ext/celex/62025TJ0283

THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber)

10 June 2026 ( * )

( EU trade mark – Invalidity proceedings – EU figurative mark representing the sun and Arabic characters – Earlier figurative sign representing the sun and Arabic characters – Relative ground for invalidity – Article 8(4) and Article 60(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 )

In Case T‑283/25,

Global Rice EOOD, established in Sofia (Bulgaria), represented by H. Raychev, lawyer,

applicant,

v

European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), represented by D. Stoyanova-Valchanova, acting as Agent,

defendant,

the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court, being

Ricegrowers Ltd, established in Leeton (Australia), represented by C. Menebröcker and C. Böhmer, lawyers,

THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber),

composed of E. Buttigieg (Rapporteur), President, M. Kancheva and F. Bestagno, Judges,

Registrar: V. Di Bucci,

having regard to the written part of the procedure,

having regard to the fact that no request for a hearing was submitted by the parties within three weeks after service of notification of the close of the written part of the procedure, and having decided to rule on the action without an oral part of the procedure, pursuant to Article 106(3) of the Rules of Procedure,

gives the following

Judgment

1 By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, Global Rice EOOD, seeks the annulment of the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 17 March 2025 (Case R 1476/2024-5) (‘the contested decision’).

Background to the dispute

2 On 8 November 2022, the applicant filed with EUIPO an application for a declaration of invalidity of the EU trade mark which had been registered following an application filed on 1 October 2019 for the following figurative sign:

3 The goods covered by the contested mark in respect of which a declaration of invalidity was sought were in Class 30 of the Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended, and corresponded to the following description: ‘Processed grains, starches, and goods made thereof, baking preparations and yeast, in particular rice; convenience food and savoury snacks, in particular rice chips, rice crackers, rice snacks, rice biscuits, rice cakes, rice products and rice-based snack foods; frozen meals consisting primarily of rice’.

4 The application for a declaration of invalidity was based on the earlier non-registered Bulgarian figurative mark reproduced below, which is purportedly used in the course of trade in Bulgaria, in relation to rice:

5 The grounds relied on in support of the application for a declaration of invalidity were those set out in Article 60(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2017 L 154, p. 1), read in conjunction with Article 8(4) thereof.

6 On 29 May 2024, the Cancellation Division rejected the application for a declaration of invalidity in its entirety.

7 On 22 July 2024, the applicant filed a notice of appeal with EUIPO against the decision of the Cancellation Division.

8 By the contested decision, the Board of Appeal dismissed the appeal. It found, in essence, that the applicant had failed to demonstrate that one of the four conditions for the application of Article 8(4) of Regulation 2017/1001 was satisfied, namely the condition which requires that the applicable national law confer on the proprietor of the non-registered mark, relied on in support of the application for a declaration of invalidity, the right to prohibit the use of the subsequent mark. It noted in that regard that Article 12(4) of the Zakon za markite i gueografskite oznachenija (Bulgarian Law on trade marks and geographical indications; ‘the Bulgarian Law on Trade Marks’), on which the applicant had based its opposition, required a non-registered Bulgarian mark to be used in Bulgarian territory in order to prohibit the use of a subsequent mark. It held that, in view of the evidence and arguments submitted by the intervener, the applicant had not established that the earlier non-registered Bulgarian mark, which had been used only for export purposes, satisfied that use requirement laid down in the applicable Bulgarian law and case-law. Since the conditions for the application of Article 8(4) of Regulation 2017/1001 are cumulative, the Board of Appeal took the view that there was no need to examine the three other conditions for the application thereof.

Forms of order sought

9 The applicant claims that the Court should:

– annul the contested decision;

– order EUIPO and the intervener to pay its costs incurred in the present proceedings and in the procedure before the Board of Appeal.

10 EUIPO contends that the Court should:

– dismiss the action;

– order the applicant to pay the costs in the event that an oral hearing is convened.

11 The intervener contends, in essence, that the Court should:

– dismiss the action in its entirety;

– order the applicant to pay its costs incurred in the present proceedings and in the procedure before the Board of Appeal.

Law

12 The applicant relies, in essence, on a single plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 60(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001, read in conjunction with Article 8(4) thereof, in that the Board of Appeal erred in finding that it had failed to demonstrate that the fourth condition for the application of the latter provision was satisfied.

