text: S21sec, the contractor of ENISA for this study is an international security services company with offices in several countries.

text: It should be noted that, in general, the terms CERT and CSIRT (Computer Security Incident Response Team) are often interchanged, though the first is actually a registered trademark of Carnegie Mellon University.

text: Some CERTs might be private.

identifier: ENISA Smart Grid Security Recommendations

title: ENISA Smart Grid Security Recommendations

text: Smart Grid Security

text: Recommendations for Europe and Member States [Deliverable – 2012-07-01]

text: Smart Grid Security I Recommendations for Europe and Member States

text: Contributors to this report

text: ENISA would like to recognise the contribution of the S21sec team members that prepared this report in collaboration with and on behalf of ENISA:  Elyoenai Egozcue,  Daniel Herreras Rodríguez,  Jairo Alonso Ortiz,  Victor Fidalgo Villar,  Luis Tarrafeta.

text: Agreements or Acknowledgements

text: ENISA would like to acknowledge the contribution of Mr. Wouter Vlegels and Mr. Rafał Leszczyna to this study.

text: Smart Grid Security II

text: Recommendations for Europe and Member States

text: About ENISA

text: The European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) is a centre of network and information security expertise for the EU, its member states, the private sector and Europe’s citizens. ENISA works with these groups to develop advice and recommendations on good practice in information security. It assists EU member states in implementing relevant EU legislation and works to improve the resilience of Europe’s critical information infrastructure and networks. ENISA seeks to enhance existing expertise in EU member states by supporting the development of cross-border communities committed to improving network and information security throughout the EU. More information about ENISA and its work can be found at www.enisa.europa.eu. Follow us on Facebook <http://www.facebook.com/ENISAEUAGENCY> Twitter <https://twitter.com/enisa_eu> LinkedIn <http://www.linkedin.com/company/european-network-and-information-securityagency-enisa> Youtube <https://www.youtube.com/user/ENISAvideos> & RSS feeds <http://www.enisa.europa.eu/front-page/RSS>

text: Contact details

text: For contacting ENISA or for general enquiries on CIIP & Resilience, please use the following details:  E-mail: resilience@enisa.europa.eu  Internet: http://www.enisa.europa.eu

text: For questions related to ‘’Smart Grid Security: Recommendations for Europe and Member States’’, please use the following details:  E-mail: Konstantinos.Moulinos@enisa.europa.eu

text: Legal notice

text: Notice must be taken that this publication represents the views and interpretations of the authors and editors, unless stated otherwise. This publication should not be construed to be a legal action of ENISA or the ENISA bodies unless adopted pursuant to the ENISA

text: Regulation (EC) No 460/2004

text: as lastly amended by

text: Regulation (EU) No 580/2011

text: . This publication does not necessarily represent state-of the-art and ENISA may update it from time to time. Third-party sources are quoted as appropriate. ENISA is not responsible for the content of the external sources including external websites referenced in this publication. This publication is intended for information purposes only. It must be accessible free of charge. Neither ENISA nor any person acting on its behalf is responsible for the use that might be made of the information contained in this publication. Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. © European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA), 2012

text: Smart Grid Security 1 Recommendations for Europe and Member States

text: 1 Executive Summary

text: The smart grid can be defined as an upgraded electricity network to which two-way digital communication between supplier and consumer, intelligent metering and monitoring systems have been added (1). Smart grids will be able to efficiently integrate the behaviour and actions of all users connected to them — generators, consumers and those that do both — in order to ensure an economically efficient, sustainable power system with low losses and high quality and security of supply and safety (2). Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) are envisioned to be the underpinning platform of smart grids, which exemplifies the increasing dependency of the European economy and society on communication networks and computer applications. Smart grids give clear advantages and benefits to the whole society, but their dependency on computer networks and applications, as well as on the Internet, makes our society more vulnerable to malicious cyber attacks with potentially devastating results. Recognising the importance of the problem, ENISA launched a series of activities, which include the present study, aiming at bringing together the relevant stakeholders and engaging them in an open discussion on smart grid cyber security. The principal goal of the open dialogue is to identify the main concerns regarding the security of smart grids as well as to recognize and support national, pan-European and international initiatives on smart grid security. This study makes 10 recommendations to the public and private sector involved in the definition and implementation of smart grids. These recommendations intend to provide useful and practical advice aimed at improving current initiatives, enhancing co-operation, raising awareness, developing new measures and good practices, and reducing barriers to information sharing. This guidance is based on the results of a thorough analysis of the opinions of the experts who participated in the study. Furthermore, important information coming from in-depth desktop research is also taken into consideration. All this data has been analysed and has provided almost 100 Key Findings. The top ones are:

text: Recommendation 1. The European Commission (EC) and the Member States’ (MS) competent authorities should undertake initiatives to improve the regulatory and policy framework on smart grid cyber security at national and EU level.

text: Recommendation 2. The EC in cooperation with ENISA and the MS should promote the creation of a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) to coordinate smart grid cyber security initiatives.

text: Recommendation 3. ENISA and the EC should foster awareness raising and training initiatives.

text: Recommendation 4. The EC and the MS in cooperation with ENISA should foster dissemination and knowledge sharing initiatives.

text: Smart Grid Security 2

text: Recommendation 5: The EC, in collaboration with ENISA and the MS and the private sector, should develop a minimum set of security measures based on existing standards and guidelines.

text: Recommendation 6. Both the EC and the MS competent authorities should promote the development of security certification schemes for components, products and organisational security.

text: Recommendation 7. The EC and MS competent authorities should foster the creation of test beds and security assessments.

text: Recommendation 8: The EC and the MS, in cooperation with ENISA, should further study and refine strategies to coordinate measures countering large scale pan-European cyber incidents affecting power grids.

text: Recommendation 9: The MS competent authorities in cooperation with CERTs should initiate activities in order to involve CERTs to play an advisory role in dealing with cyber security issues affecting power grids.

text: Recommendation 10. EC and the MS competent authorities in cooperation with the Academia and the R&D sector should foster research in smart grid cyber security, leveraging existing research programmes.

text: A full list of recommendations can be found on page 27.

text: Smart Grid Security 3 Recommendations for Europe and Member States

text: 2 Introduction

text: The adoption of smart grids will dramatically change the grid as we know it today, and traditional energy services and markets will undergo a significant transformation. In addition to bulk generation facilities the smart grid will intelligently integrate distributed or dispersed generation, where many energy sources of small size (i.e. the so called Distributed Energy Resources, DER) will be dispersed along the transmission, distribution and customer domains. Some examples of distributed energy resources include solar panels, small wind turbines, fuel cells, and distributed cogeneration sources, and even the Electric Vehicle (EV) itself. The smart grid will also result in smarter networks, both in the transmission and distribution domains. It will bring a whole range of new specific applications and technologies to improve the transmission system, and will complement existing technologies such SCADA/EMS and current substation automation. Besides, the smart grid places new requirements on the automation, monitoring control and protection of distribution substations and transformer stations/centres. Advanced Distribution Automation (ADA) technologies and applications as well as Advanced Metering Infrastructures (AMI) will provide the necessary intelligence to this section of the power grid to cope with the new requirements. It is clear that smart grids will substantially improve control over electricity consumption and distribution to the benefit of consumers, electricity suppliers and grid operators. Nevertheless, improved operations and services will come at the cost of exposing the entire electricity network to new challenges, in particular in the field of security of communication networks and information systems. Thanks to ICT, the grid of the future will become smarter so as to improve the reliability, security, and efficiency of the electric system through information exchange, distributed generation, storage sources, and the active participation of the end consumer. However, vulnerabilities of communication networks and information systems may be exploited for financial or political motivation to shut off power to large areas or directing cyber-attacks against power generation plants. This was demonstrated for instance in 2009, when officials from the US public administration recognised that cyber spies from China and Russia had hacked into the US electricity grid and hidden software that could be used to disrupt power supplies (3).

text: 2.1 Cyber security aspects of smart grids

text: A smart grid is an upgraded electricity network depending on two-way digital communications between supplier and consumer that in turn give support to intelligent metering and monitoring systems. Information and communication technologies have become the underpinning platform for the grid of the future but at the same time they are also its Achilles heel. The communication infrastructures are not the only source of vulnerabilities. Software and hardware used for building the smart grid infrastructure are at risk of being tampered with even before they are linked together. Rogue code, including the so-called logic bombs which

text: Smart Grid Security 4

text: cause sudden malfunctions, can be inserted into software while it is being developed. As for hardware, remotely operated “kill switches” and hidden “backdoors” can be written into the computer chips used by the smart grid and allowing outside actors to manipulate the systems. The risk of compromise in the manufacturing process is very real and is perhaps the least understood threat. Tampering is almost impossible to detect and even harder to eradicate. Achieving a secure smart grid will not be an easy task. As it is exemplified in the previous paragraph, there is a series of unknown or not well understood potential vulnerabilities and weaknesses that must be further analysed. Besides, there are also well understood problems that need complex solutions. This is the case of security issues concerning the data protection of end-consumers information. To this regard, the development of legal and regulatory regimes that respect consumer privacy, promote consumer access to and choice regarding third-party use of their energy data is a sine qua non for broad acceptance of smart grids. Assessing risks, securing processes as well as identifying technological gaps and organizational problems are some of the main challenges that the smart grid will face in the years to come. Raising awareness and fostering training and knowledge sharing among all the actors are urgent measures needed to set the breeding ground for bringing security to the first line of action.

text: 2.2 The policy context

text: Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) and Critical Information Infrastructure Protection (CIIP) related directives and communications have already established a general regulatory framework for the protection of the critical infrastructures of the power (smart) grid. In December 2006 the COM(2006) 786 (4) “on a European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection” fixed the main aspects of a European Programme for Critical Infrastructures Protection (EPCIP). This communication recognized the threat from terrorism as a priority even though the protection of critical infrastructure would be based on an allhazards approach. This Communication also defined the main guiding principles of the EPCIP and identified the necessity for creating an EU framework concerning the protection of critical infrastructures. Likewise, of particular interest is the Council Directive 2008/114 on CIP (5), which considers electricity generation and transmission (in respect of supply electricity) infrastructures and facilities as candidates for being identified as European Critical Infrastructures. In 2009, the Commission adopted COM(2009) 149 (6) on Critical Information Infrastructure Protection. This Communication recognizes that ICT infrastructures are the underpinning platform of other CIs and defines a plan of immediate actions to strengthen the security and resilience of Critical Information Infrastructures (CIIs) based on five pillars: preparedness and prevention, detection and response, mitigation and recovery, international cooperation, and criteria for EC infrastructures in the field of ICT. In 2011, another Communication from the Commission, COM(2011) 163 (7), summarised the achievements of this plan and defined next steps to be taken. It also recognized that new threats have emerged, mentioning Stuxnet as

text: Smart Grid Security 5 Recommendations for Europe and Member States

text: an example. Besides, this, the Communication specifically mentions that smart grids can be affected by sophisticated and targeted cyber threats, with the purpose of disruption. Data protection and data privact issues are also engaged, with the most vigorous declaration on their importance , together with that of cyber security and infrastructures resiliency, coming from specific energy-related policy documents. This is the case in COM(2011) 202 (1), “Smart Grids: from innovation to deployment”, where the Commission identifies challenges on smart grid deployment and proposes to focus on, among other things, developing technical standards, ensuring data protection, and providing continued support to innovation for technology and systems. Moreover it communicates the creation of a group of high-level stakeholders to assess the network and information security and resilience of smart grids as well as to support related international cooperation.

