ext/celex/62024TJ0494

JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Second Chamber)

22 April 2026 ( * )

( EU trade mark – Invalidity proceedings – EU figurative mark CRETE HOMES REAL ESTATE CRETE PROPERTY and CONSTRUCTION CONSULTANTS SINCE 1990 – Relative ground for refusal – Consent of the proprietor of the trade mark – Article 52(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 40/94 – Article 8(3) of Regulation No 40/94 – Obligation to state reasons – Article 94(1) and Article 95(1) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 )

In Case T‑494/24,

Emmanouil Peponis, residing in Agios Nikolaos (Greece), represented by F. Chrysomallidi and A. Koutoulaki, lawyers,

applicant,

v

European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), represented by E. Markakis and V. Ruzek, acting as Agents,

defendant,

the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court, being

Fanourios Palamianakis, residing in Agios Nikolaos (Greece), represented by M. Kosmopoulos, lawyer,

THE GENERAL COURT (Second Chamber),

composed, at the time of the deliberations, of A. Marcoulli, President, J. Schwarcz (Rapporteur) and W. Valasidis, Judges,

Registrar: G. Mitrev, Administrator,

having regard to the written part of the procedure,

further to the hearing on 22 October 2025,

gives the following

Judgment

1 By his action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, Mr Emmanouil Peponis, seeks the annulment and alteration of the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 22 July 2024 (Case R 2221/2023-2) (‘the contested decision’).

Background to the dispute

2 On 19 October 2021, the applicant, Mr Emmanouil Peponis, submitted an application to EUIPO for a declaration of invalidity of the EU trade mark registered on 2 July 2008, in his name and in the name of the intervener, Mr Fanourios Palamianakis, under No 6 335 772, following an application filed on 6 October 2007, and duly renewed, for the figurative sign set out below. The applicant stated that he was seeking to have that mark assigned to himself pursuant to Article 21(2)(a) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2017 L 154, p. 1).

3 The services covered by the mark at issue in respect of which a declaration of invalidity was sought were in Classes 36 and 37 of the Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended, and corresponded, for each of those classes, to the following description:

– Class 36: ‘Real estate affairs’;

– Class 37: ‘Building construction; repair; installation services’.

4 The application for a declaration of invalidity was based on the following marks:

– the previous Greek figurative mark filed on 11 May 2007 registered under number D 191 560, duly renewed, covering, inter alia, services in Class 35: ‘advertisement; business administration; business management; office work’, in Class 36: ‘insurance; real estate affairs’, in Class 37: ‘construction works; repairs; installation services’, and in Class 38: ‘telecommunications’, is represented as follows:

– the mark at issue, as described in paragraphs 2 and 3 above.

5 The ground relied on in support of the application for a declaration of invalidity was that referred to in Article 60(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, read in conjunction with Article 8(3) of that regulation.

6 By decision of 14 September 2023, the Cancellation Division rejected the application for a declaration of invalidity on the ground that it had not been demonstrated that the application to register the mark at issue had been filed ‘without the proprietor’s consent’.

7 On 6 November 2023, the applicant filed a notice of appeal with EUIPO against the Cancellation Division’s decision.

8 By the contested decision, the Board of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the ground that, in essence, it had been demonstrated that the mark at issue had been filed with the consent of the applicant for a declaration of invalidity.

Forms of order sought

9 The applicant claims that the Court should:

– annul and alter the contested decision;

– order EUIPO and the intervener to pay the costs, including those incurred before the Board of Appeal.

10 EUIPO contends that the Court should:

– dismiss the action;

– order the applicant to pay the costs in the event that a hearing is convened.

11 The intervener contends that the Court should:

– dismiss the action;

– order the applicant to pay the costs, including those incurred before the Board of Appeal.

Law

On the determination of the law applicable ratione temporis

12 Given the date on which the application for registration at issue was filed, namely 6 October 2007, which is decisive for the purpose of identifying the applicable substantive law, the facts of the case are governed by the substantive provisions of Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community trade mark (OJ 1994 L 11, p. 1) (see, to that effect, order of 5 October 2004, Alcon v OHIM , C‑192/03 P, EU:C:2004:587, paragraphs 39 and 40, and judgment of 23 April 2020, Gugler France v Gugler and EUIPO , C‑736/18 P, not published, EU:C:2020:308, paragraph 3 and the case-law cited).

13 Consequently, in the present case, so far as concerns the substantive rules, the references made by the Board of Appeal in the contested decision and by the applicant and the intervener in their written pleadings to Article 60(1)(b) and Article 8(3) of Regulation 2017/1001 must be understood as referring to Article 52(1)(b) and Article 8(3) of Regulation No 40/94, the wording of which is identical.

14 Furthermore, since, according to settled case-law, procedural rules are generally held to apply on the date on which they enter into force (see judgment of 11 December 2012, Commission v Spain , C‑610/10, EU:C:2012:781, paragraph 45 and the case-law cited), the case is governed by the procedural provisions of Regulation 2017/1001.

Substance

15 The applicant relies on four pleas in law. The first plea alleges, in essence, that the statement of reasons for the contested decision is inadequate. The second plea alleges infringement of Article 52(1)(b) and Article 8(3) of Regulation No 40/94, and of Article 21(2)(a) of Regulation 2017/1001. The third plea alleges infringement of Article 94(1) and Article 95(1) of Regulation 2017/1001, read in conjunction with Article 89(1) of Regulation No 40/94 and Rule 76(1), (2) and (4) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 2868/95 of 13 December 1995 implementing Regulation No 40/94 (OJ 1995 L 303, p. 1). The fourth plea alleges breach of the general principles of legal certainty and good administration.

The first plea in law, alleging, in essence, that the statement of reasons for the contested decision is inadequate

16 The applicant submits, in essence, that the contested decision is vitiated by a failure to state reasons.

17 EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.

18 The first sentence of Article 94(1) of Regulation 2017/1001 provides that decisions of EUIPO are to state the reasons on which they are based. That obligation has the same scope as that which derives from the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU, which requires that the statement of reasons must disclose in a clear and unequivocal manner the reasoning followed by the institution which adopted the measure in question, without it being necessary for that reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons meets those requirements must, nonetheless, be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (see judgment of 28 June 2018, EUIPO v Puma , C‑564/16 P, EU:C:2018:509, paragraph 65 and the case-law cited).

19 The duty to state reasons in decisions is an essential procedural requirement which must be distinguished from the question whether the reasoning is well founded, which is concerned with the substantive legality of the measure at issue. The reasoning of a decision consists in a formal statement of the grounds on which that decision is based. If those grounds are vitiated by errors, those errors will vitiate the substantive legality of the decision, but not the statement of reasons in it, which may be adequate even though it sets out reasons which are incorrect (see judgment of 20 February 2013, Langguth Erben v OHIM (MEDINET) , T‑378/11, EU:T:2013:83, paragraph 15 and the case-law cited).

20 Nevertheless, the duty to state reasons does not require the adjudicating bodies of EUIPO to take a view on every argument which the parties have submitted to them. It is sufficient for them to set out the facts and legal considerations having decisive importance in the context of the decision (see judgment of 12 November 2008, Shaker v OHIM – Limiñana y Botella (Limoncello della Costiera Amalfitana shaker) , T‑7/04, EU:T:2008:481, paragraph 81 and the case-law cited).

21 In the present case, according to the applicant, the Board of Appeal failed to fulfil its duty to state reasons since the contested decision does not explain why it was found that clear, specific and unconditional consent could be inferred from the general power of attorney granted by both parties to a joint representative for the purpose of filing the application for registration (‘the general power of attorney’). The applicant claims that, as a result, the reasoning of the contested decision is neither clear nor specific, with the result that he was unable to challenge the reasons establishing that the legal conditions required for consent were satisfied.

22 In the present case, it is apparent from the contested decision that the Board of Appeal examined whether the mark at issue had been filed without the applicant’s consent. In that regard, it took the view, first of all, in paragraph 48 of the contested decision, that the applicant’s consent could be inferred, in particular, from the general power of attorney signed by both the applicant and the intervener with a view to enabling their joint representative to proceed with the application for registration, in both parties’ names, of the mark at issue that had been filed by that joint representative with EUIPO on 2 November 2007. Next, the Board of Appeal added, in paragraphs 51 and 52 of the contested decision, that the business relationship between the parties and, in particular, their forming a general partnership in 2010, supported the argument that there was consent on the part of the applicant. Moreover, it took the view, in paragraphs 55 to 57 of the contested decision, that the intervener’s not taking part in legal actions against parties allegedly infringing the mark at issue was not capable of demonstrating his concealment from the applicant of the fact that the mark at issue had been registered also in his name. Furthermore, the Board of Appeal took the view, in paragraph 59 of the contested decision, that the existence of other marks and domain names which had been registered in the applicant’s name only did not call into question his consent to the registration of an EU trade mark in his name and in that of a co-proprietor. Lastly, the Board of Appeal found, in paragraph 62 of the contested decision, that it could not be inferred from Article 1 of the articles of incorporation of the general partnership formed by the parties in 2010 that the mark at issue was included in the scope of that article, since it was not expressly mentioned therein.

23 Therefore, it must be held that the Board of Appeal has set out to the requisite legal standard, in a clear and detailed manner, the reasoning leading to its finding that there was clear, specific and unconditional consent on the part of the applicant to the filing of the mark at issue in his name and in that of the intervener. Consequently, the applicant’s claims that the contested decision provides no grounds to demonstrate the existence of his consent and that the reasoning of that decision is not clear or specific must also be rejected.

24 Moreover, it is apparent from the examination of the second plea below that the reasoning set out in the contested decision enabled the applicant to understand that decision and to challenge it as regards its substance.

25 Therefore, the first plea must be rejected as unfounded.

The second plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 52(1)(b) and Article 8(3) of Regulation No 40/94, and of Article 21(2)(a) of Regulation 2017/1001

26 The applicant complains that the Board of Appeal performed an incomplete and incorrect assessment of the facts of the present case. The plea is divided into six parts.

27 According to Article 52(1)(b) of Regulation No 40/94, an EU trade mark is to be declared invalid on application to EUIPO or on the basis of a counterclaim in infringement proceedings, where there is a trade mark as referred to in Article 8(3) of that regulation and the conditions set out in that paragraph are fulfilled.

28 Under Article 8(3) of Regulation No 40/94, upon opposition by the proprietor of the trade mark, a trade mark is not to be registered where an agent or representative of the proprietor of the trade mark applies for registration thereof in his or her own name without the proprietor’s consent, unless the agent or representative justifies his or her action. The objective pursued by Article 8(3) of Regulation No 40/94 is to prevent the misuse of the earlier mark by the agent or representative of the proprietor of that mark, as those persons may exploit the knowledge and experience acquired during their business relationship with that proprietor and may therefore improperly benefit from the effort and investment which the proprietor himself or herself has made. The purpose of that provision is therefore to protect the legitimate interests of trade mark proprietors and to preserve them from arbitrary misuse of their trade marks by granting them the right to prohibit registrations applied for by their agents or representatives without their consent (see judgment of 28 June 2023, CEDC International v EUIPO – Underberg (Shape of a blade of grass in a bottle) , T‑145/22, EU:T:2023:365, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited).

29 It is apparent from the wording of that article that four cumulative conditions must be satisfied, therefore it is necessary, first, for the opponent to be the proprietor of the earlier mark; secondly, for the applicant for the mark to be or to have been the agent or representative of the proprietor of the mark; thirdly, for the application to have been filed in the name of the agent or representative without the proprietor’s consent and without there being legitimate reasons to justify the agent’s or representative’s action; and, fourthly, for the application to relate in essence to identical or similar signs and goods (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 June 2023, Shape of a blade of grass in a bottle , T‑145/22, EU:T:2023:365, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited).

30 Pursuant to Article 21(2)(a) of Regulation 2017/1001, the proprietor of a mark may submit a request for assignment in his or her favour to EUIPO, instead of an application for a declaration of invalidity.

31 It is in the light of those various principles that it should be assessed whether the Board of Appeal made an error of assessment by taking the view that the condition related to the absence of the proprietor’s consent at the stage of filing the application for registration was not satisfied in the present case and, therefore, since the conditions set out in Article 8(3) of Regulation No 40/94 are cumulative, that there was no need to assess whether the other conditions were satisfied.

32 As a preliminary point, it should be noted that the Board of Appeal took the view, as did the Cancellation Division, that the present case, inasmuch as it concerns an application for a declaration of invalidity of a trade mark filed by one of its proprietors, in so far as that mark was also registered in favour of the other co-proprietor, does not, a priori, fall outside the scope of Article 8(3) of Regulation No 40/94. As EUIPO observes, that interpretation, which the parties, moreover, do not dispute, accords with the purpose of that provision recalled in paragraph 28 above.

33 In the present case, it is common ground between the parties that the applicant has been using the trade name ‘CRETE HOMES’ since 1992. The intervener began working for the applicant as an employee on 10 August 2000. On 11 July 2006, the applicant filed an application for registration of the EU word mark ‘CRETE HOMES’, under No 5 191 135, in his name only, in respect of services in Classes 35 and 37, which was rejected. As of 6 March 2007, by a special proxy formalised by notarial deed, the applicant designated the intervener as representative and proxy and conferred on him the right and power to use the trade name ‘CRETE HOMES’. That special proxy was revoked by the applicant on 8 October 2019. On 11 May 2007, the applicant registered, in his name only, the Greek mark indicated in paragraph 4 above. On 6 October 2007, the application for registration of the EU mark at issue was filed in the names of both parties by a joint representative. That joint representative filed with EUIPO, on 2 November 2007, a general power of attorney signed by both parties. The mark at issue was registered on 2 July 2008. In April 2010, the parties formed a general partnership and continued working together until the intervener’s resignation in 2017.

34 First, the applicant claims, in essence, that the Board of Appeal wrongly concluded that the general power of attorney granted by both parties to the same lawyer demonstrated his consent to the registration of the mark at issue in the intervener’s name.

35 EUIPO and the intervener dispute that line of argument.

36 It is apparent from the case-law that consent for the purposes of the registration of the mark in the name of the representative or agent must be clear, specific and unconditional (judgment of 29 November 2012, Adamowski v OHIM – Fagumit (FAGUMIT) , T‑537/10 and T‑538/10, EU:T:2012:634, paragraph 23).

37 It is apparent from paragraph 45 of the contested decision that the Board of Appeal found that the general power of attorney issued by both parties was intended to enable the joint representative to represent both parties before EUIPO in all procedures as an applicant or beneficiary, in relation to any application, present or future, or any EU trade mark registration, and also in any other procedure before EUIPO.

38 In the first place, in respect of the applicant’s argument that the Board of Appeal inferred consent on his part on the sole basis of the general power of attorney, it should be noted that that argument is founded on a misreading of the contested decision. In fact, the contested decision also took into consideration facts and acts prior and subsequent to the filing of the application for registration of the mark at issue, as is apparent from paragraph 22 above. In that regard, it should be noted that, in addition to prior facts and acts, it has been held that EUIPO can take into consideration evidence which, although subsequent to the date of filing of the application for registration, enables the drawing of conclusions regarding the situation as it was on that date (see, to that effect, judgment of 17 July 2008, L & D v OHIM , C‑488/06 P, EU:C:2008:420, paragraph 71 and the case-law cited).

39 In the second place, in respect of the argument that the general power of attorney does not constitute clear, specific and unconditional consent to the registration of the mark at issue in the intervener’s name, the applicant submits that the general power of attorney gives rise to doubts as to how and when it was signed. Moreover, that general power of attorney does not reflect a clear intention on the part of the applicant, in particular because of the vague reference made therein to ‘all’ procedures.

40 In that regard, it should be noted that the general power of attorney in question was signed by both parties, which has not been disputed.

41 Moreover, it should be emphasised that the general power of attorney was granted by both parties in favour of a joint representative specifically to file the application for registration of the mark at issue. That general power of attorney was filed with EUIPO by the joint representative on 2 November 2007, less than one month after the application for registration of the mark at issue was filed. That document clearly names both signatories as applicants for registration of the mark at issue, which implies that they will subsequently become co-proprietors of that mark. Furthermore, the fact that the applicant is the sole proprietor of the Greek mark referred to in paragraph 4 above cannot, in itself, call into question his consent to the registration of the mark at issue in the intervener’s name, as co-proprietor.

42 In the third place, the applicant’s argument that the general power of attorney is vague, in referring to ‘all’ procedures without distinction, should be rejected on the ground that that power of attorney specifies, as indicated in paragraph 37 above, that it is intended to apply, in essence, to any procedure, present or future. Moreover, that document was filed in the context of the registration procedure specific to the mark at issue, and no other procedure was ongoing. In that regard, the applicant was not able to provide any evidence allowing the conclusion that the mention of a ‘present’ application referred to anything other than the registration procedure concerning the mark at issue. Those factors enabled the Board of Appeal to hold, rightly, that the general power of attorney did indeed relate to the application for registration of the mark at issue.

43 In the fourth place, although the applicant relies on the judgment of 28 June 2023, Shape of a blade of grass in a bottle (T‑145/22, EU:T:2023:365), it should be noted, as he himself acknowledges, that that case concerned the condition in Article 8(3) of Regulation No 40/94 linked to the existence of a relationship of agency or representation between the parties and not the condition linked to the absence of the trade mark proprietor’s consent. Therefore, that argument is irrelevant and must, for that reason, be rejected.

44 In the light of the foregoing, the Board of Appeal did not err in finding that the general power of attorney, in particular, showed clear, specific and unconditional consent on the part of the applicant.

45 Therefore, the first part of the second plea must be rejected.

46 Secondly, the applicant claims that the Board of Appeal performed an incomplete and incorrect assessment of the acts prior and subsequent to the application for registration of the mark at issue.

47 EUIPO and the intervener dispute that line of argument.

48 It is clear from the contested decision that, in order to support its conclusion in relation to the applicant’s consent, the Board of Appeal analysed other evidence in the file which it considered to be of relevance and which concerned acts prior and subsequent to the application for registration of the mark at issue, as is apparent, in essence, from paragraph 22 above.

49 The applicant submits, first, that the Board of Appeal has not taken sufficient account of the acts prior to the application for registration of the mark at issue, namely, in particular, (i) the special proxy authenticated by notarial deed of 6 March 2007, by which the applicant designated the intervener as representative and proxy, and conferred upon him the right and the power to use the trade name ‘CRETE HOMES’, and (ii) the application for registration of the Greek mark referred to in paragraph 4 above, in the sole name of the applicant, on 11 May 2007. In the applicant’s view, those acts and the registration in his sole name of domain names demonstrate that he had no intention of consenting to the registration of the mark at issue also in the intervener’s name. Had there been consent on his part, the name of the intervener would have appeared in those various documents, due to their closeness in time to the filing of the application for registration of the mark at issue. Secondly, the applicant submits that the Board of Appeal attributed too great an importance to the parties’ setting up of a general partnership, three years after the application for registration, in order to show that the applicant had consented to the registration of the mark at issue also in the intervener’s name.

50 In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, according to the case-law cited in paragraph 38 above, EUIPO can take into consideration evidence which, although subsequent to the date of filing of the application for registration, enables the drawing of conclusions regarding the situation as it was before that date.

51 For that purpose, it is apparent from the contested decision that the Board of Appeal rightly took account, in particular in paragraphs 50 to 52 thereof, of the chronological sequence of events in order to assess whether the applicant consented to the registration of the mark at issue in the names of both parties.

52 That chronological sequence of events, as detailed in paragraph 33 above, tends to show that the business relationship between the parties, which started in 2000, became closer with the passing of time. Thus, the intervener, who initially was the applicant’s employee, subsequently became his representative and proxy and then his business partner.

53 Moreover, the abovementioned chronological sequence shows that the applicant had been able to carry out, in his sole name, various registration procedures. It is only after co-signing a general power of attorney with the intervener that the application for registration of the mark at issue was filed in both names.

54 Thus, the abovementioned factors do not allow the conclusion that the applicant had not consented to the registration of the mark at issue in his name and that of the intervener. Moreover, that chronological sequence highlights the growing development of the business relationship between the parties. Therefore, the fact that from 2 July 2008 the parties officially became co-proprietors of the mark at issue is consistent with the development of their business relationship. All those factors, taken as a whole, constitute a body of evidence which makes it possible to conclude that there was clear, specific and unconditional consent on the part of the applicant.

55 Consequently, the Board of Appeal did not err in concluding that the business relationship between the parties and, in particular, the setting up of a partnership in 2010 support the conclusion that the applicant for a declaration of invalidity had given his consent to the filing of the application for the registration of the mark at issue in the names of both parties.

56 Therefore, the second part of the second plea must be rejected.

57 Thirdly, the applicant submits that the Board of Appeal erred by not taking account of the decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 16 February 2023 (M MYTEK (fig.)/MYTEK, Case R 0887/2022-1) on which he had relied and in accordance with which, in essence, the existence of implicit consent to the registration of the mark at issue cannot be inferred from the lack of opposition by the party concerned during a certain period of time.

58 EUIPO and the intervener dispute that line of argument.

59 In the present case, that argument is founded on a misreading of the contested decision, which is not based on the applicant’s implicit consent on account of his lack of opposition until recently.

60 Therefore, the third part of the second plea must be rejected.

61 Fourthly, the applicant submits that the Board of Appeal wrongly assessed the intervener’s potential concealment of the registration in both names of the mark at issue.

62 EUIPO and the intervener dispute that line of argument.

63 It should be noted that there is no item of evidence in the case file that demonstrates that the intervener enacted a concealment strategy or that he indeed was in a position to do so during the time period concerned, from 6 October 2007, the date the application for registration of the mark at issue was filed, to 19 October 2021, the date the application for a declaration of invalidity of the mark at issue was filed. The applicant, who was questioned on that point at the hearing, did not submit any evidence in support of that claim. Therefore, no item of evidence was adduced to demonstrate how the applicant could have been unaware that the intervener’s name appeared on the registration certificate of the mark at issue, on 2 July 2008, or, furthermore, on the documents submitted by EUIPO in 2017 which concerned the renewal of the registration of the mark at issue.

64 Consequently, the fourth part of the second plea must be rejected.

65 Fifthly, the applicant alleges that the Board of Appeal incorrectly interpreted and assessed Article 1 of the general partnership’s articles of incorporation. The contested decision is therefore vitiated by a contradiction in that respect.

66 EUIPO and the intervener dispute that line of argument.

67 In the first place, in respect of the applicant’s claim that the Board of Appeal has not indicated which industrial and intellectual property rights were covered by Article 1 of the articles of incorporation of the general partnership formed by the parties in 2010, it should be noted that that article makes reference to rights belonging exclusively to the applicant, with the result that the mark at issue, held by both parties, cannot be deemed to be covered by it.

68 In the second place, the applicant states that the contested decision is vitiated by a contradiction. The Board of Appeal refused to regard the mark at issue as being covered by the industrial and intellectual property rights referred to in Article 1 of the articles of incorporation of the general partnership on the ground that the mark was not explicitly mentioned therein. Conversely, it inferred the applicant’s consent to the registration of the mark at issue in the names of both parties from the general power of attorney, even though that mark was equally not expressly mentioned therein.

69 In that regard, it should be noted that it is accepted that the general power of attorney was filed precisely in the context of the application for registration of the mark at issue. For that reason, it referred to the ‘present’ procedure and there was nothing to permit the inference that that reference did not specifically concern the procedure relating to the mark at issue, which is the only application filed by both parties with EUIPO. Conversely, the articles of incorporation of the general partnership between the parties did not have a link with that registration procedure and, therefore, cannot be related to it, in the absence of evidence to justify such a finding. It follows that no contradiction in the Board of Appeal’s assessment can be inferred therefrom.

70 Consequently, the fifth part of the second plea must be rejected.

71 Sixthly, the applicant states that the contested decision is in breach of the trade mark law principle of commercial origin.

72 EUIPO and the intervener dispute that line of argument.

73 It must be borne in mind that the essential function of a trade mark is to guarantee the identity of the origin of the marked product or service to the consumer or end user by enabling him or her, without any possibility of confusion, to distinguish the product or service from others which have another origin (see judgment of 8 May 2008, Eurohypo v OHIM , C‑304/06 P, EU:C:2008:261, paragraph 56 and the case-law cited).

74 That function does not preclude the creator and the exclusive user of a trade mark from consenting to the subsequent registration of a similar mark both in his or her name and in the name of a third party. Furthermore, in the present case, the applicant has not adduced any evidence in support of the allegation that the contested decision disregards the trade mark law principle of commercial origin.

75 Therefore, the sixth part of the second plea has no factual basis and must, on that ground, be rejected.

76 In the light of the foregoing, the Board of Appeal did not err in finding that in the present case the applicant’s consent could be established in a clear, specific and unconditional manner.

77 Consequently, the second ground of appeal must be rejected as unfounded.

The third plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 95(1) and Article 94(1) of Regulation 2017/1001, read in conjunction with Article 89(1) of Regulation No 40/94 and Rule 76(1), (2) and (4), third sentence, of Regulation No 2868/95

78 The applicant submits, in essence, that the Board of Appeal carried out a superficial examination of the general power of attorney, failing to analyse it in the light of the provisions of Article 89(1) of Regulation No 40/94 and of Rule 76(1), (2) and (4), third sentence, of Regulation No 2868/95. Although, admittedly, that general power of attorney could, under those provisions, relate to ‘all trade mark transactions’, the applicant takes the view that some of the transactions carried out in that connection by the representative required, for them to have legal effect, the principal’s express agreement or confirmation, which was not given in the present case.

79 EUIPO and the intervener dispute that line of argument.

80 In accordance with Article 95(1) of Regulation 2017/1001, in proceedings before it, EUIPO is to examine the facts of its own motion; however, in proceedings relating to relative grounds for refusal of registration, EUIPO is to be restricted in this examination to the facts, evidence and arguments provided by the parties and the relief sought.

81 Under the last subparagraph of Article 89(1) of Regulation No 40/94, representatives acting before EUIPO must file with it a signed authorisation for insertion on the files, the details of which are set out in the Implementing Regulation.

82 Under Rule 76(1) of Regulation No 2868/95, legal practitioners and professional representatives entered on the list maintained by EUIPO pursuant to Article 89(2) of Regulation No 40/94 are to file with EUIPO a signed authorisation for insertion in the files only if EUIPO expressly requires it, or where there are several parties to the proceedings in which the representative acts before EUIPO, if the other party expressly asks for it. Under Rule 76(2), employees acting on behalf of natural or legal persons pursuant to Article 88(3) of Regulation No 40/94 are to file with EUIPO a signed authorisation for insertion in the files. Lastly, under Rule 76(4), where it is required, pursuant to paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, that a signed authorisation be filed, EUIPO is to specify a time limit within which such authorisation is to be filed. If the authorisation is not filed in due time, proceedings are to be continued with the represented person. Any procedural steps other than the filing of the application taken by the representative are to be deemed not to have been taken if the represented person does not approve them within a period specified by EUIPO. Rule 76(4) of Regulation No 2868/95 does not affect the application of Article 88(2) of Regulation No 40/94.

83 In the applicant’s view, the registration of an EU trade mark may be classified as a transaction for the purposes of Rule 76(2) of Regulation No 2868/95 and as such EUIPO may not require any other act of approval from the principals. However, that would not apply where a transfer of a licence to use is concerned. In that case, such an act would require explicit consent in order to be valid and have legal effects. It follows that, according to the applicant, by filing only the general power of attorney it was not possible to meet that specifically regulated requirement of consent on the part of the principal in respect of the representative. Accordingly, EUIPO gave the general power of attorney granted to the joint representative too broad an interpretation, since that power of attorney did not constitute an act of consent by the applicant to the registration of the mark at issue in the intervener’s name.

84 In that regard, it should be noted that, under the provisions referred to in paragraphs 81 and 82 above, the filing of an application for registration does not require confirmation on the part of the principals where a signed power of attorney has been filed with EUIPO and where that filing has taken place in due time.

85 In the present case, the registration of the mark at issue, in the names of both parties, was carried out by the joint representative designated by those parties, as is apparent, specifically, from the general power of attorney filed with EUIPO on 2 November 2007. It is also common ground that, first, both parties signed the general power of attorney and, secondly, at the time of the filing no deadline had been set by EUIPO so that it cannot be argued that the deadline for filing had passed. Consequently, EUIPO was not required to demand the applicant’s confirmation for the mark at issue to be registered.

86 Therefore, the third plea must be rejected as being unfounded.

Fourth plea in law, alleging breach of the general principles of legal certainty and good administration

87 The applicant complains that the Board of Appeal acted in breach of the general principles of legal certainty and good administration by not carrying out a stringent and full examination and by finding, as a result, that the general power of attorney amounted to clear and specific consent.

88 EUIPO and the intervener dispute that line of argument.

89 It is apparent from the case-law that the examination of trade mark applications must not be minimal, but must be stringent and full, so that trade marks are not improperly registered and in order to ensure, for reasons of legal certainty and good administration, that trade marks whose use could be successfully challenged before the courts are not registered (see judgment of 9 September 2010, OHIM v BORCO-Marken-Import Matthiesen , C‑265/09 P, EU:C:2010:508, paragraph 45 and the case-law cited).

90 In the present case, it is sufficient to state that the argument relied on in support of the fourth plea overlaps with the argument put forward in relation to the second plea, which was rejected for the reasons set out in paragraphs 38 to 77 above, to which reference should be made.

91 Accordingly, the fourth plea must be rejected.

92 In the light of all the foregoing considerations, since none of the pleas in law relied on by the applicant in support of the form of order sought can be upheld, the claim for annulment and, as a consequence, the claim for alteration of the contested decision must be rejected. The action must therefore be dismissed in its entirety.

Costs

93 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

94 Since a hearing has taken place and the applicant has been unsuccessful, he must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the forms of order sought by EUIPO and the intervener.

95 Furthermore, the intervener has claimed that the applicant should be ordered to pay the costs which the intervener incurred before the Board of Appeal. In that regard, it is sufficient to note that, since the present judgment dismisses the action brought against the contested decision, point 2 of the operative part of that decision continues to govern the costs incurred in the appeal proceedings before EUIPO (see judgment of 14 July 2021, Cole Haan v EUIPO – Samsøe & Samsøe Holding (Ø) , T‑399/20, EU:T:2021:442, paragraph 64 and the case-law cited).

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (Second Chamber)

hereby:

1. Dismisses the action;

2. Orders Mr Emmanouil Peponis to bear his own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) and by Mr Fanourios Palamianakis.

Marcoulli | Schwarcz | Valasidis

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 22 April 2026.

V. Di Bucci | L. Truchot

Registrar | President

* Language of the case: English.