text: 6 The main purpose of the draft law is to transpose Directives

text: and

text: into Bulgarian law, and to bring relevant national legislation in line with these amendments. As a result, the draft law also adapts, through its transitional and final provisions, Articles of the Law on BNB related to the competences of BNB’s Governing Council . The need for such an adaptation evolves from the exclusion of electronic money institutions from the scope of the credit institution definition under

text: Published in Darjaven vestnik No 23, 27.3.2009. 2 Published in Darjaven vestnik No 46, 10.6.1997. 3 These include the Law on credit institutions, published in Darjaven vestnik No 59, 21.7.2006. 4 OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 5 Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 amending Directive

text: on settlement finality in payment and securities settlement systems and Directive

text: on financial collateral arrangements as regards linked systems and credit claims (OJ L 146, 10.6.2009, p. 37). 6 Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 on the taking up, pursuit and prudential supervision of the business of electronic money institutions amending Directives

text: and

text: and repealing Directive

text: (OJ L 267, 10.10.2009, p. 7). 7 See § 3. of the Transitional and Final Provisions of the draft law.

text: See

text: Article 20(1) of Directive 2009/110/EC

text: amending

text: Article 4(1) of Directive 2006/48/EC

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions (recast) (OJ L 177, 30.6.2006, p. 1). 9 § 4. of the Transitional and Final Provisions of the draft law provides for changes of

text: Article 1(2)

text: and Article 2(1) of the Law on credit institutions to align the definition for credit institution thereof to the amended definition pursuant to

text: Article 4(1) of Directive 2006/48/EC

text: . 10 See proposed Article 16(15) of the Law on the BNB. The draft law, however, subjects electronic money institutions to the licensing procedure and terms for payment institutions under the Law on payment services and payment systems. 11 See proposed Article 16(16) of the Law on the BNB.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 3 August 2010 on certain competences of the Governing Council of Българска народна банка (Bulgarian National Bank) (CON/2010/61)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 3 August 2010 on certain competences of the Governing Council of Българска народна банка (Bulgarian National Bank) (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 7 July 2010 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Governor of Българска народна банка (Bulgarian National Bank) (BNB) for an opinion on a draft law amending the Law on payment services and payment systems , the Law on the Bulgarian National Bank (hereinafter the ‘Law 2 3 on BNB’) and other national legal acts (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to BNB. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: Directive

text: and from the subsequent implementation of Directive

text: into national law . Therefore, the draft law adjusts the competences of BNB’s Governing Council in relation to the legal regime under which it grants, refuses or revokes licenses for electronic money institutions. Under the draft law, the license procedure and terms under the Law on credit institutions no longer apply to electronic money institutions . In addition, since electronic money institutions are no longer defined as credit institutions, the draft law removes them from the list of types of credit institutions that BNB’s Governing Council may place under special supervision as a remedy measure for credit institutions pursuant to the Law on credit institutions .

text: 2. General observation

text: Amendments to the Law on BNB

text: 2.1 The ECB understands the rationale of § 3 of the draft law. While welcoming it, the ECB considers that it would be beneficial for reasons of clarity and legal certainty if proposed Article 16(15) of the Law on BNB lists the full range of institutions for which the BNB’s Governing Council is competent to grant, refuse or revoke licenses, including for example payment institutions and financial institutions, which are subject to a licensing regime. 2.2 The ECB also notes that the deletion of the words ‘electronic money institutions’ in Article16(16) of the Law on BNB may be a source of uncertainty in relation to identifying the relevant BNB body competent to exercise supervision of electronic money institutions and more generally of payment services providers. This body should be clearly designated in the Law on BNB as is the case for the supervision of the banking system pursuant to Article 20(3) of the Law on BNB. 2.3 Furthermore, it is advisable to adapt the terminology of the Law on BNB to the new definition for credit institutions by replacing, where relevant, the term ‘bank’ with the term ‘credit institution’.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 3 August 2010. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: Draft law T/581 on the adoption and amendment of certain economic and financial legal acts, submitted to the Parliament by the Minister for the National Economy on 2 July 2010.

text: Articles 81

text: to 83/A, 95 to 96, 115 to 129, 131, 137 to 138 and 141 to 143 have been submitted to the ECB.

text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: ECB Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: 361/2009. (XII. 30.) Korm. rendelet. a körültekintő lakossági hitelezés feltételeiről és a hitelképesség vizsgálatáról.

text: See

text: Case C-464/98

text: , Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Stefan and Republik Österreich [2001] ECR I-173.

publisher: Europeiska centralbanken

sprak: en

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 4 August 2010 on amendments to various laws regarding the reduction of financial imbalances (CON/2010/62)

serie: con

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 4 August 2010 on amendments to various laws regarding the reduction of financial imbalances (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

type: rubrik

text: On 5 July 2010, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Hungarian Ministry of the National Economy for an opinion on a draft law amending certain financial legal acts (hereinafter the ‘draft law’) . The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the sixth indent of

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to rules applicable to financial institutions in so far as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

type: stycke

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: On 8 June 2010, Hungary’s Prime Minister announced an action plan containing 29 measures to establish a balanced budget and to stimulate economic growth. The provisions submitted to the ECB for consultation aim to implement several of these measures, including introducing restrictions on foreign currency mortgages and earning limits for certain organisations in the public sector; imposing a special tax on financial institutions; providing for the repayment of State subsidies on housing saving plans under certain conditions; introducing certain organisational changes at the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority and introducing certain amendments to the Law on strengthening stability of the financial intermediation system.

text: 2. General observations

text: The appropriate time to consult the ECB

text: 2.1 The consulting authority submitted the relevant Articles of the draft law to the ECB on 5 July 2010, requesting the ECB’s opinion as soon as possible. The consulting authority did not set the ECB any specific time limit for the submission of its opinion nor provide justified reasons for the urgency. The ECB interprets the request in accordance with

text: Article 3(1) of Decision 98/415/EC

text: allowing the ECB at least one month for the submission of its opinion. According to information received by the ECB, the Parliament expects to adopt the draft law before the extraordinary summer session of the parliamentary legislative process ends. According to the information available on the website of the Hungarian Parliament, the provisions of the draft law sent for consultation have already been adopted with several substantive amendments on 22 July 2010 before the ECB could adopt its opinion. 2.2 Recalling its relevant comments in its previous opinion on a related issue in Hungary , the ECB emphasises that the consultation should have taken place at a point in the legislative process which would have afforded the ECB sufficient time to examine the draft legislative provisions and to adopt its opinion in all required language versions, and which also would have enabled the relevant national authorities to take the ECB’s opinion into consideration before the provisions were adopted. According to

text: Article 3(4) of Decision 98/415/EC

text: , Hungary should have suspended the adoption process for the draft law, pending receipt of the ECB’s opinion. 2.3 Furthermore, the opportunity to issue an opinion on a draft law within its competence allows the ECB to express its views on the substance of the proposed legislation, including considerations such as the importance that the ECB may attach to a particular legislative proposal and its potential impact on the European System of Central Banks. Therefore, the ECB reiterates its position that even cases of particular urgency do not relieve national authorities from their duty to consult the ECB and to allow sufficient time to take into account its views in accordance with Decision

text: . Any substantive amendments to the draft law – as in the case of the provisions subject to this consultation – have to be submitted to the ECB to allow it to issue its opinion based on the most recent text. The ECB’s comments on the consulted provisions do not eliminate the breach of the obligation to consult the ECB. Even though the provisions have already been enacted, the ECB considers that its comments are important for the application and interpretation of the enacted law and any future amendments. The ECB also emphasises that it expects the Ministry for the National Economy to give due consideration to honouring its obligation to consult the ECB in accordance with Decision

text: Legislation subject to consultation

text: 2.4 Although the draft law amends several legal acts, this opinion only covers the provisions of the draft law that the consulting authority has submitted for consultation. ECB Opinion

text: has already addressed

text: Article 95

text: . The ECB also advises that this opinion is without prejudice to any other ECB opinions concerning any other legal acts possibly affected by the draft law and falling under the ECB’s competence. The ECB expects to be consulted on all such matters.

text: 3. Financial stability

text: Restrictions on foreign currency mortgages

text: 3.1 Articles 81 and 82 of the draft law amending respectively the Hungarian Civil Code and the Law on the Land Register with future effect prohibit entering into or claiming a right as a result of foreign currency mortgages contracted by individuals in the Land Register.

text: Article 82(2)

text: introduces the possibility of a collateral swap or refinancing operations in case of all such mortgages entered into the Land Register before the draft law enters into force. Under Article 262 of the Civil Code real property may be pledged as security only in the form of a mortgage, and a mortgage is valid only if contracted in writing and recorded in the Land Register. Therefore, the practical consequence of Articles 81 and 82 of the draft law is that after the draft law enters into force, claiming a new right as the result of mortgages contracted by individuals in a foreign currency is no longer possible since it cannot serve as adequate security because its entry in the Land Register will be prohibited. 3.1.1 The ECB notes that high levels of foreign currency loans to unhedged borrowers are an important vulnerability in Hungary, as they convert direct exchange rate exposure of the banking system into credit risk and expose the economy to significant macro-financial risks. Furthermore, a high level of foreign currency debt may restrict the room for monetary policy manoeuvre and its effectiveness. Given these negative side effects associated with foreign currency lending, it is important for policymakers to take measures to avoid its excessive build-up in the banking system. 3.1.2 To contain foreign currency lending, policymakers are strongly encouraged to create an overall environment for economic agents which encourages prudent and well-informed decision making. This involves the pursuit of sound and stability-oriented macroeconomic policies and policies to strengthen financial literacy and appropriate financial regulation and supervision. If this proves insufficient, additional policies to prevent an excessive build-up of foreign currency debt, such as moral suasion and administrative measures, could be considered. 3.1.3 Against this background the ECB welcomes the general objective of the Hungarian authorities of limiting the building up of further macro-financial imbalances and takes note of the recent changes in Hungary’s regulation of foreign currency lending. In particular, Government Decree 361/2009 has already tightened credit standards substantially by defining relative lending limits and maximum loan-to-value ratios and by introducing additional stricter criteria for foreign currency mortgages, depending on the currency of denomination. The efficient implementation and thorough

text: assessment of the measures laid down by Government Decree 361/2009, as well as the improvement in banks’ risk management practices, should be emphasised. More generally, there is a need to ensure that strict and prudent regulatory and administrative measures are in place for lending to unhedged domestic borrowers in a foreign currency. In addition, banks should always hold sufficient capital to reflect the specific risks associated with foreign currency lending, in particular as regards the transformation of exchange rate risk into credit risk. 3.1.4 If the proposed complete ban on individuals taking foreign currency mortgages in Articles 81 and 82 of the draft law has a cross-border effect, it may raise issues of compliance with Article 63 of the Treaty on free movement of capital and payments . The ECB appreciates that the free movement of capital and payments is without prejudice to, inter alia, ‘measures which are justified on grounds of public policy or public security’, as laid down in

text: Article 65(1)

text: (b) of the Treaty. As in the case of exceptions based on the principle of general good, the exemption in

text: Article 65(1)

text: (b) of the Treaty is narrowly interpreted by the Court of Justice of the European Union, with the implication that any such measure would, for example, need to meet the proportionality test. Under this test, restrictions are justified only if no less restrictive measure would suffice to reach the desired end. The final assessment of whether the complete ban on individuals taking foreign currency mortgages is in breach of the free movement of capital and payments is entrusted to the Union institutions ensuring the application and observance of the Treaties.

text: Special tax imposed on financial institutions

text: Articles 115

text: to 120 of the draft law amending the Law on a special tax and contribution to balance the State budget impose a special tax on financial institutions. According to

text: Article 116

text: , financial institutions whose annual report closed on 1 July 2010 will be subject to a special tax in 2010. The rate will depend on the form of the financial institution. 3.2.1 The ECB notes that the feasibility of a tax on financial institutions should be considered in relation to the objectives of covering the public cost arising from their failure and of addressing the risks posed by them. The proceeds raised by the tax should preferably accrue to the deposit guarantee schemes or to resolution funds set up ex-ante that would need to be supported by a robust resolution framework. Furthermore, the proceeds from a bank tax should be ring-fenced to avoid their use for general fiscal consolidation purposes. In this context, the draft law raises the following concerns. 3.2.2 First, using the proceeds for general budget purposes is not desirable as it does not serve the general objective of enhancing financial stability. In particular, given the magnitude of the proposed measure, the marked deterioration of the financial sector’s capital accumulation ability may weaken its solvency position, thereby making the financial system more vulnerable to potential further shocks.

text: Second, the tax may hamper the provision of bank credit to the non-financial private sector and result in extra charges to customers. In particular, banks which aim to partly offset the unexpected taxes may increase their margins, thus making credit to households and enterprises more expensive. This, in turn, would lead to even weaker domestic demand growth, thereby delaying recovery of the Hungarian economy. Third, as a response to the substantial increase in the tax burden, some banks and other financial institutions may cut back their activities in Hungary, thus further limiting the availability of financing. Finally, such ad hoc taxing of an industry may create uncertainty for business and thus have a detrimental impact on long term growth. Given these concerns, the ECB strongly recommends a comprehensive impact assessment of the proposed measure. 3.2.3

text: Article 118(7)

text: stipulates only the total amount of levy to be paid by the financial sector in 2011 without specifying the details of the tax. In addition,

text: Article 118(8)

text: does not specify the total amount of tax to be imposed on the financial sector in 2012. These measures will be laid down in a separate law, which creates additional uncertainty. For the sake of legal clarity and the predictability of the business environment, the ECB would welcome defining the actual tax measures for 2011 and 2012 in the draft law.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 4 August 2010.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET

type: vagledning

utgivare: ecb


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: ECB Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are available on the ECB’s website at www.europa.eu.

text: See on its content footnote 3 in Opinion

text: This structure is mirrored in the draft regulation on insurance companies.

text: The explanatory memorandum to the draft regulation on institutions assumes that the Financial Stability Board (FSB) Implementation Standards are ambiguous on this point; therefore the possibility cannot be ruled out that the FSB may, in future, clarify that at least 50% of the variable remuneration is to be paid entirely in the form of shares or instruments similar to shares. In this case, it will be necessary to amend the Regulation accordingly.

text: Principles for Sound Compensation Practices of 2 April 2009; Principles for Sound Compensation Practices - Implementation Standards of 25 September 2009. See also

text: Commission Recommendation 2009/384/EC of 30 April 2009

text: on remuneration policies in the financial services sector (OJ L 120, 15.5.2009, p. 22). 7 Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 relating to the taking up and pursuit of business of credit institutions, (OJ L 177. 30.6.2006, p. 1).

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 5 August 2010 on implementing rules regarding compensation systems at institutions and insurance companies (CON/2010/63)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 5 August 2010 on implementing rules regarding compensation systems at institutions and insurance companies (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 5 July 2010 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the German Federal Ministry of Finance for an opinion on the draft regulation on the prudential supervision requirements for the remuneration systems at institutions (hereinafter the ‘draft regulation on institutions’) and the draft regulation on the prudential supervision requirements for the remuneration systems at insurance companies (hereinafter the ‘draft regulation on insurance companies’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the sixth indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft regulation on institutions relates to rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft regulations

text: 1.1 The draft regulations aim at implementing the Law on the prudential supervision requirements for the compensation systems at institutions and insurance companies, which had been subject to ECB Opinion

text: . The draft regulations are the implementing legislation mentioned in paragraphs 1.2 and 2.3 of that opinion. With regard to their legislative background, reference is made to Section 1 of Opinion

text: . In substance, the draft regulation on institutions largely corresponds to Circular 22/2009 (BA) of the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) , which will be repealed on entry into force of the draft regulation on institutions. 1.2 The draft regulation on institutions distinguishes between (1) requirements that apply to all institutions and the remuneration systems for all their managers and staff; and (2) more demanding special requirements that are only relevant to major institutions and the remuneration systems for

text: their managers and certain members of their staff . According to the draft, an institution is regarded as major if its balance sheet total, on average, has equalled or exceeded EUR 10 billion on the relevant key dates of the last three financial years and the institution determines, based on a risk analysis, that it is major. The BaFin monitors the implementation of proper risk analysis and compliance with the special requirements. Institutions whose balance sheet total, on average, has equalled or exceeded EUR 40 billion on the relevant key dates will generally be regarded as major. This assumption should serve as guidance for the institutions and may be refuted within the context of the risk analysis. Institutions whose balance sheet total has amounted to less than EUR 10 billion on the relevant key dates are deemed not to be major. 1.3 Remuneration systems are deemed to be appropriate if they avoid paying incentives to the managers or staff for accepting disproportionately high risks and if they do not contravene the controlling units’ monitoring function. Incentives to accept disproportionately high risks may arise, in particular, through a significant dependence of managers and staff on variable remuneration. At least once a year, the managers must inform the administrative or supervisory body of the design of the company’s remuneration systems, so that this body may form its own opinion on their appropriateness. 1.4 The requirements are imposed only on major institutions to reflect the principle of proportionality. Major institutions must determine by means of a risk analysis whether they have staff who are able to create high risk positions. According to the draft, guaranteed variable remuneration is generally not consistent with appropriate risk management and the principle of performance-based remuneration. Consequently, guaranteed variable remuneration of managers and staff who can create high risk positions is only permitted in the context of a new working relationship, and at most for one year. 1.5 Besides the overall success of the institution and the profit contribution by the organisational unit, the individual profit contribution will also be taken into account for the variable remuneration of managers and staff who can create high risk positions, insofar as this is determinable with reasonable effort. At least 40% of the variable remuneration is to be deferred for at least three years and to be paid out pro rata temporis. One half of the variable remuneration to be deferred must depend on the sustainable development of the institution . If the performance of a member of staff or of an organisational unit and/or the overall success of the institution does not meet the specified target, or should previous positive profit contributions turn out not to be sustainable, this must result in the variable remuneration, including the amounts deferred, being reduced or cancelled. The risk orientation of the remuneration may not be restricted or equalised by coverage measures or other countermeasures by the managers or staff concerned. A remuneration committee will monitor the appropriateness of the remuneration systems. According to the explanatory

text: memorandum to the draft regulation on institutions, the members of the committee must hold a managerial position within their respective organisational units.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 The ECB welcomes the draft regulations as part of a legislative framework aiming at implementing, within the financial services sector, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) principles and standards endorsed by the G20 leaders and intended to enhance the stability and robustness of the financial system . The ECB supports also the relatively broad scope of application of this legislation, which covers not only credit institutions and investment firms, but also insurance companies, encompassing therefore the bulk of the regulated financial services sector. 2.2 In its opinion on the law on the prudential supervision requirements for compensation systems at institutions and insurance companies, the ECB emphasised the importance of fully aligning requirements relating to compensation policies and practices with the international standards on compensation, and with the envisaged revision of Directive

text: , introducing provisions aimed at ending practices that lead to excessive risk taking. The ECB is of the view that such consistency is essential to ensure the efficiency of the measures taken by Member States to avoid regulatory arbitrage across major financial centres and therefore contribute to the limitation of excessive risk-taking behaviours at the European and global level. In this respect, and as far as credit institutions and investment firms are concerned, the German authorities should ensure an appropriate degree of coherence of their legislative framework with the Union legislation under finalisation, which the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) may specify further by elaborating guidelines on sound remuneration policies in the banking sector.

text: 3. Specific observations

text: 3.1 Proportionality principle The ECB takes note of the approach to proportionality adopted by the draft regulation on institutions. In this respect, the ECB is of the view that the special requirements for major institutions should, at least, target all systemically relevant institutions, and that the draft regulation should define this by the size of these institutions, and also by factors such as their interconnectedness or substitutability. Furthermore, and with a view to ensuring a consistent application of the Union legislative framework for the supervisory review of remuneration policies, the ECB stresses the importance for the German authorities of updating their approach to proportionality, if need be, in light notably of the future CEBS guidelines on sound remuneration policies, should these guidelines address proportionality. Overall, the ECB considers of paramount

text: importance that national jurisdictions maintain a consistent treatment across institutions in the application of the international framework as reflected by the Union legislative provisions on compensation systems at institutions. 3.2 Aligning the draft implementing legislation with the international framework 3.2.1 To ensure that the institutions’ remuneration policies and schemes are designed in a way that avoids and reduces excessive risk-taking behaviour, the ECB suggests that inconsistencies with the international framework, reflected by the Union legislative provisions currently under finalisation, should be addressed in a timely manner by the German authorities. In this regard, the ECB has identified three key areas for possible improvement. 3.2.2 First, with respect to governance of the remuneration policies, the ECB considers that the general requirements need to be enhanced to ensure effective oversight of the remuneration policies and schemes of the institutions by the administrative or supervisory board, in line with the FSB principles on effective governance of compensation. In the same vein, the requirements relating to the establishment of remuneration committees in major institutions should be strengthened in line with FSB implementation standard 1 and the Union legislation under finalisation. 3.2.3 Second, in the framework of the remuneration systems for major institutions, the provisions on the guaranteed variable remuneration need to be clarified to ensure that guaranteed variable remuneration only occurs in the context of hiring new staff, as highlighted by FSB implementation standard 11. 3.2.4 Third, the legislative requirements in Section 5(5) should be amended with a view to ensuring that at least 50% of any variable remuneration consists of shares or share-linked instruments (or, where appropriate, other non-cash instruments), as long as these instruments create incentives aligned with long term value creation and the time horizon of risk, as highlighted by FSB principle 8 and the Union legislative provisions under finalisation.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 5 August 2010.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: Consolidated text: Dziennik Ustaw (Dz. U.) of 4 June 2009 No 84, item 711.

text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: Participation in the deposit-guarantee scheme operated by the Fund is mandatory for all banks established in Poland, including cooperative banks, but not for the Polish version of credit unions operating on the basis of the Law of 14 December 1995 on cooperative savings and loan associations (Dz. U. of 4 January 1996 No 1, Item 2). Branches of non-EU banks must, and branches of EU credit institutions may, be covered by the scheme to the extent that their home country schemes do not ensure deposit guarantees at the level established in Polish law (Articles

text: and

text: b of the Law on the Bank Guarantee Fund).

text: OJ L 68, 13.3.2009, p. 3.

text: Consolidated text: Dz.U. of 1 April 2005 No 1, item 2.

text: See amendments introduced in

text: Articles 7(2)

text: (4) and 15(6) of the Law on the Bank Guarantee Fund by

text: Article 1(4)

text: and Article 1(5) of the draft law. 7 See

text: Article 16

text: a(5) of the Law on the Bank Guarantee Fund, introduced by Article 1(6) of the draft law, which replaces the rules contained in the present Article 34 of the Law on the Bank Guarantee Fund, as repealed by Article 1(15) of the draft law. 8 See Opinions

text: and

text: . All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 9 See

text: Article 1(1)

text: (b)(ii) of

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 of 13 December 1993

text: specifying definitions for the application of the prohibitions referred to in Articles

text: and

text: b(1) of the Treaty (OJ L 332, 31.12.1993, p. 1). 10 See the ECB’s Convergence Report December 2006, p. 30; the ECB’s Convergence Report May 2008, p. 24; paragraphs 11 to 14 of Opinion

text: ; paragraphs 11 to 13 of Opinion

text: ; paragraphs 2.1 to 2.3 of Opinion

text: ; paragraphs 2.2 to 2.8 of Opinion

text: ; paragraphs 2.2 to 2.4 of Opinion

text: ; paragraph 3.2 of Opinion

text: ; paragraph 3.1 of Opinion

text: ; and paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: . 11 See the ECB’s Convergence Report May 2010, p. 25.

text: See footnote 8. 13 See ECB’s Convergence Report December 2006, p. 229; the ECB’s Convergence Report May 2008, p. 244; and the ECB’s Convergence Report May 2010, p. 255. 14 See paragraph 2.5 of Opinion

text: . 15 See paragraph 2.6 of Opinion

text: See Article 38(3) of the Law on the Bank Guarantee Fund. 17 See Article 38(1) of the Law on the Bank Guarantee Fund. 18 See

text: Article 38

text: (3a) of the Law on the Bank Guarantee Fund, introduced by Article 1(17) of the draft law, which transposes the amendment introduced in

text: Article 10(1) of Directive 94/19/EC

text: by

text: Article 1(6) of Directive 2009/14/EC

text: . 19 See Article 38(4) of the Law on the Bank Guarantee Fund. 20 See

text: Article 38

text: a(2) of the Law on the Bank Guarantee Fund. The Fund may share the possessed information, subject to reciprocity and confidentiality safeguards, with counterparty deposit-guarantee schemes in the European Economic Area (see

text: Article 38

text: c in connection with

text: Article 2

text: b(2) of the Law on the Bank Guarantee Fund). 21 See paragraph 3.3 of Opinion

text: . 22 See

text: Article 3

text: (6a) of the Law on NBP. 23 Entering into such an agreement is based on Article 38(5) of the Law on the Bank Guarantee Fund. 24 See in particular Article 55 of the Law on NBP and Article 16 of the Law on supervision of the financial market (Dz. U. of 4 September 2006 No 157, item 1119); cf. paragraph 15 of the Annex to the Regulation of the Council of Ministers of

text: September 2009 on the adoption of the Statute of the Bank Guarantee Fund (Dz.U. of 5 October 2009 No 164, Item 1308), establishing confidentiality obligations in relation to members of the Fund’s Council.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 6 August 2010 on amendments to the legal framework for the deposit-guarantee scheme (CON/2010/64)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 6 August 2010 on amendments to the legal framework for the deposit-guarantee scheme (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 8 July 2010 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Polish Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft law (hereinafter the ‘draft law’) amending the Law of 14 December 1994 on the Bank Guarantee Fund (hereinafter the ‘Law on the Bank Guarantee Fund’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third and sixth indents of

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to Narodowy Bank Polski (NBP) and to the rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The draft law amends the legal framework for the operation of the national deposit-guarantee scheme operated by the Bank Guarantee Fund (hereinafter the ‘Fund’) . The purpose of the amendment includes, but is not limited to, the transposition of Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2009 amending Directive

text: on deposit-guarantee schemes as regards the coverage level and the payout delay into the Polish legal system by amending, inter alia, the Law on the Bank Guarantee Fund and the Law on Narodowy Bank Polski of 29 August 1997 (hereinafter the ‘Law on NBP’). In line with

text: Article 1(2)

text: of

text: Decision

text: , this opinion does not concern provisions of the draft law that have the transposition of the Directive

text: into national law as their exclusive purpose. 1.2 The draft law amends the provisions of the Law on the Bank Guarantee Fund and of the Law on NBP that relate to the financing sources of the Fund and to the extension of short-term credit to the Fund by NBP. In this respect, the draft law: (a) clarifies the procedure and order of priority according to which the various financing sources, including short-term credit from NBP, are drawn on by the Fund ; and (b) expands the criteria under which short-term credit is granted by NBP, to include a requirement that any such credit should cover urgent needs of the Fund . 1.3 The ECB has already been consulted on several amendments to the Law on the Bank Guarantee Fund which introduced extensive adjustments to the method of financing, governance and supervision of the Fund .

text: 2. Compliance with the monetary financing prohibition

text: 2.1 Funding arrangements for national deposit-guarantee schemes must comply with the monetary financing prohibition under Article 123 of the Treaty. This provision prohibits, inter alia, the granting by the national central banks (NCBs) of overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facility to the public sector, including a facility in the form of financing public sector obligations vis-à-vis third parties . Compliance with the monetary financing prohibition requires that the shortterm transfers from an NCB to a national deposit-guarantee scheme may only be performed subject to strict criteria . As most recently expressed in the ECB’s Convergence Report of May 2010 ‘the costs of financing deposit guarantee schemes and investor compensation schemes must be borne, respectively, by credit institutions and investment firms themselves. National legislation which provides for the financing by an NCB of a national deposit insurance scheme for credit institutions or a national investor compensation scheme for investment firms would be compatible with the monetary financing prohibition only if it were short term, addressed urgent situations, systemic stability aspects were at stake, and decisions were at the NCB’s discretion’ .

text: 2.2 In this regard, the ECB notes that the proposed

text: Article 16

text: a(5) of the Law on the Bank Guarantee Fund sets out that ‘After exhausting the resources referred to in [other sections of the Law on the Bank Guarantee Fund] and occurrence of a threat to the financial stability, with a view to covering urgent needs of the Fund, Narodowy Bank Polski may, at the request of the Fund’s Management Board, grant the Fund the short-time credit as referred to in

text: Article 15(6)

text: [of the Law on the Bank Guarantee Fund], provided that adequate collateral is ensured’. The ECB welcomes these amendments as they had been specifically recommended to the Polish authorities in previous ECB 12 13 opinions and convergence reports . The ECB also welcomes the maintenance of the reference to the provision of adequate collateral by the Fund as an additional requirement for granting shortterm credit by NBP, as also previously suggested by the ECB . 2.3 Furthermore, the ECB recommends introducing a legislative correction in proposed

text: Article 16

text: a of the Law on the Bank Guarantee Fund. Under the currently proposed wording, the reference to short-term credit from NBP appears in two separate sections of this Article. The first reference is in section four where NBP’s short-term credit is indirectly indicated as one of the ‘other sources referred to in

text: Article 15

text: ’, which are to be activated after the resources referred to in the three preceding paragraphs have been exhausted. The second reference is in section five where NBP’s short-term credit is identified as a source of financing to be activated after the resources referred to in the first four paragraphs of

text: Article 16

text: a have been exhausted. This dual reference might result in an incorrect interpretation of the proposed provisions following which NBP’s short-term credit may be used before all other financing sources have been exhausted. The ECB recommends that the final version of the draft law clarify these provisions, for example by explicitly excluding NBP short-term credit from the cross-reference to

text: Article 15

text: contained in section four of

text: Article 16

text: a, with a view to ensuring that NBP’s short-term credit unambiguously remains the ‘last-resort’ source of financing of the Fund , only granted in compliance with the strict criteria specified in the ECB’s convergence reports. 2.4 As the result of a further amendment introduced by the draft law, Article 43 of the Law on NBP will include a reference to the proposed

text: Article 16

text: a(5) of the Law on the Bank Guarantee Fund. The ECB understands that under the amended provisions NBP will retain full discretion in assessing if the statutory criteria for granting short-term credit to the Fund are met, and, if this is the case, whether to grant such credit. It is indeed essential for compliance with the monetary financing prohibition that the legal framework ensures that NBP is able to make its decision at its own discretion and in an independent manner.

text: 3. Exchange of information between NBP and the Fund

text: 3.1 The draft law broadens the sources of information that the Fund may use in assessing the financial soundness of the credit institutions benefiting from the Fund’s coverage. Under the amended Law on the Bank Guarantee Fund: (a) NBP and the Financial Supervision Commission are required to inform the Fund about the financial status of the credit institutions, including actions undertaken in the case where a balance sheet loss or a solvency threat arises ; and (b) the Financial Supervision Commission is required to inform the Fund about: (i) facts relevant to the assessment of the proposed plans for the use of the Fund’s financial assistance ; and (ii) circumstances that may lead to the activation of the Fund’s payout guarantees . The Fund has the right to request further information relevant to its tasks from NBP, the Financial Supervision Commission and other enumerated public authorities . At the same time, the Law on the Bank Guarantee Fund does not include any legal basis for the Fund to provide information that it has collected to other authorities, such as NBP . 3.2 In a previous opinion, the ECB recommended that ‘it is important to maintain channels for timely central bank access to information concerning financial market participants, relating in particular to crisis situations. Such access to prudential information, as possessed, inter alia, by the Fund, will allow NBP to properly perform its financial stability role’ . The ECB recommends that the draft law introduces an explicit legal basis for an agreement allowing for the sharing with NBP of information in the Fund’s possession that is relevant to financial stability and that is needed by NBP to: (a) fulfil its own financial stability mandate ; and/or (b) determine whether granting shortterm credit to the Fund is appropriate in view of the ‘occurrence of a threat to the financial stability’ under proposed

text: Article 16

text: a(5) of the Law on the Bank Guarantee Fund. 3.3 Moreover, the ECB understands that any information sharing arrangements involving the Fund and NBP will be subject to confidentiality safeguards laid down in the agreement entered into between NBP and the Fund . In this context, the internal confidentiality standards applicable within the Fund under Article 38(10) of the Law on the Bank Guarantee Fund should be strengthened so as to incorporate confidentiality obligations applicable specifically to the members of the Fund’s staff and governing bodies, similar to those set out in other sectoral legislation .

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 6 August 2010. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: EUT C 291, 1.12.2009, s. 1.

text: P7_TA-PROV (2010) 0274.

text: Enligt definitionen i

text: artikel 22.4 i direktiv 85/611/EEG av den 20 december 1985

text: om samordning av lagar och andra författningar som avser företag för kollektiva investeringar i överlåtbara värdepapper (fondföretag) (UCITS) (EGT L 375, 31.12.1985, s. 3).

text: Se punkt 68.3 i bilaga VI till

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 2006/48/EG av den 14 juni 2006

text: om rätten att starta och driva verksamhet i kreditinstitut (omarbetning) (EUT L 177, 30.6.2006, s. 1).

text: EGT L 310, 11.12.2000, s. 1.

text: Text markerad med fet stil anger ECB:s förslag till ny text. Genomstruken text anger de strykningar som ECB föreslår.

sprak: sv

title: Europeiska centralbankens yttrande av den 6 augusti 2010 om ett förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv om ändring av direktiv 2006/48/EG och 2006/49/EG i fråga om kapitalkrav för handelslager och omvärdepapperisering samt samlad tillsynsbedömning av ersättningspolitik (CON/2010/65)

text: Inledning och rättslig grund

text: Den 12 november 2009 avgav Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) yttrande

text: om förslaget till Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv om ändring av direktiv

text: och

text: i fråga om kapitalkrav för handelslager och omvärdepapperisering samt samlad tillsynsbedömning av ersättningspolitik (nedan kallat direktivförslaget). Den 7 juli 2010 antog Europaparlamentet det direktivförslag som nu är föremål för formellt antagande av Europeiska unionens råd. Detta yttrande grundar sig på den version av direktivförslaget som har antagits av Europaparlamentet.

text: ECB:s behörighet att avge ett yttrande grundas på

text: artikel 127.4

text: sista stycket i fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt, där det fastställs att ECB får avge yttranden inom sitt behörighetsområde till bl.a. unionens behöriga institutioner. Direktivförslaget innehåller i detta avseende bestämmelser som berör Europeiska centralbankssystemets (ECBS) uppgift att utforma och genomföra unionens monetära politik enligt

text: artikel 127.2

text: första strecksatsen i fördraget samt att bidra till ett smidigt genomförande av politiken för det finansiella systemets stabilitet enligt artikel 127.5 i fördraget. I enlighet med

text: artikel 17.5

text: första meningen i arbetsordningen för Europeiska centralbanken har detta yttrande antagits av ECB-rådet.

text: 1. Allmänna kommentarer

text: 1.1 ECB uttrycker sin oro över att undantaget för exponeringar i form av täckta obligationer, med säkerhet som ställs i form av lån mot säkerhet i bostadsfastigheter och kommersiella fastigheter, ska förlängas enligt punkt 2 c ii) i bilaga I till direktivförslaget. Förlängningen av undantaget från den 31 december 2010 till den 31 december 2013 innebär att det blir tillåtet att i säkerhetspoolen med täckta obligationer obegränsat använda bättre rangordnade andelar utfärdade av organ för värdepapperisering som värdepapperiserar exponeringar i bostadsfastigheter och kommersiella fastigheter. I den antagna texten har även hänvisningen till den mest fördelaktiga kreditkvalitet som krävs för dessa andelar tagits bort.

text: 1.2 Direktivförslaget påverkar därmed täckta obligationer enligt UCITS-direktivet samt värdepapper med bakomliggande tillgångar som är godtagbara för Eurosystemets kredittransaktioner i enlighet med riktlinje ECB/2000/7 av den 31 augusti 2000 om Eurosystemets penningpolitiska instrument och förfaranden. Sett ur ett riskhanteringsperspektiv föreskriver Eurosystemets ram för säkerheter i detta avseende en striktare behandling, dvs. högre värderingsavdrag och ratingkrav, av värdepapper med bakomliggande tillgångar än av täckta obligationer enligt UCITS-direktivet. En möjlig konsekvens av direktivförslaget skulle kunna vara att det ger starka incitament för penningpolitiska motparter att lägga in sina värdepapper med bakomliggande tillgångar i säkerhetspoolen med sådana täckta obligationer för att därigenom få en fördelaktigare behandling, vilket skadar Eurosystemets riskexponering.

text: 1.3 Samtidigt, och utan att det påverkar ECB:s välkomnande inställning till lagstiftningsåtgärder som innebär att lagstiftningen i mindre grad stöder sig på externa kreditvärderingar, har ECB vissa betänkligheter mot borttagandet av hänvisningen till den mest fördelaktiga kreditkvalitet som krävs för dessa andelar, eftersom detta ytterligare skulle kunna undergräva trovärdigheten och öppenheten för marknaden för täckta obligationer och i slutänden få konsekvenser för den finansiella stabiliteten.

text: 1.4 Generellt sett bör målet för lagstiftarna inom en snar framtid vara att avlägsna detta undantag och utarbeta en strikt uppsättning kriterier för tillgångar som ska ingå i säkerhetspoolen för täckta obligationer, som i) inte grundar sig på externa kreditvärderingar och ii) är tillräckligt stark för att säkerställa marknadens förtroende för täckta obligationer, och samtidigt ge de finansiella instituten tillräckligt med tid för att anpassa sina olika affärsmodeller. Att sänka gränsen för det nominella beloppet av de utestående emissionerna från 20 till 10 procent enligt punkt 2 c i och ii) i bilaga I till direktivförslaget kan ses som ett positivt steg i den riktningen.

text: 2. Ändringsförslag

text: I de fall där ECB rekommenderar att direktivförslaget ändras anges de specifika förslagen i bilagan åtföljt av en förklaring.

text: Utfärdad i Frankfurt am Main den 6 augusti 2010.

text: Jean-Claude Trichet

text: ECB:s ordförande

text: BILAGA

text: Europaparlamentets förslag | ECB:s ändringsförslag

text: (ii) Det tredje stycket ska ersättas med följande: Fram till den 31 december 2013 ska tioprocentsgränsen för bättre rangordnade andelar utfärdade av franska Fonds Communs de Créances eller av likvärdiga organ för värdepapperisering som anges i punkterna d och e inte vara tillämplig, förutsatt att i) de värdepapperiserade exponeringarna i bostadsfastigheter eller kommersiella fastigheter har sitt ursprung hos samma konsoliderade grupp där emittenten av de täckta obligationerna ingår eller hos en enhet som är underställd samma centrala organ som emittenten av de täckta obligationerna är underställd (huruvida emittenten ingår i gruppen eller är underställd organet ska fastställas vid den tidpunkt då de bättre rangordnade andelarna blir säkerheter till täckta obligationer), och ii) en enhet som ingår i samma konsoliderade grupp där emittenten av de täckta obligationerna ingår, eller en enhet som är underställd samma centrala organ som emittenten av de täckta obligationerna är underställd, behåller hela den tranch som är i första-förlustläge och som hänför sig till dessa bättre rangordnade andelar. Före utgången av denna period och senast den 31 december 2012 ska kommissionen se över lämpligheten i denna delegering och, om tillämpligt, lämpligheten av att utvidga denna behandling till att omfatta alla andra former av täckta obligationer. Kommissionen får mot bakgrund av denna översyn vid behov anta delegerade akter i enlighet med den befogenhet som avses i

text: artikel 151

text: a, för att förlänga denna period eller göra denna delegering permanent eller utvidga den till att omfatta andra former av täckta obligationer. | ii) Det tredje stycket ska ersättas med följande: Fram till den 31 december 2013 ska tioprocentsgränsen för bättre rangordnade andelar utfärdade av franska Fonds Communs de Créances eller av likvärdiga organ för värdepapperisering som anges i punkterna d och e inte vara tillämplig, förutsatt att i) dessa bättre rangordnade andelar har en kreditvärdering från ett utsett ratinginstitut som är den mest fördelaktiga kategorin av kreditvärdering som detta ratinginstitut har gjort för täckta obligationer, ii) de värdepapperiserade exponeringarna i bostadsfastigheter eller kommersiella fastigheter har sitt ursprung hos samma konsoliderade grupp där emittenten av de täckta obligationerna ingår eller hos en enhet som är underställd samma centrala organ som emittenten av de täckta obligationerna är underställd (huruvida emittenten ingår i gruppen eller är underställd organet ska fastställas vid den tidpunkt då de bättre rangordnade andelarna blir säkerheter till täckta obligationer), och iii) en enhet som ingår i samma konsoliderade grupp där emittenten av de täckta obligationerna ingår, eller en enhet som är underställd samma centrala organ som emittenten av de täckta obligationerna är underställd, behåller hela den tranch som är i första-förlustläge och som hänför sig till dessa bättre rangordnade andelar. Före utgången av denna period och senast den 31 december 2012 ska kommissionen se över lämpligheten i denna delegering och, om tillämpligt, lämpligheten av att utvidga denna behandling till att omfatta alla andra former av täckta obligationer. Kommissionen får mot bakgrund av denna översyn vid behov anta delegerade akter i enlighet med den befogenhet som avses i

text: artikel 151

text: Förklaring Av de skäl som anges i detta yttrande har ECB vissa betänkligheter mot borttagandet av kravet att bättre rangordnade andelar ska ha den mest fördelaktiga kategorin av kreditvärdering som har gjorts av ett utsett ratinginstitut, eftersom detta ytterligare skulle kunna undergräva trovärdigheten och öppenheten för marknaden för täckta obligationer. Mot denna bakgrund rekommenderar ECB att kravet införs igen. Inom en snar framtid bör emellertid målet vara att avlägsna undantaget och utarbeta en strikt uppsättning kriterier för tillgångar som ska ingå i säkerhetspoolen för täckta obligationer som i) inte grundar sig på externa kreditvärderingar och ii) är tillräckligt stark för att säkerställa marknadens förtroende för täckta obligationer. Eventuella hänvisningar till en möjlig förlängning av undantaget (på obestämd tid) bör därför strykas. ECB är medveten om att bättre rangordnade andelar som används som säkerheter enligt punkt 68 i) i bilaga VI ska uppfylla kraven för kreditkvalitetssteg 1. Detta minskar emellertid inte oron för att kravet på att bättre rangordnade andelar ska ha den mest fördelaktiga kategorin av kreditvärdering som har gjorts av ett utsett ratinginstitut har tagits bort. Anledningen till detta är att kravet på kvalitetssteg 1 endast tillämpas för den tioprocentsgräns för det nominella beloppet av de utestående emissionerna som är tillämplig i de fall då undantaget inte har aktiverats. I detta hänseende noteras det att kreditkvalitetssteg 1 till 6 ska fastställas av de behöriga myndigheterna i enlighet med

text: artikel 82 i direktiv 2006/48/EG

text: , vilket innebär en viss skönsmässig bedömning i fråga om kreditkvaliteten. ECB tolkar det emellertid som att begreppet den mest fördelaktiga kategorin av kreditvärdering ska vara mer snävt definierat. I den version av direktivförslaget som har antagits av Europaparlamentet kan undantaget tillämpas med förbehåll för två krav. Det första kravet är att de värdepapperiserade exponeringarna i bostadsfastigheter eller kommersiella fastigheter inte ska ha sitt ursprung utanför den gruppstruktur där emittenten av de täckta obligationerna också ingår. ECB anser att detta krav kan bli svårt att kontrollera i praktiken. Det andra kravet är att de som ingår i samma gruppstruktur ska behålla hela den tranch som är i första-förlustläge och som hänför sig till dessa bättre rangordnade andelar. ECB anser att även om hela den tranch som är i första-förlustläge behålls inom gruppen, kan enheter enkelt kringgå detta krav genom att använda hedgingstrategier. Mot denna bakgrund anser ECB inte att dessa krav i sig utgör tillräckliga skyddsåtgärder, som skulle garantera att dessa tillgångar inkluderas i säkerhetspoolen för täckta obligationer. ECB erkänner emellertid att dessa krav utgör ett visst skydd för obligationsinnehavare, särskilt om de kombineras med ett återinförande av hänvisningen till den mest fördelaktiga kreditvärdering som krävs för bättre rangordnade andelar.


text: Law No 226/2009 on the organisation and functioning of official statistics in Romania, Monitorul Oficial al României No 397 of 11 June 2009.

text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: Regulation (EC) No 223/2009

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2009 on European statistics and repealing Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1101/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the transmission of data subject to statistical confidentiality to the Statistical Office of the European Communities,

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 322/97

text: on Community Statistics, and

text: Council Decision 89/382/EEC

text: , Euratom establishing a Committee on the Statistical Programmes of the European Communities (OJ L 87, 31.3.2009, p. 164 ).

text: All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: See Article 5 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank and

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 2533/98

text: concerning the collection of statistical information by the European Central Bank (OJ L 318, 27.11.1998, p. 8).

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 9 August 2010 on amendments to the legislation on official statistics (CON/2010/66)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 9 August 2010 on amendments to the legislation on official statistics (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 15 July 2010 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Romanian National Institute of Statistics for an opinion on a draft law amending and supplementing Law No 226/2009 on the organisation and functioning of official statistics in Romania (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third and the fourth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to Banca Naţională a României (BNR) and the collection, compilation and distribution of monetary, financial, banking, payment systems and balance of payments statistics. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The draft law supplements Law No 226/2009 on the organisation and functioning of official statistics in Romania with some provisions of

text: Regulation (EC) No 223/2009

text: in order to bring Romanian legislation on official statistics into line with the changes to the European Statistical System framework. 1.2 In particular, the draft law introduces the fundamental principles of official statistics, which are professional independence, impartiality, objectivity, reliability, statistical confidentiality and costeffectiveness. The definitions of these principles are identical to those of the statistical principles in

text: Regulation (EC) No 223/2009

text: 1.3 Furthermore, the draft law extends the composition of the Romanian National Statistical Council, an advisory body, with six new members comprising two representatives from the Presidential administration and four representatives from the Parliament (two representatives from each of its two chambers) to ensure the impartiality, transparency and scientific nature of the activities related to official statistics. 1.4 In addition, in line with

text: Article 5(1) of Regulation (EC) No 223/2009

text: , the Romanian National Institute of Statistics is designated as the national statistical authority responsible for coordinating all activities at national level for the development, production and dissemination of European statistics. The Romanian National Institute of Statistics is also the contact point for the Commission (Eurostat) on statistical matters. 1.5 Finally, the competence of the Romanian National Institute of Statistics is intended to be enhanced by entrusting it with the tasks, within its scope of competence, of negotiating and concluding international treaties at department level and other international agreements .

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 In Opinion

text: on the draft of Law No 226/2009, the ECB welcomed the provisions that recognised and preserved the independence of BNR as a participant in the National Statistical System and as the producer of official statistics in its areas of competence. It was noted that the statistics developed, produced and disseminated by BNR as part of the European System of Central Banks are governed by statistical principles that are close but not identical to the principles in

text: Regulation (EC) No 223/2009

text: . 2.2 The ECB also welcomes the intention of the Romanian authorities to update and streamline the provisions of the national legal framework on statistics to follow changes at European level and to meet the needs of the statistical data users.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 9 August 2010. [signed]

text: The Vice-President of the ECB

text: Vítor CONSTÂNCIO


text: EGT L 257, 27.10.1995, s. 1.

text: Text markerad med fet stil anger ECB:s förslag till ny text. Genomstruken text anger de strykningar som ECB föreslår.

title: Europeiska Centralbankens Yttrande av den 9 augusti 2010 över ett utkast till kommissionens förordning om tillämpningsföreskrifter för rådets förordning (EG) nr 2494/95 vad gäller minimistandarder för kvaliteten på vägningstalen för harmoniserade konsumentprisindex och om upphävande av kommissionens förordning (EG) nr 2454/97 (CON/2010/67)

text: Inledning och rättslig grund

text: Den 13 juli 2010 mottog Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) en begäran från Europeiska kommissionen om ett yttrande över ett utkast till kommissionens förordning om tillämpningsföreskrifter för

text: rådets förordning (EG) nr 2494/95

text: (nedan kallat förslaget till förordning).

text: ECB:s behörighet att avge ett yttrande grundar sig på

text: artikel 127.4

text: . i fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt och

text: artikel 5.3 i rådets förordning (EG) nr 2494/95 av den 23 oktober 1995

text: om harmoniserade konsumentprisindex (nedan kallad HIKP-förordningen). I enlighet med

text: artikel 17.5

text: första meningen i arbetsordningen för Europeiska centralbanken har detta yttrande antagits av ECB-rådet.

text: 1. Allmänna kommentarer

text: 1.1 Enligt förslaget till förordning ska det harmoniserade konsumentprisindexet (HIKP) baseras på vägningstal som speglar konsumenternas utgiftsmönster under det föregående kalenderåret, d.v.s. t 1, i repsektive medlemsstat. ECB välkomnar förslagets målsättning att förbättra minimistandarderna som de vägningstal som utgör HIKP ska uppfylla. När förslaget till förordning genomförs kommer HIKP i medlemsstaterna att vara ett äkta årligt prisindex av Laspeyres-typ som tar hänsyn till att konsumenternas utgiftsmönster kan förändras relativt snabbt.

text: 1.2 ECB noterar att de nya minimistandarderna för HIKP-kvaliteten som framgår av förslaget till förordning kommer att medföra ett mer relavant och exakt inflationsmått som förväntas förbättra jämförbarheten mellan medlemsstaternas HIKP-data och tillförlitligheten på denna.

text: 2. Ändringsförslag

text: I de fall där ECB rekommenderar att förslaget till förordning ändras anges de specifika förslagen i bilagan tillsammans med en förklaring.

text: BILAGA

text: Kommissionens förslag | ECB:s ändringsförslag

text: om harmoniserade konsumentprisindex, särskilt

text: artikel 3

text: , och | med beaktande av fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt, med beaktande av

text: artikel 3

text: artikel 5.3, och med beaktande av Europeiska centralbankens yttrande, och

text: Förklaring: Det andra beaktandeledet anger den rättsliga grunden för förslaget till förordning. På detta sätt hänvisar man till artikel 5.3 i HIKP-förordningen enligt vilken kommissionen ska i) anta de genomförandeåtgärder som är nödvändiga för att garantera HIKP:s jämförbarhet liksom för att bevara och förstärka dess tillförlitlighet och relevans samt ii) hålla samråd med ECB och begära ett yttrande om de åtgärder som kommissionen föreslår ska överlämnas till kommittén. Därför bör andra beaktandeledet i förslaget till förordning hänvisa till HIKP-förordningens

text: artikel 5.3

text: , inte

text: artikel 3

text: som anger förordningens tillämpningsområde. Eftersom ECB måste höras om förslaget till förordning enligt artikel 127.4 i fördraget bör ett beaktandeled med detta innehåll införas i förslaget till förordning i linje med artikel 296 andra stycket i fördraget enligt vilket rättsakter ska motiveras och innehålla en hänvisning till bl.a. de yttranden som föreskrivs i fördragen.

text: artikel 140 i fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt

text: . Syftet med HIKP är att underlätta internationella jämförelser av konsumentprisinflationen. De är viktiga styrmedel för penningpolitiken. | (1) Harmoniserade konsumentprisindex (HIKP) är harmoniserade inflationsmått som kommissionen och Europeiska centralbanken behöver för att kunna fullgöra sina förpliktelser enligt

text: . Syftet med HIKP är att underlätta internationella jämförelser av konsumentprisinflationen. De är viktiga styrmedel som används av Europeiska centralbankssystemet för att genomföra penningpolitiken i enlighet med

text: artikel 127.2 i fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt

text: Förklaring: Europeiska centralbankssystemet använder HIKP inte bara för de syften som framgår av artikel 140 i fördraget utan även för att genomföra den monetära politiken enligt artikel 127.2 i fördraget.

text: (4) Enligt

text: artikel 9 i förordning (EG) nr 2494/95

text: ska HIKP vara prisindex av Laspeyres-typ. När de relativa priserna på olika varor och tjänster förändras, kan konsumenternas utgiftsmönster förändras i sådan omfattning att vägningstalen för motsvarande utgiftsgrupper, och i synnerhet de kvantiteter som ligger till grund för dessa, måste uppdateras för att garantera att de är relevanta. | (4) Enligt

text: artikel 9 i förordning (EG) nr 2494/95

text: ska HIKP vara prisindex av Laspeyres-typ. När de relativa priserna på olika varor och tjänster de ekonomiska förutsättningarna förändras, kan konsumenternas utgiftsmönster förändras i sådan omfattning att vägningstalen för motsvarande utgiftsgrupper, och i synnerhet de kvantiteter som ligger till grund för dessa, måste uppdateras för att garantera att de är relevanta.

text: Förklaring: Förändringar av vägningstalen för utgiftsgrupper kan bli nödvändiga inte bara p.g.a. förändringar av de relativa priserna på olika varor och tjänster utan även p.g.a. att de ekonomiska förutsättningarna förändras.

text: (8) I den här förordningen bör det inte föreskrivas att medlemsstaterna måste genomföra nya statistiska undersökningar eller hushållsbudgetundersökningar oftare än en gång vart femte år, med tanke på att medlemsstaterna måste sammanställa nationalräkenskaper i enlighet med det europeiska nationalräkenskapssystemet (ENS 1995)7 och att landsvägningstalen, som krävs för att utarbeta euroområdes- och EU-aggregat samt andra HIKP-aggregat, bygger på uppgifter från nationalräkenskaperna. | (8) I den här förordningen bör det inte föreskrivas att medlemsstaterna måste genomföra nya statistiska undersökningar eller hushållsbudgetundersökningar oftare än en gång vart femte år, med tanke på att medlemsstaterna eventuellt kan uppdatera resultaten från undersökningar av hushållsbudgetundersökningar med hjälp av annan information eller har tillgång till måste sammanställa nationalräkenskapligaer uppgifter som sammanställts i enlighet med det europeiska nationalräkenskapssystemet (ENS 1995)7 och att landsvägningstalen, som krävs för att utarbeta euroområdes- och EU-aggregat samt andra HIKP-aggregat, bygger på uppgifter från nationalräkenskaperna.

text: Förklaring: För att undvika att nya statistiska undersökningar måste genomföras bör man förtydliga att medlemsstater även får uppdatera resultaten från undersökningar av hushållsbudgetundersökningar med hjälp av annan tillgänglig information.

text: artikel 5.3 i förordning (EG) nr 2494/95

text: . | (10) Samråd har skett med Europeiska centralbanken i enlighet med

text: Förklaring: Eftersom ECB enligt fördraget ska höras om förslaget till förordning bör ett beaktandeled med detta innehåll tas med i förslaget i enlighet med artikel 296 i fördraget och skäl 10 strykas.

text: 2. Varje år ska medlemsstaterna därför se över och uppdatera vägningstalen för HIKP-delindex med hänsyn till preliminära nationalräkenskapsuppgifter om konsumtionsmönstren under år t 2, förutom i vederbörligen motiverade undantagsfall, samt tillgängliga och relevanta uppgifter från hushållsbudgetundersökningar och andra uppgiftskällor som är tillräckligt tillförlitliga för HIKP. | 2. Varje år ska medlemsstaterna därför se över och uppdatera vägningstalen för HIKP-delindex med hänsyn till preliminära nationalräkenskapsuppgifter om konsumtionsmönstren under år t 2, utom i fall där förutom i vederbörligen motiverade undantagsfall, samt tillgängliga och relevanta uppgifter från hushållsbudgetundersökningar och andra uppgiftskällor finns tillgängliga för år t 2 och anses vara lämpligare som är tillräckligt tillförlitliga för HIKP.

text: Förklaring: Ordalydelsen i

text: artikel 3.2

text: bör ändras. Eftersom andra uppgiftskällor än preliminära nationalräkenskapsuppgifter om konsumtionsmönstren under år t 2 kan vara mer tillförlitliga bör man förtydliga att sådan annan information får användas om detta anses vara lämpligare för HIKP.


title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 11 August 2010 on reserve requirements for credit institutions (CON/2010/68)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 11 August 2010 on reserve requirements for credit institutions (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 20 July 2010 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (MNB) for an opinion on a draft decree on reserve requirements (hereinafter the ‘draft decree’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and

text: Article 2(2) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft decree relates to instruments of monetary policy of a Member State whose currency is not the euro. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft decree

text: 1.1 According to the explanatory memorandum attached to the consultation request, in November 2008 the MNB reduced the minimum reserve ratio in a single step from 5 %, the reserve ratio which had been in effect from 2002, to 2 %, which is the reserve ratio currently applying to the Eurosystem. This was done in response to the confidence crisis affecting the Hungarian interbank market. The reduction of the reserve ratio was prompted mainly by liquidity shortages experienced by a number of large Hungarian banks due to their foreign exchange exposures. It also contributed significantly to the increase in these credit institutions’ surplus HUF liquidity, thereby mitigating the risks to the stability of the banking sector. However, the lower reserve requirement posed a challenge for a number of smaller banks in the Hungarian market in coping with large fluctuations in their liquidity needs. This problem has been exacerbated by the fact that the interbank market is still weak compared to the period before the crisis in 2008, due to, inter alia, risk aversion. 1.2 Pursuant to Decree 15/2008 (XI.24.) of the Governor of the MNB on the reserve requirement ratio, the current reserve ratio applicable to Hungarian credit institutions subject to reserve requirements is 2 %. The purpose of the draft decree is to enable credit institutions subject to reserve

text: requirements to choose from one of the following reserve ratios: 2 %, 3 %, 4 % or 5 %. The draft decree will enter into force upon approval by the MNB’s Monetary Council.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 Experience from the recent crisis has shown the importance of the buffering function played by reserves held at the central bank. This may imply that it is beneficial for some banks to have a reserve ratio that is not too low. In this context, the ECB understands the MNB’s approach of transferring the responsibility for determining the reserve ratio to the banking system. At the same time, incentives encouraging credit institutions to have active liquidity management are needed to ensure a dynamic and efficient interbank market. In this regard, a continual and long-term monitoring of the possible impacts of the measures introduced by the draft decree on the functioning of the Hungarian interbank market is recommended. Similarly, alternative ways of reducing the size and frequency of liquidity shocks should be considered. It could also be beneficial to address the sources of the liquidity shocks that led the MNB to introduce the draft decree. 2.2 More specifically, the difficulties some Hungarian banks had in coping with large shocks in their liquidity demand, e.g. due to large transactions from their clients, appear to be a key reason behind the significant accumulation of overnight deposits. In the short term and during the convergence process towards joining the euro area, the MNB may need greater flexibility to address liquidity shocks and market inefficiencies which hinder the implementation of national monetary policy. Member States whose currency is not the euro retain their powers in the field of monetary policy. However, in the implementation of the single monetary policy, consistency with the Eurosystem’s operational framework at an early stage will be required. Credit institutions in such Member States will need to be familiar with requirements that will apply to them when the euro is introduced, such as the single reserve ratio of 2 %.

text: 3. Specific observations

text: Upon adoption of the euro in Hungary, the ECB’s minimum reserves framework will apply, in particular. (a) Article 19 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank; (b)

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 2531/98 of 23 November 1998

text: concerning the application of minimum reserves by the European Central Bank ; (c) Regulation ECB/2003/9 of 12 September 2003 on the application of minimum reserves ; and (d) in relation to the definition and calculation of the reserve base, Regulation ECB/2008/32 of 19 December 2008 concerning the balance sheet of the monetary financial institutions sector (recast) . Article 11 of and Annex III to Regulation ECB/2008/32 requires statistical information reported by credit institutions under Regulation ECB/2008/32 to be used for the purpose of

text: minimum reserves. Special rules set out in this Regulation prevail over Regulation ECB/2003/9 and concern small credit institutions, group reporting and reserve requirements in the case of mergers. This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website two months after the date of its adoption. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 11 August 2010. [signed]

text: The Vice-President of the ECB

text: Vítor CONSTÂNCIO


text: Monitorul Oficial al României No 441, 30.6.2010. 2 OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: Law No 312/2004 (Monitorul Oficial al României No 582, 30.6.2004).

text: Chapter 6.8. All ECB documents are available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 5 See e.g. ECB Opinion

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 26 August 2010 on further measures for the restoration of budgetary balance (CON/2010/69)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 26 August 2010 on further measures for the restoration of budgetary balance (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 19 August 2010 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Romanian Ministry of Public Finance for an opinion on a draft government emergency ordinance amending Law No 118/2010 on certain measures necessary for the restoration of budgetary balance (hereinafter ‘draft emergency ordinance’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft emergency ordinance relates to Banca Naţională a României (BNR). In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft emergency ordinance

text: On 1 July 2010, the ECB adopted Opinion

text: on the draft of Law No 118/2010 which decreased the salaries of BNR’s staff and transferred directly to the State budget the amounts representing this decrease. In terms of substance, the ECB expressed its concerns mainly with regard to the compliance of these provisions with the principles of central bank independence pursuant to Article 130 of the Treaty and the monetary financing prohibition pursuant to Article 123 of the Treaty and invited the Romanian authorities to amend these provisions accordingly. The draft emergency ordinance is intended to bring Law No 118/2010 into line with the abovementioned Treaty provisions, to avoid infringement proceedings for breach of Articles 123 and 130 of the Treaty. Consequently, it provides that all the amounts representing the decrease of the salary rights of BNR’s staff will be reflected in BNR’s financial results.

text: 2. General observations

text: The Romanian Ministry of Public Finance requested the ECB to deliver an opinion before 28 August 2010. While the ECB generally appreciates the swift reaction by the Romanian authorities to amend provisions on which the ECB and the European Commission have expressed serious concerns, there are continued concerns as elaborated below. The ECB would like to point out that, in cases of particular urgency which do not allow for a normal consultation period, the consulting authority may indicate such urgency in the consultation request and ask for a shorter deadline for the adoption of the ECB opinion. Therefore, the ECB understands the reasons for the application of an accelerated legislative procedure, but would appreciate receiving consultations allowing more time for it to prepare its opinion in the future.

text: 3. Specific observations

text: 3.1 The ECB notes that the draft emergency ordinance maintains the decrease of BNR’s salaries, although the Romanian State is not the formal employer of BNR staff and the Law on the Statute of Banca Naţională a României clearly provides that BNR’s management board decides on BNR’s staff salaries. In this regard, the explanatory memorandum addresses only the ECB’s concerns in Opinion

text: regarding the monetary financing prohibition whereas BNR’s autonomy in staff matters is not discussed. In this context, the ECB notes that Member States are obliged to safeguard the independence of their national central banks (NCBs), thus ensuring the proper performance of their tasks under the Treaty and the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank. In particular, the principle of central bank independence requires that no third party should be able to exercise direct or indirect influence over the NCB. As a consequence, Member States may not put an NCB in a position where it has limited or no control over its staff, or where the government of a Member State can influence its policy on staff matters. This implies that to protect BNR’s autonomy in staff matters, a particular aspect of the central bank independence principle, the Romanian authorities are under an obligation to ensure that any amendment to the legislative provisions relating to the remuneration of BNR’s staff is decided in close cooperation with BNR, taking due account of BNR’s views. 3.2 Article II of the draft emergency ordinance provides that the amounts representing the decrease of the ‘salary rights ... not transferred to the State budget until entry into force of this emergency ordinance shall be reflected in the financial results of Banca Naţională a României’. The ECB understands from this wording that certain salary rights are still intended to be and others have already been transferred to the State budget. For the latter, any such already transferred rights must be transferred back adequately to avoid any breach of the monetary financing prohibition in Article 123 of the Treaty.

text: 3.3 As regards the funds not yet transferred to the State budget, in Opinion

text: the ECB stressed that from an accounting perspective, a decrease of staff salaries will de facto decrease BNR’s operational costs, hence increasing its financial results leading to a potential increase in its financial resources. However, if this related increase of BNR’s financial resources is directly transferred to the State, this would effectively mean increasing the funding of the Romanian State at BNR’s expense. In this respect, any direct financial transfer of this nature from BNR to the State budget can be assimilated to monetary financing, which is clearly prohibited under Article 123 of the Treaty. In the same vein, any circumvention of the objectives of the monetary financing prohibition should be avoided. 3.4 In view of Opinion

text: and to comply with Article 123 of the Treaty, the draft emergency ordinance amends Law No 118/2010, so that all the amounts representing the decrease of the salary rights of BNR staff will be reflected in BNR’s financial results. The ECB understands that this does not amount to an instruction to BNR regarding decisions taken in respect of its financial results. The ECB notes that BNR must be fully independent in deciding how to use the funds resulting from the 25% decrease of salaries as it considers appropriate, in accordance with the Law on its Statute and with a view to ensuring sufficient levels of its own financial resources to fulfil its mandate in the long term. Subject to this interpretation of the Law on BNR’s Statute, this particular provision complies with the principle of central bank independence, which implies that BNR can independently use its financial resources to fulfil its mandate. 3.5 If, however, the main purpose of the salary rights cut were to eventually increase the financial resources of the State through the distribution of increased profits from BNR to the State, this would appear to be a circumvention of the objectives of the prohibition on monetary financing. In addition, Article 43 of the Law on the Statute of BNR provides that BNR must transfer to the State budget, on a monthly basis, an 80% share of the net revenues left after deducting expenses relating to the financial year, including provisions for credit risk, and loss related to the previous financial years that remain uncovered. The ECB’s Convergence Report of May 2010 already criticised this Article , as it does not rule out the possibility of an intra-year anticipated profit distribution which, in turn, gives rise to concerns relating to the monetary financing prohibition. As noted in past ECB opinions , it is indeed of crucial importance for the distribution of profits to be exclusively the result of profits that are fully realised, accounted for and audited, which in turn requires due calculation of profits and losses to avoid such possibility. 3.6 By contrast, a decrease in the operational costs of the central bank with a view to increasing its own financial resources to strengthen the performance of its mandate would be acceptable.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 26 August 2010. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 9 September 2010 on amendments to the legal framework for the operation of Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego (CON/2010/70)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 9 September 2010 on amendments to the legal framework for the operation of Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 16 August 2010 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Polish Parliament’s Sejm for an opinion on a draft law (hereinafter ‘the draft law’) amending the Law of 14 March 2003 on Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego (hereinafter the ‘Law on BGK’) . The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third and sixth indents of

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to Narodowy Bank Polski (NBP) and contains rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego (BGK) is the only Polish credit institution established by legislation as a State bank . Its main activities include supporting the government’s socio-economic programmes, as well as local self-government and regional development projects. Within this scope, BGK provides banking services to public entities and several public funds established for special purposes, including those established to distribute Union funds. As a specific financial

text: 1 Dz. U. of 2003, No 65, item 594.

text: 2 OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: 3 See Article 2(1) of the Law on BGK in conjunction with Article 1 of the Regulation of the President of Poland of 30 May 1924 merging the State credit institutions into Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego (Dziennik Ustaw (Dz. U.) of 1924 No 46, item 477). See also Article 46(1) of the Law on banking of 13 April 1960 (Dz. U. of 1960 No 20, item 121) together with Article 64(2) of the Law on banking of 12 June 1975 (Dz. U. of 1975 No 20, item 108) and

text: Article 96(1)

text: (1) of the Law on banking of 26 February 1982 (Dz. U. of 1982 No 7, item 56). See also Article 14(1) of the Law on banking of 29 August 1997 (consolidated text: Dz. U. of 2002 No 72, item 665) (hereinafter the ‘Law on banking’). See Regulation of the Minister for the State Treasury of 11 May 2010 laying down the articles of incorporation for Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego (Dz. U. of 2010 No 81, item 535). institution created for public purposes, BGK is exempted from Directive

text: of 14 June 2006 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions (recast) . 1.2 According to the draft law’s explanatory memorandum , one of the main aims of the draft law is to reduce the cost of borrowing by BGK on the financial markets. The draft law intends to improve BGK’s credit rating up to a level similar to the rating of Poland’s sovereign debt. This effect would be achieved by introducing an explicit provision on the liability of the State Treasury for BGK’s debts in case of BGK’s liquidation . Moreover, the draft law also significantly relaxes the rules on transfers of funds between BGK and the State Treasury, by introducing (i) a general obligation for the Minister for public finance to provide BGK with own funds sufficient to carry out its statutory tasks , and (ii) the possibility of reducing BGK’s statutory funds if they exceed the level necessary to comply with supervisory requirements and, consequently, resulting in a transfer to the State budget . The draft law aims also to facilitate the refinancing of BGK’s real estate activities, including in particular its support of government housing programmes, by creating a legal basis for issuance by BGK of mortgage-backed securities . The draft law also streamlines and clarifies Law on BGK. 1.3 As a result of the draft law, BGK will also become the provider of core banking services to the State budget and State budget entities. State bank accounts, including those for the State budget, State budget entities and tax authorities, are currently operated by NBP which maintains a legal monopoly on providing core banking services to the State until Poland’s adoption of the euro . The draft law removes this limitation , allowing the Minister for Finance to select either NBP or BGK as a provider of banking services. After the entry into force of the draft law, NBP would, if selected, therefore be allowed - but no longer legally required - to fulfil the function of fiscal agent of the State.

text: 2. General observations

text: In view of the envisaged strengthening of BGK’s market position resulting from the draft law expressly introducing State liability for BGK’s obligations, the ECB notes its previous observations on the need to

text: 4 OJ L 177, 30.6.2006, p. 1. See

text: Article 2

text: 5 Not yet available on Sejm’s website.

text: 12 Under Article 196(2) of the Law on public finance and

text: Article 51(1)

text: (2) of the Law of 29 August 1997 on Narodowy Bank Polski (consolidated text: Dz. U. of 2005, No 1, item 2). maintain a level playing field and to avoid undue distortions of competition between financial institutions .

text: 3. Specific observations

text: 3.1. The ECB understands that BGK may be a counterparty for NBP’s monetary policy operations, and that mortgage-backed securities issued by BGK may become eligible as collateral for the NBP’s monetary policy operations . The ECB reminds the Polish authorities that compliance with the monetary financing prohibition laid down in the Treaty needs to be ensured. In this respect, Article 123(2) of the Treaty lays down that publicly owned credit institutions shall be given the same treatment as private credit institutions insofar as participation in monetary policy operations of the central banks is concerned, whereas the prohibition contained in Article 123(1) of the Treaty against purchases in the primary market of securities issued by the public sector applies also to publicly owned credit institutions. Therefore, NBP may not purchase mortgage-backed securities issued by BGK in the primary market . 3.2 Article 21.2 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (ESCB Statute) expressly recognises the provision by the ECB or the national central banks of fiscal agency services to the public sector, as it is a legitimate function traditionally performed by central banks . However, Article 21.2 of the ESCB Statute does not oblige the central banks to undertake any fiscal agency functions. In view hereof, the ECB takes note of the possibility for the Minister of Finance to select BGK instead of the NBP as provider of banking services to the State budget . 3.3 In view of the envisaged possibility of reducing BGK’s statutory funds and transferring the difference to the State budget , the ECB understands that sufficient safeguards will be in place to ensure that such a transfer would not compromise BGK’s compliance with banking supervisory requirements.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: 13 See paragraph 2.2 of ECB Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: 14 As published and updated from time to time on NBP’s website www.nbp.pl.

text: 15 See also in part paragraph 3.2 of ECB Opinion

text: 16 See Chapter 2 of the ECB Convergence Report of May 2010. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 9 September 2010. [signed] The President of the ECB Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 2 All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: See Opinions

text: and

text: . 4 See Opinions

text: , paragraph 3.1,

text: , paragraph 2.5.2 and

text: , paragraph 3.2.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 16 September 2010 on the extension of the Irish State guarantee of certain liabilities of credit institutions (CON/2010/71)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 16 September 2010 on the extension of the Irish State guarantee of certain liabilities of credit institutions (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 10 September 2010 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Irish Minister for Finance (hereinafter the ‘Minister’) for an opinion on a draft Credit Institutions (Eligible Liabilities Guarantee) (Amendment) Scheme 2010 (hereinafter the ‘draft scheme’) amending the Credit Institutions (Eligible Liabilities Guarantee) Scheme 2009 (hereinafter the ‘ELG Scheme’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the sixth indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft scheme relates to rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft scheme

text: The ELG Scheme was signed into law on 9 December 2009. The ECB was consulted on the ELG Scheme at the draft stage and adopted its Opinion

text: . Subsequently the ECB adopted its Opinion

text: on proposed amendments to the ELG Scheme. The Irish Government now proposes a prolongation of the validity of the ELG Scheme by three months, i.e. that eligible liabilities may be issued until 31 December 2010 together with some minor technical changes.

text: 2. The appropriate time to consult the ECB

text: 2.1 The ECB notes that the Minister has requested that the ECB provides its opinion as soon as possible in order to ensure that Union State aid approval for the draft scheme can be obtained

text: quickly and the draft scheme presented for parliamentary approval. The ECB points out that, in cases of particular urgency which do not allow for a normal consultation period, the consulting authority may indicate the urgency in the consultation request and ask for a shorter deadline for the ECB’s opinion to be adopted. This does not prejudice the consulting authority’s duty under Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty to consult the ECB on national draft legislative provisions falling within its fields of competence in due course of the national legislative process. The second sentence of

text: Article 4 of Decision 98/415/EC

text: provides that the ECB must be consulted ‘at an appropriate stage’ in the legislative process. This implies that the consultation should take place at a point in the legislative process which affords the ECB sufficient time to examine the draft legislative provisions and to adopt its opinion in all required language versions, and which also enables the relevant national authorities to take the ECB’s opinion into consideration before the provisions are adopted.

text: Article 3(4) of Decision 98/415/EC

text: also obliges Member States to suspend the adoption process for draft legislative provisions, pending receipt of the ECB’s opinion. 2.2 The ECB would appreciate the Department of Finance giving due consideration to honouring their obligation to consult the ECB in the future, in accordance with Decision

text: 3. General observations

text: 3.1 The purpose of the draft scheme is the extension of the issuance period under the ELG Scheme from 29 September 2010 to 31 December 2010. The Minister in his request for an opinion advises that increased pricing will apply to liabilities issued under the draft scheme after 29 September 2010, the precise quantum of which is to be determined in conjunction with the European Commission. The ECB notes that it has not been requested to consider the pricing modalities for the purposes of this Opinion. The Minister also states that a positive assessment by the ECB on financial stability grounds of the requirement for a prolongation of the guarantee of short term and interbank liabilities is considered essential by the European Commission to the Commission’s approval process. 3.2 The ECB reiterates the views expressed in previous opinions . In particular, it recalls that coordination of the duration of national financial support schemes across the Union is of crucial importance in order to ensure a level playing field . 3.3 Taking into account financial stability considerations, an extension of the ELG Scheme may be beneficial.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 16 September 2010. [signed]

text: The Vice-President of the ECB

text: Vítor CONSTÂNCIO