ext/celex/62024TJ0252

JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Sixth Chamber)

12 November 2025 ( * )

( EU trade mark – Invalidity proceedings – EU figurative mark WASHTOWER – Absolute grounds for invalidity – Descriptive character – Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 )

In Case T‑252/24,

LG Electronics, Inc., established in Seoul (South Korea), represented by M. Graf, lawyer,

applicant,

v

European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), represented by M. Eberl, acting as Agent,

defendant,

the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court, being

Washtower IP BV, established in Hengelo (Netherlands), represented by L. Fresco, lawyer,

THE GENERAL COURT (Sixth Chamber),

composed, at the time of the deliberations, of M.J. Costeira, President, P. Zilgalvis and E. Tichy-Fisslberger (Rapporteur), Judges,

Registrar: V. Di Bucci,

having regard to the written part of the procedure,

having regard to the fact that no request for a hearing was submitted by the parties within three weeks after service of notification of the close of the written part of the procedure, and having decided to rule on the action without an oral part of the procedure, pursuant to Article 106(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court,

gives the following

Judgment

1 By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, LG Electronics, Inc., seeks the annulment of the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 11 March 2024 (Case R 5/2023-5) (‘the contested decision’).

Background to the dispute

2 On 21 September 2020, the applicant filed with EUIPO an application for a declaration of invalidity in respect of the EU trade mark which had been registered following an application filed on 3 April 2019 for registration of the following figurative sign:

3 The goods covered by the contested mark in respect of which a declaration of invalidity was sought were in Class 20 of the Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended, and corresponded to the following description: ‘Furniture, namely cabinets for washing machines or tumble dryers’.

4 The grounds relied on in support of the application for a declaration of invalidity were those set out in Article 59(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2017 L 154, p. 1), read in conjunction with Article 7(1)(b) and (c) thereof.

5 On 22 November 2022, the Cancellation Division dismissed the application for a declaration of invalidity.

6 On 2 January 2023, the applicant filed a notice of appeal with EUIPO against the decision of the Cancellation Division.

7 By the contested decision, the Board of Appeal dismissed the appeal. In particular, the Board of Appeal found, first, that the word element ‘washtower’ of the contested mark was descriptive of the ‘furniture, namely cabinets for washing machines or tumble dryers’ at issue (see paragraph 50 of the contested decision), but that its figurative element prevented that mark, taken as a whole, from being descriptive of those goods within the meaning of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001 (see paragraphs 51 to 58 of the contested decision). Second, the Board of Appeal found that the contested mark had, as a whole, distinctive character with regard to the goods at issue within the meaning of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 (see paragraphs 62 and 63 of the contested decision).

Forms of order sought

8 The applicant claims that the Court should:

– annul the contested decision;

– order EUIPO to pay the costs.

9 EUIPO contends that the Court should:

– dismiss the action;

– order the applicant to pay the costs incurred by EUIPO in the event that a hearing is held.

10 The intervener contends that the Court should:

– dismiss the action;

– order the applicant to pay the costs.

Law

Admissibility of the general references made by the applicant and the intervener to the pleadings submitted before EUIPO

11 The applicant and the intervener refer generally to arguments and evidence which they submitted in the proceedings before EUIPO.

12 In this regard, it should be recalled that, in accordance with the first paragraph of Article 21 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Article 177(1)(d) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the application must contain the pleas and arguments on which the application is based as well as a summary of those pleas. That statement must be apparent from the text of the application itself and be sufficiently clear and precise to enable the defendant to prepare its defence and the General Court to rule on the action, if necessary without any other supporting information (see judgment of 22 June 2017, Biogena Naturprodukte v EUIPO (ZUM wohl) , T‑236/16, EU:T:2017:416, paragraph 11 and the case-law cited).

13 Similarly, in accordance with Article 180(1)(c) of the Rules of Procedure, the response must contain the pleas in law and arguments relied on.

14 Moreover, whilst the text of the application and the response can be supported by references to specific passages in documents annexed to it, it is not for the Court to seek and identify in the annexes the pleas and arguments on which it may consider the action to be based, the annexes having a purely evidential and instrumental function. It follows that a procedural document, namely an application or a response, in so far as it refers to written submissions lodged before EUIPO, is inadmissible to the extent that the general references in it cannot be linked to the pleas and arguments put forward in that procedural document itself (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 June 2017, ZUM wohl , T‑236/16, EU:T:2017:416, paragraph 12 and the case-law cited).

15 In the present case, it should be noted, first, that the applicant makes, in paragraphs 19 to 23 and in paragraph 43 of the application, general references to the content of the pleadings which it lodged before EUIPO on 21 September, 9 October, 10 November 2020, 16 June 2021, 22 March and 18 July 2023 and to their respective annexes. However, it does not identify, in the application, the specific paragraphs of those pleadings on which it intends to base the present action. Accordingly, it is not for the Court to seek in those pleadings the arguments to which the applicant might refer. The application is therefore inadmissible in so far as it refers to those pleadings.

16 Second, the intervener confined itself, in paragraphs 2, 9 and 11 of the response, to making general references to the observations which it lodged before EUIPO on 20 January 2021, 18 May 2022, 23 May and 17 September 2023 and to their respective annexes, without providing further details. The intervener’s response is therefore inadmissible in so far as it concerns those general references.

Substance

17 In support of its action, the applicant relies on two pleas in law, alleging, first, infringement of Article 59(1)(a) of Regulation 2017/1001, read in conjunction with Article 7(1)(c) of that regulation, and second, infringement of Article 59(1)(a) of Regulation 2017/1001, read in conjunction with Article 7(1)(b) of that regulation.

18 In support of the first plea, the applicant submits that the word element ‘washtower’ of the contested mark is descriptive of the goods in respect of which that mark was registered and also that the figurative elements of that mark are devoid of distinctive character, with the result that that mark, taken as a whole, is descriptive of those goods.

19 Under Article 59(1)(a) of Regulation 2017/1001, an EU trade mark is to be declared invalid on application to EUIPO, where it has been registered contrary to the provisions of Article 7 of that regulation.

20 Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001 provides that trade marks which consist exclusively of signs or indications which may serve, in trade, to designate the kind, quality, quantity, intended purpose, value, geographical origin or the time of production of the goods or of rendering of the service, or other characteristics of the goods or service must not be registered. Article 7(2) of that regulation provides that Article 7(1) is to apply notwithstanding that the grounds of non-registrability obtain in only part of the European Union.

21 Those signs or indications are regarded as incapable of performing the essential function of a trade mark, namely that of identifying the commercial origin of the goods or services (judgments of 23 October 2003, OHIM v Wrigley , C‑191/01 P, EU:C:2003:579, paragraph 30, and of 27 February 2002, Eurocool Logistik v OHIM (EUROCOOL) , T‑34/00, EU:T:2002:41, paragraph 37).

22 For a sign to be caught by the prohibition set out in Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001, there must be a relationship between the sign and the goods or services in question that is sufficiently direct and specific to enable the relevant public immediately to perceive, without further thought, a description of the goods and services in question or of one of their characteristics (see judgments of 12 January 2005, Deutsche Post EURO EXPRESS v OHIM (EUROPREMIUM) , T‑334/03, EU:T:2005:4, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited, and of 22 June 2005, Metso Paper Automation v OHIM (PAPERLAB) , T‑19/04, EU:T:2005:247, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).

23 Whether a sign is descriptive can be assessed only, first, by reference to the goods concerned and, second, by reference to the understanding which the relevant public has of the sign (see judgment of 25 October 2005, Peek & Cloppenburg v OHIM (Cloppenburg) , T‑379/03, EU:T:2005:373, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).

24 In the first place, as regards the relevant public, the Board of Appeal found, in paragraph 41 of the contested decision, that the goods at issue, that is to say, ‘furniture, namely cabinets for washing machines or tumble dryers’ in Class 20, were aimed at the general public. According to the Board of Appeal, that public was likely to display a higher than average level of attention, given that those were goods which were not purchased on a regular basis and that aesthetic or compatibility considerations could play a role in their choice.

25 It also recalled, in paragraph 42 of the contested decision, that Article 7(2) of Regulation 2017/1001 provided that the absolute grounds for refusal set out in Article 7(1) of that regulation were to apply even if those grounds for refusal obtain in only part of the European Union. In that regard, in so far as the word element of the contested mark had, at the very least, a meaning in English, it found that it was appropriate to assess the contested mark from the point of view of the English-speaking part of the relevant public, namely that located in Ireland and Malta.

26 Those findings are not disputed by the parties.

27 In the second place, as regards the word element ‘washtower’, the Board of Appeal found that it was descriptive for the English-speaking part of the relevant public and constituted a direct reference to the purpose, shape and kind of goods at issue. According to the Bord of Appeal, the term ‘washtower’ is composed of two characteristics of the goods at issue, namely the shape of the cabinet, evoked by the element ‘tower’, and the purpose of the appliances stored in those goods, to which the element ‘wash’ refers. In paragraphs 44 and 45 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal noted, in essence, that that element was stylised, but that whether or not the font had been specially designed for the intervener was irrelevant, given that the relevant public was normally not aware of such circumstances. According to the Board of Appeal, the degree of distinctiveness of the font used stemmed from the impression it produced on that public, when it was perceived by that public in relation to the goods at issue.

28 As regards the figurative element, the Board of Appeal noted, in essence, in paragraphs 46 and 47 of the contested decision, that a shield (or coat of arms), consisting of various details, in particular vines, tendrils, plumage and two bulls, in light grey, appeared behind the central letters ‘hto’ of the word element, which occupied a significant part of the sign at issue and gave it a certain height and volume. First, in paragraphs 53 and 54 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found that the figurative element of the contested mark (i) was not a simple geometric construct, because it consisted of various elements, such as the coat of arms, the plumage resembling the ‘bird of paradise’ plant and the lateral vines and tendrils; (ii) was not purely decorative or ornamental, since shields or coats of arms were used as a means of identification; and (iii) was not descriptive of the goods covered by the contested mark. Second, in paragraph 55 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal referred to the common communication adopted by the European Trade Mark and Design Network on 2 October 2015, entitled ‘Distinctiveness – figurative marks containing descriptive/non-distinctive words’, according to which, in principle, a figurative element of a composite mark the word element of which is descriptive or non-distinctive is not capable of rendering that sign registrable if that figurative element is not clearly recognisable in the sign at issue, due to its size or position, or if it represents the goods or services in question, or if there is a direct link between the figurative element and the goods or services at issue, or if that figurative element is commonly used in trade in relation to the goods and services at issue. However, according to the Board of Appeal, none of those circumstances apply in the present case.

29 Taking those considerations into account, the Board of Appeal, in paragraphs 57 and 58 of the contested decision, concluded that, although the word element of the contested mark was descriptive of the goods at issue, the contested mark also contained a fully distinctive figurative element, which was visible and would be immediately perceived by the relevant public, which made that mark, as a whole, distinctive and not exclusively descriptive, for the purposes of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001.

30 The applicant submits, in essence, that the word element ‘washtower’ of the contested mark is descriptive as regards the goods at issue. It claims that the figurative elements of the contested mark are devoid of distinctive character, with the result that that mark, taken as a whole, is descriptive of the goods at issue. It submits that, despite the presence of the coat of arms, that figurative element of the contested mark will be perceived as a simple label shape and, consequently, not as an indication of the commercial origin of the goods at issue. There is a large number of very similar coats of arms or crests and the relevant public will not be able to distinguish between those coats of arms or crests. The applicant also submits that the figurative element is not clearly visible, with the result that the relevant public will perceive it as a non-specific background.

31 EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.

32 EUIPO contends that the applicant agrees with the Board of Appeal’s reasoning that the word element of the contested mark is descriptive. By contrast, unlike the applicant, it argues that the figurative element of the contested mark is clearly visible and is not a simple geometric construct. On account of the composition of the various details making up the figurative element, it claims that that element cannot be regarded as decorative or ornamental. It also states that none of the details making up the figurative element is descriptive of the goods for which the contested mark was registered. Furthermore, according to EUIPO, coats of arms can function as a business identifier. Consequently, in its view, the figurative element distracts the relevant public from the message conveyed by the word element.

33 The intervener submits, in essence, that, having regard to the distinctive character of the figurative element of the contested mark, that mark is distinctive as a whole and that ‘excludes it from being exclusively descriptive’. It submits, first, that the applicant’s line of argument in relation to the descriptive character of the word element of the contested mark is contradictory, since the applicant had applied for registration of similar marks for the same goods. Second, the intervener submits that the applicant merely repeated the arguments which it had submitted before EUIPO, whereas it is for the applicant, as applicant for a declaration of invalidity, to demonstrate the existence of absolute grounds for invalidity.

34 In the present case, it should be noted that the contested mark is a composite mark, composed of the word element ‘washtower’ and a figurative element.

35 First, as regards the word element ‘washtower’ of the contested mark, it must be held that the element ‘tower’ may be perceived by the relevant English-speaking public as describing a characteristic of the goods at issue, namely their shape. Second, as regards the element ‘wash’, having regard to the designation of the goods at issue, that is to say, ‘furniture, namely cabinets for washing machines or tumble dryers’, that element expressly states that those goods are intended to contain household washing appliances, with the result that the contested mark will be understood by the relevant public as a reference to the purpose of the appliances stored in those goods.

36 In those circumstances, the overall meaning produced by the word element of the contested mark does not go beyond that of the elements of which it consists and informs the English-speaking part of the relevant public about the characteristics of the goods at issue (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 November 2024, Washtower IP v EUIPO – LG Electronics (WASHTOWER) , T‑376/23, not published, EU:T:2024:849, paragraphs 60 to 79).

37 For those reasons, the Board of Appeal correctly found that the word element ‘washtower’ was descriptive of the goods at issue.

38 It is therefore necessary to ascertain whether the figurative element of the contested mark alters, from the point of view of the relevant public, the meaning of that mark as a whole in relation to the goods at issue.

39 In that regard, as the Board of Appeal correctly pointed out in paragraph 39 of the contested decision, for the purposes of assessing the descriptive character of a composite mark, if the word element is descriptive of the goods or services concerned, the decisive question is whether the figurative elements alter, from the point of view of the relevant public, the meaning of the sign at issue as a whole in relation to the goods or services concerned. Thus, if the word element of a mark is descriptive, the mark as a whole is descriptive if the graphic elements of that mark cannot distract the relevant public from the descriptive message conveyed by the word element (see judgment of 26 April 2018, Pfalzmarkt für Obst und Gemüse v EUIPO (100% Pfalz) , T‑220/17, not published, EU:T:2018:229, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).

40 As the Board of Appeal correctly pointed out in paragraphs 53 and 54 of the contested decision, on account of the numerous details of the figurative element of the contested mark, in particular the shield, plumage, vines, bulls and lateral tendrils, that element is not a simple geometric construct and is not descriptive of the goods at issue, namely cabinets for washing machines or tumble dryers.

41 However, first, despite some complexity, that figurative element, namely the shield and the elements which it includes, will rather be perceived as a decorative element, although it is easily perceptible on account of its size.

42 Second, and in any event, the figurative element of the contested mark, namely the shield, does not represent any clear concept and does not convey any particular semantic meaning that would be capable of altering, from the point of view of the relevant public, the meaning of the contested mark as a whole, as it results from the word element.

43 Consequently, the figurative element of the contested mark is not capable of distracting the relevant public from the descriptive message conveyed by the word element within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 39 above.

44 Furthermore, although the word element of the contested mark is represented in a dark blue font and in bold, that stylisation is also not such as to influence the relevant public’s understanding of the word element.

45 Therefore, on account of the descriptive character of the word element of the contested mark ‘washtower’ for ‘furniture, namely cabinets for washing machines or tumble dryers’ in Class 20 (see paragraphs 35 to 37 above) for the English-speaking part of the relevant public, and the fact that the figurative element and the stylisation of the word element are not such as to distract that public’s attention away from the descriptive meaning of that word element for those goods (see paragraphs 38 to 45 above), that mark, taken as a whole, has a sufficiently direct and specific relationship with the goods at issue to enable the relevant public immediately to perceive, without further thought, a description of those goods or one of their characteristics.

46 In those circumstances, it must be held that the Board of Appeal made an error of assessment in concluding that the figurative element prevented the contested mark as a whole from being descriptive of the goods at issue, for the purposes of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001, with the result that the first plea in law must be upheld.

47 It is apparent from Article 7(1) of Regulation 2017/1001 that it is sufficient that one of the absolute grounds for refusal listed therein applies for the sign not to be registrable as an EU trade mark or, if it has been registered, for the EU trade mark to be declared invalid pursuant to Article 51(1) of that regulation (order of 21 April 2016, ultra air v EUIPO , C‑232/15 P, not published, EU:C:2016:299, paragraph 57).

48 Accordingly, it is not necessary to examine the merits of the applicant’s second plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of that regulation.

49 In the light of all of the foregoing, the contested decision must be annulled.

Costs

50 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

51 In the present case, since EUIPO has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to pay the costs incurred by the applicant, in accordance with the form of order sought by it.

52 Since the intervener has also been unsuccessful, but the applicant has not applied for costs, it must bear its own costs.

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (Sixth Chamber)

hereby:

1. Annuls the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 11 March 2024 (Case R 5/2023 ‑ 5);

2. Orders EUIPO to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by LG Electronics, Inc.;

3. Orders Washtower IP BV to bear its own costs.

Costeira | Zilgalvis | Tichy-Fisslberger

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 12 November 2025.

V. Di Bucci | M. van der Woude

Registrar | President

* Language of the case: English.