text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 2 Zakon o preprečevanju zamud pri plačilih, published in Uradni list Republike Slovenije No 18/2011. 3 All ECB opinions are published on the ECB's website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: For details on the consulting authority’s duty to consult the ECB, see paragraphs 2.1 to 2.5 of Opinion

text: . 5 See paragraph 3.1 of Opinion

text: . 6 See paragraph 3.5 of Opinion

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 5 August 2011 on amendments to the Law on prevention of late payments (CON/2011/61)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 5 August 2011 on amendments to the Law on prevention of late payments (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 19 July 2011, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Slovenian Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft law amending the Law on prevention of late payments (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to Banka Slovenije. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The draft law amends the Law on prevention of late payments (hereinafter the ‘Law’) that was addressed in Opinion

text: . The Law, adopted on 4 March 2011, introduced measures to prevent late payments as part of the Slovenian Government’s efforts to improve economic and business conditions for small and medium-sized enterprises. It defined the moment of late payment and the consequences of late payment for contracts entered into by economic operators or by economic operators and public authorities where one party provides goods or services and the other party provides payment. 1.2 Since the adoption of the Law, economic operators have raised many issues with the Ministry about its proper implementation. The amendment intends to resolve several of these issues. According to the consultation request, the draft law primarily amends the Law’s rules on obligatory multilateral set-off of obligations. However, the draft law also regulates other issues, including which authorities supervise compliance with the Law.

text: 2. General observation

text: The Law was adopted before the ECB issued its opinion . The ECB’s observations could therefore not be taken into account in the final version of the Law; however, a number of the observations remain relevant.

text: 3. Independence of Banka Slovenije

text: 3.1 Application of the Law to Banka Slovenije’s contractual relations As noted in Opinion

text: , Banka Slovenije falls under the definition of ‘public authorities’, so the Law applies to its contractual relations in the area of administration, in particular. However, Article 2(4) of the Law exempts Banka Slovenije where it exercises its exclusive competences pursuant to the law governing Banka Slovenije or any other laws or Union regulations laying down the exclusive competences of Banka Slovenije. The ECB welcomed this provision as it ensured that the Law would not interfere with the tasks of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and the Eurosystem carried out by Banka Slovenije in accordance with the Treaty and the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, in particular the implementation of the monetary policy of the Union. For the sake of clarity, the ECB repeats its proposal to further improve the Law by referring specifically to Banka Slovenije’s competences as part of the ESCB and the Eurosystem. 3.2 Supervision of the implementation of the Law 3.2.1 Article 9 of the draft law explicitly allocates supervision of implementation of the Law to the Market Inspectorate of the Republic of Slovenia and the Tax Administration of the Republic of Slovenia. This eliminates concerns about a possible allocation of this role to Banka Slovenije, which was expected under the current wording of the Law, and about related issues regarding the allocation of sufficient human and financial resources to Banka Slovenije for such task . 3.2.2 Under the Law, Banka Slovenije is subject to supervision. The ECB reiterates that, in order to fully respect central bank independence, it should be made clear that any supervision of Banka Slovenije’s compliance with the Law should respect its status as an independent central bank under the Treaty.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 5 August 2011. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: Dz. U. (Dziennik Ustaw) of 2010 No 112, Item 743.

text: Dz. U. of 2004 No 91, Item 871.

text: Dz. U. of 2009 No 175, Item 1361.

text: See

text: Articles 1(1)

text: (b), 1(3), 1(5)-(8) of the draft law. 7 See Articles

text: -(9) of the draft law. 8 OJ L 166, 11.6.1998, p. 45. 9 See

text: Articles 1(1)

text: (e) and 1(4) of the draft law. 10 See Article 1(9) of the draft law, introducing a new paragraph (6) to Article 18 of the Law on settlement finality; see also Articles

text: and

text: a of the Law on settlement finality which define the scope of information to be provided in an application for an authorisation to operate a payment system. 11 See

text: Article 1(11) of Directive 2009/44/EC

text: amending

text: Article 10(1) of Directive 98/26/EC

text: . 12 See Article 1(10) of the draft law, amending Article 23 of the Law on settlement finality.

text: See ECB Opinions

text: and

text: . All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 14 See ECB Opinions

text: and

text: . 15 As amended by Article 1(10) of the draft law. 16 OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 120. 17 See

text: Article 10(1) of Directive 98/26/EC

text: , as amended by

text: Article 1(2) of Directive 2010/78/EU

text: . According to

text: Article 13(1) of Directive 2010/78/EU

text: , this provision should be transposed by the Member States by 31 December 2011. 18 As amended by Article 3(4) of the draft law. 19 As introduced by Article 3(5) of the draft law.

publisher: Europeiska centralbanken

sprak: en

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 5 August 2011 on amendments to the legal framework for payment systems and clearing and settlement systems (CON/2011/62)

serie: con

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 5 August 2011 on amendments to the legal framework for payment systems and clearing and settlement systems (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

type: rubrik

text: On 27 June 2011, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Polish Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft law amending the Law on settlement finality in payment systems and securities settlement systems and the rules for the supervision of such systems, the Law on financial collateral and the Law on bankruptcy and rehabilitation (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European and the third, fifth and sixth indents of

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to Narodowy Bank Polski (NBP), to payment and settlement systems and to rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

type: stycke

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The draft law amends the Law of 24 August 2001 on settlement finality in payment systems and securities settlement systems and the rules for the supervision of such systems (hereinafter the ‘Law on settlement finality’), the Law of 2 April 2004 on financial collateral and the Law of 28 February 2003 on bankruptcy and rehabilitation (hereinafter the ‘Law on bankruptcy and rehabilitation’). The main purpose of the draft law is the transposition of Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 amending Directive

text: on settlement finality in payment and securities settlement systems and Directive

text: on financial collateral arrangements as regards linked systems and credit claims , inter alia, by

text: introducing into Polish law the concept of interoperable systems and extending the scope of assets eligible as financial collateral to include credit claims . Furthermore, the draft law recasts certain provisions previously transposing Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 1998 on settlement finality in payment and securities settlement systems in order to take into account, inter alia, the possibility of opening foreign insolvency proceedings against entities established in Poland . Finally, several clarifying and streamlining amendments are introduced. 1.2 The draft law introduces two specific amendments related to NBP. First, an express legal basis is provided for NBP to request from entities suspected of operating payment systems on a de facto basis, i.e. without the required authorisation, information required for an application for such authorisation . Second, the NBP’s obligation to notify systemically important systems to the Commission is extended in line with Directive

text: to include also information on operators of such systems .

text: 2. Transposition of Directives

text: and

text: In line with

text: Article 1(2) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: this opinion does not address provisions of the draft law exclusively transposing Directive

text: into Polish law. Nevertheless, the ECB welcomes the intention expressed in the draft law of additionally reviewing the provisions transposing Directive

text: into Polish law. In view of a substantial rise in the number of cross-border insolvency cases, including foreign insolvency proceedings against entities established in Poland, the possibility of such proceedings against participants or system operators needs to be taken into account to ensure the completeness of protection given by the Polish legal framework with regard to payment systems and securities settlement systems in line with Directive

text: 3. Specific observations

text: 3.1 The ECB welcomes the clarification in the draft law of NBP’s right to request information from the entities suspected of operating a payment system without the authorisation required by the Law on settlement finality. Providing an express legal basis for such right – although it is already acknowledged in practice – will enhance legal certainty and contribute to improving the efficiency of central bank oversight of payment systems.

text: 3.2 As mentioned in previous ECB opinions , payment systems and securities settlement systems are interlinked, particularly in view of the use of the ‘delivery versus payment’ mechanism, under which settlements of securities and transfers of funds take place simultaneously. Such interlinking is further enhanced by the acknowledgment of interoperable systems under Directive

text: and the draft law. There is therefore a strong argument in favour of the model used in some Member States of integrating the oversight of payment systems with the oversight of clearing and settlement systems, with national central banks performing the oversight function. In this regard, the ECB reiterates the observations made in previous ECB opinions regarding the need to ensure NBP’s responsibility for the oversight function in relation to clearing and settlement. An oversight function is inherent in the central banks’ task of promoting a sound market infrastructure, in order to safeguard the effectiveness of monetary policy and the overall stability of the financial system. Hence, the ECB reiterates its general recommendation that NBP is expressly made responsible for the oversight of all clearing and settlement systems operating in Poland, including the systems’ rules, and given access to all information and data relevant to the performance of such oversight tasks. Such change would then require extending the proposed powers of NBP to require information from de facto payment systems to cover also clearing and settlement systems. 3.3 In relation to the proposed amendment to Article 23 of the Law on settlement finality , the ECB understands that the Polish legislator would shortly initiate another amendment in order to bring it in line with Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 amending Directives

text: and

text: in respect of the powers of the European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), the European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority) and the European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority) , providing for the European Securities and Markets Authority to replace the Commission as the recipient of notifications of payment systems and securities settlement systems . 3.4. Article 67 of the Law on bankruptcy and rehabilitation excludes assets provided as collateral in connection with participation in a system from the bankruptcy estate of the bankrupt system participant or any other entity which provided the collateral. In addition, the proposed second sentence introduced by the draft law in Article 77(4) of the Law on bankruptcy and rehabilitation , which refers to

text: Article 67

text: , exempts those assets from the general rule according to which legal acts

text: of the bankrupt entity concerning the assets included in the bankruptcy estate are null and void. Doubts may arise as to how these two provisions interact, in particular as regards the moment when such assets may be provided as collateral by the bankrupt participant or used for that purpose by the system operator. Articles

text: and

text: would benefit from some more clarity in this respect. This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 5 August 2011. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET

type: vagledning

utgivare: ecb


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 2 Consolidated text published in Dziennik Ustaw (Dz. U) of 2010 No 211, item 1384. 3 As operated by the national depository for securities (Krajowy Depozyt Papierów Wartościowych (KDPW)) or KDPW’s subsidiary to which it delegated the operation of the central securities depository under Article 48(7) of the Law on trading in financial instruments. 4 The current set-up is characterised by two levels of records. The first level is deposit accounts maintained by KDPW for investment firms, custodian banks and other entities authorised to maintain securities accounts, and the second level is securities accounts, maintained by the holders of deposit accounts (and to a limited extent also by KDPW), where the identity of the holders of specific securities can be established (see explanatory memorandum to the draft law, p. 1).

text: In particular, under the current set-up, foreign investors are prevented from holding Polish securities on an account with an intermediary located in the same country as the investor, the former holding the securities through an omnibus account either directly with KDPW or with an institution in Poland which holds the securities through an account opened for it by KDPW. 6 See explanatory memorandum to the draft law, pp. 1-3. 7 The draft law defines omnibus accounts as accounts in which dematerialised securities may be registered where they do not belong to the persons for whom these accounts are maintained; see

text: Article 8

text: a(1) of the Law on trading in financial instruments, as amended by the draft law. 8 The group of eligible holders of omnibus accounts includes, inter alia (subject to further qualifications): foreign central securities depositories, foreign investment firms and brokerage houses, as well as credit institutions outside the Union; see

text: Article 8

text: a(2) of the Law on trading in financial instruments, as amended by the draft law. 9 See

text: Article 8

text: b of the Law on trading in financial instruments, as amended by the draft law. 10 See in particular Article 4 of the draft law amending the Law of 26 July 1991 on personal income tax (Dz. U. of 2010 No 51, Item 307); Article 5 of the draft law amending the Law of 15 February 1992 on corporate income tax (Dz. U. of 2011 No 74, Item 397). 11 See in particular

text: Article 15(1)

text: (c) of Guideline ECB/2010/2 of 21 April 2010 on TARGET2-Securities (OJ L 118, 12.5.2010, p. 65).

text: See also paragraph 4 in Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.2 in Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 17 August 2011 on the introduction of omnibus accounts in the legal framework for clearing and settlement systems (CON/2011/63)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 17 August 2011 on the introduction of omnibus accounts in the legal framework for clearing and settlement systems (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 19 July 2011, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Polish Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft law amending the Law on trading in financial instruments and certain other laws (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the fifth and sixth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to payment and settlement systems and to rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The draft law amends the Law of 29 July 2005 on trading in financial instruments and several other laws with a view to extending the securities registration system in Poland to omnibus accounts, to be opened and operated, within the Polish central securities depository (CSD) or within a system for the registration of securities operated by Narodowy Bank Polski, for the benefit of eligible institutions from outside Poland. 1.2 Under the current securities registration system , foreign investors may only hold Polish securities on a dedicated securities account opened in their own name by a local intermediary or KDPW .

text: The introduction of omnibus accounts will remove the additional administrative burden and costs incurred by foreign investors as a result of this restriction by offering other holding options. In particular, foreign institutions holding an account with a foreign CSD will have the possibility of executing transactions in Polish financial instruments through an omnibus account of that foreign CSD with KDPW, which will foster the establishment of operational links between KDPW and foreign CSDs . 1.3 To this end, the draft law defines, inter alia: (i) the concept of omnibus accounts ; (ii) eligible omnibus account holders and operators ; and (iii) reporting obligations for omnibus account holders . In addition, the draft law accordingly amends legal provisions contained in laws other than the Law on trading in financial instruments, such as taxation provisions, to enable the full integration of the omnibus account in the Polish legal framework .

text: 2. Specific observations

text: 2.1 The ECB understands that the adoption of the draft law will, as one of its outcomes, remove a legal barrier preventing access by KDPW to TARGET2-Securities (T2S) to be offered on the basis of the Eurosystem platform. Specifically, the proposed

text: Article 8

text: a(2)(1) of the Law on trading in financial instruments provides that ‘legal persons or other entities established outside Poland which discharge duties in relation to central registration of securities’ will be among the entities eligible to hold omnibus accounts with KDPW. The ECB understands that this provision will enable KDPW to open omnibus accounts for the benefit of foreign CSDs. The ECB welcomes this alignment of the Polish legal framework with one of the T2S eligibility criteria, requiring the participating CSDs to make each security/International Securities Identification Number for which they are an issuer CSD (or technical issuer CSD) available to other CSDs in T2S upon request . 2.2 The ECB also notes that to allow for KDPW’s participation in T2S, the Law on trading in financial instruments should be further adapted in the future so that it cannot be interpreted as preventing KDPW from outsourcing certain functions related to securities settlement to the Eurosystem acting

text: as operator of the T2S platform. Particular attention in this regard needs to paid to

text: Article 48(7)

text: and

text: Article 150(1)

text: (13a) of the Law on trading in financial instruments, which may be interpreted as allowing KDPW to transfer information related to securities settlement solely to its subsidiaries to which it has delegated operation of the central securities depository . The ECB recommends adequately amending or supplementing the above provisions to allow KDPW to outsource certain securities settlement functions to a third-party service provider, and to transfer relevant information to them.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 17 August 2011.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 18 August 2011 on the protection against counterfeiting and on the preservation of the quality of the cash circulation (CON/2011/64)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 18 August 2011 on the protection against counterfeiting and on the preservation of the quality of the cash circulation (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 18 July 2011, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Nationale Bank van België/Banque Nationale de Belgique (NBB), acting on behalf the Belgian Ministry of Finance, for an opinion on a draft law on the protection against counterfeiting and on the preservation of the quality of the cash in circulation (hereinafter the ‘draft law’), accompanied by a draft law concerning certain appeal provisions (hereinafter the ‘draft law amending the Law of 12 May 2004’) , and a draft royal decree implementing the draft law (hereinafter the ‘draft royal decree’) (the draft law, the draft law amending the Law of 12 May 2004 and the draft royal decree are hereinafter collectively referred to as the ‘draft legislation’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Article 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the first, second and third indents of

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft legislation concerns currency matters, means of payment and the NBB. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft legislation

text: 1.1 The draft legislation aims to bring the Belgian legal framework for the protection against counterfeiting in line with recent Union legislation adopted in this area .

text: 1 Draft law amending the Law of 12 May 2004 organising the appeal proceedings in the context of the protection against counterfeiting.

text: 2 OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: 3 Notably, with: (a)

text: Article 6 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1338/2001 of 28 June 2001

text: laying down measures necessary for the protection of the euro against counterfeiting (OJ L 181, 4.7.2001, p. 6); (b) Decision ECB/2010/14 of 16 September 2010 on the authenticity and fitness of checking and recirculation of euro banknotes (OJ L 267, 9.10.2010, p. 1); and (c)

text: Regulation (EU) No 1210/2010

text: of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 December 2010 concerning authentication of euro coins and handling of euro coins unfit for circulation (OJ L 339, 22.12.2010, p. 1). 1.2 The draft law defines a set of monitoring and corrective measures, as well as administrative fines, aimed at ensuring the proper execution of the Union legislation relating to protection against counterfeiting which is to be identified in a draft royal decree . The draft law contains provisions for banknotes and for coins. The monitoring and corrective measures and the administrative fines provided for in the draft law apply to institutions within the scope of the abovementioned Union 6 7 legislation , i.e. all institutions referred to in

text: Article 6(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1338/2001

text: . In addition, the draft law empowers the King, upon receiving a proposal from the NBB as far as banknotes are concerned, to define in a royal decree the additional rules that institutions must observe with a view to the application of the abovementioned Union legislation . Compliance with these additional rules is also subject to the monitoring and corrective measures, and the administrative fines provided for in the draft law. 1.3 Under the empowering clause in the draft law, the draft royal decree will impose on institutions certain internal organisational requirements, including internal control measures, instructions, regular awareness campaigns and training for their agents involved in the processing of notes and coins . It also subjects institutions to information obligations and to specific actions to be taken in the event of presumed counterfeited notes and coins being detected.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 The ECB generally welcomes the draft legislation, which contains a direct reference to the Union legislation of which it aims to ensure the proper execution, and it is confident that its provisions will ensure the preservation of euro banknotes in circulation, resulting in continued public confidence in euro banknotes . 2.2 As Decision ECB/2010/14 applies to cash handlers by virtue of

text: , which refers to procedures defined by the ECB for checking euro banknotes, there is no strict need to implement Decision ECB/2010/14 into Belgian law. However, the ECB understands that the draft legislation goes beyond mere implementation because it further enhances the monitoring and corrective measures established for banknotes in accordance with Decision ECB/2010/14. The draft legislation also contains provisions concerning the application of administrative fines.

text: 4 The draft law will replace the Law of 12 May 2004 on the protection against counterfeiting.

text: 5 Article 2 of the draft law, implemented by Article 2 of the draft royal decree which contains the list of the Union legislation defining the scope of the draft legislation, i.e. (a)

text: Article 6 of Regulation (EC) No 1338/2001

text: , (b) Decision ECB/2010/14, and (c)

text: Regulation (EU) No 1210/2010

text: 6 Article 3 of the draft law.

text: 7 With the exception, as far as coins are concerned, of the institutions referred to in the third indent of

text: (see

text: Article 2

text: (d) of

text: Regulation (EU) No 1210/2010

text: 8 Article 4 of the draft law.

text: 9 The draft royal decree will replace the Royal Decree of 5 April 2006 implementing the Law of 12 May 2004 on the protection against counterfeiting.

text: 10 Article 3 of the draft royal decree, taking over Article 5 of the Royal Decree of 5 April 2006.

text: 11 Paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 2.3 The ECB considers it essential that any draft legislation implementing Decision ECB/2010/14 does not deviate from its common provisions, unless this is otherwise explicitly provided for in Decision ECB/2010/14. Any national implementing measures should clarify the primacy and direct application of Union law on the authenticity and fitness checking and recirculation of euro banknotes with which cash handlers must comply. In this context and for consistency reasons, the ECB favours the use of direct references to Decision ECB/2010/14 or, alternatively, reproduction of its provisions without any alterations or additions . 2.4 In addition, although national authorities are not formally obliged to consult the ECB on the implementation of the Member States’ obligation to take the necessary measures to ensure that breaches of

text: are subject to effective, proportionate and deterrent sanctions, the ECB believes it is beneficial to harmonise throughout the Union the national measures implementing the abovementioned obligation to the extent possible, subject to national peculiarities .

text: 3. Specific observations

text: 3.1 Monitoring measures To fully implement Decision ECB/2010/14, the ECB recommends aligning the powers of the NBB under Article 5 of the draft law with

text: Article 10(1)

text: (ii) of Decision ECB/2010/14. In particular, the NBB should also be allowed to verify the instructions and procedures that cash handlers (i.e. ‘institutions’ in the sense of the draft legislation) are required to establish under Article 3 of the draft royal decree . In addition, beside the proportionality requirement in

text: Article 6(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1338/2001

text: , also the administrative measures aimed at ensuring compliance with the rules and procedures established under Decision ECB/2010/14 (including the monitoring 15 16 measures) must have an adequate character and, thus, may not go beyond what is necessary . In this respect, the ECB would welcome a clarification that the monitoring measures in

text: Article 5(1)

text: (3) and

text: Article 5(1)

text: (4) of the draft law cover the right to access only to such types of documents, data files and records, as well as such information technology system which the NBB considers necessary for the purpose of its monitoring tasks. 3.2 Additional obligations imposed on cash handlers The ECB notes that Article 3 of the draft royal decree imposes additional obligations on cash handlers. The ECB understands that the cash handlers’ obligations to draft instructions and procedures under

text: Article 3(1)

text: and (2) of the draft royal decree concern ‘the procedures governing

text: 12 Paragraphs 2.1 and 2.3 of Opinion

text: 13 Paragraph 1.1 of Opinion

text: 14 Concerning the measures in Article 3 of the draft royal decree, see also paragraph 3.2 of this Opinion.

text: 15 Decision ECB/2010/14, recital 6.

text: 16 Paragraph 3.2 of Opinion

text: , concerning the proportionality of corrective measures. the operation and control of the banknote handling machines, the treatment of checked euro banknotes and any manual authenticity and fitness checking’ referred to in

text: Article 10(1)

text: (ii) of Decision ECB/2010/14. Hence, the ECB considers that these provisions of the draft royal decree contribute to the adequate implementation of Decision ECB/2010/14 into Belgian law and accordingly welcomes these provisions. 3.3 Administrative fines and corrective measures 3.3.1 Where cash handlers breach the obligations set out in the Union legislation to which the draft law refers, the Minister for Finance may, following receipt of a proposal from the NBB as far as banknotes are concerned, impose an administrative fine . The amount of the administrative fine must be set by the Minister to be between EUR 250 and EUR 50 000. In addition, the draft law introduces the possibility for the NBB to impose corrective measures on cash handlers who fail to fulfil these obligations, as far as banknotes are concerned . The specific measures are not specified in the draft legislation, which ‘leaves it up to the NBB to impose the measure which is the most adequate considering the seriousness and the needs of each specific case’ . The ECB generally welcomes these provisions of the draft law, subject to the following observations. 3.3.2 The ECB recalls the importance of effective, proportionate and deterrent sanctions . To ensure the deterrent effect of the administrative fines, the maximum amount should allow setting the fine at an amount which effectively deters cash handlers from non-compliance with their obligations. While it is up to the Member States’ legislators to define the particular amounts of the administrative fines, they should aim at achieving a certain degree of harmonisation across the Member States to contribute to the establishment of a level playing field among cash handlers within the euro area without prejudice to: (a) the particularities of the cash cycle and the organisation of cash handlers at a national level; and (b) the consistency of the levels of financial sanctions available in their legal orders . 3.3.3 The provision introduced by Article 9 of the draft law, allowing the NBB to impose corrective measures on cash handlers, is in line with Article 10(3) of Decision ECB/2010/14. Nevertheless, for reasons of legal certainty and proportionality, the ECB expresses its concern that these measures are not generally defined in advance. In addition, the ECB notes that under the first sentence of Article 10(3) of Decision ECB/2010/14, NCBs do not enjoy discretion in imposing corrective measures. Therefore, the ECB recommends that in

text: Article 9(1)

text: , first sentence, of the draft law, the words ‘may … impose measures’ are replaced by the words ‘shall … impose measures’, thus clarifying that the NBB has the mandatory duty to impose corrective measures in any such case.

text: 17 Articles 6 and 7 of the draft law.

text: 18 Article 9 of the draft law.

text: 19 Comments on

text: Article 9

text: in the explanatory memorandum.

text: 21 Paragraph 3.4 of Opinion

text: . This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 18 August 2011. [signed] The President of the ECB Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: KOM(2011) 295 slutlig.

text: KOM(2011) 296 slutlig.

text: Rådets slutsatser av den 23 november 1998 och den 5 november 2002 om euromynt avsedda att utgöra samlingsmynt,

text: kommissionens rekommendation 2009/23/EG av den 19 december 2008

text: om gemensamma riktlinjer för de nationella sidorna och för utgivningen av euromynt avsedda att sättas i omlopp (EUT L 9, 14.1.2009, s. 52) samt

text: kommissionens rekommendation 2010/191/EU av den 22 mars 2010

text: om omfattningen och effekterna av eurosedlars och euromynts ställning (EUT L 83, 30.3.2010, s. 70).

text: Normala euromynt i omlopp, minnesmynt i euro i omlopp samt samlarmynt i euro.

text: Förslaget till förordning bidrar främst till att medlemsstaterna inte utvecklar olika nationell praxis avseende utgivningen av euromynt, främst samlarmynt och minnesmynt i euro, som annars skulle kunna medföra avsteg från målen och principerna för de gemensamma europeiska reglerna för mynt som upprättades när euron infördes. Se tredje stycket i ECB:s yttrande

text: . Alla ECB:s yttranden finns på ECB:s webbplats http://www.ecb.europa.eu

text: Report of the Euro Legal Tender Expert Group (ELTEG) on the definition, scope and effects of legal tender of euro banknotes and coins, s. 5, finns på engelska på http://www.ec.europa.eu

text: Se andra stycket under rubriken Allmänna kommentarer samt de två ändringsförslagen i bilagan till ECB:s yttrande

text: av den 4 mars 2011 om ett förslag till rådets förordning om valörer och tekniska specifikationer för mynt i euro som ska sättas i omlopp (kodifiering) (EUT C 114, 12.4.2011, s. 1).

text: EGT L 139, 11.5.1998, s. 6.

text: Text markerad med fet stil anger ECB:s förslag till ny text. Genomstruken text anger de strykningar som ECB föreslår.

text: Se Gemensam praktisk handledning; Europaparlamentets, rådets och kommissionens gemensamma praktiska handledning för personer som deltar i utformningen av lagtexter inom gemenskapens institutioner, finns på http://eur-lex.europa.eu

text: Se ändring 3.

text: Se fotnot 3.

text: Se punkt 3 i yttrande

text: Se punkt 3 i yttrande

sprak: sv

title: Europeiska centralbankens yttrande av den 23 augusti 2011 om ett förslag till förordning om utgivning av euromynt och ett förslag till förordning om valörer och tekniska specifikationer för mynt i euro som ska sättas i omlopp (CON/2011/65)

text: Inledning och rättslig grund

text: Den 28 juni 2011 mottog Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) en begäran från Europaparlamentet om ett yttrande över ett förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning om utgivning av euromynt (nedan kallat förslaget till förordning). Den 5 juli 2011 mottog ECB två ytterligare anhållanden från Europeiska unionens råd om yttrande över a) förslaget till förordning och b) ett förslag till rådets förordning om ändring av förordning

text: (EG) nr 975/98

text: av den 3 maj 1998 om valörer och tekniska specifikationer för mynt i euro som skall sättas i omlopp (nedan kallat förslaget till ändringsförordning).

text: ECB:s behörighet att avge ett yttrande grundar sig på

text: artikel 133

text: och artiklarna

text: och

text: i fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt (EUF-fördraget). I enlighet med

text: artikel 17.5

text: första meningen i arbetsordningen för Europeiska centralbanken har detta yttrande antagits av ECB-rådet.

text: 1. Förslaget till förordning och rättslig grund

text: 1.1 Förslaget till förordning innehåller regler för utgivningen av euromynt avsedda att sättas i omlopp samt för samlarmynt. Genom förordningen införs också vissa volymbegränsningar för minnesmynt avsedda att sättas i omlopp samt ett samråd före destruering av euromynt ägnade att vara i omlopp.

text: 1.2 ECB tolkar förslaget till förordning som att det ska kodifiera unionens aktuella icke-bindande instrument och slutsatser avseende reglerna för utgivningen av euromynt. ECB tolkar det också som att man, genom att skapa ytterligare regler om utgivningen av mynt på unionsnivå, vill harmonisera praxis i medlemsstaterna och värna rättssäkerhet och transparens.

text: 1.3 ECB noterar att de deltagande medlemsstaterna enligt

text: artikel 128.2 i EUF-fördraget

text: ansvarar för utgivningen av euromynt medan det enligt

text: artikel 133 i EUF-fördraget

text: är Europaparlamentet och rådet som ska föreskriva nödvändiga åtgärder när det gäller användningen av euron som gemensam valuta. Därutöver får rådet i enlighet med

text: artikel 128.2 i EUF-fördraget

text: vidta åtgärder för att harmonisera valörerna och de tekniska specifikationerna för alla mynt som ska sättas i omlopp, i den utsträckning som detta är nödvändigt för att säkerställa myntens smidiga omlopp inom unionen. Mot bakgrund av detta måste unionens lagstiftning om utgivningen av euromynt respektera de deltagande medlemsstaternas behörighet att ge ut euromynt och deras ställning som rättsliga utgivare av euromynt. Trots att ECB:s uppgifter och skyldigheter enligt EUF-fördraget och stadgan för Europeiska centralbankssystemet och Europeiska centralbanken (nedan kallad ECBS-stadgan) inte påverkas av förslaget till förordning, rekommenderar ECB ändå att varje medlemsstats synpunkter på behörigheten att ge ut euromynt bör diskuteras mellan den berörda medlemsstaten och union enligt principen om lojalt samarbete som framgår av

text: artikel 4.3 i fördraget om Europeiska unionen

text: 1.4 Det är tillrådligt att harmonisera terminologin i förslaget till förordning. Exempelvis definieras inte termerna utgivning och sätta i omlopp i förslaget till förordning. Detta skulle kunna medföra osäkerhet avseende termernas rättsliga betydelse. Normalt omfattar begreppet utgivning även förfarandet att sätta dessa euromynt i omlopp. För att undvika missförstånd vore det därför bättre att endast använda ett begrepp – utgivning. ECB överlåter åt kommissionen att besluta om denna språkliga fråga och tar inte upp aspekten i sina ändringsförslag.

text: 1.5 I de fall där ECB rekommenderar att förslaget till förordning ska ändras anges de specifika förslagen i bilaga I åtföljt av en förklaring.

text: 2. Förslaget till ändringsförordning

text: 2.1 Förslaget till ändringsförordning innehåller nya bestämmelser om gemensamma principer för utformningen av de nationella sidorna av ordinarie euromynt och minnesmynt avsedda att sättas i omlopp samt för medlemsstaternas ömsesidiga information om, och ömsesidiga godkännande av, utformningen.

text: 2.2 ECB konstaterar att förslaget till ändringsförordning innehåller ett förfarande för att godkänna eller avvisa utkast till nya nationella sidor av euromynt som liknar det förfarande som framgår av rekommendation

text: . Den enda skillnaden är att förslaget till ändringsförordning ger kommissionen, istället för Ekonomiska och finansiella kommitténs relevanta underkommitté, behörighet att ta det slutgiltiga beslutet att godkänna eller avvisa nya utformningar. ECB noterar att denna förändring inte påverkar dess uppgifter och skyldigheter enligt EUF-fördraget och ECBS-stadgan och ECB rekommenderar att varje kompetensfråga, vare sig nationell eller interinstitutionell, som rör kommissionens ovannämnda ansvarsområde bör samordnas och diskuteras enligt principen om lojalt samarbete som framgår av

text: 2.3 Slutligen upprepar ECB sin tidigare rekommendation att ändra de tekniska specifikationer som återfinns i bilaga I till förordning

text: (EG) nr 975/98

text: av den 3 maj 1998 om valörer och tekniska specifikationer för mynt i euro som ska sättas i omlopp. Särskilt riktvärdena för euromyntens tjocklek bör ersättas med de faktiska värdena som är allmänt kända och används av myntverken vid produktionen av euromynt. I denna punkt hänvisar ECB till de specifika ändringsförslagen ECB gjort i bilagan till yttrande

text: och rekommenderar att de genomförs inom ramen för förordning

text: (EG) nr 975/98

text: 2.4 Ide fall där ECB rekommenderar att förslaget till ändringsförordning ska ändras anges de specifika förslagen i bilaga II åtföljt av en förklaring.

text: BILAGA I

text: Kommissionens förslag | ECB:s ändringsförslag

text: 2. Avsaknaden av föreskrivande bestämmelser för utgivningen av euromynt kan resultera i olika praxis i medlemsstaterna och skapar inte ett tillräckligt integrerat ramverk för den gemensamma valutan. För att värna rättslig transparens och rättssäkerhet är det därför nödvändigt att införa bindande regler för utgivningen av euromynt. | 2. Utan att det påverkar tillämpningen av artikel 128.2 i fördraget om medlemsstaternas rätt att ge ut euromynt kan avsaknaden av allmänna föreskrivande bestämmelser för utgivningen av euromynt kan resultera i olika praxis i medlemsstaterna och skapar inte ett otillräckligt integrerat ramverk för den gemensamma valutan. För att värna rättslig transparens och rättssäkerhet är det därför nödvändigt att införa bindande regler för utgivningen av euromynt.

text: Förklaring Dessa ändringar är nödvändiga för att a) tydligt ange att förslaget till förordning inte påverkar medlemsstaternas behörighet att ge ut euromynt enligt

text: artikel 128.2 i EUF-fördraget

text: Artikel 1

text: Syfte I denna förordning föreskrivs regler för utgivningen av euromynt avsedda att sättas i omlopp, inklusive minnesmynt avsedda att sättas i omlopp, utgivningen av samlarmynt i euro, samt regler om samråd före destruering av euromynt som är ägnade att vara i omlopp. |

text: Artikel 1

text: Syfte Utan att det påverkar tillämpningen av artikel 128.2 i fördraget om medlemsstaternas rätt att ge ut euromynt kan föreskrivs i denna förordning föreskrivs regler för utgivningen av euromynt avsedda att sättas i omlopp, inklusive minnesmynt avsedda att sättas i omlopp, utgivningen av samlarmynt i euro, samt regler om samråd före destruering av euromynt som är ägnade att vara i omlopp.

text: artikel 128.2 i EUF-fördraget

text: och b) beakta den lucka som finns i regleringen i förhållande till allmänna bindande bestämmelser om utgivningen av euromynt. Därutöver medför de fördelen att man bättre definierar föremålet för förslaget till förordning i förhållande till relevanta krav enligt punkterna 13.1 och 13.3 i Europaparlamentets, rådets och kommissionens gemensamma praktiska handledning. Eftersom den ändrade definitionen av Euromynt i omlopp uttryckligen omfattar eurominnesmynt i omlopp behöver detta inte upprepas i

text: artikel 1

text: Artikel 2

text: Definitioner I denna förordning avses med 1. Euromynt i omlopp euromynt som är avsedda att sättas i omlopp, vilkas valörer och tekniska specifikationer fastställs i

text: rådets förordning (EG) nr 975/98 av den 3 maj 1998

text: . 2. Eurominnesmynt i omlopp euromynt i omlopp, som är avsedda att uppmärksamma ett specifikt ämne enligt vad som anges i

text: artikel 1

text: f i

text: rådets förordning (EG) nr 975/98

text: . 3. Samlarmynt i euro euromynt avsedda att samlas och som inte är avsedda att sättas i omlopp. |

text: Artikel 2

text: Definitioner I denna förordning avses med 1. Euromynt i omlopp ordinarie euromynt och minnesmynt euromynt som är avsedda att sättas i omlopp, vilkas valörer och tekniska specifikationer fastställs i

text: . 2. Ordinarie euromynt i omlopp euromynt avsedda att sättas i omlopp exklusive minnesmynt avsedda att sättas i omlopp. 23. Eurominnesmynt i omlopp euromynt i omlopp, som är avsedda att uppmärksamma ett specifikt ämne enligt vad som anges i

text: artikel 1

text: f i

text: rådets förordning (EG) nr 975/98

text: . 34. Samlarmynt i euro euromynt avsedda att samlas och som inte är avsedda att sättas i omlopp.

text: Förklaring Den aktuella definitionen av euromynt i omlopp bör göras tydligare och en separat definition av ordinarie euromynt i omlopp bör läggas till för att undvika en tvetydig terminologi.

text: Artikel 3

text: Typer av euromynt Medlemsstaterna får ge ut två typer av euromynt: Euromynt i omlopp, som inbegriper minnesmynt i euro i omlopp, och samlarmynt i euro. |

text: Artikel 3

text: Förklaring Eftersom den ändrade definitionen av Euromynt i omlopp uttryckligen omfattar eurominnesmynt i omlopp behöver detta inte upprepas i

text: artikel 3

text: Artikel 4

text: Utgivning av euromynt i omlopp 1. Euromynt i omlopp ska ges ut till nominellt värde. 2. Genom undantag från punkt 1 får en liten andel, högst 5 % av det totala värdet och volymen utgivna euromynt, ges ut till ett pris som överstiger det nominella värdet om det kan motiveras av myntets särskilt höga kvalitet eller specialförpackning. |

text: Artikel 4

text: Utgivning och försäljning av euromynt i omlopp 1. Euromynt i omlopp ska ges ut till nominellt värde och sättas i omlopp av de behöriga myndigheterna i varje medlemsstat. 2. Genom undantag från punkt 1 får En liten andel, högst 5 % av det totala utelöpande värdet och volymen utgivna euromynt, får ges ut säljas till ett pris som överstiger det nominella värdet om det kan motiveras av myntets särskilt höga kvalitet eller specialförpackning.

text: Förklaring ECB rekommenderar att man samordnar artikel 4 i förslaget till förordning med punkt 1 i rekommendation

text: för att denna bestämmelse ska stämma överens med medlemsstaternas praxis baserad på punkt 1 i rekommendation

text: b) De får inte använda avbildningar som liknar de gemensamma sidorna på euromynt i omlopp eller en nationell sida av euromynt i omlopp. | b) De får inte använda avbildningar som liknar de gemensamma sidorna på euromynt i omlopp eller en nationell sida av euromynt i omlopp utom, i det sistnämnda fallet, om man ändå tydligt kan särskilja det samlade utseendet.

text: Förklaring Detta ändringsförslag gör det möjligt att bibehålla medlemsstaternas nationella traditioner avseende utgivningen av samlarmynt. ECB välkomnar i princip att man vid utgivningen av samlarmynt beaktar medlemsstaternas nationella traditioner. Därutöver skulle ändringsförslaget medföra att bestämmelsen överensstämmer med Ekofinrådets slutsatser av den 5 november 2002 och uppmuntra medlemsstaterna att utforma sina samlarmynt på ett sådant sätt att dessa skiljer sig från den nationella sidan av euromynt avsedda att sättas i omlopp.

text: 3. Samlarmynt i euro får ges ut till eller överstigande det nominella värdet. | 3. Samlarmynt i euro får ges ut säljas till eller överstigande det nominella värdet.

text: Förklaring Detta ändringsförslag återger på ett korrekt sätt medlemsstaternas överenskommelse från Ekofinrådets möte den 5 november 2002 enligt vilken samlarmynt i euro får säljas till ett pris som överstiger det nominella värdet.

text: 5. Medlemsstaterna ska vidta alla lämpliga åtgärder för att förhindra att samlarmynt i euro används som betalningsmedel, som exempelvis särskild förpackning, äkthetsintyg, förhandsmeddelande från en utgivande myndighet eller utgivning till ett pris som överstiger det nominella värdet. | 5. Medlemsstaterna ska vidta alla lämpliga åtgärder för att förhindra motverka att samlarmynt i euro används som betalningsmedel, som exempelvis särskild förpackning, äkthetsintyg, förhandsmeddelande från en utgivande myndighet eller utgivningförsäljning till ett pris som överstiger det nominella värdet.

text: Förklaring Medlemsstaterna har ingen möjlighet att förhindra att samlarmynt i euro används som betalningsmedel i den utgivande medlemsstaten. Därför föreslår ECB att man ersätter ordet förhindra med motverka. Av konsekvensskäl bör även formuleringen utgivning till ett pris som överstiger det nominella värdet ersättas med försäljning till ett pris som överstiger det nominella värdet som bättre återger formuleringen i Ekofinrådets slutsatser av den 5 november 2002.

text: BILAGA II

text: Ingen text | 4. Utformningen av eurominnesmynt avsedda att sättas i omlopp som gemensamt ges ut av alla deltagande medlems-stater ska ske utan att det påverkar deras eventuella konstitutionella krav.

text: Förklaring Detta ändringsförslag beaktar eventuella nationella lagfästa krav och gör det möjligt att bibehålla medlemsstaternas nationella traditioner avseende utgivningen av minnesmynt i euro avsedda att sättas i omlopp. ECB välkomnar i princip att man vid utgivningen av minnesmynt beaktar medlemsstaternas nationella traditioner.

text: 1. Medlemsstaterna ska informera varandra om utkast till utformningen av nya nationella sidor av euromynt, inklusive randpräglingar, och om utgivningsvolymen innan de formellt godkänner dessa utformningar. | 1. Medlemsstaterna ska informera varandra om utkast till utformningen av nya nationella sidor av euromynt, inklusive randpräglingar, och om utgivningsvolymen innan före det formellat godkännandeter av dessa utformningar.

text: Förklaring Av språkliga skäl rekommenderar ECB att man förtydligar att medlemsstaterna är skyldiga att informera varandra om utgivningsvolymen avseende euromynt i omlopp innan utformningen av dessa godkänts. Av

text: artikel 1

text: g.2 och 1g.3 framgår att kommissionen kontrollerar att bestämmelserna i förslaget till ändringsförordning uppfylls och fattar det slutgiltiga beslutet om huruvida utformningen ska godkännas eller avvisas. ECB föreslår därför att man ändrar sista delen av

text: artikel 1

text: g.1 som implicerar att medlemsstaterna formellt godkänner utformningen av nya nationella sidor av euromynt avsedda att sättas i omlopp.

text: a) ska inte gälla för euromynt i omlopp som givits ut innan rådets förordning (EU) nr … [inför den föreliggande ändringsförordningens nummer när denna antagits] träder i kraft, | a) ska inte gälla för euromynt i omlopp som givits ut tillverkats innan rådets förordning (EU) nr … [inför den föreliggande ändringsförordningens nummer när denna antagits] träder i kraft,

text: Förklaring ECB tolkar det som att

text: artikel 1

text: h a omfattar euromynt i omlopp som har ställning av lagligt betalningsmedel innan ändringsförordningen träder i kraft, medan

text: artikel 1

text: h b inför en övergångsperiod för att byta ut verktygen för utformningen av euromynt i omlopp i överensstämmelse med de nya designkraven. I detta sammanhang rekommenderar ECB att orden givits ut ersätts med tillverkats i

text: artikel 1

text: h a. Detta skulle öka omfattningen på de mynt som undantas genom bestämmelsen till att även omfatta lager av euromynt som tillverkats av behöriga myndigheter i de deltagande medlemsstaterna men som ännu inte har ställning som lagligt betalningsmedel när förslaget till ändringsförordning träder i kraft. På så sätt skapar man en rättslig garanti för alla kostnader som Eurosystemets nationella centralbanker haft för att tillverka euromynt som ännu inte har ställning som lagligt betalningsmedel när förslaget till ändringsförordning träder i kraft. ECB noterar även att euromynt i omlopp som ges ut under övergångsperioden enligt

text: artikel 1

text: h b skulle behålla sin ställning som lagligt betalningsmedel efter övergångsperiodens utgång.


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 2 See

text: Article 4(1)

text: to (3) of the draft law. 3 The ECB understands that these liabilities are non-consolidated, i.e. are on an individual basis. 4 Law No 118/1996 Coll. on the protection of bank deposits and amending certain other laws, as amended.

text: See

text: Article 2

text: (a) of the draft law. 6 See

text: Article 2

text: (b) of the draft law. 7 See p. 1 of the general part of the explanatory memorandum to the draft law. 8 See

text: Article 1

text: (a) of the draft law. 9 See conclusion of the European Council of 28-29 October 2010, available at the Council website at www.consilium.europa.eu. 10 See the work on Union legislation aimed at harmonising bank recovery and resolution rules initiated by the European Commission and in particular, the DG Internal Market and Services working document: technical details of a possible EU framework for bank recovery and resolution of 6 January 2011, available on the Commission’s website at http://ec.europa.eu. 11 See paragraph 3.6 of Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: See page 1 of the general part of the explanatory memorandum. 13 See Article 4(3) of the draft law. 14 See

text: Article 2

text: (b) of the draft law. 15 See Article 5 of the draft law, referring in the footnotes to the Law No 563/2009 Coll. on the administration of taxes and amending certain other laws. 16 According to the draft law, the use of state financial assets consisting of collected levies will be governed by Law No 523/2004 Coll. on budgetary rules of the public administration and amending certain other laws. 17 See paragraph 3.2 of Opinion

text: . 18 See paragraph 3.4 of Opinion

text: See the work on Union legislation aimed at harmonising bank recovery and resolution rules initiated by the Commission and in particular, the DG Internal Market and Services working document: technical details of a possible EU framework for bank recovery and resolution of 6 January 2011, available on the Commission’s website at http://ec.europa.eu.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 23 August 2011 on a special levy on financial institutions operating in Slovakia (CON/2011/66)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 23 August 2011 on a special levy on financial institutions operating in Slovakia (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 25 July 2011 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Slovak Ministry of Finance for an opinion on the draft law on a special levy on selected financial institutions, on an amendment to Law No 479/2009 Coll. on state administration authorities in the field of taxes and charges and on amendments to certain laws (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the sixth indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: The draft law imposes an obligation on banks and branches of foreign banks (hereinafter jointly the ‘banks’) to pay a special levy, the proceeds of which are to be held in a separate extra-budgetary account intended to cover costs related to the resolution of financial crises in the banking sector and to protect the stability of the banking sector in Slovakia . The rate of the levy for the respective calendar year will be 0.2% of the amount of liabilities of the bank reported in the balance sheet , with certain deductions including: (a) the amount of the bank’s equity, provided that its value is positive; (b) the value of financial resources provided to the branch of a foreign bank on a long term basis; (c) the value of subordinated debt; (d) the value of deposits received by the bank within the territory of the Slovak Republic and protected according to a special regulation ; (e) the value of deposits received by the bank within the

text: territory of Slovak Republic and protected in other Member State of the European Economic Area . Levies shall be administered by the Tax Office for Selected Tax Entities .

text: 2. Collection of the bank levy

text: 2.1 As noted in the general part of the explanatory memorandum to the draft law , the imposition of the bank levy introduces the risk of ‘double charging’ which may arise when Member States introduce bank levies on subsidiaries of their own financial institutions resident in other Member States or on foreign branches of Union banks resident in their own territory. There is therefore a risk that the draft law may result in double charging, in particular through the imposition of a levy on branches of foreign banks . In this context, the ECB notes that the European Council has called for ‘further coordination between different levy schemes in order to avoid double-charging’ . 2.2 The ECB supports the development of a harmonised approach to bank levies, which should be aligned with the developing Union framework for bank recovery and resolution and is complementary to existing regulation. The development of this harmonised approach would achieve the overall objective of preserving the level-playing field, whilst limiting distortions to competition, and ensuring that financial stability is equally safeguarded. This is particularly important in the Union where the introduction of different bank levy schemes could potentially undermine the process of financial integration by introducing elements of fiscal, regulatory and supervisory fragmentation. Hence, the ECB invites the Slovak authorities to amend the draft law to introduce an approach which is flexible enough to adapt to the ongoing changes in Union regulation and supports the medium-term Union harmonised solution, e.g. through the built-in flexibility of a ‘rendez-vous clause’. 2.3 To enhance coordination between the relevant home and host authorities in these matters, the ECB highlights the need for the Slovak authorities to inform, where possible, in advance, the supervisory and fiscal authorities of the countries concerned, regarding the plan to introduce a levy system that will impose charges on foreign branches in Slovakia. 2.4 Moreover, in accordance with its recent opinion , the ECB invites the Slovak authorities to consider introducing rules for replenishing the funds collected through the levy where part or all of such funds are subsequently used to finance resolution measures.

text: 3. Administration and use of the resolution fund

text: 3.1 As noted in the general part of the explanatory memorandum to the draft law , the levy is expected to contribute to creating a dedicated resolution mechanism for banks. To this effect, the draft law specifies that proceeds of the levy are to be held in a separate extra-budgetary account intended to cover costs related to the resolution of financial crises in the banking sector and to protect financial stability . The ECB understands that the proposed levy is to be collected by the general taxation 14 15 authorities and will be governed by the general rules of tax administration . Moreover, the draft law does not address any further specific provisions as to the conditions under which the levy proceeds are to be applied to finance bank resolution measures. 3.2 The ECB makes the following specific observations regarding the administration and use of the resolution fund, which is created on the basis of the levy proceeds. 3.2.1 The ECB recommends that, as a minimum, a clearer separation is introduced between the extrabudgetary account created out of the levy proceeds, and the general budgetary resources . Potential use of the levy’s proceeds to reduce public deficit and failure to establish, in the long term, dedicated resolution funds may result in an increasing dependence of the financial sector on public funds, particularly where crisis conditions may reoccur, which would strengthen the moral hazard concerns. 3.2.2 In line with its recent opinion , the ECB recommends that detailed rules on the application of the resolution fund to finance the bank resolution measures are set out in the draft law or in another adequate legal instrument. Such rules should, in particular, help to limit moral hazard in connection with the application of the resolution fund. A primary purpose of resolution funds should be to mitigate the effects of a bank failure for the different stakeholders, including customers, the real economy and taxpayers. In particular, this implies that resolution funds should not be used for any form of bailout or to avoid a bank’s insolvency. Therefore, stringent conditions for their use need to be defined, including no automatic relationship between fund contributions and pay-out, and decisions about the use of the funds should reside with independent and accountable public authorities. The ECB made further recommendations in this respect in a recent opinion , to which

text: it draws the attention of the Slovak authorities, whilst at the same time inviting them to monitor the harmonised solutions which are being developed in this respect at Union level . This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 23 August 2011. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: COM(2011) 142 final. 3 ECB Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: Paragraphs 9, 10, 12 and 13 of the draft resolution.

text: In the Financial Stability Review of June 2011, the ECB highlighted that “About a third of outstanding commercial property mortgages in the euro area are due to mature between 2011 and 2013[…]. Many of these mortgages […] were often granted with high loan-to-value ratios (often 75-85%)”.

text: ECB Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.2.

text: ECB Opinion

text: , paragraph 3.1.1.

text: ESRB press conference – 22 June 2011.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 26 August 2011 on responsible lending requirements for credit institutions (CON/2011/67)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 26 August 2011 on responsible lending requirements for credit institutions (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 29 July 2011, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from Lietuvos bankas for an opinion on a draft resolution of the Board of Lietuvos bankas on responsible lending requirements (hereinafter the ‘draft resolution’). On 17 August 2011, the ECB received an amended version of the draft resolution from the consulting authority. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and the third and sixth indents of

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft resolution relates to Lietuvos bankas and rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In addition, the ESCB contributes to the smooth conduct of policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system under Article 127(5) of the Treaty. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft resolution

text: 1.1 The main purpose of the draft resolution is to establish the responsible lending requirements that are applicable to credit institutions providing credit to natural persons. The draft resolution is intended to reduce the systemic risk within the credit institution sector, imbalances in the development of the real estate market, risks related to the rapid growth of credit portfolios and the concentration of excess risk, as well as to provide consumers with protection from accumulating excessive financial liability. Accordingly, the draft resolution should help to contribute to the overall stability of the financial system. 1.2 The responsible lending requirements established in the draft resolution include: (i) rules for the comprehensive assessment of the borrower’s ability to meet their financial liabilities in relation to the credit offered; (ii) maximum acceptable loan-to-value ratios for pledged assets; (iii) maximum debt-to-income ratios; (iv) maximum credit maturity, and (v) rules relating to the lending process and conditions, including the information, to be provided to the borrower.

text: 1.3 The draft resolution is intended to enter into force on 1 October 2011, except for Chapter VI (‘Borrower’s assessment’), which is expected to enter into force on 1 February 2012.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 The ECB welcomes the draft resolution, which is aimed at promoting responsible lending by credit institutions, enforcing market discipline, and increasing the transparency of credit institutions’ activities to provide a higher level of consumer protection, especially in the area of credit for residential property. From a financial stability perspective, the ECB supports the measures that are aimed at ensuring responsible borrowing and lending, and restoring consumer confidence. 2.2 The ECB understands that Lietuvos bankas follows the current legislative initiatives at Union level related to the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on credit agreements relating to residential property . In this context, the ECB refers to its Opinion

text: . The ECB understands the relevant national legislation will, if necessary, be aligned with the future Directive.

text: 3. Specific observations

text: Criteria for assessing consumers’ creditworthiness

text: 3.1 The ECB welcomes the introduction of quantitative limits, notably on loan-to-value ratios insofar as such measures should contribute to strengthening credit institutions’ lending practices, whilst also ensuring consistency in assessing consumers’ creditworthiness. In this respect, the ECB notes the following. First, as regards the quantitative limits on loan-to-value ratios, the ECB recommends subjecting them to a thorough impact assessment study of their appropriateness and regularly reviewing them to take into account the implications of changes in macroeconomic and financial conditions. Second, further guidance may be required regarding the methods and criteria used to evaluate consumers’ creditworthiness. Such guidance should include the clarification of the requirements set out in paragraph 7.3 of the draft resolution, according to which lending should be based on an assessment of ‘rational’ ratios. 3.2 The substantive scope of the recommendations in Chapter III should be clarified. Under the current wording, such recommendations refer exclusively to lending for residential purposes, i.e. they are narrower in scope than the draft resolution. Moreover, the reference periods for which the average credit repayment and interest contribution pursuant to paragraph 16 are calculated should be specified.

text: Foreign currency lending

text: 3.3 The ECB has noted that high levels of foreign currency loans to unhedged borrowers may create latent financial vulnerabilities in certain Member States. Such lending converts direct exchange rate exposure in the banking system into credit risk and exposes the economy to significant macrofinancial risks. Given the potentially negative side effects associated with foreign currency lending, the ECB emphasises the importance for policymakers taking appropriate measures to avoid an excessive accumulation within the banking system . 3.4 The ECB welcomes the stricter limitations on the acceptable loan-to-value and debt-to-income ratios where the credit and income currencies are different, which would take into consideration potential foreign exchange risk. However, the ECB would welcome further details and an explanation of these proposals. For example, the information provided to the borrower should also include an explanation of the potential risks where the credit is denominated in a foreign currency. In addition, the regulatory framework could be amended to provide incentives to credit institutions to offer domestic currency loans to customers, for the same purposes as foreign currency loans. 3.5 More generally, it should be noted that the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), in considering options to reinforce the resilience of the Union financial system, has identified as one of the challenges the potential problems arising from foreign currency borrowing by households and small and medium-sized enterprises within the Union . The outcome of the work undertaken by the ESRB in this regard will need to be adequately taken into consideration by the relevant national authorities.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 26 August 2011.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: The specific conditions to be fulfilled are as follows: (i) members with at least 70% of the total quotas giving written consent to their increase in quota; (ii) the Amendment concerning the new structure of the IMF Executive Board entering into force; (iii) the Amendment to the Articles of Agreement approved under IMF Board of Governors Resolution No 63- 2 entering into force

text: Article 80 of the Italian Constitution.

text: Agreement of 10 December 2007, approved and executed by Ministerial Decree No 127093 of 28 December 2008.

text: See ECB Opinions

text: . All Opinions are available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 7 September 2011 on Italy’s ratification of an Amendment to the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund and increase in quota (CON/2011/68)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 7 September 2011 on Italy’s ratification of an Amendment to the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund and increase in quota (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 10 August 2011, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Italian Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance for an opinion on a draft law regarding the ratification of an Amendment to the Articles of Agreement (hereinafter the ‘Amendment’) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the increase of Italy’s quota with the IMF (the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to the Banca d’Italia. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 On 15 December 2010, the IMF Board of Governors adopted Resolution No 66-2 on the ‘Fourteenth General Review of Quotas and Reform of the Executive Board’, proposing an amendment to the Articles of Agreement. The Amendment contains two sets of provisions. The first set provides that all the Executive Directors on the IMF Executive Board will be elected by IMF member countries. The second set of provisions concerns a general review of quotas, after which the increase in quotas will become effective on fulfilment of specific conditions . As a consequence of the increase in quotas, a review of the ‘New Arrangements to Borrow’ (NAB) credit arrangements will take place, with the possibility for the NAB to roll back. 1.2 Under Italian law , the ratification of international agreements involving public expenditure and amendments to legislation must be authorised by a law approved by the Parliament.

text: Articles 1

text: and

text: 2 of the draft law provide for the authorisation of the Amendment ratification and its incorporation into Italian law. Articles 3 and 4 of the draft law authorise the Government to pay up the increase in Italy’s quota by requesting the Banca d’Italia to perform this transaction. In particular, following the increase of the total quotas decided by the IMF Board of Governors, the draft law authorises the Ministry to pay up, by having recourse to the Banca d’Italia, the proposed increase in Italy’s IMF quota from SDR 7 882.3 million to SDR 15 070 million. Article 5 of the draft law refers to an agreement between the Ministry and the Banca d’Italia on their relationship in connection with Italy’s participation in the IMF.

text: Article 6

text: provides for the necessary means to cover the expenses deriving from the payment.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 Article 4 of the draft law authorises the Ministry to pay the increase in the quota, by requesting the Banca d’Italia to perform this transaction. The ECB notes that the wording of this Article changed during the course of the parliamentary procedure to include an obligation for the Ministry to provide guarantees to the Banca d’Italia covering any risk connected to the payments to the IMF that the Banca d’Italia carries out on behalf of the Italian Government regarding the quota increase. The ECB understands that the new wording is meant to protect the Banca d’Italia from any risk connected to such payments. 2.2 Several ECB Opinions have noted that the tasks performed by a national central bank must comply with the monetary financing prohibition under Article 123 of the Treaty and

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 of 13 December 1993

text: specifying definitions for the application of the prohibitions referred to in Articles

text: and

text: b(1) of the Treaty . Pursuant to

text: Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 3603/93

text: , the financing by national central banks of obligations falling upon the public sector vis-à-vis the IMF is not regarded as a credit facility within the meaning of Article 123 of the Treaty. Therefore, the ECB notes that any possible payment by the Banca d’Italia of the proposed increase in Italy’s IMF quota complies with

text: Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 3603/93

text: and does not infringe the monetary financing prohibition.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 7 September 2011. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: See the Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic Policy Conditionality (First Update) of 17 May 2011, page 28, and the Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic Policy Conditionality (Second Update) of 28 July 2011, page 8, available on the Department of Finance’s website at www.finance.gov.ie.

text: See section 21 of the draft law for the list of persons to whom the powers of an authorised officer can apply. 4 The first was the Central Bank Reform Act 2010, renaming the Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland the Central Bank of Ireland, that became a single fully-integrated structure with a unitary board to replace the two-pillar structure of the previous Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland.

text: See also paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: . 6 See, for example, paragraph 17 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 9 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2 of Opinion

text: . 7 See the ECB’s Convergence Report, May 2010, p. 21, and paragraph 3.1.5 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 3.2.1 of

text: See section 21 of the draft law for the list of persons to whom the powers of an authorised officer can apply. 9 The proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council on the supplementary supervision of credit institutions, insurance undertakings and investment firms in a financial conglomerate, COM(2011) 453 final also introduces a provision

text: regarding whistleblowing (

text: Article 70

text: ). 10 See in this respect the Commission Communication on reinforcing sanctioning regimes in the financial services sector (COM (2010) 716 final), 8 December 2010, page 15. 11 Part 5 of the draft law. 12 For example under section 21 of the Central Bank Act 1971 and under section 18 of the Insurance Act 1989. 13 See for example Opinion

text: , Opinion

text: , Opinion

text: and Opinion

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 9 September 2011 on new measures strengthening supervision and enforcement in financial regulation (CON/2011/69)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 9 September 2011 on new measures strengthening supervision and enforcement in financial regulation (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 1 August 2011, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Irish Ministry of Finance for an opinion on the Central Bank (Supervision and Enforcement) Bill 2011 (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third and sixth indents of

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to the Central Bank of Ireland (CBI) and contains rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: The draft law is intended to enhance the CBI’s powers to (a) supervise regulated financial service providers, and (b) enforce financial services legislation. The introduction of this legislation is one of the financial sector reform actions under the EU/IMF Programme of financial support for Ireland . 1.1 The draft law is intended to empower the CBI to require a financial service provider or a related undertaking to provide the CBI with an independent expert report paid for by the financial service provider or a related undertaking. The report may be required for the proper and effective regulation of financial service providers and may relate to any matter on which the CBI may require information or documents under financial services legislation.

text: 1.2 The draft law will - with limited exceptions - replace the CBI’s powers to appoint investigative officers with a single consolidated ‘authorised officer’ regime which the CBI may use to obtain information from all regulated financial service providers and various other categories or persons . An authorised officer may be an officer or employee of the CBI or other suitably qualified person and may be appointed by the CBI for the purpose of obtaining any information necessary for the CBI’s performance of its functions under financial services legislation relating to the proper and effective regulation of financial service providers. 1.3 The draft law will introduce whistleblowing protection in the financial services area. Persons who make good faith disclosures regarding the possible or actual contravention of financial services legislation to the CBI, or an officer or employee of the CBI or an authorised officer, will be protected from civil liability and penalisation (as defined in section 32 of the draft law) by their employer. The draft law will also require persons who perform a pre-approval controlled function within regulated financial service providers, i.e. a senior role or a role related to regulatory compliance, to disclose to the CBI such possible or actual contraventions of financial services legislation which they believe or know might be of material assistance to the CBI. Additionally, to protect the whistleblower’s personal data, Section 34(5) of the draft law provides that the CBI may not divulge the whistleblower’s identity except (i) with the whistleblower’s consent, or (ii) if this is necessary to ensure proper investigation of the matters to which the disclosure relates. 1.4 The draft law extends the CBI’s powers to give directions to all regulated service providers or related undertakings, in particular where they are acting or failing to act in a particular manner. 1.5 The draft law will empower the CBI to make wide-ranging regulations, following prior consultation with the Ministry, for the proper and effective regulation of financial service providers. It will also provide additional powers to the CBI to enforce financial services legislation and will increase the maximum levels of financial sanctions which can be imposed on regulated financial service providers by the CBI for contraventions of financial services legislation.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 The ECB understands that this draft law is the second step in the legislative reform of the Irish central banking and financial regulatory regime . In particular, it will provide the CBI with powers, such as powers related to third party reports, authorised officers and directions, which would extend beyond the regulated financial service provider to include related undertakings. These powers therefore will enhance the ability of the CBI to have a complete understanding of the whole group of which the regulated entity is a member when assessing the risks to which the regulated

text: business is subject. In this regard, the ECB welcomes the draft law as enhancing the supervisory and enforcement tools available to the CBI . 2.2 The ECB understands that further legislation will be introduced to consolidate all legislation relating to the CBI. The ECB reaffirms its previous opinions on the consolidation of Ireland’s Central Bank Acts and notes that such further consolidating legislation should be the subject of a separate consultation of the ECB.

text: 3. Additional CBI powers in supervisory and enforcement matters

text: As regards the financing of the additional and enhanced CBI powers in supervisory and enforcement matters introduced by the draft law, the ECB refers to the principle of financial independence under which a national central bank must have sufficient means to perform its tasks related to the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and its national tasks . The CBI should, therefore, dispose of sufficient human and financial resources to efficiently perform any additional tasks introduced by the draft law, as well as its current tasks, and should not be adversely affected in carrying out its ESCB-related tasks, from an operational or financial point of view, as a result of any additional tasks introduced by the draft law. 3.1 Independent expert report Part 2 of the draft law will empower the CBI in certain circumstances to require a financial service provider or a related undertaking to report to it. While section 9 of the draft law provides (i) that the substance of such report may relate to any matter on which the CBI could require information or documents under financial services legislation, and (ii) that the report may be required for the proper and effective regulation of financial service providers, section 10 provides that the CBI must have regard to certain matters before requesting a report under section 9. For example, the CBI must have regard to whether it might use other more appropriate powers instead of requesting a report and to the degree of relevant knowledge and expertise available to the financial service provider or related undertaking, as well as the cost implications of providing such report. Although the draft law does not specify precisely when a report may be requested, the ECB acknowledges the need for flexibility in this regard and understands that the scope of section 9 should be read against the provisions in section 10. Section 11(1) of the draft law provides that the person appointed to report (hereinafter the ‘reviewer’) will be either (i) nominated by the financial service provider or related undertaking being reviewed (hereinafter the ‘reviewee’) and approved by the CBI, or (ii) nominated by the CBI if the reviewee makes no nomination. Section 11(2) provides that the reviewer may be employed or

text: otherwise engaged by the reviewee. The ECB welcomes the provisions of section 11(3) aimed at ensuring the independence and impartiality of the reviewer vis-à-vis the reviewee as a precondition for its appointment and for drafting the report. The ECB stresses the importance of the adequate application of such provisions by the reviewee and by the CBI, through thorough scrutiny of the absence of conflict of interests and fulfilment of all the other conditions set forth by the draft law. 3.2 Authorised officers Part 3 of the draft law provides for the appointment in certain circumstances by the CBI of an authorised officer in respect of a regulated financial service provider or related undertaking and various other categories or persons , for the purposes of obtaining information necessary for the CBI’s performance of its regulatory and supervisory functions. According to section 25 of the draft law, an authorised officer is provided with a wide range of powers including in relation to inspections, interviews, searches and document production. Section 30 provides that where a person subject to an authorised officer’s powers fails or refuses to comply with that authorised officer in the exercise of their powers, the authorised officer may certify the failure or refusal to the High Court. The High Court may then make an order or direction as it sees fit, following hearings of any witnesses against or on behalf of the person concerned and any statement in defence. The ECB notes that the draft law does not address the question of possible interplay between the function of a reviewer appointed under Part 2 to report to the CBI, and that of an authorised officer appointed under Part 3 to obtain information for the CBI. The draft law does not provide in what circumstances a reviewer as opposed to an authorised officer, and vice versa, would be appointed. Similarly, there are no provisions in the draft law to deal with the potential situation where both a reviewer and an authorised officer are performing tasks for the CBI in relation to a regulated financial service provider or related undertaking at the same time. The ECB appreciates that the reviewer and the authorised officer have different functions, with the reviewer performing specific, stipulated tasks for the CBI, whilst the authorised officer will be largely gathering information for the CBI. Although it could be helpful to clarify the respective positions of each as regards the other in such circumstances, the ECB understands the difficulty in providing precise dividing lines in the draft law between the use and position of authorised officers and reviewers, respectively, and that the choice of measure will depend on the circumstances in each case, and therefore suggests that this point is addressed by the CBI when implementing the draft law. 3.3 Whistleblowing Part 4 of the draft law introduces whistleblowing protection for persons who make good faith disclosures to the CBI or a CBI officer or employee or an authorised officer regarding the possible or actual contravention of financial services legislation . The ECB understands that this

text: introduction of specific protection for whistleblowers in the financial services sector is to address a recognised lack of protection for good faith disclosures in respect of a potential or actual offence under or contravention of financial services legislation. The ECB understands that the CBI could use any of the information disclosed to it under Part 4 to more efficiently avail of its other powers under the draft law and under other relevant laws to contribute to the more effective application of the financial services legislation . On this basis, the ECB welcomes the introduction of such protection for whistleblowers. 3.4 Directions The ECB understands that the CBI’s power to give directions is not new and that the intention of 11 12 the draft law is rather to clarify and consolidate its precise scope by providing for a new power which applies to all regulated financial service providers and their related undertakings. In this regard, the ECB welcomes the intention of clarification and consolidation. 3.5 Regulations Part 6 of the draft law will empower the CBI to make wide-ranging regulations, following prior consultation with the Ministry, for the proper and effective regulation of financial service providers. Such regulations would allow the CBI to effectively perform the new supervisory responsibilities related to all financial services providers and financial markets. As pointed out on previous occasions , and without prejudice to the Governing Council’s powers under Article 14.4 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks (hereinafter the ‘Statute of the ESCB’), the ECB does not consider that this new task would interfere with the ESCB’s objectives and tasks. Nonetheless, pursuant to the last sentence of Article 14.4 of the Statute of the ESCB, this new task would have to be performed on the responsibility and liability of the CBI and would not be regarded as being part of ESCB functions. Section 41 of the draft law provides that, prior to making any such regulations, the CBI must (i) consult with the Ministry, and (ii) provide the Ministry with a draft of the proposed regulations. The ECB would welcome elaboration in the draft law of the precise procedural rules for such consultation, for example in terms of timing. Such procedural rules should not impact on the CBI’s independence of decision-making or action or its need to act quickly in times of crisis. In this regard, it should be clear that, by giving the Ministry the opportunity to comment on a draft regulation, the CBI will have fulfilled ipso facto its obligation to consult the Ministry under section 41, and that there is no obligation to obtain the Ministry’s consent before making any such regulation.

text: 3.6 Cooperation with foreign authorities The ECB welcomes the provision in section 53 on cooperation with foreign authorities to enhance the effectiveness of international supervision. The ECB notes, however, that a reference to Member State and third country authorities would be more consistent with Union language and for this reason preferable to ‘overseas regulator’. In this regard, the provision should address (i) cooperation with Member State authorities and the duty to cooperate to comply with any Treaty obligation and the Union banking directives, and (ii) cooperation with third country authorities, by setting out the conditions for such international cooperation which are not applicable in the Union context.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 9 September 2011.

text: [signed]

text: The Vice-President of the ECB

text: Vítor CONSTÂNCIO