13 EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.

14 It should be recalled that, pursuant to Article 8(4) of Regulation 2017/1001, read in conjunction with Article 60(1)(c) thereof, the proprietor of a sign other than a registered mark may apply for a declaration of invalidity of an EU trade mark if that sign satisfies four cumulative conditions: first, the sign must be used in the course of trade; secondly, it must be of more than mere local significance; thirdly, the right to that sign must have been acquired in accordance with EU law or the law of the Member State in which the sign was used prior to the date of application for registration of the EU trade mark; and, fourthly, the sign must confer on its proprietor the right to prohibit the use of a subsequent trade mark (see, to that effect, judgment of 1 March 2023, Romedor Pharma v EUIPO – Perfect Care Distribution (PERFECT FARMA CERVIRON) , T‑36/22, not published, EU:T:2023:94, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited).

15 The first two conditions, namely those concerning the use of the sign or mark relied on and its significance, which must be more than merely local, are apparent from the very wording of Article 8(4) of Regulation 2017/1001 and must therefore be interpreted in the light of EU law. That regulation thus sets out uniform standards, relating to the use of signs and their significance, which are consistent with the principles underlying the system established by that regulation (see judgment of 24 September 2025, Tamasu Butterfly Europa v EUIPO – Domu Brands (BTFY) , T‑326/24, not published, EU:T:2025:892, paragraph 90 and the case-law cited).

16 By contrast, it is apparent from the phrase ‘where and to the extent that, pursuant to the law of the Member State governing that sign’ that the two other conditions, set out subsequently in Article 8(4)(a) and (b) of Regulation 2017/1001, constitute conditions laid down by the regulation which, unlike the conditions above, must be assessed in the light of the criteria set by the law governing the sign relied on. That reference to the law governing the sign relied on is justified, given that Regulation 2017/1001 allows signs which fall outside of the EU trade mark system to be relied on against an EU trade mark. Therefore, only the law which governs the sign relied on can determine whether that sign predates the EU trade mark and whether it can justify a prohibition of the use of a subsequent trade mark (see judgment of 24 September 2025, BTFY , T‑326/24, not published, EU:T:2025:892, paragraph 91 and the case-law cited).

17 For the application of the fourth condition, referred to in Article 8(4)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, which requires that the applicable national law confer on the proprietor of the non-registered mark the right to prohibit the use of the subsequent mark, regard must be had, in particular, to the national rules relied on and to the judicial decisions delivered in the Member State concerned. On that basis, the proprietor of the earlier sign must establish that the sign concerned falls within the scope of the law of the Member State relied on and that it would allow the use of a subsequent mark to be prohibited. The proprietor of the earlier sign is required, in order to be able to have the use of an EU trade mark prohibited by virtue of an earlier right, to provide EUIPO with not only particulars showing that he or she satisfies the necessary conditions under the national law which he or she seeks to have applied, but also particulars establishing the content of that law (see judgment of 12 July 2023, aTmos Industrielle Lüftungstechnik v EUIPO – aTmos Industrielle Lüftungstechnik (aTmos) , T‑694/21, not published, EU:T:2023:395, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited).

18 It should also be borne in mind that, where an application for a declaration that an EU trade mark is invalid is based on an earlier right protected by a rule of national law, the competent EUIPO bodies must assess the weight and scope to be attributed to the particulars submitted by the applicant in order to establish the content of that rule. The General Court is to undertake a full review of that assessment (see judgment of 20 January 2021, Jareš Procházková and Jareš v EUIPO – Elton Hodinářská (MANUFACTURE PRIM 1949) , T‑656/18, not published, EU:T:2021:17, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited; see also, to that effect, judgment of 5 July 2011, Edwin v OHIM , C‑263/09 P, EU:C:2011:452, paragraphs 51 and 52).

19 It is in the light of the principles laid down in the case-law referred to above that it must be examined whether the Board of Appeal was correct in finding that the applicant had not established that the fourth condition for the application of Article 8(4) of Regulation 2017/1001, referred to in paragraph 17 above, was satisfied in the present case.

20 In the contested decision, the Board of Appeal stated, in the first place, that the applicant had relied, during the administrative procedure, on several provisions of Bulgarian law.

