text: A hazai gazdasági szereplők versenyképességének erősítésével és a közigazgatás hatékonyságának növelésével összefüggő egyes törvények módosításáról szóló 2023. évi CIX. törvény, Magyar Közlöny 2023/187. (XII. 22.). 2

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).

text: Article 12(4) of the Law on the MNB. 7 Article 12(5) of the Law on the MNB. 8

text: Article 14(1)

text: and (4) of the Law on the MNB. 9 Article 14(3) of the Law on the MNB. 10 Article 14(2) of the Law on the MNB. 11 Article 162(2) of the Law on the MNB.

text: See also Guide to consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions, p. 18, available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 13 See ECB Convergence Report 2022, p. 36, available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 14 Decision ECB/2014/8 of the European Central Bank of 20 February 2014 on the prohibition of monetary financing and the remuneration of government deposits by national central banks (OJ L 159, 28.5.2014, p. 54).

text: Article 4(13) of the Law on the MNB. 16 Article 4(14) of the Law on the MNB. 17

text: Article 4(8)

text: , (9), (10) and (14) of the Law on the MNB. 18 See paragraph 6 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 14.2.4 of Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on EUR-Lex.

text: See judgment of 13 September 2022, Banka Slovenije,

text: , EU:C:2022:670, paragraph 97.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 26 February 2024 on the single treasury account managed by the Magyar Nemzeti Bank and the competencies of the Supervisory Board of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (CON/2024/5)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 26 February 2024 on the single treasury account managed by the Magyar Nemzeti Bank and the competencies of the Supervisory Board of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 16 January 2024 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Hungarian Minister for Finance for an opinion on (1) amendments to the Law on Magyar Nemzeti Bank (hereinafter the ‘Law on the MNB’) and the Law on public finance concerning the management of treasury accounts by the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (MNB) contained in Law CIX of 2023 amending certain laws related to strengthening the competitiveness of domestic economic operators and increasing the efficiency of public administration, which was promulgated in Magyar Közlöny (the Hungarian Gazette) on 22 December 2023 (hereinafter the ‘adopted amendments to the Laws on the MNB and public finance’); and (2) draft amendments to the Law on the MNB concerning the competences of the MNB’s Executive and Supervisory Boards (hereinafter the ‘draft amendments to the Law on the MNB’, and together with the adopted amendments to the Laws on the MNB and public finance, the ‘amendments’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the amendments relate to a national central bank (NCB). In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the amendments

text: Purpose of the adopted amendments to the Laws on the MNB and public finance 1.1 The adopted amendments to the Laws on the MNB and public finance introduce single foreign currency treasury accounts to supplement the existing single Hungarian forint (HUF) treasury account. The single foreign currency treasury accounts will be managed by the MNB. 1.2 The Law on the MNB provides that the MNB is to pay interest on the current balance of the HUF single bank account of the treasury to the central budget at the market interest rate but not exceeding the central bank base rate. The adopted amendments to the Laws on the MNB and public finance provide that the MNB is to pay interest on the current balance of the single foreign currency treasury

text: accounts at the market interest rate and that it will have due regard to the prohibition of monetary financing when determining such rate. 1.3 The adopted amendments to the Laws on the MNB and public finance are to enter into force on the day following publication in the Magyar Közlöny of the decision of the Minister responsible for the macroeconomic foundations of the budget, issued after the receipt of the official notification of the ECB’s consent.

text: Purpose of the draft amendments to the Law on the MNB

text: 1.4 According to the reasoning accompanying the draft amendments to the Law on the MNB, it is appropriate to strengthen the accountability and transparency of the MNB, which carries out its tasks independently, focusing on its basic tasks, on the basis of organisational and managerial autonomy. It is therefore considered necessary to clarify the rules governing the activities of certain bodies of the MNB, in particular as regards its other tasks. To this end, the tasks and powers of the Executive Board and the Supervisory Board of the MNB should be clarified. Role and composition of the Executive and Supervisory Boards of the MNB under the Law on the

text: MNB

text: 1.5 Under the Law on the MNB the bodies of the MNB are the Monetary Council, the Financial Stability Council, the Executive Board and the Supervisory Board . The Monetary Council is the MNB’s supreme decision-making body and the scope of its competence includes, inter alia, (1) strategic decisions concerning the MNB’s tasks relating to monetary policy, banknotes and coins, official foreign exchange and gold reserves, foreign exchange operations and the collection and publication of statistical information; and (2) the definition of the strategic framework within which the Financial Stability Council makes its decisions in respect of the MNB’s tasks concerning payment and securities settlement systems, macroprudential policy, resolution and supervision of the system of financial intermediation . 1.6 Under the Law on the MNB the Executive Board, comprising the MNB Governor and the two or three Deputy Governors, are responsible for implementing the decisions of the Monetary Council and of the Financial Stability Council, as well as for managing the operations of the MNB . The scope of the Executive Board’s competences include (1) managing the implementation of the decisions of the Monetary Council and the Financial Stability Council; (2) establishing the accounting report of the MNB, issuing decisions on the payment of dividends, and approving the draft year-by-year forecast of the preliminary level of the equity at the end of the previous year and its expected development, and approving the draft report to be sent to the shareholder on the MNB’s management and assets; (3) approving matters related to the organisation and internal management of the MNB; (4) approving study plans and programmes relating to the operation of the MNB and the performance of its tasks, including the costs of the development and operational plan; (5) managing the MNB’s internal audit organisation in respect of tasks falling outside the scope of competence of the Supervisory Board, and discussing the observations and plans of the internal audit; (6) amending the collective

text: agreement in respect of employment rights and obligations; and (7) adopting decisions relating to the management of HUF and foreign currency accounts on behalf of certain persons . In addition, the Monetary Council may authorise the Executive Board to decide on any matter falling within its scope of competence . 1.7 Under the Law on the MNB the Supervisory Board is the body responsible for the continuous supervision of the MNB on behalf of the owner, and comprises a chair and three additional members elected by the Parliament, a representative of the Minister for Finance as well as an expert appointed by the Minister for Finance . The supervision carried out by the Supervisory Board is limited in two respects. First, the scope of competence of the Supervisory Board does not include the MNB’s tasks relating to monetary policy, banknotes and coins, official foreign exchange and gold reserves, foreign exchange operations, the collection and publication of statistical information, payment and securities settlement systems, macroprudential policy, resolution and supervision of the system of financial intermediation, or the impact of these tasks on the MNB’s profit and loss . Second, even though the Supervisory Board supervises the internal audit department of the MNB, this supervision does not extend to the tasks listed above. With respect to duties falling outside the scope of Supervisory Board’s competence, the internal audit department of the MNB is supervised by the Executive Board. If the Executive Board, while exercising its management powers, becomes aware of any audit findings within the scope of the Supervisory Board’s competence, it must immediately provide information to the Supervisory Board on such findings . Changes to the Executive and Supervisory Boards of the MNB under the draft amendments to the

text: Law on the MNB

text: 1.8 The draft amendments to the Law on the MNB propose to expand the scope of competences of the Executive Board to include the adoption of decisions in relation to the tasks of the MNB other than the basic tasks of the MNB, taking into account that (1) the Executive Board must inform the MNB’s Supervisory Board of the decisions on a quarterly basis; (2) decisions involving expenditure in excess of that provided for in the MNB’s Statutes are subject to the prior approval of the Supervisory Board; and (3) the Chair of the Executive Board reports to the Supervisory Board at least once a year on the MNB’s activities relating to such other tasks. 1.9 The Law on the MNB currently provides that in line with its tasks and primary objective, the MNB may establish a business association in which it has a majority holding or may create a foundation . The draft amendments to the Law on the MNB amend this provision to provide that in line with its tasks and primary objective, the MNB may establish a business association in which it has a majority holding, acquire shares in an existing company, or create a foundation. Within the framework of the supervision on behalf of the owner, the Supervisory Board of the MNB or, at the request of the Supervisory Board, the internal audit department of the MNB is entitled to audit the management of

text: any company in which the MNB has a majority holding, any foundation established by the MNB and any company in which a foundation established by the MNB has a majority holding. The draft amendments to the Law on the MNB also require that in the case of any company in which the MNB has a majority holding and any foundation established by the MNB, the creation of a supervisory board consisting of three or five members who are natural persons is mandatory.

text: 2. Observations concerning the adopted amendments to the Laws on the MNB and public finance

text: 2.1 The ECB lacks competence under the Treaties to consent to the adoption of national laws. Rather, under Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty, the ECB must be consulted by national authorities regarding any draft legislative provision in its fields of competence, but within the limits and under the conditions set out in Decision

text: , and the ECB may submit opinions to national authorities on matters in its fields of competence. In accordance with

text: Article 4 of Decision 98/415/EC

text: , each Member State must ensure that the ECB is consulted at an appropriate stage enabling the authority initiating the draft legislative provision to take into consideration the ECB’s opinion before taking its decision on the substance. Based on this, the ECB should have been consulted on the adopted amendments to the Laws on the MNB and public finance in draft form prior to their adoption . 2.2 Article 123(1) of the Treaty prohibits overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facility with the NCBs in the European System of Central Banks in favour of, inter alia, central governments of Member States. National legislation that enables an NCB to hold government deposits and to service government accounts does not raise concerns about compliance with the monetary financing prohibition as long as such provisions do not enable the extension of credit, including overnight overdrafts. However, there would be a concern about compliance with the monetary financing prohibition if, for example, national legislation enabled the remuneration of deposits or current account balances above, rather than at or below, market rates . 2.3 The ECB welcomes that the adopted amendments to the Laws on the MNB and public finance provide that the interest paid by the MNB to the central budget on the current balance of the single foreign currency treasury accounts cannot exceed market rates, and that when setting the interest rate for these accounts the MNB will have due regard to the prohibition of monetary financing. The ECB refers in this respect to Decision ECB/2014/8 of the European Central Bank , which sets out the criteria applied by the ECB regarding the remuneration of government deposits by NCBs for the purposes of monitoring compliance with the monetary financing prohibition laid down in Article 123(1) of the Treaty.

text: 3. Observations concerning the draft amendments to the Law on the MNB

text: Interpretation of the draft amendments to the Law on the MNB

text: 3.1 The ECB understands that the new supervisory competences of the Supervisory Board will be limited, as the Supervisory Board will not have the right to supervise any MNB activities that would directly or indirectly affect the basic tasks of the MNB. Given that, under the Law on the MNB, the basic tasks of the MNB comprise the MNB’s tasks relating to monetary policy, banknotes and coins, official foreign exchange and gold reserves, foreign exchange operations, the collection and publication of statistical information, payment and securities settlement systems and macroprudential policy , the Supervisory Board is not entitled to supervise any activities related to those tasks of the MNB, including the provision of IT services related to the performance of the MNB’s basic tasks. Consistent with the foregoing, the ECB understands that the Supervisory Board will not have the right to supervise any activities of any company in which the MNB has a majority holding if such activity directly or indirectly affects these basic tasks of the MNB. For the sake of legal certainty, the ECB suggests reformulating the draft provision on the supervision of majority owned companies to reflect this understanding. 3.2 The ECB understands that, in accordance with the Law on the MNB, tasks other than the basic tasks are the other tasks of the MNB, which only the MNB is to perform, in accordance with the applicable law, without prejudice to the achievement of its primary objective and the performance of its basic tasks . The ECB understands that these non-basic tasks include, inter alia, the MNB’s tasks relating to resolution and to supervision of the system of financial intermediation . Given that the Law on the MNB stipulates that the scope of competence of the Supervisory Board is not to include the MNB’s tasks relating to resolution and to supervision of the system of financial intermediation, the ECB understands that the Supervisory Board would have no supervisory competences with respect to these non-basic tasks of the MNB, including the activities of any company in which the MNB has a majority holding if such activity directly or indirectly affects these particular non-basic tasks of the MNB or their impact on the MNB’s profit and loss.

text: Central bank independence

text: 3.3 Pursuant to Article 130 of the Treaty, when exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties conferred on it by the Treaty and the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter the ‘Statute of the ESCB’), neither an NCB nor any member of its decision-making bodies may seek or take instructions from, inter alia, any government of a Member State or from any other body, which includes a statutory body such as the Supervisory Board. Consequently, the Supervisory Board may not seek to influence the performance of any of the MNB’s tasks related to its membership of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) . The independence of the MNB should be fully respected.

text: 3.4 The Supervisory Board does not intervene in the performance of ESCB-related tasks, nor in the decisions concerning those tasks. Regarding the Supervisory Board’s proposed competence to give prior approval for decisions of the Executive Board in relation to the MNB’s other, non-basic tasks involving expenditure in excess of that provided for in the MNB’s Statutes, the ECB underlines that this right cannot place the MNB in a situation which in any way undermines its ability to carry out independently a task falling within the scope of the ESCB . National laws should guarantee, in a manner that does not allow for arbitrary interpretations, the independence of the central bank in order for it to achieve its ESCB objectives and carry out its ESCB tasks.

text: This opinion will be published on EUR-Lex.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 26 February 2024.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Christine LAGARDE


text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42). 2 Zakon o prihvaćanju članstva Republike hrvatske u međunarodnom monetarnom fondu i drugim međunarodnim financijskim institucijama na temelju sukcesije (“Narodne novine”, br. 89/92). 3 Odluka o načinu vođenja poslova i izmirivanju obveza koje proizlaze iz članstva Republike Hrvatske u međunarodnom monetarnom fondu i drugim međunarodnim financijskim institucijama (“Narodne novine”, br. 83/93 i 94/93). 4 Zakon o Vladi Republike Hrvatske (“Narodne novine” br. 150/11, 119/14, 93/16, 116/18 i 80/22).

text: See explanatory memorandum to the draft decision, p. 1. 6 See Article 2 of the draft decision. 7 See Article 3 of the draft decision. 8 See Article 4 of the draft decision. 9 Zakon o Hrvatskoj narodnoj banci (“Narodne novine” br. 75/08, 54/13 i 47/20). See Article 5 of the draft decision. 10 See Article 6 of the draft decision. 11 See Article 7 of the draft decision. 12 See Article 10 of the draft decision. 13 See explanatory memorandum to the draft decision, p. 8.

text: Zakon o sklapanju i izvršavanju međunarodnih ugovora (“Narodne novine”, br. 28/96). See Article 8 of the draft decision. 15 See Article 9 of the draft decision. 16 See Articles 11 and 12 of the draft decision. 17 See Article 12(2) of the draft decision.

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 of 13 December 1993

text: specifying definitions for the application of the prohibitions referred to in Articles

text: and

text: b(1) of the Treaty (OJ L 332, 31.12.1993, p. 1). 19 See, for example, Opinions

text: and

text: . All ECB opinions are published on EUR-Lex. 20 See, in the same vein, paragraph 3 of Opinion

text: . 21 See Article 100 of the Law on HNB.

publisher: Europeiska centralbanken

sprak: en

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 26 February 2024 on the competences of Hrvatska narodna banka related to Croatia’s membership of the International Monetary Fund (CON/2024/6)

serie: con

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 26 February 2024 on the competences of Hrvatska narodna banka related to Croatia’s membership of the International Monetary Fund (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

type: rubrik

text: On 19 January 2024, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Croatian Minister for Finance for an opinion on a draft decision on the manner of conducting operations and settling liabilities arising from the membership of the Republic of Croatia in the International Monetary Fund (hereinafter the ‘draft decision’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft decision relates to Hrvatska narodna banka (HNB). In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

type: stycke

text: 1. Purpose of the draft decision

text: 1.1 The purpose of the draft decision is to amend the legal framework governing the relations between Croatia and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which constitutes the Law on accepting membership of the Republic of Croatia of the International Monetary Fund and other international financial organisations on the basis of succession (hereinafter the ‘Law’) and the Decision on the manner of conducting operations and settling liabilities arising from the membership of the Republic of Croatia of the International Monetary Fund and other international financial organisations . The latter would be repealed in its entirety by the draft decision, which would be adopted by the Croatian government pursuant to its powers under Article 6 of the Law and Article 31(2) of the Law on the Government of the Republic of Croatia . 1.2 The draft decision regulates the manner of conducting operations and settling obligations arising from Croatia’s membership of the IMF, shifting certain responsibilities from the Ministry of Finance

text: to HNB. As noted in the explanatory memorandum to the draft decision, the draft decision aims to optimise the distribution of roles between the Ministry of Finance and HNB. As it is expected that Croatia will become a creditor member state of the IMF, this optimisation will be achieved by redefining the roles of the two institutions, authorising the Governor and Deputy Governor of HNB to represent Croatia at the IMF and ensuring compliance with the prohibition on monetary financing. Furthermore, the draft decision obliges Croatia to reimburse certain losses or transaction costs to HNB from the State budget. The purpose of the draft decision is to establish a new legal framework, given that Croatia adopted the euro on 1 January 2023, and it is anticipated that Croatia’s role as a member state of the IMF will include additional obligations and activities . 1.3 The draft decision: (1) authorises the Governor and Deputy Governor of HNB to represent Croatia in the Board of Governors of the IMF in the capacity of Governor and Alternate Governor of the IMF respectively, while in the event that both are temporarily prevented from representing Croatia in the Board of Governors, the Governor of HNB may authorise another person to do so in the capacity of Governor or Alternate Governor of the IMF ; (2) transfers the financial obligations related to Croatia’s quota, which includes past and future payments to the IMF and other obligations based on the quota, from the Ministry of Finance to HNB ; (3) provides that participation in the implementation of the IMF’s Financial Transactions Plan and in special drawing rights (SDRs) trading will now be carried out by HNB from its own resources on behalf of Croatia ; (4) regulates the powers and obligations related to the allocation of SDRs and stipulates that the SDRs allocated by the IMF to Croatia are part of the international reserves of Croatia managed by HNB in accordance with the Law on HNB ; (5) establishes that the Ministry of Finance covers liabilities under the first and second allocation of SDRs, as well as interest rate expenses on those liabilities, on the basis of succession of membership of the IMF following the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia ; (6) regulates the conclusion and implementation of agreements on voluntary trading of SDRs (voluntary trading arrangements) ; and (7) requires the Ministry of Finance and HNB to cooperate and coordinate Croatia’s positions towards the IMF and exchange information in relation to Croatia’s membership of the IMF . 1.4 As noted in the explanatory memorandum to the draft decision, the draft decision also specifies the distribution of roles and obligations in respect of Croatia’s participation in the IMF’s voluntary financial initiatives. This includes, for example, loans under new arrangements to borrow and bilateral borrowing agreements, and loans or donations to trusts managed by the IMF. The latter include the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust and the Resilience and Sustainability Trust . In particular, the draft decision provides that Croatia may participate in the IMF’s voluntary financial

text: initiatives, including loans and grants to the IMF and to the trusts managed by the IMF. When the resources for Croatia’s participation in an IMF voluntary financial initiative in the form of a loan are provided by HNB, the decision on participation in such an initiative is to be adopted by HNB with the prior consent of the Ministry of Finance. When the resources for Croatia’s participation in an IMF voluntary financial initiative are provided from the State budget, the decision on participation is to be adopted by the Croatian government. If participation in an IMF voluntary financial initiative is the subject of an international agreement, the decision on participation is to be adopted in accordance with the Law regulating the entry into and execution of international agreements . The explanatory memorandum to the draft decision notes that, on account of the prohibition on monetary financing, Union national central banks (NCBs), including HNB, are only allowed to grant loans to the IMF and its trusts provided the resulting claims have all the characteristics of reserve assets. Donations or grants can only be financed from budgetary funds. Prior approval of the Ministry of Finance is required for a decision on Croatia’s participation in IMF voluntary financial initiatives for which funds are provided by HNB. The reasons for this are that these contributions can be characterised as development assistance given by Croatia, and that the State undertakes to reimburse possible losses in the event of credit and interest risk materialising in respect of these loans and to reimburse transaction costs in relation to them. 1.5 The draft decision provides that any principal and interest losses, as well as transaction costs, arising from Croatia’s participation in the implementation of the IMF’s Financial Transactions Plan and in the IMF’s voluntary financial initiatives for which the resources are provided by HNB, are to be paid to HNB from the State budget . 1.6 Finally, the draft decision authorises the Ministry of Finance to enter into an agreement with HNB, which is to be concluded within 30 days of the entry into force of the draft decision and which is to detail the manner of conducting operations and settling liabilities to be followed . The draft decision further provides that HNB must, within 30 days of the entry into force of the draft decision, transfer the funds that the Ministry of Finance has paid up to that date for Croatia’s quota in the IMF, at the date of entry into force of the draft decision recorded in HNB’s balance sheet as liabilities towards the Ministry of Finance in relation to membership of the IMF. The funds are to be deposited in a special deposit account of the Ministry with HNB .

text: 2. Monetary financing prohibition

text: 2.1 When carrying out its tasks under the draft decision HNB must comply with Article 123(1) of the Treaty, which prohibits overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facility with the NCBs in favour of central governments. This prohibition is subject to certain exemptions contained in Council

text: Regulation (EC) No 3603/93

text: . In particular,

text: Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 3603/93

text: provides that the financing by NCBs of obligations falling upon the public sector vis-à-vis the IMF is not regarded as a credit facility within the meaning of Article 123 of the Treaty. The fourteenth recital of

text: Regulation (EC) No 3603/93

text: clarifies the rationale behind this exemption, stating that it is appropriate to authorise the financing by the NCBs of obligations falling upon the public sector visà-vis the IMF because such financing ‘results in foreign claims which have all the characteristics of reserve assets’. Therefore, the exemption in

text: Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 3603/93

text: must be interpreted in line with this rationale . 2.2 Against this backdrop, the ECB welcomes that HNB’s financing obligations under the draft decision, read in line with the explanatory memorandum, including as concerns Croatia’s participation in the IMF’s voluntary financial initiatives, are compatible with the limitations imposed by the monetary financing prohibition as specified in

text: Regulation (EC) No 3603/93

text: . Concretely, under the draft decision, HNB may provide loans to the IMF and any IMF-administered trusts that result in foreign claims having all the characteristics of reserve assets, and any donations or grants to the IMF or any IMF-administered trusts may only be financed out of the State’s budgetary funds. 2.3 In addition, the ECB considers that the transfer to the Ministry of Finance’s special deposit account with HNB of the funds paid by the former for Croatia’s quota at the IMF, as referred to in paragraph 1.6, falls within the scope of the exemption in

text: Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 3603/93

text: and therefore does not infringe the monetary financing prohibition .

text: 3. Central bank independence

text: 3.1 Under the draft decision HNB is responsible for paying any future increases in Croatia’s IMF quota, for carrying out SDR trading in the implementation of the IMF’s Financial Transactions Plan from its own resources, and for fulfilling most of Croatia’s financial obligations vis-à-vis the IMF. HNB may also be responsible for the provision of resources in the form of a loan for Croatia’s participation in an IMF voluntary financial initiative. This is consistent with HNB’s overall responsibility to manage Croatia’s international reserves , as HNB’s financing results in foreign claims that have all the characteristics of reserve assets. The ECB understands that in this context and in line with the principle of central bank independence enshrined in Article 130 of the Treaty, HNB should take decisions regarding the management of HNB’s IMF-related international reserves in a fully independent manner. 3.2 From a financial independence perspective, pursuant to which Member States may not put their NCBs in a position where they have insufficient financial resources to carry out their ESCB or Eurosystem-related tasks, the ECB welcomes that any principal and interest losses, as well as transaction costs, arising from Croatia’s participation in the implementation of the IMF’s Financial

text: Transactions Plan and the IMF’s voluntary financial initiatives for which the resources are provided by HNB, are to be paid to HNB from the State budget. However, the ECB notes that currently this reimbursement arrangement under the draft decision does not explicitly cover exchange rate risk on moneys advanced by HNB. This opinion will be published on EUR-Lex. Done in Frankfurt am Main, 26 February 2024. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Christine LAGARDE

type: vagledning

utgivare: ecb


text: Euro kasutusele võtmise seadus, RT I, 31.12.2015, 21.

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 974/98 of 3 May 1998

text: on the introduction of the euro (OJ L 139, 11.5.1998, p. 1).

text: See paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on EUR-Lex.

text: See

text: recital 7

text: of

text: Regulation (EU) No 651/2012

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on the issuance of euro coins (OJ L 201, 27.7.2012, p. 135).

text: See paragraph 2.4 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.4 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: Available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 4 March 2024 on the rounding of cash payments (CON/2024/7)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 04 March 2024 on the rounding of cash payments (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 2 February 2024 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Estonian Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft law amending the Law on the introduction of the euro (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the first and second indents of

text: , as the draft law relates to currency matters and means of payment. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The purpose of the draft law is to introduce the rounding of final amounts payable in cash. Regardless of the quantity of goods and services purchased with a single cash payment, the draft law proposes to round only the total final cash payment, meaning that the prices of the individual items constituting the final amount payable are not rounded. The final amount payable is to be rounded down or up to the closest multiple of five cents. The rounding does not apply if the final amount payable is less than three cents. The rounding rules under the draft law will not apply to payments made via electronic means, such as payment cards. The draft law does not affect the status of one and two cent coins as legal tender: coins in these denominations may continue to be used for payment without restrictions. 1.2 The explanatory memorandum to the draft law explains that the purpose of the draft law is to introduce mandatory rounding rules for one and two cent coins. The national legislator envisages that these rules will lessen the demand for one and two cent coins in the circulation of cash, and as a result lead to (1) reduced costs for the public, and a reduced burden on the environment relating to the minting of new one and two cent coins, which fall out of circulation very quickly;

text: (2) simplification of the procedure for cash payments; and (3) reduction of the administrative and related costs imposed on market participants that relate to the handling, storage, ordering and transportation of coins of a low value and denomination.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 The draft law is not likely to have a real impact on inflation in Estonia, particularly considering that the rounding of prices is symmetrical and confined to final cash amounts to be paid. 2.2 In accordance with Article 128(2) of the Treaty, the competence to adopt measures to harmonise the denomination and technical specifications of all euro coins intended for circulation to the extent necessary to permit their smooth circulation within the Union is vested in the Council of the European Union, on a proposal from the European Commission and after consulting the European Parliament and the ECB. The legal tender status of euro cent coins within the euro area is laid down in

text: Article 11 of Council Regulation (EC) No 974/98

text: . In addition,

text: Article 2 of Regulation (EC) No 974/98

text: provides that the euro, as the currency of the euro area, is divided into one hundred cent. The denomination structure of the euro coins (i.e. 1, 2, 5, 10, 50 euro cent, 1 euro and 2 euro coins) has remained unchanged since the introduction of the euro . However, the use of different denominations of euro coins, as currently devised, should be periodically and carefully examined by the competent institutions against the criteria of cost and public acceptability. In particular, the Commission should conduct an impact assessment on the continued issuance of one and two euro cent coins . In this regard, the Commission has carried out a public consultation on uniform rounding rules for cash payments in euro, with the response period having closed on 11 January 2021. 2.3 With a view to preserving the unity and integrity of the single monetary area, and considering the abovementioned ongoing work of the Commission, the ECB has consistently recommended that any rounding rules are established in a harmonised manner at Union, rather than at national level . Accordingly, and in the light of the Union’s exclusive competence for laying down the measures necessary for the use of the euro as the single currency, any mandatory rounding rules in respect of euro coins would appear to call exclusively for Union rather than national legislation. 2.4 The ECB also considers it important to stress that mandatory rounding legislation must not prevent one and two euro cent coins from being accepted as a means of payment as they are de jure legal tender in the entire euro area. In this respect, Member States’ legislation must not lead to divergent treatment of euro legal tender. In this regard, the ECB understands that the provisions of the draft

text: law do not discharge individuals and businesses from the obligation to accept one and two euro cent coins even after the draft law introduces mandatory rounding. This means that one and two cent coins will remain universally accepted legal tender in Estonia. The ECB considers it crucial that one and two euro cent coins remain universally accepted legal tender for so long and insofar as they remain legal tender under Union law. 2.5 Finally, the ECB notes that the reduced use of one and two euro cent coins as a result of rounding will reduce resource consumption and be supportive of a more efficient use of cash. This is in line with the goals of the Eurosystem’s Cash 2030 strategy to make the cash cycle as cost efficient as possible and to look at the environmental footprint of cash to identify opportunities to reduce its environmental impact.

text: This opinion will be published on EUR-Lex.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 04 March 2024.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Christine LAGARDE


title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 7 March 2024 on requiring credit institutions to provide a minimum cash infrastructure (CON/2024/8)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 07 March 2024 on requiring credit institutions to provide a minimum cash infrastructure (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 26 January 2024 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Dutch Minister for Finance for an opinion on the Law on cash payments (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the first, second and third indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft law relates to currency matters, means of payment and De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB). In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The overall purpose of the draft law is to ensure an adequate level of access to cash services, comprising facilities for both withdrawals and deposits of euro banknotes and coins, throughout the Netherlands by requiring credit institutions with a certain number of account holders to provide a basic cash infrastructure and imposing requirements relating to cash transport services. 1.2 Under the draft law, credit institutions with more than three million payment account holders in the Netherlands are collectively required to ensure the maintenance of a basic cash infrastructure consisting of nationwide and adequate facilities for the withdrawal and deposit of euro banknotes and coins, and to enable their payment account holders to make use of that basic cash infrastructure. Further rules will be laid down on the services that make up the basic cash infrastructure and the requirements to be imposed upon it. The basic cash infrastructure will be accessible to other credit institutions on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms and rates. Credit institutions with more than fifty thousand payment account holders in the Netherlands are required to allow their payment account holders in the Netherlands to make use of the services that make up the basic cash infrastructure for the withdrawal and deposit of euro banknotes and coins.

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42). 1.3 Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council has been duly transposed into Dutch law . The draft law applies to payment accounts within the meaning of Directive

text: and

text: Directive (EU) 2015/2366

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council . Credit institutions that provide payment accounts within the meaning of Directive

text: are already required to provide for the withdrawal of funds to consumers. The draft law seeks to further address the adequacy of the provision of cash withdrawal services to consumers as well as cash deposit services to non-consumers. 1.4 The explanatory memorandum accompanying the draft law notes that although the use of cash in the Netherlands has decreased, cash is important for the proper functioning of payment systems and performs a number of important societal functions. For example, significant groups in society depend on the use of cash because they struggle with electronic forms of payment. Such groups include, for example, people with visual, cognitive or mobile impairments, and seniors. In addition, there are various other groups of people who may prefer to pay in cash, including those who wish to budget more easily, those in education and those who wish to pay anonymously. The explanatory memorandum also notes that cash is, for the time being, the main fallback option in case of disruptions in electronic payments. It also states that cash is the only form of public money and contributes to trust in the wider financial system. 1.5 To achieve its objective of allowing reasonable access to cash, rules on the applicable tariffs are to be adopted, and rules on the applicable conditions may be adopted, in relation to use of the basic cash infrastructure. The tariffs for payment account holders may be set to zero. 1.6 The explanatory memorandum identifies a weakness in the cash infrastructure, which is the dependency on a limited number of companies involved in the transport and processing of cash. To address this risk, the draft law empowers DNB to monitor the continuity of service relating to the transport of cash. As a consequence, designated cash transport companies are required to inform DNB in the event of a material change in their service or in the event that they file for bankruptcy. Cash transport companies are also required to have a resolution plan in place. 1.7 DNB is empowered to enforce the draft law by imposing either an order subject to penalty or an administrative fine on the credit institutions and cash transport companies under the scope of the draft law. 1.8 According to the explanatory memorandum, DNB will not be reimbursed for costs incurred under the draft law. The explanatory memorandum also states that the financing of the DNB’s tasks under the draft law is in line with the prohibition of monetary financing and the DNB’s financial independence under Articles 123 and 130 of the Treaty.

text: 2 Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on the comparability of fees related to payment accounts, payment account switching and access to payment accounts with basic features (OJ L 257, 28.8.2014, p. 214).

text: 3 Wet van 28 september 2006, houdende regels met betrekking tot de financiële markten en het toezicht daarop (Wet op het financieel toezicht) (Stb. 2006,475).

text: Directive (EU) 2015/2366

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on payment services in the internal market, amending Directives

text: and

text: and

text: Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010

text: , and repealing Directive

text: (OJ L 337, 23.12.2015, p. 35).

text: Article 3

text: :267m(1) of the draft law.

text: Article 3

text: :267m(2) of the draft law. 1.9 Finally, the explanatory memorandum notes the relevance to the draft law of the recent Commission proposal for a regulation on the legal tender status of euro banknotes and coins , in particular as concerns the obligation of Member States to ensure sufficient and effective access to cash on their territory and the remedial measures to be taken by a Member State if such access is not sufficiently and effectively guaranteed.

text: 2. Observations

text: 2.1 The ECB understands that electronic payment instruments are increasingly used as the preferred method of payment in the Netherlands, while the use of cash is declining. Despite the digitalisation of the Union economy and the increasing use of electronic means of payment, cash continues to play an important role in society . Cash is a well-established and secure means of payment providing for immediate settlement of debts and direct control over the payer’s spending. It is currently the only payment instrument that allows citizens to settle a transaction in central bank money which is also settled instantly, while, importantly, ensuring privacy . Additionally, cash payments facilitate the inclusion of the entire population in the economy by allowing it to settle any kind of financial transaction in this way, thus ensuring freedom of choice as to method of payment for all citizens . The ECB notes that cash could play an important role in the event of a disturbance in the payment systems, even though cash machines and other service points may also be affected as these are dependent on interaction with the account holding institutions. Furthermore, the ability to pay in cash remains particularly important for certain groups in society that, for various legitimate reasons, prefer to use cash rather than other means of payment, or who do not have access to bank services and electronic means of payments. These groups include disabled citizens, immigrants, socially vulnerable citizens, elderly people, minors and others with limited or no access to digital payment services . 2.2 Notwithstanding that the ECB holds a positive view of further innovation and development in the field of electronic payment instruments, the ECB also welcomes the core objectives of the draft law to facilitate the continued use of cash in Dutch society by ensuring an adequate level of access to cash services throughout the Netherlands. The availability and accessibility of cash and its fallback function in case of disruptions contribute to trust into the financial system, which is important for the smooth functioning of monetary policy.

text: 7 COM(2023) 364 final.

text: 8 See, for example, paragraphs 2.4 and 2.7 of Opinion

text: , paragraphs 2.1 and 2.2 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 4.7 of Opinion

text: of the European Central Bank of 16 February 2022 on a proposal for a directive and a regulation on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing (OJ C 210, 25.5.2022, p. 15) and paragraph 1.7 of Opinion

text: of the European Central Bank of 13 October 2023 on a proposal for a regulation on the legal tender of euro banknotes and coins (OJ C, C/2023/1355, 1.12.2023). The ECB has stated its neutrality regarding different means of payment, which means that it does not favour one instrument over another. See paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: 9 See paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: 10 See Opinions

text: and

text: 11 See paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: . 2.3 The ECB considers it important that all Member States take appropriate measures to ensure that credit institutions and branches operating within their territories provide adequate access to cash services, in order to facilitate the continued use of cash . Sufficient and effective access to cash is necessary to preserve the effectiveness of the legal tender status of cash. If citizens do not have easy access to cash, they will not be able to use it as a means of payment . 2.4 The ECB welcomes the orders subject to penalty and administrative fines that may be imposed on credit institutions and cash transport companies under the draft law, which should facilitate the enforcement of their collective obligations under the draft law. 2.5 The ECB notes that the role assigned to DNB under the draft law does not raise concerns of compatibility with the prohibition of monetary financing and central bank independence requirements under Articles 123 and 130 of the Treaty. 2.6 The draft law seems aligned with the Commission proposal for a regulation on the legal tender status of euro banknotes and coins, which includes the obligation for Member States to ensure sufficient and effective access to cash throughout their territory. The imposition in the draft law of new obligations on credit institutions and cash transport companies, as specialised service providers for credit institutions, will contribute to ensuring that cash remains available in the Netherlands. This opinion will be published on EUR-Lex. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 07 March 2024. [signed] The President of the ECB Christine LAGARDE

text: 12 See paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 3.3 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: 13 See paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 1.2 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: . See also Principle 6 of ELTEG III in the Final report of the Euro Legal Tender Expert Group (ELTEG) of 6 July 2022, available on the Commission’s website at www.ec.europa.eu.


text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).

text: Bundesgesetz vom 23. Juni 1971 über die Erhöhung der Quote Österreichs beim Internationalen Währungsfonds und die Übernahme der gesamten Quote durch die Oesterreichische Nationalbank, BGBl 309/1971. 3

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 of 13 December 1993

text: specifying definitions for the application of the prohibitions referred to in Articles

text: and

text: b (1) of the Treaty (OJ L 332, 31.12.1993, p. 1). 4 See Opinion

text: , which concerns the last increase of Austria’s quota in the IMF. See also Opinions

text: and

text: . All ECB Opinions are published on EUR-Lex.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 19 March 2024 on the increase of Austria’s quota in the International Monetary Fund (CON/2024/9)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 19 March 2024 on the increase of Austria’s quota in the International Monetary Fund (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 20 February 2024 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Austrian Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft law on the increase of Austria’s quota in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft law relates to the Oesterreichische Nationalbank (OeNB). In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 As noted in the explanatory memorandum to the draft law, the purpose of the draft law is to increase Austria’s quota in the IMF. On 15 December 2023, the IMF Board of Governors finalised the Sixteenth General Review of Quotas and agreed to a 50 % increase in quotas while maintaining the existing relative quota shares. The quotas are expected to increase by 238.6 billion Special Drawing Rights (SDR) to SDR 715.7 billion. The Board of Governors’ resolution also states that the IMF’s lending capacity should be maintained and its dependence on borrowed funds reduced. This is to be achieved by reducing the New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB) and phasing out bilateral borrowing agreements. The IMF member countries have until 15 November 2024 to agree to a corresponding increase in their quotas. This increase comes into force only when (1) IMF member countries that together hold no less than 85 % of the previous quota funds have agreed to the increase and (2) the participants under the NAB agree to a reduction in the NAB. 1.2 The draft law incorporates the IMF quota increase into Austrian law. In particular, Austria’s quota will increase from SDR 3 932 million to SDR 5 898 million. The draft law entitles and obliges the OeNB to assume Austria’s additional quota in the IMF. The explanatory memorandum to the draft law notes that the authorisation for the OeNB to assume the entire Austrian quota also applies to future increases in accordance with the Law of 23 June 1971 on the increase of Austria’s IMF quota and

text: the transfer of the entire quota by the OeNB . According to Article 2(1) of this Law, the OeNB is authorised to fulfil all financial commitments resulting from Austria’s membership of the IMF.

text: 2. General observation

text: The issues raised in this opinion are likely to be relevant for other Member States legislating to facilitate an increase in their respective quotas in the IMF in response to the IMF’s Sixteenth General Review of Quotas.

text: 3. Monetary financing prohibition

text: Article 123(1) of the Treaty prohibits the national central banks (NCBs) from granting overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facility to public authorities and bodies of the Member States.

text: Article 1 of Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93

text: defines ‘any other type of credit facility’, inter alia, as ‘any financing of the public sector’s obligations vis-à-vis third parties’. However,

text: Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 3603/93

text: provides that the financing by NCBs of obligations falling upon the public sector vis-à-vis the IMF is not regarded as a credit facility within the meaning of Article 123(1) of the Treaty. The fourteenth recital of

text: Regulation (EC) No 3603/93

text: sets out the rationale behind this exemption, stating that it is appropriate to authorise the financing by the NCBs of obligations falling upon the public sector vis-à-vis the IMF because such financing results in ‘claims which have all the characteristics of reserve assets’. Therefore, the exemption set out in

text: Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 3603/93

text: should be interpreted in line with that rationale. As the payment by the OeNB of the proposed increase in Austria’s IMF quota would result in claims which have all the characteristics of reserve assets, the draft law complies with the monetary financing prohibition .

text: This opinion will be published on EUR-Lex.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 19 March 2024

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Christine LAGARDE


text: Ustawa z dnia 9 października 2015 r. o wsparciu kredytobiorców, którzy zaciągnęli kredyt mieszkaniowy i znajdują się w trudnej sytuacji finansowej (consolidated text: Dz. U. of 2022, item 2452).

text: Ustawa z dnia 7 lipca 2022 r. o finansowaniu społecznościowym dla przedsięwzięć gospodarczych i pomocy kredytobiorcom (consolidated text: Dziennik Ustaw z 2023 r., poz. 414).

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).

text: See

text: Article 3(1)

text: , point (3), of the Law on support to home loan borrowers in a difficult financial situation in connection with Article 8(1) of the Law on social assistance (Ustawa z dnia 12 marca 2004 r. o pomocy społecznej, consolidated text: Dz. U. of 2023, item 901).

text: Ustawa z dnia 26 października 1995 r. o społecznych formach rozwoju mieszkalnictwa (consolidated text: Dziennik Ustaw of 2023, item 790).

text: See Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on EUR-Lex.

text: See Opinion

text: See paragraph 3.6 of Opinion

text: “Recommendation S”, FSC, published on the website of the Polish Financial Supervisory authority available at www.knf.gov.pl.

text: See also opinion of Narodowy Bank Polski on an earlier version of the draft law published on the website of the governmental legislation office available at https://rcl.gov.pl/. 12 See paragraph 4.3 of Opinion

text: See paragraph 5.1 of Opinion

text: . 14 See paragraph 3.3 of Opinion

text: . 15 See paragraph 5.2 of Opinion

text: . 17 See paragraph 2.4 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.4 of Opinion

text: , paragraphs 2.1.1 and 2.2.3 of Opinion

text: , and paragraphs 2.3 and 3.1.4 of Opinion

text: . 18 See paragraph 5.4 of Opinion

text: . 19 See paragraph 5.5 of Opinion

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 8 April 2024 on borrower support and mortgage holidays (CON/2024/10)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 8 April 2024 on borrower support and mortgage holidays (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 18 March 2024 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Marshal of the Polish Parliament for an opinion on a draft law amending (1) the Law on support to home loan borrowers in a difficult situation as it relates to the Borrower Support Fund and (2) the Law on crowdfunding for business ventures and assistance to borrowers as it relates to mortgage holidays (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the sixth indent of

text: , as the draft law relates to rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets, and the ECB’s tasks concerning the prudential supervision of credit institutions pursuant to Article 127(6) of the Treaty. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 Law on support to home loan borrowers in a difficult situation 1.1.1 The Law on support to home loan borrowers in a difficult situation specifies the rules for the granting of, and the conditions of use of, repayable financial aid to natural persons in financial difficulties with a home loan (hereinafter ‘financial aid’). Financial aid is provided through a State-owned bank, Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego (BGK), from a special Borrower Support Fund funded by credit institutions. The Law on support to home loan borrowers in a difficult situation covers any home loans that are secured by a mortgage arrangement, regardless of the currency in which they were granted. The funding of the Borrower Support Fund was increased in 2022 by the Law on crowdfunding for business ventures and assistance to borrowers (hereinafter the ‘Law on mortgage holidays’).

text: 1.1.2 Under the Law on support to home loan borrowers in a difficult situation, financial aid may be granted if: (1) when applying for financial aid at least one of the borrowers is an unemployed person; or (2) the proportion of the borrower’s expenses allocated to paying monthly instalments of principal and interest on a home loan exceeds 50 % of the borrower’s household income; or (3) the monthly household income minus any monthly costs related to the home loan is lower than Polish zloty (PLN) 1552 for a single-person household or PLN 1200 per person for a multi-person household (these amounts are subject to adjustment every three years) . 1.1.3 The duration of financial aid is 36 months, and the maximum amount of financial aid is equal to PLN 2 000 per month, up to a maximum of PLN 72 000 over three years. Persons receiving financial aid must start to repay the funds received, at the latest, in the month following the month that marks two years since the last tranche of financial aid was paid out. The funds are to be repaid in 144 equal and interest-free monthly instalments. However, if the borrower repays 100 instalments without any delay the remaining 44 instalments will be cancelled. 1.1.4 The draft law proposes to liberalise the granting of, and the conditions of use of, the financial aid. In particular, with respect to the eligibility criteria, the draft law proposes to: (1) lower the proportion of the borrower’s expenditure allocated to paying monthly instalments of principal and interest on a home loan by reference to the borrower’s household income from 50 % to 40 %; and (2) increase the amount resulting from deducting from the monthly household income any monthly costs related to the home loan from PLN 1552 to PLN 1940 for a single-person household and from PLN 1200 to PLN 1500 per person for a multi-person household. 1.1.5 In addition, the draft law proposes to: (1) extend the duration of financial aid from 36 to 40 months; (2) increase the maximum monthly amount of financial aid from PLN 2 000 to PLN 3 000 and consequently increase the maximum over the entire duration of the financial aid from PLN 72 000 to PLN 120 000; and (3) increase the number of monthly repayments from 144 to 200 with the consequential amendment that if the borrower repays 134 instalments (as opposed to 100 under the current version of the Law on support to home loan borrowers in a difficult situation) without delay the remaining 66 (as opposed to 44) instalments will be cancelled. 1.2 Law on mortgage holidays 1.2.1 The Law on mortgage holidays introduced the concept of mortgage holidays into Polish law to alleviate the burden on borrowers with outstanding mortgage loans following several increases in interest rates by Narodowy Bank Polski. The Law on mortgage holidays gave consumers with outstanding mortgage loans in PLN the right to suspend mortgage payments resulting from one loan agreement, concluded before 1 July 2022, for eight months in 2022 and 2023, comprising four months in 2022 and one month during each quarter in 2023. The only eligibility criteria specified in the Law on mortgage holidays were that the loan must be denominated in PLN and satisfy the borrower’s housing needs.

text: 1.2.2 The draft law proposes to extend the borrower’s right to benefit from a mortgage holiday also in 2024. Under the draft law borrowers may suspend loan repayments for two months in the period from 1 May to 30 June 2024 and for one month in each quarter in the period from 1 July to 31 December 2024. 1.2.3 The draft law also lays down eligibility criteria to limit the scope of borrowers entitled to request a mortgage holiday, under which this right is available to any borrower the total amount of whose loan does not exceed PLN 1 200 000. According to the explanatory memorandum, this amount, which is three times the average value of a home loan in 2023, will ensure that borrowers who do not need them will not use mortgage holidays and, on the other hand, take into account real estate prices in big cities. 1.2.4 In addition, under the draft law, suspension of the loan repayment will only be possible for a borrower (1) for whom the arithmetic average ratio between expenses related to servicing the monthly instalment of principal and interest on the loan and monthly household income exceeds 30 % in the last three months before the submission of the application for a mortgage holiday; or (2) who at the time of submission of such application has at least three dependent children. 1.3 Suspension of repayment of loans granted under the Law on social forms of housing development 1.3.1 The draft law proposes to extend the right of social housing investors to request suspension of repayment of the preferential loan granted by BGK in accordance with the provisions of the Law on social forms of housing development . In particular, investors may suspend loan repayments for two months in each of the periods from 1 May to 30 June 2024 and from 1 July to 31 December 2024. At the same time, the draft law proposes that the suspension of loan repayments should be linked to the restriction on rates that may be charged by investors to the tenants living in housing constructed with the benefit of the preferential loan. In particular, such charges may not exceed those in force on 31 December 2023 during the period of loan repayment suspension.

text: 2. General observation

text: In March 2023 the ECB adopted an own-initiative opinion on the Law on mortgage holidays and in December 2023 it adopted an opinion on two draft laws amending the Law on mortgage holidays.

text: 3. Borrower Support Fund

text: 3.1 The ECB previously encouraged the Polish authorities to carry out a thorough analysis to consider the active use of the Borrower Support Fund before introducing solutions relating to mortgage holidays . 3.2 In that respect the ECB welcomes the draft law’s objective of enabling the wider use of the Borrower Support Fund. However, the ECB cautions against an extensive widening of the eligibility criteria for access to the Borrower Support Fund. In particular, the scale of the proposed relaxation in the eligibility criteria would lead to a situation in which new loans granted in accordance with prudential recommendations on creditworthiness assessment would immediately qualify for support from the Borrower Support Fund. This might in turn discourage banks from granting such loans, leading to limited access to credit for borrowers with a lower income. With that in mind, the ECB encourages the Polish authorities to reassess the effect the proposed eligibility criteria may have on access to credit. At the same time, the ECB questions whether further extension of mortgage holidays will, in practice, reduce incentives to use the Fund .

text: 4. Eligibility criteria for mortgage holidays

text: 4.1 As mentioned by the ECB on a number of occasions, granting concessions, such as payment holidays, to borrowers facing financial difficulties can support financial stability under certain circumstances by, for example, allowing such borrowers to recover from temporary liquidity shortages, while enabling lenders to maintain client relationships and avoid selling collateral at depressed prices . 4.2 The ECB welcomes that the draft law proposes to introduce specific eligibility criteria. At the same time, as previously noted by the ECB, governments are equipped with better tools to support the economy other than the mandatory restructuring of loans within the banking system, such as directly supporting distressed borrowers or compensating banks for losses caused by a moratorium in the public interest .

text: 5. Impact of the draft law on the banking system and on financial stability

text: 5.1 Widespread payment holidays give rise to financial stability concerns. On the one hand, where borrowers face debt sustainability problems, payment holidays may delay the recognition and resolution of non-performing debt, which increases its economic cost. On the other hand, if borrowers who are able to make payments benefit from a payment holiday, the negative financial impact will unduly reduce bank profitability and increase uncertainty. The impact of payment holidays on banks’ profitability is further exacerbated by a scheme under which the repayment period is extended in

text: accordance with the number of deferred instalments. Under these circumstances, the value of the loan decreases due to the non-payment of instalments on it during the repayment suspension period . 5.2 Reduced bank profitability means in turn that banks have reduced capacity to retain earnings and thus to increase the capital needed to absorb losses and back future loan origination. This, together with increased uncertainty, ultimately limits prospective borrowers’ access to credit, including mortgage loans, and could therefore lead to adverse feedback loops between the banking sector and the real economy. In addition, large losses resulting from payment holidays may threaten banks’ solvency , particularly if the loan portfolio subject to payment holidays constitutes a large proportion of their assets or if their profitability is already low . 5.3 In such circumstances, uncertainties arising from the impact of the draft law on credit institutions may potentially decrease their franchise value. Consequently, credit institutions may face increased difficulty in attracting investors in respect of the potential raising of equity or issuance of bonds to meet capital requirements and minimum requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities. Had banks known in advance that such a change to the legislation affecting their contractual agreements with borrowers would be made, they could (and most likely would) have protected themselves by charging higher mortgage interest rates or, in the last resort, not lending at all. This means that the draft law not only allows mortgage borrowers a payment holiday, but that borrowers may in fact receive a financial transfer from their lenders . 5.4 Additionally, the ECB has pointed out in several opinions that the ability of financial institutions to effectively manage credit risk depends on a reliable, predictable and stable legal framework that adequately balances the interests of both the creditor and the debtor . 5.5 Considering that the payment holidays, albeit in a different form, are being applied for the third year in a row, the ECB highlights that continuous and widespread payment holidays, especially but not limited to those that disregard the actual financial position of the relevant debtors, may contribute to increasing moral hazard among debtors, who may assume that such holidays will be extended and adjust their behaviour accordingly . 5.6 As indicated above, the ECB suggests that, before introducing new solutions, it may be advisable to first make use of the instruments that are already available, such as the Borrowers Support Fund .

text: 5.7 Several systemically important euro area banks hold significant Polish mortgage loan exposures. Therefore, extended mortgage holidays as provided for in the draft law may have negative consequences for financial stability in the euro area, as well as in Poland . This opinion will be published on EUR-Lex. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 8 April 2024. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Christine LAGARDE


title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 26 April 2024 on the legal framework for the High Council for Financial Stability (CON/2024/11)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 26 April 2024 on the legal framework for the High Council for Financial Stability (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 23 January 2024, a draft law related to the French Haut Conseil de Stabilité financière (HCSF, High Council for Financial Stability) (hereinafter the ‘draft law’), which modifies Articles L.631-2 et seq. of the Code monétaire et financier (CMF, Monetary and Financial Code), the current wording of which results from the 2013 Law on the separation and regulation of banking activities , was presented for consideration by the French National Assembly. The draft law was amended by the Finance Committee of the French National Assembly on 10 April 2024. Although the draft law provides that the consultation of the European Central Bank (ECB) under Article 127(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union is a requirement for the second article of the draft law to enter into force, the ECB has not, as of the time of adoption of this opinion, been consulted by the French authorities on the draft law. The ECB has decided to deliver an own initiative opinion on the draft law. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Article 127(4), second paragraph, and Article 282(5) of the Treaty, as the draft law relates to the Banque de France and to the European System of Central Banks’ task to contribute to the smooth conduct of policies relating to the stability of financial system pursuant to Article 127(5) of the Treaty. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The draft law modifies the CMF with the intention of overhauling the legal framework governing the activities of the HCSF, which was first established in 2010, and then significantly revamped in 2013. 1.2 In 2010, the Law on banking and financial regulation established the Conseil de la régulation financière et du risque systémique (Corefris, Council of Financial Regulation and Systemic Risk). This was composed of the Minister for the Economy, who also chaired it, the Governor of the Banque de France, the Vice-President of the Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de résolution (ACPR, Prudential Supervision and Resolution Authority), the President of the Autorité des marchés

text: 1 The draft law proposes to amend Articles L.631-2 and L.631-2-1 of the CMF.

text: 2 Loi n° 2013-672 du 26 juillet 2013 de séparation et de régulation des activités bancaires, JORF n° 0173 du 27 juillet 2013, texte n° 1.

text: 3 See Article 2, II, of the draft law.

text: 4 The draft law proposes to amend Articles L.631-2 and L.631-2-1 of the CMF.

text: 5 Loi n° 2010-1249 du 22 octobre 2010 de régulation bancaire et financière, JORF n° 0247 du 23 octobre 2010, texte n° 1. financiers (Financial Markets Authority), the President of the Autorité des normes comptables (Accounting Standards Authority) and three qualified individuals appointed for their expertise in monetary, financial or economic matters by the Minister for the Economy. At a time when discussions at the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision on macroprudential instruments were still ongoing and Union legislation was yet to introduce such an instrument, the main task of Corefris was to monitor financial stability, especially systemic risks, and foster cooperation between the different institutions represented. 1.3 In 2013, while unchanged in its composition and governance (apart from the nomination of the qualified individuals now resting with the Chairpersons of both chambers of Parliament and the Minister, each of them nominating one qualified individual), the legal framework governing the activities of Corefris was substantially overhauled, in line with Union law . Corefris became the HCSF and was granted six tasks: (1) to foster cooperation between the different institutions represented ; (2) to analyse systemic risks taking into account the opinions and recommendations of European 8 9 authorities ; (3) to issue opinions and recommendations ; (4) to adopt legally binding measures to address systemic risks ; (5) to recommend to the relevant European authorities the adoption of measures preventing any systemic risk to the financial stability of France ; and (6) to facilitate the cooperation of its members with a view to contributing to the adoption of European or international norms . 1.4 The draft law intends to modify both the composition and the legal framework of the HCSF. According to the explanatory note to the draft law, the aim pursued is twofold. First, the draft law aims at increasing the democratic aspect in the adoption of the HCSF’s decisions by changing the composition of the HCSF. Second, the draft law intends to constrain the HCSF’s power to adopt legally binding measures setting the conditions for granting credit with a view to preventing the emergence of excessive upward movements in the prices of assets of any kind or excessive indebtedness on the part of economic agents (hereinafter ‘borrower-based measures’). 2. Consultation of ECB by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions 2.1 As noted above, the draft law sets out that the consultation of the ECB under Article 127(4) of the Treaty is a requirement for the second article of the draft law to enter into force. Under Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty, the ECB must be consulted by national authorities regarding any draft legislative provision in its fields of competence, but within the limits and under the conditions set out in

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: . In accordance with

text: Article 4 of Decision 98/415/EC

text: , each Member

text: 6 Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive

text: and repealing Directives

text: and

text: (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 338).

text: 7 Article L.631-2-1, 1°, of the CMF.

text: 8 Article L.631-2-1, 2°, of the CMF.

text: 9 Article L.631-2-1, 3°, of the CMF.

text: 10 Article L.631-2-1, 4°, 4° bis, 4° ter, 5°, 5° bis and 5° ter, of the CMF.

text: 11 Article L.631-2-1, 6°, of the CMF.

text: 12 Article L.631-2-1, 7°, of the CMF.

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42). State must ensure that the ECB is consulted at an appropriate stage enabling the authority initiating the draft legislative provision to take into consideration the ECB’s opinion before taking its decision on the substance. 2.2 Based on this, the ECB should be consulted not only in respect of a single article, but on the draft law in its entirety prior to its adoption .

text: 3. Changes to the nomination and appointment of the members of the HCSF

text: 3.1 Composition of the HCSF 3.1.1 The draft law introduces changes to the nomination and appointment of the members of the HCSF. To that end the draft law provides for an increase in the number of members sitting in the HCSF from eight to ten. These two new members to be appointed are both members of the French Parliament, respectively a member of the National Assembly and a member of the Senate. 3.1.2 In this respect, the draft law also requires that, following the increase in appointed members, the two members of Parliament to be appointed are chosen so that gender balance is achieved at the HCSF level; the current arrangement provides that the three qualified representatives are chosen so that the overall composition of the HCSF tends to be gender balanced. 3.1.3 In its previous opinions on macroprudential oversight the ECB expressed support for the design of effective macroprudential policy frameworks within Member States, in line with the guiding principles set out in Recommendation

text: of the European Systemic Risk Board . It should be highlighted that the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) recommends that national central banks should have a leading role in macroprudential oversight because of their expertise and their existing responsibilities in the area of financial stability. The ECB takes note that this principle is also indicated by

text: Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council . In addition, Recommendation

text: also recommends that, in the pursuit of its objective, the macroprudential authority is as a minimum operationally independent, in particular from political bodies. This includes that organisational and financial arrangements do not jeopardise the conduct of macroprudential policy. In this regard, the ESRB, in its 2014 Compliance Report on the implementation of Recommendation 2011/3, considered that France was only partially compliant with regard to Recommendation E on independence, as the government was deemed to play a leading role in the macroprudential authority .

text: 14 See paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on EUR-Lex. See also Guide to consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions, pp. 18-20, available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: 15 See, for example, paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: 16 Recommendation

text: of the European Systemic Risk Board of 22 December 2011 on the macro-prudential mandate of national authorities (OJ C 41, 14.2.2012, p. 1).

text: Recital 24

text: of

text: Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010

text: on European Union macro-prudential oversight of the financial system and establishing a European Systemic Board (OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 1).

text: 18 On the other hand, the power conferred on the Governor of the Banque de France to propose measures was assessed as a positive organisational feature of the HCSF. See European Systemic Risk Board, ESRB Recommendation on the macro-prudential mandate of national authorities (

text: ) Follow-up Report – Overall assessment, June 2014, available on the ESRB’s website at www.esrb.europa.eu. 3.1.4 The simultaneous increase in the number of members and the fact that these new members with voting rights are members of Parliament alters the composition of the HCSF. The number of HCSF members would increase to ten, with members who are politically appointed or representing political bodies now due to increase to six . Consequently, in its current form, the draft law risks further conflict with the principles sets out in ESRB Recommendation 2011/3, which recommends that the macroprudential authority should be as a minimum operationally independent, in particular from political bodies . This risk of conflict is potentially reinforced by the fact that to break a tie among the members of the HCSF during a vote the Minister for the Economy holds the casting vote . These changes de facto result in a dilution of the representation of technical bodies in the HCSF, including, but not limited to, the Banque de France and the ACPR. 3.1.5 In the light of the above, the ECB invites the French legislator to further reflect on how best to maintain the balance of powers and responsibilities within the HCSF. 3.2 Gender-balanced representation The ECB takes note of and welcomes the arrangements to further strengthen gender-balanced representation in the HCSF. 3.3 Hearing before the Parliament of the qualified candidates 3.3.1 The draft law provides that the three qualified individuals sitting on the HCSF are to be appointed after being heard by the Finance Committees of the National Assembly and the Senate. 3.3.2 The ECB understands that the hearing of the nominated qualified candidates before the French Parliament does not amount to a formal vote of approbation from the Parliament in respect of the candidates. This does not constitute a material change in the procedure to appoint the qualified candidates. The choice to appoint these qualified candidates to the HCSF continues to reflect the sole decision of, respectively, the President of the National Assembly, the President of the Senate and the Minister for the Economy.

text: 4 Amendments to the framework for setting borrower-based measures in France

text: 4.1 Summary of amendments 4.1.1 The draft law introduces substantial changes to the powers enjoyed by the HCSF with the aim of limiting the application of borrower-based measures . In this regard, the draft law also introduces a three-month sunset clause requiring the HCSF to periodically review and consult on a HCSF decision regarding a borrower-based measure . Moreover, it makes explicit that the HCSF, upon a proposal made by the Governor of the Banque de France, can set exemptions in respect of borrower-based

text: 19 Under the draft law, the HCSF is composed of six members who are either representatives of, or appointed by, political authorities: three qualified individuals (appointed, as has been the case since 2013, respectively by the Minister for the Economy, the President of the Senate and the President of the National Assembly), the Minister for the Economy and two members of the French Parliament.20 See Section I of Recommendation

text: 20 See Section I of Recommendation

text: 21 Article R.631-8, II, of the CMF.

text: 22 Adopted under Article L.631-2-1, 5°, of the CMF. rd

text: 23 In Article L.631-2-1, 5°, 3 sentence, of the CMF. measures as part of its decisions on their adoption. Finally, the draft law amends the rules governing the publication of proposals made by the Governor to the HCSF to adopt borrower-based measures. 4.1.2 The ECB recalls its support for the implementation of a legislative framework for borrower-based measures in all euro area Member States, which are known to be effective in addressing macroprudential and systemic risks . The availability of a comprehensive set of borrower-based measures, including income-based measures, enables the HCSF to respond in a flexible and proportionate way to potential risks to financial stability. 4.1.3 The ECB understands that under the draft law, any proposal on borrower-based measures would have to be made by the Governor of the Banque de France, and that only a formal proposal from the Governor would be put to a vote among the members of the HCSF. The ECB also understands that the Governor of the Banque de France also retains the power to define in any such proposal the exemptions for borrower-based measures. The ECB supports the central role assigned to the Governor of the Banque de France to propose and define the conditions under which borrower-based measures are to be adopted and then implemented. 4.2 The sunset clause in respect of the borrower-based measures 4.2.1 As noted in paragraph 4.1.1, the draft law adds a sunset clause under which borrower-based measures, including any exemptions in respect of such measures, are in force for up to three months and are reassessed by the HCSF after consulting the Comité consultatif du secteur financier (CCSF, Consultative Committee for the Financial Sector), which is a consultative body composed of financial services stakeholders, before potentially being renewed. In this regard, the ECB notes that the consultation of the CCSF may further impact upon the effectiveness and independence of the HCSF’s decision-making process, as the members of such consultative body are appointed by the Minister for the Economy, among representatives of the financial sector and consumers of financial services, and also include a member of the National Assembly and a member of the Senate. The ECB further notes that the very limited timeframe during which borrower-based measures are in force would severely jeopardise their effectiveness in tackling risks to financial stability. 4.2.2 Borrower-based measures are macroprudential limits to lending standards, such as debt-to-serviceincome, debt-to-income and loan-to-value ratios, as well as maturity and amortisation requirements, that generally apply only to newly originated loans. The availability of a comprehensive set of borrower-based measures, including income-based measures, enables the relevant authorities to respond in a flexible and proportionate way to potential risks to financial stability. Against this background, it should be recalled that including exemptions in respect of borrower-based measures is a common practice in their design. The calibration of borrower-based measures, including possible exemptions, should be informed by thorough technical impact assessments conducted by the macroprudential authorities . A limited period of applicability would not allow for a proper technical assessment of borrower-based measures, potentially hindering the achievement of their financial stability objectives, namely increasing the resilience of both borrowers and banks.

text: 24 See paragraph 3.2 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 3.1 of Opinion

text: 25 Under Article L.631-2-1, 5°, of the CMF. 4.2.3 The very strict timeframe of three months, coupled with a cumbersome extension procedure, would jeopardise the effective implementation of borrower-based measures. 4.2.4 These characteristics explain why in other Union jurisdictions the review of borrower-based measures, when it is required, takes place after a longer period of time. For example, in Austria, borrower-based measures are effective for a period of up to three years . In Ireland, the macroprudential authority in general considers borrower-based measures to be permanent in nature and their calibration to be largely driven by structural factors and does not therefore envisage regular calibration changes. In this respect, structural factors are seen as slow-moving features that play a role in determining, for example, the magnitude of risks to affordability or a sustainable level of house prices relative to incomes . 4.2.5 In the light of the above, the ECB suggests that any sunset clause for borrower-based measures should extend over a sufficiently long period of time. 4.3 Publication of proposals made by the Governor of the Banque de France to adopt legally binding measures 4.3.1 The draft law introduces new requirements regarding the publication of proposals made by the Governor of the Banque de France under the relevant provisions of the CMF . The ECB understands that the draft law requires the publication of all proposals made by the Governor of the Banque de France pertaining to borrower-based measures , while it remains at the discretion of the Governor that proposals concerning other legally binding macroprudential measures may be published. 4.3.2 The ECB acknowledges the intention of this amendment to enhance transparency in the work of the HCSF but considers that the introduction of what amounts to a dual regime regarding publication of proposals made by the Governor of the Banque de France may have detrimental effects. The differentiated treatment of proposals increases the constraints on the actions of the Governor and may ultimately affect the reputation of the Banque de France by requiring the publication of market sensitive proposals in circumstances in which it may not always be appropriate to do so. 4.3.3 In addition, the potential application of a differentiated regime of transparency suggests that the proposals made by the Governor of the Banque de France are not equally considered. The ECB therefore recommends aligning the regime governing the disclosure of the Governor’s proposals regarding borrower-based measures with the provision currently governing the publication of the other proposals. At the very least, the ECB suggests including a provision giving the Governor the right to veto the publication of any proposals where this is considered necessary to preserve financial stability. 4.3.4 Should the provisions of the draft law become subject to further amendments in the course of the parliamentary process, and should these amendments substantially alter the draft law compared to

text: 26 See

text: Article 23

text: h of the Austrian Banking Act.

text: 27 See Central Bank of Ireland, The Central Bank’s framework for the macroprudential mortgage measures (October 2022), p. 22.

text: 28 See Article L.631-2-1, 4°, 4° bis, 4° ter, 5°, 5° bis and 5° ter, of the CMF.

text: 29 See Article L.631-2-1, 5°, of the CMF.

text: 30 Under Article L.631-2-1, 5°, and under Article L.631-2-1, 4°, 4° bis, 4° ter, 5° bis and 5° ter, of the CMF.

text: 31 Under Article L.631-2-1, 5°, of the CMF. the version on which the ECB expressed its opinion, the ECB would need to be consulted on these amendments . This opinion will be published on EUR-Lex. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 26 April 2024. [signed] The President of the ECB Christine LAGARDE

text: 32 See, for example, paragraph 3.4 of Opinion