text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).

text: Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on the comparability of fees related to payment accounts, payment account switching and access to payment accounts with basic features (OJ L 257, 28.8.2014, p. 214).

text: Regulation (EU) No 575/2013

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending

text: Regulation (EU) No 648/2012

text: (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 1). 4 See paragraph 2 of Opinion CON2015/22. All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: See § 27 of the draft law.

text: See § 24 of the draft law. 7 See new

text: Article 73

text: и as set out in § 3 of the draft law. 8 See the ECB’s 2014 Convergence Report, p. 25. 9 See, for example, paragraph 3.1.2 of Opinion

text: . 10 At the time of the adoption of this opinion, there were indications that Member States were roughly split in equal proportion: while many did not intend to designate their NCBs as the competent authority under the PAD, many others did intend to do so. This is consistent with the existing allocation of consumer protection tasks exercised by NCBs in those Member States. 11 See Article 112 of the Law on payment services and payment systems.

text: See new

text: Article 73

text: а(2) as provided in § 3 of the draft law. 13 See new

text: Article 73

text: и(2) as provided in § 3 of the draft law. 14 Article 21(1) of PAD. 15 See paragraph 3.1.6 of Opinion

text: . 16 See

text: Article 3

text: а(9) of the draft law.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 24 March 2016 on payment services (CON/2016/18)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 24 March 2016 on payment services (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 26 January 2016 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from Българска народна банка (Bulgarian National Bank - BNB) for an opinion on a draft law amending and supplementing the law on payment services and payment systems (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the second, third and sixth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft law relates to means of payment, a national central bank (NCB) and contains rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft

text: 1.1 The primary purpose of the draft law is to transpose Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council (hereinafter the ‘Payment Accounts Directive’ or PAD) into Bulgarian law. Under the PAD, Member States must designate a national competent authority to oversee the application and enforcement of its provisions. Such competent authorities must either be public authorities or entities recognised by national law or by public authorities expressly empowered for that purpose under national law. While such competent authorities may not be payment service providers, an exception is made for national central banks. In the draft law, BNB is designated as the competent authority, responsible for the application and enforcement of the rules that implement the PAD into national legislation. 1.2. In addition, the draft law introduces several amendments to the Bulgarian Law on credit institutions, including the following: • exempting licenced institutions that grant loans as an ancillary service from the requirement to register, provided they have been granted a licence for another type of activity;

text: • establishing a procedure allowing capital instruments to be classified as Additional Tier 1 instruments and Tier 2 instruments in accordance with

text: Regulation (EU) No 575/2013

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council ; • introducing a fee for anyone requesting access to information from the central credit register; • regarding the supervisory powers of BNB; • repeal of BNB’s competence to impose administrative sanctions on persons who communicate false information regarding a bank, which may be detrimental to its reputation and credibility.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 New NCB task The ECB would like to recall that when new tasks are conferred on a member of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), it is necessary to assess these tasks against the prohibition of monetary financing under Article 123 of the Treaty. For this purpose and in the light of that basic need, the ECB has developed guidance in the form of general and specific considerations on the basis of which the ECB may decide whether the new task conferred on an NCB is to be considered a central banking task or a government task for the purposes of the monetary financing prohibition . This guidance is set out in this paragraph 2.1. The concrete assessment of whether BNB’s task of overseeing the application and enforcement of the new rules in the draft law that relate to payment accounts is to be considered a central banking task or a government task is then undertaken in paragraph 3.1. 2.1.1 General considerations First, the systematic categorisation of tasks assigned to NCBs as central banking or government tasks applies to genuinely new tasks that did not exist in the past or did not form an integral part of the central banking tasks already assigned to an NCB. In recognition of the different Member States’ legal frameworks, central banking traditions and national set-ups, the tasks currently discharged by an NCB as central banking tasks are not reviewed and re-categorised, but may be reassessed if their substance is amended. Second, the principle of financial independence requires that the Member States may not put their NCBs in a position where they have insufficient financial resources to carry out their ESCB or Eurosystem-related tasks. Third, central banking tasks comprise in particular those tasks that are related to the tasks listed in

text: Article 127(2)

text: , (5) and (6) of the Treaty.

text: Fourth, new tasks conferred on an NCB which are atypical of NCBs’ tasks, or which are clearly discharged on behalf of and in the exclusive interest of the government or of other public entities, should be considered to be government tasks. 2.1.2 Specific considerations An important criterion for qualifying a new task as a government task is the impact of the task on the institutional, financial and personal independence of the NCB. In particular, the following issues should be taken into account. First, it should be assessed whether the performance of the new task creates inadequately addressed conflicts of interests with existing central banking tasks, without necessarily complementing the existing central banking tasks. If a conflict of interest arises between existing and new tasks, there should be sufficient mitigation measures in place to adequately address that conflict. Complementarity between the new task and existing central banking tasks should not, however, be interpreted broadly, as this could lead to the creation of an indefinite chain of ancillary tasks. The assessment of the complementarity of a new task should also take into account the financing of that task. Second, it should be assessed whether, without new financial resources, the performance of the new task places a disproportionate burden on the financial or organisational capacity of the NCB and may negatively impact on its capacity to properly perform existing central banking tasks. Third, it should be assessed whether the performance of the new task is aligned with the institutional set-up of the NCB, in particular as regards central bank independence and accountability considerations. Fourth, it should be assessed whether the performance of the new task entails substantial financial risks. Fifth, it should be assessed whether the performance of the new task exposes the members of the NCB’s decision-making bodies to political risks that are disproportionate and could also impact on their personal independence and, in particular, the guarantee of the Governor’s term of office under Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB. 2.2 Any final assessment on the qualification of a task given to an NCB as either falling within the scope of a central banking task or a government task will be guided by the objective of ensuring the consistent application of the monetary financing prohibition within the Eurosystem and the ESCB.

text: 3. Specific observations

text: 3.1 Conferral of the task relating to the application and enforcement of the new rules The ECB notes that the draft law would assign to BNB the application and enforcement of the rules implementing the PAD into national law. To this end, BNB’s Governing Council must adopt a regulation on the application of the new rules and enforce its implementation. Furthermore, BNB is mandated to take the necessary measures to raise public awareness of the availability of payment

text: accounts with basic features and must provide access, free of charge, to a website comparing the fees charged by payment service providers for the relevant payment services . 3.1.1 New task The application and enforcement of the rules implementing the PAD is a new task, which no public authority in Bulgaria has previously performed. In the light of the guidance set out in paragraph 2.1 it must therefore be assessed carefully whether this new task and the associated responsibilities for BNB could constitute a breach of the monetary financing prohibition. 3.1.2 The principle of financial independence The principle of financial independence requires that the Member States may not put their NCBs in a position where they have insufficient financial resources to carry out not only their ESCB-related tasks, but also their national tasks, both from an operational and financial perspective . Furthermore, when allocating specific non-ESCB-related tasks to the NCBs, additional personnel and financial resources must also be allocated so that these tasks may be carried out in a manner that will not affect the NCBs’ operational or financial capacity to perform their ESCB-related tasks . In this regard, the ECB also notes that the PAD requires Member States to ensure that the national authorities in charge of the application and enforcement of its rules are granted adequate resources for the efficient and effective performance of their duties. However, the draft law does not specify whether the State would reimburse BNB for the costs related to the performance of this new task. 3.1.3 Links to tasks listed in

text: Article 127(2)

text: , (5) and (6) of the Treaty The application and enforcement of the rules implementing the PAD is a task related to the task conferred in the fourth indent of Article 127(2) of the Treaty, as this task is ancillary to the promotion of the smooth operation of payment systems. 3.1.4 Atypical tasks The application and enforcement of the rules implementing the PAD is a new task for national authorities in the Union. The PAD provides that Member States may designate their central banks as competent authorities, and the ECB understands that a number of Member States intend to do so . 3.1.5 Complementarity of the new task with existing BNB tasks BNB is already in charge of the application of the provisions of the Law on payment services and payment systems . The new rules in the draft law apply to payment service providers licenced by

text: BNB, as well as to the branches and agents of payment service providers that conduct business on Bulgarian territory . BNB’s new task therefore seems to complement BNB’s existing tasks. 3.1.6 Extent to which the performance of the new task is aligned with the institutional set-up of BNB The performance of the new task appears to be aligned with the institutional set-up of BNB. As mentioned in paragraph 3.1.4, BNB is already in charge of the application of provisions regarding payment services and systems. Furthermore, BNB’s Governing Council is entrusted with the adoption of a regulation on the application of the draft law’s new rules, thus allowing it to decide on the approach that best suits its own institutional set-up. 3.1.7 Extent to which the performance of the new task is proportional with BNB’s financial and operational capacity and its ability to perform ESCB-related tasks The draft law entrusts BNB with the potentially resource-intensive task of applying and enforcing the new rules. Moreover, the draft law mandates BNB to take the necessary measures to raise public awareness of the availability of payment accounts with basic features. More importantly, the ECB understands that the draft law requires BNB to establish and operate a website comparing the fees charged by payment service providers . The ECB therefore understands that BNB will bear the cost of establishing such a website at its own expense. All such costs go beyond those relating to the issuance of licences, which BNB currently recovers under the existing law. 3.1.8 Conclusion The ECB considers that, given their link to the ESCB task of promoting the smooth operation of payment systems, the tasks conferred on BNB under the draft law can be considered as central banking tasks. As such, their financing by BNB is – in principle – in compliance with the prohibition of monetary financing under

text: Article 123

text: TFEU. Nonetheless, given that the PAD requires that the national competent authorities be granted adequate resources necessary for the efficient and effective performance of their duties , the absence of any clear commitment from the State to reimburse BNB for the costs that it incurs as a result of the draft law raises some concerns as regards BNB’s financial independence. Adequate provisions to implement the full extent of the PAD requirements should therefore be taken into account by the draft law. 3.2 Amendments to the Law on credit institutions 3.2.1 The ECB welcomes the amendments to the Law on credit institutions, especially insofar as they contain a clarification regarding the fees charged for accessing the central credit register, which is also consistent with the ECB’s previous stance . 3.2.2 As regards the provision exempting licenced institutions that grant loans as an ancillary service from the requirement to register , the ECB notes that it should be ensured that the credit risk associated with such loans is mitigated appropriately.

text: 3.2.3 The ECB considers that any BNB regulation specifying the procedure for allowing capital instruments to be classified as Additional Tier 1 instruments and Tier 2 instruments, should be consistent with the relevant rules of

text: Regulation (EU) No 575/2013

text: . This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 24 March 2016. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).

text: See Articles D.213-2, D.213-6, D. 213-9, D. 213-11, D.213-12, D. 213-13 and D.213-14 of the CMF.

text: Under the simplified regime all issuers mentioned in Article L. 213-3 of the CMF will be entitled to issue short term TCNs (titres négociables à court terme). The same issuers with the exception of those mentioned in Article L. 213-3 paragraph 12 will be entitled to issue medium term TCNs (titres négociables à moyen terme).

text: Guideline

text: (EU) 2015/510

text: of the European Central Bank of 19 December 2014 on the implementation of the Eurosystem monetary policy framework (ECB/2014/60) (OJ L 91, 2.4.2015, p. 3).

publisher: Europeiska centralbanken

sprak: en

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 30 March 2016 on the regime applicable to negotiable debt securities (CON/2016/20)

serie: con

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 30 March 2016 on the regime applicable to negotiable debt securities (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

type: rubrik

text: On 1 March 2016 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the French Ministry of Finance and Public Accounts for an opinion on a draft decree and a draft ministerial order amending the regime applicable to negotiable debt securities (hereinafter the ‘draft regulatory acts’). The ECB’s competence to deliver this opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third, fourth and sixth indents of

text: , as the draft regulatory acts relate to the Banque de France, the collection, compilation and distribution of monetary, financial, banking, payment systems and balance of payments statistics and rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of the financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

type: stycke

text: 1. Purpose of the draft regulatory acts

text: 1.1 The purpose of the draft regulatory acts is to simplify further the regulatory framework applicable to the issue of negotiable debt securities (titres de créances négociables, TCNs) with the aim of enlarging the investor and issuer base and increasing the transparency of the TCN market. 1.2 To that effect, the draft regulatory acts provide for (a) a simplified regime of TCNs based on two different categories, ‘short term TCNs (titres négociables à court terme)’ and ‘medium term TCNs (titres négociables à moyen terme)’; (b) a further standardisation of the issuance documentation for TCNs; (c) a clearer and more accessible framework for non-domestic TCN issuers; (d) an extension to the list of eligible rating agencies (under specific conditions) whose rating is required for certain issuers to access the TCN market; and (e) an extension to the type of guarantors eligible to guarantee TCNs. 1.3 Aside from these simplification measures the issuance regime for TCNs is not materially changed. The Banque de France remains the competent authority required to ensure that issuers of TCNs comply with the relevant provisions of the French Monetary and Financial Code (Code monétaire et financier, CMF) and is therefore the addressee of the issuance documentation established by

text: issuers of TCNs. The Banque de France also performs other tasks in relation to the issuance of TCNs (including the suspension of issuances) and receives certain statistics from TCN issuers .

text: 2. Observations of the ECB

text: 2.1 The ECB generally welcomes the initiative of the French authorities to simplify the regulatory framework applicable to the issuance of TCNs, in particular, the fact that the relevant provisions are now grouped together in the CMF and one ministerial order, thereby increasing the overall readability of the framework. 2.2 The draft regulatory acts are intended to simplify further the regime applicable to the issue of TCNs. The former categories of certificates of deposit (certificats de dépôts) and treasury bills (billets de trésorerie), with different issuers but identical maturities (of one year or less), are replaced by a single category for all issuers known as ‘short term TCNs (titres négociables à court terme)’. The former medium term negotiable notes (bons à moyen terme négociables) become the second category and are now known as ‘medium term TCNs (titres négociables à moyen terme)’. The ECB welcomes the simplification of the categorisation of TCNs through the creation of two clear categories of TCN distinguished by their maturities and issuers . 2.3 The ECB notes, as regards the standardisation of the issuance documentation, that the draft regulatory acts simplify further the language regime applicable to the issuance documentation published in respect of TCNs issued for an amount of at least EUR 200 000 by allowing the issuer to publish the documentation in a language other than French provided such language is customarily used in the financial sphere. This is intended to facilitate the issue of TCNs as issuers will no longer have to produce a summary of the full issuance documentation in French. A short disclaimer in the issuance documentation will nevertheless be required, inviting investors, if necessary, to have recourse to a French translation. Second, the description of the activities of the issuers of TCNs will be standardised, putting an end to the former specific description of activities based on the issuer’s status as either an industrial and commercial entity or a credit institution or investment firm. These arrangements do not give rise to any specific remarks from the ECB. 2.4 The amendment of Article D. 213-9 of the CMF will allow the inclusion, in the TCN issuance documentation, of financial statements established pursuant to a standard considered by the European Commission as equivalent to international financial reporting standards. This clarifies the former requirement for non-domestic issuers to provide financial information of an ‘equivalent nature’ to international financial reporting standards, thereby increasing legal certainty for nondomestic issuers. Where the registered office of the issuer is located outside the European Economic Area (EEA), the issuer will have to provide accounting data subject to a statutory audit under an equivalent public oversight system recognised as such by the European Commission. These measures aim to facilitate the issue of TCNs by non-domestic issuers and, at the same time,

text: ensure the reliability of the accounting data provided by non-EEA issuers. The ECB has no particular observations on these measures. 2.5 The draft regulatory acts also extend the list of eligible rating agencies whose rating is required for certain issuers to access the TCN market. Under the current regime, non-supervised entities (i.e. entities which are not credit institutions, investment firms or insurance companies), the securities of which are not admitted to trading on a regulated market, must provide a rating of their issue programme or be guaranteed by a guarantor benefitting from such a rating. At present only four rating agencies are specified as eligible. The draft regulatory acts extend this list to all agencies authorised to operate by the European Securities Markets Authority (ESMA) and which fulfil certain specific coverage requirements over a historic period of three years. Moreover, issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market outside the EEA assessed by the European Commission as equivalent to EEA regulated markets are now exempted from having to provide a rating for their issue programme. The ECB welcomes these amendments. 2.6 The envisaged extension to the type of entities entitled to guarantee TCN issuance programmes does not give rise to any specific remarks from the ECB. 2.7 Finally, the ECB observes that, in accordance with Article 68 of Guideline

text: (EU) 2015/510

text: of the European Central Bank (ECB/2014/60) , in order to be eligible as collateral for Eurosystem credit operations, debt instruments must be admitted to trading either on a regulated market or on certain acceptable non-regulated markets. The current list of acceptable non-regulated markets, published by the ECB on its website, includes the French treasury bills market and medium term negotiable notes market. In this regard, the selection process for non-regulated markets is defined exclusively in terms of the performance of the Eurosystem collateral management function and should not be regarded as an assessment by the Eurosystem of the intrinsic quality of any market. The ECB considers the changes envisaged in the draft regulatory acts unlikely to alter the Eurosystem’s assessment of the treasury bills market and medium term negotiable notes market as acceptable non-regulated markets in the context of the Eurosystem collateral framework.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 30 March 2016.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI

type: vagledning

utgivare: ecb


text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42). 2 See IMF Press Release No 15/34, 5 February 2015.

text: See the simplified outcome-oriented impact assessment accompanying the draft law. 4

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 of 13 December 1993

text: specifying definitions for the application of the prohibitions referred to in Articles

text: and

text: b(1) of the Treaty (OJ L 332, 31.12.1993, p. 1). 5 Consistently with this interpretation, see Opinions

text: and

text: . With regard to the issue of national central banks financing of IMF quota increase, see Opinions

text: and

text: . All ECB Opinions are available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 6 This position departs from the one set out in Opinions

text: and

text: . All ECB opinions are available on the ECB website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 6 April 2016 on Austria’s contribution to the Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust of the International Monetary Fund (CON/2016/21)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 6 April 2016 on Austria’s contribution to the Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust of the International Monetary Fund (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 11 February 2016, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Austrian Ministry of Finance (MoF) for an opinion on a draft law regarding Austria’s contribution to the International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust (hereinafter the ‘CCR Trust’) (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and on the third indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft law relates to a national central bank. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 In November 2014, the G-20 called upon the IMF to provide additional financial aid for the countries stricken by the Ebola epidemic. In response to this request, the IMF extended the aid provided by the Post-Catastrophe Debt Relief Trust, which provides assistance in the aftermath of natural disasters, to include support in the event of epidemics . The IMF has combined these funds to create the CCR Trust, which will enable low-income countries that have been affected by natural disasters or epidemics to be able to reduce their IMF debt by 20% of their quota (or more in exceptional cases). This reduction will be implemented by decreasing the number of their debt instalments due until that amount is reached. As regards the three Ebola-stricken countries, Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone, the IMF will write off USD 100 million of debt. 1.2 Generally, the CCR Trust resources are sufficient to provide support to the countries currently affected by the Ebola epidemic. However, additional resources amounting to approximately USD 150 million will be required to respond to similar cases in the future. The IMF therefore appealed to its members to help with funding this amount. As regards Austria, the IMF requested that the Oesterreichische Nationalbank (OeNB) provide support amounting to USD 3 to 5 million. 1.3 The draft law authorises the OeNB to transfer EUR 2.7 million from its own resources on behalf of

text: Austria to the CCR Trust. According to the explanatory memorandum accompanying the draft law, the OeNB’s contribution is to be considered a donation in order for the OeNB to avoid repayment claims against the IMF or third parties. As a result of this contribution, the OeNB will experience an annual loss of interest amounting to EUR 1,350, which would have been received by the OeNB at an interest rate of 0.05 % on the amount transferred to the CCR Trust . This loss will reduce the OeNB’s annual income, resulting in a marginally lower profit distribution to the MoF.

text: 2. Monetary financing prohibition

text: 2.1 The tasks performed by a national central bank must comply with the monetary financing prohibition under Article 123 of the Treaty, which is subject to certain exemptions laid down in

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93

text: . In particular,

text: Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 3603/93

text: provides that the financing by national central banks of obligations falling upon the public sector in relation to the IMF are not regarded as a credit facility within the meaning of Article 123 of the Treaty.

text: Recital 14

text: of

text: Regulation (EC) No 3603/93

text: clarifies the rationale behind this exemption, stating that it is appropriate to authorise the financing by the central banks of obligations falling upon the public sector in relation to the IMF because such financing ‘results in foreign claims which have all the characteristics of reserve assets’. Therefore, the exemption in

text: Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 3603/93

text: must be interpreted in line with this rationale . 2.2 The OeNB’s transfer of Austria’s contribution to the CCR Trust, as set out in the draft law, does not fall under the exemption in

text: Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 3603/93

text: because the financing does not result in claims that have the characteristics of reserve assets within the meaning of

text: Recital 14

text: of

text: Regulation (EU) No 3603/93

text: . Therefore, the ECB regards the OeNB’s donation to the CCR Trust as a form of monetary financing prohibited by Article 123(1) of the Treaty. In order to avoid such an infringement of the monetary financing prohibition, the OeNB should not finance the Austrian contribution to the CCR Trust from its own resources, and the draft law should be amended accordingly.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 6 April 2016.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: COM(2015) 603 final.

text: Se de fem ordförandenas rapport Färdigställandet av EU:s ekonomiska och monetära union, 22 juni 2015, finns på www.ec.europa.eu

text: Artiklarna II och III i IMF-stadgarna.

text: Se artikel V avsnitt 1 i IMF-stadgarna, där det fastställs att de enskilda medlemsstaterna endast får ingå avtal med fonden genom sitt finansministerium, sin centralbank, sin stabiliseringsfond eller annat liknande organ samt att fonden endast får ingå avtal med eller via dessa organ.

text: Se t.ex. Österrike: avsnitt 1 och 2 i förbundslagen av den 23 juni 1971 om ökningen av Österrikes andel i IMF och Österreichische Nationalbanks överföring av hela kvoten, BGBl nr 309/1971; Tyskland: artikel 3.2 i lagen om IMF-stadgarna av den 9 januari 1978 (BGBl. 1978 II, s. 13) ändrad genom

text: artikel 298 i förordningen

text: av den 31 augusti 2015 (BGBl. I, s. 1474); Finland: avsnitt 2 i lag 68/1977 om godkännande av vissa ändringar i avtalet om Internationella valutafonden; Slovenien: artikel 4 i lagen om Republiken Sloveniens medlemskap i Internationella valutafonden; Portugal: artikel 1.1 i lagdekret nr 245/89 av den 5 augusti 1989.

text: Så är det exempelvis i Belgien, Estland, Tyskland, Lettland, Litauen, Malta, Nederländerna, Österrike, Slovakien, Slovenien, Finland och Portugal.

text: Se artikel XIII avsnitt 2 (a) i IMF-stadgarna.

text: Se artikel XVII i IMF-stadgarna.

text: Se

text: artikel 23

text: första och fjärde strecksatserna i ECBS-stadgan.

text: Se artikel 31.1 i ECBS-stadgan.

text: Se artikel 30.5 i ECBS-stadgan.

text: Se artikel XVII avsnitt 3 i IMF-stadgarna.

text: När det gäller ECB bör man även väga in de uppgifter som ECB tilldelas genom

text: rådets förordning (EU) nr 1024/2013 av den 15 oktober 2013

text: om tilldelning av särskilda uppgifter till Europeiska centralbanken i fråga om politiken för tillsyn över kreditinstitut (EUT L 287, 29.10.2013, s. 63).

text: Se punkt 134 i domen i

text: mål C-11/00

text: , Europeiska gemenskapernas kommission mot Europeiska centralbanken, ECLI:EU:C:2003:395.

text: Se avsnittet Funktionellt oberoende första stycket i kapitel 2.2.3 i ECB:s konvergensrapport 2014.

text: Se punkt 9 i yttrande

text: vad gäller begreppet monetär politik i

text: artikel 3.1 c i EUF-fördraget

text: . Eftersom ECBS-stadgan utgör en integrerad del av fördragen (

text: artikel 51 i EU-fördraget

text: ) hänför sig begreppet monetär politik även till de bestämmelser om monetär politik som fastställs i ECBS-stadgan.

text: Se

text: artikel 27 i förordning (EU) nr 1024/2013

text: Se

text: artikel 282.3 i EUF-fördraget

text: , artikel 9.1 i ECBS-stadgan och

text: artikel 8 i förordning (EU) nr 1024/2013

text: . ECB:s ställning som internationell juridisk person begränsar sig till dess funktioner samt de tillämpliga bestämmelserna i fördragen. Enligt artikel 6.1 och 6.2 i ECBS-stadgan måste ECB därför bestämma hur ECBS ska företrädas i fråga om sådant internationellt samarbete som angår de uppgifter som anförtrotts ECBS, samt om ECB och, med dess godkännande, de nationella centralbankerna får delta i internationella monetära institutioner. I artikel 6.3 i ECBS-stadgan fastställs att dessa bestämmelser inte ska påverka de lämpliga åtgärder som rådet har antagit enligt

text: artikel 138.2 i EUF-fördraget

text: Beslut nr 12925-(03/1), 27 december 2002, ändrat genom beslut nr 13414-(05/01), 23 december 2004, 13612-(05/108), 22 december 2005, och 14517-(10/1) 5 januari 2010.

sprak: sv

title: Europeiska centralbankens yttrande av den 6 april 2016 om ett förslag till rådets beslut om åtgärder för att gradvis införa en enad representation för euroområdet i Internationella valutafonden (CON/2016/22)

text: Inledning och rättslig grund

text: Den 30 oktober 2015 mottog Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) en begäran från rådet om ett yttrande över ett förslag till rådets beslut om åtgärder för att gradvis införa en enad representation för euroområdet i Internationella valutafonden (IMF eller fonden) (nedan kallat förslaget till beslut).

text: ECB:s behörighet att avge ett yttrande grundas på

text: artikel 138 i fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt

text: (EUF-fördraget), där det fastställs att rådet, på förslag av kommissionen och efter samråd med ECB, får anta lämpliga åtgärder för att säkerställa en enad representation inom internationella finansinstitutioner och finanskonferenser i syfte att säkerställa eurons plats i det internationella valutasystemet. I enlighet med artikel 17.5 första meningen i arbetsordningen för Europeiska centralbanken har detta yttrande antagits av ECB-rådet.

text: 1. Allmänna kommentarer

text: 1.1 Förslaget till beslut grundar sig på de fem ordförandenas rapport, där det framfördes krav på att Ekonomiska och monetära unionen (EMU) ska ha en alltmer enad extern representation i takt med att den utvecklas till en ekonomisk, finansiell och finanspolitisk union. ECB ställer sig bakom målsättningen att gradvis stärka euroområdets externa representation i IMF med det slutgiltiga målet att skapa en eller flera valkretsar i euroområdet samt säkerställa att euroområdet uttrycker en gemensam ståndpunkt.

text: 1.2 ECB stöder fullt ut att samordningen av politiken i euroområdet stärks, vilket är avgörande för målet om enad extern representation i enlighet med artiklarna 4 och 9 i förslaget till beslut. Samordningen har visserligen förbättrats under senare år, men behöver fortfarande stärkas ytterligare och förbättras så att den är i linje med euroområdets ekonomiska styrning, som redan har stärkts under senare år samt med den fördjupade integration som förutses i de fem ordförandenas rapport.

text: 1.3 ECB skulle vilja understryka att en avgörande faktor för att uppnå en enad och effektiv representation för euroområdet i IMF är att samtliga berörda parter iakttar principen om lojalt samarbete fullt ut. Enligt

text: artikel 4.3 i fördraget om Europeiska unionen

text: (EU-fördraget) ska unionen och medlemsstaterna respektera och bistå varandra när de fullgör de uppgifter som följer av EU-fördraget och EUF-fördraget (nedan tillsammans kallade fördragen). Denna princip innebär att medlemsstaterna ska vidta alla lämpliga åtgärder för att säkerställa att de skyldigheter fullgörs som följer av fördragen eller av unionens institutioners akter samt att de ska avstå från varje åtgärd som kan äventyra fullgörandet av unionens mål. I

text: artikel 13.2 i EU-fördraget

text: föreskrivs att unionens institutioner ska samarbeta lojalt med varandra.

text: 1.4 ECB noterar att syftet med förslaget till beslut är att upprätta en enad representation för euroområdet enligt unionsrätten utan att ändra IMF:s landsbaserade medlemsstruktur i enlighet med Internationella valutafondens stadgar (nedan kallad IMF-stadgarna). För att uppnå en fullt ut enad representation för euroområdet i IMF förefaller det som om IMF-stadgarna skulle behöva ändras så att överstatliga organisationer som unionen/euroområdet skulle kunna bli medlemmar. ECB noterar att någon sådan reform inte planeras genom detta förslag till beslut. Den enade representationen för euroområdet i IMF begränsas därför till de politikområden som har överförts till unionen.

text: 1.5 ECB noterar att de nationella centralbankerna i Eurosystemet och Europeiska centralbankssystemet spelar en viktig roll för att företräda sina länder i IMF inom ramen för IMF:s landsbaserade medlemsstruktur. I enlighet med artikel V första stycket i IMF-stadgarna ska varje medlemsstat utse de organ varigenom det ska ingå avtal med IMF. I majoriteten av medlemsstaterna i euroområdet har de nationella centralbankerna utsetts till sådana organ. De nationella centralbankerna spelar också en viktig roll genom att företräda sina medlemsstater i IMF:s beslutande organ. I majoriteten av medlemsstaterna i euroområdet representerar den nationella centralbankschefen sitt land som guvernör i IMF:s guvernörsstyrelse, medan andra medlemsstater ger centralbankschefen posten som guvernörssuppleant i IMF:s guvernörsstyrelse. I många fall är dessutom den nationella centralbankschefen suppleant i Internationella valuta- och finanskommittén (IMFC). Många nationella centralbanker är också mycket involverade i urvalsförfarandet då landets ordinarie ledamöter och suppleanter ska utses till exekutivstyrelsen, och i vissa fall görs urvalet av den nationella centralbanken. I enlighet med IMF-stadgarna ska varje medlemsstat i euroområdet utse sin centralbank som förvaringsinstitut för samtliga IMF:s innehav av dess valuta. Vidare innehar och förvaltar de nationella centralbankerna i Eurosystemet särskilda dragningsrätter (SDR) som tilldelats respektive land till följd av dess deltagande i IMF:s SDR-avdelning och deltar i frivilliga handelsarrangemang för särskilda dragningsrätter. Utöver detta deltar de nationella centralbankerna i Eurosystemet i IMF:s finansiella transaktionsplan, tillhandahåller det obligatoriska insatskapitalet för respektive lands IMF-medlemskap och erbjuder – när det finns behov och är lämpligt – frivilliga kreditlinjer bilateralt till IMF samt inom ramen för såväl IMF:s generella låneavtal (General Agreements to Borrow, GAB) som de nya lånearrangemangen (New Arrangements to Borrow, NAB).

text: 1.6 Sett i ett EU-rättsligt perspektiv bekräftar fördragen den roll som de nationella centralbankerna och ECB spelar gentemot IMF. Enligt stadgan för Europeiska centralbankssystemet och Europeiska centralbanken (nedan kallad ECBS-stadgan) får ECB och de nationella centralbankerna vid behov upprätta förbindelser med internationella organisationer och utföra alla slags banktransaktioner med dem, inklusive upplåning och utlåning. De nationella centralbankerna ska ha rätt att utföra transaktioner för att uppfylla sina förpliktelser mot internationella organisationer. ECB får inneha och förvalta IMF-reservpositioner och SDR samt bestämma att sådana tillgångar ska läggas samman. I samband med detta har IMF:s exekutivstyrelse utsett ECB som föreskriven innehavare av SDR enligt IMF-stadgarna.

text: 1.7 ECB förstår att förslaget till beslut inte syftar till att ändra några av de arrangemang som medlemsstaterna i euroområdet har infört för att säkerställa att de fullgör sina respektive rättigheter och skyldigheter till följd av sitt medlemskap i IMF. Inom dessa ramar är ECB redo att bidra till rådets ansträngningar för att säkerställa en enad representation för euroområdet i samtliga IMF-organ, samt att spela sin roll i en enad representation för euroområdet i enlighet med rådets beslut. För varje åtgärd som grundas på

text: artikel 138 i EUF-fördraget

text: ska det beaktas att tillämpningsområdet för denna artikel begränsas till de politikområden som har överförts till unionen och inom vilka ECB och de nationella centralbankerna oberoende utövar de specifika befogenheter som de tilldelas enligt EUF-fördraget och ECBS-stadgan.

text: 2. Specifika kommentarer

text: 2.1 Eurosystemets oberoende

text: 2.1.1 Som tidigare konstaterats måste målet att uppnå en enad representation för euroområdet i IMF uppnås med beaktande av Eurosystemets befogenheter, framför allt enligt

text: artikel 127 i EUF-fördraget

text: , och dess oberoende, framför allt enligt

text: artikel 130 i EUF-fördraget

text: och artikel 7 i ECBS-stadgan. Den unionsrättsliga principen om oberoende syftar till att skydda Eurosystemet mot alla former av politiska påtryckningar för att det ska kunna arbeta effektivt för målen samt på ett oberoende sätt utöva de uppgifter som det tilldelats genom de särskilda befogenheter som det har getts genom unionsrätten.

text: 2.1.2 Eurosystemets oberoende kan inte inskränkas genom

text: artikel 138.2 i EUF-fördraget

text: . För att vara en lämplig åtgärd i den mening som avses i

text: artikel 138.2 i EUF-fördraget

text: ska förslaget till beslut därför säkerställa att Eurosystemets oberoende utövande av sina uppgifter och befogenheter skyddas genom hela processen för att hitta en optimal modell för den enade externa representationen för euroområdet i IMF. De mål, uppgifter och särskilda befogenheter som skyddas genom Eurosystemets oberoende fortsätter att utvecklas, och de mest relevanta beskrivs här nedan.

text: 2.1.3 Eurosystemets primära mål är att upprätthålla prisstabilitet (de första meningarna i

text: artikel 127.1 i EUF-fördraget

text: respektive artikel 2 i ECBS-stadgan samt artikel 282.2 andra meningen i EUF-fördraget). Detta mål är nära kopplat till att Eurosystemet tilldelas en hög grad av oberoende, eftersom det krav som ställs i EUF-fördraget på centralbankens oberoende avspeglar den generella synpunkten att det primära målet prisstabilitet uppnås bäst genom ett helt oberoende centralbankssystem med ett väl avgränsat uppdrag. Enligt artikel 282.1 andra meningen i EUF-fördraget ska unionens monetära politik föras av Eurosystemet. När det gäller artikel 3.1 c och artikel 282.1 andra meningen i EUF-fördraget ska begreppet monetär politik inte tolkas i snäv och teknisk mening så att det endast avser Eurosystemets grundläggande uppgift som det hänvisas till i artikel 127.2 första strecksatsen i EUF-fördraget. Ett sådant snävt synsätt är varken motiverat eller avsett. ECB tolkar begreppet monetär politik som att det hänför sig till rubriken till del III avdelning VIII kapitel 2 i EUF-fördraget och anser att det således innefattar alla särskilda befogenheter som avser euron, såsom detta beskrivs i de relevanta bestämmelserna i EUF-fördraget, särskilt artiklarna

text: och

text: i EUF-fördraget.

text: 2.1.4 Eurosystemet har även tilldelats sekundära mål: utan att målet om prisstabilitet åsidosätts ska Eurosystemet understödja den allmänna ekonomiska politik som förs i unionen i syfte att bidra till uppnåendet av unionens mål enligt

text: artikel 3 i EU-fördraget

text: (se även artikel 127.1 andra meningen i EUF-fördraget, artikel 282.2 tredje meningen i EUF-fördraget och artikel 2 i ECBS-stadgan). De mål som fastställs i

text: artikel 3 i EU-fördraget

text: specificeras närmare i artiklarna

text: i EUF-fördraget.

text: 2.1.5 Utöver de mål som fastställs i EUF-fördraget ska Eurosystemet slutligen medverka till att de behöriga myndigheterna smidigt kan genomföra sin politik när det gäller tillsyn över kreditinstitut och det finansiella systemets stabilitet i enlighet med

text: artikel 127.5 i EUF-fördraget

text: . Det arbetar för målet att säkerställa kreditinstitutens säkerhet och sundhet med avseende på de särskilda uppgifter som rådet har tilldelat ECB i samband med tillsynen över kreditinstitut på grundval av

text: artikel 127.6 i EUF-fördraget

text: . Sedan november 2014 utför ECB dessa uppgifter inom ramen för den gemensamma tillsynsmekanismen (SSM), som består av ECB och de nationella behöriga myndigheterna. I detta hänseende omfattas ECB även av tystnadsplikt och måste agera oberoende i enlighet med

text: artikel 19 i förordning (EU) nr 1024/2013

text: 2.2 ECB:s observatörsstatus i IMF

text: 2.2.1 ECB är den enda av de EU-institutioner som anges i

text: artikel 13.1 i EU-fördraget

text: som har fått ställning som internationell juridisk person. Enligt artikel 6.1 och 6.2 i ECBS-stadgan ska ECB bestämma hur ECBS ska företrädas i fråga om sådant internationellt samarbete som angår de uppgifter som anförtrotts ECBS samt om ECB och, med dess godkännande, de nationella centralbankerna får delta i internationella monetära institutioner. I artikel 6.3 i ECBS-stadgan fastställs att dessa bestämmelser inte ska påverka de lämpliga åtgärder som rådet har antagit enligt

text: artikel 138.2 i EUF-fördraget

text: för att säkerställa en enad representation för euroområdet inom internationella finansinstitutioner och finanskonferenser. ECB bör även fortsättningsvis ha en framträdande roll i representationen för euroområdet i IMF, dvs. en roll som fullt ut beaktar att Eurosystemet på ett oberoende sätt utövar de särskilda befogenheter som det har tilldelats genom EUF-fördraget och ECBS-stadgan, på samma sätt som ECB gör i fråga om de befogenheter som ECB har tilldelats genom förordning

text: (EU) nr 1024/2013

text: . Denna roll ska därför åtminstone omfatta de rättigheter som ECB, i egenskap av representant för Eurosystemet, i nuläget har som observatör i IMF, dvs. rätten att uttala sig och lämna skriftliga uttalanden till IMF-organen. Denna roll kan behöva utökas ytterligare om den enade externa representationen utformas på ett sådant sätt att euroområdet får utökade rättigheter inom IMF. Mot denna bakgrund anser ECB att målet om en enad representation för euroområdet i IMF endast kan uppnås om man fullt ut respekterar innebörden av ECB:s oberoende utövande av sina särskilda befogenheter vad gäller den externa representationen. Euroområdets åsikter och ståndpunkter bör noggrant samordnas och framföras med en röst. Detta förutsätter emellertid att den enade representationen utformas på ett sådant sätt att man fullt ut beaktar de olika EU-institutionernas interna fördelning av befogenheter och deras olika mandat samt de fördragsbaserade garantierna om oberoende som syftar till att skydda Eurosystemet mot alla former av politiska påtryckningar för att det ska kunna arbeta effektivt för de mål som fastställts för dess uppgifter.

text: 2.2.2 Som tidigare konstaterats skulle den enade representationen också behöva utformas helt i linje med principen om ömsesidigt lojalt samarbete mellan EU-institutionerna (

text: artikel 13.2 i EU-fördraget

text: ). ECB förväntar sig därför att kommissionen och rådet ska bidra till att uppnå målet om en enad representation för euroområdet i enlighet med Eurosystemets uppdrag och befogenheter. En sådan enad representation förväntas följa den långvariga praxisen att samarbeta nära tillsammans med centralbankerna för att ta fram gemensamma ståndpunkter för euroområdet när det gäller IMF:s beslutsförfaranden samt att låta de nationella centralbankerna i Eurosystemet delta i dessa förfaranden med tanke på deras expertis inom de områden där IMF bedriver verksamhet.

text: 2.2.3 I nuläget är ECB representerat i två IMF-organ på permanent basis. ECB:s ordförande är observatör i IMFC. ECB har även observatörsstatus i IMF:s exekutivstyrelse när frågor som rör dess mandat diskuteras. ECB uppmanas att sända en representant till mötena i IMF:s exekutivstyrelse när följande frågor diskuteras: a) euroområdets politik i samband med artikel IV-konsultationer med medlemsstaterna, b) fondens övervakning i enlighet med artikel IV av de enskilda euroländernas politik, c) euroområdets roll i det internationella monetära systemet, d) utsikterna för världsekonomin, e) globala finansiella stabilitetsrapporter, f) världsekonomins och marknadens utveckling. ECB bjuds dessutom in att sända en representant till möten i IMF:s exekutivstyrelse när man behandlar frågor som ECB och IMF bedömer vara av ömsesidigt intresse för fullgörandet av deras respektive uppdrag. ECB:s observatörsstatus innebär att ECB:s representant, med ordförandens tillåtelse får uttala sig i IMF:s exekutivstyrelse, muntligen eller skriftligen, om de punkter på dagordningen som ECB har inbjudits till, medan däremot endast medlemsstaterna har rätt att uttala sig om och fatta beslut om alla de olika frågor som behandlas i IMF:s organ.

text: 2.3 Tekniska synpunkter och förslag

text: I de fall där ECB rekommenderar att förslaget till beslut ändras anges de specifika förslagen i ett separat tekniskt arbetsdokument som åtföljs av en förklaring. Det tekniska arbetsdokumentet finns på engelska på ECB:s webbplats.


text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42). 2 Zakon o preprečevanju pranja denarja in financiranja terorizma (ZPPDFT) (Ur. l. RS No 60/07, 19/10, 77/11, 108/12 – ZIS-E and 19/14). 3

text: Directive (EU) 2015/849

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, amending

text: Regulation (EU) No 648/2012

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council and

text: Commission Directive 2006/70/EC

text: (OJ L 141, 5.6.2015, p. 73). 4 See the Report on Fourth Assessment Visit for Slovenia, dated 17 March 2010, and the 2nd regular follow-up progress report, dated April 2013, available on the Council of Europe’s website at ‘www.coe.int’.

text: The Slovenian Office can be categorised as an administrative type of financial intelligence unit (see the publication of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank Financial Intelligence Units: An Overview, dated 2004, available here: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/FIU/fiu.pdf). 6

text: Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013

text: conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63). 7 See also Article 6(2) of the

text: Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013

text: pursuant to which the ECB and national competent authorities shall be subject to a duty of cooperation in good faith, and an obligation to exchange information. 8 See

text: Article 165(8)

text: in conjunction with Article 165(6) of the draft law. 9 See

text: Article 4(1)

text: (a) of

text: Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013

text: . 10 See

text: Article 165(9)

text: in conjunction with

text: Article 165(6)

text: and (7) of the draft law.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 13 April 2016 on the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing (CON/2016/23)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 13 April 2016 on the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 9 March 2016 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Slovenian Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft law on the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft law relates to Banka Slovenije and the ECB’s specific tasks concerning the prudential supervision of credit institutions. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: The main purpose of the draft law, which replaces the current Law on the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing (hereinafter the ‘Law’), is to implement

text: Directive (EU) 2015/849

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council into Slovenian law. In addition, the draft law introduces certain amendments aimed at improving the effectiveness of the system for the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing (hereinafter ‘AML/CTF’) in Slovenia, by removing identified shortcomings in the current Law and addressing certain recommendations made to Slovenia by the Council of Europe’s Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism – MONEYVAL . As part of these amendments, the draft law strengthens the powers of the Office for Money Laundering Prevention (hereinafter the ‘Office’), which is the Slovenian financial

text: intelligence unit, established as part of the Ministry of Finance . The Office may issue administrative decisions and sanctions to the entities obliged to comply with AML/CTF laws and regulations (hereinafter the ‘obliged entities’)., The new powers of the Office under the draft law will include investigative powers allowing it to conduct on-site inspections of the obliged entities. These powers will extend both in relation to obliged entities without a primary supervisor (e.g. firms performing tax consultancy services) and to obliged entities having a primary supervisor. According to the explanatory memorandum, the aim of this amendment is to improve the supervisory system over the obliged entities and to provide for more effective sanctioning. The primary supervisors for ensuring compliance with AML/CTF laws and regulations by obliged entities in the financial market are otherwise the relevant sectoral prudential supervisors: Banka Slovenije, the Securities Market Agency and the Insurance Supervision Agency.

text: 2. General observations

text: This opinion does not address whether the draft law effectively transposes

text: Directive (EU) 2015/849

text: into Slovenian law, but rather the assessment is limited to certain provisions of the draft law that relate to the role and tasks of Banka Slovenije, and to ECB competences and responsibilities in the field of the prudential supervision of credit institutions. As noted in Recitals

text: and

text: of

text: Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013

text: , the supervisory tasks not conferred on the ECB, which remain with the national authorities, include the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing. The ECB should cooperate, as appropriate, fully with the national authorities, which are competent to ensure the fight against money laundering . With respect to the competences entrusted to the Office by the draft law, it is noted that they result in certain inspection powers that parallel those of Banka Slovenije in relation to the same obliged entities. In this regard, the ECB understands that national authorities shall closely cooperate in exercising their powers without adversely affecting their respective supervisory responsibilities. As regards the measures and sanctions to be imposed on credit institutions as obliged entities following infringements of AML/CTF provisions, which may, in case of the most severe breaches, include the withdrawal of the authorisation to carry out activities , it is noted that the ECB has exclusive competence, for prudential supervisory purposes, to withdraw a banking licence . With regard to the possibility under the draft law to impose a prohibition on the performance of managerial tasks , for significant credit institutions, it is noted that the ECB is directly competent to ensure compliance with acts imposing requirements on credit institutions to have in place robust governance

text: arrangements, including the fit and proper requirements for persons responsible for the management of credit institutions . This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 13 April 2016. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42). 2 Zakon o Banki Slovenije (ZBS-1) (Ur. l. RS No 72/06 – official consolidated text, and 59/11). 3 See Opinions

text: and

text: . All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: Zakon o računskem sodišču (ZRacS-1) (Ur. l. RS No 11/01 and 109/12). 5 See Article 20(1) of the Law on the Court of Audit in conjunction with

text: Article 20(3)

text: thereof. 6 Pursuant to Article 2 of the Law on Banka Slovenije, the principle of central bank independence should be respected not only when Banka Slovenije performs ESCB-related tasks, but also when it performs national tasks. 7

text: Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013

text: conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63).

text: See paragraph 4.3 of Opinion

text: . 9 It is noted that Article 2 of the Law on Banka Slovenije does not contain a prohibition against the Government and other bodies giving instructions to Banka Slovenije or seeking to influence the members of its decision-making bodies; however a prohibition to this effect is contained in Article 130 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB. 10 See Article 29 of the Law on the Court of Audit. 11 See the Guide to consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions, dated October 2015. The Guide is available on the ECB’s website at www.europa.eu.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 18 April 2016 on the auditing of Banka Slovenije’s business operations (CON/2016/24)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 18 April 2016 on the auditing of Banka Slovenije’s business operations (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 23 March 2016 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Slovenian Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft law amending the Law on Banka Slovenije (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third indent of

text: , as the draft law relates to Banka Slovenije. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: Banka Slovenije is currently subject to an audit of its financial accounts pursuant to Article 27.1 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter the ‘Statute of the ESCB’). The purpose of the draft law is to also establish rules for the auditing of Banka Slovenije’s operations by the national Court of Audit, which would be compatible with the principle of central bank independence. The draft law provides for the introduction of these rules by adding a new Article to the Law on Banka Slovenije .

text: 2. Observations

text: 2.1 As stated in past ECB opinions, notably in relation to various Slovenian draft legislative initiatives , whereas a state auditor may not undertake the audit of an NCB’s financial accounts, it is possible for a state audit office or similar body that controls the use of public finances, such as the Court of Audit, to undertake an audit in respect of an NCB’s activities and use of public finances. However, any state audit office or similar body entrusted with such competences must be subject to a number of safeguards designed to ensure compliance with the principle of central bank independence: (a) the scope of the control should be clearly defined by the legal framework; (b) the activities of the NCB’s independent external auditors should not be prejudiced; (c) in line with the principle of institutional independence, as enshrined in Article 130 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the

text: Statute of the ESCB, the audit should: (i) comply with the prohibition on giving instructions to an NCB and its decision-making bodies, (ii) not interfere with the NCB’s ESCB-related tasks, and (iii) be carried out on a non-political, independent and purely professional basis. 2.2 The ECB welcomes the fact that by establishing rules for the auditing of Banka Slovenije the draft law aims to take into account the principle of central bank independence and the related safeguards referred to in paragraph 2.1. In this respect, it is noted that, according to Article 1 of the Law on the Court of Audit , the Court is the supreme audit institution for the supervision of the state’s accounts, the state budget and all public spending in Slovenia. In relation to other state authorities, the Court of Audit is an autonomous and independent authority. The scope of control of the Court of Audit in relation to Banka Slovenije’s operations is defined in paragraph 1 of the new Article introduced by the draft law. This paragraph provides that the Court of Audit must audit the ‘regularity’ and ‘efficiency’ of Banka Slovenije’s business operations. These terms derive from the Law on the Court of Audit: a ‘regularity audit’ is therein defined as ‘obtaining relevant and sufficient data to enable an opinion to be expressed on the compliance of the business operations with regulations and guidelines that any user of public funds is required to observe in the conduct of the operations’, while an ‘efficiency’ audit is one of the three types of audit that are categorised as socalled ‘performance audits’, which are defined as ‘obtaining relevant and sufficient data to enable an opinion to be expressed on the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of the business operations’, respectively . Audits of the efficiency of Banka Slovenije’s business operations relate to the fields of its organisation, administration, human resources and general operational efficiency. In this manner, and taken together with the explicit provision in paragraph 6 of the new Article introduced by the draft law, which states that when discharging its auditing duties, the Court of Auditors may not interfere with the activities of independent external auditors appointed in accordance with Article 52 of the Law on Banka Slovenije, the draft law also ensures that the Court of Audit may not audit the financial accounts of Banka Slovenije and interfere with or prejudice the activities of Banka Slovenije’s independent external auditors appointed in accordance with Article 27.1 of the Statute of the ESCB. Furthermore, paragraph 2 of the new Article introduced by the draft law explicitly excludes any actions representing the performance of duties under the Law on Banka Slovenije and the Statute of the ESCB from the scope of audit. This provision is important in that it ensures that the audit does not interfere with Banka Slovenije’s tasks . In this context, the ECB would remind the Slovenian authorities that, in line with the principle of independence specific to banking supervision, as set out in

text: Article 19 of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013

text: , which applies to both the ECB and the national competent authorities when acting within the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), as well as the limitations provided in Article 27.2 of the Statute of the ESCB and

text: Article 20(7) of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013

text: in relation to the supervisory tasks conferred on the

text: ECB, the audit should: (a) not extend to the application and interpretation of supervisory law and practices in the context of the SSM; this is of particular importance in determining the scope of the abovementioned ‘regularity’ audit; (b) not interfere with and not include the tasks conferred on the ECB by

text: Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013

text: , nor be extended so that it results in an indirect audit of the ECB; and (c) be carried out on a non-political, independent and purely professional basis . The draft law and its implementation should ensure that these principles are respected. The ECB understands that by referring in paragraph 3 of the new Article introduced by the draft law to ‘recommendations’ of the Court of Audit and to the ‘comply or explain’ principle, the draft law aims to ensure that Banka Slovenije is not bound by the opinion of the Court of Audit and that the Court of Audit may not therefore give instructions to Banka Slovenije . To ensure compliance with the principle of central bank independence, the provision in paragraph 5 of the new Article proposed by the draft law is also relevant as excludes from the general duties and competences of the Court of Audit the proposal of the dismissal of a responsible person in certain cases laid down in the Law on the Court of Audit, with respect to the members of the Governing Board of Banka Slovenije . 2.3 With reference to paragraphs 4 and 7 of the new Article proposed by the draft law, it is noted that reference is made to Article 37 of the Statute of the ESCB and also to the rules of the ESCB. For the sake of completeness, the ECB recommends that, in addition to references made to Article 37 of the Statute of the ESCB and to the relevant ESCB rules, reference should also be made to the applicable Union laws, including those governing the exchange of statistical and supervisory information. 2.4 Finally, in case this draft law undergoes substantial amendments of a non-technical nature compared with the version received and opined on herein, the ECB should be consulted in relation to those amendments .

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 18 April 2016.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 2 In particular, Decision ECB/2010/14 of the European Central Bank of 16 September 2010 on the authenticity and fitness checking and recirculation of euro banknotes (OJ L 267, 9.10.2010, p. 1); Article 97 of Decree Law No 1 of 24 January 2012 on urgent provisions on competition, infrastructure development and competitiveness, which was converted into Law No 27 of 24 March 2012 containing legal provisions for the protection of the euro from counterfeiting; and Article 145 of Legislative Decree No 385 of 1 September 1993 as amended by Legislative Decree No 72 of 12 May 2015.

text: Decision ECB/2013/10 of the European Central Bank of 19 April 2013 on the denominations, specifications, reproduction, exchange and withdrawal of euro banknotes (OJ L 118, 30.4.2013, p. 37).

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 20 April 2016 on the authenticity and fitness checking of euro banknotes and their circulation (CON/2016/25)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 20 April 2016 on the authenticity and fitness checking of euro banknotes and their circulation (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 2 March 2016, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Banca d’Italia for an opinion on draft amendments to a Banca d’Italia act laying down secondary provisions on the authenticity and fitness checking of euro banknotes and their circulation (hereinafter the ‘draft legislation’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion on the draft legislation is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the first, second and third indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft legislation concerns currency matters, means of payment and the Banca d’Italia. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft secondary legislation

text: 1.1 The draft legislation takes into account certain legislative developments at European and national level , and reflects the experience gained by the Banca d’Italia in relation to the inspection and remote monitoring of cash handlers. More specifically, the draft legislation: (i) further clarifies the procedural and technical requirements applicable to cash handlers, (ii) lays down administrative sanctions and corrective measures for non-compliance with such requirements, and (iii) streamlines procedures on statistical reporting by cash handlers.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 The ECB considers that the draft legislation will improve the procedures regarding the authenticity and fitness checking of euro banknotes and their circulation, thus ensuring continued public confidence in the euro. 2.2 The ECB notes that the draft legislation uses the term ‘damaged banknotes’. So far, the draft legislation only refers to Decision ECB/2010/14 as a regulatory source. However, Decision ECB/2010/14 does not refer to ‘damaged banknotes’. Article 2(11) of Decision ECB/2010/14 defines the term ‘unfit euro banknotes’ and Annex III to the Decision refers to defects with regard to specific features that would cause a euro banknote to be categorised as unfit for circulation. However, another ECB legal act, Decision ECB/2013/10 of the European Central Bank , uses the term ‘damaged banknotes’. The ECB therefore recommends integrating Decision ECB/2013/10 into the list of regulatory sources referred to in the draft legislation.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 20 April 2016.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI