using capabilities level etc. It should be possible for these TLS (recommended TLS 1.2 or TLS NAA2, NAA3, NAA4 items to be securely negotiable in a 1.3) standardized way. If the network slice Access to the network management negotiation procedures are not secured in interface shall be authorised using a standardized way, the slice management OAuth 2.0 may be subject to malicious attacks, e.g. man-in-the middle (MitM) attacks to modify and downgrade the slice capabilities.

text: Vulnerable mechanisms for authentication and authorisation in Network Slicing Management

text: Improper slice- Access control to Network Slices may Network Additional Configure Network Slice to perform Unauthorized access to MNO, CSP 3GPP TR authentication require additional authorisation and Slice authentication access authentication and authorisation NSI, DoS for legitimate 33.813 V16.0.0 mechanisms authentication different from the 3GPP Instance mechanism in addition to primary authentication. users 6.2 SUPI. This will take place after the primary Perform the additional authentication NAAx authentication which is still required after primary authentication using between the UE and the 5GS for PLMN credentials other than credentials used access authorisation and authentication. If for primary authentication used for Slice specific authentication is not 3GPP access. performed, unauthorized UEs may access the Slice which those UEs are not entitled to access. The unauthorized UEs may consume resources of the Network Slice and they may cause DoS to legitimate UEs.

text: Lack of Without confidentiality or integrity NSSAAI Secure Protect the security of the User ID and Unauthorized access to MNO, CSP 3GPP TR protection of protection of the User ID and authentication credentials in UE storage, transition and User ID, theft of access 33.813 V16.0.0 NSSAI and corresponding credentials, sensitive mechanisms network storage. credentials 6.5 home control information may leak, and user data may Protect the security of the interaction NAAx be obtained by attackers. between the 3rd party entities and the network functions performing slice authorisation and authentication. Interaction between the network functions performing slice authorisation and authentication and the related MNO NFs such as AMF, SMF or NSSF

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Lack of Network Slice Selection Assistance NSSAAI Protect S-NSSAI 5G system shall provide confidentiality Man-in-the middle (MitM) MNO, CSP 3GPP TR protection of Information (NSSAI) may contain sensitive during protection for NSSAI transmission: attacks may disrupt the 33.813 V16.0.0 the User ID and information that causes privacy concerns transmission - Cryptographic key available from an services, leak of NSSAI 6.7 credentials when transmitted in clear. earlier authentication run, NAAx If a Single – Network Slice Selection - Use of existing NAS or AS security Assistance Information (S-NSSAI) is sent contexts. in the clear text during the Radio Resource Control (RRC) connection establishment procedure, then the user privacy is lost. A non-compliant serving PLMN may transmit NSSAI in clear, leading to a leak of NSSAI.

text: Insufficient or improper monitoring mechanism of Network Slice Instance (NSI)

text: Insufficient / Security must be enforced in all phases of Network Security event Appropriate logging and auditing Create fake slices. MNO, CSP 5G Network inadequate the NSI lifecycle because a vulnerability in Slice logging mechanisms should be implemented Delete/deactivate slices. Slicing: A logging and one phase can introduce vulnerabilities in Instance throughout the slice life cycle. Expose/change the Security auditing across other phases. Without proper Real-time analysis of security events to configuration of the Overview NSI lifecycle monetarization of all phases, security immediately detect any attempted network slice. events remain undetected attack. DoS/consume resources and network functions. Slice life-cycle includes: 1) Preparation (NAAx, FMx) phase; 2) Installation, Configuration, and Activation phase; 3) Run-time phase; 4) Decommissioning phase.

text: Improper Logs and audit trails can assist in Network Protection of log Establish policies and procedures for Logs that are secured MNO, CSP NIST 800-92 protection of detecting security violations, performance Slice information log management. improperly in storage or security event problems, and flaws. It is important that Managemen Logs must be protected from breaches in transit might be log files audit records are available and complete. t of their confidentiality and integrity. susceptible to intentional For this reason, protection is required for and unintentional all security events. alteration and destruction. (NAAx, FMx)

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Improper A correct level of isolation must be Network Isolation of data Proper isolation between distinct slices Unauthorized access, MNO, CSP 5G Network isolation of implemented among the services and Slice in the slice manager and restriction to leakage of shared Slicing: A monitoring between the slice and the consuming Instance perform changes on parameters shared parameters, sensitive Security capabilities services. among slices belonging to different data transmitted between Overview and data Security is one dimension of isolation, tenants. Strong authentication and the slices. (NAAx, FMx) together with performance and access control procedures must be in dependability. Isolation must be place. If a 5G customer device is considered from different perspectives: allowed to simultaneously attach to isolation between network slices, isolation multiple slices, isolation of data should between network functions, isolation be possible at the customer device too. between users, isolation of data. The measurement of isolation remains an open problem.

text: Improper or The concept of end-to end security is Network End-to-end Slices are end-to-end logical networks, Availability of the service, MNO, CSP 5G Network insufficient closely connected to the concepts of Slice monitoring so end-to-end security should be sensitive data Slicing: A end-to-end isolation and orchestration. Without end- Instance considered. All resources and network transmitted between the Security monitoring to-end security monitoring, it is not functions consumed by a slice should slices. (NAAx, FMx) Overview capabilities for possible to ensure adequate protection of be monitored. NSI the service provided by the network slice. All communication (e.g., between the slice and the resource layer, the slice and the slice manager, the sub-slices of a slice, the customer device and the access point in the network) should use adequate mechanisms to assure the target security level.

text: Insufficient / Security must be enforced in all phases Network Security event Appropriate logging and auditing Create fake slices. MNO, CSP 5G Network inadequate because a vulnerability in one phase can Slice logging mechanisms should be implemented Delete/deactivate slices. Slicing: A logging and introduce vulnerabilities in other phases. Instance throughout the slice life cycle. Expose/change the Security auditing across Slice life-cycle include: 1) Preparation Real-time analysis of security events to configuration of the Overview NSI lifecycle phase; 2) 2) Installation, Configuration, immediately detect any attempted network slice. and Activation phase; 3) Run-time phase; attack. DoS/consume resources 4) Decommissioning phase. Without and network functions. proper monetarization of all phases, (NAAx, FMx) security events remain undetected

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: E ANNEX: DETAILED VULNERABILITIES IN THE RADIO ACCESS NETWORK

text: Associated Name of Security Requirements /Description of Threats (Threat Description Assets Security Controls Stakeholder Source Ref Vulnerability security controls Taxonomy) Category

text: Improper implementation of gNB security functions

text: Improper RRC-signalling data sent between UE gNB, UE TS 33.501/5.3.2 The gNB shall implement the following Tampering data, Vendor, 3GPP TS Ciphering of and gNB over the NG RAN is not User data and ciphering algorithms: Information SECAM 33.511, RRC-signalling encrypted or encrypted using a non- signalling data - NEA0, 128-NEA1, 128-NEA2, 128- Disclosure, Accreditation 4.2.2.1.6 compliant ciphering algorithm confidentiality NEA3 Denial of Service Body, (NAAx) Accredited Test Lab

text: Failure to If the gNB does not provide gNB, N2/Xn TS 33.501/9.2 and In order to protect the reference points, it Tampering data, Vendor, 3GPP TS ensure control confidentiality protection for control interface 9.4 Security is required to implement IPsec ESP and Information SECAM 33.511, plane data plane packets on the N2/Xn reference mechanisms for N2 IKEv2 certificates-based authentication. Disclosure, Accreditation 4.2.2.1.16 confidentiality points, then the control plane packets and Xn interfaces IPsec is mandatory to implement on the Denial of Service Body, protection over sent between gNBs (e.g. inter-gNB gNB and the ng-eNB. In addition to Accredited (NAAx) N2/Xn interface handover) and from gNB to AMF (e.g. IPsec, DTLS shall be supported to Test Lab handover on AMF change) can be provide integrity protection, replay intercepted and/or modified and the gNB protection and confidentiality protection. can be compromised by attackers to prevent service to legitimate users (e.g. Handover failure) or to perform masquerading by making use of the legitimate users’ UE identifiers to gain access to the network.

text: Improper If the gNB does not provide integrity gNB TS 33.501/5.3.3 The gNB shall support integrity protection Tampering data, Vendor, 3GPP TS mechanisms to protection for control plane packets, they User data and and replay protection of RRC-signalling. Denial of SECAM 33.511, protect RRC risk being exposed and/or modified. The signalling data Service, Rogue Accreditation 4.2.2.1.1 signalling data intruder manipulations on control plane integrity base station Body, integrity packets can lead to denial of service to Accredited legitimate users. (NAAx, EIH4) Test Lab

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: RRC integrity Failure in RRC integrity check affects gNB, UE TS 33.501/6.5.1 RRC integrity protection shall be Tampering data, Vendor, 3GPP TS check failure the data/message exchange between RRC integrity provided by the PDCP layer between UE Denial of SECAM 33.511, gNB and UE mechanisms and gNB and no layers below PDCP Service, Rogue Accreditation 4.2.2.1.4 shall be integrity protected. Replay base station Body, protection shall be activated when (NAAx) Accredited integrity protection is activated. Full Test Lab mechanism is described in TS 33.501/6.5.1 RRC integrity mechanisms

text: Failure to The integrity and replay-protection of gNB TS 33.501/9.2 and In order to protect the reference points, it Tampering data, Vendor, 3GPP TS ensure control transport of control plane data and user 9.4 Security is required to implement IPsec ESP and Denial of SECAM 33.511, plane data data over N2/Xn could be affected mechanisms for N2 IKEv2 certificates-based authentication. Service. (NAAx, Accreditation 4.2.2.1.17 integrity and Xn interfaces IPsec is mandatory to implement on the EIH4) Body, protection over gNB and the ng-eNB. In addition to Accredited N2/Xn interface IPsec, DTLS shall be supported to Test Lab provide integrity protection, replay protection and confidentiality protection.

text: Improper or gNB must provide replay protection by gNB, UE TS 33.501/5.3.3 The gNB shall support integrity protection Tampering data, Vendor, 3GPP TS missing replay dropping/ignoring replayed packets. If User data and and replay protection of RRC-signalling Denial of Service SECAM 33.511, protection of the gNB does not provide adequate signalling data (NAA2, NAA5) Accreditation 4.2.2.1.9 RRC-signalling integrity protection for RRC packets on, integrity Body, the control plane packets risk being Accredited exposed and modified. The intruder Test Lab manipulations on control plane packets can lead to denial of service to legitimate users.

text: Improper User data sent between UE and gNB gNB TS 33.501/5.3.2 The gNB shall activate ciphering of user Tampering data, Vendor, 3GPP TS ciphering of over the NG RAN is not encrypted or User data and data based on the security policy sent by Information SECAM 33.511, User data encrypted using a non-compliant signalling data the SMF. Disclosure Accreditation 4.2.2.1.7 between UE and ciphering algorithm confidentiality The gNB shall implement the following (NAA2, NAA3, Body, gNB ciphering algorithms: NAA4) Accredited - NEA0, 128-NEA1, 128-NEA2, 128- Test Lab NEA3

text: Improper If the gNB does not handle integrity gNB TS 33.501/5.3.3 The gNB shall implement the following Information Vendor, 3GPP TS integrity protection for user plane packets for the User data and ciphering algorithms: Disclosure, SECAM 33.511, protection of NG RA interface then all the signalling data - NEA0, 128-NEA1, 128-NEA2, 128- Rogue base Accreditation 4.2.2.1.2 user data uplink/downlink user plane packets can integrity NEA3 station (NAAx, Body, between the UE be attacked and/or manipulated by EIH4) Accredited and the gNB intruders to launch Denial of Service Test Lab attack.

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: User plane Failure to ensure proper managing of gNB, UE TS 33.501/6.6.4 UP If the gNB or the UE receives a PDCP Tampering data, Vendor, 3GPP TS integrity check PDCP PDU with faulty or missing MAC-I integrity PDU which fails integrity check with Denial of SECAM 33.511, failure mechanisms faulty or missing MAC-I after the start of Service. Accreditation 4.2.2.1.5 integrity protection, the PDU shall be Body, (NAAx) discarded Accredited Test Lab

text: Missing of gNB must provide replay protection by gNB, UE TS 33.501/5.3.3 The gNB shall support integrity protection Tampering data, Vendor, 3GPP TS improper replay dropping/ignoring replayed packets. If User data and and replay protection of user data Denial of Service SECAM 33.511, protection the gNB does not provide such signalling data between the UE and the gNB. (NAA2, NAA5) Accreditation 4.2.2.1.8 mechanisms of protection for user plane packets user integrity Body, user data over plane packets can be manipulated by Accredited NG RAN intruders to launch Denial of Service Test Lab interface attack.

text: Improper If AS does not use the highest priority gNB TS 33.501/6.7.3. Each gNB/ng-eNB shall be configured Tampering data, Vendor, 3GPP TS procedures for algorithm to protect AS layer, i.e. RRC Procedures for AS via network management with lists of Information SECAM 33.511, AS algorithm and PDCP, data on the AS layer risks algorithm selection algorithms which are allowed for usage. Disclosure, Accreditation 4.2.2.1.12, 15 selection being exposed and/or modified, or denial When AS security context is to be Denial of Service Body, of service. established in the gNB/ng-eNB, the AMF (NAAx, EIH4) Accredited shall send the UE 5G security Test Lab capabilities to the gNB/ng-eNB. The gNB/ng-eNB shall choose the ciphering algorithm which has the highest priority from its configured list and is also present in the UE 5G security capabilities.

text: Lack of If the gNB does not send the UE 5G gNB, AMF TS 33.501/6.7.3.1 The AMF shall verify that the UE's 5G Tampering Data, Vendor, 3GPP TS /improper security capabilities, the AMF cannot Xn-handover security capabilities received from the Information SECAM 33.511, mechanisms for verify 5G security capabilities are the target gNB are the same as the UE's 5G Disclosure, Accreditation 4.2.2.1.4 prevention of same as the UE security capabilities that security capabilities that the AMF has Denial of Body, bidding down at the AMF has stored, the attacker (e.g. locally stored. If there is a mismatch, the Service. Accredited Xn-handover gNB) may force the system to accept a AMF shall send its locally stored 5G Test Lab weaker security algorithm than the security capabilities of the UE to the system is allowed forcing the system target gNB in the Path-Switch into a lowered security level making the Acknowledge message. The AMF shall system easily attacked and/or support logging capabilities for this event compromised and may take additional measures, such as raising an alarm

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Failure to If AS keys are not refreshed by the gNB gNB TS 33.501/6.9.4. Key change on-the-fly consists of key Information Vendor, 3GPP TS refresh keys by when PDCP COUNTs is about to be re- Key-change-on-the- refresh or key re-keying. Complete Disclosure SECAM 33.511, gNB used with the same Radio Bearer fly requirements are described in TS (NAA4, EIH4) Accreditation 4.2.2.1.13 identity and with the same KgNB, key 33.501/6.9.4. Body, stream reuse is possible. This can result Accredited in information disclosure of AS signalling Test Lab and user plane data.

text: Failure to Failure to update key at the gNB on Dual gNB TS 33.501 / When executing the procedure for adding Information Vendor, 3GPP TS update key at Connectivity may lead to key stream 6.10.2.1 subsequent radio bearer(s) to the same Disclosure SECAM 33.511, the gNB on Dual reuse. This can result in information SN, the MN shall, for each new radio Accreditation (NAA4, EIH4) 3GPP TS Connectivity disclosure of AS signalling and user bearer, assign a radio bearer identity that Body, plane data. has not previously been used since the Accredited 33.512 last KSN change. If the MN cannot Test Lab 84.2.2.1.8 allocate an unused radio bearer identity for a new radio bearer in the SN, due to radio bearer identity space exhaustion, the MN shall increment the SN Counter and compute a fresh KSN, and then shall perform a SN Modification procedure to update the KSN"

text: Failure to apply If gNB does not apply security controls gNB TS 33.501/5.3.2 The gNB shall activate ciphering of user Tampering data, Vendor, 3GPP TS SMF-sent based on security policy provided by User data and data based on the security policy sent by Information SECAM 33.511, ciphering and SMF, this can lead to no security or signalling data the SMF. Disclosure, Accreditation 4.2.2.1.4 integrity policy reduced security provided to the UE confidentiality Denial of Service Body, user plane TS 33.501/5.3.3 Accredited User data and (NAAx, EIH4) Test Lab signalling data integrity

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Improper protection of Data and Information of gNB Components

text: System Presence of active system function(s) gNB TS 33.117 / When the system is not under Elevation of Vendor, 3GPP TS functions that reveal confidential system internal 4.2.3.2.2 Protecting maintenance, there shall be no system Privilege, SECAM 33.117 revealing data in the clear to users and data and function that reveals confidential system Information Accreditation 3GPP TS confidential administrators. Such functions could be, information – internal data in the clear to users and Disclosure, Body, 33.511-519 data for example, local or remote OAM CLI or Confidential System administrators. Such functions could be, Tampering Accredited 4.2.3.2.2 GUI, logging messages, alarms, Internal Data for example, local or remote OAM CLI or NAA2, NAA3, Test Lab configuration file exports etc. GUI, logging messages, alarms, NAA4 Confidential system internal data configuration file exports etc. Confidential contains authentication data (i.e. PINs, system internal data contains cryptographic keys, passwords, cookies) authentication data (i.e. PINs, as well as system internal data that is cryptographic keys, passwords, cookies) not required for systems administration as well as system internal data that is not and could be of advantage to attackers required for systems administration and (i.e. stack traces in error messages). could be of advantage to attackers (i.e. stack traces in error messages).

text: Improper For sensitive data in (persistent or gNB TS 33.117 / For sensitive data in (persistent or Elevation of Vendor, 3GPP TS protection of temporary) storage read access rights 4.2.3.2.3 Protecting temporary) storage read access rights Privilege, SECAM 33.117 data and shall be restricted. Files of a system that data and shall be restricted. Files of a system that Information Accreditation 3GPP TS information in are needed for the functionality shall be information in are needed for the functionality shall be Disclosure, Body, 33.511-519 storage protected against manipulation. storage protected against manipulation. Tampering Accredited 4.2.3.2.3 In addition, the following rules apply for: NAA2, NAA3, Test Lab - Systems that need access to NAA4 identification and authentication data in the clear, e.g. in order to perform an authentication. Such systems shall not store this data in the clear, but scramble or encrypt it by implementation-specific means. - Systems that do not need access to sensitive data (e.g. user passwords) in the clear. Such systems shall hash this sensitive data - Stored files on the network product: examples for protection against manipulation are the use of checksum or cryptographic methods.]

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Lack of or The transmission of data is done without gNB TS 33.117 / Usage of cryptographically protected Spoofing, Vendor, 3GPP TS improper proper protection (industry standard 4.2.3.2.4 Protecting network protocols is required. The Information SECAM 33.117 cryptographic network protocols with sufficient security data and transmission of data with a need of disclosure Accreditation 3GPP TS protection of measures and industry accepted information in protection shall use industry standard NAA3, NAA4, Body, 33.511-519 data in transfer cryptographic algorithms), as defined in transfer network protocols with sufficient security EIH4 Accredited 4.2.3.2.4 TS33.310/33.210 measures and industry accepted Test Lab algorithms. In particular, a protocol version without known vulnerabilities or a secure alternative shall be used.

text: No traceability In some cases, access to personal data gNB TS 33.117 / In some cases, access to personal data Information Vendor, 3GPP TS of access to in clear text might be required. If such 4.2.3.2.5 Logging in clear text might be required. If such disclosure SECAM 33.117 personal data access is required, access to this data access to personal access is required, access to this data NAA4, LEG Accreditation 3GPP TS shall be logged, and the log shall contain data shall be logged, and the log shall contain Body, 33.511-519 who accessed what data without who accessed what data without Accredited 4.2.3.2.5 revealing personal data in clear text. revealing personal data in clear text. Test Lab When for practical purposes such When for practical purposes such logging logging is not available, a coarser grain is not available, a coarser grain logging is logging is allowed. allowed. In some cases, the personal data stored In some cases, the personal data stored in the log files may allow the direct in the log files may allow the direct identification of a subscriber. In such identification of a subscriber. In such cases, the revealed personal information cases, the revealed personal information may not expose the subscriber to any may not expose the subscriber to any kind of privacy violation kind of privacy violation.

text: Improper protection of availability and integrity of gNB Components

text: Failure to Overload situation could appear in the gNB TS 33.117 / The system shall provide security Denial of service Vendor, 3GPP TS address case of DoS attack or increased traffic. 4.2.3.3.1 System measures to deal with overload situations attacks SECAM 33.117 overload Lack to deal with such events affects handling during which may occur as a result of a denial of NAA5, UD5 Accreditation 3GPP TS situation availability of information or security overload situations service attack or during periods of Body, 33.511-519 functionalities TS 33.117 increased traffic. In particular, partial or Accredited 4.2.3.3.1, /4.2.3.3.3 System complete impairment of system Test Lab 4.2.3.3.3 handling during availability shall be avoided. excessive overload In the situation where the security situations measures are no longer sufficient., it shall be ensured that the system cannot reach an undefined and thus potentially insecure state. In an extreme case this means that a controlled system shutdown is preferable to uncontrolled failure of the security functions and thus loss of system protection.

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Boot from The network product can boot only from gNB TS 33.117 / The network product can boot only from Denial of Vendor, 3GPP TS unauthorized the memory devices intended for this 4.2.3.3.2 Boot from the memory devices intended for this Service, SECAM 33.117 memory purpose intended memory purpose Spoofing identity, Accreditation 3GPP TS devices devices only Tampering of Body, 33.511-519 Data, Information Accredited 4.2.3.3.2 Disclosure Test Lab (NAAx)

text: Improper The following typical implementation gNB TS 33.117 / During transmission of data to a system it Denial of Vendor, 3GPP TS handling of errors open relevant vulnerabilities: 4.2.3.3.4 System is necessary to validate input to the Service, SECAM 33.117 unexpected - No validation on the lengths of robustness against network product before processing. This Spoofing identity, Accreditation 3GPP TS input transferred data unexpected input includes all data which is sent to the Tampering of Body, 33.511-519 - Incorrect assumptions about data system. Examples of this are user input, Data, Information Accredited 4.2.3.3.4 formats values in arrays and content in protocols. Disclosure Test Lab - No validation that received data (NAAx) complies with the specification - Insufficient handling of protocol errors in received data - Insufficient restriction on recursion when parsing complex data formats - White listing or escaping for inputs outside the values margin

text: Insufficient Lack of software package integrity could gNB TS 33.117 / 1) Software package integrity shall be Denial of Vendor, 3GPP TS assurance of affect CIA of data, services, hardware 4.2.3.3.5 Network validated in the installation/upgrade Service, SECAM 33.117 software and policies during installation or Product software stage; 2) Network product shall support Spoofing identity, Accreditation 3GPP TS package upgrade phases for the envisioned package integrity software package integrity validation via Tampering of Body, 33.511-519 integrity product/system. Missing information validation cryptographic means, e.g. digital Data, Information Accredited 4.2.3.3.5 regarding software package integrity signature. To this end, the network Disclosure Test Lab checks, including details of how the product has a list of public keys or NAAx integrity check is carried out. Missing certificates of authorised software authentication and access control sources, and uses the keys to verify that mechanisms for software package the software update is originated from installation. only these sources; 3) Tampered software shall not be executed or installed if integrity check fails; 4) A security mechanism is required to guarantee that only authorized individuals can initiate and deploy a software update, and modify the list mentioned in bullet 2.

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Vulnerable mechanisms for authentication and authorisation of gNB Components

text: Unauthenticated The usage of a system function without gNB TS 33.117 / The usage of a system function without Denial of Vendor, 3GPP TS access to successful authentication on basis of the 4.2.3.4.1.1 System successful authentication on basis of the Service, SECAM 33.117 system user identity and at least one functions shall not user identity and at least one Spoofing identity, Accreditation 3GPP TS functions authentication attribute (e.g. password, be used without authentication attribute (e.g. password, Tampering of Body, 33.511-519 certificate) opens the opportunity of successful certificate) shall be prevented. System Data, Information Accredited 4.2.3.4.1.1 exploitation and limits accountability. authentication and functions comprise, for example network Disclosure Test Lab This includes M2M communication authorisation. services (like SSH, SFTP, Web NAAx services), local access via a management console, local usage of operating system and applications.

text: Improper Depending of information sensitivity gNB TS 33.117 / The usage of a system function without Denial of Vendor, 3GPP TS authentication different level of strong authentication 4.2.3.4.1.2 successful authentication on basis of the Service, SECAM 33.117 mechanisms mechanisms are required. Fail to identify Accounts shall user identity and at least one Spoofing identity, Accreditation 3GPP TS the proper correspondence between allow unambiguous authentication attribute (e.g. password, Tampering of Body, 33.511-519 levels of protection and authentication identification of the certificate) shall be prevented. Data, Information Accredited 4.2.3.4.1.2, mechanisms implemented creates the user The various user and machine accounts Disclosure Test Lab 4.2.3.4.2.1 possibility to allow unauthorized entities TS 33.117 / on a system shall be protected from NAAx 4.2.3.4.3. to access unallocated resources 4.2.3.4.2.1 Account misuse. To this end, an authentication protection by at attribute is typically used, which, when least one combined with the user name, enables authentication unambiguous authentication and attribute identification of the authorized user.

text: Predefined/ All predefined or default accounts and/or gNB TS 33.117 / All predefined or default accounts shall Denial of Vendor, 3GPP TS default or default authentication attributes shall 4.2.3.4.2.2 be deleted or disabled. Should this Service, SECAM 33.117 accounts and/or be deleted or disabled Predefined measure not be possible the accounts Spoofing identity, Accreditation 3GPP TS authentication accounts shall be shall be locked for remote login. Tampering of Body, 33.511-519 attributes deleted or disabled Preconfigured authentication attributes Data, Information Accredited 4.2.3.4.2.2 TS 33.117 / shall be changed by automatically forcing Disclosure Test Lab 4.2.3.4.2.3 4.2.3.4.2.3 a user to change it on 1st time login to NAAx Predefined or the system or the vendor provides default instructions on how to manually change it authentication attributes shall be deleted or disabled

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Weak or A password policy shall address the gNB TS 33.117 / Password policy requirements include Denial of Vendor, 3GPP TS missing password structure, password change, 4.2.3.4.3 Password requirements regarding Password Service, SECAM 33.117 password policy hiding password display capabilities, policy complexity, password change, Protection Spoofing identity, Accreditation 3GPP TS consecutive failed login attempts. A against brute force and dictionary Tampering of Body, 33.511-519 week password structure and/or a long attacks, hiding password display Data, Information Accredited 4.2.3.4.3. validity password period could lead to a Disclosure Test Lab successful brute force attack. Password NAAx display is vulnerable to eavesdropping attack. Password policy is a security policy component.

text: Lack of mutual The network product management shall gNB TS 33.117 / The network product management shall Denial of Vendor, 3GPP TS authentication support mutual authentication 4.2.3.4.4.1 support mutual authentication Service, SECAM 33.117 of entities for mechanisms, the mutual authentication Authentication on mechanisms, the mutual authentication Spoofing identity, Accreditation 3GPP TS management mechanism can rely on the protocol Network Product mechanism can rely on the protocol used Tampering of Body, 33.511-519 interfaces used for the interface itself or other Management and for the interface itself or other means. Data, Information Accredited 4.2.3.4.4.1 means Maintenance Disclosure, Test Lab interfaces Operator Error NAAx, Udx

text: Improper The authorisations for accounts and gNB TS 33.117 / The authorisations for accounts and Denial of Vendor, 3GPP TS authorisation applications shall be reduced to the 4.2.3.4.6 applications shall be reduced to the Service, SECAM 33.117 and access minimum required for the tasks they Authorisation and minimum required for the tasks they have Spoofing identity, Accreditation 3GPP TS control policy have to perform. access control to perform. Tampering of Body, 33.511-519 Authorisations to a system shall be Data, Information Accredited 4.2.3.4.6 restricted to a level in which a user can Disclosure, Test Lab only access data and use functions that Operator Error he needs in the course of his work. NAAx, Udx Alongside access to data, execution of applications and components shall also take place with rights that are as low as possible. Applications should not be executed with administrator or system rights.

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Improper session protection mechanisms of gNB Components

text: Improper / The system should have a function that gNB TS 33.117 / 4.2.3.5 The system shall have a function that Denial of Vendor, 3GPP TS missing allows a signed in user to logout at any Protecting sessions allows a signed in user to logout at any Service, SECAM 33.117 functionality for time. All processes under the logged in time. All processes under the logged in Spoofing identity, Accreditation 3GPP TS session user ID should be terminated on log out. user ID shall be terminated on log out. Tampering of Body, 33.511-519 protection A permanently exposed session The network product shall be able to Data, Information Accredited 4.2.3.5. increases the vulnerability of the system continue to operate without interactive Disclosure, Test Lab as an entry point for unauthorized sessions. Operator Error person. OAM user interactive session An OAM user interactive session shall be NAAx, Udx should be terminated automatically after terminated automatically after a specified a specified period of inactivity. It shall be period of inactivity. It shall be possible to possible to configure an inactivity time- configure an inactivity time-out period out period

text: Insufficient or improper monitoring mechanisms of gNB Components

text: lack of security lack of security events logged together gNB TS 33.117 / Security events shall be logged together Denial of Vendor, 3GPP TS event logging with a unique system reference (e.g. 4.2.3.6.1 Security with a unique system reference (e.g. host Service, SECAM 33.117 host name, IP or MAC address) and the event logging name, IP or MAC address) and the exact Spoofing identity, Accreditation 3GPP TS exact time the incident occurred do not time the incident occurred. For each Tampering of Body, 33.511-519 allow a correct and rapid audit in case of security event, the log entry shall include Data, Information Accredited 4.2.3.6.1 security incident occurrence. Security user name and/or timestamp and/or Disclosure, Test Lab restauration is delayed. performed action and/or result and/or Operator Error length of session and/or values NAAx, Udx exceeded and/or value reached. IETF RFC 3871, section 2.11.10 specifies the minimum set of security events.

text: Vulnerabilities in Operating Systems supporting gNB Components

text: Improper / Security event logs should be forwarded gNB TS 33.117 / Log functions should upload securely of Denial of Vendor, 3GPP TS missing or uploaded to a central location or 4.2.3.6.2 Log log files to a central location or to an Service, SECAM 33.117 controls for external systems. Security event log files transfer to external system for the Network Product Spoofing identity, Accreditation 3GPP TS protection of shall be protected in storage and centralized storage that is logging. Secure transport Tampering of Body, 33.511-519 security event transfer states, too. Availability and TS 33.117 / protocols shall be used. Data, Information Accredited 4.2.3.6.2 log files integrity of security event log files could 4.2.3.6.3 Protection The security event log shall be access Disclosure, Test Lab 4.2.3.6.3 conduct to delays, wrong audit results, of security event log controlled (file access rights) so only Operator Error delays in security restauration, threats files privileged users have access to the log NAAx, Udx persistence. files.

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Improper Growing or dynamic content (e.g. log gNB TS 33.117 / Growing or dynamic content (e.g. log Denial of service Vendor, 3GPP TS handling of files, uploads) could influence system 4.2.4.1.1.1 Handling files, uploads) shall not influence system attacks, SECAM 33.117 growing content functions. A file system that reaches its of growing content functions. A file system that reaches its equipment / Accreditation 3GPP TS by file system maximum capacity could stop a system maximum capacity shall not stop a software errors, Body, 33.511-519 from operating properly. system from operating properly. growing dynamic Accredited 4.2.4.1.1.1 Therefore, countermeasures shall be content Test Lab taken such as usage of dedicated NAA5, UD5, FM5 filesystems, separated from main system functions, or quotas, or at least a file system monitoring to ensure that this scenario is avoided.

text: Processing of Processing of ICMPv4 and ICMPv6 gNB TS 33.117 / Processing of ICMPv4 and ICMPv6 Denial of service Vendor, 3GPP TS ICMP packets packets which are not required for 4.2.4.1.1.2 packets which are not required for attacks, SECAM 33.117 not required for operation shall be disabled on the Processing of operation shall be disabled on the equipment / Accreditation 3GPP TS operation network product. In particular, there are ICMPv4 and network product. In particular, there are software errors, Body, 33.511-519 certain types of ICMP4 and ICMPv6 that ICMPv6 packets certain types of ICMP4 and ICMPv6 that misconfigurations Accredited 4.2.4.1.1.2 are not used in most networks, but TS 33.511 / are not used in most networks, but NAA5, UD5, FM5 Test Lab represent a risk. 4.2.4.1.1.2 represent a risk. Permitted, forbidden Processing of and optional ICMP packets are detailed ICMPv4 and in TS 33.117 clause 4.2.4.1.1.2, with the ICMPv6 packets specific additions in TS 33.511: Echo Reply can be sent by default and, in case of remote base station auto deployment, Router Advertisement can be processed

text: Processing of IP IP packets with unnecessary options or gNB TS 33.117 / IP packets with unnecessary options or Denial of Vendor, 3GPP TS packets with extension headers could be used by 4.2.4.1.1.2 extension headers shall not be Service, SECAM 33.117 unnecessary attackers to get unauthorized access to Processing of processed. IP options and extension Spoofing identity, Accreditation 3GPP TS options or system resources. ICMPv4 and headers (e.g. source routing) are only Tampering of Body, 33.511-519 extensions ICMPv6 packets required in exceptional cases. So, all Data, Information Accredited 4.2.4.1.1.3 packets with enabled IP options or Disclosure Test Lab extension headers shall be filtered. NAAx

text: Privilege Authenticated Privilege Escalation gNB TS 33.117 / There shall not be a privilege escalation Privilege Vendor, 3GPP TS Escalation allowed without re-authentication could 4.2.4.1.2.1 method in interactive sessions (CLI or escalation SECAM 33.117 allowed without permit to an authorized user to gain Authenticated GUI) which allows a user to gain NAA3 Accreditation 3GPP TS re- unallocated higher rights to resources, Privilege Escalation administrator/root privileges from another Body, 33.511-519 authentication violating security policy only user account without re-authentication. Accredited 4.2.4.1.2.1 Implementation example: Disable Test Lab insecure privilege escalation methods so that users are required to (re-)login directly into the account with the required permissions.

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Recurrent UIDs Each system account in UNIX shall have gNB TS 33.117 / Each system account in UNIX shall have Authorisation Vendor, 3GPP TS for UNIX System a unique UID, to provide for system 4.2.4.2.2 System a unique UID. The term 'UNIX' includes attacks SECAM 33.117 accounts account accountability account all major derivatives, including Linux. NAA3 Accreditation 3GPP TS identification Body, 33.511-519 Accredited 4.2.4.2.2 Test Lab

text: Vulnerabilities in Web Servers supporting gNB Components

text: Unsecure Https The communication between Web client gNB TS 33.117 / 4.2.5.1 The communication between Web client Spoofing identity, Vendor, 3GPP TS connection to and Web server shall be protected using HTTPS and Web server shall be protected using Tampering of SECAM 33.117 web servers TLS. TLS profile should be defined in TLS. Cipher suites with NULL encryption Data, Information Accreditation 3GPP TS compliance Annex E of TS 33.310, with shall not be supported Disclosure Body, 33.511-519 the following additional requirement: NAA2, NAA3, Accredited 4.2.5.1 cipher suites with NULL encryption shall NAA4, EIH4 Test Lab not be supported

text: Lack of / When logging information lacks gNB TS 33.117 / 4.2.5.2 Access to the webserver shall be logged. Denial of Vendor, 3GPP TS improper completeness, integrity or timeliness it is Webserver logging The web server log shall contain the Service, SECAM 33.117 logging of impossible to detect, analyse and following information: Access timestamp / Spoofing identity, Accreditation 3GPP TS access to the respond to system faults and relevant Source (IP address) / (Optional) Account Tampering of Body, 33.511-519 webserver security events. (if known) / (Optional) Attempted login Data, Information Accredited 4.2.5.2 name (if the associated account does not Disclosure Test Lab exist) / Relevant fields in http request. NAAx The URL should be included whenever possible / Status code of web server response

text: Lack of / Improper session protection gNB TS 33.117 / 4.2.5.3 To protect user sessions the Network Session hijacking Vendor, 3GPP TS improper http mechanisms may lead to session HTTP User Product shall support comprehensive NAA3 SECAM 33.117 user session hijacking, disclosure of confidential sessions session ID and session cookie protection Accreditation 3GPP TS protection information, including authentication mechanisms Body, 33.511-519 attributes Accredited 4.2.5.3 Test Lab

text: Improper The Network Product shall have a gNB TS 33.117 / 4.2.5.4 The Network Product shall validate, filter, Injection, cross- Vendor, 3GPP TS validation of mechanism in place to ensure that web HTTP input escape, and encode user-controllable site scripting SECAM 33.117 HTTP input application inputs are not vulnerable to validation input before it is placed in output that is NAA3 Accreditation 3GPP TS command injection or cross-site scripting used as a web page that is served to Body, 33.511-519 attacks. other users. Accredited 4.2.5.4 Test Lab

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Vulnerabilities of network devices running gNB Components

text: Lack of packet Lack of, or improper mechanisms to filter gNB TS 33.117 / The Network Product shall provide a Denial of service, Vendor, 3GPP TS filtering incoming IP packets on any IP interface 4.2.6.2.1 Packet mechanism to filter incoming IP packets packet flooding SECAM 33.117 functionality according to defined and manageable filtering on any IP interface, as defined in RFC NAA5, FM5 Accreditation 3GPP TS rules leaves the network device 3871 and TS 33.117 clause 4.2.6.2.1 Body, 33.511-519 vulnerable to denial-of-service attacks, Accredited 4.2.6.2.1 service degradation or attack aimed at Test Lab leading the device to an exception state.

text: Lack of If a network device does not have the gNB TS 33.117 / All incoming packets, from other network Malware, denial- Vendor, 3GPP TS robustness capability to detect and drop by 4.2.6.2.2 Interface element, that are manipulated or differing of-service, SECAM 33.117 against incoming packets, from other network robustness the norm shall be detected as invalid and packet flood Accreditation 3GPP TS unexpected element, that are manipulated or requirements be discarded. The process shall not be NAA5, FM5 Body, 33.511-519 input differing the norm, it can lead to an affecting the performance of the network Accredited 4.2.6.2.2 impairment of availability. device. This robustness shall be just as Test Lab effective for a great mass of invalid packets as for individual or a small number of packets.

text: Improper or In the absence of effective GTP-U gNB TS 33.117 / For each message of a GTP-U-based Authorisation Vendor, 3GPP TS absent GTPU filtering mechanisms, the network is 4.2.6.2.4 GTP-U protocol, it shall be possible to check attacks, man-in- SECAM 33.117 Filtering exposed to malformed GTP packets, Filtering whether the sender of this message is the-middle Accreditation 3GPP TS denial of service attacks, and out-of- authorized to send a message pertaining attacks Body, 33.511-519 state GTP messages, and also vectors to this protocol. NAA2, NAA3, Accredited 4.2.6.2.4 such as spoofed IP packets. NAA4 Test Lab

text: Improper hardening of gNB Components

text: Unnecessary or Should the network product run protocol gNB TS 33.117 / 4.3.2.1 The network product shall only run Denial of Vendor, 3GPP TS insecure handlers and services which are not No unnecessary or protocol handlers and services which are Service, SECAM 33.117 services / needed for its operation, or which have insecure services / needed for its operation, and which do Spoofing identity, Accreditation 3GPP TS protocols known security vulnerabilities, they may protocols not have any known security Tampering of Body, 33.511-519 be manipulated to gain unauthorized vulnerabilities. Data, Information Accredited 4.3.2.1 access to the system, impair its Disclosure, Test Lab availability or other forms of Software errors manipulation. NAAx, FMx

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Unrestricted The network product shall restrict the gNB TS 33.117 / 4.3.2.2 The network product shall restrict the Denial of Vendor, 3GPP TS reachability of reachability of services so that they can Restricted reachability of services so that they can Service, SECAM 33.117 services only be reached on interfaces where reachability of only be reached on interfaces where their Spoofing identity, Accreditation 3GPP TS their usage is required. The absence of services usage is required. On interfaces were Tampering of Body, 33.511-519 appropriate mechanisms expose the services are active, the reachability Data, Information Accredited 4.3.2.2 services to risk of exploitation of known should be limited to legitimate Disclosure Test Lab or unknown vulnerabilities by malicious communication peers. This limitation NAAx parties or technical faults. shall be realized on the network product itself (without measures (e.g. firewall) at network side) according to the requirement detailed in clause 4.2.6.2.1 Packet Filtering.

text: Unused Unused software components or parts of gNB TS 33.117 / 4.3.2.3 Unused software components or parts of Denial of Vendor, 3GPP TS software software which are not needed for No unused software software which are not needed for Service, SECAM 33.117 components operation or functionality of the network operation or functionality of the network Spoofing identity, Accreditation 3GPP TS product create an unnecessary attack product shall not be installed or shall be Tampering of Body, 33.511-519 surface. Such unused software deleted after installation. This includes Data, Information Accredited 4.3.2.3 components have a high susceptibility of also parts of a software, which will be Disclosure Test Lab falling outside patching and vulnerability installed as examples but typically not be NAAx management processes and therefore used (e.g. default web pages, example are increasingly exposed to malicious databases, test data). attacks and technical faults.

text: Unused During installation of software and gNB TS 33.117 / 4.3.2.4 During installation of software and Denial of Vendor, 3GPP TS software or hardware functions that are not required No unused hardware often functions will be activated Service, SECAM 33.117 hardware for operation or function of the system functions that are not required for operation or Spoofing identity, Accreditation 3GPP TS functions will be often activated. Such hardware function of the system. If unused Tampering of Body, 33.511-519 and software functions increase the IT functions of software cannot be deleted Data, Information Accredited 4.3.2.4 attack surface and their exposure is or deinstalled individually, such functions Disclosure Test Lab increased by their susceptibility of falling shall be deactivated in the configuration NAAx outside access control policies. of the network product permanently. Also, hardware functions which are not required for operation or function of the system (e.g. unused interfaces) shall be permanently deactivated. Permanently means that they shall not be reactivated again after network product reboot.

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Unsupported Unsupported components incur a high gNB TS 33.117 / 4.3.2.5 The network product shall not contain Denial of Vendor, 3GPP TS components risk of unmitigated vulnerabilities that No unsupported software and hardware components that Service, SECAM 33.117 can be exploited by malicious actors or components are no longer supported by their vendor, Spoofing identity, Accreditation 3GPP TS technical faults. producer or developer, such as Tampering of Body, 33.511-519 components that have reached end-of- Data, Information Accredited 4.3.2.5 life or end-of-support. Excluded are Disclosure, Test Lab components that have a special support Component contract. This contract shall guarantee malfunctions the correction of vulnerabilities over NAAx, FMx components' lifetime.

text: Remote login of Unrestricted remote login for privileged gNB TS 33.117 / 4.3.2.6 Description: Direct login as root or Authorisation Vendor, 3GPP TS privileged users users expose the network element to Remote login equivalent highest privileged user shall attacks, elevation SECAM 33.117 increased risk of unauthorized access restrictions for be limited to the system console only. of privilege Accreditation 3GPP TS and manipulation. privileged users Root user will not be allowed to login to NAAx Body, 33.511-519 the system remotely. Accredited 4.3.2.6 Test Lab

text: Excessive file In the presence of excessive file system gNB TS 33.117 / 4.3.2.7 The system shall be designed to ensure Unauthorised / Vendor, 3GPP TS system authorisation privileges, application and file system that only users that are authorized to erroneous data SECAM 33.117 Authorisation configuration data is exposed to risks of Authorisation modify files, data, directories or file element Accreditation 3GPP TS privileges unauthorised disclosure, tampering, or privileges systems have the necessary privileges to modification / Body, 33.511-519 destruction. do so. deletion Accredited 4.3.2.7 NAA1, NAA2, Test Lab NAA3, UD1, UD2

text: Lack of IP address spoofing involving the use of gNB TS 33.117 / Systems shall not process IP packets if Packet flood Vendor, 3GPP TS protection a trusted IP address can be used by 4.3.3.1.1 IP-Source their source address is not reachable via NAA5 SECAM 33.117 against IP- network intruders to overcome network address spoofing the incoming interface. Accreditation 3GPP TS Source address security measures, such as mitigation Body, 33.511-519 spoofing authentication based on IP addresses. Accredited 4.3.3.1.1 IP address spoofing is most frequently Test Lab used in denial-of-service attacks, where the objective is to flood the target with an overwhelming volume of traffic, and the attacker does not care about receiving responses to the attack packets.

