identifier: AMC & GM to Part-SPA — Amendment 4

beslut: ED Decision 2016/022/R

title: AMC & GM to Part-SPA — Amendment 4

text: Annex V to ED Decision 2016/022/R

text: ‘AMC and GM to Annex V (Part-SPA) — Amendment 4’

text: The Annex to ED Decision 2012/019/R is amended as follows: The text of the amendment is arranged to show deleted text, new or amended text as shown below: (a) deleted text is marked with strikethrough; (b) new or amended text is highlighted in grey; (c) an ellipsis (…) indicates that the remaining text is unchanged in front of or following the reflected amendment.

text: 1. A new Subpart K — Helicopter offshore operations is added as follows:

text: Subpart K — Helicopter offshore operations

text: GM1 SPA.HOFO.105(c) Approval for offshore operations

text: The requirement to inform both Member States (MSs) allows the MSs to mutually decide on how best to exercise their obligations in accordance with ARO.GEN.300(d) and (e) when operations are intended to be performed in a MS other than the MS issuing the approval for offshore operations.

text: AMC1 SPA.HOFO.110(a) Operating procedures

text: RISK ASSESSMENT The operator’s risk assessment should include, but not be limited to, the following hazards: (a) collision with offshore installations, vessels and floating structures; (b) collision with wind turbines; (c) collision with skysails; (d) collision during low-level instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) operations; (e) collision with obstacles adjacent to helidecks; (f) collision with surface/water; (g) IMC or night offshore approaches; (h) loss of control during operations to small or moving offshore locations; (i) operations to unattended helidecks; and (j) weather and/or sea conditions that could either cause an accident or exacerbate its consequences.

text: AMC1 SPA.HOFO.110(b)(1) Operating procedures

text: OPERATIONAL FLIGHT PLAN The operational flight plan should contain at least the items listed in AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.175(a) Flight preparation.

text: AMC1 SPA.HOFO.110(b)(2) Operating procedures

text: PASSENGER BRIEFING The following aspects applicable to the helicopter used should be presented and demonstrated to the passengers by audio-visual electronic means (video, DVD or similar), or the passengers should be informed about them by a crew member prior to boarding the aircraft: (a) the use of the life jackets and where they are stowed if not in use; (b) the proper use of survival suits, including briefing on the need to have suits fully zipped with, if applicable, hoods and gloves on, during take-off and landing or when otherwise advised by the pilot-in-command/commander; (c) the proper use of emergency breathing equipment; (d) the location and operation of the emergency exits;

text: (e) life raft deployment and boarding; (f) deployment of all survival equipment; and (g) boarding and disembarkation instructions. When operating in a non-hostile environment, the operator may omit items related to equipment that is not required.

text: AMC1.1 SPA.HOFO.110(b)(2) Operating procedures

text: PASSENGER BRIEFING This AMC is applicable to passengers who require more knowledge of the operational concept, such as sea pilots and support personnel for offshore wind turbines. The operator may replace the passenger briefing as set out in AMC1 SPA.HOFO.110(b)(2) with a passenger training and checking programme provided that: — the operator ensures that the passenger is appropriately trained and qualified on the helicopter types on which they are to be carried; — the operator defines the training and checking programme for each helicopter type, covering all safety and emergency procedures for a given helicopter type, and including practical training; — the passenger has received the above training within the last 12 calendar months; and — the passenger has flown on the helicopter type within the last 90 days.

text: AMC1 SPA.HOFO.110(b)(5) Operating procedures

text: AUTOMATIC FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM (AFCS) To ensure competence in manual handling of the helicopter, the operator should provide instructions to the flight crew in the operations manual (OM) under which circumstances the helicopter may be operated in lower modes of automation. Particular emphasis should be given to flight in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) and instrument approaches.

text: GM1 SPA.HOFO.110(b)(9) Operating Procedures

text: Emergency flotation systems (EFSs) cannot always be armed safely before the approach when a speed limitation needs to be complied with. In such case, the EFS should be armed as soon as safe to do so.

text: AMC1 SPA.HOFO.115 Use of offshore locations

text: GENERAL (a) The operations manual (OM) relating to the specific usage of offshore helicopter landing areas (Part C for CAT operators) should contain, or make reference to, a directory of helidecks (helideck directory (HD)) intended to be used by the operator. The directory should provide details of helideck limitations and a pictorial representation of each offshore location and its helicopter landing area, recording all necessary information of a permanent nature and using a standardised template. The HD entries should show, and be amended as necessary, the most recent status of each helideck concerning noncompliance with applicable national standards, limitations, warnings, cautions or other comments of operational importance. An example of a typical template is shown in Figure 1 of GM1 SPA.HOFO.115 below.

text: (b) In order to ensure that the safety of flights is not compromised, the operator should obtain relevant information and details in order to compile the HD, as well as the pictorial representation from the owner/operator of the offshore helicopter landing area. (c) If more than one name for the offshore location exists, the common name painted on the surface of the landing area should be listed, but other names should also be included in the HD (e.g. radio call sign, if different). After renaming an offshore location, the old name should also be included in the HD for the following 6 months. (d) Any limitations associated with an offshore location should be included in the HD. With complex installation arrangements, including combinations of installations/vessels (e.g. combined operations), a separate listing in the HD, accompanied by diagrams/pictures, where necessary, may be required. (e) Each offshore helicopter landing area should be inspected and assessed based on limitations, warnings, instructions and restrictions, in order to determine its acceptability with respect to the following as a minimum: (1) The physical characteristics of the landing area, including size, load-bearing capability and the appropriate ‘D’ and ‘t’ values. Note 1: ‘D’ is the overall length of the helicopter from the most forward position of the main rotor tip to the most rearward position of the tail rotor tip plane path, or rearmost extension of the fuselage in the case of ‘Fenestron’ or ‘NOTAR’ tails. Note 2: ‘t’ is the maximum allowable mass in tonnes. (2) The preservation of obstacle-protected surfaces (an essential safeguard for all flights). These surfaces are: (i) the minimum 210° obstacle-free surface (OFS) above helideck level; (ii) the 150° limited-obstacle surface (LOS) above helideck level; and (iii) the minimum 180° falling ‘5:1’ gradient with respect to significant obstacles below helideck level. If these sectors/surfaces are infringed, even on a temporary basis, and/or if an adjacent installation or vessel infringes the obstacle-protected surfaces related to the landing area, an assessment should be made to determine whether it is necessary to impose operating limitations and/or restrictions to mitigate any non-compliance with the criteria. (3) Marking and lighting: (i) for operations at night, adequate illumination of the perimeter of the landing area, using perimeter lighting that meets national requirements; (ii) for operations at night, adequate illumination of the location of the touchdown marking by use of a lit touchdown/positioning marking and lit helideck identification marking that meet national requirements; (iii) status lights (for night and day operations, indicating the status of the helicopter landing area, e.g. a red flashing light indicates ‘landing area unsafe: do not land’) meeting national requirements; (iv) dominant-obstacle paint schemes and lighting;

text: (v) condition of helideck markings; and (vi) adequacy of general installation and structure lighting. Any limitations with respect to non-compliance of lighting arrangements may require the HD to be annotated ‘daylight only operations’. (4) Deck surface: (i) assessment of surface friction; (ii) adequacy and condition of helideck net (where provided); (iii) ‘fit for purpose’ drainage system; (iv) deck edge safety netting or shelving; (v) a system of tie-down points that is adequate for the range of helicopters in use; and (vi) procedures to ensure that the surface is kept clean of all contaminants, e.g. bird guano, sea spray, snow and ice. (5) Environment: (i) foreign-object damage; (ii) an assessment of physical turbulence generators, e.g. structure-induced turbulence due to clad derrick; (iii) bird control measures; (iv) air flow degradation due to gas turbine exhaust emissions (turbulence and thermal effects), flares (thermal effects) or cold gas vents (unburned flammable gas); and (v) adjacent offshore installations may need to be included in the environmental assessment. To assess for potential adverse environmental effects, as described in (ii), (iv) and (v) above, an offshore location should be subject to appropriate studies, e.g. wind tunnel testing and/or computational fluid dynamics (CFD) analysis. (6) Rescue and firefighting: (i) systems for delivery of firefighting media to the landing area, e.g. deck integrated firefighting system (DIFFS); (ii) delivery of primary media types, assumed critical area, application rate and duration; (iii) deliveries of complementary agent(s) and media types, capacity and discharge; (iv) personal protective equipment (PPE); and (v) rescue equipment and crash box/cabinet. (7) Communication and navigation (Com/Nav): (i) aeronautical radio(s); (ii) radio-telephone (R/T) call sign to match the offshore location name with the side identification that should be simple and unique; and (iii) radio log.

text: (8) Fuelling facilities: in accordance with the relevant national guidance and legislation. (9) Additional operational and handling equipment: (i) windsock; (ii) meteorological information, including wind, pressure, air temperature, and dew point temperature, and equipment recording and displaying mean wind (10-min wind) and gusts; (iii) helideck motion recording and reporting system, where applicable; (iv) passenger briefing system; (v) chocks; (vi) tie-down strops/ropes; (vii) weighing scales; (viii) a suitable power source for starting helicopters (e.g. ground power unit (GPU)), where applicable; and (ix) equipment for clearing the landing area of snow, ice and other contaminants. (10) Personnel: trained helicopter-landing-area staff (e.g. helicopter landing officer/helicopter deck assistant and firefighters, etc.); persons required to assess local weather conditions or communicate with the helicopter by radio-telephony should be appropriately qualified. (f) The HD entry for each offshore location should be completed and kept up to date, using the template and reflecting the information and details described in (e) above. The template should contain at least the following (GM1 SPA.HOFO.115 below is provided as an example): (1) details: (i) name of offshore location; (ii) R/T call sign; (iii) helicopter landing area identification marking; (iv) side panel identification marking; (v) landing area elevation; (vi) maximum installation/vessel height; (vii) helideck size and/or ‘D’ value; (viii) type of offshore location: (A) fixed, permanently manned installation; (B) fixed, normally unattended installation; (C) vessel type (e.g. diving support vessel, tanker, etc.); (D) semi-submersible, mobile, offshore drilling unit:

text: (E) jack-up, mobile, offshore drilling unit: (F) floating production, storage and offloading (FPSO); (ix) name of owner/operator; (x) geographical position, where appropriate; (xi) Com/Nav frequencies and identification; (xii) general drawing of the offshore location that shows the helicopter landing area with annotations indicating location of derrick, masts, cranes, flare stack, turbine and gas exhausts, side identification panels, windsock, etc.; (xiii) plan view drawing, and chart orientation from the general drawing to show the above; the plan view should also show the 210-degree sector orientation in degrees true; (xiv) type of fuelling: (A) pressure and gravity; (B) pressure only; (C) gravity only; and (D) none; (xv) type and nature of firefighting equipment; (xvi) availability of GPU; (xvii) deck heading; (xviii) ‘t’ value ; (xix) status light system (Yes/No); and (xx) revision publication date or number; and (2) one or more diagrams/photographs, and any other suitable guidance to assist pilots. (g) For offshore locations for which there is incomplete information, ‘restricted’ usage based on the information available may be considered by the operator, subject to risk assessment prior to the first helicopter visit. During subsequent operations, and before any restriction on usage is lifted, information should be gathered and the following should apply: (1) pictorial (static) representation: (i) template blanks (GM1 SPA.HOFO.115 is provided as an example) should be available to be filled in during flight preparation on the basis of the information given by the offshore location owner/operator and of flight crew observations; (ii) where possible, suitably annotated photographs may be used until the HD entry and template have been completed; (iii) until the HD entry and template have been completed, conservative operational restrictions (e.g. performance, routing, etc.) may be applied; (iv) any previous inspection reports should be obtained and reviewed by the operator; and

text: (v) an inspection of the offshore helicopter landing area should be carried out to verify the content of the completed HD entry and template; once found suitable, the landing area may be considered authorised for use by the operator; and (2) with reference to the above, the HD entry should contain at least the following: (i) HD revision date or number; (ii) generic list of helideck motion limitations; (iii) name of offshore location; (iv) helideck size and/or ‘D’ value and ‘t’ value; and (v) limitations, warnings, instructions and restrictions.

text: GM1 SPA.HOFO.115 Use of offshore locations

text: Figure 1 — Example of a helicopter landing area template Operator 10-1 Revision date Installation/vessel name Position (N/S XXX) (E/W XXX) Highest obstacle Deck height Installation height Deck heading Deck ident within 5 nm (XXX ft) (XXX ft) AIMS/ICAO code Radio Radio Deck category Side ident (1/2/3) Cleared for (above Deck size (m) T value (XXX kg) Installation type Operator D or t values) (Helicopter type (Fixed/semi/etc.) xxx) Fuel Ground power Inspection date Inspected by Next due (Press/gravity/no) (AC/DC/no)

text: Wind direction Wind speed Limitations (All) (All) (Performance requirements) (000–050) (> 30) (Table 2 etc.) 5:1 non-compliant obstacles Additional information

text: Figure 2 — Example of a helicopter landing area template

text: GM2 SPA.HOFO.115 Use of offshore locations

text: Operators should use available standards and regulations provided for operations to offshore locations such as those contained in United Kingdom Civil Aviation Authority (UK CAA) CAP 437 ‘Standards for Offshore Helicopter Landing Areas’, Norwegian Civil Aviation Regulation BSL D 5-1 or similar national documentation, or ICAO Annex 14, Vol II ‘Heliports’.

text: AMC1 SPA.HOFO.120 Selection of aerodromes and operating sites

text: COASTAL AERODROME (a) Any alleviation from the requirement to select an alternate aerodrome for a flight to a coastal aerodrome under instrument flight rules (IFR) routing from offshore should be based on an individual safety risk assessment. (b) The following should be taken into account: (1) suitability of the weather based on the landing forecast for the destination; (2) the fuel required to meet the IFR requirements of CAT.OP.MPA.150, NCC.OP.131 or SPO.OP.131 except for the alternate fuel; (3) where the destination coastal aerodrome is not directly on the coast, it should be: (i) within a distance that with the fuel specified in (b)(2), the helicopter is able, at any time after crossing the coastline, to return to the coast, descend safely, carry out an approach under visual flight rules (VFR) and land, with the VFR fuel reserves intact; (ii) within 5 nm of the coastline; and (iii) geographically sited so that the helicopter is able, within the rules of the air and within the landing forecast: (A) to proceed inbound from the coast at 500-ft above ground level (AGL), and carry out an approach and landing under VFR; or (B) to proceed inbound from the coast on an agreed route, and carry out an approach and landing under VFR; (4) procedures for coastal aerodromes should be based on a landing forecast no worse than: (i) by day, a cloud base of ≥ 400 ft above descent height (DH)/minimum descent height (MDH), and a visibility of 4 km, or, if descent over the sea is intended, a cloud base of 600 ft and a visibility of 4 km; or (ii) by night, a cloud base of 1 000 ft and a visibility of 5 km; (5) the descent to establish visual contact with the surface should take place over the sea or as part of the instrument approach; (6) routings and procedures for coastal aerodromes nominated as such should be included in the operations manual (OM) (Part C for CAT operators); (7) the minimum equipment list (MEL) should reflect the requirement for airborne radar and radio altimeter for this type of operation; and (8) operational limitations for each coastal aerodrome should be specified in the OM.

text: AMC2 SPA.HOFO.120 Selection of aerodromes and operating sites

text: OFFSHORE DESTINATION ALTERNATE AERODROME ‘Aerodrome’ is referred to as ‘helideck’ in this AMC. (a) Offshore destination alternate helideck landing environment The landing environment at an offshore location proposed for use as an offshore destination alternate helideck should be pre-surveyed, together with the physical characteristics, such as the effect of wind direction and strength, as well as of turbulence established. This information, which should be available to the pilot-in-command/commander both at the planning stage and in-flight, should be published in an appropriate form in the operations manual (OM) (including the orientation of the helideck) so that the suitability of the alternate helideck can be assessed. This helideck should meet the criteria for size and obstacle clearance appropriate to the performance requirements of the type of helicopter concerned. (b) Performance considerations The use of an offshore destination alternate helideck should be restricted to helicopters that can achieve one engine inoperative (OEI) in ground effect (IGE) hover at an appropriate power rating above the helideck at the offshore location. Where the surface of the helideck or prevailing conditions (especially wind velocity) precludes an OEI IGE, OEI out-of-ground effect (OGE) hover performance at an appropriate power rating should be used to compute the landing mass. The landing mass should be calculated based on graphs provided in the operations manual (OM) (Part B for CAT operators). When this landing mass is computed, due account should be taken of helicopter configuration, environmental conditions and the operation of systems that have an adverse effect on performance. The planned landing mass of the helicopter, including crew, passengers, baggage, cargo plus 30-min final reserve fuel (FRF), should not exceed the OEI landing mass of the helicopter at the time of approach to the offshore destination alternate. (c) Weather considerations (1) Meteorological observations When the use of an offshore destination alternate helideck is planned, the meteorological observations, both at the offshore destination and the alternate helideck, should be made by an observer acceptable to the authority responsible for the provision of meteorological services. Automatic meteorological-observation stations may be used. (2) Weather minima When the use of an offshore destination alternate helideck is planned, the operator should neither select an offshore location as destination nor as alternate helideck unless the weather forecasts for the two offshore locations indicate that during a period commencing 1 h before and ending 1 h after the expected time of arrival at the destination and the alternate helideck, the weather conditions will be at or above the planning minima shown in the following table:

text: Table 1 — Planning minima

text: Planning minima

text: Day Night Cloud base 600 ft 800 ft Visibility 4 km 5 km

text: (3) Conditions of fog To use an offshore destination alternate helideck, it should be ensured that fog is not forecast or present within 60 nm of the destination helideck and alternate helideck during the period commencing 1 h before and ending 1 h after the expected time of arrival at the offshore destination or alternate helideck. (d) Actions at point of no return Before passing the point of no return, which should not be more than 30 min from the destination, the following actions should have been completed: (1) confirmation that navigation to the offshore destination and offshore destination alternate helideck can be assured; (2) radio contact with the offshore destination and offshore destination alternate helideck (or master station) has been established; (3) the landing forecast at the offshore destination and offshore destination alternate helideck have been obtained and confirmed to be at or above the required minima; (4) the requirements for OEI landing (see (b) above) have been checked in the light of the latest reported weather conditions to ensure that they can be met; and (5) to the extent possible, having regard to information on the current and forecast use of the offshore alternate helideck and on prevailing conditions, the availability of the helideck on the offshore location intended as destination alternate helideck should be guaranteed by the duty holder (the rig operator in the case of fixed installations, and the owner in the case of mobile ones) until the landing at the destination, or the offshore destination alternate helideck, has been achieved or until offshore shuttling has been completed.

text: AMC1 SPA.HOFO.125 Airborne radar approach (ARA) to offshore locations

text: Note: alternative approach procedures using original equipment manufacturer (OEM)-certified approach systems are not covered by this AMC. GENERAL (a) Before commencing the final approach, the pilot-in-command/commander should ensure that a clear path exists on the radar screen for the final and missed approach segments. If lateral clearance from any obstacle will be less than 1 nm, the pilot-in-command/commander should: (1) approach to a nearby target structure and thereafter proceed visually to the destination structure; or (2) make the approach from another direction leading to a circling manoeuvre. (b) The cloud ceiling should be sufficiently clear above the helideck to permit a safe landing. (c) Minimum descent height (MDH) should not be less than 50 ft above the elevation of the helideck: (1) the MDH for an airborne radar approach should not be lower than: (i) 200 ft by day; or (ii) 300 ft by night; and

text: (2) the MDH for an approach leading to a circling manoeuvre should not be lower than: (i) 300 ft by day; or (ii) 500 ft by night. (d) Minimum descent altitude (MDA) may only be used if the radio altimeter is unserviceable. The MDA should be a minimum of the MDH + 200 ft, and be based on a calibrated barometer at the destination or on the lowest forecast barometric pressure adjusted to sea level (QNH) for the region. (e) The decision range should not be less than 0.75 nm. (f) The MDA/MDH for a single-pilot ARA should be 100 ft higher than that calculated in accordance with (c) and (d) above. The decision range should not be less than 1 nm. (g) For approaches to non-moving offshore locations, the maximum range discrepancy between the global navigation satellite system (GNSS) and the weather radar display should not be greater than 0.3 nm at any point between the final approach fix (FAF) at 4 nm from the offshore location and the offset initiation point (OIP) at 1.5 nm from the offshore location. (h) For approaches to non-moving offshore locations, the maximum bearing discrepancy between the GNSS and the weather radar display should not be greater than 10° at the FAF at 4 nm from the offshore location.

text: GM1 SPA.HOFO.125 Airborne radar approach (ARA) to offshore locations

text: GENERAL (a) General (1) The helicopter ARA procedure may have as many as five separate segments: the arrival, initial, intermediate, final approach, and missed approach segment. In addition, the specifications of the circling manoeuvre to a landing under visual conditions should be considered. The individual approach segments can begin and end at designated fixes. However, the segments of an ARA may often begin at specified points where no fixes are available. (2) The fixes, or points, are named to coincide with the beginning of the associated segment. For example, the intermediate segment begins at the intermediate fix (IF) and ends at the final approach fix (FAF). Where no fix is available or appropriate, the segments begin and end at specified points; for example, at the intermediate point (IP) and final approach point (FAP). The order in which the segments are discussed in this GM is the order in which the pilot would fly them in a complete procedure: that is, from the arrival through the initial and intermediate to the final approach and, if necessary, to the missed approach. (3) Only those segments that are required by local conditions applying at the time of the approach need to be included in a procedure. In constructing the procedure, the final approach track, which should be orientated so as to be substantially into the wind, should be identified first as it is the least flexible and most critical of all the segments. When the origin and the orientation of the final approach have been determined, the other necessary segments should be integrated with it to produce an orderly manoeuvring pattern that does not generate an unacceptably high workload for the flight crew.

text: (4) Where an ARA is conducted to a non-moving offshore location (i.e. fixed installation or moored vessel), and a reliable global navigation satellite system (GNSS) position for the location is available, the GNSS/area navigation system should be used to enhance the safety of the ARA. This is achieved by using the GNSS/area navigation system to navigate the helicopter onto, and maintain, the final approach track, and by using the GNSS range and bearing information to crosscheck the position of the offshore location on the weather radar display. (5) Examples of ARA procedures, as well as vertical profile and missed approach procedures, are contained in Figures 1 and 2 below. (b) Obstacle environment (1) Each segment of the ARA is located in an overwater area that has a flat surface at sea level. However, due to the passage of large vessels which are not required to notify their presence, the exact obstacle environment cannot be determined. As the largest vessels and structures are known to reach elevations exceeding 500 ft above mean sea level (AMSL), the uncontrolled offshore obstacle environment applying to the arrival, initial and intermediate approach segments can reasonably be assumed to be capable of reaching to at least 500 ft AMSL. Nevertheless, in the case of the final approach and missed approach segments, specific areas are involved within which no radar returns are allowed. In these areas, the height of wave crests, and the possibility that small obstacles may be present that are not visible on radar, results in an uncontrolled surface environment that extends to an elevation of 50 ft AMSL. (2) Information about movable obstacles should be requested from the arrival destination or adjacent installations. (3) Under normal circumstances, the relationship between the approach procedure and the obstacle environment is governed by the concept that vertical separation is very easy to apply during the arrival, initial and intermediate segments, while horizontal separation, which is much more difficult to guarantee in an uncontrolled environment, is applied only in the final and missed approach segments. (c) Arrival segment The arrival segment commences at the last en-route navigation fix, where the aircraft leaves the helicopter route, and it ends either at the initial approach fix (IAF) or, if no course reversal or similar manoeuvre is required, it ends at the IF. Standard en-route obstacle clearance criteria should be applied to the arrival segment. (d) Initial approach segment The initial approach segment is only required if the intermediate approach track cannot be joined directly. Most approaches will be flown direct to a point close to the IF, and then on to the final approach track, using GNSS/area navigation guidance. The segment commences at the IAF, and on completion of the manoeuvre, it ends at the IP. The minimum obstacle clearance (MOC) assigned to the initial approach segment is 1 000 ft. (e) Intermediate approach segment The intermediate approach segment commences at the IP, or in the case of straight-in approaches, where there is no initial approach segment, it commences at the IF. The segment ends at the FAP and should not be less than 2 nm in length. The purpose of the intermediate segment is to align the

text: helicopter with the final approach track and prepare it for the final approach. During the intermediate segment, the helicopter should be lined up with the final approach track, the speed should be stabilised, the destination should be identified on the radar, and the final approach and missed approach areas should be identified and verified to be clear of radar returns. The MOC assigned to the intermediate segment is 500 ft. (f) Final approach segment (1) The final approach segment commences at the FAP and ends at the missed approach point (MAPt). The final approach area, which should be identified on radar, takes the form of a corridor between the FAP and the radar return of the destination. This corridor should not be less than 2 nm wide so that the projected track of the helicopter does not pass closer than 1 nm to the obstacles lying outside the area. (2) On passing the FAP, the helicopter will descend below the intermediate approach altitude and follow a descent gradient which should not be steeper than 6.5 %. At this stage, vertical separation from the offshore obstacle environment will be lost. However, within the final approach area, the MDA/MDH will provide separation from the surface environment. Descent from 1 000 ft AMSL to 200 ft AMSL at a constant 6.5 % gradient will involve a horizontal distance of 2 nm. In order to follow the guideline that the procedure should not generate an unacceptably high workload for the flight crew, the required actions of levelling off at MDH, changing heading at the offset initiation point (OIP), and turning away at the MAPt, should not be planned to occur at the same time from the destination. (3) During the final approach, compensation for drift should be applied, and the heading which, if maintained, would take the helicopter directly to the destination should be identified. It follows that at an OIP located at a range of 1.5 nm, a heading change of 10° is likely to result in a track offset of 15° at 1 nm, and the extended centre line of the new track can be expected to have a mean position approximately 300–400 m to one side of the destination structure. The safety margin built into the 0.75-nm decision range (DR) is dependent upon the rate of closure with the destination. Although the airspeed should be in the range of 60–90 KIAS during the final approach, the ground speed, after due allowance for wind velocity, should not be greater than 70 kt. (g) Missed approach segment (1) The missed approach segment commences at the MAPt and ends when the helicopter reaches the minimum en route altitude. The missed approach manoeuvre is a ‘turning missed approach’ which should be of not less than 30° and should not, normally, be greater than 45°. A turn away of more than 45° does not reduce the collision risk factor any further nor does it permit a closer DR. However, turns of more than 45° may increase the risk of pilot disorientation, and by inhibiting the rate of climb (especially in the case of an OEI missed approach procedure), may keep the helicopter at an extremely low level for longer than it is desirable. (2) The missed approach area to be used should be identified and verified as a clear area on the radar screen during the intermediate approach segment. The base of the missed approach area is a sloping surface at 2.5 % gradient starting from MDH at the MAPt. The concept is that a helicopter executing a turning missed approach will be protected by the horizontal boundaries of the missed

text: approach area until vertical separation of more than 130 ft is achieved between the base of the area and the offshore obstacle environment of 500 ft AMSL that prevails outside the area. (3) A missed approach area, taking the form of a 45° sector orientated left or right of the final approach track, originating from a point 5 nm short of the destination, and terminating on an arc 3 nm beyond the destination, should normally satisfy the specifications of a 30° turning missed approach. (h) Required visual reference The visual reference required is that the destination should be in view in order to be able to carry out a safe landing. (i) Radar equipment During the ARA procedure, colour mapping radar equipment with a 120° sector scan and a 2.5-nm range scale selected may result in dynamic errors of the following order: (1) bearing/tracking error of ± 4.5° with 95 % accuracy; (2) mean ranging error of 250 m; or (3) random ranging error of ± 250 m with 95 % accuracy.

text: Figure 1 — Horizontal profile

text: Figure 2 — Vertical profile

text: GM2 SPA.HOFO.125 Airborne radar approach (ARA) to offshore locations

text: GLOBAL NAVIGATION SATELLITE SYSTEM (GNSS)/AREA NAVIGATION SYSTEM Where an ARA is conducted to a non-moving offshore location (i.e. fixed installation or moored vessel), and the GNSS/area navigation system is used to enhance the safety of the ARA, the following procedure or equivalent should be applied: (a) selection from the area navigation system database or manual entry of the offshore location; (b) manual entry of the final approach fix (FAF) or intermediate fix (IF), as a range of and bearing from the offshore location; (c) operation of the GNSS equipment in terminal mode; (d) comparison of weather radar and GNSS range and bearing data to cross-check the position of the offshore location; (e) use of GNSS guidance to guide the aircraft onto the final approach track during the initial or intermediate approach segments; (f) use of GNSS guidance from the FAF towards the offset initiation point (OIP) during the final approach segment to establish the helicopter on the correct approach track and, hence, heading; (g) transition from GNSS guidance to navigation based on headings once the track is stabilised and before reaching OIP; (h) use of GNSS range of and bearing to the offshore location during the intermediate and final approach segments to cross-check weather radar information (for correct ‘painting’ of the destination and, hence, of other obstacles); (i) use of GNSS range of the offshore location to enhance confidence in the weather radar determination of arrival at the OIP and MAPt; and (j) use of GNSS range of and bearing to the destination to monitor separation from the offshore location.

text: AMC1 SPA.HOFO.140 Performance requirements — take-off and landing at offshore locations

text: FACTORS To ensure that the necessary factors are taken into account, operators not conducting CAT operations should use take-off and landing procedures that are appropriate to the circumstances and have been developed in accordance with ORO.MLR.100 in order to minimise the risks of collision with obstacles at the individual offshore location under the prevailing conditions.

text: AMC1 SPA.HOFO.145 Flight data monitoring (FDM) programme

text: FDM PROGRAMME Refer to AMC1 ORO.AOC.130. Note: Appendix 1 to AMC1 ORO.AOC.130 is not valid for helicopters.

text: GM1 SPA.HOFO.145 Flight data monitoring (FDM) programme

text: DEFINITION OF AN FDM PROGRAMME Refer to GM1 ORO.AOC.130, except for the examples that are specific to aeroplane operation.

text: GM2 SPA.HOFO.145 Flight data monitoring (FDM) programme

text: FDM Additional guidance material for the establishment of a FDM programme is found in: (a) International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Doc 10000 — Manual on Flight Data Analysis Programmes (FDAP); and (b) United Kingdom Civil Aviation Authority (UK CAA) CAP 739 — Flight Data Monitoring. The following table provides examples of FDM events that may be further developed using operator- and helicopter-specific limits. The table is considered illustrative and non-exhaustive. Table 1 — Examples of FDM events

text: Event title/description Parameters required Comments

text: Ground

text: Outside air temperature (OAT) OAT To identify when the helicopter is high — Operating limits operated at the limits of OAT. Sloping-ground high-pitch attitude Pitch attitude, ground switch To identify when the helicopter is (similar) operated at the slope limits. Sloping-ground high-roll attitude Roll attitude, ground switch To identify when the helicopter is (similar) operated at the slope limits. Rotor brake on at an excessive Rotor brake discreet, NR To identify when the rotor brake number of rotations (main rotor is applied at too high NR. speed) (NR) Ground taxiing speed — max Ground speed (GS), ground switch To identify when the helicopter is (similar) ground taxied at high speed (wheeled helicopters only). Air taxiing speed — max GS, ground switch (similar), radio To identify when the helicopter is altitude (Rad Alt) air taxied at high speed. Excessive power during ground Total torque (Tq), ground switch To identify when excessive power taxiing (similar), GS is used during ground taxiing. Pedal — max left-hand (LH) and Pedal position, ground switch To identify when the helicopter right-hand (RH) taxiing (similar), GS or NR flight controls (pedals) are used to excess on the ground. GS or NR to exclude control test prior to rotor start. Excessive yaw rate on ground Yaw rate, ground switch (similar), To identify when the helicopter during taxiing or Rad Alt yaws at a high rate when on the ground. Yaw rate in hover or on ground Yaw rate, GS, ground switch To identify when the helicopter (similar) yaws at a high rate when in a

text: hover. High lateral acceleration (rapid Lateral acceleration, ground To identify high levels of lateral cornering) switch (similar) acceleration, when ground taxiing, that indicate high cornering speed. High longitudinal acceleration Longitudinal acceleration, ground To identify high levels of (rapid braking) switch (similar) longitudinal acceleration, when ground taxiing, that indicate excessive braking. Cyclic-movement limits during Cyclic stick position, ground To identify excessive movement taxiing (pitch or roll) switch (similar), Rad Alt, NR or GS of the rotor disc when running on ground. GS or NR to exclude control test prior to rotor start. Excessive longitudinal and lateral Longitudinal cyclic pitch rate, To detect an excessive rate of cyclic rate of movement on lateral cyclic pitch rate, NR movement of cyclic control when ground on the ground with rotors running. Lateral cyclic movement — closest Lateral cyclic position, pedal To detect the risk of a helicopter to LH and RH rollover position, roll attitude, elapsed rollover due to an incorrect time, ground switch (similar) combination of tail rotor pedal position and lateral cyclic control position when on ground. Excessive cyclic control with Collective pitch, longitudinal cyclic To detect an incorrect taxiing insufficient collective pitch on pitch, lateral cyclic pitch technique likely to cause rotor ground head damage. Inadvertent lift-off Ground switch (similar), autopilot To detect inadvertent lifting into discreet hover.

text: Flight — Take-off and landing

text: Day or night landing or take-off Latitude and Longitude (Lat & To provide day/night relevance to Long), local time or UTC detected events. Specific location of landing or Lat & Long, ground switch To give contextual information take-off (similar), Rad Alt, total Tq concerning departures and destinations. Gear extension and retraction — Indicated airspeed (IAS), gear To identify when undercarriage airspeed limit position airspeed limitations are breached. Gear extension & retraction — Gear position, Rad Alt To identify when undercarriage height limit altitude limitations are breached. Heavy landing Normal/vertical acceleration, To identify when hard/heavy ground switch (similar) landings take place.

text: Cabin heater on (take-off and Cabin heater discreet, ground To identify use of engine bleed air landing) switch (similar) during periods of high power demand. High GS prior to touchdown (TD) GS, Rad Alt, ground switch To assist in the identification of (similar), elapsed time, latitude, ‘quick stop’ approaches. longitude

text: Flight — Speed

text: High airspeed — with power IAS, Tq 1, Tq 2, pressure altitude To identify excessive airspeed in (Palt), OAT flight. High airspeed — low altitude IAS, Rad Alt To identify excessive airspeed in low-level flight. Low airspeed at altitude IAS, Rad Alt To identify a ‘hover out of ground’ effect. Airspeed on departure (< 300 ft) IAS, ground switch (similar), Rad To identify shallow departure. Alt High airspeed — power off IAS, Tq 1, Tq 2 or one engine To identify limitation exceedance inoperative (OEI) discreet, Palt, of power-off airspeed. OAT Downwind flight within 60 sec of IAS, GS, elapsed time To detect early downwind turn take-off after take-off. Downwind flight within 60 sec of IAS, GS, elapsed time To detect late turn to final shortly landing before landing.

text: Flight — Height

text: Altitude — max Palt To detect flight outside of the published flight envelope. Climb rate — max Vertical speed (V/S), or Palt, or Identification of excessive rates of Rad Alt, Elapsed time climb (RoC) can be determined from an indication/rate of change of Palt or Rad Alt. High rate of descent V/S To identify excessive rates of descent (RoD). High rate of descent (speed or V/S, IAS or Rad Alt or elevation To identify RoD at low level or low height limit) speed. Settling with power (vortex ring) V/S, IAS, GS, Tq To detect high-power settling with low speed and with excessive rate of descent. Minimum altitude in autorotation NR, total Tq, Rad Alt To detect late recovery from autorotation.

text: Low cruising (inertial systems) GS, V/S, elevation, Lat & Long To detect an extended low-level flight. Ground speed is less accurate with more false alarms. Lat & Long used for geographical boundaries. Low cruising (integrated systems) Rad Alt, elapsed time, Lat & Long, To detect an extended low-level ground switch (similar) flight.

text: Flight — Attitude and controls

text: Excessive pitch (height related — Pitch attitude, Rad Alt elevation, To identify inappropriate use of turnover (T/O), cruising or Lat & Long excessive pitch attitude during landing) flight. Height limits may be used (i.e. on take-off and landing or < 500 ft) — Lat & Long required for specific-location-related limits. Elevation less accurate than Rad Alt. Elevation can be used to identify the landing phase in a specific location. Excessive pitch (speed related — Pitch attitude, IAS, GS, Lat & Long To identify inappropriate use of T/O, cruising or landing) excessive pitch attitude during flight. Speed limits may be used (i.e. on take-off and landing or in cruising) — Lat & Long required for specific-location-related limits. GS less accurate than IAS. Excessive pitch rate Pitch rate, Rad Alt, IAS, ground To identify inappropriate use of switch (similar), Lat & Long excessive rate of pitch change during flight. Height limits may be used (i.e. on take-off and landing). IAS only for IAS limit, ground switch (similar) and Lat & Long required for specific-locationrelated limits. Excessive roll/bank attitude Roll attitude, Rad Alt, IAS/GS To identify excessive use of roll (speed or height related) attitude. Rad Alt may be used for height limits, IAS/GS may be used for speed limits. Excessive roll rate Roll rate, Rad Alt, Lat & Long, Rad Alt may be used for height Ground switch (similar) limits, Lat & Long and ground switch (similar) required for specific-location-related and

text: air/ground limits.

text: Excessive yaw rate Yaw rate To detect excessive yaw rates in flight. Excessive lateral cyclic control Lateral cyclic position, ground To detect movement of the lateral switch (similar) cyclic control to extreme left or right positions. Ground switch (similar) required for pre or post T/O. Excessive longitudinal cyclic Longitudinal cyclic position, To detect movement of the control ground switch (similar) longitudinal cyclic control to extreme forward or aft positions. Ground switch (similar) required for pre or post T/O. Excessive collective pitch control Collective position, ground switch To detect exceedances of the (similar) aircraft flight manual (AFM) collective pitch limit. Ground switch (similar) required for pre or post T/O. Excessive tail rotor control Pedal position, ground switch To detect movement of the tail (similar) rotor pedals to extreme left and right positions. Ground switch (similar) required for pre or post T/O. Manoeuvre G loading or Lat & Long, normal accelerations, To identify excessive G loading of turbulence ground switch (similar) or Rad Alt the rotor disc, both positive and negative. Ground switch (similar) required to determine air/ground. Rad Alt required if height limit required. Pilot workload/turbulence Collective and/or cyclic and/or tail To detect high workload and/or rotor pedal position and change turbulence encountered during rate (Lat & Long) take-off and landing phases. Lat & Long required for specific landing sites. A specific and complicated algorithm for this event is required. See United Kingdom Civil Aviation Authority (UK CAA) Paper 2002/02. Cross controlling Roll rate, yaw rate, pitch rate, GS, To detect an ‘out of balance’ accelerations flight. Airspeed could be used instead of GS.

text: Quick stop GS (min and max), V/S, pitch To identify inappropriate flight characteristics. Airspeed could be used instead of GS.

text: Flight — General

text: OEI — Air OEI discreet, ground switch To detect OEI conditions in flight. (similar) Single engine flight No 1 engine Tq, No 2 engine Tq To detect single-engine flight. Torque split No 1 engine Tq, No 2 engine Tq To identify engine-related issues. Pilot event Pilot event discreet To identify when flight crews have depressed the pilot event button. Traffic collision avoidance system TCAS TA discreet To identify TCAS alerts. (TCAS) traffic advisory (TA) Training computer active Training computer mode active or To identify when helicopter have discreet been on training flights. High/low rotor speed — power on NR, Tq (ground switch (similar), To identify mishandling of NR. IAS, GS) Ground switch (similar), IAS or ground speed required to determine whether helicopter is airborne. High/low rotor speed — power off NR, Tq (ground switch (similar), To identify mishandling of NR. IAS, GS) Ground switch (similar), IAS or ground speed to determine whether helicopter is airborne. Fuel content low Fuel contents To identify low-fuel alerts. Helicopter terrain awareness and HTAWS alerts discreet To identify when HTAWS alerts warning system (HTAWS) alert have been activated. Automatic voice alert device AVAD discreet To identify when AVAD alerts (AVAD) alert have been activated. Bleed air system use during take- Bleed air system discreet, ground To identify use of engine bleed air off (e.g. heating) switch (similar), IAS during periods of high power demand. Rotors’ running duration NR, elapsed time To identify rotors’ running time for billing purposes.

text: Flight — Approach

text: Stable approach heading change Magnetic heading, Rad Alt, To identify unstable approaches. ground switch (similar), gear position, elapsed time

text: Stable approach pitch attitude Pitch attitude, Rad Alt, ground To identify unstable approaches. switch (similar), gear position Stable approach rod GS Altitude rate, Rad Alt, ground To identify unstable approaches. switch (similar), gear position Stable approach track change Track, Rad Alt, ground switch To identify unstable approaches. (similar), gear position Stable approach angle of bank Roll attitude, Rad Alt, ground To identify unstable approaches. switch (similar), gear position Stable approach — rod at Altitude rate, Rad Alt, ground To identify unstable approaches. specified height switch (similar), gear position Stable approach — IAS at IAS, Rad Alt, ground switch To identify unstable approaches. specified height (similar), gear position Glideslope deviation above or Glideslope deviation To identify inaccurately flown below instrument landing system (ILS) approaches. Localiser deviation left and right Localiser deviation To identify inaccurately flown ILS approaches. Low turn to final Elevation, GS, V/S, heading Airspeed could be used instead of change GS. Premature turn to final Elevation, GS, V/S, heading Airspeed could be used instead of change GS. Stable approach — climb IAS (min & max), V/S (min & max), To identify unstable approaches. elevation Stable approach — descent IAS (min & max), V/S, elevation To identify unstable approaches. Stable approach — bank IAS (min & max), V/S, elevation, To identify unstable approaches. roll Stable approach — late turn Heading change, elevation, GS To identify unstable approaches. Go-around Gear select (Rad Alt) To identify missed approaches. Rad Alt for height limit. Rate of descent on approach Altitude rate, Rad Alt, Lat & Long, To identify high rates of descent ground switch (similar) when at low level on approach. Rad Alt if below specified height, Lat & Long for specified location required.

text: Flight — Autopilot

text: Condition of autopilot in flight Autopilot discreet To detect flight without autopilot engaged; per channel for

text: multichannel autopilots. Autopilot engaged within 10 sec Autopilot engaged discreet, To identify inadvertent lift-off after take-off elapsed time, ground switch without autopilot engaged. (similar), total Tq, Rad Alt Autopilot engaged on ground Autopilot engaged discreet, To identify inappropriate use of (postflight or preflight) elapsed time, ground switch autopilot when on ground. (similar), total Tq, Rad Alt Elapsed time required to allow for permissible short periods. Excessive pitch attitude with Pitch attitude, autopilot discreet, To identify potential for low NR autopilot engaged on ground ground switch (similar), Lat & when helicopter pitches on (offshore) Long floating helideck. Airspeed hold engaged — Autopilot modes discreet, IAS, To detect early engagement of airspeed (departure or non- (ground switch (similar), total Tq, autopilot higher modes. Ground departure) Rad Alt) switch (similar), total Tq and Rad Alt to determine if the flight profile is ‘departure’. Airspeed hold engaged — altitude Autopilot modes discreet, Rad Alt, To detect early engagement of (departure or non-departure) (IAS, ground switch (similar), total autopilot higher modes. IAS, Tq) ground switch (similar), total Tq to determine if the flight profile is ‘departure’. Alt mode engaged — altitude Autopilot modes discreet, Rad Alt, To detect early engagement of (departure or non-departure) (ground switch (similar), total Tq, autopilot higher modes. Ground IAS) switch (similar), total Tq and Rad Alt to determine if the flight profile is ‘departure’. Alt mode engaged — airspeed Autopilot modes discreet, IAS, To detect early engagement of (departure or non-departure) (ground switch (similar), total Tq, autopilot higher modes. IAS, Rad Alt) ground switch (similar), total Tq to determine if the flight profile is ‘departure’. Heading mode engaged — speed Autopilot modes discreet, IAS To detect engagement of autopilot higher modes below minimum speed limitations. Ground switch (similar), total Tq and Rad Alt to determine if the flight profile is ‘departure’. V/S mode active — below Autopilot modes discreet, IAS To detect engagement of specified speed autopilot higher modes below minimum speed limitations. VS mode engaged — altitude Autopilot modes discreet, IAS, To detect early engagement of

text: (departure or non-departure) (WOW, total Tq, Rad Alt) autopilot higher modes. Ground switch (similar), total Tq and Rad Alt to determine if the flight profile is ‘departure’. Flight director (FD) engaged — FD discreet, IAS To detect engagement of speed autopilot higher modes below minimum speed limitations. FD-coupled approach or take off FD discreet, IAS, ground switch To detect engagement of — airspeed (similar) autopilot higher modes below minimum speed limitations. Go-around mode engaged — Autopilot modes discreet, IAS, To detect engagement of airspeed ground switch (similar), total Tq, autopilot higher modes below Rad Alt minimum speed limitations. Flight without autopilot channels Autopilot channels To detect flight without autopilot engaged engaged; per channel for multichannel autopilots.

text: AMC1 SPA.HOFO.150 Aircraft tracking system

text: GENERAL Flights should be tracked and monitored from take-off to landing. This function may be achieved by the air traffic services (ATS) when the planned route and the planned diversion routes are fully included in airspace blocks where: (a) ATS surveillance service is normally provided and supported by ATC surveillance systems locating the aircraft at time intervals with adequate duration; and (b) the operator has given to competent air navigation services (ANS) providers the necessary contact information. In all other cases, the operator should establish a detailed procedure describing how the aircraft tracking system is to be monitored, and what actions and when are to be taken if a deviation or anomaly has been detected.

text: GM1 SPA.HOFO.150 Aircraft tracking system

text: OPERATIONAL PROCEDURE The procedure should take into account the following aspects: (a) the outcome of the risk assessment made when the update frequency of the information was defined; (b) the local environment of the intended operations; and (c) the relationship with the operator’s emergency response plan. Aircraft tracking data should be recorded on the ground and retained for at least 48 h. Following an accident or a serious incident subject to investigation, the data should be retained for at least 30 days, and the operator should be capable of providing a copy of this data without delay.

text: AMC1 SPA.HOFO.155 Vibration health monitoring (VHM) system

text: GENERAL Any VHM system should meet all of the following criteria: (a) VHM system capability The VHM system should measure vibration characteristics of rotating critical components during flight, using suitable vibration sensors, techniques, and recording equipment. The frequency and flight phases of data measurement should be established together with the type certificate holder (TCH) during the initial entry into service. In order to appropriately manage the generated data and focus upon significant issues, an alerting system should be established; this is normally automatic. Accordingly, alert generation processes should be developed to reliably advise maintenance personnel of the need to intervene and help determine what type of intervention is required. (b) Approval of VHM installation The VHM system, which typically comprises vibration sensors and associated wiring, data acquisition and processing hardware, the means of downloading data from the helicopter, the ground-based system and all associated instructions for operation of the system, should be certified in accordance with CS-29 or equivalent, established by the Agency. Note: for applications that may also provide maintenance credit (see Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Advisory Circular (AC) 29-2C Miscellaneous Guidance (MG) 15), the level of system integrity required may be higher. (c) Operational procedures The operator should establish procedures to address all necessary VHM subjects. (d) Training The operator should determine which staff will require VHM training, determine appropriate syllabi, and incorporate them into the operator’s initial and recurrent training programmes.

text: GM1 SPA.HOFO.155 Vibration health monitoring (VHM) system

text: GENERAL Operators should utilise available international guidance material provided for the specification and design of VHM systems. Further guidance can be found in: (a) CS 29.1465 Vibration health monitoring and associated AMC; (b) Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Advisory Circular (AC) 29-2C Miscellaneous Guidance (MG) 15 — Airworthiness Approval of Rotorcraft Health Usage Monitoring Systems (HUMSs); and (c) United Kingdom Civil Aviation Authority (UK CAA) CAP 753 — Helicopter Vibration Health Monitoring.

text: GM1 SPA.HOFO.160(a)(1) Additional equipment requirements

text: PUBLIC ADDRESS (PA) SYSTEM When demonstrating the performance of the PA system or that the pilot’s voice is understandable at all passengers’ seats during flight, the operator should ensure compatibility with the passengers’ use of ear defenders/ear plugs (hearing protection). The operator should only provide hearing protection that is compatible with the intelligibility of the PA system or pilot’s voice, as appropriate.

text: GM1 SPA.HOFO.160(a)(2) Additional equipment requirements

text: RADIO ALTIMETER For additional information, please refer to AMC1 CAT.IDE.H.145 Radio altimeters and AMC2 CAT.IDE.H.145 Radio altimeters, as well as to GM1 CAT.IDE.H.145 Radio altimeters.

text: AMC1 SPA.HOFO.165(c) Additional procedures and equipment for operations in hostile environment

text: EMERGENCY BREATHING SYSTEM (EBS) The EBS of SPA.HOFO.165(c) should be an EBS system capable of rapid underwater deployment.

text: AMC1 SPA.HOFO.165(d) Additional procedures and equipment for operations in hostile environment

text: INSTALLATION OF THE LIFE RAFT (a) Projections on the exterior surface of the helicopter that are located in a zone delineated by boundaries that are 1.22 m (4 ft) above and 0.61 m (2 ft) below the established static waterline could cause damage to a deployed life raft. Examples of projections that need to be considered are aerials, overboard vents, unprotected split-pin tails, guttering, and any projection sharper than a three-dimensional right-angled corner. (b) While the boundaries specified in (a) above are intended as a guide, the total area that should be considered should also take into account the likely behaviour of the life raft after deployment in all sea states up to the maximum in which the helicopter is capable of remaining upright. (c) Wherever a modification or alteration is made to a helicopter within the boundaries specified, the need to prevent the modification or alteration from causing damage to a deployed life raft should be taken into account in the design. (d) Particular care should also be taken during routine maintenance to ensure that additional hazards are not introduced by, for example, leaving inspection panels with sharp corners proud of the surrounding fuselage surface, or by allowing door sills to deteriorate to a point where their sharp edges may become a hazard.

text: AMC1 SPA.HOFO.165(h) Additional procedures and equipment for operations in a hostile environment

text: EMERGENCY EXITS AND ESCAPE HATCHES In order for all passengers to escape from the helicopter within an expected underwater survival time of 60 sec in the event of capsize, the following provisions should be made: (a) there should be an easily accessible emergency exit or suitable opening for each passenger; (b) an opening in the passenger compartment should be considered suitable as an underwater escape facility if the following criteria are met:

text: (1) the means of opening should be rapid and obvious; (2) passenger safety briefing material should include instructions on the use of such escape facilities; (3) for the egress of passengers with shoulder width of 559 mm (22 in.) or smaller, a rectangular opening should be no smaller than 356 mm (14 in.) wide, with a diagonal between corner radii no smaller than 559 mm (22 in.), when operated in accordance with the instructions; (4) non-rectangular or partially obstructed openings (e.g. by a seat back) should be capable of admitting an ellipse of 559 mm x 356 mm (22 in. x 14 in.); and (5) for the egress of passengers with shoulder width greater than 559 mm (22 in.), openings should be no smaller than 480 mm x 660 mm (19 in. x 26 in.) or be capable of admitting an ellipse of 480 mm x 660 mm (19 in. x 26 in.); (c) suitable openings and emergency exits should be used for the underwater escape of no more than two passengers, unless large enough to permit the simultaneous egress of two passengers side by side: (1) if the exit size provides an unobstructed area that encompasses two ellipses of size 480 mm x 660 m (19 in. x 26 in.) side by side, then it may be used for four passengers; and (2) if the exit size provides an unobstructed area that encompasses two ellipses of size 356 mm x 559 mm (14 in. x 22 in.) side by side, then it may be used for four passengers with shoulder width no greater than 559 mm (22 in.) each; and (d) passengers with shoulder width greater than 559 mm (22 in.) should be identified and allocated to seats with easy access to an emergency exit or opening that is suitable for them.

text: GM1 SPA.HOFO.165(h) Additional procedures and equipment for operations in a hostile environment

text: SEAT ALLOCATION The identification and seating of the larger passengers might be achieved through the use of patterned and/or colour-coded armbands and matching seat headrests.

text: AMC1 SPA.HOFO.165(i) Additional procedures and equipment for operations in a hostile environment

text: MEDICALLY INCAPACITATED PASSENGER (a) A ‘Medically incapacitated passenger’ means a person who is unable to wear the required survival equipment, including life jackets, survival suits and emergency breathing systems (EBSs), as determined by a medical professional. The medical professional’s determination should be made available to the pilot-in-command/commander prior to arrival at the offshore installation. (b) The operator should establish procedures for the cases where the pilot-in-command/commander may accept a medically incapacitated passenger not wearing or partially wearing survival equipment. To ensure proportionate mitigation of the risks associated with an evacuation, the procedures should be based on, but not be limited to, the severity of the incapacitation, sea and air temperature, sea state, and number of passengers on board. In addition, the operator should establish the following procedures: (1) under which circumstances one or more dedicated persons are required to assist a medically incapacitated passenger during a possible emergency evacuation, and the skills and qualifications required;

text: (2) seat allocation for the medically incapacitated passenger and possible assistants in the helicopter types used to ensure optimum use of the emergency exits; and (3) evacuation procedures related to whether or not the dedicated persons as described in (1) above are present.

text: AMC1 SPA.HOFO.170(a) Crew requirements

text: FLIGHT CREW TRAINING AND CHECKING (a) Flight crew training programmes should: (1) improve knowledge of the offshore operations environment with particular consideration of visual illusions during approach, introduced by lighting, motion and weather factors; (2) improve crew cooperation specifically for offshore operations; (3) provide flight crew members with the necessary skills to appropriately manage the risks associated with normal, abnormal and emergency procedures during flights by day and night; (4) if night operations are conducted, give particular consideration to approach, go-around, landing, and take-off phases; (5) include instructions on the optimum use of the helicopter’s automatic flight control system (AFCS); (6) for multi-pilot operation, emphasise the importance of multi-crew procedures, as well as the role of the pilot monitoring during all phases of the flight; and (7) include standard operating procedures. (b) Emergency and safety equipment training should focus on the equipment fitted/carried. Water entry and sea survival training, including operation of all associated safety equipment, should be an element of the recurrent training, as described in AMC1 ORO.FC.230(a)(2)(iii)(F). (c) The training elements referred to above should be assessed during: operator proficiency checks, line checks, or, as applicable, emergency and safety equipment checks. (d) Training and checking should make full use of full flight simulators (FFSs) for normal, abnormal, and emergency procedures related to all aspects of helicopter offshore operations (HOFO).


text: -5 LANDING SITE Assumed engine failure rate per FH 1,00x10

text: Estimated Cumulative Assumed height Segment probability of flight time from Segments of or height band exposure unsuccessful Segment risk Cumulative Comment on estimation of AD Other start of take-off flight above ground time forced landing if factor risk per flight unsuccessful outcome to end of level (AGL) in ft (in s) engine fails in this segment (in s) segment

text: T-O aborted before being

text: Take-off (T-O) -12 -12 airborne. 0 ft X 20 20 0.01 % 5.56 x 10 5.56 x 10 ground roll Runway long enough to stop the

text: aircraft.

text: -11 -11 Climb-out 0-50 ft X 8 28 0.10 % 2.22 x 10 2.78 x 10 Aircraft aborts T-O and lands

text: ahead within runway length -10 -10 50-200 ft X 10 38 1.00 % 2.78 x 10 3.06 x 10 available.

text: Aircraft has to land ahead outside -7 -7 200-1 100 ft 36 74 100.00 % 1.00 x 10 1.00 x 10 airfield with little height for

text: -8 -7 1 100-2 000 ft X 36 110 50.00 % 5.00 x 10 1.50 x 10 U-turn and landing at opposite

text: q-code for magnetic heading of a -8 -7 2 000-4 000 ft X 80 190 25.00 % 5.56 x 10 2.06 x 10 runway (QFU) possible.

text: Climbing to en -8 -7 Aircraft able to operate a glide-in 4 000-10 000ft X X 240 430 5.00 % 3.33 x 10 2.39 x 10 route height approach.

text: Cruising: En route cruising time with -7 -7 emergency ≤ 10 000 ft X 5 400 5 830 5.00 % 7.50 x 10 9.89 x 10 available landing sites along the

text: area available route within gliding range.

text: Cruising: En route cruising time without emergency -7 -6 ≤ 10 000 ft 300 6 130 100.00 % 8.33 x 10 1.82 x 10 available landing sites within area NOT gliding range. available

text: Descent to

text: initial 10 000-4 000 ft Descent with available landing approach fix -8 -6 on a 4° slope X 300 6 430 5.00 % 4.17 x 10 1.86 x 10 sites within gliding range, and for instrument (1 200 ft/min) destination not reachable. flight rules

text: (IFR) approach

text: Aircraft has to

text: below the

text: glide approach Aircraft descends below the height capability to 4 000-1 000 ft needed to maintain a glide set up for a -7 -6 on the X 150 6 580 50.00 % 2.08 x 10 2.07 x 10 approach for reaching the airfield. normal approach Therefore, it may land short of powered airfield if engine fails. landing from

text: 000 ft on a

text: Aircraft assumes 3° glideslope, Aircraft 1 000 -50 ft on regained to ensure normal descends on a approach at -7 -6 95 6 675 100.00 % 2.64 x 10 2.34 x 10 landing. Therefore, it may 3° approach 120 kt undershoot the landing field if path (600 ft/min) engine fails at this late stage.

text: Aircraft over runway. Engine is to 50 ft above -9 -6 be idled anyway, but failure, while Landing threshold until X 10 6 685 5.00 % 1.39 x 10 2.34 x 10 airborne, may surprise pilot and touchdown result in hard landing.

text: Aircraft on ground. Risk negligible,

text: Landing Touchdown to -12 -6 if engine stops on the example X 15 6 700 0.01 % 4.17 x 10 2.34 x 10 ground run stop runway (very long) providing that

text: all services are retained.

text: 1.26 x 10 Risk per flight

text: Probability in % Description

text: Impossible 0-1 Negligible likelihood/remote possibility 1-10 Possible but not likely 10-35 Moderately likely 35-65 Possible 65-90 Likely 90-99 Almost certain 99-100 Certain

identifier: AMC & GM to Part-SPA — Amendment 5

amnesord: Part-SPA - Operations requiring Specific Approvals

beslut: ED Decision 2017/004/R

publisher: Europeiska unionens byrå för luftfartssäkerhet

sprak: en

title: AMC & GM to Part-SPA — Amendment 5

serie: amc-gm

text: Annex IV to ED Decision 2017/004/R

type: stycke

text: Annex IV to ED Decision 2017/004/R

text: ‘AMC/GM to Part-SPA — Amendment 5’

text: The Annex to ED Decision 2012/019/R is amended as follows: The text of the amendment is arranged to show deleted, new or amended text as shown below: (a) deleted text is struck through; (b) new or amended text is highlighted in grey; and (c) an ellipsis ‘[…]’ indicates that the remaining text is unchanged.

text: Annex IV to ED Decision 2017/004/R

text: 1. New Subpart L is added as follows:

text: Subpart L — Single-engined turbine aeroplane operations at night or in instrument meteorological conditions (SET-IMC)

text: AMC1 SPA.SET-IMC.105 SET-IMC operations approval

text: ANNUAL REPORT After obtaining the initial approval, the operator should make available to its competent authority on an annual basis a report related to its SET-IMC operations containing at least the following information: (a) the number of flights operated; (b) the number of hours flown; and (c) the number of occurrences sorted by type.

text: AMC1 SPA.SET-IMC.105(a) SET-IMC operations approval

text: TURBINE ENGINE RELIABILITY (a) The operator should obtain the power plant reliability data from the type certificate (TC) holder and/or supplemental type certificate (STC) holder. (b) The data for the engine-airframe combination should have demonstrated, or be likely to demonstrate, a power loss rate of less than 10 per million flight hours. Power loss in this context is defined as any loss of power, including in-flight shutdown, the cause of which may be traced to faulty engine or engine component design or installation, including design or installation of the fuel ancillary or engine control systems. (c) The in-service experience with the intended engine-airframe combination should be at least 100 000 h, demonstrating the required level of reliability. If this experience has not been accumulated, then, based on analysis or test, in-service experience with a similar or related type of airframe and turbine engine might be considered by the TC/STC holder to develop an equivalent safety argument in order to demonstrate that the reliability criteria are achievable.

text: AMC1 SPA.SET-IMC.105(b) SET-IMC operations approval

text: MAINTENANCE PROGRAMME The following maintenance aspects should be addressed by the operator: (a) Engine monitoring programme The operator’s maintenance programme should include an oil-consumption-monitoring programme that should be based on engine manufacturer’s recommendations, if available, and track oil consumption trends. The monitoring should be continuous and take account of the oil added. An engine oil analysis programme may also be required if recommended by the engine manufacturer. The possibility to perform frequent (recorded) power checks on a calendar basis should be considered. The engine monitoring programme should also provide for engine condition monitoring describing the parameters to be monitored, the method of data collection and a corrective action process, and should be based on the engine manufacturer’s instructions. This monitoring will be used to detect propulsion

text: Annex IV to ED Decision 2017/004/R

text: system deterioration at an early stage allowing corrective action to be taken before safe operation is affected. (b) Propulsion and associated systems’ reliability programme A propulsion and associated systems’ reliability programme should be established or the existing reliability programme supplemented for the particular engine-airframe combination. This programme should be designed to early identify and prevent problems, which otherwise would affect the ability of the aeroplane to safely perform its intended flight. Where the fleet of SET-IMC aeroplanes is part of a larger fleet of the same engine-airframe combination, data from the operator’s total fleet should be acceptable. For engines, the programme should incorporate reporting procedures for all significant events. This information should be readily available (with the supporting data) for use by the operator, type certificate (TC) holders, and the competent authority to help establish that the reliability level set out in AMC1 SPA.SET-IMC.105(a) is achieved. Any adverse trend would require an immediate evaluation to be conducted by the operator in consultation with its competent authority. The evaluation may result in taking corrective measures or imposing operational restrictions. The engine reliability programme should include, as a minimum, the engine hours flown in the period, the power loss rate for all causes, and the engine removal rate, both rates on an annual basis, as well as reports with the operational context focusing on critical events. These reports should be communicated to the TC holder and the competent authority. The actual period selected should reflect the global utilisation and the relevance of the experience included (e.g. early data may not be relevant due to subsequent mandatory modifications that affected the power loss rate). After the introduction of a new engine variant and whilst global utilisation is relatively low, the total available experience may have to be used to try to achieve a statistically meaningful average.

text: AMC1 SPA.SET-IMC.105(c) SET-IMC operations approval

text: TRAINING PROGRAMME The operator’s flight crew training and checking, established in accordance with ORO.FC, should incorporate the following elements: (a) Conversion training Conversion training should be conducted in accordance with a syllabus devised for SET-IMC operations and include at least the following: (1) normal procedures: (i) anti-icing and de-icing systems operation; (ii) navigation system procedures; (iii) radar positioning and vectoring, when available; (iv) use of radio altimeter; and (v) use of fuel control, displays interpretation; (2) abnormal procedures:

text: Annex IV to ED Decision 2017/004/R

text: (i) anti-icing and de-icing systems failures; (ii) navigation system failures; (iii) pressurisation system failures; (iv) electrical system failures; and (v) engine-out descent in simulated IMC; and (3) emergency procedures: (i) engine failure shortly after take-off; (ii) fuel system failures (e.g. fuel starvation); (iii) engine failure other than the above: recognition of failure, symptoms, type of failure, measures to be taken, and consequences; (iv) depressurisation; and (v) engine restart procedures: (A) choice of an aerodrome or landing site; and (B) use of an area navigation system; (vi) air traffic controller (ATCO) communications; (vii) use of radar positioning and vectoring (when available); (viii) use of radio altimeter; and (ix) practice of the forced landing procedure until touchdown in simulated IMC, with zero thrust set, and operating with simulated emergency electrical power. (b) Conversion checking The following items should be checked following completion of the SET-IMC operations conversion training as part of the operator’s proficiency check (OPC): (1) conduct of the forced landing procedure until touchdown in simulated IMC, with zero thrust set, and operating with simulated emergency electrical power; (2) engine restart procedures; (3) depressurisation following engine failure; and (4) engine-out descent in simulated IMC. (c) Use of simulator (conversion training and checking) Where a suitable full flight simulator (FFS) or a suitable flight simulation training device (FSTD) is available, it should be used to carry out training on the items under (a) and checking of the items under (b) above for SET-IMC operations conversion training and checking. (d) Recurrent training Recurrent training for SET-IMC operations should be included in the recurrent training required by Subpart FC (FLIGHT CREW) of Annex III (Part-ORO) to

text: Regulation (EU) No 965/2012

text: for pilots carrying out SET-IMC operations. This training should include all items under (a) above.

text: Annex IV to ED Decision 2017/004/R

text: (e) Recurrent checking The following items should be included into the list of required items to be checked following completion of SET-IMC operations recurrent training as part of the OPC: (1) conduct of the forced landing procedure until touchdown in simulated IMC, with zero thrust set, and operating with simulated emergency electrical power; (2) engine restart procedures; (3) depressurisation following engine failure; and (4) emergency descent in simulated IMC. (f) Use of simulator (recurrent training and checking) Following conversion training and checking, the next recurrent training session and the next OPCs including SET-IMC operations items should be conducted in a suitable FFS or FSTD, where available.

text: AMC2 SPA.SET-IMC.105(c) SET-IMC operations approval

text: CREW COMPOSITION (a) Unless the pilot-in-command has a minimum experience of 100 flight hours under instrument flight rules (IFR) with the relevant type or class of aeroplane including line flying under supervision (LIFUS), the minimum crew should be composed of two pilots. (b) A lesser number of flight hours under IFR on the relevant type or class of aeroplane may be acceptable to the competent authority when the flight crew member has significant previous IFR experience.

text: AMC1 SPA.SET-IMC.105(d)(2) SET-IMC operations approval

text: FLIGHT PLANNING (a) The operator should establish flight planning procedures to ensure that the routes and cruising altitudes are selected so as to have a landing site within gliding range. (b) Notwithstanding (a) above, whenever a landing site is not within gliding range, one or more risk periods may be used for the following operations: (1) over water; (2) over hostile environment; or (3) over congested areas. Except for the take-off and landing phase, the operator should ensure that when a risk period is planned, there is a possibility to glide to a non-congested area. The total duration of the risk period per flight should not exceed 15 min unless the operator has established, based on a risk assessment carried out for the route concerned, that the cumulative risk of fatal accident due to an engine failure for this flight remains at an acceptable level (see GM2 SPA.SET-IMC.105(d)(2)). (c) The operator should establish criteria for the assessment of each new route. These criteria should address the following: (1) the selection of aerodromes along the route;

text: Annex IV to ED Decision 2017/004/R

text: (2) the identification and assessment, at least on an annual basis, of the continued suitability of landing sites (obstacles, dimensions of the landing area, type of the surface, slope, etc.) along the route when no aerodrome is available; the assessment may be performed using publicly available information or by conducting on-site surveys; (3) assessment of en route specific weather conditions that could affect the capability of the aeroplane to reach the selected forced landing area following loss of power (icing conditions including gliding descent through clouds in freezing conditions, headwinds, etc.); (4) consideration of landing sites’ prevailing weather conditions to the extent that such information is available from local or other sources; expected weather conditions at landing sites for which no weather information is available should be assessed and evaluated taking into account a combination of the following information: (i) local observations; (ii) regional weather information (e.g. significant weather charts); and (iii) terminal area forecast (TAF)/meteorological aerodrome report (METAR) of the nearest aerodromes; and (5) protection of the aeroplane occupants after landing in case of adverse weather. (d) At the flight planning phase, any selected landing site should have been assessed by the operator as acceptable for carrying out a safe forced landing with a reasonable expectation of no injuries to persons in the aeroplane or on the ground. All information reasonably practical to acquire should be used by the operator to establish the characteristics of landing sites. (e) Landing sites suitable for a diversion or forced landing should be programmed into the navigation system so that track and distance to the landing sites are immediately and continuously available. None of these preprogrammed positions should be altered in-flight.

text: AMC2 SPA.SET-IMC.105(d)(2) SET-IMC operations approval

text: ROUTE AND INSTRUMENT PROCEDURE SELECTION The following should be considered by the operator, as appropriate, depending on the use of a risk period: (a) Departure The operator should ensure, to the extent possible, that the instrument departure procedures to be followed are those guaranteeing that the flight path allows, in the event of power loss, the aeroplane to land on a landing site. (b) Arrival The operator should ensure, to the extent possible, that the arrival procedures to be followed are those guaranteeing that the flight path allows, in the event of power loss, the aeroplane to land on a landing site. (c) En route The operator should ensure that any planned or diversionary route should be selected and be flown at an altitude such that, in the event of power loss, the pilot is able to make a safe landing on a landing site.

text: Annex IV to ED Decision 2017/004/R

text: AMC3 SPA.SET-IMC.105(d)(2) SET-IMC operations approval

text: LANDING SITE A landing site is an aerodrome or an area where a safe forced landing can be performed by day or by night, taking into account the expected weather conditions at the time of the foreseen landing. (a) The landing site should allow the aeroplane to completely stop within the available area, taking into account the slope and the type of the surface. (b) The slope of the landing site should be assessed by the operator in order to determine its acceptability and possible landing directions. (c) Both ends of the landing area, or only the zone in front of the landing area for one-way landing areas, should be clear of any obstacle which may be a hazard during the landing phase.

text: GM1 SPA.SET-IMC.105(d)(2) SET-IMC operations approval

text: LANDING SITE (a) When selecting landing sites along a route to be operated, it is recommended to prioritise the different types of landing sites as follows: (1) aerodromes with available runway lighting; (2) aerodromes without available runway lighting; (3) non-populated fields with short grass/vegetation or sandy areas. (b) When assessing the suitability of a landing site which is not an aerodrome, it is recommended to consider the following landing site criteria: (1) size and shape of the landing area: (i) landing sites with a circular shape providing multiple approach paths depending on the wind; and (ii) for other cases, landing sites with a minimum width of 45 m; and (2) type of surface: the surface of the landing area should allow a safe forced landing to be conducted.

text: GM2 SPA.SET-IMC.105(d)(2) SET-IMC operations approval

text: SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT FOR A SPECIFIC ROUTE (a) Introduction The risk assessment methodology should aim at estimating for a specific route the likelihood of having fatalities due to emergency landing caused by engine failure. Based on the outcome of this risk assessment, the operator may extend the duration of the risk period beyond the maximum allowed duration if no landing site is available within gliding range. (b) The safety target The overall concept of SET-IMC operations is based on an engine reliability rate for all causes of 10 per million flight hours, which permits in compliance with SET-IMC requirements an overall fatal accident rate for all causes of 4 per million flight hours.

text: Annex IV to ED Decision 2017/004/R

text: Based on accident databases, it is considered that the engine failure event does not contribute by more than 33 % to the overall fatal accident rate. Therefore, the purpose of the risk assessment is to ensure that the probability of a fatal accident for a specific flight following engine failure remains below the -6 target fatal accident rate of 1.3 × 10 . (c) Methodology The methodology aims at estimating the likelihood of failing to achieve a safe forced landing in case of engine failure, a safe forced landing being defined as a landing on an area for which it is reasonably expected that no serious injury or fatalities will occur due to the landing even though the aeroplane may suffer extensive damage. This methodology consists of creating a risk profile for a specific route, including departure, en route and arrival airfield and runway, by splitting the proposed flight into appropriate segments (based on the flight phase or the landing site selected), and by estimating the risk for each segment should the engine fail in one of these segments. This risk profile is considered to be an estimation of the probability of an unsuccessful forced landing if the engine fails during one of the identified segments. When assessing the risk for each segment, the height of the aeroplane at which the engine failure occurs, the position relative to the departure or destination airfield or to an emergency landing site en route, and the likely ambient conditions (ceiling, visibility, wind and light) should be taken into account, as well as the standard procedures of the operator (e.g. U-turn procedures after take-off, use of synthetic vision, descent path angle for standard descent from cruising altitude, etc.). The duration of each segment determines the exposure time to the estimated risk. The risk is estimated based on the following calculation: Segment risk factor = segment exposure time (in s)/3 600 × probability of unsuccessful forced landing in this segment x assumed engine failure rate per flight hour (FH). By summing up the risks for all individual segments, the cumulative risk for the flight due to engine failure is calculated and converted to risk on a ‘per flight hour’ basis. -6 This total risk must remain below the target fatal accident rate of 1.3 × 10 as under (b) above. (d) Example of a risk assessment An example of such a risk assessment is provided below. In any case, this risk assessment is an example designed for a specific flight with specific departure and arrival aerodrome characteristics. It is an example of how to implement this methodology, and all the estimated probabilities used in the table below may not directly apply to any other flight. The meaning of the different parameters used is further detailed below: AD/Other: ‘AD’ is ticked whenever only aerodromes are selected as landing sites in the segment concerned. ‘Other’ is ticked if the selected landing sites in the segment concerned are not aerodromes. When a risk period is used by the operator, none of the two boxes (neither ‘AD’ nor ‘Other’) are ticked. Segment exposure time: this parameter represents the duration of each segment in seconds (s). Estimated probability of an unsuccessful forced landing if engine fails in the segment: probability of performing in the segment a safe forced landing following engine power loss. Segment risk factor: risk of an unsuccessful forced landing (because of power loss) per segment (see formula above).

text: Annex IV to ED Decision 2017/004/R

text: Annex IV to ED Decision 2017/004/R

text: Annex IV to ED Decision 2017/004/R

text: The following likelihood scale may be used to determine the estimated probability of an unsuccessful forced landing:

text: AMC1 SPA.SET-IMC.105(d)(4) SET-IMC operations approval

text: CONTINGENCY PROCEDURES When a risk period is used during the take-off or landing phase, the contingency procedures should include appropriate information for the crew on the path to be followed after an engine failure in order to minimise to the greatest extent possible the risk to people on the ground.

text: AMC1 SPA.SET-IMC.110(b) Equipment requirements for SET-IMC operations

text: ATTITUDE INDICATORS A backup or standby attitude indicator built in the glass cockpit installations is an acceptable means of compliance for the second attitude indicator.

text: AMC1 SPA.SET-IMC.110(d) Equipment requirements for SET-IMC operations

text: AIRBORNE WEATHER-DETECTING EQUIPMENT The airborne weather-detecting equipment should be an airborne weather radar, as defined in the applicable Certification Specification — European Technical Standard Order (CS-ETSO) issued by the Agency, or equivalent.

text: AMC1 SPA.SET-IMC.110(f) Equipment requirements for SET-IMC operations

text: AREA NAVIGATION SYSTEM The area navigation system should be based on a global navigation satellite system (GNSS) stand-alone receiver or multi-sensor system, including at least one GNSS sensor, to enable at least required navigation performance approach (RNP APCH) operations without vertical guidance.

text: Annex IV to ED Decision 2017/004/R

text: GM1 SPA.SET-IMC.110(f) Equipment requirements for SET-IMC operations

text: AREA NAVIGATION SYSTEM Acceptable standards for the area navigation system are ETSO-145/146c, ETSO-C129a, ETSO-C196a or ETSO-C115 issued by the Agency, or equivalent.

text: GM1 SPA.SET-IMC.110(h) Equipment requirements for SET-IMC operations

text: LANDING LIGHTS In order to demonstrate the compliance of its aeroplane’s landing lights with the 200-ft illumination capability requirement, and in the absence of relevant data available in the aircraft flight manual (AFM), the operator should liaise with the type certificate (TC) holder or supplemental type certificate (STC) holder, as applicable, to obtain a statement of compliance.

text: GM1 SPA.SET-IMC.110(i)(7) Equipment requirements for SET-IMC operations

text: ELEMENTS AFFECTING PILOT’S VISION FOR LANDING Examples of elements affecting pilot’s vision for landing are rain, ice and window fogging.

text: AMC1 SPA.SET-IMC.110(l) Equipment requirements for SET-IMC operations

text: EMERGENCY ENGINE POWER CONTROL DEVICE The means that allows continuing operation of the engine within a sufficient power range for the flight to be safely completed in the event of any reasonably probable failure/malfunction of the fuel control unit should enable the fuel flow modulation.

type: vagledning

utgivare: easa


identifier: AMC & GM to Part-SPA — Amendment 6

beslut: ED Decision 2017/009/R

title: AMC & GM to Part-SPA — Amendment 6

text: Annex to Decision 2017/009/R

text: Annex to Decision 2017/009/R

type: rubrik

text: ‘AMC and GM to Part-SPA — Amendment 6’

text: The Annex to Decision 2012/019/R is hereby amended as follows:

text: The text of the amendment is arranged to show deleted, new or amended text as shown below:

text: 1. deleted text is marked with strike through;

text: 2. new or amended text is highlighted in grey; and

text: 3. an ellipsis (…) indicates that the remaining text is unchanged in front of or following the reflected amendment.

text: AMC1 SPA.RVSM.105 RVSM operational approval

text: CONTENT OF OPERATOR RVSM APPLICATION The following material should be made available to the competent authority, in sufficient time to permit evaluation, before the intended start of RVSM operations: (…) (h) Continuing airworthiness Aircraft maintenance programme and continuing airworthiness procedures in support of the RVSM operations. (…)

text: AMC2 SPA.RVSM.105 RVSM operational approval

text: OPERATING PROCEDURES (…) (d) In-flight procedures (1) The following practices should be incorporated into flight crew training and procedures: (…) (vii) At intervals of approximately 1 hour, cross-checks between the primary altimeters should be made. A minimum of two will need to agree within ±60 m (±200 ft). Failure to meet this condition will require that the altimetry system be reported as defective and ATC notified or contingency procedures applied: (A) tThe usual scan of flight deck instruments should suffice for altimeter cross-checking on most flights; and

text: Annex to ED Decision 2017/009/R

text: (B) before entering RVSM airspace, the initial altimeter cross-check of primary and standby altimeters should be recorded. (…)

text: AMC3 SPA.RVSM.105 RVSM operational approval

text: CONTINUING AIRWORTHINESS (a) Maintenance programme The aircraft maintenance programme should include the instructions for continuing airworthiness issued by the type certificate holder in relation to the RVSM operations certification in accordance with AMC1 ACNS.A.GEN.010. (b) Continuing airworthiness procedures The continuing airworthiness procedures should establish a process to: (1) assess any modification or design change which in any way affects the RVSM approval; (2) evaluate any repairs that may affect the integrity of the continuing RVSM approval, e.g. those affecting the alignment of pitot/static probes, repairs to dents, or deformation around static plates; (3) ensure the proper maintenance of airframe geometry for proper surface contours and the mitigation of altimetry system error, surface measurements or skin waviness as specified in the instructions for continued airworthiness (ICA), to ensure adherence to RVSM tolerances. These checks should be performed following repairs or alterations having an effect on airframe surface and airflow. (c) Additional training may be necessary for continuing airworthiness and maintenance staff to support RVSM approval. Areas that may need to be highlighted for the initial and recurrent training of relevant personnel are: (1) Aircraft geometric inspection techniques; (2) Test equipment calibration and use of that equipment; and (3) Any special instructions or procedures introduced for RVSM approval. (d) Test equipment The operator should ensure that maintenance organisations use test equipment adequate for maintenance of the RVSM systems. The adequacy of the test equipment should be established in accordance with the type certificate holder recommendations and taking into consideration the required test equipment accuracy and the test equipment calibration. (…)

text: GM1 SPA.RVSM.105(d)(9) RVSM operational approval

text: SPECIFIC REGIONAL PROCEDURES (a) The areas of applicability (by Flight Information Region) of RVSM airspace in identified ICAO regions is contained in the relevant sections of ICAO Document 7030/4. In addition, these sections contain operating and contingency procedures unique to the regional airspace concerned, specific flight planning requirements and the approval requirements for aircraft in the designated region.

text: Annex to ED Decision 2017/009/R

text: (b) Comprehensive guidance on operational matters for European RVSM airspace is contained in ICAO EUR Doc 009 entitled ‘Guidance material on the implementation of a 300 m (1 000 ft) vertical separation minimum in the European RVSM airspace’ EUROCONTROL Document ASM ET1.ST.5000 entitled “The ATC Manual for a Reduced Vertical Separation (RVSM) in Europe” with further material included in the relevant State aeronautical publications.

text: AMC5 SPA.LVO.105 LVO approval

text: MAINTENANCE OF CAT II, CAT III AND LVTO EQUIPMENT Maintenance instructions for the on-board guidance systems should be established by the operator, in liaison with the manufacturer, and included in the operator's aircraft maintenance programme in accordance with Annex I to Commission Regulation (EUC) No 1321/2014 2042/2003. (Part-M).

text: AMC1 SPA.LVO.120 Flight crew training and qualifications

text: GENERAL PROVISIONS (a) The operator should ensure that flight crew member training programmes for LVO include structured courses of ground, FSTD and/or flight training. (…) GROUND TRAINING (b) The initial ground training course for LVO should include at least the following: (…) (10) procedures and precautions to be followed with regard to surface movement during operations when the RVR is 400 m or less and any additional procedures required for take-off in conditions below 150 m (200 m for category D aeroplanes); (…)

text: AMC6 SPA.LVO.105 LVO approval

text: ELIGIBLE AERODROMES AND RUNWAYS (a) Each aircraft type/runway combination should be verified by the successful completion of at least one approach and landing in CAT II or better conditions, prior to commencing CAT III operations. (b) For runways with irregular pre-threshold terrain or other foreseeable or known deficiencies, each aircraft type/runway combination should be verified by operations in CAT I or better conditions, prior to commencing LTS CAT I, CAT II, OTS CAT II or CAT III operations. (…)

text: AMC1 SPA.DG.105(a) Approval to transport dangerous goods

text: TRAINING PROGRAMME (…) (f) Training should be conducted at intervals of no longer than 2 years. If the recurrent training is undertaken within the last 3 calendar months of the validity period, the new validity period should be counted from the original expiry date. (…)