text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42). 2 According to

text: Article 2(1)

text: , participating entities are: (a) institutions authorised to grant credit which have their head office in Portugal; (b) branches of institutions which have their head office abroad and which are authorised to grant credit in Portugal; (c) other entities with a permanent establishment in Portugal, designated by the BdP, which grant credit under special regimes or which acquire credit originally granted by the financial sector.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 21 July 2014 on the Central Credit Register (CON/2014/57)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 21 July 2014 on the Central Credit Register (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 30 May 2014 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Portuguese Minister of State and for Finance for an opinion on a draft decree-law amending Decree-Law No 204/2008 of 14 October 2008 establishing the legal framework for the Central Credit Register (hereinafter the ‘draft decree-law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and on the third and sixth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft decree-law relates to the Banco de Portugal (BdP) and to rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft decree-law

text: 1.1 The draft decree-law introduces changes to the legal framework aimed at increasing the information available to assess the risk involved in credit operations and in the acceptance of credit claims as a guarantee in liquidity-providing operations of the BdP and the Eurosystem. It also allows participating entities to access the company and sector tables in the Central Balance Sheet Database and establishes that the BdP may provide participating entities with historical information to enable borrowers without a record of default in the Central Credit Register (Central de Responsabilidades de Crédito - CRC) to negotiate improved credit conditions. 1.2 Additionally, the draft decree-law authorises the BdP, under conditions to be defined by the BdP, to grant access to information on legal persons to credit rating agencies solely for the purpose of

text: preparing ratings , and clarifies that the information contained in the CRC may be used by both the BdP and the ECB to perform their respective tasks .

text: 2. Specific observations

text: 2.1 The ECB generally welcomes initiatives that enable credit risk assessment systems to improve the quality of their assessments. More informed evaluation of credit risk can benefit the financial market in general and the Eurosystem which uses credit risk assessments in its collateral framework for monetary policy operations. 2.2 The ECB also welcomes the fact that the data collected in the CRC can be shared with the ECB, thus supporting the performance of the ESCB’s tasks.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 21 July 2014.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: COM(2013) 48 final.

text: Se det gemensamma meddelandet till Europaparlamentet, rådet, Europeiska ekonomiska och sociala kommittén samt Regionkommittén EU:s strategi för cybersäkerhet: En öppen, säker och trygg cyberrymd, JOIN(2013) 1 final.

text: Detta omfattar följande meddelanden Nät- och informationssäkerhet: förslag till en europeisk strategi, KOM(2001) 298 slutlig, En strategi för ett säkert informationssamhälle: Dialog, partnerskap och användarinflytande, KOM(2006) 251 slutlig, Skydd av kritisk informationsinfrastruktur – Skydd mot storskaliga it-attacker och avbrott: förbättrad beredskap, säkerhet och motståndskraft i Europa, KOM(2009) 149 slutlig, En digital agenda för Europa, KOM(2010) 245 slutlig, och Skydd av kritisk infrastruktur Resultat och kommande åtgärder: vägen mot global it-säkerhet, KOM(2011) 163 slutlig.

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 2002/21/EG av den 7 mars 2002

text: om ett gemensamt regelverk för elektroniska kommunikationsnät och kommunikationstjänster (EGT L 108, 24.4.2002, s. 33).

text: Vissa medlemmar av ECBS utför även övervakning på grundval av nationella lagar och andra författningar som kompletterar och i vissa fall duplicerar Eurosystemets behörighet.

text: Begreppet avveckling inbegriper i detta yttrande även clearingfunktionen.

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 98/26/EG av den 19 maj 1998

text: om slutgiltig avveckling i system för överföring av betalningar och värdepapper (EGT L 166, 11.6.1998, s. 45).

text: Se

text: artikel 10.1 tredje stycket i direktivet

text: om slutgiltig avveckling.

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning (EU) nr 648/2012 av den 4 juli 2012

text: om OTC-derivat, centrala motparter och transaktionsregister (EUT L 201, 27.7.2012, s. 1).

text: COM(2012) 73 final.

text: Finns på webbplatsen för Banken för internationell betalningsutjämning https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d94.pdf

text: Finns på ECB:s webbplats http://www.ecb.europa.eu

text: Se ECB:s pressmeddelande om samförståndsavtalet om övergripande principer för samarbete i krishanteringssituationer mellan banktillsynsmyndigheter och centralbanker i Europeiska unionen (2003), finns på ECB:s webbplats http://www.ecb.europa.eu

text: Se rekommendation 3 om övervakning och rapportering av incidenter i Recommendations for the security of internet payments – final version after public consultation, Europeiska forumet för säkra massbetalningar (SecuRe Pay), januari 2013, finns på ECB:s webbplats www.ecb.europa.eu

text: På grundval av de principer för en internationell tillsyn baserad på samarbete, som CPSS erinrade om i sin tillsynsrapport från 2005, har centralbankerna i Eurosystemet med framgång deltagit i samarbetsarrangemang vid en rad olika tillfällen, vilket framgår av t.ex. tillsynsarrangemangen för Swift (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications) och CLS (Continuous Linked Settlement).

text: Exempelvis kraven på att marknadsoperatörer ska följa de tekniska och organisatoriska åtgärderna enligt artikel

text: och

text: samt befogenheten att utfärda bindande anvisningar för marknadsoperatörer enligt artikel 15.3 i direktivförslaget.

text: Se punkt 2.12 i ECB:s yttrande

text: om ett förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv om betaltjänster på den inre marknaden och om ändring av direktiven

text: och

text: samt upphävande av direktiv

text: (EUT C 224, 15.7.2014, s. 1). Alla ECB:s yttranden finns på ECB:s webbplats www.ecb.europa.eu

text: Text markerad med fet stil anger ECB:s förslag till ny text. Genomstruken text anger de strykningar som ECB föreslår.

text: Finns på ECB:s webbplats www.ecb.europa.eu

publisher: Europeiska centralbanken

sprak: sv

title: Europeiska centralbankens yttrande av den 25 juli 2014 om ett förslag till Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv om åtgärder för att säkerställa en hög gemensam nivå av nät- och informationssäkerhet i hela unionen (CON/2014/58)

serie: con

text: Inledning och rättslig grund

type: rubrik

text: Den 7 februari 2013 lade Europeiska kommissionen fram ett förslag till direktiv om åtgärder för att säkerställa en hög gemensam nivå av nät- och informationssäkerhet i hela unionen (nedan kallat direktivförslaget).

type: stycke

text: Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) har beslutat att avge ett yttrande på eget initiativ över direktivförslaget eftersom ECB inte formellt har rådfrågats. ECB:s behörighet att avge ett yttrande grundas på artiklarna

text: och

text: i fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt eftersom direktivförslaget innehåller bestämmelser som berör Europeiska centralbankssystemets (ECBS) uppgift att främja väl fungerande betalningssystem i enlighet med artikel 127.2 fjärde strecksatsen i fördraget. Enligt

text: artikel 22 i stadgan

text: för Europeiska centralbankssystemet och Europeiska centralbanken (nedan kallad ECBS-stadgan) får ECB och de nationella centralbankerna ställa anordningar till förfogande, och ECB får anta förordningar för att säkerställa effektiva och sunda clearing- och betalningssystem inom gemenskapen och i förbindelser med tredje land. I enlighet med artikel 17.5 första meningen i arbetsordningen för Europeiska centralbanken har detta yttrande antagits av ECB-rådet.

text: 1. Direktivförslagets syfte

text: 1.1 Syftet med direktivförslaget är att säkerställa en hög gemensam nivå av nät- och informationssäkerhet genom att förbättra säkerheten för internet och de nät- och informationssystem som behövs för att våra samhällen och ekonomier ska fungera. Detta förslag är den viktigaste åtgärden inom den europeiska strategin för it-säkerhet.

text: 1.2 Nät- och informationssystem är viktiga för att främja den gränsöverskridande rörligheten för varor, tjänster och personer. I och med denna inneboende transnationella dimension kan störningar i en medlemsstat även påverka andra medlemsstater och unionen som helhet. Sannolikheten för att incidenter ofta kan uppstå och oförmågan att garantera ett effektivt skydd kan också undergräva allmänhetens förtroende för och tillit till näten och informationstjänsterna. Nät- och informationssystemens motståndskraft och stabilitet är därför viktiga för att den inre marknaden ska fungera smidigt.

text: 1.3 Direktivförslaget bygger på tidigare initiativ inom det här området. I detta direktivförslag konstateras därför att det finns ett behov av att harmonisera reglerna för nät- och informationssäkerhet och skapa effektiva samarbetsmekanismer mellan medlemsstaterna.

text: 1.4 Genom direktivförslaget fastställs en gemensam unionsrättslig ram för nät- och informationssäkerhet när det gäller medlemsstaternas kapacitet, mekanismer för unionssamarbete och krav som ska gälla för offentliga förvaltningar samt för enheter inom den offentliga sektorn inom specifika kritiska sektorer. Detta bör säkerställa tillräcklig beredskap på nationell nivå och bidra till ett klimat av ömsesidigt förtroende, vilket är en förutsättning för effektivt samarbete på unionsnivå. Inrättandet av samarbetsmekanismer på unionsnivå via nätverket kommer att ge sammanhållna och samordnade förebyggande åtgärder och svarsåtgärder vid gränsöverskridande incidenter och risker som rör nät- och informationssäkerhet.

text: 1.5 De centrala bestämmelserna gäller följande:

punkt: a

text: Ett krav på att alla medlemsstater ska ha en miniminivå av nationell kapacitet genom att inrätta behöriga myndigheter för nät- och informationssäkerhet, inrätta incidenthanteringsorganisationer (Cert) och anta nationella strategier för nät- och informationssäkerhet och nationella samarbetsplaner för nät- och informationssäkerhet.

punkt: b

text: Medlemsstaterna ska få i uppdrag att utbyta information inom ramen för ett nätverk. Det ska också upprättas en europeisk plan för samarbete inom nät- och informationssäkerhet och samordnade tidiga varningar för it-säkerhetsincidenter.

punkt: c

text: Utifrån

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 2002/21/EG

text: ska det säkerställas att det utvecklas en riskhanteringskultur och att information utbyts mellan privat och offentlig sektor. Företag inom specifika kritiska sektorer och offentliga förvaltningar kommer att åläggas att bedöma de risker som de står inför och vidta ändamålsenliga och proportionella åtgärder för att garantera nät- och informationssäkerheten. De kommer också att vara skyldiga att underrätta de behöriga myndigheterna om alla incidenter som utgör ett hot mot deras nät och informationssystem och som på ett allvarligt sätt påverkar kontinuiteten för kritiska tjänster och tillhandahållandet av varor.

text: 2. Allmänna kommentarer

text: 2.1 ECB stöder direktivförslagets syfte, dvs. att säkerställa en hög gemensam nivå av nät- och informationssäkerhet i hela unionen samt att åstadkomma en enhetlig strategi inom detta område för olika branscher och medlemsstater. Det är viktigt att se till så att det är säkert att bedriva affärsverksamhet på den inre marknaden och att alla medlemsstater har en viss minimiberedskap om det uppstår en it-säkerhetsincident.

text: 2.2 ECB anser emellertid att direktivförslaget inte ska påverka det nuvarande systemet för Eurosystemets övervakning av betalnings- och avvecklingssystem, som inbegriper lämpliga arrangemang bland annat i fråga om nät- och informationssäkerhet. Det bör noteras att ECB har ett särskilt intresse av säkrare betalnings- och avvecklingssystem för att främja väl fungerande betalningssystem och bidra till att upprätthålla förtroendet för euron och en välfungerande ekonomi inom unionen.

text: 2.3 Att bedöma säkerhetsarrangemang och anmäla incidenter för betalnings- och avvecklingssystem och betaltjänstleverantörer hör till tillsynsmyndigheternas och centralbankernas centrala behörighetsområden. Ansvaret för att utarbeta tillsynskrav för ovannämnda områden bör därför ligga kvar hos dessa myndigheter och betalnings- och avvecklingssystem samt betaltjänstleverantörer bör inte utsättas för motstridiga krav av andra nationella myndigheter. Riskhantering, som inbegriper säkerhetskrav för betalnings- och avvecklingssystem och annan marknadsinfrastruktur inom euroområdet, fastställs dessutom av Eurosystemet, vilket omfattar ECB och de nationella centralbankerna i de medlemsstater som har infört euron. Genom denna tillsynsfunktion vill Eurosystemet säkerställa välfungerande betalnings- och avvecklingssystem genom att bland annat tillämpa lämpliga tillsynsregler och minimikrav. Direktivförslaget bör utformas med hänsyn till den befintliga tillsynsramen och säkerställa ett samstämmigt regelverk runtom i unionen.

text: 3. Specifika kommentarer

text: 3.1 Enligt skäl 5 och artikel 1 i direktivförslaget ska de relevanta skyldigheterna, samarbetsmekanismen och säkerhetskraven gälla för alla offentliga förvaltningar och marknadsoperatörer. Med den nuvarande lydelsen av skäl 5 och

text: artikel 1

text: beaktas inte Eurosystemets uppdrag att utöva tillsyn över betalnings- och avvecklingssystemen i enlighet med fördraget. Direktivförslaget bör därför ändras för att ge en rättvisande bild av Eurosystemets ansvar inom detta område.

text: 3.2 Arrangemang och förfaranden för centralbankernas och andra behöriga myndigheters övervakning av betalnings- och värdepappersavvecklingssystem fastställs i ett antal olika unionsdirektiv och unionsförordningar, däribland

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 98/26/EG

text: (nedan kallat direktivet om slutgiltig avveckling), som ger de behöriga myndigheterna i medlemsstaterna rätt att införa tillsynsarrangemang för betalnings- och avvecklingssystem som faller under deras jurisdiktion.

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning (EU) nr 648/2012

text: (nedan kallad förordningen om Europas marknadsinfrastrukturer [EMIR]), som bekräftar vilken roll som Europeiska värdepappers- och marknadsmyndigheten (Esma), Europeiska bankmyndigheten (EBA) och ECBS ska spela för att fastställa tillsynsstandarder och utöva tillsyn över centrala motparter.

text: Förslaget till förordning om om förbättrad värdepappersavveckling i Europeiska unionen och om värdepapperscentraler samt ändring av direktiv

text: (nedan kallad förordningen om värdepapperscentraler), som anger att de behöriga myndigheterna ska tilldelas tillsyns- och utredningsbefogenheter. I detta sammanhang bör särskilt

text: artikel 45 i den förordningen

text: nämnas, varigenom krav införs på stabilitetstillsyn för värdepapperscentralerna, vilket inbegriper viktiga bestämmelser om reducering av operativa risker.

text: 3.3 Det bör dessutom noteras att ECB-rådet den 3 juni 2013 antog de principer för finansmarknadernas infrastruktur som lagts fram i april 2012 av kommittén för betalnings- och avvecklingssystem (CPSS) inom Banken för internationell betalningsutjämning och tekniska kommittén inom Internationella organisationen för värdepapperstillsyn (Iosco), med avseende på Eurosystemets tillsyn över alla olika former av finansmarknadens infrastruktur. Detta följdes av ett offentligt samråd beträffande ett utkast till förordning om krav på övervakning av systemviktiga betalningssystem (nedan kallad SIPS-förordningen). SIPS-förordningen genomför CPSS-Iosco-principerna så att de blir rättsligt bindande och omfattar systemviktiga betalningssystem såväl för större betalningar som för massbetalningar, oavsett om de utförs av nationella centralbanker i Eurosystemet eller av privata enheter.

text: 3.4 De nuvarande tillsynsarrangemangen för betalningssystem och betaltjänstleverantörer omfattar redan förfaranden för tidiga varningar och samordnade svar i och utanför Eurosystemet för att hantera potentiella hot mot it-säkerheten, motsvarande dem som anges i artiklarna 10 och 11 i direktivförslaget.

text: 3.5 ECBS har fastställt standarderna i fråga om rapporterings- och riskhanteringsskyldigheter för betalningssystem. ECB bedömer dessutom regelbundet värdepappersavvecklingssystem för att fastställa huruvida dessa får användas vid Eurosystemets kreditoperationer. ECB anser därför att direktivförslagets krav som påverkar kritisk marknadsinfrastruktur och deras marknadsoperatörer inte får påverka tillämpningen av standarderna i SIPS-förordningen, Eurosystemets ram för tillsynspolicyn eller andra unionsförordningar, i synnerhet inte förordningen om Europas marknadsinfrastrukturer och den kommande förordningen om värdepapperscentraler. Det ska inte heller inkräkta på EBA:s, Esmas och andra tillsynsmyndigheters uppgifter.

text: 3.6 Trots vad som sägs ovan anser ECB att det finns mycket som talar för att Eurosystemet ska utbyta relevant information med den kommitté för nät- och informationssäkerhet som ska inrättas enligt artikel 19 i direktivförslaget. Med tanke på det effektiva informationsutbyte som kan komma att bli nödvändigt bör ECB, EBA och Esma uppmanas att sända representanter till mötena inom kommittén för nät- och informationssäkerhet för de punkter på dagordningen som skulle kunna vara av intresse för de olika uppdrag som de ska utföra.

text: Utfärdat i Frankfurt am Main den 25 juli 2014.

text: Mario Draghi

text: Ecb:s ordförande

text: BILAGA

text: Kommissionens förslag | ECB:s ändringsförslag

text: om ett gemensamt regelverk för elektroniska kommunikationsnät och kommunikationstjänster (ramdirektiv) (2), som omfattas av de särskilda säkerhets- och integritetskrav som fastställs i

text: artikel 13

text: a i direktivet; direktivet bör inte heller tillämpas på tillhandahållare av betrodda tjänster. | (5) Detta direktiv bör tillämpas på alla nät- och informationssystem, så att alla relevanta incidenter och risker täcks. De skyldigheter som införs för offentliga förvaltningar och marknadsoperatörer bör dock inte tillämpas på företag som tillhandahåller allmänna kommunikationsnät eller allmänt tillgängliga elektroniska kommunikationstjänster enligt

text: artikel 13

text: a i direktivet; direktivet bör inte heller tillämpas på tillhandahållare av betrodda tjänster. Utan att detta påverkar hur direktivet tillämpas på offentliga förvaltningar och marknadsoperatörer ska detta direktiv inte påverka de uppgifter och skyldigheter som tilldelats Europeiska centralbankssystemet (ECBS) genom fördraget och stadgan för Europeiska centralbankssystemet och Europeiska centralbanken, eller motsvarande uppgifter som utförs av medlemmar i ECBS inom ramen för deras nationella regelverk, särskilt i fråga om politiken för tillsyn över kreditinstitut och övervakningen av betalnings- och värdepappersavvecklingssystem. Medlemsstaterna ska förlita sig på de tillsyns- och övervakningsuppgifter som utförs av centralbankerna och tillsynsmyndigheterna för dessa operatörer inom deras behörighetsområde.

text: Förklaring Skäl 5 bör ändras för att spegla ECB:s och de nationella centralbankernas ansvar för att övervaka och reglera betalnings- och avvecklingssystem. Enligt

text: artikel 127.2

text: fjärde strecksatsen i fördraget är en av ECBS centrala uppgifter att främja väl fungerande betalningssystem. Enligt artikel 22 i ECBS-stadgan har ECB också befogenhet att anta förordningar för att säkerställa effektiva och sunda clearing- och betalningssystem. Det bör också beaktas att enligt artikel 127.5 i fördraget ska ECBS medverka till ett smidigt genomförande av politiken för det finansiella systemets stabilitet. I Eurosystemets ram för tillsynspolitiken från juli 2011 fastställs också att tillsynen över betalnings- och avvecklingssystem är en centralbanksfunktion som syftar till att främja målen om säkerhet och effektivitet genom att befintliga och planerade system övervakas och bedöms mot dessa mål, och förändringar genomförs vid behov. Att säkerställa att systemen är säkra och effektiva är med andra ord en viktig förutsättning för att Eurosystemet ska kunna medverka till finansiell stabilitet, genomföra den monetära politiken och upprätthålla allmänhetens förtroende för euron. I enlighet med ECB:s synpunkter om den föreslagna översynen av direktivet om betaltjänster (PSD2) bör det också noteras att de nationella tillsynsmyndigheterna och centralbankerna är de myndigheter som är behöriga att utfärda riktlinjer om incidenthantering och anmälningar av incidenter för betaltjänstleverantörer samt riktlinjer om vidarebefordran av anmälningar av incidenter mellan relevanta myndigheter. I detta skäl bör också vederbörlig hänsyn tas till de uppgifter som tilldelats ECB genom förordning

text: (EU) nr 1024/2013

text: . Slutligen ska detta inte heller påverka uppgifter motsvarande dem som fastställs i fördraget och ECBS-stadgan och som utförs av medlemmar i ECBS utanför euroområdet inom ramen för deras nationella bestämmelser.

text: 4. Detta direktiv påverkar inte tillämpningen av EU-lagstiftning om it-brottslighet och

text: rådets direktiv 2008/114/EG av den 8 december 2008

text: om identifiering av, och klassificering som, europeisk kritisk infrastruktur och bedömning av behovet att stärka skyddet av denna (9). 5. Detta direktiv påverkar inte heller tillämpningen av

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 95/46/EG av den 24 oktober 1995

text: om skydd för enskilda personer med avseende på behandling av personuppgifter och om det fria flödet av sådana uppgifter (10) och

text: Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 2002/58/EG av den 12 juli 2002

text: om behandling av personuppgifter och integritetsskydd inom sektorn för elektronisk kommunikation och Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning om skydd för enskilda personer med avseende på behandling av personuppgifter och om det fria flödet av sådana uppgifter (11). 6. Informationsutbytet inom samarbetsnätverket enligt kapitel III och anmälan av nät- och informationssäkerhetsincidenter enligt

text: artikel 14

text: kan förutsätta behandling av personuppgifter. Sådan behandling, som är nödvändig för att tillgodose detta direktivs syfte av allmänintresse ska godkännas av medlemsstaten i enlighet med

text: artikel 7 i direktiv 95/46/EG

text: och direktiv

text: , såsom dessa har genomförts i nationell lagstiftning. | 4. Detta direktiv påverkar inte tillämpningen av EU-unionslagstiftning om it-brottslighet och

text: om identifiering av, och klassificering som, europeisk kritisk infrastruktur och bedömning av behovet att stärka skyddet av denna (9). 5. Detta direktiv påverkar inte övervakningen och de uppgifter som tilldelats ECB och ECBS i fråga om tillsynen av kreditinstitut och betalnings- och avvecklingssystem som omfattas av särskilda riskhanterings- och säkerhetskrav som har fastställts inom ECBS regelverk samt inom andra relaterade unionsdirektiv och unionsförordningar. Detta direktiv ska inte heller påverka motsvarande uppgifter som utförs av medlemmar i ECBS inom ramen för deras nationella regelverk. 56. Detta direktiv påverkar inte heller tillämpningen av

text: om behandling av personuppgifter och integritetsskydd inom sektorn för elektronisk kommunikation och Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning om skydd för enskilda personer med avseende på behandling av personuppgifter och om det fria flödet av sådana uppgifter (11). 67. Informationsutbytet inom samarbetsnätverket enligt kapitel III och anmälan av nät- och informationssäkerhetsincidenter enligt

text: artikel 14

text: artikel 7 i direktiv 95/46/EG

text: och direktiv

text: , såsom dessa har genomförts i nationell lagstiftning.

text: Förklaring Som tidigare har konstaterats har ECBS ett stort intresse av att se till att betalnings- och avvecklingssystemen fungerar ordentligt. Skälet till detta är att betalnings-, clearing- och avvecklingssystemen har stor betydelse för välfungerande penningpolitiska transaktioner och bidrar till att säkerställa det finansiella systemets stabilitet i största allmänhet. ECB rekommenderar därför att ECBS roll i samband med betalnings- och avvecklingssystemen och den befintliga tillsynsramen beaktas i direktivförslaget. ECBS har ytterst effektiva verktyg för att fastställa graden av säkerhet och effektivitet i dessa system. I detta skäl bör också vederbörlig hänsyn tas till de uppgifter som tilldelats ECB genom förordning

text: (EU) nr 1024/2013

text: . Direktivförslaget bör inte heller påverka motsvarande uppgifter som utförs av medlemmar i ECBS utanför euroområdet inom ramen för deras nationella regelverk.

text: 1. Varje medlemsstat ska utse en behörig nationell myndighet för säkerheten i nät- och informationssystem (den behöriga myndigheten). | 1. Varje medlemsstat ska utse en behörig nationell myndighet för säkerheten i nät- och informationssystem (den behöriga myndigheten). Ett effektivt samarbete ska etableras mellan den behöriga myndigheten och de europeiska och nationella tillsynsmyndigheterna.

text: Förklaring ECB rekommenderar att

text: artikel 6.1

text: ändras för att säkerställa en hög grad av samarbete på unionsnivå.

text: artikel 10

text: . (b) Säkerställa samordnade svarsåtgärder i enlighet med

text: artikel 11

text: . (c) Regelbundet offentliggöra ej konfidentiell information om pågående tidiga varningar och samordnade svarsåtgärder på en gemensam webbplats. (d) På en begäran av en medlemsstat eller kommissionen gemensamt diskutera och bedöma en eller flera nationella NIS-strategier och nationella NIS-samarbetsplaner enligt

text: artikel 5

text: , inom detta direktivs räckvidd. (e) På begäran av en medlemsstat eller kommissionen gemensamt diskutera och bedöma incidenthanteringsorganisationernas effektivitet, i synnerhet när NIS-övningar genomförs på unionsnivå. (f) Samarbeta och utbyta information om alla relevanta frågor med Europeiska it-brottscentrumet inom Europol och med andra relevanta europeiska organ, i synnerhet inom områdena dataskydd, energi, transport, bankverksamhet, börs och hälso- och sjukvård. (g) Utbyta information och bästa praxis med varandra och med kommissionen och bistå varandra i uppbyggnaden av NIS-kapacitet. (h) Anordna regelbundna kollegiala granskningar av kapacitet och beredskap. (i) Anordna NIS-övningar på unionsnivå och delta, såsom lämpligt, i internationella NIS-övningar. | 3. Inom samarbetsnätverket ska de behöriga myndigheterna göra följande: (a) Sprida tidiga varningar om risker och incidenter i enlighet med

text: artikel 10

text: artikel 11

text: artikel 5

text: , inom detta direktivs räckvidd. (e) På begäran av en medlemsstat eller kommissionen gemensamt diskutera och bedöma incidenthanteringsorganisationernas effektivitet, i synnerhet när NIS-övningar genomförs på unionsnivå. (f) Samarbeta och utbyta information om alla relevanta frågor med Europeiska it-brottscentrumet inom Europol och med andra relevanta europeiska organ, i synnerhet inom områdena dataskydd, energi, transport, bankverksamhet, börs och hälso- och sjukvård. (g) Utbyta information och bästa praxis med varandra och med kommissionen och bistå varandra i uppbyggnaden av NIS-kapacitet. (h) Anordna regelbundna kollegiala granskningar av kapacitet och beredskap. (i) Anordna NIS-övningar på unionsnivå och delta, såsom lämpligt, i internationella NIS-övningar. (j) Säkerställa informationsutbyte med europeiska och nationella tillsynsmyndigheter (vilket för finanssektorns del skulle omfatta Europeiska centralbankssystemet (ECBS), Europeiska bankmyndigheten (EBA) och Europeiska värdepappers- och marknadsmyndigheten (Esma), som ska samarbeta när säkerhetsincidenter har identifierats som skulle kunna utgöra ett hinder för välfungerande betalnings- och avvecklingssystem).

text: Förklaring Det finns mycket som talar för ett informationsutbyte med Europeiska unionens byrå för nät- och informationssäkerhet eller behöriga myndigheter inom ramen för direktivförslaget samt med EBA eller Esma i egenskap av behörig myndighet. för att samordna incidenter som avser betaltjänstleverantörer. ECB föreslår därför denna ändring för att främja informationsutbyte och bättre samordning på unionsnivå.

text: (EU) nr 182/2011

text: . | 1. Kommissionen ska bistås av en kommitté (kommittén för nät- och informationssäkerhet). Denna kommitté ska vara en kommitté i den mening som avses i förordning

text: (EU) nr 182/2011

text: . ECB, EBA och Esma ska ges möjlighet att sända en representant till mötena inom kommittén för nät- och informationssäkerhet för de punkter på dagordningen som skulle kunna vara av intresse för ECB:s, EBA:s eller Esmas respektive uppdrag.

text: Förklaring ECB har ett egenintresse av att höja säkerheten för system, tjänster och instrument i samband med betalning och avveckling, eftersom detta utgör en viktig faktor för att upprätthålla förtroendet för euron och en välfungerande ekonomi inom unionen. ECB rekommenderar därför att ECB bjuds in till mötena inom kommittén för nät- och informationssäkerhet. ECB ska under alla förhållanden formellt konsulteras i enlighet med fördraget om sådana åtgärder som avser betalningssystem och andra frågor som faller inom ECB:s behörighetsområde. EBA eller Esma bör också involveras när det gäller frågor som rör betaltjänstleverantörer.

type: vagledning

utgivare: ecb


text: See in particular amending proposals T/465/7 and T/465/9.

text: Law XXXVIII of 2014, published in Magyar Közlöny 98/2014 on 18 July 2014.

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).

text: Judgment of the Court of 30 April 2014 in

text: Case C-26/13

text: Decision 8/2014 of the Constitutional Court of 20 March 2014.

text: Uniform Decision 2/2014 of the Supreme Court of 16 June 2014. See also Decision 6/2013 of the Supreme Court of 16 December 2013.

text: See Opinions

text: and

text: For further information on lending in foreign currencies in the Union see the Annex to Recommendation

text: of 21 September 2011 on lending in foreign currencies (OJ C 342, 22.11.2011, p.1).

text: Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 February 2014 on credit agreements for consumers relating to residential immovable property and amending Directives

text: and

text: and

text: Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010

text: (OJ L 60, 28.2.2014, p. 34).

text: The MNB estimates that the one-off cost of the measures could be between EUR 2.3 billion and 2.9 billion for the banking sector. This estimate compares with the EUR 1 billion loss faced by the Hungarian banking system as a result of the early repayment scheme.

text: See paragraph 3.7 of Opinion

sprak: en

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 28 July 2014 on new general measures stemming from the Supreme Court’s decision on consumer loan contracts (CON/2014/59)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 28 July 2014 on new general measures stemming from the Supreme Court’s decision on consumer loan contracts (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 27 June 2014 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Hungarian Ministry of the National Economy (hereinafter the ‘consulting authority’) for an opinion on a draft law on certain measures relating to consumer loan contracts (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). Several amending proposals to the draft law were submitted to the Hungarian Parliament, none of which was sent to the ECB . Furthermore, the draft law was adopted by the Parliament on 4 July 2014 . Under these circumstances, the ECB has adopted its opinion based on the adopted law (hereinafter the ‘law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the sixth indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the law relates to rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1 Purpose of the law

text: 1.1 Following a Court of Justice of the European Union preliminary ruling and a Hungarian Constitutional Court decision on this subject matter, the Hungarian Supreme Court delivered a uniform decision (hereinafter the ‘Supreme Court decision’) outlining the basic conditions of certain uniform measures to be laid down by the Hungarian Parliament for consumer loan

text: contracts denominated in forint or in foreign currency entered into by private persons in Hungary. The Supreme Court decision states inter alia that the use of exchange rate margins (i.e. bid/ask spreads) in relation to loans granted in foreign exchange (hereinafter ‘FX loans’) is unfair and that financial institutions must apply the official exchange rate quoted by the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (MNB) when recalculating loan instalments. The Supreme Court also established that increases in the interest rates, charges and fees relating to consumer loan contracts unilaterally imposed by financial institutions will be considered unfair unless they comply with a set of cumulative principles (hereinafter the ‘seven principles’) laid down in the Supreme Court decision. Against this background, the law regulates certain elements of forint and FX loans and financial leasing contracts entered into by private persons, with retroactive effect. The measures introduced by the law are the first in a series of measures to be adopted by the Parliament which aim to address the Supreme Court decision. The law also introduces additional requirements relating to the execution of the new measures stemming from the Supreme Court decision. 1.2 To these ends, the law:  declares null and void the use of exchange rate margins by financial institutions to calculate loan advancement and loan instalments in FX loan contracts and financial leasing contracts entered into prior to the entry into force of the law, but not earlier than 1 May 2004. As a result, the law requires financial institutions to calculate the amounts to be repaid to consumers using the official exchange rate published by the MNB. This calculation has to be made dating back to the start of the contract but not earlier than 1 May 2004, within 90 days of the entry into force of the law. The financial institutions concerned are required to submit the methodology used for this calculation to the MNB for verification within 60 days of entry into force of the law.  lays down the seven principles, and states that no unilateral amendment of the general terms and conditions of a loan contract or a financial leasing contract meets the seven principles, therefore making any such amendment unfair, and thus, void. A financial institution that has adopted such an amendment will have to prove that the amendment complies with the seven principles in civil legal proceedings initiated at the institution’s discretion within 30 days following the entry into force of the law in the case of FX loans and 90 days in the case of forint loans. If such a procedure is not carried out, the unilateral amendment is considered to be unfair pursuant to the law, and thus null and void,  lays down specific rules on how financial institutions can initiate such civil proceedings. These rules impose a short deadline for the financial institutions to prove that the

text: contractual conditions applied by them comply with the seven principles. The burden of proof is on the financial institutions.  under certain conditions, disapplies the statute of limitations, and suspends court proceedings in pending cases, as well as the execution of foreclosures related to consumer credit contracts.

text: 2 General observations

text: 2.1 The appropriate time to consult the ECB The draft law was adopted on 4 July 2014, shortly after the ECB was consulted, and before it could adopt its opinion. As a consequence, it was not possible for the Hungarian Parliament to take the ECB’s views into account before legislating. Moreover, the law differs substantially from the draft law as a result of several amendments submitted to the Parliament in the interim, none of which was sent to the ECB in draft form. Under these circumstances, this opinion is based on the law. The Hungarian authorities have therefore failed to comply with their duty to consult the ECB. The adoption of the law in no way relieves the authorities of their duty to consider this opinion, since this duty is important for the application and interpretation of the law and any possible future amendments. In this respect, the ECB emphasises that even in cases of particular urgency or where the legislation has reached an advanced stage, the national authorities are not relieved of their duty to consult the ECB at an appropriate stage in the legislative process that allows sufficient time for: (a) the ECB to examine the draft legislative provisions and adopt its opinion in all required language versions; and (b) the national authorities to take into account the ECB’s views in accordance with Decision

text: . The ECB would therefore appreciate the consulting authority honouring its consultation obligation in line with Decision

text: in future. 2.2 Overview of the measures introduced by the Parliament The ECB has assessed the situation in the Hungarian financial market in relation to FXdenominated loans in several opinions . Prior to the global financial crisis, borrowing in foreign currencies by households and non-financial corporations was popular in several Member States , as lower interest rates applied to FX loans compared to interest rates applied to loans in the domestic currency, as well as the expectation of domestic currency appreciation, supported the demand for FX loans. In Hungary, FX loans were denominated in euro, Swiss francs and Japanese yen.

text: To address risks borne by the banking system associated with the negative effects stemming from the depreciation of the forint on private sector balance sheets, the Hungarian authorities implemented a series of measures from 2010. In March 2010 the authorities introduced lower maximum loan-to-value ratios for mortgages and car loans in foreign currencies, and in June 2010 they introduced more stringent debt-to-income ratios for FX loans. Moreover, a prohibition on foreign currency-denominated mortgage lending effective from August 2010 was introduced. In July 2011 the Hungarian authorities repealed the prohibition, and announced very strict conditions for granting FX loans with essentially the same effect. In addition, two government initiatives aiming to reduce the increased burden of FX loans on households due to the depreciated forint were introduced in the same year. These were the early repayment scheme and the exchange rate cap scheme. In the first quarter of 2014, FX loans to households accounted for more than 54% of the total loans granted in Hungary, and their total value was just below 13% of the country’s annual gross domestic product.

text: 3. Specific observations

text: 3.1 As mentioned above, the Supreme Court laid down the seven principles (clarity, itemised listing, objectivity, factuality and proportionality, transparency, the right of termination and symmetry), and laid down that, if these are met, the unilateral amendment of the general terms and conditions of a consumer loan contract is not to be considered unfair. For the sake of consistency and legal soundness, it could have been made clearer in Article 5 of the law that a decision as to whether a particular condition imposed by unilateral amendment of the general terms and conditions applied by a financial institution is fair or not has to be assessed exclusively on the basis of the seven principles . If possible, guidance should be given to the affected parties on the application of the seven principles, since pursuant to the law the question of fairness would have to be decided in a civil procedure if a financial institution decided to prove the fairness of the general terms and conditions it has applied. 3.2 Acknowledging that Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council does not apply to credit agreements existing before 21 March 2016 , the retroactive effect of the law does not seem to be in line with the general aim and principle of

text: Article 23(5) of Directive 2014/17/EU

text: . This Directive allows Member States to further regulate foreign currency loans, on the condition that such regulation is not applied with retroactive effect.

text: 3.3 Noting that point 6 of the explanatory memorandum to the draft law acknowledges the significance of the potential economic impact of the new measures, the ECB suggests that the Hungarian authorities carry out a thorough analysis of the possible effects of the measures having retroactive effect, as such measures could put a significant strain on the banking sector, potentially adversely affecting the stability of the Hungarian financial sector as a whole, and possibly resulting in adverse spillover effects on the economy. Preliminary estimates by affected banks suggest that the potential one-off impact of the measures could be more significant than the losses that the banking system incurred in 2011 as a result of the early repayment scheme. While the banking sector’s current capital position is stronger than before the implementation of the early repayment scheme, the potentially significant costs of the new measures may in some cases require material capital injections from the owners of the financial institutions to restore regulatory capital ratios and lending capacity to levels prevailing before the law was adopted . The ECB reiterates that in this context it is of the utmost importance that a meaningful dialogue takes place between the Hungarian authorities and all the relevant stakeholders, including authorities in other Member States. Consultation with such stakeholders might shed light on macro-prudential issues which are not apparent at national level. Furthermore, an exchange of views with the MNB, which is the authority responsible for macro-prudential issues, could help to coordinate effective action without impacting financial stability. In addition, the Hungarian authorities should ensure a proper and timely consultation of competent European authorities, including the European Commission, the European Banking Authority, the European Systemic Risk Board and the ECB on any further measures as anticipated in Article 3(5) of the law. 3.4 To this end, when laying down further measures applicable to the method of repayment or write down of the amounts to be repaid to customers as a result of the law, and the method for potentially converting FX loans, the ECB suggests that due consideration should be given to the interests of the general public, including financial institutions and borrowers, as well as the authorities responsible for ensuring the stability of the financial system in Hungary. In particular, further measures to be applied to the planned conversion of FX loans should also take into account the need to preserve financial stability, ensure an appropriate burden sharing among all stakeholders and avoid moral hazard in the future. 3.5 With regard to the high percentage of the entities operating in the Hungarian banking sector owned by foreign banking groups, and depending on the nature of the further measures applicable to the method of repayment or write down of the amounts to be repaid to customers, cross-border spillover effects on banking groups’ consolidated profits and capital positions may

text: occur. In the past few years, losses stemming from other government measures, including the bank levy, the financial transaction tax and the early repayment scheme for FX loans, were offset by capital injections by foreign parent banks to ensure the stable functioning of their subsidiaries, highlighting their long-term commitment to the financial sector. Moreover, the MNB, as the competent banking supervisor, may wish to consider how it would address a capital shortfall in a Hungarian credit institution resulting from application of the law. 3.6 In addition to the possible significant adverse financial impact on the banking system, the possibility of negative effects on the Hungarian economy and financial markets cannot be excluded. This should also be taken into consideration in establishing the further measures on the conditions of the financial settlement between credit institutions and their customers and on the conversion of FX loans into forint so that these measures do not jeopardise macro-economic and financial stability in Hungary.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 28 July 2014.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: Law 17(I)/2013, as amended. 2

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).

text: Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms (OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 190). 4 Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Bank Resolution Fund (COM (2013) 520 final). See also Outcome of the European Parliament’s first reading, 23 April 2014, available on the Council’s website at www.consilium.europa.eu. 5

text: Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013

text: conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63). 6

text: Article 6

text: a of the proposed SRM regulation. 7 Law 90(I)/2014, Episimi Efimerida tis Dimokratias, Annex. Ι(Ι), No. 4450, 30.6.2014

text: See Opinion

text: , paragraph 3. All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 9 Law 138(I)/2002. 10 Section 5(6) of the draft law. 11 Section 5(13) of the draft law. 12 Section 5A(2) of the draft law.

text: See Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.2, and Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.4. See also Article 3(3) of the BRRD. 14 Section 9(9) of the Law. 15 Section 10 of the Law. 16 Section 11 of the Law. 17 Section 12 of the Law. 18 In accordance with Article 3(6) of the BRRD. 19 Sections 28A to 28D of the draft law. 20 Sections 35 and 36 of the draft law. 21 See Article 110(3) of the BRRD.

text: Section 8 of the draft law. 23

text: Regulation (EU) No 468/2014

text: (ECB/2014/17) of the European Central Bank of 16 April 2014 establishing the framework for cooperation between the European Central Bank and national competent authorities and with national designated authorities (OJ L 141, 14.5.2014, p. 1).

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 22 July 2014 on the resolution of credit and other institutions (CON/2014/60)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 22 July 2014 on the resolution of credit and other institutions (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 23 May 2014, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Minister for Finance of the Republic of Cyprus for an opinion on a draft law (hereinafter the ‘draft law’) amending the Resolution of Credit and Other Institutions Laws of 2013 (hereinafter the ‘Law’) . The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third and sixth indents of

text: , as the draft law relates to the Central Bank of Cyprus (CBC) and to rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: The draft law amends certain provisions of the Law, with the overall aim of improving the operational effectiveness and efficiency of the CBC in its resolution tasks. More specifically, the draft law: (a) designates the CBC as the Resolution Authority (the CBC in its capacity as resolution authority is hereinafter referred to as the ‘Resolution Authority’); (b) establishes the Resolution Committee of the Resolution Authority, which is composed of the CBC’s Governor and the two executive members of the CBC’s Board of Directors and whose primary responsibilities are to implement the provisions of the Law and to take decisions and issue decrees; (c) establishes a resolution unit within the CBC, the main duty of which is to assist the Resolution Authority and the Resolution Committee in the exercise of their duties; (d) confers on the CBC, in its capacity as the competent supervisory authority, the power to decide whether an institution is no longer viable or likely no longer to be viable, after consultation with the Resolution Committee; and

text: (e) inserts new sections into the Law, empowering the Resolution Authority to collect information and conduct investigations for the exercise of its responsibilities and to impose administrative fines in the event of breaches of the Law.

text: 2. General observations

text: Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council (hereinafter the ‘BRRD’) lays down rules and procedures that must be transposed by the Member States by 31 December 2014. The ECB understands that the framework established under the Law, as amended by the draft law once it has been adopted, will be reviewed in due course in order to ensure full transposition of the BRRD into Cypriot law. This framework will also be reviewed to ensure full consistency with all developments at Union level, such as the provisions of the proposed regulation on the Single Resolution Mechanism (hereinafter ‘the proposed SRM regulation’) , when the latter has been adopted and enters into force. Once the proposed SRM regulation is applicable, the Single Resolution Board of the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) will be responsible for institutions: (a) that are considered significant under the terms of

text: Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013

text: ; (b) in relation to which the ECB has decided to exercise directly itself all the relevant powers in accordance with

text: Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013

text: ; or (c) that constitute other cross-border groups . However, the Resolution Authority will still retain some tasks in relation to institutions under the responsibility of the Single Resolution Board. According to the proposed SRM regulation, national resolution authorities will be required to assist the Single Resolution Board in resolution planning and in preparing resolution decisions for institutions under the Single Resolution Board’s responsibility. The national resolution authorities should implement the resolution scheme established by the Board by exercising resolution powers and tools in relation to the institutions in question.

text: 3. Appropriate time to consult the ECB

text: The ECB received the consultation request on 23 May 2014. The ECB notes that the draft law has already been enacted and was published in the Official Gazette of the Republic on 30 June 2014 . The consultation request did not refer to such timetable and did not indicate a deadline for preparing the opinion. Pursuant to

text: Article 4 of Decision 98/415/EC

text: , the ECB must be consulted at an appropriate stage in the legislative process. This implies that the consultation should take place at a point in the legislative process that allows the ECB sufficient time to examine the draft legislative provisions and adopt its

text: opinion, and the national authorities to take into account the ECB’s views in accordance with Decision

text: . Therefore, the ECB would appreciate the consulting authority honouring its obligation to consult the ECB in good time in the future.

text: 4. Specific observations

text: 4.1 The Resolution Authority The ECB welcomes the draft law as it substantially improves the operational effectiveness and efficiency of the Resolution Authority and allocates sole responsibility to the CBC for the execution of tasks which are broadly consistent with the CBC’s financial stability role. Furthermore, the ECB understands that these tasks do not interfere with the performance of the CBC’s Eurosystem-related tasks provided for in the Treaty and do not prejudice the financial means necessary for carrying out the CBC’s Eurosystem-related tasks. Any involvement of the CBC and the members of its decision-making bodies in measures to strengthen financial stability must be compatible with the Treaty and, consequently, with the CBC’s institutional and financial independence, as well as with the personal independence of the members of its decision-making bodies safeguarding the proper performance of their tasks under the Treaty and the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank . 4.2 Separation and operational independence of supervisory and resolution tasks The draft law provides that the CBC must take all measures necessary to ensure: (a) the effective separation between its supervisory tasks pursuant to the Central Bank of Cyprus Laws of 2002 to (No 3) of 2013 and its resolution tasks laid down in the draft law; (b) operational independence of its supervisory tasks pursuant to the Central Bank of Cyprus Laws of 2002 to (No 3) of 2013 and its resolution tasks laid down in the draft law; and (c) adequate expertise, resources and operational capacity to apply the resolution measures . The draft law further provides that the Resolution Authority must have access to all information in the possession of the competent supervisory authority that is necessary for the implementation of the resolution measures and the exercise of its tasks . In accordance with the draft law, the CBC will also establish a resolution unit consisting of CBC staff members . The staff of the resolution unit will be structurally separate from the staff involved in carrying out the CBC’s supervisory tasks and must report directly to the Resolution Committee. The ECB takes note of the solution adopted in the draft law which is one of the organisational arrangements that can ensure the effective separation and operational independence between the CBC’s supervisory tasks and its resolution tasks, as well as the expertise and the operational capacity of the CBC to implement any of the Resolution Committee’s decisions.

text: The ECB welcomes this section of the draft law and reiterates that any resolution powers vested in the CBC need to be functionally separate from its supervisory and other tasks, in order to ensure independence and to avoid conflicts of interest. That separation should not prevent the exchange of information and close cooperation between the resolution function and the supervisory function . 4.3 Minister for Finance’s consent to the Resolution Committee’s decisions Under the draft law, the Resolution Committee, with the consent of the Minister for Finance, where required, may decide to adopt some of the resolution measures provided for in the Law. The Minister for Finance’s consent is required in order to apply the sale of operations tool without complying with the associated marketing requirements , for the transfer of all or some assets, rights or obligations of an institution under resolution to a bridge bank , for the transfer of assets 16 17 and rights to an asset management company and for the application of the bail-in tool . The ECB understands that this requirement for the Minister’s consent to the Resolution Committee’s decisions is limited to situations where a resolution measure with a direct fiscal 18. impact or systemic implications is being applied If so, it would be preferable to make this clearer in section 7(1) of the Law. 4.4 Powers of the Resolution Authority to collect information and conduct investigations 4.4.1 The draft law includes new sections empowering the Resolution Authority to collect information and conduct investigations for the exercise of its responsibilities and to impose administrative fines if it establishes that a person has acted in breach of any provision of the Law . In addition, criminal offences are introduced for cases where a person makes a false, misleading or deceitful statement as to any fact, or fails to submit facts in the course of providing information to the Resolution Authority . 4.4.2 The ECB acknowledges that both the CBC’s resolution function and its supervisory function should have all the information-gathering and investigatory powers that are necessary for the exercise of their respective functions . However, activities such as requesting information and onsite inspections should be coordinated to avoid duplication of tasks; in that sense, a possible solution would be to require that these activities should primarily be conducted by the supervisory function, which, in such case, would be the main provider of the information necessary to the Resolution Authority in order to prepare for the resolution of the institution.

text: 5. Credit institutions subject to resolution measures The draft law provides that a decision of the Resolution Committee may be made in relation to a ‘subsidiary’ of an affected institution, as well as in relation to the affected institution itself . The ECB understands that the term ‘subsidiary’ may include companies incorporated in countries other than the Republic of Cyprus. Therefore, it must be assumed that the resolution measures contained in the draft law are intended also to apply to foreign incorporated subsidiaries of the affected institutions. The ECB notes that these measures may only be enforceable against such foreign legal entities to the extent permitted under the foreign law applicable to them.

text: 6. Cooperation with the ECB

text: 6.1 According to the Law, the supervisory and resolution functions of the CBC will cooperate in a number of instances: for example, in determining whether a credit institution is no longer viable or is likely no longer to be viable for the purpose of taking resolution measures in relation to an affected institution. 6.2 As clarified in Section 2 above, following the forthcoming adoption and entry into force of the proposed SRM regulation the Resolution Authority will only be competent in relation to the resolution of institutions that do not fall within the competence of the Single Resolution Board of the SRM. In order to ensure cooperation between the competent supervisory authority and the Resolution Authority once the proposed SRM regulation is adopted and enters into force, the competent supervisory authority should only exercise its supervisory tasks and, in turn, decide that the affected institution is no longer viable or is likely no longer to be viable in respect of institutions for which both it and the Resolution Authority remain competent. 6.3 In this regard, the ECB will assume the supervisory tasks conferred on it by

text: Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013

text: on 4 November 2014. There is a need to ensure consistency during the period after which the ECB has assumed its tasks under

text: Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013

text: , but before all the provisions of the proposed SRM regulation are applicable (most likely from 1 January 2016). During this period, elements of the Law will apply to credit institutions under ECB supervision. Therefore, the Resolution Authority should also be obliged to cooperate closely with the ECB in accordance with

text: Article 3 of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013

text: . 6.4 The consulting authority is also requested to consider the provisions of the Law in order to ensure compatibility with the exclusive competence of the ECB to authorise credit institutions and to withdraw authorisations of credit institutions under

text: Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013

text: . Relevant procedures for conducting those tasks are provided for in

text: Regulation (EU) No 468/2014

text: (ECB/2014/17) of the European Central Bank (hereinafter the ‘SSM Framework Regulation’), which applies to public authorities and credit institutions. Both

text: Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013

text: and

text: the SSM Framework Regulation have primacy over the Law and the draft law, once the latter is adopted. These national laws must therefore be read and applied in conjunction with the aforementioned Union-level regulations. This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 22 July 2014. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: Federal Law adopting the Federal Law establishing a divestment unit (GSA), the Federal Law incorporating a federal divestment holding company for HYPO ALPE-ADRIA-BANK S.P.A. (HBI Federal Holding Law), the Federal Law incorporating a federal divestment (public limited) company (ABBAG Law) and the Federal Law on the reorganisation of HYPO ALPE ADRIA BANK INTERNATIONAL AG (HaaSanG) and amending the Law on financial market stability and the Law on the Financial Market Supervisory Authority.

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).

text: Federal Law establishing a divestment unit (GSA).

text: Federal Banking Law No 532/1993, as amended.

text: Federal Law incorporating a federal divestment (public limited) company (ABBAG Law).

text: Federal Law incorporating a federal divestment holding company for HYPO ALPE-ADRIA-BANK S.P.A. (HBI Federal Holding Law).

text: Federal Law on the reorganisation of HYPO ALPE ADRIA BANK INTERNATIONAL AG (HaaSanG).

text: A list of the relevant subordinated liabilities is listed in Annex 1 to the HaaSanG.

text: See Article 5 of the HaaSanG.

text: Federal Law amending the Law on financial market stability.

text: Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 April 2001 on the reorganisation and winding up of credit institutions (OJ L 125, 5.5.2001, p. 15).

text: Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending

text: Council Directive 82/891/EEC

text: , and Directives

text: and

text: , and Regulations

text: (EU) No 1093/2010

text: and

text: (EU) No 648/2012

text: , of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 190).

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 29 July 2014 on reorganisation and winding-up measures regarding Hypo Group Alpe Adria (CON/2014/61)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 29 July 2014 on reorganisation and winding-up measures regarding Hypo Group Alpe Adria (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 11 June 2014 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Austrian Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft law on reorganisation and winding-up measures regarding Hypo Group Alpe Adria, including the establishment of a run-off unit (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and on the sixth indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft law relates to the rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 Under the draft law , Hypo Alpe-Adria-Bank International AG (HBInt) can be turned into a deregulated run-off unit that does not have to comply with own funds and liquidity rules for credit institutions. The unit can be established once HBInt’s banking licence lapses, which will occur when the Financial Market Authority (FMA) issues a notice confirming that HBInt has ceased its deposit-taking business and no longer has any qualifying holdings in other credit institutions or investment firms. The purpose of the run-off unit is to wind down HBInt’s remaining portfolio and to realise its assets. HBInt is obliged to establish a run-off plan to this effect, and may only conduct business transactions that serve this purpose. Such transactions include banking activities, with the

text: exception of deposit-taking business. Nevertheless, only certain provisions of the Law on banking apply to the run-off unit, including the requirement that its managing directors and the members of the supervisory board are fit and proper persons to hold such positions, and provisions relating to internal audits, the prevention of money laundering and accounting. The draft law also enables the Minister for Finance (MoF) to transfer assets and liabilities of HBInt to third party institutions and authorises the MoF to establish a run-off holding company to take over and administer the shares in the run-off unit . 1.2 The draft law authorises the MoF to establish a separate holding company (HBI-Bundesholding AG) to take over all of HBInt’s shares in its Italian subsidiary, Hypo Alpe-Adria-Bank S.P.A. 1.3 The draft law also enables the cancellation and deferral of liabilities and contains other measures regarding HBInt that aim to facilitate the run-off of the bank. The draft law provides that certain subordinated and shareholder liabilities are extinguished on publication of a regulation to that effect by the FMA. At the same time, most guarantees and collateral for such liabilities terminate by operation of law, with the exception of certain disputed liabilities. The due date in respect of such disputed liabilities is deferred until the making of a final court order in respect of the liability in question. The draft law also disapplies creditors’ contractual or statutory rights to terminate their relationship with a reorganised entity, seek the alteration of terms, or enforce security as a consequence of the reorganisation and winding-up measures . The draft law appoints the FMA as the competent authority to implement the reorganisation and winding-up measures. The explanatory memorandum accompanying the draft law explains that statutory measures ensuring that the losses arising from the reorganisation and winding-up are borne by lower ranking creditors and former shareholders with a close relationship to HBInt are justified in order to achieve the Government’s aims of achieving an orderly run-off of the bank and preserving financial stability. 1.4 The draft law also enables the MoF to provide measures pursuant to the Law on financial market stability in respect of the run-off unit and to raise the maximum amount of costs of recapitalisation measures permitted thereunder from EUR 15 to EUR 22 billion. These funds are financed from the general budget without direct recourse to bank levies.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 The ECB notes that the draft law was adopted by the National Council on 8 July 2014, and reminds

text: the consulting authority that

text: Article 4 of Decision 98/415/EC

text: requires that the ECB must be consulted ‘at an appropriate stage’ in the legislative process. This implies that the consultation should take place at a point in the legislative process that gives the ECB sufficient time to examine the draft legislative provisions and adopt its opinion. The ECB requests that, in future, the Austrian authorities comply with their obligation to consult the ECB at an appropriate stage. 2.2 The ECB understands that the MoF’s right to transfer assets and liabilities of HBInt to third parties aims at safeguarding the deregulated status of Hypo Group Alpe Adria in the event that it cannot be turned into a run-off unit because HBInt is still conducting deposit-taking business or maintaining qualifying holdings in other credit institutions or investment firms. 2.3 The ECB also understands that the MoF’s right to dispose of the shares in the Italian subsidiary Hypo Alpe-Adria-Bank S.P.A. will create a legal basis for the shares in this subsidiary to be sold without hindering the run-off.

text: 3. Specific observations

text: 3.1 Conduct of banking and leasing activities by the run-off unit Once HBInt has been turned into a run-off unit, the run-off unit may continue to conduct banking and leasing activities if such activities either directly or indirectly serve the purpose of the run-off. In this context the ECB is concerned that the run-off unit will be partly deregulated but remain entitled to conduct banking activities. The condition that such business ‘directly or indirectly’ serves the purpose of the run-off is loosely worded and therefore open to broad interpretation. This appears inappropriate in view of the need for thorough and consistent regulation of the financial sector. Therefore, the draft law should define more precisely the conditions to be met in order for the deregulated run-off unit to carry on banking and leasing activities.

text: 3.2 Relationship with Directive

text: Article 6 of the draft law states that the Federal Law on the reorganisation of Hypo Alpe Adria Bank International AG serves the purpose of transposing Directive

text: . The ECB understands that the sole purpose of this provision is to establish that measures provided for in the draft law are reorganisation measures within the meaning of Article 2 of that Directive.

text: 3.3 Relationship with Directive

text: Directive

text: entered into force on 2 July 2014. The ECB notes that the draft law is not

text: intended to implement the resolution framework or any of the specific resolution tools under that Directive, but establishes a special wind-down regime purely in respect of Hypo Group Alpe Adria.

text: 3.4 Relationship with the Single Resolution Fund

text: The ECB notes that Article 3(4) of the Agreement on the transfer and mutualisation of contributions to the Single Resolution Fund provides that any amount disbursed by the resolution financing arrangement of a Contracting Party prior to the date of application of the Agreement in respect of resolution actions within its territory shall be deducted from those contributions to be transferred by that Contracting Party to the Single Resolution Fund. The ECB understands that the draft law does not intend to transpose Directive

text: or parts of it, and that the measures envisaged for the reorganisation and winding-up of Hypo Group Alpe Adria will not be financed from the national resolution fund to be established under Directive

text: . It should therefore be ensured that any amounts disbursed for the purpose of reorganising and winding up Hypo Group Alpe Adria are not deducted from Austria’s contributions to the Single Resolution Fund under the abovementioned Agreement.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 29 July 2014.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: Draft law No T/262, submitted to the Hungarian Parliament on 12 June 2014.

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).

text: Directive

text: of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending

text: Council Directive 82/891/EEC

text: , and Directives

text: and

text: , and Regulations

text: (EU) No 1093/2010

text: and

text: (EU) No 648/2012

text: , of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 190.)

text: Law CXXXIX of 2013 on the Magyar Nemzeti Bank. 5 Law XXXVII of 2014, published in Magyar Közlöny 98/2014 on 18 July 2014.

text: See paragraph 4 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 3.3 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 2.3 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 3 of Opinion

text: , and paragraph 3.2.3 of Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 7 See paragraph 3.1.2 of Opinion

text: . 8 See Articles 127, 132 and 140 of the draft law. 9 See further paragraph 6.3 of Opinion

text: . 10 See Article 132(3) of the draft law.

text: See the ECB’s June 2014 Convergence Report, p. 38. See also paragraph 4 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 4.3 of Opinion

text: , paragraph 3.6 of Opinion

text: and paragraph 3.2 of Opinion

text: . 12

text: Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013

text: conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63). 13 Pursuant to the third indent of Article 288 of the Treaty, national authorities are free to choose the form and methods of implementing a directive.

text: In this connection see also the conditions for a resolution to commence and the procedure to be followed set out in Article 17 of the draft law.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 6 August 2014 on resolution of credit institutions and investment firms (CON/2014/62)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 6 August 2014 on resolution of credit institutions and investment firms (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 2 June 2014 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Hungarian Ministry for the National Economy (hereinafter the ‘consulting authority’) for an opinion on a draft law establishing a resolution framework for credit institutions and investment firms (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). Given the advanced stage of the legislative process, the consulting authority asked for the adoption of the ECB’s opinion on an urgent basis. On 20 June 2014 the consulting authority notified the ECB that the version of the draft law which had been submitted to Parliament for adoption was substantially different from the version sent to the ECB. The ECB has therefore adopted its opinion based on the version of the draft law available on the website of the Hungarian Parliament . The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the sixth indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft decree relates to rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1 Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 According to the explanatory memorandum, the draft law aims to transposing Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council (hereinafter the ‘BRRD’) by providing early intervention tools and resolution tools for the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (MNB) as the resolution authority designated to manage failing or likely to fail credit institutions and investment firms, in order to allow the MNB to ensure the continuity of the credit institutions’ and investment firms’

text: fundamental financial and economic functions while minimising the impact on the financial system. The draft law also aims to maintain the stability of the financial markets, and to minimise the cost to taxpayers of any potential resolution via the establishment of a resolution fund funded by levies on credit institutions and investment firms. 1.2 To facilitate the above aims, the draft law also amends several Hungarian legal acts, including the Law on the Magyar Nemzeti Bank . 1.3 The draft law is planned to enter into force three days after its publication, with the exception of a number of provisions which will only enter into force sixty days after its adoption.

text: 2 General observations

text: 2.1 Appropriate time to consult the ECB The ECB received the request from the consulting authority for an urgent consultation on the draft law on 2 June 2014. It requested the ECB’s opinion by 25 June 2014. On 20 June 2014 it informed the ECB of substantial changes to the draft law. The draft law was adopted on 4 July 2014 before the ECB could adopt this opinion . As a consequence, there was no possibility for the Hungarian legislator to take the ECB’s views into account before adopting the draft law. This made the request for an urgent ECB opinion obsolete. Furthermore, the draft law was enacted with substantial amendments which were not sent to the ECB for consultation. With regard to the consultation on the draft law, the Hungarian authorities have not complied with their duty to consult the ECB. The adoption of this opinion in no way divests the Hungarian authorities of their duty to consult in compliance with this obligation, since this duty is important for the application and interpretation of the enacted law and any possible future amendments. The ECB reiterates that even cases of particular urgency do not relieve national authorities from their duty under Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty to consult the ECB and to allow sufficient time to take its views into account, in accordance with Decision

text: . Any significant amendments to the draft law, as in the case of the provisions subject to this consultation, have to be submitted to the ECB in order to allow it to issue its opinion based on the most recent text. In cases of particular urgency which do not allow for a normal consultation period, the consulting authority may indicate urgency in the consultation request and ask for a shorter deadline for the ECB’s opinion to be adopted, thereby indicating the estimated course of the legislative process. However, the second sentence of

text: Article 4 of Decision 98/415/EC

text: provides that the ECB must be consulted ‘at an appropriate stage’ in the legislative process. This implies that the consultation should take place at a point in the legislative process which gives the ECB sufficient time to examine the draft legislative provisions and to adopt its opinion in all required language versions, and which also

text: enables the relevant national authorities to take the ECB’s opinion into consideration before the provisions are adopted.

text: Article 3(4) of Decision 98/415/EC

text: also obliges Member States to suspend the adoption process for draft legislative provisions, pending receipt of the ECB’s opinion. The ECB would appreciate the consulting authority honouring its obligation to consult the ECB in line with the provisions of Decision

text: in the future. 2.2 Independence of the MNB The ECB welcomes the new resolution tasks allocated to the MNB under the draft law, which are broadly consistent with its financial stability role. The ECB understands that these tasks will not interfere with the performance of its ESCB-related tasks under the Treaty or reduce the funds available to carry them out . The ECB reiterates that, in view of the MNB’s new role as resolution authority and in line with the principle of financial independence, appropriate resources will have to be made available to ensure that it is able to perform these new tasks . In order to be compatible with the Treaty, any involvement on the part of the MNB or the members of its decision-making bodies in measures to strengthen financial stability must safeguard the MNB’s functional, institutional and financial independence and the personal independence of the members of its decision-making bodies, and the proper performance of their tasks from an operational and financial point of view under the Treaty and the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank.

text: 3. Specific observations

text: 3.1 Funding and replenishment of the resolution fund The ECB welcomes the fact that the initial capitalisation of the resolution fund will be achieved through the imposition of an ex ante levy on the financial services industry, as this will protect public funds and reduce moral hazard. This is considered to be broadly in line with the countercyclical approach taken in the BRRD of building up funds before a crisis. As funds accumulated ex ante may prove insufficient in a crisis situation, the ECB welcomes the provisions of the draft law requiring the banking sector to repay any funds provided by the State during a resolution, if these are not recovered during the resolution process. This concept of extraordinary ex post levies, which is enshrined in the BRRD, promotes additional market discipline and is aimed 9 10 at addressing moral hazard risk . The ECB also welcomes the provision of the draft law stating that the MNB may not under any circumstances finance the resolution fund, which is in line with

text: the prohibition of monetary financing . The ECB understands that this provision applies to all of the MNB’s activities related to the resolution fund, including the management of the account of the resolution fund pursuant to Article 134 of the draft law. 3.2 Cooperation with the ECB Hungary is not a participating Member State under

text: , i.e. it is not a Member State whose currency is the euro or a Member State whose currency is not the euro which has established close cooperation in accordance with

text: Article 7 of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013

text: . While there is no reference in the draft law to the MNB as the competent authority of a non-participating Member State cooperating with the ECB in the performance of supervisory tasks under Union law, such cooperation is essential and should be carried out in accordance with

text: Article 3(6) of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013

text: . 3.3 Operational separation of the MNB’s supervisory and resolution functions In view of the MNB carrying out both resolution and supervisory functions, the ECB notes that, while the draft law states the principle that the resolution function will be operationally independent from the MNB’s other functions, it does not specify any particular arrangements that are to be put in place in order to safeguard this independence. The BRRD ‘exceptionally’ allows an authority to carry out both resolution and supervisory functions on the condition that adequate structural arrangements are put in place to ensure operational independence and to avoid conflicts of interest between the resolution function and the authority’s other functions. By way of example, the BRRD envisages structural separation being achieved through separate reporting lines for staff involved in carrying out resolution tasks from those involved in supervision activity. The ECB recommends introducing the requirements for adequate structural separation as laid down in the BRRD , in order to ensure the operational independence of the resolution function within the MNB. That separation should not, however, prevent the resolution function from having access to any necessary information which is available to the supervisory function. 3.4 Independent valuation The MNB is required to determine the value of the assets and liabilities of the institution that will undergo resolution by means of an independent valuation. Article 23(8) of the draft law provides that the MNB, acting in its resolution capacity, has to approve the independent valuation by issuing an order. The order can only be overturned as part of a legal challenge to the decision ordering the resolution of the institution. The ECB considers that it should be made clear that the valuation report is an integral part of the decision ordering the resolution and thus should not require separate approval. It is important that upon ordering a valuation report the MNB does not take any action

text: during or after the preparation of the report that could cast doubt on the independence of the entity which prepared it. 3.5 Legal remedies Article 116 of the draft law grants affected parties the right to appeal against an MNB decision ordering a resolution or exercising resolution powers. However, the ECB notes that Article 116(4) of the draft law imposes a number of restrictions on the rights of appellants. The consulting authority is invited to consider whether these restrictions are necessary to ensure the expeditious determination of such appeals, and consistent with the need to preserve a balance between the property rights of affected parties and the public interest in a prompt resolution being affected by the resolution authority. What is critical is that the filing of the appeal does not suspend the resolution process. 3.6 Sale of business tool Article 36(2) of the draft law appears to allow the MNB in its capacity as resolution authority to require an institution to search for a buyer of its business, or even take over from the institution’s management in conducting such a search, although the competent authorities have not yet placed the institution into resolution . In this context the ECB notes that Article 36(2) of the draft law is not fully in line with Article 27(2) of the BRRD. This provision of the BRRD sets out that if the conditions for early intervention are met, the resolution authority may require the institution to contact potential purchasers in order to prepare for its resolution. In contrast, the draft law makes the power to require the institution to contact potential purchasers conditional on the unsuccessful use of intervention measures. Furthermore, the BRRD also grants resolution authorities the power to decide on the timing for the potential application of the sale of business tool, without linking it to the unsuccessful application of intervention measures. With a view to the above, Article 36(2) of the law would benefit from being brought in line with the provisions set out in Article 27(2) of the BRRD. 3.7 Depositor preference rules The ECB considers that a depositor preference as set out in Article 108 of the BRRD, i.e. ‘super priority’ for covered deposits in the ranking of creditors in insolvency, and ‘simple priority’ for all eligible deposits held by natural persons, and by micro, small and medium-sized enterprises in the ranking of creditors in insolvency, should be fully and clearly introduced into Hungarian law. The ECB understands that

text: Article 154

text: read in conjunction with Article 160(6) of the draft law introduces some form of preference, which, however, does not clearly and fully reflect Article 108 of the BRRD, because the distinction between covered and eligible deposits is not reflected adequately, thereby allowing for multiple interpretations of these provisions of the draft law. The

text: ECB points out that it is necessary to fully and clearly implement the depositor preference in Hungarian legislation by the 31 December 2014 transposition deadline set by the BRRD. This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 6. August 2014. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42). 2 Teis s akt registras, 29.4.2014, No 2014-04875.

text: See Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 6 August 2014 on the redenomination of the capital and securities of companies (CON/2014/63)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 6 August 2014 on the redenomination of the capital and securities of companies (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 7 July 2014, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Lithuanian Ministry of the Economy for an opinion on a draft law on the procedures and rules applicable to the conversion of a company’s capital and the nominal value of its securities into euro (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the first indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , as the draft law relates to currency matters. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The draft law is to be adopted under an enabling provision in the Law on the introduction of the euro in Lithuania . Its main objective is to establish the procedure for the conversion of a company’s capital and the nominal value of its securities into euro. The conversion rate is to be the conversion rate fixed by the Council of the European Union pursuant to Article 140(3) of the Treaty and the procedure for redenomination is described in the Law on the introduction of the euro in Lithuania. Following redenomination, amounts in euro will be rounded up or down to the nearest euro cent. However, redenomination is not to be treated as either an increase or a decrease in a company’s capital; instead, the difference in the capital amount, following the redenomination, will be recorded as income or as a cost of the company, as the case may be. 1.2 The draft law also sets out procedures for updating the accounts of a holder of company securities and for submitting amended articles of association to the Register of Legal Entities. The latter procedure is to be carried out free of charge for companies and the cost of registering the amended articles of association will be covered by the State.

text: 2. General observations

text: The ECB welcomes these timely preparations for the introduction of the euro in Lithuania. The Lithuanian authorities have already consulted the ECB on issues relating thereto and the ECB has provided its opinion on the Law on the introduction of the euro in Lithuania . The ECB notes that the draft law is to be adopted under an enabling provision in this law and that any future legislative provisions implementing the Law on the introduction of the euro in Lithuania will be drafted under the same enabling provision.

text: 3. Specific observations

text: The ECB has no specific observations on the draft law.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 6 August 2014.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI


text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42). 3 Put in place by Decree-Law No. 298/92 of 31 December 1992. 4 See

text: Article 3

text: (b) of the Legal Framework.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 14 August 2014 on savings banks attached to mutual associations (CON/2014/64)

text: of 14 August 2014

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 3 July 2014, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Portuguese Minister of State and Finance for an opinion on a draft decree-law introducing the Mutual Associations Code (hereinafter the ‘draft decree-law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and on the sixth indent of

text: , as the draft decree-law relates to rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft decree-law

text: 1.1 The draft decree-law introduces a new Mutual Associations Code, which is aimed at setting clearer rules for mutual associations regarding their financial and budgetary autonomy, the safeguarding of their financial stability and the investment and management of their assets. It specifically provides for a definition of savings banks attached to mutual associations, according to which ‘attached savings banks’ are credit institutions: (a) with legal personality and organisational, administrative and financial independence; and (b) which are governed by specific regulations . 1.2 The Legal Framework of Credit Institutions and Financial Companies (hereinafter the ‘Legal Framework’) include ‘savings banks’ (caixas económicas) in the list of entities that are classified as credit institutions to which the Legal Framework applies . Savings banks are further regulated by Decree-Law No 136/79 of 18 May 1979. In May 2014 four savings banks were registered with the Banco de Portugal (BdP) as authorised credit institutions, all of which are attached to mutual

text: associations. Taken together, attached savings banks represent 6.11 % of the total assets of the Portuguese banking sector.

text: 2. Observations

text: The ECB welcomes the introduction of legislation clarifying the status of savings banks attached to mutual associations. The draft decree-law provides for a clearer distinction between the finances of a mutual association and those of a savings bank attached to it .

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 14 August 2014.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Mario DRAGHI