text: Directive

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions (recast), OJ L 177, 30.6.2006, p. 1.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 13 January 2010 on the consolidation of deposit banks (CON/2010/9)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 13 January 2010 on the consolidation of deposit banks (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 9 December 2009, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Finnish Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a proposal for a law on the consolidation of deposit banks (hereinafter the ‘draft law’) and certain related laws. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the sixth indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: The draft law concerns the consolidation of deposit banks, in particular the rules applicable to central bodies and affiliated credit institutions as referred to in Article 3 of the Banking Directive . The main purpose of the draft law is to allow such group structures to apply to all deposit banks irrespective of their company form, thus widening the scope of the present legislation which only applies to cooperative banks in this respect. According to the explanatory memorandum, the draft law further aims, inter alia, to clarify the rules concerning the supervision of the solvency of the affiliated institutions, to strengthen the supervisory powers of the central body and to strengthen the system of mutual liability of the affiliated institutions. The draft law provides for general requirements for the formation of a consortium, namely that: (1) the central body supervises and monitors its affiliated credit institutions; (2) the combined minimum amount of assets and liquidity of the companies belonging to the consortium are monitored in a consolidated manner at the consortium level; (3) the central body is liable for the debts of affiliated credit institutions, which are obliged to take part in support measures to prevent the liquidation of an individual institution

text: and to contribute towards payments by the central body to settle the debt of an individual institution; and (4) the majority of affiliated credit institutions are deposit banks. The draft law requires a central body to apply for a licence from the Financial Supervisory Authority and imposes certain restrictions with regard to the business activities of a central body. In order to strengthen the binding effect of the rules laid down by a central body, the draft law provides that an affiliated institution can lose its affiliate status in the event of significant non-compliance with such rules. In addition, proposed amendments to the Law on the Government guarantee fund would allow financial support to also be granted to a central body which distributes the support to affiliated institutions.

text: 2. Specific observations

text: According to Section 8 of the draft law, an affiliated credit institution can withdraw or be dismissed from the central body under certain conditions. In the case of a voluntary withdrawal, the combined amount of assets of each company belonging to the consortium must remain as required under Section 19 of the draft law. Grounds for dismissal are, inter alia, a failure of the affiliated credit institution to comply with the guidelines issued or general operational principles verified by the central body. The ECB understands that, according to Section 29 of the draft law, in the event of a withdrawal or dismissal, the provisions concerning a member credit institution’s liability to pay its share to the central body are applicable for up to five years from the end of the calendar year during which the withdrawal or dismissal took place. In the case of voluntary withdrawal it is understood from Section 8 that the solvency of the credit institution shall be confirmed by calculations verified by the auditors of the central body. The ECB notes however, that the draft law does not include provisions as to how the solvency and liquidity of the disconnected credit institution shall be ensured in case of dismissal due to non-compliance. For reasons of clarity and to safeguard the interests of depositors and creditors as well as the stability of the financial system, the ECB would recommend clarifying this aspect in the draft law. The ECB understands that the withdrawal or dismissal of an affiliated credit institution from a central body would be without prejudice to the minimum reserve holding obligations of the credit institution in question, in the event that its minimum reserves have been held, until its withdrawal or dismissal, through that central body, in its capacity as intermediary, pursuant to Article 10 of Regulation ECB/2003/9 on the application of minimum reserves.

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: Published in Magyar Közlöny 2001/76 (VII. 5.)

text: Published in Magyar Közlöny 2007/162 (XI. 28.)

text: Draft Law No T/10998 was submitted to the Hungarian Parliament on 22.10.2009, and the consultation request concerning it was received by the ECB on 23.11.2009.

text: See, e.g. paragraph 5 of Opinion

text: Available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu

text: OJ L 332, 31.12.1993, p. 1.

text: See paragraphs 3.2.3 and 3.2.4 of Opinion

text: See footnote 7.

publisher: Europeiska centralbanken

sprak: en

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 18 January 2010 on the Magyar Nemzeti Bank’s tasks, the structure and legal status of the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority and the establishment of the Financial Stability Council (CON/2010/10)

serie: con

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 18 January 2010 on the Magyar Nemzeti Bank’s tasks, the structure and legal status of the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority and the establishment of the Financial Stability Council (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

type: rubrik

text: On 23 November 2009, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Hungarian Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft law amending several legal acts, including the Law on the Magyar Nemzeti Bank and the Law on the Financial Supervisory Authority (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). On 4 December 2009, the ECB received an additional request from the Hungarian Ministry of Finance for an opinion on further supplementary articles of the draft law. As part of the legislative procedure, on 7 December 2009 the Hungarian Parliament adopted substantive amendments to the draft law, on which the ECB was not consulted. The Parliament enacted the draft law including the amendments on 14 December 2009, before the ECB had adopted its opinion on the draft law. As a consequence, the ECB’s views have not been taken into account in the legislative process. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third and sixth indent of

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (MNB) and rules applicable to financial institutions in so far as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

type: stycke

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The draft law inter alia extends the duties of the MNB. Pursuant to Article 4(7) of Law LVIII of 2001 on the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (hereinafter the ‘Law on the MNB’) the MNB promotes the stability of the financial system and contributes to the development and smooth conduct of policies related to the prudential supervision of the financial system. The draft law amends this provision so that the MNB will ‘support the evaluation and implementation of policies referring to the

text: prudential supervision of credit institutions and to the stability of the financial intermediary system.’ For this purpose, among other things the draft law specifies that the MNB will identify business and economic risks threatening the financial intermediary system as a whole, promote the prevention of systemic risks and help to ease or eliminate the identified systemic risk. 1.2 The draft law authorises the Governor of the MNB to issue decrees prohibiting, restricting or making conditional certain activities, services, deals and the distribution of certain products if they pose a significant threat to the stability of the financial intermediary system. The Governor may also make proposals for legislation to the Government, to a member of the Government or to the President of the Financial Supervisory Authority (FSA) for regulations for the safe and secure operation of the financial intermediary system. 1.3 The draft law establishes the Financial Stability Council (FSC) consisting of the Minister of Finance, the President of the FSA and the Governor of the MNB (hereinafter the ‘three represented authorities’), as well as three invited members. The chairmanship of the FSC will rotate annually between the Minister of Finance, the Governor of the MNB and the President of the FSA. The FSC’s tasks are defined in Article 44 of the draft law and include: continuously assessing the stability of the financial market; discussing the FSA’s risk analysis; proposing to the Government, to a member of the Government or to the President of the FSA the adoption of legal acts; discussing the FSA’s annual report; discussing all general measures, orders or decisions of the FSA, other than those applying to individuals; delivering an opinion on draft decrees of the Governor of the MNB issued under the new proposed

text: Article 60

text: /A of the Law on the MNB; and continuously monitoring the FSA’s enforcement activities. 1.4 The draft law also changes the FSA’s legal status. Under Article 1(1) of Law CXXXV of 2007 on the Financial Supervisory Authority (hereinafter the ‘Law on the FSA’), the FSA is a Government authority. Under the draft law, the FSA becomes an independent agency. The draft law also amends the purpose of the FSA’s activities. 1.5 The draft law establishes a new organisational framework for the FSA. Pursuant to Article 11 of the Law on the FSA, financial supervision is conducted by a Board. Under the draft law, the Board is abolished and most of its functions are transferred to the President of the FSA who will be personally responsible for FSA’s governance. The draft law also regulates in detail the process of appointing the President of the FSA, his conditions of employment and the scope of his duties and authority.

text: 2. General observations

text: The appropriate time to consult the ECB

text: 2.1 The ECB points out that, in cases of particular urgency which do not allow for a normal consultation period, the consulting authority may indicate urgency in the consultation request and ask for a shorter deadline for the ECB’s opinion to be adopted. This does not prejudice the consulting authority’s duty under Article 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty to consult the ECB on national draft legislative provisions falling within its fields of competence in due course of the national legislation process. The second sentence of

text: Article 4 of Decision 98/415/EC

text: states that the ECB must be consulted ‘at an appropriate stage’ in the legislative process. This implies that the consultation should take place at a point in the legislative process which affords the ECB sufficient time to examine the draft legislative provisions and to adopt its opinion in all required language versions, and which also enables the relevant national authorities to take the ECB’s opinion into consideration before the provisions are adopted.

text: Article 3(4) of Decision 98/415/EC

text: also obliges Member States to suspend the adoption process for draft legislative provisions, pending receipt of the ECB’s opinion. As the draft law was submitted to the Hungarian Parliament a month before the ECB received the first consultation request , the ECB could not take into consideration the consulting authority’s request for urgency on the grounds of the advanced stage of the process of legislation. 2.2 The opportunity to issue an opinion on a draft law within its competence of consultation allows the ECB to express its views on the substance of the proposed legislation, including considerations such as the importance that the ECB may attach to a particular legislative proposal and its potential impact on the Eurosystem. Therefore, the ECB reiterates its position that even cases of particular urgency do not relieve national authorities from their duty to consult the ECB and to allow sufficient time to take into account its views in accordance with

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: . Any substantive amendments to the draft law – as in the case of the provisions subject to this consultation – have to be submitted to the ECB in order to allow it to issue its opinion based on the most recent text. Furthermore, with respect to the ongoing consultation, the process of adoption of the draft law should have been suspended. The ECB’s comments on the consulted provisions do not eliminate the breach of the obligation to consult the ECB. Even though the provisions have already been enacted, the ECB considers that its comments are important for the application and interpretation of the enacted law and any future amendments. The ECB would appreciate the Ministry of Finance giving due consideration to honouring their obligation to consult the ECB in the future, in accordance with the regulations laid down in

text: Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: New tasks of the MNB in relation to its contribution to financial stability and the prevention of systemic

text: risks

text: 2.3 The ECB understands that, under Articles

text: and

text: /A of the Law on the MNB, specific new tasks will be assigned to the MNB which are intended to facilitate the MNB’s effective

text: performance of its financial stability role and its contribution to the prevention, identification and elimination of systemic risks. The ECB welcomes and supports the inherent recognition in the proposed institutional framework of the essential role of the central bank in promoting the safety and soundness of financial institutions and the stability of the financial system as a whole . Moreover, the introduction of a reference in the draft law to the ‘support to the evaluation and implementation of supervisory policies’ in the context of the financial stability tasks recognises the importance of taking financial stability considerations into account when developing supervisory policies. In this context, the creation of a financial stability council, with the involvement of the central bank, will allow the central bank to contribute with its systemic risk assessments to the development of the supervisory policies of the FSA.

text: Interaction with the monetary policy of the MNB

text: 2.4 The ECB understands that, by setting up the FSC, the draft law does not establish a body responsible for supervision, functioning autonomously within the framework of the FSA. According to Article 44 of the draft law, the FSA will provide the secretariat of the FSC. Although the draft law provides that the FSC will ‘assist’ the FSA, which seems to indicate that the FSC will have a subordinate role in contributing to the fulfilment of the tasks of the FSA, the ECB trusts that the FSC will be a separate body to which the FSA will provide administrative and logistical support. The assignment to the MNB of specific tasks in the context of the establishment of the FSC is welcome, as it enhances the MNB’s contribution to financial stability. These new tasks should contribute to financial stability, without compromising the conduct of the monetary policy by the MNB. 2.5 The draft law provides that the FSC will assess the stability of the financial markets, including the money market. It is emphasised that the MNB is a key actor in the money market through the implementation of its monetary policy in order to fulfil its objectives. The implementation of monetary policy decisions is thus the exclusive competence of the central bank and should be preserved in all circumstances. It is therefore expected that the assessment of the stability of the money market will fully respect this exclusive competence of the MNB over monetary policy. Also, any recommendations that may be made by the FSC should not impinge on the MNB’s implementation of monetary policy decisions. For the sake of clarity, it might be advisable to stress that the new tasks conferred on the MNB in the draft law will not affect its conduct of monetary policy. 2.6 Given the abovementioned considerations, the FSC’s responsibilities should be formulated precisely so as to ensure that the effectiveness of the coordination process is not affected by any uncertainty regarding the roles, tasks and competences of the FSC and the three represented authorities.

text: Broadening the scope of secondary legislative powers of the MNB, and the MNB’s relationship with the

text: FSC

text: 2.7 Under the new

text: Article 60

text: /A of the MNB Law, the Governor of the MNB is empowered to issue decrees prohibiting, restricting or making conditional certain activities, services, deals and the distribution of certain products if they pose a significant threat to the stability of the financial intermediary system. According to the draft law, the Governor has to inform and seek the opinion of the FSC prior to issuing such decrees. In contrast to other provisions of the draft law,

text: Article 60

text: /A(6) does not set a time limit for the FSC to give an opinion. When issuing a decree, the Governor may also make proposals for legislation to the Government, or to a member of the Government or to the President of the FSA for regulation to provide for the safe and secure operation of the financial intermediary system. The new power of the Governor could be beneficially used to allow the MNB to better carry out its financial stability tasks. This new power of the MNB is underpinned by Article 28(1) of the Law on the MNB which gives the MNB the competence to gather adequate information on activities or persons pursuing activities that could endanger financial stability. 2.8 In its Convergence Reports , most recently in its May 2008 Convergence Report, the ECB has reiterated that: ‘An express statutory obligation for an NCB to consult third parties ex ante provides the latter with a formal mechanism to influence the final decision and is therefore incompatible with the Treaty and the Statute. However, dialogue between NCBs and third parties, even when based on statutory obligations to provide information and exchange views, is compatible with central bank independence provided that: – this does not result in interference with the independence of the members of the NCB’s decision-making bodies; – the special status of Governors in their capacity as members of the ECB’s General Council is fully respected; and – confidentiality requirements resulting from the Statute are observed.’ Although the ECB welcomes the fact that the new

text: Article 60

text: /A of the MNB Law reaffirms the independence of the MNB by specifying that an ex ante obligation to consult ‘may not in any way result in influencing the independence of the members of the decision making bodies of the MNB, or result in influencing or delaying the decision of the MNB’, in practice the obligation to consult the FSC in advance without a time limit for the opinion to be given, allows the FSC to influence and delay the MNB’s decisions. Therefore, the draft law should establish a regime for cooperation and dialogue based on clear procedural rules, including a time limit for the FSC to give its opinion, ensuring that the MNB’s independence is respected and its decisions not delayed.

text: 2.9 As pointed out in ECB Opinion

text: , it is expected that the MNB’s new tasks under Articles

text: and

text: , and its activities to support the FSC under

text: Article 44

text: will fully comply with the Treaty obligations. In particular, it is expected that the MNB’s new tasks laid down in the draft law will neither affect the MNB’s institutional, functional and financial independence nor the performance by the European System of Central Banks of its tasks under the Treaty and the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank. Similarly, it is also expected that it will be ensured that the new tasks of the MNB, such as its contribution to the FSC, will fully comply with the prohibition of monetary financing laid down in Article 123(1) of the Treaty, read in conjunction with

text: Council Regulation 3603/93/EC of 13 December 1993

text: specifying definitions for the application of the prohibitions referred to in Articles

text: and

text: b(1) (now Articles 123 and 125(1) of the Treaty). In this respect, the MNB’s new tasks and activities to support the FSC should not give rise, implicitly or explicitly, to any form of overdraft facility or any type of credit facility with the MNB.

text: The establishment and role of the FSC

text: 2.10 In the view of the ECB, the newly established FSC will contribute to fostering cooperation and information sharing between the three represented authorities and contribute to financial market stability, thus creating a forum where the three represented authorities playing a key role in financial regulation can initiate coordinated action in a financial crisis. 2.11 The establishment of national financial stability committees can enhance the ability of national central banks and supervisory authorities to contribute analytical support to the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB). The tasks performed by these committees should complement the activities performed by the ESRB, therefore it is particularly important to develop appropriate synergies. However, it is necessary to avoid such national committees being entrusted with tasks and powers that potentially conflict with those of the ESRB, and which may undermine the effectiveness of the newly-established European macro-prudential supervisory body. Moreover, the legal frameworks of these committees should appropriately reflect the roles of central banks, should not constrain the independence of the governors of the central banks or unduly affect the quality and impartiality of their contributions as members of the ESRB. Lastly, in view of the importance of ensuring the effectiveness of macro-prudential supervisory arrangements at EU level, it is essential to safeguard the ability of the ESRB to perform its tasks independently and to guarantee an authoritative and effective channel for transmitting the warnings and recommendations issued by the ESRB. 2.12 The ECB also reminds the consulting authority of the Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation between Financial Supervisory Authorities, Central Banks and Finance Ministries of the European Union on cross-border financial stability which entered into force on 1 June 2008. The Memorandum of Understanding provides for the establishment of a domestic standing group in each Member State consisting of the financial supervisory authorities, central banks, finance

text: ministries at the national level with the objective of enhancing preparedness in normal times and facilitating the management and resolution of a financial crises.

text: Changes to the FSA’s institutional framework

text: 2.13 In line with the position taken by the ECB in previous opinions , and in the light of the widespread practice in the European Union on decision-making in supervisory matters, it may be preferable for the FSA’s decision-making body to consist of a formal board, acting on the basis of collegiality, rather than a President acting alone. 2.14 In many Member States that have adopted supervisory models based on an independent financial supervisory authority, the central bank either provides members of the decision-making body of the supervisory authority or plays an institutional role in the appointment and dismissal of its members. In some cases there is cross-membership between the decision-making bodies of the central bank and of the supervisory authority. Such an approach would retain some of the advantages of the existing institutional framework for the supervision of credit institutions in Hungary, and provide a practical means for exchanging information between the MNB and the FSA. 2.15 Having regard to the above, the ECB would welcome the inclusion in the draft law of provisions establishing a collegiate decision-making body as the FSA’s sole organ, including an appropriate number of MNB representatives in such a collegiate body, with the full right to participate in its meetings, to vote and to share in all information available to the FSA. The inclusion of MNB representatives in the FSA’s collegiate body would need to give due consideration to safeguards for the independence of the members of the MNB staff and its governing body . 2.16 The draft law does not provide for the transfer of the tasks of the current supervisory body, i.e. from the Board to the President of the FSA. The ECB draws the consulting authority’s attention to the need to ensure the continuity of the smooth performance of the FSA’s tasks by regulating the transfer of the competencies and responsibilities from the Board to the President of the FSA. The operational independence of supervisory bodies from political interference is an essential and internationally recognised standard for the supervision of financial markets. Such standards should be applied in particular to the procedures for the dismissal of the chairman of the Board of the FSA. Article 72(2) of the draft law concerns the status of the current chairman of the Board of the FSA. The ECB welcomes the inclusion in the draft law of a provision for the current chairman of the Board of the FSA to continue in office until the end of his appointed term. Lastly, the ECB stresses the importance of legal certainty. The law governing the tasks and the operational structure of the FSA has been amended several times in recent years, and it is essential for the basic legislation regulating the structure of the FSA to serve as clear and consistent guidance. Overly frequent changes to the structure of the FSA may compromise this function.

text: 2.17 The ECB supports the basic principle that, in order to carry out their respective responsibilities effectively, there should be close cooperation between financial regulators. Therefore, the ECB welcomes the reference in the tasks of the FSA to the duty to cooperate with the MNB to prevent systemic risks arising. The Hungarian authorities may also consider further enhancing arrangements for information-sharing between the MNB and the FSA to take into account the duty of the FSA to cooperate with the MNB for the mitigation of systemic risks.

text: 3. Specific comments

text: Definitions

text: According to Article 28 of the draft law, the MNB will play a significant role in the evaluation and implementation of policies concerning the stability of the financial intermediary system. The ECB recommends that the term ‘financial intermediary system’ should be defined for the sake of legal clarity.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 18 January 2010.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET

type: vagledning

utgivare: ecb


text: EGT L 189, 3.7.1998, s. 42.

text: Se ECB:s yttranden

text: punkt 3.1,

text: punkt 2.5.2 och

text: punkt 3.2. Dessa yttranden finns på ECB:s webbplats www.ecb.europa.eu. 3 Se ECB:s yttranden

text: punkt 2.2,

text: punkt 3.3 samt CON/2009/73punkt 3.2 och

text: punkt 3.6.

sprak: sv

title: Europeiska centralbankens yttrande av den 21 januari 2010 om en andra förlängning av de statliga kapitaltillskotten till solventa banker (CON/2010/11)

text: EUROPEISKA CENTRALBANKENS YTTRANDE av den 21 januari 2010 om en andra förlängning av de statliga kapitaltillskotten till solventa banker (

text: ) Inledning och rättslig grund

text: Den 13 januari 2010 mottog Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) en begäran från Finansdepartementet om ett yttrande över ett förslag till förordning (nedan kallad andra ändringsförordningen) om ändring av förordning (2009:46) om kapitaltillskott till solventa banker m.fl. (nedan kallad förordningen). ECB:s behörighet att avge ett yttrande grundas på artiklarna

text: och

text: i fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt och artikel 2.1 sjätte strecksatsen i

text: rådets beslut 98/415/EG av den 29 juni 1998

text: om nationella myndigheters samråd med Europeiska centralbanken rörande förslag till rättsregler , eftersom förslaget till förordning innehåller regler som gäller finansiella institut som har en påtaglig inverkan på de finansiella institutens och marknadernas stabilitet. I enlighet med

text: artikel 17.5

text: första meningen i arbetsordningen för Europeiska centralbanken har detta yttrande antagits av ECB-rådet.

text: 1. Bakgrund

text: 1.1 Den 16 februari 2009 mottog ECB en begäran från Finansdepartementet om ett yttrande över ett utkast till förordningen, som trädde i kraft den 17 februari 2009. Eftersom Finansdepartementets begäran om ett yttrande kom in sent hade ECB inte tillräckligt med tid för att avge ett yttrande om förordningen. 1.2 Förordningens mål är att ställa kapital till solventa bankers förfogande så att kreditgivningen till den reala ekonomin underlättas. Den svenska staten får bevilja kapitaltillskott till solventa banker 1) genom en marknadstransaktion där staten, på samma villkor som övriga investerare, står för högst 70 procent av emissionsbeloppet, eller 2) genom att inom ramen för en riktad emission förvärva mer än 70 procent av emissionsbeloppet enligt villkor som staten fastställer. Hittills har endast en bank, Nordea Bank AB, deltagit i kapitaltillskottsprogrammet (under våren 2009), då staten deltog i Nordeas nyemission i enlighet med sin tidigare ägarandel.

text: 1.3 Den 30 juni 2009 mottog ECB en begäran från Finansdepartementet om ett yttrande över en första förlängning av förordningen (nedan kallad första ändringsförordningen) där förordningens giltighetstid förlängdes med sex månader från den 17 augusti 2009 till den 17 februari 2010. Den 14 juli 2009 antog ECB sitt yttrande

text: om den första ändringsförordningen.

text: 2. Syftet med den andra ändringsförordningen

text: Syftet med den nu aktuella andra ändringsförordningen är att förlänga förordningens giltighetstid med ytterligare sex månader, från den 18 februari 2010 till den 17 augusti 2010.

text: 3. Allmänna kommentarer

text: 3.1 I sitt yttrande

text: lämnade ECB synpunkter på förordningen och den första ändringsförordningen. I tillämplig utsträckning gäller kommentarerna i yttrandet

text: även för den andra ändringsförordningen. 3.2 ECB vill även i det aktuella fallet påpeka att alla initiativ som behöriga myndigheter i medlemsstaterna vidtar för att återupprätta förtroendet på finansmarknaderna bör samordnas och ha som mål att genomföra de gemensamma riktlinjerna i nära samarbete med andra medlemsstater och EU:s institutioner, eftersom större skillnader mellan ländernas nationella genomförandeåtgärder skulle kunna leda till obalanser på de globala bankmarknaderna. ECB anser det viktigt att giltighetstiden på de nationella stödåtgärderna som vidtas i Unionen samordnas så att konkurrens på lika villkor kan säkerställas . ECB understryker också att nationella stödåtgärder bör vara tidsbegränsade . 3.3 Finansdepartementet har informerat ECB om att den andra ändringsförordningen förväntas antas senast den 21 januari 2010. Mot denna bakgrund tycks Finansdepartementet åberopa det undantag från huvudregeln som återfinns i

text: artikel 3.2 i rådets beslut 98/415/EG

text: enligt vilket, i fall av yttersta brådska, tidsfristen för ECB:s avgivande av sitt yttrande får vara kortare än en månad. ECB vill påminna Finansdepartementet om att det av

text: artikel 4

text: andra meningen i beslut

text: framgår att ECB ska höras ”i ett lämpligt skede” av lagstiftningsprocessen. Detta bör tolkas som att ett samråd bör ske i ett skede av lagstiftningsprocessen som ger ECB tillräckligt med tid att dels granska förslaget till rättsregler och dels anta sitt yttrande på alla nödvändiga språk, samtidigt som den berörda nationella myndigheten har tillräckligt med tid för att beakta ECB:s yttrande innan rättsreglerna antas.

text: Detta yttrande kommer att offentliggöras på ECB:s webbplats. Utfärdat i Frankfurt am Main den 21 januari 2010. [Namnteckning] Jean-Claude TRICHET

text: ECB:s ordförande


text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: See paragraph 3.7 of ECB Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions are published on the ECB website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: See the ECB Convergence Report, May 2008, p. 20. See also Opinion

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 27 January 2010 on the special administration procedure initiated by Banca Naţională a României for credit institutions in distress (CON/2010/12)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 27 January 2010 on the special administration procedure initiated by Banca Naţională a României for credit institutions in distress (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 6 January 2010 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from Banca Naţională a României (BNR) for an opinion on a draft law amending and supplementing the Government Emergency Ordinance No 99/2006 on credit institutions and capital adequacy (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third and sixth indents of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to BNR and to rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 The draft law is designed to amend the special administration procedure currently provided for by the Government Emergency Ordinance No 99/2006 on credit institutions and capital adequacy (hereinafter the ‘GEO No 99/2006’). The aim is to provide supplementary tools to enable BNR to respond in a timely and effective manner in the event of a credit institution in distress and to strengthen the special administrator's powers by explicitly allowing it to promptly implement a broad range of restructuring measures with respect to such credit institution. GEO No 99/2006 is the main piece of legislation regulating the activity of credit institutions and financial investment companies in Romania, as well as their prudential supervision and the supervision of payment systems and settlement systems for financial instruments. The draft law forms part of the legislative amendments to be adopted by Romania, as agreed during the negotiations between the Romanian Government, on the one hand, and the International Monetary Fund and the European Union, on the other.

text: 1.2 Moreover, the draft law aims at ensuring greater legal certainty for the measures adopted during special administration so that they could neither be suspended nor reversed by a court of law, nor subject to the consent of the credit institution’s creditors. The main issues relate to: • the special administration procedure, including the conditions and the period of time for imposing this procedure, the characteristics and tasks of the special administrator and the possible measures to be taken during this procedure; • the prerogatives of BNR in the case of the special administration procedure. With regard to the appointment of the special administrator, the draft law extends BNR’s prerogatives by allowing it to specifically designate the objectives and tasks of the designated person(s), their remuneration and the amounts that may be spent in the performance of the authorised tasks (see, in particular, Section 2 in Chapter VIII of the draft law).

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 The consulting authority has informed the ECB that the draft law is to be adopted before 31 March 2010. In view thereof, the consulting authority invokes the exemption provided for in

text: Article 3(2) of Council Decision 98/415/EC

text: , which allows for a reduction of the minimum time limit for submission of the ECB’s opinion of one month only in case of extreme urgency, and asks the ECB to deliver its opinion by 31 January 2010. The ECB would however wish to draw the consulting authority’s attention to the fact that the second sentence of

text: Article 4 of Decision 98/415/EC

text: states that the ECB must be consulted ‘at an appropriate stage’ in the legislative process. This implies that the consultation should take place at a point in the legislative process that affords the ECB sufficient time to examine the draft legislative provisions and to adopt its opinion in the required language versions and which also enables the relevant national authorities to take the ECB’s opinion into consideration before the provisions are adopted. 2.2 The ECB takes note of the draft law’s widening of BNR’s prerogatives and restates its view that the tasks to be performed by BNR to aid the carrying out of stabilisation measures in the domestic banking sector must be conducted in a manner that is fully compatible with BNR’s institutional and financial independence and that safeguards the proper performance of its existing tasks under the Treaty and the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank . Moreover, BNR should independently avail itself of sufficient financial and personnel resources, both in terms of quantity and quality, to carry out tasks related to the European System of Central Banks as well as its own tasks, including its new tasks based on the draft law . 2.3.1 The ECB welcomes the intention of the draft law to increase the preventive character of the actions to be taken in order to improve the financial situation of a credit institution in distress. Furthermore, the ECB supports the extension of the responsibility of those involved in the special administration

text: procedure for the purposes of assuring financial stability and protecting the interests of the credit institution’s depositors. 2.3.2 The ECB understands that the draft law aims to: (i) allow the special administrator to deal with ailing credit institutions with a broader range of restructuring measures; (ii) ensure that credit institution resolution measures during the special administration may not be suspended or reversed by a court of law, and are not subject to the creditors’ consent; (iii) specify a clear trigger for the early and mandatory appointment of a special administrator based on a regulatory threshold. The ECB notes that the financial crisis has shown the importance of an efficient resolution regime and has triggered reflections both at international and European level on how to enhance the instruments at the disposal of competent authorities in a crisis situation. In this context, the ECB welcomes the measures contained in the draft law to enhance the capability of BNR to respond in a timely and effective manner in the event of a credit institution in distress. The forthcoming legislative proposals of the European Commission on early intervention tools and crisis resolution may result in a need to further improve the national legal framework.

text: 3. Specific observations

text: The draft law provides only for the right of the creditor of a credit institution to claim compensation if his interests have been negatively affected as a result of the measures implemented during a special administration procedure concerning the credit institution, without specifying who bears the liability to compensate such creditor (see Article 254 (3) of the draft law). This should therefore also be expressly specified in the draft law.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 27 January 2010.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: Law LVIII of 2001, published in the Magyar Közlöny 2001/76 (VII. 5.). 3 Article 16(1) of Law XI of 1987 on legislation. 4 The Fifth Amendment consists of IMF Resolution Nos 63-2 and 63-3.

text: Presidential Board Decision 7/1982 was repealed by Law LXXXII of 2007, published in the Magyar Közlöny 2007/83 (VI. 29.).

text: See also other ECB opinions:

text: and

text: , available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 27 January 2010 on the tasks of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank relating to Hungary’s membership of the International Monetary Fund  (CON/2010/13)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 27 January 2010 on the tasks of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank relating to Hungary’s membership of the International Monetary Fund (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 6 January 2010 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Hungarian Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft law integrating several amendments to the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) into Hungarian law, as well as amending the Law on the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (MNB) (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third indent of

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to the MNB. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: 1.1 Under Hungarian law , generally binding international agreements to which the Republic of Hungary is a party have to be incorporated into national law by means of a legal act. The Articles of Agreement of the IMF (hereinafter the ‘Articles of Agreement’) as they stood on 6 May 1982 were incorporated into Hungarian law by Law-Decree 6 of 1982. The main purpose of

text: Articles 1

text: to 5 of the draft law is to implement the amendments to the Articles of Agreement since 1982 (the Third, Fourth and the Fifth Amendments ) in Hungarian law. 1.2 Article 1 of the draft law implements the Third Amendment to the Articles of Agreement, which concerns the consequences of a Member State failing to fulfil any of its obligations under the Articles of Agreement, such as, among others, the suspension of voting rights. As stated in the

text: preamble of the draft law, the Third Amendment to the Articles of Agreement entered into force under international law on 11 November 1992. Under Hungarian law, it will enter into force eight days after publication of the draft law. 1.3 Article 2 of the draft law implements the Fourth Amendment to the Articles of Agreement, which concerns supplementing the existing reserve assets, authorising the IMF to allocate special drawing rights (SDRs) and the detailed regulations of the special one-time allocation of SDRs. As stated in the preamble of the draft law, the Fourth Amendment to the Articles of Agreement entered into force under international law on 10 August 2009. Under Hungarian law, it will enter into force eight days after publication of the draft law. 1.4 The purpose of

text: Articles 3

text: to 5 of the draft law is to incorporate the Fifth Amendment to the Articles of Agreement. Articles

text: and

text: acknowledge the binding force of the Fifth Amendment to the Articles of Agreement.

text: Article 5

text: refers to the appointment procedure for the alternates to the Executive Directors; the method of calculating the total votes of the members; the possible use of the currency held in the Investment Account, as well as the termination of the Investment Account; the possible use of the currency held in the Disbursement Account; and, finally, the specific procedural regulations to be followed should the IMF sell gold assets. These Articles will enter into force as regulated in the amendments to the Articles of Agreement. 1.5 Article 6 of the draft law puts in place regulations similar to those that previously existed for the MNB’s tasks relating to the Republic of Hungary’s IMF membership by amending the Law on the MNB. The tasks listed in Article 6 of the draft law, which will be the new

text: Article 42

text: /A of the Law on the MNB, are the following: (i) the MNB will be the agency making periodic payments to the IMF acting as agent on behalf of the Republic of Hungary; (ii) the MNB may issue non-negotiable and non interest bearing notes payable to the IMF in accordance with the Articles of Agreement; (iii) the MNB will perform the task of fiscal agent required by the Articles of Agreement on behalf of the Republic of Hungary and, in this context, the MNB will act as a beneficiary in its capacity as fiscal agent with respect to any amount transferred or paid to the Republic of Hungary based on the provisions of the Articles of Agreement; (iv) the MNB will attend to the safekeeping of the IMF’s foreign currency reserves held in the Republic of Hungary as a designated depository.

text: Article 6

text: will enter into force eight days after the publication of the draft law.

text: 2. General observations

text: The ECB reminds the Ministry of Finance that the tasks performed by the national central banks must comply with the monetary financing prohibition under Article 123(1) of the Treaty, which prohibits, inter alia, overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facility with the national central banks in favour of

text: central governments . However,

text: Article 7 of Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 of 13 December 1993

text: specifying definitions for the application of the prohibitions referred to in

text: Articles 104

text: [now 123] and 104b(1) [now 125(1)] of the Treaty provides that the financing by the national central banks of obligations falling upon the public sector vis-à-vis the IMF is not regarded as a credit facility within the meaning of Article 123 of the Treaty. The ECB notes therefore that, should there be any payment by the MNB of the Republic of Hungary's obligations to the IMF, such financing would fall within the scope of

text: Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 3603/93

text: and would not constitute a form of monetary financing prohibited by the Treaty.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: Draft resolution of 7 January 2010.

text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: The Law of 29 August 1997 on Narodowy Bank Polski (consolidated text: Dziennik Ustaw (Dz. U.) of 2005 No 1, item 2).

text: Resolution No 2/98 of the Management Board of Narodowy Bank Polski of 27 February 1998 on the types of bills of exchange eligible for rediscounting with Narodowy Bank Polski, and specifying the rules and procedures applicable to the rediscounting of bills (as published in Dziennik Urzędowy NBP of 9 March 1998 No 3, item 5).

text: See the explanatory memorandum to the draft resolution, p. 1. See also ‘Monetary policy guidelines for the year 2010’, p. 18 (available on NBP’s website at www.nbp.pl). 6 As defined in Articles

text: and

text: (1), (2) and (17) of the Law on banking of 29 August 1997 (consolidated text: Dz. U. of 2002 No 72, item 665) – credit institutions registered in Poland are legally referred to as ‘banks’ (this definition does not cover the Polish version of credit unions), the term ‘credit institution’ as used in Polish law only relates to EEA credit institutions from outside Poland, and non-EEA credit institutions are referred to as ‘foreign banks’. 7 In the English version of this opinion, the terms ‘bill of exchange’ and ‘promissory note’ are used in this Opinion in the light of their respective definitions both in the relevant convention (see

text: Article 1

text: vs. Article 75 of the Convention Providing a Uniform Law for Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes (Geneva, 1930)) and in the relevant provisions of Polish law (see

text: Article 1

text: vs. Article 101 of the Law on bills of exchange referred to in footnote 8 below). 8 The Law of 28 April 1936 on bills of exchange (Dz. U. of 1936 No 37, item 282, and of 2006 No 73, item 501). 9 See paragraphs 1(1)(2)-(8) of the draft resolution. 10 See Section 6.2.2 of Annex I to Guideline ECB/2000/7 of 31 August 2000 on monetary policy instruments and procedures of the Eurosystem (OJ L 310, 11.12.2000, p. 1).

text: For example, the re-endorsement mechanism under which the promissory notes which serve as discount credit collateral will not be presented by NBP to the drawers for repurchase, but will be re-indorsed to the banks which presented them for discounting, while at the same the current account of the bank held with NBP will be debited with the full amount of the notes (see paragraph 12(1) of the draft resolution); the acceleration clause applied in the event of the bank’s default (see paragraph 4(5) of the draft resolution); the right for NBP to review the relevant credit documentation (see paragraph 2(3) of the template discount credit agreement); the requirement for banks, when presenting promissory notes for discounting, to certify that that they are not aware of the drawer having defaulted in the past in the repayment of its obligations under a promissory note or a bill of exchange (see paragraph 4(3)(2) of the draft resolution); the right for NBP to terminate the discount credit agreement with immediate effect (see paragraph 6(1) of the template discount credit agreement). 12 Article 70(1) of the Law on banking referred to in footnote 6.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 29 January 2010 on measures to support bank lending to businesses  (CON/2010/14)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 29 January 2010 on measures to support bank lending to businesses (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 8 January 2010 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the President of Narodowy Bank Polski (NBP) for an opinion on a draft resolution on promissory notes eligible for discounting at Narodowy Bank Polski and on the rules and procedures applicable to the discounting of promissory notes (hereinafter the ‘draft resolution’) . The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and

text: Article 2(2) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft resolution relates to the introduction of a new instrument of monetary policy in a Member State that has not adopted the euro. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft resolution

text: 1.1 Under Article 44 of the Law on Narodowy Bank Polski , NBP may accept bills of exchange and promissory notes from banks for discounting and rediscounting, and the eligible types of such bills and notes are specified by resolution of the NBP Management Board. Pursuant to this mandate, the rules governing the rediscounting mechanism were defined in 1999 . The purpose of the draft resolution is to introduce a discounting mechanism under which NBP will accept for discounting promissory notes presented by banks, applying to such notes the discount rate to be set by the Monetary Policy Council. 1.2 The draft resolution is a measure designed to address the current unfavourable market conditions restraining banks’ lending to businesses. To this end, it introduces discount credit, a new

text: refinancing instrument enabling NBP to indirectly finance banks’ lending to businesses without engaging in direct relationships with original borrowers . 1.3 The draft resolution specifies the eligibility criteria and procedural set-up applicable to the proposed discounting instrument. The following are eligible to submit promissory notes for discounting at NBP: (i) domestic banks; (ii) branches of foreign banks; and (iii) branches of credit institutions , which (a) have an account with NBP; and (b) have entered with NBP into a discount credit agreement. Promissory notes with maturities of less than one year are eligible for discounting at NBP, if they meet general requirements specified in the Law on bills of exchange and additional requirements set out in the draft resolution .

text: 2. ECB comments

text: 2.1 The ECB understands that the scope of the draft resolution covers credit institutions established in Poland, including subsidiaries of foreign credit institutions, as well as branches of European Economic Area (EEA) credit institutions from outside Poland. The ECB welcomes this, as it ensures a level playing field for all domestic and foreign credit institutions. 2.2 Although non-participating Member States retain their powers in the field of monetary policy, it is nevertheless beneficial for them to gradually achieve consistency with Eurosystem standards so that credit institutions operating in their territories can become acquainted with the requirements that will apply once these Member States have adopted the euro. Such gradual harmonisation prior to the adoption of the euro will contribute to the smooth integration of the national central bank (NCB) into the Eurosystem. In this context, the ECB draws NBP’s attention to the fact that the Eurosystem’s single list of eligible collateral does not include promissory notes other than those which are issued by credit institutions that are eligible counterparties to the Eurosystem's monetary policy operations, which are secured by a pool of residential mortgages, and which comply with certain other eligibility criteria . 2.3 The requirement for lending to be based on adequate collateral, specified in Article 18 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, does not presently apply to NBP due to a derogation in Article 42(1) of the Statute. However, in the interest

text: of encouraging NCB lending only against adequate collateral, the ECB notes that the draft

text: resolution might benefit from including an express provision requiring examination of the

text: creditworthiness of original borrowers, complementing those safeguards which are already

text: included in it and in the template discount credit agreement attached to it , as well as the general

text: statutory requirement for credit institutions to ensure creditworthiness of borrowers .

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 29 January 2010.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: Bretton Woods Agreements Act 1957 to 1999, published in Iris Oifigiuil Nos 18/1957, 10/1969, 19/1977 and 4/1999.

text: See ECB Opinions

text: and

text: . All ECB opinions are available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 9 February 2010 on Ireland’s bilateral borrowing agreement with the International Monetary Fund (CON/2010/15)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 9 February 2010 on Ireland’s bilateral borrowing agreement with the International Monetary Fund (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 27 January 2010, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Irish Department of Finance for an opinion on a draft law amending the law on Ireland’s membership of the International Monetary Fund (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law has implications for the Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland (hereinafter the ‘CBFSAI’). In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: The main purpose of the draft law is to amend the law on Ireland’s membership of the International Monetary Fund (hereinafter the ‘Law’), to adopt and approve a bilateral borrowing agreement (hereinafter the ‘Borrowing Agreement’) between Ireland and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The Borrowing Agreement will be entered into in line with Ireland’s commitment to comply with the Presidency conclusions of the European Council meeting of 19 and 20 March 2009 under which the Member States will provide temporary bilateral loans of EUR 75 billion to the IMF to deal with the international financial crisis. As the provision of such additional funds to the IMF is not part of the regular IMF quota, and the Member States will provide these funds on the basis of bilateral borrowing agreements with the IMF, new legislation is needed for Ireland’s provision of additional funds for the IMF’s activities and to define the scope and content of the obligations of the CBFSAI and of Ireland towards the IMF.

text: Section 1(b) of the draft law inserts the Borrowing Agreement as a new Schedule 2 to the Law. Section 1(a) of the draft law inserts a new Section 3A to the Law, pursuant to which the terms of the Borrowing Agreement are approved. Under the terms of the Borrowing Agreement, Ireland agrees to lend to the IMF on request an SDR-denominated amount up to the equivalent of EUR 1.3 billion on the terms and conditions set out in the Borrowing Agreement. Unless otherwise agreed between the IMF and the CBFSAI, the loan will be made by way of payments to the IMF by the CBFSAI. Section 1(a) of the draft law also inserts a new Section 3B in the Law, pursuant to which the Minister for Finance may guarantee, in such form and manner and on such terms and conditions as he or she thinks fit, either or both the payment to the CBFSAI of the principal of and any interest on, any money advanced by the CBFSAI under the terms of the Borrowing Agreement.

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 On 27 January 2010, the Department of Finance informed the ECB that the draft law was intended to be adopted as a matter of urgency and, pursuant to

text: Article 3(2) of Decision 98/415/EC

text: which allows for a reduction of the minimum time limit of one month for the submission of the ECB’s opinion in case of extreme urgency, the Department of Finance requested the opinion of the ECB on the draft law. Notwithstanding

text: Article 3(2) of Decision 98/415/EC

text: , the ECB draws the Department of Finance’s attention to the fact that the second sentence of

text: Article 4 of Decision 98/415/EC

text: states that the ECB must be consulted ‘at an appropriate stage’ in the legislative process. This implies that the consultation should take place at a point in the legislative process that affords the ECB sufficient time to examine the draft legislative provisions and to adopt its opinion in the required language versions and which also enables the relevant national authorities to take the ECB’s opinion into consideration before the legislative provisions are adopted. 2.2 As recently expressed in other opinions , the ECB reminds the Department that the tasks performed by the CBFSAI must comply with the monetary financing prohibition under Article 123(1) of the Treaty which prohibits, among other things, overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facility with the national central banks in favour of central governments. However,

text: Article 7 of Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 of 13 December 1993

text: specifying definitions for the application of the prohibitions referred to in

text: Articles 104

text: [now

text: Article 123

text: ] and 104b(1) [now

text: Article 125(1)

text: ] of the Treaty provides that the financing by the national central banks of obligations falling upon the public sector vis-à-vis the IMF is not regarded as a credit facility within the meaning of

text: Article 104

text: [now

text: Article 123

text: ] of the Treaty. Any payment by the CBFSAI of Ireland’s additional obligations to the IMF provided for in the Borrowing Agreement inserted into the Law by Section 1(b) of the draft law falls within the scope of

text: Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 3603/93

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 9 February 2010. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: Riigi Teataja I, 7.1.2010, 1, 2.

text: COM(97) 337 final, not published in the Official Journal.

text: OJ L 359, 31.12.1998, p. 1.

text: Paragraph 3.3 of ECB Opinion

text: . All ECB opinions and reports are available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

text: Convergence Report May 2008, p. 40. 10 A similar comment applies also in respect of the draft Article 5253(1) of the Commercial Code. 11 First indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Decision 98/415/EC

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 23 February 2010 on preparations for the introduction of the euro (CON/2010/16)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 23 February 2010 on preparations for the introduction of the euro (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 5 January 2010 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from Estonia’s Ministry of Finance for an opinion on the draft law on introduction of the euro, the draft law on State fees and the draft amendments to the Commercial Code and other laws (hereinafter the ‘draft laws’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the first and second indents of

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft laws relate to currency matters and means of payment. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion. The ECB will also comment on the Law on the salaries of higher State officials adopted by the Riigikogu (Parliament) on 16 December 2009 that will enter into force on the date of commencement of authority of the composition No 12 of the Riigikogu, expected in March 2011.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft laws

text: 1.1 The draft laws replace amounts in kroons with amounts in euro, specify the rounding rules and enter into force on the date that the derogation will be abrogated; some of the Commercial Code draft provisions will enter into force on 1 July 2010. 1.2 The draft amendments to the Commercial Code accommodate the need to express amounts in euro on the one hand and the need to express amounts in evenly divisible integer numbers on the other hand. The draft amendments also specify that before the derogation is abrogated, amounts expressed in euro will be calculated in kroons based on the Eesti Pank rate and thereafter based on the rate established by the EU Council. To allow time for undertakings to make the necessary adjustments, monetary indicators that are important from the point of view of undertakings’ activities may be expressed in euro from 1 July 2010. The general obligation to express all amounts only in euro enters into force one year after introduction of the euro. An additional aspect of the

text: amendments to the Commercial Code is the introduction of no par value shares in line with the Communication from the Commission of 2 July 1997 on the impact of the introduction of the euro on capital markets .

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 The draft laws should refer to the TFEU which entered into force on 1 December 2009, instead of to the Treaty establishing the European Community. 2.2 The draft laws comply with the principles of the introduction of the euro, according to which the EU Council decides when to abrogate the derogation of a Member State according to Article 140(2) of the TFEU and the conversion rate will be set amending

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 2866/98 of 31 December 1998

text: on the conversion rates between the euro and the currencies of the Member States adopting the euro on the basis of

text: Article 140(3)

text: TFEU. 2.3 The ECB has already noted that the official redenomination should only take place on the basis of the conversion rate fixed according to Article 140(3) of the TFEU . However, the ECB has accepted that national legal provisions containing amounts in euro may enter into force before that if the Law refers to an amount in national currency equivalent to EUR [X] . In the case of the draft amendments to the Commercial Code, the possibility of expressing amounts in euro before the abrogation of the derogation is in line with this approach. 2.4 The ECB notes that the draft amendments to the Commercial Code allow for the continued limited use of the legacy currency after the euro adoption date. This would, however, require the application of a ‘phasing-out’ period under

text: Article 9

text: a of

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 974/98 of 3 May 1998

text: on the introduction of the euro . If this Regulation is amended with a view to the introduction of the euro in Estonia, its annex will need to provide that Estonia is a Member State with a phasing-out period. 2.5 The draft law on State fees expresses all fees in euro and rounds the amounts to the nearest complete cent. This is intended to cover the costs underlying the services and is based on the current exchange rate of the central bank. The eventual balance between the costs underlying the services and the fees to be paid will depend on the final conversion rate that will be set amending

text: Regulation (EC) No 2866/98

text: . 2.6 Rounding rules for the euro introduction preparations are set out in Articles

text: and

text: of Council Regulation (EC) No 1103/97 of 17 June 1997 on certain provisions relating to the introduction of the euro . The draft laws further specify these rules while staying within the scope of these articles.

text: 2.7 The ECB welcomes timely preparations for the introduction of the euro. The ECB also welcomes the repeal of the Law on currency and the Law on the security of kroons which did not comply with the requirements for legal integration into the Eurosystem .

text: 3. Draft law on the introduction of the euro

text: 3.1 The draft law on the introduction of the euro specifies the methodology for converting kroons to euro. According to

text: Article 4(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1103/97

text: , inverse rates must not be used. However, the conversion rates must be used for conversions either way between the euro unit and the national currency units. To avoid any misunderstanding concerning the conversion methodology, it might be useful to follow in Article 224 of the draft law on the introduction of the euro the order of the wording of

text: Article 4(3)

text: ; that is conversion rates will be used ‘between the euro unit and the national currency units’ . 3.2 As explained by the consulting authority, the obligation set out in Article 222 of the draft law on the introduction of the euro is relevant for persons not specified in

text: Article 2

text: . As another point, the ECB notes that

text: Article 223(2)

text: should specify a period rather than a point in time for removal of the national currency from circulation.

text: 4. The Law on the salaries of higher State officials

text: 4.1 The Law on the salaries of higher State officials sets in euro the highest rate of salary and specifies coefficients applicable to the salaries for different posts. The Law also specifies that these rates in euro will be calculated in kroons based on the central rate of Eesti Pank and that the Law enters into force with the next composition of Riigikogu, which can be expected in March 2011. 4.2 National authorities have the obligation to consult the ECB on draft legislative provisions concerning matters that fall within its competence. Currency matters are expressly listed among the areas of the ECB’s competence . According to

text: Article 4 of Decision 98/415/EC

text: , each Member State must ensure that the ECB is consulted at an appropriate stage enabling the authority initiating the draft legislative provision to take into consideration the ECB’s opinion before taking its decision on the substance. This obligation was not fulfilled in respect of the Law on the salaries of higher State officials. 4.3 The currency of a Member State with a derogation is its national currency until the entry into force of the Council decision abrogating the derogation under

text: Article 140(2)

text: TFEU. National provisions may only contain amounts in euro either when the euro is referred to as a foreign currency or where it is necessary due to the transposition of Union law provisions expressed in euro . Neither of these conditions are present here, and the Law does not comply with the principles of the introduction of

text: the euro. Therefore, the ECB recommends amending this Law in line with the techniques applied to the draft laws as described above. This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 23 February 2010. [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET


text: In accordance with Chapter III of the ‘Guide to consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions’ (available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu), ‘The duty to consult the ECB on amendments to draft legislative provisions which have already been submitted to the ECB for an opinion applies to substantive amendments which affect the essence of the draft legislation. It is useful to distinguish between two different [cases]. The first is where substantive amendments are proposed at a stage when the ECB has not yet adopted its opinion. In such situations the ECB expects the consulting authority to submit the amended draft legislative provision to it as soon as possible, so that the opinion can be based on the most recent text. The second situation is where substantive new provisions are proposed after adoption of the ECB opinion. In the latter situation, the ECB should be consulted in relation to those amendments. However, no further consultation is required if the amendments in essence aim to accommodate the view expressed by the ECB in its opinion. The ECB nevertheless welcomes being kept informed about the response to its opinions and receiving details of such amendments for information purposes’.

text: OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.

text: Regulation (EC) No 223/2009

text: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2009 on European statistics and repealing Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1101/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the transmission of data subject to statistical confidentiality to the Statistical Office of the European Communities,

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 322/97

text: on Community Statistics, and

text: Council Decision 89/382/EEC

text: , Euratom establishing a Committee on the Statistical Programmes of the European Communities (OJ L 87, 31.3.2009, p. 164).

text: The Code was endorsed by the Commission in its Recommendation of 25 May 2005 on the independence, integrity and accountability of the national and Community statistical authorities (COM(2005) 217 final). Articles

text: and

text: of Regulation (EC) No 223/2009 stipulate that the statistical principles set out in Article 338(2) of the TFEU and in Article 2 of the Regulation are further elaborated in the European Statistics Code of Practice. The Code of Practice is to be reviewed and updated as necessary by the European Statistical System Committee (ESS Committee). While the Code of Practice does not form an integral part of

text: Regulation (EC) No 223/2009

text: , the authority to further elaborate the statistical principles in the Code of Practice is clearly specified in

text: Regulation (EC) No 223/2009

text: Under Article 3 of the draft law, the composition of the HSSC, which will be chaired by the HSTAT President (the chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors will be its vice-chairman), also includes one member nominated by the Bank of Greece. The HSSC will advise HSTAT on: a) the Hellenic Statistical Programme; b) the Rules on Statistical Obligations; c) the priorities of the HSS on the basis of developments at European and international levels and on measures to reduce the administrative response cost of HSS entities; d) issues relating to the need for coherence in the production of statistics by the HSS entities and compliance with statistical principles, as well as further development and dissemination of the Code of Conduct for all such entities; e) issues pertaining to statistical confidentiality; f) methodology issues which arise in the preparation and application of statistical programmes, especially issues pertaining to statistics at European and international levels.

text: Under Article 9(4) of the draft law, HSTAT will be entrusted with the systematic production of official statistics, the conduct of scientific research and carrying out studies, which: a) concern all areas of activity of the public and private sector; b) support decision-making, as well as the definition and evaluation of Government and public sector policies; c) are submitted to international organisations for the purpose of complying with Greece’s obligations; and d) concern the general public or specific categories of users of statistics within Greece or abroad.

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 2533/98 of 23 November 1998

text: concerning the collection of statistical information by the European Central Bank (OJ L 318, 27.11.1998, p. 8).

text: See

text: Article 55

text: C of the Bank of Greece’s Statute.

text: Article 1(2) of the draft law stipulates that the HSS entities will comprise the HSTAT and the other HSS entities, which have the responsibility for or obligation to collect data and which will be included in the list of HSS entities under Article 10(8) of the draft law. At the same time Article 10(5) of the draft law refers to the list of ‘national authorities’ within the meaning of

text: Article 5(2) of Regulation (EC) No 223/2009

text: , which includes the Bank of Greece.

text: See e.g. the different terms used in Articles 6(3) and 7(1) of the Greek version of the draft law in relation to the identification of reporting agents in the context of statistical confidentiality; these terms are not in line with the term introduced in Article 1(3) of the draft law for the same concept.

text: The explanatory memorandum states that this provision is intended to prevent cases of e.g. the engagement of Board members in companies conducting public opinion surveys. However, the current formulation of the draft law remains unclear as to the scope of activities.

text: E.g. State budget funds, own asset management, sales of HSTAT’s statistical products to third parties, grants, donations and other contributions from public or private sector entities, administrative fines etc.

text: OJ L 145, 10.6.2009, p. 1.

text: Article 8(2) of Regulation (EC) No 479/2009

text: stipulates that: ‘Member States shall provide the Commission (Eurostat), as promptly as possible, with the relevant statistical information requested for the needs of data quality assessment, without prejudice to the provisions relating to the statistical confidentiality in

text: Council Regulation (EC) 322/97

text: ’. Article 21(1) of Regulation 223/2009, which has replaced

text: Regulation (EC) No 322/97

text: , stipulates that the transmission of confidential data from an ESS authority, as referred to in Article 4 of that Regulation, that has collected the data to another ESS authority may take place if this information is necessary for the efficient development, production and dissemination of European statistics, and

text: Article 21(4)

text: further specifies that national rules on statistical confidentiality may not be invoked to prevent the transfer of confidential data, where an act of the European Parliament and of the Council in accordance with Article 294 of the Treaty provides for the transmission of the data.

text: is such a provision on the transmission of confidential information for quality assessment and improvement purposes.

text: See Annex D of the Updated Hellenic Stability and Growth Programme (January 2010), available on the website of the Ministry of Finance (www.mnec.gr).

title: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 23 February 2010 on the establishment of the Hellenic Statistical System and an independent statistical authority (CON/2010/17)

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 23 February 2010 on the establishment of the Hellenic Statistical System and an independent statistical authority (

text: ) Introduction and legal basis

text: On 12 January 2010 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Greek Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a draft law on the Hellenic Statistical System (HSS) and the establishment of the Hellenic Statistical Authority (HSTAT) as an independent authority and legal person governed by public law (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). This opinion is based on the text of the draft law received by the ECB on 12 January 2010 . The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the third indent of

text: Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998

text: on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions , as the draft law relates to a national central bank. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

text: 1. Purpose of the draft law

text: The draft law is mainly aimed at making an institutional upgrade of the official statistics production system with a view to ensuring professional independence, scientific impartiality and integrity, as well as administrative efficiency. This is to be achieved by the establishment of the HSS, composed of HSTAT and other public and private sector entities (hereinafter the ‘other HSS entities’) that have the responsibility for or the obligation to collect data and produce the statistics required for decision and policy making at local, national, European and international levels. Under the draft law the General

text: Secretariat of the National Statistical Service of the Ministry of Finance, which has been subject to direct

text: control by the State, is converted into an independent administrative authority, namely HSTAT. HSTAT

text: will operate as a legal person governed by public law and benefit from the institutional safeguards

text: necessary for its independent functioning. More specifically, Chapter A of the draft law sets out the rules

text: of procedure for the HSS and assigns to HSTAT the coordination of all the activities of the other HSS

text: entities for the production of official national statistics and their transmission to Eurostat, taking into

text: account the existing Union legal framework and in particular

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 223/2009

text: on

text: European Statistics , as well as the European Statistics Code of Practice . Chapter A of the draft law also

text: establishes the Hellenic Statistical System Council (HSSC) as an advisory body to HSTAT . Chapter B of

text: the draft law sets out the structure and operational methods of HSTAT .

text: 2. General observations

text: 2.1 The ECB welcomes the aim of the draft law to improve the collection, compilation and distribution

text: of European and national statistics by the HSS. At the same time, the ECB underlines that,

text: irrespective of the general institutional setting, the specific arrangements of a national statistical

text: system should aim to optimise the reliability and efficiency of the statistical production process and

text: ensure that the statistics provided are of high quality, in particular with a view to preserving the

text: credibility and the sound functioning of monetary union. The achievement of these aims relies on

text: the efficient and effective implementation of the arrangements introduced by the draft law.

text: 2.2 There are two complementary regimes for the production of European statistics set out in

text: Regulation (EC) No 223/2009

text: and in

text: Regulation (EC) No 2533/98

text: . The ECB notes that the

text: explanatory memorandum of the draft law takes account of these complementary regimes by expressly stating that the distinct institutional framework governing the collection of statistical information by the ECB, assisted by the Bank of Greece, within its fields of competence, is not affected by the draft law in any way. The ECB strongly recommends including in the draft law itself, and ideally in its

text: Article 1

text: , an explicit statement that the draft law is without prejudice to Article 5 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank. The ECB also strongly recommends that it should be clear in the draft law that, as a member of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), the Bank of Greece has a duty to cooperate with the ECB and other Eurosystem central banks on statistical matters and to compile official statistics. Such a clarification would be welcome to the extent that the Bank of Greece may also be entrusted 8 9 with the compilation of certain official statistics in the context of the HSS . 2.3 Furthermore, given the complementary regimes for the production of European statistics, ensuring effective cooperation between the Bank of Greece, as a producer of European Statistics under

text: Regulation (EC) No 2533/98

text: , and the HSS entities is very important for cost-effectiveness and, in particular, for the quality of the statistics. The ECB would favour a formalisation of such cooperation either by means of the draft law or by any other means that the relevant national authorities deem appropriate. In addition, for the purposes of such cooperation the ECB emphasises the importance of ensuring that a national statistical system should allow for the transmission of confidential data to ESCB members, in accordance with

text: Regulation (EC) No 223/2009

text: and

text: Regulation (EC) No 2533/98

text: , while preserving strict confidentiality safeguards.

text: 3. HSS entities’ tasks, statistical principles and quality criteria

text: 3.1 Without prejudice to the general observations made above, the ECB notes that, for the purpose of ensuring that the HSS entities can adequately perform their tasks,

text: Articles 1(4)

text: and (5) of the draft law provide for the application of the statistical principles and quality criteria set out in

text: Regulation (EC) No 223/2009

text: . While the ECB welcomes the aim of the Greek legislator to optimise the proposed national statistical system, among other things by aligning it with the European Statistical System framework, it makes the following specific observations. 3.2 HSS entities’ tasks The draft law could benefit from a clearer formulation of the responsibilities and duties of HSTAT and the other HSS entities. For example, Article 1(2) of the draft law stipulates that the HSS entities will be HSTAT and the other entities in the list of HSS entities determined by a decision of HSTAT’s Board in accordance with

text: Article 10(8)

text: . At the same time,

text: Article 4(3)

text: (b) of the draft law seems to exclude HSTAT from the definition of HSS entities, in particular if read in conjunction

text: with

text: Article 4(3)

text: (a) thereof, as it states that the Hellenic Statistical Programme is to be implemented by the HSS entities ‘or HSTAT’. In the light of the above, the ECB recommends the use of consistent formulations for, and a clearer delineation of, the responsibilities assigned to HSS entities, since this could contribute to ensuring the necessary quality of statistics, as also highlighted in the following paragraphs. The ECB also notes that there is scope for enhancing the consistency of the use of terminology in the draft law . 3.3 Independence of HSTAT 3.3.1 The draft law establishes HSTAT as an independent authority and ensures that the HSS entities comply with the quality criteria set out in

text: Article 12 of Regulation (EC) No 223/2009

text: . The ECB notes that under the draft law HSTAT has functional independence and administrative and financial autonomy, not being subject to control by any government body or other administrative authority but, rather, being supervised by the Hellenic Parliament . To the extent that the concept and scope of supervision cannot be clearly derived from the draft law, for the purposes of safeguarding the independent nature of HSTAT and avoiding any misunderstanding, the ECB would welcome the use of the formulation ‘is accountable to’ rather than ‘supervised by’ in Article 9(2) of the draft law. Furthermore, the ECB recommends specifying in Article 9 of the draft law how such accountability towards the Hellenic Parliament will be carried out. 3.3.2 HSTAT will be governed by its President and Board. Under Article 12 of the draft law, the composition of HSTAT’s Board comprises seven members, each appointed by the Speaker of the Hellenic Parliament for a four-year term of office, renewable once. The Board will comprise: (i) the HSTAT president as its chairman to be selected by the Conference of Presidents of the Hellenic Parliament; (ii) four members, including the vice-chairman, also to be selected by the Conference of Presidents of the Hellenic Parliament; (iii) one representative from the Ministry of Finance, to be nominated by the Minister of Finance; and (iv) one member to be nominated by the HSTAT’s staff union. To further enhance HSTAT’s independence, the ECB recommends that the chairman and members of HSTAT’s Board should be appointed for longer terms of office and that the terms of office for different Board members should be staggered, with a view to ensuring continuity in policymaking. Furthermore, the use of the term ‘representative’ in relation to the Board member nominated by the Minister of Finance seems to be incompatible with Article 15(1) of the draft law, on the safeguards of HSTAT’s independence, according to which the chairman and members of HSTAT’s Board enjoy personal independence in the performance of their duties and are bound only by the law and their consciences. Moreover, under the same Article, HSTAT’s President must be employed by HSTAT on a full-time basis, while the other Board members may not hold any remunerated or non-remunerated public office or engage in any other professional activities of a business or other nature, which are incompatible with their status and duties as

text: members of HSTAT’s Board. While the ECB welcomes the independence safeguards in

text: Article 15

text: , it is of the view that the draft law leaves broad discretion as to which types of activities may be considered incompatible with such persons’ status and duties and recommends that also the vicechairman of HSTAT should be employed by HSTAT on a full-time basis. Furthermore, under Article 15(2) of the draft law, the chairman and members of the Board may be dismissed by a decision of the body appointing them on serious grounds relating to the performance of their duties or for failure to perform their duties due to illness or disability. The ECB recommends that these serious grounds should be further specified in the draft law. 3.3.3 Article 16 of the draft law provides for a multitude of income sources for HSTAT, including Union, public and private funds . Article 4 of the draft law, on the production of statistics, stipulates that the production of statistics that need to be compiled is weighed against the availability of human and financial resources. The ECB emphasises the importance of the availability of adequate resources at all times for the appropriate fulfilment of HSTAT’s tasks in line with Union legal obligations. In this respect, the ECB draws the consulting authority’s attention to the need to ensure the adequacy of regular and secure resources. The need to ensure the availability of resources is also underlined by the European Statistics Code of Practice, which stipulates that staff, financial and computing resources, adequate both in magnitude and in quality, should be available to meet European statistics needs. 3.4 Quality and confidentiality of statistics under the HSS 3.4.1 Article 5(1) of the draft law stipulates that, in order to safeguard the quality of the HSS’s results, HSS entities must develop, produce and disseminate statistics on the basis of uniform standards and harmonised methods, applying the evaluation criteria of Article 1(5) of the draft law, which in turn refers to the quality benchmarks set out in

text: . The ECB emphasises the importance of the high quality of statistics and recommends that the ‘certification’ procedure, which is referred to in Articles 1(6) and 10(9) of the draft law and which will be set out in detail in the HSTAT’s Rules of Operation and Administration, should allow for thorough data validation to ensure the quality of the statistics produced. In view of the above, the ECB draws the consulting authority’s attention to the need for HSS entities to provide HSTAT with all relevant statistical information required for the purposes of data validation as promptly as possible. In this respect, and in order to provide a practical safeguard for ensuring compliance with the abovementioned principles and quality standards, the ECB recommends that, without prejudice to Article 5(2) of the draft law, each HSS entity should submit a quality report to HSTAT at least once a year. As a minimum, such quality reports should address the completeness of the data, their compliance with relevant definitions and/or accounting rules, their internal consistency, their timeliness and their reliability. HSS entities should also properly document any cases of reporting

text: agents’ non-compliance with their obligations to provide the required data, as well as any major data revisions. Moreover, the quality reports should provide HSTAT with a detailed inventory of the methods, procedures and sources used to collect data and produce statistics. The ECB would also welcome a clarification of the access rights provided for in the first sentence of Article 2(3) of the draft law. In particular, HSTAT’s access rights should not be limited to ‘statistics’, as the current formulation suggests; HSTAT should also have access to primary information. 3.4.2 On the confidentiality of statistics, the ECB notes that under Article 7(2) of the draft law HSS entities may refuse to transmit confidential data if such data relate to national defence, State security and Greece’s international relations. This provision is not in line with

text: Regulation (EC) No 223/2009

text: or

text: Council Regulation (EC) No 479/2009 of 25 May 2009

text: on the application of the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to the Treaty establishing the European Community . Against this background, arrangements should be put in place that allow for the proper recording of all government expenditure, including military expenditure, in the national accounts without compromising secret State information.

text: 4. Statistics used for administrative purposes

text: 4.1 It is also important to ensure the highest quality of statistics used for administrative purposes, such as the statistics on the Harmonized Index for Consumer Prices (HICP) and the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP). In particular, the credibility of budgetary surveillance in the European Union and, ultimately, as stated above, the credibility and the sound functioning of monetary union, depend on the reliable and timely compilation of EDP statistics, independently of political cycles. Although the draft law aims to ensure the independence of HSTAT, the independence of the other HSS entities under the draft law is not ensured. Indeed, the current formulation of Article 2(3) of the draft law seems to allow, in practice, one or more of these HSS entities in the private or the public sector to be entrusted with the compilation of EDP statistics. However, the ECB recommends that the draft law should expressly stipulate that HSTAT is responsible for the compilation of EDP statistics, and that the other HSS entities should provide HSTAT with the administrative source data necessary for such compilation. 4.2 Furthermore, the ECB recommends that the other HSS entities should provide HSTAT with all information necessary for verifying the plausibility of the source data feeding into the EDP statistics as promptly as possible. Such verification should be made by comparing these source data

text: with monetary and financial statistics collected by the Bank of Greece. The quality of the source data would also be improved by the establishment of an independent budget office to monitor the execution of the budget, as envisaged in the updated Hellenic Stability and Growth Programme . The ECB recommends that HSTAT, the Bank of Greece and the relevant HSS entities should draw up a memorandum of understanding to define their various responsibilities in the field of EDP statistics.

text: This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.

text: Done at Frankfurt am Main, 23 February 2010.

text: [signed]

text: The President of the ECB

text: Jean-Claude TRICHET