identifier: AMC & GM to Part-CAT — Issue 2, Amendment 15

beslut: ED Decision 2018/012/R

text: Annex III to ED Decision 2018/012/R

text: Annex III to Decision 2018/012/R ‘AMC and GM to Part-CAT — Issue 2, Amendment 15’

text: The Annex to Decision 2014/015/R of 24 April 2014 is hereby amended as follows: The text of the amendment is arranged to show deleted, new or amended text as shown below:

text: 1. deleted text is marked with strike through;

text: 2. new or amended text is highlighted in blue; and

text: 3. an ellipsis (…) indicates that the remaining text is unchanged in front of or following the reflected amendment.

text: 1. AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.170(b) is inserted as follows: AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.170(b) Psychoactive substances POLICY ON PREVENTION OF MISUSE OF PSYCHOACTIVE SUBSTANCES (a) The operator’s policy on prevention of misuse of psychoactive substances should ensure that flight and cabin crew, as well as other safety-sensitive personnel, are dealt with in a consistent, just and fair manner as regards the prevention and detection of misuse of psychoactive substances. (b) The operator’s training policy on misuse of psychoactive substances should include training and/or educational material on: (1) the effects of psychoactive substances on individuals and on flight safety; (2) established procedures within the organisation to prevent misuse of p sychoactive substances; (3) individual responsibilities with regard to applicable legislation and policies on psychoactive substances; and (4) assistance provided by the support programme in accordance with CAT.GEN.MPA.215. 2. AMC2 CAT.GEN.MPA.170(b) is inserted as follows: AMC2 CAT.GEN.MPA.170(b) Psychoactive substances POLICY TO PREVENT MISUSE OF PSYCHOACTIVE SUBSTANCES The operator’s policy should ensure testing for psychoactive substances at least in the following cases: (a) upon employment by the operator; and (b) with due cause in the following cases: (1) following a reasonable suspicion, and following an assessment by appropriately trained personnel; and (2) after a serious incident or accident within the meaning of

text: Regulation (EU) No 996/2010

text: , provided that testing is possible due to the location of the serious incident or accident. Annex III to ED Decision 2018/012/R

text: 3. GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.170(b) is inserted as follows: GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.170(b) Psychoactive substances POLICY ON PREVENTION OF MISUSE OF PSYCHOACTIVE SUBSTANCES Guidance for the development and implementation of the policy on prevention of misuse of psychoactive substances is contained in ICAO Doc 9654 ‘Manual on Prevention of Problematic Use of Substances in the Aviation Workplace’. TRAINING AND EDUCATION PROGRAMMES Guidance for the development and implementation of training and education programmes is contained in ICAO Doc 9654 ‘Manual on Prevention of Problematic Use of Substances in the Aviation Workplace’.

text: 4. GM2 CAT.GEN.MPA.170(b) is inserted as follows: GM2 CAT.GEN.MPA.170(b) Psychoactive substances OPERATOR RANDOM TESTING PROGRAMME Nothing should prevent an operator from implementing a random testing programme in accordance with national requirements on testing of individuals, in order to mitigate the risk that misuse of psychoactive substances remains undetected and endangers the safety of the aircraft or its occupants.

text: 5. GM3 CAT.GEN.MPA.170(b) is inserted as follows: GM3 CAT.GEN.MPA.170(b) Psychoactive substances MEANING OF ‘PERSONNEL UNDER THE DIRECT CONTROL OF THE OPERATOR’ (a) Personnel under the direct control of the operator means personnel that is directly employed by the operator. This excludes personnel of contractors or subcontractors of the operator unless they act as flight or cabin crew. (b) The operator may require the contracted service provider to carry out testing of personnel as part of the contract between the operator and the contracted service provider.

text: 6. GM4 CAT.GEN.MPA.170(b) is inserted as follows: GM4 CAT.GEN.MPA.170(b) Psychoactive substances POLICY TO PREVENT MISUSE OF PSYCHOACTIVE SUBSTANCES After referral and assessment by the medical assessor of the licencing authority, the operator may consider unannounced testing as part of a periodic medical follow-up after rehabilitation and return to work.

text: 7. AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.170(c) is inserted as follows: AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.170(c) Psychoactive substances OBJECTIVE, TRANSPARENT AND NON-DISCRIMINATORY TESTING PROCEDURE The operator’s objective, transparent and non-discriminatory testing procedure should specify: (a) means to ensure confidentiality and protection of data; Annex III to ED Decision 2018/012/R (b) the responsibilities of the person carrying out a test, which should be in accordance with national legislation; (c) the timing and suitable locations for testing; (d) that the body responsible for testing should be an independent, accredited body using standard guidelines on psychoactive substance testing in line with national legislation; (e) the testing process, and in particular: (1) the psychoactive substances to be tested for; (2) the applicable national legislation and use of recognised quality standards applied to the testing methodology; (3) initial screening and confirmation methods used; and (4) handling of test results, which should be conducted by impartial and trained personnel, in order to ensure adherence to the procedure, to determine the true positives and to prevent false positives; (f) applicable limits applying to psychoactive substance tests; (g) the process to be followed in case of a confirmed positive test result; and (h) the internal appeal process.

text: 8. AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.175(b) is inserted as follows: AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.175(b) Endangering safety PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT (a) The psychological assessment should be: (1) appropriate to the particularity, the complexity and the challenges of the operational environment that the flight crew is likely to be exposed to, as defined by a job analysis identifying the safety-critical dimensions related to the flight crew’s function and role within the operator and should include at least the following assessment criteria: (i) cognitive abilities; (ii) personality traits; (iii) operational and professional competencies; and (iv) social competences in accordance with crew resource management principles; (2) validated and either directly performed or overseen by a psychologist with acquired knowledge in aviation relevant to the flight crew’s operati ng environment and with expertise in psychological assessment, and where possible, the psychological selection of aviation personnel; and (3) undertaken at least within the past 24 months before commencing line flying, unless the operator can demonstrate that the psychological assessment undertaken more than 24 months ago is still adequate for the risk mitigation as required by ORO.GEN.200(a)(3). Such a demonstration should be based on the tests previously performed, an updated Annex III to ED Decision 2018/012/R risk assessment based on data gathered from previous operational experience and continuous human performance monitoring since the last psychological assessment. (b) As regards the psychological assessment, the following should be documented: (1) the procedures followed; (2) the personnel involved; (3) the assessment criteria and instruments used in the assessment; and (4) the validity period.

text: 9. GMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.175(b) is inserted as follows: GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.175(b) Endangering safety GUIDANCE ON CONDUCTING A PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT (a) A psychological assessment performed by one operator may subsequently be accepted by a different operator, provided that the latter is satisfied that the assessment has been performed in accordance with AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.175(b). (b) A psychological assessment conducted by or on behalf of an operator should not be considered or conducted as a clinical psychological evaluation. (c) When establishing the policy on psychological assessment of flight crews, the operator may refer to recognised industry standards and best practices in the field of pilot selection, aptitude testing and psychological assessment such as: (1) IATA ‘Guidance Material and Best Practices for Pilot Aptitude Testing’; and (2) national or European standards of ethical codes of conduct when conducting a psychological assessment, such as by national or European associations for (aviation) psychology.

text: 10. AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.175(c) is inserted as follows: AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.175(c) Endangering safety INTERNAL ASSESSMENT FOR NON-COMPLEX OPERATORS (a) An operator may replace the psychological assessment with an internal assessment of the psychological attributes and suitability of the flight crew, if the operator is considered to be a non-complex operator, i.e. when it has a workforce of 20 full -time equivalents (FTEs) or less, that are involved in an activity subject to

text: Regulation (EU) 2018/1139

text: and its implementing rules. (b) The internal assessment for non-complex operators should as far as possible apply the same principles as the psychological assessment before commencing line flying for complex operators.

text: 11. AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.215 is inserted as follows: AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.215 Support programme PRINCIPLES GOVERNING A SUPPORT PROGRAMME The access to a support programme should: Annex III to ED Decision 2018/012/R (a) enable self-declaration or referral in case of a decrease in a flight crew’s medical fitness with an emphasis on prevention and early support; and (b) if appropriate, allow the flight crew to receive temporary relief from flight duties and be referred to professional advice.

