title: Europeiska centralbankens yttrande - av den 1 december 2003 - på begäran av Europeiska unionens råd över ett förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning om gemenskapsstatistik över betalningsbalansen, internationell handel med tjänster och utländska direkta investeringar (KOM(2003) 507 slutlig) (CON/2003/26)

text: 1. Den 22 september 2003 mottog Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) en begäran från Europeiska unionens råd om ett yttrande över ett förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning om gemenskapsstatistik över betalningsbalansen, internationell handel med tjänster och utländska direkta investeringar (nedan kallat förslaget).

text: 2. ECB:s behörighet att avge ett yttrande grundas på artikel 105.4 första strecksatsen i Fördraget om upprättandet av Europeiska gemenskapen. I enlighet med artikel 17.5 första meningen i arbetsordningen för Europeiska centralbanken har detta yttrande antagits av ECB-rådet.

text: 3. Genom förslaget skapas en rättslig grund för insamling och sammanställning av statistik över betalningsbalansen, internationell handel med tjänster och utländska direkta investeringar i Europeiska unionen (EU). Kommissionen behöver dessa statistiska uppgifter för att i enlighet med artikel 99.3 i fördraget kunna utarbeta rapporter till rådet som gör det möjligt för rådet att övervaka den ekonomiska utvecklingen i varje medlemsstat och inom gemenskapen, samt den ekonomiska politikens överensstämmelse med de allmänna riktlinjer som avses i artikel 99.2. Enligt artikel 133.2 och 133.3 i fördraget skall dessutom kommissionen lägga fram förslag för rådet om hur den gemensamma handelspolitiken skall genomföras och föra handelsförhandlingar efter bemyndigande från rådet. För att kunna utföra dessa uppgifter behöver kommissionen relevant statistik av god kvalitet. Därutöver behövs sådan statistik för att genomföra och se över handelsavtal, inbegripet det Allmänna tjänstehandelsavtalet (GATS) och Avtalet om handelsrelaterade immateriella rättigheter (TRIPs), samt för pågående och kommande förhandlingar om ytterligare avtal.

text: 4. Genom förslaget införs en gemensam ram för systematisk framställning av gemenskapsstatistik med hjälp av gemensamma definitioner som medlemsstaterna skall använda för att sammanställa statistiska uppgifter om betalningsbalansen, internationell handel med tjänster och utländska direkta investeringar. Dessutom fastslås deras skyldigheter i fråga om de uppgifter som skall översändas.

text: 5. I förslaget fastställs även regler i fråga om kommissionens spridning av gemenskapsstatistiken. Slutligen inrättas Betalningsbalanskommittén som ett nytt forum för samarbete mellan medlemsstaterna, kommissionen och ECB (som observatör) angående statistik över betalningsbalansen, internationell handel med tjänster och utländska direkta investeringar.

text: 6. ECB välkomnar förslaget. I enlighet med samförståndsavtalet mellan ECB:s generaldirektorat för statistik (nedan kallat GD statistik) och Europeiska gemenskapernas statistikkontor (Eurostat) av den 10 mars 2003 är ECB, särskilt GD statistik, beredd att samarbeta med Eurostat för att sammanställa den finansiella balansen och därmed sammanhängande avkastning för EU:s betalningsbalans och att bidra med sin erfarenhet när det gäller att sammanställa euroområdets betalningsbalans.

text: 7. I skäl 7 i förslaget nämns att

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning (EG) nr 2560/2001 av den 19 december 2001

text: om gränsöverskridande betalningar i euro(1) har en direkt betydelse för insamlingen av statistik. I

text: artikel 8 i den förordningen

text: hänvisas särskilt till möjligheten att höja tröskelvärdet för rapporteringskraven för gränsöverskridande betalningar genom banker från 12500 euro till 50000 euro. Detta väcker vissa betänkligheter, främst eftersom en sådan höjning av tröskelvärdet kan påverka kvaliteten på betalningsbalansen för EU:s medlemsstater och för de länder som i framtiden blir medlemsstater i EU, för vilka betalningsbalansstatistiken är ett viktigt instrument för att kunna avgöra om konvergenskriterierna är uppfyllda.

text: 8. ECB välkomnar särskilt artikel 8 i förslaget om överföring och utbyte av insynsskyddade uppgifter för statistikändamål.

text: Artikel 8

text: bör kunna bli till stor hjälp för att bemästra de svårigheter som ständigt dyker upp när det gäller utbytet av insynsskyddade uppgifter. ECB utgår ifrån att medlemsstaternas arbete med de uppgifter som ingår i gemenskapsaggregaten också kommer att förbättra kvaliteten på aggregaten för euroområdet.

text: 9. ECB välkomnar även

text: artikel 11

text: , varigenom ECB får observatörsstatus i Betalningsbalanskommittén. ECB:s deltagande i kommittén kommer att bidra till att kraven på medlemsstaterna att rapportera statistiska uppgifter blir konsekventa och att internationella statistikstandarder beaktas, även om ECB:s bidrag till följd av dess observatörsstatus begränsas något. Det kommer även att ge effektivare sammanställningsmetoder för betalningsbalansen och därmed sammanhängande statistik samt utveckla kvaliteten på uppgifterna och informationen om dem (metadata).

text: 10. ECB utgår ifrån att det enligt förslaget inte krävs uppgifter om valutareserver från medlemsstaterna, eftersom det inte finns någon EU-valutareserv. Skulle emellertid sådana uppgifter i framtiden behövas för statistikändamål (exempelvis för att i redovisningstermer utjämna EU:s betalningsbalansredogörelse och därigenom underlätta bedömningen av uppgifternas kvalitet) skulle ECB:s GD statistik, tillsammans med det Europeiska centralbankssystemet (ECBS), kunna ge experthjälp beträffande metoden för och sammanställningen av dessa uppgifter. I så fall, måste också icke-deltagande medlemsstater förse ECB med relevanta uppgifter (dvs. fordringar på hemmahörande utanför EU i andra valutor än euro och i övriga valutor som är lagliga betalningsmedel i EU).

text: 11. ECB delar Europaparlamentets nyligen uttalade intresse för att övervaka eurons internationella betydelse(2). Under de närmaste åren kommer ECBS att undersöka i vilken omfattning information om en uppdelning efter valuta - åtminstone en uppdelning mellan euro och övriga valutor - beträffande transaktioner i varor och tjänster skulle behövas, och hur sådan information skulle kunna samlas in på ett kostnadseffektivt sätt. Beroende på resultatet av undersökningen, skulle frågan senare kunna diskuteras inom de relevanta kommittéerna för att överväga en lämplig ändring av förslaget.

text: 12. Detta yttrande skall offentliggöras i Europeiska unionens officiella tidning.

text: Utfärdat i Frankfurt am Main den 1 december 2003.

text: Jean-Claude Trichet

text: ECB:s ordförande

text: (1) EGT L 344, 28.12.2001, s. 13.

text: (2) Hänvisning görs främst till Europaparlamentets resolution av den 3 juli 2003 om euroområdet i världsekonomin och införandet av sedlar och mynt i euro (KOM(2002) 332 - 2002/2259(INI)).


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: Article 1(1)

text: (b)(ii) of

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 of 13 December 1993

text: specifying definitions for the applications of the prohibition referred to in Article

text: and

text: (b)(1) of the Treaty [now Article 101 of the Treaty] defines as ‘other type of credit facility’ ‘any financing of the public sector’s obligation vis-à-vis third parties’.

publisher: Europeiska centralbanken

sprak: en

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 2 December 2003 at the request of the Austrian Federal Ministry of Finance on a draft Federal law on the National Foundation for Research, Technology and Development (CON/2003/27)

serie: con

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 2 December 2003 at the request of the Austrian Federal Ministry of Finance on a draft Federal law on the National Foundation for Research, Technology and Development

type: rubrik

type: stycke

text: Introduction

text: 1. On 13 November 2003 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Austrian Federal Ministry of Finance for an opinion on Article 1 of the draft Wachstums- und Standortgesetz 2003 (Growth and Location Act 2003) adopting the Bundesgesetz über die Nationalstiftung für Forschung, Technologie und Entwicklung (Federal Law on the National Foundation for Research, Technology and Development) (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB has not been consulted on the other draft laws that will be presented to the Austrian Parliament as part of the Growth and Location Act 2003.

text: 2. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Article 105(4) of the Treaty establishing the European Community, the first indent of Article 4(a) of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank and the third indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 415/98/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , since the draft law contains provisions enabling the Oesterreichische Nationalbank (OeNB) to restructure its free reserves and to make annual financial contributions to the proposed National Foundation for Research, Technology and Development (hereinafter the ‘Foundation’). In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council of the ECB has adopted this opinion.

text: 3. On 24 November 2003, the ECB received from the OeNB copies of two letters from the OeNB’s Direktorium (Governing Board) to the Austrian Minister of Finance, both dated 5 November 2003, which anticipate the adoption of the draft law. The first of these letters determines in detail, in the form of a declaration of intent that may be seen as a unilateral commitment, how the OeNB plans to implement various provisions of the draft law. The second letter deals with the funds that, according to the draft law, can be transferred from one of the OeNB’s reserves to another. As the commitments set out in these letters supplement the provisions of the draft law, where they are of relevance to the assessment of the draft law they are referred to below, as appropriate.

text: The ESCB’s financial independence

text: 4. § 4(5) lines 1 and 2 of the draft law allow the OeNB to allocate funds to the Foundation. The question arises as to whether the draft law, read together with the declaration of intent contained in the first letter from the OeNB’s Governing Board to the Austrian Minister of Finance, duly preserves the OeNB’s discretion to contribute to the Foundation. This becomes all the more relevant as this letter of intent could potentially be interpreted as an unilateral commitment by the OeNB (although it is acknowledged that the OeNB’s Governing Board alone could not commit the OeNB to implement the proposed structure, but would require resolutions to that effect to be passed by the OeNB’s shareholders in general meeting. According to the draft law the Foundation will be established as a gemeinnützige Stiftung (foundation of benefit to the public) with the sole purpose of sponsoring research, technology and development in Austria. It is intended that the Foundation will be funded by annual contributions from (i) the European Recovery Program (ERP) Fund and (ii) the OeNB. According to § 4(5) lines 1 and 2 of the draft law, the OeNB will be entitled to transfer EUR 1.5 billion from its general reserve fund and its free reserves to the Jubiläumsfonds (a fund for sponsoring scientific research and teaching tasks) and to make an annual contribution of EUR 75 million to the Foundation. Read together with the first of OeNB’s letters of 5 November 2003, the impression could be created that the OeNB is committed to make an annual contribution of EUR 75 million to the Foundation. The letter states that the OeNB will make an annual contribution of EUR 75 million to the Foundation, and that if the income on investment of the EUR 1.5 billion is less than EUR 75 million, then the difference will be made up from the OeNB’s surplus profits pursuant to a resolution of its shareholders in general meeting or from other own funds held by the OeNB (for example by drawing on the general reserve fund).

text: 5. The requirement of ESCB independence as laid down in Article 108 of the Treaty is further elaborated on in the convergence reports of the ECB and its predecessor, the European Monetary Institute. In these reports a distinction is made between different features of central bank independence, and amongst others, financial independence. Concerning the notion of financial independence it is stated, inter alia, that ‘NCBs should be in a position to avail themselves of the appropriate means to ensure that their ESCB-related tasks can be properly fulfilled’. Formally, in view of the size of the OeNB’s balance sheet, annual contributions of EUR 75 million by the OeNB to the Foundation are unlikely to impede the proper fulfilment of the OeNB’s ESCB-related tasks, particularly if such donations are offset against the profits to be distributed to the State. However, as a matter of principle, it would not be consistent with the Treaty for a member of the ESCB to be under a legal obligation to provide financial support, potentially by drawing on its own funds, for activities that are normally sponsored by the State. With a view to the compatibility of the envisaged structure with the ESCB’s financial independence, the ECB considers it of utmost importance that the OeNB will be under no obligation to contribute to the Foundation, either under the draft law or otherwise. This may, however, be unclear since the explanatory notes to the draft law state that the Foundation is established to enable sustained financing of long-term, interdisciplinary research projects (which implies the continuity of contributions by the OeNB). Therefore, the wording of § 4(5) lines 1 and 2 of the draft law should state clearly and explicitly that the OeNB has a discretion to resolve to make contributions to the Foundation, which means that any commitment deriving from the first of the OeNB’s letters of 5 November 2003 (once its provisions have been endorsed by the OeNB’s shareholders in general meeting) may be withdrawn at any point in time, the amount of the contributions reviewed or the method for its funding revised.

text: 6. The ECB understands that from an accounting perspective, the envisaged transfer of EUR 1.5 billion in accordance with § 4(5) of the draft law is a transfer from one OeNB reserve to another and that these funds, once allocated to the Jubiläumsfonds, (i) will remain on the OeNB’s balance sheet (ii) will continue to be managed by the OeNB and (iii) will remain fully at the OeNB’s disposal. The ECB understands furthermore that the proposed structure would not lead to a reduction of the OeNB’s reserves and that consequently the EUR 1.5 billion would continue to be available to cover potential losses of the OeNB. In this context, the second letter from the OeNB to the Austrian Minister of Finance of 5 November 2003 makes it clear that if due to specific circumstances in an economically poor year (and despite other balance sheet provisions) the OeNB makes a loss, recourse could be had to the EUR 1.5 billion transferred to the Jubiläumsfonds in order to cover the OeNB’s annual losses. The draft law should contain a provision making it clear that contributions to the Foundation by the OeNB are subordinate to any financial needs relating to the ESCB’s tasks and functions and to covering potential losses of the OeNB.

text: 7. Finally, the OeNB’s income may be subject to Articles 32 and 33 of the Statute. Any distribution of such income to the Foundation in implementation of the draft law and of the OeNB’s commitments should respect the priority of the aforementioned articles, which derives from the supremacy of Community over national law.

text: The financing by central banks of non-central bank activities

text: 8. The ECB takes note that according to the explanatory notes to the draft law, funding the Foundation with interest income from the ERP Fund and the OeNB will not directly affect the Federal budget. However, the funds flowing to the Foundation from the OeNB will influence the level of national central bank (NCB) profits payable to the Bund (Federal Government) and therefore will have an indirect effect on the Federal budget. The explanatory notes to the draft law state by way of illustration that estimating OeNB gross profits to be EUR 643 million in 2004, the establishment of the Foundation and the proposed redirection by the OeNB of reserves in the amount of EUR 1.5 billion would lead to a reduction in income for the Federal Government of EUR 44.3 million (for the benefit of the proposed sponsoring of research, technology and development).

text: 9. The ECB notes that the funding of research, technology and development is a field where the State is normally active and where funds are normally provided from budgetary sources. As contributions to research, technology and development do not represent a traditional central bank activity, task or function, the OeNB’s funding of the Foundation out of the earnings of the Jubiläumsfonds could be seen as sponsoring activities that would otherwise have to be funded at the State’s expense, following budgetary procedures, and which are normally financed from democratically controlled budgetary sources. The ECB has therefore investigated whether the proposed financial contributions by the OeNB to the Foundation would be compatible with Article 101 of the Treaty of the Statute prohibiting monetary financing. Article 101 of the Treaty states that ‘[o]verdraft facilities or any other type of credit facilities with the ECB or with the national central banks […] in favour of […] central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings […] shall be prohibited […]’. Article 21.1 of the Statute mirrors this provision (i) When assessing the proposed structure’s compatibility with Article 101 of the Treaty and Article 21.1 of the Statute, not only a strict literal interpretation is of relevance, but also the purpose of these provisions has to be considered. Therefore, the ECB would like to recall that Articles 101 of the Treaty and 21.1 of the Statute have the overall aim of prohibiting NCBs from financing the public sector. (ii) The OeNB’s annual contributions to the Foundation would not represent an ‘overdraft’ or ‘any other type of credit facilities’ within the literal meaning of Article 101 of the Treaty and Article 21.1 of the Statute. Indeed, the proposed arrangement provides for a yearly donation rather than a credit facility. Yet, where a credit facility (with the obligation to repay such credit) is prohibited under these provisions, it could perhaps be argued that this prohibition might also apply a fortiori to a donation ‘à fonds perdu’. Whilst it is, of course, in principle not incompatible with Article 101 of the Treaty and Article 21.1 of the Statute for the OeNB to make donations to foster research, technology and development, this may be seen in a different light if it has to be considered that under the proposed structure the donations are construed as a regular and permanent financing mechanism for such activities. As a result, they may be seen as coming in effect rather close to credit facilities . Following this line of argument, even if formally speaking the proposed arrangements would not contradict Article 101 of the Treaty and Article 21.1 of the Statute under a strict literal interpretation, caution is still warranted taking into account the spirit of these provisions and the public nature of financing research, technology and development. (iii) The ECB has also considered whether the Foundation could come close to being a ‘regional, local or other public authority, other body governed by public law, or public undertaking’ within the meaning of Article 101 of the Treaty and Article 21.1 of the Statute. The explanatory notes to the draft law (specific part, note on §§ 1, 2 and 4 of the draft law) state in this context that the Foundation would be a body sui generis and not a foundation established under the Privatstiftungsgesetz (Federal Law on Private Foundations) or under the Bundes-Stiftungs- und Fondsgesetz (Federal Law on Federal Foundations and Funds). § 16 of the draft law provides that the Foundation shall only constitute a public foundation for tax-law purposes, which seems to indicate that it is not the overall intention to establish the Foundation as a public entity. In conclusion, it appears that the Foundation in terms of its legal nature appears to be a body sui generis with more elements of a private foundation, although with certain public elements. However, as stated under point (i) above, caution is still warranted, since the Foundation’s sole purpose is to provide financial means for the (public) activity of financing research, technology and development. (iv) According to the draft law, the Foundation will not allocate sponsored funds directly to the applicants, but instead to Einrichtungen (institutions) borne by the Federal Government, which then will further distribute the money to individual applicants in accordance with their Förderrichtlinien (sponsoring guidelines). Therefore, the ECB has also considered whether these institutions could qualify as public entities within the meaning of Article 101 of the Treaty and Article 21.1 of the Statute. It is important to assess whether these institutions are entities to which the OeNB would be prohibited from allocating funds directly (for instance by means of its present annual sponsoring of economics-oriented research via the Jubiläumsfonds which will cease once the Foundation has been established). If this were the case, an indirect allocation of OeNB funds to these institutions via the Foundation (even if the Foundation does not hold itself out as a ‘public’ institution) would indeed represent a circumvention of the Treaty. The explanatory notes to the draft law (specific part, note on § 3 of the draft law) mentions the following as potential beneficiaries of the Foundation: the Forschungsförderungsfonds (the Research and Development Fund), the Austria Wirtschaftsservice Gesellschaft, the Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften (the Austrian Academy of Sciences), the Ludwig Boltzmanngesellschaft and other research associations. No detailed information has been provided to the ECB concerning these entities, but the fact that they are borne by the Government seems to indicate that their institutional nature lies in the public sphere. The OeNB has clarified that the ultimate beneficiaries of the funds distributed by the Foundation will without exemption be private beneficiaries. Furthermore, the OeNB has already in the past directly contributed to some of these institutions via its Jubiläumsfonds. Nonetheless, the ECB strongly recommends carefully assessing this aspect before adopting the draft law.

text: The ESCB’s functional independence

text: 10. It was also assessed whether the proposed structure would interfere with the ESCB’s objectives and tasks. Indeed, if this were to be the case (quod non as explained below), Article 14.4 of the Statute would perhaps become relevant. This Article states that ‘[n]ational central banks may perform functions other than those specified in this Statute unless the Governing Council finds […] that these functions interfere with the objectives and tasks of the ESCB’. According to Article 105(1) of the Treaty and Article 2 of the Statute, the primary objective of the ESCB is ‘to maintain price stability’. The question is therefore whether the investment of the EUR 1.5 billion in the framework of the Jubiläumsfonds or the annual transfer of up to EUR 75 million to the Foundation (and the use of this amount for research, technology and development) could have an impact on the objective of maintaining price stability. From a purely monetary-policy perspective, the draft law would not necessarily have an impact on liquidity and interest rate developments different from the one prevailing under the current system of profit transfer. Transferring EUR 1.5 billion from the OeNB’s general reserve fund and its free reserves to the Jubiläumsfonds (both of which are liabilities on the OeNB’s balance sheet) and distributing some of the proceeds from this investment to the Foundation rather than to the Federal Government (by way of profit allocation) would not per se constitute a different net liquidity injection to the euro area economy. In any case, any possible effects of the proposed structure on liquidity would need to be taken into account, and such effects on liquidity could be offset, like any other shock to autonomous factors, by adjusting the amount of liquidity provided via regular open-market operations, leaving interest rates and liquidity conditions unchanged. The ECB notes that the proposed structure does not conflict with the ESCB’s tasks as defined in Article 105(2) of the Treaty and Article 3 of the Statute, as neither the investment of EUR 1.5 billion in the framework of the Jubiläumsfonds nor the annual transfer of up to EUR 75 million to the Foundation seem to be activities that could have any negative impact on the implementation of any of the ESCB’s tasks as defined in the Treaty and the Statute.

text: Conclusion

text: 11. In view of the above, the ECB does not oppose the arrangements envisaged by the draft law enabling the OeNB to contribute to the Foundation. However, for the reasons stated above, the ECB is of the opinion that vigilance should be applied as to the way in which the envisaged arrangements will be implemented in practice and that a regular review of these arrangements would be warranted.

text: Publication

text: 12. The ECB confirms that it has no objection to the competent national authorities making this opinion publicly available at their discretion. This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website six months after the date of its adoption. Done at Frankfurt am Main on 2 December 2003. The President of the ECB [signed] Jean-Claude TRICHET

type: vagledning

utgivare: ecb


title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 18 December 2003 at the request of the Spanish State Under-Secretary for Economic Affairs on a draft proposal amending Article 6 of Law 13/1994 of 1 June on the  autonomy of the Banco de España (CON/2003/28)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 18 December 2003 at the request of the Spanish State Under-Secretary for Economic Affairs on a draft proposal amending Article 6 of Law 13/1994 of 1 June on the autonomy of the Banco de España (

text: 1. On 27 November 2003 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request dated 26 November 2003 from the Banco de España at the request of the Spanish State Under-Secretary for Economic Affairs for an opinion on a draft proposal amending Article 6 of Law 13/1994 of 1 June on the autonomy of the Banco de España (hereinafter the ‘draft amendment’).

text: 2. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on the second indent of Article 105(4) of the Treaty establishing the European Community and the third indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the ECB by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions, since the amendment would modify Law 13/1994 of 1 June on the autonomy of the Banco de España (hereinafter ‘Law 13/1994’). In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the ECB, the Governing Council of the ECB has adopted this opinion.

text: 3. The ECB notes that the proposed amendment would introduce a new

text: Article 6

text: bis in Law 13/1994 providing that the relations between the Banco de España and its members of staff are governed by employment law. It would further refer to the restrictions imposed on certain members of staff who may have access to confidential information on their securities market transactions and to their obligations concerning information on their private financial activities, as laid down in the insider trading rules in the Code of Conduct for the Staff of the Banco de España, adopted by Internal Circular 10/2002 of 18 October 2002. The ECB notes that the data provided under these reporting obligations is to be kept for a maximum of five years.

text: 4. The ECB welcomes these rules intended to ensure that central bank staff do not benefit financially from access to privileged information. In this respect, the ECB notes that the draft amendment would incorporate into Law 13/1994 the insider trading rules that are already established in the Banco de España’s Code of Conduct. Section Three of this Code of Conduct specifies the requirements applying to those members of staff who have access to privileged information, including the obligation to submit an annual declaration to the internal audit office regarding their private financial transactions. The ECB welcomes the legal certainty that would ensue from incorporating these rules into Law 13/1994.

text: 5. The ECB confirms that it has no objection to the competent national authorities making this opinion publicly available at their discretion. This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website six months after the date of its adoption. Done at Frankfurt am Main on 18 December 2003. The President of the ECB [signed] Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: See Decision ECB/1998/6 of 7 July 1998 on the denominations, specifications, reproduction, exchange and withdrawal of euro banknotes, OJ L 8, 14.1.1999, p. 36; Decision ECB/2001/7 of 30 August 2001 on the denominations, specifications, reproduction, exchange and withdrawal of euro banknotes, OJ L 233, 31.8.2001, p. 55; and Decision ECB/2003/4.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 18 December 2003 on a draft decree-law amending the Organic Law of the Banco de Portugal (CON/2003/29)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 18 December 2003 on a draft decree-law amending the Organic Law of the Banco de Portugal (

text: 1. On 5 December 2003 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Portuguese Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft decree-law (the ‘draft decree-law’) amending Articles 8 to 11, 53 and 55 of the Organic Law of the Banco de Portugal (the ‘Organic Law’). Chapter III (Currency Issue) of the Organic Law contains Articles 8 to 11, whereas Chapter VII (Budget and Accounts) contains Articles 53 and 55.

text: 2. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on the first and third indents of

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the legislative proposal contains provisions concerning currency matters and a national central bank (NCB). In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council of the ECB has adopted this opinion.

text: 3. The draft decree-law rewords Article 8 of the Organic Law, which now provides that credit institutions or financial companies have, within the scope of their respective activities and particularly in the ambit of foreign exchange operations, the obligation to retain banknotes or coins which are legal tender in Portugal or abroad if they know or have sufficient reason to believe them to be counterfeits. The draft decree-law further establishes a duty on those establishments to send the retained banknotes and coins to the authorities indicated in instructions issued by the Banco de Portugal, in compliance with the terms laid down in them. These provisions are also extended to other entities authorised to carry out manual foreign exchange operations. In the case of breach of draft

text: Article 8

text: , draft

text: Article 10(1)

text: (a) provides for a penalty of EUR 8 000 to 30 000 for credit institutions and financial companies and EUR 3 000 to 15 000 for other entities authorised to carry out manual foreign exchange operations.

text: 4. The ECB welcomes the new

text: Article 8

text: together with the abovementioned infringement regime. These provisions implement

text: Article 6(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1338/2001

text: of

text: 28 June 2001 laying down measures necessary for the protection of the euro agains counterfeiting , which provides that Member States must take all necessary measures to ensure that credit institutions and any other institutions engaged in the sorting and distribution to the public of notes and coins as a professional activity comply with the obligations laid down in its

text: Article 6(1)

text: . 5. The ECB notes however that draft

text: Article 8

text: refers to banknotes and coins with legal tender status in Portugal and abroad. Given that euro banknotes and coins were introduced on 1 January 2002 in the territories of the Member States that adopted the euro, and that they have been legal tender since that date, the ECB would propose making a distinction in draft

text: Article 8

text: between banknotes and coins denominated in euro and in a foreign currency instead of between banknotes and coins with legal tender status in Portugal and abroad. 6. The draft decree-law also rewords Article 9(1) of the Organic Law, which now provides that the reproduction or imitation, in whole or part, by any technical means, of banknotes denominated in euro, as well as the distribution of such reproductions or imitations, even if to a limited group of people, can only be done in the cases and under the terms and conditions expressly laid down by the ECB. The draft decree-law further provides in a reworded

text: Article 10(1)

text: (b) of the Organic Law that the breach of

text: Article 9(1)

text: will be subject to a penalty ranging from EUR 4 000 to 20 000. 7. The ECB welcomes the new

text: Article 9(1)

text: . It notes that the Portuguese authorities have chosen the very appropriate legislative technique of referring in general terms to the rules adopted by the ECB on the reproduction of euro banknotes – which are currently laid down in Article 2 of Decision ECB/2003/4 of 20 March 2003 on the denominations, specifications, reproduction, exchange and withdrawal of euro banknotes . As such, members of the general public will know that they will have to comply with the rules on reproducing euro banknotes in force at the time they make or issue a concrete reproduction. The ECB would however recommend deleting the word ‘imitations’ from the proposed

text: Article 9(1)

text: . The ECB has consistently used the term ‘reproduction’ in the various rules on reproduction of banknotes it has adopted since 1998 . Moreover, Article 2(1) of Decision ECB/2003/4 provides a definition of ‘reproduction’. The use of the term ‘imitation’ might jeopardise legal certainty in the application of both this ECB provision and the relevant provisions of the Organic Law. 8. As mentioned above, draft

text: Article 10(1)

text: (b) of the Organic Law lays down penalties for the infringement of the rules on reproduction of euro banknotes as provided in draft

text: Article 9(1)

text: . The ECB understands that the penalties provided for in

text: Article 10(1)

text: (b) are of a criminal law nature and therefore do not conflict with

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 2532/98 of 23 November 1998

text: concerning the powers of the ECB to impose sanctions , which allows for criminal law of Member States to be applicable. 9. The draft decree-law further amends

text: Article 53(1)

text: (b) of the Organic Law so as to provide a legal basis for a special reserve relative to gains from gold sale operations. The ECB does not object to this amendment, since the creation of legal reserves is in accordance with Annex IV to Guideline ECB/2002/10 of 5 December 2002 on the legal framework for accounting and financial reporting in the European System of Central Banks . 10. Finally, the draft decree-law amends Article 55 of the Organic Law on the frequency of publication of the Banco de Portugal’s synopsis of its assets and liabilities, so that publication will be monthly rather than weekly. The ECB welcomes this amendment as it would mean that the frequency of publication would coincide with the frequency of the allocation of the issue of euro banknotes among Eurosystem NCBs. 11. The ECB confirms that it has no objection to the competent national authorities making this opinion publicly available at their discretion. This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website six months after the date of its adoption. Done at Frankfurt am Main on 18 December 2003. The President of the ECB [signed] Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: European Monetary Institute, Convergence Report, March 1998.

text: Directive

text: of the European Parliament and the Council of 19 May 1998 on settlement finality in payment and securities settlement systems, OJ L 166, 11.6.1998, p. 45.

text: The oversight function of NCBs has been described in detail in previous ECB opinions published on its website http://www.ecb.int. For example see ECB Opinion

text: of 7 August 2003 at the request of the Banca d’Italia on a draft regulation on payment systems, payment infrastructures and payment instruments and ECB Opinion

text: of 8 August 2003 at the request of Sveriges Riksbank on a draft law amending the Sveriges Riksbank Act (not yet published).

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 20 January 2004 at the request of the Economic Committee of the Finnish Parliament on the government proposal to amend the Suomen Pankki Act and other related acts (CON/2004/1)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 20 January 2004 at the request of the Economic Committee of the Finnish Parliament on the government proposal to amend the Suomen Pankki Act and other related acts (

text: Introduction

text: 1. On 22 December 2003 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Economic Committee of the Finnish Parliament for an opinion on a government proposal (HE 134/2003) to amend the Suomen Pankki Act (Laki Suomen Pankista (214/1998)) of 27 March 1998, the Suomen Pankki Officials Act (Laki Suomen Pankin virkamiehistä (1166/1998)) of 30 December 1998, and the Financial Supervision Act (Laki Rahoitustarkastuksesta (587/2003)) of 27 June 2003 (hereinafter the ‘final legislative proposal’). The consultation request concerns the same subject matter as that addressed in ECB Opinion

text: of 15 October 2003 which related to the draft government proposal (hereinafter the ‘draft legislative proposal’). The present opinion concerns the final government proposal that was submitted subsequent to the ECB’s first opinion. Like the first opinion also this opinion focuses on proposed measures affecting Suomen Pankki’s financial position and provisions relating to its power to issue norms.

text: 2. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on the second indent of Article 105(4) of the Treaty establishing the European Community and the third indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the ECB by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the final legislative proposal relates to the national central bank (NCB) of Finland (Suomen Pankki). In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council of the ECB has adopted this opinion. Summary of the most important differences between the draft and the final legislative proposal

text: 3. The draft legislative proposal suggested reducing the primary capital of Suomen Pankki. This reduction would have forced Suomen Pankki de facto to sell part of its foreign reserve assets. As stated in

text: the ECB considered that reducing the capital combined with other proposed measures affecting Suomen Pankki’s financial position and with a lack of statutory safeguards ensuring Suomen Pankki’s ability to perform its ESCB-related and other tasks would have endangered Suomen Pankki’s independence. The ECB welcomes the fact that the final legislative proposal does not reduce the capital. The ECB also welcomes the fact that the final legislative proposal contains a clause aiming to ensure that Suomen Pankki is able to perform its ESCB-related tasks, although this clause does not fully satisfy the requirements of financial independence as discussed below. General assessment of the proposed measures affecting Suomen Pankki’s independence

text: 4. Article 109 of the Treaty provides that the Member States must ensure that their national legislation, including the NCBs’ Statutes, is compatible with the Treaty and the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank. Article 108 of the Treaty, reinforced by Article 7 of the Statute, requires an NCB that forms part of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) to be independent.

text: 5. The principle of financial independence of central banks embedded in Article 108 of the Treaty requires that ‘the NCBs be in a position to avail themselves of the appropriate means to ensure that their ESCB-related tasks can be properly fulfilled’ . The concept of financial independence also requires that an NCB must, at all times, have sufficient financial means to carry out its other functions, i.e. to perform its national tasks, to meet its international obligations, and to cover properly its administrative and operational expenses. It should also be taken into account that the NCBs have commitments also regarding their foreign reserve assets and own funds, such as IMF-related commitments. Suomen Pankki’s national tasks include those related to financial stability and crisis prevention and management. Although systemic crises tend to be rare events that are largely unpredictable, they can have great impact on the economy and should therefore receive appropriate attention from central banks. In such cases, an NCB’s ability to act swiftly may prove to be particularly valuable. In particular, sufficient financial resources will assure public confidence as to the NCB’s ability to intervene independently to tackle the crisis. This would also strengthen the credibility of its public statements aimed at restoring confidence in the viability of the financial system as a whole.

text: 6. The final legislative proposal contains, inter alia, two measures, (i) an obligation to transfer 100% of Suomen Pankki’s profits to the State, as a rule, and (ii) a strict limitation on Suomen Pankki’s right to create financial provisions. Without proper statutory safeguards ensuring Suomen Pankki’s ability to perform its ESCB-related tasks, the combined effect of these measures will weaken Suomen Pankki’s financial position over time, increasing the risk that it may not have sufficient resources in the future to carry out its ESCB-related and other tasks and making it dependent on the decisions of third parties in such situations. In view of the uncertainty about future financial demands on Suomen Pankki, it is vital to have adequate margins and to safeguard the real value of the bank’s resources in relation to its tasks. In its present form, the final legislative proposal infringes the principle of financial independence with regard to Suomen Pankki. Therefore, the ECB concludes that the final legislative proposal is still incompatible with the Treaty and its intentions. Moreover, as the weakening of the financial position of an NCB forming part of the ESCB/Eurosystem cannot be seen in isolation from the system as a whole, the final legislative proposal will have an adverse effect on the credibility and financial standing of the Eurosystem as a whole. Distribution of Suomen Pankki’s profit

text: 7. According to the final legislative proposal the rules on the allocation of Suomen Pankki’s profit would be amended. The current Suomen Pankki Act states that half of the profit is credited as income to the State and the other half is transferred to the reserve fund, unless the Parliamentary Supervisory Council decides to allocate the profits differently. The final legislative proposal will change this rule and establish the compulsory transfer of the entire annual profit of Suomen Pankki to the State. A decision by the Parliamentary Supervisory Council to use the profit differently would require special justification.

text: 8. The ECB is seriously concerned with regard to the consequences of a legislative arrangement under which not even a share of Suomen Pankki’s profits is allocated to the reserve fund either automatically or based on the independent and professional judgement of the Board of Suomen Pankki after taking into account any possible future risks. The wording of the final legislative proposal places the use of possible profits for such purpose at the sole discretion of the Parliamentary Supervisory Council. Financial independence in Member States where Government or Parliament can directly or indirectly exercise influence on the distribution of an NCB’s profit requires that statutory provisions guarantee that the proper performance of the NCBs’ ESCB-related tasks is not hindered .

text: 9. Section 21.2 of the final legislative proposal acknowledges that the Parliamentary Supervisory Council can decide to alter the profit allocation in order to safeguard the performance of ESCB-related tasks. However, the wording of the clause, especially the use of the word ‘can’ instead of ‘must’, leaves the discretion of opting for or against the main rule (100% to the State) entirely with the Parliamentary Supervisory Council. Even though the justification for Section 21.2 in the explanatory memorandum states that ‘the allocation of profit may not jeopardise the performance of Suomen Pankki’s ESCBrelated tasks’, the ECB considers that the actual drafting of the statutory clause does not ensure the financial independence of Suomen Pankki required by Article 108 of the Treaty. For the sake of clarity the ECB would point out that even if it were not proposed to transfer the whole profit to the State as a rule but only a part of it, the final legislative proposal would still infringe the requirement of central bank independence set out in the Treaty if it allowed the Parliamentary Supervisory Council to refrain from allocating profits to Suomen Pankki where the performance of ESCB-related tasks would require such an allocation.

text: 10. In its report to the Economic Committee of the Finnish Parliament of 27 November 2003 the Finnish Parliament’s Constitutional Committee considered that since Article 108 of the Treaty may in certain circumstances oblige the Parliamentary Supervisory Council to detract from the main rule for profit allocation, the statutory law should not imply that the Parliamentary Supervisory Council has any kind of discretion in such situations. The ECB fully supports this view. Suomen Pankki’s right to make financial provisions

text: 11. The final legislative proposal would abolish Suomen Pankki’s right independently to create financial provisions to safeguard the maintenance of the real value of its capital and reserves. The ECB stresses that future financial and economic developments cannot be foreseen with any degree of certainty, and therefore does not consider it justified for an NCB to be deprived of the opportunity of protecting itself against the erosion of the real value of its capital in the longer term.

text: 12. The final legislative proposal allows exchange rate risk and the risk of variation in the market value of securities to be covered by making financial provisions. However, such provisions may only equal the amounts of annual realised net profits resulting from these sources. Where such net realised gains do not exist or are insufficient to cover future exposures, the final legislative proposal leaves the decision of allocating regular profits to the general reserve fund to the discretion of the Parliamentary Supervisory Council. This arrangement is not compatible with the requirement for an NCB to be financially independent, as the professional assessment of the Board of Suomen Pankki regarding coverage of future exposures would, under the final legislative proposal, not be decisive and there is still no adequate safeguard that the rules concerning the allocation of regular profits would sufficiently guarantee Suomen Pankki’s ability to take care of its current or future tasks. Suomen Pankki’s power to issue norms regarding oversight

text: 13. The final legislative proposal grants Suomen Pankki certain limited powers to issue norms in order to carry out its duties as part of the Eurosystem. According to the final legislative proposal, the norms would only be addressed to those institutions that maintain or participate in such payment and clearing systems as the Finnish Ministry of Finance has designated under the Finnish law implementing the Settlement Finality Directive . As the final legislative proposal remained, to some extent, unchanged on this matter, the ECB would like to reiterate the views expressed in

text: 14. Article 105(2) of the Treaty and Article 3.1 of the Statute include as a basic Eurosystem central bank task the promotion of the smooth operation of payment systems. For the NCBs of the participating Member States, these Articles provide a legal basis for the oversight of payment systems functionally directly linked with settlement systems. Within the Eurosystem, oversight activities are generally performed at NCB level, in line with the common oversight policy defined for the Eurosystem by the ECB’s Governing Council. The ECB understands that in line with the NCBs’ oversight function , Section 3 of the Suomen Pankki Act provides the legal basis for Suomen Pankki’s oversight function by stipulating that it will both participate in maintaining the reliability and efficiency of the payment system and the overall financial system and assist in their development.

text: 15. The ECB supports the proposed measure, which makes it easier for Suomen Pankki to fulfil its oversight function in a sufficiently transparent way. The ECB notes, however, that the wording of the final legislative proposal appears relatively restrictive and could prove to be impracticable. Firstly, Suomen Pankki is responsible for overseeing the reliability and efficiency of the overall infrastructure of the financial system, which includes securities settlement systems. Therefore, an explicit reference in the Suomen Pankki Act to Suomen Pankki’s oversight function regarding securities clearing and settlement systems might be helpful for the sake of clarification. Secondly, given the broad oversight function of Suomen Pankki, as described in the explanatory memorandum, it would be reasonable for all payment and securities clearing and settlement systems to be brought under the regulatory powers of Suomen Pankki, regardless of whether they are protected by the Settlement Finality Directive. Thirdly, ECB legal acts other than guidelines, instructions and regulations, such as decisions, as well as ESCB-wide agreements, are excluded from the explicit wording of the final legislative proposal. ECB decisions that bind the NCBs are, however, referred to in the explanatory memorandum. The ECB notes that when adopting the Treaty Finland undertook to act in a manner enabling its central bank to abide by the legal instruments of the ECB with binding effect on it. For the sake of greater clarity and legal certainty the ECB would like to invite the Finnish Government and Parliament to extend the explicit wording of the final legislative proposal to cover ECB legal instruments binding on NCBs. This could be done for example by linking Suomen Pankki’s power to issue norms to its obligation to carry out its tasks as part of the ESCB, as is acknowledged in the explanatory memorandum. In this context, the ECB would point out that the NCBs are always bound by the content and parameters laid down in ECB legal acts, which do not allow discretionary powers to be used when implementing them. This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main on 20 January 2004. [signed] The President of the ECB Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: EGT L 333, 17.12.2001, s. 1. 3 Vad beträffar Statistiska centralbyråns roll i förhållande till riksbankens framtagande av statistik, hänvisas till Europeiska centralbankens yttrande

text: av den 14 augusti 2002 på begäran av Sveriges riksbank över ett utkast till framställan om ändring i riksbankslagen (1988:1385) vad gäller insamling av betalningsbalansstatistik och kravet på lätt omsättningsbarhet för värdepapper som används vid penningpolitiska transaktioner.

sprak: sv

title: Europeiska centralbankens yttrande av den 26 januari 2004 på begäran av Sveriges riksbank över ett förslag till föreskrifter och allmänna råd om instituts rapportering av finansmarknadsstatistik (CON/2004/2)

text: EUROPEISKA CENTRALBANKENS YTTRANDE av den 26 januari 2004 på begäran av Sveriges riksbank över ett förslag till föreskrifter och allmänna råd om instituts rapportering av finansmarknadsstatistik (

text: 1. Den 8 december 2003 mottog Europeiska centralbanken en begäran från Sveriges riksbank om ett yttrande över ett förslag till ändring av Sveriges riksbanks föreskrifter och allmänna råd om monetära finansinstituts rapportering av finansmarknadsstatistik (Riksbankens föreskrifter och allmänna råd (RFBS 2003:2) om instituts rapportering av finansmarknadsstatistik) (nedan kallat "förslaget").

text: 2. ECB:s behörighet att avge ett yttrande grundas på artikel 105.4 andra strecksatsen i fördraget och artikel 4 a andra strecksatsen i stadgan för Europeiska centralbankssystemet och Europeiska centralbanken samt artikel 2.1 fjärde strecksatsen i

text: rådets beslut 98/415/EG av den 29 juni 1998

text: om nationella myndigheters samråd med Europeiska centralbanken rörande förslag till rättsregler , eftersom förslaget rör insamling, sammanställning och spridning av finansmarknadsstatistik. Detta yttrande har antagits av ECB-rådet i enlighet med

text: artikel 17.5

text: första meningen i arbetsordningen för Europeiska centralbanken.

text: 3. Huvuddelen av förslaget består av en uppsättning föreskrifter som var och en åtföljs av allmänna råd som förklarar hur föreskriften i fråga skall tillämpas (1-10§§ i förslaget). Dessa föreskrifter och allmänna råd rör tillämpningsområdet och definitionerna för insamling av statistiska uppgifter, samt vilka institutioner som har ålagts rapporteringsskyldighet och med vilken frekvens och inom vilken tidsram uppgifterna skall rapporteras. Föreskrifterna innehåller också specifikationer för statistikrapporteringens utformning och innehåll, hur beloppen skall anges, hur tillgångar och skulder skall behandlas och hur uppgifterna skall arkiveras.

text: 4. Därutöver finns elva bilagor som innehåller blanketterna som de monetära finansinstituten skall använda för att rapportera uppgifter från sina balansräkningar (de s.k. MFI-blanketterna) samt tekniska specifikationer avseende de olika balansräkningsposterna och övriga poster som skall rapporteras. De tekniska specifikationerna av de poster som skall rapporteras innehåller ett flertal hänvisningar till Finansinspektionens föreskrifter och allmänna råd (FFFS 2003:11) om årsredovisning i kreditinstitut och värdepappersbolag (nedan kallade "FI:s föreskrifter"), särskilt vad gäller definitionen av termer som används för rapporteringsändamål. Riksbankens förslag trädde i kraft den 1 januari 2004 och ECB utgår ifrån att FI:s föreskrifter trädde i kraft samma datum. Emellertid har ECB inte erhållit den slutliga versionen av FI:s nya föreskrifter som en del av den föreliggande begäran om yttrande och framför inte några slutliga synpunkter på hur dessa kommer att påverka Sveriges riksbanks nya system för insamling av statistik.

text: 5. ECB välkomnar förslaget då det genomför en stor del av kraven för finansmarknadsstatistik för monetära finansinstituts balansräkning i euroområdet och då det i stora drag stämmer överens med ECB:s krav på det statistiska underlaget för kassakrav. Även om Sverige inte har någon skyldighet att uppfylla dessa krav innan euron införs, rekommenderas en anpassning till ECB:s statistikrapporteringskrav också för medlemsstater med undantag, så att dessa i god tid kan förbereda en anpassning på statistikområdet innan de blir deltagande medlemsstater. Detta yttrande fokuserar på statistikkraven i förordning ECB/2001/13 av den 22 november 2001 om konsoliderade balansräkningar för monetära finansinstitut , senast ändrad genom förordning ECB/2003/10.

text: 6. Riksbankens förslag riktar sig till banker och ett antal andra finansinstitut. ECB känner till att riksbanken senare under året planerar att ta upp penningmarknadsfonder i förteckningen över rapporteringsskyldiga institut. ECB välkomnar detta, eftersom det är i linje med förordning ECB/2001/13 och är lämpligt mot bakgrund av de hänvisningar till penningmarknadsfonder som redan finns på andra ställen i förslaget (t.ex. i den huvudsakliga balansräkningstabellen). Vidare hänvisar ECB till sitt yttrande

text: av den 20 juni 2003 på begäran av det svenska finansdepartementet över ett lagförslag om reformerade regler för bank– och finansieringsrörelse. Med detta lagförslag om reformerade regler föreslogs avskaffandet av bankernas monopol på inlåning. ECB rekommenderar att utvidga insamlingen av finansmarknadsstatistik till att omfatta även institut som inte är banker men som tar emot inlåning från allmänheten i enlighet med definitionen av penningmarknadsfonder i artikel 1.1 i förordning ECB/2001/13, utan att det påverkar tillämpningen av

text: artikel 1.2 i den förordningen

text: 7. ECB noterar att riksbankens förslag omfattar två centrala element: a) blanketterna på vilka monetära finansinstitut rapporterar uppgifter från sina balansräkningar i linje med ECB:s nya krav i förordning ECB/2001/13 i dess nuvarande lydelse, och b) Statistiska centralbyråns (SCB) önskemål rörande finansräkenskaper . Förslaget täcker de flesta kraven i förordning ECB/2001/13. Emellertid görs inte följande uppdelning av stockar: 7.1. Den månadsvisa uppdelningen efter ändamål av utlåning till hushåll som föreskrivs i tabell 1 i förordning ECB/2001/13 beaktas inte. 7.2. I tabell S2 i förslaget, som specificerar post nr 203 om emitterade värdepapper, finns en uppdelning efter hemvist för innehavare av värdepapper med löptid upp till 1 år, men inte för dem med en löptid på mellan 1 och 2 år, vilket krävs enligt artikel 2.5 i Europeiska centralbankens riktlinje ECB/2003/2 av den 6 februari 2003 om vissa av Europeiska centralbankens krav på statistikrapportering och om förfarandena för de nationella centralbankernas rapportering av penningmängds- och bankstatistik . 7.3. I enlighet med ECB:s kassakravssystem behövs en separat identifiering av positioner gentemot institut som omfattas av kassakrav. Innan riksbanken deltar i Eurosystemet behövs ytterligare uppdelningar för att kunna identifiera dessa positioner både vad gäller de som har och inte har hemvist i andra medlemsstater.

text: 8. ECB föreslår att de ovan nämnda uppdelningarna skall införas i MFI-blanketterna, såvida detta inte redan sker genom andra nationella rapporteringskrav, vilket antas vara fallet åtminstone vad gäller punkt 7.1 o ovan. ECB rekommenderar därutöver att följande terminologiska problem löses. 8.1. Generellt sett bör uttrycket "euro och EMU-valutor" ersättas med "euro", eftersom det skulle vara klarare och eftersom uttrycket "EMU-valutor" inte längre är lämpligt efter införandet av euron (utom möjligtvis för sedlar och mynt i nationella valörer under den övergångsperiod som tog slut under 2002). Det skulle vidare kunna indikeras att "euro" omfattar nationella sedlar i medlemsstater som inför euron i framtiden, såvida en övergångsperiod för utbyte av sedlar och mynt beslutas för sådana medlemsstater. 8.2. I tabell S1 Konto, löptid 1.10, som specificerar post nr. 201 in- och upplåning, motparter efter kontoslag och löptid, är inlåning med uppsägningstid uppdelade efter "löptid". Den korrekta termen är "uppsägningstid". 8.3. ENS 95-sektorn S.125 beskrivs i förslaget (i t.ex. i tabell T3. Dagslån 1.2. post nr 1031133) som "försäkringföretag och pensionsinstitut" vad gäller hemmahörande i Sverige och som "försäkringsföretag" vad gäller utländska aktörer. Det vore bättre att använda samma term, eller om detta anses ändamålsenligt, förklara skillnaden. 8.4. I tabellen som specificerar övriga EU–valutor och övriga valutor, borde dessa valutor inte omfatta positioner denominerade i euro. Detta framgår inte tydligt av tabellen.

text: 9. Ytterligare en viktig punkt i förslaget är tillägget av en ny avdelning för rapportering av justeringar av omvärderingar vad gäller flöden. Förslaget är helt i linje med kraven på justeringar för omvärderingar i förordning ECB/2001/13. Förslaget går längre än minimikraven vad gäller uppgiftsrapporteringen, eftersom det omfattar alla uppdelningar i tabell 1A i förordning ECB/2001/13. Detta välkomnas av ECB.

text: 10. I förslaget introduceras också nya hänvisningar i lands- och valutaspecifikationerna till de länder som väntas bli nya medlemsstater i EU fr.o.m. maj 2004 (de "anslutande staterna"). Med beaktande av de ovan nämnda rekommendationerna, välkomnar ECB också dessa ändringar.

text: 11. Vidare omfattar förslaget en ytterligare uppdelning av utlåning efter löptid och en mer enhetlig sektorsvis uppdelning, som också är i linje med förordning ECB/2001/13. För närvarande har dock inte någon uppdelning av lån till hushåll efter ändamål inkluderats, något som är viktigt i den monetära analysen av krediter till hemmahörande.

text: 12. ECB utgår ifrån att förslaget inte omfattar insamling av uppgifter vad gäller räntesatser som tillämpas av monetära finansinstitut på in- och utlåning gentemot hushåll och icke-finansiella företag enligt förordning ECB/2001/18 av den 20 december 2001 om statistik över räntesatser som tillämpas av monetära finansinstitut på inlåning och utlåning i förhållande till hushåll och ickefinansiella företag . Trots att förslaget omfattar vissa krav vad beträffar belopp för nya låneavtal, noterar ECB att förslaget inte helt täcker statistikkraven för icke-finansiella företag.

text: 13. ECB bekräftar att den inte har någon invändning mot att behöriga nationella myndigheter offentliggör detta yttrande om de så önskar. Detta yttrande kommer att offentliggöras på ECB:s webbplats sex månader efter datum för antagandet. Utfärdat i Frankfurt am Main den 26 januari 2004. [Namnteckning] Jean-Claude TRICHET ECB:s ordförande


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: See the Commission Services’ Third consultation paper on the review of capital requirements for banks and investment firms, Part 1 - Draft proposed risk-based capital requirements of the Working Document of 1 July 2003. 3 Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 on the prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading and amending Directive

text: , OJ L 345, 31.12.2003, p. 64.

text: Luxembourg forms of undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS). 5

text: Council Directive 85/611/EEC of 20 December 1985

text: on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS), as amended OJ L 375, 31.12.1985, p. 3

text: See for instance Article 33 of the draft law’s Chapter 3 (the liquidation of securitisation entities).

text: DG Internal Market Services’ working document ESC 36/2003 on the implementation of Articles 5, 7, 10, 11, 14 and 15 of the

text: European Parliament and Council Directive 2003/71/EC

text: on the prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading on a regulated market and amending Directive

text: . Text available on http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/finances/mobil/docs/prospectus/working-doc-esc36-2003_en.pdf. 8 Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 March 2000 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions, OJ L 126, 26.5.2000, p. 1.

text: In the context of the Prospectus Directive, securities ‘issued in a continuous or repeated manner’ means ‘issues on tap or at least two separate issues of securities of a similar type and/or class over a period of 12 months’ (

text: Article 2(1)

text: (l)).

text: COM(2002)654 final.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 4 February 2004 at the request of the Ministry of Finance of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg on a draft law on securitisation (CON/2004/3)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 4 February 2004 at the request of the Ministry of Finance of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg on a draft law on securitisation (

text: 1. On 5 December 2003 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Luxembourg Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft law on securitisation -Projet de loi relative à la titrisation- (hereinafter the ‘draft law’).

text: 2. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on the second indent of Article 105(4) of the Treaty establishing the European Community, the second indent of Article 4(a) of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, and on the sixth indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions as the legislative proposal contains provisions applicable to financial institutions that ‘materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets’. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council of the ECB has adopted this opinion. Preliminary remarks

text: 3. The draft law, as submitted by the Luxembourg Ministry of Finance, establishes a specific legal framework for securitisation transactions in Luxembourg. The draft law draws upon experience with laws already in place in other countries and covers the legal status of securitisation undertakings and of securitisation funds respectively, the authorisation conditions for these securitisation entities and the supervisory powers of the Luxembourg financial supervisory authority – the Commission de surveillance du secteur financier (CSSF) - regarding these entities, the liquidation of these entities, the nature of the securitised risks and the rights of investors and creditors. One chapter of the draft law is also devoted to the rights, powers and authorisation conditions for a new category of financial sector player namely fiduciary representatives (représentants-fiduciaires). Fiduciary representatives must be registered in Luxembourg and the investors and creditors of a securitisation undertaking may use them to manage their interests. Finally, the draft law also contains some provisions relating to the accounting and tax treatment of securitisation transactions.

text: 4. The ECB notes that in Europe both domestic securitisation markets and structures as well as the corresponding legal, accounting and fiscal frameworks are highly fragmented. The ECB therefore welcomes the initiative of the Luxembourg authorities to provide more secure and transparent rules for the securitisation market with a view to increasing financial markets participants’ use of securitisation techniques. The ECB acknowledges the benefits of having an explicit and comprehensive regulatory framework for these complex transactions, which are rapidly growing in Europe. In the ECB’s view, such domestic frameworks should particularly aim to enhance legal certainty and transparency and ensure financial stability and should include a robust supervisory regime of the entities in charge of securitisation transactions. On the one hand, the ECB notes that the draft law offers great flexibility for establishing securitisation transactions and that the objective of the Luxembourg authorities was to provide practicable procedures at reasonable costs. On the other hand, the ECB is of the view that the objective of flexibility should co-exist with other goals of a regulatory nature such as investor protection and risk control and that the domestic framework should contain the legal safeguards necessary to ensure the safe and transparent conduct of these activities.

text: 5. A number of issues addressed by the draft law or its explanatory memorandum highlight certain legal uncertainties regarding cross-border securitisation transactions, in particular regarding the law applicable. For example, the draft law will apply only to securitisation entities situated in Luxembourg, which means that, if the acquiring and the issuing vehicles are segregated (see also paragraph 8), the draft law will only cover entities situated in Luxembourg. The draft law also highlights gaps whose removal could reduce obstacles to performing certain cross-border securitisation deals and enhance legal certainty. In this regard, the ECB regards securitisation as an area where considerable progress in integrating European financial markets could still be made notably in terms of the convergence of market practices, instruments and legal rules. Recently the European Union (EU) has launched efforts to introduce the necessary adjustments to any current proposal for EU legislation and reach a common understanding of certain securitisation-related concepts. In this respect the ECB would refer to the on-going work in the context of the review of capital requirements for banks and investment firms and the review of the Basel Accord or in the context of the implementing measures for the Prospectus Directive . Looking beyond the Financial Services Action Plan, the ECB sees merit in a strategy of increased harmonisation in the area of securitisation at EU level. Definition of securitisation

text: 6. The draft law defines securitisation as ‘the operation by which a securitisation entity acquires or assumes, directly or through the intermediary of another entity, the risks connected to debts, to other goods, or to liabilities assumed by third parties or inherent to all or part of the activities carried out by third parties in issuing the securities whose value or return depends on these risks’. The ECB notes the broad definition proposed by the Luxembourg Ministry of Finance. In addition, the ECB understands the Ministry’s desire to favour an economic and financial approach to defining securitisation thus covering all forms of securitisation transactions within the scope of the draft law. However, questions could arise as to whether the draft law is sufficiently explicit in defining concepts such as the ‘acquisition of risks’ or ‘the assumption of risks’. For example, in the context of traditional securitisation, the securitisation vehicle acquires the claims and not only the ‘risks connected to debts’. The ECB considers that it might also be useful to clarify this in some parts of the draft law and in particular its chapter on ‘risk assumption’. Securitisation vehicles proposed under the draft law

text: 7. Under the draft law, it will be possible to create securitisation entities, either in the form of securitisation undertakings or of securitisation funds without legal personality. The draft law leaves open to market participants the choice of using securitisation undertakings or securitisation funds and the Luxembourg legislator intends to follow closely the model adopted for the Luxembourg organismes de placement collectif (OPC) while taking into account the particular characteristics of the functions and purposes of securitisation vehicles. Firstly, the ECB notes that, for the sake of clarity, it would be preferable for the draft law to expressly state that these securitisation entities are not undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities within the meaning of the UCITS Directive . Secondly, with regard to securitisation funds, it is provided that either the management company (cf.

text: Article 7(1)

text: and (3) of the draft law) or the fund itself (cf.

text: Article 9

text: and Article 10(1) and 10(4) of the draft law) will be the issuers. The ECB notes that a securitisation fund’s lack of legal personality could give rise to legal uncertainty regarding its capacity to issue securities directly. Thirdly, the concepts of valeurs mobilières (securities) and of titres de créances (debt instruments) seem to be used interchangeably in the draft law and the ECB is of the view that the link between

text: Article 7(3)

text: and Article 9 of the draft law could be further clarified in this respect. Fourthly, the ECB understands Article 7 of the draft law and the explanatory memorandum (cf. page 26) as meaning that the Luxembourg authorities intend to allow securitisation funds to issue either units -representing a co-ownership right - or debt instruments representing a claim over the fund. If this choice is indeed available, the ECB considers that it should be expressed more clearly in the draft law and that rules relating to the redemption of units should be included. This might also lead to a distinction having to be made between investors (investing in fund units or debt instruments issued by the securitisation fund or the securitisation undertaking) and originators investing in the securitisation entities.

text: 8. As regards the ‘sub-structures’ of securitisation vehicles, Article 1(2) of the draft law provides that securitisation entities shall mean the entities that wholly perform securitisation and those that participate in such transactions by assuming all or part of the securitised risks (the acquiring entities) or by issuing securities to cover the financing of the securitised risks (the issuing entities). In this context, the ECB notes that the draft law does not make it obligatory for securitisation transactions to be exclusively performed through a single securitisation entity. Under this scheme, it should be possible to transfer the assets of an entity distinct from the entity issuing the securities, i.e. the acquiring entity and even to envisage an issuing entity dealing with several acquiring entities. The ECB is aware that similar structures that dissociate the two activities are used by market participants and are authorised by the legislation of other Member States. In the ECB’s view, it is necessary to ensure that the complexity of such structures, especially in a cross-border context and for vehicles with segments, does not create obstacles in terms of transparency, risk control and effectiveness of the legal transfer of assets and does not contradict the objective of reinforcing the direct correlation between the rights of investors and the underlying assets of the securitisation entities. In addition, the provisions of the draft law do not specify how the rules that apply to the acquiring and issuing entities will coexist (see however

text: Article 63

text: ). The ECB would also recommend clarifying the rules that apply to securitisation undertakings and securitisation funds respectively, since the possibility of segregating the functions of acquiring and issuing entities seems to be envisaged for both types of vehicle.

text: 9. The ECB notes that the draft law allows the creation of some segments within securitisation entities. This possibility is expressly provided for in Article 8 of the draft law and it is understood that securitisation undertakings also have this right . This provision may produce some economies of scale by allowing several originators to use the same vehicle for issuing asset-backed securities. However, secure segregation mechanisms must be put in place to ensure strict separation between pools of assets so that losses incurred in a given segment do not affect the profitability of the other segments. The ECB considers that this should also be clarified when acquiring entities and issuing entities are dissociated. Protection of investors and disclosure requirements

text: 10. The draft law’s extensive coverage in terms of underlying assets and risks covered aims to follow developments in the securitisation markets, where the range of asset classes is constantly expanding. The scope of the draft law is not limited to securitisations resulting from a transfer of claims or other assets. This flows from the definitions in

text: Article 1

text: and Article 53(1) of the draft law. The ECB understands that such wide coverage could include highly complex structures. In this respect, the ECB notes that Article 10(4) of the draft law obliges investors to accept the securitisation fund’s rules when acquiring securities issued by the fund. However, the draft law does not specify in detail the obligations imposed on securitisation vehicles in terms of the disclosure of information when securities are offered to the public, especially as regards the underlying assets and the assessment of the risks involved. The ECB would point out in this respect that the proposed implementing measures for the Prospectus Directive (hereinafter the implementing measures) aim to define the minimum information necessary depending on the type of issuer and the nature of the securities offered to the public or admitted to trading on a regulated market, to enable investors to make an informed assessment. More details are foreseen regarding the applicable disclosure regime for issuers of asset-backed securities.

text: 11. The additional information requirements identified for asset-backed securities in the implementing measures include the types of securities issued, the underlying assets and the structure of the transaction and cash flow (credit enhancements, subordinated debt, priority of payments, etc.) and should improve the quality of the information provided to investors. This applies particularly to information on the nature of underlying assets and the general characteristics of debtors which constitute, in the ECB’s view, particularly important types of information. The ECB also places great importance on a detailed description of the characteristics of the securities issued and of the types of structures used (including type of credit risk transfer) as well on an external assessment of the risks involved. Considering the various securitisation structures across Europe, it would be advisable for the draft law to clearly specify the respective obligations of the parties to the securitisation transaction vis-à-vis investors. Similarly, a practical consideration in relation to prospectuses concerns their availability to the public; in this respect the draft law could specify more clearly the nature of the legal entity responsible for drafting and disseminating the prospectus and how access can be obtained to the prospectuses, information notes for investors, management rules of securitisation funds and segments, etc. Supervisory aspects

text: 12. According to Article 19 of the draft law, securitisation entities that continuously issue securities to the public must be authorised by the CSSF to fulfil their functions. In this respect the ECB would first note that the concept of ‘continuing issue’ relates to the definition of credit institution in the consolidated Banking Directive . According to recital 6 of the consolidated Banking Directive, repayable funds may be ‘in the form of deposits or in other forms such as the continuing issue of bonds’. The ECB deduces, from the wording of the explanatory memorandum that these securitisation entities will not be considered to be credit institutions for supervisory purposes. Second, the draft law refers to the continuous issuance of securities to the public, which seems to imply that the issuance of securities to professional investors (private placement) would not be covered. This provision could be interpreted as meaning that, in such circumstances, securitisation vehicles would not have to be authorised by the CSSF. The ECB considers that the concept of ‘continuous issuance’ as applied in this context should be clarified so as to leave no ambiguity . The ECB feels that avoiding any ambiguity in the scope of supervisory competences is particularly important in view of the draft law’s aforementioned objectives of providing more secure and transparent rules. These competences should be designed to enable effective and comprehensive supervision, without introducing undue complications in supervisory regimes for different types of transactions. In particular, the complexities that are introduced by creating three different authorisation regimes for securitisation entities, i.e. authorised entities, non-authorised entities falling within the scope of the draft law and a third category comprising the entities not subject to the draft law, should be assessed against their benefits. The ECB recommends further clarification on these aspects in order to ensure sufficient supervision coverage of the entities involved in securitisation transactions in Luxembourg.

text: 13. Article 61(1) of the draft law provides that ‘a securitisation entity shall only be authorised to transfer its assets in accordance with the terms and conditions laid down by its statutes or its management rules’. The ECB feels that these management rules should clearly specify the conditions that apply to the transfer of underlying assets, to ensure that investors are fully aware of possible changes to the risk characteristics of the portfolio of underlying assets. Such additional detail might also cover certain safeguards in relation to securitisation entities’ ability to borrow. The ECB also notes that under Article 14 of the draft law management companies of securitisation funds do not solely manage securitisation funds, which means that they are entitled to extend their activities to the management of UCITS or pension funds provided that they fulfil the required criteria. The ECB would emphasise both the risks involved in blurring the borders between these different types of financial activity and the need for management companies to comply with strict standards in terms of conflicts of interest, disclosure and risk management rules.

text: 14. According to Article 22 of the draft law, authorised securitisation entities must entrust the custody of their liquid assets and their securities to a credit institution that is established or has its registered office in Luxembourg. According to the explanatory memorandum, this provision aims to ensure optimal protection for investors and facilitate the CSSF’s supervision of authorised securitisation entities. The ECB understands this provision as including branches of credit institutions established in the EU. Cross-border legal issues

text: 15. The draft law aims inter alia to make it easier for securitisation entities to acquire or transfer receivables. However, in the case of foreign debtors, the question of the conditions under which the assignment could be invoked against third parties might not fall within the scope of Luxembourg law, thus highlighting the limits of a strictly domestic approach. Cross-border securitisation transactions have to deal with conflict of law issues, which may affect the validity or enforceability of international assignments of receivables. In its Green Paper of 14 January 2003 on the conversion of the Rome Convention of 1980 on the law applicable to contractual obligations into a Community instrument and its modernisation , the European Commission points out that ‘the Rome Convention does not deal explicitly with the question under which conditions the assignment can be invoked against third parties. The question is important because it determines the effectiveness of the assignment of the claim and the transfer of the property’. Currently each Member State applies its own rules in this area and the solutions vary widely from one court to another. At international level the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a Convention on the assignment of claims in international trade in New York on 31 January 2002. The ECB notes that certain of the provisions of the draft law are inspired by this Convention (cf. the commentary to Articles

text: and

text: ) which, inter alia, aims to make key aspects of the rules on the conflict of laws more consistent and remove legal obstacles to certain international financing practices. Among the Member States to date only Luxembourg has signed the Convention on 12 June 2002. The ECB hopes that the solutions adopted and/or examined at international level will lead to an increased convergence of the applicable rules in this area at EU level. Use of asset-backed securities as collateral for central bank operations

text: 16. From a collateral policy point of view, the ECB would highlight the criteria that assets must fulfil in order to be eligible as collateral for Eurosystem monetary policy and intraday credit operations. Asset-backed securities may be accepted as collateral provided they fulfil these eligibility criteria. A case-by-case assessment is always performed by central banks, carrying out this task might necessitate them obtaining any relevant information from supervisory authorities. The ECB notes that the draft law potentially allows the issue of a wide range of types of assets, some of which may be eligible. The obligation that the securities are transferable in book-entry form is one of the requirements laid down for eligibility as collateral. The ECB therefore welcomes the fact that Article 7(3) of the draft law, despite the absence of a general regime for dematerialised securities in Luxembourg, allows the management company of the securitisation fund to issue book-entry securities. Statistics reporting

text: 17. The regular and timely collection of accurate and reliable statistical data on securitisation vehicles across Europe is of importance for monetary policy purposes. Work is currently under way to improve euro area statistics on securitisation. In general, in carrying out its statistical tasks, the ECB identifies reporting agents using a combination of criteria based on EU law and national regulatory provisions, including supervisory agreements or tax provisions. The ECB would recommend that the Luxembourg authorities add a provision to the draft law to ensure that securitisation entities provide the Banque centrale du Luxembourg with the information necessary to comply with the statistical obligations imposed by the ECB.

text: 18. This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main on 4 February 2004. [signed] The President of the ECB Jean-Claude TRICHET


title: Europeiska centralbankens yttrande av den 4 februari 2004 på begäran av Europeiska unionens råd över ett förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning om sammanställning av kvartalsvisa icke-finansiella räkenskaper efter institutionell sektor (KOM(2003) 789 slutlig) (CON/2004/4)

text: 1. Den 13 januari 2004 mottog Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) en begäran från Europeiska unionens råd om ett yttrande över ett förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning om sammanställning av kvartalsvisa icke-finansiella räkenskaper efter institutionell sektor (nedan kallat "förslaget").

text: 2. ECB:s behörighet att avge ett yttrande grundar sig på artikel 105.4 i Fördraget om upprättandet av Europeiska gemenskapen. I enlighet med artikel 17.5 första meningen i arbetsordningen för ECB har detta yttrande antagits av ECB-rådet.

text: 3. Syftet med förslaget är att upprätta en gemensam ram för medlemsstaternas bidrag till sammanställningen av kvartalsvisa europeiska icke-finansiella räkenskaper efter institutionell sektor.

text: 4. I enlighet med samarbetsavtalet om ekonomisk och finansiell statistik mellan ECB:s generaldirektorat för statistik och Europeiska gemenskapernas statistikkontor (Eurostat) av den 10 mars 2003, skall ECB:s GD för statistik och Eurostat gemensamt utveckla området för icke-finansiella räkenskaper efter institutionell sektor inom ramen för de nationella statistikräkenskaperna. Ansvaret för utvecklingen och offentliggörandet av kvartalsvisa och årliga icke-finansiella räkenskaper efter institutionell sektor för euroområdet är delat.

text: 5. ECB välkomnar förslaget som förberetts av en arbetsgrupp som inrättats gemensamt av ECB:s generaldirektorat för statistik och Eurostat. Förslaget är en del av handlingsplanen för statistikkrav avseende Ekonomiska och monetära unionen (EMU) (nedan kallad "handlingsplanen"), som på begäran av rådet (Ekofin-rådet) utarbetats av Eurostat i nära samarbete med ECB. Handlingsplanen är ett svar på monetära kommitténs rapport om statistikkraven i EMU, som godkändes av Ekofin-rådet den 18 januari 1999, samt den andra lägesrapporten om statistikkraven i EMU, som godkändes av Ekofin-rådet den 5 juni 2000. I den femte lägesrapporten, som godkändes av Ekofin-rådet den 18 februari 2003, anges att upprättandet av en uppsättning kvartalsvisa sektorsräkenskaper i enlighet med handlingsplanen fortfarande återstår att genomföra.

text: 6. ECB noterar att det i den gemensamma rapporten från Ekofin-rådet och kommissionen till Europeiska rådet om statistik och indikatorer för euroområdet som antogs av Ekofin-rådet den 18 februari 2003 understryks att högprioriterade åtgärder som ännu inte genomförts, inklusive kvartalsvisa nationalräkenskaper efter institutionell sektor, snabbt måste genomföras. Senast år 2005 skall de kvartalsvisa nationalräkenskaperna efter institutionell sektor, som är en del av de europeiska ekonomiska huvudindikatorerna, vara fullt genomförda.

text: 7. Den förslagna förordningen blir en del av det övergripande målet att sammanställa ett konsekvent system av årliga och kvartalsvisa räkenskaper för Europeiska unionen och för euroområdet. Systemet omfattar särskilt de viktigaste makroekonomiska aggregaten för sektorerna hushåll och företag i de finansiella och icke-finansiella räkenskaperna efter institutionell sektor. Systemet kräver konsekvens mellan betalningsbalansstatistik och övriga räkenskaper i utlandet. Utöver uppgifter om medlemsstaternas räkenskaper efter institutionell sektor, behövs uppgifter om räkenskaperna avseende EU-institutioner och organ för att komplettera systemet för europeiska räkenskaper.

text: 8. Slutligen stödjer ECB tidsplanen för överföring av uppgifter till Eurostat som skall ske senast 90 kalenderdagar efter utgången av det kvartal som uppgifterna gäller, samt bestämmelserna som rör tillhandahållandet av tidigare uppgifter från och med det första kvartalet 1999.

text: Utfärdat i Frankfurt am Main den 4 februari 2004.

text: Jean-Claude Trichet

text: ECB:s ordförande


text: OJ L 35, 11.2.2003, p. 1. 2 OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: OJ C 271, 26.9.2001, p. 10.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 13 February 2004 at the request of the Austrian Federal Ministry of Finance on a draft Federal law adopting a Federal Law on the supplementary supervision of credit institutions, insurance undertakings and investment firms in a financial conglomerate and amending the Insurance Supervision Act, the Banking Act, the Securities Supervision Act and the Financial Markets Supervisory Authorities Act (CON/2004/5)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 13 February 2004 at the request of the Austrian Federal Ministry of Finance on a draft Federal law adopting a Federal Law on the supplementary supervision of credit institutions, insurance undertakings and investment firms in a financial conglomerate and amending the Insurance Supervision Act, the Banking Act, the Securities Supervision Act and the Financial Markets Supervisory Authorities Act

text: 1. On 6 January 2004 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Austrian Federal Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft Bundesgesetz mit dem ein Bundesgesetz über die zusätzliche Beaufsichtigung der Kreditinstitute, Versicherungsunternehmen und Wertpapierfirmen eines Finanzkonglomerats (Finanzkonglomerategesetz – FKG) erlassen wird sowie das Versicherungsaufsichtsgesetz, das Bankwesengesetz, das Wertpapieraufsichtsgesetz und das Finanzmarktaufsichtsbehördengesetz geändert werden (Federal law adopting a Federal Law on the supplementary supervision of credit institutions, insurance undertakings and investment firms in a financial conglomerate (Financial Conglomerates Law) and amending the Insurance Supervision Act, the Banking Act, the Securities Supervision Act and the Financial Markets Supervisory Authorities Act) (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The draft law implements Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2002 on the supplementary supervision of credit institutions, insurance undertakings and investment firms in a financial conglomerate and amending Council Directives

text: and

text: , and Directives

text: and

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council .

text: 2. As the purpose of the draft law is to implement Directive

text: in Austria, the Austrian authorities were not legally obliged to consult the ECB under

text: Article 1(2) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions . However, it should be noted that at the request of the Council of the European Union, the ECB delivered its opinion on a draft of Directive

text: on 13 September 2001 (

text: ) and the ECB has a continuing interest in the harmonised implementation of Directive

text: in all Member States. In the light of the previous consultation, the ECB now strongly welcomes the opportunity to give its opinion on the draft law, which contains, inter alia, provisions concerning the prudential supervision of financial institutions and fosters the stability of financial institutions and markets. 3. The explanatory notes to the draft law refer to the Commission’s Financial Services Action Plan and state that the transposition of Directive

text: is a further step towards the completion of the Internal Market by filling certain gaps in current legislation relating to the supervision of financial conglomerates.

text: 4. In a general context, the ECB notes that increasing links between financial markets calls for careful consideration of cross-sector group structures to supervise and contain institutional and systemic risk. In particular, the combined operations of groups that comprise insurance undertakings, credit institutions and investment firms (referred to as ‘financial conglomerates’) may also create new prudential risks or exacerbate existing ones. The introduction of the euro has prompted changes in financial markets that call for a substantial enhancement of cooperation procedures between national authorities and the ECB and the national central banks within the Eurosystem. Capital adequacy requirements must therefore be sufficient and proportionate so as to counter the risks undertaken in groups that straddle traditional sectoral boundaries. The purpose of Directive

text: is to ensure the stability of European financial markets, to establish common standards for the prudential supervision of financial conglomerates throughout Europe and to ensure a level playing field and legal certainty between financial institutions. Key elements of Directive

text: are to ensure that there is adequate cooperation between the competent authorities and that due consideration is given to general requirements for transparent and clear arrangements for the supervision of conglomerates and the appropriate distribution of tasks and supervisory competencies. The ECB supports the transposition of Directive

text: into Austrian law as it will supplement the existing supervisory framework in Austria, which is currently organised on a sectoral basis. This reflects the need to provide increasingly integrated European financial markets with an adequate framework to achieve and maintain financial stability.

text: 5. The ECB welcomes the comprehensive provisions of the draft law on supervisory cooperation and the exchange of information. The explanatory memorandum to the draft law recalls explicitly the excellent cooperation between the Oesterreichische Nationalbank (OeNB) and the Finanzmarktaufsicht (FMA) (Austrian Financial Markets Authority) and mandates the OeNB to use its expertise and resources for on-site supervision of market and credit risk in credit institutions and, where appropriate, in investment firms within a financial conglomerate. Moreover, the ECB welcomes Paragraph 12(4) of the draft law which explicitly includes the European System of Central Banks and the ECB in such exchange of information on supervised entities, i.e. conglomerates, where this is necessary for the fulfilment of their respective tasks. Such entities are likely to be systemically important and their operations may affect financial stability, the stability of payment systems and also be relevant to the conduct of monetary policy in the European Union (EU).

text: 6. The ECB further notes that defining a conglomerate according to harmonised criteria represents the first crucial step towards consistent supervision of such financial groups throughout the EU. Paragraph 4(1) of the draft law imposes an obligation on the financial institutions concerned to review initially whether they satisfy the definition of a financial conglomerate. The final responsibility however remains with the FMA, which may, under Paragraph 3(5) of the draft law, substitute or add to the criteria defining a financial conglomerate. In particular, the FMA may take a group’s earning structure and off-balance sheet items into account. Furthermore, the ECB notes Paragraph 5(4) of the draft law, which states that in limited circumstances the Federal Minister of Finance may deviate in part from the provisions of Directive

text: when appointing a coordinating authority to carry out supplementary supervision. The ECB recalls the need to achieve an EU-wide harmonisation of the regulatory framework and advocates a high degree of caution when deviating from Directive

text: in order to define a conglomerate or identify the coordinating authority. The ECB regards the main benefit of harmonised and objective criteria as a contribution to the transparency, clarity and legal certainty facilitating a harmonised implementation of Community law throughout the EU.

text: 7. The ECB confirms that it has no objections to the competent national authorities making this opinion publicly available at their discretion. This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website six months after the date of its adoption. Done at Frankfurt am Main on 13 February 2004. [signed] The President of the ECB Jean-Claude TRICHET