title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 22 May 2012 on the recapitalisation and resolution framework for credit institutions in Greece (CON/2012/39)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 22 May 2012 on the recapitalisation and resolution framework for credit institutions in Greece (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 11 April 2012, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Greek Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a set of draft provisions on urgent issues for the recapitalisation of credit institutions in Greece, and on 19 April 2012 the ECB received a revised version of part of such draft provisions (hereinafter the ‘original draft provisions’). On 30 April 2012, the ECB received a supplementary consultation request from the Greek Ministry of Finance on provisions governing the bridge recapitalisation of credit institutions in Greece (hereinafter the ‘supplementary draft provisions’). The original draft provisions and the supplementary draft provisions were enacted under the emergency legislative procedure provided for in Article 44 of the Greek Constitution and entered into force on 2 3 19 April 2012 and 30 April 2012 , respectively. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union and the third and sixth indents of

text: on the consultation of the ECB by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions, as the draft provisions relate to the Bank of Greece and to rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft provisions

text: 1.1 The draft provisions amend the Greek legal framework for the recapitalisation and resolution of 4 5 credit institutions . In particular, Article 1 of the original draft provisions amends Law 3864/2010 on the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund (hereinafter the ‘Law on the HFSF’) and Article 2 of the

text: 1 With the exception of the provisions of

text: Article 3

text: , as discussed in paragraphs 1.1, 1.4 and section 6.

text: 2 FEK A 94/19.4.2012.

text: 3 FEK A 103/30.4.2012.

text: 4 For previous ECB Opinions on amendments to the legal framework on recapitalisation and resolution of credit institutions in Greece see in particular

text: and

text: . All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: 5 FEK A 119/21.7.2010. original draft provisions amends Law 3601/2007 (hereinafter the ‘Law on banking’) and Law 3556/2007 . In addition,

text: Article 3

text: , submitted as a distinct set of the original draft provisions, introduces taxation and accounting arrangements pertaining to the participation of credit institutions in the Greek debt restructuring. The supplementary draft provisions further amend Article 6 of the Law on the HFSF. 1.2 Amendments to the Law on the HFSF According to the explanatory memorandum, Article 1 of the original draft provisions introduces the amendments necessary to: (i) increase the capital of the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund (HFSF) to € 50 billion in the context of the second economic adjustment programme for Greece; (ii) include in the HFSF’s assets, in addition to cash, capital in the form of European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) notes or other financial instruments issued or approved by the EFSF, which are to be held with an account in the Bank of Greece’s system for monitoring transactions in book-entry securities, with the Bank of Greece acting as a custodian; (iii) extend the period within which a credit institution’s viability under the business plan should be ensured, no longer taking into account profitability; (iv) enable the HFSF, following a decision by the Bank of Greece, to provide to credit institutions eligible for recapitalisation a certification committing the HFSF to participate in the credit institution’s capital increase once certain conditions are met and, in such cases, to enable the HFSF, until completion of the capital increase, to have direct access to the credit institution’s economic data, to conduct due diligence controls and to appoint representatives on its Board of Directors with specific powers; (v) to include in the recapitalisation tools, in addition to the existing common shares and contingent convertible bonds, other convertible financial instruments; (vi) to facilitate recapitalisation by repealing the restriction on non-transferability of the HFSF’s shares to third parties and on their trading on regulated markets; (vii) to ensure, in view of the HFSF’s participation in the share capital of credit institutions, that its financial statements are published after those of the latter institutions; and (viii) enable the HFSF to provide guarantees to the credit institutions being recapitalised in order to enhance confidence in the domestic financial system. The supplementary draft provisions introduce the amendments necessary to enable the HFSF to provide bridge recapitalisation to credit institutions and to authorise the Minister for Finance, following an opinion by the HFSF, to issue decisions further specifying corporate governance issues for the period before the completion of the bridge recapitalisation undertaken. 1.3 Amendments to the Law on banking and to Law 3556/2007 According to the explanatory memorandum, Article 2 of the original draft provisions introduces the amendments necessary to: (i) facilitate the immediate implementation of transfer orders issued as a resolution measure by the Bank of Greece under

text: Article 63

text: D(2) of the Law on banking, by

text: 6 FEΚ A 178/1.8.2007.

text: 7 FEK A 91/30.4.2007 providing that where the transfer order amounts to a concentration of undertakings the procedure will not be suspended but will be conducted as normal, unless the Greek Competition Commission, which has to be notified, decides otherwise; to avoid uncertainty and ensure the efficiency of the procedure, the deadline for such decision is shortened; (ii) authorise the Minister for Finance to extend the time within which issuers of securities listed in regulated markets are obliged to publish the relevant annual financial statements in accordance with law. 1.4 Draft provisions on taxation and accounting issues According to the explanatory memorandum, Article 3 of the original draft provisions, referred to in paragraph 1.1 above, mainly aims to address the problem of adequate regulatory capital of credit institutions participating in the Greek debt exchange, taking into account the envisaged Union legal framework on capital adequacy of credit institutions and investment firms which will incorporate the Basel III rules. In particular, according to the explanatory memorandum, the tax benefit that will arise for the credit institutions participating in the Greek debt restructuring from writing down the debit difference resulting from such participation, as defined in

text: Article 3

text: , will not depend on their future profitability and, thus, will not be deducted from their basic regulatory capital. Therefore, the need for additional capital outflow from shareholders and eventually from the State to credit institutions would be considerably curtailed resulting in no additional charge to the public debt.

text: 2. General observations

text: As stated in the introduction, the ECB received the original draft provisions on 11 and 19 April and it received the supplementary draft provisions on 30 April. The original and the supplementary draft provisions were enacted under the emergency legislative procedure provided for in Article 44 of the Greek Constitution , and they came into force on 19 April 2012 and 30 April 2012, respectively. The ECB underlines that it should be consulted in due time prior to entry into force. More generally, internal administrative procedures should be in place to ensure the timely consultation of the ECB, and the ECB should be consulted at an appropriate point in time in the event of amendments during the legislative procedure.

text: 3. Procedure for the activation of the HFSF and bridge recapitalisation

text: Article 1(2)

text: (a) of the original draft provisions amends

text: Article 6(2)

text: (a) of the Law on the HFSF to the effect that the required business plan accompanying a credit institution’s request for capital support must demonstrate how the said institution is to ensure viability ‘within three to five years’. The ECB understands that this prolongation from three years to a maximum of five years aims to

text: 9 This provides for the issuance of a specific act by the President of the Hellenic Republic, acting on a proposal by the Cabinet. Within 40 days from issuance the act is submitted to Parliament for ratification within another three months. It enters into force upon publication in the national Government Gazette. facilitate a longer term strategy of the business plan, which is welcome. The ECB also understands that this prolongation does not interfere with the maximum duration of four years of the HFSF’s investment in a credit institution where it has full voting rights . 3.2 According to the new Article 6(8) of the Law on the HFSF, introduced by

text: Article 1(2)

text: (b) of the original draft provisions, upon a decision by the Bank of Greece the HFSF will provide a credit institution, which the Bank of Greece has assessed as viable and which has submitted a request for capital support under Article 6(2) of such Law, with a certification committing it to participate in the said institution’s share capital increase pursuant to Article 7 of the Law for the amount determined by the Bank of Greece, without following the procedure laid down in

text: Article 6(3)

text: thereof . The above commitment will not apply where the license of the credit institution is withdrawn for any reason or a procedure for such withdrawal is launched before the procedure for the capital increase has commenced. 3.3 Furthermore, according to the new Article 6(9) of the Law on the HFSF, introduced by

text: Article 1(2)

text: (b) of the original draft provisions, where the HFSF provides the abovementioned certification, for the period until the completion of the relevant capital increase the HFSF: (a) will appoint up to two representatives to the Board of Directors of the credit institution, who will have the powers referred to in Article 10(3) of the Law on the HFSF and will recommend to the Board of Directors the measures necessary for safeguarding the HFSF’s interests and supervise their implementation; and (b) may request from the credit institution any data and information it considers necessary for fulfilling its purpose and may carry out special audits (due diligence) and exercise its rights according to Article 11 of the Law on the HFSF. Article 6(9) of the Law on the HFSF is further supplemented by the supplementary draft provisions specifying that the HFSF will have the same rights if it has paid in advance the contribution referred to in paragraph 3.4 below in the context of the bridge recapitalisation. 3.4 Finally, according to the new Article 6(10) of the Law on the HFSF, introduced by the supplementary draft provisions, the HFSF, in view of its participation in a future share capital increase of a credit institution that the Bank of Greece has considered to be viable, will pay in advance its entire contribution to the capital increase or part of such contribution and up to the

text: 10 See

text: Article 8

text: , in conjunction with

text: Article 7

text: a, of the Law on the HFSF.

text: 11 According to

text: Article 1(2)

text: (b) of the draft provisions, the HFSF shall grant this certification provided that (a) the business plan of the credit institution has been assessed as viable and credible by the Bank of Greece, (b) the above request, also notified to the European Commission, has been approved by the Bank of Greece and that (c) the Bank of Greece has considered that granting such certification is necessary both for the credit institution to continue operating without impediments (going concern) and to meet the capital adequacy requirements in accordance with the decisions of the Bank of Greece, and for maintaining the financial stability of the Greek banking system.

text: 12 Namely: (a) to call the general meeting of shareholders; (b) to veto any decision of the Board of Directors either on distribution of dividends and bonus policy for the Chairman, Managing Director and the other members of the Board, as well as for the general managers and their deputies, or where the decision in question could seriously compromise the interests of depositors, or impair the credit institution’s liquidity or solvency or its overall sound and smooth operation; (c) to request an adjournment of any meeting of the credit institution’s Board for three (3) business days, until instructions are given by the HFSF’s Executive Council, following consultation with the Bank of Greece. Such right may be exercised by the end of the meeting of the credit institution’s Board; (d) the right to request that the Board be convened; (e) the right to approve the Economic Director. In exercising his rights, the HFSF’s representative in the Board of Directors shall respect the credit institution’s business autonomy. amount determined by the Bank of Greece, following a decision of the latter, provided that: (i) the credit institution has submitted a request for capital support, accompanied by a business plan and a detailed time plan; (ii) the request has been approved by the Bank of Greece and notified to the European Commission and the business plan has been assessed by the Bank of Greece as viable and reliable; (iii) the Bank of Greece considers that the prepayment of the contribution is necessary in order for the credit institution to comply with the relevant capital adequacy requirements and to maintain access to Eurosystem monetary policy operations, and in order to ensure the stability of the Greek banking system; and (iv) the credit institution has concluded a subscription agreement with the HFSF and the EFSF. The prepaid contribution will be deposited in an account of the credit institution held with the Bank of Greece exclusively for the purpose of the HFSF’s participation in the capital increase and will be released upon certification of payment of the capital in accordance with Greek company law provisions . Pending its release for the completion of the capital increase, the contribution may be used exclusively for the purpose of ensuring liquidity through repurchase transactions with market counterparties and/or through the ECB or the Bank of Greece within the Eurosystem. If the HFSF’s contribution to the capital increase is lower than the amount prepaid, or if the capital increase does not take place, the HFSF will have a claim for a refund of the excess amount or the entire amount, as the case may be, at an interest rate determined by the Minister of Finance following a proposal of the Bank of Greece and the HFSF. If the credit institution’s license is withdrawn before the completion of the capital increase and a transitional credit institution (TCI) is established under

text: Article 63

text: E of the Law on banking, the EFSF notes which have been provided as the HFSF’s prepaid contribution will constitute assets of the TCI. The abovementioned procedure set out in the new Article 6(10) of the Law on the HFSF will apply following a decision of the Bank of Greece published in the Government Gazette, prior to which the consent of the European Commission, the ECB and the EFSF must be obtained . 3.5 In relation to the new Article 6(9) of the Law on the HFSF, as introduced by the original draft provisions and further amended by the supplementary draft provisions, the ECB notes that, as already highlighted in previous opinions , the HFSF’s responsibilities need to be clearly defined, to ensure that the HFSF does not inadvertently interfere with the powers of the Bank of Greece as supervisory and resolution authority and as guarantor of the stability of the financial system. The documentation for the second economic adjustment programme for Greece explicitly calls for the need to ‘clarify the procedures and responsibilities for the valuation of assets and liabilities’ and

text: 13 Under Article 11(2) of Codified Law 2190/1920, in each case of capital increase the payment or not of the capital must be certified by the Board of Directors within one month from expiry of the deadline for paying the amount of the increase. Certification of payment is not required if the capital increase does not take place through new contributions.

text: 14 Furthermore, according to such

text: Article 6(10)

text: a Cabinet decision to be issued following an opinion by the HFSF will determine: (i) the more detailed terms of the subscription agreement, (ii) the more detailed terms ensuring the EFSF’s rights, as set out in the Loan Facility Agreement dated 15 March 2012, the draft of which was approved by Article 1 of Law 4046/2012 (FEK A 28/14/2/2012), and (iii) any necessary issue for the implementation of such Article 6(10) of the Law on the HFSF.

text: 15 See Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.2.

text: 16 See section 18 of the Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies (MEFP) in ‘The Second Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece’, March 2012 entrusts the assessment of credit institutions’ viability and capital raising plans to the Bank of Greece , as also reflected in the new Article 6(8) of the Law on the HFSF. The ECB notes that this clear allocation of responsibilities could be jeopardised if the HFSF was to be enabled to conduct special audits (due diligence) prior to recapitalising a credit institution. In particular, the involvement of the HFSF in conducting such audits without any clarification as to the consequences of such audits for the recapitalisation procedure could result in interference with the competence of the Bank of Greece. The resulting uncertainty and potential delays in the recapitalisation procedure would undermine the whole purpose of the new Article 6(8) of the Law on the HFSF, which is to enable the Bank of Greece to promptly respond to the recapitalisation needs of a credit institution it has assessed as being viable, by immediately providing a solution to ensure such credit institution’s (bridge) capital adequacy . 3.6 In relation to the new Article 6(10) of the Law on the HFSF, introduced by the supplementary draft provisions governing the bridge recapitalisation, the ECB highlights that for financial stability reasons it is very important to ensure that the advance deposit by the HFSF of EFSF notes will result in an increase in the capital of the beneficiary credit institution. In this respect, the ECB considers that the basic purpose of the bridge recapitalisation is to ensure an increase in the lossabsorbing capital of a beneficiary credit institution. Indeed, the extent to which the recapitalisation scheme can achieve this central objective is closely linked to the treatment of the EFSF notes in the event of the beneficiary credit institution’s insolvency prior to the conclusion of the bridge recapitalisation. In determining whether this objective has been achieved the views of the Bank of Greece, as supervisor of Greek-licensed credit institutions, will be of central importance. In the light of the above considerations, the ECB expects that the bridge recapitalisation will be finalised shortly. 3.7 As to the scope of the restrictions on the beneficiary credit institutions to only use the EFSF notes in repurchase operations and/or as eligible collateral for borrowing from the Eurosystem for the period prior to the conclusion of the recapitalisation procedure, the ECB notes that it will be for the Eurosystem to define the eligibility criteria for assets to be used in Eurosystem operations. 3.8 Finally, in relation to the requirement introduced by the new Article 6(10) of the Law on the HFSF that the recapitalisation procedure set out therein is to be based on a decision of the Bank of Greece after having obtained the consent of the European Commission, the ECB and the EFSF, the ECB notes that it is not for a national legislator to confer upon the ECB decision-making powers such as that provided for in

text: Article 6(10)

text: above. Besides, the involvement of the ECB in the process leading up to the recapitalisation of Greek banks would not be in line with the need to ensure a clear role of the Bank of Greece as the domestic supervisory and resolution authority and as (http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2012/pdf/ocp94_en.pdf); also as Annex V to Law 4046/2012 (FEK A 28/14.2.2012).

text: 17 See section 17 of the MEFP.

text: 18 The above considerations also apply in relation to the bridge recapitalisation procedure provided for in the new Article 6(10) of the Law on the HFSF, introduced by the supplementary draft provisions. guarantor of the stability of the financial system, as suggested in paragraph 3.5 above. The ECB therefore does not consider itself bound by this provision. Pursuant to Article 127(6) of the Treaty, the Council of the European Union, acting by means of regulations, may unanimously confer specific tasks upon the ECB concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions. In addition, Article 127(5) of the Treaty provides that the ESCB contributes to the smooth conduct of policies pursued by competent authorities relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions; however, the consent required by

text: Article 6(10)

text: above goes beyond the scope of the ESCB’s competence under

text: Article 127(5)

text: 4. Means of provision of capital support

text: Article 1(3) of the original draft provisions amends Article 7(1) of the Law on the HFSF to the effect that capital support to be provided under such Law by the HFSF’s participation in the capital increase of a credit institution will be effected through the issuance of common shares or contingent convertible securities or other convertible financial instruments. The ECB welcomes that the original draft provisions extend the types of instruments that can be used as recapitalisation tools.

text: 5. Provision of guarantee by the HFSF

text: 5.1 Article 1(6) of the original draft provisions amends the last sentence of

text: Article 16

text: C(6) of the Law on the HFSF to enable the HFSF to provide guarantees to the credit institutions eligible for recapitalisation under Article 2(1) of the said Law and to grant security over its assets for the purposes of performing its obligations under such guarantee. Any necessary detail for the implementation of such paragraph may be laid down by a decision of the Minister for Finance 5.2 The ECB notes that the abovementioned

text: Article 1(6)

text: would extend the mandate and scope of action of the HFSF by turning it into a potential guarantor of credit institutions’ exposures, thereby strengthening their financial state. This provision does not set out the conditions for providing such guarantees and the rationale behind it. The explanatory memorandum also makes no reference to the conditions to be met for the activation of such guarantees and their assessment, as well as regarding the implications and the underlying reasoning . Moreover, the fact that

text: Article 1(6)

text: provides for a ministerial decision to regulate ‘any necessary detail for the implementation’ does not provide the necessary clarity and legal certainty, as the decision would only address the implementation of the provision and not the conditions for the activation of the guarantees. Furthermore, the explicit objective of the HFSF is to maintain the stability of the Greek banking system by strengthening the capital adequacy of credit institutions . This can only be convincingly achieved by providing Greek credit institutions with a solid, fully loss-absorbing capital base, which gives a clear signal to the market that the Greek banking sector is healthy and viable. The

text: 19 It merely states that the objective would be to ‘to boost confidence in the Greek financial system’.

text: 20 See Article 2 of the Law on the HFSF. possibility to guarantee the exposures of the credit institutions instead of recapitalising them directly does not seem to be transparent and convincing in achieving this objective of the HFSF.

text: 6. Income tax and related issues

text: Article 3

text: , submitted as a distinct set of the original draft provisions, stipulates that the debit difference to be borne by credit institutions participating in the Greek debt exchange will be deducted from the gross income in thirty equal-amount annual instalments, starting from the year in which the exchange took place. Furthermore, it stipulates that where (i) the annual tax profits of such credit institutions (before deduction of the annual debit difference and after setting off against tax losses of previous years carried over) do not suffice to write down the annual debit difference, or (ii) annual tax losses occur, the income tax corresponding to the part of such annual debit difference not written down will, to the extent not covered by annual profits, automatically amount to a final and cleared claim of the beneficiary credit institution against the State; such claim is generated at the time when the beneficiary submits its income tax return and is set off against its income tax of the subsequent years until it is repaid in full. At the same time, the abovementioned

text: Article 3

text: provides that the claim is subject to a prescription period of thirty years from its generation. 6.2 The ECB notes that this particular provision, while submitted as part of the original draft provisions, adopted on 19 April 2012, has thus far not been adopted by the Greek authorities. In terms of its substance and purported objectives, the ECB is of the view that there is need for further clarification of such provision and its individual elements by the national legislator. In particular, the provision in its current form is not clear as to whether the claim of the credit institution against the State will depend on the credit institution’s future profitability or not. In this respect, the explanatory memorandum states that the tax benefit for credit institutions participating in the Greek debt restructuring will not depend on their future profitability; accordingly, the provision refers to a final and cleared claim of the beneficiary credit institution against the State. However, it is not clear how this interacts with the provisions stipulating that the claim will be set off against the income tax of the subsequent years, that the debit difference to be borne by credit institutions will be deducted from the gross income in thirty equal-amount annual instalments and, most importantly, that the claim will be subject to a 30-year prescription period. In relation to the above, the ECB notes that in the event that a given credit institution is not profitable for a number of years, the fact that such tax credit may result in lower capital needs – to fulfil the regulatory requirements following participation in the Greek debt restructuring – may be an issue from a financial stability

text: 21 According to such

text: Article 3

text: , the debit difference is defined as the difference between the acquisition cost for the exchanged Greek Treasury bonds and corporate bonds guaranteed by the Greek State and the face value of the bonds given in exchange, provided that the legal entity has not already set off the relevant devaluation loss, nor will it do so in the future.

text: 22 Private sector involvement in the Greek debt restructuring was agreed by the Heads of State or Government of the euro area Member States. See Euro Summit Statement, Brussels, 26 October 2011, available on the website of the Council of the European Union at www.consilium.europa.eu. perspective. The ECB would require clarification of the above in order to be able to meaningfully assess such an arrangement in the context of a consultation procedure. This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 22 May 2012. [signed] The President of the ECB Mario DRAGHI


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: Law 3869/2010 on debt arrangements for over-indebted households and other provisions (FEK 130 A/3.8.2010).

text: All ECB opinions are available on the ECB’s website www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: See paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: . See also paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: on restructuring of business and professional debts owed to credit institutions and on credit bureau data processing.

text: See paragraph 1.2 above.

text: See paragraph 1.7 above.

publisher: Europeiska centralbanken

sprak: en

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 22 May 2012 on debt arrangements for over-indebted individuals (CON/2012/40)

serie: con

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 22 May 2012 on debt arrangements for over-indebted individuals (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

type: rubrik

text: On 19 April 2012, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Greek Ministry of Labour and Social Security for an opinion on a draft law on debt arrangements for over-indebted individuals (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Article 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the sixth indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

type: stycke

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The draft law introduces amendments to both: (a) Law 3869/2010 governing the procedures enabling over-indebted individuals to benefit from a debt arrangement under specific conditions, and (b) the Code of Civil Procedure. The ECB was previously consulted on Law 3869/2010 and issued Opinion

text: on debt arrangements for over-indebted individuals in response. 1.2 The draft law amends the conditions for applying to the competent court for a debt arrangement, by specifying that: (a) debtors may reach an out-of-court settlement with their creditors prior to or following the submission of their application, pending final judgment by the competent court on such application; and (b) individuals regularly engaged in the conduct of commercial transactions will also be eligible for a debt arrangement subject to the following conditions: (i) they are selfemployed, (ii) they have not employed more than one employee over the four years prior to making the application and, (iii) their debt from commercial transactions does not exceed a specific amount.

text: 1.3 In addition, the draft law specifies further certain procedural issues in relation to the submission of applications for a debt arrangement and the assessment of such applications by the courts. More specifically, it provides that in case of assignment of creditors’ claims to third parties, assignees with no main residence or seat in the Hellenic Republic are obliged to appoint an agent pursuant to the relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. This obligation is to apply retroactively. 1.4 As regards debt arrangements for debtors whose assets are not sufficient to repay the debt, the draft law extends from four to five years the maximum period during which the debtor may be obliged to pay a specific amount to satisfy his creditors’ claims on a monthly basis. In such a case, where the debtor fails to make the payments imposed on him by the court, he must, within six years from submission of his application or within one year from the court judgement, settle the outstanding amount plus the interest accruing from the date of such judgement. The applicable interest rate is 2.5 percentage points higher than the interest rate applicable to the ECB’s main refinancing operations. This measure will also apply retroactively to pending applications. In exceptional cases, the court may limit the maximum arrangement period to three years. Due performance of the above obligations by the debtor will, in principle, result in him being released from any residual debts towards all his creditors. 1.5 As regards the special procedure aimed at protecting the debtor’s primary residence, the draft law allows for the extension of the maximum repayment period for the total debt from 20 to 35 years, in certain cases. The creditor may only institute enforcement proceedings with respect to the debtor’s sole place of residence if the debtor fails to honour the obligations imposed during such repayment period, by being at least four monthly instalments in arrears. 1.6 The draft law also reinforces the debtors’ duty of disclosure, stipulating that the consequences of infringing such duty will also apply where debtors deliberately omit creditors from their application for a debt arrangement. 1.7 Finally, the draft law amends Article 982 of the Code of Civil Procedure in order to provide that debtor claims on deposits with credit institutions up to an amount of EUR 1 500 for personal bank accounts and EUR 2 000 for joint bank accounts shall be exempt from seizure.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 The ECB understands that the draft law aims to enhance the legal framework governing debt arrangement procedures with a view to improving its effectiveness and ensuring the adequate fulfilment of its objectives. On the basis of the consultation request submitted to the ECB, the draft law aims to safeguard the interests of credit institutions and debtors, restoring trust between credit institutions and creditors and enhancing liquidity in the banking sector. However, in the absence of a thorough impact assessment of the proposed changes, it remains doubtful whether these objectives will be achieved. Such assessment should therefore be undertaken before the draft law is adopted.

text: 2.2 The ECB notes that the amended provisions are of unlimited duration and general application and govern existing legal relationships between debtors and creditors, such as credit institutions. Consequently, the observations made by the ECB in Opinion

text: still apply to the proposed provisions. This is of importance given that the time which has elapsed since the adoption of the relevant legislation and the issuance of Opinion CON 2010/34 has seen changes to the Greek financial system, which should be taken into consideration prior to the adoption of the draft law. 2.3 It seems likely that several of the amendments may have negative implications for credit institutions in their capacity as creditors and these provisions should be thoroughly assessed before the adoption of the draft law. In particular, such amendments may have a potential impact on both the capital adequacy and liquidity position of credit institutions as well as the functioning of the financial system. It is only by making such a prior assessment that it may be possible to mitigate such negative implications. In turn, this will safeguard financial stability, promote market efficiency and liquidity and support the adequate flow of credit to the economy . From a financial stability perspective, potential concerns impacting on credit institutions, which need to be assessed from the outset, stem from the following provisions: (a) the proposed extension from 20 to 35 years of the maximum repayment period for debt related to primary residences, (b) the proposed extension of the debt arrangement regime to self-employed persons regularly engaged in the conduct of commercial transactions, as described above , (c) the exemption from seizure of certain deposits with credit institutions , and (d) the removal of the current requirement to first pursue an out-of-court settlement procedure, thereby making it possible to immediately file for a court procedure and for the stay of enforcement procedures. 2.4 In this context, the ECB stresses that the proposed amendments should be accompanied by the necessary safeguards to avoid moral hazard, as it is important that the debtor has an incentive to fulfil the payment obligations determined by the court settlement procedure. Against this background, the proposed interest rate to be applied in the event of non-fulfilment of such obligations seems to be too low to serve as a penalty rate. In addition, no explanatory material on the background of this provision has been provided and this would be needed in order for a full assessment to be made. 2.5 The ECB welcomes the reinforcement of the debtors’ duty of disclosure and considers, in view of its importance for the stability of financial institutions and markets, that the draft law could be further elaborated on in order to ensure that the relevant legal framework takes into account the current needs of all stakeholders involved and will prove efficient in the long term.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 22 May 2012. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI

type: vagledning

utgivare: ecb


text: The draft law amending the Law on trading in financial instruments and the Law on public offering, conditions governing the introduction of financial instruments to organised trading, and public companies (version of 24 April 2012, parliamentary print no. 337).

text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: Consolidated text published in Dziennik Ustaw (Dz. U) of 2010 No 211, item 1384. 5 See explanatory memorandum to the draft law, p. 1.

text: See

text: Article 45

text: b of the Law on trading in financial instruments as amended by the draft law. 7 See

text: Article 45

text: e of the Law on trading in financial instruments as amended by the draft law. 8 See new

text: Article 45

text: g of the Law on trading in financial instruments inserted by the draft law. 9 See new

text: Article 45

text: h of the Law on trading in financial instruments inserted by the draft law. 10 See new

text: Article 48

text: (5a) of the Law on trading in financial instruments inserted by the draft law. 11 See

text: Article 22(1)

text: (4), 66-67, 77(4), 80, 84(3), 85, 85a, 127(4), 135-137, 333(2) and 498(4) of Law on bankruptcy and rehabilitation of 28 February 2003 (consolidated text published in Dz.U. of 21 October 2009 No 175, item 1361). 12 Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 1998 on settlement finality in payment and securities settlement systems (OJ L 166, 11.6.1998, p. 45). 13 Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 June 2002 on financial collateral arrangements (OJ L 168, 27.6.2002, p. 43). 14 See

text: Article 4(1)

text: together with

text: Article 2(1)

text: points (b) and (l) of the Financial Collateral Directive.

text: See also paragraph 4 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 22 May 2012 on the introduction of legal framework for the operation of central counterparties (CON/2012/41)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 22 May 2012 on the introduction of legal framework for the operation of central counterparties (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 10 April 2012, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Marshal of the Polish Parliament (Sejm) for an opinion on a draft law amending the Law on trading in financial instruments and certain other laws (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). A modified version of the draft law , as developed in the parliamentary legislative procedure, was made public following the original consultation request. This opinion takes these modifications into account. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the fifth and sixth indents of

