text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: OJ L 166, 11.6.1998, p. 45.

text: See the definition of ‘system’ in

text: Article 2

text: (a) of the Settlement Finality Directive.

text: See the current list of designated and notified systems at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/financialmarkets/settlement/dir-98-26-art10-national_en.htm

text: Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993

text: on investment services in the securities field (OJ L 141, 11.6.1993, p. 27).

text: Article 69 of Directive 2004/39/EC

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on markets in financial instruments amending Council Directives

text: and

text: and Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing

text: Council Directive 93/22/EEC

text: (OJ L 145, 30.4.2004, p. 1).

text: See Commission of the European Communities, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive

text: on markets in financial instruments, as regards certain deadlines’ (COM(2005) 253 final, 14.6.2005).

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 16 February 2006 at the request of Lietuvos bankas on a draft law amending the Law on settlement finality in payment and securities settlement systems (CON/2006/5)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 16 February 2006 at the request of Lietuvos bankas on a draft law amending the Law on settlement finality in payment and securities settlement systems (

text: On 16 November 2005 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from Lietuvos bankas for an opinion on a draft law amending the Law on settlement finality in payment and securities settlement systems (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on the fifth indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to payment and settlement systems. Although national authorities are not obliged to consult the ECB on draft legislation transposing Community directives into national law, under Article 25 of the Statute the ECB may offer advice to and be consulted by the competent authorities of the Member States on the scope and implementation of Community legislation relating to the stability of the financial system. This legislation includes Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 1998 on settlement finality in payment and securities settlement systems (hereinafter the ‘Settlement Finality Directive’). In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1 General remarks

text: 1.1 The ECB understands that the main objective of the draft law is to extend the scope of the Law on settlement finality in payment and securities settlement systems (hereinafter the ‘SFD Law’) in order to ensure that bankruptcy and/or suspension of operations of an institution registered in Lithuania do not affect the operation and soundness of a payment or securities settlement system governed by the law of a Member State other than Lithuania. The ECB welcomes the initiative of Lietuvos bankas in addressing this issue, since it is interested in promoting a harmonised EU-wide implementation of the Settlement Finality Directive in Member States, in order to ensure legal

text: certainty for payment and securities settlement systems and a level playing field throughout the Community. 1.2 As a preliminary remark, the ECB suggests that the SFD Law should refer to ‘systems’ in general terms rather than to specific types of systems, to reflect the fact that it aims to protect as wide a range of systems as possible and to minimise systemic risk. More detailed comments regarding this issue are set out in paragraph 2.2.1 of this opinion.

text: 2 Definitions

text: 2.1 Insolvency proceedings The ECB notes that Article 2(13) of the SFD Law defines the suspension of operations as a ‘decision by a court or other authorised institution of the Republic of Lithuania or a Member State relating to the prohibition on a system participant disposing of funds or securities held in a settlement account or the application of temporary judicial protective measures or enforcement measures by the supervisory authority to a system participant resulting in the suspension or limitation of securities transfer orders and/or payment instructions’. The ECB understands that this definition would capture most of the measures resulting in the suspension or limitation of securities transfer orders and/or payment instructions and would be in line with the Settlement Finality Directive. However, Lietuvos bankas may consider using this opportunity to go beyond the minimum scope of protection provided in the Settlement Finality Directive and to expressly provide in the draft law that voluntary winding-ups are also covered by the SFD Law. 2.2 Systems protected by the SFD Law 2.2.1 Article 2(17) of the SFD Law, including the proposed amendments set out in the draft law, limits the definition of systems protected by the SFD Law to payment and securities settlement systems. Although not strictly required by the Settlement Finality Directive, Lietuvos bankas may consider referring to ‘systems’ in the SFD Law in more general terms, i.e. without specifying various types of existing or future systems . In some instances, Member States may see the need to designate a clearing system . 2.2.2 Article 1 of the draft law amends the definition of ‘system’ and provides, inter alia, that Lithuanian law may be chosen as the law governing a system if at least one of the system’s participants has its head office in Lithuania. Article 2(17) of the existing SFD Law only refers to an ‘office’ (buveinė) of a participant in Lithuania. The new wording to be introduced by the draft law is welcome since it more appropriately reflects the wording of the Settlement Finality Directive, which requires that the participants may only choose the law of a Member State in which at least one of them has its ‘head office’.

text: 2.3 Institutions Article 1 of the draft law proposes to include, in the definition of an ‘institution’, legal entities which provide funds transfer services. The ECB notes that

text: Article 2

text: (f) of the Settlement Finality Directive defines a participant as ‘an institution, a central counterparty, a settlement agent or a clearing house’. Moreover,

text: Article 2

text: (b) of the Directive refers to undertakings which can be regarded as institutions, including undertakings which participate in a supervised system executing securities transfers and payments resulting from such orders. The ECB therefore notes that Article 1 of the draft law may be considered as going beyond the provisions of the Settlement Finality Directive and therefore suggests aligning the draft law with

text: Article 2

text: (b) of the Directive. 2.4 Securities The ECB notes that the SFD Law defines ‘securities’ by reference to the Law on the securities market. It is also noted that

text: Article 2

text: (h) of the Settlement Finality Directive defines ‘securities’ as all instruments referred to in Section B of the Annex to the Investment Services Directive . The Investment Services Directive will be repealed by the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive , with effect from 30 April 2006. If the current proposal regarding the deadlines for transposition and application of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive is adopted, this date will be postponed . Under Article 69 of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive, references to terms defined in the Investment Services Directive will henceforth have to be construed as references to equivalent terms defined in the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive. Section C of Annex I to the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive contains a more detailed list of financial instruments than Section B of the Annex to the Investment Services Directive. The ECB therefore draws Lietuvos bankas’s attention to the fact that the reference to the definition of securities in the SFD Law will have to be reviewed in the light of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive.

text: 3 Law governing the rights and obligations of a participant

text: Article 4 of the draft law expressly states that in the event that operations are suspended against a participant in a system governed by the law of another Member State, the law of that Member State governs the participant’s rights and obligations arising from participation in that system. This provision remedies the situation under the existing SFD Law whereby only bankruptcy proceedings are mentioned with respect to participation in a system governed by law of another Member State. The ECB welcomes this amendment.

text: 4 No unwinding of netting or revocation of transfer orders

text: 4.1 Under Article 3(2) of the Settlement Finality Directive, actions relating to underlying transactions may in no way lead to the ‘unwinding of netting’. Furthermore, recital 13 to the Settlement Finality Directive states that, for example, in the event of fraud or technical error, the Directive does not prevent a participant or a third party from exercising any right or claim resulting from the underlying transaction as long as this leads ‘neither to the unwinding of netting nor to the revocation of the transfer order in the system’. In a number of Member States, the laws implementing the Settlement Finality Directive expressly confirm that although the underlying transaction could potentially be challenged in the context of proceedings such as the avoidance of transactions, this would only have an impact on the bilateral relationship between the payer and the payee, not on the system. 4.2 Article 7(5) of the SFD Law states that netting may not be unwound if a transaction concluded before the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings is recognised as void on the grounds defined by the laws regulating the bankruptcy of a system participant. The ECB notes that transactions may also be declared void not only under the laws regulating the bankruptcy of a system participant, but also under other Lithuanian laws, such as the Law on enterprise restructuring or the Civil Code (which refers to actio Pauliana). In addition, transfer orders, including payment orders, should also not be subject to revocation. The ECB suggests clarifying in the SFD Law that, if an underlying transaction is void: (i) netting may not be unwound; (ii) transfer orders, including payment orders, may not be revoked; and (iii) this would only affect the bilateral relationship between the payer and the payee, not the system.

text: 5 Bankruptcy and restructuring laws

text: 5.1 As already mentioned, Article 7 of the Settlement Finality Directive prohibits any insolvency proceedings initiated against a participant from having retroactive effect on the rights and obligations of the participants in a system. The prerogatives in insolvency proceedings of courts, liquidators, administrators and other officials, such as the power to limit the disposition of an insolvent participant’s property, must therefore be limited in order to ensure the enforceability of transfer orders and netting in the system. 5.2 The ECB notes that certain Lithuanian laws, such as the Law on enterprise bankruptcy and the Law on enterprise restructuring, impose certain restrictions on the disposition of an insolvent entity’s property and entitle the administrators to terminate contracts entered into before proceedings are inititated. The ECB notes that the Law on enterprise bankruptcy and the Law on enterprise restructuring are generally regarded as taking priority over other laws. Although the Law on enterprise bankruptcy already provides for exemptions from some of its provisions in cases covered by the SFD Law, the ECB recommends inserting a general provision in both the Law on enterprise

text: bankruptcy and the Law on enterprise restructuring providing that the SFD Law takes priority as far as rights and obligations arising from participation in a system are concerned. This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 16 February 2006. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: Komiteanmietintö 2005:2, Ehdotus uudeksi valmiuslaiksi, Valmiuslakitoimikunnan mietintö, Oikeusministeriö Helsinki 2005. 2 OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 3 Valmiuslaki, 1080/1991 of 22 July 1991.

text: Joined Cases 6 and 11/69, Commission v French Republic, ECR [1969] 523;

text: Case C-285/98

text: , Tanja Kreil v Bundesrepublik Deutschland [2000] ECR I-69, paragraph 16. 5 Article 297 of the Treaty provides for a consultation obligation for the Member States for the exceptional cases where a Member State may be called upon to take measures to protect its national interests. The proceedings set out in Article 298 of the Treaty aim at guaranteeing that

text: Article 297

text: is used in a restrictive way. 6

text: Case C-13/68

text: Salgoil v Italian Ministry of Foreign Trade [1968] ECR 453. 7 Gilsdorfer/Brandtner, ‘Vorbem. zu den Artikeln 296 bis 298 EG’, No 3-5, Bardenhewer-Rating/Grill/Jakob/Woelker, EG- und EU-Kommentar, 6th ed. (2004), p. 1534. 8 See e.g.,

text: Case 804/79

text: Commission v UK, paragraph 30. 9 ‘The exchange rate for the relevant currency applied by Suomen Pankki when exchanging the relevant currency in euro at the time of transfer would be observed’.

text: The Eurosystem’s policy line with regard to consolidation in central counterparty clearing.

text: Section 17 of the draft law provides among others that ‘more detailed provisions on index clauses and other links prohibited in emergency conditions alongside the index clauses or engagements prohibited pursuant to the said Law shall be laid down by Government decree’.

publisher: Europeiska centralbanken

sprak: en

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 16 February 2006 at the request of the Finnish Ministry of Justice on Committee report 2005:2 consisting of a draft Government proposal for a law on emergency powers act and for laws amending certain related Laws (CON/2006/6)

serie: con

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 16 February 2006 at the request of the Finnish Ministry of Justice on Committee report 2005:2 consisting of a draft Government proposal for a law on emergency powers act and for laws amending certain related Laws (

text: ) Background

type: rubrik

text: 1. On 5 January 2006 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Finnish Ministry of Justice for an opinion on a Committee Report (2005:2) ‘Proposal for a new law on emergency powers, Report of the Emergency Powers Act Committee’ containing a draft Government proposal for a law on emergency powers and other laws amending certain related Laws (hereinafter ‘draft law’) and their statement of reasons.

type: stycke

text: 2. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on the first, second, third, fifth and sixth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the legislative proposal contains provisions concerning rules on currency matters, means of payment, national central banks, payment and settlement systems and rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: Description of the draft law

text: 3. According to the draft law’s statement of reasons its main objective is to bring the Emergency Powers Law (hereinafter ‘Law’) into conformity with the Finnish Constitution and to modernise the authorities’ current emergency powers. In particular, a delegation of regulatory powers in emergency conditions as provided for in the Law is not compatible with the Constitution, as according to the latter, emergency powers affecting basic rights may not be delegated in a loose manner. Instead, a rather detailed legal framework to be applied in emergency situations has to be set out in law. It would also be unconstitutional for the Government to simply assume exceptional powers on an ad hoc basis.

text: 4. The draft law defines a limited number of emergency situations in which a Governmental decree can be issued to provide Finnish authorities with certain emergency powers, for a limited period. These emergency situations are: • an armed attack on Finland and its immediate aftermath (‘armed attack’), • a substantial armed threat against Finland, the effects of which can only be repelled by immediately introducing the powers under the Emergency Powers Law (‘armed threat’), • a particularly serious event or threat impacting on the population’s subsistence or the foundations of the national economy that poses a material hazard to society’s functioning (‘economic crisis’), and • a particularly serious major accident and its immediate aftermath as well as widespread dangerous communicable disease having effects comparable to those of a serious major accident (‘major accident or communicable disease’).

text: 5. In these situations, once the Government has established, in consultation with Finland’s President, the existence of emergency conditions, it can adopt a decree activating certain emergency powers. Powers are only authorised that are (i) necessary and proportionate to achieve the purpose of protecting the population and its subsistence and the national economy, maintaining legal order and human rights as well as safeguarding Finland’s territorial integrity and independence in emergency conditions; and (ii) proportionate to the goal sought through their use. In addition, the draft law provides that the emergency powers can only be used in situations that cannot be controlled through the authorities’ regular powers. The Government Decree must thereafter be submitted to the Finnish Parliament that will decide whether to confirm the Decree, which will then remain in force for the period it foresees, or whether to partially or fully repeal it. The Decree will lapse unless submitted to the Parliament within one week of its issue.

text: 6. The draft law provides for emergency powers in various sectors, such as communications, social security, energy supply and financial markets. In accordance with the ECB’s consultative competence, the present opinion only deals with emergency powers concerning the financial markets: These are dealt with in Part II (Sections 13 to 26) of the draft law. In particular: • Section 14 of the draft law provides that in order to safeguard the nation’s exchange reserves and the State’s liquidity in the conditions of ‘armed attack’ and ‘armed threat’, responsibility is vested in Suomen Pankki for practical measures required for exchange controls, such as granting permission to take actions impacting the currency reserve and deciding on the duty of repatriation of currency, securities and receivables. • Section 16 of the draft law provides that in order to secure the population’s livelihood, the State’s liquidity or essential economic activity in the conditions of ‘armed attack’, ‘armed threat’ and ‘economic crisis’, the Government Decree could e.g. (i) provide for interest rates to be observed by credit institutions, financial institutions and other similar bodies on various types of financial claims so that these would not exceed or fall below the maximum and minimum limits set by the Government Decree; (ii) regulate the issue of loans and restrict withdrawals of deposits and other repayable assets; and (iii) provide for a certain proportion of investments by credit and other institutions to be made in debt instruments issued by the State. Suomen Pankki, the Financial Supervision Authority and the Insurance Supervisory Authority willensure enforcement of these rules in their respective fields of operations. • Section 18 of the draft law provides that in all the foreseen emergency conditions securities markets could be subject to restriction. The Financial Supervision Authority will be responsible for enforcing these rules regarding securities markets. Moreover, Section 19 provides that in the same cases payment transactions could be restricted. Suomen Pankki and the Financial Supervision Authority will ] enforce these rules. • Section 20 of the draft law provides that in all the foreseen emergency conditions, solvency requirements lower than the those provided for under the law will apply to credit institutions, investment firms and insurance and pension institutions, if meeting the statutory solvency requirement in emergency conditions may materially compromise their operations. In addition, according to Section 22 of the draft law, the Government Decree may provide for exceptions to the ordinary legal requirements concerning bankruptcy, liquidation, accounting and financial statements applicable to credit and financial institutions, management companies, investment firms, the stock exchange, the central securities depository, option corporations, insurance and pension institutions. The Financial Supervision Authority and the Insurance Supervisory Authority will be responsible for enforcement of these rules. • The draft law also amends Section 13 of the Law on the book-entry system listing the tasks of central securities depository, Arvopaperikeskus (‘APK’), which holds all book-entry Finnish securities, providing that APK maintains the central data systems required for the book-entry system with the hardware and software located in Finland.

text: 7. According to Section 26 of the draft law, the Government Decree on the application of certain emergency powers concerning the duties assigned by the Treaty to the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) may only be adopted if the ECB, or Suomen Pankki acting as part of the ESCB, are incapacitated in emergency conditions. Prior to issuing the Decree on emergency powers according to Sections 14, 16 and 19 of the draft law, the Government must request an opinion from the ECB in expedited proceedings.

text: ECB Opinion

text: 8. By adopting the euro, Finland has transferred irreversibly to the Community monetary policy and other powers enumerated in the Treaty and the Statute with regard to ESCB tasks. In these fields (setting reference rates, injecting or withdrawing liquidity in the market, ensuring efficient and sound clearing and payment systems, managing foreign reserves, issuing banknotes, contributing to the stability of the financial system) certain policy-making and legislative powers belong exclusively, under Article 8 of the Statute, to the decision-making bodies of the ECB. According to Article 10 of the Treaty, the Member States have a duty to facilitate the achievement of Community’s tasks and must abstain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty.

text: 9. Already in 2002, the Finnish authorites consulted the ECB on a draft amendment to the current Law. In its Opinion (

text: ) of 31 October 2002, the ECB concluded that some of the powers granted to the Finnish authorities conflicted with the Treaty as they belonged to Community competencies in the field of monetary union and of the single market for capital. In its opinion, the ECB criticised among others (i) the definition of emergency situations; in particular the emergency conditions enumerated in the Law were broader than those referred to in Article 297 of the Treaty; and (ii) the lack of clarity of the provision on when the Law would apply. In this latter respect, the opinion noted that emergency powers should only apply if both Suomen Pankki and the ECB are deprived by emergency events of their capacity to perform their tasks and that both the ECB and Suomen Pankki should be referred to as authorities that need to be unable to take measures, before the Law can be activated. A different interpretation following which the Law could be applied with regard to the tasks of the ESCB, even if the ECB and Suomen Pankki retained their operational and decision-making capabilities intact, would neither be justifiable under nor consistent with Community law. Finally, the opinion noted that (iii) the ECB should be consulted before the adoption of any draft decree in its field of competence.

text: 10. Having assessed the draft law, the ECB notes that it aims at taking into account the abovementioned concerns raised by the ECB in its previous opinion. The ECB welcomes the fact that Section 26 of the draft law requires the Government to request an opinion from the ECB in expedited proceedings prior to issuing the Decree.

text: 11. Section 26 also provides that the Government Decree on the introduction of the powers provided for in Sections 14, 16 and 19 concerning duties belonging to the ESCB under the Treaty and the Statute may only be issued if the ECB, or Suomen Pankki acting as part of the ESCB, are incapacitated by the emergency conditions. It is clear from the overall assessment set out in the ECB opinion of 2002 that both the ECB (including through the Eurosystem emergency measures) and Suomen Pankki must be incapacitated to take action before national emergency powers affecting the ESCB tasks can be activated. The ECB stresses accordingly that the word ‘or’ in Section 26 of the draft law should be replaced by the word ‘and’, in order to avoid the misconception that the Government Decree on emergency powers could be adopted in a situation where Suomen Pankki is incapacitated as part of the Eurosystem e.g. perform its Eurosystemrelated duties but the ECB is still functioning. Whereas the draft law’s statement of reasons use both expressions ‘or’ and ’and’, they generally provide the impression that the purpose of Section 26 is indeed to ensure the primacy of Community action meaning that also the ECB should be incapacitated to act before the decree on emergency powers may be adopted. Amending the wording of the Law itself would clarify this issue. In general, the ECB considers Section 26, once clarified, as an important improvement to the current Law.

text: 12. However, there are still some provisions that would need to be brought into line with Community law, as specified in more detail below.

text: 13. According to settled case-law, Member States may derogate from obligations imposed by the Treaty under the conditions laid down in the Treaty itself . Article 297 of the Treaty is one of the few articles allowing derogation from the rules of the Treaty under certain conditions and according to certain procedures . This Article deals with exceptional cases which are clearly defined and are to be interpreted in a restrictive manner ; it can therefore be understood only as a ‘hedge clause’ and not as an expression of any residual Member State competence . The Court of Justice has held in cases where Member States acted due to urgency on matters of exclusive Community competence that ‘Member States may act only as trustees of the common interest’ and that ‘Member States cannot bring into force any interim measure which may be required by the situation except as part of a process of collaboration with the’[Community].

text: 14. Unfortunately, the emergency conditions set out in Section 3 of the draft law still do not correspond with those listed in Article 297 of the Treaty. The emergency conditions ‘economic crisis’ and ‘major accident or communicable disease’ in the draft law are clearly not included in the exhaustive list of emergency conditions, although the ECB notes that the emergency condition ‘economic crisis’, required to trigger the application of the draft law, must concern a particularly serious economic crisis caused by a serious exogenous event or threat, and not merely an economic crisis involving the domestic market. The ECB strongly recommends amending the draft law so that the powers that fall within the ESCB’s exclusive competence may not be granted to national authorities in the absence of an emergency condition included in Article 297 of the Treaty.

text: 15. The wording in Article 14 of the draft law ‘Finnish currency’ could be misinterpreted to mean that Finland would re-introduce an own national currency. Based on the statement of reasons for Section 14, especially concerning the exchange rate used when paying the compensation for repatriated ‘Finnish currency’ , it appears however that reference is made to the euro. The ECB considers that the euro, as a single currency, should be referred to as such and that the wording ‘Finnish currency’ should be replaced either by ‘euro’ or by ‘currency being legal tender in Finland’. The ECB also recommends replacing ’the current exchange rate of Suomen Pankki shall be observed’ by the wording ‘the relevant current exchange rate of euro shall be observed thereby’ or by the wording ‘the relevant ECB reference rates shall be observed’.

text: 16. Moreover, the ECB considers that the consultation obligation set out in Section 26 of the draft law should cover also Section 18(3) and Section 20 of the draft law.

text: Article 18(3)

text: allows for restrictions on operations of a central securities depository holding securities in book-entry form which is licensed in Finland and may affect the settlement of Finnish collateral held by the Eurosystem and thus the execution of monetary policy operations or the provision of intraday credit for payment system purposes. The provision by Government Decree of a generalised exception to ordinary solvency requirements for credit institutions provided for in Section 20 of the draft law would concern Eurosystem’s counterparties and thus imply a derogation from ordinary Eurosystem requirements and possibly cause spill over effects on the financial stability of other Eurosystem members.

text: 17. The draft law introduces a requirement for any central securities depository licensed in Finland to maintain in Finland the book-entry information technology system required for its functioning. The ECB shares the authorities’ concerns for the continuity of post-trading facilities located in the euro area. The ECB is of the view, in particular, that it is essential to subject the SSSs used by the Eurosystem for collateral settlement and custody to the law of a euro area country in order to ensure that the perfection and realisation of eligible collateral used for Eurosystem operations are subject to euro area law. In addition, a provision requiring the location of such infrastructure in a specific country and not generally in the euro area warrants careful consideration. Since the treatment of collateral is a collective Eurosystem subject, of which Suomen Pankki is an integral part, it is logical for the collateral infrastructure to be located anywhere in the euro area, as reflected in the Eurosystem’s policy line published in 2001 .

text: 18. The ECB also proposes adjusting the list of definitions in Section 13(1) of the draft law to clarify that when referring to credit and other institutions as addressees of the restrictions, only institutions resident in Finland are concerned. Concerning Section 13(2) of the draft law providing that ’the Nordic Investment Bank, Nordic Project Export Fund and other international financial or other institutions resident in Finland shall be considered parties resident abroad’, the ECB assumes that this treatment reflects the 5th edition of the IMF Balance of Payments Manual.

text: 19. Moreover, as it is possible that the ECB and Suomen Pankki, as part of the ESCB, would only temporarily be unable to take normal measures, the ECB recommends also clarifying in Section 26 of the draft law that the Decree it refers to will be applicable only as long as the said entities are incapable of acting. Concerning the ECB’s ability to take action, it is noted for the sake of clarity that there are ESCB emergency and contingency plans, according to which the ECB, in general, will act in emergency situations.

text: 20. Article 26 of the draft law provides that the Government Decree affecting the ESCB competences may only be enacted if the ECB, or Suomen Pankki as part of the ESCB, are incapacitated, expressing the principle of the supremacy of Community action. As the draft law provides for procedures for emergency situations based on the principles and procedures set out in Article 297 of the Treaty, the ECB would welcome an additional reference in the draft law, for the sake of clarity, to the obligation to consult the other Member States set out in Article 297 of the Treaty, according to which the Member States are obliged to consult each other to prevent the functioning of the internal market from being affected by the measures a Member State is allowed to take in extraordinary cases enumerated in it. In particular, if ‘exceptions to solvency requirements’ for financial institutions (for instance by Section 20) in an ‘economic crisis’ (a particularly serious crisis caused by a relevant exogenous event or threat, with an impact on the stable operations of financial markets) are allowed to be introduced, coordination with other Member States and EU institutions could involve monitoring of spill over effects on financial stability of other Member States with a view to triggering, if necessary, a coordinated Eurosystem or Europe-wide response.

text: 21. In order to avoid any misunderstandings the ECB recommends clarifying in Section 17 of the draft law that the detailed provisions on index clauses will apply for other than statistical purposes.

text: 22. Since the draft law affects some very core principles of Community law, such as the principle of the free movement of capital, the ECB proposes consulting the Commission of the European Communities, as the guardian of the Treaties, on this draft law.

text: 23. This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 16 February 2006. [signed] The President of the ECB Jean-Claude TRICHET

type: vagledning

utgivare: ecb


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 20 February 2006 at the request of Magyar Nemzeti Bank on a draft regulation on the general terms and conditions and internal regulations of clearing houses for credit institutions (CON/2006/7)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 20 February 2006 at the request of Magyar Nemzeti Bank on a draft regulation on the general terms and conditions and internal regulations of clearing houses for credit institutions (

text: 1. On 6 December 2005 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from Magyar Nemzeti Bank for an opinion on a draft regulation on the general terms and conditions and internal regulations of clearing houses for credit institutions (hereinafter the ‘draft regulation’).

text: 2. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on the second, third, fifth and sixth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft regulation contains provisions concerning means of payment, Magyar Nemzeti Bank, payment and settlement systems and rules that materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 3. The draft regulation sets out requirements for the general terms and conditions and internal regulations of clearing houses for credit institutions that may include preconditions to performing such activities.

text: 4. The ECB welcomes such rules as they are essential to Magyar Nemzeti Bank’s oversight function, particularly as they take into account recent developments.

text: 5. In the ECB’s view the draft regulation should specify that the list of issues to be regulated in the terms and conditions of a clearing house for credit institutions is not exhaustive and constitutes a list of minimum requirements, therefore making it possible to include additional items in the clearing houses’ terms and conditions.

text: 6. Article 20 of the draft regulation on fees requires transparency and equal treatment of participants. However, this transparency requirement would not apply to entities that are considering participation and have a strong interest in applicable fees when deciding whether to participate. Hence, it would be advisable to extend

text: Article 20

text: to entities considering becoming participants, direct submitters or settlement agents.

text: 7. This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 20 February 2006. [signed] The President of the ECB Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: Kursiverad stil i texten anger de strykningar som ECB föreslår.

text: Text markerad med fet stil anger ECB:s förslag till ny text.

sprak: sv

title: Europeiska centralbankens yttrande av den  21 februari 2006  på begäran av Europeiska unionens råd om ett förslag till rådets förordning om upphävande av rådets förordning (EEG) nr 3181/78 och rådets förordning (EEG) nr 1736/79 avseende penningpolitik (CON/2006/8)

text: Den 1 februari 2006 mottog Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) en begäran från Europeiska unionens råd om yttrande över ett förslag till rådets förordning om upphävande av

text: rådets förordning (EEG) nr 3181/78

text: och

text: rådets förordning (EEG) nr 1736/79

text: avseende penningpolitik (KOM(2005) 611 slutlig), (nedan kallat förslaget till förordning). ECB:s behörighet att avge ett yttrande grundar sig på artikel 105.4 i Fördraget om upprättandet av Europeiska gemenskapen, eftersom förslaget till förordning innehåller bestämmelser som berör Europeiska monetära systemet (EMS) samt de uppgifter för Europeiska monetära institutet (EMI) som ECB tog över i enlighet med

text: artikel 44 i stadgan

text: för Europeiska centralbankssystemet och Europeiska centralbanken. I enlighet med

text: artikel 17.5

text: första meningen i arbetsordningen för Europeiska centralbanken har detta yttrande antagits av ECB-rådet.

text: 1. Specifika kommentarer

text: The ECB har två specifika kommentarer till förslaget till förordning.

text: 1.1. Titeln på förslaget till förordning

text: ECB föreslår att titeln på förslaget till förordning ändras så att den bättre återger innehållet i de två obsoleta förordningarna som skall upphävas, eftersom båda förordningarna berör EMS funktion snarare än det vidare området penningpolitik.

text: 1.2. Hänvisning till ECB:s yttrande

text: Enligt artikel 253 i fördraget skall förordningar som antas av rådet hänvisa till alla de yttranden som skall inhämtas enligt fördraget. ECB föreslår därför att man i ingressen till förslaget till förordning hänvisar till det här yttrandet.

text: 2. Ändringsförslag

text: De ändringsförslag som blir resultatet av rekommendationerna ovan framgår av bilagan.

text: BILAGA

text: Kommissionens förslag | ECB:s ändringsförslag

text: RÅDETS FÖRORDNING om upphävande av

text: rådets förordning (EEG) nr 3181/78

text: och

text: rådets förordning (EEG) nr 1736/79

text: avseende penningpolitik | RÅDETS FÖRORDNING om upphävande av förordning

text: (EEG) nr 3181/78

text: och förordning

text: (EEG) nr 1736/79

text: avseende Europeiska monetära systemet

text: Motivering – se punkt 1.1 i yttrandet

text: [För närvarande inget förslag] | med beaktande av Europeiska centralbankens yttrande (3), (3) EUT C […], […], s. […].

text: Motivering – se punkt 1.2 i yttrandet


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: See section 192 of the Cyprus Securities and Stock Exchange Laws of 1993 to 2005.

text: Ibid, sections 3(1) and (2), read in conjunction with section 7(1). State supervision is exercised through the Cyprus Securities and Exchange Commission.

text: Ibid, section 9, read in conjunction with section 3 of the Cyprus Securities and Stock Exchange (Central Depository and Central Securities Registry) Laws of 1996 to 2005 (hereinafter the ‘CDCSR Laws’). Accordingly, the CSE Council supervises their operation, manages their resources and is responsible for implementing their business strategy.

text: Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on markets in financial instruments amending Council Directives

text: and

text: and Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing

text: Council Directive 93/22/EEC

text: (OJ L 145, 30.4.2004, p. 1).

text: This refers to CSE Members (brokerage firms), issuers of securities listed and traded on the CSE and investors.

text: The ECB draws attention to its ‘Guide to consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions’ which states on page 14 that ‘[T]he duty of consultation is not limited to draft legislative provisions which are destined to be adopted by a parliament. Decision

text: covers all types of legally binding provisions, including secondary legislation, as well as binding acts of general applicability of [national central banks] or supervisory authorities (where these bodies have regulatory powers)’.

text: The ECB notes that section 3 of the CDCSR Laws, apparently limits the CSE Council’s powers to the ‘creation, management and administration of [the CDCSR]’.

text: Section 19 of the draft law which, inter alia, confers on the CSE Council the power to establish and operate a ‘fund’ and to determine the contributions to be made by CSE members and/or depositories and the giving of guarantees or security by the CSE Members and/or the depositories, to ensure the clearing and settlement of stock exchange transactions.

text: Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 1998 on settlement finality in payment and securities settlement systems (OJ L 166, 11.6.1998, p. 45).

text: Law 8(I)/2003 on settlement finality in payment and securities settlement systems (Official Gazette of the Republic, No 3679, 31.1.2003). See ECB Opinion

text: of 10 August 2005 at the request of the Central Bank of Cyprus on a draft law amending the Settlement Finality in Payment Systems and Securities Settlement Systems Law of 2003.

text: See Titles V and VI of

text: Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993

text: on investment services in the securities field (OJ L 141, 11.6.1993, p. 27). Directive as last amended by Directive

text: (OJ L 145, 30.4.2004, p. 1). Pursuant to the ISD, the competent home Member State authorities are responsible for the prudential supervision of investment services firms. However, responsibility for implementing the rules of conduct and for monitoring compliance with these rules remains within the competence of the host Member State, which, when applying them, has to respect the principle of the public interest.

text: The MiFID was originally intended to be transposed into national legislation after the standard period of two years from adoption (April 2006). In June 2005, the Commission presented a proposal to extend the transposition deadline for Member States and the compliance date for regulated firms to October 2006 and April 2007, respectively.

text: Published in 1998, the Eurosystem user standards have been regarded as de facto common standards for EU securities settlement systems. Nevertheless, they are not intended to be a comprehensive set of standards for the oversight or supervision of securities settlement systems. The standards are available on the ECB’s website at http://www.ecb.int/home/html/index.en.html.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 22 February 2006 at the request of the Cypriot Ministry of Finance on a draft law amending the Cyprus Securities and Stock Exchange (Central Depository and Central Securities Registry) Laws of 1996 to 2005 (CON/2006/9)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 22 February 2006 at the request of the Cypriot Ministry of Finance on a draft law amending the Cyprus Securities and Stock Exchange (Central Depository and Central Securities Registry) Laws of 1996 to 2005 (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 7 February 2006 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Cypriot Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft law amending the Cyprus Securities and Stock Exchange (Central Depository and Central Securities Registry) Laws of 1996 to 2005 (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Article 105(4) of the Treaty establishing the European Community and on the fifth and sixth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to payment and settlement systems and to rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1 Purpose of the draft law and general observations

text: 1.1 The ECB understands that the objective of the draft law is to enable the Central Depository and Central Registry (CDCR) for securities listed and traded on the Cyprus Stock Exchange (CSE) to operate more flexibly. This would be achieved by delegating to the Council of the CSE (hereinafter the ‘CSE Council’) the power to regulate certain technical issues relevant to the management of the CDCR’s business by means of ‘Regulatory Decisions’. Until now, such issues have been dealt with by means of either CSE ‘Council Regulations’, which are subject to the endorsement of the Cypriot Council of Ministers and the approval of the House of Representatives or CSE ‘Council Decisions’, which are subject to the approval of the Cyprus Securities and Exchange Commission. In this context, the ECB understands that the intention underlying the draft law is that the CSE

text: Council should have the power in future to regulate technical matters only, while other issues will continue to be regulated by law. 1.2 The ECB notes that the CSE Council is responsible for managing and operating: (i) the CSE, a public law-regulated market that operates subject to the supervision of the Cypriot Minister for 3 4 Finance ; and (ii) the CDCR , which operates as a division of the CSE rather than as an independent legal entity. Members of the CSE Council are designated by the Minister for Finance and appointed by the Council of Ministers .

text: 2. Corporate governance considerations

text: 2.1 The changes that the draft law introduces to the decision-making process within both the CSE and the CDCR have important implications for the latter’s governance and supervision, which the draft law does not directly address. As the CDCR is the central securities depository (CSD) for all Cypriot book-entry securities, its governance arrangements are of a significance that goes beyond corporate law. The ECB therefore makes a few observations relevant to the supervision of payment and securities clearing and settlement systems. These observations are also in the spirit of the future implementation of Directive

text: on markets in financial instruments (MiFID), and in particular of

text: Articles 36

text: to 47 thereof. The ECB emphasises these observations are offered as policy recommendations only, not as a statement of legal requirements. 2.2 As CSDs combine the provision of final settlement with the recording of changes in legal title resulting from transactions in securities, they should identify, monitor and assess sources of risk. 2.3 Regardless of a CSD’s status under national company law or of the national corporate governance requirements applicable to it, a CSD should adopt the highest corporate governance standards or best practices recommended for listed companies and ensure that they are effectively implemented. These may include traditional corporate governance mechanisms, (e.g. the appointment of nonexecutive directors and the use of specialised board committees, such as an audit committee), or mechanisms specifically developed for securities settlement systems, (e.g. the use of board advisory committees or public consultation documents). It is noted that a CSD should disclose adequately its corporate governance arrangements to enable its participants and the competent public authorities to assess how to prevent, resolve or mitigate conflicts of interest among owners, the CSE Council and CSD participants, and how to safeguard the public interest. Finally, corporate

text: governance arrangements for CSDs should be subject to adequate regulation and oversight. Regulators, central banks and competition authorities should institute policies the combined operation of which ensures that services are provided at a fair price to participants under equitable conditions of access.

text: 3 Powers delegated to the CSE Council under the draft law

text: 3.1 Section 2 of the draft law amends section 2 of the CDCSR Laws entitled ‘Interpretation’ to provide that ‘“Regulatory Decision” means the decision of the [CSE] Council containing regulatory content, issued in accordance with the provisions of this Law and which is published in the Official Gazette of the Republic’. It follows from the definition of the term ‘Regulatory Decision’ that the powers which the draft law confers on the CSE Council are conceived as being regulatory powers of general applicability and that rights and obligations imposed under Regulatory Decisions issued by the CSE Council would bind all regulated market participants , not contractually, but as a matter of law. 3.2 The ECB would remind the consulting authority that, in view of the obligation incumbent on Member States to consult the ECB on any draft legislative provision within its field of competence pursuant to Decision

text: (EC) No 98/415

text: , and taking into consideration the vague nature of the delegation to the CSE Council, it will be necessary to submit to the ECB for consultation all significant secondary legislation , including Regulatory Decisions, issued by the CSE Council on the basis of the powers delegated to it under the draft law before such legislation is adopted.

text: 4 Scope of delegation under the draft law

text: 4.1 The ECB notes that, while the contents of the Regulatory Decisions to be issued by the CSE Council under the powers delegated to it pursuant to the draft law cannot be anticipated, several of the provisions of the draft law – in particular sections 13, 15, 19 and 22 – confer broad decisionmaking powers on the CSE Council in connection with matters not directly related to the management and operation of the CDCR . These powers, inter alia, affect: (i) the property rights of owners of securities registered with the CDCR; (ii) the finality of the settlement of transactions entered into in respect of securities listed and traded on the CSE; and (iii) financial stability . The

text: ECB notes that, as Cyprus has implemented the Settlement Finality Directive (SFD) , the draft law could further clarify that settlement finality issues are governed by the national law implementing the SFD , and that it is only on technical issues (including deadlines, transfer of funds issues, etc.) that the CSE Council will enjoy decision-making powers. The same principle should apply to issues affecting the property rights of CSE Members and their clients, which are already governed by national law. Overall, the ECB recommends that the scope of delegation to the CSE Council should be restricted to technical issues only. 4.2 The ECB considers that section 20 of the draft law, which empowers the CSE Council to stipulate, by means of Regulatory Decisions, the conditions for provision of the services of a custodian (‘depository’), is prima facie inconsistent with the freedom to provide services and the ‘home country control’ principle enshrined in the Investment Services Directive (ISD) . 4.3 Regarding the exercise, under the draft law, of broad decision-making powers by the CSE Council, the ECB would also draw attention to the provisions of Articles 34, 36, 46 and 48 of the MiFID on regulated markets and competent authorities . In view of the future implementation of the MiFID in Cyprus, certain amendments to the draft law may need to be considered.

text: 5. Assessment of the CDCR against the Eurosystem user standards

text: 5.1 Because Cyprus has not yet adopted the euro and the CDCR is not used for Eurosystem operations, the Eurosystem has not assessed the CDCR against the Standards for the use of EU securities settlement systems in ESCB credit operations (known as the ‘Eurosystem user standards’) . 5.2 The ECB considers that sections 3, 5 (on the limitation of the CSE’s responsibility) and 9 of the draft law are prima facie inconsistent with the Eurosystem user standards.

text: 6. Additional comments

text: 6.1 Section 19 of the draft law amends section 24 of the CDCSR Laws entitled ‘Certain issues defined by a decision of the Council’ to, inter alia, provide that ‘(f) … the currency in which stock exchange transactions are conducted in and any other related matters regarding currency exchange rates’ will be determined by means of Regulatory Decisions issued by the CSE Council. The ECB invites the legislator to clarify in the draft law whether the purpose of this amendment is to enable the CSE Council to designate the euro as a reference unit for transactions in the context of the planned common trading platform between the CSE and the Athens Stock Exchange, or to institute the euro as the settlement currency for such transactions. Whilst the use of the euro as a trading unit of account in a common platform raises no concern, its use as a settlement currency would need to take into account that, before Cyprus adopts the euro, it qualifies in Cyprus as a foreign currency, and thus is subject to liquidity and credit risks. This may have implications for the smooth settlement of securities transactions. 6.2 Whatever the purpose of the designation of the euro, the ECB would remind the consulting authority that the CSE Council’s power under section 19 of the draft law to define ‘matters regarding currency exchange rates’ by means of Regulatory Decisions will become redundant (as far as the euro is concerned) once Cyprus has adopted the euro, and draws attention to the fact that the ECB publishes the euro foreign exchange reference rates on its website based on the daily concertation procedure between central banks within and outside the European System of Central Banks. 6.3 Given the urgency of the present consultation, this opinion raises general issues only. The ECB reserves the right to raise further issues on a future occasion.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 22 February 2006.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: In addition to being the currency of the ‘participating Member States’.

text: OJ L 236, 23.9.2003, p. 34. 5 As stated by the Court of Justice of the European Communities in Case 34-73 Fratelli Variola S.p.A. v Amministrazione italiana delle Finanze [1973] ECR 981: ‘by virtue of the obligations arising from the Treaty and assumed on ratification, Member States are under a duty not to obstruct the direct applicability inherent in regulations and other rules of Community law. Strict compliance with this obligation is an indispensable condition of simultaneous and uniform application of Community regulations throughout the Community’. This position was also reiterated in Case 50-76 Amsterdam Bulb BV v Produktschap voor Siergewassen [1977] ECR 137.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 23 February 2006 at the request of the Central Bank of Malta on a draft law on the adoption of the euro (CON/2006/10)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 23 February 2006 at the request of the Central Bank of Malta on a draft law on the adoption of the euro (

text: On 20 January 2006, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Central Bank of Malta for an opinion on the Euro Adoption Act (bill on the adoption of the euro in the Republic of Malta (hereinafter the ‘draft law’)). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on the first and second indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to currency matters and means of payment. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion. The ECB welcomes this initiative to prepare early for the introduction of the euro, thus ensuring the timely implementation of the necessary transitional measures. The draft law intends to establish the legal framework and mechanics for the adoption of the euro as the currency of Malta and for the replacement of the Maltese lira. It lays down (i) measures for the adoption of the euro; and (ii) the Minister of Finance’s powers with regard to the introduction of the euro. The purpose of the delegation to the Minister of Finance of the power to issue regulations in this field is to shorten the procedure for the adoption of the euro and increase flexibility in updating the same regulations.

text: 1. Preliminary terminological considerations

text: 1.1 In several parts of the draft law the term ‘unit’ is added to the word ‘currency’. In consistency with the terminology of

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 974/98 of 3 May 1998

text: on the introduction of the euro , the term ‘unit’ should be reserved for addressing the unit of account, but otherwise the euro is to be adopted merely as the ‘currency’ of Malta .

text: 1.2 There is no need to define the ‘euro’ in Article 3 of the draft law as Community law defines it. For this reason, the draft law, when defining the ‘euro’, should merely refer to the definition in

text: Regulation (EC) No 974/98

text: . 1.3 The definition of ‘legal instrument’ should be aligned with the definition in

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 974/98

text: , to include the words ‘legislative and statutory provisions’. There is the risk that the current definition in the draft law has a narrower effect. 1.4 Although the ECB is consulted on the English language version of the draft law only, in accordance with the Maltese Constitution the final text of the law has to be adopted also in the Maltese language. The Maltese version prevails in case of conflict, unless expressly specified otherwise. The Maltese version of the law will therefore need to refer to the single currency as ‘euro’ in order to comply with

text: Article 2 of Council Regulation (EC) No 974/98

text: that provides that ‘the currency of the participating Member States shall be the euro’, and with the conclusions of the Madrid European Council of 16 December 1995 recorded in recital 2 of the same Regulation that: ‘the name of the single currency must be the same in all official languages of the European Union, taking into account the existence of different alphabets’. In addition, the European Council has concluded that the uniform name ‘euro’ of the single currency is ‘the agreed and definitive interpretation of the relevant Treaty provisions’, and that pursuant to Article 5(3) of the Act concerning the conditions of accession , Member States have to observe the principles and guidelines deriving from the declarations, resolutions or other positions of the European Council at the time of their accession to the EU.

text: 2. Comments on Part II ‘Measures for the Adoption of the Euro’

text: 2.1 The ECB notes that in

text: Article 4

text: (i) and (ii) of the draft law the Minister will prescribe by order that euro banknotes and coins are legal tender, and that the euro is the currency of Malta. In this context, the ECB refers to Article 249 of the Treaty which provides that a Community regulation ‘shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States’. A Community regulation therefore does not need to be transposed into the domestic law of Member States . If a Member State transposes a regulation into national law, the fact that the provision is a Community law provision may be obscured. In addition, if a Member State transposes a regulation in even a slightly different form, there is a risk that its content will be altered. 2.2 Considering that Community regulations and decisions on monetary matters apply directly in Malta, Article 4 of the draft law should not repeat

text: and Article 106(1) of the Treaty, which, in addition, are clear and sufficiently comprehensive.

text: Article 4

text: instead should merely refer to the abovementioned Community provisions and the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank as the legal basis for the adoption of the euro in Malta, and provide the Minister with the capacity to prescribe by order the discontinuation of the legal tender status of the Maltese lira banknotes and coins (

text: Article 15(1) of Council Regulation (EC) 974/98

text: ), to regulate the dual circulation period until the withdrawal from circulation of national banknotes and coins (

text: Article 15(2) of Council Regulation (EC) 974/98

text: ), as well as their late redemption (

text: Article 16 of Council Regulation (EC) 974/98

text: ), and to adopt any necessary provision regarding the logistics of the cash changeover. 2.3 For the same reason, Article 5 of the draft law granting powers to the Minister in relation to Community provisions that have direct effect needs to be reconsidered, given that the application of the reference to euro in legal instruments and the principle of continuity are already provided for in

text: Article 6(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 974/98

text: and

text: Article 3 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1103/97

text: on certain provisions relating to the introduction of the euro respectively. It should instead refer to these Community provisions. Any reference to ‘legal instruments’ should be in line with the same definition in

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 974/98

text: . Hence phrases such as ‘law, contract or other legal instrument’ should be replaced by ‘legal instrument’. It is also important to refer to the euro as the currency of Malta when necessary, since from the adoption date the euro will be legal tender in Malta.

text: 3. Comments on Part III ‘Powers of the Minister’

text: 3.1 Article 6 of the draft law has the nature of an enabling provision, granting powers to the Minister to make regulations. In view of the obligation on authorities of Member States to consult the ECB on any draft legislative provision within its field of competence in accordance with

text: Council Decision (EC) No 98/415

text: , all relevant significant subsidiary legislation by virtue of Article 6 of the draft law will need to be submitted to the ECB for its opinion before it is adopted. 3.2 Additionally, in

text: Article 6

text: (ii), the phrase ‘when the euro is not the currency unit of Malta’ should be substituted with ‘when the euro is not yet the currency of Malta’. It is clear that this provision refers to the dual pricing period in place before the adoption of the euro, hence such an insertion would clarify the timing of its effect.

text: Article 6

text: (iii) should either refer to

text: Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 1103/97

text: , as this a directly applicable Community provision, or

text: Article 6

text: (iii) of the draft law should be deleted. 3.3 Moreover, in view of Malta’s Treaty and international obligations vis-à-vis the adoption of the euro in Article 7(1) of the draft law, the ECB proposes implementation instead of compliance.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 23 February 2006. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 March 2000 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions (OJ L 126, 26.5.2000, p. 1), as last amended by Directive

text: (OJ L 125, 28.4.2004, p. 44).

text: Technical adaptations to Article 2(3) of the Consolidated Banking Directive under Chapter 3 of Annex II to the Accession Treaty 2003. 7 Paragraph 10.

text: As in the case of Regulation ECB/2000/11 of 2 November 2000 concerning transitional provisions for the application of minimum reserves by the European Central Bank following the introduction of the euro in Greece (OJ L 291, 18.11.2000, p. 28) and as stated in Opinions

text: and

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 23 February 2006 at the request of Latvijas Banka on draft amendments to the Regulation on calculating and fulfilling the minimum reserve requirements for banks (CON/2006/11)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 23 February 2006 at the request of Latvijas Banka on draft amendments to the Regulation on calculating and fulfilling the minimum reserve requirements for banks (

text: 1. On 30 January 2006 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from Latvijas Banka for an opinion on draft amendments to the Regulation on calculating and fulfilling the minimum reserve requirements for Banks (hereinafter the ‘Regulation’). Latvijas Banka is the national authority that will adopt the draft amendments.

text: 2. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Article 105(4) of the Treaty and the sixth indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the legislative proposal contains provisions concerning rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In addition, under

text: Article 2(2) of Decision 98/415/EC

text: , the authorities of Member States other than participating Member States are obliged to consult the ECB on any draft legislative provisions on the instruments of monetary policy. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the European Central Bank has adopted this opinion.

text: 3. The main objective of the draft amendments is to broaden the reserve base for the minimum reserve requirement in view of accelerating domestic lending growth and to contain credit expansion. The draft amendments also intend to harmonise the Regulation with the Law on credit institutions and Latvijas Banka’s Regulation on compiling the monthly financial position report of monetary financial institutions and its appendices.

text: General observations

text: 4. The ECB notes that, although non-participating Member States retain their powers in the field of monetary policy, it is nevertheless beneficial to gradually achieve consistency with Eurosystem standards so that credit institutions operating in their territory can already become acquainted with the minimum reserve requirements that will apply once the euro has been introduced in Latvia.

text: 5. The legal framework underlying the Eurosystem’s minimum reserve system is laid down in: (i) Article 19 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and the European Central Bank; and (ii)

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 2531/98 of 23 November 1998

text: concerning the application of minimum reserves by the European Central Bank ; and (iii) Regulation ECB/2003/9 of 12 September 2003 on the application of minimum reserves . The purpose of these legal acts, that are directly applicable to and binding on credit institutions in the euro area, is to ensure that the terms and conditions for the Eurosystem’s minimum reserve system are uniform throughout the euro area. Taking into account the abovementioned legal framework for the Eurosystem’s reserve requirements, the ECB comments as follows on the draft amendments.

text: 6. First, in the course of preparing for the introduction of the euro in Latvia, Latvijas Banka will need to examine whether the Eurosystem’s requirements can be fulfilled effectively and whether the necessary measures have been adopted in Latvia to ensure that the authorities have the requisite powers, under Latvian law, to assist and cooperate with the ECB to collect and verify the information necessary for the Eurosystem’s minimum reserve system.

text: 7. Second, because the Eurosystem’s minimum reserve system is highly dependent on the Eurosystem’s statistical reporting requirements and because any changes to the statistical reporting requirements will have a direct influence on the size of minimum reserve holdings, a key element for achieving consistency between the Latvian minimum reserve system and that of the Eurosystem is the introduction into Latvian law of statistical reporting requirements corresponding to those of the Eurosystem.

text: Specific observations

text: 8. The ECB welcomes the broadening of the reserve base as it contributes to aligning Latvian reporting requirements with those of the Eurosystem. Paragraph 3.2 of the current Regulation excludes from the reserve base deposits with a fixed maturity of more than two years, deposits redeemable at notice with a notice period of more than two years, irrevocable (irredeemable before maturity) debt securities with an original maturity of more than two years and repo transactions. The draft amendments delete paragraph 3.2, thus including the abovementioned liabilities in the reserve base. The ECB notes that this is consistent with Article 3 of Regulation ECB/2003/9.

text: 9. Draft amendments also insert a new paragraph 4.2 into the Regulation enabling Latvijas Banka to establish a different reserve ratio for each category of liabilities included in the reserve base. This provision does not necessarily differ from Article 4 of Regulation ECB/2003/9 that applies a fixed reserve ratio of 0% to deposits with agreed maturity over two years, deposits redeemable at notice over two years, repos and debt securities issued with an agreed maturity over two years, and a fixed reserve ratio of 2% to all other liabilities. However, according to the consultation letter, the applied reserve ratio for liabilities with an original maturity of over two years would be larger than zero. Indeed, Latvijas Banka’s Council is authorised to set the level of required reserves as appropriate. The ECB notes that this measure does not contribute to further bringing into line the Latvian reserve requirement level with that of the Eurosystem.

text: 10. The ECB also welcomes the introduction of a list of entities subject to minimum reserve requirements as it aligns the Regulation with Article 2 of Regulation ECB/2003/9. However, according to Article 2 of the Regulation ECB/2003/9, all credit institutions located in the euro area are subject to a minimum reserve requirement, while in Latvia currently neither electronic money institutions nor credit unions are covered by minimum reserve requirements. These differences between the Eurosystem and Latvia will need to be eliminated on Latvia’s accession to the euro area, as further explained in the paragraphs below.

text: 11. Article 2(1) of Regulation ECB/2003/9 subjects the following categories of institutions to minimum reserve requirements: (a) credit institutions as defined in the first subparagraph of Article 1(1) of the Consolidated Banking Directive , other than participating national central banks (NCBs); and (b) branches, as defined in Article 1(3) of the Consolidated Banking Directive, of credit institutions as defined in the first subparagraph of Article 1(1) of the same Directive, other than participating NCBs. Article 1(1) of the Consolidated Banking Directive defines a credit institution as (a) ‘an undertaking whose business is to receive deposits or other repayable funds from the public and to grant credits for its own account’; or (b) an electronic money institution within the meaning of Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 September 2000 on the taking up, pursuit and prudential supervision of the business of electronic money institutions .

text: 12. Article 1 of the Latvian Law on credit institutions mirrors the definition of a credit institution contained in Article 1(1) of the Consolidated Banking Directive and covers: (a) banks – capital companies whose business is to receive deposits or other repayable funds from an unrestricted circle of clients, to grant credits for their own account and to provide other financial services; and (b) electronic money institutions – capital companies that issue and service electronic money and that are not banks. However, electronic money institutions are excluded from the scope of application of the Regulation as the Regulation outlines the procedure for calculating and fulfilling the minimum reserve requirements only for banks and branches of foreign banks registered in Latvia.

text: 13. The ECB notes that credit unions established in Latvia are not subject to the Law on credit institutions and that they are expressly excluded from the scope of application of the Consolidated Banking Directive under the Accession Treaty . However, as made clear in ECB Opinion

text: on 1 April 2005 at the request of Lietuvos bankas on draft rules on minimum reserve requirements for credit institutions the fact that ‘credit unions are exempt for prudential supervision purposes from the scope of application of the Consolidated Banking Directive does not automatically imply that they will also be exempt from the Eurosystem’s reserve requirements established for monetary policy purposes. Indeed, the ECB considers that in order to apply the Eurosystem’s reserve requirements it is necessary to carry out a material test as to whether an institution fulfils the criteria laid down in the first subparagraph of Article 1(1) of the Consolidated Banking Directive (i.e. whether its business is to receive deposits or other repayable funds from the public and to grant credits for its own account).’

text: 14. The exemption of Latvian credit unions from the EU banking supervisory regime is irrelevant to the application of Eurosystem minimum reserve requirements due to the very different purposes served by banking supervisory and minimum reserve requirements. The legal basis for the imposition of minimum reserve requirements contained in Article 19.1 of the ESCB Statute clarifies that the ECB may require credit institutions established in Member States to hold minimum reserve on accounts with the ECB and national central banks ‘in pursuance of monetary policy objectives.’ The first key function of the minimum reserve system is to stabilise money market interest rates. Its second important function is enlargement of the banking system’s structural liquidity shortage. The need for credit institutions to hold reserves with central banks contributes to increasing the demand for central bank refinancing which, in turn, makes it easier for the ECB to steer money market rates through regular liquidity-providing operations. Thus, the range of credit institutions that are within the ambit of minimum reserve requirements differs from the category of credit institutions that fall within the scope of prudential supervision. In the area of minimum reserve requirements the term ‘credit institution’ is clearly meant to denote all financial market operators whose activities are relevant for the growth of monetary aggregates. Consistent with this, Regulation ECB/2003/9 establishes a very specific exemption regime unrelated to the exemption regime under the Consolidated Banking Directive. In this respect, it is noted that Article 5(2) of Regulation ECB/2003/9 grants to each institution an allowance of EUR 100 000 to be deducted from the amount of minimum reserves, subject to conditions.

text: 15. Under Article 2 of the Latvian Law on credit unions, credit unions may provide a variety of financial services to their members, including receiving their deposits and other repayable funds and providing loans to them, as well as other appropriate activities.

text: 16. Regarding the issue as to whether credit unions in Latvia receive deposits from the ‘public’ within the meaning of the Consolidated Banking Directive’s definition of a credit institution, the concept of the ‘public’ encompasses any natural or legal person other than a credit or financial institution, while those entities that fund themselves only in the interbank markets are excluded from the concept of the ‘public’ for this purpose. It is clear that a Latvian credit union may receive deposits from the ‘public’. In particular, a Latvian credit union may receive deposits from members that may include natural persons and their spouses, local governments, trade unions and other bodies. The fact that admission to membership of a Latvian credit union is restricted to persons sharing a common place of residence in the territory of the same local government or are otherwise linked to the specific local government (e.g. as owners of immovable property) or to persons employed by the same employer, or to persons sharing membership of a particular organisation, such as a professional association, trade union or public sports organisation, is irrelevant for this purpose. The key issue is that Latvian credit unions may receive deposits from persons other than credit or financial institutions. Therefore Latvian credit unions receive deposits ‘from the public’ within the meaning of the Consolidated Banking Directive.

text: 17. In the light of the above, the ECB considers that credit unions established in Latvia will fall under the definition of a credit institution subject to Eurosystem minimum reserve requirements within the meaning of Regulation ECB/2003/9 on the introduction of the euro. It is also noted that subjecting the electronic money institutions and credit unions to the Eurosystem minimum reserve requirement should not present practical difficulties from a statistical perspective as both types of institutions are already included in the list of monetary and financial institutions produced by Latvijas Banka.

text: 18. Finally, the ECB may consider introducing certain transitional arrangements for the application of the Eurosystem’s minimum reserve system on the introduction of the euro in Latvia . This would involve a transitional maintenance period for credit institutions located in Latvia. This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 23 February 2006. [signed] The President of the ECB Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: Rådets förordning

text: (EG) nr 2223/96

text: av 25 juni 1996 om det europeiska national- och regionalräkenskapssystemet i gemenskapen (EGT L 310, 30.11.1996, s. 1).

title: Europeiska centralbankens yttrande av den  24 februari 2006  på begäran av Europeiska unionens råd över ett förslag till förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning om ändring av rådets förordning (EG) nr 2223/96 med avseende på rapportering av nationalräkenskapsdata (CON/2006/12)

text: Den 19 januari 2006 mottog Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) en begäran från Europeiska unionens råd om ett yttrande över ett förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning om ändring av

text: rådets förordning (EG) nr 2223/96

text: med avseende på rapportering av nationalräkenskapsdata (KOM(2005) 653 slutlig) (nedan kallat förslaget till förordning).

text: ECB:s behörighet att avge ett yttrande grundas på

text: artikel 105.4

text: första strecksatsen i fördraget om upprättandet av Europeiska gemenskapen eftersom förslaget till förordning faller inom ECB:s behörighetsområde. I enlighet med

text: artikel 17.5

text: första meningen i arbetsordningen för ECB har detta yttrande antagits av ECB-rådet.

text: 1 ALLMÄNNA KOMMENTARER

text: 1.1 Målet med förslaget till förordning är att ändra bilaga B i förordningen om Europeiska nationalräkenskapssystemet 1995 avseende leveransprogrammet för nationalräkenskapsdata. I förslaget till förordning föreslås ändringar av tidsfrister, frekvens och innehåll i de nationalräkenskaper som medlemsstaterna rapporterar till EU-kommissionen (Eurostat) för att på så sätt förbättra tillgängligheten av uppgifter ur nationalräkenskaperna och kvaliteten på den europeiska statistiken. Förslaget till förordning beaktar principerna om att harmonisera och samordna uppgifter. Förslaget innehåller även en del nya krav som tillkommit på initiativ av viktiga användare samtidigt som man, på initiativ av nationella statistikproducenter, även sänkt vissa krav jämfört med tidigare leveransprogram.

text: 1.2 För att bedriva penningpolitiken är det viktigt för ECB att använda och sammanställa statistik för euroområdet med utgångspunkt i uppgifter från alla medlemsstaters nationalräkenskaper och att dessa uppgifter är heltäckande, jämförbara och klara för aggregering mellan euroområdets medelsstater samt att de levereras i rätt tid, är tillförlitliga och tillämpas på ett konsekvent sätt i leveransprogrammets alla tabeller. För ECB har nationalräkenskaperna på kvartalsbasis högsta prioritet och ECB välkomnar de bestämmelser i förslaget som rör tillhandahållandet av dessa uppgifter. En konsekvent uppsättning nationalräkenskapsuppgifter är också viktig för att kunna utföra omfattande analyser av produktivitetsförändringar. För bl.a. detta ändamål behövs en mer detaljerad uppdelning för årsvisa än för kvartalsvisa uppgifter. ECB anser att den mer detaljerade uppdelningen efter ekonomisk aktivitet och institutionell sektor i förslaget till förordning är en viktig förbättring. Regionalräkenskaper är inte prioriterade för ECB:s del.

text: 1.3 ECB ser också positivt på att man i förslaget till förordning fäster stor betydelse vid att medlemsstaterna inom givna tidsfrister skall tillhandahålla nyare historiska uppgifter ur nationalräkenskaperna. ECB uppmanar EU-kommissionen (Eurostat) och medlemsstaterna att dels säkerställa konsekventa uppgifter i leveransprogrammets tabeller och dels ta fram och genomföra riktlinjer för att offentliggöra och revidera uppgifter på ett samordnat sätt. ECB anser att detta även berör tidpunkten för större statistiska revideringar av nationalräkenskaperna som kan ha samband med viktiga metodförändringar.

text: 2. SPECIFIKA KOMMENTARER

text: 2.1 Tabell 1 i leveransprogrammet omfattar kvartalsvisa och årliga huvudaggregat av avgörande betydelse för penningpolitiken och den ekonomiska politiken. ECB välkomnar att tillhandahållandet av de uppgifter som skall levereras enligt tabell 1 förbättras. Förbättringarna inkluderar en specificering av export- och importuppgifter efter destination och ursprung (EU-medlemsstater, medlemmar av den monetära unionen och EU-institutioner) samt det specifika förädlingsvärdet och sysselsättningsdata inom tillverkning. ECB rekommenderar att man använder en gemensam metod för att sammanställa kvartalsvisa kedjeindex som speglar volymförändringar. Därutöver rekommenderar ECB att man inför krav om arbetsdags- eller säsongsjusterad statistik i leveransprogrammet för de kvartalsvisa huvudaggregaten, och där så är lämpligt bara arbetsdagsjusterad statistik.

text: 2.2 Tabell 3 i leveransprogrammet omfattar årliga aggregat efter bransch som är viktiga för produktivitets- och strukturanalysen. För sin sammanställning av aggregat för euroområdet föredrar ECB ett fullständigt genomförande av den mindre detaljerade uppdelningen i de fall där två typer av uppdelning anges i tabellen.

text: 2.3 För ECB är det viktigt att icke-finansiella konton fördelade på sektorer (tabell 8 i leveransprogrammet) levereras inom samma tidsfrister som finansiella konton fördelade på sektorer (tabell 6 i leveransprogrammet) och balansräkningar över finansiella tillgångar och skulder (tabell 7 i leveransprogrammet), så att en fullständig överensstämmelse kan säkerställas vid sammanställningen av de integrerade räkenskaperna för euroområdet.

text: 2.4 ECB skulle föredra att tidsfristen för leverans av uppgifter om offentliga sektorn fördelad på funktion (tabell 11 i leveransprogrammet) sänktes från tolv till nio månader efter referensårets utgång. Detta skulle också stå i överensstämmelse med tidsfristen för att leverera en detaljerad uppdelning av den offentliga sektorns utgifter (tabell 2 i leveransprogrammet). Därutöver skulle ECB gärna se en tvingande bestämmelse om ytterligare uppdelning efter COFOG-grupper av den offentliga sektorns utgifter för COFOG-avdelningarna näringslivsfrågor, hälso- och sjukvård, utbildning och socialt skydd. Den uppdelning som krävs för detaljredovisning av skatteintäkter efter typ av skatt och mottagande delsektor (tabell 9 i leveransprogrammet) däremot är mer detaljerad än ECB:s krav.

text: 2.5 ECB skulle också förorda att man mäter arbetskraftsinsatsen i användningstabellen (tabell 16 i leveransprogrammet) även i form av arbetade timmar samt gör en underuppdelning som möjliggör analyser av den betydelse som utvecklingen av arbetskraftens kvalitet har för produktivitetsförändringar. På samma sätt skulle ECB gärna se att användningstabeller även anges i baspriser, så att symmetriska input-outputtabeller kan tas fram för varje år. Om dessa årliga tabeller även delades upp efter importkomponenter och inhemska komponenter, skulle de symmetriska input-outputtabellerna för inhemsk produktion och import till baspriser (tabellerna 18 och 19 i leveransprogrammet) inte utgöra något prioriterat krav för ECB. Vad gäller tabell 16 i leveransprogrammet skulle man kunna tänka sig att ha olika rapporteringskrav för större och mindre medlemsstater. ECB anser att tabellerna avseende symmetrisk input-output till baspriser (tabell 17 i leveransprogrammet) och de symmetriska input-outputtabellerna för inhemsk produktion och import till baspriser (tabellerna 18 och 19 i leveransprogrammet) på femårsbasis är mindre relevanta p.g.a. eftersläpningen och den låga frekvensen för uppgifterna.

text: 2.6 ECB välkomnar överföringen av balansräkningar över icke-finansiella tillgångar (tabell 26 i leveransprogrammet) och anser att fler variabler i denna tabell borde göras obligatoriska. I synnerhet borde den obligatoriska informationen om värdet på bostäder åtföljas av korresponderande information om värdet på mark, eftersom dessa uppgifter utgör grunden för att bedöma hushållens tillgångar i form av bostäder och fastigheter som är av stor betydelse för ECB.


text: EGT L 257, 27.10.1995, s. 1.

title: Europeiska centralbankens yttrande av den  27 februari 2006  om ett förslag till rådets förordning om tillämpningsföreskrifter för rådets förordning (EG) nr 2494/95 avseende de tidsperioder under vilka prisuppgifter skall samlas in för det harmoniserade konsumentprisindexet (CON/2006/13)

text: Den 24 februari 2006 mottog Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) en begäran från Europeiska unionens råd om ett yttrande över ett förslag till rådets förordning om tillämpningsföreskrifter för

text: rådets förordning (EG) nr 2494/95 av den 23 oktober 1995

text: om harmoniserade konsumentprisindex (HIKP-förordningen) avseende de tidsperioder under vilka prisuppgifter skall samlas in för det harmoniserade konsumentprisindexet (nedan kallat förslaget till förordning).

text: artikel 105.4

text: första strecksatsen i fördraget om upprättandet av Europeiska gemenskapen och artikel 5.3 i HIKP-förordningen. I enlighet med

text: artikel 17.5

text: första meningen i arbetsordningen för Europeiska centralbanken har detta yttrande antagits av ECB-rådet.

text: 1. Syftet med förslaget till förordning är att fastställa miniminormer för de perioder under vilka prisuppgifterna skall samlas in varje månad för att förbättra jämförbarheten av de harmoniserade konsumentprisindexen (HIKP) mellan medlemsstaterna och tillförlitligheten av HIKP för euroområdet. Eftersom de tidsperioder under vilka prisuppgifterna samlas in varierar mellan medlemsstaterna, kan vissa poster som ingår i HIKP vara utsatta för kortfristiga prisvariationer under en månad som leder till att den uppskattade prisförändringen varierar åtskilligt. ECB välkomnar att förslaget till förordning fastställer att prisuppgifterna skall samlas in under en period bestående av minst en arbetsvecka i mitten, eller kring mitten, av månaden och under en längre period än en arbetsvecka när det gäller produkter vars priser normalt varierar kraftigt och ojämnt inom en och samma månad. Denna minimistandard utgör en kompromiss mellan å ena sidan behovet av att harmonisera insamlingen av prisuppgifterna mellan medlemsstaterna, och kostnaderna för att ändra nu gällande regler för insamlingen av prisuppgifter å andra sidan.

text: 2. Kravet att produkter vars priser normalt är volatila skall samlas in under en längre period än en arbetsvecka ger medlemsstaterna ett visst spelrum vid genomförandet av den föreslagna bestämmelsen. Det är därför berättigat att noga kontrollera hur effektivt förslaget till förordning i detta avseende genomförs.

text: 3. ECB förstår att förslaget till förordning inte skall hindra publiceringen av preliminära harmoniserade konsumentprisindex eller snabbestimat och ej heller påverka den gällande tidtabellen för publicering av euroområdets HIKP.

text: 4. ECB stöder det föreslagna genomförandet av bestämmelserna med verkan fr.o.m. januari 2007, eftersom inga systematiska effekter förväntas uppstå vad gäller de uppmätta års- eller månadsvisa prisförändringarna. Mot bakgrund av detta förväntas revideringar av historiska uppgifter inte bli nödvändiga.


text: EUT L 47, 17.2.2006, s. 58.

title: Yttrande från ECB-rådet av den  2 mars 2006  över en rekommendation från Europeiska unionens råd beträffande utnämningen av en ledamot av Europeiska centralbankens direktion (CON/2006/14)

text: 1. Genom skrivelse av den 15 februari 2006 hemställde ordförandeskapet för Europeiska unionens råd om ECB-rådets yttrande över

text: rådets rekommendation 2006/108/EG av den 14 februari 2006

text: om utnämningen av en ledamot av Europeiska centralbankens direktion.

text: 2. I den ovannämnda rekommendationen som, efter det att ECB-rådet och Europaparlamentet hörts, skall överlämnas för beslut till stats- eller regeringscheferna i de medlemsstater som infört euron, föreslås att Jürgen Stark utnämns till ledamot i ECB:s direktion för en mandattid om åtta år från och med den 1 juni 2006.

text: 3. ECB-rådet anser att den föreslagna kandidaten är en person som besitter den allmänt erkända auktoritet och yrkeserfarenhet inom den finansiella sektorn som krävs enligt artikel 112.2 b i Fördraget om upprättandet av Europeiska gemenskapen.

text: 4. ECB-rådet har ingen invändning mot rådets rekommendation att den föreslagna kandidaten skall utnämnas till ledamot av ECB:s direktion.

text: 5. ECB-rådet har antagit detta yttrande i enlighet med artikel 112.2 b i fördraget och artiklarna

text: och

text: i stadgan för Europeiska centralbankssystemet och Europeiska centralbanken.