text: Regulation (EU) 2015/751

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2015 on interchange fees for card-based payment transactions (OJ L 123, 19.5.2015, p. 1).

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).

text: Νόμος υπ’ αριθμ. 3862/2010 «Προσαρμογή της ελληνικής νομοθεσίας στις Οδηγίες 2007/64/ΕΚ, 2007/44/ΕΚ και 2010/16/ΕΕ που αφορούν υπηρεσίες πληρωμών στην εσωτερική αγορά, προληπτική αξιολόγηση προτάσεων απόκτησης συμμετοχής σε επιχειρήσεις του χρηματοπιστωτικού τομέα και άλλες διατάξεις», [ΦΕΚ A/113/13.7.2010].

text: Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2007 on payment services in the internal market amending Directives

text: and

text: and repealing Directive

text: (OJ L 319, 5.12.2007, p. 1).

text: Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 September 2007 amending

text: Council Directive 92/49/EEC

text: and Directives

text: and

text: as regards procedural rules and evaluation criteria for the prudential assessment of acquisitions and increase of holdings in the financial sector (OJ L 247, 21.9.2007, p. 1).

text: Commission Directive 2010/16/EU of 9 March 2010

text: amending Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the exclusion of a certain institution from the scope of application (OJ L 60, 10.3.2010, p. 15).

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 of 13 December 1993

text: specifying definitions for the application of the prohibitions referred to in Articles

text: and

text: b(1) of the Treaty (OJ L 332, 31.12.1993, p. 1).

text: Article 123 of the Treaty also serves the objective of maintaining price stability and reinforces central bank independence.

text: The Hellenic Competition Commission is responsible for the enforcement of Law 3959/2011 on competition (as amended) and Union law on competition, applied on the basis of Articles

text: and

text: TFEU in accordance with

text: Article 5 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002

text: on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, (OJ L 1, 4.1.2003, p. 1).

text: The General Secretariat for Commerce and Consumer Protection is responsible for consumer protection under Article 1 of Presidential Decree 147/2017 (Οργανισμός του Υπουργείου Οικονομίας και Ανάπτυξης, ΦΕΚ (Α 192/13.12,2017)).

text: By virtue of Article 66(3) of Law No 4446/2016 «Πτωχευτικός Κώδικας, Διοικητική Δικαιοσύνη, Τέλη-Παράβολα, Οικειοθελής αποκάλυψη φορολογητέας ύλης παρελθόντων ετών, Ηλεκτρονικές συναλλαγές, Τροποποιήσεις του ν. 4270/2014 και λοιπές διατάξεις», (ΦΕΚ Α' 240/22.12.2016).

text: See

text: Article 2

text: (e) of the Statute of Bank of Greece.

text: See paragraph 3.1.3 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.4.1 of Opinion

text: This is the case in Bulgaria (

text: Article 122(2)

text: and Articles 124 and 139 of the Law on Payment Services and Payment Systems), Hungary (Article 41(19) of Law CXXXIX of 2013 on the Magyar Nemzeti Bank and Law LXXXV of 2009), Lithuania (Article 62 of Law No XII-2561 of 30 June 2016 on Payments), Malta (Regulation 2 of Legal Notice 326 of 2015), Spain (Law 18/2014 of 15 October 2014), and Slovenia (based on the list of competent authorities available on the European Commission’s website http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/financial_services/national_competent_authorities.pdf).

text: This is the case in Belgium (Article XV.18/4 of the Code of Economic Law), Croatia (

text: Article 4

text: paragraphs 1, 2, 5 and 6, and Article 6 of the Law NN 50/2016 on Implementation of EU Regulations Governing Payment Systems), Ireland (Regulation 6 of Statutory Instrument No 550 of 2015 and of Statutory Instrument No 292 of 2016), Italy (Article 3 of legislative Decree No 218 of 15 December 2017 and

text: Article 34

text: -quater of the Law on payment services), Netherlands (

text: Article 2

text: (r) and

text: Article 5

text: and Annex 2 of the Administrative Order of 17 March 2017 amending the Administrative Order implementing EU Regulations on Financial Markets), Poland (Article 14 of the Law on Payment Services of 19 August 2011 (Dz.U. 2017, item 2003)), Slovakia (Article 2(3) of Law 492/2009 Coll., Law 747/2004 Coll.,

text: Article 2

text: b of Law No 291/2002 Coll., Article 36(1) of Law No 80/1997 Coll., Law No 514/2003 Coll., Article 90 of Law No 492/2009 Coll.), and the Czech Republic (based on the list of competent authorities available on the European Commission’s website http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/financial_services/national_competent_authorities.pdf).

text: See paragraphs 3.2 and 4.4 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.3.2 of Opinion

text: See paragraphs 3.3.4.1, 3.3.4.2 and 3.3.4.3.1 of Opinion

text: See

text: Recital 24

text: of

text: Regulation (EU) 2015/751

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 15 February 2018 on conferring new tasks relating to interchange fees for card-based payment transactions to the Bank of Greece (CON/2018/11)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 15 February 2018 on conferring new tasks relating to interchange fees for card-based payment transactions to the Bank of Greece (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 3 January 2018 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Greek Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft law on measures implementing

text: Regulation (EU) 2015/751

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2015 on interchange fees for card-based payment transactions (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft law relates to the Bank of Greece. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The purpose of the draft law is to introduce implementing measures in respect of

text: Regulation (EU) 2015/751

text: , by designating the competent authorities empowered to ensure the application of its provisions and to impose penalties in cases of infringement.

text: Regulation (EU) 2015/751

text: imposes a maximum cap on interchange fees and lays down technical and business requirements for cardbased payment transactions, which primarily aim to promote the use of electronic payment instruments for the benefit of payees and consumers, as well as to create a level playing field and to promote competition among players in the market for card payments. 1.2 The draft law designates the Bank of Greece as the main competent authority responsible for ensuring the enforcement of the majority of the provisions of

text: Regulation (EU) 2015/751

text: , and for imposing penalties on payment service providers in cases of infringement. Furthermore, the draft law designates the General Secretariat for Commerce and Consumer Protection of the Ministry of Economy and Development as the competent authority responsible for ensuring compliance with

text: all remaining obligations under

text: Regulation (EU) 2015/751

text: , i.e. those not assigned to the Bank of Greece. 1.3 More specifically, under the draft law, the Bank of Greece is responsible for monitoring and ensuring the application of a maximum cap on interchange fees for consumer debit card transactions of no more than 0.20 % of the transaction value, and a cap for consumer credit card transactions of no more than 0.30 % of the transaction value, which are applicable to all domestic or cross-border transactions. In addition, the Bank of Greece is responsible for monitoring the technical and business requirements that will apply to all categories of card-based payment transactions. The most significant of these are: (i) the prohibition of territorial licensing, namely that licences delivered by payment card schemes for issuing or acquiring purposes should cover the entire Union territory; (ii) the separation of the payment card schemes and the processing entities in terms of accounting, organisation and decision-making processes; (iii) the prohibition against applying rules hindering or preventing co-badging two or more different payment brands or payment applications; (iv) changes in respect of the application of the ‘Honour All Cards Rule’, whereby payees cannot be forced to accept all cards from a given payment card scheme; (v) the prohibition against preventing payees from steering consumers to the use of any payment instrument of their preference. In addition, the Bank of Greece is responsible for monitoring rules which aim at increasing transparency in respect of charges applied to payees, such as: (i) the unblending and breakdown of the total fees charged to payees with respect to each category and brand of payment card; and (ii) the obligation of the payment service provider to provide certain information relating to individual transactions to the payee. Finally, the responsibilities conferred upon the Bank of Greece also include the imposition of penalties on payment service providers in cases of infringement of the abovementioned rules. 1.4 The draft law also designates the General Secretariat for Commerce and Consumer Protection as the competent authority responsible for ensuring that consumers may obtain two or more different payment brands on a card-based payment instrument from a payment service provider, as well as for ensuring payees’ obligation to display which cards they accept at the entrance of their business and at the till in a clear and unequivocal manner. The General Secretariat for Commerce and Consumer Protection is also empowered to impose penalties in cases of infringement of the abovementioned rules.

text: 2. General observations

text: In this opinion, the ECB will only assess those provisions of the draft law that may impact on the role and tasks of the Bank of Greece as a national central bank (NCB), national supervisory authority and member of the Eurosystem and the European System of Central Banks (ESCB). Consequently, this opinion will not address the question of whether the draft law, if adopted as proposed, would represent an effective means of implementing

text: Regulation (EU) 2015/751

text: in Greece.

text: 3. New tasks of the Bank of Greece

text: 3.1 The draft law expands the current supervisory functions of the Bank of Greece, by assigning to it the responsibility for supervising interchange fees in respect of payment service providers and payment card schemes and other technical and business requirements relating to card-based payment transactions. It should be noted that the Bank of Greece is already the competent authority for supervising payment service providers pursuant to Law No 3862/2010 , which transposed Directive 2007/64/ΕC of the European Parliament and of the Council , Directive 2007/44/ΕC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directive 2010/16/ΕU into the Greek legal order. However, the Bank of Greece does not have any statutory powers in the fields of competition and consumer protection, nor does it exercise any supervisory tasks over payment service providers or payment card schemes as regards their compliance with competition and consumer protection rules. Thus, the conferral upon the Bank of Greece under the draft law of the power to monitor and ensure the compliance of payment service providers, payment card schemes and payees with their obligations under

text: Regulation (EU) 2015/751

text: , and to impose penalties in cases of infringement pursuant to Article 59(2) of Law No 4261/2014, are considered to be new tasks of the Bank of Greece. 3.2 The ECB underlines that a proposed conferral of tasks on an NCB in the ESCB must be assessed against the prohibition on monetary financing under Article 123 of the Treaty. For the purposes of that prohibition,

text: Article 1(1)

text: (b)(ii) of

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93

text: defines ‘other type of credit facility’ as, inter alia, ‘any financing of the public sector’s obligations vis-à-vis third parties’. Ensuring that Member States implement a sound budgetary policy is one of the key objectives of the monetary financing prohibition, which may not be circumvented . Therefore, the task of financing measures, which are normally the responsibility of the Member States, and which are financed from their budgetary sources rather than by the NCBs, must not be entrusted to NCBs. To decide what constitutes financing of the public sector’s obligations vis-à-vis third parties, which can be translated as the provision of central bank financing outside the scope of central bank tasks, it is necessary to carry out, on a case-by-case basis, an assessment of whether the task to be undertaken by an NCB is a central bank task or a government task, i.e. a task within the responsibility of the Member States. In other words, adequate safeguards must be in place to

text: ensure that circumventions of the objective of the monetary financing prohibition of maintaining a sound budgetary policy of Member States do not take place. 3.3 As part of its discretion in the exercise of its duty, on the basis of

text: Article 271

text: (d) of the Treaty and Article 35.6 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter the ‘Statute of the ESCB’), to ensure that NCBs honour the obligations laid down by the Treaty, the Governing Council has endorsed safeguards of that kind in the form of criteria for determining what may be seen as falling within the scope of a public sector’s obligation within the meaning of

text: Article 1(1)

text: (b)(ii) of

text: Regulation (EC) No 3603/93

text: or, in other words, what constitutes a government task as follows: First, central bank tasks are in particular those tasks that are related to the tasks that have been conferred upon the ECB and the NCBs by the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB. These tasks are mainly defined in

text: Article 127(2)

text: Article 22

text: and Article 25.1 of the Statute of the ESCB. Second, Article 14.4 of the Statute of the ESCB allows NCBs to perform ‘other functions’, new tasks, i.e. tasks that are not related to tasks that have been conferred upon the ECB and the NCBs, are not precluded per se. However, new tasks that are undertaken by an NCB and which are atypical of NCB tasks or which are clearly discharged on behalf of and in the exclusive interest of the government or other public sector entities should be considered government tasks. Third, an important criterion for qualifying a new task as atypical of an NCB task or as being clearly discharged on behalf of and in the exclusive interest of the government or other public sector entities is the impact of the task on the institutional, financial and personal independence of the NCB. In particular, the following aspects should be taken into account: (a) whether the performance of the new task creates conflicts of interest with existing central bank tasks which are not adequately addressed and does not necessarily complement those existing central bank tasks. If a conflict of interest arises between existing and new tasks, sufficient safeguards to mitigate that conflict should be in place. The complementarity between a new task and the existing central bank tasks should not be interpreted broadly, so as to lead to the creation of an indefinite chain of ancillary tasks. Such complementarity should also be examined in relation to the financing of those tasks; (b) whether without new financial resources the performance of the new task is disproportionate to the NCB’s financial or organisational capacity and may have a negative impact on the capacity to perform properly the existing central bank tasks; (c) whether the performance of the new task fits into the institutional set-up of the NCB in the light of central bank independence and accountability considerations; (d) whether the performance of the new task harbours substantial financial risks; (e) whether the performance of the new task exposes the members of the NCB decision-making bodies to political risks which are disproportionate and may also have an impact on their personal independence and, in particular, on the guarantee of term of office set out in Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB.

text: 3.4 On the basis of the criteria set out above, the following paragraphs assess whether the new tasks of the Bank of Greece are in line with the monetary financing prohibition. 3.4.1 Tasks related to the tasks conferred upon the ECB and the NCBs by the Treaty and the Statute of

text: the ESCB

text: The tasks conferred upon the Bank of Greece in relation to ensuring enforcement of interchange fee caps between the issuing and the acquiring banks of card-based payment instruments as well as compliance with the requirements of

text: Regulation (EU) 2015/751

text: by payment service providers, card payment schemes and payees are not among the central banking tasks listed in

text: Article 127(2)