text: 2.3 The aim of the study

text: This study aims at identifying risks and challenges related to cyber security aspects of smart grids. Besides, this study also takes stock of national and European initiatives on standardisation, knowledge sharing, certification, training, pilots, and other activities addressing cyber security in the smart grids. Pilot projects in Europe were studied in order to identify the cyber security controls being deployed. Additionally, the study investigates the importance of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) as the underpinning platform of the future grid, and investigates related threats and risks. Based on a thorough analysis, the study proposes good practices and recommendations for all relevant stakeholders that will help them improve the security, reliability and resilience of future smart grid deployments. Moreover, the study aims at helping the involved stakeholders in recognising the importance of security issues, engaging in international cooperation, raising awareness inside their organisations, and supporting standards. Finally, the recommendations resulting from the study will also allow ENISA to pave the way for future actions and studies on smart grids.

text: 2.4 Scope of the study

text: The two pillars of this study are:  Identifying the current state of smart grid security based on the concrete, comprehensive, and up to date ‘inventory’ of factual knowledge coming from the field.  Obtaining opinions on the subject from all the relevant stakeholders.

text: Based on these pillars the recommendations for the stakeholders are derived. Work on the factual description of the current situation has focused on the following aspects:  Review on the definitions of the smart grid  High level objectives of the smart grid  Drivers for the adoption of the smart grids in Europe, the US, and other regions

text: Smart Grid Security 6

text:  Quick overview on standardisation efforts on the smart grid architecture  Physical infrastructure of the smart grid and high-level application and services  The importance of ICT technology in the smart grid  Review on real incidents and relevant discoveries on flaws affecting the smart grid  Cyber security risks, threats and challenges  Summary of the current European security policy context  European initiatives addressing cyber security in the smart grid  Review of the most significant standards, guidelines, regulatory documents as well as active groups and initiatives on smart grid cyber security Most of the content is based on highly reputable sources of information, such as official good practices, technical reports and standards of organizations such as CEN/CENELEC/ETSI SGCG, NIST, Smart Grid Task Force, ANSI/ISA, IEC, ISO, and others. However, it is also enriched by the contribution of several experts in the topic. These experts have contributed to this part of the study, by providing their knowledge in existing initiatives, known good practices, standards and policies, as well as other topics already addressed. The second basic pillar of the study, obtaining the opinion on the subject of all relevant stakeholders (grid operators, manufacturers, policy makers, academia, etc.), is actually the crucial part of the study. The relevant representatives of the public and the private sector have been engaged (by means of a survey and personal interviews) to provide their opinion on critical aspects of smart grid security, as for instance current public-private partnerships, information sharing platforms, test beds, and other initiatives; the challenges, barriers and obstacles for smart grid protection; ways to improve the adoption of security good practices and standards; the current policy context; economic strategies and incentives, etc. This study identifies common points and differences among stakeholders' replies and contributions to propose recommendations for these same stakeholders. These recommendations intend to provide useful and practical advice aimed at improving current initiatives, enhancing co-operation, developing new measures and good practices, and reducing barriers to information sharing.

text: 2.5 Approach

text: The study comprised two main phases. The first phase,“stocktaking”, was intended to gather all the data that will make up the work base for the study. The second phase was based on the analysis of the data in order to develop recommendations for the different types of stakeholders involved with cyber security aspects of the smart grid. The activities carried out during the first phase of the study included the so called ‘desktop research’, which means the analysis of all available documents relevant to the topic of the study. In this part we made use of recognised existing documents (guidelines,

text: Smart Grid Security 7 Recommendations for Europe and Member States

text: recommendations, reports, etc.) coming from organisations, companies, consortiums or research centres, as well as the most influential books in the field, and the latest news (for this we have for example subscribed to forums, discussion groups, news feeds, etc.). The second crucial part of the stocktaking was the survey and interviews with the smart grid experts aimed at obtaining their opinion on the most important smart grid security subjects. Besides, in this part some of the authors of this report actively participated in initiatives such as DG CONNECT’s ad-hoc EG, or even contacted the visible head of the most relevant smart grid pilots, so as to ask for further information about the impact of cyber security. Questionnaires included the 11 topics listed above which in turn were further divided into a total number of 27 different questions or concepts. At the same time, those experts who answered the questionnaire and accepted being interviewed were not only asked on these new concepts but also were proposed to personally discuss on the ‘key messages’ they shared with us in the answers to the questionnaires. The information provided by the experts was classified according to the main background of the expert. For instance, if one expert worked for a DSO but majorly in R&D aspects it was classified as an expert belonging to the Academia/R&D category. The categories defined are the following:

text:  Manufacturers and integrators

text:  Security tools and services providers

text:  Distribution System Operation (DSO)

text:  Transmission System Operation (TSO)

text:  Power generation

text:  Smart Grid services provider (e.g. marketer)

text:  Academia and R&D

text:  Public bodies

text:  Standardisation bodies

text: It is worth mentioning that over 304 experts were contacted for the study of which 50 participated in the poll. Additionally we were able to carry 23 personal interviews. The second phase of the study was based on the qualitative analysis of the findings and the development of recommendations for different categories of stakeholders. As a result of the first stage of the study we had built up a large data source which comprised diverse information. We consolidated and normalized this data into a structured set of information that can be easily and thoroughly processed. The basic element of it is a “key finding”, which is a relevant and influential observation from the desktop research, the survey and/or the

text: Smart Grid Security 8

text: interviews. Key findings may show an emerging issue, an initiative taken or believed to be taken, an agreement/disagreement level between stakeholders, values or tendencies in the answers, a relevant line of opinion or any other piece of elaborated information that might have any impact in the field of smart grid security. Key findings are finally combined in order to ultimately derive the recommendations presented in this study. th On 29 February 2012, ENISA organised a workshop where the results of the study were presented. The aim of this workshop was to share and discuss the most relevant conclusions of the report, including the proposed recommendations, with the experts that participated in the study. For this reason, an open dialogue among the attendees was also planned. This dialogue allowed ENISA to gauge the particiapnts’ impressions of the recommendations and gather different opinions on how to improve them.

text: 2.6 Target Audience

text: This report constitutes a source of the most recent information on the topic of smart grid security in Europe. It might be useful to anyone involved in the definition of the grid of the future or interested in obtaining a detailed and broad overview on what are the main issues in relation to the security of the current and future power grids. One part of this report is devoted to introducing the basic concepts of the smart grid, from its very basic definition, objectives and similarities and differences among countries, to a more technically advanced description on the new infrastructures and applications supporting it. Another important chapter of this report is devoted to providing an up-to-date factual description of the current security panorama of today’s power grids and the smart grid in general, including existing initiatives, standards, guidelines, and regulatory documentation, current security challenges and emerging issues. These two parts of the report are presented mostly in a high-level language but sometimes a more technical vocabulary is used. For this reason, it is assumed that the readers have some security and electrical background knowledge. This section is intended for:

text:  Engineers

text:  Researchers

text:  Information security specialists

text:  Security consultants

text:  Managers

text:  Business leaders

text: In addition, the core sections of this document contain a number of key findings and recommendations regarding smart grid security, resulting from the analysis of the opinions of multiple experts in the field and a desktop research. These key findings and recommendations

text: Smart Grid Security 9 Recommendations for Europe and Member States

text: are written in a non-technical language suitable especially for decision-makers. The key findings describe possible future strategies, devise new initiatives, and propose new research activities with the aim of building a secure smart grid at different action levels: political, organizational, technical, awareness raising, economical, etc. For this reason, this part of the report is more appropriate for:  Business leaders

text:  Policy makers

text:  Standardisation bodies

text:  Public agencies

text:  Analysts

text:  Managers

text:  Researchers

text: 2.7 About the report

text: This report is divided into nine main chapters: Executive Summary, Introduction, Purpose and Scope of the Study, Target Audience, Approach, Key Findings, Recommendations, and Conclusions. Additionally, there are 5 annexes which contain the detailed information on the results of the study. They include the detailed output of the desktop research and the analysis of the raw data coming from the experts. Additionally, another annex is devoted to the study validation workshop.  Annex I and Annex II present the main results of the desktop research phase. Annex I provides a detailed introduction to smart grid concepts, and Annex II gives an overview of the security issues related to the smart grid.  Annex III provides a detailed analysis of the data gathered from the interviews and the survey in which experts participated.  Annex IV is a compilation of current security guidelines, standards and regulatory documents on power grid and smart grid cyber security.  Annex V includes a complete list of initiatives related with smart grid security as well as a detailed analysis of those pilots that are addressing smart grid cyber security.

text: Smart Grid Security 10 Recommendations for Europe and Member States

text: 3 Key Findings

text: In this chapter we present the key findings discovered during the desktop research and the analysis of the results of the survey and interviews. The key findings have been grouped into various thematic categories, starting with what we consider the biggest challenges in smart grid security, and continuing with a multiplicity of topics on smart grid security, including:  The biggest challenges of the smart grid  Basic components of the smart grid  Smart grid pilots and cyber security  Risk assessments in smart grid  Certifications and the role of NCAs  Basic aspects for a secure smart grid  Smart grid cyber security challenges  Current smart grid initiatives on cyber security  Measuring cyber security in the smart grid  Managing cyber attacks  Research topics in smart grid security  The smart grid business case  Recommendations for Protecting Industrial Control Systems (ENISA report)

text: 3.1 The biggest challenges in smart grid security

text: 3.1.1 Factors of success

text: There are several factors which are considered of key importance to guarantee the success of the smart grid: a) A common definition of the smart grid concept; b) Cost reduction and fraud prevention; c) Cyber-security of the grid; d) Guaranteeing privacy of consumers; e) Consumer acceptance via awareness rising and education; f) Smart meter acceptance/roll-out.

text: 3.1.2 Lack of a standard reference architecture for the Smart Grid

text: Standardization bodies recognise that there is not a clear standard describing the architecture of the future smart grid in Europe. The lack of a standard architecture spans all the different

text: Smart Grid Security 11 Recommendations for Europe and Member States

text: domains (e.g. generation, distribution, etc.). Additionally some experts expressed their concern because some working groups can not further develop their activities due to this lack of definition. It is agreed that consensus-based reference architecture is necessary.

text: 3.1.3 End-to-end security approach based on a standard architecture

text: Smart grid companies along the value chain are getting more and more interconnected and interdependent. Therefore, experts referred to the necessity of an end-to-end security approach at all levels of communication, from the lowest levels (meters, physical, etc.) to the upper ones (application systems, integration with corporate systems, value-added services, etc.) and all along the smart grid value chain. They consider that having a standard architecture of the smart grid is on the basis of such a strategy.

text: 3.1.4 Cyber security, not at the front-line of action

text: A slight majority of experts think that not enough attention is being paid in Europe to cyber security and data privacy, as it is exemplified by current smart grid pilots. According to some experts there is a generalized perception that cyber security is not at the front-line of the smart grid priorities. Several experts stated that prior to security and privacy, primary concepts of the smart grid (i.e. business models, objectives, functionalities, services, etc.) need to be well addressed.

text: 3.1.5 Cyber security and privacy as two different matters

text: Customer acceptance is considered a key success factor for the smart grid. To that aim, privacy is considered more important than cyber security, mainly in smart meter related applications. This is the reason why privacy and cyber security are being addressed separately, while many experts consider they are intimately related.

text: 3.1.6 Security by design

text: Experts consider that cyber security and privacy are not being addressed appropriately since in many cases it has been considered as an overlay more than a very integral part of the design phase. These experts consider that cyber security and privacy should be addressed at the design phase so as to minimize costs and maximize security. This will become more important in the near-term with the ever increasing sophistication of industrial equipment.

text: 3.1.7 New cyber risks

text: The integration of the end user property (e.g. demand-response and home-based energy sources), as part of the smart grid, widely extends the attack surface area, bringing new risks for electricity delivery. Since it is not possible to control what is going on inside the endcustomer houses it should be considered as a high-risk area. Additionally, a more intensive use of the Internet and other public networks in the smart grid (e.g. DER connection, and value-added services for end customers) will also bring new risks to power infrastructures.

text: Smart Grid Security 12

text: 3.2 Basic components of the smart grid

text: 3.2.1 Horizontal view of the smart grid

text: For the majority of experts, the smart grid should span the complete value chain of electricity delivery, from electricity production in the power plants to its consumption by final clients, including trading, transmission, distribution, marketing (industrial and residential), etc.

text: 3.2.2 Vertical view of the smart grid

text: There are some experts who consider that the smart grid is everything that is related with the grid operations and the supporting communication infrastructure, and therefore it should be separated from added-value services built upon them. On the other hand, some experts consider that the smart grid concept includes all aspects, from devices, technologies and infrastructures to operations (e.g. grid management or market operation) and services (e.g. demand-side management).

text: 3.2.3 Bi-directionality feature of the smart grid

text: Bi-directionality should be considered in two different ways. On one hand it means that the grid should be able to make use of any distributed generation resources. On the other hand, the Smart Grid should be based on a supporting ICT infrastructure based on bidirectional communications.

text: 3.2.4 Smart-home and smart-industry as part of the smart grid

text: There is no clear agreement among experts when it comes to clarify whether Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI), smart homes and smart industry are part or not of the smart grid concept. DSOs for instance consider that what is inside the house (e.g. household automation, smart appliances, home energy management, etc.) is outside the scope of the DSO – with the frontier between the grid and the household at the smart meter or the home gateway. However, other experts consider that the smart grid should include also the smart home and the smart industry.

text: 3.2.5 New applications and services

text: Smart grid services and applications can be classified into three domains: 1) AMI-based applications/services (e.g. demand-side management, home-energy management); 2) distributed generation management (i.e. DER management); 3) and advanced distribution/transmission automation (e.g. substation automation, storage management, advanced distribution applications, islanding, etc.). Additionally, it is considered that macrogeneration (i.e. bulk generation) will also be affected by the smart grid.

text: Smart Grid Security 13 Recommendations for Europe and Member States

text: 3.3 Smart grid pilots and cyber security

text: 3.3.1 Lack of a global perspective on European smart grid pilots

text: Even though a majority of experts confirmed the knowledge of various pilots related to different domains of the smart grids, there is a lack of global perspective. The result is that each expert only knows in detail those projects related to the topics of their interest. However, the publication from the JRC “Smart Grid Projects In Europe: lessons learned and current developments” (8) has contributed to increase awareness on pilots among the community.

text: 3.3.2 Cyber security, a second-line issue in smart grid pilots

text: In general terms, pilots are not considering cyber security at all (with very few exceptions). According to the experts many of the projects are at an early stage. For this the reason pilots are focusing on testing smart grid applications and functionalities, which are considered essential, leaving out cyber security measures.According to the experts, cyber security and privacy are only taken into account seriously once they start massive deployments, as it is happening already in the smart meters roll-out.

text: 3.4 Risk assessments in smart grids

text: 3.4.1 Challenges, goals and needs for protecting national energy infrastructures

text: Experts consider that, in order to determine the cyber security challenges, goals and needs for the protection of national energy infrastructures, public bodies should follow a risk-driven approach. Additionally, it should be considered that priorities on risks and threat levels might be different across Member States.

text: 3.4.2 Mandatory risk assessments to be conducted by TSOs and DSOs

text: Several experts consider that DSOs, and maybe also TSOs, should conduct mandatory risk assessments, involving technical people to indicate the critical assets and processes, the most critical threats (e.g. intentional threats) and to help define a plan to address them. Mandatory risk assessments should be based on a selected methodology.

text: 3.4.3 The need for a specific risk assessment methodology

text: Experts consider that there is not a good methodology for understanding/assessing cyber risks of the Smart Grid. They asked for a Programme to address this need. At the same time, some experts referred to the actual work being carried out on this topic by the SGIS European Working Group, the DG CONNECT’s ad-hoc expert group, and other US working groups so as to not reinvent the wheel.

text: Smart Grid Security 14

text: 3.4.4 Characteristics of the risk assessment methodology

text: A risk assessment methodology for smart grids should include a dependability analysis, a threat and vulnerability assessment, as well as an interdependencies analysis. Moreover, such a methodology should also include a stakeholder analysis to consider their opinions, assumptions and expectations.

text: 3.4.5 Examples of real risk assessments

text: Techniques being used by utilities to assess smart grid risks include: collaborative and manual risk assessments based on a workshop approach, where experts met to collaboratively identify risks; use of an actual risk assessment methodology, such as the IS1 methodology from the UK.

text: 3.4.6 Suitability of current risk assessment tool

text: According to experts belonging to DSOs in The Netherlands the current risk assessments tools used by DSOs are not good to deal with the very distributed nature of the Smart Grid, and in particular of the smart metering systems.

text: 3.4.7 The role of risk assessments in product security certifications

text: According to several experts, and in order to identify which components of the Smart Grid should undergo a security certification process, a detailed risk-based analysis should be considered.

text: 3.5 Certifications and the role of National Certification Authorities

text: 3.5.1 The role of NCAs

text: A great majority of participants believe that National Certification Authorities have an important role to play. Some of the suggested roles include: 1) Guaranteeing that the critical components of the smart grid - including specific setups - are secure enough by checking against predefined protection profiles; 2) Certifying that organisational aspects (e.g. processes and people) of grid operators are consistent with the corporate security governance strategy.

text: 3.5.2 European vs. national security evaluation schemes

text: There are two bodies of opinion on having a European-wide evaluation scheme that applies to all EU MS. There are experts that consider that such a process needs to be coordinated by a European entity, and not independently by each NCA at each MS. On the contrary, other experts argue that priorities on risks and threat levels might be different across Member States and should be addressed independently as a national security issue.

text: 3.5.3 Possible reference standards and initiatives on device-oriented security certifications

text: In order to certify smart grid individual components and full set-ups, many experts declared that Common Criteria is a reference standard to be considered. Other general reference

text: Smart Grid Security 15 Recommendations for Europe and Member States

text: standards that were mentioned include FIPS 140 and PCI PTS. Additionally, ISA 99 standard on security controls for embedded systems was also referenced several times. Finally, the The UK National Technical Authority for Information Assurance (CESG), part of the UK government, is currently designing an accreditation process for smart metering devices in the UK which can also be considered as a reference.

text: 3.5.4 Common Criteria in the smart grid

text: According to the experts, CC is generic certification scheme. Therefore, to be applied in the smart grid environment, it should be extended to include specific security profiles for the Smart Grid, similar to those related to the Smart Card Industry, where a joint interpretation library was developed.

text: 3.5.5 Alternatives to standards-driven device-oriented certifications

text: According to some experts, standards-driven certifications such as Common Criteria can be a burden for manufacturers and integrators due to their complexity. At the same time they need to be developed, which might take long time. Moreover, smart grid technology is not considered yet mature enough for such kind of certifications. For all these reasons, some experts proposed a more agile alternative, based on quick tests (e.g. white-box and code audits) as it is done in the US National SCADA Test Bed Programme. To this respect, WIB's requirements for vendors (currently IEC/PS 62443 and ISA 62443) are suggested as a possible reference.

text: 3.5.6 Security governance certification for the smart grid

text: A certification on security governance for the smart grid should check the proper implementation of integral ISMS in grid operators and possibly other actors. A certification like this would provide a baseline for utilities and other stakeholders to measure themselves (i.e. benchmark and to assess the security posture) but also to compare them one to another. Experts suggested considering ISO 27K series of standards as a main reference that would need to be adapted – as it occurred with the telecommunications sector. Other suggested reference standards include ISA 99 and NISTIR 7628.

text: 3.5.7 Alternative to governance certifications

text: Similarly to the strategy for product/device certification, experts declared that we should not only focus on deciding the best standard for security management (e.g. ISO 27K). In parallel, we should incentivize independent third party companies and organisations to carry out security assessments and penetration testing on DSOs in order to identify vulnerabilities and security flaws.

text: Smart Grid Security 16

text: 3.6 Basic aspects for a secure smart grid

text: 3.6.1 Processes, people and technology as main pillars for a secure smart grid

text: Most of the experts consider that to improve security in the smart grid the first objective should be to secure existing processes and establish appropriate organizational structures for information security management. Additionally, people and technology should also be considered as two basic pillars.

text: 3.6.2 The importance of ISMS

text: Information Security Management Systems (ISMSs) shall provide the necessary organizational structures, processes, policies and procedures to be able to respond to the ever evolving threat panorama, foster training and awareness rising among staff and deal with technological issues.

text: 3.6.3 Security efforts should not only include smart meters

text: The current specific focus on smart meters should be further extended to other critical smart grid subsystems, especially: secondary distribution substations, primary distribution substations, transmission substations, micro grids, control centres, and IT and telecommunication systems linking them together.

text: 3.6.4 Infrastructures at the consumer premises should be fool-proof

text: Home Area Networks are directly dependent on end consumers. Establishing an ISMS or even providing appropriated and updated training in this domain is impossible or highly difficult. Therefore, these systems need to be completely fool-proof, and for this purpose technology will play a key role.

text: 3.6.5 Privacy/security by design and defence in depth strategies

text: The smart grid has to follow a privacy and security by design approach. Additionally, a defence in depth strategy is considered also a must. In any case, robustness and reliability of the whole grid have to be the guiding principles both from a physical and an ICT point of view.

text: 3.6.6 Security training of operations staff and consumers

text: People have to be aware of the risks and threats – such as social engineering – that might affect their organisations and lives. In order to achieve this objective, periodic training is of key importance. Moreover, training needs to be adapted to each member of the staff according to the position they hold.

text: Smart Grid Security 17 Recommendations for Europe and Member States

text: 3.7 Smart grid cyber security challenges

text: 3.7.1 Lack of expertise and budget limits in the root causes for dismissing cyber security

text: Cyber security is almost always considered as an important topic in any Smart Grid project. However, when it comes to a practical implementation is often ignored because of project budgets, scarce funding/incentives and lack of expertise.

text: 3.7.2 A robust and resilient grid

text: It is agreed that it is necessary to have a robust and resilient grid able to overcome potential attacks, and particularly Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. The challenge is to maintain the current degree of stability in the grid, with similar or even better level of availability.

text: 3.7.3 Data protection and secure data handling

text: Data protection (i.e. confidentiality, integrity and privacy) and secure data handling of consumer data as well as control and automation readings and commands processed by automated decision-making systems (e.g. distribution balancing) need to be addressed. Regarding personal data protection and secure handling of these data, two great challenges are envisioned by the experts: 1) The possibility of inferring relevant information (e.g. particular habits) from personal data; 2) Metering data will have to be securely accessible by several independent actors (e.g. DSO, service provider, the consumer).

text: 3.7.4 Raising awareness among manufacturers and operators

text: For security tools and services providers and standardization bodies the greatest challenge is raising awareness and training among manufacturers, as they have to build secure devices, as well as provide expert support. A change of mentality is also necessary among utilities to avoid situations where cyber security is not considered an important issue until massive rollouts.

text: 3.7.5 Technical challenges

text: Other challenges pointed out by experts and mainly related with technical aspects include: 1) a proper integration of legacy systems into a robust and resilient grid will be of paramount importance; 2) having standard interfaces at smart grid devices, particularly in what refers to the interaction with security devices such as identity management systems, will be a shortterm challenge; 3) unauthorized access to systems or devices; 4) segmentation between ICT infrastructures devoted to "competitive" aspects (e.g. added-value services for consumers) and non-competitive ones (e.g. metering or grid operations); 5) availability of traffic analyzers, communications monitoring and application log monitoring; 6) secure devices (e.g. trust and authentication capabilities).

text: Smart Grid Security 18

text: 3.7.6 Incomplete or inexistent regulations

text: Addressing the consequences of incomplete or inexistent regulations can be a great challenge. Examples on this include: 1) Current regulations promoting smart meter roll-outs not taking into account information security risks; 2) Lack of a complete regulation on the integration of different energy types (e.g. heat, gas and electricity) at the metering infrastructure. This could imply interdependencies and shared cyber security risks between businesses.

text: 3.8 Current smart grid initiatives on cyber security

text: 3.8.1 CEN/CENELEC/ETSI coordination group for Smart Grid, a reference for stakeholders

text: According to the survey, the most well known initiative dealing with smart grid cyber security is the CEN/CENELEC/ETSI association for Smart Grid standardisation. Moreover, the majority of the stakeholders coincide in pointing it as a reference for smart grids issues in general.

text: 3.8.2 Ongoing initiative for a European smart grid standard architecture

text: The CEN/CENELEC/ETSI SG-CG will publish a standard architecture by the end of 2012. It is expected to have the final technical report approved by Member States by the end of this year. It will consider different granularity levels, ranging from a conceptual (block diagram) and/or functional architecture to a detailed architecture (including blocks and interconnections) for each one of the general blocks. It will be based on 400 use cases, on existing standards, and should also include security issues.

text: 3.8.3 DG-CONNECT ad-hoc EG, a reference on smart grid cyber security

text: According to the survey, experts consider DG CONNECT ad-hoc expert group as one of the most important working groups concerning cyber security of the smart grid.

text: 3.8.4 Lack of participation in cyber security related initiatives

text: Security providers and academia/R&D are by far less involved than other stakeholders in knowledge sharing platforms and other initiatives devoted to smart grid cyber security. However, now that it seems the electrical sector has recognized the high risks which might affect the Smart Grid, they are getting more active. Additionally, DSOs and TSOs should have a more active and leading role. Grid operators will have a central role in the development of the smart grid and should be the ones providing the largest number of security requisites.

text: 3.8.5 Space for improvement in smart grid initiatives

text: Many experts consider that there is space for improving EU-wide and national initiatives. Some of the major criticisms include: 1) Lack of visibility of EU-wide initiatives; 2) Duplicity of topics across the EU in national initiatives; 3) Same experts in all initiatives; 4) Too much talking and no real work done; 5) Lack of a unified coordination.

text: Smart Grid Security 19 Recommendations for Europe and Member States

text: 3.8.6 Generalised satisfaction about the SG Task Force EG2

text: Most of the experts that participated in EG2 of the Smart Grid Task Force, on privacy issues of the Smart Grid, were quite satisfied with how the group functioned and on its composition. They consider that all the necessary stakeholders were present.

text: 3.8.7 Opinions about EG2's report on data safety, data handling and data protection

text: The recommendations provided in the document are considered a high-quality work providing an overview of the problem of privacy and data protection as well as a reference for understanding the roles of the entities participating in smart grids. However, they are also seen as too general and not considering data protection and privacy under the broadest umbrella of cyber security. Additionally, it is suggested to periodically updating the report, extending its scope, and aligning it with other similar documents (e.g. NISTIR 7628, IEC TC57).

text: 3.8.8 Concerns about the progress done by M490's SGIS WG

text: Relevant experts from the EC declared that it seems that the SGIS subgroup is not progressing at the appropriate pace. It is suggested that this may be the result of a lack of a concrete work programme with specific deliverables and milestones. Likewise, it was recognized that the lack of a standard architecture can be another reason.

text: 3.8.9 Overlaps between M490's SGIS WG and DG-CONNECT ad-hoc EG

text: Several experts belonging to almost all stakeholder types consider that these two initiatives have overlapping work programmes. Additionally, around 50% of the experts in one group are also present in the other group, while at the same time there are complaints for not being able to cope with the work load of both initiatives.

text: 3.8.10 Conciousness about the overlaps between SGIS and DG-CONNECT ad-hoc EG

text: Experts from SGIS and DG-CONNECT ad-hoc EG declared that a meeting was organised to clarify the scopes of the work programmes of both initiatives. These experts stated that clear orientation and non-overlapping scopes were agreed.

text: 3.8.11 The need for a coordinating entity on smart grid cyber security and privacy initiatives

text: Several experts suggested that there should be a unique central coordinating committee with a global vision of all of the European initiatives dealing with cyber security and privacy issues. It should be in direct contact with the EC and other public bodies and standardisation organisations, and would include under its range of action initiatives such as DG CONNECT’s ad-hoc EG, SGIS working subgroup, and OpenMeter. According to the needs identified by the experts, its main objectives could include: a) avoid duplicated work; b) enhance communication among task forces; c) define a clear and unified strategy; d) disseminate the work being done; e) establish a common dictionary of technical terms; f) manage lobbies.

text: Smart Grid Security 20

text: 3.8.12 New initiatives on awareness raising and dissemination

text: Experts suggested creating initiatives targeting awareness-raising of C-level (e.g. CEO, CTO, etc.) staff in relation to the importance of the cyber security and data privacy in the Smart Grid. Additionally, some experts also consider important the creation of a dissemination working group targeting end consumers.

text: 3.9 Measuring cyber security in the smart grid

text: 3.9.1 Cyber security effectiveness metrics

text: DSOs, TSOs, and public bodies consider that cyber security must be measured in terms of robustness, resiliency or reliability of the network under attack conditions. Counting the number and impact (i.e. monetary, image, lives, etc.) of incidents, writing detailed reports about them and controlling the degree of robustness during the operation are some of the metrics/techniques enumerated by these experts.

text: 3.9.2 Need for a European common framework

text: Many experts agreed on the necessity of having a standard common framework to ensure a minimum level of harmonisation on security and resiliency requirements across Member States, establishing the basis for a minimum set of auditable controls across Europe. This framework would allow National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) to effectively measure the appropriate security controls and to make comparisons among different companies.

text: 3.9.3 Components of the framework

text: According to the experts, such a framework should consider including the following elements: 1) A minimum set of standards and guidelines; 2) Certification schemes targeting products/devices and grid operators; 3) A certification authority organised as a PPP; 4) Articulating regulatory mechanisms asking for mandatory certifications and risks assessments; 5) A platform for knowledge sharing among DSOs and TSOs.

text: 3.9.4 A minimum set of standards and guidelines

text: The following list of standards and guidelines was suggested by some of the experts participating in the study: 1) a common reference architecture; 2) a reference risk assessment methodology; 3) a methodology for assessing interdependencies, 4) an incident handling reference strategy, 5) technical requirements for products; 6) organisational requirements for legal entities playing a market role; 7) standard requirements matching requirements for products with organisational requirements (i.e. default secure reference configurations, guidance for technicians configuring setups, etc.); 8) standard requirements for security governance.

text: Smart Grid Security 21 Recommendations for Europe and Member States

text: 3.9.5 Considerations on regulatory mechanisms

text: Regarding the articulation of regulatory mechanisms asking for mandatory risk assessments and certifications, experts provided a number of interesting aspects that should be considered: 1) Requirements should be more stringent for systemic organisations; 2) In case of incompliance there should be regulatory pressures (e.g. monetary fines); 3) The European Directive 2008 114/EC should not only include TSOs but also DSOs; 4) (In)compliance results should be public while not revealing confidential information of the grid operator.

text: 3.9.6 Assessing product security

text: Experts consider that, in order to determine if a product is secure, a development process evaluation and a verification of security functionalities are necessary. The first one is considered especially important for efficiency reasons, so as to avoid product redesigns, which would have costly consequences in a large life-cycle domain, such as is the case of Industrial environments as the Smart Grid.

text: 3.10 Managing cyber attacks

text: 3.10.1 Considerations on cyber security incidents

text: A cyber security incident can impact any domain along the value chain. For this reason, different stakeholders will have to be involved depending on the type of incident, ranging from electricity generators to consumers, and at all levels, from infrastructures to services and operations. It is important to pay attention to value-chain interdependencies, as for example among DSOs, with TSOs, retailers, etc. as well as to the impact on other critical infrastructures at the national and European levels.

text: 3.10.2 Existing experience on incident handling

text: Several experts stated that TSOs and DSOs are used to dealing with incidents of different type (e.g. blowing of transformers due to an overload). Moreover, they declared that there are structures and mechanisms in place, at the organisational and coordination level and also at the technical level that should be considered so as to not reinvent the wheel; DSOs and TSOs are good already in restoring the power service since they’ve been doing it for the last 100 years.

text: 3.10.3 DSOs and TSOs should be in charge of incident detection

text: Experts agreed that TSOs and DSOs need to perform monitoring actions to detect possible incidents affecting the European power grid as a whole and also in each MS. In European-wide incidents, many experts consider that TSOs should be the organisations in charge of monitoring and triggering alarms. Experts mentioned the IRRIS FP7 IP project as a reference for the creation of an alarming system for grid operators.

text: Smart Grid Security 22

text: 3.10.4 Technical aspects of cyber security incident detection

text: Experts provided relevant technical details on incident detection in Smart Grids: 1) Security monitoring sensors should be distributed across the grid gathering data that could be processed in a decentralised or centralised manner; 2) A central monitoring centre for data collection and analysis could adopt the structure of a Security Operations Centre (SOC); 3) Signature-based software will be needed in sensors; 4) Correlation and intelligence capabilities can be distributed across the grid or included in the SOC; 5) Intelligence implies being able to distinguish if the root cause of an incident is a cyber security event or any other event; 6) Monitoring centres could also perform research activities (i.e. write new signatures, study new threats, etc.).

text: 3.10.5 Regulation on incident management

text: There should be a regulation obliging grid operators to report on incidents to a national or supranational entity.

text: 3.10.6 A European entity for the coordination of large scale cyber security incidents

text: Several experts share a common view on the need for a pan-European entity which coordinates transnational structures (i.e. European TSOs) and national CIP agencies when managing a large scale cyber security incident. Such an entity should have the following characteristics: 1) A global overview on what is going on in the European grid; 2) It should be in charge of escalating alarms and acting upon them - final decisions (e.g. isolating a TSO) are considered a political issue; 3) It should understand interdependencies in the European grid and with other critical infrastructures; 4) It should have direct communication with normal crisis management structures in place.

text: 3.10.7 Controversy on candidate organisations for large scale incidents coordination

text: An expert from academia considers that operators should be involved but should not take any decision in order to avoid conflicts of interest. Other experts suggest ENISA, ENTSO (European Network of TSOs), ACER (Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators) as possible good candidates.

text: 3.10.8 Alternatives to a European large-scale cyber incidents coordinating entity

text: There are several sceptic experts about the idea of having a centrally coordinating entity. They think that reaction times will be worse, since trying to address the incidents from a global point of view can be by far more complicated than solving individual problems. These experts suggest a more decentralized approach by simply improving communications and coordination procedures among directly related agents.

text: Smart Grid Security 23 Recommendations for Europe and Member States

text: 3.10.9 Role of CERTs in smart grid incidents management

text: Experts agreed CERTs could play a role but should not be the central piece. They consider that there is room for ICS and smart grid CERT functionalities at the EU level, where the knowledge of the different countries would be combined. In cases of very large cyber incidents this entity should be advising the normal crisis management structures in place at the EU and MS, which would involve grid operators and public bodies.

text: 3.10.10 Scope of CERTs addressing smart grid security issues

text: Experts consider that it is better to extend the scope of the current CERTs – both public and private ones – instead of creating CERTs focusing only on smart grid cyber security issues. An EU-level CERT dealing with smart grid aspects should also have a broader view on other critical infrastructures, telecommunication systems, etc. Moreover, some of the characteristics and services of these CERTs could include: 1) A unified point for information exchange among smart grid stakeholders; 2) A reference for valuable information (e.g. good practices distribution); 3) A central point for cyber security monitoring for power grids; 4) A leader in awareness rising activities; 5) A help point on cyber security certifications.

text: 3.11 Research topics in smart grid security

text: 3.11.1 Protection of grid controlling/monitoring systems

text: New services and highly automated systems in smart grids – at TSO, DSOs, retail, etc. – will need to monitor the grid more deeply than ever before by implementing new monitoring technologies (e.g. synchrophasors). It is necessary to have a security infrastructure capable of guaranteeing trusted large scale transactions (millions of devices that could be shut down for one hour at the scale of a country, which will result in lots of payment information transactions, etc.).

text: 3.11.2 Architecture

text: This topic would include: self-healing and graceful degrading architectures; standard and secure interconnections among domains; management of processes associated with the use of cryptographic material (i.e. generation, distribution and storage of cryptographic material); active monitoring for attack detection and traceability.

text: 3.11.3 End-to-end security

text: Cyber security strategies should be considered at a global level and not defined for each domain separately. Such a topic should include dependencies analysis (i.e. dependencies types, business process dependencies, impact propagation, etc.) across the whole smart grid,

text: Smart Grid Security 24 Recommendations for Europe and Member States

text: and include: security governance; use-case modelling; threat analysis; and the development of security mechanisms against distributed denial of service attacks and other attacks.

text: 3.11.4 Trust and assurance

text: This topic would include: security metrics to measure the maturity level of security controls for each domain of the Smart grid; hardware-based one-way communications.

text: 3.11.5 Security in dependable systems

text: This category would include subtopics such as: the definition of common procedures and interfaces; the overcome of hardware constraints limiting log management; encryption functionalities; application/network filtering capabilities.

text: 3.11.6 Privacy and security by design

text: This topic would include research areas such as: protection against zero-day vulnerabilities; optimization of very specific cryptographic protocols to reduce processing load without reducing the security level.

text: 3.11.7 Other topics

text: Experts also provided other topics which cannot be included in any of the abovementioned categories. These are: supply chain protection; usability, legal and economic issues; and smart grid and the cloud.

text: 3.12 The smart grid business case

text: 3.12.1 Balance between cost and benefits

text: The huge cost/investment of implementing the necessary infrastructures cannot be understood without the benefits deriving from the new services, applications and functionalities (e.g. reduced emissions, increased energy efficiency, demand-response, etc.).

text: 3.12.2 Key drivers of the Smart grid business case

text: In addition to optiminization and efficiency, a majority of respondents also consider that reliability and resiliency are key factors driving the smart grids business case.

text: 3.12.3 Other drivers of the Smart grid business case

text: Experts suggested other drivers of the smart grid business are: a need for a scalable power grid, DERs integration, integration of renewable energy sources, support the integration of the EV, and new business opportunities/value-added services for consumers.

text: Smart Grid Security 25 Recommendations for Europe and Member States

text: 3.13 Recommendations for Protecting Industrial Control Systems (ENISA report)

text: What follows is the list of recommendations provided in ENISA’s previous study on ICS protection “Protecting Industrial Control Systems: recommendations for Europe and Member States” (9). They have been included here for completeness, since many of the abovementioned key findings complete and superceeds these general recommendations on industrial control systems in regards to the smart grids domain.

text: 3.13.1 Creation of Pan-European and National ICS Security Strategies

text: The European Union should create a pan-European Strategy for European ICS Security activities and each Member State should develop a National Strategy for ICS Security. The strategies must be coherent with the European Union

text: Council Directive 2008/114/EC

text: for Critical Infrastructures, and leverage the existing initiatives addressing the problem of ICS Security (e.g. EuroSCSiE) as well as the national and Pan-European Public Private Partnerships (e.g. EP3Rs). The strategies have to serve as references for all state-members stakeholders, act as facilitators for sharing initiatives and foster research and education.

text: 3.13.2 Creation of a Good Practices Guide for ICS security

text: The European Union should assume leadership and develop a consensus-reached document or set of documents regarding security good practices, integrating both physical and logical security aspects, to serve as reference for every type of stakeholder. This document should help all stakeholders ensure that best security practices are applied in the industry.

text: 3.13.3 Creation of ICS security plan templates

text: The different National ICS Security Strategies should consider within their tasks the creation of ICS security plan templates, both for operator and infrastructures, which security experts could adapt to their particular situation. These plans should include operational and physical security, technical issues, training and awareness, security governance with roles and responsibilities, business impact measures and crisis management. These templates should severely decrease the cost of developing security plans and accelerate the adoption of comprehensive security measures within the industry.

text: 3.13.4 Foster awareness and training

text: As part of national ICS-Security strategies, the Member States should foster dissemination and awareness activities through high quality events involving all kinds of stakeholders and with special attention to top management commitment. Training and awareness programmes and events should be created for all types of end users.

text: Smart Grid Security 26

text: 3.13.5 Creation of a common test bed, or alternatively, an ICS security certification framework

text: The Common ICS-Strategy should lead to the creation of a common test bed(s) at European level, as a Public-Private Partnership in which tests could be performed in order to guarantee that different systems interaction do not cause security failures. A common test bed will help all stakeholders to detect potential problems in a controlled environment, ensuring integrity and increasing the trustfulness in certified solutions. Alternatively a security framework model adapted for ICS could be defined, based on existing efforts such as Common Criteria or FIPS. Member State existing certifying organisms would be responsible for the certification process based on this security framework.

text: 3.13.6 Creation of national ICS-CERTs

text: Following the national ICS Security Strategies, national ICS-CERTs should be established, in cooperation with an adequate number of public and private CERTs. The ICS-CERTs activities should help all stakeholders to have a reference in order to share vulnerability information, disclosure it, coordinate actions and help in effectively dealing with risk management in ICS infrastructures. In order to address the challenges which span across the borders, the National ICS-CERTs should cooperate on the Pan-European level (e.g. with the aid of an ICS-Security information sharing platform such as EuroSCSiE).

text: 3.13.7 Foster research in ICS security leveraging existing Research Programmes

text: The National and Common ICS Security Strategies should foster research to address current and future ICS threats and security challenges such as ICS-ICT integration, legacy/insecure equipment, targeted attacks or Smart grid issues. This should be done by leveraging existing European or National research programmes, such as the European Framework Programme.

text: Smart Grid Security 27 Recommendations for Europe and Member States

text: 4 Recommendations

text: Based on the key findings described above, this chapter presents 10 recommendations to achieve a future European smart grid. These recommendations focus on national and pan- European initiatives that should be implemented as soon as possible. They are intended primarily for public bodies and authorities and specifically to the national and European ones. However, they also target other stakeholders such as manufacturers and integrators, grid operators, energy producers, energy consumers, smart grid services providers, security tools and services providers, academia/R&D, and standardisation bodies. The 10 recommendations address different smart grid security topics and can be considered as equally important. They are coherent among them and can be implemented independently even though there are clear bindings among each. For instance, recommendation 1 presents an enhanced regulatory framework on smart grid security asking for mandatory risk assessments and standards-driven compliance. Supporting these requirements, recommendation 5 suggests developing a minimum set of standards, including a risk assessment methodology and security requirements for organisations and products. Besides, recommendation 6 proposes fostering the development of security certification schemes based on these standards and supporting the policy and regulatory framework. The detailed descriptions of the recommendations contain the following sections:

text:  Description: where the core content of the recommendation is presented. It can be considered as the “what” and the “how” parts of the recommendation.

text:  Objective: provides a more detailed description of what would be the benefits of this recommendation.

text:  Steps: suggests a number of possible phases to successfully implement the recommendation.

text: 4.1 Recommendation 1: Improve the regulatory and policy framework

text: 4.1.1 Description

text: The EC and MS competent authorities should take the lead and develop specific policy documents and regulations on cyber security and privacy of the smart grid in order to improve the current regulatory and policy framework. This extended framework should define and develop, by taking into account existing regulations and policies on smart grid, the root principles, challenges, goals and needs of a long-term European-wide cyber security and privacy strategy for the grid of the future. Policies and regulations should at least look for: 1) considering privacy and cyber security as two intrinsically interdependent topics; 2) defining security measures to be considered in current smart grid deployments (e.g. smart meter rollouts); 3) demanding grid operators for mandatory risk assessments; 4) demanding manufacturers, integrators, services providers and grid operators to comply with specific

text: Smart Grid Security 28

text: security certifications; 5) establishing regulatory pressures (e.g. fines) for not complying companies; 6) making public the compliance results; 7) demanding operators to report on cyber security related incidents to a national or supranational entity.

text: 4.1.2 Objective

text: The articulation of a broad and complete regulatory and policy framework would bring cyber security to the front-line of action, recognizing these matters as key factors for its success and as an essential and fundamental part in the definition of smart grid business models, functionalities, services, etc. Establishing regulatory pressures for not complying companies will help change their mentality, which will be important for evaluating cyber security at the pilot phase or for avoiding companies dismissing cyber security for budgetary or lack of experience reasons. It would change the perception that Europe is not paying enough attention to cyber security and privacy in smart grids. Moreover, cyber security and privacy would be treated as a whole and not as two separate disciplines. On the other hand, this legal framework would help harmonize existing policies and regulations addressing cyber security, and will be considered as a reference with which to align policies and regulations on other aspects. This would be the case of those promoting smart meter roll-outs or the integration of different energy types (e.g. heat, gas and electricity) at the metering infrastructure. In combination with other recommendations provided in this document, this new framework will ensure a minimum level of harmonisation on security and resiliency requirements across Member States, establishing the basis to allow National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) to effectively measure security and to make comparisons among different companies.

text: 4.1.3 Steps

text:  At the European level, the necessary contacts network has to be established: DG ENER, DG CONNECT, DSOs, TSOs, CEN/CENELEC/ETSI SGCG, Smart grid Task Force, etc.  Regulatory pressures and other mechanisms are analysed in detail with the involved stakeholders  The previous regulatory actions are analysed and considered as a basis  A strategy for implementing the regulatory framework is defined  Policy documents, EC communications and Directives are prepared and published according to the previous strategy

text: 4.2 Recommendation 2: Foster the creation of a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) entity to coordinate smart grid cyber security initiatives

text: 4.2.1 Description

text: The EC in cooperation with ENISA and the MS should foster the creation of a public-private partnership incorporating MS public bodies and the private sector. This PPP should act as a unique central coordinating entity at the EU-level with a global vision of all European and MS’s initiatives dealing with cyber security and privacy issues. It should be in direct contact with the

text: Smart Grid Security 29 Recommendations for Europe and Member States

text: EC, MS authorities and other public bodies and standardisation organisations. Under its range of action should include the coordination of the work done at EU-level initiatives such as DG CONNECT’s ad-hoc EG, SGIS working subgroup, or OpenMeter. Its main objectives should target: 1) avoiding duplicated work; 2) enhancing communication among task forces and work groups; 3) defining a clear and unified strategy for ongoing and new initiatives; 4) Identifying synergies among national and European initiatives; 5) disseminating the work being done; 6) establishing a common dictionary of technical terms; 7) and managing lobbies.

text: 4.2.2 Objective

text: Such a PPP would be a reference for the smart grid community. It would help disseminate the major achievements, facilitating the search for specific information on security topics (e.g. standardisation, policies, technologies, research, etc.) and minimizing the current lack of visibility of some of the current initiatives. Besides, it would articulate the global lines of action of the EC on cyber security aspects of the smart grid by coordinating existing initiatives or creating new ones to address them. Additionally, the proposed coordinating entity will help: remove the current duplicity of topics across the EU; make the most of the available resources and experts volunteering to collaborate; coordinate roadmaps to avoid situations where an initiative is paralysed because of the lack of output from another; define and update the work programmes and establish requirements for new and existing initiatives; foster cooperation and alignment with sister initiatives outside the EU (e.g. US-EU collaborations); achieve a balanced and complete presence and leadership of stakeholders; etc.

text: 4.2.3 Steps

text:  Identify initiatives of interest on smart grid security at the EU and national levels  Analyse the current work programmes, expected results, interdependencies, potential synergies, gaps, duplicities, etc.  Establish appropriate communication channels and procedures  Define a common, coherent and clear strategy for current and future initiatives  Establish the necessary mechanisms for managing dissemination activities  Get MS public bodies and the private sector together in order to create the coordinating entity

text: 4.3 Recommendation 3: Foster awareness raising and training initiatives

text: 4.3.1 Description

text: Under the umbrella of the aforementioned PPP, EC, ENISA and the MS and the should foster the creation of initiatives targeting awareness-raising of C-level (e.g. CEO, CTO, etc.) staff of grid operators, electricity services providers, manufacturers and end consumers in relation to the importance of the cyber security and data privacy in the smart grid. Besides, specific training initiatives should also be created for manufacturers on how to build secure devices and applications, for grid operators on the threats and risks affecting the resiliency and

text: Smart Grid Security 30

text: security of the grid, as well as for services providers and end consumers on fraud prevention, privacy, etc.

text: 4.3.2 Objective

text: Fostering awareness and training will probably contribute to change the generalized perception that cyber security is not a first interest matter in the development of the smart grid. For instance it will probably help changing mentality to avoid situations where utilities do not consider cyber security as an important issue until massive roll-outs. Training, adapted to the profile of the trainees (e.g. specific training according to staff positions, end consumers, etc.), manufacturers, etc. will also contribute to establish a security culture in organisations and end consumers as well as raise their expertise in the field. Among the basic objectives of CERT organisations contributing to raising security awareness is one of the most relevant. For this reason, CERTs – preferable those specialised in industrial ICT – are very well positioned to contribute to the purposes of this recommendation.

text: 4.3.3 Steps

text:  Build a network of C-level contacts for the main grid operators and services providers in Europe.  Identify the forums and events of interest of C-level staff.  Prepare the appropriate media for raising awareness on smart grid security aspects of C-level staff.  Participate in the identified forums and events.  Organise through the appropriate channels (e.g. ENISA) specialised technical events for raising awareness and training.  Analyse, in cooperation with CERTs and other platforms such as ENCS (former CyberTECH), the alternatives for fostering awareness rising and training.

text: 4.4 Recommendation 4: Foster dissemination and knowledge sharing initiatives

text: 4.4.1 Description

text: Under the umbrella of the aforementioned PPP, EC, ENISA and MS should actively involve security providers and academia in current knowledge sharing initiatives, as well as increase DSO/TSO leadership in cyber security initiatives. Besides, dissemination of the results of existing initiatives should be actively encouraged. Moreover, the creation of a platform for knowledge sharing among DSOs and TSOs – and possibly other stakeholder – should be analysed. To this respect CERTs could play a role as a unified point for information exchange among smart grid stakeholders as well as a reference for valuable information (e.g. good practices distribution).

text: Smart Grid Security 31 Recommendations for Europe and Member States

text: 4.4.2 Objective

text: Grid operators will have a central role in the development of the smart grid and should be the ones providing the largest number of security requisites. For this reason it is necessary that they have a leading role in cyber security initiatives. Additionally, encouraging existing initiatives to actively disseminate their work will help reduce their lack of visibility while an EU level coordinating entity for smart grid cyber security initiatives is created. In addition to contributing to raising security awareness, CERT organisations are also expected to be a reference on valuable information about ICT security. For this reason, CERTs – preferable those specialised in industrial ICT – are very well positioned to contribute to the purposes of this recommendation.

text: 4.4.3 Steps

text:  Build a network of C-level contacts for the main grid operators and services providers in Europe.  Identify the forums and events of interest of C-level staff.  Establish a global strategy for disseminating the activities and results being undertaken by active initiatives.  Apply the dissemination strategy in a coordinated and coherent manner.  Leverage the built network of contacts to achieve that DSOs and TSOs have a leading role in information sharing initiatives as well as to actively involve academia/R&D.  Analyse, in cooperation with CERTs and other platforms such as ENCS (former CyberTECH), the alternatives for establishing a knowledge sharing platform.

text: 4.5 Recommendation 5: Develop a minimum set of reference standards and guidelines

text: 4.5.1 Description

text: The EC, in collaboration with ENISA and the MS competent authorities and the private sector, should develop, by leveraging existing initiatives, a minimum set of reference standards and guidelines on cyber security for the smart grid. The set should include at least: 1) a common reference architecture; 2) a reference risk assessment methodology; 3) technical requirements for smart grid systems; 4) guidelines on security governance for legal entities involved in the future grid; 5) guidelines for achieving fool-proof home networks. This body of standards and guidelines shall set a basis for conducting assessments and support the development of a European certification scheme for vendors and grid operators.

text: 4.5.2 Objective

text: Smart grid companies along the value chain are getting more and more interconnected and interdependent. Therefore, there is the necessity of an end-to-end security approach, from the lowest levels (meters, physical, etc.) to the upper ones (application systems, integration with corporate systems, value-added services, etc.) and all along the smart grid value chain. It

text: Smart Grid Security 32

text: is considered that having a standard architecture of the smart grid is on the basis of such a strategy. Moreover, a consensus-based reference standard architecture is central to avoid cyber security initiatives being “paralysed” from addressing challenges such as the secure integration of legacy systems in a robust, resilient and smart grid, or segmenting ICT infrastructures devoted to "competitive" aspects (e.g. added-value services for consumers) from non-competitive ones (e.g. metering or grid operations). The mandatory risk assessments being asked by the legal framework defined in recommendation 1 should be based on new methodology that should leverage the actual work being carried out on this topic by the SGIS European Working Group, the DG CONNECT’s ad-hoc expert group, and other US working groups. Moreover, it should consider the particular experiences of stakeholders, such as the case of utilities that conducted collaborative and manual risk assessments based on a workshop approach. According to the experts, the risk assessment methodology to be developed should include a dependability analysis, a threat and vulnerability assessment, as well as an interdependencies analysis. Moreover, such a methodology should also include a stakeholder analysis to consider their opinions, assumptions and expectations. Cyber security and privacy should be addressed at the design phase so as to minimize costs and maximize security. Defining standard technical requirements for smart grid systems will allow vendors to take them into account during the design phase. Moreover, they would set a basis for defining a security certification scheme for smart grid products. These requirements should not only focus on smart meters but be further extended to other critical smart grid subsystems, especially secondary distribution substations, primary distribution substations, transmission substations, micro grids, control centres operated by SCADA systems, and the IT and telecommunication systems linking all them together. These technical standard requirements should be based in existing initiatives such as ISA 99 (10) on security controls for embedded devices or WIB’s requirements for vendors (11). On the other hand, the creation of guidelines on security governance for legal entities involved in the future grid Information, will allow them easily adapt their Security Management Systems (ISMSs) to also include industrial equipment such as substations, AMI, SCADA systems, etc. A full scale ISMS will provide the necessary organizational structures, processes, policies and procedures to be able to respond to the ever evolving threat panorama, foster training and awareness rising among staff and deal with technological issues. Guidelines on security governance for smart grids should leverage existing initiatives such as ISO 27K, ISA99 (10) and NIST IR 7628 (12). Both, security requirements for systems as well as security guidelines on security governance in the smart grid, should be developed considering at least the principles of robustness, resiliency and reliability of the grid and privacy of consumer data. According to many experts, cyber security should be measured according to these indicators and therefore security requirements should consider them as a security target.

text: Smart Grid Security 33 Recommendations for Europe and Member States

text: Finally, since Home Area Networks are directly dependent of end consumers, associated systems need to be completely fool-proof, and for this purpose secure and security technology will play a key role. Specific guidance on this topic is necessary to allow defining the best suited architecture or selecting the most appropriate technologies (i.e. encryption).

text: 4.5.3 Steps

text:  Analyse the current work being done by initiatives such as the SGIS working group or DG CONNECT’s ad-hoc EG.  Leverage existing information sharing platforms to fully understand industry expectations, compare them against existing work, and identify gaps.  Achieving a common reference architecture should be set as the main priority  Develop the common reference architecture.  Leverage previous experience on smart grid risks assessment methodologies by actively involving DSOs and TSOs.  Develop a risk assessment methodology coherent with the common reference architecture.  Based on the common reference architecture, define a number of technical requirements for smart grid systems.  Develop best practices guidelines on security governance, and for achieving a foolproof HAN/IAN/BAN

text: 4.6 Recommendation 6: Promote the development of security certification schemes for products and organisational security

text: 4.6.1 Description

text: EC and MS competent authorities should foster the development of security certification schemes for product and organisational security, leveraging existing initiatives such as Common Criteria, ISA99, and ISO 27K. These certification schemes should harmonise security and resiliency requirements across Member States, establishing the basis for a minimum set of auditable controls across Europe. Security certificate issuance capabilities should be accredited to National Certification Authorities.

text: 4.6.2 Objective

text: By raising the level of security and mitigating risk, accreditation and certification schemes would increase end consumers’ confidence in smart grid services and systems and accelerate their acceptance. Moreover, certified service providers can be easily compared allowing for marketing strategies. Product certificates would provide grid operators and service providers with information on the level of security attached to a product or system they may wish to purchase, knowing if they will be secure enough for a specific smart grid application, as well as allowing them to compare with other products or systems of the competence. Likewise, a certification on security governance for the smart grid should check the proper implementation of integral ISMS in grid operators and possibly other actors. A certification

text: Smart Grid Security 34

text: like this would provide a baseline for utilities and other stakeholders to measure themselves (i.e. benchmark and to assess the security posture) but also to compare them one to another. On the other hand, during the study it became clear that in order to determine if a product is secure, a development process evaluation and a verification of security functionalities are necessary. The first one is considered especially important for efficiency reasons, so as to avoid product redesigns, which would have costly consequences in a large life-cycle domain, such as is the case of Industrial environments as the Smart grid. A well developed product certification scheme would allow for both types of assessments by defining the appropriate security assurance requirements. This recommendation should leverage the set of standards promoted in recommendation 3, and specifically the technical requirements for smart grid systems and the guidelines on security governance for legal entities involved in the future grid. As it was already discussed in this recommendation, CC or ISO 27K were the most popular standards for developing the suggested certification schemes for smart grid. However none of them are directly applicable. According to the experts, CC is not specialised on control systems and other smart grid industrial elements. Therefore, to be applied in these environments, it should be extended to include specific security profiles for the smart grid, similar to those related to the smart card industry, where a joint interpretation library was developed. On the other hand experts suggested adapting ISO 27K series of standards as it occurred with the telecommunications sector.

text: 4.6.3 Steps

text:  Conduct a risk-driven identification of those components and set-ups that should be security certified.  Analyse previous experiences (e.g. smart card industry) on how to adapt existing standards and good practices (e.g. test beds) for defining smart grid security certification schemes.  Develop certification schemes for products and set-ups as well as for organisational security  Accredit NCAs as issuers of the corresponding security certificates.  Accredit independent companies as evaluators of these certification schemes.

text: 4.7 Recommendation 7: Foster the creation of test beds and security assessments

text: 4.7.1 Description

text: MS competent authorities and EC should foster the creation of test beds to assess, by means of quick and agile tests, if products are secure according to basic security principles, such as those defined by WIB's requirements for vendors. Additionally, it should be incentivized that independent third party companies and organisations carry out security assessments and penetration testing on DSOs, TSOs and other smart grid actors so as to identify security flaws

text: Smart Grid Security 35 Recommendations for Europe and Member States

text: at the organisational level. These actions should fill the gap while certification schemes are being developed. Moreover, the suggested test beds, which should preferably be organised as PPP, could eventually become accredited certification evaluators once the proposed certification schemes are ready.

text: 4.7.2 Objective

text: The availability of test beds with the necessary infrastructure and qualified personnel to perform agile security tests (e.g. white-box and code audits) against standards such as WIB’s requirements for vendors will be highly useful. Such test beds will allow manufacturers to quickly assess if their products and systems comply with a minimum set of security requirements, that operators associations are considering as basic. The verification of security functionalities in final devices is considered an essential element for many of the experts participating in the study. Besides, this will contribute to create a the breeding ground so as to manufacturers and vendors start thinking in the necessity of establishing mechanisms for evaluating security functionalities during the development process. In the future, if the proposed certification schemes are developed, these test beds could assume the role of independent evaluators, accredited by MS governments that would prepare the evaluation report to be validated by National Certification Authorities. Moreover, their experience with the agile security tests will bring them to a privileged position to help develop the protection profiles of product certification schemes. Additionally, such test beds could also be the perfect organisation to support the accomplishment of some others of the previous recommendations of this report. In addition to helping developing the product certification scheme, they might also play a role in supporting the development of improved industry standards applicable to smart grids. Likewise they might also contribute to knowledge sharing and dissemination by participating in conferences that include smart grid security topics where they would share information obtained through system assessments and analyses. Finally, such test beds could also be a training platform if they organised workshops to describe common cyber vulnerabilities found in control systems and other smart grid systems and providing effective methods for their mitigation. The construction of test beds should be based on well-established approaches that allow the execution of scientifically rigorous security assessments in safe experimentation environments. The inter-disciplinary nature of Smart Grids as a scientific area will definitely represent a challenge for test bed creators that will struggle to cover all possible constraints and requirements. Therefore, it is likely that many geographically distributed test beds, each focusing on a different aspect of Smart Grids, will need to interconnect and share resources. For instance, cyber-security assessment test beds, e.g. the EPIC (13)(Experimental Platform for ICT Contingencies) test bed developed within the Joint Research Centre, might need to federate with other test beds focusing on the electrical grid, e.g. test beds at remote locations. A first effort for the creation of a thematic network of European experimental

text: Smart Grid Security 36

text: facilities in the field of Industrial Control Systems and Smart Grids has already been started by the ERNCIP project (14).

text: 4.7.3 Steps

text:  Coordinate a group to clearly define the purpose of such test beds.  Identify the requirements and design the organisation of such a test bed.  Involve the main actors: manufacturers, integrators, and security tools and services providers.  Identify guidelines for reference on security requirements for technologies, products and set-ups  Develop a set of guidelines for quick product/technology/set-up assessments: source code analysis, black-box assessment, etc.  Further analyse how these test beds can be reconverted in accredited certification evaluators.

text: 4.8 Recommendation 8: Refine strategies to coordinate large scale pan- European cyber incidents affecting power grids

text: 4.8.1 Description

text: EC, ENISA and the MS competent authorities should further study strategies to coordinate the response to large scale cyber incidents affecting European power grids, studying the convenience of a central coordinating entity or alternatively a decentralised self-coordinated mesh of grid operators. These strategies should consider existing transnational electricity structures (i.e. European TSOs and DSOs) and national CIP agencies as well as other crisis management structures in place and CERTs. Besides, topics such as alarm scalation, political decisions (e.g. isolating a TSO) and pre-established incident handling procedures should also be discussed, taking into consideration existing and future interdependencies inside the European grid.

text: 4.8.2 Objective

text: A cyber security incident can impact any domain along the value chain. Therefore, in order to develop strategies for handling cyber incidents, different stakeholders will have to be involved, ranging from electricity generators to consumers, and at all levels, from infrastructures to services and operations. Besides, structures and mechanisms in place, at the organisational and coordination level and also at the technical level should be considered so as to not reinvent the wheel. During the study experts agreed that TSOs and DSOs need to be the ones performing monitoring actions to detect possible incidents, affecting the European power grid as a whole and also in each MS. In European-wide incidents, many experts consider that TSOs should be the organisations in charge of monitoring and triggering alarms,

text: Smart Grid Security 37 Recommendations for Europe and Member States

text: and mentioned the IRRIS FP7 IP project (13) as a reference for the creation of an alarming system for grid operators. Experts provided relevant technical details on how to implement incident detection in smart grids, which should also be considered when discussing the creation of a pan-European entity to manage large-scale cyber incidents. Some of the suggestions that experts made include:  Security monitoring sensors should be distributed across the grid gathering data that could be processed in a decentralised or centralised manner.  A central monitoring centre for data collection and analysis could adopt the structure of a Security Operations Centre (SOC).  Signature-based software will be needed in sensors.  Correlation and intelligence capabilities can be distributed across the grid or included in the SOC.  Intelligence implies being able to distinguish if the root cause of an incident is a cyber security event or any other event.  Monitoring centres could also perform research activities (i.e. write new signatures, study new threats, etc.) Another topic for discussion with respect to coordinating a global response to large scale cyber incidents is the degree of involvement of grid operators. It is widely accepted that operators should be involved in the detection and service restoration phases. However, it is not clear if they should be involved when decisions have to be taken so as to avoid conflicts of interest. Moreover, there are several candidates that could opt to be the germ of a central coordinating European entity. Experts suggest ENISA, ENTSO (European Network of TSOs), and ACER (Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators) as possible good candidates. On the other hand there are several sceptic experts with respect to the idea of having a centrally coordinating entity. According to them, this approach would worsen reaction times, since trying to manage incidents from a global point of view can be by far more complicated than solving individual problems. These experts suggest a more decentralized approach where communications and coordination procedures among directly related agents are improved.

text: 4.8.3 Steps

text:  Involve all stakeholders in an open discussion on the needs, advantages and disadvantages of an EU-level coordinating entity for large scale cyber incidents.  Analyse current procedures and structures for handling large scale incidents so as to identify gaps.  Analyse the role of ENTSO, ACER and ENISA in a future pan-European coordinating entity.  Discuss the role of grid operators and CERTs in dealing with large scale cyber incidents.

text: Smart Grid Security 38

text: 4.9 Recommendation 9: Involve CERTs to play and advisory role in dealing with cyber security issues affecting power grids

text: 4.9.1 Description

text: EC and the MS competent authorities should encourage competent CERT s to extend their capabilities to deal with smart grid cyber security issues. These CERTs should also have a broader scope, including other critical infrastructures (e.g. telecommunication systems or transportation systems) that are directly interdependent on the power grid. Particularly, in the case of very large cyber incidents, these entities should advise the normal crisis management structures in place at the EU and MS levles, including grid operators and public bodies and in full alignment with the strategies to be defined according to recommendation 8.

text: 4.9.2 Objective

text: In order to deal with cyber incidents affecting the current power grid and future smart grids in Europe, coordination with CERTs could be very valuable and probably needs to be further studied. The experts of this study agreed that CERTs could play a role in incident management but should not be the central piece. For instance, in the case of very large cyber incidents, this entity should be advising the normal crisis management structures in place at the EU and MS. Experts consider that it is better to extend the scope of the current CERTs – both public and private ones – instead of creating CERTs focusing only on smart grid cyber security issues. CERTs dealing with smart grid aspects should also have a broader view on other critical infrastructures, telecommunication systems, etc. Moreover, during the interviews and the survey, the experts identified some of the characteristics and services for these CERTs. These include being: 1) a unified point for information exchange among smart grid stakeholders; 2) a reference for valuable information (e.g. good practices distribution); 3) a central point for cyber security monitoring for power grids; 4) a leader in awareness rising activities; 5) a help point on cyber security certifications.

text: 4.9.3 Steps

text:  Consider other initiatives to find synergies and avoid duplicated efforts, such as the already recommended ICS-CERT  Contact Member State authorities to coordinate the collaboration with national public and private CERTs  Define smart grid computer emergency response capabilities as well as functional and operational duties  Clearly define the contributions from every public and private CERT

text: Smart Grid Security 39 Recommendations for Europe and Member States

text:  Collaborate with ongoing initiatives addressing the definition of management strategies for dealing with large-scale cyber security incidents affecting power grids in Europe

text: 4.10 Recommendation 10: Foster research in smart grid cyber security leveraging existing research programmes.

text: 4.10.1 Description

text: EC and the MS research and development competent authorities in cooperation with the Academia and R&D sector should assure that existing and future national and European research programmes, such as FP7 and Horizon 2020 (14), will incorporate into their work programmes research lines on smart grid related cyber security aspects. Some of these research lines are:  Protection of monitoring functionalities and automated decision making systems of the smart grid  Robust, secure and resilient architectures: self-healing and graceful degradation; generation, distribution and storage of cryptographic material  Trust and assurance and end-to-end security: dependencies and threat analysis and use-case modelling; active monitoring for incident detection; security metrics; security mechanisms against DoS attacks  Security in dependable systems: legacy systems; encryption functionalities; application/network filtering  Privacy and security by design: common procedures and interfaces, protection against zero-day vulnerabilities, optimization of cryptographic protocols.  Supply chain protection  Secure smart grid in the cloud  Legal and economic aspects of cyber security in the smart grid

text: 4.10.2 Objective

text: The general objective is to help overcome the cyber security challenges of the grid of the future, by achieving highly reliable and robust grids able to cope with an ever evolving threat landscape. Prosumer is also considered a major target by addressing privacy issues but also by acknowledging their importance in the operation and stability of the new grid. Data protection (i.e. confidentiality, integrity and privacy) and secure data handling, of consumer data as well as control and automation readings and commands processed by automated decision-making systems (e.g. distribution balancing) will be of paramount importance. The abovementioned research topics will help develop the necessary technology and strategies to address this important challenge. Moreover, other challenges that have been identified by the experts participating in the study and which will have to be addressed by research include:  A proper integration of legacy systems into a robust and resilient grid

text: Smart Grid Security 40

text:  Having standard interfaces at smart grid devices, particularly in what refers to the interaction with security devices such as identity management systems  Unauthorized access to systems or devices  Segmentation between ICT infrastructures devoted to "competitive" aspects (e.g. added-value services for consumers) and non-competitive ones (e.g. metering or grid operations)  Availability of traffic analyzers, communications monitoring and application log monitoring  Secure devices (e.g. trust and authentication capabilities).

text: 4.10.3 Steps

text:  Establish priorities for the different research objectives  Make contact with existing security programmes at EU and National levels, such as the European Framework Programme and Horizon 2020  Work together with appropriate organisations and bodies (e.g. Framework Programme Committee and Advisory Groups, Technology Platforms, etc.) to define an appropriate Work Programme  Emphasize the importance of disseminating results

text: Smart Grid Security 41 Recommendations for Europe and Member States

text: 5 Conclusions

text: This study proposes 10 recommendations to the public and private sector involved in the definition and implementation of the smart grids. These recommendations intend to provide useful and practical advice aimed at improving current initiatives, enhancing co-operation, raising awareness, developing new measures and good practices, and reducing barriers to information sharing. ENISA considers that these recommendations are effective, achievable, and urgent. This opinion is also shared by the experts who attended the validation workshop in which these recommendations were presented. Moreover, they showed their strong support for improving the recommendations and their willingness to help in their implementation. ENISA considers that the implementation of these recommendations is urgent because the smart grid, which is being built at the same time is being defined, is the greatest revolution of the electricity power grids since their creation. It is a major upgrade that prepares our power st systems for the 21 century and for which Information and Communication Technology (ICT) is of paramount importance. Thanks to ICT, the grid of the future will become smarter so as to improve reliability, security, and efficiency of the electric system through information exchange, distributed generation, storage sources, and the active participation of the end consumer. The development of smart grids exemplifies the increasing dependency of European economy and society on Information and Communication Technologies. The implementation of these recommendations will be challenging. Many of them will require the active collaboration between the public organizations and the private sector. Additionally, European institutions will have to take the lead in a field that has been addressed only quite recently. However ENISA believes that with a strong involvement of all engaged parties this will be an achievable task.

text: Smart Grid Security 42

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text: 7 Abbreviations

text: ACER Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators ADA Advanced Distribution Automation AMI Advanced Metering Infrastructure AMR/AMM Advanced Metering Reading/Measures ANSI American National Standards Institute AoR Assessment of the Resilience BAN Building Area Networks BPL Broadband over power line C&DM Control & Data Management CC Common Criteria CEN European Committee for Standardization CENELEC European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization CEO Chief Executive Officer CERT Centre Emergency Response Team CIA Confidentially, Integrity and Availability CIWIN Critical Infrastructure Warning Information Network C-level Chief level (CEO, CIO, ...) CO2 Carbon dioxide COTS Commercial of the Self CS Control Systems CZ Czech Republic DAE Digital Agenda for Europe DCA Distribution Contingency Analysis DE Germany DER Distributed Energy Resources DG ENER Directorate-General for Energy DK Denmark DLF/DLE Distribution Load Forecasting and Estimation Device Language Message specification/COmpanion Specification for Energy DLMS/COSEM Metering DLR Dynamic Line Ratings DMS Distribution Management System DoS Denial of Service DPF Distribution Power Flow DSE Distribution State Estimation DSM Demand Side Management DSO Distribution System Operators EACI European Association for Creativity and Innovation

text: Smart Grid Security 60

text: EC European Commission ECI European Critical Infrastructures EG Expert Group EII European Industrial Initiatives EISAS European Information Sharing and Alert System EL Greek EMS Energy Management System ENISA European Network and Information Security Agency ENTSO European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity EP3R European Public Private Partnership for Resilience EPCIP European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection ES Spain ESI Energy service interface ETN Electrical Transmission Network ETP Executive Training Programme ETP European Technology Platform ETSI European Telecommunications Standards Institute EU European Union EV Electric Vehicle FAN Field Area Network FDIR Fault Detection Isolation and Restoration FP7 Framework Programme 7 FTP File Transfer Protocol GDP Gross domestic product GHG Greenhouse Gas GIS Geographic Information System GPRS General Packet Radio Service HAN Home Area Network HMI Human Machine Interface HPC High Performance Computing HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol HTTPS Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure HVDC High-Voltage Direct Current HW Hardware IAC Integrity, Availability, Confidentiality IAN Industrial Area Networks ICS Industrial Control Systems ICT Information and communications technology IE Information Exchange IEC International Electrotechnical Commission

text: Smart Grid Security 61 Recommendations for Europe and Member States

text: IED Intelligent Electronic Devices IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers IoE Internet of Energy IPS/IDS Intrusion Protection/Detection System IP-Sec Internet Protocol Secure ISA International Society of Automation ISM Information Security Management ISMS Information Security Management System ISO International Organization for Standardization IST Information Society Technologies IT Information Technology IT Italy IVVC Integrated Voltage/Var Control JHA Justice and Home Affairs JRC Joint Research Center JWG Joint Working Group KF Key Finding LAN Local Area Network LV Low Voltage MAN Metropolitan Area Network MDMS Meter data management system MID Measuring Instruments Directive MPLS Multiprotocol Label Switching MS Member State MV Medium Voltage NAN Neighbourhood Area Network NCA National Certification Authorities NCI National Critical Infrastructures NERC North American Electric Reliability Corporation NIS Network and Information Security NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology NL Nederland NO Norway NRA National Regulatory Authorities OFC Optimal Feeder Configuration OFDM Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing OMS Outage Management System OWASP Open Web Application Security Project PCD Process Control Domain PLC Power Line Communications

text: Smart Grid Security 62

text: PMU Phasor Measurement Units PP Protection Profiles QoS Quality of Service R&D Research and Development RBAC Role Based Access Control RF Radio Frequency RISI Repository of Industrial Security Incidents RMP Risk Management Process RTD Research and Technology Development RTP Real-Time Pricing RTU Remote Terminal Units SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition SES Smart Electricity System SFTP Secure File Transfer Protocol SG Smart Grid SGIS Smart Grid Information Security SIEM Security information and event management SL Slovenia SMART Standardization, Monitoring, Accounting, Rethink, Transformation SOC Security Operations Centre SSH Secure Shell ST Security Targets SW Software TCP/IP Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol Telnet Telecommunications Network TF Task Force TOE Target of Evaluation TP Topology Processor TSO Transmission System Operators UK United Kingdom USA/US United States of America USB Universal Serial Bus VPN Virtual Private Network WAAPCA Wide-Area Adaptive Protection, Control and Automation WAMS Wide Area Monitoring System WAN Wide Area Networks WASA Wide-Area Situational Awareness WG Working Group WMD Weapon of Mass Destruction

text: Smart Grid Security 2 Recommendations for Europe and Member States

text: P.O. Box 1309, 71001 Heraklion, Greece www.enisa.europa.eu