JUDGMENT OF 14.7.1972 — CASE 54/69 FRANCOLOR v COMMISSION

In Case 54/69

THE COURT composed of R. Lecourt, President, J. Mertens de Wilmars and H. Kutscher, Presidents of Chambers, A. M. Donner, A. Trabucchi (Rapporteur), R. Monaco and P. Pescatore, Judges, Advocate-General: H. Mayras Registrar: A. Van Houtte

gives the following

JUDGMENT

Issues of fact and of law

I — Statement of the facts

II — Conclusions of the parties

III — Submissions and arguments of the parties

A — Submissions as to form

First submission, concerning the commencement of the administrative procedure and the publication of the decision adopted

Second submission, concerning the inquiries subsequent to the communication of the notice of objections

Third submission, concerning the incomplete nature of the notice of objections

Fourth submission, concerning the reference made by the contested decision to a decision of a national authority

Fifth submission, concerning the period of limitation

B — Substantive submissions

Sixth and eighth submissions, concerning the concept and existence of concerted practices

(a) The 1964 increase

(b) The 1965 increase

(c) The 1967 increase

The 1964 increase

The increases of 1965 and 1967

Seventh submission, on the statement of the objections adopted against the applicant in the contested decision and of the evidence put forward in support of them

IV — Procedure

Grounds of judgment

Submissions relating to procedure and to form

The submissions concerning the administrative procedure

(a) The complaint relating to the commencement of the administrative procedure

(b) The complaint relating to a continuation of inquiries following notification of the objections

(c) The complaints relating to the incomplete state of the notice of objections

The submission concerning the publication of the contested decision

The submission as to the limitation period

Substantive submissions as to the existence of concerted practices

Arguments of the parties

The concept of a concerted practice

The characteristic features of the market in dyestuffs

The increases of 1964, 1965 and 1967

The fine

Costs

I —. Statement of the facts

II —. Conclusions of the parties

(a). Annul, or in any event reverse, the measure adopted by the Commission of the European Communities on 24 July 1969 entitled Decision of the Commission relating to proceedings under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/26.267 — Dyestuffs);

(b). Order the Commission of the European Communities to bear the whole costs of the present proceedings.

(a). Dismiss Application No 54/69 lodged at the Court Registry on 3 October 1969;

(b). Order the applicant to bear the costs.

III —. Submissions and arguments of the parties

A —. Submissions as to form

(a). It involves the simultaneous application of Article 3 and of Article 15 of the regulation, whereas the decision of 31 May 1967 to commence the procedure resulting in the contested decision referred only to Article 3 of Regulation No 17;

(b). The Commission published the contested decision in the Journal Officiel of the European Communities, whereas decisions mentioned in Article 15 of the said regulation are not included amongst those for which publication is envisaged by Article 21.

(a). The decision of 31 May 1967 to commence the administrative procedure was taken in application of Regulation No 17 as a whole, and not just on the basis of Articles 3 and 9. The reason why that decision referred especially to Article 3 of Regulation No 17 was in order to forestall the future application of the concurrent jurisdiction of the national authorities to apply Article 85(1);

(b). The publication of the decision in the Journal Officiel, for which no provision was made in the operative part of that decision, constitutes a measure subsequent to the occurrence of the measure in question and cannot as such entail its annulment. As a subsidiary point, the defendant observes that although Article 21 of Regulation No 17 does not require publication, it does not say anything which might prevent it. It is alleged that in cases not covered by that provision the Commission has a general power to decide, under its discretionary powers, whether it is appropriate to publish a measure.

(a). The phrase especially Article 3 appearing in the decision of 31 May 1967 does not reappear in the notification of 11 December 1967, the wording of which is as follows: On 31 May 1967 the Commission decided on its own initiative to commence proceedings pursuant to Article 3 of Regulation No 17/62 of the Council. Nor does the word especially appear in the letter addressed to the Prime Minister of France on 22 November 1967 informing him that proceedings had been commenced. It is argued that since the decision of 31 May 1967 was not as such notified to the applicant, it cannot take effect with regard to it. Furthermore, according to the quotation from it given by the defendant, the decision does not appear to mention the applicant undertaking as an addressee. Moreover, by reason of the express and exclusive mention of Article 3 of Regulation No 17, the Commission is barred from imposing a fine on the applicant. Finally, by reason of the wording of the first line of paragraph 21 of the notice of objections, the applicant was not, it is argued, able to submit adequate defence;

(b). The formalities relating to publication of decisions taken pursuant to Article 85 of the Treaty are of a substantive nature. It is asserted that publicity is required for decisions capable of affecting the rights of third parties, and that therefore the formality of publication is a substantive requirement in this respect, because it alone ensures that such decisions have more than merely relative legal force. This function and this purpose are not relevant to decisions imposing fines, the scope of which is necessarily limited to their addressees. It is argued that the provisions of Article 21 are mandatory and, in so far as they require publication of individual measures, should be interpreted restrictively, even where the decision applying Article 85 is intended to have a collective effect, going beyond the consequences of a typical decision affecting an individual.

(a). There is no rule that a decision commencing a procedure under Regulation No 17 must be notified to the undertakings concerned. Outside the administration such a decision is only relevant to the relationship between the Commission and the Member States. As regards the relationship between the Commission and the undertakings concerned, it is the notice of objections alone which determines the subject-matter of the procedure. The applicant's argument based on paragraph 21 of the notice of objections is unfounded; the Commission's intentions appear very clearly since the said notice of objections includes ample explanations concerning the fines imposed under Article 15 of Regulation No 17.

(b). On the subject of the publication of the decision, the provision of Article 191 of the Treaty, according to which decisions shall take effect upon notification to those to whom they are addressed, does not in any way imply that the Community bodies may not publish such decisions as they may choose in the Official Journal, provided that they have been duly notified. There is no reason for regarding the system of publication otherwise than in terms of a discretionary power given to the Commission, which is qualified by Article 21 of Regulation No 17 only to a limited extent in that it lays down a duty to publish certain kinds of decision.

B —. Substantive submissions

(a). The 1964 increase

(b). The 1965 increase

(c). The 1967 increase

IV —. Procedure

1. An expert's report shall be obtained in respect of the following questions:

2. The parties may, by agreement between themselves, propose the name of an expert to the Court before 1 October 1970.

1. It is common ground that from January 1964 to October 1967 three general and uniform increases in the prices of dyestuffs took place in the Community.

2. Between 7 and 20 January 1964, a uniform increase of 15 % in the prices of most dyes based on aniline, with the exception of certain categories, took place in Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg and in certain third countries.

3. On 1 January 1965 an identical increase took place in Germany.

4. On the same day almost all producers in all the countries of the Common Market except France introduced a uniform increase of 10 % on the prices of dyes and pigments excluded from the increase of 1964.

5. Since the ACNA undertaking did not take part in the increase of 1965 on the Italian market, the other undertakings did not maintain the announced increase of their prices on that market.

6. Towards mid-October 1967, an increase for all dyes was introduced, except in Italy, by almost all producers, amounting to 8 % in Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg, and 12 % in France.

7. By a decision of 31 May 1967 the Commission commenced proceedings under Article 3 of Regulation No 17/62 on its own initiative concerning these increases for presumed infringement of Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty against seventeen producers of dyestuffs established within and outside the Common Market, and against numerous subsidiaries and representatives of those undertakings.

8. By a decision of 24 July 1969, the Commission found that the increases were the result of concerted practices, which infringed Article 85(1) of the Treaty, between the undertakings

9. It therefore imposed a fine of 50000 u.a. on each of these undertakings, with the exception of ACNA, for which the fine was fixed at 40000 u.a.

10. By application lodged at the Court Registry on 3 October 1969 the undertaking SA Française des Matières Colorantes, now SA Produits Chimiques Ugine Kuhlmann, has brought an application against that decision.

(a). The complaint relating to the commencement of the administrative procedure

11. The applicant argues that the contested decision is vitiated by infringement of essential procedural requirements, misuse of powers, infringement of the Treaty and infringement of Regulation No 17/62 of the Council in that it constitutes a simultaneous application of Articles 3 and 15 Regulation No 17, whereas the decision of 31 May 1967 concerning the commencement of the procedure does not mention Article 15 relating to fines.

12. It is the notice of objections alone and not the decision to commence proceedings which is the measure stating the final attitude of the Commission concerning undertakings against which proceedings for infringement of the rules on competition have been commenced.

13. The notice of objections sent to the applicant expressly referred to Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17 relating to fines.

14. These submissions therefore are unfounded.

(b). The complaint relating to a continuation of inquiries following notification of the objections

15. The applicant asserts that the Commission, in continuing its inquiries following communication of the notice of objections and in not informing it of the information thus obtained, disregarded the rights of the defence guaranteed by Article 19(1) of Regulation No 17/62 and by Regulation No 99/63.

16. The Commission has the right and where appropriate the duty to institute fresh inquiries during the administrative procedure if it appears from the course of that procedure that additional investigations are necessary.

17. Such inquiries would render it necessary to send an additional statement of objections to the undertakings concerned only if the result of the investigations led the Commission to take new facts into account against the undertakings or to alter materially the evidence for the contested infringements.

18. The rights of the defence of the undertakings are not infringed by such inquiries if the decision terminating the administrative procedure does not hold against the undertakings concerned any facts other than those set out in the notice of objections.

19. This submission is therefore unfounded.

(c). The complaints relating to the incomplete state of the notice of objections

20. The applicant claims that the contested decision is vitiated by infringement of essential procedural requirements, infringement of the rights of the defence and infringement of Article 4 of Regulation No 99/63 in that the notice of objections did not contain an adequate statement of the elements of fact and of the documents on which the objections were based.

21. In particular, it is argued that the contested decision is vitiated by these infringements in that it relies on a decision of the Bundeskartellamt, which was not mentioned in the notice of objections, in support of the assertion relating to the existence of concerted practices.

22. In order to protect the rights of the defence during the course of the administrative procedure, it is sufficient that undertakings should be informed of the essential elements of fact on which the objections are based.

23. However, it is not necessary for the contents of the file to be made available in their entirety.

24. It appears from the notice of objections that the facts taken into consideration against the applicant were clearly stated therein.

25. That notice contains all the information necessary for deciding as to the objections put forward with regard to the applicant, in particular the circumstances in which the increases of 1964, 1965 and 1967 were announced and implemented.

26. Additional evidence for the facts taken into consideration and amendments made to the contested decision concerning the precise course of those facts pursuant to information furnished by the interested parties to the Commission during the course of the administrative procedure cannot constitute an infringement of the rights of the defence.

27. Although the interested parties are entitled to dispute the facts alleged by the Commission in support of its objections, there is nothing to prevent the latter, in applying the Community rules on competition, from using the results of investigations carried out by the national authorities.

28. These submissions are therefore unfounded.

29. The applicant complains that the Commission published the contested decision in the Official Journal of the Communities, although decisions taken pursuant to Article 15 of Regulation No 17/62 are not amongst those which must be published according to Article 21 of the same regulation.

30. Article 21 of Regulation No 17/62, which provides that certain decisions shall be published, does not include those taken pursuant to Article 15 of the said regulation.

31. Although the Commission was not required to publish the contested decision, there was nothing in the letter or in the spirit of the abovementioned Article 21 to prevent it from effecting publication, if to do so did not involve revealing trade secrets of the undertakings.

32. The present submission is therefore unfounded.

33. The applicant argues that the contested decision is contrary to the Treaty and to the rules relating to its application because the Commission, in commencing on 31 May 1967 proceedings concerning the price increase of January 1964, exceeded any reasonable limitation period.

34. The provisions governing the Commission's power to impose fines for infringement of the rules on competition do not lay down any period of limitation.

35. In order to fulfil their function, limitation periods must be fixed in advance.

36. The fixing of their duration and the detailed rules for their application come within the powers of the Community legislature.

37. Although, in the absence of any provisions on this matter, the fundamental requirement of legal certainty has the effect of preventing the Commission from indefinitely delaying the exercise of its power to impose fines, its conduct in the present case cannot be regarded as constituting a bar to the exercise of that power as regards participation in the concerted practices of 1964 and 1965.

38. Therefore the submission is unfounded.

39. The applicant complains that the Commission has not proved the existence of concerted practices within the meaning of Articles 85(1) of the EEC Treaty in relation to any of the three increases mentioned in the contested decision.

40. That decision states that prima facie evidence that the increases of 1964, 1965 and 1967 took place as the result of concerted action is to be found in the facts that the rates introduced for each increase by the different producers in each country were the same, that with very rare exceptions the same dyestuffs were involved, and that the increases were put into effect over only a very short period, if not actually on the same date.

41. It is contended that these increases cannot be explained simply by the oligopolistic character of the structure of the market.

42. It is said to be unrealistic to suppose that without previous concertation the principal producers supplying the Common Market could have increased their prices on several occasions by identical percentages at practically the same moment for one and the same important range of products including speciality products for which there are few, if any, substitutes, and that they should have done so in a number of countries where conditions on the dyestuffs market are different.

43. The Commission has argued before the Court that the interested parties need not necessarily have drawn up a common plan with a view to adopting a certain course of behaviour for it to be said that there has been concertation.

44. It is argued that it is enough that they should previously have informed each other of the attitude which they intended to adopt so that each could regulate his conduct safe in the knowledge that his competitors would act in the same way.

45. The applicant argues that the contested decision is based on an inadequate analysis of the market in the products in question and on an erroneous understanding of the concept of a concerted practice, which is wrongly identified by the decision with the conscious parallelism of members of an oligopoly, whereas such conduct is due to independent decisions adopted by each undertaking, determined by objective business needs, and in particular by the need to increase the unsatisfactorily low rate of profit on the production of dyestuffs.

46. It is argued that in fact the prices of the products in question displayed a constant tendency to fall because of lively competition between producers which is typical of the market in those products, not only as regards the quality of the products and technical assistance to customers, but also as regards prices, particularly the large reductions granted individually to the principal purchasers.

47. It is argued that it was in the applicant's interest to align its prices on those of its competitors in order to counterbalance the difficult selling conditions which were imposed on it on its national market by the application of a vigorous freeze on producer prices.

48. The fact that the rates of increase were identical was the result, it is said, of the existence of the price-leadership of one undertaking.

49. It is asserted that academic writers accept the proposition that in an oligopolistic market such as the dyestuffs market so-called barometer undertakings, although not necessarily the most powerful, can ensure that their rivals follow their prices where those prices reflect changes in conditions on the market with sufficient rapidity.

50. It is argued that in these circumstances, since there is no conclusive proof of the existence of a common will, it would be quite wrong to regard a common approach as a concerted practice.

51. Article 85 draws a distinction between the concept of concerted practices and that of agreements between undertakings or of decisions by associations of undertakings; the object is to bring within the prohibition of that article a form of coordination between undertakings which, without having reached the stage where an agreement properly so-called has been concluded, knowingly substitutes practical cooperation between them for the risks of competition.

52. By its very nature, then, a concerted practice does not have all the elements of a contract but may inter alia arise out of coordination which becomes apparent from the behaviour of the participants.

53. Although parallel behaviour may not by itself be identified with a concerted practice, it may however amount to strong evidence of such a practice if it leads to conditions of competition which do not correspond to the normal conditions of the market, having regard to the nature of the products, the size and number of the undertakings, and the volume of the said market.

54. This is especially the case if the parallel conduct is such as to enable the persons concerned to attempt to stabilize prices at a level different from that to which competition would have led, and to consolidate established positions to the detriment of effective freedom of movement of the products in the Common Market and of the freedom of consumers to choose their suppliers.

55. Therefore the question whether there was a concerted action in this case can only be correctly determined if the evidence upon which the contested decision is based is considered, not in isolation, but as a whole, account being taken of the specific features of the market in the products in question.

56. The market in dyestuffs is characterized by the fact that 80 % of the market is supplied by about ten producers, very large ones in the main, which often manufacture these products together with other chemical products or pharmaceutical specialities.

57. The production patterns and therefore the cost structures of these manufacturers are very different, and this makes it difficult to ascertain competing manufacturers' costs.

58. The total number of dyestuffs is very high, each undertaking producing more than a thousand.

59. The average extent to which these products can be replaced by others is considered relatively good for standard dyes, but it can be very low or even non-existent for speciality dyes.

60. As regards speciality products, the market tends in certain cases towards an oligopolistic situation.

61. Since the price of dyestuffs forms a relatively small part of the price of the final product of the user undertaking, there is little elasticity of demand for dyestuffs on the market as a whole and this encourages price increases in the short term.

62. Another factor is that the total demand for dyestuffs is constantly increasing, and this tends to induce producers to adopt a policy enabling them to take advantage of this increase.

63. In the territory of the Community, the market in dyestuffs in fact consists of five separate national markets with different price levels which cannot be explained by differences in costs and charges affecting producers in those countries.

64. Thus the establishment of the Common Market would not appear to have had any effect on this situation, since the differences between national price levels have scarcely decreased.

65. On the contrary, it is clear that each of the national markets has the characteristics of an oligopoly and that in most of them price levels are established under the influence of a price-leader, who in some cases is the largest producer in the country concerned, and in other cases is a producer in another Member State or a third State, acting through a subsidiary.

66. According to the experts this dividing-up of the market is due to the need to supply local technical assistance to users and to ensure immediate delivery, generally in small quantities, since, apart from exceptional cases, producers supply their subsidiaries established in the different Member States and maintain a network of agents and depots to ensure that user undertakings receive specific assistance and supplies.

67. It appears from the data produced during the course of the proceedings that even in cases where a producer establishes direct contact with an important user in another Member State, prices are usually fixed in relation to the place where the user is established and tend to follow the level of prices on the national market.

68. Although the foremost reason why producers have acted in this way is in order to adapt themselves to the special features of the market in dyestuffs and to the reeds of their customers, the fact remains that the dividing-up of the market which results tends, by fragmenting the effects of competition, to isolate users in their national market, and to prevent a general confrontation between producers throughout the Common Market.

69. It is in this context, which is peculiar to the way in which the dyestuffs market works, that the facts of the case should be considered.

70. The increases of 1964, 1965 and 1967 covered by the contested decision are interconnected.

71. The increase of 15 % in the prices of most aniline dyes in Germany on 1 January 1965 was in reality nothing more than the extension to another national market of of the increase applied in January 1964 in Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg.

72. The increase in the prices of certain dyes and pigments introduced on 1 January 1965 in all the Member States, except France, applied to all the products which had been excluded from the first increase.

73. The reason why the price increase of 8 % introduced in the autumn of 1967 was raised to 12 % for France was that there was a wish to make up for the increases of 1964 and 1965 in which that market had not taken part because of the price control system.

74. Therefore the three increases cannot be isolated one from another, even though they did not take place under identical conditions.

75. In 1964 all the undertakings in question announced their increases and immediately put them into effect, the initiative coming from Ciba-Italy which, on 7 January 1964, following instructions from Ciba-Switzerland, announced and immediately introduced an increase of 15 %. This initiative was followed by the other producers on the Italian market within two or three days.

76. On 9 January ICI-Holland took the initiative in introducing the same increase in the Netherlands, whilst on the same day Bayer took the same initiative on the Belgo-Luxembourg market.

77. With minor differences, particularly between the price increases by the German undertakings on the one hand and the Swiss and United Kingdom undertakings on the other, these increases concerned the same range of products for the various producers and markets, namely, most aniline dyes other than pigments, food colouring and cosmetics.

78. As regards the increase of 1965 certain undertakings announced in advance price increases amounting, for the German market, to an increase of 15 % for products whose prices had already been similarly increased on the other markets, and to 10 % for products whose prices had not yet been increased. These announcements were spread over the period between 14 October and 28 December 1964.

79. The first announcement was made by BASF, on 14 October 1964, followed by an announcement by Bayer on 30 October and by Cassella on 5 November.

80. These increases were simultaneously applied on 1 January 1965 on all the markets except for the French market because of the price freeze in that State, and the Italian market where, as a result of the refusal by the principal Italian producer, ACNA, to increase its prices on the said market, the other producers also decided not to increase theirs.

81. ACNA also refrained from putting its prices up by 10 % on the German market.

82. Otherwise the increase was general, was simultaneously introduced by all the producers mentioned in the contested decision, and was applied without any differences concerning the range of products.

83. As regards the increase of 1967, during a meeting held in Basel on 19 August 1967, which was attended by all the producers mentioned in the contested decision except ACNA, the Geigy undertaking announced its intention to increase its selling prices by 8 % with effect from 16 October 1967.

84. On that same occasion the representatives of Bayer and Francolor stated that their undertakings were also considering an increase.

85. From mid-September all the undertakings mentioned in the contested decision announced a price increase of 8 %, raised to 12 % for France, to take effect on 16 October in all the countries except Italy, where ACNA again refused to increase its prices, although it was willing to follow the movement in prices on two other markets, albeit on dates other than 16 October.

86. Viewed as a whole, the three consecutive increases reveal progressive cooperation between the undertakings concerned.

87. In fact, after the experience of 1964, when the announcement of the increases and their application coincided, although with minor differences as regards the range of products affected, the increases of 1965 and 1967 indicate a different mode of operation. Here, the undertakings taking the initiative, BASF and Geigy respectively, announced their intentions of making an increase some time in advance, which allowed the undertakings to observe each other's reactions on the different markets, and to adapt themselves accordingly.

88. By means of these advance announcements the various undertakings eliminated all uncertainty between them as to their future conduct and, in doing so, also eliminated a large part of the risk usually inherent in any independent change of conduct on one or several markets.

89. This was all the more the case since these announcements, which led to the fixing of general and equal increases in prices for the markets in dyestuffs, rendered the market transparent as regards the percentage rates of increase.

90. Therefore, by the way in which they acted, the undertakings in question temporarily eliminated with respect to prices some of the preconditions for competition on the market which stood in the way of the achievement of parallel uniformity of conduct.

91. The fact that this conduct was not spontaneous is corroborated by an examination of other aspects of the market.

92. In fact, from the number of producers concerned is it not possible to say that the European market in dyestuffs is, in the strict sense, an oligopoly in which price competition could no longer play a substantial role.

93. These producers are sufficiently powerful and numerous to create a considerable risk that in times of rising prices some of them might not follow the general movement but might instead try to increase their share of the market by behaving in an individual way.

94. Furthermore, the dividing-up of the Common Market into five national markets with different price levels and structures makes it improbable that a spontaneous and equal price increase would occur on all the national markets.

95. Although a general, spontaneous increase on each of the national markets is just conceivable, these increases might be expected to differ according to the particular characteristics of the different national markets.

96. Therefore, although parallel conduct in respect of prices may well have been an attractive and risk-free objective for the undertakings concerned, it is hardly conceivable that the same action could be taken spontaneously at the same time, on the same national markets and for the same range of products.

97. Nor is it any more plausible that the increases of January 1964, introduced on the Italian market and copied on the Netherlands and Belgo-Luxembourg markets, which have little in common with each other either as regards the level of prices or the pattern of competition, could have been brought into effect within a period of two to three days without prior concertation.

98. As regards the increases of 1965 and 1967 concertation took place openly, since all the announcements of the intention to increase prices with effect from a certain date and for a certain range of products made it possible for producers to decide on their conduct regarding the special cases of France and Italy.

99. In proceeding in this way, the undertakings mutually eliminated in advance any uncertainties concerning their reciprocal behaviour on the different markets and thereby also eliminated a large part of the risk inherent in any independent change of conduct on those markets.

100. The general and uniform increase on those different markets can only be explained by a common intention on the part of those undertakings, first, to adjust the level of prices and the situation resulting from competition in the form of discounts, and secondly, to avoid the risk, which is inherent in any price increase, of changing the conditions of competition.

101. The fact that the price increases announced were not introduced in Italy and that ACNA only partially adopted the 1967 increase in other markets, far from undermining this conclusion, tends to confirm it.

102. The function of price competition is to keep prices down to the lowest possible level and to encourage the movement of goods between the Member States, thereby permitting the most efficient possible distribution of activities in the matter of productivity and the capacity of undertakings to adapt themselves to change.

103. Differences in rates encourage the pursuit of one of the basic objectives of the Treaty, namely the interpenetration of national markets and, as a result, direct access by consumers to the sources of production of the whole Community.

104. By reason of the limited elasticity of the market in dyestuffs, resulting from factors such as the lack of transparency with regard to prices, the interdependence of the different dyestuffs of each producer for the purpose of building up the range of products used by each consumer, the relatively low proportion of the cost of the final product of the user undertaking represented by the prices of these products, the fact that it is useful for users to have a local supplier and the influence of transport costs, the need to avoid any action which might artificially reduce the opportunities for interpenetration of the various national markets at the consumer level becomes particularly important on the market in the products in question.

105. Although every producer is free to change his prices, taking into account in so doing the present or foreseeable conduct of his competitors, nevertheless it is contrary to the rules on competition contained in the Treaty for a producer to cooperate with his competitors, in any way whatsoever, in order to determine a coordinated course of action relating to a price increase and to ensure its success by prior elimination of all uncertainty as to each other's conduct regarding the essential elements of that action, such as the amount, subject-matter, date and place of the increases.

106. In these circumstances and taking into account the nature of the market in the products in question, the conduct of the applicant, in conjunction with other undertakings against which proceedings have been taken, was designed to replace the risks of competition and the hazards of competitors' spontaneous reactions by cooperation constituting a concerted practice prohibited by Article 85(1) of the Treaty.

107. In view of the frequency and extent of the applicant's participation in the prohibited practices, and taking into account the consequences thereof in relation to the creation of a Common Market in the products in question, the amount of the fine is appropriate to the gravity of the infringement of the Community rules on competition.

108. Under Article 69(2) of the Rules of Procedure the unsuccessful party shall be ordered to pay the costs.

109. The applicant has failed in its submissions.

110. Therefore it must be ordered to bear the costs.

On those grounds, Upon reading the pleadings; Upon hearing the report of the Judge-Rapporteur; Upon hearing the parties; Upon hearing the opinion of the Advocate-General: Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, especially Articles 85 and 173; Having regard to Regulation No 17/62 of the Council of 6 February 1962; Having regard to Regulation No 99/63 of the Commission of 25 July 1963; Having regard to the Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Communities; Having regard to the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, THE COURT hereby:

1 Dismisses the application;

2 Orders the applicant to bear the costs.