title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 25 May 2005 at the request of the Ministry of Finance of Luxembourg on a draft law on financial collateral arrangements (CON/2005/12)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 25 May 2005 at the request of the Ministry of Finance of Luxembourg on a draft law on financial collateral arrangements (

text: 1. On 16 March 2005 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Ministry of Finance of Luxembourg for an opinion on a draft law on financial collateral arrangements (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The draft law was submitted to the Chamber of Representatives of Luxembourg on 25 November 2003. Subsequently the Government of Luxembourg amended the draft law on 16 April 2004. These amendments are also the subject of the present consultation.

text: 2. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on the third, fifth and sixth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to (i) the Banque centrale du Luxembourg (BCL) and the other central banks in the European System of Central Banks (ESCB); (ii) securities settlement systems; and (iii) the stability of financial institutions and markets.

text: 3. The ECB notes that the main purpose of the draft law is to transpose in Luxembourg Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 June 2002 on financial collateral arrangements (hereinafter the ‘Collateral Directive’) . While national authorities are not obliged to consult the ECB on draft legislative provisions the exclusive purpose of which is the transposition of Community directives into the law of Member States, under Article 25.1 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter the ‘ESCB Statute’) the ECB may offer advice to and be consulted by the competent authorities of the Member States on the scope and implementation of Community legislation relating to the stability of the financial system. The draft law addresses matters directly relevant to the Eurosystem’s core fields of competence which will have an impact both on the efficient and safe use of financial collateral arrangements in EU financial markets and the Eurosystem’s credit operations.

text: 4. The draft law also contains certain provisions that go beyond merely transposing the Collateral Directive, including provisions on the statutory lien granted to depositories principally operating a 1 OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 2 OJ L 168, 27.6.2002, p. 43. securities settlement system (SSS) that have an impact on the BCL’s Statute and that relate to the incorporation into the legal framework in Luxembourg of certain provisions of the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Certain Rights in respect of Securities held with an Intermediary (hereinafter the ‘Hague Convention’). Since the provisions on the statutory lien of depositories principally operating an SSS have implications for the BCL’s lien under its Statute, the ECB addresses this matter first. Statutory lien granted to depositories principally operating a securities settlement system

text: 5. Under the current law in Luxembourg a statutory lien is granted to depositories principally operating an SSS (hereinafter the ‘depositories’) over a participant’s own assets held by the depositories in relation to the system they operate where such assets are not affected by collateral duly notified to or accepted by the depository. For this purpose ‘collateral’ is defined as any realisable asset, including money, provided in the context of a pledge, repurchase agreement, fiduciary transfer or a similar agreement, or in another way, with the aim of guaranteeing the rights and obligations which may arise in the context of an SSS, or provided to Member States’ central banks or to the ECB vis-à-vis such realisable assets .

text: 6. The draft law, as amended by the Government of Luxembourg, specifies that the depositories’ claims vis-à-vis a participant arising from the transactions carried out by the participant on its own account, as well as on behalf of its clients, are guaranteed by the statutory lien of the depositories. The draft law also grants a lien to these depositories on the assets of a participant’s clients held by the depositories in relation to the system they operate, but this lien only guarantees a depository’s claims vis-à-vis a participant arising from the transactions carried out by a participant on behalf of its clients.

text: 7. Under the law in Luxembourg this statutory lien would supersede any general or special statutory lien . However, it is unclear whether it would prevail over the lien granted to the BCL, which provides that claims of the BCL, the ECB or any other national central bank (NCB) in the ESCB resulting from operations in connection with common monetary or exchange rate policies will have priority over all debtor assets, whether held with the BCL or with an SSS or any other counterpart in Luxembourg, and that this lien ranks equally with that of a pledgee .

text: 8. The statutory lien granted to the depositories on the assets of a participant’s clients held in relation to the system which they operate increases, in terms of scope, the risk of potential conflicts 3 Article 17 of the loi du 1 août 2001 concernant la circulation de titres et d’autres instruments fongibles (Law of 1 August 2001 on the circulation of securities and other fungible instruments; hereinafter the ‘Securities Law’). 4

text: Article 25(4)

text: (b) of the draft law, amended by Governmental Amendment No 7 relating to the statutory lien granted to depositories, repeats the provisions of Article 17 of the Securities Law. The definition now refers to the central bank members of the ESCB. 5 The second paragraph of Article 17 of the Securities Law (and

text: Article 25(4)

text: (b) of the draft law, as amended by Governmental Amendment No 7). 6 Article 4(4) of the loi du 23 décembre 1998 relative au statut monétaire et à la Banque centrale du Luxembourg (Law of 23 December 1998 on the monetary status and the Banque centrale du Luxembourg), under the subheading ‘Financial bases’. between the statutory lien of the depositories and the lien of the BCL and the ESCB central banks. It is noted in this respect that the lien of the BCL and the ESCB central banks has, in large part, been introduced into the law in Luxembourg in order to reinforce the BCL’s financial position , thereby assisting the BCL and the Eurosystem in performing their central banking tasks. In this regard the ECB takes note of the particular situation of the BCL within the Eurosystem. The risks stemming from the BCL’s operations with the financial sector are of systemic relevance in view of the relative importance of the financial market in Luxembourg. The BCL is the third largest national central bank within the Eurosystem in terms of liquidity granted to credit institutions and the amount of collateral used for monetary policy operations. A substantial part of the assets used to collateralise Eurosystem credit operations on a cross-border basis originates in Luxembourg. Furthermore, the Standards for the use of EU Securities Settlement Systems in ESCB credit operations, published in 1998, are relevant from the perspective of the Eurosystem as a user of a central securities depository operating an SSS. Standard 1 states that an SSS must provide adequate protection of the rights of the NCBs and the ECB in respect of securities held on their accounts in such systems. Against this backdrop, the ECB would strongly prefer a statutory lien granted to the depositories that does not prejudice the legal position of the BCL and the ESCB central banks in performing their central banking functions. The ECB hopes that the relevant provisions of the draft law can be amended accordingly in order to fully secure the legal position of the BCL and the ESCB central banks.

text: 9. The ECB notes that both the current law in Luxembourg and the provisions of the draft law exclude from the scope of the statutory lien granted to the depositories any own assets of participants, which are affected by collateral duly notified to or accepted by the depository. The ECB is of the view that this exclusion should also apply to the assets of participants’ clients, which are affected by collateral duly notified to or accepted by the depository. Furthermore, the statutory lien of depositories, including the lien on the assets of a participant’s clients intended by the draft law, should not cover the BCL’s assets or the assets provided as collateral to the BCL or another central bank member of the Eurosystem, regardless of any notification or acceptance requirement, which in any case should not affect the realisation and enforceability of such collateral.

text: 10. The comments on the articles of the draft law point out that the lien over the assets of a participant’s clients is very limited since, as mentioned in paragraph 6 above, it only covers the assets of a participant’s clients in respect of transactions carried out on behalf of those clients . The statutory lien of qualified intermediaries and clearing and settlement institutions under 7 Report of the Commission des Finances et du Budget (Commission of Finances and Budget in Luxembourg, 10.12.1998) on draft law No 4468/07, p. 2. 8 Draft law No 4468/07, comments on the articles, comment on

text: Article 4(4)

text: , p. 9. 9 Comments on key figures of the 2004 BCL accounts are available on the BCL website (http://www.bcl.lu). 10 See the comments on the articles, comment on

text: Article 25(4)

text: , p. 23.

text: 11 Referred to in Article 31 of the loi du 2 août 2002 relative à la surveillance du secteur financier et aux services financiers (Law of 2 August 2002 on the supervision of the financial sector and on financial services). Belgian law also covers the assets of clients and, in the case of clearing and settlement institutions, the assets of a participant’s clients. However, under Belgian law, the assets of a participant’s clients can only be credited to an account with the relevant intermediary or clearing and settlement institution (and therefore be covered by the statutory lien) if those clients give their written consent . It is noted in this respect that one of the rules set out in the ESCB-CESR Standards for Securities Clearing and Settlement in the European Union lays down that entities holding securities in custody must not use the customer’s securities for any transaction unless they have obtained the customer’s explicit consent. Under Directive

text: , the same principles apply to investment firms . Furthermore, Belgian law expressly provides for criminal sanctions for those who, acting on behalf of an intermediary, use the financial instruments of clients without their written consent, whether this use is for their own profit, the profit of the intermediary or the profit of third parties . Under Belgian law, there is also a requirement of segregation between the assets of participants’ clients and the own assets of a participant . Finally, there is a solidarity mechanism between all the clients of a particular participant within the system under which, in the event of the participant’s insolvency, the clearing or settlement institution will enforce its lien on the assets of this participant’s clients taken as a whole, i.e. without taking into account the positions of the individual clients . In the case of Luxembourg, the ECB notes that the draft law does not

text: 12 Article 10(1) of the loi du 15 décembre 2004 relative aux sûretés financières et portant des dispositions fiscales diverses en matière de conventions constitutives de sûreté réelle et de prêts portant sur des instruments financiers (Law of 15 December 2004 on financial collateral and various tax provisions in relation to in rem collateral arrangements and loans for financial instruments). Under

text: Article 10(1)

text: and (2) of this law, unless otherwise agreed between the parties, the lien of the pledgee prevails over the statutory lien of qualified intermediaries and clearing and settlement institutions as well as over the statutory lien of the Nationale Bank van België/Banque Nationale de Belgique (hereinafter the ‘NBB’), provided that the intermediary, the institution or the NBB, as the case may be, has agreed to register this pledge on financial instruments covered by the statutory lien to a special account in its books or has acknowledged that cash has been given as collateral.

text: 13 Article 148(3) of the loi du 6 avril 1995 relative au statut des entreprises d'investissement et à leur contrôle, aux intermédiaires et conseillers en placements (Law of 6 April 1995 on the legal status and supervision of investment firms, intermediaries and investment advisers), title as amended by the Law of 2 August 2002; and Article 31(5) of the Law of 2 August 2002.

text: 14 Standard 12, key element 6 of the Standards for Securities Clearing and Settlement in the European Union, jointly published by the ESCB and the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR), October 2004; available on the CESR and ECB websites (http://www.cesr-eu.org and http://www.ecb.int).

text: Article 13(7)

text: and (8) of Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on markets in financial instruments amending Council Directives

text: and

text: and Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing

text: Council Directive 93/22/EEC

text: (OJ L 145, 30.4.2004, p. 1; hereinafter the ‘MiFID’).

text: 16 Under Article 13(7) of the MiFID, when holding financial instruments belonging to clients, investment firms must safeguard clients’ ownership rights, especially in the event of the investment firm’s insolvency, and prevent the use of a client’s instruments on own account except with the client’s express consent. Article 13(8) of the MiFID provides that investment firms must also, except in the case of credit institutions, prevent the use of client funds for their own account.

text: Article 26

text: (16°) of the Law of 2 August 2002.

text: 19 Comments on the articles of the projet de loi modifiant la loi du 6 avril 1995 relative aux marchés secondaires, au statut des entreprises d’investissement et à leur contrôle, aux intermédiaires et conseillers en placement, et la loi du 4 décembre 1990 relative aux opérations financières et aux marchés financiers (draft law amending the Law of 6 April 1995 on secondary markets, the legal status and supervision of investment firms, intermediaries and investment advisers, and the Law of 4 December 1990 on financial operations and financial markets), 5 December 1995, comment on

text: Article 9

text: , p. 7; and the comments on the articles of the projet de loi relative à la surveillance du secteur financier et aux services financiers (draft law on the supervision of the financial sector and on financial services), 4 June 2002, comment on

text: Article 31

text: , p. 70. indicate whether the assets of participants’ clients would be treated on an individual basis and does not have any requirement to obtain the client’s consent for the use of these assets. Against this background, the ECB is of the view that the authorities of Luxembourg should consider the adoption of appropriate mechanisms ensuring both the protection of clients’ assets and the smooth operation of the clearing and settlement system. 11. Finally, the ECB understands that if a lien on the assets of a participant’s clients is granted to depositories, as contemplated by the draft law, the assets of a participant’s clients would not be available to collateralise credit extended to participants. However, it should be ensured that the increased opportunities for custodians to receive (intraday) credit, in cases where there are insufficient financial assets to collateralise such credit, do not risk creating moral hazard. General comments regarding implementation of the Collateral Directive 12. As previously noted, the ECB has an interest in the harmonised implementation of the Collateral Directive . In this regard, the ECB very much welcomes the fact that the draft law does not avail itself of any of the opt-out possibilities provided in the Directive. This will also help to ensure a broad application of the Directive’s provisions under the law in Luxembourg. In this regard the ECB would like to recall its position that ‘simple and reliable methods of collateralisation, which include efficient enforcement methods, are of fundamental interest to the Eurosystem, as they help, inter alia, to ensure the smooth functioning of the Eurosystem’s single monetary policy’ . For this reason, the ECB supports the authorities of Luxembourg’s grouping into a single law the provisions on different kinds of financial collateral arrangements. Personal scope of the Collateral Directive 13. The draft law applies to operations transferring title to assets as collateral, including by fiduciary means, and to operations involving repurchase agreements on property, in which the assignor or the assignee or both are ‘finance professionals’ . The recognition of the validity and third party enforceability of insolvency netting is subject to the condition that they result from operations subject to agreements or bilateral or multilateral netting clauses between two or more parties of whom at least one is a ‘finance professional’ . This concept of a ‘finance professional’ is very wide and encompasses, in addition to various public authorities and financial entities, any commercial or industrial establishment with professional access to the financial market, pension funds, securitisation bodies, entities or bodies participating in a securitisation operation and any

text: 20 See paragraph 2 of ECB Opinion

text: of 26 June 2003 at the request of the Austrian Federal Ministry of Justice on a draft Federal law implementing Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 June 2002 on financial collateral arrangements. See also paragraph 3 of ECB Opinion

text: of 4 August 2004 at the request of the Belgian Ministry of Finance on a draft law on financial collateral and various tax provisions in relation to in rem collateral arrangements and loans for financial instruments. Both are available on the ECB’s website (http://www.ecb.int).

text: 21 Paragraph 4 of ECB Opinion

text: 22 Articles 13 and 15 of the draft law.

text: 23 Article 18 of the draft law. other financial sector professional . As emphasised by the ECB in previous opinions ‘establishing different regimes for the creation and use of the same kind of collateral, depending on the type of parties involved, implies evaluating the status of the parties to an arrangement and tends to disrupt the operation of collateralised transactions’ . The ECB welcomes the fact that the personal scope of the draft law goes beyond the Collateral Directive’s requirements. In this respect, the fact that the concept of ‘commercial or industrial establishment enjoying professional access to the financial market’, includes for example, the finance company of a group or special vehicle enjoying the support of a large group , tends to indicate that the draft law would cover arrangements between two unregulated entities . When implementing the Collateral Directive a comparable approach was 28 29 also followed in Denmark and Germany with respect to transactions between corporates. 14. As regards pledges , the draft law applies, whatever the nature of the parties to the financial collateral arrangements, without restricting the categories of collateral takers or providers . The ECB notes in this respect that the Conseil d’Etat (the Council of State of Luxembourg), in a recent 32 33 opinion , suggests that, along the lines of the legislation adopted in Belgium , there should not be any limitation in terms of personal scope on other types of financial collateral arrangements such as repurchase agreements or transfers of title as collateral. This would imply that the requirement for the arrangements to be concluded with one finance professional would be abandoned, except for 34 35 fiduciaries . In line with its comments on the draft Belgian law on financial collateral , the ECB would welcome a ‘broad scope and uniform approach to financial collateral arrangements’. Material scope of the Collateral Directive 15. The draft law applies to pledge contracts concerning assets (‘avoirs’) , operations transferring title to assets as collateral and repurchase operations concerning all kinds of tangible or intangible property . Assets are defined as financial instruments and claims. While the concept of claims is not further defined in the draft law, financial instruments are defined in the broadest sense. The

text: 25 Paragraph 4 of ECB Opinion

text: 26 Comments on the articles of the draft law, comment on

text: Article 1

text: 27 See in this respect the opinion of the Chamber of Commerce of Luxembourg, 23 August 2004, p. 2.

text: 28 L 2003-12-19 nr 1171 Ændring af lov om værdipapirhandel m.v., lov om finansiel virksomhed med flere love; Act No 1171 of 19 December 2003, amending the law on trade in securities etc., the law on investment companies, and other legal acts.

text: 29 Gesetz zur Umsetzung der Richtlinie 2002/47/EG vom 6. Juni 2002 über Finanzsicherheiten und zur Änderung des Hypothekenbankgesetzes und anderer Gesetze (Law transposing Directive

text: of 6 June 2002 on financial collateral and amending the Mortgage Banking Law and other Laws).

text: Articles 3

text: to 12 of the draft law.

text: 31 This is confirmed by Article 18 of the draft law.

text: 32 Council of State of Luxembourg opinion of 13 April 2005 on Articles

text: and

text: 33 Law of 15 December 2004.

text: 34 Opinion of the Council of State of Luxembourg of 13 April 2005 on Articles

text: and

text: , p. 10.

text: 35 Paragraph 4 of ECB Opinion

text: 36 Article 3 of the draft law.

text: 37 Article 13 of the draft law. ECB understands that credit claims in the form of bank loans would be covered by the draft law. The ECB welcomes the approach proposed by the authorities of Luxembourg since it is in line with the ECB’s recommendation in its opinion on the proposed collateral directive, a recommendation which the ECB still supports. In particular, the ECB proposed extending the scope to ‘cover all types of assets that are eligible for Eurosystem credit operations, including, inter alia, credit claims in the form of bank loans’ . To date, some Member States have chosen to go beyond the Collateral Directive’s requirements with regard to the definition of the implementing legislation’s material scope, as the Collateral Directive refers to the more narrowly defined concepts of ‘financial instruments’ and ‘cash’. For example, in France, the material scope of the legislation implementing the Collateral Directive is extended to claims, bills and contracts, and different forms of rights, provided that they are assignable , while in Sweden the scope of the draft legislation transposing the Collateral Directive encompasses money loans . Netting provisions 16. The draft law covers the ‘netting of assets’ which includes both claims and financial instruments. Furthermore, the draft law’s definition of ‘close-out netting provision’ is very similar to the corresponding definition in the Collateral Directive . Title V of the draft law refers to the concepts of ‘close out netting’, ‘netting’, ‘agreements (‘conventions’) or bilateral or multilateral netting clauses between two or more parties’, and also ‘netting agreements’ (‘contrats de compensation’). The ECB notes that other provisions of the law in Luxembourg refer to the concept of ‘conventions de compensation et de novation’ . The comments on the articles justify the separate reference to netting agreements by the fact that netting may be either (i) a means of realising a financial collateral arrangement, in which case it is covered by this term; or (ii) an independent contract between professionals or between a professional and a non-professional, with this latter case covered by the use of the term ‘netting agreement’ . For the sake of clarity, it might be useful to define the concept of ‘netting agreements’ in the general provisions of the draft law and to ensure consistency in the use of the concepts of ‘contrat’ or ‘convention’ in relation to netting in both the draft law and other relevant provisions of the law in Luxembourg.

text: 39 Paragraph 10 of ECB Opinion

text: of 13 June 2001 at the request of the Council of the European Union concerning a proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on financial collateral agreements (OJ C 196, 12.7.2001, p. 10). See also paragraph 6 of ECB Opinion

text: 40 Articles L.431-7-1 and following of the Code Monétaire et Financier (the French Monetary and Financial Code), as amended by Ordinance No 2005-171 of 24 February 2005.

text: 41 See the Swedish legislative proposal on financial collateral (Regeringens proposition 2004/05:30 om finansiella säkerheter), adopted in April 2005, and the legislative amendments entering into force on 1 May 2005.

text: 42 Article 18 of the draft law.

text: 45 Article 61-14 of the loi du 5 avril 1993 relative au secteur financier (Law of 5 April 1993 on the financial sector).

text: 46 Comment on

text: Article 2

text: , p. 15. Private international law issues 17. The draft law contains a specific title on private international law issues which aims in particular to transpose the conflict-of-law rule contained in the Collateral Directive. In this respect, the ECB notes that the draft law reproduces almost verbatim the conflict-of-law provisions of the Directive . However, the draft law departs slightly from the Directive since two paragraphs have been added to the list of matters that may arise in relation to book-entry securities collateral that, under the Directive, are governed by the law of the country in which the relevant account is maintained . These two additional matters concern respectively: (i) the duties of the keeper of the relevant account towards a person other than the holder of the relevant account who claims concurrent rights on book-entry securities with this keeper against the relevant account holder or any other person ; and (ii) the extension of the financial collateral arrangement for book-entry securities to entitlements to dividends, income or other distributions, or to redemption, sale or other proceeds . The ECB has, in principle, no objection to these additional matters being subjected to the Collateral Directive’s conflict-of-law rule, although this goes beyond the Directive’s requirements. 18. The comments on the articles of the draft law point out that these two matters are directly inspired by the Hague Convention and that ‘since, according to the timetable currently planned, the Convention should be ratified rather rapidly and thus replace the Directive, it appeared useful to harmonise the scope of [Luxembourg] legislation with the scope of the Convention’ . The ECB stated in its recent opinion on a proposal for a Council decision concerning the signing of the Hague Convention that it ‘would, in view of the Convention’s possible implications and current Community legislation, … welcome a comprehensive prior assessment of the Convention’s impact in the Community. […] In order not to pre-empt an open-ended outcome, this assessment should be undertaken prior to a discussion of the possible signature of the Convention, considering that the existing Community regime is sufficiently satisfactory and does not require an urgent or compelling signature of the Convention’ . The European Commission shares this view and indicated in a recent Green Paper that it would prepare a legal assessment evaluating the concerns raised by the end of 2005, enabling it to decide then whether changes would be needed to the abovementioned proposal for a Council decision.

text: 51 Comment on

text: Article 23

text: , p. 22.

text: 53 Comment on

text: Article 23

text: , p. 22; November 2003.

text: 54 Paragraph 20 of ECB Opinion

text: of 17 March 2005 at the request of the Council of the European Union on a proposal for a Council decision concerning the signing of the Hague Convention on the Law applicable to certain rights in respect of securities held with an intermediary (COM(2003) 783 final), (OJ C 81, 2.4.2005, p. 10).

text: 55 ‘Green Paper on Financial Services Policy (2005-2010)’, COM(2005) 177, 3 May 2005, p. 10; available on the website of the European Commission (http://www.europa.eu.int). 19. The ECB doubts, as suggested in the explanatory text to the draft law, that the Hague Convention may serve as a basis for interpreting the conflict-of-law rule contained in the draft law. The essence of the Hague Convention’s conflict-of-law regime is that the law applicable to the issues covered by the Convention is the law in force in the State that the relevant intermediary and the account holder have expressly agreed as governing their account agreement, or the law of the State that their agreement expressly provides as applying to these issues. This primary rule is only tempered by the ‘reality test’ whereby the Convention also requires the relevant intermediary to have, at the time of the agreement, an office in that State which is engaged in a business or other regular activity of maintaining securities accounts. By contrast, the conflict-of-law rule proposed by the draft law refers to the law of the country in which the relevant account is located. This locationbased conflict-of-law rule is inconsistent with the Hague Convention’s conflict-of-law rule, which is primarily based on the freedom of contract of the relevant intermediary and the account holder, subject only to a relevant office requirement in order to avoid entirely arbitrary choices. If the Hague Convention were to be ratified by the Community, it would not therefore be possible to apply the conflict-of-law rule established by the draft law in the light of the Convention. 20. This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 25 May 2005. [signed] The President of the ECB Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: OJ L 333, 17.12.2001, p. 1. Regulation as last amended by Regulation ECB/2004/21 (OJ L 371, 18.12.2004, p. 42). 3 OJ L 10, 12.1.2002, p. 24. Regulation as amended by Regulation ECB/2004/21.

text: OJ L 241, 26.9.2003 p. 1. Guideline as amended by Guideline ECB/2004/1 (OJ L 83, 20.3.2004, p. 29).

text: OJ L 293, 24.10.1990, p. 1. Regulation as amended by

text: Commission Regulation (EC) No 29/2002

text: (OJ L 6, 10.1.2002, p. 3).

text: A ‘participating Member State’ is a Member State which has adopted the euro.

text: See Part 3 of Annex I to Regulation ECB/2001/13, table entitled ‘Detailed description of instrument categories of the monthly aggregated balance sheet of the MFI sector’, in particular categories 9, 11 and 13.

publisher: Europeiska centralbanken

sprak: en

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 30 May 2005 at the request of the Central Bank of Cyprus on a draft directive on the reporting by monetary financial institutions of their monthly balance sheets (CON/2005/13)

serie: con

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 30 May 2005 at the request of the Central Bank of Cyprus on a draft directive on the reporting by monetary financial institutions of their monthly balance sheets (

type: rubrik

text: 1. On 26 April 2005, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Central Bank of Cyprus (CBC) for an opinion on a draft directive on the reporting by monetary financial institutions of their monthly balance sheets (hereinafter the ‘draft directive’).

type: stycke

text: 2. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on the fourth indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft directive relates to the collection by the CBC of financial information submitted by reporting agents. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 3. The draft directive reflects the provisions of Regulation ECB/2001/13 of 22 November 2001 concerning the consolidated balance sheet of the monetary financial institutions sector , and incorporates the balance sheet requirements of Regulation ECB/2001/18 of 20 December 2001 concerning statistics on interest rates applied by monetary financial institutions to deposits and loans vis-à-vis households and non-financial corporations , Guideline ECB/2003/2 of 6 February 2003 concerning certain statistical reporting requirements of the European Central Bank and the procedures for reporting by the national central banks of statistical information in the field of money and banking statistics , and Guideline ECB/2002/7 of 21 November 2002 on the statistical reporting requirements of the European Central Bank in the field of quarterly financial accounts as well as other information required by the CBC for its own supervisory purposes. The draft directive prescribes the requirements for the statistical returns and the contents of the monthly balance sheets which monetary financial institutions (MFIs) are required to submit to the CBC and it is intended that it shall apply to all MFIs licensed to operate in Cyprus. It also includes a breakdown of loans by economic activity, in accordance with the NACE Revision 1.1 classification established by

text: Council Regulation (EEC) No 3037/90 of 9 October 1990

text: on the statistical classification of economic activities in the European Community , as required for financial stability purposes. The legal basis for the adoption of the draft directive is Section 63 of the Central Bank of Cyprus Laws of 2002 and 2003, and Sections 25 and 26 of the Banking Laws of 1997 to 2004 which, inter alia, empower the CBC, as the competent national authority for banking supervision in the Republic of Cyprus, to define certain reporting requirements necessary for the fulfilment of its objectives and for the exercise of its powers, and to impose these on MFIs in Cyprus. 4. The draft directive is intended to run in parallel with the CBC Balance Sheet Directive currently in force, until such time as the CBC has verified the correct implementation of the new reporting requirements imposed under the draft directive.

text: 5. Article 5.2 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank provides that the national central banks (NCBs) shall carry out, to the extent possible, the tasks described in Article 5.1 of the Statute, i.e. the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) tasks prescribed in the Treaty establishing the European Community and in the Statute. Article 43.1 of the Statute implies that legal instruments adopted by the ECB for the fulfilment of its statistical reporting requirements do not confer any rights or impose any obligations on the non-participating Member States.

text: 6. Article 10 of the Treaty requires that ‘Member States shall take all appropriate measures ... to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of this Treaty’. More specifically,

text: Article 4 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2533/98 of 23 November 1998

text: concerning the collection of statistical information by the European Central Bank requires that ‘Member States shall organise themselves in the field of statistics and shall fully cooperate with the ESCB in order to ensure the fulfilment of the obligations arising out of Article 5 of the Statute’.

text: Recital 17

text: of

text: Regulation (EC) No 2533/98

text: states that, ‘while it is recognised that the statistical information needed to fulfil the ECB’s statistical reporting requirements is not the same for the participating as for the non-participating Member States, Article 5 of the Statute applies to both participating and non-participating Member States’; this fact, together with Article 10 of the Treaty, implies an obligation to design and implement at the national level all the measures that Member States consider appropriate in order to carry out the collection of the statistical information needed to fulfil the ECB’s statistical reporting requirements and the timely preparations in the field of statistics in order for them to become participating Member States

text: 8. On the basis of the above, the ECB welcomes the CBC’s initiative to adopt a directive on the requirements for the statistical returns and the contents of the monthly balance sheets of MFIs, and notes that the reporting requirements of NCBs are an indispensable component of the national statistical collection systems. The ECB does not comment in detail on national reporting provisions, as these may differ considerably between Member States, depending on various national and external factors. The ECB’s comments are therefore of a general nature only, and are meant to serve as a guide, enabling the CBC to shape its balance sheet reporting requirements so as to bring them into line with those of the Eurosystem, in preparation for the adoption of the euro by the Republic of Cyprus.

text: 9. The ECB welcomes the core objective of the draft directive, which is to bring the balance sheet reporting requirements of the CBC into line with those prescribed under the relevant legal acts and instruments of the ECB. This revision of the reporting obligations of MFIs towards the CBC is welcome, since accurate and timely balance sheet statistical information is necessary for the CBC’s fulfilment of its tasks, also vis-à-vis the ESCB.

text: 10. The ECB observes that, in certain respects, the draft directive goes beyond what is strictly necessary for the fulfilment of the MFI balance sheet reporting requirements of the ECB. It is nevertheless noted that it is the task primarily of NCBs to assess whether any proposed detailed reporting instructions and collection methods at national level are the most efficient, effective and the least burdensome for the reporting agents concerned.

text: 11. The ECB notes that, although no money market funds (MMFs) have so far been identified among MFIs in Cyprus, the draft directive contains a definition of such entities and includes them within its scope. The inclusion of the additional item ‘Money market fund shares/units issued’ under ‘Liability categories’ in Section I.6 would better accommodate the possibility that licences to operate as an MMF may be granted to resident entities in the future.

text: 12. The ECB notes that, in Schedule No 13 of Section I.6, under the heading ‘Remaining liabilities’, the sub-item ‘Debts evidenced by certificates’ consists of financial instruments which would be classified either as ‘Deposits’ or ‘Debt securities issued’ under Regulation ECB/2001/13, depending on whether or not they are negotiable . Accordingly, a reclassification of the instruments referred to in the sub-item ‘Debts evidenced by certificates’ from the category of ‘Remaining liabilities’ to the categories ‘Deposits’ and/or ‘Debt securities issued’, as appropriate, would bring the reporting requirements in the draft directive more closely into line with those of Regulation ECB/2001/13.

text: 13. This opinion does not prejudice any later assessment by the ECB of the balance sheet reporting scheme applicable in the Republic of Cyprus or of the balance sheet information reported to the CBC against the balance sheet reporting requirements of the ECB.

text: 14. This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 30 May 2005. [signed] The President of the ECB Jean-Claude TRICHET

type: vagledning

utgivare: ecb


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 March 2000 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions, OJ L 126, 26.5.2000, p. 1. Directive as last amended by

text: Commission Directive 2004/69/EC

text: (OJ L 125, 28.4.2004, p. 44).

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 31 May 2005 at the request of Magyar Nemzeti Bank on a draft regulation on the calculation, method of allocation and placement of minimum reserves (CON/2005/14)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 31 May 2005 at the request of Magyar Nemzeti Bank on a draft regulation on the calculation, method of allocation and placement of minimum reserves (

text: 1. On 29 April 2005 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from Magyar Nemzeti Bank (MNB) for an opinion on a draft regulation on the calculation, method of allocation and placement of minimum reserves (hereinafter the ‘draft regulation’).

text: 2. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on

text: Article 2(2) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the legislative proposal contains provisions concerning the application of minimum reserve requirements for the implementation of monetary policy in a Member State that has not adopted the euro. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 3. The draft regulation will apply to credit institutions with an operating licence which are located in Hungary, including branches of credit institutions registered outside Hungary. It defines the reserve base and how the minimum reserves are to be held with MNB. MNB remunerates the required reserves according to a formula corresponding to the ECB’s, and the draft regulation amends the date thereof. Furthermore, the draft regulation lays down the procedures for verification and rectification of data, and procedures in the event of infringement of the minimum reserve requirements. Finally, the draft regulation specifies the sanctions regime to be applied by MNB where an infringement of the minimum reserve requirements has been identified. Generally speaking, the draft regulation does not significantly modify the existing minimum reserve system in Hungary. It only modifies its scope of application and MNB’s powers to impose sanctions, as well as making a minor change to the remuneration date.

text: 4. This is the first opportunity for the ECB to comment on MNB’s minimum reserve framework, after Hungary’s accession to the European Union in 2004. In view of Hungary’s intention to adopt the euro and the single monetary policy this entails, the ECB acknowledges MNB’s intention to bring the Hungarian minimum reserve system into line with the ECB’s minimum reserve framework. For this reason the ECB has undertaken a detailed comparison of the proposed MNB minimum reserve regime with that of the Eurosystem.

text: 5. The ECB welcomes the draft regulation as it further brings into line the Hungarian minimum reserve framework with that of the ECB. The ECB welcomes the draft regulation’s introduction of an express reference to credit institutions with an operating licence that are registered in European Economic Area countries and that conduct business in Hungary, thereby accommodating the ‘European Passport’ established by the Consolidated Banking Directive .

text: 6. The sanctions regime in Article 7 of the draft regulation distinguishes two cases in which sanctions may be applied: (a) where the average daily balance on the credit institution’s current account is insufficient, on the basis of data corrected after the end of the maintenance period by the credit institution; and (b) where the MNB identifies a shortfall, either through regular verification of compliance on the basis of end-of-month supervisory balance sheet data or by extraordinary on-site inspection. It should be noted that the ECB’s framework does not provide for such a distinction because the ECB does not allow revisions to the reserve requirement data after the start of the reserve maintenance period to which the reserve requirement refers. Indeed, any error in the reporting of statistical data affecting the reserve base would be dealt with under the ECB’s specific statistical reporting sanctions regime.

text: 7. The sanctions provided for in the draft regulation in the event of a ‘reserve deficit’ require unremunerated funds equal to the average daily shortfall for that maintenance period to be held on a separate account at MNB. In the second instance mentioned in paragraph 6 above (i.e. infringements identified by MNB), the amount would be 1.5 times the average daily shortfall. In both cases the funds would be held on an unremunerated basis for 30 days. If the credit institution’s liquidity situation does not allow for the imposition of such a sanction, the holding of funds may be spread over several maintenance periods. Moreover, if the credit institution’s holdings at the central bank do not cover the required funds, the central bank grants credit to the credit institution for the missing amount at a rate twice MNB’s base rate. On the other hand, the ECB, in the event of infringement of the minimum reserve requirements, notifies the corresponding sanction, a nominal amount determined on the basis of a predetermined formula, to the credit institution and its right to appeal within five working days. If the credit institution does not appeal, the sanction is imposed on the infringing credit institution’s reserve account.

text: 8. This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 31 May 2005. [signed] The President of the ECB Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 31 May 2005 at the request of the Danish Competition Authority on a proposal for a law amending the Act on certain means of payment (CON/2005/15)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 31 May 2005 at the request of the Danish Competition Authority on a proposal for a law amending the Act on certain means of payment (

text: 1. On 21 March 2005 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Konkurrencestyrelsen (the Danish Competition Authority) for an opinion on a proposal for a law amending the Lov om visse betalingsmidler (Act on certain means of payment) (hereinafter the ‘draft law’).

text: 2. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Article 105(4) of the Treaty establishing the European Community and the second and fifth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law contains provisions concerning means of payment and payment and settlement systems. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 3. The draft law focuses on two main issues. First, credit institutions established in Denmark, which jointly own and operate Dankort (the Danish debit card system), will no longer be allowed to charge consumers a fee of DKK 0.50 per physical transaction when consumers use a Dankort with a chip. Instead, according to the draft law, credit institutions will only be allowed to charge merchants an annual subscription fee for the costs of operating the Dankort system. Moreover, according to the draft law, the Minister of Economic and Business Affairs (hereinafter the ‘Minister’) may lay down detailed rules for how the annual Dankort subscription shall be calculated. Second, the draft law prohibits merchants from passing on Dankort costs to consumers both in respect of physical and non-physical (i.e., Internet) transactions. In addition, in accordance with powers given in Article 1.7 of the current Act on certain means of payment, the Minister may exempt internationally issued (i.e., non-Danish) means of payment from the provisions of the draft law. From the comments which accompanied the draft law, the ECB understands that it is intended that the Minister will exercise his existing right to issue secondary legislation to exempt payment instruments provided by service providers established outside Denmark from the provisions of the draft law, so that such service providers could still charge fees from the redeeming banks in connection with each transaction, and merchants would be free to charge the consumers for using such cards.

text: 4. While recognising that Denmark has not adopted the single currency, the ECB would like to draw attention to the European banking industry’s project for a Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA), the aim of which is to abolish barriers to payments within the euro area. More specifically, the purpose of the SEPA project is to create a single domestic payments market in which citizens and economic actors will be able to make payments as easily and inexpensively as in their place of residence. The establishment of a Single Payment Market is also an objective of the European Commission, which aims to bring European cross-border and national payments to the same level of efficiency as the best national system. Notwithstanding the right of national legislators to adopt legislation on consumer protection measures, the creation of national rules might have the potential to fragment the market, create obstacles and impose costs on providers and users who wish to operate and carry out transactions in the wider EU market. Another potential distortion may arise in the provision of acquiring services or issuing cards in Denmark, given that the existence of a business model which is fixed by law and which prohibits the imposition of charges on consumers will not facilitate other European business models entering the market.

text: 5. The ECB is of the opinion that legally binding measures to restrict free pricing have to be carefully considered and an assessment made as to whether they are compatible with the principle of an open market economy with free competition, as laid down by Article 4(1) of the Treaty and the other objectives recognised by the Treaty, and consistent with the principle of proportionality.

text: 6. This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 31 May 2005. [signed] The President of the ECB Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: EUT L 35, 8.2.2005, s. 23.

sprak: sv

title: Europeiska centralbankens yttrande av den 31 maj 2005 på begäran av Europeiska unionens råd över ett förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning om gemenskapsstatistik över utländska dotterbolags struktur och verksamhet (KOM(2005) 88 slutlig) (CON/2005/16)

text: 1. Den 6 april 2005 mottog Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) en begäran från Europeiska unionens råd om ett yttrande över ett förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning om gemenskapsstatistik över utländska dotterbolags struktur och verksamhet (nedan kallad den föreslagna förordningen).

text: 2. ECB:s behörighet att avge ett yttrande grundas på artikel 105.4 första strecksatsen i Fördraget om upprättandet av Europeiska gemenskapen. I enlighet med artikel 17.5 första meningen i arbetsordningen för Europeiska centralbanken har detta yttrande antagits av ECB-rådet.

text: 3. Syftet med den föreslagna förordningen är att skapa en gemensam ram för systematisk produktion av gemenskapsstatistik över utländska dotterbolags struktur och verksamhet. Inom denna ram kommer medlemsstaterna å ena sidan att rapportera uppgifter om utländska dotterbolag med hemvist i det land som sammanställer uppgifterna, men som kontrolleras av en utländsk institutionell enhet. Bilaga I till den föreslagna förordningen fastställer en gemensam modul för sådan statistik över utländska dotterbolag i det land som sammanställer uppgifterna (inward FATS). Å andra sidan är rapporteringen av uppgifter om utländska dotterbolag som inte har hemvist i det land som sammanställer uppgifterna, men som kontrolleras av en institutionell enhet med hemvist i det land som sammanställer uppgifterna för närvarande frivillig och kommer att bli föremål för pilotstudier som skall vara genomförda av vissa medlemsstater senast tre år efter det att den föreslagna förordningen har trätt i kraft. Bilaga II till den föreslagna förordningen fastställer en gemensam modul för sådan statistik över dotterbolag i utlandet (outward FATS).

text: 4. ECB välkomnar den föreslagna förordningen. Genom att en gemensam ram skapas, bör den föreslagna förordningen medföra att uppgifter om utländska dotterbolag bättre kan jämföras i EU, vilket gör att de lättare kan aggregeras på EU- och/eller euroområdesnivå och bli mer tillförlitliga för alla användare. Uppgifter om utländska dotterbolag sammanställs för närvarande av nationella statistikorgan (vanligtvis statistik över utländska dotterbolag i det land som sammanställer uppgifterna) och centralbanker (vanligtvis statistik över dotterbolag i utlandet) i medlemsstaterna. De sammanställningsmetoder som används är i linje med den föreslagna förordningen och sådana uppgifter torde också hjälpa ECB i bedömningen av den ekonomiska utvecklingen i samband med verksamheten i stora företag och deras utländska dotterbolag inom och utanför euroområdet. Dessa uppgifter anses i synnerhet vara värdefulla för att undersöka både trender avseende euroområdets handel samt prissättningsbeteende, liksom för förståelsen av utländska direktinvesteringars ekonomiska inflytande på t.ex. konkurrenskraft och sysselsättning.

text: 5. I detta sammanhang skulle ECB vilja ta tillfället i akt att kommentera vissa specifika bestämmelser i den föreslagna förordningen. ECB noterar att tillhandahållandet av statistik över dotterbolag i utlandet inte omedelbart blir obligatoriskt enligt den föreslagna förordningen. Först efter en treårsperiod kommer det att bli möjligt att bedöma resultaten av pilotstudierna som skall genomföras i vissa medlemsstater. ECB beklagar att det i den föreslagna förordningen inte görs en indelning av varor och tjänster i separata kategorier, trots att en indelning av varor och tjänster i separata kategorier avseende dataflödena för statistik över betalningsbalansen görs i avsnitt 2 i bilaga I till

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning (EG) nr 184/2005 av den 12 januari 2005

text: om gemenskapsstatistik över betalningsbalansen, internationell handel med tjänster och utländska direktinvesteringar. Om sådana uppgifter inte indelas i separata kategorier, kommer de att bli mindre värdefulla för analytiska ändamål och det kommer att bli svårare att jämföra dem med uppgifter som offentliggjorts i de länder som är euroområdets viktigaste motparter.

text: 6. En annan fråga är tidsfristen på 20 månader efter referensårets slut som medlemsstaterna har att översända statistik över utländska dotterbolag i det land som sammanställer uppgifterna, som avses i avsnitt 5 i bilaga I till den föreslagna förordningen. Detta framstår som en längsta möjliga tidsfrist för att kunna säkerställa en regelbunden utvärdering av den ekonomiska utvecklingen, vilken innefattar (frekventa) förändringar i stora företags struktur och deras dotterbolags antal, storlek och ekonomiska verksamhetsområde. ECB uppmuntrar därför parlamentet och rådet att överväga möjligheten att, efter en utvärdering av pilotstudier, förkorta den föreslagna tidsfristen på medellång sikt, åtminstone för aggregerade uppgifter (t.ex. Nivå 1, som det hänvisas till i den föreslagna förordningen). Detta skulle göra att den bättre överensstämmer med tidsramen för aggregerade uppgifter om utländska direktinvesteringar i förordning

text: (EG) nr 184/2005

text: i vilken en tidsfrist på nio månader föreskrivs.

text: 7. Efter att ha gjort en mer detaljerad bedömning av bilagorna I till III till den föreslagna förordningen noterar ECB att punkt 6 i bilaga I till förordning

text: (EG) nr 184/2005

text: som heter Nivåer för geografisk fördelning innefattar en ytterligare post som heter U4 Extra-euroområdet bredvid andra EU-poster. För att kunna ta fram aggregatet för euroområdet anser ECB att skulle det vara lämpligt att inkludera en liknande referens till Extra-euroområdet i bilaga III till den föreslagna förordningen som en ytterligare geografisk fördelningsnivå under rubriken Nivå 1. Slutligen hänvisas i motiveringen till EU-15 (och alternativt till medlemsstater i EU-15). ECB föreslår att det istället bör hänvisas till de nuvarande EU-25 och medlemsstater i EU-25.


text: EGT L 209, 2.8.1997, s. 6.

title: Europeiska centralbankens yttrande av den 3 juni 2005 på begäran av Europeiska unionens råd över ett förslag till rådets förordning om ändring av förordning (EG) nr 1467/97 om påskyndande och förtydligande av tillämpningen av förfarandet vid alltför stora underskott (KOM(2005) 155 slutlig) (CON/2005/17)

text: 1. Den 3 maj 2005 mottog Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) en begäran från Europeiska unionens råd om ett yttrande över ett förslag till rådets förordning om ändring av förordning

text: (EG) nr 1467/97

text: om påskyndande och förtydligande av tillämpningen av förfarandet vid alltför stora underskott (nedan kallad den föreslagna förordningen).

text: 2. ECB:s behörighet att avge ett yttrande grundas på artikel 104.14 andra stycket i Fördraget om upprättandet av Europeiska gemenskapen. I enlighet med

text: artikel 17.5

text: första meningen i arbetsordningen för Europeiska centralbanken har detta yttrande antagits av ECB-rådet.

text: 3. En sund finanspolitik är av avgörande betydelse för den ekonomiska och monetära unionens (EMU) framgång. Den är en förutsättning för makroekonomisk stabilitet, tillväxt och sammanhållning i euroområdet. Den finanspolitiska ram som fastställs i fördraget samt i stabilitets- och tillväxtpakten är en av EMU:s hörnstenar och således mycket viktig för att förankra förväntningar om budgetdisciplin. Detta regelbaserade ramverk som syftar till att säkerställa hållbara offentliga finanser samtidigt som svängningar i produktionen jämnas ut genom automatiska stabilisatorer, måste förbli klart, enkelt och verkställbart. Genom att dessa principer följs kommer också öppenhet och likabehandling vid genomförandet av detta ramverk att underlättas.

text: 4. Målet med den föreslagna förordningen är att spegla de förändringar i genomförandet av stabilitets- och tillväxtpakten som rådet (EKOFIN) kom överens om den 20 mars 2005. Den föreslagna förordningen gäller tillämpningen av förfarandet vid alltför stora underskott. Den föreslagna förordningens syfte är att garantera en sund finanspolitik genom att skapa incitament för budgetdisciplin. Trots att ECB inte anser det vara nödvändigt att yttra sig om de enskilda bestämmelserna i den föreslagna förordningen, så vill ECB ytterligare en gång påpeka att förfarandet vid alltför stora underskott måste vara både trovärdigt och effektivt samt iaktta en strikt tidsplan för att ge ett skydd mot ohållbara offentliga finanser. Mot denna bakgrund ser ECB helst en så begränsad ändring som möjligt av förordning

text: (EG) nr 1467/97

text: av den 7 juli 1997 om påskyndande och förtydligande av tillämpningen av förfarandet vid alltför stora underskott. En disciplinerad och konsekvent tillämpning av förfarandet vid alltför stora underskott främjar en balanserad finanspolitik.


title: Europeiska centralbankens yttrande av den 3 juni 2005 på begäran av Europeiska unionens råd över ett förslag till rådets förordning om ändring av rådets förordning (EG) nr 1466/97 om förstärkning av övervakningen av de offentliga finanserna samt övervakningen och samordningen av den ekonomiska politiken (KOM(2005) 154 slutlig) (CON/2005/18)

text: 1. Den 3 maj 2005 mottog Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) en begäran från Europeiska unionens råd om ett yttrande över ett förslag till rådets förordning om ändring av

text: rådets förordning (EG) nr 1466/97

text: om förstärkning av övervakningen av de offentliga finanserna samt övervakningen och samordningen av den ekonomiska politiken (nedan kallad den föreslagna förordningen).

text: 2. Den föreslagna förordningen grundar sig på artikel 99.5 i Fördraget om upprättandet av Europeiska gemenskapen. Även om denna bestämmelse inte uttryckligen föreskriver att ECB skall höras, är övervakningen av de offentliga finanserna samt övervakningen och samordningen av den ekonomiska politiken betydelsefull för Europeiska centralbankssystemets huvudmål att upprätthålla prisstabilitet. ECB:s behörighet att avge ett yttrande grundas sålunda på

text: artikel 105.4

text: första strecksatsen i fördraget. I enlighet med

text: artikel 17.5

text: 4. Målet med den föreslagna förordningen är att spegla de förändringar i genomförandet av stabilitets- och tillväxtpakten som rådet (EKOFIN) kom överens om den 20 mars 2005. Den föreslagna förordningen gäller övervakningsprocessen och uppsättandet av medelfristiga mål för medlemsstaternas finanspolitik. Trots att ECB inte anser det vara nödvändigt att yttra sig om de enskilda bestämmelserna i den föreslagna förordningen, så stöder ECB målet att förbättra övervakningen och samordningen av den ekonomiska politiken för att uppnå och upprätthålla medelfristiga mål som garanterar de offentliga finansernas hållbarhet. Ett disciplinerat och konsekvent genomförande av övervakningsförfarandena främjar en balanserad finanspolitik.


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 2 OJ L 181, 4.7.2001, p. 11. 3 OJ L 337, 20.12.2001, p. 49.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 7 June 2005 at the request of Magyar Nemzeti Bank on a draft regulation on technical tasks and other duties related to the protection of Hungarian and foreign legal tender against counterfeiting (CON/2005/19)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 7 June 2005 at the request of Magyar Nemzeti Bank on a draft regulation on technical tasks and other duties related to the protection of Hungarian and foreign legal tender against counterfeiting (

text: 1. On 13 April 2005, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from Magyar Nemzeti Bank (MNB) for an opinion on a draft regulation on technical tasks and other duties related to the protection of Hungarian and foreign legal tender against counterfeiting (hereinafter the ‘draft regulation’).

text: 2. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on the first and third indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft regulation concerns the fight against national and foreign currency counterfeits and a national central bank’s tasks. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the ECB, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 3. The draft regulation intends to implement

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 1339/2001 of 28 June 2001

text: extending the effects of

text: Regulation (EC) No 1338/2001

text: laying down measures necessary for the protection of the euro against counterfeiting to those Member States that have not adopted the euro as their single currency . It also intends to implement in Hungary Decision ECB/2001/11 of 8 November 2001 on certain conditions regarding access to the Counterfeit Monitoring System (CMS) . The draft regulation introduces the rules applicable to credit institutions, institutions entitled to carry out cash processing activities, institutions carrying out cash transfer services, institutions providing postal cash services, bureaux de change, MNB itself and natural persons, other legal entities and bodies that are not legal entities, when handling both the domestic and foreign banknotes and coins concerning the fight against counterfeiting. It also lays down rules for the authenticity check concerning suspicious, forfeited or genuine banknotes and coins.

text: 4. The ECB welcomes Article 2 of the draft regulation which introduces a unified protective regime for Hungarian and foreign legal tender. It observes, however, that

text: Article 4(1)

text: (b), which qualifies as genuine all foreign banknotes and coins complying with a mere description in the relevant legal act or notice, may not hold true in all circumstances, and would recommend deleting it. Article 4(3) of the draft regulation, setting the standards for the authenticity check of foreign banknotes and coins, would suffice.

text: 5. The ECB suggests ATM operators also to be covered by the scope of the draft regulation in

text: Article 1

text: , in accordance with the framework adopted by the Governing Council on 16 December 2004 for the detection of counterfeits and fitness sorting by credit institutions and other professional cash handlers. The importance of ATM transactions vis-à-vis over-the-counter transactions is expected to increase in the future, hence the required change.

text: 6. In accordance with

text: Article 3(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1338/2001

text: technical and statistical data relating to counterfeit notes and coins are gathered and indexed by the competent national authorities. The ECB presumes that the National Counterfeit Centre (NCC) will play this role, but an express reference in Article 10(1) of the draft regulation to

text: would be useful.

text: 7. The ECB notes that the draft regulation goes beyond the scope of

text: Article 6(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1338/2001

text: as it will oblige natural or legal persons or even unincorporated entities to send or hand over suspected banknotes or coins to MNB, in the event of the slightest doubt as to their authenticity. The ECB welcomes this approach. The ECB equally welcomes Article 8(3) of the draft regulation’s expressly attributing to MNB the general responsibility of keeping and handling all counterfeit banknotes.

text: obliges credit institutions and any other institutions engaged in cash handling to withdraw from circulation all counterfeit or presumably counterfeit euro banknotes and coins received by them and to hand them over to the competent national authorities. In order to reinforce this rule,

text: Article 6(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1338/2001

text: also requires a sanctions regime to be established. The ECB understands that the draft regulation itself cannot provide either for criminal sanctions, since Acts of Parliament establish these, or for administrative sanctions, which fall outside of MNB’s field of competence. Thus, the competent authorities will need to establish the effective, proportionate and deterrent sanctions required by

text: Regulation (EC) No 1338/2001

text: 9. The draft regulation also remains silent on the national authority designated by Hungary as the national central office within the meaning of the fourth indent of

text: Article 2

text: (b) of

text: Regulation (EC) No 1338/2001

text: . According to

text: Article 8 of Regulation (EC) No 1338/2001

text: information on any detected counterfeits is communicated to the abovementioned national central office with a view to its being forwarded to Europol through the Europol national unit. In addition, Member States are obliged to ensure the exchange of information between the national central office and the Europol national unit. The ECB recommends mentioning in the draft regulation the body acting as the national central office.

text: 10. This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 7 June 2005. [signed] The President of the ECB Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 14 June 2005 at the request of Latvijas Banka on the draft law amending the Law on Latvijas Banka (CON/2005/20)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 14 June 2005 at the request of Latvijas Banka on the draft law amending the Law on Latvijas Banka (

text: 1. On 27 April 2005 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from Latvijas Banka for an opinion on a draft law amending the Law on Latvijas Banka (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). Latvijas Banka has requested the ECB’s opinion before the submission of the draft law to the Latvian Ministry of Finance.

text: 2. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Article 105(4) of the Treaty establishing the European Community and the third indent of Article 2(1)of

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law concerns a national central bank. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 3. The ECB understands that the primary objective of the draft law is to ensure that the Law on the Latvijas Banka is compatible with the Treaty and the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank. The draft law contains six articles which mainly address issues raised in the ECB’s Convergence Report 2004, namely Latvijas Banka’s primary objective of price stability, its right to open accounts for members of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and the need for Latvijas Banka’s credit operations to be backed by adequate collateral. The draft law also contains two technical provisions which will update the Law on Latvijas Banka in accordance with other more recent Latvian legal acts.

text: 4. The ECB notes that the draft law, which would enter into force without delay after its adoption by the Latvian Parliament, addresses issues which are of immediate relevance in view of Latvijas Banka’s membership of the ESCB, as well as some of the issues which will need to be dealt with to ensure compatibility with Community law when Latvia adopts the euro and Latvijas Banka is fully integrated into the Eurosystem. In the latter context the ECB understands that further amendments to the Law on Latvijas Banka are currently being drafted as a separate exercise to cover the remaining issues not dealt with by the draft law.

text: 5. Pursuant to Article 3 of the Law on Latvijas Banka as currently drafted, Latvijas Banka’s main objective is to implement monetary policy by controlling the amount of money in circulation with the aim of maintaining price stability in the Latvian State. As noted in the ECB’s Convergence Report 2004, this provision requires adaptation in order to comply fully with the Treaty and the Statute. Under the draft law Latvijas Banka’s main objective is to maintain price stability. The ECB welcomes this adaptation which will allow Latvijas Banka to meet the criteria of functional independence as regards the ESCB’s primary objective of maintaining price stability.

text: 6. The ECB notes that, notwithstanding the draft law’s objective of ensuring the compatibility of the Law on Latvijas Banka with the Treaty and the Statute, the draft law does not deal with the issue of the personal independence of the members of Latvijas Banka’s Council (hereinafter the ‘Council’). The grounds for dismissal of the Governor, Deputy Governor and other members of the Council currently laid down in Article 22 of the Law on Latvijas Banka are that: (1) they have submitted their resignation, or (2) a court decision sentencing the Governor of Latvijas Banka, the Deputy Governor or a member of the Council for a deliberate crime has taken legal effect, or (3) the Governor of Latvijas Banka, the Deputy Governor or a member of the Council is unable to perform their functions for a period exceeding six successive months because of illness. It is recalled that the ECB’s Convergence Report 2004 concluded that the grounds for dismissal of the Governor of Latvijas Banka currently laid down in Article 22 of the Law on Latvijas Banka require further adaptation in order to comply fully with Article 14.2 of the Statute. The ECB therefore suggests that this issue be addressed in the draft law.

text: 7. Article 12 of the Law on Latvijas Banka currently provides that Latvijas Banka is entitled to open accounts only for the Latvian Government, foreign banks, international monetary, financial and credit institutions, Latvian banks and other credit institutions. Thus, as indicated in the ECB’s Convergence Report 2004, Latvijas Banka’s right to open accounts for credit institutions needs to be extended to comply with Article 17 of the Statute. The Law on Latvijas Banka may not in any case restrict Latvijas Banka’s right to open accounts for members of the ESCB/Eurosystem. The ECB therefore welcomes the suggested rewording of Article 12 of the Law on Latvijas Banka insofar as it is less restrictive than the current provisions of the Law. The ECB notes, however, that the suggested wording is still slightly more restrictive than what is required by Article 17 of the Statute, which provides that in order to conduct their operations, the ECB and the national central banks (NCBs) may open accounts for credit institutions, public entities and other market participants and accept assets, including book entry securities, as collateral. The current proposed wording of Article 12 of the Law only entitles Latvijas Banka to open accounts for the Government of Latvia, credit institutions, international organisations and ‘other institutions’. It does not explicitly refer to the members of the ESCB. In this regard it is noted that NCBs that are members of the ESCB are established under different legal arrangements, all of which might or might not be covered by the concept of ‘institutions’ (some of the NCBs are not strictly public institutions but instead are established as companies). Therefore, in order to avoid any doubts as to whether ESCB members are covered by Article 12 of the Law on Latvijas Banka, the ECB recommends including an explicit reference to them in the draft law. Furthermore, Article 17 of the Statute refers to other market participants, although it is not entirely clear whether such other market participants would also be covered by the current wording of the draft law. Therefore, for the purposes of clarity, the ECB would welcome the inclusion of an explicit reference to market participants in the draft law.

text: 8. Article 36 of the Law on Latvijas Banka provides that Latvijas Banka is entitled to grant short-term loans against collateral to those Latvian banks and other credit institutions, foreign banks, and international foreign exchange, financial and credit institutions that have opened an account with Latvijas Banka. In its Convergence Report 2004 the ECB noted that pursuant to the second indent of Article 18.1 of the Statute, Article 36 of the Law on Latvijas Banka will need to subject credit operations with credit institutions and other market participants to adequate collateral. As a consequence, the ECB welcomes the suggested rewording of

text: Article 36

text: , which provides that Latvijas Banka shall be entitled to effect, against adequate collateral, credit operations with credit institutions and other financial market participants. However, from a strictly drafting perspective it is noted that, while the draft law refers only to credit operations, Article 18 of the Statute refers to all types of open market operations. While it is aware of Latvijas Banka’s intention to draft further amendments in order to ensure full compliance with the Treaty and the Statute when Latvijas Banka joins the Eurosystem, the ECB would still welcome at this stage a more extensive alignment of the text of Articles 36 and 37 of the Law on Latvijas Banka with the relevant provisions of Article 18 of the Statute in order to reflect Latvijas Banka’s entitlement to conduct a wide range of open market operations both for liquidity providing and absorbing purposes.

text: 9. This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 14 June 2005. [signed] The President of the ECB Jean-Claude TRICHET