Sweden’s eighth national report under the Convention on Nuclear Safety

Sweden’s Eighth National Report under the Convention on Nuclear Safety Sweden’s Implementation of the Obligations of the Convention

Swedish Government Official Reports (SOU) and the Ministry Publications Series (Ds) may be purchased from Norstedts Juridiks kundservice. Ordering address: Norstedts Juridiks kundservice SE- 106 47 Stockholm, Sweden Telephone orders: +46 8-598 191 90 Email orders: kundservice@nj.se Online orders: www.nj.se/offentligapublikationer As far as concerns distribution of SOU and Ds publications as part of a referral procedure, Norstedts Juridik has a remit from the Swedish Government Offices’ Office for Administrative Affairs. Cover exterior of Forsmark NPP: Jann Lipka/Strålsäkerhetsmyndigheten Graphic design: Granath Printed by Elanders Sverige AB Stockholm 2019 ISBN 978-91-38-24960-4 ISSN 0284-6012

Sweden’s Eighth National Report under the Convention on Nuclear Safety Sweden’s Implementation of the Obligations of the Convention

7.5. Enforcement of applicable regulations and terms of licences 37 4 Contents

18.4. Implemetation Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety 130

19.1. Initial authorization 131 19.2. Operational limits and conditions 132 19.3. Procedures for operation, maintenance,

Contents 5

Foreword 6 Foreword

Foreword

Sweden’s eighth national report has been issued in for in its eighth national report. Chapter 3 provides facts compliance with the provisions of Article 5 of the and information, Article by Article, to substantiate Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS). Sweden signed compliance with the obligations of the Convention. the Convention on 20 September 1994. The Convention The reporting on Articles 6, 14, 18, 19 and the summary was ratified one year later, on 11 September 1995, and contain specific paragraphs regarding implementation entered into force on 24 October 1996. of the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety (VDNS) principles, in consideration of a special letter and advice The first national report on Swedish implementation of the issued by the president of the eighth review meeting. obligations under the Convention was issued in August 1998. Altogether, this information provides evidence demon - Subsequent national reports were issued in August of the strating compliance with the obligations of the Convention years 2001, 2004, 2007, 2010, 2013 and 2016. All these on Nuclear Safety. reports are available from the CNS website as well as from the website of the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority The seventh review meeting of the contracting parties (www.ssm.se). The reports were the subject of discussion to the Convention on Nuclear Safety resulted in a number at review meetings held in 1999, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2011, of topics to be considered while preparing national reports 2014 and 2017. for the eighth review meeting. The topics are to be reflected upon and the results presented in the report. The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority has been assigned by the Government of Sweden to coordinate preparation The general conclusions regarding Sweden’s compliance of this national report. The report was produced by a with the obligations of the Convention are provided in working group comprising representatives of the regula- the summary and in Chapter 3, Article 5. tory body, i.e. the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority, The present national report covers the period March together with representatives of the licensed operators 2016 – April 2019. of nuclear power plants in Sweden. The report is designed for good screen readability. The present report is structured in accordance with This increases its accessibility, while also reducing the Convention guidelines and other recommendations. need to make a printout. This is beneficial from an To provide the reader with a frame of reference and environmental aspect. an introduction, Chapter 1 includes basic facts and information about the Swedish nuclear power programme. Stockholm, June 2019. Chapter 2 includes a summary of the report and additional comprehensive information. It also includes a summary of highlights and issues raised in relation to Sweden during the seventh review meeting, held during the period Isabella Lövin 24 March – 4 April 2017. Additionally, this chapter provides an overview of the issues Sweden was requested to account Minister for Environment and Climate

Foreword 7

Executive Summary

The national reports for the review meetings are developed authorisation in June 2017. An appointed investigator in response to Article 5 of the Convention, which call for a assisted by and expert committee with representatives self-assessment of each Contracting Party with regard to from the Government Offices, regulatory authorities, the compliance with the obligations of the Convention. On industry, and non-governmental organisations were the part of Sweden, this self-assessment has demonstrated involved in the investigation. In early April 2019, a report compliance with all the obligations of the Convention, as was delivered to the Swedish Government in which a shown in Chapter 3 of this national report. proposal is made to have the current Act on Nuclear Activities repealed and replaced by a new act with a new The Swedish nuclear power reactors were designed in the structure. 1970 and 1980 and have since the original design and th th constructions been periodically modernised and reassessed A overhaul of SSM’s regulations promulgated in the SSM to ensure compliance with the current design basis and to Code of Statutes SSMFS, began in late 2013. The first of further improve safety as well as to prepare for long term the new regulations are finalised and entered into force in operation. In 2015, decisions were taken by the plant June 2018. By the end of 2020, key regulations governing owners to phase out the four oldest operating nuclear nuclear power reactors are expected to come into force. power reactors during the period 2017 – 2020. Two of A full scope IAEA IRRS mission to Sweden was these reactors have been shut down permanently during performed in February 2012. The Government subsethe current review period. The plant owners decisions were quently requested a follow-up IRRS mission, which was based on the overall business and energy market situation performed in April 2016. The outcome of the follow-up and other circumstances over the past few years. mission was that two out of 22 recommendations given to There are currently eight nuclear power reactors in Sweden in 2012 remained open, signifying that work operation in Sweden. Two reactors were permanently remained to be done. A general conclusion of the IRRS shut-down during the current review period and are not team was that they were satisfied with the approach of included in this reporting. One nuclear power reactor will Sweden to address the findings and work on closing the be permanently shut-down in the end of 2019 and will not remaining recommendations. The next IRRS mission be in operation at the time of the review meeting. scheduled for Sweden is in 2022. From the perspective of political developments, the No major events implying serious consequences for safety Government prepared an invitation following the 2014 at Swedish NPPs have occurred during the review period. election to parties across the Parliament to participate in a However, a few events have occurred which have importance special energy commission to agree on long-term energy in relation to safety barrier integrity. For example, reactor policy. The multiparty Energy Commission, whose containment liner leakage and an internal leakage between members in June 2016 announced an overall agreement on drywell and wetwells have been detected and identified Swedish energy policy, and published its final report on during a regular integrated containment air tests during 9 January 2017. The agreement included the aim of 100% annual outages. renewable electricity production by 2040, which does, Important measures identified by the EU stress test however not preclude the operation of nuclear reactors National Action Plan (NAcP) include measures for after 2040. The agreement also confirmed the existing meeting new requirements for robust and functionally legislation allowing new nuclear power reactors to be built independent core cooling. The purpose of these measures at existing reactor sites to replace existing and closed is to increase the reliability of core cooling in a NPP by reactors, and that there is no longer an end date for nuclear introducing a new and alternate independent function. energy in Sweden. Furthemore, a special tax on electrical Thus, SSM decided in 2014 that any nuclear power reactor power produced in nuclear reactors was eliminated. in operation at 2020 must have functionally independent An investigation into a revision of Swedish nuclear core cooling system (ICCS) capabilities in place. At the time legislation has been performed following the Government’s of this report, temporary safety measures to increaseing

8 Executive Summary

the independence of existing core cooling systems are in The work will also enhance procedures and guides on place at all plants. The principle design for the permanent managing accidents affecting more than one unit at a site. ICCS function are decided and the preparatory work for At the seventh review meeting, Contracting Parties decided installation is ongoing. that the fulfilment of the principles and practical Following decisions taken by the plant owners, to perma- implemen tation of the VDNS should be specifically nently shutdown four reactors, licensees in Sweden are considered while preparing national reports for the eighth facing new challanges in the area of human resources as review meeting. For this reason, a brief discussion of well as the overall safety strategies. The lincensees must practical measures regarding implementation of principles ensure that safety is maintained throughout the decommis- of the Declaration is provided in Chapter 2, and presented sioning process and also ensure safe and stable continued in detail in Chapter 3, Articles 6, 14, 18 and 19 of this operation of the remaining nuclear power reactors at the report. sites. Various approaches have been applied by the licensees to preserve, develop and strengthen the safety culture, and to ensure that safety and radiation protection are properly maintained. Due to these new challenges SSM has focused its supervision at the sites concerned to the licensees’ staffing and the competence of the staff. The closure of two of the oldest reactors, less maintenance and fewer large projects involving reactor systems, and concerted efforts to improve radiation protection conditions in the work environment resulted in substantially lower average collective dose per year and reactor. The work to lower individual radiation doses has also been successful. During the reporting period only very few NPP staff received radiation doses exceeding 10 mSv. Special projects have inter alia focused on education and training and measures to adhere the new dose limit for the lens of the eye. In the area of emergency preparedness, the emergensy preparedness and response regulations contain new rules for logistics centres and provisions concerning the ability to receive aid and support from external organisations. Changes have also been made to the structure of the regulations and some requirements were moved to over-arching general safety regulations.A number of new monitoring stations have been installed around the nuclear power plants in Sweden. The new stations will provide information on dose rates at 90 locations around the Swedish nuclear power plants. The licensees have also devoted efforts to the area of severe accident management guidelines (SAMG) and improvements to existing procedures, and the creation of new procedures for extraordinary situations at Swedish NPPs are ongoing.

Executive Summary 9

1. Introduction

1.1. National policy

settlement and associated services in both day-ahead and intraday markets across nine European countries. The 1.1.1. Current role of nuclear power in Swedish national high voltage grid is managed by a state authority, electricity production Svenska Kraftnät. Regional and local grids are operated as The total electricity production in Sweden increased in regulated monopolies by various grid companies. 2017. Net production grew by 5.2 percent compared with 2016 to 160.5 TWh. Electric power generated in Sweden 1.1.2. Political developments regarding use nuclear surpassed domestic consumption. This meant Sweden had Energy a net surplus of 19.0 TWh on its international electricity After the 2014 election, the Government invited parties exchanges. across the political aisles in Parliament to participate in a special energy commission to agree on long-term energy In 2017, wind power production increased by 13.8 percent policy. The multiparty Energy Commission announced an to 17.6 TWh. The contribution of hydro-power, including overall agreement on Swedish energy policy in June 2016, pumping, increased by 4.7 percent to 64.7 TWh. Convenand published its final report on 9 January 2017 (SOU tional thermal power increased to 15.0 TWh, an increase 2:2017 in the Government Official Reports series). The of 2.6 percent. Nuclear power increased by 4.1 percent to main points relating to nuclear energy in the report were: 63.0 TWh. Solar power contributed with 0.23 TWh, an increase of 60.1 percent compared with the previous year. – The target by 2040 is 100 per cent renewable electricity production. This is a target, not a deadline for banning The net electricity generation from the various production nuclear power, nor does it mean closing of nuclear resources was in 2017 distributed as presented in the figure 1. power plants through political decisions. Total generation net 160,5 TWh – New nuclear power reactors may be built at existing Solar power reactor sites to replace existing and closed reactors. The

Conv. thermal power 0,14% Windpower

9,35% 10,97% total number of Swedish reactors at any time is limited to 10. Nuclear power reactors may operate beyond 2040; consequently, there is no end date for nuclear energy in Sweden. Central government support for nuclear power, in the form of direct or indirect subsidies, cannot however be assumed. – Nuclear operators’ liability for accidents will triple, from 4 billion SEK to 12 billion SEK, in accordance with the Hydro-power Paris Convention. Operators will be required to have

40,28%

full insurance coverage. – The tax on installed reactor capacity was decided to be entirely removed over a period of two years. The Government has thereafter abolished the tax on nuclear Nuclear power Source: Swedish Energy Agency reactor capacity with the intent of introducing a 39,26% and Statistics Sweden compensatory increase in the tax on electricity, though Figure 1. Electricity generation from various production sources in 2017. with an exemption for electricity-intensive industry.

In June 2017, the government appointed an inquiry chair The Swedish electric power market has been deregulated to review the nuclear safety law. The aim of the inquiry since 1996. Trading of electricity is managed on the Nordic was to carry out a review of the nuclear safety law to marketplace, Nord Pool, which offers trading, clearing, ensure that the legal framework will provide an effective

10 Introduction

and sound base ensuring high level of nuclear safety to units have been cancelled, though all necessary measures protect workers and the general public against the dangers for maintaining safety will be taken until the reactors are arising from ionizing radiations from nuclear installations. taken out of operation. Subsequently, a new and important missions for the concerned utilities OKG and RAB, are to ensure safe and effective decommissioning of the perma-

1.2. National nuclear power programme

nently shut down units.

1.2.1. Development of the nuclear power The nuclear safety strategy in Sweden is to apply programme in Sweden continuous improvements based on regular and systematic In Sweden, the first steps towards a national nuclear re-assessments, aiming at ensuring compliance with modern programme were taken in 1947, when AB Atomenergi was requirements and current design basis. The strategy also established to realise a development programme decided includes identification of further safety improvements by by Parliament. As a result, the first research reactor, located taking into account ageing issues, operational experience, at the Royal Institute of Technology (KTH) in Stockholm, most recent research and development and developments went critical in 1954. This was followed by the first in international standards. prototype nuclear power plant (PHWR), Ågesta NPP, The Swedish licensee implemented safety measures located in a rock cavern near a suburb of Stockholm, and through relevant modifications and, in some cases, by research reactors built at the Studsvik research centre. The means of comprehensive modernization projects. For Ågesta NPP was in operation between 1964 and 1974, and example, after the accident in Three Mile Island in 1979, was mainly used for district heating. The first commercial severe accident management systems (including Filtered nuclear power plant, Oskarshamn unit 1, was commis- Containment Venting System, FCVS) were introduced at sioned in 1972. Between 1974 and 1985 another eleven the Swedish NPPs. Also, extensive modernization nuclear power reactor units were taken in to operation, at programmes were introduced in 2005 and completed in the sites in Barsebäck, Oskarshamn, Ringhals and 2015 for all Swedish NPPs in order to meet new Forsmark. The twelve commercial reactors built in Sweden requirements issued by the regulator in 2004. In summary, comprise nine BWRs (ASEA-Atom design) and three the safety measures implemented as a result of the new PWRs (Westinghouse design). As a result of political regulations in 2004 mainly included improvements in decisions, the BWR units Barsebäck 1 and 2 were shut separation and diversification, as well as enhancing the down permanently in 1999 and 2005, respectively. In 2004, capability to control conditions that might arise during Studsvik Nuclear AB decided to shut down the two design basis accidents. Actions have also been taken to remaining research reactors at the Studsvik site. The considerably strengthen the capabilities to operate the Studsvik research reactors were closed in June 2005 and plants and monitor the status of the barriers by introthe decommissioning will be completed in 2019. ducing new and or upgraded instrumentation and control An application for a licence to construct, own and operate equipment. a nuclear facility consisting of one or two nuclear power Furthermore, safety improvements have also been reactors with adjacent facilities was presented to SSM in identified through international reviews such as the EU July 2012. At that time the applicant, Vattenfall, considered stress test National Action Plan (NacP). In 2015 the replacing the two oldest units at Ringhals by one or two licensees completed all necessary analyses covered by the new units. However, in late 2014, Vattenfall informed SSM NacP, see Appendix 2. During the first quarter of 2016, that all ongoing work relating to plans for new builds of licensees submitted to SSM plant-specific implementation nuclear reactors had been put on hold. There is currently plans for reasonably practicable measures identified by the no intention to resume the project. evaluations and analyses covered by the NAcP. During the autumn of 2015, at extraordinary shareholders’ meetings of RAB and OKG, decisions in principal were 1.2.2. Nuclear power installations in Sweden taken to phase out the reactors Ringhals units 1 and 2 and As at March 2019, Sweden has eight nuclear power reactors Oskarshamn units 1 and 2. The decisions were taken based with an operational licence, as specified in Table 1 below. on to the overall business and energy market situation, Five nuclear power reactors have been permanently shut existing taxes, and SSM’s requirements for operation down, namely Ågesta, Barsebäck unit 1, Barsebäck unit 2, beyond 2020. Following these decisions, the owners of Oskarshamn unit 1 and Oskarshamn unit 2. OKG decided to cancel implementation of the ongoing safety modernization project of Oskarshamn unit 2. This unit had been in long term outage for modernization since 2013, and it was subsequently decided not to restart the unit. The owners of OKG also decided that Oskarshamn unit 1 would continue operation until the annual outage in 2017, after which it was permanently shut down and entered the decommissioning phase. The owners of RAB have decided that operation of Ringhals unit 2 will end in 2019 and that operation of Ringhals unit 1 will end in 2020. As a consequence, all major investments in these two

Introduction 11

Table 1. Main data for nuclear power installations in Sweden.

Licensed thermal Electrical gross Commercial Power reactor Type Operator Construction start power level (MW) output (MW) operation

Ågesta 105 12 PHWR AB Atomenergi Vattenfall 1957 1964 –1974

1 Maintained by Vattenfall AB and AB SVAFO. All fuel and heavy water as well as parts of the primary system (some of the steam generators) have been removed from the installation.

Nuclear Facilities in Sweden

Boiling Water Reactor (ASEA-Atom)

Pressurized Water Reactor (Westinghouse) Forsmark 1 Forsmark 2 Other facilities Forsmark 3

Permanently Shut down SFR Final repository for radioactive operational waste

Westinghouse Stockholm Electric Sweden AB Ågesta Fuel fabrication facility Vattenfall AB Ågesta PHWR Ranstad Mineral AB Studsvik Uranium recovery facility Facilities for fuel and materials testing, waste management and storage

Gothenburg

Ringhals 1 Ringhals 2 Ringhals 3 Ringhals 4

Oskarshamn NPP OKG AB Barsebäck 1 CLAB Oskarshamn 1 Barsebäck 2 Central interim storage Oskarshamn 2 Malmo facility for spent fuel Oskarshamn 3

Figure 2. Location of the nuclear facilities in Sweden.

12 Introduction

All Swedish BWRs including Ågesta PHWR were designed mainly large power companies such as Vattenfall AB,

by domestic vendor ASEA-Atom (later merged into ABB Sydkraft Nuclear Power AB, and Fortum Generation AB.

Atom, further Westinghouse Electric Sweden AB), and all The respective workforces at the different sites varies in Swedish PWRs were designed by Westinghouse Electric number of employees depending on the plant situation in Company (USA). The maximum power level of the terms of the operational status for the units. The number operated reactors has been uprated between 6% and 38% of employees is declining at the Oskarshamn and Ringhals from the original licensed power levels (see section 6.3). sites. This was also previously the case at Barsebäck NPP. An overview of the current situation and the main data for Workforces present at Swedish nuclear power plants in nuclear power installations in Sweden are shown in Table 2018, together with trends compared with the years since 1. Figure 2 shows the geographical locations of Swedish 2015, are presented in Table 4 of section 11.2.2. nuclear facilities, all of which are situated in the southern

half of Sweden.

1.2.4. Support organisations of owner and licensees

Considering the ageing of the Swedish nuclear reactor Swedish nuclear power plant operators jointly own the

fleet, work on implementation and development of following support organisations:

comprehensive ageing management programmes at the – KSU AB (Nuclear Safety and Training): provides nuclear power plants has been ongoing since specific operational training, including simulator training, on a requirements regarding ageing management and long term contractual basis to all Swedish nuclear power plants. operation were originally introduced in the national KSU also analyses international operational experience regulations in 2005. In recent years, activities regarding and provides the results to the Swedish operators. ageing management have been intensified, and the – SQC (Swedish Qualification Centre): a company for preparations for long term operation for reactors facing independent qualification of NDT systems the end of their original design lifetime in the near future, (Non-Destructive Testing) to be used by NDT typically 40 years, have been intensified. companies at Swedish nuclear power plants.

1.2.3. Ownership and staffing – Norderf (formerly ERFATOM): formed by Swedish

Ownership of Swedish nuclear power plants is characterized and Finnish NPP operators, KSU and SKB with the aim

by a large extent cross-ownership, as shown in Figure 3. to proactively monitor predetermined trends and

The key players in the nuclear power sector in Sweden are deviating results, and carry out experience feedback

Uniper SE

100%

Sydkraft AB

100%

Sydkraft Utility/ MKB AB Group Vattenfall AB Nuclear Power Fortum Owner of Utilites AB

22,2% 45,5% *) 66% 70,4% 9,9% *) 54,5% 100% 29,6%

Licence Barsebäck Kraft Forsmark Holder/ Ringhals AB OKG AB AB Kraftgrupp AB Operator

100% 100% 100% 100%

Nuclear Barsebäck NPP Ringhals NPP Oskarshamn NPP 1 Forsmark NPP Power 2 BWR 1 BWR BWR 3 BWR Plants Shut down 3 BWR 2 BWR Shut down

*) including ownership through Mellansvensk Kraftgrupp AB (MKB)

Figure 3. Utility and ownership structure 2019.

Introduction 13

analysis of events in Swedish and Finnish NPPs, as well level waste (LILW) from operations and decommissioning, as of international operational experience. and 15,000 m of long-lived LILW. The assumption is based – SKB (Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management on 60 years of reactor operation, with the exceptions of Company): a company that deals with spent nuclear fuel Ringhals units 1 and 2 which were expected to be operated and radioactive waste. SKB owns and operates the for 50 years and the actual years for the permanently shut central interim storage facility for spent nuclear fuel down reactor units. Total annual production of LILW at the nuclear facilities is usually around 1,000 – 1,500 m . (Clab) at Oskarshamn and the final repository for short-lived radioactive waste (SFR) at Forsmark. SKB is The national waste programme includes the waste also responsible for R&D work in connection with the treatment facilities at Studsvik, the repository for shorttechnical concept and location of the final repository lived LILW and operational radioactive waste at the for spent fuel, including the Äspö Hard Rock Forsmark site (SFR), shallow land burials at the nuclear Laboratory and canister laboratory at Oskarshamn. power plant sites and at Studsvik, the interim storage SKB has applied for, and is currently waiting for a facility for spent nuclear fuel at Oskarshamn (Clab), the government decision on, the construction and operation transportation system, and the use of clearance. Material of a final repository for spent nuclear fuel. may be cleared for unrestricted use, for example recycling, or for treatment as conventional non-radioactive waste. In 1.2.5. Other commercial services in the nuclear addition to the existing waste management facilities, four industry major waste facilities are foreseen to be designed, sited, The supply of services in the nuclear field has become constructed and licensed in the future: A plant for encapconcentrated to a few companies. The main Swedish sulation of spent nuclear fuel, a disposal facility for spent vendor, previously ASEA-Atom/ABB Atom, is now part fuel, a disposal facility for long-lived low and intermediate of Westinghouse Corporation, which is owned by Brook- level waste, and an extension of the SFR facility for waste field Business Partners L.P. under the name Westinghouse from decommissioning. Additional land burials may also be Electric Sweden AB. Other active vendors on the Swedish constructed. market are Framatome, Westinghouse, GE Hitachi Nuclear Transport of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste is done Energy, GE, Siemens, and Alstom. largely by sea, since all Swedish nuclear power reactors and Studsvik AB is a contractor for materials testing and most nuclear facilities are situated along coastlines. The nuclear fuel investigations. Its materials testing reactors are transport system has been in operation since 1982 and closed, but the company cooperates with others as needed. consists of a transport ship, transport casks and containers, Studsvik AB maintains operations at its own hot-cell and terminal vehicles for loading and unloading. In 2013, laboratory for fuel investigations. The company also the new transport ship M/S Sigrid was taken into provides decommissioning and waste treatment services. operation, a custom built vessel for transports of spent Swedish nuclear power plant licensees have observed a fuel and radioactive waste from nuclear power plants to lower number of companies bidding for qualified technical Clab and SFR.

projects and services. This reflects the concentration of

1.2.7. Nuclear education, research and development

vendors and service companies on the market, in addition In Sweden, higher education in nuclear technology is to increasing demand as a result of the upgrading of mainly concentrated to the Royal Institute of Technology Swedish reactors and a nuclear construction project in in Stockholm (KTH), Chalmers University of Technology neighbouring country Finland. in Gothenburg (CU), and Uppsala University (UU). According to Swedish law, a licence holder is required to The three Swedish nuclear power plant licensees and make the necessary checks for the quality and competence Westinghouse Electric Sweden AB jointly support these of a contractor and to take full responsibility for the work three universities through the Swedish Centre of Nuclear performed by such contractors. Technology (SKC), an organisation for sponsoring and

coordination that has been in existence since 1992. SKC

1.2.6. Nuclear waste

supports undergraduate education, graduate schools as well Operational radioactive waste is generated by nuclear as research. reactors and fuel cycle facilities, such as Studsvik AB’s facilities at Studsvik and Westinghouse Electric Sweden When SKC was set up in 1992, there was a decision AB’s fuel fabrication plant located in Västerås. Radioactive pending on closure of nuclear power plants, and student waste also originates from medical and research institutions, enrolment in nuclear studies was very low. At that time, the industry and consumer products. The radioactive waste industry and the regulatory authority faced similar chalproduced during infancy of the Swedish civil nuclear lenges in competence development in general and staff industry’s development, is safely stored at the Studsvik site renewal in particular. The situation during the early days of or has already been transferred to a final repository for SKC is similar to that of the present situation, involving radioactive waste. the recent shutdown of two reactors and the planned shutdown of two reactors out of the eight currently in In total, the Swedish nuclear power programme is expected operation in Sweden. This will introduce new challenges in to generate approximately 20,000 m (12,600 tonnes) of terms of maintaining sufficient competence within the spent fuel, 155,000 m of short-lived low and intermediate country. The present SKC contract ends in 2019, but there

14 Introduction

are ongoing negotiations regarding a continuation cooperation mainly takes place within the frameworks of

involving the same partners. the IAEA, OECD/NEA and EU, and also in connection

with the international conventions ratified by Sweden and SSM provides financial support for basic and applied in non-governmental organisations such as the Western research as well as the development of methods and European Nuclear Regulators Association (WENRA), processes to a number of Swedish universities as well as Heads of European Radiation Control Authorities relevant research institutes, and has an observer’s status in (HERCA), and the International Nuclear Regulators SKC. SSM have also recurrently received Government Association (INRA). assignment to investigate staffing and competence needs

over the long term among all stakeholders in the Swedish In addition to multilateral collaboration, SSM currently has

nuclear sector. The last assignment was reported to the bilateral agreements with thirteen regulatory bodies in

Government in 2018. various countries. These agreements concern the exchange

of information and cooperation within agreed areas (e.g. Vattenfall has provided joint funding for a new bachelor’s nuclear safety, emergency preparedness, occupational degree programme on nuclear power at UU, which will exposure, environmental radiological protection, and start autumn 2019. Moreover, long-term cooperation is radioactive waste management). These countries are established between the nuclear industry and UU for Australia, Belarus, Canada, France, Finland, Germany, training staff in nuclear technology and radiation protec- Japan, South Korea, Lithuania, Russia, Ukraine, the United tion within NANSS (Nordic Academy for Nuclear Safety Kingdom, and the United States. In addition, Sweden has and Security). This effort has also resulted in improved special agreements with the Nordic countries (Denmark, education and closer exchange between students and the Finland, Iceland and Norway) regarding emergency industry, because places not used by industry are filled by preparedness and information exchange. university students.

SSM provided technical expertise to the Swedish govern- Moreover, Vattenfall has been a major partner in KIC ment during the development of the new and amended InnoEnergy (Knowledge & Innovation Community) EU directives in the areas of nuclear safety and radiation during the development of the master’s programme protection. SSM participates in ENSREG (European EMINE (European Master in Nuclear Energy), where Nuclear Safety Regulators Group), an expert advisory students attend one year in Barcelona or at KTH, and one group for the European Commission. ENSREG is year in France. Around 20 students graduate annually from composed of senior officials from national nuclear safety, the EMINE programme. Discussions are in progress with radioactive waste safety or radiation protection regulatory CU on launching a similar programme. authorities and senior civil servants with competence in

Also, a large international project on a joint research and these fields from all 28 Member States of the European

education programme was established in 2011. Within this Union together with representatives of the European

project, 15 Swedish PhD students spend a significant part Commission.

of their study period at French laboratories. The project Following the severe accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi also includes training sessions at a research reactor, the NPP in March 2011, the European Council requested that Saclay Nuclear Research Centre outside Paris. comprehensive safety and risk assessments should be

performed for all EU nuclear power plants. The so called

1.2.8. National industry cooperation

EU stress tests were performed at national level, and A joint industry initiative was taken in 2013 by forming a supplemented by a European peer review. On behalf of coordination group, KSKG (Kärnkraftssäkerhetskoordinthe Swedish government, and with input from the Swedish eringsgrupp), to coordinate critical nuclear safety and licensees, SSM developed and published a national security issues (primarily following the Fukushima Dai-ichi assessment report. Furthemore, SSM contributed to this accident), stress tests, and work on other upcoming process as a member of ENSREG’s stress test peer review regulatory requirements. The goal of this liaison group is board and as a team leader for one of the three topical to develop and strengthen safety and security in an areas included in the peer review. effective way. KSKG delivers position papers on high

priority and strategic issues. The members of KSKG are In 2017 the first EU topical peer review under the

these licence holders: Forsmarks Kraftgrupp AB (FKA), amended EU Nuclear Safety Directive, took place. Ageing

RAB, OKG, SKB and the owners of the nuclear facilities, management was the topic for this peer review process.

i.e. Vattenfall, Sydkraft NP and Fortum. On behalf of the Swedish government and with input

from the Swedish licensees, SSM developed and published

a national assessment report and participated actively in the

1.3. Swedish participation in international

peer review process.

activities to enhance nuclear safety and

SSM contributes to the work performed within interna-

radiation protection

tional conventions in the areas of nuclear safety and

1.3.1. The regulatory body radiation protection, such as the Convention on Nuclear

Through SSM, Sweden is involved in about 140 interna- Safety and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent

tional working groups. The majority of these groups deal Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste

with nuclear safety and radiation protection issues. The Management, the Convention on Early Notification of a

Introduction 15

Nuclear Accident, the Convention on Assistance in the Ministry of the Environment, and Sweden’s International

Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, Development Cooperation Agency. The total budget is

the Espoo Convention, the Convention for the Protection approximately 35 million Swedish kronor per year.

of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR) and the Helsinki Commission (HELCOM) 1.3.2. Utilities

conventions for reduction of releases of radioactive Utilities in Sweden are active in international cooperation

substances from nuclear facilities. for the purpose of enhancing nuclear safety by sharing

experience, contributing to work on international regula- SSM participate actively in the development of the IAEA tion and guidelines, and by participating in safety assesssafety standards, through the membership of the Commisments and peer reviews. At the present time, this is sion on Safety Standards (CSS) as well as the membership primarily accomplished through memberships in WANO of the Safety Standards Committees. and in owner’s group associations of major European and

Apart from regulatory matters, SSM is engaged in a US vendors, and by participation in the Foratom initiative

number of international research projects, mostly within European Nuclear Installations Safety Standards, the

the framework of cooperation projects carried out by the European Utilities Requirements project and IAEA

Nordic countries, the EU research programme, OECD activities. Both Vattenfall and Sydkraft Nuclear Power have

NEA, and the IAEA. Sweden is also active in networks for direct membership in WANO.

promoting research and cooperation in radiobiology, Swedish utilities are also engaged in international projects radioecology and biological dosimetry. Furthermore, SSM and research organisations. The examples are, the Nordic staff have been involved in many international expert Safety Research Project (NKS), ongoing since 1977, and missions, for example as experts in the IAEA peer review programmes and projects within the framework of EU and service teams of the IRRS, OSART and SALTO. OECD/NEA.

SSM is active within the framework of OECD/NEA Swedish nuclear licensees participated in the EU stress test through participation in committees and working groups and in the 2017 EU Topical Peer Review on Ageing as well as through the membership in the OECD/NEA Management and supported the development of a national Multinational Design Evaluation Programme (MDEP), evaluation report as well as the development of a National which was launched by regulatory authorities to foster Action Plan. cooperation on the safety of new reactors.

Swedish nuclear licensees participate in European Nuclear SSM plays an active role in WENRA and its working Installations Safety Standards Initiative, ENISS. ENISS has groups. SSM has contributed to the review and developrepresentation from 19 European nuclear power ment of the updated WENRA Safety Reference Levels for companies and licensees from 16 countries. The primary Existing Reactors, and participated in WENRA’s ongoing objective of ENISS was to create a forum for the benchmarking projects, which makes a systematic compar- European nuclear operators to prepare common positions ison of national reactor safety requirements and their for WENRA consultation processes. For example, ENISS implementation against jointly agreed reference levels. participated actively in the consultation process for the

WENRA study, “Safety Objectives for New Power

1.3.1.1. International development and cooperation

Reactors”, and the review of the 2014 update of the

programmes

WENRA Safety Reference Levels, as well as the Guidance Through SSM, Sweden is involved in a number of Documents related to that update, i.e., WENRA Guidance development and cooperation programmes with countries Documents on Design Extension Conditions (Issue F) and in Central and Eastern Europe. The aim is to enhance Natural Hazards (Issue T). The aim of the initiative is to safety at nuclear power plants in the region and improve bring together decision makers and specialists from the radiation protection of people and the environment. SSM industry with the regulators in an effort to establish safety also works towards increasing awareness about nuclear targets, safety rules and measures, and to achieve a set of non-proliferation and strengthening control regimes in the common and harmonized European safety standards. region. The cooperation projects are mainly run together Another task of ENISS is to review new or revised IAEA with Russia and Ukraine, though certain projects are also Requirements and Guidelines, TECDOCs and the Safety run together with Georgia and Moldova. In 2015, SSM Glossary. From this aspect, ENISS has adopted a coordiworked together with Finnish and Norwegian authorities nating role in the European industry’s contacts with the to establish initial contact with the Belorussian authority IAEA. This means that European nuclear utilities can join on launching cooperation in the areas of nuclear and the IAEA revision process at an earlier stage than was radiation safety, mainly relating to the construction of two previously the case. nuclear reactors. As of 2017, there has been an ongoing

exchange of opinions and experience in regulatory In February 2019, Vattenfall nuclear sector received full

activities between the Nordic regulators and Belorussian membership of the Electric Power Research Institute,

counterparts. EPRI. This organisation offers support, often based on

best practices, in many important nuclear areas. EPRI The programmes are based on Government decisions, with conducts research on materials management, fuel and financing provided by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the

16 Introduction

chemistry, plant performance and strategic initiatives to support safe, reliable, cost-effective and environmentally friendly use of nuclear power. This is done by means of global collaboration conducted together with nuclear power plant operators, regulatory authorities, and other research organizations. The membership gives Vattenfall the potential to maintain existing and develop new competences as well as the possibility to follow the latest development in important areas of interests.

Introduction 17

2. Summary of the development since last national report

2.1. Highlights and issues in the discussion

details of managing ageing issues, as well as a in creating a companywide awareness of the necessities and require-

about Sweden at the seventh review

ments related to operating the plants beyond its original

meeting held in 2017

design life. Furthermore, Sweden participated in the first Observations and aspects which were highlighted and EU Topical Peer Review process on managing the ageing documented by the rapporteur during the discussions of of nuclear installations. the CNS Review Meeting regarding the seventh Swedish Through supervision, SSM has found deviations in some national report, led to the following challenges presented of the plants aging management processes, and has in country report. A short summary on progress done requested improvements and relevant measures to be since seventh review meeting is also presented below. implemented by the licensees. Follow-up reviews and Challenge SE-2014-05: Ensuring safe long-term inspection have been conducted to control that the operation of Swedish NPPs requires additional safety measures taken by the licensees have the intended effect. improvements and licensee applying an effective ageing Results from these inspections are described in Sweden’s management (remained open). EU Topical Peer Review on ageing management.

In the latest years, the preparations for long term operation More details are available and described in section 14.3.5 (LTO i.e. more than 40 years of operation) has been

Challenge SE-2017-01: Implementing an approach,

intensified, especially for those plants that will remain in consistent with the government assignment, to sustain and operation after 2020. SSM requires an integrated develop capability in both the regulatory body and licensee programme for management of degradation due to ageing. (including sustaining support such as R&D and suppliers) Long term operation (LTO) is not formally defined in given the plan to shut down some NPPs and the need to Swedish legislation or associated regulations, instead the develop additional capability in technical and radiological term “continued operation” has been suggested. The aspects of the decommissioning area. requirement on establishment of an ageing management programme is applicable to all reactors in operation, As presented in section 11.4., in September 2018 SSM regardless of age. SSM recognizes the fact that the reactors submitted a government assignment on the national were originally designed for an operating time of 40 years, long-term competence supply in the field of radiation with LTO used as a term to designate operation in excess safety to the government. The report to the Government of 40 years. Since the last CNS report, SSM has defined a shows that there are challenges and shortcomings in the position regarding LTO which states that that the main supply of skills in the radiation safety area in Sweden. It process for supervision in regards of LTO will be within includes several suggestions covering the areas of the framework of the PSR reviews. knowledge management, funding provided to the critical core of research environments, and identification of The licensees have developed overall ageing management education programmes critical importance to society in the programmes (AMP), by compiling information from field of nuclear safety and radiation protection. already existing programmes, such as maintenance, component qualification, in service inspection and In addition, recommendations were given to employers and chemistry programmes. These programmes compile a lot to the industry within the field to attract students so that of experience gained from the operation of the plants as they enroll in nuclear safety and radiation protection well as external ageing related experience. programmes, and to manage research funding to guarantee

that the relevant research environments will be sustained. To have international experience and aspects included in the overall ageing management programmes, all licensees Since September 2018, some progress has been made and have made use of the IAEA SALTO or pre-SALTO the industry have carried out recruitment campaigns to reviews, which were important steps in both the technical attract young employees. Additionally, SSM is reforming its

18 Summary of the development since last national report

work to strengthen the national strategic perspective on On 15 June 2017, the Swedish Parliament (Riksdagen) long-term knowledge management. decided on amendments to the Act on Nuclear Activities (1984:3) to transpose several important provisions of the

Challenge SE-2017-02: Maintaining and overseeing safety

Council Directive (2014/87/Euratom) amending Directive culture during the transition from operation to decommis- 2009/71/Euratom establishing a Community framework sioning. for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations. The amend- Following the decisions on permanent shutdown of two ments to the Act on Nuclear Activities entered into force reactors at each of the Oskarshamn and Ringhals sites, the on 1 August 2017. At the same time, several regulations of licensees are facing new tasks to take measures and set up the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority were amended to strategies in order to ensure that safety is maintained transpose other provisions of the directive. throughout the decommissioning process. In this respect As presented in section 7.2.2 of the report, a major review preservation of safety culture is an important aspect, which of SSM’s Code of Statues, SSMFS, is under progress. In needs to remain in focus of both the licensees and the May 2018, the first part of the new Code of Statutes, regulatory body, and numerous activities were started and concerning nuclear activities, was decided. This part are currently ongoing. (SSMFS 2018:1) includes regulations on basic rules for all In order to maintain continuity in the work with, and licensed activities involving ionising radiation. The implementation of safety culture throughout the decom- regulations also transpose provisions of Council Directive missioning process, the licensees developed action plans or 2013/59/Euratom, which have not been included in the special projects. These plans and projects address safety- new Radiation Protection Act. The regulation SSMFS related activities that the management priorities in order to 2018:1 came into force on 1 June 2018. maintain, develop and strengthen the safety culture, and to In preparing SSM’s new Code of Statutes, consideration is ensure that safety and radiation protection standards are also given to all relevant IAEA standards as well as to the maintained throughout the decommissioning process. WENRA Safety Reference Levels. Various approaches have been used by the licensees, starting with new safety promoting work methods,

experiences exchanges (benchmarks) with other organi- 2.2. Significant changes to the National sations, or start of a dedicated project aimed at preparing Nuclear Programme

for decommissioning, mainly regarding technical and

2.2.1. Licensee

organisational aspects. During autumn 2015, at the extraordinary shareholders’ Safety culture workshops and surveys were also performed meetings of RAB and OKG, decision in principal have in order to identify and discuss safety culture challenges been taken to permanently shut down units 1 and 2 at related to transition to decommissioning. Ringhals NPP and unit 1 and 2 at Oskarshamn NPP. SSM focus areas has been the licensees’ competence Oskarshamn unit 2 were at that time in outage since 2013, provision and staffing, considering the challenges the for modernization and the OKG owners decided not to licensees have in retaining personnel and hiring new staff restart the unit. After the outage 2017 Oskarshamn unit 1 now and in the near future. SSM has formed a cross-organ- was permanently shut down and entered the decommisisational team to carry out the strengthened supervision, sioning phase as well. The remaining OKG reactor, and to ensure that the licensees are continuously followed. Oskarshamn unit 3, is planned to remain in operation, with a planned lifespan of 60 years, i.e., into the 2040’s. One further area that has come into focus is the issue of the relationship between national culture and nuclear safety The owners of RAB have decided that operation of culture. A Country-specific Safety Culture Forum (CSSCF) Ringhals unit 2 will end in 2019 and of Ringhals unit 1 in was developed jointly by the Nuclear Energy Agency 2020. In consequence, all major investments for these units (NEA) and the World Association of Nuclear Operators have been cancelled, but all necessary measures to maintain (WANO) to provide countries with a forum for dialogue safety will be taken, as appropriate, until they are decomand reflection on how national attributes can influence missioned. Ringhals units 3 and 4 will remain in operation, nuclear safety culture. SSM was involved in the develop- with a planned lifespan of 60 years, i.e., into the 2040’s. ment of this forum and hosted the very first CSSCF in January 2018. Representatives from both the regulator and 2.2.2. Regulatory programme the industry participated in the workshop on national Pursuant to Government’s authorisation in June 2017, the safety culture. Ministry of the Environment and Energy appointed an inquiry chair to conduct a review of the national nuclear Section 12.2.1.3 and 12.4.1 contains more details and legislation. Additionally an appointed expert committee description of the activities performed. with representatives from the Government offices, Challenge SE-2017-03: Completion of the remaining regulatory authorities, the industry and non-governmental work to update the set of regulations, including conside- organisations was established to assist the inquiry chair. In ration of the requirements from EU Directives and April 2019 the inquiry chair delivered a report (SOU WENRA reference levels. 2019:16) to the Swedish Government where it is proposed

Summary of the development since last national report 19

that the current Act on Nuclear Activities will be repealed events and activities, including dissemination of all and replaced by a new act with a new structure. significant experience.

Most of the substance of the present provisions is The work with these recommendations are still ongoing. transferred to the new act, but sometimes with revised Also, the 2016 IRRS follow-up mission resulted in four language. Some provisions are suggested to be modified additional suggestions for Sweden (for more information and others deleted. A few completely new provisions are see section 8.1.4). also suggested to be added. The Government has officially requested IAEA to carry A summary of the most important proposals from the out the next IRRS mission in Sweden, which is scheduled inquiry is presented in section 7.1.2. for 2022.

2.2.3. Regulatory body Furthermore, several IAEA SALTO review missions were SSM is currently revising its Code of Statutes related to performed in Sweden during the current reporting period. nuclear activities and radiation protection. Experience has In December 2017, IAEA performed a pre-SALTO peer demonstrated the need to clarify and broaden the regula- review at Oskarshamn NPP for OKG unit 3. In November tions in order to create more predictability for the licensees 2016 IAEA performed a pre-SALTO review at the and to improve the regulatory support. Forsmark NPP and a full scope SALTO peer review mission at Forsmark NPP is planned for June 2019. In The major review of Codes and Statutes, SSMFS, began in March 2018, an IAEA SALTO peer review mission was late 2013. In the early stages of the work, a decision in performed at Ringhals NPP for unit 3, and a follow-up principle was taken stating that the aspects of radiation mission is planned for March 2020. protection, nuclear safety and security largely than previously should be regulated in an integrated manner. The The sections 9.2.3.2 and 9.2.3.1 contain more details and new structure that was decided signifies regulation of description of the activities performed. radiation safety (i.e. radiation protection, nuclear safety and security) at nuclear facilities for different phases of a

2.4. Implementation of Vienna

facility’s lifetime and for different main types of substan-

Declaration on Nuclear Safety

tive issues (see section 7.2.2). Considering the relatively large change to structure and content as well as to the Since the previous national report several, a number of regulatory approach, SSM decided to apply a multi-step safety related activities in line with the VDNS principles process during the development process. Thus, the first have been ongoing. The most relevant activities are as parts of the new Code of Statutes was finalised, decided follows: and entered into force in June 2018. – The licensees are required to implement an independent An additional challenge for the regulator was the Govern- core cooling system (ICCS) at reactors intended to be ment’s decision in August 2017 to relocate SSM’s head- operated beyond 2020. The principal design solutions quarters from Stockholm to Katrineholm by the end of for the ICCS functions are presented in section 18.2.1.6. 2018. Starting from October 2018, SSM has located parts and installations of the systems are at the time of this of its operations in the new offices. In addition, SSM also report, ongoing. According to schedule, the new opened a branch office in Gothenburg. systems will be taken into operation during the second half of 2020. – At the time of this report, temporary safety measures to

2.3. IAEA IRRS mission and other IAEA

increase the independence of existing core cooling

peer- reviews systems are in place at all plants and has been so since

A full-scope IAEA IRRS mission to Sweden was 2017 (see section 6.2). These measures were taken to performed February 2012 and the resulting recommenda- ensure safety during extreme events that were previously tions have been addressed, on behalf of the Swedish (before the EU stress tests) not covered by the safety Government, by SSM in an action plan. A follow-up analyses. These measures were taken prior to mission took place in April 2016. implementation of the ICCS and are not required after the installation of the ICCS. The general conclusion from the 2016 IRRS follow-up – During this reporting period considerable focus from team was that they were satisfied with the approach of both the regulatory body and the licensees has been on Sweden to address the findings of the 2012 IRRS mission the assurance of long-term safety functions and safety and to improve on the regulatory system for nuclear safety. barriers through the introduction of extensive work However, two of 22 recommendations originally given by related to ageing issues. The licensees have subsequently the IRRS team were judged still to be open. The two updated ageing management programmes to address the recommendations refer to: impact of degradations and other ageing related – Provisions to maintain competence for nuclear safety processes on specific safety related components and and radiation protection on a national level, and systems. These activities also relate to the preparation – The systematic evaluation of operational experience of LTO at the units that will be facing end of their from non-nuclear facilities and radiation protection design lifetime, to assure safe continued operation.

20 Summary of the development since last national report

For this purpose, ageing issues are given considerably In order to keep focus on the area of ageing and LTO, increased attention in relation to PSR reporting and several IAEA SALTO missions are scheduled to be review, including reporting on matters related to performed at Swedish NPPs. Preliminary dates for various long-term plant safety status and proof of continued licensees are as follows. OKG is planning for future IAEA safe operation until the time for the next PSR (see peer reviews, with the second pre-SALTO mission section 14.1.1). preliminarily scheduled for 2021 and a full scope SALTO – Since the middle of 2017, work is ongoing on mission in 2023. IAEA performed a pre-SALTO review at improvements and creation of new procedures for the Forsmark NPP in November 2016, and a full scope handling of extraordinary situations at the Swedish SALTO mission is planned for June 2019. Ringhals NPP NPPs. The work will enhance operational procedures has a follow-up mission planned for March 2020, following and improve guides to handle accidents affecting more the SALTO review performed in March 2018. than one reactor unit at a site. The goal with this update Following the EU topical peer review process, a national is to also improve the severe accident management action plan to handle the outcome of the peer reviews procedures and to adapt them to the international have been developed. For the upcoming period it will be a guidelines (SAMG). The work is scheduled to be task for both the licensees and the regulator to implement finished at the end of 2020. the national action plan.

2.5. Future activities until the next

Preparation for the next IRRS mission to Sweden, scheduled for 2022, will be a vital part of SSM’s activities

National Report

during the period, requiring extensive efforts and resources In the upcoming period until preparation of the next prior to the mission. national report there are a number of activities already ongoing and planned that will be of vital importance for further work to ensure that safety and radiation protection are properly maintained. Important measures identified by the NAcP include measures to meet the requirements for functionally independent core cooling systems (ICCS). Within the framework of the NAcP, SSM has decided that any nuclear power reactor in operation after 2020 must have functionally independent core cooling capabilities in place. This means the licensees are required to have ICCS in operation before the end of 2020. The principle design of ICCS are set and the installation is ongoing. A proposal regarding a new Act on Nuclear Activities was presented by an inquiry chair to the Government in April 2019. This proposal has been submitted for a consultation procedure involving authorities, municipalities, licensees and other stakeholders. A major review of SSM’s Code of Statutes, SSMFS, is under progress (see section 7.2.2). Since the middle of 2017, work is ongoing to issue specific procedures for extraordinary situation at the Swedish NPPs. This will give better support to the organisation in similar events. A part of the work is improvement of emergency operating guidelines and adaptation to international guidelines in the area of SAMG. The work is schedule to be finished in the end of 2020. The work will also enhance procedures and guides to handle the accidents affecting more than one unit at a site. Regarding the decision by OKG and RAB on permanent shutdown of four units, the upcoming period will include transition from operation to decommissioning for two more units. This will introduce new challenges for all organisations involved and particularly in the area of human resources. The changed work load in total with lower number of employees and with operation and decommissioning in parallel, is a challenge for both the licensees and the regulatory body.

Summary of the development since last national report 21

Part I General Provisions 22 22 Part I General Provisions

3. Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

Article 4. Implementing measures

The legislative, regulatory and other measures to fulfil the Each Contracting Party shall take, within the framework of obligations of the Convention in Sweden are accounted its national law, the legislative, regulatory and administrafor in this report. tive measures and other steps necessary for implementing its obligations under this Convention.

Article 5. Reporting

obligations of the Convention’s Articles. Articles 6 – 8 are Each Contracting Party shall submit for review, prior to structured to enable reporting in a clear and reviewable each meeting referred to in Article 20, a report on the manner. Articles 9 – 19 have a similar basic structure, where measures it has taken to implement each of the obligainformation is provided about the regulatory requirements tions of this Convention. relating to the corresponding Article and measures taken by the licence holders to comply with the regulatory The present report constitutes the eighth Swedish report requirements. These accounts also include information issued in compliance with Article 5 of the Convention. about the licensees’ own safety initiatives as well as about

regulatory control. In the reporting for Articles 6 – 19, the present report describes and accounts for Sweden’s compliance with the

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 23

Article 6. Existing nuclear installations

6.1. Significant events since the

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to

ensure that the safety of nuclear installations existing at previous national report

the time the Convention enters into force for that During the current review period, no events occurred Contracting Party is reviewed as soon as possible. When indicating a serious degradation of safety and radiation necessary in the context of this Convention, the protection at Swedish nuclear power plants. An overview Contracting Party shall ensure that all reasonable of the most relevant events occurring during the period practicable improvements are made as a matter of 2016–18 is provided below. urgency to upgrade the safety of the nuclear installation. If such upgrading cannot be achieved, plans should be

6.1.1. Leakage through the reactor containment

implemented to shut down the nuclear installation as soon

liner

as practically possible. The timing of the shut-down may take into account the whole energy context and possible The Ringhals unit 1 containment has a gastight liner, alternatives as well as the social, environmental and designed to withstand high pressure in the event of a economic impact. steam release in the containment. The liner is mostly covered by concrete. In the upper part, however, the liner is fully visible, and therefore also possible to test. This part Under this article, Sweden provides information about of the liner has a conical form and is 6 mm thick. significant events that have occurred at the nuclear power plants during the past three years, as well as conclusions In connection with restarting Ringhals unit 1 after the 2017 drawn from these events. Furthermore, information is annual outage, a containment air test (CAT) was carried provided about performed and planned measures for out, with approved results. Upon inspection of the safety upgrades and power uprates of the reactors. Basic containment, leakage was detected in the upper part of the information about the design of the reactors, safety liner. Three small pitting holes were visible. Two of the upgrading already decided, and measures already imple- holes were wet, and one was leaking approximately 40 litres mented, is provided in section 18.2. and Appendix 1. of water per day.

Between the upper part of the liner and the outer concrete

Summary of developments wall, mineral wool insulation was attached when since the last report

constructing the containment. This was done to create an air gap that would give flexibility regarding movements During the current review period, the following developbetween the liner and the concrete. The insulation had ments are of relevance with regard to the obligations of been glued to the liner, and the concrete of the contain- Article 6: ment poured around this insulation. – Transitional safety measures have been in place at The investigation conducted after the discovery of the reactors since 2017. These measures regard independent pitting holes showed that water had collected between the core cooling in relation to extreme events, which were liner and the concrete wall of the containment. Leakages previously not covered by the safety analyses. from pools located above the containment were the origin – The licensees have finalised implementation of major of the water. The insulation, combined with intermittent power uprating as the remaining part of the uprate leakage, provided the preconditions for corrosion of the programme for nuclear power capacity in Sweden. Some liner. The driving forces behind the corrosion were the fact of the units are still in trial operation before decision on that the water had accumulated intermittently during transition to routine operation. periods of outages when the reactor internals and storage pools were filled with water. Together with the mineral wool insulation, this created a local environment that was conducive to propagation of corrosion cells. Furthermore, the anticorrosion paint had degraded in some areas.

24 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

The performed CAT showed that the containment leakage plans for reasonably practicable measures identified by the

was within the limits specified in the SAR. Analysis shows evaluations and analysis covered by the NAcP.

that the liner will not crack in exposed conditions during a The result from the evaluations and reassessments also severe accident. The containment thus fulfilled the identifies a number of reasonably practicable administraintended safety function in the event of a severe accident. tive and technical measures for further improvements. A

Most of the insulation was removed, the liner repaired and list of such administrative and technical measures for each

drainage channels added to gain control over possible NPP was submitted to SSM in February 2016 for regula-

leakage from the pools. The work prolonged the outage tory review. The main areas of improvements identified are

time by approximately 73 days. A programme for repairing new independent core cooling systems, more robust

the above-lying pools has been launched. Ringhals is also cooling of spent fuel pools and more robust supply of

overhauling its processes for preventive maintenance of emergency power.

building structures. This is to ensure build-up of compe- According to the NAcP, reasonably practicable administratence, define responsibilities, and achieve clear communicative and technical measures identified by the evaluations tion that encompasses maintenance of buildings. and reassessments required by the NAcP, shall be imple-

mented at the latest 2020, see Appendix 2.

6.1.2. Internal containment leakage violating the

pressure suppression function Important measures identified in the NAcP include

At Forsmark unit 2, a sealing with a modified design was measures taken to meet the requirements for functionally

installed in 2009 in the intermediate floor between drywell independent core cooling. The purpose of such measures

and wetwell. The intermediate floor has two redundant is to increase the reliability of the core cooling in a NPP by

seals. Following the redesign, the lower seal has as it’s only introducing a new and an alternate independent function.

task to fulfil the safety requirements concerning leak Already in the early 2000s, discussions began regarding

tightness. The upper original sealing is only considered to introduction of an additional independent core cooling

serve as protection against spillage in the dry well. function. This need was confirmed later by the EU stress

tests. Within the framework of the NAcP, SSM decided in During the 2016 annual outage of reactor 2 at the late 2014 that the licensees are required to report on Forsmark NPP, planned testing was performed of the detailed implementation plans for independent core sealing function in the intermediate floor of the containcooling (ICCS). According to the SSM decision, intermement. The test showed an increased leakage rate, exceeding diate safety measures aimed at considerably increasing the the safety limits, in the intermediate floor between the independence of existing emergency core cooling should drywell and wetwell in the containment. A total of four be implemented by the end of 2017, and a robust and different leakage sections were detected by means of completely independent system should be implemented by inspection, showing deviations in the epoxy injections. the end of 2020, see section 18.2.1.6. Tests and analysis regarding leak tightness, performed after

the deficiencies were found in the lower sealing in 2016, 6.2.1. Transitional measures pending installation of

showed that the upper sealing status was within the SAR an independent core cooling system

accepted criteria. Consequently, the decision was made to Following completion of the stress tests, efforts have been

credit the tightness of the upper sealing for the forth- made to strengthen the weaknesses identified. These

coming operational season and to plan for permanent efforts are transitional measures until the ICCS is in place.

repair in the next annual outage.

6.2.1.1. Forsmark NPP

Until the outage in 2017, the condition during power The Forsmark strategy is to focus on mobile equipment operation was considered to be a minor deviation from the and to strengthen the emergency preparedness organisadefence-in-depth concept of the unit. The sealing of the tion with the overall goal of reducing the core damage intermediate floor was considered approved for operation, frequency (CDF) by 50 per cent. A toolbox comprising giving a fully operational containment function including mobile equipment gives a flexibility that is useful for many an intact pressure suppression function. During the annual different scenarios and events. outage of 2017, permanent repair was performed. Most of the events that are now taken into account are

external events that evolve slowly. Forsmark has an

6.2. Safety improvements of nuclear agreement in place with the Swedish Meteorological and power reactors Hydrological Institute (SMHI) on giving daily and local

Already during late 90’s and before the accident in weather forecasts for the site. These forecasts are taken

Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP and the EU stress test, actions in into account for different levels of proactive responses and

the area of natural external hazards and other external for the purpose of preventing or mitigating plant impacts.

events, were taken by the licensees within the scope of the At the Forsmark NPP, the transitional measures, intro-

modernisation programmes, see Appendix 2. duced by the end of 2017, consist of:

In 2015, the licensees completed all the necessary analyses – New connections at emergency diesel generators that covered by the EU NAcP. In the first quarter of 2016, the enable cooling by using mobile equipment licensees submitted to SSM plant-specific implementation

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 25

– Mobile equipment, e.g. pumps, heaters, portable lighting a high degree of complexity, the majority of the necessary and coolers technical and administrative measures identified by the – Connections to external power sources investigations included in the Swedish national action plan, – Mobile diesel generators were expected to be implemented after 2015. Within the framework of the NAcP, SSM decided in late 2014 that the – Establishment of a new local preparedness team licensees are required to report on detailed implementation – Strengthening of the emergency preparedness organisation plans and specifically ICCS. SSM conducts, and will – New and improved procedures. continuously conduct, supervision of licensees’ implementation of safety improvements in the plants. The objective

6.2.1.2. Ringhals NPP

is to ensure that requirements are met and to have the Pending installation of the independent core cooling licensee efforts for strengthening of plant safety maintain a system, the capability to cope with station blackout has continuous process. been improved at Ringhals units 3 and 4. The battery capacity has been extended to at least 8 hours (2017) and

one mobile diesel generator per unit (primarily for charging 6.3. Status of the nuclear power reactors

of batteries) has been acquired (2017) to improve the Operating licences, which are issued by the Government, reliability of core cooling using the existing steam turbine- stipulate the highest allowed thermal power level. To driven auxiliary feedwater pump. The mobile diesel further increase the power level, the licensee must apply to generator can be connected to the plant within 4 hours the Government for a new licence in accordance with the using separate connection points (to all four electrical Act on Nuclear Activities (1984:3). divisions) to secure access to essential instrumentation and The power uprate programmes in Sweden included major control systems. No corresponding improvements have power uprates of seven reactors, and a minor power uprate been considered necessary for Ringhals units 1 and 2, of one reactor. Several Swedish reactors were uprated in based on the comprehensive and recently (2015) completed the 1980s, with additional power uprates having been safety upgrades for compliance with regulatory requirements. implemented over the past twelve years. The levels of these 6.2.1.3. Oskarshamn NPP power uprates are illustrated by figure 4 below. Regarding Oskarshamn unit 3, temporary safety measures 35 comprise timely strengthening of existing core cooling power uprates in the 1980s power uprates over the past twelve years capability and reliability. The temporary measures consist

30

of enhanced and simplified connection of the on-site, 25 existing gas turbine plant to the busbars of unit 3. Here, the purpose was to achieve a robust, powerful (40 MW)

20

and diversified power source. Further measures include 15 reinforcement of the capability to cool the condensation Power uprates [%] pool, using two out of the four available trains of the

10

condensation pool cooling system and the corresponding 5 diesel generator engines. The amount of available water for

0

the primary system make-up and for creating a feed-and- s 2 s 3 s 4 bleed possibility for the spent fuel pools has been increased Ringhals 1 Ringhal Ringhal Ringhal

Forsmark 1 Forsmark 2 Forsmark 3

to 120,000 m 3 by installing new pumps and valves for Oskarshamn 3 bypassing to the operational water treatment facility. The Figure 4. Power uprate levels of Swedish reactors in operation. latter is also a part of the ICCS function. The introduction of the ICCS strengthens reactor capabili- Depending on the magnitude of the power uprate, a power ties to prevent core damage during a number of extreme increase can affect the facility in a number of different events that were previously not covered by the safety ways and to a varying degree. Therefore, conditions and analyses. The ICCS is designed to protect the plants during parameters that might affect safety must be identified and events leading to loss of normal core cooling functions. analysed in order to show that the safety requirements are Such events for example include failure of all AC voltage, met. A number of components and systems in the nuclear as well as Common Cause Failures (CCF) in emergency power plant must be verified as having a capacity correcore cooling functions, which might occur simultaneously sponding to the higher power level. Consequently, planning due to extreme external impact. Examples of design as well as reviewing a power uprate are key aspects solutions for ICCS functions are given in section 18.2.1.6. requiring special attention for the purpose of ensuring that there is no impact on plant safety. Comprehensive overviews of plant modifications performed in the past and implemented during the current In its regulatory review of a power uprate application, SSM reporting period are also presented in Appendix 1. checks that the licensee is in compliance with all applicable safety requirements. In this sense, an application for a 6.2.2. Regulatory control power uprate comprises an opportunity to revise and verify SSM has continuously performed reviews and follow up on the entire safety case. The licensing process in Sweden is the licensee actions concerning the Swedish NAcP. Due to described in section 7.3.

26 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

Since the previous report, the ongoing power uprate processes have developed as follows:

– Forsmark unit 2 is still in test operation (since 2013) at the new power level. The licensee has performed the test programme and the plant has continued operation with a steady state test period at the new maximum power level. The utility applied for routine operation in 2015; however, several amendments to the application were needed. This application is still undergoing review by the regulator. – Oskarshamn unit 3 applied for routine operation in 2017. This application is currently undergoing review by the regulator. – Ringhals unit 1 started test operation at the higher power level in 2007. The decision on routine operation was postponed due to modernization projects. Ringhals 1 went into routine operation at the new power level in 2017. – Ringhals unit 4 applied for routine operation in 2017 and began operation at the new power level in 2018.

6.4. Implementation of Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety

This section, in reference to Article 6, describes how Sweden implements relevant improvements and assessments concerning principles of the VDNS. As part of the fulfilment of the SSM decision on the new independent core cooling system, transitional safety measures have been in place since 2017. These measures were also taken in relation to extreme events that were previously not covered by the safety analyses. The measures were taken prior to implementation of a permanent design solution and introduction of an independent core cooling function that strengthens the reactor’s capability to prevent core damage in the case of extreme events that were previously not included in the design basis. The final and permanent solution of the ICCS is to be introduced by 2020 (see section 18.2.1.6).

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 27

Part II Legislation and regulation 28 Part II Legislation and regulation

Article 7. Legislative and regulatory framework

This part (SSMFS 2018:1) includes regulations on 1. Each Contracting Party shall establish and maintain basic rules for all licensed activities involving ionising legislative and regulatory framework to govern the safety radiation. The regulations also transpose provisions of nuclear installations. of Council Directive 2013/59/Euratom, which have 2. The legislative and regulatory framework shall provide for: not been included in the new Radiation Protection Act. (i) the establishment of applicable national safety The regulation SSMFS 2018:1 came into force on 1 June requirements and regulations; 2018. (ii) a system of licensing with regard to nuclear installations – On 1 April 2019, an inquiry chair appointed by the and the prohibition of the operation of a nuclear installation Government presented a proposal regarding a new Act with a licence; on Nuclear Activities. This proposal has been submitted (iii) a system of regulatory inspection and assessement of for a consultation procedure involving authorities, nuclear installations to ascertain compliance with municipalities, licensees and other stakeholders. applicable regulations and the terms of licences;

(iv) the enforcement of applicable regulations and the 7.1. Hierarchy of Swedish legislation and the regulatory framework

terms of licences, including suspension, modification or revocation.

Parliament Arts

Summary of developments since the previous report

Legally binding Government Ordinances

During the review period, the following developments are of relevance with regard to the obligations of Article 7:

SSM Regulations

– On 15 June 2017, the Swedish Parliament (Riksdag) decided on amendments to the Act on Nuclear General advices Not Activities to transpose several important provisions of

legally binding

the Council Directive (2014/87/Euratom) amending Guidance Directive 2009/71/Euratom establishing a Community framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations. Figure 5. Hierachy of Swedish legislation and the regulatory framework. The amendments to the Act on Nuclear Activities entered into force on 1 August 2017. At the same time, In the Swedish system the parliament decides on acts, the several regulations of the Swedish Radiation Safety government on ordinances and SSM on more detailed Authority were amended to transpose other provisions regulations and guides, see figure 5. Acts, ordinances and of the directive. SSM’s regulations are legally binding. General advice is not – A new Radiation Protection Act (2018:396) was decided legally binding per se, but cannot be ignored by the by the Swedish Parliament (Riksdag) on 26 April 2018 licensee without risking actions being taken by the regulaand entered into force on 1 June 2018. The new tory body. The general advice belonging to a regulation can Radiation Protection Act transposes several key be seen as a strong recommendation. Measures should be provisions of Council Directive 2013/59/Euratom taken according to the general advice or, alternatively, laying down basic safety standards for protection against methods that are deemed as justified, and equivalent from the dangers arising from exposure to ionising radiation. a safety point of view, should be implemented. Guidance is – A major overhaul of SSM’s Code of Statutes, SSMFS, is provided for comprehension of the implications of the under progress. On 24 May 2018, the first part of the regulations, with explanations and examples of application. new Code, concerning nuclear activities, was decided. Guidance is not binding.

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 29

7.1.1. Basic nuclear safety and radiation protection protection. These areas are regulated by a separate act and

legislation a separate code: the Radiation Protection Act (see section

The following five enactments constitute the basic nuclear 7.1.3) and the Environmental Code (see section 7.1.4).

safety and radiation protection legislation in Sweden: As far as nuclear activities are concerned, the Radiation

Protection Act, the Environmental Code and the Act on – The Act on Nuclear Activities (1984:3), Nuclear Activities should be applied in parallel and in close – The Radiation Protection Act (2018:396), association with each other. – The Environmental Code (1998:808), In the Act on Nuclear Activities, nuclear activities are – The Act on the Financing of Management of Residual defined as: Products from Nuclear Activities (2006:647), and

– The Nuclear Liability Act (1968:45). – The construction, possession and operation of a nuclear

installation All acts and code are all supplemented by a number of – Acquisition, possession, transfer, handling, processing, ordinances and other secondary legislation which contain transport or other dealings with nuclear substances and more detailed provisions for particular aspects of the regime. nuclear waste

Operation of a nuclear facility may only be conducted in – Import of nuclear substances and nuclear waste

accordance with a licence issued under the Act on Nuclear – Export of nuclear waste.

Activities, as well as with a licence issued under the Environmental Code. The Act on Nuclear Activities The Act on Nuclear Activities contains:

mainly concerns issues of safety and security, while the – Basic requirements for nuclear safety, including nuclear Environmental Code regulates general aspects of the security and measures to be taken to prevent unlawful environment and the possible impacts of “environmentally dealings with nuclear material or nuclear waste. hazardous activities”. Nuclear activities are defined as – Licensing obligation, licensing requirements, mandate to belonging here. decide on licence conditions and conditions for The objective of the Radiation Protection Act is to protect revocation of licences.

people, animals and the environment from harmful effects – General obligations of the licensees, including

of radiation. The Act applies to radiation protection in requirements for measures to maintain and improve

general and, in this context, provides provisions regarding safety, to perform periodic safety reviews (PSR), to

workers’ protection, radioactive waste management, and decommission and dismantle facilities, and to safely

the protection of the general public and the environment. handle and dispose of nuclear waste.

The Act on the Financing of Management of Residual – Provisions on supervision and mandates of the

Products from Nuclear Activities contains provisions regulatory authority.

concerning the future costs of spent fuel disposal, – Provisions on public transparency.

decommissioning of reactors, and research in the field of – Provisions on responsibilities and sanctions.

nuclear waste. Financial means for these purposes must be available when needed. On 15 June 2017, the Swedish Parliament decided on

amendments to the Act on Nuclear Activities to transpose The Nuclear Liability Act implements Sweden’s obligations several important provisions of the Council Directive as a party to the 1960 Paris Convention on Third Party (2014/87/Euratom) amending Directive 2009/71/ Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, and the 1963 Euratom establishing a Community framework for the Brussels Convention Supplementary to the Paris Convention. nuclear safety of nuclear installations. The amendments

Other relevant acts are the Act on Control of Export of to the Act on Nuclear Activities entered into force on

Dual-Use Products and Technical Assistance (2000:1064) 1 August 2017. These included the Article 8a, paragraphs

and the Act on Inspections According to International (a) and (b) of the directive, which correspond to safety

Agreements on Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons objectives according to the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear

(2000:140). Emergency preparedness matters are regulated Safety. These new provisions in the Act on Nuclear

by the Civil Protection Act (2003:778) and Ordinance Activities concern not only existing Swedish nuclear power

(2003:789). reactors, but also any new reactors that might be built.

The Ordinance on Nuclear Activities (1984:14) contains

7.1.2. The Act and Ordinance on Nuclear Activities

detailed provisions on matters including definitions, The Act on Nuclear Activities is the basic law regulating applications for licences, reviews, evaluations and inspecnuclear safety. It contains basic provisions concerning tions. The Ordinance also specifies that the regulatory safety in connection with nuclear activities, and applies to authority is authorised to impose licence conditions and to the operation of nuclear power plants and other nuclear issue general regulations concerning measures to maintain facilities, as well as handling of nuclear material and the safety of nuclear activities. nuclear waste. Pursuant to the Government’s authorisation granted in The Act does not contain provisions concerning radiation June 2017, the head of the Ministry of the Environment protection and general provisions on environmental and Energy appointed an inquiry chair to conduct a review

30 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

of national nuclear legislation. The Government also decision has been made to permanently shut down a appointed an expert committee with representatives from nuclear power reactor. A formal notification should also the Government offices, regulatory authorities, the industry be made when all nuclear fuel (nuclear material under and non-governmental organisations, to assist the inquiry safeguards) has been removed from the permanently shut chair. On 1 April 2019, the inquiry chair delivered a report down nuclear power reactor. (SOU 2019:16) to the Swedish Government. In this report,

Nuclear waste:

it is proposed that the present Act on Nuclear Activities The inquiry proposes harmonisation of the concept of should be repealed and replaced by a new act having a new nuclear waste with the definition of radioactive waste structure. contained in the Radiation Protection Act. Thus, nuclear Most of the substance of the present provisions is waste becomes a subset of what is defined as radioactive transferred to the proposed new act, though occasionally waste. Furthermore, the inquiry proposes a change to the using revised wording. Some provisions have been provisions regarding special permits for the disposal of modified and others removed. A small number of entirely foreign nuclear waste in Sweden and for the final disposal new provisions have also been added to the proposed of Swedish nuclear waste abroad. In general, “special legislation. reasons” for these permits should be the requirement, and A summary of key proposals made by the inquiry is not “exceptional reasons”, as is the case today. However, presented below. this does not entail any practical change in the basis for the assessment or the grounds for granting such permits, since The responsibilities of licence holders and operators that which has been termed “exceptional reasons” rather are clarified: constitutes “special reasons”. The inquiry proposes clarification of the operator’s

Research and development responsibility for waste

long-term responsibility, including the financial responsi-

management:

bility for the decommission of closed facilities and the The inquiry proposes amending the current requirement management and disposal of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear of the Act on Nuclear Activities to imply that a licence waste, and the licence holder’s responsibility for the safety holder of a nuclear power reactor is responsible for setting of nuclear facilities and activities, i.e. that a nuclear facility up a comprehensive research and development programme is designed, sited, constructed, commissioned, operated as needed for the safe management and disposal of spent and decommissioned in a safe way, as well as the responsinuclear fuel and radioactive waste, including building bility for safe management of nuclear material or radioacnecessary waste management facilities and repositories. tive waste resting with the licence holder. The proposal Furthermore, the inquiry proposes that the programme also clarifies that delegation of licensee responsibility is not should only cover parts of the planned system for waste allowed. disposal for which a licence has not been granted. This A formal stepwise licensing process is introduced: means that the obligations only covers the parts of the The inquiry proposes that a stepwise process for the waste system for which a solution is yet to be realised. licensing of nuclear operations or facilities are to be Dismantling of closed nuclear facilities should be encomintroduced in the new act. Up until now, the stepwise passed only to the extent that this relates to existing or licensing process has had its legal basis in the licence planned repositories. conditions stipulated by the licensing authority (the

Decommissioning and dismantling of nuclear facilities:

Government). The licence conditions usually state that the licensee is not allowed to begin construction, commence The inquiry proposes amending the Environmental test operation, or commercially operate the nuclear facility Assessment Regulation (2013:251) to imply that a renewed or begin decommissioning activities until the regulatory licensing process, including an environmental impact authority has given its approval. assessment, for decommissioning of a nuclear power reactor would apply as of the time when dismantling and Subsidiary responsibility and ultimate responsibility of demolition activities commence. The assessment should the state: focus on the environmental effects that the new activities, The inquiry proposes that the state’s subsidiary responsi- i.e. dismantling and demolition, entail. Activities performed bility for nuclear activities, which ensues from international under the existing licence, e.g. management of operational commitments and which has been confirmed by the wastes and spent nuclear fuel, do not need to be subject to Swedish parliament and government, should be laid down new review and approval. in the act. Moreover, the inquiry proposes introduction of The inquiry proposes that a facility that has been released provisions clarifying that the long-term responsibility for a in accordance with the requirements of the Radiation geological repository for spent nuclear fuel or radioactive Protection Act ceases to be classified as nuclear facility. waste, once it has been sealed, shall rest with the state (ultimate responsibility of the state). The proposal regarding a new Act on Nuclear Activities with the appurtenant ordinance has been submitted for

Permanently closed nuclear power reactors:

consultation with government agencies, municipal authori- The inquiry proposes introduction of an obligation ties, licensees and other stakeholders. requiring the licence holder to notify the authorities when a

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 31

7.1.3. The Radiation Protection Act and Ordinance 7.1.4. The Environmental Code

Requirements for radiation protection are set out in the The objective of the Environmental Code (1998:808) is to Radiation Protection Act and Radiation Protection promote sustainable development and thereby ensure a Ordinance. The purpose of the legislation is to protect healthy environment for current and future generations. people, animals and the environment against harmful The Code includes general provisions on environmental effects of radiation. protection. The Code is applicable to nuclear activities and The Act applies to all activities involving radiation. These activities involving radiation and must be applied in parallel are defined as including all activities involving radioactive with the Act on Nuclear Activities and the Radiation substances or technical devices capable of generating Protection Act. The Code is supplemented by a number of radiation. Consequently, the Act applies to radiation from ordinances. These are laid down by the Swedish Government. nuclear activities and to harmful radiation, ionising as well In the Code, environmentally hazardous activities are as non-ionising, from any other source (medical, industrial, defined as: research, consumer product and NORM). As far as nuclear installations are concerned, this Act and the Act on – the discharge of wastewater, solid matter or gas from Nuclear Activities are applied in parallel. land, buildings or structures onto land or into water

areas or groundwater, A new Radiation Protection Act (2018:396) was decided by – any use of land, buildings or structures that entails a risk the Swedish Parliament on 26 April 2018, entering into detrimental to human health or the environment due to force on 1 June 2018. The new Radiation Protection Act discharges or emissions other than those referred to transposes several key provisions of Council Directive above, or to pollution of land, air, water areas or 2013/59/Euratom laying down basic safety standards for groundwater, or protection against the dangers arising from exposure to ionising radiation. – any use of land, buildings or structures that may be detrimental to the surroundings due to noise, vibration, The Radiation Protection Act contains: light, ionising or non-ionising radiation or similar impact. – Basic provisions on protection against ionising radiation, including issues of justification, optimisation, The Environmental Code contains general rules of dose limits, waste, releases and environmental protection. consideration. These several important principles that must – Obligations for licensees, regulating areas such as be complied with by a licensee, e.g: precautionary measures, knowledge management, and financial, administrative and human resources. – The knowledge principle means that the implementer – Prohibition on employing anyone below 18 years of age. must possess the knowledge that is necessary regarding the nature and scope of the activity to protect human – Provisions on medical examinations, notification of health and the environment against damage or pregnancy and breastfeeding. detriment. – Provisions on providing information concerning tasks – The precautionary and BAT (Best Available Technique) in radiological emergency situations and voluntary work principles mean that the implementer shall put into for their implementation, in addition to surveillance and practice protective measures, comply with restrictions, protective devices. and take any other precautions that are necessary in – Provisions relating to radioactive waste management, and order to prevent, hinder or combat damage or detriment measures for clearance of building structures and areas. to human health or the environment as a result of the – Licensing obligation, licensing requirements, mandate to activity. For the same reason, the best available decide on license conditions and conditions for technology shall be used in connection with revocation of licenses. professional activities. – Provisions on responsibilities and sanctions. – The most suitable site principle means that as regards The Ordinance on Radiation Protection (2018:506) activities for which land or water areas are used, a contains detailed information on dose limits for ionising suitable site shall be selected while taking into account radiation activities. The Ordinance also contains detailed the goals of the Environmental Code. Sites for activities provisions pursuant to authorisation under the Radiation must always be chosen in such a way as to make it Protection Act. It stipulates that the regulatory authority possible to achieve their purpose with a minimum of assigned by the Government may issue regulations damage or detriment to human health and the regarding further provisions concerning general obliga- environment.

tions, radioactive waste and prohibitions against activities – The after-treatment liability principle means that with certain materials, etc. The Ordinance also stipulates everyone who has pursued an activity that causes that certain provisions in the Act do not apply to very damage or is detrimental to the environment shall be low-level radioactive materials and technical equipment responsible for restoring it to the extent deemed emitting only low-level radiation (exemption). The reasonable. An individual who is liable for afterregulatory authority may also issue regulations concerning treatment shall carry out or pay for any after-treatment the release of very low-level radioactive material. measures necessary.

32 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

The general rules of consideration function as a preventive advice provides interpretation of the regulations, in addition tool and follow the principle that the economic risks of to guidance on understanding the meaning of the regulations, environmental impact should be borne by the polluter and including explanations and examples of application. See not by the environment. also figure 5 in the introduction to section 7.1.

According to the Environmental Code, a permit is required SSM’s regulations also implement binding EU legislation for environmentally hazardous activities. The Government and international obligations. In preparing SSM’s regulahas in the Environmental Assessment Ordinance tions, consideration is given to IAEA safety standards, (2013:251) stipulated that facilities for the treatment, WENRA Safety Reference Levels (RL) and other WENRA storage or disposal of spent fuel, nuclear waste or radio- reports as well as other relevant international recommendaactive waste need a permit. A permit is also needed for the tions. SSM’s regulations are issued in accordance with an decommissioning of nuclear reactors. The Land and established management procedure which stipulates Environmental Court is the court of first instance for the technical and legal reviews of draft versions. In accordance hearing of cases concerning such activities. In addition, the with governmental rules, consultation with government Government must consider the permissibility of nuclear authorities, licensees, various interested parties is required activities, e.g. the disposal of spent fuel and radioactive before new regulations are issued. waste. The system for licensing is further described in SSM’s Code of Statutes (SSMFS) currently (May 2019) section 7.3. contains 15 parts regarding nuclear safety, nuclear security and radiation protection.

7.1.5. The principle of Public access (Open government) 7.2.2. Major revision of the Code of Statutes, SSMFS

To guarantee transparency, the principles of public SSM is currently revising its Code of Statutes relating to access to official documents are enshrined in one of the nuclear activities and radiation protection. Experience has fundamental laws, Chapters 2 and 3 of the Freedom of demonstrated the need to clarify and broaden the regulathe Press Act. tions in order to create more predictability for the licensees “To encourage the free exchange of opinion and availability and to improve the regulatory support. Another reason for of comprehensive information, every Swedish citizen shall this revision is the IRRS mission report to Sweden in be entitled to have free access to official documents.” spring 2012, which concluded that Swedish regulations for (Chapter 2, Article 1, Freedom of the Press Act) nuclear facilities have, historically, emerged as the need for

regulation arose. The report also notes that the IAEA’s The principle of public access entitles the general public to safety standards were used as the basis for the Swedish access official documents submitted to or drawn up by the nuclear safety rules, or referenced therein, but not in a authorities. Anyone may avail him/herself of this possibility systematic way. Therefore, the report recommended that whenever they wish. Documents that are received or sent SSM review the existing regulatory framework and make it out by the Government Offices and other government clearer, more consistent and comprehensive. Moreover, the agencies, e.g. letters, decisions and inquiries, usually Swedish Government has, through appropriation direcconstitute official documents. As a general rule, all tions, ordered SSM in 2012 and 2013 to review the incoming documents should be registered by the receiving regulations concerning nuclear power reactors, to ensure authority. Notes and draft decisions are not normally that appropriate requirements were in place for potential classified as official documents. new nuclear power plants, taking into account the experi- If a member of the public wants to know what documents ences of events and accidents that have occurred and new are held by a government agency or wants to get hold of international safety standards. them, this person should contact the agency in question. Against this background, the major and thorough review The principle of public access also means that officials and of Codes and Statutes, SSMFS, began in late 2013. In the others working for central government, municipalities and early stage of the work, a decision in principle was taken county councils have freedom of communication. This stating that the aspects of radiation protection, nuclear means that, with some exceptions, they have the right to safety and security, to a greater extent than previously, tell, for example, the media about matters that would should be regulated in an integrated manner and in the otherwise be secret without punishment and without the contexts where these aspects are concerned, and not in employer discovering who provided the information. separate regulations. See also Figure 6. The objectives are

to establish an improved and more transparent and consistent set of requirements, give a more logical

7.2. National safety and radiation

structure, and to improve the preconditions for more

protection regulations integrated regulatory supervision. In order to achieve this

aim, it was decided to define a collective term that encom-

7.2.1. SSM’s nuclear safety and radiation

passes “nuclear safety”, including “security” (in accordance

protection regulations

with the Act on Nuclear Activities) and “radiation protec- With reference to its legal mandate SSM issues legally tion”. The term “radiation safety” (strålsäkerhet in binding safety and radiation protection regulations for Swedish) was therefore defined accordingly. nuclear facilities in its Code of Statutes, SSMFS. General

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 33

Traditional way of regulating

Non-proliferation Nuclear safety Radiation protection Security control

Design X X X X Analysis and assessment X X X X Operation X X X X Decommissioning X X X X Integrated regulation of various aspects related to nuclear safety, security and radiation protection

Figure 6. Different approaches to regulation of various aspects.

The new structure that was decided signifies regulation of procedure with relevant licensees. At this stage SSM also radiation safety at nuclear facilities for different phases of requests input to the impact assessments, from a facility’s lifetime and for different main types of substantive concerned licensees; and issues. Moreover, this regulation is to encompass three 4. A formal external consultation procedure with relevant levels, namely: licensees, in addition to a number of Swedish public authorities and other organisations, including NGOs. In 1. The first level represents requirements that are addition, the proposals will be published as draft applicable to all licensed activities involving ionising documents on SSM’s website to enable interested parties radiation; in the public to submit their comments. This last 2. The second level is facility/activity-specific consultation procedure will also have an attached report requirements; and on the impact of the new regulations on the facilities 3. The third level consists of requirements applying to and activities in question. specific aspects of radiation safety. The first parts of the new Code of Statutes were finalised, This structure is also illustrated schematically in Figure 7 issued and entered into force in June 2018. According to below. the latest schedule, key regulations applying to nuclear power reactors are expected to be issued at the end of 2020 and the remaining parts of the new Code of Statutes are expected to be completed and enter into force in 2021.

Regulations with

7.3. System of licensing

basic provisions for Increasing levels of detail Level 1 all activities involving ionising radiation

that are licensed Licensing of nuclear activities is governed by several acts having different purposes. This also involves a number of Facility/activity specific regulations authorities. A general permissibility consideration has to be

Design, safety assessment and

Level 2 operation of NPP and other nuclear made as to whether or not to grant permission for an facilities activity. Furthermore, a nuclear activity must be approved in accordance with aspects of nuclear safety and radiation protection to ensure the protection of human health and

Regulation of specific aspects of radiation safety Pressurized components, reactor containment, other

the environment. Lastly, licensing conditions are issued

Level 3 building structures, lifting ezuipment, information security,

handling of nuclear materials and nuclear waste and other

specific regulations under the various acts by the authorities responsible. New nuclear facilities and major modifications of existing Figure 7. The planned new structure with regulations on three levels facilities that are subject to authorisation must be considwith increasing levels of detail. ered under both the Act on Nuclear Activities and the Considering the relatively large change to the structure and Environmental Code. As stipulated by the procedure for content as well as to the regulatory approach that these applications, a licence application must be submitted to the new regulations were expected to introduce in relation to Swedish Radiation Safety Authority, which processes the today’s situation, it was obvious that extensive interaction matter under the Act on Nuclear Activities, and to the with concerned parties would be needed before new Land and the Environment Court, which processes the regulations could be issued. SSM therefore decided to case under the Environmental Code. Applications are to be apply a multi-step process during the development process. accompanied by an environmental impact assessment Hence, all the proposed regulations and associated general under Chapter 6 of the Environmental Code. Figure 8 advice produced as part of this project have to go through below is a schematic illustration of the licensing process several steps of review and consultation: for construction of a new nuclear facility. The figure depicts how related review and licensing tasks are assigned. 1. An initial internal consultation procedure within SSM; 2. A preliminary consultation procedure with relevant 7.3.1. Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and licensees; consultation with other countries 3. A second internal consultation procedure within SSM in During the licensing process, an important instrument is parallell with a second preliminary consultation the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). Swedish

34 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

Applicant

Prepares and submits a licence application in accordance with the Environmental Code and the Act on Nuclear Activities.

Land and Environmental Court Swedish Radiation Safety Authority

Processes the matter in accordance Processes matter under the Act on Nuclear with the Environmental Code, holds Activities; statement of its views. main hearing. Examination under the Coordination Code; issues statement of its views.

Swedish Government

Grants approval Issues licence under the Swedish under the act on Municipal authority Environmental Nuclear Activities;

The municipal council approves Code. decides on licence or rejetcts the activity. conditions.

Environmental court Swedish Radiation Safety Authority

Holds new main hearing. Issues Decides on any additional conditions under licence and conditions under the the Act on Nuclear Activities and Radiation Environmental Code. Protection Act; also, examination in accordance with the Government’s licence conditions.

Figure 8. Schematic illustration of the licensing process for a new nuclear facility.

EIA legislation is in accordance with Council Directive Environment Court reviews an application for permissi- 85/337/EEC of 27 June 1985, amended by Council bility, which is thereafter forwarded to the Government for Directive 97/11/EC of 3 March 1997 and by Directive final consideration. The Government may decide on the 2003/35/EC of 26 May 2003, on the assessment of the permissibility only if the municipal council concerned effects of certain public and private projects on the agrees that the planned activities may be sited in the environment. An EIA is to be submitted together with an municipality (municipal veto). application for permission to conduct environmentally If the Government grants permissibility as per the hazardous activities. An EIA must also be submitted in Environmental Code, licensing approval needs to be issued connection with the future decommissioning of nuclear for the nuclear activity according to the Act on Nuclear facilities. Activities, and for the environmentally hazardous activity If an activity is likely to have a significant environmental according to the Environmental Code. The Government impact in another country, the authority responsible, as ultimately grants a possible licence in accordance with the designated by the Government, must inform the authority Act on Nuclear Activities. responsible in the possibly affected country about the The application is reviewed by the regulatory authority planned activity. This requirement is intended to give the assigned by the Government (i.e. SSM) and forwarded country concerned and the citizens who are affected the thereafter for a Government decision. A licence under opportunity to take part in a consultation procedure the Radiation Protection Act is not required for activities concerning the application and the environmental impact encompassed by the Act on Nuclear Activities. Following assessment. Another requirement is providing this kind of a Government permissibility decision, the Land and information when so requested by another country that is Environment Court grants a possible licence and issues likely to be exposed to a significant environmental impact. conditions imposed on environmentally hazardous activities under the Environmental Code. The Land and

7.3.2. Permissibility, licensing approval

Environment Court’s judgement when granting permission

and step-wise review process

for an activity may include provisions concerning super- According to the Environmental Code, as a step of the vision, inspections and checks, the safety and technical licensing process, the Government is to consider the design of the activity, and conditions that are necessary to permissibility of certain activities, such as represented by prevent or limit any harmful or other detrimental impact. facilities for nuclear activities under the Act on Nuclear Activities. An environmental impact statement must be It should be noted that the preparation and review of an submitted for the permissibility assessment. The Land and application, as well as the issuing of a licence and conditions,

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 35

take place in open court hearings at the Land and – There are any other very specific reasons for revocation, Environment Court. At these hearings, all interested from the viewpoint of safety. parties may attend and comment, including the relevant This means that revocation of a licence may be decided in authorities. The applicant must verbally describe all cases of severe misconduct by the operator, or otherwise relevant aspects of its case. Questions may be submitted for exceptional safety reasons. If the licence to operate a during the proceedings. nuclear power plant is revoked, the licence holder remains In a case where SSM approves the application and responsible for waste management and decommissioning. proposes that the Government grant the licence under the According to Section 18 of the Act on Nuclear Activities, Act on Nuclear Activities, SSM must in these matters also the regulatory authority (SSM) may decide on the measures propose that the Government take a decision on licence that are needed, including prohibitions in individual cases, conditions enabling a continued step-wise review process for compliance with the Act, or regulations issued or until such date that the planned facility may begin regular conditions granted under the Act. operation.

Furthermore, according to Section 25 of the Act on As regards nuclear facilities, depending on the type of Nuclear Activities, anyone without permission who matter, one or more of the following licence conditions intentionally or negligently is engaged in nuclear activities are to be proposed: shall be imposed a fine or imprisonment not exceeding two – The facility may not commence construction prior to years. approval by SSM.

– The facility may not commence test operation

7.4. EU legislation

(commissioning) prior to approval by SSM.

– The facility may not commence regular operation prior 7.4.1. The European Nuclear Safety Directive to approval by SSM. On 25 June 2009, Council Directive 2009/71/Euratom

was adopted establishing a Community framework for the Based on these licence conditions, a step-wise review nuclear safety of nuclear installations in the Member States. process then follows, where SSM decides at each stage if On 8 July 2014, an amended Nuclear Safety Directive was the licensee is allowed to proceed to the next step. As adopted by the Council, the Council Directive 2014/87/ mentioned in section 7.1.2, this process involving step-wise Euratom of 8 July 2014. reviews is now proposed to be regulated by the Act on Nuclear Activities. The amended directive introduces nuclear safety objectives comparable to the nuclear safety objectives included in the It should be noted that for all nuclear power reactors in Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety, which aims to limit operation in Sweden, the operating licence are granted with the consequences of a potential nuclear accident while also an indefinite term. This means that the operation of a nuclear addressing the safety of the entire lifecycle of nuclear power reactor is allowed as long as the licensee meets the installations (siting, design, construction, commissioning, requirements set by the applicable laws, government operation and decommissioning of nuclear power plants), ordinances, regulation of the nuclear regulatory authority, including on-site emergency preparedness and response. and conditions imposed by the initial licence. The amended directive further strengthens the role and the 7.3.3. Legal provisions to prevent the operation independence in regulatory decision-making of the of a nuclear installation without a valid licence national regulatory authorities, and enhances transparency All activities involving nuclear installations require a in nuclear safety matters. Also, the provisions on the licence. As mentioned in the introduction to section 7.3, information to be provided to the general public are now licensing of nuclear activities is governed by several acts more specific. As the consequences of a nuclear accident having different purposes, and involves a number of may cross national borders, close cooperation, coordinagovernment authorities. A general permissibility considera- tion and information exchange between regulatory tion has to be made as to whether or not to grant permis- authorities of member states in the vicinity of a nuclear sion for an activity. Furthermore, a nuclear activity must be installation are encouraged by the amended directive. The approved in accordance with aspects of nuclear safety and amended directive also introduced a new concept for radiation protection to ensure the protection of human exchange of experiences through its provisions on topical health and the environment. peer reviews. Starting in 2017, these are to be performed

on the nuclear installations at least every sixth year. A licence to conduct nuclear activities may be revoked by the authority issuing the permit in cases where:

7.4.1.1. Implementation of the amended nuclear safety

– Conditions have not been complied with in some directive in the national regulatory framework essential respect; On 15 June 2017, the Swedish Parliament decided on amendments to the Act on Nuclear Activities to transpose – The licensee has not fulfilled its obligations concerning several important provisions of the Council Directive research and development work on waste management (2014/87/Euratom) amending Directive 2009/71/ and decommissioning, and there are very specific Euratom establishing a Community framework for the reasons from the viewpoint of safety to revoke the nuclear safety of nuclear installations. The amendments to licence; or

36 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

the Act on Nuclear Activities entered into force on 1 activities involving ionising radiation, which all entered into August 2017. This included the Article 8a, paragraphs (a) force on 1 June 2018. In addition, five other acts as well as and (b) of the directive, which correspond to safety several ordinances and authority regulations have been objectives as per the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety. amended to fully transpose provisions of the Directive These new provisions in the Act on Nuclear Activities 2013/59/Euratom in Sweden. These amendments also apply both to existing Swedish nuclear power reactors and entered into force on 1 June 2018. to any new reactors that might be built.

7.5. Enforcement of applicable

The changes to the Act also clarified licensee responsibility as well as the requirements for continuous analysis and

regulations and terms of licences

assessment of safety at facilities.

7.5.1. Powers for legal actions and enforcement

Changes to existing SSM regulations have also been made

measures available to the regulatory body

for transposition of the safety provisions of the Directive SSM has a strong mandate as a regulatory body. According 2014/87/Euratom that are not regulated by the amended to the Act on Nuclear Activities, SSM may, during the term Nuclear Activity Act or which, through previous readings, of validity of a licence, decide that certain conditions are were not encompassed sufficiently by the regulations. necessary to ensure safety. SSM may also decide that These amendments were decided on 15 June 2017 and additional measures are necessary, and issue orders and concerned SSM’s regulations (SSMFS 2008:1) on safety in prohibitions to the licensee to ensure that the Act, or nuclear facilities, and the regulations (SSMFS 2014:2) on regulations or conditions issued under the Act, are preparedness at nuclear facilities. The amended regulations observed. entered into force on 1 August 2017. A licence may be revoked for activities that do not fulfil 7.4.2. European basic safety standards for protec- the obligations set out in the legislation. If there is an tion against the dangers arising from exposure to ongoing licensed activity that does not comply with ionising radiation regulations or the terms of the licence, the supervisory On 5 December 2013, Council Directive 2013/59/ authorities may issue any injunctions and prohibitions Euratom was adopted, establishing a set of basic safety required in the specific case to ensure compliance. standards to protect workers, members of the public and Injunctions or prohibitions issued under the acts may carry patients against the dangers arising from ionising radiation contingent fines. If a person fails to carry out a measure (EU BSS). The new directive also strengthens requirements incumbent upon him or her under the acts, ordinances, or for emergency preparedness and response. regulations or conditions issued pursuant to the acts, or The aim of the EU BSS basic safety standards is to ensure: under SSM’s injunction, SSM may arrange for the measure

to be taken at this person’s own expense. – Protection of workers exposed to ionising radiation, such as workers in the nuclear industry and other The Act on Nuclear Activities also contains provisions industrial applications, medical staff, and those working regulating areas such as safeguards and sanctions. Anyone in places with indoor radon or in activities involving who conducts nuclear activities without possessing a naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM) licence, or who disregards conditions or regulations, shall – Protection of members of the public, for example from be sentenced to pay a fine, or to imprisonment for a radon in buildings maximum of two years. Such cases are submitted to a – Protection of medical patients, for example by avoiding prosecutor and it is not SSM who decides on a sanctions or accidents in radio-diagnosis and radiotherapy penalty, unlike the other paragraphs, where SSM has the mandate to do so. If the offence is intentional and – More stringent regulation of emergency preparedness aggravated, the individual shall be sentenced to imprisonand response, incorporating lessons learnt from the ment for a minimum of six months or a maximum of four Fukushima accident. years. Liability shall not be adjudged if responsibility for The directive incorporates recommendations from the the offence may be assigned under the Penal Code or the International Commission on Radiological Protection Act on Penalties for Smuggling (2000:1225), or if the (ICRP) published in 2007, and harmonises the EU regime offence is trivial. with the requirements of the Basic Safety Standards of the SSM has a similar mandate as per the Radiation Protection International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Act to decide whether additional measures are necessary, and to issue orders and prohibitions to the licensee to

7.4.2.1. Implementation of basic safety standards for

ensure compliance with the Act, or with regulations or

protection against the dangers arising from exposure to

ionising radiation conditions issued under the Act.

The main transposition in Sweden of Directive 2013/59/ According to the provisions of both the Act on Nuclear Euratom has been implemented in the form of additions Activities and Radiation Protection Act, the police to the amended Radiation Protection Act (2018:396) and authority shall, if necessary, provide the assistance needed its appurtenant ordinance (2018:506), together with SSM’s for SSM’s supervision. regulations (SSMFS 2018:1) on basic rules for all licensed

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 37

SSM has access to a variety of measures that can be used Furthermore, according to the Act on Nuclear Activities,

to remedy a non-compliance situation. SSM’s management a licensee is liable to provide local safety boards, as

system provides guidance on how different measures appointed by the Government, with insight into the safety

should be used (see further description in section 8.8). and radiation protection work at the facility. The insight

shall enable the board to obtain information about the

safety and radiation protection work that has been

7.6. Regulatory supervision

conducted or is being planned at the facility and to SSM’s regulatory activities relating to inspection and compile material in order to inform the general public

assessment are reported under “Article 8, Regulatory about this work.

Body”. An overview of SSM’s supervision with regard to

the safety of nuclear installations and supervisory

programme is contained in section 8.10. 7.8. The WENRA Reactor Harmonisation Project

As a member of WENRA, SSM participates in the

7.7. Openness and transparency

development of the WENRA safety reference levels for In line with the Aarhus Convention, Sweden’s legal existing nuclear power reactors (RLs). The RLs reports, framework contains provisions regulating access to were issued in 2006 and updated in January 2008, information, public participation in decision making, and September 2014 and March 2018. WENRA reports are access to justice. available on the WENRA website (www.wenra.org).

The Swedish Constitution also contains provisions The latest reviews of the RLs are based latest available regulating public access to official records as described in knowledge and experience and takes into account the section 7.1.5. lessons learned from the accident at the Fukushima

Under EIA provisions, the public is also guaranteed Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant, including the insight from

opportunities to gain access to information and to submit the EU stress tests, the reviews of the IAEA safety

their opinions on planned activities and facilities for which requirements as well as the conclusions from the 2nd

permission is sought. These provisions require consulta- Extraordinary Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the

tion (in addition to that conducted between municipalities Convention on Nuclear Safety. Prior to finalisation,

and authorities) with the public concerned and with WENRA makes the updated reference levels available for

environmental organisations. stakeholder consultation.

In various cases, decisions issued by the Land and Envi- WENRA members are currently working preparing a pilot

ronment Court or by government authorities may be study on RL implementation at the nuclear power plants.

appealed not only by the party concerned, but also by A project to update the RLs on external hazards (Issue

environmental organisations and non-governmental TU) and internal hazards (Issue SV) is also ongoing, as well

organisations (which have existed for three years and have as the preparation for the next RL revision programme.

a minimum of 100 members). Furthermore, during this review period WENRA has

publish number of reports, guidance, position papers and A decision by the Government on permissibility under recommendations, including the Guidance on Article 8a of the Environmental Code (see section 7.1.4) and a licence the Nuclear Safety Directive, the Position Paper on IAEA granted under the Act on Nuclear Activities (see section Nuclear Safety Strategy, the Report on Interfaces between 7.1.2) cannot be appealed. Under certain conditions, the Nuclear Safety and Nuclear Security, and the WENRA Supreme Administrative Court might examine whether a Reactor Harmonisation Working Group (RHWG) Report decision by the Government is in contravention of any on Regulatory Aspects of Passive Systems. rule of law. This does not imply an examination of the case in substance, but rather to ascertain whether the In preparing SSM’s new Code of Statutes, consideration is

decision have been taken according to the correct given to the WENRA Safety Reference Levels as well as

procedures. other WENRA reports.

To ensure that necessary information in relation to the

nuclear safety of nuclear installations and its regulation 7.9. Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety

is made available to workers and the general public, all

reports issued by SSM are publicly available and the SSM Article 8a, paragraphs (a) and (b) of Directive 2009/71/ website is used to provide information on current events Euratom, corresponding to the first and second principles and Authority decisions in accordance with the SSM under the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety. These communication policy. In addition, the licensees provides provisions of the Directive have been transposed into the information to their employees through working Swedish Act on Nuclear Activities, which means that the meetings, intranets and internal information meetings, first and second principles in the Vienna Declaration on and to the public through their websites and public Nuclear Safety are considered in the act. These new provisions media. In specific cases, licensees may also host public in the Act on Nuclear Activities concern both existing information meetings. nuclear power reactors and new nuclear power reactors.

38 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

Section 7.2.2 describes how Sweden implements the third principle of the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety in the form of SSM’s ongoing comprehensive review of its Code of Statutes, and which shall ensure that IAEA Safety Standards are more systematically referenced and used as a basis for the regulations governing safety, security and radiation protection at nuclear facilities.

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 39

Article 8. Regulatory Body

Fund and control function in nuclear waste financing 1. Each Contracting Party shall establish or designate a would be transferred to the National Debt Office by 1 regulatory body entrusted with the implementation of the December 2018 at the latest. The transfer of these tasks legislative and regulatory framework referred to in Article was completed by 1 September. Nevertheless, SSM has the 7, and provided with adequate authority, competence and task of providing assistance on the information and financial and human resources to fulfil its assigned responsibilities. analyses within its area of responsibility which are needed by the Debt Office for performance of its tasks. 2. Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure an effective separation between the functions of SSM works to promote protection of people and the the regulatory body and those of any other body or organi- environment from harmful effects of radiation, now and in sation concerned with the promotion or utilization of the future. The mission and tasks of SSM are defined in an nuclear energy. ordinance with instructions for the Authority and in the annual government appropriation directions, which contains detailed objectives and reporting obligations.

Summary of developments since

Other authorities that have a supervisory mandate relating

the last report to nuclear power plants are the Swedish Civil Contingen-

During the current review period, the following develop- cies Agency, the Swedish Work Environment Authority, the ments are of relevance with regard to the obligations of Nuclear Waste Fund, and the National Electrical Safety Article 8: Board.

– SSM has been reorganised due to relocation of its SSM is a central administrative authority, independent in its headquarters. decision-making (see section 8.2), that reports to the Ministry of the Environment. – Development of the integrated management system has resulted in a new overarching process map. The director general of the Swedish Radiation Safety – Development of the supervisory programme for Authority is appointed by the Government, normally for a nuclear power plants. term of six years. The director general has the sole responsibility and reports directly to the Government.

8.1. The regulatory body and its However, the Authority has an advisory council whose mandate

members are appointed by the Government. The council members are usually members of parliament, agency 8.1.1. General information about the Swedish officials or independent experts. The functions of the Radiation Safety Authority council are to advise the director general and to ensure The Government decided on 31 August 2018 to relocate public transparency (insight) in the Authority’s activities, SSM’s headquarters to the city of Katrineholm by 30 but it has no decision-making powers. November 2018. Katrineholm is situated about 120 The level of requirements imposed on SSM and other kilometres southwest of Stockholm. In addition, SSM has Swedish authorities for openness and provision of opened a small branch office in Gothenburg. information services to the public, politicians and media In February 2019, SSM had approximately 50 employees are very high. Swedish official documents are public unless with positions at the Katrineholm office. In the long term, a decision is made to classify them according to the Public SSM’s ambition is to increase its staffing to approximately Access to Information and Secrecy Act (2009:400). Secrecy 70 employees. may be warranted in the interests of national security, international relations, commercial relations, or individuals’ In connection with the decision to relocate parts of the right to privacy. No one needs to explain why they wish to Authority to Katrineholm, the Government also decided review a public document, or to reveal her/his identity to that the Authority’s tasks concerning the Nuclear Waste have access to a document.

40 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

As all other Swedish authorities, SSM issues an annual SSM is to work actively and preventively to promote high report and financial statement, which are submitted to the levels of nuclear safety and radiation protection in society Government. They summarize major results, effects, and, through its activities, take actions to: revenues and costs. The Government carries out follow-up 1. Prevent radiological accidents and ensure safe work and evaluates an agency’s operations based on the operations and safe waste management at the nuclear annual report. facilities; SSM publishes reports to inform interested parties and 2. Minimise risks and optimise the effects of radiation in stakeholders. The SSM website is used to provide informedical applications; mation on current events and Authority decisions. R&D 3. Minimise radiation risks in the use of products and reports and central regulatory assessments are published as services, or which arise as a by-product in the use of part of the SSM report series. All reports issued by SSM products and services; are publicly available; most of them are available for 4. Minimise the risks linked to exposure to naturally downloading from the SSM website. occurring radiation; and As an emergency authority, SSM coordinates the national 5. Contribute to an enhanced level of nuclear safety and system for emergency preparedness and radiation protection. radiation protection internationally. SSM maintains 24-hour emergency preparedness for the purpose of rapid response to the consequences of SSM shall ensure that regulations and work routines are accidents and events involving radiation in Sweden or cost effective and straightforward for citizens and enterabroad. SSM also has functions in place for press contacts prises to apply and understand. and IT support outside office hours. SSM shall furthermore:

1. Take measures to fulfil Swedish obligations according to

8.2. Independence of the regulatory body conventions, EU ordinances/directives, and other

The de jure and de facto independence from political binding agreements; pressure and promotional interests is well provided for 2. Supervise that nuclear material and equipment are used in Sweden. as declared and in manner that agrees with the international commitments; According to the Swedish constitution, administrative authorities are independent in its regulatory decision- 3. Carry out international cooperation with national and making within the legislation and statutes laid down by multinational organisations; the Government. An individual minister is not allowed to 4. Monitor and contribute to the progress of international interfere in a specific case handled by an administrative standards and recommendations; authority. The Cabinet as a whole is responsible for all 5. Coordinate activities needed to prevent, identify and detect governmental decisions. Although in practice, a large nuclear or radiological emergencies, as well as organise number of routine matters are decided upon by individual and lead the national organisation for expert advice to ministers, and only formally confirmed by the Government, authorities involved in, or leading, rescue operations; the principle of collective responsibility is reflected in all 6. Contribute to national competence development within forms of governmental work. the Authority’s field of activities; The laws governing SSM concentrate solely on nuclear 7. Provide data for radiation protection assessments and safety and radiation protection (also security, physical maintain the competence to predict and manage protection, and non-proliferation, but these tasks of SSM evolving issues; and are outside of the scope addressed in this convention). SSM 8. Ensure public insight into all the Authority’s activities. reports to the Ministry of the Environment, which is not The annual appropriation directions focus more on involved in the promotion or utilization of nuclear energy. short-term issues and funding of authorities’ activities. In its latest appropriation directions, dated 21 December

8.3. Missions, tasks and fundamental values 2018, SSM was among other things assigned to:

SSM’s missions and tasks are defined in the Ordinance – Assist the Government Offices in the work on the (2008:452) with instructions for the Swedish Radiation international initiative on verification of nuclear Safety Authority and in annual appropriation directions. In disarmament (IPNDV) and in the quartet cooperation the latter, the Government issues directives for authorities, Quad Nuclear Verification Partnership (QNVP), and which include the use of appropriations. participate and actively contribute with technical The Ordinance states that SSM is the administrative expertise in the sub-groups for these collaborations. authority for protection of people and the environment The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority shall conduct against harmful effects of ionising and non-ionising an overall analysis of the results achieved after the radiation, for issues on nuclear safety including physical initiation phase of the initiative. The assignment shall protection in nuclear technology activities, as well as in be reported to the Government (Ministry of the other activities involving radiation, and for issues regarding Environment and Ministry of Foreign Affairs) no later non-proliferation. than 15 March 2019.

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 41

– Cooperate with neighbouring Russia in development equipment in industry, public use of sources and devices in cooperation with Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova and commodities, use of detectors and scanning equipment for Belarus. The purpose of the collaboration is to create an security reasons, and exposure to ionising radiation from increased radiation safety and environmental quality in naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM). both Russia and Sweden, and to support the SSM also runs the the National Metrology Laboratory for development of Russia’s authority structures and ionising radiation and maintains the national secondary legislation. The collaboration has the aim of standards for the dosimetric quantities of kerma, absorbed strengthening Sweden’s environmental and foreign dose and dose equivalent. Furthermore, SSM operates a policy focus on the environment, peace and security. national dose register and issues national individual dose As far as possible, the cooperation will be co-financed passports. SSM operates a national dose register and issues with Russia. SSM shall coordinate its activities with the national individual dose passports. work on the radiation safety area that international organisations and other countries have with Russia, and Figure 9 shows the organisation of SSM as of 1 September work to promote Russia’s integration in various regional 2018. and international frameworks for radiation safety and The inspectors responsible for supervision of plant the environment that contribute to its goal fulfilment. operations are organised within the Department of Completed activities shall be summarized in a separate Nuclear Power Plant Safety. SSM has no resident inspecreport to the Government (Ministry of the tors for supervision of nuclear facilities. However, there is Environment) no later than 28 February 2019. an appointed inspector responsible for the coordination – Implement a support programme for the International between the licensee and regulator, who monitors the Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Costs of the licensee’s overall activities and the Authority’s activities programme must be reported separately. towards the licensee. The task rotates between the inspec- – Assist the Government Offices with technical expertise tors in relation to the respective plant, at an interval of in support of Sweden’s participation in the work ahead four years. Inspections are carried out by teams where the of the NPT Review Conference in 2020. inspection team is composed of different competencies relevant to the area of inspection. In general, the inspector SSM’s work can be divided into supervision of safety and in charge of coordination between the licensee and SSM radiation protection work relating to non-ionising and participates in the inspections. ionising radiation. As far as concerns ionising radiation, the main regulatory areas are: use of nuclear technology and SSM has, in terms of the safety of nuclear facilities, power production, the medical sector with therapy and permanent advisory committees on reactor safety, radioactive diagnostics, the use of radiation sources and x-ray waste and spent nuclear fuel, and research and development.

Director General

Deputy D.G.

Office for International Relations

Dept. of Nuclear Dept. of Radioactive Dept. of Radiation Development Organisational Power Plant Safety Materials Protection Dept. Services Dept.

Facility Radiation Transport and Waste Emergency Research Archive and Protection Preparedness Record Operation and and Response Legal Services Management Operations at Nuclear Decommissioning Power Plants of Nuclear Facilities Medical Exposures Communication Finance

Man-Technology- Nuclear Non- Environmental HR Organisation proliferation Assessment IT Reactor Technology Nuclear Security Radiation and Analysis Measurements Management Spent Fuel and System Control Structural Integrity Waste Disposal Occupational and Event Analysis Practices and Work Activities System Assessement

Figure 9. SSM’s organisation.

42 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

SSM also has advisory committees in other fields such as an Effective Nuclear Regulatory Body’ (NEA No. 7247, UV, electromagnetic fields, and the use of ionising OECD 2016) and has, as a direct result of this work, radiation in oncology. incorporated the five principles from these efforts into the management system of the regulator. The five principles in 8.3.1. Fundamental values the integrated management system of SSM are:

SSM embraces the fundamental values held by Swedish public – Safety and security aspects are clear elements of the administration based on the platform of democracy and Authority’s leadership human rights, while continually striving to follow the rule of law, maintain efficiency and effectiveness, and have a – All SSM employees have a personal responsibility for citizen’s perspective. The fundamental values of the Authority patterns of behaviour that influence safety and security

comprise its vision, mission statement and key values. These – A culture that promotes safety and security facilitates fundamental values also shape the Authority’s safety culture. cooperation and open dialogue

– The Authority has a holistic approach to aspects of

SSM’s vision:

safety and security A society safe from harmful effects of radiation. – Continual improvements, learning and self-assessments Mission statement of SSM: on all levels of the organisation.

SSM works proactively and preventively to protect people SSM has also conducted several internal seminars, some and the environment from harmful effects of radiation, with invited speakers, on different themes related to the now and in the future. We have a systematic and structured safety culture of the regulator, such as leadership, the roles approach to continual improvements to our processes in of the regulatory body, the content of the OECD-NEA order to develop our operations, render them more booklet “The Safety Culture of an Effective Nuclear efficient and achieve our objectives. Regulatory Body”, and information safety and information Key values: classification.

Credibility, Integrity and Openness Furthermore, SSM procured an external evaluation of the

safety culture, conducted by Lund University. The evaluation Credibility means pursuing our work on the basis of facts. involved interviews, focus groups and a questionnaire, and Credibility is achieved when employees are competent, resulted in a valuable baseline evaluation of the status of objective and impartial. ‘Competence’ means employees the safety culture. SSM is still working on some of the having the requisite professional skills, education, training findings from the evaluation in its continuous effort to support and experience. and promote the safety culture of the regulatory body. Integrity means maintaining the Authority’s independence and not allowing us to be unduly influenced when it comes

to our own decisions, standpoints, advice and recommen- 8.5. Human and financial resources

dations. Integrity involves taking charge, both while

8.5.1. Staffing

exercising authority and on an employee level. SSM has (31 Dec. 2018) a workforce totaling 296 Openness means that the work of the Authority is employees. Prior to this, the number of employees was transparent to the outside world and that we clearly and higher, but a reduction was made in 2014 when it was proactively provide information about our work, stand- realized that new reactors would not be built in the near points, advice, recommendations and decisions. Openness future. The average age of an employee is 49 years and also involves our willingness to be attentive to and consider 54% are men and 46% are women. Among the employees, external views. 89% have a higher education.

The key values are an active component of all the Compared with many other authorities, the staff of SSM Authority’s activities. They are for instance used to has a rather high educational level. This is a result of the underpin the decision making of the Authority. many specialist areas covered by the Authority, and to

some extent the fact that there are no Technical Support Organisations in Sweden to support the regulatory body

8.4. Safety Culture

with specialist knowledge. One important aspect of the development of the regula- Comparing internationally, the number of regulatory staff tory body is to scrutinize its own safety culture and its in Sweden is small for the size of the nuclear programme. wider role in the national safety infrastructure. A regulatory Many staff members are typically involved in several tasks, body must have public safety as the primary focus, and in such as inspections, regulatory reviews and approval tasks, order to achieve, this it is essential for the regulatory body revision of regulations, handling research contracts, and to have a healthy safety culture. SSM has for several years participation in public information activities, with each worked on its own safety culture. This work has encomactivity requiring a specific expertise. When comparing the passed involvement in international activities to enhance sizes of staff between different countries, it is however the safety culture as well as internal activities. important not only to count the staff members per reactor, SSM participated e.g. in the OECD-NEA senior task but also to consider the types of legal obligations imposed group, which developed the booklet ‘The Safety Culture of on the licensees and the different supervisory practices.

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 43

8.5.2. Recruitment – In order to recruit the right candidates, we apply In total, the authority has carried out 67 recruitments in competence-based recruitment, and ensure that the 2018, which is a large increase compared to previous years. employees that we recruit are committed to SSM’s The increase is mainly due to the vacancy situation the induction programme that also includes a mentor for authority had after the decision to stop all recruitments in the first six months. the autumn of 2017 pending analysis of the relocation – In order to retain our employees, we have several decision. A small percentage of the increase is also due to programmes in the areas of supervision and leadership. the fact that as of 2018 we use the recruitment tool for all Employee departures are subject to a tailored skills recruitment processes, which we have not previously done. transfer programme for the purpose of retaining knowledge in-house at SSM. In summary, it has been difficult to recruit the right skills, especially to the authority’s core business during the year, which is believed to be explained by, among other things, 8.5.5. Employee value proposition the ongoing economic boom. An important prerequisite for the Authority’s staffing and competence is that the Authority succeeds in attracting and A recruitment strategy with prioritized activities has been recruiting staff who have the education, experience and developed during the year to increase the authority’s ability skills needed, together with the qualities that make the to attract and recruit the right skills in the coming years. employees contribute optimally to the organisation. What Lack of competent applicants is a problem that the the Authority offers as an employer and workplace should authority shares with the state in general. be attractive to those who we wish to recruit. The offer must be in line with the management’s ambitions, must be

8.5.3. Staff turnover

true and relevant, but also distinctive compared to what Staff turnover was 12% in 2018, which is a small decrease other employers offer. compared with the previous year. There was a total of 36 employee departures, of whom 17 are women and 19 are

8.5.6. Skills transfer programme

men. Of this group, nine entered retirement. SSM has developed a skills transfer concept (KÖK) in order to manage transfer of skills possessed by only one or

8.5.4. Knowledge management

a few employees. It is important to have a structured and SSM systematically analyses prospective skills needed by systematic approach to maintaining competence and skills the Authority in the short and long term in order to perform in the organisation. The programme should also be seen as its current and future tasks. Working strategically with staffing a professional development opportunity for both mentors and confidence, and thereby developing the organisation and mentees. The mentorship pairs are identified in and its work is a crucial prerequisite for SSM’s capability to connection with professional development interviews. achieve its goals and effectively conduct its activities. SSM has continued working on a structured programme The purpose of the model is to provide an overview of the for transfer of competence. During the year, technical methods and other assumptions that SSM applies in order expertise has been transferred and the Leadership Competo optimally meet its needs for staffing and competence tence programme has been run to enable backup (see Figure 10). functions among the Authority’s employees possessing The overall objective of the model is to create the precon- critical competence, as well as to carry out professional ditions for performing effective knowledge management in development. The KÖK programme defines different order to develop the operations of SSM. roles: A mentee sees to it that objectives and goals are met. A mentor transfers his or her skills and helps the mentee SSM’s model includes the following steps: achieve the defined objectives and goals. A supervisor – To attract the right candidates with appropriate performs follow-ups and sees to it that the competency qualifications, we use our employee value proposition transfer takes place.

and market it, for example at job fairs.

Attract Recruit Develop Retain Departures

Attract Recruit Develop employees Retain Skills transfer means appropriate the right so that they have knowledge termination after having candidates candidate with appropriate competence in-house adequately transferred with the right appropriate and skills for the the departing qualifications skills assignment employee’s competence

Figure 10. Knowledge management process.

44 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

Table 2. Budget of SSM in million SEK.

Budget item 2016 2017 2018 Source of funding

Nuclear safety, emergency preparedness, supervision, crisis 372.0 384.4 393.0 Mainly fees management, nuclear non-proliferation (including administration)

Professional development is goal-oriented. As necessary, In recent years, ongoing development efforts have been new goals are defined for improvement of skills. SSM has undertaken on the part of the entire senior management trained all supervisors and employees of the Authority in team. The content of this work was based on the skills order to emphasize the importance of development profiles of identified managers at SSM. dialogue as a strategic skills tool. The Authority has continued to develop managerial skills Through goal-oriented, individualized and transparent and carried out basic training programmes for new professional development, and discussions that are supervisors, and continuing education in developmental followed up, we create the preconditions for attracting, leadership, with a focus on distance management. All retaining and developing staff. supervisors have also received training in competencebased recruitment.

8.5.8. Internal staff training

SSM has worked on developing the Authority’s employer Professional development has been conducted in all branding in order to attract candidates and retain in-house departments and sections in 2018. Approximately 2,061 knowledge at three locations. Consequently, the Authority days have been utilised for training programmes. This is has developed more flexible terms of employment an average of 6.8 days per employee. including teleworking, together with the opportunity to use During an average year, SSM conducts around 60 joint travel time as working hours. agency training sessions in the areas of supervision, emergency preparedness, monitoring, skills exercises, and 8.5.9. Financial resources occupational health and safety. The regulatory activities of SSM are financed by the State budget. These costs are largely recovered from licensees in 8.5.8.1. Induction programme the form of fees that cover the cost of regulatory activities A new induction programme for employees has been and related research. The amounts of the fees are proposed developed with the aim of providing basic knowledge annually by SSM, but decided by the Government. The about the Authority and the Authority’s role and mandates. budgets for 2016, 2017 and 2018, including the funding of The induction programme is mandatory for new employees, the separately financed international cooperation and regardless of position, and covers the Authority’s role, development work, are shown in Table 2. Additional occupational health and safety work, in addition to SSM’s resources are in the form of fees for processing of special core operations. The aim is to foster a deeper understanding applications and licensing work, which are directly payable of the Authority’s activities and to give new employees an to the Authority. important network. All new employees also meet with the Director General during an informal meeting. In order to

be able to introduce most of the new employees to SSM in 8.6. Integrated management system

2018, we carried out the induction programme for around SSM has an integrated and process-based management 60 employees during the year. system which is certified in the areas of environment, quality management and occupational health and safety in 8.5.8.2. Safety training accordance with SS-EN ISO 14001:2015, SS-EN ISO Training efforts are conducted continuously to increase 9001:2015 and SIS-OHSAS 18001:2007. The management safety awareness among employees and supervisorsman- system encompasses all of SSM’s operations. The system is agers. An introduction to the safety work is provided given supplemented by a section devoted to information security, to all new employees (in 2018, 47 new employees received which follows SS-ISO/IEC 27001:2017 although the such training), and the majority of SSM’s employees in Authority is not certified in that area. Internal and external safety-classified positions have undergone a basic safety audits are performed yearly, which are one of the bases for education programme over the past three years. continuous improvements to the system.

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 45

Strategic management Project Process Management areas and operational control management management

Management process

International Emergency preparedness cooperation and and emergency response development A society safe from Licensing Communi cating Rule making Super vision the harmeful reviews and influencing effects of Securing radiation knowledge Laboratory operations, and skills environmental monotoring, measurements and calibrations

Supporting processes

Managing matters, records and archiving

Communi- Staffing and Accounting Legal affairs Purchasing IT cation competence and finance

Figure 11. SSM’s overarching process map.

An interactive process model is published on the intranet. ISO 9001, ISO 14001, OHSAS 18001 and other relevant The overarching process map highlights the sequence of requirements are audited by contracted external auditors all key processes, and has been updated since 1 January accredited by the government authority SWEDAC. In 2019 to enable an active ownership of all processes. 2018, SSM was re-certified in accordance with ISO 9001 Process information and associated guidance materials are and ISO 14001. These certificates are valid until 5 readily accessible within the interactive model. Users are December 2021. The certificate in OHSAS 18001 is valid guided to dedicated intranet pages and a robust document until 26 October 2019. The plan is to be certified in ISO management system. Ownership of processes applies to 45001 in September/October 2019. From the last external key processes. Figure 11 illustrates SSM’s present overar- audit of SSM, conducted in September 2018, no deviations ching process map. were identified, however, some proposals were made for improvement of the management system. These proposals will mainly be considered in 2019 as part of efforts to

8.7. Internal and external audits

improve the management of objectives, and by means of SSM ensures that annual internal and external audits of the improved potential to manage our processes. Authority’s activities are carried out. The SSM management system accounts for internal and external requirements;

the latter including ISO standards, statutes and legal 8.8. Regulatory supervision

provisions. Regulatory inspections and safety assessments are carried out by SSM as authorized by the Ordinance on Nuclear The objective of internal audits is to check compliance Activities and Radiation Protection Ordinance, and as with external and internal requirements, to investigate how instructed by the Government. the ‘shared values’ are integrated in the day-to-day work, and to check whether the management system is effective

8.8.1. SSM’s supervisory practices

and fit for purpose. SSM’s internal auditors are appointed SSM has continued to develop its supervisory processes by the director general. Audit teams are formed based on and methods, which are also part of SSM’s overall manageexperience, competence and audit objectives. ment system. Since 2015, development projects have been External audits are carried out every year. Audits on the performed with the aim of improving and simplifying the annual report, finances and effectiveness are conducted by Authority’s supervision and thereby increase the quality the Swedish National Audit Office. The requirements of and efficiency of SSM’s supervision.

46 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

The supervisory process is divided into the following seven sub-processes:

– Compliance inspections Plant Operation – Surveillance inspections status Safety analysis – Reviews – Managing events – Managing reports – Integrated safety assessments Management and control – Periodic safety review, PSR.

These processes are used in the supervisory programme as described below.

8.8.2. Supervisory programme Design Environmental Over the past three years, the SSM supervisory programme impact has been fundamentally revised to provide better overview, assure complete alignment with regulations, and introduce a higher degree of risk-information in the frequency and scope of supervision. The new supervisory programme Figure 13. Functional supervisory aspects. was tested in 2017, and formally introduced in 2018. The programme entails considerable changes to the planning, implementation, and follow-ups of supervision. The supervisory programme is now structured into two basic The supervision groups are carried out every three, five or parts, baseline supervision and demand-based supervision seven years, based on the risk importance of the group. (see figure 12). There are a total of 36 supervision groups, including, e.g.:

– Safety analysis (3 years) – Operations (3 years) General part – Management systems (5 years) – Safety review (5 years) Baseline – Experience feedback (5 years) Plant specific part – Security (5 years) – ALARA programme (5 years)

8.8.2.2. Identification of supervision needs

Demand-based Specific needs for each year As an important complement to the baseline supervision, the demand-based supervision is defined yearly. It can Supervisory programme therefore differ from year to year, depending on:

– Results from integrated safety assessments Figure 12. Structure of the Supervisory programme. – Results from inspections carried out or events that have occurred

8.8.2.1. Baseline supervision

– Identified areas where supervision is deemed necessary The requirements building up the baseline supervision plan from, e.g., events or concerns are divided into six fundamental aspects (see figure 13): – Major ongoing changes, technical or organisational – Management and control – Other identified needs – Safety analysis – Design 8.8.3. Nuclear safety and radiation protection

inspections

– Plant status The compliance inspections are carried out by teams – Operation composed of the site inspector(s) and one or more experts – Environmental impact on the subject matter of the inspection. An exit meeting is The baseline supervision plan covers a period of 10 years held where preliminary results are communicated to the and describes the basic supervision groups that are carried licensee. The inspection report documents the purpose and out each year for nuclear power plants in operation. Over objectives of the inspection, observations, compliance and the 10-year period, the baseline supervision programme deviations from requirements, an assessment of the covers every requirement in the regulations at least once. significance of any deviations, and a proposal on any further regulatory actions.

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 47

Table 3. Compliance inspections, surveillance inspections and reviews 2016 – 2018.

surveillance inspections to gather information on safety interval not exceeding ten years. The purpose of the PSR is

problems and overall activities at the plants. Normally to have the licence holder re-assess, verify and continuously

these surveillance inspections include three or four annual improve the safety of its nuclear installations. In addition,

meetings with each reactor operations management, two the PSR addresses any issues that might limit the planned

annual meetings with the safety department, one inspection operating period of the facility, and shows how they will be

at each power plant, and yearly meetings to review safety managed. All reasonably practicable improvements shall be

and internal audit programmes. Some inspections are made taken by the licensee.

in connection with events, to follow up organisational SSM reviews the licensee’s PSR regarding confidence in the change, and relating to other current issues, such as level of radiation safety at present, and the licence holder’s findings from earlier inspections. In many cases, these ability to maintain and increase it in the future. SSM’s inspections focus on non-technical issues, such as safety review is partly based on regulatory supervision, while management and safety culture. including an assessment of the licensee’s ability to operate

Preparation and documentation of surveillance inspections the facility until the next PSR.

are simplified in comparison with compliance inspections, Recently performed and ongoing periodic safety reviews but the results are systematically documented and reported are on the part of Oskarshamn 3 (2017 – 2018), Forsmark at SSM management meetings. Each surveillance inspection 1 and 2 (2018 – 2019), and Ringhals 3 and 4 (2019 – 2020). typically takes 1-2 days on site for 1-2 inspectors. Often, a These reviews will take into account new regulations and specialist on the subject matter for the visit accompanies requirements laid down in the EU’s revised Nuclear Safety the inspector. Table 3 below provides an overview of the Directive (2014/87/Euratom) (see section 7.4.1). performed activities.

SSM can also perform so-called intensified supervision. 8.8.5. SSM’s integrated safety assessments

The use is decided by the director general and is applied SSM’s integrated safety assessments comprise annual

when the Authority is dissatisfied with the safety perfor- nuclear safety and radiation protection assessments of each

mance of a licensee. Intensified supervision can also be major facility under SSM’s supervision. Based on all

applied to other special safety reasons, e.g. during test compliance inspections, surveillance inspections, reviews,

operations after a large plant modification. The intensified authority decisions and other relevant information,

supervision regime means that more inspections are done evaluations and a general appraisal are made of the nuclear

and particular progress reporting is required. Intensified safety, radiation protection and non-proliferation control

supervision has been applied in several cases. status of the facility in relation to relevant requirements.

The basic material should also cover earlier information Under SSM regulations, inspection of the licensee and conclusions in order to identify trends that could programmes, activities and results of surveillance, and otherwise be difficult to detect in a short-term perspective. in-service inspection of mechanical components, are The reports are approved by SSM’s director general and performed by an accredited control body (“third-party presented at top-level management meetings with the control”). If the requirements are fulfilled, a compliance licensees. certificate is issued by the control organisation (see section 14.1.2). An aspect of importance when drafting the report is the

traceability from the basis of data, via the analysis, to the

8.8.4. Periodic Safety Reviews final conclusions and the assessment. It should be clearly

Periodic safety reviews (PSR) were introduced in Sweden described how SSM evaluated the relevant issues, and the

in the early 1980’s as a result of the TMI nuclear accident. report should be comprehensible to interested parties

The requirements regarding the reviews have developed lacking expert knowledge in the assessed areas. In order to

over the years and are now quite similar to those recom- perform the integrated safety assessments more effectively

mended in the IAEA Safety Standards. and to improve the quality of the assessment, SSM has

48 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

developed a database with the aim of covering all identified SSM supports basic and applied research, and also

deficiencies and issues from performed supervisory development of methods and processes. However, for

activities. The database was taken into operation in 2012 development work, the intention is to have the developed

and is now undergoing further development. method or process preferably used by the Authority in

support of the Authority’s work.

8.9. Enforcement measures

The research funded annually by SSM totals approximately

84 MSEK. Of this amount, around 55 MSEK is earmarked It is the task of the regulatory body to enforce the for projects relating to nuclear safety. constitutional rules, judgments, conditions and other

decisions governing the activities of a licensee. SSM has

8.10.1. National research

the task of providing advice and information to create the Research is a prerequisite for SSM to be able to conduct its conditions for regulatory purposes to be met, and taking regulatory activities and to achieve its overall objectives. the necessary steps to remedy a situation if necessary. Research to support supervision in the nuclear field focuses Under the Act on Nuclear Activities, the Radiation on strategic areas such as safety assessment, safety analysis, Protection Act and the Environmental Code, the regulareactor technology, material and fuel properties, human tory body has extensive legal powers to enforce the factors, emergency preparedness and non-proliferation. regulations and its decisions. Ageing of components and system materials is an important

The regulatory body has access to a variety of measures area of focus, since Swedish reactors have entered or will

that can be used to remedy a non-compliance situation. soon enter into long term operation (>40 years).

Here, an overarching principle is to avoid taking a measure In the area of radiation protection, key aspects are the that is more restrictive than necessary in the case. Also, the following: research and development work relating to SSM management system provides guidance on how source terms, production and spread of activated different measures should be taken for compliance with corrosion products, new detection and measurement this principle. Whoever becomes the subject of a regulamethods, and waste treatment. More generally, research on tory decision always has the option to appeal the decision. radioecology, radiation biology and radiation dosimetry is

Normally the regulatory body uses a scale of administrative also of long-term importance.

sanctions in cases where the licensees deviate from the In order to contribute to national competence and research regulations. The different steps are: capacity, SSM also supports research in the area of severe

– Issuing a remark on issues to be corrected by the accidents. This is partly directed at Chalmers University of

licensee Technology and the Royal Institute of Technology, in

– Ordering an action plan to be developed and actions to addition to providing support for a national project, APRI,

be taken within a certain time period which is being run jointly with Swedish industry and

academia. The purpose of these projects is to contribute to – Ordering specified actions to be taken within a certain strategic national engagements in OECD/NEA and EU time period and the results submitted for review and projects. Similar funding is directed at Uppsala University approval. This can be applied in combination with a fine. and the Royal Institute of Technology in the area of – Ordering suspension of operations until deficiencies are nuclear non-proliferation. Support is also provided for a corrected and the measures taken are reviewed and long-term activity in the area of cross-section measureapproved by the Authority ments and analysis of nuclear data at Uppsala University. – Revoking a licence.

8.10.2. International research collaborations.

In combination with the above sanctions, the regulatory To fulfil research needs, SSM contracts universities and body can take the following actions: consulting companies, of which most of the funding is

– Refer suspected cases of criminal violations to a public earmarked for research organisations located in Sweden.

prosecutor However, as an important complement to this, SSM also

– Impose additional licensing conditions. participates actively in many international research projects.

Over many years now, a general trend has been observed in

8.10. Regulatory research

Europe of increasing international cooperation in the area

of nuclear safety research. Based on the provisions concerning research, as laid down

in the Ordinance (2008:452) with instructions for the SSM collaborates in research projects conducted by the EU

Swedish Radiation Safety Authority, the overall objective and OECD/NEA, and takes part in a large number of

of the research funded by SSM is to: other projects. Ever since Sweden joined the EU, the

importance of participating in joint European work has – Maintain and develop national competence of increased. Not only does SSM have its own active role, the importance for radiation protection and nuclear safety, Authority also provides funding for Swedish organisations and that participate in EU projects. SSM plans to continue – Ensure that SSM has the knowledge and tools needed to providing this support in the future. carry out effective regulatory and supervisory activities.

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 49

As examples, the following international projects can be The assessment of SSM from these findings is that the mentioned: knowledge management framework in relation to the field of nuclear safety and radiation protection requires rein- – NKS (Nordic Nuclear Safety Research): Nuclear safety forcement as follows: research is performed within NKS in two programme areas: reactor safety, and emergency preparedness and – A comprehensive national strategy with coordinated response; also, within bilateral agreements with Finland. efforts is a prerequisite for achieving a higher level of – Halden: The Halden Project in Norway conducts effectiveness in the knowledge management system. research of importance for fuel, materials and human – Increasing the funding provided to the critical core of factors. research environments needed to maintain the – SCIP (Studsvik Cladding Integrity Project): The fuel knowledge management system and to meet needs in project SCIP is an example of an OECD/NEA Sweden, given the activities relating to radiation that are international project conducted in Sweden. conducted nationally and abroad, today and in the years – ESARDA (European Safeguards Research and to come. Today’s inadequate funding to these research Development Association): ESARDA is an important environments has made this component of the joint project focusing on the area of safeguards. knowledge management system all too vulnerable and dependent on the knowledge of individuals. – ATLAS+ (Advanced Structural Integrity Assessment Tools): ATLAS+ is a project covering experiments and – Formalising the interaction between stakeholders in the analyses to assess the structural integrity of large piping system for central government research funding to components supporting safe long-term operation. guarantee that the relevant research environments as described above will be sustained. – Fukushima-related projects in cooperation with other OECD/NEA countries in, for example, TCOFF and – Ensuring that education programmes critical to society PreADES. in the field of nuclear safety and radiation protection can be run, and that the content of courses relating to Moreover, SSM cooperates closely with other government the field is given defined objectives as necessary and agencies internationally, e.g. the NRC (US), IRSN (France), subjected to quality assurance. STUK (Finland) and ENSI (Switzerland). In particular, – Several stakeholders should run campaigns and issue close cooperation with the NRC is prioritised in order to communication for the purpose of attracting students have access to models and computer programs developed so that they enrol in nuclear safety and radiation for three-dimensional coupled thermal-hydraulics simula- protection education programmes and choose tions, neutron kinetic calculations, as well as severe occupations in the field. accident analyses.

8.11. Communication

8.10.3. Long-term national competence

SSM’s ordinance states that SSM shall, by means of As commissioned by the Swedish Government, SSM has communication and transparency, contribute towards investigated the prerequisites for maintaining national public insight into all operations encompassed by the competence in its area of responsibility. SSM has estab- Authority’s mandate. The aim of this work shall be to: lished that there is a need to strengthen the national framework for knowledge management in areas relating to 1. Promote health and prevent ill health, radiation safety, both for the purpose of meeting today’s 2. Prevent acute radiation injuries and reduce the risk of needed competence, and for anticipating needs arising in delayed injuries due to radiation, and the years to come. One of the root causes of this vulnera- 3. Provide advice and information about radiation, its bility in the knowledge management system nationally is properties and areas of application, and about radiation the present underfunding of several areas of research that protection. are critical to society. This situation is due to a number of factors, for instance the following:

8.11.1. Governance policy and communication

– Certain competencies in radiation protection are needed Our governance policy states that the Authority’s role in connection with e.g. emergencies; however, these includes working proactively and preventively in many professional skills are only in low demand by employers arenas – to develop, improve and promote radiation for their day-to-day operations. This makes it difficult protection and nuclear safety, and to ensure compliance. for research projects of this kind to find matching The governance policy states further that we shall influence sources of funding. Another aspect is that students are patterns of behaviour for improvement of radiation safety not attracted to the area of knowledge. within our mandates and make use of appropriate tools for – The nuclear power industry is subject to financial influencing behaviours, and that our work should be pressure. As a result, the industry has scaled down its perceived as beneficial to interested part. Communication programmes for support of nuclear research. and consultation are strategic tools used by the Authority – There are no incentives for central government sources for influencing behaviours and adding value on the part of of research funding to liaise on concerted investment the interested parties. for the purpose of sustaining dynamic research environments relating to radiation safety.

50 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

8.11.2. Communication policy The communication strategy sets out how SSM’s vision SSM’s communication policy is an overall governance and governance goals can be achieved from: document that sets out how our mission and fundamental – Strategies for guidance of communication work, and values should characterise our communication with – Criteria for navigating selection of communication interested parties. The policy specifies the responsibility activities. of employees and managers for internal and external communication. It also states that SSM, as per our The strategy has both an internal and an external perspecordinance, shall, through information and transparency, tive and applies to all employees. The strategy does not contribute to providing the public with insight into all claim to cover all communication work of the Authority. activities covered by our mandates. The policy also emphasises our fundamental values – credibility, integrity SSM’s communication strategy is accompanied by guideand openness – in communication: lines for communication, and in some cases by separate strategies, e.g. SSM’s reputation crisis communication Credibility strategy. – Our messages are based on the laws and regulations governing our operations.

8.12. Follow-up of the 2012 IRRS

– We clearly convey that our recommendations and

decisions are based on objectivity and facts. review mission

A full-scope IAEA IRRS mission to Sweden was Integrity performed February 2012, with the resulting recommen- – We communicate based on our mission: achieving a dations having been addressed by SSM in an action plan. radiation-safe society. We do not allow ourselves to be Following arrangements made with the IAEA, a influenced by irrelevant interests. follow-up mission took place in April 2016. Two out of – We clearly separate between our mission and actions the subsequent 22 recommendations given by the IRRS from those of others. team in 2012 were considered by Sweden in 2016 to remain open since more work was needed to close these Openness recommendations. – We communicate proactively and comprehensively and The general conclusion of the 2016 IRRS follow-up team have accessible information about our mission, matters was that they were satisfied with the approach of Sweden and mandates. to address the findings of the 2012 IRRS mission, and to – We are also open about issues that might have a negative improve the regulatory system for nuclear safety. Eleven impact on us. recommendations out of the 22 identified in 2012 were – We are attentive to the needs of interested parties, and closed, and a further nine were closed on “progress and seek new ways of communicating with them. confidence”. Two recommendations remained open in 2016. Twelve suggestions out of the 17 identified during SSM’s communication policy states that all employees are the 2012 IRRS mission were closed and the remaining five responsible for communicating in accordance with our were closed on “progress and confidence”. mission and fundamental values. It also states that all The two recommendations that remain open refer to 1) employees have the right to inform the media (freedom of provisions to maintain competence for nuclear safety and speech). This means that all employees have the statutory radiation protection on a national level, and 2) the systemright to anonymously inform the mass media about our atic evaluation of operational experience from non-nuclear operations. facilities and radiation protection events and activities, 8.11.2.1. Overall communication strategy including dissemination of all significant experience. The SSM’s communication policy is accompanied by an overall work on these areas will continue. communication strategy, listing its key target groups as As a further result of the 2016 IRRS follow-up, an follows: additional four suggestions were received. These are listed – Employees below. – The public SSM should: – Licensees – Complete a comprehensive resource and competence The strategy emphasises that communication is a strategic assessment, based on a strategic review that tool for achieving the vision of a radiation-safe society, and incorporates the Swedish nuclear industry’s perspective contributing to the fulfilment of SSM’s mission. It also – Consider making key management system process emphasises that in order for the Authority to influence the documentation available to the applicants, licensees and behaviour of the target groups, they need to know and other interested parties trust us. Consistent and targeted communication work is a – Consider reviewing its roles, responsibilities, and basis for ensuring knowledge and confidence. expectations of its departments to ensure clarity and

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 51

to consider methods to ensure effective cross- SSM also received two new “good practices” referring to a) organisational boundary communication that enables the development of criteria for assessing risks in conneceffective implementation of its management system tion with the use of radiation sources, and b) SSM’s components approach to establishing consistent and comprehensive – The Swedish Government should consider expanding regulations, while taking into account international the scope of the national emergency response plan for standards and good practices. management of nuclear accidents to take into The Swedish Government has officially requested that the consideration arrangements for responding to IAEA carry out the next IRRS mission in Sweden. This radiological emergencies, based on threat/hazard mission is scheduled to take place at SSM in 2022. assessment.

52 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

Article 9. Responsibility of the licence holders

measures to maintain safety, but also measures to improve Each Contracting Party shall ensure that prime responsisafety where this is justified. bility for the safety of a nuclear installation rests with the holder of the relevant licence and shall take the appro- Furthermore, according to the Act, SSM shall ensure that priate steps to ensure that each such licence holder meets regulations and procedures applied are cost effective and its responsibility. useful for individuals as well as companies. The regulations and procedures must be formulated in a way implying that the regulatory body does not take over the prime responsi-

Summary of developments since bility for safety and radiation protection. the previous national report

Also, supervision by SSM shall ensure that the licensees During the current review period, the following developmaintain good control over the safety of the plants and ments are of relevance with regard to the obligations of that safety work is conducted with a satisfactory level of Article 9: quality.

– WANO peer review and development work are SSM’s regulations on safety in nuclear facilities (SSMFS continuing at all plants. 2008:1) specify the responsibility of the licensee through a – IAEA SALTO reviews have been initiated for the number of fundamental requirements for safety manage- Forsmark NPP, Ringhals NPP and Oskarshamn NPP as ment, design and construction, safety analysis and review, a part of activities related to safe continued operation operations, nuclear materials and waste management and of the units. documentation including archiving. In addition, it is clearly stated by these regulations (Chapter 2, Section 9, item 8)

9.1. Regulatory requirements that safety shall be monitored and followed up by the

licensee on a routine basis, with deviations identified and The Act on Nuclear Activities (1984:3) is clear about the rectified so that safety is maintained and developed further prime responsibility for safety: in accordance with set objectives and strategies. The Section 10 in the Act on Nuclear Activities states that the meaning of this provision is that continuous preventive holder of a licence for nuclear activities shall ensure that all safety work is a legal requirement, which includes safety measures are taken which are needed for: reassessments, analysis of events in one’s own facility and

other installations, and analysis of relevant new safety – Maintaining safety, taking into account the nature of the standards, practices and research results. All reasonable activities and conditions under which they are measures that are useful for safety shall be taken as a result conducted, of this proactive and continuous safety work, and they – The safe management and disposal of nuclear waste must be documented in a safety programme that is to be arising in the activities or therein arising nuclear material updated annually. which is not reused, and – The safe decommissioning and dismantling of facilities SSM’s regulations spell out three basic control principles, in which nuclear activities are no longer carried out. which clearly separate the roles of a licensee and the regulator: It is also stated that the holder of a licence for nuclear activities shall, in connection with near-accidents, threats or – Approval by SSM (in specified matters) after primary other similar circumstance, report without delay to the and independent safety review by the licensee. regulatory body such information that is of consequence – Notification of SSM (in specified matters) after primary for the assessment of safety. and independent safety review by the licensee. – Internal audits by the licensees according to their own In the bill and the legislative history for the Act on Nuclear management systems. Activities, it is stated that the licensee shall not only take

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 53

The basic safety documentation, SAR including OLCs, procedures of management review and performance PSA, and plans for emergency response and physical management. protection must be formally approved by SSM. Plant and The next WANO review is planned for April 2019. It will organisational modifications and changes in the safety also include a Conduct of Crew Performance Observations, documentation are to be notified to SSM. If warranted, CPO, for control room training at the simulator, and a SSM may impose additional conditions and requirements. CPO for work in connection with a “safety train outage” in 2019. A corporate peer review is also planned for

9.2. Compliance of the licence holders

summer 2019.

A number of measures being taken give evidence that the

Forsmark NPP

Swedish licensees are taking the prime responsibility for As a result of the WANO Peer Review in October 2015, safety. The following subsections give examples of such WANO performed a follow-up at the Forsmark NPP in measures where the activities are more or less ongoing. May 2018. The follow-up resulted in an action plan relating to deviations whose rectification is in progress, according

9.2.1. Safety policies

to WANO, as per the AFIs (Areas For Improvement). Vattenfall and OKG have adopted nuclear safety policies. The action plan culminating from the follow-up resulted These safety policies are the highest level documents in six areas needing improvement, with a total of 44 expressing key corporate values, and are valid for all parts actions having been decided. The areas are within the of each company. The policies express a fundamental following: independent oversight, performance improveperspective on matters of safety and establish levels of ments, industrial safety, operation fundamentals, equipment ambition and priorities, such as the following: failure prevention, and emergency preparedness. Four – Always put safety first. Member Support Missions, MSM, have been requested from WANO. The MSMs are planned for first quarter of – Take own safety initiatives. 2019. The next WANO Peer Review is planned for – Maintain an open dialogue with the regulators and with October 2019. other companies on safety issues. – Regard regulations as the minimum standard, meeting Ringhals NPP this with conservative margins. Ringhals and WANO performed a peer review in March – Take an active and leading role in research and 2017. The peer review resulted in some areas for improvedevelopment. ment (AFI). These identified areas for improvement have – Strive for the continuous improvement of safety. been addressed, following an action plan agreed between Ringhals and WANO. The follow-up by WANO is planned Implementation of the safety policies is described further to be carried out in May 2019. in section 10.2.1. In addition, Ringhals has requested several member 9.2.2. Continuous improvements at the plants support missions (MSM), within areas including operation, The principles applied to improvements at nuclear power engineering, emergency preparedness, and coaching. Other plants are discussed in section 6.2. It is made clear by these areas supported by WANO are significant operating descriptions that the utilities make substantial own experience reports (SOER), where several recommendainitiatives to assess and improve the reactors. tions have been implemented over the past few years, as well as adoption of WANO guidelines, mainly in the areas 9.2.3. International peer reviews of operation, maintenance and engineering. International reviews are performed on the initiative of the licensees. Several Swedish nuclear power plant staff 9.2.3.2. IAEA SALTO peer review members also participate each year in WANO as well as Oskarshamn NPP OSART review missions abroad. Participating as an expert In December 2017, OKG conducted an IAEA pre-SALTO is considered to be of great value to the individuals as well peer review for OKG unit 3. The mission resulted in three as to their plant organisations. good performances and 19 issues. The LTO project at OKG has been dealing with issues arising from the 9.2.3.1. WANO peer review pre-SALTO mission, together with other actions needed Oskarshamn NPP for safe long-term operation of unit 3. In autumn 2017, a WANO follow-up of the peer review Planning for future IAEA peer reviews is preliminary conducted in 2015 took place at the Oskarshamn NPP. A scheduled as follows: total of 13 areas for improvement (AFI) were followed up. An action plan for dealing with the AFI has been estab- – 2021: second pre-SALTO lished by the senior management team. The action plan has – 2023: full scope SALTO been merged with OKG’s strategic plan. Thus, it is fully – 2025: follow-up SALTO integrated in the development strategy of the company. This allows the actions to be tracked for their progress and The aim is to ensure long-term and safe operation of evaluated in terms of their effect as part of the standard OKG unit 3 beyond 2025, when the plant passes 40 years of operation.

54 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

Forsmark NPP

The Forsmark NPP’s units 1 and 2 will pass 40 years of operation and subsequently enter LTO in 2020 and 2021, respectively. For this reason, Forsmarks Kraft Grupp AB (FKA) has initiated a SALTO peer review programme. IAEA performed a pre-SALTO review at the Forsmark NPP in November 2016. Forsmark received 13 recommendations and three suggestions. A full scope SALTO mission is planned for June 2019.

Ringhals NPP

In March 2018, an IAEA SALTO review mission was performed for unit 3 of the Ringhals NPP, with a follow-up mission planned for March 2020. The SALTO review mission resulted in 9 recommendations, 8 suggestions, 13 encouragements, 19 good performances and 3 good practices. Post-SALTO mission activities are ongoing in order to follow up activities related to SALTO issues, and to close or reduce the gaps in each of the areas. Unit 3 is expected to pass 40 years of operation in 2021, thus entering long-term operation. Ringhals is preparing a PSR report for units 3 and 4, to be submitted to SSM in April 2019.

9.3. Regulatory control

SSM’s regulatory activities involves promotion and verification of compliance. That means performing a number of inspections as a part of supervisory practices (see section 8.8). The aim is to produce evidence on how the licensees apply principles of prime responsibility for safety in practice and in their daily work. In cases where inspections resulted in enforcement actions these are followed up in order to control that the deviations have been given sufficient attention. Reporting requirements are also an important aspect of the SSM’s assurance that licensees continue meet their responsibilities. According to regulations, licensees have to notify SSM of all plant and organisational modifications affecting conditions reported in the SAR, as well as modifications to the SAR itself and the OLC. The statement of the independent safety review made by the licensee must be attached to the notification. If SSM is not satisfied with a notification, the licensee has to complement it, or SSM can impose further requirements or conditions on the proposed solution before it may be implemented. If more investigation time is needed, SSM can stop the implementation until the case has been investigated further. Further information on this process can be found under section 10.3.4.

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 55

Part III

General Safety Considerations 56 Part III General Safety Considerations

Part III General Safety Considerations

Article 10. Priority to safety

implementation of measures, Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to – A sufficient number of adequately trained staff are ensure that all organisations engaged in activities directly available, related to nuclear installations shall establish policies that give due priority to nuclear safety. – Conservative criteria are applied in the design and

operation of the plant,

– Safety is monitored and followed up, and failures and

Summary of developments since the deficiencies are identified in a timely manner and previous report corrected,

Significant developments during the current review period – The operating organisation has a strong programme in

related to Article 10 are the following: place for learning from its own and others’ mistakes so

that safety deficiencies that can be eliminated or avoided, – The 2015 decisions of the owners of the Ringhals NPP – Quality management is applied in all activities, and Oskarshamn NPPs to shut down two reactors each, – Possibilities for improving safety are evaluated and resulted in an immediate and permanent shut down of reasonably practicable safety improvements are the Oskarshamn NPP’s unit 2, followed by unit 1 in implemented as appropriate, and 2017. As a result of this, SSM is conducting increased – The organisation as a whole is characterised by a good supervision of the safety status and licensees activities safety culture. in order to closely monitor the situation.

In SSM’s regulations on safety in nuclear facilities (Chapter

10.1. Regulatory requirements 2, Sections 7 to 9 of SSMFS 2008:1), these requirements

Policies that provide due priority to safety are recognised are given for safety management having the aim of giving

as normal safety policies and safety strategies. Safety the right priority to safety:

management provisions and tools for managing a nuclear – The operating organisation shall have the necessary power plant apply in such a way that safety is prioritised financial and personnel resources and be structured to and a good safety culture is established and maintained. maintain safety. A good safety culture that gives safety issues the attention – A management system shall be implemented and kept warranted by their significance is also a prerequisite for up to date so that requirements on safety are met in all robust implementation of a management system. relevant activities.

A basic requirement laid down in SSMFS 2008:1 is that – Documented safety objectives and safety strategies must

radiological accidents shall be prevented through a verified be in place for ensuring that safety is always prioritised.

and robust design on the part of each facility. Such a – Responsibilities, levels of authority and cooperation design shall include multiple barriers and a facility-specific shall be defined for staff having tasks of importance for implementation of the defence in depth concept. This is safety. further elaborated in the general advice for the regulation, – Activities shall be planned in such a way that necessary where the items below must be prioritised in order to time is allocated for safety measures and safety reviews. develop and maintain effective implementation of the – Safety decisions shall be preceded by sufficient safety defence in depth concept. The items (shown in the bullet investigation and review; for instance, an independent list below) may also be interpreted as the key elements of a safety committee should be used to review issues of safety policy to be implemented by the licensees’ operating principal importance for safety. organisations in order to facilitate their work to ensure an – Staff shall be given the working conditions needed to effective management system: safely carry out work.

– Safety is always prioritised over commercial operations, – Applicable operational experience shall be assessed

– Sufficient financial resources are available for continuously and reported to the relevant staff.

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 57

– Safety shall be assessed and followed up on a routine management level 1 is often represented by the plant basis, with deviations identified and corrective measures manager. taken so that safety is maintained and developed – Safety management level 2 is responsible for long-term according to the established safety objectives and safety issues, manuals and procedures. Level 2 is also strategies. responsible for the unit-related safety reviews.

Additionally, Level 2 has to ensure that the unit safety Chapter 2, Section 10 of SSMFS 2008:1, requires that the report (SAR) is up to date and reflects sound safety licensees have an up-to-date safety programme. It is stated, practices. Level 2 performs follow-ups on deviations, that after commissioning, the safety of a facility shall be trends and operating experience. Deviations from regularly analysed and assessed in a systematic manner. regulations, company norms and policies should be Reasonably practicable technical and organisational reported to safety management level 1. Level 2 also has measures for safety improvements that are identified as a the role of sanctioning procedures relating to the extent result of this analysis and assessment shall be included in of work on safety-related equipment, and ensuring that an established safety programme. This programme shall be documentation fulfils the requirements. Safety evaluated and updated annually to identify priorities and management level 2 is often represented by the time schedules for measures to be taken. production unit manager.

The regular analysis and assessment should take into – Safety management level 3 is responsible for safe consideration technical and organisational experience from operation within the limits of procedures and technical the plant’s own activities as well as from other similar specifications. Level 3 is also responsible for all work plants, results of relevant R&D-projects and development permits regarding safety-related equipment. Safetyof safety standards. Organisational experience includes for related deviations should be reported to safety instance; results of MTO analyses, evaluation of organisa- management level 2. tional changes, evaluation of work conditions, and self-assessments of the working climate and safety culture. Independent safety reviews are carried out by the safety and quality departments. The management structure outlines:

10.2. Compliance of the licence holders

– Reporting criteria and requirements. 10.2.1. Safety policies – Criteria for regular and periodical (daily and weekly)

The safety policies (see section 9.2) issued by Vattenfall operational meetings including criteria for shift change-over. and Uniper, express the most important corporate values – Issues to be handled within the company’s safety review regarding nuclear safety. They have been interpreted and committee. further developed in the management systems for each – Requirements regarding plant modifications (technical nuclear power plant. The safety policies are reviewed and organisational). periodically and the policies of the plant managements are reviewed by external and internal safety audits. All licensees have safety programmes in place as required

by SSM’s regulation SSMFS 2008:1. The programmes are 10.2.2. Safety management provisions part of the management system documentation. They

All licensees have safety committees in order to review contain priorities and schedules for technical, organisamajor and principal safety issues and to follow up and tional and administrative measures to be implemented as a assess the safety situation at the plants. Furthermore, for result of safety analyses, audits, safety culture surveys and many years local safety review committees have been estab- other evaluations conducted at the plant. lished at plant level to advice on principal safety issues.

10.2.3. Ringhals NPP

All licensees have quite similar structure in place for safety The level of safety in plant operations is monitored in management and review where the responsibilities and several ways, including the use of performance indicators. levels of authority of the different levels of management The indicators are classified into four groups: Maintain and are clearly defined. At Vattenfall there are two parallel Develop the Plant, Maintain and Develop the Competence, management structures, one for safety and one for Develop Structures and Behaviours, and Reinforce Trust in operational responsibility. The roles often coincide. At the Ringhals NPP Internally and Externally. The quality OKG there is one management structure applied for indicators measure factors such as unplanned automatic operational structure. Safety management are included in scrams, fuel integrity, safety systems performance, safety the responsibility of all managers at OKG. culture, and work-related injuries. The indicators are The basic principles are the following: periodically reviewed (monthly or quarterly) by the

management team. Any deviation from expected perfor- – Safety management level 1 is responsible for the overall mance is analysed and actions for improvement are decided safety review process, and for specific safety issues on by the plant manager. forwarded to the manager from lower levels (2 and 3). Level 1 responsibility includes issuing policies, the safety A description is provided below on safety management management system and company directives for nuclear development at Ringhals over the past three years. Safety safety, as well as sanctioning deviations. Safety management has been adjusted in accordance with the

58 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

Ringhals CEO’s allocation of tasks across the organisation Index. This is a weighted index consisting of ten specific by introducing operation and construction management. indicators. The calculation of the Indicator Index was Safety issues with a direct impact on the plant safe developed by INPO and is used for evaluation and setting operation are dealt with by the operation management, and goals for NPPs. safety issues without a direct impact on the plant are dealt with by the operation and construction management. 10.2.7. Vattenfall’s Corporate Independent Nuclear

Safety Oversight

Safety evaluation has been divided into four safety rating In addition to the NPP independent safety organisations levels according to complexity and impact on the indivi- Vattenfall has established an independent nuclear safety dual, construction, or the environment. oversight function on high corporate level, namely the – Safety management level 4 is represented by the skift Corporate Independent Nuclear Safety Oversight (CINSO) manager or the shift engineer who is responsible for the group reporting directly to the Corporate Executive safety within the limits of procedures and technical Officer (CEO). Figure 14 provides an overview of safety specifications. Level 4 should continuously evaluate functions on line management and independent oversight ready and mandate to order changes to the facility’s levels, and safety committees or councils on different levels. operation within assigned management responsibility.

10.2.7.1. Independent Oversight at Vattenfall

Level 4 is also responsible for all work permits on safety

Corporate Level

relates equipment. Safety related deviations should be The CEO of Vattenfall conduct independent oversight of reported to the safety management level 3. nuclear safety and performance through two functions independent of the line organisation: the Corporate

10.2.4. Forsmark NPP

Independent Nuclear Safety Oversight (CINSO) function, The level of safety in plant operations is monitored in and the Nuclear Safety Council (NSC). several ways, including the use of performance indicators. The indicators are classified into four areas: Safety and CINSO has the task of providing advice to the CEO of Environment, Production and Plant, Competence and Vattenfall on the basis of an independent and diversified Staffing, and Efficiency and Cooperation. The indicators perspective. The independent oversight work should be measure factors such as fuel integrity, LTI, radiation strategic, enabling the CEO to be well-informed in matters exposure, unviability of safety systems, and outage that may have consequences on nuclear safety and perfordeviation. There are 18 indicators on company level. mance. By reporting its findings, the CINSO function is These are further broken down on department level. The also to provide added value to the Chief Nuclear Officer indicators are periodically reviewed (monthly or quarterly) (CNO) and the licence holders. The CNO reports directly by the management teams. Any deviation from expected to the CEO. The NSC advises the CEO on matters of performance is analysed and actions for improvements are nuclear safety and performance from an external perspective. decided on by the plant manager.

10.2.7.2. Independent Oversight by CINSO

10.2.5. Oskarshamn NPP CINSO constitutes an additional layer of the defence in The level of safety in plant operations is monitored in depth by advising top management on safety and perforseveral ways, including the use of performance indicators. mance in the nuclear business. Processes and performance The performance indicators are linked to the company’s are systematically assessed and gaps to best practice are strategic goals. reported to the line organisation for decisions on actions to be taken. Recommendations and suggestions are The indicators are periodically reviewed (monthly or followed up. Good practices are shared with the sites. quarterly) by the management team. Any deviation from expected performance is analysed and actions for improve-

10.2.7.3. The regulatory framework and CINSO

ment are decided. Selected indicators, their results, and All nuclear operations within Vattenfall shall comply with corrective actions to improve performance are presented existing national nuclear laws and regulations as well as with to the board on a quarterly basis. All results are also internal Vattenfall requirements. Additionally, all nuclear presented on the intranet under the heading “Goals and activities shall comply with Vattenfall’s Nuclear Safety Safety Indicators”. Policy, which should also be in agreement with IAEA Structured work on KPIs forms the basis for continuous Safety Standards and WANO Guidelines. It is the responsidevelopment of the management structure. Currently, the bility of the line organisation to adhere to these requireconcept of “Operational Excellence” is being rolled out ments. With regard to compliance with nuclear laws and throughout the organisation. Visual management, in which regulations, the responsibility lies with the nuclear licensees. KPIs are published on “visual boards” as a basis for The CINSO function performs its oversight within this decisions, follow-ups and planning, is a vital part of framework of requirements and regulations i.e. oversees Operational Excellence. that these basic requirements are fulfilled. However, the focus should be more on strategic issues. The independent

10.2.6. Use of WANO Performance Indicators

oversight should also be in agreement with WANO All licensees utilise the complete WANO programme of principles regarding corporate oversight of nuclear power Performance Indicators including the WANO Indicator organisations.

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 59

Formal reporting Reporting/information Oversight scope NPPs

Line Management Independent oversight Committees/Councils function

Vattenfall Group Level

Vattenfall AB Board of Directors Vattenfall CINSO – Corporate Vattenfall Nuclear Safety Council Independent Nuclear (NSC) Safety Oversight Vattenfall CEO

Business Area Level Nuclear Safety Board (NSB)

CNO Safety Coordination Group (SRG)

NPP Company & Unit Level

EHSQ Department NPP Company Boards

NPP MD/Oversight Level 1 On-site Safety Review Committees (SRC) Oversight Level 2

Oversight Level 3

Control Room

Figure 14. Vattenfall’s safety management structure and CINSO scope and reporting.

The CINSO oversight shall emphasise a proactive vision in which systems and processes are assessed to approach, in other words, early detection of safety and ensure safety. This facilitates a proactive approach. In the performance degradations in order to avoid more serious more reactive work, e.g. follow-ups of incidents and events, problems developing. signs of deficiencies in the safety work, etc., the main focus is on evaluating management of the incident or problem.

10.2.7.4. Independent role of CINSO

Additionally, the CINSO role and function include tasks The independent oversight role implies that CINSO shall such as assessing: not engage in, take responsibility for, or execute authority over activities that normally would be reviewed. CINSO – Organisational changes at Vattenfall corporate reviews and approaches do not relieve management of organisations that affect nuclear safety within assigned responsibilities for establishing and maintaining Vattenfall’s nuclear-related operations. control over nuclear safety and performance. – Introduction of new or changed governance at Vattenfall that affects, or may affect, the nuclear safety

10.2.7.5. Graded approach

of licensees. The independent oversight activities are based on a – Other decisions within Vattenfall that affect nuclear risk-based prioritisation of the organisations covered by safety and/or the responsibility of licensees as per the CINSO. The organisations are divided up into two Act on Nuclear Activities and SSM’s regulations. categories (primary and secondary). The main focus of the CINSO independent oversight activities is on the nuclear

10.2.7.7. CINSO’s methods and approaches

facilities (Forsmark NPP, Ringhals NPP, SKB) and CNO The CINSO function gathers information on nuclear including Staff Function Fleet Development, for which safety and performance through various sources and designated oversight engineers are assigned. For other parts means. Fulfilment of the independent oversight presupof the nuclear organisation, a plan for independent poses the CINSO function having access to documentaoversight activities is formulated and documented annually. tion and meeting with fora on site at the nuclear facilities 10.2.7.6. Scope of CINSO as needed.

The corporate independent oversight should provide The sources include, but are not limited to, the regular added value to the corporate management and licence reporting on safety and performance from the line holders alike. The oversight is based on systems super-

60 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

organisation, operating experience reports and root cause nicated to the CEO, CNO, top management of the investigations, audit reports, major plant modification and business units, as well as to the local safety departments. improvement plans and progress reports, safety culture The areas of concern identified from annual reports are assessments, and various types of reports produced by the part of Vattenfall’s business planning directives. CINSO regulatory bodies. also reports to Vattenfall’s board of directors once a year.

The CINSO function is also tasked with gathering CINSO meets regularly with the CEO and CNO. Meetings information by means of plant visits and participation in are held on a monthly basis with local safety departments. key meetings. Plant visits can have various purposes, from Results from individual reports are presented to the general information gathering to more focused assess- Nuclear Safety Council (NSC) and or Nuclear Safety Board ments of specific areas. The focused assessments can be (NSB). based on identified concerns, or have a more proactive approach aimed at ensuring high quality in known precur- 10.2.7.12. Follow-ups by CINSO sors to safety performance. It is the responsibility of the CINSO function to perform follow-ups on issues and concerns raised by CINSO in All types of assessments should be based on a systems various fora. An annual assessment is performed on the view of safety and performance, i.e. recognising the involvement of CINSO in issues and concerns, also the complex interplay between humans technology and degree to which its advice has been implemented and or organisations, as well as nuclear leaders and managers taken into consideration. having the skills, knowledge and ability to deal with the unique interaction between the technology, human and 10.2.7.13. Independent Oversight by the Nuclear Safety organisational factors, economics, and safety. Thus, Council assessments should be based on an integrated approach The role of the NSC is to advise the CEO of Vattenfall on using various types of information sources to form nuclear safety and performance issues. The advice shall be grounds for judgement. credible, i.e. well-informed, and based on Vattenfall’s way

of doing business. This means that the information is The criteria used for assessments should be based on coherent, in other words reflecting as far as possible the Vattenfall Nuclear Safety Policy (see section 9.2.1) and thinking of the entire team. It must also be useful, i.e. other requirements, nuclear regulations, WANO guidelines, address agreed strategic issues. The members of the NSC IAEA Safety Standards and documented best international are appointed by the CEO. The NSC is to consist of practices. This requires that the CINSO function shall external experts possessing extensive experience from the follow international developments in the area of nuclear nuclear field. The CNO and head of CINSO participate safety and performance. on the part of Vattenfall. The CEO chairs the NSC.

10.2.7.8. Systematic Independent Assessments, SIA

The main tasks of the Nuclear Safety Council are: SIA is a proactive in-depth assessment aimed at reviewing areas that are assessed as important and vital for safe – To evaluate issues of strategic or otherwise principal nuclear operations. SIAs are performed according to a importance regarding nuclear operations, with input predefined schedule, with the intention of covering the from sources such as worldwide operating experience, main areas for oversight over a six-year period and one SIA regulatory requirements, internal and external being performed each year. assessments, periodic safety reviews, etc.

– To review and give advice on policies and other 10.2.7.9. Focus Area Review, FAR governing documents, major changes to organisational FARs are used for areas where there is a need for deeper structures, communication regarding nuclear safetyreview. The FAR is normally performed by a smaller team related issues, etc. for the nuclear operations. gathering information regarding the area during a period – To provide high level oversight or commentary on the comprising around one quarter. An annual plan for the level of nuclear safety of the nuclear installations by FARs is developed based on previous insights and findings. reviewing Vattenfall reports, and to communicate related considerations for improvement.

10.2.7.10. Observation reports

– To visit nuclear installations periodically, to observe and Observation reports are a way of documenting observadiscuss issues and operations with staff, and to provide tions made by CINSO personnel. Observation reports are feedback to management. used as a tool for documenting important findings made – On occasion, and as requested by Vattenfall, to carry during regular monitoring of performance. These reports out targeted information gathering exercises or may also be used as a way of steering site performance evaluations. monitoring by defining areas for observations. Areas for observations should be revised regularly and are communi- – To prepare nuclear safety-related reports as needed.

cated to the local safety departments. The NSC normally meets two or three times per year.

10.2.7.11. Reporting The CINSO function shall provide the NSC members with Results from nuclear independent oversight are compiled a standard set of performance reports and other relevant in annual and bi-annual safety assessment reports commu- information material on an ad hoc basis. The NSC

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 61

members can furthermore request certain reports or The main recipient of outcomes from SNP’s independent

information for review. The documented recommen- oversight is the CEO of SNP. Regular reporting also takes

dations from the NSC are based on consensus among place to SNP’s board of directors and to the managing

the external experts, whereas Vattenfall officers are directors of the plants.

non-voting members. A number of different evaluations of the corporate

independent function have been conducted. The effective-

10.2.7.14. Whistle-blowing function

ness of the independent oversight process is also self- CINSO has a “whistle-blowing” function i.e. anyone within assessed annually. the Vattenfall organisation may contact CINSO regarding

concerns on nuclear related safety issues. Uniper also has a Nuclear Safety Council which serves as

the highest independent function. Uniper Nuclear Safety The CINSO whistleblowing function has a broad scope Council, UNSC, consists of senior nuclear experts and regarding safe nuclear operations. Any serious concerns provides recommendations to the CNO based on a related to nuclear and radiation safety could be reported combination of observing the organisation and the plants to CINSO, whether they be issues on technical matters, and by studying assessment and performance reports. Most competence, safety management, safety culture etc., in members of the UNSC are external senior experts who cases of non-compliance by the line organisation. give an additional, external view on safety aspects.

10.2.8. Corporate independent oversight at

10.2.8.1. Whistleblowing function

Sydkraft Nuclear Power Sweden AB (SNP)

Employees at Uniper are to report any potential violations In Sweden, the licence holder has the full responsibility for of the Code of Conduct and other violations of law or nuclear safety according to the Act on Nuclear Activities internal company policies. All employees have the opportuand national regulations. This means that the licence nity to securely submit reports on any violation, also holders of the operating nuclear companies have the full anonymously if desired, via the Uniper “whistleblower responsibility for taking measures to comply with the hotline”. legislation. Additionally, all nuclear activities within Uniper

shall comply with the Uniper Nuclear Safety Policy, which Reports on potential violations within the company may be

also constitutes an important point of reference for the directed to any member of the Uniper Compliance Team

corporate independent nuclear oversight performed. and to supervisors serving as internal ombudsmen. This

opportunity is equally available to all third parties (e.g. SNP´s independent oversight function is independent of customers and suppliers) who have a business relationship the line organisation, and reports directly to the CEO. with Uniper. The purpose of the corporate independent nuclear safety

oversight is to create an additional layer in the defence in Each report received will be treated with the utmost

depth by advising SNP’s CEO and top management on confidentiality. Also, all employees who report potential

safety and performance in SNP´s nuclear business. rule violations benefit from special protection according to

Processes and performance should be systematically the principles of the Code of Conduct. In other words, a

assessed with identified gaps reported to the line organisa- whistleblower need not fear any retaliation resulting from

tion for decision making and actions. his or her report.

The basis for the process of corporate independent Investigations and evaluations relating to compliance

nuclear safety oversight is to challenge safety performance incidents are coordinated by the chief compliance officer

over and above legal requirements and the level of at Uniper.

standards and guidelines from international organisations.

The activities should be planned adequately in order to 10.2.8.2. Legislation board at OKG

ensure that all relevant aspects of SNP’s nuclear-related Uniper, as the owner, exercises control over OKG. Uniper

business are covered, thus providing the means to work governs OKG through recommendations and business

systematically and be proactive. This is done as part of a strategies.

continual review plan that is reviewed annually to also OKG, as a licensee, assesses whether, and the extent to cover current areas of interest. which, these recommendations and strategies comply with

Assessments are made with the aim to achieve best safety the regulatory requirements. This assessment, which is

performance from a corporate point of view, thus adding conducted by the legislation board, identifies gaps between

value by reviewing quality and safety against safety criteria Uniper’s recommendations and strategies in relation to the

and best practice. Nuclear safety assessments are regulations and the impact on OKG from the perspectives

performed in order to identify areas for improvements and of current legislation and safety requirements.

to give a second opinion for the line organisation’s oversight. 10.2.9. Safety culture programmes

Maintaining a strong safety culture when operating nuclear Depending on the severity of identified gaps, reporting is power plants is considered a vital aspect by the Swedish to be performed immediately or according to a reporting utilities. Safety culture is emphasised in the policies of the schedule. Recommendations made by SNP’s independent different plants and in their strategic planning. Manageoversight are followed by relevant indicators until completion. ment at all levels, including the managing directors, is

62 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

involved in activities to enhance the safety culture and to During the plant life extension project run at the Oskar-

stress the responsibility of all personnel to work actively in shamn’s NPP unit 2, safety coaching as a concept was

maintaining and developing the safety culture standard, for developed at OKG and has been further developed and

further information see section 12.2.1.2. implemented. During decommissioning, safety coaching

will play a role in supporting the activities for the purpose 10.2.10. Safety Management at OKG of decreasing risk and maintaining safety.

In order to strengthen the conditions for, and under-

standing of, a safe and efficient business, OKG has over 10.2.11.2. Ringhals NPP unit 1 and 2

the past three years maintained focus on safety manage- The decision to decommission Ringhals units 1 and 2 was

ment, operational excellence and safety culture. The aim made in April 2015. In May 2015, a dedicated project,

has been to increase the competence of the employees and called STURE, was assigned to prepare for the decommis-

to create an understanding of how their own tasks have an sioning. The purpose of the project is to prepare for

impact on radiation safety and the importance of decommissioning, mainly regarding technical and organisa-

performing them correctly. Among other things, these tional aspects, and thereby support the line organisation

efforts have taken place in the form of dialogue seminars focusing on safe and reliable operation.

for all employees and certain hired staff. One part of the STURE project is a sub-project on human

resources and safety culture. The purpose of this project is

10.2.11. Safety culture during a period

to identify and secure overall company actions needed

of preparation for decommissioning

within the areas of human resources, competence and 10.2.11.1. Oskarshamn NPP safety culture.

In order to maintain continuity in the company’s work on The safety environment of a plant requires regular and safety culture and its implementation throughout the sufficient attention so that a healthy nuclear safety culture decommissioning process, OKG, the owner of the can be maintained. The transitional period between a Oskarshamn NPP, has developed an action plan together decision and a shutdown poses a challenge to the safety with the operations management staff at Oskarshamn culture. From literature studies and experience exchange, units 1 and 2. The action plan consists of safety-related three risks have emerged as essential to address: activities prioritised by the management in order to

maintain, develop and strengthen the safety culture, and to – Loss of motivation,

ensure that safety and radiation protection standards are – Loss of knowledge and experience, and maintained throughout the decommissioning process. The – Decreased quality in work processes, with degraded plan also contains defined expectations of the managetechnical safety as a consequence. ment in terms of approaches to promoting safety that the

organisation is expected to use more intensively during this

Goals, strategies and measurements

process. It has been decided that the approaches should be The goal is to prevent safety culture degradation due to the applied in adaptation to the present circumstances. The shutdown decision, i.e. a healthy safety culture should be focal point is on clarifying OKG’s principal values as well maintained. The strategy of the project is to decrease or as the management’s expectations in terms of these values. mitigate the consequences of the three risks mentioned

Activities that have been carried out in accordance with the above. This is carried out in cooperation between the

plan include a number of workshops whose main focus project’s human factors and safety culture specialist,

was the following: discussion of OKG’s new mission together with the line organisation’s representative, who

(decommissioning of units 1 and 2 alongside operation of has the formal responsibility.

Oskarshamn unit 3), dealing with the changeover from a Methods for identifying signals from the organisation have psychosocial perspective by proactive occupational health been developed. These are monitored continually and work on prevention of health consequences, maintaining a corrective actions are identified, when applicable. For key focus on safety by applying OKG’s values, and expectaactions, the effect of corrective actions is monitored. tions for professional behaviour. The outcomes of safety Applicable activities include: culture surveys and analysis were also presented during the

workshops. – A method was developed in 2015 for regularly

evaluating whether signals on degraded safety Other activities that are to be carried out are experience performance due to a shutdown decision can be exchanges (benchmarks) with the Studsvik and Barsebäck identified within the organisation, or whether signals organisations, and gaining knowledge on their management can be identified relating to the company’s capability to of organisational changes and a good safety culture during successfully manage the transition; this method has been their decommissioning processes. OKG has recruited applied every three months since its inception. additional staff in the field of safety culture. They work as – An interview programme involving 10 managers was ambassadors to further strengthen safety culture in introduced in 2017. This programme is carried out decommissioning. This is to provide additional support to quarterly to convey an up-to-date picture of management in safety-related work. These efforts will be organisational status regarding the change process, carried out together with the pre-existing safety culture motivation, competence, challenges, etc. on the part of coordinators (specially trained human factors personnel).

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 63

different departments and groups. An analysis of updated and comprehensive regulatory assessment of

aggregated results is also performed on a yearly basis. facility safety.

– Comments and conclusions from the Swedish Radiation Furthermore, SSM monitors the work of licensees on Safety Authority’s supervisory activities are compiled safety culture issues. This is mainly conducted through its yearly, and relevant corrective actions are evaluated. regular inspections. The role of SSM in this context is to – A supplementary follow-up of signals indicating a high ensure that the licensees have proactive safety management

workload was carried out in 2017, with a follow-up on in place. SSM expects the licensees to create and maintain a

motivation to be performed in 2019. strong safety culture. It is essential that the licensees react

in a timely manner to indications of deficiencies in their

Actions

safety culture. If such deficiencies are not corrected, the Several actions have been taken in relation to safety culture ability of the operating organisation to handle difficult in the stage of transition to decommissioning: situations and maintain safety will deteriorate.

– A safety culture workshop was held in 2016 in order to

10.3.1. Regular top management meetings with the

identify and discuss safety culture challenges related to

licensees

the transition to decommissioning. In addition to the At least once a year, the director general and department risks identified from literature and experience exchange, directors of SSM meet with the management group of the workshop resulted in five focus areas (groupthink, each nuclear power plant and other major facilities to normalisation, clear standards, motivation, lack of discuss current issues and safety priorities. Annual holistic perspective). meetings are also held with the corporate executives of the – After the safety culture workshop, communication took utilities. place in 2016 and 2017 covering the five focus areas.

The topic was on encouraging managers and employees

10.3.2. Special supervision

to reflect upon their current and future work situation.

10.3.2.1. Oskarshamn NPP

– Two workshops with employees regarding the future at In December 2012, SSM placed OKG under special Ringhals were held in 2017. Their purpose was to focus supervision, i.e. SSM issued a decision related to the on new opportunities in the future. special supervision including special conditions for the – A “transition to decommissioning” perspective is operation of Oskarshamn NPP. This was due to identified applied to other safety culture evaluation activities, such deficiencies in the defence-in-depth, including weaknesses as the company’s overall safety culture evaluations, in strategy and prioritisation, plant status needs analysis which were performed in 2016 and 2018. and description, leadership and management, organisation – A workshop was carried out in 2018 on the topic of and work processes, and quality control. SSM then closely organisational and social work environment. followed OKG’s comprehensive improvement programme – Another strong emphasis is placed on high-priority and conducted extensive supervision in order to make sure topical issues in the area of communication (see section OKG’s efforts result in the rectification of the identified 11.2.2.2). deficiencies.

SSM’s review findings showed that OKG continued to

10.3. Regulatory control strengthen and develop its organisation. Strong manage-

ment follow-up and enhanced processes for long term SSM performs a number of regulatory activities in order to plant strategies gradually gave OKG much better ability for verify that the licensees give adequate priority to safety. the safe operation. Therefore, following an assessment of Some examples are provided below. OKG status with acceptable results, in 2016 SSM decided The supervision described in section 8.8 is targeted to to end the period of special supervision. SSM thereafter

assess how safety is prioritised. Examples include inspec- has followed the status through regular supervision, in

tions of licensee safety programmes, management of order to find out if indications of symptoms of the

organisational changes, management of safety reviews, and original weaknesses will arise.

management and assessment of incidents (conservative

decision making). 10.3.3. Increased supervision due to shut down

decisions

SSM applies a special methodology for rapid response In 2015, SSM decided to increase the supervision of RAB surveillance inspections following significant events. Also, and OKG due to the decisions of shutdown of Ringhals the decision-making process on the part of the licensees units 1 and 2 and Oskarshamn units 1 and 2 in order to regarding the operational status of the reactor following an follow the situation more closely. SSM focus has been on event or identified deficiencies has received increased the activities that the licensees were initiating in order to attention in recent years. manage the new situation.

Another tool used for evaluating whether the licensees are Issues that were observed have been specific decision assigning adequate priority to safety is a yearly integrated points, communication activities, maintaining sufficient safety assessment (see section 8.8.5), which provides an competence, retention of sufficient staff, support to

64 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

managers (including the ability to lead through times of – No further action change and to cope with the situation at hand), wariness, – To be postponed until the notification meets the motivation, commitment and fitness for duty, assessments expected quality conducted, as well as the licensee capability to maintain the – The notification should be further reviewed regarding safety level and the safety culture. specified aspects (in this case the licensee is allowed to The strategy has been to monitor the licensees continu- introduce the modification during the SSM review) ously in the preparations for and during the decommis- – The proposed modification shall not be allowed to be sioning. At the turn of the year 2017, the increased introduced until SSM has finalised it´s review. supervision was ended for OKG after satisfactory The process of pre-reviewing of notifications is an measures to promote safety had been implemented by the efficient and effective procedure that meets the expectalicensee; for RAB it will continue. Methods and plans tions of SSM. It is also made clear that SSM has the including dedicated programmes have been developed are necessary regulatory control over the modifications to be used during decommissioning process. without having to review everything in great detail or to grant permission. This has enabled SSM to allocate

10.3.4. Actions taken by SSM to prioritise safety

resources to more important safety tasks. The criteria in One of the basic concepts of SSM’s supervisory use puts 20 – 25% of all notifications into the recommenprogramme is to dedicate its supervisory resources to key dation category “review to be performed”. safety issues. The annual activity planning process has, as its starting point, current regulatory challenges, which are This system allows SSM to concentrate its review resources documented, as well as input from SSM’s integrated safety on safety issues of key significance, while also retaining full assessments and other regulatory processes. The supervi- insight into, and control over, the measures taken by the sory database in use is an important tool for integrated licensees. safety assessments, but it is also used to facilitate SSM’s prioritisation of forthcoming supervisory activities relating to key safety issues. Inspection results, international work, research and other inputs may indicate that SSM needs to devote regulatory resources to specific facilities and safety issues. Moreover, the general safety regulations (SSMFS 2008:1) allow SSM to apply a flexible approach to reviewing plant modifications, safety cases and technical specifications. The licensees are required to notify SSM of such modifications, as well as to notify SSM of all plant and organisational modifications affecting conditions reported in the SAR, in addition to as modifications to the SAR itself, and to the OLC. The statement from the independent safety review conducted by the licensee must be attached to the notifications. SSM also checks that the independent review report attached to the notification is of sufficient quality. Notifications dealing with new or complex technology are usually reviewed further by SSM, and assisted by external experts if necessary. Large plant modifications must be notified in the form of a preliminary safety analysis report in order to systematically clarify all the interactions with the existing safety case. Following the commissioning and the first entry into routine operation, necessary findings are to be incorporated in the SAR, and the SAR shall be finalised so that it describes and represents the nuclear power plant’s as-built status. SSM has an established a procedure with specified criteria to assess the notifications and to decide whether a notification is sufficiently important from a safety point of view to warrant detailed review (see section 14.3.5). A standing group of experts (ABG) has been established by SSM in order to conduct a first assessment of all notifications. This group makes a proposal regarding each notification at the management meeting of the nuclear power plant safety department. The proposals are categorised as follows:

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 65

Article 11. Financial and human resources

– New working methods for transferring employees have 1. Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps been developed, as a consequence of the need for more to ensure that adequate financial resources are available employees in the area of decomissioning and the to support the safety of each nuclear installation oposite for reactors in operation. throughout its life. 2. Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps

11.1. Regulatory requirements

to ensure that sufficient numbers of qualified staff with appropriate education, training and retraining are In order to obtain a licence in Sweden, large adequate available for all safety-related activities in or for each financial resources must be committed in order to manage nuclear installation, throughout its life. the far-reaching safety obligations required by the Act on Nuclear Activities and SSM’s regulations. Each prospective licensee must be assessed in this respect.

Summary of developments since the

In addition to this basic requirement, power plant licensees

previous report

must pay a fee on each produced kWh to a state-controlled Oskarshamn units 1 and 2 are permanently shut down and fund, the Nuclear Waste Fund, as per the Act on Financing Ringhals units 1 and 2 will be closed in 2020 and 2019, of Management of Residual Products from Nuclear respectively. This has reduced the number of employees Activities (2006:647). This is to ensure that financing is needed, and this number will be reduced further. At the available for the future decommissioning, management and same time, this will increase the need for employees within disposal of spent fuel and nuclear waste, including the the area of decommissioning. The licensees have handled research needed for these activities. The fees are calculated the situation by conducting a proactive transitional activity. on the assumption that each reactor will generate electricity The licensees have reduced redundancies in their opera- for 50 years, though always with a minimum remaining tional organisations and the number of individual agree- operating time of six years. If there is insufficient assets in ments for leaving the companies has been smaller than the Fund to pay for the costs, the licensees will nevertheless initially expected. This approach has ensured sufficient still be liable. For a reactor site with no reactor in competence in the organisations and a distribution based operation, the remaining costs for a permanently shut on the needs. down reactor shall be paid to the fund within three years. In addition, the power plant licensees shall provide two Since last reporting period, the following developments have separate financial guarantees as security in order to account taken place with regard to the obligations of Article 11: for possible early shutdowns and for costs in connection – Significant financial funds have been invested in with unforeseen events. The Government’s decision in Swedish nuclear power plants during the last few years. December 2017 on fees and financial guarantees for the – A revision of the Financing act was promulgated in period 2018 – 2020 for the first time took into account the 2 2017, clarifying the principles for how the nuclear waste utilities decisions for the early permanent shut down of fee is calculated and how assets in the Nuclear Waste reactors in Oskarshamn and Ringhals, resulting in fewer Fund are to be managed in order to reduce the state’s production units paying for the future liabilities. financial risk. Based on the revised act, nuclear waste Licensees are also required to pay regulatory and research fees and finacial guarantees for Nuclear power plants fees invoiced by the regulatory body. These fees are laid have been decided by the Government for the period down in ordinances and payable to the Government, see 2018 – 2020. also section 8.5.9. – General transfer of competence is still of high priority at all Swedish nuclear power plants. In the area of human resources, SSM’s general safety regulations (SSMFS 2018:1) clearly stipulate requirements

2 The nuclear waste fees for 2018 – 2020 are 0.033 SEK/kWh for Forsmark Kraftgrupp AB, 0.064 for OKG AB and 0.052 for Ringhals AB. Required financial guarantees amount to an average of 14 billion SEK per licensee.

66 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

Table 4. Number of employees at the licensees.

nuclear facilities. The licensee has to ensure that the staff The number of employees working for the licensees has

has the competence and suitability needed for all tasks of been changing somewhat over the past few years, see Table

importance for safety. This must be documented. 4. Consultants and contractors are not included in these

Long-term planning is required in order to ensure a figures. The number of contractors used during a unit

sufficient and available workforce having adequate refuelling outage, normally lasting between two to five

competence and suitability for the safety-related tasks. A weeks, is, as before, between 500 and 1,000.

systematic approach should be used for the definition of A challenging factor regarding the continued use of competence requirements, and for planning and evaluation consultants is that several of them having experience from of all safety-related training. Annual competence assessthe start of the nuclear programme have changed positions ments shall be performed. To the extent applicable, these and or are no longer available. general requirements also apply to using contractors.

Another requirement for safety-related tasks is to ensure The staffing and competence planning at the plants has

a careful balance between using in-house personnel and been reinforced over the past few years. The need for

contractors. The competence necessary for ordering, high-level competence in specific areas has been identified

managing and evaluating contracted work should always and competence profiles have been defined. By comparing

exist within the organisation of a nuclear installation. these profiles with the available expertise, the need for

Specific regulations govern operational staff at nuclear development and training of employees and for recruit-

power plants and research reactors (SSMFS 2008:32 ment has been assessed.

Regulation on the competence of operation personnel at The need to “rejuvenate” the nuclear power plant organisareactor facilities). These regulations also encompass tions is obvious when considering the average age of the operations managers and plant managers to the extent the plants. At OKG, the average employee working today is 48 latter are involved in the operational decision making. years old. In addition to these figures, about 15 employees Operational staff must be formally authorised by the per year face retirement from OKG over the forthcoming licensee for the specific position. The authorisation is valid years. Of OKG’s circa 627 present employees, the ratio for three years under certain conditions. male-female is 80/20. The situation is comparable to the

situation at FKA and RAB.

11.2. Compliance of the licence holders All licensees work actively to transfer knowledge from

soon to retire, experienced staff to the next generation.

11.2.1. Financial resources

The planning builds on mapping of strategic competence The majority owners of the Swedish nuclear power plants needs and individual plans to replace key personnel. Other are Vattenfall and Sydkraft NP, with ownership shares as approaches include trainee programmes and the involveshown in Figure 3 of section 1.2.3. The Swedish state is ment of young engineers together with highly experienced the sole owner of Vattenfall, while the owner of Sydkraft staff in modernization and development projects as well as NP is the German energy company, Uniper SE. in international R&D projects. Current planning at the Vattenfall and Uniper are two large electrical power different sites is described below.

producers in Sweden and elsewhere in Europe. Besides the The decision to permanently shut down the four oldest nuclear power plants, they also have substantial assets in units in Sweden has made the competence and staffing hydropower, thermal power and wind power. Both groups plans even more important. Activities regarding compeare financially stable and have good financial records. tence planning have therefore been intensified and the To date, all safety investments in the nuclear power plants plans are more detailed. The goal is to secure competence

have been financed by corporate funds, as decided by the prior to the closure and to support a good transition

utility boards, and on commercial grounds for the process.

licensees. This means that realistic plans for writing off the

investments have to be made. Costs for safety improve- 11.2.2.1. Transferring of competence

ments are considered an integrated part of the operating at the Oskarshamn NPP

costs. A high safety level, demonstrated by a good safety Since last reporting period, no major changes have been

record, is considered an essential component of the total made regarding the procedure for transferring competence

business concept. at OKG.

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 67

The short term objective is still to: conduct long-term development planning for the whole

organisation in a more robust manner. Examples of – In every group, create a plan for the next five years for activities that have been run to address the problem of transferring of competence; and staffing and competence of staff within OKG and in the – From this plan, create individual plans for those who are industry are strengthening of the brand, expanding expected to leave the company within the next three years. contacts with the education system, and deepening

collaboration with regional businesses and various types of The longer-term perspective is still to: industry. This includes BWR Future, an investigation in

– Create an environment in day-to-day operations that which Nordic licensees and suppliers jointly map available

stimulates transfer of competence. competencies in the area of boiling water reactor tech-

nology. OKG also needs to create an environment where During the autumn of 2015, the company board took a employees are encouraged to move between different definitive decision to begin the decommissioning of units positions, thus developing their competence and leaving 1 and 2, starting immediately at unit 2 and after the new positions open for others. summer of 2017 at unit 1. Consequently, many of the In obtaining new competence areas, competence transforprocedures regarding competence and staffing will be mation is an important measure. OKG needs to be altered in order for OKG to meet the challenges of efficient in transforming competence for employees in keeping two units in decommissioning and one unit in positions that are no longer going to be needed. Quickly long-term operation. In the future, OKG must be transforming employees from traditional competence areas successful in maintaining strategic competencies and into new areas needed in the decommissioning of the obtaining new competencies simultaneously. plants requires good relations with local and national OKG has thus performed a staffing and competence schools alike. analysis for the remaining business timeframe for the

period 2015 – 2050. The aim of this analysis has been to Transition work at the Oskarshamn NPP

assess the need for various competencies and estimate The overall strategy for the transition work has always been

staffing levels during the entire expected life span of the to have the work and its approach create an image of the

company. The experience and the result from the transition company that all employees are proud to be part of, and to

within the company is that new working methods are have those who are let go have the desire to start working

developed as a result of a reduced total workload, with for the company again if the possibility arises.

fewer employees and simultaneous production and The decision to end operation of units 1 and 2 made decommissioning, with an increasing workload in the area redundancies necessary. However, thanks to the company’s of decommissioning. This means that analyses based on proactivity immediately after the announcement to shut previous assessments gradually become out of date, and down units 1 and 2, measures were taken to minimize the there is now a need to re-examine parts of previous future redundancy, and the figures for redundancies and assessments. In addition, another few evaluations are individual agreements were smaller than was initially planned up until 2030 to assess the development expected. throughout the decommissioning period.

A transitional meeting was created, the purpose of which OKG has completed the first part of the planned transiwas to have all the competence needs that arise in the tion as regards the number of employees. About 120 company dealt with there for further decision making. This employees left OKG as a result of termination or indiis to ensure that sufficient competence exists and that it is vidual agreements during the second half of 2017. distributed where it is best needed. As a result, external Approximately the same number of personnel changed recruitments have been minimized. positions or organisation affiliation. A change of this kind

requires careful preparation, and great importance is Since the announcement of closure, just over 300 people

attached to managing identified risks so that safety and have left the company. Of these, over 200 employees

serviceability are not compromised during the transition departed for natural reasons, such as retirement or other

work. Risk analyses have been conducted continuously at jobs outside OKG. Staff turnover has been higher than

different levels and having different time perspectives. normal, and the reason for this is likely the uncertainty

Skills requirements that arise in the business are handled in sensed by many people during the transition of the

a company transitional meeting, where decisions on further company and the currently very favourable local labour

management are made. The magnitude and nature of the market.

needs that arise paint an ongoing picture of the state of During the summer and autumn of 2016, OKG and the competence in the company, and indicate whether there is owners produced a staffing analysis, and in parallel, work a need for more extensive measures in any specific area. began on developing new competence requirements for

On a more detailed level, mapping of key competencies OKG’s operations. In early 2017, all employees were

has been carried out at the company. This basis has given assessed against the new requirements for the position they

OKG a comprehensive picture of key positions and had at the time. The competence assessment and the

individuals within the company, which in itself has previously completed mapping of formal competence were

provided the prerequisites to be able to plan strategies and important tools for future staffing of the new OKG. OKG

68 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

then conducted negotiations with the trade union organisa- transferring key competencies are based on an annual tions, where the staffing level was established and the competence and staffing plan covering future needs and proper procedure was decided. The main principle was that the balance between Ringhals employees and contractors the number of years of employment and sufficient or consultants. The need for competence transfer is an competence were the primary selection criteria. The annual process. The “competence transfer” means an company produced a basis for staffing at the individual intentional learning programme having a clear goal in a level, which also became the subject of negotiation before situation where a person (mentor) with important a message could be submitted to all co-workers. The results knowledge will retire, resign, or where Ringhals from a of the negotiations were that 84 employees left the vulnerability perspective needs to change a specific skill. company due to a shortage of work. Individual agreements The mentor then transfers the competence to one or more were concluded between 26 employees and the company. persons (mentees) so that the knowledge is retained at Around 120 people changed positions or their organisation Ringhals. affiliation. The competence and staffing plan is based on an annual In connection with the redundancies, enhanced service inventory regarding the strategic competencies that control was carried out in the business, and throughout the Ringhals needs for fulfilment of short and long term process, transparent and factual information was provided company goals. to employees. All departments at OKG also carried out A specific method for competence transfer was developed recurrent psychosocial surveys in order to be able to catch and has been in place since 2009. The method involves the signals early on if the general conditions changed. The following steps: questionnaires also provided the basis for internal discussions and adapted support measures. When all employees – Inventory: To annually create a comprehensive list of all were informed, the managers could also start planning for possible candidates for skills transfer. transfer of competence, handing over assignments, and – Selecting: To determine which persons’ competencies receiving new employees. In support of this work, should be transferred. checklists were developed. – Competence Inventory: To create an understanding of Prior to adapting the staffing, the department head the skills that each mentor is expected to transfer. Also, presented a departmental implementation plan for the to select one, or several, mentees, and to assess the need transition in order to create an overall picture of the for support from human resources (HR) to implement change and document the measures that would be imple- all the skill changes. mented to manage the changeover. The plan was a living – Training: The purpose of this training is to give the document throughout the transition. It is of great impor- stakeholders a shared understanding of the following tance to be prepared to be able to quickly manage the areas: what skills transfer is, what each role entails, the changes that the process entails. Other important measures areas included in the transfer of skills, and the support are the management’s accessibility for conversations and or assistance that is available. support in everyday life and in dialogue stations, supple- – Competence Shift Plan created: To create a skills mented by the CEO and HR manager’s round of visits to transfer plan that describes in detail how the work will all departments to meet employees in a direct dialogue. be performed in terms of objectives and activities. Altogether, these measures have been crucial to the success Identify forms of monitoring and for starting skills of the implementation, progress and result alike. exchange. – Competence Exchange Activities implemented: To To be able to ensure the competence of control room staff implement the planned activities for achievement of the at unit 1 and unit 2, which was one of the largest risks set of competence transfer goals. identified, a number of measures were taken. From the first moment after the owners’ notice regarding decision – Monitoring and evaluation conducted: Follow up to on closure, continuous meetings were held where both the ensure that the objectives of competence shift are CEO and the HR manager, together with the plant achieved and to consider experience for further process managers, met with employees in joint dialogue. In development. addition to this, specific agreements were concluded for The decision for permanent shut down of Ringhals 1 and the benefit of the operators. 2 was taken in April 2015. In May 2015, a dedicated project One conclusion is that it is important to continuously was assigned to prepare for the decommissioning. The evaluate risk analyses and associated measures. Some purpose of the project is to prepare for decommissioning, changes in the business take place more quickly than mainly regarding technical and organisational aspects, planned, whereas others are slower. For this reason, it is thereby supporting the line organisation focusing on safe crucial for the management to continually monitor signals and reliable operation. A sub-project concerns Human from the organisation. Resources (HR) and safety culture.

11.2.2.2. Competence assurance at the Ringhals NPP Goals, strategies and evaluations

In the next few years, it is estimated that 30 employees are A long term goal for the HR transition was developed to expected to retire from Ringhals each year. Strategies for secure the right competence and staffing as of that time

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 69

and forward to minimize potential redundancies. This is – Training in change management was provided for essential in the ambition to decrease risks regarding loss of managers, union representatives and HR staff in 2015 motivation, loss of knowledge and experience, as well as and 2016. degradation in work processes. – Principles for management of the HR transition were

negotiated in 2016. New meeting fora for addressing The following goals for the HR transition have been questions concerning competence and staffing were developed: implemented on departmental level and company level – Create a clear picture of the future and a well-defined in 2016. change process up until 2022. – A simplified internal recruitment process was

– Secure and adapt competence and staffing continuously. implemented in 2017.

– Managers will have abilities and feel secure in handling – Individual dialogues regarding individual wishes for the the change process. future were conducted in 2017 and 2018, in addition to – Everyone will receive information and have a gap analysis comparing future needs with employees’ opportunities for dialogue and support. wishes.

– Everyone will have an individual professional – An incentive programme called “65 plus” was development plan, both short term and long term. introduced in 2019 to encourage elderly employees to – We will cooperate internally and externally to identify remain in the workforce instead of retiring.

good solutions from company and employee perspectives.

Actions on departmental level

To support the goals, the following strategies were Operations, and especially the control room operators of identified: units 1 and 2, have been an area of special concern due to the risk of losing competence and motivation. Several – Continuously strive to perform actions that lead towards actions have been taken on departmental level, for current and future needs regarding organisation, example: strategies, ways of working, competence needs and the number of employees. – A risk forum addressing risks and needs during – Strong focus on listening and flexibility. Adapt the plan 2015 – 2016. to upcoming needs. – Estimating and mapping the needs of employees from – Minimise the risk of redundancies in the form of 2020 and onwards. natural personnel turnover or transitions to other units – Investigating and mapping the employer’s ambitions in of Vattenfall, i.e. decommissioning, or externally. The relation to the company’s future needs. company cannot promise more than it can keep. – Preparation to reduce shifts (from seven to six) in the

– Collect experiences and good practices from event of large staff turnover. decommissioning and HR transitions. – Regular meetings with employees for information and

– Communicate and visualise future possibilities with a involvement. focus on units 3 and 4. – Training and transferring operators from units 1 and 2

to units 3 and 4 to increase flexibility and motivation. Evaluation of performance indicators, i.e. leadership index, – Contractors help to bridge gaps. engagement index and personnel turnover, was established. – Analysis of minimum staff during defueling ready in Methods were developed for identification of other signals 2019. from the organisation. Indicators and signals were monitored on a monthly basis and acted on by senior Actions have also been taken by other parts of the management. Trends were monitored over these years. If organisation. Within engineering and maintenance, minor needed, corrective actions were taken. As far as concerns organisational changes are continually made to reduce the key actions, the effect of corrective actions was monitored. number of employees. One major challenge is restricted Actions on an overall organisational level recruitment when employees depart – preparing for unit 2 operation – while retaining key skills and expertise. The Several actions have been taken on various management actions were taken to increase flexibility within and levels in the organisation. between departments as well as achieve effective use of The most important actions are: consultants and contractors.

– In 2015, individual dialogues were initiated between

Communication

managers and employees to deal with feelings relating to Close collaboration was maintained between the project the decision. Since then, individual dialogues are one of and communications. A communication strategy and plan the most important communication tools during the have been developed. change process. Communication has mainly focused on opportunities: – Incentives for control room operators were implemented in 2015 and revised in 2016. A bonus – Decommissioning – development and possibilities scheme was implemented in 2017 for the control room – Opportunities for personal development – focus on operators of units 1 and 2. internal recruitment.

70 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

– A long time between the decision and shutdown from a programmes include theoretical courses, on-site training human perspective – time to plan and address questions with experienced colleagues and full scope simulator and challenges. training, as well as training performed in a workplace – Two reactors will close, two will stay in production. environment. The company will still be a major employer. Control room personnel are subject to an internal – Decommissioning opportunities for employees forming promotion schedule in which the operators begin working a new business area. as field operators. The qualification time to become a reactor operator is about five years, and to become a shift Communication has mainly involved weekly updates via a supervisor, a minimum of seven years. newsletter on the intranet with a personal tone of voice. The risk of losing one’s job is a personal matter and should The mandatory training programmes typically include basic be addressed with this in mind. Multiple channels have courses in nuclear technology and safety, plant knowledge been used: meetings, open fora, opportunities to pose including systems, processes and dynamics, operational questions anonymously to the management, and editorials limits and conditions (Tech-Spec), radiation protection, in the staff magazine and on the intranet. plant organisation and work routines. Operational personnel are given extended courses on systems, 11.2.2.3. Competence assurance at the Forsmark NPP processes and dynamics, transients and accident scenarios, The goal for transferring competence is set in the business operational procedures, emergency operating procedures, plan. To create a positive attitude, the human resource and Tech-Spec. department and the respective managers have to be The control room operators receive about 10 days of engaged and take responsibility for carrying out the action annual re-training, partly on a simulator, divided into two plans. periods: one that focuses on normal operation startup and The process of transferring competence (knowledge, skills shutdown procedures, and one period on transients and and attitude) consists of several steps: accidents. All simulator sessions are evaluated systematically.

– Whose competence is important to transfer? The Competence assessments against specified criteria are identified need of transferring necessary long-term performed each year by operations management. This is to competence is documented in the annual strategic action check the required competence for the specific position plans, following a dialogue conducted between the and to define further training needs. Every third year, an respective managers and HR staff. extended check is also performed with regard to fitness for – What kind of competence? The chosen individuals duty. This extended check is required for issuance of the work in groups developing the existing task analysis, authorisation, which is valid for three years. The systematic focusing on the specific competencies of each person. approach is being extended to encompass maintenance In view of explicit and tacit knowledge by means of, for staff and other groups with tasks of importance for safety. example, interviews and observations, new information The line managers of the operating organisations are is gathered on performance of the tasks. responsible for the training of their staff and for providing – To whom shall the competence be transferred? The the necessary resources. KSU (the Swedish Nuclear results of renewed and in-depth competence task Training and Safety Centre) has been contracted by the analysis are used to complement available working licensees to carry out most of the operator training and methods for the competence transfer and annual re-training. The training and competence follow-up documentation, e.g. instructions, material for training, systems are audited by the licensees on a regular basis to work rotation, supervision and guidance, pre-job ensure that they fulfil specifications and requirements. briefing, and daily practices. Depending on the level of Procedures for plant and safety documentation modificaknowledge and experience of recipients or mentees tions ensure that such modifications are introduced into suitable methods are identified. The measures must be the training programmes. The annual training inventories discussed in the development dialogues and ensure that domestic and relevant international operational documented in the personal development plans. experience is incorporated into the training programmes. – How to transfer competence and by whom? Several KSU has significant resources for training and production methods can be used depending on the recipients or of training material. In 2018, the company had about mentees and supervisors. In the case of employees who 180 employees. The total number of training days per will serve as supervisors, the measures are to be year during the review period varies in the range of discussed in the development dialogues and 4,000 – 5,000 days. KSU also has an extensive instructor documented in the personal action plans. training programme for its own staff with several qualification levels.

11.2.2.4. Training of nuclear power plant staff

All licensees have a systematic approach in place for Since 2000, all operator training has been moved from the training of operators. Training programmes are developed KSU central facility in Studsvik to the local centres situated based on task analysis and definitions of required compe- near the power plants. Full-scale simulators for all tence. A systematic method is also used to define the operating reactors are now located at these local training annual re-training that is required. The training centres.

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 71

Since 2008, KSU also utilises the training of maintenance – Students are not being attracted to the field as personnel for the shutdown units at the Barsebäck NPP. decommissioning is taking place. This training takes place in realistic environments. At the – Financial pressure has made the nuclear industry reduce NPP, training is also provided to the operational personnel, its research budgets. specifically in areas in which a realistic environment – Nuclear programmes at the universities suffer from a enhances the training quality. The training at the Barsebäck lack of students and declining research budgets. plant will only be able to continue until circa 2018 – 2020, – Certain competencies needed mainly in emergencies are since the site is in the decommissioning process. A recently in low demand by employers for their day-to-day started project is in progress on how to replace, or move, operations, thus making it difficult for research projects the training at Barsebäck to other sites. of this kind to find matching sources of funding.

The degree of training has decreased in the past few years – There are no incentives for central government sources due to the completion of the extensive modernisation of research funding to liaise on concerted investment programmes. The number of training days is estimated to for sustaining dynamic research environments relating be reduced yet further over the forthcoming five years due to radiation safety. to the decommissioning of four units at Swedish NPPs. The report submitted to the Government includes the The need for future training in decommissioning activities following suggestions: is expected to slightly increase, though this estimation remains uncertain. – A comprehensive national strategy with coordinated efforts is needed for achieving a higher level of

11.3. Regulatory control

effectiveness in the knowledge management system.

– Increase the funding provided to the critical core of Through its supervision, SSM has concluded that the research environments needed to maintain the licensee compliance with SSM’s requirements for compeknowledge management system. tence assurance is satisfactory. The required systematic – Formalise the interaction between stakeholders in the approach is in place to ensure long term staffing and system for central government research funding to competence, including health checks, as well as systems for guarantee that the relevant research environments as ensuring the competence of consultants and contractors. described above will be sustained. However, SSM has previously observed delays and quality – Ensure that education programmes critical to society in problems in the modernisation and power uprate the field of nuclear safety and radiation protection can programmes at the nuclear power plants. It is paramount be run, and that the content of courses relating to the that these kinds of problems do not negatively affect the field is given defined objectives as necessary and safety of the plants. SSM is therefore continuing to focus subjected to quality assurance. attention on the licensees’ systems for ensuring quality of services purchased, e.g. assuring supplier and consultant In addition, one recommendation was given to employers competence. In addition, the licensees’ reliance on within the field: contractors and consultants might decrease in the forth- – Several stakeholders should run campaigns and issue coming years, due to the permanent shutdown of two communication for attracting students so that they enrol units and planned shutdown of two more units. It is in nuclear safety and radiation protection education difficult to predict whether this will affect the long-term programmes and choose occupations in the field. availability of contractors with the right competence. On the other hand, the shutdowns might lead to an increase Since September 2018, some progress has been made. The of contractors with other competencies, and is therefore industry has with good results carried out campaigns to something that will be considered by SSM in the future. attract employees, one university nuclear programme that was previously closed down due to few student applica-

11.4. National availability of qualified

tions has reopened, and SSM is reforming its work to strengthen the national strategic perspective on long-term

experts in nuclear safety and radiation

knowledge management.

protection

In September 2018, SSM submitted a government assignment on the national long-term competence supply in the field of radiation safety to the government. The final report describes how a healthy competence supply consists of university education that attracts students to study in the field, research that provides university programmes with competence and meets society’s need for expertise, and employers who attract and employ the skilled labour.

The report shows that there are shortcomings in the supply of skills in the radiation safety area in Sweden, mainly due to the following:

72 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

Article 12. Human Factors

– Safety objectives and strategies, Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to – Responsibilities and levels of authority, ensure that the capabilities and limitations of human performance are taken into account throughout the life of – Competence assurance, fitness for duty, a nuclear installation. – Occupational environment, – Planning of nuclear activities, – Design adapted to human capabilities and limitations,

Summary of developments

– Operational experience feedback, and

since the previous report

– Event investigation. – New general requirements have been implemented 2018 The regulation SSMFS 2008:17 contains more specific including further development of many of the requirements on: requirements related to human and organisational factors. – Design to allow operators sufficient time to understand – Hosting of the first Country-Specific Safety Culture situations and take safe actions, Forum – Design of the central control room and the secondary control room/control post,

Introduction – Evaluation of control room design as well as

The area of human factors has developed over many years verification and validation of new solutions, and and is now to many people known as “human and – Design requirements for detection and control of core organisational factors” in order to further highlight the instability. breadth of the areas covered. Irrespective of any managers or staff having an impact on safety in an organisation, SSM requires that the licensees have adequate staff with human and organisational factors are relevant and essential. competence concerning human factors in order to conduct This is also reflected in the development of SSM’s Code of independent safety reviews (see section 14.1.3) of relevant Statutes. issues. There is no explicit requirement to have staff with behavioural science competence in the line organisation of the operators; however, SSM recommends this in order to

12.1. Regulatory requirements integrate the human-technology-organisation (MTO)

In June 2018, new general requirements were implemented perspective early on as part of plant modifications, in the form of regulation SSMFS 2018:1. This regulation experience feedback, investigation of events, assessments governs a wide range of requirements related to human of safety culture, etc. and organisational factors, replacing several requirements contained in SSMFS 2008:1. What differs the new general

12.2. Compliance of the licence holders

requirements from earlier requirements in this area is a more detailed regulatory framework with additional Today, the concept of the interaction between MTO has requirements and clearer guidelines that are provided. become an established component in the nuclear safety work of all Swedish nuclear power plants, supported by The regulation SSMFS 2018:1, in conjunction with certain policies, responsibilities and organisational structures. requirements contained in SSMFS 2008:1, impose Currently, all the licensees have MTO specialists with a extensive requirements relating to human factors on the behavioural science background or similar industrial field following: experience in their independent safety review functions – Safety monitoring and follow-ups, (see section 14.2.5). All licensees have specialist teams whose work focuses on human and organisational issues. – The operating organisation and its design, The responsibility of these teams is to gather competence – Management system, including safety culture,

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 73

(both technical and behavioural) and to work with MTO Oskarshamn NPP issues, experience feedback, safety culture, management Ever since OKG’s long term programme for improving development and organisational issues. Typically, MTO safety culture (referred to as the “Action plan for safety competence is used within the licensee organisations for culture at OKG”) was implemented in 2004, OKG has the following activities: worked with these aspects in a systematic way. Periodical investigations, such as a safety culture survey and a – Review of plant modifications, especially control room meta-analysis, have been carried out regularly. Other design issues, activities involving all staff, such as workshops discussing – Review of organisational modifications, different topics regarding safety culture, have been popular

– Event analysis, events that brought about good discussions.

– Safety culture programmes, and OKG has further developed the approach to supporting – Specific development and analysis projects. the organisation as of 2016. Safety culture coordinators have been assigned at different departments to provide Swedish licensees use a set of specific methods for analysis support. This makes it possible for the safety culture of human factors events and trends. The analyses are coordinators to focus on one specific area (i.e. maintenance based on both the Human Performance Enhancement or production) and support the managers and employees System (HPES) model and behavioural science expertise. working in that area. The result is tailored activities with Lately, recent developments in the field of event analysis the different departments’ needs in mind. To assist the have been utilised, such as Functional Resonance Analysis coordinators with these tasks, each department has Methodology (FRAM). designated personnel as Safety Culture Ambassadors. The R&D projects in MTO have been conducted over the ambassadors’ role is to assist the coordinators with their years on: activities and help their departments with questions

relating to safety culture. – Design assessment of control rooms,

– Operability verification, Here, the objectives include the following:

– Assessment of plant changes, – Improved incorporation of corporate values into the – Non-destructive testing from a human factors organisation through management expectations for perspective, professional behaviour, – Development of methods for human reliability – Making safety culture a corporate culture, and assessments, – Increased use and improved efficiency of human – Event analysis, performance tools. – Good practices in control rooms, – Evaluation of control room function during outages, A deeper purpose of this approach is to effectively support the organisation’s safety culture work and to identify the – Team training of control room operators, actual individual needs within the different departments. – Safety culture surveys,

– Safety diagnosis of the plant organisation, The current aim of the safety culture work at OKG is to – Assessment of organisational modifications, implement a change in the approach and the attitudes towards safety culture and the safety enhancement tools. It – Resilience engineering in maintenance outages, should be clearly stated how the work with the “Action – Human performance tools in maintenance, and plan for safety culture” correlates with the corporate values – Learning from successes in maintenance (i.e. Safety II). and the management’s expectations for professional behaviour. This has brought about a change in perspective

12.2.1. Ongoing activities

towards a more holistic view of how safety culture 12.2.1.1. Organisational changes messages and training are being delivered and executed. All licensees have formal procedures for assessment and This also means that the goal relating to expectations for review of organisational changes. These procedures ensure professional behaviour should be a vital part of each that relevant safety aspects are considered when such department’s strategic work in order to make safety culture changes are notified to SSM and reviewed in the same the corporate culture. Also, the main focus during 2018 manner as technical changes. was to clarify how safety culture correlates to safety management and operational excellence, and how these 12.2.1.2. Safety culture programmes three pillars altogether shape the corporate culture. Maintaining a strong safety culture in the operation of

Forsmark and Ringhals NPPs

nuclear power plants is considered vital by the Swedish At the Forsmark and Ringhals NPPs, the role of coordiutilities, and this is emphasised in the policies of the nating safety culture development and activities is since different plants and in their strategic plans. Management at 2018 delegated to the safety and compliance departments. all levels, including the managing director’s, is involved in Expertise and best practices are shared between the two activities to enhance the safety culture and to stress the plants. Development of nuclear safety culture is part of responsibility of all personnel to work actively in mainthe normal procedures incorporated in the management taining and developing the safety culture standard.

74 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

system, and encouraged by the reactor safety programme. At FKA, a training course is applied on a regular basis. The The programme is revised annually and approved by the aim is to improve “everyday safety” with regards to human chief executive officer. performance. Since 2014, this course has been developed and run through the maintenance department. Both FKA A comprehensive evaluation of safety culture is performed employees and entrepreneurs have taken part in these at each site every four years. The evaluation follows a seminars. Retraining was rolled out during the second Vattenfall corporate instruction for assessing safety culture, quarter of 2016. Plans for another occasion of retraining and consists of both quantitative and qualitative methods. are ongoing, as FKA has found this concept effective in One of the inputs is the outcome of the safety culture relation to the goals of the training. survey, which follows WANO’s ten traits for a strong safety culture. The safety culture survey is administered every two At the Ringhals NPP, a human performance improvement years. Other sources of input for the comprehensive project is being carried out during the period 2015-2019. evaluation of safety culture include a summary of feedback The purpose of the project is to increase the focus on from group discussions following the safety culture survey, continuous improvements to human performance in order evaluation of event analyses, evaluation of licensee to achieve safe and well-performed results throughout the operational events, interviews, evaluation of trends in company. All managers and staff receive an extensive indicators, and comments from IAEA OSART missions, training programme that includes areas such as usage of WANO reviews and SSM reviews and inspections. human performance tools, managers coaching in the field, feedback training, self-assessments, how to utilize staff Safety culture questionnaires are used as a tool for developcompetence in human performance development with ment of the safety culture, together with other activities. A group dialogues, and fallibility models. The focus on shared initiative has been taken by the licensees to improve human performance improvement and general competence the questionnaire. for safe and good job performance are increased throughout the organisation. Managers and supervisors

12.2.1.3. Network for Human Performance and

now have the tools for continuation of everyday improve-

Safety Culture

ments to human performance. A network for Human Performance and Safety Culture (HUSC) involving the NPP licensees in Finland and

12.2.1.5. Human factors engineering

Sweden as well as SKB, KSU and Westinghouse. The All licensees take into account the human factors perspecnetwork was established in 2006. The aim of the network tive in plant modifications, Human System Interface (HSI). is to exchange information and develop expert knowledge. To ensure that the work performance of operators and This initiative is still ongoing. other personnel is not negatively affected, HSI is applied 12.2.1.4. Projects relating to human performance and by means of several analyses and by dealing with known safety culture issues in the existing configuration. The modifications are A human performance simulator was developed at OKG ultimately subject to a verification and validation process in in 2018. The aim of the simulator is to have employees order to ensure safe operation. Generally, the human practice in different areas such as human performance factors engineering process is very similar to the US NRC’s tools, foreign material exclusion and personal protective Human Factors Engineering Program Review Model, equipment use. Also, during 2018 the package regarding NUREG 0711.

pre-job briefing (PJB), post-job debriefing (PJD) at OKG

12.2.1.6. Research in human factors engineering

was updated and restructured to better support the users. Research in the area of HSI, i.e. on best practices in main The procedures were updated with new checklists and control rooms and research on operators’ need for different levels of PJB and PJD, the existing requirements computer-based tools, is being conducted at the were clarified, and new requirements were set regarding Norwegian Institute for Energy Technology (IFE) in documentation. collaboration with utilities in Sweden and Finland. In 2017 and 2018, OKG carried out cross-group seminars Research on Resilience Engineering (RE), Human Perforfor all managers, employees, long term contractors and mance (HuP) and learning from successes in maintenance partners. The focus of the seminar was on discussing the is performed jointly by IFE, the VTT Technical Research interconnections between safety culture, safety manage- Centre in Finland and Ringhals NPP in Sweden, and is ment, and operational excellence. sponsored by Nordic Nuclear Safety Research (NKS).

At OKG, weekly safety messages have been distributed for In 2016 and 2017, a research project in the area of discussion by the entire organisation. This format was organisational matters and safety culture was conducted by implemented in 2014 and has been ongoing since then. In the VTT Technical Research Centre in Finland, sponsored 2015, the maintenance, production, engineering, and by NKS. Two reports were issued: the first report in early shared services departments contributed with two safety 2017 (“Safety Culture Assurance and Improvement Methods messages each. In 2017, this format expanded to now in Complex Projects – Intermediate Report from the also include the safety department and managing director. NKS-R SC_AIM”) and the second one in early 2018 All employees work together with the safety culture (“Safety Culture Assurance and Improvement Methods in department to formulate messages for discussion by the Complex Projects – Final Report from the NKS-R SC_AIM”). organisation.

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 75

The research activity aimed to provide guidance for order to manage their respective situations regarding methodical safety culture change in complex nuclear continued safe operation, and the preparation and impleindustry projects, and explain how to utilise existing safety mentation of decommissioning activities. Areas monitored culture tools or to create new tools. A set of twelve by SSM include specific decision points, communication principles of safety culture change were developed, which activities, competence and staff retention, support to summarise essential good practices for leading safety managers (for example, the ability to lead through times of culture change. change and coping with the situation at hand), alertness, motivation, commitment and fitness for duty, assessments conducted, and the capability to maintain the safety level

12.3. Regulatory control

and the safety culture. The strategy of SSM is to continu- The MTO section at SSM is integrated with the technical ously monitor the licensees in their preparations for sections of the nuclear power plant safety department. decommissioning and during the decommissioning The section consists of twelve professionals, all with a process. SSM discontinued the strengthened supervision behavioural science background. The MTO specialists of the Oskarshamn NPP in 2018. conduct inspections, safety reviews and other supervisory activities, and assist in development of the regulatory

framework. In many cases, the MTO specialists lead the 12.4. National culture

inspections in which they are involved.

12.4.1. Workshop on national culture traits

Current tasks for the MTO section include inspections and One area of focus that came into focus after the reviews of management systems, organisations and Fukushima Daiichi accident was the challenging issue of organisational change, safety culture and management of the relationship between national culture and nuclear safety safety, operational decision making and time for consulta- culture. All cultures have certain characteristics or traits tion, competence, training and staffing including fitness for that reinforce nuclear safety culture, and all cultures have duty, working conditions for safety, MTO perspective of characteristics that might not provide this reinforcement. A plant modernisations and modifications, investigation of Country-Specific Safety Culture Forum (CSSCF) was events, and analysis of licensee event reporting. One area developed jointly by the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) of focus is the licensees’ competence provision and and the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) staffing considering the challenges of licensees in retaining to provide countries with a forum for dialogue and and hiring new staff now and in the near future. Further- reflection on how the national attributes of a given country more, due to the shutdown of reactors and decommis- can influence nuclear safety culture. SSM was involved in sioning planning at Oskarshamn and Ringhals, the MTO the development of this forum, and hosted the very first section is responsible for managing a cross-organisational CSSCF in January 2018 . 3 team for strengthened supervision of this situation. This The purpose of the forum is to enable licence holders and means that the licensees are subjected to continuous the regulatory body in a specific country to explore which supervision (see also section 10.3.3). factors and characteristics of the national culture can influence safety culture. The design of the forum is meant

12.3.1. Current regulatory research

to facilitate an open and explorative dialogue on possible The MTO section has procured projects on e.g. dealing essentials for maintaining a healthy safety culture. In with challenges faced by organisations under economic addition, the dialog should also explore suggested actions pressure and human capability for dealing with unforeseen for mitigating potentially negative aspects and identifying events. SSM also provides funding for postgraduate studies best practices. and an associate professorship in Man-Technology- Organisation at Lund University. For many years now, the The explorative dialogue that took place during the forum, Authority has provided support to the Halden Reactor in conjunction with material from interviews and focus Project in Norway. group sessions ahead of the forum, resulted in six themes, or characteristics, which can be recognised as rather typical 12.3.2. Strengthened supervision due to shutdown Swedish cultural traits, or national attributes in Sweden. decisions (See figure 15.) SSM has continued its strengthened supervision of the To some extent, these national attributes 4 can all reinforce Ringhals and Oskarshamn NPPs, which started in 2015 nuclear safety culture, or might have a negative impact on after the decisions were taken on the shutdown of nuclear safety culture if they are not taken into account. Ringhals units 1 and 2 and Oskarshamn units 1 and 2. SSM focuses on the activities initiated by the licensees in

3 Country-Specific Safety Culture Forum Sweden, NEA report no. 7420, 2018. 4 This figure depicts only certain aspects of national attributes in Sweden. These were among the themes that emerged during the CSSCF forum, discussed by participants representing the nuclear infrastructure in Sweden.

76 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

The first-of-its-kind forum conducted in Sweden was considered a success, building on a foundation for continued reflection and work relating to national cultural traits and their impact on the safety culture of licence holders, the regulatory body, and the Swedish safety infrastructure as a whole.

A drive towards “Samskap”

shared understanding Being in unity To ensure successful and a will to implementation, take take a collective the time to explain and accountability check understanding. for well being Otherwise a risk for and harmony. preferential right of interpretation.

“Allskap” Complacency/National pride

Everyone should have the “There is no point in seeking same rights and all things advice from others because we should be fair. No one should think we are the best.” stand out from the crowd!

Freedom Security and trust

Lead your staff by Tendency to feel secure defining goals. and to trust that the Do not micro- system works correctly. manage our staff. “Trust your staff, don’t ask questions about progress or you will seem bossy!”

Figure 15. National attributes recognized during the CSSCF forum.

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 77

Article 13. Quality Assurance

Furthermore, it should be made clear by the management Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to system how contractors and vendors are to be audited, and ensure that quality assurance programmes are established how to keep the results of these audits up to date. The and implemented with a view to providing confidence that internal audit function should have a sufficiently strong specified requirements for all activities important to and independent position in the organisation and should nuclear safety are satisfied throughout the life of a nuclear installation. report to the highest management of the plant. The audits

should have continuity and auditors should have good

knowledge about activities being audited. Audit intervals

Summary of developments since the should take into account the safety significance of the previous report

different activities and special needs that can arise.

Normally, all audit areas should as a minimum be audited – New general requirements have been implemented. every four years. The auditing activity itself and the – Change in legal conditions for supervision concerning management function of the plant should also be periodi-

suppliers. cally audited.

The legal conditions for supervision of suppliers have

13.1. Regulatory requirements

been changed through changes made in the Act on Nuclear In June 2018, new general requirements were implemented Activities (1984:3). This gives the regulatory body the in the form of regulation SSMFS 2018:1. Among many possibility to monitor how the safety requirements are areas, this regulation covers quality assurance, thus followed concerning activities conducted by suppliers or replacing similar requirements that were contained in their subsuppliers and contractors or their subcontractors SSMFS 2008:1. What differs the new general requirements or other parties delivering services to the licensees. from earlier requirements in this area is a more detailed

regulatory framework, including additional requirements

and clearer guidelines that are provided. SSMFS 2018:1 13.2. Compliance of the licence holders

requires nuclear activities with regard to related design,

13.2.1. Current development of management

construction, operation and decommissioning to be

systems

managed, controlled, assessed and developed by means of All licensees have integrated management systems in place a management system so designed that requirements for and work continuously to develop and improve their safety will be met. The management system, including the respective systems. The licensees have a strong focus on necessary routines and procedures, must be kept up to date integrated processes and information modelling. and be documented. This view on the integration of

quality and safety with other business concerns into a total The licensees have updated their management systems in

integrated management system is in line with the IAEA relation to the updated standard, IAEA GSR Part 2,

Safety Requirements on Leadership and Management for Leadership and Management for Safety. Audits of manage-

Safety, GSR Part 2. ment systems are in compliance with GSR Part 2, and are

performed in order to ensure the management systems’ The management system should cover all nuclear activities continuing suitability and effectiveness. at the plant. It is furthermore required by SSMFS 2018:1 to

have the application of the management system, and its

13.2.1.1. Forsmark NPP

efficiency and effectiveness, audited systematically and Continuous improvement of the management system is periodically by a function having an independent position a priority, including a high level of involvement and in relation to the activities being audited. An established commitment from the management team. The manageaudit programme must be in place at the plant. ment system has been updated to reflect and be in

78 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

accordance with the new organisation introduced in FKA and RAB also utilise different methods for self- October 2015. assessment. The management system at both plants requires performance of self-assessments at different levels FKA has clarified the responsibility for the line organisain the organisation. Both methods for performing selftion’s structure and process governance, line organisation assessments are based on IAEA Safety Guide GS-G-3.1. responsibility for implementation of external requirements, and reducing the number of functions for internal During this review period, several development activities requirements. have been carried out by the internal audit organisation of OKG in order to create more added value for the organisa- FKA is in compliance with GSR Part 2, Leadership and tion. Staffing of internal audit teams has changed so that Management for Safety. A management system review was the auditors are now part of the safety and quality departcommenced to identify potential gaps when the new issue ment. Previously, auditors from the entire organisation of GSR Part 2 (new edition of GS-R-3) was published. were used. Audit teams are led, and the audits evaluated, by lead auditors who work on the section’s internal audit

13.2.1.2. Ringhals NPP

within the safety and quality department. This change was RAB’s management system is an integrated, modernised made to ensure that auditing resources are available to and user-friendly management system. This means that meet the needs of the audit programme. RAB has an overall structure which includes clear steering, evaluation and development of processes to fulfil goals A new audit training programme covering the audit and strategies. RAB also has a process for handling of process and related methodology has been developed. requirements which involves corrective actions and Auditors have taken part in this programme. The audit verifications. The ambition of RAB is to fulfil external process itself has been strengthened by means of human requirements for management systems, derived from performance tools for reinforcement of safety and quality. nuclear as well as conventional industry models. Another development activity has been initiated to bolster

evaluation of identified audit findings by supporting the

13.2.1.3. Oskarshamn NPP

managers to a greater extent. Here, the objective is to No structural or principal changes regarding management ensure that findings are manage systematically to prevent and governance have been made to the operating system. their reoccurrence. However, development has taken place within the framework of existing principles for management and control. 13.2.3. Audits of suppliers

Audits of suppliers are carried out jointly and in coopera- Decisions made include the development of a new tion between the Swedish licensees. Swedish licensees have process-oriented management system. This work is in a joint working group for shared development of proceprogress. An introduction is ongoing, focusing on methods dures and methods for supplier audits. The working group for process mapping in the organisation. meets two or three times per year. A shared procedure is Procedures for requirement management and requirement used for executing a supplier audit, which is maintained handling have been mapped, and associated routines have, and developed as a collaborative effort between the in connection with this, been simplified and adapted to the Swedish licensees. processes. Spring of 2017 was characterised by continued implementation in the management system of the require-

ments contained in the new ISO standard for the environ- 13.3. Regulatory control

ment, 14001:2015. As per the new supervisory programme, SSM conducts

baseline inspections in all areas. The MTO section has 13.2.2. Audit programmes recently conducted baseline inspections of the licensees’ At licensee corporate level, audit programmes support to management systems, organisations, and organisational ensure and confirm that requirements from the owners are change management. The purpose of the baseline inspecadhered to, as well as that the right level of governance is tions regarding the management system is to monitor the in place, at both corporate and nuclear power plant level. current status and progress of the licensees’ principles for,

and their systematic work on, their respective systems. This The licensees have processes in place for performing audits is to ensure that their management systems direct, control, and running audit programmes. These processes are used evaluate and develop the organisation’s activities. Another to monitor how well the quality system is implemented at purpose is also to determine whether the management different levels and applied to the organisation, as well as system is suitable, up-to-date, accessible and effective the efficiency of the system to ensure quality and safety. enough. Such quality audits are performed on a regular basis so that all areas are covered over a three period. At FKA and RAB, As far as concerns the baseline inspections in relation to an audit teams consist of individuals who are experienced in organisation, the purpose is to determine the current status audits, in addition to an audit team leader. The audit of the licensees’ organisations and their systematic work programmes being run fulfil the requirements for inde- on ensuring that they have an organisation with an pendent assessment stipulated by IAEA Safety Guide appropriate design for maintaining nuclear and radiation GS-G-3.1. safety now and in the long term, as well as to judge the

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 79

suitability of the organisation. The inspections also include looking into licensee management of organisational changes. Furthermore, SSM conducts continuous supervision of the internal audit process. The results of internal audits are covered in most inspections and reviews of specifically defined technical areas, and sometimes the subject of inspections focusing specifically on audit programmes. Against the background of the changed legal conditions for conducting supervision of suppliers, SSM plans to launch inspections and reviews of suppliers in 2019.

80 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

Article 14. Assessment and Verification of safety

date. The legally binding requirements and the Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to corresponding general advice are summarized below. ensure that:

(i) comprehensive and systematic safety assessments are 14.1.1.1. Safety analysis report

carried out before the construction and commissioning of A comprehensive deterministic safety analysis shall be

a nuclear installation and throughout its life. Such performed before a facility is constructed and before it is

assessments shall be well documented, subsequently taken into operation. In addition to the deterministic updated in the light of operating experience and significant analysis, the facility shall be analysed using probabilistic new safety information, and reviewed under the authority methods in order to provide a more complete picture of of the regulatory body; an overall safety level.

(ii) verification by analysis, surveillance, testing and inspection is carried out to ensure that the physical state A preliminary safety analysis report is required to be

and the operation of a nuclear installation continue to be prepared and approved before a facility may be constructed

in accordance with its design, applicable national safety and, for an existing facility, before major refurbishing or

requirements, and operational limits and conditions. rebuilding work or major modifications are carried out.

The safety analysis report (SAR) must be renewed before

commissioning, and completed before the facility may be

Summary of developments taken into commercial operation. The SAR shall contain since the previous report information as specified in the regulations and be subject

to safety reviews before submission to the regulator. All During the current review period, the following developstages of the SAR shall be reviewed and approved by SSM. ments have taken place with regard to the obligations of Thereafter, the safety analysis report is to be kept up to date. Article 14:

The SAR shall reflect the plant as built, analysed and – Sweden has intensified and developed its management verified, and show how current safety requirements are of ageing issues and long term operation, as well as met. All safety systems as well as all other plant structures, supervision in this area. systems and components of importance for the defence in – The development process for new regulations for depth shall be described in the SAR. New safety standards assessment, as was mentioned in the previous report, and practices, which have been assessed by the licensee and has been extended. The regulations are now planned to found applicable, shall be documented and incorporated come into force in January 2021. into the SAR as soon as the corresponding modifications

or other plant measures have been taken.

14.1. Regulatory requirements

14.1.1.2. Safety programme

14.1.1. Requirements for Comprehensive and

The licensee must have a safety programme in place. After

Systematic Safety Assessment

a facility has been taken into operation, the safety of the The requirement for a safety programme is defined in facility shall be regularly analysed and assessed in a Chapter 2 of the regulations concerning safety in nuclear systematic manner. Such analysis and assessment shall facilities (SSMFS 2008:1). Requirements on safety assesscover applicable rules for design, construction and ment, safety reviews and reporting are mainly defined in operation as well as assumptions and methods applied. Chapter 4 of SSMFS 2008:1. Since the previous report, the Reasonably practicable safety improvement measures, requirement on identifying events, event sequences and technical as well as organisational, resulting from such conditions that are of importance to safety and their analyses or assessments, are to be documented in the safety analysis has been moved from SSMFS 2008:1 to Chapter 2 programme and implemented in a timely manner. The in the new regulations (SSMFS 2018:1) on basic rules for safety programme shall be reviewed and updated on an all licensed activities involving ionising radiation. This also annual basis. applies to the requirement on keeping the analysis up to

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 81

14.1.1.3. Periodic Safety Reviews mechanisms that might potentially affect structures, The PSR shall aim at ensuring compliance with the current systems and components of importance for safety. design basis and identify further safety improvements by Functional testing to verify operability has to be performed taking into account developments in science and techbefore structures, systems and components are taken into nology. Reasonably practicable safety improvements must operation following maintenance or other interventions. be implemented in order to maintain the level of safety Programmes for testing of active components should and to ensure that older facilities can achieve a comparable reflect consequences of a malfunction and the probability level of safety as new nuclear facilities. Thus, the PSR of this occurring. The functional testing has to be carried process is an important instrument for ensuring safe out with the frequency and scope providing confidence long-term operation of nuclear facilities in Sweden, see that the equipment will function as credited in the safety section 14.3.5 analyses. The functional tests shall reflect the circumstances that are expected when the function is required. If

14.1.1.4. Ageing management and long term operation

this is not possible, an analysis shall show that the safety SSM determines the specific point in time for submission function is verified sufficiently despite limitations of the of periodic safety reviews for each facility, which according testing. to the Act on Nuclear Activities (see section 7.1.2) must be performed at least once every ten years. In the general Requirements for mechanical components are defined in advice for the regulations, it is clarified that the periodic the regulations concerning mechanical components in review of the facility’s safety and radiation protection certain nuclear facilities (SSMFS 2008:13). These regulashould provide a basis for determining, at an established tions contain requirements for the use of mechanical point in time, whether the facility can continue its equipment, limits and conditions, damage control, accredioperation until the next periodic safety reviews with the tation of control organisations and laboratories, in-service levels of safety and radiation protection assumed in the inspection and control, repair, replacement and modificalicence for the nuclear facility. Since the previous report, tion of structures and components, as well as on compli- SSM has also decided to adopt a standpoint accepting ance control and annual reporting to SSM. status of ageing management programmes and continued Regulation SSMFS 2008:13 requires certain inspections and operation (LTO) in connection with the PSR reviews. inspection intervals for specified components, such as the The general advice also specifies that the periodic safety reactor pressure vessel and its nozzles, etc. In addition to review should cover 17 safety review areas. It is also such compulsory inspections, the nuclear power plants are clarified that if the facility does not fulfil relevant, new required to allocate the mechanical components in the safety standards, measures should be implemented if this is plants to a number of inspection groups. The inspection considered to be reasonable and suitable with respect to groups determine the extent of the in-service inspections. the benefit to safety, taking into account the existing design The inspection programme, resulting from the use of the assumptions of the facility. principles, shall be reviewed by the accredited inspection body to certify that the programme complies with the 14.1.2. Requirements for verification by surveil- regulations and additional SSM decision rulings. Three lance, testing and inspection inspection groups, A, B and C, are used. Group A includes Sweden has since the beginning of its nuclear programme components with the highest relative risk, and C those with had specific requirements for surveillance, testing and the lowest. The relative risks can be assessed using in-service inspection to ensure that the operation and the qualitative or quantitative methods as described above. In material condition of the reactors comply with design inspection groups A and B, the non-destructive inspection requirements and operational limits and conditions. systems used shall be qualified by an NDT qualification Chapter 5, Section 3 of SSMFS 2008:1, which regulates body to detect, characterize and size any existing defects to operations, includes requirements on continuous surveil- the required standard. Apart from the division into lance, maintenance and testing of structures, systems and inspection groups, mechanical components must be components of importance to safety to ensure that they divided into five quality classes. The principles for this shall meet the safety requirements. Programmes are required for also be approved by SSM. The division into quality classes maintenance, surveillance, inspection and testing as well as shall take into account the safety significance of the for ageing management. The programmes must be carried integrity of the respective mechanical component for out using methods validated for their purposes. Measure- safety in all plant states up to, and including, design basis ment and test devices shall be calibrated in line with accidents. The quality classes determine the design instructions. Programmes shall be documented and kept requirements and quality assurance measures needed for up to date with regard to new experiences and develop- repairs, replacements and plant modifications. ments in science and technology. In order to ensure that An accredited inspection body is required to review the maintenance, as well as continuous inspections and inspection programmes in detail, and issues certificates of controls, are carried out in line with safety requirements, compliance with the SSM regulation. In addition, a the licensee must have documented procedures. The ageing qualification body, approved by SSM, qualifies the non-demanagement programme should include identification, structive testing systems used and certifies their suitability surveillance, handling and documentation of all ageing for the component and applicability in question. The

82 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

14.2. Compliance of the licence holders

inspection companies (laboratories) conducting the

inspections must be accredited for the tasks and methods The Act on Nuclear Activities (1984:3) stipulates that a they use with regard to quality systems, technical procedures licensee shall continuously and systematically evaluate and, and competence by the Swedish Board for Accreditation as far as possible and reasonable, improve the safety of its and Conformity Assessment (SWEDAC). SWEDAC activities and its facilities with regard to: makes annual inspections and follow-ups of the accredited

inspection bodies. SSM, as the competent authority for – The conditions under which the activities are conducted,

nuclear matters, supports SWEDAC in this supervision of – How equipment and facilities are affected by operations

the inspection bodies. and ageing,

– Experiences from the activities and similar activities, and

14.1.3. Requirements for safety reviews

– Developments in science and technology. Chapter 4, Section 3 of SSMFS 2008:1 specifies requirements

for licensees’ safety reviews. The objective is to ensure that

14.2.1. Safety analysis reports

all relevant aspects of a safety issue have been taken into Earlier major development of the Swedish safety analysis account and that all relevant requirements concerning the reports (SAR) is described in previous national reports. design, function, organisation and activities of a facility are

met. The review shall be carried out systematically and be Safety requirements included in the SAR are regularly

documented. assessed for their applicability, and the licensees have

specific procedures in place regarding evaluation of new or The safety review is to be performed in two steps. The first revised codes and standards. These procedures include: step, the primary review, shall be carried out within the

parts of the licensee’s organisation that are in charge of – Maintenance, the specific issues. The primary review should typically – Component qualification, address motives for implementing a measure, in addition to – In-service inspection/ISI, and presumptions and delimitations, verification and validation – Surveillance testing. of analysis methods, and the accuracy of the results. The

second step, the independent review, shall be carried out As an example, the licensees have specific norm commitby a safety review function, established for this purpose tees that hold periodical meetings to evaluate new codes and having an independent position in relation to the and standards. organisation responsible for the specific issues. The

independent review should not duplicate the primary 14.2.1.1. Deterministic safety assessments

review, but rather apply a different perspective and focus The safety analyses of Swedish plants presented in the

on how a matter has been handled, whether all relevant original SAR were from the beginning essentially struc-

aspects have been considered, and whether all relevant tured according to US rules. The events analysed were

safety requirements have been met. Both of the review divided into different classes depending on the expected

steps should ascertain whether the measures maintain or frequency and significance (severity). The highest class

improve the level of safety. contains the design basis accident (DBA), typically a large

loss of coolant accident such as a double-ended guillotine Areas which, as per regulation SSMFS 2008:1 and the break of the largest pipe cooling the reactor. regulations contained in SSMFS 2014:2 concerning

emergency preparedness in nuclear facilities, are subject to The methods and methodologies in the safety analyses

the licensee’s own safety review, include the following: were essentially based on 10 CFR 50.46 Appendix K.

Design criteria to be fulfilled included limited fuel cladding – Technical or organisational modifications to a facility damage and no zirconium-water reaction (i.e. maximum which might affect the conditions specified in the safety cladding temperature of 1204 °). Although the DBA did analysis report, not include core melt at that time, it was postulated that a – Principal modifications in the safety analysis report, large proportion of the fission products would be released – Modifications in an emergency response plan, into the containment. It was subsequently shown that the – Modifications in the OLC, containment leak tightness was sufficient for limiting – Modifications in procedures concerning the control of radioactive releases to the environment.

readiness for operation as well as procedures and The introduction of the severe accident mitigation guidelines intended for abnormal operation and requirements in 1986 implied introduction of a new class accidents, of accidents, including severe fuel damage (core melt), and – Investigations carried out as regards deficiencies in the safety analyses were extended to show that the barriers and in defence in depth, and the measures taken acceptance criteria for these cases (see section 18.1) were met. as a result of the deficiency, and

– Plans for necessary measures for ensuring safe The new regulation SSMFS 2008:17 issued in 2005 resulted

confinement of non-conforming waste (nuclear waste in a need to update and extend certain analyses and tasks.

arising which, in terms of quantity and type, deviates These were included in the reactor-specific modernisation

from specification in the safety analysis report). plans (see section 6.2) and completed by December 2015.

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 83

The reviews and updates mainly consisted of a few external the licensees are progressing towards application of a

events and several beyond design basis accidents (BDBA). “Living PSA” approach. PSA results are also used routinely

by the licensees to support decisions concerning significant Major updates of the deterministic safety analyses have modification of the designs, modification of operations, also been made for reactors that have had power uprates, documentation and assessment of events. see section 6.3. Since the previous report, deterministic

safety analyses for Ringhals 4 and Oskarshamn 3 have been As mentioned in previous national reports, the numerical

renewed for their applications for routine operation PSA figures are not regarded as a definitive and exact value

following power uprates. of the actual risk level. There are no requirements related

to numerical PSA results, although the licensees have

14.2.1.2. Probabilistic safety assessments internally developed such safety objectives. The studies are

Extensive development of the methods and tools for PSA required to be sufficiently detailed, comprehensive and

has been performed over the years. As a result, up-to-date realistic to enable identification of weaknesses in designs,

software and considerable expertise is at hand both within and must be used for assessment of plant modifications,

the Swedish utilities, the regulator, consultancies and modifications of technical specifications and procedures,

contractors. One item of particular importance is the as well as the risk significance of events.

reliability databases accumulated from operational experi- PSA is used to evaluate plant modifications. It was used as ence. These databases are available in the reliability data a tool to plan measures for compliance with the regulations handbooks “The Reliability Data of Components in SSMFS 2008:17. Generally, these modifications covered: Nordic NPPs” (the T Book), and “Reliability Data for measures to protect against CCF, actions to improve fire Piping Components in Nordic Nuclear Power Plants” (the protection, improvement of operator support, and R Book). The T Book provides specific reliability data of improvements to maintenance and testing. Since the high quality for a large number of components since 1977. previous report, PSA has been used to evaluate safety The R Book provides high quality data for piping compoimprovements for transitional measures pending installanents, and is utilised to distribute pipe break frequencies tion of the new independent core cooling system (ICCS) and to categorise pipe breaks in different categories. Work and of the new ICCS itself. is also performed relating to Common Cause Failure (CCF)

data. This data is compiled in the CCF reliability book (the

14.2.2. Periodic safety reviews

C Book). Extensive compilation of CCF data is also The licensees are required to submit a PSR of each reactor performed within the OECD/NEA ICDE project. These unit at least every ten years. The review must verify that the sets of dependency data are transferred into the domestic plant complies with the current safety requirements and PSA models when delivered from the OECD/NEA has the prerequisites for safe operation until the next PSR, project. None of the books are readily available, but the taking into account advances in science and technology. T Book can be purchased . Access to the R Book and the 5 The analyses, assessments and proposed measures shall be C Book is possible via the Nordic PSA Group (NPSAG) . 6 reported to SSM.

NPSAG was founded in December 2000 by the nuclear The licensee must inform SSM when the planning starts. utilities in Finland and Sweden. SSM, the Finnish regulator The licensee meets with SSM to discuss the proposed (STUK) and the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Managescope, contents and methodology of the PSR. Typically, ment Company (SKB) participate as associated members. the review is organised in project form involving 15 – 20 The associated members may take part in the funding of staff members from the licensee. One goal is to include a the projects run within the NPSAG. NPSAG is a forum few young engineers in every project in order to transfer for discussing issues relating to PSAs of nuclear power knowledge. The total work effort encompasses around plants, with a focus on research and development needs. 8–10 man-years per PSR. The group monitors and discusses current issues relating

to PSAs both nationally and internationally, as well as PSA Ageing management is an important topic in the PSRs.

activities conducted at participating utilities. The group When performing the PSR, long-term operation must be

initiates, finances and co-ordinates research and develop- addressed specifically, and it must be demonstrated

ment activities and discusses how new knowledge shall be (through sufficient analyses) that the plant is able to

used. The licensees strive to implement results from the operate safely beyond the designed lifetime, typically 40

NPSAG projects in their PSAs. years, referred to as long term operation (LTO). The PSR

for Ringhals 3 and 4 will be submitted in April 2019. This All nuclear power reactors have complete level 1 and level document will cover LTO aspects. 2 PSA studies including all operating modes and virtually

all relevant internal and external hazards for the sites. The Act on Nuclear Activities (1984:3) stipulates that a

licensee must continuously and systematically evaluate and, The PSA models are expected to be updated every year if as far as reasonably practicable, improve the level of safety there have been plant modifications during the past year in its activities and facilities. Therefore, the PSR is not that have an impact on the PSA result. Full updates of the expected to identify any major needs for enhancement of PSA studies are expected every three years. In principle,

5 Contact TUD@vattenfall.com. 6 See www.npsag.org

84 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

nuclear safety, but give an opportunity to make an overall technical, quality control, and in-service inspection

assessment of the safety and performance of the plant requirements, and has facilitated the development of

and organisation as a part of the efforts on continued plant-specific documents in these areas.

improvements. Organisations required for qualification of Non-Destructive

As an example, for Oskarshamn NPP unit 3, the last PSR Testing (NDT) systems and techniques, as well as for

was reported in 2017. The review led to findings (strengths carrying out and evaluating such inspections, have been

and weaknesses) and improvements within the organisa- established in accordance with regulatory requirements.

tion. An aggregated analysis and overall assessment SQC (Swedish Qualification Centre) serves as an inde-

identified four strategic development areas, for example pendent body for qualification of NDT systems to be used

“Take advantage of personnel as enablers and barriers” by NDT companies that operate at Swedish nuclear power

and “Further development of the organisation’s ability in plants.

operational excellence”. These strategic areas have become The regulations require all safety-related components to be part of OKG’s strategic planning and safety programme. assigned to specific inspection groups related to their safety The goals have subsequently been broken down into significance. The assignment to inspection groups is relevant activities for each department and unit. An documented together with relevant information example of an activity linked to the first area mentioned is concerning the inspection in question. The assignment is a cross-group seminar on the topics of safety management, reviewed and approved by the plant organisation. The safety culture and operational excellence. Nearly all managers, overall objectives of the total inspection programme and employees and a selection of partners participated in this the fulfilment of the requirements of the regulations are seminar, which was held on several occasions in 2018. also reviewed by a specifically accredited inspection body.

The information concerning inspection group assignments

14.2.3. Safety programmes

and inspection areas is maintained by the plant organisa- All licensees have safety programmes in place, as required tion in a database, and forms the basis for the creation of by SSM regulation SSMFS 2008:1. The programmes are the inspection programmes to be performed at given part of the management system’s documentation, and are a inspection times. result of safety analyses, audits, safety culture surveys and

other evaluations performed at the plant. The programmes The inspection group assignment is reviewed annually,

contain priorities and time schedules for future technical, and updated if deemed necessary, depending on plant

organisational and administrative measures. modifications, damage or indications found in Swedish or

other nuclear power plants, or new and relevant research 14.2.4. Verification by surveillance, testing and findings.

inspection

Extensive replacement of piping, found to be sensitive to A number of different verification programmes are specific damage mechanisms, has been carried out in the implemented in order to ensure that the physical state and power plants. Many of these replacements were carried the operation of the nuclear installation continue to be in out to mitigate potential future damage as knowledge was accordance with its design basis, safety requirements, and gained on damage mechanisms. In other cases, replaceits operational limits and conditions. The programmes are ments were carried out when the damage occurred. broken down into these groups: surveillance, in-service

inspection, preventive maintenance, and safety reviews.

14.2.5. Safety reviews

In order to verify that the operation of a nuclear power

14.2.4.1. Surveillance

plant is in accordance with the applicable national safety The operational limits and conditions (OLC) are developed requirements and standards, different types of safety reviews to ensure that plants are operated in accordance with are performed regularly at the plants. The regulation on design assumptions. This document is discussed in more nuclear safety, SSMFS 2008:1, requires a dual safety review detail in connection with Article 19. The OLC document for all safety-related issues at the plant, e.g. operational also clarifies the types and frequency of functional testing events, changes in OLCs, plant modifications, etc. First, a for verification that components and systems are ready for primary review is carried out by the operations department operation. These tests are carried out in accordance with that is primarily responsible for reactor safety. If needed, documented procedures, and all test results are reviewed resources from other departments are utilised. and documented.

A second review that is autonomous is then performed by Special attention has been given to verification of the an independent department or function within the operability of safety systems when going from shutdown licensee’s organisation. This independent department or to a power operating mode. This verification is ensured function is not allowed to be involved in the preparation or today by using a large number of parameters, computerised execution of the issues under review. Typically, the tools and new procedures. Operability is discussed further independent review function consists of 10 – 15 experiin section 19.2 and 19.3. enced engineers with competence profiles to cover all

14.2.4.2. In-service inspection forthcoming matters. In some cases, consultants are

Swedish licensees use a shared document that serves as an utilised to back up the function.

industry standard. This document is divided into general,

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 85

The objective of the secondary review is to assess whether “Ageing Management and Development of a Programme the primary review included the relevant types of analyses for Long Term Operation of Nuclear Power Plants” and investigations, and whether they are of sufficient (SSG- 48), which are similar to the ten elements described quality, rather than repeating the primary review. Certain in the Generic Aging Lessons Learned (GALL) Report issues, according to the regulations, require application or (NUREG-1801). In order to check consistency, Swedish notification to the regulator. Both the primary and the licensees have used IAEA’s generic lessons learned report 7 independent reviews are carried out according to written (SRS 82) and NUREG-1801, as described in the EU-TPR instructions developed specifically for the purpose. ageing assessment . 8 A third type of review is performed by the safety review The Ringhals nuclear power plant has worked on implemencommittees and councils at different organisational levels. ting and developing methods for ageing management at There are review committees on operating unit level, as the plant. The Ringhals power plant also adopted the well as on power plant level (see section 10.2.7). These IAEA methodology (SRS-57) for justifying LTO at an early consist of individuals representing different disciplines in stage. Initially, this work was done as part of an extension order to achieve a broad view of the subjects discussed. of the PSR for the oldest reactors, Ringhals 1 and 2, but The members are appointed based on their personal this also covered units 3 and 4. The work within the LTO qualifications and knowledge. In some committees and project covered a review of the existing ageing management councils, one or more external members also take part. as well as identification, reviews and updates of TLAAs for the remaining time of planned operation: 60 years for units Committees working on operating unit level deal with daily 3 and 4 and 50 years for units 1 and 2. The IAEA was operational matters of safety, such as event and scram invited by Ringhals for a peer review of the project and reports, operational experience from other plants, and discussion of other preconditions for LTO through the safety issues linked to OLC and plant modifications. SALTO mission services. The project ended in 2017 and Committees working on power plant level focus on issues underwent an IAEA SALTO in 2018. IAEA has been of principle, such as a safety policy and strategy, the plants’ asked to return for a follow-up in 2020. The LTO adherence to the Authority’s regulations, and general programme at Ringhals is given as an example in figure 16. reviews of safety and quality activities. At OKG, a project was started to reinforce ageing manage- 14.2.6. Ageing management and LTO ment for Oskarshamn 3. Since ageing management and (Long Term Operation) LTO are closely related, the goal is to as far as possible Implementation and development of ageing management take advantage of work that has already been done at the nuclear power plants have been ongoing efforts over regarding ageing management for the LTO demonstration. more than a decade starting when requirements were The basis for the project’s LTO demonstration is formed introduced in the national regulation SKIFS 2004:1 in by the IAEA guidelines on LTO, supplemented by specific 2005. Preparations for long term operation (LTO), i.e. SSM requirements on subjects related to LTO. The result operation beyond the designed lifetime (typically 40 years), of the pre-SALTO review, that was held in late 2017, have also been performed following review reports together with the collection of worldwide experience, has published by SSM in 2012 and guidance from the IAEA. enhanced the understanding of LTO at OKG. This has The Swedish nuclear reactor fleet has experience as made it possible for OKG to build a comprehensive regards LTO, e.g. from the units Oskarshamn 1 and 2, method for Oskarshamn 3 to safely enter Long Term and Ringhals 1 and 2. Preparations for LTO have been Operation in 2025. intensified for reactors that will be facing an LTO period The Forsmark NPP has developed overall ageing in the near future, see table 5. management programmes by compiling information from

and reliability over time. Following the Ringhals NPP For more information about LTO and the alternate term approach, Forsmark has also implemented an LTO project “continued operation”, see section 14.3.5.2. in order to verify the scope of systems, structures and components, and to review the ageing management for Key elements for assessing ageing are based on the nine operating the plants beyond the originally intended attributes contained in the IAEA’s safety standards, lifespan. The review has included an update of the

7 Ageing Management for Nuclear Power Plants: International Generic Ageing Lessons Learned (IGALL), IAEA Safety Reports Series No. 82 8 2017:36, Topical Peer Review 2017. Ageing Management, Swedish National Assessment Report.

86 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

licensing basis documentation regarding analyses that use The ageing management programme functions on an

time-based assumptions. interdisciplinary level through existing programmes and is

to be the link that fulfils the ageing perspective in all To enable an international assessment of the overall ageing programmes. The related programmes are: management programmes, all licensees have made use of

the IAEA SALTO or pre-SALTO review service, see – Maintenance

section 9.2.3.2. The SALTO peer reviews are important – Component qualification steps as part of the technical details of managing ageing – In-service inspection/ISI issues, as well as creating a company-wide awareness of the – Surveillance testing necessities and requirements of operating the plants past – Chemistry their originally intended lifespan. – Operations

14.2.6.1. Organisation of the ageing management work – Radiation protection

Each site has organised its ageing management work in – Obsolescence

different ways. These different approaches are described below. The maintenance department is responsible for coordi-

nating the ageing management.

Organisation of ageing management work at the

In order to manage the above requirements, a coordinating

Ringhals NPP

group has been established within OKG. The coordination Handling of ageing-related degradation and damage as group is responsible for overall ageing management and described in the ageing management programme requires handles subjects such as: access to support and information from closely related

programmes and activity areas. – Events and deviations that may have resulted in forced

ageing and thereby degradation of function and The ageing management programme functions on an performance. interdisciplinary level through existing programmes and is to be the link that fulfils the ageing perspective in all – New knowledge of the status of the facilities based on

programmes. The related programmes are: the outcome of testing activities.

– New knowledge of material and ageing effects. – Maintenance – New knowledge of the supplier market and access to – Equipment qualification replacement components. – In-service inspection/ISI

– Surveillance and monitoring Organisation of ageing management work at the

– Chemistry Forsmark NPP

– Operations The responsibility for coordinating overall ageing manage-

ment is assigned to the engineering department. Since – Radiation protection ageing management is a common concern, with collective – Obsolescence responsibilities, it involves staff in many plant departments.

The maintenance department is responsible for dealing Forsmark has started implementation of collaboration

with and developing the ageing management at Ringhals. groups in the areas of civil engineering, electrical, I&C and

A team coordinates and supervises the ageing management mechanical equipment with the purpose of developing

programme. The team’s responsibilities are to: interdepartmental coordination in ageing management.

Part of the engineering department’s configuration – Document the overall ageing management process. management activities is the responsibility to develop and – Ensure that the programme for ageing management maintain systematic ageing management analyses for is complete. systems, structures and components that are important for – Coordinate activities related to ageing management. safety. This includes identification and documentation of – Evaluate and optimize the efficiency of the programme. relevant degradation mechanisms and ageing effects for – Exchange experiences with external organisations. relevant SSCs. – Ensure that experience and results from R&D relating The maintenance department is responsible for conducting to ageing management are forwarded to the parties a continuous review of the maintenance programmes, concerned. including ageing management-related activities. The – Ensure that information and training within the area are maintenance department is also responsible for management available and conveyed to the right persons. of obsolescence and the establishment of a programmatic – Report to the management. approach.

Organisation of ageing management work at the The operations department is responsible for surveillance

Oskarshamn NPP testing, routine trending of results from testing and status

Handling of ageing-related degradation and damage as monitoring and reporting of vital activities as part of

described in the ageing management programme requires detecting effects of ageing.

access to support and information from closely related

programmes and activity areas.

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 87

2018-03 2018-06 2018-09 2019-04 2020 Q1 2020-06 2020-12 2022-06 2022-12

PSR R34 SALTO SSM SSM SALTO LTO- LTO LTO TLAA sub - ~ Follow- Notice ~ Notice R3 project R3 R4 mission up R3 R4

Conduct ageing management

Production ageing management documents (AMD) 2109-03-01

Assesment AMD

Punch list (LTO Q&C) 2109-04-01

SALTO SALTO Followup 2020 Q1 R3 2019-10-18 R1, LTO:2016 R2, LTO:2015 Facts and issues SALTO AIP 2019-12-01 R3, LTO:2021 R4, LTO:2023 TLAA Analysis Areas: RAB NU effort Production PSR R34, report 7 LTO-project SALTO Production PSR R34, Main report PSR R34

TLAA

Dept NU LTO project SALTO TLAA PSR Figure 16. Plan for LTO activities at Ringhals NPP, unit 3 and 4.

14.3. Regulatory control

14.3.1.1. Deterministic Safety Assessment

In the following cases, SSM reviews the Deterministic SSM continuously reviews and inspects work performed Safety Analyses (DSA): by the licensees. Section 14.3 describes some general approaches regarding regulatory control in this area, and – As part of power uprate reviews, gives examples of recent supervision. – When a licensee notifies the Authority (see section 10.3)

of new analyses due to e.g.

14.3.1. Safety analysis reports

– New fuel types, Generally, SSM reviews safety analysis reports due to – Plant changes, applications for power uprates or notifications (see section – New or modified analyses, 10.3.4) relating to (for example) plant modifications or – As a response to injunctions issued by SSM for new new analysis methods. SSM may also initiate SAR reviews analyses to prove requirement fulfilment, for instance at any time, regardless of incoming updates. SSM may also when new safety issues have been raised that are not impose new assessments to prove requirement fulfilment, covered by the current SAR. for example due to increased knowledge through research projects, international collaboration, and or own Some examples are presented below of SSM’s review investigations. activities performed during the current CNS review period. SSM’s reviews have the aim of verifying that a SAR reflects

Ringhals 1 routine operation review

the facility as it is built, analysed and verified, as well as that Since the previous report, SSM has reviewed and approved it demonstrates how current requirements on design, the application for routine operation at Ringhals 1, after function, organisation and activities are met. the modernisation to meet the requirements in the Since the previous report, SSM has reviewed a number of regulations concerning the design and construction of SAR updates, including updates due to measures taken nuclear power reactors, SSMFS 2008:17. following the stress tests, power uprates (Ringhals 4, Oskarshamn 3 and Forsmark 2), and the modernization Manual measures credited in the safety analyses programmes to comply with SSM’s regulations concerning One example of a new area of focus since the previous the design and construction of nuclear power reactors, report is the issue of time for performing manual measures contained in SSMFS 2008:17. that are credited in the safety analyses. Section 4 of the regulations concerning the design and construction of nuclear power reactors, SSMFS 2008:17, stipulates that

88 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

manual measures in connection with necessary activation 14.3.2. Periodic safety reviews and operational change of reactor safety functions may SSM requires that licensees present a plan for conducting only be applied if the personnel are given sufficient time the PSR in order to reach a consensus concerning the – time for consideration – in order to safely take the overall arrangements including the scope of the PSR, the measures. Since the previous report, SSM has placed an methods used in the analyses, etc. SSM maintains a increasing focus on assessing the time needed for taking dialogue and hosts meetings with the licensee during the manual actions in deterministic safety analyses. SSM has entire PSR process. When a PSR is submitted to SSM, SSM imposed a requirement on the licensees to identify and conducts comprehensive reviews and assessments of the report all necessary manual actions and to validate that the submitted reports and their references. In its reviews, SSM time for these is sufficient, for example by using a full scale compares the statements made by the licensees with simulator of the plant. This work is ongoing and has thus findings from the regulatory supervision. SSM’s process for far resulted in notifications of several updated analyses PSR review is in line with IAEA safety guide SSG-25, from the Ringhals NPP, which are currently under review. Periodic Safety Review for Nuclear Power Plants (2013), and the Nuclear Safety Directive amendment. The

Mitigation of unidentified degrading power supplies

regulatory assessments of the PSRs are submitted to the Another topic that has been an area of focus in recent Government. years is mitigation of unidentified degrading power supplies. After the undetected phase imbalance at Since the previous report, SSM has concluded its reviews Forsmark 3 in 2013, SSM issued an injunction to conduct of four PSRs from nuclear power plants in operation, i.e. plant assessments to identify possible mitigation measures Forsmark 3, Ringhals 1 and 2, and Oskarshamn 3. In all of to limit the consequences of degraded power supplies. these reviews, SSM concluded that the safety improve- This was followed by an injunction in 2017 to justify plant ments suggested by the licensees had the potential to behaviour and configuration based on the insight that it provide an appropriate basis for continued operations. may be subjected to unidentified degrading power supplies. SSM also identified additional areas of improvement to The licensees generally concluded that preventive and ensure safe future operation of these reactors. protective measures are suitable measures in an existing

14.3.2.1. Forsmark 3 PSR

plant, as well as enhanced electro-mechanical separation In the case of Forsmark 3, SSM decided that the licensee measures in the independent core cooling function to be should implement its action plan to improve the identified implemented before 2021. weaknesses in a timely manner. SSM also decided that the Robustness of structures and components in the lower licensee should present a plan for rectifying the weaknesses drywell of the containment identified by SSM. Five months after the review was Another example where SSM has required new assessments finished, SSM performed a follow-up on how the licensee to prove requirement compliance is an injunction in 2018 proceeded with the improvements. The supervision to have the licensees of Forsmark 1 – 3 and Oskars hamn 3 showed that most of the highest ranked improvements had to analyse the robustness of structures and components in been taken care of. the lower drywell of the containment against impulse loads that might occur in a case of steam explosions during a 14.3.2.2. Ringhals 1 and 2 PSRs severe accident. The injunction was based on an investiga- The reviews of the PSRs for Ringhals 1 and 2 were tion taking into account both national and international specific, since the decisions to cease operation of the research results. plants were taken at the beginning of the SSM reviews. Due to the new circumstances, the licensee had to update 14.3.1.2. Probabilistic Safety Assessments its action plans for safety improvements. The greatest As of 2014, the licensees submit a yearly report to SSM change was that Ringhals 1 cancelled its plans to modernise that includes information regarding the Probabilistic Safety the control room. In the case of Ringhals 2, the major Analysis (PSA) status as well as relevant information change was that the plan for a new analysis package for the regarding plant changes, method changes, R&D, and deterministic safety analyses was cancelled. In the cases of operational experience of importance for the plant-specific both Ringhals 1 and 2, SSM decided that the licensee PSAs. SSM’s PSA supervision also includes reviews of should complete the implementation of its updated action updated PSAs, living PSA reporting, treatment of fire and plans to rectify the identified weaknesses and report on its other hazards in the PSA, topical meetings with licensees, progress every six months until all improvements regarding and surveillance inspections. Another important part of requirement compliance were implemented. As March 2019, SSM’s PSA supervision is to observe the processes used by 43 out of the 44 improvements have been implemented. the licensees, for instance to ensure that PSAs are used in SSM also decided that the licensee should implement all relevant applications. improvements relating to weaknesses identified by SSM. As far as concerns Ringhals 2, SSM also concluded that the In the area of PSA, SSM performs surveillance inspections licensee should present an updated evaluation regarding at all sites every second year. The PSAs for Forsmark 2 and the need for modernization of the deterministic analyses. Ringhals 4 have been reviewed within the applications for This re-evaluation was reviewed by SSM and the conclusion routine operation following the power uprates. was made that the necessary steps had been taken.

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 89

14.3.2.3. Oskarshamn 3 PSR In 2015, the licensee submitted an application for permis- SSM has decided that the licensee of Oskarshamn 3 (see sion to restart the reactor with the remaining instances of also 14.2.2) should present a plan for rectification of the damage. The regulatory assessment was difficult, since the weaknesses identified by SSM, since the licensee’s own licensee had recovered the liner before the permission was amendments were not included as most of them were sought. In early 2016, the plant remained shut down, with already implemented according to plan. SSM also decided ongoing investigations, analyses and discussions. In that OKG should present the results of its Time Limiting October 2016, SSM decided that the licensee could restart Ageing Analysis (TLAA) review in 2021, since the reactor the reactor, but for a limited period, i.e. until the end of will pass 40 years of operation before the next PSR. 2019. SSM’s integrated assessment was that the licensee had shown that the safety margins against breach of the 14.3.3. Safety programmes integrity were sufficient for this limited period. Due to Since the previous report, SSM has not conducted any uncertainties, the authorisation to restart the reactor was specific supervision of the safety programmes, however, subject to certain conditions regarding further analyses, a safety programme is one of the seventeen areas in controls and examinations. the periodic safety review. In this respect, the safety programmes for Forsmark 3, Ringhals 1 and Oskarshamn Environmental qualification 3 have been reviewed. During 2015, SSM started to examine the status of environmental qualification at all licensees. SSM found 14.3.4. Inspection and testing of plant structures, some components and equipment at the Forsmark NPP systems and components and at OKG where the validity of environmental qualification had expired due to ageing. In the following years, the

14.3.4.1. The Swedish third-party control system

licensees have investigated, qualified and exchanged As mentioned in section 14.1.2. the Swedish system equipment, primary in the containment, during the period regarding inspection and testing of mechanical devices is to maintain and restore the status of the equipment. based on the regulator, SSM, having set up a framework (the regulations) encompassing principles, methods and

Surveillance programmes

modes for inspections and testing. An accredited inspec- Since the previous report, SSM has reviewed the surveiltion body and qualification body are involved in the lance programmes for the reactor pressure vessels of process. These bodies undergo annual inspections Ringhals 1 – 4 and Forsmark 1 – 3. The corresponding conducted by SWEDAC for evaluation of the accredited supervision on the part of the reactor Oskarshamn 3 is inspection bodies. SSM, as the competent authority for ongoing. nuclear matters, supports SWEDAC in this supervision of the inspection bodies. 14.3.4.3. Functional tests

Since the previous report, SSM has performed supervision As far as concerns the only qualification body in Sweden at the Ringhals and Oskarshamn NPPs within the area of (SQC), its approval was renewed in 2016, though subject to functional tests as part of the baseline supervisory terms and conditions. These were followed up at an programme, see section 8.8.2. The corresponding superinspection performed in 2018, along with previous vision on the part of the Forsmark NPP is ongoing. inspection findings. The conclusion was that the licensee complied for the most part with the regulatory require-

14.3.5. Ageing management and long term

ments.

operation

14.3.4.2. Inspection and surveillance of plant structures 14.3.5.1. Ageing management programmes

and components As stated in section 14.1.2, SSMFS 2008:1 requires an Corrosion in the bottom part of the containment liner integrated programme for management of degradation due The seventh national report described an ageing problem to ageing. The programme needs to include all structures, involving corrosion in the bottom part of the containment systems and components that are of importance for safety. liner in Ringhals 2 (see section 6.1.3 of Sweden’s seventh This includes mechanical, electrical and I&C components. national report), which was identified during a regular Concrete structures also need to be covered by the ageing integrated containment air test in 2014. At that time, the management programmes.

work had not been finished, and a continued degradation In recent years, SSM has intensified its reviews and search led to uncovering of a total area of 380 m2 of liner. inspections of the NPP programmes for ageing manage- Areas with instances of corrosion damage deeper than 3 ment, considering the age of Swedish NPPs. SSM has mm were then repaired (the liner is 5-6 mm thick). The found deviations in some of the plants’ ageing managework on uncovering the liner was terminated when the ment, and has consequently requested improvements. licensee found a correlation between the magnitude of the damage and the root cause of the corrosion. Based on this, Follow-up reviews and inspections have been performed the licensee assessed that the parts of the liner that to verify that measures implemented by the licensees are remained covered would not have instances of damage effective. The results of these inspections are described in deeper than 3 mm. Sweden’s EU Topical Peer Review on ageing (see section 14.2.6). The inspections showed that all licensees in

90 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

14.4. Implementation of VDNS

different degrees have implemented the requirements

stated in Chapter 5, Section 3 of the Swedish regulation This section, in reference to Article 14 of CNS, describes SSMFS 2008:1. how Sweden implements relevant measures and performs

Nevertheless, all three licensees still needed to improve safety analyses in enhancement of the fulfilment of

their programmes for ageing management. In the case of principles of the VDNS.

Ringhals, SSM found that no new injunction was necessary During this reporting period, the focus of the regulatory since Ringhals had started to work on the needed improvebody and licensees alike was on ensuring safety functions ments. However, in the cases of Oskarshamn 3 and and safety barriers through the introduction of extensive Forsmark 1 – 3, SSM issued new injunctions on completion work on ageing issues. This was followed by setting up of their programmes for ageing management and impleupdated ageing management programmes by the licensees mentation of changes to their respective organisations. to guarantee the elimination of impact from degradation SSM’s review of Forsmark’s response to the injunction was and other processes on specific safety-related components completed in 2018 with no further comments. As far as and systems. The programmes were subject to several concerns Oskarshamn 3, the follow-up started with an IAEA SALTO review missions and the results were inspection in 2017 and led to another injunction in which incorporated. certain conditions needed to be met for the plant to

remain in operation after January 2018 and January 2019, An important instrument for implementing the second

respectively. principle of the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety is

the periodic safety review (PSR) process. Furthermore, an SSM’s review of the licensee’s response was completed in emphasis was placed on the importance of preparation and January 2019 with the assessment that the requirements assessing safety on the part of all reactors that will be were fulfilled. SSM also noted that the licensee had facing their end of design lifetime in order to ensure safe identified a need for further improvements. SSM is continued operation (“LTO”). For this purpose, an awaiting the outcome of these improvements. extended PSR has been used specifically in the area of

ageing to require analyses and reporting on matters related

14.3.5.2. Long term operation

to plant safety status, and to prove continued safe Long term operation (LTO) is not defined in Swedish operation until the next PSR. legislation, nor in associated regulations, see section 7;

instead, the term “continued operation” has been Sections 14.2.1 through 14.2.6 present the licensees’

suggested. The requirement on having an ageing manage- implementation of the regulatory requirements. Relevant

ment programme is applicable to all reactors in operation, regulatory activities are reported in sections 14.3.1 through

regardless of age. 14.3.5.

Nevertheless, SSM recognises the fact that the reactors

were originally constructed and analysed for 40 years of

operation. Since the previous report, SSM has decided to

adopt a standpoint accepting continued operation (LTO)

in connection with the PSR reviews, as described in the

EU-TPR report . In this respect, a key aspect for the 9

licensees for justifying continued operation is to show that

the identified TLLAs meet the criteria established. The

TLLAs should consider the entire remaining period of

time for which the continued operation is planned. If the

licensee has not provided SSM with the time limiting

ageing analyses in time for the PSR review, SSM will

require this by issuing a decision to provide SSM with these

analyses well in advance prior to 40 years of operation.

This was done for Oskarshamn 3, see section 14.3.2,

“Periodic safety reviews”.

14.3.6. Safety reviews

SSM reviews the licensees’ safety reviews most frequently

when reviewing notifications. However, inspections are

also performed when necessary.

9 2017:36, Topical Peer Review 2017. Ageing Management, Swedish National Assessment Report.

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 91

Article 15. Radiation Protection

15.1. Regulatory requirements

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that in all operational states the radiation exposure

15.1.1. Occupational radiation protection

to the workers and the public caused by a nuclear A new Radiation Protection Act (2018:396) was decided by installation shall be kept as low as reasonably achievable the Swedish Parliament (Riksdag) on 26 April 2018 and and that no individual shall be exposed to radiation doses entered into force on 1 June 2018. National radiation which exceed prescribed national dose limits. protection regulations are specified in SSM’s Code of Statutes, SSMFS. A more detailed specification of SSMFS

Summary of developments since the

is provided in section 7.2.

previous report Presently, Swedish occupational radiation protection

During the current review period, the following develop- requirements governing nuclear facilities are in accordance ments are of relevance with regard to the obligations of with the binding requirements of the new Radiation Article 15: Protection Act. The new Radiation Protection Act transposes several key provisions of Council Directive – A new Radiation Protection Act (2018:396) was decided 2013/59/Euratom laying down basic safety standards for by the Swedish Parliament (Riksdag) on 26 April 2018 protection against the dangers arising from exposure to and entered into force on 1 June 2018. The new ionising radiation. Radiation Protection Act transposes several key The regulations comprising SSMFS 2018:1 and SSMFS provisions of Council Directive 2013/59/Euratom 2008:26 contain extensive requirements relating to proteclaying down basic safety standards for protection against tion of the public and occupational radiation protection in the dangers arising from exposure to ionising radiation. connection with activities involving ionizing radiation as – On 24 May 2018, new regulations on basic rules for all well as workers at all nuclear facilities. These requirements licensed activities involving ionising radiation were are based on the fundamental principles of radiation decided (SSMFS 2018:1). These regulations came into protection as defined by the International Commission on force on 1 June. They transpose additional provisions of Radiological Protection (ICRP): justification, optimisation Council Directive 2013/59/Euratom that were not of protection and application of dose limits. included in the new Radiation Protection Act.

– The new lower dose limit for equivalent dose to the lens Regulations regarding an appointed radiation protection of the eye is stated in the radiation protection manager, the actual radiation protection expert available ordinance. Requirements on the application of this are onsite (not deemed a manager in the line organisation), are specified in SSMFS 2018:1. These include the situations specified in SSMFS 2008:24. Previous requirements on where measurements need to be conducted. A joint appointing radiation protection managers remain in effect, project has been carried out together with all Swedish but have been supplemented by additional requirements on nuclear facilities in connection with this lower dose appointing radiation protection experts in SSMFS 2018:1.

limit. Shared methods and guidelines have been The new, lower dose limit for equivalent dose to the lens developed. of the eye is stated in the radiation protection ordinance. – Radiation protection education and training have been Requirements on the application of this are specified in continuously reviewed and strengthened. Part of this SSMFS 2018:1. These include situations where measurework was the self-assessment conducted in 2017. ments need to be conducted. – Efforts to reduce releases of radioactive substances to air and water have been effective. The activity amounts, 15.1.2. Protection of the general public and the as well as the corresponding calculated doses to the environment public, have decreased or remained at the same order of Nuclear power reactors in normal operation are regulated magnitude. by the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority’s regulations

92 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

(SSMFS 2008:23) concerning the protection of human Environmental monitoring in the areas surrounding

health and the environment from discharges of radioactive nuclear facilities is currently performed according to

substances from certain nuclear facilities. monitoring programmes determined by SSM. This

arrangement will be changed in the future to imply that The requirements comprise a dose constraint on effective licence holders will be charged with developing and dose to the public from discharges of radioactive maintaining site-specific environmental monitoring substances to the environment, and required monitoring programmes at the site. The programmes are to be kept of releases of radioactive substances to water and air. All regularly updated and subject to approval by SSM. unmonitored leakages must be investigated and an upper

boundary has to be set for possible unmonitored leakages The programmes specify the type and sampling frequency,

to air and water from each facility. sample treatment, radionuclides to consider, reporting etc.

Sampling is performed at and outside the sites. Samples are Compliance with the dose constraint is demonstrated by analysed by staff of the nuclear facilities, or by external calculating the dose to a hypothetical member of the laboratories that have adequate quality assurance systems. public. The methodology used calculates the dose from To verify compliance, SSM performs inspections and one year’s releases integrated over a certain time period, evaluates laboratory performance. The laboratories take and the calculated dose should consist of the sum of the part in proficiency tests and bilateral inter-laboratory effective dose from external exposure and the committed comparisons on random sub-samples to check compliance effective dose from internal exposure. The methodology is with measurements performed by SSM or by another to be regularly updated and approved by SSM. The latest independent laboratory. and most extensive update has been conducted in the form

of a joint project with participants from all of the nuclear Nuclear reactor licensees report annually to SSM on

facilities concerned. In 2017 the methodology and the adopted or planned measures to limit or reduce releases of

specific dose factors in terms of Sv/year per Bq/year for radioactive substances, with the aim of achieving specified

each nuclear facility were sent to SSM for approval. The target values. If established reference values are exceeded,

new methodology includes adoption of the ICRP’s the planned measures to achieve the reference values shall

recommendations for the “representative person” (instead be reported.

of critical group) and the use of three different age groups. Releases of radioactive substances to the environment as The integration period is also extended from 50 to 100 well as results from environmental monitoring shall be years. SSM has decided that the new methodology and reported twice per year to SSM. Events that lead to a resulting site-specific dose factors shall be applied as of substantial increase in releases of radioactive substances 2019 for releases of radionuclides to the environment. from a nuclear facility must be reported to SSM as soon as

The discharge limit is achieved by restricting the radiation possible, together with a description of the actions taken

dose to the public. Sweden has no statutory nuclide- to reduce the releases.

specific discharge limits. The dose limit for members of Clearance of materials, rooms, buildings and land in the public is 1 millisievert (mSv) per year. Hence, in order practices involving the use of ionising radiation is regulated to protect the public, the dose constraint is 0, 1 millisievert in SSMFS 2018:3, which stipulates detailed requirements per year and site for discharges of radioactive substances for clearance procedures. to the environment (authorised releases).

Releases though the main stacks of nuclear power reactors 15.1.3. New legislative work

shall be controlled by means of continuous nuclide- specific The new regulations concerning nuclear safety in nuclear

measurements of volatile radioactive substances, such as power plants comprise an ongoing project in which the

noble gases, continuous collection of samples of iodine Radiation Protection Act (2018:396) will be an integral

and particle-bound radioactive substances, as well as component.

measurements of carbon-14 and tritium.

Discharges of radionuclides to water shall be controlled 15.2. Compliance of the licence holders

through measurements of representative samples from Previous national reports include descriptions of measures each release pathway. The analyses shall cover nuclidetaken by the licensees to comply with radiation protection specific measurements of gamma and alpha-emitting regulations. The following sections describe the current radioactive substances as well as, where relevant, situation at Swedish nuclear facilities. The sections selected strontium-90 and tritium. provide relevant examples of the ongoing work.

Limitation of releases shall be based on optimisation of

15.2.1. Organisation of radiation protection

radiation protection and by applying the Best Available

at the nuclear power plants

Technology (BAT) in order to limit and further reduce the Radiation protection (RP) resources are centralised at releases of radionuclides. Swedish nuclear power plants, though normally a few The function and efficiency of measurement equipment individuals are assigned to specific units. Plant operators

and release limiting systems shall be checked periodically frequently hire external RP personnel, particularly during

and whenever there are any indications of malfunctions. outages. The percentage of hired RP personnel during

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 93

outages can be as high as 70 – 80%. During normal of the frequencies of contamination alarms and house-

operation, the percentage of hired RP personnel is keeping in general. Some examples of focus areas are

approximately 30 – 40% at Forsmark, 20% at Ringhals and clearance of materials, measurements of equivalent dose to

25% at Oskarshamn. the lens of the eye, enhancing practical training of exposed

workers in the controlled areas, enhancing the process of Radiation protection responsibilities reflect the organisamaking dose prognoses, as well as categorisation of tional structure. The RP sections are responsible for radiation protection-related events and incidents. performing assessments and providing other radiation

protection services. The responsibility to comply with

15.2.3. Radiation protection education and training

instructions rests with management in the line organisa- There is no exclusive education programme solely for tion. Planning and discharging of resources are carried out ALARA, though at Forsmark NPP an ALARA training within the overall processes for production, refurbishment, and education programme for staff involved in the plant outages, project work, etc., except for special services (e.g. modification and renewal process has been developed dosimeter service, whole-body counting, RP instruments, and a pilot training course has been held. The training some monitoring and surveillance, etc.). The senior and education programme is intended for personnel management plans RP work in conjunction with the overall involved in planning and construction of plant modificamanagement of the plant, and particularly in connection tions. Feedback and experience from this have been taken with overall health and safety activities. into account. The programme has been revised and is now

in use.

15.2.1.1. Ringhals NPP

The decisions to phase out units 1 and 2 at the Ringhals Competence Councils have been established between

NPP will affect the organisational structure in radiation Forsmark and Ringhals in order to deal with common

protection. Measures will be taken to ensure adequate education issues within the radiation protection area. An

competence and resources during the future decommis- education programme for radiation protection personnel in

sioning process. An ongoing (first quarter of 2019) the area of free release has been developed together with

reorganisation is taking place within the RP department the other nuclear power plants in Sweden. Targeted

to meet new criteria. radiation protection training is held within the plant

renewal projects where the need exists.

15.2.1.2. Forsmark NPP

A mandatory education programme on radiation protec- As a continuation of the reorganisation that was carried tion techniques for own personal working in the controlled out in October 2015, “Operational radiation protection area and external foreman and supervisors is being updated groups at Forsmark 1, 2, and Forsmark 3” have been in cooperation between the Swedish NPPs. merged to form one “operational radiation protection

group”. The group has now developed a competence and Due to the new national regulations in the field of

succession plan, with a clear career path, that gives radiation protection, site-specific instructions and

additional development opportunities within the profession. procedure are in the process of being adjusted accordingly.

Examples of significant changes include new dose limits After losing staff over the course of a few years through and new procedures for measuring equivalent dose to the retirement and other staff departures, recruitments have lens of the eye. been carried out.

A simulator for practical training has been built at OKG.

15.2.1.3. Oskarshamn NPP

The simulator, set up in an authentic environment, is used The decision phase out the two oldest reactors at the by in-house staff and entrepreneurs. It offers opportunities Oskarshamn NPP affected the organisational structure. to carry out practical training in an authentic environment, A new organisation was created with two main directions: with a focus on personal radiation protection. production and decommissioning, whereby a new depart-

ment was created to handle decommissioning. At the 15.2.4. Activities to prevent spread of contamination

decommissioning department, a new organisation for Activities have been enforced further at all sites. The

radiation protection was established. activities cover individual follow-ups of alarms set off at

exit gates in connection with identity registration when Both at the decommissioning department and production conducting a measurement, changes in procedures, department, a focus was placed on creating radiation enhanced checks closer to workplaces, as well as enhanced protection organisations with a higher degree of own staff information, education and training efforts. than previously. This decision was received very positively.

At Forsmark, work has been carried out to take into

15.2.2. Internal procedures for radiation protection

account international guidelines on detection and control Work is continuing to harmonise procedures at and of alpha activity. This includes, among other things, between sites. This includes behaviour-related instructions, mapping of alpha activity levels inside the facilities. This such as procedures and rules for radiation protection, mapping shows that alpha activity does not presently pose usage of prescribed personal protective equipment in any risks in connection with internal contamination. After radiation and contamination controlled areas, and controls risk assessment, mobile filters are used to filter the air from

94 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

radioactive aerosols as close to the source as possible. are installed only at the BWR unit Ringhals 1. The online Furthermore, card readers have been installed in personal instrumentation is used to track the surface activity buildup monitors for easier identification of contaminated in the reactor system with the aim of evaluating the effect personnel. Also, a web-based interface has been introduced of system decontamination campaigns, as well as smaller to simplify follow-ups of personal contamination regis- changes in chemistry and operation. The measurements tered by the personal monitors. show that the degree of recontamination of the reactor system surfaces is now roughly 80% of the status prior to Ringhals has installed personal identification at all exit the campaign carried out in 2014. monitors located at units 3 and 4. There is an ongoing project to install inner monitors at units 1 and 2. The All the Forsmark units have nuclide-specific gamma purpose is to improve handling of PCE (Personal Contam- measurement systems installed online monitoring of ination Events) in order to more effectively gain control gaseous fission products in the condenser’s off-gases. over radioactive contamination in controlled area and This monitoring is used for early detection of fuel failures protect the individuals involved. and to identify a leaking fuel bundle in the core. The data evaluation software is being updated during the period Ringhals previously reported on ongoing work to improve 2017 – 2019 to provide more robust and versatile data procedures for clearance measurements. There are processing. currently three clearance stations equipped with high purity germanium (HpGe) detectors. An average of around 300 Replacement of software for the monitoring systems for nuclide-specific measurements are performed each year, detection of fuel damage at Forsmark unit 1 and 2 is and very few of them exceed the clearance limits. This ongoing, thus providing more flexible data management. indicates that the clearance process works well in all stages In systems for monitoring activity in airborne releases, regarding sorting, packing, smear tests, etc. modernisation of the detectors are planned. This involves At Oskarshamn, work has been carried out to prevent newer models, due to lack of available spare parts for the spreading of contamination, through a daily procedure and old models. sampling. In order to further strengthen radiation protec- During the annual outage of each Forsmark unit, tion work, a checklist has been developed for describing nuclide-specific gamma measurements are performed on expected performance by the operator and radiation pipes and heat exchangers at selected locations. The protection personnel before gaining access to areas with measurements show the amount of radioactivity that is high levels of radiation. present as internal contamination, and which nuclides that Oskarshamn has also installed personal identification at all contribute to the dose rate at the measurement location. exit monitors for registration and follow-up to get an overview of levels of radioactive contamination. If an 15.2.6. Dose reduction and ALARA programmes individual sets off an alarm when exiting, this information The alpha value, used at the Ringhals NPP in the optimiis communicated to the manager responsible. sation process, has since 2015 been 10.8 million SEK per saved man-sievert (manSv). The former alpha value, since 15.2.5. Measurements of radionuclides 2008, was 10 million SEK/man-sievert. This alpha value is in reactor systems still valid at the Forsmark NPP. At the Oskarshamn NPP, Online dose rate measurements at several locations are the value of 11, 1 MSEK/man-sievert has been used since carried out in order to continuously monitor changes in the beginning of 2017. The alpha value is used when dose rates. During outages, supplementary measurement applicable. In case there is a possibility to achieve a greater campaigns are performed as input for determining overall benefit, the monetary sum may be increased. An additional protective measures during the outage, but also assessment is made on a case by case basis. to cover long-term trends in specific measurement All NPPs continue to make improvements to their programmes. radiation protection activities by using the principle of At the Ringhals NPP, surface activity measurements (SAM) optimisation of protection in a long-term perspective, as have been conducted at all plants since 1990. Measurements well as in day-to-day work. During the previous review are performed using collimated gamma spectroscopy period, the focus had already come to concentrate more equipment. It has been established that most nuclides on reducing high individual exposures as a complement to contributing to dose rate have decreased over the years due focusing on collective doses. This work is continuing. to operational and chemical controls. In 2018, a new Dose statistics for a ten-year period are presented in shutdown program was tested on Ringhals unit 2 without section 15.3.1. using Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCPs) during the cleanup. The purpose of this test was to reduce recontamination 15.2.6.1. Forsmark NPP and activity spread to systems during the cleanup, and thus The use of the new electronic personal dosimeters (EPD) reduce dose rates during the maintenance period. During system has progressed using further reduced fine-tuned the shutdown, dose rates were monitored in a number of dose alarm limits for work in spaces with low dose rates. positions, and a nuclide-specific online measurement was A list of spaces, systems and jobs with a high risk of performed using the SAM equipment. Online nuclide-spe- overexposure has been developed and used when planning cific measurements of system surfaces and reactor water RP measures.

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 95

When working with the Foreign Material Exclusion (FME), effects on source terms and dose rates will be analysed in

which involves prioritising where the focus should be order to evaluate future implementation in Ringhals’ PWRs.

placed, classification lists were developed for different

systems to facilitate maintenance work at all three facilities. 15.2.6.3. Oskarshamn NPP

Already in the preparation stage, these classification lists The main focus of the ALARA committee at the OKG

make it possible to plan the appropriate type of measures NPP is to supervise continuation of long-term develop-

before, during and after the work. For complex works, ment of radiation protection. The committee evaluates the

templates are available so that the responsible work group, strategies for individual and collective doses, and follows

together with the FME staff, can in advance produce up radiation protection activities. Committee members are

structured FME plans that describe in detail how the works made up of managers who have personnel working in the

are to be carried out in order to minimise the risk of controlled area, or who can affect the design and conditions

adding foreign objects. Checklists and certificates help in the controlled area, together with radiation protection

employees to carry out all key tasks. As a final safety experts.

measure, FME staff makes final checks using their own A number of planning values for dose and dose rate have specially trained staff to ensure purity after work has been been implemented as an optimisation tool to reduce high completed. individual doses. Dose limitations have been established

for individual doses on a daily, monthly and annual basis,

15.2.6.2. Ringhals NPP

and for dose rates. The measure has significantly reduced System decontamination, conducted at Ringhals unit 1 the number of high individual doses. The recommendastarting in 2014, remains beneficial in 2019 as regards low tions from the common ALARA benchmark are being recontamination of the involved systems. Each year, this implemented gradually. saves several tens of milliman-sievert collective dose.

A new model for management of dose prognosis has been The ALARA committee is undergoing a review regarding established throughout the organisation. Each department the procedures workflow. The main focus for the manager now has the responsibility to establish a dose committee remains to conduct supervision over continuaprognosis for work within the department during the year tion of long-term radiation protection development. The in co-operation with the radiation protection organisation. committee also evaluates ALARA plans and objectives for The main focus of the activity is to delegate the responindividual and collective doses, and follows up radiation sibility for and dedication to ALARA among the departprotection activities. The committee members are made up ments outside the RP department. Also, management of of managers who have personnel working in the controlled ALARA plans has been strengthened. area or who can affect the design and/or conditions in the

controlled area, together with radiation protection experts. An extensive project with the FME, Foreign Material

Exclusion, has been carried out with the intention of A number of dose constraints have been implemented, preventing foreign substances or objects from ending up in and will be revised as an optimisation tool to reduce high the core. OKG works proactively on keeping process individual doses. Dose constraints are established for systems free from foreign objects. Work on FME promotes individual doses: not only effective dose, but also equivanuclear safety, protects the integrity of fuel, contributes to lent doses to extremities, and for different levels of dose reduced radiation dose through reduced contamination, rate and dose prognosis. The measure has significantly contributes to component health and equipment reliability, decreased the number of high individual doses. reduces unplanned stops, and reduces remedial maintenance.

The recommendations from the joint ALARA Benchmark An established and well-functioning FME programme is a

are being successively implemented. A new model for cost effective way to reduce the risk of fuel damage caused

management of dose prognosis, which was implemented by abrasion, and is an important ALARA measure.

throughout the organisation, will be evaluated in order to optimise more exact dose planning. 15.2.7. Programmes to reduce the release of

radioactive substances

The main focus of the activity is to delegate the respon- Plans and action programmes remain in effect for the sibility for and dedication to ALARA among the departpurpose of reducing releases of radioactive substances ments outside the RP department. Also, the management from nuclear power plants to the environment. Some of ALARA plans has been strengthened. The ALARA examples of measures implemented are given here. plans, one from each department, have to be reviewed by

the ALARA committee before approval. For projects with All sites have programmes for separation and minimisation

dose prognosis greater than 80 milliman-sievert, a specific of different types of waste water. This has altogether

ALARA plan must always be established. resulted in reduced volumes of waste water as well as

reduced activity discharges. At Ringhals units 2, 3 and 4, fuel decontamination has been performed yearly. Efforts to avoid fuel failures are ongoing and include

education and training, as well as introducing new An alternative shutdown procedure involving RCP techniques to stop foreign debris from entering reactor operation during hydrogen peroxide cleanup was tested at systems. Ringhals 2 shutdown for refuelling in 2018. The eventual

96 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

15.2.7.1. Forsmark NPP 15.2.8. Other events and activities during the

The goal is to maintain its low levels of releases of review period aerosols by maintaining and enhancing the procedures A joint project has been conducted with the purpose of and equipment developed during the previous CNS review improving the precision of the dose budgets. At the period. As an example, when preparing for each outage, present time, these results are undergoing implementation, an aerosol minimising plan is produced. though the effects remain to be evaluated.

A joint project has been carried out together with all

15.2.7.2. Ringhals NPP

Swedish nuclear facilities due to the lower dose limit for Since 2014, Ringhals units 1 – 4 have been free from any equivalent dose to the lens of the eye. Common work fuel damage. For this reason, they have been able to methods and guidelines have been developed. From earlier maintain low activity release rates to the environment. All studies, it has been found that the whole body dose, Hp the units now have very low levels of tramp fissile material (10), and dose to the lens of the eye, Hp (3), are compaon the core; in the case of Ringhals 1, it is considered as an rable for most work situations that occur in a nuclear all-time low. The reduction rate relating to airborne releases power plant. A number of specific jobs have been identilevelled off on the part of all the units during the previous fied in which the lens of the eye might receive a higher period. Ringhals 1 is still working actively on reducing air dose than measured by the whole body dosimeter. From leakage into the turbines. This was successful during the these two findings, a solution has been decided for period 2016 – 2017, but became more challenging in 2018. monitoring dose to the lens of the eye. Installations at Ringhals units 3 and 4 for delaying and reducing releases of radioactive gases have been working as

15.2.8.1. Ringhals NPP

intended. As a result of less maintenance and fewer large projects Releases to water were further reduced during the period, involving reactor systems along with stable or decreasing mainly as a result of optimising operation of the evapo- source terms, the power plant has faced a notably lower rator at Ringhals 1. Experiments have also been made to CRE (collective radiation exposure). Along with lower reduce and clean boron-rich waste waters, using ultrafiltra- individual doses and a fewer number of man hours, this tion in combination with specific ion exchange resins. The challenges the system of dose prognosis. purpose is to be able to use the evaporator more efficiently. Decommissioning activities are in progress for Ringhals Since 2012 (Ringhals unit 3) and 2015 (Ringhals unit 2 and unit 1 and 2 with, for example, radiological mapping as 4), a programme for cleaning of fuel elements ultrasoni- ongoing procedures. cally has been implemented. The removal of both activated and not yet activated deposits limits the general source 15.2.8.2. Forsmark NPP term of the plant including the reactor water, which is also The plans for long time operation on the part of all three expected to affect the effluents. reactors have resulted in an increased need for maintenance of contaminated systems and components, which At the Ringhals NPP, the dose to the critical group (most in turn creates a need for efficient ALARA planning and exposed individual) is mainly due to C-14. Releases of other implementation of ALARA measures. radionuclides contribute less than 5% of the total dose. Releases to water are a factor behind approximately 1% of Identification and encapsulation of damaged fuel rods the total dose calculated on the part of the critical group. and removal to the intermediate fuel storage are ongoing. This is to minimize leakage of activity to the storage pools.

15.2.7.3. Oskarshamn NPP

The decision to phase out the two oldest units at the 15.2.8.3. Oskarshamn NPP Oskarshamn NPP has reduced releases from the site. To WANO’s compilation of registered collective doses at the reduce off-gas flows in Oskarshamn unit 3, air in-leakage world’s boiling water reactors showed that the O3 reactor sources have been tracked during startup following outages at mid-year 2017 had the lowest value of all the compared since 2017. reactors. The outcome of 0, 32 man-sievert should be compared with the mean value for all reactors included in All fuel elements in Oskarshamn unit 3 were flushed the statistics, which was 1, 19 man-sievert. The internal during the outage in 2017, with the aim of removing conclusion was that OKG had a positive trend over a long foreign debris. period of time in terms of the radiological status and Releases to air of Co-60 and Ag-110m from the O3 reactor purity of the facility. The corresponding three-year value increased from 2009 and after upgrading the reactor to for the O1 reactor amounted to 0, 68 man-sievert. This 3900 MWth. The level of silver in the reactor water also reactor has been in operation for 45 years and ended up increased. During the period, there was a focus on in twelfth place in the statistics, thereby distancing a large following up releases to air from the O3 reactor and the number of plants which are considerably younger. The presence of Ag-110m in the reactor water. The increased successes were the result of ever better collaboration level of silver remains unexplained. The level of the silver between all parties involved, primarily in the maintenance release has reduced over the past year. It was below budget and operation organisations. during 2018, unlike the year before, but the investigation is continuing.

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 97

Prior to the outage in 2018, a “safety team” was created by As can be seen from table 6, the number of persons who using personnel from different parts of the OKG organi- received intake of radionuclides leading to committed sation. Their task was involvement in the O3 facility during effective dose > 0,25 millisievert during the last three years the outage, with a strong focus on raising OKG’s level of is continuously low. occupational safety by means of improved security ahead Table 6. Number of persons with committed effective doses > 0.25 of schedule, rules and identified risks related to operations, mSv at Swedish NPPs in operation 2016 – 2018. stopping tasks that seem to pose risks, and rectifying and reporting risks and events. The purpose is to reinforce the Number of persons with a Committed

Year registered committed effective dose effective dose

overall safety culture in the long term. This work will

(> 0.25 mSv) [mSv]

continue during future outages. 2016 1 0,3 There is also a radiation protection organisation in place 2017 0 – set up to provide assistance at the logistics centre, which is 2018 0 – used for emergency preparedness activities. Exercises have been held on six occasions to train personnel who will staff The low number of intakes leading to registered the logistics centre, and provide practice to personnel involved committed effective dose reflects low contamination levels in the crisis management organisation (see section 16.3.4.3). and effective work procedures.

For certain specific worker categories, the average indi-

15.3. Impact and results of radiation

vidual dose per year over a 10-year period is shown in

protection measures figure 18. Only doses > 0, 1 millisievert in any monitoring

period (≤ 1 month) are used when calculating average

15.3.1. Worker protection

doses. Activities to improve the radiological environment and to

Average individual dose

decrease worker exposure at the reactors are described in 5,0 the plants’ ALARA programmes. An annual evaluation of 4,5 the ALARA work is to be conducted, with the outcome of

4,0

this evaluation to be sent to SSM. An inspection is taking

3,5

place in 2019 in the area of ALARA activities.

3,0

phase out the two oldest units at the Oskarshamn NPP, in 0,5 2015 (Oskarshamn 2) and 2017 (Oskarshamn 1); for this 0,0

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

reason, these reactors are excluded from dose statistics. Mechanical work In-service inspection All NPP The two “peaks” illustrated by figure 17 are explained by Insulation work Health Physics the major modernisation work carried out in 2011 at Forsmark, and in 2014 at Ringhals and Oskarshamn. Figure 18. Average individual doses to select workers’ catagories at Collective radiation dose, NPPs in operation Swedish NPPs.

14

12 A selection of statistics on radiation doses at Swedish NPPs during the same 10-year period is shown in table 7 .

10

As can be seen, there is a significant decrease in the 8 number of individuals exceeding 10 millisievert per year, which is considered to be an effect of the operator’s

manSv 6

specific focus on reducing doses to the most exposed 4 workers, e.g. by the use of dose constraints. In addition, no annual effective dose exceeding 20 millisievert has been

2

received since 2009.

0

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Average individual dose has remained at a relatively stable level. The number of high individual doses has

Forsmark Oskarshamn Ringhals All NPP

been kept low. Figure 17. Collective radiation doses at Swedish NPPs in operation during the period 2009 – 2018.

The radiation exposure is mainly due to contamination of surface layers by Co-60. However, fairly low radiation levels are achieved as a result of continuous efforts to reduce production and distribution of Co-60 in the reactor systems.

98 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

Table 7. Radiation dose statistics for Swedish NPPs.

Number of persons with a Number of persons with a Year Total dose manSv Average dose mSv Highest dose mSv

The dose limit for members of the public is 1 millisievert The concepts of reference values and target values are per year (effective dose) as set out in the Radiation used on the part of nuclear power reactors as a measure Protection Ordinance (2018:506). In order to sufficiently as part of applying Best Available Technique (BAT) for protect the public, SSM has issued a site-specific dose reducing releases of radionuclides. These values are constraint for releases of radioactive substances from defined by the licensees and are valuable for achieving the nuclear installations to the environment. The dose long-term objective of reducing releases and effluents of constraint of 0,1 millisievert per year is independent of the radioactive substances. number of release points at the site. The methodology used for estimating dose to the public is described in

section 15.1.2. There are no regulatory limitations for 15.4. Regulatory control

releases of specific radionuclides. Figure 19 displays SSM has continued to develop its supervisory methods for effective dose to the public resulting from releases of radiation protection in the form of SSM’s new regulations, radionuclides during the period 2008 – 2018 at Swedish SSMFS, and the Radiation Protection Act (2018:396). A nuclear power plant sites. new method was introduced in 2017, so-called “basic supervision”. The idea is that all paragraphs of the SSMFS regulations are to undergo review and revision over a

4,5E-04

10-year period.

4,0E-04

3,5E-04

During 2018 the basic supervision was focusing on

3,0E-04

radiation protection work at the plant, however the basic supervision for 2019 will focus on ALARA activities. The

2,5E-04

mSv findings from the 2018 was for instance encompassed on

2,0E-04

1,5E-04 reinforcing aspects of radiation protection among other 1,0E-04 occupational groups. It was due to their lack of knowledge 5,0E-05 of planning values or alarm limits to the extent that they are affected. Other findings included personnel perceiving

0,0E+00

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 ineffective co-planning between units, which makes it impossible to influence work and, in the long term, to

Forsmark Ringhals Oskarshamn

optimise the radiation protection work. Figure 19. Estimated radiation doses from releases of radionuclides from Swedish NPPs to the representative individuals of the critical group. Furthermore, SSM has since 2017 been utilising selfassessments for different topics, most recently about The efforts to reduce releases of radioactive substances, by radiation protection education. The year before, the topic administrative and technical means, have been effective, was dose to the lens of the eye. Self-assessments are based and the released activity amounts, as well as the corre- on plants submitting a report in which they respond on sponding calculated doses to the most exposed individuals their evaluation of (for example) radiation protection (< 1µSv/year and site), have decreased or remained at the education and retraining through the courses. The reports same level in recent years. Releases to water and air from are reviewed by SSM. Swedish reactors are for the most part at the same level as The result of the previous self-assessments from 2018 releases from other reactors of the same type and size in showed that Oskarshamn, Forsmark and Ringhals met the

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 99

requirements for radiation protection education. The In addition to these inspections, reviews are also self-assessments, and the fact that the limit was lowered conducted. Annual reports are submitted for review by for dose to the lens of the eye, by means of the new SSM. During the inspections and reviews over the past Radiation Protection Ordinance (2018:506), have also three years, SSM has identified room for improvement raised awareness at the plants. regarding the role to include radiation protection aspects in connection with operational planning at the plants. SSM In addition to basic supervision, SSM carries out inspechas also observed challenges in relation to retirement of tions to look into ongoing work on radiation protection. radiation protection staff. Normally, these inspections include one or two annual meetings held with radiation protection management and workers. This is in addition to inspections carried out in connection with outages, from a radiation protection point of view.

100 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

Article 16. Emergency Preparedness

requirements that were previously found in SSMFS 1. Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps 2014:2 (on-site emergency preparedness and response) to ensure that there are on-site and off-site emergency are now instead found in SSMFS 2018:1 (basic rules for plans that are routinely tested for nuclear installations and all licensed activities involving ionising radiation). cover the activities to be carried out in the event of an emergency. For any new nuclear installations, such plans – New monitoring stations have been installed around the shall be prepared and tested before it commences nuclear power plants in Sweden. The new stations will operation above a low power level agreed by the regula- provide information on dose rates at 90 locations tory body. around the Swedish nuclear power plants. The last 2. Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps stations went online in late 2018 and are currently to ensure that, insofar as they are likely to be affected by a undergoing an evaluation process. radiological emergency, its own population and the – Two ordinances, 2015:1052 and 2015:1053, entered into competent authorities of the states in the vicinity of the force on 1 April 2016. These ordinances replace the nuclear installation are provided with appropriate former Emergency Preparedness and Heightened Alert information for emergency planning and response. Ordinance (2006:942) that is now split into two parts 3. Contracting Parties which do not have a nuclear without any major revisions of the content having being installation on their territory, insofar as they are likely to made. be affected in the event of a radiological emergency at a

16.1. Regulatory requirements

nuclear installation in the vicinity, shall take the appropriate steps for the preparation and testing of emergency plans for their territory that cover the activities to be Requirements for emergency activities and plans for the carried out in the event of such an emergency. nuclear facilities are included in several legally binding documents:

Summary of developments since

– SSM’s regulations (SSMFS 2014:2) concerning emergency preparedness at nuclear facilities (on-site

the previous national report

emergency preparedness and response), During the current review period, the following develop- – SSM’s regulations (SSMFS 2018:1, Chapter 2) ments are of relevance with regard to the obligations of concerning basic rules for licensed activities involving Article 16: ionising radiation, – A new Radiation Protection Act (2018:396) which – Civil Protection Act (2003:778) regarding protection entered into force on 1 June 2018. It is applicable to against accidents with serious potential consequences workers and the public during an emergency. for human health and the environment (on-site and off-site emergency preparedness and response), – A new Radiation Protection Ordinance (2018:506) which entered into force on 1 June 2018. It sets – Civil Protection Ordinance (2003:789) regarding reference levels to be applied in the case of a protection against accidents with serious potential radiological emergency and includes requirements for consequences for human health and the environment optimisation. (on-site and off-site emergency preparedness and – Updated regulations, SSMFS 2014:2 (revised through response), SSMFS 2018:26), concerning on-site emergency – Ordinance with instructions for the Swedish Radiation preparedness and response, entered into force on 1 June Safety Authority (2008:452) (off-site emergency 2018. The regulation contains new rules for logistics preparedness and response), centres and provisions concerning the ability to receive – Ordinance on Emergency Preparedness and aid and support from external organisations. Also, some Surveillance Responsible Authorities’ Measures at concepts have been renamed. Heightened Alert (2015:1052) (off-site emergency – The structure of the regulation has been changed. Some preparedness and response),

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 101

– Ordinance on Total Defence and Heightened Alert of facilities categorised as belonging to emergency (2015:1053) (off-site emergency preparedness and preparedness category 1 must be capable of setting up a response), and logistics centre in a location distanced from the site. This – Health Care Act (2017:30) (off-site emergency logistics centre should have capabilities for serving as the preparedness and response). forward control point for transports of personnel and equipment to and from the facility during an emergency, including facilities and equipment for dosimetry and

16.1.1. Requirements for on-site activities

As far as concerns on-site emergency preparedness and decontamination.

response, the Civil Protection Act (2003:778) and Similar to the previous regulations, SSMFS 2014:2 also Ordinance (2003:789) stipulate general requirements addresses alarm criteria and alerting, emergency facilities, applying to facilities that conduct dangerous activities. evacuation plans, training and exercises, and other aspects The Act requires preventive measures and emergency of emergency preparedness (e.g. iodine prophylaxis, preparedness to be arranged by the owner or operator of personal protective equipment, monitoring, ventilation a facility that conducts dangerous activities. filters and meteorological data).

The Act on Nuclear Activities (1984:3) contains general

16.1.2. Requirements for off-site activities

provisions on emergency response in the event of an The overarching objective of the Civil Protection Act accident at a nuclear facility. The Act requires the licensee (2003:778) is civil protection for all of Sweden with to have an organisation with sufficient financial, adminisconsideration given to local conditions – for life, health, trative and human resources to carry out protective property and the environment, against all types of measures in connection with an accident at the facility. incidents, accidents, emergencies, crises and disasters. Through the Ordinance on Nuclear Activities (1984:14) The act defines the responsibilities for individuals, local and the Radiation Protection Ordinance (1988:293), the authorities and central government in cases of serious Government has assigned SSM the mandate to issue accidents, including radiological accidents. The act contains specific regulations for licensees in the fields of nuclear provisions on how community rescue services shall be safety and radiation protection. SSM’s former regulations organised and operated, and also stipulates that a rescue on on-site emergency preparedness (SSMFS 2014:2) have commander with a specified competence, and far-reaching been revised. Updated regulations (SSMFS 2014:2) were authority, is to be engaged in all rescue operations. issued in 2018 and entered into force on 1 June 2018. As The Civil Protection Ordinance (2003:789) states that in the previous regulations, SSMFS 2014:2 uses the County Administrative Boards are responsible for rescue concept of emergency preparedness categories (1, 2, 3 and operations in cases where the public needs protection from 4) based on the IAEA’s emergency preparedness categories. a radioactive release from a nuclear installation, or in cases The regulation introduces the application of a graded where such a release seems imminent. The ordinance approach depending on the radiological hazard at the contains general provisions concerning emergency nuclear facility. SSM’s regulation SSMFS 2014:2 requires planning as well as more specific requirements on the licensee to take prompt actions in the event of an reporting obligations, information to the public, responsiemergency in order to: bility of the County Administrative Board for planning and – Classify the event according to predefined alarm criteria, implementing public protective measures, content of the

– Alert the facility’s emergency response organisation, off-site emergency plan, competence requirements for – Assess the risk and magnitude of possible radioactive rescue commanders, inner emergency planning zones and releases and time-related aspects, outer emergency planning zones around major nuclear facilities. The County Administrative Board is required to – Return the facility to a safe and stable state, and draw up an off-site nuclear emergency response plan. The – Notify SSM. Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) is responsible The actions planned to be taken in the event of an at a national level for coordination and supervision of emergency shall be documented in an emergency response preparedness for an off-site rescue service response to plan, along with instructions for the on-site emergency radioactive releases.

response organisation, including the chain of command, The ordinance with instructions for the Swedish Radiation relevant facilities, resources and coordination of emergency Safety Authority (2008:452) contains provisions imposed response activities (both on-site and off-site). The plan is on SSM that apply in the case of a nuclear or radiological subject to a safety review by the licensee and must be emergency. SSM’s role in the Swedish emergency manageapproved by SSM. The plan is to be kept up to date and ment system is mainly to give advice and recommendations validated through regular exercises. on radiation protection to the public and authorities in charge, SSMFS 2014:2 requires nuclear power plant (NPP) maintain a national expert response organisation for licensees to have in place an emergency response organisa- monitoring, and provide information on the technical state tion capable of dealing with simultaneous emergencies at of nuclear installations in the case of a nuclear emergency.

all reactor units at their site over a minimum period of one Two ordinances, 2015:1052 and 2015:1053, entered into week. Another new requirement in SSMFS 2014:2, that force on 1 April 2016. These ordinances replace the entered into force on 1 June 2018, states that the licensees

102 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

former Emergency Preparedness and Heightened Alert authorities’ mandates. The plan also describes national

Ordinance (2006:942) that is now split into two parts coordination and liaison between competent authorities.

without any major revisions of the content having being The document outlines the resources available at national

made. The aim of ordinance 2015:1052, Emergency level and how they are requested and coordinated. Interna-

Preparedness and Surveillance Responsible Authorities’ tional assistance is also described in the plan. In addition to

Measures at Heightened Alert, is to ensure that govern- the contingency plan, a national action plan is in place for

ment authorities at national and regional level work to improvements to emergency preparedness work.

reduce vulnerabilities in society and develop a good The County Administrative Boards are responsible for capacity for handling their tasks during emergencies, crises emergency preparedness and response in the event of an and cases of heightened alert. The ordinance requires of accident at a nuclear facility. The Board appoints a rescue each government authority affected by a crisis, for example commander who decides on issuing a warning and a nuclear or radiological emergency, that it carry out communicating to the population affected, and who necessary measures for managing the consequences of determines which actions to take to protect the public. such event. In crisis situations, these authorities are to The responsibility for directing rescue services also rests cooperate and provide mutual assistance. Ordinance with the County Administrative Board in the affected 2015:1053 on Total Defence and Heightened Alert county or counties, unless the Government decides contains provisions on civil defence during periods of otherwise. Surrounding each NPP, inner emergency zones heightened alert. are established. Here, pre-distributed potassium iodide

tablets are available for iodine thyroid blocking, and

16.2. National structure

pre-distributed information describes urgent protective

actions in the event of a nuclear emergency. Residents The Swedish emergency management system is based on inside the inner emergency planning zone are provided three principles: with special radio receivers. These are used for warning

– The principle of responsibility – meaning that the entity residents in the event of an emergency at the NPP. The

that is responsible for an activity under normal County Administrative Board is also responsible for

conditions also should have this responsibility in the managing decontamination activities following a nuclear

case of an emergency. emergency involving fallout.

– The principle of parity – meaning that to the extent The Government is responsible for crisis management at possible, operations should be organised in the same national level. The Government’s mandate is primarily way during emergencies as under normal conditions. strategic issues. Responsibility for management and – The principle of proximity – meaning that emergencies coordination of operational work rests with the relevant should be dealt with where they occur and at the most authorities. The Government has the overall responsibility local level possible in society (the affected municipality to ensure that an effective crisis management system is in or county). place and that crisis communication is credible. The

Government is also responsible for maintaining certain Furthermore, the Swedish emergency management system contacts with international organisations. The Government distinguishes between authorities having jurisdiction in a Offices assist the Government in crisis management work. specific region (municipality, county or country) and Within the Government Offices, the responsibility authorities having mandates in specific areas of expertise, principle is to be applied during times of crisis. This for instance SSM in the fields of radiation protection and principle implies that the ministry with mandates under nuclear safety. The system is based on collaboration normal conditions also has these responsibilities in the between authorities in order to enable agreement on how event of a crisis. to direct handling and coordination of available resources.

MSB has the task of supporting coordination between the A senior official for crisis management has a post at the

public sector and various stakeholders. MSB has developed Ministry of Justice. In the event of a crisis, the senior

recommendations for the shared foundations of collabora- official has the task of ensuring that crisis management

tion and management, which will contribute to an work begins promptly. The senior official is also respon-

improved capability to cope with emergency situations in sible for coordination and assistance for crisis management

Sweden. The aim is to provide guidance to authorities on work conducted at the Government Offices. The senior

joint methods and approaches for enabling shared official is in turn assisted by the Secretariat for Crisis

direction and coordination. The recommendations Management. The Secretariat monitors threat and risk

developed by MSB have resulted in a review of SSM’s developments around the clock, both domestically and

emergency response organisation to enable SSM’s role in internationally, and is the central focal point in the Govern-

the emergency response system to efficiently provide ment Offices. The Government’s strategic direction for the

advice and recommendations to other authorities. Government Offices is prepared by a group for strategic

coordination (GSS) that consists of the state secretaries of A national contingency plan is in place for dealing with all the ministries involved in managing a serious incident. nuclear accidents. This national plan describes basic GSS is convened by the Ministry of Justice’s state secretary, conditions, such as applicable legislation and the authorities or by the state secretary that he or she appoints. involved in dealing with an incident, in addition to these

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 103

SSM is tasked with coordinating the emergency prepared- the County Administrative Boards. The work of the

ness measures necessary for preventing, identifying and council includes revision of national guidelines on

detecting nuclear and radiological events that might cause remediation and food production in the event of fallout of

damage to human health or the environment. SSM is the radioactive substances in Sweden.

appointed National Competent Authority (NCA) in As mentioned earlier, MSB has a responsibility in prepared- Sweden. In the event of a radiological or nuclear ness work to assist in coordinating preparedness measures emergency, SSM provides recommendations and expert taken by local, regional and national authorities. MSB also advice to other authorities, including those responsible for provides competent authorities with communication deciding on protective actions for the public. The recomnetworks during extraordinary events. MSB has the overall mendations and expert advice include, but are not limited responsibility for Rakel, the Swedish national digital radio to, protective actions, radiation protection assessments, communication system for connection of national dispersion prognoses, radiation monitoring and conditions emergency services and other stakeholders in the fields of at an NPP. SSM also maintains and leads a national expert civil protection, public safety and security, emergency medical response organisation for radiation monitoring and expert services and healthcare during emergency situations. The support. Furthermore, SSM is tasked with keeping the Rakel system is used by municipalities, counties, national Government informed about the situation, current and agencies, licensees and commercial entities. MSB also assists possible developments, forecasts, available resources, and the Swedish Government Offices by providing documentameasures taken and planned following a request from the tion and information in the event of serious crises or Secretariat for Crisis Management at the Ministry of disasters, and by providing methods for crisis communica- Justice, or from MSB. SSM is required to provide necessary tion and coordination of official information to the public. information for assessment of a situation.

Sweden’s structure for emergency preparedness and Authorities that have key roles during a radiological or response for nuclear emergencies is shown in figure 20. nuclear emergency include the National Food Agency,

which is responsible for taking decisions on maximum In the event of a nuclear emergency abroad, any affected

permitted levels of radioactive materials in foodstuffs, and County Administrative Boards still have a responsibility to

the Board of Agriculture, which is responsible for taking provide information and take potential protective actions

decisions on maximum permitted levels in feed. Other in their region as per the principle of proximity. SSM’s role

authorities that have a mandate during crises and that as an advisory authority is maintained in the event of a

cooperate with SSM, or receive advice and recommenda- nuclear emergency abroad.

tions from SSM, include the County Administrative Boards, MSB, Board of Health and Welfare, Swedish 16.2.1. Alerts

Customs, Swedish Meteorological and Hydrological In the event of a radiological emergency at a Swedish

Institute (SMHI), Police Authority, and Swedish Coast nuclear power plant (belonging to emergency preparedness

Guard. SMHI assists SSM by providing weather forecasts, category 1), the licensee is responsible for immediately

weather data and certain dispersion calculations in the contacting the national alarm centre (SOS Alarm Sverige

event of a radiological or nuclear emergency. AB). In its turn, SOS Alarm will alert the authorities and

organisations responsible for emergency management. See MSB, the National Food Agency, Board of Agriculture, figure 21. Swedish Defence Research Agency and SSM collaborate closely within the national expert council on remediation In the event of an emergency at a nuclear facility classified

(NESA). The purpose of NESA is to collect and share as belonging to emergency preparedness category 2, the

information on different aspects of remediation among the alert sequence is similar, with some differences in terms of

participating organisations, other central authorities and the role of SOS Alarm.

Swedish Radiation National expert Safety Authority response organisation

Swedish Civil Licensee Contingencies Agency

Government

County Administrative Regional Actors Board

Other Authorities Municipalities

Figure 20. The Swedish national structure for emergency preparedness and response for nuclear emergencies.

104 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

County Administrative Public alert Regional stakeholders Alert in emergency Board planning zone

Swedish Radiation International org. Radio Sweden Safety Authority Neighbouring countries

Licensee

Swedish Civil SOS Alarm Contigencies Agency

Other stakeholders Other authorities in respective sector

Figure 21. Current alarm sequence for an emergency Government Respective ministry

event at a Swedish nuclear power plant.

In the event of a radiological or nuclear emergency abroad ologies developed by SSM from a review of the Swedish

(with a possible request for assistance), the alert goes to emergency planning zones and distances were used in the

SMHI, which is the national point of contact (National development. Development of this decision support has

Warning Point, NWP). Upon an alert SMHI will, through continued for the purpose of securing its performance in

SOS Alarm, contact the officer on duty at SSM. The connection with the forthcoming new emergency

officer on duty at SSM then contacts the Government prepared ness zones and planning distances.

ministry offices and the central and regional authorities On 22 October 2015, the Government of Sweden having roles and responsibilities in the initial phase of a commissioned SSM, in consultation with MSB, relevant nuclear accident or incident. County Administrative Boards and other involved authori-

ties and stakeholders, to perform a review of emergency

16.2.2. Emergency preparedness strategy

planning zones and emergency planning distances applying The new Radiation Protection Act and new appurtenant to activities involving ionising radiation. On 1 November ordinance came into force on 1 June 2018 as part of the 2017, SSM proposed new emergency planning zones and implementation of Council Directive 2013/59/Euratom. distances to surround the relevant nuclear facilities in The new legislation has strengthened the requirements in Sweden. The review included sensitivity analyses for the the field of emergency preparedness and response. purpose of looking into the feasibility of the proposed Among other things, the Government has, in the radiation emergency planning zones and distances, including events protection ordinance, set reference levels for the public in with simultaneous releases from several reactors at a site. emergency exposure situations. Optimised protection

strategies for different postulated events have been The Government commissioned MSB on 22 February

developed by SSM for nuclear facilities in emergency 2018 to propose necessary changes to the Civil Protection

preparedness categories 1 and 2 (cf. SSM Report 2017:27e) Ordinance in order to implement the proposal from SSM.

in consultation with MSB, relevant County Administrative On 1 September 2018, MSB finalised the proposal for the

Boards, and other involved authorities and stakeholders. necessary changes to the Civil Protection Ordinance. On

The protection strategies are based on identified hazards 30 October 2018, the Government released both the

and potential consequences at each nuclear facility, proposal for new emergency planning zones and distances

including generic criteria for public protective actions from SSM as well as the proposed changes to the Civil

derived from the reference levels, as well as operational Protection Ordinance for public consultation. The deadline

criteria and default triggers. for submitting comments was set at 1 March 2019. New

emergency planning zones and distances around the NPPs To support an optimised protection strategy, SSM has are now pending a decision by the Government. developed decision support diagrams that provide guidance

for making decisions on public protective actions in the A national strategy for radiation measurements in the event

event of a nuclear emergency at the Swedish NPPs, which of a nuclear or radiological accident is being developed by

take the inherent uncertainties of such events into account. SSM, MSB and the County Administrative Boards together

The decision support diagrams are based on emergency with the nuclear power plants. The project focuses

class and recurring evaluation of the situation, and lead to primarily on a possible accident at a Swedish nuclear power

a recommended course of action given the present plant. After this, the project will broaden its scope to cover

knowledge of the situation. The decision support diagrams other nuclear and radiological emergencies.

were developed in close collaboration between radiological On the basis of the Nordic Flag Book and in collaboration experts, the authorities responsible for nuclear emergency with the National Food Agency, Board of Agriculture, response planning, and the final decision makers. Method-

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 105

Figure 22. New monitoring stations around Forsmark nuclear power plant (the insert shows a monitoring station).

County Administrative Boards, MSB, National Board of information about radiation levels. Each gamma station Health and Welfare, and the Police Authority, SSM is in the continually records the dose rate and can be monitored process of developing national guidelines on protective online. If the integrated dose or dose rate exceeds a measures during a nuclear or radiological event at facilities pre-defined alarm level, notifications are automatically and activities belonging to emergency preparedness transmitted to Radiation Geographical Information System categories 3 and 4. The guidelines will supplement the (RadGIS) where, depending on the alarm, further actions review of Swedish emergency planning zones and will be taken by the officer on duty at SSM. The alarm level distances (SSM Report 2017:27) which took into con sider- is set to detect deviations from prevailing conditions. In ation facilities belonging to emergency preparedness addition to the national gamma monitoring network, new categories 1 and 2. The guidelines will use the concepts of stations are currently being installed around the nuclear reference levels, dose criteria and operational intervention power plants in Sweden. The new monitoring stations will levels in an emergency exposure situation, in line with provide information on the dose rate at 90 locations recommendations contained in ICRP 103 and IAEA GSR around the NPPs. While the national gamma monitoring Part 7. The project will be completed by the end of 2019. network is primarily used as an early information system, the new stations will, when online in late 2019, provide A development project (ETAPP), together with Swedish fast, reliable and automatic information on dose rates to be NPPs regarding electronic transmission of nuclear power used in decision making on early public protective actions plant parameters, was launched in 2012. A first memoranin the case of an accident at a Swedish nuclear power plant. dum of understanding was signed by the director general Figure 22 shows the monitoring stations set up around the of SSM and the managing directors of the NPPs in the Forsmark NPP. autumn of 2012. This encompassed three phases of development and a specification of requirements regarding In addition, a new radiation monitoring system for fallout these first three phases. In 2015, phase one and phase two mapping in Sweden is currently undergoing development. were completed, including a transmission solution and a The system will be based on mobile gamma spectrometry shared standard for visualisation of the parameters. In and be used for detailed mapping of dose rates around 2017, all three development phases were completed and Swedish nuclear power plants in the case of a nuclear an agreement on operation of the transmission and the accident. The plan is to have the new system up and visualisation tool was signed by the same parties, while running by the end of 2020. It will replace the current awaiting new requirements from SSM. That same year, system, which involves measurement of dose rates using a second memorandum of understanding was signed handheld instruments in discrete positions. regarding education, training and exercises, i.e. phase four. SSM has developed new GIS software for reporting, By mid-2019, this fourth phase is to be completed, and the storing, extracting and visualising radiation monitoring data online visualisation tool, together with transmission of and environmental samples collected during an emergency. process parameters, are to be in use. The new software, RadGIS 2.0, replaces RadGIS 1.0, which was developed in the 1990s. RadGIS 2.0 will be used

16.2.3. Radiation monitoring

by all Swedish organisations that perform radiation Sweden has a gamma monitoring network that presently monitoring and sampling during a nuclear emergency. This has 28 permanent stations spread throughout the country. software, launched on 15 April 2019, will be implemented The stations are designed to provide warnings and rapid

106 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

Radiation monitoring organisation

Rescue leader

Strategic monitoring Crisis centre command

Advice from SSM

Tactical monitoring Operations and command coordination centre

Monitoring leader Monitoring leader Monitoring leader SSM Coast guard Fire brigade

Coast guard Fire brigade National (International monitoring teams monitoring teams monitoring teams monitoring teams)

Figure 23. The Swedish radiation monitoring organisation which is setup in case of a nuclear emergency.

in the response plans drawn up by organisations belonging analysis and field monitoring, mobile and airborne to the national structure for emergency preparedness and monitoring, weather forecasting and plume dispersion response. prognoses. In addition to the tasks belonging to the national expert response organisation, individuals engaged Sweden also has six permanent air sampling stations in this response organisation may also have a role in operated by the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) providing expert advice during the response. and a Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) station located in Stockholm. These stations continuously sample the air in order to collect any airborne radioactive materials. Their air filters are regularly collected and transported to a laboratory for measurement and evaluation. The detection system is sufficiently sensitive to measure activity levels in the order of tens of µBq/m and 3 is consequently also used for environmental monitoring.

As the County Administrative Boards are responsible for protecting the public during and after a nuclear emergency,

Expert Response Organisation

the Boards’ emergency response planning also encom- • Swedish Defence Research passes monitoring. Monitoring of dose rates and collection Agency, FOI (Umeå) of air samples for the purpose of public protective actions Umeå • Geological Survey of Sweden, are performed by local rescue services from municipalities SGU (Uppsala) within each county at predefined locations or routes. • Cyclife Sweden AB (Nyköping) During a nuclear emergency, the relevant County Administrative Board coordinates response and monitoring • Linköping University (Linköping) activities with the national expert response organisation • Göteborg University (Göteborg) and government authorities in accordance with the • Lund University (Malmö region) Uppsala organisational chart shown in figure 23. • Swedish Meteorological and Stockholm

Hydrological Institute, SMHI Nyköping The national expert response organisation comprises Linköping Norrköping (Norrköping) government authorities, organisations and laboratories that Göteborg have expertise in radiological assessment and radiation • SSM (Stockholm region) monitoring. This organisation, coordinated by SSM, has as its main purpose to perform radiation measurements. Figure 24. National expert response Figure 24 lists the contracted authorities, organisations and organisation for nuclear and Malmö laboratories that have capabilities encompassing laboratory radiological emergencies.

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 107

16.3. Compliance of the licence holders

severe accident (core melt) take into account planned

accident management strategies. The procedure for The licensees at all sites are working on measures to fulfil calculation of dose rates in the case of a fuel handling the new requirements of SSMFS 2014:2, which concern accident in the reactor hall has been updated. on-site emergency preparedness and response at nuclear

installations. This regulation entered into force on 1 July To serve as guidance for emergency responders, a set of

2018. Measures have been completed regarding require- Operational Intervention Levels (OIL), based on readable

ments for the ability to establish an off-site logistics centre parameters such as dose rates, has been further developed

for heavy equipment, and decontamination, monitoring since first being taken into operation.

and follow-ups of radiation doses, in addition to other The workforce has been increased for the emergency aspects. The licensees also carry out measures that were response organisation. New indicators show that there are identified and reported during and after the European sufficient personnel on duty available for rotation, as per stress tests and were included in the NAcP. the WANO recommendation.

More specific information regarding the work performed

is provided below. 16.3.2. Ringhals NPP

Since the last report the logistic centre has been fully

16.3.1. Forsmark NPP implemented. It now functions as planned and in accord-

At the Forsmark NPP, documentation has been developed ance with Swedish regulations. The logistic centre is mobile

to manage abnormal events. This documentation consists and can be relocated depending on the circumstances. The

of early support strategies for the operational management purposes of the logistic centre are listed in section 16.3.1.

for coping with the following; slowly developing incidents, In addition, Ringhals and the County Administrative Board

extreme weather situations, emergency situations such as have formulised an agreement which states that they will

loss of ultimate heatsink, station blackout (loss of all support each other in the logistic centre in case of a

external and internal power), and long-term loss of radiological accident. The totality of this agreement as well

alternate power. The strategies may or may not lead to a as the function of the logistics centre was tested in an

declared emergency level. exercise held in November 2017, and an inspection was

carried out by SSM in October 2018. Since mid-2017, a project is ongoing at Forsmark to update

its procedures for severe accidents. The goal of this update As mentioned in 16.2.2. a project aiming to provide SSM

is to improve the procedures and adapt them to interna- with process data will be finalised in 2019. Already, process

tional guidelines in the area of SAMG (Severe Accident data from Ringhals is delivered electronically in real time to

Management Guidelines). The work will be finished at the SSM. The application used for displaying process data has

end of 2020. also been used to develop and record simulated emergency

scenarios for training and exercises. This has been A fully mobile logistics centre has been established. The developed as a joint project between the nuclear power purposes of the centre include receiving equipment, plants in Sweden, and will be used in future exercises to personnel and supply protective equipment, dosimetry improve the skills of the emergency response organisaservices (EPD), screening for external and internal tions. contamination, cleaning personnel, cars, trucks and

equipment, rotation of on-site personnel, and receiving The system used to collect, store and display meteorolog-

heavy equipment prior to transport to the NPP. ical information at Ringhals was replaced in early 2017.

Both its hardware and software have been replaced with SSM’s overall assessment is that the Forsmark NPP meets newer technologies. To increase the redundancy, most the requirements for the possibility of establishing a sensors have been duplicated. Data can now be fed directly logistics centre, as per the regulations (SSMFS 2014:2) on into Ringhals’ process information system and be displayed emergency preparedness at nuclear facilities. along with all other process data.

For dealing with a situation where the dosimeter system Since the last report, there has been strengthened focus on intended for normal operation is unavailable, a set of 250 severe accident management. For Ringhals 1 (BWR) several pieces of electronic dosimeter (EPD), including equipment new instructions have been introduced and exercised by for stand-alone read-in and read-out of the dose meters, the shift crews and Technical Support Centre (TSC) in the has been acquired. These dosimeters and equipment are simulator. Existing routines have been updated, verified stored near the power plant. In addition, robust procedures and validated. Also for the PWRs (Ringhals 2, Ringhals 3 for work at the power plant during radiological emergenand Ringhals 4) the existing SAMG routines have been cies, including a set of reference values, have been further trained and exercised by the shift crews and TSC. developed in order to prevent dependence on the availa-

bility of the IT systems normally used. These include

16.3.3. OKG NPP

pre-job breifing, actual work performance, and post-job Post-Fukushima improvement work is ongoing in the field debriefing. of emergency preparedness. One example is represented

As a planning tool and guidance in situations where the by the final stages of establishing OKG’s off-site opera-

radiological status may be unknown, updated calculations tional support centre. The latest command management

of dose rates in the reactor buildings in the event of a technology, such as smartboards, sound and video

108 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

equipment etcetera, has been installed in the off-site source terms, and assessment of total environmental operational support centre. The off-site operational consequences of a scenario. Local follow-up exercises support centre’s technology is identical to that of the from the major national exercise (named KKÖ17, see pre-existing on-site operational support centre. The off-site section 16.5) have also been carried out. operational support centre is located in the town of Oskarshamn, about 30 kilometres from the nuclear power 16.3.4.1. Forsmark NPP plant. The Engineer on Duty (EoD) will, following an At the Forsmark NPP, training, retraining and exercises are assessment of the situation, select from which of the carried out according to predetermined plans for staff operational support centres to operate. The two opera- involved in emergency preparedness and response work. In tional support centres give the opportunity for shared addition to the annual functional exercises, the FKA NPP management and relocation, if necessary. conducts unannounced call-out drills a number of times each year. The purpose of the drills is to evaluate the Another example of a post-Fukushima improvement is a performance of the emergency response organisation. mutual agreement that has been concluded by Swedish nuclear power plants regarding protective equipment.

16.3.4.2. Ringhals NPP

Furthermore, the mutual agreement concluded previously At the Ringhals NPP, exercises for the Emergency on pooling resources during an event will provide addi- Response Organisation (ERO) have been conducted tional reinforcement of an affected plant. according to plan. The plan addresses planned exercises as OKG places great emphasis on good performance from well as unannounced call-out drills. A functional exercise the response organisation during stressful conditions. for personnel in the field has been developed and is now Consequently, all personnel belonging to the emergency part of the exercise and training programme. One of its response organisation, a workforce of around 200, are purposes is to enhance the ERO’s capability to carry out trained and retrained annually in command and control actions in radiologically controlled areas during an methodology. This arrangement works well, as was emergency, where the radiation environment is both confirmed during various exercises carried out with the different and variable. The exercise focuses on using emergency response organisation. OKG has seven pre-job briefings and human performance tools that can be members of staff from the emergency preparedness applicable in these situations, where standard procedures organisation, who are available around the clock. may not be available or relevant. Also, a new scenario that forced the ERO to relocate from the standard to the In 2018, OKG conducted an internal audit, in 2016, SSM alternative command centre was exercised as part of a conducted one compliance inspection, and in 2017, functional exercise for the alternative command centre. As WANO conducted a follow-up of the peer review that mentioned in section 16.3.2, the logistics centre took part took place in 2015 in the area of emergency preparedness. in an exercise in 2017. Great emphasis was placed on rectifying the development areas of the emergency preparedness and response In 2018 the Ordered Leave routine for Ringhals was organisations, an aspect that was identified from OKG’s exercised during the un-announced call-out drills. The internal audit as well as from SSM’s inspection. The Ordered Leave routine states that personnel on site shall development areas identified during the latest WANO leave site as soon as possible by their own means. Early in inspection are currently being managed in the existing 2019 a full muster exercise was conducted. It also included development plan for the emergency preparedness and evacuation of the two largest assembly points. response arrangements.

16.3.4.3. Oskarshamn NPP

Based on the lessons learned from the nuclear accident in At OKG, training in emergency response is based on an Fukushima in 2011, the requirements for emergency exercise and training plan. Each function within the equipment were made more stringent at Swedish nuclear emergency preparedness organisation continuously power plants. It is the licensee of nuclear power plant to conducts internal exercises in order to strengthen its have capability to establish a logistics centre during an capacity. The plan is continuously monitored, and reported emergency. The logistics centre is to serve as a hub for on at the last meeting of OKG’s emergency preparedness transporting personnel and equipment to and from the site council. Training activities are adapted to the content, in the event of a serious accident. This requirement came structure and time aspects emerging from needs and into force on 1 July 2018. For this reason, OKG has experiences. This is in addition to adaptation to other established a logistics centre at a former airport, having an parties’ exercises, or events that are considered valuable for organisation set up to provide assistance at this centre. the emergency response organisation. An adaptation is carried out by selecting a scenario, as well as by means of

16.3.4. Exercises

quick and flexible planning. A number of on-site functional exercises are conducted In 2019, OKG plans to conduct an exercise involving the annually at all nuclear sites. Specific plans are in place for Swedish armed forces and police. In late 2017, a major these exercises. Exercised functions for example include regional exercise was performed as planned. Its main focus accident management, communication within the was evacuation. OKG’s goal is to put the functions of the emergency response organisation, environmental monilogistics centre into practice. Future exercise activities will toring and sampling, assessment of core damage and

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 109

be adapted to this scenario. In 2018, a number of exercises Table 8. The Swedish nuclear facilities that are categorised in an

emergency preparedness category. were carried out with the purpose of training staff and

verifying the function of the logistics centre. All functions Emergency

Facility Preparedness

have additional exercises planned. In April 2019, a

Category

simulation exercise was carried out involving the entire Forsmark (NPP) 1 emergency response organisation, including certain

Oskarshamn (NPP) 1 governmental organisations, with the theme of cyber-

severe accident conditions. AB SVAFO (waste management and storage) 3 During the period, exercises were also held on six Barsebäck (permanently shut down NPP) 3 occasions at the logistics centre. This was for training of Chalmers University of Technology (fuel research) 3 personnel who will staff the logistics centre, as well as to Cyclife Sweden AB 3 provide practice to the personnel involved in the crisis Studsvik Nuclear AB (facilities for waste management) 3 management organisation.

During the period, the Chalmers University of Technology

16.4. Regulatory control and Cyclife Sweden AB were both classified as belonging

In recent years, regulatory control of on-site emergency to emergency preparedness category 3.

preparedness and response has focused on implementation of the new requirements contained in regulation SSMFS

16.5. National exercises

2014:2. A number of emergency response exercises of varying In 2015 and 2016, compliance inspections were carried scope are conducted annually in Sweden. These exercises out regarding new requirements at the nuclear facilities, vary in complexity from limited scope to full-scale termination of transitional rules, and further implemen- exercises. Periodical tests of the alerting systems between tation of SSMFS 2014:2. the power plants and the authorities are performed each

year. In 2016, emergency preparedness at the Oskarshamn NPP was inspected. Only a minor remark was noted regarding Every other year, a full-scale exercise is held at one of the dosimetry during a radiological emergency. three nuclear power sites to check the planning and

capability of the on-site and off-site organisations. In 2017, staffing and reorganisation at the OKG NPP were Full-scale exercises are designed to enable evaluations of inspected. Due to the decision to close two out of the regional level command and national inter-agency cooperathree reactors at the site, the focus of this inspection tion. Often, full-scale exercises are also used to test internaencompassed staffing, competence and the subsequent tional communications, for instance USIE and 10 reorganisation of remaining personnel. Another inspection ECURIE . The respective County Administrative Board 11 conducted at the Ringhals NPP in 2017 focused on direct where the plant is located has the responsibility for communication between the Ringhals NPP and SSM planning these exercises, often with the assistance of MSB, during a radiological emergency situation. The Ringhals a government agency, which is also responsible for the NPP has subsequently changed its emergency response evaluation and follow-up analyses. SSM participates in organisation and introduced a new function that roughly planning and evaluation. Usually, 15 to 30 organisations translates to team leader. participate in these exercises, including SSM and the In 2018 and 2019, SSM’s supervisory focus is on the Government. requirements imposed on licensees to implement a logistics In recent years, a number of annual, limited extent centre (new requirements regarding a logistics centre, as exercises have been held, which primarily include an NPP stipulated by SSMFS 2014:2, for facilities belonging to site, a County Administrative Board, and SSM. These emergency preparedness category 1). All three operating exercises require relatively little planning, though they NPP sites have been inspected, with all of them having provide a good opportunity for training, as well as testing been found to be compliant with the new requirements of shared development concepts. The aim is to conduct regarding a logistics centre. one of these exercises with each NPP site on an annual Regulatory control has shown that on-site emergency basis. These limited exercises also bring about better preparedness at Swedish nuclear facilities categorised as continuity in the collaboration between the NPPs, SSM, belonging to an emergency preparedness category (see and the County Administrative Boards. Table 8) has been strengthened in recent years, and that In addition, SSM conducts a number of more limited the main elements of SSMFS 2014:2 have been effectively functional exercises every year. Exercised functions for implemented.

10 USIE is IAEA’s Unified System for Information Exchange in Incidents and Emergencies. 11 ECURIE is the interface to the EU early notification and information exchange system for radiological emergencies.

110 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

instance include assessment of core damage and source In 2015, the Nordic radiation and nuclear safety authorities

terms, prognosis and assessment of environmental published a revised joint manual for cooperation between

consequences and doses to the public as part of a scenario, the authorities in response to, and preparedness for, nuclear

and arrangements for national and international notifica- and radiological emergencies and incidents. The manual

tion and communication. Yearly timetables are in place for describes practical arrangements regarding communication

these exercises. and information exchange to fulfil the stated obligations in

bilateral agreements between the Nordic countries. These The expert response organisation is exercised annually in arrangements also cover response to events and threats of field monitoring exercises and by participating in laboramalicious use of radioactive material, as well as threats or tory intercomparison measurements. SSM has a central role malevolent acts concerning nuclear facilities. in organising these exercises. SSM also uses the exercises to

train its own field assessment teams. The contracted In 2013, the Nordic radiation and nuclear safety authorities

organisations within the expert response organisation published the document “Protective measures in early and

maintain their own equipment and arrange for internal intermediate phases of a nuclear or radiological emergency

education and small-scale exercises. – Nordic guidelines and recommendations” (Nordic Flag

Book). The document gives comprehensive recommenda- Sweden has a long tradition of participating in internations on the Nordic countries’ shared approach to impletional emergency response exercises. This allows for testing mentation of the 2007 ICRP system of radiological protecof aspects relating to bilateral and international agreements tion during an emergency exposure situation. on early notification and information exchange. Sweden

regularly participates in the IAEA Convention Exercises

16.6.1. Measures taken to inform neighbouring states

(ConvEx), the OECD/NEA International Nuclear SSM has been appointed a Competent Authority in Emergency Exercises (INEX), and the European ECURIE accordance with the IAEA Convention on Early Notificaexercises. tion in the Case of a Nuclear Accident (INFCIRC/335)

One full-scale exercise (KKÖ17) has been arranged since and EU Council Decision (87/600/Euratom) on early

Sweden’s sixth national report under the Convention on notification. SMHI is the designated numerical weather

Nuclear Safety, see below. In 2016, limited extent exercises prediction (NWP), implying availability around the clock.

were conducted involving all three NPP sites. The respec- SSM and SMHI use the ECURIE information system for

tive County Administrative Boards also participated. information exchange within the European Union, and the

Because of the limited extent, SSM and the County USIE system for notification and information exchange

Administrative Boards had the opportunity to test the between the IAEA member states. Sweden participates

newly implemented joint methods and approaches for regularly in ConvEx and ECURIE exercises and routinely

creating shared direction and coordination in giving advice includes arrangements for early notification in national

and deciding on protective actions. In 2017, the KKÖ17 exercises.

full-scale exercise was organised by the County Administra- The five Nordic countries of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, tive Board in Kalmar. Also in this exercise, the joint Norway and Sweden have compiled a Nordic manual methods and approaches for creating shared direction and (NORMAN) for cooperation between their respective coordination regarding decisions on protective actions regulators in response to and preparedness for nuclear and were tested with very good results, according to the radiological emergencies and incidents. The manual evaluation report. In 2017, the exercise IPilot was carried describes practical arrangements regarding communication out, with its main focus on IT intrusion. This was and information exchange to fulfil the stated obligations in simulated in a computer environment, primarily involving bilateral agreements between the Nordic countries. These participants from the nuclear power plants. The exercise arrangements also apply to a response to events or threats was a good opportunity for operators to increase their of malicious use of radioactive material and threats or knowledge in the area. Once again in 2018, two exercises malevolent acts concerning nuclear facilities. Other aspects were carried out involving only the County Administrative include small-scale events, such as the spreading of Board and NPPs, where the IAEA’s IEC also participated rumours and minor incidents, having consequences limited with assessment and prognosis capabilities, including to public concern and interest by the media, or a need for reactor assessment tool reports, with good results. exchange of technical information between nuclear and

radiation safety regulatory bodies. The arrangements

16.6. International arrangements

defined in this document include all phases of events,

including intermediate and recovery phases. Sweden has ratified the International Convention on Early

Notification and the Convention on Assistance in the Case NORMAN also takes into consideration the current

of a Nuclear Accident. Moreover, Sweden has bilateral international development concerning response to and

agreements with Denmark, Norway, Finland, Germany, preparedness for nuclear and radiological incidents and

Ukraine and Russia regarding early notification and emergencies, as well as other key international aspects.

exchange of information in the event of an incident or Communication exercises are performed five times per

accident at a nuclear power plant in Sweden or abroad. An year, in compliance with NORMAN. These exercises

agreement at regulatory body level has also been signed include procedures for alerts and communication by means

with Lithuania. of videoconference systems.

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 111

16.6.2. Assistance

Sweden has registered national field and laboratory resources with the international response and assistance network (RANET), managed by the IAEA under the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident (INFCIRC/336). In 2018, Swedish national assistance capacities were updated to reflect the current situation. For example, atmospheric dispersion modelling was added due to extensive experience gained in this area in recent years. Sweden contributed to the development of the RANET system by participating in a radiation monitoring workshop held in the Fukushima prefecture in 2018, hosted by the IAEA at its Capacity Building Centre in Japan.

16.6.3. Nuclear accidents abroad

The Chernobyl accident in 1986 demonstrated that Sweden can be affected by radiological consequences from a nuclear accident that takes place abroad. Although the foreseeable consequences, such as the impact on agriculture, animal breeding, forestry, hunting, recreation, household outdoor activities (fishing, picking mushrooms, hunting game, vegetable gardening, etc.) and on the environment can be substantial due to the uptake and concentration of radioactive substances in plants, animals, and human food chains, sheltering or relocation of people due to fallout is unlikely. In the event of a nuclear accident abroad, the County Administrative Boards affected still have the responsibility to provide information and take potential protective actions in their respective regions. SSM’s role as an advisory authority is maintained in the event of a nuclear accident abroad.

112 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 113

Part IV Safety of Installations 114 Part IV Safety of Installations

Article 17. Siting

might arise outside or inside the facility and which can lead Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to to a radiological accident. Natural phenomena and event ensure that appropriate procedures are established and sequences that do not allow for sufficient time for taking implemented: of protective measures when they occur shall be assigned (i) for evaluating all relevant site-related factors likely to to event class. For each type of natural phenomenon that affect the safety of a nuclear installation for its projected can lead to a radiological accident, an established action lifetime; plan shall be available for the situations in which the

(ii) for evaluating the likely safety impact of a proposed dimensioning values run the risk of being exceeded. In the nuclear installation on individuals, society and the general advice for Section 14 of SSMFS 2008:17, examples environment; are listed of natural phenomena that should be taken into

(iii) for re-evaluating as necessary all relevant factors account, such as extreme winds, extreme precipitation,

referred to in sub-paragraphs (i) and (ii) so as to ensure the extreme ice formation, extreme temperatures, extreme sea continued safety acceptability of the nuclear installation; waves, extreme seaweed/algae growth or other biological

(iv) for consulting Contracting Parties in the vicinity of a conditions that can affect the cooling water intake, as well

proposed nuclear installation, insofar as they are likely to as extreme water levels and earthquakes.

be affected by that installation and, upon request Safety classification is regulated by Section 21 of SSMFS providing the necessary information to such Contracting Parties, in order to enable them to evaluate and make 2008:17. According to these requirements, structures,

their own assessment of the likely safety impact on their systems and components of a nuclear power reactor shall

own territory of the nuclear installation. be divided into different safety classes. The detailed quality

and functional requirements resulting from this safety

classification are defined and controlled by specifying

Summary of developments sub-classes, including mechanical quality class, electrical since the previous report function class, as well as classification with respect to

seismic and environmental tolerance. During the current review period, the following develop-

ments are of relevance with regard to the obligations of In relation to the safety impact of a nuclear installation on

Article 17: individuals, society and the environment, and in relation to

having revisited the impact and bases for drawing conclu- – SSM is currently revising its regulations on nuclear sions from the evaluations, it is stated in the introduction activities, including requirements related to external to the SSM regulation that limitation of emissions of hazards and siting. radioactive substances from a nuclear facility is to be based – The licensees have revisited the site impact analyses of on optimization of radiation protection and using the best their designs, with actions taken and planned with the available technology. aim of improving robustness and safety. The actions include an update of the dimensioning values relating to The major project for updating SSM regulations, as

external hazards and implementation of any needed described in section 7.2.2, includes amending the regula-

measures at the NPPs. tion governing siting aspects. The background and

experiences used in the update project also include, apart

17.1. Regulatory requirements

from international standards and experiences, the national

action plan (NAcP) developed by Sweden as a consequence Resilience to failures and other internal and external events, of the EU stress tests (see Appendix 2), and the SSM including natural phenomena and human induced situadecision on installation of an Independent Core Cooling tions and activities, are regulated by Section 14 of SSMFS System (ICCS), described in section 18.1. 2008:17. According to these requirements, a nuclear reactor

shall withstand natural phenomena and other events that

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 115

17.2. Compliance of the licence holders

also used to estimate the fatigue loads of the structures.

Estimations and assumptions regarding material properties

17.2.1. Evaluation of site-related factors such as radiation-induced embrittlement are verified

As part of the licensing process of the plant, an assess- through inspection programmes including monitoring of

ment was made to evaluate site-related factors affecting the irradiation and non-destructive testing. Safety margin

safety of the nuclear installation. Based on experience assessments considering all external hazards have been

feedback, certain supplements and improvements to the performed. Weaknesses and potential improvements have

assessment have been made since then. The experiences been identified.

from the Fukushima Daiichi accident, the EU stress test In addition to the deterministic safety analyses, a probabiland the development of the Swedish national action plan istic safety assessment (PSA) is performed in terms of (NAcP) have constituted the main background for external events (excluding a seismic PSA ) on the part of 12 developing and improving the assessment during the each reactor unit. The purpose of the PSA is to evaluate period as of the reporting comprising the seventh national plant resilience against various events. The probability of report under the Convention. core damage and the probability of releases to the environ-

The safety analysis of the nuclear installations is based on ment are evaluated in the PSA study.

identifying a number of initiating events undergoing Assessments performed in relation to siting are reported analysis using deterministic methods and, if appropriate, below. Physical measures as a consequence of the assessprobabilistic methods. The basis for the original design ments are reported in sections 6.2.1 and 18.2.1. Informacomprised safety features for ensuring the robustness of tion on actions taken in the area of on-site emergency the facility during external events with a probability of preparedness is presented in section 16.3. >10 per year. Today, events with a probability of >10 -4 -5

per year are being analysed, and the analyses performed as

17.2.1.1. Seismic plant analyses

a result of the NAcP and the analyses as part of the design Evaluations of structures, systems and components against of the ICCS include external events with a probability of ground motions exceeding the values specified for the >10 per year. -6 design basis accidents have been performed. These

The licensees have, for all facilities at their sites, identified evaluations place special emphasis on safety margin

external events that may lead to a radiological accident. assessments.

The basic principle is that initiating events are divided into Following the EU stress test, the EU Member States categories based on the estimated frequency of occurrence. agreed that a return frequency of 10 per year (with a -5 A distinction is made between events that are not considminimum peak ground acceleration of 0.1 g) should be ered for further evaluations (screening) and events that are used as a basis for plant reviews and backfitting. considered, with the latter being classified into categories based on frequency. The events that are not considered for To ensure compliance with this, Swedish licensees have

further evaluations are those that are either considered performed the following actions:

extremely unlikely to occur (<10 -6 per year) with a high – Further studies regarding the structural integrity of the level of confidence, or that are deemed physically imposreactor containments, scrubber buildings and fuel sible to occur, such as sandstorms. storage pools, and

The events being considered are assessed in terms of: – A pipe has been evaluated further, located between the

reactor containment and the Multi Venturi Scrubber – Probability of occurrence with respect to the conditions System (MVSS), that allows for controlled pressure at the site, relief of the containment. The function of the pipe is – Whether the event sequences are covered by other essential for fulfilling the requirements regarding a events, and release of radioactive nuclides affecting society and the – Whether there is a need for further analysis or other environment in the event of a core meltdown. measures.

Ringhals has performed a robustness check on a 10 per -6 The deterministic analyses are used to verify that there are year earthquake and for the severe accident mitigation no initiating events that can jeopardize the safety of the systems, in addition to the estimated ability to withstand surroundings and the environment. This is accomplished the 10 per year probability earthquake. -7 by verifying that fuel damage is avoided, verifying that the

reactor coolant pressure boundary is not overpressurised, 17.2.1.2. Investigations regarding secondary

verifying that the containment is not overpressurised, and effects of an earthquake

demonstrating that the plant can be brought to safe state Investigations have been performed on possible secondary

after any initiating event. effects of an earthquake. Fire analyses at Swedish NPPs

are generally performed according to the SAR, however, an Calculations are performed to verify that the plant analysis of fire starting as a result of an earthquake had structures can withstand certain loads. Calculations are previously not been carried out at any Swedish NPPs.

12 No seismic PSAs have been performed for Swedish NPPs. However, the Swedish seismic ground response spectra were developed by using probabilistic methods. The plants that were not originally seismically designed have afterwards been verified to the Swedish DBE (10–5/year).

116 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

Detailed analysis of earthquake-induced flooding, such as on statistics, including the consequences of waves. Due to an analysis taking into account leakage from broken water the results of the analyses, the conclusion has been drawn storage tanks and cracks in cooling water channels, has that flood levels having a frequency of >10 per year -5 been performed. cannot flood the ground level, thus ruling out the risk of posing a real threat to reactor safety. The ICCS is neverthe- 17.2.1.3. Seismic monitoring less designed for a 0.5 m water over ground level. Seismic monitoring systems are installed at all Swedish sites. The utilities have updated the procedures and training 17.2.1.7. Evaluation of the protected volume approach programme for seismic monitoring, and implemented them. Studies have been performed to identify critical areas and rooms inside the plants following a flooding event. In 17.2.1.4. Investigation of extreme weather conditions particular, this study considered the need for further An investigation has been performed of plant characteris- improvement of the volumetric protection of buildings tics in extreme weather conditions. In particular, the containing safety-related equipment located in rooms at or investigation assessed plant robustness against combined below ground level. extreme weather conditions, such as ice storms and simultaneous heavy snow load on structures. A systematic 17.2.1.8. Investigation of improved early warning notification analysis of other possible combinations of naturally At all sites, the need for improved early warning systems occurring hazards has also been performed. for deteriorating weather conditions has been investigated, as well as the provision of appropriate procedures to be Some possible improvements have been identified (e.g. followed by operators when warnings are issued. improving the resistance of certain buildings against tornado-induced missiles and heavy snow load). Further

17.2.1.9. Development of standards to address qualified

analyses have resulted in the identification of additional

plant walk-downs

measures that have been taken to protect the plant against The licensees have developed standards to address negative impacts of extreme weather. One example is qualified plant walk-downs with regard to earthquakes, reinforcement of the service building’s resilience against flooding, on-site fires and extreme weather conditions. external events at Ringhals. The work on addressing this The aim is to enable more systematic identification of shortcoming is under way, with the measures planned to be non-conformities and their correction (e.g. appropriate in place by 2020. For more information, see the transition storage of equipment, particularly for temporary and solution described in section 6.2.1. mobile equipment and tools used to mitigate beyond The Ringhals plant’s ability to withstand an ice storm has design basis external events). The potential creation of been evaluated, giving an acceptable outcome. A renewed debris that might affect essential safety systems of the estimation of temperature extremes for return periods up plant has been recognized and evaluated. The walk-downs to 100,000 years at Ringhals has also been performed. The also included mapping of potential on-site fire initiators.

emergency diesel generators have been reinforced to

17.2.1.10. Practices to collect data for characterizing the site

withstand low outdoor temperatures in the form of Meteorological and hydrological data are acquired from installed manual waste gate valves. SMHI, the Swedish Meteorological and Hydrological 17.2.1.5. Investigation of the frequency of extreme Institute. Since 1966, SMHI has performed oceanographic water levels investigations at sea outside the relevant sites. SMHI has An investigation of the frequency of extreme water levels also performed local meteorological surveys and studied has been performed. fog conditions in the areas.

This analysis considered the combined effects of waves Snow and wind loads are stated by Swedish building and high seawater levels (including potential dynamic regulations. Normal wind load (>10 per year) is stated by -2 effects of such events). Historically, extreme seawater Eurocode (EN 1991-4) using the national values from levels in Scandinavia are mainly caused by very high wind regulations issued by the National Board of Housing, speeds. Thus, it is important to expand the analyses to take Building and Planning, which specify reference winds from into account these combined effects. various parts of the country. Estimation of a wind having a probability in the range 10 to 10 per year is based on -3 -6 17.2.1.6. Flooding margin assessments values measured by SMHI over the course of 24 years. An analysis of incrementally increased flood levels beyond Information is also gathered through observation of ocean the design basis and identification of potential improvelevels and precipitation data. Information regarding ments have been performed. This analysis assessed and bedrock is available through drilling protocols and photos verified the capability of the plant to mitigate internal and taken during and before construction of the NPPs. Local external flooding events. The analysis also included an meteorological investigations are performed on site using evaluation of potential distribution of water volumes an observation mast, where temperature, wind speed and inside the plants following external flooding. wind direction are recorded. The temperature of the FKA has performed analyses of extreme external flooding cooling water intake is measured. Equipment is also showing that the plants can withstand the 10 per year -6 available for measurement of ground acceleration and the flooding. RAB has analysed extreme flooding levels, based response of civilian structures.

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 117

17.2.1.11. Nearby installations containing materials that for cooling might be caused due to the marine transports

might jeopardize the safety of the nuclear installation that take place along and outside the coast.

Forsmark NPP

Main public roads, railroads and fairways with transports The Forsmark nuclear power plant is located in a relatively of large quantities of goods are located at a distance of at isolated area. There are no other installations near the least three kilometres. This means that a potential power plant that contain dangerous materials. Oil spills explosion would be at such a distance making an influence from ships operating on the Baltic Sea are taken into from a fire irrelevant. An explosion or transport accident account in the external event analysis. Possible forest fires occurring just outside the plant site might potentially lead near the Forsmark nuclear power plant are also considered. to a loss of external power. The study “Loss of external

power” covers this case. Since the distance is sufficiently

Ringhals NPP

far, chemical releases do not merit consideration of urgent Hydrogen gas explosions or deflagration taking place at actions; however, actions will be taken in connection with the hydrogen gas plant (HGP) or at the turbine building of this kind of event. Ringhals unit 1 constitute the largest risk. Smaller explo-

sions might be caused by hydrogen gas containers, though

Oskarshamn NPP

the actual impact is judged as negligible. The distance from Similar to the Forsmark NPP, the site of the Oskarshamn the reactors of Ringhals units 1 and 2 to units 3 and 4 is NPP is located in a relatively isolated area. The site is too large to bring about an event affecting the latter two situated on the coastline of the Baltic Sea, on Simpevarp units, if initiated at Ringhals’ reactors at units 1 or 2. Peninsula, part of Oskarshamn Municipality, located 8 km

In these analyses, distance-dependent effects such as northeast of the village of Figeholm and 20 km northeast

pressure, impulse density and heat impact are studied. of the town of Oskarshamn.

The analysis regarding existing buildings was performed Hydrogen gas explosions at the hydrogen gas plant or at in the autumn of 2008. Fire constitutes a secondary fault the turbine building are considered to pose a risk. The and effect initiated by the explosion or deflagration, and is analysis of existing buildings was performed in 2007. The analysed and evaluated in connection with unit-specific safety distance is maintained between the nuclear power analysis of such event. It is the summed effect of plant and hydrogen gas plant with respect to a possible explosion and fire which constitutes the dimensioning case. blast, heat radiation and tremors in connection with a The present analysis of the HGP only accounts for the hydrogen explosion. The safety distance between the explosion or deflagration aspect. A hydrogen deflagration nuclear power plant and hydrogen gas plant is not mainat the HGP has the potential to result in lost external tained with respect to objects expelled by a blast (missiles). power. The study “Loss of external power” covers this A missile might potentially reach the nuclear power plant, case. If gas releases are detected, existing surveillance though the buildings are dimensioned to withstand automatically closes the air supply. A judgement is made tornadoes, and thus generated missiles. depending on the distance to the source. There are no other installations near the power plant The Ringhals NPP has its own harbour, which is dimencontaining dangerous materials. Oil spills from ships sioned for bulky transports so that reactor vessels, steam operating on the Baltic Sea are considered in the external generators and other heavy components can be received. event analysis. Potential forest fires occurring near the The harbour is mainly used by the marine vessel M/S Oskarshamn NPP are also considered. Sigrid, which is specially designed to transport spent

nuclear fuel and low and intermediate level wastes. 17.2.2. Impact of the installation on individuals,

There are two fairways close by along the coast. The society and the environment

largest, the “T route” is mostly used by large ships, passing 17.2.2.1. Forsmark NPP

20 kilometres (10 nautical miles) west of the Ringhals site. The environmental control programme in place at and

All transports of chemicals take place along this fairway. around the power plant has the objective of verifying that

The “Öresund route” lies closer to the coast and is used by no unknown sources for releases of radionuclides to water

cargo ships and tankers, especially vessels that are north- and air exist, or that any unpermitted accumulation of radi-

bound. The risk of external influence from these vessels oactive substances is occurring in the vicinity of the power

may be posed in the form of potential releases from these plant.

ships, either by means of an accident or in the form of

illicit dumping. Chemicals transported along the west coast 17.2.2.2. Ringhals NPP

of Sweden include hydrocarbons, acids, hydroxides and With the help of aerial photography of smoke releases

other aggressive chemicals. Transports of hydrocarbons, during different meteorological circumstances (wind,

i.e. crude oil, represent up to half of all transports made temperature, precipitation, snow cover, etc.), weather data

through Kattegat. Transports of acids, hydroxides and from the meteorological mast and values of the diffusion

other aggressive chemicals only constitute a small fraction parameters, a so-called “dispersion catalogue” for the

of those made through Kattegat. Releases having a Ringhals NPP was established. Using this catalogue, the

potential to harm or endanger the safe and stable operation main characteristics of the dispersion can easily be

of the nuclear power plant may possibly occur along the identified.

larger “T route” fairway. An impact to the seawater used

118 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

No special study of the hydrological dispersion conditions External Events (DBEE) was conducted. The Swedish

has been conducted. The dispersion may, however, be requirements (SSMFS 2008:17) concerning the magnitude

described based on hydrological observations, e.g. how the of the DBEE stipulate that it must correspond to the

surface water is affected by the water flowing from the probability of occurrence of 10 per year. As far as -5

Baltic Sea, and how often it is exchanged (less than once concerns earthquakes, a robustness check was made

every thirty days), the bottom water being contained regarding an even more improbable event, 10 per year, -6

between one to four months per year, and the outflow of and for the severe accident mitigation systems, the

water from rivers, streams and point releases by industries capability to withstand a 10 per year probability earth- -7

and sewage installations. quake was also estimated. An earthquake specific to

Sweden is defined in the regulator’s report, SKI 92:3. As Other forms of identified disturbances consist of light, far as concerns high water levels, the Swedish Meteorolognoise, smells, water use, releases to water and air, effects ical and Hydrological Institute’s (SMHI) data was reviewed. from electromagnetic fields, and the use of chemical The Finnish meteorological institute conducted a second products. Chemical products such as hypochlorite are used evaluation of the probability of extremely high water levels to reduce settlement of mussels and barnacles in the water and waves in the Baltic sea, confirming SMHI’s data. The tunnels for cooling waters. It is possible for unforeseen, plants’ capability to withstand an ice storm was also non-ionising related accidents such as explosions, fires and evaluated, giving an acceptable outcome. pipe breaks on raw water lines in the area to occur.

Several studies were carried out regarding the effects of 17.2.2.4. Implementation of criteria in the licensing process

releasing cooling water and its impact on fish and the A general description regarding the licensing process is

small-scale fishing industry. All fishing is forbidden in an presented in section 7.3 and the environmental impact

established and marked area around the mouths of the assessment is further described in section 7.3.1. Protection

discharge tunnels. From the harbours of Bua and Videberg of the environment is further described in section 15.1.2.

on the Värö peninsula, both trawling and coastal fishing take place. The releases from the power plants have no 17.2.3. Re-evaluation of site-related factors

discernible effect on fishing, according to the consistent The most common reason for initiating a change in the

views of the inspector of fisheries at the County Adminis- design basis is experience feedback from both internal and

trative Board of Halland, the chairpersons of the local external sources. With the methods used to collect and

fishing associations of Bua and Videberg, and the coastal evaluate information from an own facility and facilities of

laboratory of the Swedish Agency for Marine and Water the same type, and through the systems for international

Management in Gothenburg. feedback and reporting, the safety design basis is kept

up-to-date and relevant. Experience feedback from both Report no. 3463 from the Environmental Protection internal and external sources is further described in section Agency, from 1988, describes the results of test fishing 19.6. during the period 1975 – 85 regarding easily discernible sicknesses and defects. The test comprised 29,000 cod, In an attempt to keep the design basis up-to-date and

13,000 flounder and 7,000 eels. For some of the material, complete, records are kept about new events that need to

the fish were more laboriously examined. The occurring be addressed in the safety assessment. In this additional

frequency of sicknesses and parasites was largely repre- work, the initiating events are studied that have already

sentative for the regions of Bohuslän and Halland. No been identified due to their estimated event frequency.

effects due to the Ringhals NPP could be detected; If it can be shown that an event is more probable than

furthermore, no effects were observed on plankton and previously assessed, it is moved to another category of

algal growth, since the area around the Värö peninsula events that matches the assumed frequency.

does not deviate from the rest of the coast of Halland. Since the systematics of the original event identification

involved identifying the worst case events that might occur

17.2.2.3. Oskarshamn NPP

within each event category, only a few events have been BAT implies introduction of the most effective measure to added to the event list. It is nevertheless possible to have limit the release of radioactive substances and their new potential initiating events identified. All new events harmful effects on human health and the environment, and are categorized in accordance with the occurrence which does not entail unreasonable costs. One should also frequency and their safety impact on the facility, as was consider that the radiation doses to workers may increase carried out earlier during the original event identification. when emissions into the environment are reduced. The Identification of new initiating events is performed partly regulation SSMFS 2008:23 also specifies that the annual through the systematic work on probabilistic safety effective dose from air and water discharges from all plants assessments, which are periodically conducted, partly by in the same geographical area to individuals in the critical means of the internal and external systems for feedback group is not allowed to exceed 0.1 mSv. The “critical exchange and reporting. group” refers to persons who are estimated to receive the

largest dose from the plant. Actions related to the NAcP are further described in

Appendix 2. All licensees have conducted evaluations and During the stress tests and as part of the NAcP (EU stress reassessments in accordance with the NAcP. The conclutest National Action Plan), a review of the Design Basis sion has been made that ongoing work relating to extreme

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 119

natural phenomena will provide prerequisites for manage- Most measures in the NAcP have been followed by a phase ment of extreme events, which will result in improving the two, which includes implementation of reasonably plants’ defence in depth. practicable and achievable technical and administrative safety improvements. A new review of the measures in the NACP and the improvements is planned to be reported by

17.3. Regulatory control

SSM in the end of 2019. The main improvement is the Generally, the site re-evaluations are conducted as part of installation of Independent Core Cooling systems, which periodic safety reviews, see section 14.3.2. A review of the adds another safety barrier for many of the external events NAcP’s implementation has been performed. This was dealt with in the NAcP, see section 18.2.1.6. reported to SSM at the end of 2015. SSM has also ensured that all measures identified in the NAcP have been appropriately considered for each reactor.

120 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

Article 18. Design and Construction

of the facility according to a predefined classification Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to scheme. Chapter 3, Section 1 of SSMFS 2008:1 outlines ensure that: the basic requirements for defence in depth as follows.

(i) the design and construction of a nuclear installation provides for several reliable levels and methods of “Defence in depth shall be achieved by:

protection (defence in depth) against the release of – ensuring that the design, construction, operation, radioactive materials, with a view to preventing the monitoring and maintenance of a facility are such that occurrence of accidents and to mitigating their radiological abnormal operation and accidents are prevented, consequences should they occur; – ensuring that multiple devices are available and prepared (ii) the technologies incorporated in the design and measures are in place to protect the integrity of the construction of a nuclear installation are proven by barriers and, if the integrity should be breached, to experience or qualified by testing or analysis; mitigate the ensuing consequences, and (iii) the design of a nuclear installation allows for reliable, – ensuring that any release of radioactive substances to stable and easily manageable operation, with specific the environment, which may nevertheless occur as a consideration of human factors and the man-machine interface. result of abnormal operation and accidents, is

prevented, or, if this is not possible, controlled and

mitigated through devices and prepared measures.”

Summary of developments since the

More specific requirements on design and construction are

previous report

given in Chapter 3 Section 1 of SSMFS 2008:1. These can

– Re-assessments of the robustness of the electrical be summarized in the following points.

power supply are ongoing at all operating reactors in “The design shall: reaction to national and international events indicating a

need for a more rigorous approach to electrical system – be able to withstand component and system failures,

design. – be reliable and have operational stability,

– The first requirement in the decision on introducing an – be able to withstand such events and conditions which

independent core cooling system was to considerably can affect the safety function of the barriers or defence

improve independence of existing emergency core in depth, as well as

cooling systems by the end of 2017; this has been – make it possible to maintain, inspect and test structures, achieved for all reactors in operation at that time. systems and components and as far as reasonable – The design work for the independent core cooling facilitate a safe future decommissioning.”

system has been finalised, and the construction work is

ongoing for all reactors intended to be in operation after More specific requirements regarding design principles for

31/12 2020. defence in depth in nuclear power reactors are defined in

the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority’s Regulations and

18.1. Regulatory requirements

General Advice concerning the Design and Construction

of Nuclear Power Reactors (SSMFS 2008:17). These The SSM regulation SSMFS 2018:1, Chapter 2, and SSMFS regulations include requirements on simplicity and 2008:1, Chapter 2, outline licensees’ obligations with regard durability, redundancy and diversification as well as physical to barriers and defence in depth. This includes requireand functional separation in the design of the safety ments on the utilisation of multiple barriers and requires a functions, requirements regarding automatic control or facility-specific approach for implementing the defence in passive functions, and requirements to ensure that failures depth concept for nuclear facilities. It also obliges licensees in safety classified equipment lead to acceptable levels of to analyse and report to the Authority any identified safety. SSMFS 2008:17 also includes design requirements anomalies that can affect the defence in depth or barriers

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 121

18.2. Compliance of the licence holders

concerning resilience to failures and internal and external

events, environmental tolerance and environmental impact,

control rooms, safety classification, event classification as 18.2.1. Implementation of defence in depth

well as the reactor core. All Swedish facilities basically follow the INSAG-10

approach to defence in depth, which is referred to in In addition to the regulations SSMFS 2008:18, SSMFS SSMFS 2008:17, and in practice also take into conside- 2008:1 and SSMFS 2008:17, there are also regulations ration the WENRA approach of Design Extension concerning pressure vessels, mechanical equipment, Conditions. Swedish nuclear power plants were designed competence and training for operators, security, and at a time when the focus was on three levels of defence radiation protection. in depth, but have followed the advancements to more

The regulations SSMFS 2008:1 stipulate that guidelines specifically address BDBAs and design extension

shall be developed to manage beyond design basis conditions.

accidents (BDBA). Regulations regarding the design and The earliest reactor designs in Sweden incorporated a construction of nuclear reactors to cope with BDBAs lower degree of redundancy and separation, but enhanced (including severe accidents with core melt) are found in diversification of safety functions through the use of SSMFS 2008:17. Requirements on release mitigation in the isolation condensers and steam-driven pumps. Later event of severe accidents are given in a governmental designs are characterized by significantly increased decision from February 1986. For a discussion about the redundancy and separation, but with a lower degree of applicable requirements for an emergency situation, see diversification of safety functions. Backfitting and modernsection 16.1. isations have led to major improvements to the older

Requirements on proven and verified technology are found designs, especially concerning increased redundancy and

in Chapter 2 of the Environmental Act (1998:808) and separation, and have implemented increased diversification

further detailed by the provisions of Chapter 3, Section 2 and protection against common-cause failures, see

of SSMFS 2008:1. This requires testing of design princi- Appendix 1.

ples and design solutions under realistic conditions, or if The risk for single failures are taken into consideration in this is not reasonably achievable, to have them undergo the the design . The same applies to common-cause failures, necessary testing or evaluation with regard to safety. although it is always possible to postulate even more

The regulation SSMFS 2008:1 requires functionally based challenging failures to identify critical areas for improve-

safety classification. In the case of nuclear power reactors, ments. It is an ongoing process to identify reasonably

this is further detailed by the regulations SSMFS 2008:17, achievable safety enhancements through deterministic and

which states that structures, systems, components and probabilistic methods, complemented by engineering

devices of the nuclear power reactor shall be divided into judgements and operational experience.

safety classes. According to the general advice for SSMFS Safety functions should be able to withstand a single failure 2008:17, safety classification may be carried out as per the in active components during all events within the design principles contained in the US standards ANSI/ANS 51.1 basis envelope. Reasonable diversification in order to for PWR and 52.1 for BWR. Classification may also follow withstand common-cause failures should be applied to the IEC standards where applicable; the I&C systems of design of the safety functions for events up to and modernised plants in particular use applicable aspects of including unanticipated events (except LOCAs). IEC 61226.

Safety systems are generally designed to be fail-safe, which Provisions concerning quality classification of mechanical means that the loss of active functions leads to a favourcomponents in certain nuclear facilities are stipulated in the able state of the plant. The level of active functions regulation SSMFS 2008:13. required varies for different designs of different genera-

In December 2014, SSM issued an injunction with tions. However, for all reactor designs, the severe accident

requirements for an independent core cooling system. mitigation systems have passive actuation parts which

The injunction requires safety measures considerably would mitigate the consequences of a sequence where

improving the independence of existing emergency core there is a risk of containment overpressurisation.

cooling to be implemented by the end of 2017, and the Separation of systems, both physically and functionally, system for independent core cooling to be installed and in is an important area in which a number of backfitting operation by 31 December 2020. The purpose of the measures have been implemented over many years as measures is to increase the reliability of the core cooling reported previously, see Appendix 1. In many cases, the and strengthen the capabilities to prevent core damage need for improved separation was identified through PSA. during a number of extreme events that were previously Swedish reactors have been retrofitted to comply with not covered by the safety analyses. The extreme events are regulatory requirement on functional diversification. The defined by the extended loss of all AC voltage, as well as functions of reactivity control, overpressure protection, the by CCFs in emergency core cooling functions. The two cooling and residual heat removal, and the containment events should be combined with extreme external influence function, shall all have diversified backup capabilities, see that may arise. Appendix 1.

122 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

The objective of implemented or planned design measures originally designed to withstand a design basis earthquake, or changes (plant modifications, backfitting) is to prevent but earthquake requirements have been taken into account BDBAs and to mitigate their radiological consequences, as part of maintenance and modernisation measures. should they occur. Some examples are: Reasonably practicable approaches to strengthen the reactors’ capabilities to withstand earthquakes have been – Structural integrity assessed for containment and taken to ensure that no undue risk is foreseen with regard containment filtered venting systems for beyond design to seismic criteria being excluded from the initial design seismic events. basis. Also, when installing new equipment and imple- – Battery capacity extended to 8 hours. menting measures, seismic events are required to be taken – Mobile and fixed equipment and connection points for into account (see also section 17.2.1.1.). recharging of batteries.

– Upgraded reactor cooling pump seals (PWR) reducing 18.2.1.2. Flooding and tsunami reactor coolant system leakage during beyond design The general risk of flooding was reassessed after the conditions. Fukushima Daiichi accident. The analyses and, in some – Spent fuel pool level measurement, and independent cases, corresponding administrative and physical improveinjection. ments, show that the NPPs can handle extreme water levels with the exceedance frequency of 10 per year. -5 – Independent Core Cooling designed to cope with loss For the ICCS to be installed by 2020, extreme water levels of ultimate heat sink and extended loss of AC power, with the exceedance frequency of 10 per annum shall be -6 as described below. considered for the design.

Measures to increase the level of safety and strengthening The tsunami risk in Sweden is low given the geographical the defence in depth at all the Swedish NPPs have been location of the country. After the Fukushima Daiichi implemented gradually, taking account of new knowledge accident, the tsunami risk was reassessed and no additional and experience. New knowledge and experience have measures to particularly mitigate a tsunami were identified emerged from lessons learned in connection with incidents (see also 17.2.1.6.). and accidents, and from research, safety analyses and new reactor designs. International accidents or incidents such as

18.2.1.3. Other external hazards

the TMI nuclear accident in 1979, as well as domestic The facilities’ characteristics in relation to extreme weather incidents such as the ‘strainer event’ in Barsebäck unit 2 in conditions have been reassessed after the Fukushima 1992 and the electric power system event at Forsmark unit Daiichi accident. In general, the evaluations indicate that 1 in 2006, have had a major influence on these measures. the facilities are robust; however, for some areas, measures Furthermore, the new Swedish regulations on the design have been taken to strengthen the protection against and construction of nuclear power reactors issued in 2005 extreme weather conditions. The ICCS will make the have resulted in extensive backfitting and modernisation facilities even more robust (see also section 17.2.1.). programmes for all Swedish NPPs. Also, insights gained from the EU stress tests after the accident in Fukushima 18.2.1.4. Simultaneous accidents at multiple units Daiichi have led to the identification of further areas of Simultaneous accidents at multiple reactors on the same improvement. A large number have already been imple- site were not included in the design basis of existing mented, or are in the process of being finalized in the nuclear facilities. Safety systems as well as severe accident forthcoming years to improve the robustness of Swedish management systems at Swedish nuclear power plants are, nuclear power reactors. See Appendix 1. however, dedicated to one unit only. Shared auxiliary

systems principally encompass the off-site grid, station In summary, since the time when the original reactor blackout generators, and inlet and outlet channels to the designs were taken into operation, extensive measures have ultimate heat sink. Evaluations and measures for coping been taken to improve: with multi-unit accidents are part of the NAcP, where the – physical and functional separation with in and between requirement for independent core cooling specifically safety functions addresses the loss of ultimate heat sink and extended loss

– diversification of safety functions of AC power at all reactors on the site, see section 18.1.

– severe accident management measures

18.2.1.5. Severe accident mitigation measures

– protection against local dynamic effects from pipe The government decree of February 1986, following the breaks and other internal hazards Three Mile Island accident in the United States in 1979, – protection against external events substantially strengthened the nuclear reactors’ capabilities – control room capabilities to manage design extension conditions. This government – environmental qualification and surveillance. decree required all licensees to take appropriate actions to

ensure that all nuclear power reactors are capable of 18.2.1.1. Seismic withstanding a core melt accident without any casualties Sweden uses a design envelope, when defining the realistic or ground contamination of significance to the population. seismic events on the Scandinavian peninsula. This is done In the decree, it was stated that these requirements can be with a safety margin. Reactors built earlier were not considered met if a release is limited to a maximum of

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 123

Release to atmosphere

CONTAINMENT OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION CONTAINMENT FILTERED VENTING

Rupture disk

Rupture disk Pressure release to the atmosphere Manually operated valves

Moisture separator UPPER DRYWELL

Scrubber pool

Pressure relief line WETWELL from containment

LOWER DRYWELL Venturis and venturi distribution system

Lower drywell flooding from wetwell

Water injection to the reactor Containment

Containment penetration shielding in lower drywell

Water pumped in by mobile pump unit

Illustrated by Bosse Alenius Water reservoir

Figure 25. Schematic view of the severe accident mitigation features installed in Swedish BWRs.

0.1% of the reactor core content of caesium-134 and bubbles through the cleaning liquid. A conceptual illustracaesium-137 in a reactor core of 1800 MW thermal power tion of the overall severe accident mitigation concept for (corresponding to approximately 100 TBq Cs-137), the BWRs and PWRs is presented in figure 25 and figure provided that other nuclides of significance are limited to 26, respectively. the same extent as caesium. This resulted in an extensive The major component is the scrubber system comprising a backfitting for all Swedish nuclear power reactors large number of small venture scrubbers submerged in a including: pool of water. The water contains chemicals for adequate – Filtered containment venting through an inert MVSS retention of iodine. with a decontamination factor of at least 500, The design of the venturi is based upon the suppliers’ – Unfiltered pressure relief in BWRs in the case of a large broad experience in this area, gained when designing LOCA and degraded pressure suppression function to venturi for cleaning of polluted gases from various protect the containment from early overpressurization, industrial plants. The MVSS can be activated automatically, – Flooding of lower drywell from wetwell (most BWR:s) via a rupture disk, or manually. There are two separate – Passive autocatalytic recombiner (PAR), venting lines from the containment for these two modes – Independent containment spray, of activation. The venting line with the rupture disk is – All mitigating systems designed to withstand an always open so that no operator actions are needed to vent earthquake, and this way. The design principle of the system is the same for BWRs and PWRs. The system is kept inert to avoid a – A comprehensive set of SAM procedures and hydrogen explosion. guidelines. The Swedish strategy for dealing with a core melt in BWRs All of the reactors in operation have chosen the Multi is to allow the core debris to fall into a large volume of Venturi Scrubber System (MVSS) concept to fulfil the water in the lower regions of the containment. This is a requirements for filtered venting. A venturi scrubber is a quite uncommon approach and only a few reactors in the gas cleaning device that lets the contaminated gas pass as world apply this strategy. Since the strategy is somewhat

124 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

Containment spray

Release to atmosphere

Manually operated valves

Steam generator

Ordinary containment spray system

Rupture disk Moisture separator Reactor pressure vessel

Independent pump and connection for containment spray

Scrubber pool

Pressure relief line from containment

Venturis and venturi distribution system

Auxiliary water source – fire water or as a last resort sea water

Illustrated by Bosse Alenius

Figure 26. Schematic view of the severe accident mitigation features installed in Swedish PWRs.

unique, the international research related to the special might occur when the core melt interacts with water and a phenomena, mainly steam explosion, associated with this huge heat transfer occurs. strategy was fairly limited, even if a wide range of international research has been conducted on phenomena that 18.2.1.6. Installation of independent core cooling systems are also applicable to Swedish plants. An extensive national SSM has decided that the licensees are required to research programme was set up in the 1980s to highlight implement an independent core cooling system (ICCS) at all important aspects needing to be addressed. The all reactors in operation after 31 December 2020. programme (APRI, Accident Phenomena of Risk Impor- In order to fulfil the SSM requirement and after installation tance) is still run in cooperation between the Authority of temporary safety measures see section 6.2, preparatory and licensees. The programme is conducted in consecutive work for installation of the permanent solution resulted in three-year periods, with evaluation of the progress and principle final design versions for various reactors, as results over the previous three years. The current presented below. The installation work is ongoing and the programme is the 10th. In order to address specific system is expected to be in operation in late 2020 at all uncertainties relating to the Swedish severe accident reactors. mitigation strategy, major efforts are conducted by the Royal Institute of Technology and Chalmers University Forsmark NPP of Technology within the APRI programme. The severe At the Forsmark plant, the ICCS is currently under accident research is now targeted at confirming that the construction. The new system is a consequence of the uncertainties linked to the chosen solution are acceptable. stress tests following the Fukushima accident and the SSM APRI also monitors international research in the area of requirements for an independent core cooling system, severe accidents. designed to withstand extreme external hazards.

Results from the APRI programme indicate, e.g., that a The ICCS will be placed in a new building adjacent to the major interaction between concrete and core melt will reactor building. Concrete and external construction works most likely be avoided. However, some issues still need to are nearly complete and work on component installations be further explored, including steam explosions, which has begun.

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 125

Reactor building Rupture disc

Reactor

Pressure M New ICCS building

Vessel

Test pipe Water source

Connection 733 (water supply)

Mobile equipment

Containment

M

Pfo Pump, diesel driven Multi venturi scrubber (FRISK)

Connection to mobile equipment

Figure 27. Schematic view of Forsmark ICCS installation design.

A schematic view of the Forsmark ICCS installation design Forsmark has also implemented a new function for is shown in figure 27. independent water supply to the spent fuel pools, using the principle of “feed-and-boil”. The water is allowed to boil The ICCS mainly consists of the following components: while water is added at least at the same pace that the – Building structure boiling occurs. The technical solution consists of new – Water source pipes, mobile pumps and level measurement. – One pump

Ringhals NPP

– Valves An ICCS will be installed in Ringhals units 3 and 4, to be – Connection pipes taken into operation in late 2020. The purpose of the ICCS is to provide alternative core cooling if the ordinary The power supply is galvanically separated from the plant’s safety systems are unavailable in the event of design regular electrical power system via a motor-generator set. extension conditions. Forsmark units 1 and 2 share the same ICCS building and water source. There are, however, separate pumps, pipes The design events for the independent core cooling system are: and valves so that the ICCS function is independent – Extended Loss of AC Power, ELAP (for 72 hours) between the units. The water source is sufficient for 24 – Loss of Ultimate Heat Sink, LUHS (for 72 hours). hours of operation for both units, or 72 hours for one unit. In case of operation for both units, additional water In addition to loss of AC power, it is postulated that DC sources are available to make operation for 72 hours power is lost and that the existing steam-driven auxiliary possible. The pump capacity is sufficient to supply water to feedwater pump fails. The ELAP and LUHS events are the RPV at full pressure. assumed to coincide with, or be the consequence of, severe Decay heat will be removed from the containment after external events (beyond the ordinary design base), about 8 hours of ICCS operation by transporting steam to including various electrical disturbances. All features, the multi venturi scrubber (FRISK). One important design including supportive functions, are housed in a separate condition is that the FRISK system must be fully available building designed to withstand severe external events, one for severe accident management if an event escalates into a for each unit. Inside the building, there are two large water severe accident scenario involving core damage. If needed, tanks that provide the different functions with water for there is an additional possibility to utilize mobile independent core cooling, see figure 28. The water equipment to supply more water, and thereby use the ICCS provided to the reactor coolant system is borated and for a longer period of time than 72 hours. The ICCS will demineralized, and the water for the steam generators and be in operation in late 2020. spent fuel pit is demineralized and deareated.

126 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

SG PORV SG SV

Steam generator

Pressuriser

Spent fuel pit

AFW

Reactor

Demineralized water

SI Independent core cooling building

Borated water

Containment building

Figure 28. Schematic view of Ringhals ICCS installation design for PWR.

The main features of the Independent Core Cooling improve the physical separation between the existing system are as follows: redundant spent fuel cooling pumps. Permanent connections are being installed to improve the potential to provide – Providing feedwater to the steam generators (normal spent fuel cooling by using existing portable pumps. All the operation) improvements will be completed by the end of 2020. – Providing boron and make-up to a closed reactor coolant system (normal operation) Oskarshamn NPP – Providing borated make-up for feed-and-bleed for an The ICCS function comprises a new one-train low pressure open reactor coolant system (shutdown mode) make-up system (system 329 in Figure 29) with a direct – Providing make-up for feed-and-boil of the spent diesel-driven pump, supporting electrical, and water source fuel pit. make-up systems. The primary water source for the ICCS is the central handling pool at the reactor service floor The ICCS building has a separate electrical power supply (system 244 in Figure 29). The available amount of water is system that is galvanically, functionally, and physically sufficient for continuation of core cooling for 40 hours. separated from the regular electrical power system. The After 40 hours, make-up water for the central service pool galvanic separation is achieved by a motor-generator set is taken from the fire water tanks (TB51 and TD51 shown between the incoming power supply and ICCS power in figure 30), which will last for another 32 hours. system. The electromagnetic design of the building As part of the design and installation of the ICCS at structure and shielding of cables ensure that no electrical OKG, measures are being taken to establish feed-and-bleed disturbances (conductive or radiative) can affect the ICCS. for the spent fuel pools (SPF). The measures comprise In addition to the independent core cooling system main feeding of the SFP with water from the fire water tanks. If function, the system also improves the capability to cool additional make-up water for both the ICCS and the SFP is the spent fuel pool by establishing a feed and boil-off needed, it can be pumped by diesel-driven pumps from a cooling function. This function will be fulfilled by perma- freshwater pond on the site that holds approximately nently installed piping for make-up water from the ICCS 120,000 m , see figure 30. The bleeding is done through 3 building, see Figure 30. The instrumentation for water level new piping leading to the normal cooling water outlet measurement and the separate hatches for steam release channel. The measures introduced will keep the SFP from the spent fuel building have also been improved. The temperature below 80°C. spent fuel pools are also to be verified for boiling condi- The ICCS has its own diesel generator set that can tions. Measures are also being taken to improve the existing recharge the dedicated batteries for the ICCS and energize instrumentation for temperature measurement and to

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 127

Reactor building

Reactor hall

M Feed water

VA2 VA1

324 861/736

244 M M Auxiliary building A 361 362 VC3 VA10 VA3 VC1 VC2 329 =667.GAC1 RI

311 VC4

300 KVA VA11 327/735 M VA5 VA6

321 314

M VA16 M VC50 675

380

VAC 327 PD1 MVSS PA1 VA13 VA12 VAxx VA4 VA5 VA6 362 PB1

VA50 CC2

672 677 672 677 316

671 673 671 673 323

Sub Sub G A B 323.PA1 CC1 DG

Figure 29. Schematic view of the ICCS function at Oskarshamn Unit 3.

Water treatment

Feedwater Götemaren 324 0NVO.736

V41

0NVO.735 3.861

V404 Pumpstation Sörå Söråmagasinet

V402

TB51 TD51 V406 V140 P102

1500 m 3 1500 m 3 120 000 m 3 V401 M

V405 V141 PB3 P101

861 3.861

M

PD3

Figure 30. Make-up water configuration to the ICCS and SFP at Oskarshamn Unit 3.

128 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

the battery-backed busbars after the initial 8 hours in order defined number of areas. The method was applied to the

to retain RPS functionality. Residual heat is released main steps of the project, with a final demonstration of

through the multi-venturi scrubber system. safety during start-up and operation. Additional analyses

of the concept were performed based upon experiences Implementation of the final design solution is under way from the “Forsmark event” that occurred in 2006, and and the extension of the battery capacity is being impleresulted in implementation of additional possibilities for mented in steps. The final step will be completed in 2020. DC power supply by DC, and some additional uniterrup-

tible power supplies (UPSs). For more information, see

18.2.2. Incorporation of proven technologies

Sweden’s seventh national report under the Convention on The application of particular standards for fulfilment of Nuclear Safety. legal and regulatory requirements is a licensee responsi-

bility. The original design of the Swedish NPPs relied to a

18.2.3. Design for reliable, stable and manageable

large extent on US standards, and these US standards still

operation

have a strong influence. As applicable, European standards The design solutions must be adapted to the ability of the have been assessed by the licensees, and where appropriate, personnel to manage the facility in a safe manner, as well as incorporated into the design. One way for the licensees to to manage abnormal events, incidents and accidents. In perform the work is to use the co-operation of a shared some areas, specific Swedish requirements on consideragroup, mainly for managing technical requirements for tion of grace time have been added, e.g. the “30-minute plant design found to be applicable. Further information rule”. This rule requires that all measures needed to be on verification by surveillance, testing and inspection is taken within 30 minutes after an initiating event involving provided in sections 14.1.2 and 14.2.4. the risk of a radioactive release must be automated. The

A good example of incorporation of proven technologies, rule is implemented in the BWRs, and with some excep-

including the assessment needed to ensure that the tions in the PWRs.

technology is proven, is the major upgrade to the digital SSM has requested that the licensees, starting with the instrumentation and control system (I&C), completed in PWR operators, to conduct an analysis as to whether the Ringhals unit 2 as part of the TWICE project. The project grace times are suitable for different incidents. Human involved installation of a completely new and modern factors have long been recognised as an important control room. consideration in design matters, and are addressed in

Some of the requirements applied to the TWICE project were: Section 5 of SSMFS 2008:1. Both the licensees and the

Authority have dedicated functions in place in their – Functional classification is to follow the intentions respective organisations to specifically ensure that due stated in IEC 1226, first edition. consideration is given to human factors. – The cable separation shall, considering limitations posed by the existing buildings, to the largest extent possible Sweden also participates in international organisations,

fulfil the requirements stated in IEEE 384 –1992. such as the Halden Project in Norway, which conducts

research of importance for the areas of fuel, materials and – The fire protection shall, considering limitations posed human factors. the existing buildings, to the largest extent possible fulfil

requirements applicable to new nuclear power plants.

– Installations of cabinets and equipment which support 18.3. Regulatory control

safety-related system functions shall have seismic The regulatory approach in Sweden is to retrofit facilities capabilities according to “Swedish earthquake spectra” to meet modern requirements, and all facilities are expected with a probability of exceedance of 10 -5 per year. as far as reasonably achievable to meet modern standards. – The structure shall have a level of functional separation Major safety upgrades have been completed at Swedish that allows I&C system failures without loss of major facilities over the last 15 years to achieve this target, see plant system functionality, and allows maintenance and Appendix 1. SSM conducts and will continue to carry out modification work to be performed at a plant and on supervision of licensee implementation of safety improve- I&C system or function level without affecting any ments and measures taken to ensure compliance with other major systems or functions. current standards and regulations. – The structure shall have a sufficient degree of SSM’s overall assessment is that the measures taken to functional diversity for avoidance of software CCFs comply with modern requirements contained in SSMFS that might affect functional safety or reliability. 2008:17 have significantly improved the level of safety at – The structure shall not introduce any additional all nuclear power reactors in Sweden. The main capability functional dependencies between plant systems or that has been improved is control over conditions that functions. might possibly arise in the event of design basis accidents.

A plant safety demonstration method was developed and The operation of the nuclear power reactors and licensee

iterated with the regulator. The objective of the method monitoring of the barriers’ surveillance have also been

was to demonstrate that plant safety was improved or at substantially improved by implementing new or upgraded

least remained unchanged prior to the implementation in a control equipment.

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 129

Regarding all the plants, the analysis and modernisation As reported in the previous national reports, all Swedish

work has now been completed. The concluding assessment reactors have installed filtered venting systems according to

of compliance, performed by SSM, is not fully completed the Multi Venturi Scrubber concept to fulfil the require-

and reviewed plants are deemed to fulfil the intent of the ments for filtered venting in the case of a severe accident

requirements, although areas of possible further improve- mitigation. Simultaneous accidents at multiple unit sites

ment are highlighted. were not included in the design basis of existing nuclear

facilities. Safety systems as well as severe accident manage- Further work aimed at enhancing plant resilience ment systems at Swedish nuclear power plants are, performed as a result of the ongoing implementation of however, dedicated to one unit only. the NAcP, including independent core cooling, is described

in section 6.2 and Appendix 2. SSM has decided that the licensees are required to

implement an independent core cooling system at reactors According to the regulation, any safety significant events or intended to be operated after December 31 2020. Design plant modifications must be reported to the Authority. A solutions for the ICCS function have been developed for standing group of experts (see section 10.3.4) makes the all affected reactors. The final design versions of the ICCS first assessment of all notifications; it consists of experts for various reactors, as presented in section 18.2.1.6. are representing all relevant disciplines, including human currently being installed, and are all planned to be taken factors experts. Information on regulatory review and into operation during the second half of 2020. control activities in relation to operation and human

factors is provided in articles 12 and 19. Implementation of particular design measures to maintain

the integrity of the physical containment and to basically

avoid a severe accident with potential long-term off-site

18.4. Implemetation Vienna Declaration

contamination are examples of VDNS principles’ fulfil-

on Nuclear Safety ment.

This section, in reference to Article 18, describes how

Sweden implements relevant improvements concerning

principles of the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety

regarding the design of power plants.

130 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

Article 19. Operation

– The total number of licensee event reports (category 2 Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to LERs) varies in the range of 175 to 210 per year over ensure that: the past three years.

(i) the initial authorization to operate a nuclear installation – Since mid-2017, efforts are ongoing to produce specific is based upon an appropriate safety analysis and a procedures for extraordinary situations at Swedish commissioning programme demonstrating that the NPPs. These will give better support to the organisation installation, as constructed, is consistent with design and in the case of similar events. A part of the work is safety requirements; improvement and adaptation to international guidelines (ii) operational limits and conditions derived from the in the area of SAMG. safety analysis, tests and operational experience are

defined and revised as necessary for identifying safe

boundaries for operation; 19.1. Initial authorization

(iii) operation, maintenance, inspection and testing of a 19.1.1. Regulatory requirements

nuclear installation are conducted in accordance with The general safety regulation SSMFS 2008:1 contains approved procedures; legally binding requirements relevant to all the obligations

(iv) procedures are established for responding to antici- of Article 19. These requirements are summarised below.

pated operational occurrences and to accidents; As mentioned in section 14.1, a comprehensive determin- (v) necessary engineering and technical support in all istic and probabilistic safety analysis is required by SSMFS safety-related fields is available throughout the lifetime of 2008:1, Chapter 4, Sections 1 and 2, prior to constructing a nuclear installation; and commissioning a plant. These analyses shall subse- (vi) incidents significant to safety are reported in a timely quently be kept up to date. To show how the plant is built, manner by the holder of the relevant licence to the analysed, verified, and the safety requirements are met, a regulatory body; Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) shall be (vii) programmes to collect and analyse operating supplemented to provide a pre-operational Safety Analysis experience are established, the results obtained and the Report, which justifies the finalised detailed design of the conclusions drawn are acted upon and that existing plant and demonstrates its safety. The final report (SAR) mechanisms are used to share important experience with incorporates any necessary revisions to the pre-operational international bodies and with other operating organisa- Safety Analysis Report following the commissioning and tions and regulatory bodies; licensing process for the first entry into routine operation (viii) the generation of radioactive waste resulting from the of the as-built nuclear power plant. operation of a nuclear installation is kept to the minimum

practicable for the process concerned, both in activity and

19.1.2. Compliance of the licence holders

in volume, and any necessary treatment and storage of No nuclear units have been commissioned in Sweden since spent fuel and waste directly related to the operation and 1985, when Forsmark 3 and Oskarshamn 3 went into on the same site as that of the nuclear installation take into consideration conditioning and disposal. commercial operation. No additional units are currently

undergoing planning or construction.

As described in section 14.2, all Swedish units in operation

Summary of developments

have been analysed and have followed commissioning

since the previous report programmes in order to demonstrate their compliance with

During the current review period, the following develop- design and safety requirements, as specified in legislation,

ments are of relevance with regard to the obligations of regulations and standards that were in effect at the time of

Article 19: startup. The objective was to develop a PSAR before

commencing design, construction and erection of the unit,

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 131

and later an FSAR; and through extensive operational all BWR STFs produced in the country. STFs for PWRs

testing, to verify both the function of the different follow the Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG)

individual systems and their shared performance. Permis- approach. The scope and content of Swedish STFs are

sion to start up the units was given in steps by the regula- similar to the OLCs used in other European countries.

tory authority, following completion of the different opera- The original STF for each unit is derived from the safety tional tests, and reporting of results from the startup analyses contained in the SAR, where the behaviour of the stages. Permission for commercial operation was granted unit, when different transients and abnormal events when the operational tests had been completed satisfactooccurred, is described. However, several revisions have rily and reported, and the FSAR and technical specificabeen made in all STFs since the first versions were issued. tions had been accepted. Corrections and updates take place when new and better

The main changes and modifications in the SAR were knowledge is available, either from research and testing, or

related to plant modifications due to power uprates. Also, from operational experience or plant modifications.

plant modifications and related analyses are to be reflected Suggestions for changes to the STF are subjected to a

in SAR updates. The state of the art safety requirements twofold safety review and notified to SSM. Today, STFs are

are regularly assessed for their implementation in the integrated in plant management systems in order to ensure

current SARs, and the licensees have specific procedures in adequate use and updates of the document.

place for evaluation of new or revised codes and standards Parts of STFs developed after commissioning the plants to be reflected in a regular update. comprise specific chapters concerning conditions during

refuelling outages and the background to the document

19.1.3. Regulatory control

(STF BASIS). The STF documents are now part of the SSM reviews safety analysis reports as a result of updates SAR documentation upon which STFs are based. SSM has made due to applications for power uprates, or notifications imposed further requirements for the scope of STFs, for related to (for example) plant modifications or analysis instance their also covering non-safety system equipment updates. Reviews by SSM have the aim of verifying that the of importance for defence in depth, such as fire protection SAR reflects the facility as it is built, analysed and verified, systems and certain electrical systems. For these, requireas well as its demonstrating how current requirements for ments for operability have been included to a varying design, function, organisation and activities are met. extent in STFs.

The STF of the Westinghouse PWRs at Ringhals has been

19.2. Operational limits and conditions

updated as part of a particular project using the MERITS

concept (Methodically Engineered Restructured and

19.2.1. Regulatory requirements

Improved Technical Specifications) documented in As stated by the regulation SSMFS 2008:1, Chapter 5, NUREG-1431 rev. 1, and following experience gained by Section 1, documented and up-to-date Operational Limits the Westinghouse Owners Group, documented in and Conditions (OLC) are required containing the NUREG-1431 rev. 2. necessary limits and conditions, as further specified in a

separate annex to the regulations. Before equipment with importance for defence in depth is

The OLC shall, together with the operational procedures, accepted for continuous operation following maintenance,

ensure that the conditions postulated in the safety analysis in-service inspection or after a plant modification, the

report are maintained during operation of the facility equipment must pass an operability test to verify that the

(Chapter 5, Section 1 of SSMFS 2008:1). The OLC is equipment fulfils specified operational requirements.

subjected to a twofold safety review by the licensee and Integral tests for verification of complete system function

submitted to SSM for approval. SSM is to be notified by are used as far as possible. If they are not feasible, overlap-

the licensee about any changes that must also be subjected ping tests are conducted. After this, an initial integral test is

to a safety review. performed.

19.2.3. Regulatory control 19.2.2. Compliance of the licence holders

SSM is regularly notified by a licensee when changes are The operational limits and conditions of the reactor units made in the STF (OLC), or when temporary exemptions are included in an operational document named “STF” in are needed. These notifications on changes in STFs and Sweden (Säkerhetstekniska driftförutsättningar, or technical exemptions from STFs are reviewed as described in section specifications). This document is considered as one of the 14.3. In total, SSM receives 10 to 20 notifications from the cornerstones in the governance and regulation of the licensees each year. operations of Swedish plants. As required by SSM, all

control room operators and operations managers, as well

as engineers on duty at the plants, are given training and

19.3. Procedures for operation, mainte-

annual retraining on the intent and content of this

nance, inspection and testing

document. Each STF is unit-specific and is in its basic

version approved by SSM. STFs for the oldest BWRs were 19.3.1. Regulatory requirements

produced in close cooperation between nuclear utilities. Suitable, verified and documented procedures according to

Consequently, the structure of the documents is similar for Chapter 5, Section 2 of SSMFS 2018:1 shall be established

132 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

by the licensee and are required for all plant states, Signing of steps’ fulfilment, carried out in the procedures,

including accidents. Symptom-based procedures shall be in is mandatory in most cases in order to confirm their

place for a nuclear power reactor in order to re-establish or completion and to facilitate verification. Temporary

compensate for lost safety functions and to avoid core operation procedures (TOP) and special conditions are

damage. Management guidelines are required to control controlled in the form of operation notices with limited

and mitigate consequences of BDBAs. These guidelines validity. These notices are reviewed and issued by the

should be developed to the extent possible and reasonable operations department according to a special procedure.

with regard to the need for protection of the public and Operations personnel are deeply involved in production the environment. The guidelines should be well coordiand revision of operating procedures. As usual, processes nated with emergency procedures. Required instructions and systems are assigned to the different shift teams as also cover events and conditions affecting several facilities ”owners”. One task of such system ownership is to at the same site. develop, review and revise related operating procedures.

The procedures for operability verification, as well as Development of procedures follows specified directives, procedures and guidelines used in plant modes other than which include reviewing the documents, normally by more normal operation shall be subjected to a twofold safety than one person other than the author, before their review by the licensee. A full scale simulator should be approval by the operations manager or someone else with used if possible and to a suitable extent for verification of the corresponding level of authority. The same applies operational procedures. Procedures for maintenance that when revising procedures. Revision of procedures is to be are important for safety are also included in the requirecarried out continuously, particularly in the case of ment. Maintenance programmes are to be documented. maintenance procedures, when new experience is obtained. Inspection and testing of mechanical components shall be

carried out in accordance with qualified methods and Procedures used for abnormal operation and emergency

verified procedures (see also section 14.1.2.). should undergo specific safety review. The same review

applies when it comes to procedures for checking opera-

19.3.2. Compliance of the licence holders bility according to technical specifications. As far as

All activities that directly affect the operation of the plants possible, or when needed, full-scale simulators of the units

are governed by procedures of different kinds. Normal are used when verifying a new or revised operating

operation, abnormal operation, emergency operation and procedure.

functional tests are included in this category. Maintenance Emergency procedures have been developed in order to activities according to an approved maintenance deal with anticipated operational occurrences and accident programme are also to a great extent accomplished conditions. Emergency procedures are supplemented by according to procedures that are not always as detailed as symptom-based emergency operating procedures for all operating procedures, where activities are described step units (Övergripande störningsinstruktioner, ÖSI). ÖSI are by step, in sequences. used by the shift supervisors and represent a link to the

Periodic maintenance consists of activities performed safety panel display system (SPDS) in place using different

on a routine basis, and may include any combination of layouts at all Swedish units as part of the accident manage-

external/internal inspection, alignment or calibration, ment system. The emergency management procedures are

overhaul, and component or equipment replacement. Any also the link to the emergency planning and its criteria for

deficiencies found by predictive or periodic maintenance activating an alarm. The structure of procedures is

are addressed by corrective or planned maintenance. illustrated by Figure 31.

Planned maintenance includes activities performed prior

to equipment failure, and is typically carried out during

outages, or on spare or redundant equipment that is

available during plant operation. The safety regulation Procedures Used by the plant management

for

SSMFS 2008:17 allows preventive maintenance to be extraordinary

situations

performed during operation, if specific conditions are met.

This is specified in the OLCs and lies within the conditions Symptom based

Used by the shift supervisor

analysed and described in the Safety Analysis Report

emergency operating procedures

(SAR).

Unit specific event based

Modification activities are also carried out as part of emergency operating procedures

maintenance and the Plant Life Management (PLiM) Used by the

programme, which deals with the design life of compo-

control room Unit specific operating procedures operators

nents, to fulfil their function throughout the plant’s

expected lifetime. Such activities are part of the long-term System specific procedures for normal

plans and strategies included in the safety programmes.

and disturbed operation

Optimisation is also carried out in order to achieve an

appropriate balance between maintenance and equipment Figure 31. Overview of the main procedures applied during

modification. emergency situations.

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 133

19.4. Engineering and technical support

Other documents are available that reference to the main

procedures. The level of detail and number of procedures decrease in pace with the increasing height of the pyramid. 19.4.1. Regulatory requirements

The licensee shall ensure, under the requirement stipulated At the top of the pyramid, procedures for extraordinary by Chapter 3, Section 10 of regulation SSMFS 2018:1, that situations include procedures for the engineer on duty, adequate personnel are available having the necessary the operative emergency response plan, and technical competence and suitability required for tasks that are handbooks for dealing with BDBAs, including severe important for safety, while also ensuring that these aspects accidents as well as cases when more than one unit per are documented. A long-term staffing plan is required. The site is affected. requirement also covers contractors to an applicable extent.

The Swedish PWRs follow EOPs and SAMG (Severe Requirements for using contractors as opposed to own

Accident Management Guidelines) from the Westinghouse personnel should be carefully considered in order to have a

Owners Group, whereas the BWRs have own specifically capability to develop and sustain adequate in-house

developed instructions and guidelines from the 1980s for expertise, as stated in Chapter 3, Section 11 of SSMFS

accident management. At that time, these procedures (both 2018:1. The requirements also state that necessary

PWR and BWR) covered dealing with situations including expertise should always be available in-house for

loss of all AC power and depressurization by means of the requesting, managing and evaluating work important for

system for filtered ventilation of the containment. safety that is carried out by contractors.

Due to experience from the Fukushima event, an ongoing

19.4.2. Compliance of the licence holders

project is being carried out since mid-2017 to create The nuclear power plants have personnel whose role is to procedures for extraordinary situations at Swedish NPPs. specifically account for the responsibilities of the licensees. The purpose of the work is to develop procedures to All the licensees have these competencies available in their better facilitate the organisation during similar events. The organisation. This means that even if some external goal of this update is to improve the procedures and adapt support still must be used, the plants have in-house them to international guidelines in the area of SAMG. expertise and the capability to evaluate the results of Completion of the project is planned for late 2020. analyses, calculations, etc. that have been performed. Moreover, this work will enhance procedures and guides for dealing with accidents affecting more than one unit at The former engineering group within Vattenfall functioned

a site. In such event, each facility will be staffed to manage previously as consultants. The group has been incorpo-

its own situation. The plant’s emergency and command rated as a line organisation function for some time now,

centre is staffed and has the ultimate responsibility for and in 2019 it was reorganised in order to incorporate the

making fundamental decisions that have an impact on Fuel business unit. This unit, which is responsible for

more than the individual facility. Vattenfall’s nuclear fuel supplies, is now named Fuel

Engineering & Projects (FE&P).

19.3.3. Regulatory control

In 2018, the concept of Competence Centres (CC) was Procedures are usually reviewed during supervision. When introduced at Vattenfall. CCs comprise the joint resource conducting an event investigation, SSM requests that management for FE&P, Ringhals, Forsmark, decommisprocedures be submitted relating to the event in question. sioning and SKB. The purpose of the CC model is to In these cases, SSM performs scrutiny in order to ascertain ensure access to strategically important competence within whether the procedure gives the prerequisite for the agreed competence areas, which is a long-term need. personnel to properly accomplish their tasks.

Ordinarily, operational, emergency and maintenance 19.4.3. Regulatory control

procedures are not reviewed by SSM when they have been With the exception of the independent safety review

published or updated. However, SSM’s review of the functions and involvement in the national competence

procedures that was carried out in 2016 highlighted the situation, as reported in section 11.3., SSM has thus far not

need for a reassessment of the instructions and guidelines specifically reviewed the engineering and technical support

for severe accident management at the BWRs. In July 2017, available at the nuclear power plants. In connection with

SSM issued orders to the licensees to evaluate and reassess other inspections and reviews, the specialist staffing

their procedures for BWRs, with reference to recommen- situation has occasionally been commented upon.

dations from the IAEA and WENRA. SSM requested

broadening of the scope of prepared strategies for

19.5. Reporting of incidents

managing severe accidents, in addition to a specific

reassessment of the interface between the preventive and 19.5.1. Regulatory requirements

mitigatory domains. SSM had also identified a need for The requirements of SSMFS 2008:1, “The Swedish

improvement of the documented support for deci- Radiation Safety Authority’s Regulations concerning Safety

sion-making, and for extended verification and validation in Nuclear Facilities”, include a chapter containing

of the procedures. The licensees were also asked to provisions on reporting and an appendix specifying these

evaluate their training programmes for both BWRs and requirements in relation to various types of events (SSMFS

PWRs, and to report to SSM each year until 2020 about the 2008:1, Chapter 7 and Appendix 4, respectively). The

outcome of their evaluations and reassessments. following is a brief summary:

134 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

– Reporting within one hour: alarm events, scram with The regulations also include an important general clause

complications, and events and conditions belonging to stipulating that the plant is to be brought to a safe state

category 1 (see below) without delay if the plant has a disturbance in its opera-

– Reporting within 16 hours: INES events of Level 2 or tions, or in cases where it is difficult to determine the

higher significance of an identified deficiency.

– Reporting within 7 days: a comprehensive investigation

19.5.2. Compliance of the licence holders

report on alarm events or events and conditions Incidents of safety significance, including unintended belonging to category 1 reactor shutdowns, are reported in accordance with the – Reporting within 30 days: a comprehensive investigation non-routine reporting requirements in the STFs. There are report on events and conditions belonging to category two types of licensee event report (LER). The more severe 2, INES events of Level 1, and scram reports. one, called category 1, requires plant personnel to notify

Additional requirements include daily reporting of SSM within one hour. An extensive report is to be

operational state, power level and occurrence of any submitted within seven days from the point in time of the

abnormal events or disturbances, such as scrams, and event, and the full analysis of the event and appropriate

requirements for a comprehensive annual report summa- measures to prevent recurrence must be approved by SSM

rizing all experiences that are important for plant safety. before restarting the reactor. Only a very limited number

Specifications are provided on the content of the different of events of this category have occurred at Swedish plants

reports and further interpretation of the reporting over the years. These events are also typically of a

requirements given in the general advice. magnitude warranting prompt reporting (Level 2 or higher)

according to the INES scale. During the period 2016 – 18, One of the fundamental paragraphs contained in SSMFS three reported events were rated as Level 1 on the INES 2008:1 regulates actions to be taken by licensees in cases of scale. The rest of the reported events were rated as 0 or deficiencies in barriers or in the defence in depth. These below the scale. actions include the first assessment and classification, adjustment of the operational state, implementation of The other type of LER, called category 2, is used for less

necessary measures, performance of safety reviews, and severe events. This type of event is mentioned in the daily

reporting to SSM. A graded approach is allowed here. report that is submitted to the regulatory body; this is

Appendix 1 of the SSMFS 2008:1 regulation specifies followed up by a final report within 30 days.

events and conditions that require different responses Events that have resulted in reactor shutdown are analysed depending on the category of event they belong to. The by the operations department and reviewed independently three categories below are defined in this appendix: by the safety department and, at some sites, by the safety

committee before restarting the unit. The reports are

Category 1

reviewed at different levels within the operating organisa- A severe deficiency observed in one or more barriers or in tion and approved by the operations or production the defence in depth system, or a well-founded suspicion manager before submittal. These reports are distributed that safety is severely threatened. (In these cases, the facility within the organisation, to the regulatory body, and to must be brought to a safe state without delay.) other Swedish NPPs. This description is also valid for

Category 2 handling of LER category 2.

A deficiency observed in one barrier or in the defence in The front page of the standardised report form describes depth system that is less severe than that which is referred the event in general: identification number, title, reference to in category 1, or a well-founded suspicion that safety is to the relevant STF paragraph, date of discovery and threatened. (In these cases, the facility is allowed to length of time for corrective actions, conditions at the time continue operation under certain limitations and controls.) of occurrence, system consequences, a contact person at

the plant, and activities affected by the event. On the

Category 3

reverse side of the document, the event is described under A temporary deficiency in the defence in depth system that the following headings: arises when an event or situation is rectified and which,

without measures, could lead to a more severe condition. – Sequence of events and operational consequence(s)

Such deficiencies are pre-analysed in the OLCs. (In these – Safety significance cases, the facility is allowed to continue operation under – Direct and root causes certain limitations during implementation of the corrective – Planned/decided measures measures.) – Lessons learned from the event In all three cases, corrective measures are to be subjected – Other information to a twofold safety review by the licensee. The results of

these reviews must be submitted to SSM. After a category If the description of the event is extensive, additional

1 event, SSM must approve the measures taken before the pages are added to the form.

licensee is allowed to restart the plant. Category 3 events Reports are also required in accordance with the STF if are not subject to specific reporting to SSM. It is sufficient the permitted levels of activity release from the plant are to make a compilation of these events in the annual report.

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 135

exceeded, or in the event of unusually high radiation prevented or stopped the sequence, causes and root causes exposure to individuals at the plant. are to be identified, and the consequences clarified and the measures defined to prevent recurrence. MTO analysis is 19.5.3. Regulatory control used when root causes and in-depth analysis are deemed

Over the past few years, the number of licensee event relevant. MTO analysis is an established methodology (see reports (category 2 LERs) has been in the range of 20 to section 12.2) executed by a team of trained investigators 30 per year and operating reactor. During the past three available at all plants. years, the total number has been approximately 175 to 210 Analyses of reactor shutdowns and other event reports LERs each year. Licensee reporting has improved over the from Swedish NPPs, as well as from Finnish BWRs in past few years, and in most cases provides the necessary addition to other information from abroad, are performed information, together with SSM verifications on-site, for by Norderf, which provides Nordic NPPs with external making needed regulatory decisions. operational experience from the nuclear industry For more serious incidents, SSM has a procedure in place worldwide. Norderf consists of representatives from TVO for conducting on-site rapid investigations in the form of (Finland), Swedish nuclear power companies, SKB surveillance inspection (see section 8.8). This procedure (Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company), has been used in a few cases over the past few years. as well as KSU (nuclear safety and training). Analysis work

is performed by representatives of the above organisations and the results are reported to the plants every other week,

19.6. Operating experience

supplemented by topical and annual reports. Event reports 19.6.1. Regulatory requirements are classified. Severe events also imply recommendations The licensee shall ensure that experience of importance directed towards Swedish and Finnish operators.

for safety from own activities, and from similar activities The procedure for operating experience feedback (OEF, at other relevant facilities, is continuously analysed, acted termed “ERF” in Swedish) describes the requirements, upon and communicated to the personnel concerned. organisation and working principles for experience The requirements are stated in Chapter 3, Sections 16, 17 feedback in the Nordic system. A shared organisation and 18 of SSMFS 2008:1. Furthermore, all events and reviews experience feedback from the areas of reactor detected conditions that affect safety must be investigated safety, environmental protection and occupational safety. systematically in order to determine sequences and causes, Other experience feedback initiated by Norderf, or any as well as to establish the measures needed in order to other internal organisation, is also reviewed and entered restore safety margins and prevent recurrence. The results into a shared database. of the investigations shall, under Chapter 5, Section 4 of The working principles of the Nordic system include SSMFS 2008:1, be disseminated within the organisation screening by different organisations: and have the purpose of contributing to the development of safety work at the facility. Moreover, the results of – KSU is responsible for collecting and assessing events investigations must also be reported to SSM (see above). abroad for the Norderf process. These sources are SSM ensures that significant events are reported to mainly WANO, IAEA, OECD-NEA, USNRC, EU international organisations as appropriate (IAEA IRS) and Clearing House etc., and the information is collected, other regulatory bodies, as well as to other suitable reviewed, screened and sorted out as well as categorised organisations. by KSU. The events are graded on a scale of four .

– Norderf assesses all events, including scram reports,

19.6.2. Compliance of the licence holders

from Nordic BWR and PWR reactors, including final The objective of the operating experience analysis and repository and its settlement. International events are feedback programme is to learn from experience, from one’s assessed by Norderf and categorised into one of the own plant and from others, and to prevent recurrences of below: events, particularly events that might affect plant safety. – Category A: Significant importance for reactor safety The operating experience process consists of a wide variety of activities within the plant organisation as well as – Category B: Moderate importance for reactor safety

externally. Some activities are described briefly below. – Category C: Minor importance for reactor safety

– Category N: Not applicable to Nordic plants Around half of operating experience feedback is from – The task of OEF is to collect, evaluate, document and plant personnel and around half of overall analysis efforts follow up experience from the Nordic system. focus on events in one’s own reactors. Event reports constitute essential input for this analysis task, together – The OEF database is used for registration and with specific operating experience reports written about management of issues and the measures taken.

events. The reports include events that do not meet the – All Norderf Category A, B and C events, WANO event criteria for LERs, in addition to minor events and Significant Operating Experience Reports (SOERs) and near-misses. Norderf recommendations are managed in the respective plant’s OEF system. SSM imposes strict requirements for systematic investigations and analyses of events. The event sequence must All Swedish event reports are registered in the Norderf be fully clarified, including circumstances that might have event database. The database is intended for use by

136 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

operators who have direct access and can use it for specific technical skills and organisational position. The overall purposes. objective is to enhance reactor safety by making use of external events/lessons learned. Plants report events to the WANO Event Reporting Program. Event reports are selected in accordance with Selected technical issues with a possible impact on nuclear WANO criteria and sent for worldwide distribution. As safety are investigated within the organisation and then mentioned above, Swedish utilities also participate in evaluated by a multidisciplinary technical group composed various owners’ groups. Some plants also carry out of 10 persons. The group meets eleven times per year. The cooperation directly with other plants (i.e. Forsmark with SPS decides upon recommendations and whether or not the Finnish plant, TVO and the German plant, Gund- actions are to be taken. remmingen; the Oskarshamn NPP cooperates with other Uniper SE plants). Participation in owners’ groups is 19.6.2.2. Operating experience feedback function at considered valuable, although it is a more demanding task Forsmark to separate operating experience relevant to a specific The OEF function at Forsmark is organised in the plant design. Engineering Department. The OEF function is composed of two groups: Internal and External Operating Experience 19.6.2.1. Operating experience feedback function at and MTO Investigation.

Ringhals

Internal and External OE

The internal operating experience feedback function at The main task of the Internal OE is to manage all OEF Ringhals follows the principles of the industrial practice in a systematic and structured way. This includes implecommonly referred to as the Corrective Action mentation of a process for CAP (see Figure 32). In order Programme (CAP). The external operating experience to assist in handling and processing of OE reports, all feedback function (OPEX) is managed in a similar main departments at FKA have OE coordinators who are systemic process. responsible for ensuring that matters are dealt with as Corrective Action Programme (CAP) specified by the CAP process. The OEF department has CAP has the purpose of identifying deviations, near-misses four OE coordinators: one for the maintenance unit and and lessons learned in daily operations, implementing project, which is the planning and outage management corrective actions, and performing follow-ups. In addition, unit, one coordinator for plant operations units 1, 2 and 3, CAP provides input for the internal experience feedback loop. one coordinator for the engineering unit, and one coordinator for the safety, quality and environment unit. Each department manager is responsible for encouraging reporting of deviations (e.g. observations and near-misses) The main task for external OE is to enhance reactor safety from expected conditions (status, quality, etc.) and ensuring by making use of experience from external events and that the process of screening, analyses, corrective action lessons learned. A group made up of members designated and follow-ups is effective. based upon their technical skills and position in the organisation meets every other week to evaluate incoming CAP is carried out at the distributed sub-locations of external reports. The WANO SOER coordinator assists in Operations, Maintenance and Health & Physics, and they and follows up ongoing work with recommendations and all provide input for the internal OPEX by addressing actions for the SOER. relevant observations to the central OPEX group.

MTO investigation group Internal OPEX

The group’s main task is to provide and assist the entire Each department is responsible for managing OPEX organisation with adequate knowledge for performing root within their sub-organisation, including screening and cause analysis for events affecting the interplay between corrective actions. Screening and addressing are managing Man, Technology and Organisation (MTO). by the central OPEX group. The result is brought upstream to the central OPEX group meeting. This group

19.6.2.3. Operating experience feedback function at

is staffed by appointed representatives from the OPEX

Oskarshamn

group and two or three from the line organisation. All departments and sections at the Oskarshamn plant are Industrial experience, an analytical approach and credibility responsible for applying experience feedback in daily work in the organisation are considered valuable qualities for this within their own operations. This means that departments role. Input for the central OPEX group consists of and sections at OKG:

screened observations that might be of interest to share – Identify and share experiences and act upon across the organisation, along with OPEX – Identify root causes to prevent recurrence information from Norderf. – Allow experience feedback to be a natural part of daily External OPEX self-assessments and development and improvement work The production unit’s safety board (SPS) meets three or – Report on experiences and conduct trend analyses four times per year and constitutes the decision-making body for external experience feedback. The SPS appoints Departments and sections at OKG also obtain experience members to the external OPEX group based upon feedback from the quality department and from OKG’s

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 137

If the trend of codes show a rising trend, a new

External Internal

analyze is expected and corrective action are taken

Effect evaluation INPUT DATA/CODING

CAP

Follow-up Analyze Information No corrective action

Trend

Measure taken Recommendation

Corrective Action

Work orders Plant amendment Education Documentation Routine/Method

Figure 32. Vattenfall’s Corrective Action Programme.

ERF (operational experience feedback) group, which from the plant are shared through the CAP process by the consists of key members from various parts of the managers responsible in accordance with the management organisation. Production managers deal with deviations system. It is expected that all nonconformities and and events with regard to reactor safety at daily operational improvement proposals are dealt with in the process, review meetings. These are held every weekday. Specific which visualizes the drive for continuous improvements key issues are dealt with at operations assessment meetings, and defines setting of priorities. where the production managers require a broad illustration

Operating experience for training at KSU

and cause analysis of the issues being dealt with. OEF is included in KSU’s training programmes for plant Depending on the nature and complexity of the event, personnel. A special section at KSU is responsible for MTO analyses on different levels are conducted in order to screening and selecting OEF suitable for the training as far as possible have capability to focus resources and programmes. OEF information is forwarded to training evaluation time on events that require special scrutiny. departments in the form of OEF modules sorted by External issues are assessed with regard to any possibility training category. International OE information suitable that a similar event might occur at OKG. It is vital in this for training purposes is selected from WANO, IAEA and assessment to avoid exclusion of any issues based on NRC reports. Trainers can also consult with OE engineers dissimilarities found, and instead to seek identification of for additional operating experience suitable for training of associated similarities and details. operations personnel.

Corrective action programme (CAP)

OKG works with a CAP for management of events,

19.7. Regulatory control

nonconformities and suggested improvements, see figure 33. These are referred to collectively as ‘observations’. A procedure called “ASK” in Swedish, which deals with The main objective of observations is not only to identify analysis of disturbances on electricity-generating nuclear appropriate measures for reducing the risk of recurrence, power plants, is in place and used by SSM. The procedure but also to eliminate the risk of more serious events describes the management and evaluation of shortcomings taking place. reported by the licensees. This activity is divided into two parts: a national part which deals with reporting from the All employees at OKG undergo training on reporting of respective power plant, as regulated by SSMFS 2008:1, and observations. Managers and other key personnel undergo an international part which is reporting activity through the training on actively managing observations, performing IAEA reporting system, IRS. analyses, and executing proposed actions. Experiences

138 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

CAP-process workflow

Decision/ Handeling/ Screening Follow up Completion Report CR Complete CR priority on completion of CR actions of CR report actions of actions Condition CAP- Production CAP- Observer CR-owner CR-owner CR-owner coordinator meeting coordinator

Analysis

Resource for Figure 33. CAP process at OKG. analyse

All reports from licensees are screened each week by a radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel must be met as SSM team of six to eight persons from the reactor safety well as the need for extra space for moving radioactive department. These persons have different expert materials. knowledge and make a first assessment as to whether – Plans for the management, including disposal, of all these reports need further regulatory attention. Licensees radioactive material present at the facility, which is likely are asked for clarifications if necessary. If there are any to arise at the facility or is brought to the facility in some regulatory concerns, the issue is brought up at the way. The plans shall for example take into account management meeting of the department and further amounts of different categories of the radioactive measures to be taken by SSM are decided. The event material, estimated nuclide-specific content, and sorting, analysis group can also issue information notices in order treatment and interim storage of the radioactive to raise concerns in a broader sense. Once per year, a material. The plans are to be included in the safety seminar is held at which licensees and the regulator discuss analysis report before the facility is taken into operation. lessons learned from recent reports and the quality of the – Only packages approved by SSM may be transported to reports and root cause analysis. a geological repository (such as the SFR facility) for Since the 1970s, all LERs and reactor shutdown reports disposal. Such approval presupposes the waste packages from Swedish nuclear power reactors have been registered complying with conditions stated in the safety analysis in a database at the regulator (“ASKEN”). All events are report of the repository. indexed and searchable and can easily be trended across – An up-to-date inventory of on-site radioactive waste. many parameters. The events are also evaluated against The inventory of nuclear materials including spent IRS reporting guidelines and, if necessary, suggested for nuclear fuel is regulated by SSMFS 2008:3. reporting to the common IAEA and NEA international – Waste acceptance criteria must be derived based on the reporting system (WBIRS). properties of the radioactive material that can be received for storage, disposal or some other management. These criteria must, to the extent that is

19.8. Radioactive waste

feasible and possible, be formulated while taking into account safety and radiation protection throughout all

19.8.1. Regulatory requirements

stages of the ongoing management. The waste As of 1 November 2012, requirements are in effect acceptance criteria are to form part of the safety regarding handling, processing and storage of radioactive analysis report. waste. These requirements are stipulated by regulation SSMFS 2008:1. The regulations of SSM include require- – Procedures must also be in place for management of ments for the following: radioactive material that does not meet the waste acceptance criteria in that it is returned to the consignor, – Measures for safe on-site handling, storage or disposal or by taking measures to rectify identified deviations. of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel shall be described in the safety analysis report of the facility. For shallow land burial facilities, waste acceptance criteria The measures for on-site handling shall consider the are stated in the licence conditions. requirements implied by continued handling, transport and disposal of the radioactive material. 19.8.2. Compliance of the licence holders – Legally binding requirements to minimize radioactive 19.8.2.1. Spent fuel waste to a reasonable extent. Spent fuel is stored in fuel pools at Swedish nuclear power – When designing and operating a facility concerning plants, usually for an average of two years while awaiting space for storage, the need to inspect the stored transport. In the cases of the Forsmark and Ringhals

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 139

NPPs, transports are carried out by the M/S Sigrid, which 19.8.2.4. Low and very low-level waste ships the spent fuel in special transport casks to Clab. After segregation with respect to activity content and Clab is a central interim storage facility located near the combustibility, low-level waste is compacted into bales or Oskarshamn nuclear power plant. At the Oskarshamn site, packaged in drums or cases, which are placed in standard handling and operation of the casks are performed using freight containers. Some waste with very low activity level purpose-built vehicles. All transportation of the spent fuel is disposed of in shallow land burial sites at the nuclear is a routine operation. power plants. To minimize infiltration, the waste is covered with bentonite liners and/or compacted clays. The sealing 19.8.2.2. General objectives of waste management layers are protected by an approximately 1 metre thick layer The general objectives of waste management at the of moraine. Some combustible low-level waste is shipped locations of the nuclear power plants are: to Studsvik, where it is incinerated in a special facility. The ash is collected in steel drums, which in turn are grouted – Minimizing the amount of waste, with concrete in overpacks of steel. – Ensuring that all nuclear waste is handled and conditioned for disposal according to existing regulatory

19.8.2.5. Registration, storage and disposal of waste

requirements, and Registration and documentation are required for all waste – Accomplishing safe and cost-efficient waste management at the sites. Examples of data concerning the management with the least possible impact on human waste that is documented and registered in a database health and the environment. include:

Waste minimization is in certain cases substituted by – Identity optimization of waste generation, in which consideration – Type of package is given to radiation doses and costs. Minimization of the – Date of production amount of waste is, for example, achieved by reducing the – Category of waste amounts and kinds of materials brought into radiologically – Weight controlled areas, and separating waste at source. Radio- – Activity content, nuclide composition and dose active wastes generated at Swedish nuclear power plants rate at the surface or at a distance of 1 m belong to different categories; consequently, they are – Position during intermediate storage treated, stored and disposed of in various ways as described briefly below. Production and storage of radioactive waste at the plants are reported annually to SSM and SKB.

19.8.2.3. Intermediate-level waste

This type of waste is dominated by filters and spent ion Intermediate and low-level waste at the nuclear power exchange resins, which are commonly solidified with plants is stored temporarily in rock caverns or storage cement or bitumen in steel drums, or in moulds of buildings while awaiting transport to the SFR repository. reinforced concrete or carbon steel. The cement or SFR is located near the Forsmark nuclear power plant. bitumen immobilizes waste, while moulds contain different The use of waste packages of different types and their materials and in case of use concrete moulds also provide application for storage of various radioactive waste must for radiation shielding. Some intermediate-level resins with have approval of SSM. relatively low activity content are packaged in concrete tanks and dehydrated without solidification. 19.8.3. Regulatory control Inspection of on-site management of radioactive waste is Metal scrap and other kinds of solid wastes above a certain carried out by SSM’s inspectors. SSM also inspects level of activity also belong to this category. They are radiation protection aspects of waste handling. A major packaged in concrete or steel moulds, compacted if effort undertaken by specialists at SSM is to review and possible and grouted with concrete. approve the types of waste packages produced at the nuclear power plants, prior to their use for disposal in SFR.

140 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention

19.9. Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety

This section, in reference to Article 19, accounts for Sweden’s implementation of relevant improvements concerning principles of the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety regarding safe operation of nuclear power plants. Swedish PWRs use EOPs and SAMG (Severe Accident Management Guidelines) from the Westinghouse Owners Group, whereas the BWRs are subject to their own developed instructions and guidelines for accident management. These procedures (both PWR and BWR) originally covered management of situations including loss of all AC power and dealt with depressurization through the system for filtered ventilation of the containment, etc. Since mid-2017, work is in progress on carrying out improvements and drawing up new procedures for extraordinary situations at Swedish NPPs. Due to the experience from the Fukushima event, the work will also enhance procedures and guides for dealing with accidents affecting more than one unit at a site. Another goal of this update is to improve the procedures and adapt them to international guidelines in the area of SAMG. This work is scheduled to be finished at the end of 2020.

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 141

Abbreviations

ALARA As Low As Reasonably Achievable (a principle applied in radiation protection) ANS American Nuclear Society ANSI American National Standard Institute BAT Best Available Technique BSS The Basic Safety Standards Directive of the Euratom BWR Boiling Water Reactor CAP Corrective Action Programme CAT Containment Air Test CCF Common Cause Failure Clab Central Interim Storage Facility for Spent Nuclear Fuel CNS Convention on Nuclear Safety DBA Design Basis Accident BDBA Beyond Design Basis Accident EDG Emergency Diesel Generator ENISS European Nuclear Installations Safety Standards ENSREG European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group EPRI Electric Power Research Institute EU European Union EUR European Utility Requirements FKA Forsmarks Kraftgrupp AB (licence holder of Forsmark NPP) FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency ICCS Independent Core Cooling System I&C Instrumentation and Control IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers INES International Nuclear Event Scale IRS IAEA International Reporting System for Operating Experience INPO Institute of Nuclear Power Operations IRRS IAEA Integrated Regulatory Review Service KPI Key Performance Indicator KSKG Kärnkraftssäkerhetskoordineringsgrupp (Nuclear Safety Coordination Group of the Swedish licensees) KSU Kärnkraftsäkerhet och Utbildning AB (the Swedish Nuclear Training and Safety Centre) LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident LTO Long Term Operation KTH Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan (Royal Institute of Technology) LER Licensee Event Report LILW Low and Intermediate Level Waste MSB Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap (Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency) MTO Interaction between Man, Technology and Organisation

142 Abbreviations

MVSS Multi Venturi Scrubber System NAcP EU stress test National Action Plan NORM Naturally occurring radioactive material NDT Non Destructive Testing NKS Nordic Nuclear Safety Research Norderf Swedish-Finnish Group for Operating Experience Feedback NPP Nuclear Power Plant (including all nuclear power units at one site) NPSAG Nordic PSA Group NUREG Nuclear Regulatory Guide (issued by the USNRC) OE Operational Experience OECD/NEA Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/ Nuclear Energy Agency OKG OKG Aktiebolag (licence holder of Oskarshamn NPP) OLC Operational Limits and Conditions OSART Operational Safety Review Team (a review service of the IAEA) PSA Probabilistic Safety Analysis (or Assessment) PSAR Preliminary Safety Analysis Report PSR Periodic Safety Review PWR Pressurized Water Reactor PHWR Pressurized Heavy Water Reactor R&D Research and Development RAB Ringhals AB (licence holder of Ringhals NPP) RPS Reactor Protection System SALTO Safe Long Term Operation (a review service of the IAEA) SAMG Severe Accident Management Guideline SAR Safety Analysis Report SFR Final repository for short-lived radioactive waste SKB Svensk Kärnbränslehantering AB (the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company) SKC Svenskt kärntekniskt centrum (Swedish Centre of Nuclear Technology) SOER Significant Operating Experience Report SQC Swedish Qualification Centre (NDT qualification SSM Strålsäkerhetsmyndigheten (Swedish Radiation Safety Authority) SSMFS Strålsäkerhetsmyndighetens författningssamling (the SSM Code of Statutes) STF Säkerhetstekniska driftförutsättningar (Technical Specifications, Operational Limits and Conditions) SVAFO Swedish company engaged in management of radioactive waste SWEDAC Swedish Board for Accreditation and Conformity Assessment TMI Three Mile Island NPP USNRC US Nuclear Regulatory Commission VDNS Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety VTT Finnish Technical Research Centre WANO World Association of Nuclear Operators WENRA Western European Nuclear Regulators’ Association

Abbreviations 143

Appendix 1

Major past and currently implemented modifications at Swedish NPPs.

1. Measures implemented during the reporting period 2016–18

1.1. Oskarshamn NPP

– New permanent diesel generator set to the emergency Command Centre location 1.1.1. Oskarshamn unit 1 and unit 2 – An external break-point about 50 km from the site, – No significant measures are implemented since decision where we in a safe way can exchange staff to and from have been taken to permanently shut down unit 1 and 2 the site in case of a severe accident. The break-point has (Today not in operation). monitors and showers as well as a storehouse and, of course, personnel that supports the teams and runs the

1.1.2. Oskarshamn unit 3

place – Enhanced and simplified connection of the on-site – Exchange of electrical motors to a new design in most existing gas-turbine plant to the busbars on unit 3. In of the process systems, no spare parts to the original order to get a robust and powerful (40 MW) diversified motors are available anymore. power source. – Exchange of fire extinguishing piping due to corrosion. – The amount of availavable water for make-up to the primary system and creating a feed-and-bleed possibility – Installation of protection against discrepancies beween for the spent fuel pools is increased to 120 000 m 3 . by the terminals in the three-phase connections to the installation of new pumps and valves to bypass to external grid. operational water treatment facility. The latter is also a – Inspection and repair measures in the sea water cooling part of the final solution of the ICCS function. channels – A shut-off valve in the storm water well in the yard in – Installation of additional logic to run-back of the main order to prevent back-flow from the baltic sea in case of feedwater pumps in case of an ATWS event, in order to water levels exceeding the 10 – 7/year probability. protect the cladding from high temperatures. – Reinforced capability to cool the condensation pool – Installation of additional logic regarding the pressure with two out of the four available trains of the control valves in the safety relief valve system, in order condensation pool cooling system and the to better preserve the Reactor Pressure Vessels water corresponding diesel generator engines. inventory.

144 Appendix 1

– Installation of new relay protections in the operational Ringhals unit 1 and unit 2

10 kV busbars in order to protect the electrical motors – Installation of protection features against Open Phase

connected to the busbars from asymmetric errors Conditions in the Electric Power Systems (2017)

(phase errors). – Installation of temperature controlled ventialtion

dampers to avoid steam intrusion to electrical rooms

1.2. Forsmark NPP (only unit 2) (2016)

Forsmark unit 1 Ringhals unit 3and unit 4

– Independent water supply to the spent fuel pool – Extended battery capacity on Class 1E electrical systems

(2016 – 2017) (at least 8 hours) (2017)

– Forward pumping of high pressure drainage (2018) – Mobile diesel generators (primarily to charge batteries)

with separate connection points to the electric power – Upgrade of alarm signal system (non-safety system) systems (2017) (2017) – Installation of protection features against Open Phase – Change of production platform for control systems conditions and Sustained Degraded Voltage conditions (non-safety system) (2018) the Electric Power Systems (2018) – Installation of protection device regarding degraded – Environmental qualification uppgrades (2016-2018) voltage conditions at the EDG busbars (2015 – 2017) – Replacement of safe ends and spool pieces on – Improvement of the RPS regarding trip conditions pressurizer (only unit 3) (2016) (2017) – Installation of filters in the salt water system piping – Forsmark unit 2 upstream the emergency diesels (2017) – Independent water supply to the spent fuel pool – Installation of manual waste gate valves to improve the (2016 – 2017) tolerance for low outside temperatures (2016) – Upgrade of alarm signal system (non-safety system) – Automatic disconnection of the pressurizer backup (2018) heater upon active SI-signal to decrease the Emergency – Installation of protection device regarding degraded Diesel Generator load (2017) voltage conditions at the EDG busbars (2015 – 2017) – Emergency Diesel Generators modernization, power – Replacement of Step-up and Auxiliary Transformers increase and major overhaul of diesel generators (2018) (2016 – 2018) – Improvement of the RPS regarding trip conditions – Analysis of verify Long Term Operation of the plant (2018) (2018)

Forsmark unit 3

– Time Limited Ageing Analyses of important structures, – Independent water supply to the spent fuel pool systems and components (2018) (2016 – 2017) – Introduction of a risk monitoring tool (2018) – Installation of protection device regarding degraded Requalification of the containment sump strainers voltage conditions at the EDG busbars (2015 – 2017) (including reducing the amount och fibre isolation in the – Replacement of containment electrical penetration containment) to resolve GSI-191 (2018) assemblies (2015 – 2018)

– Replacement of wide range neutron monitor (2018)

1.3. Ringhals NPP

Ringhals unit 1 – 4

– Improvements of the Emergency preparedness to

comply with new regulations SSMFS 2014:2 (including

new logistics centre outside the site, sysstem to oversee

the evacuation of the site ) (2016 – 2018)

Measures implemented during the reporting period 2016–18 145

2. Modifications implemented 1995–2015

2.1. Oskarshamn NPP

The following modifications were performed after the finalisation of the PULS project until 2013.

Oskarshamn unit 3

Major safety modifications have been implemented at – Changed turbine bearings Oskarshamn unit 3. The PULS (Power Uprate with Licensed – Increased manoeuvrability and instrumentation of the Safety) project included a power uprate, modifications to reactor protection functions in the emergency control comply with SSMFS 2008:17 as well as replacement of room critical components in order to achieve a 60-year operating – Replacement of 400kV switchgear life. The power uprate of Oskarshamn unit 3 to 3900 – Replaced internal parts of the reactor pressure vessel MWth and 1450 MWe gross is now complete (the plant is (shroud head, steam separators and steam dryers). still in test operations). This corresponds to 129% of the – Fire hazards analysis (2010 – 13) original design (3020 MWth). The uprated plant is planned – Update of the environmental qualification inside the for operation until 2045 (60-year lifetime). The main part containment, including measures if necessary (2014) of the work was performed during the 2009 outage.

2.2. Forsmark NPP

A great number of modifications were made in order to improve safety. For example, nuclide-specific on-line The first comprehensive modernization programme for measurement was installed in the turbine offgas system the Forsmark NPP, Program 2000, started in 1995, and was with the purpose of achieving early detection of fuel completed in 2000. Another strategy and modernization failures. Experience from the events at Forsmark unit 1 plan was then adopted, Program P40+, that contained on 25 July 2006 resulted in the redesign of the auto modernization items, of which 70% are aimed at mainswitching automatics for the diesel bus bars at voltages of taining technical status, 20% for safety upgrades and 10% less than 85%. for dose reduction and environmental improvements. Some other examples of the modifications implemented The following major measures have been completed: during PULS are listed below: – removal of the core spray nozzles in the reactor – Replacement of internal parts in the RPV pressure vessel after analyses showing that all safety – Replacement of main steam isolation valves requirements are met with injection only. The – Installation of new aggregate and station transformers advantages are: less non-destructive testing will be – Installation of a new generator required in the future, releasing resources for other – Replacement of high-pressure turbine and all safety work; avoiding the risk for costly repairs; and low-pressure turbines lower doses to the personnel – Installation of two new scram modules in system for – replacement of equipment in the main circulation hydraulic SCRAM pumps to reduce transients on the fuel at loss of – Replacement of all main circulation pumps external power – Replacement of all main cool water-pumps – prevention of oxy-hydrogen in steam systems – Installation of new logic chains in the reactor protection – diversified reactor vessel level measurement computer system – new equipment for physical protection – Installation of new diversified cooling chains. – improved fire safety and security systems – Component diversity in the RPV level measurement – strengthening of auxiliary buildings to withstand created by using different brands of level transmitters external hazards. (differential pressure) in two different measurement – exchange of moderator tank lid ranges. – exchange of moisture separator

146 Modifications implemented 1995–2015

– exchange of steam separator – Improved fire protection of safety functions by – a new diversified reactor shutdown system additional spray nozzles in culverts containing power – robustness measure to prevent pipe-break and I&C cables

– measures on new I&C in the Emergency Control Room – New RPV-internals. Moderator vessel head, steam and moisture separators installed. – earthquake measures – Diversified reactivity control implemented. – diversification of sensors and actuation of RPS Automatization of the initiation of the boron injection – ventilation measures in electrical building to segregate system fire compartments – New main steam inboard isolation valves installed – new hook-on devices for the containment for external – Reconstruction of the sequence for control rod screw mobile decay heat cooling units. activation in order to fulfil requirements on diversity

Forsmark unit 1 and unit 2

– New high voltage switchgear for connection of unit 2 – core grids and other reactor internals have been to the 400kV grid replaced in units (unit 1 and 2) – New high pressure turbines 2009 – replacement of 6 kV switchboards (units 1 and 2). – replacement of electrical control boards in the main

Forsmark unit 1

control room (unit 2) – modernization of instrumentation for activity – modification of the reactor pressure vessel head measurement in the off-gas system. These modifications sprinkler comprise detectors as well as electronics. – modernization of the power measurement system – measures to deal with slowly decreasing voltage in the – modification of the cooling chain for increased capacity external grid. Relay protection modification to and separation of power supply connections disconnect the external grid if the voltage decreases to – new low pressure turbines (2006). less than 85% for 10 second.

Forsmark unit 3

– improved capacity and physical separation of cooling chains to the condensation pool. These cooling chains – Measures to handle slow decreasing voltage in outside are now divided in four sub divisions. grid. Relay protection modification to disconnect the outside grid if the voltage decreases to less than 85% – partial scram upgraded. Modification comprises design for 10 second. as well as conditions for the activation of partial scram. – Diversified source for emergency feed water to the RPV – installation of cyclone filters in the feed water system inside the containment. The purpose of these filters is – Partial scram upgraded. Modification comprises design to collect debris that could cause fuel damage. as well as conditions for the activation of partial scram

– redesign of the sequence for control rod screw – New nuclide-specific on-line measurement equipment in activation in order to fulfil requirements on diversity. the stack

– replacement of the power range monitoring system. – Separation of operational and safety functions in the The new system contains protection against power power system with battery back-up

oscillations. – A new diversified reactor shutdown system

– improved fire protection of safety functions by – Separation of safety classified electrical equipment from additional spray nozzles in culverts containing power non safety

and I&C cables. – Measures to diversify the residual heat removal

– new high voltage switchgear for connection of unit 1 to – Security measures the 400kV grid. – Robustness measure against pipe-break

– alteration of the reactor’s auxiliary cooling circuits, – new automatic stop of reactor building ventilation in separation of power supplies and increase in Capacity case of loss of heating system for the building

– new low pressure turbines (2005). – new low pressure turbines (2004)

Forsmark unit 2 – Analysis of the requirement on two different parameters – Partial scram upgraded. Modification comprises design to identify the need of initiation of the reactor as well as conditions for the activation of partial scram. protection system, including necessary plant – Replacement of the power range monitor system. The modifications (2013)

new system contains protection against power

oscillations 2.3. Ringhals NPP

– Modernization of instrumentation for activity The renewal programme for the Ringhals plant was measurement in the off-gas system. These modifications initiated in 1997, and the following major measures have comprise detectors as well as electronics. been completed.

– Measures to handle slow decreasing voltage in the

Ringhals units 1 – 4

outside grid. Relay protection modification to – Improvements in fire protection systems disconnect the external grid if the voltage decreases to less than 85% for 10 second. – Fire system modernizations

Modifications implemented 1995–2015 147

– Upgrading and modernizing Ringhals NPP’s – Analysis of local loads (2013), including necessary plant Command Centre modifications (2015) – Strategy for long-term cooling of a severely damaged – Analysis of natural phenomena, including necessary core, including necessary plant modifications (2014 –15) plant modifications (2013) – Update of the environmental qualification outside the – Measures regarding dependency of miniature circuit containment, including necessary plant modifications breakers (2014) (2015 ) – Emergency Diesel Generators modernization, power Ringhals unit 1 and unit 4 increase and major overhaul of diesel generators (2014, – Analysis of earthquake, including necessary plant 2015) modifications (2011–13) Ringhals unit 1 Ringhals unit 2 and unit 4 – separation of electric power supply of core cooling – Interconnection of RH and SP systems (2014) systems – introduction of alarm for core instability

Ringhals units 2 – 4

– exchange of control rod indication and manoeuvring – improvements of the safety valves of the pressurizer system – modernization of the radiation monitoring system – verification and improvement of piping supports – measures to cope with containment sump blockage – the SPRINT project (replacement of primary system during design basis accidents piping) – improved battery capacity during station black-out – part two of fire protection modernization programme – securing of piping for the pressurizer completed.

Ringhals units 3 and 4

– diversified source for feed water to the core spray – modernization of the safety injection pumps including system installed. vibration monitoring – modernization project RPS/SP2 completed. The main – upgrading with redundant cooling of the charging purpose of these modifications is to increase the level pumps at shut-down of separation in order to strengthen protection against – modernization of vibration measurement/monitoring fire and to mitigate common cause failures, i.e. to of the reactor coolant pumps improve diversity in safety functions. Major modifications – introduction of cavitation alarms on the residual heat consist of modernization of the reactor protection system removal pumps and improvement of the residual heat removal systems. – reactor pressure vessel heads replaced – measures on RPS (isolation logic train blockage during – pressurizer relief valves replaced/modified tests enhanced) – new emergency core cooling strainers fitted in the – robustness measures on electrical systems (from bottom of the containments Forsmark event of 25 July 2006) – diesel back up power supply to the spent fuel pool – a new diversified reactor shutdown system cooling systems installed – security measures – passive autocatalytic re-combiners installed in the – Post-Accident measure system containment – a new main fire water ring installed for the site of units – upgraded capacity in the heat exchangers for the spent 1 and 2. fuel pool cooling systems – Separation of operation and safety systems within the – power operated relief valves of the pressurizer qualified switchgear (2013) to withstand water blowing – Change to two phase flow relief valves (2014) – improved fire protection in the relay and cable – Measures to vent incondensable gases from the reactor spreading rooms vessel (2015) – environmental qualification of components in the – Improvement of the back panels in the control room turbine and auxillary building (2013) – Diversified Protection System Ringhals unit 2 – redundant check valves – completions for the Twice-project, replacement I & C – PORV qualification for containing liquid equipment including the main control room – steam line break protection – a fourth level measurement channel installed in the – NICE – Modernization of turbine and generators’ I&C steam generators – replacement of Kerotest valves – modernization of 110 V DC systems with new – replacement of control room roof switchboards – modernization emergency control room – replacement of toroid plates – measures to meet the seismic requirements of the facility. – pressurizer relief valves replaced/modified – Analysis of the emergency control post, including – replacements and improvement in the electrical supply necessary plant modifications (2013) systems for improved separation and safety

148 Modifications implemented 1995–2015

– Passive autocatalytic recombiners installed in the containment – Implementation of the TWICE-project. I&C equipment replaced with new technology. Modifications include new main control room (MCR), all I&C and cables connected to MCR together with sensors and measuring apparatus in the plant. – Separation of RPS – Diverse actuation system – New severe accident monitoring systems – a new main fire water ring installed for the site of units 1 and 2. – Measures to make the auxiliary feed-water system independent, including a new water supply (2013; application to extend completion time until 2015) – Physical separation within the ventilation system in the auxiliary systems building (2014) – Analysis of the physical separation within the power system in the auxiliary systems building and the containment, including necessary plant modifications (2014) – Separation within component cooling system (2014) – Supports for several containment isolation valves (2014) – Fire hazards analysis, including necessary plant modifications ( 2014) – Incore and Flux measurement (2015)

Ringhals unit 3

– Modernization of turbine – The GREAT power uprate project completed, thermal power increased to 3144 MW.

Ringhals unit 4

– Steam generator and pressurizer replacement.

Modifications implemented 1995–2015 149

Appendix 2

Progress of National Action Plan

Foreword

The Swedish national action plan (NacP) was first issued in SSM has continuously performed reviews and follow up on December 2012 and was reviewed and revised in the licensee actions concerning the Swedish national action December 2014. This Appendix describes the current plan. Due to a high degree of complexity, the majority of status of the actions included in the Swedish national the necessary technical and administrative measures action plan. identified by the investigations included in the Swedish national action plan, were expected to be implemented Following the severe accidents which started in the after 2015. Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant, the European Council of 24/25 March 2011 requested stress tests to be All measures in the Swedish national action plan have been performed on all European nuclear power plants. The completed in accordance to the given time schedule. The Swedish national action plan is part of these stress tests implementations of all identified measures at all sites will and was developed with the aim to manage all plant be completed at the latest in 2020, when the Independent weaknesses identified by the EU stress tests as well as by Core Cooling System (ICCS) will be in place. The installaother forums such as the second extraordinary meeting tions of the ICCS is an important major technical measure under the Convention on Nuclear Safety. that is required to be in place by the end of 2020 at all Swedish NPPs that will operate after 2020. In general, the Swedish national action plan required investigations to be performed whose aim it was to determine and consider which technical and administrative measures that would be needed as well as how they should be implemented and appropriate time schedule for these technical and administrative measures. According to the Swedish national action plan, all necessary actions resulting from the investigations, such as technical and administrative measures should be fully implemented before the end of 2020.

150 Appendix 2

1. Progress on implementation and necessary technical and administrative measures

In the following sections the progress on the measures shows that the NPPs can handle extreme weather with the included in the Swedish national action plan are described. exceedance frequency of 10 – 5 per annum. For the ICC to Further technical and administrative measures identified be installed by 2020 extreme weather with the exceedance and considered as needed by the completed investigations frequency of 10 – 6 per annum shall be considered for the are also described. design.

T1.LA.5 – Investigation of the frequency of extreme water

1.1. Natural hazards

levels

Completed for all NPPs. The analyses and in some cases

1.1.1. Actions performed by the licensees

corresponding administrative and physical improvements In this section, the status for each measure related to shows that the NPPs can handle extreme water levels with natural hazards performed by the Swedish licensees (LA) the exceedance frequency of 10 – 5 per annum. For the is given. Further technical and administrative measures ICCS to be installed by 2020 extreme water levels with the needed are also described. exceedance frequency of 10 – 6 per annum shall be T1.LA.1 – Seismic plant analyses considered for the design.

Completed for all NPPs. Further studies regarding the T1.LA.6 - Flooding margin assessments structural integrity of the reactor containments, scrubber Completed for all NPPs. Analyses of incrementally buildings and fuel storage pools have been performed. increased flooding levels beyond the design basis and The analyses showed that those structures can withstand identification of potential improvements have been an earthquake significantly stronger than the “Swedish performed. These analyses included capability to mitigate E-5-earthquake”. For the ICC to be installed by 2020 internal and external flooding events. Weaknesses have earthquakes with the exceedance frequency of 10 – 6 per been addressed and physical measures have been taken at annum shall be considered for the design. some plants T1.LA.2 – Investigation regarding secondary effects of an T1.LA.7 – Evaluation of the protected volume approach earthquake

Completed for all NPPs. Based on performed stress tests, Completed for all NPPs. A more detailed analysis of measures have been taken at some plants. earthquake induced flooding has been included in the analyses regarding secondary effects. In addition, seismic T1.LA.8 – Investigation of an improved early warning induced fires have been analysed. Minor weaknesses have notification been addressed. Completed for all NPPs. The licensees have introduced T1.LA.3 – Review of seismic monitoring instructions for the control room staff to check the

weather forecast with the Swedish Metrological and Hydro- Completed for all NPPs. Seismic monitoring systems are logical Institute (SMHI) once per shift. The instructions installed at all Swedish sites. The licensees have reviewed include a check regarding possible effects of extreme the procedures and training program for seismic moniweather conditions at the NPPs and the consideration of toring and implemented the revised procedures and suitable mitigating measures. programs.

T1.LA.9 – Investigation of external hazard margins T1.LA.4 – Investigation of extreme weather conditions

Completed for all NPPs. The analyses and in some cases Completed for all NPPs. The analyses, and in some cases the corresponding administrative and physical improvecorresponding administrative and physical improvements, ments show that the NPPs can handle external hazard with

Progress on implementation and necessary technical and administrative measures 151

the exceedance frequency of 10 – 5 per annum. For the design basis. All licensees have already performed strength- ICC to be installed by 2020 extreme external hazards with ening of the electrical power supply. In some cases, the the exceedance frequency of 10 – 6 per annum shall be strengthening will be a part of the ICCS solutions. considered for the design. T2.LA.4 – Reassess DC power supplies and DC power T1.LA.10 – Develop standards to address qualified plant distribution system Completed for all NPPs. The licensees walk-downs have analysed the actual battery capacity available with existing loads. The analyses shows that there are consider- Completed for all NPPs. Extensive efforts have been able margins of the batteries at some of the plants. For the undertaken to manage resistance to earthquakes and other remaining plants, measures have been taken to expand the external events. As part of this, a walk-down methodology battery capacity in existing battery systems. Alternatively an has been defined and documented, and walk-downs have application of load shedding or a combination thereof been performed. The licensees use the deterministic have been installed. method represented by SMA T2.LA.5 – Reassess the integrity of the primary system (Seismic Margin Assessment), based on guidelines in the EPRI NP-6041 SL Completed for all NPPs. For the PWRs the integrity of the primary system has been further evaluated and reassessed 1.1.2. Actions to be performed by the regulators for prolonged extreme situations resulting from natural The following section describes the status for each phenomena and other events. This included reassessment measure related to natural hazards performed by the of the primary pumps seals, which will be replaced at the Swedish regulatory body (RA). latest in 2020.

T1.RA.1 – Research project regarding the influence of T2.LA.6 – Reassess the operability and habitability of the paleoseismological data Main and Emergency Control Rooms as well as emergency

control centreCompleted for all NPPs. Operability and Completed. Results presented in SSM technical report habitability of both the main and the emergency control 2017:35. rooms as well as of the emergency control centre have T1.RA.2 – Estimation of extreme weather conditions been further evaluated. Some weak points have been

identified and addressed. For example, the inner roofs in SSM shall initiate a study to better estimate extreme the control rooms have been strengthened to withstand weather conditions. The study will be performed as a strong earthquakes. research project in cooperation with the industry. A research project with the same aim is ongoing within the T2.LA.7 – Reassess the instrumentation and monitoring Finnish SAFIR-program, EXWE, thus cooperation would Completed for all NPPs. For dose monitoring, see T3. be useful. The project will start in 2018. LA.4. For core cooling and residual heat removal, see T3. LA2. For spent fuel pools see, T2.LA.8, and T3.LA.3.

1.2. Design issues

T2.LA.8 – Reassess the integrity of the spent fuel pools

1.2.1. Actions to be performed by the licensees

Completed for all NPPs. The integrity and robustness of The following section describes the status for each the spent fuel pools during prolonged extreme situations measure related to Design issues performed by the Swedish have been further evaluated and reassessed. The assesslicensees (LA). Further technical and administrative ments have defined technical and administrative measures measures needed are also described. to be addressed, e.g. regarding strengthening of the T2.LA.1 – Implementation of the demonstrations of instrumentation and of the water supply to the fuel pools.

design basis in SAR T2.LA.9 – Evaluate the need for mobile equipment

Completed for all NPPs. Included in the Safety Analysis Completed for all NPPs. New mobile equipment has been Reports for all Swedish NPPs identified as necessary for all plants for prolonged extreme T2.LA.2 – Define design basis for alternate cooling and situations. The needed mobile equipment is in place.

alternate residual heat removal T2.LA.10 – Reassess and update equipment inspection Completed for all NPPs. The ICCS decision states that programs

Loss of Ultimate Heat Sink (LUHS) 72 hours is a design Completed for all NPPs. Plans have been developed to basis. The licensees have also performed strengthening of ensure that the procedures for inspection and maintenance existing alternate cooling and alternate residual heat are incorporated in ordinary activities, both for equipment removal. In some cases, the strengthening will be a part of that existed before the Fukushima accident and equipment the ICCS solutions. acquired as a result of the stress tests.

T2.LA.3 – Primary and alternative AC power supplies and T2.LA.11 – Reassess and update training programs AC power distribution systems Ongoing. Training programs are reassessed when new Completed for all NPPs. The ICCS decision states that equipment and new administrative measures are in place. Extended Loss of AC Power (ELAP) for 72 hours is a

152 Progress on implementation and necessary technical and administrative measures

T2.LA.12 – Evaluate the need for consumables 1.2.2. Actions to be performed by the regulators

No specific actions to be performed by the Swedish Completed for all NPPs. The licensees have evaluated and regulatory body (RA) have been identified. assessed the technical and administrative measures needed to ensure adequate accessibility during all potential

1.3. Severe accident management and

situations.

The conclusions drawn are that the review carried out by recovery (Onsite)

all facilities for fuel supplies and consumables do fulfil the

19.9.1. Actions to be performed by the licensees

requirement. The following section describes the status for each T2.LA.13 – Evaluate the need for resources measures related to severe accident management

performed by the Swedish licensees (LA). Further technical Completed for all NPPs. This issue is handled within the and administrative measures needed are also described. framework of actions in response to the requirements of the new emergency regulations, SSMFS 2014: 2 T3.LA.1 – Consider improvements of the capability to

cool the spent fuel pool T2.LA.14 – Evaluate the accessibility of important areas

The licensees have in a common project developed a Completed for all NPPs. The licensees have conducted a ”Position Paper” that defines requirements that shall be review of existing emergency operating procedures with adopted. bearing on accessibility of important areas. This has resulted in an updating of the instructions in the T3.LA.2 – Define the design basis for an independent core Emergency Operating Procedures. cooling system

T2.LA.15 – Investigate the effects of simultaneous events The licensees have in a common project developed a affecting all reactors at the site ”Position Paper” that defines requirements that shall be

adopted. Completed for all NPPs. The licensees have conducted a review of existing operating procedures with focus on T3.LA.3 – Investigate instrumentation of spent fuel pool weather and other events that can simultaneously affect all Completed for all NPPs. reactors at the site. This has resulted in an update of the This will be followed by introducing necessary instrumeninstructions in SAR and Operating Procedures. tation to monitor temperature and water level in the fuel T2.LA.16 – Reassess the use of severe accident mitigation pools in connection with the introduction of an alternative systems function for cooling the fuel in the fuel storage pools. See

Action T3.LA.1. This is a part of the solutions for ICCS for the BWRs, which will use the severe accident mitigation systems as an T3.LA.4 – Investigate the need for measuring radiation levels ultimate heat sink. The analyses or/and technical improve- Completed for all NPPs. Recommendations on more dose ments showing that this does not affect the system’s rate monitors in the reactor building to support accident primary function as a severe accident mitigation system, management have been addressed at all utilities. New must have been completed by 2020. monitors have been installed at the NPPs. T2.LA.17 – Reassess the procedures and operational T3.LA.5 – Develop a plan to handle more than one training affected unit Ongoing. Procedures and operational training are reas- Completed for all NPPs. As a direct measure after the sessed when new equipment and new administrative Stress tests, the licensees have developed training scenarios measures are in place. and emergency exercises in which more than one reactor at T2.LA.18 – Evaluate the need for external support each site is involved.

Completed for all NPPs. The licensees have implemented T3.LA.6 – Improve the strategies for managing re-criticality and evaluated external recourses that will be needed in Completed for all NPPs. The licensees have conducted a prolonged extreme situations. review of existing emergency operating procedures with T2.LA.19 – Reassess the risk of criticality and/or re-criticality bearing on re-criticality. This has resulted in updating of

the instructions in the Emergency Operating Procedures. Completed for all NPPs. For the Ringhals PWRs re- criticality must be considered in the long-term scenario. Measures T3.LA.7 – Develop the strategies for managing loss of have been identified and addressed and will be performed containment integrity Completed for all NPPs. in the ICCS project. Boron will be included in the ICCS The licensees have investigated possible strategies on the water and new pump seals installed. loss of containment function and approaches to assess the The overall probability for re-criticality that endangers the containment damage extent. The outcome of the investigacontainment integrity is judged very low for the BWRs tions have been incorporated in the Emergency Operating based on APRI research. Instructions.

Progress on implementation and necessary technical and administrative measures 153

T3.LA.8 – Evaluate accident management programmes performed by the licensees. The conclusion of the study is

that none of the studied phenomena are expected to Completed for all NPPs. A review of the instructions have provide substantial degradation of the containment and been carried out for all utilities. Some changes have been increase the emissions. Uncertainties remain for some implemented based on the findings. As the emergency plants regarding the risks of corrosion and degradation of preparedness organisation develops, further mobile polymeric materials. Current research in these areas should equipment are introduced and analyses carried out. The be followed. emergency procedures are continuously developed.

T3.LA.18 – Evaluate the need for common resources T3.LA.9 – Consider an extended scope of training and drills available at the site

Completed for all NPPs. As a direct measure after the Completed for all NPPs. The licensees have evaluated the Stress tests, the licensees developed training scenarios and existing shared resources on the site with different emergency exercises in which more than one plant at each suggested solutions. site is involved.

T3.LA.19 – Investigate the performance of the common T3.LA.10 – Investigate the need for a new call-in system system for filtered containment venting

Completed for all NPPs. The licensees have in some cases Not applicable since Oskarshamn 1 and 2 are permanently decided to introduce enhanced call-in-systems. shut down. No other plants have common containment

T3.LA.11 – Analyse the management of hydrogen venting.

Completed for all NPPs. An investigation regarding the

1.3.1. Actions to be performed by the regulators

handling of hydrogen (oxyhydrogen) after a severe No specific actions to be performed by the Swedish accident is handled in a joint licensees project within the regulatory body (RA) was identified. Nordic Owners group (NOG). Some potential short-

comings in the handling of hydrogen gas after a severe

accident have been identified and a will be corrected at the 1.4. National organisations

latest 2020 by installing increased venting in identified potential shortcomings. 1.4.1. Actions to be performed by the operators or

other national organisations

T3.LA.12 – Investigate the need for means to manage large The following section describes the status for each volumes of contaminated water measures related to the national organisation are given.

Completed for all NPPs. Plans on how to manage large T4.NA.1 – Processing the result from the evaluations of volumes are in place. the country-wide exercise focusing on a nuclear power

T3.LA.13 – Reassess personal safety issues plant accident – SAMÖ/KKÖ

Completed for all NPPs. This issue is handled within the The result has been processed.

framework of actions in response to the requirements of T4.NA.2 – Processing the result from the evaluations of the the new emergency regulations, SSMFS 2014: 2. performances of the national organisations throughout the

T3.LA.14 – Secure the accessibility of the emergency first month of the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP

control centre Findings related to responsibilities were handled within the

Completed for all NPPs. This issue is handled within the framework of the Action Plan “The Swedish preparedness

framework of actions in response to the requirements of for radiological and nuclear accidents” (2015). Internal

the new emergency regulations, SSMFS 2014: 2. development projects have been initiated at the involved

authorities to increase the ability to manage a nuclear T3.LA.15 – Set up action plans for support to local operators event. During 2016 – 2017 a working model following

Completed for all NPPs. This issue is handled within the guidelines for effective coordination (SOL) published by

framework of actions in response to the requirements of the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) has been

the new emergency regulations, SSMFS 2014: 2. implemented, exercised and evaluated with good results.

During this period, three different exercises were T3.LA.16 – Reassess the use of containment filtered conducted involving the County Administrative Boards venting system in the long-term that have the primary responsibility for protecting the

Completed for all NPPs. Investigations and assessments of public during a NPP accident.

the ability to manage a severe accident have been T4.NA.3 – Evaluation of the Swedish Defense Research performed by the licensees with different suggested Agency’s (FOI) role during a radiological or nuclear solutions. emergency

T3.LA.17 – Investigate long-term handling of the contain- The role of the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) ment chemistry has been evaluated as part of the evaluations mentioned

Completed for all NPPs. Investigations and assessments of above in T4.NA.2. The responsibilities of FOI during a

the ability to manage a severe accident have been radiological or nuclear emergency include field and

154 Progress on implementation and necessary technical and administrative measures

laboratory measurements and analysis (for example within 19.9.1.1. Actions identified in Sweden at a national level the framework of the national expert response organisation T5.LA.4 – It shall be investigated whether some of the led by SSM). FOI also gives advice to the Government of functions included in the emergency preparedness organi- Sweden and supports SSM with assessment and prognosis sation staffing are sufficient, to sustain shifts around the clock in radiological or nuclear emergencies. An investigation has been conducted and the number of T4.NA.4 – A country-wide exercise focusing on a nuclear persons to maintain permanent staffing around the clock in power plant accident – Havsörn 2013 case of emergency has been established for the roles in the emergency response organisation. The results have been The exercise included 33 organisations and was carried out incorporated in the emergency plan. in December 2013. The scenario included an event on the NPP Forsmark, in the County of Uppsala, that escalated to T5.LA.5 – Presently calling in personnel depends on a a discharge. The exercise included field measurements. functioning GSM/Telenet. An improvement in this area shall be investigated T4.NA.5 – The evaluation of the exercise finished with a final report from the evaluation team – Havsörn 2013 Handled within the update of the emergency plan in 2014.

The County Board of Uppsala has produced the final T5.LA.6 – Identify alternative evacuation routes. report evaluating the exercise. Alternative collection sites shall be decided upon and T4.NA.6 – Processing the result from the evaluations of incorporated in the licensee’s emergency plans These sites the country-wide exercise focusing on a nuclear power shall be communicated with the emergency planning at the plant accident – Havsörn 2013 county administration board. Handled within the framework of actions in response to the requirements of the new Most findings are handled within the framework of the emergency preparedness regulations, SSMFS 2014: 2. Action Plan “The Swedish preparedness for radiological and nuclear accidents” (2015). Various development T5.LA.7 – The Command Centre shall be connected to its projects have been initiated to increase the ability to own auxiliary power supply that is independent of the manage a nuclear event. For example, a table top (Assar) regular power supply at the plant site. was conducted in December 2014 as a follow-up to Auxiliary power is now in place for all the Command increase the ability to handle a nuclear accident. Centres.

T5.RA.1 – Up-dating and formalization of pre-defined

1.5. Emergency preparedness criteria on countermeasures and the implementation of and response and post-accident measurable operational intervention levels and routines for management (Off-site) application of intervention levels

SSM has performed a review of emergency planning

1.5.1. Actions to be performed by the licensees

zones. emergency planning distances and measures for The following section describes the status for each protection in consultation with the Swedish Civil Continmeasure related to Emergency preparedness and response gencies Agency (MSB), relevant county administrative and post-accident management performed by the Swedish boards and other competent authorities and stakeholders, licensees (LA). Further technical and administrative see SSM2017:27 Översyn av beredskapszoner. Proposal of measures needed are also described. new emergency planning zones are for pending by the T5.LA.1 – Clarify the responsibility for decontamination Swedish Government. stations outside the site for personnel during shift T5.RA.2 – SSM and the nuclear facilities are currently turnovers and how equipment is to be replaced working towards establishing a system for electronic Handled within the update of the emergency plan. transmission of plant data from the Swedish nuclear power

plants to SSM’s Emergency Response Centre. T5.LA.2 – Investigate the course of action during a long-term need for personnel The project is ongoing. There has been substantial

progress since 2014 and the project is implemented by the Handled within the update of the emergency plan. end of 2018. Development, education and training will T5.LA.3 – An investigation is suggested to ascertain advancontinue 2019. tages and disadvantages in replacing the present substitute T5.RA.3 – Implementation of the revised Swedish Command Centre with a suitable office outside the site regulation SSMFS 2008:15, Handled within the update of the emergency plan. SSM’s Regulations concerning Emergency Preparedness at 1.5.2. Actions to be performed by the regulators Certain Nuclear

The following section describes the status for each Facilities. Implemented. measures related to Emergency preparedness and response and post-accident management performed by the Swedish T5.RA.4 – The Nordic Flag Book

regulatory body (RA). In the last quarter of 2013 the “Nordic Flagbook”,

Progress on implementation and necessary technical and administrative measures 155

“Protective Measures in Early and Intermediate Phases of T6.RA.7 – Fulfilment of WENRA reference levels (RLs) a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency, Nordic Guidelines New requirements are planned to be in force partly at the and Recommendations”, was completed and approved by end of 2018 and finally 2020. the Director Generals of the Nordic Radiation Safety Authorities. The “Nordic Flagbook” has been translated into Swedish during 2014. See answer to T5.RA.1 for further information.

1.6. International cooperation

19.9.2. Actions to be performed by the licensees

The following section describes the status for each measure related to International cooperation performed by the Swedish licensees (LA). Further technical and administrative measures needed are also described. T6.LA.1 – Expanding the scope of WANO Peer Reviews Ongoing. T6.LA.2 – Expanding the frequency of WANO Peer Reviews Ongoing. T6.LA.3 – Developing a world-wide integrated event response strategy Ongoing.

1.6.1. Actions to be performed by the regulators

The following section describes the status for each measures related to International cooperation performed by the Swedish regulatory body (RA). T6.RA.1 – Accede to the 2004 Protocol to amend the Paris and Brussels Conventions on Third Party Liability in the field of nuclear energy Ongoing. T6.RA.2 – Assessment and improvement of international crisis communication and information dissemination The Swedish emergency preparedness guidelines have been updated. Sweden participates in WENRA and HERCA. T6.RA.3 – IRRS recommendation to SSM to establish and implement guidance for dissemination of all significant operating experience and lessons learned to all relevant authorized parties This is an ongoing process. T6.RA.4 – Actively participate in information exchange after the Fukushima accident – International organisations Ongoing. Sweden participates in relevant meetings and information exchange. T6.RA.5 – IRRS-recommendation: Better ensure compliance with relevant IAEA Standards Completed, the internal guidelines are updated and have been checked against IAEA guides and standards. This is also an important part of the on-going project to update regulations related to operating NPP:s. T6.RA.6 – More strategic coordination and follow-up of the work in the different IAEA Safety Standards Committees Ongoing.

156 Progress on implementation and necessary technical and administrative measures

Progress on implementation and necessary technical and administrative measures 157

Departementsserien 2019

Kronologisk förteckning Systematisk förteckning

1. Straffrättsliga åtgärder mot tillgreppsbrott och vissa

Arbetsmarknadsdepartementet

andra brott. Ju. Ny modell för statsbidrag till vissa ideella organisationer 2. Höjda åldersgränser i pensionssystemet och i andra inom brottsofferområdet. [7] trygghetssystem. S. Etableringsjobb. [13] 3. Tydligare regler vid konsumentavtal. Ju.

Försvarsdepartementet

4. Förslag till en nationell institution för mänskliga Värnkraft. Inriktningen av säkerhets-politiken och rättigheter i Sverige. Ku. utformningen av det militära försvaret 2021–2025. [8] 5. Passdatalag – en ny lag som kompletterar EU:s

Justitiedepartementet

dataskyddsförordning. Ju. Straffrättsliga åtgärder mot tillgreppsbrott och vissa 6. Lägre kapitalkrav för privata aktie- bolag. Ju. andra brott. [1]

7. Ny modell för statsbidrag till vissa ideella Tydligare regler vid konsumentavtal. [3] Passdatalag – organisationer inom brottsofferområdet. A. en ny lag som kompletterar EU:s dataskyddsförordning. [5]

8. Värnkraft. Inriktningen av säkerhets-politiken och Lägre kapitalkrav för privata aktiebolag. [6] utformningen av det militära försvaret 2021–2025. Fö. En effektivare handläggning av ärende om överförande 9. En effektivare handläggning av ärende om av straffverkställighet. [9] överförande av straffverkställighet. Ju. Ett förbud mot spridning av bilder från rättegångar. [10] 10. Ett förbud mot spridning av bilder från rättegångar. Ju. Kompletteringar till nya EU-regler om aktieägares 11. Översyn av vissa bestämmelser om tullfrihet. UD. rättigheter. [12]

12. Kompletteringar till nya EU-regler om aktieägares En strängare syn på vapenbrott och smuggling av vapen rättigheter. Ju. och explosiva varor. [14]

13. Etableringsjobb. A.

Kulturdepartementet

14. En stängare syn på vapenbrott och smuggling Förslag till en nationell institution för mänskliga av vapen och explosiva varor. Ju. rättigheter i Sverige. [4]

15. Långsiktighet och stadga i arbetet framåt Långsiktighet och stadga i arbetet framåt – en myndighet – en myndighet för romska frågor. Ku. för romska frågor. [15]

16. Sweden’s Eighth National Report under the

Miljödepartementet

Convention on Nuclear Safety. Sweden’s Sweden’s Eighth National Report under the Convention Implementation of the Obligations of the on Nuclear Safety. Sweden’s Implementation of the Convention M. Obligations of the Convention [16]

Socialdepartementet

Höjda åldersgränser i pensionssystemet och i andra trygghetssystem. [2]

Utrikesdepartementet

Översyn av vissa bestämmelser om tullfrihet. [11]

158 Departementsserien 2019

Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention 159

160 Compliance with Articles 4 –19 of the Convention