text: AMC & GM to Part-CAT

text: Issue 2, Amendment 22

text: Annex II to ED Decision 2022/014/R Page 1 of 5

text: AMC & GM to Part-CAT

text: Issue 2, Amendment 22

text: ALTIMETER SETTING PROCEDURES

text: DETERMINATION OF RVR OR VIS FOR INSTRUMENT APPROACH OPERATIONS — AEROPLANES

text: Lowest RVR Type of Facilities approach Multi-pilot Single-pilot operations operations

text: 3D runway touchdown zone lights (RTZL) and runway No limitation operations centre line lights (RCLL) Final without RTZL and RCLL but using HUDLS or approach equivalent system; coupled autopilot or flight No limitation 600 m track offset director to the DH o 15 for category A and B aeroplanes o No RTZL and RCLL, not using HUDLS or equivalent or 5 for 750 m 800 m system or autopilot to the DH Category C and D aeroplanes 3D runway touchdown zone lights (RTZL) and runway operations centre line lights (RCLL) 800 m 1 000 m and

text: Annex II to ED Decision 2022/014/R Page 2 of 5

text: AMC & GM to Part-CAT

text: Issue 2, Amendment 22

text: o Final approach track offset  15 for Category A and B o aeroplanes or Final approach track offset  5 for Category C and D aeroplanes without RTZL and RCLL but using HUDLS or equivalent system; autopilot or flight director to the DH and 800 m 1 000 m o Final approach track offset  15 for Category A and o B aeroplanes or Final approach track offset  5 for Category C and D aeroplanes o 2D Final approach track offset 15 for category A and B o 750 m 800 m operations aeroplanes or 5 for Category C and D aeroplanes o Final approach track offset  15 for Category A and 1 000 m 1 000 m B aeroplanes o Final approach track offset  5 for Category C and D 1 200 m 1 200 m aeroplanes

text: EFFECT ON LANDING MINIMA OF TEMPORARILY FAILED OR DOWNGRADED GROUND EQUIPMENT

text: STABILISED APPROACH OPERATIONS — AEROPLANES

text: Annex II to ED Decision 2022/014/R Page 3 of 5

text: AMC & GM to Part-CAT

text: Issue 2, Amendment 22

text: BASIC FUEL SCHEME WITH VARIATIONS — PLANNING MINIMA

text: VERIFICATION OF THE SUITABILITY OF RUNWAYS FOR EFVS 200 OPERATIONS

text: Annex II to ED Decision 2022/014/R Page 4 of 5

text: AMC & GM to Part-CAT

text: Issue 2, Amendment 22

text: Annex II to ED Decision 2022/014/R Page 5 of 5

identifier: AMC and GM to Annex IV (Part-CAT) to Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 — Issue 2, Amendment 22

amnesord: Part-CAT - Commercial Air Transport Operations

beslut: ED Decision 2022/014/R

publisher: Europeiska unionens byrå för luftfartssäkerhet

sprak: en

serie: amc-gm

text: Annex II to ED Decision 2022/014/R ‘AMC & GM to Annex IV (Part-CAT) to

text: Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012

text: — Issue 2, Amendment 22’

type: rubrik

text: The text of the amendment is arranged to show deleted, new or amended text as shown below: (a) deleted text is struck through; (b) new or amended text is highlighted in blue; (c) an ellipsis ‘[...]’ indicates that the rest of the text is unchanged.

type: stycke

text: Note to the reader

text: In amended, and in particular in existing (that is, unchanged) text, ‘Agency’ is used interchangeably with ‘EASA’. The interchangeable use of these two terms is more apparent in the consolidated versions. Therefore, please note that both terms refer to the ‘European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)’.

text: The Annex to Decision 2014/015/R of 24 April 2014 of the Executive Director of the Agency is amended as follows:

text: GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.101(b) Altimeter check and settings

text: The following paragraphs of ICAO Doc 8168 (PANS-OPS), Volume III provide recommended guidance on how to develop the altimeter setting procedure:

text: (a) 3.2 ‘Pre-flight operational test’;

text: (b) 3.3 ‘Take-off and climb’;

text: (c) 3.5 ‘Approach and landing’.

text: AMC5 CAT.OP.MPA.110 Aerodrome operating minima

text: (a) […]

text: (b) […]

text: (c) […]

text: (d) […]

text: Table 10

text: Visual and non-visual aids and/or on-board equipment versus minimum RVR — aeroplanes

text: AMC11 CAT.OP.MPA.110 Aerodrome operating minima

text: (b) Conditions applicable to Table 17:

text: (1) multiple failures of runway/FATO lights other than those indicated in Table 17 should not be acceptable;

text: (2) deficiencies failures of approach and runway/FATO lights are acceptable at the same time, and the most demanding consequence should be applied; and

text: (3) failures other than ILS, GLS, MLS affect the RVR only and not the DH.

text: AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.115(a) Approach flight technique — aeroplanes

text: (g) The operator should specify the following in the operations manual:

text: (1) the acceptable tolerances referred to in (d);

text: (2) the means to identify the predetermined points referred to in (a) and (b). This should normally be the FAF.

text: (fh) When the operator requests approval for an alternative to the stabilised approach criteria for a particular approach to a particular runway, the operator should demonstrate that the proposed alternative will ensure that an acceptable level of safety is achieved.

text: AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.140(d) Maximum distance from an adequate aerodrome for two-engined aeroplanes without an ETOPS approval

text: […] (h) Dispatch/flight planning rules […] (4) ERA aerodrome(s): the operator should ensure that ERA aerodromes are available for the intended route, within the distance flown in 180 minutes based upon the OEI cruising speed, which is a speed within the certified limits of the aeroplane, selected by the operator and approved by the competent authority, confirming that, based on the available meteorological information, the weather conditions at ERA aerodromes are at or above the applicable minima for the applicable period of time, in accordance with CAT.OP.MPA.1825. […]

text: AMC9 CAT.OP.MPA.182 Fuel/energy scheme — aerodrome selection policy — aeroplanes

text: (a) Variations to the basic fuel schemes in the selection of aerodromes in regard to the planning minima are methods to reduce the meteorological margins based on the established mitigating measures. (b) As a minimum, the operator should: (1) use a suitable computerised flight-planning system; (2) hold an approval for limitedlow-visibility approach operations for that fleet; and (3) have established an operational control system that includes flight monitoring. […]

text: AMC2 CAT.OP.MPA.312(a)(2) EFVS 200 operations

text: The operational assessment before authorising the use of a runway for EFVS 200 operations should be conducted as follows: (a) Check whether the runway has been promulgated as suitable for EFVS operations or is certified as a precision approach runway category II or III by the State of the aerodrome. If this is so, then check whether and where the approach and runway lights installed (notably incandescent or LED lights) are adequate for the EFVS equipment LED lights are installed in order to assess the impact on the EFVS equipment used by the operator.

text: (b) If the check in point (a) above comes out negative (the runway is not promulgated as EFVS suitable or is not category II or III), then proceed as follows: (1) For straight-in IAPs, US Standard for Terminal Instrument Procedures (TERPS) may be considered to be acceptable as an equivalent to PANS-OPS. If other design criteria than those in PANS-OPS or US TERPS are used, the operations should not be conducted. (2) If an OFZ is established, this will ensure adequate obstacle protection from 960 m before the threshold. If an OFZ is not established or if the DH for the approach is above 250 ft, then check whether there is a visual segment surface (VSS). (3) VSSs are required for procedures published after 15 March 2007, but the existence of the VSS has to be verified through the aeronautical information publication (AIP), operations manual Part C, or direct contact with the aerodrome. Where the VSS is established, it may not be penetrated by obstacles. If the VSS is not established or is penetrated by obstacles and an OFZ is not established, then the operations should not be conducted. Note: obstacles of a height of less than 50 ft above the threshold may be disregarded when assessing the VSS. (4) Runways with obstacles that require visual identification and avoidance should not be accepted. (5) For the obstacle protection of a balked landing where an OFZ is not established, the operator may specify that pilots follow a departure procedure in the event of a balked landing, in which case it is necessary to verify that the aircraft will be able to comply with the climb gradients published for the instrument departure procedures for the expected landing conditions. (6) Perform an assessment of the suitability of the runway which should include whether the approach and runway lights installed (notably incandescent or LED lights) are adequate for the EFVS equipment used by the operator. (c) If the AFM stipulates specific requirements for approach procedures, then the operational assessment should verify that these requirements can be met.

type: vagledning

utgivare: easa


text: AMC & GM to Part-SPA

text: Issue 1, Amendment 13

text: Annex III to ED Decision 2022/014/R Page 1 of 7

text: AMC & GM to Part-SPA

text: Issue 1, Amendment 13

text: Annex III to ED Decision 2022/014/R Page 2 of 7

text: AMC & GM to Part-SPA

text: Issue 1, Amendment 13

text: Annex III to ED Decision 2022/014/R Page 3 of 7

text: AMC & GM to Part-SPA

text: Issue 1, Amendment 13

text: Annex III to ED Decision 2022/014/R Page 4 of 7

text: AMC & GM to Part-SPA

text: Issue 1, Amendment 13

text: Annex III to ED Decision 2022/014/R Page 5 of 7

text: AMC & GM to Part-SPA

text: Issue 1, Amendment 13

text: Annex III to ED Decision 2022/014/R Page 6 of 7

text: AMC & GM to Part-SPA

text: Issue 1, Amendment 13

text: Annex III to ED Decision 2022/014/R Page 7 of 7

identifier: AMC and GM to Annex V (Part-SPA) to Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 — Issue 1, Amendment 13

amnesord: Part-SPA - Operations requiring Specific Approvals

text: Annex III to ED Decision 2022/014/R ‘AMC & GM to Annex V (Part-SPA) to

text: Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012

text: — Issue 1, Amendment 13’

text: The text of the amendment is arranged to show deleted, new or amended text as shown below: (a) deleted text is struck through; (b) new or amended text is highlighted in blue; (c) an ellipsis ‘[...]’ indicates that the rest of the text is unchanged. Note to the reader In amended, and in particular in existing (that is, unchanged) text, ‘Agency’ is used interchangeably with ‘EASA’. The interchangeable use of these two terms is more apparent in the consolidated versions. Therefore, please note that both terms refer to the ‘European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)’. The Annex to Decision N° 2012/019/Directorate R of 24 October 2012 of the Executive Director of the Agency is amended as follows:

text: AMC1 SPA.LVO.100(a) Low-visibility operations and operations with operational credits

text: LOW-VISIBILITY TAKE-OFF (LVTO) OPERATIONS — AEROPLANES IN AN RVR OF LESS THAN 400 M

text: […] (c) The minimum RVR value specified in Table 1 or 2 should be achieved for all reporting points representative of the parts of the runway from the point at which the aircraft commences the take-off until the calculated accelerate-stop distance from that point.

text: LVTO OPERATIONS — AEROPLANES IN AN RVR OF LESS THAN 125 M

text: (ed) For LVTO operations with an RVR of less than 125 m, the following additional elements should apply: (1) The runway has centre line lights spaced at intervals of 15 m or less; (2) If an ILS signal is used for lateral guidance, the ILS localiser signal meets the requirements for category III operations, unless otherwise stated in the AFM; (3) If an ILS signal is to be used, low-visibility procedures (LVPs) include protection of the runway and, where an ILS localiser signal is used, it should include protection of the ILSsensitive area unless otherwise stated in the AFM; and (4) If a GLS signal is used for lateral guidance, the GLS performance type meets the requirements for category III operations (GAST D and to GBAS point to which guidance is required), unless otherwise stated in the AFM. (fe) For LVTO operations with an RVR of less than 125 m, the reported RVR should be not less than the minimum specified in the AFM or, if no such minimum is specified, not less than 75 m. (gf) The minimum required RVR should be achieved for all reporting points representative of the parts of the runway from the point at which the aircraft commences the take-off until the greater of the calculated take-off distance or accelerate-stop distance from that point. (hg) The reported RVR value representative of the initial part of the take-off run can be replaced by pilot assessment.

text: AMC3 SPA.LVO.100(b) Low-visibility operations and operations with operational credits

text: INSTRUMENT APPROACH OPERATIONS IN LOW-VISIBILITY CONDITIONS — EFFECT ON LANDING MINIMA OF TEMPORARILY FAILED OR DOWNGRADED EQUIPMENT FOR APPROACH OPERATIONS WITH A DH BELOW

text: 200 ft

text: (a) […] (b) The following conditions should be applied to Table 6: (1) multiple failures of runway/FATO lights other than those indicated in Table 6 are not acceptable; (2) deficiencies failures of both the approach and runway/FATO lights are acceptable at the same time, and the most demanding consequence should be applied; […] Table 7 Failed or downgraded equipment —effect on landing minima Operational credits

text: Effect on landing minima Failed or downgraded equipment SA CAT I SA CAT II EFVS-A EFVS-L

text: Navaid stand-by No effect transmitter

text: Outer marker (ILS) No effect if replaced by height check at 1 000 ft

text: Middle marker (ILS) No effect

text: RVR assessment On runways equipped with two or more RVR assessment units, one may be systems inoperative

text: Approach lights Not allowed Not allowed As per IAP As per IAP

text: Approach lights except the last Not allowed No effect As per IAP As per IAP

text: t

text: n 210 m

text: e m

text: ip Approach lights

text: u q

text: except the last No effect No effect As per IAP As per IAP

text: e d

text: e 420 m

text: ad

text: gr Standby power for No effect wn approach lights

text: o r d

text: o Day: No effect Day: no effect As per IAP As per IAP d Edge lights,

text: le

text: Night: not Night: Fai Threshold lights As per IAP As per IAP allowed RVR 550 m

text: Threshold lights Night: not Night: As per IAP As per IAP allowed RVR 550 m

text: No effect if centre line lights are Runway end lights As per IAP serviceable

text: Day: RVR 400 m Day: RVR 300 m As per IAP As per IAP

text: Centre line lights

text: Night: Night:

text: As per IAP As per IAP RVR 550 m RVR 400 m

text: Centre line lights spacing increased to No effect No effect As per IAP As per IAP 30 m

text: Day:

text: Day: no effect As per IAP RVR 300 m TDZ lights

text: Night:

text: Night: no effect As per IAP RVR 350 m Taxiway light system No effect

text: GM3 SPA.LVO.110 Aerodrome-related requirements, including instrument flight procedures.

text: SUITABLE AERODROMES — ASSESSMENT — SUITABLE RUNWAY AND RUNWAY ENVIRONMENT CHARACTERISTICS (a) […] (b) […] (c) […] (d) There should be a radio altimeter operating area for runways intended to be used for EFVS-L, CAT III, CAT II, SA CAT II and SA CAT I operations. The ICAO aerodrome provisions detail that the radio altimeter operating area extends to at least 300 m from the runway threshold with a width of 60 metres on either side of the extended centre line of the runway. The width may be reduced to not less than  30 metres if such a reduction does not affect the safety of aircraft operations as assessed by the aerodrome operator in cooperation with affected stakeholders. Slope changes should be kept to a minimum. […]

text: GM4 SPA.LVO.110 Aerodrome-related requirements, including instrument flight procedures

text: SUITABLE AERODROMES — ASSESSMENT — PREVIOUS OPERATIONAL DATA PROVIDED BY THE STATE OF THE AERODROME (a) As detailed in point (b)(1) of AMC1 SPA.LVO.110, the assessment of the suitability of an aerodrome, including instrument flight procedures, for the intended operations, may be made considering previous operational data for the particular aerodrome, runway and instrument flight procedures. (b) The following guidance is provided for the assessment of suitability of aerodromes for LVOs or operations with operational credits. (1) If a State provides data related to a list of airports or runways in its territory that are suitable for CAT II or CAT III operations with a specific aircraft model or group of aircraft models, those airports or runways may be considered suitable for the purpose of AMC2 SPA.LVO.110 for those specific aircraft model(s), airports or runways, and approach operations (e.g. the FAA may provide such a type of list). Note: A CAT II or CAT III approved runway does not necessarily mean that the airport is suitable for the purpose of AMC2 SPA.LVO as the aerodrome’s provisions may not ensure that the requirements for certain aircraft models are fulfilled. (2) If a State provides data related to a list of airports or runways in its territory that are found suitable for SA CAT I or SA CAT II, those airports or runways may be considered suitable for the purpose of AMC2 SPA.LVO.110. Note: In some States the concept of SA CAT I and SA CAT II may be different from the EU concept. The operator should consider these differences. (3) If a State provides data related to a list of airports or runways in its territory that are approved for CAT II/III operations but are designated as restricted or non-standard or irregular, those designated runways should be considered not suitable. The remaining CAT II/III runways of that State may be considered regular. (4) A competent authority may provide data related to a list of airports or runways that can be considered suitable for defined LVOs. The suitability statement could be credited by operators under the oversight of that authority.

text: GM8 SPA.LVO.110 Aerodrome-related requirements, including instrument flight procedures.

text: SUITABLE AERODROMES — OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT — PROCESS TO DETERMINE THE NUMBER OF APPROACHES AND LANDINGS — AEROPLANES […] Figure 01: Typical example of ‘very complex’ with greater than 6 m ‘sea wall’ at 300 m (Asturias, LEAS 29 dated 2007) that after suitability assessment and due to the presence present of ARAS, it may be changed to ‘moderate’. […] — Deviation from mean LSAA slope: greatest elevation difference between any runway elevation inside LSAA and mean LSAA slope. Figure 1: Mean LSAA slope & Deviation from mean LSAA slope Note: Published runway profiles usually contain the position and elevation of each significant runway longitudinal slope change. Elevation at other location can be interpolated assuming straight slope between each published elevation. The highest / lowest elevation of the LSAA might not be the one where the deviation from mean LSAA slope is the greatest. (i) Simple (A) Approximately ± 0.4 % mean LSAA slope and less than 1 m (3 ft) variation around mean LSAA slope; or (B) previous experience in more constraining touch down condition in the same aircraft type or variant. (ii) Moderate Approximately ± 0.8 % mean LSAA slope and less than 2 m (36 ft) variation around mean LSAA slope. (iii) Complex Approximately ± 1.0 % mean LSAA slope and less than 4 m (612 ft) variation around mean LSAA slope. (iv) Very complex Outside any of the limits defined above. […]

text: AMC4 SPA.LVO.120(b) Flight crew competence

text: RECURRENT CHECKING FOR LVTO, SA CAT I, CAT II, SA CAT II AND CAT III APPROACH OPERATIONS

text: (a) The operator should ensure that the pilots’ competence to perform LVOs for which they are authorised is checked by completing at least the following exercises: (1) One or more low-visibility rejected take-off at minimum approved RVR at least once over the period between two operator proficiency checks or once at every periodic demonstration of competence or, for an ATQP operator, at each required operator proficiency check or alternatively at each required LOE. (2) Pilots authorised for LVTO operations in an RVR of less than 150 m should additionally conduct at least one LVTO in the minimum approved visibility at each required operator proficiency check or periodic demonstration of competence. (3) One or more low-visibility approaches in simulated instrument flight conditions down to a point between 500 ft AGL and the threshold (e.g. applicable DH), followed by goaround, at DH at each required operator proficiency check or periodic demonstration of competence; and (4) One or more low-visibility approach and landings with visual reference established at the DH at each required operator proficiency check or periodic demonstration of competence. (b) Pilots authorised to conduct CAT III operations on aircraft with a fail-passive autoland system, or HUDLS or equivalent, should complete a missed approach at least once over the period of three consecutive operator proficiency checks or demonstrations of competence as the result of an equipment failure at or below the DH when the last reported RVR was less than 300 m. For ATQP operators, pilots authorised to conduct CAT III operations on aircraft with a failpassive autoland system, or HUDLS or equivalent, should complete a missed approach at least once every two OPCs or LOE (a period of about 2 years). (c) CAT III approach operations should be conducted in an FSTD. Other exercises may be conducted in an FSTD or aircraft.


text: AMC & GM to Part-NCC

text: Issue 1, Amendment 17

text: Annex IV to ED Decision 2022/014/R Page 1 of 5

text: AMC & GM to Part-NCC

text: Issue 1, Amendment 17

text: ALTIMETER SETTING PROCEDURES

text: DETERMINATION OF RVR OR VIS FOR INSTRUMENT APPROACH OPERATIONS — AEROPLANES

text: Lowest RVR Type of Facilities approach Multi-pilot Single-pilot operations operations

text: 3D runway touchdown zone lights (RTZL) and runway No limitation operations centre line lights (RCLL) Final without RTZL and RCLL but using HUDLS or approach equivalent system; coupled autopilot or flight No limitation 600 m track offset director to the DH o 15 for category A and B aeroplanes o No RTZL and RCLL, not using HUDLS or equivalent or 5 for 750 m 800 m system or autopilot to the DH Category C and D aeroplanes 3D runway touchdown zone lights (RTZL) and runway operations centre line lights (RCLL) 800 m 1 000 m and

text: Annex IV to ED Decision 2022/014/R Page 2 of 5

text: AMC & GM to Part-NCC

text: Issue 1, Amendment 17

text: o Final approach track offset  15 for Category A and o B aeroplanes or Final approach track offset  5 for Category C and D aeroplanes 3D without RTZL and RCLL but using HUDLS or operations equivalent system; autopilot or flight director to the DH and 800 m 1 000 m o Final approach track offset  15 for Category A and o B aeroplanes or Final approach track offset  5 for Category C and D aeroplanes o 2D Final approach track offset 15 for category A o operations and B aeroplanes or 5 for Category C and D 750 m 2D operations aeroplanes o Final approach track offset  15 for Category A 1 000 m 1 000 m and B aeroplanes o Final approach track offset  5 for Category C and 1 200 m 1 200 m D aeroplanes

text: EFFECT ON LANDING MINIMA OF TEMPORARILY FAILED OR DOWNGRADED GROUND EQUIPMENT

text: USE OF COMMERCIALLY AVAILABLE INFORMATION

text: Annex IV to ED Decision 2022/014/R Page 3 of 5

text: AMC & GM to Part-NCC

text: Issue 1, Amendment 17

text: VISUAL AND NON-VISUAL AIDS AND INFRASTRUCTURE

text: VERIFICATION OF THE SUITABILITY OF RUNWAYS FOR EFVS 200 OPERATIONS

text: Annex IV to ED Decision 2022/014/R Page 4 of 5

text: AMC & GM to Part-NCC

text: Issue 1, Amendment 17

text: Annex IV to ED Decision 2022/014/R Page 5 of 5

identifier: AMC and GM to Annex VI (Part-NCC) to Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 — Issue 1, Amendment 17

amnesord: Part-NCC - Non-commercial operations with complex-motor-powered aircraft

text: Annex IV to ED Decision 2022/014/R ‘AMC & GM to Annex VI (Part-NCC) to

text: Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012

text: — Issue 1, Amendment 17’

text: The text of the amendment is arranged to show deleted, new or amended text as shown below: (a) deleted text is struck through; (b) new or amended text is highlighted in blue; (c) an ellipsis ‘[…]’ indicates that the rest of the text is unchanged.

text: Note to the reader

text: In amended, and in particular in existing (that is, unchanged) text, ‘Agency’ is used interchangeably with ‘EASA’. The interchangeable use of these two terms is more apparent in the consolidated versions. Therefore, please note that both terms refer to the ‘European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)’.

text: The Annex to Decision N° 2013/021/R of 23 August 2013 of the Executive Director of the Agency is amended as follows:

text: GM1 NCC.OP.101 Altimeter check and settings

text: The following paragraphs of ICAO Doc 8168 (PANS-OPS), Volume III provide recommended guidance on how to develop the altimeter setting procedure:

text: (a) 3.2 ‘Pre-flight operational test’;

text: (b) 3.3 ‘Take-off and climb’;

text: (c) 3.5 ‘Approach and landing’.

text: AMC5 NCC.OP.110 Aerodrome operating minima

text: (a) […]

text: (b) […]

text: (c) […]

text: (d) […]

text: Table 9

text: Visual and non-visual aids and/or on-board equipment versus minimum RVR — multi-pilot operations aeroplanes

text: AMC9 NCC.OP.110 Aerodrome operating minima — general

text: (a) […]

text: (b) Conditions applicable to Table 15:

text: (1) multiple failures of runway/FATO lights other than those indicated in Table 15 should not be acceptable;

text: (2) deficiencies failures of approach and runway/FATO lights are acceptable at the same time, and the most demanding consequence should be applied treated separately; and

text: (3) failures other than ILS, GLS, or MLS affect the RVR only and not the DH.

text: GM9 NCC.OP.110 Aerodrome operating minima — general

text: When an operator uses commercially available information to establish aerodrome operating minima, the operator remains responsible for ensuring that the material used is accurate and suitable for its operation, and that the aerodrome operating minima are calculated in accordance with the method specified in Part C of its operations manual and approved by the competent authority.

text: The operator should apply the procedures in ORO.GEN.205 ‘Contracted activities’.

text: GM10 NCC.OP.110(b)(5) Aerodrome operating minima

text: ‘Visual and non-visual aids and infrastructure’ refers to all equipment and facilities required for the procedure to be used for the intended instrument approach operation. This includes but is not limited to lights, markings, ground- or space-based radio aids, etc.