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Unneeded Kernel based network functions not gNB TS 33.117 / Kernel based network functions not Exploitation of Vendor, 3GPP TS kernel network needed for the operation of the network 4.3.3.1.2 Minimized needed for the operation of the network vulnerable kernel SECAM 33.117 functions element offer an unnecessary attack kernel network element shall be deactivated functions Accreditation 3GPP TS surface. Particularly vulnerable services functions NAAx Body, 33.511-519 are: IP Packet Forwarding between Accredited 4.3.3.1.2 different interfaces of the same Test Lab equipment, Proxy ARP (resource exhaustion attacks and man-in-themiddle attacks), Directed broadcast (Smurf, Denial of Service attack), IPv4 Multicast handling (smurf and fraggle attacks), gratuitous ARP messages (ARP Cache Poisoning attack)

text: automatic Automatic launch of removable media gNB TS 33.117 / The network product shall not Malware, Vendor, 3GPP TS launch of provides a potential vector for 4.3.3.1.3 No automatically launch any application bypassing of SECAM 33.117 removable unauthorized or malicious payloads automatic launch of when removable media device such as security controls, Accreditation 3GPP TS media removable media CD-, DVD-, USB-Sticks or USB-Storage running Body, 33.511-519 drive is connected. If the operating unauthorised Accredited 4.3.3.1.3 system supports an automatic launch, it operating system Test Lab shall be deactivated unless it is required NAAx to support availability requirements.

text: No SYN Flood A SYN flood is a form of denial-of- gNB TS 33.117 / The network product shall support a Syn Flood Vendor, 3GPP TS Prevention service attack in which an attacker 4.3.3.1.4 SYN mechanism to prevent Syn Flood attacks attacks SECAM 33.117 sends a succession of SYN requests to Flood Prevention ; (e.g. implement the TCP Syn Cookie NAA5 Accreditation 3GPP TS a target's system in an attempt to RFC 4987 technique in the TCP stack by setting Body, 33.511-519 consume enough server resources to net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies = 1 in the linux Accredited 4.3.3.1.4 make the system unresponsive to sysctl.conf file). This feature shall be Test Lab legitimate traffic enabled by default.

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: No protection Exploiting the behaviour of a buffer gNB TS 33.117 / The system shall support mechanisms Buffer overflow Vendor, 3GPP TS against buffer overflow is a well-known security exploit. 4.3.3.1.5 Protection for buffer overflow protection. attacks SECAM 33.117 overflows By sending in data designed to cause a from buffer Documentation which describes these NAA2, NAA3 Accreditation 3GPP TS buffer overflow, it is possible to write into overflows buffer overflow mechanisms and also Body, 33.511-519 memory areas known to hold executable how to check that they have been Accredited 4.3.3.1.5 code and replace it with malicious code, enabled and/or implemented shall be Test Lab or to selectively overwrite data provided. pertaining to the program's state, therefore causing behaviour that was not intended by the original programmer. Buffers are widespread in operating system (OS) code, so it is possible to make attacks that perform privilege escalation and gain unlimited access to the computer's resources.

text: No/improper In the absence of effective external file gNB TS 33.117 / If normal users are allowed to mount Malware, Vendor, 3GPP TS external file systems mount restrictions, the system 4.3.3.1.6 External external file systems (attached locally or bypassing of SECAM 33.117 system mount is exposed to privilege escalation and file system mount via the network), OS-level restrictions security controls, Accreditation 3GPP TS restrictions excessive access permissions due to restrictions shall be set properly in order to prevent unauthorised Body, 33.511-519 the contents of the mounted file privilege escalation or extended access operating system Accredited 4.3.3.1.6 systems. permissions due to the contents of the NAAx Test Lab mounted file systems.

text: Directory Web servers can be configured to gNB TS 33.117 / Directory listings (indexing) / "Directory Scanning of Vendor, 3GPP TS listings automatically list the contents of 4.3.4.10 No browsing" shall be deactivated. vulnerable SECAM 33.117 directories that do not have an index directory listings resources Accreditation 3GPP TS page present. This can aid an attacker NAA4 Body, 33.511-519 by enabling them to quickly identify the Accredited 4.3.4.10 resources at a given path, and proceed Test Lab directly to analysing and attacking those resources. It particularly increases the exposure of sensitive files within the directory that are not intended to be accessible to users, such as temporary files and crash dumps.

text: Web server The HTTP headers sent by the remote gNB TS 33.117 / The HTTP header shall not include Exploitation of Vendor, 3GPP TS information in web server disclose information that can 4.3.4.11 Web information on the version of the web vulnerable SECAM 33.117 HTTP headers aid an attacker, such as the server server information server and the modules/add-ons used. components Accreditation 3GPP TS version and languages used by the web in HTTP headers NAAx Body, 33.511-519 server. Accredited 4.3.4.11 Test Lab

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Web server The error page sent by the web server gNB TS 33.117 / User-defined error pages shall not Exploitation of Vendor, 3GPP TS information in discloses information that can aid an 4.3.4.12 Web include version information about the vulnerable SECAM 33.117 error pages attacker, such as the server version, server information web server and the modules/add-ons components Accreditation 3GPP TS modules/add-ons used or information in error pages used. Error messages shall not include NAAx Body, 33.511-519 revealing inner workings such as internal internal information such as internal Accredited 4.3.4.12 server names, error codes, etc. server names, error codes, etc. Default Test Lab error pages of the web server shall be replaced by error pages defined by the vendor.

text: Unused file Unused File type- or script-mappings gNB TS 33.117 / File type- or script-mappings that are not Code injection Vendor, 3GPP TS type- or script- can be used in attacks based on delivery 4.3.4.13 Minimized required shall be deleted, e.g. php, NAAx SECAM 33.117 mappings of malicious payloads, such as code- file type mappings phtml, js, sh, csh, bin, exe, pl, vbe, vbs Accreditation 3GPP TS injection attacks. Body, 33.511-519 Accredited 4.3.4.13 Test Lab

text: Unrestricted Improperly restricted file access rights gNB TS 33.117 / Restrictive access rights shall be Direct access to Vendor, 3GPP TS access to files may lead to unauthorized delivery of 4.3.4.14 Restricted assigned to all files which are directly or restricted data SECAM 33.117 files which are not meant to be file access indirectly (e.g. via links or in virtual from public Accreditation 3GPP TS delivered, and to path traversal attacks. directories) in the web server's document domain Body, 33.511-519 directory. In particular, the web server NAA4 Accredited 4.3.4.14 shall not be able to access files which Test Lab are not meant to be delivered.

text: Execution rights Improper restriction of execute rights gNB TS 33.117 / If CGI or other scripting technology is Code injection Vendor, 3GPP TS outside may lead to Remote Command 4.3.4.15 Execute used, only the CGI/Scripting directory is NAAx SECAM 33.117 CGI/Scripting Execution by unauthorized delivery of rights exclusive for configured with execute rights. Other Accreditation 3GPP TS directory malicious payload through various CGI/Scripting directories used or meant for web Body, 33.511-519 vectors. directory content do not have execute rights Accredited 4.3.4.15 Test Lab

text: System If the web server runs under privileged gNB TS 33.117 /4.3.4.2 No web server processes shall run with Elevation of Vendor, 3GPP TS privileges for accounts, web server compromise No system system privileges. This is best achieved if privileges SECAM 33.117 web server caused by malicious action or technical privileges for web the web server runs under an account NAA2, NAA3, Accreditation 3GPP TS processes fault has an increased chance to server that has minimum privileges. If a process NAA4 Body, 33.511-519 compromise the host operating system's is started by a user with system Accredited 4.3.4.2 integrity and availability. privileges, execution shall be transferred Test Lab to a different user without system privileges after the start.

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Active and Unused http methods provide an gNB TS 33.117 / 4.3.4.3 HTTP methods that are not required shall Abuse of unused Vendor, 3GPP TS unused HTTP unnecessary attack surface that can No unused HTTP be deactivated. Standard requests to vulnerable SECAM 33.117 methods lead to security compromise of the methods web servers only use GET, HEAD, and methods Accreditation 3GPP TS system POST. If other methods are required, NAA2, NAA3, Body, 33.511-519 they shall not introduce security leaks NAA4 Accredited 4.3.4.3 such as TRACK or TRACE. Test Lab

text: Unused web Unused server add-ons provide an gNB TS 33.117 / 4.3.4.4 All optional add-ons and components of Code injection Vendor, 3GPP TS server add-ons unnecessary attack surface that can No unused add-ons the web server shall be deactivated if NAA2, NAA3, SECAM 33.117 lead to security compromise of the they are not required. In particular, CGI NAA4 Accreditation 3GPP TS system or other scripting components, Server Body, 33.511-519 Side Includes (SSI), and WebDAV shall Accredited 4.3.4.4 be deactivated if they are not required. Test Lab

text: Access to CGI and other server-side scripting gNB TS 33.117 / 4.3.4.5 If CGI (Common Gateway Interface) or Code injection Vendor, 3GPP TS compiler, specifications provide opportunities to No compiler, other scripting technology is used, the NAA2, NAA3, SECAM 33.117 interpreter, or read files, acquire shell access, and interpreter, or shell CGI directory - or other corresponding NAA4 Accreditation 3GPP TS shell via CGI or corrupt file systems on server machines via CGI or other scripting directory - shall not include Body, 33.511-519 other server- and their attached hosts. Means of server-side scripting compilers or interpreters (e.g. PERL Accredited 4.3.4.5 side scripting gaining access include: exploiting interpreter, PHP interpreter/compiler, Tcl Test Lab assumptions of the script, exploiting interpreter/compiler or operating system weaknesses in the server environment, shells). and exploiting weaknesses in other programs and system calls. Presence in the scripting directory of compilers, interpreters or operating system shells renders the system particularly vulnerable.

text: Common In upload is permitted in the gNB TS 33.117 / 4.3.4.6 If CGI or other scripting technology is Code injection Vendor, 3GPP TS directory for CGI/Scripting, the system is vulnerable No CGI or other used, the associated CGI/script directory NAA2, NAA3, SECAM 33.117 uploads and to code injection / shell upload attacks. scripting for uploads shall not be used for uploads. NAA4 Accreditation 3GPP TS CGI/Scripting Body, 33.511-519 Accredited 4.3.4.6 Test Lab

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Execution of SSIs are directives present on Web gNB TS 33.117 / 4.3.4.7 If Server Side Includes (SSI) is active, Code injection Vendor, 3GPP TS system applications used to feed an HTML page No execution of the execution of system commands shall NAA2, NAA3, SECAM 33.117 commands with with dynamic contents. The Server-Side system commands be deactivated. NAA4 Accreditation 3GPP TS server side Includes attack allows the exploitation of with SSI Body, 33.511-519 includes (SSI) a web application by injecting scripts in Accredited 4.3.4.7 HTML pages or executing arbitrary Test Lab codes remotely. It can be exploited through manipulation of SSI in use in the application or force its use through user input fields.

text: Excessive / Improper setting of access rights for web gNB TS 33.117 / 4.3.4.8 Access rights for web server Manipulation of Vendor, 3GPP TS improper server configuration files may lead to Access rights for configuration files shall only be granted server SECAM 33.117 access rights unauthorized disclosure or modification web server to the owner of the web server process configuration Accreditation 3GPP TS for web server of configuration information. configuration or to a user with system privileges. files Body, 33.511-519 configuration Implementation example: Delete "read" NAA2, NAA3 Accredited 4.3.4.8 files and "write" access rights for "others." Test Lab Only grant "write" access to the user who configures the web server

text: Presence of Presence of default content may gNB TS 33.117 / 4.3.4.9 Default content (examples, help files, Abuse of Vendor, 3GPP TS default content disclose information on the web server No default content documentation, aliases) that is provided vulnerable SECAM 33.117 version, add-ons and configuration or with the standard installation of the web content, collection Accreditation 3GPP TS information/file structure, and thus server shall be removed. of system Body, 33.511-519 facilitate information gathering for a information Accredited 4.3.4.9 malicious party. Also, default content (NAA2, NAA3, Test Lab may include known vulnerabilities (such NAA4) as the case of IIS Default Page).

text: Inadequate Unsegregated traffic belonging to gNB TS 33.117 / 4.3.5.1 The network product shall support Lateral movement, Vendor, 3GPP TS traffic separation different planes (data, control, Traffic Separation physical or logical separation of traffic elevation of SECAM 33.117 of traffic management) increases the risk that RFC 3871 / 2.3.5. belonging to different network domains. privileges, Accreditation 3GPP TS belonging to unauthorized individuals will be able to Support Separate For example, O&M traffic and control eavesdropping Body, 33.511-519 different network observe management traffic and/or Management Plane plane traffic belong to different network NAA2, NAA3, Accredited 4.3.5.1 domains compromise the device. IP Interfaces domains. See RFC 3871 [3] for further NAA4, EIH4 Test Lab information.

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: F ANNEX: DETAILED VULNERABILITIES IN NETWORK FUNCTION VIRTUALIZATION – MANO

text: Associated Name of Security Security Requirements /Description of Threats (Threat Description Assets Stakeholder Source Ref Vulnerability Controls security controls Taxonomy) Category

text: Service-Based Vulnerabilities of NFV components

text: Improper The transmitter of a message should NFV MANO Message Detection of any changes, deletions, Abuse and MNO ETSI GS message and provide means to allow for the integrity checks insertions or replays. modification of NFV-SEC 014 session determination whether any modification, sessions and / 6 integrity deletion, insertion, or replay has messages checks on occurred. The receiver should have (NAA2, NAA5) internal corresponding verification mechanisms. interfaces Lack of or improper such measures facilitate abuse and modification of sessions and messages.

text: Improper Lack of appropriate confidentiality NFV MANO, Use of secure Provide confidentiality of internal transfers Data leakage MNO ETSI GS confidentiality protection of data transferred over any VNF communication using an encrypted mode of well-known (NAA4, EIH4) NFV-SEC 014 protection of internal interface of MANO. protocols network protocols. / 5

text: data transferred over internal interfaces to MANO

text: Improper API TLS not implemented for API Os-Ma-nfvo Secure API The confidentiality and data integrity of all Unauthorized MNO ETSI GS Access communication, or implementation messages shall be ensured by using TLS on access (NAAx) NFV-SEC 022 implementation shortcomings such as lack of TLS-based each interface. / 4 authentication: client and authorisation The client and authorisation servers shall servers are not mutually authenticated or mutually authenticate. client does not authenticate the resource The client shall authenticate the resource server. server.

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Use of legacy Vulnerabilities of a PNF could be used Control Enforce security The 5GC should be configured so that NFs Attackers using MNO 3GPP TR PNF as a starting point for an attack against plane policies to can only communicate with NFs which they insecure 33.848 / 5.17 VNFs, potentially taking advantage of protect mixed are specifically authorised to communicate interfaces as legacy security used by PNFs and not PNF-VNF with. injection points provided by the virtualisation layer. deployments and for reverse attack. (NAAx)

text: Improper If an internal interface allows any actions NFV MANO Identity Successful identification and verification of Abuse of VIM or MNO ETSI GS verification of from received data without successfully validation the identity and location of the transmitting VNFM functions NFV-SEC 014 identity and identifying and verifying the identity and party by unauthorized / 6 location of location of the transmitting party, it parties (NAAx) transmitting enables masquerading of the party on Orchestrator and other forms of privilege internal escalation that in turn can lead to abuse interfaces of VIM or VNFM functions by unauthorized parties.

text: Improper protection of Data and Information of NFV components

text: Inability to Poor monitoring of stored images to VIM VIM shall The VIM shall monitor stored images to Unauthorized MNO ETSI GS provide proof determine if any unauthorized monitor stored determine if any unauthorized modification, modification, NFV-SEC 014 of integrity of modification, deletion or insertion has images deletion or insertion has occurred deletion or / 5.2-c.1.1.4 the data stores occurred renders VIM unable to ensure insertion of the used for VM integrity of VM images and of data data stores images transfers. used for VM images (NAAx)

text: Lack of An attacker could read data in transit if Control Encrypt control All control plane data in transit between An attacker MNO 3GPP TR encryption of control plane data in transit between plane plane data hosts should be sent over an encrypted and could read data 33.848 / 5.15 control plane hosts is not sent over an encrypted and authenticated channel using non-proprietary in transit. data authenticated channel. protocols. (NAA4, EIH4)

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Improper hardening of NFV components

text: Improper patch Once identified, vulnerabilities in VNF System patching Regular and effective patch management Malware MNO ETSI GS management software can be fixed through security program Denial of NFV-SEC 001 patches whereas hardware service / 7.2.2 vulnerabilities are much more costly to Unauthorized fix. Security patches may require a access (NAAx, reboot and could cause service FMx) disruption, particularly if many commodity servers have to be rebooted over a short period. Security patches are not always in time. Failure to apply necessary patches leave the systems open to exploitation of known vulnerabilities.

text: Mis- Complexity brought by virtualisation VNF Hardening Careful planning, detailed documentation, Human error MNO ETSI GS configuration increases probability for errors and standards and configuration review, testing before (UDx) NFV-SEC 001 misconfiguration remaining undetected. procedures production, periodic security configuration / 7.1 Accidental misconfigurations or failure to checks follow security standards and practices can cause service problems directly, or leave open unintended vulnerabilities, which will cause service problems if exploited.

text: No mechanism The MANO system should allow NFV MANO Implementing Attribute-based access control and attribute- Unknown MNO ETSI GS to enforce geo- instantiation of MANO components and mechanisms to based or multi-factor authentication - where geographic NFV-SEC 014 restrictions managed entities, the NFVIs, only at allow geo- location is one of the attributes or jurisdiction (e.g. / 6 explicit geographic locations. Failure to restrictions behavioural factors for legal and do so may leave the system vulnerable policy to legal and licensing risks. compliance) (LEG)

text: Time The VNFs must synchronize with trusted VNF The system The VNFs shall synchronize with trusted time Time MNO 3GPP TR Manipulation time servers. Failure to do so, leaves the should provide a servers. manipulation 33.848 / 5.20 system vulnerable to an attack that protected and attacks. (NAAx) manipulates the network timing source trusted network or VNF clock, thus causing the network time source to be compromised.

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Virtualisation platform vulnerabilities

text: Inadequate Administrative models that enable an Virtualised Hardening of Granting access based on the "lowest Human error MNO ETSI GS access admin/root/super user account type has Resources virtualized privilege" principle (NAAx) NFV-SEC 003 privileges in full access to system resources allow environments / 4.4.2.1.2 virtualized visibility and modification of environments cryptographic keys, passwords in memory, configuration files, intellectual property and other resources within the NFV. The hypervisor is fully aware of the current state of each guest OS it controls. Hypervisor introspection can enable the ability to view, inject, and/or modify operational state information associated with NFV through direct or indirect methods. Access to state information can result in the ability to arbitrarily read and/or write the contents of memory, storage, key storage and other NFV operational aspects.

text: Improper key The host system shall provide NSM Core HBRT The host system shall implement a key Manipulation of MNO, Vendor ETSI GS management cryptographically separated secure hardware management system which includes key VNFs (NAAx) NFV-SEC 012 system environments to different applications. In requirements generation, key storage, key deletion and / 5.1.2 the absence of these conditions, the cryptographic processing. virtualised environment can be abused to compromise sensitive functions from less protected ones.

text: Lack of a A Hardware-Based Root of Trust NFVI Core HBRT The host system shall implement a Manipulation of MNO, Vendor ETSI GS proper (HBRT) should act as Initial Root of hardware Hardware-Based Root of Trust (HBRT) VNFs (NAAx) NFV-SEC 012 mechanism for Trust to ensure a safe environment for requirements based on core hardware requirements / 5.1.1 ensuring a running sensitive virtualised Hardware- components.

text: Based Root of Trust (HBRT)

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Software The risks from software vulnerabilities VNF Vulnerability Regular and effective vulnerability Malware MNO ETSI GS Vulnerabilities could be higher with NFV than with assessment management program Denial of NFV-SEC 001 in NFV traditional bespoke appliances because service / 7.2.2 implementation VNFs are expected to run on commodity Unauthorized software and hardware and because access (NAAx, NFV is built on cloud technology with UDx, FMx) standard security level. Virtualisation technology will need to be re-assessed before it can be considered suitable for protecting critical network infrastructure.

text: Vulnerable mechanisms for authentication and authorisation of NFV components

text: Improper VNF Improper procedures for signing and VNF Cryptographic Verification of VNF Package during Manipulation of MNO ETSI GS on-boarding management of associated Manager signature of VNF instantiation; Handling of confidentiality VNFs (NAA2) NFV-SEC 021 cryptographic key may enable Package protected of VNF Package during / 5.1 manipulation and integrity compromise instantiation of VNF Packages.

text: Improper VNF Lack of or improper mechanisms to Ve-Vnfm-em Signature of Signing of VNF Package; Handling of Manipulation of MNO ETSI GS instantiation prevent instantiation of VNF Packages Ve-Vnfm-vnf VNF Package confidentiality protected for VNF Package VNFs (NAA2) NFV-SEC 021 unless their signature is verified may during on-boarding / 5.2 enable manipulation and integrity compromise of VN Functions

text: Improper Unauthenticated access to system NFV-MANO, System The usage of a system function without Denial of Vendor 3GPP TS authentication functions of NFV Management and VSF, ISF, functions shall proper authentication on basis of the user Service, 33.117 policy Orchestration PSF, not be used identity and at least one authentication Spoofing 4.2.3.4.1.1 without proper attribute (e.g. password, certificate) shall be identity, The usage of a system function without authentication prevented. System functions comprise, for Tampering of successful authentication on basis of the and example network services (like SSH, SFTP, Data, user identity and at least one authorisation. Web services), local access via a Information authentication attribute (e.g. password, management console, local usage of Disclosure certificate) opens the opportunity of operating system and applications. This (NAAx) exploitation and limits accountability. requirement shall also be applied to accounts This includes M2M communication. that are only used for communication between systems.

