ext/celex/62025TJ0412

JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Eighth Chamber)

17 June 2026 ( * )

( EU trade mark – Opposition proceedings – Application for the EU word mark PARKNER – Earlier EU word mark PARKSTER – Earlier national figurative mark Parkster – Relative ground for refusal – Likelihood of confusion – Similarity of the goods and services – Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 )

In Case T‑412/25,

Parkster AB, established in Lund (Sweden), represented by J. Norderyd, C. Sundén and J. Nilsson, lawyers,

applicant,

v

European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), represented by M. Eberl, acting as Agent,

defendant,

the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court, being

Ühisteenused AS, established in Tallinn (Estonia), represented by T. Toomela, lawyer,

THE GENERAL COURT (Eighth Chamber),

composed of I. Gâlea (Rapporteur), President, M.J. Costeira and T. Tóth, Judges,

Registrar: V. Di Bucci,

having regard to the written part of the procedure,

having regard to the fact that no request for a hearing was submitted by the parties within three weeks after service of notification of the close of the written part of the procedure, and having decided to rule on the action without an oral part of the procedure, pursuant to Article 106(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court,

gives the following

Judgment

1 By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, Parkster AB, seeks the annulment and alteration of the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 6 May 2025 (Case R 1944/2024-2) (‘the contested decision’).

Background to the dispute

2 On 20 October 2022, the intervener, Ühisteenused AS, filed an application for registration of an EU trade mark with EUIPO in respect of the word sign PARKNER.

3 The mark applied for covers goods and services in Classes 9, 36, 39 and 42 of the Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended, corresponding, in respect of services in Class 39, to the following description:

‘Car parking; Providing information relating to vehicle parking services; Rental of garages and parking places; Vehicle parking and storage; Rental of mechanical parking systems; Rental of vehicle parking spaces; Parking place rental; Reservation of parking spaces; Vehicle parking; Car park services; Providing information relating to the rental of mechanical parking systems; Services for the garaging of vehicles; Airport parking services; Parking garages services’.

4 On 24 January 2023, the applicant filed a notice of opposition to registration of the mark applied for in respect of all the goods and services covered by the application for registration.

5 The opposition was based on the earlier EU word mark PARKSTER, filed on 14 March 2013 and registered on 12 August 2013 under No 11654647 in respect of goods and services in, inter alia, Classes 9 and 36, and on the earlier Swedish figurative mark, filed on 3 June 2022 and registered on 4 July 2022 under No 622359, reproduced below:

6 The latter mark covers goods and services in Classes 9, 35, 36 and 38, corresponding, as regards goods and services in Classes 9 and 36, inter alia, to the following description:

– Class 9: ‘Software for payment of parking fees; downloadable mobile applications for payment of parking fees; parking meters’;

– Class 36: ‘Payment services for payment of parking fees through mobile applications’.

7 The ground relied on in support of the opposition was that set out in Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2017 L 154, p. 1).

8 By decision of 7 August 2024, the Opposition Division upheld the opposition in part, on the basis of the earlier Swedish figurative mark referred to in paragraph 5 above, on the ground that there was a likelihood of confusion. It refused registration of the mark applied for in respect of all the goods and services in Classes 9, 36 and 42 and rejected the opposition in respect of all the services in Class 39.

9 On 4 October 2024, the applicant filed a notice of appeal with the Board of Appeal of EUIPO against the Opposition Division’s decision, requesting that that decision be annulled in part to the extent that it had rejected the opposition in respect of all the services in Class 39.

10 By the contested decision, the Board of Appeal dismissed the appeal. It considered that the services covered by the mark applied for, being essentially services relating to the provision of parking spaces, in Class 39, were dissimilar, first, to software and mobile applications for payment of parking fees and parking meters in Class 9 and, second, to payment services for payment of parking fees through mobile applications in Class 36 covered by the earlier Swedish mark and by the earlier EU mark (‘the earlier marks’). Accordingly, the Board of Appeal concluded that, irrespective of the degree of similarity or identity of the signs at issue or the possible reputation of the earlier marks, there was no likelihood of confusion.

Forms of order sought

11 The applicant claims, in essence, that the Court should:

– annul the contested decision;

– uphold the opposition in respect of all the services in Class 39 covered by the mark applied for;

– order EUIPO to pay the costs;

– order the intervener to pay the costs incurred before EUIPO.

12 EUIPO contends that the Court should:

– dismiss the action;

– order the applicant to pay the costs in the event that a hearing is convened.

13 The intervener contends that the Court should:

– dismiss the action;

– order the applicant to pay the costs.

Law

14 In support of its action, the applicant relies upon a single plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001.

Substance

The claim for annulment

15 By its single plea in law, the applicant submits, inter alia, that, contrary to what the Board of Appeal found in the contested decision, the services in Class 39 covered by the mark applied for should be regarded as similar to the goods and services in Classes 9 and 36 covered by the earlier marks.

16 EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.

17 EUIPO contends that the goods and services at issue are not similar. In that regard, it maintains that those goods and services are not complementary, in that consumers would usually not expect there to be a link between the goods and services at issue such as would lead them to believe that they come from the same undertaking.

18 Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 provides that, upon opposition by the proprietor of an earlier trade mark, the trade mark applied for is not to be registered if, because of its identity with, or similarity to, an earlier trade mark and the identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by the trade marks, there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public in the territory in which the earlier trade mark is protected. The likelihood of confusion includes the likelihood of association with the earlier trade mark.

19 The risk that the public may believe that the goods or services in question come from the same undertaking or from economically linked undertakings constitutes a likelihood of confusion. The likelihood of confusion must be assessed globally, according to the relevant public’s perception of the signs and goods or services in question and taking into account all factors relevant to the circumstances of the case, in particular the interdependence between the similarity of the signs and that of the goods or services covered (see judgment of 9 July 2003, Laboratorios RTB v OHIM – Giorgio Beverly Hills (GIORGIO BEVERLY HILLS) , T‑162/01, EU:T:2003:199, paragraphs 30 to 32 and the case-law cited).

20 For the purpose of applying Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, a likelihood of confusion presupposes both that the marks at issue are identical or similar and that the goods or services which they cover are identical or similar. Those conditions are cumulative (see judgment of 22 January 2009, Commercy v OHIM – easyGroup IP Licensing (easyHotel) , T‑316/07, EU:T:2009:14, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).

21 Where the Board of Appeal finds that there is no similarity between the goods and services covered by the marks at issue, it may reject the opposition based on Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, without there being any need to carry out a global assessment of the likelihood of confusion and thus to take account of all the relevant factors, such as the level of attention of the relevant public or its perception of the marks and goods or services at issue (judgment of 17 April 2024, Coinbase v EUIPO – Coinbase Global (coinbase) , T‑126/22, not published, EU:T:2024:252, paragraph 68).

22 It is in the light of those considerations that it must be examined whether the Board of Appeal was correct in concluding that there was no likelihood of confusion on the part of the relevant public concerning the goods and services at issue, within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001.

23 As a preliminary point, it should be noted that the Board of Appeal, in paragraph 7 of the contested decision, recalled the findings of the Opposition Division regarding the relevant public, according to which software for payment of parking fees and payment services for payment of parking fees through mobile applications covered by the earlier marks may target the same end users that use parking services covered by the mark applied for. Although the Board of Appeal did not expressly analyse the relevant public in respect of the goods and services at issue, it implicitly acknowledged, in paragraphs 19 to 22 of the contested decision, that those goods and services were intended for the general public, namely persons in need of parking, with the exception of parking meters in Class 9 covered by the earlier marks, which are intended rather for municipalities, owners or companies that manage parking space and facilities and not for the users of garages and parking places. The finding that software and mobile applications for payment of parking fees and parking meters (Class 9), payment services for payment of parking fees through mobile applications (Class 36), covered by the earlier marks, and services in Class 39 covered by the mark applied for are intended for the general public is not, as such, disputed by the applicant.

The comparison of the goods and services

24 In assessing the similarity of the goods or services at issue, all the relevant factors relating to those goods or services should be taken into account. Those factors include, in particular, their nature, their intended purpose, their method of use and whether they are in competition with each other or are complementary. Other factors may also be taken into account such as the distribution channels of the goods concerned (judgment of 29 September 1998, Canon , C‑39/97, EU:C:1998:442, paragraph 23; see also judgment of 14 May 2013, Sanco v OHIM – Marsalman (Representation of a chicken) , T‑249/11, EU:T:2013:238, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited).

25 It should also be noted that, for the purpose of examining the similarity of services, it is necessary to take into consideration the objective characteristics and qualities of the services at issue, as set out in the list of services covered by the mark applied for, and those covered by the earlier marks (see judgment of 12 February 2015, Klaes v OHIM – Klaes Kunststoffe (Klaes) , T‑453/13, not published, EU:T:2015:98, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).

26 It is settled case-law that complementary goods or services are those between which there is a close connection, in the sense that one is indispensable or important for the use of the other with the result that consumers may think that the same undertaking is responsible for manufacturing those goods or for providing those services. That case-law definition implies that complementary goods or services can be used together, which presupposes that they are intended for the same public (see judgment of 22 January 2009, easyHotel , T‑316/07, EU:T:2009:14, paragraphs 57 and 58 and the case-law cited).

27 In addition, it should be recalled that the principles applicable to the comparison of goods also apply to the comparison between goods and services. While it is true that, owing to their very nature, goods are generally different from services, the fact remains that they can be complementary or that the services can have the same subject or purpose as the goods and therefore be in competition with them. It follows that, in some cases, goods and services can be found to be similar (judgment of 8 February 2023, UniSkin v EUIPO – Unicskin (UNISKIN by Dr. Søren Frankild) , T‑787/21, not published, EU:T:2023:56, paragraph 32).

28 It is in the light of that case-law that the applicant’s arguments must be examined.

29 In the present case, the Board of Appeal considered, first of all, in paragraph 18 of the contested decision, that the services covered by the mark applied for were different from the goods and services covered by the earlier marks in terms of their nature and intended purpose and that they did not coincide in their method of use or in their distribution channels.

30 It also found, in paragraph 19 of the contested decision, that companies providing car parking services or parking rental services were not normally engaged in the development of specialised software or IT devices, but instead outsourced such work to IT companies. Conversely, it considered that a company offering software or a mobile application for the booking of car parking services did not usually offer car parking services. According to the Board of Appeal, software offered by such a company is a tool that allows consumers to have an overview of the parking spaces which are available and most convenient and of the prices offered by various other undertakings, and to book the parking space offered by the company chosen.

31 Next, in paragraph 20 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal considered that the goods and services covered by the earlier marks and the services covered by the mark applied for were also not complementary. In that regard, it distinguished complementarity from use of the goods and services in combination or together. Thus, the use of the goods at issue together is merely optional and not indispensable or important, the necessary close connection being missing. The Board of Appeal added, in paragraph 22 of the contested decision, that the mere fact that software may be used in the provision of the applicant’s services or to facilitate customers’ access to the applicant’s services, or indeed any services, does not suffice for the purpose of concluding that there is complementarity.

32 Furthermore, in paragraph 23 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found that the parking meters covered by the earlier marks, in particular, did not target the same public, being intended for municipalities, owners or companies that manage parking space and facilities and not for the users of garages and parking places.

33 Lastly, in paragraph 24 of the contested decision, it found that the goods and services under comparison were not indispensable or important to each other, given that the payment of parking fees does not necessarily need to be carried out through a mobile application or software, but can also be made through a cashier or a parking meter. Therefore, according to the Board of Appeal, no consumer will perceive such a close connection between the relevant goods and services as to assume that they originate from the same undertaking. It also concluded that the services at issue were not in competition as they were not substitutes for each other.

34 The applicant submits, in essence, that the Board of Appeal made an error of assessment as regards the comparison of the goods and services at issue. In the first place, it maintains that the similarity of the goods and services at issue is evident from the fact that those goods and services are all connected with parking or all explicitly relate to parking. It argues that the purpose of the relevant goods and services of both parties is the same, that they are made available through the same distribution channels and that they target the same public.

35 In the second place, the applicant submits that the goods and services at issue are complementary. It claims that various municipalities, such as Berlin (Germany), Copenhagen (Denmark), Stockholm (Sweden) and Malmö (Sweden), offer payment services for payment of parking fees through mobile applications. In that regard, according to the applicant, services relating to the provision of parking spaces in Class 39 are necessary for the proper use and functioning of the goods and services covered by the earlier marks. It argues that the reverse is also true, taking into account the digital nature of today’s society and the significant amount of parking services which nowadays are paid through mobile applications.

36 In the third place, the applicant calls into question the Board of Appeal’s findings that companies providing parking rental services are not normally engaged in the development of software and that companies offering parking mobile applications do not usually offer parking services themselves. In addition, it submits that its business model, which is common in the parking sector, consists of the provision, by the same company, of parking services and payment services, to the same consumer, through a mobile application. According to the applicant, its mobile application does not enable the consumer to find and pay for any available parking space, but only parking spaces offered by that application.

37 In the fourth and last place, the applicant submits that the services at issue target the same public.

38 EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.

39 In the first place, EUIPO contends that the fact that the goods and services under comparison are aimed at identical consumers cannot be regarded, in itself and on its own, as a significant factor in assessing the similarity between the goods and services, in particular where those services target the general public.

40 In the second place, EUIPO maintains that consumers would usually not expect there to be a link between the goods and services at issue, such that they are complementary. Thus, those consumers would not be led to believe that the undertaking responsible for providing the parking services is the same undertaking providing the application, even if the payment of parking fees by means of an application may play a significant role in choosing a parking space. In addition, it points out that the applicant itself has shown in its application lodged at the Court that, in certain cities, it is possible to pay for the parking space through several application providers in respect of the same parking service.

41 In the third place, EUIPO contends that the provider of the application, such as the applicant, merely facilitates the payment for the parking services and that the fact that those services nowadays are very likely also accessible through a mobile application does not necessarily result in a similarity with the software goods and services covered by the earlier marks.

42 In the fourth place, EUIPO maintains that recognising similarity on the basis of complementarity in cases where goods and services are offered electronically and where an earlier mark includes computer programs or software would extend beyond the protection given to a trade mark owner by law. It argues that such a position would lead to a situation in which the registration of an EU trade mark designating software would in practice exclude subsequent registration of any other right designating the goods and services provided electronically.

43 The intervener agrees with the Board of Appeal’s findings that the services in Class 39 covered by the earlier marks bear no similarity to the applicant’s goods and services. It also adds, as regards the applicant’s argument that companies providing parking services are engaged in the development of software or the provision of IT services, that such a combination of business activities, by the same entity, is clearly not common and that the assessment in that regard should be based on the overall market situation and not on the applicant’s individual business model.

44 It must be stated at the outset, as the Board of Appeal found, that the goods and services at issue are different in their nature, intended purpose and method of use. The services in Class 39 covered by the mark applied for include, inter alia, services relating to car parking, rental of garages and parking places, parking services in garages and airports, vehicle storage and provision of information in that regard, to which the Board of Appeal refers collectively as services relating to ‘the provision of parking spaces’. Thus, those services are used mainly for the purpose of physically occupying a parking space for a short period, or in order to provide information in that regard, whereas the services covered by the earlier marks are used in order to pay for and manage such parking.

45 Accordingly, those goods and services do not coincide in their intended purpose because they meet different needs, even though the target public coincides in relation to some of the goods and services at issue, namely persons who need to find a parking space.

46 Nevertheless, it is necessary to examine the Board of Appeal’s assessment concerning the complementarity of the goods and services at issue.

47 For the purpose of assessing whether the goods and services at issue are complementary, it must be ascertained, in the first place, whether, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 26 above, there is a close connection between the goods and services at issue, in the sense that one is indispensable or important for the use of the other and, in the second place, whether that close connection is such that consumers would attribute the same commercial origin to those goods and services.

48 In the first place, as regards the first condition referred to in paragraph 47 above, it must be stated, first of all, as is apparent from paragraph 21 of the contested decision, that the goods and services under comparison can be used together, a characteristic which, moreover, is not disputed by the parties.

49 Next, as regards the question whether the use of one product or service is indispensable or important for the use of the other, it must be held that, as the applicant correctly submits, the provision of parking spaces, which encompasses most of the services in Class 39 covered by the mark applied for, such as services relating to car parking, rental of garages and parking places, parking services in garages and airports, and vehicle storage, is necessary – that is to say, indispensable – for the proper use and functioning of the goods and services covered by the earlier marks, namely software and mobile applications for payment of parking fees (Class 9), parking meters (Class 9) and payment services for payment of parking fees through mobile applications (Class 36), given that the specification in the registration of the earlier marks covers software, mobile applications and payment services ‘for payment of parking fees’. Indeed, it is objectively not possible to pay for parking by means of software or a payment service without using the service relating to parking.

50 As regards services for providing information relating to vehicle parking services and for providing information relating to the rental of mechanical parking systems, also in Class 39, it must be observed that those services are at least ‘important’ for the goods and services covered by the earlier marks, referred to above.

51 Conversely, the services covered by the earlier marks, inter alia software and mobile applications for payment of parking fees (Class 9) and payment services for payment of parking fees through mobile applications (Class 36), must be classified as ‘important’ for the proper functioning of services relating to car parking, rental of garages and parking places, parking services in garages and airports, vehicle storage and provision of information in that regard (Class 39), which relate to the mark applied for.

52 As EUIPO acknowledges in its response, in today’s digital society, ‘payment of parking fees by [means of] an app may play a significant role in choosing a parking spot’.

53 The conclusion set out in paragraphs 49 to 51 above is not called into question by the fact that the payment of parking fees may also be carried out by means other than a mobile application, such as a cashier or a parking meter, contrary to what the Board of Appeal found in the contested decision. In that regard, the fact that parking may be paid for by a number of means – which the parties do not dispute – rules out the ‘indispensable’ nature of the goods and services covered by the earlier marks in relation to the services covered by the mark applied for, without, however, ruling out the possibility of their being ‘important’. As the applicant has argued, by presenting screenshots relating to the methods for payment of parking fees in certain cities, and without being contradicted on that point by EUIPO, payment for parking via mobile applications is now a common payment method.

54 Furthermore, as regards the Board of Appeal’s finding that the goods and services under comparison are used together on a purely optional basis, whether by choice or for convenience, such that the necessary close connection between them is missing, it is true that the Court has held that, although certain goods covered by the mark applied for may be used, or consumed, together with goods covered by the earlier mark, their use as such is optional and is by no means indispensable for the consumption of those goods (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 October 2015, Monster Energy v OHIM – Home Focus (MoMo Monsters) , T‑736/14, not published, EU:T:2015:809, paragraph 29).

55 On that point, it should, however, be recalled, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 26 above, that complementary goods are those between which there is a close connection, in the sense that one is indispensable ‘or important’ for the use of the other. In the present case, as is apparent from paragraph 52 above, although the use of software and mobile applications for payment of parking fees and of services for payment via mobile applications in respect of parking fees is not indispensable within the meaning of the case-law referred to in paragraph 54 above, such use nevertheless constitutes an important alternative in relation to payment for parking services, alongside physical methods of payment, with the result that the use of mobile applications for such purposes is, on that basis, complementary.

56 In the light of all the foregoing considerations, it must be held that the Board of Appeal’s finding, set out in paragraph 24 of the contested decision, that the goods and services at issue are neither indispensable nor important for each other, is vitiated by an error of assessment. It thus follows from the foregoing that there is a close connection between the goods and services at issue.

57 In the second place, for the purpose of assessing the second condition relating to complementarity, referred to in paragraph 47 above, it must be examined whether, given the existence of a close connection between the goods and services at issue, as established in paragraph 56 above, consumers may think that the same undertaking is responsible for manufacturing those goods or for providing those services.

58 According to the case-law cited in paragraph 26 above, the second condition must be assessed with regard to the relevant public, namely whether that public may believe that the goods and services at issue have the same commercial origin.

59 In the present case, as noted in paragraph 23 above, software and mobile applications for payment of parking fees (Class 9) and payment services for payment of parking fees through mobile applications (Class 36) covered by the earlier marks may target the same end users as parking services (Class 39) covered by the mark applied for, namely persons who need to find a parking space. That aspect has not been examined by the Board of Appeal, nor is it contested by the parties. EUIPO acknowledges, moreover, that ‘the goods and services under comparison are aimed at identical consumers’.

60 Therefore, it must be stated that consumers coincide with regard to the services covered by the mark applied for in Class 39 and, at least, to software and mobile applications for payment of parking fees in Class 9 and payment services for payment of parking fees through mobile applications in Class 36 covered by the earlier marks.

61 Nevertheless, as EUIPO points out, the fact that the relevant public coincides with regard to at least some of the services under comparison, while important in the assessment of complementarity, is not in itself sufficient to conclude that there is similarity. Therefore, it is necessary to determine whether those consumers, in view of the close connection between the goods and services at issue, may attribute the same commercial origin to them.

62 In the present case, it must be observed that, first, as was stated in paragraph 53 above, payment for parking via mobile applications is now a common payment method. Second, in today’s digital technology-driven society, it is quite common for consumers to interact with a single entity or undertaking that provides the software and/or mobile application for parking as well as the option to select and actually occupy a vehicle parking space, or even to obtain information relating to the rental of parking systems. Indeed, it is apparent from the evidence provided by the applicant (Annexes A.7 and A.8 to the application) that, under that business model, which the applicant itself has also adopted, the provider of a mobile application for parking acts as the sole intermediary between owners of parking spaces and consumers wishing to find one, by offering those spaces to consumers on the owners’ behalf through the mobile application. Thus, the only trade mark with which the consumer comes into contact is that of the provider of the mobile application.

63 Therefore, in that case, it is irrelevant, in the eyes of the average consumer, whether the company offering the software or mobile application for parking under its own trade mark is actually the owner of the parking space. As a result, the provider of the mobile application for parking is also likely to be perceived as the provider of the parking services and not merely as the one that developed the software or mobile application. Accordingly, as the applicant correctly submits, services relating to the provision of parking places as well as services for providing information in that regard covered by the mark applied for may, in such a case, be made available through the same distribution channels as certain goods and services covered by the earlier marks, namely mobile applications and software relating to payment for parking.

64 Consequently, it must be held that the Board of Appeal’s assessment in paragraph 19 of the contested decision, according to which a company offering software or a mobile application for the booking of car parking services does not usually offer car parking services, is vitiated by an error of assessment.

65 In addition, the Board of Appeal found, in paragraph 19 of the contested decision, that, conversely, companies providing car parking services were not normally engaged in the development of specialised software or IT devices, instead preferring to outsource the development of such software or devices to IT companies. It must be observed in that regard that, even if that claim were to be established, the fact that the development of mobile applications for parking is outsourced does not prevent consumers from attributing the same commercial origin to payment services for payment of parking fees through mobile applications (Class 36), to the software or mobile application for parking itself (Class 9) and to services relating to the provision of parking spaces (Class 39).

66 In that respect, according to the case-law cited in paragraph 26 above, one of the conditions for the goods or services at issue to be complementary is that the relevant public may think that the same undertaking is responsible for manufacturing those goods or for providing those services. It is true that undertakings which provide services relating to car parking, rental of parking places and provision of information in that regard are not normally engaged in the ‘manufacturing’ of software or in the provision of payment services based on a mobile application. However, it must be observed that the Board of Appeal did not take into account the possibility that such undertakings might be responsible for the ‘provision’ of a payment application for parking, as is precisely the case with the municipalities to which the applicant refers.

67 Consequently, it must be held that the relevant public, namely consumers who need to park a vehicle, may perceive a provider of mobile applications for payment of parking fees, such as the applicant, as a provider of services relating to the provision of parking spaces and to the provision of information in that regard. Accordingly, the Board of Appeal erred in concluding, in paragraphs 22 and 24 of the contested decision, that no consumer would perceive such a close connection between the relevant goods and services as to believe that they originate from the same undertaking.

68 That conclusion cannot be called into question by EUIPO’s argument, set out in paragraph 42 above, that recognising similarity on the basis of complementarity in cases where goods and services are offered electronically and where an earlier mark includes computer programs or software would extend beyond the protection given to a trade mark owner by law.

69 It is true that it has been held that, in today’s high-tech society, the majority of goods and services are also provided electronically or with the use of computers in one form or another, with the result that there is a multitude of software or programs with radically different functions. To acknowledge complementarity and, accordingly, similarity in all cases in which the goods and services are also provided electronically, and in which the earlier word mark covers computer programs or software, would clearly exceed the scope of the protection granted by the legislature to the proprietor of a trade mark. Such a position would lead to a situation in which the registration of an EU trade mark designating software or programs would in practice exclude subsequent registration of any other right designating the goods and services provided electronically (see judgment of 17 April 2024, coinbase , T‑126/22, not published, EU:T:2024:252, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited).

70 Nevertheless, such a finding, formulated in general terms regarding ‘computer programs or software’ without a particular specification, cannot cover a situation in which the specification precisely limits the intended purpose of the programs or software in respect of which the mark is registered. The present case concerns specific software, mobile applications and payment services, since they are connected with ‘payment of parking fees’. Thus, in order effectively to assess the complementarity between the goods and services at issue, function or intended purpose constitutes an important criterion that must be taken into consideration. In that regard, it has been held that, in order effectively to assess the degree of similarity between programs and software, the function criterion, and therefore the criterion of intended purpose, assumes overriding importance among the relevant factors to be taken into account (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 30 June 2021, Zoom v EUIPO – Facetec (ZOOM) , T‑204/20, not published, EU:T:2021:391, paragraph 53).

71 In the present case, in so far as the intended purpose of the goods and services at issue is specified with a certain degree of precision, it helps to differentiate them beyond their common nature as software and services for payment through mobile applications (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 30 June 2021, ZOOM , T‑204/20, not published, EU:T:2021:391, paragraph 57). Accordingly, that precision must be taken into consideration in the assessment of whether the goods and services at issue are complementary. Thus, in the case of specific goods and services identified with a high degree of precision, complementarity cannot be ruled out. The present case therefore does not concern complementarity between parking services and any software, mobile application or payment service, but solely complementarity between parking services and software, mobile applications and payment services ‘for payment of parking fees’. For that reason, EUIPO’s argument must be rejected.

72 In the light of all of the foregoing, it must be held that the Board of Appeal’s assessments, according to which the services in Class 39 covered by the mark applied for are not complementary to software and mobile applications for payment of parking fees (Class 9) and payment services for payment of parking fees through mobile applications (Class 36) covered by the earlier marks, and therefore are not similar, at least to a low degree, are vitiated by an error of assessment. That finding applies, moreover, to all the services in Class 39 covered by the mark applied for, all of which are, in essence, services relating to car parking, rental of garages and parking places and provision of information in that regard, which the Board of Appeal examined as a whole.

73 Accordingly, it follows from all of the foregoing that the applicant’s single plea in law must be upheld and, consequently, the contested decision must be annulled, without there being any need to examine the other arguments put forward by the applicant.

The application for alteration

74 By its second head of claim, the applicant asks the Court to uphold the opposition in respect of all the services in Class 39 covered by the mark applied for.

75 It must be observed, as EUIPO contends, that, by that head of claim, the applicant, in essence, is asking the Court to take the decision which the applicant would have wished the Board of Appeal to have adopted. Consequently, the applicant’s second head of claim must be interpreted as asking the Court to exercise its power to alter decisions, as provided for in Article 72(3) of Regulation 2017/1001 (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 September 2018, Kwizda Holding v EUIPO – Dermapharm (UROAKUT) , T‑266/17, EU:T:2018:569, paragraph 84).

76 According to the case-law, the power of the General Court to alter decisions does not have the effect of conferring on that Court the power to substitute its own reasoning for that of a Board of Appeal or to carry out an assessment on which that Board of Appeal has not yet adopted a position. Exercise of the power to alter decisions must therefore, in principle, be limited to situations in which the Court, after reviewing the assessment made by the Board of Appeal, is in a position to determine, on the basis of the matters of fact and of law as established, what decision the Board of Appeal was required to take (judgment of 5 July 2011, Edwin v OHIM , C‑263/09 P, EU:C:2011:452, paragraph 72).

77 In the present case, the Board of Appeal examined only one of the cumulative conditions laid down in Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, namely the condition that the goods and services at issue be identical or similar. It found that there was no likelihood of confusion, without having to carry out a global assessment of that likelihood and thus without having to take account of all the relevant factors.

78 Consequently, the applicant’s request for alteration would require the Court to carry out assessments on which the Board of Appeal has not yet adopted a position, inter alia as regards the similarity of the signs at issue. Thus, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 76 above, the Court is not in a position to exercise its power to alter decisions and, accordingly, the applicant’s second head of claim must be rejected.

Costs

79 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

80 In the present case, since EUIPO has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the applicant, in accordance with the form of order sought by the applicant.

81 The intervener has been unsuccessful, but the applicant has not claimed that it should be ordered to pay the costs of the present proceedings. Consequently, the intervener shall bear only its own costs incurred before the Court.

82 By contrast, the applicant has claimed that the intervener should be ordered to pay the costs incurred before the Board of Appeal and the Opposition Division.

83 In that regard, it suffices to observe that it will be for the Board of Appeal to decide, in the light of the present judgment, on the costs relating to those sets of proceedings (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 May 2018, Uribe-Etxebarría Jiménez v EUIPO – Núcleo de comunicaciones y control (SHERPA) , T‑577/15, EU:T:2018:305, paragraph 94).

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (Eighth Chamber)

hereby:

1. Annuls the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 6 May 2025 (Case R 1944/2024-2);

2. Dismisses the action as to the remainder;

3. Orders EUIPO to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by Parkster AB for the purposes of the proceedings before the General Court;

4. Orders Ühisteenused AS to bear its own costs incurred for the purposes of the proceedings before the General Court.

Gâlea | Costeira | Tóth

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 17 June 2026.

V. Di Bucci | S. Papasavvas

Registrar | President

* Language of the case: English.