publisher: Europeiska centralbanken

sprak: en

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 18 November 2025 on the supervisory independence of the Banca d’Italia, the prevention of conflicts of interest and the exercise of administrative discretion in case of mergers, divisions and acquisition of material holdings (CON/2025/36)

serie: con

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 18 November 2025 on the supervisory independence of the Banca d’Italia, the prevention of conflicts of interest and the exercise of administrative discretion in case of mergers, divisions and acquisition of material holdings (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

type: rubrik

text: On 13 October 2025 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance for an opinion on a draft legislative decree transposing

text: Directive (EU) 2024/1619

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2024 amending Directive

text: as regards supervisory powers, sanctions, third-country branches, and environmental, social and governance risks, and ensuring alignment with

text: Regulation (EU) 2024/1623

text: Regulation (EU) No 575/2013

text: as regards requirements for credit risk, credit valuation adjustment risk, operational risk, market risk and the output floor (hereinafter the ‘draft legislative decree’).The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and

text: Article 2(1)

text: , third indent, of

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft legislative decree relates to the Banca d’Italia and the specific tasks conferred upon the ECB concerning the prudential supervision of credit institutions pursuant to Article 127(6) of the Treaty. In addition, pursuant to Article 25.1 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and the European Central Bank (hereinafter the ‘Statute of the ESCB’), the ECB may offer advice to, and be consulted by, the competent authorities of the Member States on the implementation of Union legislation relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, among other matters. In accordance with

text: Article 17.5

text: , first sentence, of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

type: stycke

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The main purpose of the draft legislative decree is to transpose into Italian law those amendments to Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council introduced by Directive (EU)

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/1998/415/oj).

text: 2 Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions, amending Directive

text: and repealing Directives

text: and

text: (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 338, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2013/36/oj). 2024/1619 of the European Parliament and of the Council (hereinafter the ‘CRD6’), and to implement those provisions of

text: Regulation (EU) 2024/1623

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council , that relate to incompatibilities and limits on financial investments and cooling-off requirements for the members of the Governing Board and the staff of the Banca d’Italia . 1.2 The draft legislative decree aims to strengthen Italy’s alignment with Union banking and financial regulations by introducing stricter rules for third-country banks, enhancing corporate governance standards, revising mergers and acquisitions regulations, and addressing ESG risks and supervisory powers. It further aims to ensure the sound and prudent management of credit institutions, while simplifying rules and improving cooperation between supervisory authorities. 1.3 Among other things, the draft legislative decree implements the provisions of the CRD 6 pertaining to the exercise of supervisory powers in relation to the procedures for the notification and assessment of the acquisition and disposal of material holdings, as well as those governing mergers and divisions. 1.4 Furthermore, the draft legislative decree transposes the provisions of the CRD 6 that relate to the supervisory independence of competent authorities and the prevention of conflicts of interest in relation to the officials and employees of such authorities. 1.5 With regard to this latter aspect, the draft legislative decree provides that the members of the Governing Board of the Banca d’Italia are to be appointed on the basis of published, transparent and objective criteria, among persons of recognised integrity and professional experience, and can be removed from office if they no longer meet the appointment criteria or have been convicted of a serious criminal offence. 1.6 To prevent conflicts of interest and incompatibilities in the performance of professional activities after the termination of their mandate or employment with the Banca d’Italia, the draft legislative decree introduces certain restrictions. 1.7 First, recruitment by or engagement with any of the following entities under any type of contract for the provision of professional services is prohibited: (a) institutions in respect of which the member of the Governing Board or member of staff of the Banca d’Italia has been directly involved in the supervision or decision-making process, including direct or indirect parent undertakings, affiliates or subsidiaries; (b) entities providing services to the entities referred to in point (a), unless the member of the Governing Board or member staff of the Banca d’Italia is strictly precluded from participating in the provision of those services during the cooling-off period; and (c) entities that engage in lobbying and outreach activities addressed to the Banca d’Italia on matters for which the member of the Governing Board or member of staff of the Banca d’Italia was responsible during their term of

text: Directive (EU) 2024/1619

text: as regards supervisory powers, sanctions, third-country branches, and environmental, social and governance risks (OJ L, 2024/1619, 19.6.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1619/oj).

text: Regulation (EU) 2024/1623

text: Regulation (EU) No 575/2013

text: as regards requirements for credit risk, credit valuation adjustment risk, operational risk, market risk and the output floor (OJ L, 2024/1623, 19.6.2024, ELI: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1623/oj/eng).

text: 5 [The transposition of the CRD 6 required amendments and additions to the rules on incompatibilities, currently contained in Law No 262 of 28 December 2005, and the introduction of new rules on trading in private financial instruments. The amendments to Law No 262 of 28 December 2005 mainly involved the insertion in Article 19(7) of a new paragraph 7 bis and the new

text: Articles 29

text: ter, 29 quater and 29 quinquies.] office or employment. The duration of the cooling-off period is: (i) 24 months for members of the Governing Board of the Banca d’Italia; and (ii) 12 months for members of staff of the Banca d’Italia directly involved in the supervision of the entities specified in (a) above. These cooling-off periods also apply in relation to the entities not subject to supervision specified in (b) and (c) above. Members of the Governing Board are to be awarded appropriate compensation, determined at the time of their appointment. Member of staff must notify the Banca d’Italia without delay of any job offer they receive which falls within the scope of the prohibition. Where an incompatibility has been ascertained, the Banca d’Italia must assign the member of staff to different duties at the same level for the duration of the incompatibility and until the termination of the employment relationship (internal cooling-off mechanism). During this period, the relevant member of staff continues to receive their salary and does not have access to confidential or sensitive information. Retired, resigned, or dismissed members of staff are not entitled to compensation for the duration of the incompatibility. 1.8 Second, members of the Governing Board and members of the supervisory staff of the Banca d’Italia are prohibited from trading in financial instruments issued by, or related to, institutions supervised by the Banca d’Italia, and the direct or indirect parent undertakings, affiliates or subsidiaries of such institutions, with the exception of: (i) instruments managed by third parties, provided that the holders of those instruments are prevented from intervening in portfolio management; and (ii) investments in collective investment undertakings. These exceptions only apply where third parties and collective investment undertakings do not predominantly invest in financial instruments the trading of which is prohibited. 1.9 Third, members of the Governing Board and members of the supervisory staff of the Banca d’Italia are required to make a declaration on financial investments likely to give rise to a conflict of interest prior to their appointment and, subsequently, on an annual basis. 1.10 Fourth, where a member of the Governing Board or of the supervisory staff of the Banca d’Italia owns, at the time of recruitment or appointment or at any time thereafter, financial instruments that may give rise to conflicts of interest, the Banca d’Italia may require, on a case-by-case basis, that such instruments be sold or disposed of within a reasonable timeframe. The violation of the prohibitions and obligations in relation to trading may give rise to disciplinary liability. 1.11 Finally, the draft legislative decree empowers the Banca d’Italia to adopt further provisions on conflicts of interest, incompatibilities following termination of office and restrictions on financial investments by means of internal regulatory acts implementing its obligations arising from its membership of the European System of Central Banks and the European Central Bank (ESCB) and the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM).

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 Article 130 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB address the independence of central banks in the ESCB , stipulating that when exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks

text: 6 Regarding the doctrine of the ECB as to independence and its ramifications, see the ECB Convergence Report 2025, Section 2.2. Available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. and duties conferred upon them by the Treaties and the Statute of the ESCB, neither the ECB, nor an NCB, nor any member of their decision-making bodies, are to seek or take instructions from Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, from any government of a Member State or from any other body. This independence was thus entrusted to the ECB and the Banca d’Italia, as an NCB, by primary law. 2.2 Based on considerations of central bank independence, and in order to ensure the independence of NCBs such as the Banca d’Italia when exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties conferred upon them by the Treaties and the Statute of the ESCB, the ECB has established an ethics framework. This includes the ECB’s Code of Conduct for high-level ECB officials (hereinafter the ‘Single Code’), which applies, among others, to the members of the Governing Council of the ECB when exercising their functions as members of a high-level ECB body, and Guideline (EU) [2021/2253] of the European Central Bank (ECB/2021/49) , which is addressed to the NCBs of the Eurosystem and establishes ethics requirements applicable to the members of the decision-making bodies and staff of the NCBs. 2.3 The NCBs, as an integral part of the ESCB, must act in accordance with the guidelines of the ECB . Hence, national legislation is without prejudice to the ethics framework which the ECB has established in order to ensure the independence of the ECB and the NCBs when exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties conferred upon them by the Treaties and the Statute of the ESCB, as both frameworks have their own scope and legal basis. 2.4 Furthermore,

text: Article 19 of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013

text: (hereinafter the ‘SSM Regulation’) stipulates that when carrying out the tasks conferred on it by the SSM Regulation, the ECB and the national competent authorities acting within the SSM must act independently. The legal basis for this provision is Article 127(6) of the Treaty. Article 31(3) of the SSM Regulation furthermore requires the ECB, in cooperation with the national competent authorities, to: (a) establish and maintain comprehensive and formal procedures including ethics procedures and proportionate periods to assess in advance and prevent possible conflicts of interest resulting from subsequent employment within two years of members of the Supervisory Board; and (b) provide for appropriate disclosures. Those procedures are without prejudice to the application of stricter national rules. 2.5 In view of this independence and these requirements of the SSM Regulation, the ECB has established an ethics framework to ensure the independence of national competent authorities, such as the Banca d’Italia, when assisting the ECB in carrying out the tasks conferred on it by the SSM Regulation. This ethics framework includes the Single Code, which applies, among others, to the members of the Supervisory Board of the ECB when exercising their functions as members of a

text: 7 Code of Conduct for high-level ECB officials (OJ C 478, 16.12.2022, p. 3).

text: 8 Guideline (EU) [2021/2253] of the European Central Bank of 2 November 2021 laying down the principles of the Eurosystem Ethics Framework (ECB/2021/49) (OJ L 454, 17.12.2021, p. 7, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/guideline/2021/2253/oj).

text: 9 See Article 14.3 of the Statute of the ESCB.

text: Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013

text: conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2013/1024/oj). high-level ECB body, and Guideline

text: (EU) 2021/2256

text: of the European Central Bank (ECB/2021/50) , which is addressed to the national competent authorities of the SSM and establishes ethics requirements applicable to the members of their bodies and the members of staff of the national competent authorities. In view of the responsibility of the ECB for the effective and consistent functioning of the SSM , the national competent authorities must comply with Guideline

text: (EU) 2021/2256

text: (ECB/2021/50). 2.6 In contrast to the ethics framework, which is ultimately based on Article 127(6) of the Treaty, the CRD 6, including its provision on supervisory independence of competent authorities , is based on Article 53(1) of the Treaty. A legal act based on this provision cannot alter the rights and obligations of the ECB and the national competent authorities when carrying out the tasks conferred on them by the SSM Regulation based on Article 127(6) of the Treaty. It follows from settled case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union that the different legal bases, namely

text: Article 53(1)

text: and Article 127(6) of the Treaty, cannot be combined as the legal basis for a legal act, in view of the different procedures involved. In particular, the measures adopted under Article 53(1) of the Treaty are adopted by the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee (and, if relevant, the ECB in accordance with Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty). By contrast, the regulations adopted under Article 127(6) of the Treaty are adopted by the Council alone, in a special legislative procedure in which the Council acts unanimously, after consulting the European Parliament and the ECB . 2.7 Hence, the amendments made by the CRD 6 are without prejudice to the ethics framework which the ECB has established to ensure the independence of the national competent authorities in the context of the SSM, as both frameworks have their own scope and legal basis. The Union legislator acknowledged this through the CRD 6’s amendments to Directive

text: , which provide that

text: Article 4

text: a(2) of Directive

text: is without prejudice to the rights and obligations of the national competent authorities pursuant to the SSM established by the SSM Regulation . 2.8 In this regard, the ECB welcomes that, under

text: Article 3(1)

text: , point c), which inserts a new

text: Article 29

text: quinquies in Law No 262 of 28 December on the protection of savings and the regulation of financial markets (hereinafter ‘Law No 262 of 28 December 2005’), of the draft legislative decree, the Banca d’Italia has been expressly confirmed in its power to adopt, through its own internal regulatory acts,

text: 11 Guideline

text: (EU) 2021/2256

text: of the European Central Bank of 2 November 2021 laying down the principles of the Ethics Framework for the Single Supervisory Mechanism (ECB/2021/50) (OJ L 454, 17.12.2021, p. 21, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/guideline/2021/2256/oj).

text: 13 See

text: Article 1

text: , point (4), of the CRD 6, which inserts a new

text: Article 4

text: a in Directive

text: 14 See judgment of the Court of Justice of 29 April 2004, Commission v Council,

text: , ECLI:EU:C:2004:253, paragraphs 57 and 58; and judgment of the Court of Justice of 10 January 2006, Commission v Parliament and Council,

text: , ECLI:EU:C:2006:4, paragraphs 43 to 60.

text: 15 See paragraph 2.6.2 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.1.3 of Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on EUR-Lex.

text: 16 See the fourth subparagraph of

text: Article 4

text: a(2) of Directive

text: , as inserted by the CRD 6. This acknowledgement refers directly to the dismissal requirements included in

text: Article 4(2)

text: , second subparagraph, of the CRD 6.

text: 17 Disposizioni per la tutela del risparmio e la disciplina dei mercati finanziari, pubblicata nella Gazzetta Ufficiale n. 301 28 dicembre 2005. additional provisions on conflicts of interest, cooling-off periods and limits on financial investments, in order to implement the relevant obligations arising from its participation in the ESCB and the SSM.

text: 3. Specific observations

text: 3.1 Supervisory independence and prevention of conflicts of interest 3.1.1 The ECB understands that the current Italian legislation (including the Statute of the Banca d’Italia) already complies with the provision of CRD 6 on the maximum term of office for members of the governance bodies of competent authorities, which provides that Member States must ensure that no member of a competent authority’s governance body (except for governors of national central banks) who is appointed after 11 January 2026 remains in office for more than 14 years . The ECB therefore considers that it is not necessary for the draft legislative decree to include any provisions in this respect. Under Law No 262 of 28 December 2005 and the Statute of the Banca d’Italia the Governor and the other members of the Governing Board are to hold office for six years, with the possibility of only one renewal of their mandates. 3.1.2 In this context, the ECB highlights that in accordance with Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB, statutes of national central banks must provide for a minimum term of office of five years for a Governor. This does not preclude longer terms of office. Applying the rules regarding the term of office of Governors to other members of the decision-making bodies of NCBs involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks also safeguards the personal independence of those persons . The application of the same rules regarding the term of office to both Governors and members of decision-making bodies is particularly pertinent where a Governor is ‘first among equals’ alongside other members who have equivalent voting rights, or where other members are involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks , as is the case in the Banca d’Italia. The ECB considers that the relevant provisions of the Statute of the Banca d’Italia are consistent with the requirements of Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB . 3.1.3 The provisions of Law No 262 of 28 December 2005 and of the Statute of the Banca d’Italia (as they currently stand) that regulate the appointment and dismissal of members of the Governing Board of the Banca d’Italia are consistent with the CRD 6 and the draft legislative decree only supplements them with new provisions concerning the public disclosure of grounds for dismissal. The CRD 6 provides in this respect that Member States must ensure that members of a competent authority’s governance body are appointed on the basis of published criteria that are objective and transparent and that those members can be dismissed if they no longer meet the criteria of appointment or have been convicted of a serious criminal offence. The reasons for dismissal are to be made public unless the member of the competent authority’s governance body concerned objects to the publication .

text: 18 See

text: Article 4

text: a(2), second paragraph, first sentence, of Directive

text: , as inserted by the CRD 6.

text: 19 Disposizioni per la tutela del risparmio e la disciplina dei mercati finanziari, pubblicata nella Gazzetta Ufficiale n. 301 28 dicembre 2005.

text: 20 Article 130 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB, which address the independence of central banks in the ESCB, refer to ‘members of the decision-making bodies’ of NCBs, rather than to Governors specifically.

text: 21 See ECB Convergence Report, June 2025, p. 26.

text: 22 See ECB Convergence Report, May 2006, p. 75 and ECB Convergence Report, May 2008, p. 238.

text: 23 See

text: Article 4

text: a(2), second paragraph, second and third sentences, of Directive

text: , as inserted by the CRD 6. The ECB considers that it is not necessary for the draft legislative decree to include provisions relating to the grounds for dismissal of members of the Governing Board of the Banca d’Italia. Under the Statute of the Banca d’Italia, the Governor, the Senior Deputy Governor and the three Deputy Governors can only be dismissed prior to the expiration of their term of office if they do not fulfil the conditions required for the performance of their duties or they have been found guilty of serious misconduct . 3.1.4 In this context, the ECB highlights that, pursuant to

text: Article 14.2

text: , second paragraph, first sentence, of the Statute of the ESCB, ‘a Governor may be relieved from office only if he no longer fulfils the conditions required for the performance of his duties or if he has been guilty of serious misconduct’. Applying the same rules regarding the grounds for relieving Governors from office to other members of the decision-making bodies of NCBs involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks will also safeguard the personal independence of those persons. As noted in paragraph 3.1.1, Article 130 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB refer to ‘members of the decision-making bodies’ of NCBs, rather than to Governors specifically. The application of the same rules regarding appointment and dismissal to both Governors and members of decision-making bodies is particularly pertinent where a Governor is ‘first among equals’ with other members who have equivalent voting rights, or where other members are involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks , as is the case in the Banca d’Italia. The ECB considers that the relevant provisions of the draft legislative decree are consistent with the requirements of Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB . 3.1.5 The ECB notes that the 24-month cooling-off period applicable to the Governor, the Senior Deputy Governor and the three Deputy Governors of Banca d’Italia under the draft legislative decree is also in line with the provisions of the Single Code . 3.1.6 In addition, the Single Code sets limits on the establishment of post-employment relationships, not only directly with significant or less significant credit institutions, but also with ‘other financial institutions’ or ‘any entity engaged in lobbying in relation to the ECB, or consultancy and/or advocacy for the ECB or for any [supervised] institution’ . The ECB notes that under the draft legislative decree the categories of entities in respect of which a cooling-off period is applied, in cases where staff or members of the governing bodies of the Banca d’Italia take up employment after termination of their employment with the Banca d’Italia, extend beyond financial institutions other than supervised credit institutions. Therefore, the ECB considers the cooling-off regime provisions under the draft legislative decree as broadly in line with those contained in the Single Code. 3.1.7 The ECB also notes that the prohibition on the trading by Banca d’Italia Governing Board members and employees in certain financial instruments is aligned to that provided for under the Eurosystem and SSM Ethics Frameworks, which the ECB has established, without prejudice to the

text: 24 See Articles

text: and

text: and (3) of the Statute of the Banca d’Italia. 25 See ECB Convergence Report, June 2025, p. 26. 26 See ECB Convergence Report, May 2006, p. 75, and ECB Convergence Report, May 2008, p. 238. 27 See

text: Article 17.3

text: , point (b), of the Single Code; see also paragraph 2.2.3 of Opinion

text: . 28 See Articles 17.1 and 17.2 of the Single Code. 29 See Article 11 of Guideline (EU) [2021/2253] (ECB/2021/49). 30 See Article 11 of Guideline

text: (EU) 2021/2256

text: (ECB/2021/50). requirements of the Single Code . 3.1.8 The ECB strongly welcomes that the draft legislative decree is without prejudice to the Eurosystem and SSM Ethics Frameworks and to the Single Code, as they may be amended from time to time. Indeed, as already mentioned, the text of the draft legislative decree explicitly clarifies that Banca d'Italia is empowered to adopt further provisions and restrictions on conflicts of interest, cooling-off periods, as well as on financial investments by means of internal regulatory acts implementing its obligations arising from its membership of the ESCB and the SSM . The ECB considers that the internal act(s) to be adopted by the Banca d’Italia could support alignment with the Single Code. Therefore, it is not necessary for the draft legislative decree to include any further provisions in this respect. 3.2 Prudential supervisory aspects in relation to mergers, divisions and the acquisition of material holdings 3.2.1 Regarding the assessment of mergers, divisions and material holdings, the ECB understands that the draft legislative decree assigns to the Banca d’Italia the responsibility for implementing, through secondary legislation, the derogations from the mandatory assessment requirement, as set out in the CRD 6. Such derogations specifically apply in situations where mergers or transactions involving material holdings occur between entities within the same group, or when the acquisition or divestment of material holdings takes place within the same institutional protection scheme. 3.2.2 In this regard, the ECB notes that the CRD 6 provides that the competent authorities will not be required to carry out the assessment in all the cases referred to in paragraph 3.2.1 . 3.2.3 The ECB understands that the Banca d’Italia, in its internal regulatory acts, will not introduce conditions that are not derived from the CRD 6 and will not constrain the discretion of the competent authorities to determine on a case-by-case basis whether to conduct such an assessment. This opinion will be published on EUR-Lex. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 18 November 2025. [signed] The President of the ECB Christine LAGARDE

text: 31 See Article 16 of the Single Code. 32 See Article 3 of the draft legislative decree. 33 See

text: Articles 27

text: a(7) and 27i(2) of Directive

text: , as added by the CRD VI.

type: vagledning

utgivare: ecb


text: COM(2025) 591 final.

text: COM(2025) 593 final.

text: COM(2025) 595 final.

text: Detta inkluderar

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning (EU) 2024/1263 av den 29 april 2024

text: om en effektiv samordning av den ekonomiska politiken och om multilateral budgetövervakning samt om upphävande av

text: rådets förordning (EG) nr 1466/97

text: ( EUT L, 2024/1263, 30.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1263/oj),

text: rådets förordning (EU) 2024/1264 av den 29 april 2024

text: om ändring av förordning

text: (EG) nr 1467/97

text: om påskyndande och förtydligande av tillämpningen av förfarandet vid alltför stora underskott ( EUT L, 2024/1264, 30.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1264/oj) och

text: rådets direktiv (EU) 2024/1265 av den 29 april 2024

text: om ändring av direktiv

text: om krav på medlemsstaternas budgetramverk ( EUT L, 2024/1265, 30.4.2024, ELI:http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1265/oj.

text: Se de allmänna kommentarerna i Europeiska centralbankens yttrande

text: av den 5 juli 2023 om ett förslag om en reform av EU:s ramverk för ekonomisk styrning (EUT C 290, 18.8.2023, s. 17). Alla ECB-yttranden publiceras i EUR-Lex.

text: Se skäl 8 i förslaget till förordning om ändring av förordning

text: (EU) nr 472/2013

text: Se artikel 1.9 b i de föreslagna ändringarna av förordning

text: (EU) nr 472/2013

text: som inför en ny

text: artikel 14.1

text: a i förordning

text: (EU) nr 472/2013

text: Se artikel 1.9 d i de föreslagna ändringarna av förordning

text: (EU) nr 472/2013

text: som inför en ny

text: artikel 14.2

text: a i förordning

text: (EU) nr 472/2013

text: Rådets förordning

text: (EU) nr 1024/2013

text: av den 15 oktober 2013 om tilldelning av särskilda uppgifter till Europeiska centralbanken i fråga om politiken för tillsyn över kreditinstitut (EUT L 287, 29.10.2013, s. 63, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2013/1024/oj).

text: Se Europeiska centralbankens yttrande

text: av den 7 mars 2012 om ökad ekonomisk styrning i euroområdet (EUT C 141, 17.5.2012, s. 7).

text: ECB noterar att

text: artiklarna 7.4

text: (övervakning av programmet) och 14.2 (övervakning efter programperiodens slut) i förordning

text: (EU) nr 472/2013

text: , efter ändringen genom förslaget till förordning om ändring av förordning

text: (EU) nr 472/2013

text: ,, skulle innebära korshänvisningar till

text: artikel 3.3

sprak: sv

title: Europeiska centralbankens yttrande av den 18 november 2025 om ett förslag till ett förenklingspaket som innehåller ändringar av vissa regler i unionens ramverk för ekonomisk styrning (CON/2025/37)

text: Inledning och rättslig grund

text: Den 17 och 22 oktober 2025 mottog Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) en begäran från Europeiska unionens råd respektive Europaparlamentet om ett yttrande om a) ett förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning om ändring av förordningarna

text: (EU) nr 1173/2011

text: och

text: (EU) nr 473/2013

text: vad gäller anpassning till EU:s ramverk för ekonomisk styrning och ytterligare förenkling av detta ramverk (nedan kallat förslag till förordning om ändring av förordningarna

text: (EU) nr 1173/2011

text: och

text: (EU) nr 473/2013

text: ), och b) ett förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning om ändring av förordning

text: (EU) nr 472/2013

text: vad gäller den ekonomiska övervakningen och övervakningen av de offentliga finanserna i medlemsstater i euroområdet som har, eller hotas av, allvarliga problem i fråga om sin finansiella stabilitet (nedan kallat förslag till förordning om ändring av förordning

text: (EU) nr 473/2013

text: Därutöver mottog ECB den 17 oktober 2025 en begäran från Europeiska unionens råd om ett yttrande om ett förslag till rådets förordning om ändring av

text: rådets förordning (EG) nr 332/2002

text: vad gäller finansieringsarrangemang och användning av en diversifierad finansieringsstrategi (nedan kallat förslag till förordning om ändring av förordning

text: (EU) nr 332/2002

text: ) som, tillsammans med förslaget till förordning om ändring av förordningarna

text: (EU) nr 1173/2011

text: och

text: (EU) nr 473/2013

text: samt förslaget till förordning om ändring av förordning

text: (EU) nr 472/2013

text: de förslagna förordningarna).

text: ECB:s behörighet att avge ett yttrande grundas på artiklarna

text: och

text: i fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt eftersom de förslagna förordningarna har betydelse för Europeiska centralbankssystemets huvudmål att upprätthålla prisstabilitet enligt artiklarna 127.1 och 282.2 i fördraget och

text: artikel 2 i stadgan

text: för Europeiska centralbankssystemet och Europeiska centralbanken. I enlighet med

text: artikel 17.5

text: första meningen i arbetsordningen för Europeiska centralbanken har detta yttrande antagits av ECB-rådet.

text: 1. Allmänna kommentarer

text: 1.1 ECB välkomnar de föreslagna förordningarna, som innehåller nödvändiga och riktade ändringar av vissa regler för unionens ekonomisk styrning som är specifika för euroområdet. Dessa ändringar syftar till att säkerställa att de senare anpassas till den omfattande reformen av unionens ekonomiska styrning som antogs för hela unionen i april 2024. De delar av unionens ekonomiska styrning som är specifika för euroområdet och som omfattas av de föreslagna förordningarna hade inte inkluderats i den omfattande reformen och bör därför anpassas till denna. Förslagen till förordningar har också till syfte att minska medlemsstaternas rapporteringsskyldigheter bl.a. genom att undvika dubbelrapportering.

text: 1.2 De föreslagna förordningarna innehåller bl.a. följande ändringar för att säkerställa överensstämmelse med 2024 års reform: a) gemensamma bestämmelser för övervakning och bedömning av utkast till budgetplaner och säkerställande av korrigering av alltför stora underskott i medlemsstater i euroområdet, b) sanktioner för euroområdets medlemsstater om dessa inte följer reglerna för ekonomisk styrning, och c) bestämmelser om förstärkt övervakning för medlemsstater i euroområdet som har, eller hotas av, allvarliga svårigheter med sin finansiella stabilitet eller mottar ekonomiskt bistånd, samt övervakning efter programperiodens slut. Denna anpassning kommer att bidra stabilitet i unionens ekonomiska styrning överlag. Som tidigare framförts i ECB:s yttrande om den reformen, ligger en stabil unionsram för samordning och övervakning av den ekonomiska politiken och finanspolitiken i Europeiska unionens, medlemsstaternas och i synnerhet euroområdets intresse.

text: 1.3 Att förtydliga och förenkla förfaranden och rapporteringsskyldigheter, i enlighet med de föreslagna förordningarna, kommer också att effektivisera den ekonomiska och finanspolitiska övervakningen och minska medlemsstaternas rapporteringsbörda.

text: 1.4 Vad gäller förstärkt övervakning välkomnar ECB särskilt förtydligandet att tillämpningen på en medlemsstat i euroområdet mottar förebyggande ekonomiskt bistånd uttryckligen kopplas till att ett sådant förebyggande stöd förutsätter att nya politiska åtgärder antas av medlemsstaten. Detta skulle vara fallet oavsett om det förebyggande finansiella stödet beviljas inom ramen för en ytterligare villkorad kreditlina (ECCL) inom ramen för Europeiska stabilitetsmekanismen (ESM), som i sig omfattar ett sådant krav på antagande av nya politiska åtgärder, eller inom ramen för något annat instrument för förebyggande ekonomiskt bistånd. Detta förtydligande kommer att utesluta medlemsstater i euroområdet som får förebyggande ekonomiskt bistånd från tillämpningen av förstärkt övervakning för vilken inga nya politiska åtgärder krävs. När det gäller eventuella nya instrument för förebyggande ekonomiskt bistånd från ESM kommer kommissionen dessutom att bedöma om en förstärkt övervakning verkligen behövs. ECB välkomnar denna systematisering av tillämpningen av förstärkt övervakning för medlemsstater i euroområdet som mottar förebyggande ekonomiskt bistånd. ECB välkomnar också att de föreslagna förordningarna klargör syftet med, och omfattningen av, övervakningen efter programperiodens slut, och förenklar den samtidigt som en effektiv bedömning av återbetalningsriskerna upprätthålls.

text: 1.5 Slutligen anpassar de föreslagna förordningarna också finansieringsarrangemangen för unionens ekonomiska stöd till medlemsstater utanför euroområdet som har betalningsbalansproblem till unionens övergripande diversifierade finansieringsstrategi som för närvarande tillämpas, vilket ECB också välkomnar.

text: 2. Specifika kommentarer

text: 2.1 Förslaget till förordning om ändring av förordningarna

text: (EU) nr 1173/2011

text: och

text: (EU) nr 473/2013

text: ECB välkomnar de föreslagna ändringarna av förordningarna

text: (EU) nr 1173/2011

text: och

text: (EU) nr 473/2013

text: eftersom de syftar till att säkerställa att dessa förordningar anpassas till bestämmelserna och den övergripande logiken och strategin i unionens reformerade ramverk för ekonomisk styrning. Genom att man säkerställer samstämmighet mellan de olika förordningar som unionens ramverk för ekonomisk styrning består av, bidrar man till större tydlighet och transparens, vilket är avgörande för ett effektivt genomförande av det reformerade ramverket.

text: 2.2 Förslaget till förordning om ändring av förordning

text: (EU) nr 472/2013

text: 2.2.1 Såsom anges i punkt 1.4, välkomnar ECB förtydligandena om de föreslagna ändringarna av förordning

text: (EU) nr 472/2013

text: . Enligt skäl 8 bör en medlemsstat i euroområdet som mottar ekonomiskt bistånd i förebyggande syfte från en eller fler andra medlemsstater eller tredjeländer, den europeiska finansiella stabiliseringsmekanismen, Europeiska stabiliseringsmekanismen eller någon annan berörd internationell finansiell institution, såsom Internationella valutafonden, som förutsätter att nya politiska åtgärder antas, ställas under förstärkt övervakning, även om det ekonomiska biståndet ännu inte har börjat utnyttjas. Skälet förtydligar också att en ytterligare villkorad kreditlina (ECCL) från ESM förutsätter att sådana nya politiska åtgärder antas, varför en medlemsstat som mottar sådant ekonomiskt bistånd i förebyggande syfte bör ställas under förstärkt övervakning. Slutligen förtydligar skäl 8 när det gäller nya instrument för förebyggande ekonomiskt bistånd från ESM, att kommissionen bör bedöma från fall till fall om sådana nya politiska åtgärder faktiskt är kopplade till det nya instrumentet som används i det aktuella fallet och om den medlemsstat som mottar bör ställas under förstärkt övervakning.

text: 2.2.2 Enligt vad som framgår av punkt 1.4, välkomnar ECB förslaget att i

text: artikel 14 i förordning (EU) nr 472/2013

text: införa en bestämmelse som förtydligar syftet med, och omfattningen av, övervakningen efter programperiodens slut som en övervakning och bedömning av a) den berörda medlemsstatens förmåga att återbetala det ekonomiska bistånd som mottagits, med beaktande av medlemsstatens ekonomiska, budgetmässiga och finansiella situation, b) genomförandet av alla reformer som ingår i det makroekonomiska anpassningsprogrammet eller villkoren enligt vilka det ekonomiska biståndet i förebyggande syfte erhålls, samt c) behovet av korrigerande åtgärder för att minska risker som rör den berörda medlemsstatens förmåga att återbetala det ekonomiska bistånd som mottagits. Granskningsuppdrag och kommissionens rapportering av resultaten från dessa till Europaparlamentets ansvariga utskott, ekonomiska och finansiella kommittén samt den berörda medlemsstatens parlament ska även fortsättningsvis äga rum i samarbete med ECB och i regel var sjätte månad.

text: 2.2.3 ECB välkomnar också det föreslagna införandet av ytterligare en ny bestämmelse i

text: som gör det möjligt för kommissionen att fem år efter det att övervakningen initierats tillfälligt, för en period om fem år, upphäva övervakningen, med beaktande av en särskild bedömning som kommissionen kan ta fram av den berörda medlemsstatens förmåga att återbetala det ekonomiska bistånd som mottagits, för vilken kommissionen måste beakta vissa omständigheter som anges i den föreslagna nya bestämmelsen. ECB noterar att den inte förväntas agera i samverkan med kommissionen när den meddelar sin bedömning eller när den fattar beslut om att avbryta övervakningen efter programperiodens slut. Relevanta uppdrag ska dock genomföras i samarbete med ECB, på liknande sätt som kontrollbesök efter programperiodens slut.

text: 2.2.4 Rådets förordning

text: (EU) nr 1024/2013

text: (nedan kallad SSM-förordningen) hade ännu inte antagits när kommissionens förslag som resulterade i antagandet av förordning

text: (EU) nr 472/2013

text: publicerades. Därutöver antogs ECB:s yttrande om detta förslag från kommissionen den 7 mars 2012, i god tid innan SSM-förordningen färdigställdes och innan ECB övertog de uppgifter som den tilldelats genom SSM-förordningen den 4 november 2014. ECB välkomnar den uttryckliga hänvisningen i föreslaget till förordning till samspelet mellan SSM-förordningen, å ena sidan, och ECB:s roll som tillsynsmyndighet och de relevanta nationella behöriga myndigheternas roll inom den förstärkta övervakningen enligt

text: artikel 3.3 i förordning (EU) nr 472/2013

text: , å andra sidan.

text: 2.3 Förslaget till förordning om ändring av förordning

text: (EU) nr 332/2002

text: 2.3.1 ECB välkomnar förslaget till förordning om ändring av förordning

text: (EG) nr 332/2002

text: , som syftar till att förenkla finansieringsarrangemangen för betalningsbalansfaciliteten till förmån för medlemsstater utanför euroområdet och öka dess effektivitet och kostnadseffektivitet.

text: 2.3.2 Finansieringsmetoden för unionens system bygger för närvarande på back-to-back-finansiering, vilket innebär att kommissionen genomför marknadsoperationer utifrån vad som behövs för varje enskilt utlåningstillfälle. Detta innebär att varje upplåningstransaktion som kommissionen genomför är direkt kopplad till ett utbetalningsbehov. Förslaget till förordning om ändring av förordning

text: (EU) nr 332/2002

text: ändrar finansieringsmetoden för systemet till en mer diversifierad finansieringsstrategi, vilket gör att den blir mer lik den gemensamma diversifierade finansieringsstrategi som kommissionen för närvarande tillämpar.

text: Utfärdat i Frankfurt am Main den 18 november 2025.

text: Christine Lagarde

text: ECB:s ordförande

text: Europeiska unionens officiella tidning

text: III Förberedande akter

text: EUROPEISKA CENTRALBANKEN

text: Europeiska centralbanken


text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/1998/415/oj).

text: Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions, amending Directive

text: and repealing Directives

text: and

text: (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 338, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2013/36/oj). 3

text: Directive (EU) 2024/1619

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2024 amending Directive

text: as regards supervisory powers, sanctions, third-country branches, and environmental, social and governance risks (OJ L, 2024/1619, 19.6.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1619/oj). 4 Pursuant to Articles 118 and 119 of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus and Article 20 of the Law of 2002 on the Central Bank of Cyprus (138(I)/2002) (hereinafter the ‘Law on the CBC’). Under Article 120 of the Constitution and Article 21 of the Law on the CBC, the Deputy Governor assists the Governor in the performance of his tasks and may perform all tasks assigned by the Constitution and the Law on the CBC to the Governor in case of the latter’s absence or temporary incapacity. The position of Deputy Governor has been vacant since 1963.

text: See paragraph 3 of the draft directive amending paragraph 41 of the Directive on the Terms of Service of the Employees of the Central Bank of Cyprus of 2024 (Κ.Δ.Π. 195/2024, hereinafter the ‘CBC Directive’). 6 ibid. 7 The draft directive also introduces definitions for the terms ‘personal interest’ and ‘conflict of interest’ (paragraph 2).

text: See paragraph 5 of the draft directive amending paragraph 45 of the CBC Directive 9 According to the proposed definition, ‘financial instrument’ means any of the following: (a) a contract that gives rise to both a financial asset of one party and a financial liability or equity instrument of another party; (b) the financial instruments as defined in

text: Article 4(1)

text: , point 15 of Directive

text: (MiFID II), read in conjunction with Section C of Annex I thereto; (c) a derivative financial instrument; (d) a primary financial instrument; (e) a cash instrument; and (f) instruments issued through distributed ledger technology (DLT). 10 See paragraph 44 of the CBC Directive. 11 Regarding the doctrine of the ECB as to independence and its ramifications, see the ECB’s Convergence Report 2025, Section 2.2. Available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: , paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on EUR-Lex.

text: Code of Conduct for high-level ECB officials (OJ C 478, 16.12.2022, p. 3). Article 1.1 of the Single Code provides that it also applies to members of the Supervisory Board when exercising their functions as members of a high-level ECB body and representatives of NCBs participating in meetings of the Supervisory Board. 14 Guideline (EU) [2021/2253] of the European Central Bank of 2 November 2021 laying down the principles of the Eurosystem Ethics Framework (ECB/2021/49) (OJ L 454, 17.12.2021, p. 7, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/guideline/2021/2253/oj). 15 See paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: . 16 See Article 14.3 of the Statute of the ESCB. 17 See paragraph 2.1.4 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: . 18

text: Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013

text: conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2013/1024/oj). 19 See paragraph 2.1.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.4 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.4 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.4 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.4 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.4 of Opinion

text: . 20 Guideline

text: (EU) 2021/2256

text: of the European Central Bank of 2 November 2021 laying down the principles of the Ethics Framework for the Single Supervisory Mechanism (ECB/2021/50) (OJ L 454, 17.12.2021, p. 21, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/guideline/2021/2256/oj).

text: See Article 6(1) of the SSM Regulation. 22 See paragraph 2.5 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.5 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.5 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.5 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.5 of Opinion

text: . 23 See

text: Article 4

text: a of Directive

text: as inserted by the CRD6. 24 See judgment of the Court of Justice of 29 April 2004, Commission v Council,

text: , ECLI:EU:C:2004:253, paragraphs 57 and 58; and judgment of the Court of Justice of 10 January 2006, Commission v Parliament and Council,

text: , ECLI:EU:C:2006:4, paragraphs 43 to 60. 25 See paragraph 2.6.2 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1.3 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.6 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.6 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.6 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.6 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.6 of Opinion

text: . 26 See

text: Article 4

text: a(2), fourth subparagraph, of Directive

text: , as inserted by the CRD6. This acknowledgement refers directly to the dismissal requirements included in

text: Article 4

text: a(2), second subparagraph, of Directive

text: , as inserted by the CRD6. 27 See paragraph 2.1.4 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.7 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.7 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.7 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.7 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.7 of Opinion

text: See paragraphs 41, 44 and 45 of the CBC Directive. 29 See paragraph 3.6 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 3.6 of Opinion

text: . 30 See

text: Articles 17.1

text: , points (b) and (c), and 17.2, points (b) and (c), of the Single Code. 31 See Articles 17.1 and 17.2 of the Single Code.

text: and paragraph 3.1.8 of Opinion

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 25 November 2025 on the prevention of conflicts of interest among the staff of the Central Bank of Cyprus (CON/2025/38)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 25 November 2025 on the prevention of conflicts of interest among the staff of the Central Bank of Cyprus (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 17 November 2025 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Central Bank of Cyprus (CBC) for an opinion on a draft directive of the CBC amending the Directives on the Employees of the Central Bank of Cyprus (Terms of Service) of 2024 (hereinafter the ‘draft directive’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 2(1), third indent, of

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft directive relates to the CBC and the specific tasks conferred upon the ECB concerning the prudential supervision of credit institutions pursuant to Article 127(6) of the Treaty. In accordance with

text: Article 17.5

text: , first sentence, of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft directive

text: 1.1 The main purpose of the draft directive is to transpose into Cypriot law

text: Article 4

text: a of Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council , which was introduced by

text: Directive (EU) 2024/1619

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council (hereinafter the ‘CRD6’) and which relates to the supervisory independence of competent authorities and the prevention of conflicts of interest involving members of their governance bodies and staff. 1.2 According to the explanatory memorandum accompanying the draft directive, given that

text: Article 4

text: a explicitly exempts governors of national central banks (NCBs) from the scope of its application and the executive functions as to the day-to-day management of the CBC’s supervisory function are solely vested in the Governor , the Cypriot transposition of

text: Article 4

text: a of Directive

text: focuses

text: on those CBC employees who are involved in the performance of supervisory tasks and on the prevention and management of conflicts of interest. 1.3 In particular, the draft directive provides that CBC employees are to be subject to a cooling-off period following the termination of their employment with the CBC. During this period, CBC employees may not take up employment or accept any contract for the provision of professional services with any of the following: (a) institutions with which the employee has been directly involved for purposes of supervision, including direct or indirect parent undertakings, subsidiaries or affiliated companies of those institutions; (b) entities providing services to any of the institutions referred to in point (a); or (c) entities conducting lobbying and advocacy activities directed at the CBC in relation to matters for which the employee was responsible during the course of his or her employment. The cooling-off period begins on the day on which the CBC employee ceases to directly participate in the supervision of the abovementioned institutions or entities. During the cooling-off period, the CBC must ensure that the CBC employee has no access to confidential or sensitive information concerning the abovementioned institutions or entities and may take relevant actions, such as the reassignment of the employee. The draft directive further provides that the duration of the cooling-off period is six months for employment in the institutions and entities referred to in points (a) and (b), and three months for employment in the entities referred to in point (c) or by direct competitors of the institutions referred to in point (a) . 1.4 The draft directive also provides that employees who are subject to a cooling-off period are entitled to compensation amounting to 50 % of the employee’s last gross salary, and only upon notification to the CBC that the employee received a formal and binding employment offer from an institution or entity listed above which the employee was prohibited from accepting due to the cooling-off requirement. The payment of compensation will cease if, during the cooling-off period, the employee becomes employed in the public or private sector or by an institution or entity other than those referred to in paragraph 1.3, becomes self-employed or receives pension benefits. In the event of receipt of an unemployment benefit, this will be deducted from the amount of the compensation. The draft directive further provides that the competent organisational unit of the CBC responsible for regulatory compliance and ethics may issue guidelines on the implementation of these requirements, including on the adoption of guidelines of the European Banking Authority, and will maintain a register of employees to whom a cooling-off period has been applied . 1.5 Upon their appointment and on an annual basis thereafter, the draft directive requires CBC employees to submit a signed declaration of interests, which must include information regarding their private activities, duties and financial interests, as well as their potential conflicts of interest . Financial interests include shareholdings, shares, bonds, mutual funds, investment funds, mixedtype funds, hedge funds and exchange-traded funds. If a conflict of interest is identified, the Governor has the power to take the appropriate measures to manage or mitigate the conflict, including by discharging the employee from duties or responsibilities connected to the object of the conflict and/or

text: requesting the disposal of the financial interests causing the conflict. The draft directive also provides that all actual or potential conflicts of interest declared through declaration of interests must be recorded in a dedicated register . 1.6 Finally, the draft directive replaces the definition of the term ‘financial instrument’ , which is used in the CBC Directive in connection with employees’ private financial transactions . Specifically, the CBC Directive prohibits employees from carrying out private financial transactions involving (a) equity and debt securities issued by a regulated entity; (b) derivatives related to equity and debt securities issued by a regulated entity; and (c) units in collective investment schemes whose declared investment policy is mostly directed at regulated entities, while allowing certain other private financial transactions – such as foreign exchange transactions and transactions relating to gold, euro area government securities, equities and debt securities issued by insurance corporations, as well as equity and debt securities issued by non-regulated entities and purchased by Eurosystem central banks under any ECB asset purchase programme – with the prior approval of the competent organisational unit. Short-term transactions are also prohibited. With the exception of the proposed replacement of the definition of ‘financial instrument’, the draft directive does not alter the abovementioned provisions or any of the existing provisions on the private financial transactions of CBC employees.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 Article 130 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter the ‘Statute of the ESCB’) address the independence of central banks in the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) , stipulating that when exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties conferred upon them by the Treaties and the Statute of the ESCB, neither the ECB, nor an NCB, nor any member of their decision-making bodies, are to seek or take instructions from Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, from any government of a Member State or from any other body. This independence was thus entrusted to the ECB and the CBC, as an NCB, by primary law . 2.2 Based on considerations of central bank independence, and in order to ensure the independence of NCBs such as the CBC when exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties conferred upon them by the Treaties and the Statute of the ESCB, the ECB has established an ethics

text: framework. This includes the ECB’s Code of Conduct for high-level ECB officials (hereinafter the ‘Single Code’), which applies, among others, to the members of the Governing Council of the ECB when exercising their functions as members of a high-level ECB body, and Guideline (EU) [2021/2253] of the European Central Bank (ECB/2021/49) , which is addressed to the NCBs of the Eurosystem and establishes ethics requirements applicable to the members of the decision-making bodies and staff of the NCBs . 2.3 The NCBs, as an integral part of the ESCB, must act in accordance with the guidelines of the ECB . Hence, national legislation transposing the CRD6 into Cypriot law is without prejudice to the ethics framework which the ECB has established in order to ensure the independence of the ECB and the NCBs when exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties conferred upon them by the Treaties and the Statute of the ESCB, as both frameworks have their own scope and legal basis . 2.4 Furthermore,

text: Article 19 of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013

text: (hereinafter the ‘SSM Regulation’) stipulates that when carrying out the tasks conferred on it by the SSM Regulation, the ECB and the national competent authorities acting within the SSM must act independently. Article 31(3) of the SSM Regulation furthermore requires the ECB, in cooperation with the national competent authorities, to: (a) establish and maintain comprehensive and formal procedures including ethics procedures and proportionate periods to assess in advance and prevent possible conflicts of interest resulting from subsequent employment within two years of members of the Supervisory Board; and (b) provide for appropriate disclosures. Those procedures are without prejudice to the application of stricter national rules . The legal basis for these provisions of the SSM Regulation is Article 127(6) of the Treaty. 2.5 In view of this independence and these requirements of the SSM Regulation, the ECB has established an ethics framework to ensure the independence of national competent authorities, such as the CBC, when assisting the ECB in carrying out the tasks conferred on it by the SSM Regulation. This ethics framework includes the Single Code, which applies, among others, to the members of the Supervisory Board of the ECB when exercising their functions as members of a high-level ECB body, and Guideline

text: (EU) 2021/2256

text: of the European Central Bank (ECB/2021/50) , which is

text: addressed to the national competent authorities of the SSM and establishes ethics requirements applicable to the members of their bodies and the members of staff of the national competent authorities. In view of the responsibility of the ECB for the effective and consistent functioning of the SSM , the national competent authorities must comply with Guideline

text: (EU) 2021/2256

text: (ECB/2021/50) . 2.6 In contrast to the ethics framework, which is ultimately based on Article 127(6) of the Treaty, the CRD6, including its provision on the supervisory independence of competent authorities , is based on Article 53(1) of the Treaty. A legal act based on this provision cannot alter the rights and obligations of the ECB and the national competent authorities when carrying out the tasks conferred on them by the SSM Regulation based on Article 127(6) of the Treaty. It follows from settled caselaw of the Court of Justice of the European Union that the different legal bases, namely

text: Article 53(1)

text: and Article 127(6) of the Treaty, cannot be combined as the legal basis for a legal act, in view of the different procedures involved. In particular, the measures adopted under Article 53(1) of the Treaty are adopted by the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee (and, if relevant, the ECB in accordance with Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty). By contrast, the regulations adopted under Article 127(6) of the Treaty are adopted by the Council alone, in a special legislative procedure in which the Council acts unanimously, after consulting the European Parliament and the ECB . 2.7 Hence, the amendments made by the CRD6 are without prejudice to the ethics framework which the ECB has established to ensure the independence of the national competent authorities in the context of the SSM, as both frameworks have their own scope and legal basis. The Union legislator acknowledged this through the CRD6’s amendments to Directive

text: , which provide that

text: Article 4

text: a(2) of Directive

text: is without prejudice to the rights and obligations of the national competent authorities pursuant to the SSM established by the SSM Regulation . For the avoidance of doubt, the CBC may wish to clarify this within the text of the draft directive. From an ECB perspective, the provisions from the CRD6 may nevertheless serve as guidance for establishing safeguards for the independence of the ECB and the national competent authorities when carrying out the tasks conferred on them by the SSM Regulation .

text: 3. Specific observations

text: 3.1 The ECB considers that the draft directive overall reflects the relationship with the rules mentioned in the previous paragraphs by maintaining the provisions of the SSM Ethics Framework laid down in Guideline

text: (EU) 2021/2256

text: (ECB/2021/50) that have been implemented in national law, including the reporting of personal interests, the prohibition and management of conflicts of interests and the regulation of private financial transactions . The ECB highlights that the draft directive should be without prejudice to the Eurosystem and SSM Ethics Frameworks which the ECB has established, and to the Single Code, as it may be amended from time to time . 3.2 The Single Code sets limits on the establishment of post-employment relationships directly with credit institutions, ‘any other financial institution’ or ‘any entity engaged in lobbying in relation to the ECB, or consultancy and/or advocacy for the ECB or for any institution’ . For the first category, the Single Code establishes a cooling-off period of one year for ‘members’ and six months for ‘alternates’, while for the two latter categories it establishes a cooling-off period of six months for members and three months for alternates . In contrast, under the draft directive, the categories of entities in respect of which a cooling-off period is applied extend to those listed in paragraph 1.3 of this Opinion and follow the wording of

text: Article 4

text: a of Directive

text: . From this perspective, the cooling-off regime under the draft directive appears to introduce slightly different provisions from those contained in the Single Code as far as the CBC member of the Supervisory Board of the ECB is concerned, who the ECB understands is a member of the CBC’s staff and thus subject to the CBC Directive. In this respect, the ECB reiterates that the draft directive must be interpreted without prejudice to the Single Code, and the CBC may wish to explicitly clarify in the text of the draft directive that the Single Code applies to the CBC staff member who participates in the Supervisory Board of the ECB. This internal act, to be adopted by the CBC, would thus support a better alignment with the Single Code .

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 25.11.2025.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Christine LAGARDE


text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/1998/415/oj). 2 See Article 1.1 of the draft law.

text: See Opinion CON 2019/23. All ECB opinions are published on EUR-Lex.

text: See paragraph 3.1 of Opinion CON 2019/23.

text: See paragraph 3.2 of Opinion CON 2019/23. 6

text: Article 30

text: requires all NCBs, including the Banca d’Italia, to transfer a defined amount of foreign reserves, including gold, to the ECB, in proportion to their share in the capital of the ECB. For the purpose of regulating the transfer of foreign reserve assets by NCBs to the ECB pursuant to Article 30 of the Statute of the ESCB, the ECB adopted Guideline ECB/2000/15, which included gold among the foreign reserves which had to be transferred by the NCBs, including the Banca d’Italia, to the ECB upon the start of Stage 3 of the European Monetary Union (EMU) and subsequently upon joining the euro. The ECB may effect further calls of foreign reserve assets, including gold, from the NCBs, including the Banca d’Italia, in case of need for such foreign reserve assets. See Guideline ECB/2000/15 of the European Central Bank of 3 November 1998 as amended by the Guideline of 16 November 2000 on the composition, valuation and modalities for the initial transfer of foreign-reserve assets, and the denomination and remuneration of equivalent claims (OJ L 336, 30.12.2000, p. 114 ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/guideline/2000/15/oj); Article 30.4 of the Statute of the ESCB; and

text: Article 1

text: and

text: Article 2(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1010/2000 of 8 May 2000

text: concerning further calls of foreign reserve assets by the European Central Bank (OJ L 115, 16.5.2000, p. 2, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2000/1010/oj).

text: See paragraph 3.4 of Opinion CON 2019/23. 10 See paragraph 3.6 of Opinion CON 2019/23.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 2 December 2025 concerning the ownership of the Banca d’Italia’s gold reserves (CON/2025/39)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 2 December 2025 concerning the ownership of the Banca d’Italia’s gold reserves (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 28 November and 1 December 2025 the European Central Bank (ECB) received requests from the Italian Minister for Economy and Finance for an opinion on a provision (hereinafter the ‘draft provision’) of the draft Budget Law 2026 (hereinafter the ‘draft law’) concerning the ownership of the Banca d’Italia’s gold reserves. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 2(1), third indent, of

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: as the draft provision relates to the Banca d’Italia’s gold reserves and therefore to the basic task to be carried out through the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) to hold and manage the official foreign reserves of the Member States pursuant to

text: Article 127(2)

text: , third indent, of the Treaty, and to the Banca d’Italia, respectively. In accordance with

text: Article 17.5

text: , first sentence, of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft provision

text: 1.1 The draft provision provides that Article 4.2 of the Italian Presidential Decree 31 March 1988 no. 148 concerning the management of reserves must be construed as meaning that the gold reserves managed and held by the Banca d’Italia belong to the Italian people . 1.2 The draft provision is not accompanied by an explanatory note or memorandum explaining its rationale.

text: 2. Observations

text: 2.1 In 2019 the ECB adopted an opinion on a draft law (hereinafter the ‘2019 draft law’) concerning an authentic interpretation of Article 4 of the Italian Consolidated law on foreign exchange on the management of official reserves , in response to a request by the President of the lower chamber of the Italian Parliament. The 2019 draft law provided an authentic interpretation of Article 4.2 of the Italian Presidential Decree 31 March 1988 no.148 concerning the management of reserves, which

text: provides that the Banca d’Italia manages the official reserves within the framework established by Article 31 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter the ‘Statute of the ESCB’). In particular, the 2019 draft law provided that this article shall be construed as meaning that the Banca d’Italia manages the official gold reserves exclusively as a depositary, without prejudice to the property of such gold reserves of the Italian State, including reserves held abroad. Many of the observations made by the ECB on the 2019 draft law correspond to those made in this opinion. 2.2 The question of the legal ownership and the competences of the ESCB with regard to the gold reserves of Member States ultimately relate to the competences of the ESCB under the Treaty. The basic points of reference are

text: Article 127(2)

text: and Article 130 of the Treaty. Article 127(2) of the Treaty, which is contained in Chapter 2 (Monetary Policy) of Title VIII of the Treaty, sets out the basic tasks to be carried out through the ESCB. In this respect, it is noted that under

text: Article 3(1)

text: , point (c), of the Treaty, the Union has exclusive competence in the area of monetary policy for the Member States whose currency is the euro.

text: Article 127(2)

text: , third indent, of the Treaty provides, in particular, that one of the basic tasks to be carried out through the ESCB is to hold and manage the official foreign reserves of the Member States. Article 130 of the Treaty guarantees the independence of the national central banks (NCBs), including the Banca d’Italia, and the ECB in performing their ESCB tasks . 2.3 The Treaty does not determine ESCB and ECB competences with respect to official reserves by using the concept of ownership. Rather, the Treaty only deals with the dimension of exclusive holding 5. and management of the reserves 2.4 On the basis of Article 31 of the Statute of the ESCB, operations in foreign reserve assets remaining 6, with the NCBs, including the Banca d’Italia, after the transfers to the ECB referred to in

text: Article 30

text: and Member States’ transactions with their foreign exchange working balances, are, above a certain limit established within the framework of guidelines issued by the ECB with a view to facilitating such operations, subject to approval by the ECB in order to ensure consistency with the exchange rate 7. and monetary policies of the Union 2.5 Pursuant to

text: Article 18.1

text: , first indent, of the Statute of the ESCB, in order to achieve the objectives of the ESCB and to carry out its tasks, the ECB and the NCBs may, inter alia, operate in the financial markets by buying and selling outright (spot and forward) or under repurchase agreement and by lending and borrowing claims and marketable instruments, whether in euro or other currencies, as

text: well as precious metals. In addition, under Article 23 of the Statute of the ESCB, the ECB and the NCBs may, inter alia, acquire and sell spot and forward all types of foreign exchange assets and precious metals. 2.6 In accordance with Article 130 of the Treaty, when carrying out the task of holding and managing gold reserves, neither the ECB, nor an NCB, including the Banca d’Italia, nor any member of their decision-making bodies, shall seek or take instructions from, inter alia, any government of a Member State. The governments of the Member States undertake to respect this principle and not to seek to influence the members of the decision-making bodies of the ECB or the NCBs, including the Banca d’Italia, in the performance of their tasks . 2.7 In view of these provisions, the ESCB task of holding and managing foreign reserves includes all actions necessary for its effective performance of the Eurosystem’s mandate. For instance, for reserve assets to accomplish their function in foreign reserve management operations, the aspect of full effective control by the central bank is essential. This implies the ability of NCBs to take decisions, in complete autonomy, relating to the holding, retention, disposal, negotiation and daily, as well as 9, long-term, management of the foreign reserves including by buying and selling gold outright, spot and forward and under repurchase agreements. 2.8 In this regard, an explicit reference in the draft provision to the provisions of

text: Article 127(2)

text: and Article 130 of the Treaty and, additionally, to Article 31 of the Statute of the ESCB may be useful: it would further clarify the scope of the draft provision, even if these Treaty provisions apply in any case. The independent holding and management of the official foreign reserves (including the gold reserves) also specifically means that the official foreign reserves (including the gold reserves) must be recorded on the balance sheets of the NCBs or of the ECB. A transfer of the foreign reserves (including the gold reserves) off the balance sheet of the Banca d’Italia to the State would circumvent the prohibition of monetary financing under Article 123 of the Treaty, which prohibits central bank financing of the public sector, and would be also against the principle of independence under

text: Article 10

text: . 130 of the Treaty 2.9 Consistently with the principle of financial independence under Article 130 of the Treaty and the prohibition of monetary financing under Article 123 of the Treaty, any income accruing to the Banca d’Italia as a result of the management of such official foreign reserves can only be distributed to the State through the process for the distribution of profits as set out in the relevant legislative and statutory provisions. The principle of financial independence requires that a sufficient amount of reserves has been constituted to ensure that the Banca d’Italia has the financial means to 11. independently perform its tasks 2.10 The ECB notes that if the Italian authorities consider it necessary to clarify the legal ownership of the gold reserves, then the Banca d’Italia must be consulted in order to ensure that the Treaty

text: requirements and in particular the independence of the Banca d’Italia established in Article 130 of 12. the Treaty will continue to be fully respected 2.11 In the light of the above considerations, it is not clear to the ECB what the concrete purpose of the draft provision is. For this reason, and in the absence of any explanation as to the purpose of the draft provision, the Italian authorities are invited to reconsider the draft provision, also with a view to preserving the independent performance of the basic ESCB-related tasks of the Banca d’Italia under the Treaty.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 2 December 2025.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Christine LAGARDE


text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/1998/415/oj). 2 See Article 1.1 of the draft law.

text: See Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on EUR-Lex.

text: See Opinion

text: Article 30

text: requires all NCBs, including the Banca d’Italia, to transfer a defined amount of foreign reserves, including gold, to the ECB, in proportion to their share in the capital of the ECB. For the purpose of regulating the transfer of foreign reserve assets by NCBs to the ECB pursuant to Article 30 of the Statute of the ESCB, the ECB adopted Guideline ECB/2000/15, which included gold among the foreign reserves which had to be transferred by the NCBs, including the Banca d’Italia, to the ECB upon the start of Stage 3 of the European Monetary Union (EMU) and subsequently upon joining the euro. The ECB may effect further calls of foreign reserve assets, including gold, from the NCBs, including the Banca d’Italia, in case of need for such foreign reserve assets. See Guideline ECB/2000/15 of the European Central Bank of 3 November 1998 as amended by the Guideline of 16 November 2000 on the composition, valuation and modalities for the initial transfer of foreign-reserve assets, and the denomination and remuneration of equivalent claims (OJ L 336, 30.12.2000, p. 114 ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/guideline/2000/15/oj); Article 30.4 of the Statute of the ESCB; and

text: Article 1

text: and

text: Article 2(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1010/2000 of 8 May 2000

text: concerning further calls of foreign reserve assets by the European Central Bank (OJ L 115, 16.5.2000, p. 2, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2000/1010/oj).

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 08 December 2025 concerning the ownership of the Banca d’Italia’s gold reserves (CON/2025/40)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 08 December 2025 concerning the ownership of the Banca d’Italia’s gold reserves (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 4 December 2025 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Italian Minister for Economy and Finance for an opinion on a revised provision (hereinafter the ‘revised draft provision’) of the draft Budget Law 2026 (hereinafter the ‘draft law’) concerning the ownership of the Banca d’Italia’s gold reserves. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 2(1), third indent, of

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: as the revised draft provision relates to the Banca d’Italia’s gold reserves and therefore to the basic task to be carried out through the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) to hold and manage the official foreign reserves of the Member States pursuant to

text: Article 127(2)

text: Article 17.5

text: 1. Purpose of the revised draft provision

text: 1.1 The revised draft provision states that, without prejudice to the provisions of Articles

text: , and 130 of the Treaty, Article 4.2 of the Italian Presidential Decree 31 March 1988 no. 148 concerning the management of reserves must be construed as meaning that the gold reserves managed and held by the Banca d’Italia, as recorded on its balance sheet, belong to the Italian people . 1.2 The revised draft provision is not accompanied by an explanatory note or memorandum explaining its rationale.

text: 2. Observations

text: 2.1 In 2019 the ECB adopted an opinion on a draft law (hereinafter the ‘2019 draft law’) concerning an authentic interpretation of Article 4 of the Italian Consolidated law on foreign exchange on the management of official reserves , in response to a request by the President of the lower chamber of the Italian Parliament. The 2019 draft law provided an authentic interpretation of Article 4.2 of the

text: Italian Presidential Decree 31 March 1988 no.148 concerning the management of reserves, which provides that the Banca d’Italia manages the official reserves within the framework established by Article 31 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter the ‘Statute of the ESCB’). In particular, the 2019 draft law provided that this article shall be construed as meaning that the Banca d’Italia manages the official gold reserves exclusively as a depositary, without prejudice to the property of such gold reserves of the Italian State, including reserves held abroad. Many of the observations made by the ECB on the 2019 draft law correspond to those made in this opinion. 2.2 In December 2025 the ECB adopted an opinion on an earlier version of the draft provision (hereinafter the ‘earlier draft provision’), in response to a request by the Minister for Economy and Finance, which provided that Article 4.2 of the Italian Presidential Decree 31 March 1988 no. 148 concerning the management of reserves must be construed as meaning that the gold reserves managed and held by the Banca d’Italia belong to the Italian people . The ECB understands that the revised draft provision introduces two innovations compared with the earlier draft provision. First, the revised draft provision clarifies that the operative provision is without prejudice to the provisions of Articles

text: , and 130 of the Treaty. Second, the revised draft provision acknowledges that the gold reserves managed and held by the Banca d’Italia are recorded on its balance sheet. Many of the observations made by the ECB on the earlier draft provision correspond to those made in this opinion. 2.3 The question of the legal ownership and the competences of the ESCB with regard to the gold reserves of Member States ultimately relate to the competences of the ESCB under the Treaty. The basic points of reference are

text: Article 127(2)

text: Article 3(1)

text: Article 127(2)

text: , third indent, of the Treaty provides, in particular, that one of the basic tasks to be carried out through the ESCB is to hold and manage the official foreign reserves of the Member States. Article 130 of the Treaty guarantees the independence of the national central banks (NCBs), including the Banca d’Italia, and the ECB in performing their ESCB tasks . 2.4 The Treaty does not determine ESCB and ECB competences with respect to official reserves by using the concept of ownership. Rather, the Treaty only deals with the dimension of exclusive holding and management of the reserves .

text: 2.5 On the basis of Article 31 of the Statute of the ESCB, operations in foreign reserve assets remaining with the NCBs, including the Banca d’Italia, after the transfers to the ECB referred to in

text: Article 30

text: , and Member States’ transactions with their foreign exchange working balances, are, above a certain limit established within the framework of guidelines issued by the ECB with a view to facilitating such operations, subject to approval by the ECB in order to ensure consistency with the exchange rate and monetary policies of the Union . 2.6 Pursuant to

text: Article 18.1

text: , first indent, of the Statute of the ESCB, in order to achieve the objectives of the ESCB and to carry out its tasks, the ECB and the NCBs may, inter alia, operate in the financial markets by buying and selling outright (spot and forward) or under repurchase agreement and by lending and borrowing claims and marketable instruments, whether in euro or other currencies, as well as precious metals. In addition, under Article 23 of the Statute of the ESCB, the ECB and the NCBs may, inter alia, acquire and sell spot and forward all types of foreign exchange assets and precious metals . 2.7 In accordance with Article 130 of the Treaty, when carrying out the task of holding and managing gold reserves, neither the ECB, nor an NCB, including the Banca d’Italia, nor any member of their decision-making bodies, shall seek or take instructions from, inter alia, any government of a Member State. The governments of the Member States undertake to respect this principle and not to seek to influence the members of the decision-making bodies of the ECB or the NCBs, including the Banca d’Italia, in the performance of their tasks . 2.8 In view of these provisions, the ESCB task of holding and managing foreign reserves includes all actions necessary for its effective performance of the Eurosystem’s mandate. For instance, for reserve assets to accomplish their function in foreign reserve management operations, the aspect of full effective control by the central bank is essential. This implies the ability of NCBs to take decisions, in complete autonomy, relating to the holding, retention, disposal, negotiation and daily, as well as , long-term, management of the foreign reserves including by buying and selling gold outright, spot and forward and under repurchase agreements . 2.9 In this regard, the ECB welcomes that the revised draft provision includes an explicit reference to the provisions of Articles 127 and 130 of the Treaty. This clarifies the scope of the revised draft provision, even if these Treaty provisions apply in any case. The independent holding and management of the

text: official foreign reserves (including the gold reserves) also specifically means that the official foreign reserves (including the gold reserves) must be recorded on the balance sheets of the NCBs or of the ECB. In this respect, the revised draft provision helpfully acknowledges that the gold reserves managed and held by the Banca d’Italia are recorded on its balance sheet. A transfer of the foreign reserves (including the gold reserves) off the balance sheet of the Banca d’Italia to the State would circumvent the prohibition of monetary financing under Article 123 of the Treaty, which prohibits central bank financing of the public sector, and would be also against the principle of independence under Article 130 of the Treaty . 2.10 Consistently with the principle of financial independence under Article 130 of the Treaty and the prohibition of monetary financing under Article 123 of the Treaty, any income accruing to the Banca d’Italia as a result of the management of such official foreign reserves can only be distributed to the State through the process for the distribution of profits as set out in the relevant legislative and statutory provisions. The principle of financial independence requires that a sufficient amount of reserves has been constituted to ensure that the Banca d’Italia has the financial means to 13. independently perform its tasks 2.11 The ECB notes that if the Italian authorities consider it necessary to clarify the legal ownership of the gold reserves, then the Banca d’Italia must be consulted in order to ensure that the Treaty requirements and in particular the independence of the Banca d’Italia established in Article 130 of the Treaty will continue to be fully respected . 2.12 In the light of the above considerations, and notwithstanding the changes introduced in the revised draft provision, it remains unclear to the ECB what the concrete purpose of the revised draft provision is. For this reason, and in the absence of any explanation as to the purpose of the revised draft provision, the Italian authorities are invited to reconsider the revised draft provision, also with a view to preserving the independent performance of the basic ESCB-related tasks of the Banca d’Italia under the Treaty .

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 08 December 2025.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Christine LAGARDE