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Insecure / Failure to protect accounts by at least NFV-MANO, Secure The usage of a system function without Denial of Vendor 3GPP TS insufficient one authentication attribute, active VSF, ISF, procedures for successful authentication on basis of the Service, 33.117 authentication predefined authentication attributes. PSF, authentication user identity and at least one authentication Spoofing 4.2.3.4.1.2, attributes and attribute (e.g. password, certificate) shall be identity, 4.2.3.4.2.1 Depending on information sensitivity, authorisation prevented. Tampering of 4.2.3.4.3. different level of strong authentication The various user and machine accounts on a Data, mechanisms are required. Fail to identify system shall be protected from misuse. To Information the proper correspondence between this end, an authentication attribute is Disclosure levels of protection and authentication typically used, which, when combined with (NAAx, Udx) mechanisms implemented creates the the user name, enables unambiguous possibility to allow unauthorized entities authentication and identification of the to access unallocated resources. authorized user. All predefined or default accounts and/or or default authentication attributes shall be deleted or disabled.

text: Insecure A password policy shall address the NFV-MANO, Password policy Password policy requirements include Denial of Vendor 3GPP TS password password structure, password change, VSF, ISF, requirements regarding Password Service, 33.117 policy hiding password display capabilities, PSF, complexity, password change, Protection Spoofing 4.2.3.4.3. consecutive failed login attempts. A against brute force and dictionary attacks, identity, week password structure and/or a long hiding password display Tampering of validity password period could lead to a Data, successful brute force attack. Failure to Information block consecutive failed login attempts Disclosure may lead to password guess.

text: Insecure The network product management shall NFV-MANO, Protect Protect devices used for administration. Unauthorised Vendor 3GPP TS authentication support mutual authentication VSF, ISF, management Reduce the exposure of management access at 33.117 mechanisms to mechanisms, the mutual authentication PSF, interfaces interfaces. system, theft of 4.2.3.4.4.1 management / mechanism can rely on the protocol Ensuring there's a trail of breadcrumbs. data maintenance used for the interface itself or other interfaces means.

text: Insecure The authorisations for accounts and NFV-MANO, Authorisation The authorisations for accounts and Denial of Vendor 3GPP TS authorisation applications shall be reduced to the VSF, ISF, and access applications shall be reduced to the minimum Service, 33.117, and access minimum required for the tasks they PSF, control required for the tasks they have to perform. Spoofing 4.2.3.4.6 control have to perform. Authorisations to a system shall be restricted identity, mechanisms to a level in which a user can only access Tampering of data and use functions that he needs in the Data, course of his work. Information Alongside access to data, execution of Disclosure, applications and components shall also take Operator Error place with rights that are as low as possible. Applications should not be executed with administrator or system rights.

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Insufficient or improper monitoring mechanisms of NFV

text: Insufficient / Lack of security events logged together NFV-MANO, Security event Security events shall be logged together with Denial of Vendor 3GPP TS inadequate with a unique system reference (e.g. NFVI logging a unique system reference (e.g. host name, Service, 33.117, logging of host name, IP or MAC address) and the IP or MAC address) and the exact time the Spoofing 4.2.3.6.1 security events exact time the incident occurred do not incident occurred. For each security event, identity, for MANO and allow a correct and rapid audit in case of the log entry shall include user name and/or Tampering of NFVI security incident occurrence. timestamp and/or performed action and/or Data, result and/or length of session and/or values Information exceeded and/or value reached. Disclosure, IETF RFC 3871, section 2.11.10 specifies Operator Error the minimum set of security events.

text: Logs not Security event logs should be forwarded NFV-MANO, Transfer security Log functions should upload securely of log Denial of Vendor 3GPP TS transferred to or uploaded to a central location or NFVI logs to a files to a central location or to an external Service, 33.117, centralized external systems. Security event log files centralized system for the Network Product that is Spoofing 4.2.3.6.2 storage shall be protected in storage and storage logging. Secure transport protocols shall be identity, 4.2.3.6.3 transfer states, too. used. Tampering of Data, Information Disclosure, Operator Error

text: Improper Availability and integrity of security event NFV-MANO, Protection of The security event log shall be access Denial of Vendor 3GPP TS protection of log files could conduct to delays, wrong NFVI security event controlled (file access rights) so only Service, 33.117, security event audit results, delays in security log files privileged users have access to the log files. Spoofing log files restauration, threats persistence. identity, Tampering of Data, Information Disclosure, Operator Error

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: G ANNEX: DETAILED VULNERABILITIES IN SOFTWARE DEFINED NETWORKS

text: Associated Security Name of Security Requirements /Description of Threats (Threat Description Assets Stakeholder Source Ref Vulnerability Controls security controls Taxonomy) Category

text: Vulnerabilities in implementation of SDN functionalities

text: Improper Lack of functionality in the SDN control SDN Prevention of flow It is required to provide a functionality in Flow rules MNO, Vendor Rec. ITU-T mechanisms layer to support preventing flow rules Controller rules confliction the SDN control layer to support confliction, Fake X.1038 for preventing confliction in order to avoid mandatory preventing flow rules confliction in order to flow rule (10/2016) / flow rules network policies from being bypassed. avoid mandatory network policies from insertion (NAA2, R15 confliction being bypassed. UD2, FM2)

text: SBA/SBI vulnerabilities of SDN components

text: Insecure APIs Like any software, APIs can be Northbound Secure APIs Network providers should consider Interception, MNO ENISA Threat compromised and data can be Interface, deploying encryption and authentication Eavesdrop, Landscape intercepted. The 10 most known APIs Southbound techniques to all SDN APIs. Availability and Good vulnerabilities are those presented by Interface, Attacks, TCP Practice OWASP foundation in the "OWASP API Eastbound- Attack (NAAx) Guide for Security Project". API exploitation may Westbound Software relate to all the different types of APIs that Interface Defined may be found in an SDN: Northbound API Networks/5G / exploitation, Southbound API exploitation, 8.1 Eastbound-Westbound API exploitation.

text: Improper Inadequate security of configuration data SDN Data integrity Implement security mechanisms for Unauthorized MNO Rec. ITU-T mechanisms (including security policies and QoS Controller integrity protection of configuration data access, Denial X.1038 to protect policies) while being transported from stored in the SDN controller and of service, (10/2016) / Rintegrity and SDN applications to the SDN controller configuration interfaces. eavesdropping, 18, R-22 confidentiality over the application-control interface. Holistic Support for Security policies Manipulation of attacks. (NAAx, configuration EIH4)

text: data

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Associated Security Name of Security Requirements /Description of Threats (Threat Description Assets Stakeholder Source Ref Vulnerability security controls Taxonomy) Category Controls

text: Vulnerable mechanisms for authentication and authorisation of SDN components

text: Improper Improper authentication and/or SDN Authentication and It is required to provide a functionality in Unauthorized MNO Rec. ITU-T authentication authorisation mechanism for SDN Controller authorisation the SDN resource layer to authenticate access, Denial X.1038 and controller or defective implementations of the SDN controller. of service, (10/2016) / Rauthorisation these mechanisms, It is required to provide a functionality in eavesdropping, 10, R-11, Rthe SDN control layer to authenticate the repudiation 12, R-13, R- SDN switch. attacks, 14 information disclosure (NAAx, EIH4)

text: Improper hardening of SDN components

text: Multiple An attacker may exploit vulnerabilities of SDN Operating system Disable unused services; close unused Spoofing MNO Rec. ITU-T vulnerabilities the operating system such as default Controller hardening ports, activate firewall, update software (NAAx) X.1038 in operating passwords, back-door accounts, open package, monitor integrity of file system. (10/2016) / Rsystem ports, unprotected services, unsecure 24 protocols.

text: Software SDN controllers operate as a software SDN Vulnerability Regular and effective vulnerability Authentication MNO Rec. ITU-T vulnerabilities platform. Vulnerabilities of general Controller assessment management program and X.1038 software become vulnerabilities for the authorisation (10/2016) / R- SDN controller. A software vulnerability is attacks, denial 25 a flaw, defect in software construction, of service, weakness or even an error, which could eavesdropping, be exploited by attackers to alter the repudiation normal behaviour of the SDN network or attacks, to reconfigure the whole network to make information further attacks. disclosure (NAAx, FMx)

text: Improper Improper mechanisms to manage SDN Cryptographic It is required to provide a functionality in Spoofing, MNO Rec. ITU-T cryptographic cryptographic key, including use of weak Controller controls the SDN controller layer to perform Repudiation, X.1038 key algorithms, undermine trust in integrity key/certificate management. Information (10/2016) management and confidentiality protection mechanisms Disclosure /R19 mechanisms (NAAx)

text: Lack of, or Lack of DoS mechanisms lays all SDN SDN DoS protection It is required to provide a functionality in DoS attacks MNO, Vendor Rec. ITU-T improper DoS applications and resources potentially Controller mechanisms the SDN control layer to support anti-DoS (NAA5) X.1038 protection uncontrollable in case of an attack protection. (10/2016) mechanisms /R16

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Insufficient or improper monitoring mechanisms of SDN components

text: Improper log Improper monitoring may lead to attacks SDN Log and audit It is required to provide a functionality in Undetected MNO Rec. ITU-T and audit or failures going undetected and therefore Controller management the SDN control layer to support log and nefarious X.1038 mechanisms not mitigated audit. activities (10/2016) /R- Undetected 17 malware Undetected failures of malfunctions (NAAx, FMx)

text: Lack of, or Improper monitoring and management of SDN Hardware It is recommended to provide a Hardware MNO Rec. ITU-T improper hardware resources may lead to the Controller monitoring functionality in the SDN control layer to failure (FMx) X.1038 hardware operator not being able to prevent or to mechanisms support hardware management to (10/2016) monitoring mitigate hardware failures in a timely discover hardware failure automatically /R26 mechanisms manner. Hardware failures may in turn and recover from such a failure as soon compromise network security or bring as possible. down the SDN network.

text: Virtualisation vulnerabilities of relevant SDN components

text: Vulnerabilities SDN offers a high level of abstraction to SDN Application Sandboxing, application-Kernel isolation, Eavesdropping, Developers, ENISA Threat in the programmers. When applications are Application, Isolation application permission policy enforcement Interception, Administrators, Landscape virtualization developed caution is required to protect SDN Hijacking System and Good layer the network operation against application Resources (NAAx, EIH4) configuration Practice misbehaviour and bugs. Guide for Software Defined Networks/5G / 8.1

text: Physical and environmental vulnerabilities of relevant SDN components

text: Data centre Many SDN systems are deployed within SDN Traffic encryption Encrypt the interconnection traffic Eavesdropping, Administrators, ENISA Threat vulnerabilities data centres. Security vulnerabilities of Infrastructure between Data Centres. Interception, System Landscape data centres should be considered. Data layer Hijacking configuration and Good servers are using Data Centre (NAAx, EIH4) Practice Interconnect (DCI) protocols, which may Guide for lack authentication and encryption to Software secure the packet contents. Defined Networks/5G / 5.3

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: H ANNEX: DETAILED VULNERABILITIES IN MULTI-ACCESS EDGE COMPUTING

text: Associated Security Threats Name of Security Requirements /Description of Description Assets (Threat Stakeholder Source Ref Vulnerability Controls security controls Category Taxonomy)

text: Vulnerabilities in implementation of MEC security functionalities

text: Improper The mobile edge system shall allow the Application Collection of The mobile edge system shall allow the "Unauthorised MNO, Edge ETSI GS MEC mechanisms for collection of charging-related information, Data Traffic, charging related collection of charging-related information, access to data, Computing 002 V2.1.1 collection, log it in a secure way and make it MEC Host information log it in a secure way and make it Fraud Service (2018-10) / secure storage available for further processing. available for further processing. Provider 8.3. and NAA2" [Charging-01]

text: transmission of chargingrelated information

text: Improper The mobile edge system shall comply Multi-edge Compliance with The mobile edge system shall comply Inability to MNO, Edge 8.2. mechanisms for with regulatory requirements for lawful computing lawful interception with regulatory requirements for lawful respond to Computing [Lawful-01] Lawful interception. requirements interception. lawful Service ETSI GS MEC Interception at interception Provider 002 V2.1.1 Edge level mandates (2018-10) LEG

text: SBA/SBI vulnerabilities of MEC components

text: Improper CAPIF main purpose is to have a unified 3GPP SA6 Secure APIs The confidentiality and data integrity of all Unauthorized MNO, Edge ETSI White implementation north bound API framework across interfaces, messages shall be ensured by using TLS access, Computing Paper #36 of APIs several 3GPP functions. Like any ETSI MEC on each interface. Interception, Service Harmonizing software, APIs can be compromised and interfaces The client and authorisation servers shall Eavesdrop, Provider standards for your data can be stolen. Since APIs mutually authenticate. Availability edge serve as conduits that reveal applications The client shall authenticate the resource Attacks, TCP computing for third-party integration, they are server. Attack susceptible to attacks. NAAx, EIH4

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Associated Security Threats Name of Security Requirements /Description of Description Assets (Threat Stakeholder Source Ref Vulnerability security controls Category Controls Taxonomy)

text: Improper traffic MEC system is able to flexibly choose Application 5GC control plane Obtaining the mandatory input Service MNO, Edge ETSI GR path update for UPF(s) and the corresponding DN Data Traffic solution parameters and use high level message unavailability Computing MEC 031 mobility according to MEC operators' and/or MEC flow to influence traffic path. FM5 Service V2.0.20 support application providers' operation policy or Provider (2020-08) / unstable physical conditions. If traffic 5.1 path is not updated appropriately, user context may not be transferred to the application instance.

text: Improper The mobile edge platform shall only MEC Information access The mobile edge platform shall only Unauthorised MNO, Edge ETSI GS MEC access control provide a mobile edge application with platform, controls provide a mobile edge application with access to data, Computing 002 V2.1.1 to information the information for which the application MEC the information for which the application malicious Service (2018-10) / is authorized. Application, is authorized. Authentication of access to modification of Provider 8.1. EAS the MEC services has to be performed configuration [Security-02] according to CAPIF data, elevation of privileges NAAx

text: Virtualisation vulnerabilities of relevant MEC components

text: Vulnerable Security risks and concerns around Virtual Best Practices for The design should take into account the Unauthorised MNO, Edge Cloud virtualisation / virtual IT systems can be broadly infrastr., Mitigating Risks in appropriate logical segregation of access, Computing Security container / classified into three types: 1. Virtual Virtualized instances that contain sensitive data. eavesdropping, Service Alliance - Best micro-service Architectural: The layer of abstraction Infrastr. Environments During implementation, extensive modification of Provider practices for environment between physical hardware and manager assessment of the vulnerability of the security mitigating virtualized systems running IT services is (VIM) virtualization components is mandatory. parameters, risks in a potential target for attack. A VM or The underlying virtualization platform lateral virtualized group of VMs connected to the same should be hardened using vendor- movements, environments network can be the target of attacks from provided guidelines and/or third-party denial of other VMs on the network. 2. Hypervisor tools. In a virtualized environment, robust services software: The most important software in key management is essential to access NAAx, FMx a virtual IT system is the hypervisor. Any control and proof of ownership for both security vulnerability in the hypervisor data and keys. Role-based access and associated infrastructure and policies should be enforced to enable management software / tools puts VMs at segregation of duties and data. Proper risk. 3. Configuration: Given the ease of VM encryption is required to significantly cloning and copying images in a virtual reduce the risk associated with user environment, a new infrastructure can be access to physical servers and storage deployed very easily. This introduces containing sensitive data. configuration drift. As a result, controlling and accounting for rapidly deployed environments becomes a critical task.

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Improper hardening of MEC Components

text: Lack of / Due to the distributed nature of edge Customer Response to Although specific measures required Denial of MNO, Edge ISO/IEC improper DDoS computing deployments, appropriate facing DoS/DDoS attacks depend upon the type of DoS/DDoS Service Computing 27011 - ITU Protection DDoS mechanisms may be impractical to service attacks, telecommunications NAA5 Service x.1205 / deploy. Alternative protection (CFS) portal organizations Provider TEL.13.1.6 mechanisms need to be implemented in should take account of the following order to deter attacks. countermeasures: a) filtering of packets heading for the target site under attacks; b) restriction of communication port used for DoS/DDoS attacks; c) reduction or suspension of operation of target telecommunications facilities.

text: MEC Application Vulnerabilities

text: Vulnerabilities Vulnerabilities in MEC Applications may MEC Security Testing of A regular security testing program should Exploitation of Edge ISO/IEC in MEC be used as an entry point for attacks applications, MEC Applications be implemented to provide assurance application Computing 27001 / applications aiming at exploiting the virtualisation Edge that application vulnerabilities are security Application A.18.2.3 environments, unauthorised access to Application identified and mitigated in a timely vulnerabilities Provider data, elevation of privileges or denial of Server manner. service. (EAS)

text: Vulnerabilities of the MEC virtualization platform

text: Improper Physical and logical resources should not Virtualisation Resource isolation Network segmentation, resource Unauthorized MNO, Edge NIS Directive isolation of be shared with components which have infra- separation, data segregation. access, Computing resources not the same criticality. This constraint structure, Interception, Service requires the right level of isolation around MEC host, Eavesdrop Provider the service to prevent regulation pollution MEC NAAx to its own components and Platform infrastructures

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Physical and environmental vulnerabilities of relevant MEC components

text: Improper Edge computing facilities are, by their MEC Host Improper physical To protect physically isolated operating Destruction of MNO, Edge ISO/IEC Physical and nature, seated in locations distributed security of areas (e.g., mobile base stations) in edge computing Computing 27011 - ITU environmental geographically. Normally, the first choice equipment in which telecommunications facilities are facilities, Service x.1205 / security of edge will be communications shelters already remote locations located for providing telecom business, unauthorised Provider TEL.11.1.8, computing operated by MNO. While the following controls should be access at TEL 11.3 facilities communications shelters have physical considered: system level as security controls in place, these are a) earthquake-proofing; an entry point to calibrated to risks associated with b) automatic fire control equipment; all hosted communication equipment. An additional c) monitoring by a remote office for the resources, theft risk assessment is needed to assess purpose of detecting facility failures, of data on local suitability in the context of additional risks power failures, fire, humidity and storage. incurred by presence of computing temperature and so on; Vandalism, facilities. d) physically secure perimeters, including Sabotage an automatic alert function. Natural Disaster PAx, DIS

text: Improper Mobile-edge computing have to be MEC Host Security Incident Event logs recording user activities, Denial of MNO, Edge ISO/IEC security integrated in the network-wide Security and event exceptions, faults and information Service, Computing 27011 - ITU monitoring of Incident and Monitoring System, but with monitoring security events should be produced, kept Spoofing Service x.1205 / edge computing additional considerations: development of and regularly reviewed. identity, Provider A.12.4.1 facilities use-case specific alert rules, integration Additional considerations: development of Tampering of and correlation of data at all levels use-case specific alert rules, integration Data, (network, application), integration and and correlation of data at all levels Information correlation with service provider -level (network, application), integration and Disclosure, monitoring mechanisms. Failure to do so correlation with service provider -level Unauthorised may leave advanced or sustained threats monitoring mechanisms. access, undetected, as well as technical failures Elevation of or malfunctions of local resources. privileges. Technical failures NAAx, FMx

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Insecure The mobile edge system shall provide a MEC Host Secure The mobile edge system shall provide a Unauthorised MNO, Edge ETSI GS MEC service secure environment for running services environment secure environment for running services access, Computing 002 V2.1.1 environment for the following actors: the user, the for the following actors: the user, the eavesdropping, Service (2018-10) / network operator, the third-party network operator, the third-party modification of Provider 8.1. application provider, the application application provider, the application security [Security-01] developer, the content provider, and the developer, the content provider, and the parameters, platform vendor. platform vendor. lateral movements, denial of services PAx, DIS, NAAx, FMx

text: Vulnerable mechanisms for authentication and authorisation of MEC components

text: Improper The usage of a system function without LCM Proxy, System functions The usage of a system function without Denial of MNO, Edge 3GPP TS authentication successful authentication on basis of the MEC shall not be used proper authentication on basis of the user Service, Computing 33.117 policy, such as user identity and at least one Orchestrator without proper identity and at least one authentication Spoofing Service 4.2.3.4.1.1 unauthenticated authentication attribute (e.g. password, authentication and attribute (e.g. password, certificate) shall identity, Provider access to certificate) opens the opportunity of authorisation. be prevented. System functions Tampering of system exploitation and limits accountability. This comprise, for example network services Data, functions, use includes M2M communication. (like SSH, SFTP, Web services), local Information of generic access via a management console, local Disclosure accounts usage of operating system and applications. This requirement shall also be applied to accounts that are only used for communication between systems.

text: Insecure / Depending on information sensitivity LCM Proxy, Secure procedures The usage of a system function without Denial of MNO, Edge 3GPP TS insufficient different level of strong authentication MEC for authentication successful authentication on basis of the Service, Computing 33.117 authentication mechanisms are required. Fail to identify Orchestrator and authorisation user identity and at least one Spoofing Service 4.2.3.4.1.2, attributes, such the proper correspondence between authentication attribute (e.g. password, identity, Provider 4.2.3.4.2.1 as failure to levels of protection and authentication certificate) shall be prevented. Tampering of 4.2.3.4.3. protect mechanisms implemented creates the The various user and machine accounts Data, accounts by at possibility to allow unauthorized entities on a system shall be protected from Information least one to access unallocated resources. misuse. To this end, an authentication Disclosure authentication attribute is typically used, which, when attribute, active combined with the user name, enables predefined unambiguous authentication and authentication identification of the authorized user. attributes. All predefined or default accounts and/or or default authentication attributes shall be deleted or disabled.