text: and (5) of the Treaty (they have not, in other words, been conferred upon the NCBs under primary Union law). In addition, the tasks in question appear to go beyond the scope of the existing tasks of the Bank of Greece as supervisory authority of payment service providers, to the extent that there is no Greek law empowering the Bank of Greece to exercise supervision of payment card schemes, or which grants any competences in the fields of competition and consumer protection. In Greece, competences in the field of competition lie with the Hellenic Competition Commission , whereas competences in the field of consumer protection lie with the General Secretariat of Commerce and Consumer Protection . The General Secretariat for Commerce and Consumer Protection is the competent authority under national law to receive complaints from consumers and impose penalties on merchants where they violate their obligation to display which cards they accept at the entrance of their business and at the till in a clear and unequivocal manner. The conferral of further tasks related to consumer protection on the General Secretariat for Commerce and Consumer Protection is within the abovementioned division of competences between the national authorities. At the same time, the new tasks complement existing supervisory tasks as the Bank of Greece already supervises payment institutions as payment service providers. These existing supervisory tasks must not be viewed in isolation from the objective of safeguarding the smooth and efficient functioning of the payment systems . In this respect, pursuant to Law No 3862/2010, the Bank of Greece is responsible for authorising, supervising and withdrawing the authorisation of payment institutions providing payment services after assessing their programme of operations, business plan, the holding of initial capital and own funds, their governance arrangements, internal control mechanisms, structural organisation, and the identity of the directors and persons responsible for their management. In this sense, the Bank of Greece’s new tasks could be regarded, in the particular context of this Regulation, as also related to the task conferred upon the ESCB in the

text: fourth indent of Article 127(2) of the Treaty, as well as in the fourth indent of Article 3.1 of the Statute of the ESCB, based on the understanding that these tasks are ancillary to the promotion of the smooth operation of payment systems . 3.4.2 Tasks which are atypical of NCB tasks

text: Regulation (EU) 2015/751

text: grants Member States wide discretionary power in determining the competent authorities which are responsible for monitoring compliance with its provisions, provided that the designated authorities have adequate resources for the performance of the duties assigned to them. A number of Member States have already designated their NCBs as the sole competent authorities to ensure compliance with the provisions of

text: Regulation (EU) 2017/751

text: , while many other Member States have allocated these tasks between their NCBs and other public authorities with competences in the fields of competition and/or consumer protection. There are also Member States that have not assigned any of these tasks to their NCBs. As the majority of the Member States have allocated at least some of the tasks relating to the application of the Regulation to their NCBs, the new tasks conferred upon the Bank of Greece would thus not be regarded as atypical of NCB tasks. In addition, the ECB has consistently expressed the view that consumer protection tasks discharged by an NCB may be regarded as central banking tasks provided that such tasks do not interfere with the performance of the NCB’s ESCB-related tasks, and to the extent that those tasks complement existing supervisory powers and thus contribute to the soundness of the financial market and the preservation of confidence in the marketplace . Without prejudice to the ECB’s expressed reservations as regards the assignment of pure competition related tasks to NCBs , the new tasks assigned to the Bank of Greece by the draft law could, as further explained under 3.4.1 above, be regarded as ancillary to the promotion of the smooth operation of payment systems, and, as such, they cannot be regarded as atypical of an NCB, nor being discharged in the exclusive interest of the government.

text: 3.4.3 Extent to which performance of the new task creates conflicts of interest with existing central bank

text: tasks

text: While the new tasks broadly appear to be of the same nature as the supervisory tasks of the Bank of Greece, conflicts of interest may arise in the course of the discharge of these new tasks. As with other consumer protection tasks, sufficient mitigation measures should be in place to ensure that in the event of a conflict of interest supervisory considerations prevail. Also, the Bank of Greece would need to mitigate any potential conflicts of interest between its new tasks and its financial stability mandate by ensuring that financial stability considerations are not compromised when imposing penalties for a breach of an obligation under

text: Regulation (EU) 2015/751

text: . 3.4.4 Extent to which performance of the new task is disproportionate to the financial or organisational

text: capacity of the Bank of Greece

text: The principle of financial independence requires that Member States do not put their NCBs in a position where they have insufficient financial resources to carry out their ESCB-related tasks, from an operational and financial perspective. Furthermore, each NCB concerned should have additional financial and human resources at its disposal to ensure that the new tasks can be carried out without impacting on the NCB’s operational or financial capacity to perform its ESCB-related tasks. In order to ensure that the Bank of Greece has the capacity to perform its ESCB-related tasks, the Bank of Greece must be in a position to avail itself of the necessary resources for the performance of its new tasks, which is also required under

text: Article 13(5) of Regulation (EU) 2015/751

text: . For instance, the Bank of Greece will be required to impose additional reporting obligations on payment service providers and payment card schemes , and will need to allocate additional human resources and IT infrastructure in order to collect, process and analyse the relevant data. Further costs may be incurred in the context of imposing penalties. Nevertheless, the draft law does not specify the resources to be used by the Bank of Greece for the discharge of its new tasks, nor does it provide an estimate of the direct costs likely to be incurred in the performance of these tasks. Thus, it cannot be excluded that the new tasks will impact on the regular budget of the Bank of Greece. The ECB therefore notes that it is important that adequate resources are available to the Bank of Greece in order to ensure that it can properly perform its tasks, while maintaining, at all times, sufficient financial means to carry out its ESCB-related tasks and national tasks and to meet its administrative and operational expenses. 3.4.5 Extent to which performance of the new task fits into the institutional set-up of the Bank of Greece, in the light of central bank independence and accountability considerations Given the complementarity of the new tasks with the existing tasks of the Bank of Greece, as further explained under section 3.4.1 above, in particular in the field of supervision of payment institutions, they appear to broadly fit into the institutional set-up of the Bank of Greece. That said, it is most likely that additional organisational units may need to be established to accommodate the new tasks. Also, it should be noted that the assignment of the new tasks to the Bank of Greece

text: deviates from the well-established national allocation of competencies under the current legal and institutional framework in the fields of competition and consumer protection. 3.4.6 Extent to which the performance of tasks harbours substantial financial risks In the absence of any provision in the draft law excluding the liability of the Bank of Greece in the discharge of its new tasks, the Bank of Greece could potentially be held liable for damages in accordance with the rules of Greek law on liability applicable to the Bank of Greece. 3.4.7 Extent to which performance of the new task exposes members of the decision-making bodies of the Bank of Greece to disproportionate political risks and impacts on their personal independence The performance of the new tasks does not appear to expose the decision-making bodies of the Bank of Greece to any disproportionate political risk or to have an impact on their personal independence 3.4.8 Conclusion Without prejudice to the ECB’s expressed reservations with regard to the assignment of pure competition tasks to the NCBs, the new tasks conferred upon the Bank of Greece could, as further explained under section 3.4.1 above, be regarded as central banking tasks based on the understanding that they are complementary to the Bank of Greece’s existing tasks in the area of supervision of payment service providers and, ultimately, ancillary to the task of promoting the smooth operation of payment systems. These tasks have been conferred on many NCBs in the ESCB and therefore cannot generally be regarded as being atypical of an NCB or as being discharged in the exclusive interest of the government. On the other hand, some Member States have chosen to allocate these tasks between their NCBs and other competent authorities. In this respect, it is noted that the performance of these tasks under

text: Regulation (EU) 2015/751

text: requires expertise in the fields of competition and consumer protection, neither of which falls within the exclusive competence of the Bank of Greece under Greek law. Additionally, it is essential that the new tasks assigned to the Bank of Greece do not have a negative impact on the institutional and financial independence of the Bank of Greece and do not adversely affect its capacity to carry out its ESCB-related tasks or central bank tasks. To this end, it must be ensured that the Bank of Greece can avail itself of the necessary resources for the performance of its new tasks. Moreover, sufficient mitigation measures should be in place to adequately address any potential conflicts of interest between the new tasks of the Bank of Greece and its existing supervision and financial stability mandates. The ECB recommends that the Greek Ministry of Finance take the above considerations into

text: account in deciding on whether to confer the new tasks on the Bank of Greece. This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 15 February 2018. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: COM(2017) 538 final.

text: Europeiska centralbankens yttrande av den 4 februari 2015 om översynen av Europeiska systemrisknämndens uppdrag och organisation (

text: ) (EUT C 192, 10.6.2015, s. 1). Alla ECB:s yttranden finns på ECB:s webbplats www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning (EU) nr 1092/2010 av den 24 november 2010

text: om makrotillsyn av det finansiella systemet på EU-nivå och om inrättande av en europeisk systemrisknämnd (EUT L 331, 15.12.2010, s. 1).

text: Se ECB:s bidrag till Europeiska kommissionens samråd om översynen av regelverket för makrotillsyn, december 2016, nedan kallat ECB:s bidrag, finns på ECB:s webbplats www.ecb.europa.eu. Se ESRB:s svar till Europeiska kommissionens samrådsdokument Review of the EU Macro-prudential Policy Framework, 24 oktober 2016, nedan kallat ESRB:s svar, finns på ESRB:s webbplats www.esrb.europa.eu.

text: Se sidorna 9 och 10 i ECB:s bidrag och sidan 3 i ESRB:s svar.

text: Se artikel 2 a i föreslaget till förordning.

text: Se sidan 3 i ESRB:s svar.

text: Se sidan 9 i ECB:s bidrag.

text: Se punkt 1.2 i yttrande

text: Se artikel 1.1 a i förslaget till förordning.

text: Se

text: skäl 8

text: och

text: artikel 2 i rådets förordning (EU) nr 1096/2010 av den 17 november 2010

text: Se

text: artikel 3.2 i förordning (EU) nr 1096/2010

text: Rådets förordning

text: (EU) nr 1096/2010

text: av den 17 november 2010 om tilldelning till Europeiska centralbanken av särskilda uppgifter angående Europeiska systemrisknämndens verksamhet (EUT L 331, 15.12.2010, s. 162).

text: Se artikel 1.1 b i förslaget till förordning.

text: Se artikel 1.2 b i förslaget till förordning.

text: Se t.ex.

text: artikel 19.1 i förordning (EU) nr 1092/2010

text: Se artikel 1.3 a i i föreslaget till förordning.

text: Se artikel 1.5 a i i föreslaget till förordning.

text: Se

text: artikel 1.7 a

text: ii i förslaget till förordning.

text: Se punkterna 2.1 och 5.1 i yttrande

text: , se även sidan 10 i ECB:s bidrag.

text: Se artikel 1.4 i förslaget till förordning.

text: Se

text: artikel 9.5 i förordning (EU) nr 1092/2010

text: Se sidan 2 i ECB:s bidrag.

text: Se artikel 1.8 b i förslaget till förordning.

publisher: Europeiska centralbanken

sprak: sv

title: Europeiska centralbankens yttrande av den 2 mars 2018 över ett förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning om ändring av förordning (EU) nr 1092/2010 om makrotillsyn av det finansiella systemet på EU-nivå och om inrättande av en europeisk systemrisknämnd (CON/2018/12)

serie: con

text: INLEDNING OCH RÄTTSLIG GRUND

type: rubrik

text: Den 27 november 2017 mottog Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) en begäran från Europeiska unionens råd om ett yttrande över ett förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning om ändring av förordning

text: (EU) nr 1092/2010

text: om makrotillsyn av det finansiella systemet på EU-nivå och om inrättande av en europeisk systemrisknämnd (nedan kallat förslaget till förordning).

type: stycke

text: ECB:s behörighet att avge ett yttrande grundas på artiklarna

text: och

text: i fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt eftersom förslaget till förordning innehåller bestämmelser som berör Europeiska centralbankssystemets (ECBS) medverkan till att de behöriga myndigheterna smidigt kan genomföra sin politik när det gäller tillsyn över kreditinstitut och det finansiella systemets stabilitet, enligt artikel 127.5 i fördraget, och ECB:s särskilda uppgifter i samband med tillsynen över kreditinstitut och Europeiska systemrisknämndens (ESRB) funktion, i enlighet med artikel 127.6 i fördraget. I enlighet med

text: artikel 17.5

text: första meningen i arbetsordningen för Europeiska centralbanken har detta yttrande antagits av ECB-rådet.

text: ALLMÄNNA KOMMENTARER

text: Förslaget till förordning är en del av ett omfattande paket av förslag för att stärka det europeiska systemet för finansiell tillsyn (ESFS) som består av de tre europeiska tillsynsmyndigheterna och ESRB. ECB anser att ESRB har spelat en central och framgångsrik roll sedan den inrättades med målet att förhindra eller minska systemrisker för den finansiella stabiliteten i unionen som kan uppstå inom det finansiella systemet.

text: Därför stöder ECB det begränsade antalet riktade ändringar avseende ESRB:s styrning och operativa ramverk som EU-kommissionen föreslår med målet att ytterligare stärka ESRB:s effektivitet och göra det lättare för nämnden att fullgöra sitt uppdrag. Mer specifikt anser ECB att de föreslagna ändringarna av

text: är nödvändig för att beakta inrättandet av den gemensamma tillsynsmekanismen (SSM) samt för att säkerställa att ESRB, i takt med att marknadsbaserad finansiering blir allt viktigare, kan utöva makrotillsyn av hela det finansiella systemet, i synnerhet i och med upprättandet av kapitalmarknadsunionen. ECB och ESRB anser att ECB även fortsättningsvis har goda möjligheter att ge stöd till ESRB i form av analyser, statistik och administration i linje med existerande arrangemang. ECB kommer även fortsättningsvis att stödja ESRB för att undvika dubbelarbete, och dra nyttja av de fördelar som kommer från ECB:s riskbedömningsroll och analys av banksektorn i de medlemsstater som deltar i den gemensamma tillsynsmekanismen.

text: Därutöver noterar ECB att förordning

text: (EU) nr 1092/2010

text: föreskriver att ESRB till de europeiska tillsynsmyndigheterna ska lämna de uppgifter som dessa behöver för att kunna fullgöra sitt uppdrag, men inte reglerar informationsutbytet mellan ESRB och makrotillsynsmyndigheter i medlemsstater som inrättats efter dess antagande 2010. Mot bakgrund av detta skulle ECB välkomna ett lagstiftningsförslag som justerar de aktuella reglerna om informationsutbyte som framgår av förordning

text: (EU) nr 1092/2010

text: . En översyn av de aktuella reglerna om informationsutbyte skulle göra det möjligt för ESRB att ge nationella makrotillsynsmyndigheter tillgång till relevanta tillsynsdata som dessa behöver för att utföra sina uppgifter enligt nationell rätt, förutsatt att tillräckliga skyddsåtgärder vidtas för att säkerställa att relevant unionsrätt efterlevs. Ett motsvarande förtydligande kan dessutom vara nödvändigt för att göra det möjligt för ESRB-medlemmar från ECBS och tillsynsmyndigheterna att använda information som erhålls från ESRB för att utöva sina lagstadgade uppgifter.

text: SPECIFIKA KOMMENTARER

text: 1. ESRB:s ordförande

text: Enligt förslaget till förordning ska ECB:s ordförande även vara ordförande för ESRB, vilket skulle skapa en permanent koppling mellan ECB:s ordförande och ordföranden för ESRB. Trots att ESRB förblir oberoende, har den även i mycket stor utsträckning dragit nytta av ECB:s synlighet, oberoende och renommé. Såsom tidigare påpekats har centralbankerna en viktig roll för makrotillsynen pga. sitt ansvar att bidra till den finansiella stabiliteten och deras analytiska expertis om den reala ekonomin, finansmarknaderna och marknadsinfrastrukturen. I detta hänseende ger ECB stöd till ESRB i form av analyser, statistik, administration och logistik. Därutöver säkerställs ett nära samarbete på teknisk nivå mellan ECB och ESRB genom ömsesidig representation i ESRB:s rådgivande tekniska kommitté (ATC) och ECB:s kommitté för finansiell stabilitet. Mot denna bakgrund understryker det faktum att ECB:s ordförande i enlighet med

text: artikel 5.1 i förordning (EU) nr 1092/2010

text: även ska vara ordförande i ESRB, den betydelse som centralbankerna har för ESRB:s funktion. Därför stöder ECB kommissionens förslag att koppla ECB:s ordförande till ordförandeskapet i ESRB.

text: 2. ESRB:s organisation

text: 2.1 Förfarande för att utse ESRB:s sekretariatschef

text: Enligt förslaget till förordning ska styrelsen, när den rådfrågas om utnämningen av ESRB:s sekretariatschef, genom ett öppet och transparent förfarande bedöma lämpligheten på kandidaterna till tjänsten som ESRB:s sekretariatschef samt även hålla Europaparlamentet och rådet informerade om konsultationsförfarandet. ECB stöder i princip förslaget att höja profilen för ESRB:s sekretariatschef och vill lämna några specifika kommentarer avseende ECB:s stöd till ESRB:s sekretariat och den roll som ECB för närvarande har i det förfarande genom vilket ESRB:s sekretariatschef utses. ECB svarar för ESRB:s sekretariat och ECB bör i detta syfte tillhandahålla tillräckligt med personal och medel för detta. Chefen för ESRB:s sekretariat utses av ECB i samråd med ESRB:s styrelse som har en konsulterande roll. Mot denna bakgrund anser ECB att detta förfarande enligt vilket styrelsen, när den rådfrågas om utnämningen av ESRB:s sekretariatschef, ska bedöma kandidaternas lämplighet, inte ska påverka ECB:s rätt att utse ESRB:s sekretariatschef samtidigt som man full ut respekterar det samrådsförfarande som framgår av

text: 2.2 Uppgifterna för ESRB:s sekretariatschef

text: Enligt förslaget till förordning kan ESRB:s ordförande och styrkommittén ge chefen för ESRB:s sekretariat specifika uppgifter. Dessa omfattar bl.a. den dagliga driften av ESRB:s sekretariat, samordning och beredning av styrelsens arbete och beslut samt utarbetande av förslag till ESRB:s årliga program och dess genomförande. ECB välkomnar förtydligandet av de uppgifter som chefen för ESRB:s sekretariat får utföra. I praktiken utför chefen för ESRB:s sekretariat redan merparten av de uppgifter som anges i förslaget till förordning. Vad gäller utarbetandet av förslag till ESRB:s årliga program anser ECB att ESRB även fortsättningsvis bör ha möjlighet att flexibelt reagera på potentiella sårbarheter i det finansiella systemet, något som kan nödvändiggöra tillfälliga och exceptionella avsteg från det årliga arbetsprogrammet, beroende på den specifika situationen.

text: 2.3 Hur ESRB:s sekretariatschef företräder ESRB utåt

text: Förslaget till förordning innehåller en möjlighet för ESRB:s ordförande att delegera sina uppgifter när det gäller att företräda ESRB utåt till ESRB:s sekretariatschef. ECB stöder kommissionens mål att höja profilen för ESRB:s sekretariatschef genom att delegera vissa uppgifter. ECB anser dock att förslaget till förordning bör förtydliga huruvida ESRB:s sekretariatschef även får företräda ESRB avseende sådana uppgifter som framgår av artikel

text: och

text: i förordning (EU) nr 1092/2010 avseende ansvarighet och rapporteringskrav. Mot bakgrund av hur viktig ansvarighet är för ESRB, anser ECB att ESRB:s ordförande även fortsättningsvis bör företräda ESRB avseende sådana uppgifter som framgår av artikel

text: och

text: i förordning (EU) nr 1092/2010, och att detta endast bör kunna delegeras till ESRB:s vice ordförande.

text: 2.4 Förändringar avseende inrättandet av den gemensamma tillsynsmekanismen

text: För att beakta upprättandet av bankunionen och särskilt inrättandet av den gemensamma tillsynsmekanismen, inkluderar förslaget till förordning ordföranden för ECB:s tillsynsnämnd bland styrelseledamöterna med rösträtt, i styrkommittén samt dennes representant i ESRB:s rådgivande tekniska kommitté (ATC). Upprättandet av bankunionen och de tillhörande ändringarna i det institutionella ramverket för tillsynen över kreditinstitut efter inrättandet av den gemensamma tillsynsmekanismen har betydelse för ESRB:s uppgifter och funktioner. ECB välkomnar därför de ändringar som föreslås av kommissionen, eftersom dessa till stor del är i linje med ECB:s tidigare rekommendationer om att stärka ESRB:s verksamhet. ECB noterar att förslaget till förordning ger tillsynsnämndens ordföranden rösträtt i ESRB:s styrelse, och säkerställer att tillsynsnämndens ordföranden är företrädd i ESRB:s styrkommitté. I samband med dessa specifika aspekter måste man ta hänsyn till tillsynsmekanismens europeiska dimension och beakta behovet av att skapa en lämplig institutionell balans mellan rösträtt/icke rösträtt för representanter för tillsynsmyndigheter i de medlemsstater som deltar i bankunionen och sådana i icke-deltagande medlemsstater.

text: 2.5 Hur myndigheter från tredjeländer deltar i ESRB-styrelsen

text: Kommissionen föreslår att man stryker den bestämmelse i förordning

text: (EU) nr 1092/2010

text: enligt vilken ESRB:s verksamhet får vara öppen för deltagande av företrädare på hög nivå för relevanta myndigheter i tredjeländer, särskilt EES-länderna. Deras deltagande är begränsat till frågor som är av särskild betydelse för dessa länder. Denna bestämmelse utgör den rättsliga grunden ESRB-styrelse att bjuda in företrädare på hög nivå för relevanta myndigheter i tredjeländer och gör det möjligt för ESRB att upprätta regler om arten och omfattningen av samt förfarandena för dessa tredjeländers deltagande i ESRB:s verksamhet. ECB föreslår att man bibehåller denna bestämmelse så att ESRB även framledes har nödvändig flexibilitet för att fortsätta att vid behov inkludera företrädare på hög nivå för relevanta myndigheter i tredjeländer i ESRB:s arbete.

text: 3. ESRB:s varningar och rekommendationer

text: 3.1 ECB som mottagare av ESRB:s varningar och rekommendationer

text: Förslaget till förordning ändrar förordning

text: (EU) nr 1092/2010

text: så att varningar eller rekommendationer som ESRB utfärdar också får riktas till ECB, i egenskap av behörig myndighet eller utsedd myndighet i medlemsstater som deltar i den gemensamma tillsynsmekanismen, för de uppgifter som tilldelats ECB i enlighet med artiklarna

text: och

text: i förordning (EU) nr 1024/2013. ECB välkomnar förtydligandet av förteckningen över möjliga mottagare av ESRB:s varningar och rekommendationer, som fullt ut beaktar upprättandet av bankunionen och de tillhörande ändringarna i det institutionella ramverket avseende makrotillsynsåtgärder.

text: 3.2 Överföring av ESRB:s varningar och rekommendationer till Europaparlamentet

text: ECB stöder i princip förslaget att överföra ESRB:s varningar och rekommendationer till Europaparlamentet. ECB vill dock understryka att alla organ måste säkerställa strikt sekretess och tystnadsplikt för att minska de potentiella risker som utgår från för tidiga eller felaktiga offentliggöranden av känslig marknadsinformation som kan utgöra en risk för den finansiella stabiliteten i unionen. Dessa risker, som existerar så länge varningarna och rekommendationerna inte har meddelats en bredare allmänhet, måste beaktas om man ökar antalet mottagare av ESRB:s varningar och rekommendationer.

text: 4. Insamling och utbyte av information

text: 4.1 Hur de europeiska tillsynsmyndigheterna ska involveras när disaggregerad information begärs från ECBS-centralbanker

text: ECB anser att förslaget till förordning bör förtydliga omfattningen på

text: artikel 15.7 i förordning (EU) nr 1092/2010

text: . För närvarande framgår det inte helt klart av bestämmelsens ordalydelse huruvida de europeiska tillsynsmyndigheterna också ska höras när ESRB begär disaggregerad information från ECBS-centralbanker. ECB ser ingen anledning till varför de europeiska tillsynsmyndigheterna skulle delta i bedömningen av huruvida ESRB:s begäranden avseende andra uppgifter än tillsynsuppgifter är berättigade och lämpliga. Därför föreslår ECB att man förtydligar att de europeiska tillsynsmyndigheterna endast behöver höras när en ESRB-begäran berör disaggregerad tillsynsinformation.

text: I de fall där ECB rekommenderar att förslaget till förordning ska ändras anges de specifika förslagen i ett separat tekniskt arbetsdokument som åtföljs av en förklaring. Det tekniska arbetsdokumentet finns på engelska på ECB:s webbplats.

type: vagledning

utgivare: ecb


text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).

text: See Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: See Opinion

text: See paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: , and paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: See paragraph 3.1.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 3.2.2 of Opinion

text: , and paragraph 3.1.2 of Opinion

sprak: en

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 5 March 2018 on mortgage arrears resolution (CON/2018/13)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 5 March 2018 on mortgage arrears resolution (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 29 January 2018 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Chairman of the Oireachtas (Irish National Parliament) Joint Committee on Justice and Equality for an opinion on a Mortgage Arrears Resolution (Family Home) Bill 2017 (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the sixth indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft law relates to rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets and to the specific tasks conferred upon the ECB concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions pursuant to Article 127(6) of the Treaty. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The draft law provides for the establishment of a Mortgage Resolution Office (MRO), within the existing Insolvency Service of Ireland. The Insolvency Service of Ireland was established under the Personal Insolvency Act 2012 (hereinafter the ‘2012 Act’) . The 2012 Act was further amended by the Personal Insolvency (Amendment) Act 2015. 1.2 The draft law provides for the establishment of a framework applicable to certain ‘Financially Restricted Mortgagors’. The draft law provides that a Financially Restricted Mortgagor is a mortgagor who resides in, and is the registered owner of, a mortgaged property that is a family home, and whose disposable income, non-essential assets, and total personal debts are restricted below a level to be prescribed by ministerial order. 1.3 The draft law provides the MRO with powers to make mortgage resolution orders in respect of Financially Restricted Mortgagors that submit an application for such an order under certain conditions. These include that the Financially Restricted Mortgagor has already corresponded and/or communicated with the financial institution that provided the mortgage for the purpose of

text: seeking to renegotiate or restructure their mortgage. Moreover, the draft law will only apply to Financially Restricted Mortgagors who were in arrears on or before 1 January 2017. 1.4 The draft law provides that various types of mortgage resolution orders may be made by the MRO. These include, inter alia, an order that (1) the Financially Restricted Mortgagor make interest only payments on the mortgage for a period of time that will not exceed four years; (2) the mortgage period be extended by a period of time that will not exceed 20 years; (3) the mortgage payments due to be made by the Financially Restricted Mortgagor be deferred for a period that will not exceed one year; (4) the terms and conditions of the mortgage be amended so that the interest rate can be changed to a fixed or variable interest rate, including a change to the rate itself, that the MRO considers appropriate, taking into account prevailing market conditions; (5) the principal sum due on the mortgage be reduced in a fair manner, provided that the mortgagee be granted a share in the Financially Restricted Mortgagor’s equity in the family home as the MRO considers appropriate; and (6) the principal sum due on the mortgage be reduced in a fair manner, taking into account certain factors. 1.5 The draft law provides that the effect of such orders is to inter alia prevent the financial institution that provided the mortgage from commencing any legal proceedings for the recovery of a debt or repayment, save in limited circumstances, or to seek to eject the Financially Restricted Mortgagor from their tenancy in the family home. The financial institution may object to the order, and the order may be amended or terminated in certain circumstances. 1.6 The draft law also provides for an independent appeals system, whereby a mortgagor or financial institution aggrieved by a decision of the MRO may appeal against that decision. The draft law also stipulates offences and penalties concerning cases of fraudulent or dishonest conduct by the mortgagor, and in respect of circumstances where any person seeks to improperly influence an Appeals Officer, wilfully neglects to attend oral hearings or interferes with documents relevant to the appeal.

text: 2. Observations

text: 2.1 Interaction with existing national measures 2.1.1 The ECB recalls that the introduction of the 2012 Act was required by the EU-IMF Financial Support Programme for Ireland. The ECB was consulted on the draft of the 2012 Act, and supported the aim of lowering the cost and increasing the speed and efficiency of personal insolvency proceedings, while at the same time mitigating moral hazard and maintaining credit discipline. The ECB considered that the draft of the 2012 Act provided for debt relief in appropriate cases and contained provisions that aimed to protect the interests of creditors by applying strict eligibility criteria to the availability of the insolvency arrangements, providing for oversight by the Insolvency Service and the courts and requiring supermajority creditor approval of the insolvency arrangement in appropriate cases. The ECB considered that the provisions struck a reasonable balance between the interests of creditors and debtors in coming to an insolvency arrangement .

text: 2.1.2 The ECB notes that the 2012 Act was further enhanced by the Personal Insolvency (Amendment) Act 2015, in particular by ensuring that a borrower whose proposal for a personal insolvency arrangement is refused by the mortgage lender or other creditors can seek an independent review of that refusal by the courts. The courts in turn have power, subject to certain conditions, to impose the rejected proposal on the mortgage lender or other creditors. 2.1.3 Several other measures have also been introduced in Ireland to seek to address mortgage arrears and debt resolution. First, the Central Bank of Ireland adopted a Code of Conduct on Mortgage Arrears in 2009, in accordance with Section 117 of the Central Bank Act 1989. This Code is binding on mortgage lenders, and the Central Bank of Ireland has the power to administer sanctions for a contravention of the Code under Part IIIC of the Central Bank Act 1942. Second, the Consumer Protection (Regulation of Credit Servicing Firms) Act 2015 seeks to protect borrowers who are parties to credit agreements in respect of which credit servicing firms undertake certain services. The ECB welcomed the measures thus introduced, as they aim to strengthen consumer protection and thereby contribute to preserving confidence in the marketplace . Third, the Irish Government has put in place various measures to assist distressed borrowers, including the Abhaile scheme, which is a scheme that has been established to allow homeowners to access independent legal advice and support, and the Mortgage to Rent Scheme. Support is also provided to distressed borrowers by the Money Advice and Budgeting Service. 2.1.4 It is unclear how the provisions of the draft law will interact with these existing measures or with ongoing processes for the resolution of mortgage arrears. This uncertainty could introduce further delays in ongoing processes. In particular, unlike the 2012 Act, the draft law addresses only the mortgage debt of the borrower, and does not address the resolution of other, non-mortgage debt. In order to ensure an efficient and effective regime for addressing personal insolvency, a borrower’s entire debt should be taken into account. 2.1.5 Moreover, the draft law does not provide for the publication of relevant data on the functioning of the proposed regime or the independent review of the efficacy of mortgage resolution orders and their impact on Irish credit institutions and the Irish financial system . 2.1.6 It is suggested that it would be more appropriate to build on and enhance the existing regime, rather than establish a new regime. In that respect, the ECB notes that in March 2017 the Department of Justice and Equality launched a public consultation on the operation of the Personal Insolvency Acts 2012-2015, as part of the mandatory review of the legislation provided for under section 141 of the 2012 Act. This review may provide an appropriate opportunity to address the shortcomings of the existing legislation. 2.2 Effects on the banking sector 2.2.1 In the context of its direct responsibility for the supervision of significant banking groups within the euro area, the ECB monitors closely the stability of credit institutions. The high level of nonperforming loans in Ireland has brought large credit losses to Irish banks in the recent past. Thus, it is important that non-performing loans are dealt with in an efficient and effective manner, balancing

text: the need to ensure, on the one hand, observance of the general duty of debtors to meet their payment obligations and, on the other hand, the need to provide assistance to individuals in dire financial situations . 2.2.2 The draft law is being introduced without the benefit of a thorough economic impact assessment. The mortgage arrears resolution arrangements and the supporting administrative infrastructure should above all be workable. While partial write-down of debt can sometimes offer a solution in special cases where the borrower’s solvency can be restored, and where creditor losses can be minimised, it is important to ensure that these measures do not result in blanket mortgage debt forgiveness and are geared to minimising the risk of abuse. In particular, the draft law may have a potential negative impact on credit institutions as well as the functioning of the financial system. It is only by making such a prior assessment that it may be possible to mitigate such negative implications. In turn, any reforms should be formulated in a manner that safeguards financial stability, promotes market efficiency and liquidity and supports the adequate flow of credit to the economy. In the absence of an impact assessment, however, it is difficult to be confident that the objectives set by the draft law will be achieved . 2.2.3 Even though the draft law, if adopted, will only apply to Financially Restricted Mortgagors who were in arrears on or before 1 January 2017, the scope of possible mortgage resolution orders is extensive, including various forms of debt forgiveness. The ability of financial institutions to effectively manage credit risk depends on a reliable, predictable and stable legal framework that adequately balances the interests of both the creditor and the debtor. However, the draft law introduces changes that may affect the ability of lenders to give effect to the agreed terms of secured credit in Ireland, which could undermine legal certainty and the adequate management of credit risk in financial institutions. In this respect, it is important to carefully consider the impact of the draft law on credit agreements in order to ensure legal certainty and avoid undue interference with the contractual and property rights of credit institutions, and to prevent moral hazard from arising in the relationship between creditor and debtor . 2.2.4 It is for the Irish authorities to assess whether the draft law complies with Irish constitutional law and other applicable legal principles. 2.3 Effects on financial stability Given the scope of the draft law and the importance of mortgage portfolios in total bank assets, the draft law may have a potential negative impact on the credit institutions affected, and ultimately may have implications for financial stability. 2.4 Effects on the Irish economy 2.4.1 As noted above, the scope of possible mortgage resolution orders is extensive, including various forms of debt forgiveness. Notwithstanding some of the safeguards in the draft law, such provisions may adversely affect the future supply of credit and the pricing of mortgages. Banks could respond by unduly tightening lending conditions, in particular to compensate for credit losses resulting from

text: the application of the draft law. The implications for the real economy are uncertain, given the absence of a quantitative impact assessment. 2.4.2 While the draft law, if adopted, will only apply to Financially Restricted Mortgagors that were in arrears on or before 1 January 2017, the potential for interference with the ability of lenders to give effect to the agreed terms of secured credit in Ireland might nevertheless render the market less attractive and discourage new entrants. This could stifle competition in financial services in Ireland, due to a perceived increase in legal uncertainty .

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 5 March 2018.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: EUT C 67, 22.2.2018, s. 1.

title: ECB-rådets yttrande av den 7 mars 2018 om rådets rekommendation om utseende av vice ordförande för Europeiska centralbanken (CON/2018/14)

text: Inledning och rättslig grund

text: Den 23 februari 2018 mottog Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) en begäran från Europeiska rådets ordförande om ett yttrande över rådets rekommendation av den 20 februari 2018 om utseende av vice ordförande för Europeiska centralbanken.

text: ECB-rådets behörighet att avge ett yttrande grundar sig på

text: artikel 283.2 i fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt

text: Allmänna kommentarer

text: 1. I rådets rekommendation, som överlämnats till Europeiska rådet och som Europaparlamentet och ECB-rådet nu ska yttra sig om, föreslås att Luis DE GUINDOS JURADO utses till vice ordförande i ECB för en tid av åtta år från och med den 1 juni 2018.

text: 2. ECB-rådet anser att den förslagna kandidaten är en person som besitter den allmänt erkända auktoritet och yrkeserfarenhet inom den finansiella sektorn som krävs enligt artikel 283.2 i fördraget.

text: 3. ECB-rådet har ingen invändning mot rådets rekommendation att utse Luis DE GUINDOS JURADO till vice ordförande i ECB.


text: « Loi du 11 décembre 1998 relative à la classification et aux habilitations, attestations et avis de sécurité/Wet van 11 december 1998 betreffende de classificatie en de veiligheidsmachtigingen, veiligheidsattesten en veiligheidsadviezen».

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).

text: er « Loi du 1 juillet 2011 relative à la sécurité et à la protection des infrastructures critiques/wet van 1 juli betreffende de beveiliging en de bescherming van de kritieke infrastructuren ».

text: Regulation of the European Central Bank

text: (EU) No 795/2014

text: of 3 July 2014 on oversight requirements for systemically important payment systems (ECB/2014/28), (OJ L 217, 23.7.2014, p. 16), as amended..

text: With regard to the NBB’s role as competent authority for the security and protection of critical infrastructures, see

text: , paragraphs 3.1 and 3.5.

text: Arrêté Royal du 17 juillet 2012, modifié par l’arrêt royal du 5 juillet 2015, relatif à la couverture des frais de fonctionnement de la Banque Nationale de Belgique liés au contrôle des établissements financiers en exécution de l’

text: article 12

text: bis, § 4 de la loi du 22 février 1998 fixant le statut organique de la Banque Nationale de Belgique/Koninklijk besluit van 17 juli 2012 gewijzigd bij het koninklijk besluit van 5 juli 2015 betreffende de dekking van de werkingskosten van de Nationale Bank van België verbonden aan het toezicht op financiële instellingen, tot uitvoering van artikel 12bis, § 4 van de wet van 22 februari 1998 tot vaststelling van het organiek statuut van de Nationale Bank van België ».

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 21 March 2018 on security and protection of critical infrastructures (CON/2018/15)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 21 March 2018 on security and protection of critical infrastructures (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 21 February 2018 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Governor of the Nationale Bank van België/Banque Nationale de Belgique (NBB), acting on behalf of the Belgian Ministry of Finance, for an opinion on a draft law (hereinafter the ‘draft law’) amending the Law of 11 December 1998 on security classification, security clearance, security certificates and security advisory notices (the ‘Law of 11 December 1998 on security matters’ ) and on a draft Royal Decree appointing the administrative authorities as competent to implement the Law of 11 December 1998 on security matters (hereinafter the ‘draft Royal Decree’ and together with the draft law, the ‘draft laws’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third, fifth and sixth indents of

text: , as the draft laws relate to the NBB, payment and settlement systems and rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft laws

text: 1.1 The main purpose of the draft laws is to complement the existing legal framework on the protection of the fundamental interests of the Belgian State, including, inter alia, the internal and external security of the State and the integrity of the State’s territory, in the light of growing terrorist threats. 1.2 Although the Law of 3 May 2005 had already amended the Law of 11 December 1998 on security matters with a view to creating a clearer and more comprehensive legal basis for the Belgian National Security Authority to conduct security checks of specific natural persons, this framework has proven inadequate to deal with the growing number of requests for security checks. 1.3 In order to improve the balance between the respect for the privacy of natural persons subject to security checks and the efficiency of these measures, the draft law provides for the designation of administrative authorities which will act as a liaison between the National Security Authority and the

text: various sectors of activities falling within the scope of the Law of 11 December 1998 on security matters and deemed necessary for the protection of the fundamental interests of the State. 1.4 The draft Royal Decree designates the NBB as the administrative authority for critical financial infrastructures. The NBB has already been designated as the competent authority for critical financial infrastructures under the Law of 1 July 2011 on the security and protection of critical infrastructures . 1.5 The draft law requires the appointment of security officers within the administrative authorities as well as within all public and private legal entities falling within the relevant sectors. The draft law outlines the procedures which will take place between the National Security Authority, the competent administrative authorities and the legal entities within the relevant sectors, through their respective security officers. Upon request by the competent administrative authorities, the relevant legal entities will perform a preliminary risk analysis in order to assess whether the exercise of a profession, function, mission or mandate, the access to premises, buildings, sites or the holding of a permit, license or authorisation may, through inappropriate use, undermine any of the fundamental interests of the Belgian State. Based on this preliminary risk analysis, the competent administrative authority conducts an impact analysis mapping out the effect of potential damages to the fundamental interests of the Belgian State. Depending on the results of the impact analysis, the competent administrative authority may propose to the National Security Authority that individual security checks be conducted with regard to the exercise of a profession, function, mission or mandate, access to premises, buildings or sites or the holding of a permit, license or authorisation. If the National Security Authority approves the request, it will conduct itself the security checks of specific individuals involved in the exercise of the relevant profession, function, mission, mandate, the access to premises, buildings, sites or the holding of a permit, license or authorisation. Some of the information gathered as a result of the above-mentioned security checks is available only to the security officers of the administrative authorities and the relevant legal entities, and may be used only in the specific context of the draft law. The draft law provides that the costs incurred as a result of the security check, which are currently borne by the individual persons subject to check, will be paid by the legal entity which employs the relevant individual.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 The ECB supports the basic purpose of the draft laws to ensure national security in the light of the growing threat of terrorism, including to critical financial infrastructures. In particular, the ECB welcomes that the draft laws strengthen the protection of critical financial infrastructures at a time when terrorism has become a serious threat to the stability of the financial system. 2.2 The ECB has laid down oversight requirements for systemically important payment systems (SIPS) pursuant to

text: Regulation (EU) No 795/2014

text: of the European Central Bank (ECB/2014/28) , which addresses operational risk, requiring SIPS operators to establish, inter alia, (i) comprehensive physical and information security policies that adequately identify, assess and manage all potential

text: vulnerabilities and threats and (ii) a business continuity plan that addresses events posing a significant risk of disrupting the SIPS’ operations, including the use of a secondary site, and a design that ensures that critical information technology systems can resume operations within two hours of those events . In organising the conduct of security checks for employees of legal entities operating critical financial infrastructures, the draft laws touch upon matters of national security going beyond the ECB’s oversight requirements. 2.3 The tasks conferred upon the NBB by the draft laws appear to naturally complement the NBB’s existing tasks with regard to the security of critical financial infrastructures, which are carried out by the NBB in its capacity as competent authority pursuant to the Law of 1 July 2011 on the security and protection of critical infrastructures. As the draft laws do not, therefore, confer genuinely new tasks on the NBB, the issue of assessing the conferral of new tasks on a national central bank from the perspective of the prohibition of monetary financing does not arise in the case at hand.

text: 3. Specific comments

text: 3.1 The ECB understands that in appointing the NBB as the competent administrative authority for critical financial infrastructures, the draft laws enable the NBB, subject to the approval of the National Security Authority, to set in motion the performance of security checks intended to assess the potential risks associated with individuals working for private and public legal entities that operate critical financial infrastructures. As a liaison between the National Security Authority and the security officer for the relevant legal entity, the NBB’s security officer will, for the strict purpose of organising the security verification, have access to classified information which would otherwise be unavailable. 3.2 The tasks of the NBB are limited to (i) the performance of part of the preliminary risk analysis; (ii) where appropriate, the submission of a proposal to the National Security Authority for the conduct of security checks with regard to the exercise of a profession, function, mission, mandate, access to premises, buildings, sites, or the holding of a permit, license or authorisation; and (iii) acting as a liaison between the relevant legal entity and the National Security Authority. Furthermore, pursuant to Article 9 of the draft law, the costs incurred in relation to the security checks will ultimately be borne by the legal entity employing the individuals subject to the checks. Finally, given that this new function will be exercised with respect to financial institutions that are already subject to the supervisory and oversight powers of the NBB, the corresponding expenses are expected to be marginal and to be reimbursed in full by the supervised institutions as provided for in the first and second paragraphs of Article 12 of the Royal Decree of 17 July 2012, as amended by the Royal Decree of 5 July 2015, on the coverage of the NBB’s functioning costs derived from the control of

text: financial institutions . Consequently, the draft laws would not have an impact on the financial

text: independence of the NBB.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 21 March 2018.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI