ext/celex/62025TJ0471

JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Fifth Chamber)

25 March 2026 ( * )

( EU trade mark – Application for EU word mark NAVIGATE – Absolute ground for refusal – Descriptive character – Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 )

In Case T‑471/25,

ABB Asea Brown Boveri Ltd, established in Zurich (Switzerland), represented by M. Hartmann, S. Fröhlich and H. Lerchl, lawyers,

applicant,

v

European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), represented by J. Ivanauskas, acting as Agent,

defendant,

THE GENERAL COURT (Fifth Chamber),

composed of M. Sampol Pucurull, President, J. Laitenberger (Rapporteur) and M. Brkan, Judges,

Registrar: V. Di Bucci,

having regard to the written part of the procedure,

having regard to the fact that no request for a hearing was submitted by the parties within three weeks after service of notification of the close of the written part of the procedure, and having decided to rule on the action without an oral part of the procedure, pursuant to Article 106(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court,

gives the following

Judgment

1 By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, ABB Asea Brown Boveri Ltd, seeks the annulment of the decision of the First Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 12 May 2025 (Case R 2200/2024-1) (‘the contested decision’).

Background to the dispute

2 On 16 April 2024, the applicant filed an application for registration of an EU trade mark with EUIPO in respect of the word mark NAVIGATE.

3 The mark applied for covers services in Classes 41, 42 and 45 of the Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended, corresponding, for each of those classes, to the following description:

– Class 41: ‘Electrical safety training; providing of education, training and tuition; arranging and conducting of seminars, also online; all in the field of electrical distribution installations’;

– Class 42: ‘Technological consultancy and testing services in the field of electrical distribution installations; technical project studies and consultancy relating thereto, in the field of electrical distribution installations; engineering services in the field of electrical distribution installations; provision of expert appraisals relating to electrical distribution installations; computer security consultancy; quality control testing services for electrical distribution installations; providing technical information and advice relating to electrical distribution installations; sustainability consultancy, namely advice and consultancy in relation to energy efficiency; consulting and advisory services in the fields of energy measurement to improve energy efficiency; advice and consultancy in relation to carbon offsetting’;

– Class 45: ‘Security consultancy; security assessment of risks’.

4 By decision of 9 October 2024, the examiner rejected the application for registration of the mark applied for on the basis of Article 7(1)(b) and (c), read in conjunction with Article 7(2), of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2017 L 154, p. 1). Furthermore, the examiner rejected the applicant’s arguments based on a comparison with other, earlier registrations.

5 On 14 November 2024, the applicant filed a notice of appeal with EUIPO against the examiner’s decision.

6 By the contested decision, the Board of Appeal dismissed the action on the ground that the sign in respect of which registration was sought was descriptive of the services referred to in paragraph 3 above, in that it will be perceived by the relevant public as an indication of their intended purpose, namely to guide and direct through a number of choices, risks and issues that arise in the field of electrical distribution installations. The descriptive character of those services also results in their lack of distinctive character.

Forms of order sought

7 The applicant claims that the Court should:

– annul the contested decision;

– order EUIPO to pay the costs.

8 EUIPO contends that the Court should:

– dismiss the action;

– order the applicant to pay the costs in the event that an oral hearing is convened.

Law

Documents presented for the first time before the Court

9 In support of its action, the applicant relied, inter alia, on the documents produced in Annexes A.5 and A.6 to the application, namely, respectively, a printout of an article entitled ‘An analysis of the navigation metaphor – And why it works for the World Wide Web’ and published in the multidisciplinary journal Spatial Cognition & Computation , dated 2006, and a printout of an article entitled ‘Beyond navigation as metaphor’ and published on the website Researchgate , dated 1998. According to EUIPO, those documents are new and submitted for the first time before the Court. Consequently, they should be declared inadmissible.

10 In the present case, it should be noted that the documents in Annexes A.5 and A.6 were not part of the file submitted by the applicant during the proceedings before EUIPO.

11 Those documents, which were produced for the first time before the Court, cannot be taken into consideration. The purpose of actions before the Court is to review the legality of decisions of the Boards of Appeal of EUIPO for the purposes of Article 72 of Regulation 2017/1001, so it is not the Court’s function to review the facts in the light of documents produced for the first time before it. Accordingly, the abovementioned documents must be excluded, without it being necessary to assess their evidential value (see, to that effect, judgment of 24 November 2005, Sadas v OHIM – LTJ Diffusion (ARTHUR ET FELICIE) , T‑346/04, EU:T:2005:420, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited).

Substance

12 The applicant relies on three pleas in law, alleging, first, infringement of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001, secondly, infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of that regulation and, thirdly, infringement of the principles of equal treatment and sound administration.

The first plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001

13 In the first plea, the applicant criticises, in essence, the Board of Appeal for having infringed Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001, by considering that the mark applied for was descriptive of the services referred to in the application for registration.

14 Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001 provides that trade marks which consist exclusively of signs or indications which may serve, in trade, to designate the kind, quality, quantity, intended purpose, value, geographical origin or the time of production of the goods or of rendering of the service, or other characteristics of the goods or service, must not be registered. Article 7(2) of that regulation provides that Article 7(1) is to apply notwithstanding that the grounds of non-registrability obtain in only part of the European Union.

15 Those signs or indications are deemed incapable of performing the essential function of a trade mark, namely that of identifying the commercial origin of the goods or services (judgments of 23 October 2003, OHIM v Wrigley , C‑191/01 P, EU:C:2003:579, paragraph 30, and of 27 February 2002, Eurocool Logistik v OHIM (EUROCOOL) , T‑34/00, EU:T:2002:41, paragraph 37).

16 For a sign to be caught by the prohibition set out in Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001, there must be a relationship between the sign and the goods or services in question that is sufficiently direct and specific to enable the relevant public immediately to perceive, without further thought, a description of the goods and services in question or of one of their characteristics (see judgments of 12 January 2005, Deutsche Post EURO EXPRESS v OHIM (EUROPREMIUM) , T‑334/03, EU:T:2005:4, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited, and of 22 June 2005, Metso Paper Automation v OHIM (PAPERLAB) , T‑19/04, EU:T:2005:247, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).

17 Whether a sign is descriptive can be assessed only, first, by reference to the goods or services concerned and, secondly, by reference to the understanding which the relevant public has of the sign (see judgment of 25 October 2005, Peek & Cloppenburg v OHIM (Cloppenburg) , T‑379/03, EU:T:2005:373, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).

18 It is in the light of those principles that the complaints raised by the applicant are to be examined.

19 In the first place, the applicant does not dispute the definition of the relevant public adopted by the Board of Appeal, according to which the services in question are aimed primarily at the English-speaking professional public of the European Union, with a higher-than-average level of attention. Therefore, it is with regard to that public that it must be examined, on the basis of a given meaning of the word sign NAVIGATE, whether there is a sufficiently direct and specific relationship between that word sign and the services in question.

20 In the second place, as regards the relevant public’s understanding of the mark applied for, the Board of Appeal noted, as did the examiner, that, according to the Cambridge Dictionary , the English term ‘navigate’ could mean ‘to lead a company, activity, etc. in a particular direction, or to deal effectively with a difficult situation’. According to the Board of Appeal, that term is not metaphorical and is easily understood, outside maritime and IT contexts, as meaning ‘guiding [or] helping to deal with a complex issue’, without any additional cognitive effort being required.

21 The applicant submits, in essence, that the Board of Appeal’s use of the term ‘navigate’ is figurative and constitutes an example of a conceptual metaphor. Rather, it is a metaphorical interpretation evoking a term belonging initially to the language of navigation and functioning as an analogy to illustrate the act of handling complexity. While the applicant acknowledges that the use of the term ‘navigate’ has broadened across different fields over time, it submits that the term has nevertheless retained its core meaning, namely intentional, guided movement toward a goal.

22 The applicant claims, in essence, that the relevant public is required to perform an interpretative mental operation in order to understand the figurative meaning of the term ‘navigate’ as adopted by the Board of Appeal and will not perceive that term as a direct or technical indication of a characteristic of a given service. That term therefore does not have the characteristics required to correspond to the descriptive character referred to in Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001.

23 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments.

24 First of all, while it is true that the applicant is correct to claim that, originally, the term ‘navigate’ denoted the act of guiding or manoeuvring a vessel, it must be stated, as the Board of Appeal and the applicant itself noted, that the use of that term outside the maritime context is not unusual. As is apparent from the Cambridge Dictionary referred to in the contested decision, the term ‘navigate’ is now used, inter alia, in the fields of transport, internet and telecommunications and in the field of business. In that connection, it is clear from that dictionary that in the field of business, the term ‘navigate’ means, as was noted by the Board of Appeal, ‘to lead a company, activity, etc. in a particular direction, or to deal effectively with a difficult situation’, without it being specified whether that is a metaphorical interpretation, contrary to what is stated by the applicant. The applicant has not, in addition, submitted any evidence capable of establishing the veracity of its claims or attesting to the mental operation of interpretation necessary to understand the meaning of the term ‘navigate’ as adopted by the Board of Appeal. Lastly, the inclusion of the definition contested by the applicant in a dictionary is, in any event, the expression of a fair amount of recognition on the part of the public (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 July 2021, Aldi v EUIPO (Cachet) , T‑622/20, not published, EU:T:2021:446, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited).

25 Furthermore, the fact relied on by the applicant that, in essence, the term ‘navigate’ has nevertheless retained its core meaning – namely intentional, guided movement toward a goal – is not relevant in the present case.

26 It should be borne in mind that a word sign must be refused registration under Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001 if at least one of its possible meanings designates a characteristic of the goods or services concerned (judgments of 23 October 2003, OHIM v Wrigley , C‑191/01 P, EU:C:2003:579, paragraph 32, and of 12 February 2004, Campina Melkunie , C‑265/00, EU:C:2004:87, paragraph 38). In addition, the possible meaning of a term should not be examined in the abstract, but in relation to the goods and services covered by the application for registration and to the consumers for whom they are intended (see judgment of 14 January 2026, Variuscard v EUIPO (CRYPTOSTAMP) , T‑140/25, not published, EU:T:2026:11, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).

27 Accordingly, it should be noted that, as stated in paragraph 24 above, while it is apparent from the Cambridge Dictionary that the term ‘navigate’ means, inter alia, ‘to lead a company, activity, etc. in a particular direction, or to deal effectively with a difficult situation’, it also follows from the examples of use in that dictionary that that term is used to describe finding one’s way through a complex process or a difficulty, including with the assistance of a third party. Therefore, in the context of training, information and advice services in the field of electrical distribution installations, the Board of Appeal was entitled to find that the sign NAVIGATE will be understood by the relevant public as indicating the intended purpose of those services, namely guiding and directing customers through issues with a certain degree of complexity.

28 Therefore, the Board of Appeal did not commit an error of assessment by noting, in paragraphs 21 and 22 of the contested decision, that the term ‘navigate’ will be understood by the relevant public as meaning ‘guiding [or] helping to deal with a complex issue’.

29 In the third place, as regards the assessment of the descriptive character of the mark applied for in relation to the services covered by the application for registration, the Board of Appeal, first of all, noted that the various services in respect of which the registration had been sought came within the field of electrical distribution installations, in the context of which the guidance relating to their installation, distribution and security would be vital, which the applicant does not dispute. The Board of Appeal then found that, in the context of those services, the sign NAVIGATE will be clearly perceived as an indication of their intended purpose.

30 The applicant maintains, in essence, that even when interpreting the term ‘navigate’ as meaning ‘to deal effectively with a difficult situation’, that term does not have a sufficiently direct and specific relationship with the services in question as provided for in Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001. Apart from the fact that metaphorical language by its very nature resists direct descriptiveness, the applicant submits that the metaphor used by the Board of Appeal does not have a direct, specific and readily comprehensible relationship with the services in question, given that that term is too vague and does not name the type of services offered, nor their subject matter, intended purpose, or function. Furthermore, the establishment of that relationship requires multi-step reasoning and prior reflection, so the relevant public will not immediately perceive, without any interpretative effort, a description of the services in question.

31 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments.

32 As a preliminary point, it should be recalled that where registration of a mark is sought in respect of various goods or services, the Board of Appeal must determine specifically that none of the grounds for refusal of registration listed in Article 7(1) of Regulation 2017/1001 applies to that mark, in relation to each of those goods or services claimed, and may reach conclusions which differ depending upon the goods or services in question. Therefore, when refusing registration of a trade mark, the Board of Appeal is required to state in its decision its conclusion for each of the goods and services specified in the application for registration, regardless of the manner in which that application was formulated. However, where the same ground for refusal is given for a category or group of goods or services, the competent authority may limit itself to using general reasoning for all of the goods or services concerned (see judgment of 29 January 2025, Coswell v EUIPO (Biorepair) , T‑1128/23, not published, EU:T:2025:108, paragraph 44 and the case-law cited).

33 In the present case, the Board of Appeal found that the services in respect of which registration was sought all came within the same field, namely electrical distribution installations, and pursued an objective of guidance, which the applicant does not dispute. Moreover, it is apparent from paragraphs 15 and 24 to 26 of the contested decision that the Board of Appeal grouped the services in respect of which registration was sought into three distinct categories, namely (i) as regards the services in Class 41, training in the field of electrical distribution installations, (ii) as regards the goods in Class 42, advice and consultancy, and (iii) as regards the services in Class 45, security consultancy and security assessment of risks. It is apparent from the contested decision that the Board of Appeal provided reasons and undertook an analysis of the relationship between the term ‘navigate’ and the services in question for each of those categories.

34 As regards the question whether there exists, from the point of view of the relevant public, a sufficiently direct and specific relationship between the mark applied for and the goods and services covered by the application for registration, it should be recalled that, by the use, in Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001, of the terms ‘the kind, quality, quantity, intended purpose, value, geographical origin or the time of production of the goods or of rendering of the service, or other characteristics of the goods or service’, the EU legislature made it clear, first, that those terms must all be regarded as corresponding to characteristics of goods or services and, secondly, that that list is not exhaustive, since any other characteristics of goods or services may also be taken into account (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 March 2011, Agencja Wydawnicza Technopol v OHIM , C‑51/10 P, EU:C:2011:139, paragraph 49).

35 The fact that the EU legislature chose to use the word ‘characteristic’ highlights the fact that the signs referred to in Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001 are merely those which serve to designate a property, easily recognisable by the relevant class of persons, of the goods or the services in respect of which registration is sought. Accordingly, a sign can be refused registration on the basis of that provision only if it is reasonable to believe that it will actually be recognised by the relevant class of persons as a description of one of those characteristics (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 March 2011, Agencja Wydawnicza Technopol v OHIM , C‑51/10 P, EU:C:2011:139, paragraph 50 and the case-law cited).

36 Moreover, for Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001 to apply, it is sufficient for the sign to be descriptive of one of the possible intended purposes of the goods and services in question which the relevant public is liable to take into account when making a choice and which accordingly constitutes an essential characteristic thereof (see judgment of 12 June 2024, Nike Innovate v EUIPO – Puma (FOOTWARE) , T‑130/23, not published, EU:T:2024:373, paragraph 67 and the case-law cited).

37 In other words, for a sign to be regarded as descriptive, it is necessary, but also sufficient, that, in one of its possible meanings, that sign could designate, in the eyes of the relevant public, the services concerned or at least one of the characteristics thereof, which include the intended purpose.

38 That is indeed the case here.

39 As the Board of Appeal noted in paragraph 23 of the contested decision, the services covered by the application for registration come within the field of electrical distribution installations, which may be complex and hazardous, with the result that guidance relating to installation, distribution and security is vital.

40 It must be recalled that it is apparent from the case-law referred to in paragraph 17 above that a sign’s descriptive character cannot be assessed other than by reference to the goods concerned and by reference to the understanding which the relevant public has of it.

41 In that connection, it is apparent from paragraphs 24 to 28 above that the Board of Appeal was right to find that the relevant public will understand the term ‘navigate’ as referring to the idea of ‘guiding [or] helping to deal with a complex issue’. As the Board of Appeal further notes in paragraph 27 of the contested decision, in the context of the services in question, that term conveys a message of guiding and directing through complex issues in the field of electrical distribution installations.

42 Moreover, it should be recalled that, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 36 above, it is sufficient, in order for the registration applied for to be refused on the basis of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001, that the sign is descriptive in at least one of its possible meanings.

43 In the present case, in view of the meaning of the term ‘navigate’, which refers to the idea of guiding and directing and of effectively handling difficult situations, and of the very nature of the services in question, consisting in the supply of training, information, advice and assessment of risks in a complex technical field, the relevant public will immediately perceive that the mark applied for indicates the intended purpose of those services, namely guiding and directing customers in complex issues relating to electrical distribution installations.

44 Accordingly, as regards, first, the training services in Class 41, namely the services provided in the field of electrical distribution installations relating to electrical safety training, providing of education, training and tuition and the arranging and conducting of seminars, including online, the Board of Appeal cannot be criticised for having found that the sign NAVIGATE, understood in the context of the services in question and by the relevant public as meaning ‘guiding [or] helping to deal with a complex issue’, will convey to that public, as regards those services, an indication, likely to be grasped immediately and relating to the intended purpose of those services, consisting in guiding customers via training through the complex issues of electrical distribution installations and in enabling them to work while avoiding hazards in that field.

45 Contrary to what the applicant argues, it is irrelevant, in that connection, that the sign does not expressly indicate the exact nature of the service or that it does not, as such, refer to detailed educational content. As is apparent from paragraph 37 above, Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001 does not require that the sign describe all of the characteristics of the service in question. In the context of an activity in electrical safety training, and, more generally, an activity in the field of electrical distribution installations, the idea of assistance in dealing with a complex issue constitutes immediately intelligible information as to the intended purpose of the services in question.

46 Furthermore, as regards the applicant’s argument that the term ‘navigate’ is not an expression commonly used in the context of electrical safety training services and of education, training and tuition in the field of electrical distribution installations, it must be recalled that it is not necessary that the signs or indications referred to in Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001 actually be in use at the time of the application for registration, in a way that is descriptive of goods or services such as those in respect of which the application is made or of characteristics of those goods or services. It is sufficient, as the wording of that provision itself indicates, that such signs and indications might be used for such purposes (see order of 7 April 2025, Skechers USA v EUIPO (HANDS FREE FIT) , T‑254/24, not published, EU:T:2025:393, paragraph 46 and the case-law cited).

47 As regards, secondly, the advice and consultancy services in Class 42, it must be noted that they include more specifically technological consultancy, engineering and expert appraisal services, consultancy services in relation to energy efficiency, sustainability and carbon tax, computer security consultancy and, lastly, quality control testing services. Those services all come under the field of electrical distribution installations. As is apparent from the meaning of the term ‘navigate’ adopted in paragraph 28 above, that term refers, for the relevant public, to the idea of guidance when dealing with a situation involving a certain complexity. In the context of the services in question, which consist specifically in the provision of advice, expert appraisals, information and technical evaluations enabling decisions to be made or solutions to be implemented, the sign NAVIGATE will be understood as indicating that the intended purpose of those services is to guide customers through technical, regulatory or strategic options relating to those installations.

48 Therefore, the sign NAVIGATE is capable of being immediately perceived, as regards the services in Class 42, as a descriptive indication of their intended purpose, within the meaning of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001.

49 That assessment is not called into question by the applicant’s arguments in that connection. The applicant submits, in essence, that the term ‘navigate’ does not describe the exact technical nature of the services in Class 42, in particular those involving testing, studies or expert appraisals, and that its application to services such as consultancy in relation to computer security, sustainability or carbon offsetting would require too indirect an interpretation, or even an interpretation too vague to constitute a descriptive indication. First of all, as is apparent from paragraph 45 above, it is irrelevant, for the assessment of the descriptive character of the sign in question, that that sign does not describe the exact technical nature of the services, since it indicates their intended purpose. Next, even in respect of consultancy in relation to computer security or sustainability, the term ‘navigate’ directly refers to the idea of guidance through complex requirements and choices. Lastly, the fact that certain services involve testing or expert appraisals does not prevent the sign from being perceived as indicating assistance through technical processes.

50 As regards, thirdly, security consultancy and security assessment of risks in Class 45, it should be noted that they consist, by their very nature, in assisting customers in the identification, analysis and handling of risks and hazards and the determination of appropriate prevention and protection measures. The intended purpose of those services is therefore to guide recipients through an uncertain or complex situation in order to enable them to make informed security decisions. In those circumstances, the Board of Appeal was right to find that in the context of those services, the sign NAVIGATE, understood by the relevant public to refer to the idea of assistance in dealing with a complex issue, directly conveys the information that the services in question aim to guide customers through risks and security issues and therefore provides an indication as to the intended purpose of those services, within the meaning of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001.

51 The applicant submits that the sign NAVIGATE does not contain any reference to typical security concepts such as protection, prevention or risk analysis. However, as is apparent from paragraphs 45 and 49 above, such an argument cannot be accepted. Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001 does not require that the sign explicitly designate the technical terminology or the specific content of the service, since it can, in the context of the services covered, be immediately understood by the relevant public as providing an indication of a characteristic of that terminology or content, inter alia their intended purpose. As regards security consultancy and the assessment of risks, the mere fact of guiding the recipient through situations involving risks or security issues constitutes an element inherent in the purpose of those services. Therefore, the Board of Appeal was entitled to find that, in that context, the sign NAVIGATE directly referred to the intended purpose of the signs in question.

52 The applicant also made a number of complaints which are, in essence, identical with regard to each of the three categories identified by the Board of Appeal.

53 As regards the applicant’s claim that the interpretation of the term ‘navigate’ adopted by the Board of Appeal is based on a metaphor and, as such, resists descriptive character within the meaning of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001, it has already been established, as is apparent from paragraphs 24 to 28 above, that the meaning given by the Board of Appeal to that term is not figurative and that it constitutes, in a given context, one meaning out of several of the term ‘navigate’ and that it is therefore not necessary to employ a metaphorical interpretation.

54 Furthermore, the applicant’s argument that the establishment of a relationship between the sign and the services in question requires multi-step reasoning with the result that the relevant public will not immediately perceive, without any interpretative effort, a description of the services also cannot be accepted. In the sectoral context concerned by the services in question, namely that of electrical distribution installations, which is characterised by compliance and safety issues, the relevant public consists in professionals faced with technical choices and safety constraints. In such a context, the term ‘navigate’, understood as referring to the idea of guidance and assistance when dealing with a difficulty, is such that it will be immediately perceived as indicating that the intended purpose of the services is to guide and help their recipients through issues bearing a certain degree of complexity. The applicant seems to confuse, in actual fact, the requirement of a direct and specific link with the requirement of an exhaustive or detailed description of the services in question. Accordingly, a sign may be descriptive even if it does not provide in itself a complete description of each of the services in question given that, in the context of the services covered, it immediately conveys descriptive information about a relevant characteristic, such as the intended purpose. Lastly, inasmuch as it follows from the foregoing that the descriptive character is, in the present case, immediately perceptible and does not require any particular effort, the applicant’s argument alleging the vague character of the sign in question also cannot succeed.

55 In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the first plea must be rejected as unfounded.

The second plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001

56 The applicant criticises, in essence, the Board of Appeal for failing to indicate the reasoning for its finding that the registration of the mark applied for should also be refused under Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001. The applicant submits that, in any event, since the contested decision is not based on that absolute ground for refusal, its examination is outside the scope of the present proceedings.

57 It is sufficient to recall that, according to the case-law, a word mark which is descriptive of characteristics of goods or services for the purposes of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001 is, on that account, necessarily devoid of any distinctive character in relation to those goods or services within the meaning of Article 7(1)(b) of that regulation (see judgment of 2 July 2025, Lunar Outpost v EUIPO (LUNAR OUTPOST) , T‑513/24, not published, EU:T:2025:658, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited).

58 Furthermore, it is apparent from Article 7(1) of Regulation 2017/1001 that it is sufficient that one of the absolute grounds for refusal listed in that provision applies for the sign in question not to be registrable as an EU trade mark (see order of 7 April 2025, HANDS FREE FIT , T‑254/24, not published, EU:T:2025:393, paragraph 54 and the case-law cited).

59 In the present case, in view of the fact that it has been found that the word sign in respect of which registration is sought was descriptive of the services concerned within the meaning of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001 and that the ground for refusal, first, implies a lack of distinctive character in relation to those services and, secondly, justifies, in itself, the refusal to register that sign, it is not necessary to examine the second ground, alleging infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of that regulation.

The third plea in law, alleging infringement of the principles of equal treatment and sound administration

60 The applicant submits, in essence, that EUIPO is required to treat comparable cases consistently if the legal and factual circumstances are substantially the same and if the earlier decisions are consistent and lawful. The applicant specifically claims, in that connection, that the Board of Appeal did not adequately take into consideration the earlier registrations of the term ‘navigate’ on which it had relied and in the context of which that term was rightly found to be sufficiently distinctive and not descriptive. The refusal to register the applicant’s mark therefore resulted in unjustified unequal treatment.

61 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments.

62 It must be recalled that, since the application by EUIPO of the principles of equal treatment and sound administration must be consistent with respect for the principle of legality, a person who files an application for registration of a sign as an EU trade mark cannot rely, to his or her advantage and in order to secure an identical decision, on a possibly unlawful act committed to the benefit of someone else (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 March 2011, Agencja Wydawnicza Technopol v OHIM , C‑51/10 P, EU:C:2011:139, paragraphs 73, 75 and 76).

63 In the present case, as is apparent from paragraphs 38 to 55 above, the Board of Appeal was entitled to find that the mark applied for was caught by the ground for refusal laid down in Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001, with the result that the applicant cannot successfully rely on EUIPO’s earlier decisions in order to invalidate that finding.

64 It follows that the plea alleging infringement of the principles of equal treatment and sound administration must be rejected as unfounded.

Costs

65 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

66 Although the applicant has been unsuccessful, EUIPO has applied for the applicant to be ordered to pay the costs only in the event that a hearing is convened. Since no hearing was held, it is appropriate to order each party to bear its own costs.

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (Fifth Chamber)

hereby:

1. Dismisses the action;

2. Orders ABB Asea Brown Boveri Ltd and the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) each to bear their own costs.

Sampol Pucurull | Laitenberger | Brkan

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 25 March 2026.

V. Di Bucci | M. van der Woude

Registrar | President

* Language of the case: English.