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Weak or A password policy shall address the LCM Proxy, Password policy Password policy requirements include Denial of MNO, Edge 3GPP TS missing password structure, password change, MEC requirements regarding Password Service, Computing 33.117 password hiding password display capabilities, Orchestrator complexity, password change, Protection Spoofing Service 4.2.3.4.3. policy consecutive failed login attempts. A week against brute force and dictionary attacks, identity, Provider password structure and/or a long validity hiding password display Tampering of password period could lead to a Data, successful brute force attack. Failure to Information block consecutive failed login attempts Disclosure may lead to password guess.

text: Insecure The network product management shall LCM Proxy, Protect Protect devices used for administration. Unauthorised MNO, Edge 3GPP TS authentication support mutual authentication MEC management Reduce the exposure of management access at Computing 33.117 mechanisms to mechanisms, the mutual authentication Orchestrator interfaces interfaces. system, theft of Service 4.2.3.4.4.1 management / mechanism can rely on the protocol used Ensuring there's a trail of breadcrumbs. data Provider maintenance for the interface itself or other means.

text: interfaces

text: Insecure The authorisations for accounts and LCM Proxy, Authorisation and The authorisations for accounts and Denial of MNO, Edge 3GPP TS authorisation applications shall be reduced to the MEC access control applications shall be reduced to the Service, Computing 33.117 and access minimum required for the tasks they have Orchestrator minimum required for the tasks they have Spoofing Service 4.2.3.4.6 control to perform. to perform. identity, Provider mechanisms Authorisations to a system shall be Tampering of restricted to a level in which a user can Data, only access data and use functions that Information he needs in the course of his work. Disclosure, Alongside access to data, execution of Operator Error applications and components shall also take place with rights that are as low as possible. Applications should not be executed with administrator or system rights.

text: Insufficient or improper monitoring mechanisms of MEC components

text: Insufficient / Lack of security events logged together MEC Security event Security events shall be logged together Denial of MNO, Edge 3GPP TS inadequate with a unique system reference (e.g. host platform, logging with a unique system reference (e.g. host Service, Computing 33.117 logging of name, IP or MAC address) and the exact MEC Host, name, IP or MAC address) and the exact Spoofing Service 4.2.3.6.1 security events time the incident occurred do not allow a MEC time the incident occurred. For each identity, Provider for MEC App correct and rapid audit in case of security Application, security event, the log entry shall include Tampering of and MEC host incident occurrence. VIM user name and/or timestamp and/or Data, performed action and/or result and/or Information length of session and/or values exceeded Disclosure, and/or value reached. Operator Error IETF RFC 3871, section 2.11.10 specifies the minimum set of security events.

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Logs not Security event logs should be forwarded MEC Transfer security Log functions should upload securely of Denial of MNO, Edge 3GPP TS transferred to or uploaded to a central location or platform, logs to a log files to a central location or to an Service, Computing 33.117 centralized external systems. Security event log files MEC Host, centralized storage external system for the Network Product Spoofing Service 4.2.3.6.2 storage shall be protected in storage and transfer MEC that is logging. Secure transport protocols identity, Provider 4.2.3.6.3 states, too. Application, shall be used. Tampering of VIM Data, Information Disclosure, Operator Error

text: Improper Availability and integrity of security event MEC Protection of The security event log shall be access Denial of MNO, Edge 3GPP TS protection of log files could conduct to delays, wrong platform, security event log controlled (file access rights) so only Service, Computing 33.117 security event audit results, delays in security MEC Host, files privileged users have access to the log Spoofing Service 4.2.3.6.2 log files restauration, threats persistence. MEC files. identity, Provider 4.2.3.6.3 Application, Tampering of VIM Data, Information Disclosure, Operator Error

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: I ANNEX: DETAILED VULNERABILITIES IN THE PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

text: Associated Security Threats Name of Security Requirements /Description Description Assets (Threat Stake-holder Source Ref Vulnerability Controls of security controls Category Taxonomy)

text: Vulnerabilities of Data centre and telecommunication facilities

text: Improper physical Communication centres should provide Physical Securing Physical security of communication Destruction of MNO ISO/IEC security of a full set of physical and environmental asset, communication centres, where telecommunications assets, 27011 - ITU communication controls aimed to assure access Cloud Data centres facilities such as switching facilities for unauthorised x.1205 / centres control, monitoring, continuity of Centre providing telecommunications business access, theft of TEL.11.1.7, operations and protection against are housed, should be designed, data on local TEL 11.3 environmental disasters. Failure to do developed and applied. storage, so may lead to unauthorised access, vandalism, destruction of assets and impairment of sabotage Natural operations. Disasters

text: (PAx, DIS)

text: Improper physical Telecom equipment rooms should Physical Securing Physical security of equipment room, Destruction of MNO ISO/IEC security of provide a risk-calibrated set of physical asset, Light telecommunications where telecommunications facilities are assets, 27011 - ITU telecommunications and environmental controls aimed to Data equipment room set for providing telecommunications unauthorised x.1205 / equipment room assure access control, monitoring, Centre business, should be designed, access, theft of TEL.11.1.8, continuity of operations and protection developed and applied. data on local TEL 11.3 against environmental disasters. Failure storage, to do so may lead to unauthorised vandalism, access, destruction of assets and sabotage Natural impairment of operations. Disasters

text: (PAx, DIS)

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Associated Security Threats Name of Security Requirements /Description Description Assets (Threat Stake-holder Source Ref Vulnerability of security controls Category Controls Taxonomy)

text: Improper physical Remote equipment facilities should Physical Securing physically For physically isolated operating areas, Destruction of MNO ISO/IEC security of provide a set of physical and asset, Light isolated operation where telecommunications facilities are assets, 27011 - ITU physically isolated environmental controls aimed to assure Data areas located for providing telecom business, unauthorised x.1205 / operation areas access control, monitoring, continuity of Centre physical security controls should be access, theft of TEL.11.1.9, operations and protection against designed, developed and implemented. data on local TEL 11.3 environmental disasters, taking into storage, account its remoteness and lack of vandalism, human presence. Failure to do so may sabotage Natural lead to unauthorised access, Disasters destruction of assets and impairment of (PAx, DIS) operations.

text: Improper physical Equipment located in third party Physical Protection of When telecommunications Destruction of MNO, Partner ISO/IEC security equipment facilities rooms should be protected asset, Light equipment sited in organizations install equipment outside assets, 27011 - ITU sited in other using a risk-calibrated set of physical Data other carrier's of their own premises, the equipment unauthorised x.1205 / carrier's or and environmental controls aimed to Centre premises should be sited in a protected area so access, theft of TEL.11.1.8, partner's premises assure access control, monitoring, that any risks from environmental data on local TEL 11.3.1 continuity of operations and protection threats or dangers and from the storage, against environmental disasters. Failure possibility of unauthorized access are vandalism, to do so may lead to unauthorised reduced. sabotage Natural access, destruction of assets and Disasters impairment of operations. (PAx, DIS)

text: Improper protection Lack of a power supply continuity Physical Continuity of power Power supply facilities in the isolated Unavailability of MNO, Vendor ISO/IEC to Power Outages strategy that includes multiple power asset supplies area such as mobile base stations resources 27011 / supplies to avoid a single point of should preferably provide an 11.2.2 supply failure. uninterruptible power supply with capacity for all loading and capable of (OUT) withstanding primary power supply failures for the duration of likely outages. If that is impossible, a mechanism to provide uninterruptible power to critical equipment should be installed. Batteries may need to be augmented with a private electric generator, especially in isolated areas.

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Improper protection Environmental conditions, such as Physical Equipment siting Equipment should be sited or protected Destruction of MNO, Partner ISO/IEC against temperature and humidity, should be asset and protection to reduce the risks from environmental assets, natural 27011 / environmental monitored for conditions, which could threats and hazards, and opportunities disasters 11.2.1 disasters adversely affect the operation of for unauthorized access. information processing facilities. If the systems of several organizations are (FM5, DIS) sited in the same data centre as telecommunications facilities, the telecommunications organization should implement appropriate measures to protect customers' information stored in their systems.

text: Improper capacity Lack of capacity for mission critical Physical Capacity The use of resources should be Unavailability of MNO ISO/IEC planning telecommunication systems and asset management monitored, tuned and projections made services 27011 / facilities. of future capacity requirements to 12.1.3 ensure the required system performance. (OUT)

text: Improper Improper maintenance of equipment in Physical Maintenance Equipment should be maintained in Destruction of MNO ISO/IEC maintenance the data centre can lead to failures. asset program accordance with the supplier’s assets, 27011 / recommended service intervals and unavailability of 12.1.4 specifications. Only authorized services maintenance personnel should carry out repairs and service equipment. (UD4, OUT)

text: Improper The lack of monitoring of the hardware Physical Monitoring program Develop a program to monitor critical Destruction of MNO ISO/IEC monitoring of parameters means that the preventive asset hardware resources assets, 27011 / hardware alerts given by the equipment are not unavailability of 12.1.4 parameters included in the operative maintenance. services Thus, preventive maintenance is not done in time and defects can occur, creating incidents and making (UD4, OUT) equipment unavailable. The cost of corrective maintenance is much higher than the cost of preventive maintenance

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Hardware vulnerabilities

text: Firmware Firmware could be hacked and Hardware Secure firmware The firmware must be secured by a Firmware Vendor vulnerabilities embedded with malware. Firmware cryptographic signature (hash) in order malware producers usually do not design their to be able to detect infiltration. Update (NAAx) firmware with security in mind. firmware periodically. Buy hardware Firmware malware will exploit this lack with built-in protections against of security by attaching their code to the malicious firmware. firmware’s code.

text: Side-channel A side-channel vulnerability bypasses a Hardware TEMPEST-resistant Shielding of devices from EMR is Unauthorised Vendor vulnerabilities computer’s account permissions, standards achieved by a number of methods. The access at virtualization boundaries and protected most sophisticated devices use system, theft of memory regions and exposes sensitive advanced micro-components that have data device information. Timing information, been designed from scratch to minimize power consumption, electromagnetic Tempest emanations. Generally, leaks or even sound can provide an shielding involves encompassing the (PAx) extra source of information, which can device in a Faraday cage that does not be exploited. Notable side-channel permit stray emanations, along with vulnerabilities include: Spectre / special modifications to the power Meltdown, Foreshadow, TLBleed, source. Tempest shielding also involves PortSmash, NetSpectre. such issues as the design of a room and placement of equipment within it, to ensure that no information can escape.

text: Hardware Backdoor A hardware backdoor might easily be Hardware Firmware upgrade Hardware backdoor might be removed Recovered keys Vendor installed through re-flashing BIOS. A by replacing the hardware or re-flashing could be used hardware backdoor typically has full BIOS, or firmware for net devices. to compromise access to the device it runs on. The the operating backdoors may be directly implemented system and as hardware Trojans in the integrated encrypted data. circuit. (NAAx)

text: Semiconductor Adding impurities to silicon-based semi- Hardware Product testing Purchase and use of tested and Rogue designer Vendor Doping conductors change or control their certified hardware equipment. /developer / electrical properties. It is possible to admin 'dope' transistors of a chip to change function behaviour. This was done successfully to change the random (NAAx) number generator of Ivy Bridge Intel processors.

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Unprotected Management interfaces are written in Hardware Protect Protect devices used for administration. Unauthorised MNO, Vendor management software, and like all software, can management Reduce the exposure of management access at interfaces and contain vulnerabilities. interfaces interfaces. system, theft of consoles Ensuring there is a trail of breadcrumbs. data

text: (NAA4, EIH4)

text: TPM-FAIL TPM-FAIL vulnerabilities allow Hardware Monitor hardware Buy only tested and certified hardware. Recovered keys Vendor vulnerabilities attackers to steal cryptographic keys vulnerabilities Replace vulnerable hardware could be used protected inside of Trusted Platform immediately. to compromise Modules (TPMs). the operating system and encrypted data. (NAA4, EIH4)

text: Cabling vulnerabilities

text: Unprotected cables Fibres routed between pieces of Cables Compliance with Raceway / conduit, is one of the easiest Destruction of MNO TIA-569-E equipment without proper protection are cable standards ways to protect any cable, fibre optic assets, susceptible to damage, which can included. These hollow pieces of plastic unauthorised critically affect network reliability. The act like a protective outer shell. access, fibre cable management system should vandalism, therefore ensure that every fibre is sabotage (UD4, protected from physical damage. OUT)

text: Unprotected Lack of protection of junction boxes / Cables Secure junction Optical fibre junction boxes / splice Destruction, MNO TIA-569-E junction boxes splice closures. Improper cable routing boxes closures shall be accessible to unauthorised also causes increased congestion in maintenance personnel and access, the termination panel and the maintenance vehicles. A closure should vandalism, cableways, increasing the possibility of be located away from high traffic or sabotage bend radius violations and long-term conditions that could cause damage to (UD4, OUT) failure. the closure or injury to personnel.

text: Vulnerabilities related to virtualisation technologies

text: Improper protection Management interfaces are written in Virtualisation Secure Reducing the exposure of management Improper MNO, Cloud of access to software, and like all software, may assets management interfaces. protection of Security management contain vulnerabilities. Avoiding interfaces access to Alliance interfaces exposure of management interfaces management can reduce attack surface. interfaces

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Vulnerable A Hardware-Based Root of Trust Virtualisation Core HBRT The host system shall implement a Hardware MNO, Vendor NA mechanisms for (HBRT) should act as Initial Root of assets hardware Hardware-Based Root of Trust (HBRT) manipulation Hardware-Based Trust to ensure a safe environment for requirements based on core hardware requirements Root of Trust running sensitive virtualised (HBRT) components.

text: Hypervisor A hypervisor-based attack is an exploit Virtualisation Hardening Secure access can become Hypervisor- MNO, Vendor NA vulnerabilities in which an intruder takes advantage of assets hypervisor compromised due to VM sprawl and based attacks conduct to cross- vulnerabilities in the program used to other issues. Ensure that authentication contamination of allow multiple operating systems to procedures, identity management, and shared resources share a single hardware processor. A logging are enforced compromised hypervisor can allow the hacker to attack each virtual machine on a virtual host.

text: Improper Denial of service attacks exploit many Virtualisation VM traffic The ability to monitor VM backbone Denial of MNO, Vendor NA availability hypervisor platforms and range from assets monitoring network traffic is critical. Conventional service arrangements for flooding a network with traffic to methods will not detect VM traffic hardware sophisticated leveraging of a host’s own because it is controlled by internal soft infrastructure resources. The availability of botnets switches. However, hypervisors have continues to make it easier for attackers effective monitoring tools that should be to carry out campaigns against specific enabled and tested. servers and applications with the goal of derailing the target’s online services.

text: Shared resource VM guest OS may escapes from its VM Virtualisation VM segregation In addition to normal isolation, VM image MNO, Vendor NA contamination encapsulation to interact directly with assets strengthen VM security through attacks, VMthe hypervisor. This gives the attacker functional segregation. based attack access to all VMs and, if guest privileges are high enough, the host machine as well. Although few if any instances are known, experts consider VM escape to be the most serious threat to VM security.

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Vulnerability to Radio Jamming Attacks

text: Vulnerability to As any wireless cellular networks, 5G Base Implement Anti- Jam-resistance designs. Eavesdropping, Vendor NA radio jamming networks are built upon open sharing in stations Jamming Use hardware-based real-time Interception, attacks which the communication medium is Technologies encryption and decryption. Hijacking, three space making them prone to Denial of interference. This weakness can be service, used by some adversary nodes to information cause intentional interference and disclosure hinder legitimate user’s communication over specific wireless channels. 5G improves resilience against jamming (EIH4) attacks over the 4G LTE but remains vulnerable to customised attacks. Jamming attacks are a special concern for mission-critical applications.

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: J ANNEX: DETAILED VULNERABILITIES IN IMPLEMENTATION OPTIONS

text: Vulnerabilities of legacy technologies

text: Inadequate Should the Access Stratum (AS) over- UE, eNB, Integrity protection User data and signalling data integrity, Tampering of MNO 3GPP 33.401 integrity the-air User Plane traffic not be MME of AS User Plane 3GPP 33.401 / 5.1.4 Data, Information / 5.1.4 protection of adequately protected by Integrity Traffic Disclosure over-the-air Protection security algorithms, a User Plane scenario is possible where a customer’s NAAx, EIH4 traffic message and/or communication flow could be intercepted in the middle between the UE and the server. An adversary could then manipulate the customer’s message and/or communication flow between the UE and the server.

text: Exposure of Exposure of IMSI may occur due to clear UE, eNB, Encryption of Security Aspects of IMS Emergency Tampering of MNO 3GPP 33.401 international text transmission of IMSI during MME authentication Session Handling 3GPP 33.401 / 15 Data, Information / 15 mobile Authentication Procedures, or by means procedures Disclosure Authentication and key agreement3GPP 3GPP 33.401 subscriber of insecure IMS Emergency Session identities (IMSI) Handling 33.401 / 6.1 NAAx, EIH4 / 6.1

text: Roaming vulnerabilities

text: SS7 Extensive research of SS7 and Diameter LTE Visiting Compensating Compensating controls are detailed in the Tampering of MNO, Signalling Vulnerabilities vulnerabilities is available in the ENISA - PLMN controls referred report Data, Information Roaming Security in Signalling Security in Telecom Disclosure partners Telecom SS7/Diameter/5G,” Report, https:// SS7/Diameter NAAx, EIH4 /5G / Section www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/signal 3.3 ling-security-in-telecom-ss7-diameter- 5g/at_download/fullReport.

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Diameter Extensive research of SS7 and Diameter LTE Visiting Compensating Compensating controls are detailed in the Tampering of MNO, Signalling vulnerabilities vulnerabilities is available in the ENISA - PLMN controls referred report Data, Information Roaming Security in Signalling Security in Telecom Disclosure partners Telecom SS7/Diameter/5G,” Report, https:// SS7/Diameter NAAx, EIH4 /5G / Section www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/signal 3.3 ling-security-in-telecom-ss7-diameter- 5g/at_download/fullReport.

text: VoLTE Vulnerability to ReVOLTE attack: LTE Visiting Increase bearer Using different radio bearer identities Tampering of MNO, See reference vulnerabilities PLMN identities; derive mitigates the threat of keystream reuse, as Data, Information Roaming Adding a PDCP entity for the VoLTE new key with an a separate input parameter changes the Disclosure partners data-bearer in the same radio intra-cell handover; output keystream for the subsequent call. connection resets packet counts fora mandatory media However, the radio bearer identity is only NAAx, EIH4 second time, which introduces the encryption and defined as a 5-bit field, which means that keystream reuse for a subsequent call integrity protection incrementing it only works for 32 new along with reusing the same bearer 96 bearers. identity An inter-cell handover allows transferring a phone from one cell to another while the phone stays connected. Using an intracell handover as mitigation works, as the handover procedure has a built-in key reuse avoidance.

text: A successful REVOLTE attack requires that no additional media encryption is active. Even though the adversary can attack and decrypt the radio layer encryption, such additional encryption via SRTP prevents access to any voice data

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Improper implementation of updated security functions

text: Vulnerabilities Improper or not updated configuration MME MME security Relevant security requirements include: Tampering Data, MNO, 3GPP TS in MME and implementation of MME to comply functionalities and Information Vendor 33.401 implementation with updated security requirements as configurations as - User data and signalling data Disclosure, Denial v.16.3.0 / eNB confidentiality and integrity defined by Release 16 versions of defined by 3GPP of Service NAAx, / 5.1, 5.3, 6, 7, applicable 3GPP requirements updated - Integrity-, confidentiality- and replay- EIH4 8.1, 9,11, protection of control plane data over S1specification 14.1, 14.3, 15 MME and X2-C interfaces - Compliant Security Procedures between UE and EPC / EPS - Secure key derivation and management requirements - NAS Integrity mechanisms - Network Domain Control Plane protection - Secure IMS Emergency Session Handling

text: Vulnerabilities Improper or not updated configuration eNB User-to-network User-to-network security requirements Tampering Data, MNO, 3GPP TS in evolved and implementation of eNB to comply security; include: Information Vendor 33.401 Node B (eNB) with updated security requirements as Disclosure, Denial v.16.3.0 / eNB Security visibility - User identity and device confidentiality implementation defined by Release 16 versions of of Service NAAx, / 5.1, 5.2, 5.3 applicable 3GPP requirements and configurability; - Entity authentication EIH4 - User data and signalling data Security confidentiality requirements for User data and signalling data integrity eNB Security requirements for eNB include:

text: - Requirements for eNB setup and configuration - Requirements for key management inside eNB - Requirements for handling User plane data for the eNB - Requirements for handling Control plane data for the eNB - Requirements for secure environment of the eNB

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Vulnerabilities in the technical baseline of EPC+ functions

text: Improper Inadequate security measures for EPC+ 3GPP TS 33.117 / EPC+ components should be secured on Elevation of MNO, 3GPP TS protection of protecting sensitive data, such as: functions 4.2.3.2 Protecting a similar level to 5G Core components. Privilege, Vendor 33.117, 116, Data and data and Detailed description of security Information 216 / 4.2.3.2. - System functions revealing Information of information requirements in the technical baseline is Disclosure, EPC+ confidential data presented in the corresponding 5G Core Tampering - Improper protection of data and components detailed vulnerabilities section. information in storage NAA2, NAA3, - Lack of or improper cryptographic NAA4 protection of data in transfer - No traceability of access to personal data

text: Improper Inadequate security measures for EPC+ 3GPP TS 33.117 / EPC+ components should be secured on Denial of Service, MNO, 3GPP TS protection of protecting availability and integrity, such functions 4.2.3.3 Protecting a similar level to 5G Core components. Spoofing identity, Vendor 33.117, 116, availability and as: availability and Detailed description of security Tampering of 216 / 4.2.3.3. integrity of integrity requirements in the technical baseline is Data, Information - Failure to address overload situation EPC+ presented in the corresponding 5G Core Disclosure components - Boot from unauthorized memory detailed vulnerabilities section. devices NAAx - Improper handling of unexpected input - Insufficient assurance of software package integrity

text: Vulnerable Inadequate mechanisms for EPC+ 3GPP TS 33.117 / EPC+ components should be secured on Denial of Service, MNO, 3GPP TS mechanisms authentication and authorisation, such functions 4.2.3.4 a similar level to 5G Core components. Spoofing identity, Vendor 33.117, 116, for as: Authentication and Detailed description of security Tampering of 216 / 4.2.3.4. authentication authorisation requirements in the technical baseline is Data, Information and - Unauthenticated access to system presented in the corresponding 5G Core Disclosure functions authorisation detailed vulnerabilities section. of EPC+ - Improper authentication mechanisms NAAx - Predefined/ default accounts and/or

text: components

text: authentication attributes - Weak or missing password policy - Lack of mutual authentication of entities for management interfaces - Improper authorisation and access control policy

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Improper The system shall have a function that EPC+ 3GPP TS 33.117 / EPC+ components should be secured on Denial of Service, MNO, 3GPP TS session allows a signed in user to logout at any functions 4.2.3.5 Protecting a similar level to 5G Core components. Spoofing identity, Vendor 33.117, 116, protection time. All processes under the logged in sessions Detailed description of security Tampering of 216 / 4.2.3.5. mechanisms of user ID shall be terminated on log out. A requirements in the technical baseline is Data, Information EPC+ permanent exposed session increases presented in the corresponding 5G Core Disclosure, components the exposure of the system as an entry detailed vulnerabilities section. Operator Error point for unauthorized person. OAM user interactive session shall be NAAx, Udx" terminated automatically after a specified period of inactivity.

text: Insufficient or Lack of security events logged together EPC+ 3GPP TS 33.117 / EPC+ components should be secured on Denial of Service, MNO, 3GPP TS improper with a unique system reference (e.g. functions 4.2.3.6 Logging a similar level to 5G Core components. Spoofing identity, Vendor 33.117, 116, monitoring host name, IP or MAC address) and the Detailed description of security Tampering of 216 / 4.2.3.6. mechanisms of exact time the incident occurred hinder a requirements in the technical baseline is Data, Information EPC+ correct and rapid audit in case of presented in the corresponding 5G Core Disclosure, components security incident occurrence. Security detailed vulnerabilities section. Operator Error restauration is delayed. NAAx, Udx

text: Vulnerabilities Inadequate or missing security EPC+ 3GPP TS 33.117 / EPC+ components should be secured on Denial of Service, MNO, 3GPP TS in Operating measures at O.S. level, such as: functions 4.2.4. Operating a similar level to 5G Core components. Spoofing identity, Vendor 33.117, 116, Systems Systems Detailed description of security Tampering of 216 / 4.2.4. - Improper / missing controls for supporting requirements in the technical baseline is Data, Information EPC+ protection of security event log files presented in the corresponding 5G Core Disclosure, - Improper handling of growing content components detailed vulnerabilities section. Operator Error, by file system equipment / - Processing of ICMP packets not software errors, required for operation growing dynamic - Processing of IP packets with content r unnecessary options or extensions NAAx, Udx, FMx - Privilege Escalation allowed without re-authentication - Recurrent UIDs for UNIX System accounts

text: Vulnerabilities Inadequate or missing measures to EPC+ 3GPP TS 33.117 / EPC+ components should be secured on Spoofing identity, MNO, 3GPP TS in Web Servers secure web servers, such as: functions 4.2.5. Web Servers a similar level to 5G Core components. Tampering of Vendor 33.117, 116, supporting Detailed description of security Data, Information 216 / 4.2.5. - Unsecure Https connection to web EPC+ requirements in the technical baseline is Disclosure, Denial components servers presented in the corresponding 5G Core of Service, - Lack of / improper logging of access to detailed vulnerabilities section. the webserver Session hijacking - Lack of / improper http user session Injection, crossprotection Improper validation of HTTP input site scripting, - NAAx, EIH4

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Vulnerabilities Inadequate or missing security in EPC+ 3GPP TS 33.117 / EPC+ components should be secured on Denial of service, MNO, 3GPP TS of network network devices, such as: functions 4.2.6. Network a similar level to 5G Core components. packet flooding, Vendor 33.117, 116,

text: devices Devices Detailed description of security malware, 216 / 4.2.6. running EPC+ - Lack of packet filtering functionality requirements in the technical baseline is authorisation

text: - Lack of robustness against components presented in the corresponding 5G Core attacks, man-inunexpected input detailed vulnerabilities section. the-middle attacks - Improper or absent GTP-C Filtering NAAx, FM5 - Improper or absent GTPU Filtering

text: Improper Failure to implement hardening baseline EPC+ 3GPP TS 33.117 / EPC+ components should be secured on Denial of Service, MNO, 3GPP TS

text: hardening of controls, such as: functions 4.3. Security a similar level to 5G Core components. Spoofing identity, Vendor 33.117, 116, EPC+ requirements Detailed description of security Tampering of Data, 216 / 4.3 - Unnecessary or insecure services / components related to requirements in the technical baseline is Information protocols hardening presented in the corresponding 5G Core Disclosure, - Unrestricted reachability of services detailed vulnerabilities section. Component - Unused software components malfunctions,

text: - Unused software or hardware Authorisation functions attacks, elevation of - Unsupported components privilege, - Remote login of privileged users Unauthorised /

text: - Excessive Filesystem Authorisation erroneous data privileges element - Lack of protection against IP-Source modification / address spoofing deletion, Packet - Unneeded kernel network functions flood, Exploitation - automatic launch of removable media of vulnerable kernel

text: - No SYN Flood Prevention functions, malware, - No protection against buffer overflows bypassing of

text: - No/improper external file system security controls, mount restrictions running - Directory listings unauthorised - Web server information in HTTP operating system,

text: headers Syn Flood attacks, - Web server information in error pages Buffer overflow

text: - Unused file type- or script-mappings attacks, Exploitation - Unrestricted access to files of vulnerable

text: - Execution rights outside CGI/Scripting components, Code directory injection, Elevation - System privileges for web server of privileges, Abuse processes of unused - Active and unused HTTP methods vulnerable methods - Unused web server addons

text: - Access to compiler, interpreter, or NAAx, UDx,FMx

text: shell via CGI or other server-side scripting - Common directory for uploads and

text: CGI/Scripting

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: - Execution of system commands with server side includes (SSI) - Excessive / improper access rights for web server configuration files - Presence of default content - Inadequate traffic separation of traffic belonging to different network domains - Code execution or inclusion of external resources by JSON parsers - JSON Parser not robust

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: K ANNEX: DETAILED VULNERABILITIES IN MNO PROCESSES

text: Associated Threats Name of Security Security Requirements /Description of Description Assets (Threat Stakeholder Source Ref Vulnerability Controls security controls Category Taxonomy)

text: Improper Resource Capability Delivery Processes

text: Improper The Map & Analyse Resource 5G system Map & Implement sound processes to define the Design errors; MNO eTOM 20 / processes to Requirements processes define the architecture Analyse detailed resource infrastructure requirements network 1.5.2.1 map and detailed resource infrastructure Operational Resources to support the service capabilities required by complexity; analyse requirements and the associated processes Requirements new technological arrangements in the context new resource performance requirements. The high for end-to-end of 5G. technology; requirements complexity of the 5G system demands 5G network lack of well-structured analysis of such lifecycle using Such requirements should be based on competences detailed analysis of new resource requirements. Failure to do so may lead as a reference (NAAx, EIH4, to inability to deliver on planned the applicable requirements and should include detailed Pax, UDx, performance requirements – current and operational and security parameters. requirements, FMx, OUT, such as 3GPP forecast. DIS, LEG)

text: 33.501 and

text: 23.501 and corporate / service-level security

text: requirements.

text: Failure to adapt The Enable Resource Support & Resource Enable Operator examines the network product; the Faults or MNO, eTOM 20 / resource Operations processes manage the support and Resource compliance reports and the test laboratories vulnerabilities Vendor, 1.5.2.5 support and design of any improvements or changes operations Support & accreditation published by the SECAM in equipment Accreditation operations required to the operational support processes Operations - Accreditation Body and decides if the results FMx, OUT Body processes to support the new eTOM process are sufficient according to its internal policies capabilities and infrastructure brought by type the new technology. Improper functioning of these processes leads to operational support shortfalls which impair the ability to achieve, preserve or restore operational and security attributes.

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Inability to Processes must be in place to identify Resource Capture Sound analysis to identify specific or imminent Network MNO eTOM 20 / capture specific or imminent resource capacity, capability Resource resource capacity, resource performance complexity; 1.5.2.2 resource resource performance and/or resource delivery Capability and/or resource operational support shortfalls. new/untested capability operational support shortfalls. These processes Shortfalls Special attention needs to be given to technology; shortfalls processes must be adapted to the new process - foreseen impact to connected systems, such new/untested technological and operational challenges eTOM process as business support, billing, customer business of the 5G System. Failure to do so may type interfaces and common infrastructure, and models; lack lead to failure to foresee otherwise adequate mechanisms have to be enabled for of preventable operational and security monitoring Tolerance (Survivability, Disruption competences incidents triggered by resource failure or Tolerance, Traffic Tolerance) (UDx, FMx) limitations.

text: Improper Resource capabilities design processes Resource Design Sound management of resource infrastructure Network MNO eTOM 20 / Resource must ensure a sound integration capability Resource management to ensure that requirements of complexity; 1.5.2.4 Capabilities between the existing legacy resource delivery Capabilities the migration projects include relevant new/untested design infrastructure and the new resource processes process - standards and best practices as well as technology; infrastructure. Care must be given that eTOM process security functionalities and controls. new/untested resource analysis references relevant type business standards and best practices as well as models; lack security functionalities and controls. of Failure to do so expose the system to competences degradation of operational and security (UDx, FMx) attributes.

text: Improper Adequate processes must be in place to Resource Manage Implement sound processes to manage the Exploitation of MNO eTOM 20 / management of manage the provision, implementation, capability Resource provision, implementation, commissioning and 5G networks 1.5.2.6 Resource commissioning and roll-out of the new delivery Capability roll-out of the new or enhanced resource triggered by Capability resource capabilities and their processes Delivery capability and associated operational support improper Delivery associated operational support process - processes, aligned with the relevant eTOM management processes. Improper management and eTOM process reference and industry best practices. and coco-ordination of the delivery of individual type ordination of resource infrastructure components lead Such processes should include management the delivery of of suppliers/partners responsible for the to inability to deliver the overall resource individual capability and therefore inability to resource delivery, installation, and resource construction, and may include audits on deliver the planned operational and infrastructure security parameters operators and on implementation projects. component; nefarious activity/abuse (NAAx)

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Improper Adequate processes must be in place to Resource Manage Implement sound processes to manage the Lack of MNO eTOM 20 / processes to ensure that all relevant requirements capability Handover to handover new resource infrastructure to available skills 1.5.2.7 manage have been met, and prerequisites for delivery Resource operational control, aligned with the relevant and Handover to successful operation are in place at the processes Operations eTOM reference and industry best practices. competences Resource prior to new resource infrastructure is Resource process Such processes should ensure that all relevant (UDx) Operations handed over to operations. Failure to do Management requirements are met by the new resource so may lead to loss of operational & Operations infrastructure, and prerequisites for successful control over the newly deployed Processes operation are in place, including skills, resources. equipment and support processes and include coordination of all stakeholders involved in the approval and acceptance of handover to operational control.

text: Improper Resource Development & Retirement Processes

text: Improper Adequate processes must be in place to Resource Develop Implement sound processes to manage the Network MNO eTOM 20 / control of develop and document detailed Development Detailed develop and document detailed technical, complexity; 1.5.3.4 Detailed technical, performance and operational & Retirement Resource performance and operational specifications, new/untested Resource specifications for the components of the Process Specifications aligned with the relevant eTOM reference and technology; Specifications new 5G System. Failure to ensure - eTOM industry best practices. Such processes must lack of development adequate control on specification process type have as mandatory input security requirements competences development may lead to significant and adherence to 3GPP specifications. (UDx, FMx) security and operational exposure, especially so in the context of emerging technologies such as 5G System components.

text: Inadequate Adequate processes must be in place to Resource Manage Processes to ensure that the required service Legal Threats, MNO eTOM 20 / coordination of ensure that all resources needed to Development Resource level agreements and operational level Loss of 1.5.3.5 resource support new resource & Retirement Development - agreements are developed and agreed for Quality (LEG, development classes/components are identified and Process eTOM process each resource class deployed, and that any FMx) developed. These might include new SLAs type supplier/partner operational support has been operational processes and procedures, OLAs identified and agreed, aligned with the relevant IT / network changes and eTOM reference and industry best practices. operational/service level agreements. Failure to do so impairs the ability to deliver the required resource capability and the associated operational and security attributes.

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Improper Adequate processes must be in place to Resource Manage Implement sound processes to ensure the co- Flawed MNO eTOM 20 / management of ensure the co-coordinated deployment Development Resource coordinated deployment of new resources products / 1.5.3.6 resource of new resources aligned with the & Retirement Deployment - aligned with the approved 5G business cases resources, deployment approved 5G business cases and to Process eTOM process and to ensure that all resources needed to flawed ensure that all resources needed to type support new resource classes/components are processes, support new resource implemented, aligned with the relevant eTOM unreliable classes/components are implemented. reference and industry best practices. processes, These might include new operational lack of processes and procedures, IT / network competences, changes and operational/service level unreliable agreements. partners (UDx, FMx) Failure to do so impairs the ability to deliver the required resource capability and the associated operational and security attributes.

text: Improper Reuse of data storage media without Decommission Manage Resource exit procedures should include clear Unauthorised MNO ISO/IEC storage media properly deleting previous data could ing processes Resource Exit risk-based rules for media sanitisation upon access to 27001 sanitisation lead to confidentiality loss of various Network - eTOM decommissioning of network elements. information /A.8.3.2 types of data (management, operation, Elements process type (NAA1, NAA4) personnel) and subsequently to major security, commercial or judicial issues

text: Improper Appropriate processes must be in place Decommission Manage Implement sound processes to ensure the Nefarious MNO eTOM 20 / management of to develop specific exit or migration ing processes Resource Exit controlled of resource exit, aligned with the activity / 1.5.3.7 resource exit strategies, develop resource Network - eTOM relevant eTOM reference and industry best abuse of infrastructure transition and/or Elements process type practices. Such processes should ensure that vulnerable replacement strategies, and manage the specific exit, migration, resource infrastructure components, operational aspects of the exit process. transition and/or replacement strategies are information Failure to do so leaves open gateways developed, and that the operational aspects of leaks, for security threats, information leaks the exit process are managed. operational and operational failures. failures It is key that these processes include cross- (NAAx) enterprise co-ordination to ensure that the needs of all stakeholders are identified and managed.

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Improper Party Tender Management Processes

text: Inadequate Sourcing requirements take into account Tender and Determine the Implement sound processes to determine Scarcity of MNO eTOM 20 definition of the required functional, technical and/or purchasing Sourcing sourcing requirements, aligned with the potential and /1.6.2.1 sourcing operational specifications. Such processes Requirements relevant eTOM reference. existing requirements requirements must include security - eTOM industry relevant requirements, must be aligned process type Such requirements should include technical, suppliers and operational, training, and specific supplier with industry standards, and must be Indispensable partners, aligned with the risk level of the baseline support requirements. Security requirements, limited with regard for the entire supply chain must be purchased component. security interoperability requirements taken into consideration. between Failure to do so may lead to inability to for the Industry standards and applicable regulatory different deliver on security and operational procurement suppliers' attributes of the system. requirements provide an essential input for this of secure ICT process. equipment, products and high-risk services suppliers (NAAx, FMx, UDx, LEG)

text: Improper Potential S/P selection process must Tender and Determine Implement sound processes to determine Scarcity of MNO eTOM 20 / process to leverage information available from the purchasing Potential Potential Suppliers/Partners, aligned with the potential and 1.6.2.2 determine Gather & Analyse Supply Chain processes Parties - relevant eTOM reference. existing Potential Information processes, as well as other eTOM industry Suppliers/Partn specific inputs available from within the Process Type Such processes should shortlist suppliers that suppliers and meet specific enterprise and industry standard ers enterprise, or from external supplier Indispensable partners, research organizations at the specific baseline requirements. limited time the need arises. Failure to do so security Also, such processes should provide detailed interoperability may lead to selection of suppliers whose requirements between analysis of potential partners/suppliers, risk profile is inadequate for the for the leveraging information available from internal different purchased product / service. procurement suppliers' and external sources, such as dependency of secure ICT risks, espionage by state or state-backed equipment, products and high-risk actors using malware to abuse poor quality services network components or unintentional suppliers (NAAx, FMx, vulnerabilities affecting sensitive elements in the network. UDx, LEG)

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Manage the In absence of sound tender Tender and Manage the Implement sound processes to manage and Scarcity of MNO eTOM 20 / Tender management process, delays, and purchasing Tender administer the mechanics of the tender potential and 1.6.2.3 Process errors in selecting the appropriate processes Process process, aligned with the relevant eTOM existing industry vendors and solutions may result in reference. suppliers and deteriorating the security and availability partners, limited of the 5G system, and failure to comply Such processes should ensure coordination interoperability and control of engagement interactions with with applicable regulation. between potential parties, timing of the process, different inclusion of relevant commercial and functional suppliers' requirements and tender analysis equipment, mechanisms, procedures, and approach. high-risk suppliers (NAAx, FMx, UDx, LEG)

text: Improper Resource management and operation Support & Readiness processes

text: Improper Improper processes for supporting Resource Enable Implement sound processes to ensure Network MNO eTOM 20 / processes to Resource Provisioning processes may management Resource availability and adequacy of support complexity; 1.5.4.1 support lead to ineffective and uncontrolled and operation Provisioning - infrastructure for Resource Provisioning new/untested resource resource provisioning processes, leading processes eTOM process processes, and ensure that these processes technology; provisioning availability issues and wrong type are adequately managed, monitored, and lack of configurations due to inappropriate reported on, aligned with the relevant eTOM competences; information or emergency handling reference and industry best practices. flawed design/ equipment / Key objectives of these processes in the system context of 5GS migration include: integration (UDx, FMx, - creation and deployment of support tools for resource deployment, and of adequate OUT) processes for newly modified resource infrastructure; - scheduling, management, and monitoring of the roll-out of new resource infrastructure -·monitoring of newly deployed infrastructure to provide early detection of potential shortfalls;

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Improper Sound processes should be in place to Resource Enable Implement sound processes to monitor and Network MNO eTOM 20 / processes to monitor and assess resource management Resource assess resource infrastructure performance, complexity; 1.5.4.2 support infrastructure performance, as well as and operation Performance and to monitor, manage and report on the new/untested resource ensuring the capability of the Resource processes Management - capability of the Resource Performance technology; performance Performance Management processes. eTOM process Management processes, aligned with the lack of management Soundness of such processes increases type relevant eTOM reference and industry best competences; in importance with the increase in practices. flawed design/ complexity and performance equipment / requirements of 5G networks system integration (UDx, FMx, OUT)

text: Improper Proper processes to conduct resource Resource Support Implement sound support processes for Network MNO eTOM 20 / processes to infrastructure maintenance and repair management Resource Resource Trouble Management, such as complexity; 1.5.4.3 support activities will be key to prevent and operation Trouble statistically driven preventative and scheduled new/untested resource performance degradation caused by processes Management - maintenance and repair activities, and technology; trouble unforeseen corelations and eTOM process monitoring, management and reporting on lack of management dependencies, and to proactively identify type Resource Trouble Management processes, competences; and remediate flaws that can affect aligned with the relevant eTOM reference and flawed design/ confidentiality, integrity, availability of industry best practices. equipment / systems and data. system integration (UDx, FMx, OUT)

text: Improper Improper processes to establish and Resource Manage Implement sound support processes for System MNO eTOM 20 / management of manage the enterprise Resource management Resource resource inventory management, aligned with heterogeneity 1.5.4.5 resource Inventory Database may lead to and operation Inventory - the relevant eTOM reference and industry best (UDx, FMx, inventory uncontrolled access to the resource processes eTOM process practices. OUT) inventory and poor data quality, which in type Key objectives of these processes in the turn opens the path to risks such as resource misconfiguration, loss of context of 5GS migration include: confidentiality for security-sensitive data - updating of processes and tools for resource and inefficient resource allocation and inventory management and information incident response capture; - management of registration and access control processes - accuracy, completeness, and validation of resource inventory;

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Improper Party Agreement processes

text: Insufficient / Improper processes for party agreement Party Prepare Party Define and maintain a sound process to Nefarious MNO, Vendor, eTOM 20 / improper management may lead to Insufficient / Agreement Agreement prepare agreements or a template agreement activities, Service 1.6.5.1 definition of improper definition of relevant processes that can be used as the basis for party-specific Improper Provider relevant operational and security clauses in agreements. performance, operational and agreements with suppliers and partners Improper Agreements should define the commercial security definition of clauses in terms and conditions and requirements to security ensure compliance with the technical / agreements responsibilities with suppliers operational reference specifications. All and agreements should include relevant security and partners parameters, clauses System misconfigurati on, Lack of responsibility (NAAx, UDx, FMx, OUT, LEG)

text: Improper Improper management of contract Party Manage Party Define and maintain a sound process to Nefarious MNO, Vendor, eTOM 20 / management of variations may lead to improper updating Agreement Agreement manage changes to the terms/conditions of an activities, Service 1.6.5.4 contract of security-relevant clauses and processes Variation agreement during its term of agreement. Improper Provider variations parameters, thus imperilling the overall performance, security of the system Improper definition of security responsibilities and parameters, System misconfigurati on, Lack of responsibility (NAAx, UDx, FMx, OUT, LEG)

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Improper Party Support processes

text: Support Party In the absence of sound processes to Party Support Support Party Define and maintain sound Support Party High-risk MNO, Vendor, eTOM 20 / Requisition manage engagement with parties who processes Requisition Requisition Management processes to: suppliers, Service 1.6.6.1 Management own and manage outsourced Management - arrange and manage external party access to supplier Provider infrastructure, and to ensure that the infrastructure deployment support tools and dependency, Party Requisition Management processes; resource processes are operating effectively, a - oversee roll-out of the new infrastructure; scarcity (UDx, variety of risks affecting resource - track and monitor infrastructure deployment FMx, OUT, integrity and availability may ensue. undertaken by contractors; LEG) Also, as these processes manage - continuously update relevant inventories; access authorisation, unauthorized access may result from faulty processes

text: Support Party In the absence of sound processes to Party Support Support Party Define and maintain sound Support Party High-risk MNO, Vendor, eTOM 20 / Performance manage performance restoration activity processes Performance Performance Management processes, aligned suppliers, Service 1.6.6.3 Management with outsourced infrastructure providers, Management with the relevant eTOM reference and industry supplier Provider and to ensure that the Contractor best practices. dependency, Performance Management processes resource can operate effectively, resource and scarcity (UDx, service availability issues may affect the FMx, OUT, performance and security of the system LEG)

text: Support Party These processes are responsible for Party Support Support Party Define and maintain sound processes to High-risk MNO, Vendor, eTOM 20 / Interface implementing generic and specific processes Interface ensure that there is adequate capability to suppliers, Service 1.6.6.5 Management changes to supplier/partner interfaces, Management support effective operation of the S/P Interface supplier Provider and to keep up to date all information Management processes, aligned with the dependency, concerning suppliers and partners. relevant eTOM reference and industry best resource Inability to do so may lead to wrong practices. scarcity (UDx, allocation of resources, inability to liaise FMx, OUT, to S/P resources for resolution of LEG) operational / security incidents or allowing/maintaining unauthorized access rights due to obsolete contact data.

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Improper resource provisioning processes

text: Improper Improper processes for allocation, Resource Allocate & Define and maintain sound processes to Network MNO eTOM 20 / processes for installation, configuration, activation and provisioning Install allocate & deliver specific resources required complexity; 1.5.6.1 resource testing of specific resources to meet the processes Resource - to support new services, and to ensure that new/untested allocation and service requirements, or in response to eTOM process sufficient information is supplied with the technology; installation requests from other processes may lead type resource requisition orders regarding resource lack of to resource capacity shortfalls, installation and configuration, aligned with the competences; availability concerns or failure relevant eTOM reference and industry best flawed design/ conditions, as well as misconfiguration- practices. equipment / related security risks system integration

text: Improper / The objective of the Configure & Activate Resource Configure & Define and maintain sound processes to Network MNO eTOM 20 / obsolete Resource Processes is to configure and provisioning Activate configure and activate the specific resources complexity; 1.5.6.2 processes to activate the specific resources allocated processes Resource - allocated against issued resource orders, new/untested Configure & to fulfil resource orders. Improper eTOM process aligned with the relevant eTOM reference and technology; Activate processes or obsolete data used in type industry best practices. lack of Resources process may lead to insecure competences; configuration of equipment as well as Key control objectives in the context of 5GS flawed design/ migration include: lack of visibility over the systems' active equipment / resources. - configuration and activation approach and system planning; integration - resource inventory update with the (UDx, FMx, configuration of new resources and their OUT, LEG) status.

text: Improper Inefficient processes for tracking and Resource Track & Define and maintain sound processes to Network MNO eTOM 20 / tracking & management fail to provide guarantee provisioning Manage ensure resource provisioning activities are complexity; 1.5.6.4 management of that all provisioning tasks are finished at processes Resource assigned, managed, and tracked efficiently, new/untested resource the appropriate time and in the Provisioning - aligned with the relevant eTOM reference and technology; provisioning appropriate sequence. An aggravating eTOM process industry best practices. lack of circumstance is reliance on provisioning type competences; activities when that have been Key control objectives in the context of 5GS flawed design/ migration include: outsourced or contracted to external equipment / parties. system - resource provisioning scheduling, allocation and coordination; integration (UDx, FMx, - tracking of the execution process; - including all relevant information to resource OUT, LEG) orders, such as use case-specific security or operational requirements;· - Monitoring resource orders’ status, and escalating resource orders as necessary; - engaging external suppliers when necessary

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Resource Trouble Management

text: Improper Improper resource alarm event Resource Survey & Define and maintain sound processes and Network MNO eTOM 20 / survey and notification collection, filtering and Trouble Analyse tools to: complexity; 1.5.8.1 analysis of correlation impairs the ability of the Management Resource - detect, collect, record, and manage resource new/untested resource operator to detect and respond to processes Trouble alarm events; technology; trouble service impacting condition, either by - perform alarm event notification analysis, lack of failing to respond to a relevant event, or correlation, and filtering; competences; by allocating resources to deal with - report alarm events to relevant processes. flawed design/ false-positives, such as events triggered equipment / by planned outages. system In the case of security event integration notifications, improper correlation and (UDx, FMx, analysis may lead to significant losses of OUT, LEG) security attributes.

text: Improper Improper procedures for root-cause Resource Localize Define and maintain sound processes and Network MNO eTOM 20 / processes for analysis and problem isolation, or failure Trouble Resource tools to: complexity; 1.5.8.2 localisation of to abide by such procedures may lead to Management Trouble - - verify resource configuration and validate new/untested resource significant delays in incident analysis processes eTOM process fitness for the relevant service features; technology; trouble and response and degradation of type - schedule and perform diagnose, test, and lack of operational and security attributes audit of resources in order to localise resource competences; trouble events flawed design/ equipment / system integration (UDx, FMx, OUT, LEG)

text: Improper Improper procedures, or deficient Resource Correct & Define and maintain sound processes and Network MNO eTOM 20 / processes for resource allocation for correction and Trouble Resolve tools to restore or replace resources that have complexity; 1.5.8.3 correction and resolution activities, as well as improper Management Resource failed as efficiently as possible, aligned with new/untested resolution of communication of correction & resolution processes Trouble - the relevant eTOM reference and industry best technology; resource results to other relevant processes may eTOM process practices. lack of trouble lead to significant losses of operational type competences; and security attributes. flawed design/ equipment / system integration (UDx, FMx, OUT, LEG)

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Resource data collection & distribution

text: Incomplete / Processes and mechanisms for Security Data Collect Define and maintain sound processes and Network MNO eTOM 20 / untimely / collection of management and security Management tools to collect management and security complexity, 1.5.7.1 inaccurate information and data records from and Security information and data records from resource evolving threat Management resource and service instances and from Information & and service instances and relevant enterprise landscape and Security relevant processes produces produce Data - eTOM processes, aligned with the relevant eTOM (NAAx, EIH4, Information & incomplete / untimely / inaccurate or process type reference and industry best practices. Pax, UDx, Data otherwise inadequate management and FMx, OUT, Key control objectives in the context of security information and data DIS, LEG) operation of 5GS include:

text: - collection of security information and data from networks, systems, and security sensors

text: - collection of usage, network, security, and information technology events and, performance and other management information

text: - distribution of relevant information to other corporate processes or to resource and service instances.

text: Improper Processing of management and security Security Data Process Define and maintain sound processes and Network MNO eTOM 20 / processing of information and/or data that does not Management tools for processing of management and complexity, 1.5.7.2 management output a form suitable for the intended and Security security information & data, aligned with the evolving threat and Security recipient processes, resource or service Information & relevant eTOM reference and industry best landscape Information & instances renders such data unusable Data - eTOM practices. (NAAx, EIH4, Data and hinders action upon it. process type Pax, UDx, FMx, OUT, DIS, LEG)

text: Inadequate Audit and analysis of information & data Security Data Audit and Define and maintain sound processes and Network MNO eTOM 20 / processes for collection, processing and distribution Security Data tools to audit information & data collection complexity, 1.5.7.4 Audit of activities is not executed on a consistent Collection & activities, aligned with the relevant eTOM evolving threat Management basis to identify possible anomalies and Distribution - reference and industry best practices. landscape and Security to preserve audit data for future forensic eTOM process (NAAx, EIH4, Data Collection use. type Pax, UDx, & Distribution FMx, OUT, DIS, LEG)

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Improper Resource Performance Management Processes

text: Improper Improper processing of resource Performance Monitor Define and maintain sound processes and Network MNO eTOM 20 / monitoring of performance data, or improper setting of data Resource tools to monitor received resource complexity, 1.5.9.1 resource performance thresholds and standards, Performance - performance information and perform direct evolving threat performance as well as failure to notify relevant eTOM process detection of security-relevant events, aligned landscape resource trouble or resource type with the relevant eTOM reference and industry (NAAx, EIH4, performance management processes best practices. Pax, UDx, may lead to failure to detect and FMx, OUT, Key control objectives in the context of adequately respond to security-relevant DIS, LEG) events. operation of 5GS include:

text: - first in detection of security relevant events by monitoring specific resource performance data; - detection of performance threshold violations that signal resource failures; - detect performance degradation that provides early warning of potential issues; - log resource performance degradation and violation details to ensure historical records are available for other relevant processes.

text: Improper Control Resource Performance Performance Control Define and maintain sound processes and Network MNO eTOM 20 / processes for processes are designed to optimize data Resource tools for timely and effective restoration of complexity, 1.5.9.3 controlling resource performance by restoring failed Performance - failed resource instances, or normal operation evolving threat resource resource instances, or normal operation eTOM process thereof, aligned with the relevant eTOM landscape performance thereof. Improper control plans, or type reference and industry best practices. (NAAx, EIH4, improper decision making on necessary Pax, UDx, controls may lead to exposure to FMx, OUT, security risks or degradation of security DIS, LEG) attributes. This is especially relevant due to the highly interdependent nature of 5G systems

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Improper Party Interaction Management Processes

text: Track and In the absence of sound processes to Party Track and Define and maintain sound processes and Network MNO, Vendor, eTOM 20 / Manage Party ensure that Party Interactions are Interaction Manage Party tools to track and manage interactions with complexity, Service 1.6.9.3 Interaction managed and tracked efficiently to meet Management Interaction relevant parties, aligned with the relevant evolving threat Provider applicable interaction policies and SLA Processes eTOM reference and industry best practices. landscape requirements, performance and security (NAAx, EIH4, Key control objectives in the context of deviations may appear Pax, UDx, operation of 5GS include: FMx, OUT, - track and manage timely completion and DIS, LEG) closure of all interactions - monitoring and notifying situation when applicable SLAs are endangered; - measure, analyse and communicate KPIs to improve efficiency of interactions.

text: Handle Party The purpose of this process is to Party Handle Party Define and maintain sound processes and Loss of MNO, Vendor, eTOM 20 / Interaction manage all requests. Improper Interaction Interaction tools to fulfil all inbound and outbound quality, legal Service 1.6.9.4 (Including Self management of interactions may leave Management (Including Self requests from/to external parties, aligned with threats, Provider Service) unresolved security or operational Processes Service) the relevant eTOM reference and industry best supplier events that involve external parties in practices. interface analysis, response, and mitigation. complexity (FMx, OUT, LEG)

text: Improper Party Problem Handling Processes

text: Receive Party In the absence of sound processes to Party Problem Receive Party Define and maintain sound processes and Loss of MNO, Vendor, eTOM 20 / Problem receive party-originated problems, Handling Problem tools to manage problem raised by, or related quality, Service 1.6.10.1 problems may get unnoticed and Processes to external parties, aligned with the relevant security Provider unmanaged. eTOM reference and industry best practices. incidents, legal threats (NAAx, FMx, OUT, LEG)

text: Assess Party In the absence of sound processes to Party Problem Assess Party Define and maintain sound processes and Loss of MNO, Vendor, eTOM 20 / Problem analyse party problems, solutions are Handling Problem tools to manage problem raised by, or related quality, Service 1.6.10.2 not properly identified and implemented Processes to external parties, aligned with the relevant security Provider eTOM reference and industry best practices. incidents, legal threats (NAAx, FMx, OUT, LEG)

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Track Party In the absence of sound processes to Party Problem Track Party Define and maintain sound processes and Loss of MNO, Vendor, eTOM 20 / Problem track party problems, problems may stay Handling Problem tools to manage problem raised by, or related quality, Service 1.6.10.4 unsolved Processes to external parties, aligned with the relevant security Provider eTOM reference and industry best practices. incidents, legal threats (NAAx, FMx, OUT, LEG)

text: Analyse Party In the absence of sound processes to Party Problem Analyse Party Define sound processes to conduct and report Loss of MNO, Vendor, eTOM 20 / Problem Trend analyse party problem trends, availability Handling Problem Trend trend analysis on party problems. These quality, Service 1.6.10.9 and integrity of critical systems and Processes should include security parameters security Provider services may be imperilled incidents, legal threats (NAAx, FMx, OUT, LEG)

text: Improper Party Performance Management Processes

text: Monitor & Improper processes to monitor & control Party Monitor & Improper processes to monitor & control Loss of MNO, Vendor, eTOM 20 / Control Party performance of services, processes or Performance Control Party performance of services, processes or quality, Service 1.6.11.1 Performance resources delivered by external parties Management Performance resources delivered by external parties open security Provider open significant operational risks due to Processes significant operational risks due to the high incidents, the high availability objectives of the 5G availability objectives of the 5G system and legal threats system and attack path via forcing of attack path via forcing of emergency (NAAx, FMx, emergency arrangements due to arrangements due to Supplier-side OUT, LEG) Supplier-side performance degradation. performance degradation.

text: Track & The objective of the track & manage Party Track & The objective of the track & manage party Loss of MNO, Vendor, eTOM 20 / Manage Party party performance resolution processes Performance Manage Party performance resolution processes is to ensure quality, Service 1.6.11.2 Performance is to ensure improvement and Management Performance improvement and restoration activities are security Provider Resolution restoration activities are being assigned, Processes Resolution being assigned, coordinated, and tracked incidents, coordinated, and tracked efficiently, and efficiently, and that corrective actions are legal threats that corrective actions are initiated for initiated for any relevant performance (NAAx, FMx, any relevant performance degradation degradation reports. Failure to do so may lead OUT, LEG) reports. Failure to do so may lead to to degradation of operational and security degradation of operational and security attributes. attributes.

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Manage and Improper management of Supplier Party Manage and Improper management of Supplier inventory Loss of MNO, Vendor, eTOM 20 / Administer inventory may lead to availability, Inventory Administer may lead to availability, integrity, and quality, Service 1.6.21.2 Party Inventory integrity, and confidentiality risks on Management Party confidentiality risks on supplier data, including security Provider supplier data, including capabilities, Processes Inventory capabilities, resources, and contact data. incidents, resources, and contact data. These in These in turn may lead to operational and legal threats turn may lead to operational and security security risks of unauthorized access, inability (NAAx, FMx, risks of unauthorized access, inability to to respond to operational or security events, or OUT, LEG) respond to operational or security resource misallocation. events, or resource misallocation.

text: Business Continuity Management

text: Inadequate / Business continuity plans must be BCM Process Plan Business Business continuity must be carefully planned Disasters, MNO eTOM 20 / obsolete updated to take into consideration the Continuity - and operational procedures that support outages (OUT, 1.7.2.1.2 business changed operational and risk landscape. eTOM process business continuity must be proactively tested, DIS) continuity Failure to do so may lead to inability to type in line with the relevant eTOM specifications plans respond to major disruptive events. and industry best practices.

text: Inadequate / Infrastructure recovery plans must be BCM Process Plan Proactive determination and implementation of Disasters, MNO eTOM 20 / obsolete updated to take into consideration the Infrastructure recovery procedures and backup planning for outages (OUT, 1.7.2.1.3 Infrastructure changed operational and risk landscape. Recovery - all key 5G infrastructure capabilities and their DIS) Recovery plans Failure to do so may lead to inability to eTOM process regular testing, in line with the relevant eTOM respond to major disruptive events, type specifications and industry best practices.

text: Inadequate / Incident management plans must be BCM Process Plan Serious Plan and implement sound processes and for Disasters, MNO eTOM 20 / obsolete updated to take into consideration the Incident Serious incident management, including roles outages (OUT, 1.7.2.1.4 incident changed operational and risk landscape. Management - and responsibilities, operational procedures, DIS) management Failure to do so may lead to inability to eTOM process and escalation criteria. plans respond to major disruptive events, type

text: Fraud Management

text: Failure to adapt Practices and processes for detection, Fraud Fraud Policy Manage and maintain sound policies for fraud Disasters, MNO eTOM 20 / fraud investigation, ongoing education, tool Management Management - prevention and management, aligned with the outages (OUT, 1.7.2.3.1 management uses, feedback of identified frauds, eTOM process relevant eTOM specifications and industry best DIS) policies and external interactions (partners, LEAs) type practices. controls must be adapted to the risks of 5G operations and technology. Failure to do so may lead to inability to prevent, detect, and respond to fraud,

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Insurance management

text: Failure to With the introduction of the 5G systems, Insurance Identify The risk management process must ensure Outages, MNO eTOM 20 / identify areas, and activities within the enterprise management Insurable that all risks that are insurable are identified, failures and 1.7.2.5.1 insurable risks where risk aspects are insurable must Risks - eTOM assessed, and appropriately mitigated. malfunctions, be updated. Failure to identify insurable process type denial of risks may lead to unnecessary risk service exposure. attacks, privacy threats (OUT, DIS, NAA5)

text: Regulatory management

text: Failure to 5G system with its verticals will involve Regulatory Ensure Ensure that the enterprise complies with all Evolving and MNO eTOM 20 / identify and significant changes in applicable management regulatory existing government regulations. complex 1.7.6.4 comply with compliance requirements, including but compliance - regulatory updated not limited to security, privacy, consumer eTOM process landscape, compliance protection. Failure to identify applicable type outages, requirements requirements for implementation failures and scenarios and verticals may lead to malfunctions, significant regulatory actions denial of service attacks, privacy threats (NAAx, OUT, DIS, LEG)

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Security management

text: Non-proactive Security management processes should Security Manage Identify internal and external sources of threat. Evolving MNO eTOM 20 / Security proactively identify areas of threat and management Proactive Areas of threat can be physical or logical. threat 1.7.2.2.1 Management support the categorization and Security landscape, Set up a sound framework for security risk prioritization of threat and deal with Management - network exposure to loss of value or reputation. eTOM process analysis. complexity, Connect to information exchange sources and Failure to ensure a systematic risk type resource analysis framework based on ENISA Threat communities. scarcity, lack information collection and exchange Landscape of leaves the organisation exposed in the competences, context of implementing 5G technology advanced in which the threats and vulnerabilities threats, fraud, landscape is in ongoing exploration. abuse (NAAx, EIH4, PAx, UDx, FMx, OUT, DIS, LEG)

text: Failure to Monitoring of industry trends and best Security Monitor Security management threat minimization Evolving MNO eTOM 20 / monitor practice approaches is essential to management Industry through monitoring of industry trends and best threat 1.7.2.2.2 Industry ensure the 5G operator is on top of Trends for practice approaches. landscape, Trends for security challenges. Failure to do so is Security network Security especially damaging in the context of 5G Management - complexity, Management technology in which the threats and eTOM process resource vulnerabilities landscape is in ongoing type scarcity, lack exploration. ETSI, GSMA, of 3GPP, ITU competences, Standards advanced ENISA Threat threats, fraud, Landscape abuse (NAAx, EIH4, PAx, UDx, FMx, OUT, DIS, LEG)

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Inadequate / Security Management corporate policies, Security Define Define and follow corporate policies, Evolving MNO eTOM 20 / obsolete guidelines, best practices, and auditing management Security procedures, guidelines, best practices. Audit threat 1.7.2.2.3 Security processes need to be updated to adapt Management processes are needed to provide assurance landscape, Management to the new challenges posed by the new Policies & that the necessary control structures are in network Policies & technologies and subsequently changed Procedures - place and provide assurance that the complexity, Procedures operations, services, and business eTOM process procedures are followed and are effective. resource models. type scarcity, lack ISO 27011 / of ITU 1051 competences, advanced threats, fraud, abuse (NAAx, EIH4, PAx, UDx, FMx, OUT, DIS, LEG)

text: Failure to Security management functions should Security Assist with Deploy appropriate physical infrastructure, Evolving MNO eTOM 20 / involve assist operational areas in deploying management Security procedures, and monitoring capabilities to threat 1.7.2.2.4 security appropriate infrastructure, procedures, Management support relevant operational areas. Security landscape, management and monitoring capabilities. Security Deployment - Management processes are implemented at network functions in management functions should be eTOM process many levels of the enterprise. complexity, Deployment of involved in all phases of the system type resource adequate lifecycle. Failure will be translated in scarcity, lack security poorly deployed or inadequate security of controls controls competences, advanced threats, fraud, abuse (NAAx, EIH4, PAx, UDx, FMx, OUT, DIS, LEG)

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Improper data Improper definition and deployment of Security Manage Implementation of tools and capabilities for Evolving MNO eTOM 20 / collection updated processes and tools to capture management Reactive data collection on operational activity. threat 1.7.2.2.5 capabilities relevant operational and security date Security Incorporate in the operational infrastructure the landscape, may generate significant blind spots that Management - procedures and facilities for security network may impede security management and eTOM process monitoring, control, and management in the complexity, fraud prevention activities. type areas of the SIP process and Operations. resource Integration of these processes with relevant scarcity, lack fraud management processes. of competences, advanced threats, fraud, abuse (NAAx, EIH4, PAx, UDx, FMx, OUT, DIS, LEG)

text: Improper Failure to adapt analysis and correlation Security Detect Up to date data analysis and correlation tools Evolving MNO eTOM 20 / detection algorithms and procedures to the new management Potential and rulesets to detect potential threats, threat 1.7.2.2.6 capabilities of technologies and changed threat Security security violations, fraud, or other security- landscape, Potential landscape may leave the operator Threats & relevant events. network Security unable to detect potential threats, Violations - complexity, Threats & security violations, fraud, or other eTOM process resource Violations security-relevant events. type scarcity, lack of competences, advanced threats, fraud, abuse (NAAx, EIH4, PAx, UDx, FMx, OUT, DIS, LEG)

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Investigate Forensic procedures must be adapted to Security Investigate Update tools, processes, and rulesets for Evolving MNO eTOM 20 / Potential new technologies. Failure to do so may management Potential forensic investigations to provide capabilities threat 1.7.2.2.7 Security impede investigations and fitness of Security adequate to the new technologies. landscape, Threats & forensic evidence. Threats & network Violations Violations - complexity, eTOM process resource type scarcity, lack of competences, advanced threats, fraud, abuse (NAAx, EIH4, PAx, UDx, FMx, OUT, DIS, LEG)

text: Improper Improper process to select, design and Security Define Implementation of risk management plans that Evolving MNO eTOM 20 / security risk specify a baseline set of security management Security take into account in addition to technical threat 1.7.2.2.8 treatment controls may leave the system Management options and the value of assets to be landscape, unprotected by ignoring relevant areas Prevention - protected, as well as the probability of threats. network or failing to identify adequate sizing and eTOM process complexity, prioritisation of preventive measures. type The technical specifications of security resource controls, operational procedures such as ISO/IEC scarcity, lack 27011 / ITU vulnerability management, risk assessment of and secure configuration procedures must be X.1051 competences, EU 5G considered. advanced Toolbox Catalogues of best practices such as EU 5G threats, fraud, Implementatio abuse (NAAx, Toolbox Implementation Plan and ISO n Plan 27011/ITU x.1051 provide frameworks to EIH4, PAx, UDx, FMx, check for completeness and consistency of prevention measures. OUT, DIS, LEG)

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Improper Failure to define updated policy-based Security Define Development of security monitoring Evolving MNO eTOM 20 / Monitoring of tools and processes for collection, management Monitoring to procedures as part of prevention process, threat 1.7.2.2.9 Security filtering, aggregation, distribution, and Facilitate which define rules for collecting and storing landscape, retention of relevant data may lead to Security relevant data that come from or are associated network several alternative risk scenarios: Management - with a certain set of managed resources and complexity, monitoring blind spots, excessive eTOM process services. Tools and mechanisms for collection, resource resource consumption, data overload, type filtering, aggregation, distribution, and scarcity, lack inability to process data for relevant retention of relevant data will be implemented. of decisions. competences, advanced threats, fraud, abuse (NAAx, EIH4, PAx, UDx, FMx, OUT, DIS, LEG)

text: Improper Failure to adapt tools and procedures for Security Define Update and maintain sound processes and Evolving MNO eTOM 20 / Security assessment of collected/correlated data management Security tools for collecting, assessing, and correlating threat 1.7.2.2.10 Management for events or trends of interest may lead Management relevant data into statistical models to detect landscape, Analysis to inability to form complete and Analysis - patterns and trends, in line with industry best network accurate picture of events and eTOM process practices and newly implemented complexity, conditions and in turn to failure to adapt type technologies. resource preventive measures to changed threat scarcity, lack and vulnerability environment. of competences, advanced threats, fraud, abuse (NAAx, EIH4, PAx, UDx, FMx, OUT, DIS, LEG)

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Improper Failure to adapt policies and procedures Security Define Update and maintain sound implement policies Evolving MNO eTOM 20 / Security for anomaly detection may lead to management Security and procedures for incident detection, in line threat 1.7.2.2.11 policies & operator unable to define automated Management with industry best practices and newly landscape, procedures to policy-based remediation controls. policies & implemented technologies. network facilitate Increased complexity of systems and procedures to complexity, detection of operations may render current facilitate resource incidents correlation & analysis tools unable to detection scarcity, lack generate meaningful and accurate incidents - of predictions and alerts. eTOM process competences, type advanced threats, fraud, abuse (NAAx, EIH4, PAx, UDx, FMx, OUT, DIS, LEG)

text: Improper Incident management processes need to Security Define Implement ITSM-based or ISO 27011 incident Evolving MNO eTOM 20 / Incident be adapted to take into account changed management Incident management policies and procedures to threat 1.7.2.2.12 Management technologies and processes and Management identify and undertake necessary response landscape, policies and updated incident response ecosystem policies and and recovery actions that may be conducted network procedures and responsibilities. procedures - by Business Continuity Management complexity, eTOM process processes or within Operations or Assurance. resource type scarcity, lack ISO 27011 / of ITU X.1051 competences, advanced threats, fraud, abuse (NAAx, EIH4, PAx, UDx, FMx, OUT, DIS, LEG)

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: L ANNEX: DETAILED VULNERABILITIES IN VENDOR PROCESSES

text: Associated Security Threats Name of Security Requirements /Description of Description Assets (Threat Stake-holder Source Ref Vulnerability Controls security controls Category Taxonomy)

text: Design

text: Failure to apply Security-by-design ensures Vendor Security by The Network Product shall implement Design Flaws, Vendor, GSMA FS.16 security vulnerabilities can be mitigated by a Development design security by design throughout the whole Exploitation of Auditor /7.2.1. architectural and secure design of the Network Product. Processes, 5G development and product lifecycles. vulnerabilities. security design Failure to apply security architectural System Therefore, architecture and design (NAAx, UDx) principles and security design principles and follow Components decisions shall be made based on a set throughout the them throughout the entire development of security principles that are tracked development lifecycle leads to structural security throughout the development and product lifecycle. problems that imperil the security of the lifecycles. components and of the 5G system Security principles must be considered and applied when appropriate. In the design phases, a threat analysis process for the Network Product shall be undertaken to identify the potential threats and related mitigation measure

text: Coding

text: Lack of or Failure to apply consistent code review Vendor Source code The Equipment Vendor shall ensure that Insecure Code Vendor, GSMA FS.16 improper code in line with specification and security Development review process; new and changed source code dedicated (Source code Auditor /7.3.1. review best practices elevates the risk of risk of Processes, 5G application of for a Network Product is appropriately dedicated for accidental occurrence of vulnerabilities. System coding best reviewed in accordance with an use in the Components practices; use of appropriate coding standard. If feasible, Network static and the review should also be implemented Product leads to dynamic code by means of using a Source Code a vulnerability) review tools; Analysis Tool and automation where (NAAx, UDx) external code appropriate review process

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Ineffective code In absence of effective mechanisms for Vendor Robust change The Equipment Vendor shall ensure that Rogue Vendor, GSMA FS.16 governance code governance source code changes Development management no changes are introduced into the developer Auditor /7.3.1. are not controlled, and it is impossible to Processes, 5G processes; Network Product without appropriate (secretly trace reasons and requirements for System independent governance introduces a code changes Components lines of control vulnerability into for any changes source code dedicated for use in the Network Product) (NAAx, UDx)

text: Compilation

text: Vulnerabilities in Compilation and build processes and Vendor Automated Build The Equipment vendor shall apply an Malicious Vendor, GSMA FS.16 Build process environment must protected from Development Process; Build automated build tool with a minimum of attacker, Auditor /7.4.1, 7.4.2 and environment tampering, to ensure that builds are Processes, 5G Environment manual intervention to compile the Tampering with reproducible, deterministic and cover System Control source code and store the build log. build tools the security procedures defined by the Components All the data (including source code, (NAAx, UDx) Equipment Vendor. Manipulated build building scripts, compilation tools, and tools or parameters may introduce compilation environment) of the vulnerabilities to the Network Product compilation build environment shall come through the compilation environment. directly from a version control system.

text: Testing

text: Lack of or Failure to ensure proper testing leaves Vendor Security testing Security testing should include the Rogue Vendor, GSMA FS.16 improper the network products exposed to Development validation of security functionality, both developer, Poor Auditor /7.5.1. security testing vulnerabilities and unexpected and Processes, 5G positive and negative testing, as well as Design, unspecified behaviour. System vulnerability testing of the Network Erroneous / Components Product. Network Products are to be Insecure Code tested from a security perspective within (NAAx, UDx) a fair representation of the operational environment. Vulnerability testing shall test for the robustness of the Network Product against undefined/unexpected input.

text: Release

text: Improper Software integrity verification methods Vendor Software The Equipment Vendor shall establish Intentional or Vendor, GSMA FS.16 verification of are not implemented or not effective. In Development Integrity and maintain methods to ensure that the unintentional Auditor /7.6.1. software integrity their absence, maliciously or Processes, 5G Protection delivery of Network Products is carried use of nonunintentionally tampered software loads System out under controlled conditions. The genuine release may be accidentally installed. Components mobile network operator shall be (NAAx, UDx) provided with appropriate means to identify whether a received software package is genuine

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Ambiguous Failure to ensure that software versions Vendor Strict release All released software package versions Intentional or Vendor, GSMA FS.16 software release are uniquely identified may lead to old Development mechanisms shall bear a unique identifier that maps to unintentional Auditor /7.6.2. identifiers versions of software being accidentally Processes, 5G including a specific build version use of outdated, installed and old vulnerabilities being re- System allocation of vulnerable introduced in networks. Components unique identifiers release (NAAx, to software UDx) versions

text: Inaccurate / Failure to ensure that product Vendor Change Customer documentation shall be up to Intentional or Vendor, GSMA FS.16 obsolete documentation is updated in all security Development management date in all security related aspects and unintentional Auditor /7.6.3., 7.6.4. documentation relevant aspects and properly reflects Processes, 5G processes. Strict reflect the current functionality of the impairing of the current functionality. This may in System release Network Product at the time when both system turn impair operation, protection and Components mechanisms. the Network Product, or software operation or maintenance of network products. Documentation upgrades of it, and the customer security (NAAx, management. documentation are shipped to the UDx, FMx) customer. The documentation delivered with the Network Products contains all up-to-date information necessary to securely configure and run the Network Product.

text: Operation

text: Failure to For all security inquiries the customer Vendor Security Point of The Equipment Vendor shall provide a Security Vendor, GSMA FS.16 provide a should know who to approach in the Development Contact point of contact for security incidents Auditor /7.7.1. security contact Equipment Vendor organisation. In Processes, 5G questions/issues and communicate this (NAAx, UDx, absence of a clear communication from System point of contact to its customers and FMx) the Equipment Vendor to let clients Components 3rdparty vulnerability disclosers. This know who to contact for any security point of contact shall be able to find the inquiries or incidents, incident response right person/department inside the and resolution are impaired. Equipment Vendor organisation to deal with security concerns raised by a customer/3rd party vulnerability discloser

text: Insufficient Failure to collect and process updated Vendor Threat and The Equipment Vendor shall have Exploitation of Vendor, GSMA FS.16 vulnerability information with regard to vulnerabilities Development vulnerability reliable processes in place to ensure it unfixed Auditor /7.7.2. awareness in 3rd party components may lead to Processes, 5G intelligence can become aware of newly revealed vulnerabilities situations in which vulnerabilities go System potential vulnerabilities in used 3rd party (NAAx, UDx) undetected although they may be Components components and to evaluate whether publicly known and are therefore not they result in vulnerabilities in the mitigated. Network Product

text: Ineffective In absence of a reliable process to deal Vendor Vulnerability The Equipment Vendor shall establish a Exploitation of Vendor, GSMA FS.16 vulnerability with vulnerabilities found in, or in Development Remedy Process process to deal with vulnerabilities found unfixed Auditor /7.7.3, 7.7.4 remedy process relation to, released Network Products it Processes, 5G and mechanisms in, or in relation to, released Network vulnerabilities cannot be ensured that known System Products. Vulnerabilities shall be dealt (NAAx, UDx) vulnerabilities are addressed Components with appropriately and, if applicable, appropriately and timely. Failure to patches/software upgrades shall be deploy security patches independently distributed to all affected mobile network

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: from regular functional updates operators, in order to honour existing increases the time window of exposure. maintenance contracts within an agreed schedule. Equipment Vendor shall have the facility to provide patches/software upgrades that close security vulnerabilities independently from unrelated patches/software upgrades that modify functionality of the Network Product

text: Unreliable Absence of reliable processes and Vendor Vulnerability A reliable process shall ensure that Exploitation of Vendor, GSMA FS.16 communication mechanisms to inform network Development Remedy Process information regarding available security unfixed Auditor /7.7.5. of software fixes operators that security fixes are Processes, 5G and mechanisms related fixes is communicated to mobile vulnerabilities available, unnecessarily extends the System network operators that have maintenance (NAAx, UDx) window of vulnerability within their Components agreements in place at the time the fix is networks. released

text: Entire lifecycle

text: Improper version The version control system should cover Vendor Version control During the entire lifetime of a Network Rogue Vendor, GSMA FS.16 control system all relevant components of the network Development system Product, the Equipment Vendor shall developer Auditor /7.8.1. product, and it should ensure Processes, 5G utilise a version control system on (NAAx) accountability, authorisation and System hardware, source code, build tools and integrity of all changes. Otherwise, the Components environment, binary software, 3rd party changes in components cannot be components, and customer controlled, and vulnerabilities may find documentation ensuring accountability, their way in to the finished product, authorisation and integrity of all changes unintentionally or on purpose.

text: Improper change Properly controlled change Vendor Change tracking The Equipment Vendor shall establish a Rogue Vendor, GSMA FS.16 management management is essential to ensure that Development comprehensive, documented and cross developer Auditor /7.8.2. process changes are appropriate, effective, Processes, 5G Network Product line procedure to (NAAx) ISO/IEC properly authorised and carried out in System ensure that all requirements and design 27001 such a manner as to minimise the Components changes, which may arise at any time /A.12.1.2. opportunity for either malicious or during the development and product accidental compromise. Failure to do so lifecycles and which impact the Network may lead to uncontrolled Product(s), are managed and tracked in a systematic and timely manner appropriate to the life cycle stage of all affected product components in all Network Products.

text: Insufficient Staff involved in design, engineering, Vendor Staff education Continuous education of all staff involved Insecure Code Vendor, GSMA FS.16 security development, implementation, and Development in Network Product design, engineering, (NAAx, UDx) Auditor /7.8.3. education and maintenance is insufficiently aware of Processes, 5G development, implementation, testing ISO/IEC awareness of IT/network security matters. System and maintenance shall be provided to 27001 staff Components ensure knowledge and awareness on /A.7.2.2 security matters, relevant to their roles are up-to-date

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Ineffective In the absence of an effective ISMS, Vendor Information In the entire lifecycle, the Equipment Information Vendor, GSMA FS.16 Information reliable identification and mitigation of Development Security Vendor shall employ an information Leakage Auditor /7.8.3 Security risks and achievement of relevant Processes, 5G Management classification and handling scheme to (NAA4) ISO/IEC Management security objectives cannot be System Continual avoid sensitive information, such as 27001 /4-10 System demonstrated. Components Improvement security flaws, signing keys, etc., being Process leaked The Equipment vendor must have a continual improvement process for its development and product lifecycle and this process must include a root cause analysis of the security flaws. The resulting improvements shall be incorporated into the relevant design or processes.

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: M ANNEX: DETAILED VULNERABILITIES IN SECURITY ASSURANCE PROCESSES

text: Associated Name of Security Requirements /Description Threats (Threat Description Assets Security Controls Stakeholder Source Ref Vulnerability of security controls Taxonomy) Category

text: Standardisation Processes

text: Obsolescence As 5G technology is rapidly advancing and Assurance Standardisation {NA} {NA} ENISA, CSA of standards new security risks and requirements are processes, Harmonisation Standardisatio Regulation identified, standards need to be updated 5GS n Bodies, constantly. Slow response of components Industry standardisation activities to technological Associations advances and security research may leave the systems exposed.

text: Alignment of As several organisation are working on Assurance Standardisation {NA} {NA} ENISA, CSA standards standardisation in the 5G sector, alignment processes, Harmonisation Standardisatio Regulation of standards is paramount to ensure 5GS n Bodies, consistency and usability of developed components Industry references Associations

text: Missing While security assurance specifications Assurance Standardisation {NA} {NA} ENISA, CSA security exist for the building blocks of the 5G processes, Harmonisation Standardisatio Regulation requirements system, no security assurance criteria and Communicat n Bodies, reference for processes are defined for 5G verticals. ion services Industry verticals This may leave relevant security Associations considerations not covered or reference security requirements unfit for specific use cases.

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Accreditation Processes

text: Recognition of While GSMA accreditation body and the Assurance EU 5G CSA Scheme [Scheme to be developed given Lack of EU-wide ENISA, CSA accreditation accreditation scheme are internationally processes pending decision from Member States security European Regulation scheme agreed by all technology providers, no (NIS CG, ECCG)] certification Commission, mechanisms such as peer review are in ECCG place to ensure recognition of the accreditation scheme by all relevant stakeholders.

text: No alignment Accreditation and conformity assessment Assurance EU 5G CSA Scheme [Scheme to be developed given Lack of EU-wide ENISA, CSA with processes should be aligned with the processes pending decision from Member States security European Regulation internationally internationally recognized conformity (NIS CG, ECCG)] certification Commission, recognized assessment standards - the ISO 17xxx ECCG standards for series. Failure to do so may cast doubt on accreditation the soundness of conformity assessment and conformity processes.

text: assessment

text: Lack of control While the existing assurance scheme - Assurance EU 5G CSA Scheme [Scheme to be developed given Lack of EU-wide ENISA, CSA by regulatory NESAS/SCAS- is accepted by processes pending decision from Member States security European Regulation and manufacturers and operators, it defines no (NIS CG, ECCG)] certification Commission, supervisory oversight mechanisms from regulatory and ECCG bodies supervisory bodies.

text: Conformity Assessment Processes

text: No security While SECAM / SCAS scheme provides Assurance EU 5G CSA Scheme [Scheme to be developed given Lack of EU-wide ENISA, CSA evaluation of that accredited security test laboratories processes, pending decision from Member States security European Regulation the operational (vendors or third party) evaluate network 5G (NIS CG, ECCG)] certification Commission, environment product according to SCAS. Conformity components ECCG and security evaluation is performed on individual network products in a vendordocumented configuration for SECAM testing, without due consideration on the environment for specific deployments.

text: ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR 5G NETWORKS

text: December 2020

text: Insufficient The logic of the SECAM/SCAS scheme is Assurance EU 5G CSA Scheme [Scheme to be developed given Lack of EU-wide ENISA, CSA assurance of that environmental assumptions taken into processes, pending decision from Member States security European Regulation environmental consideration at product testing time are 5G (NIS CG, ECCG)] certification Commission, assumptions upheld and tested at deployment by the components ECCG Operator. This validation of environmental assumptions can only be performed during deployment and is needed for security, but at present no framework exists to provide sufficient assurance for a third-party certification

text: Certification Certification must not be a barrier to entry Assurance EU 5G CSA Scheme [Scheme to be developed given Lack of EU-wide ENISA, CSA overhead and or to innovation. Any certification scheme processes pending decision from Member States security European Regulation relevance needs to add value and go beyond a box (NIS CG, ECCG)] certification Commission, ticking exercise ECCG

text: No assessment No agreed assessment/certification Assurance EU 5G CSA Scheme [Scheme to be developed given Lack of EU-wide ENISA, CSA scheme for scheme for virtualised products. processes, pending decision from Member States security European Regulation evaluation of Virtualised (NIS CG, ECCG)] certification Commission, virtualized Network ECCG products Products

text: Insufficient Once the operator received the evaluation Assurance EU 5G CSA Scheme [Scheme to be developed given Lack of EU-wide ENISA, CSA security report, the operator then decides if the processes, pending decision from Member States security European Regulation assurance level results are sufficient according to its Legal (NIS CG, ECCG)] certification Commission, internal policies and whether to accept the Requirement ECCG security assurance level of the network s product or not. The operator's acceptance decision may depend on external forces such as regulatory requirements.

text: Re-use of In the absence of a recognized Assurance EU 5G CSA Scheme [Scheme to be developed given Lack of EU-wide ENISA, CSA evidence assessment scheme of conformity processes, pending decision from Member States security European Regulation created by assessment bodies, re-use of evidence Legal (NIS CG, ECCG)] certification Commission, conformity produced by auditors and laboratories to Requirement ECCG assessment support certification processes or s bodies regulatory compliance statements is limited.

text: ABOUT ENIS A The European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, ENISA, is the Union’s agency dedicated to achieving a high common level of cybersecurity across Europe. Established in 2004 and strengthened by the EU Cybersecurity Act, the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity contributes to EU cyber policy, enhances the trustworthiness of ICT products, services and processes with cybersecurity certification schemes, cooperates with Member States and EU bodies, and helps Europe prepare for the cyber challenges of tomorrow. Through knowledge sharing, capacity building and awareness raising, the Agency works together with its key stakeholders to strengthen trust in the connected economy, to boost resilience of the Union’s infrastructure, and, ultimately, to keep Europe’s society and citizens digitally secure. More information about ENISA and its work can be found at www.enisa.europa.eu. ISBN: 978-92-9204-445-9 DOI: 10.2824/802229