court: icj

doctype: rådgivande yttrande

identifier: ICJ 100 (Advisory opinion, 1999-04-29)

caseName: Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights

decisionType: advisory opinion

publisher: International Court of Justice

reportsCitation: I.C.J. Reports 1999, p. 62

title: Advisory Opinion of 29 April 1999

text: INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

type: rubrik

text: 1999 YEAR 1999

text: 29 April General List

type: stycke

text: No. 100 29 April1999

text: DIFFERENCE RELATING TO IMMUNITY FROM LEGAL PROCESS OF A SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR OF THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

text: Article 96, paragraph 2, of the CAarter arrd Article 65, paragraph 1, of the Statute - Resolution 89 ( 1 ) of the General Assembly authorizing the Economic and Social Council to request advisory opinions - Article VIII, Section 30, of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations - Existence of a "difference" between the United Nations and one of its Members - Opinion "accepted as decisive by the parties" - Advisory nature of the Court's function and particular treaty provisions - "Legal question" - Question arising "within the scope of [the] activity" of the body requesting i f .

text: Jurisdictiorr and discretiorfary power of the Court to give an opinion -

text: "Absence of compelling reasons" to decline to give such opinion.

text: Question on which the opinion is requested - Divergence of views - Formulation adopted b y the Council as the requesting body. Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights - "Expert on mission" - Applicability of Article VI, Section 22, of the General Convention - SpecSfîc circumstances of the case - Question ulhether words spoken b y the Special Rapporteur during an interview were spoken "in the course of the performance of his mission" - Pivotal vole of the Secretary-Generul in the process of determining whether, in the prevailing circumstances, an expert on mission is entitled to the immunity provided for in Section 22 (b) - Interview given by Special Rapporteur to International Commercial Litigation - Contacts with the media by Special Rapporteurs of the Commission on Human Rights - Reference to Special Rapporteur's capacity in the text of the interview - Position of the Commission itself: Legal obligations of Malaysia in rhis case - Point in rime from which the question must be answered - Authority and responsibility of the Secretary- General to inform the Government of a member State of his jinding on the immunity of an agent - Finding creating a presumption which can only be set aside by national courts for the most compelling reasons - Obligation on the governmental authorities to convey thatjinding to the national courts concerned - Immunity from legal process "of every kind" ivithin the meaning o f Section 22 (b) of the Convention - Preliminary question which must be expeditiously decided in limine litis. Holding the Special Rapporteur Jînancially harmless. Obligation of the Malaysian Government to communicate the advisory opinion to the national courts concerned. Claims for any damages incurred as a result of acts of the Organization or its agents - Article VIII, Section 29, of the General Convention - Conduct expected of United Nations agents.

text: ADVISORY OPINION

text: Present: President SCHWEBEL; Vice-President WEERAMANTRY; Judges ODA, BEDJAOUI, GUILLAUME, RANJEVA, HERCZEGH, SHI, FLEISCHHAUER, KOUOMA, VERESHCHETIN, HIGGINS, PARRA-ARANGUREN, KOOIJMANS, REZEK; Registrar VALENCIA-OSPINA.

text: Concerning the difference relating to immunity from legal process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights,

text: THE COURT, composed as above, gives the following Advisory Opinion.

text: The question on which the Court has been requested to give an advisory opinion is set forth in decision 19981297 adopted by the United Nations Economic and Social Council (hereinafter called the "Council") on 5 August 1998. By a letter dated 7 August 1998, filed in the Registry on 10 August 1998, the Secretary-General of the United Nations officially communicated to the Registrar the Council's decision to submit the question to the Court for an advisory opinion. Decision 19981297, certified copies of the English and French texts of which were enclosed with the letter, reads as follows: "The Economic and Social Council, Having considered the note by the Secretary-General on the privileges and immunities of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the independence of judges and lawyers', Considering that a difference has arisen between the United Nations and the Government of Malaysia, within the meaning of Section 30 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, with respect to the immunity from legal process of Dato' Param Cumaraswamy, the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the independence of judges and lawyers,

text: Recalling General Assembly resolution 89 (1) of 11 December 1946,

text: 1. Requests on a priority basis, pursuant to Article 96, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with General Assembly

text: resolution 89 (1), an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on the legal question of the applicability of Article VI, Section 22, of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations in the case of Dato' Param Cumaraswamy as Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the independence of judges and lawyers, taking into account the circumstances set out in paragraphs 1 to 15 of the note by the Secretary-General', and on the legal obligations of Malaysia in this case;

text: Calls upon the Government of Malaysia to ensure that al1 judgements and proceedings in this matter in the Malaysian courts are stayed pending receipt of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, which shall be accepted as decisive by the parties.

text: Also enclosed with the letter were certified copies of the English and French texts of the note by the Secretary-General dated 28 July 1998 and entitled "Privileges and Immunities of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers" and of the addendum to that note (E/1998/94/Add. l), dated 3 August 1998.

text: 2. By letters dated 10 August 1998, the Registrar, pursuant to Article 66, paragraph 1, of the Statute of the Court, gave notice of the request for an advisory opinion to al1 States entitled to appear before the Court. A copy of the bilingual printed version of the request, prepared by the Registry, was subsequently sent to those States.

text: By an Order dated 10 August 1998, the senior judge, acting as President of the Court under Article 13, paragraph 3, of the Rules of Court, decided that the United Nations and the States which are parties to the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 13 February 1946 (hereinafter called the "General Convention") were likely to be able to furnish information on the question in accordance with Article 66, paragraph 2, of the Statute. By the same Order, the senior judge, considering that, in fixing time-limits for the proceedings, it was "necessary to bear in mind that the request for an advisory opinion was expressly made 'on a priority basis'", fixed 7 October 1998 as the time-limit within which written statements on the question might be submitted to the Court, in accordance with Article 66, paragraph 2, of the Statute, and 6 November 1998 as the time-limit for written comments on written statements, in accordance with Article 66, paragraph 4, of the Statute.

text: On 10 August 1998, the Registrar sent to the United Nations and to the States parties to the General Convention the special and direct communication provided for in Article 66, paragraph 2, of the Statute.

text: By a letter dated 22 September 1998, the Legal Counsel of the United Nations communicated to the President of the Court a certified copy of the amended French version of the note by the Secretary-General which had been enclosed with the request. Consequently, a corrigendum to the printed French version of the request for an advisory opinion was communicated to aH States entitled to appear before the Court.

text: The Secretary-General communicated to the Court, pursuant to

text: Article 65, paragraph 2, of the Statute, a dossier of documents likely to throw light upon the question; these documents were received in the Registry in instalments from 5 October 1998 onwards.

text: Within the time-limit fixed by the Order of 10 August 1998, written statements were filed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and by Costa Rica, Germany, Italy, Malaysia, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States of America; the filing of a written statement by Greece on 12 October 1998 was authorized. A related letter was also received from Luxembourg on 29 October 1998. Written comments on the statements were submitted, within the prescribed time-limit, by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and by Costa Rica, Malaysia, and the United States of America. Upon receipt of those statements and comments, the Registrar communicated them to al1 States having taken part in the written proceedings.

text: The Registrar also communicated to those States the text of the introductory note to the dossier of documents submitted by the Secretary-General. In addition, the President of the Court granted Malaysia's request for a copy of the whole dossier; on the instructions of the President, the Deputy-Registrar also communicated a copy of that dossier to the other States having taken part in the written proceedings, and the Secretary-General was so informed.

text: The Court decided to hold hearings, opening on 7 December 1998, a t which oral statements might be submitted to the Court by the United Nations and the States parties to the General Convention.

text: Pursuant to Article 106 of the Rules of Court, the Court decided to make the written statements and comments submitted to the Court accessible to the public, with effect from the opening of the oral proceedings.

text: In the course of public sittings held on 7 and 8 December 1998, the Court heard oral statements in the following order by:

text: for the United Nations: Mr. Hans Corell, Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, the Legal Counsel,

text: Mr. Ralph Zacklin, Assistant Secretary-General for Legal Affairs; for Costa Rica: H.E. Mr. José de J. Conejo, Ambassador of Costa Rica to the Netherlands, Mr. Charles N. Brower, White & Case LLP;

text: for Italy: Mr. Umberto Leanza, Head of the Diplomatic Legal Service at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; for Malaysia: Dato' Heliliah bt Mohd Yusof, Solicitor General of Malaysia, Sir Elihu Lauterpacht, C.B.E., Q.C., Honorary Professor of International Law, University of Cambridge.

text: The Court having decided to authorize a second round of oral statements, the United Nations, Costa Rica and Malaysia availed themselves of this option; at a public hearing held on 10 December 1998, Mr. Hans Corell, H.E. Mr. José de J. Conejo, Mr. Charles N. Brower, Dato' Heliliah bt Mohd Yusof and Sir Elihu Lauterpacht were successively heard.

text: Members of the Court put questions to the Secretary-General's representative, who replied both orally and in writing. Copies of the written replies were communicated to al1 the States having taken part in the oral proceedings; Malaysia submitted written comments on these replies.

text: In its decision 19981297, the Council asked the Court to take into account, for purposes of the advisory opinion requested, the "circumstances set out in paragraphs 1 to 15 of the note by the Secretary- General" (El1998194). Those paragraphs read as follows:

text: "1. In its resolution 22 A (1) of 13 February 1946, the General Assembly adopted, pursuant to Article 105 (3) of the Charter of the United Nations, the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations (the Convention). Since then, 137 Member States have become parties to the Convention, and its provisions have been incorporated by reference into many hundreds of agreements relating to the headquarters or seats of the United Nations and its organs, and to activities carried out by the Organization in nearly every country of the world. 2. That Convention is, inter alia, designed to protect various categories of persons, including 'Experts on Mission for the United Nations', from al1 types of interference by national authorities. In particular, Section 22 ( b ) of Article VI of the Convention provides:

text: 'Section 22: Experts (other than officials coming within the

text: scope of Article V) performing missions for the United Nations shall be accorded such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of their functions during the period of their missions, including time spent on journeys in connection with their missions. In particular they shall be accorded:

text: ( b ) in respect of words spoken or written and acts done by them in the course of the performance of their mission, immunity from legal process of every kind. This immunity from legal process shall continue to be accorded notwithstanding that the persons concerned are no longer employed on missions for the United Nations.' 3. In its Advisory Opinion of 14 December 1989, on the Applicability of Article VI, Section 22, of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations (the so-called 'Mazilu case'), the International Court of Justice held that a Special Rapporteur of the Subcommission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities of the Commission on Human Rights was an

text: 'expert on mission' within the meaning of Article VI of the Convention. 4. The Commission on Human Rights, by its resolution 1994141 of 4 March 1994, endorsed by the Economic and Social Council in its decision 1994125 1 of 22 July 1994, appointed Dato' Param Cumaraswamy, a Malaysian jurist, as the Commission's Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers. His mandate consists of tasks including, infer alia, to inquire into substantial allegations concerning, and to identify and record attacks on, the independence of the judiciary, lawyers and court officials. Mr. Cumaraswamy has submitted four reports to the Commission on the execution of his mandate : ElCN.411995139, ElCN.411996137, ElCN.411997132 and ElCN.411998139. After the third report containing a section on the litigation pending against him in the Malays~an civil courts, the Commission at its fifty-fourth session, in April 1997, renewed his mandate for an additional three years.

text: 5. In November 1995 the Special Rapporteur gave an interview to International Commrrcial Litigation, a magazine published in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland but circulated also in Malaysia, in which he commented on certain litigations that had been carried out in Malaysian courts. As a result of an article published on the basis of that interview, two commercial companies in Malaysia asserted that the said article contained defamatory words that had 'brought them into public scandal, odium and contempt'. Each Company filed a suit against him for damages amounting to M$30 million (approximately U S 1 2 million each), 'including exemplary damages for slander'.

text: 6. Acting on behalf of the Secretary-General, the Legal Counsel considered the circumstances of the interview and of the controverted passages of the article and determined that Dato' Param Cumaraswamy was interviewed in his official capacity as Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, that the article clearly referred to his United Nations capacity and to the Special Rapporteur's United Nations global mandate to investigate . allegations concerning the independence of the judiciary and that the quoted passages related to such allegations. On 15 January 1997, the Legal Counsel, in a note verbale addressed to the Permanent Representative of Malaysia to the United Nations, therefore 'requested the competent Malaysian authorities to promptly advise the Malaysian courts of the Special Rapporteur's immunity from legal process' with respect to that particular complaint. On 20 January 1997, the Special Rapporteur filed an application in the High Court of Kuala Lumpur (the trial court in which the said suit had been filed) to set aside andlor strike out the plaintiffs' writ, on the ground that the words that were the subject of the suits had been spoken by him in the course of performing his mission for the United Nations as Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers. The Secretary-General issued a note on 7 March 1997 confirming that 'the words which constitute the basis of plaintiffs' complaint in this case were spoken by the Special Rapporteur in the course of his mission' and that the Secretary-General 'therefore maintains that Dato' Param Cumaraswamy is immune from legal process with respect thereto'. The Special Rapporteur filed this note in support of his above-mentioned application.

text: 7. After a draft of a certificate that the Minister for Foreign Affairs proposed to file with the trial court had been discussed with representatives of the Office of Legal Affairs, who had indicated that the draft set out the immunities of the Special Rapporteur incompletely and inadequately, the Minister nevertheless on 12 March 1997 filed the certificate in the form originally proposed: in particular the final sentence of that certificate in effect invited the trial court to determine at its own discretion whether the immunity applied, by stating that this was the case 'only in respect of words spoken or written and acts done by him in the course of the performance of his mission' (emphasis added). In spite of the representations that had been made by the Office of Legal Affairs, the certificate failed to refer in any way to the note that the Secretary-General had issued a few days earlier and that had in the meantime been filed with the court, nor did it indicate that in this respect, i.e. in deciding whether particular words or acts of an expert fell within the scope of his mission, the determination could exclusively be made by the Secretary- General, and that such determination had conclusive effect and therefore had to be accepted as such by the court. In spite of repeated requests by the Legal Counsel, the Minister for Foreign Affairs refused to amend his certificate or to supplement it in the manner urged by the United Nations. 8. On 28 June 1997, the competent judge of the Malaysian High Court for Kuala Lumpur concluded that she was 'unable to hold that the Defendant is absolutely protected by the immunity he claims', in part because she considered that the Secretary-General's note was merely 'an opinion' with scant probative value and no binding force upon the court and that the Minister for Foreign Affairs' certificate 'would appear to be no more than a bland statement as to a state of fact pertaining to the Defendant's status and mandate as a Special Rapporteur and appears to have room for interpretation'. The Court ordered that the Special Rapporteur's motion be dismissed with costs, that costs be taxed and paid forthwith by him and that he file and serve his defence within 14 days. On 8 July, the Court of Appeal dismissed Mr. Cumaraswamy's motion for a stay of execution.

text: 9. On 30 June and 7 July 1997, the Legal Counsel thereupon sent notes verbales to the Permanent Representative of Malaysia, and also held meetings with him and his Deputy. In the latter note, the Legal Counsel, inter d i a , called on the Malaysian Government to intervene in the current proceedings so that the burden of any further defence, including any expenses and taxed costs resulting therefrom, be assumed by the Government; to hold Mr. Cumaraswamy harmless in respect of the expenses he had already incurred or that were being taxed to him in respect of the proceedings so far; and, so as to prevent the accumulation of additional expenses and costs and the further need to submit a defence until the matter of his immunity was definitively resolved between the United Nations and the Government, to support a motion to have the High Court proceedings stayed until such resolution. The Legal Counsel referred to the provisions for the settlement of differences arising out of the interpretation and application of the 1946 Convention that might arise between the Organization and a Member State, which are set out in Section 30 of the Convention, and indicated that if the Government decided that it cannot or does not wish to protect and to hold harmless the Special Rapporteur in the indicated manner, a difference within the meaning of those provisions might be considered to have arisen between the Organization and the Government of Malaysia.

text: 10. Section 30 of the Convention provides as follows: 'Section 30: Al1 differences arising out of the interpretation or application of the present convention shall be referred to the International Court of Justice, unless in any case it is agreed by the parties to have recourse to another mode of settlement. If a difference arises between the United Nations on the one hand and a Member on the other hand, a request shall be made for an advisory opinion on any legal question involved in accordance with Article 96 of the Charter and Article 65 of the Statute of the Court. The opinion given by the Court shall be accepted as decisive by the parties.' I l . On 10 July yet another lawsuit was filed against the Special Rapporteur by one of the lawyers mentioned in the magazine article referred to in paragraph 5 above, based on precisely the same passages of the interview and claiming damages in an amount of M$60 million ( U S 2 4 million). On 11 July, the Secretary-General issued a note corresponding to the one of 7 March 1997 (see para. 6 above) and also communicated a note verbale with essentially the same text to the Permanent Representative of Malaysia with the request that it be presented formally to the competent Malaysian court by the Government. 12. On 23 October and 21 November 1997, new plaintiffs filed a third and fourth lawsuit against the Special Rapporteur for M$100 million (US$40 million) and M$60 million (US$24 million) respectively. On 27 October and 22 November 1997, the Secretary- General issued identical certificates of the Special Rapporteur's immunity. 13. On 7 November 1997, the Secretary-General advised the Prime Minister of Malaysia that a difference might have arisen between the United Nations and the Government of Malaysia and about the possibility of resorting to the International Court of Justice pursuant to Section 30 of the Convention. Nonetheless on 19 February 1998, the Federal Court of Malaysia denied Mr. Cumaraswamy's application for leave to appeal stating that he is neither a sovereign nor a full-fledged diplomat but merely 'an unpaid, part-time provider of information'. 14. The Secretary-General then appointed a Special Envoy, Maître Yves Fortier of Canada, who, on 26 and 27 February 1998, undertook an official visit to Kuala Lumpur to reach an agreement with the Government of Malaysia on a joint submission to the International Court of Justice. Following that visit, on 13 March 1998 the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Malaysia informed the Secretary- General's Special Envoy of his Government's desire to reach an outof-court settlement. In an effort to reach such a settlement, the Office of Legal Affairs proposed the terms of such a settlement on 23 March 1998 and a draft settlement agreement on 26 May 1998. Although the Government of Malaysia succeeded in staying proceedings in the four lawsuits until September 1998, no final settlement agreement was concluded. During this period, the Government of Malaysia insisted that, in order to negotiate a settlement, Maître Fortier must return to Kuala Lumpur. While Maître Fortier preferred to undertake the trip only once a preliminary agreement between the parties had been reached, nonetheless, based on the Prime Minister of Malaysia's request that Maître Fortier return as soon as possible, the Secretary-General requested his Special Envoy to do so. 15. Maître Fortier undertook a second official visit to Kuala Lumpur, from 25 to 28 July 1998, during which he concluded that the Government of Malaysia was not going to participate either in settling this matter or in preparing a joint submission to the current session of the Economic and Social Council. The Secretary-General's Special Envoy therefore advised that the matter should be referred to the Council to request an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice. The United Nations had exhausted al1 efforts to reach either a negotiated settlement or a joint submission through the Council to the International Court of Justice. In this connection, the Government of Malaysia has acknowledged the Organization's right to refer the matter to the Council to request an advisory opinion in accordance with Section 30 of the Convention,

text: advised the Secretary-General's Special Envoy that the United Nations should proceed to do so, and indicated that, while it will make its own presentations to the International Court of Justice, it does not oppose the submission of the matter to that Court through the Council."

text: The dossier of documents submitted to the Court by the Secretary- General (see paragraph 5 above) contains the following additional information that bears on an understanding of the request to the Court.

text: The article published in the November 1995 issue of International

text: Commercial Litigation, which is referred to in paragraph, 5 of the foregoing note by the Secretary-General, was written by David Samuels and entitled "Malaysian Justice on Trial". The article gave a critical appraisal of the Malaysian judicial system in relation to a number of court decisions. Various Malaysian lawyers were interviewed; as quoted in the article, they expressed their concern that, as a result of these decisions, foreign investors and manufacturers might lose the confidence they had always had in the integrity of the Malaysian judicial system.

text: It was in this context that Mr. Cumaraswamy, who was referred to in the article more than once in his capacity as the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, was asked

text: to give his comments. With regard to a specific case (the Ajvr Molek

text: case), he said that it looked like "a very obvious, perhaps even glaring example of judge-choosing", although he stressed that he had not finished his investigation. Mr. Cumaraswamy is also quoted as having said: "Complaints are rife that certain highly placed personalities in the business and corporate sectors are able to manipulate the Malaysian system of justice." He added: "But 1 do not want any of the people involved to think 1 have made up my mind." He also said: "It would be unfair to name any names, but there is some concern about this among foreign businessmen based in Malaysia, particularly those who have litigation pending."

text: On 18 December 1995, two commercial firms and their legal counsel addressed letters to Mr. Cumaraswamy in which they maintained that they were defamed by Mr. Cumaraswamy's statements in the article, since it was clear, they claimed, that they were being accused of corruption in the Ayer Molek case. They informed Mr. Cumaraswamy that they

text: had "no choice but to issue defamation proceedings against him" and added

text: "It is important that al1 steps are taken for the purpose of mitigating the continuing damage being done to [our] business and commercial reputations which is worldwide, as quickly and effectively as possible."

text: On 28 December 1995, in view of the foregoing letters, the Secretariat of the United Nations issued a Note Verbale to the Permanent Mission of Malaysia in Geneva, requesting that the competent Malaysian authorities be advised, and that they in turn advise the Malaysian courts, of the Special Rapporteur's immunity from legal process. This was the first in a series of similar communications, containing the same finding, sent by or on behalf of the Secretary-General - some of which were sent once court proceedings had been initiated (see paragraphs 6 et seq. of the note by the Secretary-General, reproduced in paragraph 10 above).

text: On 12 December 1996, the two commercial firms issued a writ of summons and statement of claim against Mr. Cumaraswamy in the High Court of Kuala Lumpur. They claimed damages, including exemplary damages, for slander and libel, and requested an injunction to restrain Mr. Cumaraswamy from further defaming the plaintiffs.

text: As stated in the note of the Secretary-General, quoted in paragraph I O above, three further lawsuits flowing from Mr. Cumaraswamy's

text: statements to International Commercial Litigation were brought against

text: him. The Government of Malaysia did not transmit to its courts the texts containing the Secretary-General's finding that Mr. Cumaraswamy was entitled to immunity from legal process. The High Court of Kuala Lumpur did not pass upon Mr. Cumaraswamy's immunity in limine litis, but held that it had jurisdiction to hear the case before it on the merits, including making a determination of whether Mr. Cumaraswamy was entitled to any immunity. This decision was upheld by both the Court of Appeal and the Federal Court of Malaysia.

text: As indicated in paragraph 4 of the above note by the Secretary- General, the Special Rapporteur made regular reports to the Commission on Human Rights (hereinafter called the "Commission").

text: In his first report (E/CN.4/1995/39), dated 6 February 1995, Mr. Cumaraswamy did not refer to contacts with the media. In resolution 1995136 of 3 March 1995, the Commission welcomed this report and took note of the methods of work described therein in paragraphs 63 to 93.

text: In his second report (E/CN.411996137), dated 1 March 1996, the Special Rapporteur referred to the Ayer Molek case and to a critical press statement made by the Bar Council of Malaysia on 21 August 1995. The report also included the following quotation from a press statement issued by Mr. Cumaraswamy on 23 August 1995: "Complaints are rife that certain highly placed personalities in Malaysia including those in business and corporate sectors are manipulating the Malaysian system of justice and thereby undermining the due administration of independent and impartial justice by the courts. Under the mandate entrusted to me by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 1 am duty bound to investigate these complaints and report to the same Commission, if possible at its fifty-second session next year. To facilitate my inquiries 1 will seek the cooperation of al1 those involved in the administration of justice, including the Government which, under my mandate, is requested to extend its cooperation and assistance."

text: In resolution 1996134 of 19 April 1996, the Commission took note of this report and of the Special Rapporteur's working methods. In his third report (E/CN.4/1997/32), dated 18 February 1997, the Special Rapporteur informed the Commission of the article in International Commercial Litigation and the lawsuits that had been initiated against him, the author, the publisher, and others. He also referred to the notifications of the Legal Counsel of the United Nations to the Malaysian authorities. In resolution 1997123 of 11 April 1997, the Commission took note of the report and the working methods of the Special Rapporteur, and extended his mandate for another three years.

text: In his fourth report (E/CN.4/1998/39), dated 12 February 1998, the Special Rapporteur reported on further developments with regard to the lawsuits initiated against him. In its resolution 1998135 of 17 April 1998, the Commission similarly took note of this report and of the working methods reflected therein.

text: As indicated above (see paragraph l), the note by the Secretary- General was accompanied by an addendum (El19981941Add. 1) which reads as follows: "In paragraph 14 of the note by the Secretary-General on the privileges and immunities of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the independence of judges and lawyers (E/1998/94), it is reported that the 'Government of Malaysia succeeded in staying proceedings in the four lawsuits until September 1998'. In this connection, the Secretary-General has been informed that on 1 August 1998, Dato' Param Cumaraswamy was served with a Notice of Taxation and Bill of Costs dated 28 July 1998 and signed by the Deputy Registrar of the Federal Court notifying him that the bill of costs of the Federal Court application would be assessed on 18 September 1998. The amount claimed is M$310,000 (US$77,500). On the same day, Dato' Param Cumaraswamy was also served with a Notice dated 29 July 1998 and signed by the Registrar of the Court of Appeal notifying him that the Plaintiffs bill of costs would be assessed on 4 September 1998. The amount claimed in that bill is M$550,000 (US$137,500)."

text: The Council considered the note by the Secretary-General (El19981 94) at the forty-seventh and forty-eighth meetings of its substantive session of 1998, held on 31 July 1998. At that time, the Observer for Malaysia disputed certain statements in paragraphs 7, 14 and 15 of the note. The note concluded with a paragraph 21 containing the Secretary- General's proposal for two questions to be submitted to the Court for an advisory opinion : "21. . . . 'Considering the difference that has arisen between the United Nations and the Government of Malaysia with respect to the immunity from legal process of Mr. Dato' Param Cumaraswamy, the United Nations Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, in respect of certain words spoken by him: 1. Subject only to Section 30 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, does the Secretary- General of the United Nations have the exclusive authority to determine whether words were spoken in the course of the performance of a mission for the United Nations within the meaning of Section 22 ( b ) of the Convention? 2. In accordance with Section 34 of the Convention, once the Secretary-General has determined that such words were spoken in the course of the performance of a mission and has decided to maintain, or not to waive, the immunity from legal process, does the Government of a Member State party to the Convention have an obligation to give effect to that immunity in its national courts and, if failing to do so, to assume responsibility for, and any costs, expenses and damages arising from, any legal proceedings brought in respect of such words?

text: 9 $ 3

text: On 5 August 1998, at its forty-ninth meeting, the Council considered and adopted without a vote a draft decision submitted by its Vice-President following informal consultations. After referring to Section 30 of the General Convention, the decision requested the Court to give an advisory

text: opinion on the question formulated therein, and called upon the Government of Malaysia to ensure that "al1 judgements and proceedings in this matter in the Malaysian courts are stayed pending receipt of the advisory opinion of the . . . Court . . . , which shall be accepted as decisive by the parties" (El1998lL.491Rev. 1). At that meeting, the Observer for Malaysia reiterated his previous criticism of paragraphs 7, 14 and 15 of the Secretary-General's note, but made no comment on the terms of the question to be put to the Court as now formulated by the Council. On being so adopted, the draft became decision 19981297 (see paragraph 1 above).

text: As regards events subsequent to the submission of the request for an advisory opinion, and more precisely, the situation with regard to the proceedings pending before the Malaysian courts, Malaysia has provided the Court with the following information: "the hearings on the question of stay in respect of three of the four cases have been deferred until 9 February 1999 when they are due again to be mentioned in court, and when the plaintiff will join in requesting further postponements until this Court's advisory opinion has been rendered, and sufficient time has been given to al1 concerned to consider its implications.

text: The position in the first of the four cases is the same, although it is fixed for mention on 16 December [1998]. However, it will then be treated in the same way as the other cases. As to cost, the requirement for the payment of costs by the defendant has also been stayed, and that aspect of the case will be deferred and considered in the same way."

text: The Council has requested the present advisory opinion pursuant to Article 96, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations. This paragraph provides that organs of the United Nations, other than the General Assembly or the Security Council, "which may at any time be so authorized by the General Assembly, may also request advisory opinions of the Court on legal questions arising within the scope of their activities".

text: Article 65, paragraph 1, of the Statute of the Court states that "[tlhe Court may give an advisory opinion on any legal question at the request of whatever body may be authorized by or in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to make such a request".

text: In its decision 19981297, the Council recalls that General Assembly resolution 89 (1) gave it authorization to request advisory opinions, and it expressly makes reference to the fact "that a difference has arisen between the United Nations and the Government of Malaysia, within the meaning of Section 30 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, with respect to the immunity from legal process of Dato' Param Cumaraswamy, the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the independence of judges and lawyers".

text: This is the first time that the Court has received a request for an advisory opinion that refers to Article VIII, Section 30, of the General Convention, which provides that "al1 differences arising out of the interpretation or application of the present convention shall be referred to the International Court of Justice, unless in any case it is agreed by the parties to have recourse to another mode of settlement. If a difference arises between the United Nations on the one hand and a Member on the other hand, a request shall be made for an advisory opinion on any legal question involved in accordance with Article 96 of the Charter and Article 65 of the Statute of the Court. The opinion given by the Court shall be accepted as decisive by the parties."

text: This section provides for the exercise of the Court's advisory function in the event of a difference between the United Nations and one of its Members. In this case, such a difference exists, but that fact does not change the advisory nature of the Court's function, which is governed by the terms of the Charter and of the Statute. As the Court stated in its Advisory Opinion of 12 July 1973,

text: "the existence, in the background, of a dispute the parties to which may be affected as a consequence of the Court's opinion, does not change the advisory nature of the Court's task, which is to answer the questions put to it . . ." (Application for Review of Judgement No. 158 of the Dizired Nations Administrative Tribunal, Advisory

text: Opinion, I. C. J. Reports 1973, p. 171, para. 14).

text: Paragraph 2 of the Council's decision requesting the advisory opinion repeats expressis verbis the provision in Article VIII, Section 30, of the General Convention that the Court's opinion "shall be accepted as decisive by the parties". However, this equally cannot affect the nature of the function carried out by the Court when giving its advisory opinion. As the Court said in its Advisory Opinion of 23 October 1956, in a case involving similar language in Article XII of the Statute of the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organisation, such "decisive" or "binding" effect "goes beyond the scope attributed by the Charter and by the Statute of the Court to an Advisory Opinion . . . It in no wise affects the way in which the Court functions; that continues to be determined by its Statute and its Rules. Nor does it affect the reasoning by which the Court forms its Opinion or the content of the Opinion itself." (Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal of the I L 0 upon Complaints Made against Unesco, Advisory Opinion, I. C. J. Reports 1956, p. 84.) A distinction should thus be drawn between the advisory nature of the Court's task and the particular effects that parties to an existing dispute may wish to attribute, in their mutual relations, to an advisory opinion of the Court, which, "as such, . . . has no binding force" (Interpretation of Peace Treaties ~vith Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, First Phase, Advisory Opinion, 1. C. J. Reports 1950, p. 71). These particular effects, extraneous to the Charter and the Statute which regulate the functioning of the Court, are derived from separate agreements; in the present case Article VIII, Section 30, of the General Convention provides that "[tlhe opinion given by the Court shall be accepted as decisive by the parties". That consequence has been expressly acknowledged by the United Nations and by Malaysia.

text: The power of the Court to give an advisory opinion is derived from Article 96, paragraph 2, of the Charter and from Article 65 of the Statute (see paragraph 22 above). Both provisions requise that the question forming the subject-matter of the request should be a "legal question". This condition is satisfied in the present case, as al1 participants in the proceedings have acknowledged, because the advisory opinion requested relates to the interpretation of the General Convention, and to its application to the circumstances of the case of the Special Rapporteur, Dato' Param Cumaraswamy. Thus the Court held in its Advisory Opinion of 28 May 1948 that "[tlo determine the meaning of a treaty provision . . . is a problem of interpretation and consequently a legal question" (Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations (Article 4 of the Charter), Advisory Opinion, 1948, 1. C. J. Reports 1947-1948, p. 61).

text: Article 96, paragraph 2, of the Charter also requires that the legal questions forming the subject-matter of advisory opinions requested by authorized organs of the United Nations and specialized agencies shall arise "within the scope of their activities". The fulfilment of this condition has not been qÜestioned by any of the participants in the present proceedings. The Court finds that the legal questions submitted by the Council in its request concern the activities of the Commission, since they relate to the mandate of its Special Rapporteur appointed

text: "to inquire into substantial allegations concerning, and to identify and record attacks on, the independence of the judiciary, lawyers and court officials".

text: Mr. Cumaraswamy's activities as Rapporteur and the legal questions arising therefrom are pertinent to the functioning of the Commission; accordingly they come within the scope of activities of the Council, since the Commission is one of its subsidiary organs. The same conclusion was reached by the Court in an analogous case, in its Advisory Opinion of 15 December 1989, also given at the request of the Council, regarding the Applicability of Article VI, Section 22, of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations (I.C.J. Reports 1989, p. 187, para. 28).

text: As the Court held in its Advisory Opinion of 30 March 1950, the permissive character of Article 65 of the Statute "gives the Court the power to examine whether the circumstances of the case are of such a character as should lead it to decline to answer the Request" (Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, First Phase, Advisory Opinion, 1. C. J. Reports 1950, p. 72). Such discretionary power does not exist when the Court is not competent to answer the question forming the subject-matter of the request, for example because it is not a "legal question". In such a case, "the Court has no discretion in the matter; it must decline to give the opinion requested" (Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion, 1. C. J. Reports 1962, p. 155; cf. Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, I.C. J. Reports 1996 ( I ) , p. 73, para. 14). However, the Court went on to state, in its Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962, that "even if the question is a legal one, which the Court is undoubtedly competent to answer, it may nonetheless decline to do so" (1. C. J. Reports 1962, p. 155).

text: In its Advisory Opinion of 30 March 1950, the Court made it clear that, as an organ of the United Nations, its answer to a request for an advisory opinion "represents its participation in the activities of the Organization, and, in principle, should not be refused" (Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, First Phase, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 71); moreover, in its Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962, citing its Advisory Opinion of 23 October 1956, the Court stressed that "only 'compelling reasons' should lead it to refuse to give a requested advisory opinion" (Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion, I. C. J. Reports 1962, p. 155). (See also, for example, Applicability of Article VI, Section 22, of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1. C. J. Reports 1989, pp. 190-

text: 191, para. 37; and Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,

text: Advisory Opinion, I. C. J. Reports 1996 ( I ) , p. 235, para. 14.)

text: In the present case, the Court, having established its jurisdiction, finds no compelling reasons not to give the advisory opinion requested by the Council. Moreover, no participant in these proceedings questioned the need for the Court to exercise its advisory function in this case.

text: Article 65, paragraph 2, of the Statute provides that "[qluestions upon which the advisory opinion of the Court is asked shall be laid before the Court by means of a written request containing an exact statement of the question upon which an opinion is required". In compliance with this requirement, the Secretary-General transmitted to the Court the text of the Council's decision, paragraph 1 of which reads as follows: "1. Requests on a priority basis, pursuant to Article 96, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with General Assembly resolution 89 (1), an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on the legal question of the applicability of Article VI, Section 22, of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations in the case of Dato' Param Cumaraswamy as Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the independence of judges and lawyers, taking into account the circumstances set out in paragraphs 1 to 15 of the note by the Secretary-General, and on the legal obligations of Malaysia in this case."

text: Malaysia has asserted to the Court that it had "at no time approved the text of the question that appeared in El1998lL.49 or as eventually adopted by ECOSOC and submitted to the Court" and that it "never did more than 'take note' of the question as originally formulated by the Secretary-General and submitted to the ECOSOC in document E11998194". It contends that the advisory opinion of the Court should be restricted to the existing difference between the United Nations and Malaysia. In Malaysia's view, this difference relates to the question (as formulated by the Secretary-General himself (see paragraph 20 above)) of whether the latter has the exclusive authority to determine whether acts of an expert (including words spoken or written) were performed in the course of his or her mission. Thus, in the conclusion to the revised version of its written statement, Malaysia States, inter uliu, that it "considers that the Secretary-General of the United Nations has not been vested with the exclusive authority to determine whether words were spoken in the course of the performance of a mission for the United Nations within the meaning of Section 22 (b) of the Convention". In its oral pleadings, Malaysia maintained that "in implementing Section 30, ECOSOC is merely a vehicle for placing a difference between the Secretary-General and Malaysia before the Court. ECOSOC does not have an independent position to assert as it might have had were it seeking an opinion on some legal question other than in the context of the operation of Section 30. ECOSOC . . . is no more than an instrument of reference, it cannot change the nature of the difference or alter the content of the question."

text: In the written statement presented on behalf of the Secretary- General, the Legal Counsel of the United Nations requested the Court "to establish that, subject to Article VIII, Sections 29 and 30 of the Convention, the Secretary-General has exclusive authority to determine whether or not words or acts are spoken, written or done in the course of the performance of a mission for the United Nations and whether such words or acts fall within the scope of the mandate entrusted to a United Nations expert on mission".

text: In this submission, it has also been argued "that such matters cannot be determined by, or adjudicated in, the national courts of the Member States parties to the Convention. The latter position is coupled with the Secretary-General's right and duty, in accordance with the terms of Article VI, Section 23, of the Convention, to waive the immunity where, in his opinion, it would impede the course of justice and it can be waived without prejudice to the interests of the United Nations."

text: The other States participating in the present proceedings have expressed varying views on the foregoing issue of the exclusive authority of the Secretary-General.

text: As the Council indicated in the preamble to its decision 19981297, that decision was adopted by the Council on the basis of the note submitted by the Secretary General on "Privileges and Immunities of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers" (see paragraph 1 above). Paragraph 1 of the operative part of the decision refers expressly to paragraphs 1 to 15 of that note but not to paragraph 21, containing the two questions that the Secretary-General proposed submitting to the Court (see para-

text: graph 20 above). The Court would point out that the wording of the question submitted by the Council is quite different from that proposed by the Secretary-General.

text: Participants in these proceedings have advanced differing views as to what is the legal question to be answered by the Court. The Court observes that it is for the C o u n c i l and not for a member State nor for the Secretary-General - to formulate the terms of a question that the Council wishes to ask.

text: The Council adopted its decision 19981297 without a vote. The Council did not pass upon any proposal that the question to be submitted to the Court should include, still less be confined to, the issue of the exclusive authority of the Secretary-General to determine whether or not acts (including words spoken or written) were performed in the course of a mission for the United Nations and whether such words or acts fall within the scope of the mandate entrusted to an expert on mission for the United Nations. Although the Summary Records of the Council do not expressly address the matter, it is clear that the Council, as the organ entitled to put the request to the Court, did not adopt the questions set forth at the conclusion of the note by the Secretary-General, but instead formulated its own question in terms which were not contested at that time (see paragraph 20 above). Accordingly, the Court will now answer the question as formulated by the Council.

text: The Court will initially examine the first part of the question laid before the Court by the Council, which is: "the legal question of the applicability of Article VI, Section 22, of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations in the case of Dato' Param Cumaraswamy as Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the independence of judges and lawyers, taking into account the circumstances set out in paragraphs 1 to 15 of the note by the Secretary-General . . ."

text: From the deliberations which took place in the Council on the content of the request for an advisory opinion, it is clear that the reference in the request to the note of the Secretary-General was made in order to provide the Court with the basic facts to which to refer in making its decision. The request of the Council therefore does not only pertain to the threshold question whether Mr. Cumaraswamy was and is an expert on mission in the sense of Article VI, Section 22, of the General Convention but, in the event of an affirmative answer to this question, to the consequences of that finding in the circumstances of the case.

text: Pursuant to Article 105 of the Charter of the United Nations:

text: "1. The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfilment of its purposes. 2. Representatives of the Members of the United Nations and officials of the Organization shall similarly enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of their functions in connexion with the Organization. 3. The General Assembly may make recommendations with a view to determining the details of the application of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article or may propose conventions to the Members of the United Nations for this purpose."

text: Acting in accordance with Article 105 of the Charter, the General Assembly approved the General Convention on 13 February 1946 and proposed it for accession by each Member of the United Nations. Malaysia became a party to the General Convention, without reservation, on 28 October 1957.

text: The General Convention contains an Article VI entitled "Experts on Missions for the United Nations". It is comprised of two Sections (22 and 23). Section 22 provides:

text: "Experts (other than officials coming within the scope of Article V) performing missions for the United Nations shall be accorded such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of their functions during the period of their missions, including time spent on journeys in connection with their missions. In particular they shall be accorded:

text: ( b ) in respect of words spoken or written and acts done by them in the course of the performance of their mission, immunity from legal process of every kind. This immunity from legal process shall continue to be accorded notwithstanding that the persons concerned are no longer employed on missions for the United Nations.

text: In its Advisory Opinion of 14 December 1989 on the Applicability of Article VI, Section 22, of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, the Court examined the applicability of Section 22 ratione personae, ratione temporis and ratione loci. In this context the Court stated: "The purpose of Section 22 is . . . evident, namely, to enable the United Nations to entrust missions to persons who do not have the status of an official of the Organization, and to guarantee them 'such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent exercity the provisions of this Section were applicable to him at the time of his statements at issue, and that they continue to be applicable.

text: The Court observes that Malaysia has acknowledged that Mr. Cumaraswamy, as Special Rapporteur of the Commission, is an expert on mission and that such experts enjoy the privileges and immunities provided for under the General Convention in their relations with States parties, including those of which they are nationals or on the territory of which they reside. Malaysia and the United Nations are in full agreement on these points, as are the other States participating in the proceedings.

text: The Court will now consider whether the immunity provided for in Section 22 (b) applies to Mr. Cumaraswamy in the specific circumstances of the case; namely, whether the words used by him in the interview, as published in the article in Intern~ztional Commercial Litigation (November issue 1995), were spoken in the course of the performance of his mission, and whether he was therefore immune from legal process with respect to these words.

text: During the oral proceedings, the Solicitor General of Malaysia contended that the issue put by the Council before the Court does not include this question. She stated that the correct interpretation of the words used by the Council in its request "does not extend to inviting the Court to decide whether, assuming the Secretary-General to have had the authority to determine the character of the Special Rapporteur's action, he had properly exercised that authority" and added: "Malaysia observes that the word used was 'applicability' not 'application'. 'Applicability' means 'whether the provision is applicable to someone' not 'how it is to be applied'."

text: The Court does not share this interpretation. It follows from the terms of the request that the Council wishes to be informed of the Court's opinion as to whether Section 22 ( b ) is applicable to the Special Rapporteur, in the circumstances set out in paragraphs 1 to 15 of the note of the Secretary-General and whether, therefore, the Secretary-General's finding that the Special Rapporteur acted in the course of the performance of his mission is correct.

text: In the process of determining whether a particular expert on mission is entitled, in the prevailing circumstances, to the immunity provided for in Section 22 ( b ) , the Secretary-General of the United Nations has a pivotal role to play. The Secretary-General, as the chief administrative officer of the Organization, has the authority and the responsibility to exercise the necessary protection where required. This authority has been recognized by the Court when it stated:

text: "Upon examination of the character of the functions entrusted to the Organization and of the nature of the missions of its agents, it becomes clear that the capacity of the Organization to exercise a measure of functional protection of its agents arises by necessary intendment out of the Charter." (Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, I. C. J. Reports 1949, p. 184.)

text: Article VI, Section 23, of the General Convention provides that "[plrivileges and immunities are granted to experts in the interests of the United Nations and not for the personal benefit of the individuals themselves". In exercising protection of United Nations experts, the Secretary- General is therefore protecting the mission with which the expert is entrusted. In that respect, the Secretary-General has the primary responsibility and authority to protect the interests of the Organization and its agents, including experts on mission. As the Court held:

text: "In order that the agent may perform his duties satisfactorily, he must feel that this protection is assured to him by the Organization, and that he may count on it. T o ensure the independence of the agent, and, consequently, the independent action of the Organization itself, it is essential that in performing his duties he need not have to rely on any other protection than that of the Organization . . ." (Ibid., p. 183.)

text: The determination whether an agent of the Organization has acted in the course of the performance of his mission depends upon the facts of a particular case. In the present case, the Secretary-General, or the Legal Counsel of the United Nations on his behalf, has on numerous occasions informed the Government of Malaysia of his finding that Mr. Cumaraswamy had spoken the words quoted in the article in Internutionul Commerciul Litigation in his capacity as Special Rapporteur of the Commission and that he consequently was entitled to immunity from "every kind" of legal process.

text: As is clear from the written and oral pleadings of the United Nations, the Secretary-General was reinforced in this view by the fact that it has become standard practice of Special Rapporteurs of the Commission to have contact with the media. This practice was confirmed by the High Commissioner for Human Rights who, in a letter dated 2 October 1998, included in the dossier, wrote that: "it is more common than not for Special Rapporteurs to speak to the press about matters pertaining to their investigations, thereby keeping the general public informed of their work".

text: As noted above (see paragraph 13), Mr. Cumaraswamy was explicitly referred to several times in the article "Malaysian Justice on Trial" in International Commercial Litigation in his capacity as United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers. In his reports to the Commission (see paragraph 18 above), Mr. Cumaraswamy had set out his methods of work, expressed concern about the independence of the Malaysian judiciary, and referred to the civil lawsuits initiated against him. His third report noted that the Legal Counsel of the United Nations had informed the Government of Malaysia that he had spoken in the performance of his mission and was therefore entitled to immunity from legal process.

text: As noted in paragraph 18 above, in its various resolutions the Commission took note of the Special Rapporteur's reports and of his methods of work. In 1997, it extended his mandate for another three years (see paragraphs 18 and 45 above). The Commission presumably would not have so acted if it had been of the opinion that Mr. Cumaraswamy had gone beyond his mandate and had given the interview to International Commercial Litigation outside the course of his functions. Thus the Secretary-General was able to find support for his findings in the Commission's position.

text: The Court is not called upon in the present case to pass upon the aptness of the terms used by the Special Rapporteur or his assessment of the situation. In any event, in view of al1 the circumstances of this case, elements of which are set out in paragraphs 1 to 15 of the note by the Secretary-General, the Court is of the opinion that the Secretary-General correctly found that Mr. Cumaraswamy, in speaking the words quoted in the article in International Commercial Litigation, was acting in the course of the performance of his mission as Special Rapporteur of the Commission. Consequently, Article VI, Section 22 (b), of the General Convention is applicable to him in the present case and affords Mr. Cumaraswamy immunity from legal process of every kind.

text: The Court will now deal with the second part of the Council's question, namely, "the legal obligations of Malaysia in this case".

text: Malaysia maintains that it is premature to deal with the question of its obligations. It is of the view that the obligation to ensure that the requirements of Section 22 of the Convention are met is an obligation of result and not of means to be employed in achieving that result. It further states that Malaysia has complied with its obligation under Section 34 of the General Convention, which provides that a party to the Convention must be "in a position under its own law to give effect to [its] terms", by enacting the necessary legislation; finally it contends that the Malaysian courts have not yet reached a final decision as to Mr. Cumaraswamy's entitlement to immunity from legal process.

text: The Court wishes to point out that the request for an advisory opinion refers to "the legal obligations of Malaysia in this case". The difference which has arisen between the United Nations and Malaysia originated in the Government of Malaysia not having informed the competent

text: Malaysian judicial authorities of the Secretary-General's finding that Mr. Cumaraswamy had spoken the words at issue in the course of the performance of his mission and was, therefore, entitled to immunity from legal process (see paragraph 17 above). It is as from the time of this omission that the question before the Court must be answered.

text: As the Court has observed, the Secretary-General, as the chief administrative officer of the Organization, has the primary responsibility to safeguard the interests of the Organization; to that end, it is up to him to assess whether its agents acted within the scope of their functions and, where he so concludes, to protect these agents, including experts on mission, by asserting their immunity. This means that the Secretary-General has the authority and responsibility to inform the Government of a member State of his finding and, where appropriate, to request it to act accordingly and, in particular, to request it to bring his finding to the knowledge of the local courts if acts of an agent have given or may give rise to court proceedings.

text: When national courts are seised of a case in which the immunity of a United Nations agent is in issue, they should immediately be notified of any finding by the Secretary-General concerning that immunity. That finding, and its documentary expression, creates a presumption which can only be set aside for the most compelling reasons and is thus to be given the greatest weight by national courts.

text: The governmental authorities of a party to the General Convention are therefore under an obligation to convey such information to the national courts concerned, since a proper application of the Convention by them is dependent on such information. Failure to comply with this obligation, among others, could give rise to the institution of proceedings under Article VIII, Section 30, of the General Convention.

text: The Court concludes that the Government of Malaysia had an obligation, under Article 105 of the Charter and under the General Convention, to inform its courts of the position taken by the Secretary-General. According to a well-established rule of international law, the conduct of any organ of a state must be regarded as an act of that state. This rule, which is of a customary character, is reflected in Article 6 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility adopted provisionally by the International Law Commission on first reading, which provides:

text: "The conduct of an organ of the State shall be considered as an act of that State under international law, whether that organ belongs to the constituent, legislative, executive, judicial or other power, whether its functions are of an international or an internal character, and whether it holds a superior or a subordinated position in the organization of the State." (Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1973, Vol. II, p. 193.)

text: Because the Government did not transmit the Secretary-General's finding to the competent courts, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs did not refer to it in his own certificate, Malaysia did not comply with the abovementioned obligation.

text: Section 22 ( b ) of the General Convention explicitly states that experts on mission shall be accorded immunity from legal process of every kind in respect of words spoken or written and acts done by them in the course of the performance of their mission. By necessary implication, questions of immunity are therefore preliminary issues which must be expeditiously decided in limine litis. This is a generally recognized principle of procedural law, and Malaysia was under an obligation to respect it. The Malaysian courts did not rule in limine litis on the immunity of the Special Rapporteur (see paragraph 17 above), thereby nullifying the essence of the immunity rule contained in Section 22 (b). Moreover, costs were taxed to Mr. Cumaraswamy while the question of immunity was still unresolved. As indicated above, the conduct of an organ of a State - even an organ independent of the executive power must be regarded as an act of that State. Consequently, Malaysia did not act in accordance with its obligations under international law.

text: In addition, the immunity from legal process to which the Court finds Mr. Cumaraswamy entitled entails holding Mr. Cumaraswamy financially harmless for any costs imposed upon him by the Malaysian courts, in particular taxed costs.

text: According to Article VIII, Section 30, of the General Convention, the opinion given by the Court shall be accepted as decisive by the parties to the dispute. Malaysia has acknowledged its obligations under Section 30. Since the Court holds that Mr. Cumaraswamy is an expert on mission who under Section 22 ( b ) is entitled to immunity from legal process, the Government of Malaysia is obligated to communicate this advisory opinion to the competent Malaysian courts, in order that Malaysia's international obligations be given effect and Mr. Cumaraswamy's immunity be respected.

text: Finally, the Court wishes to point out that the question of immunity from legal process is distinct from the issue of compensation for any damages incurred as a result of acts performed by the United Nations or by its agents acting in their official capacity.

text: The United Nations may be required to bear responsibility for the damage arising from such acts. However, as is clear from Article VIII, Section 29, of the General Convention, any such claims against the United Nations shall not be dealt with by national courts but shall be settled in accordance with the appropriate modes of settlement that "[tlhe United Nations shall make provisions for" pursuant to Section 29.

text: Furthermore, it need hardly be said that al1 agents of the United Nations, in whatever official capacity they act, must take care not to exceed the scope of their functions, and should so comport themselves as to avoid claims against the United Nations.

text: For these reasons,

text: THE COURT

text: Is o f the opinion

text: (1) ( a ) By fourteen votes to one, That Article VI, Section 22, of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations is applicable in the case of Dato' Param Cumaraswamy as Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the lndependence of Judges and Lawyers; I N F A V ~ U R : President Schwebel; Vice-President Weeramantry; Judges Oda, Bedjaoui, Guillaume, Ranjeva, Herczegh, Shi, Fleischhauer, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek;

text: AGAINST : Judge Koroma ; (b) By fourteen votes to one, That Dato' Param Cumaraswamy is entitled to immunity from legal process of every kind for the words spoken by him during an interview as published in an article in the November 1995 issue of Internutional Commercial Litigation;

text: IN FAVOUR : President Schwebel ; Vice-President Weeramantry ; Judges Oda, Bedjaoui, Guillaume, Ranjeva, Herczegh, Shi, Fleischhauer, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek ;

text: AGAINST: Judge Koroma ;

text: (2) ( a ) By thirteen votes to two, That the Government of Malaysia had the obligation to inform the Malaysian courts of the finding of the Secretary-

text: General that Dato' Param Cumaraswamy was entitled to immunity from legal process; I N FAVOUR : President Schwebel ; Vice-President Weeramantry ; Judges Bedjaoui, Guillaume, Ranjeva, Herczegh, Shi, Fleischhauer, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek;

text: AGAINST: Judges Oda, Koroma; (6) By fourteen votes to one, That the Malaysian courts had the obligation to deal with the question of immunity from legal process as a preliminary issue to be expeditiously decided in limine litis; I N FAVOUR : President Schwebel ; Vice-President Weeramantry ; Judges Oda, Bedjaoui, Guillaume, Ranjeva, Herczegh, Shi, Fleischhauer, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek;

text: AGAINST : Judge Koroma ; (3) Unanimously, That Dato' Param Cumaraswamy shall be held financially harmless for any costs imposed upon him by the Malaysian courts, in particular taxed costs; (4) By thirteen votes to two, That the Government of Malaysia has the obligation to communicate this Advisory Opinion to the Malaysian courts, in order that Malaysia's international obligations be given effect and Dato' Param Cumaraswamy's immunity be respected; I N FAVOUR : Prrsident Schwebel; Vice-President Weeramantry ; Judges Bedjaoui, Guillaume, Ranjeva, Herczegh, Shi, Fleischhauer, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek;

text: AGAINST : Judges Oda, Koroma.

text: Done in English and in French, the English text being authoritative, at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this twenty-ninth day of April, one thousand nine hundred and ninety-nine, in two copies, one of which will be placed in the archives of the Court and the other transmitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

text: (Signed) Stephen M. SCHWEBEL, President. ( S i g n e d ) Eduardo VALENCIA-OSPINA, Registrar.

text: 9 1 IMMUNITY FROM LEGAL PROCESS (ADVISORY OPINION) Vice-President WEERAMANTRY and Judges ODA and REZEK append separate opinions to the Advisory Opinion of the Court.

text: Judge KOROMA appends a dissenting opinion to the Advisory Opinion of the Court. (Initialled) S.M.S. (Initialled) E.V.O.

title: Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights


doctype: dom

caseName: Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 11 June 1998 in the Case concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Preliminary Objections (Nigeria v. Cameroon)

decisionType: judgment

reportsCitation: I.C.J. Reports 1999, p. 3

title: Judgment of 25 March 1999

text: INTERNATIONAL C O U R T O F JUSTICE

text: YEAR 1999 1999

text: 25 March

text: General List

text: 25 March 1999 No. 101

text: REQUEST FOR INTERPRETATION O F THE JUDGMENT O F 11 JUNE 1998 IN THE CASE CONCERNING THE LAND AND M A R I T I M E BOUNDAR Y BETWEEN CAMEROON AND NIGERIA (CAMEROON v. NIGERIA), P R E L I M I N A R Y OBJECTIONS

text: (NIGERIA v. CAMEROON)

text: Article 60 of the Statute - Jurisdiction of the Court to entertain a request for interpretation of a judgment on preliminary objections - Request can relate only to the operative prrrt of the judgment and to reasons inseparable therefionz.

text: Admissihility of' the request for interpretation:

text: Need to uvoid impairing the jînality of the judgigment to he interpreted or delaying implementution tlzereof - Primacy of the principle of res judicata.

text: Judgment o f I I June 1998 - Rejection of Nigeria's sisth prelinzinury ohjecrion - Question of the conditions for udmissibility of an application at the time o f its introduction, and the question of' the admissihility q f the presentation of udditional fucts utzd legul grounds - Principle that the,f'reedom to present additioncrl fucts und legrrl considerut ions not included in the application is suhject to the limitation thcrt the dispute nzust not be transformed - Finding that Cameroon Ilad not so transformed the dispute - Additionul "incidents" und udditional '~f'uct.~'' - Principle ($audi alteram partem.

text: Submissions u f the request already considered und rejected in the Judgment o f II June 1998 - Suhrnissions seeking to remove,from the Court's considerution elenwrzts of,fact and lait1 the presentation o f ' ~ i h i c h has ulreudy heen uuthorized bjs that Judgment. or 1ilhic.11 have not yet been put ,fi)ri.i.cird. Costs - Articles 64 oj'the Stutute und 97 qf the Rules - Generul rule that each part!, .slzull hear its oiix costs.

text: J U D G M E N T

text: Present : President SCHWEBEL; Vice- President WEERAMANTRY; Judges ODA, BEDJAOUI, G U I L L A U M E , RANJEVA, HERCZEGH, SHI, FLEISCHHAUEK, KOKOMA, VERESHCHETIN, HIGGINS, PARKA-ARANGUREN, KOOIJMANS; Judges ad hoc MBAYE, AJIBOLA; Registrar VALENCIA-OSPINA.

text: In the case concerning the request for interpretation of the Judgment of 11 June 1998,

text: the Federal Republic of Nigeria, represented by H.E. Mr. Alhaji Abdullahi Ibrahim, SAN, O F R , Honourable Attorney- General of the Federation and Minister of Justice, as Agent,

text: and

text: the Republic of Cameroon, represented by H.E. Mr. Laurent Esso, Minister of Justice, Keeper of the Seals, as Agent; Mr. Maurice Kamto, Professor a t the University of Yaoundé II, Member of the Paris Bar, Mr. Peter Ntamark, Professor of Law a t the Faculty of Laws and Political Science, University of Yaoundé II, Barrister-at-Law, member of the Inner Temple, as Co-Agents; Mr. Alain Pellet, Professor a t the University of Paris X-Nanterre and a t the Institut d'études politiques, Paris, as Deputy-Agent.

text: composed as above, after deliberation, delivers the following Judgment:

text: On 28 October 1998, the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (hereinafter called "Nigeria") filed in the Registry of the Court a n Application instituting proceedings dated 21 October 1998, whereby, referring to Article 98 of the Rules of Court, it requested the Court to interpret the Judgment delivered by the Court on 11 June 1998 in the case concerning the Land und Maritime Boundury hetiveen Cameroun and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeriu). Prelinzinary objection.^.

text: Pursuant t o Article 40, paragraph 2, of the Statute, the Application was forthwith communicated t o the Government of the Republic of Cameroon (hereinafter called "Cameroon") by the Deputy-Registrar. At the same time, the Parties were informed that the senior judge, acting pursuant t o Articles 13, paragraph 3, and 98, paragraph 3, of the Rules of Court. had fixed 3 December 1998 as the time-limit for Cameroon t o submit its written observations on Nigeria's request for interpretation.

text: Pursuant to Article 40. paragraph 3, of the Statute, al1 States entitled t o appear before the Court were informed of the Application.

text: On 13 November 1998, within the time-limit fixed, the Government of Cameroon filed in the Registry its written observations on the Nigerian request.

text: In light of the dossier thus submitted to it, the Court, considering that it had sufficient information on the positions of the Parties, did not deem it necessary to invite them "to furnish further written or oral explanations", as Article 98, paragraph 4, of the Rules allows it to do.

text: Since the Court included upon the Bench no judge of the nationality of the Parties, each of them availed itself of the right conferred by Article 31, paragraph 3. of the Statute to proceed to choose a judge (id hoc to sit in the case: Nigeria chose Mr. Bola Ajibola and Cameroon Mr. Kéba Mbaye.

text: In the course of the proceedings the Parties presented the following submissions : On hehcrif' oJ' Nigeriu: in the Application "On the basis of the foregoing considerations. Nigeria requests the Court t o adjudge and declare that the Court's Judgment of 11 June 1998 is to be interpreted as meaning that: so far as concerns the international responsibility which Nigeria is said t o bear for certain alleged incidents: l u ) the dispute before the Court does not include any alleged incidents other than (at most) those specified in Cameroon's Application of 29 March 1994 and Additional Application of 6 June 1994;

text: (b) Cameroon's freedom to present additional facts and legal considerations relates (at most) only t o those specified in Cameroon's Application of 29 March 1994 and Additional Application of 6 June 1994; and ( c ) the question whether facts alleged by Cameroon are established or not relates (at most) only to those specified in Cameroon's Application of 29 March 1994 and Additional Application of 6 June 1994.''

text: On hrhulf of' Curneroon : in the written observations: "On these grounds, Having regard to the request for interpretation submitted by the Federal Republic of Nigeria dated 21 October 1998, the Republic of Cameroon makes the following submissions:

text: 1. The Republic of Cameroon leaves it to the Court to decide whether it has jurisdiction to rule on a request for interpretation of a decision handed down following incidental proceedings and, in particular, with regard to a judgment concerning the preliminary objections raised by the defending Party; 2. The Republic of Cameroon requests the Court: - Primarily: To declare the request by the Federal Republic of Nigeria inadmissible; to adjudge and declare that there is no reason to interpret the Judgment of 1 1 June 1998 ; Altrrnatively ; To adjudge and declare that the Republic of Cameroon is entitled to rely on al1 facts, irrespective of their date, that go to establish the continuing violation by Nigeria of its international obligations; that the Republic of Cameroon may also rely on such facts to enable an assessment to be made of the damage it has suffered and the adequate reparation that is due to it."

text: The Court will first address the question of its jurisdiction over the request for interpretation submitted by Nigeria. Nigeria States that, in the case concerning the Land und Maritime Boundary bet~veen Cameroon and Nigrriu, Cameroon alleged that Nigeria bore international responsibility "for certain incidents said to have occurred at various places at Bakassi and Lake Chad and along the length of the frontier between those two regions". Cameroon is also said to have "made allegations involving a number of such incidents in its Application of 29 March 1994, its Additional Application of 6 June 1994, its Observations of 30 April 1996 . . . and during the oral hearings held from 2 to 1 1 March 1998". According to Nigeria, Cameroon had "also said that [it] would be able to provide information as to other incidents on some unspecified future occasion". Nigeria contends that the Court's Judgment of 1 I June 1998 does not specify "which of these alleged incidents are to be considered further as part of the merits of the case". Thus Nigeria maintains that the Judgment "is unclear [as to] whether Cameroon was entitled at various times, after the submission of its Amended Application, to bring before the Court new incidents".

text: Nigeria further emphasizes "the inadmissibility of treating as part of the dispute brought before the Court by the Applications of March and June 1994 alleged incidents occurring subsequently to June 1994". Cameroon, it is said, is entitled in this case to submit, in due course, only "additional facts in amplification of incidents previously adverted to" ; it was not entitled to submit "entirely new and discrete incidents which are made the subject of new claims of responsibility". The Judgment of 1 1 June 1998 was accordingly to be interpreted as meaning "that so far as concerns the international responsibility [of] Nigeria . . . the dispute before the Court does not include any alleged incidents other than (at most) those specified in [the] Application . . . and Additional Application".

text: For its part, Cameroon recalls in its written observations on Nigeria's request for interpretation that, in its Judgment of 1 1 June 1998, the Court rejected seven of the preliminary objections of lack of jurisdiction and inadmissibility raised by Nigeria and stated that, in the circumstances of the case, the eighth objection was not of an exclusively preliminary character; in that Judgment, the Court further recognized that it had jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the dispute and found that the Application filed by the Republic of Cameroon on 29 March 1994, as amended by the Additional Application of 6 June 1994, was admissible. Cameroon declares that the Parties "do not have to 'apply' such a judgment; they only have to take note of it". While leaving the question to the appreciation of the Court. it states that "there are very serious doubts about the possibility of bringing a request for interpretation of a judgment concerning preliminary objections".

text: Article 60 of the Statute provides: "The judgment is final and without appeal. In the event of dispute as to the meaning or scope of the judgment, the Court shall construe it upon the request of any party." This provision is supplemented by Article 98 of the Rules of Court, paragraph 1 of which provides: "ln the event of dispute as to the meaning or scope of a judgment any party may make a request for its interpretation . . ." By virtue of the second sentence of Article 60, the Court has jurisdiction to entertain requests for interpretation of any judgment rendered by it. This provision makes no distinction as to the type of judgment concerned. It follows, therefore, that a judgment on preliminary objections, just as well as a judgment on the merits, can be the object of a request for interpretation. However, "the second sentence of Article 60 was inserted in order, if necessary, to enable the Court to make quite clear the points which had been settled with binding force in a judgment, . . . a request which has not that object does not come within the terms of this provision" (Interprrtution of Judgrnc~ilts Nos. 7 und 8 (Facto- ut Chorzott,), Jur/gnlerrt No. / / , 1927, P.C./. J., S ~ l r i e . ~ il. No. 13, p. 11). In consequence, any request for interpretation must relate to the operative part of the judgment and cannot concern the reasons for the judgment except in so far as these are inseparable from the operative part.

text: In the case concerning the Lund und Maritime Bourzdurjl betli-c~rrz Caineroon and Nigeriu, Nigeria had put forward a sixth preliminary objection "to the effect that there is no basis for a judicial determination that Nigeria bears international responsibility for alleged frontier incursions". In its Judgment of I I June, the Court summarized Nigeria's position on this point: "Nigeria contends that the submissions of Cameroon do not meet the standards required by Article 38 of the Rules of Court and general principles of law regarding the adequate presentation of facts . . . [Wlhat Cameroon has presented to the Court does not give Nigeria the knowledge which it needs . . . Similarly, in Nigeria's view, the material submitted is so sparse that it does not enable the Court to carry out fair and effective judicial determination . . . While Nigeria acknowledge[d] that a State has some latitude in expanding later what it ha[d] said in its Application and in its Memorial, Cameroon [was] said to be essentially restricted in its elaboration

text: to the case as presented in its Application." (Z.C.J. Reports 1998,

text: p. 317, para. 96.)

text: In the operative part of its Judgment of 1 1 June 1998, the Court " [ r ] e j e c t s the sixth preliminary objection". The reasons for this are set out in paragraphs 98 to 101 of the Judgment. These deal in detail with Cameroon's rights as regards the presentation of "facts and legal considerations" that it might wish to put forward in support of its submissions seeking a ruling against Nigeria (ihid., p. 31 8, para. 99). These reasons are inseparable from the operative part of the Judgment and in this regard the request therefore meets the conditions laid down by Article 60 of the Statute in order for the Court to have jurisdiction to entertain a request for interpretation of a judgment.

text: The Court will now examine the admissibility of the request of Nigeria. The question of the admissibility of requests for interpretation of the Court's judgments needs particular attention because of the need to avoid impairing the finality, and delaying the implementation, of these judgments. It is not without reason that Article 60 of the Statute lays down, in the first place, that judgments are "final and without appeal". Thereafter, the Article provides that in the case of a "dispute as to the meaning or scope of the judgment", it shall be construed by the Court upon the request of any Party. The language and structure of Article 60 reflect the primacy of the principle of res judicutu. That principle must be maintained. The Court adheres to what it has previously held, namely that "[tlhe real purpose of the request must be to obtain an interpretation of the judgment. This signifies that its object must be solely to obtain clarification of the meaning and the scope of what the Court has decided with binding force, and not to obtain an answer to questions not so decided. Any other construction of Article 60 of the Statute would nullify the provision of the article that the judgment is final and without appeal." (Request for lnterpretution oj'the Judgment qf 20 Novenîber 1950 in the Asylum Cuse, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 402.)

text: In its Judgment on the Applicution for Revision und Interpretution of the Judgment of 24 Fehruary 1982 in the Case cotzcerning tlze Continental Shelf (TunisiaILibyan Arab Jamahiriya) (Tunisiu v. Lib),un Arab Jan~trhiriyaj, the Court similarly held that

text: "[ilt is however a condition of admissibility of a request for interpretation . . . that the real purpose of the request be to obtain an interpretation - a clarification of that meaning and scope (I. C. J. Reports 1985, p. 223, para. 56)".

text: In the present case, the Court would initially recall what were Cameroon's submissions with regard to the alleged frontier incidents in the case concerning the Land und Maritime Boundary hetiveen Cameroon und Nigeria. In its Application as amended by its Additional Application, Cameroon complained in 1994 "of grave and repeated incursions of Nigerian groups and armed forces into Cameroonian territory al1 along the frontier between the two countries". It further requested the Court to adjudge that the "internationally unlawful acts" alleged to have occurred in the Bakassi and Lake Chad regions involve the responsibility of Nigeria. In its Memorial of 16 March 1995, Cameroon developed these submissions by emphasizing that, as a result of the "internationally unlawful acts" set out in pages 561 to 648 of the Memorial, Nigeria had incurred international responsibility. This document dealt not only with incidents in the Bakassi and Lake Chad regions, but also with those in other frontier areas and in particular at Tipsan. Then, in its observations of 30 April 1996. Cameroon confirmed its previous submissions and in Annex 1 to those observations listed incidents relating to 42 localities situated along the length of the frontier. Some of the incidents mentioned in Cameroon's Memorial and observations had occurred after the date of the Additional Application.

text: T o these submissions, Nigeria raised its sixth objection to admissibility. It argued that Cameroon's initial Application as amended restricted itself to vague allegations as to "the dates, circumstances and precise locations of the alleged incursions and incidents". It added that this Application "made n o claim as to Nigeria's international responsibility in relation to acts occurring outside Bakassi and Lake Chad". It considered that Cameroon must "essentially confine itself to the facts . . . presented in its Application". From this it concluded that any subsequent attempt to enlarge the scope of the case was inadmissible and that "additions" presented subsequently with a view to establishing Nigeria's responsibility must be disregarded.

text: REQUEST FOR INTERPRETATION (JUDGMENT) 3 8

text: By its Judgment of I l June 1998, the Court rejected Nigeria's sixth preliminary objection. The Court explained that "[tlhe decision on Nigeria's sixth preliminary objection hinges upon the question of whether the requirements which an application must meet and which are set out in Article 38, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court are met" (I. C.J. Reports 1998, p. 318, para. 98). The Court added that the term "succinct" used in Article 38, paragraph 2, of the Rules ("[the Application] shall also specify the precise nature of the claim, together with a succinct statement of the facts and grounds on which the claim is based") does not mean "complete" and does not preclude later additions to the statement of the facts and grounds on which the claim is based. The Court also found that the latitude of an applicant State, in developing what it has said in its application, is not strictly limited, as suggested by Nigeria. The Court underlined, inter aliu, that that conclusion cannot be drawn from the Court's pronouncement on the importance of the point of time of the submission of the application as the critical date for the determination of its admissibility as "these pronouncements d o not refer to the content of applications (Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Conv~nrion urising from the Aerial Incident ar Lockerbie (Libyan Aruh Jumalziriya v. United Kingdom), Prelinlinury Objections, Judgment, I. C. J Reports 1998, p. 26, para. 44; and Questions of Interpretation und Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Stutes of Amrrica), Prelitninury Objc.>ctions, Judgment, 1. C. J. Reports 1998, p. 130, para. 43)" (ibid., p. 318, para. 99). The Court wishes to reiterate that the question of the conditions for the admissibility of an application a t the time of its introduction, and the question of the admissibility of the presentation of additional facts and legal grounds, are two different things. The Court indicated, in its Judgment of 1 1 June 1998, that the limit of the freedom to present additional facts and legal considerations is that there must be no transformation of the dispute brought before the Court by the application into another dispute which is different in character. Whether that is the case ultimately has to be decided by the Court in each individual case in which the question arises. With regard to Nigeria's sixth preliminary objection, the Judgment of 1 1 June 1998 has concluded that "[iln this case, Cameroon has not so transformed the dispute" (ihid., p. 319, para. 100) and that Cameroon's Application met the requirements of Article 38 of the Rules. Thus, the Court made no distinction between "incidents" and "facts"; it found that additional incidents constitute additional facts, and that their introduction in proceedings before the Court is governed by the same rules. In this respect, there is no need for the Court to stress that it has and will strictly apply the principle of audi altcrarn partem.

text: It follows from the foregoing that the Court has already clearly dealt with and rejected, in its Judgment of 1 I June 1998, the first of the three submissions presented by Nigeria at the end of its request for interpretation, namely that :

text: " ( a ) the dispute before the Court does not include any alleged incidents other than (at most) those specified in Cameroon's Application of 29 March 1994 and Additional Application of 6 June 1994".

text: The Court would therefore be unable to entertain this first submission

text: without calling into question the effect of the Judgment concerned as rrs

text: judic-ata. The two other submissions, namely that:

text: " ( b ) Cameroon's freedom to present additional facts and legal considerations relates (at most) only to those specified in Cameroon's Application of 29 March 1994 and Additional Application of 6 June 1994",

text: and that :

text: "(c) the question whether facts alleged by Cameroon are established o r not relates (at most) only to those specified in Cameroon's Application of 29 March 1994 and Additional Application of 6 June 1994",

text: endeavour to remove from the Court's consideration elements of law and fact which it has, in its Judgment of 11 June 1998, already authorized Cameroon to present, o r which Cameroon has not yet put forward. In either case, the Court would be unable to entertain these submissions. It follows from the foregoing that Nigeria's request for interpretation is inadmissible.

text: In view of the conclusions it has reached above, there is n o need for the Court to examine whether there is, between the Parties, a "dispute as to the meaning or scope of the judgment" of 1 1 June 1998, as contemplated by Article 60 of the Statute.

text: In its written observations, Cameroon seeks not only to have the Court declare Nigeria's request for interpretation inadmissible, it also requests that, in conformity with Article 97 of the Rules, Nigeria be charged with the additional costs caused to Cameroon by Nigeria's request.

text: Article 64 of the Statute provides that "[u]nless otherwise decided by the Court, each party shall bear its own costs". This provision is given effect by Article 97 of the Rules of Court. While anticipating the possi-

text: bility of exceptions, in circumstances which it does not specify, Article 64 confirms the

text: "basic principle regarding the question of costs in contentious proceedings before international tribunals, to the effect that each party shall bear its own" (ApplicutionfOr Revieiv of Judgement No. 158 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, Advisory Opinion, I. C. J. Reports 1973, p. 212, para. 98).

text: The Court sees no reason to depart in the present case from the general rule set forth in Article 64 of the Statute.

text: For these reasons,

text: (1) By thirteen votes to three,

text: Drclures inadmissible the request for interpretation of the Judgment of 1 1 June 1998 in the case concerning the Lund und Maritime Boundury betli-een Cumeroon und Nigeria (Cumeroon v. Nigeriu), Preliminuiy Objections, presented by Nigeria on 28 October 1998; I N FAVOUR : President Schwebel; Judges Oda, Bedjaoui, Guillaume, Ranjeva, Herczegh, Shi, Fleischhauer, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans; Judge ad hoc Mbaye; AGAINST: Vice-President Weeramantry; Judge Koroma; Judge ad hoc Ajibola.

text: ( 2 ) Unanimously, Rejects Cameroon's request that Nigeria bear the additional costs caused to Cameroon by the above-mentioned request for interpretation.

text: Done in French and in English, the French text being authoritative, at the Peace Palace, The Hague. this twenty-fifth day of March, one thousand nine hundred and ninety-nine, in three copies, one of which will be placed in the archives of the Court and the others transmitted to the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Government of the Republic of Cameroon respectively.

text: (Signed) Stephen M. SCHWEBEL, President.

text: (Signed) Eduardo VALENCIA-OSPINA, Registrar.

text: REQUEST FOR INTERPRETATION ( J U D G M E N T ) 4 1

text: Vice-President WEERAMANTRY, Judge KOROMA, and Judge ad hoc AJIBOLA append dissenting opinions to the Judgment of the Court.

text: (Inifiulled) S.M.S.

text: (Initiallrd) E.V.O.

type: avgorande