21 Thus, first of all, the applicant relied on Article 12(4) of the Bulgarian Law on Trade Marks, which provides as follows:

‘Upon opposition of the actual owner of a non-registered mark which is used in the course of trade on the territory of the Republic of Bulgaria, a trade mark application shall not be registered when it is identical or similar to the non-registered mark and when it covers goods and services which are identical or similar to the ones for which the non-registered mark is used and for which a trade mark application has been filed, provided that the non-registered mark has been genuinely used prior to the date of filing of the trade mark application or prior to the priority date of the later mark, and such use continues until the filing of the opposition.’

22 Next, the applicant relied on Article 36(3)(1) of that law, according to which ‘the registration of a mark shall be cancelled also when the mark has been registered in conflict with an earlier right under Article 12 [of that law]’.

23 Lastly, the applicant relied on Article 52(1)(2) of that law, which provides as follows:

‘Within three months as from the publication under Article 49, paragraph 1, which for international trade mark registrations begins two months after the publication under Article 49, paragraph 3, on the grounds for refusal under Article 12, an opposition may be submitted to the Patent Office against the registration of a trade mark applied for under this law, or against recognition of the validity of an international trade mark registration on the territory of the Republic of Bulgaria:

…

(2) Under Article 12(4) – by the actual owner of an unregistered trade mark, which is used in commercial activity on the territory of the Republic of Bulgaria, when a registration application has been submitted for it and the fees under Article 42, paragraph 6, have been paid’.

24 The Board of Appeal took the view that it was apparent from those provisions of the Bulgarian Law on Trade Marks, on which the applicant had relied, that the proprietor of an earlier non-registered Bulgarian mark must demonstrate its use in the course of trade in the territory of Bulgaria in order to oppose an application for a subsequent Bulgarian mark or to prohibit the use of a subsequent registered Bulgarian mark. It added that that requirement relating to the use of an earlier non-registered Bulgarian mark was a precondition which had to be fulfilled in order to oppose or prohibit the use of a subsequent Bulgarian mark.

25 In the second place, the Board of Appeal examined Bulgarian case-law which, in the view of the applicant, indicated that the exportation of goods from Bulgaria should be regarded as use of a non-registered mark under Bulgarian law. The Board of Appeal took the view that that case-law concerned registered marks and was not applicable to non-registered marks and the requirement relating to their use laid down in Article 12(4) of the Bulgarian Law on Trade Marks.

26 In the third place, the Board of Appeal observed that the applicant did not dispute that the proof of use of the earlier non-registered Bulgarian mark submitted by the applicant merely referred to the exportation of rice from Bulgaria to entities located in Germany, Kuwait, Romania and Sweden during the period between 2019 and 2022.

27 In the fourth place, the Board of Appeal held, in particular, that the provisions of EU law referred to by the applicant, namely Article 18(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, Article 16(5)(b) of Directive (EU) 2015/2436 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2015 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks (OJ 2015 L 336, p. 1) and Article 21(3)(2) of the Bulgarian Law on Trade Marks (which transposes into Bulgarian law Article 16(5)(b) of Directive 2015/2436), all referred to registered marks and were not applicable to the use requirement laid down in Article 12(4) of the Bulgarian Law on Trade Marks in relation to non-registered marks.

28 In the fifth place, the Board of Appeal noted that Judgment No 4885 of 16 September 2020 of the Administrative Court, Sofia City, in Case No 117/2020 (‘the judgment of 16 September 2020’), produced by the intervener, stated that a non-registered Bulgarian mark could not be relied on against a subsequent mark if it had been used solely for the purpose of exporting goods from Bulgaria. Thus, in the view of the Board of Appeal, a non-registered Bulgarian mark that has been used solely for the purposes of exportation from Bulgaria cannot be validly invoked under Article 8(4) of Regulation 2017/1001.

29 The Board of Appeal concluded that, in view of the evidence and arguments submitted by the applicant, the applicant had not established that the earlier non-registered Bulgarian mark, which had been used solely for export purposes, satisfied the requirement relating to use in Bulgarian territory stemming from applicable Bulgarian law.

30 The Board of Appeal consequently held that one of the conditions for the application of Article 8(4) of Regulation 2017/1001 was not satisfied and that there was therefore no need to examine the other conditions for the application of that provision.

31 The applicant accepts that, as the Board of Appeal stated, the earlier non-registered Bulgarian mark, relied on in support of the application for a declaration of invalidity, was used solely for the purpose of exporting rice from Bulgaria.

32 The applicant is, however, of the view that the Board of Appeal should have held, in the light of Bulgarian case-law and the provisions of EU and Bulgarian law on which it relied during the administrative procedure, that use for export purposes amounted to use in the course of trade in Bulgarian territory. In that regard, it puts forward four complaints.

33 By the first complaint, it submits that the Board of Appeal neither examined nor duly considered one of the judgments which it produced during the administrative procedure, namely Judgment No 3500 of 23 May 2014 of the Administrative Court, Sofia City, in administrative case No 1459/2014 (‘the judgment of 23 May 2014’). In so doing, the Board of Appeal failed to provide full reasoning for its decision.

34 It must be held that, by that complaint, the applicant alleges failure to fulfil the obligation to state reasons.

35 Under the first sentence of Article 94(1) of Regulation 2017/1001, decisions of EUIPO must state the reasons on which they are based. That obligation to state reasons has the same scope as that under Article 296 TFEU, pursuant to which the reasoning of the author of the act must be shown clearly and unequivocally. That obligation has two purposes: (i) to allow interested parties to know the justification for the measure taken so as to enable them to protect their rights and (ii) to enable the Courts of the European Union to exercise their power to review the legality of the decision. However, the reasoning may be implicit, on condition that it enables the persons concerned to know the reasons for the Board of Appeal’s decision and provides the competent Court with sufficient material for it to exercise its power of review. To that effect, it is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons meets the requirements of Article 296 TFEU must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (see judgment of 17 May 2023, Consulta v EUIPO – Karlinger (ACASA) , T‑267/22, not published, EU:T:2023:268, paragraph 20 and the case-law cited).

36 It is also clear from the case-law that a clerical error which does not prevent the parties from correctly identifying the reasoning in question of the Board of Appeal, or from understanding that reasoning and the operative part of the contested decision following a reading thereof as a whole, cannot render that decision unlawful to the extent that it would justify its annulment (see judgment of 17 May 2023, ACASA , T‑267/22, not published, EU:T:2023:268, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited).

37 In that regard, it should be noted, first, that in paragraph 8 of the contested decision, which appears in the part of that decision dealing with the summary of the decision of the Cancellation Division, mention is made of the judgment of 23 May 2014. Secondly, it is true that, in paragraph 40 of the contested decision, in which the Board of Appeal recalled the judgments relied on by the applicant in the form of points, it mentioned twice, in the second and third points, Judgment No 7503 of 5 December 2014 of the Administrative Court, Sofia City, in Case No 9711/2013 (‘the judgment of 5 December 2014’), whereas it did not mention the judgment of 23 May 2014. However, it is clear that the second mention of the judgment of 5 December 2014 is a ‘copy-paste’ error. As EUIPO observes, the extract reproduced under that reference is taken from the judgment of 23 May 2014. Thirdly, in paragraph 47 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal examined Judgment No 2687 of 10 March 2008 of the Supreme Administrative Court in Case No 11419/2007, relied on by the applicant, and then, in paragraph 48 of that decision, the ‘further decisions submitted by the [applicant which] also refer to the provision of Article 19 [of the Bulgarian Law on Trade Marks]’. Those other decisions include the judgment of 23 May 2014, which also refers to that article of the Bulgarian Law on Trade Marks.

38 It is therefore apparent from paragraphs 8, 40, 47 and 48 of the contested decision that the Board of Appeal took into account the judgment of 23 May 2014 relied on by the applicant and that the erroneous mention of the judgment of 5 December 2014 instead of the judgment of 23 May 2014 is a clerical error which does not prevent the parties from correctly identifying and understanding the Board of Appeal’s reasoning regarding the latter judgment, or prevent the General Court from exercising its power of review. In the light of the case-law cited in paragraphs 35 and 36 above, that error cannot cause the contested decision to be vitiated by a failure to fulfil the obligation to state reasons.

39 It follows that the first complaint must be rejected.

40 By the second complaint, the applicant maintains that the Board of Appeal incorrectly interpreted the judgments which it submitted. In its view, the Board of Appeal incorrectly held that those judgments were not applicable to non-registered marks on the ground that they had been delivered in revocation proceedings and therefore concerned registered marks. Those judgments concerned the ‘use’ of a ‘trade mark’ in general, without distinguishing between registered and non-registered marks. Since no such distinction is clear from those judgments, the Board of Appeal should have held that they also applied to non-registered marks. Furthermore, the Board of Appeal should have applied, by analogy, in conjunction with the Bulgarian national case-law that it relied on, the provisions of EU and national law on which it also relied (see paragraph 27 above), which clearly indicate that use for export purposes constitutes use of a mark.

41 In that regard, it must be pointed out, first of all, that the Board of Appeal correctly held, in essence, that it followed from Article 12(4), Article 36(3)(1) and Article 52(1) and (2) of the Bulgarian Law on Trade Marks that the proprietor of an earlier non-registered Bulgarian mark must demonstrate its use in the course of trade in the territory of Bulgaria in order to oppose an application for a subsequent Bulgarian mark or to prohibit the use of a subsequent registered Bulgarian mark.

42 Next, it must be noted that the judgments, according to which, in the view of the applicant, use for export purposes amounted to use in the course of trade in the territory of Bulgaria, were delivered in revocation proceedings based on Article 19 of the Bulgarian Law on Trade Marks. As the Board of Appeal noted in the contested decision, that provision concerns the obligation to use a mark five years after its date of registration. Consequently, those decisions concern proof of genuine use of registered marks.

43 The applicant cannot therefore criticise the Board of Appeal for finding, in paragraph 49 of the contested decision, that the Bulgarian case-law relied on by the applicant did not demonstrate that, by being affixed to goods solely for export purposes, the earlier non-registered Bulgarian mark had been used within the meaning of Article 12(4) of the Bulgarian Law on Trade Marks.

44 Furthermore, it should be noted that even though, pursuant to Article 18(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 and Article 16(5)(b) of Directive 2015/2436, and also the Bulgarian provision transposing the latter provision, namely Article 21(3)(2) of the Bulgarian Law of trade marks, the affixing of the mark to goods or the packaging thereof in the Member State concerned solely for export purposes also constitutes use of a mark, those provisions nevertheless concern the use of registered marks and not the use of a non-registered mark.

45 It follows that the second complaint must be rejected.

46 By the third complaint, the applicant maintains that the Board of Appeal incorrectly interpreted and applied the judgment of 16 September 2020. In the first place, it claims that that judgment is an isolated decision which runs counter to the abovementioned case-law and provisions of Bulgarian and EU law. In the second place, the applicant submits, in essence, that the judgment of 16 September 2020 has a different territorial scope. Indeed, the present proceedings do not concern the invalidity of a national trade mark, but the invalidity of an EU trade mark. Furthermore, the rationale for the solution adopted in that judgment was to protect Bulgarian consumers, who were already familiar with the registered national mark against which the application for a declaration of invalidity was directed, from an abuse of rights by preventing the proprietor of an earlier non-registered mark from asserting its rights in a territory where it has not used its mark. In the present case, it is the consumers of the European Union who should be taken into account, and they could not suffer any harm since they are already familiar with the non-registered mark. Furthermore, the risk of an abuse of rights in the present case is excluded as the intervener has not used the contested mark and has not provided any proof of such use. The applicant concludes that the Board of Appeal should have held that that judgment was inapplicable to the present case.

47 In that regard, it must be pointed out at the outset that the judgment of 16 September 2020, relied on by the intervener, concerns the use of a non-registered mark in the course of trade in the territory of Bulgaria within the meaning of Article 12(4) of the Bulgarian Law on Trade Marks.

48 First, that judgment confirms the case-law relied on by the applicant since it states that the affixing of a sign to the packaging of goods intended solely for export, as provided for in Article 21(3)(2) of the Bulgarian Law on Trade Marks, constitutes genuine use of a registered mark. It could not therefore be regarded as contrary either to the case-law relied on by the applicant or to the provisions on which the applicant relied, referred to in paragraph 44 above, which concern registered marks.

49 Secondly, that judgment states that Bulgarian law does not provide that the exception set out in Article 21(3)(2) of the Bulgarian Law on Trade Marks concerning the ‘genuine use’ of a registered mark, namely the ‘affixing of the sign to the packaging of goods intended for export’, also applies to the use of a non-registered mark within the meaning of Article 12(4) of that law.

50 Consequently, the Board of Appeal was correct in finding, in essence, in paragraph 60 of the contested decision, that the judgment of 16 September 2020 indicated that a non-registered Bulgarian mark could not be relied on against a subsequent mark if it had been used solely for the purpose of exporting goods from Bulgaria and that, therefore, a non-registered Bulgarian mark which has been used solely for the purpose of exportation from Bulgaria cannot be successfully relied on under Article 8(4) of Regulation 2017/1001.

51 That conclusion cannot be called into question by the applicant’s argument that the Board of Appeal should have considered that judgment to be inapplicable since the present proceedings do not concern the invalidity of a registered national trade mark, but the invalidity of a registered EU trade mark.

52 It is clear from Article 8(4) of Regulation 2017/1001 that the conditions relating to the acquisition of the earlier right and the right to prohibit the use of a subsequent EU trade mark are governed by national law, as is apparent from the case-law cited in paragraphs 14 and 16 above. Thus, a non-registered Bulgarian trade mark may be relied on to prohibit such use provided that it satisfies the conditions laid down in Article 12(4) of the Bulgarian Law on Trade Marks. The conditions which must be satisfied by that mark do not depend on the territorial scope of the contested mark.

53 In addition, the judgment of 16 September 2020 draws a clear distinction between the use of registered marks and that of non-registered marks, stating that Bulgarian law does not provide that the exception laid down in Article 21(3)(2) of the Bulgarian Law on Trade Marks concerning the ‘genuine use’ of a registered mark, namely the ‘affixing of the sign to the packaging of goods intended for export’, applies to non-registered marks. The application of that exception therefore depends solely on the nature of the mark relied on in support of the application for a declaration of invalidity, namely whether or not it is registered.

54 Consequently, the fact that the contested mark in the present case is an EU trade mark and whether or not that mark has been used are irrelevant.

55 It follows that the third complaint must be rejected.

56 By the fourth complaint, the applicant submits that errors in the interpretation and application of Bulgarian case-law led the Board of Appeal to conclude, incorrectly, first, that the condition for the application of Article 8(4) of Regulation 2017/1001, namely the condition relating to the use of an earlier non-registered mark in the course of trade in Bulgaria, was not satisfied and, secondly, that it was not required to examine the other conditions for the application of that provision, given the cumulative nature of those conditions.

57 In that regard, it is sufficient to note that it is apparent from the analysis of the second and third complaints that the applicant has not established that the Board of Appeal erred in its interpretation and application of Bulgarian case-law. Consequently, the applicant has not established that the Board of Appeal made an error of assessment in finding that the applicant had failed to demonstrate that the fourth condition for the application of Article 8(4) of Regulation 2017/1001, referred to in paragraph 17 above, was satisfied.

58 Since the conditions for the application of that provision are cumulative, as is apparent from the case-law cited in paragraph 14 above, the Board of Appeal was correct in finding that there was no need to examine the other conditions for the application of that provision.

59 Therefore, the single plea in law must be rejected and, accordingly, the action dismissed.

Costs

60 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

61 Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the intervener before the Court, in accordance with the form of order sought by the intervener. By contrast, since EUIPO has applied for the applicant to be ordered to pay the costs only in the event that a hearing is convened, EUIPO must, as no hearing was held, be ordered to bear its own costs.

62 Moreover, the intervener requested that the applicant be ordered to pay the costs incurred by the intervener in the proceedings before the Board of Appeal. In that regard, it is sufficient to note that, since the present judgment dismisses the action brought against the contested decision, point 2 of the operative part of that decision continues to govern the costs incurred in the cancellation proceedings and in the appeal proceedings before the Board of Appeal (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 January 2023, Zielonogórski Klub Żużlowy Sportowa v EUIPO – Falubaz Polska (FALUBAZ) , T‑703/21, not published, EU:T:2023:19, paragraph 103 and the case-law cited).

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber)

hereby:

1. Dismisses the action;

2. Orders Global Rice EOOD to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by Ricegrowers Ltd in the proceedings before the Court;

3. Orders the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) to bear its own costs.

Buttigieg | Kancheva | Bestagno

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 10 June 2026.

V. Di Bucci | S. Kingston

Registrar | President

* Language of the case: English.