text: AMC & GM to Part-CAT Issue 2, Amendment 23

text: Annex III to ED Decision 2023/007/R Page 1 of 13

text: Annex III to ED Decision 2023/007/R Page 2 of 13

text: DH or MDH Class of lighting facility

text: (ft) FALS IALS BALS NALS

text: RVR (m)

text: - 210 550 750 1 000 1 200 211 - 240 550 800 1 000 1 200 241 - 250 550 800 1 000 1 300 251 - 260 600 800 1 100 1 300 261 - 280 600 900 1 100 1 300 281 - 300 650 900 1 200 1 400 301 - 320 700 1 000 1 200 1 400 321 - 340 800 1 100 1 300 1 500 341 - 360 900 1 200 1 400 1 600 361 - 380 1 000 1 300 1 500 1 700 381 - 400 1 100 1 400 1 600 1 800 401 - 420 1 200 1 500 1 700 1 900 421 - 440 1 300 1 600 1 800 2 000 441 - 460 1 400 1 700 1 900 2 100 461 - 480 1 500 1 800 2 000 2 200 481 - 500 1 500 1 800 2 100 2 300 501 - 520 1 600 1 900 2 100 2 400 521 - 540 1 700 2 000 2 200 2 400 541 - 560 1 800 2 100 2 300 2 400 561 - 580 1 900 2 200 2 400 2 400 581 - 600 2 000 2 300 2 400 2 400 601 - 620 2 100 2 400 2 400 2 400 621 - 640 2 200 2 400 2 400 2 400 641 - 660 2 300 2 400 2 400 2 400 661 and above 2 400 2 400 2 400 2 400

text: Annex III to ED Decision 2023/007/R Page 3 of 13

text: o 2D Final approach track offset 15 for o operations category A and B aeroplanes or 5 for 750 m 800 m Category C and D aeroplanes

text: o Final approach track offset  15 for 1 000 m 1 000 m Category A and B aeroplanes

text: o Final approach track offset  5 for Category 1 200 m 1 200 m C and D aeroplanes

text: Annex III to ED Decision 2023/007/R Page 4 of 13

text: Effect on landing minima Failed or downgraded equipment Type B Type A

text: Navaid stand-by transmitter No effect

text: APV — not applicable

text: NPA with final approach fix (FAF): no effect unless used as FAF

text: If the FAF cannot be FOR CAT I: Not allowed except if identified (e.g. no method the required height versus glide Outer marker (ILS only) available for timing of path can be checked using other descent), NPA cannot be means, e.g. DME fix conducted

text: FOR CAT I: Not allowed except if the required height versus glide path can be checked using other means, e.g. DME fix

text: No effect unless used as Middle marker (ILS only) No effect MAPt

text: No effect DME if replaced by RNAV (GNSS) information or the outer marker

text: RVR assessment systems No effect

text: Approach lights Minima as for NALS

text: Annex III to ED Decision 2023/007/R Page 5 of 13

text: Approach lights except the last 210 m Minima as for BALS Approach lights except the last 420 m Minima as for IALS Standby power for approach lights No effect Day: no effect; Edge lights, threshold lights and runway end lights Night: not allowed Aeroplanes: No effect if flight director (F/D), HUDLS or autoland; otherwise RVR 750 m No effect but the minimum Centre line lights Helicopters: No effect on CAT I RVR should be 750m. and HELI SA CAT I approach operations Centre line lights spacing increased to No effect 30 m Aeroplanes: No effect if F/D, HUDLS or autoland; TDZ lights No effect otherwise RVR 750 m Helicopters: No effect Taxiway lighting system No effect

text: (d) Guidance on accurate corrections for specific conditions (if required) is available in PANS-OPS, Volume III (ICAO Doc 8168) Section 12 Chapter 4 First Edition, 2018.

text: Annex III to ED Decision 2023/007/R Page 6 of 13

text: Annex III to ED Decision 2023/007/R Page 7 of 13

text: RELEVANT FUEL DATA TO BE RECORDED […] (b) […]

text: Annex III to ED Decision 2023/007/R Page 8 of 13

text: Annex III to ED Decision 2023/007/R Page 9 of 13

text: FACTORING OF LANDING DISTANCE PERFORMANCE DATA WHEN A USING A HEAD-UP DISPLAY (HUD) OR AN EQUIVALENT DISPLAY WITH FLARE CUE

text: Annex III to ED Decision 2023/007/R Page 10 of 13

text: Annex III to ED Decision 2023/007/R Page 11 of 13

text: Annex III to ED Decision 2023/007/R Page 12 of 13

text: Annex III to ED Decision 2023/007/R Page 13 of 13

identifier: AMC & GM to Part-CAT — Issue 2, Amendment 23

beslut: ED Decision 2023/007/R

title: AMC & GM to Part-CAT — Issue 2, Amendment 23

text: Annex III to ED Decision 2023/007/R ‘AMC & GM to Annex IV (Part-CAT) to

text: Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012

text: — Issue 2, Amendment 23’

type: rubrik

text: The text of the amendment is arranged to show deleted, new or amended text as shown below: (a) deleted text is struck through; (b) new or amended text is highlighted in blue; (c) an ellipsis ‘[…]’ indicates that the rest of the text is unchanged.

text: Note to the reader

text: In amended, and in particular in existing (that is, unchanged) text, ‘Agency’ is used interchangeably with ‘EASA’. The interchangeable use of these two terms is more apparent in the consolidated versions. Therefore, please note that both terms refer to the ‘European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)’.

text: The Annex to Decision 2014/015/R of 24 April 2014 of the Executive Director of the Agency is amended as follows:

text: AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.105 Use of aerodromes and operating sites

text: […] (e) Operations to non-pre-surveyed sites by night (except in accordance with SPA.HEMS.125(bc)(4)) should not be permitted.

text: AMC5 CAT.OP.MPA.110 Aerodrome operating minima

text: DETERMINATION OF RVR OR VIS FOR INSTRUMENT APPROACH OPERATIONS — AEROPLANES

text: Table 9

text: RVR versus DH/MDH — aeroplanes

text: Table 10

text: Visual and non-visual aids and/or on-board equipment versus minimum RVR — aeroplanes

text: Lowest RVR Type of Facilities approach Multi-pilot Single-pilot operations operations

text: 3D runway touchdown zone lights (RTZL) and No limitation operations runway centre line lights (RCLL) Final without RTZL and/or RCLL but using HUDLS approach or equivalent system; track offset No limitation 600 m o 15 for without RTZL and/or RCLL but using category A autopilot or flight director to the DH and B aeroplanes o or 5 for No RTZL and/or RCLL, not using HUDLS or Category C equivalent system or autopilot or flight 750 m 800 m and D director to the DH aeroplanes

text: 3D runway touchdown zone lights (RTZL) and operations runway centre line lights (RCLL) and o 800 m 1 000 m Final approach track offset  15 for Category A and B aeroplanes or Final o approach track offset  5 for Category C and D aeroplanes

text: without RTZL and RCLL but using HUDLS or equivalent system; autopilot or flight director to the DH and 800 m 1 000 m o Final approach track offset  15 for Category A and B aeroplanes or Final o approach track offset  5 for Category C and D aeroplanes

text: AMC11 CAT.OP.MPA.110 Aerodrome operating minima

text: EFFECT ON LANDING MINIMA OF TEMPORARILY FAILED OR DOWNGRADED GROUND EQUIPMENT

text: (a) General

text: These instructions are intended for use both before and during flight. Only those facilities mentioned in Table 17 should be acceptable to be used to determine the effect of temporarily failed of downgraded equipment. It is, however, not expected that the commander would consult such instructions after passing 1 000 ft above the aerodrome. If failures of ground aids are announced at such a late stage, the approach could be continued at the commander’s discretion. If failures are announced before such a late stage in the approach, their effect on the approach should be considered as described in Table 17, and the approach may have to be abandoned.

text: Table 17 Failed or downgraded equipment — effect on landing minima

text: Operations without LVO approval

text: GM8 CAT.OP.MPA.110 Aerodrome operating minima

text: LOW TEMPERATURE CORRECTION

text: AMC2 CAT.OP.MPA.182 Fuel/energy scheme — aerodrome selection policy — aeroplanes

text: BASIC FUEL SCHEME — DESTINATION ALTERNATE AERODROME

text: BASIC FUEL SCHEME WITH VARIATIONS — NO DESTINATION ALTERNATE AERODROME

text: (c) The operator may operate with no destination alternate aerodrome when the destination aerodrome is an isolated aerodrome or when the following two conditions are met: […] (2) two separate runways are usable at the destination aerodrome and the appropriate weather reports and/or weather forecasts indicate that for the period from 1 hour before to 1 hour after the expected time of arrival, the ceiling is at least 2 000 ft (600 m) or the circling height + 500 ft (150 m), whichever is greater, and ground visibility is at least 5 km.

text: AMC8 CAT.OP.MPA.182 Fuel/energy scheme — aerodrome selection policy — aeroplanes

text: BASIC FUEL SCHEME WITH VARIATIONS — PLANNING MINIMA

text: Table 3 — Basic fuel scheme with variations — planning minima — aeroplanes

text: Destination alternate aerodrome, fuel ERA aerodrome

text: Row Type of approach operation Aerodrome ceiling RVR/VIS (cloud base or vertical visibility)

text: 1 Type B instrument approach operations DA/H + 200 ft RVR/VIS + 550 m 2 3D Type A instrument approach operations, DA/H* + 200 ft RVR/VIS** + 800 m based on a facility with a system minimum of 200 ft or less 3 Two or more usable type A instrument approach DA/H or MDA/H* RVR/VIS** + 1 000 m operations***, each based on a separate + 200 ft navigation aid 4 Other type A instrument approach operations DA/H or MDA/H RVR/VIS + 1 500 m + 400 ft 5 Circling approach operations MDA/H + 400 ft VIS + 1 500 m

text: Crosswind planning minima: see Table 1 of AMC3 CAT.OP.MPA.182

text: Wind limitations should be applied taking into account the runway condition (dry, wet, contaminated). * The higher of the usable DA/H or MDA/H. ** The higher of the usable RVR or VIS. *** Compliance with point CAT.OP.MPA.182(f) should be ensured. […]

text: AMC9 CAT.OP.MPA.182 Fuel/energy scheme — aerodrome selection policy — aeroplanes

text: Table 4 — Basic fuel scheme with variations — planning minima

text: Destination alternate aerodrome, fuel ERA aerodrome, isolated destination aerodrome

text: Row Type of approach Aerodrome ceiling (cloud RVR/VIS base or vertical VIS)

text: 1 Two or more usable type B instrument approach DA/H* + 100 ft RVR** + 300 m operations to two separate runways*** 2 One usable type B instrument approach operation DA/H + 150 ft RVR + 450 m 3 3D Type A instrument approach operations, based DA/H + 200 ft RVR/VIS** on a facility with a system minimum of 200 ft or + 800 m less 4 Two or more usable type A instrument approach DA/H or MDA/H* + 200 ft RVR/VIS** operations ***, each based on a separate + 1 000 m navigation aid 5 One usable type A instrument approach operation DA/H or MDA/H + 400 ft RVR/VIS + 1 500 m 6 Circling approach operations MDA/H + 400 ft VIS + 1 500 m

text: GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.185 Fuel/energy scheme — in-flight fuel/energy management policy — aeroplanes

text: BASIC FUEL SCHEME

text: When an aircraft communications addressing and reporting system (ACARS) is available, the operator pilot does not need to be the one recording this data. […] (i) Example 3: The aircraft reaches FL 350, which is the cruising flight level on its 5-hour flight. The weather forecast information that was obtained before departure was favourable and, therefore, the commander did not order any discretionary fuel. The destination alternate fuel is sufficient for 25-minute flight time and the destination alternate aerodrome is located beyond the destination aerodrome. For some reason (unexpected severe turbulence, cockpit window crack, etc.), the aircraft has to descend and continue the flight at FL 230, where fuel consumption is higher. In-flight fuel checks and fuel management now show that the destination aerodrome can still be reached but only if in-flight re-planning is done without the destination alternate aerodrome (the destination aerodrome has two runways and good weather, and it is less than 64hour flight time away, thus meeting the conditions for not requiring an alternate aerodrome). By doing so, the aircraft will arrive at destination for a straight-in approach with exactly the FRF plus 15-minute flight time. During the next 3,5 hours, an ERA aerodrome is available, and the situation is under control. When approaching the destination, the aircraft has to commit to land at the destination aerodrome as there is no other destination alternate aerodrome within 15 minutes of reaching the destination aerodrome. The ATC now informs the pilots that there is a change of landing runway resulting in a 12-minute trip fuel increase. It is time to declare ‘MINIMUM FUEL’. […]

text: AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.192(d) Selection of aerodromes and operating sites — helicopters

text: […] (b) The operator may demonstrate robustness against the loss of capability of the GNSS if all of the following criteria are met: (1) At flight planning stage, SBAS or GBAS are expected to be available and used. […]

text: GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.305 Commencement and continuation of approach

text: […] (e) Where additional RVR information is provided (e.g. midpoint and stop end), this is advisory; such information may be useful to the pilot in order to determine whether there will be sufficient visual reference to control the aircraft during roll-out and taxi. For operations where the aircraft is

text: controlled manually during roll-out, Table 1 (aeroplanes) in AMC1 SPA.LVO.100(a) and Table 3 (helicopters) in AMC2 SPA.LVO.100(a) provides an indication of the RVR (e.g. midpoint and stop end) that may be required to allow manual lateral control of the aircraft on the runway.

text: AMC2 CAT.OP.MPA.312(a)(3) EFVS 200 operations

text: RECURRENT TRAINING AND CHECKING FOR EFVS 200 OPERATIONS

text: (a) The operator should ensure that the pilots are’ competentce to perform EFVS 200 operations. To do so, pilots should be trained every 6 months by performing at least two approaches on each type of aircraft operated. […]

text: AMC2 CAT.POL.A.235 Landing — wet and contaminated runways

text: AMC1 CAT.POL.H.215(a)(1);(a)(2) En-route – critical engine inoperative

text: RELEVANT TERRAIN AND OBSTACLES IN IFR

text: All terrain and obstacles along the route within the following distance on either side of the intended track should be considered: (a) 9.3 km (5 NM) to be increased to 18.5 km (10 NM) if the navigational accuracy cannot be met for 95 % of the total flight time; or (b) when flying in accordance with PBN procedures, a distance equal to or greater than the required navigation performance.

text: GM1 CAT.POL.H.215(a)(3) En-route – critical engine inoperative

text: RELEVANT TERRAIN AND OBSTACLES IN VFR

text: The terrain and obstacles to be considered are within the distance on either side of the intended track that is specified in the applicable airspace requirements: (a) for day VFR, the distances are specified in SERA.5005(f);

text: (b) for night VFR, the distances are specified in SERA.5005(c), or as authorised by the competent authority.

text: AMC1 CAT.POL.H.225 Helicopter operations to/from a public interest site

text: CHANGES TO THE OBSTACLE ENVIRONMENT

text: If the operator becomes aware of a change to the obstacle environment at an approved public interest site, the operator should: (a) assess the safety impact of such new obstacles on their operations; (b) review their site-specific procedures and modify them as necessary; (c) discontinue operations at the site if necessary; (d) inform the competent authority of all of the above.

text: GM1 CAT.POL.H.225 Helicopter operations to/from a public interest site

text: UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES

text: […] (d) Long-term solution Although not offering a complete solution, it was felt that a significant increase in safety could be achieved by applying an additional performance margin to such operations. This solution allowed the time restriction of 2004 to be removed. (1) The derogation provided for by

text: Article 6(6) of Regulation (EU) No 965/2012

text: , which allows Member States to approve public interest sites under their own conditions, was meant to be a temporary transitional arrangement. This transitional arrangement was only intended to allow the continuation of existing sites. For this reason, any newly approved public interest sites that have been established since 28 October 2014 will have to be phased out by 25 May 2028. (2) No mandatory phase-out is foreseen for sites approved under a derogation from CAT.POL.H.225 that were established as public interest sites before 28 October 2014. (3) No mandatory phase-out is foreseen for sites approved under CAT.POL.H.225 that were established as public interest sites before 1 July 2002. (4) A public interest site should be considered to be established at the time when it was operated in the public interest for the first time.

text: (5) As of 25 May 2024 there should be no more approvals of public interest sites that were established after 28 October 2014, in accordance with point ARO.OPS.220(c). (6) As of 25 May 2024 the obstacle environment at approved public interest sites should be kept under continued review in order to avoid new obstacles causing a significant safety impact, in accordance with point ARO.OPS.220(d).

text: Table 1 — Duration of public interest site approvals

text: Date on which Maximum duration the approved PIS of the PIS approval was established

text: Before 28 October Unlimited duration, provided 2014 that there is no permanent worsening of the obstacle environment.

text: After 28 October PIS approval to expire on 25 2014 May 2028.

text: (7) Since a number of hospital sites may remain approved public interest sites in the foreseeable future, it was considered important to keep minimum performance margins when operating these sites. (i) The required performance level of 8 % climb gradient in the first segment required by point CAT.POL.H.225(a)(5) reflects ICAO Annex 14 Volume II in ‘Table 4-31 ‘Dimensions and slopes of obstacle limitations surfaces’ for performance class 2. This was established as a means of mitigating performance issues. It defines a proportionate mass penalty at such sites, thereby applying an additional performance margin to such operations in the interest of safety. (ii) The performance delta is achieved without the provision of further manufacturer’s data by using existing graphs to provide the reduced take-off mass (RTOM). (iii) If the solution in relation to the original problem is examined, the effects can be seen. (A1) Solution with relation to (c)(1): although the problem still exists, the safest procedure is a dynamic take-off reducing the time taken to achieve Vstayup and thus allowing VFR recovery — if the failure occurs at or after Vy and 200 ft, an IFR recovery is possible. (B2) Solution with relation to (c)(2): as in (c)(1) above. (C3) Solution with relation to (c)(3): once again, this does not give a complete solution;, however, the performance delta minimises the time during which a climb over the obstacle cannot be achieved.

text: AMC2 CAT.IDE.H.240 Supplemental oxygen — non-pressurised helicopters

text: OXYGEN STORAGE AND DISPENSING EQUIPMENT

text: (a) Supplemental oxygen requirements may be met either by means of either installed or portable equipment. (b) The use of oxygen dispensers should not prevent the crew from performing their intended tasks, including any radio communications. (c) The oxygen-dispensing unit may consist of a nasal oxygen cannula.

type: vagledning

utgivare: easa


text: AMC and GM to Part-CAT Issue 2, Amendment 24

text: N o t e t o t h e r e a d e r

text: In amended, and in particular in existing (that is, unchanged) text, ‘Agency’ is used interchangeably with ‘EASA’. The interchangeable use of these two terms is more apparent in the consolidated versions. Therefore, please note that both terms refer to the ‘European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)’.

text: Annex II to ED Decision 2025/001/R Page 1 of 2

text: Annex II to ED Decision 2025/001/R Page 2 of 2

amnesord: Part-CAT - Commercial Air Transport Operations

beslut: ED Decision 2025/001/R

publisher: Europeiska unionens byrå för luftfartssäkerhet

sprak: en

serie: amc-gm

text: Acceptable Means of Compliance and Guidance Material to Annex IV (Part-CAT) to

text: Regulation (EU) No 965/2012

text: — Issue 2, Amendment 24

text: Annex II to ED Decision 2025/001/R ‘AMC and GM to Part-CAT — Issue 2, Amendment 24’

text: This document shows deleted, new or amended text as follows:

type: stycke

text: — deleted text is struck through;

text: — new or amended text is highlighted in blue;

text: — an ellipsis ‘[…]’ indicates that the rest of the text is unchanged.

text: GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.290 Ground proximity detection

text: TERRAIN AWARENESS WARNING SYSTEM (TAWS) FLIGHT CREW TRAINING

text: SPECIFIC ELEMENTS FOR CONTROLLED FLIGHT INTO TERRAIN (CFIT) FLIGHT CREW TRAINING PROGRAMMES

text: (d) The following items are typical performance-based training objectives for the training of flight crew in the avoidance of CFIT: — anticipate terrain threats; — prepare for terrain threats; — recognise unsafe terrain clearance; — take appropriate action; — apply appropriate procedure correctly; — maintain aircraft control; — restore safe flight path; — manage consequences. (e) The following scenarios may be addressed as part of the training: — ATC clearance giving insufficient terrain clearance; — provision of a wrong QNH; — demonstration of terrain avoidance warning systems (if TAWS is installed); — engine failure making performance marginal, leading to a TAWS warning (if TAWS is installed); — ‘virtual mountain’ meaning the surprise element of an unexpected warning (if TAWS is installed). (f) More details can be found in ICAO Doc 9995, Manual of Evidence-based Training.


text: AMC and GM to Part-CAT Issue 2, Amendment 25

text: N o t e t o t h e r e a d e r

text: Annex III to ED Decision 2025/008/R Page 1 of 5

text: Annex III to ED Decision 2025/008/R Page 2 of 5

text: Annex III to ED Decision 2025/008/R Page 3 of 5

text: Annex III to ED Decision 2025/008/R Page 4 of 5

text: Annex III to ED Decision 2025/008/R Page 5 of 5

beslut: ED Decision 2025/008/R

text: Regulation (EU) No 965/2012

text: — Issue 2, Amendment 25

text: Annex III to ED Decision 2025/008/R ‘AMC & GM to Part-CAT — Issue 2, Amendment 25’

text: This document shows deleted text, new or amended text as follows:

text: — deleted text is struck through;

text: AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.200 Transport of dangerous goods

text: CHANGES TO THE LOADING POSITION OF DANGEROUS GOODS

text: If a change to the loading position of dangerous goods is necessary, it should be made in accordance with the operator’s instructions and segregation of dangerous goods should be ensured in accordance with the Technical Instructions. The NOTOC should be amended and given to the commander before departure. The commander should confirm that the amendment has been received. A copy of this information should be kept on the ground and be accessible to the operational control personnel responsible for flight operations until after the arrival of the flight.

text: GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.220(a) Additional responsibilities for CAT operators of complex motor-powered aeroplanes performing selfhandling

text: SINGLE AIR CARRIER BUSINESS GROUPING

text: The term ‘single air carrier business grouping’ refers to two or more AOC holders whose principal place of business is in a territory to which the Treaties apply. Those AOC holders may or may not facilitate the harmonisation of their management systems and operations for the purpose of applying requirements for self-handling in a harmonised way. The management systems and operations include policies, processes and procedures for ground handling, training of personnel performing ground handling activities, ground operations procedures and the maintenance programme for ground support equipment.

text: GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.220(b) Additional responsibilities for CAT operators of complex motor-powered aeroplanes performing selfhandling

text: TRAINING PROGRAMME

text: The training programme for the operators’ ground handling personnel does not require the prior approval of the competent authority. This approach is consistent with Commission Delegated

text: Regulation (EU) 2025/20

text: , which establishes the requirements for ground handling training applicable to a CAT operator of complex motorpowered aeroplanes performing self-handling.

text: Regulation (EU) 2025/20

text: does not require any prior approval of any element of the operator’s management system, as organisations providing ground handling services operate under a declaration regime.

text: GM3 CAT.OP.MPA.250 Ice and other contaminants – ground procedures

text: DE-ICING/ANTI-ICING BACKGROUND INFORMATION

text: (…) (a) General (…) (4) (…) (vi) FAA Holdover Time Guidelines [for the corresponding Winter]; (vii) FAA Ground Deicing Program – General Information 8900.xxx series Notice ‘Revised FAA-Approved Deicing Program Updates, Winter 20xx-20yy’. (…)

text: GM4 CAT.OP.MPA.250 Ice and other contaminants — ground procedures

text: PREPARATION OF DE-ICING/ANTI-ICING OPERATIONS IN COORDINATION WITH THE STAKEHOLDERS CONCERNED

text: (a) It is recommended that, whenever possible, CAT operators, aerodrome operators and ground handling organisations providing de-icing/anti-icing services coordinate the process of preparing for de-icing/anti-icing operations in sufficient time in advance of the cold season starting. The plan for the winter season should be communicated to all stakeholders concerned. (b) Coordination includes the following elements for all stakeholders involved, as a minimum. (1) Exchanging of documents/procedures/manuals covering cold season operations, with the CAT operator ensuring that the relevant instructions and procedures are accessible at all stations where it operates. (2) Dissemination by the aerodrome operator of the local procedures to operators and ground handling organisations, including instructions and procedures for cold weather operations at the aerodrome of operation. (c) The operator ensures that the relevant personnel receive training, as appropriate, in deicing/anti-icing operations. (d) It is recommended that the operator participate, when possible, in the testing of the plan for winter operations at the relevant aerodromes of operation when such tests are organised by the aerodrome operators and the ground handling organisations providing de-icing/anti-icing services

text: GM1 CAT.POL.MAB.105(d) Mass and balance data and documentation

text: LAST-MINUTE CHANGES

text: (a) Mass and balance and load control documentation is expected to reflect the actual loaded state of the aircraft before departure. The final mass and balance and load control documentation needs to reflect any change that has been made to aircraft loading since the initial issue of the documents. These late adjustments are called last-minute changes (LMCs). (b) LMCs are used to make late updates to the mass and balance and load control documentation without requiring the preparation of a new issue of the document. (c) If in any doubt about the limitations of the aircraft, the operator should ensure that the mass and balance and load control documents are reissued. LMCs contain the following information at a minimum: (1) the load to be changed (baggage, passengers, cargo, etc.), (2) the mass of the load to be changed, (3) the location of the load to be changed (cabin/bay area, cargo compartment, etc.), (4) the nature of the change (enter ‘+’ for an increase or ‘–’ for a decrease, as appropriate). (5) the intended location of the load (if remaining on board), (6) the total mass and index change. (d) Aircraft flight envelopes may be more restrictive at lower weights. Changes in loading applied to a lighter-loaded aircraft will affect its centre of gravity more, so LMCs should be checked carefully. (e) With an increasing number of pieces of hand baggage, some of those pieces may need to be relocated into a cargo compartment. In such cases, the calculations should be completed as part of the LMCs. (f) LMCs should be communicated to the commander in writing; for example, on an LMC slip or loadsheet, or verbally, which should be recorded in the flight file.

text: AMC1 CAT.POL.MAB.110 Load control process

text: LOAD CONTROL PROCESS

text: (a) The operator should ensure that the load control process covers at least the following: (1) the functions and the tasks associated with each function are identified; (2) mass and balance and load control documentation — including, as applicable, the loading instructions/report (LIR) and the NOTOC — is distributed to the relevant persons, as identified in the load control process;

text: (3) information related to aircraft loading and load distribution is communicated between the person responsible for loading supervision and the persons responsible for load planning and the related mass and balance and load control documentation is issued, along with any other designated intermediary person if load planning is a remote function that is not performed at the departure station; (4) aircraft loading and load distribution are performed in accordance with the LIR; (5) the mass and balance documentation and the LIR are not in contradiction and include any LMCs. (b) Points (a)(2) and (a)(3) do not apply when the mass and balance documentation and loading/unloading of baggage are performed by the flight crew.

text: GM1 CAT.POL.MAB.110 Load control process

text: LOADING INSTRUCTIONS/REPORT (LIR)

text: (a) The loading instructions document (also called ‘loading instructions/report’ or ‘LIR’) is generated for the purpose of providing support to the person supervising the aircraft loading in order to facilitate this activity and ensure that the load distribution and aircraft loading are completed as per the instructions. (b) The loading instructions contain information about the maximum mass of items that may be loaded in each cargo compartment and instructions for the safe and optimal distribution of items to be loaded in the cargo compartments, along with the cargo segregation rules. (c) The LIR may be part of an existing mass and balance document or a separate form. (d) Usually, the signature on the LIR of the person responsible for loading supervision is the confirmation that the aircraft has been loaded in accordance with the loading instructions. The function of this signed document is to serve as a report. A signed copy of the LIR is retained on the ground.

text: GM2 CAT.POL.MAB.110 Load control process

text: LOADING SUPERVISION AND LOAD PLANNING

text: It is recommended that aircraft loading and unloading are supervised, if possible, by a different person from the one(s) responsible for load planning and the issuance of the mass and balance and load control documentation, the loading instructions and/or the NOTOC.


text: Decision 2014/015 /R of the Executive Director of the Agency of 24 April 2014 adopting Acceptable Means of Compliance and Guidance Material to Part-CAT of

text: Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012

text: and repealing Decision 2012/018/R of the Executive Director of the Agency of 24 October 2012.

identifier: AMC & GM to Part-CAT — Issue 2, Amendment 3

beslut: ED Decision 2015/021/R

text: Annex I to ED Decision 2015/021/R

text: ‘AMC and GM to Part-CAT — Issue 2, Amendment 3’

text: The Annex to ED Decision 2014/015/R (AMC/GM to Annex IV (Part-CAT) to

text: Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012

text: ) is amended as follows: The text of the amendment is arranged to show deleted, new or amended text as shown below:

text: 1. deleted text is marked with strike through;

text: 2. new or amended text is highlighted in grey; and

text: 3. an ellipsis (…) indicates that the remaining text is unchanged in front of or following the reflected amendment.

text: 1. AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(b) has been amended as follows: AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(b) Preservation, production and use of flight recorder recordings OPERATIONAL INSPECTIONS AND CHECKS OF RECORDINGS Whenever a flight recorder is required to be carried, the operator should: (a) the operator should perform an annual inspection of the FDR recording and the CVR recording every year unless one or more of the following applies: (1) If the flight recorder records on magnetic wire or uses frequency modulation technology, the time interval between two inspections of the recording should not exceed three months. (1) Where two solid-state FDRs both fitted with internal built-in-test equipment sufficient to monitor reception and recording of data share the same acquisition unit, a comprehensive recording inspection need only be performed for one FDR. For the second FDR, checking its internal built-in-test equipment is sufficient. The inspection should be performed alternately such that each FDR is inspected once every other year. (2) If the flight recorder is solid-state and the flight recorder system is fitted with continuous monitoring for proper operation, the time interval between two inspections of the recording may be up to two years. (3) In the case of an aircraft equipped with two solid-state flight data and cockpit voice combination recorders, where (i) the flight recorder systems are fitted with continuous monitoring for proper operation, and (ii) the flight recorders share the same flight data acquisition, a comprehensive inspection of the recording needs only to be performed for one flight recorder position. The inspection of the recordings should be performed alternately so that each flight recorder position is inspected at time intervals not exceeding four years. (4)(2) Where all of the following conditions are met, the FDR recording inspection of the FDR recording is not needed: (i) the aircraft flight data are collected in the frame of a flight data monitoring (FDM) programme; (ii) the data acquisition of mandatory flight parameters is the same for the FDR and for the recorder used for the FDM programme; (iii) the integrity of all mandatory flight parameters is verified by the FDM programme an inspection similar to the inspection of the FDR recording and covering all mandatory flight parameters is conducted on the FDM data at time intervals not exceeding two years; and (iv) the FDR is solid-state and the FDR system is fitted with continuous monitoring for proper operation an internal built-in-test equipment sufficient to monitor reception and recording of data. (3) Where two solid-state CVRs are both fitted with internal built-in-test equipment sufficient to monitor reception and recording of data, a comprehensive recording inspection need only to be performed for one CVR. For the second CVR, checking its internal built-in-test equipment is sufficient. The inspection should be performed alternately such that each CVR is inspected once every other year. (b) the operator should perform every 5 five years an inspection of the data link recording. (c) when installed, the aural or visual means for preflight checking the flight recorders for proper operation should be used every day. When no such means is available for a flight recorder, the operator should perform an operational check of this flight recorder at time intervals not exceeding seven calendar days of operation. (c)(d) the operator should check every 5 five years, or in accordance with the recommendations of the sensor manufacturer, that the parameters dedicated to the FDR and not monitored by other means are being recorded within the calibration tolerances and that there is no discrepancy in the engineering conversion routines for these parameters.

text: 2. GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(b) has been amended as follows: GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(b) Preservation, production and use of flight recorders recordings INSPECTION OF THE FLIGHT RECORDERS RECORDINGS (a) The inspection of the FDR recording usually consists of the following: (1) Making a copy of the complete recording file. (2) Converting the recording to parameters expressed in engineering units in accordance with the documentation required to be held. (2)(3) Examining a whole flight in engineering units to evaluate the validity of all mandatory parameters - this could reveal defects or noise in the measuring and processing chains and indicate necessary maintenance actions. The following should be considered: (i) when applicable, each parameter should be expressed in engineering units and checked for different values of its operational range - for this purpose, some parameters may need to be inspected at different flight phases; and (ii) if the parameter is delivered by a digital data bus and the same data are utilised for the operation of the aircraft, then a reasonableness check may be sufficient; otherwise a correlation check may need to be performed;: (A) a reasonableness check is understood in this context as a subjective, qualitative evaluation, requiring technical judgement, of the recordings from a complete flight; and (B) a correlation check is understood in this context as the process of comparing data recorded by the flight data recorder against the corresponding data derived from flight instruments, indicators or the expected values obtained during specified portion(s) of a flight profile or during ground checks that are conducted for that purpose. (3)(4) Retaining the most recent copy of the complete recording file and the corresponding recording inspection report that includes references to the documentation required to be held. (b) The inspection of the CVR recording usually consists of: (1) checking that the CVR operates correctly for the nominal duration of the recording; (2) examining, where practicable and subject to prior approval by the flight crew, a sample of inflight recording of the CVR for evidence that the signal is acceptable on each channel; and (3) preparing and retaining an inspection report. (…)

text: 3. A new GM2 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(b) has been introduced: GM2 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(b) Preservation, production and use of flight recorders recordings MONITORING AND CHECKING THE PROPER OPERATION OF FLIGHT RECORDERS — EXPLANATION OF TERMS For the understanding of the terms used in AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(b): (a) ‘operational check of the flight recorder’ means a check of the flight recorder for proper operation. It is not a check of the quality of the recording and, therefore, it is not equivalent to an inspection of the recording. This check can be carried out by the flight crew or through a maintenance task. (b) ‘aural or visual means for preflight checking the flight recorders for proper operation’ means an aural or visual means for the flight crew to check before the flight the results of an automatically or manually initiated test of the flight recorders for proper operation. Such a means provides for an operational check that can be performed by the flight crew. (c) ‘flight recorder system’ means the flight recorder, its dedicated sensors and transducers, as well as its dedicated acquisition and processing equipment. (d) ‘continuous monitoring for proper operation’ means for a flight recorder system, a combination of system monitors and built-in test functions which operates continuously in order to detect the following: (1) loss of electrical power supply to the flight recorder system; (2) failure of the equipment performing acquisition and processing; (3) failure of the recording medium and/or drive mechanism; and (4) failure of the recorder to store the data in the recording medium as shown by checks of the recorded data including, as reasonably practicable for the storage medium concerned, correct correspondence with the input data.

text: 4. AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.185 has been amended as follows: AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.185 Cockpit voice recorder OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS (a) For aeroplanes first issued with an individual CofA on or after 1 April 1998 and before 1 January 2016, the operational performance requirements for cockpit voice recorders (CVRs) and their dedicated equipment should be those laid down in the European Organisation for Civil Aviation Equipment (EUROCAE) Document ED-56A (Minimum Operational Performance Requirements For Cockpit Voice Recorder Systems) dated December 1993, or EUROCAE Document ED-112 (Minimum Operational Performance Specification for Crash Protected Airborne Recorder Systems) dated March 2003, including aAmendments No 1 and No 2, or any later equivalent standard produced by EUROCAE. (b) For aeroplanes first issued with an individual CofA on or after 1 January 2016,: (1) the operational performance requirements for CVRs should be those laid down in EUROCAE Document ED-112 (Minimum Operational Performance Specification for Crash Protected Airborne Recorder Systems) dated March 2003, including aAmendments No 1 and No 2, or any later equivalent standard produced by EUROCAE.; and (2) the operational performance requirements for equipment dedicated to the CVR should be those laid down in the European Organisation for Civil Aviation Equipment (EUROCAE) Document ED- 56A (Minimum Operational Performance Requirements For Cockpit Voice Recorder Systems) dated December 1993, or EUROCAE Document ED-112 (Minimum Operational Performance Specification for Crash Protected Airborne Recorder Systems) dated March 2003, including Amendments n°1 and n°2 , or any later equivalent standard produced by EUROCAE.

text: 5. In AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.190, the content of the last row of Table 1 (Parameter No 75) has been deleted from this table and inserted into Table 2, between Parameters Nos 74 and 76.

text: 6. In Table 1 of AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.190, the description of Parameter No 18 has been amended as follows: 18 Primary flight control surface and/or primary flight control pilot input (for aeroplanes with control systems in which movement of a control surface will back drive the pilot’s control, ‘or’ applies. For aeroplanes with control systems in which movement of a control surface will not back drive the pilot’s control, ‘and’ applies. Ffor multiple or split surfaces, a suitable combination of inputs is acceptable in lieu of recording each surface separately. For aeroplanes that have a flight control break-away capability that allows either pilot to operate the controls independently, record both inputs): 18a Pitch axis 18b Roll axis 18c Yaw axis

text: 7. AMC1 CAT.IDE.H.185 has been modified as follows: AMC1 CAT.IDE.H.185 Cockpit voice recorder OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS For helicopters first issued with an individual CofA on or after 1 January 2016, (a) the operational performance requirements for cockpit voice recorders (CVRs) should be those laid down in EUROCAE Document ED-112 (Minimum Operational Performance Specification for Crash Protected Airborne Recorder Systems) dated March 2003, including aAmendments No 1 and No 2, or any later equivalent standard produced by EUROCAE.; and (b) the operational performance requirements for equipment dedicated to the CVR should be those laid down in the European Organisation for Civil Aviation Equipment (EUROCAE) Document ED-56A (Minimum Operational Performance Requirements For Cockpit Voice Recorder Systems) dated December 1993, or EUROCAE Document ED-112 (Minimum Operational Performance Specification for Crash Protected Airborne Recorder Systems) dated March 2003, including Amendments No°1 and No°2 , or any later equivalent standard produced by EUROCAE.


identifier: AMC & GM to Part-CAT — Issue 2, Amendment 4

beslut: ED Decision 2015/030/R

text: Annex II to ED Decision 2015/030/R ‘AMC and GM to Part-CAT — Issue 2, Amendment 4’

text: The Annex to Decision 2014/015/R is amended as follows: The text of the amendment is arranged to show deleted text, new or amended text as shown below: (a) deleted text is marked with strikethrough; (b) new or amended text is highlighted in grey; (c) an ellipsis (…) indicates that the remaining text is unchanged in front of or following the reflected amendment.

text: 1. A new GM to sub-paragraph (a)(10) of CAT.GEN.MPA.105 is introduced: GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.105(a)(10) Responsibilities of the commander IDENTIFICATION OF THE SEVERITY OF AN OCCURRENCE BY THE COMMANDER The definitions of an accident and a serious incident as well as examples thereof can be found in

text: Regulation (EU) No 996/2010

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council.

text: 2. A new AMC to sub-paragraph (a) of CAT.GEN.MPA.195 is introduced: AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(a) Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection and use PRESERVATION OF RECORDED DATA FOR INVESTIGATION (a) The operator should establish procedures to ensure that flight recorder recordings are preserved for the investigating authority. (b) These procedures should include: (1) instructions for flight crew members to deactivate the flight recorders immediately after completion of the flight and inform relevant personnel that the recording of the flight recorders should be preserved. These instructions should be readily available on board; and (2) instructions to prevent inadvertent reactivation, test, repair or reinstallation of the flight recorders by operator personnel or during maintenance or ground handling activities performed by third parties.

text: 3. GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(a) is amended as follows: GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(a) Preservation, production and use of flight recorder recordings Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection and use REMOVAL OF RECORDERS IN CASE OF AN INVESTIGATION The need for removal of the recorders from the aircraft is determined by the investigating authority with due regard to the seriousness of an occurrence and the circumstances, including the impact on the operation.

text: 4. AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(b) is amended as follows: AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(b) Preservation, production and use of flight recorder recordings Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection and use (…)

text: 5. GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(b) is amended as follows: GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(b) Preservation, production and use of flight recorder recordings Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection and use (…) (b) When performing the CVR recording inspection, precautions need to be taken to comply with CAT.GEN.MPA.195(f)(1a). The inspection of the CVR recording usually consists of…

text: 6. GM2 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(b) is amended as follows: GM2 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(b) Preservation, production and use of flight recorder recordings Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection and use (…)

text: 7. A new GM3 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(b) is introduced: GM3 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(b) Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection and use CVR AUDIO QUALITY Examples of CVR audio quality issues and possible causes thereof may be found in the document of the French Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses, titled ‘Study on detection of audio anomalies on CVR recordings’ and dated September 2015 .

text: 8. A new GM to sub-paragraph (a) of CAT.IDE.A.195 is introduced: GM1 CAT.IDE.A.195(a) Data link recording APPLICABILITY OF THE DATA LINK RECORDING REQUIREMENT (a) If it is certain that the aeroplane cannot use data link communication messages for ATS communications corresponding to any application designated by CAT.IDE.A.195(a)(1), then the data link recording requirement does not apply. 1 http://www.bea.aero/en/bea/la-technique/guidance.on.detection.of.audio.anomalies.on.CVR.recordings.pdf (b) Examples where the aeroplane cannot use data link communication messages for ATS communications include but are not limited to the cases where: (1) the aeroplane data link communication capability is disabled permanently and in a way that it cannot be enabled again during the flight; (2) data link communications are not used to support air traffic service (ATS) in the area of operation of the aeroplane; and (3) the aeroplane’s data link communication equipment cannot communicate with the equipment used by ATS in the area of operation of the aeroplane.

text: 9. A new AMC to sub-paragraph (f) of CAT.IDE.A.285 is introduced: AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.285(f) Flight over water LOW-FREQUENCY UNDERWATER LOCATING DEVICE (a) The underwater locating device should be compliant with ETSO-C200 or equivalent. (b) The underwater locating device should not be installed in wings or empennage.

text: 10. A new GM to sub-paragraph (a) of CAT.IDE.H.195 is introduced: GM1 CAT.IDE.H.195(a) Data link recording APPLICABILITY OF THE DATA LINK RECORDING REQUIREMENT (a) If it is certain that the helicopter cannot use data link communication messages for ATS communications corresponding to any application designated by CAT.IDE.H.195(a)(1), then the data link recording requirement does not apply. (b) Examples where the helicopter cannot use data link communication messages for ATS communications include but are not limited to the cases where: (1) the helicopter data link communication capability is disabled permanently and in a way that it cannot be enabled again during the flight; (2) data link communications are not used to support air traffic service (ATS) in the area of operation of the helicopter; and (3) the helicopter data link communication equipment cannot communicate with the equipment used by ATS in the area of operation of the helicopter.


identifier: AMC & GM to Part CAT — Issue 2, Amendment 5

beslut: ED Decision 2016/004/R

text: Annex II to ED Decision 2016/004/R

text: Annex II to Decision 2016/004/R

text: `AMC and GM to Part CAT — Issue 2, Amendment 5’

text: The Annex to Decision 2014/015/R is hereby amended as follows: The text of the amendment is arranged to show deleted, new or amended text as shown below:

text: 1. deleted text is marked with strike through;

text: 2. new or amended text is highlighted in grey; and

text: 3. an ellipsis (…) indicates that the remaining text is unchanged in front of or following the reflected amendment.

text: 1. AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.155(b) has been amended as follows: AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.155(b) Carriage of Special Categories of Passengers (SCPs) PROCEDURES When establishing the procedures for the carriage of SCPs special categories of passengers, the operator should take into account the following factors: (a) the aircraft type and cabin configuration; (b) the total number of passengers carried on board; (c) the number and categories of SCPs, which should not exceed the number of passengers capable of assisting them in case of an emergency evacuation; and (d) any other factor(s) or circumstances possibly impacting on the application of emergency procedures by the operating crew members.

text: 2. A new AMC2 CAT.OP.MPA.155(b) has been introduced. AMC2 CAT.OP.MPA.155(b) Carriage of Special Categories of Passengers (SCPs) PROCEDURES TO PROVIDE INFORMATION TO SCP The operator procedures on information provided to the SCP should specify the timing and methods on how and when the information can be provided. Annex II to ED Decision 2016/004/R

text: 3. A new AMC4 CAT.OP.MPA.155(b) has been introduced. AMC3 CAT.OP.MPA.155(b) Carriage of Special Categories of Passengers (SCPs) CONDITIONS OF SAFE CARRIAGE FOR UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN (a) When carrying an unaccompanied child that is not self-reliant, the operator should assess the safety risks to ensure that the child is assisted in case of an emergency situation. (b) A child under the age of 12 years, separated from the accompanying adult, who is travelling in another cabin class, should be considered as an unaccompanied child in order to ensure that the child is assisted in case of an emergency situation.

text: 4. A new GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.155(b) has been introduced. GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.155(b) Carriage of Special Categories of Passengers (SCPs) PROCEDURES TO PROVIDE INFORMATION TO SCP Providing information only at the time of booking might not be sufficient to ensure that the SCP is aware of the information at the time of the flight.

text: 5. A new GM2 CAT.OP.MPA.155(b) has been introduced. GM2 CAT.OP.MPA.155(b) Carriage of Special Categories of Passengers (SCPs) INFORMATION PROVIDED TO SCP When establishing procedures on the information to be provided to an SCP, the operator should consider informing the SCP that cabin crew can only assist the SCP once the cabin has been evacuated. The following table contains additional information by SCP category: SCP category Type of information Unaccompanied child Inform the unaccompanied child on the following: (a) which adult will assist with the operation of the seat belt and the fitting of the oxygen mask if the situation requires it; (b) the content of the passenger safety briefing card; and (c) in case of evacuation, to seek the assistance of adult passenger(s) in contacting a crew member. Inform the passenger sitting next to the unaccompanied child to assist with: (a) providing the child with an oxygen mask in case of decompression after fitting one’s own mask; (b) securing/releasing the child’s seat belt, if necessary; and (c) calling a cabin crew member in all other in-flight situations. When a child and the accompanying adult travel in a different class of cabin, information should be provided to the child and adult that, in the event of an Annex II to ED Decision 2016/004/R emergency, they should follow the instructions of the cabin crew and not try to reunite inside the cabin as this would slow down the overall evacuation. Adult travelling with Information on brace position for adult with lap-held infant. an infant Information on the use of the loop belt, in case of a lap-held infant. Information to fit own oxygen mask before fitting the infant’s oxygen mask. Information on how to evacuate when carrying an infant: (a) On land, jump on the slide; and (b) In case of ditching, how to fit and when to inflate infant flotation aid (e.g. life vest, flotation device). Physically disabled Inform the SCP to leave mobility aid behind in an emergency evacuation. passenger (aided walking) Passenger with Inform the accompanying passenger to: disability of upper (a) fit the life jacket on the SCP, in case of a ditching evacuation; limbs (b) first put on their own oxygen mask before fitting the SCP’s oxygen mask, in case of decompression; and (c) secure/release the SCP’s seat belt, if necessary. Passenger with Inform the SCP: disability of lower (a) on the location of the nearest suitable exit; and limbs (b) that mobility aids might not be accessible in an emergency evacuation. Passenger with Inform accompanying passenger to secure/release the SCP’s seat belt. disability of both Inform the SCP: upper and lower (a) in case of an evacuation, on the location of the nearest suitable exit; limbs (b) in case of a ditching evacuation, that the accompanying passenger should fit the life jacket on the SCP; and (c) in case of a decompression, that the accompanying passenger should first put on his/her own oxygen mask before fitting the SCP’s oxygen mask. Visually impaired Depending on the level of impairment, inform the visually impaired passenger on passenger the following: (a) seat and seat belt operation; (b) location of the nearest exit (e.g. number of seat rows to the nearest exit); (c) oxygen mask deployment; (d) location of life jacket; Annex II to ED Decision 2016/004/R (e) brace position; and (f) location of cabin crew call button. If available, take the aircraft demonstration equipment to the passenger for tactile assistance. Passenger travelling Advise how to evacuate guide dog by holding the dog and sliding. with a recognised assistance dog in the cabin Stretcher occupant Inform the stretcher occupant and the accompanying passenger that in case of an evacuation: (a) the stretcher occupant should be evacuated when the cabin area surrounding the stretcher is clear; (b) to evacuate the stretcher occupant without the stretcher, if possible; (c) to be seated when sliding, holding the stretcher occupant in front; and (d) in the event of a ditching evacuation, to fit the life jacket on the stretcher occupant.

text: 6. A new GM3 CAT.OP.MPA.155(b) has been introduced. GM3 CAT.OP.MPA.155(b) Carriage of Special Categories of Passengers (SCPs) PROCEDURES A passenger capable of assisting in case of an emergency means a passenger who is not an SCP and has no other role or private responsibility that would prevent him/her from assisting the SCP. For example, an adult travelling alone has no other role or private responsibility, unlike a family travelling together with younger children.

text: 7. A new GM4 CAT.OP.MPA.155(b) has been introduced. GM4 CAT.OP.MPA.155(b) Carriage of Special Categories of Passengers (SCPs) BRIEFING PROCEDURE IN A PLANNED EMERGENCY In a planned emergency, if time permits, passengers identified by the cabin crew as capable of assisting an SCP should be briefed on the assistance they can provide.

text: 8. A new AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.155(c) has been introduced. AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.155(c) Carriage of Special Categories of Passengers (SCPs) SEATING PROCEDURES When establishing SCP seating procedures, the operator should take into account the following factors: (a) If the SCP travels with an accompanying passenger, the accompanying passenger should be seated next to the SCP. Annex II to ED Decision 2016/004/R (b) If the SCP is unable to negotiate stairs within the cabin unaided, he/she should not be seated on the upper deck of a multi-deck aircraft if the exits are not certified for emergency evacuation on both land and water.

text: 9. A new AMC2 CAT.OP.MPA.155(c) has been introduced. AMC2 CAT.OP.MPA.155(c) Carriage of Special Categories of Passengers (SCPs) SEATING ALLOCATION OF SCP WITH A DISABILITY AND/OR RESTRAINT AID (a) A disability and/or restraint aid that requires to be secured around the back of the seat should not be used if there is a person seated behind unless the seating configuration is approved for the use of such devices. This is to avoid the changed dynamic seat reactions with the disability and/or restraint aid, which may lead to head injury of the passenger seated behind. (b) If the seat design or installation would prevent head contact of the person seated behind, then no further consideration is necessary.

text: 10. A new GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.155(c) has been introduced. GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.155(c) Carriage of Special categories of Passengers (SCPs) GROUP SEATING (a) Taking into account access to exits, groups of non-ambulatory SCPs should be seated throughout the cabin to ensure that each SCP is surrounded by the maximum number of passengers capable of assisting in case of an emergency. (b) If non-ambulatory SCPs cannot be evenly distributed throughout the cabin, the operator should establish procedures to mitigate the increased safety risk such as seating of passengers capable of assisting in case of an emergency in the vicinity, additional information or training of cabin crew. (c) A group of passengers whose physical size would possibly prevent them from moving quickly or reaching and passing through an emergency exit, should not occupy the same seat row segment to avoid overloading the structure of the seat.

text: 11. A new GM2 CAT.OP.MPA.155(c) has been introduced. GM2 CAT.OP.MPA.155(c) Carriage of Special Categories of Passengers (SCPs) SEATING ALLOCATION When establishing the procedure on seating of an SCP, seats should be allocated taking into account the following: SCP category Seating allocation procedure Unaccompanied The seating allocation of an unaccompanied child should allow for visual or child audible communication during all phases of the flight with cabin crew. Groups of unaccompanied children should be seated in mix of ages, with the tallest child seated to allow assistance with fitting drop-down oxygen mask to smaller children in case of a decompression. Where possible, one adult should occupy the seat across the aisle next to Annex II to ED Decision 2016/004/R each row of unaccompanied children. Passenger travelling If a child travels with an accompanying adult in the same class of cabin, the with a child of less child should be seated in the same seat row segment as the accompanying than 12 years of age adult. Where this is not possible, the child should be seated no more than one seat row or aisle away. Passenger whose A passenger whose physical size would possibly prevent him/her from physical size would passing through an emergency exit (e.g. Type III or Type IV exit), should be possibly prevent seated in the vicinity of a suitable exit, taking into account the size of the exit. him/her from Seating of more than one of such passengers in the same seat row segment passing through an should be avoided. emergency exit Passenger with A passenger with a physical disability of the upper limbs travelling without an physical disability of accompanying passenger should be allocated seats during all phases of the the upper limbs flight so that visual and audible communication can be established with the cabin crew. Passenger with A passenger with a disability of the lower limbs should be seated in a location disability of lower providing easy access to floor level exits. limbs Passenger with A passenger with a disability of both upper and lower limbs should be seated disability of both in a location providing easy access to floor level exits. upper and lower limbs Mentally impaired A mentally impaired passenger, who travels without an accompanying passenger passenger, should be allocated seats during all phases of the flight so that visual and audible communication can be established with the cabin crew. Passenger travelling Suitable arrangements should be made between the passenger and the with recognised operator in advance of a flight where a recognised assistance dog is to be assistance dog in accommodated. A suitable restraint harness should be provided by the the cabin owner to secure and restrain the dog during taxi, take-off, landing and turbulence. In cruise, it is acceptable for the dog to be subject to less restraint. Stretcher occupant Where possible, the stretcher should be installed behind a cabin monument. Alternatively, the stretcher could be installed where it can demonstrate compliance with the appropriate certification basis (CS.25.561 and CS.25.562(b), (c)(7), (8)). Stretcher installation should be as close to the floor level non-overwing exits as practical; preferably close to a required cabin crew station with an adjacent seat for the designated accompanying passenger.


identifier: AMC & GM to Part-CAT — Issue 2, Amendment 6

beslut: ED Decision 2016/015/R

text: Annex to ED Decision 2016/015/R

text: Annex to Decision 2016/015/R

text: ‘AMC and GM to Part-CAT — Issue 2, Amendment 6’

text: The Annex to Decision 2014/015/R is hereby amended as follows:

text: The text of the amendment is arranged to show deleted, new or amended text as shown below:

text: 1. The following AMC/GM have been either introduced or amended:

text: Subpart B — Operating procedures Section 1 — Motor-powered aircraft

text: AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.126 Performance-based navigation

text: PBN OPERATIONS For operations where a navigation specification for performance-based navigation (PBN) has been prescribed and no specific approval is required in accordance with SPA.PBN.100, the operator should: (a) establish operating procedures specifying: (1) normal, abnormal and contingency procedures; (2) electronic navigation database management; and (3) relevant entries in the minimum equipment list (MEL); (b) specify the flight crew qualification and proficiency constraints and ensure that the training programme for relevant personnel is consistent with the intended operation; and (c) ensure continued airworthiness of the area navigation system.

text: Annex to ED Decision 2016/015/R

text: AMC2 CAT.OP.MPA.126 Performance-based navigation

text: MONITORING AND VERIFICATION (a) Preflight and general considerations (1) At navigation system initialisation, the flight crew should confirm that the navigation database is current and verify that the aircraft position has been entered correctly, if required. (2) The active flight plan, if applicable, should be checked by comparing the charts or other applicable documents with navigation equipment and displays. This includes confirmation of the departing runway and the waypoint sequence, reasonableness of track angles and distances, any altitude or speed constraints, and, where possible, which waypoints are fly-by and which are fly-over. Where relevant, the RF leg arc radii should be confirmed. (3) The flight crew should check that the navigation aids critical to the operation of the intended PBN procedure are available. (4) The flight crew should confirm the navigation aids that should be excluded from the operation, if any. (5) An arrival, approach or departure procedure should not be used if the validity of the procedure in the navigation database has expired. (6) The flight crew should verify that the navigation systems required for the intended operation are operational. (b) Departure (1) Prior to commencing a take-off on a PBN procedure, the flight crew should check that the indicated aircraft position is consistent with the actual aircraft position at the start of the take-off roll (aeroplanes) or lift-off (helicopters). (2) Where GNSS is used, the signal should be acquired before the take-off roll (aeroplanes) or lift-off (helicopters) commences. (3) Unless automatic updating of the actual departure point is provided, the flight crew should ensure initialisation on the runway or FATO by means of a manual runway threshold or intersection update, as applicable. This is to preclude any inappropriate or inadvertent position shift after take-off. (c) Arrival and approach (1) The flight crew should verify that the navigation system is operating correctly and the correct arrival procedure and runway (including any applicable transition) are entered and properly depicted. (2) Any published altitude and speed constraints should be observed. (3) The flight crew should check approach procedures (including alternate aerodromes if needed) as extracted by the system (e.g. CDU flight plan page) or presented graphically on the moving map, in order to confirm the correct loading and the reasonableness of the procedure content.

text: Annex to ED Decision 2016/015/R

text: (4) Prior to commencing the approach operation (before the IAF), the flight crew should verify the correctness of the loaded procedure by comparison with the appropriate approach charts. This check should include: (i) the waypoint sequence; (ii) reasonableness of the tracks and distances of the approach legs and the accuracy of the inbound course; and (iii) the vertical path angle, if applicable. (d) Altimetry settings for RNP APCH operations using Baro VNAV (1) Barometric settings (i) The flight crew should set and confirm the correct altimeter setting and check that the two altimeters provide altitude values that do not differ more than 100 ft at the most at or before the final approach fix (FAF). (ii) The flight crew should fly the procedure with: (A) a current local altimeter setting source available — a remote or regional altimeter setting source should not be used; and (B) the QNH/QFE, as appropriate, set on the aircraft’s altimeters. (2) Temperature compensation (i) For RNP APCH operations to LNAV/VNAV minima using Baro VNAV: (A) the flight crew should not commence the approach when the aerodrome temperature is outside the promulgated aerodrome temperature limits for the procedure unless the area navigation system is equipped with approved temperature compensation for the final approach; (B) when the temperature is within promulgated limits, the flight crew should not make compensation to the altitude at the FAF and DA/H; (C) since only the final approach segment is protected by the promulgated aerodrome temperature limits, the flight crew should consider the effect of temperature on terrain and obstacle clearance in other phases of flight. (ii) For RNP APCH operations to LNAV minima, the flight crew should consider the effect of temperature on terrain and obstacle clearance in all phases of flight, in particular on any step-down fix. (e) Sensor and lateral navigation accuracy selection (1) For multi-sensor systems, the flight crew should verify, prior to approach, that the GNSS sensor is used for position computation. (2) Flight crew of aircraft with RNP input selection capability should confirm that the indicated RNP value is appropriate for the PBN operation.

text: Annex to ED Decision 2016/015/R

text: AMC3 CAT.OP.MPA.126 Performance-based navigation

text: MANAGAMENT OF THE NAVIGATION DATABASE (a) For RNAV 1, RNAV 2, RNP 1, RNP 2, and RNP APCH, the flight crew should neither insert nor modify waypoints by manual entry into a procedure (departure, arrival or approach) that has been retrieved from the database. User-defined data may be entered and used for waypoint altitude/speed constraints on a procedure where said constraints are not included in the navigation database coding. (b) For RNP 4 operations, the flight crew should not modify waypoints that have been retrieved from the database. User-defined data (e.g. for flex-track routes) may be entered and used. (c) The lateral and vertical definition of the flight path between the FAF and the missed approach point (MAPt) retrieved from the database should not be revised by the flight crew.

text: AMC4 CAT.OP.MPA.126 Performance-based navigation

text: DISPLAYS AND AUTOMATION (a) For RNAV 1, RNP 1, and RNP APCH operations, the flight crew should use a lateral deviation indicator, and where available, flight director and/or autopilot in lateral navigation mode. (b) The appropriate displays should be selected so that the following information can be monitored: (1) the computed desired path; (2) aircraft position relative to the lateral path (cross-track deviation) for FTE monitoring; (3) aircraft position relative to the vertical path (for a 3D operation). (c) The flight crew of an aircraft with a lateral deviation indicator (e.g. CDI) should ensure that lateral deviation indicator scaling (full-scale deflection) is suitable for the navigation accuracy associated with the various segments of the procedure. (d) The flight crew should maintain procedure centrelines unless authorised to deviate by air traffic control (ATC) or demanded by emergency conditions. (e) Cross-track error/deviation (the difference between the area-navigation-system-computed path and the aircraft-computed position) should normally be limited to ± ½ time the RNAV/RNP value associated with the procedure. Brief deviations from this standard (e.g. overshoots or undershoots during and immediately after turns) up to a maximum of 1 time the RNAV/RNP value should be allowable. (f) For a 3D approach operation, the flight crew should use a vertical deviation indicator and, where required by AFM limitations, a flight director or autopilot in vertical navigation mode. (g) Deviations below the vertical path should not exceed 75 ft at any time, or half-scale deflection where angular deviation is indicated, and not more than 75 ft above the vertical profile, or half-scale deflection where angular deviation is indicated, at or below 1 000 ft above aerodrome level. The flight crew should execute a missed approach if the vertical deviation exceeds this criterion, unless the flight crew has in sight the visual references required to continue the approach.

text: Annex to ED Decision 2016/015/R

text: AMC5 CAT.OP.MPA.126 Performance-based navigation

text: VECTORING AND POSITIONING (a) ATC tactical interventions in the terminal area may include radar headings, ‘direct to’ clearances which bypass the initial legs of an approach procedure, interceptions of an initial or intermediate segments of an approach procedure or the insertion of additional waypoints loaded from the database. (b) In complying with ATC instructions, the flight crew should be aware of the implications for the navigation system. (c) ‘Direct to’ clearances may be accepted to the IF provided that it is clear to the flight crew that the aircraft will be established on the final approach track at least 2 NM before the FAF. (d) ‘Direct to’ clearance to the FAF should not be acceptable. Modifying the procedure to intercept the final approach track prior to the FAF should be acceptable for radar-vectored arrivals or otherwise only with ATC approval. (e) The final approach trajectory should be intercepted no later than the FAF in order for the aircraft to be correctly established on the final approach track before starting the descent (to ensure terrain and obstacle clearance). (f) ‘Direct to’ clearances to a fix that immediately precede an RF leg should not be permitted. (g) For parallel offset operations en route in RNP 4 and A-RNP, transitions to and from the offset track should maintain an intercept angle of no more than 45° unless specified otherwise by ATC.

text: AMC6 CAT.OP.MPA.126 Performance-based navigation

text: ALERTING AND ABORT (a) Unless the flight crew has sufficient visual reference to continue the approach operation to a safe landing, an RNP APCH operation should be discontinued if: (1) navigation system failure is annunciated (e.g. warning flag); (2) lateral or vertical deviations exceed the tolerances; (3) loss of the on-board monitoring and alerting system. (b) Discontinuing the approach operation may not be necessary for a multi-sensor navigation system that includes demonstrated RNP capability without GNSS in accordance with the AFM. (c) Where vertical guidance is lost while the aircraft is still above 1 000 ft AGL, the flight crew may decide to continue the approach to LNAV minima, when supported by the navigation system.

text: AMC7 CAT.OP.MPA.126 Performance-based navigation

text: CONTINGENCY PROCEDURES (a) The flight crew should make the necessary preparation to revert to a conventional arrival procedure where appropriate. The following conditions should be considered: (1) failure of the navigation system components including navigation sensors, and a failure effecting flight technical error (e.g. failures of the flight director or autopilot); (2) multiple system failures affecting aircraft performance;

text: Annex to ED Decision 2016/015/R

text: (3) coasting on inertial sensors beyond a specified time limit; and (4) RAIM (or equivalent) alert or loss of integrity function. (b) In the event of loss of PBN capability, the flight crew should invoke contingency procedures and navigate using an alternative means of navigation. (c) The flight crew should notify ATC of any problem with PBN capability. (d) In the event of communication failure, the flight crew should continue with the operation in accordance with published lost communication procedures.

text: GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.126 Performance-based navigation

text: DESCRIPTION (a) For both, RNP X and RNAV X designations, the ‘X’ (where stated) refers to the lateral navigation accuracy (total system error) in NM, which is expected to be achieved at least 95 % of the flight time by the population of aircraft operating within the airspace, route or procedure. For RNP APCH and A-RNP, the lateral navigation accuracy depends on the segment. (b) PBN may be required on notified routes, for notified procedures and in notified airspace. RNAV 10 (c) For purposes of consistency with the PBN concept, this Regulation is using the designation ‘RNAV 10’ because this specification does not include on-board performance monitoring and alerting. (d) However, it should be noted that many routes still use the designation ‘RNP 10’ instead of ‘RNAV 10’. ‘RNP 10’ was used as designation before the publication of the fourth edition of ICAO Doc 9613 in 2013. The terms ‘RNP 10’ and ‘RNAV 10’ should be considered equivalent. …

text: AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.135 Routes and areas of operation — general

text: RNAV 10 (a) Operating procedures and routes should take account of the RNAV 10 time limit declared for the inertial system, if applicable, considering also the effect of weather conditions that could affect flight duration in RNAV 10 airspace. (b) The operator may extend RNAV 10 inertial navigation time by position updating. The operator should calculate, using statistically-based typical wind scenarios for each planned route, points at which updates can be made, and the points at which further updates will not be possible. …

text: AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.175 Flight preparation

text: FLIGHT PREPARATION FOR PBN OPERATIONS (a) The flight crew should ensure that RNAV 1, RNAV 2, RNP 1 RNP 2, and RNP APCH routes or procedures to be used for the intended flight, including for any alternate aerodromes, are selectable from the navigation database and are not prohibited by NOTAM.

text: Annex to ED Decision 2016/015/R

text: (b) The flight crew should take account of any NOTAMs or operator briefing material that could adversely affect the aircraft system operation along its flight plan including any alternate aerodromes. (c) When PBN relies on GNSS systems for which RAIM is required for integrity, its availability should be verified during the preflight planning. In the event of a predicted continuous loss of fault detection of more than five minutes, the flight planning should be revised to reflect the lack of full PBN capability for that period. (d) For RNP 4 operations with only GNSS sensors, a fault detection and exclusion (FDE) check should be performed. The maximum allowable time for which FDE capability is projected to be unavailable on any one event is 25 minutes. If predictions indicate that the maximum allowable FDE outage will be exceeded, the operation should be rescheduled to a time when FDE is available. (e) For RNAV 10 operations, the flight crew should take account of the RNAV 10 time limit declared for the inertial system, if applicable, considering also the effect of weather conditions that could affect flight duration in RNAV 10 airspace. Where an extension to the time limit is permitted, the flight crew will need to ensure that en route radio facilities are serviceable before departure, and to apply radio updates in accordance with any AFM limitation.

text: AMC2 CAT.OP.MPA.175 Flight preparation

text: DATABASE SUITABILITY (a) The flight crew should check that any navigational database required for PBN operations includes the routes and procedures required for the flight. DATABASE CURRENCY (b) The database validity (current AIRAC cycle) should be checked before the flight. (c) Navigation databases should be current for the duration of the flight. If the AIRAC cycle is due to change during flight, the flight crew should follow procedures established by the operator to ensure the accuracy of navigation data, including the suitability of navigation facilities used to define the routes and procedures for the flight. (d) An expired database may only be used if the following conditions are satisfied: (1) the operator has confirmed that the parts of the database which are intended to be used during the flight and any contingencies that are reasonable to expect are not changed in the current version; (2) any NOTAMs associated with the navigational data are taken into account; (3) maps and charts corresponding to those parts of the flight are current and have not been amended since the last cycle; (4) any MEL limitations are observed; and (5) the database has expired by no more than 28 days. …

text: Annex to ED Decision 2016/015/R

text: AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.182 Destination aerodromes — instrument approach operations

text: PBN OPERATIONS The pilot-in-command should only select an aerodrome as a destination alternate aerodrome if an instrument approach procedure that does not rely on GNSS is available either at that aerodrome or at the destination aerodrome.

text: GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.182 Destination aerodromes — instrument approach operations

text: INTENT OF AMC1 (a) The limitation applies only to destination alternate aerodromes for flights when a destination alternate aerodrome is required. A take-off or en route alternate aerodrome with instrument approach procedures relying on GNSS may be planned without restrictions. A destination aerodrome with all instrument approach procedures relying solely on GNSS may be used without a destination alternate aerodrome if the conditions for a flight without a destination alternate aerodrome are met. (b) The term ‘available’ means that the procedure can be used in the planning stage and complies with planning minima requirements. …

text: Subpart D — Instruments, data and equipment Section 1 — Aeroplanes

text: AMC2 CAT.IDE.A.205 Seats, seat safety belts, restraint systems and child restraint devices

text: UPPER TORSO RESTRAINT SYSTEM (a) An upper torso restraint system, having including a seat belt, two shoulder straps and additional straps is deemed to be compliant with the requirement for restraint systems with two shoulder straps. (b) An upper torso restraint system which restrains permanently the torso of the occupant is deemed to be compliant with the requirement for an upper torso restraint system incorporating a device that will automatically restrain the occupant’s torso in the event of rapid deceleration. (c) The use of the upper torso restraint independently from the use of the seat belt is intended as an option for the comfort of the occupant of the seat in those phases of flight where only the seat belt is required to be fastened. A restraint system including a seat belt and an upper torso restraint that both remain permanently fastened is also acceptable. SEAT BELT (d) A seat belt with a diagonal shoulder strap (three anchorage points) is deemed to be compliant with the requirement for a seat belt (two anchorage points). …

text: GM1 CAT.IDE.A.205 Seats, seat safety belts, restraint systems and child restraint devices

text: EMERGENCY LANDING DYNAMIC CONDITIONS

text: Annex to ED Decision 2016/015/R

text: Emergency landing dynamic conditions are defined in 23.562 of CS-23 or equivalent and in 25.562 of CS- 25 or equivalent. …

text: GM2 CAT.IDE.A.345 Communication and navigation equipment for operations under IFR or under VFR over routes not navigated by reference to visual landmarks

text: AIRCRAFT ELIGIBILITY FOR PBN SPECIFICATION NOT REQUIRING SPECIFIC APPROVAL (a) The performance of the aircraft is usually stated in the AFM. (b) Where such a reference cannot be found in the AFM, other information provided by the aircraft manufacturer as TC holder, the STC holder or the design organisation having a privilege to approve minor changes may be considered. (c) The following documents are considered acceptable sources of information: (1) AFM, supplements thereto, and documents directly referenced in the AFM; (2) FCOM or similar document; (3) Service Bulletin or Service Letter issued by the TC holder or STC holder; (4) approved design data or data issued in support of a design change approval; (5) any other formal document issued by the TC or STC holders stating compliance with PBN specifications, AMC, Advisory Circulars (AC) or similar documents issued by the State of Design; and (6) written evidence obtained from the State of Design. (d) Equipment qualification data, in itself, is not sufficient to assess the PBN capabilities of the aircraft, since the latter depend on installation and integration. (e) As some PBN equipment and installations may have been certified prior to the publication of the PBN Manual and the adoption of its terminology for the navigation specifications, it is not always possible to find a clear statement of aircraft PBN capability in the AFM. However, aircraft eligibility for certain PBN specifications can rely on the aircraft performance certified for PBN procedures and routes prior to the publication of the PBN Manual. (f) Below, various references are listed which may be found in the AFM or other acceptable documents (see listing above) in order to consider the aircraft’s eligibility for a specific PBN specification if the specific term is not used. (g) RNAV 5 (1) If a statement of compliance with any of the following specifications or standards is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above, the aircraft is eligible for RNAV 5 operations. (i) B-RNAV; (ii) RNAV 1; (iii) RNP APCH; (iv) RNP 4; (v) A-RNP;

text: Annex to ED Decision 2016/015/R

text: (vi) AMC 20-4; (vii) JAA TEMPORARY GUIDANCE MATERIAL, LEAFLET NO. 2 (TGL 2); (viii) JAA AMJ 20X2; (ix) FAA AC 20-130A for en route operations; (x) FAA AC 20-138 for en route operations; and (xi) FAA AC 90-96. (h) RNAV 1/RNAV 2 (1) If a statement of compliance with any of the following specifications or standards is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above, the aircraft is eligible for RNAV 1/RNAV 2 operations. (i) RNAV 1; (ii) PRNAV; (iii) US RNAV type A; (iv) FAA AC 20-138 for the appropriate navigation specification; (v) FAA AC 90-100A; (vi) JAA TEMPORARY GUIDANCE MATERIAL, LEAFLET NO. 10 Rev1 (TGL 10); and (vii) FAA AC 90-100. (2) However, if position determination is exclusively computed based on VOR-DME, the aircraft is not eligible for RNAV 1/RNAV 2 operations. (i) RNP 1/RNP 2 continental (1) If a statement of compliance with any of the following specifications or standards is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above, the aircraft is eligible for RNP 1/RNP 2 continental operations. (i) A-RNP; (ii) FAA AC 20-138 for the appropriate navigation specification; and (iii) FAA AC 90-105. (2) Alternatively, if a statement of compliance with any of the following specifications or standards is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above and position determination is primarily based on GNSS, the aircraft is eligible for RNP 1/RNP 2 continental operations. However, in these cases, loss of GNSS implies loss of RNP 1/RNP 2 capability. (i) JAA TEMPORARY GUIDANCE MATERIAL, LEAFLET NO. 10 (TGL 10) (any revision); and (ii) FAA AC 90-100. (j) RNP APCH — LNAV minima (1) If a statement of compliance with any of the following specifications or standards is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above, the aircraft is eligible for RNP APCH — LNAV operations.

text: Annex to ED Decision 2016/015/R

text: (i) A-RNP; (ii) AMC 20-27; (iii) AMC 20-28; (iv) FAA AC 20-138 for the appropriate navigation specification; and (v) FAA AC 90-105 for the appropriate navigation specification. (2) Alternatively, if a statement of compliance with RNP 0.3 GNSS approaches in accordance with any of the following specifications or standards is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above, the aircraft is eligible for RNP APCH — LNAV operations. Any limitation such as ‘within the US National Airspace’ may be ignored since RNP APCH procedures are assumed to meet the same ICAO criteria around the world. (i) JAA TEMPORARY GUIDANCE MATERIAL, LEAFLET NO. 3 (TGL 3); (ii) AMC 20-4; (iii) FAA AC 20-130A; and (iv) FAA AC 20-138. (k) RNP APCH — LNAV/VNAV minima (1) If a statement of compliance with any of the following specifications or standards is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above, the aircraft is eligible for RNP APCH — LNAV/VNAV operations. (i) A-RNP; (ii) AMC 20-27 with Baro VNAV; (iii) AMC 20-28; (iv) FAA AC 20-138; and (v) FAA AC 90-105 for the appropriate navigation specification. (2) Alternatively, if a statement of compliance with FAA AC 20-129 is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above, and the aircraft complies with the requirements and limitations of EASA SIB 2014-04 , the aircraft is eligible for RNP APCH — LNAV/VNAV operations. Any limitation such as ‘within the US National Airspace’ may be ignored since RNP APCH procedures are assumed to meet the same ICAO criteria around the world. (l) RNP APCH — LPV minima (1) If a statement of compliance with any of the following specifications or standards is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above, the aircraft is eligible for RNP APCH — LPV operations. (i) AMC 20-28; (ii) FAA AC 20-138 for the appropriate navigation specification; and (iii) FAA AC 90-107.

text: Annex to ED Decision 2016/015/R

text: (2) For aircraft that have a TAWS Class A installed and do not provide Mode-5 protection on an LPV approach, the DH is limited to 250 ft. (m) RNAV 10 (1) If a statement of compliance with any of the following specifications or standards is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above, the aircraft is eligible for RNAV 10 operations. (i) RNP 10; (ii) FAA AC 20-138 for the appropriate navigation specification; (iii) AMC 20-12; (iv) FAA Order 8400.12 (or later revision); and (v) FAA AC 90-105. (n) RNP 4 (1) If a statement of compliance with any of the following specifications or standards is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above, the aircraft is eligible for RNP 4 operations. (i) FAA AC 20-138B or later, for the appropriate navigation specification; (ii) FAA Order 8400.33; and (iii) FAA AC 90-105 for the appropriate navigation specification. (o) RNP 2 oceanic (1) If a statement of compliance with FAA AC 90-105 for the appropriate navigation specification is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above, the aircraft is eligible for RNP 2 oceanic operations. (2) If the aircraft has been assessed eligible for RNP 4, the aircraft is eligible for RNP 2 oceanic. (p) Special features (1) RF in terminal operations (used in RNP 1 and in the initial segment of the RNP APCH) (i) If a statement of demonstrated capability to perform an RF leg, certified in accordance with any of the following specifications or standards, is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above, the aircraft is eligible for RF in terminal operations: (A) AMC 20-26; and (B) FAA AC 20-138B or later. (ii) If there is a reference to RF and a reference to compliance with AC 90-105, then the aircraft is eligible for such operations. (q) Other considerations (1) In all cases, the limitations in the AFM need to be checked; in particular, the use of AP or FD which can be required to reduce the FTE primarily for RNP APCH, RNAV 1, and RNP 1. (2) Any limitation such as ‘within the US National Airspace’ may be ignored since RNP APCH procedures are assumed to meet the same ICAO criteria around the world.

text: Annex to ED Decision 2016/015/R

text: GM3 CAT.IDE.A.345 Communication and navigation equipment for operations under IFR or under VFR over routes not navigated by reference to visual landmarks

text: GENERAL (a) The PBN specifications for which the aircraft complies with the relevant airworthiness criteria are set out in the AFM, together with any limitations to be observed. (b) Because functional and performance requirements are defined for each navigation specification, an aircraft approved for an RNP specification is not automatically approved for all RNAV specifications. Similarly, an aircraft approved for an RNP or RNAV specification having a stringent accuracy requirement (e.g. RNP 0.3 specification) is not automatically approved for a navigation specification having a less stringent accuracy requirement (e.g. RNP 4). RNP 4 (c) For RNP 4, at least two LRNSs, capable of navigating to RNP 4, and listed in the AFM, may be operational at the entry point of the RNP 4 airspace. If an item of equipment required for RNP 4 operations is unserviceable, then the flight crew may consider an alternate route or diversion for repairs. For multisensor systems, the AFM may permit entry if one GNSS sensor is lost after departure, provided one GNSS and one inertial sensor remain available. …

text: Section 2 — Helicopters

text: GM2 CAT.IDE.H.345 Communication and navigation equipment for operations under IFR or under VFR over routes not navigated by reference to visual landmarks

text: Annex to ED Decision 2016/015/R

text: (e) As some PBN equipment and installations may have been certified prior to the publication of the PBN Manual and the adoption of its terminology for the navigation specifications, it is not always possible to find a clear statement of aircraft PBN capability in the AFM. However, aircraft eligibility for certain PBN specifications can rely on the aircraft performance certified for PBN procedures and routes prior to the publication of the PBN Manual. (f) Below, various references are listed which may be found in the AFM or other acceptable documents (see listing above) in order to consider the aircraft’s eligibility for a specific PBN specification if the specific term is not used. (g) RNAV 5 (1) If a statement of compliance with any of the following specifications or standards is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above, the aircraft is eligible for RNAV 5 operations. (i) B-RNAV; (ii) RNAV 1; (iii) RNP APCH; (iv) RNP 4; (v) A-RNP; (vi) AMC 20-4; (vii) JAA TEMPORARY GUIDANCE MATERIAL, LEAFLET NO. 2 (TGL 2); (viii) JAA AMJ 20X2; (ix) FAA AC 20-130A for en route operations; (x) FAA AC 20-138 for en route operations; and (xi) FAA AC 90-96. (h) RNAV 1/RNAV 2 (1) If a statement of compliance with any of the following specifications or standards is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above, the aircraft is eligible for RNAV 1/RNAV 2 operations. (i) RNAV 1; (ii) PRNAV; (iii) US RNAV type A; (iv) FAA AC 20-138 for the appropriate navigation specification; (v) FAA AC 90-100A; (vi) JAA TEMPORARY GUIDANCE MATERIAL, LEAFLET NO. 10 Rev1 (TGL 10); and (vii) FAA AC 90-100. (2) However, if position determination is exclusively computed based on VOR-DME, the aircraft is not eligible for RNAV 1/RNAV 2 operations.

text: Annex to ED Decision 2016/015/R

text: (i) RNP 1/RNP 2 continental (1) If a statement of compliance with any of the following specifications or standards is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above, the aircraft is eligible for RNP 1/RNP 2 continental operations. (i) A-RNP; (ii) FAA AC 20-138 for the appropriate navigation specification; and (iii) FAA AC 90-105. (2) Alternatively, if a statement of compliance with any of the following specifications or standards is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above and position determination is primarily based on GNSS, the aircraft is eligible for RNP 1/RNP 2 continental operations. However, in these cases, loss of GNSS implies loss of RNP 1/RNP 2 capability. (i) JAA TEMPORARY GUIDANCE MATERIAL, LEAFLET NO. 10 (TGL 10) (any revision); and (ii) FAA AC 90-100. (j) RNP APCH — LNAV minima (1) If a statement of compliance with any of the following specifications or standards is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above, the aircraft is eligible for RNP APCH — LNAV operations. (i) A-RNP; (ii) AMC 20-27; (iii) AMC 20-28; (iv) FAA AC 20-138 for the appropriate navigation specification; and (v) FAA AC 90-105 for the appropriate navigation specification. (2) Alternatively, if a statement of compliance with RNP 0.3 GNSS approaches in accordance with any of the following specifications or standards is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above, the aircraft is eligible for RNP APCH — LNAV operations. Any limitation such as ‘within the US National Airspace’ may be ignored since RNP APCH procedures are assumed to meet the same ICAO criteria around the world. (i) JAA TEMPORARY GUIDANCE MATERIAL, LEAFLET NO. 3 (TGL 3); (ii) AMC 20-4; (iii) FAA AC 20-130A; and (iv) FAA AC 20-138. (k) RNP APCH — LNAV/VNAV minima (1) If a statement of compliance with any of the following specifications or standards is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above, the aircraft is eligible for RNP APCH — LNAV/VNAV operations. (i) A-RNP;

text: Annex to ED Decision 2016/015/R

text: (ii) AMC 20-27 with Baro VNAV; (iii) AMC 20-28; (iv) FAA AC 20-138; and (v) FAA AC 90-105 for the appropriate navigation specification. (2) Alternatively, if a statement of compliance with FAA AC 20-129 is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above, and the aircraft complies with the requirements and limitations of EASA SIB 2014-04 , the aircraft is eligible for RNP APCH — LNAV/VNAV operations. Any limitation such as ‘within the US National Airspace’ may be ignored since RNP APCH procedures are assumed to meet the same ICAO criteria around the world. (l) RNP APCH — LPV minima (1) If a statement of compliance with any of the following specifications or standards is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above, the aircraft is eligible for RNP APCH — LPV operations. (i) AMC 20-28; (ii) FAA AC 20-138 for the appropriate navigation specification; and (iii) FAA AC 90-107. (2) For aircraft that have a TAWS Class A installed and do not provide Mode-5 protection on an LPV approach, the DH is limited to 250 ft. (m) RNAV 10 (1) If a statement of compliance with any of the following specifications or standards is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above, the aircraft is eligible for RNAV 10 operations. (i) RNP 10; (ii) FAA AC 20-138 for the appropriate navigation specification; (iii) AMC 20-12; (iv) FAA Order 8400.12 (or later revision); and (v) FAA AC 90-105. (n) RNP 4 (1) If a statement of compliance with any of the following specifications or standards is found in the acceptable documentation as listed above, the aircraft is eligible for RNP 4 operations. (i) FAA AC 20-138B or later, for the appropriate navigation specification; (ii) FAA Order 8400.33; and (iii) FAA AC 90-105 for the appropriate navigation specification. (o) RNP 2 oceanic

text: Annex to ED Decision 2016/015/R

text: GM3 CAT.IDE.H.345 Communication and navigation equipment for operations under IFR or under VFR over routes not navigated by reference to visual landmarks