text: Regulation (EU) 2024/1789

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on the internal markets for renewable gas, natural gas and hydrogen, amending Regulations

text: (EU) No 1227/2011

text: (EU) 2017/1938

text: (EU) 2019/942

text: and

text: (EU) 2022/869

text: and Decision

text: (EU) 2017/684

text: and repealing

text: Regulation (EC) No 715/2009

text: (recast) Official Journal L, 2024/1789, 15.7.2024.

text: Commission Regulation (EU) 2017/459 of 16 March 2017

text: establishing a network code on capacity allocation mechanisms in gas transmission systems and repealing

text: Regulation (EU) No 984/2013

text: . Official Journal L 72, 17.3.2017.

text: Regulation (EU) 2024/1789

text: (EU) No 1227/2011

text: (EU) 2017/1938

text: (EU) 2019/942

text: and

text: (EU) 2022/869

text: and Decision

text: (EU) 2017/684

text: and repealing

text: Regulation (EC) No 715/2009

text: (recast). Official Journal 2024/1789, 15.7.2024. 4 ‘Until 5 February 2026, regulatory authorities may submit a request to the Commission for a derogation from the application of the network codes and guidelines referred to in paragraph 1 at entry points from and exit points to third countries pursuant to paragraph 2, point (d). The request for a derogation shall be submitted simultaneously to the Commission and to ACER. Within three months of the date of receipt of the request for a derogation ACER shall provide a reasoned opinion to the Commission. The Commission shall adopt a decision on the request for a derogation, taking into account ACER’s reasoned opinion and after assessing whether the regulatory authority has: (a) demonstrated that a network code or guideline, or specific element of those acts, cannot be effectively implemented at entry points from and exit points to third countries; in the case of interconnection points with third countries which have the obligation to adapt to the Union energy acquis, including this Regulation, pursuant to an agreement concluded between the Union and those third countries, but where application or implementation has not been completed, the request for a derogation shall specify which provisions of this Regulation have not been effectively applied or implemented in the third country concerned or which technical rules or lack of technical rules in the third country impede the application of the specific provisions of the relevant network code or guideline; (b) explained which measures were taken to alleviate the obstacles to the application of the specific provisions of the relevant network code or guideline; (c) demonstrated that the derogation is not detrimental to the proper functioning of the internal market for natural gas, or to the security of supply of the Union or of a Member State. The derogation shall be limited to the specific provisions that cannot be effectively implemented and shall be granted for a limited period of time.’

text: Delibera 14/2026/R/gas “Implementazione dell’articolo 70 del regolamento (UE) 2024/1789 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio. Modifiche alla deliberazione dell’Autorità 137/02”. 6

text: Regulation (EU) No 984/2013

text: . Official Journal L 72, 17.3.2017.

text: Regulation (EU) 2017/1938

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2017 concerning measures to safeguard the security of gas supply and repealing

text: Regulation (EU) No 994/2010

text: . Official Journal L 280, 28.10.2017.

text: ACER observes a reduction in quarterly capacity volumes offered after the additional FCFS allocations, likely confirming the partial application of the cascading principle established in CAM NC

text: Article 8(3)

text: , given that some volumes get reduced through the additional FCFS allocation.

text: Commission Regulation (EU) 2017/460 of 16 March 2017

text: establishing a network code on harmonised transmission tariff structures for gas. C/2017/1657 Official Journal L 72, 17.3.2017.

text: Link: https://www.snam.it/en/our-businesses/transportation/network-code-tariffs-committee-area-and-consultations/gastransmission-tariffs-2026.html.

text: ACER highlights the need for greater transparency concerning the publication of the results of the additional FCFS allocation process after its closure to ensure public accesses to such key market information and the transparency of the procedures, in line with the provisions of the CAM NC.

text: Some provisions of the TAR NC could address the specific circumstances highlighted by ARERA. For example, TAR NC

text: Article 12(1)

text: establishes that the level of multipliers and of seasonal factors may be different at interconnection points, TAR NC

text: Article 13(1)

text: (a) establish that the multipliers for quarterly and monthly products must not be less than 1, TAR NC

text: Article 28

text: sets the procedures and the criteria for consultations on, among others, multipliers and seasonal factors. These provisions could support lower multipliers for shorter-term products at entry points connected via long-distance pipelines to production fields located in third countries. This would allow network users to book additional capacity after the annual July auction at a price equivalent to the yearly tariff, potentially mitigating the financial penalty associated with short-term bookings in contexts where long-term supply stability is key.

identifier: ACER Opinion No 10/2026

title: ACER Opinion 10-2026 on the derogation request submitted by the Italian Regulatory Authority for Energy, Networks and Environment (ARERA) from the application of the network codes and guidelines

text: No 10/2026

text: OPINION

text: on the derogation request submitted by the Italian Regulatory Authority for Energy, Networks and Environment (ARERA) from the application of the network codes and guidelines, referred to in Article points from the Trans-Mediterranean pipeline and the Greenstream pipeline

text: 30 April 2026

text: A C E R O P I N I O N N O 1 0 / 2 0 2 6

text: Executive summary

text: Pursuant to

text: Article 70(3) of Regulation (EU) 2024/1789

text: (‘Gas Regulation’), ACER is required to provide the European Commission with a reasoned opinion within three months of the date of receipt of a request for a derogation, submitted by a national regulatory authority (‘NRA’) in line with the aforementioned provision, from the implementation of network codes or guidelines, referred to in Article 70(1) of the Gas Regulation, or specific elements of them. On 5 February 2026, the Italian Regulatory Authority for Energy, Networks and Environment (‘ARERA’) submitted to the European Commission and ACER a request for a derogation from the application of specific provisions of

text: Commission Regulation (EU) 2017/459

text: (‘CAM NC’) regarding the Gela and Mazara del Vallo entry points from third countries. The request concerns a derogation, for a period of five years, from the application of Article 8(1) of the abovementioned Regulation. The derogation requested by ARERA specifically relates to the possibility for the Italian transmission system operator to offer the volume of capacity not successfully allocated in the year-ahead auction, or subsequent infra-yearly auctions, via an additional allocation mechanism according to which capacity is allocated to network users based on the order of requests received (‘additional FCFS allocation’). In this case, the network user pays the same amount that it would have paid had it participated in the yearahead auction, i.e., the tariff resulting from the year-ahead auction multiplied by all the days of the gas year, irrespective of when this capacity is purchased. This additional allocation mechanism was introduced in 2021, based on network users’ requests and following a public consultation. All the other provisions of the CAM NC fully apply at these entry points from third countries since 2017. The Gela and Mazara del Vallo entry points are connected through long-distance pipelines, crossing third countries (such as Libya, Algeria, and Tunisia) and international waters, to upstream production fields located in third countries, namely Libya and Algeria, respectively. These third countries are characterised by different infrastructure access procedures and different levels of market development compared to those of the Union gas market. Specifically, rules and procedures for the allocation of upstream production access rights in the concerned third countries and the corresponding procedures for accessing these pipelines are not aligned with the year-ahead auction calendar under the CAM NC. Furthermore, no contractual congestion is registered at such entry points, e.g., booking levels are, on average, 60% of the available capacity at the Mazara del Vallo entry point. Furthermore, congestion management procedures are in place to handle potential capacity hoarding.

text: Conclusion

text: A C E R O P I N I O N N O 1 0 / 2 0 2 6

text: A C E R O P I N I O N N O 1 0 / 2 0 2 6

text: 1. Background

text: Regulation (EU) 2024/1789

text: (‘Gas Regulation’) extends the application of network codes and guidelines, referred to in Article 70(2) of the Gas Regulation (‘network codes and guidelines’), to the entry points from and exit points to third countries, namely countries that are not members of the European Union. The principle embedded in the Regulation at issue is the enhancement of the internal gas market by supporting cross-border trade and efficient operations also at the borders with third countries. Applying network codes and guidelines at these border points helps to avoid market fragmentation and ensures the seamless functioning of the internal market, in particular by guaranteeing consistent rules, non-discriminatory access and efficient cross-border trading conditions, even at the borders of the Union.

text: Article 70(2)

text: (d) of the Gas Regulation lays down that network codes and guidelines shall apply to all interconnection points within the Union and to entry points from and exit points to third countries from 5 August 2026.

text: 3 Furthermore,

text: Article 70(3)

text: thereof states that until 5 February 2026 national regulatory authorities (‘NRAs’) may submit a request to the European Commission and ACER for a derogation from the application of the network codes and guidelines at entry points from and exit points to third countries pursuant to

text: Article 70(2)

text: (d).

text: 4 ACER shall provide a reasoned opinion to the European Commission within three months of the date of receipt of the request for a derogation. In its reasoned opinion ACER provides an assessment on the request submitted by the NRA. The European Commission shall adopt a decision on the request for a derogation, taking into account ACER’s reasoned opinion and after assessing the existence of the conditions listed in

text: Article 70(3)

text: (a), (b) and (c).

text: 5 Notably, whether the NRA has demonstrated that provisions of a network code or guideline cannot be effectively implemented at an entry point from or exit point to a third country; has taken measures to alleviate obstacles to such implementation; and has shown that the derogation is not detrimental to the internal gas market or to the security of supply of the Union or of a Member State. The derogation shall be limited to specific provisions that cannot be effectively implemented and shall be granted by the European Commission for a limited period of time. A C E R O P I N I O N N O 1 0 / 2 0 2 6

text: 6 Furthermore, Recital 95 of the Gas Regulation acknowledges that specific circumstances, including the existence of long-term contractual arrangements or legal difficulties in establishing dispute resolution procedures with transmission system operators or natural gas suppliers established in third countries, may prevent the effective application of network codes in the short term. A C E R O P I N I O N N O 1 0 / 2 0 2 6

text: 2. Procedure

text: 8 On 5 February 2026, ACER received from the Italian Regulatory Authority for Energy, Networks and Environment (‘ARERA’), in written form via electronic post, a request for a derogation from the application of network codes and guidelines at entry and exit points with third countries pursuant to Article 70(3) of the Gas Regulation. Specifically, ACER received ARERA’s Resolution 14/2026/R/Gas issued on 3 February 2026 and ARERA’s accompanying letter.

text: 9 Upon the submission of the derogation request, and after an in-depth analysis thereof, ACER has interacted with ARERA to further clarify elements included in the derogation request. ACER has thus taken due account of the additional information provided by the NRA in its assessment.

text: 10 On 31 March 2026, ACER shared the draft version of the reasoned opinion with the involved NRA for a factual check and to verify the completeness of the information provided.

text: 11 On 30 April 2026, ACER adopted this reasoned opinion and sent it to the European Commission in accordance with Article 70(3) of the Gas Regulation following the prescribed timeline.

text: 3. Summary of Derogation Request

text: 12 The derogation request submitted by ARERA refers to the application of the

text: Commission Regulation (EU) 2017/459

text: (‘CAM NC’) at the following entry points from third countries: 1) Gela entry point from the Greenstream pipeline. 2) Mazara del Vallo entry point from the Trans-Mediterranean pipeline.

text: 13 ARERA requests to the European Commission a derogation from the capacity allocation provisions set forth in Article 8(1) of the CAM NC. The proposal seeks to allow the Italian transmission system operator (‘TSO’), Snam Rete Gas S.p.A., to offer residual year-ahead capacity, namely the capacity not allocated after the auction referred to in Article 11(4) of the CAM NC, or subsequent infra-yearly auctions, through an additional mechanism in which the network user requests capacity to the TSO at any time after the publication of the auction results. Such capacity is, therefore, allocated based on the order of requests received (‘additional FCFS allocation’). Irrespective of when this allocation happens, the network user pays a price equal to the tariff resulting from the year-ahead auction multiplied by all the days of the relevant gas year.

text: 14 ARERA requests a derogation for a period of five years.

text: 15 ARERA bases the derogation request on the following grounds: • The entry points of Gela and Mazara del Vallo are connected to long-distance pipelines linked to gas production fields located in Libya and Algeria, respectively. These pipelines play a key role in ensuring security of gas supply to Italy and the European Union. In the exchanges held with ACER following the submission of the derogation request, ARERA has highlighted the role of the current geopolitical and unstable situation regarding LNG markets, and the key role of Algerian gas imports to Italy, which have replaced the imports of gas of Russian origin since the energy market crisis of 2022, to become Italy’s primary source of gas supply. A C E R O P I N I O N N O 1 0 / 2 0 2 6 • Gas markets in Algeria and Libya are neither liberalised nor competitive to the same extent as the Union gas market and do not follow the access regime on which the CAM NC allocation rules are based. • The requirement to sign long-term contracts with the third-country producers affects capacity allocation needs of network users at the Italian entry side at the two points. Furthermore, the authorisations required to access such pipelines, outside Italy, are granted by the third countries’ authorities and the access conditions to the pipelines as well as the services provided by such pipeline operators are not market-based. • ARERA highlights that the CAM NC has been fully applied at the Italian side of these entry points from third countries since 2017. In 2021, some network users reported concerns regarding coordinating the timetable of CAM auctions with the signature of gas contracts on the supply side. Thus, and following a public consultation, ARERA introduced the allocation of residual year-ahead capacity through an allocation mechanism based on the order of the request received to ensure the effective application of CAM NC and to address the abovementioned obstacles at these entry points. These residual provisions hence are currently in force. • ARERA expects that extending the application of the measure after 6 August 2026 will ensure a higher level of use of the existing infrastructure and reduce costs for consumers, while it will also contribute to the security of gas supply, in line with the objectives of

text: Regulation (EU) 2017/1938

text: . • ARERA states that the removal of such additional allocation mechanism, which has been in place since 2021, could negatively affect the economic viability of supply arrangements and the security of gas supply in Italy and the European Union, as network users would need to procure intra-year capacity products at higher tariffs than the tariffs applying to the annual products. ARERA states that the continuation of the implementation of the additional capacity mechanism increases security of supply and does not contradict market efficiency. • Furthermore, ARERA states that a marginal volume of capacity has been booked via such additional mechanism since its implementation in 2021 and does not impact demand patterns negatively.

text: 4. ACER assessment

text: 4.1. Application of CAM NC at Gela and Mazara del Vallo entry points from third countries

text: 16 In 2017, ARERA implemented all CAM NC provisions at such entry points from third countries even if it was not prescribed by the CAM NC at that time. In fact, the implementation of the provisions of the network codes and guidelines at the entry points from third countries has been established in the Gas Regulation, published in July 2024, effective as of 5 August 2026.

text: 17 In 2021, ARERA approved an additional allocation procedure with reference to the year-ahead capacity product, or for parts of this yearly product, according to which the TSO makes available for purchase the volume of capacity not successfully allocated in the year-ahead auction, or of subsequent infra-yearly auctions, based on the order of requests received (‘additional FCFS allocation’). In this case, the network user pays the same amount that it would have paid had it A C E R O P I N I O N N O 1 0 / 2 0 2 6 participated in the year-ahead auction, i.e., the tariff resulting from the year-ahead auction multiplied by all the days of the gas year, irrespective of when this capacity is purchased.

text: 18 The additional FCFS allocation only applies at the Gela entry and at the Mazara del Vallo entry points from third countries.

text: 19 In practice, year-ahead capacity at the Gela and Mazara del Vallo entry points from third countries is offered on the PRISMA platform, in the auction held once per year, i.e. on the first Monday of July, in line with the CAM NC provisions. In addition, in case of volumes of capacity not allocated in the abovementioned year-ahead auction (or in the subsequent infra-annual auctions) on PRISMA and in case a market participant requests such volumes, they can be offered by the TSO via additional FCFS allocation after July via its capacity booking platform ‘Portale Capacità’. Such additional FCFS allocation could be potentially carried out also after the start of the gas year, for a duration corresponding to the residual part of it, whereas the network users still pay the tariff for the entire gas year, i.e., resulting from the yearly auction multiplied by all the days of the gas year, irrespective of when this allocation happens. Network users may request capacity only for the gas year that is about to start, or—once the gas year has already commenced—for the ongoing gas year.

text: 20 Under the auction calendar established by the CAM NC, the auction for yearly capacity is held once a year on the first Monday of July. Auctions for quarterly capacity products take place four times per year: specifically, on the first Mondays of August, November, February, and May. During the quarterly auction held in August, all four quarters of the upcoming gas year are offered. Should additional FCFS year-ahead capacity be allocated after the August auction, such a procedure would deviate from the principle set forth in CAM NC

text: Article 8(3)

text: , which establishes a logical order in which capacity products covering longer durations are offered before those with the next shortest duration for the same period (‘cascading’ principle). Consequently, if volumes were booked via the additional FCFS allocation beforehand, the TSO would offer lower volumes in the November quarterly auction, where the remaining three quarters are sold. ACER acknowledges that, as enough capacity has been available since 2021 for the auctions compared to the capacity booked, this has until now not represented an obstacle to book all other intrayearly products.

text: 21 Therefore, ACER observes that such additional FCFS allocation, for which the derogation is sought, and the corresponding product, would deviate from the CAM NC provisions established in

text: Article 8(1)

text: , according to which capacity shall only be allocated via auctions;

text: Article 8(3)

text: , establishing the abovementioned ‘cascading’ principle; and

text: Article 9

text: , which establishes the type of standard capacity products.

text: 22 The CAM NC provides network users with the possibility to purchase capacity covering all the 12 months from October to September of the following year, or part of this period, not only in the annual year-ahead auction held in July, but also in the following quarterly and monthly auctions. For example, a quarterly auction is held on the first Monday of August (offering all four quarters of the following gas year), a monthly auction is held on the third Monday of September (offering the month of October), a monthly auction is held on the third Monday of October (offering the month of November), a quarterly auction is held on the first Monday of November (offering the remaining three quarters of the gas year), and a monthly auction is held on the third Monday of November (offering the month of December).

text: 23 According to the

text: Commission Regulation (EU) 2017/460

text: (‘TAR NC’), multipliers apply to the price of shorter-term products, i.e. from quarterly to within-day durations. The same multipliers A C E R O P I N I O N N O 1 0 / 2 0 2 6 apply at all interconnection points of the Italian transportation network, and are set at 1.2 for quarterly products, 1.3 for monthly products, 1.5 for daily products, and 1.5 for within-day products for 2026 . This means that quarterly capacity products can be purchased at 20% higher tariffs than yearly products, and monthly capacity products can be purchased at 30% higher than yearly products.

text: 24 Furthermore, the tariffs applying at Gela and Mazara del Vallo entry points in 2026 are higher than the tariffs applying at the entry side of the other Italian interconnection points, i.e. from 110% to 250% higher, as a natural consequence of the reference price methodology applied by ARERA. In fact, such entry points from third countries are in the southern part of the Sicily island, which is in the south of Italy.

text: 25 The Gela and Mazara entry points are connected via long-distance pipelines to upstream production fields located, respectively, in Libya and Algeria. The gas originating from the Algerian production fields is transported for more than 2700 km to Mazara del Vallo, first in a pipeline located in Algeria, then in a pipeline located in Tunisia, and eventually via the Trans- Mediterranean pipeline, which is an under-sea pipeline located between Tunis in Tunisia and Mazara del Vallo in Italy.

text: 26 The gas originating from the Libyan production fields is transported first in a pipeline located in Libya and then via the Greenstream pipeline, which is an undersea pipeline located between west Libya and Gela. In such third countries, infrastructure access provisions are not aligned with those of the Union gas market and the market itself is not aligned with the level of the Union gas market.

text: 27 ARERA states that the contractual arrangements to access upstream production capacity in Libya and Algeria, and the transportation capacity’s access conditions in Libya, Algeria, and Tunisia, depend on the conditions and procedures established by the third countries’ authorities, and are therefore not under the control of market participants, nor aligned with the CAM NC provisions.

text: 28 ACER acknowledges that, in the absence of market competition, a reasonable market participant would purchase transportation capacity only if it has secured production and transportation capacity access rights from third-country authorities. Otherwise, such market participant would face a potentially high economic loss deriving from the difficulty to successfully re-sell such transportation capacity.

text: 29 ACER acknowledges the presence of different infrastructure access procedures and different levels of market development between such third countries and the Union gas market. Therefore, ACER notes that these contractual and factual circumstances in place in the concerned third countries are likely to negatively impact the effective implementation of CAM NC

text: Article 8(1)

text: Article 8(3)

text: , and

text: Article 9

text: at the Gela and Mazara del Vallo entry points from third countries.

text: 30 ACER has limited information on the abovementioned specific conditions, as information related to the infrastructure access in the third countries (i.e., Libya, Tunisia, Algeria) and to the supply contracts with upstream producers in Libya and Algeria is not publicly available.

text: 31 ACER notes that these entry points from third countries have not registered contractual congestion until now. ARERA informs that the capacity booked at the Mazara del Vallo point is circa 60% of the available capacity, leaving the remaining 40% as usually not booked. This element, combined with the ongoing application of procedures for contractual congestions in line with Annex I, paragraph 2.2. of the Gas Regulation at both points and combined with the need for the additional FCFS network user to pay all the annual gas year price irrespective of when A C E R O P I N I O N N O 1 0 / 2 0 2 6 this capacity is booked, reduces the risk that the additional FCFS allocation contributes to a situation of capacity hoarding.

text: 32 ACER acknowledges the marginal utilisation of such additional FCFS allocation methodology since 2021. Based on the data provided by ARERA, since the implementation of the additional FCFS allocation methodology, which was approved in July 2021 with effects from October 2021, such additional FCFS capacity was not purchased every year. On a volume-weighted average basis, this additional FCFS booked capacity accounted for less than 5% of the capacity offered in the year-ahead auctions and was only allocated at the Mazara del Vallo entry point. This likely confirms the specific situation of low market liquidity in the third countries and the difficulty of accessing upstream fields and the required long-distance infrastructure in those third countries by the timings established in CAM NC for the year-ahead auction. However, in the absence of specific feedback from market participants, including their expectations, ACER notes that it is not possible to effectively assess the impact on the market deriving from the removal of the additional FCFS allocation and that a public consultation would be required to carry out such assessment.

text: 33 Based on the auction data published on PRISMA, ACER observes that this additional FCFS allocation mechanism has not precluded the application of Articles 8(6) and 8(7) of the CAM NC, which mandate the reservation of a minimum share of technical capacity for quarterly products and for capacity offered no earlier than five years before delivery.

text: 34 ACER notes that the results of such additional allocation mechanism are communicated to the successful applicant, rather than made public after the closure of the additional FCFS allocation mechanism. Such provision is not in line with the principle of transparency established in the CAM NC, considering that the CAM NC requires the publication of the results of capacity allocation procedures after their conclusion.

text: 4.2. ACER considerations

text: 35 ACER observes that the additional FCFS allocation, for which the derogation is sought, and the corresponding product, would deviate from the CAM NC provisions established in

text: Article 8(1)

text: Article 8(3)

text: Article 9

text: Article 70(3)

text: (a) of the Gas Regulation refers to the need for an NRA to demonstrate that it is not possible to effectively implement a network code or guideline, or part of those acts.

text: 37 The Gas Regulation does not provide a definition of effective implementation of network codes or guidelines, or part of them, however Recital 95 refers to the existence of specific circumstances, including the existence of long-term contractual arrangements or legal difficulties in establishing dispute resolution procedures with the TSO or natural gas suppliers established in third countries, which may prevent the effective application of network codes in the short term.

text: 38 ACER acknowledges that the contractual circumstances applying at the entry points connected to production fields via long-distance pipelines would mostly follow the volume pattern dictated by these production fields.

text: 39 ACER acknowledges the existence of specific contractual circumstances at such entry points from third countries, which are imposed by the conditions established by the third countries’ authorities to access production rights and transportation capacity rights. A C E R O P I N I O N N O 1 0 / 2 0 2 6

text: 40 ACER is of the opinion that the abovementioned specific circumstances hinder the implementation of CAM NC

text: Article 8(1)

text: Article 8(3)

text: , and

text: Article 9

text: 41 ACER cannot access the contractual arrangements and procedures in place in the third countries. Therefore, ACER cannot objectively assess the magnitude of the actual or foreseen negative impact of such specific circumstances on the effective implementation of CAM NC

text: Article 8(1)

text: , and

text: Article 8(3)

text: 42 ACER notes the low risk of capacity hoarding deriving from the implementation of the additional FCFS allocation due to three main elements, specifically the availability of considerable amounts and shares of capacity, the implementation of congestion management procedures, and the price established for the additional FCFS allocation capacity, which is equal to the price of the auction applied to every day of the gas year, irrespective of when the additional FCFS capacity is booked.

text: 43 ACER also notes that tariffs applying at the Gela and Mazara del Vallo entry points are higher compared to those applying at the entry side of the other interconnection points in the Italian gas transportation network (e.g., Passo Gries, Tarvisio, etc), i.e. from 110% to 240% higher, and that the application of the relevant multipliers would increase the tariffs by at least 20% in case of quarterly products, and by at least 30% in case of monthly products .

text: 44 ACER notes that some of the proposed amendments to the CAM NC, if confirmed in the current comitology process, could be beneficial for network users at such entry points from third countries, as, for example, the TSO could offer the yearly capacity volumes, not allocated on the first Monday of July, in subsequent auctions to be held later during July. ACER supports ARERA’s decision of carrying out a public consultation, once the new provisions of the amended CAM NC enter into force, to assess the new allocation opportunities provided by the revised Code, with a view to comprehensively assessing the appropriateness and necessity of removing the additional FCFS allocation mechanism, and with the publication of the consultation results.

text: 45 ACER is of the opinion that the continuation of the measure would not be detrimental to the security of supply in Italy or to that of other European Member States. The gas of Algerian origin, which accounts for almost 50% of Italian demand, is a key source of gas for the Italian and the European customers and has replaced the gas of Russian origin since the energy crisis of 2022, becoming the primary source of gas imports to Italy since then and supporting the Italian and European security of supply with significant volumes. ACER acknowledges that the volumes allocated under the additional FCFS mechanism have so far been marginal and are intended to complement the CAM NC auctions, reflecting the specific circumstances existing in the third countries concerned, as well as the availability of considerable amounts and shares of capacity not booked at these entry points from third countries. ACER is of the opinion that it cannot objectively assess the market impact deriving from the removal of this additional FCFS allocation measure in the absence of specific feedback from market participants, including their expectations. A C E R O P I N I O N N O 1 0 / 2 0 2 6

text: 5. Conclusions

text: 46 ACER acknowledges that specific circumstances exist in the third countries concerned, namely Libya, Algeria and Tunisia, which have led ARERA to establish an additional FCFS capacity allocation mechanism at the Gela and Mazara del Vallo entry points from third countries. ACER also acknowledges that the additional FCFS allocation mechanism has been introduced by ARERA to overcome the obstacles of selected provisions of the CAM NC in the view of certain contractual conditions.

text: 47 ACER further acknowledges that the volumes allocated under the additional FCFS mechanism have been marginal until now, i.e., on a weighted average less than 5% of the capacity offered in the gas yearly auctions, as a reflection of the specific circumstances existing in the third countries concerned, and that, irrespective of when a network user purchases the additional FCFS capacity, it will pay an amount corresponding to the tariff resulting from the gas yearly auction multiplied by all the days of the gas year. ACER also acknowledges that considerable amounts and shares of capacity are available and that congestion management procedures are implemented. In the absence of specific feedback from market participants, including their expectations, ACER notes that it is not possible to effectively assess the impact on the market deriving from the removal of the additional FCFS allocation.

text: 48 In Section 4 of this Opinion, ACER has analysed ARERA’s derogation request to assist the European Commission in its decision. In this context, and noting that this aspect may be taken into account in the decision of the European Commission, ACER further notes that, taking into consideration the European Commission’s decision and in light of the design it establishes, it supports ARERA’s decision to carry out a public consultation once the envisaged amendments to the CAM NC enter into force, with the results duly published. This process should focus on the implementation of the revised CAM NC, by comprehensively assessing the appropriateness and necessity of the additional FCFS allocation mechanism and by duly ensuring a timely alignment with the Union gas market. This Opinion is addressed to the European Commission. Done at Ljubljana, on 30 April 2026. — SIGNED — V. ZULEGER, ACER Director ad interim

type: vagledning

utgivare: acer


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title: ACER Opinion 11-2017 on ENTSOG's Summer Supply Outlook 2017


identifier: ACER Opinion No 11/2018

title: ACER Opinion 11-2018 on the Review of National Development Plans Consistency with EU TYNDP


identifier: ACER Opinion No 11/2019

title: ACER Opinion 11-2019 on the ENTSO-E Draft Ten-Year Network Development Plan 2018


text: https://www.entsog.eu/sites/default/files/2021-10/SO0032-21_Winter%20Supply%20Outlook_2021-22.pdf Page 1 of 11

text: Opinion No 11/2021

text: st 5 a. The EU storage level on 1 October 2021 (831 TWh , 75% of overall storage capacity) is one of the lowest in recent years, with varying situations among countries going from 50% in Portugal and 53% in Austria to 91 % in Croatia

text: Including some non-EU countries. For details, see WSO 2021/2022, p.14 3 In particular, the routes considered to assess the disruption of gas supply scenario are: Ukraine, Belarus, Baltic States and Finland, Algerian pipes and LNG. 4 https://www.entsog.eu/sites/default/files/2021-10/SO0032-21_Winter%20Supply%20Review%202020-21.pdf 5 This total includes 9.4 TWh of gas in storage in the UK.

text: Opinion No 11/2021

text: WSO 2021/2022, p. 17. For an updated view of the storage level, please consult the Aggregated Gas Storage Inventory at GIE AGSI+: https://agsi.gie.eu/. ACER notes that data in Figure 11 does not allow to reproduce the gas in storage level of 831 TWh for the EU-27 and the UK (sum of data in Figure 11 leads to a value of 821 TWh). 7 Ibid, p.31. 8 Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia.

text: Opinion No 11/2021

text: For an overall assessment of the reasons, see ACER’s note on High Energy Prices, p.5 https://documents.acer.europa.eu/en/The_agency/Organisation/Documents/Energy%20Prices_Final.pdf 10 WSO 2021/2022, p. 17. 11 As of 4 November 2021, the % filling storage level of UGS Haidach - GSA (AT) is 2%, UGS Haidach - Astora (AT) 55%, UGS Rehden (DE) 9.5% and UGS Bergermeer (NL) 30%. However, the average % filling storage level is 56% in Austria, 71% in Germany and 58% in the Netherlands. Source: GIE AGSI+ platform, accessed on 4 November 2021. 12 WSO 2021/2022, p.21.

text: Opinion No 11/2021

text: UGS withdrawals account to approximately 20% of the EU and UK gas consumption of the winter season. 14 Source: ICIS-HEREN gas TTF future prices. As of 26 October, forward curves for gas wholesale contracts delivered for November and December 2021 and Q1 2022 show high-record prices (values surpassing 85 €/MWh on Dutch TTF). 15 WSO 2021/2022, p.47.

text: Opinion No 11/2021

text: https://www.entsog.eu/sites/default/files/entsogmigration/publications/sos/ENTSOG%20Union%20wide%20SoS%20simulation%20report_INV0262- 171121.pdf

text: See paragraph 6 - d. 18 In Finland, the majority of gas is consumed at large industrial and energy production plants. In these plants, gas may easily be replaced by oil, as in Finland these plants have a legal obligation to store oil. The remaining consumption of gas which cannot be replaced by oil may be replaced by LNG imports. Additionally, the large Incukalns Underground Gas Storage (UGS) in Latvia may be used for sourcing gas in cases of eastern supply interruptions. 19 This situation will improve once the gas interconnection Poland-Lithuania (GIPL) will enter into operation, which is foreseen by Q3 2022.

text: Opinion No 11/2021

text: A comparison of storage capacity in absolute level would lead to a different result, since storage capacity has gradually increased in Europe over the last 10 years. 21 E.g. End by 31 October 2021 of the transit agreement for the GME pipeline, which brought gas from Algeria to Spain through Morocco (which is compensated by an increase of transmission capacity and capacity booked at Medgaz, the pipeline connecting Algeria to Spain, as well as an increase in LNG imports); or the availability of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. 22 Add reference to ACER’s November assessment of high energy prices 23 Winter Supply Outlook 2021/22, p.5.

text: Opinion No 11/2021

text: Ibid, p.25. 25 I.e. the reduction of gas demand in case of very atypical high gas prices, a phenomenon which is likely to occur and possible to model, although challenging to quantify.

text: Opinion No 11/2021

text: See paragraph 18 of the Opinion, main risk factors for upcoming winter.

text: Opinion No 11/2021

text: Opinion No 11/2021

text: st 27

text: Country WGV [TWh] GIS [TWh] Filling level of storage [%]

text: Austria 95.48 50.84 53.3 Belgium 9.00 7.79 86.5 Bulgaria 6.27 4.40 70.2 Croatia 5.22 4.73 90.8 Czechia 35.99 30.62 85.1 Cyprus Denmark 9.08 7.36 81.0 Estonia Finland France 128.46 115.12 89.6 Germany 230.31 156.00 68.7 Greece Hungary 67.70 56.40 83.3 Ireland Italy 197.73 169.14 85.5 Latvia 21.80 17.46 80.1 Lithuania Luxembourg Malta Netherlands 143.81 83.97 58.4 Poland 35.79 34.46 96.3 Portugal 3.57 1.78 49.8 Romania 32.99 23.82 72.2 Slovakia 38.75 27.30 70.5 Slovenia Spain 34.25 25.02 73.1 Sweden 0.01 0.01 66.4

text: EU‐27 1096.2 816.2 74.5

text: Source: ENTSOG’s WSO 2021/2022, p. 17. ENTSOG informed ACER, after the Outlook’s publication, of a small discrepancy in the value for GIS in Germany (156 TWh instead of 151 TWh published in the Outlook). Probably there is also a mistake in the Outlook for the German WGV of 222 TWh, since AGSI+ platform data provides a value of 230 TWh.

identifier: ACER Opinion No 11/2021

title: ACER Opinion 11-2021 on ENTSOG’s Winter Supply Outlook 2021-2022

text: PUBLIC

text: OPINION No 11/2021 OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR THE COOPERATION OF ENERGY REGULATORS of 16 December 2021 on ENTSOG’s Winter Supply Outlook 2021/2022

type: rubrik

text: THE EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR THE COOPERATION OF ENERGY REGULATORS, Having regard to

text: Regulation (EU) 2019/942

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 establishing a European Union Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators Regulation (‘ACER’), and, in particular,

text: Article 4(3)

text: (b) thereof, Having regard to

text: Regulation (EC) No 715/2009

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on conditions for access to the natural gas transmission networks and repealing

text: Regulation (EC) No 1775/2005

text: , and, in particular, Articles

text: and

text: thereof, Having regard to the outcome of the consultation with the ACER’s Gas Working Group, Having regard to the favourable opinion of the Board of Regulators of 15 December 2021, delivered pursuant to

text: Article 22(5) of Regulation (EU) 2019/942

text: , Whereas:

text: 1. INTRODUCTION

text: (1) On 12 October 2021, the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Gas (‘ENTSOG’) published the Winter Supply Outlook 2021/2022 (‘WSO 2021/2022’) pursuant to

text: Article 8(3)

text: (f) of

text: Regulation (EC) No 715/2009

text: . (2) Pursuant to

text: Article 4(3)

text: (b) of

text: Regulation (EU) 2019/942

text: , ACER may provide an Opinion to ENTSOG on, inter alia, relevant documents referred to in

text: Article 8(3) of Regulation (EC) No 715/2009

text: , as submitted to ACER pursuant to

text: Article 9(2)

text: , first subparagraph, of

text: Regulation (EC) No 715/2009

text: 2. SUMMARY OF THE DOCUMENT

text: (3) In the WSO 2021/2022, ENTSOG undertakes an assessment of the resilience of the European gas network for the upcoming winter (October 2021 to March 2022). ENTSOG’s analysis investigates the ability of the gas infrastructure to dispatch the necessary supply volumes to meet gas demand, and especially to deal with high demand situations, provided that gas supply is available. The Outlook is based on assumptions of gas supply potentials based on historical gas supplies during the last 10 years, and it looks into the possible evolution of gas supplies and underground gas storage (UGS) utilisation levels during the upcoming winter withdrawal season. ENTSOG’s modelling simulates the ability of the gas infrastructure system to ensure supply and demand adequacy under a “reference” and a “cold” winter at the end of the winter season (mid-February). In addition, the WSO simulates and “stresses” the gas infrastructure under two scenarios of high demand linked to cold weather at the end of the winter season, namely under a “peak day” and a “2-week cold spell”, plus disruptions of major routes of gas supply to the European Union . Annexes A-D to the Outlook provide additional analyses of the assumptions and the simulations.

text: (4) ENTSOG has also reviewed and published a report on the European gas supply and demand for the past Winter 2020/2021 , which aims to provide an ex-post analysis of the gas demand and supply in the previous seasons. The report is published on voluntary basis along with the WSO 2021/2022.

text: 3. ASSESSMENT OF THE DOCUMENT

text: (5) ACER welcomes the timely publication of the WSO 2021/2022 and accompanying documents ahead of the winter season, especially in view of a winter where supplies may be tighter than usual. ACER appreciates the analysis of the historical gas supply and demand patterns, as well as of the evolution of storage levels for the upcoming winter resulting from the assumptions and simulations contained in the Outlook.

text: ENTSOG main findings and framework of analysis

text: (6) ACER takes notes and underlines the importance of the following conclusions contained in the WSO 2021/2022:

text: and 96% in Poland . This is primarily due to a record high use of storage flexibility during the previous winter 2020/2021 and a low injection during the summer with record-high wholesale gas prices.

text: b. The European gas infrastructure offers sufficient flexibility to dispatch the necessary supply volumes to meet demand in Europe, assuming that gas is imported by the market in similar volumes as in recent years. However, in case of a cold winter, the gas market would need to increase imports from pipelines and/or LNG by 5% to 10% compared to the maximum volumes observed in recent years.

text: c. Early and significant gas withdrawals from storages would result in low storage levels at the end of the winter season. Such low level of gas inventories may have a negative impact on the flexibility of the gas system to meet demand and can increase the exposure to demand curtailment in selected regions during the latter part of the winter season.

text: d. South-Eastern Europe has significantly reduced its exposure to demand curtailment following the commissioning of new infrastructures, such as the Trans Adriatic Pipeline, Turk stream and other investments . However, countries in the risk group Ukraine could be exposed to demand curtailment in case of extremely low temperatures combined with import route disruptions of Russian gas via Ukraine. Countries in the risk group formed by Estonia, Finland, Latvia, and Lithuania could be exposed to demand curtailment in case of extremely low temperatures combined with import route interruptions from Russia.

text: (7) As in previous seasonal outlooks, ACER notes that the modelling approach assumes that imported gas supplies will be available to serve demand under the assumption of available “additional flexibility” per supply source within the limits of historically observed maximum flows. Thus, the modelling is aimed to check whether the gas transmission network and storages can handle the necessary supply volumes to meet demand, including by withdrawing gas from storage. It does not consider whether supply constraints can be expected, nor what the price effects of limited supply might be.

text: The role and level of inventories in gas storage

text: (8) ACER concurs with ENTSOG that gas storages play an important role to balance the European gas system and to cover peak demand during winter. The role of storages becomes more relevant in a context where the EU indigenous gas production consistently declines year on year, increasing the gas import dependency from external gas producers to the EU. ACER notes that the storage inventory level on 1 October 2021 is one of the lowest of the past 9 years. This is primarily due to a low storage level at the end of last winter, combined with a storage injection season characterised by extremely high gas wholesale prices which did not incentivise market participants to store as much gas for this year in comparison to previous years .

text: (9) ACER notes that varying stock levels across Member States may be explained by the type of access regulations to storage and differences in storage obligations. Gas storage regulation in the EU differs between Member States. Two main categories of storage regulations can be distinguished: a pure market-based approach or some type of regulatory intervention, in the form of revenue reconciliation, storage obligations or strategic storage. In comparison to the previous years, Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, all of which opted for a market-based approach, have a lower than usual storage level. In these countries, the low filling levels of large UGS facilities under the ownership or contractual control of Gazprom Export are the main driver of a lower than usual storage level .

text: (10) ACER notes that the winter supply modelling assumptions correctly take into account that the storage withdrawal capacity depends on the filling level, since the deliverability of storage is significantly reduced at low filling levels . ACER appreciates the inclusion in the WSO 2021/2022 of an additional sensitivity analysis of the final storage level at the end of the winter, which interacts with the gas supply imports possibilities to meet gas demand. ACER underscores ENTSOG’s conclusion that in case of a cold winter, gas import needs for the EU and the UK could be 5% to 10% higher than observed in the recent years. ACER believes that this need for additional imports of 5% to 10% in case of a cold winter raises a price risk concern (in the form of exposure to unprecedented high scarcity prices on the wholesale markets) to the extent that these additional import needs require new (short-term) gas piped or LNG sourcing contracts.

text: (11) ACER welcomes ENTSOG’s intention to monitor the evolution of the storage levels and import volumes throughout the upcoming winter and to report on the situation on regular basis and if serious anomalies are identified. In addition, ACER highlights the critical importance of counting with adequate storage levels at the end of the winter season to cover still possible high demand or system stress situations.

text: (12) ACER concurs with ENTSOG that early and significant withdrawal from storages will have a negative impact on the flexibility of the gas system and can increase the exposure to supply risks towards the end of the winter. As the actual use of imports and/or storage is eventually determined by market participants, ACER expects storage users to prudently withdraw gas from storage . Furthermore, ACER calls on national competent authorities to monitor appropriately and take available measures to favour a gas withdrawal pattern that would safeguard the continuity of gas deliveries during the entire winter, in compliance with contractual and storage obligations, where applicable.

text: LNG as a critical import flexibility source for this winter

text: (13) ACER concurs with ENTSOG that, historically, additional gas supplies for winter come from gas storages , LNG and imports from Russia, as these are the main sources with significant flexibility potential. The low stock in storage combined with limited contract flexibility in gas pipeline imports from major sources may require market participants to have recourse to additional LNG imports to cover gas demand during the upcoming winter. Those critical LNG imports would probably be highly priced, based on market expectations. LNG tanks from LNG regasification terminals would offer additional short-term flexibility to cover the peak-demand and short-term cold spells, but their potential is limited .

text: (14) The WSO 2021/2022 states that LNG regasification terminals in the EU would have sufficient spare send-out regasification capacity to receive additional LNG imports. However, varying margins of spare send-out capacity exist per Member State and across LNG terminals. In addition, possible constraints in the programming of ship scheduling in some LNG terminals cannot be ruled out. ACER notes that the arrival of LNG cargoes to EU LNG terminals would be a commercial decision, since the LNG market is global and spot LNG cargoes will be destined where demand is willing to pay the highest price.

text: High demand simulations and supply route disruptions

text: (15) ACER welcomes that the disruption scenarios considered in the winter Outlook are aligned with the Security of Supply Simulations Report . It notes that ENTSOG includes in its assessment gas supply disruption scenarios for the following gas supply routes: Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic States and Algerian production under peak and cold spell situations.

text: (16) The WSO’s simulations show that gas infrastructure is resilient enough and no country is exposed to demand curtailment in case of a normal or cold winter. ACER considers that this is in line with expectations, since the gas network should be designed and developed to cope with scenarios of cold weather. In addition, significant investments to make gas infrastructure more resilient, including reverse flow projects, have taken place during the last decade.

text: (17) As regards supply disruptions, ACER notes that in case of a Ukrainian transit disruption, infrastructure recently commissioned significantly improves the situation in South-East Europe (SEE), almost fully mitigating the exposure to demand curtailment. In a “peak day” with a storage filling level of around 40%, a few countries in the risk group for SEE would be exposed to a 2% demand curtailment, which could be mitigated by gas demand side reduction in response to high gas wholesale prices due to the supply disruption. With lower stock levels in gas storage, the demand curtailment rate would increase. In case of a disruption of Russian imports to the Baltic states and Finland, although the situation has slightly improved since last winter, in case of a “peak day” or a “2 week cold spell”, the Baltics states and Finland are exposed to a significant level of demand curtailment (17% to 77%) due to limited LNG regasification capacities in the region and lack of interconnection with the rest of continental EU .

text: Main risk factors for upcoming winter

text: (18) ACER notes with concern the presence of specific risk factors for the upcoming winter season: a historically low level of gas in storage in the EU , uncertainty on the availability of additional volumes from major sources of gas imports going beyond the contracted/booked volumes, and a strong demand from Asia as main driver of upwards global LNG prices and impacting the price of LNG imports to the EU. In addition there are changes and uncertainty on the renewal and use of some gas import routes to the EU .

text: (19) This situation calls for a higher vigilance with respect to gas supply needs beyond the assumed availability of maximum import flows in the past. Events such as a colder than usual winter, virulent cold spells, operational incidents, accidents in major supply routes or in upstream production sites could limit gas supply to the EU market, possibly driving gas prices to new record levels. ACER observes that supply scarcity would firstly impact wholesale gas prices leading to some demand reduction, in particular for industrial consumers, and that involuntary demand curtailment would be a last resort emergency measure. However, the WSO makes abstraction of price impacts, which explains the appearance of demand curtailments in case of supply disruptions.

text: (20) Even if sufficient gas infrastructure is in place in the Union, wholesale gas price spikes in turn may have repercussions on the wholesale electricity price, in particular in those Member States where gas-fired power plants are generally setting marginal prices in the electricity markets.

text: A partial assessment of the gas supply outlook which focuses on gas infrastructure

text: capability

text: (21) ENTSOG rightly acknowledges that the WSO is an assessment of the readiness of the gas infrastructure to manage the upcoming winter season under different scenarios, while it is not a forecast of the expected gas supply situation . The actual utilisation of the gas infrastructure, including the development of the gas storage levels, will be determined by decisions of market participants. Therefore, the WSO is basically an evaluation of the resilience of the gas network infrastructure.

text: (22) However, ACER notes that market liquidity would be affected if the network infrastructure is there, but the market is not able to procure sufficient gas in response to price signals.

text: Consider using a scenario based on expected gas supply and booked capacities

text: (23) ACER notes that the conclusions from the WSO are only valid to the extent to which gas supply from the various sources would actually be available in the volumes used for the purpose of the model simulations. Those are based on historically observed volumes over a 10-year period, when no significant market difficulties to import additional gas flows occurred. ENTSOG should explore complementing scenarios based on past supply patterns with gas supply scenarios based on projections of gas supply availability and expected use of main infrastructure routes by main users of transmission and LNG infrastructure, which would make the analysis more pertinent for the upcoming winter. ACER notes that the current WSO framework needs some methodological adaptations in order to integrate the expected dynamics of gas supply. The WSO could consider an additional scenario based on already booked import capacities for the upcoming winter as minimum import potential at the EU borders. Additional import flows would result from the need to book new short-term gas capacities to meet demand.

text: Consider embedding gas price demand elasticity in the modelling

text: (24) ACER understands that the expected level of wholesale gas prices does not play a role in ENTSOG’s WSO assumptions and simulations. In contrast, ENTSOG acknowledges that, in practice, a reduction of demand is observed in case of risk of high prices, and that due attention should be given when interpreting the risk of demand curtailment . In this respect, expected high levels of wholesale gas prices signal scarcity which may, as shown by the recent developments, reduce gas demand, in particular for the industry, before involuntary curtailments would happen. ACER calls on ENTSOG to consider embedding in the modelling approach the gas price demand elasticity, the role of wholesale gas prices and the potential of demand response .

text: (25) ACER firmly believes that improvement in the WSO assumptions and methodology would be instrumental to better identify potential risks to which Member States would be exposed in case of a tight gas supply situation, triggering timely anticipatory measurements. ACER encourages ENTSOG to consider developing, in consultation with stakeholders, such improvements for future Outlooks.

text: Winter supply review 2021

text: (26) ACER welcomes ENTSOG’s Winter Supply Review 2020/2021. The review presents relevant facts and figures regarding wholesale gas prices, demand and supply during the last winter. ACER understands that the WSO is mainly developed for extremely uncertain situations, while the observed winter 2020/2021 was rather average. The review mainly compares the last winter with previous ones, but it does not dwell on the comparison of observed figures in last winter period with the outlook projections. ACER reiterates that ENTSOG’s document should put more focus on the comparison of the review with the outlook to draw conclusions and improve, where relevant, the approach followed for the WSO,

text: HAS ADOPTED THIS OPINION:

text: 1. ACER is of the view that ENTSOG’ Winter Supply Outlook 2021/2022 contributes to the objectives of

text: Regulation (EU) 2019/942

text: and

text: Regulation (EC) No 715/2009

text: in terms of contributing to non-discrimination, effective competition and the efficient and secure functioning of the internal natural gas market.

text: 2. ACER notes with concern that in case of a cold winter, the gas market would need to increase gas imports from pipelines and/or LNG by 5% to 10% compared to maximum volumes observed in recent years. The required additional import volumes may pose a price risk, in the form of exposure to unprecedented high wholesale gas prices.

text: 3. ACER welcomes ENTSOG’s intention to monitor the evolution of the storage levels and import volumes throughout the upcoming winter and to report on the situation on a regular basis and when anomalies appear.

text: 4. ACER highlights the critical importance of counting with adequate storage levels towards the end of the winter season to cover for possible high demand or system stress situations. Early and significant withdrawal from storages would result in low storage levels at the end of the winter season, with a negative impact on the flexibility of the gas system in terms of available gas in storage as well as withdrawal capacity. Therefore, ACER expects storage users to prudently withdraw gas from storage and national competent authorities to monitor appropriately to favour a withdrawal pattern that would safeguard the continuity of gas deliveries throughout the whole winter in compliance with the contractual commitments and storage obligations, where applicable.

text: 5. ACER notes the existence of specific risk factors for the upcoming winter season, not always factored into or mentioned in the WSO. ACER calls on ENTSOG and all actors with responsibilities regarding the gas supply continuity and price monitoring to remain vigilant for the upcoming winter to those risk factors.

text: 6. ACER firmly believes that improvement in the WSO assumptions and methodology would be instrumental to better identify potential risks to which Member States would be exposed in case of a tight gas supply situation, including exposure to very high wholesale gas prices. ACER encourages ENTSOG to consider improving the WSO assumptions and methodology in particular by using a complementary scenario based on expected gas supply and booked capacities to the current scenarios based on historical values, and to study embedding expected gas prices and gas price demand elasticity in the modelling. This Opinion is addressed to ENTSOG. Done at Ljubljana, on 16 December 2021.

text: - SIGNED -

text: Fоr the Agency The Director

text: C. ZINGLERSEN

text: Annex I: Storage filling levels per Member States on 1 October 2021 .

text: WGV: Working Gas Volume of Storages GIS: Gas in Storage