text: Annex to ED Decision 2014/030/R

text: Decision 2013/021/R of the Executive Director of the Agency of 23 August 2013 on adopting Acceptable Means of Compliance and Guidance Material for non-commercial operations with complex motor-powered aircraft (Part-NCC).

text: Annex to ED Decision 2014/030/R

text: Non-intentional No. Technical condition T-PEDs transmitters

text: The aircraft is certified as T-PED tolerant, i.e. it has All phases of flight All phases of flight been demonstrated during the aircraft certification process that front door and back door coupling have no impact on the safe operation of the aircraft 2 A complete electromagnetic interference (EMI) All phases of flight All phases of flight assessment for all technologies, using the method described in (d)(1), has been performed and has demonstrated the T-PED tolerance 3 The aircraft is certified for the use of T-PEDs using All phases of flight All phases of flight, particular technologies (e.g. WLAN or mobile restricted to those phone) particular technologies

text: The EMI assessment, using the method described All phases of flight All phases of flight, in (d)(1), has demonstrated that: restricted to those particular technologies (a) the front door coupling has no impact on safety; and (b) the back door coupling has no impact on safety when using particular technologies (e.g. WLAN or mobile phone)

text: The EMI assessment, using the method described All phases of flight Not permitted in (d)(1)(i), has demonstrated that the front door coupling has no impact on safety caused by nonintentional transmitters

text: The EMI assessment, using the method described All phases of flight - All phases of flight in (d)(1)(ii), has demonstrated that the back door except low visibility except low visibility coupling has no impact on safety when using approach operation approach operation, particular technologies (e.g. WLAN or mobile restricted to those

text: Annex to ED Decision 2014/030/R

text: phone) particular technologies 7 An EMI assessment has not been performed All phases of flight - Not permitted except low visibility approach operation 8 Notwithstanding Scenarios Nos. 3 to 7 (a) before taxi-out; (b) during taxi-in after the end of landing roll; and (c) the pilot-in-command may permit the use during prolonged departure delays, provided that sufficient time is available to check the passenger compartment before the flight proceeds

text: Annex to ED Decision 2014/030/R

text: Annex to ED Decision 2014/030/R

text: Annex to ED Decision 2014/030/R

text: Annex to ED Decision 2014/030/R

text: Annex to ED Decision 2014/030/R

text: Annex to ED Decision 2014/030/R

text: Annex to ED Decision 2014/030/R

identifier: AMC & GM to Part NCC — Amendment 1

amnesord: Part-NCC - Non-commercial operations with complex-motor-powered aircraft

beslut: ED Decision 2014/030/R

publisher: Europeiska unionens byrå för luftfartssäkerhet

sprak: en

title: AMC & GM to Part NCC — Amendment 1

serie: amc-gm

text: Annex to Decision 2014/030/R

type: stycke

text: ‘AMC and GM to Part-NCC – Amendment 1’

text: The Annex to Decision 2013/021/R is hereby amended as follows: The text of the amendment is arranged to show deleted, new or amended text as shown below:

text: 1. deleted text is marked with strike through;

text: 2. new or amended text is highlighted in grey; and

text: 3. an ellipsis (…) indicates that the remaining text is unchanged in front of or following the reflected amendment.

text: AMC1 NCC.GEN.130 is replaced by the following:

text: AMC1 NCC.GEN.130 Portable electronic devices

text: TECHNICAL PREREQUISITES FOR THE USE OF PEDS (a) Scope This AMC describes the technical prerequisites under which any kind of portable electronic device (PED) may be used on board the aircraft without adversely affecting the performance of the aircraft’s systems and equipment. (b) Prerequisites concerning the aircraft configuration (1) Before an operator may permit the use of any kind of PED on-board, it should ensure that PEDs have no impact on the safe operation of the aircraft. The operator should demonstrate that PEDs do not interfere with on-board electronic systems and equipment, especially with the aircraft’s navigation and communication systems. (2) The assessment of PED tolerance may be tailored to the different aircraft zones for which the use of PEDs is considered, i.e. may address separately: (i) the passenger compartment; (ii) the flight crew compartment; and (iii) areas not accessible during the flight. (c) Scenarios for permitting the use of PEDs (1) Possible scenarios, under which the operator may permit the use of PEDs, should be as documented in Table 1. The scenarios in Table 1 are listed in a descending order with the least permitting scenario at the bottom.

text: (2) Restrictions arising from the corresponding aircraft certification, as documented in the aircraft flight manual (AFM) or equivalent document(s), should stay in force. They may be linked to different aircraft zones, or to particular transmitting technologies covered.

text: (3) For Scenarios Nos. 3 to 8 in Table 1 the use of C-PEDs and cargo tracking devices may be further expanded, when the EMI assessment has demonstrated that there is no impact on safety as follows:

text: (i) for C-PEDs by using the method described in (d)(2); and

text: (ii) for cargo tracking devices by using the method described in (d)(3).

text: Table 1 – Scenarios for permitting the use of PEDs by the operator

text: (d) Demonstration of electromagnetic compatibility (1) EMI assessment at aircraft level The means to demonstrate that the radio frequency (RF) emissions (intentional or nonintentional) are tolerated by aircraft systems should be as follows: (i) to address front door coupling susceptibility for any kind of PEDs: (A) RTCA, ‘Guidance on allowing transmitting portable, electronic devices (T-PEDs) on aircraft’, DO-294C (or later revisions), Appendix 5C; or (B) RTCA, ‘Aircraft design and certification for portable electronic device (PED) tolerance’, DO-307 (including Change 1 or later revisions), Section 4; and (ii) to address back door coupling susceptibility for T-PEDs: (A) EUROCAE, ‘Guidance for the use of portable electronic devices (PEDs) on board aircraft’, ED-130 (or later revisions), Annex 6; (B) RTCA DO-294C (or later revisions), Appendix 6D; or (C) RTCA DO-307 (including Change 1 or later revisions), Section 3. (2) Alternative EMI assessment of C-PEDs (i) For front door coupling: (A) C-PEDs should comply with the levels as defined by: (a) EUROCAE/RTCA, ‘Environmental conditions and test procedures for airborne equipment’, ED-14D/DO-160D (or later revisions), Section 21, Category M, for operation in the passenger compartment and the flight crew compartment; and

text: (b) EUROCAE ED-14E/RTCA DO-160E (or later revisions), Section 21, Category H, for operation in areas not accessible during the flight. (B) If the C-PEDs are electronic flight bags used in the flight crew compartment, an alternative compliance method described in EASA, ‘General acceptable means of compliance for airworthiness of products, part and appliances’, AMC-20, AMC 20- 25 (‘Airworthiness and operational considerations for electronic flight bags’), may be used. (ii) For back door coupling the EMI assessment described in (1)(ii) should be performed. (3) Alternative EMI assessment of cargo tracking devices In case a transmitting function is automatically deactivated in a cargo tracking device (being a T-PED), the unit should be qualified for safe operation on board the aircraft. One of the following methods should be considered acceptable as evidence for safe operation: (i) A type-specific safety assessment, including failure mode and effects analysis, has been performed at aircraft level. The main purpose of the assessment should be to determine the worst hazards and to demonstrate an adequate design assurance level of the relevant hardware and software components of the cargo tracking device. (ii) The high intensity radiated field (HIRF) certification of the aircraft has been performed, i.e. the aircraft type has been certified after 1987 and meets the appropriate special condition. In such a case, the operator should observe the following: (A) The tracking device: (a) features an automated and prolonged radio suspension in flight using multiple modes of redundancy; and (b) has been verified in the aircraft environment to ensure deactivation of the transmitting function in flight. (B) The transmissions of the tracking device are limited per design to short periods of time (less than 1 second per 1 000 seconds) and cannot be continuous. (C) The tracking devices should comply with the levels as defined by EUROCAE ED- 14E/RTCA DO-160E (or later revisions), Section 21, Category H. (D) In order to provide assurance on the tracking device design and production, the following documents are retained as part of the evaluation package: (a) operational description, technical specifications, product label and images of the tracking device and any peripheral attachments; (b) failure mode and effects analysis report of the tracking device and any peripheral attachments; (c) declaration of stringent design and production controls in place during the tracking device manufacturing; (d) declaration of conformity and technical documentation showing compliance to the European Norms (EN), regulating the transmitter characteristic of the tracking device or its transmission module; and

text: (e) an EMI assessment report documenting the emission levels. (iii) The tracking device interference levels during transmission are below those considered acceptable for the specific aircraft environment. (e) Operational conditions of C-PEDS and cargo tracking devices The operator should ensure that C-PEDs and cargo tracking devices are maintained in good and safe condition, having in mind that: (1) damage may modify their emissions characteristics; and (2) damage to the battery may create a fire hazard. (f) Batteries in C-PEDs and cargo tracking devices Lithium-type batteries in C-PEDs and cargo tracking devices should meet: (1) United Nations (UN) Transportation Regulations, ‘Recommendations on the transport of dangerous goods - manual of tests and criteria’, UN ST/SG/AC.10/11; and (2) one of the following standards: (i) Underwriters Laboratory, ‘Lithium batteries’, UL 1642; (ii) Underwriters Laboratory, ‘Household and commercial batteries’, UL 2054; (iii) Underwriters Laboratory, ‘Information technology equipment – safety’, UL 60950-1; (iv) International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), ‘Secondary cells and batteries containing alkaline or other non-acid electrolytes - safety requirements for portable sealed secondary cells, and for batteries made from them, for use in portable applications’, IEC 62133; (v) RTCA, ‘Minimum operational performance standards for rechargeable lithium battery systems’, DO-311. RTCA DO-311 may be used to address concerns regarding overcharging, over-discharging, and the flammability of cell components. The standard is intended to test permanently installed equipment; however, these tests are applicable and sufficient to test electronic flight bags rechargeable lithium-type batteries; or (vi) European Technical Standard Order (ETSO), ‘Non-rechargeable lithium cells and batteries’, ETSO C142a.

text: A new AMC2 NCC.GEN.130 is inserted as follows:

text: AMC2 NCC.GEN.130 Portable electronic devices

text: PROCEDURES FOR THE USE OF PEDS (a) Scope This AMC describes the procedures under which any kind of portable electronic device (PED) may be used on board the aircraft without adversely affecting the performance of the aircraft’s systems and

text: equipment. This AMC addresses the operation of PEDs in the different aircraft zones — passenger compartment, flight compartment, and areas inaccessible during the flight. (b) Prerequisites Before permitting the use of any kind of PEDs the operator should ensure compliance with (c) of AMC1 NCC.GEN.130. (c) Hazard identification and risk assessment The operator should identify the safety hazards and manage the associated risks following the management system implemented in accordance with ORO.GEN.200. The risk assessment should include hazards associated with: (1) PEDs in different aircraft zones; (2) PED use during various phases of flight; (3) PED use during turbulence; (4) improperly stowed PEDs; (5) impeded or slowed evacuations; (6) passenger non-compliance, e.g. not deactivating transmitting functions, not switching off PEDs or not stowing PEDs properly; (7) disruptive passengers; and (8) battery fire. (d) Use of PEDs in the passenger compartment (1) Procedures and training If an operator permits passengers to use PEDs on board its aircraft, procedures should be in place to control their use. These procedures should include provisions for passenger briefing, passenger handling and for the stowage of PEDs. The operator should ensure that all crew members and ground personnel are trained to enforce possible restrictions concerning the use of PEDs, in line with these procedures. (2) Provisions for use (i) The use of PEDs in the passenger compartment may be granted under the responsibility of the operator, i.e. the operator decides which PED may be used during which phases of the flight. (ii) Notwithstanding (b), medical equipment necessary to support physiological functions may be used at all times and does not need to be switched-off. (3) Stowage, passenger information and passenger briefing of PEDs (i) In accordance with NCC.OP.135 the operator should establish procedures concerning the stowage of PEDs. The operator should: (A) identify the phases of flight in which PEDs are to be stowed; and

text: (B) determine suitable stowage locations, taking into account the PEDs’ size and weight. (ii) The operator should provide general information on the use of PEDs to the passengers before the flight. This information should specify at least: (A) which PEDs can be used during which phases of the flight; (B) when and where PEDs are to be stowed; and (C) that the instructions of the crew are to be followed at all times. (iii) The use of PEDs should be part of the passenger briefings. The operator should remind passengers to pay attention and to avoid distraction during such briefings. (4) In-seat electrical power supplies Where in-seat electrical power supplies are available for passenger use, the following should apply: (i) information giving safety instructions should be provided to the passengers; (ii) PEDs should be disconnected from any in-seat electrical power supply during taxiing, take-off, approach, landing, and during abnormal or emergency conditions; and (iii) flight crew and cabin crew should be aware of the proper means to switch-off in-seat power supplies used for PEDs. (5) Operator’s safety measures during boarding and any phase of flight (i) Appropriate coordination between flight crew and cabin crew should be established to deal with interference or other safety problems associated with PEDs. (ii) Suspect equipment should be switched off. (iii) Particular attention should be given to passenger misuse of equipment. (iv) Thermal runaways of batteries, in particular lithium batteries, and potential resulting fire, should be handled properly. (v) The pilot-in-command may, for any reason and during any phase of flight, require deactivation and stowage of PEDs. (vi) When the operator restricts the use of PEDs, consideration should be given to handle special requests to operate a T-PED during any phase of the flight for specific reasons (e.g. for security measures). (6) Reporting Occurrences of suspected or confirmed interference should be reported to the competent authority. Where possible, to assist follow-up and technical investigation, reports should describe the suspected device, identify the brand name and model number, its location in the aircraft at the time of the occurrence, interference symptoms, the device user’s contact details and the results of actions taken by the crew. (e) Use of PEDs in the flight crew compartment

text: In the flight crew compartment the operator may permit the use of PEDs, e.g. to assist the flight crew in their duties, when procedures are in place to ensure the following: (1) The conditions for the use of PEDs in-flight are specified in the operations manual. (2) The PEDs do not pose a loose item risk or other hazard. (3) These provisions should not preclude use of a T-PED (specifically a mobile phone) by the flight crew to deal with an emergency. However, reliance should not be predicated on a T-PED for this purpose. (f) PEDs not accessible during the flight PEDs should be switched off, when not accessible for deactivation during flight. This should apply especially to PEDs contained in baggage or transported as part of the cargo. The operator may permit deviation for PEDs for which safe operation has been demonstrated in accordance with AMC1 NCC.GEN.130. Other precautions, such as transporting in shielded metal boxes, may also be used to mitigate associated risks.

text: GM1 NCC.GEN.130 is amended as follows:

text: GM1 NCC.GEN.130 Portable electronic devices

text: DEFINITIONS (a) Definition and categories of PEDs PEDs are any kind of electronic device, typically but not limited to consumer electronics, brought on board the aircraft by crew members, passengers, or as part of the cargo and that are not included in the approved aircraft configuration. All equipment that is able to consume electrical energy falls under this definition. The electrical energy can be provided from internal sources as batteries (chargeable or non-rechargeable) or the devices may also be connected to specific aircraft power sources. PEDs fall into threeinclude the following two categories: (1) Non-intentional transmitters can non-intentionally radiate RF transmissions, sometimes referred to as spurious emissions. This category includes, but is not limited to, computing equipmentcalculators, cameras, radio receivers, audio and video reproducersplayers, electronic games and toys; when these devices are not equipped with a transmitting function. In addition, portable, non-transmitting devices provided to assist crew members in their duties are included in this category. The category is identified as PED. (2) Intentional transmitters can radiate RF transmissions on specific frequencies as part of their intended function. In addition, they may radiate non-intentional transmissions like any PED. The term ‘transmitting PED’ (T-PED) is used to identify the transmitting capability of the PED. Intentional transmitters are transmitting devices such as RF-based remote control equipment, which may include some toys, two-way radios (sometimes referred to as private mobile radio), mobile phones of any type, satellite phones, computers with mobile phone data connection, wireless fidelity (WIFI)wireless local area network (WLAN) or Bluetooth capability. After

text: deactivation of the transmitting capability, e.g. by activating the so-called ‘flight mode’ or ‘flight safety mode’, the T-PED remains a PED having non-intentional emissions. (3b) Controlled PEDs (C-PEDs) A controlled PED (C-PED) is a PED subject to administrative control by the operator using it. This will include, inter alia, tracking the allocation of the devices to specific aircraft or persons and ensuring that no unauthorised changes are made to the hardware, software or databases. A controlled PED will also be subject to procedures to ensure that it is maintained to the latest amendment state. C- PEDs can be assigned to the category of non-intentional transmitters (PEDs) or intentional transmitters (T-PEDs). (c) Cargo tracking device A cargo tracking device is a PED attached to or included in airfreight (e.g. in or on containers, pallets, parcels or baggage). Cargo tracking devices can be assigned to the category of non-intentional transmitters or T-PEDs. If the device is a T-PED, it complies with the European Norms (EN) for transmissions. (bd) Definition of the switched-off status Many PEDs are not completely disconnected from the internal power source when switched off. The switching function may leave some remaining functionality, e.g. data storage, timer, clock, etc. These devices can be considered switched off when in the deactivated status. The same applies for devices having no transmitting capability and are operated by coin cells without further deactivation capability, e.g. wrist watches. (e) Electromagnetic interference (EMI) The two classes of EMI to be addressed can be described as follows: (1) Front door coupling is the possible disturbance to an aircraft system as received by the antenna of the system and mainly in the frequency band used by the system. Any PED internal oscillation has the potential to radiate low level signals in the aviation frequency bands. Through this disturbance especially the instrument landing system (ILS) and the VHF omni range (VOR) navigation system may indicate erroneous information. (2) Back door coupling is the possible disturbance of aircraft systems by electromagnetic fields generated by transmitters at a level which could exceed on short distance (i.e. within the aircraft) the electromagnetic field level used for the aircraft system certification. This disturbance may then lead to system malfunction.

text: GM2 NCC.GEN.130 is replaced by the following:

text: GM2 CAT.GEN.MPA.140 Portable electronic devices

text: CREW REST COMPARTMENT, NAVIGATION, TEST ENTITIES AND FIRE CAUSED BY PEDS (a) When the aircraft is equipped with a crew rest compartment, it is considered being part of the passenger compartment.

text: (b) Front door coupling may influence the VOR navigation system. Therefore, the flight crew monitors other navigation sensors to detect potential disturbances by PEDs, especially during low visibility departure operation based on VOR guidance. (c) Specific equipment, knowledge and experience are required, when the industry standards for evaluating technical prerequisites for the use of PEDs are applied. In order to ensure conformity with the industry standards, the operator is encouraged to cooperate with an appropriately qualified and experienced entity, as necessary. For this entity an aviation background is not required, but is considered to be beneficial. (d) Guidance to follow in case of fire caused by PEDs is provided by the International Civil Aviation Organisation, ‘Emergency response guidance for aircraft incidents involving dangerous goods’, ICAO Doc 9481-AN/928.

text: GM3 NCC.GEN.130 is replaced by the following:

text: GM3 NCC.GEN.130 Portable electronic devices

text: CARGO TRACKING DEVICES EVALUATION (a) Safety assessment Further guidance on performing a safety assessment can be found in: (1) EASA, ‘Certification specifications and acceptable means of compliance for large aeroplanes’, CS-25, Book 2, AMC-Subpart F, AMC 25.1309; (2) EUROCAE/SAE, ‘Guidelines for development of civil aircraft and systems’, ED-79/ARP 4754 (or later revisions); and (3) SAE, ‘Guidelines and methods for conducting the safety assessment process on civil airborne systems and equipment’, ARP 4761 (or later revisions). (b) HIRF certification The type certificate data sheet (TCDS), available on the EASA website for each aircraft model having EASA certification, lists whether the HIRF certification has been performed through a special condition. The operator may contact the type certification holder to gain the necessary information. (c) Failure mode and effects analysis Further guidance on performing a failure mode and effects analysis can be found in: (1) SAE ARP 4761 (or later revisions); and (2) U.S. Department of Defense, ‘Procedures for performing a failure mode, effects and criticality analysis’, Military Standard MIL-STD-1629A (or later revisions).

type: vagledning

utgivare: easa


identifier: AMC & GM to Part-NCC — Amendment 10

beslut: ED Decision 2017/010/R

title: AMC & GM to Part-NCC — Amendment 10

text: Annex to ED Decision 2017/010/R

text: Annex to Decision 2017/010/R

type: rubrik

text: ‘AMC/GM to Part-NCC — Amendment 10’

text: The Annex to Decision 2013/021/R is hereby amended as follows:

text: The text of the amendment is arranged to show deleted, new or amended text as shown below:

text: 1. deleted text is marked with strike through;

text: 2. new or amended text is highlighted in grey; and

text: 3. an ellipsis (…) indicates that the remaining text is unchanged in front of or following the reflected amendment.

text: AMC1 NCC.GEN.140(a)(3) Documents, manuals and information to be carried

text: CERTIFICATE OF AIRWORTHINESS The certificate of airworthiness should be a normal certificate of airworthiness, or a restricted certificate of airworthiness or a permit to fly issued in accordance with the applicable airworthiness requirements. (…)

text: GM3 NCC.OP.185 Ice and other contaminants — ground procedures

text: DE-ICING/ANTI-ICING BACKGROUND INFORMATION Further guidance material on this issue is given in the ICAO Manual of Aircraft Ground De-icing/Anti-icing Operations (Doc 9640) (hereinafter referred to as the ICAO Manual of Aircraft Ground De-icing/Anti-icing Operations). (…) (c) Hold-over protection (…) (4) References to usable HoT tables may be found in the AEA ‘Recommendations for de-icing/antiicing of aircraft on the ground’. (…)

text: GM1 NCC.IDE.A.100(b) Instruments and equipment — general

text: REQUIRED INSTRUMENTS AND EQUIPMENT THAT DO NOT NEED TO BE APPROVED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE APPLICABLE AIRWORTHINESS REQUIREMENTS The functionality of non-installed instruments and equipment required by this Subpart and that do not need an equipment approval, as listed in NCC.IDE.A.100(b), should be checked against recognised industry standards

text: Annex to ED Decision 2017/010/R

text: appropriate to the intended purpose. The operator is responsible for ensuring the maintenance of these instruments and equipment. (…)

text: GM1 NCC.IDE.A.100(b)&(c) Instruments and equipment — general

text: NON-REQUIRED INSTRUMENTS AND EQUIPMENT THAT DO NOT NEED TO BE APPROVED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE APPLICABLE AIRWORTHINESS REQUIREMENTS, BUT ARE CARRIED ON A FLIGHT INSTRUMENTS AND EQUIPMENT THAT DO NOT NEED TO BE APPROVED (a) This Guidance Material The provision of this paragraph does not exempt the item of equipment from complying with the applicable airworthiness requirements if the instrument or equipment is installed in the aeroplane. In this case, the installation should be approved as required in the applicable airworthiness requirements and should comply with the applicable Certification Specifications. (b) The functionality of non-installed instruments and equipment required by this Part that do not need an equipment approval should be checked against recognised industry standards appropriate for the intended purpose. The operator is responsible for ensuring the maintenance of these instruments and equipment. (bc) The failure of additional non-installed instruments or equipment not required by this Part or by the applicable airworthiness requirements or any applicable airspace requirements should not adversely affect the airworthiness and/or the safe operation of the aircraft. Examples are the following: (1) instruments supplying additional flight information (e.g. stand-alone global positioning system (GPS)); (2) mission dedicated equipment (e.g. radios); and (3) non-installed passenger entertainment equipment. (…)

text: AMC2 NCC.IDE.A.215 Emergency locator transmitter (ELT)

text: Annex to ED Decision 2017/010/R

text: GM1 NCC.IDE.H.100(b) Instruments and equipment — general

text: REQUIRED INSTRUMENTS AND EQUIPMENT THAT DO NOT NEED TO BE APPROVED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE APPLICABLE AIRWORTHINESS REQUIREMENTS The functionality of non-installed instruments and equipment required by this Subpart and that do not need an equipment approval, as listed in NCC.IDE.H.100(b), should be checked against recognised industry standards appropriate to the intended purpose. The operator is responsible for ensuring the maintenance of these instruments and equipment.

text: GM1 NCC.IDE.H.100(b)&(c) Instruments and equipment — general

text: NON-REQUIRED INSTRUMENTS AND EQUIPMENT THAT DO NOT NEED TO BE APPROVED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE APPLICABLE AIRWORTHINESS REQUIREMENTS, BUT ARE CARRIED ON A FLIGHT INSTRUMENTS AND EQUIPMENT THAT DO NOT NEED TO BE APPROVED (a) This Guidance Material The provision of this paragraph does not exempt the item of equipment from complying with the applicable airworthiness requirements if the instrument or equipment is installed in the helicopter. In this case, the installation should be approved as required in the applicable airworthiness requirements and should comply with the applicable Certification Specifications. (b) The functionality of non-installed instruments and equipment required by this Part that do not need an equipment approval should be checked against recognised industry standards appropriate for the intended purpose. The operator is responsible for ensuring the maintenance of these instruments and equipment. (bc) The failure of additional non-installed instruments or equipment not required by this Part or by the applicable airworthiness requirements or any applicable airspace requirements should not adversely affect the airworthiness and/or the safe operation of the aircraft. Examples are the following: (1) instruments supplying additional flight information (e.g. stand-alone global positioning system (GPS)); (2) mission dedicated equipment (e.g. some mission dedicated radios, wire cutters); and (3) non-installed passenger entertainment equipment. (…)

text: AMC1 NCC.IDE.H.115 Operating lights

text: LANDING LIGHT The landing light should be trainable, at least in the vertical plane or optionally be supplemented by an additional fixed light or lights positioned to give a wide spread of illumination. (…)

text: GM1 NCC.IDE.H.125(a)(3) Operations under IFR — flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment

text: ALTIMETERS

text: Annex to ED Decision 2017/010/R

text: Altimeters with counter drum-pointer or equivalent presentation are considered to be less susceptible to misinterpretation for helicopters operating above 10 000 ft. (…)

text: AMC2 NCC.IDE.H.215 Emergency locator transmitter (ELT)

text: TYPES OF ELT AND GENERAL TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS (a) The ELT required by this provision should be one of the following: (1) Automatic Fixed (ELT(AF)). An automatically activated ELT that is permanently attached to an aircraft and is designed to aid search and rescue (SAR) teams in locating the crash site. (2) Automatic Portable (ELT(AP)). An automatically activated ELT, which is rigidly attached to an aircraft before a crash, but is readily removable from the aircraft after a crash. It functions as an ELT during the crash sequence. If the ELT does not employ an integral antenna, the aircraft-mounted antenna may be disconnected and an auxiliary antenna (stored in the ELT case) attached to the ELT. The ELT can be tethered to a survivor or a life-raft. This type of ELT is intended to aid SAR teams in locating the crash site or survivor(s). (3) Automatic Deployable (ELT(AD)). An ELT that is rigidly attached to the aircraft before the crash and that is automatically ejected, deployed and activated by an impact, and, in some cases, also by hydrostatic sensors. Manual deployment is also provided. This type of ELT should float in water and is intended to aid SAR teams in locating the crash site. (4) Survival ELT (ELT(S)). An ELT that is removable from an aircraft, stowed so as to facilitate its ready use in an emergency, and manually activated by a survivor. An ELT(S) may be activated manually or automatically (e.g. by water activation). It should be designed either to be tethered to a life-raft or a survivor. A water-activated ELT(S) is not an ELT(AP). (…)


text: Annex to ED Decision 2015/003/R

text: Decision 2013/021/R of the Executive Director of the Agency of 23 August 2013 on adopting Acceptable Means of Compliance and Guidance Material for non-commercial operations with complex motor-powered aircraft (Part-NCC).

text: Annex to ED Decision 2015/003/R

text: Annex to ED Decision 2015/003/R

identifier: AMC & GM to Part NCC — Amendment 2

beslut: ED Decision 2015/003/R

title: AMC & GM to Part NCC — Amendment 2

text: Annex to Decision 2015/003/R

text: ‘AMC and GM to Part-NCC — Amendment 2’

text: The Annex to Decision 2013/021/R is hereby amended as follows: The text of the amendment is arranged to show deleted, new or amended text as shown below:

text: 1. deleted text is marked with strike through;

text: 2. new or amended text is highlighted in grey; and

text: 3. an ellipsis (…) indicates that the remaining text is unchanged in front of or following the reflected amendment.

text: A new AMC1 NCC.GEN.119 is inserted as follows:

text: AMC1 NCC.GEN.119 Taxiing of aircraft

text: PROCEDURES FOR TAXIING Procedures for taxiing should include at least the following: (a) application of the sterile flight crew compartment procedures; (b) use of standard radio-telephony (RTF) phraseology; (c) use of lights; (d) measures to enhance the situational awareness of the minimum required flight crew members. The following list of typical items should be adapted by the operator to take into account its operational environment: (1) each flight crew member should have the necessary aerodrome layout charts available; (2) the pilot taxiing the aircraft should announce in advance his/her intentions to the pilot monitoring; (3) all taxi clearances should be heard, and should be understood by each flight crew member; (4) all taxi clearances should be cross-checked against the aerodrome chart and aerodrome surface markings, signs, and lights; (5) an aircraft taxiing on the manoeuvring area should stop and hold at all lighted stop bars, and may proceed further when an explicit clearance to enter or cross the runway has been issued by the aerodrome control tower, and when the stop bar lights are switched off; (6) if the pilot taxiing the aircraft is unsure of his/her position, he/she should stop the aircraft and contact air traffic control;

text: (7) the pilot monitoring should monitor the taxi progress and adherence to the clearances, and should assist the pilot taxiing; (8) any action which may disturb the flight crew from the taxi activity should be avoided or done with the parking brake set (e.g. announcements by public address); (e) subparagraphs (d)(2) and (d)(7) are not applicable to single-pilot operations.

text: A new GM1 NCC.GEN.120 is inserted as follows:

text: GM1 NCC.GEN.120 Taxiing of aeroplanes

text: SAFETY-CRITICAL ACTIVITY (a) Taxiing should be treated as a safety-critical activity due to the risks related to the movement of the aeroplane and the potential for a catastrophic event on the ground. (b) Taxiing is a high-workload phase of flight that requires the full attention of the flight crew.

text: The following amendments are editorial changes to the existing text which are not related to the substantial amendments of this Decision:

text: GM1 NCC.GEN.106(d) is amended as follows:

text: GM1 NCC.GEN.106(d) Pilot-in-command responsibilities and authority

text: MITIGATING MEASURES — FATIGUE — CONTROLLED REST IN THE FLIGHT CREW COMPARTEMENT (…)

text: GM2 NCC.GEN.130 is amended as follows:

text: GM2 CAT.GEN.MPA.140GM2 NCC.GEN.130 Portable electronic devices

text: CREW REST COMPARTMENT, NAVIGATION, TEST ENTITIES AND FIRE CAUSED BY PEDS (…)

text: GM1 NCC.GEN.145(a) is amended as follows:

text: GM1 NCC.GEN.145(a) Preservation, production and use of flight recorder recordings

text: REMOVAL OF RECORDERS AFTER A REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE (...)

text: The order of GM1 NCC.IDE.H.232 and AMC1 NCC.IDE.H.235 is changed as follows:

text: GM1 NCC.IDE.H.232 Helicopters certified for operating on water — Miscellaneous equipment

text: INTERNATIONAL REGULATIONS FOR PREVENTING COLLISIONS AT SEA International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea are those that were published by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) in 1972.

text: AMC1 NCC.IDE.H.235 All helicopters on flight over water — ditching

text: The same considerations of AMC1 NCC.IDE.H.231 should apply in respect of emergency flotation equipment.


identifier: AMC & GM to Part NCC — Amendment 3

beslut: ED Decision 2015/021/R

title: AMC & GM to Part NCC — Amendment 3

text: Annex II to ED Decision 2015/021/R

text: ‘AMC and GM to Part-NCC — Amendment 3’

text: The Annex to Decision 2013/021/R AMC/GM to Annex VI (Part-NCC) to

text: Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012

text: ) is amended as follows: The text of the amendment is arranged to show deleted, new or amended text as shown below:

text: 1. deleted text is marked with strike through;

text: 2. new or amended text is highlighted in grey; and

text: 3. an ellipsis (…) indicates that the remaining text is unchanged in front of or following the reflected amendment.

text: 1. AMC1 NCC.GEN.145(b) has been amended as follows: AMC1 NCC.GEN.145(b) Preservation, production and use of flight recorder recordings OPERATIONAL INSPECTIONS AND CHECKS OF RECORDINGS Whenever a flight recorder is required to be carried, the operator should: (a) the operator should perform an annual inspection of flight data recorder (FDR) recording and cockpit voice recorder (CVR) recording the FDR recording and the CVR recording every year, unless one or more of the following applies: (1) If the flight recorder records on magnetic wire or uses frequency modulation technology, the time interval between two inspections of the recording should not exceed three months. (1) Where two solid-state FDRs both fitted with internal built-in-test equipment sufficient to monitor reception and recording of data share the same acquisition unit, a comprehensive recording inspection need only be performed for one FDR. For the second FDR, checking its internal built-in-test equipment is sufficient. The inspection should be performed alternately such that each FDR is inspected once every other year. (2) If the flight recorder is solid-state and the flight recorder system is fitted with continuous monitoring for proper operation, the time interval between two inspections of the recording may be up to two years. (3) In the case of an aircraft equipped with two solid-state flight data and cockpit voice combination recorders, where (i) the flight recorder systems are fitted with continuous monitoring for proper operation, and (ii) the flight recorders share the same flight data acquisition, a comprehensive inspection of the recording needs only to be performed for one flight recorder position. The inspection of the recordings should be performed alternately so that each flight recorder position is inspected at time intervals not exceeding four years. (2)(4) Where all of the following conditions are met, the FDR recording inspection of FDR recording is not needed: (i) the aircraft flight data are collected in the frame of a flight data monitoring (FDM) programme; (ii) the data acquisition of mandatory flight parameters is the same for the FDR and for the recorder used for the FDM programme; (iii) an inspection similar to the inspection of the FDR recording and covering all mandatory flight parameters is conducted on the FDM data at time intervals not exceeding two years the integrity of all mandatory flight parameters is verified by the FDM programme; and (iv) the FDR is solid-state and the FDR system is fitted with continuous monitoring for proper operation an internal built-in-test equipment sufficient to monitor reception and recording of data. (3) Where two solid-state CVRs are both fitted with internal built-in-test equipment sufficient to monitor reception and recording of data, a comprehensive recording inspection need only to be performed for one CVR. For the second CVR, checking its internal built-in-test equipment is sufficient. The inspection should be performed alternately such that each CVR is inspected once every other year. (b) the operator should perform every 5 five years an inspection of the data link recording. (c) when installed, the aural or visual means for preflight checking the flight recorders for proper operation should be used every day. When no such means is available for a flight recorder, the operator should perform an operational check of this flight recorder at time intervals not exceeding seven calendar days of operation. (c)(d) the operator should check every 5 five years, or in accordance with the recommendations of the sensor manufacturer, that the parameters dedicated to the FDR and not monitored by other means are being recorded within the calibration tolerances and that there is no discrepancy in the engineering conversion routines for these parameters.

text: 2. GM1 NCC.GEN.145(b) has been amended as follows: GM1 NCC.GEN.145(b) Preservation, production and use of flight recorder recordings INSPECTION OF THE FLIGHT RECORDERS RECORDINGS (a) The inspection of the FDR recording usually consists of the following: (1) Making a copy of the complete recording file. (2) Converting the recording to parameters expressed in engineering units in accordance with the documentation required to be held. (2)(3) Examining a whole flight in engineering units to evaluate the validity of all mandatory parameters - this could reveal defects or noise in the measuring and processing chains and indicate necessary maintenance actions. The following should be considered: (i) when applicable, each parameter should be expressed in engineering units and checked for different values of its operational range - for this purpose, some parameters may need to be inspected at different flight phases; and (ii) if the parameter is delivered by a digital data bus and the same data are utilised for the operation of the aircraft, then a reasonableness check may be sufficient; otherwise a correlation check may need to be performed;: (A) a reasonableness check is understood in this context as a subjective, qualitative evaluation, requiring technical judgement, of the recordings from a complete flight; and (B) a correlation check is understood in this context as the process of comparing data recorded by the flight data recorder against the corresponding data derived from flight instruments, indicators or the expected values obtained during specified portion(s) of a flight profile or during ground checks that are conducted for that purpose. (3)(4) Retaining the most recent copy of the complete recording file and the corresponding recording inspection report that includes references to the documentation required to be held. (b) The inspection of the CVR recording usually consists of: (1) checking that the CVR operates correctly for the nominal duration of the recording; (2) examining, where practicable and subject to prior approval by the flight crew, a sample of inflight recording of the CVR for evidence that the signal is acceptable on each channel; and (3) preparing and retaining an inspection report. (…)

text: 3. A new GM2 NCC.GEN.145(b) has been introduced: GM2 NCC.GEN.145(b) PRESERVATION, PRODUCTION AND USE OF FLIGHT RECORDERS RECORDINGS MONITORING AND CHECKING THE PROPER OPERATION OF FLIGHT RECORDERS — EXPLANATION OF TERMS For the understanding of the terms used in AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(b): (a) ‘operational check of the flight recorder’ means a check of the flight recorder for proper operation. It is not a check of the quality of the recording and, therefore, it is not equivalent to an inspection of the recording. This check can be carried out by the flight crew or through a maintenance task. (b) ‘aural or visual means for preflight checking the flight recorders for proper operation’ means an aural or visual means for the flight crew to check before the flight the results of an automatically or manually initiated test of the flight recorders for proper operation. Such a means provides for an operational check that can be performed by the flight crew. (c) ‘flight recorder system’ means the flight recorder, its dedicated sensors and transducers, as well as its dedicated acquisition and processing equipment. (d) ‘continuous monitoring for proper operation’ means for a flight recorder system, a combination of system monitors and built-in test functions which operates continuously in order to detect the following: (1) loss of electrical power to the flight recorder system; (2) failure of the equipment performing acquisition and processing; (3) failure of the recording medium and/or drive mechanism; and (4) failure of the recorder to store the data in the recording medium as shown by checks of the recorded data including, as reasonably practicable for the storage medium concerned, correct correspondence with the input data.

text: 4. AMC1 NCC.IDE.A.160 has been amended as follows: AMC1 NCC.IDE.A.160 Cockpit voice recorder GENERAL (a) The operational performance requirements for cockpit voice recorders (CVRs) should be those laid down in the European Organisation for Civil Aviation Equipment (EUROCAE) Document ED-112 (Minimum Operational Performance Specification for Crash Protected Airborne Recorder Systems), dated March 2003, including aAmendments n°1 and 2, or any later equivalent standard produced by EUROCAE. (b) The operational performance requirements for equipment dedicated to the CVR should be those laid down in the European Organisation for Civil Aviation Equipment (EUROCAE) Document ED-56A (Minimum Operational Performance Requirements For Cockpit Voice Recorder Systems) dated December 1993, or EUROCAE Document ED-112 (Minimum Operational Performance Specification for Crash Protected Airborne Recorder Systems) dated March 2003, including Amendments No°1 and No°2 , or any later equivalent standard produced by EUROCAE.

text: 5. In AMC1 NCC.IDE.A.165, the content of the last row of Table 1 (Parameter No 75) has been deleted from this table and inserted into Table 2, between Parameters Nos 74 and 76.

text: 6. In Table 1 of AMC1 NCC.IDE.A.165, the description of Parameter No 18 has been amended as follows: 18 Primary flight control surface and/or primary flight control pilot input (for aeroplanes with control systems in which movement of a control surface will back drive the pilot’s control, ‘or’ applies. For aeroplanes with control systems in which movement of a control surface will not back drive the pilot’s control, ‘and’ applies. Ffor multiple or split surfaces, a suitable combination of inputs is acceptable in lieu of recording each surface separately. For aeroplanes that have a flight control break-away capability that allows either pilot to operate the controls independently, record both inputs): 18a Pitch axis 18b Roll axis 18c Yaw axis

text: 7. AMC1 NCC.IDE.H.160 has been amended as follows: AMC1 NCC.IDE.H.160 Cockpit voice recorder GENERAL (a) The operational performance requirements for cockpit voice recorders (CVRs) should be those laid down in EUROCAE Document ED-112 (Minimum Operational Performance Specification for Crash Protected Airborne Recorder Systems), dated March 2003, including amendments nNo°1 and No 2, or any later equivalent standard produced by EUROCAE. (b) The operational performance requirements for equipment dedicated to the CVR should be those laid down in the European Organisation for Civil Aviation Equipment (EUROCAE) Document ED-56A (Minimum Operational Performance Requirements For Cockpit Voice Recorder Systems) dated December 1993, or EUROCAE Document ED-112 (Minimum Operational Performance Specification for Crash Protected Airborne Recorder Systems) dated March 2003, including Amendments No°1 and No°2, or any later equivalent standard produced by EUROCAE.


identifier: AMC & GM to Part-NCC — Amendment 4

beslut: ED Decision 2015/030/R

title: AMC & GM to Part-NCC — Amendment 4

text: Annex III to ED Decision 2015/030/R ‘AMC and GM to Part-NCC — Amendment 4’

text: The Annex to Decision 2013/021/R is amended as follows: The text of the amendment is arranged to show deleted text, new or amended text as shown below: (a) deleted text is marked with strikethrough; (b) new or amended text is highlighted in grey; (c) an ellipsis (…) indicates that the remaining text is unchanged in front of or following the reflected amendment.

text: 1. A new GM to sub-paragraph (a)(9) of NCC.GEN.106 is introduced: GM1 NCC.GEN.106(a)(9) Pilot-in-command responsibilities and authority IDENTIFICATION OF THE SEVERITY OF AN OCCURRENCE BY THE PILOT-IN-COMMAND The definitions of an accident and a serious incident as well as examples thereof can be found in

text: Regulation (EU) No 996/2010

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council.

text: 2. A new AMC to sub-paragraph (a) of NCC.GEN.145 is introduced: AMC1 NCC.GEN.145(a) Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection and use PRESERVATION OF RECORDED DATA FOR INVESTIGATION (a) The operator should establish procedures to ensure that flight recorder recordings are preserved for the investigating authority. (b) These procedures should include: (1) instructions for flight crew members to deactivate the flight recorders immediately after completion of the flight and inform relevant personnel that the recording of the flight recorders should be preserved. These instructions should be readily available on board; and (2) instructions to prevent inadvertent reactivation, test, repair or reinstallation of the flight recorders by operator personnel or during maintenance or ground handling activities performed by third parties.

text: 3. GM1 NCC.GEN.145(a) is amended as follows: GM1 NCC.GEN.145(a) Preservation, production and use of flight recorder recordings Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection and use REMOVAL OF RECORDERS IN CASE OF AN INVESTIGATION The need for removal of the recorders from the aircraft is determined by the investigating authority with due regard to the seriousness of an occurrence and the circumstances, including the impact on the operation.

text: 4. AMC1 NCC.GEN.145(b) is amended as follows: AMC1 NCC.GEN.145(b) Preservation, production and use of flight recorder recordings Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection and use

text: 5. GM1 NCC.GEN.145(b) is amended as follows: GM1 NCC.GEN.145(b) Preservation, production and use of flight recorder recordings Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection and use (…) (b) When performing the CVR recording inspection, precautions need to be taken to comply with NCC.GEN.145(f)(1a). The inspection of the CVR recording usually consists of (...)

text: 6. GM2 NCC.GEN.145(b) is amended as follows: GM2 NCC.GEN.145(b) Preservation, production and use of flight recorder recordings Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection and use (…)

text: 7. A new GM3 NCC.GEN.145(b) is introduced: GM3 NCC.GEN.145(b) Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection and use CVR AUDIO QUALITY Examples of CVR audio quality issues and possible causes thereof may be found in the document of the French Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses, titled ‘Study on detection of audio anomalies on CVR recordings’ and dated September 2015 .

text: 8. A new GM to sub-paragraph (a) of NCC.IDE.A.170 is introduced: GM1 NCC.IDE.A.170(a) Data link recording APPLICABILITY OF THE DATA LINK RECORDING REQUIREMENT (a) If it is certain that the aeroplane cannot use data link communication messages for ATS communications corresponding to any application designated by NCC.IDE.A.170(a)(1), then the data link recording requirement does not apply. 1 http://www.bea.aero/en/bea/la-technique/guidance.on.detection.of.audio.anomalies.on.CVR.recordings.pdf (b) Examples where the aeroplane cannot use data link communication messages for ATS communications include but are not limited to the cases where: (1) the aeroplane data link communication capability is disabled permanently and in a way that it cannot be enabled again during the flight; (2) data link communications are not used to support air traffic service (ATS) in the area of operation of the aeroplane; and (3) the aeroplane data link communication equipment cannot communicate with the equipment used by ATS in the area of operation of the aeroplane.

text: 9. A new GM to sub-paragraph (a) of NCC.IDE.H.170 is introduced: GM1 NCC.IDE.H.170(a) Data link recording APPLICABILITY OF THE DATA LINK RECORDING REQUIREMENT (a) If it is certain that the helicopter cannot use data link communication messages for ATS communications corresponding to any application designated by NCC.IDE.H.170(a)(1), then the data link recording requirement does not apply. (b) Examples where the helicopter cannot use data link communication messages for ATS communications include but are not limited to the cases where: (1) the helicopter data link communication capability is disabled permanently and in a way that it cannot be enabled again during the flight; (2) data link communications are not used to support air traffic service (ATS) in the area of operation of the helicopter; and (3) the helicopter data link communication equipment cannot communicate with the equipment used by ATS in the area of operation of the helicopter.


identifier: AMC & GM to Part-NCC — Amendment 5

beslut: ED Decision 2016/017/R

title: AMC & GM to Part-NCC — Amendment 5

text: Annex to ED Decision 2016/017/R

text: Annex to Decision 2016/017/R

text: ‘AMC and GM to Part-NCC — Amendment 5’

text: The Annex to Decision 2013/021/R is hereby amended as follows:

text: The text of the amendment is arranged to show deleted, new or amended text as shown below:

text: 1. deleted text is marked with strike through;

text: 2. new or amended text is highlighted in grey; and

text: 3. an ellipsis (…) indicates that the remaining text is unchanged in front of or following the reflected amendment.

text: 1. The following AMC/GM have been introduced:

text: Subpart A — General requirements

text: AMC1 NCC.GEN.106 Pilot-in-command responsibilities and authority

text: FLIGHT PREPARATION FOR PBN OPERATIONS (a) The flight crew should ensure that RNAV 1, RNAV 2, RNP 1 RNP 2, and RNP APCH routes or procedures to be used for the intended flight, including for any alternate aerodromes, are selectable from the navigation database and are not prohibited by NOTAM. (b) The flight crew should take account of any NOTAMs or operator briefing material that could adversely affect the aircraft system operation along its flight plan including any alternate aerodromes. (c) When PBN relies on GNSS systems for which RAIM is required for integrity, its availability should be verified during the preflight planning. In the event of a predicted continuous loss of fault detection of more than five minutes, the flight planning should be revised to reflect the lack of full PBN capability for that period. (d) For RNP 4 operations with only GNSS sensors, a fault detection and exclusion (FDE) check should be performed. The maximum allowable time for which FDE capability is projected to be unavailable on any one event is 25 minutes. If predictions indicate that the maximum allowable FDE outage will be exceeded, the operation should be rescheduled to a time when FDE is available. (e) For RNAV 10 operations, the flight crew should take account of the RNAV 10 time limit declared for the inertial system, if applicable, considering also the effect of weather conditions that could affect flight duration in RNAV 10 airspace. Where an extension to the time limit is permitted, the flight crew will need to ensure that en route radio facilities are serviceable before departure, and to apply radio updates in accordance with any AFM limitation.

text: Annex to ED Decision 2016/017/R

text: AMC2 NCC.GEN.106 Pilot-in-command responsibilities and authority

text: DATABASE SUITABILITY (a) The flight crew should check that any navigational database required for PBN operations includes the routes and procedures required for the flight. DATABASE CURRENCY (b) The database validity (current AIRAC cycle) should be checked before the flight. (c) Navigation databases should be current for the duration of the flight. If the AIRAC cycle is due to change during flight, the flight crew should follow procedures established by the operator to ensure the accuracy of navigation data, including the suitability of navigation facilities used to define the routes and procedures for the flight. (d) An expired database may only be used if the following conditions are satisfied: (1) the operator has confirmed that the parts of the database which are intended to be used during the flight and any contingencies that are reasonable to expect are not changed in the current version; (2) any NOTAMs associated with the navigational data are taken into account; (3) maps and charts corresponding to those parts of the flight are current and have not been amended since the last cycle; (4) any MEL limitations are observed; and (5) the database has expired by no more than 28 days. …

text: Subpart B — Operational procedures

text: AMC1 NCC.OP.116 Performance-based navigation — aeroplanes and helicopters

text: PBN OPERATIONS For operations where a navigation specification for performance-based navigation (PBN) has been prescribed and no specific approval is required in accordance with SPA.PBN.100, the operator should: (a) establish operating procedures specifying: (1) normal, abnormal and contingency procedures; (2) electronic navigation database management; and (3) relevant entries in the minimum equipment list (MEL); (b) specify the flight crew qualification and proficiency constraints and ensure that the training programme for relevant personnel is consistent with the intended operation; and (c) ensure continued airworthiness of the area navigation system.

text: Annex to ED Decision 2016/017/R

text: AMC2 NCC.OP.116 Performance-based navigation — aeroplanes and helicopters

text: MONITORING AND VERIFICATION (a) Preflight and general considerations (1) At navigation system initialisation, the flight crew should confirm that the navigation database is current and verify that the aircraft position has been entered correctly, if required. (2) The active flight plan, if applicable, should be checked by comparing the charts or other applicable documents with navigation equipment and displays. This includes confirmation of the departing runway and the waypoint sequence, reasonableness of track angles and distances, any altitude or speed constraints, and, where possible, which waypoints are fly-by and which are fly-over. Where relevant, the RF leg arc radii should be confirmed. (3) The flight crew should check that the navigation aids critical to the operation of the intended PBN procedure are available. (4) The flight crew should confirm the navigation aids that should be excluded from the operation, if any. (5) An arrival, approach or departure procedure should not be used if the validity of the procedure in the navigation database has expired. (6) The flight crew should verify that the navigation systems required for the intended operation are operational. (b) Departure (1) Prior to commencing a take-off on a PBN procedure, the flight crew should check that the indicated aircraft position is consistent with the actual aircraft position at the start of the take-off roll (aeroplanes) or lift-off (helicopters). (2) Where GNSS is used, the signal should be acquired before the take-off roll (aeroplanes) or lift-off (helicopters) commences. (3) Unless automatic updating of the actual departure point is provided, the flight crew should ensure initialisation on the runway or FATO by means of a manual runway threshold or intersection update, as applicable. This is to preclude any inappropriate or inadvertent position shift after take-off. (c) Arrival and approach (1) The flight crew should verify that the navigation system is operating correctly and the correct arrival procedure and runway (including any applicable transition) are entered and properly depicted. (2) Any published altitude and speed constraints should be observed. (3) The flight crew should check approach procedures (including alternate aerodromes if needed) as extracted by the system (e.g. CDU flight plan page) or presented graphically on the moving map, in order to confirm the correct loading and the reasonableness of the procedure content.

text: Annex to ED Decision 2016/017/R

text: (4) Prior to commencing the approach operation (before the IAF), the flight crew should verify the correctness of the loaded procedure by comparison with the appropriate approach charts. This check should include: (i) the waypoint sequence; (ii) reasonableness of the tracks and distances of the approach legs and the accuracy of the inbound course; and (iii) the vertical path angle, if applicable. (d) Altimetry settings for RNP APCH operations using Baro VNAV (1) Barometric settings (i) The flight crew should set and confirm the correct altimeter setting and check that the two altimeters provide altitude values that do not differ more than 100 ft at the most at or before the FAF. (ii) The flight crew should fly the procedure with: (A) a current local altimeter setting source available — a remote or regional altimeter setting source should not be used; and (B) the QNH/QFE, as appropriate, set on the aircraft’s altimeters. (2) Temperature compensation (i) For RNP APCH operations to LNAV/VNAV minima using Baro VNAV: (A) the flight crew should not commence the approach when the aerodrome temperature is outside the promulgated aerodrome temperature limits for the procedure unless the area navigation system is equipped with approved temperature compensation for the final approach; (B) when the temperature is within promulgated limits, the flight crew should not make compensation to the altitude at the FAF and DA/H; (C) since only the final approach segment is protected by the promulgated aerodrome temperature limits, the flight crew should consider the effect of temperature on terrain and obstacle clearance in other phases of flight. (ii) For RNP APCH operations to LNAV minima, the flight crew should consider the effect of temperature on terrain and obstacle clearance in all phases of flight, in particular on any step-down fix. (e) Sensor and lateral navigation accuracy selection (1) For multi-sensor systems, the flight crew should verify, prior to approach, that the GNSS sensor is used for position computation. (2) Flight crew of aircraft with RNP input selection capability should confirm that the indicated RNP value is appropriate for the PBN operation.

text: Annex to ED Decision 2016/017/R

text: AMC3 NCC.OP.116 Performance-based navigation — aeroplanes and helicopters

text: MANAGAMENT OF THE NAVIGATION DATABASE (a) For RNAV 1, RNAV 2, RNP 1, RNP 2, and RNP APCH, the flight crew should neither insert nor modify waypoints by manual entry into a procedure (departure, arrival or approach) that has been retrieved from the database. User-defined data may be entered and used for waypoint altitude/speed constraints on a procedure where said constraints are not included in the navigation database coding. (b) For RNP 4 operations, the flight crew should not modify waypoints that have been retrieved from the database. User-defined data (e.g. for flex-track routes) may be entered and used. (c) The lateral and vertical definition of the flight path between the FAF and the missed approach point (MAPt) retrieved from the database should not be revised by the flight crew.

text: AMC4 NCC.OP.116 Performance-based navigation — aeroplanes and helicopters

text: DISPLAYS AND AUTOMATION (a) For RNAV 1, RNP 1, and RNP APCH operations, the flight crew should use a lateral deviation indicator, and where available, flight director and/or autopilot in lateral navigation mode. (b) The appropriate displays should be selected so that the following information can be monitored: (1) the computed desired path; (2) aircraft position relative to the lateral path (cross-track deviation) for FTE monitoring; (3) aircraft position relative to the vertical path (for a 3D operation). (c) The flight crew of an aircraft with a lateral deviation indicator (e.g. CDI) should ensure that lateral deviation indicator scaling (full-scale deflection) is suitable for the navigation accuracy associated with the various segments of the procedure. (d) The flight crew should maintain procedure centrelines unless authorised to deviate by ATC or demanded by emergency conditions. (e) Cross-track error/deviation (the difference between the area-navigation-system-computed path and the aircraft-computed position) should normally be limited to ± ½ time the RNAV/RNP value associated with the procedure. Brief deviations from this standard (e.g. overshoots or undershoots during and immediately after turns) up to a maximum of 1 time the RNAV/RNP value should be allowable. (f) For a 3D approach operation, the flight crew should use a vertical deviation indicator and, where required by AFM limitations, a flight director or autopilot in vertical navigation mode. (g) Deviations below the vertical path should not exceed 75 ft at any time, or half-scale deflection where angular deviation is indicated, and not more than 75 ft above the vertical profile, or half-scale deflection where angular deviation is indicated, at or below 1 000 ft above aerodrome level. The flight crew should execute a missed approach if the vertical deviation exceeds this criterion, unless the flight crew has in sight the visual references required to continue the approach.

text: Annex to ED Decision 2016/017/R

text: AMC5 NCC.OP.116 Performance-based navigation — aeroplanes and helicopters

text: VECTORING AND POSITIONING (a) ATC tactical interventions in the terminal area may include radar headings, ‘direct to’ clearances which bypass the initial legs of an approach procedure, interceptions of an initial or intermediate segments of an approach procedure or the insertion of additional waypoints loaded from the database. (b) In complying with ATC instructions, the flight crew should be aware of the implications for the navigation system. (c) ‘Direct to’ clearances may be accepted to the IF provided that it is clear to the flight crew that the aircraft will be established on the final approach track at least 2 NM before the FAF. (d) ‘Direct to’ clearance to the FAF should not be acceptable. Modifying the procedure to intercept the final approach track prior to the FAF should be acceptable for radar-vectored arrivals or otherwise only with ATC approval. (e) The final approach trajectory should be intercepted no later than the FAF in order for the aircraft to be correctly established on the final approach track before starting the descent (to ensure terrain and obstacle clearance). (f) ‘Direct to’ clearances to a fix that immediately precede an RF leg should not be permitted. (g) For parallel offset operations en route in RNP 4 and A-RNP, transitions to and from the offset track should maintain an intercept angle of no more than 45° unless specified otherwise by ATC.

text: AMC6 NCC.OP.116 Performance-based navigation — aeroplanes and helicopters

text: ALERTING AND ABORT (a) Unless the flight crew has sufficient visual reference to continue the approach operation to a safe landing, an RNP APCH operation should be discontinued if: (1) navigation system failure is annunciated (e.g. warning flag); (2) lateral or vertical deviations exceed the tolerances; (3) loss of the on-board monitoring and alerting system. (b) Discontinuing the approach operation may not be necessary for a multi-sensor navigation system that includes demonstrated RNP capability without GNSS in accordance with the AFM. (c) Where vertical guidance is lost while the aircraft is still above 1 000 ft AGL, the flight crew may decide to continue the approach to LNAV minima, when supported by the navigation system.

text: AMC7 NCC.OP.116 Performance-based navigation — aeroplanes and helicopters

text: CONTINGENCY PROCEDURES (a) The flight crew should make the necessary preparation to revert to a conventional arrival procedure where appropriate. The following conditions should be considered: (1) failure of the navigation system components including navigation sensors, and a failure effecting flight technical error (e.g. failures of the flight director or autopilot); (2) multiple system failures affecting aircraft performance;

text: Annex to ED Decision 2016/017/R

text: (3) coasting on inertial sensors beyond a specified time limit; and (4) RAIM (or equivalent) alert or loss of integrity function. (b) In the event of loss of PBN capability, the flight crew should invoke contingency procedures and navigate using an alternative means of navigation. (c) The flight crew should notify ATC of any problem with PBN capability. (d) In the event of communication failure, the flight crew should continue with the operation in accordance with published lost communication procedures.

text: AMC8 NCC.OP.116 Performance-based navigation — aeroplanes and helicopters

text: RNAV 10 (a) Operating procedures and routes should take account of the RNAV 10 time limit declared for the inertial system, if applicable, considering also the effect of weather conditions that could affect flight duration in RNAV 10 airspace. (b) The operator may extend RNAV 10 inertial navigation time by position updating. The operator should calculate, using statistically-based typical wind scenarios for each planned route, points at which updates can be made, and the points at which further updates will not be possible.

text: GM1 NCC.OP.116 Performance-based navigation — aeroplanes and helicopters

text: DESCRIPTION (a) For both, RNP X and RNAV X designations, the ‘X’ (where stated) refers to the lateral navigation accuracy (total system error) in NM, which is expected to be achieved at least 95 % of the flight time by the population of aircraft operating within the airspace, route or procedure. For RNP APCH and A-RNP, the lateral navigation accuracy depends on the segment. (b) PBN may be required on notified routes, for notified procedures and in notified airspace. RNAV 10 (c) For purposes of consistency with the PBN concept, this Regulation is using the designation ‘RNAV 10’ because this specification does not include on-board performance monitoring and alerting. (d) However, it should be noted that many routes still use the designation ‘RNP 10’ instead of ‘RNAV 10’. ‘RNP 10’ was used as designation before the publication of the fourth edition of ICAO Doc 9613 in 2013. The terms ‘RNP 10’ and ‘RNAV 10’ should be considered equivalent. …

text: AMC1 NCC.OP.153 Destination aerodromes — instrument approach operations

text: PBN OPERATIONS The pilot-in-command should only select an aerodrome as a destination alternate aerodrome if an instrument approach procedure that does not rely on GNSS is available either at that aerodrome or at the destination aerodrome.

text: Annex to ED Decision 2016/017/R

text: GM1 NCC.OP.153 Destination aerodromes — instrument approach operations

text: INTENT OF AMC1 (a) The limitation applies only to destination alternate aerodromes for flights when a destination alternate aerodrome is required. A take-off or en route alternate aerodrome with instrument approach procedures relying on GNSS may be planned without restrictions. A destination aerodrome with all instrument approach procedures relying solely on GNSS may be used without a destination alternate aerodrome if the conditions for a flight without a destination alternate aerodrome are met. (b) The term ‘available’ means that the procedure can be used in the planning stage and complies with planning minima requirements. …

text: Subpart D – Instruments, data and equipment Section 1 – Aeroplanes

text: AMC2 NCC.IDE.A.180 Seats, seat safety belts, restraint systems and child restraint devices

text: UPPER TORSO RESTRAINT SYSTEM (a) An upper torso restraint system, having including a seat belt, two shoulder straps and additional straps is deemed to be compliant with the requirement for restraint systems with two shoulder straps. (b) An upper torso restraint system which restrains permanently the torso of the occupant is deemed to be compliant with the requirement for an upper torso restraint system incorporating a device that will automatically restrain the occupant’s torso in the event of rapid deceleration. (c) The use of the upper torso restraint independently from the use of the seat belt is intended as an option for the comfort of the occupant of the seat in those phases of flight where only the seat belt is required to be fastened. A restraint system including a seat belt and an upper torso restraint that both remain permanently fastened is also acceptable. SAFETY SEAT BELT A safety seat belt with a diagonal shoulder strap (three anchorage points) is deemed to be compliant with the requirement for a safety seat belt (two anchorage points). …

text: GM1 NCC.IDE.A.180 Seats, seat safety belts, restraint systems and child restraint devices

text: EMERGENCY LANDING DYNAMIC CONDITIONS Emergency landing dynamic conditions are defined in 23.562 of CS-23 or equivalent and in 25.562 of CS-25 or equivalent. …

text: Annex to ED Decision 2016/017/R

text: GM1 NCC.IDE.A.250 Navigation equipment

text: AIRCRAFT ELIGIBILITY FOR PBN SPECIFICATION NOT REQUIRING SPECIFIC APPROVAL (a) The performance of the aircraft is usually stated in the AFM. (b) Where such a reference cannot be found in the AFM, other information provided by the aircraft manufacturer as TC holder, the STC holder or the design organisation having a privilege to approve minor changes may be considered. (c) The following documents are considered acceptable sources of information: (1) AFM, supplements thereto, and documents directly referenced in the AFM; (2) FCOM or similar document; (3) Service Bulletin or Service Letter issued by the TC holder or STC holder; (4) approved design data or data issued in support of a design change approval; (5) any other formal document issued by the TC or STC holders stating compliance with PBN specifications, AMC, Advisory Circulars (AC) or similar documents issued by the State of Design; and (6) written evidence obtained from the State of Design. (d) Equipment qualification data, in itself, is not sufficient to assess the PBN capabilities of the aircraft, since the latter depend on installation and integration. (e) As some PBN equipment and installations may have been certified prior to the publication of the PBN Manual and the adoption of its terminology for the navigation specifications, it is not always possible to find a clear statement of aircraft PBN capability in the AFM. However, aircraft eligibility for certain PBN specifications can rely on the aircraft performance certified for PBN procedures and routes prior to the publication of the PBN Manual. (f) Below, various references are listed which may be found in the AFM or other acceptable documents (see listing above) in order to consider the aircraft’s eligibility for a specific PBN specification if the specific term is not used. (g) RNAV 5 (1) If a statement of compliance with any of the following specifications or standards is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above, the aircraft is eligible for RNAV 5 operations. (i) B-RNAV; (ii) RNAV 1; (iii) RNP APCH; (iv) RNP 4; (v) A-RNP; (vi) AMC 20-4; (vii) JAA TEMPORARY GUIDANCE MATERIAL, LEAFLET NO. 2 (TGL 2); (viii) JAA AMJ 20X2;

text: Annex to ED Decision 2016/017/R

text: (ix) FAA AC 20-130A for en route operations; (x) FAA AC 20-138 for en route operations; and (xi) FAA AC 90-96. (h) RNAV 1/RNAV 2 (1) If a statement of compliance with any of the following specifications or standards is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above, the aircraft is eligible for RNAV 1/RNAV 2 operations. (i) RNAV 1; (ii) PRNAV; (iii) US RNAV type A; (iv) FAA AC 20-138 for the appropriate navigation specification; (v) FAA AC 90-100A; (vi) JAA TEMPORARY GUIDANCE MATERIAL, LEAFLET NO. 10 Rev1 (TGL 10); and (vii) FAA AC 90-100. (2) However, if position determination is exclusively computed based on VOR-DME, the aircraft is not eligible for RNAV 1/RNAV 2 operations. (i) RNP 1/RNP 2 continental (1) If a statement of compliance with any of the following specifications or standards is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above, the aircraft is eligible for RNP 1/RNP 2 continental operations. (i) A-RNP; (ii) FAA AC 20-138 for the appropriate navigation specification; and (iii) FAA AC 90-105. (2) Alternatively, if a statement of compliance with any of the following specifications or standards is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above and position determination is primarily based on GNSS, the aircraft is eligible for RNP 1/RNP 2 continental operations. However, in the cases mentioned in: (i) JAA TEMPORARY GUIDANCE MATERIAL, LEAFLET NO. 10 (TGL 10) (any revision); and (ii) FAA AC 90-100, loss of GNSS implies loss of RNP 1/RNP 2 capability. (j) RNP APCH — LNAV minima (1) If a statement of compliance with any of the following specifications or standards is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above, the aircraft is eligible for RNP APCH — LNAV operations. (i) A-RNP; (ii) AMC 20-27;

text: Annex to ED Decision 2016/017/R

text: (iii) AMC 20-28; (iv) FAA AC 20-138 for the appropriate navigation specification; and (v) FAA AC 90-105 for the appropriate navigation specification. (2) Alternatively, if a statement of compliance with RNP 0.3 GNSS approaches in accordance with any of the following specifications or standards is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above, the aircraft is eligible for RNP APCH — LNAV operations. Any limitation such as ‘within the US National Airspace’ may be ignored since RNP APCH procedures are assumed to meet the same ICAO criteria around the world. (i) JAA TEMPORARY GUIDANCE MATERIAL, LEAFLET NO. 3 (TGL 3); (ii) AMC 20-4; (iii) FAA AC 20-130A; and (iv) FAA AC 20-138. (k) RNP APCH — LNAV/VNAV minima (1) If a statement of compliance with any of the following specifications or standards is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above, the aircraft is eligible for RNP APCH — LNAV/VNAV operations. (i) A-RNP; (ii) AMC 20-27 with Baro VNAV; (iii) AMC 20-28; (iv) FAA AC 20-138; and (v) FAA AC 90-105 for the appropriate navigation specification. (2) Alternatively, if a statement of compliance with FAA AC 20-129 is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above, and the aircraft complies with the requirements and limitations of EASA SIB 2014-04 , the aircraft is eligible for RNP APCH — LNAV/VNAV operations. Any limitation such as ‘within the US National Airspace’ may be ignored since RNP APCH procedures are assumed to meet the same ICAO criteria around the world. (l) RNP APCH — LPV minima (1) If a statement of compliance with any of the following specifications or standards is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above, the aircraft is eligible for RNP APCH — LPV operations. (i) AMC 20-28; (ii) FAA AC 20-138 for the appropriate navigation specification; and (iii) FAA AC 90-107. (2) For aircraft that have a TAWS Class A installed and do not provide Mode-5 protection on an LPV approach, the DH is limited to 250 ft.

text: Annex to ED Decision 2016/017/R

text: (m) RNAV 10 (1) If a statement of compliance with any of the following specifications or standards is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above, the aircraft is eligible for RNAV 10 operations. (i) RNP 10; (ii) FAA AC 20-138 for the appropriate navigation specification; (iii) AMC 20-12; (iv) FAA Order 8400.12 (or later revision); and (v) FAA AC 90-105. (n) RNP 4 (1) If a statement of compliance with any of the following specifications or standards is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above, the aircraft is eligible for RNP 4 operations. (i) FAA AC 20-138B or later, for the appropriate navigation specification; (ii) FAA Order 8400.33; and (iii) FAA AC 90-105 for the appropriate navigation specification. (o) RNP 2 oceanic (1) If a statement of compliance with FAA AC 90-105 for the appropriate navigation specification is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above, the aircraft is eligible for RNP 2 oceanic operations. (2) If the aircraft has been assessed eligible for RNP 4, the aircraft is eligible for RNP 2 oceanic. (p) Special features (1) RF in terminal operations (used in RNP 1 and in the initial segment of the RNP APCH) (i) If a statement of demonstrated capability to perform an RF leg, certified in accordance with any of the following specifications or standards, is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above, the aircraft is eligible for RF in terminal operations. (A) AMC 20-26; and (B) FAA AC 20-138B or later. (ii) If there is a reference to RF and a reference to compliance with AC 90-105, then the aircraft is eligible for such operations. (q) Other considerations (1) In all cases, the limitations in the AFM need to be checked, in particular the use of AP or FD which can be required to reduce the FTE primarily for RNP APCH, RNAV 1, and RNP 1. (2) Any limitation such as ‘within the US National Airspace’ may be ignored since RNP APCH procedures are assumed to meet the same ICAO criteria around the world.

text: Annex to ED Decision 2016/017/R

text: GM2 NCC.IDE.A.250 Navigation equipment

text: GENERAL (a) The PBN specifications for which the aircraft complies with the relevant airworthiness criteria are set out in the AFM, together with any limitations to be observed. (b) Because functional and performance requirements are defined for each navigation specification, an aircraft approved for an RNP specification is not automatically approved for all RNAV specifications. Similarly, an aircraft approved for an RNP or RNAV specification having a stringent accuracy requirement (e.g. RNP 0.3 specification) is not automatically approved for a navigation specification having a less stringent accuracy requirement (e.g. RNP 4). RNP 4 (c) For RNP 4, at least two LRNSs, capable of navigating to RNP 4, and listed in the AFM, may be operational at the entry point of the RNP 4 airspace. If an item of equipment required for RNP 4 operations is unserviceable, then the flight crew may consider an alternate route or diversion for repairs. For multisensor systems, the AFM may permit entry if one GNSS sensor is lost after departure, provided one GNSS and one inertial sensor remain available. …

text: Section 2 — Helicopters

text: GM1 NCC.IDE.H.250 Navigation equipment

text: AIRCRAFT ELIGIBILITY FOR PBN SPECIFICATION NOT REQUIRING SPECIFIC APPROVAL (a) The performance of the aircraft is usually stated in the AFM. (b) Where such a reference cannot be found in the AFM, other information provided by the aircraft manufacturer as TC holder, the STC holder or the design organisation having a privilege to approve minor changes may be considered. (c) The following documents are considered acceptable sources of information: (1) AFM, supplements thereto and documents directly referenced in the AFM; (2) FCOM or similar document; (3) Service Bulletin or Service Letter issued by the TC holder or STC holder; (4) approved design data or data issued in support of a design change approval; (5) any other formal document issued by the TC or STC holders stating compliance with PBN specifications, AMC, Advisory Circulars (AC) or similar documents issued by the State of Design; and (6) written evidence obtained from the State of Design. (d) Equipment qualification data, in itself, is not sufficient to assess the PBN capabilities of the aircraft, since the latter depend on installation and integration.

text: Annex to ED Decision 2016/017/R

text: (e) As some PBN equipment and installations may have been certified prior to the publication of the PBN Manual and the adoption of its terminology for the navigation specifications, it is not always possible to find a clear statement of aircraft PBN capability in the AFM. However, aircraft eligibility for certain PBN specifications can rely on the aircraft performance certified for PBN procedures and routes prior to the publication of the PBN Manual. (f) Below, various references are listed which may be found in the AFM or other acceptable documents (see listing above) in order to consider the aircraft’s eligibility for a specific PBN specification if the specific term is not used. (g) RNAV 5 (1) If a statement of compliance with any of the following specifications or standards is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above, the aircraft is eligible for RNAV 5 operations. (i) B-RNAV; (ii) RNAV 1; (iii) RNP APCH; (iv) RNP 4; (v) A-RNP; (vi) AMC 20-4; (vii) JAA TEMPORARY GUIDANCE MATERIAL, LEAFLET NO. 2 (TGL 2); (viii) JAA AMJ 20X2; (ix) FAA AC 20-130A for en route operations; (x) FAA AC 20-138 for en route operations; and (xi) FAA AC 90-96. (h) RNAV 1/RNAV 2 (1) If a statement of compliance with any of the following specifications or standards is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above, the aircraft is eligible for RNAV 1/RNAV 2 operations. (i) RNAV 1; (ii) PRNAV; (iii) US RNAV type A; (iv) FAA AC 20-138 for the appropriate navigation specification; (v) FAA AC 90-100A; (vi) JAA TEMPORARY GUIDANCE MATERIAL, LEAFLET NO. 10 Rev1 (TGL 10); and (vii) FAA AC 90-100. (2) However, if position determination is exclusively computed based on VOR-DME, the aircraft is not eligible for RNAV 1/RNAV 2 operations. (i) RNP 1/RNP 2 continental

text: Annex to ED Decision 2016/017/R

text: (1) If a statement of compliance with any of the following specifications or standards is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above, the aircraft is eligible for RNP 1/RNP 2 continental operations. (i) A-RNP; (ii) FAA AC 20-138 for the appropriate navigation specification; and (iii) FAA AC 90-105. (2) Alternatively, if a statement of compliance with any of the following specifications or standards is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above and position determination is primarily based on GNSS, the aircraft is eligible for RNP 1/RNP 2 continental operations. However, in these cases, loss of GNSS implies loss of RNP 1/RNP 2 capability. (i) JAA TEMPORARY GUIDANCE MATERIAL, LEAFLET NO. 10 (TGL 10) (any revision); and (ii) FAA AC 90-100. (j) RNP APCH — LNAV minima (1) If a statement of compliance with any of the following specifications or standards is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above, the aircraft is eligible for RNP APCH — LNAV operations. (i) A-RNP; (ii) AMC 20-27; (iii) AMC 20-28; (iv) FAA AC 20-138 for the appropriate navigation specification; and (v) FAA AC 90-105 for the appropriate navigation specification. (2) Alternatively, if a statement of compliance with RNP 0.3 GNSS approaches in accordance with any of the following specifications or standards is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above, the aircraft is eligible for RNP APCH — LNAV operations. Any limitation such as ‘within the US National Airspace’ may be ignored since RNP APCH procedures are assumed to meet the same ICAO criteria around the world. (i) JAA TEMPORARY GUIDANCE MATERIAL, LEAFLET NO. 3 (TGL 3); (ii) AMC 20-4; (iii) FAA AC 20-130A; and (iv) FAA AC 20-138. (k) RNP APCH — LNAV/VNAV minima (1) If a statement of compliance with any of the following specifications or standards is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above, the aircraft is eligible for RNP APCH — LNAV/VNAV operations. (i) A-RNP; (ii) AMC 20-27 with Baro VNAV;

text: Annex to ED Decision 2016/017/R

text: (iii) AMC 20-28; (iv) FAA AC 20-138; and (v) FAA AC 90-105 for the appropriate navigation specification. (2) Alternatively, if a statement of compliance with FAA AC 20-129 is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above, and the aircraft complies with the requirements and limitations of EASA SIB 2014-04 , the aircraft is eligible for RNP APCH — LNAV/VNAV operations. Any limitation such as ‘within the US National Airspace’ may be ignored since RNP APCH procedures are assumed to meet the same ICAO criteria around the world. (l) RNP APCH — LPV minima (1) If a statement of compliance with any of the following specifications or standards is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above, the aircraft is eligible for RNP APCH — LPV operations. (i) AMC 20-28; (ii) FAA AC 20-138 for the appropriate navigation specification; and (iii) FAA AC 90-107. (2) For aircraft that have a TAWS Class A installed and do not provide Mode-5 protection on an LPV approach, the DH is limited to 250 ft. (m) RNAV 10 (1) If a statement of compliance with any of the following specifications or standards is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above, the aircraft is eligible for RNAV 10 operations. (i) RNP 10; (ii) FAA AC 20-138 for the appropriate navigation specification; (iii) AMC 20-12; (iv) FAA Order 8400.12 (or later revision); and (v) FAA AC 90-105. (n) RNP 4 (1) If a statement of compliance with any of the following specifications or standards is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above, the aircraft is eligible for RNP 4 operations. (i) FAA AC 20-138B or later, for the appropriate navigation specification; (ii) FAA Order 8400.33; and (iii) FAA AC 90-105 for the appropriate navigation specification. (o) RNP 2 oceanic (1) If a statement of compliance with FAA AC 90-105 for the appropriate navigation specification is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above, the aircraft is eligible for RNP 2 oceanic operations. 2 http://ad.easa.europa.eu/ad/2014-04

text: Annex to ED Decision 2016/017/R

text: GM2 NCC.IDE.H.250 Navigation equipment