text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).

text: Diário da República, No 114 Series 1, of 18 May 1979.

text: For the present purpose, this means the automatic appointment of members of the management bodies of the owner institution to the management and supervisory bodies of savings banks.

text: Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 26 June 2013, on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive

text: and repealing Directives

text: and

text: (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 338).

text: Regulation (EU) No 575/2013

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 26 June 2013, on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending

text: Regulation (EU) No 648/2012

text: (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 1).

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 7 July 2015 on a new legal framework for savings banks (CON/2015/23)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 7 July 2015 on a new legal framework for savings banks (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 15 May 2015, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Portuguese Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft decree-law (hereinafter the ‘draft decree-law’) establishing a new legal framework for savings banks (hereinafter the ‘new legal framework’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the sixth indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft decree-law relates to rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft decree-law 1.1 The draft decree-law sets out a new legal framework for savings banks (caixas económicas), and repeals the previous framework detailed in Decree-Law 136/79, of 18 May 1979 . At present, savings banks are special credit institutions which carry out limited banking business, although the Banco de Portugal (BdP) may authorise them to carry out other operations which may be carried out by banks. 1.2 The main purpose of the draft decree-law is to adjust the rules governing savings banks to reflect the gradual expansion to full-service banking by certain savings banks that has taken place during the last few decades. The new legal framework, while maintaining the community-oriented purposes of the savings banks, aims to define their nature and the relationship with their owner institutions, to strengthen their governance, and to define the terms on which they carry out banking business. 1.3 To that end, the draft decree-law sets out two separate regimes, depending on the volume of assets of the already-existing savings banks, of which there are currently four in Portugal. Those which have assets greater than or equal to EUR 50 000 000 are classified as full-service savings banks (caixas económicas bancárias) and those whose assets are below that threshold are classified as affiliated savings banks (caixas económicas anexas). Both types of savings banks will

text: continue to be controlled by a single institution, either a mutual society or other charitable institution. The full-service savings banks’ owner institution will be required to retain, directly or indirectly, either a majority of the voting rights or a majority shareholding in the institution. For this purpose, full-service savings banks will assume the form of a public limited company with a public ownership structure. Additionally, the full-service savings banks will be comparable to regular commercial banks, and entitled to carry out all forms of business which may be carried out by banks in accordance with law, and they will be subject to the same prudential rules. 1.4 This distinction between full-service savings banks and affiliated savings banks will also apply to new savings banks that are incorporated after the draft decree-law enters into force. Although they are currently incorporated on the basis of an authorisation from the Ministry of Finance, which first consults the BdP, under the draft decree-law, authorisation from the BdP will be required for new savings banks. 1.5 The draft decree-law also ensures the separation and independence of the management and supervisory boards of savings banks from their respective owner institution, specifically prohibiting ex officio appointments .

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 The ECB welcomes the draft decree-law as it adapts the legal framework for savings banks to take into account developments in the financial sector, in particular the fact that certain savings banks are already authorised to carry out other operations carried out by banks, approaching a full-service banking model and acquiring a profit-making dimension. Therefore, the ECB recognises, in general terms, the benefit of defining the nature of savings banks and the terms under which they conduct their business, as well as strengthening their respective governance models and clarifying the relationship with their owner institutions. 2.2 The ECB acknowledges that the draft decree-law aims at preserving the community-oriented purpose of savings banks, which accounts for the distinction between affiliated savings banks and full-service savings banks, as well as the legal requirement for the owner institutions of the latter to retain a majority of voting rights or shares. The ECB welcomes the possibility that private investors may participate in the share capital of full-service savings banks, since this could help stabilise the capital base of savings banks by opening up a new source of funding.

text: 3. Specific observations

text: 3.1 Application of Directive

text: and Regulation 575/2013 to savings banks 3.1.1 According to point (19) of

text: Article 2(5) of Directive 2013/36/EU

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council , savings banks in existence on 1 January 1986 fall outside the scope of application of

text: that Directive and, therefore, of Regulation 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council , taking into account its scope of application as defined in

text: Article 1

text: thereof. Exception is made, however, for those incorporated as limited companies, of which there are currently none, and to Caixa Económica Montepio Geral, as specified in Directive

text: , which is explicitly subject to the prudential requirements of Directive

text: and Regulation 575/2013. 3.1.2 Any new savings banks, whether affiliated or full-service, will be subject to the same prudential requirements as any other credit institution under Directive

text: and Regulation 575/2013. 3.1.3 In addition, the ECB understands that transforming a savings bank into a public limited company would cause Directive

text: and Regulation 575/2013 to be applicable, since the exemption in point (19) of

text: Article 2(5) of Directive 2013/36/EU

text: would no longer apply. 3.2 Incorporation of new savings banks and maintenance of assets above EUR 50 000 000 3.2.1 As indicated above, the draft decree-law generally permits the incorporation of new savings banks as either affiliated savings banks or full-service savings banks depending on whether the institution has assets below or above EUR 50 000 000. Taking into consideration the fact that, before incorporation takes place, there are no assets to account for except the initial capital proposed, it is possible to assume that this initial capital will determine the applicable category. This would mean that a new full-service savings bank would always need an initial capital of at least EUR 50 000 000, which is much higher than the lower limit established for banks (also full-service) referred to in Article 18(2) of the new legal framework. The Portuguese authorities may wish to explicitly address this question in the draft decree-law. 3.2.2 The draft decree-law does not indicate what happens if the assets of a full-service savings bank fall or remain below the EUR 50 000 000 threshold, as Article 6 of the draft decree-law only provides a solution for an affiliated savings bank which has assets greater than or equal to EUR 50 000 000 over two consecutive years, in which case it shall be converted, from the third year, to a full-service savings bank. One possible interpretation is that the draft decree-law allows full-service savings banks to maintain their nature and their services, even if their assets fall below the threshold of EUR 50 000 000, while keeping them subject to a more restrictive prudential regime. The Portuguese authorities may wish to explicitly address this issue as well. 3.2.3 Furthermore, from the point of view of legislative technique, the ECB notes that, as Article 6 of the draft decree-law does not seem to be limited to already-existing savings banks, its text could be included in the text of the new legal framework itself. 3.3 Other specific observations 3.3.1 For purposes of clarity, as well as to reinforce its interpretation, the ECB considers it useful and pertinent to make the following final comments regarding the draft decree-law: (a) Article 4(2) of the draft decree-law sets out a transitional rule according to which the BdP may require full-service savings banks existing at the date of entry into force of the draft

text: decree-law to be transformed, within a reasonable period of time, into public limited companies, depending on the complexity or risk profile of their business activities. While, in principle, given the purpose of the draft decree-law, a legally binding deadline would be justified rather than conferring responsibility for setting the relevant deadline on the BdP, the ECB understands that setting each deadline by means of an order issued by the BdP allows for the flexibility to adapt the transformation process according to the specific features of each savings bank. (b) It is not entirely clear from Article 5 of the new legal framework whether investors other than mutual societies or other charitable institutions can participate in the share capital of fullservice savings banks. Since this is one of the main changes to the previous legal framework governing these institutions, the draft decree-law would benefit from some clarification in this regard. (c) Article 5(3) of the new legal framework provides, only for interpretation and clarification purposes, that the holdings of an owner institution in a savings bank are relevant for the assessment of qualifying holdings for the purposes of the legislation applicable to credit institutions. However, since other investors will also be allowed to participate in the share capital of full-service savings banks to a level up to 49%, the draft decree-law should clarify that such other holdings will also be assessed under the prudential rules on qualifying holdings. (d) Article 19(2) of the new legal framework provides that the members of the management and supervisory bodies of full-service savings banks are to be distinct and independent from the members of the bodies of their respective owner institution, further specifying that they are not to be appointed on an ex officio basis. In order to prevent an improper interpretation according to which the same person could be appointed both to the bodies of the owner institution and of the savings bank as long as it is not via ex officio, it would be convenient to adopt different wording to make clear that the prohibition of an ex officio appointment is merely by way of example.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 7 July 2015.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: Law 3832/2010 on the Hellenic Statistical System and the Establishment of a Hellenic Statistical Authority as an Α independent authority (Official Gazette of the Republic, 38 , 09.03.2010). 2

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42). 3 Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 2533/98 of 23 November 1998

text: concerning the collection of statistical information by the European Central Bank (OJ L 318, 27.11.1998, p. 8). 5

text: Regulation (EC) No 223/2009

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2009 on European statistics and repealing Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1101/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the transmission of data subject to statistical confidentiality to the Statistical Office of the European Communities,

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 322/97

text: on Community Statistics, and

text: Council Decision 89/382/EEC

text: , Euratom establishing a Committee on the Statistical Programmes of the European Communities (OJ L 87, 31.3.2009, p. 164). 6 See also paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2 of Opinion

text: , and Opinion

publisher: Europeiska centralbanken

sprak: en

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 15 July 2015 on amendments to the law on the Hellenic Statistical System and the Hellenic Statistical Authority (CON/2015/24)

serie: con

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 15 July 2015 on amendments to the law on the Hellenic Statistical System and the Hellenic Statistical Authority (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

type: rubrik

text: On 14 July 2015, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Greek Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft law on urgent measures for the negotiation and conclusion of an agreement with the European Stabilisation Mechanism which, inter alia, amends Law 3832/2010 (hereinafter the ‘HSTAT Law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third and fourth indents of

text: , as the draft law relates to the Bank of Greece and the collection, compilation and distribution of monetary, financial, banking, payment systems and balance of payments statistics. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

type: stycke

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law and general comments

text: 1.1 The aim of the draft law is to improve the general functioning of the production of official statistics in Greece, further guarantee the independence of the Hellenic Statistical Authority (HSTAT), and ensure consistency between national law and updated Union legislation in the field of statistics. 1.2 The ECB broadly welcomes the objectives of the draft law. However, the ECB is of the opinion that the draft law should explicitly recognise the role and the independence of the Bank of Greece in the area of official statistics, and define in a general manner its rights and obligations in this regard. As explained further in this opinion, and with reference to its opinion of 23 February 2010 , the ECB would strongly welcome the inclusion in the draft law of provisions recognising the two separate but complementary legal frameworks under which official statistics are developed, produced and disseminated, on the one hand by HSTAT, operating within the partnership of the European Statistical System (ESS), and on the other hand by the Bank of Greece, as a member of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB).

text: 2. Specific comments

text: 2.1 The statistical principles governing the production of European statistics by the ESCB under

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 2533/98

text: are similar but not identical to the statistical principles governing the production of European statistics by the ESS under

text: Regulation (EC) No 223/2009

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council . 2.2 For reasons of legal certainty, the ECB would therefore welcome the express recognition, in the draft law, of the two sets of principles applicable to the production of statistics, one applying to HSTAT and the other applying to the Bank of Greece. The draft law could therefore make it explicit that the statistical principles contained in

text: Regulation (EC) No 223/2009

text: govern the production of official statistics by HSTAT, while the Bank of Greece, in its capacity as member of the ESCB, should apply the statistical principles contained in

text: Regulation (EC) No 2533/98

text: 3. Independence of the Bank of Greece

text: The ECB would welcome more explicit recognition in the draft law of the independence of the Bank of Greece as a body concerned with and producing official statistics in its areas of competence. The ECB would therefore recommend introducing drafting clarifications in the draft law, more specifically, in its provisions amending Articles 1 and 2 of the HSTAT Law, to more effectively guarantee the independence of the Bank of Greece. More particularly, the draft law should make it clear that cooperation between the Bank of Greece and HSTAT shall be without prejudice to the independence of the Bank of Greece and its tasks within the statistical framework of the ESCB .

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 15 July 2015.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI

type: vagledning

utgivare: ecb


text: Draft law on the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms (transposition of Directive

text: ) and other provisions.

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42). 3 Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending

text: Council Directive 82/891/EEC

text: , and Directives

text: and

text: , and Regulations

text: (EU) No 1093/2010

text: and

text: (EU) No 648/2012

text: , of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 190). 4 See Articles

text: et seq. of Law 4261/2014 (formerly Law 3601/2007) and secondary legislation, Decisions of the Credit and Insurance Committee No 21/4.11.2011, 77/30.5.2013.

text: See Opinions

text: and

text: . All ECB opinions are available on the ECB website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 6

text: Regulation (EU) No. 575/2013

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending

text: Regulation (EU) No 648/2012

text: (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 1). 7

text: Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013

text: conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63). 8 See Article 4(10) of Law 4261/2014 implementing Article 4(7) of Directive No.

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive

text: and repealing Directives

text: and

text: (CRDIV) (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 338). 9 See Article 38(1) of the draft law. 10 See Article 40(1) of the draft law.

text: 12 management vehicles under the asset separation tool ; (d) to give effect to the bail-in tool ; (e) to make a determination that, unless the write down or conversion power is exercised in relation to a subsidiary, the group will no longer be viable; and (f) having a direct fiscal impact or systemic implications. - Competent authorities (as defined in the CRR ) are authorised to adopt early intervention measures and to appoint a commissioner in cases where there is a significant deterioration in a credit institution’s financial situation or where there are serious infringements of law, regulations or the statutes of the institution, or serious administrative irregularities. The commissioner’s expenses must be covered by the credit institution. However in cases where the credit institution is not able to discharge such obligations, the Bank of Greece must step in to cover the expenses . The Bank of Greece will have a claim against the institution in accordance with

text: Article 55

text: E of its Statute. - Resolution authorities may apply four resolution tools individually or in combination. These tools are the sale of business tool, the bridge institution tool, the asset separation tool, and the bail-in tool. It is worth noting that the provisions on the bail-in tool, along with the powers of write down and conversion associated with the bail-in tool, will be applicable in Greece only from 1 January 2016 . - When exercising their powers, the resolution authorities are required to ensure the full protection of the deposits of the Greek State in any appropriate way. - The bridge institution shall be a legal person wholly or partially owned by one or more public authorities, which may include the resolution financing arrangement or the resolution authority, and shall be controlled by the resolution authority. In this respect, the draft law deviates from the existing resolution framework which provides that a bridge institution shall be owned and controlled by the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund (HFSF) . - Public financial support may be provided through the adoption of the public equity support tool or the temporary public ownership tool. - In accordance with the no creditor worse off principle, shareholders or creditors that have incurred greater losses in a resolution than they would have incurred in a winding-up under normal insolvency proceedings are entitled to the payment of the difference from the resolution financing arrangement. - Procedural requirements are established to ensure that resolution actions are properly notified and that resolution authorities are subject to an adequate confidentiality regime. Resolution authorities, competent authorities and the MoF are also required to provide one

text: See Article 42(1) of the draft law. 12 See Article 43(1) of the draft law. 13

text: Article 2

text: , point 5 of the draft law. 14 Article 137 of Law 4261/2014 as amended by Article 120 of the draft law. 15 Article 132(1) of the draft law. 16 The exercise of shareholder rights in bridge institutions is one of the HFSF’s tasks under Article 2 of the HFSF Statute (Law 3864/2010).

text: Article 29 of the draft law and amendments to Article 137 of Law 4261/2014. 18 Article 137 of Law 4261/2014, as amended by the draft law. 19 Article 110(3) of the draft law. 20 Amendment to Article 62(4) of Law 4261/2014. 21 Article 120 of the draft law, inserting a new

text: Article 145

text: a in Law 4261/2014. 22 Article 154 of the Insolvency Code. 23 Under Articles 57 and 58 of the draft law respectively.

text: See Opinion

text: . 25 See paragraph 2.3.2 of Opinion

text: . This position departs from the one set out in Opinions

text: and

text: . 26 ibid. See also Opinion

text: . 27

text: Article 18(3)

text: (b) of the draft law. 28 ibid.

text: See Articles 38(1), 40(1), 42(1), 43(1) and 59(7) of the draft law. 30 See paragraph 3.3 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 3.2.2 of Opinion

text: . 31 See paragraph 3.3 of Opinion

text: . 32 See paragraph 3.2.6 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 4.3 of Opinion

text: , paragraphs 5.1 and 5.2 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 3.1 of Opinion

text: . 33 See the second subparagraph of

text: Article 3(3)

text: BRRD. 34 See the CRR; and CRDIV. 35 See paragraph 3.1 of Opinion

text: . 36 See paragraph 4 of Opinion

text: Article 72(4) of the draft law. 38 See paragraph 3.2.10 of Opinion

text: . 39 See the ECB’s 2014 Convergence Report, p. 29. 40 See paragraph 3.2.9.3 of Opinion

text: . 41 See Article 38 of the Civil Servants Code (Law 3528/2007). 42 See

text: Articles 40(2)

text: (a) and 42(2)(a) BRRD. 43

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 of 13 December 1993

text: specifying definitions for the application of the prohibitions referred to in Articles

text: and

text: b (1) of the Treaty (OJ L 332 , 31.12.1993, p. 1).

text: See paragraph 3.3 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 5 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 3.6 of Opinion

text: . 45 See the ECB’s 2014 Convergence Report, p. 25. 46 See paragraph 3.1 of Opinion

text: . 47 Article 18(4) of the draft law. 48 See paragraph 3.2 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 3.3 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 3.4 of Opinion

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 20 July 2015 on recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms (CON/2015/25)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 20 July 2015 on recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 19 July 2015 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Greek Ministry of Finance (MoF) for an opinion on a draft law on the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The MoF asked for the adoption of the ECB’s opinion on an urgent basis. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and on the third and sixth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft law relates to the Bank of Greece and to rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. For elements of the draft law the exclusive purpose of which is the transposition of Union law, the ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Article 25.1 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The purpose of the draft law is to implement into Greek law Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council (the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive, or ‘BRRD’) , thereby aligning the Greek legal framework for the recovery and resolution of certain types of entities active in financial markets, including credit institutions, investment firms, and financial holding companies that have their head office in Greece with the existing Union legislation in this field. 1.2 Greece has enacted comprehensive legislation that introduced mechanisms to resolve failing 4 5 institutions since 2011, prior to the adoption of the BRRD , on which the ECB has been consulted .

text: This framework authorised the Greek resolution and supervisory authorities to take action in order to prevent systemic crises, protect depositors, safeguard public confidence in the banking system and promote financial stability. Following the establishment of the new European framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms it was necessary to replace the existing Greek legislation with a new framework addressing in a uniform manner all issues associated with the potential failure of financial sector entities. 1.3 The draft law comprises 20 chapters which in particular regulate the preparation of recovery and resolution plans, the provision of intragroup financial support, the exercise of early intervention powers, the adoption of resolution measures and their objectives, the powers of the resolution authorities, the provision of public financial support, the protection of the rights of shareholders and creditors in the context of resolution, and the use of resolution financing arrangements. The draft law also introduces necessary amendments to relevant existing legislation in order to ensure its compatibility with the new framework. 1.4 The main provisions of the draft law are as follows: - The Bank of Greece, which is the national competent authority for supervising Greek credit institutions, in accordance with

text: Regulation (EU) 575/2013

text: (the Capital Requirements Regulation, or ‘CRR’) and Council Regulation 1024/2013 (the ‘SSM Regulation’), is designated as the national resolution authority for those institutions; and the Hellenic Capital Markets Commission, which is the competent authority for supervising Greek investment firms, is designated as the national resolution authority for those firms. The Greek resolution authorities shall exercise their resolution tasks separately and independently from their supervisory tasks . - The MoF is designated as the competent ministry under the draft law. The resolution authorities are required to inform the MoF of their decisions pursuant to the draft law and have its consent before adopting any decision: (a) to transfer to a purchaser shares or other ownership instruments issued by an institution under resolution, or all or any assets, rights or liabilities of an institution under resolution under the sale of business tool ; (b) to transfer to a bridge institution shares or other ownership instruments issued by an institution under resolution, or all or any assets, rights or liabilities of an institution under resolution under the bridge institution tool ; (c) to transfer assets, rights or liabilities and contractual arrangements of an institution under resolution or a bridge institution to one or more asset

text: another upon request with all the information relevant for the other authority to carry out its tasks. - The Resolution Branch of the Deposit Guarantee Scheme is designated as the resolution financing arrangement for credit institutions. The Resolution Branch of the Investment Guarantee Fund is designated as the resolution arrangement for investment firms. - Competent authorities and resolution authorities are authorised to impose administrative measures and administrative sanctions. - With regard to the appointment of a commissioner , as outlined above, where the removal of the senior management or the executive board of an institution is deemed to be insufficient to restore that institution’s financial situation, the competent authority may appoint one or more commissioners to the institution. This complements the framework under which the commissioners are appointed . - The civil liability of resolution authorities towards third parties for actions or omissions in the performance of their duties under the draft law is limited to gross negligence and wilful misconduct. Resolution authorities are liable for damages suffered as a result of a decision that was annulled . The civil liability of the governor, the deputy governors, all members of collective bodies and members of staff of the Bank of Greece towards third parties for actions or omissions in the performance of their duties related to any competence exercised by the Bank of Greece in its capacity as a public authority has been amended. The new provision will expose these officers and staff of the Bank of Greece to liability not only for wilful misconduct, but also for gross negligence . - The ranking of creditors in the context of any future special liquidation of credit institutions has been amended so as to rank claims in the following order : (a) preferential claims arising out of insolvency proceedings and claims in case the public equity support tool or the temporary public ownership tool are exercised ; (b) claims arising out of deposits guaranteed under the deposit guarantee scheme; (c) general claims of the State; (d) the following claims will be satisfied on a pro-rata basis: (i) claims of the Resolution Fund, (ii) deposits above the guaranteed threshold for private individuals and micro, small and medium-sized enterprises; and (e) claims arising out guaranteed investment services.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 The draft law arises out of the Euro Summit Statement of 12 July 2015, pursuant to which the Greek authorities committed to enact a series of measures by 22 July, including the transposition of

text: the BRRD, with support from the European Commission. 2.2 The ECB would like to stress that, given the very short time in which it has considered this important legislation, it has not been possible to assess all of the many legal and regulatory issues which this draft law undoubtedly raises. 2.3 The ECB welcomes the draft law, as it strengthens the tools and procedures available to the Bank of Greece to carry out effective preventive, early intervention and effective resolution measures in line with the common framework of intervention powers, rules and procedures laid down in the BRRD. 2.4 The ECB stresses, however, that it does not opine on whether the draft law effectively discharges the obligations of the Greek State to implement the BRRD in Greek law. Rather, the ECB focuses primarily on those provisions that may impact on the role and tasks of the Bank of Greece as a central bank and as a member of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB). 2.5 It is worth noting that the ECB has developed guidance, in the form of general and specific considerations, on the basis of which it may decide whether a new task conferred on an ESCB national central bank (NCB) is to be considered a central banking task or a government task for the purposes of assessing such conferral against the prohibition of monetary financing under Article 123 of the Treaty . This guidance applies to genuinely new tasks that either did not exist in the past or did not form an integral part of the central banking tasks assigned to the NCB in the past. The tasks currently discharged by an NCB as central banking tasks are not reviewed and recategorised, but may be reassessed if they are subject to legislative amendments of substance. The ECB has clarified that resolution tasks can be considered central banking tasks, provided that they do not undermine an NCB’s independence in accordance with Article 130 of the Treaty . In this respect, it is noted that the Bank of Greece has already been conferred with extensive powers to take specific resolution measures vis-à-vis credit institutions since 2011 . Hence, the draft law does not constitute a substantive change in the supervisory, financial stability, and resolution tasks carried out by the Bank of Greece and is expected to have a limited impact on the overall functions carried out by it. 2.6 It is clear that the draft law does not authorise the Bank of Greece to provide any loan or financing under any circumstance to the Resolution Fund . The provision of such financing to the Resolution Fund would constitute a government task, and any such loan or financing by the Bank of Greece would therefore breach the prohibition of monetary financing under the Treaty .

text: 3. Specific observations

text: 3.1 Consent of the MoF 3.1.1 The ECB notes that the Resolution Committee of the Bank of Greece is required, before deciding to take a resolution measure, to obtain the prior consent of the MoF in a broad range of circumstances. This provision purports to implement Article 3(6) of the BRRD. However, by requiring the MoF’s prior consent for all decisions pertaining to the sale of a business, the settingup of a bridge bank, asset separation, bail-in, write down or conversion , regardless of whether they have a direct fiscal impact or systemic implication, the draft law seems to go beyond Article 3(6) of the BRRD. Further, it is important that the Bank of Greece should have ultimate control over any decision related to a resolution matter that could affect the Bank of Greece’s financial independence . 3.1.2 Moreover, in requiring the Bank of Greece as the resolution authority to obtain the MoF’s prior consent before taking resolution actions in a broad range of circumstances, the question arises as to whether the MoF may be considered to be a second resolution authority alongside the Bank of Greece. The consulting authority is invited to consider whether the MoF’s prior consent should be more appropriately limited to those cases in which the resolution measures have a direct fiscal impact or systemic implications, as required by Article 3(6) of the BRRD. This would avoid the MoF acting de facto as a joint resolution authority alongside the Bank of Greece, since if this were the case the MoF would need to ensure the operational independence of its resolution function . 3.2 Conflicts of interests with other tasks of the Bank of Greece 32 33 3.2.1 The ECB has repeatedly noted that, in line with the BRRD , staff involved in carrying out the functions of a resolution authority in accordance with the Directive must be structurally separate and subject to separate reporting lines from those involved in carrying out prudential banking supervision tasks pursuant to applicable EU legal acts or with regard to the other functions of the relevant authority. The BRRD ‘exceptionally’ allows one authority to carry out both resolution and supervisory functions on the condition that adequate structural arrangements are put in place in order to ensure operational independence and to avoid conflicts of interest between that authority’s resolution function and its other functions. For example, the BRRD envisages structural separation being achieved by keeping the reporting lines for staff involved in carrying out resolution tasks separate from those used by staff involved in supervision activities . That separation should not, however, prevent the resolution function from having access to any necessary information which is available to the supervisory function .

text: 3.2.2 Pursuant to existing law and the draft law, the Bank of Greece is required to ensure the operational and organisational independence of the department carrying out resolution functions and its staff to ensure there is no conflict of interest and to provide for the separation of tasks relating to the resolution function from the Bank of Greece’s other tasks. The ECB welcomes these provisions, as they appear to adequately address potential conflicts of interest between the resolution function and the Bank of Greece’s other tasks and functions. 3.3 Liability of the Bank of Greece 3.3.1 With regard to the provisions in the draft law on the liability of the Bank of Greece , the ECB notes that the Bank of Greece, as resolution authority, will now be held liable for gross negligence and wilful misconduct. It is not obvious why the Bank of Greece should assume the burden of those potential liabilities when the draft law requires it to obtain prior consent from the MoF before taking resolution actions in a broad range of circumstances . Against this backdrop, the ECB notes that, under the prohibition of monetary financing laid down in the Treaty, national legislation may not require an NCB to finance the public sector’s obligations vis-à-vis third parties . Given that potential liability issues represent substantial financial risks for the Bank of Greece , this should be taken into account in determining the entity that is liable to pay damages to third parties and in assessing the Bank of Greece’s ability to recover its resolution-related expenses. 3.3.2 The draft law contains provisions on the personal liability of the members of the decision-making bodies and the staff of the Bank of Greece. There may be concerns as to the proportionality of such liability, in particular, given that staff of other Greek public authorities are not subject to such personal liability in relation to third parties . 3.4 Ownership of bridge institutions and asset management vehicles 3.4.1 With regard to the bridge institution tool and the asset separation tool, the draft law sets out that the bridge institution or asset management vehicle must be wholly or partially owned by one or more public authorities which may include the resolution authority or the Resolution Fund. 3.4.2 While this provision implements the BRRD , where a central bank acts as resolution authority, it should be clarified, for the avoidance of doubt, that the central bank will in no event assume or finance any obligation of these entities. A central bank’s role as owner of such an entity must remain consistent under all circumstances with the prohibition on monetary financing under Article 123 of the Treaty, as supplemented by

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93

text: . This prohibits, inter alia, any financing by a central bank of the public sector’s obligations vis-à-vis third parties. Moreover, this role must be performed without prejudice to central bank independence, in particular

text: its financial and institutional independence . The principle of financial independence requires NCBs to have sufficient means to carry out not only their ESCB-related tasks from an operational and financial point of view, but also their national tasks . For that reason, it should be ensured that if the Bank of Greece, as resolution authority, decides to become owner of such an entity, it is provided with sufficient financial and human resources to address the operational burden associated with it. 3.4.3 It is also worth noting that under the existing law, the HFSF is conferred with the role of shareholder of bridge institutions, and may be best placed in terms of expertise and resources to exercise the role of shareholder of bridge institutions and asset management vehicles under the draft law. 3.5 Cooperation and exchange of information between the Bank of Greece and other relevant authorities, including the Hellenic Capital Markets Commission 3.5.1 The ECB notes that the draft law provides for cooperation between the Bank of Greece, which is the resolution authority for credit institutions, and other relevant authorities, including the Hellenic Capital Markets Commission, which is the resolution authority for investment firms, in performing their respective tasks, each keeping in mind the impact of their performance on the other. 3.5.2 The ECB welcomes these provisions as they will enable the relevant entities to perform their statutory tasks in a coordinated fashion. In particular, they will facilitate the Bank of Greece’s performance of its financial stability mandate. Such arrangements are also in line with current ECB doctrine and the requirements under the BRRD, pursuant to which Member States must ensure that, where the central bank is not itself the resolution authority, the competent authority (i.e. the authority responsible for the prudential supervision of institutions) and the resolution authority engage in an adequate exchange of information with the NCB . 3.6 Resolution planning The draft law provides that recovery plans and resolution plans drawn up and maintained by an institution shall not assume any access to or entitlement to extraordinary public financial support beyond that granted by the Resolution Fund. However, they shall include, where applicable, a forward-looking analysis of how and when an institution may apply for the use of central bank liquidity in stressed conditions and what collateral is to be used in respect of such . While these provisions appear to be in line with the requirements of the BRRD, the ECB emphasises that they do not in any way affect the competence of the Eurosystem to decide independently and in its full discretion on the provision of central bank liquidity, based on the existing legal framework and within the limitations imposed by the monetary financing prohibition under the Treaty .

text: 3.7 Withdrawal of authorisation With regard to Article 32(5) of the draft law, the SSM Regulation confers on the ECB the power to withdraw a credit institution’s authorisation. This applies both to institutions under the ECB’s direct supervision and to institutions under the supervision of the Bank of Greece. The drafting of Article 32(5) of the draft law should be clarified to reflect this.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 20 July 2015.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).

text: For further information on lending in foreign currencies in the Union see the Annex to Recommendation

text: of 21 September 2011 on lending in foreign currencies (OJ C 342, 22.11.2011, p.1). 3 See Opinion

text: , para. 2.2. All ECB opinions are available on the ECB website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: See NBP Monetary and financial statistics report at http://www.nbp.pl/en/statystyka/czasowe_dwn/nalez_zobow_banki_en.zip.

text: Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 February 2014 on credit agreements for consumers relating to residential immovable property and amending Directives

text: and

text: and

text: Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010

text: (OJ L 60, 28.2.2014, p. 34).

text: See Opinion

text: , para. 3.2.

text: See in particular the ECB Financial Stability Review of June 2010 and, in respect of the foreign currency loans in Hungary, Opinions

text: and

text: Recommendation

text: Recommendation S on good practices with regard to management of credit exposures that finance property and are mortgage-secured, last revised in June 2013. Available on the KNF website at www.knf.gov.pl.

text: See

text: , para. 3.4 and

text: , para. 3.3.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 5 August 2015 on a draft law on specific terms of restructuring of home loans denominated in foreign currency (CON/2015/26)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 5 August 2015 on a draft law on specific terms of restructuring of home loans denominated in foreign currency (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 23 July 2015 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Polish Parliament for an opinion on a draft law setting specific terms for the restructuring of housing loans denominated in a foreign currency and amending certain other Acts (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the sixth indent of

text: , as the draft law contains rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The purpose of the draft law is to facilitate the restructuring of home loans denominated in a foreign currency (hereinafter ‘foreign currency home loans’) that were granted before the date of entry into force of the draft law. In particular, banks will be required, on the request of an eligible borrower, to restructure foreign currency home loans, in accordance with the terms set out in the draft law, until 30 June 2020. 1.2 Under the draft law, borrowers who are consumers will be eligible to request a restructuring of their foreign currency home loans, provided that: a) the property is used by the borrowers to satisfy their own housing needs; b) the borrowers own no other residential unit nor single family house; c) the usable area of the property does not exceed 75 square metres in respect of a residential unit or 100 square meters in respect of a single family house (unless at the date of filing a restructuring request the borrower is raising three or more children, in which case no square meter limit applies); and d) the loan to value (LTV) ratio of the foreign currency home loan is above 80%. 1.3 The draft law provides that the restructuring request may be filed at different points of time depending on the LTV ratio. It may be filed as soon as the draft law comes into force where the value of the LTV ratio is above 120%, no sooner than one year after the draft law comes into force where the LTV ratio is above 100% but equal to or lower than 120%, and no sooner than two years after the draft law comes into force where the LTV ratio is above 80% but equal to or lower than 100%.

text: 1.4 The draft law provides that, once the borrower exercises the right to restructure a home loan, the borrower’s new obligation towards the bank will be the total of the following three components: (i) First, the principal amount of the home loan, denominated in zloty (PLN), which would have remained payable on the date of filing the restructuring request had the borrower concluded, with the same bank, a home loan denominated in PLN with identical loan payment terms on the date he or she concluded the foreign currency home loan which is being restructured; (ii) Second, the difference between: a) the remaining principal amount of the foreign currency home loan which is being restructured, converted into PLN at the buying exchange rate for the relevant currency published by Narodowy Bank Polski (NBP) on the day preceding the borrower’s restructuring request; and b) the amount represented by the first component in point i) above. If, based on such calculation, the resulting amount has a positive value, the bank will be required to redeem half of the amount. The non-redeemed half will form the second component of the borrower’s new obligation to the bank; (iii) Finally, the difference between two further amounts. First, the amount equal to the total principal and interest payments which the borrower would have made up to the date of filing the restructuring request, had the borrower concluded, with the same bank, a home loan denominated in PLN with identical loan payment terms on the date he or she concluded the foreign currency home loan which is being restructured. In calculating this amount, an interest rate based on the Warsaw Interbank Offered Rate base rate on the relevant dates will be applied, in line with the specific time period for the Euro Interbank Offered Rate/London Interbank Offered Rate base rate applied in the contract for the foreign currency home loan. It will be assumed that the bank’s margin would have been equal to that set in the relevant contract concluded by the borrower. If the contract provides for changes to the interest rate at the discretion of the bank’s management, the interest rate will be applied according to the terms stipulated in the relevant contract. Second, the amount representing, in PLN, the total principal and interest payments which the borrower has made under the foreign currency home loan up to the date of filing the restructuring request. The conversion to PLN will be based on the buying exchange rate for the relevant currency on the day preceding each respective payment date, as published by NBP (unless the borrower was obliged to make payments based on the buying exchange rate set by the bank, in which case that exchange rate shall be used). The difference between the two amounts described in this paragraph forms the third component of the borrower’s new obligation to the bank. The amount represented by the first component will substitute for the borrower’s obligation under the original, now-restructured foreign currency home loan. The loan will be performed according to the contractual terms of the original foreign currency home loan and bear the same interest rate as that described in section ii) above. In order to facilitate payment of the second and third components, the bank will be required to grant a new loan to the borrower for the remaining period of the original foreign currency home loan. Article 8 of the draft law refers to a ‘non-mortgage loan redeemed by the bank’ and the ECB therefore understands that the new loan will be uncollateralised. The interest rate on the new loan may not exceed NBP’s current reference rate.

text: 1.5 Finally, the draft law amends personal income tax law to provide relevant tax exemptions for the borrower as regards the amount of the debt subject to write-off. The draft law also amends corporate income tax law to treat the non-mortgage backed debt written off by the bank as a tax deductible expense.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 Prior to the global financial crisis, borrowing in foreign currencies by households and non-financial 2 3 corporations was popular in several Member States . As previously noted by the ECB , the lower interest rates applicable to foreign currency loans compared to loans in the domestic currency, as well as the expectation of domestic currency appreciation, increased the demand for such loans. Most of the foreign currency loans in Poland are housing loans denominated in Swiss francs (CHF). Foreign currency housing loans constituted approximately 47% of all outstanding housing loans and 29% of all outstanding loans to households in June 2015 . 2.2 Acknowledging that Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council does not apply to credit agreements existing before 21 March 2016, as previously noted by the ECB , the retroactive effect of the draft law does not seem to be in line with the general aim and principle of

text: Article 23(5) of Directive 2014/17/EU

text: . This Directive allows Member States to further regulate foreign currency loans, on the condition that such regulation is not applied with retroactive effect. 2.3 It is for the Polish authorities to assess whether the retroactive character of the draft law complies with Polish legal and constitutional principles. 2.4 The ECB notes that the draft law draws on previous proposal presented by the Polish Financial Supervision Authority (KNF), with the notable difference that the KNF’s proposal anticipated that the restructuring of foreign currency loans would be voluntary for both banks and borrowers.

text: 3. Specific observations

text: 3.1 Eligibility criteria 3.1.1 The rationale behind the eligibility criteria for participation in the restructuring scheme raises some doubts. In particular, the ECB notes that these criteria are not directly linked to the borrower’s actual income position. Given that not all households with a lower income and/or a fragile financial situation due to exchange rate fluctuations will be eligible, it is unclear to what extent the measures proposed in the draft law would substantially reduce overall loan default risks, or provide debt relief for low income households holding foreign currency home loans. 3.1.2 The ECB also notes that the proposed eligibility criteria, in particular, the fact that they do not refer

text: to a given household’s available income, could raise issues of equal treatment. 3.1.3 Finally, the ECB notes that the criterion linked to the LTV ratio may be difficult to assess given fluctuations in the exchange rate. 3.2 Effects on the banking sector 3.2.1 The ECB notes that the implementation of the draft law is expected to entail financial costs for the banking sector. This, in turn, may negatively affect profits and the future lending capacity of certain credit institutions. In particular, by introducing a restructuring right that will be exercisable over several years, the draft law might create a challenge for the Capital Adequacy Assessment Processes (ICAAP) of the affected institutions, potentially leading to increased write-down requirements. As a result, and given that foreign banking groups are dominant investors in banks that hold almost 60% of banking assets in Poland, it cannot be excluded that the measures affecting foreign currency loans in Poland might also have cross-border effects on the consolidated profits of international banking groups. However, given the cost estimates presented in the explanatory memorandum to the draft law, and the relatively small size of the majority of Polish banking subsidiaries, as compared to their parent banking groups, such spill-over effects should be limited. 3.2.2 As regards the proposed burden-sharing mechanism described in points (ii) and (iii) of paragraph 1.4 above, the ECB notes that the new loans granted to borrowers who take advantage of the right to restructure will not be priced at market rates. The proposed establishment of NBP’s current reference interest rate as the maximum interest rate for such new loans is substantially below the usual pricing of uncollateralised, long-term non-mortgage loans. This could have a further negative effect on the future profitability of the affected banks. 3.2.3 From a banking supervisory perspective, the ECB notes that the restructuring of the foreign currency loans as proposed by the draft law does not eliminate all risks relating to such loans, in particular interest rate risks. 3.2.4 It should also be noted that the restructuring will lead to a one-off increase in operational costs for the affected credit institutions in Poland, in particular, due to revaluation, unwinding of existing hedges and refinancing. In that context, the KNF is recommended to consider how it could address potential negative effect on the sound capital base of the credit institutions concerned resulting from the application of the draft law. 3.3 Effects on financial stability 3.3.1 The ECB has pointed out on several occasions the risks associated with foreign currency loans . In particular, they represent a major risk to financial stability in several Member States, where the share of foreign currency loans is relatively high. The ECB points in this respect to the analysis of such risks made by the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and to the ESRB recommendations for addressing such risks, made in Recommendation

text: of 21 September 2011 on lending in foreign currencies .

text: 3.3.2 However, in the case of Poland, such risks do not, at present, appear to be of a systemic nature for the financial system and are not seen as representing a particular risk from a financial stability perspective. First, the share of such foreign currency housing loans in the total housing loan portfolio is diminishing and currently amounts to around 47%. Second, following the adoption and revision by the KNF of Recommendation S , the supervisory guidelines related to the granting of housing loans have tightened significantly, mainly from January 2014. This measure includes, inter alia, a maximum loan maturity (35 years, with a recommended maximum maturity of 25 years), the requirement to grant the loan in the currency of the borrower’s income (in force as of July 2014) and a maximum level for the LTV ratio for newly granted housing loans (95% in 2014, with the general target value of 80% from 2017). The revised Recommendation S has contributed to maintaining the positive trend in the currency structure of new mortgage lending in Poland and, in the longer-term, should result in a more balanced growth of housing loans. Finally, the current macroeconomic situation in Poland is characterised by sustained strong economic growth, increasing real disposable income of households and an ongoing decline in unemployment, reducing the default risks associated with home loans. 3.3.3 From a financial stability perspective, and subject to the comments on the appropriateness of the eligibility criteria set out in paragraph 3.1, the conversion of foreign currency loans should reduce part of the currency mismatches in households’ balance sheets. This is expected to provide relief for distressed foreign currency borrowers and contribute to reducing the credit risk of banks in the longer-term. 3.3.4 As regards the longer-term effects on financial stability, the ECB remains of the opinion that, when introducing measures in relation to settling and converting foreign currency loans, due consideration should always be given to fair burden sharing among all stakeholders, thus also avoiding moral hazard in the future . This consideration should also include foreign banking groups, whose Polish subsidiaries currently hold close to 60% of all banking assets in Poland. 3.4 Effects on the Polish economy 3.4.1 The draft law might also have some negative effects if it leads to a deterioration of foreign investor sentiment due to a perceived increase in legal uncertainty and country risk. Consequently, the ECB suggests that the Polish authorities carry out a thorough analysis of the possible effects on the economy of introducing measures having retroactive effect.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 5 August 2015.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: Verordnung der OeNB betreffend die Übermittlung von Meldedaten an die OeNB unter Anwendung eines Datenmodells (Datenmodellverordnung). 2

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).

text: See Article 2 of the draft regulation. 4 See Article 5 of the draft regulation. 5 See Article 8 of the draft regulation.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 10 August 2015 on the use of an integrated data model for reporting data to the Oesterreichische Nationalbank (CON/2015/27)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 10 August 2015 on the use of an integrated data model for reporting data to the Oesterreichische Nationalbank (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 14 July 2015 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Oesterreichische Nationalbank (OeNB) for an opinion on a draft regulation on the use of an integrated data model for submitting reports to the OeNB (hereinafter the ‘draft regulation’) . The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and on the third and fourth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft regulation relates to the OeNB and the collection of balance of payments statistics. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft regulation

text: Article 44

text: (d) of the Federal Act on the Oesterreichische Nationalbank entitles the OeNB to prescribe the use of a technical reporting format (such as an integrated data model) that enables reporting agents to submit required reports to the OeNB in a standardised electronic manner. 1.2 Through the draft regulation, the OeNB therefore exercises its statutory right to prescribe an integrated data model to be used by reporting agents, who are mainly credit institutions, when reporting data to the OeNB. Accordingly, the main purpose of the draft regulation is to facilitate the submission of standardised electronic reports by reporting agents. It does not define any new data or items to be reported. 1.3 The draft regulation defines the structure and granularity of reports that are to be submitted to meet existing reporting requirements. The data model allows reporting data to be collected based on individual transactions that are mapped in a multi-dimensional data matrix using descriptive attributes. Reports based on the draft regulation have to be submitted to the OeNB in electronic form and broken down according to transaction types, attributes and other value types specified

text: and described in its enclosures. 3 4 1.4 The integrated data model will be used for reporting of data on securities , loans and deposits and impersonal accounts . Additionally, reporting agents will be required to submit anchor values in order to ensure reporting quality. According to the draft regulation, the OeNB will publish further material relating to technical specifications and issues of interpretation on its website so as to support reporting agents in their application of the integrated data model.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 The ECB notes that the draft regulation takes into account current reporting requirements and does not define any new data or items to be reported. Furthermore, the draft regulation fulfils the ECB’s statistical reporting requirements, as indicated by its references to several ECB legal acts. The ECB welcomes the granular, integrated and flexible approach introduced by the draft regulation, as it will contribute to minimising the burden on reporting agents.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 10 August 2015.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: See Opinion

text: , paragraph 3.4. All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 3 Member States have a general duty to take the necessary measures to ensure the timely appointment of a successor if a position on one of the NCB’s decision-making bodies becomes vacant. See Opinion

text: , paragraph 4.2, Opinion

text: , paragraph 7 and Opinion CON /2009/74, paragraph 2.2. See also the ECB’s 2014 Convergence Report, p. 18.

text: See Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.2. 5 For instance, it should prove useful if the office of Governor or Vice-Governor were to become vacant but the constitutional procedure for appointing a successor had not yet been completed. This could arise, for example, if the Senate were to withhold its consent before the expiration of the 60-day period mentioned in paragraph 3.1 above, which would trigger the need to start a fresh appointment procedure. 6 See Opinion

text: paragraph 2.1 and Opinion

text: paragraph 3.2. 7 See for example Opinion CON2006/32, paragraph 4.1.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 11 August 2015 on amendments to constitutional law and the Law on Česká národní banka (CON/2015/28)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 11 August 2015 on amendments to constitutional law and the Law on Česká národní banka (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 6 July 2015 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Czech Minister for Human Rights, Equal Opportunities and Legislation (hereinafter the ‘Minister’) for an opinion on a draft constitutional law amending Law No. 1/1993 Coll. on the Constitution (hereinafter the ‘draft constitutional law’) and on a draft law amending the Law on Česká národní banka No. 6/1993 Coll. (hereinafter the ‘draft law on ČNB’; together with the draft law, the ‘draft laws’). The consulting authority did not specify a time limit for the submission of the ECB’s opinion. The ECB understands that the draft laws have been adopted by the Czech Government and submitted to Parliament, but that they are not expected to be debated by the Lower House of Parliament (in committee) until after the summer recess. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (hereinafter the ‘Treaty’) and the third indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: , as the draft laws relate to Česká národní banka (ČNB). In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft laws

text: The purpose of the draft laws is to amend a number of provisions of the Constitution of the Czech Republic (hereinafter the ‘Constitution’) relating to the powers of the legislative and executive branches of the State, and which consequently affect certain provisions of the Law on ČNB. In particular, the draft laws contain provisions which would change the procedure for the appointment of ČNB’s Governor, its two Vice-Governors and the other four members of ČNB’s Board (hereinafter ‘Board members’). Whereas the Constitution currently stipulates that the President of the Czech Republic (hereinafter the ‘President’) appoints and dismisses the Governor, the Vice-Governors and the Board members without any further requirement to obtain the consent of, or consult with, any third party, the draft constitutional law stipulates that the President shall appoint the Governor, Vice-Governors and Board members following the consent of the Senate. If the Senate should fail to reach a decision on the President's proposal within 60 days of being presented with the proposal, it will be deemed to have given its consent. The draft law on ČNB reflects this modification to the appointment procedure by stipulating

text: that the President shall request the consent of the Senate for the appointment of the Governor, Vice- Governors and Board members. The Ministry’s request for an ECB opinion notes that this procedure is similar to the appointment procedure for the Justices of the Czech Constitutional Court and should strengthen cooperation between the executive and the legislature. The Ministry also notes that the independent status of ČNB will be maintained. Second, the draft law on ČNB would require ČNB’s Board to appoint another Board member to perform in full the duties of Vice-Governor (hereinafter a ‘substitute Vice-Governor’) until a new Vice-Governor or Governor is appointed, in the event that one of the two offices of Vice-Governor is unoccupied or if a Vice-Governor has been appointed to perform the duties of Governor. Likewise, if the office of Governor is unoccupied, ČNB’s Board will be required to appoint one of the Vice-Governors (or, if applicable, substitute Vice-Governors) to perform the duties of Governor until a new Governor is appointed. The draft laws do not affect the criteria for appointment or grounds for dismissal of the Governor, Vice- Governors or other Board members, nor the provisions guaranteeing their personal independence as regards security of tenure. Furthermore, pursuant to the transitional provisions of the draft constitutional law, appointments to the ČNB’s Board by the President in office at the date of entry into force of the draft constitutional law will be governed by the Constitution in force prior to that date. Therefore, the proposed changes to the appointment of Board members would only apply to appointments made by any President elected in the future and they do not affect the term of office of Board members that are currently in office.

text: 2. General observations

text: As regards the proposed change to the appointment procedure for the Governor, Vice-Governors and other Board members, the ECB notes that the draft laws would strengthen the involvement of the Senate (Upper House of Parliament) in this procedure. In this regard the ECB recalls that Member States are free to set the conditions required for the appointment of the members of the decision-making bodies of their national central banks (NCBs) .

text: 3. Specific observations regarding the draft laws

text: 3.1 The ECB welcomes the proposed amendment to the draft constitutional law stipulating that if the Senate fails to reach a decision on the President's proposal for a new Board member within 60 days of being presented with the proposal, it will be deemed to have given its consent. This should facilitate the timely appointment of new Board members , 3.2 The ECB welcomes also the provisions of the draft laws on substitute Board members as these provisions should ensure the continuity of performance of the functions of Governor and Vice-

text: Governor. The ECB notes that one consideration in the context of central bank independence is the need for a central bank legal framework that provides a stable basis for the central bank’s functioning . In this regard the ECB considers that the draft law on ČNB should safeguard the smooth and continuous functioning of ČNB’s Board . 3.3 The ECB notes that clear rules on the procedure for appointment and dismissal are not only necessary for the Governor of an NCB, but also for any person who takes over the duties of the Governor (or a Vice-Governor). Thus, it must be ensured that any Vice-Governor, or other Board member who takes over the duties of the Governor or Vice-Governor on an interim basis, benefits from the same rules that apply to the Governor (and Vice-Governors) as regards security of tenure of office, grounds for dismissal and conflicts of interest . This is ensured under the draft law on ČNB, which confines the pool of eligible candidates to the Vice-Governors and other Board members, all of whom are subject to the same rules on security of tenure of office, grounds for dismissal and conflicts of interest. 3.4 The ECB notes that, should the provisions of the draft laws become subject to further amendments in the course of the parliamentary process and should these amendments substantially alter the draft laws compared to the versions on which the ECB was consulted, then the ECB would need to be reconsulted on these amendments .

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 11 August 2015.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: Law No 136/2011 Coll. on the circulation of banknotes and coins and amending Law No 6/1993 Coll. on Česká národní banka.

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).

text: Article 11(2) of the draft law refers to self-service devices (e.g. ATMs or automatic cash telling systems) that facilitate the handling of funds held on an account with a payment service provider, in terms of the receipt, exchange or payout of domestic or foreign banknotes or coins as ‘non-anonymous devices’. (It should be noted that

text: Article 11

text: also regulates the handling of banknotes and coins by self-service devices that are used for providing services or paying out funds, without a connection to an account; however the operational requirements for this latter type of self-service device (referred to in

text: Article 11(1)

text: ) are not being amended by the draft law.)

text: Law 219/1995 Coll., as amended. 5 Law 240/2000 Coll., as amended. 6

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 1339/2001 of 28 June 2001

text: extending the effects of

text: Regulation (EC) No 1338/2001

text: laying down measures necessary for the protection of the euro against counterfeiting to those Member States which have not adopted the euro as their single currency (OJ L 181, 4.7.2001, p. 11). 7 Decision ECB/2013/10 of 19 April 2013 on the denominations, specifications, reproduction, exchange and withdrawal of euro banknotes (OJ L 118, 30.4.2013, p. 37).

text: Article 11 of the draft law. See also footnote 3. 9

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 1338/2001 of 28 June 2001

text: laying down measures necessary for the protection of the euro against counterfeiting (OJ L181, 4.7.2001, p. 6). 10 See https://www.ecb.europa.eu/euro/cashprof/cashhand/recycling/html/tested.en.html 11 See ECB Opinions

text: and

text: . All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: See principally Decision ECB/2010/14 of 16 September 2010 on the authenticity and fitness checking and recirculation of euro banknotes (OJ L 267, 9.10.2010, p. 1). 13 In particular, Article 2 of Decision ECB/2013/10. 14 Guideline ECB/2003/5 of the European Central Bank of 20 March 2003 on the enforcement of measures to counter non-compliant reproductions of euro banknotes and on the exchange and withdrawal of euro banknotes (OJ L 78, 25.3.2003, p. 20). 15 Articles

text: and

text: a of the draft law. 16 See

text: Articles 28(1)

text: (a) and 28a(1)(a) of the draft law.

text: See paragraph 3.2 of ECB Opinion

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 28 August 2015 on the circulation of banknotes and coins (CON/2015/29)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 28 August 2015 on the circulation of banknotes and coins (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: The European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Czech Ministry of Finance (‘MoF’ or ‘consulting authority’) for an opinion on Part I of a draft law amending certain laws concerning the circulation of banknotes and coins and the foreign exchange market and repealing the Foreign Exchange Law No. 219/1995 (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). Part I deals with technical amendments to the Law on the circulation of banknotes and coins (hereinafter the ‘Law’). As the Government is shortly to adopt the draft law the consulting authority has asked to receive the ECB’s opinion on an urgent basis. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (hereinafter ‘the Treaty’) and the first, second and third indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft law relates to currency matters, means of payment and the national central bank. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: The principal amendments to the Law introduced by Part I of the draft law are as follows. a) Banknotes that have been written on, drawn on or printed on/over and coins that have holes through them are removed from the list of what constitutes excessive (non-standard) damage to domestic banknotes and coins. Such damaged domestic banknotes and coins shall be subject to the less onerous administrative regime that applies to lightly damaged domestic tender. b) The operational requirements imposed on certain self-service devices (e.g. ATMs) are relaxed by no longer requiring such devices to retain suspicious coins. In view of the fact that such devices do not have technology that allows them to recognise a specific transaction with a suspicious coin, they will only be required to reject such coins and return them to the person using the device,

text: whereas currently retention is required for banknotes introduced into ATMs and automatic telling systems. c) Provisions are included detailing how Česká národní banka (ČNB) shall handle: (i) domestic and foreign bank notes and coins which have been seized on suspicion of being forgeries, and (ii) claims for compensation should such banknotes prove to be genuine. It also stipulates that ČNB will seize suspicious banknotes and coins that are damaged in a non-standard manner, even if they later prove to be genuine, without paying compensation to the person from whom they were seized. d) Individual administrative offences relating to the making of reproductions of banknotes and coins (or of articles resembling them) and administrative offences against the monetary circulation regime and other related offences are specified. e) A stipulation is added that anyone who accepts domestic banknotes or coins in fulfilment of his own claim shall not require any fee in relation to this acceptance. For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that Part II of the draft law repeals the Foreign Exchange Law , transferring, in an adapted form, the part of that law dealing with a ‘state of emergency in the foreign exchange market’ to the Law on Crisis Management , and thereby also amending the Law on ČNB No. 6/1993. Finally, Part III of the draft law introduces a new criminal offence of ‘endangering the foreign exchange market’ into the Criminal Code. The ECB does not have any specific comments on Parts II and III.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 The Czech Republic is a Member State with a derogation within the meaning of Article 139 of the Treaty. Therefore, the requirements under Union law regarding the handling and protection of euro banknotes and coins are currently not fully applicable to ČNB and other entities in the Czech Republic.

text: Article 1 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1339/2001

text: extends certain measures necessary for the protection of the euro against counterfeiting to those Member States which have not adopted the euro as their currency . Hence, such Union law is directly applicable in the Czech Republic and must be complied with by the Czech legislator. The reproduction rules for euro banknotes contained in Article 2 of Decision ECB/2013/10 currently do not apply in a Member State with a derogation. All requirements will fully apply once the Czech Republic adopts the euro and ČNB becomes a fully integrated member of the Eurosystem. In this context, while taking into account the sovereign powers of the Czech legislator, keeping the Czech legal framework in line with the rules applicable in the euro area will facilitate the Czech Republic’s future participation in the economic and monetary union.

text: 2.2 The ECB generally welcomes the proposed technical amendments, which aim to improve the quality of the Law and to reflect the experience of ČNB as the authority responsible for overseeing the monetary circulation regime under the Law. However, certain provisions of Part I of the draft law contain terminology and/or provide for concepts which differ from those established within directly applicable Union law and from procedures applied in the Eurosystem.

text: 3. Specific observations

text: 3.1 As regards Part I of the draft law the ECB has the following comments. 3.1.1 The proposed amendments to the provisions on the handling of banknotes and coins with selfservice technical devices do not take into account that

text: Regulation (EC) No 1339/2001

text: requires a specific regime for the protection of the euro against counterfeiting.

text: Article 6

text: (1a) of

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 1338/2001

text: grants a derogation to Member States that do not have the euro as their single currency from the obligation, established by the second subparagraph of Article 6(1) of that Regulation, to carry out authenticity checks for euro banknotes in line with the procedures defined by the ECB. However, this derogation only permits that, in deviation from the procedures defined by the ECB, checks on the authenticity of euro banknotes shall be carried out either by trained personnel or by a machine for handling banknotes that is on the list published by the ECB . In accordance with the derogation under

text: Article 6

text: (1a) of

text: Regulation (EC) No 1338/2001

text: , either the list of banknote handling machines published by the ECB should be referenced or, alternatively, authenticity checks by trained personnel should be provided for in the draft law. The remaining requirements of

text: Article 6 of Regulation (EC) No 1338/2001

text: continue to be fully applicable and need to be complied with by the Czech Republic. In particular, the concept of ‘anonymous and nonanonymous equipment’ in the amended

text: Article 11(1)

text: and (2) of the draft law does not appear to be in line with

text: Article 6(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1338/2001

text: , which is also directly applicable in the Czech Republic pursuant to

text: Regulation (EC) No 1339/2001

text: . The institutions and economic agents subjected to the authenticity check for euro banknotes by the first subparagraph of

text: are required by the third subparagraph of the same provision to withdraw from circulation all euro notes and coins which they know or have sufficient reason to believe to be counterfeit. Article 11 of the draft law, by contrast, allows such euro banknotes and coins to be recirculated when certain devices are used for the authenticity check. 3.1.2 The ECB further invites the consulting authority to consider aligning the terminology and concepts referred to in paragraph 2.2 above with the approaches applied in the euro area. In particular, the concept of ‘a [domestic] excessively [non-standard] damaged banknote’ in

text: Article 2(4)

text: (d) of the draft law is not used within the euro area, as highlighted in earlier ECB opinions on a previous draft decree and draft law amending the Law. The ECB would moreover urge that the requirements

text: introduced in the Czech Republic should fully reflect the relevant ECB legal acts as regards the authenticity, fitness checking and recirculation of euro banknotes. 3.1.3 As regards the reproduction of banknotes and coins, which is dealt with in the amended Articles

text: and

text: Article 28

text: a of the draft law, the ECB would welcome that these provisions also differentiate between euro banknotes and coins and other foreign banknotes and coins. In particular, the terminology referring to euro banknotes should be aligned with the relevant ECB legal acts in this field . The respective provisions of the draft law could moreover refer to the ECB’s competence under

text: Article 2(5)

text: (c) of Guideline ECB/2003/5 if approved by the Czech legislator. 3.1.4 Similarly, as regards the provisions on offences and administrative offences relating to the making and handling of reproductions of banknotes and coins and articles resembling them , reference is only made to breaching ‘the directly applicable European Union regulations concerning medals and tokens similar to euro coins’ . The ECB would welcome that these provisions also include an explicit reference to Decision ECB/2013/10. 3.1.5 Furthermore, as regards Article 13 of the draft law entitled ‘verification of the authenticity of banknotes and coins by ČNB’, it should be clearly stated that this article does not apply to euro banknotes. The rules on authenticity checks of euro banknotes, as laid down in

text: Article 1 of Regulation (EC) No 1339/2001

text: , in conjunction with

text: , apply directly in the Czech Republic within the mentioned limits of

text: Article 6

text: (1a) of

text: Regulation (EC) No 1338/2001

text: . In particular, this derogation remains limited to the means by which the authenticity check for euro banknotes is carried out and does not affect the rules on compensation. Therefore, the rules on compensation for damaged euro banknotes should preferably be aligned with the procedures defined by the ECB. In order to avoid any legal uncertainty, Article 13 of the draft law should differentiate between domestic currency, the euro and other foreign currency. 3.1.6 Finally, the ECB notes the new

text: Article 5(4)

text: in Part I of the draft law, pursuant to which nobody that accepts domestic banknotes or coins in fulfilment of his own claim shall be allowed to charge a fee in relation to this acceptance. The new provision is in line with the notion of legal tender, which, it should be noted, includes the mandatory acceptance of payments at full value for the discharge of

text: monetary debts . This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 28 August 2015. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: Meldeverordnung FinStab 1/2015 der OeNB betreffend die Erfassung von Kredit- und Länderrisiken, Restlaufzeiten und Fremdwährungskredite sowie Finanzinformationen von Auslandstochterbanken (FinStab 1/2015). 2

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42). 3 Verordnung der Finanzmarktaufsichtsbehörde (FMA) zum Vermögens-, Erfolgs- und Risikoausweis (Vermögens-, Erfolgs- und Risikoausweis-Verordnung – VERA-V).

text: See https://www.oenb.at/en/Statistics/Standardized-Tables/Financial-Institutions/Banks/financial-and-incomestatement-of-fully-consolidated-foreign-subsidiaries.html. 5

text: Regulation (EU) 2015/534

text: of the European Central Bank of 17 March 2015 on reporting of supervisory financial information (ECB/2015/13) (OJ L 86, 31.3.2015, p. 13). 6 Decision ECB/2014/6 of 24 February 2014 on the organisation of preparatory measures for the collection of granular credit data by the European System of Central Banks (OJ L 104, 8.4.2014, p. 72).

text: See Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 2 September 2015 on reporting of certain data relevant for financial stability (CON/2015/30)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 2 September 2015 on reporting of certain data relevant for financial stability (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 29 July 2015 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Oesterreichische Nationalbank (‘OeNB’) for an opinion on a draft regulation on the reporting of credit risk, country risk, residual maturities, foreign currency loans and financial information concerning fully consolidated foreign subsidiaries of banks (the ‘draft regulation’) . The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third, fourth and sixth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft regulation relates to the OeNB, the collection, compilation and distribution of monetary, financial, banking, payment systems and balance of payments statistics, and rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft regulation

text: Article 44

text: b(1) of the Law on Oesterreichische Nationalbank (hereinafter the ‘Law on the OeNB’) requires the OeNB to monitor, in the public interest, all circumstances that may have an impact on safeguarding financial stability in Austria. Based on a current reporting regulation of the Austrian Financial Market Authority (FMA) on asset, income and risk statements of credit institutions, the FMA makes available the data necessary for the OeNB to fulfil this task. If this data is not available to the FMA, the OeNB may collect it directly from the relevant credit institutions. 1.2 Currently, the data regarding credit risk, country risk, residual maturities and foreign currency loans and financial information concerning fully consolidated foreign subsidiaries of banks is covered by the FMA’s reporting regulation on asset, income and risk statements (hereinafter the ‘VERA-V’) .

text: Following a forthcoming 2015 amendment to that regulation, the abovementioned data will no longer be required under the VERA-V. The last reporting dates for this data pursuant to the VERA- V will be 30 September 2015 for credit risk and 30 June 2016 for data on residual maturities, foreign currency loans and credit risks. In light of their significance for safeguarding financial stability in Austria, the OeNB intends to collect this data based on the draft regulation. Under the draft regulation, reporting is intended to start in the first quarter after the reporting obligations under the VERA-V expire. From then on, the data must be reported on a quarterly basis. 1.3 Likewise, financial information on all fully consolidated foreign subsidiaries of groups of credit institutions required to report in Austria is also of particular relevance for safeguarding financial stability in Austria. For this reason, the draft regulation requires the submission of additional financial information concerning those foreign subsidiaries. Article 9(3) of the draft regulation provides that no reporting is required from credit institutions in respect of data covered under reporting obligations laid down in

text: Regulation (EU) 2015/534

text: of the European Central Bank (ECB/2015/13) . Accordingly, the draft regulation only affects data not already collected under

text: Regulation (EU) 2015/534

text: 2. General observations

text: The draft regulation extends the application of statistical data collection powers already available to the OeNB under the Law on the OeNB to an area currently not harmonised through a Union legal act in the field of statistics. The OeNB has a statutory obligation to monitor, in the public interest, all circumstances that may have an impact on safeguarding financial stability in Austria. In this context, the ECB points to its Decision ECB/2014/6 , which establishes measures aimed at the gradual development of the ECB’s statistical framework in relation to the credit exposures of credit institutions, or other loan-providing financial institutions, vis-à-vis borrowers. This framework will, inter alia, support the activities of the European System of Central Banks in the area of financial stability. The ECB invites the Austrian authorities to monitor the development of this ECB statistical framework, which may interact with the

text: objectives of the draft regulation . This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 2 September 2015. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI