text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 2 These Royal Decrees are: (i) the Royal Decree of 18 October 2011 granting a State guarantee covering certain liabilities of Dexia Crédit Local SA; and (ii) the Royal Decree of 19 December 2012 amending the Royal Decree of 18 October 2011 granting a State guarantee covering certain loans granted to Dexia SA and Dexia Crédit Local SA. The ECB opined on an early draft of these decrees in its Opinions

text: and

text: . All ECB Opinions are available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. According to the Explanatory Memorandum, the annulment of these Royal Decrees is currently being sought before the Belgian Administrative Court (Raad van State/Conseil d’État).

text: These include: (i) liabilities entered into by certain supervised institutions, including direct or indirect subsidiaries, or certain claims held by these institutions; (ii) losses incurred on certain assets or financial instruments by certain supervised institutions; and (iii) liabilities entered into by entities whose activity consists of acquiring and managing certain assets held by supervised institutions (respectively,

text: Article 36

text: /24, § 1, 2°, 4° and 5° of the Law of 22 February 1998). 4 New

text: Article 36

text: /24, § 3, of the Law of 22 February 1998, introduced by Article A of the draft law. 6 Article B of the draft law; Explanatory Memorandum.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 15 April 2013 on the framework for State guarantees and on State guarantees for Dexia SA and Dexia Crédit Local SA (CON/2013/27)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 15 April 2013 on the framework for State guarantees and on State guarantees for Dexia SA and Dexia Crédit Local SA (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 9 April 2013, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Nationale Bank van België/Banque Nationale de Belgique (NBB), acting on behalf of the Belgian Ministry of Finance, for an opinion on a draft law amending the Law of 22 February 1998 establishing the Organic Statute of the Nationale Bank van België/Banque Nationale de Belgique (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB was requested to deliver an opinion as a matter of extreme urgency. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Article 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the sixth indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , since the draft law relates to rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The changes introduced by the draft law are twofold: (i) it will introduce a ceiling on the amount in respect of which the King may establish a guarantee of the State by royal decree under

text: Article 36

text: /24 § 1 of the Law of 22 February 1998; and (ii) it will confer statutory law status on the Royal Decrees establishing a State guarantee for Dexia SA and Dexia Crédit Local SA (hereinafter the ‘Royal Decrees establishing a State guarantee for Dexia’) .

text: Article 36

text: /24 § 1 of the Law of 22 February 1998 empowers the King, in the event of a sudden crisis in the financial markets or a serious threat of a systemic crisis, and on the advice of the NBB, to adopt by royal decree certain measures aimed at limiting the scale or the consequences of such crisis. This provision, originally adopted in 2008 by the Belgian legislator, empowers the King to adopt by royal decree derogations to certain specified existing laws, or to establish a framework for establishing a State guarantee covering defined types of liabilities or assets of financial institutions . Under the draft law, the power of the King to establish a guarantee of the Belgian State will be limited to EUR 25 billion in total. This limit applies at group level (i.e. to related institutions within the meaning of the Belgian Companies Code), but not to institutions which are linked as a result of the exercise of control over them by the State. The ceiling only applies to the principal amount of the guarantee, but not the interest and incidental costs beyond that amount, which may also be covered . In addition, the draft law clarifies that subsequent exchange rate developments which would bring the amounts guaranteed above the threshold will not affect the validity of the guarantee. Furthermore, the ceiling applies only to State guarantees established by the King under

text: Article 36

text: /24 § 1 of the Law of 22 February 1998, and is without prejudice to the powers of the Belgian Parliament to establish a guarantee of the Belgian State for a higher amount. 1.3 The draft law will confer statutory law status on the Royal Decrees establishing a State guarantee for Dexia, through a legislative mechanism called ‘ratification’ in Belgian law. Following their ratification by the draft law, the Royal Decrees establishing a State guarantee for Dexia will acquire the same legal status as statutory legislation enacted by Parliament, with effect from their respective dates of entry into force . This ratification will only modify the position of the Royal Decrees establishing a State guarantee for Dexia in the hierarchy of legal acts in the Belgian legal system, and will not affect the substance of these Royal Decrees, whose provisions will remain unchanged.

text: 2. General observation

text: The ECB understands that the draft law aims at reinforcing legal certainty with regard to State guarantees granted by the King in the event of a financial crisis. The ECB generally takes a favourable view of initiatives of national authorities aimed at enhancing legal certainty and financial stability. It is, however, primarily for national authorities to assess the legal soundness of the instruments used to achieve this aim, in the context of their specific domestic constitutional order.

text: 3. Specific observation

text: The Royal Decrees establishing a State guarantee for Dexia will not be subject to the ceiling introduced by the draft law, as they will be given statutory law status. The ECB understands that, in any event, the ceiling to be introduced by the draft law will not apply to State guarantees that have been established prior to its entry into force . From the perspective of legal clarity, the ECB notes that the draft law itself does not specify the date of entry into force of the ceiling and its effect with regard to existing State guarantees.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 15 April 2013.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


publisher: Europeiska centralbanken

sprak: en

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 19 April 2013 on protection from risks and separation of banking businesses (CON/2013/28)

serie: con

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 19 April 2013 on protection from risks and separation of banking businesses (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

type: rubrik

text: On 25 February 2013, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the German Federal Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft law on protection from risks and on the planning of recovery and resolution of credit institutions and financial groups (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third and sixth indents of

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to the Deutsche Bundesbank and contains rules applicable to banks which materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

type: stycke

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The draft law contains rules on the following: (a) recovery plans to be prepared by credit institutions (CIs), and resolution powers, including the drawing up of resolution plans, for the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin), (b) the separation of areas of risk within CIs, and (c) requirements for governing bodies of CIs to safeguard sound risk management, including administrative and criminal sanctions. It supplements the Law on restructuring and the Law on reorganisation of credit institutions . 1.2 With respect to recovery and resolution plans and the BaFin’s powers in this regard, the draft law aims to require systemically relevant CIs and financial groups to plan recovery measures in advance of a crisis. Such CIs and financial groups must provide for various possible courses of action that could be taken in order to stabilise and improve the economic situation of the CI or group in question, thereby securing its ability to survive, without needing to have recourse to public

text: 1 OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: 2 With regard to these laws, the ECB adopted opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. stabilisation measures. Further, the draft law empowers the BaFin to establish an organisationally separate resolution unit within the BaFin itself. Such unit will draw up resolution plans in cooperation with the Bundesbank and the BaFin’s supervisory departments. 1.3 The draft law prohibits specific speculative transactions such as proprietary trading and transactions with hedge funds and alternative investment funds (highly leveraged institutions) in order to separate the areas of risk of CIs or groups with a high level of overall trading activities or where such trading activities account for a relatively large proportion of a CI’s or the group’s balance-sheet total . The draft law contains exceptions for transactions carried out in the form of services for others. Further, the BaFin has the power to prohibit (a) market making activities within the meaning of

text: Regulation (EU) No 236/2012

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2012 on short selling and certain aspects of credit default swaps , and (b) other transactions entailing a comparable level of risk, if such transactions might endanger the solvency of the CI. CIs and financial groups may continue to engage in the above transactions if these have been transferred to a financial trading institution which is economically and legally separate. Such financial trading institution: (a) must be licensed under the Law on banking to carry out the types of transactions in question, (b) will be subject to the supervisory regime under that Law, (c) must be able to refinance itself independently, and (d) must fulfil information requirements vis-à-vis BaFin. The financial trading institution is not permitted to provide payment services. 1.4 In addition, the draft law requires Managing Directors of CIs to safeguard risk management. Compliance therewith will be monitored by the BaFin. The BaFin is also competent to issue instructions. Non-compliance with such instructions may result in administrative fines of up to EUR 200 000 and prosecution under criminal law if, as a consequence, the assets of a company in the financial sector, and thereby financial stability, are endangered.

text: 2. Instruments for recovery and resolution planning

text: 2.1 The ECB welcomes the draft law as it strengthens the tools and procedures available to the national authorities for planning the recovery and resolution of CIs. In line with the Financial Stability Board’s (FSB) Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions and the European Commission’s proposal for a Directive on the recovery and resolution of credit

text: 3 The draft law considers this to be fulfilled if items in the trading book or available for sale within the meaning of Article 1 of the Annex to

text: Commission Regulation (EC) No 1126/2008 of 3 November 2008

text: adopting certain international accounting standards in accordance with

text: Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council, or items arising from these transactions allocated to the trading stocks and liquidity reserve exceed the value of EUR 100 billion or twenty per cent of the total balance sheet of the CI or group. The twenty per cent value only applies if the balance-sheet of the CI or group reached a minimum of EUR 90 billion on the date of closing of accounts in the preceding three financial years.

text: 4 OJ L 86, 24.3.2012, p. 1.

text: 5 A maximum fine on conviction of EUR 10.8 million or a term of imprisonment of up to five years.

text: 6 Available at FSB’s website at www.financialatabilityboard.org. institutions and investment firms dated 6 June 2012 (hereinafter the ‘BRRD’) , recovery and resolution plans are a key element of preparation for possible crisis scenarios and for taking swift and effective remedial action. The ECB notes that the draft law restricts the requirement to draw up recovery and resolution plans to those institutions which are assessed as ‘potentially systemic’. The ECB is of the view that it is possible to extend this requirement to all CIs, which would have the merit that all CIs would benefit from a clear plan of remedial action to be taken in the event of emerging difficulties and clarity would be provided regarding their resolvability. The existence of such plans for all CIs would also address potential concerns as regards ensuring a level playing field. The ECB understands that the consulting authority may have concerns relating to the proportionality of placing such requirements on CIs which are not systemically important. In this respect, it is important to rigorously assess why no potential threat to the system is expected to derive from an institution’s failure, thus thoroughly demonstrating why recovery and resolution planning is deemed dispensable. 2.2 The draft law empowers the BaFin to assess the recovery and resolution plans and to address eventual shortcomings. The ECB, in line with its general stance , welcomes the proposed provisions involving Deutsche Bundesbank in such assessments while it considers that certain clarifications should be introduced in this respect. It should be clarified that assessments of recovery plans are conducted by the BaFin in agreement with the Deutsche Bundesbank acting in its capacity as a competent authority performing on-going monitoring of banks . Furthermore, it should be clarified that consultation and information sharing with the Deutsche Bundesbank to which BaFin is obliged in connection with its assessments of resolution plans aims at utilising Deutsche Bundesbank’s expertise in the areas of banking supervision and financial stability and that this task is not part of the Deutsche Bundesbank’s competence to perform on-going monitoring of banks. 2.3 The organisationally separate resolution unit created within the BaFin will ensure functional separation and independence vis-à-vis the BaFin’s supervisory tasks. The ECB welcomes that this resolution unit will be responsible for drawing up the resolution plans and conducting a resolvability assessment. For the practical functioning of any resolution, it will be important that the resolution authority has clear ownership of the resolution planning and, in addition, has the power to address impediments to the resolvability, as is the case in the draft law. In particular, the power to reduce the complexity of an institution or group by changing its legal or operational

text: 7 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directives

text: and

text: , Directives

text: and

text: and

text: Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010

text: , COM (2012) 280 final.

text: 8 Opinion

text: , paragraph 4.2, Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1.1, Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1.

text: 10 See Section 7 of the Law on banking. structure is a key tool for achieving resolvability, in line with the FSB Key Attributes and the BRRD. 2.4 The ECB understands that the draft law ensures mutual support and the free exchange of information between the supervisory authority, the new resolution unit, and the Deutsche Bundesbank . Such close cooperation and information exchange will be vitally important for effective supervision as well as resolution . 2.5 The ECB notes that the draft law includes aspects of the recovery and resolution planning provided for in the BRRD. In this context, the ECB understands that the legislator will review the draft law once the BRRD is adopted, in order to ensure full consistency with developments at Union level. In this respect, the ECB also refers to the Recommendations of the European Banking Authority (EBA) on the development of recovery plans (

text: ) dated 23 January 2013, and to the recent consultation initiated by the EBA on proposed technical standards in this respect .

text: 3. Measures relating to the structure of CIs and groups

text: 3.1 This draft law arises in conjunction with the Report of the European Commission’s High-level Expert Group of 2 October 2012 on reforming the structure of the EU banking sector (hereinafter the ‘Liikanen report’) . The Commission will prepare a comprehensive impact assessment of its recommendations in the course of 2013 and will make corresponding legislative proposals as appropriate, to ensure a consistent Union framework. Given that these measures primarily address internationally active CIs, the ECB considers coordination and consistency to be important at Union level in order to avoid regulatory arbitrage and ensure a level playing field. The ECB also notes that, unlike the Liikanen report, the draft law does not provide for the mandatory separation of market making activities. Further, trading assets originated to hedge underlying exposures to clients or used for asset-liability management purposes are permitted within the deposit-taking entity. The draft law further provides for mandatory separation of proprietary trading, highfrequency trading, and credit and guarantee business with highly-leveraged institutions on a secured and unsecured basis, including the prime brokerage business, from the deposit-taking institution (above the thresholds set out in footnote 3 above). 3.2 First, the ECB sees merit in mandatory separation of proprietary trading and other high-risk nonclient related activities as it would, inter alia, further protect depositors from exposure to losses from such high risk activities, reduce complexity and enhance resolvability. However, the ECB

text: 12 See in particular

text: Article 47

text: c (2) and 47 e (1) of the draft law.

text: 13 See also point 3.1 of Opinion

text: of 29 November 2012 on a proposal for a directive establishing a framework for recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms, OJ C 39, 12.2.2013, p. 1.

text: 14 European Banking Authority, Consultation Paper: Draft Regulatory Technical Standards On the content of recovery plans under the draft directive establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms, of 11 March 2013, EBA/CP/2013/01. 15 Available on the European Commission’s website at: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/highlevel_expert_group/report_en.pdf notes that, under the draft law, market making will still be permitted in the deposit-taking entity, though it would be subject to discretionary intervention by the BaFin if risk stemming from such activities was deemed to be too high. As regards the BaFin’s power to prohibit ‘other transactions entailing a comparable level of risk’ , the ECB, while welcoming such power which aims to avoid possible circumventions of the draft law, recommends qualifying this power. This should be done by including, preferably in the law itself, the conditions ensuring compliance with the principles of legal certainty and level playing field or by inserting the requirement that the BaFin (1) specifically lists the types of prohibited transactions and (2) justifies this prohibition with evidence indicating the material similarity of the economic nature of such transactions with the transactions prohibited under the draft law. As regards the scope of mandatory separation, consistency should be ensured at Union level and the ECB encourages the German authorities to contribute to harmonisation in this respect. 3.3 Second, as regards high-frequency trading, as previously highlighted by the ECB , the ECB supports the Commission’s proposal to introduce organisational safeguards for trading venues, such as circuit breakers, minimum tick sizes and maximum ratios of unexecuted orders, in line with international recommendations. Further, all entities engaged in algorithmic trading on a professional basis should be deemed to come within the definition of investment firms and be subject to supervision and monitoring of their activities by competent authorities. In addition, the ECB supports granting competent authorities the power to temporarily prohibit or restrict certain types of financial activity or practices with a view to addressing threats to the orderly functioning of financial markets or to the stability of the whole financial system or part thereof. 3.4 Finally, the ECB notes that the draft law applies to CIs whose trading plus available-for-sale assets exceed EUR 100 billion or 20 % of total assets. The latter is subject to a EUR 90 billion de minimis threshold of total assets. The ECB understands that these thresholds are broadly in line with the proposals under the Liikanen report and are based on accounting concepts for the classification of financial instruments, such as available-for-sale assets. The recognition and measurement of financial instruments under International Financial Reporting Standards, or alternatively, the German Commercial Code , should not be the only basis for separation as it may provide sufficient discretion for CIs to e.g. restructure financial transactions and use the scope provided by accounting rules to circumvent separation rules. The ECB recommends to the German authorities

text: 16 See new paragraph 3 added in section 3 of the the Law on banking by

text: Article 2(3)

text: (b) of the draft law. 17 See Section 54 of the Law on banking pursuant to which breaching the prohibition is subject to criminal sanction. 18 See paragraph 10.1 of Opinion

text: of 22 March 2012 on (i) a proposal for a directive on markets in financial instruments repealing Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council, (ii) a proposal for a regulation on markets in financial instruments and amending Regulation [EMIR] on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories, (iii) a proposal for a directive on criminal sanctions for insider dealing and market manipulation and (iv) a proposal for a regulation on insider dealing and market manipulation (market abuse), OJ C 175, 19.6.2012, p. 11. 19 See

text: Article 2

text: , no. 3 (b) of the draft law, amending Section 3 (2) no. 2 of the Law on banking, referring to Section 340e of the Commercial Code. inserting in the draft law provisions that will counteract potential circumvention of separation rules in that they will grant relevant powers to BaFin or other competent bodies. This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 19 April 2013. [signed] The Vice-President of the ECB Vítor CONSTÂNCIO

type: vagledning

utgivare: ecb


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: Law no 78-17 of 6 January 1978. 3 See paragraph 2.1 of ECB Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: See the ECB’s Convergence Report 2012, p. 25, and paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: . 5 See, for example, paragraph 4 of Opinion

text: . 6 See the letter of the Minister for Economic Affairs and Finance to the President of the ECB, dated 3 April 2013, requesting the opinion of the ECB on the draft law. 7 Available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 8 New Article L. 333-15 of the Consumer Code. 9 Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions, OJ L 177, 30.6.2006, p. 1. 10 See paragraphs 62 and 117 of the report, available on the World Bank’s website at http://web.worldbank.org.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 26 April 2013 on a consumer credit register (CON/2013/29)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 26 April 2013 on a consumer credit register (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 5 April 2013, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Minister for Economic Affairs and Finance for an opinion on a draft law on consumer credit (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to the Banque de France. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The draft law relates to consumer credit and in particular to the setting up of a new consumer credit register called ‘registre national des crédits aux particuliers’ (national register of consumer credit) (hereinafter the ‘Register’) which will be managed by the Banque de France. It aims to prevent natural persons becoming over-indebted and to supply credit institutions with information for assessing the solvency of persons applying for loans. The Register will record loans granted to natural persons for non-professional purposes. Included are consumer credit agreements and loans for house purchases. The Register will also record repayment incidents linked to those loans, as well as information relating to situations of over-indebtedness. 1.2 Under the draft law, credit institutions are required to record relevant information in the Register, and to consult the Register before granting loans. Committees on over-indebtedness and court clerks will be obliged to report to the Banque de France information relating to situations of overindebtedness. 1.3 The draft law also contains rules on maintaining and deleting the information in the Register. The Banque de France and credit institutions will be authorised to collect, use and keep the individual’s national identity number until the loan application has been refused or a unique identifier has been created by the Banque de France for that person. The Banque de France will not be subject to

text: professional confidentiality requirements in respect of circulating information on identifiable persons contained in the Register to the credit institutions as well as to committees on overindebtedness and court clerks. It shall be a criminal offence for the Banque de France, the credit institutions, the committees on over-indebtedness and court clerks to provide to anyone information contained in the Register. Exceptions to this rule are cases where information is provided to interested parties exercising their right to access the information , officials from the Prudential Control Authority, the Banque de France and the National Commission on Computer Technology and Freedom and, where applicable, credit institutions in the Union, other than in France, who receive loan applications from individuals resident in France. 1.4 Collection of the information contained in the Register by any entity other than the Banque de France and those specifically referred to in the draft law is punishable by law. Breach of the obligation to consult the Register and to report the relevant information is also punishable by law. 1.5 The draft law also provides for the abolition of the ‘fichier national des incidents de remboursement des crédits aux particuliers’ (national file of consumer credit repayment incidents), which is managed by the Banque de France and which records information on the opening of and dealing with over-indebtedness files, and on loan repayment incidents. Further provisions deal with deferred entry into force and transitory measures. The Register must be operational on a date specified by decree, and at the latest two years as from its publication.

text: 2. General observations

text: The new consumer credit register will contribute to the improvement of the financial institutions’ credit risk management, as well as risk assessment for the financial sector as a whole. It will also be beneficial for the exercise of prudential supervision by the ‘Autorité de contrôle prudentiel’.

text: 3. Prohibition of monetary financing

text: In the absence of any provision on the financing of the new task entrusted to the Banque de France in the draft law, the ECB underlines the importance of safeguarding compliance with the prohibition of monetary financing laid down in Article 123(1) of the Treaty. The prohibition is designed to prevent central banks from providing overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facility to the public sector, e.g. financing of the public sector’s obligations vis-à-vis third parties. The ECB notes that the new task entrusted to the Banque de France under this amendment is not a central banking task in the French context. Rather, the ECB understands that the new task entrusted to the Banque de France is linked to a State task and is performed in the interests of the French State. Therefore, if the Banque de France is to be entrusted with such a task, it needs to be adequately remunerated in advance, in order to ensure compliance with the monetary financing prohibition .

text: 4. Central bank independence

text: The financing of the operation and maintenance of the Register must comply with the principle of central bank independence, under which a national central bank (NCB) must have sufficient means not only to perform its ESCB-related tasks, but also its national tasks, e.g. financing its administration and own 4 5 operations . As pointed out in previous ECB opinions , when allocating specific non-ESCB related tasks to the NCBs, e.g. tasks in the area of consumer protection, additional human and financial resources must also be allocated for these tasks so that they may be carried out in a manner that will not affect the NCBs’ operational capacity to perform their ESCB-related tasks. These requirements of financial independence would be satisfied if, as indicated by the Minister for Economic Affairs and Finance , the costs of setting up and operating the Register are covered by fees and charges levied on the credit institutions concerned.

text: 5. Information contained in the Register

text: 5.1 The ECB notes that national central credit registers (CCRs) provide useful additional information to supervisory authorities on credit concentration. The information contained in CCRs supports the analytical process, allowing early detection of potentially fragile institutions which are under supervision as set out in the Memorandum of Understanding on the exchange of information among national central credit registers for the purpose of passing it on to reporting institutions (MoU) . 5.2 The draft law contains a general prohibition on the dissemination of data contained in the Register, and provides for a limited number of exceptions. The ECB recommends that the exceptions are expanded to include a general reference to ‘competent authorities’ as defined in Directive

text: relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions , and NCBs operating CCRs, to ensure that such data can be exchanged under the provisions set out in the MoU. This MoU provides a framework for the regular exchange of information among national CCRs and allows reporting institutions to obtain a more complete overview of the indebtedness of a borrower on a cross-border basis. 5.3 The ECB considers that it would be useful to differentiate between the retention of personalised and depersonalised information as recommended by the World Bank in its report entitled ‘General Principles for Credit Reporting’ . Moreover, the ECB recommends that the information contained in the Register should not be immediately deleted after full repayment, as it constitutes positive

text: information on borrowers and their ability and willingness to pay back loans. Such positive information should be kept for a longer period than negative information. This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 26 April 2013. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: Chapter 204 of the Laws of Malta.

text: OJ C 41, 14.2.2012, p. 1.

text: See paragraph 5.1 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 3.1 of Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: Memorandum of Understanding of 25 January 2013 between the Central Bank of Malta and the Malta Financial Services Authority on the setting up of a Joint Financial Stability Board (hereinafter the ‘Memorandum of Understanding’).

text: See paragraph 4 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 3.2 of Opinion

text: See paragraph 5.3 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 4.1 of Opinion

text: See paragraphs 9 and 10 of the Memorandum of Understanding.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 30 April 2013 on macro-prudential policy (CON/2013/30)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 30 April 2013 on macro-prudential policy (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 26 March 2013, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Governor of the Central Bank of Malta (CBM) for an opinion on the draft Central Bank of Malta Directive No 11 on macro-prudential policy (hereinafter the ‘draft directive’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third indent of

text: on the consultation of the ECB by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft directive relates to the CBM. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the ECB, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft CBM Directive

text: 1.1 The Central Bank of Malta Act , by virtue of

text: article 5(1)

text: and (3), empowers the CBM to issue directives as may be required to implement the provisions of the Central Bank of Malta Act. The draft directive implements Recommendation

text: of the European Systemic Risk Board of 22 December 2011 on the macro-prudential mandate of national authorities . More specifically, the draft directive implements Recommendation A1 on the ultimate objective of macro-prudential policy and Recommendation C4 on macro-prudential instruments. 1.2 The draft directive will constitute a legally binding instrument. It is expected to be published by the end of June 2013 and to enter into force shortly thereafter.

text: 2. Specific observations

text: 2.1 The ECB supports the effective design of macro-prudential policy frameworks within the Member States, in line with the guiding principles expressed in Recommendation

text: . Moreover, the ECB considers that the ECB and national central banks should play a leading role in macro-

text: prudential oversight, given their expertise and existing responsibilities in the area of financial stability . 2.2 In the light of the above, the ECB welcomes the arrangement under which the CBM is the national authority responsible for the conduct of macro-prudential policies, acting in cooperation with other authorities whose actions have a material impact on financial stability, in particular, the Malta Financial Services Authority (MFSA). The ECB understands that the relevant arrangements in this respect are implemented through a Memorandum of Understanding . 2.3 At the same time, the ECB notes that performance by the CBM of macro-prudential tasks should not affect: (a) the CBM’s institutional, functional and financial independence; or (b) the performance by the European System of Central Banks of its tasks under the Treaty and the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank . Moreover, the CBM in its capacity as a macro-prudential authority should be expressly mandated to cooperate with the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and, where needed, with the macro-prudential authorities of the other Member States, in particular with regard to the exchange of information . The ECB understands that an express stipulation to this effect is included in the Memorandum of Understanding . 2.4 The ECB welcomes that paragraph 6(a) to (c) of the draft directive, grouping the macro-prudential instruments by reference to their intermediate objectives, is aligned with the direction of on-going analytical work by the ESRB. 2.5 This opinion does not prejudice the conclusions of the follow-up assessment of the above mentioned recommendations which the ESRB will issue in accordance with

text: Article 17 of Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 on European Union macro-prudential oversight of the financial system and establishing a European Systemic Risk Board .

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 30 April 2013. [signed]

text: The Vice-President of the ECB

text: Vítor CONSTÂNCIO


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 2 Law 312/2004 on the Statute of Banca Naţională a României, Monitorul Oficial al României, Part I No 582, 30 June 2004. 3 Organic laws are laws which are adopted by the Romanian Parliament in areas of high importance for the functioning of the State and they cannot be subject to legislative delegation to the Romanian Government. Organic laws are adopted by a majority of both Chambers of Parliament.

text: See the ECB’s Convergence Report, 2012, p. 253. 5 See the ECB’s Convergence Report, 2012, p. 32. 6 See the ECB’s Convergence Report, 2012, p. 32. 7 See paragraph 3 of Opinion

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 7 May 2013 on strengthening Banca Naţională a României’s institutional role and independence (CON/2013/31)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 7 May 2013 on strengthening Banca Naţională a României’s institutional role and independence (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 18 April 2013, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from Banca Naţională a României (BNR) for an opinion on draft amendments to the Romanian Constitution concerning BNR (hereinafter the ‘draft amendments’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the first and third indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft amendments relate to currency matters and the national central bank. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft amendments

text: BNR has prepared a set of proposals in the context of the revision of the Romanian Constitution. For institutional and functional stability purposes, the Statute of Banca Naţională a României (hereinafter the ‘Statute of BNR’) will be included in the category of organic laws and BNR’s institutional role and independence will be enshrined in the Constitution. Furthermore, the draft amendments aim to ensure the flexibility of the national legislation with regard to further developments at the European level and to the adoption of the euro by providing for the possibility of regulating by organic law the transfer of BNR tasks to the ECB and the introduction of the euro as legal tender.

text: 2. General observations

text: Due to the specific legislative stages in the national Constitution revision process, the consulting authority invokes reasons of extreme urgency and asks the ECB to deliver its opinion by 7 May 2013. The ECB

text: draws the consulting authority’s attention to the second sentence of

text: Article 4 of Decision 98/415/EC

text: pursuant to which the ECB must be consulted ‘at an appropriate stage’ in the legislative process. This implies that the consultation should take place at a point in the legislative process that affords the ECB sufficient time to carefully examine the draft legislative provisions and to adopt its opinion in the required language versions and which also enables the relevant national authorities to take the ECB’s opinion into consideration before the provisions are adopted.

text: 3. Specific observations

text: 3.1 The draft amendments provide that BNR is the central bank of Romania, an independent public institution and a member of the European System of Central Banks, and that its tasks, administration and functioning are regulated by law, in accordance with the treaties Romania has signed. The ECB welcomes the introduction of these provisions in the Romanian Constitution. 3.2 The ECB also welcomes the enhanced institutional and functional stability, as well as legal certainty, provided by the inclusion of the Statute of BNR in the category of organic laws . 3.3 The draft amendments introduce a constitutional provision specifying that an organic law may be used to regulate: (a) the transfer of BNR’s tasks to the ECB (draft

text: Article 137 (4)

text: (a)); and (b) the replacement of the national currency with the euro and the circulation thereof (draft 1 1

text: Article 137 (4)

text: (b)). The ECB notes that the draft

text: Article 137 (4)

text: (a) is not clear as to which tasks are intended to be transferred from BNR to the ECB or when this transfer would take place. The draft

text: Article 137 (4)

text: (a) appears to enable the Parliament to make the legislative adjustments to the Statute of BNR that are specified in the ECB’s Convergence Report and are necessary to ensure full integration of BNR into the Eurosystem . While such adjustments to the Statute of BNR should be adopted as soon as possible, they need only to enter into force on the date Romania adopts the 6 1 euro . The scope of application of a possible organic law in accordance with

text: Article 137 (4)

text: (a) of the draft amendments should therefore be clarified. 3.4 In addition, changes to the draft

text: Article 137 (1)

text: are necessary in order to ensure, upon adoption of the euro by Romania, that the Constitution is compatible with the Treaty and the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter ‘Statute of the ESCB’). The draft

text: Article 137 (1)

text: provides that BNR has the exclusive right to issue currency in the form of banknotes and coins in Romania. This provision is not consistent with the Treaty and the Statute of ESCB as it neither recognises the ECB’s exclusive right to authorise the issue of euro banknotes within the Union nor provides for a plurality of issuers . In order to address this concern, the ECB suggests inserting references to the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB in the draft 1 1

text: Article 137 (1)

text: . In particular,

text: Article 137 (1)

text: should state that BNR shall have the right, in

text: accordance with the Treaty, to issue currency in the form of banknotes and coins. The ECB notes that such provisions, recognising that the ECB has the right to authorise the issue of euro banknotes and to approve the volume of issuance of euro coins, and that the ECB and the national central banks of the Member States whose currency is the euro may issue euro banknotes, should enter into force on the date on which Romania adopts the euro.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 7 May 2013.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: COM(2013) 45 final.

text: COM(2013) 44 final.

text: International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation — the FATF Recommendations, Paris, 16 februari 2012, finns på FATF:s webbplats http://www.fatf-gafi.org

text: EUT L 309, 25.11.2005, s. 15.

text: Kommissionens direktiv

text: av den 1 augusti 2006 om tillämpningsföreskrifter för

text: med avseende på definitionen av person i politiskt utsatt ställning, samt tekniska kriterier för att kunna tillämpa lägre krav på kundkontroll och göra undantag på grund av finansiell verksamhet som drivs tillfälligt eller i mycket begränsad omfattning (EUT L 214, 4.8.2006, s. 29).

text: Enligt direktivförslaget ska ansvariga enheter bland annat utföra kundkontroll, föra register, genomföra interna kontroller samt lämna rapporter om misstänkta transaktioner med avseende på penningtvätt och finansiering av terrorism.

text: Se kapitel II avsnitt 1 och 2 artiklarna 9–15 i direktivförslaget.

text: Exempelvis kunder som är reglerade företag, t.ex. kredit- och finansinstitut som är etablerade i unionen samt företag som är noterade på reglerade offentliga värdepappersmarknader.

text: Se artikel 2.1 i direktivförslaget där det anges vilka ansvariga enheter som direktivförslaget ska omfatta, och då framför allt kredit- och finansinstitut, enligt närmare definition.

text: De europeiska tillsynsmyndigheterna omfattar Europeiska bankmyndigheten (EBA), Europeiska försäkrings- och tjänstepensionsmyndigheten (Eiopa) och Europeiska värdepappers- och marknadsmyndigheten (Esma).

text: Se artiklarna 16–23 i direktivförslaget.

text: Se definitionerna i

text: artikel 3.7

text: samt skyldigheterna för dessa personer enligt

text: artikel 11

text: och artiklarna 18–22 i direktivförslaget.

text: Se artikel 3.7 b i direktivförslaget. Med inhemsk avses i detta sammanhang att personen i politiskt utsatt ställning har anförtrotts viktiga offentliga funktioner av en av unionens medlemsstater och med utländsk att personen i politiskt utsatt ställning har anförtrotts sådana funktioner av ett tredjeland.

text: Se artiklarna 3.5, 29 och 30 i direktivförslaget.

text: Förslaget till förordning kommer att upphäva

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning (EG) nr 1781/2006 av den 15 november 2006

text: om information om betalaren som skall åtfölja överföringar av medel (EUT L 345, 8.12.2006, s. 1).

text: I huvudsak FATF-rekommendation 16 om ökad transparens för gränsöverskridande elektroniska överföringar.

text: Se artikel 7 i förslaget till förordning.

text: Se artikel 5 i direktivförslaget där det föreskrivs att medlemsstaterna får införa eller behålla strängare regler på det område som omfattas av direktivförslaget för att förebygga penningtvätt och finansiering av terrorism.

text: Se artikel 10 c i direktivförslaget.

text: Se

text: rådets förordning (EU) nr 267/2012 av den 23 mars 2012

text: om restriktiva åtgärder mot Iran och om upphävande av förordning

text: (EU) nr 961/2010

text: (EUT L 88, 24.3.2012, s. 1).

text: EUT L 319, 5.12.2007, s. 1.

text: EUT L 266, 9.10.2009, s. 11.

text: EUT L 94, 30.3.2012, s. 22.

sprak: sv

title: Europeiska centralbankens yttrande av den 17 maj 2013 om ett direktivförslag om förhindrande av att det finansiella systemet används för penningtvätt och finansiering av terrorism samt ett förslag till förordning om uppgifter som ska åtfölja överföringar av medel (CON/2013/32)

text: Inledning och rättslig grund

text: Den 27 februari 2013 mottog Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) en begäran från Europeiska unionens råd om ett yttrande över ett förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv om förhindrande av att det finansiella systemet används för penningtvätt och finansiering av terrorism (nedan kallat direktivförslaget). Den 28 februari 2013 mottog ECB ännu en begäran från rådet, denna gång om ett yttrande över ett förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning om uppgifter som ska åtfölja överföringar av medel (nedan kallat förslaget till förordning) (nedan tillsammans kallade förslagen till unionsinstrument). ECB mottog även en begäran från Europaparlamentet om ett yttrande över förslagen till unionsinstrument, den 2 april 2013 över direktivförslaget respektive den 3 april 2013 över förslaget till förordning.

text: ECB:s behörighet att avge ett yttrande grundas på artiklarna

text: och

text: i fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt eftersom förslagen till unionsinstrument innehåller bestämmelser som faller inom ECB:s behörighetsområde. Utöver detta grundas ECB:s behörighet att avge ett yttrande på artiklarna 127.2, 127.5 och 128.1 i fördraget samt på artiklarna

text: och

text: i stadgan för Europeiska centralbankssystemet och Europeiska centralbanken, eftersom förslagen till unionsinstrument innehåller bestämmelser som berör vissa av Europeiska centralbankssystemets uppgifter. I enlighet med artikel 17.5 första meningen i arbetsordningen för Europeiska centralbanken har detta yttrande därför antagits av ECB-rådet.

text: 1. Förslagen till unionsinstrument – syfte och innehåll

text: 1.1 Direktivförslaget

text: Direktivförslaget syftar till att uppdatera och ändra unionens regelverk för att bekämpa penningtvätt och förhindra finansiering av terrorism med avseende på de revideringar som nyligen har gjorts av tillämpliga internationella standarder, nämligen rekommendationerna från arbetsgruppen för finansiella åtgärder (Financial Action Task Force, FATF), som antogs i februari 2012, samt med avseende på ett flertal rapporter och bedömningar från Europeiska kommissionen i fråga om tillämpningen av

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 2005/60/EG av den 26 oktober 2005

text: om åtgärder för att förhindra att det finansiella systemet används för penningtvätt och finansiering av terrorism. När direktivförslaget har antagits kommer det att upphäva och ersätta direktiv

text: och

text: kommissionens direktiv 2006/70/EG av den 1 augusti 2006

text: om tillämpningsföreskrifter för direktiv

text: I direktivförslaget tillämpas en mer riskbaserad metod i fråga om åtgärder för att bekämpa penningtvätt och finansiering av terrorism. Genom förslaget stärks kraven på kundkontroll så att vissa kategorier av kunder och transaktioner inte längre undantas från de krav som gäller för förenklad kundkontroll och så att de ansvariga enheterna i fortsättningen måste bedöma risknivån innan de beslutar om en kundkontroll ska utföras eller ej. Inom två år efter det att direktivförslaget har trätt i kraft ska de europeiska tillsynsmyndigheterna också lämna ett gemensamt yttrande om riskerna för att penningtvätt och finansiering av terrorism påverkar den inre marknaden, medan medlemsstaterna ska utarbeta och underhålla uppdaterade nationella riskbedömningar för att kartlägga de områden där det behövs en förbättrad kundkontroll. Genom direktivförslaget utökas också tillämpningsområdet för unionens regelverk för att bekämpa penningtvätt, framför allt genom att tröskelvärdet för handlares kontantbetalningar från kunder i fråga om mycket värdefulla varor sänks från 15000 EUR till 7500 EUR.

text: Genom direktivförslaget höjs nivån på den kundkontroll som ska utföras i fråga om personer i politiskt utsatt ställning, framför allt genom att det ställs krav på att det ska utföras en förbättrad kundkontroll av dessa personer och av deras familjemedlemmar och medarbetare. Personer i politiskt utsatt ställning ska nu inte omfatta enbart utländska personer utan även inhemska personer med viktiga offentliga funktioner.

text: I direktivförslaget föreskrivs skärpta och mer väldefinierade regler och förfaranden för att identifiera de faktiska ägarna till företagsenheter eller andra juridiska enheter och stiftelser, även om definitionen av faktiskt ägande förblir oförändrad. Utöver detta kommer det att krävas att företagsenheter eller andra juridiska enheter och stiftelser ska föra register över de faktiska ägarnas identitet. Genom direktivförslaget införs också vissa förändringar i kraven på registerhållning när det gäller kundkontroll och transaktioner samt de ansvariga enheternas interna politik och interna förfaranden, i en strävan att uppnå en balans mellan att å ena sidan underlätta stabila kontroller för att bekämpa penningtvätt och finansiering av terrorism och å andra sidan iaktta dataskyddslagstiftningens principer och de registrerades rättigheter.

text: Genom direktivförslaget stärks också samarbetet mellan medlemsstaternas finansunderrättelseenheter som har till uppgift att fungera som nationella kontaktpunkter för att motta, analysera och till behöriga myndigheter sprida rapporter om misstänkt penningtvätt eller finansiering av terrorism.

text: I direktivförslaget läggs det slutligen också större vikt vid lagföring och påföljder än i tidigare direktiv. Medlemsstaterna ska se till att företag kan hållas ansvariga för överträdelser av regler om penningtvätt och finansiering av terrorism, och de behöriga myndigheterna får vidta lämpliga åtgärder och administrativa påföljder vid sådana överträdelser. Vilka typer av administrativa påföljder som kan tillämpas fastställs i direktivförslaget.

text: 1.2 Förslaget till förordning

text: Förslaget till förordning är nära kopplat till att direktivförslagets mål uppnås. Det är av största vikt att finansinstituten rapporterar adekvata, korrekta och aktuella uppgifter om de överföringar av medel som de genomför för sina kunders räkning, så att de behöriga myndigheterna kan bekämpa penningtvätt och finansiering av terrorism på ett effektivt sätt.

text: Förslaget till förordning syftar till att skärpa de nuvarande rättsliga skyldigheterna med avseende på penningtvätt och finansiering av terrorism när det gäller överföringar av medel och betalningsleverantörer med tanke på de internationella standarder som nu är under utveckling. Syftet är framför allt att förbättra spårbarheten för betalningar genom att införa krav på att betalningsleverantörerna ska se till att överföringar av medel åtföljs av uppgifter även om betalningsmottagaren till de berörda myndigheterna. Det ska därför införas ett krav på att betalningsleverantörer ska genomföra en identitetskontroll av betalningsmottagare med ursprung utanför unionen för belopp över 1000 EUR. Detta kommer att innebära att betalningsleverantörer ska inrätta riskbaserade förfaranden för att avgöra när de ska verkställa, avvisa eller avbryta överföringar av medel samt att de ska registerhålla uppgifter om betalningar i fem år. I förslaget till förordning klargörs också att dessa krav ska omfatta kredit- och betalkort, mobiltelefoner och annan elektronisk utrustning, om de används för att överföra medel.

text: 2. Allmänna kommentarer

text: ECB välkomnar förslagen till unionsinstrument. ECB är mycket positiv till ett EU-regelverk som säkerställer att medlemsstaternas och unionens inhemska institut har effektiva verktyg för att bekämpa penningtvätt och finansiering av terrorism, och framför allt för att förhindra att det finansiella systemet missbrukas av personer som tvättar pengar eller finansierar terrorism och av deras medbrottslingar. ECB anser att förslagen till unionsinstrument på ett korrekt och effektivt sätt åtgärdar de konstaterade bristerna i unionens nuvarande regelverk samt uppdaterar detta med hänsyn till de hot mot unionen och dess finansiella system som har konstaterats uppstå till följd av penningtvätt och finansiering av terrorism samt med hänsyn till de framväxande internationella standarderna för hur dessa hot ska hanteras. ECB anser också att förslagen till unionsinstrument kommer att leda till att de tillämpliga reglerna för medlemsstaterna blir tydligare och mer överensstämmande, t.ex. inom viktiga områden som kundkontroll och faktiskt ägande.

text: 3. Specifika kommentarer

text: När det gäller direktivförslaget noterar ECB att den rättsliga grunden är artikel 114 i fördraget och att förslagets syfte följaktligen är att tillnärma de relevanta nationella bestämmelserna samt att minimera inkonsekvenser mellan unionens medlemsstater. Medlemsstaterna får därför besluta att ytterligare sänka de tröskelvärden som anges i direktivförslaget när det gäller tillämpningen av deras skyldigheter eller att vidta ännu strängare åtgärder. När det gäller t.ex. transaktioner som uppgår till minst 7500 EUR mellan handlare med mycket värdefulla varor och icke-företagskunder, förefaller det som om artikel 5 i direktivförslaget skulle innebära att medlemsstaterna kan välja att vidta ännu strängare åtgärder än att bara kräva att handlaren ska fullgöra sina skyldigheter när det gäller kundkontroll, rapportering och andra relevanta skyldigheter enligt direktivförslaget. Varje sådan åtgärd bör noggrant vägas mot den förväntade offentliga nyttan.

text: ECB noterar visserligen definitionen av betalningsleverantör i artikel 2.5 i förslaget till förordning, men noterar även att enligt skäl 8 i förslaget till förordning och skäl 35 i direktivförslaget är det inte unionslagstiftarnas avsikt att inbegripa personer som enbart tillhandahåller kredit- eller finansinstitut meddelanden om överföring av tillgångar eller andra former av stödsystem för detta ändamål eller clearing- och avvecklingssystem, exempelvis TARGET2-systemet som drivs av ECB, i förordningens tillämpningsområde. ECB stöder detta synsätt och understryker hur viktigt det är att bibehålla detta undantag för att fortsatt väl fungerande betalningssystem ska kunna upprätthållas i Europa. Att införa ett sådant krav på leverantörer av clearing- och avvecklingssystem skulle kunna leda till stora problem och förseningar när det gäller hanteringen av betalningar mellan banker och andra betalningsleverantörer. Detta skulle i sin tur kunna få allvarliga konsekvenser för bankernas likviditetsplanering och i sista hand även för finansmarknadernas smidiga funktion. Av detta skäl samt för att garantera rättssäkerhet och transparens rekommenderar ECB att detta undantag anges i artikeldelen i förslagen till unionsinstrument och inte i skälen. Dessutom bör det noggrant övervägas om andra relaterade unionsrättsakter där samma metod och formulering nu tillämpas för denna typ av undantag bör följa denna rekommendation.

text: Vidare noterar ECB att flera av de begrepp som definieras i artikel 2 i förslaget till förordning även definieras i andra unionsrättsakter som har ett nära samband med förslaget till förordning, t.ex.

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 2007/64/EG av den 13 november 2007

text: om betaltjänster på den inre marknaden och om ändring av direktiven

text: och

text: samt upphävande av direktiv

text: (nedan kallat betaltjänstdirektivet),

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning (EG) nr 924/2009 av den 16 september 2009

text: om gränsöverskridande betalningar i gemenskapen och om upphävande av förordning

text: (EG) nr 2560/2001

text: och

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning (EU) nr 260/2012 av den 14 mars 2012

text: om antagande av tekniska och affärsmässiga krav för betalningar och autogireringar i euro och om ändring av förordning

text: (EG) nr 924/2009

text: . Eftersom det skulle leda till ökad överensstämmelse och underlätta förståelsen av unionsrättsakterna i deras helhet om de fastställda definitionerna används, föreslår ECB att artikel 2 i förslaget till förordningen ändras där så är lämpligt, dvs. i följande fall:

punkt: a

text: Definitionerna av betalare och betalningsmottagare bör anpassas till definitionerna av dessa begrepp i betaltjänstdirektivet.

punkt: b

text: Betalningsleverantör är ett begrepp som upprättas genom betaltjänstdirektivet och där begränsas till sex olika kategorier av leverantörer av de tjänster som anges i betaltjänstdirektivet. I förslaget till förordning bör därför definitionen av detta begrepp innehålla en hänvisning till betaltjänstdirektivet.

punkt: c

text: I definitionen av överföring av medel från person till person bör det klargöras att det rör sig om en transaktion mellan två fysiska personer, som båda agerar i egenskap av privatpersoner utanför sin företags-, affärs- eller yrkesverksamhet.

text: Detta yttrande kommer att offentliggöras på ECB:s webbplats.


text: Law 1/2013 entered into force on the date of its publication in the Boletín Oficial del Estado No 116 of 15 May 2013. 2 OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 3 Under the draft law, the Banco de España has powers to verify the independence of valuation agencies and services and if necessary to impose sanctions.

text: Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993

text: on unfair terms in consumer contracts (OJ L 95, 21.4.1993, p. 29). 5 Judgment of 14 March 2013 in

text: Case C-415/11

text: , Mohamed Aziz v Catalunyacaixa . 6 See the European Commission proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on credit agreements relating to residential property, (COM/2011/0142 final), and the accompanying Commission Staff working paper on ‘National measures and practices to avoid foreclosure procedures for residential mortgage loans’ of 31 March 2011, (SEC(2011) 357 final). 7 See paragraphs 2.1 and 2.3 of Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 22 May 2013 on mortgagor protection (CON/2013/33)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 22 May 2013 on mortgagor protection (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 30 April 2013, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Spanish Secretary of State for Economic Affairs and Business Support for an opinion on a draft law on mortgagor protection, debt restructuring and social housing (hereinafter the ‘draft law’), which was enacted by the Spanish Parliament on 8 May as Law 1/2013 . The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third and sixth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to the Banco de España and to rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: The purpose of the draft law is to improve the functioning of the mortgage market by reinforcing the independence of valuation agencies and services , introducing a maximum 30-year repayment period for mortgage loans on principal residences if used for securitisation purposes, and improving transparency with regard to mortgage loans by requiring a mortgagor’s statement that they have been warned of potential mortgage loan risks. In addition, under the draft law foreclosure proceedings may only begin once the borrower has been in default for a minimum of three months. Moreover, the courts or the parties may challenge the foreclosure proceedings based on unfair terms in the mortgage contract. The latter amendment has been introduced to

text: bring the Spanish implementation of

text: Council Directive 93/13/EEC

text: into line with a recent European Court of Justice judgment . The draft law is also aimed at protecting principal residence mortgagors by limiting default interest and introducing deductions for early repayment of their remaining debt following foreclosure. For principal residence mortgagors in particularly vulnerable situations as defined in the draft law, the draft law provides for a two-year moratorium on evictions and, in line with the Code of Good Practices that credit institutions may voluntarily adhere to, debt restructuring and reduction measures or, should these fail, delivery of the property in lieu of payment. Finally, the draft law requires the Spanish Government to promote the establishment of a social housing fund for the benefit of mortgagors evicted from their principal residences.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 The ECB notes that the European Commission has adopted a proposal for a Directive that aims to promote responsible lending and borrowing and ensure that borrowers are offered affordable loans, thus reducing the need for recourse to foreclosure of properties . The draft law appears to be compatible with this proposal. 2.2 It is primarily for the national legal order to balance the interests of the parties in a default or foreclosure situation as fundamental property rights and other socio-economic interests will be at stake. Also, the ECB considers that the changes to the mortgage and foreclosure legislation envisaged in the draft law should be based on a thorough assessment of their impact on the financial system . In addition, in this context, the Spanish authorities should monitor the effects that the protective measures envisaged for mortgagors could have on provisions and the fulfilment of regulatory capital requirements of credit institutions. 2.3 The ECB nevertheless stresses that foreclosure should be regarded as a last resort. Secured lenders should be interested in avoiding foreclosure proceedings, which are expensive and generally generate lower proceeds than voluntary sales, where the mortgagor continues to meet all or some agreed part of their repayment obligations. It is therefore important: (a) that secured lenders adapt their current practices to deal with defaulting borrowers so as to avoid foreclose proceedings; and (b) that the regulatory framework provides incentives to all parties concerned to agree on a timely and reasonable debt restructuring in the event of a default.

text: 2.4 To this end, a more comprehensive set of measures that addresses the underlying causes of mortgage distress and attempts to avoid, insofar as possible, foreclosure proceedings should be pursued. Only a comprehensive resolution strategy can address the challenges that arise in the face of changed economic circumstances of borrowers, significant changes in property values and the potential for resultant unviable mortgages, whilst maintaining appropriate incentives for both the debtor and creditor, and minimising the potential for moral hazard. Equally, while the establishment of a social housing fund is to be welcomed, this initiative should form part of a comprehensive and unified strategy for dealing with mortgage distress. Such a strategy may ultimately result in fewer foreclosures and a reduced need for a social housing fund.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 22 May 2013.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: Law 3869/2010 on debt arrangements for over-indebted households and other provisions (FEK 130 A/3.8.2010).

text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: Annex V to Law No 4046/2012 on the approval of the draft financing agreements between the European Financial Stability Fund, the Hellenic Republic and the Bank of Greece and of the draft Memorandum of Understanding between the Hellenic Republic, the European Commission and the Bank of Greece and other provisions of utmost importance for reducing the public debt and saving the national economy (FEK A 28/14.12.2012).

text: See ECB Opinions

text: and

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 23 May 2013 on debt arrangements for over-indebted individuals (CON/2013/34)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 23 May 2013 on debt arrangements for over-indebted individuals (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 30 April 2013, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Greek Ministry of Development, Competitiveness, Infrastructure, Transport and Networks for an opinion on draft provisions reforming the framework on debt arrangements for over-indebted individuals (hereinafter the ‘draft provisions’). The draft provisions comprise draft amendments to Law 3869/2010 (hereinafter the ‘draft amendments to Law 3869/2010’) and draft provisions on the establishment of a forbearance scheme aimed at supporting individuals in deep financial distress (hereinafter the ‘draft provisions on the facilitation programme’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Article 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the sixth indent of

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft provisions relate to rules applicable to financial institutions, insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft provisions

text: 1.1 The draft amendments to Law 3869/2010 aim at enhancing the effectiveness of the existing legal framework on debt arrangements for over-indebted individuals (hereinafter also referred to as ‘debtors’). To this end, the draft provisions redesign the procedure for debtors to apply for a judicial arrangement in respect of their due debts. The court hearing concerning applications for such arrangements shall take place within six months of the date of submission of the application by the debtor. The application must be accompanied by documentation regarding the applicant’s assets, income and creditors, as well as those creditors’ claims. The creditors shall have the right to access the documentation included in the court file. 1.2 During the two months following the submission of the application for a debt arrangement, debtors and creditors shall be required to negotiate an out-of-court settlement. The settlement shall be

text: concluded upon the approval of a majority of the creditors, and it will then be submitted to the competent court for validation. In the event of failure to conclude an out-of-court settlement on the expiry of the abovementioned two-month period, debtors shall be required to continue servicing their debts under the conditions defined by the competent court, pending a final ruling on the application for a debt arrangement. Under certain circumstances, the court may also grant debtors protection from creditors with regard to enforcement of the latters’ security. Debtors shall be subject to an enhanced duty of disclosure, as penalties for the non-disclosure of other creditors are also laid down. 1.3 The draft provisions on the facilitation programme allow individuals in financial distress to service their loans by paying reduced monthly instalments for a prescribed period of time. The facilitation programme shall apply exclusively to loans which have not fallen due, are secured on residential property and owed to credit institutions, financial institutions and credit companies. 1.4 Those eligible for benefiting from the facilitation programme are individuals whose total household income at the time of submission of the application has fallen by at least 20 % compared with 2009. The draft provisions lay down additional eligibility criteria relating, inter alia, to the value of the debtor’s primary residence and total immovable property, as well as to the total annual household income. Debtors who benefit from the facilitation programme are subject to an ongoing duty of disclosure of their financial status, and failure to comply with that duty results in the debtor’s removal from the scheme.

text: 2. General observations

text: The ECB welcomes the draft provisions, to the extent that they seek to comprehensively amend the framework on debt arrangements for over-indebted individuals currently in force, in line with the objectives outlined in the Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, as applicable from time to time . In relation to the development of the abovementioned framework, the ECB refers to its previous, relevant opinions . Without prejudice to this general observation, the ECB has the following specific observations.

text: 3. Specific observations

text: 3.1 The ECB reiterates that the reform of the framework on debt arrangements for over-indebted individuals should ensure an adequate balance between, on the one hand, observance of the general duty of debtors to meet their payment obligations, which promotes a prompt payment culture, preserves the soundness of Greek credit institutions and prevents moral hazard and, on the other hand, the need to provide assistance to individuals in dire financial situations. In this respect, the

text: proper and swift implementation of the envisaged framework, both by the authorities administering the schemes and by credit institutions and other entities affected by them, is of crucial importance for ensuring the abovementioned balance and thereby preventing serious adverse consequences for banks’ capital and liquidity positions. Proper implementation of the envisaged framework involves, inter alia, devoting sufficient resources and ensuring the establishment of efficient procedures for facilitating the conclusion of out-of-court settlements. 3.2 The ECB welcomes the determination of appropriate time limits for the negotiation of out-of-court settlements and for the hearing of debt arrangement applications, as a means to accelerate the procedure. The ECB understands that the arrangements for debts that have fallen due require proper consideration by the competent courts, as a means to ensure that arrangements are sound and workable. Moreover, the ECB welcomes the reinforcement of the debtors’ duty of disclosure by also laying down penalties for the non-disclosure of other creditors. 3.3 At the same time, there are certain prerequisites which are necessary for the effectiveness of the framework. First, the draft provisions should ensure the proper verification of the documentation to be submitted with the applications for debt arrangements. Second, the draft provisions should emphasise that the granting of debt arrangements shall be subject to the strict observance of the duty of disclosure throughout the entire duration of the arrangement. Third, effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties should be applicable in cases of fraud or gross negligence. Finally, an independent body should regularly assess the efficacy of the facilitation programme and its impact on Greek credit institutions.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 23 May 2013.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: COM(2013) 184 final.

text: EGT L 139, 11.5.1998, s. 6.

text: Yttrande

text: av den 4 mars 2011 om ett förslag till rådets förordning om valörer och tekniska specifikationer för mynt i euro som ska sättas i omlopp (kodifiering) (EUT C 114, 12.4.2011, s. 1). Alla ECB:s yttranden finns på ECB:s webbplats http://www.ecb.europa.eu

title: Europeiska centralbankens yttrande av den 23 maj 2013 om ett förslag till rådets förordning om valörer och tekniska specifikationer för mynt i euro som ska sättas i omlopp (CON/2013/35)

text: Inledning och rättslig grund

text: Den 16 maj 2013 mottog Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) en begäran från Europeiska unionens råd om ett yttrande över ett förslag till rådets förordning om valörer och tekniska specifikationer för mynt i euro som ska sättas i omlopp (nedan kallat förslaget till förordning).

text: ECB:s behörighet att avge ett yttrande grundas på artiklarna 127.4 och 128.2, artikel 133 samt

text: artikel 282.5 i fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt

text: , eftersom förslaget till förordning rör valörer och tekniska specifikationer för mynt i euro. I enlighet med artikel 17.5 första meningen i arbetsordningen för Europeiska centralbanken har detta yttrande antagits av ECB-rådet.

text: Syfte och innehåll

text: Förslaget till förordning återger i stora delar innehållet i

text: rådets förordning (EG) nr 975/98 av den 3 maj 1998

text: om valörer och tekniska specifikationer för mynt i euro som skall sättas i omlopp och inkluderar rekommendationerna från ECB:s yttrande

text: om att ändra

text: artikel 1 i rådets förordning (EG) nr 975/98

text: , bilagan till förordningen samt att stryka skäl 13.

text: Ändringarna ersätter alla nuvarande värden avseende myntens tjocklek i tabellen i

text: med euromyntens verkliga tjocklek. Dessa värden är väl kända och används som referens när myntverken producerar euromynt.

text: Allmänna kommentarer

text: ECB välkomnar kommissionens initiativ att omarbeta

text: rådets förordning (EG) nr 975/98

text: eftersom förslaget till förordning beaktar och inkluderar ECB:s tidigare rekommendationer avseende euromyntens tekniska specifikationer.


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 2 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms (COM(2011) 0452 final). 3 OJ L 177, 30.6.2006, p. 1. 4 Article 4(1) of the CRR provides that: ‘credit institution’ means ‘an undertaking the business of which is to receive deposits or other repayable funds from the public and to grant credits for its own account’.

text: See Article L.511-1 in conjunction with Article L. 311-1 of the French Monetary and Financial Code (MFC). 6 ‘Repayable funds from the public’ are defined in the new proposed Article L 312-2 as ‘funds which an entity accepts from a third party with the right to assign them for its own account subject to its returning them. These funds are received in particular in the form of deposits or through the issuing of debt securities’. 7 Proposed Article L.511-1.-I of the MFC. 8 Proposed Article L.511-1.-II of the MFC. 9 Proposed Article L.515-1 of the MFC. 10 Proposed paragraph 1a of Article L.213-3 of the MFC. th 11 Proposed 9 indent in paragraph A of Article L.612-2.-I of the MFC. 12 Proposed paragraph L.511-10 of the MFC.

text: See for instance Opinion

text: as regards capital requirements for the trading book and for resecuritisations, and the supervisory review of remuneration policies.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 24 May 2013 on the status of credit institutions and the creation of financing companies (CON/2013/36)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 24 May 2013 on the status of credit institutions and the creation of financing companies (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 22 April 2013, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the French Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance for an opinion on a draft ordinance amending the status of credit institutions (hereinafter the ‘draft ordinance’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the sixth indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft ordinance relates to rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft ordinance

text: 1.1 In view of the expected adoption and entry into force of the Regulation on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms (hereinafter the ‘CRR’) , the French government has decided to align the definition of ‘credit institutions’ under national legislation with the Union definition. Pursuant to

text: Article 4(1)

text: (a) of Directive

text: of 14 June 2006 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions , a ‘credit institution’ means ‘an undertaking whose business is to receive deposits or other repayable funds from the public and to grant credits for its own account’. The definition laid down in the CRR contains both elements as well. From a French national law perspective, this requires aligning the definition of credit institution with the Union definition. 1.2 First, under French legislation, ‘credit institutions’ are defined as ‘legal entities having as their customary activity the carrying out of banking transactions’ which ‘comprise the receipt of funds

text: from the public, credit transactions and bank payment services’ . The cumulative character of the criteria, i.e. receiving deposits and granting credits, was transposed as alternatives in the French national legislation. The draft ordinance proposes to redefine credit institutions as ‘legal entities whose business consists of receiving repayable funds from the public and granting loans for their own account’ , with a view to making it clear that both activities are required for an entity to qualify as a ‘credit institution’. 1.3 Second, the draft ordinance creates a new type of financial institution, i.e. the ‘financing company’. Financing companies are defined as ‘legal persons that are not credit institutions whose regular professional activity is to perform credit transactions in accordance with the conditions set out in their authorisation’ . Financing companies will be entitled to grant credit, but will not collect deposits or other repayable funds from the public. The draft ordinance provides that financing companies ‘may provide payment services, issue and manage electronic money and provide investment services on condition that they have obtained the relevant authorisation’ . Financing companies, as well as credit institutions, will be authorised to issue negotiable debt securities under the conditions laid down by the Minister for the Economy, provided that the financial instruments issued are not repayable funds received from the public . 1.4 Finally, the draft ordinance makes reference to the national prudential regime applicable to financing companies. The French supervisory authority (Autorité de contrôle prudentiel) will supervise financing companies . In particular, before starting their activities, financing companies, as well as credit institutions, will have to obtain approval from the French supervisory authority . The draft ordinance is intended to empower the Minister for the Economy to enact implementing decrees under which financing companies will be subject to rules, equivalent to Union requirements for credit institutions, relating to solvency and large exposures. Additionally, the draft ordinance provides that liquidity and leverage requirements of financing companies will be specified in an implementing decree.

text: 2. General observations

text: The ECB welcomes the harmonisation of the definition of credit institution under French law with the Union definition as the adjustments required by the CRR contribute to a more uniform application throughout the Union. This also ensures a level-playing field within the Union. In this context, the ECB

text: would like to highlight the observations made in the context of its Opinions on the proposal for a Directive amending Directive

text: . This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 24 May 2013. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI