text: With respect to the ECB’s comments on the current Latvian minimum reserve system, see ECB Opinions

text: and

text: . All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 4 This is expected with effect from 1 January 2014.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 2 July 2013 on reserve requirements in connection with the introduction of the euro (CON/2013/47)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 2 July 2013 on reserve requirements in connection with the introduction of the euro (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 21 May 2013, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from Latvijas Banka for an opinion on (a) a draft regulation amending the Regulation on calculating and fulfilling the minimum reserve requirements for credit institutions (hereinafter the ‘draft amending regulation’), (b) a draft regulation on the preparation of the calculation of the reserve base and reserve requirement for credit unions (hereinafter the ‘draft regulation on credit unions’), and (c) a draft regulation on the preparation of the calculation of the reserve base and reserve requirement (hereinafter the ‘draft regulation on minimum reserves’) (hereinafter collectively referred to as the ‘draft regulations’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and

text: Article 2(2) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft regulations relate to instruments of monetary policy. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft regulations

text: The draft amending regulation provides for a transitional period for credit institutions by extending the last reserve maintenance period prior to the introduction of the euro in Latvia and by introducing a new calculation of minimum reserves, based on that used for the Eurosystem’s minimum reserve system. The draft regulation on credit unions introduces transitional provisions for calculating the reserve base of credit unions and lays down the reserve requirements for the initial maintenance periods following the date of the introduction of the euro in Latvia. The draft regulation on minimum reserves will repeal both of the abovementioned regulations, resulting in a single regulation that consolidates Latvian law on reserve requirements. It will enter into force on the date when the Council of the European Union has abrogated the derogation granted to Latvia pursuant to Article 140(2) of the Treaty.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 The ECB welcomes the changes to Latvian law that will be brought about under the draft regulations as part of the preparations for the introduction of the euro in Latvia. Within the framework of monetary policy, which remains a competence of Latvijas Banka until the introduction of the euro, the draft regulations will align the current Latvian minimum reserve system with the Eurosystem standards that will apply after the introduction of the euro , a necessary step identified in previous ECB opinions on Latvijas Banka’s reserve requirements. 2.2 The ECB considers that the provisions preparing for the application of reserve requirements to credit unions are timely and appropriate. This temporary legislation should help Latvian institutions to familiarise themselves with the Eurosystem’s requirements and ensure a smooth transition to compliance with the Eurosystem minimum reserve system from the date of abrogation of Latvia’s derogation. Once Latvia introduces the euro, the draft regulation on minimum reserves will apply with the result that minimum reserves will be calculated and notified in line with Regulation ECB/2003/9 of the European Central Bank on the application of minimum reserves . 2.3 Once the Council decides to abrogate Latvia’s derogation , the ECB may, in the coming months, decide to introduce specific arrangements for the transitional period as institutions in Latvia become subject to the ECB’s minimum reserve system. It is envisaged that these arrangements will, inter alia, establish both a transitional maintenance period for institutions located in Latvia and transitional provisions for other euro area institutions subject to reserve requirements in relation to their liabilities towards such Latvian institutions.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 2 July 2013.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: COM(2013) 337 final.

text: COM(2013) 492 final.

publisher: Europeiska centralbanken

sprak: sv

title: Europeiska centralbankens yttrande av den 5 juli 2013 om ett förslag till rådets förordning om ändring av förordning (EG) nr 974/98 vad gäller införandet av euron i Lettland och ett förslag till rådets förordning om ändring av förordning (EG) nr 2866/98 vad gäller omräkningskursen till euron för Lettland (CON/2013/48)

serie: con

text: Inledning och rättslig grund

type: rubrik

text: Den 18 juni 2013 mottog Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) en begäran från Europeiska unionens råd om ett yttrande över ett förslag till rådets förordning om ändring av förordning

text: (EG) nr 974/98

text: vad gäller införandet av euron i Lettland. Den 3 juli 2013 mottog ECB en begäran från Europeiska unionens råd om ett yttrande över ett förslag till rådets förordning om ändring av förordning

text: (EG) nr 2866/98

text: vad gäller omräkningskursen till euron för Lettland.

type: stycke

text: ECB:s behörighet att avge ett yttrande grundar sig på

text: artikel 140.3 i fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt

text: . I enlighet med

text: artikel 17.5

text: första meningen i arbetsordningen för Europeiska centralbanken har detta yttrande antagits av ECB-rådet.

text: Observationer

text: 1. De föreslagna förordningarna kommer, efter upphävandet av Lettlands undantag i enlighet med förfarandet i artikel 140.2 i fördraget, att möjliggöra införandet av euron som Lettlands valuta.

text: 2. ECB välkomnar de förslagna förordningarna.

type: vagledning

utgivare: ecb


text: Union legal acts in the financial services sector, including CRR and CRDIV, apply throughout the EEA on the basis of the Agreement on the European Economic Area (OJ L 1, 3.1.1994, p. 3).

sprak: en

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 9 July 2013 on branches of non-EEA credit institutions (CON/2013/49)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 9 July 2013 on branches of non-EEA credit institutions (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 24 June 2013, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Irish Minister for Finance for an opinion on an amendment to the Central Bank (Supervision and Enforcement) Bill 2011 (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third and sixth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to the Central Bank of Ireland (CBI) and to the rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The draft law amends the Central Bank Act 1971, which provides for the licensing and supervision of banks by the CBI, by introducing a new section 9A, pursuant to which the CBI may authorise a branch of a credit institution located outside the European Economic Area (EEA) (hereinafter a ‘section 9A branch’) to carry on banking business in Ireland. Such authorisation is to be provided on condition that the CBI is satisfied that the credit institution in question is subject to authorisation and supervisory rules in the country in which its head office is located, which are broadly equivalent to those applicable in Ireland. In addition, the CBI is to be satisfied that depositors with a section 9A branch will be able to avail of protection broadly equivalent to that provided under Irish law. 1.2 A section 9A branch is not to be treated in any respect more favourably than branches of credit institutions whose head offices are located within the EEA. Furthermore, a section 9A branch will continue to be subject to prudential regulation in the country in which its head office is located, while the CBI will be responsible for regulating its conduct of business in Ireland.

text: 2. Non-compliance with the consultation obligation

text: Scope of the consultation

text: 2.1 The ECB received the consultation request on 24 June 2013. The consultation request indicated that the draft law was to have reached committee stage and been discussed in Seanad Éireann, the upper house of the Irish Parliament, on 27 June. The ECB understands that the final stages in Seanad Éireann of the 2011 Bill took place on 2 July and that, on that occasion, the draft law was amended and further related amendments were made to the Central Bank (Supervision and Enforcement) Bill 2011. This opinion is limited to the version of the draft law which was sent for consultation. 2.2

text: Article 2(1) of Decision 98/415/EC

text: provides that national authorities shall consult the ECB on any draft legislative provision within its field of competence pursuant to the Treaty.

text: Article 2(1) of Decision 98/415/EC

text: contains a non-exhaustive list of matters which fall within the ECB’s field of competence, and on which the ECB must be consulted by national authorities. In the event that a provision which has been submitted to the ECB for its opinion is substantively amended prior to the adoption by the ECB of its opinion, or where further draft legislative provisions are proposed, an updated version of all legislative provisions in question should be submitted to the ECB for its opinion.

text: Appropriate time to consult the ECB

text: Article 4 of Decision 98/415/EC

text: provides that the ECB must be consulted ‘at an appropriate stage’ in the legislative process. It follows from this that the consultation should take place at a point in the legislative process that affords the ECB sufficient time to examine the draft legislative provisions in question and adopt its opinion. Following from the wording of

text: Article 3(4) of Decision 98/415/EC

text: , Member States are obliged to suspend the process for adoption of the draft legislative provisions pending receipt of the ECB’s opinion in order to allow the relevant national authorities to meaningfully deliberate the ECB’s opinion prior to adoption of the provisions in question. In this respect, the ECB stresses that the fact that the enactment of a particular draft law is urgent does not relieve national authorities of their obligation to consult the ECB and to allow sufficient time for its views to be taken into account in accordance with Decision

text: . The Irish Government should have postponed adoption of the draft law until such time as would have allowed for a proper consultation with the ECB, as well as due consideration of the ECB’s Opinion. The ECB would appreciate it if the consulting authority would honour its obligation to consult the ECB in a timely manner in the future.

text: 3. General observations

text: Union law

text: Regulation (EU) No 575/2013

text: on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms (hereinafter ‘CRR’) and Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms (hereinafter ‘CRDIV’) do not directly govern access to the market by branches of credit institutions having their head offices in third countries; this is consistent with the legal basis of CRR and CRDIV, i.e. Article 53 of the Treaty, relating to the freedom of establishment . CRR and CRDIV provide only for safeguards; Article 47 of CRDIV provides that ‘Member States shall not apply to branches of credit institutions having their head office in a third country … provisions which result in more favourable treatment than that accorded to branches of credit institutions having their head office in the Union’. Recital 23 of CRDIV provides that rules governing branches of third-country credit institutions should be analogous in all Member States. Subject to these safeguards, the power to authorise branches of third-country credit institutions to operate within the Union, and the specific conditions under which they are to operate, are left to the Member States. Under the draft law, Ireland uses this power and sets outs such conditions.

text: Irish law

text: 3.2 Section 7(1) of the Central Bank Act 1971, as amended, provides that a licence is required for the purposes of carrying on banking business in Ireland. Under Irish law, such licences are currently only granted where the registered office and the head office of a credit institution are both located in Ireland. 3.3 Under the draft law, section 9A branches will be exempt from the requirement to hold a licence.

text: 4. Specific observations

text: 4.1 Under the draft law, the CBI is to be satisfied that a section 9A branch is subject to authorisation and supervisory rules broadly equivalent to those in force in Ireland. Furthermore, the CBI is to be satisfied that depositors with the branch are able to avail of protection broadly equivalent to that provided under Irish law. The ECB notes that the use of the word ‘broadly’ in each case leaves a margin of discretion to the CBI and introduces, therefore, a possible lack of certainty under the law. In addition, the authorisation and supervisory rules in respect of section 9A branches, and the protection of their depositors as referred to above, could be slightly more or less favourable than the rules applied to other, i.e. EEA, credit institutions. This would seem to be incompatible with Article 47 of CRDIV, which provides that Member States are not to apply provisions that result in more favourable treatment for branches of third-country credit institutions compared with branches of credit institutions having their head office in the Union. This provision is also reflected in the draft law.

text: 4.2 It is not clear from the draft law how the CBI is to establish what protection is available to depositors of section 9A branches in the third country in which the institution concerned is located. Furthermore, the draft law does not indicate how or whether the existence of protection in a thirdcountry jurisdiction is to be monitored. If, for example, the protection granted to depositors of a section 9A branch were to fall below the requisite level, it is not clear how this would be ascertained, and whether the authorisation granted to the branch of the institution concerned would be withdrawn by the CBI in that event. 4.3 For the purposes of legal certainty and clarity, the ECB also recommends substituting references to the country in which the credit institution is ‘located’ with references to the country in which the credit institution is ‘established’. 4.4 The establishment of branches of third country credit institutions might create financial stability implications. The ECB understands that further amendments to the draft law and to the Central Bank (Supervision and Enforcement) Bill 2011 have been made, which are intended to underpin the power of the CBI to withdraw the authorisation of branches operating in Ireland of credit institutions established in non-EEA countries in certain circumstances.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 9 July 2013.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: Published in Monitorul Oficial al României, Part One, No 1027, 27.12.2006. 2 OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 3 See Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 23 4 See Article 240 (1) of GEO No 99/2006 as amended by the draft emergency ordinance.

text: 6 3.1 In view of the above observations, in Section 2 (stabilisation measures) of GEO No 99/2006 it would be appropriate to make a clearer distinction between the objectives behind stabilisation measures, such as financial stability from the perspective of safeguarding market confidence and depositor protection, and the conditions that need to be met before such measures are taken against a distressed credit institution. 3.2 In this regard, BNR is invited to follow the European Commission’s proposal for a directive establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms , which is currently going through the adoption process in the Council and the European Parliament, and to align the regime for stabilisation measures with that proposal.

text: FSB Key attributes for effective resolution regimes for financial institutions, October 2011, available on the FSB’s website at www.financialstabilityboard.org. See objective (ii) in the Preamble on page 3 of that document. 23 6 In particular

text: Article 240

text: , as amended by the draft emergency ordinance. 7 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directives

text: and

text: , Directives

text: and

text: and

text: Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010

text: (COM (2012) 280 final). This text is now to go into the trialogue stage of the adoption process.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 12 July 2013 on stabilisation measures (CON/2013/50)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 12 July 2013 on stabilisation measures (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 19 June 2013, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from Banca Naţională a României (BNR) for an opinion on a draft government emergency ordinance (hereinafter the ‘draft emergency ordinance’) supplementing Government Emergency Ordinance No 99/2006 on credit institutions and capital adequacy (GEO No 99/2006) . The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third and sixth indents of

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft emergency ordinance relates to BNR and to rules applicable to the financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft emergency ordinance

text: The draft emergency ordinance extends the scope of BNR’s competence to adopt stabilisation measures to cases where there is a threat to financial stability from the perspective of depositor protection and/or public confidence in the banking sector.

text: 2. General observations

text: The ECB welcomes the enlargement of BNR’s competence to adopt stabilisation measures on the additional grounds set out in the draft emergency ordinance . Depositor protection is a legitimate aim for the resolution of distressed credit institutions which meet the conditions for resolution and it is in line with

text: the Financial Stability Board’s (FSB) Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions .

text: 3. Specific observations

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 12 July 2013.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: Law 66(I) of 1997, as amended. 2 Law 22(I) of 1985, as amended. 3 OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 4 Available on the European Commission’s website at www.ec.europa.eu.

text: Paragraph 1.13 of the MoU.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 23 July 2013 on the supervision of cooperative credit institutions (CON/2013/51)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 23 July 2013 on the supervision of cooperative credit institutions (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 25 June 2013, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Cyprus for an opinion on two draft laws (hereinafter the ‘draft laws’), which amend the 1 2 Law on banking and the Law on cooperative societies , respectively. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third and sixth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft laws relate to the Central Bank of Cyprus (CBC) and to rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft laws

text: 1.1 The draft laws’ aim is to authorise the CBC to issue binding instructions to the Commissioner of the Co-operative Societies’ Supervision Authority (CSSA), which is currently responsible for supervising the cooperatives sector, thereby enabling the CBC to order the Commissioner to intervene at the level of individual cooperative credit institutions in regard to supervision. 1.2 The Memorandum of Understanding on specific economic policy conditionality of 26 April 2013 (hereinafter the ‘MoU’) required Cypriot authorities to: (a) ensure that the regulation and supervision of cooperative credit institutions is in line with that of commercial banks; (b) take responsibility for supervising cooperative credit institutions from the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism, and transfer this responsibility to the CBC by the end of July 2013; (c)

text: introduce, by the end of May 2013, legislation to authorise the CBC to instruct the Commissioner to intervene at the level of individual cooperative credit institutions in regard to supervision . 1.3 According to the draft laws: (a) the CSSA must provide all necessary data and information concerning cooperative credit institutions to the CBC to ensure the stability of the financial system; (b) the CBC may issue binding instructions to the Commissioner, where the CBC considers that: (i) the capital adequacy, liquidity and value of a cooperative credit institution’s assets have been impaired or adversely affected, or there is a risk that these will be impaired or adversely affected; (ii) there is a risk that the cooperative credit institution’s ability to meet its obligations in relation to its depositors or creditors may be impaired or it is necessary to take measures to safeguard interests of depositors or creditors; (iii) the cooperative credit institution fails to comply with its obligations under the law. 1.4 Under the proposed amendments, the CBC may instruct the Commissioner to take, inter alia, the following specific measures in relation to a cooperative credit institution: (a) increase its share capital; (b) restore its funds to the required minimum level; (c) make adjustments to the institution’s corporate governance and the terms of its business, operation or its licence.

text: 2. General observations on the draft laws

text: The ECB welcomes transferring supervision of cooperative credit institutions to the CBC, in line with the terms and conditions of the MoU. The ECB notes that the draft laws are the first step agreed in the MoU towards the CBC assuming supervision of cooperative credit institutions. In this respect, the consulting authority may wish to indicate the transitional nature of the draft laws, clarifying that their provisions are to remain in force until the new supervisory regime for cooperative credit institutions has been introduced, at which time supervision of cooperative credit institutions will be fully transferred to the CBC, in line with the MoU.

text: 3. Specific observations on the draft laws

text: 3.1 With a view to reinforcing the efficiency of the draft laws, the consulting authority may wish to consider clarifying, in the draft law amending the Law on cooperative societies, that the Commissioner has a duty to fully comply with the CBC’s instructions with regard to the specific measures to be applied to a cooperative credit institution. The ECB notes that the corresponding amendment to the Law on banking is clear on this point. 3.2 Under new Section 35(3) of the draft law amending the Law on banking, the CBC may, after taking into consideration whether the cooperative credit institution is licenced under section 41B(1)(a) of the Law on cooperative societies or through affiliation with the central body pursuant to section 41B(1)(b) of that same law, issue binding instructions to the Commissioner to take the measures specified by the CBC. Since the draft laws’ purpose is to allow the CBC to intervene at the level of individual cooperative credit institutions in regard to supervision, regardless of whether they are affiliated, the consulting authority may wish to eliminate the above distinction made in the draft law amending the Law on banking.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 23 July 2013

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 2 Available on the Commission’s website at www.ec.europa.eu.

text: MoU, Annex 2, measures 18 and 20.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 23 July 2013 on savings banks and banking foundations (CON/2013/52)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 23 July 2013 on savings banks and banking foundations (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 2 July 2013, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Spanish Secretary of State for Economic Affairs and Business Support for an opinion on a draft law on savings banks and banking foundations (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third and sixth indents of

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to the Banco de España and to rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 General scheme and content of the draft law 1.1.1 The draft law regulates redefines the composition of the savings banks sector and regulates the governance of the institutions which form part of it. In particular, ‘savings banks’ will be strictly limited in terms of geography and size. If a savings bank exceeds these limits: (a) it will have to transfer all equity allocated to its financial activity to another credit institution in exchange for shares therein; and (b) it will be converted into a ‘banking foundation’ if its stake in that other credit institution is significant, otherwise it will be converted into an ‘ordinary foundation’. In either case, the foundations will lose their banking licence. The draft law provides a period of six months for the conversion of savings banks into foundations. As regards the savings banks that are already acting indirectly through a commercial bank, they will be transformed into a banking or ordinary foundation, as applicable, within one year from the entry into force of the law. Finally, it is noted that the draft law states the basic regime for savings banks, without prejudice to the regime applying to them by the region (Comunidad Autónoma) in which they are established. 1.1.2 Under the Memorandum of Understanding on Financial-Sector Policy Conditionality (hereinafter the ‘MoU’) between Spain and the European Commission of 23 July 2012, the Spanish authorities

text: committed to: (a) strengthen fit and proper rules for the governing bodies of savings banks and introduce incompatibility requirements regarding the governing bodies of the savings banks and the commercial banks controlled by them; and (b) clarify the role of savings banks in their capacity as shareholders of credit institutions with a view to eventually reducing their stakes to non-controlling levels . 1.1.3 In accordance with the commitments of the Spanish authorities under the MoU, the draft law increases the levels of independence and required experience of the members of the governing bodies of both savings banks and banking foundations, including in some instances the requirement of professionalism. Members of these governing bodies may not hold executive positions in political parties, trade unions and employers’ associations or be elected representatives or senior officials of government. Also in accordance with the MoU, the draft law lays down a set of negative incentives for the eventual reduction of banking foundations’ stakes in credit institutions to non-controlling levels. 1.2 Savings banks The draft law imposes constraints on the savings bank business model. In order to avoid a savings bank reaching a systemic size, the following limitations are imposed: (a) they may only operate in the territory of an autonomous region or a maximum of 10 neighbouring provinces; (b) they will not be authorised to exceed a certain volume of activity, i.e. the total assets must not exceed EUR 10 billion or its share of the deposits market must not exceed 35 % of the market in which it operates. Corporate governance is reinforced, as only 25 % of the members of the General Assembly may be appointed by government authorities and public-law entities and corporations, and the majority of the members of the Board of Directors will be independent. 1.3 Ordinary foundations Savings banks that exceed the limits for savings banks laid down in the draft law but do not have a stake in a credit institution of at least 10 % of its capital, nor voting rights that allow them to appoint or remove a member of its governing body, will have to be converted into ordinary foundations. Conversely, an ordinary foundation acquiring such a stake in a credit institution will have to be converted into a banking foundation. Ordinary foundations will be governed in accordance with the legislation on foundations. 1.4 Banking foundations 1.4.1 This is a new concept introduced by the draft law. A banking foundation is a foundation that has a stake in a credit institution of at least 10 % of its capital or voting rights which allow the appointment or removal of a member of its governing body. Its purpose is to carry out its charitable and community work and to manage its stake in the credit institution under the strengthened regime laid down in the draft law. As for corporate governance, only 25 % of the members of the Board of Directors of a banking foundation (patronos) may be designated by government authorities and public-law entities and corporations. Banking foundations must submit an annual corporate governance report to their supervisor.

text: 1.4.2 The draft law limits the influence of a banking foundation in the relevant credit institution by making membership of the governing body of the banking foundation incompatible with the holding of an equivalent position in the credit institution; by subjecting dividend distributions in the controlled credit institution to increased quorum and majority requirements, and by depriving banking foundations with a controlling stake of voting rights in some special cases. 1.4.3 Under the draft law, holding a highly significant stake (at least 30%) in a credit institution will carry with it significant burdens, e.g. obligations to prepare a stake management protocol and an annual financial plan, and submit them to Banco de España. 1.4.4 Likewise, holding controlling stakes (at least 50% or effective control) in a credit institution will be costly because of the obligation to prepare, further to the financial plan, an investment diversification and risk management plan and to create a reserve fund to provide for possible capital shortfalls of the controlled credit institution. The financial plan will specify the minimum contributions needed in order to reach the target level determined by the Banco de España; taking into account, inter alia, the capital needs of the credit institution as laid down in the financial plan, the risk-weighted assets of the credit institution and the stake held by the banking foundation in that credit institution. The banking foundations with controlling stakes will not be able to exercise the voting rights corresponding to the part of the acquired capital allowing them to maintain a stake of at least 50 % or effective control. 1.4.5 The Banco de España will monitor compliance with the obligations regarding the stake management protocol, the financial plan, the investment diversification and risk management plan and the reserve fund. Non-compliance with these obligations will be treated as a serious or very serious breach.

text: 2. ECB assessment

text: 2.1 General consideration The ECB welcomes the Spanish Government’s initiative to reform the Spanish savings bank sector, which also complies with the commitments made by the Spanish authorities under the MoU. The reform addresses several shortcomings of the governance of Spanish savings banks, which, among several other factors, contributed to some extent to the financial sector crisis in Spain, and is therefore an important pillar of the overall effort to rebuild financial stability in Spain. The ECB considers the period of one year given to the saving banks which currently exercise their activity indirectly, through a commercial bank, as adequate to the purpose. Given the importance and complexity of the reform, the ECB is of the opinion that the relevant authorities will need to closely monitor the effectiveness of the reform once it is implemented and be ready to consider a review if needed. 2.2 Savings banks The ECB welcomes the Spanish Government’s initiative to revert to a traditional savings bank model by limiting the territorial scope and size of savings banks, as it also contributes to avoiding that they become systemic. In this direction, the ECB notes that the activity of savings banks will be focused mainly on

text: attracting reimbursable funds and providing banking services and investment services to retail clients and small and medium companies.

text: The ECB also welcomes the new legal concept of banking foundation and the regulation thereof under the draft law, in line with the financial sector conditionality agreed in 2012 with the European partners and the International Monetary Fund. Time will be needed in order to confirm, in particular, how effective the structure of incentives laid down in the draft law is in terms of ultimately achieving the divestment by banking foundations of controlling stakes in credit institutions or, for banking foundations choosing to retain their controlling stakes, how effective the enhanced obligations provided for in the draft law are in order to guarantee sound and prudent management by banking foundations of credit institutions under their control. In this respect, the ECB observes that the draft law empowers the Banco de España to specify the minimum content of the management protocol, as well as relevant aspects of the investment diversification and risk management plan and of the reserve fund, including its target size. Regarding the latter, the ECB welcomes that the Banco de España’s decision will be based on general criteria that take into account the situation of the individual institutions concerned, including: (a) the level of capital needs of the credit institution according to the financial plan; (b) the value of risk-weighted assets of the credit institution and the size of the banking foundation’s stake in it; (c) whether the credit institution’s shares are listed; (d) the level of concentration of the banking foundation’s investments in the financial sector.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 23 July 2013.

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: EGT L 189, 3.7.1998, s. 42.

text: Alla ECB:s yttranden finns på ECB:s webbplats www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: EGT L 332, 31.12.1993, s. 1. Artikel

text: och

text: b.1 i fördraget om upprättandet av Europeiska gemenskapen är nu artiklarna

text: och

text: i fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt.

text: Yttrande

text: och yttrande

text: Yttrande

text: och yttrande

text: Yttrande

text: Konvergensrapport juni 2013, s. 41.

title: Europeiska centralbankens yttrande av den 24 juli 2013 om Sveriges riksbanks finansiella oberoende (CON/2013/53)

text: EUROPEISKA CENTRALBANKENS YTTRANDE av den 24 juli 2013 om Sveriges riksbanks finansiella oberoende (

text: ) Inledning och rättslig grund

text: Den 22 april 2013 mottog Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) en begäran från Finansdepartementet om ett yttrande över utredningen "Riksbankens finansiella oberoende och balansräkning" (SOU 2013:9) (nedan kallad utredningen). ECB:s behörighet att avge ett yttrande grundas på artiklarna

text: och

text: i fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt och artikel 2.1 andra strecksatsen i

text: rådets beslut 98/415/EG av den 29 juni 1998

text: om nationella myndigheters samråd med Europeiska centralbanken rörande förslag till rättsregler , eftersom utredningen och dess förslag rör lagstiftningen kring Sveriges riksbank. I enlighet med

text: artikel 17.5

text: första meningen i arbetsordningen för Europeiska centralbanken har detta yttrande antagits av ECB-rådet.

text: 1. Bakgrund

text: 1.1 I sina konvergensrapporter har ECB upprepade gånger påpekat att Sverige måste anpassa lagstiftningen som styr Sveriges riksbank för att uppfylla fördragets krav bl.a. avseende finansiellt oberoende och vinstutdelning. I mars 2008 mottog ECB en begäran från Finansdepartementet om ett yttrande över en rapport med titeln "Riksbankens finansiella oberoende" (SOU 2007:51). Ett av motiven bakom denna rapport var att man ville lägga fram förslag till ny lagstiftning som skulle undanröja de brister som ECB tidigare påpekat. Den rapporten innehöll två alternativa förslag till ändringar av lagen om Sveriges riksbank som berörde Riksbankens kapitalstruktur och vinstutdelning. 1.2 Den 4 augusti 2008 utfärdade ECB sitt yttrande

text: där man bl.a. underströk att medlemsstater, även om de har ett undantag och ännu ej deltar i den ekonomiska och monetära unionen (EMU), ändå har en skyldighet att anpassa den lagstiftning som rör den nationella centralbanken för att säkerställa att den är förenlig med fördraget och stadgan för Europeiska centralbankssystemet och Europeiska centralbanken (nedan kallad ECBS-stadgan). ECB

text: konstaterade också att varje lagstiftningsreform bör ha som målsättning att gradvis uppnå överensstämmelse med Eurosystemets regler och att inget av de två alternativa förslagen var tillräckliga för att garantera Riksbankens finansiella oberoende.

text: 2. Utredningens förslag 2013

text: 2.1 På grund av finanskrisen genomfördes inga av de förslag som gjordes i SOU 2007:51, istället gav erfarenheterna från krisen anledning att på nytt överväga samma frågor. Vid regeringssammanträde den 13 oktober 2011 fattades beslut om att tillsätta en utredning med uppdrag att göra en översyn av hur erfarenheterna från den finansiella krisen har påverkat synen på Riksbankens balansräkning (Dir 2011:89). I sina anvisningar till utredningen instruerade regeringen denna att bl.a. utreda a) hur stor Riksbankens valutareserv bör vara samt hur den bör finansieras, b) hur samarbetet mellan Riksbanken och Riksgäldskontoret kan utformas på bästa sätt, c) hur upplåningen till valutareserven bör ske med beaktande av det övergripande målet att tillförsäkra en effektiv upplåning för den svenska staten och att värna de offentliga finanserna, samt att upprätthålla finansiell stabilitet och skydda Riksbankens självständiga ställning, d) vad som är en lämplig storlek på Riksbankens eget kapital. 2.2 Utredningen presenterade sitt betänkande i januari 2013. Det här yttrandet är alltså det andra yttrandet som ECB utfärdar i delvis samma frågor och bör därför läsas tillsammans med yttrande

text: . Den svenska utredningen innehåller flera förslag som ECB kommenterar i detta yttrande: a) Riksbanken föreslås få ett kostnadsfritt kapital på 75 miljarder kronor, varav 30 miljarder i eget kapital. Kapitalet skyddas mot inflation och återställs vid förluster. b) Riksbanken ges rätt att förstärka sin valutareserv så att det upplånade och kostnadsfria kapitalet kan uppgå till 200 miljarder kronor. c) Om Riksbanken har använt sina reserver för att lämna likviditetsstöd bör den få rätt att återställa valutareserven genom upplåning i obegränsad omfattning. d) Riksbanken föreslås få rätt att finansiera sin utlåning i utländsk valuta genom upplåning i obegränsad omfattning. Härigenom skapas förutsättningar för ett tillräckligt likviditetsstöd till banker om den finansiella stabiliteten är hotad. e) Kostnaderna för den upplånade delen av valutareserven föreslås bäras av bankerna genom avgifter. De banker som har upplåning och utlåning i utländsk valuta bör ha en obligatorisk försäkring som vid behov garanterar dem likviditetsstöd i utländsk valuta.

text: f) Valutarisken som följer med valutareserven föreslås elimineras genom att den flyttas till Riksgäldskontoret. Vad gäller utredningens förslag avseende eget kapital i Riksbanken påpekar utredningen att det föreslagna beloppet bygger på att valutarisken som följer av att Riksbanken har en valutareserv är eliminerad. g) Utredningens förslag innebär att mindre kapital binds i Riksbanken vilket medför en samhällsekonomisk vinst. Om valutarisken flyttas till Riksgäldskontoret minskar behovet av eget kapital i Riksbanken. Enligt utredningens bedömning medför detta förslag att kapitalbindningen i Riksbanken minskar med 90-215 miljarder kronor. Om upplåningen i utländska valuta uppgår till ca 90 miljarder kronor i "normala" tider, beräknas den samhällsekonomiska vinsten uppgå till 180-270 miljoner per år.

text: 3. Allmänna kommentarer

text: ECB understryker att alla observationer som görs i yttrande

text: fortfarande gäller. 3.1 I utredningens kapitel 10, Konsekvenser av utredningens förslag, konstateras det att utredningens förslag innebär att Riksbankens eget kapital och reserver skulle minska avsevärt och vilket medför att 73 miljarder kronor skulle kunna föras över från Riksbanken till staten genom en särskild utdelning. Enligt utredningen skulle statsskulden då minska med 73 miljarder kronor eller ca 2 procent av BNP till följd av minskningen av eget kapital och reserver. Utredningen anger också att det kapital som frigörs i Riksbanken kan användas för att amortera statsskulden. 3.2 Enligt artikel 130 i fördraget och artikel 7 i ECBS-stadgan är centralbanker oberoende, vilket även inkluderar finansiellt oberoende, och där stadgas även det generella förbudet mot monetär finansiering enligt vilket ingen vinstutdelning får ske utanför det normala förfarandet för vinstutdelning. Detta diskuteras mer ingående nedan. 3.3 Förbudet mot monetär finansiering är fastlagt i artikel 123.1 i fördraget och förbjuder ECB och medlemsstaternas nationella centralbanker att ge unionens institutioner eller organ, byråer, centrala, regionala, lokala eller andra myndigheter, andra offentligrättsliga organ eller offentliga företag i medlemsstaterna rätt att övertrassera sina konton eller ge dem andra former av krediter; detsamma gäller ECB:s eller de nationella centralbankernas förvärv av skuldförbindelser direkt från dessa enheter inom den offentliga sektorn. Det exakta tillämpningsområdet för förbudet mot monetär finansiering klargörs vidare i

text: rådets förordning (EG) nr 3603/93 av den 13 december 1993

text: om fastställande av definitioner för tillämpningen av de förbud som avses i artikel

text: och

text: b.1 i fördraget , som förtydligar att förbudet omfattar all finansiering av den offentliga sektorns åtaganden gentemot tredje parter.

text: 3.4 Även utdelning av en centralbanks vinst som ännu ej realiserats, bokförts och varit föremål för revision strider mot förbudet mot monetär finansiering. För att inte strida mot förbudet mot monetär finansiering kan det belopp som överförs till statsbudgeten enligt de gällande reglerna om vinstutdelning inte, inte ens delvis, betalas från den nationella centralbankens reserver. Reglerna om vinstdisposition bör alltså inte påverka den nationella centralbankens reserver. Om en nationell centralbanks tillgångar överförs till staten ska det ske mot betalning som motsvarar marknadsvärdet och överföringen bör ske samtidigt som betalningen . 3.5 Därutöver får medlemsstaterna inte föreskriva minskningar av en nationell centralbanks kapital utan föregående samtycke från den nationella centralbankens beslutande organ, vilket syftar till att säkerställa att den nationella centralbanken som medlem av ECBS är tillräckligt finansiellt oberoende för att kunna fullgöra sitt uppdrag enligt artikel 127.2 i fördraget och ECBS-stadgan. Av samma skäl bör ändringar av reglerna om en nationell centralbanks vinstdisposition endast initieras och beslutas i samråd med den berörda nationella centralbanken som bäst kan avgöra hur stora reserver den behöver . När det gäller finansiella avsättningar eller buffertar måste de nationella centralbankerna ha frihet att självständigt göra avsättningar för att skydda realvärdet av kapital och tillgångar. Medlemsstaterna får heller inte hindra de nationella centralbankerna från att bygga upp sådana reserver som krävs för att en medlem av ECBS ska kunna fullgöra sina uppgifter . 3.6 Sverige är en medlemsstat med undantag och måste därför uppfylla alla krav på anpassning enligt artikel 131 i fördraget. ECB konstaterar att Sverige sedan den 1 juni 1998 har haft en skyldighet enligt fördraget att anpassa sin nationella lagstiftning inför en integrering i Eurosystemet. Alla lagstiftningsåtgärder som svenska myndigheter vidtar angående Riksbanken bör göra lagstiftningen förenlig med bestämmelserna i fördraget.

text: 4. Specifika kommentarer

text: Observationerna nedan avser specifika förslag till ändringar av lagen om Sveriges riksbank (SFS1988:1385). 4.1 Ändringsförslag avseende kapitel 10,

text: artikel 1

text: 4.1.1 Enligt

text: artikel 1

text: garanteras Riksbankens finansiella självständighet av att den fått rätten att ge ut sedlar och mynt samt att den därutöver har ett eget kapital och reserver. 4.1.2 ECB noterar att rätten att ge ut sedlar och mynt inte i sig garanterar finansiellt oberoende. Artikeln beaktar inte de skyldigheter som en nationell centralbank har enligt artikel 128.1 i fördraget och artikel 16 i ECBS-stadgan och är därför inte förenlig med Sveriges skyldigheter enligt fördragen.

text: 4.1.3 ECB vill också poängtera, på samma sätt som i yttrande

text: , att sedelmängden inte bör betraktas som ett kostnadsfritt kapital. Det finns inget stöd för detta i fördraget, och det framgår inte någonstans i fördraget att eurosedlar kan jämställas med ett kostnadsfritt kapital som ägs av en viss nationell centralbank. 4.2 Ändringsförslag avseende kapitel 10, artiklarna

text: och

text: Artikel 2

text: stadgar att om Riksbankens kostnadsfria kapital understiger den målsatta nivån ska banken tillskjutas kapital. Enligt utredningens förslag ska det totala kostnadsfria kapitalet bestå av a) utestående sedlar och mynt, och b) eget kapital. Det senare ska uppgå till minst 30 miljarder kronor. Förluster som understiger 10 miljarder kronor ska kompenseras genom att ingen vinstutdelning sker förrän det egna kapitalet har återställts. Större förluster kräver att det egna kapitalet återställs genom att nytt kapital skjuts till. ECB konstaterar att en situation där en utomstående part har befogenhet att fastställa eller påverka hur Riksbanken egna kapital återställs är oförenlig med finansiellt oberoende. 4.2.2 När det gäller vinstdispositionen framgår det av ECB:s konvergensrapporter att de nationella centralbankernas stadgar får föreskriva hur vinsten ska fördelas. Om sådana föreskrifter saknas ska beslutet om vinstdisposition fattas av den nationella centralbankens beslutande organ på yrkesmässiga grunder och inte vara föremål för bestämmanderätt för utomstående parter, såvida det inte finns någon uttrycklig skyddsbestämmelse om att detta inte ska påverka det finansiella oberoendet som är nödvändigt för att den nationella centralbanken ska kunna fullgöra sina ECBSrelaterade uppgifter samt nationella uppgifter. Detta betyder att beslut som rör vinstdispositionen ska fattas av Riksbankens direktion. 4.2.3 Vinst får endast delas ut till statsbudgeten efter det att tidigare års eventuella förluster har täckts och tillräckliga finansiella avsättningar gjorts för att värdeskydda den nationella centralbankens reala kapital och tillgångar. Tillfälliga lagstiftningsåtgärder eller ad-hoc lagstiftning som innebär att den nationella centralbanken ges instruktioner avseende sin vinstdisposition är inte tillåtna. Mot denna bakgrund noterar ECB att reglerna om Riksbankens vinstdisposition inte förbättras, eftersom både föreslaget till

text: artikel 10.6

text: och förslaget till

text: artikel 10.7

text: även i framtiden ger en avgörande roll till riksdagen och Riksrevisionen. 4.2.4 Vad gäller riksdagens och Riksrevisionens befogenheter är det oförenligt med finansiellt oberoende om en utomstående part har befogenhet att fastställa eller påverka Riksbankens budget, såvida inte lagen innehåller en skyddsbestämmelse om att dessa befogenheter inte påverkar de finansiella resurser som är nödvändiga för att Riksbanken ska kunna fullgöra sina ECBS-relaterade och nationella uppgifter. 4.3 Ändringsförslag avseende kapitel 10,

text: artikel 6

text: 4.3.1 Riksbankens räkenskaper bör upprättas antingen i enlighet med allmänna redovisningsregler eller i enlighet med regler som fastställts av Riksbankens direktion. Om sådana regler istället fastställts av utomstående parter måste redovisningsreglerna beakta vad den nationella centralbankens

text: oberoende beslutande organ har föreslagit. Årsredovisningen ska antas av Riksbankens direktion, biträdd av oavhängiga revisorer, och får i efterhand godkännas av utomstående parter, t.ex. regering eller parlament. Vad gäller vinsten ska Riksbankens direktion ha möjlighet att på ett självständigt och professionellt sätt besluta hur den ska beräknas. 4.3.2 I enlighet med artikel 139 i fördraget och artikel 42 i ECBS-stadgan gäller ECB:s rättsakter om redovisning ännu inte för Riksbanken. Riksbanken bör trots detta vara behörig att anta sina egna redovisningsriktlinjer, med utgångspunkt i ECB:s riktlinjer, fram till den dag då Sveriges undantag upphävs. 4.4 Ändringsförslag avseende kapitel 12, artiklarna

text: 4.4.1 Enligt utredningen ska en av Riksbankens uppgifter vara att svara för likviditetsstöd i utländsk valuta till svenska banker och andra finansinstitut. För denna uppgift ska Riksbanken ges rätt att vid behov förstärka sin valutareserv så att det sammanlagda kostnadsfria och upplånade kapitalet kan uppgå till 200 miljarder kronor. Detta belopp ska uppräknas med utvecklingen i BNP i löpande priser. 4.4.2 De föreslagna ändringarna begränsar Riksbankens rätt att oberoende fatta beslut om att förstärka valutareserven. Riksbankens direktion måste ha rätten att instruera Riksgälden att låna upp varje belopp som direktionen anser är nödvändigt. 4.4.3 De föreslagna ändringarna är inte tillräckligt tydliga och det finns risk att de inte uppnår överensstämmelse med ECBS grundläggande uppgifter, t.ex. att genomföra valutatransaktioner och innehav och förvalta medlemsstaternas officiella valutareserver. 4.4.4 Om en nationell centralbanks förvaltning av valutareserven underställs kontroll genom en nationell myndighet för skuldförvaltning, skulle detta stå i strid med

text: artikel 127.2

text: andra och tredje strecksatsen i fördraget,

text: artikel 3.1

text: andra och tredje strecksatsen i ECBS-stadgan samt även artiklarna 23, 30 och 31 i ECBS-stadgan. Trots att medlemsstater som har ett undantag inte omfattas av artiklarna ovan såsom framgår av artikel 139 i fördraget och artikel 42.1 i ECBSstadgan, enligt artikel 131 i fördraget, har de ändå en skyldighet att anpassa den lagstiftning som rör deras nationella centralbank för att säkerställa att den är förenlig med fördraget och ECBSstadgan vad gäller uppgifter som rör Eurosystemet .

text: 4.4.5 Om beslut som Riksbanken fattar är beroende av riksdagens beslut underminerar detta artikel 130 i fördraget och artikel 7 i ECBS-stadgan. Detta yttrande kommer att offentliggöras på ECB:s webbplats. Utfärdat i Frankfurt am Main den 24 juli 2013. [Namnteckning] Mario DRAGHI

text: ECB:s ordförande


text: Law 138(I)/2002. 3 OJ C 41, 14.2.2013, p.1.

text: See, for example, paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.1 of Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 5 See paragraph 2.2 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 24 July 2013 on the macro-prudential oversight of the national financial system (CON/2013/54)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 24 July 2013 on the macro-prudential oversight of the national financial system (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 17 June 2013 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Minister of Finance of the Republic of Cyprus for an opinion on a proposed amendment to the Central Bank of Cyprus Laws of 2002 to 2007 (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third and sixth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to the Central Bank of Cyprus (CBC) and rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The draft law aims to implement Recommendation

text: of the European Systemic Risk Board of 22nd December 2011 on the macro-prudential mandate of national authorities (hereinafter the ‘ESRB Recommendation’). The proposed amendments to sections 2 and 6, as well as proposed new section 47A of the Central Bank of Cyprus Laws of 2002 to 2007 provide for the following: 1.2 The draft law assigns the task of macro-prudential oversight of the financial system to the CBC. The ultimate objective of macro-prudential oversight of the financial system is to safeguard the stability of the financial system as a whole, inter alia, by strengthening the resilience of the financial system and decreasing the build-up of systemic risks, thereby ensuring a sustainable contribution of the financial sector to economic growth. This task will be achieved by: (a) identifying, monitoring and assessing risks to financial stability; and (b) implementing policies to prevent or mitigate those risks.

text: 1.3 In accordance with section 47A(6) of the draft law, the CBC develops and applies instruments for the performance of its task of macro-prudential oversight of the financial system either on its own initiative, or in order to implement recommendations of the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) or decisions of the ECB or other competent Union authorities. The CBC may issue special or general directives or guidelines to financial institutions, subject to ECB guidelines and instructions and the regulations in force within the framework of the ESCB. 1.4 The draft law further provides that the CBC may cooperate and exchange data and information with competent authorities in Cyprus, in other Member States and also in third countries, as well as with competent Union authorities, including the ECB and the European System of Central Banks (ESCB).

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 The ECB supports the effective design of macro-prudential policy frameworks within the Member States, in line with the guiding principles expressed in the ESRB Recommendation. Moreover, the ECB and national central banks should play a leading role in macro-prudential oversight, given their expertise and existing responsibilities in the area of financial stability . 2.2 In light of the above, the ECB welcomes the arrangement under which the CBC is the national authority responsible for the conduct of macro-prudential oversight, acting in cooperation with other competent authorities whose actions have a material impact on financial stability; in this context, the consulting authority is invited to revise subsection (3) of proposed Section 47A so as to ensure that the CBC shall cooperate with such competent authorities in accordance with the ESRB Recommendation. 2.3 At the same time, performance by the CBC of macro-prudential tasks should not affect: (a) the CBC’s institutional, functional and financial independence; or (b) the performance by the ESCB of its tasks under the Treaty and the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank . Section 6(2)(e) of the Central Bank of Cyprus Laws of 2002 to 2007 currently in force provides that one of the main tasks of the CBC is ‘ensuring the stability of the financial system’. The draft law replaces this task with ‘the macro-prudential oversight of the financial system’. The consulting authority is invited to ensure consistency with Article 127(5) of the Treaty by supplementing the proposed amendment to the aforementioned Section 6(2)(e) by making reference also to the CBC’s objective as an integral part of the Eurosystem of contributing to the stability of the financial system. 2.4 The consulting authority is invited to revise subsection (5) of proposed Section 47A so as to ensure that the CBC shall cooperate and exchange data and information with the ECB and the ESRB and,

text: where needed, with the macro-prudential authorities of other Member States, in accordance with the ESRB Recommendation. 2.5 The consulting authority is also invited to ensure consistency of the proposed rules concerning exercise of macro-prudential tasks by the CBC with the national transposition of: (a)

text: Regulation (EU) No 575/2013

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending

text: Regulation (EU) No 648/2012

text: , and (b) Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive

text: and repealing Directives

text: and

text: . 2.6 This opinion is without prejudice to the conclusions of the follow-up assessment of the abovementioned ESRB Recommendation, which the ESRB will prepare in accordance with

text: Article 17 of Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 on European Union macro-prudential oversight of the financial system and establishing a European System Risk Board .

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 24 July 2013.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: 4 beneficiaries of the limited purpose loans , (d) the type of projects to be financed by such loans , and (e) the effective allocation of the collected funds to the financing of eligible projects . In the event of a breach of the allocation requirements by the credit institution concerned, the latter will have to pay to the tax authorities 10% of the income paid or apportioned to the holders of the savings certificates or fixed-term deposits; the investors will not be affected and will retain the benefit of the reduced withholding tax . 1.3 The Financial Services and Markets Authority will be responsible for the conditions relating to the collection of funds with investors, whilst the NBB will be responsible for monitoring the credit institution’s compliance with the specific accounting rules and the allocation requirements . In this respect, the draft law establishes specific reporting requirements to ensure that the NBB has all the data necessary to verify compliance. Pursuant to the Explanatory Memorandum to the draft law these tasks fall within the NBB’s current prudential supervision competences . The draft law specifies that for the purpose of this new responsibility, the NBB may exercise all of the relevant powers it has pursuant to the Law of 22 February 1998 establishing the Organic Statute of the Nationale Bank van België/Banque Nationale de Belgique, and the special laws applicable to credit institutions .

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 26 July 2013 on measures to encourage long-term lending (CON/2013/55)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 26 July 2013 on measures to encourage long-term lending (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 26 June 2013, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Nationale Bank van België/Banque Nationale de Belgique (NBB), acting on behalf of the Belgian Ministry of Finance, for an opinion on a draft law containing various provisions relating to limited purpose loans for socially responsible projects (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third indent of

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to the NBB. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The draft law aims to encourage long-term saving by retail investors to facilitate the collection by credit institutions of funds available for long-term lending to socially responsible projects and, thereby, to boost economic activity. To this end, following the entry into force of the draft law, certain types of savings certificates issued and fixed-term deposits collected by certain credit institutions will benefit from a favourable tax treatment i.e. a reduction of the withholding tax rate from 25% to 15% . This is subject to the credit institutions only using the collected funds to grant limited purpose loans, i.e. to finance eligible projects, in compliance with the conditions set out in the draft law. 1.2 The benefit of this specific tax regime is subject to conditions relating to: (a) the savings certificates and fixed-term deposits, (b) the contracting credit institution, (c) the eligible

text: 1 OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 4.

text: 2 Articles 22 and 23 of the draft law, amending Article

text: ° and Article 269 of the Belgian Income Tax Code.

text: 2. General observations

text: The draft law introduces measures of economic policy by using a tax incentive in the form of a reduced withholding tax rate. As regards tax incentives, it is essential to reduce the risk of abuse. Against this background, the ECB welcomes the clarifications made with respect to the criteria for eligible funding instruments (i.e. savings certificates and term deposits) . These clarifications are in line with the basic rationale stipulated in the Explanatory Memorandum, namely that the purpose of the draft law is not for credit institutions to make an additional interest margin by way of a reduced rate .

text: 3 Article

text: ° of the draft law. In addition, the income generated by the financed project must be subject to taxes in Belgium (Article

text: ° of the draft law, Explanatory Memorandum p. 8).

text: 4 The eligible projects must have a socio-economic dimension; the concrete eligibility criteria will be defined in a Royal Decree (Article 8 of the draft law).

text: 5 Articles 5, 9 and 10 of the draft law. Specific accounting rules are established to allow identification of the savings collected by the credit institution and their subsequent allocation (Article 6 of the draft law). The allocation of the funds may occur indirectly, through an interbank loan, provided that the credit institution receiving such a loan directly provides the funds to the financing of an eligible project (Article 5 of the draft law).

text: 6 Article 24 of the draft law and commentary in the Explanatory Memorandum, p. 22.

text: Articles 16

text: to 19 of the draft law, and commentary in the Explanatory Memorandum, p. 20.

text: Article 12

text: to 15 of the draft law.

text: 9 Commentary of Chapter IV of the draft law in the Explanatory Memorandum, p. 18.

text: 10 Article 12 of the draft law.

text: 11 Under Article

text: ° of the draft law, the savings certificates are defined as non-equity securities referred to in

text: Article 16

text: , §1, 6° of the Law of 16 June 2006 concerning public offers of investment instruments and admission of investment instruments for trading on regulated markets. Article 4 of the draft law lays down a number of additional conditions to be met by these instruments, as well as by eligible fixed term deposits (e.g. minimum maturity of 5 years, coverage by a deposit guarantee scheme, and alignment with the market rate). See commentary on

text: Article 4

text: in the Explanatory Memorandum, p. 10.

text: 12 See commentary on

text: Article 4

text: in the Explanatory Memorandum, esp. p. 13.

text: 3. Specific observations

text: 3.1 The ECB understands that the main purpose of the monitoring task entrusted to the NBB under the draft law is to ensure that the tax incentive is not diverted from its original aim, which is to foster the financing of eligible projects . Since the draft law provides for the NBB to be fully reimbursed for the costs incurred in carrying out this new task by a contribution from credit institutions , it does not directly raise concerns regarding monetary financing or financial independence . 3.2 However, the draft law would raise concerns regarding compliance with the prohibition on privileged access under Article 124 of the Treaty and

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 3604/93 of 13 December 1993

text: specifying definitions for the application of the prohibition of privileged access referred to in

text: Article 104

text: a of the Treaty if the tax advantages established for the benefit of persons that acquire savings certificates from or place term deposits with credit institutions had the effect of putting private and public institutions on an unequal footing, for instance, by encouraging credit institutions to lend to public sector borrowers or to buy Belgian public sector bonds. Although there are no such immediate concerns due to the generic character of the draft law , the ECB underlines that full compliance with the prohibition on privileged access will need to be ensured in the actual implementation of the draft law, inter alia, when defining the criteria for 18 19 eligible projects and for sufficiently liquid and low-risk assets . 3.3 The rationale underlying this new responsibility primarily concerns tax considerations. Given that the NBB has no competence in respect of fiscal matters when carrying out its prudential supervisory tasks, the objectives and criteria that will assist the NBB in using its supervisory powers for the purpose of monitoring the draft law should be clarified, to avoid conflict of interest with its supervisory tasks. Furthermore, the obligation to professional secrecy prevents the NBB from notifying the Ministry for Finance of any breach of the provisions that it is responsible for monitoring under the draft law.

text: 13 Commentary on

text: Article 6

text: and Chapter IV of the draft law in the Explanatory Memorandum, p. 14 and 18.

text: 14 Article 15 of the draft law, see Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: 15 With respect to the task of creating a central register of bank account numbers see Opinions

text: and

text: 16 OJ L 332, 31.12.1993, p. 4–6.

text: 17 Article

text: ° of the draft law defines the eligible borrowers as a government, government institution or a company, whether or not within the framework of a collaboration agreement. Credit for individuals falls outside the scope of the draft law (commentary on Article

text: ° of the draft law in the Explanatory Memorandum, p. 5).

text: 18 Article 8 of the draft law; these criteria will be laid down in an implementing Royal Decree.

text: 19 A Royal Decree will implement Article 10(3) of the draft law, which lays down that the collected funds must be invested in sufficiently liquid and low-risk assets, generating a yield in line with market rates, pending their allocation to the financing of an eligible project.

text: Article 36

text: /4 of the Law of 22 February 1998.

text: 21 Article 35 of the Law of 22 February 1998. In this respect, the NBB only has the powers to denounce criminal offences to the judicial 22 23 authorities , or to notify information to statutory auditors . 3.4 Credit institutions granting interbank loans with the funds collected under the favourable tax regime will be required to ascertain the final allocation of the funds to the financing of an eligible project . The ECB believes that this is best achieved by including a relevant requirement in the terms and conditions of the interbank loans, restricting the use of the funds received to eligible projects. This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 26 July 2013. [signed] The President of the ECB Mario DRAGHI

text: Article 36

text: /13, 2° of the Law of 22 February 1998, and Article 20 of the draft law, defining the breaches of Articles 5, 6, 9, 10 and 11 of the draft law as criminal offences.

text: Article 36

text: /14, § 1, 9° of the Law of 22 February 1998.

text: 24 Articles 5, 8 and 10 of the draft law.