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to payment and settlement systems and to rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The draft law amends the Law of 29 July 2005 on trading in financial instruments inter alia with a view to adapting its provisions to the requirements to be introduced by the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories . The aim of this adaptation is to enable the clearing of transactions in financial instruments through a central counterparty (CCP) .

text: 1.2 To this end, the draft law introduces clearing novation, a mechanism where the CCP assumes the rights and obligations of the original parties to the transaction. This is done, inter alia, by: (a) modifying the legal definitions of clearing and settlement and the parties involved in the clearing process ; (b) extending the protection against insolvency and similar proceedings of funds available in a counterparty’s account and necessary for settling the transaction, to cover those overthe-counter (OTC) transactions with mandatory central clearing ; (c) introducing an obligation for counterparties to clear their transactions through clearing members together with corresponding rules on granting and revoking authorisation to clear such transactions ; (d) defining contractual rules for a CCP to assume the rights and obligations of the original parties to a transaction, with a separate set of steps for those transactions executed by clearing members directly and for those executed by counterparties required to execute their transactions through clearing members . 1.3 In addition, the draft law provides that a trade repository may be established and operated by the National Depository for Securities (KDPW) .

text: 2. Specific observations

text: Article 45

text: e(1) of the Law on trading in financial instruments as amended by the draft law specifies, inter alia, that where a counterparty has designated funds on its account to settle OTC transactions subject to mandatory central clearing, availability of such funds for settlement shall be protected against effects of insolvency of the counterparty providing such funds. The ECB understands that this provision extends the protection of parties to transactions in financial instruments against the effects of a counterparty’s insolvency in specific cases not covered by the relevant provisions of 11 12 Polish law , which transpose the Settlement Finality Directive and the Financial Collateral Directive . The ECB further understands that transactions not subject to mandatory central clearing, including repo transactions, would not be covered by this extended protection. In this context, the ECB notes that repo transactions are covered within the scope of ‘title transfer financial collateral arrangements’ protected under the Financial Collateral Directive and would therefore welcome extending the protection offered by amended

text: Article 45

text: e(1) of the Law on trading in financial instruments to cover repo transactions not subject to mandatory central clearing. Indeed, broad protection of repo transactions is encouraged as they constitute an effective tool for

text: mitigating counterparty credit risk, while stable repo markets are an important source of funding for the financial sector. 2.2 In the context of amended

text: Article 45

text: e of the Law on trading in financial instruments, the ECB notes that this provision currently includes paragraph 3, which extends its application to securities registration systems operated by Narodowy Bank Polski. This provision is, however, missing from

text: Article 45

text: e as amended by the draft law. The text currently included in

text: Article 45

text: e(3) should therefore be reintroduced. 2.3 The ECB also notes that to allow for KDPW’s participation in T2S, the Law on trading in financial instruments should be further adapted in the future so that it cannot be interpreted as preventing KDPW from outsourcing certain functions related to securities settlement to the Eurosystem acting as operator of the T2S platform. Particular attention in this regard needs to be paid to

text: Article 48(7)

text: and

text: Article 150(1)

text: (13a) of the Law on trading in financial instruments, which may be interpreted as allowing KDPW to transfer information related to securities settlement solely to its subsidiaries to which it has delegated operation of the central securities depository . The ECB recommends adequately amending or supplementing the above provisions to allow KDPW to outsource certain securities settlement functions to a third-party service provider, and to transfer relevant information to them. In this respect, the attention of the Polish authorities is also drawn to Article 28 of the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on improving securities settlement in the European Union and on central securities depositories (CSDs) and amending Directive

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 22 May 2012.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 2011/61/EU av den 8 juni 2011

text: om förvaltare av alternativa investeringsfonder samt om ändring av direktiv

text: och

text: och förordningarna

text: (EG) nr 1060/2009

text: och

text: (EU) nr 1095/2010

text: (EUT L 174, 1.7.2011, s. 1).

text: ECB:s yttrande

text: av den 16 oktober 2009 om förslaget till Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv om förvaltare av alternativa investeringsfonder och om ändring av direktiven

text: och 2009/…/EG (EUT C 272, 13.11.2009, s. 1). Alla ECB:s yttranden finns på ECB:s webbplats http://www.ecb.europa.eu

text: Se Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems, Baselkommittén för banktillsyn, december 2010, reviderad utgåva juni 2011.

text: Som även medför en ändring av

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 2002/87/EG

text: om extra tillsyn över kreditinstitut, försäkringsföretag och värdepappersföretag i ett finansiellt konglomerat. KOM(2011) 453 slutlig.

text: KOM(2011) 452 slutlig.

text: En harmoniserad definition av finansiell hävstång skulle inte medföra en harmonisering av hävstångsnivån för kreditinstitut och alternativa investeringsfonder.

text: Se definitionen av leverage (här översatt med skuldsättningsgrad) i artikel 4.86 i förslaget till Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning om tillsynskrav för kreditinstitut och värdepappersföretag, KOM(2011) 452 slutlig.

text: Enligt förslaget till CRD IV ska alla kontantlån redovisas i balansräkningen och ökar därför den finansiella hävstången inom detta regelverk, oavsett hur de medel som erhållits senare används. Exponeringsvärdet för poster i balansräkningen ska generellt sett vara dess redovisade värde efter tillämpning av värderingsjusteringar, t.ex. för kreditrisken; se

text: artikel 416.5

text: jämförd med artikel 106.1 i förslaget till Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning om tillsynskrav för kreditinstitut och värdepappersföretag, KOM(2011) 452 slutlig.

text: Kapitel II avsnitt 2 artiklarna 9 och 10 i utkastet till delegerad förordning.

text: Se Esmas tekniska rådgivning till Europeiska kommissionen om möjliga genomförandeåtgärder för direktivet om förvaltare av alternativa investeringsfonder, 16 november 2011 (nedan kallad Esmas rådgivning),

text: , s. 459.

text: Artikel 43 i utkastet till delegerad förordning.

text: Artikel 44 i utkastet till delegerad förordning.

text: Se kapitel III avsnitt 5 i utkastet till delegerad förordning.

text: Artikel 55 i utkastet till delegerad förordning.

text: Artikel 54 i utkastet till delegerad förordning.

text: Se kapitel IV avsnitt 2 i utkastet till delegerad förordning.

text: Se artiklarna 91, 92, 98, 100 och 101 i utkastet till delegerad förordning.

text: Se kapitel IV avsnitt 3 i utkastet till delegerad förordning.

text: Se även kommissionens samrådsdokument UCITS depositary function and on the UCITS managers’ remuneration, 14 december 2010.

text: EUT L 302, 17.11.2009, s. 32.

text: Se

text: artikel 21.3 i direktiv 2011/61/EU

text: Se bilaga V till Esmas rådgivning.

text: EUT L 211, 11.8.2007, s. 8.

text: Se punkt 10 i yttrande

text: Artiklarna 7.3 och 118 i utkastet till delegerad förordning.

text: Jämför i detta avseende artiklarna

text: 3.3 d

text: och

text: i direktiv 2011/61/EU och artiklarna 7.3 och 118 i utkastet till delegerad förordning.

text: Text markerad med fet stil anger ECB:s förslag till ny text. Genomstruken text anger de strykningar som ECB föreslår.

text: EUT C 105, 11.4.2012, s. 1.

sprak: sv

title: Europeiska centralbankens yttrande av den 24 maj 2012 om ett utkast till kommissionens delegerade förordning om komplettering av Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 2011/61/EU vad gäller undantag, allmänna verksamhetsvillkor, förvaringsinstitut, finansiell hävstång, öppenhet och tillsyn (CON/2012/42)

text: Inledning och rättslig grund

text: Den 18 april 2012 mottog Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) en begäran från kommissionen om ett yttrande över ett utkast till kommissionens delegerade förordning om komplettering av

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 2011/61/EU

text: vad gäller undantag, allmänna verksamhetsvillkor, förvaringsinstitut, finansiell hävstång, öppenhet och tillsyn (nedan kallat utkastet till delegerad förordning).

text: ECB:s behörighet att avge ett yttrande grundas på artiklarna

text: och

text: i fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt, eftersom utkastet till delegerad förordning innehåller bestämmelser som berör Europeiska centralbankssystemets (ECBS) medverkan till ett smidigt genomförande av politiken för det finansiella systemets stabilitet i enlighet med artikel 127.5 i fördraget. I enlighet med

text: artikel 17.5

text: första meningen i arbetsordningen för Europeiska centralbanken har detta yttrande antagits av ECB-rådet.

text: Specifika kommentarer

text: 1. Finansiell hävstång

text: 1.1 ECB har tidigare konstaterat att begreppet finansiell hävstång enligt direktiv

text: är avgörande för många AIF-förvaltares (AIFM) affärsmodeller. Generellt sett instämmer ECB med Europeiska värdepappers- och marknadsmyndigheten (Esma) om att information om den finansiella hävstångsnivån beräknad på grundval av bruttoexponeringen är avgörande för att övervaka systemrisken och att denna information även bör lämnas till investerarna. Om den finansiella hävstången ligger alltför högt kan det medföra avsevärda risker för den finansiella stabiliteten, men hävstångsrisken är inte den enda risken för alternativa investeringsfonder (AIF-fonder). All information om finansiell hävstång bör därför kompletteras med relevant information om andra riskkällor. I detta sammanhang är det viktigt att skilja mellan de krav som avser de olika riskkällorna. Till dessa riskkällor hör positionsrisken, dvs. marknads- och kreditrisken för särskilda investeringar, samt den finansiella hävstången för AIF-fonder.

text: 1.2 För att hålla en enhetlig linje och förhindra regelarbitrage anser ECB att de metoder och den beräkning som ska tillämpas i fråga om den finansiella hävstången i möjligaste mån bör vara förenliga med Basel III-regelverket, förslaget till Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv om behörighet att utöva verksamhet i kreditinstitut och om tillsyn av kreditinstitut och värdepappersföretag och förslaget till Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning om tillsynskrav för kreditinstitut och värdepappersföretag (nedan tillsammans kallade förslaget till CRD IV). Denna överensstämmelse bör t.ex. säkerställas genom att godkännandet av hedgingtransaktioner och hanteringen av kontantlån beaktas. Man skulle också kunna överväga korshänvisningar till de begrepp som fastställs i förslaget till CRD IV.

text: 1.3 Som framgår av punkt 1.1 ovan anser ECB att det i samband med att exponeringarna beräknas bör göras åtskillnad mellan a) de inneboende riskerna med de tillgångar (portföljer) som har köpts av AIF-fonderna, dvs. positionsrisken, och b) den faktiska finansiella hävstång som detta medför. De båda riskkällorna bör följaktligen hållas åtskilda när den finansiella hävstången för AIF-fonderna ska fastställas. Kontantlån från externa källor som inte investeras är t.ex. visserligen varken exponerade för marknadsrisk eller kreditrisk, men ökar ändå den finansiella hävstången för AIF-fonderna. I förslaget till CRD IV verkar det däremot inte göras någon åtskillnad mellan olika typer av kontantlån.

text: 1.4 I utkastet till delegerad förordning hänvisas det till tillämpningen av brutto- respektive åtagandemetoden. Den avancerade metoden behandlas inte, eftersom denna metod inte säkert skulle ge jämförbara resultat. ECB är införstådd med att den avancerade metoden, som medför en mindre strikt tillämpning av åtagandemetodens regler, är utformad med tanke på AIF-förvaltare som förvaltar AIF-fonderna och för denna målgrupp är åtagandemetoden kanske inte lämplig eller ger kanske inte ändamålsenliga resultat. ECB stöder kommissionens beslut att inte inbegripa den avancerade metoden, eftersom det räcker att tillämpa brutto- och åtagandemetoden, som kommer att ge såväl investerare som behöriga tillsynsmyndigheter användbar information om den finansiella hävstången för AIF-fonder.

text: 2. Riskhantering

text: Enligt utkastet till delegerad förordning ska AIF-förvaltare göra åtskillnad mellan sin riskhanteringsfunktion och sin operativa funktion. Detta föreslås vara uppnått när AIF-förvaltare har fullgjort de eventualvillkor som fastställs i en uttömmande förteckning. Om dessa villkor inte är uppfyllda, ska AIF-förvaltarnas ledningsorgan tillämpa skyddsåtgärder mot intressekonflikter som kan utgöra en risk för att riskhanteringsfunktionen inte genomförs på ett oberoende sätt. I detta avseende stöder ECB att riskhanteringen skiljs från operativa funktioner och ledningsfunktioner. Kommissionen kan överväga att ge Esma i uppdrag att utarbeta allmänna riktlinjer med objektiva kriterier för att undvika en inkonsekvent tillämpning i unionen samt att övervaka genomförandet.

text: 3. Investeringar i värdepapperiseringspositioner

text: 3.1 I utkastet till delegerad förordning fastställs att AIF-förvaltare får investera i värdepapperiseringspositioner förutsatt att de gör en noggrann genomlysning av det medverkande institutet och originatorn. I utkastet till delegerad förordning föreskrivs närmare bestämt att AIF-förvaltaren, innan denne investerar i värdepapperiserade instrument, ska a) uppfylla vissa kvalitativa krav, t.ex. ha en heltäckande insikt i investeringarnas riskprofil samt en lämplig formell politik och lämpliga formella förfaranden, och b) säkerställa att såväl medverkande institut som originatorer uppfyller ett antal kvalitativa krav, däribland krav på en effektiv riskhantering, lämpliga diversifieringsstrategier etc..

text: 3.2 ECB ställer sig bakom de kvalitativa kriterierna som gör AIF-förvaltarna mer medvetna om vilka risker de tar innan de investerar i värdepapperiserade produkter. Vad gäller bestämmelserna under punkt 3.1 b kan kravet att AIF-förvaltarna ska säkerställa att originatorer och medverkande institut har korrekta riskhanteringsförfaranden vara svårt att tillämpa eftersom AIF-förvaltarna kanske inte har möjlighet att direkt kontrollera kriterier som rör det medverkande institutets eller sponsorns interna förfaranden.

text: 3.3 För att säkerställa att dessa krav inte begränsar AIF-förvaltares investeringar i värdepapperiserade produkter och på så sätt utgör ett hinder för det mer omfattande målet att blåsa nytt liv i värdepapperiseringsmarknaden, kan det i utkastet till delegerad förordning föreskrivas att Esma ska ge allmän vägledning om exakt vilken dokumentation som medverkande institut eller originatorer ska lämna till AIF-förvaltare i fråga om ovannämnda kvalitetskrav.

text: 4. Förvaringsinstituts uppgifter

text: 4.1 ECB välkomnar de omfattande uppgifter som förvaringsinstitut ska utföra enligt utkastet till delegerad förordning. ECB anser framför allt att de detaljerade kraven till stor del kommer att begränsa depåförvaringsrisken för investerare i AIF-fonder.

text: 4.2 ECB stöder de strikta ansvarsregler som införs genom direktiv

text: och som specificeras ytterligare i utkastet till delegerad förordning. ECB konstaterar emellertid att dessa ansvarsregler, i kombination med de kommande ändringarna (UCITS V) av

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 2009/65/EG av den 13 juli 2009

text: om samordning av lagar och andra författningar som avser företag för kollektiva investeringar i överlåtbara värdepapper (fondföretag), skulle kunna medföra mycket stora skadeståndsanspråk gentemot förvaringsinstitut. För vissa förvaringsinstitut skulle dessa anspråk kunna motsvara förluster som ibland överskrider hela deras kapital många gånger om. ECB anser därför att förvaringsinstituten måste hantera dessa risker på lämpligt sätt, oavsett om de är kreditinstitut, värdepappersföretag eller andra institut som är föremål för tillsyn, samt att riskerna beaktas inom ramen för deras respektive regler om kapitalkrav. Den kommande lagstiftningsprocessen om UCITS V är en bra möjlighet att ta upp den här frågan när det gäller såväl fondföretag som AIF-förvaringsinstitut.

text: 5. Rapporteringskrav och informationsutbyte

text: 5.1 ECB välkomnar de rapporteringskrav som fastställs i artikel 112 i utkastet till delegerad förordning. Enligt

text: artikel 112.7

text: måste AIF-förvaltare lämna informationen enligt den standardmall för rapportering som föreskrivs i bilagan till den delegerade förordningen. I detta hänseende stöder ECB de datarapporteringskrav som Esma föreslog i sin rådgivning, med månadsvis insamling av viss information, och föreslår att ytterligare information ska tillhandahållas om AIF-fondernas historiska riskprofiler. Denna mer detaljerade information är viktig när man ska upprätta ett omfattande ramverk för att övervaka systemrisken.

text: 5.2 Trots vad som sägs ovan medför dessa rapporteringskrav för de behöriga myndigheterna, särskilt de som anges i artikel 112.1 i utkastet till delegerad förordning, till stor del en överlappning av kraven på statistikrapportering enligt förordning

text: (EG) nr 958/2007

text: av den 27 juli 2007 om statistik över tillgångar och skulder hos investeringsfonder (ECB/2007/8). ECB anser därför att det finns förutsättningar för att begränsa rapporteringsbördan för AIF-förvaltarna genom att samordna vissa av rapporteringskraven för de behöriga myndigheterna med ECB:s statistikkrav. I detta hänseende är ECB redo att diskutera med kommissionen och Esma om hur rapporteringskraven ska samordnas på bästa sätt.

text: 5.3 När det gäller informationsutbyte ger utkastet till delegerad förordning slutligen de nationella myndigheterna stora möjligheter att själva avgöra under vilka förutsättningar som den information som är relevant för att övervaka systemrisken bör delas med Esma och ESRB. ECB föreslår att dessa bestämmelser förtydligas så att man undviker oklarheter.

text: I de fall där ECB rekommenderar att utkastet till delegerad förordning ändras anges de specifika förslagen i bilagan tillsammans med en förklaring.

text: BILAGA

text: Kommissionens förslag | ECB:s ändringsförslag

text: med beaktande av fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt, | med beaktande av fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt,

text: med beaktande av

text: och

text: och förordningarna

text: (EG) nr 1060/2009

text: och (EU) nr 1095/2010, särskilt

text: artiklarna 3.6

text: […] och 53.3, och | med beaktande av

text: och

text: och förordningarna

text: (EG) nr 1060/2009

text: och (EU) nr 1095/2010, särskilt

text: artiklarna 3.6

text: […] och 53.3, och

text: | med beaktande av Europeiska centralbankens yttrande, och

text: av följande skäl: | av följande skäl:

text: Förklaring I enlighet med artikel 296 i fördraget, där det fastställs att rättsakter ska innehålla en hänvisning till de yttranden som föreskrivs av fördragen, är ändringsförslaget nödvändigt för att beakta det faktum att utkastet till delegerad förordning antas i överensstämmelse med artiklarna 127.4 och 282.5 i fördraget. I dessa bestämmelser stadgas det att ECB ska höras om varje förslag till unionsrättsakt inom Europeiska centralbankens behörighetsområde. När det gäller ECB:s rådgivande roll vad gäller utkast till delegerade akter och genomförandeakter hänvisas till punkt 4 i ECB:s yttrande

text: av den 25 januari 2012 om ett förslag till direktiv om behörighet att utöva verksamhet i kreditinstitut och om tillsyn av kreditinstitut och värdepappersföretag samt om ett förslag till förordning om tillsynskrav för kreditinstitut och värdepappersföretag.

text: Ingen text. | AIF-förvaltarens verkställande ledning ska godkänna förteckningen över valda prime brokers. AIF-förvaltarna ska utse prime brokers från denna förteckning. Eftersom en prime broker kan vara systemviktig, bör hedgefonder använda sig av mer än en prime broker som har valts från den godkända förteckningen.

text: Förklaring I artikel 27 i utkastet till delegerad förordning fastställs detaljerade krav för hur prime brokers ska väljas och utses. ECB stöder dessa kriterier liksom kravet att förteckningen över valda prime brokers måste godkännas av AIF-förvaltarens verkställande ledning. Med tanke på att en prime broker kan vara systemviktig för en hedgefond bör det i utkastet till delegerad förordning också fastställas att AIF-förvaltare principiellt sett måste använda sig av flera prime brokers i enlighet med rådande marknadspraxis.

text: Ingen text. | 6. De anmälningar som tagits emot enligt punkt 3 ska lämnas till Esma. 7. Esma kan komma att utarbeta riktlinjer för att garantera att de behöriga myndigheterna gör en samstämmig bedömning av de situationer av tillfällig natur som avses i denna artikel.

text: Förklaring ECB välkomnar att

text: artikel 5

text: har tagits med i utkastet till delegerad förordning. I denna artikel fastställs att AIF-förvaltare som tillfälligt överskrider registreringströskeln ska undantas från registreringen. Vissa AIF-förvaltare skulle emellertid kunna missbruka det här undantaget. Det vore därför lämpligt att de behöriga myndigheterna åläggs att lämna de eventuella anmälningar om att en tröskel har överskridits som har lämnats av AIF-förvaltaren för att garantera att de nationella myndigheterna gör en samstämmig bedömning av tillfälliga överskridanden.

text: 3. Vid tillämpningen av punkt 1 ska AIF-förvaltarna vidta följande åtgärder för varje AIF-fond de förvaltar: | 3. Vid tillämpningen av punkt 1 ska AIF-förvaltarna vidta följande åtgärder för varje AIF-fond de förvaltar:

text: (c) De ska utföra lämpliga och regelbundna stresstester och scenarioanalyser för att hantera risker till följd av potentiella förändringar av marknadsvillkoren som skulle kunna påverka AIF-fonderna negativt. | (c) De ska utföra lämpliga och regelbundna stresstester och scenarioanalyser minst kvartalsvis för att hantera risker till följd av potentiella förändringar av marknadsvillkoren som skulle kunna påverka AIF-fonderna negativt.

text: Förklaring Med hänsyn till den finansiella stabiliteten rekommenderar ECB att stresstester och scenarioanalyser ska genomföras oftare och minst kvartalsvis, för att man ska kunna bedöma om en AIF-fond kan klara negativa finansiella, ekonomiska och idiosynkratiska chocker.

text: 2. AIF-förvaltare ska regelbundet genomföra stresstester vid normala och exceptionella likviditetsförhållanden, så att de kan bedöma likviditetsrisken för varje AIF-fond som de förvaltar. Stresstesterna ska | 2. AIF-förvaltare ska regelbundet genomföra stresstester vid normala och exceptionella likviditetsförhållanden, så att de kan bedöma likviditetsrisken för varje AIF-fond som de förvaltar. Stresstesterna ska

text: (e) utföras med en frekvens som är lämplig för AIF-fondens art, med beaktande av fondens investeringsstrategi, likviditetsprofil, typ av investerare och inlösenpolitik, men minst en gång om året. | (e) utföras med en frekvens som är lämplig för AIF-fondens art, med beaktande av fondens investeringsstrategi, likviditetsprofil, typ av investerare och inlösenpolitik, men minst kvartalsvis en gång om året.

text: Förklaring Se förklaring till ändring 4 ovan.

text: Ingen text. | För att underlätta upprättandet av samarbetsarrangemang samt säkerställa en enhetlig tillämpning av

text: artikel 37 i direktiv 2011/61/EU

text: kan Esma komma att utarbeta riktlinjer som anger villkoren för att tillämpa detta avsnitt.

text: Förklaring ECB stöder ett samarbete mellan de behöriga myndigheterna i medlemsstaterna och tredjeländer i form av samarbetsavtal. I detta hänseende är det avgörande att det sker en samordning mellan medlemsstaterna för att minimera inkonsekvenser i den politik de för. Att direkt involvera Esma, i enlighet med artikel

text: och

text: i direktiv 2011/61/EU, skulle bidra till att säkerställa att medlemsstaterna tillämpar en enhetlig linje gentemot tredjeland.


text: Magyar Közlöny, 2011/166., 30.12.2011, p. 41648. 2 OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 3 With effect from 1 January 2013 the Labour Court shall be called ‘Administrative and Labour Court’.

text: See, for example, paragraph 4.3 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 8 of Opinion

text: , and paragraph 4.3 of 5 See Section 2.2.3 of the ECB’s Convergence Reports May 2010 and May 2012.

text: See paragraph 3.2 of Opinion

text: . 7 The ECB’s Convergence Reports are available on the website of the ECB under www.ecb.europa.eu.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 31 May 2012 on the Law on the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (CON/2012/43)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 31 May 2012 on the Law on the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 18 May 2012, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Hungarian Ministry for the National Economy for an opinion on an amended version of a draft law (hereinafter the ‘amended draft law’) introducing changes to Law CCVIII of 2011 on the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (hereinafter the ‘MNB Law’) . The ECB has previously expressed its views on an earlier version of the draft law in Opinion

text: . The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the amended draft law relates to the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (MNB). In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the amended draft law

text: The amended draft law differs from its earlier version, on which the ECB commented in Opinion

text: , and it introduces several additional amendments to the MNB Law. With regard to the rules for dismissal of Monetary Council members, the amended draft law introduces changes to Article 46(10) of the MNB Law, instead of repealing it, as was the case in the earlier version of the amendments. The two explicit grounds for dismissal of the members of the Monetary Council are now replaced by a reference to Article 14.2 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter the ‘Statute of the ESCB’). Related amendments to Articles

text: and

text: further specify the procedure for dismissal of the members of the Monetary Council members. Article 77 of the MNB Law introduces changes to the title of the Labour Court which is referred to in Articles 46(12) and 47(5) of the MNB Law . Article 77 of the MNB Law has also been

text: amended by the addition of explicit references to Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB and the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union. The amended draft law is unchanged regarding the repeal of

text: Article 34

text: and Article 46(17) of the MNB Law.

text: Article 34

text: contains the MNB’s obligation to submit the agendas for Monetary Council meetings to the Government and the right of the Government’s representative to be present at Monetary Council meetings.

text: Article 46(17)

text: provides for the abolition of the Monetary Council when Hungary adopts the euro. The amended draft law no longer contains a repeal of Article 30 of the Transitional Provisions to Hungary’s Fundamental Law, which had allowed for the possibility of a merger of the MNB and the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority. The ECB understands that the provision repealing Article 30 of the Transitional Provisions to Hungary’s Fundamental Law has been carved out in a stand-alone bill, which will be voted on by Parliament at the same time as the amended draft law.

text: 2. General observations

text: The ECB welcomes the fact that the Hungarian authorities have taken into account the ECB’s earlier observations in Opinion

text: regarding Article 46(10) of the MNB Law, thereby strengthening legal certainty with respect to the grounds for dismissal of Monetary Council members. However, the amended draft law still fails to address a number of previously highlighted concerns as regards the MNB’s independence. Therefore, the ECB maintains its view that the provisions of the current MNB Law do not go far enough to re-establish central bank independence, notwithstanding this move in the right direction, as provided by the amended draft law. The frequency of amendments to the MNB Law has been criticised in previous ECB Opinions, as it contributes to an unstable basis for the operation of the MNB. Against this background, the ECB emphasises its preference for addressing the remaining open issues on the MNB’s independence listed below as part of the present parliamentary procedure on the MNB Law amendments in order to avoid making further amendments at a later stage.

text: 3. Possibility to vary the number of Monetary Council members; appointment of a third Deputy Governor

text: The concerns expressed in Opinions

text: and

text: on the composition of the MNB’s decision-making bodies are still valid. In particular, it is of concern that the number of Monetary Council members can be varied, and a third Deputy Governor can be appointed, and that such steps can be taken without consulting the MNB and considering its needs, or without providing reasonable arguments to support an expansion against the MNB’s advice. This situation gives rise to concerns as to whether these provisions could be used to influence decision-making processes, to the detriment of central bank independence.

text: 4. Executive powers of the Monetary Council

text: The fact that the Monetary Council has a mandate on policy implementation and the day-to-day running of the MNB also raises concerns. Such a mandate allows for the Monetary Council to be responsible not only for setting policies, but also for (a) their implementation, and (b) the oversight of its own actions. These concerns are exacerbated by the fact that different standards apply to the employment and other legal relationships of executive and non-executive members of the Monetary Council.

text: 5. Remuneration of the MNB’s decision-making bodies

text: The ECB remains concerned about the frequent changes to the remuneration of the members of the MNB’s decision-making bodies. Such changes have been made without the MNB’s prior consultation and with disregard for its views. This conduct amounts to pressure on the members of the MNB’s decisionmaking bodies by the national authorities . The ECB repeats its view that, in its present form, Article 51 of the MNB Law should only apply for future appointments following prior consideration of the MNB’s views.

text: 6. Other outstanding concerns related to the MNB Law

text: 6.1 Grounds for dismissal of the members of the Monetary Council The MNB Law provides for a unique two-step dismissal procedure of the members of the Monetary Council. The first step involves notifying the person concerned about a proposal for his dismissal. The decision to make a proposal for a dismissal is taken by the Parliament’s competent committee with regard to the external members of the Monetary Council, and by the Prime Minister with regard to the Governor and other Monetary Council members. This proposal for dismissal is subject to judicial review under national law. In the second step, the proposal for dismissal can only be submitted to the President of Hungary if no action for domestic judicial review has been filed or following the final ruling of the Labour Court. The amended draft law specifies that the right to appeal to the Labour Court does not prejudice the right to appeal to the Court of Justice as specified in Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB. The ECB welcomes the reference to Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB which stipulates that governors of national central banks who have been dismissed from office may refer such a decision to the Court of Justice. National legislation should either refer to the Statute of the ESCB or remain silent on the right to refer such a decision to the Court of Justice as Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB is directly applicable . Consequently, the decision of the President of Hungary to dismiss the Governor is open for review by the Court of Justice which has exclusive jurisdiction as regards a decision to relieve a governor from office. At the same time, to ensure continuity of the MNB’s

text: operations, it is advisable that the amended draft law should provide for consultation with the MNB’s Executive Board by the Prime Minister before the initiation of a dismissal procedure for the MNB Governor. Furthermore, the ECB understands that the amended draft law intends to limit the President’s power to dismiss the MNB Governor where the Labour Court has ruled in favour of the proposal for dismissal. However, in order to remove the scope for different interpretations, the legal drafting of this provision could be improved. 6.2 Replacement of the Governor The ECB reiterates its observation from Opinion

text: related to the replacement of the MNB’s Governor. Pursuant to Article 47(8) of the MNB Law, the Deputy Chair of the Monetary Council may replace the Governor in the latter’s absence. The MNB Law needs to provide sufficient guarantees and rules for a successor to the Governor in the event of termination of office due to expiry of the term of office, resignation, dismissal or death to avoid any external ad hoc interference and at the same time to ensure the smooth and continuous functioning of the Monetary Council . 6.3 Other remaining issues are specified in the ECB’s Convergence Reports and concern, inter alia, the oath taken by the MNB’s Governor and Deputy Governors, the single spelling of the euro in several Hungarian legal acts and the requirements for legal integration of the MNB into the Eurosystem . Previous ECB Opinions have already pointed out that the recast of the MNB Law offered the Hungarian authorities the opportunity to make the necessary adjustments to ensure the MNB’s full integration into the Eurosystem when Hungary adopts the euro.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 31 May 2012.

text: [signed]

text: The Vice-President of the ECB

text: Vítor CONSTÂNCIO


title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 31 May 2012 on the Law on Česká národní banka (CON/2012/44)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 31 May 2012 on the Law on Česká národní banka (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 26 March 2012, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Czech Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft law amending Law No 6/1993 Coll. on Česká národní banka and other related laws (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the third indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to Česká národní banka (CNB). In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: The draft law is primarily aimed at addressing certain issues identified by the ECB and the European Commission in their Convergence Reports in relation to Law No 6/1993 Coll. on Česká národní banka (hereinafter the ‘Law on CNB’). To this end, amendments are made in particular to the provisions concerning the grounds for dismissal of the Governor and other members of the Bank Board, the confidentiality obligation and monetary financing prohibition. The draft law is also aimed at strengthening CNB’s mandate as an institution responsible for ensuring financial stability and the safe functioning of the Czech financial system. It also specifies that one of CNB’s tasks in this context is to set macro-prudential policy. Other proposed changes include: (a) more detailed and extended legal regulation of reporting and statistics, based on Union legislation; (b) legal clarification concerning the management of CNB’s assets, including foreign reserves; (c) further specification of CNB’s powers as regards oversight of payment and settlement systems; (d) repeal of CNB’s power to issue provisions, a special regulatory tool to be replaced by decrees or CNB’s communications; (e) necessary adjustments to the provisions concerning administrative offences and administrative proceedings; and (f) abolition of the Financial Market Committee as an advisory body to the Bank Board. In addition, several changes are

text: 1 OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: 2 See, for example, the ECB’s Convergence Report May 2010. made to the internal organisation of the Law on CNB with a view to clarifying issues relating to its application and structure. The draft law does not include any changes necessary for the legal integration of CNB into the Eurosystem.

text: 2. Central bank independence

text: 2.1 General considerations Pursuant to

text: Article 131

text: TFEU, each Member State must ensure that its national legislation is compatible with the Treaties and the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter the ‘Statute of the ESCB’). Adaptation of national legislation may be achieved by referring to the Treaties and the Statute of the ESCB, by incorporating provisions thereof and referring to their provenance, by deleting any incompatibility with the Treaties and the Statute of the ESCB or by a combination of these methods . In this context, the ECB notes that the amended Article 6(12) of the Law on CNB, which aims to mirror Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB, only refers to infringements of the TFEU, while under Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB, a decision to relieve a Governor from office may be referred to the Court of Justice of the European Union on the grounds of infringement not only of the TFEU, but of both Treaties (including their annexes and protocols). Similarly, the amended Article 9 of the Law on CNB, which aims to mirror the provisions of

text: Article 130

text: TFEU, refers only to tasks and duties conferred by the TFEU and the Statute of the ESCB, while pursuant to

text: Article 130

text: TFEU the principle of central bank independence applies to tasks and duties conferred upon central banks by both the Treaties and the Statute of the ESCB, thus including the Treaty on European Union. Consequently, the ECB recommends adapting

text: Article 6(12)

text: and Article 9 of the Law on CNB for the sake of consistency. 2.2 Functional independence In line with

text: Article 127(1)

text: TFEU, the secondary objective of CNB ‘to ensure financial stability and the safe and sound operation of the financial system in the Czech Republic’ should be stated to be without prejudice to the CNB’s primary objective to maintain price stability. 2.3 Institutional independence The ECB notes that the draft law does not remove the existing incompatibilities of the Law on CNB in the area of institutional independence . In particular, Article 3 of the Law on CNB obliges CNB to submit a report on monetary developments to the Chamber of Deputies at least twice a year for review. Upon the Chamber of Deputies’ resolution, CNB must submit an extraordinary report to be prepared pursuant to such resolution. The Chamber of Deputies has the power to acknowledge the report or ask for a revised report; such revised report must comply with the Chamber of

text: 5 See the ECB’s Convergence Report May 2012, pp. 302 to 303. Deputies’ requirements. These parliamentary powers could potentially breach the prohibition on giving instructions to national central banks (NCBs) pursuant to

text: Article 130

text: TFEU and Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB. In addition, Article 47(5) of the Law on CNB requires CNB to submit a revised report if the Chamber of Deputies rejects its annual financial report. This revised report must comply with the Chamber of Deputies’ requirements. Such parliamentary powers breach the prohibition on approving, annulling or deferring decisions.

text: Article 3

text: and Article 47(5) of the Law on CNB are therefore incompatible with central bank independence and should be adapted accordingly. Under amended Article 9(1) of the Law on CNB, when carrying out CNB’s primary objective and when exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties conferred upon them by the TFEU and the Statute of the ESCB, CNB, the Bank Board and any member of the Bank Board are prohibited from seeking or taking instructions from the President of the Republic, from Parliament, from the Government, from administrative authorities of the Czech Republic, from the bodies, institutions or other entities of the Union, from Member State governments or from any other body. Amended

text: Article 9(1)

text: does not prohibit the Government from seeking to influence the members of CNB’s decision-making bodies in situations where this may have an impact on CNB’s fulfilment of its ESCB-related tasks. In this respect the Law on CNB needs to be adapted to be fully consistent with

text: Article 130

text: TFEU and Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB. 2.4 Personal independence Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB stipulates, inter alia, that NCB Governors who have been dismissed from office or the Governing Council may refer such a decision to the Court of Justice on grounds of infringement of the Treaties or of any rule of law relating to their application. As regards judicial review by the Court of Justice, national legislation should either refer to the Statute of the ESCB or remain silent on the right to refer such decision to the Court of Justice (as Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB is directly applicable) . Amended Article 6(12) of the Law on CNB does not apply either of the two approaches and is not in line with Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB, i.e. the date from which the Governor may challenge the decision of dismissal. In addition, it is not necessary to transpose the right of the ECB to refer a decision of dismissal to the Court of Justice into the Law on CNB since this right stems directly from Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB. As regards the members of the Board other than the Governor, as noted in the ECB’s Convergence Reports , the draft law does not specifically provide for the right of national courts to review a decision to dismiss any member, other than the Governor, of the CNB’s Bank Board who is involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks. Although it is understood that this right is available under the general law, providing specifically for such a right of review could increase legal certainty.

text: 6 See, for example, the ECB’s Convergence Report May 2012, p. 29.

text: 7 See, for example, the ECB’s Convergence Report May 2012, p. 304. 2.5 Financial independence The ECB refers to its 2012 Convergence Report and the negative capital situation of CNB for a prolonged period of time.

text: 3. Monetary financing prohibition

text: 3.1 The ECB understands that new

text: Article 34

text: a of the Law on CNB aims at addressing defects highlighted in the ECB’s Convergence Report in relation to the prohibition on monetary financing. The ECB therefore welcomes the proposed changes. However, the ECB notes that instead of providing for an exception to the monetary financing prohibition in favour of publicly owned credit institutions in the context of the supply of reserves, new

text: Article 34

text: a(2) provides for such an exception with reference to ‘banks, foreign banks and credit unions’. As noted in the ECB’s Convergence Report , in general, it is unnecessary to transpose

text: Article 123

text: TFEU, supplemented by

text: Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 of 13 December 1993

text: specifying definitions for the application of the prohibitions referred to in Articles

text: and

text: b(1) of the Treaty , into national legislation as they are both directly applicable. If, however, national legislative provisions mirror these provisions, they may not narrow the scope of application of the monetary financing prohibition or extend the exemptions available under Union law. In this regard, the ECB understands that sectoral laws, i.e. the Law on banks and the Law on credit unions define that banks, foreign banks and credit unions are covered by the definition of credit institutions . However, the respective national legislative provisions should include an explicit reference to their provenance . New

text: Article 34

text: a(2) of the Law on CNB should therefore include an explicit reference to

text: Article 123(2)

text: TFEU. 3.2 Article 28 of the Law on CNB provides that CNB may purchase from banks or sell to them government bonds or other securities underwritten by the Government. The ECB notes that while secondary market purchases of debt instruments from the public sector are, in principle, allowed,

text: Council Regulation (EC) 3603/93

text: clarifies in recital 7 that purchases made on the secondary market must not be used to circumvent the objective of

text: Article 123

text: TFEU. In order to ensure compliance with the monetary financing prohibition it should therefore be ensured that, when applying

text: Article 28

text: , such purchases remain fully consistent with the objectives of

text: Article 123

text: TFEU, namely: (a) the primary objective of price stability, (b) central bank independence, and (c) fiscal discipline.

text: 8 See the ECB’s Convergence Report May 2012, p. 304.

text: 9 See the ECB’s Convergence Report May 2012, p. 36.

text: 10 OJ L OJ L 332, 31.12.1993, p. 1.

text: 11 Law No 21/1992 Coll. on banks and Law No 87/1995 Coll. on credit unions.

text: Article 4(1) of Directive 2006/48/EC

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institution (OJ L 177, 30.6.2006, p. 1) defines a credit institution as ‘an undertaking the business of which is to receive deposits or other repayable funds from the public and to grant credits for its own account’.

text: 13 See the ECB’s Convergence Report May 2012, p. 23. 3.3 Amended Article 30 of the Law on CNB provides that CNB keeps accounts in accordance with the budgetary rules, without further details. As noted in the ECB’s Convergence Report , national legislation that enables an NCB to hold government deposits and to service government accounts does not raise concerns about the compliance with the monetary financing prohibition as long as such provisions do not enable the extension of credit, including overnight overdrafts, and that deposits or current account balances are not remunerated above market rates. 3.4 The ECB understands that

text: Article 31

text: and new

text: Article 31

text: a of the Law on CNB refer to activities to be carried out by CNB as an agent of the State. Taking into account the express recognition in Article 21.2 of the Statute of the ESCB of the provision of fiscal agency services as a legitimate function traditionally performed by central banks, the ECB notes that the provision by central banks of fiscal agency services complies with the monetary financing prohibition, provided that such services remain within the scope of the fiscal agency function and do not constitute central bank financing of public sector obligations vis-à-vis third parties or central bank crediting of the public sector outside the narrowly defined exceptions specified in

text: Regulation (EC) No 3603/93

text: . The ECB considers that the provision without remuneration by CNB of fiscal agent services provided for under new

text: Article 31

text: a of the Law on CNB does not raise monetary financing concerns, provided they are core fiscal agent services. As regards possible CNB activities pursuant to Article 31 of the Law on CNB, relating to the management, redemption and transfer of government bonds, the payment of interest on such bonds and other activities as required, the law provides for remuneration of CNB to be agreed with the Ministry of Finance. In order to ensure full compliance with the monetary financing prohibition under

text: Article 123

text: TFEU, it needs to be ensured that such activities do not involve any financing by CNB, even by means of bridge financing. The ECB understands that under the arrangements currently in place, the government bond redemptions and coupon redemptions are financed from government account balances and that the CNB does not provide any form of financing with the exception of intraday financing, which is in line with the monetary financing prohibition.

text: 14 See the ECB’s Convergence Report May 2012, p. 39.

text: 15 See the ECB’s Convergence Report May 2012, p. 38, stating that ‘The purpose of Article 21.2 of the Statute is, following transfer of the monetary policy competence to the Eurosystem, to enable NCBs to continue to provide the fiscal agent service traditionally provided by central banks to governments and other public entities without automatically breaching the monetary financing prohibition.’ See also, e.g., Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: 16 This is one of the prohibited forms of monetary financing; see

text: Article 1(1)

text: (b)(ii) of

text: Regulation (EC) No 3603/93

text: and

text: b(1) of the Treaty. See the ECB’s Convergence Report May 2008, p. 233, which states with reference to the provision by CNB of administrative and financial support to the Financial Arbitrator, an administrative body entirely independent from the central bank, ‘constitutes a form of central bank financing of the public sector’s obligations’.

text: 17 See

text: Article 4

text: (non-extendable intra-day credits),

text: Article 5

text: (crediting, under specified conditions, the public sector’s account with cheques issued by third parties) and

text: Article 6

text: (holding, within specified limits, coins issued by and credited to the public sector) of

text: Regulation (EC) No 3603/93

text: . 4. Legal integration of CNB into the Eurosystem The legal integration of NCBs into the Eurosystem requires that national legislation be adapted to allow for the performance of Eurosystem-related tasks and compliance with the ECB’s decisions once the Member State concerned has adopted the euro. The ECB draws the consulting authority’s attention to the fact that, to comply with

text: Article 131

text: TFEU, relevant Czech legislation had to be adjusted by the date of the Czech Republic’s accession to the Union, i.e. 1 May 2004. Such adjustments necessary to ensure full integration of CNB into the Eurosystem need only enter into force on the date the Czech Republic adopts the euro. The ECB’s Convergence Report 2010 identifies several provisions of the Law on CNB and Law No 2/1969 Coll. that need to be adapted to ensure compatibility with the TFEU and the Statute of the ESCB in respect of Eurosystem-related tasks. An NCB’s secondary objectives must be consistent and not interfere with its obligation to support the Union’s general economic policies with a view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives laid down in Article 3 of the Treaty on the European Union, which is itself an objective expressed to be without prejudice to maintaining price stability . Therefore, amended Article 2(1) of the Law on CNB should make it clear that the objective in the area of financial stability is subordinate to the secondary objective of the ESCB , which is provided in the last sentence of amended

text: Article 2(1)

text: 5. CNB’s role in macro-prudential supervision

text: 5.1 The ECB welcomes the proposed amendments to the Law on CNB which entrust CNB with specific tasks in the area of macro-prudential policy. The ECB considers that the ECB and NCBs should play a leading role in macro-prudential oversight given their expertise and existing responsibilities in the area of financial stability, as referred to in the draft law. Against this background, the ECB would like to draw attention to the Recommendation of the European Systemic Risk Board of 22 December 2011 on the macro-prudential mandate of national authorities and more specifically to the following aspects of performance by CNB of its macroprudential oversight tasks. 5.2 First, in order for CNB to undertake its tasks, the draft law entitles CNB to require necessary information and documents in the form of statistical statements and statements for supervisory purposes and additional information or reports (hereinafter the ‘statements’) from listed reporting

text: 18 Law No 2/1969 Coll, establishing ministries and other central administrative bodies of the Czech Republic.

text: 19 See Opinions

text: and

text: 21 See Recommendation

text: of the European Systemic Risk Board of 22 December 2011 on the macro-prudential mandate of national authorities (OJ C 41, 14.2.2012, p. 1). See also

text: recital 24

text: of

text: Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 on European Union macro-prudential oversight of the financial system and establishing the European Systemic Risk Board (OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 1). entities. Under the draft law, CNB may use these statements to carry out any of its tasks, unless provided otherwise in a separate legislative act. The ECB understands that, for the benefit of its macro-prudential oversight tasks, CNB would thus be authorised to require and obtain in a timely fashion all data and information collected from reporting entities such as all financial corporations and other persons who have the information in their disposal, as referred to in new Article 41 of the Law on CNB, including information other than that currently collected for the purpose of supervising financial institutions . 5.3. Second, the Law on CNB, as amended by the draft law, provides that CNB ‘shall cooperate with the relevant state authorities in setting macro-prudential policy’ that it ‘shall be part of the European System of Financial Supervision and cooperate with the European Systemic Risk Board and with European Supervisory Authorities’ and further that it ‘shall cooperate and negotiate agreements within the scope of its field of competence with the central banks of other countries, with foreign authorities engaged in financial market supervision, and with international organisations engaged in financial market supervision’ . The ECB is of the view that these provisions may in addition specifically provide that the macro-prudential authority is entitled to exchange information with other central banks, macro-prudential authorities and with the ESRB, in particular on actions taken to address systemic risks at national level.

text: 6. Statistics and reporting

text: 6.1 The ECB takes note of the detailed and extended legal regulation of reporting and statistics, which is based on Union legislation and introduces a confidentiality regime for statistical information. 6.2 Article 5 of the Statute of the ESCB and

text: Regulation (EC) No 2533/98

text: provide the legal basis for the ECB, assisted by NCBs, to collect the statistical information necessary for the performance of ESCB tasks. Although the draft law refers to

text: Regulation (EC) No 2533/98

text: , certain provisions are not fully in line with

text: Article 8(4) of Regulation (EC) No 2533/98

text: . Under

text: Article 8(4)

text: , the transmission of confidential statistical information collected pursuant to Article 5 of the Statute of the ESCB ‘shall take place (a) to the extent and at the level of detail necessary for the performance of the tasks of the ESCB referred to in the Treaty; or (b) provided that such transmission is necessary for the efficient development, production or dissemination of statistics under Article 5 of the [Statute of the ESCB] or for increasing their quality’. New

text: Article 43

text: e and

text: Article 43

text: f(1)(a) and (c) of the Law on CNB limit the transmission of confidential statistical information that may be

text: 24 See also recommendation C(2) of Recommendation

text: 25 See new

text: Article 2(2)

text: (e) of the Law on CNB. 26 See

text: Article 2

text: a of the Law on CNB. 27 See new Article 2 (3) of the Law on CNB. 28

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 2533/98 of 23 November 1998

text: concerning the collection of statistical information by the European Central Bank (OJ L 318, 27.11.1998, p. 8). provided by CNB to the ESCB to statistical purposes. In this respect, the draft law should be amended to allow the transmission of confidential statistical information also in accordance with

text: Article 8(4)

text: (a) of

text: Regulation (EC) No 2533/98

text: . This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 31 May 2012. [signed] The Vice-President of the ECB Vítor CONSTÂNCIO