ext/celex/62024TJ0232

JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber)

14 January 2026 ( * )

( Common foreign and security policy – Restrictive measures adopted in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine – Prohibitions relating to dual-use goods and technology – Lists of persons, entities and bodies subject to the prohibitions – Inclusion and maintenance of the applicant’s name on the lists – Annex IV to Decision (CFSP) 2014/512 and Annex IV to Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 – Right to be heard – Obligation to state reasons – Error of assessment – Freedom to conduct a business )

In Case T‑232/24,

Euro Asia Cargo Private Ltd, established in Colombo (Sri Lanka), represented by F. Wolf and T. Ackermann, lawyers,

applicant,

v

Council of the European Union, represented by P. Pecheux and E. Nadbath, acting as Agents,

defendant,

supported by

French Republic, represented by B. Travard and P. Boccanfuso, acting as Agents,

and by

European Commission, represented by M. Carpus-Carcea and L. Puccio, acting as Agents,

interveners,

THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber),

composed, at the time of the deliberations, of M. Brkan, acting as President, I. Gâlea and S.L. Kalėda (Rapporteur), Judges,

Registrar: P. Nuñez Ruiz, Administrator,

having regard to the written part of the procedure,

further to the hearing on 9 July 2025,

gives the following

Judgment

1 By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, Euro Asia Cargo Private Ltd, seeks annulment of the following acts (together, ‘the contested acts’) in so far as they concern it:

– Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/746 of 23 February 2024 amending Decision 2014/512/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine (OJ L, 2024/746) and Council Regulation (EU) 2024/745 of 23 February 2024 amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine (OJ L, 2024/745) (together, ‘the initial acts’);

– Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/1744 of 24 June 2024 amending Decision 2014/512/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine (OJ L, 2024/1744) and Council Regulation (EU) 2024/1745 of 24 June 2024 amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine (OJ L, 2024/1745) (together, ‘the acts of June 2024’);

– Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/2026 of 22 July 2024 amending Decision 2014/512/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine (OJ L, 2024/2026);

– Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/175 of 27 January 2025 amending Decision 2014/512/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine (OJ L, 2025/175);

– Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/394 of 24 February 2025 amending Decision 2014/512/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine (OJ L, 2025/394) and Council Regulation (EU) 2025/395 of 24 February 2025 amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine (OJ L, 2025/395) (together, ‘the acts of February 2025’);

– Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/931 of 20 May 2025 amending Decision 2014/512/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine (OJ L, 2025/931) and Council Regulation (EU) 2025/932 of 20 May 2025 amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine (OJ L, 2025/932) (together, ‘the acts of May 2025’).

Legal context

Decision 2014/512, as amended by Decision 2024/746, and Regulation No 8 33/2014, as amended by Regulation 2024/745

2 Annex IV to Council Decision 2014/512/CFSP of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 229, p. 13), as amended by Decision 2024/746, is headed ‘List of legal persons, entities and bodies referred to in Articles 3(7), 3a(7) and 3b(1)’.

3 The introductory text of Annex IV to Decision 2014/512 provides as follows:

‘This [a]nnex lists natural or legal persons, entities or bodies which are military end-users, form part of Russia’s military and industrial complex or which have commercial or other links with or which otherwise support Russia’s defence and security sector. These natural or legal persons, entities or bodies contribute to Russia’s military and technological enhancement or to the development of Russia’s defence and security sector. They include natural or legal persons, entities or bodies in third countries other than Russia. Their inclusion in this [a]nnex does not entail any attribution of responsibility for their actions to the jurisdiction in which they are operating.’

4 Article 3(1), (1a) and (2) of Decision 2014/512, as amended by Decision 2024/746, provides as follows:

‘1. The direct or indirect sale, supply, transfer or export of all dual-use goods and technology listed in Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2021/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council … to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Russia or for use in Russia by nationals of Member States or from the territories of Member States or using their flag vessels or aircraft, shall be prohibited whether originating or not in their territories.

1a. The transit via the territory of Russia of the dual-use goods and technology, as referred to in paragraph 1, exported from the Union shall be prohibited.

2. It shall be prohibited:

(a) to provide technical assistance, brokering services or other services related to the goods and technology referred to in paragraph 1 and to the provision, manufacture, maintenance and use of those goods and technology, directly or indirectly to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Russia or for use in Russia;

(b) to provide financing or financial assistance related to the goods and technology referred to in paragraph 1 for any sale, supply, transfer or export of those goods and technology, or for the provision of related technical assistance, brokering services or other services, directly or indirectly to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Russia, or for use in Russia;

(c) [to] sell, license or transfer in any other way intellectual property rights or trade secrets as well as [to] grant rights to access or re-use any material or information protected by means of intellectual property rights or constituting trade secrets related to the goods and technology referred to in paragraph 1 and to the provision, manufacture, maintenance and use of those goods and technology, directly or indirectly to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Russia or for use in Russia.’

5 Article 3(4), (4a) and (5) of Decision 2014/512, as amended by Decision 2024/746, provides for an authorisation system enabling the competent national authorities to derogate from the prohibitions laid down in Article 3(1), (1a) and (2) of the same decision.

6 Article 3(7)(i) of Decision 2014/512, as amended by Decision 2024/746, provides as follows:

‘When deciding on requests for authorisations in accordance with paragraphs 4 and 5, the competent authorities shall not grant an authorisation if they have reasonable grounds to believe that:

(i) the end-user might be a military end-user, a natural or legal person, entity or body in Annex IV or that the goods might have a military end-use, unless the sale, supply, transfer or export of goods and technology referred to in paragraph 1 or the provision of related technical or financial assistance is allowed under paragraph 1(a) of Article 3b’.

7 Article 3a(1) and (1a) of Decision 2014/512, as amended by Decision 2024/746, provides as follows:

‘1. It shall be prohibited to sell, supply, transfer or export, directly or indirectly, goods and technology which might contribute to Russia’s military and technological enhancement, or the development of the defence and security sector, whether or not originating in the Union, to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Russia or for use in Russia.

1a. The transit via the territory of Russia of goods and technology which might contribute to Russia’s military and technological enhancement or to the development of its defence and security sector, exported from the Union, shall be prohibited.’

8 Article 3a(2) of Decision 2014/512, as amended by Decision 2024/746, reproduces the wording of Article 3(2) thereof.

9 Article 3a(4), (4a) and (5) of Decision 2014/512, as amended by Decision 2024/746, provides for an authorisation system enabling the competent national authorities to derogate from the prohibitions laid down in Article 3a(1), (1a) and (2) of that decision.

10 Article 3a(7) of Decision 2014/512, as amended by Decision 2024/746, reproduces the wording of Article 3(7) thereof.

11 Article 3b of Decision 2014/512, as amended by Decision 2024/746, provides as follows:

‘1. With regard to the natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex IV, by way of derogation from Articles 3 and 3a of this Decision, and without prejudice to the authorisation requirements pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2021/821, the competent authorities of the Member States may only authorise the sale, supply, transfer or export of dual-use goods and technology and the goods and technology referred to in Article 3a of this Decision, or the provision of related technical or financial assistance after having determined:

(a) that such goods or technology or the related technical or financial assistance are necessary for the urgent prevention or mitigation of an event likely to have a serious and significant impact on human health and safety or the environment; or

(b) that such goods or technology or the related technical or financial assistance are due under contracts concluded before 26 February 2022, or ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such a contract, provided that the authorisation is requested before 1 May 2022.

2. All authorisations required under this Article shall be granted by the competent authorities in accordance with the rules and procedures laid down in Regulation (EU) 2021/821, which shall apply mutatis mutandis . The authorisation shall be valid throughout the Union.

3. The competent authorities of the Member States may annul, suspend, modify or revoke an authorisation which they have granted pursuant to paragraph 1 if they deem that such annulment, suspension, modification or revocation is necessary for the effective implementation of this Decision.’

12 Article 7(1)(a) of Decision 2014/512, as amended by Decision 2024/746, provides as follows:

‘1. No claims in connection with any contract or transaction the performance of which has been affected, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, by the measures imposed under this [d]ecision, including claims for indemnity or any other claim of this type, such as a claim for compensation or a claim under a guarantee, in particular a claim for extension or payment of a bond, guarantee or indemnity, particularly a financial guarantee or financial indemnity, of whatever form, shall be satisfied, if they are made by:

(a) legal persons, entities or bodies listed in the [a]nnexes to this [d]ecision …’

13 Article 2(1), (2), (4), (4a) and (5) and Article 2a(1), (2), (4), (4a) and (5) of Council Regulation No 833/2014 of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 229, p. 1), as amended by Regulation 2024/745, reiterate, in essence, the wording of Article 3(1), (2), (4), (4a) and (5) and of Article 3a(1), (2), (4), (4a) and (5) respectively of Decision 2014/512, as amended by Decision 2024/746. Similarly, Article 2(7), Article 2a(7) and Article 2b of Regulation No 833/2014, as amended by Regulation 2024/745, reproduce, in essence, the content of Article 3(7), of Article 3a(7) and of Article 3b respectively of Decision 2014/512, as amended by Decision 2024/746. Moreover, the introductory text of Annex IV to Regulation No 833/2014, as amended by Regulation 2024/745, is essentially identical to the introductory text of Annex IV to Decision 2014/512, as amended by Decision 2024/746.

Decision 2014/512, as amended by Decision 2025/394, and Regulation No 833/2014, as amended by Regulation 2025/395

14 Decision 2025/394 left the heading and introductory text of Annex IV to Decision 2014/512 unchanged.

15 Decision 2025/394 left Article 3(1), (1a), (2) and (5) of Decision 2014/512, as amended by Decision 2024/746, essentially unchanged. It amended the situations, laid down in Article 3(4), in which the competent national authorities could grant authorisation to derogate from the prohibitions laid down in Article 3(1), (1a) and (2).

16 Decision 2025/394 left unchanged Article 3a(1) and (1a) and Article 3b(2) and (3) of Decision 2014/512, as amended by Decision 2024/746.

17 Article 3b(1), (1a) and (1b) of Decision 2014/512, as amended by Decision 2025/394, provides as follows:

‘1. It shall be prohibited to sell, supply, transfer or export, directly or indirectly, dual-use goods and technology, as well as goods and technology listed in Annex VII to Regulation (EU) No 833/2014, whether or not originating in the Union, to any natural or legal person, entity or body listed in Annex IV.

1a. It shall be prohibited to:

(a) provide technical assistance, brokering services or other services related to the goods and technology referred to in paragraph 1 and to the provision, manufacture, maintenance and use of those goods and technology, directly or indirectly to any natural or legal person, entity or body listed in Annex IV;

(b) provide financing or financial assistance related to the goods and technology referred to in paragraph 1 for any sale, supply, transfer or export of those goods and technology, or for the provision of related technical assistance, brokering services or other services, directly or indirectly to any natural or legal person, entity or body listed in Annex IV;

(c) sell, license or transfer in any other way intellectual property rights or trade secrets as well as grant rights to access or re-use any material or information protected by means of intellectual property rights or constituting trade secrets related to the goods and technology referred to in paragraph 1 and to the provision, manufacture, maintenance and use of those goods and technology, directly or indirectly to any natural or legal person, entity or body listed in Annex IV.

1b. By way of derogation from paragraphs 1 and 1a of this Article, and without prejudice to the authorisation requirements pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2021/821, the competent authorities may allow the sale, supply, transfer or export of dual-use goods and technology, as well as goods and technology as listed in Annex VII to Regulation (EU) No 833/2014, or the provision of related technical or financial assistance only after having determined that:

(a) such goods or technology or the related technical or financial assistance are necessary for the urgent prevention or mitigation of an event likely to have a serious and significant impact on human health and safety or the environment; or

(b) such goods or technology or the related technical or financial assistance are due under contracts concluded before 26 February 2022, or ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such a contract, provided that the authorisation is requested before 1 May 2022.’

18 Decision 2025/394 left unchanged Article 7(1) of Decision 2014/512, as amended by Decision 2024/746.

19 Article 2(1), (2), (4), (4a) and (5) and Article 2a(1), (2), (4), (4a) and (5) of Regulation No 833/2014, as amended by Regulation 2025/395, reiterate, in essence, the wording of Article 3(1), (2), (4), (4a) and (5) and of Article 3a(1), (2), (4), (4a) and (5) respectively of Decision 2014/512, as amended by Decision 2025/394. Moreover, Article 2b of Regulation No 833/2014, as amended by Regulation 2025/395, reproduces, in essence, the content of Article 3b of Decision 2014/512, as amended by Decision 2025/394.

Background to the dispute

20 The applicant is a company established in Sri Lanka engaged in activities as a cargo general sales agent and provider of transshipment handling services.

21 The present case has arisen in the context of the restrictive measures adopted by the European Union in view of the actions of the Russian Federation destabilising the situation in Ukraine.

22 On 31 July 2014, in view of the gravity of the situation in Ukraine despite the adoption of travel restrictions and asset freezes in respect of certain natural and legal persons in March 2014, the Council of the European Union, under Article 29 TEU, adopted Decision 2014/512, which has been amended subsequently, in order to introduce targeted restrictive measures on access to capital markets, defence, dual-use goods and sensitive technologies.

23 On the same date, under Article 215 TFEU, the Council adopted Regulation No 833/2014, which has been amended subsequently, containing more detailed provisions to give effect to the requirements of Decision 2014/512 at both EU and Member State level.

24 On 24 February 2024, the Council adopted the initial acts, by which it added the applicant’s name to the lists contained in Annex IV to Decision 2014/512 and in Annex IV to Regulation No 833/2014 respectively (‘the lists at issue’).

25 By letter of 26 March 2024 and email of 19 April 2024, the applicant requested the Council, first, to send it the evidence on the basis of which the Council had decided to include its name on the lists at issue and, second, to remove its name from those lists.

Events subsequent to the bringing of the action

26 On 24 June 2024, the Council adopted the acts of June 2024.

27 By letter of 28 June 2024, the Council replied to the applicant’s letter of 26 March 2024 and to its email of 19 April 2024 and stated that all the information supporting the inclusion of its name on the lists at issue was contained in Article 3(7), Article 3a(7) and Article 3b(1) of Decision 2014/512, as amended by Decision 2024/746, and in Article 2(7), Article 2a(7) and Article 2b(1) of Regulation No 833/2014, as amended by Regulation 2024/745, and in recital 5 of Decision 2024/746 and recital 4 of Regulation 2024/745. It also enclosed with that letter document WK 8689/2024 INIT (‘the evidence file’), containing evidence concerning the applicant.

28 On 22 July 2024, the Council adopted Decision 2024/2026, extending the application of Decision 2014/512 until 31 January 2025.

29 By letter of 23 July 2024, the Council informed the applicant of its intention to maintain its name on the lists at issue.

30 On 27 January 2025, the Council adopted Decision 2025/175, extending the application of Decision 2014/512 until 31 July 2025.

31 On 24 February 2025, the Council adopted the acts of February 2025.

32 On 20 May 2025, the Council adopted the acts of May 2025.

Forms of order sought

33 The applicant claims that the Court should:

– annul the contested acts, in so far as they concern it;

– order the Council to pay the costs.

34 The Council claims in essence, in the final form of its pleadings, that the Court should:

– dismiss the action as inadmissible or, in the alternative, as unfounded;

– in the alternative, in the event that the initial acts, the acts of June 2024 and Decision 2024/2026 are annulled, maintain the effects of Decision 2024/746, of Decision 2024/1774 and of Decision 2024/2026 until the annulment in part of Regulation 2024/745 and of Regulation 2024/1745 takes effect;

– order the applicant to pay the costs.

35 The European Commission claims that the Court should:

– dismiss the action as inadmissible or, in the alternative, as unfounded;

– order the applicant to pay the costs.

36 The French Republic claims that the Court should dismiss the action.

Law

37 The Council raises a number of pleas of inadmissibility in respect of the claims for annulment.

38 It should be recalled that the Courts of the European Union are entitled to assess, according to the circumstances of each case, whether the proper administration of justice justifies their dismissing the action on the merits without previously ruling on admissibility (see, to that effect, judgment of 26 February 2002, Council v Boehringer , C‑23/00 P, EU:C:2002:118, paragraph 52).

39 In the present case and in view of its particular circumstances, it is necessary, in the interests of procedural economy, to examine the merits of the action at the outset, without previously ruling on its admissibility.

40 The applicant relies on three pleas in law in support of its action, the first alleging an error of assessment, the second, infringement of Article 16 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’) and the third, breach of the right to good administration.

The third plea in law, alleging breach of the right to good administration

41 The third plea in law, raised in respect of the initial acts only, comprises two parts.

The first part of the third plea in law, alleging breach of the obligation to state reasons

42 The applicant claims that the inclusion of its name on the lists at issue is vitiated by a breach of the obligation to state reasons. In that regard, it claims that the initial acts do not contain the actual and specific reasons justifying the inclusion of its name on those lists but rather merely state general reasons common to several entities whose names are included on those lists.

43 The Council, supported by the French Republic and by the Commission, disputes the applicant’s arguments.

44 In accordance with the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU, ‘legal acts shall state the reasons on which they are based’. Furthermore, under Article 41(2)(c) of the Charter, the right to good administration includes, in particular, ‘the obligation of the administration to give reasons for its decisions’.

45 It should be noted that the purpose of the obligation to state the reasons on which an act adversely affecting an applicant is based, which is a corollary of the principle of respect for the rights of the defence, is, first, to provide the person concerned with sufficient information to make it possible to ascertain whether the act is well founded or whether it is vitiated by a defect which may permit its legality to be contested before the Courts of the European Union and, second, to enable those Courts to review the legality of that act (see judgment of 27 July 2022, RT France v Council , T‑125/22, EU:T:2022:483, paragraph 102 and the case-law cited).

46 According to settled case-law, the statement of reasons required by Article 296 TFEU and Article 41(2)(c) of the Charter must be appropriate to the nature of the contested act and to the context in which it was adopted. It must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the institution which adopted the act in such a way as to enable the person concerned to ascertain the reasons for the act and to enable the court having jurisdiction to exercise its power of review. The requirements to be satisfied by the statement of reasons depend on the circumstances of each case (see judgment of 13 September 2018, DenizBank v Council , T‑798/14, EU:T:2018:546, paragraph 70 and the case-law cited).

47 It is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons is sufficient must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question. In particular, first, the reasons given for a decision adversely affecting a person are sufficient if that decision was adopted in circumstances known to the party concerned which enable him or her to understand the scope of the measure concerning him or her. Second, the degree of precision of the statement of the reasons for a measure must be weighed against practical realities and the time and technical facilities available for taking the measure (see judgments of 27 July 2022, RT France v Council , T‑125/22, EU:T:2022:483, paragraphs 103 and 104 and the case-law cited, and of 20 September 2023, Mordashov v Council , T‑248/22, not published, EU:T:2023:573, paragraphs 46 and 47 and the case-law cited).

48 It should be noted that, in the present case, the relevant provisions of the initial acts constitute, vis-à-vis the applicant, restrictive measures of individual application (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 September 2018, Almaz-Antey v Council , T‑515/15, not published, EU:T:2018:545, paragraph 86).

49 It has been made clear in the case-law that the statement of reasons for an act of the Council which imposed a restrictive measure had not to identify only the legal basis for that measure but also the actual and specific reasons why the Council had considered, in the exercise of its discretion, that such a measure had to be adopted in respect of the person concerned (judgment of 3 July 2014, National Iranian Tanker Company v Council , T‑565/12, EU:T:2014:608, paragraph 38; see also, to that effect, judgment of 25 January 2017, Almaz-Antey Air and Space Defence v Council , T‑255/15, not published, EU:T:2017:25, paragraph 55).

50 In the first place, it should be borne in mind that all the restrictive measures at issue form part of the context of international tension, known to the applicant, which preceded the adoption of the relevant provisions of Decision 2014/512. It is clear from recitals 1 to 8 of Decision 2014/512 that the stated objective of those measures is to increase the costs of the actions of the Russian Federation designed to undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and to promote a peaceful settlement of the crisis. Decision 2014/512 therefore does describe the overall situation that led to its adoption and the general objectives it is intended to achieve (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 March 2017, Rosneft , C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraph 123).

51 In the second place, it should be noted that Article 3(1), (1a) and (2) and Article 3a(1), (1a) and (2) of Decision 2014/512, as amended by Decision 2024/746, lay down, under the conditions set out in those provisions, a prohibition on the sale, supply, transfer, export and transit via the territory of Russia of dual-use goods and technology and of goods and technology which might contribute to Russia’s military and technological enhancement or to the development of the defence and security sector, and a prohibition on the provision of technical assistance, brokering services or other services, and on the provision of financing or financial assistance related to the goods and technology referred to, to any person, entity or body in Russia. In addition, under Article 3(7) and Article 3a(7) of that decision, no authorisation derogating from those prohibitions is to be granted, in essence, where an end-user might be a member of the military or a natural or legal person, entity or body listed in Annex IV or where the goods in question might have a military end-use, save in the circumstances set out in Article 3b of that decision.

52 Moreover, in recital 3 of Decision 2024/746, the Council recalled that, in its conclusions of 14 and 15 December 2023, the European Council had reiterated its resolute condemnation of the Russian Federation’s war of aggression against Ukraine, which constituted a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations signed in San Francisco (United States) on 26 June 1945, and reaffirmed the European Union’s unwavering support for Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders and its inherent right of self-defence against the aggression by the Russian Federation. The Council added that the European Council had also stated that the ability of the Russian Federation to wage its war of aggression had to be further weakened, including by further strengthening sanctions, and through their full and effective implementation and the prevention of their circumvention, especially for high-risk goods, in close cooperation with partners and allies.

53 Moreover, it is apparent from recital 4 of Decision 2024/746 that, in view of the gravity of the situation, the Council found it appropriate to adopt further restrictive measures.

54 In that regard, it is apparent from recital 4 of Regulation 2024/745 and recital 5 of Decision 2024/746 that, in view of the key enabling role of electronic components for use by Russia’s military and industrial complex in supporting the war of aggression against Ukraine, the Council decided to include on the lists at issue certain entities in third countries other than Russia, such as the applicant, which, by trading in such components, indirectly support Russia’s military and industrial complex in the war of aggression against Ukraine.

55 The finding that those reasons justified the adoption of the initial acts in respect of the applicant is supported and reinforced by the introductory text of Annex IV to Decision 2014/512, as amended by Decision 2024/746, and to Regulation No 833/2014, as amended by Regulation 2024/745, the wording of which is reproduced in paragraph 3 above, which refers to the fact that the persons, entities or bodies to which that annex relates are, inter alia, those who ‘have commercial or other links with or which otherwise support Russia’s defence and security sector’.

56 Accordingly, it must be held that the actual and specific reasons why the Council, in the exercise of its discretion, considered that the measures at issue had to be adopted with respect to the applicant, within the meaning of the case-law referred to in paragraph 49 above, correspond, in the present case, to the criteria laid down in the relevant provisions and in the recitals of the initial acts.

57 Consequently, the applicant’s name was included on the lists at issue because the applicant satisfied the actual and specific conditions laid down in the relevant provisions and in the recitals of the initial acts, that is to say, it was considered to be trading in electronic components for use by Russia’s military and industrial complex and, as a result, to be indirectly supporting that complex in the war of aggression against Ukraine.

58 In that regard, it is necessary to clarify that the fact that the same considerations were relied on in order to adopt restrictive measures aimed at more than one person does not mean that those considerations cannot give rise to a sufficiently specific statement of reasons for each of the persons concerned (see judgment of 13 September 2018, Vnesheconombank v Council , T‑737/14, not published, EU:T:2018:543, paragraph 76 and the case-law cited).

59 Given the political context at the time of the adoption of the restrictive measures at issue and the importance of preventing any support for Russia’s military and industrial complex in the war of aggression against Ukraine, as regards the objective of those measures, which is to increase the costs of the actions of the Russian Federation to undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and to promote a peaceful settlement of the crisis, the Council’s decision to adopt such measures in respect of entities which, by trading in electronic components for use by Russia’s military and industrial complex, indirectly support that complex in the war of aggression against Ukraine can be readily understood in the light of the stated objective of those measures (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 September 2018, Almaz-Antey v Council , T‑515/15, not published, EU:T:2018:545, paragraph 96 and the case-law cited).

60 It follows that, in the context of the establishment of the further restrictions provided for in Article 3(7), Article 3a(7) and Article 3b(1) of Decision 2014/512, as amended by Decision 2024/746, intended, inter alia, to restrict the export of dual-use goods and technology and other sensitive goods and technology, the applicant was in a position to understand that its name had been included on the lists at issue due to the fact that it was considered to be an entity which, by trading in electronic components for use by the Russian military and industrial complex, indirectly supported that complex in the war of aggression against Ukraine.

61 In the light of the foregoing, it must be found that the Council did not breach the obligation to state reasons when adopting the initial acts and, accordingly, the first part of the third plea in law must be rejected.

The second part of the third plea in law, alleging breach of the right to be heard

62 The applicant claims that the Council, in breach of the right to be heard, failed to inform the applicant of its intention to include its name on the lists at issue either before adoption of the initial acts, even though there was no element of surprise justifying that omission, or at the time those acts were adopted or after that adoption.

63 The Council, supported by the French Republic and the Commission, disputes the applicant’s arguments.

64 It should be recalled that the right to be heard in all proceedings, laid down in Article 41(2)(a) of the Charter, which is inherent in respect for the rights of the defence, guarantees every person the opportunity to make known his or her views effectively during an administrative procedure and before the adoption of a decision in relation to that person that is liable to affect his or her interests adversely (see judgment of 27 July 2022, RT France v Council , T‑125/22, EU:T:2022:483, paragraph 75 and the case-law cited).

65 In a procedure relating to the adoption of the decision to include a person’s name on a list annexed to an act establishing restrictive measures, respect for the rights of the defence requires that the competent EU authority disclose to the person concerned the grounds and the evidence against that person on which that authority proposes to base its decision. When that disclosure takes place, the competent EU authority must ensure that such persons are placed in a position to make their views known effectively on the grounds advanced against them (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi , C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraphs 111 and 112).

66 Article 52(1) of the Charter nevertheless allows limitations on the exercise of the rights enshrined in the Charter, subject to the conditions that the limitation concerned respects the essence of the fundamental right in question and, subject to the principle of proportionality, that it is necessary and genuinely meets objectives of general interest recognised by the European Union. In that regard, it has been held, on a number of occasions, that the rights of the defence might be subject to limitations or derogations, including in the sphere of the restrictive measures adopted in the context of the common foreign and security policy (see judgment of 27 July 2022, RT France v Council , T‑125/22, EU:T:2022:483, paragraph 77 and the case-law cited).

67 Moreover, the question whether there is a breach of the rights of the defence must be examined in relation to the specific circumstances of each particular case, including the nature of the act at issue, the context of its adoption and the legal rules governing the matter in question (see judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi , C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 102 and the case-law cited).

68 It should also be noted that the Courts of the European Union distinguish between, on the one hand, the initial inclusion of a person’s name on the lists at issue and, on the other, the maintenance of that person’s name on those lists (see, to that effect, judgment of 30 April 2015, Al-Chihabi v Council , T‑593/11, EU:T:2015:249, paragraph 40).

69 In the first place, as regards the argument that the applicant was not heard before the adoption of the initial acts, it is apparent from the case-law that, in the case of the initial decision placing a person’s or an entity’s name on the list of persons and entities whose funds are frozen, the Council is not required to inform the person or entity concerned beforehand of the grounds on which it intends to rely in order to list that person or entity. So that its effectiveness is not jeopardised, such a measure must, by its very nature, be able to take advantage of the element of surprise and to apply immediately. Upon application to the Council, the person or entity concerned also has the right to make known his or her view on that evidence after the measure has been adopted (see judgment of 27 July 2022, RT France v Council , T‑125/22, EU:T:2022:483, paragraph 80 and the case-law cited).

70 Such a derogation from the fundamental right to be heard during a procedure preceding the adoption of restrictive measures is justified by the need to ensure that the freezing measures are effective and, in short, by overriding considerations to do with safety or the conduct of the international relations of the European Union and of its Member States (see judgment of 27 July 2022, RT France v Council , T‑125/22, EU:T:2022:483, paragraph 81 and the case-law cited).

71 It has been held that those considerations were not confined to the freezing of funds but applied to other situations in which the adoption of restrictive measures had to take advantage of an element of surprise in order to ensure their effectiveness (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 January 2025, MegaFon v Council , T‑193/23, under appeal, EU:T:2025:7, paragraph 80).

72 In addition, it should be noted that neither the relevant provisions of the acts establishing restrictive measures nor the general principle of respect for the rights of the defence give the persons concerned a right to a formal hearing, since it is sufficient that they can submit observations in writing (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 February 2020, Amisi Kumba v Council , T‑163/18, EU:T:2020:57, paragraph 75 and the case-law cited).

73 In the present case, it should be observed that the initial acts had to take advantage of an element of surprise in order to ensure their effectiveness and to prevent the applicant from being able, in particular, to obtain export authorisations for the goods and technology referred to in Articles 3 and 3a of Decision 2014/512, as amended by Decision 2024/746, or to perform contracts giving rise to the application of one of the exceptions under Article 3b(1) of that decision. The Council was therefore not obliged to hear the applicant prior to the initial inclusion of its name, within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 72 above, and there was accordingly no breach of its right to be heard in that regard.

74 In the second place, as regards the applicant’s argument that the Council should have notified it individually of the initial acts, since those acts provide for restrictive measures in respect of the applicant, it must be noted that while the absence of individual communication of those acts may have an impact as regards the point at which time started to run for the purposes of bringing an action, it does not in itself justify annulment of those acts. In that regard, the applicant has failed to put forward any arguments to demonstrate that, in the present case, the failure to communicate those acts individually resulted in a breach of its rights which would justify the annulment of those acts in so far as they concern it (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 July 2022, RT France v Council , T‑125/22, EU:T:2022:483, paragraph 82 and the case-law cited).

75 In the third place, as regards the Council’s failure to inform the applicant of the grounds justifying the adoption of the restrictive measures in relation to it before those measures were adopted, it is clear from the case-law cited in paragraph 69 above that, on application by the applicant, since the restrictions imposed on it under the relevant provisions of the initial acts constitute restrictive measures of individual application in relation to the applicant, the Council had an obligation to inform the applicant of the grounds for applying those measures in relation to it immediately after those acts were adopted.

76 In that regard, it must be recalled that the right to effective judicial protection, which is affirmed in Article 47 of the Charter, requires that the person concerned must be able to ascertain the grounds upon which the decision taken in relation to that person is based, either by reading the decision itself or by requesting and obtaining disclosure of those grounds, without prejudice to the power of the court having jurisdiction to require the authority concerned to disclose that information, so as to make it possible for the person concerned to mount a defence in the best possible conditions and to decide, with full knowledge of the relevant facts, whether there is any point in applying to the court having jurisdiction, and in order to put the latter fully in a position to review the lawfulness of the decision in question (see judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi , C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 100 and the case-law cited).

77 In the present case, as is apparent from paragraph 60 above, the applicant was in a position to understand, from a reading of the contested acts and their recitals, that its name had been included on the lists at issue because it was regarded as an entity which, by trading in electronic components for use by the Russian military and industrial complex, indirectly supported that complex in the war of aggression against Ukraine.

78 As is apparent from paragraphs 54 to 60 above, the ground on which the Council relied in order to impose restrictive measures in respect of the applicant, that is to say, the fact of trading in electronic components for use by the Russian military and industrial complex and, as a result, of indirectly supporting that complex in the war of aggression against Ukraine, is indeed apparent from the relevant provisions and from the recitals of the initial acts, which are moreover referred to by the Council in its letter of 28 June 2024.

79 Therefore, the applicant was in a position to understand the grounds for the inclusion of its name on the lists at issue, which enabled it, within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 76 above, to mount a defence in the best possible conditions and to decide, with full knowledge of the relevant facts, whether there was any point in applying to the court having jurisdiction.

80 Consequently, the second part of the third plea in law and, accordingly, the third plea in law in its entirety, must be rejected.

The first plea in law, alleging an error of assessment

81 The applicant claims that the Council made an error of assessment in the contested acts in finding that it traded in electronic components for use by the Russian military and industrial complex and that, by doing so, it provided support to the Russian defence and security sector. According to the applicant, only a significant contribution made knowingly and intentionally to the Russian defence and security sector can justify inclusion on the lists at issue.

82 The Council, supported by the French Republic and by the Commission, disputes the applicant’s arguments.

83 According to settled case-law, while it is true that the Council has a degree of discretion to determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether the legal criteria on which the restrictive measures at issue are based are satisfied, the fact remains that the Courts of the European Union must ensure the review, in principle the full review, of the lawfulness of all EU acts (see judgments of 3 July 2014, National Iranian Tanker Company v Council , T‑565/12, EU:T:2014:608, paragraphs 54 and 55 and the case-law cited, and of 26 October 2022, Ovsyannikov v Council , T‑714/20, not published, EU:T:2022:674, paragraph 61 and the case-law cited).

84 In addition, it should be recalled that the effectiveness of the judicial review guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter requires, in particular, that the Courts of the European Union ensure that the decision by which restrictive measures were adopted or maintained, which affects the person or entity concerned individually, is taken on a sufficiently solid factual basis. That entails a verification of the factual allegations in the statement of reasons underpinning that decision, with the consequence that judicial review cannot be restricted to an assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but must concern whether those reasons, or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself to support that decision, is substantiated (judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi , C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 119).

85 The assessment of whether those reasons are well founded must be carried out by examining the evidence and information not in isolation but in their context. The Council discharges the burden of proof borne by it if it presents to the Courts of the European Union a sufficiently concrete, precise and consistent body of evidence to establish that there is a sufficient link between the entity subject to a restrictive measure and the regime or, in general, the situations, being combated (judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council , T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 124).

86 It is for the competent EU authority to establish, in the event of challenge, that the reasons relied on against the person concerned are well founded, and not the task of that person to adduce evidence of the negative, that those reasons are not well founded (see judgment of 15 June 2017, Kiselev v Council , T‑262/15, EU:T:2017:392, paragraph 63 and the case-law cited).

87 In that regard, according to settled case-law, the legality of an EU measure must be assessed on the basis of the facts and the law as they stood at the time when the measure was adopted (judgments of 3 September 2015, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Commission , C‑398/13 P, EU:C:2015:535, paragraph 22, and of 8 March 2023, Prigozhina v Council , T‑212/22, not published, EU:T:2023:104, paragraph 80).

88 In addition, the review of substantive legality incumbent on the Court must be carried out, as regards in particular cases involving restrictive measures, in the light not only of the material set out in the statements of reasons of the acts at issue, but also in the light of the material provided by the Council, in the event of challenge, to the Court in order to establish that the facts alleged are made out (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 April 2021, Council v PKK , C‑46/19 P, EU:C:2021:316, paragraph 64).

89 It is in the light of those case-law principles that it is appropriate to examine the merits of the applicant’s arguments seeking to establish that the Council made an error of assessment in finding that, by trading in electronic components for use by the Russian military and industrial complex, it indirectly supported that complex.

The initial acts

90 In view of the ground on which the applicant’s name was included on the lists at issue, it is necessary to examine whether the Council has sufficiently established that the applicant traded in electronic components for use by the Russian military and industrial complex and that, as a result, it indirectly supported that complex.

91 The Council had at its disposal for that purpose the evidence file, which, although it is dated 17 June 2024, the parties do not dispute was composed of evidence available to the Council at the time it adopted the initial acts. That file is composed of an individual ‘fiche’ submitted to the Council by the Commission, which contained evidence to substantiate the proposal that the applicant’s name be included on the lists at issue.

92 In the present case, the evidence file contains a statement of facts that are considered to be capable of justifying the inclusion of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue. That statement is worded as follows:

‘[The applicant] has supplied Russian entities post-invasion with EU-origin antennas that are known to be used in Kometa modules. Kometa modules are digital antenna arrays that protect military equipment against electronic interference [and are] produced by Russian military end-user JSC VNIIR-Progress. Kometa modules in Russian Geran‑2 UAVs used in Ukraine have been found to include EU-origin antennas, which [the applicant] has shipped to several Russian entities.

Between 7 September and 16 November 2022, 502 bills of lading are linked to a Russian wholesaler …, primarily for deliveries of western microelectronics with a cumulative claimed value of [540 824 United States dollars (USD)]. In November 2022, [the applicant] facilitated the largest identified post-invasion shipment of EU-origin antennas, with a total value of USD 60 363. The exports were also destined for [the same Russian wholesaler, which] is one of the leading Russian importers of EU-origin antennas that are used for Kometa modules and is located near JSC VNIIR-Progress. The company continued with smaller shipments of such antennas to other Russian entities in January and April 2023.

By delivering EU-origin components used for the manufacture of UAVs to Russian entities, [the applicant] is indirectly supporting Russia’s technological enhancement and Russian military operations in Ukraine.’

93 In the first place, the applicant disputes that it was involved in trading electronic components or any other goods and that it participated in supplying such components to Russian defence and security firms by trading in such goods.

94 As a preliminary point, it should be noted that the applicant is not disputing that the antennas in question are known to be used in Kometa modules, that those modules are digital antenna arrays that protect military equipment against electronic interference that are produced by Russian military end-user JSC VNIIR-Progress, or that the Kometa modules in Russian Geran-2 UAVs used in Ukraine included a number of the antennas in question. It is therefore established that the antennas in question are electronic components used by Russia’s military and industrial complex.

95 On the other hand, the applicant does dispute that it delivered or facilitated delivery of the antennas in question. In that regard, in respect of the November 2022 shipment referred to in the evidence file, it accepts that it transshipped goods, the nature and value of which were unknown to it, from a company established in Hong Kong. In addition, the applicant accepts that in the airway bills relating to the deliveries in question it was shown as consignee and then as shipper, but states that it was shown as such only for formal reasons concerning local customs regulations for the purposes of the transit of those goods via Malé International Airport (Maldives) to their final destination, that is to say, Sheremetyevo International Airport (Moscow, Russia). As regards the shipments of antennas in January and April 2023, the applicant submits that it merely provided transshipment services, although accepts that it was referred to as the shipper of the goods concerned on behalf of the company established in Hong Kong referred to above.

96 In the present case, as regards the delivery at the beginning of November 2022, it is clear from the document entitled ‘Ukraine Trace Alert of 7 August 2023 – VNIIR-Progress’, quoted in a footnote in the evidence file, that the largest delivery to Russia of electronic components manufactured by the company established in the European Union referred to in that article subsequent to the invasion of Ukraine was facilitated by the applicant on behalf of the company established in Hong Kong referred to in paragraph 95 above.

97 First, it should be noted that the applicant is not disputing that the delivery in question took place, only the claim that its role in connection with it justifies a finding that it facilitated the delivery.

98 In that regard, the applicant produces airway bills dated 2 and 4 November 2022 relating to that delivery. The airway bill of 2 November 2022 shows the company established in Hong Kong referred to in paragraph 95 above as the shipper and the applicant as the consignee of goods shipped from Hong Kong airport and arriving at Malé airport in transit to their final destination. The airway bill of 4 November 2022 shows the applicant as the shipper and the Russian wholesaler referred to in paragraph 92 above as the consignee of the same goods shipped from Malé airport, bound for Moscow airport.

99 It should be noted therefore that the applicant accepts that it transshipped the goods in question. However, it submits that the fact that its name was shown as consignee and then as shipper of the goods in question in those airway bills is attributable to formal reasons relating to local customs regulations. In that regard, it states that the Maldivian regulations regarding transshipments require the same entity to be named as shipper and as consignee on incoming and outgoing airway bills, but that that rule was not enforced by the customs authorities in Malé. That situation has led transshipment service providers such as the applicant, for commercial reasons, to offer to be formally named as consignee and shipper on airway bills. Nevertheless, the actual shipper and the actual consignee of the delivery in question were the company established in Hong Kong referred to in paragraph 95 above and the Russian wholesaler referred to in paragraph 92 above respectively.

100 In that regard, irrespective of whether, as the Council suggests, it was named in that way in contravention of the applicable customs regulations, the fact of transshipping the goods concerned and of having itself named as the consignee and shipper of those goods should be regarded as sufficient to find that the applicant played a significant role in the transporting of those goods from their place of dispatch to their destination.

101 It follows that, in the present case, the fact that the applicant provided the transshipment services and that it was named as the consignee and then as the shipper of the goods in question in the airway bills of 2 and 4 November 2022 was sufficient to find that it had facilitated the corresponding delivery, irrespective of the practical or commercial reasons for being so named.

102 Nor does the applicant dispute that a delivery took place resembling that referred to in paragraph 98 above as regards the shippers, consignees and airports concerned, a circumstance which is also apparent from the airway bills dated 13 and 15 November 2022 produced by the applicant and relating to that delivery.

103 In respect of the deliveries in January and April 2023, also referred to in the evidence file, the applicant has produced airway bills for those deliveries, dated 22 and 25 January 2023 for the first and 31 March and 2 April 2023 for the second. The airway bill of 22 January 2023 shows the company established in Hong Kong referred to in paragraph 95 above as the shipper and the applicant as the consignee of goods shipped from Hong Kong airport and arriving at Malé airport in transit to their final destination. The airway bill of 25 January 2023 shows the applicant as the shipper and a different company, established in Russia, as the consignee of the same goods shipped from Malé airport, bound for Sheremetyevo airport. The airway bill of 31 March 2023 shows the company established in Hong Kong referred to in paragraph 95 above as the shipper and the applicant as the consignee of goods shipped from Hong Kong airport and arriving at Malé airport in transit to their final destination. The airway bill of 2 April 2023 shows the applicant as the shipper and a different company, established in Russia, as the consignee of the same goods shipped from Malé airport, bound for Sheremetyevo airport.

104 In that regard, it is sufficient to note that, as in the case of the November 2022 deliveries, the fact that the applicant provided the transshipment services and that it was named as the consignee and then as the shipper of the goods in question in the airway bills referred to in paragraph 103 above is sufficient to find that it had facilitated the corresponding deliveries.

105 It follows that the applicant has not demonstrated an error of assessment vitiating the statement of facts in the evidence file.

106 In the second place, it is appropriate to examine the arguments by which the applicant disputes that its role in the deliveries concerned justifies the finding that it indirectly supported the Russian military and industrial complex by trading in electronic components within the meaning of recital 4 of Regulation 2024/745 and recital 5 of Decision 2024/746. The applicant claims in particular that the services that it provided were insufficient to qualify as ‘support’ for the Russian defence and security sector, whether because they were ‘incidental’ and ‘insignificant’ or because it was unaware and was not required to be aware that the Russian defence and security sector would benefit from them.

107 It should be borne in mind that, according to recital 4 of Regulation 2024/745 and recital 5 of Decision 2024/746, in view of the key enabling role of electronic components for use by Russia’s military and industrial complex in supporting the war of aggression against Ukraine, the Council considered it appropriate to include on the lists at issue certain entities in third countries other than Russia which indirectly supported Russia’s military and industrial complex in the war of aggression against Ukraine by trading in such components.

108 Moreover, according to the introductory text of the lists at issue, those lists are of ‘natural or legal persons, entities or bodies which are military end-users, form part of Russia’s military and industrial complex or which have commercial or other links with or which otherwise support Russia’s defence and security sector’. According to that introductory text, ‘these natural or legal persons, entities or bodies contribute to Russia’s military and technological enhancement or to the development of Russia’s defence and security sector’.

109 In that regard, the applicant claims that it does not use, sell, supply, transfer, export, purchase or import goods to or from Russia or any other country, but rather, as a cargo general sales agent, exclusively provides services to various airlines using the airports of the Maldives, the Seychelles and Sri Lanka. Its activities involve the management and sale of air freight capacity on behalf of the airlines concerned, but not the transport of or trade in goods.

110 As regards the deliveries referred to in the evidence file, the applicant submits that its name was shown as the consignee or shipper of certain goods in the airway bills only for purely practical reasons relating to customs formalities and that it does not actually act as a consignee or shipper of goods. It submits that it had no contractual relationship with and did not communicate with the company established in Hong Kong referred to in paragraph 95 above or with the Russian wholesaler referred to in paragraph 92 above, and merely offered its services to the airlines that carried those goods.

111 First of all, it should be borne in mind that the deliveries in question, set out in the statement of facts in the evidence file, concerned electronic components for use by Russia’s military and industrial complex within the meaning of recital 4 of Regulation 2024/745 and recital 5 of Decision 2024/746, a circumstance not disputed by the applicant.

112 Next, it should be noted that, by supplying transshipment services in the context of those deliveries and by being named, whatever the reasons therefor, as consignee and shipper for those deliveries, the applicant played an effective part in the transporting of electronic components used to manufacture unmanned aerial vehicles to the consignees of those components in Russia, by facilitating the deliveries in question. By doing so, contrary to the applicant’s claims, it traded in those components and, therefore, indirectly supported Russia’s military and industrial complex within the meaning of recital 4 of Regulation 2024/745 and recital 5 of Decision 2024/746.

113 In addition, that finding is not undermined by the fact that the applicant’s participation in those transactions consisted in providing services that, as the applicant itself states, form part of its ordinary economic and commercial activity as an air cargo general sales agent and provider of transshipment services.

114 Accordingly, the Council did not make an error of assessment in finding that the applicant indirectly supported Russia’s military and industrial complex by trading in electronic components used by that complex.

115 In the third place, it is appropriate to examine the arguments by which the applicant disputes that it provides significant support to the Russian military and industrial complex. In that regard, the applicant submits that inclusion of the names of non-Russian companies on the lists at issue is intended to combat the circumvention of commercial restrictions imposed by Decision 2014/512 and Regulation No 833/2014, and that therefore the support for the Russian military and industrial complex referred to in the introductory text of the lists at issue and in recital 4 of Regulation 2024/745 and recital 5 of Decision 2024/746 must, first, be of sufficient qualitative and quantitative significance, and would otherwise not be compatible with the principle of legal certainty, and, second, be provided knowingly and intentionally. According to the applicant, any benefit that the Russian defence and security sector may have been able to derive from the applicant is purely incidental, insignificant and unintentional, and was therefore neither deliberate nor intentional, and did not reach the threshold of sufficient quantitative and qualitative significance to justify including the applicant’s name on the lists at issue. It submits that it merely provided purely commercial services, with nothing to indicate that they may have directly or indirectly benefited the Russian defence and security sector, by contrast to many other companies not established in Russia whose names have been included on the lists at issue.

116 It should be borne in mind that the stated objective of the restrictive measures laid down by Decision 2014/512 and by Regulation No 833/2014 is to increase the costs of the actions of the Russian Federation designed to undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and to promote a peaceful settlement of the crisis (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 March 2017, Rosneft , C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraph 123).

117 As regards the applicant’s arguments that it did not knowingly or intentionally provide support to the Russian military and industrial complex, the following should be noted.

118 In the present case, as is apparent from recital 4 of Regulation 2024/745 and recital 5 of Decision 2024/746, the applicant’s name was included on the lists at issue on the ground that, by trading in electronic components for use by the Russian military and industrial complex, it indirectly supported Russia’s military and industrial complex in the war of aggression against Ukraine.

119 It follows clearly and specifically from the wording of those recitals that the condition concerning the provision of support to Russia’s military and industrial complex is satisfied by the mere fact of trading in electronic components for use by that complex, in view of the key enabling role of those electronic components for use by the Russian military and industrial complex.

120 Therefore, contrary to the applicant’s claims, the support for the Russian military and industrial complex referred to in recital 4 of Regulation 2024/745 and recital 5 of Decision 2024/746 does not entail, in addition to an objective element consisting in having traded in the electronic components in question, a subjective element to the effect that such support must purportedly be provided knowingly and intentionally to that complex.

121 In that regard, the applicant cannot profitably argue that it was not aware or could reasonably have been unaware that the services that it had provided amounted to support for the Russian military and industrial complex.

122 For that purpose, it should be noted that the applicant relies on the Court’s interpretation of a criterion for inclusion on the lists relating to the freezing of funds and economic resources, namely the criterion for inclusion on the list annexed to Council Decision 2012/642/CFSP of 15 October 2012 concerning restrictive measures against Belarus (OJ 2012 L 285, p. 1), established in Article 4(1)(a) of that decision, and on the list in Annex I to Council Regulation (EC) No 765/2006 of 18 May 2006 concerning restrictive measures against President Lukashenko and certain officials of Belarus (OJ 2006 L 134, p. 1), established in Article 2(4) of that regulation, as amended by Council Regulation (EU) No 1014/2012 of 6 November 2012 (OJ 2012 L 307, p. 1).

123 According to those provisions, that criterion relates in particular to ‘persons, entities or bodies responsible for … the repression of civil society and democratic opposition, or whose activities otherwise seriously undermine democracy or the rule of law in Belarus’.

124 As is apparent from the case-law, that criterion must be interpreted as meaning that persons, entities or bodies whose acts or activities contribute to the repression of civil society and democratic opposition are responsible for that repression, irrespective of their intent, as soon as they are aware or cannot reasonably be unaware of the consequences of their acts or activities (judgment of 15 February 2023, Belaeronavigatsia v Council , T‑536/21, EU:T:2023:66, paragraph 31).

125 The criterion applied in the case-law invoked by the appellant is worded differently from the grounds for listing at issue.

126 Unlike the ground in recital 4 of Regulation 2024/745 and recital 5 of Decision 2024/746, which relates to indirect support for a Russian military and industrial complex, the criterion referred to in paragraph 123 above is based on the fact of being responsible for the repression of a population or for seriously undermining democracy or the rule of law.

127 Accordingly, the argument that it was for the Council to establish that the applicant was aware of or could not reasonably have been unaware of the consequences of its acts or activities must be rejected.

128 Furthermore, the applicant cannot profitably refer to Article 8 of Decision 2014/512, as amended by Decision 2024/746, and to Article 12 of Regulation No 833/2014, as amended by Regulation 2024/745, relating to the prohibition on circumventing the restrictive measures laid down in those instruments. The lists at issue, by focusing on natural or legal persons, entities or bodies which are military end-users, form part of Russia’s military and industrial complex or which have commercial or other links with or otherwise support Russia’s defence and security sector and which contribute to Russia’s military and technological enhancement or to the development of its defence and security sector, are intended to ensure the efficiency and effectiveness of the restrictive measures laid down in Article 3 of Decision 2014/512, as amended by Decision 2024/746, and in Article 2 of Regulation No 833/2014, as amended by Regulation 2024/745, in Article 3a of Decision 2014/512, as amended by Decision 2024/746, and in Article 2a of Regulation No 833/2014, as amended by Regulation 2024/745, and in Article 3b of Decision 2014/512, as amended by Decision 2024/746, and in Article 2b of Regulation No 833/2014, as amended by Regulation 2024/745, respectively, rather than to penalise circumvention of the prohibitions laid down by those provisions.

129 Furthermore, it should be noted that the restrictive measures at issue in the present case, which are aimed at reinforcing the restrictions on the export of sensitive goods and technology, do not constitute a sanction and nor do they imply any criminal accusation. The Council acts at issue do not constitute a finding of fact that a criminal offence has actually been committed, but rather have been adopted in the context and for the purpose of an administrative procedure with a precautionary function, which is intended solely to exert pressure so that the situation in respect of which the Council has taken those measures is brought to an end or at the very least evolves (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 February 2020, Amisi Kumba v Council , T‑163/18, EU:T:2020:57, paragraph 139 (not published)).

130 Accordingly, in the present case, it was not for the Council to demonstrate that the applicant, in addition to trading in electronic components, had knowingly and intentionally acted in the knowledge that that trade provided support to the Russian defence and security sector.

131 Furthermore, as is apparent from paragraphs 98, 102 and 103 above, for each shipment referred to in the evidence file, the airway bill which showed the applicant as the shipper of the goods in question also identified the consignee of those goods. It follows that, for each of those shipments, the applicant knew that it was shipping those goods to an identified consignee established in Russia. Moreover, in view of the nature of the services provided by the applicant and of the fact that it was named in the transport documents as the consignee and shipper of the goods in question, the applicant cannot shelter behind the fact that it was unaware of the nature of the goods concerned, purportedly not being required to have such information and having no practical interest in having it.

132 As regards the arguments that (i) the indirect support for the Russian military and industrial complex must be of sufficient qualitative and quantitative significance, and would otherwise not be compatible with the principle of legal certainty, and that (ii) the support that the applicant supposedly provided to the Russian military and industrial complex did not reach that threshold, the following should be noted.

133 First, it should be borne in mind that the principle of legal certainty requires that EU legislation be clear and precise and its application foreseeable by those subject to it (see judgments of 5 March 2015, Europäisch-Iranische Handelsbank v Council , C‑585/13 P, EU:C:2015:145, paragraph 93 and the case-law cited, and of 17 February 2017, Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines and Others v Council , T‑14/14 and T‑87/14, EU:T:2017:102, paragraph 192 and the case-law cited).

134 As stated in paragraph 119 above, it is clear from recital 4 of Regulation 2024/745 and recital 5 of Decision 2024/746 that the mere fact of trading in electronic components for use by Russia’s military and industrial complex amounts to indirectly supporting that complex in the war of aggression against Ukraine.

135 That direct link between the trade in such components and the existence of support for the Russian military and industrial complex (i) is clear from the key role of such components, for use by that complex, in supporting the war of aggression against Ukraine, a role which is not disputed by the applicant, and (ii) concerns a precisely defined activity, namely the fact of trading in electronic components for use by the Russian military and industrial complex.

136 That interpretation of the concept of indirect support for the Russian military and industrial complex, referred to in recital 4 of Regulation 2024/745 and recital 5 of Decision 2024/746, is sufficiently clear, precise and foreseeable in its application to be compatible with the principle of legal certainty.

137 Second, in support of the argument that the support that it allegedly provided to the Russian military and industrial complex was not of sufficient qualitative or quantitative significance, the applicant relies on the Court’s interpretation of two criteria for inclusion on lists relating to the freezing of funds and economic resources.

138 Accordingly, first, the applicant refers to the criterion for inclusion on the list in Annex II to Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP of 26 July 2010 concerning restrictive measures against Iran and repealing Common Position 2007/140/CFSP (OJ 2010 L 195, p. 39), laid down in Article 20(1)(c) of that decision, in the version amended by Council Decision 2012/635/CFSP of 15 October 2012 (OJ 2012 L 282, p. 58), and on the list in Annex IX to Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 of 23 March 2012 concerning restrictive measures against Iran and repealing Regulation (EU) No 961/2010 (OJ 2012 L 88, p. 1), laid down in Article 23(2)(d) of that regulation, in the version amended by Council Regulation (EU) No 1263/2012 of 21 December 2012 (OJ 2012 L 356, p. 34).

139 According to those provisions, that criterion is aimed in particular at ‘persons, entities or bodies that provide support, such as material, logistical or financial support, to the Government of Iran’.

140 As the applicant observes, that criterion does not concern merely any form of support to the Government of Iran, but covers forms of support which, by their quantitative or qualitative significance, contribute to the pursuit of Iran’s nuclear activities (see judgment of 28 April 2016, Sharif University of Technology v Council , T‑52/15, EU:T:2016:254, paragraph 50 and the case-law cited).

141 Second, the applicant refers to the criterion for inclusion on the list annexed to Council Decision 2014/145/CFSP of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 78, p. 16), laid down in Article 2(1)(a) of that decision, in the version amended by Council Decision 2014/499/CFSP of 25 July 2014 (OJ 2014 L 221, p. 15), and on the list in Annex I to Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 78, p. 6), laid down in Article 3(1)(a) of that regulation, in the version amended by Council Regulation (EU) No 811/2014 of 25 July 2014 (OJ 2014 L 221, p. 11).

142 According to those provisions, that criterion covers in particular ‘natural persons … actively supporting or implementing, actions or policies which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, or stability or security in Ukraine’.

143 According to the case-law, that criterion does not cover all forms of support for the Russian Government, but rather concerns forms of support which, by their quantitative or qualitative significance, contribute to the continuance of its actions and policies destabilising Ukraine (judgment of 15 June 2017, Kiselev v Council , T‑262/15, EU:T:2017:392, paragraph 74).

144 In the present case, it should be noted that the criteria invoked by the applicant are worded differently from those of the ground for listing at issue. Unlike the ground based on recital 4 of Regulation 2024/745 and recital 5 of Decision 2024/746, which concerns indirect support for a military and industrial complex, the criterion quoted in paragraph 139 above concerns the provision of support, such as material, logistical or financial support, to a government, and the criterion quoted in paragraph 142 above concerns active support for certain policies.

145 Moreover, the actions capable of establishing the active or other support in question are not set out in the wording of those latter criteria, unlike the actions capable of establishing indirect support for the Russian military and industrial complex, which, in the present case, consist in the fact of trading in electronic components for use by that complex.

146 Accordingly, in the light of (i) the differences in wording between the criteria invoked by the applicant and the ground on which its name was included on the lists at issue and (ii) the finding made in paragraph 119 above, it is appropriate to reject the argument that it was for the Council to establish that the support allegedly provided by the applicant to the Russian military and industrial complex was of sufficient quantitative or qualitative significance to constitute a significant contribution to Russia’s technological enhancement or to the development of its defence and security sector.

147 Consequently, the Council did not make an error of assessment in finding, first, that the applicant traded in electronic components for use by the Russian military and industrial complex and, second, that, by doing so, it was indirectly supporting Russia’s military and industrial complex in the war of aggression against Ukraine.

148 That finding cannot be called into question by the argument that the fact that other undertakings in a situation comparable to its own have not been subject to similar restrictive measures. It should be noted that, even assuming that circumstance to have been established, it cannot be properly put forward by the applicant. The principle of equal treatment must be reconciled with the principle of legality (see judgment of 14 October 2009, Bank Melli Iran v Council , T‑390/08, EU:T:2009:401, paragraph 59 and the case-law cited; judgment of 3 May 2016, Post Bank Iran v Council , T‑68/14, not published, EU:T:2016:263, paragraph 135).

149 The same is true of the argument based on the emails exchanged between 5 and 22 November 2024 between the applicant and export control officers of the United States of America Department of Commerce in New Delhi (India), which the applicant produced on 4 December 2024 by way of new evidence under Article 85(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court.

150 Assuming that evidence to be admissible, in view of the absence of any error of assessment by the Council, the fact that the applicant communicated information about the exports to Russia to the competent United States of America authorities and that those authorities took no measures in relation to the applicant cannot affect the legality of the initial acts.

151 Accordingly, the first plea in law must be rejected in so far as concerns the initial acts.

Decision 2025/175 and the acts of February and May 2025

152 By Decision 2025/175, the Council extended the applicability of Decision 2014/512, Annex IV to which contains the applicant’s name, until 31 July 2025.

153 As regards the acts of February 2025, they contain, in particular, new restrictive measures in respect of the persons, entities and bodies whose names are included on the lists at issue.

154 By the acts of May 2025, the Council, inter alia, included new persons and entities on the lists at issue; expanded the list of items which might contribute to Russia’s military and technological enhancement or to the development of its defence and security sector; added vessels to the list in Annex XVI to Decision 2014/512 of vessels which are banned from accessing Member States’ ports and locks and from receiving a broad range of services related to maritime transport; and extended the duration of an exemption from the oil price cap.

155 In support of its claims for annulment of Decision 2025/175 and of the acts of February and May 2025, the applicant has not put forward any further arguments to dispute that maintenance of its name on the lists at issue is well founded.

156 As regards the general context relating to the situation in Ukraine, it is clear that, on the dates on which Decision 2025/175, the acts of February 2025 and the acts of May 2025 were adopted, the situation in that country remained grave, and that the objective pursued by the initial acts, that is to say, to exert pressure on the Russian Government to end its actions and policies destabilising Ukraine, remained relevant.

157 It follows that the applicant has not established that the Council made an error of assessment in adopting Decision 2025/175 and the acts of February and May 2025 in so far as they concern the applicant.

158 Accordingly, the first plea in law must be rejected as regards Decision 2025/175 and the acts of February and May 2025 and, therefore, in its entirety.

The second plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 16 of the Charter

159 The applicant submits that the decisions made in the contested acts to include and maintain its name on the lists at issue constitute an unjustified and disproportionate limitation on its freedom to conduct a business.

160 In that regard, first, the applicant claims that, since it is not an end-user in Russia of goods subject to restrictions, the inclusion of its name on the lists at issue is manifestly not appropriate to attaining the objective pursued. It adds that any intention on the part of the Council to deter economic operators from having business relationships with it or to cause them to break off their business relationships with it is incompatible with the objectives of the restrictive measures and harms its reputation. In addition, the applicant submits that, since it does not decide on the destination of the goods it handles, it is not able to divert deliveries against the wishes of the shipper or of the consignee. Moreover, since its name does not appear until the actual performance of the contract for the carriage of goods, the competent national authorities would not be able to give consideration to the fact that its name is included on the lists at issue and it is unlikely that those authorities would seek information on the parties involved in making a delivery. Accordingly, the restrictive measures imposed on the applicant do not attain their objective in a consistent and systematic manner.

161 Second, the applicant claims that the inclusion of its name on the lists at issue was not necessary in order to achieve the objectives referred to in paragraph 160 above and that a less onerous measure would have consisted in the Council informing the applicant of its concerns so that the applicant could clarify the facts and remedy the situation.

162 Third, the applicant submits that the measure at issue is disproportionate in view of the fact that it is inappropriate and virtually ineffective and of the severity of the harm to the applicant’s reputation, and that the measure is purely punitive. Moreover, in so far as concerns the acts of February 2025, the applicant argues that the restriction of its freedom to conduct a business is even more disproportionate.

163 The Council, supported by the French Republic and the Commission, disputes the applicant’s arguments.

164 It should be borne in mind that, under Article 16 of the Charter, ‘the freedom to conduct a business in accordance with Union law and national laws and practices is recognised.’

165 In the present case, it should be noted that, contrary to the Council’s claims, the applicant’s exercise of the freedom to conduct a business is affected to a certain extent by the fact that its name is included on the lists at issue.

166 As regards the initial acts, it should be borne in mind that Article 3(1), (1a) and (2) and Article 3a(1), (1a) and (2) of Decision 2014/512, as amended by Decision 2024/746, establish prohibitions on the direct or indirect sale, supply, transfer or export of a number of categories of goods to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Russia or for use in Russia and on the transit of those categories of goods via the territory of Russia, and other specific prohibitions relating to the goods covered by those provisions (see paragraphs 4 and 8 above).

167 In addition, Article 3(4), (4a) and (5) and Article 3a(4), (4a) and (5) of Decision 2014/512, as amended by Decision 2024/746, provide for an authorisation system enabling the competent national authorities to derogate from the prohibitions laid down in paragraphs 1, 1a and 2 of those articles.

168 However, the provisions laid down in Article 3(7)(i), in Article 3a(7)(i) and in Article 3b(1) of Decision 2014/512, as amended by Decision 2024/746, by derogation from other provisions of Articles 3 and 3a of that decision, have the effect of tightening the conditions under which a person whose name is included on the lists at issue can benefit from an authorisation, for that person’s own account or as a contracting partner, under the derogating system referred to in paragraph 167 above.

169 As the Council concedes, those provisions could lead the competent national authorities to refuse to grant an authorisation derogating from the prohibitions laid down in those provisions where the transaction concerned a person whose name was included on the lists at issue.

170 Moreover, as regards the acts of February 2025 in particular, under Article 3b(1) and (1a) of Decision 2014/512, as amended by Decision 2025/394, it is prohibited to sell, supply, transfer or export, directly or indirectly, dual-use goods and technology and the goods and technology listed in Annex VII to Regulation No 833/2014 and services related to such goods and technology, to persons whose names are included on the lists at issue, such as the applicant.

171 As regards the scope of the limitation on the freedom to conduct a business in the present case, it should be noted that, while respect for fundamental rights is a condition for the legality of EU acts, according to established case-law the fundamental rights relied on by the applicant, that is to say, the right to conduct a business and the right to respect for reputation, do not enjoy absolute protection under EU law. Consequently, the exercise of those rights may be restricted, provided that those restrictions genuinely meet objectives of public interest pursued by the European Union and do not constitute, in relation to the aim pursued, a disproportionate and intolerable interference, impairing the very substance of the rights thus guaranteed (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council , T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 193 and the case-law cited).

172 Accordingly, in order to comply with EU law, a limitation on the fundamental rights at issue must be provided for by law, must respect the essential content of that freedom and must refer to an objective of general interest, recognised as such by the European Union, and must not be disproportionate (see judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council , T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 194 and the case-law cited).

173 It is clear that those four conditions are satisfied in the present case.

174 In the first place, the restrictive measures at issue are ‘provided for by law’, since they are laid down in acts which are, in particular, of general application, have a clear legal basis in EU law and are sufficiently foreseeable.

175 In the second place, the restrictive measures at issue apply for six months and are to be kept under constant review. Since those measures are temporary and reversible, it must be found that they do not undermine the essential content of the freedom relied on.

176 In the third place, the restrictive measures at issue meet an objective of general interest as fundamental to the international community as that of increasing the costs of the actions by the Russian Federation to undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and of promoting a peaceful settlement of the crisis (see, to that effect, judgments of 28 March 2017, Rosneft , C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraph 147, and of 15 November 2023, OT v Council , T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 198).

177 In that regard, in respect of the initial acts, it is apparent from recital 3 of Decision 2024/746 that that decision sought to further weaken the ability of the Russian Federation to wage its war of aggression, including by further strengthening sanctions and through their full and effective implementation and the prevention of their circumvention, especially for high-risk goods, and from recital 5 of that decision that, in order to do so, it was appropriate, inter alia, to cover more persons, entities and bodies supporting the Russian military and industrial complex.

178 In respect of the acts of February 2025, it is apparent from recital 5 of Decision 2025/394 that, in view of the gravity of the situation, it was appropriate to adopt new restrictive measures, and from recital 12 of that decision that it was necessary to strengthen the prohibition on the export of dual-use goods and technology and of goods and technology which might contribute to the technological enhancement of the Russian defence and security sector to natural or legal persons, entities or bodies set out in Annex IV to Decision 2014/512.

179 In the fourth place, it is necessary to determine whether the limitation at issue is proportionate to the aim pursued.

180 First of all, it is necessary to determine whether the restrictive measures at issue are appropriate for achieving the objectives of general interest pursued by the European Union. In that regard, it should be noted that, in the light of objectives of general interest as fundamental to the international community as those referred to in paragraph 176 above, those measures cannot, in themselves, contrary to the applicant’s claims, be regarded as inappropriate.

181 Moreover, as regards the applicant’s arguments in respect of the fact that those measures are not capable of achieving the objective that they pursue, the following should be noted.

182 In so far as concerns the provisions applicable at the time of adoption of the initial acts and summarised in paragraphs 166 to 168 above, which established a system of authorisations issued by the competent national authorities, the inclusion of the name of a person, entity or body on the lists at issue causes the competent national authorities to assess requests for authorisation to derogate from the prohibitions laid down in those provisions with greater constraint, or even to reject those requests, where there are reasonable grounds to believe that the end-user of the goods or technology to which the request relates may be a person, entity or body whose name is included on the lists at issue.

183 The fact, relied on by the applicant, that it is not the end-user of any goods subject to restrictions under Decision 2014/512 or Regulation No 833/2014 has no bearing on whether the inclusion of its name on the lists at issue is appropriate.

184 As the Council correctly notes, the inclusion of the names of third-country entities on the lists at issue serves to identify companies active in the supply of restricted goods to end-users active in Russia. That identification serves to help the competent national authorities to determine whether shipments of such goods may be intended for end-users in Russia.

185 That conclusion is not called into question by the applicant’s arguments.

186 First, in the light of the considerations set out in paragraph 184 above, the fact that the applicant is not able to divert deliveries in order to transport them to users in Russia is irrelevant in the context of the objective of ensuring the efficiency and effectiveness of the authorisation system referred to in paragraph 167 above and, by extension, of the other restrictive measures established by Decision 2014/512 and by Regulation No 833/2014.

187 Second, the applicant merely advances, without substantiation, that ‘in [its] experience’, it would be ‘highly unusual’ for the competent national authorities to request information on the suppliers of services indirectly linked to a transaction.

188 Third, as is apparent from paragraph 129 above, the restrictive measures at issue in the present case are not sanctions and do not imply any criminal accusation.

189 Fourth, as regards Article 7(1)(a) of Decision 2014/512, as amended by Decision 2024/746, the wording of which is summarised in paragraph 12 above, relating to the performance of contracts where parties to those contracts are persons whose names are included on the lists at issue or to matters connected with the performance of those contracts, and Article 7(2) of that decision, relating to the applicable burden of proof, the applicant cannot properly make a – moreover unsubstantiated – inference from those provisions that they ‘[pillory] it as a nefarious entity that allegedly circumvents EU sanctions and … supports Russia’s war of aggression’. Those provisions merely provide for accompanying measures intended to ensure the effectiveness of the restrictive measures at issue.

190 Fifth, to the extent that the applicant relies on the fact that other persons’ names are not included on the lists at issue, that argument should be rejected for the reasons summarised in paragraph 148 above.

191 As regards the measures established by the acts of February 2025, set out in paragraph 170 above, prohibiting the direct or indirect sale, supply, transfer or export of the goods and technology set out in Annex VII to Regulation No 833/2014 and of services related to such goods and technology to persons whose names are included on the lists at issue, such as the applicant, it should be found that those additional measures likewise cannot in themselves be regarded as inappropriate, in the light, in particular, of the objective, referred to in paragraph 176 above, of increasing the costs of the actions by the Russian Federation to undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.

192 Accordingly, the applicant’s arguments in respect of the fact that the inclusion and maintenance of its name on the lists at issue are not capable of achieving the objective that they pursue must be rejected.

193 Next, as regards whether the restrictive measures at issue are necessary, it should be noted that those measures relate only to certain items, namely, as regards the initial acts and Decision 2025/175, dual-use goods and technology, goods and technology which might contribute to Russia’s military and technological enhancement or to the development of the defence and security sector, firearms, their parts and essential components and ammunition and, as regards the acts of February 2025, goods and technology listed in Annex VII to Regulation No 833/2014, which are linked to electronics, computers, telecommunications, sensors and lasers, navigation and avionics, marine goods and technology, aerospace and propulsion, special materials and materials processing.

194 In addition, having regard to the considerations set out in paragraph 184 above and to the objective of the restrictive measures at issue, which is set out in particular in paragraph 176 above, the measure invoked by the applicant, consisting of an exchange of information with the Council, would not be as effective in achieving that objective.

195 In that regard, the applicant cannot profitably refer to Article 2d(1) of Regulation No 833/2014, in the version applicable whether on the date of adoption of the initial acts or on the date of adoption of the acts of February 2025, which provides merely for exchanges of information between the national authorities competent to determine requests for authorisation to derogate from the prohibitions laid down in that regulation and the other Member States and the Commission, or to Article 6b(3) of that regulation, which provides for information received directly by the Commission to be made available to the Member States. The same is true of Article 6(1)(d) of Regulation No 833/2014, which lays down an obligation to inform each other that applies solely between the Member States and the Commission, in relation to instances of breach, circumvention and attempts at breach or circumvention of the prohibitions set out in that regulation. As recalled in paragraph 128 above, the lists at issue are not intended to penalise infringements of the provisions of Regulation No 833/2014 or of Decision 2014/512.

196 Moreover, it is apparent from a weighing up of the interests at stake that the disadvantages involved in restrictions on exports of dual-use goods and technology are not disproportionate in the light of the objectives pursued. In that regard, the importance of the objectives pursued by the contested acts, which form part of the broader objective of maintaining peace and international security, in accordance with the objectives of the European Union’s external action set out in Article 21 TEU, is such as to outweigh any, even considerable, negative consequences for certain operators.

197 Last, the applicant submits that as a result of the initial acts, Decision 2025/175 and the acts of February 2025, it suffered serious damage to its reputation, manifested in the decisions of two banks to terminate their relationship with it as a result of the inclusion of its name on the lists at issue and to refuse to process international transactions involving the applicant.

198 It is clear that those circumstances are insufficient to establish that the contested acts disproportionately interfered with respect for the applicant’s reputation.

199 Consequently, the applicant has failed to establish that the contested acts were vitiated by a breach of freedom to conduct a business.

200 In the light of the foregoing, the second plea in law should be rejected.

201 It is apparent from all the foregoing that, since none of the pleas in law raised by the applicant in support of its claims is well founded, the action must be dismissed in its entirety, with no requirement to examine the pleas of inadmissibility put forward by the Council.

Costs

202 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

203 Furthermore, according to Article 138(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the Member States and the institutions which have intervened in the proceedings are to bear their costs.

204 In the present case, since the applicant has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the Council, in accordance with the form of order sought by the latter. The French Republic and the Commission, for their part, are to bear their own costs.

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber)

hereby:

1. Dismisses the action;

2. Orders Euro Asia Cargo Private Ltd to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the Council of the European Union;

3. Orders the French Republic and the European Commission each to bear its own costs.

Brkan | Gâlea | Kalėda

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 14 January 2026.

V. Di Bucci | S. Papasavvas

Registrar | President

* Language of the case: English.