text: KOM(2009) 459 slutlig.

text: EGT L 181, 4.7.2001, s. 6.

text: EUT L 184, 15.7.2005, s. 60.

text: Se yttrande

text: . Alla ECB:s yttranden finns på ECB:s webbplats http://www.ecb.europa.eu

text: Text markerad med fet stil anger ECB:s förslag till ny text. Genomstruken text anger de strykningar som ECB föreslår.

title: Europeiska Centralbankens Yttrande av den 16 november 2009 om ett förslag till rådets förordning om äkthetskontroll av euromynt och hantering av euromynt som inte är lämpliga för cirkulation (CON/2009/95)

text: Inledning och rättslig grund

text: Den 30 september 2009 mottog Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) en begäran från Europeiska unionens råd om ett yttrande över ett förslag till rådets förordning om äkthetskontroll av euromynt och hantering av euromynt som inte är lämpliga för cirkulation (nedan kallat förslaget till förordning).

text: ECB:s behörighet att avge ett yttrande grundas på artikel 123.4 tredje meningen i fördraget om upprättandet av Europeiska gemenskapen och på artikel 105.4 första strecksatsen i fördraget, tillsammans med artikel 106.2 i fördraget, eftersom förslaget till förordning rör de tekniska specifikationerna för euromynten. I enlighet med artikel 17,5 första meningen i arbetsordningen för Europeiska centralbanken har detta yttrande antagits av ECB-rådet.

text: Allmänna kommentarer

text: Genom förslaget till förordning omsätts den skyldighet som åläggs kreditinstitut och andra inrättningar som omfattas av

text: artikel 6 i rådets förordning (EG) nr 1338/2001 av den 28 juni 2001

text: om fastställande av nödvändiga åtgärder för skydd av euron mot förfalskning när det gäller att se till att euromynt som de mottagit och som de avser att åter sätta i omlopp äkthetskontrolleras och att förfalskningar upptäcks. ECB har antagit jämförbara åtgärder vad gäller samma instituts skyldigheter att äkthetskontrollera eurosedlar enligt

text: rådets förordning (EG) nr 1338/2001

text: . Genom att ha jämförbar lagstiftning på plats för institut som deltar i distributionen av eurosedlar och euromynt till allmänheten minskar de risker som förfalskningar av eurosedlar och mynt utgör för den gemensamma valutan.

text: Inom ramen för förslaget till förordning har kommissionen valt att vidareutveckla befintliga rutiner och befintlig utrustning för myntsortering som tagits fram enligt kommissionens rekommendation av den 27 maj 2005 om äkthetskontroll av euromynt och hantering av euromynt som inte är lämpliga för cirkulation, vilket är det bästa sättet att säkerställa att den goda praxis som etablerats på området bibehålls och de nya reglerna kan genomföras på ett effektivt sätt.

text: Hanteringsavgifter

text: Utan hinder av vad som sägs i artikel 8.2 och 8.4 i förslaget till förordning, enligt vilken medlemsstaterna under vissa förutsättningar får bestämma om undantag från hanteringsavgifter, ifrågasätter ECB huruvida en hanteringsavgift på 5 procent av värdet av de euromynt som inte är lämpliga för cirkulation främjar syftet med förslaget till förordning, vilket är att ålägga medlemsstaterna en skyldighet att ta euromynt som inte är lämpliga för cirkulation ur omlopp. Såsom framgår av skäl 4 i förslaget till förordning medför euromynt som inte är lämpliga för cirkulation att de blir svårare att använda och detta kan skapa förvirring bland användarna i fråga om myntens äkthet. Euromynt som inte är lämpliga för cirkulation ska dras in för att säkerställa att euromynt kan äkthetskontrolleras på ett säkert sätt och risken för förfalskningar minskar. ECB anser att utbetalning av ersättning för euromynt eller utbyte av euromynt som inte är lämpliga för cirkulation som huvudregel bör ske utan att någon hanteringsavgift tas ut. Såsom framgår av tidigare ECB-yttranden strider uttagandet av en avgift mot själva grundidén med ett lagligt betalningsmedel som innebär att det allmänna ska växla in det lagliga betalningsmedlet till nominellt värde.

text: ECB anser dock att en hanteringsavgift på 15 procent är godtagbar om det rör sig om stora mängder mynt som inte är lämpliga för cirkulation och som ska kontrolleras p.g.a. anomaliteter eller avvikelser från specifikationen, såsom avses i artikel 9 i förslaget till förordning.

text: ECB:s ändringsförslag framgår av bilagan och åtföljs av en förklaring.

text: BILAGA

text: Kommissionens förslag | ECB:s ändringsförslag

text: Artikel 31

text: . Inrättningarna ska se till att de euromynt som de mottagit och som de avser att åter sätta i omlopp äkthetskontrolleras. Denna skyldighet ska fullgöras a) främst genom användning av de myntsorteringsmaskiner som ingår i den förteckning över myntsorteringsmaskiner som avses i

text: artikel 5.3

text: , eller b) av utbildad personal. |

text: Artikel 31

text: . Inrättningarna ska se till att de euromynt med ett nominellt värde av 2 euro, 1 euro samt 50 cent som de mottagit och som de avser att åter sätta i omlopp äkthetskontrolleras. Denna skyldighet ska fullgöras a) främst genom användning av de myntsorteringsmaskiner som ingår i den förteckning över myntsorteringsmaskiner som avses i

text: artikel 5.3

text: , eller b) av utbildad personal.

text: Förklaring ECB föreslår att äkthetskontrollen begränsas till mynt med ett nominellt värde på minst 50 cent (d.v.s. 2 euro, 1 euro samt 50 cent). Sannolikheten för att mynt med ett nominellt värde under 50 cent ska förfalskas är mycket låg eftersom deras värde är mycket lågt i förhållande till a) metallvärdet och b) kostnaderna för förfalskningen. Om alla mynt ska äkthetskontrolleras skulle detta innebära en belastning för inrättningarna som kanske inte motsvarar värdet på de berörda mynten.

text: Artikel 41

text: . De utsedda nationella myndigheterna eller Europeiskt tekniskt och vetenskapligt centrum (ETSC) ska testa inrättningarnas myntsorteringsmaskiner genom detekteringstest. Sådana test ska utformas så att myntsorteringsmaskinerna kan avvisa de kända typerna av falska mynt och alla andra myntliknande föremål som inte uppfyller specifikationerna för äkta euromynt. |

text: Artikel 41

text: . Inrättningarna ska uteslutande använda sådana typer av myntsorteringsmaskiner som godkänts vid ett detekteringstest av de utsedda nationella myndigheterna eller Europeiskt tekniskt och vetenskapligt centrum (ETSC) ska testa inrättningarnas myntsorteringsmaskiner genom detekteringstest. Sådana test ska utformas så att typen av myntsorteringsmaskinerna kan avvisa de kända typerna av falska mynt, och alla andra myntliknande föremål som inte uppfyller specifikationerna för äkta euromynt samt euromynt som inte är lämpliga för cirkulation.

text: Förklaring ECB anser att det är mer logiskt att kräva att inrättningarna ska använda myntsorteringsmaskiner som har godkänts vid ett detekteringstest. På så sätt skulle myntsorteringsmaskiner som har godkänts vid ett detekteringstest även kunna användas av andra inrättningar, d.v.s. varje maskintyp behöver bara testas en gång. Detta skulle också stå i bättre överensstämmelse med artikel 5 i förslaget till förordning där det stadgas att detekteringstest får genomföras i tillverkarens anläggning och att kommissionen på sin webbplats ska offentliggöra en konsoliderad förteckning över alla myntsorteringsmaskiner som testats framgångsrikt. Därutöver föreslår ECB att detekteringstest begränsas till typer av myntsorteringsmaskiner (d.v.s. maskiner som delar samma hårdvara, mjukvara och grundfunktioner) eftersom detta bör vara tillräckligt för att säkerställa att alla myntsorteringsmaskiner av samma typ uppfyller kraven i förslaget till förordning. I artikel 2.2 i förslaget till förordning definieras dessutom euromynt som inte är lämpliga för cirkulation som euromynt som avvisats under äkthetskontrollen. Därför bör det av ordalydelsen i artikel 4.1 i förslaget till förordning även klart framgå att myntsorteringsmaskiner som detekteringstestas också ska upptäcka euromynt som inte är lämpliga för cirkulation.

text: Artikel 63

text: . Hur många maskiner som ska kontrolleras i varje medlemsstat under ett år beror på hur många euromynt som behandlas av dessa maskiner under årets lopp, eftersom denna mängd ska motsvara minst en tredjedel av den totala samlade nettomängden mynt som getts ut av medlemsstaten från införandet av euromynt till utgången av föregående år. Det antal maskiner som ska kontrolleras beräknas utifrån mängden av de tre högsta valörerna av de euromynt som enligt planerna ska sättas i omlopp. |

text: Artikel 63

text: . Hur många Antalet maskiner som ska kontrolleras i varje medlemsstat under ett år ska uppgå till 10 % av det totala antalet maskiner i den medlemsstaten eller beror på hur många euromynt som behandlas av dessa maskiner under årets lopp, eftersom denna mängd ska motsvara minst en tredjedel av den totala samlade nettomängden mynt som getts ut av medlemsstaten från införandet av euromynt till utgången av föregående år. I det senare fallet ska Ddet antal maskiner som ska kontrolleras beräknas utifrån mängden av de tre högsta valörerna av de euromynt som enligt planerna ska sättas i omlopp.

text: Förklaring ECB anser att medlemsstaterna bör kunna välja mellan att kontrollera maskiner på sitt territorium antingen genom att tillämpa den metod som framgår av förslaget till förordning eller genom att kontrollera en viss andel av maskinerna. Eftersom mynten cirkulerar i euroområdet kan myntströmmarna från en medlemsstat till en annan få avsevärda konsekvenser på den volym euromynt som cirkulerar i en medlemsstat. Vissa medlemsstater kan därför tänkas föredra att kontrollera maskinerna oberoende av den totala samlade nettomängden mynt som de ger ut. I båda fallen bör antalet maskiner som kontrolleras av medlemsstaterna vara tillräckligt högt för att garantera en effektiv kontroll av institutens förmåga att äkthetskontrollera euromynt.

text: Artikel 81

text: . En hanteringsavgift på 5 % av värdet dras av vid utbetalning av ersättning för eller utbyte av de inlämnade euromynt som inte är lämpliga för cirkulation. Till hanteringsavgiften läggs en ytterligare avgift på 15 % av de inlämnade euromyntens värde om hela påsen eller lådan kontrolleras enligt

text: artikel 10

text: . 2. Medlemsstaterna får bestämma om allmänna undantag från hanteringsavgifter i fall då inlämnande juridiska eller fysiska personer samarbetar nära och regelbundet med de utsedda nationella myndigheterna genom att dra in falska euromynt och euromynt som inte är lämpliga för cirkulation. 3. Transporter och relaterade kostnader ska betalas av den inlämnande juridiska eller fysiska personen. 4. Utan att det påverkar undantaget i punkt 2 kan en juridisk eller fysisk person varje år och för varje valör slippa hanteringsavgift för högst ett kilo inlämnade euromynt ej lämpliga för cirkulation. |

text: Artikel 81

text: . En hanteringsavgift på 5 % av värdet dras av vid utbetalning av ersättning för eller utbyte av de inlämnade euromynt som inte är lämpliga för cirkulation. Till En hanteringsavgiften läggs en ytterligare avgift på 15 % av de inlämnade euromynten, som ej är lämpliga för cirkulation, dras av vid utbetalning av ersättning för eller utbyte av dessa euromynt värde om hela påsen eller lådan kontrolleras enligt

text: artikel 10.2

text: Förklaring Se punkten om hanteringsavgifter ovan.

text: Artikel 14

text: Denna förordning träder i kraft den tjugonde dagen efter det att den har offentliggjorts i Europeiska unionens officiella tidning. Den ska tillämpas från och med den 1 januari 2012. Denna förordning är till alla delar bindande och direkt tillämplig i medlemsstaterna i enlighet med fördraget om upprättandet av Europeiska gemenskapen. |

text: Artikel 14

text: Denna förordning träder i kraft den tjugonde dagen efter det att den har offentliggjorts i Europeiska unionens officiella tidning. Den ska tillämpas från och med den 1 januari 2012. Medlemsstater som vid tidpunkten då denna förordning träder i kraft har antagit regler som genomför

text: kommissionens rekommendation 2005/504/EG

text: får dock fortsätta att tillämpa dessa regler under en övergångsperiod på tre år fr.o.m. den 1 januari 2012. Denna förordning är till alla delar bindande och direkt tillämplig i medlemsstaterna i enlighet med fördraget om upprättandet av Europeiska gemenskapen.

text: Förklaring Förslaget till förordning bör göra det möjligt att under en övergångsperiod fortsätta tillämpa väl fungerande nationella lösningar baserade på

text: , främst för att beakta de investeringar som gjorts i myntsorteringsmaskiner i de medlemsstater som genomfört kommissionens rekommendation.


publisher: Europeiska centralbanken

sprak: en

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 16 November 2009 on the realisation of collateral provided to the Banco de España, to other national central banks of the Member States or to the European Central Bank in the performance of their tasks (CON/2009/96)

serie: con

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 16 November 2009 on the realisation of collateral provided to the Banco de España, to other national central banks of the Member States or to the European Central Bank in the performance of their tasks (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

type: rubrik

text: On 23 October 2009 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Spanish State Secretary for Economic Affairs for an opinion on the second final provision of the draft State budget law for 2010 amending paragraph 2(b) of the sixth additional provision of Law 13/1994 on autonomy of the Banco de España (hereinafter ‘the draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Article 105(4) of the Treaty establishing the European Community and on the third indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law contains provisions relating to the Banco de España. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

type: stycke

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: The sixth additional provision of Law 13/1994 on autonomy of the Banco de España lays down the rules applicable to collateral provided to the Banco de España, to other national central banks of the Member States (NCBs) or to the ECB in the performance of their tasks. In particular, paragraph 2(b) governs the realisation of such collateral. The draft law amends point (b) by: (i) repealing the requirement for a copy of the document constituting the security when realising the collateral. The purpose of this repeal is to facilitate collateral realisation, avoiding problems in interpreting the requirement to submit a copy of the document constituting the security in the context of cross-border use of dematerialised securities as collateral; and

text: (ii) specifically referring to appropriation of collateral as a means of realisation subject to an agreement between the parties on such means of realisation and on valuation of the provided collateral. Realisation through appropriation had already been introduced in Spanish law by Royal Decree- Law 5/2005 of 11 March 2005 on urgent reforms to foster productivity and improve public procurement, which completed the Spanish transposition of Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 June 2002 on financial collateral arrangements . The Banco de España had recourse to realisation through appropriation on the basis of Article 4(1) of the Royal Decree-Law, which lays down that the provisions on financial collateral arrangements (including those on appropriation) apply to the Banco de España (as well as to other NCBs or to the ECB). The purpose of this draft amendment is therefore to incorporate a general provision already in force into the Banco de España’s special rules on this matter.

text: 2. General observations

text: The ECB takes note of the proposed amendments, which are consistent with Directive

text: , and welcomes them inasmuch as they will facilitate the realisation of collateral provided to the Banco de España, to other NCBs or to the ECB in the performance of their tasks and enhance the transparency and legal certainty of the legal framework for providing such collateral.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 16 November 2009.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET

type: vagledning

utgivare: ecb


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 2 OJ L 354, 30.11.2004, p. 34.

text: Available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 4 Available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 27 November 2009 on foreign trade reporting requirements (CON/2009/97)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 27 November 2009 on foreign trade reporting requirements (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 10 November 2009, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the German Ministry for Economic Affairs and Technology for an opinion on the 89th Regulation amending the Regulation on foreign trade (hereinafter the ‘draft regulation’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Article 105(4) of the Treaty establishing the European Community and the fourth indent of

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft regulation relates to the collection and distribution of balance of payments statistics. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft regulation

text: 1.1 The draft regulation will adapt the reporting requirements under the Regulation on foreign trade (Außenwirtschaftsverordnung, hereinafter the ‘AWV’) to international standards for the inclusion of assets and liabilities arising from derivatives and to the calculation of direct investment. In addition, it will repeal the reporting of the foreign assets and liabilities of natural persons. 1.2 The Regulation also enables the Bundesbank to fulfil its obligation under Guideline ECB/2004/15 of 16 July 2004 on the statistical reporting requirements of the European Central Bank in the field of balance of payments and international investment position statistics, and the international reserves template . The Deutsche Bundesbank is obliged under this Guideline, when providing the ECB with data on the international investment position, to provide information on assets and liabilities with non-euro area residents arising from financial derivatives. The Deutsche Bundesbank is also obliged to inform the International Monetary Fund accordingly. Collecting and reporting this data will in future take place in accordance with the AWV. 1.3 In addition, it implements the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) th Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct Investment (4 edition). Germany is also obliged as an

text: OECD member to collect data on direct investment, including all cross-border capital movements relating to direct investment. For this, it is necessary to record separately cross-border assets for sister companies. Therefore, in the reporting of surveys of stocks for direct investments, individual balance sheet positions are additionally broken down. 1.4 Furthermore, the draft regulation will repeal certain reporting requirements concerning capital and payment movements and amend certain reporting templates.

text: 2. General observation

text: The ECB generally welcomes this draft regulation which will ensure consistency with the reporting requirements under Guideline ECB/2004/15 that follows the basic principles of the ECB Statistics Quality Framework . The main purpose of euro area balance of payments and international investment position statistics is to support the ECB’s monetary policy and other Eurosystem tasks. Moreover, as stated in the Eurosystem’s mission statement and the public commitment , accountability, transparency and good governance are important values supporting the integrity of the statistical functions defined by Article 5 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and the European Central Bank (hereinafter the ‘Statute of the ESCB’).

text: 3. Frequency of reporting

text: In accordance with Article 14.3 of the Statute of the ESCB, NCBs must act in accordance with the guidelines of the ECB. The draft regulation envisages that corporations other than monetary financial institutions will report on an annual basis assets and liabilities with non-euro area residents arising from financial derivatives. Nonetheless, quarterly positions on financial derivatives are required under Guideline ECB/2004/15. From the reports of transactions in financial derivatives, it can however be derived that corporations other than monetary financial institutions are not significantly engaged in activities in financial derivatives with non-euro area residents. Moreover, to avoid a disproportionate increase in the reporting burden of German corporations other than monetary financial institutions, an annual report is appropriate. Developments in the activities of corporations other than monetary financial institutions in financial derivatives with non-euro area residents should be regularly monitored; if those activities acquire statistical significance, the corresponding positions should be reported quarterly.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 27 November 2009. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: Published in Magyar Közlöny 2001/76 (VII. 5.), as amended.

text: Published in Magyar Közlöny 1996/109 (XII. 12.), as amended.

text: Available on the Bank for International Settlement’s website at www.bis.org.

text: Available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 7 December 2009 on the general terms and conditions, and the operating and technical requirements, of clearing service providers for the payment system in Hungary (CON/2009/98)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 7 December 2009 on the general terms and conditions, and the operating and technical requirements, of clearing service providers for the payment system in Hungary (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 16 November 2009, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (MNB) for an opinion on two draft regulations: the first on the requirements for the general terms and conditions and regulations of clearing services providers for the payment system (hereinafter the ‘draft operational regulation’), and a second on the material, technical, security and business continuity requirements of clearing service providers for the payment system (hereinafter the ‘draft technical regulation’) (the draft operational regulation and the draft technical regulation are hereinafter referred to jointly as ‘the draft regulations’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Article 105(4) of the Treaty establishing the European Community and the fifth indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft regulations concern payment and settlement systems. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 According to Article 4(5) of Law LVIII of 2001 on the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (hereinafter the ‘the MNB Law’), one of the basic tasks of the central bank is to develop and regulate payment and clearing systems, and to oversee and monitor these systems. Pursuant to

text: Article 19

text: /C of Law CXII of 1996 on credit and financial institutions , in the process of applying for authorisation to carry out clearing operations, applicants inter alia have to submit the general terms and conditions, as well as the internal regulations of the clearing house concerning operational, technical and security rules

text: and requirements, and business continuity plans. Pursuant to Article 27(1) of the MNB Law, such general terms and conditions and their amendments are subject to prior authorisation by the MNB. 1.2 The smooth functioning of Hungarian payment and settlement systems is a crucial aspect of a sound currency and essential to the conduct of monetary policy at national level. These systems also have a significant bearing on the functioning of financial markets. Moreover, safe and efficient payment systems are critical to the maintenance of banking and financial stability. Therefore the purpose of regulating uniform preconditions is to reinforce a consistent legal framework for entities providing clearing services in Hungary. 1.3 The draft operational regulation lays down various general rules, such as requirements for the contents of the general terms and conditions and the regulations for clearing houses. The draft technical regulation governs certain risk management measures, such as the material, technical and general security conditions for operating the payment system. Furthermore, it also sets the rules for business continuity planning and regular testing, as well as recovery and resumption objectives.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 The ECB understands that the draft regulations lay down preconditions for clearing service providers in Hungary, ensuring that they are subject to the same uniform minimum standards, thereby taking into account internationally accepted oversight standards; notably the Core Principles for Systemically Important Payment Systems (Core Principles), and the Business Continuity Oversight Expectations for Systemically Important Payment Systems (BCOE Principles), while also making it possible for entities providing clearing services to include additional provisions in the general terms and conditions and to introduce further or stricter measures to ensure the safety of their operations. 2.2 The ECB welcomes such preconditions as they are essential to the MNB’s oversight function. The draft regulations enhance the soundness of clearing and settlement systems as the uniform standards clearly define the responsibilities and legal basis of organisations providing clearing services in Hungary, thereby greatly improving the transparency and accountability of such organisations and their operations. The ECB considers that the draft regulations follow the legal rules and standards established by the Eurosystem for payment and settlement systems, also taking account of recent developments in the financial markets.

text: 3. Specific observations

text: 3.1 The ECB suggests that Article 11 of the draft operational regulation consider the whole life cycle of a payment and also cover the pre-settlement phase of the payment process. Besides the time of settlement finality, it would in particular be advisable to require the system to clearly define the time of acceptance and irrevocability of payment orders in the system’s rules, in particular in the case of interconnections between systems, as it is one of the key requirements of Core Principle IV. 3.2 The tools and measures used for liquidity provision are key components of a system’s overall risk management framework; the ECB therefore welcomes the requirements in Article 12 of the draft operational regulation in this respect. The ECB recommends that the terms and conditions of granting credit specify in particular whether and how intraday credit provided for eligible participants may be converted to overnight credit. 3.3 Article 15 of the draft operational regulation addresses rules for liability sharing, as well as for mitigation and compensation for damages. The MNB could consider extending this by requiring the clearing house to define evidence, i.e. that electronic or written records of the payment messages will be accepted as means of evidence, because these conditions usually form an integral part of the liability regime. 3.4 The ESCB has developed a glossary of main business continuity terms for market infrastructures with the aim of improving the consistency of the terminology used in business continuity planning and procedures. In order to take full advantage of these harmonisation efforts, it is recommended that the definitions listed in Article 2 of the draft technical regulation take these commonly agreed definitions into account. 3.5 The ECB suggests clarifying ‘the great majority of the clearing days’ in Article 13(7) of the draft technical regulation, because it could give rise to different interpretations. The ECB also considers it preferable to make an express reference in

text: Article 13(12)

text: to the different risk profiles, i.e. geographical location, infrastructure, personnel, of the secondary site as compared to the primary site. 3.6 As part of the overall business continuity framework, the BCOE Principles impose on the system operator the key responsibility for identifying critical participants and for assessing the potential risks they present to the smooth functioning of the system. Moreover, critical participants must implement some BCOE Principles, under the control of the operator. The ECB is of the view that the draft technical regulation should also clarify the tasks and responsibilities of organisations providing clearing services in this respect.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 7 December 2009. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 10 December 2009 on the extension of the Austrian State guarantees for the interbank market (CON/2009/99)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 10 December 2009 on the extension of the Austrian State guarantees for the interbank market (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 3 December 2009, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Austrian Ministry for Finance for an opinion on a draft law amending the Law on the strengthening of the interbank money market (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the sixth indent of

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The draft law amends the Law on the strengthening of the interbank money market of 26 October 2008 on which the ECB was consulted in the same month . The Interbank Market Support Act enabled the use of certain financial instruments to revive the interbank money market, namely empowering the Minister for Finance to (i) provide State guarantees to a newly established clearing house (Oesterreichische Clearingbank AG) that borrows from financial institutions and lends at a market rate to eligible financial institutions; and (ii) act as guarantor for bonds issued by eligible financial institutions. The amount available for both measures is EUR 65 billion. Under the provisions currently in force, the Minister for Finance may issue State guarantees until 31 December 2009. 1.2 In order to temporarily maintain the support scheme the Austrian Government intends to extend this deadline to 31 December 2010. In the explanatory memorandum to the draft law it is stated that the temporary extension of the deadline will be notified to the European Commission for approval.

text: 1 OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: 2 See ECB Opinion

text: ; all ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 1.3 The draft law does not amend the conditions under which (i) the clearing house may borrow and lend funds to eligible financial institutions; (ii) the Minister for Finance may provide a State guarantee to the clearing house for its lending and borrowing operations; and (iii) the Minister for Finance may act as guarantor for eligible financial institutions that issue securities for refinancing operations.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 The ECB notes that on 14 October 2009, the Ministry for Finance consulted the ECB on measures to improve liquidity and increase the competitiveness of credit institutions. The ECB adopted its opinion on the same on 28 October 2009 . In the meantime, the measures were amended and now include the draft law. The Austrian authorities consulted the ECB on the amended measures only on request and at a late stage of the legislative process and the ECB would therefore like to reiterate that national authorities are under a duty to consult it on draft legislative provisions falling within its fields of competence at a point in the legislative process which affords it sufficient time to examine these provisions. Only in cases of extreme urgency may the time limit be reduced under

text: Article 3(2) of Decision 98/415/EC

text: . Indeed, it follows from

text: Article 3(4) of Decision 98/415/EC

text: that Member States are obliged to suspend the process of adoption of such provisions pending receipt of the ECB’s opinion, as the adopting national authority should have the opportunity to meaningfully deliberate the ECB’s opinion prior to prior to adoption . 2.2 The ECB also draws attention to the guidance provided by the Ecofin Council to the Member States in the Conclusions of its meeting of 7 October 2008 , and to the Declaration issued by the Heads of State of the euro area on 12 October 2008 (hereinafter the ‘Declaration’) . The principles contained in the Declaration and the Conclusions of the Ecofin Council were endorsed by the European Council of 15 to 16 October 2008 . In particular, the ECB stresses that any initiative put in place by the competent national authorities to restore confidence in the national segments of the euro area financial markets should be coordinated and should aim to implement the common principles in question, in a spirit of close cooperation with other Member States and the EU institutions since, as acknowledged in the Declaration, significant differences in national

text: 3 See ECB Opinion

text: 4 See the Guide to consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions, Title IV, Section 1.

text: 5 See ‘Immediate Responses to Financial Turmoil’, Ecofin Council Conclusions of 7 October 2008, available on the former French Presidency’s website at www.ue2008.fr. The Ecofin Council recommended that: (i) interventions should be timely and the support should in principle be temporary; (ii) the interests of taxpayers should be protected; (iii) existing shareholders should bear the due consequences of the intervention; (iv) the Government should be in a position to bring about a change of management; (v) management should not retain undue benefits; (vi) governments may have, inter alia, the power to intervene in remuneration; (vii) legitimate interests of competitors must be protected, in particular through State aid rules; and (viii) negative spill-over effects should be avoided.

text: 6 The text of the Declaration is available on the former French Presidency’s website at www.ue2008.fr. The Member States agreed to: (i) ensure appropriate liquidity conditions for financial institutions; (ii) facilitate the funding of banks; (iii) provide financial institutions with additional capital resources to continue to ensure the proper financing of the economy; (iv) allow for an efficient recapitalisation of distressed banks; (v) ensure sufficient flexibility in the implementation of accounting rules; and (vi) enhance cooperation procedures among European countries.

text: 7 See Brussels European Council of 15 to 16 October 2008, paragraph 3 of the Presidency Conclusions. implementation could have a counter-productive effect, creating distortions in global banking markets.

text: 3. Specific observations

text: 3.1 Relationship of the draft law to the single monetary policy of the euro area 3.1.1 Since the draft law aims at extending the scope of the State guarantee scheme laid down in the Act of 26 October 2008, the ECB would like to recall some elements previously mentioned in its opinions on the Member States’ financial rescue measures, including ECB Opinion

text: , which are important from the perspective of monetary policy. 3.1.2 As stated in the Declaration, it is stressed that it is of the utmost importance that support operations conducted by national authorities do not in any way affect the conduct and implementation of monetary policy in the euro area . In this context, the ECB reiterates its view that the extension of the State guarantee to cover interbank deposits should be avoided , as this could entail a substantial distortion in the various national segments of the euro area money market. It may thus impair the implementation of the single monetary policy, which is an exclusive competence of the Eurosystem under Article 127(2) of the Treaty . It also appears crucial to ensure the harmonisation of State guarantee fees within the euro area and the European Union, as a level playing field is also essential in this respect. In this context, the ECB recalls the specific recommendations made by the Governing Council of the ECB on government guarantees which may help to ensure such harmonisation.

text: 3.2 Temporary nature of the scheme

text: In line with the Declaration and the Conclusions of the Ecofin Council of 7 October 2008, the ECB notes that harmonisation of the measures implemented at the national level is essential to ensure the integration of the financial markets within the EU, and within the euro area in particular. In this regard, the ECB emphasises that coordination regarding the duration of national financial support schemes across the EU is of crucial importance in order to ensure a level playing field . In addition, the ECB emphasises the need for national support measures to be temporary . It is understood that the scheme’s temporary nature is essentially maintained so that the involvement of the Austrian State will be limited in time.

text: 8 See ECB Opinions

text: , paragraph 2.3 and

text: , paragraph 3.1.

text: 9 See ECB Opinion

text: , paragraph 3.5, and more recently ECB Opinions

text: , paragraph 3.3.2, and

text: , paragraph 3.9.

text: 10 See also ECB Opinion

text: , in particular paragraph 3.7, and more recently ECB Opinions,

text: , paragraph 3.9 and

text: , paragraph 3.1.

text: 11 Recommendations of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank on government guarantees for bank debt, 20 October 2008, available on the ECB’s website.

text: 12 See notably ECB Opinions

text: , paragraph 3.1,

text: , paragraph 2.5.2,

text: , paragraph 3.2,

text: , paragraph 2 and

text: , paragraph 2.2.

text: 13 See footnote 12. This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 10 December 2009. [signed] The President of the ECB Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: 3 ECB , and that the reproductions of euro coins are governed by Council Regulations and Commission provisions.

text: Decision ECB/2003/4 of 20 March 2003 on the denominations, specifications, reproduction, exchange and withdrawal of euro banknotes (OJ L 78, 25.3.2003, p. 16) and Guideline ECB/2003/5 of 20 March 2003 on the enforcement of measures to counter non-compliant reproductions of euro banknotes and on the exchange and withdrawal of euro banknotes (OJ L 78, 25.3.2003, p. 20). 3

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 2182/2004 of 6 December 2004

text: concerning medals and token similar to coins.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 5 January 2010 on the reproduction of forint and euro banknotes and of forint and euro coins in Hungary (CON/2010/1)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 5 January 2010 on the reproduction of forint and euro banknotes and of forint and euro coins in Hungary (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 14 December 2009, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (MNB) for an opinion on a draft decree on the reproduction of forint and euro banknotes (hereinafter the ‘draft banknotes decree’), and a draft decree on the reproduction of forint and euro coins, (hereinafter collectively referred to as ‘the draft decrees’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the first and second indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft decrees concern currency matters and means of payment. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft decrees

text: 1.1 The terms and conditions under which forint and euro banknotes and coins may be reproduced in Hungary are currently laid down in MNB decree 1/2006. By replacing MNB decree 1/2006 with the draft decrees, the MNB aims to separate its regulation of banknotes and coins. The draft decrees focus on adapting the existing rules to relevant Union legislation and on reflecting the technical developments and new methods of reproducing banknotes and coins. 1.2 The main purpose of the draft decrees is to protect forint and euro banknotes and coins against illegal or non-compliant reproductions. The draft decrees broaden the range of reproductions that are not subject to authorisation, regulate the authorisation process with regard to producing reproductions, set the basis for record-keeping, safeguarding and the destruction of reproductions, and clarify copyright matters. 1.3 The draft decrees refer to copyright matters in relation to euro banknotes and coins. The draft decrees acknowledge that the reproductions of euro banknotes are governed by the rules of the

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 Since Hungary is a Member State with a derogation, the ECB’s requirements regarding the denominations, specifications, reproduction, exchange and withdrawal of euro banknotes do not apply to the MNB as regards of the forint. These requirements will apply to the MNB once Hungary adopts the euro and the MNB becomes a fully integrated member of the Eurosystem. The ECB welcomes the MNB’s initiative to strengthen the legal framework for forint banknote reproduction, which is similar to the ECB’s legal framework for euro banknote reproduction. 2.2 In respect of the national central banks that will become part of the Eurosystem, the ECB supports the policy of keeping a clear and consistent separation between national rules relating to banknotes and those relating to coins. The ECB therefore welcomes the draft decrees’ separation between rules on banknotes and coins as it facilitates the legal convergence of the national legislative framework necessary for Hungary’s preparations for full participation in economic and monetary union.

text: 3. Specific observations

text: 3.1 The ECB welcomes Article 9 of the draft banknotes decree, which provides that it is aimed at ensuring compliance with ECB rules on the reproduction of euro banknotes set out in Article 2 of Decision ECB/2003/4 and

text: Articles 1

text: to 3 of Guideline ECB/2003/5. 3.2 In order to protect euro banknotes and coins as a means of payment, the general public must be able to distinguish genuine euro banknotes and coins from reproductions. Accordingly, the ECB emphasises the importance of establishing rules on the reproduction of the euro in Member States outside the euro area. In this context, the above provisions of the draft decrees effectively provide for the protection of euro banknotes on the national level.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 5 January 2010. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 2

text: Regulation (EC) No 223/2009

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2009 on European statistics and repealing Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1101/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the transmission of data subject to statistical confidentiality to the Statistical Office of the European Communities,

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 322/97

text: on Community Statistics, and

text: Council Decision 89/382/EEC

text: , Euratom establishing a Committee on the Statistical Programmes of the European Communities (OJ L 87, 31.3.2009, p. 164).

text: OJ L 318, 27.11.1998, p. 8 as amended by

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 951/2009 of 9 October 2009

text: amending

text: Regulation (EC) No 2533/98

text: concerning the collection of statistical information by the European Central Bank (OJ L 269, 14.10.2009, p. 1).

text: Regulation (EC) No 223/2009

text: and

text: Regulation (EC) No 951/2009

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 6 January 2010 on a new legal framework for the production of national statistics (CON/2010/2)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 6 January 2010 on a new legal framework for the production of national statistics (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 3 December 2009 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Ministry of Finance of Estonia for an opinion on the draft law on national statistics (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third and fourth indents of

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to Eesti Pank and the collection, compilation and distribution of monetary, financial, banking, payment systems and balance of payments statistics. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: The Law on national statistics was adopted in 1997. The draft law is aimed at improving the general functioning of national statistics production and at ensuring consistency with

text: Regulation (EC) No 223/2009

text: on European statistics . Eesti Pank and the Statistikaamet (the National Statistical Institute of Estonia (NSI)) will continue to be the producers of national statistics and the national statistics programme will consist of: (a) the list of statistical work approved by the Government of the Republic; and (b) the list of statistical work approved by the Governor of Eesti Pank.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 The ECB welcomes the aim of the draft law to ensure consistency with the framework of European statistics and to improve the production of national statistics.

text: 2.2 As of the date of abrogation of the derogation for Estonia under Article 140(2) of Treaty, the clause referred to in Article 8(1) of the draft law will require amendment. This could be avoided by making a more general reference or taking the potential replacement of this clause into account. 2.3 According to the draft law, the NSI’s Director General is responsible for cooperation with other producers of national statistics. The ECB emphasises that ensuring effective cooperation between Eesti Pank and NSI is very important for the quality and cost-effectiveness of statistics. At the same time, such cooperation must be without prejudice to Eesti Pank’s independence and to its tasks within the statistical framework of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB); the ECB would recommend addressing this issue in the draft law. 2.4 According to the draft law, the national statistics programme covers demographic, social, economic and environmental statistics and is based on national or international statistical needs. One part of the programme will be the list of statistical work approved by the Governor of Eesti Pank. The ECB understands that the monetary and financal statistical work of Eesti Pank is covered by the concept of ‘economic statistics’.

text: 3. Statistical principles and independence of the NSI

text: 3.1 The draft law provides that national statistics must be produced in accordance with the statistical principles and quality criteria set out in

text: Regulation (EC) No 223/2009

text: or in the legal instruments on statistics regulating the ECB’s activities. In addition, the ECB notes that the recent amendment of

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 2533/98 of 23 November 1998

text: concerning the collection of statistical information by the European Central Bank introduces a list of statistical principles governing the production of European Statistics by the ESCB. These principles are similar to those laid down in Regulation 223/2009 and are defined and published by the ECB on its website as a public commitment concerning European statistics produced by the ESCB. 3.2 Related to the above principles, according to

text: Article 2 of Regulation (EC) No 223/2009

text: , statistics must be developed, produced and disseminated in an independent manner, free from any pressures from national authorities. The ECB notes the declaration in the draft law that the NSI is professionally independent. However, several provisions of the draft law indicate that the Ministry of Finance has extensive powers to interfere in the production of national statistics. In general, the ECB stresses the importance of securing the independence of the NSI as this is of particular importance for statistics required for assessing convergence and for the smooth functioning of the EMU framework following the adoption of euro.

text: 4. Confidential data

text: Article 35(3) of the draft law provides that confidential data which allow direct or indirect identification can be disseminated to another producer of national statistics as well as to Eurostat and the ECB in accordance with their respective spheres of competence. However, in order to ensure an efficient collection, compilation and dissemination of European Statistics, the ECB would find it useful to extend the scope of the exchange of confidential data to cover all authorities belonging to the European Statistical System and to ESCB members and not restricting it only to the ECB and Eurostat. This would be in line with the recent amendments to the statistical regulations .

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 6 January 2010.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: Article L.631-2 of the French Monetary and Financial Code.

text: Article L.631-2 of the French Monetary and Financial Code as proposed by the draft law.

text: Article L.631-2-1 of the French Monetary and Financial Code as proposed by the draft law.

text: Article L.631-2-2 of the French Monetary and Financial Code as proposed by the draft law.

text: Article L.515-32-1 of the French Monetary and Financial Code as proposed by the draft law.

text: Article L. 144-1 of the French Monetary and Financial Code.

text: See Council conclusions of 9 October 2007.

text: To be extended under the draft law to insurance companies that are authorised to engage in credit insurance transactions in France.

text: Case C-11/00

text: Commission of the European Communities v European Central Bank [2003] ECR I-7147, paragraphs 110 and 111.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 7 January 2010 on certain measures concerning banking and financial regulation (CON/2010/3)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 7 January 2010 on certain measures concerning banking and financial regulation (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 8 December 2009 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the French Ministry for Economic Affairs, Industry and Employment for an opinion on certain provisions of a banking and financial regulation draft law relating to the establishment of the Financial Regulation and Systemic Risk Council (hereinafter the ‘FRSR’), the regime for covered bonds and an amendment to a provision of the French Monetary and Financial Code relating to the Banque de France (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third and sixth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to the Banque de France and to rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In addition, the Eurosystem shall contribute to the smooth conduct of policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system under Article 127(5) of the Treaty. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The FRSR will replace the panel of financial sector supervisory authorities . It is composed of the Governor of the Banque de France, the President of the Prudential Supervisory Authority assisted by the Vice-president, the President of the Financial Market Authority and the President of the Accounting Standards Authority or their deputies ; the FRSR is chaired by the Minister for Finance or his representative. In addition to playing a coordinating role, the FRSR is entrusted with tasks relating to macroprudential supervision and financial stability and international and European standards that apply to

text: the financial sector. The FRSR’s tasks are to: (i) foster cooperation and the exchange of information between the institutions represented by its members; (ii) examine French financial sector and market status reports from a macro-prudential point of view and evaluate systemic risks inherent in it, taking account of the opinions and recommendations of the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB); (iii) facilitate cooperation on and coordination of work in relation to international and European standards applicable to the financial sector, and with the power to issue opinions or position statements when necessary . The FRSR performs such tasks without prejudice to the remits of the institutions represented by its members. The FRSR meets at least three times a year, upon the proposal of one of its members. In the performance of its tasks, the FRSR may consult representatives of credit institutions, investment companies, insurance companies, mutual societies and welfare institutions . 1.2 The draft law defines a new category of covered bonds, ‘home bonds’, in addition to the mortgage bonds. Under the draft law, companies issuing home bonds and mortgage bonds, i.e. the housing finance companies or the mortgage companies, may subscribe to, acquire or hold their own bonds for the sole purpose of using them to collateralise Banque de France credit operations in accordance with the procedures and terms laid down by the Banque de France for its monetary policy and intraday credit operations, where the company is unable to cover all its liquidity requirements using other means at its disposal. The draft law provides for the conditions under which such transactions are to be conducted. Compliance with these conditions will be certified by a specific auditor, who will also have to draft a report for the Prudential Supervisory Authority . 1.3 The draft law amends a provision of the French Monetary and Financial Code relating to the Banque de France, in order to allow the Banque de France to also disclose to insurance companies that are authorised to engage in credit insurance transactions in France information it holds on the financial situation of any enterprise. Such disclosure may only be made once the Banque de France has established how this information will be provided and established the disclosure obligations of the companies. Currently, the Banque de France may only disclose such information to other central banks and institutions that carry out duties similar to those of the Banque de France, and to credit and financial institutions. The ECB understands that access to information held by the Banque de France on the financial situations of enterprises is granted to insurance companies that are authorised to engage in credit insurance transactions in France, in order to allow them to better manage the inter-enterprise credit risk, and that this new provision is aimed at developing credit insurance for small and medium- sized enterprises.

text: 2. Establishment of the FRSR

text: 2.1 The establishment of national financial stability committees can enhance the ability of national central banks and supervisory authorities to contribute analytical support to the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB). The tasks performed by these committees should complement the activities performed by the ESRB, therefore it is particularly important to develop appropriate synergies. However, it is necessary to avoid such national committees being entrusted with tasks and powers that potentially conflict with those of the ESRB, and which may undermine the effectiveness of the newly-established European macro-prudential supervisory body. Moreover, the legal frameworks of these committees should appropriately reflect the roles of central banks, should not constrain the independence of the governors of the central banks or unduly affect the quality and impartiality of their contributions as members of the ESRB. Lastly, in view of the importance of ensuring the effectiveness of macro-prudential supervisory arrangements at the EU level, it is essential to safeguard the ability of the ESRB to perform its tasks independently and to guarantee an authoritative and effective channel for transmitting the warnings and recommendations issued by the ESRB. 2.2 The ECB welcomes the emphasis in the draft law on the complementary nature of the FRSR and ESRB tasks, and particularly since it expressly provides that the FRSR will take account of the ESRB’s opinions and recommendations when performing its macro-prudential supervision and financial stability related tasks, moreover the scope of latter being expressly limited to the French financial sector and markets. The ECB draws attention to the importance of clarifying the FRSR’s organisational rules at an early stage to ensure that the role of the central bank is appropriately reflected and that the independence of the Governor of the Banque de France, as well as the quality and impartiality of his contribution as a future member of the ESRB, is not affected. 2.3 The Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation between Financial Supervisory Authorities, Central banks and Finance Ministries of the European Union on cross-border financial stability (MoU) that entered into force on 1 June 2008 provides for the establishment in each Member State of a domestic standing group, i.e. a national level group consisting of the financial supervisory authorities, central banks and finance ministries, with the objective of enhancing preparedness under normal market conditions and facilitating the management and resolution of financial crises. Following the conclusion of the MoU, the French authorities designated the panel of financial sector supervisory authorities as the national domestic standing group (part of its general mandate, laid down in 2005, is to facilitate exchanges of information and the coordination of the control of financial groups). For legal certainty purposes, the related tasks, i.e. ‘enhance preparedness under normal market conditions and facilitate the management and resolution of a financial crisis’, could be included in the list of tasks entrusted to the FRSR, as detailed in the draft law.

text: 3. Using home bonds as collateral for the Banque de France’s monetary policy and intraday credit operations

text: With respect to the provisions of the draft law for the use of home bonds as collateral with the Banque de France, ‘in accordance with the procedures and terms laid down by [the Banque de France] for its monetary policy and intraday credit operations,’ the ECB reiterates that it remains at the sole discretion of the Eurosystem to determine the conditions of eligibility for the use of covered bonds or other assets as collateral and the acceptance of specific assets as collateral for monetary policy and intraday credit operations. Moreover, the draft law should expressly clarify that the procedures and terms laid down by the Banque de France for its monetary policy and intraday credit operations provide for the consistent implementation of the guidelines of the ECB’s Governing Council. The draft law could for instance refer to ‘the procedures and terms laid down by [the Banque de France] for its monetary policy and intraday credit operations pursuant to the guidelines of the ECB’s Governing Council’.

text: 4. Disclosure of information held by the Banque de France on the financial situations of enterprises

text: With regard to the possibility for the Banque de France to disclose information it holds on the financial situation of any enterprise , the ECB stresses the need to ensure that the financial independence of the Banque de France is not endangered as the result of any liability that might arise from the disclosure of such information.

text: 5. The appropriate time to consult the ECB

text: 5.1 In cases of particular urgency that do not allow for a normal consultation period, the consulting authority may indicate urgency in the consultation request and ask for a shorter time limit for the ECB’s opinion to be adopted. This does not prejudice the national authorities’ duty under Article 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty to consult the ECB on national draft legislative provisions falling within its fields of competence in due course of the national legislative process. The second sentence of

text: Article 4 of Decision 98/415/EC

text: states that the ECB must be consulted ‘at an appropriate stage’ in the legislative process. This implies that the consultation should take place at a point in the legislative process that affords the ECB sufficient time to examine the draft legislative provisions and to adopt its opinion in all required language versions, and which also enables the relevant national authorities to take the ECB’s opinion into consideration before the provisions are adopted. In this respect, as noted by the Court of Justice, the obligation to consult the ECB under the Treaty is intended ‘essentially to ensure that the legislature adopts the act only when the body has been heard which, by virtue of the specific functions that it exercises in the [Union]

text: framework in the area concerned and by virtue of the high degree of expertise that it enjoys, is particularly well placed to play a useful role in the legislative process envisaged’ . Given that the consulting authority set the ECB an extremely short time limit within which to submit its opinion and that the only reason given was that the consulting authority had established a very tight timetable, the ECB considers that the minimum consultation period of one month provided for in

text: Article 3(1) of Decision 98/415/EC

text: applies. 5.2 According to

text: Article 3(4) of Decision 98/415/EC

text: , Member States are obliged to suspend the process for the adoption of draft legislative provision pending submission of the ECB’s opinion. This means that the adopting authority must have a real opportunity to consider the ECB’s opinion in a meaningful manner prior to taking its decision on the substance. The ECB also emphasises that, in accordance with

text: Article 4 of Decision 98/415/EC

text: , the opinion received from the ECB has to be brought to the knowledge of the adopting authority if the latter is an authority other than that which has prepared the legislative provisions concerned.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 7 January 2010.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 2 On the basis of the authorisation granted to the French Government by Article 152(2) of Law No 2008-776 of 4 August 2008 on the modernisation of the economy (Journal Officiel de la République française No 0181 of 5 August 2008). 3 The Insurance and Mutual Insurance Societies Supervisory Authority (autorité de contrôle des assurances et des mutuelles), the Insurance Companies Committee (comité des entreprises d’assurance), the Credit Institutions and Investment Firms Committee (comité des établissements de crédit et des entreprises d’investissement) and the Banking Commission (commission bancaire). 4 Articles L.612-1 to L.612-3 of the French Monetary and Financial Code, as proposed by the draft order. The Authority will also be entrusted with other tasks, in particular concerning the control of the marketing of financial products in cooperation with the French Financial Market Authority (Articles L.612-30 to L.612-33 of the French Monetary and Financial Code, as proposed by the draft order).

text: Article L.612-1 of the French Monetary and Financial Code, as proposed by the draft order. The draft order also provides that in performing its tasks, the Authority takes into account the objectives of financial stability throughout the European Economic Area (EEA) and convergent implementation of national and Community provisions having regard to the good practices and recommendations emanating from Community supervisory mechanisms. It cooperates with the competent authorities of other States. In particular, within the EEA, it participates in structures to supervise cross-border groups. 6 Article L.612-4 of the French Monetary and Financial Code, as proposed by the draft order. 7 Article L.612-11 of the French Monetary and Financial Code, as proposed by the draft order. 8 On the composition of colleges and commissions, see Articles L.612-5 et seq. of the French Monetary and Financial Code, as proposed by the draft order. In particular, to take account of the strong specificities of the insurance profession, the vice-president of the college in plenary session must have professional experience in the insurance field and will as a rule chair the insurance sector sub-college; the president may also delegate to him the presidency of the college or of one of its configurations or committees. Four members of the college in plenary session are the Accounting Standard Authority’s president, a member of the Council of State, a member of the Court of Cassation and a council member of the Court of Auditors. Three members, among which the vice-president will be chosen, will be appointed on account of their expertise in the fields of client protection, quantitative and actuarial expertise or any other fields under the Authority’s responsibility. Four members will be appointed based on their expertise in the fields of insurance, mutual insurance, pensions and reinsurance, whereas four other members will be appointed based on their expertise in the fields of banking operations, payment services or investment services. The Sanctions Committee is competent to order a disciplinary sanction once disciplinary proceedings have been initiated by one of the college configurations; its composition is completely different from that of the college.

text: Article L. 612-15 of the French Monetary and Financial Code, as proposed by the draft order. 11 Article L.612-18 of the French Monetary and Financial Code, as proposed by the draft order. 12 This contribution will have to be paid to the Banque de France by the persons supervised by the Authority in accordance with Article L.612-20 of the French Monetary and Financial Code, as proposed by the draft order. 13 Article L.612-17 of the French Monetary and Financial Code, as proposed by the draft order. 15 Article L. 612-19 of the French Monetary and Financial Code, as proposed by the draft order. 16 Article L. 612-17 of the French Monetary and Financial Code, as proposed by the draft order. 17 See ‘The role of central banks in prudential supervision’, ECB, 22.3.2001, available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: See, e.g. paragraph 5 of Opinion

text: of 11 May 2004 at the request of the Italian Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance on a draft law on the protection of savings. 19 See Opinion

text: of 26 October 2009 on a proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Community macro-prudential oversight of the financial system and establishing a European Systemic Risk Board and a proposal for a Council decision entrusting the European Central Bank with specific tasks concerning the functioning of the European Systemic Risk Board. 20 Input will also be provided by a high level representative of the Authority to the General Board of the ESRB.

text: The ECB’s Convergence Report 2008, p. 21 and 22. 23 Article L.612-5, I., sixth paragraph, of the French Monetary and Financial Code, as proposed by the draft order. 24 The draft order could for example expressly state that the provision only applies to members mentioned in paragraphs 3° to 8° as in the case of the third paragraph of the same Article; that would exclude the president of the Authority, mentioned in paragraph 1°.

text: An enhancement of the Banque de France’s role in the composition of the college or in the nomination process of its members could be beneficial, for instance by making the Banque de France’s representation in the Authority’s college stronger. 27 Taken in isolation, the provision of staff might not have been sufficient to overcome monetary financing concerns. 28 The ECB’s Convergence Report 2008, p. 23 and 24. See also paragraphs 8 to 12 of Opinion

text: of 15 July 2005 at the request of the Ministry of Finance of the Czech Republic on a draft law on the integration of financial market supervisors and paragraph 4(2)(d) of Opinion

text: of 4 April 2008 at the request of the Finnish Ministry of Finance on a draft government proposal for a law on the Financial and Insurance Supervisory Authority and certain related draft laws. 29

text: Article 24

text: -III(4) of the draft order. 30

text: Article 24

text: -III of the draft order. 31 Article L.612-18-III of the French Monetary and Financial Code, as proposed by the draft order.

text: Case C-11/00

text: Commission of the European Communities v European Central Bank [2003] ECR I-7147, paragraphs 110 and 111.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 8 January 2010 on the merger of the banking and insurance licensing and supervisory authorities (CON/2010/4)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 8 January 2010 on the merger of the banking and insurance licensing and supervisory authorities (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 28 December 2009 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the French Ministry for Economic Affairs, Industry and Employment for an opinion on a draft order merging the banking and insurance licensing and supervisory authorities (hereinafter the ‘draft order’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third and sixth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to the Banque de France and to rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft order

text: 1.1 The draft order is mainly aimed at merging the four banking and insurance licensing and supervisory authorities and creating in France one new supervisory authority, the Prudential Control Authority (hereinafter the ‘Authority’), endowed with the necessary powers for the exercise of its tasks. The Authority will become the single licensing and supervisory authority for the banking, payment services and investment services sector, as well as for the insurance sector . Its

text: objectives will include maintaining the stability of the financial system and protecting customers, insured parties and beneficiaries . 1.2 The Authority consists of a college sitting in plenary session, in restricted session, in sectoral subcolleges, and, where appropriate, in a specialist committee. It also includes a Sanctions Committee. Unless expressly provided otherwise, the powers conferred on the Authority are exercised by the college . The college in plenary session is expressly entrusted with the tasks of: (i) considering national and international matters of a general scope common to the banking and insurance sectors and analysing risks within these sectors in the light of the economic situation, (ii) deliberating on control priorities, and (iii) adopting the Authority’s organisational and functioning principles, budget and internal rules. Individual matters are considered by the college in restricted session, the banking sector sub-college, the insurance sector sub-college or if appropriate a specialist committee. As a rule, each sectoral sub-college will have the necessary authority to consider individual and general sector-specific matters; the restricted session is competent for individual matters concerning financial conglomerates and significant mergers and acquisitions involving entities belonging to both sectors. Moreover, taking into account their impact on financial stability, the scrutiny of matters concerning one of the two sectors may be attributed to the college by the president (plenary session for general matters or restricted session for individual matters) . 1.3 The Authority will be closely connected to the Banque de France. The Governor of the Banque de France, or the Deputy-Governor he will designate to represent him, will be the president of the college of the Authority (plenary, restricted session and banking sector sub-college). The vicepresident will chair the insurance sector sub college, in which the Governor of the Banque de France, or his designated deputy, will also be a member . As the Authority’s president, the Governor of the Banque de France will adopt the agenda for the college’s different configurations . For the purposes of fulfilling the tasks entrusted to the Authority, the Authority’s president will

text: have standing to bring proceedings before any court . The Authority’s staff will consist of the Banque de France staff and civil servants assigned to the Banque de France . The Authority’s budget will be annexed to the Banque de France’s budget. The Authority will receive financial resources from the Banque de France, within the limit of the proceeds of the contribution for supervision costs , the balance of which will be carried forward each year, and additional contributions that the Banque de France may allocate to the Authority . 1.4 Pursuant to the draft order, the Authority is an independent administrative authority . Moreover, the draft order ensures the functional independence of the Authority, which means that the necessary resources for the performance of its tasks will be managed in an autonomous manner. A secretary-general will be appointed by decree of the Minister for Economic Affairs, following a proposal from the Authority’s president. The Secretary-General will organise and direct the Authority’s departments. Following a proposal from the Secretary-General, the Authority’s college will adopt departmental organisation principles, determine the ethical rules applying to staff and establish the general framework for staff recruitment and employment in accordance with the provisions applying to statutory staff and to civil servants . The Authority will adopt its budget, following a proposal from the Secretary-General. The college will set up an internal audit committee responsible for checking, in particular, the proper use of the Authority’s resources .

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 In line with Article 127(5) of the Treaty, which provides that the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) must contribute to the smooth conduct of policies pursued by the competent authorities relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system, the ECB has stressed the importance of having the central banks closely involved in prudential supervision . Against this background, the ECB welcomes that the draft order ensures that the Banque de France will be closely involved in the Authority, in particular through its Governor, or designated Deputy-Governor, acting as the Authority’s president. 2.2 Furthermore, the nature and scope of systemic risk is widening due to the closer links between credit institutions, insurance companies, investment firms and pension funds. Traditional boundaries between the banking, insurance and securities segments of the financial system are increasingly blurred, as demonstrated by the emergence of hybrid financial products, the increased

text: use of risk transfer instruments, such as credit derivatives, between the sectors, and the growing role of financial conglomerates . The integration of micro-prudential supervisory tools under the draft order acknowledges the growing importance of financial groups that combine different types of financial services. This should help to address specific prudential concerns concerning such groups and to ensure an overall level playing field between competing intermediaries. This should also facilitate a more effective assessment of risks in the financial system as a whole. 2.3 Closely involving ESCB national central banks (NCB) in prudential supervision may support their contribution to the macro-prudential oversight of the financial sector. In this respect, the financial crisis demonstrates the need to strengthen supervision and regulation of the financial system as a whole. With respect to the insurance sector in particular, experience has shown that insurance companies are important for systemic financial stability because of their size, their interconnectedness with the financial sector and the economic function of insurance products. In view of the systemic relevance of the insurance sector for financial stability, insurance is part of the macro-prudential oversight to be exercised by the proposed European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB). In the context of the establishment of the ESRB, which will be responsible for the conduct of macro-prudential oversight in the EU , the framework established by the draft order is likely to enhance the ability of the Banque de France to contribute analytical support to the ESRB, in particular through its Governor acting as a member with voting rights . In this respect, the involvement of the Banque de France in the Authority, in particular through its Governor or Deputy-Governor acting as the Authority’s president, is positive. The ECB understands that the proposed framework will allow the Governor of the Banque de France to perform, independent of any external influence, his duties as the Governor and as a member of the ECB’s decision-making bodies as required by the Treaty.

text: 3. Central bank independence and monetary financing

text: 3.1 Member States must ensure that NCBs have sufficient financial resources to carry out their ESCBrelated tasks. In this respect, the ECB understands that the functions to be performed by the Governor of the Banque de France, or the Deputy Governor as the case may be, will be conducted in a manner that is fully compatible with the Banque de France’s institutional and financial independence and with the Governor’s personal independence, which is designed to safeguard the proper performance of their tasks under the Treaty and the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter the ‘Statute of the ESCB’).

text: 3.2 Situations where financial supervisory authorities are placed within an NCB do not pose problems from the perspective of the financial independence of central banks if such authorities are subject to the NCB’s independent decision-making . The draft order provides that the Authority is an independent administrative authority ; however, the Authority will not have legal personality and the ECB understands that, as was the case for the Banking Commission, the State and not the Banque de France will be liable for the activities of the Authority and that Banque de France’s finances will thus not be burdened by a liability for the Authority’s decisions. 3.3 Moreover, the ECB expects that care will be taken to ensure that the Banque de France, in view of the possible appointment of its staff members to the Authority, has sufficient financial and personnel resources both in terms of quantity and quality to continue to carry out all its tasks, and in particular, that its capacity to carry out ESCB-related tasks will not be affected. 3.4 The ECB notes that the draft order contains a provision according to which the duties of a college member may be terminated by reasoned decree of the Minister for Economic Affairs under the conditions it provides . The draft order, as submitted to the ECB, does not specify clearly that this provision does not apply to the Governor of the Banque de France as the Authority’s president. The ECB suggests clarifying the draft order in this respect . 3.5 The ECB notes that it is important to safeguard compliance with the prohibition of monetary financing under Article 123 of the Treaty, which is essentially designed to prevent central bank financing of the public sector. The Authority will be primarily financed by the proceeds of the contribution for supervision costs, which, in principle, would alleviate monetary financing concerns. Moreover, the draft order also provides that the Banque de France may allocate additional contributions to the Authority . The provision of such financial resources by the Banque de France to the Authority under the draft order does not appear to present monetary financing concerns insofar as the Banque de France will be financing the performance of a legitimate financial supervisory task under French law. This particular task will also facilitate the performance by the Banque de France of its ESCB-related task under Article 127(5) of the Treaty to contribute to the smooth conduct of policies pursued by the Authority relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system. In this respect, it is crucial that the Banque de France is in a position to make a meaningful contribution to the conduct of supervisory and stability-related policies by the Authority. The ECB considers that the role envisaged for the Banque de France under the draft order goes in the right direction as the Governor is the president

text: of the Authority’s college . Also, the Banque de France’s provision of staff to the Authority should serve to enhance the Banque de France’s contribution to the Authority’s supervisory and stabilityrelated policies . 3.6. The ECB notes that national legislation requiring an NCB to take over the liabilities of a previously independent public body as a result of a national reorganisation of certain tasks and duties without insulating the NCB from financial obligations resulting from the prior activities of such previously independent public bodies is incompatible with the monetary financing prohibition . The draft order provides that ‘all assets, rights and obligations of the Insurance and Mutual Insurance Societies Supervisory Authority … are transferred by force of law and full ownership to the Banque de France on behalf of the [Authority]’ . However, the draft order also specifies that ‘the Authority shall take over the respective rights and obligations of [the four merged banking and insurance licensing and supervisory authorities]’ . Based on this provision, and on the fact that the Authority is an independent administrative authority separate from the Banque de France, the ECB understands that, under French law, Banque de France will not be liable for any activities of the Insurance and Mutual Insurance Societies Supervisory Authority undertaken prior to the coming into force of the draft order.

text: 4. Ethical rules applying to the Authority’s staff

text: The draft order provides that Authority staff are subject to the ethical rules adopted by the Authority’s college and that, if necessary, because of their involvement in the Banque de France duties, staff members could be subject to the Banque de France’s ethical rules . The draft order provides that the Authority’s college determines the ethical rules applying to staff and establishes the general framework for staff recruitment and employment in accordance with the provisions applying to the Banque de France staff and to civil servants . It is not clear from the above provisions whether the ethical rules applying to the Authority staff are determined in accordance with the Banque de France’s ethical rules. The ECB recommends stating this explicitly in the draft order and expects that the ethical rules adopted by the Authority will not materially deviate from those applicable to the Banque de France’s staff.

text: 5. Audit of the Authority’s accounts

text: As the Banque de France’s annual accounts are audited by independent external auditors under Article 27.1 of the Statute of the ESCB, the ECB understands that the auditors’ mandate will be extended to the audit of the Authority’s accounts, as they will not be distinct from the Banque de France’s accounts and as they will be held by the NCB.

text: 6. The appropriate time to consult the ECB

text: 6.1 In cases of particular urgency that do not allow for a normal consultation period, the consulting authority may indicate urgency in the consultation request and ask for a shorter time limit for the ECB’s opinion to be adopted. This does not prejudice the national authorities’ duty under Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty to consult the ECB on national draft legislative provisions falling within its fields of competence in due course of the national legislative process. The second sentence of

text: Article 4 of Decision 98/415/EC

text: states that the ECB must be consulted ‘at an appropriate stage’ in the legislative process. This implies that the consultation should take place at a point in the legislative process that affords the ECB sufficient time to examine the draft legislative provisions and to adopt its opinion in the required language versions and which also enables the relevant national authorities to take the ECB’s opinion into consideration before the provisions are adopted. In this respect, as noted by the Court of Justice, the obligation to consult the ECB under the Treaty is intended ‘essentially to ensure that the legislature adopts the act only when the body has been heard which, by virtue of the specific functions that it exercises in the [Union] framework in the area concerned and by virtue of the high degree of expertise that it enjoys, is particularly well placed to play a useful role in the legislative process envisaged. ’ Given that the consulting authority set the ECB a short time limit within which to submit its opinion and that the only reason given was the tight timetable established by the consulting authority, the ECB considers that the minimum consultation period of one month provided for in

text: Article 3(1) of Decision 98/415/EC

text: applies. 6.2 According to

text: Article 3(4) of Decision 98/415/EC

text: , Member States are obliged to suspend the process for the adoption of draft legislative provision pending submission of the ECB’s opinion. This means that the adopting authority must have a real opportunity to consider the ECB’s opinion in a meaningful manner prior to taking its decision on the substance.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 8 January 2010. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET