ICC-02/11-02/11-186

The Prosecutor v. Charles Blé Goudé

Domstol: International Criminal Court
Mål: ICC-02/11-02/11
Dokumentnummer: ICC-02/11-02/11-186
Avgörandedatum: 2014-12-11
Kammare: Pre-Trial Chamber I
Dokumenttyp: Decision on the confirmation of charges against Charles Blé Goudé

fBAE

Original: English No .: ICC-02/11-02/11 Date: 11 December 2014

PRE-TRIAL CHAMBER I

Before: Judge Silvia Fernández de Gurmendi, Presiding Judge Judge Ekaterina Trendafilova Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert

SITUATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF CÔTE D’IVOIRE IN THE CASE OF THE PROSECUTOR V . CHARLES BLÉ GOUDÉ

Public

Decision on the confirmation of charges against Charles Blé Goudé

No. ICC-02/11-02/11 1/90 11 December 2014

Decision to be notified, in accordance with regulation 31 of the Regulations of the Court, to:

The Office of the Prosecutor Counsel for the Defence

Fatou Bensouda Nicholas Kaufman James Stewart

Legal Representatives of the Victims Legal Representatives of the Applicants

Unrepresented Victims Unrepresented Applicants for Participation/Reparation

The Office of Public Counsel for The Office of Public Counsel for the Victims Defence

Paolina Massidda

States Representatives Amicus Curiae

REGISTRY

Registrar Defence Support Section

Herman von Hebel

Victims and Witnesses Unit Detention Section

Victims Participation and Reparations Other Section

No. ICC-02/11-02/11 2/90 11 December 2014

Pre-Trial Chamber I (the “Chamber”) of the International Criminal Court (the “Court”) hereby issues the decision pursuant to article 61(7) of the Rome Statute (the “Statute”) on the confirmation of charges against Charles Blé Goudé.

SECTION 1. INTRODUCTION

I. Procedural history

1 On 3 October 2011, Pre-Trial Chamber III authorised the commencement of an investigation in Côte d’Ivoire with respect to crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court committed since 28 November 2010. 1 2. On 21 December 2011, Pre-Trial Chamber III issued the “Warrant of Arrest for Charles Blé Goudé”. 2 3. On 15 March 2012, the situation in Côte d’Ivoire was reassigned to the Chamber. 3 4. On 22 March 2014, Charles Blé Goudé was surrendered to the Court. Charles Blé Goudé made his first appearance before the Chamber on 27 March 2014. 4

5 On 11 June 2014, Judge Silvia Fernández de Gurmendi, acting as Single Judge, issued the “Decision on victims’ participation in the pre-trial

“ Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an 1 Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire ”, ICC-02/11-14-Corr, para. 212. On 22 February 2012, Pre-Trial Chamber III expanded its authorisation for the investigation in Côte d’Ivoire to include crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court allegedly committed between 19 September 2002 and 28 November 2010, see “ Decision on the ‘Prosecution’s provision of further information regarding potentially relevant crimes committed between 2002 and 2010 ’”, ICC-02/11-36, para. 37. 2 ICC-02/11-02/11-1 . See also Pre-Trial Chamber III, “ Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application Pursuant to Article 58 for a warrant of arrest against Charles Blé Goudé ”, 6 January 2012, ICC-02/11-02/11-3. ICC-02/11-37 . 3 4 Transcript of hearing, ICC-02/11-02/11-T-3-CONF-ENG. A public redacted version is also available, see Transcript of hearing , ICC-02/11-02/11-T-3-Red-ENG. No. ICC-02/11-02/11 5/90 11 December 2014

proceedings and related issues”, wherein she, inter alia , admitted 199 victims

to participate in the proceedings, appointed counsel from the Office of Public

Counsel for victims as common legal representative and ruled on the set of

procedural rights accorded to the participating victims in the present case.

On 1 August 2014, the Single Judge admitted a further 272 victims to

participate in the proceedings, represented by the same common legal

representative, and terminated the status as victim participating in the case of

one applicant.

6 On 22 August 2014, the Prosecutor filed, inter alia , the document

containing the charges (the “DCC”)

and her list of evidence.

7 The Defence filed its list of evidence on 12 September 2014.

8 The confirmation of charges hearing was held between 29 September

2014 and 2 October 2014,

while the Defence also filed final written

submissions on 15 October 2014.

Pre-Trial Chamber I, “ Décision portant désignation d’un juge unique ”, 16 March 2012, ICC- 5 02/11-02/11-9. ICC-02/11-02/11-83 , pp. 19-22. “ Second Decision on victims’ participation in the pre-trial proceedings and related issues ”, 7 ICC-02/11-02/11-111, pp. 13-16. ICC-02/11-02/11-124-Anx1-Corr; ICC-02/11-02/11-124-Conf-Anx2-Corr, see also ICC-02/11- 8 02/11-124-Anx2-Corr-Red, ICC-02/11-02/11-124-Conf-Anx2-Corr-tENG. ICC-02/11-02/11-124-Conf-Anx3-Corr. On 29 August 2014, the Single Judge authorised the 9 Prosecutor to rely on an additional item of evidence, see “ Decision on the Prosecutor’s request to add an item to her list of evidence ”, ICC-02/11-02/11-138. 10 ICC-02/11-02/11-153-Conf-AnxA; ICC-02/11-02/11-153-Conf-AnxB; ICC-02/11-02/11-153- Conf-AnxB-Red. On 22 September 2014, the Single Judge authorised the Defence to rely on five additional items of evidence, see “ Decision on the ‘Defence request to add recently disclosed material to its list of evidence ’”, ICC-02/11-02/11-164. 11 Transcript of hearing, 29 September 2014, ICC-02/11-02/11-T-5-CONF-ENG; Transcript of hearing, 30 September 2014, ICC-02/11-02/11-T-6-CONF-ENG; Transcript of hearing, 1 October 2014, ICC-02/11-02/11-T-7-CONF-ENG; Transcript of hearing, 2 October 2014, ICC- 02/11-02/11-T-8-CONF-ENG. Public redacted versions are also available, see ICC-02/11-02/11- T-5-Red-ENG; ICC-02/11-02/11-T-6-Red-ENG; ICC-02/11-02/11-T-7-Red-ENG; ICC-02/11- 02/11-T-8-Red-ENG.

No. ICC-02/11-02/11 6/90 11 December 2014

9 On 12 November 2014, the Chamber issued the “Decision on the Defence challenge to the admissibility of the case against Charles Blé Goudé for insufficient gravity”, wherein it rejected a Defence challenge to the admissibility of the case before the Court. 13

II. Preliminary remarks

10 The Prosecutor alleges that Charles Blé Goudé is criminally responsible, in the alternative, under articles 25(3)(a), (b), (c) and (d) of the Statute, for crimes against humanity of murder under article 7(1)(a) of the Statute (Count 1), rape under article 7(1)(g) of the Statute (Count 2), other inhumane acts under article 7(1)(k) of the Statute or alternatively attempted murder under articles 7(1)(a) and 25(3)(f) of the Statute (Count 3), and persecution under article 7(1)(h) of the Statute (Count 4) committed during the course of five particular incidents in Abidjan: (i) the attacks on 16-19 December 2010 related to the demonstrations at the RTI building; (ii) the attack in Yopougon on 25-28 February 2011; (iii) the attack on a women’s demonstration in Abobo on 3 March 2011; (iv) the shelling of Abobo market and the surrounding area on 17 March 2011; and (v) the attack in Yopougon on or around 12 April 2011. 14 11. In accordance with article 19 of the Statute, the Chamber observes that the crimes with which Charles Blé Goudé is charged fall within the jurisdiction of the Court, as the Prosecutor alleges the commission of crimes against humanity under article 7 of the Statute (jurisdiction ratione materiae ) on ICC-02/11-02/11-179-Conf-Corr. A public redacted version was also filed, see ICC-02/11- 12 02/11-179-Corr-Red. 13 ICC-02/11-02/11-185 . 14 DCC, paras 322-334 and pp. 243-244. No. ICC-02/11-02/11 7/90 11 December 2014

the territory of Côte d’Ivoire (jurisdiction ratione loci ) between 16 December

2010 and on or around 12 April 2011 (jurisdiction ratione temporis ).

12 In the present decision, the Chamber renders its determination under

article 61(7) of the Statute on whether there is sufficient evidence to establish

substantial grounds to believe that Charles Blé Goudé committed each of the

crimes charged. According to the jurisprudence of the Court, in order to meet

this evidentiary threshold, the Prosecutor must “offer concrete and tangible

proof demonstrating a clear line of reasoning underpinning [her] specific

allegations”.

13 The Chamber’s determination is based on an assessment of the evidence

relied upon by the Prosecutor and the Defence – and included for this

purpose on their respective lists of evidence pursuant to rule 121(3) and (6) of

the Rules of Procedure and Evidence – taking into account the oral and

written submissions advanced by the parties as well as the legal

representative of the victims admitted to participate at the confirmation of

charges hearing.

Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, Declaration dated 18 April 2003, ICC-02/11-01/11-129-Anx16; Pre- 15 Trial Chamber III, “ Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire ”, 3 October 2011, ICC- 02/11-14-Corr. See Pre-Trial Chamber I, “ Decision on the confirmation of charges ”, 29 January 2007, ICC- 16 01/04-01/06-803-tEN, para. 39; id ., “ Decision on the confirmation of charges ”, 30 September 2008, ICC-01/04-01/07-717, para. 65; Pre-Trial Chamber II, “ Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo ”, 15 June 2009, ICC-01/05-01/08-424, para. 29; Pre-Trial Chamber I, “ Decision on the confirmation of charges ”, 16 December 2011, ICC-01/04-01/10-465-Red, para. 40; Pre- Trial Chamber II, “ Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute ”, 23 January 2012, ICC-01/09-02/11-382-Red, para. 52; id ., “ Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Bosco Ntaganda ”, 9 June 2014, ICC-01/04-02/06-309, para. 9; Pre-Trial Chamber I, “ Decision on the confirmation of charges against Laurent Gbagbo ”, 12 June 2014, ICC-02/11- 01/11-656-Red, para. 19; Pre-Trial Chamber II, “ Decision pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute ”, 11 November 2014, ICC-01/05-01/13-749, para. 25.

No. ICC-02/11-02/11 8/90 11 December 2014

14 The Chamber has assessed the probative value of the relevant evidence, bearing in mind that due to the limited scope and purpose of the confirmation of charges proceedings, such assessment is limited and that, as recognised by the Appeals Chamber, the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is “necessarily presumptive”. 17 Indeed, the Chamber is mindful of the guidance of the Appeals Chamber that while a Pre-Trial Chamber may evaluate the credibility of witnesses, “it should take great care in finding that a witness is or is not credible”, 18 as it considers that the credibility of witnesses can only be properly addressed at trial.

15 The conclusions of the Chamber are based on the totality of the available evidence, considered in a system as a whole, regardless of which party originally tendered the evidence in the record of the case. Consistent with the established practice of Pre-Trial Chambers, 19 the items of evidence referred to in the present decision are included for the sole purpose of providing the reasoning that underpins its determination. This is without prejudice to the relevance of other items of evidence than those referred to, which the Chamber has in any case considered thoroughly. More specifically, a lack of explicit reference to an item of evidence may signify that the finding to which it relates is already sufficiently supported by other pieces of evidence, or, conversely, that a certain finding, satisfactorily established in light of the 17 Appeals Chamber, “ Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision of Pre- Trial Chamber I of 16 December 2011 entitled ‘Decision on the confirmation of charges’ ”, 30 May 2012, ICC-01/04-01/10-514, para. 48. Id . 18 19 Pre-Trial Chamber I, “ Decision on the confirmation of charges ”, 29 January 2007, ICC-01/04- 01/06-803-tEN, para. 39; id. , “ Decision on the confirmation of charges ”, 30 September 2008, ICC-01/04-01/07-717, para. 69; id., “ Decision on the Confirmation of Charges ”, 8 February 2010, ICC-02/05-02/09-243-Red, para. 45; id., “ Corrigendum of the ‘Decision on the Confirmation of Charges ’”, 7 March 2011, ICC-02/05-03/09-121-Corr-Red, para. 39; id ., “ Decision on the confirmation of charges ”, 16 December 2011, ICC-01/04-01/10-465-Red, para. 48; Pre-Trial Chamber II, “ Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute ”, 23 January 2012, ICC-01/09-02/11-382-Red, para. 60; Pre- Trial Chamber I, “ Decision on the confirmation of charges against Laurent Gbagbo ”, 12 June 2014, ICC-02/11-01/11-656-Red, para. 22. No. ICC-02/11-02/11 9/90 11 December 2014

evidence taken as a whole, is not negated by one or more other discrete items of evidence.

16 The same applies to the arguments advanced by the parties and participants in their submissions, each of which has been carefully considered as part of the Chamber’s determination. This decision does not explicitly address each and every submission of the parties and participants, but only those that are necessary to provide sufficient reasoning for the Chamber’s determination under article 61(7) of the Statute.

SECTION 2. ANALYSIS OF THE EVIDENCE

I. The five charged incidents

A. Attacks related to the demonstrations at the RTI building (16-19 December 2010) 17. The Prosecutor alleges that between 16 and 19 December 2010, in Abidjan, during and after a pro-Ouattara march on the building of the Ivorian Radio and Television (RTI), the pro-Gbagbo forces killed at least 45 persons, raped at least 16 women and girls, and wounded at least 54 persons. 20 18. The evidence shows that a demonstration leading to the RTI building in Cocody was planned for 16 December 2010 and announced in advance by leaders of the Rally of Houphouetists for Democracy and Peace (RHDP). 21

19 The intention to hold the demonstration was known to the high commanders of the Defence and Security Forces (FDS), 22 and a meeting took place in advance at which Laurent Gbagbo prohibited the demonstration,

DCC, paras 327(a), 328(a), 329(a). 20 21 CIV-OTP-0019-0211 at 0216; CIV-OTP-0019-0306 at 0311; CIV-OTP-0020-0033 at 0037; CIV- OTP-0020-0064 at 0072; CIV-OTP-0020-0335 at 0377, 0379; CIV-OTP-0028-0550 at 0556; CIV- OTP-0032-0011 at 0021; CIV-OTP-0040-0372 at 0384; CIV-OTP-0042-0508 at 0547; CIV-OTP- 0044-2614 at 2617; CIV-OTP-0044-2628 at 2638; CIV-OTP-0048-1675 at 1680; see also CIV-OTP- 0002-0366 at 0367; CIV-OTP-0016-0390 at 0407; CIV-OTP-0051-2210 at 2210. 22 CIV-OTP-0051-0335 at 0352, 0353; CIV-OTP-0051-0871 at 0900. No. ICC-02/11-02/11 10/90 11 December 2014

instructing the high commanders of the FDS to take any necessary measures

to prevent it. The FDS then initiated a well-coordinated and comprehensive

operation on the ground with the aim of preventing the demonstrators from

reaching the RTI.

20 In addition to the deployment of the FDS, the evidence indicates the

presence of militia and mercenary elements and their participation in the

repression of the march. Elements of the Group of Patriots for Peace (GPP)

were deployed to participate in the dispersion of the demonstrators in

coordination with the FDS elements, with instruction to “ mater par tous les

moyens ”.

Most importantly, witnesses describe the involvement of members

of the Federation of Students and School Pupils of Côte d’Ivoire (FESCI), a

youth organisation which, as further outlined below, effectively operated as a

militia.

According to the evidence, members of FESCI acted following

instructions given from Charles Blé Goudé to Augustin Mian to mobilise the

students in Cocody against the RHDP activists.

CIV-OTP-0051-0935 at 0937, 0957, 0960-0962; CIV-OTP-0053-0574 at 0608-0609. The 23 Chamber considers that the discrepancy in the evidence as to whether this meeting occurred on 14 or 15 December 2010 is immaterial for the purposes of the present decision. CIV-OTP-0006-0169 at 0170; CIV-OTP-0011-0430 at 0443; CIV-OTP-0014-0233 at 0262-0263; 24 CIV-OTP-0015-0164 at 0174-0177, 0180-0181; CIV-OTP-0015-0270 at 0277-0282; CIV-OTP-0020- 0193 at 0209-0211; CIV-OTP-0046-1011 at 1018, 1019, 1021, 1023; CIV-OTP-0047-0961 at 0961; CIV-OTP-0047-0962 at 0962; CIV-OTP-0047-0963 at 0963; CIV-OTP-0047-0964 at 0964; CIV- OTP-0051-0335 at 0352, 0354, 0355, 0358-0366, 0369, 0374-0376, 0381, 0384; CIV-OTP-0051-0907 at 0912-0913, 0927-0928; CIV-OTP-0051-0935 at 0938-0957, 0970; CIV-OTP-0057-1430 at 1449; CIV-OTP-0057-1463 at 1487-1493. 25 CIV-OTP-0019-0211 at 0217; CIV-OTP-0020-0033 at 0042; CIV-OTP-0020-0064 at 0076, 0078; CIV-OTP-0029-0323 at 0332; CIV-OTP-0044-2614 at 2618-2619; see also CIV-OTP-0002-0166 at 0168; CIV-OTP-0048-1396 at 1430. CIV-OTP-0060-0015 at 0015; CIV-OTP-0063-1765 at 1774-1775, 1782, 1788; CIV-OTP-0063- 26 2271 at 2280, 2290, 2296. CIV-OTP-0063-2597 at 2611. 27 CIV-OTP-0019-0211 at 0217; CIV-OTP-0020-0064 at 0076-0077; CIV-OTP-0063-1765 at 1791, 28 1794; CIV-OTP-0063-2271 at 2286. 29 See below, para. 70. 30 CIV-OTP-0063-2597 at 2610.

No. ICC-02/11-02/11 11/90 11 December 2014

21 The evidence shows that the unarmed

demonstrators advancing from

various directions throughout Abidjan towards the RTI were attacked by FDS

units, supported by militia and mercenary elements, leading to killings and

injuries

and at least one instance of rape.

22 Demonstrators at the premises of RHDP political parties in Cocody were

attacked at those locations, which equally resulted in deaths and injuries.

appears that the violence against demonstrators was particularly intense at

locations close to the RTI.

23 According to the evidence, after the dispersal of the demonstrations, the

FDS continued to actively search neighbourhoods close to the RTI, arresting

and attacking demonstrators. Witnesses describe how they were arrested

and held in police custody where they were raped, at times repeatedly over a

31 CIV-OTP-0019-0211 at 0217; CIV-OTP-0019-0306 at 0317; CIV-OTP-0020-0033 at 0039; CIV- OTP-0020-0064 at 0075; CIV-OTP-0020-0335 at 0377, 0379; CIV-OTP-0040-0372 at 0385; CIV- OTP-0044-2614 at 2618; CIV-OTP-0044-2628 at 2638, 2641, 2642; CIV-OTP-0048-1675 at 1680; see also CIV-OTP-0063-1765 at 1789-1790. 32 CIV-OTP-0002-0647 at 0660; CIV-OTP-0003-0745 at 0745; CIV-OTP-0007-0231 at 0232; CIV- OTP-0010-0028 at 0031-0032; CIV-OTP-0014-0289 at 0301; CIV-OTP-0019-0211 at 0217-0219; CIV-OTP-0019-0306 at 0311-0314; CIV-OTP-0020-0033 at 0039-0042; CIV-OTP-0020-0064 at 0073-0078; CIV-OTP-0020-0335 at 0377-0378; CIV-OTP-0028-0550 at 0556-0557; CIV-OTP-0032- 0011 at 0022-0023; CIV-OTP-0040-0372 at 0385-0388; CIV-OTP-0040-0419 at 0419; CIV-OTP- 0042-0508 at 0547-0549; CIV-OTP-0044-2401 at 2402; CIV-OTP-0044-2408 at 2410; CIV-OTP- 0044-2441 at 2444; CIV-OTP-0044-2614 at 2618-2619; CIV-OTP-0044-2628 at 2639-2649; CIV- OTP-0045-0510 at 0511; CIV-OTP-0045-0735 at 0735; CIV-OTP-0045-1157 at 1165; CIV-OTP- 0045-1413 at 1413; CIV-OTP-0046-0275 at 0284; CIV-OTP-0048-1396 at 1429-1430; CIV-OTP- 0048-1675 at 1680-1681; CIV-OTP-0049-2570 at 2571-2596; CIV-OTP-0057-1430 at 1449-1450; CIV-OTP-0057-1463 at 1488, 1491; CIV-OTP-0057-1494 at 1496. CIV-OTP-0044-2614 at 2619-2620. 33 34 CIV-OTP-0029-0323 at 0332-0333; CIV-OTP-0032-0011 at 0021; CIV-OTP-0039-0143 at 0173- 0174; CIV-OTP-0044-2628 at 2640-2645; CIV-OTP-0045-1157 at 1165; see also CIV-OTP-0045- 0510 at 0512-0515; CIV-OTP-0045-0541 at 0541; CIV-OTP-0051-0978 at 0992-0993, 0997-0998. CIV-OTP-0007-0231 at 0232-0233; CIV-OTP-0007-0235 at 0236; CIV-OTP-0020-0064 at 0074- 35 0076; CIV-OTP-0042-0508 at 0549; CIV-OTP-0044-2393 at 2395; CIV-OTP-0044-2397 at 2399; CIV-OTP-0044-2401 at 2402; CIV-OTP-0045-0541 at 0541; CIV-OTP-0048-1396 at 1429; see also CIV-OTP-0051-0335 at 0371, 0384-0387. CIV-OTP-0020-0064 at 0076-0079; CIV-OTP-0020-0335 at 0378-0379; CIV-OTP-0044-2628 at 36 2644-2647; CIV-OTP-0045-0717 at 0717; CIV-OTP-0045-0735 at 0736; CIV-OTP-0045-0999 at 0999-1002.

No. ICC-02/11-02/11 12/90 11 December 2014

period of several days, 37 and some specify that the attackers made reference to the victims’ perceived ethnicity or political affiliation. 38 24. In addition, there is evidence that the violence by the FDS as well as militias continued in the days following 16 December 2010. FDS units went into hospitals where they searched for wounded participants of the demonstration; 39 the FDS and militias killed, raped and abducted residents during raids on civilian homes; the FDS attacked mosques; and pro- 40 41 Gbagbo militias committed killings at a roadblock. 42 25. In conclusion, based on the evidence available assessed individually and taken as a whole, the Chamber finds that the violent repression of the demonstration of RHDP supporters on 16 December 2010 and the violence in the days that followed resulted in the killing of at least 45 persons, the rape of at least 16 women and girls, and the injury of at least 54 persons. B. The attack in Yopougon (25-28 February 2011) 26. The Prosecutor alleges that between 25 and 28 February 2011 in the Yopougon commune of Abidjan, pro-Gbagbo forces killed at least 24 persons, hailing primarily from northern Côte d’Ivoire and neighbouring West African countries, 43 and wounded at least seven persons. 44 The Prosecutor alleges that

CIV-OTP-0019-0306 at 0312-0316; CIV-OTP-0020-0033 at 0043-0049; CIV-OTP-0048-1675 at 37 1681-1684; see also CIV-OTP-0002-0647 at 0675. CIV-OTP-0019-0306 at 0314-0315; CIV-OTP-0020-0033 at 0044-0045. 38 39 CIV-OTP-0019-0211 at 0218; CIV-OTP-0020-0033 at 0049; CIV-OTP-0020-0064 at 0079; CIV- OTP-0029-0323 at 0333; CIV-OTP-0044-2628 at 2644-2645; CIV-OTP-0048-1396 at 1432. CIV-OTP-0002-0046 at 0054; CIV-OTP-0002-0166 at 0169-0170; CIV-OTP-0002-0647 at 0675- 40 0676; CIV-OTP-0002-1019 at 1020; CIV-OTP-0044-0868 at 0870-0871; CIV-OTP-0048-1396 at 1442. CIV-OTP-0002-0046 at 0056-0057; CIV-OTP-0044-0868 at 0870-0871; CIV-OTP-0048-1396 at 41 1445; CIV-OTP-0052-0386 at 0404. CIV-OTP-0002-0647 at 0677. 42 43 DCC, para. 327(b). 44 DCC, para. 329(b). No. ICC-02/11-02/11 13/90 11 December 2014

these crimes were committed on political, national, ethnic or religious grounds. 45 27. The evidence indicates that on the evening of 24 February 2011, RTI television broadcast a statement recorded by Charles Blé Goudé, 46 in which he asked the youth to hinder the movements of the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), and to attend a large meeting at 9.00 hours the following day at the Baron Bar in Yopougon in order to receive “the final instructions”. 47 Charles Blé Goudé visited the Presidential Residence the night before the broadcast, as well as on 24 February 2011 shortly after the 48 broadcast. 49 28. The evidence indicates that on the morning of 25 February 2011, during a meeting at the Baron Bar in Yopougon, Charles Blé Goudé said that he was giving an “ ordre ” to the youth that was to be applied in all neighbourhoods. The order was that when the youth returned to their neighbourhoods, they should prevent the movement of the UNOCI, contact the neighbourhood presidents, get together to be aware of and check the entrances and exits of their neighbourhoods, and report every “ personne étrangère ” coming into their neighbourhood. 50 29. According to several witnesses, soon after his speech at the Baron Bar, Charles Blé Goudé held another meeting at the nearby Place CP1 , where he

DCC, para. 330. 45 CIV-OTP-0026-0020 at 01:08:48-01:12:10 (CIV-OTP-0044-2534 at 2556-2557). 46 CIV-OTP-0026-0020 at 01:10:28-01:11:47 (CIV-OTP-0044-2534 at 2557). 47 48 CIV-OTP-0053-0574 at 0704. CIV-OTP-0053-0574 at 0706. 49 CIV-D25-0001-0985 at 1006; CIV-OTP-0002-0647 at 0677; CIV-OTP-0004-0072 at 0118; CIV- 50 OTP-0043-0269 at 00:00:00-00:00:48 (CIV-OTP-0047-0611 at 0613); CIV-OTP-0055-0421 at 0421; CIV-OTP-0057-1345 at 1362; CIV-OTP-0058-0586 at 0604; CIV-OTP-0063-1497 at 1502-1503, 1524-1527; CIV-OTP-0064-0087 at 00:14:01-00:14:44 (CIV-OTP-0063-2998 at 3001). No. ICC-02/11-02/11 14/90 11 December 2014

presented a message to the crowd. 51 Shortly after the meeting ended, in the

vicinity of Place CP1 , pro-Gbagbo youth identified two men as “rebels” after

finding that they wore talismans, and killed them by beating and burning

them. 52

30 Further, the evidence shows that clashes broke out around the Boulevard

Principal 53 dividing Doukouré and Lem – an area with inhabitants mostly

from the Dioula group, the north of Côte d’Ivoire and West African

countries 54 – from Yaho Séhi – a neighbourhood with inhabitants perceived to

be in support of Laurent Gbagbo. At the beginning of the clashes, it appears 55

that pro-Gbagbo youth and youth from Doukouré threw stones at each

other. 56

31 Around the time of the clashes, a man sought shelter inside the police

station of the 16 th arrondissement . After being pushed outside, pro-Gbagbo

youth killed the man by beating and burning him. 57 The pro-Gbagbo youth

remained at the scene of the killing when a convoy, which evidence suggests

contained Charles Blé Goudé, arrived at the police station. 58 59

CIV-OTP-0058-0289 at 0304-0305; CIV-OTP-0058-0488 at 0501; CIV-OTP-0058-0586 at 0604; 51 CIV-OTP-0061-0080 at 0085-0086. 52 CIV-OTP-0057-1345 at 1351; CIV-OTP-0058-0289 at 0305, 0311; CIV-OTP-0058-0488 at 0510. CIV-OTP-0020-0335 at 0360; CIV-OTP-0028-0229 at 0230-0231; CIV-OTP-0044-0392 at 0416; 53 CIV-OTP-0057-1345 at 1355, 1358, 1362; CIV-OTP-0058-0289 at 0304, 0306; CIV-OTP-0062-0860 at 0865. 54 CIV-OTP-0020-0335 at 0352; CIV-OTP-0029-0267 at 0289; CIV-OTP-0048-1396 at 1467; CIV- OTP-0057-1345 at 1350. CIV-OTP-0044-1738 at 1738; CIV-OTP-0058-0488 at 0495. 55 CIV-OTP-0020-0335 at 0360; CIV-OTP-0028-0229 at 0232; CIV-OTP-0044-1738 at 1738; CIV- 56 OTP-0057-1345 at 1355, 1356, 1361; CIV-OTP-0058-0289 at 0306-0307; CIV-OTP-0058-0488 at 0504; CIV-OTP-0062-0860 at 0865, 0866. CIV-OTP-0044-0392 at 0416; CIV-OTP-0058-0289 at 0307; CIV-OTP-0058-0488 at 0512. 57 CIV-OTP-0057-1345 at 1358; CIV-OTP-0058-0289 at 0307; CIV-OTP-0058-0488 at 0505; CIV- 58 OTP-0058-0586 at 0604. 59 CIV-OTP-0058-0289 at 0307-0308; CIV-OTP-0058-0488 at 0512.

No. ICC-02/11-02/11 15/90 11 December 2014

32 Two eyewitnesses explain that immediately after the convoy left,

policemen exited the building and fired towards Doukouré. The escalation

of the clash is described by several witnesses, who state that grenades were

launched

and shots were fired

towards Doukouré by militia members,

including those of Maguy le Tocard, and FDS elements, especially the police.

Witnesses also describe the presence of youth amongst the perpetrators.

appears that the grenade explosions and shots fired led to injuries and

killings.

33 The Lem mosque, located on the Boulevard Principal , was also attacked.

The evidence suggests that people had retreated into the mosque’s enclosure,

from where they continued throwing stones. Following this, it appears that

at least one grenade was launched into the mosque,

shots were fired,

and

some attackers entered the mosque.

The mosque caught fire

and Qurans

60 CIV-OTP-0058-0289 at 0308; CIV-OTP-0058-0488 at 0505. CIV-OTP-0020-0335 at 0360; CIV-OTP-0057-1345 at 1361; CIV-OTP-0058-0289 at 0308-0310; 61 CIV-OTP-0062-0860 at 0866. 62 CIV-OTP-0020-0335 at 0360, 0363; CIV-OTP-0044-1738 at 1738; CIV-OTP-0058-0289 at 0308, 0310; CIV-OTP-0062-0860 at 0866. CIV-OTP-0020-0335 at 0360-0361; CIV-OTP-0028-0229 at 0232-0233; CIV-OTP-0048-1396 at 63 1468; CIV-OTP-0057-1570 at 1581-1582; CIV-OTP-0058-0289 at 0309-0310; CIV-OTP-0062-0860 at 0865-0866. 64 CIV-OTP-0020-0335 at 0360-0361; CIV-OTP-0028-0229 at 0232-0233; CIV-OTP-0062-0860 at 0865-0866. CIV-OTP-0020-0335 at 0361; CIV-OTP-0028-0229 at 0232-0233; CIV-OTP-0057-1570 at 1582; 65 CIV-OTP-0058-0289 at 0308-0310; CIV-OTP-0058-0320 at 0329; CIV-OTP-0058-0488 at 0505; CIV-OTP-0062-0860 at 0866; CIV-OTP-0062-0872 at 0872; CIV-OTP-0062-0873 at 0873. CIV-OTP-0020-0335 at 0361; CIV-OTP-0028-0229 at 0233; CIV-OTP-0044-0392 at 0416; CIV- 66 OTP-0046-0029 at 0029; CIV-OTP-0057-1345 at 1361; CIV-OTP-0057-1378 at 1378; CIV-OTP- 0058-0289 at 0308, 0310; CIV-OTP-0058-0320 at 0320; CIV-OTP-0058-0488 at 0505, 0508; CIV- OTP-0062-0860 at 0867. CIV-OTP-0020-0335 at 0361; CIV-OTP-0028-0229 at 0232; CIV-OTP-0058-0488 at 0504, 0506. 67 CIV-OTP-0020-0335 at 0361; CIV-OTP-0058-0488 at 0503, 0506. 68 CIV-OTP-0020-0335 at 0361. 69 70 CIV-OTP-0002-0647 at 0674; CIV-OTP-0004-0072 at 0126; CIV-OTP-0044-0392 at 0416; CIV- OTP-0048-1396 at 1446; CIV-OTP-0057-1345 at 1359. CIV-OTP-0002-0647 at 0674; CIV-OTP-0004-0072 at 0126; CIV-OTP-0020-0335 at 0362; CIV- 71 OTP-0028-0229 at 0234; CIV-OTP-0043-0269 at 00:28:30-00:29:04 (CIV-OTP-0047-0611 at 0626); CIV-OTP-0044-1522 at 1526; CIV-OTP-0044-1531 at 1531-1532; CIV-OTP-0046-0029 at 0029; CIV-OTP-0048-1396 at 1446-1447; CIV-OTP-0057-1345 at 1356; CIV-OTP-0057-1570 at 1581;

No. ICC-02/11-02/11 16/90 11 December 2014

and prayer mats were burned.

The evidence shows that the perpetrators

consisted of youth, militia members, especially those of Maguy le Tocard, and

FDS elements, especially the police.

As a consequence of the attack, several

people were injured, either by bullets or machete.

The mosque’s keeper was

taken outside of the mosque and was subsequently beaten and burned to

death by a combination of youth and militia members.

34 On the same day, further along the Boulevard Principal , near a roadblock

at the Saguidiba crossing, youth and militia members accused a man of being

a rebel and beat and burned him to death. According to several sources,

killings, some of which involved individuals being burned alive, also

occurred at other locations in Yopougon.

35 As the Defence argues,

there is evidence establishing that roadblocks

existed in Yopougon prior to the morning of 25 February 2011.

However, the

evidence indicates that, between 25 and 28 February 2011, after Charles Blé

Goudé’s speeches at the Baron Bar and Place CP1 , pro-Gbagbo youth erected

CIV-OTP-0058-0289 at 0309-0310; CIV-OTP-0058-0488 at 0503, 0506, 0507; CIV-OTP-0061-0080 at 0094; CIV-OTP-0062-0860 at 0869. CIV-OTP-0048-1396 at 1446; CIV-OTP-0061-0080 at 0094. 72 73 CIV-OTP-0002-0647 at 0674; CIV-OTP-0004-0072 at 0126; CIV-OTP-0020-0335 at 0361, 0362; CIV-OTP-0044-0392 at 0416; CIV-OTP-0048-1396 at 1446; CIV-OTP-0057-1345 at 1359; CIV- OTP-0057-1570 at 1581; CIV-OTP-0058-0488 at 0503, 0506 ; CIV-OTP-0062-0860 at 0869. CIV-OTP-0002-0647 at 0674; CIV-OTP-0020-0335 at 0363; CIV-OTP-0020-0392 at 0392; CIV- 74 OTP-0020-0398 at 0398; CIV-OTP-0020-0399 at 0399; CIV-OTP-0020-0400 at 0400; CIV-OTP- 0057-1345 at 1359. CIV-OTP-0020-0335 at 0362; CIV-OTP-0044-0392 at 0416 ; CIV-OTP-0057-1345 at 1359-1360; 75 CIV-OTP-0058-0289 at 0309; CIV-OTP-0058-0488 at 0507-0508. CIV-OTP-0020-0335 at 0376-0377; CIV-OTP-0044-1738 at 1738; CIV-OTP-0046-0029 at 0030; 76 CIV-OTP-0057-1570 at 1574-1578; CIV-OTP-0058-0289 at 0311; CIV-OTP-0058-0488 at 0510; CIV-OTP-0058-0586 at 0597, 0599-0602; CIV-OTP-0061-0080 at 0106. CIV-OTP-0002-0647 at 0677; CIV-OTP-0020-0335 at 0363; CIV-OTP-0044-0392 at 0416; CIV- 77 OTP-0046-0029 at 0029-0030; CIV-OTP-0057-1345 at 1356-1357; CIV-OTP-0058-0289 at 0310 ; CIV-OTP-0058-0488 at 0512; CIV-OTP-0061-0080 at 0091-0092. Defence Final Confirmation Submissions, para. 3; Transcript of hearing, 1 October 2014, 78 ICC-02/11-02/11-T-7-Red-ENG, pp. 9-10. CIV-D25-0001-0639 at 0642-0643; CIV-D25-0001-0658 at 0670-0671; CIV-D25-0001-0840 at 79 0857-0858; CIV-D25-0001-0865 at 0890; CIV-D25-0001-0937 at 0938; CIV-D25-0001-0967 at 0978; CIV-OTP-0003-0438 at 0438; CIV-OTP-0049-2842 at 2850; CIV-OTP-0057-1570 at 1579-1580.

No. ICC-02/11-02/11 17/90 11 December 2014

additional roadblocks in Yopougon and that there was an increase in violent

acts committed by pro-Gbagbo youth at the roadblocks. The evidence

indicates that these developments were triggered by the instructions of

Charles Blé Goudé.

36 A police report further supports the conclusion that there was an

increase in violent activity at roadblocks between 25 and 28 February 2011, as

pro-Gbagbo youth and militia members killed people suspected of being

rebels.

Significantly, it is specified in the report that only Charles Blé Goudé,

the “initiator” of the roadblocks, had the power to call for the roadblocks and

the killings to end.

37 Several witnesses state that pro-Gbagbo youth and militia members

continued to attack the population in Yopougon from 26 to 28 February

2011.

In addition, reports based in part on first-hand accounts refer to

numerous killings by pro-Gbagbo youth and militia members during this

period.

80 CIV-OTP-0002-0647 at 0677; CIV-OTP-0004-0072 at 0118, 0120, 0180; CIV-OTP-0020-0335 at 0355; CIV-OTP-0028-0008 at 00:01:17-00:01:29 (CIV-OTP-0027-0440 at 0442); CIV-OTP-0028- 0229 at 0230-0231; CIV-OTP-0044-1531 at 1533; CIV-OTP-0044-1547 at 1548, 1550; CIV-OTP- 0055-0421 at 0421; CIV-OTP-0057-1345 at 1364-1366; CIV-OTP-0057-1570 at 1579-1580; CIV- OTP-0058-0289 at 0314, 0316; CIV-OTP-0058-0586 at 0605-0606; CIV-OTP-0061-0080 at 0085- 0086; CIV-OTP-0062-0860 at 0868; CIV-OTP-0063-1403 at 1414-1415; CIV-OTP-0063-1464 at 1495. CIV-OTP-0004-0072 at 0118; CIV-OTP-0020-0335 at 0355; CIV-OTP-0028-0008 at 00:01:17- 81 00:01:29 (CIV-OTP-0027-0440 at 0442); CIV-OTP-0044-1531 at 1533, 1536; CIV-OTP-0049-2842 at 2850; CIV-OTP-0057-1345 at 1364-1365; CIV-OTP-0058-0289 at 0315; CIV-OTP-0058-0425 at 0434-0435; CIV-OTP-0058-0586 at 0605; CIV-OTP-0062-0282 at 0290. CIV-OTP-0045-0135 at 0135; CIV-OTP-0046-0029 at 0029-0030. 82 CIV-OTP-0046-0029 at 0029-0030; CIV-OTP-0062-0282 at 0300-0303. 83 84 CIV-OTP-0020-0335 at 0363; CIV-OTP-0057-1345 at 1363-1364; CIV-OTP-0058-0488 at 0513. CIV-OTP-0002-0647 at 0678-0679; CIV-OTP-0003-0013 at 00:00:00-00:02:25 (CIV-OTP-0008- 85 0049 at 0050); CIV-OTP-0003-0418 at 0419-0420; CIV-OTP-0044-1480 at 1480; CIV-OTP-0044- 1531 at 1531-1536; CIV-OTP-0044-1538 at 1539-1540; CIV-OTP-0044-1542 at 1545-1546; CIV- OTP-0044-1547 at 1548-1550; CIV-OTP-0044-1568 at 1568; CIV-OTP-0044-1743 at 1743-1744; CIV-OTP-0045-0389 at 0389; CIV-OTP-0052-0292 at 0305, 0306.

No. ICC-02/11-02/11 18/90 11 December 2014

38 On the basis of the evidence presented taken individually and together,

the Chamber concludes that in the Yopougon commune of Abidjan during the

period commencing shortly after Charles Blé Goudé’s speech at the Baron Bar

on 25 February 2011, until 28 February 2011, pro-Gbagbo forces killed at least

24 persons and wounded at least seven persons. The evidence suggests that

the victims were targeted on the basis that they were perceived as Ouattara

supporters, nationals of neighbouring West African countries, Muslims,

natives of northern Côte d’Ivoire, or members of the Dioula ethnic group.

C. Attack on a women’s demonstration in Abobo (3 March 2011)

39 The Prosecutor alleges that on 3 March 2011, pro-Gbagbo forces killed

seven women and wounded at least three persons who had participated in a

pro-Ouattara women’s demonstration in Abobo commune in Abidjan.

40 The evidence before the Chamber indicates that on the morning of 3

March 2011 a demonstration of unarmed women was fired at with heavy

87 88

weapons and guns

by an FDS convoy

which included a vehicle of the

86 DCC, paras 327(c) and 329(c). 87 CIV-OTP-0019-0211 at 0220; CIV-OTP-0019-0245 at 0250; CIV-OTP-0019-0306 at 0320; CIV- OTP-0020-0033 at 0054; CIV-OTP-0020-0064 at 0082, 0084; CIV-OTP-0028-0550 at 0557; CIV- OTP-0032-0011 at 0024-0025; CIV-OTP-0040-0372 at 0395; CIV-OTP-0041-0328 at 0340. CIV-OTP-0019-0211 at 0220; CIV-OTP-0020-0064 at 0084; CIV-OTP-0032-0011 at 0028; CIV- 88 OTP-0040-0372 at 0401; CIV-OTP-0044-1619 at 1621. CIV-OTP-0003-0716 at 00:03:39-00:07:48 (CIV-OTP-0021-0104 at 0106); CIV-OTP-0019-0211 89 at 0220; CIV-OTP-0019-0245 at 0250; CIV-OTP-0019-0306 at 0321; CIV-OTP-0020-0033 at 0055; CIV-OTP-0020-0064 at 0083; CIV-OTP-0028-0550 at 0557, 0562, 0563; CIV-OTP-0032-0011 at 0026; CIV-OTP-0039-0143 at 0175-0176; CIV-OTP-0040-0372 at 0395-0396; CIV-OTP-0041-0328 at 0340; CIV-OTP-0042-0508 at 0520; CIV-OTP-0042-0587 at 00:00:43-00:18:31 (CIV-OTP-0053- 0089 at 0090-0095); CIV-OTP-0044-0313 at 0313-0314; CIV-OTP-0044-0738 at 00:00:18-00:12:51 (CIV-OTP-0053-0113 at 0115-0123); CIV-OTP-0048-1396 at 1451; see also CIV-OTP-0004-0072 at 0130. CIV-OTP-0004-0072 at 0130; CIV-OTP-0019-0245 at 0250; CIV-OTP-0019-0306 at 0320; CIV- 90 OTP-0020-0033 at 0055; CIV-OTP-0032-0011 at 0026; CIV-OTP-0039-0143 at 0174-0175; CIV- OTP-0040-0372 at 0395; CIV-OTP-0046-1033 at 1034-1038; CIV-OTP-0049-2312 at 2321-2332; CIV-OTP-0049-2336 at 2353-2355; CIV-OTP-0051-1086 at 1121, 1125-1129, 1134; CIV-OTP- 0057-1430 at 1453-1455; CIV-OTP-0057-1535 at 1553.

No. ICC-02/11-02/11 19/90 11 December 2014

Republican Guard,

coming from the direction of Camp Commando where

FDS units were stationed. Taking into account the totality of the evidence

available, the Chamber concludes that as a result of this shooting attributable

to FDS units stationed in Camp Commando, seven women who participated

in the march were killed

and at least three others were injured.

D. Shelling of Abobo market and the surrounding area (17 March 2011)

41 The Prosecutor alleges that on 17 March 2011, pro-Gbagbo forces killed

at least 40 persons and injured at least 60 persons in or near Abobo market by

shelling a densely populated area.

42 The evidence demonstrates that, on 17 March 2011, a number of mortar

shells landed on the centre of Abobo, in particular at the Siaka Koné market,

the SOS village neighbourhood and the Derrière Rails sector.

On the basis of

91 CIV-OTP-0014-0326 at 0338-0341; CIV-OTP-0019-0168 at 0172; CIV-OTP-0028-0481 at 0496; CIV-OTP-0037-0425 at 0451; CIV-OTP-0039-0143 at 0174-0175. CIV-OTP-0020-0033 at 0055; CIV-OTP-0020-0064 at 0083; CIV-OTP-0028-0550 at 0557-0558; 92 CIV-OTP-0049-2192 at 2199, 2226, 2228; see also CIV-OTP-0049-2269 at 2286. 93 CIV-OTP-0019-0211 at 0220; CIV-OTP-0019-0245 at 0250; CIV-OTP-0020-0033 at 0055-0056; CIV-OTP-0020-0064 at 0083; CIV-OTP-0028-0550 at 0558-0559, 0562-0563; CIV-OTP-0040-0372 at 0396; CIV-OTP-0041-0328 at 0340-0341; CIV-OTP-0042-0508 at 0521; CIV-OTP-0044-0313 at 0313-0314; CIV-OTP-0044-0767 at 0767. CIV-OTP-0002-0010 at 0020; CIV-OTP-0002-0598 at 0603-0604; CIV-OTP-0019-0211 at 0220; 94 CIV-OTP-0019-0245 at 0250; CIV-OTP-0028-0550 at 0558; CIV-OTP-0032-0011 at 0026-0027; CIV-OTP-0032-0051 at 0051; CIV-OTP-0032-0052 at 0052; CIV-OTP-0044-1740 at 1740; CIV- OTP-0044-1745 at 1745. DCC, paras 327(d) and 329(d). 95 96 CIV-OTP-0002-0598 at 0604; CIV-OTP-0002-0647 at 0673; CIV-OTP-0002-0983 at 0991-0992; CIV-OTP-0003-0425 at 0425; CIV-OTP-0003-0725 at 0725-0727; CIV-OTP-0004-0072 at 0140- 0141; CIV-OTP-0007-0231 at 0231-0233; CIV-OTP-0019-0211 at 0228; CIV-OTP-0019-0245 at 0248-0249; CIV-OTP-0028-0550 at 0565; CIV-OTP-0040-0372 at 0406-0409; CIV-OTP-0041-0328 at 0334-0336, 0339; CIV-OTP-0041-0345 at 0345; CIV-OTP-0041-0388 at 0392-0393; CIV-OTP- 0041-0412 at 0416-0417, 0419-0420; CIV-OTP-0042-0508 at 0538-0539; CIV-OTP-0044-0729 at 0729-0732; CIV-OTP-0044-1654 at 1662-1665; CIV-OTP-0044-1666 at 1666-1679; CIV-OTP-0046- 0275 at 0279-0283; CIV-OTP-0046-0286 at 0286; CIV-OTP-0046-0287 at 0287; CIV-OTP-0046- 0288 at 0288; CIV-OTP-0046-1203 at 1207-1209; CIV-OTP-0046-1244 at 1247-1248; CIV-OTP- 0046-1271 at 1274-1277; CIV-OTP-0046-1282 at 1282; CIV-OTP-0048-1396 at 1461-1463.

No. ICC-02/11-02/11 20/90 11 December 2014

the evidence available, the Chamber concludes that this shelling resulted in

the death of at least 40 persons and injured at least another 60.

43 The evidence indicates that the shelling was carried out by elements of

the Surface-to-Air Artillery Battalion (BASA), a unit of the National Armed

Forces of Côte d’Ivoire (FANCI) specialised in the use of heavy artillery

including mortars, posted at Camp Commando,

in accordance with orders

received from their superiors.

E. The attack in Yopougon (on or around 12 April 2011)

44 The Prosecutor alleges that on or around 12 April 2011 in Yopougon,

pro-Gbagbo forces killed at least 68 persons hailing primarily from northern

Côte d’Ivoire and neighbouring West African countries, raped at least 22

women and wounded at least two persons.

100

45 The analysis of the evidence indicates that on or around 12 April 2011, in

the Yopougon neighbourhoods of Doukouré and Mami Faitai – areas with

inhabitants mostly from the Dioula group, the north of Côte d’Ivoire and

CIV-OTP-0002-0010 at 0021; CIV-OTP-0002-0214 at 0214-0215; CIV-OTP-0002-0235 at 0235; 97 CIV-OTP-0002-0598 at 0604; CIV-OTP-0002-0647 at 0673; CIV-OTP-0002-0983 at 0991-0992; CIV-OTP-0004-0072 at 0140-0141; CIV-OTP-0019-0211 at 0228; CIV-OTP-0019-0245 at 0248- 0250; CIV-OTP-0029-0323 at 0334; CIV-OTP-0032-0011 at 0023, 0030-0031; CIV-OTP-0037-0151 at 0151; CIV-OTP-0041-0328 at 0335-0336; CIV-OTP-0041-0388 at 0392; CIV-OTP-0041-0412 at 0416-0417; CIV-OTP-0042-0508 at 0538-0539, 0540-0541; CIV-OTP-0044-1739 at 1739; CIV- OTP-0046-0275 at 0280-0282; CIV-OTP-0046-1203 at 1208; CIV-OTP-0046-1244 at 1248; CIV- OTP-0046-1254 at 1258; CIV-OTP-0046-1264 at 1264; CIV-OTP-0046-1265 at 1265; CIV-OTP- 0046-1271 at 1276; CIV-OTP-0048-1396 at 1461-1463. CIV-OTP-0004-0072 at 0140; CIV-OTP-0007-0231 at 0231-0233; CIV-OTP-0016-0084 at 0098, 98 0102; CIV-OTP-0016-0104 at 0117; CIV-OTP-0028-0481 at 0484, 0486, 0488-0491, 0495; CIV- OTP-0037-0425 at 0429, 0432, 0434-0436, 0441-0445; CIV-OTP-0039-0143 at 0148-0149, 0167- 0168; CIV-OTP-0040-0446 at 0462; CIV-OTP-0046-0275 at 0279-0280; CIV-OTP-0046-1011 at 1012-1013; CIV-OTP-0048-1396 at 1461; CIV-OTP-0048-1503 at 1510. CIV-OTP-0028-0481 at 0502-0503; CIV-OTP-0037-0425 at 0443-0444; CIV-OTP-0039-0143 at 99 0177-0179; see also CIV-OTP-0040-0446 at 0463; CIV-OTP-0041-0534 at 0574-0577. 100 DCC, paras 327(e), 328(b), 329(e).

No. ICC-02/11-02/11 21/90 11 December 2014

West-African countries

101

– pro-Gbagbo forces armed with guns and machetes

attacked people on the street and broke into homes, killing, raping and

102 103

injuring residents.

104

This violence was politically motivated and directed

against real or perceived Ouattara supporters.

105

46 The evidence suggests that a number of mass graves found in Yopougon

were associated with these acts of violence.

106

On the basis of this evidence,

101 CIV-OTP-0020-0335 at 0352; CIV-OTP-0028-0008 at 00:02:30-00:02:58 (CIV-OTP-0027-0440 at 0443); CIV-OTP-0029-0267 at 0289; CIV-OTP-0029-0656 at 0660; CIV-OTP-0039-0196 at 0219; CIV-OTP-0048-1396 at 1467; CIV-OTP-0057-1345 at 1350. CIV-OTP-0002-0631 at 0632-0633, 0642-0645; CIV-OTP-0004-0072 at 0147-0150; CIV-OTP- 102 0007-0231 at 0233; CIV-OTP-0020-0335 at 0366-0373; CIV-OTP-0020-0393 at 0393; CIV-OTP- 0020-0404 at 0404; CIV-OTP-0029-0656 at 0670-0671; CIV-OTP-0032-0054-0001 at 0104, 0106; CIV-OTP-0039-0143 at 0182-0185; CIV-OTP-0044-0356 at 0356; CIV-OTP-0044-0392 at 0415; CIV-OTP-0044-1270 at 1275; CIV-OTP-0048-1396 at 1465-1466; CIV-OTP-0049-2842 at 2860- 2861; CIV-OTP-0051-0236 at 0249-0250; CIV-OTP-0057-1345 at 1368-1369; CIV-OTP-0058-0289 at 0311-0312; CIV-OTP-0058-0488 at 0516-0517, 0519; CIV-OTP-0058-0526 at 0526; CIV-OTP- 0058-0586 at 0609; CIV-OTP-0061-0080 at 0095-0100; CIV-OTP-0061-0111 at 0111. CIV-OTP-0002-0631 at 0632-0633, 0644-0645; CIV-OTP-0004-0072 at 0149-0150; CIV-OTP- 103 0021-0955 at 0982, 0983; CIV-OTP-0022-0002 at 0002; CIV-OTP-0022-0003 at 0003; CIV-OTP- 0022-0004 at 0004; CIV-OTP-0022-0005 at 0005; CIV-OTP-0022-0006 at 0006; CIV-OTP-0022- 0008 at 0008; CIV-OTP-0022-0009 at 0009; CIV-OTP-0022-0010 at 0010; CIV-OTP-0022-0011 at 0011; CIV-OTP-0022-0013 at 0013; CIV-OTP-0022-0017 at 0017; CIV-OTP-0022-0018 at 0018; CIV-OTP-0022-0020 at 0020; CIV-OTP-0022-0022 at 0022; CIV-OTP-0022-0023 at 0023; CIV- OTP-0022-0029 at 0029; CIV-OTP-0022-0030 at 0030; CIV-OTP-0022-0037 at 0037; CIV-OTP- 0022-0038 at 0038; CIV-OTP-0022-0039 at 0039; CIV-OTP-0022-0040 at 0040; CIV-OTP-0022- 0041 at 0041; CIV-OTP-0022-0042 at 0042-0047; CIV-OTP-0029-0656 at 0670-0673; CIV-OTP- 0048-1396 at 1466-1467; CIV-OTP-0049-2842 at 2856-2859; CIV-OTP-0051-0236 at 0246-0249. 104 CIV-OTP-0004-0072 at 0147-0148; CIV-OTP-0020-0335 at 0367. CIV-OTP-0002-0631 at 0642-0644; CIV-OTP-0004-0234 at 00:01:20-00:01:30 (CIV-OTP-0021- 105 0929 at 0931); CIV-OTP-0020-0335 at 0367-0368, 0370-0371; CIV-OTP-0029-0656 at 0670-0672; CIV-OTP-0039-0143 at 0184-0185; CIV-OTP-0048-1396 at 1465-1466; CIV-OTP-0049-2842 at 2856, 2857, 2859-2861; CIV-OTP-0051-0236 at 0246, 0247; CIV-OTP-0057-1345 at 1368; CIV- OTP-0058-0289 at 0311-0312; CIV-OTP-0061-0080 at 0097-0098. CIV-OTP-0002-0598 at 0605; CIV-OTP-0002-1006 at 1006; CIV-OTP-0002-1046 at 1046; CIV- 106 OTP-0003-0603 at 0603; CIV-OTP-0004-0043 at 0043; CIV-OTP-0004-0072 at 0149; CIV-OTP- 0004-0222 at 0222-0223; CIV-OTP-0004-0234 at 00:00:00-00:00:58 (CIV-OTP-0021-0929 at 0930); CIV-OTP-0012-0048 at 00:00:00-00:07:37 (CIV-OTP-0053-0003 at 0004); CIV-OTP-0013-0108 at 0126; CIV-OTP-0017-0040 at 0040-0041; CIV-OTP-0017-0042 at 00:00:00-00:04:04 (CIV-OTP- 0021-1014 at 1015-1016); CIV-OTP-0020-0335 at 0366, 0367, 0369, 0374-0375; CIV-OTP-0020- 0387 at 0387; CIV-OTP-0020-0395 at 0396; CIV-OTP-0020-0408 at 0408; CIV-OTP-0032-0054- 0001 at 0106; CIV-OTP-0037-0138 at 0144; CIV-OTP-0044-1270 at 1274; CIV-OTP-0048-1396 at 1466; CIV-OTP-0049-2842 at 2861; CIV-OTP-0051-0236 at 0249; CIV-OTP-0057-1345 at 1368- 1369; CIV-OTP-0057-1381 at 1381; CIV-OTP-0057-1382 at 1382; CIV-OTP-0057-1570 at 1582; CIV-OTP-0058-0320 at 0330; CIV-OTP-0058-0488 at 0519-0520; CIV-OTP-0058-0526 at 0526; CIV-OTP-0061-0080 at 0101-0103; CIV-OTP-0061-0112 at 0112; CIV-OTP-0062-0311 at 0330.

No. ICC-02/11-02/11 22/90 11 December 2014

which includes the identification of some victims of the attack who were buried in mass graves, the Chamber considers that the connection between 107 the reported mass graves and the acts of violence is sufficiently established for the purpose of the present decision. In the view of the Chamber, and contrary to the assertion of the Defence, 108 it is therefore appropriate to take into account the entirety of the evidence related to the mass graves when determining the total number of killings.

47 Based on the analysis above, the evidence indicates that at least 22 women were raped and at least 68 individuals were killed, while at least two persons were injured, by the pro-Gbagbo forces in the course of the attack on perceived Ouattara supporters in Yopougon.

48 The evidence points to the acts of violence having been committed by pro-Gbagbo youth, militia and mercenaries. 109 A number of militia groups, with links to Charles Blé Goudé, Laurent Gbagbo and other members of the latter’s inner circle, were active in Yopougon at the relevant time and cooperated with mercenaries. 110 49. The Chamber acknowledges that the violence in Yopougon may have been triggered in part by anger and a wish for revenge after Laurent Gbagbo’s arrest on 11 April 2011. 111 However, the evidence also indicates that the pro- Gbagbo youth, militia and mercenaries in Yopougon harboured aversion

CIV-OTP-0020-0335 at 0366, 0367, 0369; CIV-OTP-0058-0488 at 0516-0517, 0519-0520; CIV- 107 OTP-0058-0526 at 0526; CIV-OTP-0061-0080 at 0101-0104; see also CIV-OTP-0057-1345 at 1368- 1369; CIV-OTP-0057-1381 at 1381; CIV-OTP-0057-1382 at 1382; CIV-OTP-0057-1570 at 1582. Transcript of hearing, 1 October 2014, ICC-02/11-02/11-T-7-Red-ENG, pp. 24, 29-30. 108 CIV-OTP-0002-0598 at 0602-0603; CIV-OTP-0002-0631 at 0642-0645; CIV-OTP-0020-0335 at 109 0366-0368, 0370-0373; CIV-OTP-0029-0656 at 0670, 0671; CIV-OTP-0039-0143 at 0183-0184; CIV-OTP-0048-1396 at 1466; CIV-OTP-0049-2842 at 2856; CIV-OTP-0051-0236 at 0246-0247, 0249-0250. See below, paras 68-73. 110 111 CIV-OTP-0004-0072 at 0147-0148; CIV-OTP-0020-0335 at 0374. See also CIV-OTP-0004-0043 at 0043. No. ICC-02/11-02/11 23/90 11 December 2014

against those they considered enemies prior to Laurent Gbagbo’s arrest 112 and that inter-community tensions appear to have been fuelled within the youth and militia groups in Yopougon by Charles Blé Goudé 113 as well as by Laurent Gbagbo. 114 Most importantly, the Chamber notes that throughout the relevant period, Charles Blé Goudé engaged in a sustained effort to mobilise the youth, in particular in Yopougon, including for the use of violence against civilians, and that his speeches and public statements equally had an effect on the members of militias and mercenaries. 115 50. The Chamber notes that the Defence has raised an alibi, asserting that Charles Blé Goudé cannot be responsible for the crimes in Yopougon on or around 12 April 2011, because at that time he had already left Côte d’Ivoire. 116 However, the Chamber notes that the evidence demonstrates that Charles Blé Goudé undertook the conduct which led to the commission of the crimes in Yopougon during the period preceding the alleged time of his escape to Ghana, and it is only the consequence of his conduct, i.e. the realisation of the objective elements of the crimes by the direct perpetrators, that occurred thereafter.

II. Other acts of violence

51 The Prosecutor submits that numerous violent acts were committed against the civilian population within the context of a number of incidents which occurred in Abidjan during the post-election crisis. The Chamber 117

112 CIV-OTP-0020-0064 at 0068-0070; CIV-OTP-0020-0335 at 0374; CIV-OTP-0028-0008 at 00:01:23-00:03:07 (CIV-OTP-0027-0440 at 0442-0443); CIV-OTP-0029-0656 at 0662; CIV-OTP- 0039-0143 at 0183-0185. CIV-OTP-0020-0335 at 0352; see also CIV-OTP-0063-1040 at 1066-1067. 113 114 CIV-OTP-0020-0335 at 0346, 0350; see also CIV-OTP-0013-0108 at 0113-0114. See also below, para. 94. See below, para. 101. 115 Transcript of hearing, 1 October 2014, ICC-02/11-02/11-T-7-Red-ENG, p. 24, line 13; Defence 116 Final Confirmation Submissions, para. 5. 117 DCC, paras 83-93. No. ICC-02/11-02/11 24/90 11 December 2014

notes that the Prosecutor relies on over 800 acts committed against civilians in

the context of 38 incidents, including the 348 acts allegedly committed within

the five incidents for which Charles Blé Goudé bears criminal responsibility. 118

52 The Chamber considers that, in addition to the rapes committed on 16

December 2010 and in the days that followed, 119 and on or around 12 April

2011 in Yopougon, 120 the evidence demonstrates that on 25 February 2011 in

Abobo, FDS and pro-Gbagbo youth raped nine women who were targeted

because of their known political affiliation with the Ouattara camp. 121

53 Further, in addition to the events on 16 December 2010 and on 3 March 122

2011 in Abobo, 123 there is evidence of a pattern of repression of civilian

demonstrations organised by Ouattara supporters by the FDS, for example

between 27 and 29 November 2010 in Abobo; 124 on 4 December 2010 in

Koumassi; 125 on 6 December 2010 in Adjamé; 126 on 18 and 19 January 2011 in

Adjamé and Attécoubé; 127 between 19 and 21 February 2011 in Abobo,

Koumassi and Treichville; 128 and on 19 February 2011 in Abobo. 129

118 DCC, para. 331. 119 See above, paras 21, 23-24. See above, para. 45. 120 CIV-OTP-0002-0173 at 0176-0177; CIV-OTP-0048-1396 at 1447-1449. 121 See above, paras 17-25. 122 123 See above, paras 39-40. CIV-OTP-0003-0565 at 0573; CIV-OTP-0032-0011 at 0019-0020; CIV-OTP-0045-0793 at 0798- 124 0799; CIV-OTP-0051-0830 at 0844; CIV-OTP-0053-0835 at 0847. CIV-OTP-0045-0527 at 0532-0533; see also CIV-OTP-0004-0072 at 0103-0105; CIV-OTP-0048- 125 1396 at 1441. CIV-OTP-0044-0955 at 0958-0959; CIV-OTP-0045-0751 at 0751; CIV-OTP-0045-0793 at 0865; 126 CIV-OTP-0045-1535 at 1535. CIV-OTP-0002-0010 at 0019; CIV-OTP-0002-0076 at 0079; CIV-OTP-0003-0435 at 0435-0436; 127 CIV-OTP-0003-0527 at 0534; CIV-OTP-0044-0996 at 0999-1000; CIV-OTP-0044-2441 at 2446, 2461-2463; CIV-OTP-0053-0835 at 0848. CIV-OTP-0002-0173 at 0178; CIV-OTP-0002-0198 at 0199-0200; CIV-OTP-0021-3713 at 3714; 128 CIV-OTP-0025-0082 at 0083-0084; CIV-OTP-0044-0316 at 0328; CIV-OTP-0044-1606 at 1606- 1608; CIV-OTP-0048-1396 at 1449-1450; see also CIV-OTP-0043-0318 at 0318-0319. 129 CIV-OTP-0032-0011 at 0024; CIV-OTP-0037-0482 at 0482.

No. ICC-02/11-02/11 25/90 11 December 2014

54 Similarly, in addition to the events at the party offices of the Union of

Côte d’Ivoire Republicans (RDR) and of the Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire

(PDCI) on 16 December 2010,

130

the Chamber notes the evidence of a series of

attacks on premises of parties supporting Alassane Ouattara, in particular on

1-2 December 2010 at the RDR seat in Yopougon,

131

and on 25 December

2010

132

and 4 January 2011

133

at the PDCI seat in Cocody.

55 Furthermore, the evidence shows that violence by pro-Gbagbo forces

was also directed more generally at parts of the population perceived to be

Ouattara supporters, such as Dioulas, Muslims or people from the north of

Côte d’Ivoire or the neighbouring West African countries.

134

In particular, the

Chamber recalls its analysis of the events in Abobo on 17 March 2011, and

135

the attacks in Yopougon on 25-28 February 2011

136

and on or around 12 April

2011,

137

and takes note of the evidence establishing specific acts of violence by

pro-Gbagbo forces including FDS, pro-Gbagbo youth and militia, for example

130 See above, para. 22. 131 CIV-OTP-0002-0010 at 0018-0019; CIV-OTP-0002-0212 at 0212; CIV-OTP-0003-0173 at 0185; CIV-OTP-0003-0527 at 0533; CIV-OTP-0044-0392 at 0415, 0445, 0452; CIV-OTP-0044-1398 at 1401; CIV-OTP-0045-0793 at 0850; CIV-OTP-0046-0099 at 0100-0102; CIV-OTP-0054-0852 at 0853-0855; CIV-OTP-0057-1646 at 1646; CIV-OTP-0057-1647 at 1647; CIV-OTP-0062-0194 at 0200-0201; CIV-OTP-0062-0247 at 0260-0280; CIV-OTP-0062-0282 at 0283; CIV-OTP-0063-1553 at 1554-1556. CIV-OTP-0003-0527 at 0533; CIV-OTP-0044-1323 at 1330; CIV-OTP-0045-0793 at 0921; CIV- 132 OTP-0048-1396 at 1483; see also CIV-OTP-0014-0170 at 0197-0200; CIV-OTP-0014-0204 at 0205- 0206. CIV-OTP-0002-0010 at 0019; CIV-OTP-0002-0076 at 0079; CIV-OTP-0002-0647 at 0671; CIV- 133 OTP-0003-0527 at 0533-0534; CIV-OTP-0044-0337 at 0345-0346; CIV-OTP-0044-0392 at 0421; CIV-OTP-0044-0975 at 0980-0981; CIV-OTP-0044-0996 at 1000; CIV-OTP-0044-1332 at 1339; CIV-OTP-0044-1341 at 1349; CIV-OTP-0045-0793 at 0933; CIV-OTP-0048-1396 at 1484; CIV- OTP-0053-0835 at 0848. See also CIV-OTP-0019-0211 at 0224-0225; CIV-OTP-0023-0323 at 0328; CIV-OTP-0028-0550 134 at 0564; CIV-OTP-0032-0011 at 0024; CIV-OTP-0040-0372 at 0391, 0409; CIV-OTP-0042-0508 at 0517; CIV-OTP-0045-0135 at 0138; CIV-OTP-0046-0029 at 0030; see also CIV-OTP-0003-0344 at 0344; CIV-OTP-0003-0423 at 0423; CIV-OTP-0052-0292 at 0355-0372; CIV-OTP-0052-0386 at 0404-0429; CIV-OTP-0053-0835 at 0848. See above, paras 41-43. 135 136 See above, paras 26-38. 137 See above, paras 44-50.

No. ICC-02/11-02/11 26/90 11 December 2014

on 30 November 2010 in Abobo;

138

on 4 December 2010 in Port-Bouët;

139

around 5 January 2011 in Adjamé; on 11-12 January 2011 in Abobo; on 7

140 141

and 8 February 2011 in Abobo;

142

on 24 February 2011 in Yopougon;

143

on 26

February 2011 in Abobo;

144

on 1 March 2011 in Yopougon;

145

on 3-4 March

2011 in Port-Bouët;

146

on 4 and 8 March 2011 in Yopougon;

147

on 11 March 2011

in Yopougon;

148

on 11-12 March 2011 in Abobo;

149

on 15 March 2011 in

Yopougon; on 19 March 2011 in Williamsville; on 22 March 2011 in

150 151

Abobo;

152

on 29 March 2011 in Adjamé;

153

on 30 March 2011 in Adjamé;

154

on 2

138 CIV-OTP-0044-0903 at 0907; CIV-OTP-0052-0292 at 0359. 139 CIV-OTP-0001-0052 at 0053-0054; CIV-OTP-0003-0723 at 0723; CIV-OTP-0043-0380 at 0380- 0384; CIV-OTP-0045-0527 at 0528-0529; CIV-OTP-0048-1396 at 1483. CIV-OTP-0044-0310 at 0311; CIV-OTP-0052-0292 at 0300; see also CIV-OTP-0003-0527 at 140 0539. 141 CIV-OTP-0002-0010 at 0019; CIV-OTP-0002-0166 at 0169; CIV-OTP-0003-0527 at 0534-0535; CIV-OTP-0024-0759 at 0759-0778; CIV-OTP-0044-0975 at 0978; CIV-OTP-0045-0777 at 0777- 0778; CIV-OTP-0046-0316 at 0316-0331; CIV-OTP-0053-0835 at 0848. 142 CIV-OTP-0044-1119 at 1121; CIV-OTP-0053-0835 at 0848. 143 CIV-OTP-0045-0391 at 0393; CIV-OTP-0045-0396 at 0396-0397. CIV-OTP-0040-0372 at 0405; CIV-OTP-0040-0426 at 0426; CIV-OTP-0040-0427 at 0427-0429; 144 CIV-OTP-0051-1045 at 1072-1081. 145 CIV-OTP-0002-0173 at 0176; CIV-OTP-0048-1396 at 1484. 146 CIV-OTP-0003-0416 at 0416; CIV-OTP-0003-0423 at 0423; CIV-OTP-0004-0072 at 0121; CIV- OTP-0044-1709 at 1715; CIV-OTP-0045-0180 at 0181; CIV-OTP-0048-1396 at 1484-1485. CIV-OTP-0002-0173 at 0176; CIV-OTP-0044-0310 at 0312; CIV-OTP-0044-0392 at 0433; CIV- 147 OTP-0044-1562 at 1562-1563; CIV-OTP-0044-1709 at 1712-1713, 1715; CIV-OTP-0045-0144 at 0146; CIV-OTP-0048-1396 at 1485. CIV-OTP-0013-0108 at 0122. 148 CIV-OTP-0002-0010 at 0021; CIV-OTP-0002-0647 at 0673; CIV-OTP-0044-1167 at 1170. 149 CIV-OTP-0044-0392 at 0416; CIV-OTP-0057-1345 at 1366; CIV-OTP-0057-1463 at 1485-1486; 150 CIV-OTP-0062-0311 at 0331; CIV-OTP-0063-1436 at 1449. CIV-OTP-0002-0598 at 0608; CIV-OTP-0014-0170 at 0177-0179; CIV-OTP-0014-0479 at 0501- 151 0502; CIV-OTP-0044-0392 at 0416-0417; CIV-OTP-0044-1681 at 1683; CIV-OTP-0052-0292 at 0308; see also CIV-OTP-0054-0940 at 0941; CIV-OTP-0054-0989 at 0992. 152 CIV-OTP-0020-0033 at 0058; CIV-OTP-0042-0508 at 0544-0546; CIV-OTP-0042-0567 at 0579; CIV-OTP-0042-0594 at 00:00:00-00:11:04 (CIV-OTP-0053-0101 at 0102-0107); CIV-OTP-0044- 1211 at 1212; CIV-OTP-0044-1692 at 1694, 1695, 1703; CIV-OTP-0048-1396 at 1464. See also CIV-OTP-0044-1201 at 1204. 153 CIV-OTP-0004-0072 at 0144-0145; CIV-OTP-0048-1396 at 1486. 154 CIV-OTP-0002-0182 at 0185; CIV-OTP-0048-1396 at 1486.

No. ICC-02/11-02/11 27/90 11 December 2014

April 2011 in Port-Bouët; 155 on 10 April 2011 in Yopougon; 156 and on 11 April 2011 in Treichville. 157

III. The inner circle and the pro-Gbagbo forces

56 According to the Prosecutor, Charles Blé Goudé committed the crimes charged jointly with Laurent Gbagbo and other persons, referred to in the DCC as “Gbagbo’s inner circle”, 158 and through an organisation comprising the FDS, militias, mercenaries and pro-Gbagbo youth (the “pro-Gbagbo forces”). 159 A. The inner circle 57. In the view of the Chamber, the evidence shows that the effort to maintain Laurent Gbagbo in power at any cost, including by the use of force against civilians, was conceived and controlled by Laurent Gbagbo and a limited number of close associates who shared his objective of staying in power and who coordinated with him the means to achieve this goal.

58 According to the evidence, Charles Blé Goudé was a prominent member of Laurent Gbagbo’s inner circle. Laurent Gbagbo and Charles Blé Goudé had a long-lasting relationship that predated the crisis, which involved Charles Blé Goudé rallying youth behind Laurent Gbagbo. 160 Charles Blé Goudé maintained very close relations with Laurent Gbagbo and Simone Gbagbo throughout the period of events under consideration. 161 It appears that

155 CIV-OTP-0007-0235 at 0235. CIV-OTP-0007-0235 at 0235. 156 CIV-OTP-0044-0356 at 0357; CIV-OTP-0044-0392 at 0414; CIV-OTP-0052-0292 at 0319-0320. 157 DCC, paras 97-103, 323-325. 158 159 DCC, paras 174, 324, 326. CIV-OTP-0011-0482 at 0498-0499; CIV-OTP-0014-0400 at 0440-0441; CIV-OTP-0014-0665 at 160 0676; CIV-OTP-0014-0684 at 0702; CIV-OTP-0014-0713 at 0715; CIV-OTP-0047-0008 at 0013- 0014; see also CIV-OTP-0063-1248 at 1273-1274, 1279-1280; CIV-OTP-0063-1283 at 1284-1285. 161 CIV-OTP-0011-0201 at 0221; CIV-OTP-0014-0400 at 0433; CIV-OTP-0014-0665 at 0676; CIV- OTP-0014-0684 at 0699-0700; CIV-OTP-0017-0392 at 0407, 0410-0411; CIV-OTP-0029-0172 at No. ICC-02/11-02/11 28/90 11 December 2014

Charles Blé Goudé received payments from the Ivorian Presidency already

before the crisis. In addition, there is evidence that Charles Blé Goudé 162

maintained direct links with other members of the inner circle, including high

commanders of the FDS. 163

59 In accordance with the evidence, Charles Blé Goudé’s role in the inner

circle was primarily to serve as the link to the pro-Gbagbo youth. 164 He was

the most prominent leader of the pro-Gbagbo youth movements and was

referred to as the “ général de la rue ”. 165 Charles Blé Goudé possessed an

extraordinary ability to influence the masses at political rallies. 166

60 In December 2010, Laurent Gbagbo appointed Charles Blé Goudé as

Minister for Youth, Vocational Training and Employment, which, in the 167

view of the Chamber, served as additional legitimisation for his activities. The

appointment of Charles Blé Goudé, despite the fact that he was subject to

sanctions by the UN, 168 illustrates the importance which Laurent Gbagbo and

the inner circle attached to him.

61 Another prominent figure in the inner circle next to Charles Blé Goudé

was Simone Gbagbo. The evidence shows that she exerted considerable

influence over State institutions, relying on her status as Laurent Gbagbo’s

0176; CIV-OTP-0046-1368 at 1394; CIV-OTP-0046-1461 at 1465; CIV-OTP-0062-0574 at 0594- 0595. 162 CIV-OTP-0025-0680 at 0680; CIV-OTP-0025-0687 at 0687; CIV-OTP-0025-0690 at 0690; CIV- OTP-0025-0692 at 0692; CIV-OTP-0025-0696 at 0696; CIV-OTP-0025-0701 at 0701; CIV-OTP- 0025-0787 at 0787. CIV-OTP-0011-0482 at 0488-0489; CIV-OTP-0011-0593 at 0603; CIV-OTP-0016-0321 at 0336, 163 0342; CIV-OTP-0016-0390 at 0395-0397; CIV-OTP-0046-1050 at 1051-1052; CIV-OTP-0051-0300 at 0301; CIV-OTP-0051-0871 at 0880. CIV-OTP-0011-0201 at 0215-0216, 0221, 0222; CIV-OTP-0016-0321 at 0335; CIV-OTP-0046- 164 1368 at 1394; CIV-OTP-0063-1377 at 1389; CIV-OTP-0063-1641 at 1660. 165 CIV-OTP-0011-0201 at 0221; CIV-OTP-0014-0400 at 0425; CIV-OTP-0017-0392 at 0403; CIV- OTP-0046-1345 at 1359, 1360; CIV-OTP-0051-0697 at 0699-0700; see also below, paras 74-75. CIV-OTP-0011-0201 at 0221-0222; CIV-OTP-0014-0713 at 0715; CIV-OTP-0029-0125 at 0128; 166 CIV-OTP-0049-2359 at 2379; CIV-OTP-0051-0697 at 0700; CIV-OTP-0063-1248 at 1279. 167 CIV-OTP-0018-0047 at 0050-0051; CIV-OTP-0051-0663 at 0694-0695. 168 CIV-OTP-0052-0613 at 0613; CIV-OTP-0052-0681 at 0751-0752.

No. ICC-02/11-02/11 29/90 11 December 2014

wife and on the political positions held in her own name.

169

During the crisis,

Simone Gbagbo performed an important coordinating role, as she presided

over regular crisis meetings.

170

There is specific evidence that Simone Gbagbo

maintained direct relationships with the high commanders of the FDS,

171

well as with the leaders of youth organisations and militias,

172

including

through her position as the Secretary-General of the National Resistance

Congress for Democracy (CNRD). The Chamber also notes the evidence

173

indicating that Simone Gbagbo coordinated activities with Laurent Gbagbo

174

and Charles Blé Goudé.

175

62 In addition to Charles Blé Goudé and Simone Gbagbo, the evidence

indicates that Laurent Gbagbo’s inner circle comprised a limited number of

trusted political associates, including government ministers,

176

certain other

leaders of pro-Gbagbo youth movements,

177

high commanders of the FDS,

178

and other trusted military commanders.

179

169 CIV-OTP-0011-0361 at 0370; CIV-OTP-0014-0443 at 0453, 0457-0458; CIV-OTP-0014-0622 at 0639, 0643; CIV-OTP-0014-0646 at 0647, 0653; CIV-OTP-0016-0347 at 0349; CIV-OTP-0016-0372 at 0375; CIV-OTP-0017-0056 at 0074; CIV-OTP-0017-0124 at 0139. CIV-OTP-0016-0642 at 0643; CIV-OTP-0018-0309 at 0309; CIV-OTP-0018-0395 at 0396; CIV- 170 OTP-0051-1247 at 1276-1277. 171 CIV-OTP-0011-0361 at 0370; CIV-OTP-0014-0443 at 0454-0455; CIV-OTP-0017-0056 at 0069- 0070. CIV-OTP-0017-0392 at 0412; CIV-OTP-0018-0339 at 0339-0340; CIV-OTP-0018-0426 at 0426- 172 0429; CIV-OTP-0018-0810 at 0834, 0836, 0850-0852; CIV-OTP-0029-0172 at 0178. 173 CIV-OTP-0017-0144 at 0160. The Chamber notes that according to a document emanating from the CNRD, one of the latter’s goals was to ensure Laurent Gbagbo’s re-election; see CIV- OTP-0018-0326 at 0326. CIV-OTP-0014-0684 at 0701; CIV-OTP-0017-0056 at 0069. 174 175 CIV-OTP-0014-0684 at 0700; CIV-OTP-0014-0713 at 0737-0738; CIV-OTP-0014-0768 at 0775; CIV-OTP-0063-1641 at 1660. CIV-OTP-0014-0443 at 0444-0448, 0463-0464; CIV-OTP-0014-0646 at 0661; CIV-OTP-0016- 176 0301 at 0318-0319; CIV-OTP-0046-0932 at 0950-0951; CIV-OTP-0062-0615 at 0625. 177 CIV-OTP-0014-0400 at 0441-0442; CIV-OTP-0014-0622 at 0642; CIV-OTP-0014-0646 at 0661; CIV-OTP-0016-0256 at 0270; CIV-OTP-0018-0581 at 0581; CIV-OTP-0029-0172 at 0176, 0178; CIV-OTP-0046-0759 at 0773-0774; CIV-OTP-0046-1102 at 1108; CIV-OTP-0046-1574 at 1575- 1576. 178 CIV-OTP-0014-0646 at 0661; CIV-OTP-0016-0301 at 0318; CIV-OTP-0051-0770 at 0782. 179 See below, paras 66-67.

No. ICC-02/11-02/11 30/90 11 December 2014

B. The pro-Gbagbo forces 63. The evidence demonstrates that Laurent Gbagbo and his inner circle, including Charles Blé Goudé, controlled an organisation (the “pro-Gbagbo forces”) composed of several identifiable components, namely FDS, militias, mercenaries and youth organisations.

a) Defence and Security Forces 64. According to the evidence, the FDS principally comprised FANCI, the Gendarmerie, the Republican Guard (GR), the Security Operations Command Centre (CECOS) and the Police, each headed by a senior commander. 180 At the time of the events under consideration, the various components of the FDS were consolidated under the command of the Army Chief of Staff, 181 who would generally report to the President directly or through the Minister of Defence. 182 65. The FDS was a functioning apparatus of State power, under responsible command, and with considerable capacity. 183 The FDS hierarchy was effective, in the sense that execution of orders was ensured and disobedience repressed. 184 The Chamber is conscious of the fact that the capacity of the FDS to conduct operations diminished towards the end of the crisis, but considers

CIV-OTP-0010-0019 at 0019; CIV-OTP-0010-0020 at 0020; CIV-OTP-0011-0324 at 0331; CIV- 180 OTP-0011-0341 at 0348; CIV-OTP-0014-0135 at 0137-0138, 0140, 0147; CIV-OTP-0016-0046 at 0049-0050; CIV-OTP-0016-0204 at 0211, 0248-0249; CIV-OTP-0016-0347 at 0368-0369; CIV- OTP-0016-0372 at 0384; CIV-OTP-0046-0689 at 0711; CIV-OTP-0046-0932 at 0958; CIV-OTP- 0051-0556 at 0566; CIV-OTP-0051-0586 at 0602, 0605-0607. 181 CIV-OTP-0046-0886 at 0888-0890; CIV-OTP-0051-0434 at 0450; see also below, para. 104. See below, para. 92. 182 CIV-OTP-0002-0573 at 0577, 0578. 183 CIV-OTP-0043-0289 at 0289-0291; CIV-OTP-0045-0692 at 0692-0297; CIV-OTP-0045-1289 at 184 1289-1297; CIV-OTP-0051-0586 at 0599-0600; see also CIV-OTP-0045-0692 at 0694-0695; CIV- OTP-0045-1143 at 1143. No. ICC-02/11-02/11 31/90 11 December 2014

that the FDS nevertheless remained operative, if only in part, until the end of the crisis. 185 66. Laurent Gbagbo and the inner circle exercised control over the FDS through the official State hierarchy, on the basis of Laurent Gbagbo’s claim of status as President of Côte d’Ivoire, 186 and through parallel lines of control and command, which depended on the personal relationships of Laurent Gbagbo and the inner circle with certain individuals in the FDS. The 187 evidence demonstrates that these individuals bypassed the official hierarchy where necessary and received instructions directly from Laurent Gbagbo and the inner circle, even without informing their formal superiors. 188 67. The evidence also shows that the units that were led by individuals who were particularly close to Laurent Gbagbo were better equipped, 189 and were entrusted with operations deemed more important in the pursuit of preserving power. 190 These units were also the ones which worked alongside militias and to which new elements that had been recruited outside of regular procedures were sent. 191 b) Militia 68. The pro-Gbagbo forces also included a number of militia groups which were organised as paramilitary units under formalised and effective

See below, paras 109-113. 185 CIV-OTP-0016-0426 at 0433; CIV-OTP-0051-0586 at 0598. 186 CIV-OTP-0014-0233 at 0246; CIV-OTP-0014-0443 at 0444-0448; CIV-OTP-0016-0390 at 0392- 187 0395; CIV-OTP-0019-0168 at 0173; CIV-OTP-0037-0425 at 0432, 0433; CIV-OTP-0039-0143 at 0151-0152; CIV-OTP-0043-0461 at 0471; CIV-OTP-0046-0886 at 0904-0905; CIV-OTP-0048-1503 at 1510-1512; CIV-OTP-0051-0618 at 0636-0637. CIV-OTP-0019-0168 at 0172; CIV-OTP-0046-0932 at 0957-0959; CIV-OTP-0048-1503 at 1519; 188 CIV-OTP-0051-0586 at 0594. See also all other evidence cited in the previous footnote. CIV-OTP-0048-1503 at 1514, 1515; CIV-OTP-0051-0556 at 0566; CIV-OTP-0051-0586 at 0611- 189 0617; CIV-OTP-0051-0618 at 0624, 0628-0630, 0635-0636. CIV-OTP-0039-0143 at 0166; CIV-OTP-0041-0534 at 0565-0566; CIV-OTP-0051-0871 at 0888; 190 CIV-OTP-0051-1086 at 1091. 191 CIV-OTP-0011-0572 at 0574, 0577; CIV-OTP-0014-0233 at 0244-0246. No. ICC-02/11-02/11 32/90 11 December 2014

command. The most prominent pro-Gbagbo militia group operating in

Abidjan at the relevant time was the GPP. The available evidence

192

demonstrates that the GPP maintained an effective hierarchical structure,

193

carried out military training of its recruits in the pre-election period,

194

and

had considerable operating capability.

195

In addition, the evidence points to

Charles Blé Goudé’s important role in the creation of the GPP in 2003,

196

and

to his continued links, including at the time of the post-election crisis, to

Touré Zéguen, a GPP leader.

197

The Chamber also notes the evidence that GPP

elements provided security to Charles Blé Goudé’s residence in Yopougon

from September 2010.

198

The evidence further indicates that the GPP regularly

reported in writing to, inter alia , the Presidency and Simone Gbagbo

directly.

199

69 In addition, the evidence demonstrates the existence of other organised

militia groups in Yopougon.

200

The group of Maguy le Tocard was one such

192 CIV-OTP-0014-0400 at 0429-0430, 0432; CIV-OTP-0015-0323 at 0339-0341; CIV-OTP-0016- 0256 at 0265-0269; CIV-OTP-0020-0283 at 0292; CIV-OTP-0051-0266 at 0281; CIV-OTP-0051- 0392 at 0418-0419; CIV-OTP-0051-0618 at 0652-0653, 0655; CIV-OTP-0051-1195 at 1222-1223; CIV-OTP-0051-0663 at 0670. 193 CIV-OTP-0063-1615 at 1632; CIV-OTP-0063-1718 at 1747; CIV-OTP-0063-1833 at 1846, 1849. CIV-OTP-0063-1718 at 1744-1745; CIV-OTP-0063-1833 at 1840-1841; CIV-OTP-0063-2180 at 194 2193. CIV-OTP-0063-1668 at 1702; CIV-OTP-0063-1718 at 1749. 195 196 CIV-OTP-0063-1615 at 1626-1627. CIV-OTP-0029-0107 at 0108; CIV-OTP-0058-0355 at 0371-0372; CIV-OTP-0062-0574 at 0587; 197 CIV-OTP-0062-0632 at 0639; CIV-OTP-0063-1377 at 1391; CIV-OTP-0063-2597 at 2604-2608. The Chamber notes the evidence, relied upon by the Defence, to the effect that there were disagreements between Touré Zéguen and Charles Blé Goudé, but considers that this evidence does not deny, and in fact confirms, the existence of links between the two; see CIV- D25-0001-0985 at 1012; CIV-D25-0001-0967 at 0978. CIV-OTP-0063-2227 at 2228-2229. 198 199 CIV-OTP-0063-2137 at 2160-2163. CIV-OTP-0020-0064 at 0086; CIV-OTP-0020-0335 at 0357, 0358, 0364; CIV-OTP-0039-0143 at 200 0183, 0186; CIV-OTP-0039-0196 at 0212, 0214, 0222, 0223; CIV-OTP-0041-0678 at 0678; CIV- OTP-0041-0681 at 0681; CIV-OTP-0043-0461 at 0483; CIV-OTP-0046-1545 at 1571-1572; CIV- OTP-0048-1396 at 1468; CIV-OTP-0048-1503 at 1536, 1547; CIV-OTP-0049-2634 at 2644-2647, 2662; CIV-OTP-0051-0618 at 0652-0653, 0655; CIV-OTP-0051-1247 at 1278-1283.

No. ICC-02/11-02/11 33/90 11 December 2014

group,

201

and there is evidence that this group was linked to the hierarchy of

the GPP, as well as directly to Charles Blé Goudé. In addition, the group

202 203

of Cobri

204

was, according to witnesses, directly linked to Charles Blé

Goudé.

205

There is also evidence of the presence at the relevant time in

Yopougon of a militia composed of fighters from the west of Côte d’Ivoire

and foreign mercenaries, led by Maho Glofiéhi,

206

and of the latter’s links to

Charles Blé Goudé.

207

70 Furthermore, the evidence reveals that some youth movements, notably

FESCI, were in fact operating as militias. There is specific evidence that GPP

208

elements trained FESCI elements in the use of firearms in the period before

the elections at university residence halls, including in Cocody. According

209

to the evidence, FESCI worked with Charles Blé Goudé during the crisis.

210

201 CIV-OTP-0013-0108 at 0114-0115; CIV-OTP-0020-0064 at 0086; CIV-OTP-0020-0335 at 0364; CIV-OTP-0028-0550 at 0567; CIV-OTP-0039-0143 at 0183, 0186; CIV-OTP-0043-0461 at 0483; CIV-OTP-0046-1545 at 1571-1572; CIV-OTP-0048-1396 at 1468; CIV-OTP-0048-1503 at 1547; CIV-OTP-0051-1247 at 1278-1279; CIV-OTP-0061-0080 at 0104; CIV-OTP-0062-0157 at 0168; CIV-OTP-0063-1718 at 1739; CIV-OTP-0063-2180 at 2196. 202 CIV-OTP-0063-1718 at 1740-1741; CIV-OTP-0063-1752 at 1756. CIV-OTP-0013-0108 at 0114; CIV-OTP-0057-1345 at 1367; CIV-OTP-0058-0289 at 0300; CIV- 203 OTP-0062-0157 at 0188-0191; CIV-OTP-0063-0781 at 0803; CIV-OTP-0063-1377 at 1388; CIV- OTP-0063-2327 at 2353. 204 CIV-OTP-0020-0335 at 0358-0359; CIV-OTP-0058-0289 at 0298; CIV-OTP-0058-0488 at 0500- 0501; CIV-OTP-0058-0586 at 0594. CIV-OTP-0058-0289 at 0299-0300; CIV-OTP-0058-0488 at 0522. 205 CIV-OTP-0016-0256 at 0261-0262; CIV-OTP-0016-0347 at 0355; CIV-OTP-0020-0335 at 0364; 206 CIV-OTP-0029-0244 at 0263-0264; CIV-OTP-0048-1396 at 1468; CIV-OTP-0048-1503 at 1540; CIV-OTP-0049-2818 at 2830; CIV-OTP-0051-0266 at 0283-0284; CIV-OTP-0058-0425 at 0444- 0445. CIV-OTP-0045-0457 at 0461; CIV-OTP-0058-0355 at 0373-0374; CIV-OTP-0062-0574 at 0586; 207 CIV-OTP-0062-0632 at 0646. CIV-OTP-0051-0712 at 0768; CIV-OTP-0051-1247 at 1278-1283; CIV-OTP-0062-0194 at 0197- 208 0198; CIV-OTP-0062-0247 at 0256-0257; CIV-OTP-0063-1668 at 1690. CIV-OTP-0063-1668 at 1685-1688; CIV-OTP-0063-1877 at 1913-1914. 209 210 CIV-D25-0001-0967 at 0973; see also CIV-D25-0001-0658 at 0689; CIV-OTP-0058-0355 at 0375-0376; CIV-OTP-0062-0632 at 0651-0652.

No. ICC-02/11-02/11 34/90 11 December 2014

71 According to the evidence, these militia groups were linked to Laurent Gbagbo and the inner circle through the leaders of youth movements, 211 including – as explained above – Charles Blé Goudé, and through some loyal FDS commanders. 212 Reliance on organised militia groups is confirmed by government documents, 213 as well as the diary of Simone Gbagbo seized from the Presidential Residence. 214 72. The evidence also shows that on occasion, militias operated alongside the FDS, receiving their assistance. 215 According to the evidence, militia were particularly active in Abidjan late in the crisis, and at some point operated 216 from FDS bases. 217 c) Mercenaries 73. The Chamber finds, on the basis of the evidence, that mercenaries formed part of the organisation under the control of Laurent Gbagbo and the inner circle. According to the evidence, they were recruited and integrated into certain FDS units, or operated as part of loyal militias. 218 Control over the mercenary component of the organisation was thus exercised through the FDS or through militias. d) Pro-Gbagbo youth 74. According to the evidence, a large number of organisations supportive of Laurent Gbagbo existed in Côte d’Ivoire, through which political CIV-OTP-0002-0573 at 0579; CIV-OTP-0013-0108 at 0114; CIV-OTP-0014-0400 at 0429-0430; 211 CIV-OTP-0014-0622 at 0634-0635; CIV-OTP-0046-1545 at 1571-1572. 212 CIV-OTP-0039-0143 at 0183, 0186; CIV-OTP-0047-0036 at 0056-0057. CIV-OTP-0045-0127 at 0128; CIV-OTP-0045-0148 at 0151-0152. 213 CIV-OTP-0018-0810 at 0834, 0850. 214 CIV-OTP-0045-0148 at 0151; CIV-OTP-0051-0266 at 0284-0285; CIV-OTP-0051-0618 at 0657- 215 0658; CIV-OTP-0063-1833 at 1862-1866, 1870-1871. CIV-OTP-0051-1195 at 1223; CIV-OTP-0063-1833 at 1869-1870; CIV-OTP-0063-2180 at 2217- 216 2218. CIV-OTP-0028-0481 at 0487, 0508-0509; CIV-OTP-0039-0143 at 0182; CIV-OTP-0049-2634 at 217 2645-2647, 2662; CIV-OTP-0051-0392 at 0415. 218 See below, paras 86-88. No. ICC-02/11-02/11 35/90 11 December 2014

supporters, primarily youths, were mobilised and used for acts of violence.

219

Albeit not organised in a formal hierarchy, these groups were assembled in an

umbrella organisation, commonly referred to as the “Patriotic Galaxy”.

220

Laurent Gbagbo’s Presidency systematically financed loyal youth

organisations.

221

75 The Chamber notes the argument of the Defence that the Patriotic

Galaxy was not a formal hierarchy of organisations, and that, due to power

struggles and an ideological split among the youth leaders, Charles Blé Goudé

219 See below, paras 93-102. 220 CIV-D25-0001-0865 at 0883; CIV-D25-0001-2020 at 2024-2025; CIV-D25-0001-2062 at 2067- 2068; CIV-OTP-0014-0622 at 0625, 0629-0630; CIV-OTP-0014-0684 at 0686; CIV-OTP-0029-0107 at 0110; CIV-OTP-0046-1427 at 1433; CIV-OTP-0062-0212 at 0218-0219; CIV-OTP-0062-0574 at 0589; CIV-OTP-0063-1248 at 1274, 1278; CIV-OTP-0063-1615 at 1627; see also CIV-OTP-0014- 0135 at 0165-0167; CIV-OTP-0014-0170 at 0172; CIV-OTP-0014-0233 at 0248. CIV-OTP-0014-0768 at 0778; CIV-OTP-0025-0450 at 0450; CIV-OTP-0025-0451 at 0451; CIV- 221 OTP-0025-0452 at 0452; CIV-OTP-0025-0453 at 0453; CIV-OTP-0025-0454 at 0454; CIV-OTP- 0025-0456 at 0456; CIV-OTP-0025-0460 at 0460; CIV-OTP-0025-0461 at 0461; CIV-OTP-0025- 0462 at 0462; CIV-OTP-0025-0468 at 0468; CIV-OTP-0025-0469 at 0469; CIV-OTP-0025-0473 at 0473; CIV-OTP-0025-0478 at 0478; CIV-OTP-0025-0479 at 0479; CIV-OTP-0025-0484 at 0484; CIV-OTP-0025-0487 at 0487; CIV-OTP-0025-0492 at 0492; CIV-OTP-0025-0494 at 0494; CIV- OTP-0025-0496 at 0496; CIV-OTP-0025-0497 at 0497; CIV-OTP-0025-0498 at 0498; CIV-OTP- 0025-0505 at 0505; CIV-OTP-0025-0506 at 0506; CIV-OTP-0025-0508 at 0508; CIV-OTP-0025- 0514 at 0514; CIV-OTP-0025-0515 at 0515; CIV-OTP-0025-0519 at 0519; CIV-OTP-0025-0525 at 0525; CIV-OTP-0025-0526 at 0526; CIV-OTP-0025-0528 at 0528; CIV-OTP-0025-0532 at 0532; CIV-OTP-0025-0533 at 0533; CIV-OTP-0025-0537 at 0537; CIV-OTP-0025-0541 at 0541; CIV- OTP-0025-0542 at 0542; CIV-OTP-0025-0548 at 0548; CIV-OTP-0025-0550 at 0550; CIV-OTP- 0025-0551 at 0551; CIV-OTP-0025-0555 at 0555; CIV-OTP-0025-0559 at 0559; CIV-OTP-0025- 0560 at 0560; CIV-OTP-0025-0566 at 0566; CIV-OTP-0025-0568 at 0568; CIV-OTP-0025-0569 at 0569; CIV-OTP-0025-0573 at 0573; CIV-OTP-0025-0577 at 0577; CIV-OTP-0025-0578 at 0578; CIV-OTP-0025-0582 at 0582; CIV-OTP-0025-0586 at 0586; CIV-OTP-0025-0587 at 0587; CIV- OTP-0025-0591 at 0591; CIV-OTP-0025-0595 at 0595; CIV-OTP-0025-0596 at 0596; CIV-OTP- 0025-0600 at 0600; CIV-OTP-0025-0604 at 0604; CIV-OTP-0025-0605 at 0605; CIV-OTP-0025- 0609 at 0609; CIV-OTP-0025-0613 at 0613; CIV-OTP-0025-0614 at 0614; CIV-OTP-0025-0615 at 0615; CIV-OTP-0025-0616 at 0616; CIV-OTP-0025-0617 at 0617; CIV-OTP-0025-0622 at 0622; CIV-OTP-0025-0623 at 0623; CIV-OTP-0025-0624 at 0624; CIV-OTP-0025-0625 at 0625; CIV- OTP-0025-0626 at 0626; CIV-OTP-0025-0628 at 0628; CIV-OTP-0025-0631 at 0631; CIV-OTP- 0025-0632 at 0632; CIV-OTP-0025-0633 at 0633; CIV-OTP-0025-0634 at 0634; CIV-OTP-0025- 0637 at 0637; CIV-OTP-0025-0638 at 0638; CIV-OTP-0025-0641 at 0641; CIV-OTP-0025-0642 at 0642; CIV-OTP-0025-0643 at 0643; CIV-OTP-0025-0644 at 0644; CIV-OTP-0025-0645 at 0645; CIV-OTP-0025-0651 at 0651; CIV-OTP-0025-0652 at 0652; CIV-OTP-0025-0653 at 0653; CIV- OTP-0025-0654 at 0654; CIV-OTP-0025-0655 at 0655; CIV-OTP-0025-0656 at 0656; CIV-OTP- 0025-0686 at 0686; CIV-OTP-0025-0657 at 0657; see also CIV-OTP-0025-0174 at 0174; CIV-OTP- 0025-0681 at 0681; CIV-OTP-0025-0796 at 0796.

No. ICC-02/11-02/11 36/90 11 December 2014

cannot be said to have exercised control over all the youth organisations. 222 Indeed, the evidence indicates that there were disputes between the leaders of the Patriotic Galaxy and that some leaders refused to recognise Charles Blé Goudé’s primacy. 223 However, the Chamber notes that: (i) this evidence also shows that the division between leaders was largely on a personal level and that all the leaders and organisations nevertheless shared the common objective to keep Laurent Gbagbo in power; (ii) no competing or opposing camps of pro-Gbagbo youth formed on the ground; and (iii) the rival youth leaders nevertheless continued to be associated with Charles Blé Goudé because of his close link to Laurent Gbagbo 224 and because of his unmatched ability to mobilise the youth. In light of this, and in light of the evidence of 225 the instructions given to the youth by Charles Blé Goudé and the effect of these instructions on the youth, 226 the Chamber is of the view that the Prosecutor’s allegation that Charles Blé Goudé exercised considerable leadership over the pro-Gbagbo youth during the relevant time is sufficiently supported by the evidence.

IV. Preparatory activities in anticipation of the use of violence

A. Acquisition of weapons 76. The evidence shows that Laurent Gbagbo and his inner circle engaged in efforts to acquire weapons, ammunition and other combat material before and during the post-election crisis, in spite of a UN arms embargo. Further, 227

Transcript of hearing, 30 September 2014, ICC-02/11-02/11-T-6-Red-ENG, p. 67, line 8 to p. 222 81, line 25; Defence Final Confirmation Submissions, paras 14, 16. CIV-D25-0001-0865 at 0873, 0882; CIV-D25-0001-0895 at 0908-0909; CIV-D25-0001-2062 at 223 2070; CIV-OTP-0029-0107 at 0109; CIV-OTP-0046-1574 at 1575; CIV-OTP-0063-1641 at 1659, 1661. 224 CIV-OTP-0046-1368 at 1394; CIV-OTP-0062-0574 at 0590; see also above, paras 58-60. CIV-OTP-0029-0125 at 0128; CIV-OTP-0063-1248 at 1279. 225 See below, paras 93-102. 226 CIV-OTP-0014-0646 at 0652; CIV-OTP-0014-0684 at 0704-0710; CIV-OTP-0014-0768 at 0783- 227 0784; CIV-OTP-0017-0246 at 0265-0267; CIV-OTP-0017-0270 at 0271-0272; CIV-OTP-0018-0810 at 0854; CIV-OTP-0021-0125 at 0137, 0146-0148; CIV-OTP-0021-7523 at 7523; CIV-OTP-0041- No. ICC-02/11-02/11 37/90 11 December 2014

there is evidence that weaponry was stored at the Presidential Palace

228

and

that it was distributed outside the official structure and procedures,

229

including with personal involvement of Charles Blé Goudé.

230

77 Additionally, the evidence demonstrates that significant financial means

were assigned, including by Laurent Gbagbo directly, to the procurement of

arms, ammunition and other equipment.

231

B. Recruitment into the FDS

78 The evidence shows that efforts were made to mobilise new elements for

the armed forces, both through official recruitment, as well as through

irregular recruitment of youth and militia elements that were integrated into

the FDS.

79 According to the evidence, several waves of official recruitment into the

FDS took place before and during the post-election crisis.

232

There is specific

evidence of recruitment after the second election round, approved by

233

Laurent Gbagbo,

234

for the purposes of which entry requirements were

0534 at 0554; CIV-OTP-0042-0686 at 0697, 0700, 0785-0789; CIV-OTP-0045-0102 at 0102-0104; CIV-OTP-0046-1150 at 1153-1157; CIV-OTP-0051-0663 at 0665-0666, 0668-0669; CIV-OTP-0051- 0770 at 0788-0799; CIV-OTP-0052-0282 at 0282; CIV-OTP-0052-0283 at 0284. CIV-OTP-0011-0423 at 0424-0427; CIV-OTP-0014-0684 at 0705-0707; CIV-OTP-0021-0125 at 228 0160; CIV-OTP-0042-0686 at 0700; CIV-OTP-0046-1121 at 1123-1125; CIV-OTP-0046-1150 at 1159-1161. 229 CIV-OTP-0046-1150 at 1151-1152, 1159-1162; CIV-OTP-0051-0712 at 0733. CIV-OTP-0014-0684 at 0690, 0703-0706; see also CIV-OTP-0062-0157 at 0191. 230 CIV-OTP-0028-0303 at 0303; CIV-OTP-0028-0304 at 0304-0316; CIV-OTP-0028-0317 at 0317; 231 CIV-OTP-0028-0318 at 0318-0332; CIV-OTP-0046-1121 at 1129-1146, 1148-1149; CIV-OTP-0046- 1150 at 1152-1153, 1155-1157; CIV-OTP-0051-0556 at 0575-0576; CIV-OTP-0051-0663 at 0669; CIV-OTP-0051-0806 at 0809-0815. CIV-OTP-0045-0341 at 0342-0346; CIV-OTP-0048-1094 at 1094-1095; CIV-OTP-0048-1110 at 232 1110; CIV-OTP-0048-1111 at 1111; CIV-OTP-0048-1112 at 1112; CIV-OTP-0048-1117 at 1117- 1120; CIV-OTP-0048-1121 at 1121-1123; CIV-OTP-0048-1124 at 1124-1128; CIV-OTP-0048-1129 at 1129-1133; CIV-OTP-0048-1134 at 1134-1137; CIV-OTP-0048-1138 at 1138-1140; CIV-OTP- 0048-1146 at 1146-1147; CIV-OTP-0051-1195 at 1198-1204, 1213-1218; CIV-OTP-0057-1430 at 1438-1442; CIV-OTP-0057-1511 at 1529-1534. 233 CIV-OTP-0051-1195 at 1196-1199. 234 CIV-OTP-0051-0806 at 0807-0808, 0813, 0815.

No. ICC-02/11-02/11 38/90 11 December 2014

lowered, people with prior experience in weapon handling were prioritised, and the training period for the new recruits was shortened. There is also 235 evidence that the FDS utilised elements still in training. 236 80. In addition to official recruitment activities, members of youth groups and militias were integrated into the FDS in an irregular manner. According to witness statements, members of youth groups were already incorporated into the official FDS structure in 2003, forming what was informally called “ contingent Blé Goudé ”. 237 There is evidence that Charles Blé Goudé provided lists of youth who were to be recruited to FDS officers; these lists could not be contested. 238 It appears that the majority of these recruits were from the west, south and east of the country, and that some were recruited despite not 239 fulfilling all physical requirements. 240 The recruits received an accelerated training in FDS units including BASA. 241 According to the evidence, elements of this contingent were given special treatment and acted with impunity, they implemented orders that a trained soldier would have to refuse because they involved infringement of the law, and they were trained “ pour défendre la 242 personne de Gbagbo ”. 243 According to one witness, these youth participated in FDS missions during the crisis, including in missions to Abobo, which are of 244 particular significance for the case. 81. There is also evidence that additional recruitment of youths took place around the time of the elections and during the crisis, with the recruits being

CIV-OTP-0051-1195 at 1199-1207. 235 236 CIV-OTP-0045-0084 at 0084-0085. CIV-OTP-0028-0481 at 0492, 0493; CIV-OTP-0043-0461 at 0472; CIV-OTP-0063-1970 at 1987- 237 1988. CIV-OTP-0043-0461 at 0472; see also CIV-OTP-0063-1970 at 1988-1989. 238 239 CIV-OTP-0028-0481 at 0492. CIV-OTP-0043-0461 at 0472. 240 CIV-OTP-0028-0481 at 0492; CIV-OTP-0043-0461 at 0483. 241 CIV-OTP-0028-0481 at 0492. 242 243 CIV-OTP-0028-0481 at 0492; see also CIV-OTP-0043-0461 at 0473. 244 CIV-OTP-0028-0481 at 0493. No. ICC-02/11-02/11 39/90 11 December 2014

sent to different FDS units including the GR and BASA after a brief training.

245

According to the evidence, Charles Blé Goudé arranged for members of his

personal guard to participate in this training.

246

There is evidence suggesting

that the recruitment into the GR was ordered by Laurent Gbagbo.

247

C. Recruitment into, training and supplying of loyal militias

82 In addition to official recruitment into FDS ranks, other efforts focused

on building up and sustaining loyal militia groups. The evidence shows that

different groups recruited and trained youths in various neighbourhoods of

Abidjan, in particular in Yopougon, starting as early as 2004 and continuing

during the post-election crisis.

248

It appears that the youths were promised

that they would later be integrated into the regular forces.

249

83 The evidence indicates links between such militia groups and FDS units,

including through assistance in training, as well as the Gbagbo political

camp. There is evidence linking Charles Blé Goudé to the training of militia

250

CIV-OTP-0002-0164 at 0165; CIV-OTP-0003-0527 at 0538; CIV-OTP-0007-0283 at 0287; CIV- 245 OTP-0016-0175 at 0179-0183; CIV-OTP-0037-0425 at 0437-0439; CIV-OTP-0037-0464 at 0464; CIV-OTP-0037-0465 at 0465; CIV-OTP-0043-0461 at 0484-0486; CIV-OTP-0044-2421 at 2427; CIV-OTP-0048-1503 at 1548; CIV-OTP-0049-2818 at 2825; CIV-OTP-0057-1430 at 1438, 1441; CIV-OTP-0057-1511 at 1529-1530, 1533. CIV-OTP-0063-1073 at 1101-1106. 246 247 CIV-OTP-0037-0425 at 0437, 0438. CIV-OTP-0002-0046 at 0047, 0058, 0059; CIV-OTP-0002-0995 at 00:04:42-00:06:28, 00:08:59- 248 00:16:35 (CIV-OTP-0007-0181 at 0186-0189, 0190-0193); CIV-OTP-0003-0713 at 00:00:13- 00:02:45 (CIV-OTP-0021-0009 at 0010-0012); CIV-OTP-0013-0108 at 0115; CIV-OTP-0014-0684 at 0690; CIV-OTP-0014-0742 at 0757-0767; CIV-OTP-0014-0768 at 0769-0771; CIV-OTP-0020- 0033 at 0051; CIV-OTP-0020-0064 at 0068, 0069; CIV-OTP-0020-0335 at 0345, 0356-0359; CIV- OTP-0028-0008 at 00:00:15-00:02:59 (CIV-OTP-0027-0440 at 0441-0443); CIV-OTP-0039-0143 at 0153-0154; CIV-OTP-0044-1488 at 1488; CIV-OTP-0044-1562 at 1563; CIV-OTP-0048-0203 at 0203-0217; CIV-OTP-0048-1396 at 1477. CIV-OTP-0013-0108 at 0114; CIV-OTP-0020-0335 at 0356-0357, 0358; CIV-OTP-0063-1615 at 249 1637-1638. CIV-OTP-0002-0527 at 0565; CIV-OTP-0013-0108 at 0115; CIV-OTP-0020-0033 at 0051, 0053; 250 CIV-OTP-0020-0335 at 0357-0359; CIV-OTP-0039-0143 at 0153-0154; CIV-OTP-0041-0534 at 0578.

No. ICC-02/11-02/11 40/90 11 December 2014

which started shortly before the election, in particular in Yopougon.

251

Further,

the evidence points to such recruitment and training of youth in militia

groups at least being condoned, if not actively supported, by Laurent

Gbagbo,

252

Simone Gbagbo

253

and her aide-de-camp.

254

84 This is further substantiated by the evidence showing that militia groups

received weapons from the FDS and the Gbagbo political camp,

255

and were

given financial support by the State, including at the Presidency, and by

256

members of Laurent Gbagbo’s inner circle.

257

Importantly, the evidence points

to Charles Blé Goudé’s involvement in the provision of arms or money to

militias, in particular the militias of Maguy le Tocard and Cobri in

CIV-OTP-0014-0684 at 0690; CIV-OTP-0014-0742 at 0758, 0763. Two other witnesses, 251 despite not mentioning the involvement of Charles Blé Goudé, corroborate the evidence of Witness P-44 as they state that militia were trained at approximately the same location; see CIV-OTP-0039-0143 at 0153; CIV-OTP-0063-1718 at 1744-1745; CIV-OTP-0063-2180 at 2192- 2193. Witness P-440 also refers to the presence of militia at that location, see CIV-OTP-0062- 0157 at 0185. 252 CIV-OTP-0014-0742 at 0763-0764; CIV-OTP-0018-0059 at 0059-0060; CIV-OTP-0063-1668 at 1711. CIV-OTP-0018-0810 at 0834, 0836, 0838, 0850, 0854, 0857; CIV-OTP-0018-0881 at 0884-0891. 253 254 CIV-OTP-0028-0450 at 0457-0458. 255 CIV-OTP-0003-0123 at 0130; CIV-OTP-0003-0527 at 0538; CIV-OTP-0003-0670 at 00:07:54- 00:10:17 (CIV-OTP-0020-0479 at 0538-0539); CIV-OTP-0004-0002 at 0021; CIV-OTP-0004-0238 at 0238; CIV-OTP-0011-0201 at 0209, 0214; CIV-OTP-0013-0108 at 0120; CIV-OTP-0014-0684 at 0690, 0708-0710; CIV-OTP-0014-0768 at 0781-0783; CIV-OTP-0020-0064 at 0070, 0087; CIV- OTP-0039-0196 at 0209-0210, 0222; CIV-OTP-0041-0534 at 0578; CIV-OTP-0043-0461 at 0496; CIV-OTP-0045-0148 at 0152; CIV-OTP-0046-1102 at 1111-1113; CIV-OTP-0047-0036 at 0049- 0052; CIV-OTP-0048-1503 at 1538; CIV-OTP-0049-2634 at 2653-2656; CIV-OTP-0051-0712 at 0760-0767; CIV-OTP-0063-1877 at 1917-1920; CIV-OTP-0063-2137 at 2174-2176. 256 CIV-OTP-0019-0168 at 0173-0174; CIV-OTP-0025-0459 at 0459; CIV-OTP-0025-0472 at 0472; CIV-OTP-0025-0480 at 0480; CIV-OTP-0025-0488 at 0488; CIV-OTP-0025-0501 at 0501; CIV- OTP-0025-0511 at 0511; CIV-OTP-0025-0518 at 0518; CIV-OTP-0025-0527 at 0527; CIV-OTP- 0025-0536 at 0536; CIV-OTP-0025-0544 at 0544; CIV-OTP-0025-0552 at 0552; CIV-OTP-0025- 0561 at 0561; CIV-OTP-0025-0572 at 0572; CIV-OTP-0025-0581 at 0581; CIV-OTP-0025-0590 at 0590; CIV-OTP-0025-0599 at 0599; CIV-OTP-0025-0608 at 0608; CIV-OTP-0039-0143 at 0161- 0162; CIV-OTP-0043-0461 at 0487; CIV-OTP-0046-0759 at 0773-0775; CIV-OTP-0048-1503 at 1539; CIV-OTP-0063-1615 at 1636. 257 CIV-OTP-0002-0573 at 0580; CIV-OTP-0014-0233 at 0249-0250; CIV-OTP-0014-0326 at 0333- 0334; CIV-OTP-0014-0400 at 0428-0429; CIV-OTP-0043-0461 at 0487.

No. ICC-02/11-02/11 41/90 11 December 2014

Yopougon.

258

There is also indication that later in the crisis, militia took

possession of weapons in FDS bases and at other locations.

259

85 The evidence suggests the presence of militia in camps of regular FDS

and their cooperation with the regular forces, in some respects to an extent

which indicates their de facto integration into the FDS chain of command.

260

this context, the Chamber notes that there is evidence suggesting that Charles

Blé Goudé gave money to the commander of an FDS unit which cooperated

with the militia of Maguy le Tocard.

261

D. Recruitment and financing of mercenaries

86 The evidence shows that efforts were made to recruit and finance

mercenaries who cooperated with and fought alongside regular armed forces

during the post-election crisis.

87 It appears that active recruitment of mercenaries by the Gbagbo camp

commenced as early as 2002, and there is evidence demonstrating that

262

recruitment of mercenaries, for example from Liberia and Angola, took place

CIV-OTP-0058-0289 at 0300; CIV-OTP-0062-0157 at 0191; CIV-OTP-0063-2327 at 2353; see 258 also CIV-OTP-0003-0653 at 0653; CIV-OTP-0014-0684 at 0690. 259 CIV-OTP-0003-0123 at 0130; CIV-OTP-0014-0443 at 0462-0463, 0476-0477; CIV-OTP-0015- 0595 at 00:02:00-00:06:42 (CIV-OTP-0021-0026 at 0027-0030); CIV-OTP-0016-0256 at 0275-0278; CIV-OTP-0016-0347 at 0359-0360; CIV-OTP-0028-0023 at 0026. CIV-OTP-0002-0647 at 0679-0680; CIV-OTP-0003-0527 at 0538; CIV-OTP-0005-0002 at 0013; 260 CIV-OTP-0011-0201 at 0212-0213, 0217; CIV-OTP-0013-0108 at 0120-0121; CIV-OTP-0014-0233 at 0243-0247; CIV-OTP-0014-0326 at 0332-0334; CIV-OTP-0014-0443 at 0471-0472; CIV-OTP- 0014-0768 at 0800-0801; CIV-OTP-0015-0595 at 00:04:41-00:09:04 (CIV-OTP-0021-0026 at 0030- 0031); CIV-OTP-0016-0347 at 0353-0354; CIV-OTP-0019-0168 at 0174; CIV-OTP-0020-0064 at 0069; CIV-OTP-0020-0335 at 0360-0363; CIV-OTP-0028-0481 at 0487; CIV-OTP-0037-0425 at 0447-0448; CIV-OTP-0039-0143 at 0186; CIV-OTP-0040-0446 at 0463-0464, 0467; CIV-OTP- 0041-0534 at 0578; CIV-OTP-0043-0461 at 0494-0496; CIV-OTP-0045-0127 at 0128; CIV-OTP- 0045-0148 at 0151-0152; CIV-OTP-0046-0790 at 0804-0806; CIV-OTP-0046-0814 at 0816-0821, 0824; CIV-OTP-0047-0036 at 0056-0057; CIV-OTP-0049-2634 at 2662-2663; CIV-OTP-0049-2760 at 2782-2784; CIV-OTP-0051-0392 at 0415. CIV-OTP-0014-0326 at 0332-0334; see also CIV-D25-0001-0840 at 0856; CIV-OTP-0063-1718 261 at 1741-1742; CIV-OTP-0063-2227 at 2235-2240, who confirm that Maguy le Tocard indeed worked together with that unit. 262 CIV-OTP-0013-0108 at 0117; CIV-OTP-0014-0768 at 0784-0785, 0792; CIV-OTP-0048-1396 at 1480.

No. ICC-02/11-02/11 42/90 11 December 2014

during the post-election crisis.

263

Individuals close to Laurent Gbagbo were

involved in the recruitment, organisation and supervision of mercenaries,

264

and there is evidence that money as well as weaponry and other equipment,

such as uniforms, were provided for the mercenaries by Laurent Gbagbo’s

associates.

265

The evidence suggests that mercenaries cooperated with or were

de facto integrated into FDS units, and were controlled by FDS officers or other

members of the inner circle.

266

88 There is specific evidence that Charles Blé Goudé organised and

financed the procurement of Liberian mercenaries from a refugee camp in

Ghana in December 2010.

267

Furthermore, the Chamber considers relevant the

evidence that after the crisis, blank Ivorian birth certificates which were

263 CIV-OTP-0002-0010 at 0020; CIV-OTP-0002-0161 at 0162; CIV-OTP-0002-0295 at 0295; CIV- OTP-0013-0108 at 0118, 0119; CIV-OTP-0014-0443 at 0469; CIV-OTP-0014-0768 at 0772, 0792; CIV-OTP-0020-0064 at 0086-0087; CIV-OTP-0020-0335 at 0364-0365; CIV-OTP-0027-0304 at 0325, 0326, 0331; CIV-OTP-0037-0425 at 0453; CIV-OTP-0041-0534 at 0577-0580; CIV-OTP- 0042-0508 at 0558-0559; CIV-OTP-0043-0461 at 0497-0499; CIV-OTP-0046-0790 at 0800-0803; CIV-OTP-0048-1396 at 1479-1481. See also CIV-OTP-0049-2842 at 2856; CIV-OTP-0051-0236 at 0245. 264 CIV-OTP-0013-0108 at 0117-0119; CIV-OTP-0014-0646 at 0651-0652; CIV-OTP-0014-0684 at 0710; CIV-OTP-0014-0768 at 0784-0785, 0792; CIV-OTP-0018-0810 at 0859; CIV-OTP-0018-0881 at 0891; CIV-OTP-0020-0335 at 0364-0365; CIV-OTP-0021-1290 at 1290-1291; CIV-OTP-0027- 0304 at 0325-0326; CIV-OTP-0039-0143 at 0187; CIV-OTP-0043-0461 at 0499; CIV-OTP-0046- 0790 at 0800-0805, 0811; CIV-OTP-0046-0862 at 0878-0880; CIV-OTP-0051-0392 at 0416. 265 CIV-OTP-0002-0010 at 0020; CIV-OTP-0002-0527 at 0546; CIV-OTP-0004-0072 at 0140; CIV- OTP-0013-0108 at 0117, 0118; CIV-OTP-0020-0335 at 0365, 0380; CIV-OTP-0027-0304 at 0324- 0327; CIV-OTP-0039-0143 at 0150; CIV-OTP-0041-0534 at 0578, 0579; CIV-OTP-0042-0508 at 0559; CIV-OTP-0046-0814 at 0821-0822, 0830-0831; CIV-OTP-0046-0862 at 0878-0882; CIV- OTP-0048-1396 at 1479, 1480. CIV-OTP-0002-0527 at 0546; CIV-OTP-0011-0572 at 0574-0583; CIV-OTP-0014-0289 at 0323- 266 0325; CIV-OTP-0014-0326 at 0331-0332; CIV-OTP-0014-0400 at 0423-0425; CIV-OTP-0014-0443 at 0466-0471; CIV-OTP-0014-0768 at 0793-0801; CIV-OTP-0014-0802 at 0806; CIV-OTP-0016- 0642 at 0642; CIV-OTP-0019-0168 at 0174; CIV-OTP-0020-0033 at 0053-0054; CIV-OTP-0020- 0064 at 0086-0087; CIV-OTP-0020-0283 at 0294-0295, 0301; CIV-OTP-0020-0335 at 0365, 0380; CIV-OTP-0027-0304 at 0317, 0319, 0330-0331; CIV-OTP-0028-0481 at 0487, 0508, 0509; CIV- OTP-0029-0323 at 0332; CIV-OTP-0037-0425 at 0453; CIV-OTP-0041-0534 at 0577-0580; CIV- OTP-0043-0461 at 0497-0499; CIV-OTP-0044-2421 at 2423; CIV-OTP-0046-0790 at 0802-0806; CIV-OTP-0046-0814 at 0816-0821, 0824, 0828-0829; CIV-OTP-0046-0862 at 0876; CIV-OTP- 0046-1050 at 1063, 1066-1067; CIV-OTP-0046-1102 at 1109-1110; CIV-OTP-0047-0113 at 0119; CIV-OTP-0048-1396 at 1480-1481; CIV-OTP-0048-1503 at 1541; CIV-OTP-0049-2538 at 2566- 2569; CIV-OTP-0049-2616 at 2617-2620; CIV-OTP-0051-0392 at 0413-0414. 267 CIV-OTP-0063-1801 at 1825-1827.

No. ICC-02/11-02/11 43/90 11 December 2014

intended for issuance to foreign mercenaries were found at Charles Blé

Goudé’s house. There is additional evidence of Charles Blé Goudé’s 268

involvement in the recruitment of mercenaries for the pro-Gbagbo forces. 269

V. Planning and coordination of the use of violence

A. Meetings and instructions within the inner circle

89 The evidence, including the logbook of visitors to the Presidential

Residence, 270 demonstrates that Charles Blé Goudé was in unrestricted contact

with Laurent Gbagbo at all times relevant for the case. 271 In addition, the

Chamber notes the evidence that Charles Blé Goudé maintained direct

relationships with Simone Gbagbo and with certain high commanders of the

FDS. 272 Minutes of a government meeting held on 22 February 2011 reveal that

Charles Blé Goudé intervened in the discussion on a matter affecting the

military. 273

90 Other evidence demonstrates that members of the inner circle were

involved in coordination meetings throughout the crisis, for example in

regular crisis meetings which seem to have been held at the Presidential

Residence, 274 with a view to discussing the situation on the ground and to

CIV-OTP-0039-0143 at 0162; CIV-OTP-0062-1001 at 00:00:00-00:00:53. The Chamber also 268 notes an item of documentary evidence, which demonstrates that provision of Ivorian nationality to mercenaries was stated as part of conditions to obtain their services; see CIV- OTP-0021-6645. CIV-OTP-0013-0108 at 0117; CIV-OTP-0039-0143 at 0163. 269 270 CIV-OTP-0053-0574 at 0584, 0586, 0588, 0589, 0593, 0596, 0610, 0612, 0614, 0624, 0633, 0642- 0643, 0663, 0673, 0678, 0704, 0706-0707, 0737. CIV-OTP-0014-0400 at 0433-0435; CIV-OTP-0014-0665 at 0676; CIV-OTP-0046-1368 at 1394; 271 CIV-OTP-0061-0080 at 0087; CIV-OTP-0062-0512 at 0535. 272 See above, paras 57-62. CIV-OTP-0025-0082 at 0084. 273 CIV-OTP-0011-0361 at 0370-0371; CIV-OTP-0014-0684 at 0697-0698; CIV-OTP-0017-0144 at 274 0159-0161; CIV-OTP-0017-0162 at 0163-0176, 0178-0179, 0181-0182; CIV-OTP-0021-5125 at 5125; CIV-OTP-0051-1247 at 1276-1278. See also CIV-OTP-0018-0309 at 0309; CIV-OTP-0018-0395 at 0397.

No. ICC-02/11-02/11 44/90 11 December 2014

coordinating necessary actions.

275

According to the evidence, Simone Gbagbo

also took part in meetings of the CNRD.

276

91 The evidence before the Chamber shows that during the post-election

crisis, regular briefings took place at the General Staff involving all high

commanders of the armed forces, especially after the military assumed

command over all operations which were then coordinated from the General

Staff.

277

92 Laurent Gbagbo held regular meetings with the high commanders of the

FDS, occasionally with the participation of Charles Blé Goudé. In addition,

278 279

there is evidence that he was in regular telephone contact with the Chief of

Staff, that he was informed of discussions at meetings held at the General

280

Staff and of developments on the ground,

281

and that he gave direct

275 CIV-OTP-0017-0162 at 0172, 0175. 276 CIV-OTP-0018-0810 at 0817, 0830, 0832, 0836, 0840; CIV-OTP-0018-0881 at 0882-0893. See also above, para. 61. CIV-OTP-0011-0341 at 0349-0351; CIV-OTP-0011-0361 at 0366-0369; CIV-OTP-0011-0455 at 277 0477; CIV-OTP-0011-0505 at 0506; CIV-OTP-0014-0354 at 0379-0380; CIV-OTP-0014-0479 at 0516; CIV-OTP-0015-0077 at 0095-0104; CIV-OTP-0015-0109 at 0117-0118; CIV-OTP-0015-0270 at 0273-0275; CIV-OTP-0015-0298 at 0312-0314; CIV-OTP-0016-0256 at 0258; CIV-OTP-0016- 0301 at 0304-0308; CIV-OTP-0016-0413 at 0419; CIV-OTP-0016-0426 at 0438-0440, 0444; CIV- OTP-0045-0308 at 0308; CIV-OTP-0046-0908 at 0909-0912; CIV-OTP-0051-0556 at 0571-0575; CIV-OTP-0051-1086 at 1092-1093, 1100-1101; CIV-OTP-0051-0434 at 0449-0450. CIV-OTP-0011-0361 at 0362-0364; CIV-OTP-0011-0505 at 0519-0528; CIV-OTP-0011-0529 at 278 0530, 0538-0540; CIV-OTP-0015-0134 at 0153-0160; CIV-OTP-0016-0084 at 0087; CIV-OTP- 0016-0426 at 0445; CIV-OTP-0046-0886 at 0895-0901; CIV-OTP-0049-0036 at 0036; CIV-OTP- 0051-0434 at 0449-0456; CIV-OTP-0051-0462 at 0471-0472; CIV-OTP-0051-0480 at 0500-0501; CIV-OTP-0051-0806 at 0808-0815; CIV-OTP-0051-1045 at 1047, 1053-1056, 1064-1065, 1067, 1069-1071, 1081-1084; CIV-OTP-0053-0574 at 0584, 0586, 0588, 0592, 0595, 0601, 0605, 0608, 0609, 0610, 0613, 0642, 0706, 0722, 0723, 0736, 0737, 0739, 0759, 0761, 0762, 0763, 0764; see also below, para. 104. CIV-OTP-0053-0574 at 0584, 0586, 0588, 0610, 0613-0614, 0642-0643, 0706, 0736-0737; see 279 also below, para. 104. CIV-OTP-0011-0361 at 0369; CIV-OTP-0011-0395 at 0410-0418; CIV-OTP-0014-0289 at 0309- 280 0312, 0316-0321; CIV-OTP-0015-0298 at 0312-0313; CIV-OTP-0016-0084 at 0087, 0101; CIV- OTP-0016-0175 at 0195; CIV-OTP-0016-0204 at 0224-0225; CIV-OTP-0016-0301 at 0315-0319; CIV-OTP-0016-0426 at 0432-0435; CIV-OTP-0046-0886 at 0901-0904; CIV-OTP-0051-0556 at 0572-0574. 281 CIV-OTP-0011-0395 at 0414-0417; CIV-OTP-0011-0505 at 0524-0525; CIV-OTP-0014-0289 at 0312-0322; CIV-OTP-0016-0065 at 0081-0083; CIV-OTP-0016-0084 at 0085-0087; CIV-OTP-0016-

No. ICC-02/11-02/11 45/90 11 December 2014

instructions to the Chief of Staff and other high commanders. 282 The evidence also indicates that units on the ground at times received orders outside their official chain of command, including directly from Laurent Gbagbo. 283 B. Mobilisation of the youth for violent acts 93. In the view of the Chamber, the evidence demonstrates that as part of the effort to keep Laurent Gbagbo in power at any cost, the pro-Gbagbo youth, whose allegiance had been cultivated for years in the framework of various organisations forming part of the Patriotic Galaxy, 284 was mobilised for violence in an organised and planned manner. The Chamber finds that this mobilisation also resulted in some of the crimes charged. 94. The conduct of campaign activities on behalf of Laurent Gbagbo, in particular among communities perceived as loyal to him, indicates that the mobilisation of supporters for the possible use of violence began well in advance of the violence at issue in the present case. Large and well-organised rallies, including at major public gatherings referred to as parlements , formed a prominent part of Laurent Gbagbo’s election campaign in 2010. The 285 evidence also indicates that violent rhetoric and hate speech was utilised at these rallies, in particular in Yopougon. 286 Already at this time, members of communities identified as pro-Ouattara were openly threatened with death at

0204 at 0224; CIV-OTP-0016-0426 at 0434-0435, 0438-0440; CIV-OTP-0046-0932 at 0949-0950; CIV-OTP-0051-0556 at 0572-0575; CIV-OTP-0051-0871 at 0882-0887; CIV-OTP-0051-1086 at 1088, 1101. CIV-OTP-0011-0395 at 0414-0416; CIV-OTP-0016-0130 at 0138; CIV-OTP-0020-0307 at 0308- 282 0311. See also CIV-OTP-0014-0135 at 0151-0152; CIV-OTP-0014-0170 at 0171-0172. CIV-OTP-0007-0283 at 0293; CIV-OTP-0028-0481 at 0497-0499; CIV-OTP-0037-0425 at 0432- 283 0433; CIV-OTP-0039-0143 at 0151-0153, 0159, 0171; CIV-OTP-0041-0534 at 0560; CIV-OTP- 0048-1503 at 1510-1511, 1517, 1519-1520. See also above, paras 66-67. 284 See above, paras 74-75. CIV-OTP-0014-0622 at 0625, 0632; CIV-OTP-0020-0335 at 0348; CIV-OTP-0046-1345 at 1350, 285 1352. CIV-OTP-0002-0046 at 0051; CIV-OTP-0013-0108 at 0113; CIV-OTP-0020-0064 at 0068-0069; 286 CIV-OTP-0020-0335 at 0347, 0348; CIV-OTP-0029-0656 at 0668; CIV-OTP-0039-0196 at 0224; CIV-OTP-0042-0508 at 0558; CIV-OTP-0048-1503 at 1538. No. ICC-02/11-02/11 46/90 11 December 2014

the rallies, 287 and violence was used against perceived supporters of Alassane

Ouattara on the side lines of large pro-Gbagbo gatherings. The Chamber 288

notes the evidence showing that Charles Blé Goudé 289 and also Simone

Gbagbo 290 were regular speakers at pro-Gbagbo rallies. The evidence also

demonstrates that Laurent Gbagbo attended campaign rallies in Yopougon. 291

95 According to the evidence, the central figure in the mobilisation of the

youth was Charles Blé Goudé, who engaged in a sustained effort to control

and direct the actions of the pro-Gbagbo youth throughout the time period

relevant for the charges. The evidence demonstrates that he was aware of and

wilfully exploited his capacity to mobilise the youth. 292 Charles Blé Goudé’s

speeches were designed to create and maintain the youth in a state of alert

and at his disposal, waiting for his instructions at the opportune moment, as

evidenced by announcements of orders to be given in the near future, 293 and

by references to previous acts of mobilisation. 294 The Chamber also finds

relevant, as a tool to control the youth, his instruction to the effect that only

information received from the RTI and from representatives of the youth

organisations in the neighbourhoods should be trusted, and not opposition

287 CIV-OTP-0049-2842 at 2848. 288 CIV-OTP-0049-2842 at 2848. CIV-OTP-0013-0108 at 0114; CIV-OTP-0016-0372 at 0378; CIV-OTP-0020-0335 at 0348-0350, 289 0352-0354; CIV-OTP-0039-0196 at 0225; CIV-OTP-0049-2359 at 2379. CIV-OTP-0013-0108 at 0116-0117; CIV-OTP-0016-0372 at 0375, 0378. 290 291 CIV-OTP-0017-0392 at 0400; CIV-OTP-0020-0335 at 0346. See also CIV-OTP-0020-0335 at 0348, 0350. CIV-OTP-0003-0670 at 00:05:47-00:06:02 (CIV-OTP-0020-0531 at 0537); CIV-OTP-0052-0673 292 at 00:08:30-00:12:17 (CIV-OTP-0054-0458 at 0462-0463); CIV-OTP-0062-1041 at 00:30:57- 00:33:24 (CIV-OTP-0063-3017 at 3023). CIV-OTP-0022-0065 at 00:03:52-00:03:55 (CIV-OTP-0062-0922 at 0925); CIV-OTP-0022-0065 293 at 00:11:19-00:11:39 (CIV-OTP-0062-0922 at 0298); CIV-OTP-0022-0067 at 00:35:24-00:35:48 (CIV-OTP-0053-0014 at 0027-0028); CIV-OTP-0026-0016 at 00:50:00-00:50:03 (CIV-OTP-0052- 0653 at 0666); CIV-OTP-0026-0020 at 01:11:29-01:11:46 (CIV-OTP-0044-2534 at 2557); CIV-OTP- 0026-0022 at 00:29:23-00:29:26 (CIV-OTP-0052-0813 at 0822); CIV-OTP-0055-0449 at 00:12:18- 00:12:41 (CIV-OTP-0062-0949 at 0957); CIV-OTP-0055-0470 at 00:01:52-00:02:10; CIV-OTP- 0064-0087 at 00:14:45-00:15:14 (CIV-OTP-0063-2998 at 3001); CIV-OTP-0064-0094 at 00:20:59- 00:22:07. 294 CIV-OTP-0052-0673 at 00:06:41-00:06:43 (CIV-OTP-0054-0458 at 0461).

No. ICC-02/11-02/11 47/90 11 December 2014

media or foreign media.

295

The evidence indicates that the RTI spread

messages of hate against specific groups considered to be opponents, such as

perceived Ouattara supporters, foreigners or the UN.

296

96 The evidence also indicates a systematic effort on the part of Charles Blé

Goudé to impart a sense of threat to the pro-Gbagbo youth, and to create a

situation of apparent self-defence, which would justify an eventual use of

force. In particular, the Chamber notes the repeated references to the need to

defend themselves,

297

to the existence of genocidal threat,

298

as well as

inflammatory or even xenophobic statements, vilifying broad components of

the international community, such as France, the European Union, the United

States of America, the United Nations as well as the UNOCI, the Economic

Community of West African States (CEDEAO) and the Economic Community

of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and the Peace and

Security Council of the African Union.

299

97 Importantly, the effect of these speeches was compounded by an

amalgam of external actors and internal opposition. According to Charles Blé

CIV-OTP-0026-0026 at 00:19:30-00:19:59; CIV-OTP-0043-0269 at 00:03:41-00:04:00 (CIV-OTP- 295 0047-0611 at 0614). 296 CIV-OTP-0002-0010 at 0023; CIV-OTP-0002-0046 at 0047, 0057-0058; CIV-OTP-0020-0033 at 0037; CIV-OTP-0025-0138 at 0139-0140; CIV-OTP-0044-0337 at 0354; CIV-OTP-0044-0392 at 0430-0431; CIV-OTP-0044-1323 at 1326; CIV-OTP-0044-1332 at 1332; CIV-OTP-0048-1396 at 1439, 1473-1475; CIV-OTP-0049-2359 at 2378-2379. 297 CIV-OTP-0041-0470 at 00:12:39-00:12:42 (CIV-OTP-0044-2597 at 2600); CIV-OTP-0055-0449 at 00:07:07-00:07:15 (CIV-OTP-0062-0949 at 0954). CIV-OTP-0015-0530 at 00:12:12-00:12:23 (CIV-OTP-0063-2928 at 2936); CIV-OTP-0026-0028 298 at 00:25:52-00:25:59 (CIV-OTP-0063-2955 at 2963). 299 CIV-OTP-0015-0524 at 00:07:07-00:10:34 (CIV-OTP-0063-2914 at 2917-2918); CIV-OTP-0022- 0065 at 00:01:24-00:03:55, 00:09:06-00:09:33 (CIV-OTP-0062-0922 at 0923-0925, 0927); CIV-OTP- 0026-0016 at 00:45:45-00:47:32 (CIV-OTP-0052-0653 at 0665); CIV-OTP-0026-0020 at 01:08:48- 01:11:19 (CIV-OTP-0044-2534 at 2556-2557); CIV-OTP-0026-0022 at 00:26:49-00:29:26 (CIV- OTP-0052-0813 at 0821-0822); CIV-OTP-0026-0028 at 00:25:41-00:29:03 (CIV-OTP-0063-2955 at 2962-2965); CIV-OTP-0026-0028 at 00:25:41-00:27:54 (CIV-OTP-0063-2955 at 2963-2964); CIV- OTP-0041-0470 at 00:06:49-00:07:03 (CIV-OTP-0044-2597 at 2599); CIV-OTP-0041-0474 at 00:04:10-00:10:43 (CIV-OTP-0044-2485 at 2487-2489); CIV-OTP-0052-0673 at 00:03:10-00:03:43 (CIV-OTP-0054-0458 at 0460); CIV-OTP-0055-0449 at 00:05:53-00:06:12 (CIV-OTP-0062-0949 at 0953); CIV-OTP-0055-0470 at 00:00:09-00:01:00.

No. ICC-02/11-02/11 48/90 11 December 2014

Goudé, the threat, including the threat of genocide, originated also from

Alassane Ouattara. The evidence indicates that such an amalgam

300

contributed to identifying the civilian population perceived as supporting

Alassane Ouattara as a legitimate target of violence. The Chamber notes that

while Charles Blé Goudé referred to the adversaries as “rebels”,

301

on many

occasions persons attacked by the pro-Gbagbo youth under the pretext of

being rebels, in particular at roadblocks, were in fact civilians perceived to be

rebels on the basis of their ethnicity, religion or nationality.

302

98 Furthermore, the Chamber is satisfied that the evidence indicates that

the youth were mobilised for violence. The calls to obstruct the activities of

the UNOCI, to erect roadblocks and control the neighbourhoods, and to

303 304

assist the FDS in their combat,

305

were, and were understood as, calls to

engage in violence, in particular against civilians. This conclusion is

supported by the evidence of the use of violence against civilians, in

particular in Yopougon and at roadblocks.

306

CIV-OTP-0015-0524 at 00:08:18-00:08:26, 00:12:35-00:12:53 (CIV-OTP-0063-2914 at 2917, 300 2919); CIV-OTP-0022-0065 at 00:03:00-00:03:08 (CIV-OTP-0062-0922 at 0925); CIV-OTP-0022- 0067 at 00:33:02-00:33:37 (CIV-OTP-0053-0014 at 0027); CIV-OTP-0064-0094 at 00:21:38- 00:21:57. CIV-OTP-0022-0065 at 00:03:00-00:03:08 (CIV-OTP-0062-0922 at 0925); CIV-OTP-0026-0020 301 at 01:09:28-01:09:55 (CIV-OTP-0044-2534 at 2556-2557); CIV-OTP-0026-0028 at 00:26:00- 00:27:36 (CIV-OTP-0063-2955 at 2963-2964); CIV-OTP-0052-0673 at 00:03:10-00:03:43 (CIV- OTP-0054-0458 at 0460); CIV-OTP-0055-0449 at 00:05:53-00:06:12 (CIV-OTP-0062-0949 at 0953); CIV-OTP-0055-0470 at 00:02:18-00:02:19. See above, paras 26-38, 44-50, 52, 55. 302 CIV-OTP-0026-0020 at 01:11:19-01:11:28 (CIV-OTP-0044-2534 at 2557); CIV-OTP-0064-0087 303 at 00:14:02-00:14:14 (CIV-OTP-0063-2998 at 3001). CIV-OTP-0015-0482 at 00:01:56-00:02:04 (CIV-OTP-0019-0204 at 0205); CIV-OTP-0026-00118 304 at 01:10:50-01:12:19 (CIV-OTP-0051-2220 at 2241-2242); CIV-OTP-0047-0604 at 00:02:51- 00:03:00 (CIV-OTP-0051-1681 at 1682); CIV-OTP-0064-0087 at 00:14:15-00:14:32 (CIV-OTP- 0063-2998 at 3001). CIV-OTP-0002-1057 at 00:00:50-00:01:28 (CIV-OTP-0007-0195 at 0196); CIV-OTP-0015-0476 305 at 00:05:14-00:05:20 (CIV-OTP-0020-0500 at 0502); CIV-OTP-0015-0482 at 00:00:08-00:00:21 (CIV-OTP-0019-0204 at 0205); CIV-OTP-0047-0604 at 00:03:50-00:04:07 (CIV-OTP-0051-1681 at 1682). 306 See above, paras 26-38, 44-50, 55.

No. ICC-02/11-02/11 49/90 11 December 2014

99 Thus, the Chamber is not persuaded by the argument of the Defence that the activities of Charles Blé Goudé were peaceful in nature. The Chamber 307 notes that Charles Blé Goudé’s speeches regularly contained messages of nonviolence, 308 but considers that these messages were rendered meaningless by qualifications which accompanied them or paled in comparison with the rest of his speeches. As concerns specifically the reference to combat with bare hands (“ mains nues ”), it appears from a recording of a speech given by Charles Blé Goudé that it involved, at least in part, the idea of the youth being an auxiliary force that could support the activities of the FDS. In this context, 309 the Chamber considers the references to combat, 310 readiness to die for the cause and similar phrases to be calls for actual violence and not mere 311 312 hyperbole. 100. The Chamber also notes that the statements at the rallies indicate that Charles Blé Goudé possessed knowledge of the fact that violence was being exerted, in particular at the roadblocks established following his explicit instructions. The Chamber notes the argument of the Defence as well as 313 some evidence that at the end of the crisis Charles Blé Goudé was concerned with the proliferation of weapons among the population. However, there is 314 evidence that, despite such concerns, his mobilisation of the pro-Gbagbo youth for violence did not end. On the contrary, in a video broadcast in the 307 Transcript of hearing, 30 September 2014, ICC-02/11-02/11-T-6-Red-ENG, p. 47, line 4 to p. 61, line 12. CIV-OTP-0026-0022 at 00:06:28-00:06:35 (CIV-OTP-0052-0813 at 0816); CIV-OTP-0026-0026 308 at 00:18:49-00:19:30, 00:20:47-00:21:06; CIV-OTP-0055-0470 at 00:02:20-00:02:48. 309 CIV-OTP-0064-0094 at 00:21:58-00:22:07. CIV-OTP-0028-0103 at 00:00:34-00:02:18 (CIV-OTP-0044-2590 at 2591); CIV-OTP-0047-0604 310 at 00:04:08-00:05:40 (CIV-OTP-0051-1681 at 1682); CIV-OTP-0055-0449 at 00:07:13-00:07:18 (CIV-OTP-0062-0949 at 0954); CIV-OTP-0055-0470 at 00:02:54-00:03:00. 311 CIV-OTP-0026-0020 at 01:11:51-01:12:01 (CIV-OTP-0044-2534 at 2557); CIV-OTP-0026-0028 at 00:28:39-00:28:50 (CIV-OTP-0063-2955 at 2964); CIV-OTP-0064-0094 at 00:23:29-00:23:31. CIV-OTP-0026-0016 at 00:50:53-00:51:02 (CIV-OTP-0052-0653 at 0666). 312 CIV-OTP-0003-0670 at 00:05:16-00:05:39 (CIV-OTP-0020-0479 at 0486); CIV-OTP-0026-0018 313 at 01:11:08-01:11:19 (CIV-OTP-0051-2220 at 2241). 314 Transcript of hearing, 1 October 2014, ICC-02/11-02/11-T-7-Red-ENG, p. 40, lines 3-12. No. ICC-02/11-02/11 50/90 11 December 2014

beginning of April 2011, Charles Blé Goudé continued with the same kind of rhetoric that was employed throughout the crisis. 315 101. It appears that while Charles Blé Goudé’s mobilisation activities were most immediately directed at the pro-Gbagbo youth, they also had an impact on the conduct of militia groups, including those that employed mercenaries. In this respect, the Chamber notes first that, at least in the later stages of the crisis, the distinction between pro-Gbagbo youth and pro-Gbagbo militias was blurred, as more and more youth took up arms. 316 Secondly, the Chamber finds important the evidence that Maguy le Tocard and Maho Glofiéhi participated in the rallies organised by Charles Blé Goudé. 317 Third, the Chamber notes the specific evidence that on 25 February 2011, militia elements participated in the violence which erupted immediately following public speeches of Charles Blé Goudé. 318

102 Finally, the Chamber also notes that the youth mobilisation activities emphasised a connection between the youth and the FDS, two limbs of the pro-Gbagbo forces. A particularly significant manifestation of this effort 319 was the rally in honour of the FDS held on 23 January 2011 at the Champroux Stadium in Marcory, apparently organised in order to dispel rumours 320 questioning the loyalty of the FDS, in particular of the Chief of Staff. 321

CIV-OTP-0047-0604 at 00:00:00-00:05:40 (CIV-OTP-0051-1681 at 1682). 315 CIV-OTP-0011-0201 at 0209, 0217. 316 CIV-OTP-0058-0355 at 0373-0374; CIV-OTP-0062-0632 at 0646; CIV-OTP-0063-1377 at 1388; 317 see also above para. 69. See above, paras 26-38. 318 CIV-OTP-0015-0476 at 00:05:14-00:05:20 (CIV-OTP-0020-0500 at 0502); CIV-OTP-0015-0482 319 at 00:00:08-00:00:21 (CIV-OTP-0019-0204 at 0205); CIV-OTP-0026-0016 at 00:50:11-00:50:15 (CIV-OTP-0052-0653 at 0666). CIV-OTP-0002-0995 at 00:08:59-00:11:16 (CIV-OTP-0007-0181 at 0189-0191); CIV-OTP-0003- 320 0651 at 0651; CIV-OTP-0003-0872 at 0872; CIV-OTP-0041-0470 at 00:05:49-00:06:48 (CIV-OTP- 0044-2597 at 2599); CIV-OTP-0047-0444 at 0444-0445; CIV-OTP-0047-0670 at 00:00:00-00:00:27 (CIV-OTP-0048-1660 at 1661); CIV-OTP-0051-1159 at 1176, 1187, 1192. 321 CIV-OTP-0051-1159 at 1193. No. ICC-02/11-02/11 51/90 11 December 2014

C. Reaction to the evolution of the crisis

103 In the view of the Chamber, the evidence of the reaction of Laurent

Gbagbo and the inner circle, including Charles Blé Goudé, to the changing

situation is particularly important for findings in relation to the charges.

104 The evidence demonstrates that in response to the commencement of

armed attacks on the FDS in Abobo from the second half of December 2010, 322

FANCI, rather than regular law enforcement units, had control over FDS

operations in Abobo, 323 and instituted a curfew. 324 There is evidence that

Laurent Gbagbo directly ordered that these measures be taken, 325 and that he

held a meeting with the high commanders of the FDS for the purpose of

discussing these measures. 326 Notably, there is evidence that Charles Blé

Goudé participated in this meeting. 327

105 However, in the weeks that followed, there was an intensification of

attacks on the FDS in Abobo by elements that were increasingly organised

and well-equipped. 328 By 23 February 2011, also, the situation in western Côte

322 CIV-OTP-0014-0135 at 0159; CIV-OTP-0014-0354 at 0356-0357; CIV-OTP-0016-0301 at 0310; CIV-OTP-0017-0124 at 0143; CIV-OTP-0043-0461 at 0497; CIV-OTP-0044-1341 at 1346; CIV- OTP-0045-0291 at 0291-0294; CIV-OTP-0045-0785 at 0785-0792; CIV-OTP-0045-1084 at 1084; CIV-OTP-0048-1503 at 1524; CIV-OTP-0049-2676 at 2716-2717; CIV-OTP-0051-0462 at 0472; CIV-OTP-0051-1008 at 1025-1026. CIV-OTP-0046-0814 at 0827-0828; CIV-OTP-0046-0862 at 0884; CIV-OTP-0047-0653 at 323 00:00:14-00:08:18 (CIV-OTP-0048-1657 at 1658-1659); CIV-OTP-0051-0434 at 0442-0443, 0449; CIV-OTP-0051-1045 at 1057. 324 CIV-OTP-0017-0124 at 0139-0140; CIV-OTP-0044-0975 at 0976; CIV-OTP-0047-0653 at 00:00:00-00:04:18 (CIV-OTP-0048-1657 at 1658-1659); CIV-OTP-0051-0434 at 0439-0442; CIV- OTP-0051-1008 at 1024. CIV-OTP-0051-0434 at 0443-0444; CIV-OTP-0051-1008 at 1024-1025; CIV-OTP-0051-1045 at 325 1047, 1057-1058. CIV-OTP-0046-0886 at 0895-0901; CIV-OTP-0049-0036 at 0036; CIV-OTP-0053-0574 at 0642- 326 0643. CIV-OTP-0049-0036 at 0036; CIV-OTP-0053-0574 at 0642-0643. 327 328 CIV-OTP-0040-0372 at 0403; CIV-OTP-0042-0508 at 0517, 0518; CIV-OTP-0043-0461 at 0497; CIV-OTP-0049-2359 at 2374-2375; CIV-OTP-0051-0434 at 0448.

No. ICC-02/11-02/11 52/90 11 December 2014

d’Ivoire had degenerated into a non-international armed conflict between pro-Gbagbo and pro-Ouattara forces. 329 106. In Abobo, the FDS responded with full-scale military intervention, 330 and heavy weapons were used in densely populated areas. 331 There is evidence that Laurent Gbagbo held a meeting with the high commanders of the FDS on 24 February 2011 at the Presidential Palace for the purpose of discussing the intervention in Abobo. 332 107. The evidence also indicates that, by this time, the distinction between the enemy, most commonly referred to as “rebels”, and the civilian population was blurred, if at all present. 333 In fact, the evidence indicates that residents of certain neighbourhoods of Abobo were, on account of their ethnic, national or religious affiliation, perceived as pro-Ouattara and thus targeted by the FDS intervening in Abobo at the time. 334

108 At this juncture, the Chamber recalls its analysis of the evidence related to the attack in Yopougon in late February 2011, noting in particular that it occurred at approximately the same time as the beginning of the FANCI intervention in Abobo, and was set in motion by Charles Blé Goudé, who had met Laurent Gbagbo twice immediately before. 335

CIV-OTP-0002-0527 at 0540-0541, 0568; CIV-OTP-0053-0835 at 0847, 0849-0850, 0854. 329 CIV-OTP-0002-0010 at 0020; CIV-OTP-0037-0425 at 0442; CIV-OTP-0049-2404 at 2439-2441, 330 2454-2456; CIV-OTP-0051-0462 at 0473-0474; CIV-OTP-0051-0556 at 0571; CIV-OTP-0051-1045 at 1048, 1065-1067. See above, paras 41-43, 55. 331 CIV-OTP-0011-0505 at 0526-0528; CIV-OTP-0011-0529 at 0530, 0538-0540; CIV-OTP-0051- 332 1045 at 1047, 1064-1065, 1067, 1069-1071, 1081-1084; see also CIV-OTP-0015-0134 at 0153-0160. 333 CIV-OTP-0025-0082 at 0084; CIV-OTP-0028-0481 at 0494, 0495; CIV-OTP-0028-0550 at 0564; CIV-OTP-0037-0425 at 0451; CIV-OTP-0041-0534 at 0547-0548, 0573; CIV-OTP-0043-0269 at 00:50:14-00:50:47 (CIV-OTP-0047-0611 at 0633). CIV-OTP-0020-0064 at 0085; CIV-OTP-0028-0550 at 0564; CIV-OTP-0029-0323 at 0328-0329, 334 0332; CIV-OTP-0046-1203 at 1209; CIV-OTP-0049-2760 at 2786. 335 See above, paras 26-38. No. ICC-02/11-02/11 53/90 11 December 2014

109 The Chamber also notes that during this period there were numerous

defections from the FDS, and that the regular structure of the FDS effectively

collapsed by the end of March 2011. 336 However, the evidence shows that

Laurent Gbagbo and the inner circle were able to reorganise the loyal forces in

order to continue the fight for power, including through the commission of

crimes against civilians.

110 In particular, persons most loyal to Laurent Gbagbo continued to fight,

and took leading roles, 337 an example of which is General Dogbo Blé’s de facto

assumption of command over the FDS following the defection of the Chief of

Staff. 338 Laurent Gbagbo and the inner circle also increased their reliance on

loyal militias, which occupied FDS bases, and on the pro-Gbagbo youth. 339

111 With respect to the latter, the Chamber notes that on 19 March 2011

Charles Blé Goudé publicly appealed to the youth to enrol in the army. 340 He

indicated that the purpose of his call was to legitimise their fight and their

taking up weapons on behalf of Laurent Gbagbo. 341 On 21 March 2011, the

youth responded massively by gathering at the General Staff, but no 342

integration of new recruits into the armed forces actually took place.

CIV-OTP-0019-0211 at 0225; CIV-OTP-0045-0140 at 0142; CIV-OTP-0046-0814 at 0827; CIV- 336 OTP-0046-0862 at 0865, 0875, 0878; CIV-OTP-0049-2192 at 2201-2202; CIV-OTP-0049-2336 at 2337; CIV-OTP-0051-0556 at 0580-0581. 337 CIV-OTP-0002-0573 at 0577; CIV-OTP-0048-1503 at 1512, 1519; CIV-OTP-0051-0586 at 0591- 0593. CIV-OTP-0002-0573 at 0577; CIV-OTP-0051-0586 at 0591-0593. 338 See above, paras 68-72. 339 340 CIV-OTP-0002-0010 at 0021; CIV-OTP-0002-1057 at 00:00:00-00:01:18 (CIV-OTP-0007-0195 at 0196); CIV-OTP-0003-0632 at 0632; CIV-OTP-0004-0072 at 0119; CIV-OTP-0011-0201 at 0209- 0210; CIV-OTP-0011-0593 at 0603; CIV-OTP-0013-0108 at 0116; CIV-OTP-0015-0323 at 0335- 0336; CIV-OTP-0019-0211 at 0221; CIV-OTP-0020-0335 at 0356; CIV-OTP-0029-0656 at 0662; CIV-OTP-0041-0534 at 0581; CIV-OTP-0046-1102 at 1107-1108. CIV-OTP-0002-1057 at 00:03:43-00:05:09 (CIV-OTP-0007-0195 at 0198). 341 CIV-OTP-0002-0389 at 00:00:45-00:02:03 (CIV-OTP-0020-0517 at 0518); CIV-OTP-0003-0010 342 at 00:03:10-00:03:39 (CIV-OTP-0007-0220 at 0223); CIV-OTP-0011-0201 at 0211-0212; CIV-OTP- 0013-0108 at 0116; CIV-OTP-0015-0323 at 0340; CIV-OTP-0020-0335 at 0356; CIV-OTP-0046- 1102 at 1107-1108.

No. ICC-02/11-02/11 54/90 11 December 2014

112 In addition to the calls to recruit the youth into the army, during this time period, Charles Blé Goudé also undertook other activities aimed at the mobilisation of the youth for the struggle to preserve power. 343 On 26-27 March 2011, a mass rally was held at the Place de la République in Plateau in order to mobilise the pro-Gbagbo youth. 344 There is evidence that youth in Abidjan were increasingly armed at the time, 345 and that the violence against perceived supporters of Alassane Ouattara, in particular at roadblocks, intensified. 346 There is also evidence which links such violence to the public appearances of Charles Blé Goudé. 347 113. According to the evidence, these activities, which were primarily led by Charles Blé Goudé, were coordinated with Laurent Gbagbo and the inner circle. For example, there is evidence that the call to the youth to enrol in the army was coordinated with Laurent Gbagbo and the inner circle. 348 In addition, on 18 March 2011 Laurent Gbagbo issued a statement through his spokesperson in which he called on Ivorians to take greater responsibility and for stronger collaboration between citizens and security forces, so that all suspect presences could be neutralised, 349 and on 9 April 2011 a government communiqué was issued, stating, inter alia , that the President was calling on the people to continue the resistance. 350

See above, paras 93-102. 343 CIV-OTP-0011-0201 at 0214-0216. 344 345 CIV-OTP-0011-0201 at 0209, 0217; CIV-OTP-0013-0108 at 0116; CIV-OTP-0019-0211 at 0221; CIV-OTP-0029-0656 at 0663; CIV-OTP-0039-0196 at 0210; CIV-OTP-0048-1503 at 1538; CIV- OTP-0058-0586 at 0608; CIV-OTP-0063-1464 at 1477-1493; CIV-OTP-0063-1497 at 1498-1501; CIV-OTP-0063-2180 at 2215. 346 CIV-OTP-0011-0201 at 0216, 0217; CIV-OTP-0019-0211 at 0221-0222; CIV-OTP-0049-2842 at 2852. See also above, paras 44-50, 55. CIV-OTP-0017-0003 at 0020; CIV-OTP-0029-0656 at 0663. 347 CIV-OTP-0014-0646 at 0657-0658; see also CIV-OTP-0053-0574 at 0736-0737. 348 349 CIV-OTP-0004-0072 at 0119. 350 CIV-OTP-0018-0564 at 0566. No. ICC-02/11-02/11 55/90 11 December 2014

SECTION 3. FINDINGS OF THE CHAMBER

I. Specific elements of the alleged crimes against humanity

114 On the basis of the analysis of evidence as laid out in the preceding section, the Chamber makes the following conclusions in relation to the specific elements of the crimes charged.

A. Murder 115. The Chamber finds that there are substantial grounds to believe that in the course of the five incidents analysed above the pro-Gbagbo forces killed at least 184 persons, namely: (i) at least 45 persons during the attacks related to the demonstrations at the RTI building on 16-19 December 2010; 351 (ii) at least 24 persons during the attack in Yopougon on 25-28 February 2011; 352 (iii) seven women during the attack on a women’s demonstration in Abobo on 3 March 2011; 353 (iv) at least 40 persons in the shelling of Abobo market and the surrounding area on 17 March 2011; and 354 (v) at least 68 persons during the attack in Yopougon on or around 12 April 2011. 355 116. Accordingly, the specific elements of the crime of murder under article 7(1)(a) of the Statute are met.

See above, paras 17-25. 351 See above, paras 26-38. 352 See above, paras 39-40. 353 354 See above, paras 41-43. 355 See above, paras 44-50. No. ICC-02/11-02/11 56/90 11 December 2014

B. Rape 117. The Chamber finds that there are substantial grounds to believe that the pro-Gbagbo forces raped at least 38 persons, namely: (i) at least 16 women and girls during the attacks related to the demonstrations at the RTI building on 16-19 December 2010; 356 and (ii) at least 22 women during the attack in Yopougon on or around 12 April 2011. 357 118. Accordingly, the specific elements of the crime of rape under article 7(1)(g) of the Statute are met. C. Other inhumane acts or attempted murder 119. The Chamber finds that there are substantial grounds to believe that in the course of the five incidents analysed above, the pro-Gbagbo forces injured at least 126 persons, namely: (i) at least 54 persons during the attacks related to the demonstrations at the RTI building on 16-19 December 2010; 358 (ii) at least seven persons during the attack in Yopougon on 25-28 February 2011; 359 (iii) at least three persons during the attack on a women’s demonstration in Abobo on 3 March 2011; 360 (iv) at least 60 persons in the shelling of Abobo market and the surrounding area on 17 March 2011; 361 and

356 See above, paras 17-25. See above, paras 44-50. 357 See above, paras 17-25. 358 See above, paras 26-38. 359 360 See above, paras 39-40. 361 See above, paras 41-43. No. ICC-02/11-02/11 57/90 11 December 2014

(v) at least two persons during the attack in Yopougon on or around 12 April 2011. 362 120. Considering the modalities in which the alleged criminal acts were performed, including the kinds of weaponry used, and in light of the available information on the nature of the injuries suffered by the victims of the crimes charged, the Chamber is satisfied that there are substantial grounds to believe that the infliction of these acts by the pro-Gbagbo forces, which were of a character similar to the other acts referred to in article 7(1) of the Statute, caused great suffering and serious injury to body. Accordingly, the Chamber concludes that the specific elements of the crime of other inhumane acts under article 7(1)(k) of the Statute are met.

121 Turning to the alternative charge, with respect to the same injuries, of attempted murder under articles 7(1)(a) and 25(3)(f) of the Statute, the Chamber likewise takes into account the modalities of the criminal acts under consideration, including the kinds of weaponry used, and the information in relation to the nature of the injuries experienced by the victims. On the basis of the available evidence, the Chamber is of the view that there are substantial grounds to believe that the conduct of the pro-Gbagbo forces which led to the injuries referred to above was designed to bring about the death of the victims. Further, the Chamber considers that there are substantial grounds to believe that these acts constituted a substantial step for the attainment of said consequence, and that the fact that the death of the victims eventually did not occur was independent of the perpetrators’ intentions. Accordingly, the Chamber concludes that the specific elements of the crime of attempted murder under articles 7(1)(a) and 25(3)(f) of the Statute are met. Therefore, since the evidentiary threshold is met in relation to the constitutive elements

362 See above, paras 44-50. No. ICC-02/11-02/11 58/90 11 December 2014

of both other inhumane acts, under article 7(1)(k), and attempted murder, under articles 7(1)(a) and 25(3)(f) of the Statute, the Chamber considers it appropriate to confirm the charge with the alternative qualification as proposed by the Prosecutor. 363 D. Persecution 122. The Chamber considers that there are substantial grounds to believe that at least 348 victims of the killings, rapes and injuries committed by the pro- Gbagbo forces in the course of the five incidents analysed above 364 were targeted by reason of their identity as perceived supporters of Alassane Ouattara. This conclusion of the Chamber is supported by the facts, outlined above, that during the five events under consideration, the pro-Gbagbo forces targeted participants at pro-Ouattara demonstrations, 365 or inhabitants of areas perceived as supporting Alassane Ouattara, namely Abobo and certain neighbourhoods of Yopougon (Doukouré, Mami Faitai and Lem). 366 123. Accordingly, the Chamber finds that these acts of violence constitute persecution on political grounds, as well as on ethnic (against ethnic groups originating in the north of Côte d’Ivoire, such as Dioula and Baoulé), national (against nationals of other West African countries, and Ivorians of West African descent) and religious (against Muslims) grounds, as members of these groups were as such considered as supporters of Alassane Ouattara. Therefore, the Chamber concludes that the specific elements of the crime of persecution under article 7(1)(h) of the Statute are met.

DCC, p. 244. 363 See above, paras 17-50. 364 365 See above, paras 17-25, 39-40. 366 See above, paras 26-50. No. ICC-02/11-02/11 59/90 11 December 2014

II. Contextual elements of the alleged crimes against humanity

124 On the basis of the analysis of evidence as laid out in the preceding section, the Chamber finds that there are substantial grounds to believe that the charged criminal acts committed within the context of the five incidents described above were part of a widespread and systematic attack directed against the civilian population pursuant to article 7 of the Statute. Also, as further developed below, the Chamber is satisfied that there are substantial 367 grounds to believe that Charles Blé Goudé, in performing his actions, had knowledge of the attack.

125 Article 7(1) of the Statute states that in order for a crime to qualify as a crime against humanity under the Statute, it must have been committed “as part of a widespread or systematic attack against the civilian population”. Article 7(2)(a) of the Statute defines the “attack” as “a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1 [of article 7 of the Statute] against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organisational policy to commit such attack”.

126 The Chamber recalls the previous findings of the Court, including of this Chamber, with regard to the interpretation of these provisions. 368 Pursuant to them, the Chamber must ascertain first the existence of an attack directed against the civilian population, within the meaning of article 7(2)(a) of the Statute, and then its widespread or systematic character.

A. Existence of an attack directed against the civilian population 127. The Chamber concludes that there are substantial grounds to believe that, between 27 November 2010 and on or around 12 April 2011, a course of

See below, paras 156, 164, 170, 180. 367 See Pre-Trial Chamber I, “ Decision on the confirmation of charges against Laurent 368 Gbagbo ”, 12 June 2014, ICC-02/11-01/11-656-Red, paras 208-210 and 213-217 and legal provisions and jurisprudence referred therein and in the corresponding footnotes. No. ICC-02/11-02/11 60/90 11 December 2014

conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1 of article 7 of the Statute was carried out by the pro-Gbagbo forces against civilians perceived to be Alassane Ouattara’s supporters. These acts were committed in the context of the five incidents charged as well as the other events of violence analysed above. 369 128. The Chamber considers that this course of conduct against the civilian population was carried out pursuant to a State or organisational policy. The Chamber notes in this regard the evidence which demonstrates that preparatory activities were undertaken for the purpose of the possible use of violence against civilians in order to keep Laurent Gbagbo in power, 370 and that the violence was a planned and coordinated effort of Laurent Gbagbo and his inner circle, 371 carried out through the forces under their control. 372 In light of the evidence available, 373 the Chamber is also satisfied that the pro- Gbagbo forces, which included elements of the FDS, militia, mercenaries and pro-Gbagbo youth, and were led by Laurent Gbagbo and his inner circle, constituted an organisation within the terms of article 7(2)(a) of the Statute and that the policy may thus be attributed to an organisation in accordance with that provision. The Chamber is equally of the view that the policy to be attributed to such entity, which comprised part of the State apparatus, may on this basis be also qualified as a State policy. Therefore, for the purposes of the present decision, the Chamber considers that the Prosecutor’s allegation that the policy to carry out the attack on the civilian population may qualify as a

See above, paras 17-55. 369 See above, paras 76-88. 370 See above, paras 89-113. 371 372 See above, paras 64-75. 373 See above, paras 64-75. No. ICC-02/11-02/11 61/90 11 December 2014

State or organisational policy 374 also finds sufficient support in the available evidence.

129 The Chamber notes that the Prosecutor asserts as part of the facts and circumstances described in the charges that “[u]pon assuming the Presidency of the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire in October 2000, Gbagbo harboured the objective of retaining power by, inter alia , repressing or violently attacking those who challenged his authority”. The Chamber refrains from any 375 finding in this regard and focuses on the time frame of the post-election crisis, as indeed pleaded by the Prosecutor and discussed by the parties and 376 participants during the proceedings. 130. In light of the above, the Chamber concludes that the course of conduct that took place between 27 November 2010 and on or around 12 April 2011 constituted an “attack directed against the civilian population” within the meaning of article 7(2)(a) of the Statute. B. Widespread or systematic character of the attack 131. The attack referred to above was widespread within the meaning of article 7(1) of the Statute, as it: (i) involved a large number of acts; (ii) targeted and victimised a significant number of individuals; (iii) extended over a time period of more than four months; and (iv) affected the entire city of Abidjan, a metropolis of more than three million inhabitants. 377 132. The Chamber is equally of the view that the attack was “systematic” within the meaning of article 7(1) of the Statute, considering that: (i) preparations for the attack were undertaken in advance, and the attack was 378

DCC, para. 212. 374 DCC, para. 323. 375 DCC, paras 323-324. 376 377 See above, paras 17-55. 378 See above, paras 76-88. No. ICC-02/11-02/11 62/90 11 December 2014

planned and coordinated; 379 and (ii) the acts of violence analysed by the Chamber reveal a clear pattern of violence directed at pro-Ouattara demonstrators or activists, 380 and more generally against areas whose inhabitants were perceived to be supporters of Alassane Ouattara. 381

III. Individual criminal responsibility of Charles Blé Goudé

133 The Prosecutor alleges that Charles Blé Goudé is criminally responsible for the crimes charged under the alternative modes of liability of article 25(3)(a), 25(3)(b), 25(3)(c) and 25(3)(d) of the Statute. 382 As this Chamber has stated previously, when alternative legal characterisations of the same facts proposed by the Prosecutor are satisfactorily established by the evidence, it is appropriate that the charges be confirmed with the various available alternatives, in order for the Trial Chamber to determine whether any of those legal characterisations is established to the applicable standard of proof at trial. 383 A. Article 25(3)(a) of the Statute 134. According to article 25(3)(a) of the Statute, commission of a crime may be joint with another person. The central aspect of joint commission (also called “co-perpetration”) pursuant to article 25(3)(a) of the Statute is the presence of an agreement between a plurality of persons to commit a crime 384

See above, paras 89-113. 379 380 See above, paras 17-25, 39-40, 53-54. See above, paras 26-50. 381 DCC, para. 322. 382 Pre-Trial Chamber I, “ Decision on the confirmation of charges against Laurent Gbagbo ”, 12 383 June 2014, ICC-02/11-01/11-656-Red, paras 227-228. See also Pre-Trial Chamber II, “ Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Bosco Ntaganda ”, 9 June 2014, ICC-01/04-02/06-309, para. 100. Having regard to article 30(2) of the Statute, this includes situations where the co- 384 perpetrators share the intent to engage in certain conduct knowing that crimes will result from that conduct in the ordinary course of events. No. ICC-02/11-02/11 63/90 11 December 2014

– which may take the form of a “common plan”. 385 The existence of this agreement justifies the reciprocal attribution of the contributive acts of the joint perpetrators, the coordinated sum of which results in the realisation of the objective elements of a crime. 386 It is not required that each joint perpetrator personally participates in the execution of each material element of the crime, and there may be circumstances in which a particular joint perpetrator contributes to the commission of the crimes in ways other than by realising a material element of the crimes, such as by performing a crucial role at the planning or preparation stage, including when the common plan is conceived. 387 135. The decisive consideration is whether the individual contribution of each co-perpetrator within the framework of the agreement is such that without it the crime would not be committed or would be committed in a significantly different way. In this regard, the Chamber is attentive to the recent findings of the Appeals Chamber, which confirmed the criterion of “control over the crime” as the distinguishing factor between “commission” under article 25(3)(a) and accessory responsibility under article 25(3)(b) to (d) of the Statute for a crime committed by (an)other person(s), and defined a “coperpetrator” as “one who makes, within the framework of a common plan, an essential contribution with the resulting power to frustrate the commission of the crime”. More specifically, the Appeals Chamber held: 388 [I]n circumstances where a plurality of persons was involved in the commission of crimes under the Statute, the question of whether an accused ‘committed’ a crime – and therefore not only contributed to the crime committed by someone else – cannot only be answered by reference to how close the accused was to the actual crime and whether he or she directly carried out the incriminated conduct. Rather, what is required is a normative Appeals Chamber, “ Judgment on the appeal of Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against his 385 conviction ”, 1 December 2014, ICC-01/04-01/06-3121-Red, para. 445. Ibid . 386 387 Ibid. , para. 469. 388 Ibid. , para. 7. No. ICC-02/11-02/11 64/90 11 December 2014

assessment of the role of the accused person in the specific circumstances of the case. The Appeals Chamber considers that the most appropriate tool for conducting such an assessment is an evaluation of whether the accused had control over the crime, by virtue of his or her essential contribution to it and the resulting power to frustrate its commission, even if that essential contribution was not made at the execution stage of the crime. 389 136. In accordance with the jurisprudence of the Court, the co-perpetrators may execute the material elements of the crimes directly or through another person. In the latter case, it is required that the co-perpetrators do so by jointly controlling the action of another person to such a degree that the will of that person becomes irrelevant, and her/his action must be attributed to the co-perpetrators as if it were their own. In cases of multiple direct perpetrators, it is not required that each co-perpetrator be individually in a position of control with respect to some or all of the direct perpetrators. What is decisive is that the co-perpetrators be jointly in control of the direct perpetrators, whom the co-perpetrators utilise for the commission of the crimes. This form of responsibility combines the commission of a crime “jointly with another” (in which a plurality of persons has the capacity to frustrate the commission of the crime in the way it is realised by not performing their coordinated contributive acts within the framework of an agreement among them) with the commission of a crime “through another person” (in which a person commits the crime by subjugating another person’s will, rather than directly). 137. In the present case, Charles Blé Goudé is charged with having committed the alleged crimes jointly with Laurent Gbagbo and the latter’s inner circle, through the pro-Gbagbo forces. In essence, what is required in order for these charges to be confirmed as proposed by the Prosecutor is that the evidence establishes substantial grounds to believe that: (i) there existed an agreement or common plan between Charles Blé Goudé and his alleged co-perpetrators to commit the crimes or

389 Ibid. , para. 473. No. ICC-02/11-02/11 65/90 11 December 2014

to engage in a conduct which, in the ordinary course of events, would result in the commission of the crimes; (ii) Charles Blé Goudé, acting in a coordinated manner with his coperpetrators, had control over the crimes by virtue of his essential contribution within the framework of the common plan with the resulting power to frustrate the commission of the crimes; (iii) Charles Blé Goudé and his co-perpetrators relied on the pro- Gbagbo forces to carry out the material elements of the crimes, over which they exercised joint control subjugating the individual will of the direct perpetrators; and (iv) Charles Blé Goudé held the requisite intent and knowledge pursuant to the Statute with respect to the crimes charged. a) The common plan between Charles Blé Goudé and others 138. The Chamber finds that Charles Blé Goudé, together with Laurent Gbagbo, Simone Gbagbo and other members of the inner circle, agreed to keep Laurent Gbagbo in power at any cost, including through the use of force against civilians, and conceived a plan to this effect (“common plan”).

139 The Chamber relies on evidence demonstrating: (i) Charles Blé Goudé’s relations with Laurent Gbagbo and a limited number of close associates who agreed on the objective of keeping Laurent Gbagbo in power and coordinated the means to achieve this goal, including the use of force against civilians; 390 (ii) the mobilisation of the youth for violent acts; (iii) preparatory activities in 391 anticipation of the use of violence, such as acquisition of weapons, recruitment into the FDS, recruitment, training and supplying of militias and

390 See above, paras 57-62. 391 See above, paras 93-102. No. ICC-02/11-02/11 66/90 11 December 2014

mercenaries; 392 (iv) the interaction between Charles Blé Goudé, Laurent Gbagbo and members of his inner circle, and the forces under their control, illustrated by the evidence of meetings and instructions to units on the ground during the crisis; 393 as well as (v) the steps undertaken by Charles Blé Goudé, Laurent Gbagbo and the inner circle in reaction to the evolution of the crisis. 394 140. Based on these considerations, the Chamber concludes that violence against civilians, while it was not in itself the ultimate goal of Charles Blé Goudé, Laurent Gbagbo and the inner circle, was a criminal element inherent to the common plan to keep Laurent Gbagbo in power at any cost. b) Charles Blé Goudé’s contribution within the framework of the common plan 141. As recalled above, in order to determine whether Charles Blé Goudé is criminally responsible as a co-perpetrator for the crimes charged, the Chamber must evaluate whether he had control over the crimes by virtue of his essential contribution within the framework of the common plan and the resulting power to frustrate their commission. Such evaluation, according to the Appeals Chamber, cannot be made only “by reference to how close [he] was to the actual crime or whether he […] directly carried out the incriminated conduct”, but requires “a normative assessment” of his role in the specific circumstances of the case. 395 142. In light of the evidence, the Chamber is satisfied that Charles Blé Goudé was a prominent member of the inner circle although not the ultimate decision maker. The evidence demonstrates that he participated in the conception and implementation of the common plan, including by way of his See above, paras 76-88. 392 See above, paras 89-92. 393 See above, paras 103-113. 394 395 Appeals Chamber, “ Judgment on the appeal of Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against his conviction ”, 1 December 2014, ICC-01/04-01/06-3121-Red, para. 473. No. ICC-02/11-02/11 67/90 11 December 2014

contribution to the recruitment into the FDS, the recruitment, training and financing of militias and mercenaries, the distribution of weapons, and, in 396 particular, by way of the mobilisation of the youth for violence against perceived supporters of Alassane Ouattara and related activities aimed at strengthening the co-operation between the youth and the FDS. 397 143. The Chamber also considers that the evidence sufficiently establishes that Charles Blé Goudé, by mobilising the youth for violence in Yopougon decisively contributed to the commission of the crimes in the context of the attacks of 25-28 February and on or around 12 April 2011 in Yopougon. In 398 the view of the Chamber, these crimes would not have been committed or would have been committed in a significantly different way had Charles Blé Goudé not performed his own conduct. 144. However, in the particular circumstances of the present case as emerging from the available evidence, the Chamber is of the view that his contribution to the conception and implementation of the common plan, including his essential contribution to the violence that unfolded in Yopougon during the post-electoral crisis, does not suffice to attribute to Charles Blé Goudé responsibility as co-perpetrator for all the crimes that were committed in pursuance of the common plan to keep Laurent Gbagbo in power at any cost, including by the use of violence against civilians. 145. The Chamber recognises that the contributions of Charles Blé Goudé to the conception and implementation of the common plan, as described above, had the effect of strengthening the general capability of the pro-Gbagbo forces to commit all the crimes in pursuance of the common plan. Nonetheless, the Chamber is not satisfied that Charles Blé Goudé’s contribution was such that,

See above, paras 76-88. 396 397 See above, paras 93-104. 398 See above, paras 26-38, 44-50, 93-102. No. ICC-02/11-02/11 68/90 11 December 2014

in its absence, the crimes committed in the context of the repression of the RTI march and the attacks in Abobo (which appear to be part of separate and primarily FDS operations) would have been frustrated, namely that they would not have been committed or would have been committed in a significantly different way. 146. The Chamber notes that the common plan in the instant case was broad in nature and its implementation carried out by an organisation which included both a formal and informal structure composed of different elements, different chains of command and distinct lines of activation. Furthermore, in light of the available evidence, it appears that the attack against the civilian population that resulted from the implementation of such a plan did not take the form of a single, unified and coordinated operation but rather the form of separate, multiple violent operations tied together mainly by the overarching coordinating role exercised by Laurent Gbagbo and by the overall purpose to keep Laurent Gbagbo in power at any cost, including by use of violence against civilians. 147. In these particular circumstances, the Chamber is of the view that the contribution provided by Charles Blé Goudé within the framework of the common plan was only essential with respect to some of the violent operations that were carried out in its implementation, in particular – as already indicated – with respect to the attacks in Yopougon. 148. However, the evidence does not demonstrate that, had his contribution not taken place, the crimes committed within the separate and primarily FDS operations with respect to the repression of the march on the RTI building on 16-19 December 2010 and the attacks in Abobo on 3 and 17 March 2011 would not have taken place or would have taken place in a significantly different way. Without prejudice to his responsibility under other forms of liability

No. ICC-02/11-02/11 69/90 11 December 2014

under the Statute, the Chamber concludes that the available evidence does not establish substantial grounds to believe that Charles Blé Goudé had control over the commission of these crimes and, accordingly, may be deemed to have committed them, within the meaning of article 25(3)(a) of the Statute, jointly with Laurent Gbagbo and the inner circle and through the pro-Gbagbo forces as alleged by the Prosecutor. c) The co-perpetrators’ joint control over the pro-Gbagbo forces 149. The Chamber further finds that, by virtue of the common plan to which he was party, Charles Blé Goudé was able to exercise control, jointly with the other co-perpetrators, over the pro-Gbagbo forces, which were organised and hierarchical in nature and through which the crimes charged were committed. 150. The evidence analysed above demonstrates that joint control over the FDS, as well as over militias and mercenaries by way of their de facto integration into the FDS, was exercised by the co-perpetrators, both through the official State hierarchy and a parallel structure and chain of command which initially complemented and eventually virtually replaced the official structure. 399 151. Control over the pro-Gbagbo youth was ensured in the context of the campaign activities and their related mobilisation to use violence, as well as later calls for their enrolment in the FDS. Charles Blé Goudé himself, by way of his own activities relating to mobilisation of the youth for violence, played a vital role in ensuring control over the pro-Gbagbo youth, which despite not being organised in a formal hierarchy, had a clearly defined leadership in his

399 See above, paras 63-67. No. ICC-02/11-02/11 70/90 11 December 2014

person, received financial support, and was controlled primarily through manipulation at mass rallies. 400 152. Charles Blé Goudé was also fundamental for the exercise of control by the co-perpetrators over the militia groups, in particular in Yopougon, through his personal links with militia leaders and the provision of weapons, assistance in training and financial support. 401 153. Finally, the Chamber observes that the co-perpetrators’ joint control over the pro-Gbagbo forces – in the sense of their capacity to rely on them for the pursuance of the shared common effort – also resulted from the fact that the implementation of the common plan to keep Laurent Gbagbo in power at any cost, including through the use of violence against civilians, was coordinated and planned through meetings, instructions to units on the ground and a generally functioning communication chain. 402 d) Charles Blé Goudé’s intent and knowledge 154. The Chamber finds that Charles Blé Goudé meant to engage in his activities in the post-election crisis, and to issue orders and instructions, with a view to implementing the common plan to retain power at any cost, including by the use of force against civilians. Further, the Chamber finds that Charles Blé Goudé, in performing his actions aimed at sustaining the common effort agreed with the other co-perpetrators, meant to cause the use of violence against civilians or was aware that the violence would occur in the ordinary course of events, leading to killings, rape and acts causing serious injury to body and great suffering, and that Charles Blé Goudé intended the discriminatory use of violence against civilians known or perceived to be supporters of his political opponent Alassane Ouattara. The Chamber also See above, paras 74-75. 400 401 See above, paras 68-72. 402 See above, paras 89-113. No. ICC-02/11-02/11 71/90 11 December 2014

finds that Charles Blé Goudé and the other co-perpetrators were mutually aware and accepted that the implementation of the common plan to maintain power at any cost would result in the use of violence against civilians. 155. Indeed, the evidence shows that: (i) Charles Blé Goudé, Laurent Gbagbo and his inner circle mobilised the youth for violent acts against known or perceived supporters of Laurent Gbagbo’s political opponent Alassane Ouattara; (ii) Charles Blé Goudé, Laurent Gbagbo and his inner circle 403 engaged in preparatory activities in anticipation of the use of violence, such as acquisition of weapons and recruitment of FDS elements, militias and mercenaries; 404 (iii) Charles Blé Goudé, Laurent Gbagbo and his inner circle coordinated the implementation of the common plan through their interaction with the pro-Gbagbo forces, as illustrated by the meetings and instructions given to units on the ground during the crisis; 405 and (iv) Charles Blé Goudé, Laurent Gbagbo and his inner circle reacted to the evolution of the crisis by taking specific steps to ensure continued implementation of the common plan to retain power at any cost, including by use of violence against civilians. 406 156. In the view of the Chamber, this evidence also shows that Charles Blé Goudé was aware that the crimes committed formed part of a widespread and systematic attack directed against a civilian population, namely known or perceived Ouattara supporters. 157. Finally, the Chamber finds that Charles Blé Goudé was aware that he had the capacity to direct the conduct of the pro-Gbagbo youth by way of publicly issuing instructions to them. In addition, Charles Blé Goudé knew 407 that Laurent Gbagbo, on the basis of his claim of status as President of Côte See above, paras 93-102. 403 See above, paras 76-88. 404 See above, paras 89-92. 405 406 See above, paras 103-113. 407 See above, paras 93-102. No. ICC-02/11-02/11 72/90 11 December 2014

d’Ivoire, was able to assert his authority over the entirety of the FDS, with the high commanders of the FDS recognising his leadership, receiving instructions from him, and reporting to him, directly or indirectly, and that Laurent Gbagbo and the inner circle exercised joint control over the pro- Gbagbo forces also through a parallel structure which initially complemented and eventually virtually replaced the official structure. 408 e) Conclusion on Charles Blé Goudé’s criminal responsibility under article 25(3)(a) of the Statute 158. In conclusion, the Chamber finds that there are substantial grounds to believe that Charles Blé Goudé is criminally responsible under article 25(3)(a) of the Statute for committing, jointly with Laurent Gbagbo and other members of Laurent Gbagbo’s inner circle and through members of the pro- Gbagbo forces, crimes against humanity of murder, rape, other inhumane acts (serious injury to body and great suffering) or, alternatively, attempted murder, and persecution, within the context of the attacks in Yopougon on 25- 28 February 2011 and on or around 12 April 2011. B. Article 25(3)(b) of the Statute 159. Article 25(3)(b) of the Statute provides for individual criminal responsibility if a person “orders, solicits or induces the commission” of a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court which in fact occurs or is attempted. This Chamber previously observed that “‘ordering’, ‘soliciting’ and ‘inducing’ in essence fall into a broader category of ‘instigating’ or ‘prompting another person to commit a crime’”. 409 Recently, Pre-Trial Chamber II also took the view that ‘soliciting’ and “inducing’ characterise the same factual situation whereby the perpetrator is prompted by another to commit a crime, and have

See above, paras 64-67, 89-92. 408 409 Pre-Trial Chamber I, “ Decision on the confirmation of charges against Laurent Gbagbo ”, 12 June 2014, ICC-02/11-01/11-656-Red, para. 243. No. ICC-02/11-02/11 73/90 11 December 2014

the same legal requirements. 410 Similarly, the Chamber observes that, in the jurisprudence of the Court, the elements of “ordering” overlap with those applicable to “soliciting” and “inducing”, with the exception of the requirement of a position of authority held by the person vis-à-vis the perpetrator(s) of the crime, which is particular to “ordering” and is not a necessary element of “soliciting” or “inducing”. 411 160. The Chamber considers that the evidence analysed above demonstrates that while Charles Blé Goudé may not have been a superior of the Patriotic Galaxy in the formal sense, he had the capacity to define the mobilisation activities of the youth, and through this, to compel their conduct. As such, he was in a position of authority vis-à-vis the youth who were among the direct perpetrators of the crimes. 412 Also, in light of the evidence indicating Charles Blé Goudé’s involvement with militias, in particular in Yopougon, 413 the Chamber finds that he had also the capacity to compel or otherwise influence the conduct of the militias. 161. The Chamber further finds that Charles Blé Goudé indeed instructed or otherwise instigated the pro-Gbagbo forces to carry out certain actions in the execution of which certain charged crimes were committed and that these instructions or acts of instigation had a direct effect on the commission of such crimes. In particular, the evidence analysed above demonstrates that Charles Blé Goudé gave instructions to FESCI leader Augustin Mian to participate in the repression of the march on the RTI building on 16 December 2010, after which FESCI participated in the repression of the march, joining the other Pre-Trial Chamber II, “ Decision pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute ”, 410 11 November 2014, ICC-01/05-01/13-749, para. 34. 411 Pre-Trial Chamber II, “ Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application under Article 58 ”, 13 July 2012, ICC-01/04-01/12-1-Red, para. 63; id., “ Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Bosco Ntaganda ”, 9 June 2014, ICC- 01/04-02/06-309, paras 145 and 153. 412 See above, paras 74-75. 413 See above, paras 68-72. No. ICC-02/11-02/11 74/90 11 December 2014

branches of the pro-Gbagbo forces which had simultaneously been activated through other mechanisms. 414 162. In addition, Charles Blé Goudé engaged in a sustained effort to mobilise the youth for violence against perceived supporters of Alassane Ouattara, in particular in Yopougon. 415 In this regard, the Chamber finds that the available evidence sufficiently establishes that: (i) the crimes committed in the course of the attack in Yopougon on 25-28 February 2011 were committed immediately following Charles Blé Goudé’s instructions to, inter alia , report any “ personne étrangère ”, which, in the view of the Chamber, was a conscious reference to Alassane Ouattara’s supporters; 416 and (ii) the crimes committed in the course of the attack in Yopougon on or around 12 April 2011 resulted from the sustained effort aimed at the mobilisation of the youth for violence against perceived supporters of Alassane Ouattara. 417

163 Conversely, the Chamber considers that the available evidence does not show any instruction or instigation on the part of Charles Blé Goudé which would have had a direct effect on the commission of the crimes in Abobo on 3 and 17 March 2011. 164. In terms of the relevant mental elements, the Chamber finds that Charles Blé Goudé: (i) meant to instruct or instigate the pro-Gbagbo forces to carry out certain actions in the execution of which the crimes charged were committed as part of the repression of the march on the RTI building on 16 December 2010 and in the course of the attacks in Yopougon on 25-28 February and on or around 12 April 2011; (ii) was aware that crimes would be committed in the ordinary course of events as a consequence of his instructions or instigation,

See above, para. 20. 414 See above, paras 93-102. 415 416 See above, paras 26-38. 417 See above, paras 44-50. No. ICC-02/11-02/11 75/90 11 December 2014

and in particular, was aware that the use of violence against civilians would lead to killings, rapes and acts causing serious injury to body and great suffering; (iii) knew that the civilians targeted would be those considered to be supporters of Alassane Ouattara; and (iv) was aware that the crimes were committed as part of a widespread and systematic attack against a civilian population, namely known or perceived supporters of Alassane Ouattara. 165. For these findings, the Chamber relies on the same evidence concerning Charles Blé Goudé’s acts of instructing or otherwise instigating the pro- Gbagbo forces to commit the crimes, as well as on the evidence demonstrating that Charles Blé Goudé’s relevant actions (including the instruction to FESCI to repress the march on the RTI building and the acts of mobilisation of the youth for violence) were performed as, and intended to be, part of the common effort to keep Laurent Gbagbo in power at any cost, including by attacking civilians, from which the relevant crimes ensued, 418 and that he engaged in other coordinated activities to this end. 419 166. In conclusion, the Chamber finds that there are substantial grounds to believe that Charles Blé Goudé is criminally responsible under article 25(3)(b) of the Statute for having ordered, induced or solicited crimes against humanity of murder, rape, other inhumane acts (serious injury to body and great suffering) or, alternatively, attempted murder, and persecution, committed in the context of the attacks related to the demonstration at the RTI building on 16-19 December 2010 and the attacks in Yopougon on 25-28 February 2011 and on or around 12 April 2011.

418 See above, paras 17-38, 44-50. 419 See above, paras 93-102, 76-88, 111-113. No. ICC-02/11-02/11 76/90 11 December 2014

C. Article 25(3)(c) of the Statute 167. Article 25(3)(c) of the Statute provides for individual criminal responsibility if a person, for the purpose of facilitating the commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court, “aids, abets or otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted commission, including providing the means for its commission”. In essence, what is required for this form of responsibility is that the person provides assistance to the commission of a crime and that, in engaging in this conduct, he or she intends to facilitate the commission of the crime. 168. The Chamber finds that Charles Blé Goudé assisted the pro-Gbagbo forces in the commission of the crimes charged, by way of his role in the conception and participation in the common effort to keep Laurent Gbagbo in power at any cost, including through the use of violence against civilians. In particular, the Chamber recalls the evidence indicating the activities undertaken by Charles Blé Goudé in anticipation of the use of violence, such as recruitment into the FDS, recruitment, training and supplying of militias and mercenaries, as well as his instructions to FESCI to repress the march on the RTI building and his mobilisation activities, in particular in Yopougon. 420 The Chamber also notes the related activities on the part of Charles Blé Goudé promoting the co-operation between the components of the pro-Gbagbo forces, in particular emphasising the link between the FDS and the youth. 421 169. The Chamber considers that Charles Blé Goudé’s activities had the effect of strengthening the capability of the pro-Gbagbo forces to commit the crimes that resulted from the implementation of the common effort aimed at preserving Laurent Gbagbo in power at any cost, including the crimes committed in the context of the five incidents. 420 See above, paras 20, 27-29, 49, 76-88, 93-102. 421 See above, para. 102. No. ICC-02/11-02/11 77/90 11 December 2014

170 In the conclusion of the Chamber, these activities were intentional and were performed for the purpose of facilitating the commission of the crimes. In addition, they were performed in the knowledge that the crimes were committed as part of a widespread and systematic attack against the civilian population, namely known or perceived supporters of Alassane Ouattara. For these findings, the Chamber relies on the evidence relating to: (i) Charles Blé Goudé’s role in Laurent Gbagbo’s inner circle and his participation in, and knowledge of, the common plan to keep Laurent Gbagbo in power at any cost; 422 (ii) the nature of Charles Blé Goudé’s activities relating to the mobilisation of the youth; 423 (iii) the fact that Charles Blé Goudé engaged in preparatory activities in anticipation of the use of violence; 424 and (iv) the fact that Charles Blé Goudé was involved in the coordination of the efforts to keep Laurent Gbagbo in power at any cost. 425 171. In light of the above, the Chamber finds that there are substantial grounds to believe that Charles Blé Goudé is criminally responsible under article 25(3)(c) of the Statute for having aided, abetted or otherwise assisted in the commission crimes against humanity of murder, rape, other inhumane acts (serious injury to body and great suffering) or, alternatively, attempted murder, and persecution, committed in the context of the five incidents specifically described in the charges. D. Article 25(3)(d) of the Statute 172. Article 25(3)(d) of the Statute criminalises contributing “in any other way” to the commission of a crime by a group of persons acting with a See above, paras 57-62. 422 See above, paras 93-102. 423 424 See above, paras 76-88. 425 See above, paras 89-92. No. ICC-02/11-02/11 78/90 11 December 2014

common purpose. It is therefore required that: (i) the crime be committed ( i.e. realised in its material elements) by a group of persons acting with a common purpose; and (ii) that the person charged provides a contribution to the commission of such a crime.

173 As far as the relevant mental element is concerned, this form of responsibility requires that the person: (i) meant to contribute to the commission of the crimes; and (ii) carried out his or her contribution either with the aim of furthering the purpose or the activity of the group (in case of a criminal common purpose or activity involving the commission of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court), or in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crimes.

174 The Chamber recalls that the evidence analysed above shows that the crimes charged were perpetrated by members of pro-Gbagbo forces led by Laurent Gbagbo and his inner circle (including Charles Blé Goudé) 426 who committed the crimes acting with the common purpose of maintaining Laurent Gbagbo in power at any cost, including through the use of violence against civilians entailing the commission of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.

175 More specifically, the evidence shows: (i) Laurent Gbagbo’s relations with a limited number of close associates who shared his objective of staying in power and coordinated with him the means to achieve this goal; 427 (ii) the mobilisation of the youth for violent acts; 428 (iii) the activities in anticipation of the use of violence such as securing the allegiance of the FDS, acquisition of weapons,

See above, paras 17-50. 426 427 See above, paras 57-62. 428 See above, paras 93-101. No. ICC-02/11-02/11 79/90 11 December 2014

recruitment into the FDS, and recruitment, training and supplying of militias and mercenaries; 429 (iv) the interaction between Laurent Gbagbo and members of his inner circle, and the forces under their control, including by way of meetings and instructions to units on the ground during the crisis; 430 and (v) the steps undertaken by Laurent Gbagbo and members of his inner circle in reaction to the evolution of the crisis. 431 176. The Chamber considers that the evidence also sufficiently demonstrates that members of the pro-Gbagbo forces led by Laurent Gbagbo, Charles Blé Goudé and other members of the inner circle were a group within the meaning of article 25(3)(d) of the Statute, 432 and notes that in spite of adverse developments, the group was able to reorganise in the late stages of the crisis, and to continue the execution of its common purpose, including commission of the crimes charged, throughout the relevant period of time. 433 177. The Chamber finds that Charles Blé Goudé performed a number of activities which, alone or in combination, contributed to the commission of the crimes. In particular, the Chamber recalls the evidence regarding Charles Blé Goudé’s role in the activities undertaken in anticipation of the use of violence, such as recruitment into the FDS, and recruitment, training and supplying of militias and mercenaries. 434 178. In addition, Charles Blé Goudé’s instructions to FESCI to participate in the repression of the march on the RTI building on 16 December 2010

429 See above, paras 76-88. See above, paras 89-102. 430 See above, paras 103-113. 431 See above, paras 57-75. 432 433 See above, paras 109-113. 434 See above, paras 76-88. No. ICC-02/11-02/11 80/90 11 December 2014

constituted a relevant immediate contribution to the crimes committed as part of this operation. Similarly, his acts of mobilisation of the youth for violence 435 against perceived supporters of Alassane Ouattara, in particular in Yopougon, were relevant contributive acts to the attacks on 25-28 February 2011 and on or around 12 April 2011. 436 179. The Chamber also notes the related activities aimed at strengthening the co-operation between the components of the pro-Gbagbo forces, in particular emphasising the link between the FDS and the youth, which had the effect of strengthening the capacity of the pro-Gbagbo forces. 437 180. The Chamber finds that Charles Blé Goudé meant to contribute to the commission of the crimes and did so with the aim of furthering the criminal purpose of the group, which he shared. In addition, Charles Blé Goudé was aware that the crimes were committed as part of a widespread and systematic attack against the civilian population, namely known or perceived supporters of Alassane Ouattara. For these findings, the Chamber relies on the evidence relating to: (i) Charles Blé Goudé’s role in Laurent Gbagbo’s inner circle and his participation in, and knowledge of, the common plan to keep Laurent Gbagbo in power at any cost; 438 (ii) the nature of Charles Blé Goudé’s activities relating to the mobilisation of the youth; 439 (iii) the fact that Charles Blé Goudé engaged in preparatory activities in anticipation of the use of violence; and 440

435 See above, para. 20. See above, paras 27-29, 49, 93-102. 436 See above, para. 102. 437 See above, paras 57-62. 438 439 See above, paras 93-102. 440 See above, paras 76-88. No. ICC-02/11-02/11 81/90 11 December 2014

(iv) the fact that Charles Blé Goudé was involved in the coordination of the efforts to keep Laurent Gbagbo in power at any cost. 441 181. In light of the above, the Chamber finds that there are substantial grounds to believe that Charles Blé Goudé is criminally responsible under article 25(3)(d) of the Statute for contributing, in any other way, to the commission of the crimes against humanity of murder, rape, other inhumane acts (serious injury to body and great suffering) or, alternatively, attempted murder, and persecution committed in the context of the five incidents specifically described in the charges.

SECTION 4. CONCLUSION: FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES AND THEIR LEGAL CHARACTERISATION CONFIRMED BY THE CHAMBER

182 In light of the above, the Chamber finds that there is sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe that Charles Blé Goudé, born on 1 January 1972 in Niagbrahio, Côte d’Ivoire, is individually criminally responsible for the crimes against humanity of murder, rape, other inhumane acts or – in the alternative – attempted murder, and persecution under article 7 of the Statute committed in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire, between 16 December 2010 and on or around 12 April 2011, as specified below.

I. Facts and circumstances described in the charges confirmed by the Chamber

183 The facts and circumstances described by the Prosecutor in the charges brought against Charles Blé Goudé (Section 9 of the DCC) confirmed by the Chamber under article 61(7)(a) of the Statute are as follows: 184. In advance of the presidential election of 2010, Charles Blé Goudé, Laurent Gbagbo and Laurent Gbagbo’s inner circle jointly conceived and implemented a common plan to keep Laurent Gbagbo in office by all means, including by committing the crimes charged.

441 See above, paras 89-92. No. ICC-02/11-02/11 82/90 11 December 2014

By 27 November 2010, the implementation of the common plan had developed to include a State or organisational policy whose purpose was a widespread and systematic attack against civilians considered to support Alassane Ouattara. Furtherance of the common plan and the policy was criminal in nature: the implementation of the widespread or systematic attack comprised multiple criminal acts such as murder, rape, other inhumane acts and persecution of the civilian population. The crimes charged resulted, therefore, from the implementation of the common plan.

185 During the material time, Charles Blé Goudé, Laurent Gbagbo and the other members of Laurent Gbagbo’s inner circle exerted joint control and authority over the Forces de Défense et de Sécurité (“FDS”), the pro-Gbagbo youth, the militia members and the mercenaries – all of which formed the “pro-Gbagbo forces”. Charles Blé Goudé was the “leader” of the pro-Gbagbo youth and wielded control and direct authority over them. Through him, Laurent Gbagbo controlled these youths, who were devoted to his cause.

186 The pro-Gbagbo forces constituted an organised and hierarchical apparatus of power. By virtue of their position of authority and their contributions to the common plan and the policy, Charles Blé Goudé, Laurent Gbagbo and the other members of Laurent Gbagbo’s inner circle were able to make use of the forces to implement the plan and the policy by, inter alia , committing the crimes charged.

187 Between 16 December 2010 and on or around 12 April 2011, pro- Gbagbo forces killed at least 184 people during the following five events:

(a) Between 16 and 19 December 2010, they killed at least 45 persons in Abidjan, during and after the pro-Ouattara march heading to the RTI headquarters;

(b) Between 25 and 28 February 2011, they killed at least 24 persons, primarily from northern Côte d’Ivoire and neighbouring West African countries, in Yopougon commune , Abidjan;

(c) On 3 March 2011, they killed seven women who had participated in a women’s pro-Ouattara demonstration in Abobo commune , Abidjan;

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(d) On 17 March 2011, they killed at least 40 persons in or near Abobo market by subjecting a densely populated area to mortar shelling;

(e) On or around 12 April 2011, in Yopougon commune , Abidjan, they killed at least 68 persons, mainly from northern Côte d’Ivoire and neighbouring West African countries.

188 Between 16 December 2010 and on or around 12 April 2011, pro- Gbagbo forces raped at least 38 women and girls in the following two events:

(a) Between 16 and 19 December 2010, pro-Gbagbo forces raped at least 16 women and girls in Abidjan during and after the pro-Ouattara march heading to the RTI headquarters;

(b) On or around 12 April 2011, they raped at least 22 women in Yopougon.

189 Between 16 December 2010 and on or around 12 April 2011, pro- Gbagbo forces inflicted great suffering and serious injury to body on at least 126 persons during the following five events:

(a) Between 16 and 19 December 2010, they wounded at least 54 persons in Abidjan during and after the pro-Ouattara march heading to the RTI headquarters;

(b) Between 25 and 28 February 2011, they wounded at least seven persons in Yopougon commune , Abidjan;

(c) On 3 March 2011, they wounded at least three persons who had participated in a pro-Ouattara women’s demonstration in Abobo;

(d) On 17 March 2011, they wounded at least 60 persons in or near Abobo market by subjecting a densely-populated area to mortar shelling;

(e) On or around 12 April 2011, they wounded at least two persons in Yopougon.

190 The crimes charged were committed on political, national, ethnic or religious grounds. The victims of these crimes were targeted because they were regarded as synonymous with members of Alassane Ouattara’s political groups or his supporters, or because

No. ICC-02/11-02/11 84/90 11 December 2014

they lived in neighbourhoods of Abidjan perceived as Ouattara strongholds. Furthermore, they were often targeted on ethnic grounds (mainly the Dioula and the Baoulé), religious grounds (Muslims), or national grounds (citizens of West African States such as Mali, Burkina Faso and Nigeria and Ivorians of West African descent). Charles Blé Goudé, Laurent Gbagbo and the other participants in the common plan considered the members of the abovementioned political, ethnic, national and religious groups to be Alassane Ouattara supporters.

191 From 27 November 2010 until on or around 12 April 2011 in Abidjan, the pro-Gbagbo forces carried out a widespread and systematic attack on the civilian population perceived as supporting Alassane Ouattara, involving the multiple commission of criminal acts, pursuant to a policy of the pro-Gbagbo forces led by Laurent Gbagbo and his inner circle, including Charles Blé Goudé. The crimes charged were committed as part of this attack.

192 Charles Blé Goudé contributed to the commission of the crimes charged as follows:

(a) Charles Blé Goudé had a part in conceiving and implementing the common plan, which resulted in the commission of the crimes charged.

(b) Charles Blé Goudé contributed to the establishment and organisation of a structure, which allowed the execution of the common plan, occasioning the commission of the crimes. Charles Blé Goudé: (i) secured the allegiance of the youth to him and their compliance with his instructions by galvanising them; (ii) ensured, through his leadership, that the pro- Gbagbo youth groups acted in unity; (iii) acted as a vital intermediary between Laurent Gbagbo and the pro-Gbagbo youth; (iv) organised the dissemination of instructions through various channels of communication; (v) mobilised the youth to commit violent acts; (vi) contributed to the financing of the activities of the pro-Gbagbo youth; (vii) played an essential role in the recruitment and enlistment of pro-Gbagbo youth into the FDS; (viii) provided support for the military training and arming of pro-Gbagbo youth; (ix) contributed to the recruitment of pro-Gbagbo mercenaries; and (x) supported and encouraged cooperation between the pro-Gbagbo youth, the militias and the FDS.

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(c) Charles Blé Goudé contributed to the implementation of the common plan which resulted in the commission of crimes. Charles Blé Goudé: (i) frequently met Laurent Gbagbo and other members of the inner circle to adapt their strategy as the crisis developed; (ii) through his speeches he conveyed the determination of the Gbagbo government to remain in power at any cost, including by the use of force; (iii) maintained close ties with FDS officers and encouraged collaboration between the FDS and the other pro-Gbagbo forces; (iv) maintained ties with the other pro-Gbagbo youth leaders and conveyed to them the decisions of Laurent Gbagbo and the inner circle; (v) held mass rallies to mobilise the pro-Gbagbo youth and to issue “mots d’ordre” to them; (vi) motivated the pro-Gbagbo youth, directed their actions and prepared them for combat; (vii) encouraged and endorsed the actions of the pro-Gbagbo forces; (viii) prompted the pro-Gbagbo youth to enlist in the FDS and contributed to the reorganisation of pro- Gbagbo forces; and (ix) created an environment conducive to the commission of crimes.

(d) Charles Blé Goudé incited the pro-Gbagbo forces and the pro-Gbagbo youth in particular to commit crimes or otherwise facilitated their commission: (i) used xenophobic rhetoric; (ii) laid responsibility for the violence during the post‐election crisis on the Ouattara camp; (iii) accused Ouattara supporters and the international community of harbouring genocidal intentions against “Ivorians”; (iv) singled out civilians perceived as supporting pro-Ouattara as the targets for attacks by the perpetrators of the crimes; (v) called on the youth to erect roadblocks, keep watch in their neighbourhood and identify and report any “ étrangers [strangers or foreigners]” in their neighbourhoods; (vi) commended pro-Gbagbo youth on their actions and asked them to continue fighting for Laurent Gbagbo and defend the population against the “[ TRANSLATION ] rebels”; (vii) legitimated the actions of the pro-Gbagbo youth; (viii) used the media and other channels of communication to propagate such messages of hate.

193 In performing these actions, Charles Blé Goudé had the requisite intent and knowledge in relation to the crimes charged. He also knew that his conduct was, or intended it to be, part of a widespread or

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systematic attack against a civilian population pursuant to or in furtherance of the policy.

II. Legal characterisation of the facts

194 The legal characterisation of the facts described by the Prosecutor in the charges brought against Charles Blé Goudé (Section 9 of the DCC) confirmed by the Chamber under article 61(7)(a) of the Statute is as follows:

Count 1 – Murder constituting a crime against humanity

Having regard to the facts and circumstances set forth above, Charles Blé Goudé is responsible under article 7(1)(a) of the Statute for the crime against humanity of the murder of at least 184 persons, committed by pro-Gbagbo forces. He is responsible alternatively, as detailed below, under article 25(3)(a) (indirect co-perpetration), 25(3)(b) (ordering, soliciting or inducing), 25(3)(c) (aiding, abetting or otherwise assisting) or 25(3)(d) of the Statute:

- under article 25(3)(a), (b), (c) or (d) of the Statute for the crime against humanity of the murder of at least 92 persons committed between 25 and 28 February 2011 and on or around 12 April 2011 in Yopougon commune, Abidjan;

- under article 25(3)(b), (c) or (d) of the Statute for the crime against humanity of the murder of at least 45 persons committed between 16 and 19 December 2010 during and after the pro-Ouattara march heading to the RTI headquarters;

- under article 25(3)(c) or (d) of the Statute for the crime against humanity of the murder of at least 47 persons committed on 3 March 2011 in the context of a women’s pro- Ouattara demonstration in Abobo commune and on 17 March 2011 in or near Abobo market by subjecting a densely populated area to mortar shelling.

Count 2 – Rape constituting a crime against humanity

Having regard to the facts and circumstances set forth above, Charles Blé Goudé is responsible under article 7(1)(g) of the Statute for the crime against humanity of the rape of at least 38 persons, committed by pro-Gbagbo forces. He is responsible alternatively, as detailed

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below, under article 25(3)(a) (indirect co-perpetration), 25(3)(b) (ordering, soliciting or inducing), 25(3)(c) (aiding, abetting or otherwise assisting) or 25(3)(d) of the Statute:

- under article 25(3)(a), (b), (c) or (d) of the Statute for the crime against humanity of the rape of at least 22 women committed on or around 12 April 2011 in Yopougon commune, Abidjan;

- under article 25(3)(b), (c) or (d) of the Statute for the crime against humanity of the rape of at least 16 women and girls committed between 16 and 19 December 2010 during and after the pro-Ouattara march heading to the RTI headquarters.

Count 3 – Other inhumane acts or attempted murder constituting a crime against humanity

Having regard to the facts and circumstances set forth above, Charles Blé Goudé is responsible under article 7(1)(k) of the Statute for the crime against humanity of other inhumane acts, viz. acts which caused great suffering and serious injury to body to at least 126 persons, committed by the pro-Gbagbo forces; or, is responsible under articles 7(1)(a) and 25(3)(f) of the Statute for the crime against humanity of attempted murder, committed by pro-Gbagbo forces. He is responsible alternatively, as detailed below, under article 25(3)(a) (indirect co-perpetration), 25(3)(b) (ordering, soliciting or inducing), 25(3)(c) (aiding, abetting or otherwise assisting) or 25(3)(d) of the Statute:

- under article 25(3)(a), (b), (c) or (d) of the Statute for the crime against humanity of other inhumane acts or the crime against humanity of attempted murder of at least nine persons committed between 25 and 28 February 2011 and on or around 12 April 2011 in Yopougon commune, Abidjan;

- under article 25(3)(b), (c) or (d) of the Statute for the crime against humanity of other inhumane acts or the crime against humanity of attempted murder of at least 54 persons committed between 16 and 19 December 2010 during and after the pro-Ouattara march heading to the RTI headquarters;

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- under article 25(3)(c) or (d) of the Statute for the crime against humanity of other inhumane acts or the crime against humanity of attempted murder of at least 63 persons committed on 3 March 2011 in the context of a women’s pro- Ouattara demonstration in Abobo commune and on 17 March 2011 in or near Abobo market by subjecting a densely populated area to mortar shelling.

Count 4 – Persecution constituting a crime against humanity

Having regard to the facts and circumstances set forth above, Charles Blé Goudé is responsible under article 7(1)(h) of the Statute for the crime against humanity of the persecution of at least 348 persons on political, national, ethnic and religious grounds, committed by pro- Gbagbo forces. He is responsible alternatively, as detailed below, under article 25(3)(a) (indirect co-perpetration), 25(3)(b) (ordering, soliciting or inducing), 25(3)(c) (aiding, abetting or otherwise assisting) or 25(3)(d) of the Statute:

- under article 25(3)(a), (b), (c) or (d) of the Statute for the crime against humanity of the persecution of at least 123 persons committed between 25 and 28 February 2011 and on or around 12 April 2011 in Yopougon commune, Abidjan;

- under article 25(3)(b), (c) or (d) of the Statute for the crime against humanity of the persecution of at least 115 persons committed between 16 and 19 December 2010 during and after the pro-Ouattara march heading to the RTI headquarters;

- under article 25(3)(c) or (d) of the Statute for the crime against humanity of the persecution of at least 110 persons committed on 3 March 2011 in the context of a women’s pro- Ouattara demonstration in Abobo commune and on 17 March 2011 in or near Abobo market by subjecting a densely populated area to mortar shelling.

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FOR THESE REASONS, THE CHAMBER

CONFIRMS the charges against Charles Blé Goudé as specified in Section 4 above; and COMMITS Charles Blé Goudé to a Trial Chamber for trial on the charges as confirmed. Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert appends a partly dissenting opinion. Done in both English and French, the English version being authoritative. _____________________

Judge Silvia Fernández de Gurmendi Presiding Judge

_____________________________ _____________________________

Judge Ekaterina Trendafilova Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert

Dated this 11 December 2014 At The Hague, The Netherlands

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