text: 12. AMC2 CAT.GEN.MPA.215 is inserted as follows: AMC2 CAT.GEN.MPA.215 Support programme CONFIDENTIALITY AND PROTECTION OF DATA (a) The personal data of flight crew who have been referred to a support programme should be handled in a confidential, non-stigmatising, and safe environment. (b) A culture of mutual trust and cooperation should be maintained so that the flight crew is less likely to hide a condition and more likely to report and seek help. (c) Disclosure of data to the operator may only be granted in an anonymised manner such as in the form of aggregated statistical data and only for purposes of safety management so as not to compromise the voluntary participation in a support programme, thereby compromising flight safety. (d) Notwithstanding the above, an agreement with related procedures should be in place between the operator and the support programme on how to proceed in case of a serious safety concern.

text: 13. AMC3 CAT.GEN.MPA.215 is inserted as follows: AMC3 CAT.GEN.MPA.215 Support programme ELEMENTS OF A SUPPORT PROGRAMME (a) A support programme should contain as a minimum the fol lowing elements: (1) procedures including education of flight crew regarding self-awareness and facilitation of self-referral; (2) assistance provided by professionals, including mental and psychological health professionals with relevant knowledge of the aviation environment; (3) involvement of trained peers, where trained peers are available; (4) monitoring of the efficiency and effectiveness of the programme; (5) monitoring and support of the process of returning to work; (6) management of risks resulting from fear of loss of licence; and (7) a referral system to an aero-medical examiner in defined cases raising serious safety concerns. (b) A support programme should be linked to the management system of the operator, provided that data is used for purposes of safety management and is anonymised and aggregated to ensure confidentiality. Annex III to ED Decision 2018/012/R

text: 14. AMC4 CAT.GEN.MPA.215 is inserted as follows: AMC4 CAT.GEN.MPA.215 Support programme TRAINING AND AWARENESS (a) The operator should promote access to the support programme for all flight crew. (b) Professionals, including mental and psychological health professionals, as well as trained peers, where trained peers are available, that are involved in the support programme, should receive initial and recurrent training related to their role and functi on within the support programme.

text: 15. GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.215 is inserted as follows: GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.215 Support programme SUPPORT PROGRAMME (a) A support programme is a proactive programme applying the principles of ‘just culture’ as defined in

text: Regulation (EU) No 376/2014

text: , whereby the senior management of the operator, mental health professionals, trained peers, and in many cases representative organisations of crew members work together to enable self-declaration, referral, advice, counselling and/or treatment, where necessary, in case of a decrease in medical fitness. (b) The support programme should be easily accessible for flight crew, and should provide adequate means of support at the earliest stages.

text: 16. GM2 CAT.GEN.MPA.215 is inserted as follows: GM2 CAT.GEN.MPA.215 Support programme FACILITATION OF TRUST IN THE SUPPORT PROGRAMME Essential trust between management and crew is the foundation for a successful support programme. This trust can be facilitated by: (a) establishing a platform for multi-stakeholder participation and partnership in the governance process of the support programme by involving flight crew representatives from one or more operators and representatives of the relevant operator. In some cases, a multi-stakeholder platform may also include representatives of the competent authority; (b) participation of the representatives of those personnel covered by the support programme in the design, implementation and operation of the support programme; (c) a formal agreement between management and crew, identifying the procedures for the use of data, its protection and confidentiality; (d) clear and unambiguous provisions on data protection; (e) senior management’s demonstrated commitment to promote a proactive safety culture; (f) a non-punitive operator policy that also covers the support programme; (g) support programme management by staff either established within the operator or by a separate independent organisation; Annex III to ED Decision 2018/012/R (h) involvement of persons with appropriate expertise when advising crews (for example, pilot peers with similar cultural backgrounds and professional staff with appropriate training in e.g. psychology, etc.); (i) a structured system to protect the confidentiality of personal data; and (j) an efficient communication system that promotes the benefits of the support programme, such as its positive impacts, temporary relief from duties without fear of dismissal, management of risks resulting from fear of loss of licence.

text: 17. GM3 CAT.GEN.MPA.215 is inserted as follows: GM3 CAT.GEN.MPA.215 Support programme TRAINING AND AWARENESS (a) When promoting the benefits of the support programme, the operator should stress at least the following elements of the programme: (1) positive impacts of a support programme; (2) awareness of job stressors and life stressors — mental fitness and mental health; (3) coping strategies; (4) potential effects of psychoactive substances and their use or misuse; (5) medication use (prescribed and over-the-counter medication) to ensure the safe exercise of the privileges of the licence whilst taking medication; (6) early recognition of mental unfitness; (7) principles and availability of a support programme; and (8) data protection and confidentiality principles. (b) Mental health professionals involved in the support programme should be trained on: (1) psychological first aid; (2) applicable legal requirements regarding data protection; and (3) cases where information should be disclosed due to an immediate and evident safety threat and in the interest of public safety. (c) Peers involved in the support programme should receive practically orientated basic training in psychological first aid and regular refresher trainings.

text: 18. GM4 CAT.GEN.MPA.215 is inserted as follows: GM4 CAT.GEN.MPA.215 Support programme ELEMENTS CONTRIBUTING TO A SUPPORT PROGRAMME When implementing a support programme, the operator should pay attention to the following: (a) establishment and verification of operational and data protection procedures; (b) selection and training of dedicated and experienced staff and peers; Annex III to ED Decision 2018/012/R (c) offer of motivating alternative positions to flight crew in case a return to in-flight duties is not possible; and (d) limitation of the financial consequences of a loss of licence, for example through extending loss of licence coverage.

text: 19. GM5 CAT.GEN.MPA.215 is inserted as follows: GM5 CAT.GEN.MPA.215 Support programme POSSIBILITY TO CONTRACT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SUPPORT PROGRAMME TO A THIRD PARTY The operator may contract the establishment of a support programme to a third party. For a smallersized operator, the synergies created by a third-party support programme can be beneficial and in some cases may provide the only feasible option to ensure access to a support programme or to ensure availability of trained peers.

text: 20. GM6 CAT.GEN.MPA.215 is inserted as follows: GM6 CAT.GEN.MPA.215 Support programme OBLIGATION TO SEEK AERO-MEDICAL ADVICE IN CASE OF A DECREASE IN MEDICAL FITNESS Joining a support programme does not remove the flight crew’s obligation to seek aero-medical advice in case of a decrease in medical fitness in accordance with MED.A.020 of

text: Commission Regulation (EU) No 1178/2011

text: 21. GM7 CAT.GEN.MPA.215 is inserted as follows: GM7 CAT.GEN.MPA.215 Support programme SCOPE OF THE SUPPORT PROGRAMME Nothing should prevent an operator from extending the scope of the support programme to include, apart from flight crew, other safety-sensitive categories personnel, e.g. cabin crew or maintenance, as well.

text: 22. GM8 CAT.GEN.MPA.215 is inserted as follows: GM8 CAT.GEN.MPA.215 Support programme MEANING OF THE TERM ‘PEER’ (a) In the context of a support programme, a ‘peer’ is a trained person who shares common professional qualifications and experience, and has encountered similar situations, problems or conditions with the person seeking assistance from a support programme. This may or may not be a person working in the same organisation as the person seeking assistance from the support programme. (b) A peer’s involvement in a support programme can be beneficial due to similar professional backgrounds between the peer and the person seeking support. However, a mental health professional should support the peer when required, e.g. in cases where i ntervention is required to prevent endangering safety.


identifier: AMC & GM to Part-CAT — Issue 2, Amendment 16

amnesord: Part-CAT - Commercial Air Transport Operations

beslut: ED Decision 2019/008/R

publisher: Europeiska unionens byrå för luftfartssäkerhet

sprak: en

serie: amc-gm

text: Annex III to ED Decision 2019/008/R

type: stycke

text: Annex III to ED Decision 2019/008/R

text: ‘AMC/GM to Part-CAT – Issue 2, Amendment 16’

text: The Annex to Decision 2014/015/R of 24 April 2014 is amended as follows: The text of the amendment is arranged to show deleted, new or amended text as shown below:

text: 1. deleted text is struck through;

text: 2. new or amended text is highlighted in blue; and

text: 3. an ellipsis ‘(…)’ indicates that the rest of the text is unchanged.

text: 1. AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.140 is amended as follows: AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.140 Portable electronic devices TECHNICAL PREREQUISITES FOR THE USE OF PEDS (…) (d) Demonstration of electromagnetic compatibility (1) EMI assessment at aircraft level The means to demonstrate that the radio frequency (RF) emissions (intentional or nonintentional) are tolerated by aircraft systems should be as follows: (i) to address front door coupling susceptibility for any kind of PEDs: (A) RTCA, ‘Guidance on allowing transmitting portable, electronic devices (T-PEDs) on aircraft’, DO-294C (or later revisions), Appendix 5C; or (A) EUROCAE, ‘Guidance for the use of Portable Electronic Devices (PEDs) on Board Aircraft’, ED-130A / RTCA DO-363 ‘Guidance for the Development of Portable Electronic Devices (PED) Tolerance for Civil Aircraft’, Section 5; or (B) RTCA, ‘Aircraft design and certification for portable electronic device (PED) tolerance’, DO-307 (including Change 1 or later revisions), Section 4; and (B) EUROCAE, ‘Aircraft Design and Certification for Portable Electronic Device (PED) Tolerance’, ED-239 / RTCA DO-307A, Section 4; The use of RTCA, ‘Guidance on Allowing Transmitting Portable Electronic Devices (T-PEDs) on Aircraft’, DO-294C (or later revisions), Appendix 5C; or RTCA DO-307 ‘Aircraft Design and Certification for Portable Electronic Device (PED) Tolerance’, (including Change 1 or later revisions), Section 4 may be acceptable. (ii) Tto address back door coupling susceptibility for T-PEDs: (A) EUROCAE, ‘Guidance for the use of portable electronic devices (PEDs) on Board Aircraft’, ED-130A/RTCA DO-363, Section 6; or (or later revisions), Annex 6; Annex III to ED Decision 2019/008/R (B) RTCA DO-294C (or later revisions), Appendix 6D; or (B) EUROCAE, ‘Aircraft Design and Certification for Portable Electronic Device (PED) Tolerance’, ED-239 / RTCA DO-307A, Section 3; or (C) RTCA DO-307 (including Change 1 or later revisions), Section 3. The use of EUROCAE, ‘Guidance for the use of Portable Electronic Devices (PEDs) on Board Aircraft’, ED-130, Annex 6; or RTCA DO-294C (or later revisions), Appendix 6D; or RTCA DO-307 (including Change 1 or later revisions), Section 3 may be acceptable. (2) Alternative EMI assessment of controlled PEDs (C-PEDs) (i) For To address front door coupling: (A) C-PEDs should comply with the levels as defined by: (a) EUROCAE/RTCA, ‘Environmental conditions and test procedures for airborne equipment’, ED-14D/RTCA DO-160D (or later revisions), Section 21, Category M, for operation in the passenger compartment and the flight crew compartment; and (b) EUROCAE ED-14ED/RTCA DO-160ED (or later revisions), Section 21, Category H, for operation in areas not accessible during the flight. (B) If the C-PEDs are electronic flight bags used in the flight crew compartment and if the DO-160 testing described in (A) identifies inadequate margins for interference or has not been performed, it is necessary to test the C-PED in each aircraft model in which it will be operated. The C-PED should be tested in operation on the aircraft to show that no interference with aircraft equipment occurs. Credit may be given to other aircraft that are similarly equipped (meaning in particular that they contain the same avionics equipment) of the same make and model as the one tested., an alternative compliance method described in EASA, ‘General acceptable means of compliance for airworthiness of products, part and appliances’, AMC-20, AMC 20- 25 (‘Airworthiness and operational considerations for electronic flight bags’), may be used. (ii) For To address back door coupling susceptibility for C-PEDs with transmitting capabilities, the EMI assessment described in (1)(ii) should be performed. (3) Alternative EMI assessment of cargo tracking devices In cases where a transmitting function is automatically deactivated in a cargo tracking device that(being is a T-PED), the unit should be qualified for safe operation on board the aircraft. One of the following methods should be considered to be acceptable as evidence of itsfor safe operation: (i) A type-specific safety assessment, including failure mode and effects analysis, has been performed at the aircraft level. The main purpose of the assessment should be to determine the worst hazards and to demonstrate that the an adequate design assurance levels of the relevant hardware and software components of the cargo tracking device are adequate. Annex III to ED Decision 2019/008/R (ii) The high intensity radiated field (HIRF) certification of the aircraft has been performed, i.e. the aircraft type has been certified after 1987 and meets the appropriate special condition. In such a case, the operator should observe ensure that the following conditions are met: (A) The tracking device: (a) features an automated and prolonged radio suspension in flight using multiple modes of redundancy; and (b) has been verified in the aircraft environment to ensure deactivation of the transmitting function in flight. (B) The transmissions of the tracking device are limited per design to short periods of time (less than 1 second per 1 000 seconds) and cannot be continuous. (CB) The emissions from the tracking device emissions should comply comply with the levels as defined by EUROCAE ED-14E/RTCA DO-160E (or later revisions), Section 21, Category H. (CD) In order to provide assurance on the tracking device design and production, The operator should ensure that the following documents are provided by the tracking device manufacturer retained as part of the evaluation package: (a) operational description, technical specifications, product label and images of the tracking device and any peripheral attachments a declaration from the manufacturer identifying the device and confirming that the device and its deactivation function comply with the requirement (A) and (B) above; (b) failure mode and effects analysis report of the tracking device and anyperipheral attachments; (bc) a declaration showing that of stringent robust design and production controls are in place during the manufacturing of the tracking device manufacturing; (cd) a declaration of conformity and technical documentation showing compliance towith the European Norms (EN), regulating the transmitter characteristics of the tracking device or its transmission module; and (de) an the EMI assessment report documenting the emission levels compliance with point (B) above. (…)

text: 2. GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.140 is amended as follows: GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.140 Portable electronic devices DEFINITIONS (a) Definitions and cCategories of PEDs Annex III to ED Decision 2019/008/R PEDs are any kind of electronic device, typically but not limited to consumer electronics, brought on board the aircraft by crew members, passengers, or as part of the cargo and that are not included in the approved aircraft configuration. All equipment that is able to consume electrical energy falls under this definition. The electrical energy can be provided from internal sources as batteries (chargeable or non-rechargeable) or the devices may also be connected to specific aircraft power sources. PEDs include the following two categories: (...) (b) Controlled PEDs (C-PEDs) A controlled PED (C-PED) is a PED subject to administrative control by the operator using it. This will include, inter alia, tracking the allocation of the devices to specific aircraft or persons and ensuring that no unauthorised changes are made to the hardware, software or databases. C-PEDs can be assigned to the category of non-intentional transmitters or T-PEDs. (bc) Cargo tracking device A cargo tracking device is a PED attached to or included in airfreight (e.g. in or on containers, pallets, parcels or baggage). Cargo tracking devices can be assigned to the category of unintentional transmitters or transmitting PEDs (T-PEDs). If the device is a T-PED, it should comply with the European Norms (EN) for transmissions. (cd) Definition of the switched-off status Many PEDs are not completely disconnected from the internal power source when switched off. The switching function may leave some remaining functionality, e.g. data storage, timer, clock, etc. These devices can be considered switched off when in the deactivated status. The same applies to devices having no transmitting capability that are operated by coin cells without further deactivation capability, e.g. wrist watches. (de) Electromagnetic interference (EMI) The two classes of EMI to be addressed can be described as follows: (1) Front door coupling is the possible disturbance to an aircraft system that is received by the antenna of the system and is mainly in the frequency band used by the system. Any PED internal oscillator has the potential to radiate low-level signals in the aviation frequency bands. Due to this disturbance, especially the instrument landing system (ILS) and the VHF omnirange (VOR) navigation system may indicate erroneous information. (2) Back door coupling is the possible disturbance of aircraft systems by electromagnetic fields generated by transmitters at a level which could exceed at short distance (i.e. within the aircraft) the electromagnetic field level used for the aircraft system certification testing. This disturbance may then lead to system malfunctions.

text: 3. GM3 CAT.GEN.MPA.140 is amended as follows: GM3 CAT.GEN.MPA.140 Portable electronic devices EVALUATION OF CARGO TRACKING DEVICES EVALUATION (…) Annex III to ED Decision 2019/008/R (c) Failure mode and effects analysis Further guidance on performing a failure mode and effects analysis can be found in: (1) SAE ARP 4761 (or later revisions); and (2) U.S. Department of Defense, ‘Procedures for performing a failure mode, effects and criticality analysis’, Military Standard MIL-STD-1629A (or later revisions). (c) Multiple modes of redundancy Multiple modes of redundancy means that the device is designed with a minimum of two independent means to turn it off completely, turn off the cellular or mobile functions, or a combination of both when airborne. These independent methods should use different sources to identify that the aircraft is in flight, for example, a cargo-tracking device may be designed to sense rapid altitude changes and acceleration to determine when to turn off cellular transmissions. Redundant sources of the same information, such as two vertical accelerometers, should not be considered independent.

text: 4. A new GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.141 is added: GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.141 Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs) DEFINITIONS For the purpose of EFB use, the following definitions apply: (a) Aircraft administrative communications (AAC): AAC are defined by ICAO as non-safety communications that are used by aeronautical operating agencies and are related to the business aspects of operating their flights and transport services. These communications are used for a variety of purposes, such as flight and ground transportation, bookings, deployment of crew, and aircraft or any other logistical purposes that maintain or enhance the efficiency of overall flight operations. AAC data links receive/transmit information that includes, but is not limited to, the support of EFB applications. (b) Aeronautical operational control (AOC): AOC communications are defined by ICAO as communications required for the exercise of authority over the initiation, continuation, diversion or termination of flight for safety, regularity, and efficiency reasons.

text: 5. A new GM2 CAT.GEN.MPA.141 is added: GM2 CAT.GEN.MPA.141 Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs) BACKGROUND INFORMATION Further related information on EFB hardware and EFB applications can be found in the following documents: (a) EASA AMC 20-25, Airworthiness considerations for EFBs; (b) EASA CS-25, Book 2, AMC Subpart F, AMC 25.1309, System Design and Analysis; (c) EUROCAE ED-14D/DO-160D (or later revisions) Environmental Conditions and Test Procedures for Airborne Equipment; Annex III to ED Decision 2019/008/R (d) EASA ETSO-C165A, Electronic Map Systems for Graphical Depiction of Aircraft Position; (e) FAA AC 120-76(C), Authorization for an Electronic Flight Bag Program; (f) FAA AC 120-78, Electronic Signatures, Electronic Recordkeeping, and Electronic Manuals; (g) ICAO Doc 10020, Manual of Electronic Flight Bags (EFBs).

text: 6. A new AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.141(a) is added: AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.141(a) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs) HARDWARE Before using a portable EFB, the following considerations should be assessed by the operator: (a) General A portable EFB is a portable electronic device (PED) and may host type A and/or type B EFB applications. In addition, it may host miscellaneous software applications. Portable EFBs are controlled PEDs (C-PEDs). A portable EFB should be capable of operation autonomously inside and outside the aircraft. The mass, dimensions, shape, and position of the portable EFB should not compromise flight safety. The power supply of a portable EFB may be provided by aircraft sources through an adequate power source. If mounted or stowed, a portable EFB should be easily removable from its mounting device/viewable stowage device or attached to it, without the use of tools by the flight crew. Any locking devices used to prevent theft should be unlocked during flight. A portable EFB may be part of a system that contains EFB-installed resources which are part of the certified aircraft configuration. The intended functions of the EFB-installed components may be to mount the EFB onto the aircraft and/or connect it to other systems. Portable EFBs may be used in all phases of the flight if secured to a certified mount or securely attached to a viewable stowage device in a manner that allows its use. Portable EFBs that do not meet the above characteristics should be stowed during critical phases of the flight. However, this does not preclude a flight crew from using a portable EFB during restricted portions of the critical phases of flight to complete a task related to the safety of the flight on the condition that the device is continuously handheld and used only during a short period of time. When the task is completed, the device should be stowed again. Any EFB component that is either not accessible in the flight crew compartment by the flight crew members or not removable by the flight crew members should be installed as ‘certified equipment’ covered by a type certificate (TC), a change to a TC or a supplemental (S)TC. (b) Characteristics and placement of the EFB display For a portable EFB, the considerations on the location of the display proposed below should apply to the proposed location of the display when the EFB is in use. Annex III to ED Decision 2019/008/R The EFB display and any other elements of the EFB system should be placed in such a way that they do not unduly impair the flight crew’s external view during any of the phases of the flight. Equally, they should not impair the view of or access to any flight-crew-compartment control or instrument. The location of the display unit and the other EFB system elements should be assessed for their possible impact on egress requirements. When the EFB is in use (intended to be viewed or controlled), its display should be within 90 degrees on either side of each flight crew member’s line of sight. Glare and reflection on the EFB display should not interfere with the normal duties of the flight crew. (c) Power source If the aircraft is equipped with electrical power outlet(s) in the flight crew compartment, the operator should ensure that their certified characteristics are compatible with the intended use of the EFB system. The powering or charging of the EFB system should be compatible with the electrical characteristics of the power supplied by the outlets in terms of power consumption, voltage, frequency, etc., not to impair the EFB system or other aircraft systems. (d) EFB data connectivity Portable EFBs may have data connectivity to aircraft systems, either wired or wireless, provided that the connections (hardware and software for data connection provisions) and adequate interface protection devices are incorporated into the aircraft type design. A portable EFB may receive any data from aircraft systems, but data transmission from EFBs should be limited to aircraft systems that have been certified for this intended purpose (refer to AMC 20-25 for more details). (e) External connecting cables (to avionics and/or power sources) When external cables are used to connect a portable EFB to the aircraft systems and/or to a power source, the following should apply: (1) cables should not hang loosely in a way that compromises task performance and safety; flight crew members should be able to easily secure the cables out of the way during operations (e.g. by using cable tether straps); and (2) cables should be of sufficient length so that they do not obstruct the use of any movable device (e.g. flight controls, switches, seats, windows) in the flight crew compartment. (f) Electromagnetic interference (EMI) demonstrations See paragraph (b), (c) and (d) of AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.140. The EMI demonstration should cover any cable connected to the EFB as well as non-certified power chargers. (g) Batteries See paragraph (f) of AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.140. (h) Viewable stowage Annex III to ED Decision 2019/008/R The evaluation of the viewable stowage should be performed for a given location in the flight deck. This location should be documented and this information should be part of the EFB policy. The viewable stowage should not be positioned in such a way that it creates significant obstruction to the flight crew members’ view or hinders physical access to aircraft controls and/or displays and/or aircraft safety equipment, flight crew ingress or egress. The viewable stowage as positioned should allow the flight crew to retain a sufficiently extensive, clear, and undistorted view, to enable them to safely perform any manoeuvres within the operating limitations of the aircraft, including taxiing, takeoff, approach, and landing. The design of the viewable stowage should allow the user easy access to any item of the EFB system, even if stowed, and notably to the EFB controls and a clear view of the EFB display while in use. The following design practices should be considered: (1) The viewable stowage and associated mechanisms should not impede the flight crew members in the performance of any task (whether normal, abnormal, or emergency) associated with operating any aircraft system; (2) When the viewable stowage is used to secure an EFB display, it should be able to be easily locked in position. If necessary, the selection of positions should be adjustable enough to accommodate a range of flight crew member preferences. In addition, the range of available movement should accommodate the expected range of users’ physical abilities (i.e. anthropometric constraints). Locking mechanisms should be of a low-wear type that will minimise slippage even after extended periods of normal use; (3) The viewable stowage should be designed and installed so that it will sustain all foreseeable conditions relative to the flight environment (e.g. severe turbulence, hard landings) while retaining its structural integrity and without becoming detached. The use of restraints of the device should be considered where appropriate; (4) A provision should be available to secure or lock the device in a position out of the way of flight crew operations when not in use. When stowed, the device and its securing mechanism should not intrude into the flight crew compartment space to the extent that they cause either visual or physical obstruction of flight controls/displays and/or ingress/egress routes; (5) Possible mechanical interference issues of the viewable stowage, either on the side panel (side stick controller), or on the control yoke, in terms of full and free movement under all operating conditions and non-interference with buckles, etc., should be prevented; (6) Adequate means should be provided (e.g. hardware or software) to shut down the portable EFB when its controls are not accessible by the flight crew members when strapped in the normal seated position; and (7) The viewable stowage device should be easily removable from the aircraft without the use of tools. Some types of means for securing viewable stowage may have characteristics that degrade noticeably with ageing or due to various environmental factors. In that case, the documentation should include procedures (e.g. crew procedures, checks, or maintenance actions) to ensure that the stowage characteristics remain within acceptable limits for the proposed operations. Securing means based on vacuums (e.g. suction cups) have holding capacities that decrease with pressure. It should be demonstrated that they will still perform their intended function at operating cabin altitudes or in the event of a rapid decompression. Annex III to ED Decision 2019/008/R In addition, it should be demonstrated that if the EFB moves or is separated from its stowage, or if the viewable stowage is unsecured from the aircraft (as a result of turbulence, manoeuvring, or other action), it will not jam flight controls, damage flight deck equipment, or injure flight crew members. The risks associated with an EFB fire should be minimised by the design and location of the viewable stowage.

text: 7. A new GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.141(a) is added: GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.141(a) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs) VIEWABLE STOWAGE (a) Viewable stowage devices have been involved in several reported incidents worldwide. The following issues should be considered by the operator when assessing the compliance of a viewable stowage device: (1) The EFB or EFB stowage interfering with controls (e.g. side sticks, tillers, PTT switches, etc.); (2) Stowage or EFB cables interfering with the opening of windows; (3) Stowage or EFB cables interfering with the access to oxygen masks; (4) The EFB falling during take-off, cruise, or landing, interfering with flight controls, disengaging the autopilot, or hurting the flight crew; and (5) Suction cups detaching following a loss of pressurisation, adding to the crew’s workload. (b) Guidance on the safety, reliability and usability of different viewable stowage solutions and on the related operating conditions can be found in a study published by the FAA . With regard to the specific example of suction cups, the following means of mitigation are recommended: (1) The suction cups and the surface to which they will be attached should be properly cleaned with isopropyl alcohol or aircraft window cleaner prior to attachment of the suction cups; (2) Attachment surfaces should be substantially smooth and flat; (3) Periodic cleaning and reattachment should be performed, as appropriate, for the conditions of the environment in which they are used (dusty, etc.); (4) Suction cups should not be left attached to the aircraft windscreen for long periods of time; (5) Suction cups should be replaced every 6 months at a minimum, and, more often in extreme environments.

text: 8. A new AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.141(b) is added: AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.141(b) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs) APPLICATION CLASSIFICATION Annex III to ED Decision 2019/008/R An EFB software application is an application that is not part of the configuration of the certified aircraft and is installed on an EFB system to support flight operations. The classification of the applications, based on their respective safety effects, is intended to provide clear divisions between such applications and, therefore, between the assessment processes applied to each. For the purpose of the following process, ‘malfunction or misuse’ means any failure, malfunction of the application, or design-related human errors that can reasonably be expected in service. (a) Determination of an application type: AMC2 CAT.GEN.MPA.141(b) and AMC3 CAT.GEN.MPA.141(b) should be used to justify a classification, provided that the application does not feature design or functional novelties that introduce new forms of crew interaction or unusual procedures. An application may also be recognised as a type A or type B EFB application through an appropriate approval (e.g. ETSO authorisation) granted by EASA. If an application is not listed in AMC2 or AMC3 to CAT.GEN.MPA.141(b), presents a high degree of novelty, or is not covered by an EASA approval (e.g. ETSO authorisation), the classification should be established using the definitions and criteria provided hereafter. As a first step, it should be verified that the application does not belong to the following list of applications that are not eligible for classification as either type A or type B EFB applications. Applications that: (1) display information which is tactically used by the flight crew members to check, control or deduce the aircraft position or trajectory, either to follow the intended navigation route or to avoid adverse weather, obstacles or traffic during the flight; (2) display information which may be directly used by the flight crew members to assess the real-time status of aircraft critical and essential systems, as a replacement for existing installed avionics, and/or to manage aircraft critical and essential systems following a failure; (3) send data to air traffic services; are not eligible to be classified as either type A or type B EFB applications. Then, the next steps in this process should be to: (1) identify any failure conditions resulting from potential losses of function or malfunction (with either detected or undetected erroneous outputs), taking into consideration any relevant factors (e.g. aircraft/system failures, operational or environmental conditions) and any established mitigation (e.g. flight crew procedures, flight crew training) that would intensify or alleviate the effects; and (2) classify the application as follows, based on the assessment of the safety effect of each failure condition: (i) if there is no failure condition that may have a safety effect, the application should be classified as a type A EFB application; (ii) if one or several failure conditions with a safety effect that is limited to minor are identified, the application should be classified as type B; Annex III to ED Decision 2019/008/R (iii) if more severe failure conditions are identified, the application should not be eligible for classification as an EFB application. Software applications with failure conditions that are classified as more severe than minor are ineligible as type A or type B EFB applications. Notes: — The severity of the failure conditions linked to displaying a function that already exists in the certified type design, or that is already authorised through an ETSO, and used with same concept of operation (considering the intended function but also operational means of mitigation), should be considered in the assessment of the severity of the failure condition of an application and cannot be less than the severity already assessed for this function. — The data resulting from this process may be reused by the operators in the context of the EFB risk assessment process. (b) Miscellaneous software applications Miscellaneous software applications are applications that support function(s) that are not directly related to operations conducted by the flight crew on the aircraft. Miscellaneous software applications are not considered to be EFB applications for the purposes of this AMC. Examples of miscellaneous software applications are web browsers (not used for operational purposes), email clients, picture management applications, or even applications used by ground crews (e.g. for maintenance purposes).

text: 9. A new AMC2 CAT.GEN.MPA.141(b) is added: AMC2 CAT.GEN.MPA.141(b) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs) TYPICAL TYPE A EFB APPLICATIONS The following EFB application should be considered type A EFB applications: (a) browsers that display: (1) the certificates and other documents which are required to be carried by the applicable operational regulations, including digitally created documents such as: (i) the certificate of registration; (ii) the certificate of airworthiness (CofA); (iii) the noise certificate, and its English translation if applicable; (iv) the air operator certificate (AOC); (v) the operations specifications relevant to the aircraft type, issued with the AOC; (vi) the third-party liability insurance certificate(s); and (vii) the aircraft continuing airworthiness records, including the technical log (flight crew view thereof); (2) some manuals and additional information and forms which are required to be carried by the applicable operational regulations such as: Annex III to ED Decision 2019/008/R (i) notifications of special categories of passenger (SCPs) and special loads; and (ii) passenger and cargo manifests, if applicable; and (3) other information within the operator’s aircraft library such as: (i) airport diversion policy guidance, including a list of special designated airports and/or approved airports with emergency medical service (EMS) support facilities; (ii) maintenance manuals; (iii) emergency response guidance for aircraft incidents involving dangerous goods (see ICAO Doc 9481-AN/928); (iv) aircraft parts manuals; (v) service bulletins/published airworthiness directives, etc.; (vi) current fuel prices at various airports; (vii) trip scheduling and bid lists; (viii) passenger information requests; (ix) examiner and flight instructor records; and (x) flight crew currency requirements; (b) interactive applications for crew rest calculations in the framework of flight time limitations; (c) interactive forms to comply with the reporting requirements of the competent authority and the operator; (d) applications that make use of aircraft administrative communications (AAC) to collect, process and then disseminate data that has no effect on the safe operation of an aircraft.

text: 10. A new AMC3 CAT.GEN.MPA.141(b) is added: AMC3 CAT.GEN.MPA.141(b) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs) TYPICAL TYPE B EFB APPLICATIONS The following EFB applications should be considered type B EFB applications, provided that they do not feature design or functional novelties that introduce new forms of crew interaction or unusual procedures: (a) Document browsers that display the manuals and additional information and forms required to be carried by regulations and that are necessary for the safe operation of the aircraft, such as: (1) the operations manual (including the minimum equipment list (MEL) and configuration deviation list (CDL)); (2) the aircraft flight manual, or equivalent document; (3) the operational flight plan; (4) meteorological information with graphical interpretation; (5) air traffic services (ATS) flight plan; (6) notices to airmen (NOTAMs) and aeronautical information service (AIS) briefing documentation. Annex III to ED Decision 2019/008/R (b) Electronic aeronautical chart applications including en-route, area, approach, and airport surface maps. (c) Airport moving map display (AMMD) applications. (d) Applications that make use of the aeronautical operational control (AOC) communications to collect, process and then disseminate operational data. (e) Aircraft performance calculation applications that use algorithmic data or that perform calculations using software algorithms to provide aircraft performance data such as: (1) take-off, en-route, approach and landing, missed approach and other phases of flight, performance calculations providing limiting masses, distances, times and/or speeds, etc.; (2) power settings, including reduced take-off thrust settings, etc. (f) Mass and balance calculation applications used to establish the mass and centre of gravity of the aircraft and to determine that the load and its distribution are such that the mass and balance limits of the aircraft are not exceeded. (g) Applications providing in-flight weather information.

text: 11. A new GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.141(b) is added: GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.141(b) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs) TACTICAL USE The tactical use of an EFB application is considered to be related to short-term decision-making, while strategic use is related to long-term decision-making support.

text: 12. A new GM2 CAT.GEN.MPA.141(b) is added: GM2 CAT.GEN.MPA.141(b) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs) HUMAN–MACHINE INTERFACE (HMI) FOR TYPE A EFB APPLICATIONS An HMI assessment is not required for a type A EFB application. However, type A EFB applications should be designed in accordance with the human factor principles in order to minimise their impacts on crew workload.

text: 13. GM1 CAT.POL.MAB.105(e) is deleted: GM1 CAT.POL.MAB.105(e) Mass and balance data and documentation ON-BOARD INTEGRATED MASS AND BALANCE COMPUTER SYSTEM. An on-board integrated mass and balance computer system may be an aircraft installed system capable of receiving input data either from other aircraft systems or from a mass and balance system on ground, in order to generate mass and balance data as an output.

text: 14. GM2 CAT.POL.MAB.105(e) is deleted: GM2 CAT.POL.MAB.105(e) Mass and balance data and documentation STAND-ALONE COMPUTERISED MASS AND BALANCE SYSTEM Annex III to ED Decision 2019/008/R A stand-alone computerised mass and balance system may be a computer, either as a part of an electronic flight bag (EFB) system or solely dedicated to mass and balance purposes, requiring input from the user, in order to generate mass and balance data as an output.

text: 15. In Subpart A (‘General requirements’), Section 2 (‘Non-motor-powered aircraft’) is deleted.

text: 16. In Subpart B (‘Operating procedures’), Section 2 (‘Non-motor-powered aircraft’) is deleted.

text: 17. In Subpart D (‘Instruments, data, equipment’), Section 3 (‘Sailplanes’) is deleted.

type: vagledning

utgivare: easa


text: Annex V to ED Decision 2019/019/R

text: Annex V to ED Decision 2019/019/R

text: Annex V to ED Decision 2019/019/R

text: ICAO Doc 8168-OPS/611 - PANS-OPS ( Procedures for Air Navigation Services - Aircraft Operations), Volume IIII - Flight Aircraft Operating Procedures, First Edition, 2018 (Fifth edition, Amendment 4). ICAO Doc 4444-ATM/501 - PANS-ATM (Procedures for Air Navigation Services-Air Traffic Management) (Fifteenth edition, Amendment 3).

text: Annex V to ED Decision 2019/019/R

text: Annex V to ED Decision 2019/019/R

text: Annex V to ED Decision 2019/019/R

text: Annex V to ED Decision 2019/019/R

text: Annex V to ED Decision 2019/019/R

text: Annex V to ED Decision 2019/019/R

text: Annex V to ED Decision 2019/019/R

identifier: AMC & GM to Part-CAT — Issue 2, Amendment 17

beslut: ED Decision 2019/019/R

text: Annex V to ED Decision 2019/019/R

text: ‘AMC and GM to Part-CAT — Issue 2, Amendment 17’

text: The Annex to Decision 2014/015/R of 24 April 2014 is hereby amended as follows: The text of the amendment is arranged to show deleted, new or amended text as shown below: — deleted text is is marked with strike through; — new or amended text is highlighted in blue; — an ellipsis ‘(…)’ indicates that the rest of the text is unchanged.

text: AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.107 Adequate aerodrome

text: RESCUE AND FIREFIGHTING SERVICES (RFFS) When considering the adequacy of an aerodrome’s rescue and firefighting services (RFFS), the operator should: (a) as part of its management system, assess the level of RFFS protection available at the aerodrome intended to be specified in the operational flight plan in order to ensure that an acceptable level of protection is available for the intended operation; and (b) include relevant information related to the RFFS protection that is deemed acceptable by the operator in the operations manual.

text: GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.107 Adequate aerodrome

text: RESCUE AND FIREFIGHTING SERVICES (RFFS) Guidance on the assessment of the level of an aerodrome’s RFFS may be found in Attachment I to ICAO Annex 6 Part I.

text: GM2 CAT.OP.MPA.155(b) Carriage of Sspecial Ccategories of Ppassengers (SCPs)

text: INFORMATION PROVIDED TO SCPs (…) Adult travelling with an Information on brace position for adult with lap-held infant. infant Information on the use of the loop belt, in case of a lap-held infant. Information to fit own oxygen mask before fitting the infant’s oxygen mask. Information on how to evacuate when carrying an infant: (a) On land, see EASA SIB 2013-06 on evacuation of infants on aircraft equipped with inflatable slides or hatch-type overwing exits, jump on the slide; and (b) In case of ditching, how to fit and when to inflate infant flotation aid (e.g. life vest jacket, flotation device).

text: AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.170 Passenger briefing

text: PASSENGER BRIEFING Passenger briefings should contain the following: (a) Before take-off (1) Passengers should be briefed on the following items, if applicable: (…) (iv) the use and stowage of portable electronic devices, including in-flight entertainment (IFE) systems; (…)

text: AMC3 CAT.OP.MPA.170 Passenger briefing

text: IN-FLIGHT ENTERTAINMENT (IFE) SYSTEMS When IFE systems are available by means of equipment that can be handled by passengers, including portable electronic devices (PEDs), provided by the operator for the purpose of IFE, appropriate information containing at least the following should be made available to passengers: (a) instructions on how to safely operate the IFE system for personal use in normal conditions; (b) restrictions, including stowage of retractable or loose items of equipment (e.g. screens or remote controls) during taxiing, take-off and landing, and in abnormal or emergency conditions; and

text: (c) the instruction to alert cabin crew members in case of IFE system malfunction in accordance with point (f)(9) of GM2 CAT.OP.MPA.170.

text: GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.295 Use of airborne collision avoidance system (ACAS)

text: GENERAL (a) The ACAS operational procedures and training programmes established by the operator should take into account this GM. It incorporates advice contained in: (1) ICAO Doc 8168 (PANS-OPS), Volume III1 Flight Aircraft Operating Procedures, Chapter 3 and Attachment A (ACAS Ttraining Gguidelines for Ppilots) and Attachment B (ACAS Hhigh Vvertical Rrate (HVR) Eencounters) to Part III, Section 43, Chapter 3; and (2) ICAO PANS-ATM Chapters 12 and 15 phraseology requirements; (3) ICAO Annex 10, Volume IV; and (4) ICAO PANS-OPS, Volume 1; (45) ICAO PANS-ATM.; and (6) ICAO guidance material ‘ACAS Performance-Based Training Objectives’ (published under Attachment E of State Letter AN 7/1.3.7.2-97/77). (…)

text: AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.125(a)(1)(iii) & CAT.IDE.A.130(b) Operations under VFR by day & Operations under IFR or at night — flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment

text: CALIBRATION OF THE MEANS OF MEASURING AND DISPLAYING PRESSURE ALTITUDE The instrument measuring and displaying pressure barometric altitude should be of a sensitive type calibrated in feet (ft), with a sub-scale setting, calibrated in hectopascals/millibars, adjustable for any barometric pressure likely to be set during flight.

text: AMC2 CAT.IDE.A.190 Flight data recorder

text: OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR AEROPLANES FIRST ISSUED WITH AN INDIVIDUAL CoFA ON OR AFTER 1 APRIL 1998 AND BEFORE 1 JANUARY 2016 (…) (c) When determined by the Agency, Tthe FDR of aeroplanes first issued with an individual CofA before 20 August 2002 and equipped with an electronic display system does not need to record those parameters listed in Table 3 for which: (…)

text: AMC4 CAT.IDE.A.190 Flight data recorder

text: LIST OF PARAMETERS TO BE RECORDED FOR AEROPLANES FIRST ISSUED WITH AN INDIVIDUAL CoFA ON OR AFTER 1 JUNE 1990 UP TO AND INCLUDING 31 MARCH 1998 (…) (b) When determined by the Agency, Tthe FDR of aeroplanes having an MCTOM of 27 000 kg or below does not need to record parameters 14 and 15b of Table 1 below if any of the following conditions are met:

text: (c) When determined by the Agency, Tthe FDR of aeroplanes having an MCTOM exceeding 27 000 kg does not need to record parameter 15b of Table 1 below, and parameters 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30 and 31 of Table 2 below, if any of the following conditions are met: (…)

text: (d) When determined by the Agency, Tthe FDR does not need to record individual parameters that can be derived by calculation from the other recorded parameters. (…)

text: AMC6 CAT.IDE.A.190 Flight data recorder

text: LIST OF PARAMETERS TO BE RECORDED FOR AEROPLANES FIRST ISSUED WITH AN INDIVIDUAL COFA BEFORE 1 JUNE 1990 (…)

text: (b) When determined by the Agency, Tthe FDR of aeroplanes with an MCTOM exceeding 27 000 kg that are of a type first type certified after 30 September 1969 does not need to record the parameters 13, 14 and 15b in Table 2 below, when any of the following conditions are met:

text: AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.205 Seats, seat safety belts, restraint systems and child restraint devices

text: CHILD RESTRAINT DEVICES (CRDsS) (a) A CRD is considered to be acceptable if: (1) it is a ‘supplementary loop belt’ manufactured with the same techniques and the same materials as the approved safety belts; or (2) it complies with (b). (b) Provided the CRD can be installed properly on the respective aircraft seat, the following CRDs are considered acceptable: (1) CRDs approved for use in aircraft according to the European Technical Standard Order ETSO-C100c on Aviation Child Safety Device (ACSD)by the competent authority on the basis of a technical standard and marked accordingly; (2) CRDs approved by EASA through a Type Certificate or Supplemental Type Certificate; (23) CRDs Child seats approved for use in motor vehicles on the basis of the technical standard specified in point (i) below. The child seat must be also approved for use in aircraft on the basis of the technical standard specified in either point (ii) or point (iii): according to the UN standard ECE R 44, -03 or later series of amendments; (i) UN Standard ECE R44-04 (or 03), or ECE R129 bearing the respective ‘ECE R’ label; and (ii) German ‘Qualification Procedure for Child Restraint Systems for Use in Aircraft’ (TÜV/958-01/2001) bearing the label ‘For Use in Aircraft’; or (iii) Other technical standard acceptable to the competent authority. The child seat should hold a qualification sign that it can be used in aircraft. (34) CRDs Child seats approved for use in motor vehicles and aircraft according to Canadian CMVSS 213/213.1 bearing the respective label; (45) CRDs Child seats approved for use in motor vehicles and aircraft according to US FMVSS No 213 and manufactured to these standards on or after 26 February 1985. US approved CRDs manufactured after this date must bear bearing one or two labels displaying the following two sentences labels in red letters: (i) ‘THIS CHILD RESTRAINT SYSTEM CONFORMS TO ALL APPLICABLE FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARDS’; and (ii) in red letters ‘THIS RESTRAINT IS CERTIFIED FOR USE IN MOTOR VEHICLES AND AIRCRAFT’; (56) Child seats approved for use in motor vehicles and aircraft according to Australia/New Zealand’s technical standard AS/NZS 1754:2013 bearing the green part on the label displaying ‘For Use in Aircraft’ CRDs qualified for use in aircraft according to the German

text: ‘Qualification Procedure for Child Restraint Systems for Use in Aircraft’ (TÜV Doc.: TÜV/958-01/2001); and (67) devices CRDs approved for use in cars, manufactured and tested according to other technical standards equivalent to those listed above. The devices should be marked with an associated qualification sign, which shows the name of the qualification organisation and a specific identification number, related to the associated qualification project. The qualifying organisation should be a competent and independent organisation that is acceptable to the competent authority. (c) Location (1) Forward-facing CRDs child seats may be installed on both forward-and rearward-facing passenger seats, but only when fitted in the same direction as the passenger seat on which they are positioned. Rearward-facing CRDs child seats should only be installed on forward-facing passenger seats. A CRD child seat should not be installed within the radius of action of an airbag unless it is obvious that the airbag is de-activated or it can be demonstrated that there is no negative impact from the airbag. (2) An infant/child in a CRD should be located as near to in the vicinity of a floor level exit as feasible. (3) An infant/child in a CRD should not hinder evacuation for any passenger. (4) An infant/child in a CRD should neither be located in the row (where rows are existing) leading to an emergency exit nor located in a row immediately forward or aft of an emergency exit. A window passenger seat is the preferred location. An aisle passenger seat or a cross aisle passenger seat that forms part of the evacuation route to exits is not recommended. Other locations may be acceptable provided the access of neighbour passengers to the nearest aisle is not obstructed by the CRD. (5) In general, only one CRD per row segment is recommended. More than one CRD per row segment is allowed if the infants/children are from the same family or travelling group provided the infants/children are accompanied by a responsible adult sitting next to them in the same row segment. (6) A row segment is one or more seats side-by-side separated from the next row segment by an aisle the fraction of a row separated by two aisles or by one aisle and the aeroplane fuselage. (d) Installation (1) CRDs tested and approved for use in aircraft should only be installed on a suitable passenger seat by the method shown in the manufacturer’s instructions provided with each CRD and with the type of connecting device they are approved for the installation in aircraft. CRDs designed to be installed only by means of rigid bar lower anchorages (ISOFIX or equivalent) should only be used on passenger seats equipped with such connecting devices and should not be secured by passenger seat lap belt. CRDs should only be installed on a suitable aeroplane seat with the type of connecting device they are approved or qualified for. For instance, CRDs to be connected by a three-point harness only (most rearward-facing baby CRDs currently available) should not be attached to an

text: aeroplane seat with a lap belt only; a CRD designed to be attached to a vehicle seat only by means of rigid bar lower anchorages (ISO-FIX or US equivalent), should only be used on aeroplane seats that are equipped with such connecting devices and should not be attached by the aeroplane seat lap belt. The method of connecting should be the one shown in the manufacturer’s instructions provided with each CRD. (2) All safety and installation instructions should be followed carefully by the responsible adult accompanying the infant/child. Cabin crew Operators should prohibit the use of any a CRD inadequately not installed on the passenger seat according to the manufacturer’s instructions or not approved for use in aircraft CRD or not qualified seat. (3) If a forward-facing CRD child seat with a rigid backrest is to be fastened by a seat lap belt, the restraint device should be fastened when the backrest of the passenger seat on which it rests is in a reclined position. Thereafter, the backrest is to be positioned upright. This procedure ensures better tightening of the CRD child seat on the aircraft seat if the aircraft seat is reclinable. (4) The buckle of the adult safety belt must be easily accessible for both opening and closing, and must be in line with the seat belt halves (not canted) after tightening. (5) Forward-facing restraint devices with an integral harness must not be installed such that the adult safety belt is secured over the infant. (e) Operation (1) Each CRD should remain secured to a passenger seat during all phases of flight unless it is properly stowed when not in use. (2) Where a CRD child seat is adjustable in recline, it must be in an upright position for all occasions when passenger restraint devices are required.

text: GM2 CAT.IDE.A.205 Seats, seat safety belts, restraint systems and child restraint devices

text: USE OF CHILD SEATS ON BOARD Guidance on child restraint devices and facilitation of mutual acceptance of these devices can be found in ICAO Doc 10049 ‘Manual on the approval and use of child restraint systems’.

text: AMC2 CAT.IDE.H.190 Flight data recorder

text: LIST OF PARAMETERS TO BE RECORDED FOR HELICOPTERS HAVING AN MCTOM OF MORE THAN 3 175 KG AND FIRST ISSUED WITH AN INDIVIDUAL CoFA ON OR AFTER 1 AUGUST 1999 AND BEFORE 1 JANUARY 2016 AND HELICOPTERS HAVING AN MCTOM OF MORE THAN 7 000 KG OR AN MOPSC OF MORE THAN 9 AND FIRST ISSUED WITH AN INDIVIDUAL COFA ON OR AFTER 1 JANUARY 1989 AND BEFORE 1 AUGUST 1999 (…)

text: (b) When determined by the Agency, Tthe FDR of helicopters with an MCTOM of more than 7 000 kg does not need to record parameter 19 of Table 2 below, if any of the following conditions are met: (…)

text: AMC1 CAT.IDE.H.205 Seats, seat safety belts, restraint systems and child restraint devices

text: CHILD RESTRAINT DEVICES (CRDsS) (a) A CRD is considered to be acceptable if: (1) it is a ‘supplementary loop belt’ manufactured with the same techniques and the same materials of the approved safety belts; or (2) it complies with (b). (b) Provided the CRD can be installed properly on the respective helicopter seat, the following CRDs are considered acceptable: (1) CRDs approved for use in aircraft according to the European Technical Standard Order ETSO-C100c on Aviation Child Safety Device (ACSD) by a competent authority on the basis of a technical standard and marked accordingly; (2) CRDs approved by EASA through a Type Certificate or Supplemental Type Certificate; (23) CRDs Child seats approved for use in motor vehicles on the basis of the technical standard specified in point (i) below. The child seats must be also approved for use in aircraft on the basis of the technical standard specified in either point (ii) or point (iii): according to the UN standard ECE R 44, -03 or later series of amendments; (i) UN Standard ECE R44-04 (or 03), or ECE R129 bearing the respective ‘ECE R’ label; and (ii) German ‘Qualification Procedure for Child Restraint Systems for Use in Aircraft’ (TÜV Doc.: TÜV/958-01/2001) bearing the label ‘For Use in Aircraft’; or (iii) Other technical standard acceptable to the competent authority. The child seat should hold a qualification sign that it can be used in aircraft. (34) CRDs Child seats approved for use in motor vehicles and aircraft according to Canadian CMVSS 213/213.1 bearing the respective label; (45) CRDs Child seats approved for use in motor vehicles and aircraft according to US FMVSS No 213 and are manufactured to these standards on or after February 26, 1985. US approved CRDs manufactured after this date must bear bearing one or two labels displaying the following two sentences labels in red letters: (i) ‘THIS CHILD RESTRAINT SYSTEM CONFORMS TO ALL APPLICABLE FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARDS’; and (ii) in red letters ‘THIS RESTRAINT IS CERTIFIED FOR USE IN MOTOR VEHICLES AND AIRCRAFT’;

text: (56) Child seat approved for use in motor vehicles and aircraft according to Australia/New Zealand’s technical standard AS/NZS 1754:2013 bearing the green part on the label displaying ‘For Use in Aircraft’ CRDs qualified for use in aircraft according to the German ‘Qualification Procedure for Child Restraint Systems for Use in Aircraft’ (TÜV Doc.: TÜV/958- 01/2001); and (67) devices CRDs approved for use in cars, manufactured and tested according to other technical standards equivalent to those listed above. The device should be marked with an associated qualification sign, which shows the name of the qualification organisation and a specific identification number, related to the associated qualification project. The qualifying organisation should be a competent and independent organisation that is acceptable to the competent authority. (c) Location (1) Forward-facing CRDs child seats may be installed on both forward-and rearward-facing passenger seats, but only when fitted in the same direction as the passenger seat on which they are positioned. Rearward-facing CRDs child seats should only be installed on forwardfacing passenger seats. A CRD child seat should not be installed within the radius of action of an airbag unless it is obvious that the airbag is de-activated or it can be demonstrated that there is no negative impact from the airbag. (2) An infant/child in a CRD should be located as near to in the vicinity of a floor level exit as feasible. (3) An infant/child in a CRD should not hinder evacuation for any passenger. (4) An infant/child in a CRD should neither be located in the row (where rows are existing) leading to an emergency exit nor located in a row immediately forward or aft of an emergency exit. A window passenger seat is the preferred location. An aisle passenger seat or a cross aisle passenger seat that forms part of the evacuation route to exits is not recommended. Other locations may be acceptable provided the access of neighbour passengers to the nearest aisle is not obstructed by the CRD. (5) In general, only one CRD per row segment is recommended. More than one CRD per row segment is allowed if the infants/children are from the same family or travelling group provided the infants/children are accompanied by a responsible adult sitting next to them in the same row segment. (6) A row segment is one or more seats side-by-side separated from the next row segment by an aisle the fraction of a row separated by two aisles or by one aisle and the helicopter fuselage. (d) Installation (1) CRDs tested and approved for use in aircraft should only be installed on a suitable passenger seat by the method shown in the manufacturer’s instructions provided with each CRD and with the type of connecting device they are approved for the installation in aircraft. CRDs designed to be installed only by means of rigid bar lower anchorages (ISOFIX or equivalent) should only be used on passenger seats equipped with such connecting devices and should not be secured by passenger seat lap belt. CRDs should only be installed

text: on a suitable helicopter seat with the type of connecting device they are approved or qualified for. For instance, CRDs to be connected by a three-point harness only (most rearward facing baby CRDs currently available) should not be attached to a helicopter seat with a lap belt only, a CRD designed to be attached to a vehicle seat by means of rigid bar lower anchorages (ISO-FIX or US equivalent) only, should only be used on helicopter seats that are equipped with such connecting devices and should not be attached by the helicopter seat lap belt. The method of connecting should be the one shown in the manufacturer’s instructions provided with each CRD. (2) All safety and installation instructions must be followed carefully by the responsible person accompanying the infant/child. Cabin crew Operators should prohibit the use of any a CRD inadequately not installed on the passenger seat according to the manufacturer’s instructions or not approved for use in aircraft CRD or not qualified seat. (3) If a forward-facing CRD child seat with a rigid backrest is to be fastened by a seat lap belt, the restraint device should be fastened when the backrest of the passenger seat on which it rests is in a reclined position. Thereafter, the backrest is to be positioned upright. This procedure ensures better tightening of the CRD child seat on the aircraft seat if the aircraft seat is reclinable. (4) The buckle of the adult safety belt must be easily accessible for both opening and closing, and must be in line with the seat belt halves (not canted) after tightening. (5) Forward facing restraint devices with an integral harness must not be installed such that the adult safety belt is secured over the infant. (e) Operation (1) Each CRD should remain secured to a passenger seat during all phases of flight unless it is properly stowed when not in use. (2) Where a CRD child seat is adjustable in recline, it must be in an upright position for all occasions when passenger restraint devices are required.