text: AMC2 NCC.OP.235(a)(2) EFVS 200 operations

text: The operational assessment before authorising the use of a runway for EFVS 200 operations may be conducted as follows: (a) Check whether the runway has been promulgated as suitable for EFVS 200 operations or is certified as a PA category II or III runway by the State of the aerodrome. If this is so, then check whether and where the approach and runway lights installed (notably incandescent or LED lights) are adequate for the EFVS equipment LED lights are installed in order to assess the impact on the EFVS equipment used by the operator. (b) If the check in point (a) above comes out negative (the runway is not promulgated as EFVS suitable or is not category II or III), then proceed as follows: (1) For straight-in IAPs, US Standard for Terminal Instrument Procedures (TERPS) may be considered to be acceptable as an equivalent to PANS-OPS. If other design criteria than PANS-OPS or US TERPS are used, the operations should not be conducted. (2) If an OFZ is established, this will ensure adequate obstacle protection from 960 m before the threshold. If an OFZ is not established or if the DH for the approach is above 250 ft, then check whether there is a visual segment surface (VSS). (3) VSSs are required for procedures published after 15 March 2007, but the existence of the VSS has to be verified through an aeronautical information publication (AIP), operations manual Part C, or direct contact with the aerodrome. Where the VSS is established, it may not be penetrated by obstacles. If the VSS is not established or is penetrated by obstacles and an OFZ is not established, then the operations should not be conducted. Note: obstacles of a height of less than 50 ft above the threshold may be disregarded when assessing the VSS. (4) Runways with obstacles that require visual identification and avoidance should not be accepted. (5) For the obstacle protection of a balked landing where an OFZ is not established, the operator may specify that pilots follow a departure procedure in the event of a balked landing, in which case it is necessary to verify that the aircraft will be able to comply with the climb gradients published for the instrument departure procedures for the expected landing conditions.

text: (6) Perform an assessment of the suitability of the runway which should include whether the approach and runway lights installed (notably incandescent or LED lights) are adequate for the EFVS equipment used by the operator. (c) If the AFM stipulates specific requirements for approach procedures, then the operational assessment should verify that these requirements can be met.


text: AMC & GM to Part-NCC Issue 1, Amendment 18

text: Note to the reader

text: In amended, and in particular in existing (that is, unchanged) text, ‘Agency’ is used interchangeably with ‘EASA’. The interchangeable use of these two terms is more apparent in the consolidated versions. Therefore, please note that both terms refer to the ‘European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)’.

text: Annex I to ED Decision 2023/004/R Page 1 of 2

text: ADEQUACY OF GROUND FACILITIES

text: ADEQUACY OF GROUND FACILITIES — SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT OF OPERATIONS WITHOUT RESCUE AND FIREFIGHTING SERVICES AT THE AERODROME OF INTENDED OPERATION

text: Annex I to ED Decision 2023/004/R Page 2 of 2

identifier: AMC and GM to Annex VI (Part-NCC) to Commission Regulation (EU) No 965-2012 — Issue 1, Amendment 18

beslut: ED Decision 2023/004/R

text: Annex I to ED Decision 2023/004/R

text: ‘Acceptable Means of Compliance AMC and Guidance Material (GM) to Annex VI (Part-NCC) to

text: Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012

text: Issue 1, Amendment 18’

text: The text of the amendment is arranged to show deleted, new or amended text as follows:

text: — deleted text is struck through;

text: — new or amended text is highlighted in blue;

text: — an ellipsis ‘[…]’ indicates that the rest of the text is unchanged.

text: The Annex to ED Decision No° 2013/021/ Directorate R is amended as follows:

text: SUBPART B — OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES

text: AMC1 NCC.OP.145(a) Flight preparation

text: When deciding on the adequacy of facilities and services available at an aerodrome of intended operation, the operator should: (a) consult the aeronautical information publication (AIP) for information on the availability of rescue and firefighting services (RFFS) at the aerodrome of intended operation; and (b) assess the level of safety risk that is associated with the aircraft type and nature of the operation in relation to the availability of RFFS.

text: GM1 NCC.OP.145(a) Flight preparation

text: To operate at an aerodrome with downgraded or unavailable rescue and firefighting services (RFFS), the operator may consider including in its operations manual, for each aircraft type, certain criteria to be used when conducting a safety risk assessment of such operations. For aircraft in rescue and firefighting (RFF) category 3 and higher, the conditions under which the pilot-in-command may decide to conduct a flight may include, but not be limited to the following: (a) acceptable downgrades of RFFS for planning and in-flight purposes such as departure, destination, and alternate aerodromes; (b) aircraft characteristics related to mass, landing speed, fuel capacity; (c) length of route or flight duration; (d) maximum number of passengers on board; (e) possible limitation to daytime only or a certain time of the day (due to fatigue); (f) weather constraints; (g) aerodromes that are unacceptable with unavailable or downgraded RFFS.


identifier: AMC and GM to Annex VII (Part-NCO) to Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 — Issue 2, Amendment 14

amnesord: Part-NCO - Non-commercial operations with other than complex-motor-powered aircraft

text: AMC & GM to Part-NCO

text: Issue 2, Amendment 14

text: Annex V to ED Decision 2022/014/R ‘AMC & GM to Annex VII (Part-NCO) to

text: Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012

text: — Issue 2, Amendment 14’

text: The text of the amendment is arranged to show deleted, new or amended text as shown below: (a) deleted text is struck through; (b) new or amended text is highlighted in blue; (c) an ellipsis ‘[…]’ indicates that the rest of the text is unchanged. Note to the reader In amended, and in particular in existing (that is, unchanged) text, ‘Agency’ is used interchangeably with ‘EASA’. The interchangeable use of these two terms is more apparent in the consolidated versions. Therefore, please note that both terms refer to the ‘European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)’.

text: Annex V to ED Decision 2022/014/R Page 1 of 2

text: AMC & GM to Part-NCO

text: Issue 2, Amendment 14

text: The Annex to Decision 2014/016/R of 24 April 2014 of the Executive Director of the Agency is amended as follows:

text: GM1 NCO.OP.105 Specification of isolated aerodromes — aeroplanes

text: USE OF AN AERODROME AS AN ISOLATED AERODROME

text: The concept of an isolated aerodrome allows the operator to use aerodromes that would otherwise be impossible or impractical to use with sufficient fuel/energy to fly to the destination aerodrome and then to a destination alternate aerodrome, provided that operational criteria are used to ensure a safe-landing option, for example by specifying a point of no return (PNR). If alternate fuel/energy is carried, the operator is not required to consider the aerodrome isolated and use the aforementioned operational criteria.

text: Annex V to ED Decision 2022/014/R Page 2 of 2


text: AMC & GM to Part-NCO Issue 2, Amendment 15

text: Note to the reader

text: In amended, and in particular in existing (that is, unchanged) text, ‘Agency’ is used interchangeably with ‘EASA’. The interchangeable use of these two terms is more apparent in the consolidated versions. Therefore, please note that both terms refer to the ‘European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)’.

text: Annex II to ED Decision 2023/004/R Page 1 of 2

text: ADEQUACY OF GROUND FACILITIES

text: Annex II to ED Decision 2023/004/R Page 2 of 2

identifier: AMC and GM to Annex VII (Part-NCO) to Commission Regulation (EU) No 965-2012 — Issue 2, Amendment 15

text: Annex II to ED Decision 2023/004/R

text: ‘Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) and Guidance Material (GM) to Annex VII (Part-NCO) to

text: Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012

text: Issue 2, Amendment 15’

text: — deleted text is struck through;

text: The Annex to ED Decision No 2104/016/R is amended as follows:

text: SUBPART B — OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES

text: AMC1 NCO.OP.135(a) Flight preparation

text: (a) The pilot-in-command, in ascertaining the adequacy of facilities and services available at an aerodrome of intended operation, should assess the safety risk that is associated with the type of the operation in relation to the availability of rescue and fire-fighting services (RFFS). (b) The safety risk assessment may conclude that there is no need for availability of RFFS at the aerodrome of intended landing because of the low risk that is associated with the type of aircraft and type of operation specific to NCO.


text: o 2D Final approach track offset 15 for category A o operations and B aeroplanes or 5 for Category C and D 750 m 2D operations aeroplanes

text: o Final approach track offset  15 for Category A 1 000 m 1 000 m and B aeroplanes o Final approach track offset  5 for Category C and 1 200 m 1 200 m D aeroplanes

identifier: AMC and GM to Annex VIII (Part-SPO) to Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 — Issue 1, Amendment 17

text: AMC & GM to Part-SPO

text: Issue 1, Amendment 17

text: Annex VI to ED Decision 2022/014/R ‘AMC & GM to Annex VIII (Part-SPO) to

text: Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012

text: — Issue 1, Amendment 17’

text: The text of the amendment is arranged to show deleted, new or amended text as shown below: (a) deleted text is struck through; (b) new or amended text is highlighted in blue; (c) an ellipsis ‘[...]’ indicates that the rest of the text is unchanged. Note to the reader In amended, and in particular in existing (that is, unchanged) text, ‘Agency’ is used interchangeably with ‘EASA’. The interchangeable use of these two terms is more apparent in the consolidated versions. Therefore, please note that both terms refer to the ‘European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)’.

text: Annex VI to ED Decision 2022/014/R Page 1 of 6

text: AMC & GM to Part-SPO

text: Issue 1, Amendment 17

text: The Annex to Decision 2014/018/R of 24 April 2014 of the Executive Director of the Agency is amended as follows:

text: GM1 SPO.OP.101 Altimeter check and settings

text: ALTIMETER- SETTING PROCEDURES

text: The following paragraphs of ICAO Doc 8168 (PANS-OPS), Volume III provide recommended guidance on how to develop the altimeter setting procedure: (a) 3.2 ‘Pre-flight operational test’; (b) 3.3 ‘Take-off and climb’; (c) 3.5 ‘Approach and landing’.

text: AMC3 SPO.OP.110 Aerodrome operating minima — aeroplanes and helicopters

text: TAKE-OFF OPERATIONS

text: (a) […] (b) Visual reference (1) The take-off minima should be selected to ensure sufficient guidance to control the aircraft in the event of both a rejected take-off in adverse circumstances and a continued take-off after failure of the critical engine. (2) For night operations, ground lights should be available to illuminate the runway/final approach and take-off area (FATO) and any obstacles the prescribed runway lights should be in operation to mark the runway and any obstacles.

text: AMC4 SPO.OP.110 Aerodrome operating minima — aeroplanes and helicopters

text: DETERMINATION OF THE DH/MDH FOR INSTRUMENT APPROACH OPERATIONS — AEROPLANES

text: (a) The decision height (DH) to be used for a 3D approach operation or a 2D approach operation flown using the continuous descent final approach (CDFA) technique should not be lower than the highest of: (1) […]

text: Annex VI to ED Decision 2022/014/R Page 2 of 6

text: AMC & GM to Part-SPO

text: Issue 1, Amendment 17

text: AMC5 SPO.OP.110 Aerodrome operating minima — aeroplanes and helicopters

text: DETERMINATION OF RVR OR VIS FOR INSTRUMENT APPROACH OPERATIONS — AEROPLANES

text: (a) […] (b) […] (c) […] (d) […] Table 9 Visual and non-visual aids and/or on-board equipment versus minimum RVR — aeroplanes

text: Lowest RVR Type of Facilities approach Multi-pilot Single-pilot operations operations 3D runway touchdown zone lights (RTZL) and runway No limitation operations centre line lights (RCLL) Final without RTZL and RCLL but using HUDLS or approach equivalent system; coupled autopilot or flight No limitation 600 m track offset director to the DH o 15 for category A and B aeroplanes o No RTZL and RCLL, not using HUDLS or equivalent or 5 for 750 m 800 m system or autopilot to the DH Category C and D aeroplanes 3D runway touchdown zone lights (RTZL) and runway operations centre line lights (RCLL) and 800 m 1 000 m o Final approach track offset  15 for Category A and o B aeroplanes or Final approach track offset  5 for Category C and D aeroplanes without RTZL and RCLL but using HUDLS or equivalent system; autopilot or flight director to the DH and 800 m 1 000 m o Final approach track offset  15 for Category A and o B aeroplanes or Final approach track offset  5 for Category C and D aeroplanes

text: Annex VI to ED Decision 2022/014/R Page 3 of 6

text: AMC & GM to Part-SPO

text: Issue 1, Amendment 17

text: AMC9 SPO.OP.110 Aerodrome operating minima — aeroplanes and helicopters

text: EFFECT ON LANDING MINIMA OF TEMPORARILY FAILED OR DOWNGRADED GROUND EQUIPMENT — COMPLEX MOTOR-POWERED AIRCRAFT

text: (a) […] (b) Conditions applicable to Table 15: (1) multiple failures of runway/FATO lights other than those indicated in Table 15 should not be acceptable; (2) deficiencies failures of approach and runway/FATO lights are acceptable at the same time, and the most demanding consequence should be applied treated separately; and (3) failures other than ILS or MLS affect the RVR only and not the DH. […]

text: GM10 SPO.OP.110 Aerodrome operating minima —aeroplanes and helicopters

text: USE OF COMMERCIALLY AVAILABLE INFORMATION

text: When an operator uses commercially available information to establish aerodrome operating minima, the operator remains responsible for ensuring that the information used is accurate and suitable for its operation, and that the aerodrome operating minima are calculated in accordance with the method specified in Part C of its operations manual and approved by the competent authority. The operator should apply the procedures in ORO.GEN.205 ‘Contracted activities’.

text: AMC2 SPO.OP.116 Performance-based navigation – aeroplanes and helicopters

text: MONITORING AND VERIFICATION

text: […] (d) Altimetry settings for RNP APCH operations using Baro VNAV […] (2) Temperature compensation (i) For RNP APCH operations to LNAV/VNAV minima using Baro VNAV: (A) […]

text: Annex VI to ED Decision 2022/014/R Page 4 of 6

text: AMC & GM to Part-SPO

text: Issue 1, Amendment 17

text: (B) when the temperature is within promulgated limits, the flight crew should not make compensation to the altitude at the FAF and DA/H; and […]

text: AMC2 SPO.OP.235(a)(2) EFVS 200 operations

text: VERIFICATION OF THE SUITABILITY OF RUNWAYS FOR EFVS 200 OPERATIONS

text: The operational assessment before authorising the use of a runway for EFVS 200 operations may be conducted as follows: (a) Check whether the runway has been promulgated as suitable for EFVS 200 operations or is certified as a PA category II or III runway by the State of the aerodrome. If this is so, then check whether and where the approach and runway lights installed (notably incandescent or LED lights) are adequate for the EFVS equipment LED lights are installed in order to assess the impact on the EFVS equipment used by the operator. (b) If the check in point (a) above comes out negative (the runway is not promulgated as EFVS suitable or is not category II or III), then proceed as follows: (1) For straight-in IAPs, US Standard for Terminal Instrument Procedures (TERPS) may be considered to be acceptable as an equivalent to PANS-OPS. If other design criteria than PANS-OPS or US TERPS are used, the operations should not be conducted. (2) If an OFZ is established, this will ensure adequate obstacle protection from 960 m before the threshold. If an OFZ is not established or if the DH for the approach is above 250 ft, then check whether there is a visual segment surface (VSS). (3) VSSs are required for procedures published after 15 March 2007, but the existence of the VSS has to be verified through an aeronautical information publication (AIP), operations manual Part C, or direct contact with the aerodrome. Where the VSS is established, it may not be penetrated by obstacles. If the VSS is not established or is penetrated by obstacles and an OFZ is not established, then the operations should not be conducted. Note: obstacles of a height of less than 50 ft above the threshold may be disregarded when assessing the VSS. (4) Runways with obstacles that require visual identification and avoidance should not be accepted. (5) For the obstacle protection of a balked landing where an OFZ is not established, the operator may specify that pilots follow a departure procedure in the event of a balked landing, in which case it is necessary to verify that the aircraft will be able to comply with the climb gradients published for the instrument departure procedures for the expected landing conditions. (6) Perform an assessment of the suitability of the runway which should include whether the approach and runway lights installed (notably incandescent or LED lights) are adequate for the EFVS equipment used by the operator.

text: Annex VI to ED Decision 2022/014/R Page 5 of 6

text: AMC & GM to Part-SPO

text: Issue 1, Amendment 17

text: (c) If the AFM stipulates specific requirements for approach procedures, then the operational assessment should verify that these requirements can be met.

text: Annex VI to ED Decision 2022/014/R Page 6 of 6


text: AMC & GM to Part-SPO Issue 1, Amendment 18

text: Note to the reader

text: In amended, and in particular in existing (that is, unchanged) text, ‘Agency’ is used interchangeably with ‘EASA’. The interchangeable use of these two terms is more apparent in the consolidated versions. Therefore, please note that both terms refer to the ‘European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)’.

text: Annex III to ED Decision 2023/004/R Page 1 of 2

text: ADEQUACY OF GROUND FACILITIES

text: ADEQUACY OF GROUND FACILITIES — SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT OF OPERATIONS WITHOUT RESCUE AND FIREFIGHTING SERVICES AT THE AERODROME OF INTENDED OPERATION

text: Annex III to ED Decision 2023/004/R Page 2 of 2

identifier: AMC and GM to Annex VIII (Part-SPO) to Commission Regulation (EU) No 965-2012 — Issue 1, Amendment 18

text: Annex III to ED Decision 2023/004/R

text: ‘Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) and Guidance Material (GM) to Annex VIII (Part-SPO) to

text: Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012

text: Issue 1, Amendment 18’

text: The text of the amendment is arranged to show deleted, new or amended text as follows:

text: — deleted text is struck through;

text: — new or amended text is highlighted in blue;

text: — an ellipsis ‘[…]’ indicates that the rest of the text is unchanged.

text: The Annex to ED Decision No 2014/018/R is amended as follows:

text: SUBPART B: OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES

text: AMC1 SPO.OP.140(a) Flight preparation

text: When deciding on the adequacy of facilities and services available at an aerodrome of intended operation, the operator should: (a) consult the aeronautical information publication (AIP) for information on the availability of rescue and firefighting services (RFFS) at the aerodrome of intended operation; and (b) assess the level of safety risk that is associated with the aircraft type and nature of the operation in relation to the availability of RFFS.

text: GM1 SPO.OP.140(a) Flight preparation

text: To operate at an aerodrome with downgraded or unavailable rescue and firefighting services (RFFS), the operator may consider including in its operations manual, for each aircraft type, certain criteria to be used when conducting a safety risk assessment of such operations. For aircraft in rescue and firefighting (RFF) category 3 and higher, the conditions under which the pilot-in-command may decide to conduct a flight may include, but not be limited to the following: (a) acceptable downgrades of RFFS for planning and in-flight purposes such as departure, destination, and alternate aerodromes; (b) aircraft characteristics related to mass, landing speed, fuel capacity; (c) possible limitation to daytime only or a certain time of the day (due to fatigue); (d) weather constraints; (e) aerodromes that are unacceptable with unavailable or downgraded RFFS.


text: AMC and GM to ATM/ANS.AR Issue 1, Amendment 4

text: N o t e t o t h e r e a d e r

text: Annex IX to ED Decision 2023/010/R Page 1 of 2

text: Annex IX to ED Decision 2023/010/R Page 2 of 2

identifier: AMC & GM to ATM/ANS.AR — Issue 1, Amendment 4

beslut: ED Decision 2023/010/R

text: Annex IX to ED Decision 2023/010/R ‘AMC and GM to ATM/ANS.AR — Issue 1, Amendment 4’

text: — deleted text is struck through;

text: — new or amended text is highlighted in cyan;

text: The Annex II to ED Decision 2022/004/R of the Executive Director of the Agency of 14 March 2022 is amended as follows:

text: The Annex to Decision 2017/001/R of 8 March 2017 of the Executive Director of the Agency is amended as follows:

text: AMC1 ATM/ANS.AR.A.025A Immediate reaction to an information security incident or vulnerability with an impact on aviation safety

text: (a) To appropriately collect and analyse information related to information security incidents and vulnerabilities with a potential impact on aviation safety, the competent authority should implement means that ensure the necessary confidentiality. (b) When disseminating information related to information security incidents and vulnerabilities with a potential impact on aviation safety, the competent authority should properly select the appropriate recipient(s) to prevent the content of a report from being exploited to the detriment of aviation safety, by revealing, for instance, uncorrected vulnerabilities.

text: GM1 ATM/ANS.AR.A.025A Immediate reaction to an information security incident or vulnerability with an impact on aviation safety

text: When deemed necessary, a two-step mechanism could be used: a report alerting about the information security event or incident and the availability of additional data that would require controlled and confidential distribution. This report should only alert recipients of the urgency and the necessity for organisations and competent authorities to establish further communication through secure means. Therefore, the report should consist of two parts: one limited to mostly public information and one containing the sensitive data that should be restricted to the recipients who need to know. Wherever possible, reports should be based on an agreed taxonomy.

text: AMC1 ATM/ANS.AR.B.005 Allocation of tasks to qualified entities

text: GM1 ATM/ANS.AR.B.005 Allocation of tasks to qualified entities


text: Annexes I and II to ED Decision 2018/013/R

text: Annex I to ED Decision 2018/013/R

text: ICAO Doc 8168-OPS/611 - PANS-OPS (Procedures for Ai r Na vi gation Servi ces-Aircraft Operations), Vol ume I - Flight Procedures — Fi fth edition amendment 7. ICAO Doc 4444-ATM/501 - PANS-ATM (Procedures for Ai r Na vi gation Servi ces-Air Tra ffic Ma nagement) — Si xteenth edi tion a mendment 7-A.

text: Annex II to ED Decision 2018/013/R

text: Annex II to ED Decision 2018/013/R

text: Annex II to ED Decision 2018/013/R

text: ‘Procedural control’ means a ir tra ffic control s ervice provided by using i nformation derived from sources other than an ATS s urveillance sys tem.

text: Annex II to ED Decision 2018/013/R

text: Annex II to ED Decision 2018/013/R

text: Commi ssion Implementing

text: Regulation (EU) No 716/2014 of 27 June 2014

text: on th e establishment of the Pilot Common Project s upporting the i mplementation of the European Air Tra ffic Ma nagement Ma ster Plan

text: Annex II to ED Decision 2018/013/R

text: Annex II to ED Decision 2018/013/R

identifier: AMC & GM to AUR — Issue 2

beslut: ED Decision 2018/013/R

title: AMC & GM to AUR — Issue 2

text: European Aviation Safety Agency

text: Acceptable Means of Compliance and Guidance Material to

text: Commission Regulation (EU) No 1332/2011

text: and Commission Implementing

text: Regulation (EU) 2018/1048

text: on common airspace usage requirements and operating procedures ‘AMC & GM to AUR’

text: Issue 2 21 November 2018 For the da te of entry i nto force of this Issue, refer to Decision 2018/013/R in the Official Publication of the Agency.

text: Annex I

text: Commission Regulation (EU) No 1332/2011

text: AMC1 AUR.ACAS.1010 ACAS II Training

text: The ACAS II operational procedures and training programmes established by the operator should take into account the procedures contained in: (a) ICAO PANS-OPS, Volume I Flight Procedures, Attachment A (ACAS Training Guidelines for Pilots) and Attachment B (ACAS High Vertical Rate Encounters) to Part III, Section 3, Chapter 3; and (b) ICAO PANS-ATM Chapters 12 and 15, in regard to ACAS phraseology and applicable procedures.

text: Annex II

text: Guidance Material to Commission Implementing

text: Regulation (EU) 2018/1048

text: Article 4

text: Transitional measures

text: EVALUATION OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT As part of the preparation for the transition to performance-based navigation (PBN), it would be advisable that providers of ATM/ANS evaluate the operational environment that is expected to exist at the time when the PBN routes and procedures are to be implemented in accordance with AUR.PBN.2005 and up to the deadline imposed by

text: Article 7(2)

text: (a), i.e. 6 June 2030. The evaluation of the operational environment could: (a) ensure that measures are taken and appropriate information is made available to the ATS units in order to facilitate mixed operations, i.e. operations of PBN capable and non-PBN capable aircraft; (b) underpin the transition plan and help to describe the introduction of the new PBN routes and procedures in detail, i.e. the transition along the different stages until the end-state is eventually implemented, together with the rationale for the coexistence with ATS routes and instrument approach procedures that do not meet the requirements stipulated in AUR.PBN.2005; and (c) consider both normal operations as well as contingencies, and therefore, be used to define the contingency measures required by

text: Article 6

text: , which are expected to evolve and adapt to the different stages of the implementation.

text: Article 4

text: Transitional measures

text: RELEVANT ASPECTS OF THE TRANSITION PLAN In implementing the required routes and procedures, there is an opportunity to optimise the overall safety, capacity and efficiency of flight operations. The transition plan needs to take due account of the complexity of the airspace structures and traffic flows as well as the specificities of the traffic operating at the affected aerodromes. In addition, it is suggested that a transition plan address, at least, the following aspects: (a) justification on how the controlled, smooth and safe transfer from the existing procedures and routes is going to be achieved; (b) evaluation of the aircraft operational capability expected in the affected airspace, with the purpose of estimating the number of aircraft unable to perform the envisaged PBN operations; (c) the decommissioning of navigation facilities (e.g. NDB, VOR, DME, ILS) operated in the airspace and adjacent airspace blocks with a view to retaining only the minimal network of ground-based NAVAIDs that provide the necessary operational coverage for those stakeholders that do not conduct PBN operations prior to 2030, as well as to support contingency operations. It would also be beneficial to take into consideration cross-border synergies and coordination, where applicable;

text: (d) the need to consider CAT II/III ground facilities (ILS, MLS) to supplement RNP APCH procedures where operations below CAT I minima are required due to local conditions, as well as the existing and planned GLS facilities that currently provide guidance during CAT I approach and landing operations, but which are anticipated to support CAT II/III operations in the future; and (e) the analysis of the supporting communications and surveillance infrastructure that is required to support the operations at all stages during the transition, together with the anticipated means by which ATS are provided to aircraft. The set of measures planned to achieve an efficient transition should be based on local considerations and, at the same time, be consistent with European communication, navigation and surveillance (CNS) strategies stemming from the ATM Master plan.

text: Article 4

text: Transitional measures

text: COMPETENT AUTHORITY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE AIRSPACE The competent authority of the Member State could play an essential role by ensuring coordination of the measures taken by different ATM/ANS providers to meet the requirements in AUR.PBN.2005. In this regard, it is highly recommended that the competent authority set the required timeframes in coordination with the providers of ATM/ANS, so as to guarantee that the transition plans are delivered in due time, meet the applicability dates and are updated whenever substantial changes take place. Moreover, it is recommended that the competent authority verify that the measures adopted are suitably synchronised at national level. This is in order to maximise the benefits of a joint implementation and address potential issues that may result from major implementation projects that affect a particular area, e.g. the construction of a new airport or new runways, and the potential interferences with the existing airspace routes and procedures.

text: Article 4

text: Transitional measures

text: PROVIDERS OF ATM/ANS To ensure the effective realisation of AUR.PBN.2005, it is important that the providers of ATM/ANS that are responsible for its implementation develop and maintain coordinated transition plans so as to ensure the smooth implementation of the PBN routes and procedures wi thin their respective airspace in replacement of existing ATS routes and instrument approach procedures which are not conforming to AUR.PBN.2005, including non-compliant PBN applications. The transition plan may have an impact on a number of interested parties, so its measures and any update thereof clearly benefit from coordination with those stakeholders potentially affected by the changes to the operational environment. In particular, the preparation and relevant updates of the transition plans should be done in consultation with the civilian and military stakeholders that are affected by the corresponding PBN operations, i.e. airspace users and their representatives, aerodrome operators, as well as the neighbouring providers of ATM/ANS and the Network Manager. In order to ensure the full implementation of AUR.PBN.2005 by 6 June 2030, by when completion of the transition is required as per

text: Article 5(1)

text: , it is advisable to commence the drafting of the transition plans as soon as possible and to subsequently keep them up-to-date.

text: Article 4

text: Transitional measures

text: NON-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS The transition phase until 6 June 2030 could be characterised by any combination of PBN applications, as per AUR.PBN.2005, and any of the following measures, which may be considered to ensure operations of non-capable aircraft: (a) vectoring of controlled aircraft based on the use of an ATS surveillance system; (b) conventional navigation procedures; (c) use of any other existing PBN application not conforming to AUR.PBN.2005; and (d) procedural control .

text: Article 4

text: Transitional measures

text: NAVAID INFRASTRUCTURE It should be noted that the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) is not the only positioning source to support PBN operations. In fact, some of the navigation specifications contemplated in AUR.PBN.2005 could be entirely supported by ground-based NAVAIDs without having to resort to GNSS signals. In developing the transition plans, it should also be recognised that the implementation of PBN does not imply the need for the provision of a reversionary NAVAID infrastructure. However, when operationally required and where technically feasible, providers of ATM/ANS may pro vide a reversionary NAVAID infrastructure that is capable of meeting the performance requirements of the navigation specifications set out in AUR.PBN.2005 whenever the primary means of navigation is no longer available. For instance, the arrival and departure procedures within a particular terminal control area (TMA) could be designed in accordance with the RNAV 1 specification and the primary means of navigation could be predicated on the use of GNSS. However, after a GNSS outage, reversion to a secondary DME/DME infrastructure could equally ensure that RNAV 1 applications are flown with the same performance. The retention of a minimal network of ground-based NAVAIDs (NDB, VOR, DME and ILS) intends to allow the operation of non-PBN capable aircraft during the transition to PBN, as well as providing alternative means of navigation during contingency operations. Nevertheless, the transition plan may reflect, in some cases, an increase in the number of ground-based NAVAIDs, in particular DMEs, in order to support the implementation of PBN, as per AUR.PBN.2005.

text: Article 5

text: Exclusive use of PBN

text: One of the benefits of PBN is that it allows to decommission more costly or less performing equipment. As PBN allows vertical guidance through RNP APCH procedures down to LNAV/VNAV or LPV minima, this applies, in particular, to a number of the remaining NDB and VOR facilities used for approach, which could be decommissioned by 6 June 2030 as per

text: Article 7(2)

text: (a). However, the implementation of PBN approaches does not currently permit the replacement of landing systems where minima below 200 ft are required, such as those enabled by CAT II or CAT III operations. Therefore , it is

text: expected that CAT II and CAT III landing systems, primarily predicated on ILS, will remain i n service unaffected by this Regulation.

text: Article 5

text: precludes the use of instrument approach procedures, other than those predicated on PBN, as per AUR.PBN.2005. As regards CAT I approaches predicated on ILS and MLS, they may in many cases be replaced by SBAS approaches that can be operated down to CAT I precision approach minima. There could be locations at which SBAS approaches cannot offer CAT I minima, so existing instrument approach procedures based on ILS, GLS or MLS may be retained. Additionally, it should be noted that when designing the contingency measures foreseen under

text: Article 6

text: , providers of ATM/ANS may decide to retain also a network of CAT I landing systems using, for instance, ILS as a backup. As regards this contingency infrastructure, more information is provided in GM1

text: Article 6

text: Article 6

text: Contingency measures

text: EVALUATION OF THE CONTINGENCY INFRASTRUCTURE As part of the contingency navigation environment, a minimum network of ground-based NAVAIDs should be retained for the purpose of providing alternative means of navigation to the PBN operations stipulated in AUR.PBN.2005. These remaining ground-based NAVAIDs, e.g. VOR, DME, ILS, MLS, may enable conventional navigation or, alternatively, support less performing PBN applications. The performance necessary during a contingency depends on the evaluation performed by the providers of ATM/ANS. In this regard, it is advisable that this infrastructure should be commensurate with the impact of PBN-related failure modes (e.g. as a consequence of local or wide-area GNSS outages), to ensure safety and an appropriate level of service based on local conditions. In addition, it is recommended that the surveillance and communication systems be evaluated with regard to their exposure to GNSS and other failure modes and the ability to support the contingency measures, e.g. provision of ATS vectoring. When taking such measures, it should be borne in mind that the ADS-B reported position also depends on the position determined by GNSS, so ATS surveillance services, like vectoring, may need to draw upon other means of surveillance, whereby aircraft position is not determined on board, e.g. secondary surveillance radar (SSR). As regards the evaluation of safety during contingency modes, Commission Implementing

text: Regulation (EU) 2017/373

text: requires that providers of ATM/ANS carry out and document the necessary safety (support) assessment(s) to cover the scope of the change, including the supporting communication and surveillance functions under failure conditions, as per ATS.OR.205 and ATM/ANS.OR.C.005. In the event of PBN-related failure modes, providers’ contingency measures may include notification to the Network Manager of the application of the appropriate contingency measures in order to minimise a potential reduction in capacity at network level.

text: Article 6

text: Contingency measures

text: GNSS FAILURES As the envisioned PBN operations are primarily predicated on GNSS, and although the robustness of GNSS is expected to be improved through the use of multi -frequency and multi-constellation technologies, a contingency mode based on purely non-GNSS technologies would be considered desirable. This could be achieved, for instance, through the provision of ILS CAT I precision approaches

text: at certain aerodromes and a network made up of DME and VOR to ensure a minimum coverage within terminal and en route airspace. In those instances where aircraft are unable to have recourse to a reversionary NAVAID infrastructure, ATS providers should consider other measures to ensure safe operations. Other contingency measures could include provision of tactical vectors using the available ATS surveillance information and the notification of traffic restrictions, including to the Network Manager, when necessary.

text: Article 7

text: Entry into force and application

text: The following table provides a summary of the implementation timing:

text: Implementation by 3 December 2020 AUR.PBN.2005 points RNP APCH or RNP AR to all IREs without PA, except at those airports listed in point 1.2.1 of the Annex to the PCP (1) + (2) + (3) Regulation , and, where required, RF legs RNAV 5 for all ATS routes at or above FL150 (6) Implementation by 25 January 2024 RNP APCH or RNP AR to all IREs, and, where required, RF legs (1) + (2) + (3) For all IREs, RNAV 1 or RNP 1(+) for at least one established (4) + (5) SID/STAR For all IREs, RNP 0.3 or RNP 1 or RNAV 1 for at least one (7) established SID/STAR for rotorcraft operations RNAV 5 for ATS routes established below FL150 (6) RNP 0.3 or RNP 1 or RNAV 1 for ATS routes established below (7) FL150 for rotorcraft operations Implementation by 6 June 2030 RNAV 1 or RNP 1(+) applicable to all SIDs/STARs when (4) + (5) established RNP 0.3 or RNP 1 or RNAV 1 applicable to all SIDs/STARs for (7) rotorcraft operations when established IRE: instrument runway end PA: precision approach RNP 1(+): RNP 1 specification including RF and/or vertical paths defined by constraints SID: standard instrument departure STAR: standard instrument arrival RF: radius to fix RNAV X & RNP X: navigation specifications

text: GM1 AUR.PBN.2005 Routes and procedures

text: Instrument approach procedures and designated ATS routes (e.g. SIDs/STARs) predicated on PBN require the use of an available NAVAID infrastructure (space- and/or ground-based) capable of supporting the performance requirements of the navigation specification. The PBN routes and approach procedures should primarily conform to the following: (a) ICAO Annex 4, ‘Aeronautical Charts’, 2009, 11th Edition, Amendment 59; (b) ICAO Annex 11, ‘Air Traffic Services’, 2016, 14th Edition, Amendment 50-A; (c) ICAO Document 8168 OPS/611 ‘Procedures for Air Navigation Services: Aircraft Operations’ (PANS-OPS), Volume II, 2014, 6th Edition, Amendment 7; (d) ICAO Document 4444 ATM/501, ‘Procedures for Air Navigation Services: Air Traffic Management’ (PANS-ATM), 2007, 16th Edition, Amendment 7-A; (e) ICAO Document 9905 AN/471 ‘Required Navigation Performance Authorization Required (RNP AR) Procedure Design Manual, 2016, 2nd Edition; and (f) ICAO Annex 10, Volume I, ‘Radio Navigation Aids’, as specified in Annex VIII to Commission Implementing

text: Regulation (EU) 2017/373

text: . In addition to the above references, further information related to the design and implementation can be found in the following manuals: (a) ICAO Document 9613 AN/937, ‘Performance-based Navigation (PBN) Manual’, 2013, 4th Edition; (b) ICAO Document 9992 AN/494, ‘Manual on the Use of PBN in Airspace Design’, 2013, 1st Edition; (c) ICAO Document 9426 AN/924, ‘Air Traffic Services Planning Manual’, 1984, 1st Edition, Amendment 4; (d) ICAO Document 9906 AN/472, ‘Quality Assurance Manual for Flight Procedure Design’, Volumes 1–3, 2009/2010, 1st Edition, Amendment 1; (e) ICAO Document 9906 AN/472, ‘Quality Assurance Manual for Flight Procedure Design’, Volumes 5-6, 2012, 1st Edition; (f) ICAO Document 9689 AN/953, ‘Manual on Airspace Planning Methodology for determination of separation minima’, 1998, 1st Edition, Amendment 1; (g) ICAO Document 9643, ‘Manual on Simultaneous Operations on Parallel or Near-Parallel Instrument Runways (SOIR)’, 2004, 1st Edition; (h) ICAO Document 8697, ‘Aeronautical Chart Manual’, 2016, 3rd Edition; and (i) ICAO EUR Doc 025, RNP APCH Guidance Material, 2012, 1st Edition. To mitigate the environmental impact, it is recommended that consideration be given to the information included in the following references: (a) ICAO Document 9931 AN/476, ‘Continuous Descent Operations (CDO) Manual’, 2010, 1st Edition; and (b) ICAO Document 9993 AN/495, ‘Continuous Climb Operations (CCO) Manual’, 2013, 1st Edition.

text: Contractual arrangements covering the implementation of approach procedures based on the European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service (EGNOS) are expected to be established between the providers of ATM/ANS responsible for implementing RNP APCH down to LPV minima and the EGNOS service provider, as per paragraph 3.1 of Annex I to Commission Implementing

text: Regulation (EU) No 1035/2011

text: . Similar provisions in Commission Implementing

text: Regulation (EU) 2017/373

text: regarding contracted activities, i.e. ATM/ANS.OR.B.015, and the associated AMC & GM, may be of help to providers of ATM/ANS.

text: The term ‘appropriate SBAS coverage’ refers to the EGNOS Safety of Life (SoL) service area, as declared in the EGNOS SoL Service Definition Document (SDD). The EGNOS SoL SDD is published by the European GNSS Agency (GSA), including the performance commitment maps, as provided by the certified EGNOS provider. It is expected that the signal-in-space meets the performance requirements defined in Amendment 89 to ICAO Annex 10, Volume I, prior to implementing SBAS-based procedures. It is recommended that the 18-month deadline commence from the moment at which the affected aerodrome reference point falls at least 100 NM inside the 99 % APV-I availability area, as published in the EGNOS SoL SDD. For those areas where the SBAS performance commitment does not meet the average continuity risk specified in Amendment 89 to ICAO Annex 10, Volume I, it is still possible to implement SBAS-based procedures. However, due consideration should be given to the implementation of specific operational mitigations. These operational mitigations should be appropriate to the continuity performance declared by the SBAS service provider and should account for aspects such as the influence of airspace complexity, traffic levels, limiting terrain and obstacles, level of ATS provided, and availability of other navigation and surveillance capabilities.


identifier: AMC & GM to AUR

beslut: ED Decision 2012/002/R

nummer: aur

title: AMC & GM to AUR

text: Annex to ED Decision 2012/002/R

text: European Aviation Safety Agency

text: Acceptable Means of Compliance and Guidance Material for common airspace usage requirements and operating procedures (AUR)

text: Initial Issue 8 March 2012

text: Annex to ED Decision 2012/002/R

text: AMC/GM AUR

text: TABLE OF CONTENTS

text: Annex to ED Decision 2012/002/R

text: Part ACAS

text: Section II - Operations

text: Part ACAS

text: Section II — Operations AMC1 AUR.ACAS.2010 ACAS II Training (a) GENERAL The ACAS II operational procedures and training programmes established by the operator should take into account the guidance material contained in: (1) ICAO PANS-OPS, Volume 1 Flight Procedures, Attachment A (ACAS Training Guidelines for Pilots) and Attachment B (ACAS High Vertical Rate Encounters) to Part III, Section 3, Chapter 3; and (2) ICAO PANS-ATM chapters 12 and 15 phraseology requirements. ICAO Doc 8168-OPS/611 - PANS-OPS (Procedures for Air Navigation Services- Aircraft Operations), Volume I - Flight Procedures Fifth edition amendment 4. ICAO Doc 4444-ATM/501 - PANS-ATM (Procedures for Air Navigation Services-Air Traffic Management) Fifteenth edition amendment 3.


text: AMC & GM to the Authority, Organisation and Operations Requirements for Aerodromes Issue 1, Amendment 11

text: N o t e t o t h e r e a d e r

text: In amended, and in particular in existing (that is, unchanged) text, ‘Agency’ is used interchangeably with ‘EASA’. The interchangeable use of these two terms is more apparent in the consolidated versions. Therefore, please note that both terms refer to the ‘European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)’.

text: Annex to ED Decision 2024/008/R Page 1 of 2

text: RADIO COMMUNICATION FAILURE

text: Annex to ED Decision 2024/008/R Page 2 of 2

identifier: AMC and GM to Authority, Organisation and Operations Requirements for Aerodromes — Issue 1, Amendment 11

beslut: ED Decision 2024/008/R

text: Acceptable Means of Compliance and Guidance Material to the Authority, Organisation and Operations Requirements for Aerodromes Issue 1, Amendment 11

text: Annex to ED Decision 2024/008/R ‘Acceptable Means of Compliance and Guidance Material for Aerodromes Issue 1, Amendment 11’

text: This Annex shows deleted, new or amended text as follows:

text: — deleted text is struck through;

text: — new or amended text is highlighted in blue;

text: — an ellipsis ‘[…]’ indicates that the rest of the text is unchanged.

text: The Annex to ED Decision 2014/012/R of the Executive Director of the Agency of 27 February 2014 is amended as follows:

text: AMC1 ADR.OPS.B.031(b)(4) Communications

text: (a) The signals to be used in case of radio communication failure between air traffic services and vehicles or pedestrians authorised to operate on the manoeuvring area should have the following meaning:

text: LIGHTS SIGNAL FROM AIR TRAFFIC MEANING SERVICES

text: Green flashes Permission to cross landing area or to move onto taxiway Steady red Stop Red flashes Move off the landing area or taxiway and watch out for aircraft White flashes Vacate manoeuvring area in accordance with local instructions (b) In emergency conditions or if the signals in point (a) are not observed, the signal given below will be used for runways or taxiways equipped with a lighting system and should have the following meaning:

text: LIGHT SIGNAL MEANING

text: Flashing runway or taxiway lights Vacate the runway and observe the tower for light signal (ca) Care should be taken to ensure that the procedures address the case where, due to the prevailing visibility conditions, the light signals may not be seen by the driver or the pedestrian authorised to operate on the manoeuvring area. (db) In case of agreement with the air traffic services provider to use other/additional communication means in the event of radio communication feature (e.g. mobile phones), the procedures should also cover the necessary practical details (e.g. telephone numbers to be used), as well as the order of the use of the agreed solutions.