procedure: Merits (including the text of the declaration of Judges Basdevant and Zoričić)

title: Judgment of 9 April 1949

text: INTERNATIONAL COUI2T OF JUSTICE

text: YEAR 1949.

text: April 9th.

text: General List 1949. No. 1.

text: April 9tb,

text: THE CORFU

text: CHANNEL CASE

text: (MERITS)

text: International responsibility for explosion of mines i n territorial waters.--Connivance with another State ; 'midence.-Minelaying by persons unknown.-Knowledge of minelaying by State party.to proceedings : control of territory as ground for responsibility ; its influence on the choice of means of proof; indirect midence, concordant inferences of tact.-Breach of obligations resulting from knowledge of minelaying, gvounds for responsibility.-Court's jurisdiction to assess amount o f compensation ; interpretation of Special Agreement ; subsequent attitude of Parties.

text: Right of passage of warships in time of peace through Straits connecting two parts of the high seas.-International custom.-Straits in which right of passage exists.-North Corfu Channel.-Innocent passage ; purpose of passage and manner of its execution.-Production of documents at Court's request ; refusal to produce ; Article 49 of Statute of Court and Article 54 of Rules.-Minesweeping undertaken i n territorial waters contrary to wish of territorial State ; justification derived from theory of intervention and notion of self-help.-Violation of territorial sovereignty ; international responsibility ; satisfaction i n form of a declaration by the Court of violation of right.

text: JUDGMENT

text: Present : Acting President GUERRERO ; President BASDEVANT ;

text: Judges ALVAREZ, FABELA, HACKWORTH, WINIARSKI,

text: ZORIEIC, DE VISSCHER, Sir Arnold MCNAIR, KLAESTAD,

text: BADAWI PASHA, KRYLOV, READ, HSU MO, AZEVEDO ;

text: M. EEER, Judge ad hoc.

text: I n the Corfu Channel case,

text: between

text: the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, represented by : Sir Eric Beckett, K.C.M.G., K.C., Legal Adviser to the Foreign Office, as Agent and Counsel, assisted by The Right Honourable Sir Hartley Shawcross, K.C., M.P., Attorney-General, replaced on November I jtfi, 1948, by Sir Frank Soskice, K.C., M.P., Solicitor-General ; Mr. C. H. M. Waldock, Professor of international law in the University of Oxford, Mr. R. O. Wilberforce, Mr. J. Mervyn Jones, and Mr. M. E . Reed (of the Attorney-General's Office), members of the English Bar, as Counsel,

text: the Government of the People's Republic of Albania, represented by : M. Kahreman Ylli, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Albania in Paris, as Agent, replaced on February 14th, 1949, by M. Behar Shtylla, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Albania in Paris, assisted by M. Pierre Cot, Profssseur agrégé of the Faculties of Law of France, and Maître Joe Nordmann, of the Paris Bar, as Counsel; and

text: Slaitre Marc Jacquier, of the Paris Bar, and Maître Paul Villard, of the Paris Bar, as Advocates.

text: composed as above, delivers the following judgment :

text: By a Judgment delivered on March 25th, 1948 (I.C. J. Reports 1947- 1948, p. 15), in the Corfu Channel case, in proceedings instituted on May zznd, 1947, by an application of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland against the Government of the People's Republic of Albania, the Court gave its decision

text: THE COR^ CHANNEL CASE (MERITS). 6

text: on the Preliminary Objection filed on December gth, 1947, by t h e latter Government. The Court rejected t h e Objection and decided that proceedings on t h e merits should continue, and fixed t h e time-limits for t h e filing of subsequent pleadings as follows : for the Counter-Memorial of Albania : June q t h , 1948 ; for t h e Reply of t h e United Kingdom : August znd, 1948 ; for the Rejoinder of Albania : September zoth, 1948. Immediately after the delivery of the judgment, t h e Court was notified by the Agents of the Parties of a Special Agreement, which i s a s follows :

text: "The Government of the People's Republic of Albania, represented by their Agent Mr. Kahreman YUi, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Albania at Paris ; and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, represented by their Agent, Mr. W. E. Beckett, C.M.G., K.C., Legal Adviser to the Foreign Office ; Have accepted the present Special Agreement, which has been drawn up as a result of the Resolution of the Security Council of the 9th April, 1947, for the purpose of submitting to thi: International Court of Justice for decision the following questions :- (1) 1s Albania responsible under international law for the explosions which occurred on the zznd October 1946 in Albanian waters and for the damage and loss of human life which resulted from them and is there any duty to pay compensation ? (2) Has the United Kingdom under international law violated the sovereignty of the Albanian People's Republic by reason of the acts of the Royal Navy in Albanian waters on the ~ 2 n d October and on the 12th and 13th November 1946 and is there any duty to give satisfaction ? The Parties agree that the present Special Agreement shall be notified to the International Court of Justice immediately after the delivery on the 25th March of its judgment on the question of j urisdiction. The Parties request the Court, having regard to the present Special Agreement, to make such orders with regard to procedure, in conformity wlth the Statute and the Rules of the Court, as the Court may deem fit, after having consulted the Agents of the Parties. In witness whereof the above-mentioned Agents, being duly authorized by their Governments to this effect, have signed the present Special Agreement.

text: Done this 25th day of March, 1948, at midday, at The Hague, in English and French. both texts being equally authentic, in a single copy which shall be deposited with the International Court of Justice."

text: On March 26th, 1948 (I.C. J. Reports 1947-1948, p. j3), the Court made an Order in which i t placed on record that the Special 6

text: Agreement now formed the basis of further proceedings before the Court, and stated the questions submitted t o i t for decision. The Court noted that the United Kingdom Government on October ~ s t , 1947, that is within the time-limit fixed by the Court, had filed a Meinorial with statements and submissions relating to the incident t h a t occured on October zznd 1946. I t further noted that the Agents, having been consulted, declared that they agreed in requesting that the order and time-limits for the filing of the subsequent pleadings as fixed by the Judgment of hlarch q t h , 1948, be maintained. The Court confirmed this order and these time-limits. The Counter-Memorial, Iieply and Rejoinder were filed within these limits. The case was thus ready for heanng on September zoth, 1948, and the commencement of the oral proceedings was then fised for November 5th, 1948. As the Court did not include upon the Bench a judge of Albanian nationality, the Albanian Government availed itself during the proceedings on the Preliminary Objection of the right provided by Article 31, paragraph 2, of the Statute, and chose hf. Igor Daxner, Doctor of Lam, President of a Chamber of the Supreme Court of Czechoslovakia, as Judge ad hoc. On October z8th, 1948, the Registrar was informed that Judge Daxner was prevented byreasons of health from sitting or1 the date fixed. The Court decided on November znd, 1948, to fix a time-limit expiring on November 7th, within which the Albanian Government might notify the name of the. person whom it wished to choose as Judge ad hoc in place of Dr. Daxner, and to postpone the opening of the hearing until November 9th. Within the time fixed the Albanian Government designated 11. Bohuslav EEer, Doctor of Law and Professor in the Faculty of Law at Brno, and delegate of the Czechoslovak Government to the International Military Tribunal a t Nuremberg. Public sittings were held by the Court on the following dates : November, 1948, 9th to ~ z t h , 15th to rgth, zznd to 26th, 28th and 29th ; December, 1948,1st to 4th, 6th to t th, 13th, 14th and 17th ; January, 1949, 17th to zznd. In the course of the sittings from November 9th to ~ g t h , 1948, and from January 17th to zznd, 1949, the Court heard arguments by Sir Hartley Shawcross, K.C., Counsel, Sir Eric Beckett, K.C., Agent and Counsel, and Sir Frank Soskice, I<.C., Counsel, on behalf of the United Kingdom ; and by M. Kahreman Ylli, Agent, and MM. J. Nordmann and Pierre Cot, Counsel, on behalf of Albania. I n the course of the sittings from November zznd to December 14th, 1948, the Court heard the evidence of the witnesses and experts called by each of the Parties in reply to questions put to them in examination and cross-examination on behalf of the Parties, and by the President on behalf of the Court or by a Member of the Court. The following perçons gave evidence :

text: Ca-lled by the United Kingdom :

text: Commander E. R. D. Sworder, O.B.E., D.S.C., Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, as witness and expert ;

text: Karel Kovacic, former Lieutenant-Commander in the Yugoslav Navy, as witness ; Captain IV. H. Selby, D.S.C., Royal Navy, as witness ;

text: Commander R. T. Paul, C.B.E., Royal Navy, as witness;

text: Lieutenant-Commander P. K. Lankester, Royal Navy, as witness and expert ; Commander R. Mestre, French Navy, as-witness ;

text: Commander Q. P. Whitford, O.B.E., Royal Navy, as witness and expert ;

text: Called by Albania :

text: Captain Ali Shtino, Albanian Army, as witness ; First Captain Aquile Pdena, Albanian Army, as witness ;

text: Xhavit Muço, former Vice-President of the Executive Committee of Saranda, as witness ; Captain B.

text: Ormanov, Bulgarian Navy, as expert ; Rear-Admiral Raymond Moullec, French Navy, as expert.

text: Documents, including maps, photographs and sketches, were ?Xed by both Parties, and on one occasion by the Parties jointly, both as annelIes to the pleadings, and after the close of the written proceedings. On one occasion during the sittings when a photostat of an extract 'from a document was submitted, the Court, on November q t h , 1948, made a decision in which it reminded both Parties of the provisions of Article 48 and Article 43, paragraph I, of the Rules of Court ; held that the document in question could be received only if it were presented in an original and complete form ; ordered that al1 documents which the Parties intended to use should previously be filed in the Registry ; and reserved the right to inform the Parties later which of these documents should be presented in an original, and which in certified true copy, form.

text: Another decision as to the production of a senes of new documents was given by the Court on December xoth, 1948. This decision noted that the Parties were agreed as to the production of certain of these documents and that certain others were withdrawn ; authonzed the production of certain other documents ; lastly, in the case of one of these documents, the examination 8

text: THE CORFD CHt\NPIEI, CASE (IIERITS) 9

text: of which had been subjected to certain conditions, the Court's decision placed on record the consent of the other Party to its production and, in view of that consent, permitted its production, having regard to the special circumstances ; but the Court expressly stated that this permission could not form a precedent for the future l. By an Order of December 17th, 1948, the Court, having regard to the fact that certain points had been contested between the Parties which made it necessary to obtain an expert opinion, defined these points, and entrusted the duty of giving the expert opinion to a Committee composed of Commodore J. Bull of the Royal Korwegian Navy, Commodore S. A . Forshell of the Royal Swedish Kavy, and, Lieutenant-Commander S. J. Elfferich of the Royal Netherlands Navy. These Experts elected Commodore Bull as their chairman, and filed their Report on January Sth, 1949, within the prescribed time-limit. By a decision read a t a public sitting on January 17th, the Court requested the Experts to proceed to Sibenik in Yugoslavia and Saranda in Albania and to make on the land and in the waters adjacent to these places any investigations and experiments that they might consider useful with a view to verifying, completing, and, if necessary, modifying the answers given in their report of January 8th. The Experts' second report-in which Commodore Bull did not join, having been unable to niake the journey for reasons of health-was filed on February 8th, 1949. On February ~ o t h , three members of the Court put questions to the Experts, to which the Experts replied on February 12th. At sittings held from January 17th to mnd, 1949, the representatives of the Parties had an opportunity of commenting orally on the Experts' report of January 8th. They also filed written observations concerning the further statements contained in the Report of February 8th and the replies of February ~ z t h , as provided in the Court's decision of January 17th. The Parties' submissions, as formulated by their Agents or Counsel at the end of the hearings on the 18th, ~ g t h , ~ 1 s t and 22nd Januaiy, 1949, are as follows :

text: Question (1) of the Special Agreement. On behalf of the United Kingdom :

text: "The Governnient of the United Kingdom asks the Court in this case to adjudge and declare as follows :

text: The list of documents in support produced by the Parties and accepted by the Court will be found in Xnnex I t o this Judginent. 2 See Annex 2 for t h e Experts' Report of Jariuarp Sth, the Court's decision of January i;th, the Experts' second Report of February Xth, t h e qiiestions p u t by three members of the Court, and the Experts' replies of February i2th.

text: That, on October aand, 1946, damage was caused to His Majesty's ships Saumarez and Volage, which resulted in the death and injuries of 44, and personal injuries t o 42, British officers and men by a minefield of anchored automatic mines in the international highway of the Corfu Strait in an area south-west of the Bay of Saranda ;

text: That the aforesaid minefield was laid between May 15th and October zznd, 1946, by or with the connivance or knowledge of the Albanian Government ; That (alternatively to 2) the Albanian Government knew that the said minefield was lying in a part of its territorial waters ;

text: That the Albanian Government did not notify the existence of these mines as required by the Hague Convention VI11 of 1907 in accordance with the general principles of international law and humanity ; That in addition, and as a n aggravation of the conduct of Albania as set forth in Conclusions (3) and (4). the Albanian Government, or Cts agents, knowing that His Majesty's ships were going t o make the passage through the North Corfu swept channel, and being in a position to observe their approach, and having omitted, as alleged in paragraph 4 of these conclusions, to notify the existence of the said mines, failed to warn His Majesty's ships of the danger of the said mines of which the Albanian Government or its agents were well aware ;

text: That in addition, and as a further aggravation of the conduct of Albania as set forth in Conclusions (3), (4), and (5), the permission of the existence without notification of the minefield in the North Corfu Channel, being an international highway, was a violation of the right of innocent passage which exists in favour of foreign vessels (whether warships or merchant ships) through such an international highway ;

text: That the passage of His Majesty's ships through the North Corfu Channel on October zznd, 1946, was an exercise of the right of innocent passage, according to the law and practice of civilized nations ; That even if, for any reason, it is held that conclusion (7) is not established, nevertheless, the Albanian Government is not thereby relieved of its international responsibility for the damage caused to the ships by reason of the existence of an unnotified minefield of which it had knowledge ; That in the circumstances set forth in the Memorial as summarized in the preceding paragraphç of these Conclusions, the Albanian Government has committed a breach of its obligations under international law, and is internationally responsible to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom for the deaths, injuries and àainage caused to His Majesty's ships and personnel, as set out more particularly in paragraph 18 of the Memorial and the Annexes thereto ;

text: (IO) That the Albanian Government is under an obligation to the Government of the United Kingdom t o make reparation in respect of the breach of its international obligations as aforesaid ; (II) That His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom has. as a result of the breach by the Albanian Government of its obligations under international law, sustained the foiiobving damage : Damage to H.M.S. Saurmrez . . . . . . L ~ ~ O , O O O Damage to H.M.S. Volage. . . . . . . 75,000

text: Compensation for the pensions and other expenses incurred by the Government of the United Kingdom in respect of the deaths and injuries of naval personnel. . 50,000

text: On behalf of the Albanian Government :

text: [Translation.]

text: "(1) Under the terms of the Special Agreement of March 25th, 1948, the following question has been submitted to the International Court of Tustice ., : *'Is Albania responsible under international law for the explosions which occurred on the 22nd October 1946 in Albanian waters and for the damage and loss of human life which resulted £rom them and is there any duty to pay compensation ?' The Court would not have jurisdiction, in virtue of this Special .4greement, to decide, if the case arose, on the claim for the assessment of the compensation set out in the submissions of the United Kingdom Government. (2) I t has not been proved that the mines which caused the accidents of October zznd, 1946, were laid by Albania.

text: (3) I t has not been proved that these mines were laid by a third

text: Power on behalf of Albania.

text: (4) It has not been proved that these mines were laid with the help

text: or acquiescence of Albania. ( 5 ) It has not been proved that Albania knew, befote the incidents of October zznd, 1946, that theçe mines were in her territorial waters. (6) Consequently, Albania cannot be declared responsible, under international law, for the explosions which occurred on October zznd, 1946, in Albanian waters, and for the damage and loss of human life which resulted £rom them. Albania owes no compensation to the United Kingdoin Government."

text: Question ( 2 ) of the Special Agreement.

text: On behalf of the Albanian Governrnent :

text: [Translation.]

text: "(1) Under the terms of the Special Agreement concluded on March 25th, 1948, the International Court of Justice has before it the following question : II

text: 'Has the United Kingdom under international law violated the sovereignty of the Albanian People's Kepublic by reason of the acts of the Royal Navy in Aibanian waters on the 22nd October and on the 12th and 13th November 1946, and is there any duty to give satisfaction ?' (2) The coastal State is entitled, in exceptional circumstances, to regulate the passage of foreign warships through its territorial waters.

text: (3) This rule is applicable to the North Corfu Channel.

text: (4) In October and November, 1946, there existed, in this area, exceptional circumstances which gave the Albanian Government the right t o require that foreign warships should obtain previous authorization before passing through its territorial waters. (5) The passage of several British warships through Albanian territorial waters on October zznd, 1946, without previous authorization, constituted a breach of international law. (6) In any case that passage was not of an innocent character. (7) The British naval authorities were not entitled to proceed, on November 12th and 13th, 1946, to sweep mines in A!banian territorial waters without the previous consent of the Albanian authorities. (8) The Court should find that, on both these occasions, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland committed a breach of the rules of international law and that the Albanian Government has a right to (Icmand that it should give satisfaction therefor."

text: On hehcrlf of the United Kingdom Govcrnmcint :

text: " 1 ask the Court to decide that on neither heatl of tlic, counterclaim has Albania made out her case, and that there is rio ground for the Court to award nominal damages of one farthing or one franc."

text: By t h e first part of t h e Special Agreement, t h e following question is submitted t o the Court : "(1) 1s Albania responsible under international law for the cxplosions which occurred on the 22nd October 1946 in Albanian waters and for the tlamage and loss of human life which resulted from them and is there any duty to pay compensation ?" On October zznd, 1946, a squadron of British warships, the cruisers Mauritius and Leander a n d t h e destroyers Saumarez a n d I'olage, left t h e port of Corfu a n d proceeded northward through a channel previously suftpt for mines in the North Corfu Strait. The cruiser Mauritius was leading, followed by t h e destroyer Saumarez; a t a certain distance therealter came the cruiser Leander followed by t h e ciestroyclr Volage. Outside the Bay of Saranda, Saumarez btruck ;L rninc and was heavily damaged. Volnga was ordered to give her assistance and t o take her in tow. Whilst towing the damaged ship, Volage struck a mine and was much damaged. Nevertheless, she succeeded in towing the other ship back t o Corfu.

text: Three weeks later, on November 13th, the North Corfu Channel was swept by British minesweepers and twenty-two moored mines were cut. Two mines were taken t o Malta for expert examination. During the minesweeping operation i t was thought that the mines were of the German GR type, but it was subsequently established that they were of the German GY type..

text: The Court will consider first whether the two explosions that occurred on October zznd, 1946, were caused by mines belonging to the minefield discovered on Novemter 13th. I t was pointed out on behalf of the United Kingdom Government that this minefield had been recently laid. This was disputed in the Albanian pleadings but was no longer disputed during the hearing. One of the Albanian Counsel expressly recognized that the minefield had been recently laid, and the other Counsel subsequently made a similar declaration. I t was further asserted on behalf of the Albanian Government that the minefield must have been laid after October 22nd ; this would make it impossible a t the same time to mainiain that the minefield was old. The documents produced by the United Kingdom Government and the statements made by the Court's Experts and based on these documents show that the minefield had been recerttlv laid. This is - now established.

text: The United Kingdom Government contended that the mines which struck the two ships on October zznd were part of this minefield. This was contested by the Albanian Government, which argued that these mines may have been floating mines, coming from old minefields in the vicinity, or magnetic ground mines, magnetic moored mines, or German GR mines. It was also contested by them that the explosions occurred in the previously swept channel a t the place where the minefield was dircovered. The Albanian Government also contended that the minefield was laid after Octcber 2211d, between that date and the minesweeping operation on 12-13th November.

text: On -the evidence produced, the Court finds t h a t the following facts are established : I n October, IW, the North Corfu Channel was swept by the British Navy and no mines were found in the channel thus swept, whereupon -the existence of a safe route through the Channe! was announced in November 1944. In January and February,

text: THE COKFU CHANNEL CASE (BIERITS)

text: I 4 1945, the Channel was check-swept by the British Navy \vitil negative results. That the British Admiralty must have considered the Channel t o be a safe route for navigation is s h o ~ n by the fact t h a t on May ~ j t h , 1946, i t sent two British cruisers and on October zznd a squadron through the C.hanne1 without any special measlires of precaution against danger from nloored mines. It was in this swept channel that the minefield was discovered on November 13th, 1946.

text: I t is further proved by evidence produced by the United

text: Kingdom Govemment that the mining of Snzrnrarez and 1,'olage

text: occurred in Albanian territorial n ~ t e r s , just a t the place in the swept channel where the minefield was found, as indicated on the chart forming Annex g to the United Kingdom hlemorial. This is confirmed by the Court's Experts, ~ h o consider it to be free from any doubt t h a t the two ships were mined in approxinlately the position indicated on this chart.

text: I t is established by the evidence of witnesses that the minefield consisted of moored contact mines of the German GY type. I t is further shown by the nature of the damage sustained hy the two ships, and confirmed by witnesses and experts, that it could not have been caused by floating mines, magnetic ground mines, magnetic moored mines, or German GR mines. The experts of the Court have stated that the nature of the damage excludes the faintest possibility of its cause being a floating mine ; nor could it have been caused by a ground mine. They also expressed the view that the damage must have been caused by the explosion of moored contact mines, each having a charge of approximately

text: 600 lbs. of explosives, and that the two ships struck mines of

text: the same type as those which were swept on November 13th, 1946.

text: The Albanian Government put forward a suggestion that the minefield discovered on November 13th may have been laid after October zznd, so that the explosions that occurred on this latter date would not have been caused by mines from the field in question. But it brought no evidence in support of this supposition. As it has been established that the explosions could only have been due to moored mines having an explosive charge similar to that contained in GY mines, there would, if the Albanian contention were true, have been a t least two mines of this nature in the channel outside the Bay of Saranda, in spite of the sweep in October 1941 and the check-sweeps in January and February 1945 ; and these mines would have been struck by the two vessels at poi~its fairly close to one another on October 2211d, 1946. Such a supposition is too improbable to be accepted.

text: The Court consequenrly finds that the following facts are established. The two ships were mined in Albanian territorial waters in a previously swept and check-swept channel just a t the place where a newly laid minefield consisting of moored contact German GY mines was discovered three weeks later. The damage sustained by the ships was inconsistent with damage which could have been caused by floating mines, magnetic ground mines, magnetic moored mines, or German GR mines, but its nature and extent were such as would be caused by mines of the type found in the minefield. I n such circumstances the Court arrives a t the conclusion that the explosions were due t o mines belonging to that minefield.

text: Such are the facts upon which the Court n u s t , in order to reply to the first question of the Special Agreement, give judgment a s t o Albania's responsibility for the explosions on October zznd, 1946, and for the damage and loss of human life which resulted, and for the compensation, if any, due in respect of such damage and loss.

text: To begin with, the foundation for Albania's responsibility, as alleged by the United Kingdom, must be considered. On this subject, the mzin position of the United Kingdom is to be found in its submission No. 2 : that the minefield which caused the explosions was laid between May 15th, 1946, and October zznd, 1946, by or with the connivance or knowledge of the Albânian Government. The Court considered first the various groundç for responsibility alleged in this submission. In fact, although the United Kingdom Govemment never abandoned its contention that Albania herself laid the mines, very little attempt was made by t5e Government to demonstrate this point. In the written Reply, the United Kingdom Govemment takes note of the Albanian Government's formal statement that it did not lay the mines, and was not in a position to do so, as Albania possessed no navy ; and that, on the whole Albanian littoral, the Albanian authorities only had a few launches and motor boats. In the light of these statenlents, the Albanian Government was called upon, in the Reply, to disclose the circumstances in which two Yugoslav war vessels, the Mljet and the Meljine, carrying contact mines of the GY type, sailed routhward from the port of Sibenik on or about October 18th, and proceeded to the Corfu Channel The United Kingdom Government, having thus indicated the argument upon

text: 15 which it was thenceforth to concentrate, stated that it proposed to show that the said warships, with the knowledge and connivance of the Albanian Government, laid mines in the Corfu Channel just before October zznd, 1946. The facts were presented in the same light and in the same language in the oral reply by ~ o u n s e l for the United Kingdom Government a t the sittings on January 17th and 18th, 1949.

text: Although the suggestion that the minefield was laid by Albania was repeated in the United Kingdom statement in Court on January 18tii, 1949, and in thé final submissions read in Court on the same day, this suggestion was in fact hardly put forward at that time except pro memoria, and no evidence in support was furnished. In these circumstances, the Court need pay no further attention to this matter. The Court now comes to the second alternative argument of the United Kingdom Govemment, namely, that the minefield was laid with the connivance of the Albanian Government. According to this argument, the minelaying operation was carried out by tw70 Yugoslav warships a t a date prior to October zznd, but very near that date. This would imply collasion between the Albanian and the Yugoslav Governments, consisting either of a request by the Albanian Govemment t o the Yugoslav Government for assistance, or of acquiescence by the Albanian authoritieo in the laying of the mines.

text: In proof of this collusion, the United Kingdom Government relied on the evidence of Lieutenant-Commander Kovacic; as shown in his affidavit of October 4th, 1948, and in his statements in Court a t the public sittings on November 24th, 25th, 26th and 27th, 1948 The Court gave much attention t o this evidence and to the documentary information supplied by the Parties. I t supplemented and checked al1 this information by sending two experts appointed by it to Sibenik : Commodore S. A. Forshell and Lieutenant- Commander S. J. W. Elfferich.

text: Without deciding as to the personal sincerity oi the witness Kovacic, or the truth of what he said, the Court finds that the facts stated by the witness from his personal knowledge are not sufficient to prove what the United Kingdom Government considered them to prove. His ayegations that he saw mines being loaded upon two Yugoslav minesweepers a t Sibenik and that these two vessels departed from Sibenik about October 18th and returned a few days after the occurrence of the explosions do not suffice to constitute decisive legal proof that the mines were laid by these two vessels in Albanian waters off Saranda. The statements attributed 16 by the witness Kovacic to third parties, of which the Court has received no personal and direct confirmation, can be regarded only as allegations falling short of conclusive evidence. A charge of such exceptional gravity against a State would require a degree of certainty that has not been reached here. Apart from Kovacic's evideqce, the United Kingdom Government endeavoured to prove coliusion between Albania and Yugoslavia by certain presumptions of fact, or circumstantial evidence, such as the possession, a t that time, by Yugoslavia, and by no other neighbouring State, of GY mines, and by the bond of close political and military alliance between Albania and Yugoslavia, resulting from the Treaty of friendship and mutual assistance signed by those two States on July gth, 1946.

text: The Court considers that, even in so far as these facts are established, they lead to no firm conclusion. I t has not been legaliy established that Yugoslavia possessed any GY mines, and the origin of the mines laid in Albanian territorial waters remains a mat ter for conjecture. I t is' clear that the existence of a treaty, such as that of July gth, 1946, however close may be the bonds uniting its signatories, in no way leads to the conclusion that they participated in a criminai act. On its side, the Yugoslav Government, although not a party t o the proceedings, authorized the Albanian Govemment to produce certain Yugoslav documents, for the purpose of refuting the United Kingdom contention that the mines had been laid by two ships of the Yugoslav Navy. As the Court was anxious for fuli light to be thrown on the facts alleged, it did not refuse to receive these documents. But Yugoslavia's absence from the proceedings meant that these documents could only be admitted as evidence subject to reserves, and the Court finds it unnecessary to express an opinion upon their probative value. The Court need not dwell on the assertion of one of the Counsel for the Albanian Govemment that the minefield might have been laid by the Greek Govemment. I t is enough to Say that this was a mere conjecture which, as Counsel himself admitted, was based on no proof. In the light of the information now available to the Court, the authors of the minelaying remain unknown. In any case, the task of the Court, as defined by the Special Agreement, is to decide whether Albania is responsible, under international law, for the explosions which occurred on October zznd, 1946, and to give judgment as to the compensation, if any. Finally, the United Kingdom Govemment put forward the argument that, whoever the authors of the minelaying were, it could not have been done without the Albanian Government's knowledge.

text: I t is clear that knou-leoge of the mineIaying cannot be imputed to the Albanian Government by reason merely of the fact that a minefield discovered in Albanian temtorial waters caused the explosions of which the British warships were the victims. I t is true, as international practice shows, that a State on whose territory or in whose waters an act contrary to international law has occurred, may be called upon to give an explanation. I t is also true that that State cannot evade such a request by limiting itself to a reply that it is ignorant of the circumstances of the act and of its authors. The State may, up to a certain point, be bound to supply particulars of the use made by i t of the means of information and inquiry a t its disposal. But it cannot be concluded from the mere fact of the control exercised by a State over its territory and waters that that State necessarily knew, or ought to have known, of any unlawful act perpetrated therein, nor yet that i t necessarily knew, or should have known, the authors. This fact, by itself and apart from.other circumstances, neither involves prima facie resp~nsibility nor shifts

text: the burden of proof. On the other hand, the fact of this exclusive temtorial control exercised by a State within its frontiers has a bearing upon the methods of proof available to establish the knowledge of that State as to such events. By reason of this exclusive control, the other State, the. victim of a breach of international law, is often unable to furnish direct proof of facts giving rise to responsibility. Such a State should be d o w e d a more liberal recourse to inferences of fact and circumstantial evidence. This indirect evidence is admitted in al1 systems of law, and its use is recognized by international decisions. I t must be regarded as of special weight when it is based on a series of facts linked together and leading logically to a single conclusion.

text: The Court must examine therefore whether it has k e n established by means of indirect evidence that Albania has knowledge of minelaying in her territorial waters independently of any connivance on her part in this operation. The proof may be drawn from inferences of fact, provided that they leave no room for reasonable doubt. The elements of fact on which these inferences can be based may differ from those which are relevant to the question of connivance. In the present case, two series of facts, which corroborate one another, have to be considered : the first relates to Albania's attitude before and after the disaster of October zznd, 1946 ; the other concerns the feasibility of observing minelaying from the Xlbanian coast.

text: I . I t is clearly estabilshed that the Albanian Government constantly kept a close watch over the waters of the North Corfu Channel, at any rate after May 1946. This vigilance is proved

text: THE CORFU CHANNEL CASE (MERITS)

text: by the declaration of the Albanian Delegate in the Security Council on February ~ g t h , 1947 (Oficial Records of the Security Council, Second Year, No. 16, p. 328), and especially by the diplomatic notes of the Albanian Government concerning the passage of foreign ships through its territorial waters. This vigilance sometimes went so far as to involve the use of force : for esample the gunfire in the direction of the British cruisers Orion and Sztperb on May ~ g t h , 1946, and the shots fired a t the U.N.R.R.A. tug and barges on October 29th, 1946, as established by the affidavit of Enrico Bargellini, which was not seriously contested. The Albanian Government's notes are al1 evidence of its intention to keep a jealous watch on its temtorial waters. The note verbale addressed to the United Kingdom on May z ~ s t , 1946, reveals the existence of a "General Order", in execution of which the Coastal Commander gave the order to fire in the direction of the British cruisers. This same note formulates a demand that "permission" shall be given, by the Albanian authorities, for passage through territorial waters. The insistence on "formalities" and "permission" by Albania is repeated in the Albanian note of June 19th. As the Parties agree that the minefield had been recently laid, i t must be concluded that the operation was carried out during the period of close watch by the Albanian authorities in this sector. This conclusion renders the Albanian Govemment's assertion of ignorance a priori somewhat improbable.

text: The Court also noted the reply of Captain Ali Shtino to a question put by it ; this reply shows that the witness, who had been called on to replace the Coastal Defence Commander for a period of thirteen t o fifteen days, immediately before the events of October zznd, had received the following order: "That the look-out posts must inform me of every movement [in the Corfu Channel], and that no action would be taken on our part."

text: The telegrams sent by the Albanian Government on November 13th and November 27th, 1946, to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, a t a time when that Government was fully aware of the discovery of the minefield in Albanian territorial waters, are especially significant of the measures taken by the Albanian Government. I n the first telegram, that Government raised the strongest protest against the movements and activity of British naval units in its territorial waters on November 12th and 13th, 1946, without even mentioning the existence of a minefield in these waters. I n the second, it repeats its accusations against the United Kingdom, without in any way protesting against the laying of this minefield which, if effected without Albania's consent, constituted a very serious violation of her sovereignty.

text: Another indication of the Albanian Govemment's knowledge consists in the fact that that Govemment did not notify the presence of mines in its waters, a t the moment when it must have known this, a t the latest after the sweep on November 13th, and further, whereas the Greek Government immediately appointed a Commission to inquire into the events of October zznd, the Albanian Govemment took no decision of such a nature, nor did it proceed to the judicial investigation incumbent, in such a case, on the territorial sovereign. This attitude does not seem reconcilabIe with the alieged ignorance of the Albanian authorities that the minefield had been laid in Albanian territorial waters. I t could be explained if the Albanian Government, while knowing of the minelaying, desired the circumstances of the operation to remain secret.

text: As regards the possibility of observing minelaying from the Albanian coast, the Court regards the following facts, relating t o the technical conditions of a secret minelaying and to the Albanian surveillance, as particularly important.

text: The Bay of Saranda and the channel used by shipping through the Strait are, from their geographical configuration, easily watched ; the entrance of the bay is dominated by heights offenng excellent observation points, both over the bay and over the Strait ; whilst the channel throughout is close t o the Albanian coast. The laying of a minefield in these waters could hardly fail to have been observed by the Albanian coastal defences.

text: On this subject, it must first be said that the minelaying operation itself must have required a certain time. The method adopted required, according to the Experts of the Court, the methodical and well thought-out laying of two rows of mines that had clearly a combined offensive and defensive purpose : offensive, to prevent the passage, through the Channel, of vessels drawing ten feet of water or more ; defensive, to prevent vessels of the same draught from entering the Bay of Saranda. The report of. the Experts reckons the time that the minelayers would have been in the waters, between Cape Kiephali and St. George's Monastery, a t between two and two and a haif hours. This is sufficient time to attract the attention of the observation posts, placed, as the Albanian Government stated, a t Cape Kiephali and St. George's Monastery.

text: The facilities for observation from the coast are confirmed by the two following circumstances : the distance of the nearest mine from the coast was only 500 metres ; the minelayers must have passed a t not more than about 500 metres from the coast between Denta Point and St. George's Monastery.

text: Being anxious to obtain any technical information that might guide it in its search for the truth, the Court submitted the following question to the Experts appointed by it :

text: "On the assumption that the mines discovered on November 13th, 1946, were laid at some date within the few preceàing months, whoever may have laid them, you are requested to examine the information availabie regarding (a) the number and the nature of the mines, (b) the means for laying them, and (c) the time required to do so, having regard to the different states of the sea, the conditions of the locality, and the different weather conditions, and to ascertain whether it is possible in that way to draw any concl~~sions, and. if so, what conclusions, in regard to : (1) the means employed for laying the minefield discovered on November 13th, 1946, and (2) the possibility of mooring those mines with those means without the Albanian authorities being aware of it, having regard to the extent of the measures of vigilance existing in the Saranda region."

text: As the first Report submitted b y the Experts did not s e e n entirely coaclusive, the Court, b y a decision of January 17th, 1949, asked the Experts t o go t o Saranda and t o venfy, complete and, if necessary, modify their answers. I n this way, observations were made a n d various expenments carned out on the spot, in the presence of the experts of the Parties a n d of Albanian officials, with a view t o estimating the possibility of the minelaying having been observed b y the Albanian look-mit posts. On this subject reference must be made t o a test of visibility b y night, carried out on the evening of January 28th, 1949, a t St. George's Monastery. A motor ship, 27 metres long, a n d with no bridge, wheel-house, or funnel, a n d very low on the water, was used. The ship was completely blacked out, a n d on a moonlcss night, i.e., under the moçt favourable conditions for avoiding discovery, i t was clearly seen and heard from St. George's Monastery. The noise of the motor was heard a t a distance of 1,800 metres, a n d the ship itself was sighted at 570 metres a n d remained visible u p éo about 1,900 metres. T h e Experts' Report on this visit stated t h a t :

text: "The Experts consider it to be indisputable that if a normal look-out was kept at Cape Kiephali, Denta Point, and St. George's Monastery, and if the look-oiits were equipped with binoculars as has been stated, under normal weather conditions for this area, the minelaying operations shown in Annex g to the United Kingdom Memorial must have been noticed by these coastguards."

text: The Court cannot fail t o give great weight t o the opinion of the Experts who examined the locality in a manner giving every guarantee of correct and impartial information. Apart from the existence of a look-out post a t Cape Denta, which hâs not been proved, the Court, basing itself on the declarations of the Albanian Government t h a t look-out posts were stationed a t Cape Kiephali a n d St. George's Monastery, refers t o the following conclusions

text: 2 1 in the Experts' Report : (1) that in the case of minelaying from the North towards the South, the minelayers would have been seen from Cape Kiephali ; (2) in the case of minelaying from the South, the minelayers would have been seen from Cape Kiephali and St. George's Monastery.

text: From al1 the facts and observations mentioned above, the Court draws the conclusion that the laying of the minefield which caused the explosions on October zznd, 1946, could not have been accomplished without the knowledge of the Albanian Government. The obligations resulting for Albania from this knowledge are not disputed between the Parties. Counsel for the Albanian Government expressly recognized that [t[tvnnslatio?z] "if Albania had been informed of theuperation before the incidents of October zznd, and in time to warn the British vessels and shipping in general of the existence of mines in the Corfu Channel, her responsibility would be involved.. . .".

text: The obligations incumbent upon the Albanian authori ties consisted in notifying, for the benefit of shipping in general, the existence of a minefield in Albanian territorial waters and in warning the approaching British warships of the imminent danger to which the minefield exposed them. Such obligations are based, not on the Hague Convention of 1907, No. VTII, which is applicable in time of war, but on certain general and well-recognized principles, namely : elementary considerations of humanity, even more exacting in peace than in war ; the principle of the freedom of maritime communication ; and every State's obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary t o the rights of other States.

text: I n fact, Albania neither notified the existence of the minefield, nor warned the British warships of the danger they were approaching. But Albania's obligation to notify shipping of the existence of mines in her waters depends on her having obtained knowledge of that fact in sufficient time before October zznd ; and the duty of the Albanjan coastal authorities to warn the British ships depends on the time' that elapsed between the moment that these ships were reported and the moment of the first explosion.

text: On this subject, the Court makes the following observations. As has already been stated, the Parties agree that the mines were recently laid. I t must be concluded that the minelaying, whatever may have been its exact date, was done a t a time when there was a close Albanian surveillance over the Strait. If it be supposed that it took place a t the last possible moment, i.e., in the night of October zrst-zznd, the only conclusion to be drawn would be that a general notification to the shipping of al1 States before the time of the explosions would have been difficult, perhap- a even impossible. But this would certainly not have prevented the .Ilbanian authorities from taking, as they should have done, al1 necessary steps immediately to warn ships near the danger zone, more especially these that were approaching that zone. X'hen on October zznd about 13.00 hours the British warships were reported by the look-out post a t St. George's hlonastery to the Commander of the Coastal Defences as approaching 'Cape Long, it n a s perfectly possible for the Albanian authorities to use the interval of almost two hours that elapsed before the explosion affecting Sairnznvez (14.53 hours or 14.55 hours) to warn the vessels of the danger into which they were running.

text: In fact, nothing was attempted by the Albanian authorities t o prevent the disaster. These grave omissions in\-olve the international responsibility of Albania. The Court therefore reaches the conclusion that Albania is responsible under international law for the explosions which occurred on October zznd, 1946, in Albanian waters, and for the damage and loss of human life which resulted from them, and that there is a duty iipon Albania to pay compensation t o the United Kingdom.

text: In the final submissions contained in its oral reply, the United Kingdom Government asked the Court t o give judgment that, as a result of the breach by the Albanian Govemment of its obligations under international law, i t had sustained damages amounting to £87 5,000.

text: In the last oral statement submitted in its name, the Albanian Government, for the first time, asserted t h a t the Court would ilot have jurisdiction, in virtue of the Special Agreement, to assess the amount of compensation. No reason was given in support of this new assertioc, and the United Kingdom Agent did not açk leave to reply. The question of the Court's jurisdiction was not argued between the Parties. In the first question of the Special Agreement the Court is asked : ( i ) 1s Albania under international law responsible for the explosions and for the damage and loss of human life which resulted from them, and (ii) is there any duty to pay compensation ? This text gives rise to certain doubts. If point (i) is answered in the affirmative, i t follows from the establishment of responsibility that compensation is due, and i t w o d d be superfiuous t o add point (ii) unless the Parties had something else in mind than a mere declaration by the Court t h a t compensation is due. It would indeed be incompatible with the generally accepted rules of interpretation to admit that a provision of this sort occurring in a special agreement should be devoid of purport or effect. In this connexion, the Court refers to the views expressed by the Permanent Court of International Justice with regard to similar questions of interpretation. I n Advisory Opinion No. 13 of July 23rd, 1926, that Court said (Series B., No. 13, p. 19) : "But, so far a s concerns the specific question of competence now pending, i t may suffice to observe t h a t the Court, in determining the nature and scope of a measure, must look to its practical effect rather than to the predominant motive that may be conjectured to have inspired it." I n its Order of August ~ g t h , 1929, in the Free Zones case, the Court said (Series A., No. 22, p. 13) : "in case of doubt, the clauses of a special agreement by which a dispute is referred to the Court must, if i t does not involve doing violence t o their terms, be construed in a manner enabling the clauses themselves to have appropriate effects"

text: The Court thinks i t necessary to reier to the different stages of the procedure. In its Resolution of April gth, 1947, the Security Council recommended that the two Governments should immediately refer "the dispute" t o the Court. This Resolution had without doubt for its aim the final adjustment of the whole dispute. In pursuance of the Resolution, the Government of the United Kingdom filed a n Application in which the Court was asked, iwter d i a , to "determine the reparation or compensation", and in its Memorial that Government stated the various sums claimed. The Albanian Govemment thereupon submitted a Preliminary Objection, which was rejected by the Court by its Judgment of March 25th, 1948. Immediately after this judgment n a s delivered, the Agents of the Parties notified the Court of the conclusion of a Special Agreement. Commenting upon this step taken by the Parties, the Agent of the Albanian Government said that in the circumstances of the present case a special agreement on which "the whole procedure" should be based was essential. He further said [translation] : "As 1 have stated on several occasions, i t has always been the intention of the Albanian Govemment to respect the decision taken by the Security Council on April gth, 1947, in virtue of \\-hich the present Special Agreement is submitted to the International Court of Justice." Neither the Albanian nor the Cnited Kingdom Agent suggested in any way that the Special Agreement had limited the competence of the Court in this matter to a decision merely upon the pnnciple of compensation or that the United Kingdom Government had abandoned an important part of its original claim. The main

text: 24 object both Parties had in mind when they concluded the Special Agreement Ras to establish a complete equality between them by replacing the original procedure based on a unilateral Application by a procedure based on a Special Agreement. There is no suggestion that this change as t o procedure was intended to involve any change with regard t o the merits of the British claim as originally presented in the Application and Memorial. Accordingly, the Court, after consulting the Parties, in its Order of Iiarch 26th, 1948, maintained the United Kingdom's BZemonal, filed previously, "with statements and submissions". These submissions included the claim for a fixed sum of compensation.

text: The subsequent attitude of the Parties shows that it \vas not their intention, by entering into the Special Agreement, to preclude the Court from fixing the amount of the compensation. I n its Reply (paragraph 71) the United Kingdom Government maintained the submissions contained in paragraph 96 of its hiemorial, including the claim for a fixed amount of reparation. This claim \vas expressly repeated in the final United Kingdom submissions. I n paragraph 52 of its Counter-Memorial, the Albanian Governrnent stated that i t had no knowledge of the loss of human life and damage t o ships, but i t did not contest the Coart's competence to decide this question. I n the Rejoinder, paragraph 96, that Government declared that, owing to its claim for the dismissal of the case, it was unnecessary for it to examine the United Kingdom's claim for reparation. [T~.an.slafio~z.] "It reserves the right if need be, to discuss this point which should obviously form the subject of a n expert opinion." Having regard to what is said above as to the previous attitude of that Government, this statement must be considered as a n implied acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction to decide this question.

text: It may be asked why the Parties, when drafting the Special Agreement, did not expressly ask the Court to assess the amount of the damage, but used the words : "and is there any duty to pay compensation ?" I t seems probable that the explanation is to be found in the similarity betn-een this clause and the corresponding clause in the second part of the Special Agreement : "and is there axiy duty to give satisfaction ?"

text: The Albanian Government has not disputed the competence of the Court t o decide what kind of sntisfactio~z is due under this part of the Agreement. The case \vas argued on behalf of both Parties on the basis that this question should be decided by the Court. In the w i t t e n plendings, the Xlbanian Government contended that it \vas entitled to apologies. During the oral proceèdings, 25

text: Counsel for Albania discussed the question whethes ê pecuniary satisfaction \vas due. As no damage was caused, he did not claim an57 s u n ~ of money. He concluded [t~atzslntion] : "What we desire

text: If, hon-ever, the Court is competent t o decide what kind of satisfaction is due t o Albania under the second part of t h e Speêia! Agreement, i t is difficult to see why i t should lack competence to decide the amount of compensation which is due t o the United Kingdom under the first part. The clauses used in the Special Agreement are parallel. It cannot be supposed t h a t the Parties, while drafting these clauses i n the same form, intended t o give them opposite meanings-the one a s giving the Court jurisdiction, the other as denying such jurisdiction.

text: As has been said above, the Security Cmncil, in its Resolution of April gth, 1947, undoubtedly intended that the whole dispute should be decided by the Court. If, however, the Court should limit itself to saying that there is a duty to pay compensation without deciding what amount of compensation is due, the dispute would not be finally decided. An important part of it would remain unsettled. As both Parties have repeatedly declared that they accept the Resolution of the Security Council, such a result mould not conform with their declarations. I t would not give full effect to the Resolution, but would leave open the possibility of a further dispute. For the foregoing reasons, the Court has arrived a t the conclusion that it has jurisdiction to assess the amount of the compensation. This cannot, however, be done in the present Judgment. The Albanian Government has not yet stated which items, if any, of the various sums claimed it contests, and the United Kingdom Government has not submitted its evidence with regard to them. The Court therefore considers that further proceedings on this subject are necessary ; the order and time-limits of these proceedings will be fixed by the Order of this date.

text: ' I n the second part of the Special Agreement, the following question is submitted to the Court : "(2) Has the United Kingdom under international law violated the sovereignty of the Albanian People's Republic by reason of the acts of the Royal Navy in Albanian waters on the 22nd October and on the 12th and 13th November 1946 and is there any duty to give satisfaction ?" The Court will first consider whether the sovereignty of Albania was violated by reason of the acts of the British Navy in Albanian waters on October zznd, 1946.

text: On May rgth, 1946, the British cruisers Oviolt and Szrpevb, while passing southward through the North Corfu Channel, were fired a t by an Albanian battery in the vicinity of Saranda. I t appears from the report of the commanding naval officer dated May zgth, 1946, that the firing started when the ships had already passed the battery and were m o ~ i n g away from i t ; that from 12 to 20 rounds were fired ; that the finng lasted 1 2 minutes and ceased only when the ships were out of range ; but that the ships were not hit although there were a number of "shorts" and of "overs". An Albanian note of May zrst states that the Coastal Commander ordered a few shots to be fired in the direction of the ships "in accordance with a General Order founded on international law".

text: The United Kingdom Government a t once protested t o the Albanian Government, stating that innocent passage through straits is a right recognized by international law. There ensued a diplomatic correspondence in which the Albanian Government asserted that foreign warships and merchant vessels had no right to pass through Albanian territorial waters without pnor notification to, and the permission of, the Albanian authorities. This view was put into effect by a communication of the Albanian Chief of Staff, dated Jlay 17th, 1946, which purported to subject the passage of foreign warships and merchant vessels in -4lbanian territorial. waters to previous notification to and authorization by the Albanian Government. The diplomatic correspondence continued, and culminated in a United Kingdom note of August znd, 1946, in which the United Kingdom Government maintained its view with regard to the right of innocent passage through straits forming routes for international maritime traffic between two parts of the high seas. The note ended with the warning that if Albanian coastal batteries in the future opened fire on any British warship passing through the Corfu Channel, the fire would be returned.

text: The contents of this note were, on August ~ s t , communicated by the British Admiralty to the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, with the instruction that he should refrain from using the Channel until the note had been presented to the Albanian Government. On Aiigust ~ o t h , he received from the Admiralty the following telegram : "The Albanians have now received the note. North Corfu Strait may now be used by ships of your fleet, but only when essential and with armament in fore and aft position. Jf coastal guns fire a t ships passing through the Strait, ships should fire back." On September zrst, the following telegram was sent by the Admiralty to the Commander-in-Chief, hiediterranean : "Establishment of diplomatic relations wvith Albania is again under consideration by His Riajesty's Government who wish to know whether the Albanian Government have learnt to behave themselves. Information is requested whether any ships under your command have passed through the North Corfu Strait since August and, if not, whether you intend them to do so shortly." The Commander-in-Chief answered the next day that his ships had not done so yet, but that it ww7as his intention that Jfazlritius and Lennder and twvo destroyers should do so when they departed from Corfu on October zznd.

text: I t wvas in such circumstances that these two cruisers together with the destroyers Saz~inarez and T701age were sent through the North Corfu Strait on that date. The Court will now consider the Albanian contention that the United Kingdom Government violated Albanian sovereignty by sending the warships through this Strait without the previous authorization of the Albanian Government.

text: It is, in the opinion of the Court, generally recognized and in accordance with international custom that States in time of peace have a right t o send their warships through straits used for international navigation be'nveen two parts of the high seas without the previous authorization of a co'astal State, provided that the passage is innocent. Unless othenvise prescribed in a n international convention, there is no right for a coastal State to prohibit such passage through straits in time of peace.

text: The Albanian Government does not dispute that the liorth Corfu Channel is a strait in the geographical sense ; but it denies that this Channel belongs to the class of international highn-ays through wvhich a right of passage exists, on the grounds that it is only of secondas. importance and not el-en a neceçsary route between twvo parts of the high seas, and that i t is used almost exclusively for local traffic to and from the ports of Corfu and Saranda.

text: I t may be asked whether the test is to be found in the \lolume of traffic passing through the Strait or in its greater or lesser importance for international navigation. But in the opiiiion of the Court the decisive criterion is rather its geographical situation as connecting two parts of the high seas and the fact of its being used for international navigation. S o r can it be decisire that this Strait is not a necessary route bettveen tn-O parts of the high aeas, but only an alternative passage betwveen the E g e a n and the Adriatic Seas. I t has nevertheless been a useful route for international maritime traffic. I n this respect, the -\gent of the Vnited Kingdom Government gave the Court the foilowing information relating to the 28 period from April ~ s t , 1936, to December 31st, 1937 : "The following is the total number of ships putting in at the Port of Corfu after passing through or just before passing through the Channel. During the period of one year nine months, the total number of ships was 2,884. The flags of the ships are Greek, Italian, Roumanian, Yugoslav, French, Albanian and British. Clearly, very small vessels are included, as the entries for Albanian vessels are high, and of course one vessel may make several journeys, but 2,884 ships for a period of one year nine months is quite a large figure. These figures relate to vessels visited by the Customs at Corfu and so do not include the large number. of vessels which went through the Strait without calling a t Corfu a t all." There were also regular sailings through the Strait by Greek vessels three times weekly, by a British ship fortnightly, and by two Yugoslav vessels weekly and by two others fortnightly. The Court is further informed that the British Navy has regularly used this Channel for eighty years or more, and that it has also been used by the navies of other States.

text: One fact of particular importance is that the North Corfu Channel constitutes a frontier between Albania and Greece, that a part of it is wholly within the territorial waters of these States, and that the Strait is of special importance to Greece by reason of the traffic to and from the port of Corfu.

text: Having regard to these various considerations, the Court has arrived a t the conclusion that the North Corfu Channel should be considered as belonging to the class of international highways through which passage cannot be prohibited by a coastal State in time of peace. On the other hand, i t is a fact that the two coastal States did not maintain normal relations, that Greece had made territorial claims precisely with regard to a part of Albanian territory bordering on the Channel, that Greece had declared that she considered herself technically in a state of war with Albania, and that Albania, invoking the danger of Greek incursions, had considered it necessary to take certain measures of vigilance in this region. The Court is of opinion that Albania, in view of these exceptional circumstdnces, would have been justified in issuing regulations in respect of the passage of warships through the Strait, but not in prohibiting such passage or in subjecting it to the requirement of special authorization. For these reasons the Court is unable to accept the Albanian contention that the Government of the United Kingdom has violated Albanian sovereignty by sënding the warships through the Strait without having obtained the previous authorization of the Albanian Government. I n these circumstances, i t is unnecessary to consider the more general question, much debated by the Parties, n-hether States under international law have a right to send warships in time of peace through territorial waters not included in a strait.

text: The Albanian Government has further contended that the sovereignty of Albania was violated because the passage of the British warships on October zznd, 1946, was not a n i?z.izocejzt passage. The reasons advanced in support of this contention may be summed u p as foilows : The passage was not an ordinary passage, but a political mission ; the ships were manoeuvring and sailing in diamond combat formation with soldiers on board ; the position of the guns was not consistent with innocent passage ; the vessels passed with crews a t action stations ; the number of the ships and their armament surpassed what \vas necessa- in order t o attain their object and showed an intention t o intimidate and not merely to pass ; the ships had received orders to obsen-e and report upon the coastal defences and this order was carried out.

text: It is shown by the Adniiralty telegram of September z ~ s t , cited above, and admitted by the United Kingdom Agent, t h a t the object of sending the warships through the Strait \vas not only t o c a n y out a passage for purposes of navigation, but also to test Albania's attitude. As mentioned above, the Albanian Government, on May 15th, 1946, tried to impose by means of gunfire its view with regard t o the passage. As the exchange of dipIomatic notes did not lead t o any clarification, the Government of the United Kingdom wanted to ascertain by other ineans whether the Albanian Govemment would maintain its illegal attitude and again impose its view by firing a t passing ships. The legality of this measure taken-by the Goveniment of the United Kingdom cannot be disputed, provided that i t \vas carried out in a manner consistent with the requirements of international law. The "mission" was designed to affirm a right which had been unjustly denied. The Government of the United Kingdom was not bound to abstain from exercising its right of passage, which the Albanian Government had illegally denied.

text: I t remains, therefore, to consider whether the m n n n e r in which the passage was carried out was consistent with the principle of innocent passage and to examine the various contentions of the Albanian Government in so far as they appear to be relevant. When the Albanian coastguards a t St. George's Monastery reported that the British warships were sailing in combat formation and were manoeuvring, they must have been under a misapprehension. i t is shown by the evidence that the ships were not proceeding in combat forrnatior,, but in line, one after the other,

text: THE CORFU CHANNEL CASE (MERITS) 3I

text: and that they were not manoeuvnng until after the first explosion. Their movements thereafter were due to the explosions and were made necessary in order to Save human life and the mined ships. It is showvn by the evidence of wvitnesses that the contention that soldiers were on board must be due to a misunderstanding probably ansing from the fact that the two cruisers carried their usual detachment of marines.

text: I t is knowvn from the above-mentioned order issued by the British -1dmiralty on -4ugust ~ o t h , 1946, that ships, when using the North Corfu Strait, must pass with armament in fore and aft position. That this order was carried out during the passage on October ~ 2 n d is stated by the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, in a telegram of October 26th to the Admiralty. The guns were, he reported, "trained fore and aft, which is their normal position a t sea in p e a e time, and n-ere not loaded". I t is confirmed by the commanders of Sazinzarez and Volage that the guns were-in this position before

text: the explosions. The navigating officer on board Jfauritius

text: explained that al1 guns on that cruiser were in their normal stowage position. The main guns u-ere in the line of the ship, and the antiaircraft guns were pointing outwards and up into the air, which is the normal position of these guns on a cruiser both in harbour and a t sea. In the light of this evidence, the Court cannot accept the Albanian contention that the position of the guns was inconsistent with the rules of innocent passage.

text: In the above-mentioned teleg~am of October 26th, the Commander-in-Chief reported that the passage "was made with ships a t action stations in order that they might be able t o retaliate quickly if fired upon again". In view of the firing from the Albanian battery on May I j t h , this measure of precaution cannot, in itself, he regarded as unreasonable. But four warships-t~vo cruisers and t ~ v o destroyers-passed in this manner, with crews a t action stations, ready to retaliate quickly if fired upon. They passed one after another through this narrow channel, close to the Albanian Coast, a t a time of political tension in this region. The intention must have been, not only to test Albania's attitude, but a t the same time to demonstrate such force that she wvould abstain from firing again on passing ships. Having regard, however, to al1 the circumstances of the case, as described above, the Court is unable to characterize these measures taken by the United Kingdom authorities as a violation of Albania's sovereignty.

text: The Admiralty Chart, Annex 21 to the Memorial, shows that coastal defences in the Saranda region had been observed and reported. In a report of the commander of Volage, dated October z3rd, 1~46-a report relating to the passage on the zznd-it is stated : "The most was made of the opportunities to study Albanian defences a t close range. These included, with reference

text: defences. In accordance with Article 49 of the Statute of the Court and Article 54 of its Rules, the Court requested the United Kingdom Agent to produce the documents referred to as XCU for the use of the Court. Those documents were not produced, the Agent pleading naval secrecy ; and the United Kingdom witnesses declined t o answer questions relating to them. It is not the~efore possible to know the real content of these naval orders. The Court cannot, however, draw from this refusal t o prodaice the orders any conclusions differing from those t o which the actual events gave rise. The United Kingdom Agent stated that the instructions in these orders related solely to the contingency of shots being fired from the coast-which did not happen. . If it is tme, as iAe commander of Volage said in evidence, that the orders contained information concerning certain positions from which the British warships might have been fired at, it cannot be deduced therefrom that the vessels had received orders i o reconnoitre Albanian coastal defences. Lastly, as the Court has to judge of the innocent nature of the passage, it cannot remain indifferent to the fact that, though two warships struck mines, there was no reaction, either on their part or on that of the cruisers that accompanied them.

text: With regard to the observations of coastal defences made after the explosions, these were justified by the fact that two ships had just been blown up and that, in this critical situation, their commander~ might fear that they would be fired on from the coast, as on May 15th. Having thus examined the various contentions of the Albanian Govemment in so far as they appear to be relevant, the Court has arrived a t the conclusion that the United Kingdom did not violate the sovereignty of Albania by reason of the acts of the British Navy in Albanian waters on October zznd, 1946.

text: In addition to the passage of the United Kingdom warships on October zznd, 1946, the second question in the Çpecial Agreement relates to the acts of the Royal Navy in Albanian waters on November 12th and q t h , 1946. This is the minesweeping operation called "Operation Retail" by the Parties during the proceedings. This name will be used in the present Judgment.

text: After the explosions of October zznd, the United Kingdom Govemment sent a note to the Albanian Government, in which it announced its intention to sweep the Corfu Channel shortly. The Albanian reply, which was received in London on October p s t , stated that the Albanian Govemment would not give its consent to this unless the operation in question took place outside Albanian tem'torial waters. Meanwhile, a t the United Kingdom Government's request, the International Central Mine Clearance Board decided, in a resolution of November ~ s t , 1946, that there should be a further sweep of the Channel, subject to Albania's consent. The United Kingdom Govemment having infonned the Albanian Government, in a communication of November ~ o t h , that the proposed sweep would take place on November ~ z t h , the Albanian Government replied 0x1 the n t h , protesting against this "unilateral decision of His Majesty's Government". I t said it did not consider it inconvenient that the British fleet should undertake the sweeping of the channel of navigation, but added that, before sweeping was camed out, it considered it indispensable to decide what area of the sea should be deemed to constitute this channel, and proposed the establishment of a Mixed Commission for the purpose. I t ended by saying that any sweeping undertaken without the consent of the Albanian Government outside the channel thus constituted, i.e., inside Albanian temtorial waters where foreign warships have no reason to sail, could only be considered as a deliberate violation of Albanian territory and sovereignty.

text: After this exchange of notes, "Oyeration Retail" took place on November 12th and 13th. Commander Mestre, of the French Navy, was asked to attend as observer, and was present a t the sweep on November 13th. The operation was camed out under the protection of an important covering force composed of an aircraft carrier, cruisers and other war vessels. This covering force remained throughout the operation a t a certain distance to the west of the Channel, except for the frigate St. Bride's Bay, which was stationed in the Channel south-east of Cape Kiephali. The sweep began in the morning of November 13th, a t about g o'clock, and ended in the afternoon near nightfall. The area swept was in Albanian territorial waters, and within the limits of the channel previously swept.

text: The United Kingdom Govemment does not dispute that "Operation Retail" was carried out against the clearly expressed wish of the Albanian Govemment. It recognizes that the operation had not the consent of the international mine clearance organizations, that i t could not be justifie& as the exercise of a right of innocent passage, and lastIy that, in principle, international law does not allow a State to assemble a large number of warships in the territorial waters of another State and to carry out minesweeping in those waters. The United Kingdom Government states that the operation was one of extreme urgency, and that it considered itself entitled to carry it out without anybody's consent. The United Kingdom Government put forward two reasons in justification. First, the Agreement of November zznd, 1945, signed by the Govemments of the United Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union and the United States of America, authorizing regional mine clearance organizations, such as the Mediterranean Zone Board, to divide the sectors in their respective zones amongst the States concerned for siveeping. Relying on the circumstance that the Corfu Channel was in the sector allotted to Greece by the Mediterranean Zone Board on November 5th, i.e., before the signing of the above-mentioned Agreement, .the United Kingdom Government put forward a permission given by the Hellenic Govemment to resweep the navigable channel.

text: The Court does not consider this argument convincing. I t must be noted that, as the United Kingdom Govemment admits, the need for resweeping the Channel was not under consideration in November 1945 ; for previous sweeps in 1944 and 1945 were considered as having effected complete safety. As a consequence, the allocation of the sector in question t o Greece, and, therefore, the permission of the Hellenic Govemment which is relied on, were both of them merely nominal. I t is also to be remarked that Albania was not consulted regarding the allocation to Greece of the sector in question, despite the fact that the Channel passed through Albanian territorial waters.

text: But, in fact, the explosions of October 22nd, 1946, in a channel declared safe for navigation, and one which the United Kingdom Government, more than any other govemment, had reason to consider safe, raised quite a different problem from that of a routine sweep carried out under the orders of the mineclearance organizations. These explosions were suspicious ; they raised a question of responsibility. Accordingly, this was the ground on which the United Kingdom Govemment chose to establish its main line of defence. According to that Government, the corpora delicti must be secured as quickly as possible, for fear they should be taken away, without leaving traces, by the authors of the minelaying or by the Albanian authorities. This justification took two distinct forms in the United Kingdom Government's arguments. I t was presented first as a new and special application of the theory of intervention, by means of which the State intervening would secure possession of evidence in the territory of another State, in order to submit it to an international tribunal and thus facilitate its task.

text: The Court cannot accept such a line of defence. The Court can only regard the alleged right of intervention as the manifestation of a policy of force, such .as has, in the past, given rise to most serious abuses and such a s cannot, whatever be the present defects in international organization, find a place in international law. Intervention is perhaps still less admissible in the particular form i t would take here ; for, from the nature of things, i t would be reserved for the most powerful States, and might easily lead to perverting the administration of international justice itself.

text: The United Kingdom Agent, in his speech in reply, has further classified "Operation Retail" among methods of self-protection or self-help. The Court cannot accept this defence either. Between independent States, respect for territorial sovereignty is an essential foundation of international relations. The Court recognizes that the Albanian Govemment's complete failure to c a n y out its duties after the explosions, and the dilatory nature of its diplomatic notes, are extenuating circumstances for the action of the United Kingdom Government. But to ensure respect for international law, of which i t is the organ, the Court must declare that the action of the British Navy CO stituted a violation of Albanian sovereignty .

text: This declaration is in accordance with the request made by Albania through her Counsel, and is in itself appropriate satisfaction. The method of carnina out "O~eration Retail" has also been 4 " criticized by the Albanian Govemment, the main ground of complaint being that the United Kingdom, on that occasion, made use of an unnecessarily large display of force, out of proportion to the requirements of the sweep. The Court thinks that this criticism is not justified. I t does not consider that the action of the British Navy was a de~nonstration of force for the purpose of exercising political pressure on Albania. The responsible naval commander, who kept his ships a t a distance from the coast, cannot be reproached for having employed an important covering force in a region where twice within a few months his ships had been the object of serious outrages.

text: on the first question put by the Special Agreement of March z j t h , 1948,

text: by eleveil votes t o five,

text: Gives judgment that the People's Republic of Albania is responsible under international law for the explosions which occurred on October zznd, 1946, in Albanian waters, and for the damage and loss of human life that resulted therefrom ; and

text: by ten votes to six,

text: Reserves for further consideration the assessment of the amount of compensation and regulates the procedure on this subject by an Order dated this day ;

text: on the second question put by the Special Agreement of Jiarch zjth, 1948,

text: by fourteen votes to two,

text: Gives judgment that the United Kingdom did not violate the sovereignty of the People's Republic of Albania by reason of the acts of the British Navy in Albanian waters on October zznd, 1946 ; and

text: unanimously,

text: Gives judgment that by reason of the acts of the British Navy in =Ilbanian waters in the course of the Operation of November 12th and 13th, 1946, the United Kingdom violated the sovereignty of the People's Republic of Albania, and that this declaration by the Court constitutes in itself appropriate satisfaction.

text: Done in French and English, the French text being authoritative, a t the Peace Palace, The Hague, this ninth day of April, one thousand nine hundred and forty-nine, in three copies, one of which will be placed in the archives of the Court and the others transmitted to the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of the People's Republic of Albania respectively.

text: (Signed) J. G. GUERRERO,

text: Acting. President.

text: (Signed) E . HAXIBRO,

text: Registrar.

text: Judge BASDEVANT, President of the Court, whilst accepting the whole of the operative part of the Judgment, feels bound to state that he cannot accept the reasons given by the Court in support of its jurisdiction to assess the amount of compensation, other. reasons being in his opinion more decisive.

text: Judge ZORIEI~ declares that he is unable to agree either with the operative clause or with the reasons for the Judgment in the part relating to Albania's responsibility ; the arguments submitted, and the facts established are not such as to convince him that the Albanian Govemment was, or ought to have been, aware, before Noveinber 13th, 1946, of the existence of the minefield discovered on t h a t date. On the one hand, the attitude adopted by a government when confronted by certain facts varies according to the circumstances, to its mentality, to the means a t its disposal and to its experience in the conduct of public affairs. But i t has not been contested that, in 1946, Albania had a new Government possessing no experience in international practice. I t is therefore difficult to draw any inferences whatever from its attitude. Again, the conclusion of the Experts that the operation of laying the mines must have been seen is subject to an express reservation : it would be necessary t o assume the realization of several conditions, in particular the maintenance of normal look-out posts a t Cape

text: Kiephali, Denta Point and San Giorgio Monastery, and the existence of normal weather conditions a t the date. But the Court knows neither the date on which the mines were laid nor the weather conditions prevailing on that date. Furthermore, no proof has been furnished of the presence of a look-out post on Denta Point, though that, according to the Experts, would have been the only post which would necessarily have observed the minelaying. On the other hand, the remaining posts would merely have been able to obsen~e the passage of the ships, and there is no evidence to show that they ought to have concluded that the ships were going to lay mines. According to the Experts, these posts could neither have seen nor heard the minelaying, because the San Giorgio Monastery was 2,000 m. from the nearest mine and Cape Kiephali was several kilometres away from it. As a result, the Court is confronted with suspicions, conjectures and presilmptions, the foundations for which, in Judge Zori-iCiC's view, are too uncertain to justify him in imputing to a State the responsibility for a grave delinquency in international law.

text: Judge ALVAREZ, whilst concurring in the Judgment of the Court, has availed himself of the right conferred on him by Article 57 of the Statute and appended to the Judgment a statement of his individual opinion.

text: Judges \~'INIARÇIII, BADAWI PASHA, KRYLOV and ~ E V E D O , and Judge ad hoc EGER, declaring that they are unable to concur in the Judgment of the Court, have availed themselves of the right conferred on them by Article 57 of the Statute and appended to the Judgment statements of their dissenting opinions.

text: LIST OF DOCUMENTS SUBhlITTED TO THE COURT.

text: A.-During the written proceedzngs .

text: Admiralty Chart No. 206 showing the Corfu Strait. Section of German Mine Information Chart. (This is a chart which was captured by the Allies, showing the North Corfu Channel and the position of mines laid by the Axis there ; the original chart has been filed with the Registry.) International Agreement between the Govemments of the United Kingdom, France, .U.S.S.R. and the United States, setting up the Mine Clearance Boards and dated November 22nd, 1945. Affidavit by despatch clerk at the Admiralty proving despatch of Medri Charts to Albania (August zoth, 1947). Section of Medri Index Chart showing North Corfu swept channel and the international highway established therein together with Medri pamphlets for use with the Index Chart. (Single copy of the entire Chart and of the complete pamphlets numbered 5, 9 and 12 have been filed with Registry.) Diplomatic correspondence between the Government of the United Kingdom and Albania regarding the nght of navigation in the Strait of Corfu. Admiralty tracings showing the North Corfu swept channel and the position and tracks of H.M.S. Orion, Superb, Leander, Sarcmavez and Mauritizbs, passing through the North Corfu Channel on May 15th, 1946, and on October aznd, 1946. Photographs of H.M.S. Saumarez (below water line) and Volage (bows blown off) taken shortly after the explosion on October 22nd, 1946. Admiralty tracing showing position of H.M. ships at the time of the explosion. I O . Report on damage to H.M.S. Saumarez (December 8th, 1946). I I . Report on damage to H.M.S. Volage (November 3oth, 1946). 1 2 . List. of sailors killed, with statement of pensions, etc., payable t o dependants. List of sailors injured, with statement of expenses, pensions, etc. Statement of cost of repairs to the Volage and cost of replacement of the Saumare:. I j . Minutes of Mine Clearance Boards. 16. Reports of Capitaine Mestre (November 16th and 23rd, 1946). (There were two reports, both in French. The reason why there were two reports was that Capitaine Mestre wished t o make certain corrections in his second report of certain statements which he had made in his first report.) Reports on Operation Retail by Rear-Admiral Kinahan and Commander Whitford. (The minesweeping operation of November ~ j t h , 1946.)

text: Chart showing position in which mines were found on November 13th, 1946. Photographs of the mines. Report on mines examined at Admiralty Mining Establishment, Leigh Park House, Hants. Chart showing the defences of Saranda. Affidavit of Skipper Bargellini regarding the incident of U.N.R.R.A. barges on October q t h , 1946 (December 31st, 1946).

text: Documents and records of the Security Council, etc., relative to the dispute. Third Interim Report of the Central Mine Clearance Board in European Waters after the war (October ~ s t , 1946-June 3oth, 1947). Mine Information Chart No. 2711. Two signals relating to the sweeping in October .1g44 of the Corfu Channel. Extracts from Hansard (Parliamentary Debates), containing Statements by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs regarding Albania. Telegram from Flag Officer Commanding 15th Cruiser Squadron, describing the incident of May ~ j t h , 1946. Photostat copies of extracts from Political Report of July zgth, 1945, portions of which appear in Annex II of the Albanian Counter-Memorial. Text of Admiral Willis's statement of October 26th, 1946.

text: Photograph of Saumarez omitted from Annex 8 of United Kingdom Memorial. Extract from Third Interim Report of Central Mine Clearance Board in European waters after t h e war. Affidavit by Commanding Officer of Skipjack identifying mines brought to Malta with those found at Corfu (September 5th, 1947).

text: Chartlet showing areas swept on November ~ z t h , 1946.

text: Minutes of the Central Mine Clearance Board in European waters after the war (May 25th, 1945-May 19th, 1948). Minutes of the Mediterranean Zone Mine Clearance Board (November jth, 1945-May th, 1948). Extracts from the Minutes of the First Meeting of the Mediterranean Zone Mine Clearance Board (November 5th, 1945). and of the Fourth Meeting (Second Sitting-February 27th, 1946).

text: B.- A!ter the clostcre of the written proceedings.

text: (a) Before the Itearing : Affidavit sworn in London on October 4th, 1948, by Karel Kovacic, former Lieutenant-Commander in the Yugoslav Navy.

text: Chart annexed to above affidavit, showing the route probably followed by the vessels in going from Sibenik to Boka Kotorska and to Corfu Channel. 133 bis. Tracing made from sketch of Panikovac from the Yugoslav ' Hydrographie Institute, November zoth, 1948 (filed by Albanian Government's Agent), showing the position of M-minesweepers in Panikovac Cove. Copy of a note from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the British Embassy, Athens, August 13th, 1948. Affidavit by Commander Sworder (October zznd, 1948) regarding minesweeping in the Corfu Channel in October 194.4, January and February, 1945. Estract from Admiralty Instructions on minesweeping in war time.

text: Chart showing sectors swept in October 1944. Affidavit by D. G. Jacobs, First Lieutenant of BTMS zoo9 of the 153rd Minesweeping Flotilla, in October 1944 (October zznd, 1948). Affidavit by Commander Sworder showing the manner in which Medri Charts were drawn up (October zznd, 1948). Log-books of the Volage, Mauritius and Leander. Affidavit by Lieutenant Godsall, Officer of the Watch on board the Saumarez on October z ~ n d , 1946, from 14.00 hours to 14.53 hours (October 22nd, 1948). Report of a Board of Enquiry set up on the arrival of the Saumare= a t Corfu (October q t h , 1946). Chart prepared bu the Members of the above-mentioned Board of Enquiry, showing the route followed by the Saumarez. Affidavit by Commander Paul, in command of the Volage on October zznd, 1946 (October 22nd, 1948). Track-chart of the Volage prepared by Commander Paul.

text: Certified true copy of the letter of the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, to the Admiralty of August 15th, 1946, transmitting the programme for the autumn criiise of his Fleet.

text: Photostat copy of Report of Proceedings of Volage, by Commander Paul (October 23rd, 1946). Photostat copy of Report of Proceedings of Saumarez, by Captain Selby (October 23rd, 1946). Photostat copy of Report of Proceedings of Leander, b57 Captain Otway Ruthven (October 23rd, 1946). Photostat copy of Report of Proceedings of Ocean, by Captain John (October 24th, 1946). Certified true copy of Report of Rear-Admiral Kinahan, Commanding First Cruiser Squadron in H.M.S. Mnlcritizts, on the explosions caused on board the Saumarez and Volage by mines (October q r d , 1946). Original copy of a German chart captured by the Allies at the German Admiralty, Berlin (Ionian Sea and Gulf of Taranto, south-western Coast of Greece). Affidavit by Commander Whitford, Senior Officer of the 5th Minesweeping Flotilla from March to December, 1946, explainine the difference between mines recently laid and those that have been long in the water (October zznd, 1948).

text: CORFU CHANNEL CASE (MERITS) (ANNEX 1) 135

text: Photographs M 1, 2 and 3 of a German mine that had been two years in the water, with a cerîificate by Colonel Golemis. Photographs M 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of a German mine that had been five years in the water, with a certificate by Commander Littleboy. Telegrams passing between the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, and the Admiralty, prior to the incident of October aznd, 1946, embodying the instructions of the Admiralty regarding the passage of H.M. ships through the Corfu Chamel. Telegrams passing between the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, and the Admiralty, embodying the instructions of the Admiralty regarding Operation Retail. Affidavit by Professor J. E. Hams, Professor of Zoology in the University of Bristol, concerning the state of the mines swept in the Corfu Channel on November 13th, 1946 (October 27th, 1948). Affidavit by Mr. N. 1. Hendey, of the Admiralty Central Metallurgical Laboratory, Emsworth, giving the reasons for the absence of fouling on mines in the Black Sea (October 25th, 1948)- Affidavit by Commander Moloney, certifying that no dumps of German mines had been left in Greece (October zgth, 1948).

text: (b) At the hearing : Photograph of Panikovac Cove. Copies of two telegrams from the British Admiralty dated November gth, 1948, relating to the Mljet and Meljine. Copy of two telegrams from the Air Ministry, United Kingdom, dated November 8th, 1948, and concerning weather conditions and the angle of the Sun at Sibenik on October 16th, 17th and 18th, 1946. Jane's Fightifig Ships 1946-1947. Photographs of mines found during the sweep on November 13th. 1946. (These photographs had b e n submitted to the Security Council in 1947 and were marked VI (b) and VI (c).) Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance between Yugoslavia and Albania (July gth, 1946.-The date did not appear on the copy filed). Economic Agreement between Yugoslavia and Albania (November 27th, 1946.-The date did not appear on the copy filed). Marinkalender I 947. School and College Atlas (Londcn : G. W. Bacon & Co.). : H. P. Leopold).

text: & London, IN).

text: Rough copy of log of the Mauritiws. Document showing the differences between the entries in the log-book (fair copy) and the rough log of the Mauritius.

text: Three fragments of the mine which struck Volage. Extract from Report dated May zgth, 1946, from Rear-Admiral Kinahan, addressed to the Commander-in-Chief of the Mediter-

text: CORFU CHANNEL CASE (MERITS) (ANNEX 1)

text: ranean, reporting the proceedings of the squadron under his command for the period April 29th to May 25th, 1946 (paragraph 23, relating to the passage of the squadron through the Corfii Channel on May 15th, 1946).

text: Warships of the World, Victory Edition, U.S.A.

text: Two sketches made by Commander Kovacic a t the hearing on November q t h , 1948, morning, showing one of the Yugoslav ships with the rails and mifielaying mechanism.

text: X j . Photograph of Panikoc-ac Cove on which Commander Koc-acic drew an arrow showing the entrance to the tunnel used as a mine store (hearing on iu'ovember q t h , 1948, morning).

text: Sh. Two plans of the region of Sibenik on which Commander Kovacic had marked : (a) the course foliowed ip the launch and the place from which he could recognize the mines ; ( b ) the jetty from which the photograph of Panikovac Cove was probably taken (hearing on November 24th, 1948, morning). Report of the 153rd Minesweeping Flotilla (October 8th, 1944) on the sweeping of the Korcula and Scedro Channels, with a tracing showing the minesweeping operations. File relating to mines laid by the Germans (German documents).

text: German files relating to mine stocks. Original of the Report of Proceedings of the Leander, made by Captain Otway Ruthven (October 23rd, 1946) (a photocopy had already been filed), with signature certified by Captain Selby.

text: Tracing showing course followed by the Leander on October 22nd, 1946, dated October q r d , 1946, and attached t o the Report of Captain Otway Ruthven (this tracing replaces the trackchart made on December 26th, 1946, and filed as Annex 7 to the United Kingdom Memorial). gr. Typeu~itten copy of the Report of the Volage made on October 23rd, 1946, by Commander Paul (a photocopy had already been filed), with certificate by Commander Paul.

text: Original of Report sent by Rear-Admiral Kinahan on May zgth, 1946, to Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, on proceedings of his Squadron from April 29th to May 25th, 1946, with signature certified by Commander Whitford. Sketch made by Lieutenant-Commander Kovacic a t the hearing on the morning of November 26th, 1948, showing the position of Mljet and Meljine as he saw them on the evening of October 17th or 18th, 1946, about 18.30 hours. Plan of environs of Sibenik, on which Commander Kovacic marked the site of the house from which he saw the Mljet and the Meljine on October 17th or 18th, 1946, about 18.30 hours (hearing on morning of November 26th, 1948). Sketch made by Lieutenant-Commander Kovacic a t the hearing in the afternoon of November 25th, 1948, showing the position of Mljct and Meljine in relation to the mouth of the tunnel at Panikovac Cove, on October 17th or 18th, about 16.30 hours. 136

text: 97. Two sketches made by Lieutenant-Commander Kovacic a t the heanng in the afternoon of November 26th, 1948, showing the manoeuvre made by the MZjet and Meljine t o facilitate the loading of the mines, and the position of the two vessels during the loading. 98. Sketch showing a minesweeper with its cable cutting the moonng of a mine, and a mine already swept (sketch made by Commander Sworder and shown to the Court a t the hearing in the morning of November ~ 2 n d . 1948). 99. Diagram showing sweeps of moored mines, 100% safe (made by Commander Sworder and shown to the Court a t the hearing on the morning of Not-ember aznd, 198).

text: IOO. Photograph showing Mazrritius and Saumarez after the esplosion (this photograph was -spbmitted to the Security Council in 1947, and was number. II (a), A. 4). 101. Two extracts from Yugoslav illustrated papers, showing two photographs of a minelayer with its demck. 102. Map of Sibenik, from U.S. Army (scale 1/5o,ooo).

text: 103. Admiralty Chart No. 1581 : Approach to Sibenik harbour.

text: Air photograph (No. 4025) of Sibenik and Panikovac Cove. Page of an illustrated paper, showing the view over the sea from a house situated near Keric's house. Tracing of Panikovac Cove, made b p Yugoslav Hydrographic Institute, November aoth, 1940 (original fded by Albania). Telegram received from Rome by United Kingdom Delegation, concerning weather reports published a t Sibenik on October 17th and 18th, 1946 (November 24th, 1948). Reply by the United Kingdom experts t o questions put €0 the Mixed Committee of Experts by Judge EEer on November 3oth, 1948 : (1) Was the light sufficient a t 17.35 hours to enable Lieutenant-Commander Kovacic to see the vessels moored in Panikovac Cove ? (2) If the light was sufficient, would the view have been interrupted by the lie of the land ? Letter from Commander Sworder to Rear-Admiral Moullec, dated December 8th, 1948, forwarding a revision of the common reply to question 5 of the Questionnaire by the agents submitted on November 26th, 1948, t o the experts of the two Parties. Affidavit by hl. Zivan Pavlov (December roth, 1948), certifying that between October ~ 3 r d . and 26th, 1946, in the Gulf of Kotor, he saw a Yugoslav minelayer of the Meljilte class, mo\.ing towards the fuel refdling points a t Boka Kotorska (original in Serb-Croat, with English translation). III. Membership card of the Yugoslav Seamen's and Port-workers' Union, bearing name of Zivan Pavlov (in Serbo-Croat language, with English translation of pertinent passages). 1 1 2 . Instructions for rendering Safe Underwater II'eapons-German Buoyant Mines-1943. 137

text: Air photograph of the environs of Saranda, showing certain paths and roads (1943). Map of Saranda District (I/~O,OOO Albania sheet 26-IV Saranda).

text: Amendments submitted by the United Kingdom naval experts t o the replies they had given to questions by Judge EZer.

text: Six copies of photographs of H.M.S. Mauritius (photographs Nos. A 1, A 2, A 3 and A 4 are additional copies of photographs appearing in Supplement 6 t o Minutes of the Security Council, and are bad reproductions).

text: A.-During the written proceedings :

text: Letter from the Greek Representatiw to the Secretary-General of the United Nations (March ~ o t h , 1947). Declaration by Captain Avdi Mati (October 4th, 1947). Letter from the Head of the United Kingdom Military Mission in Albania to the Albanian A m y General Staff (January 25th, 1946). Minutes of the Meeting of the Mediterranean Zone Mine Clearance Board, held on July znd, 1946. Report on the incident of May 15th, 1946. Letter from the Albanian Representative to the Secretary- General of the United Nations, April ~ z t h , 1947. Report on the incident of October zznd, 1946. Reuter's communiqué of October 26th, 1946.

text: Article 3 of the Albanian-Yugoslav Maritime Arrangement of

text: September ~ o t h , 1946. IO. Report on the occurrences on November 12th and 13th, 1946. I I . Report by General Hodgson (July zgth, 1945) on Greek provocation. Chart showing passage of British war squadron on October zznd, 1946. Map of Albanian coast ; Saranda and environs. Report of the Commander of the Yugoslav Navy on German minefields. List of cases of vessels that have struck mines, published by Lloyds. "Aggressive acts of the G ~ e e k monarcho-fascist Government against Albania." "War provocation by the Greek monarcho-fascist Government against Albania." Full text of the Albanian-Yugoslav Maritime Arrangement of September ~ o t h , 1946. Message from General Maitlahd Wilson, Allied Commander-in- Chief, Mediterranean, to Colonel-General Enver Hoxha (November ~ z t h , 1944). Message from Mr. Corde11 Hull (November zSth, 1943). Message from Mr. Edward Stettinius (May zznd, 1945).

text: Declaration by MI'. Winston Churchill (November 4th, 1943). Declaration by Mr. Cordell Hull (undated). Letter from General Hodgson congratulating General Enver Hoxha on the general elections (December 4th, 1945). Photocopies of parts of Medri Charts, M.6502 : NO. 3, December 17th, 1945 ; No. 8, May 6th, 1946 ; No. 1 2 , August 26th, 1946, showing the route through the North Corfu Channel on those dates. The map of December 17th, 1945, gives to the route the number 18/54. Telegram from harbour-master of Saranda, October zznd, 1946.

text: Letter from the Albanian A m y General Staff to the Foreign Ministry, Tirana, August 3oth, 1948. Summary of an article in the "Red Star", appearing in the Bashkimi newspaper, May 18th, 1947. Letters from two Greek sailors to the United Nations Commission of Enquiry in Greece (February 15th, 1947). Report on the possibility of secret minelaying. Tracing of track-chart of Mauritius, taken from British Chart Annex 7, and position of mines according to British Chart, Annes 9.

text: B.- A f t e ~ the closure of the written proceedings :

text: (a) Before the hearing : Note from the Yugoslav Legation at The Hague to the Agent for the Albanian Govemment, dated November 8th, 1948, and fonvarding a communiqué of the Yugoslav Govemrnent concerning Lieutenant-Commander Kovacic's evidence. Tracing of swept channel and normal route for shipping through the middle of the North Corfu Channel. Tracing of swept channel and of the North Corfu Channel Zone not deeper than 25 fathoms. Tracing of respective positions of German channel and swept channel. Tracing of position of the minefield and track of Mauritius, Leander, Superb and Orion. Minutes of the Secunty Council, First Year, Second Series, Supplement No. 4.

text: (b) At the heczring : Report by M. Jacques Chapelon, Professor of Analysis a t the École polytechnique, Paris, concerning the passage of Mauritius through a minefield. Extract from Order No. 892 of the Yugoslav Ministry of National Defence, dated November 17th, 1945, concerning minesweepers M I, M 2 and M 3 (in Serbo-Croat, with French translation certified correct by Yugoslav Legation at The Hague).

text: Sworn statement, dated November 17th, 1948, relating to repair of ships of the M class and type in Sibenik dockyard, between September 27th and November gth, 1946 (in Serbo-Croat, with

text: French translation certified correct by Yugoslav Legation a t The Hague). Photocopy of a page of the Repairs Register of Sibenik dockyard (copy, with French translation of the entries concerning the M 1, M 2 and M 3 vessels, certified correct by Yugoslav Legation a t The Hague). Calculation made by Captain Ormanov of height of sun a t Sibenik on October ~ S t h , 1946, a t 15.15 hours. Sworn statement concerning the officer Drago Blazevic, dated November 17th, 1948 (in Serbo-Croat, with French translation certified correct by Yugoslav Legation at The Hague).

text: Certificate concerning movements of ships of the ill.class and type in October 1946, dated No\-ember 17th, 1948 (in Serbo-Croat, with French translation certified correct by Yugoslav Legation at The Hague). British Admiralty Chart No. 1581 : Approach to Sibenik harbour. Sketch of Panikovac by Yugoslav Hydrographid Institute, dated November zoth, 1948. Cadastral plan of town of Sibenik. Photographs Nos. 1, I I and III of Panikovac, taken from Cipad quay, or near h i . Photographs Nos. I V and V, looking towards Panikovac from the terrace on which Lieutenant-Commander Kovacic was. Italian map of Sibenik (No. 558). Report of the 1-ugoslav "Commission" concerning the nonarailability of the M 1, M 2 and BI 3 (three original documents dated Kovember th, 1946, with French translations certified correct by Yugoslav Legation a t The Hague).

text: Work dockets of Sibenik dockyard for Orders Nos. 920, 921 and 922, relating to ships M 1, M 2 and M 3 (original documents in Serbo-Croat, with French translations certified correct by Yugoslav Legation at The Hague).

text: 1Vork docket concerning ship M 1, signed by Lieutenant-Commander Kovacic (original in Serbo-Croat, with French translation certified correct by the Yugoslav Legation at The Hague).

text: ''\York Orders" Nos. 923, 921 and 922, addressed to the Directorate of Sibenik Dockyard, dated September 26th, 19.46, and concerning repairs to be done to the boilers of the ships Ii.I r, AI 3 and JI 3 (three original documents in Serbo-Croat, with French translations certified correct by Yugoslav Legation a t The Hague).

text: Affidavit by the Presidency of the Government of the People's Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, on the subject of legal time in Yugoslavia (in Serbo-Croat, dated November 27th, 1948, with French translation certified correct by Yugoslav Legation a t The Hague). Reply by the experts of the Albanian Delegation (December 4th 1948) to questions piit by Judge ECer to the Mixed Committee of Experts on November 3oth, 1948 : (1) 15:as there sufficient light

text: 140 at 17.35 hours to enable Lieutenant-Commander Kovacic to see the vessels moored in Panikovac.Col-e ? ( 2 ) If the light was sufficiené, would the lie of the land have obstructed the \?ew ?

text: 57. Nautical instructions for the East Mediterranean (Imprimerie nationale, 194 5). 5s. Sketch showing part of a vessel of the hl-class that might have been seen from the coast a t night from an altitude of 15 feet, the vessel being : (1) 550 metres from the shore ; (2) I$ miles from the shore (sketch made by Captaiii Ormanov and shown to the Court at the hearing on the afternoon of December 8th, 1948). 59. Register of the naval dockyard a t Sibenik. 60. Map of "Europe and North Africa", sheet 4, published by the French National Geographical Institute in 1941-showing shipping routes. 61. Four photographs of the coast near Saranda. 62. Sketch showing roughly the hills around Panikovac Cove towards Sibenik (sketch made by Rear-Admiral Moullec).

text: 63. Observations by Rear-Admiral Moullec on the Reports of Commander Sworder as to the position of the ships in Panikovac Bay.

text: 64. Original of Report of Commander of First lnfantry Regiment, dated May ~ j t h , 1946. 65. Original of letter of May 16th, 1946, addressed to Tirana. 66. Original of Captain Ali Shtino's Report, dated October 23rd, 1946 (concerning events on October zznd, 1946).

text: ,4.-During the written proceedings : I. Special Agreement between Albania and the United Kingdom, dated llarch 25th 1948. B.-During the hearing : 2. Questionnaire prepared bÿ M. Pierre Cot and Sir Eric Beckett, and submitted to the experts of the two Parties on November 26th, 1948 : height of the sun at Sibenik on October 17th and 18th, 1946.

text: Replies established jointly by the Parties to above Questionnaire (?\To\.ember 27th, 1948). Two diagrams showing the moment when a shadow would have 4. faIlen on the jetty where the mines were being loaded.

text: Sketch of the environs of Sibenik showing nearest points from which the jetty would have been visible during the journey of the motor-boat that Lieutenant-Commander Kovacic was in. (Three possible routes are gi\-en in the Questionnaire.)

text: Joint Sote of Cnited Kingdom and Albanian experts on the qiiestions put by Judge ECer to the Mixed Committee of Experts on Yo\wnber 3oth, 1948 : (1) \Vas there sufficient light at 17.35 hours to enable Lieutenant-Commander Kovacic to see the vessels inoored in Paniko\-ac Co\-e ? (2) If the light was sufficient, wouid the lie of the land have obstructed the view ?

text: EXPERTS' REPORT OF JANUARY 8th, 1949.

text: The Committee of Naval Experts appointed by the International Court' of Justice on December 17th, 1948, have the honour to submit ,to the Court the following unanimous answers to the questions put to them :

text: Question (1). You are requested to examine the situation in tlze North ' Corfu Strait immediately before October eond, 1946, from the point of view of

text: (a) the position of the swept channel. (1) (a) ANSWER : The German track shown in Annex 2 t o the United Kingdom Memorial could not be the centre line of a one-mile swept channel because the western boundary would in this case intersect Minefield G 146 c. When the Royal Navy planned to sweep a channel through the North Corfu Strait in 1944, route 18/32 and 18/34 was established, which was, according to us, the only feasible way to make a passage through Corfu Channel without doing unnecessary sweeping of Minefield QBY 539. We consider therefore route 18/32 and 18/34 the quickest and safest way to open up a route through the North Corfu Channel.

text: (b) the efjectiveness of the mineclearance prer~iolrsly carried out.

text: (1) (6) ANSWER : In order to decide whether the sweeping operations which were carried out in October 1944 and January 1945 were effective, it is necessary to 'study the minesweeping reports. The latter, however, could not be produced. But bearing in mind : 1st. That the Royal Navy had a great esperience in mineclearing ;

text: 2nd. That the sweeping .of a moored minefield is far easier than sweeping a ground minefield ; 3rd. That the sweeping of a moored minefield, if carried out in the proper way, can be considered 100% safe ;

text: Nok-Speaking strictly, a channel can only be declared safe a t the time when it is cleared. One cannot guarantee that the channel in the future will remain so. Some evil person may lay mines-as in fact has been done in this case-and there is also the very remote possibility of a mine which went to the bottom when laid, rising to "correct" depth later on.

text: Eut if such eventualities were to be taken into account, it would mean that no waters could be declared safe, and mined areas could never be used any more ;

text: 4th. That this charnel was swept for troopships and supplies t o pass through for the Italian front,

text: we assume that the clearing was camed out with the greatest possible care.

text: and (c) the risk of encountering floating mines in this chanfiel owing to the $roximity of the old minefields, and to study the German documents in order to obtain information from them concerning the ty$es of mines laid i n those minefields.

text: The presence of moored Italian minefields off Corfu explains the possibility of floating mines in this area. We cannot see, however, that the possible presence of floating mines could be connected with the mining of H.M.S. Saumarez and H . M . S . Volage, as the nature of the damage sustained by the above ships excludes the faintest possibility of its cause being a floating mine.

text: I t is often thought thatsfloating mines are a serious danger to shipping. This is entirely wrong. To Our knowledge, it has not been definitely proved that more than one single ship l , steaming on a straight course (as was the case with

text: Saumarez and Volage), has been damaged by a floating mine, although

text: thousands have been afloat during the two great wars.

text: Admittedly, there are ten more cases of ships having been struck b y alleged floating mines ; but these cases have not been proved.

text: Apart from other obvious reasons, such as the very minute space of sea occupied by a mine, the ease with which it is seen in daylight and its normally harmless condition, there is the fact that the bow wave bnishes the mine clear of the ship. Extensive practical tests have proved that it is impossible to ram a floating mine, however hard one tries.

text: Whatever the possibility may be of two mines from the old German minefield floating about, it is, as stated above, of no interest in this case, as the damage done to the two ships could not possibly be caused by floating mines. A close study of the German docunlents diows :

text: I. That until October 23rd, I ~ M , only Italian mines were laid in the North Corfu Channel area ;

text: l The Belty Hindley, October 1 9 4 7 .

text: 2. That GY types of mines were available at Trieste on April 25th, 194.5 ;

text: 3. No manufacturer's numbers are shown in these documents.

text: ,Vote.-Each mine has a number stamped on the bottom plate. The Germans had a very elaborate spstem of tabulating al1 particulars of the mines on so-called Kennkarten. If those cards could be traced for the Adriatic Zone, one could compare the numbers on the bottom plates of the swept mines with these Kennkarten in order to find out the place of origin of the mines that were laid in North Corfu Channel.

text: Q~lestion ( 2 ) . 1-ou are reqzresfed to examine the information and docniments available concerning tlze navigation of the Mauritius,

text: the Saumarez and the Volage, in order to ascertain wltat

text: conclusions, if a n y , m a y be drawn concerning the identify

text: of the type of mines which strnick the two last-named

text: z-essels with the type of mines discovered o n Noaember 13flt,

text: 1946, and to state how fur, in yozcr opinion, these conclusions can be regarded as oalid.

text: . . -1lthough the log-books of APatcritizds, Leander and 1701age show some inaccuracies in speed and course, we consider it beyond any doubt that Saumarez and Volage were mined in approsimately the positions indicated in Annex g to the United Kingdom Memorial.

text: Even if both ships were mined nearer the northern edge of the channel, they would still have been victims of the two lines of mines shomn in Annes g. Our conclusion, therefore, is definite : that both ships were struck by the type of mine which was swept on November 13th, 1946.

text: Qtrestion (3). 1-OU are requested to examine the information and documents aziailable relating to tlze danzage sugered by the

text: Saumarez and tlze Volage, and fo the fragments of n

text: m i n e found i n tlze Volage, with a aiew to ascertaining wltat conclusions, if a n y , m a y be drawn regarding tlze type of mines which strzrck these aessels, and how fur

text: these co~tcl~rsio~zs can, in yozrr opinion, be regarded as valid.

text: (3) AXSWER : -4s far as it is possible to estimate the damage sustained by Sazrmare: and I'olage, which were ships of modern construction, this damage must have been caused by the esplosion of a moored contact mine of approximately 600 lb. charge. The reasons for this are :

text: 1st. A ground mine would not cause this type of damage, and certainly not a t this depth of water ; 2nd. A floating mine can be excluded altogether, as previously explained ; 3rd. The only remaining possibility is a moored contact mine.

text: Of the fragments found in Volage, the two small, slightly curved pieces are obviously not parts of a mine shell ; for they are of cast iron. The third piece, which is part of a horn adapter, fits closely to the homs and elements of a GY mine or of a GR mine, the adapters of these two types of mine being identical.

text: Question (4). Y o u are requested to examine tlze q w s t i m s whether i t i s possible to draw (a) from the Positiolt of the mines swept on Noaember 13th, 1946 ; (b) from the fact that a complete

text: mineclearafice of the Albanian waters in this area had not

text: yet been carried out ut that time; and (c) from the passage of

text: the Mauritius on the zznd October, 1946, without striking

text: any mine, any conclusions, and, if so, what conclusions,

text: regarding the existence of a methodicdly laid minefield and

text: the object for which, in the light of tlze disposition of the mines, the9 appear to have been laid.

text: The position of the mines swept on the 13th November, 1946, strongly indicates that the mines were methodically laid in two rows. Any previous minesweeping in the Medri Route Channel would necessarily have detected such mines, if they had been laid at that time.

text: The minefield was skilfully placed, as if its combined object was : (1) offensive : to stop ships drawing some IO feet or more from passing through the channel; (2) defensive : to stop ships of the same draught from entering Saranda Bay.

text: That Mauritius passed unmolested through the minefield only shows she had good luck. There is nothisg strange in a ship getting through

text: a minefield with a densiiy of mines as indicated by the sweep.

text: Question (5). From the state of the mines sze~ept on h70z~ember 13th, 1946, can you draw any conclusions, and, if so, what conclusions, as to the date on which they were moored, and, i n particular,

text: on the question whether they ulere moored before or aftej

text: the ~ 2 n d October, 1946 ?

text: The condition of the mines swept during the sweeping operation on the 13th November, 1946, as shown in Supplement No. 6 of the Security Council Official Records, leads to the conclusion that the mines should be considered as recently laid.

text: 1f7e are not in a position to give even an approximate date for the minelaying. The amount of barnacles, growth, rust, etc., is dependent on many factors which Vary considérably with prevailing conditions. Only actual tests a t the same time of the year and in the same waters could give sufficient information to afford a rough estimate of the age of the minefield.

text: 1Vith nothing more than general information, al1 we are prepared to state with certainty is that the mines cannot possibly belong to a minefield laid during the war.

text: The question whether the mines were laid before or after the 22nd October, 1946, cannot possibly be answered. The state of the mines would certainly not alter noticeably from the 21st to the 23rd of October.

text: Question (6). Having regard to the replies given, by agreement between the Parties, to the qz~estions concerning the position of the

text: sztn at Sibenik on October 17th and 18th, 1946, and o n the basis 01 the docz~ments i n the case, does the examination of the factztal circumstances concerning (a) the date, (b) the time of day, (c) the lie of the land, (d) the conditions

text: of visibility, (e) the position of the objects (ships, mines, horns, rails), ( f ) their form, coloztr and dimensions, lead

text: yozt to the conclusion that, in the circumstances in which

text: the witness Kovacic w m sitztated, i t was possible for h i m

text: to see the loading and the presence of G Y mines o n board two ships of the "M"-class in Panikovac Cove and the

text: rails o n the ships ?

text: (6) AKSWER: 'The following could have been seen :

text: 1. A t 16.15 hours: ( a ) The two ships of the "JI"-class, if moored at Panikovac Cove ;

text: ( b ) the mine-bodies and sinkers on board these ships ; (c) the loading of the mines. These observations could easily have been made, whichever of the three courses indicated on map N.I.D. 14/32/48> Annex C in File E.1111172, was followed by the launch. Provided that the ships were moored on the northern side of the Cove, as stated by the witness Kovacic, also :

text: ( d ) that the mines were newly painted (the gloss). If the launch had followed course (i), it would have passed within about 4jo metres of the Cove, and then

text: ( e ) horns and rails could have been seen, although idintly. If either of courses (ii) or (iii) was followed, we think it must have been impossible to see horns or raiis.

text: I 46

text: II. At 17.35 h0~r.S : Given no obstacles i n the line of sight : (f) I t would perhaps be possible from Kenc's house to see the silhouettes of the ships loaded with mines. The above conclusions (a) to ( f ) are based upon tests made at "Naval Base A" (see Annex rl) which were carried out a t a time corresponding to 17.28 hours in Sibenik, on October 18th, 1946, and under similar circumstances.

text: Possible obstructions to the line of sight : Three different opinions have been given by the Parties as to the possible position of the ships a t 17.35 hours. 1. Ships moored along the south-western pier. I n this case the configuration of the land woüld prevent the ships from being seen. 2. Ships moored in the most westerly part of the north-eastern pier, where they also wodd have been hidden.

text: 3. Ships moored along the "built-up" extension of the north-eastern

text: 9UaY. From the documents tïled with the Court-espcial:y Annex 4 (V), File E.II/1/77 - we think that the statement made by the United Kingdom expert in Appendix z to Annex 1, File E.I1/1/89, as to the configuration of the land, appears to be the more correct. I n that case the silhouettes of the ships may partly have been seen from Keric's house. A more definite statement cannot be made without inspection of the locality.

text: Question (7). Y o u are requested to state your opinion as to

text: (a) the r~umber of GY mines which a minelayer of the

text: "M"-class could load.

text: (7) (a) ANSWER :

text: We assume that the "W-class ships are of about 130 tons, in which case the dimensions given in the Swedish Marinkalender would be approximately correct. According to these dimensions, the number of GY mines these minelayers can take would be. twenty, if stability allowed for this top weight.

text: (b) the time required by h o shifis of this c l a s , emh

text: possessing a derrick and a steam winch, a d lying apfiroximately i n the positions iftdicated by the m'tness Kovacic, to take their complete load of mines.

text: (7) (b) ANSWER : Under normal conditions, it should be possible to load oce mine with one derrick in 14 minutes' time. This time is based upon a g ~ e a t number

text: Not reproduced.

text: 147 of actual reports from Our three navies, and the times are remarkably consistent. Under less favourable conditions, the time required should not be more than 3 minutes per mine per derrick. We assume that the full load of mines could have been taken on board within an hour.

text: and (c) whether GI' mines are normally fitted with lzorns wherz they are loaded on ships, or wlzetlzer, on the contrary,

text: they norntally have to be fitted with the horns at the

text: time when they are moored.

text: (7) (c) ANSWER : Guards to the horns are not fitted to GY mines.

text: These mines are loaded with or without horns in place, according to the rules laid down by the authorities concerned. I n Our opinion, the safest procedure would be to unscrew the bakelite covers and screw in the horns after the mines were on board. This requires approximately 5 minutes per mine per unskilled person and could be done at any time before the mines are laid.

text: Question ( 8 ) (i). O n the assumption that the mines discovered on November 13th, 1946, were laid at some date within the fm preceding months, whoever may have laid them, you are reqwsted to examine the information available

text: regarding (a) the number and the naizcre of the mines, (b) the means for laying them, alzd (c) the time required to do so, having regard to the dieerent states of the sea,

text: the conditions of the locality, and the diflcrent weather

text: conditions, and to ascertain whether i t i s possible in that

text: way to draw any conclusions, and, if so, w h d conclusions, in regard to-(i) the means employed for layingthe

text: mine field discovered cm ATovember q t h , 1946.

text: (8) (i) ANSWER

text: There is no doubt that the 24 or more GY mines which were laid a t Saranda, were placed in their position by means of surface craft. The laying of GY mines is not done by submarine or by aircraft.

text: The time necessary to lay those mines is approximately the same as the time taken to steam the distance between the points where the mine barrage is to be laid, plus the necessary time to approach and leave the area of vigilance and to take fixes.

text: The total time that the minelayers would be in the waters between Cape Kiephali and San Giorgio Monastery amounts to about two and a half hours at a speed of six knots, if the ships are approaching from the North and leaving towards the North.

text: If they approached from the South the time would be about two hours from the neighbourhood of Barchetta Rock to the northern end of the minefield, provided they left towards the South.

text: If the ships approached the area of vigilance from the North and left towards the South, the time necessary between Cape Kiephali and San Giorgio Monastery would be about two hours.

text: If the ships approached from the South and left towards the North, the time would be about two hours.

text: Questiota (8) (ii). and to (ii) the possibility of mooring those mines

text: w i t h those means zithout the Albanian authorities being aware of i t , having regard to tlze extent of the

text: measures of vigilance existing in the Saranda region.

text: (8) (ii) AXSWER :

text: T h e possibility of seeing the operation. The Corfu Channel can be navigated with no great difficulty, when it iç a question of simply passing through. But to place a minefield accurately, as was done, requires a reasonably good visibility so that definite cross-bearings on the coast can be taken, as there is only one lighthoiise in the 1-icinity.

text: The necessary landmarks would probably be at a greater distance away than the distance from the fix (taken before starting the minelaying) to the shore : for instance, the Monastery and Limion Point might be selected. Incidentally, one row of mines does actually point to both of these landmarks. Another bearing might be taken on the north-west promontory of Denta Point. Of course, objects can be seen much more clearly when looking seawards than when looking landwards.

text: The minelayer must have passed at about 500 metres off the coast between Denta Point (an obvious place for a look-out) and the San Giorgio Monastery. From this part of the coast the minelaying could easily have been observed by a look-out with ordinary hinoculars. The ships would probably have kept t~ the swept channel and might therefore also have been seen from Cape Kiephali and even more so from the San Giorgio hIonastery ; for if the eastern line of mines was laid from the South, the minelayer must probably have been within half a mile of the Monastery.

text: If the minelaying was done in darkness, it is doubtful whether it could have been observed from Porto Edda. If done in daylight, it can unhesitatingly be said that the operation must have been noticed bÿ the Albanian authorities.

text: T h e possibility of hearing. The most favourable conditions for hearing a minelaying operation would be : (a) dead quiet in the immediate vicinity of the observer ; 149

text: (b) wind blowing off shore (no surf) ; ( c ) wind force 3 or less (scale Beaufort) ; (d) people ashore suspecting some action to be going on, and being on the alert ; (e) people on board minelayers not skilful (unnecessary lights and noises) ; (f) where echoes strengthen the sound. Tests which we have canied out a t "Naval Base B" (see Annex 2 l) under similar conditions t o those stated above show that rail noise could be heard faintly a t a distance of about 1,200 metres, while a splash could be heard faintly only at about 650 metres.

text: Additional noises quickly reduce the audibility. Accordingly, under favourable conditions it would be possible to hear the minelaying operation from Limion Point and from the coast - betweenDenta - - Point and San Giorgio Monastery, but not from Porto Edda. Under less favourable conditions it would, however, be impossible to hear the minelaying from any of the positions mentioned. We are not in the possession of sufficient information as to conditions when the mines were laid to give a more definite statement.

text: This Report was drawn up in English in one copy, a t the Peace Palace, The Hague, this eighth day of January, one thousand nine hundred and forty-nine.

text: (Signed) S. ELFFERICH. J. BULL. AND. FORSHELL.

text: (Signed) S. T. CROSS, Secretary of .the Committee.

text: ' Not reproduced.

text: DECISION OF THE COURT, DATED JANUARY 17th, 1949, REGARDING AN ENQUIRY ON THE SPOT.

text: The Court requests the Experts appointed by the Order of the,17th December, 1948, t o proceed to Sibenik and Saranda, and to make, on the land and in the waters adjacent to these two places, any investigations and, so far as possible, any experiments which they may consider useful with a view t o verifying, completing and, if necesary, modifying the answers given in their Report filed by them on - January 8th, Ï949. The Parties shall have the right t o make suggestions to the Experts regarding the points to which their investigations and experiments should be directed. The Registrar, with the authority of the President, shall make the preparations required for the journey of the Experts and for ensuring that they will receive all the facilities essential to the due and prompt accomplishment of their mission. IVithin one week of the filing of the complementary Report of the Experts in the Registry, the Parties may file in the Registry their observations upon any new statements which it may contain.

text: EXPERTS' REPORT DATED FEBRUARY 8th, 1949, ON THE INVESTIGATIONS AND TESTS AT SIBENIK AND SARANDA.

text: appointed by Order of Court of December 17th, 1948, visited Sibenik and Saranda in pursuance of the Court's decision of January 17th, 1949. They have the honour to submit to the Court a report on the observations made and tests carried out by them.

text: Investigations were made as to the following points : 1. At Sibenik on January 24th and 25th, 1949 (a) Length of the quays a t Panikovac Cove ; (b) existence of a "built-up quay" ; (c) depth of water alongside the quays in Panikovac Cove ; (d) existence of a wreck or of obstructions alongside the southwestern quay ; (e) configuration of the land a t Panikovac Cove ; (f) general lay-out of the tunnels a t Panikovac Cove; (g) what could be seen of an "Mt'-class minelayer moored in Panikovac Cove, during the course of the journey by motor boat past the Cove, following : (1) route (i), ( 2 ) route (iii), as these routes are described in Annex C to the document filed in the Registry on November 27th, 1948, and headed : "Agreed answers to questions in connexion with state of Sun at Sibenik" ;

text: ( h ) possibility of mooring a motor launch a t Kulina Point ; (2) a general inspection of "M 2" ; ( j ) the line of sight from Keric's terrace, and what could be seen from the tenace in broad daylight, and at the end of civil twilight on January q t h , 1949 (17.30 hours) ;

text: ( k ) the time required for walking from Mo10 Krka, via Kovacic's

text: house, to Keric's house ;

text: II. At Saranda o n Janzcary 28th and zgth, 1949 : (a) Survey of the Coast from Limion Hill to San Giorgio Monastery ; ( b ) \-kit to the Monastery by land ; ( c ) visit to Denta Point by land ; (d) possibility of observing, from the San Giorgio Monastery, the passage of a ship by night along the line on which the eastern row of mines was laid (as shown in Annex 9 of the United Kingdom Memorial) ; (e) a landing at Denta Point to check the accuracy of observations made of this area from the sea ; 152

text: ( f ) survey of the coast from Saranda to Cape Kiephali ; (g) visit to Limion Hill ;

text: (h) visit to Saranda lighthouse.

text: The attached sketch (Annex 1 l) shows the situation as it was found to be a t Panikovac Col-e.

text: DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION MENTIONED UNDER 1.

text: 1 (a) The quays were measured and the dimensions found to be

text: approximately as given by Admiral Moullec (dimensions are shown in Annex 1 l ) . At the north-eastern quay, standard small-gauge rails and minetransport cars were observed ; the latter were evidently not of the type used to transport German GY mines. - 1 (b) No "built-up quay" was observed, nor were any remnants seen such as would indicate the previous existence of such a quay.

text: 1 (c) Soundings of the depth of water alongside the qua s were taken at low tide, and are shown in Annes 1 l. Difference etween g

text: high and low water : approximately 60 cm.

text: 1 (d) There were no traces of any wrecks or obstructions alongside the south-western quay.

text: 1 (e) The configuiation of the land was such that, a t 16.06 hours

text: on January q t h , 1919, a ship moored an'where in Panikovac Col-e would be in the shade. On this dai; and a t this time, the altitude of the sun was 7" 6'. Note.-16.06 hours on Januarjr 24th, was 55 minutes before sunset ; 16.20 hours on October ~ g t h , 1946, was also 55 minutes before sunset. 1 ( f ) The entrances to the tunnels were measured. The rails leading to them appeared to be in working order and had probably been used not long before. This was proved by the absence of mst, which was apparent on the rails mentioned under 1 (a). The fact that the floor of the tunnels was covered with iron sheeting prevented rails from being observed. The tunnel led to a widened excavation which the esperts did not insist on examining entirely. But they were able to see old ammunition and ground mines stored in the tunnel and modem German ground mines (oval) stored in the excavation.

text: Electnc light was installed in the tunnels, but was not working a t the time of Our visit. Observations were made with the aid of a single electric torch and details could not be seen \-ery distinctly.

text: Not reproduced.

text: The following colzclusions can be drawn fiom the above obsewations ut Pa7tikaiac Coae :

text: (i) An "M"-class minelayer could have been moored along the south-western or along the north-eastern quay. The best place for loading would be the south-western quay, which is closest to both tunnels. If loading were to be done simultaneously from both tunnels, the quickest way to load two "M"-class minelayers would be to moor them alongside the south-western quay, one astern of the other.

text: As there is no "built-up quay", two ships could not be moored along the north-eastern quay, one behind the other. (ii) The gloss of newly painted mines c o d d not have been observed a t any time after 16.15 hours on October ~ g t h , 1946; for a t that time the ships were in the shade. (iii) The entrantes to the tunnels were wide enough to permit their being used to accommodate German GY mines. If both GY mines (moored mines) and ground mines were stored in the excavations, it would be feasible to stow the moored mines in the widened area and the others in the tunnel itself. If this were done and if the GY mines had t o be loaded, the ground mines would have to be cleared from the tunnel and placed temporarily on the quay-side, in order to remove the GY mines.

text: Note.-The Yugoslav representative said that it was impossible to carry out tests with GY mines (e.g., loading on board ship), since no such mines were available.

text: 1 (g) Observations were made as to visibility while passing Panikovac Cove in a launch, a t various distances, as shown in Annex C to the document filed in the Registry on November 27th, 1948, and mentioned above. At 16.16 hours on January 24th, 1949, the first trip was made on route (i). The altitude of the Sun a t the moment was 6" 1'. The "M 2" was moored with her stern towards the Sibenik Bay alongside the north-easter'h quay, and was completely in the shade of the hills When passing Panikovac Cove on route (i), the distance from the launch t o the Cove was measured and found to be 520 metres. At 16.25 hours a second trip was made over the same route. During both trips it was possible to obsewe : "M 2" moored a t any place in Panikovac Cove ; (a) the

text: (b) people waiking on the deck of the "M 2". I t would be fiossible to see : ( c ) mines being loaded on board the "M 2". I t might be possible to see :

text: (d) mine bodies and sinkers on board these ships.

text: I t would have been impossible to see :

text: (e) that the mines were newly painted ; (f) horns or rails (ships being in the shade).

text: A third trip was made a t 16.35 hours on January 24th, 1949, on

text: route (iii). The altitude of the sun a t this moment was 3' 2'. The "M 2" was moored in the same position and the distance measured from the launch to the "M 2" was found to be 840 metres. During this run 'it zeu.~ found possible to observe ships moored in Panikovac Cove. It would be possible to observe the actual loading of mines. No other observations could have been made while following this route. 1 (h) During the preparation for the trips mentioned under 1 (g), the north-east coast of Mandalina Peninsula was observed. Several jetties were seen a t which a launch could easily be moored. If the launch calIed at Kulina Point, it would, however, follow route (ii) from Kulina Point to Mo10 Krka.

text: We can see no reason why route (i) should be followed. Route (iii) would be followed if the launch did not call at Kulina Point. The distance from route (ii) to Panikovac Cove would be 600 metres and the possibility of observation would be the same as mentioned for route (i). "M 2" was found to be fitted out as a minesweeper. 1 (i) The Minesweeping gear consisted of Oropesa gear for moored mines ; the minesweeping winch was situated about one metre in front of the aft mast. This ship could, however, easily be converttd into a minelayer, and had for the purpose the following equipment : (a) a derrick to load mines. Length of derrick: 7.80 metres. Diameter of shackle: I inch;

text: (b) props in the deck to fix the sleepers of the mine rails. These props were well greased, and easily removable ; (c) length of rails on starboard and port side : each 12.70 metres ; distance between props : 0.675 metres ; three joints on either rail ; no turntables. These rails are of a sufficient length to accommodate 18-20 GY mines in all. Although the inside width of rails needed for GY mines is 70 cm. and the distance between the props on "M 2" is 67.5 cm., it should be borne in mind that the actual width of the rails dependr entirely on the construction of the sleepers and the attachment of the rails to the sleepers. There exist smallgauge rails of which the width can be regulated as required ; a t Sibenik, however, the rails were not available for inspection ;

text: (d) small wire winches were screwed into the deck, but were easily removable.

text: CORFU CHANNEL CASE (MERITS) (ANXES 2) 156

text: The abozle Zeads ILS to the conclzuio~t fhat GT- mines co~rld be zued o.ir board "11 2".

text: 1 ( j ) and (k) The experts visited Keric's house to observe the view of Panikovac Cove from the terrace. The- went by the same way as Kovacic said he followed from Mo10 Krka. Mo10 Krka was reached a t 16.43 on January 24th, 1949.

text: The walk to Kovacic's house took 12 minutes, and that from Kovacic's house to Keric's house 14 minutes.

text: tt-entlzev co?ulitions 0% January 2$h, 1949 : cloudless-clear-good visibility-slight breeze. On October ~ g t h , 1946, sunset \vas at 17.15 ; civil twilight Ras a t 17.41. On January 24th, 1949, sunset \vas 17.01 ; cilil twilight at 17.30.

text: The follou-ing obserc-ations were made : at 17.30 on January q t h , 1949, "11 2" mas not visible from Keric's house ; "JI 2;' was in the same position as during the afternoon (moored alongside the northeastern qua)-). "hl 2" \vas then instructed by telephone to move eastmard and to moor in a position as if a "built-up quay" esisted.

text: At 17.35, when "M 2" was moored in her nexv position, it \vas still impossible to observe her from Keric's terrace. This was solely due to the configuration of the land and not to the visibility conditions.

text: So long as the ship was moored in the ColTe, only the smoke of the funnel could be seen from Keric's terrace. As a matter of fact, this was the only proof that the ship was shifting. "AI 2" \vas then instructed by telephone to leave Panikovac Cove, and at 17.40 her silhouette became clearly visible when she had left the Cove and reached a part of Sibenik Ba\- that was not shaded bj- the hills. (See Annes I I l . )

text: I n this position it would have been possible to obserl-e whether the ship was loaded with mines or not. Assuming that the "hl"-class ships were at Panikovac Cove and left the Cove after sunset, the obserz~ations made in Sibefzik lead te the /olloxing co~tclzcsioizs :

text: A. "M"-class ships could be used for the minelaj-ing operation. The tunnels could accommodate GY mines.

text: B. It is of no importance where and how the "JI"-class ships were moored in Panikovac Cove, for :

text: (1) at 16.15 on October ~ g t h , 1946, it was possible on an? of the routes (i), (ii) or (iii) to observe the ships and the loading of mines ;

text: ' Not reproduced.

text: ( 2 ) at 17.35 on the same day it was impossible for ivitness Kovacic to see anything of the ships wherever they might be moored in Panikovac Cove. The arguments concerning : the way the ships ivere moored ; wrecks or obstructions alongside the south-western qiiay ; the configuration of the land ; jetties at KuIina Point ; visibility at 17.3 j hours while witness Kovacic ivas at Keric's house ; esistence of "built-up quay", are of no material importance. C. The only possibility of observing the "M"-class ships froni Keric's terrace rvould not be when they ivere in the COI-e, but when they had left it. Witness Kovacic stated that it became too dark to see the ships leave the Cove. On the contrary, it would only be after their departure, when they had left the portion of Sibenik Bay shaded by the hills around the Cove, that they could have been observed.

text: I I . -4T S.9R.4NDA OH JANUARY 28th AND 2gth, 1949.

text: I I (a) -4 trip along the coast by sea, from Saranda, past Liniion Hill to San Giorgio Jlonastery, was made on January 28th.

text: The route followed is shown in Annex I I I l ; and passed throiigli the positions A, B, C, D, and back to Saranda. The following were observed : I. battery a t a position just west of Saranda ; 2. fort Likiirski, a i-ery conspicuous landmark ; 3. lighthouse south of Likurski ; 4. houses at Denta Point ; 5. a landing beach near Denta Point ; 6. San Giorgio &lonasterj-, very conspicuous against the sky. Attention is drawn to the fact that the course followed coincides with the direction of the eastern row of mines. This course was easily checked bj. heading for the Jfonastery and keeping Limion Hill right astern, or vice versa.

text: II (b) After making a general survev of the coast from Saranda- Limion Hill-San Giorgio IIonasterj7, it was decided to examine further the points coted. On January 28th, a trip \vas made from Saranda to San Giorgio 3Ionastery ; the foot of the hill, on which this is situated, can be reached by car in about 25 minutes. From there, a path leads up to the llonastery. The walk to the top takes 9 minutes. Mules use this track. 3 n reaching the actual ItIonastery, the party- found the door closed. The Albanian authorities tried in

text: l N o t reproduced.

text: vain to get those inside to open the door. Permission was then requested and obtained to force the door and this was done. The Monastery was occiipied by six soldiers, but there was accommodation for many more ; it had telephone communication. A stable for mules was seen. During a general survey around the Monastery, the following were observed :

text: (a) Infantry defences just outside the building.

text: (b) If the look-out posts were stationed outside the Monastery, thev would be able to watch only part of the Bay of Saranda, as a number of trees partly obstructed the line of sight. I t was therefore obvious that another place would be used to watch the sea traffic close to the Monastery. This place was a look-out tower inside the Monastery ; it was equipped with benches and this higher spot afforded a much clearer view over the Corfu Strait and Bay of Saranda, and was not obstructed by trees to the same extent.

text: The Albanian authorities said that the men in the Monastery slept there during the night and only watched the seavduring the day-time. This statement, however, does not seem quite to coincide with the difficulties experienced in obtaining entrance a t the door of the Monastery earlier in the day. I I (c) and (e) On the way back from the Monastery, the experts desired to test the observation off the houses that had been noticed on Denta Point. As far as could be seen, no suitable path existed, leading to the houses observed from the sea.

text: I t was therefore decided to approach Denta Point from the sea side. On January 29th, a trip was made by motor ship with a rowingboat in tow. A landing was made near Denta Point on a small beach (see Annex III l). From here, two paths, which are used by mules, lead over the slopes of Denta Pomt to the houses. I t only took a couple of minutes from the shore to the lowest situated house. Here were seen : ; (i) infantry defence line and machine-gun posts (ii) an old house with a roof, capable of accommodating men and mules ; (iii) places where a fire could be lighted ; t th, 1948, was found

text: (iv) a newspaper Bashkimi dated September

text: in the trenches.

text: At this place one has a clear view over the whole of the Corfu Strait, as well as the Bay of Saranda. The above fmts point to the conclusion that guards or look-out posts were kept at Denta Point until September th, 1948. Attention is drawn to the fact that the Experts' Report of January 8th, 1949, called this spot an "obvious place" to keep a look-out, as it commanded the Corfu Strait as weil as Saranda Bay.

text: 1 Not reproduced.

text: -Vote.-X second house which was much bigger than the former and could be used as quarters, was situated higher up the slope. This house was not visited by the experts.

text: I I (d) In the evening of January 28th, a test of visibility by night from San Giorgio Monastery was carried out. Weathev conditions : cloudless ; slight breeze ; no moon. The ship mentioned above was again used. Al1 lights were extinguished. One of the experts, and the Parties' experts, went t o San Giorgio Monastery to test the degree of visibility, while the other expert travelled on the ship along a line identical with that on which the eastern row of mines had been laid (see Annex g of the United Kingdom Memorial). The party for the Monastery left Saranda about three quarters of an hour before the ship sailed. On arriving a t the ship in Saranda, the other party received a telephone message from the Monastery confirming that the first party had arrived. On their way up the hill to the Monastery, the first party was halted by two soldiers with rifles. This occurrence did not seem to taliy with the statement made' that afternoon that the men slept during the night.

text: The course of the ship dong the eastern line of mines was easily

text: checked with the aid of: the background of Limion Hill ; Saranda lighthouse ; Cape Kiephali ; San Giorgio Monastery ; Denta Point ; Tignoso lighthouse. The ship was completely blacked out. Note.-This is the most favourable condition for the avoidance of detection. For usually a minelayer, like al1 oiland coal-burning vessels, would emit some smoke from its funnels ; and, as a rule, some sort of light would be used on a small ship during the actual minelaying operation.

text: While the ship was following a course towards the Monastery, the line of sight from that observation post was partly obstructed by trees (see Annex IV l ) . The noise of the motor was already heard from the Monastery at 22.20 hours (distance 1,800 metres). The ship was sighted for a very short while a t 22.26 hours (distance 670 metres). It was not possible on this occasion to observe the ship for long, as it disappeared behind the trees (see Annex IV l ) . After altering course, it was sighted clearly again from the Monastery a t 22.30 hours (approximate distance 800 metres). A northerly course was then set and, at 22.47 hours, a signal was received on board from the Monastery, stating that the ship was out

text: Not reproduced.

text: 159 of sight. The distance \vas then calculated from a cro~s~bearing, taken a t 22.50, from Saranda light and a promontory south of the Monastery, and the distance at 22.47 hours was found to be approximately 1,900 metres.

text: Noise of motor was heard at 1,800 metres distance ; Ship was obserl-ed for the first time a t 670 ,metres distance ; Ship was again clearly seen at 800 metres distance ; Ship was followed for a distance of 1,900 metres. -Voir.-This motor ship was only So feet long, had no bridge, wvheelhouse or fu~inel, and w\?as very lo\v on the wvater.

text: I I (1) On January 29th, a general survey \vas made of the coast between Saranda and Cape Kiephali. Xothing extraordinarp was observed. Here and there were look-out posts which seemed to be deserted. Pill-boxes were also noticed. At Cape Kiephali, a house was sighted which would be an ideal place for a look-out, commanding the whole Medri channel.

text: II (g) On January ~ g t h , a w-isit was paid to Limion Hill, where an old Italian battery was situated. I I (II) In the Experts' Report of January Sth, 1949, it was stated that only one light existed to guide navigation in Corfu Strait. In fact, onlr one light is indicated on the -1dniiralty chart. But Saranda lighthouse \vas found to be working on Jaiiuary ~ S t h , 1949 ; it could not, however, be used for a cross-bearing if the minelaying began from the South, owing to the configuration of the land a t Denta Point. This lighthouse \vould Iiave been of service if the mines were laid from the Yorth. But as no log-book or other documentary information was available, according to the Albanian authorities, it \vas not possible t o state whether the Saranda light \vas in working order in October 1946.

text: 1. -1 minelaying operation could be carried out in Corfu Channel, starting : (a) from the Xorth ; (b) from the South. B. On a clear night, on either course, there would lia\-e been sufficient landmarks to take a fis.

text: C. Pro\-ided a look-out was kept at Cape Kiephali, Denta Point and San Giorgio Afonastery, and under normal weather conditions for this area, and if the mines were laid from the Xorth towards the South : (i) the operation might not be seen by the look-out post a t the foot of San Giorgio lfonastery, because "position 22.47

text: 160 hours" coincides with the most southerly mine which was cut (see Annex III l) ; (ii) the minelayers would, however, be seen from Cape Kiephali ; and (iii) must have been noticed from Denta Point, as the distances while passing it are within the limits of visibility shown in summary under I I (d).

text: D. If the minelaying were done from the South (which is most feasible, as the ships would not have to cross their own minefields if returning to the North), the minelayers would have been observed from Cape Kiephali, Denta Point and San Giorgio Monastery. I t must be borne in mind that in this case the ships would have passed the above-mentioned points twice.

text: T h e experts consider i t to be indisputable that if a normal look-out was kept at Cape Kiephali, Denta Point, and S a n Giorgio Monastery, and if the look-outs were equipped with bi~wculars as has been stated, under m r m a l weather conditions for this area, the minelaying operations shown in A n n e x g to the United Kingdom Memorial must have been noticed by these coast-guards.

text: On the occasion of the experts' visit to San Giorgio Monastery, the Albanian authorities stated that no binoculars were now available a t that post.

text: GENERAL.

text: During the general survey of the coast from Limion Hill to San

text: Giorgio Monastery on January 28th and from Limion Hill to Cape Kiephali on January zgth, the experts noticed that Barchetta Rock was not so easy a point to distinpish as Tignoso lighthouse. But it happens that in the Reports on Operation Retail (United Kingdom Memorial, p. 117)~ the positions of al1 the mines swept on November 13th, 1946, are given b y bearing and distance from Barchetta Rock. The experts therefore consulted the Reports on Operation Retail in order to check the positions in question. They reached the conclusion that :

text: I. individual ships taking part in the Operation may have selected any obvious landmark in plotting the position of a swept mine ;

text: 2. these positions would then be plotted later on a chart of the whole area of the sweep ;

text: 3. Barchetta Rock, as being the closest landmark to the most westerly lap of the sweep, was then selected as a d a h m dan (reference point) for tabulating al1 the positions shown on page 117 of the United Kingdom Memorial ;

text: Not reproduced.

text: CORFU CHANNEL CASE (MERITS) (ANNEX 2) 162

text: 4. but any other reference point could just a s well have been used, e.g., Tignoso lighthouse or San Giorgio Monastery.

text: This Report was drawn up in EngIish in one copy, at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this eighth day of Febmary, one thousanid nine hundred and forty-nine.

text: (Signed) AND. FORSHELL. (Sig- S. ELFFERICH.

text: QUESTIONS PUT BY THREE MEMBERS OF THE COURT ON FEBRUARY roth, 1949.

text: (a) By Judge ZoriZiC.

text: 1.-On page 15 of the French text (page 14 of the English text) the Report amves at certain conclusions. Under heading C it is stated that, subject to certain conditions:

text: 1. the @eration might not be seen by the look-out post a t the

text: foot of San Giorgio Monastery ; 2. the minelayers would however be seen from Cape Kiephali ; and

text: 3. they must have been noticed from Denta Point. I n paragraph D mention is also made of the mifielayers which would

text: have been observed. From this text it would appear that what the guards might have, or should have, observed was the minelayers, i.e., the ships themselves, and it seems that the word "operation" in sub-paragraph I refers to the movements and manoeuvres of the ships. At the end of the page (and top of next page in English text) it is stated that if a normal look-out was kept at Cape Kiephali, Denta Point, and San Giorgio Monastery, and if certain other conditions were fulfilled : "the minelaying operations . ... must have been noticed by the coast-guards". These passages mention "minelaying operations", and it is therefore important to know what meaning the Experts attach to these words ; in other words :

text: (1) Does the conclusion mean that the minelaying ships themselves must have been observed by the coast-guards, or

text: (2) Do the words "minelaying operations" mean that the coastguards must have seen not only the ships and the manoeuvres which they carried out, but also the actual minelaying, Le., the launching of the mines into the sea ?

text: II.-Does the view which is obtainable from Cape Denta enable one to see certain parts of the Strait, or of Saranda Bay, which would not be visible either from Cape Kiephali, or from Saranda, or again from the tower of the old Monastery of San Giorgio ? I n other words, is it not possible to see, from these look-out posts, everything which would lx visible from Cape Denta ?

text: (b) By Judge Krylov.

text: I. Were the houses a t Denta Point inhabited ? Why wai the big house not visited ? Had these houses been recently built ? ' See p p 160-161. 1 ,, p. 161.

text: Please give a fuller description of the old hoiise which was visited (page II l of the Report).

text: 2. \Vere the infantry line and the machine-gun posts a t Denta Point of recent construction (page IO l , English text) ?

text: 3. \Vhat was the direction of the wind during the observations on January 28th ? Mention is made of a slight breeze (page II 2, English text).

text: 4. Had the house that was seen a t Cape Kiephali been recently constructed ? Had it been used as a look-out post ? (Page 13 3, English text.)

text: 5. On page 14' (English text) the Experts twice make use of the term normal" with reference to weather conditions. What is the definition of "normal" conditions ?

text: 6. \Vhy did the Experts think it necessary to submit observations

text: to the Court relating to the fixing of the positions of mines by bearing and distance from Barchetta Rock (page 15 =, English text) ?

text: IVhy would the ships which laid the mines have had to pass the Albanian Coast talice (page 14 5 , English text) ?

text: What reply can the Experts give to M. Cot's objection to their Report of January 8th, 1949 (Distr. 491.9, as regards the audibility of the operation ? (Page 1111 of Distr. 435 ter.)

text: 1 See p. I 56.

text: ,, .a 139. ,. ,, 160. 4 ,, pp. 160 and 161. ,, p. 161.

text: EXPERTS' REPLIES, DATED FEBRUAKY u t h , 1949, TO QUESTIONS PUT BY THREE MEMBERS OF T H E COURT.

text: who were appointed by the Court's Order of December 17th, 1948, and who visited Sibenik and Saranda in pursuance of the Court's decision of January 17th, 1949, have the honour to reply as follows to the questions which were put to them in the Registrar's letter of February ~ o t h , 1949.

text: 1. Questions put by Judge Krylov.

text: (a) The houses at Denta Po&.

text: The experts did not see any advantage in visiting the bigger of these houses, or in asking if it was inhabited, or for what use it is intended. In truth, the facts they had ascertained in regard to the existence of the look-out post appeared to them sufficient for the purposes of their enquiry. The only reason why they referred, incidentally, to this house in their report was in order to confirm the fact that Denta Point is not inaccessible.

text: @) Date of co?zstrz~ction.

text: By the term "old house" (building situated at the look-out post) the experts meant that it was certainly built earIier than 1946. It seemed to them unnecessary to seek for greater accuracy. In regard to the bigger house, the experts thought it unnecessary to estimate or to make enquiries in regard to the date of its construction, for the reasons given above in paragraph ( a ) . They are, however, able to state that, as seen from the sea, it seemed to be of more recent construction than the building situated at the look-out post.

text: (c) Description of the "old house".

text: The dimensions of the "old house" were approximately as follows : Length : IO m. ; width : 2.50 m. ; height : 2.50 m. It is used as a stable. In front of the door, which is situated in the narrow face of the house looking towards the South-West, there is a place used for fires. The experts considered it useless to spend time in examining the "old house" in closer detail.

text: The infantry trenches and the machine-gun posts at Denta Point are in an excellent state, though that does not mean that they are of recent construction. In truth, the same poor vegetation which 165 one finds everywhere on this rocky coast grows also on the parapet of the trench, made of the excavated soil. Moreover, the experts were informed that these defence lines had been constructed by the Italian troops. Ad 3. The very slight breeze was blowing from the N.-E. Ad 4. The experts saw no purpose in prolonging their investigations by asking to go on shore at Cape Kiephali. The observations the'; had made a t Denta Point, together with the remarks given in their report under No. I I ( f ) , seemed to them sufficient for the needs of their enquiry.

text: Ad 5.

text: According to the Mediterranean Pilot, Volume III, one can consider the following weather conditions as being normal. (a) Wind. During summer, north-westerly winds are most prevale,nt, but in winter those from the South-East. I n settled summer weather, when the barometer is high, and often in winter, land and sea breezes prevail. The land wind is light and, near the Corfu Channel, it blows from North to North-East. I t begins to blow two or three hours after sunset, and increases in force until after midnight, when it decreases, falls calm at sunrise, freshens again as the Sun gets higher, veering some points eastward until about g a.m., after which it dies away and is succeeded by the sea breeze.

text: (b) Clouds. When land and sea breezes prevail, there is little cloud.

text: South-east wind may be accompanied by rainfall, and an overcast sky may be expected, the average for October being 40 % covered with clouds. (c) Visibility . Visibility is usually good in the Adriatic, except when the Bora blows and causes rainfall. Ex,ceptionally good visibility often occurs on the Dalmatian coast.

text: Note.-The Bora is a local wind which can blow very strongly from the North-East for about 15 or 20 hours, with heavy squalls. thunder, lightning and rain at intervals. I t generally dispels any hovering clouds or fog, and when it blows with great force the weather is very clear. (d) Conclz4sions. The experts when mentioning "normal" weather conditions under paragraph D of their conclusions on page 15 l (English text) have ' See p. 161.

text: r 66 therefore in mind the following weather : clouds 3-4110th-visibility good (20 miles)-no fog or rainfall-slight easterly breeze.

text: Ad 6.

text: From the position of the mines indicated in the United Kingdom Memorial, Barchetta Rock is not sufficiently visible t o be used for taking fixes. Why, then, it may be asked, does the Memorial calculate the positions of the mines with reference to that rock ? The experts thought they should seek an answer to that question. They found it, and gave it in their report, in order to fqrestall any question about it.

text: Ad 7.

text: As stated in the Experts' Report of January 8th, 1949, under (8) (i), there are four operational possibilities for laying mines in the Corfu Strait. They are : 1. Approach from the North and leaving towards the North ; II. Approach from the North and leaving towards the South; III. Approach from the South and leaving towards the South ; IV. Approach from the South and leaving towards the North.

text: In order to carry out the operations mentioned under 1 and I I I the ships would have had to pass the area of vigilance twice. If the operations under I I and IV were carried out, the ships would pass the area of vigilance only once.

text: If the area of operations is approached from either North or South and the ships carrying out the operations leave again either to the North or South, they can adopt two methods of laying the mines:

text: (a) from the North ; (b) from the South. Operation 1 is discussed as regards method (a) and as regards method (b) in the Experts.' Report of February 8th, 1949, A to D of Section II. If operation I I I was carried out by method (a) or by method (b) the conclusions contained in the Experts' Report of February 8th would have been as follows :

text: Conclusions A and B.-No change. Colzclusiort C.-Provided that a look-out was kept a t Cape Kiephali, Denta Point and San Giorgio Monastery, and under normal weather conditions for this area, and if the mines were laid from the North towards the South (i) the operation might not be seen by the look-out post a t the foot of San Giorgio Monastery ; (ii) the operation would not be seen from Cape Kiephali ; (iii) the minelayers must have been noticed from Denta Point. Co?iclzcsim D.-If minelaying was carried out from the South towards the North, the minelayers would have to take a fix and plot this fix south of a point a t which the actual minelaying operation would start.

text: CORFU CHANNEL CASE (MERITS) (ANNEX 2) 168

text: As this fix was the reference point for this particular minelaying operation, it had to be in line with the row of mines and consequently much closer to the San Giorgio Monastery than the position of the most southerly mine, as indicated in Annex 9 of the United Kingdom Memorial.

text: I n this case

text: (i) the ships must have been observed by look-out posts from San Giorgio Monastery and from Denta Point ; (ii) the operation would not be observed from Cape Kiephali. I t must be borne in mind that in this case the ships would have passed the above-mentioned points twice, with the exception of Cape Kiephali.

text: A comparison of operations I and I I I :

text: Operation I . Operation I I I

text: (a) Minelaying from the North : (a) Minelaying from the North :

text: I. Operation might not be seen I. Operation might not be seen by the look-out at San Gior- by the look-out at San Giorgio Monastery. gio Monastery.

text: 2. Minelayers would be seen 2. Operation would not be seen from Cape Kiephali. from Cape Kiephali.

text: 3. Minelayer must have been 3. Minelayer must have been seen from Denta Point. seen from Denta Point.

text: (b) Minelaying from the South : (b) Minelaying from the South :

text: I. Minelayers would be seen by I. Minelayers must have been the look-out at San Giorgio seen by the look-out at San Monastery. Giorgio Monastery.

text: 2. Minelayer must have been 2 . Minelayer must. have been seen from Denta Point. seen by the look-out from Denta Point.

text: 3. Minelayers would have been 3. Operation would not have

text: seen from Cape Kiephali. been seen from Cape Kiephali. The difference between operation 1 and operation III is that when a ship approached the area from the South, she would not be observed by a look-out post situated at Cape Kiephali. I n both cases, the look-out posts a t Denta Point must have seen the minelayers ; in other words, the minelayers could not have escaped the notice of the look-out posts a t Denta Point, and if the minelaying were started from the South, it must in both cases have been seen from the San Giorgio Monastery.

text: II. Qpestions put by Judge Z o r i E i O .

text: Ad 1.

text: Bv the term "the operation" in conclusion C (i) the experts meant the whole of the minelaying operation (i.e., both the manoeuvres of the ships and the actual launching of the mines).

text: By employing the term "minelayers" in paragraphs C (ii) and C (iii), the experts intended to indicate that the ships which were used for the minelaying operation would in case C (ii), or must in case C (iii.) have drawn the attention of the look-out posts.

text: From Cape Kiephali the view extends over the whole of the Strait, but not over Saranda Bay. From Saranda the view extends over the bay, but not over the whole of the Strait. From the San Giorgio Monastery the view extends over the whole of the Strait and over the greater part of the bay. But Denta Point, which projects further than the other promontories, commands both the whole of the Strait and the whole of the bay. The investigation has confirmed the conclusion which was derived from a study of the map : this spot is very suitable for a lookout post.

text: III. Qpesdon put by Judge EEer.

text: In their Report of January 8th, 1949, the experts concluded that, having regard to the insufficiency of the information available as to the conditions under which the mines were laid, it was not possible to give a precise opinion concerning the possibility of hearing the minelaying operations. After their visit to Saranda, the experts added nothing further on this subject. They confirm that they have nothing to add. The conclusions which they have drawn in regard to the possibility of seeing the operation appear to them t o deprive the question whether the operation could be heard of any further importance. In these circumstances, they think it unnecessary to reply to the objections on this subject that have been made in regard to their report of January 8th, 1949 ; at the same time, thev do not for a moment admit that these objections are justified.

text: Done in English, in one copy, at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this twelfth dav of February, one thousand nine hundred and forty-nine.

title: Corfu Channel (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Albania)